

Old ways in the New Days?
How the 1965/66 massacres are covered in the
Indonesian press today



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Abstract

More than half a million people were killed in a series of massacres in Indonesia from October, 1965 to March, 1966. These events were followed by 32 years of authoritarian rule with state propaganda and strict media control hindering public debate. This analysis looks at the coverage of these massacres in the Indonesian press today, to reveal to what degree it is influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. The analysis shows that the coverage is hampered by formal and informal restrictions which primarily encourage Indonesian press workers to self-restrain from investigative reporting into so-called sensitive issues, such as the 1965/66 massacres. The ownership structures in the media sector are particularly influencing independent reporting, as the powerful political elite are significant shareholders of major media conglomerates. Practices and traditions from the New Order era still remain in today's news rooms and are also contributing factors to self-censorship, and a lack of professionalism and ethical standards serve to sustain these practices. The Indonesian press are today critiquing the authorities without significant fears of repercussions by state institutions, but has still not yet fully embraced their role as a 'watchdog'. A mission to contribute to developing the nation seems to be deemed equally important, in line with the traditions of development journalism and the *Pancasila* philosophy.

Sammendrag

Flere enn en halv million mennesker ble drept i en serie massakre i Indonesia mellom oktober 1965 og mars 1966. Deretter fulgte 32 år med et autoritært regime med statlig propaganda og streng mediekontroll som hindret offentlig debatt. Denne analysen ser på deknningen av disse massakrene i dagens indonesiske presse for å avdekke i hvilken grad den er påvirket av eksterne restriksjoner og selvsensur. Analysen viser at formelle og uformelle restriksjoner begrenser deknningen da disse i all hovedsak oppfordrer til selvsensur og fører til mindre undersøkende journalistikk på områder som 1965/66 massakrene. Eierskapsstrukturene innen mediesektoren står særlig i veien for uavhengig journalistikk i Indonesia, ettersom den politiske eliten er eiere av store mediekonglomerater. Tradisjoner og journalistisk praksis fra tiden under militærstyret er fortsatt i stor grad gjeldene og bidrar også til selvsensur, og manglende profesjonalitet og etiske normer gjør at denne praksisen opprettholdes. Indonesisk presse kritiserer myndighetene uten i særlig grad å frykte følger fra statlige institusjoner, men har fortsatt til gode å fungere fullt ut som 'vaktbikkje', og er i tillegg opptatt å bidra til sosial utvikling i tråd med tradisjoner som utviklingsjournalistikk og *Pancasila*-filosofien.

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Preface

‘Sometimes we need our gangsters to get things done’. This was said by the former vice president of the Republic of Indonesiaⁱ and the chairman of the country’s branch of one of the world’s largest humanitarian organizations. The occasion was a celebration of a para-military youth organization claimed to be part of mass-killings in the 1960s, which are considered to be one of the world’s worst massacres in the 20th centuryⁱⁱ. The speech became part of a documentary which I watched in the Saga movie theatre in Oslo, whilst thinking of the several times I had met with the man on the screen on various humanitarian issues whilst working in the country in 2012. Affected by the disturbing content of the documentary, where self-proclaimed executioners re-enact their murders from the sixties, I wondered if these words said by a leader of a humanitarian organization and a candidate considered for the 2014 presidential elections, had led to any discussions in the Indonesian public. I searched online, but could not find any immediate evidence that it had. The documentary suggests that the perpetrators from 1965/66 are considered by many as national heroes for their actions, which allegedly saved the nation from falling into the hands of communists. I started to wonder if these were the views of the Indonesians I know. And I reflected upon the fact that I had heard remarkably little mention of the massacres, considering the magnitude of the events. How well are these brutalities of the past known by the Indonesians themselves? Following these events the country entered into a dictatorship with strict media control, which ended in 1998. Have these events from the sixties been a topic of public discussion after the democratization? Or has there been – and perhaps still is – reluctance to voice opinions publicly about these issues? In search of answers I got in touch with an Indonesian friend who replied by saying that he had a family story to share, which he had just learned of himself. I was compelled to learn more, about his personal story and about the journalistic space for public discussions on the 1965/66 massacres in today’s Indonesia. The topic for my master thesis was then decided.

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Introduction

More than half a million people were killed in a series of massacres from October, 1965 to March, 1966 in Indonesia. Exactly how many died is still uncertain as there were few records of the events as they took place and the numbers vary between half a million and two million people (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009:296.). The victims were mainly members of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), which until then had been the largest communist party in the non-communist world and appeared well-placed to come to power after the departure of the president at the time. The massacres followed an attempted coup d'état, which PKI was accused of orchestrating, and paved the way for the accession to power of Major General Suharto and his New Order regime. Suharto's authoritarian rule lasted until 1998, during which the propagated official line was that the purge of communists was necessary to avoid communist influence (Roosa, 2006:5-7).

To date, there have been no judicial prosecutions, official apologies, compensation offered to the victims or other forms of reconciliation. Even after the democratization of the country, there seems to have been little public debate on the issue. In 2012, two events happened that can be said to have influenced the in-country conversation about the massacres. Firstly, a report after the first official inquiry into the events concluded that the events met all the criteria of a gross violation of human rightsⁱⁱⁱ, and several recommendations were provided for government follow-up. Secondly, the documentary *The Act of Killing* by Canadian-American Joshua Oppenheimer was released, which is a British-Norwegian-Danish co-production with financial contributions from, amongst others, the Freedom of Expression Foundation Oslo. The documentary gives the viewer insight from the perspectives of the perpetrators, who re-enact the killings they committed in the 1960s. The entire Indonesian production crew chose to remain anonymous due to fear of reprisals after the movie's release. The film was offered for free via the internet^{iv}, and several public screenings led to protests and violence, and some screenings were thus banned from taking place.

These events indicate that the 1965/66 massacres still stand as unresolved and appear to be a relevant issue even today, nearly fifty years after the events took place. Sixteen years has passed since the end of the authoritarian military regime and the strict censorship and media control (Hill, 2007:11). Why has there been little public debate on the issue after democratization? What are the conditions for openly discussing the massacres after almost half a century of silence? What is the content of the public debate in today's Indonesian press?

The research question for the master thesis is:

How do Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 massacres today, and to what degree is the coverage influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship?

To help me answer the research question I developed the following assisting questions:

1. What are the issues raised in articles relating to the 1965/66 massacres in the newspapers *Kompas*, *The Jakarta Post* and *The Jakarta Globe*, and what are the perceptions identified in the articles of communists, the Indonesian government, politicians, the military and radical religious groups?
2. To what degree do Indonesian journalists experience formal or informal restrictions in covering the 1965/66 massacres?

Thesis structure

I will start this thesis by presenting the backdrop for the 1965/66 massacres and the political situation leading up to the establishment of the New Order regime. I will look at the situation during the New Order period, focusing particularly on the state propaganda and the conditions for the press. Thereafter I will look at the political situation post-New Order with emphasis on freedom of speech and its limitations in the legal framework and the conditions for the press in today's Indonesia, particularly with regards to ownership structures.

In chapter 2, I will reflect on the relevant theory of free speech, the relationship between the government and the press, as well as propaganda, including censorship and particularly focus on self-censorship.

Chapter 3 will present information on how I selected the data material and the methods used for the analysis, and I will also use this chapter to critically reflect on possible limitations in the material that may affect the outcome of the analysis.

On the basis of the above mentioned elements in the first three chapters, chapter 4 will interpret the collected data material and seek to find answers to my research questions, and in chapter 5 I will draw my conclusions. Lastly, I will present a bibliography of the literature and documents used and referred to in this thesis.

1. Background

In the following I will give an overview of some of the main political developments in Indonesia from 1965 to the present day, focusing on their influence on the media. This to provide a better understanding of the circumstances in which the 1965/66 massacres took place as well as a history of the press in Indonesia. Thereafter I will present a brief status of freedom of speech and the legal restrictions in Indonesia in more recent years as a backdrop for the following analysis

1.1 Entering the New Order regime

There are various versions about what actually happened and who were behind the events leading up to the massacres and the following 32 years of authoritarian military rule in Indonesia. On October 1st, 1965, six army generals and a lieutenant were kidnapped and killed in Jakarta. Those responsible called themselves the September 30th Movement and stated that their aim was to protect the president from right-wing army generals who were plotting a coup d'état. Hundreds of soldiers belonging to the Movement occupied the central square of the capital city in a show of strength. General Suharto took command of the Indonesian Army and launched an immediate counterattack and sent all the rebel troops fleeing within few days (Roosa, 2006:5).

The situation was used by Suharto as a pretext for delegitimizing the sitting president and seizing power. He blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) of initiating and organizing the Movement, and claimed that it was an attempted start of 'a massive, ruthless offensive by the PKI against all non-communist forces and an opening salvo for a social revolt' (Roosa, 2006:5-7). To prevent this from happening, Suharto instigated a severe and brutal anti-communist repression, and more than half a million people were killed between October, 1965 and March, 1966.

PKI's role in the September 30th Movement is today highly controversial, and many historians find it unconvincing. They especially question the motivation for the PKI to go to such an extreme at a time when they appeared to be well-placed to take over power legitimately (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009:296). To fully know what happened is however difficult as 'nearly all the personal testimonies and written records from late 1965 onward seem intended to misdirect, obfuscate, or deceive' (Roosa, 2006:7).

1.2 The New Order regime 1966 - 1998

In an atmosphere of national emergency Suharto established himself as the de facto president in March, 1966 and the original legal legislation authorized him to 'restore order'. That was an emergency order, but Suharto decided that the exception of 1965 was permanent, and the military operation remained in force until the end of his regime. He sustained the 'latent threat of communism', which was the very foundation of and justification for his regime (Roosa, 2006: 13). He presented himself as the saviour of the nation for defeating the communists. His regime incessantly drilled the event into the minds of the populace by every possible method of state propaganda: textbooks, monuments, street names, films, museums, commemorative rituals and national holidays. Under Suharto anti-communism became the state religion, complete with sacred sites, rituals and dates. The site of the murder of the seven army officers became holy ground where a monument of seven life-size bronze statues of the deceased officers stands. This has become a common field-visit by school children. Every 30th September, all TV-stations were required to broadcast a film commissioned by the government named *The Treason of the September 30th Movement / PKI* (1984). This four-hour film about the kidnapping and killing of the seven army officers in Jakarta became mandatory annual viewing for all schoolchildren.

1.2.1 The press in New Order Indonesia

Within a week of Suharto's seizing power, the press was under complete military control. The press was immediately used to spread anti-PKI propaganda. One story described how PKI members had tortured, mutilated, and castrated the captured generals. These stories have been shown to be false, but the propaganda spread through newspapers and radio stations are claimed to have added fuel to the fire and contribute to an escalating situation and mob mentality amongst the population during the massacres (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009: 292, Roosa 2006: 63).

Within a short period of time after the new regime was established, approximately one-third of the country's newspapers were shut down. For the survivors, Suharto put into place 'an intricate, if chaotic, web of security restrictions and draconian legislation' to control what was published in the press (Hill, 2007:11).

The decade prior to the New Order were characterized by 'a vibrant, often caustically partisan press, organized along party lines, technologically and financially impoverished but richly committed to stimulating public debate and mobilising public opinion, even if this brought it

into direct conflict with government policies' (Hill, 2007; 14). In the fifties Suharto's predecessor made the press responsible for mobilizing public opinion and dubbed the press the 'tool of the revolution' (ibid).

The New Order government was more moderate in its call to the media industry and claimed that the role of journalism was 'to safeguard national security against internal and external threats' and to be the 'guardian of the *Pancasila*' (Hill, 2007: 15). The *Pancasila* is the five ideological principles of the nation, which were initially introduced by then president Sukarno but re-interpreted and given the following meaning by the New Order government: 'Belief in 1) the one and only God 2) a just and civilized humanity 3) the unity of Indonesia 4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives 5) social justice for all Indonesian people' (Hill, 2007: 15 footnote 5). In this way, Suharto's government sought to ensure that the press were answerable ultimately to the government.

From 1966 to 1995 there was massive growth in the Indonesian economy, which was referred to by the World Bank as 'The East Asian Economic Miracle' (Baker et al, 1999: 4). This had a great effect on the press. The Indonesian middle class grew and had more purchasing power and the newspapers became more popular with advertisers. In addition, the press' new political independence led to broader circulation amongst the readers. In the 1980s and 90s the Indonesian press industry transformed dramatically, and there was substantial media expansion. While pursuing commercial success, the Indonesian press was declared by New Order to be 'free but responsible' in contrast to the implied irresponsibility of liberal, western newspapers. The media that survived the bans of the 1970s generally reached an accommodation with the government. Most media organizations proved to be sufficiently 'self-regulating' and there were thus few banning orders in the 1980s and 1990s (Hill, 2007: 51).

1.3 Post New Order Indonesia

Three decades of authoritarian rule under President Suharto ended in 1998 with a weak economy, hyper-inflation, political instability and an uncertain future for Indonesia. Many believed that poor information available in the media led to the significant consequences of the financial crisis of 1997. Censorship inflicted by the government, but also the generally poor quality of journalism, were said to be reasons for the lack of preparedness for the potential risks. Problems were claimed to be hidden from the public view and thus inhibited intelligent risk analysis. People did therefore not have an accurate understating of how

radically conditions had changed. The consequences were that the ideals of the *Pancasila* press were ignored with focus moving to the importance of improving both press freedom and the press' function as a 'watchdog' (Romano 2003:48).

The Governments' poor handling of the financial crisis led to protests and student demonstrations and, in the final stage, to the demand for president Suharto's departure (Baker et al, 1999: 5). In May of 1998, Suharto stepped down and left the presidency to B.J. Habibie. The end of the dictatorship was accompanied by an immediate increase in freedom to publish facts and opinions. While some journalists published serious analyses and investigations of socio-political issues, others published sensationalist mixes of fact, speculation and rumour (Romano 2003: 65). The press thus saw a need to increase professionalism and ethical standards and the *Kode Etik Wartawan Indonesian* (Indonesian Journalists' Code of Ethics) was created. This is an umbrella code, which all associations accept in addition to their individual codes. One aim of the unified code was to reduce the potential of future governments to claim that state regulation or corporatized statuses are necessary to standardise industry ethics and practices (Romano2003: 66-67).

Suharto's removal paved the way for Indonesia to transform into a democratic nation. Amongst the numerous reforms undertaken (*Reformasi*) was a decentralization process and the empowerment of power of regional councils through devolution. Sixteen years after the end of Suharto's dictatorship and five presidencies later, Indonesia is today recognized as a democracy with a strong economy, and the country is amongst the leading nations in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the 2014 presidential elections, Indonesians chose Jakarta governor Joko Widodo from the Great Indonesian Movement Party (PDI-P), a candidate considered more independent of the political and military establishment than his opponents, and his presidency is claimed by many to represent a new and positive direction for Indonesia^v.

1.3.1 Freedom of speech and legal regulations

Freedom of speech in Indonesia is guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution, which was reaffirmed in 2002. Chapter 10, Article 28F states^{vi}:

Every person shall have the right to communicate and to obtain information for the purpose of the development of his/her self and social environment, and shall have the right

to seek, obtain, possess, store, process and convey information by employing all available types of channels

Reporters Without Borders ranked Indonesia as number 139 out of 178 countries on their last Press Freedom Index^{vii}. In the current situation foreign journalists are not authorized to travel to the restive provinces of Papua and West Papua without special permission. In addition, reporters sometimes face violence and intimidation, which in many cases goes unpunished. The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AIJ) recorded 56 cases of violence against journalists in 2012, in addition to 12 separate incidents against journalists in Papua alone^{viii}.

There are also a number of legal and regulatory restrictions. Legislation that restricts the freedom of expression includes the Defamation Laws. These fall under the jurisdiction of the Penal Code where defamation is defined as ‘written or oral communication that is against the will of the affected party and that they may find offensive’^{ix}. The frequent use of these laws is claimed by some to encourage self-censorship in the coverage of sensitive subjects.

Additional concerns have arisen with recent legislation such as the Informational Technology Crime Bill and the Anti-Pornography Law, both introduced in 2008. These are accused of giving broad and sweeping power to the authorities to censor the web^x and containing vague wording and can be misused^{xi}.

In 2013, the Law on Mass Organizations was passed which allows the government greater control over public activities, including the power to disband an organization deemed a threat to the state. The NGOs are specifically forbidden from espousing ‘anti-*Pancasila*’ creeds including atheism, communism, and Marxist-Leninism. Critics of the law claim that it infringes upon the rights to freedom of association, religion and expression (in the article *Freedom under grave threat* in *The Jakarta Post*, July 3rd, 2013)

The legal framework for authorized censorship said to be vague and broad and thus open to undue misinterpretations^{xii}. Until 2010 Indonesia kept in active use a law on book-banning which was first introduced under the Law on Printed Materials Pacification. This was a widely used tool to censor publications that could disrupt public order, particularly concerning the 20th century political turmoil. In 2006, a total of thirteen high school history books were banned from publication because they failed to mention the role of the Indonesian Communist Party in the kidnapping and assassination of army generals in the September 1965 Movement. Books may still be banned by lower courts or under the Anti-Pornography and Anti-

Blasphemy Laws. Films can be censored by the Film Censorship Institute which is a Government-supervised institution, and between 2006 and 2009 four documentary films were banned because all were about Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.

1.3.2 Media ownership

Reforms that followed the fall of the Suharto regime resulted in a more healthy media environment in Indonesia. However, the liberalization of the information market did not significantly alter media ownership. New investors in the media industry have included members of a web of political, well-connected business people that surrounded former President Suharto's family and friends, or heads of conglomerates who have strong ties with powerful officials. The ruling elite have built up large portfolios of shareholdings in media companies. According to a study published jointly by the Ford Foundation and the Participatory Media Lab at Arizona State University in 2011^{xiii}, twelve media groups owned a hundred percent of the national commercial television shares and five out of six newspapers with the highest circulation, as well as all four of the most popular online news media, a majority of flagship entertainment radio networks, and a significant portion of the major local television networks. Most of these are involved also in non-media related businesses and have strong commercial interests and power. Amongst them are veteran players with relative political autonomy, but also those with obvious political ties. Media Group is, for instance, owned by the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the former ruling party Golkar; Bakrie & Brothers is owned by the Chairman of the Golkar party; Trans Corpora (Trans TV and Trans 7) is owned by a close ally of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the owner of the MNC Group is known for his close relations with major political players. This will be further elaborated on and discussed under the analysis in chapter 4.

1.4 Concluding remarks

In the above I have presented background information to set the scene and establish a context relevant for the analysis under chapter 1. I found it necessary to present the political situation in the 1960s as the pretext for the massacres and highlight some of the political developments until today and what it has meant for the press. Worth mentioning is that Indonesia was in a state of emergency at the time when the massacres took place in 1965/66. General Suharto seized power after an attempted coup d'état allegedly orchestrated by the communist party, and the state of emergency was extended until the end of his reign in 1998. One third of news media were shut down in the sixties, and the remaining were used to spread propaganda and

placed under strict government control. As the country's financial situation changed in the 80s and 90s, so did the media industry; its formal freedom was expanded. However, the media was self-regulatory and still closely tied with the political establishment through ownership structures. These ownership structures remain, but the game still changed as the authoritarian rule ended, and democracy was established. The media used its new freedom, and the question is what the status is today on how freely the media can report on topics sensitive to the authorities.

