International Norms and Political Change:

‘Women, Peace and Security’ and the UN Security Agenda

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I am indebted and grateful to all of you. Thank you!

*Torunn L. Tryggestad*
Oslo, May 2014
### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSW</td>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAW</td>
<td>Division for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of developing countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of leading industrialised countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSTRAW</td>
<td>International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPs</td>
<td>Monthly Action Points</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSAGI</td>
<td>Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN PBC</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEOG</td>
<td>Western European States and Other Group</td>
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<td>WGLL</td>
<td>Working Group on Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

**Acknowledgements** ........................................................................................................ i

**Abbreviations** .............................................................................................................. iii

**PART I** .......................................................................................................................... 1

1. **Introduction** .............................................................................................................. 1
   1.1 Background ............................................................................................................. 1
   1.2 Why Research on ‘Women, Peace and Security’? ............................................. 4
      1.2.1 ‘Women’s Issues’ in International Relations/UN Peace and Conflict Studies Literature ................................................................. 5
   1.3 Research Questions .............................................................................................. 8
   1.4 Key Concepts and Definitions ............................................................................. 9
      1.4.1 International Norms .................................................................................. 9
      1.4.2 The Women, Peace and Security Norm ................................................... 10
   1.5 Dissertation Delimitation ............................................................................... 13
   1.6 Dissertation Structure ..................................................................................... 14

2. **The Analytical and Theoretical Framework** ..................................................... 16
   2.1 Global Governance and the Role of Non-State Actors .................................... 16
   2.2 Transnational Advocacy Networks ................................................................ 19
   2.3 Norms in International Relations ................................................................... 23
      2.3.1 The ‘Norm Life Cycle’ ........................................................................... 25
      2.3.2 Norm Cascading .................................................................................... 28
   2.4 The Changing Concept of Security and ‘New Wars’ ...................................... 30
      2.4.1 The Changing Concept of Security ......................................................... 30
      2.4.2. The ‘New Wars’ .............................................................................. 32
      2.4.3 The Construction of Gender in War ..................................................... 33

3. **Research Methodology** .......................................................................................... 35
   3.1 Research Design ............................................................................................... 36
   3.2 Process Tracing ................................................................................................ 37
   3.3 Sampling of Interviewees ............................................................................... 39
   3.4 Sources of Data .................................................................................................. 42
      3.4.1 Official/Formal Documents .................................................................. 43
      3.4.2 Secondary Literature ........................................................................... 45
      3.4.3. Interviews ......................................................................................... 47
      3.4.4 Participant Observation ..................................................................... 49
3.5 Reflections on Methodology ........................................................................................................50

4. Article Findings .................................................................................................................................. 53
   4.1 Article I: ‘Trick or Treat’ ............................................................................................................. 53
   4.2 Article II: The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Gender: A Case of Norm Reinforcement .............................................................................................................. 55
   4.3 Article 3: State Feminism Going Global: Norway on the UN Peacebuilding Commission ................................................................. 57

5. Discussion of Findings in Articles and Beyond .............................................................................. 59
   5.1 Where Is WPS in the ‘Norm Life Cycle’? .................................................................................. 59
      5.1.1 Institutionalization in International Law ............................................................................ 59
      5.1.2 Organizational Institutionalization .................................................................................... 62
      5.1.3 Institutionalization in Foreign Policies of UN Member States ...................................... 65
   5.2 The WPS Process – The Ideal Type Model of Tripartite Collaborative Governance? .......... 69

6. Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................................... 72

7. References ......................................................................................................................................... 76

8. Appendices – Interview Guides .......................................................................................................... 90

PART II .................................................................................................................................................. 92

List of Dissertation Articles .................................................................................................................. 93
PART I

1. Introduction

Women’s participation in those activities [peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding] is not a nice thing to do. It is not as though we are doing a favor for ourselves and them by including women in the work for peace. It is a necessary global security imperative. Including women in the work of peace advances our national security interests and promotes political stability, economic growth and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, addressing the UN Security Council, 26 October 2010)¹

1.1 Background

The above quote is taken from Hillary Rodham Clinton’s statement in the UN Security Council open debate commemorating the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) in October 2010. The statement expressed a notable normative turn in the discourse on international peace and security. As late as the mid-1990s, it was unthinkable that the UN Security Council might address issues of women’s human rights in relation to international peace and security. The issue of violence against women, for example, was regarded as an interpersonal matter, or at best a concern to be addressed at the

national level (Mackinnon 2012). By 2010, however, the advancement of women’s human rights, including the protection of women from conflict-related sexual violence, had emerged as a legitimate international security concern, and had become an integral part of the discourse on international peace and security (Hudson 2010; Olonisakin et al. 2011).