2. Theory

The analysis for this thesis aim to reveal how the Indonesian press covers the 1965/66 massacres today and if the coverage is influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. The question is rather broad and thus I will in the following present also a broad spectre of theory that I find relevant for the analysis.

Indonesia has since the end of the New Order transformed into a democracy and whether it is still in an emerging or transitional phase is debated and some will claim that the country is not yet comparable to western democracies in ensuring human rights to its citizens and with it freedom of speech. I will for this thesis understand Indonesia as a transitional democracy. I will in the following discuss the press in transitional democracies and whether there are differences in the role of the press in transitional and well-established democracies. In this chapter, I will present theory with basis in the western media tradition which might be argued to be more applicable to established democracies than to the Indonesian context, which I will reflect on successively. I presume however that the below theory is of relevance as basis for the analysis under chapter 4 and can provide a broader insight relating to the research question for this thesis.

Looking at the development and transformation from the dictatorship to the current democracy in Indonesia, I find it relevant to present propaganda theory. In the background chapter, I described how the press was used to propagate a certain version about the circumstances under which the massacres took place. The complexity of the events and various sides to the story were moulded into a simple narrative about evil versus good, which placed the ruling government in a good light. Details that did not fit well into this narrative were left out and conflicting versions were silenced. As I will argue for below, censorship is for this thesis included as a propaganda technique. Censorship will be emphasized in the following, as my analysis aim to reveal if and how the press workers in Indonesia experience

restrictions on their freedom to report, either directly or indirectly by being encouraged to self-censor. Self-censorship and its causes will be a central part of this theoretical presentation. As an underlying theme for this thesis, freedom of speech theory will also be touched upon in the following, particularly relating to its limitations.

2.1 The press in transitional democracies

The most universally endorsed ideal characteristics of the media are freedom and independence (Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:6). When developing their for-mentioned annual, world-wide Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders measure these characteristics. As do Freedom House for their annual survey which looks at the degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information considering the legal, political, and economic environments. The normative functions of the media are often based on the characteristics of representative or liberal democracies. These include as mentioned above for the press to serve as a channel for public expression and a forum for public debate, as a space for developing ideas and the mind of the individual and encouraging participation in political processes, as well as to function as a ‘watch dog’ and a guardian against the abuse of power^{xiv}. Thus, transforming the media into fully democratic institutions is a challenging task for several reasons. One of them is that the relationship between the media is highly ambivalent. Also, the media institutions will still retain elements of the logic and constraints of their predecessors and the journalists will still hold values that are rooted in their professional life under the old regime (Voltmer and Rowsley, 2009 in Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:6.) The guarantee of freedom of speech is usually undisputed constitutionally in transitional democracies and has been implemented in virtually all (ibid). In emerging democracies the function of the press is most often assumed to be the same as in established democracies, where the main function is said to be to hold the government and political elites accountable (Voltmer, 2006a, Scammel and Semtko, 2000a, Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990 in (Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:6-7). The role of the press as the ‘forth estate’ or ‘watchdog’ means that they serve as a means for voters to make decisions by disseminating information about government actions. This understanding of the press’s role is strongly rooted in the liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism. Emerging democracies are however also claimed to develop unique types of media systems that differ significantly from the above, and according to McConnell and Becker, 2002) ‘journalistic professionalism is argued to be embedded in the wider cultural traditions of a given country and to reflect the needs and expectations of audiences’ (Jebril, Stetka and Loweless, 2013:7). This creates

several – and larger – gaps between the ‘ideal’ and the reality of journalism than in established democracies.

Indonesia is a consensus-oriented culture, in which the president is traditionally seen as the ultimate father-figure of the national family. Under the New Order era, the Indonesian press was as mentioned in chapter 1 supposed to be ‘free and responsible’. According to Steele (2005: 94) press freedom under the New Order was understood to mean freedom to ‘assist the state in carrying out programs for social and economic development’. This is significantly different than the western concept of press freedom which emphasizes freedom *from* government control. Being ‘responsible’ meant avoiding “anything that was likely to inflame ethnic, religious, racial, or group (class) tensions’ (ibid). The Indonesian Press Council’s 1974 guidelines said on this basis that the responsibility of the press was to ‘hold high the national consensus’ and to cooperate with community and government in a manner ‘inspired by the family’ (Romano 2003:44). This is in line with the *Pancasila* philosophy as described in chapter 1. *Kompas* reporter Ratih Hardjono wrote in 1998 that the controlling word for journalists remain ‘responsibility’, which means to protect what government ministers or officials think is best for the nation or their careers^{xv}. In a survey of 65 Indonesian journalists in 2003, Angela Romano found that the majority of the journalists saw no contradiction between the role of a *Pancasila* journalist and the role as a ‘watchdog’ (Romano, 2003: 57). What the interviewed journalists did however object to was the aggressiveness in the way that the ‘watchdog’ role was conducted in western journalism (ibid). The findings of a nation-wide survey among 600 Indonesian journalists conducted by Pintak and Setiyono (2010) support this. According to their analysis, Indonesian journalists have not yet fully embraced the role as a ‘watchdog’, even if most reject the ‘government-mouthpiece media functions’ under the New Order period. ‘The echo of the development journalism model that prevailed in the Suharto years can be seen in the top priorities of Indonesian journalists’ (Pintak and Setiyono, 2010: 1).

I will in the following, as mentioned, present research and theory with basis in western media tradition which may be argued to be more applicable for the situations in established democracies different to the Indonesian context. Their relevance will therefore be discussed successively with the traditions of the ‘responsible’ *Pancasila* journalist in mind.

2.2 Freedom of speech – the term and its justifications

According to the philosopher, Isaiah Berlin, there is a distinction between two concepts of freedom; negative and positive. Negative freedom means that one has freedom from constraints. Positive freedom is, on the other hand, ‘the freedom to actually achieve what you want to do’ (Warburton 2009:7). There are two kinds of ethical systems used to justify freedom of speech. According to a utilitarian approach, freedom of expression is required as a means or ‘instruments’ towards other ends. Preserving free speech ‘produces tangible benefits of some kind’ (Warburton 2009: 16). Free speech is for example said to promote the public debate necessary for democracy to function efficiently. Citizens need to be exposed to a range of ideas to be able to make good judgments. Free speech allows citizens to be informed about a variety of views by people who strongly believe in them. The focus here is, in other words, on consequences, and these arguments are thus dependent upon empirical verification of argued consequences. If the supposedly beneficial consequences of free speech for the individual or society turn out not to follow, then justification for free speech evaporates (ibid).

A non-consequentialist or deontological view, on the other hand, does not depend upon confirmation of predicted consequences of preserving freedom of expression. According to this approach arguments are based on a notion of a built-in value of free speech and its connection with a concept of human dignity (Warburton 2009: 16). Preventing people from speaking their views, or listening to others’ views, would be failing to respect them as individuals capable of thinking and deciding for themselves, and thus simply wrong (Warburton 2009: 17)

Dahl (1999) states that the demand for freedom of speech lies in this double reasoning: Freedom of speech as an individual right and freedom of speech as a means to create a well-functioning society (Dahl, 1999: 10).

2.2.1 Freedom of speech and the press

Freedom of speech entails not only a right to speak, but a right to speak in public. This means there must be channels through which one can publicly voice one’s opinion. Press freedom is thus sometimes used as a synonym to freedom of speech. The press does have a double function. It is to be a channel for information and opinions, but the press also has a positive obligation to ensure that the freedom of speech is used. Freedom of speech is protected only through being used (Dahl, 1999: 11). This obligation, which is in the form of an unwritten

contract between the media and society, also entails that the information presented through the press is relevant, balanced and well-funded. Diversity of opinion must be reflected upon and the depth of expression ensured (ibid).

2.2.2 Limitations to freedom of speech

Defenders of freedom of expression almost without exception recognize the need for some limits to the freedom they advocate. In practice, the right to freedom of speech is not absolute in any country and the right is commonly subject to limitations. There are often legal regulations when it comes to libel, defamation and national security matters, as well as hateful or racist expressions or blasphemy. The latter three are often more of a grey zone in legal frameworks in the western world and thus more related to ethics than law. In some Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, in particular blasphemy is often well-regulated by law. Under the analysis in chapter 4 formal restrictions in the Indonesian legal framework, such as blasphemy laws, will be discussed. However, the main part of my analysis will focus more on looking into whether there are informal limitations through external influences and internal considerations for the press to self-censor on the issue of the 1965/66 events.

2.3 A propaganda model

In *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky (1988) introduce a propaganda model which draws on Marxist ideology to explain the complex dynamics of politics, media and the corporate world. In this model they state that there is an institutional bias in the commercial news media that guarantees the mobilization of certain propaganda campaigns on behalf of elite consensus, thus this system is far more credible and effective in putting over a patriotic agenda than one based on official censorship. The propaganda model describes five editorially-distorting filters applied to news reporting in mass media: 1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income-source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) the use of official and elite-based "flak" as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) "anti-communism" as a national religion and control mechanism (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:29). These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 2)

The Propaganda Model is a model developed for western media and above all related to the American context. Thus, there is a question to how well it does fit with the Indonesian reality. The ‘anti-communism’ filter can however be argued to be very relevant for the context in Indonesia, despite that it was developed with the Cold War situation in mind. During the Cold War, the ideology of anti-communism was a form of control mechanism which provided journalists with a pre-defined understanding of global events and political elites with a rhetorical tool to criticize anyone who questioned government decisions as unpatriotic. Revolutions in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba as well as well-publicized abuses of communist states had led to a strong opposition to communism in Western ideology and politics when *Manufacturing Consent* was published in 1988. According to Herman and Chomsky there is a lack of demand for evidence to support the claims of abuses by communists ‘when anti-communist fever is aroused’ and ‘defectors, informers and assorted other opportunists move to centre stage as experts where they remain even after being exposed as highly unreliable, if not downright liars’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988:30).

It has been questioned whether the anti-communism filter in the Propaganda Model have lost its relevance in western media in the post-Cold War period. Dimaggio (2009:14) claims however that the anti-socialist and anti-communist continue to be a mainstay of media commentary, but adds that the filter can be interpreted to also include anti-terrorism as another means of silencing criticism. For the Indonesian context, Dimaggio’s first point is seems to be descriptive of the situation. As presented in chapter 1 the propagated narrative in New Order was that the communists orchestrated the alleged coup d’etat and the massive repercussions that followed saved the nation from a communist takeover that would have destroyed the nation. Suharto’s rule was based around communism as ‘evil’ and massive state propaganda ensured a shared understanding of communism as the common enemy (Hill, 2007:16). To what extent this is still the conception of the ideology and if this filter is in fact a contributing means to limiting the debate around the 1965/66 massacres, will be part of the analysis in chapter 4.

Another filter that I will argue is relevant for the Indonesian context is ‘the size, ownership and profit orientation of mass media’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988:3). Their common interests with government as well as other major business actors may present a challenge to the press role as a ‘fourth estate’. Direct interventions or more indirect influence on editorial decisions by media owners may be contributing reasons for why some stories are never told. Selecting and rewarding journalists may for instance be done according to what extent they are

considered challenging to elite interests and career prospects may be reasons for journalists and editors to self-censor (Robinson in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 98). Concentration of ownership was encouraged by both the state and market forces as early as 1975 (Dhakidae, 1991: 283) and ownership of the media groups was concentrated' in the hands of a powerful few from the ruling elite who controlled the flow of news' (Tapsell in Asian Review Studies June 2012: 232). Major media organizations diversified their business interests to other industries (Hill, 2007:81-110), a legacy that, according to Tapsell, has continued also after the end of the New Order era (Asian Review Studies June 2012: 232). These aspects will be discussed in the analysis in chapter 4.

Herman and Chomsky's five filters represent the means by which propagandistic messages are conveyed by media and not the crux of what constitutes propaganda. Below I will look at the meaning of the term propaganda and present theory on censorship as one of the propaganda techniques.

2.4 Propaganda – The term

There are numerous definitions of propaganda. A definition much referred to is by Jowett and O'Donnell (1999): 'Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist' (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012: 7).

This definition emphasizes that propaganda is seeking to achieve to either 'rouse an audience to certain ends and usually resulting in significant change, or to render an audience passive, accepting and non-challenging' (Szanto in Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012: 17).

Propaganda can be separated into white, grey, or black propaganda. White propaganda comes from a known or identified source, and the information in the message tends to be accurate. Black propaganda includes lies, fabrications, and deceptions and occurs when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority. Grey propaganda is somewhere in-between the two. Whether the information is accurate is uncertain and the source may or may not be correctly identified (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2012: 17-20). Propaganda is sometimes referred to as disinformation. This is usually considered black propaganda and means 'false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group or country' (Shultz and Godson in Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012:24).

Propaganda does not necessarily need to be a negative and is, according to Jowett and O'Donnell (1999: 2-4), a neutral term and a description of a process for convincing someone of something. Propaganda can merely be considered within its context depending on who the source is, who the target is and what the aim is. Prior to the First World War propaganda was used to describe the means the promoters of a doctrine used to spread its message to their audiences. The term was however discredited in the 1930s as a result of the procedures of the Nazis. Today the term propaganda is viewed as negative and should be avoided in society as it can cause significant damage. However, in times of conflict and crisis it is considered more legitimate, particularly if the interests of one's nation are threatened. If the aim is, for instance, to liberate the nation from occupation, the threshold for accepting propaganda is higher.

Kempf (2002:166-169) claims that war propaganda is a separate kind of propaganda, which presents conflict in such a way as it supports military logic rather than the perspectives of a peaceful solution. In his opinion Military conflicts have low legitimacy and thus need to be portrayed as necessary. The intentions and justifications are idolized, and the actions seen as legitimate and rightful and the opponents' actions are denounced. Kempf's definition of war propaganda differs from Jowett and O'Donnell's as it is presented as an instrument of war rather than a something that can be neutral.

2.5 Propaganda, influence and information

A central dilemma in propaganda theory is to distinguish propaganda from other forms of communication. Propaganda may appear to be informative communication when ideas are shared, something is explained, or instruction takes place. Information communicated by the propagandist may appear to be indisputable and totally factual. The propagandist knows, however, that the purpose 'is not to promote mutual understanding but rather to promote his or her own objectives'. Thus, the propagandist will attempt to control information flow and manage a certain public's opinion by shaping perceptions through strategies of informative communication (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012: 45). The true purpose and the identity of the propagandist are likely to be concealed. There are many forms of information control, such as withholding information, releasing information at predetermined times, releasing information in juxtaposition to other information that may influence public perception, manufacturing information, communicating information to selected audiences and distorting information. There are two major ways for the propagandists to control information flow. One of these is to control the media as a source of information distribution. Another is to present distorted

information from what appears to be a credible source. The latter can be done by using journalists to infiltrate the media and spread disinformation (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2012. 46).

2.6 Propaganda techniques

There are many variations of categorizing propaganda techniques. Jowett and O'Donnell do not list an exhaustive overview but present some of the central techniques. Amongst these is the use of metaphors and images. The use of certain words and images can directly influence how some events are perceived by a population. Rhetoric may be used to explain certain events to create sympathy for the propagandist's position, and thus achieve or maintain support amongst the population. Metaphors or terms have also been used to downplay or disguise events. Ways of speaking from one discourse are used in another. Harming people has for instance been referred to by using the term 'mop up', which usually refers to cleaning. The medical term 'operation' serves as another example, which is often used to describe military actions. By using these metaphors the actions come across as less brutal (Eide 2003:2). Metaphors have been used to compare opponents to people with negative connotations, such as Hitler or Stalin. Quoting Philip Knightly (1975), Ottosen (1995) describes how an important element in war reporting is to demonize the enemy (Ottosen 1995:99). To invent or maintain an enemy image creates, according to Ottosen, expectations of inhuman, aggressive or hostile actions by those included in the enemy image. He defines an enemy image as a negative stereotypical description of a nation, state, religion, ideology, regime or state leader (Ottosen, 1994: 103).

2.6.1 Censorship

As mentioned above, the propagandist will attempt to control the information flow. One of the many ways to do so is withholding information. I will in what follows look at the issue of censorship. Censorship differs from the other propaganda techniques. Some claim that even if censorship often appears together with propaganda, censorship and propaganda are two different entities (Fosland 1993: 16-17). Others, such as Jowett and O'Donnell (2012), are of the opinion that censorship is a technique propagandists utilize. For this thesis I have chosen to organize my analysis around the latter understanding.

A definition of censorship sometimes referred to is 'the changing or the suppression or prohibition of speech or writing that is deemed subversive to the common good. It occurs in all manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modern times it has been of special importance in its relation to governments and the rule of law' (Encyclopædia Britannica

Online 2014). What ‘common good’ means to the authorities will vary. Censorship is however a means to seek to hinder utterances that will be understood as not in line with what is considered best for society at large.

When looking at the classical literature about freedom of speech, such as John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty* (1859), one may get the impression that the question of freedom of speech or censorship is a question of either/or. In practise, however, there are no necessarily clear lines between the two (Dahl, 1999: 26). Censorship has a long history and has appeared in different ways in different cultures. From the very beginning of writing, the established power players have found ways to impose bans and restrictions on writers. Throughout the 18th century it became continuously more difficult for the world’s regimes to explain or institutionalise censorship. This resulted in a more ‘hidden censorship’ over the last century. According to Michael Scammel, it is almost a global phenomenon that every time censorship is introduced the censors censor the word censorship (Dahl, 1999: 27-28). This can for instance be done through using euphemisms when naming the censorship authorities, such as, for example, South-Africa’s previous *Publications Appeal Board* or Indonesia’s *Law on Printed Materials Pacification* which was used to ban books. According to Dahl (1999:28), the term censorship in peace time is discredited in all languages.

In times of war or crisis, however, the situation may be another. In liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism, extensive literature says there is a consistency between the agendas of governments and media. Robinson (in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 97) refers to Glasgow University Media Group (1985); Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Bennett 1990; Bennett and Paletz 1994; Mermin 1999; Wolfsfeld 1997. This research suggest collectively that ‘media rarely report outside the bounds of what Daniel Hallin (1986) described as elite-legitimated controversy’ (Robinson in Allan and Zelizer, 2004: 97). Hallin found in that the media was less oppositional to the US policy during the Vietnam War than previously believed, and the media rarely, if ever, argued that the war was fundamentally wrong or immoral (ibid). Dahl (1999:28) claims the muse of freedom of the press and information is silenced when a war threatens or breaks out. He points to history and the legitimacy of censorship as a principal during both the First and Second World Wars. Journalists and editors were then active in the role not only as propagandists for their governments, but also as censors making sure that nothing unfortunate was revealed about their nations.

During more recent and current wars, such as the Gulf War and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many journalists seem to accept a lesser and more one-sided access to information. This has led to several media critical discussions around the issue of control and restrictions, however uncritical and biased reporting from war zones is still not uncommon in practise (Ottosen in Eide, 2004: 218). Norstedt and Ottosen (2000) have found that the nation's security policies and foreign political orientations still influence the national media discourse (Ottosen in Eide, 2004: 198).

The above describes the role of the press in traditional conflicts between nations according to the liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism. Thus, the relevance to the situation in Indonesia is not obvious and debatable. As presented in chapter 1, Indonesia was in a national crisis in 1965 with alleged coup d'état and a military emergency order. The emergency state was kept until the end of the New Order and the press was expected to be loyal to the government throughout Suharto's rule. This expectation for the press to be loyal towards the sitting government in its fight against a threat to the current state is highly relevant for the Indonesian context. It may be argued that the expected loyalty to the state by the 'responsible' *Pancasila* journalist may in parts resemble the approach of the media in times of conflict or crisis according to western media tradition. The loyalty expected by the 'responsible press' in Indonesia did however go beyond national security and in addition to restrictions to writing unfavourably about national unity, the military, and dissent in outer regions of the archipelago, the list also included the President's life or family business interest, the business activities of senior officials, or corruption or mismanagement stories with 'sensitive' political overtones (Romano, 2003:164-165). In this way, the mass media became 'the most important area of maintenance and reproduction of the New Order's legitimation' (Hill, 1994:60).

If there is still an expectation for the Indonesian press to be 'responsible' and avoid 'taboo topics' such as President Suharto's family, and racial or religious conflicts (SARA^{xvi}), will be discussed in the analysis in chapter 4. I will also present additional theory relating this under the following section about self-censorship.

2.7 Self-censorship

There is a distinction between when boundaries are drawn by an outside power about what to write or publish and when journalists and editors are not openly directed but choose themselves not to report or to ignore aspects of a story. The latter is referred to as self-

editorial censorship. In other words it is an act of knowingly excluding information or distorting or under-reporting information that could be of public interest. There is no widely accepted definition. According to McLaughlin (Ottosen, 2001: 223 – 224), self-censorship means that journalists or editors have information they choose not to publish. This may appear also when institutional control-mechanisms by the authorities are in place. Dahl (1999: 20) considers self-censorship to be a mechanism where the editor determines out of his or her own considerations what is to be published and what is not to be published. If all editors make the same decision about a specific case, then there is a situation where the self-censorship is part of the press corps as a whole and comes from internalized norms which concerns each actor as much as the communion.

Self-censorship is a universal challenge for critical journalism. In a special edition of *The Columbia Journalism Review* (May/June 2000) self-censorship is referred to as a ‘living reality’ and a survey showed that 25 per cent of the American journalists questioned for the survey revealed that they had not printed articles in order to avoid potential conflicts with their own editors or readers (Ottosen 2001: 224). In interviews following the survey, many shared that they avoided developing ideas that will lead to uncomfortable situations for themselves.

To choose what information to include and what to exclude is a central part of the journalistic profession. This decision-making process can potentially be influenced by various external factors and these may not always be obvious. Some of these are referred to in the paragraph above. The American journalists in the survey wanted to avoid conflicts with editors or readers or uncomfortable situations. Tapsell (in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:229) claims self-censorship occurs ‘when journalists limit or ignore aspects of a story because they fear repercussions for those with vested interests who are cited in their report’. A study by Mužíková, Chaaban, Salomon, & Lee (2013) explains that self-censorship is practised ‘in order to avoid trouble or sanctions from state officials, striking controversy, offending an audience, initiating lawsuits or other problematic consequences’. The latter definition suggests that the reasons for self-censorship can be many. Causes for self-censorship may also differ in various country contexts. A sensitive issue in one country may be openly discussed in another. In the analysis for this thesis I will look into the Indonesian context and self-censorship specifically relating the topic of the 1965/66 massacres. In this connection the tradition of the *Pancasila* journalist may be relevant to highlight. Journalists in Indonesia (and elsewhere in Asia) have been told by their officials that self-censorship is a ‘responsible’ function to ‘build and develop the nation’ (Romano, 2005: 4). The idea of responsibility evolved in the 1980s and 1990s as

developmental journalism, which was widely implemented in many Third World countries particularly in Asia. Steele (2011:96), claim some still advocate this and that there are members of the press in Indonesia that believe that ‘responsible journalists should filter or tone down reports about sensitive issues, arguing, for example, that it is better simply not to report inter-religious or ethnic violence’ (in Tapsell, *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:228). Whether this is supported by the findings in this thesis and if it applies to the issue of the 1965/66 massacres, will be discussed under the analysis in chapter 4.

Another potential cause for self-censorship relating the Indonesian context is the media ownership structures described under chapter 1. In their survey Pintak and Setiyono (2010:16) found that one-third of the 600 interviewed Indonesian journalists identified the ownership structures of the media as a threat to journalism. Tapsell concluded in his study that self-censorship is still evident in the Indonesian media and that it usually occurs when journalists believe ‘they must adhere to the owner’s agenda on certain stories, rather than report freely and comprehensively on all topics’ (in the *Asian Studies Review* June 2012: 241) According to Tapsell the control over the news flow has shifted from the government and military to ‘an oligarchic group of media owners political and business interests’ (in the *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:228). As described in chapter 1 of this thesis, business interests are often interlinked with political interests in Indonesia as many of the media owners are also high-level politicians or affiliated with the established political elite. Robinson and Hadiz (2004) questioned whether there in fact has been ‘a deeper social and political transition’ after the democratization and market reforms in Indonesia. This is supported by Tapsell (in the *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:228), who claims that the powerful ruling elite in Indonesia encourage self-censorship to limit criticism of its actions (ibid).

In previous years Indonesian journalists self-censored out of fears of repercussions by state institutions, and the question remains if members of the Indonesian press still self-restrain due to founded or unfounded fears of state interventions. Another means to encourage self-censorship can be broad and unclear formal restrictions on freedom of speech backed by government authority, which will also be discussed in the analysis in chapter 4.

In their propaganda model presented above, Herman and Chomsky (1988) refer to various news filters. One could argue that similar filters are at play in connection to self-censorship that effect at the level of the individual journalist. Filters such as reliance on information particularly from government sources, the orientation towards profit by journalists, flak, and

anti-communism as a national religion could all to some extent serve as explanations for self-censorship. This will be looked further into in the analysis.

As described in the section about censorship, other factors come into play in times of conflict and crisis. There are examples that the threshold for when journalists are uncomfortable to cover certain stories is particularly low in all situations that concern state security (Ottosen in Eide, 2004: 223). In the Nordic press journalists have in various periods of time avoided giving the audience insight into sensitive issues that concern the interests of the nation. Finnish journalists restrained themselves when dealing with the former Soviet Union and the Norwegian press was loyal to the workers' movement and avoided covering certain issues concerning state security. Self-censorship and conscious or unconscious self-restraints are according to Ottosen a well-documented and recognized problem in how the media deal with sensitive issues that concerns the interests of the nation (Eide, 2004: 223).

The above causes for self-censorship are by no means an exhaustive list and, as mentioned above, these causes may also differ in various country contexts. In the following analysis I will look into whether Indonesian journalists do self-censor with regards to the 1965/66 massacres and try to uncover the reasons why.

3. Selection and method

The research question for this thesis is: *How do Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 massacres today and to what degree is the coverage influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship?* To find the answer present some methodological challenges. Finding out about legal restrictions is easy enough. However, revealing the more informal restrictions and what influences the journalists to self-censor are more ambitious tasks. I will look into articles relating to the 1965 massacres to find out how this topic is covered in Indonesian press today. That will, however, merely provide me with parts of the answer to my research question. I also see to answer if the coverage is influenced by informal restrictions and self-censorship. I will thus need to find out *why* the topic is being covered the way it is, as well as to reveal what is *not* being printed and *why*. I therefore choose to conduct qualitative interviews in addition to analysing articles on the topic of the 1965/66 massacres. Some of the interview subjects are also the writers of some of the reference articles. However, my list of interviewees also include journalists who cover topics such as politics, human rights and defence issues, as well as a former journalist and current journalism professor and human rights activists and one of the co-producers of the documentary *The Act of Killing*.

In this chapter, I will present the reference articles and interviewees and the process of selecting them. The methods that will be used for the analysis will be presented and I will also look at how to evaluate qualitative research. In addition, I will critically reflect upon my selection process and choices and the limitations of the methods I use and the selected material. Finally I will consider the ethical aspects in the research process.

3.1 Material selection

In the following I will present my selected material and describe how it was collected and the considerations behind the decisions to choose the respective material.

3.1.1 Reference articles

To find out how the Indonesian press covers the massacres in 1965 today, I looked into articles related to this topic in three newspapers. These are the *Jakarta Post*, the *Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas*. The first two are English-language papers and the third is in Indonesian. I chose to include the latter, even though I do not speak the language, to see if there are any differences in the coverage between the English-language papers and the Indonesian-language *Kompas*. It also reaches out to a larger number of the population and has a more diverse group of readers, as well as having a longer history with its being one of the oldest newspapers in Indonesia. All three newspapers have online editions. I however chose to look at the coverage in the paper versions. Thus was I able also to calculate how much space each paper devoted to the story, where it was placed and look at other editorial priorities, which I think adds value to a comprehensive analysis. A more detailed presentation of the three papers follows in 3.2.2.

As I was interested to identify the press coverage of the 1965 massacres today, I chose to look at the time frame of September, 2013 to March, 2014. My assumption was that the nomination for an Academy Award for the documentary *The Act of Killing* and a possible award would lead to an increased number of articles about the 1965 massacres in the Indonesian newspapers. The nomination was announced January 16th, 2014 and the Academy Award winner was announced March 2nd. Since this time period is somewhat short, I decided to include some additional months to ensure that I would have a sufficient number of articles to analyse. I chose to include the months following September 30th, 2013 which was the 48th anniversary of the start of the massacres.

The articles were collected from the newspapers' archives. *The Jakarta Post* had a library with physical copies of the newspapers, where I went through the issues from the selected

time period searching for relevant articles. A researcher from The Jakarta Post completed the search in the month of March, when I was no longer present in Indonesia. *The Jakarta Globe* merely had an electronic archive which they were in the process of transforming to a new system, which made the collection process somewhat challenging. I was however allowed access to their internal system and went through CDs with PDF files containing electronic copies of the paper issues. To collect the articles from *Kompas*, I hired a translator who assisted me in doing an online search at the paper's information centre. The articles were translated into English before I could start the analysing process.

I included everything that was written relating to the 1965 massacres. In addition to news articles, my material consists of features, front pages, opinions, commentaries, editorials, reader's views, et cetera. I find them all relevant for looking into how the 1965 massacres are covered in the Indonesian press today. Allowing a reader's opinion and public debate into the paper says something about the space created for the issues, and placing the topic on the front page reveals how the particular newspaper's editors weighs its importance. Reflecting on the type of articles and where the articles are placed in the papers is a part of the analysis.

The total selection is 65 articles, whereof 28 from *The Jakarta Globe*, 22 from *The Jakarta Post* and 15 from *Kompas*.

3.1.2 Newspapers: The Jakarta Post, The Jakarta Globe and Kompas

The Jakarta Post

The Jakarta Post was started as collaboration between four Indonesian media under the urging of the Information Minister at the time and politician Jusuf Wanandi. After the first issue was printed in 1983, it spent several years with minimal advertisements and increasing circulation. In the beginning of the 1990s it began to take a more vocal pro-democracy point of view. The paper was one of the few Indonesian English-language dailies to survive the 1997 Asian financial crisis and currently has a circulation of about 40,000. It also features both a Sunday and online edition. The paper is targeted at foreigners and educated Indonesians, although the middle-class Indonesian readership has increased. Noted for being a training ground for local and international reporters, *The Jakarta Post* has won several awards and been described as being "Indonesia's leading English-language daily". The newspaper is owned by PT Bina Media Tenggara.

The Jakarta Globe

The Jakarta Globe is an English language daily launched in 2008. It is today the most-read newspaper in English in Indonesia, and is published six days a week. It is marketed primarily at cosmopolitan and well educated Indonesians and expatriates. It had three sections, and contains a range of general news, including metropolitan and national news coverage as well as international news, plus comment, Indonesian and world business and sport plus a classified advertising section, and features and lifestyle coverage as well as entertainment, listings and reader service and puzzle/cartoon pages. The newspaper has since added a Sunday and an online edition. The newspaper's owner, PT Jakarta Globe Media, is part of the BeritaSatu Media Holdings that is an associated company of Lippo.

Kompas

Kompas is an Indonesian national newspaper established in 1965 and is published by *Kompas* Gramedia. The paper is distributed to all parts of Indonesia. With a circulation of an average of 500,000 copies per day and 600,000 for the Sunday edition, *Kompas* is not just the largest circulating printed media in Indonesia, but also it is the largest circulating newspaper in Southeast Asia. Its readership totals of approximately 2.25 million.

The paper was first suggested by the then commander of the Indonesian army and was established as a newspaper that was representative of the Catholic Party faction, in order to counter the communist propaganda spearheaded by the PKI. Later the newspaper's mission was changed to become one that is independent and free from any political factions.

Like many major daily newspapers, *Kompas* is divided into three principal parts: a front section containing national and international news, a business and finance section and a sports section. *Kompas* also manage an online portal (www.kompas.com), which contains updated news and the digital version of the paper.

3.1.3 Interviews

This thesis is however not merely aiming to find out what is being written in the press, but *why* it was written the way it is also on what is *not* being written and *why*. My research question presents an ambition to find out to what degree external restrictions and self-censorship influences the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres. Finding out which formal restrictions that applies is fairly straight forward. A different matter completely is to find out how the coverage is influenced by informal restrictions and influences leading to self-

ensorship. To identify this I decided to ask journalists themselves, as well as their editors. I chose to do qualitative interviews rather than a survey because of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues to be discussed.

The interview subjects were identified partly through purposeful sampling (Patton 1990 in Johannessen et al. 2010: 106). I decided I needed to speak with Indonesian press workers. I wished to speak with both senior journalists, who had also been working during the New Order regime, and younger journalists with only recent experience. As the journalists might write articles about the 1965/66 massacres, only to have them turned down by editorial decisions, I decided I also needed to speak with editors. I aimed to speak with some journalists who were authors of articles on my subject, but did not limit myself to this. This for two reasons: One, I was also interested to hear from journalists who did *not* write about these issues, but who worked with fields such as human rights issues, politics and defence, et cetera. Two was a practical reason. Due to limited time and resources I had merely three and a half weeks in Indonesia and thus had to work in parallel with collecting and reading the articles and conducting the interviews.

I adopted the snowball method (Johannessen et al. 2010:109) to identify names of those to contact. I started off with contacting Indonesians I knew from various fields of work and asked if they had contacts within journalism or human rights. From there I contacted leads who recommended others for me to contact, et cetera. When leaving for Indonesia I had merely one scheduled interview, but quite a few names on my list that either already I had been in communication with or would get in contact with once I arrived in the country.

After I started to collect articles I noted down the by-lines and contacted some of these journalists for interviews. More than once I received advice to contact journalists that I had already noted down on my list of interviewee prospects.

I conducted in all 11 semi-structured interviews using an interview guide. However, the interviews varied because of the interviewees' different backgrounds, the contact made and the flow of conversation. All interviews lasted approximately one hour and were recorded. The recorded interviews were afterwards transcribed into text.

3.2 Quantitative and qualitative methods

Data are rarely indisputable facts. There are different ways of collecting and analysing data, and there is a division between quantitative and qualitative methods. A quantitative approach is to count phenomena or to map distribution. A lot of the procedures for the quantitative method stem from a natural scientific method, but it is simultaneously adjusted to the fact that these are humans and human phenomena being studied. The qualitative method does however say something about the quality or specific characteristics of the phenomenon that is being analysed. Qualitative method is particularly appropriate if one is to investigate phenomena that are unfamiliar or has a desire to understand more in-depth (Johannesen et al., 2010:31).

The method selected for this thesis is based on the research question, as well as time and financial resources. One way to collecting qualitative data is through interviews (Johannesen et al. 2010: 100), which I choose for this thesis. The interviews left me with the following data to analyse: Interview notes and recorded sound transcribed into text.

My data included also 65 newspaper articles. Despite the rather small material, which was expected, I choose to do a quantitative analysis as well as qualitative. Standing alone the quantitative analysis will not have much value due to the limited number of articles. I do however find it relevant to analyse the written articles also quantitatively as I believe it can give some indications of common features, looking at the number of articles per month (how much space), which section the articles are placed in (priorities), whether or not the articles had accompanying photos (how visible), by-line (anonymous), sources (whose voice), thematic priorities (the issues raised). Thereafter, I will do a qualitative analysis to take the material further and go more into depth. I will firstly then be able to look more distinctly at possible patterns and move closer towards answering the research question for this thesis. Data from observations and interviews are not necessarily qualitative. If the data are registered in the form of countable categories, they are considered quantitative data (Johannesen et al. 2010: 100). I have not chosen to categorize the data from the interviews because of the low number of interviews. For this thesis, I choose to have few informants because I had a limited time frame and thus needed to ensure sufficient time to do thorough and in-depth interviews to bring out nuances that could contribute to a broader insight into the issues.

3.2.1 Qualitative interviews

Interviews are the most common way of gathering qualitative data. It is a flexible method that can be used almost everywhere and enables full and detailed descriptions. If the theme is not sensitive or difficult, most informants will feel comfortable in an interview. Kvale and Brinkman (2009) characterise the qualitative research interview as a conversation with a structure and a purpose (Johannesen et al. 2010: 135). The structure is connected to the division of roles between the participants in the interview. The interviewer asks the questions, and the interviewee answers. As the interviewer controls the situation, the participants are not equal. The purpose is often to understand or describe something. Interviews are often more a dialogue than purely questions and answers (ibid).

Kvale and Brinkman emphasize that the qualitative interview's purpose is to elicit descriptions of the informants' every-day world in order to be able to analyse the meaning of the phenomena described. One has to separate general research questions from the concrete questions asked in an interview (Johannesen et al. 2010: 136).

The reason why interviews are often used – and why it is used for this thesis - is because social phenomena tend to be complex and through interviews it is possible to bring out complexity and nuances. For this thesis I have chosen interviews as a supplementary to the written newspaper articles, as I presume that approaching my research question from different angles will provide for a broader and more comprehensive answer.

3.3 Evaluation of qualitative research

In quantitative research reliability and validity are used as criteria for quality. Yin (2008) uses these terms also for qualitative data (Johannesen et al., 2010: 229). Others, like Guba and Lincoln (1985, 1989) think, however, that qualitative research must be evaluated differently, and operate with the terms trustworthiness, credibility, generality and conformability. A third option is presented by Johannesen et al. (2010:229), who claim that reliability and validity in some cases can be relevant also for qualitative research.