The commemoration of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in itself served as an illustration of this normative change. Since the resolution’s adoption in October 2000, Arria Formula meetings had been organized on an annual basis, each meeting being followed by an open debate in the Security Council on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS). The setup was the same in 2010, but that year’s open debate differed from those of previous years in several ways. First, a record number of more than 90 statements were given by member states, UN officials, civil society representatives, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and regional intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU). Second, statements were delivered by a record number of high-level government representatives – including the US secretary of state. All of the statements were variations on the same key themes: that women’s involvement in peace and security matters is a prerequisite for sustainable peace, and that there was an urgent need for more dedicated efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions. Third, the gallery of the

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2 The term ‘Arria Formula’ refers to informal meetings outside of Security Council chambers, where members of the Security Council meet with and listen to the views of civil society (usually NGOs and individual experts) on a particular topic or conflict. The meeting format is named after Diego Arria, a former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN who initiated the first meeting of this kind in 1993 (Paul 2004).


4 The open debate was initially scheduled for 29 October, but was moved at the last minute to 26 October to accommodate the participation of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who insisted on giving the US statement herself.
Security Council chambers was filled to the last seat by civil society representatives, who followed the debate and enthusiastically applauded the statements of Rodham Clinton and the civil society representatives. The combined effect of these factors resulted in an open debate that was significantly different from Security Council proceedings in general, and from the previous debates on WPS in particular.

Also, during the course of the ‘Anniversary Week’, a large number of side-events took place, organized by UN member states, UN entities and women’s organizations, addressing various aspects of the WPS agenda and its implementation. The majority of these events were organized as collaborative efforts between these three different types of actors – a form of tripartite collaboration that seems to have become a common trait of contemporary global governance. In the case of WPS, however, this collaboration appears to be particularly dense. The commemoration of the 10th anniversary served as an important mobilizing event and, argued observers, expressed the international community’s reinforced commitment to the normative framework of WPS.5

In the years that followed the 10th anniversary, this normative agenda has continued to gain ground, both within the context of the UN and beyond. Indeed, it is now a normative framework in a process of rapid diffusion. A number of follow-up resolutions have been passed by the UN Security Council, system-wide action plans and guidelines for the implementation of these resolutions have been adopted within the UN Secretariat, and a steadily growing number of UN member states and regional organizations are adopting national and regional action plans for the integration and implementation of this normative framework in their peace and security policies.

5 I participated as an observer at the open debate, as well as at a number of the side-events organized during the anniversary week. The ‘reinforced commitment of the international society’ was a recurring topic during discussions and Q&A sessions, as well as in hallway conversations.
One of the most recent and notable initiatives was the historic agreement made in April 2013 by the G-8 group of states on working together to end sexual violence in conflict.\(^6\) This agreement was reached under the United Kingdom’s chairmanship of the G-8, which was led by British Foreign Secretary William Hague. Hague pledged that this issue would be his personal priority for the talks during the UK presidency. The UK was also instrumental in rallying support for a ‘Declaration of Commitment To End Sexual Violence in Conflict’, which was signed by 122 member states during the UN General Assembly in September 2013.\(^7\) Hague used the occasion of International Women’s Day on 8 March 2014 to reiterate his commitment to this particular cause, this time together with US Secretary of State John Kerry. The two men echoed Rodham Clinton’s statement from 2010, declaring that the advancement of women’s human rights in relation to conflicts has become a national security imperative for both the UK and the USA (*Huffington Post* 2014).\(^8\)

1.2 Why Research on ‘Women, Peace and Security’?

There are several reasons why it is interesting to research WPS as an international norm. First of all, WPS represents a major normative change in international peace and security politics. In a historical perspective, the speed with which this normative


framework has impacted the peace and security discourse within the UN system and among influential UN member states is quite remarkable. Usually, it takes decades for new ideas and international norms to emerge and diffuse (Thakur and Weiss 2011). The WPS norm, however, has in less than 14 years from it was first formally coined by the UN Security Council emerged and made its mark on UN peace and security politics. Second, I believe it is important to document what I find to be an understudied example of international norm emergence and political change. A normative framework has emerged and is now prompting political change within the realms of UN peace and security politics, without this being fully acknowledged in mainstream international relations literature. The case of WPS is a process of norm dynamics and political change that should be of interest to scholars beyond those within feminist international relations and gender studies.