The different tests for reliability in quantitative research are hardly useful for qualitative research. For qualitative research the researcher can however strengthen reliability or trustworthiness by giving the reader a thorough description of the context and an open, detailed presentation of the method for the entire research process (Johannesen et al. 2010: 230). Validity in qualitative research is about to what extent the researcher's methods and

findings accurately reflect the intention of the study and represent reality (ibid). Lincoln and Guba (1985) present two techniques that can increase the probability that the research leads to credible results. One is continuous observation, which is to invest enough time to get to know the field well so that one can differentiate between relevant and non-relevant information and build up trust (ibid). Triangulation is another. This means that the researcher uses a combination of different methods, which can enhance the validity of the analysis (Østbye et al. 1997:101). For this thesis, triangulation is taking into use by analysing reference articles quantitatively and qualitatively and conducting qualitative interviews.

Credibility can also be strengthened by informing the interviewees of the results to obtain confirmation, or by letting other competent persons analyse the same material to see if they reach the same conclusion (Johannesen et al., 2010: 230).

The aim of all research is to draw conclusions beyond the immediate information that is collected. A study's generality is about whether one is successful in establishing descriptions, terms, interpretations and explanations that are useful in other areas than that which is being analysed (Johannesen et al., 2010: 230).

It is important that the findings be the result of the research and not the researcher's subjective views, which the conformability is to ensure. Conformability is the equivalent of the objectivity criteria for the quantitative research. One can ensure this by describing all the decisions taken throughout the research process, so that the audience can follow and evaluate them. It is important to be self-critical and comment on previous experiences, variations, prejudices and perceptions which may influence the interpretation and approach to the project. Conformability can also be strengthened if the researcher considers whether the interpretations are supported by other literature, or if they are supported by the research interviewees (Johannesen et al., 2010: 231).

3.4 Source critic

Being critical of one's own material is important to be able to identify possible limitations. In that way one can seek ways to avoid these and enhance the quality of the end result, or – if not possible - at least be aware of them and ensure transparency and allow the audience to know potential weaknesses of the research.

3.4.1 Reference articles

Two of the three newspapers selected for this thesis are in English and Jakarta. These were selected primarily for practical reasons as I do not speak the Indonesian language. English-language newspapers do necessarily have a more limited and different readership than those in the local language. These newspapers are read by the Indonesian middle class and elite, as well as the foreign elite living in the country, and the content is thus influenced by this as well as the fact that they are both Jakarta-based. The media content of these papers do not reach out to the majority of the Indonesian people. Therefore, I also chose to have an Indonesian-language newspaper in the selection which has a much larger reach demographically as well as geographically speaking. By comparing these I will be able to perhaps identify some differences which may indicate something about the limitations of the end result. However, there are also newspapers that reaches out to more people at the grass-root level than also *Kompas* that could have resulted in an even broader understanding of the issues at hand.

Another weakness could be that *Kompas* as an Indonesian-language newspaper had to be translated before I could start with the analysis. There could be meanings and nuances that were lost in translation and thus contributed to a lesser quality of the end-product. The translator was a professional who were recommended through work-relations, but despite the professionalism this could be a limiting factor.

In addition, as mentioned in chapter 1, Indonesians are good at reading between the lines as a result of the writing style of the New Order era where messages were hidden in the articles. In the analysis I will look at whether this still takes place. Such hidden messages might thus be found in the reference articles which could be lost on me as a foreigner who are not accustomed to reading between the lines.

3.4.2 Interviews

As presented above I took into use the snowball method when selecting the interview objects. These are limited in numbers and they might not necessarily represent the majority views related to these issues. They may have experiences or opinions that are unique and individual and there might be others that would provide a better picture and understanding of the issues for this thesis. I attempted to mitigate this by ensuring a variety within the selection of interview objects, both in terms of age and gender and also to include both journalists and editors. In addition I added a non-professional media worker, the documentary maker who will thus have a view of journalism more from the outside.

For many years the issue of the 1965 massacres was taboo in Indonesia. It is still a sensitive topic to discuss openly. In addition, it might be very personal for many. It can therefore be challenging to interview Indonesians on this particular topic. Whether the interviewed subjects were completely open or not is hard to say with one hundred per cent certainty. There were also people who declined to speak with me on this particular topic, either directly or indirectly via others. Those who declined my interview invitations explained that they either lacked experience of this particular issue and had little to say, or suggested other people whom they considered more relevant or knowledgeable. In addition, there were also others still who did not have the time or were out of town, et cetera.

In addition, there are differences between the Norwegian and Indonesian cultures. This might have led to misinterpretations or an environment of lesser trust between the interviewer and interviewees. The Indonesians are also part of an Asian culture where 'losing face' is a factor, and for this reason some tend to shy away from critical conversations on their own or others' behalf. However, as the interview subjects are media workers, this might be less of a factor than possibly for other working groups, as media workers themselves are preoccupied with critical questions and underlying truths.

Language may also be a cause of misunderstandings and misinterpretations. This goes both for the interviews, but also for the translated articles as I am not able to understand the Indonesian language. Many of my interviewees are however working for English-speaking newspapers and are thus more advanced in English than most Indonesians and I used a professional to translate the articles.

Due to time and resources I had only a limited amount of time in Indonesia. Towards the end of my stay, I did have leads that I would have liked to follow up but was unable to. However, knowing at what point one has sufficient material might always be a problem, especially when one gets engaged and is eager to learn more, even if this might not be necessary for the results of the analysis.

The time limitation also obliged me to simultaneously gather the articles and conduct the interviews. In a perfect world I would have preferred to have a long enough stay to collect, go through and analyse the articles before conducting the interviews.

3.5 Ethical considerations

As mentioned, the issue of the 1965/66 massacres is still sensitive to discuss after years of being completely taboo in Indonesian society. Many still fear possible consequences of talking openly. For a lot of people it is also deeply personal. Many had relatives who were killed, detained or stigmatized for allegedly sympathizing with the Communist Party. Others have strong beliefs one way or the other after years of indoctrination and propaganda. It is therefore not straight forward to come as a foreigner and start asking questions about these issues. Ethical considerations were in the back of my mind throughout the process of working on this master's thesis. I attempted to approach prospective interview subjects gently, without too bluntly asking about the 1965/66 massacres. I tried to lead into it by starting to talk about freedom of expression and sensitive issues in general, but ensured that I was always clear about the fact that it was the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres I was particularly interested in.

I made sure to send out written information via email before every interview, even those I had arranged by phone, to ensure that the interviewees had all necessary information before the meeting took place. During the interview I tried to take my time and build up trust before asking direct questions that might be uncomfortable if the interviewee had any personal experiences or fears of reprisals for being too outspoken. I tried to conduct the interviews in settings they were comfortable with and was flexible when they suggested the meeting place. If we met in public places, I ensured that we did not sit too close to other people. I recorded the interviews after consent, and placed the recorder so that it was visible. I made it very clear when I turned it on and off.

I offered all my interview subjects anonymity. This for security reasons, but also to allow for a safe environment where they could be completely open and honest. Only one out of the eleven wanted to remain anonymous. This person had chosen to remain anonymous after co-producing the film, *The Act of Killing*, for security reasons, and I never knew his name. Because of a volcano eruption and a closed airport, I did not actually meet him in person and the interview was conducted via Skype. This was the only interview which was not carried out face-to-face.

3.6 Analysis build-up

The question I am aiming to answer through this analysis is: *How does the Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 massacres today, and to what degree is the coverage influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship?*

It is a two-part question, with the first asking how the Indonesian press covers the 1965/66 massacres today. To help me find the answer I will look into the extent to which the topic is prioritized in the selected newspapers. I will look into the number of articles as well as which sections they are placed under and whether they have connected photos to enhance their visibility amidst other media content.

Thereafter I will look into who raises the topic of the 1965/66 massacres and who are the sources in the reference articles. This is to present an overview over the participants of the public debate on the issue, which I see as important background for the further discussions. The use of by-line may also reveal something about the sensitivity and security situation relating the 1965/66 massacres.

I will then get into the question on which issues that are raised in the articles. I have chosen the following five thematic categories, and all the articles are placed in one or more of these.

1. Truth and reconciliation
2. Moving on and letting go
3. Academy Award nomination and film production
4. Understanding the massacres
5. Communism / anti-communism
6. Freedom of speech / propaganda

I will also look into how the relevant stakeholders and communism as an ideology were described in the reference articles to see if the indoctrinated perceptions imposed by the New Order were still valid in today's Indonesia. I will look into the perceptions of:

1. Communists and communism
2. The Indonesian Government and politicians
3. The Indonesian Military
4. Anti-communists and radical Islamic groups

The second part of my research question is to what degree is the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres is influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. To answer this I will also look beyond the written material and ask journalists and editors if and how they experience formal and informal restrictions in their journalistic practise.


4. Analysis

4.1 The space, priority and visibility of articles about the 1965/66 massacres

I will start the analysis by presenting the reference articles and looking at how many articles relating the 1965/66 massacres in the selected time period appeared in *The Jakarta Post*, *The Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas*. This will give an indication of the space and priority the topic was given in the selected papers. In addition I will present which sections these articles were to be found in and if photos were attached. The latter may say something about how visible the articles were to the reader in the midst of the other media content. Together these factors can give an indication of the importance attributed to the topic in the selected papers.

As mentioned above all the publications are called ‘reference articles’ as a common term throughout this thesis, whether they were opinion pieces or commentaries, front pages, feature stories, or news articles. Merely when relevant are they specified to be news articles or opinion pieces, et cetera. In section 4.1.2 I will present an overview in what sections the articles appeared and thus the distribution of the selection of ‘articles’ will be visible to the reader.

4.1.1 Number of reference articles




The above graph shows the number of articles in *The Jakarta Post*, *The Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas* for each month in the time period from September 2013 to March 2014.

In the selected time period from September 2013 to March 2014, there were altogether 65 articles relating to the issues of the 1965/66 massacres in the three papers *The Jakarta Post*, *The Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas*. As the massacres took place nearly fifty years back in time and are in themselves not news to most Indonesians, this can be said to be a significant number. The news coverage of a particular topic will at all times depend on the broader media picture and current events, and what makes it into the news does thus have an aspect of randomness to it. That 2014 was an election year in Indonesia is assumed to have affected how much space were allocated to other issues, and the main focus in the reference articles were on issues connected with the elections particularly from January onwards. The amount of coverage of the 1965/66 events is thus considered with that in mind.

There are some variations relating to what extent the three papers cover the 1965/66 massacres. *The Jakarta Globe* had the largest number of articles about the topic in the selected time period (28 articles). *The Jakarta Post* had 22 articles had *Kompas* a mere 15 articles. The selected time frame is, as mentioned, short and this does not necessarily mean that *The Jakarta Globe* or *The Jakarta Post* in general cover this topic more often than *Kompas*, but it suggests that this may be the case. *Kompas* is the only Indonesian-language newspaper in the selection, which raises the question if the topic is more easily covered by English-language newspapers. As presented above *The Jakarta Post* and *The Jakarta Globe* have a different readership, namely the Indonesian middle class and elite as well as the foreign population. *Kompas* has a much wider reach, both in terms of numbers and demographics. Whether there are other reasons why *Kompas* publishes fewer articles on this topic than the two others in the selection will be part of later discussions in this thesis.


4.1.2 Sections and photos



The above graph shows which sections the reference articles were organized in in the three newspapers *The Jakarta Post*, *The Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas*

The sections the articles were organized in in the newspaper gives an indication of the editorial priorities. The 1965/66 massacres took place nearly fifty years ago, which attenuates

their newsworthiness or sensational element. However, there may be new developments or utterances that increase the news angle. In the selected time period *The Jakarta Globe* allocated two front pages to the 1965/66 issues. One of them was accompanied by a photo of the then Indonesian president and the text said ‘Time to Move On? Indonesia marks Pancasila Sanctity Day as it tries to redress history’ (*The Jakarta Globe*, January 24th, 2014). The other headlined the word ‘*Jagal*’ in bold letters, which is the Indonesian title of the documentary *The Act of Killing* and the text across the front page said: ‘Coming to Terms With the Past. Global spotlight: Oscar nomination for ‘The Act of Killing’ sparks soul-searching about 1960s anti-communist purge’ (*The Jakarta Globe*, October 30th, 2013). Approximately half the number of articles in *The Jakarta Globe* can be found under the news section. This is also the case for *Kompas*. *The Jakarta Post* has a rather low number of their articles in the news section and the majority are opinion pieces or commentaries.



The above graph shows the number of reference articles that had photos attached

In total for all three newspapers, approximately half of the articles had photos attached. The Jakarta Globe had slightly more photos as part of their publications of the 1965/66 massacres than *The Jakarta Post* and *Kompas*. This may merely have more to do with the newspaper's policy of publishing more photos in general. Tapsell (in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:234)

describes *The Jakarta Globe* as ‘a glossy, full-colour English-language daily’, which may indicate that photos are commonly used in the paper. However, the use of photos does increase the visibility of an article and may thus indicate that the issue of the 1965/66 massacres was more visible to the reader in *The Jakarta Globe* than the other two newspapers. The variations amongst the three papers were however so small that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this.

4.1.3 Concluding remarks


The fact that there were in all 65 articles in the selected seven-month period on issues relating to the 1965/66 massacres, does indicate that the events which took place almost fifty years ago are still relevant for Indonesians today. A large number of the articles are also found in the newspapers' news sections and a few front pages were even devoted to the topic. The topic thus seems to be a priority amongst other media content and as half the articles had attached photos, the topic appears to have been given space and was visible to readers.

There are variations between the newspapers published in English and Indonesian in the selection. This may indicate that the topic was considered more sensitive by *Kompas* than the two English-language newspapers which draw their readerships primarily from the Jakarta-based middle class and elite. I will be looking more into this also in the following discussions, particularly in relation to self-censorship and political and commercial influences.

4.2 Who are the voices?

Looking into who gave voice to the issues of the 1965/66 massacres is an important part of the analysis. There are several aspects to consider. First of all, who were the sources for the articles? As stated above in chapter 1 the Indonesian government's version of the events that took place in 1965/66 was the only one during the New Order period. This version was propagated through the media and voices with stories not in line with the ruling opinion were silenced. The issue of the 1965/66 was taboo even in general society and many relatives of victims were not even aware of their family history until recently. Today public space is formally open for discussions of the topic, and in this analysis I am attempting to look into the level of openness and who is utilising public space to voice their thoughts and opinions. To do so, I have looked into not only their sources, but also who raised the topic in the first place. In addition to being important as background, the use of by-lines may also say something about the sensitivity and security situation relating to public writing about the 1965/66 massacres.

4.2.1 By-lines



The above graph shows the number of the reference articles that carry by-lines and whether the by-lines belong to Indonesians, foreigners or Indonesians living abroad.


As seen from the graph above there were quite a few articles that did not carry by-lines. This may potentially say something about sensitivity to the issue of the 1965/66 massacres. According to some of those interviewed for this thesis, omitting by-lines was a security precaution. Others, however, stated that it was merely a practical matter. In *Kompas* the by-line '*Tim Kompas*' (Team Kompas) was sometimes used instead of the name or names of contributing journalists. In the article selection it is also evident that merely using the journalist's initials rather than their full name is quite common in *Kompas*. This is not the case for the other two papers in the selection. I will come back to this topic of security in section 4.5 and discuss in more detail the interviewees' notions relating to the security situation.

Most of the articles did however reveal the names of the journalists or the readers voicing their comments and opinions. Most of those who wrote the articles were, as expected, Indonesians. However, there were several foreigners behind some of these articles. The


English-language newspapers, *The Jakarta Post* and *The Jakarta Globe*, did and do have some foreigners on their staff. In addition there were readers from countries like Australia and the United States that wrote opinion pieces. In addition, there were several Indonesians living abroad who contributed their opinions to the debate. Some of these were correspondents in other countries, but most seemed to belong to the Indonesian diaspora.

In the *Kompas* article, ‘Going Back Home’, (November 11th, 2013) a social worker and alumnus of the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague in Holland, Bambang Sipayung, wrote about the Indonesian diaspora and their interest in getting involved in re-writing Indonesian history and in particular the ‘often-concealed G30S’. Most of the Indonesians in Europe and South America were students sent by Sukarno to study in socialist-communist countries as part of a plan to educate experts to help build Indonesia. Under the New Order regime, Indonesians abroad were forced to choose whether to support of and state their loyalty to the regime or to lose their citizenship due to their ideological or political beliefs. These exiles were referred to by former President Abdurrahman Wahid as ‘the roaming children of the state’. According to the article, many showed a strong bond with their homeland and engaged in these debates about the past.

4.2.2 Sources



The above graph shows the use of single or multiple sources in the reference articles in *The Jakarta Post*, *The Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas*



The above graph shows the distribution of sources in the reference articles according to type, categorized in seven groups.

A large number of the reference articles are opinion pieces or commentaries. Thus they were merely the voice of the individual journalist, editor or reader. If not an opinion piece or a commentary, most of the articles had multiple sources. The majority of these sources belonged to civil society, including non-governmental organizations, activists and historians. Some of them appeared in several of the articles and seemed to be very active in conveying their messages and were easily accessible to the journalists. This category also contained the anti-communism activists and Islamic activists.

There were a very few sources from the government or political elite. This is worth noting since the majority of the articles referred to the need for the government to assume responsibility for taking some sort of action relating to the 1965/66 massacres. One particular statement given by the President's spokesperson after the release of *The Act of Killing*, was referred to in many of the reference articles. According to some of the interviewees, the elite sources were often difficult to reach for a statement to the press. Margareth Aritonang from

The Jakarta Post stated that she attempted to get a comment from one of the ministers after the release of the Komnas HAM report in 2012, and was dismissed with a question aimed at her asking if she would have let the communists take over if she had been part of the government in 1965 (from an interview on February 24th, 2014). The absence of sources particularly from government officials, politicians and military men will be further discussed in the analysis in chapter 4.

The graph above shows a high number of sources from lower-level state institutions and may thus be said to be somewhat misrepresentative as the lower-level officials are grouped together with the elite politicians and government representatives, et cetera. The most quoted among the state officials were members of the national human rights commission, *Komnas HAM*. In 2012, the commission presented its report after investigating the 1965/66 massacres, and stated that the massacres were ‘a gross human rights violation’ (in article ‘New lease on life for probe into 1965 anti-communist purge’ in *The Jakarta Post*, September 30th, 2013). Their recommendations to the government on steps forward to resolve the issues of the 1965/66 massacres are yet to be followed by the time of the submission of this thesis.

The victims and victims' families were also well represented as sources in the reference articles. Their identities were only partially revealed as ‘*Maria (68)*’ or ‘*Arifin (72)*’. They were categorized as ‘victims and victims’ families’ since it is clear that they belonged to this group and are only partially anonymous. Several of these sources were quoted after gatherings of victims and victims’ families and shared stories their experiences. In many of the articles the journalists merely referred to presentations given during these gatherings and did not conduct additional interviews with the victims and their families. The article ‘Putu’s Word Remains Mighty’ (*The Jakarta Globe* 13.11.13) offers a more in-depth story by a victim of the 1965/66 events, who were jailed for ten years as a political prisoner.

There were few sources from the film industry, which shows that articles and discussions about the documentary *The Act of Killing* were mainly concerned with the content and not film production or technical aspects.

4.2.3. Concluding remarks


It is worth noting the low number of government sources and sources from the political sphere in general, not to mention from the police and military forces. These were all key stakeholders in the debate, but their voices were significantly absent. Often statements by government

officials were referred to in several of the articles instead of being exclusive to the respective articles and were thus often less relevant for the specific questions raised in the articles. This will also be further discussed in section 4.5.

The notable absence of government and political sources combined with the very high number of sources from civil society suggests that the public debate on the issue is at this stage rather one-sided. It suggests that there is less discussion than advocacy by non-governmental organizations, activists and historians who are trying to create political interest and a will to take action. This will be further discussed in section 4.3 which deals with the issues raised in the articles.

As seen above, most of the collected publications carry by-lines, but quite a large percentage of them, however, do not reveal who the writer was. There were variations in the explanations by the journalists why this was so, but most stated this was more a practical matter than a concern for security. It is interesting also to note the large percentage of contributions to the public debate from foreigners and Indonesians living abroad. This may be connected to the selection's larger number of articles published in the English-language newspapers, and perhaps indicate that distance to the real events might have made it easier to part-take in terms of both emotions and the notion of security. I will come back to the latter later in the analysis.

4.3 Issues raised in the articles about the 1965/66 massacres



The above graph shows the number of reference articles in *The Jakarta Post*, *The Jakarta Globe* and *Kompas* categorized by themes according to which issues they raise. All the reference articles are categorized under one or several of the themes.

Since the 1965/66 massacres happened almost fifty years ago, they are not news to most Indonesians. However, since the topic has been censored and silenced for so long there might be elements of news to the story despite the time passed since the events took place. There have also been developments and utterances over the past years that have increased the relevance of the topic and thus led to media coverage. Amongst these is the formal investigation into the events and the report published by the national human rights committee, *Komnas Ham*, in 2012 and the release of the documentary *The Act of Killing* the same year. Within the selected time frame for this thesis the nomination of *The Act of Killing* for an Academy Award was a new development that caught the media's attention. In the following I will present what content the various articles in the reference articles discussed, which is highly relevant for a comprehensive analysis of coverage of the 1965/66 massacres. Some of

the articles carry similar messages, and I have categorized the content in six themes as described above in chapter 3 and presented in the graph below. In the following I will discuss the number of articles categorized under the various themes, as well as the content of the themes. All of the articles are categorized under these themes, and some are categorized under more than one if they were hard to categorize or brought up several parallel issues.

4.3.1 Truth and Reconciliation

A vast majority of the reference articles dealt thematically with the importance of seeking truth and reconciliation. This can also be seen in the use of sources, many of which were non-governmental organisations, historians and activists working towards this aim, as well as victims and victims' families sharing their stories to convey the truth.

There is a lot of variation in this category, and there are many meanings of the terms 'truth' and 'reconciliation' in these articles. Many of the articles and interviewees concluded that the full story and complete truth about what happened in 1965/66 would remain a question mark in history because so much time has passed. Most of those who knew all the details are no longer alive. However, further investigations and the search for more pieces to the puzzle were requested by many in the articles selected. For many, 'truth' means that those who know and continue to try and disclose information should come forward and share their knowledge. 'Truth' also refers to openness and honesty in the public debate and civil conversations about this topic. Several of the articles also talked of the need for re-writing history books and educational material. It is worth noting that very few brought up the issue of the legal prosecutions of perpetrators and those responsible. 'Reconciliation' is however a much used term in the article selection. What this refers to seems however to differ. Some of the articles referred to Nelson Mandela and the South African reconciliation model. The article "Indonesia Not Yet Ready to Come to Terms with 1965" in *The Jakarta Globe* mentioned this and stated that with next year's 50th anniversary for the massacres and with Nelson Mandela's passing, Indonesia is under a 'harsh spotlight' and needs to take action (*Jakarta Globe*, March 3rd, 2014). The article refers to the report by the national human rights committee Komnas HAM from 2012, where one of the recommendations was to establish a truth and reconciliation committee. To date, this has not been followed up. In the article 'New lease on life for probe into 1965 anti-communist purge' in *The Jakarta Post* (September 30th 2013), the follow-up of the report was discussed. According to the article, the commission and the attorney general's office would jointly set up an investigation team following a complete

deadlock after the report was launched. The spokesperson for the attorney general's office was not available for comments, but a member of the House of Representatives stated that she encouraged the President to issue a presidential decree to rehabilitate the rights of the survivors after 1965. In her mind, this would be 'a win-win solution' as the survivors would be willing to forgive mistakes from the past as they 'only want their rights rehabilitated and their descendants officially cleared of stigma'. The article's journalist, Margareth Aritonang, opened the article by saying that the survivors 'could finally receive justice' if this were to happen and stated that the intention of a joint investigation would bring hope for a solution. During the interview for this thesis in February 22nd, 2014, Aritonang was however less hopeful for a resolution any time soon, and stated:

“...our government does nothing to clarify whether what Komnas HAM did find was actually right or wrong. No, they just put it (the report) in the cupboard and then just closed it and do nothing”.

She fears the consequences of the inaction of the political leadership on the 1965/66 issues as she believes this nurtures hatred amongst the many victims which might lead to rebellion or other unrest. All the interviewees are in agreement that there is a need for resolution, but none of them believe this will happen any time soon. They all refer to the fact that those responsible are still in power and running the country. A frequently cited example is that the father-in-law of the President at the time of the interviews, General Sarwo Edhie, was the leader of the Indonesian Military's Special Forces (Kopassus) and thus led the anti-communist campaign in 1965/66. In an interview quoted by several of the interviewees, he was asked to confirm if half a million was the correct number of people killed during the purge, to which he replied: 'Are you kidding me? It is three million!'

Several of the interviewees believe that the current power-holders need to pass away before anything will be resolved, and the next generation will be responsible for reconciling the nation. This was also a common view in the articles. In the article '1965 Massacres Remain a Divisive Issue' in *The Jakarta Globe* (October 10th, 2013) by journalist Dessy Sagita, one of the sources stated that it is unlikely that the government will be willing to reveal the truth.

'Some of those people who were responsible for the tragedy are still here, they are still enjoying their existence, and the 1965 tragedy is a dark secret they don't want anyone to know about because it could jeopardize their comfortable positions. [They were so unbelievably brutal and sadistic that I do not think they could bare the shame'

In 2010 the then President attempted to offer an apology to the victims and victims' families. However he did not apologize on behalf of the government, but on behalf of the organisation, Nahdluha Ulama, to which he belonged. Some claim this is what brought about his fall from power.

Many of the presidential candidates during the elections in July 2014 were of the older generation. According to writer Putu Oka Sukanta, who was in jail for ten years for affiliation with the communist party, the candidates were 'sons of Soeharto in soul and spirit' (*The Jakarta Globe*, November 13th, 2013). He was imprisoned without a trial and did not receive any explanation, apology or compensation from the government after his release. He says that 'events of 1965 may seem a long time ago, but many are still feeling the repercussions'. Stigmatization is still very real for former detainees or alleged communists. Former political detainees must for instance carry an identification card and cannot work as civil servants or school teachers. Thus, removing the social stigma and in this way bringing justice to the victims and their families are, for many, part and parcel of the term 'reconciliation'. Compensating them for their loss is another demand by some of the voices in the reference articles.

In an article in *The Jakarta Globe* of February 8th 2014, disappointment was expressed over the fact that addressing human rights crimes from the past has been largely absent in the presidential election campaigns. This is according to the article 'not an issue that should be swept under the carpet, but one that should take front and centre stage in the debate'. It said further that hundreds of thousands are waiting for truth and justice after Indonesia's many past conflicts, such as the events of 1965/66. 'Addressing past crimes would contribute to healing the open wounds and go a long way toward ending the general mistrust people across the country will feel towards authorities and the judiciary, as long as the complete impunity for serious human rights violations remains'. The article claimed that the province of Aceh should serve as an example where the Aceh Truth and Reconciliation bylaw was passed in 2013, calling for the establishment of a truth commission after the Aceh conflict that ended in 2005.

The second public official to offer an apology, after President Wahid as described above, was the mayor of Palu. He apologized on behalf of the Palu administration to the survivors and to the families of those who died in 1965/66 (*The Jakarta Post*, October 25th, 2013). The mayor is from the Golkar party, which was the main party in power in 1965/66, and is also a former

chairman of the Pancasila Youth, which is even today warning against communism. The mayor says that he was guilty too, and admits that in 1966 he was told by the military to guard suspected communists who were gathered in a square. 'I guarded them with my boy scout stick', he said in the article. The main reason for his apology was however the desire not to leave the burden of history to the next generation. As a regional leader he gave his residents compensations in the form of scholarships, health insurance and equal opportunities for careers and politics. In the article 'Truth and justice for the 1965 victims' a human rights activist and daughter of a 1965 victim, referred to the mayor's apology: 'We know that human rights tribunals are unlikely. But a public apology like the one made by the mayor helped a lot' (*The Jakarta Post*, December 17th, 2013).

Another reading of the term 'reconciliation' was presented in a Kompas article titled '30 September 1965 – Encouraging Reconciliation and Mutual Forgiveness' (Kompas, December 10th, 2013). The article talked of an 'organic reconciliation' which, according to one of the voices in the article, is on-going. The article dealt with a book launch by the Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. In speeches the leadership of the Islamic group highlighted that members of Nahdlatul Ulama were also victims of 'bloody 30 September', which was 'the continuation of the PKI rebellion of 1948 that destabilised Indonesia'. The important next step was, according to these Islamic leaders, to encourage mutual forgiveness and 'organic reconciliation'. It was stated that the elders of the organization 'deeply regretted conflict, violence and murders' and emphasized that the clash between the group and PKI happened 'to save the great country of Indonesia'.

4.3.2 Letting go and moving on

The article 'If Democracy Gets Tired' warns against reconciliation (in *Kompas*, January 1st, 2014). Interviewee Salim Said of the Defence University in Jakarta stated:

We should not formally seek for reconciliation. Any formal statement of peace will instead provoke. Trauma is not fully resolved in all parties. Let this process organically proceed among those who are enlightened. Slowly, this awareness spreads and erases the grudge embedded inside.

This article is categorized in 'Letting go and moving on'. Few of the references are categorized under this theme compared to the much larger number of voices arguing for the opposite.

The statements from the few government sources represented in the reference articles may be said to resemble the aforementioned understanding of an ‘organic reconciliation’. A statement referred to in several of the articles was made by Coordination Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Djoko Suyanto, after the release of the Komnas HAM report in 2012: ‘We cannot apologize without taking a good look at what really happened during the 1965 incident’ (*The Jakarta Globe*, October 1st, 2013). According to Priyo Budi Santoso, a representative from the Golkar party, Indonesians should ‘just forget about it, and move on’. Santoso continued by stating that ‘there is no use in pursuing it. We have many other issues to deal with’.

Journalist for *The Jakarta Post*, Margareth Aritonang, said in an interview (February 22nd, 2014) they she did not know if the Government refused to take action because they did not care or they were afraid: ‘It would bring big changes to the course of our history, you know. Many people will be impacted, and they are just not ready to deal with the changes that might happen’.

The anonymous co-director of *The Act of Killing*, challenged the media on their attempts to balance the views in articles about 1965/66. He claimed that the Indonesian media hide behind their ethical standards and ideal of objectivity by including the Government’s untrue versions when reporting the truth about the events. In that way, the media is in his opinion ‘balancing a lie’ as if there were more than one correct version (shared in an interview March 2014). According to this analysis, this is however not the case as most of the articles presented differing views from the Government’s and government officials were to a large degree absent as sources.

4.3.3 Academy Award nomination and film production

A lot of the reference articles mentioned the documentary *The Act of Killing*. Few of these, however, have been categorized under the theme ‘Award nomination and film production’ because the main contents of the articles were rarely the film in itself, but other issues related to the 1965/66 events. Though, a few of them were primarily about the film, and all three papers covered the nomination for the Academy Award for Best Documentary. The article in *Kompas* distanced itself from the two others in *The Jakarta Post* and *The Jakarta Globe*. It was titled ‘Oscar nomination for The Act of Killing’, and two film experts were interviewed about the quality of the documentary (*Kompas*, January 18th, 2014). A documentary filmmaker and lecturer at the Jakarta Institute of Arts stated that a documentary film about

history should be balanced, and, he believes ‘there should be more in-depth and comprehensive research so that the movie does not come across as unfairly accusatory and incriminating’. Another film study expert and lecturer at the Jakarta Institute of Arts claimed in the same article that the movie clearly represented the perspectives of a foreigner and said that the film was ‘certainly subjective’. Both film experts stated that *The Act of Killing* could possibly be ‘a smear campaign against Indonesia’

4.3.4 Understanding the massacres

There is noticeable repetition in the various articles about the 1965/66 massacres and across the different newspapers in the selection. As mentioned above, some sources were used repeatedly, particularly those from a few historians and human rights activists. The same statements from public officials are referred to in various articles and several of the articles deal with the same events. It is not uncommon for the media anywhere to cover the same events or have a certain herd mentality, however it is worth mentioning that several of the articles do seem to scratch the surface rather than go into detail about the issue of the 1965/66 massacres. The vast majority of the articles, as mentioned above, demand some sort of action to achieve truth and reconciliation. A few articles go into more detail to explain why the events that took place. Those articles where explanation and understanding seem to be the authors' main thrust, are categorized under ‘*Understanding the massacres*’. Several of these present something additional to the more common narratives found in the majority of the article selection, which provides a broader picture of the massacres. “*Documentary Director Hope the US will Admit its Role in Genocide*” (*The Jakarta Globe*, March 3rd, 2014), for example, highlighted the United States' role in the events. In the article “*Why Indonesian President Should Rehabilitate the Late Subandrio*” the author explained in-depth how former President Subandrio was accused and punished for being involved in the alleged coup d'état, and provided details about later findings (*The Jakarta Globe*, February 2nd, 2014). In “*Going Back Home*” the author explained the causes for there being a large percentage of the Indonesian diaspora living abroad (*Kompas*, November 11th, 2014).

4.3.5 Communism / anti-communism

There are few articles categorized also under ‘Communism / anti-communism’. Most articles did not go into detail about communism as an ideology or its status today (or even back then). Some articles did, however, deal with anti-communist protests and demonstrations by radical groups that occurred at the time. I will discuss these articles further in section 4.4.1 which

deals with the current perceptions of communists and whether there are still remains of communists portrayed as the common enemy in today's press as they were during the New Order era.

4.3.6 Freedom of speech and propaganda

The freedom to publicly discuss the 1965/66 massacres and propaganda as reasons for a lot of wrongdoing in the past were underlying themes in many of the articles, however only a few are categorized under 'Freedom of speech and propaganda', as these topics were not the main theme in most articles. An article in *The Jakarta Globe* 'The Act of Killing' Skirts Censors with Online Download' (October 10th, 2013) explained how the documentary was never banned, but neither officially released in Indonesian theatres. The producers made the film available to the public by offering it free via an online download and thus avoided the issue of censorship. Human Rights Watch summed up the status of human rights in Indonesia in another article ('Indonesia Still Weak on Human Rights', *The Jakarta Globe*, January 23rd, 2014) noting that 'the government had acted positively toward ending the national taboo on discussing the purge of suspected members and sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965 and 1966, by allowing limited screenings of *The Act of Killing*.

Other articles, however, mentioned the police banning screenings of the documentary following protests from anti-communist and radical religious groups, and there were discussions about whether the police should rather have protected the film-goers from the protesters than banning the documentary screenings. This may also be seen in connection to several articles dealing with violent protests against gatherings by victims of the 1965/66 events and their families. In 'Freedom of Assembly – Ex-prisoners Gathering was Forcefully Dissolved' (*Kompas*, October 28th, 2013) it was reported how a radical anti-communist group prevented ex-prisoners from gathering whilst the police stood by and did not protect their right to assembly. I will get back to this also in section 4.4.4 which deals with perceptions of the anti-communist and radical religious groups.

4.3.6 Concluding remarks

The above support the findings in 4.2 which suggest that the 1965/66 debate as reflected in the selected newspapers had more to do with advocacy and political influence than a two-sided discussion. The vast majority of the reference articles dealt thematically with the need for truth and reconciliation requiring political action. In many of the articles the aim seemed to be to raise awareness and momentum in the population to influence the political power-

holders to find the truth and take steps towards reconciliation. Others challenged the political level more directly. Kitley (2008:221), as mentioned under chapter 2, found that the government and other state institutions are frequently criticised in Indonesian media (in Tapsell in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:227). This analysis supports this, however suggests that the critique is somewhat moderate. The critique found in the reference articles were often formulated in quite general terms and seldom with any demands aimed at specific government officials or politicians. The President was at times targeted and called upon to assume responsibility for taking action, however few other representatives were specifically mentioned by name. This suggests a certain weariness in the press community vis-à-vis the power-holders and politicians and that the Indonesian press are somewhat cautious relating to holding the ruling power accountable and fully taking on the role as a ‘watchdog’. This supports the findings of analysis by Pintak and Setiyono (2010:1) and Tapsell (in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:227), as presented in chapter 2. This will be further discussed relating to restrictions on freedom of speech and self-censorship in section 4.5.

4.4 Old perceptions in a new context? Perceptions of 1965/66 stakeholders then and now

As presented in chapter 1, a heavy propaganda machine was put into place in the initial phases of the New Order era (Roosa, 2006, Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009, Hill, 2007). The media were taken under control, and the only version of the attempted coup d’état and the following anti-communist purge in 1965/66 was the official state one. As mentioned in section 2, controlling the media as a source of information distribution was one of the main ways for the propagandists to control information flows (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012: 46). Towards the end of New Order the media changed in the wake of the mutating financial situation in the region, and a more politically independent press gradually emerged. With the downfall of Suharto’s regime formal press freedom was eventually granted. Many of the military and political power-holders from the New Order regime did however remain, and some are still involved in the country’s highest political levels. The question thus stands as to what extent there are still remnants of propaganda and attempts to influence public debate on this particular issue. Informal restrictions of free debate about the 1965/66 topic will be further presented in section 4.5. Firstly, I will present thoughts on the perceptions of the 1965/66 massacres and the stakeholders as shown in today’s press. These thoughts will be based on whether the previously official New Order version of the 1965/66 events is still visible and upheld by some in today’s press and how valid the perceptions propagated relating

to the various stakeholders appear today, after 32 years of propaganda under New Order followed by 16 years of democracy and free speech.

4.4.1 Communists as the common enemy

It is evident from the reference articles that there are still misconceptions and a lack of understanding of communism as an ideology even today. According to the findings, this is due to the distorted information received in the New Order reign and the long-lasting taboo to discuss the topic. The word 'communist' is still used today by Indonesians as negative name calling when someone has done something wrong or misbehaved, and some of the interviewees admitted to sometimes using the word for this purpose. The majority of the articles argue that the communist party was not in fact responsible for the coup d'état, was falsely accused and did not deserve the massive repercussions in 1965/66. Many who were accused of being communists at the time, were subsequently proved not to have been a member of the party or have had any other affiliation with communism. This is likely to be the reason why the articles almost always had the words 'alleged' or 'suspected' attached to the word 'communist'. It may lead us to think that being a communist is still considered something negative, to a certain extent also by those who deny the New Order version of the events in the 1960s.