1.2.1 ‘Women’s Issues’ in International Relations/UN Peace and Conflict Studies Literature

There is a huge body of literature on the UN and the organization’s activities in the fields of conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding (Adebajo and Sriram 2003; Durch 1993; Howard 2008; Malone 2004; Malone and Wermester 2003). This body of literature began to flourish from the mid-1990s onwards and grew out of the renewed optimism around and interest in the UN and collective arrangements for conflict prevention and conflict management (Tryggestad 2009). With a small number of exceptions (Mazurana et al. 2005; Meintjes et al. 2001; Olsson and Tryggestad 2001), however, very few of the early books and articles addressed issues related to the role of women and/or gender in the context of UN peace and security politics. At the time, the field of UN peace and conflict studies was
largely influenced by dominant theoretical and methodological approaches within mainstream international relations theory, which were perceived to be objective and gender neutral. Although the discipline had begun to open up for more critical theoretical perspectives and mixed methodological approaches, issues of women’s rights or the role of women in politics were still not identified as central objects of study within international relations. Rather, these were relegated to other disciplinary homes, such as development studies and comparative politics (Murphy 1996).

In the 1990s, a number of feminist international relations scholars began to criticize mainstream international relations for its perceived gender-neutral analytical approaches to the study of international politics (Enloe 1990, 1993; Peterson 1992; Sylvester 1994; Tickner 1992; Zalewski and Parpart 1998). In reality, they argued, international politics has always been, and continues to be, a highly gendered enterprise. A central purpose of these publications was to show that dominant conceptual frameworks within international relations were the products of masculine traditions of thought (Hutchings 2009). International politics has been analysed primarily by men, from the perspective of men, in effect leaving women’s roles and contributions largely invisible. Feminist international relations called for a reformulation of established concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘security’, and dismissed the strict division between ‘international politics’ and ‘national politics’.

Hutchings (2009) argues that the feminist critique of international relations has changed somewhat during the last decade in terms of both substantive and theoretical focus. Substantively, the issue of gender mainstreaming across actors and domains and the highly gendered discourse on for example asymmetric warfare have gained prominence (Ackerly et al. 2006; Rai and Waylen 2008; Sheperd 2009). Theoretically, constructions of masculinities, and the concept of ‘hegemonic
masculinities’ in particular, have caught the interest of many scholars (Kronsell 2005; Parpart and Zalewski 2008).

The substantive and theoretical changes in feminist international relations are reflected in some of the scholarly literature on the nexus made up of UN peace and security politics, UNSCR 1325, and the WPS agenda. Issues of gender mainstreaming in the peace and security sector, the challenges of implementing the WPS agenda, and changes in the UN security discourse have become recurring topics (Anderlini 2007; Cockburn 2007; Hudson 2010; Olonisakin et al. 2011; Porter 2007; Schnabel and Tabyshalieva 2012). However, the literature seems to be written primarily by and communicating to women’s rights activists and scholars within feminist international relations and women’s studies. With the notable exceptions of a couple of special issues of the journals *International Peacekeeping* (2010, Vol. 17, Issue 2) and *International Interactions* (2013, Vol. 39, Issue 4), many of the most recent scholarly articles and debates on UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda have typically appeared in journals of feminist or gender studies (Gibbings 2011; Harrington 2011; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Reeves 2012). This reinforces the compartmentalization of scholarly debates within international relations, which feminist scholars for so long have criticized.

An objective of my research is to move WPS as a topic into mainstream international relations. For this reason I have sought to publish the articles included in this dissertation in what are regarded as mainstream peace and security journals such as *Global Governance, International Peacekeeping* and *Cooperation and Conflict*, rather than in journals of feminist studies. In so doing, I hope the research carried out for this doctoral dissertation will contribute to an increased interest in and
acknowledgement of the relevance of gender issues in international relations in
general, and in UN peace and security studies in particular.