The analysis clearly suggests that there are still elements of various levels of distrust and even hatred towards communists, and that the enemy image of communists created in New Order still holds stand for some. As described in chapter 2, Herman and Chomsky claimed in their Propaganda Model (1988) that anti-communism as a national religion and control mechanism were among other editorially-distorting filters which applied to news reporting by the mass media. During New Order this was very much the case, and this filter may be said from this analysis to not having lost its relevance in the Indonesian context. The ideological filter explains the criterion of the two kinds of victims; the worthy and unworthy. The unworthy victims' fate is ignored or denied, which may be said to be the situation in Indonesia where there has been no recognition of or resolution for the many victims who are still suffering due to the 1965/66 massacres. The analysis show that there are various and conflicting opinions on this issue in the Indonesian society, and there are indications that the press rooms may not be where anti-communism has its strongest hold. Still, the press workers operate as part of the society as a whole and within the conditions given them by the authorities and also relating pressure from external groups such as anti-communist groups and radical religious groups.

The latter will be discussed in section 4.4.4. As it emerges from the analysis, the conceptions following the indoctrination by the New Order regime still holds their stand to various degrees for the individual.

‘Just the name Gerwani sent shivers down my spine as a kid’

– Dessy Sagita, journalist for *The Jakarta Global*, February 19th, 2014

Gerwani stands for *Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* and was the women's wing of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). According to the New Order narrative the women belonging to this wing of the organisation tortured and mutilated the generals kidnapped in October 1956. These stories were later proven false (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009: 292). *Gerwani* members were referred to as ‘sadistic whores’ in the newspapers, where people could read stories about the mutilation of the generals’ genitals and the gouging out of their eyes in the wake of orgies (*The Jakarta Globe*, February 28th, 2014). These stories were portrayed in detail in the movie *Pengkhianatan* (The Betrayal of the PKI), which was shown on the state TV channel every year until 1998. This was obligatory viewing for school children who wrote reviews of the movie every year. Dessy Sagita remembers it well (shared in an interview February 19th, 2014):

‘Having to watch that kind of movie every year, you did not question whether communism was bad for you. You knew for sure it was bad. Even though you did not know what communism was all about’.

In the article ‘On Act of Killing, No Easy Answers’ in *The Jakarta Globe* (February 17th, 2014), the author related memories about how the entire village watched the propaganda movie together on the only TV around. ‘When the army and death squads succeeded in slaughtering what they called ‘communists’ the villagers cheerfully clapped their hands’. He stated that ‘New Order no doubt succeeded in brainwashing Indonesians, including myself, by declaring that communism was a common enemy and a continuous threat to the nation. It argued that deadly violence against communists and their sympathizers was legitimate and that the perpetrators had to be considered heroes’.

The propaganda movie is no longer aired on TV. However, the history books still contain the same narrative as before 1998, and the same curriculum is taught in schools. Indonesians celebrate the Pancasila Sanctuary Day on October 1st, to honour the generals who were murdered by the communists. Then the ‘red-and white flutters at full mast, symbolizing how

good triumphed over evil by crushing the coup and all the unmentioned measures to purge that evil' (*The Jakarta Post*, September 30th, 2013).

In some of the articles the 1965/66 events were referred to by the term 'G30SPKI'. This term contains the date of the alleged coup d'état on 30th September, 1965, and during the Suharto era PKI was added so that the date and the alleged perpetrators were inevitably linked together. This term is used only in the Indonesian-language newspaper, *Kompas*, and not in the English-language papers in the article selection. In the English-language papers the terms 'massacres', 'genocide', 'killings', 'purge' or 'violence' are those most commonly used. The interviewees confirmed that 'G30SPKI' is often used in the Indonesian language. Sometimes it is shortened to 'G20S' as there have been suggestions to officially change the term to better reflect what really happened ('30 September: Still Dark Until Now' in *Kompas*, October 13th, 2013)

4.4.2 The Indonesian government and politicians

Two main conflicting perceptions are present in the reference articles. Some support the view that the military and political leaders during the 1965/66 anti-communist purge should be considered heroes for saving the nation from communist takeover, which was also the official line proclaimed during the New Order regime. The dominant view, however, is that the leaders in the sixties were responsible for a massacre of disproportionate dimensions and targeted innocent people. There are of course variations within these main narratives. One of the nuances is the perception that communist rule would have been damaging to the nation and that their rise to power was forceful and violent, but that the repercussions from the government were still wrong and disproportionate.

The reference articles reveal a clear perception that the current power-holders in Indonesia are the same as in 1965/66, if not in person then by family ties. After the time period of the reference articles a change of power has occurred in the wake of the presidential election in July, 2014. The former governor for Jakarta, belonging to the Indonesian Party of Struggle (PDP-P), Joko Widodo, was elected president, which might be said to be a political change of direction for Indonesia. Several of the other presidential candidates were former military generals, a common trait in Indonesian politics where strong and powerful leaders are valued. Some of these candidates had personal or family ties to the events of 1965/66. In the article 'No Inquiry Into '65 on SBY's Watch' a university lecturer of defence speculated that Widodo was the most likely to attempt to uncover the truth about the 1965/66 events, should

he come to power. Now that he has it remains to be seen if this will be the case or if he will uphold what seems to be a tradition of silence about the human rights violations of the sixties.

Government officials' reluctance to speak about the 1965/66 events was stated by the interviewees, as mentioned in section 4.2. The majority of the reference articles suggest the same. The few statements from government representatives in the reference articles clearly support the previous official line proclaimed under the New Order regime. In the commentary 'Act of Killing, in Contention for Oscar, Fails to Stir Indonesia' a reference was made to a statement made by Indonesian Coordination Minister for Security at the time, Djoko Suyanto, claiming that 'the military saved the Indonesian state' by leading the anti-communist purge in the sixties (*The Jakarta Globe*, March 3rd, 2014). The said minister is himself a retired military commander-in-chief. The statement followed the release of the report by the national committee for human rights in 2012.

More active participation in the debate by the politicians was suggested in the selected article as being important for Indonesia as a democracy. Several of the articles voiced disappointment that this topic was not a larger part of the 2014 presidential election campaign, and the reference articles suggest that the lack of addressing human rights violations in the past has led to a general mistrust towards the authorities and the judiciary. *The Jakarta Post* journalist Andreas Aditya claims that what he sees as the glorification by the political leadership of a history of genocide to create a climate of fear, involves a 'very real risk that the country will backslide toward military dictatorship' (*The Jakarta Post*, January 18th, 2014).

4.4.3 The Indonesian military; heroes and perpetrators

It is evident from the reference articles that there is a broadly shared understanding that the military were the driving force for the implementation of the anti-communist purge in 1965/66. There are variations in the reference articles about the level of strength and power still held by the Indonesian military. The military had a dual function and also held political power under New Order. There was a significant internal reform within the Indonesian military after the restoration of democracy, but the selected material is inconclusive when it comes to how far the process of separating the military and politics have come and how much power is still held by the military. There are inevitably still close links between politics and the Indonesian military. Several of the candidates in the 2014 election were former generals, and there are several references in the reference articles as to how Indonesians believe in strong leaders, which in the Indonesian context mean military generals. With the presidential

election in 2014 Indonesians, however, did prove that they wanted a new direction for the nation as they elected a candidate who is neither a former general nor known for being a strong leader in the traditional Indonesian sense of the term. It was suggested in the reference articles that a president with a non-military background would be preferable for the nation in order to put an end the general distrust people across the country felt towards authorities.

In the article ‘If democracy gets tired’, a teacher at the Defence University in Jakarta, Salim Said, feared that what he calls a ‘democratic burnout’ will lead to military leadership once again. According to Said, this will happen if the Indonesian politicians ‘continue to deplete public trust’. People will get tired of democracy and resort to ‘iron-fisted leaders, which in Indonesian history are the military’ (*Kompas*, January 5th, 2014).

The view that the military has succeeded in separating themselves from politics is present in the reference articles (‘An impartial military as a result of democracy’ in *Kompas*, January 9th 2014). According to the article the question of impartiality always arises in times of elections as there are concerns that the military might ‘align with certain candidates or have a certain vested interest to influence the election result’, which has happened in the past. The article claims that recent polls show that the general public is now convinced that the Indonesian military is ‘able to remain impartial and free from intervention of any political powers, including the influence of past military leaders who have now become active politicians’ (ibid).

Prior to the presidential election in 2014 *Tempo Magazine* conducted a nine hour interview with presidential candidate and a former military man, General Prabowo. The editor in chief of *Tempo* was of the opinion that the fact that the journalists did not suffer any reprisals after the interview, despite confrontations with Prabowo, showcases the changing times. ‘Prabowo now knows that he would have been scrutinized by the public had anything happened following his dissatisfaction with the *Tempo* interview’ (Arif Zulkifi, editor in chief of *Tempo Magazine*, in an interview February 24th, 2014).

The level of power of the Indonesian military today will be presented further in section 4.5.

4.4.4 Anti-communists and radical Islamic and militia groups

There are additional voices that support the New Order narrative of the 1965/66 events in the reference articles. These belong primarily to radical religious groups. As previously stated in section 1, the propaganda under the Suharto regime claimed that communists per definition were also atheists and thus a threat to Islam. The reference articles suggest that this still seems

to be valid among certain groups. Several of the reference articles dealt with violent anti-communism protests from various radical groups, and there are several mentions of these groups in the interviews as challenges to practising free speech. There are particularly three groups that reoccur in the articles as well as in the interviews. These are the para-military youth organization Pemuda Pancasila, the anti-communist group Front Anti Komunis Indonesia (FAKI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). Violence and threats seem to be part of their arsenal, and from the coverage in the reference articles they seem to share a notion of being above the law by attacking legal institutions and seemingly not fearing repercussions from the police. A commentary in *The Jakarta Post* talks of ‘a blessing of bullies’ in Indonesian society, which happens ‘through the absence of law enforcement against these groups’ actions’ (*The Jakarta Post*, November 4th, 2013). Thus, the article claims that these groups continue their ‘efforts to uphold their versions of what is right and wrong’.

There are several suggestions in the reference articles that there are links between certain members of the political elite and these radical groups. The FPI was originally set up by the military and the police in 1998 to confront the student demonstrations at the time. The group then disappeared but re-emerged some years later. Then it was without formal ties to the military or police, but still with their informal support according to the reference articles. In the documentary *The Act of Killing* the now current and at the time former Vice President of Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla, appeared during a gathering for the para-military organisation, Pemuda Pancasila, dressed in their uniform and proudly proclaimed, ‘We need our gangsters to get things done’ (referred to in the article ‘Courts Wilt Under attack from Pemuda Pancasila Thugs’ in *The Jakarta Globe*, September 18th, 2013). In the commentary ‘Muscle testing of bullies amid dangerous state silence’ (*The Jakarta Post*, November 4th, 2013) the Home Affairs Minister at the time, Fauzii, refers to the FPI as a ‘national asset’. There is also mention of how the law enforcement on several occasions gave into the demands of these groups and, for instance, banned screenings of *The Act of Killing*, book signings about communism, or gatherings of families of victims of the 1965/66 events, instead of protecting them from the violent protesters to ensure freedom of speech.

4.4.5 Concluding remarks

It is evident from the reference articles that despite the massive transformation that the country has gone through over the past 16 years, there are still quite a few remnants from the

New Order period in the 'new' Indonesia. First and foremost, several of the political and military actors from the sixties are either still active and hold political power themselves or are connected by family ties to current power-holders. That these have certain interests in upholding the narrative propagated in the New Order era is understandable. Whether they attempt to do so by influencing the press to avoid journalistic attention either by legislative or informal methods will be further presented in section 4.5. However, it is apparent from the above that three decades of indoctrination has made a clear mark on the Indonesian population and, to a greater or lesser degree, still influences their perceptions of certain issues today. This also seems applicable to some degree for some of those fully aware of the propaganda methods utilized by the New Order regime and who are both knowledgeable about the context in which the massacres took place and well-informed about their political past and current power-structures. This serves to show that propagated narratives are long-lived in contexts where open public debate is limited – not matter the cause – and that certain issues are not subjected to substantial investigative journalism.

4.5 Restrictions on freedom of speech

The end of the New Order regime and the turn to democracy in Indonesia has led to a vast and vibrant media environment. According to the above analysis, voices critical of the government and state institutions are visible in today's press, which supports the Kitley's view (2008: 221) when he says that such critical articles appear frequently in the Indonesian press (Tapsell in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:227). This serves as an example that times have changed, and Indonesian journalists can write more openly without fearing state intervention. The question remains however if there is more to the story than meets the eye, and how open and free the press in fact is when it comes to reporting on certain sensitive issues, such as the 1965/66 massacres.

Reporters Without Borders acknowledges that there are significant challenges when it comes to how freely the press operates in Indonesia. As mentioned in chapter 1, Indonesia is ranked as number 139 out of 178 countries on the 2013 Press Freedom Index. Freedom House emphasizes that press freedom is hampered by a number of legal and regulatory restrictions, cases of violence against journalists and self-censorship by journalists.

In the above, I have attempted to uncover to what extent the topic of the 1965/66 massacres is present in today's press and how the issue is covered. The second part of my research question is to what extent the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres is influenced by external

restrictions and/or self-censorship. This means I will also need to look beyond the written material to attempt to examine what articles are not written and why. As previously stated, there is a methodical challenge to drawing conclusions about what has not appearing in the printed media, and the following analysis relies more on the interviews carried out than on the written reference articles.

4.5.1 Legal restrictions

As seen in chapter 2, even the most consistent advocates of free speech acknowledge the need for limitations. Freedom of expression in Indonesia is guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution and reaffirmed in 2002^{xvii}. Chapter 1 presents a background overview of some of the legislation that restricts freedom of expression in Indonesia. In the following I will elaborate further on this.

All the interviewed journalists agree that certain formal regulations are necessary and important, and that those which apply for the Indonesian press are to a large degree acceptable. The discrepancy between theory and practice is however raised as an issue by some of the interviewees. In the Indonesian context the most important legal restrictions in this regard are the law of defamation, the law against pornography, and law of information technology and electronic transaction. Most of the interview subjects view the law of defamation as the most significant for their daily practise in the journalism industry. As described above, this law falls under the Penal Code. As such, defamation is defined as written or oral communication that goes against the will of the affected party and might be found offensive^{xviii}. These laws are in active use in Indonesia, and the co-producer of the documentary *The Act of Killing* explained that the risk of being sentenced under the Defamation Laws was part of his and his Indonesian colleagues' reasons for remaining anonymous after releasing the documentary.

The active use of the defamation laws has been criticised by international actors for encouraging self-censorship in the coverage of sensitive subjects. Similar concerns have arisen with more recent legislation such as the Information Technology Crime Bill and the Anti-Pornography Law, both introduced in 2008. These have been criticised for containing vague and ambiguous wording which can lead to confusion or misinterpretation and thus being potentially disruptive for freedom of expression in Indonesia.

Indonesia has an established Press Council to arbitrate potential conflicts between the media and the public. In cases where the Council concludes that a certain paper has overstepped its bounds, the paper is recommended to write and print a retraction, seek balance or apologize.

To ensure this mechanism, the Press Council has a memorandum of understanding with both the police and the legal system that all complaints are firstly to be handled by this Council. The challenge emphasized by some of the interviewees is that procedures are not necessarily followed, particularly by politicians, businessmen and others belonging to the Indonesian elite. These often go straight to the police with their complaints, and instead of referring them to the Press Council the complaints may be immediately passed on to the legal system.

‘Powerful people do not bother, but go straight to the police. It is stressful and it is scary. I do not think they want to throw all journalists to jail, but to scare them off. Especially if you are new, it will be quite a shock for you’.

– Dessy Sagita, journalist for *The Jakarta Globe*, February 19th, 2014

The above quote indicates that these laws are used to intimidate the press to self-censor, which supports the for-mentioned critique by some international actors that the legal framework is too vague and thus open for misuse. The above is not an exhaustive overview of the legal framework for freedom of speech, but it gives a certain snapshot.

4.5.2 Propaganda and censorship then and now

As stated above in section 1, Suharto and his government immediately seized control of the media after taking over power in 1965. Many news media were shut down and an intricate set of rules and regulations were put in place that imposed severe limitations for the survivors (Hill, 1994:11). A heavy propaganda machine was established, and the media was used to propagate the government’s version of what happened in the alleged coup d’état in 1965 and the atrocities that took place afterwards when between 500,000 to 2 million people were massacred (Cribb in Totten and Parsons, 2009:289).

‘Being Editor in Chief in the Suharto era was like being a pilot on an airplane that was hijacked’

– Former editor in chief, Goenawan Muhaddad, according to current editor in chief of *Tempo Magazine*, Arif Zulkifi, February, 2014

As mentioned under the background chapter there was an intricate legal framework in place during the rule of Suharto, but also unwritten rules which the media were expected to obey. The *Kompas* newspaper had a whiteboard next to the newsroom where the secretary would write down messages after receiving phone calls with demands from Ministry of Information, the military, and the department of Foreign Affairs. Not to obey these orders could lead to banning of the publication. Individual journalists were also privately disciplined by authorities.

Journalists received constant phone calls, and particularly the military commands were hard to disobey. Doing so could lead to a jail sentence or physical beatings from the military or police. In this way, the regime created an environment of fear in which journalists were consistently afraid of reporting anything that could be seen as critique of the ruling elite.

The government's restrictions were however not always verbalized in clear messages. According to senior editor at *The Jakarta Post*, Endy Bayuni, there was an 'imaginary line' under the New Order regime (from an interview on February 21st, 2014). The framework in which to practise journalism was not specifically formulated, and editors and journalists were left to guess by the mood of the government if it was safe to write and publish a specific story. If one came too close to the 'imaginary line' the editor in chief was given a warning by the Ministry of Information, and the unwritten rule was that after three warnings, the publication was shut down. Over thirty cases of temporary or permanent bans occurred between 1965 and 1994. In 1994 *Tempo Magazine* and the mainstream publications *Editor* and *DeTIK* were controversially banned (Steele, 2006). All these instances served as warnings to other editors who would self-censor to avoid a similar fate for their publications.

Being a journalist during the New Order era was like
walking on a beach full of crabs. You take one step forward
and if no crab bites your foot, you take another one. If you
are bitten, you have to step back'.

– Founder of *Kompas*, Jakob Oetama, according to the editor in chief of *Tempo Magazine*,
Arif Zulkifi, February 24th, 2014

Bayuni shared in an interview (February 21st, 2014) that he believed a certain level of risk had to be accepted to avoid merely being 'a mouthpiece of the government'. Most Indonesian newspapers were however reluctant to take too many risks. One way to avoid repercussions was to 'hide' controversial messages in their articles. In an interview (February 24th, 2014) senior reporter for *Kompas*, Maria Harteningsih, stated that under New Order she had to be 'clever' when writing about the issue of the 1965/66 massacres by burying the stories in the middle of articles to get it past editors and published. In her view her younger colleagues today do not have the experience in how to write about these issues. She feels that if the articles are 'bluntly' written they will be rejected even today. Her explanation of how sensitive issues were hidden in less controversial stories is backed by statements from some of the other interviewees about how Indonesians are very good at 'reading between the lines'. Under New Order this was a necessity, as a lot was not specifically stated, but implied.

Today Suharto's authoritative regime is history and freedom of speech is guaranteed under the Constitution. According to Voltmer and Rowsley (2009) the guarantee of freedom of speech is usually undisputed constitutionally in transitional democracies and has been implemented in virtually all such (in Jebril, Stetka and Loveless, 2013:7). The analysis in this thesis shows that there are debates about the level of freedom of speech experienced in Indonesia today. One of the interviewees goes so far to that the country has 'un-freedom of expression' (from an interview with the anonymous co-producer of the *'Act of Killing'* on March 19th, 2014). The mere fact that he and the other Indonesian crew behind the documentary chose to remain anonymous shows that there is limited space to discuss the 1965/66 massacres even today. Some of the interviewees do claim that major parts of the restrictions and mentality back then are still valid today. Thus, despite the official freedom there are still significant challenges when it comes to reporting about the 1965/66 massacres and other issues considered sensitive to the current government. There are variations in the selected material as to whether there still is an 'imaginable line' for what is accepted to report on in the Indonesian press today. There are indications that the notion of how freely one may practise journalism is connected with journalistic or editorial experience during the New Order regime. However, there is not a definite relation between age and duration of journalistic experience and the notion of press freedom in the material. Individual experiences of being either censored by their respective newsrooms or approached by various external actors and given warnings or direct threats seems to form the basis for the interviewees' perceptions of their journalistic freedom.

As a common denominator these challenges to freely report do however seem to be mainly connected with pressure or expectations to self-censor. In the following I will look into the issue of self-censorship and aim to uncover whether the 1965/66 reporting is influenced by self-censorship and why.

4.5.3 Self-censorship and the 1965/66 massacres

As mentioned in chapter 2 self-censorship is when journalists or editors have information they choose not to publish (McLaughlin in Ottosen 2001: 223 – 224; Dahl 1999:20). These are broad definitions without any information about the reasoning behind them. For this thesis, as mentioned in chapter 2, I do understand self-censorship as Tapsell sees it: 'self-censorship occurs when journalists limit or ignore aspects of a story because they fear repercussions for those with vested interests who are cited in their report' (in Asian Studies Review June 2012:229). A central part of the journalistic practise is to choose which information to include

and what to exclude. The reasons behind these choices are relevant when it comes to self-censorship, which often results from various external factors that are not obvious but exist and influence the decision-making process.

As stated above, the analysis shows that there are still issues that are sensitive to report on in today's Indonesia and the 1965/66 massacres are amongst these. Despite the formal freedom, the interviewees reveal that either they themselves or colleagues either belonging to their own news organization or others do at times restrain from covering all aspects of certain topics. As presented under chapter 2 it is often assumed that the function of the press is to be the same as in established democracies where the main function is said to be to hold the government and political elites accountable (Voltmer, 2006a, Scammel and Semtko, 2000a, Gurevitch and Blumler, 1990 in Jebril, Stetka and Loveless, 2013:7). This understanding of the press's role is strongly rooted in the liberal, Anglo-American tradition of journalism, and at times transitional democracies have however shown to develop media systems that differ from this, which creates several – and larger – gaps between the 'ideal' and the reality of journalism than in established democracies. (McConnell and Becker, 2002 in Jebril, Stetka and Loveless, 2013:7) What the 'ideal' characteristics of the press is in Indonesia can be debated, as the 'free but responsible' *Pancasila* journalist has had a strong hold in the Indonesian society. However the official ideal is a free and independent press as guaranteed in the Constitution. I will in the following discuss this further in connection with the identified external influences for self-censorship.

4.5.3.1 Political influence

As referred to above, *Kompas* had a whiteboard where the instructions from the authorities were written and visible for all the editors and journalists to see under the New Order. This is no longer the case, and few news workers today receive direct instructions from the political sector. According to senior editor for *The Jakarta Post*, Endy Bauyundi, phone calls from politicians and other state officials in attempts to pressure or influence the media content do to a certain extent still occur, but they are few and far in-between (stated in an interview February 21st, 2014).

'That is still happening, but not frequently. But some would resort to that – powerful businessmen, politicians and the radical Islamic groups. They would resort to threats and violence, intimidations to deprive journalists of the freedom of the press. I cannot remember the last experience I had, so it must be quite a while ago. But the point is not the frequency. One event is enough to send a chilling effect'.

This analysis points to a trend where the political influence on news products presents itself in a much more indirect manner in Indonesia today. The *Pancasila* philosophy was strongly upheld by the Suharto government during New Order. The findings in this analysis indicate that there is still a notion amongst journalists that the expectations from the political sector is that they should be 'responsible' in the sense that they are loyal and non-critical towards the authorities and do not stir controversy with regards to certain issues, such as the 1965/66 massacres.

As previously stated, the voices of government officials appear to be absent from the reference articles, and the few that there are seems to be either downplaying the anti-communist purge or defending it. According to some of the interviewees, it is challenging to get statements from the Indonesian elite on these kinds of issues. They do in other words claim that is not due to the lack of attempts to confront the political sector that this is often absent in the reference articles, but rather that the politicians refuse to respond. In western news media reporters inform the reader when a government representative chooses not to respond to questions, and the reader or viewer can thus draw their own conclusions about why they chose not to comment on a certain issue. In the Indonesian media this is not the case, and one is left to wonder whether the journalist has sought to get a comment from the responsible government body or not. Not being available for journalists is an efficient way for elite sources to not only withhold information, but also to send a message to the journalists that their attempts at critical reporting are disapproved of.

The reference articles do, as mentioned above, demand action from the political leadership to address the human rights violation of the past. However, few of the reference articles call upon specific members of the government or political sector with their demands. Many of the demands are repetitions of previous demands and often are they also said in broad and general terms. This must be considered in connection with what the press workers see as the function of the media. The analysis does show variations relating to what the press workers see as their main role. Pintak and Setiyono found in their survey (2010:1) that the way the journalists see their core mission has evolved but not 'radically changed since the Suharto era' and they continue to see it as their duty to 'work for societal development and to give voice to those who have none'. This finding is supported by the analysis for this thesis. As previously stated, there is a notion of advocacy in the reference articles in the sense that they seek to reveal the truth about the 1965/66 massacres and aim to achieve reconciliation of the past to enable the

country to heal and move forward. Several of the interviewees shared that they considered that the most important tasks for journalists were to give a voice to the voiceless and to raise topics such as human rights, anti-corruption, climate change, health issues, et cetera. However, it must be mentioned here that I deliberately sought out some interviewees with experience within the human rights field, and their background may influence their views relating what they consider to be their most important tasks.

The media workers interviewed for this analysis did however also mention holding the government accountable for their politics and functioning as a ‘watchdog’ was a significant part of the journalist role. In Pintak and Setiyono’s survey (2010: 17) the ‘watchdog’ role is however further down on the list of priorities. 66 percent of the respondents said that ‘Investigating government statements’ is most important, while more than half the respondents state that the media should ‘support government policies’ and merely 41 percent think journalists should be ‘adversaries of the government’.

It appears from this analysis that both holding the government accountable and contributing to social development are deemed important functions of the press. A large number of the reference articles called out for government action relating to the 1965/66 massacres, which supports the view of the interviewees who said that the ‘watchdog’ function is an essential part of journalistic role. The efforts to seek the truth, represent the voiceless victims and reconcile the country which are apparent in the reference articles, are in line with the interviewees’ view that contributions to social development is also an important function of the press. Romano (2003: 57) found in her survey that most of the journalists saw no contradiction between the role of a *Pancasila* journalist and the role as a ‘watchdog’. What they did object was aggressive way the ‘watchdog’ role was conducted in western journalism. This may serve as part of the explanation for why the power-holders were not specifically confronted in the reference articles. The weariness vis a vis the power-holders and the lack of direct confrontations and concrete suggested actions as it appears in this analysis, clearly indicate that while the ‘watchdog’ role seems to be deemed important, it is still not fully embraced by the Indonesian press. This appears from this analysis to be a consequence of a combination of continuous influence and expectations from the press by the political sector, as well as a practice within the newsrooms and amongst the press workers themselves. The latter will be further discussed also under 4.5.3.4

Nationalism is also an aspect to be noted in this connection. The expectation of loyalty to the Indonesian state can be found in the reference articles relating to the documentary *The Act of Killing*. The documentary has a western producer as well as western financial support, and the movie is criticized for presenting an inaccurate and unbalanced ‘foreign view’ of the events as well as being a deliberate smear campaign of Indonesia. These are statements both from opinion writers as well as by official representatives. Indonesia is amongst the up-and-coming countries on the world market and is, as most countries, concerned about its international reputation. The analysis suggests that there is a notion of national pride in the Indonesian society. This is visible from the expressed pride that the Indonesian nation was ‘saved’ from communism, but also from a certain collective shame related to the 1965/66 massacres. That people are concerned about external impressions of their nations may be true in many countries, and it is understandable that this may also influence news reporting. This may be even more valid for Indonesia, which is an emerging democracy and economy with a recent history of colonization and wide-spread poverty. As mentioned in chapter 2, loyalty towards the state is common within the press during crisis and conflict. The 1965/66 massacres took place after an alleged coup d’etat and a political crisis and was followed by over thirty years of dictatorship and an emergency-like situation which may say to have enhanced the feelings of loyalty to the Indonesian nation.

The findings in this analysis do however suggest that the most significant political means to influence the Indonesian press today is media ownership. This was described in chapter 1 and further presented in chapter 2. Daniel Dhakidao (1991: 283) has argued that Indonesian journalists under the New Order became ‘politically de-capacitated’ due to a concentration of ownership encouraged by both the state and market forces as early as 1975 (Tapsell in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012: 232). Media groups were already then owned by the powerful elite and expanded into other industries (Hill, 1994:81-110), which according to Tapsell continued also after New Order and is still valid in the Indonesian society. In the following I will look into the commercial side of the press and how the media content is influenced by the existing ownership structures today.

4.5.3.2 Commercial influence

The analysis in this thesis supports the findings of Tapsell (in the *Asian Studies Review* June 2012: 241) and Pintak and Setiyono (2010:16) saying that the ownership structures in Indonesia do influence the media content. As mentioned in the background chapter, the news

organizations grew in numbers and the media environment diversified following the reforms after the fall of the Suharto regime. The new investors included members of a web of political, well-connected business people that surrounded former President Suharto's family and friends, or heads of conglomerates with strong ties to powerful officials. The top-selling newspapers in Indonesia are *Kompas* and *Jawa Pos*, while other influential publications include *Tempo*, *Pos Kota* and *The Jakarta Post* (Tapsell, 2012: 234). *The Jakarta Globe* is a rival of English-language *The Jakarta Post*, but with a lower circulation and reach. As mentioned in chapter 1, *The Jakarta Globe* was established in 2008 by today's owner and deputy chairman of the Lippo Group, James Riady. Lippo Group is the largest property owner and developer in Indonesia, and has business interests in banking, publishing and retail. Riady has a large media portfolio and his son is the director of digital media at *The Jakarta Globe*. James Riady is not himself a political figure but has close links to politicians in Indonesia and the US (*The New York Times*, 20 March, 2011, in Tapsell, 2012: 235). Aburizal Bakrie is the chairman of the Golkar Party and was amongst the candidates for the 2014 presidential elections. He is one of Indonesia's richest men and controls companies in a wide range of businesses, including mining, oil and gas, palm oil, property and finance. The Bakrie media portfolio is large and includes television stations, online newswire media and newspapers.

Indonesia's biggest media conglomerate is the Jawa Pos Group. The CEO is a former *Tempo* journalist, Dahlan Iskan, who in 2011 was appointed to the position of State-owned Enterprises Minister by then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The Jawa Pos Group owns 140 newspapers all over Indonesia in addition to multiple TV stations and is the most rapidly expanding conglomerate investing in new newspapers. They also invest in fields such as hotels, real estate, transport and power.

There is an inconsistency in the reference articles to what extent the public is aware of these ownership structures. Some of the interviewees claim it is transparent and open and thus feel confident that the general public is able to distinguish between propaganda and 'real news'. Due to the vastness of the media in Indonesia, alternatives and various views are available to people. One of the interviewees stated that there is a certain balance as the various TV-stations are owned by politicians from different parties who 'fight each other' and that the audience can thus compare and in this way easily spot propaganda. Other interviewees pointed out that those living in Jakarta and those of the middle class are enlightened about the commercial side of the media landscape. However, this information and knowledge might not

reach out to those living in decentralized areas at lower levels of society, which means most of the large Indonesian population.

All the media workers interviewed for this thesis are of the opinion that the ownership structures do influence editorial content for the media in Indonesia. Thus, the degree of independence and ability to report freely on all issues vary significantly amongst the different media organizations. *Tempo Magazine* is according to this analysis least affected by the business side out of the news organizations included in this thesis. The ownership of *Tempo* is in part on the hands of the employees, who have a large percentage of the shares. *The Jakarta Post* is also said to be relatively independent. It was founded in 1993 by a consortium of five newspapers, of which *Kompas* was the largest. *Tempo* and the political party Golkar's newspaper were also part of the consortium. Senior editor, Endy Bayuni, was the chief editor at from 2004 – 2010. He confided that it was a balancing act to be chief editor as he had to consider the interests of the board as well as the public's expectations that the editorial content were in line with the paper's vision to promote democracy, human rights and being a voice for the voiceless. In addition there were external demands and strongly expressed interests from outside the media organization. After six years Bayuni choose to leave the position (from interview on February 21st, 2014).

Kompas is published by the second largest press media owner in Indonesia, Kompas Gramedia. According to several of the interviewees, it is claimed to be less independent than the other news media in this analysis, particularly due to its commercial and historical ties with Catholicism which is said to create a certain wariness about crossing Muslim interests.

‘*Kompas* is very, very careful about that. They are very afraid that conflict can affect the business side. So you cannot expect *Kompas* to reveal corruption and human rights violence. They will not’.

– Editor in chief of *Tempo Magazine*, Arif Zulkifi, February 23rd, 2014.

The broadcasting media reaches a much larger percentage of the Indonesian widespread population than print media. The interviewees claim that broadcast media in general are less independent, partly because there are more TV stations than print media owned by the political elite. The interviews for this thesis were conducted merely two months prior to the 2014 presidential elections. Two of the presidential candidates, the for-mentioned Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Poloh, as well Harry Tanoe, who ran for the vice presidency, own several of the largest TV stations.

‘I honestly do not trust any of them (the TV stations) now. There is too much politics. Politicians say that those who own the media will have more access to voice their campaign or whatever their agenda is’.

– Journalist at *The Jakarta Post*, Margareth Aritonang, in an interview on February 24th, 2014

It is not obvious from the analysis exactly how the interviewed media workers experience the influence from the commercial side of journalism. As an editor in chief for *The Jakarta Post*, Endy Bayuni were at times explicitly told the expectations relating the media content by the board, other times not. Lower level journalists are given directions by their editors, however often also merely left with an expectation that they should consider the interests of their editors and news organizations before writing a story. The majority of the interviewees share that they experience a constant pressure to be wary of what they write about certain issues, particularly concerning religion, human rights issues and corruption relating to elite members of the Indonesian society.

‘There are not a lot of media that are courageous enough to go all the way. It is about business and you have to protect your interests’.

– Journalist at *The Jakarta Globe*, Dessy Sagita, February 19th, 2014

4.5.3.3 Safety and security

Failing to adhere to the ‘imaginable line’ could mean prison or worse for journalists during the New Order era. This analysis show that the timidity for physical repercussions from the state institutions amongst press workers is fading. Some of the interviewees claim that the fears altogether are unfounded and rooted in a false sense that the old system still stands.

‘Of course there is the family of Suharto. Of course there is money. But we have to say to the younger journalists that as long as they write ethical articles that covers both sides, they do not need to be afraid. You cannot be afraid of a shadow. You cannot be afraid of a ghost’.

- Arif Zulkifi, editor in chief of *Tempo Magazine*, February 23rd, 2014

The above quote does not represent the majority of the interviewees, who did in fact reveal that they fear repercussions if they were to report on certain issues. The feared repercussions seem to be of various natures. The sense of physical safety when writing about so-called sensitive issues appears to co-relate with previous experiences of receiving violent threats. The entire

Indonesian crew of the documentary *The Act of Killing* chose to be anonymous out of fear of repercussions, and the interviewed co-producer revealed that they had received death threats and other serious warnings through their anonymous web accounts (in an interview on March 19th, 2014). Several of the other interviewees have also had experiences of being threatened in various forms by politicians, members of the military or, most commonly, radical Islamic groups. Senior Reporter at *Kompas*, Iwan Santosa, covers mainly military and defence issues and reveals that he has at times feared for his life. He states that there are certain boundaries that he cannot cross, despite the theoretical press freedom in today's Indonesia (reported in an interview on February 24th, 2014).

The analysis reveal variations when it comes to how the interviewees consider the level of strength and power still held by the Indonesian military and how closely it is linked to politics in today's Indonesia. Prior to the presidential election in 2014 *Tempo Magazine* conducted a nine hour interview with presidential candidate and former General Prabowo. The editor in chief of Tempo, Arif Zulkifi, is of the opinion that if the journalists did not experience any repercussions after the interview despite heated exchange with Prabowo, it showcases the changing times. 'Prabowo now knows that he would have been scrutinized by the public had anything happened following his dissatisfaction with the Tempo interview' (in an interview February 24th, 2014). Senior editor for *The Jakarta Post*, Endy Bayuni, stated in an interview (February 21st, 2014) that he no longer knows the names of other military men than the chief of staff, as this is today not crucial knowledge for an editor, whereas in the past he would have known them all as they would be influencing editorial decisions.

The analysis clearly shows that there is significant pressure inflicted on the press by radical religious groups to control the information flow on certain so-called sensitive issues. During New Order, religious issues were downplayed in the media. After initial electoral successes in the 1960s, Islamic grassroots organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) were barred from politics and confined to civil society to prevent them from becoming an alternative to the regime. With Suharto's departure, Islam entered mainstream politics and took a more overt role in society (Smith, 2005 in Pintak and Setiyono, 2010:6). Some news organizations chose to a large degree not to cover Islamic politics and its militant off-shoots to avoid serving as channels for propaganda for radical Islamic groups and inflaming opinion and thus exacerbating the conflicts. *The Jakarta Post* was amongst these, according to senior editor Endy Bayundi (revealed in an interview February 21st, 2014). This was according to Bayundi a deliberate decision after a violent episode when *The Jakarta Post* received a bomb threat

and had their premises occupied by protesters following a published article unpopular with a radical Islamic group. *The Jakarta Post* and other media were criticized for practicing self-censorship by other media organizations. Meanwhile, other media were also physically targeted by the militants. Newspapers were stormed and journalists threatened and roughed up and *Tempo Magazine* was also victim of a bombing in 2004, though with no casualties.