1.3 Research Questions

This dissertation seeks to answer the following research questions:

First:

*How did the normative framework of WPS emerge?*

Closely related to the first question, I also ask:

*Who are the actors involved in this process, and what forms does their
interrelationship take?*

And, finally:

*To what extent has the normative framework of WPS become an institutionalized
norm with influence on UN peace and security policies?*

To answer these questions, I have conducted an actor-oriented case study, tracing the
process through which the normative framework of WPS emerged and has been
diffused at the strategic level of UN peace and security politics. In terms of this
particular case, norm diffusion is understood as the process through which the WPS
norm is increasingly reflected in UN peace and security policies and is enjoying ever-
increasing support among UN member states, which in turn adopt policies for its
implementation. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) propose that, for norms to diffuse, three forms of institutionalization will most likely have to take place: institutionalization within international law; organizational institutionalization; and institutionalization in the foreign policies of member states. The three articles in this dissertation address each of these three forms of institutionalization, respectively.

1.4 Key Concepts and Definitions

1.4.1 International Norms

What is a norm? There seems to be a general agreement in the literature that a norm can be defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). In the context of international norms, the primary actors are assumed to be states. As discussed in Article II of this dissertation (Tryggestad 2009: 160), the forms of ‘appropriate behavior’ with which the majority of UN member states appear to identify themselves are those generally associated with liberal norms and values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The normative framework of WPS encompasses all of these, but pays particular attention to the rights of women.

WPS is a prescriptive normative framework. The resolutions adopted under the WPS umbrella are of a non-coercive nature. They carry a normative imperative that is intended to influence behaviour at both the international and the national level (Tryggestad 2009: 160). It is this ‘oughtness’ that makes norms different from other kinds of rules, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891). Which behaviour is considered appropriate at any time, is judged by the reactions of the larger community or society. Reactions can take the form of disapproval, praise or, in the case of highly
internalized norms, no reaction at all (because the relevant behaviour is taken for
granted).

Scholars within the realist/rational choice tradition of international relations
would argue that norms are mere reflections of the material interests and fixed
preferences of the most powerful states, whereas scholars with a constructivist
approach would argue that the role of norms is to determine those preferences (Florini
1996: 366). Or put differently, ‘norms have explanatory power independent of
structural and situational constraints’ (Florini 1996: 363). According to Adler
(2002:102) constructivists take issue with what he refers to as ‘the naïve notion’ that
either material objects or ‘ideas’ constitutes interests, not both. Instead,
‘constructivism advances the notion that interests are ideas’. Constructivism does not
take the world as it is, but sees it as a project under continuous construction.

Constructivist approaches have dominated research on international norms in the last
couple of decades, particularly with its emphasis on empirical studies of norms. This
dissertation also places itself within such an empirical constructivist research
approach.

1.4.2 The Women, Peace and Security Norm

The key concept in this dissertation is ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS), referred
to alternately as ‘a normative framework’ or as ‘a norm’. WPS was first formally
coined as a concept when the 15 members of the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) in October
2000. Historically, the UN has played an important role in launching and nurturing
new ideas and concepts that have gone on to play an important role within
international relations. Jolly et al. (2009) argue that some of these ideas and concepts
have become issues on the international arena with remarkable speed. Weiss (2014) makes particular reference to the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) norm as one of the best examples. I would argue that WPS is probably an even better example, since it appears to enjoy much stronger universal support and is far less contested.

Through the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the Security Council acknowledged the multiple roles women play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, as well as in peacebuilding efforts. The resolution contains 18 provisions, which can roughly be separated into three main categories (Tryggestad 2009):

1. *Representation/participation*: The resolution urges member states to increase the representation and active participation of women at all decisionmaking levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding (including the appointment of more women as special envoys, Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General, etc.).

2. *Gender Perspective*: A gender perspective should be adopted in the planning and implementation of peace operations and in peace negotiations, which should include gender-sensitive training of personnel, an expanded role for women as peacekeepers, and increased attention to local women’s peace initiatives, needs and interests in mission areas.

3. *Protection*: The resolution emphasizes the need for increased attention to the protection and respect of women’s human rights, including protection against gender-based violence in situations of armed conflict and initiatives to bring an end to impunity for such crimes.
UNSCR 1325, and its six subsequent resolutions, now make up what the UN refers to as the normative framework of ‘Women, Peace and Security’. The provisions of UNSCR 1325 (and the subsequent resolutions) reinforce norms on women’s social, political and economic human rights that are already codified in international law. However, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions take this codification process one step further, prescribing the protection and advancement of women’s human rights also in the realms of peace and security. Women’s continued marginalization from matters of international peace and security is defined as morally and politically unacceptable, not only in its own right, as a severe breach of fundamental human rights, but also because it is detrimental to the prospects of achieving sustainable peace and development (World Bank 2012). WPS has become an overarching normative framework similar to what Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011: 18) refer to as a supernorm, defined as ‘a cluster of interrelated norms grouped into a unified and coherent framework that pursues a grand prescriptive goal’.

In this dissertation, I refer to WPS as an international normative framework, understood as consisting of several interrelated norms on women’s rights. The grand prescriptive goal of the normative framework of WPS is understood as being that of having women’s human rights fully integrated into all aspects of international peace and security, with a particular emphasis on women’s participation in processes of conflict prevention, peace mediation and peacebuilding.

9 For more on these resolutions, see the ‘Discussion’ section of this dissertation.
11 Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011) discuss how ending global poverty has become a supernorm during the course of the last two decades. In order to eradicate dehumanizing poverty, the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – each important individual norms in themselves – have become important strategic goals of the supernorm (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011: 18).
1.5 Dissertation Delimitation

In studying the phenomenon of norm emergence and the influence of norms on UN peace and security policies, I have focused primarily on processes taking place at the strategic level of the UN Headquarters in New York. Whereas Article I focuses on how the WPS issue area emerged and was set on the UN peace and security agenda, Article II looks at how the emerging norm impacted policy development within a new organizational entity of the UN, the Peacebuilding Commission. In its turn, Article III looks at how a small state like Norway has promoted the WPS agenda in its foreign policy, particularly at the strategic level of its UN policies. In neither of the articles am I exploring or discussing in any depth the impact of the normative framework of WPS on operational activities at the field level. Neither do I discuss the concepts of ‘peace’ or ‘security’ as such in any detail.

The three articles included in this dissertation focus primarily on the time period from the late 1990s to 2008. The late 1990s was the period in which the campaign to have a resolution on WPS adopted was launched by the international advocacy network. The end year of 2008 was chosen since it marked the end of the first two-year session of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which is a case-within-the-case of my dissertation. However, in the introduction to this dissertation, I discuss the article findings in the light of normative developments in the last 5–6 years. This update not only reinforces the conclusions of my dissertation articles that WPS is an emerging normative framework, but also concludes that it is in fact a normative framework that has moved from a phase of norm emergence to a phase of norm diffusion.
1.6 Dissertation Structure

This PhD dissertation consists of two parts. Part I introduces the thematic background and research questions. It also lays out the analytical and theoretical framework applied and the choice of research method. This first part also provides a summary of the findings in the three empirical articles included in this dissertation. I discuss these article findings in the light of developments in recent years, before providing some concluding remarks.

Part II consists of three articles published in international journals, each shedding light on different aspects of my research questions. The first article, addressing the first and second research questions, traces the process of norm emergence by looking at how the WPS norm was put on the UN peace and security agenda, and who the key actors in the agenda-setting process were. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000 institutionalized the WPS norm in international law, and served as a first important step towards norm diffusion. The second article relates to the third research question and addresses the issue of norm diffusion through organizational institutionalization. It asks to what extent the normative framework of WPS half a decade on from its formalization in international law had reached a stage of actual influence on policy development within the realms of UN peace and security politics. This is done through a study of the impact of WPS on the proceedings of the UN Peacebuilding Commission during its formative years (2005–2008). Finally, the third article addresses the issue of norm diffusion by looking at the institutionalization of WPS in the foreign policies of individual member states, exemplified by a study of the role Norway played as a WPS norm entrepreneur while being a co-chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and chair of one of its country configurations. This last article exemplifies the dual nature of norm-diffusion processes. Not only do
international norms impact national policy development, member states can also play key roles in getting norms institutionalized within an organization like the UN. As such this article relates primarily to the third research question of my dissertation. All three articles address how the tripartite model for collaboration has been a central feature of how the WPS norm emerged and gradually started to diffuse.