Journalism professor and human rights activist, Andreas Harsono, received massive physical threats after sharing a video where men from a religious minority group, Ahmadiyah, were beaten to death by militia in 2011.

‘My mate was threatened; my son who was just born was also threatened, not to say my wife. The most bizarre was a Dayak militia, who publicly declared he would drink blood from my skull’.

- Andreas Harsono, Human Rights Watch, February 19th, 2014

On the issue of the 1965/66 massacres, the analysis clearly show that religious groups and various militia are very much involved in attempting to determine the framework of public. The para-military youth organization Pemuda Pancasila, the anti-communist group Front Anti Komunis Indonesia (FAKI), and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) are said to have participated in the 1955/66 massacres and are among the most significant voices in the reference articles. According to the interview subjects, these groups do at times resort to threats or violence against journalists and editors in attempts to control the media publications. The reference articles suggest that there are political influences behind some of the actions carried out by certain religious groups to limit open public debate in the media, but it is not overtly stated. It is worth mentioning however that there seems to be a shared notion that these groups are free to operate without too much control by or interference from the police or politicians. Instead, it is even hinted in the reference articles and interviews that they may be protected and thus able to maintain their pressures on Indonesian journalists and editors, again leading to self-censorship.

4.5.3.4 Professional practise and organizational structures in the newsrooms

This analysis does, as stated above, reveal variations in opinions related to role of the Indonesian media, whether its main function is to serve as a ‘watchdog’ holding the ruling power accountable or to serve as ‘responsible’ and contribute to developing the country. The latter can be said to be a remain from the New Order era when the *Pancasila* journalist was upheld as the ideal, which meant that the press should not be confronting the government, but

rather working alongside them to develop the nation. It is evident from this analysis – despite the reforms and time passed – that some press workers still think in terms of the New Order era and the old mind-set. Some journalists have found it difficult to adapt to the journalistic transition. Senior journalist for *Kompas*, Maria Hartiningsih, admitted in an interview (February 24th, 2014) that she finds the current journalistic landscape confusing and that things were ‘easier’ during New Order. Then there was a common enemy, the dictatorship, but after the reform even the most idealistic activists became corrupt politicians. She therefore finds it difficult to know who to trust, and the journalistic world is ‘less clear’ than in the New Order era. This view is also supported by other interviewees and some of the reference articles for the analysis.

The Indonesian society is said to be hierarchical, which seems accurate for the news organizations used for this thesis. In most cases journalists do not oppose their editors or those senior in rank or age. The most influential editors are likely to be senior in age and they thus have had media experience under the New Order era. They may therefore maintain certain mind-sets and traditions of self-censorship that can be maintained in the newsrooms even today. Maria Hartiningsih told in an interview (February 24th, 2014) about a younger colleague who wrote an article about the Academy Award nomination of the documentary *The Act of Killing*, that panned it. The article was in addition ‘hidden’ in the middle of the paper among ads and insignificant content and was thus not very visible. She asked the journalist why she had written a one-sided article of such poor quality, only to be told that the editor had not only given strict instructions, but had also heavily edited the piece. Hartiningsih had not confronted the editor, but claimed that he must have deliberately sabotaged the article rendering it ‘poor and insignificant’, because she knew him to be in fact a better writer and editor than the article showed. In her opinion this serves as an example of how some editors are still severely cautious when it comes to certain issues, and that younger journalists are not equipped to write stories about events like the 1965/66 massacres. They write ‘bluntly’ instead of ‘between the lines’ and are thus being either rejected or edited.

There are clear indications in the analysis that there is lack of professionalism and that the current journalistic practice in general may not be fully aligned with the desired standards of quality and ethics. As mentioned under chapter 1 the increased freedom of the press after the New Order regime resulted in an influx of sensation stories and publications of rumors and speculations. The press saw a need to increase professionalism and improve ethical standards, so *Kode Etik Wartawan Indonesia* was created (Indonesian Journalists’ Code of Ethics).

According to this analysis, these are however not adequately followed. This also supports the findings by Pintak and Setiyono (2010:1) in their nationwide survey amongst 600 journalists where they found that the journalists saw the lack of professionalism as the greatest risk to their industry. One serious challenge to point out is corruption. Corruption is widespread in Indonesian society and the journalism industry is no exception. Reporters are frequently given ‘taxi money’ for attending news conferences and some editors receive remuneration in cash, cars, and favors. Several of the interviewees for this thesis admit to having been offered bribes, and share that they know that many of their colleagues do accept them. According to Pintak and Setiyono’s survey, few of the respondents (less than five percent) saw it as acceptable to take payments for stories, however 40 percent supported the idea of being given travel money when writing a story or agreeing to write a story in return for a purchase of advertising (2010: 20). This practise of ‘envelope journalism’ is closely linked to the conditions of journalists in the country as it is seen as an occupation with limited status and low pay. A few of the younger journalists interviewed for this thesis were not trained journalists and stated that they occupied temporary positions. They saw their jobs as stepping stones to a different career path in the future. This consideration is also linked to politics because journalistic and media conditions in practical terms depend on political will. Journalism lecturer and human rights activist Andreas Harsono claims that further training and professionalization are necessary in order to improve the current situation where there is a lack of thorough and investigative journalism, particularly in terms of sensitive issues such as the 1965/66 massacres. In his opinion journalists themselves hold quite a bit of power. He believes that the younger generation can change Indonesian journalism by meeting two criteria for writing well, i.e. the journalist has to be knowledgeable, and the journalist has to be brave and daring enough to rebel against the newsroom (expressed in an interview with Andreas Harsono in February 19th, 2014).

4.5.4 Concluding remarks

Indonesians have experienced a significant transformation in their ability to freely express their opinions through public channels, and the press does publish articles which are critical of the government and state institutions. And, according to Kitley (2008: 221), this occurs frequently (Tapsell in *Asian Studies Review* June 2012:227). Despite this, the analysis shows that the press’ freedom to cover certain issues is hampered by various factors. The legal framework regulating free speech is actively used, and anti-obscenity laws and civil and criminal libel laws particularly restrict the free reporting of certain issues. Self-censorship

plays an important role in this case. Self-censorship is often the result of various external factors that are not obvious, but exist and influence the decision-making process.

In this day and age in Indonesia, political and commercial interests are often intertwined due to the ownership structures. Several prominent political figures have large shareholdings in various media groups, particularly in broadcast media. They also have significant ownership of the written media. As emerges from this analysis, the ownership structures do indeed influence media content with editorial decisions being based on the stated or assumed interests of the media group and its owner. As senior journalists had grown highly accustomed to 'sensing' the journalistic space tolerated under the New Order era, the findings of this analysis suggest that these senior journalists have carried on this tradition into the new era. In the past news workers were forced to make assumptions about the interests of external actors, such as politicians and the military whom they tried to please in order to avoid physical reprisals. Some still do, but for the most part present editorial decisions seem to be more influenced by the assumed interests of the media group than the owners' commercial or political interests. In Indonesia's hierarchical society the younger journalists will not necessarily challenge their seniors in age or rank, but work in accordance with their spoken or unspoken interests. Self-censorship still seems to be conducted out of a fear of repercussions, but repercussions more related to career opportunities and financial gain than violent consequences. The journalistic profession is underpaid and under-valued in Indonesia. To mitigate self-censorship there is a need to further professionalise journalism and enhance skills and knowledge of younger journalists, as suggested in the reference articles.

5. Sum-up and conclusion

As presented under chapter 1, the aim for this thesis was to answer the research question: *How do Indonesian press cover the 1965/66 massacres today, and to what degree is the coverage influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship?* For the analysis I have looked into the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres in articles in the newspapers *The Jakarta Globe*, *The Jakarta Post* and *Kompas* over a period of seven months and conducted interviews with ten Indonesian media workers and one independent documentary maker.

It is a two part question, with the first part asking how the Indonesian press covers the 1965/66 massacres today. To answer this I looked at the extent to which the topic was prioritized amidst other media content in the selected time period, whose voices were represented in the articles, and what were the issues raised relating the 1965/66 massacres. In

addition I looked into how relevant stakeholders were described in the reference articles to reflect on whether the indoctrinated perceptions imposed by the New Order still are valid in today's Indonesia.

The second part of my research question is to what degree is the coverage of the 1965/66 massacres was influenced by external restrictions and self-censorship. To answer this I had to also look beyond the reference articles and ask media workers if and how they experience formal and informal restrictions on their freedom to report on all issues, including the 1965/66 massacres.

In the following I will sum up my findings and make my conclusions.

5.1 Coverage of the 1965/66 massacres today

The analysis clearly shows that the topic of the 1965/66 massacres is not merely one for the history books, but is also part of the present and a relevant issue in the Indonesian press even today. The coverage is not limited to revealing stories about past events, but also requiring the current government to take action and ensure national reconciliation. It is evident from the analysis that the issue of the 1965/66 massacres is not resolved or by any means exhausted as a topic for debate. Most of the reference articles were on the contrary pointing to the need for more debate and more sharing of information in efforts to reveal the full truth about the events. This does indicate that there has been limited public discussion on the topic also in the recent years after the democratization in 1998, which were also specifically said in several of the reference articles and also supports the findings in previous research (Roosa, 2006, Cribb, 2009). The coverage may to a large extent be said to be advocacy efforts by civil society actors (non-governmental organizations, activists, historians) and also the press itself, attempting to influence the government and political sector to take action and revealing the truth and ensuring some form of reconciliation. The demands in the reference articles were clear enough, but specifically whom they target was more indistinct. The articles did point to the Indonesian government as responsible for resolving these events from the past, and critique against the power-holders were most certainly found in many of the reference articles. This finding supports other research which says that the government and other state institutions are frequently criticized in Indonesian media (Kitley, 2008:221 in Tapsell in Asian Studies Review June 2012: 227). The critique was however at times quite vague and formulated in general terms, often replicating and repeating other statements found in other articles. Few others than the President were specifically mentioned or confronted with these

demands or accusations. Government officials and other politicians were remarkably absent as sources in the articles which required them to act. The public “debate” on the issue may thus be said to be rather one-sided with accusations and demands to which no-one responds.

The findings from the analysis also show that three decades of indoctrination has made its clear mark on people’s conceptions, which influences the current debate on the 1965/66 massacres. Remnant of New Order propaganda seems still to be visible in today’s press in the descriptions of the various stakeholders of the events that took place in the 1960s. This serves to show that propagated narratives are long-lived in contexts where open public debate is limited – no matter the cause - and where certain issues are not subjected to substantial investigative journalism. Several of the political and military actors from the 1960s are still politically active or have family ties to those in power. That these have certain interests in upholding the narrative propagated during the New Order era is understandable.

The primary aim for this thesis did not include doing an extensive analysis on whether the Indonesian state still uses means of propaganda today. This thesis describes the state propaganda in New Order and looks at the transition and developments of the Indonesian society. The analysis looks into whether there are still remnants of what was propagated during New Order, and relating to the current situation in Indonesia it discusses propaganda in the form of censorship and causes for self-censorship. A separate and broader analysis on state propaganda in Indonesia today would be interesting to see in connection with the findings from this thesis, which could potentially enhance the insight into these issues and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding.

5.2 Restrictions on free reporting

Despite the transformation of the Indonesian society and guaranteed freedom of speech under the Constitution, the Indonesian press is still not fully free. This is evident from the findings of this analysis. Independent and thorough reporting on sensitive issues such as the 1965/66 massacres, is hampered by formal and informal restrictions which primarily encourage to self-censorship. The legal framework regulating free speech is in active use and laws on obscene content and civil and criminal libel laws are particularly restricting free reporting on certain issues. This occurs primarily because journalists attempt to avoid them by self-censoring. Self-censorship often results from various external factors which are not obvious, but exist and influence the journalistic decision-making processes. Fear of repercussions from the

power-holders and state institutions used to be the main cause for self-censorship during New Order. In this day and age the pressure and influence to self-restrain from publishing certain stories seem to be more indirect. The findings indicate that the political elite still expect a certain conduct from the press and are not particularly responsive when being confronted about 'sensitive' issues. The tradition of the 'responsible' *Pancasila* journalist (Romano, 2003, Hill, 2007) seems still to be very much relevant even today. Not only does it seem to be expected by the government and political elite, but it also seems to be deemed important by the press themselves. This can be drawn from the non-confrontational form of journalism as seen in the reference articles, in addition their efforts to advocating for and contributing to resolving the 1965/66 massacres and reconciling the nation. The interviewees revealed that they see it as their task to contribute to developing their nation and that journalism has a clear social mission. On the other hand, they also see it as their duty to hold the government accountable for their actions. Many of the reference articles contained critique against the government and described their wrong-doings and required political will to resolve them. These efforts were however less confrontational than what would be the case in western media. Thus, it may be said that, despite the attempts to hold the government accountable, the Indonesian press do not fully embrace the role as a 'watchdog' relating to the 1965/66 massacres. This finding supports the results of research by Tapsell (in the Asian Studies Review June 2012: 229) and Pintak and Sentiyono, 2010: 1)

Political influence on editorial content can, according to this analysis, best be seen through their commercial involvement in the media industry. Several significant political figures have large shares in various media houses, particularly within broadcast media, but also print media. As it emerges from this analysis, the ownership structures do influence the media's content and editorial decisions are made based on either stated or assumed interests of the media organizations and owners. This supports the results of research by Tapsell (in the Asian Review Studies June 2012:241). Senior media workers are highly accustomed to 'sensing' the journalistic space that they are allowed to operate within, which they were forced to do during New Order. The findings of this analysis suggest that they still think along the same mind-set and have carried the tradition with them into the new era. In the past, media workers often had to guess what the interests of power-players were and then aimed to please these to avoid repercussions. Some still do this, but this analysis suggest that the editorial decisions for the most part are more influenced by interests within the media organizations, primarily the commercial and political interests of the owners. In the hierarchical society of Indonesia, the

younger journalists rarely oppose those senior to them in age or rank and perform their jobs according to the spoken or unspoken interests of those above them in the organizational structure. Self-censorship seems to be still conducted out of fears of repercussions, however more relating to career opportunities and financial aspects than violent consequences. The journalistic profession is not highly valued in Indonesia and the journalists are underpaid. This also leads to challenges relating bribes and the so-called 'envelope journalism' in the Indonesian society where corruption is wide-spread. This analysis indicates a need to further professionalize Indonesian journalism and to ensure improved conditions for the upcoming generation of journalists, who did not practice journalism under New Order, and reduce the continuous breeding-ground for self-censorship.

Although less than before, fears of physical repercussions are still present among Indonesian press workers. They seem however to worry less about violence by state institutions, but more-so by radical religious or anti-communist groups. As it emerges from this analysis, these groups are very much present in the debate on the 1965/66 issues. Through protests, threats and acts of violence towards those with conflicting views, they attempt to set the frames for the debate on the issue of the 1965/66 massacres. The findings of this analysis indicate that these groups are condoned by the politically elite and not held legally responsible, which enhances the effects of their actions and imposes restrictions on free debate by promoting self-censorship.

5.3 Other remarks

The analysis for this thesis was conducted prior to the change of political leadership in Indonesia. The new President, former Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, was inaugurated on October 20th in 2014 after winning the presidential elections in July. Widodo is the seventh Indonesian president and the first not to have come from the military or political elite. He is the son of a carpenter and prior to his political career he worked as a furniture exporter. He is claimed by many to represent a new political direction for Indonesia, and on a Time Magazine cover (on October 16th) he is called 'a new hope' and 'a force for democracy'. A few of the reference articles for this thesis mentioned him as more likely to take action and reconcile the nation after the 1965/66 massacres than his opponents, and several of the interviewees were of the same opinion. It remains to be seen whether they are right. In his government, there are several politicians from the traditional, powerful elite, including the

newly elected Vice President Jusuf Kalla from the Golkar Party, who was mentioned in the preface for this thesis for his appearance in the documentary *The Act of Killing*.

The massacres that took place in the 1960s affected such a large number of people directly or indirectly, and this analysis clearly suggests that the wounds are still deep and visible in the Indonesian society. The silence and taboos that followed these events led to a situation where people still today learn that there are victims within their closest families and many are still grieving. It seems obvious that the issues relating to the 1965/66 massacres will not quietly fade away, but will need to be resolved in some way or another by Indonesian authorities. As it emerges from this analysis, surprisingly few seem to demand legal justice and criminal persecutions following the massacres, unlike for many others of the world's massive massacres and genocides. Nelson Mandela and his South African model of reconciliation are mentioned as an ideal in some of the reference articles and by some of the interviewees.

Komnas Ham, the national human rights committee, took a gentle first step towards an official resolution after concluding their four years-long inquiry into the massacres by officially deeming them 'gross human rights violations' and providing recommendations for next steps. If these will be taken, remains to be seen. This analysis suggests that in any case the Indonesian press are likely to continue to being part of the process by raising the issue, despite the various restrictions and influences hampering a fully free debate.

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Attachment:

Interview guide

ⁱ Jusuf Kalla was elected Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia for the second time in the 2014 elections

ⁱⁱ A CIA report described the massacre as "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s. David A. Blumenthal and Timothy L. H. McCormack (2007). *The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance? (International Humanitarian Law)*.

ⁱⁱⁱ The Jakarta Post: Article on the Komnas Ham report deeming the 1965/66 massacres a 'gross human rights violation': <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/23/komnas-ham-declares-1965-purge-a-gross-human-rights-violation.html>

^{iv} The Act of Killing website: <http://theactofkilling.com/>

^v Time Magazine allocated their cover to the inauguration of the new President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, naming him 'a new hope' and 'a force for democracy': <http://www.globalindonesianvoices.com/16606/joko-widodo-is-in-time-magazine-cover-a-new-hope/>

^{vi} Article 19, Freedom of expression and the media in Indonesia, 27 February 2006, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4754185f0.html>

^{vii} Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index 2013: <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html>

^{viii} Freedom House: Report on freedom of speech in Indonesia: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/indonesia-0#.VHs73YrKyM8>

^{ix} <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ART19,COUNTRYREP,IDN,,4754185f0,0.html> p. 58

^x The Jakarta Globe: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/national/indonesian-cyber-crime-bill-to-spark-debate/349320>

^{xi} Global Information Society Watch" report: http://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/indonesia_gisw11_up_web.pdf

^{xii} <http://www.dw.de/freedom-of-indonesian-journalists-under-threat/a-15954119>

^{xiii} Merlyna Lim for the FORD Foundation and Arizona State University: "@Crossroads: Democratization and Democratization of Media in Indonesia"; P.8. Available at: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/68588915/Crossroads-Democratization-Corporatization-of-Media-in-Indonesia>

^{xiv} Other normative values that are highly regarded where public communication is concerned include equality, diversity, truth and information quality, and social order and solidarity (McQuail, 2005).

^{xvi} SARA = suku (ethnicity), agama (religion), ras (race) and antar golongan ("between groups") relations or conflicts

^{xvii} Article 19, Freedom of expression and the media in Indonesia, 27 February 2006, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4754185f0.html>