The articles included in this dissertation are as follows:

*Article I:*

*Article II:*

*Article III:*
‘State Feminism Going Global: Norway on the UN Peacebuilding Commission’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, May 2014 (‘online first’).
2. The Analytical and Theoretical Framework

In this dissertation, I am concerned with how international norms emerge and diffuse and who the most prominent actors in these processes of change are. I am particularly interested in looking at how these processes are played out within the auspices of the UN, the most prominent arena of global governance.

In developing an analytical and theoretical framework for my dissertation, I draw on several bodies of literature within the discipline of international relations. These include literature on global governance, theories on international norm dynamics and political change, and the closely associated literature on transnational advocacy networks (Florini 2000; Jolly et al. 2009; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002). All of these bodies of literature are discussed against the backdrop of the changing concept of security and the ‘new wars’ theory that emerged in the 1990s.

2.1 Global Governance and the Role of Non-State Actors

When I started to plan my PhD research in 2005/2006, I was curious to find out how new ideas emerge on the international scene and influence policy change. I was inspired by the debates taking place at that time on the emerging role and influence of non-state actors in global governance, particularly within the auspices of the UN. The visibility and influence of non-state actors in international relations became rampant in the 1990s and continued to grow in scope and influence throughout the 2000s. This trend has been referred to by some scholars as a new and heavily understudied phenomenon, particularly within the UN studies/global governance literature (Weiss et al. 2009).

Inspired by realist and neorealist theories of international relations, and their notions of world society as an anarchic society of sovereign states, classical UN
studies regarded UN member states as the primary actors in the development of new policies and prompting change in international politics (Bull 1977; Claude 1956). In an increasingly globalized world, however, challenges and threats can no longer be managed by sovereign states alone. These challenges require a sort of global governance that includes a myriad of non-state actors and arrangements (Weiss and Thakur 2010). This, in turn, challenges the traditional notion within international relations theory of states as the primary actors in international politics.

Karns and Mingst (2004: 21) contend that the form of globalization that emerged in the early 2000s was unprecedented ‘in the degree to which markets, cultures, peoples, and states are being linked together’. In these processes, the UN emerged as both a key actor and a central arena for the development of new normative frameworks, policies and practices to regulate the behaviour of various actors in international relations (Emmerij et al. 2001; Jolly et al. 2005).

Inis L. Claude Jr’s (1956) classical distinction of the relations between the first UN (understood as the member states) and the second UN (understood as the Secretariat) has guided explanations of how ideas, norms, policies and practices emerge and shift within the organization. In this model, UN member states were typically given prominence as the most influential actors. In today’s world, however, we need to move beyond the classical distinction between the first and the second UN, and to pay more attention to non-state actors, referred to as ‘the third UN’ by Weiss et al. (2009). ‘The third UN’ is defined as ‘those individuals and private organizations who have a continuing relationship with the first and the second UN and who seek changes in the UN’s thinking, policies, priorities, or actions’ (Weiss et

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12 Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur (2010: 31) define global governance as ‘the sum of laws, norms, policies and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-border relations between states, citizens, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and the market’.
al. 2009: 9, emphasis added). The main components of the third UN are: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), academics and other expert consultants, and independent commissions of eminent persons.

Already in 2002, Thomas Risse referred to such collaborative arrangements as ‘tripartite global governance’ (see Figure 1) – arrangements he claimed were replete within the UN system and would continue to grow in influence in the years to come (Risse 2002: 268–269). Both Risse and Weiss et al. emphasize the close and continuing relationships between these three groups of actors as a particularly interesting trait of contemporary global governance. As examined in Article I of this dissertation, among other places, the tripartite arrangement in the case of the WPS has become so close that it is at times difficult to distinguish between the various roles and identities of the actors involved. Together, they make up a transnational advocacy network that has been very effective in promoting and advancing the WPS norm.

Figure 1: Tripartite Global Governance

Figure inspired by Risse (2002) and Weiss et al. (2009)
2.2 Transnational Advocacy Networks

The end of the Cold War changed the external conditions or opportunity structure for non-state actors to play a role in international relations (Joachim 2003). Both the number and the influence of non-state actors have grown exponentially during the last couple of decades. This is particularly true in the case of transnational actors. Already in the early 2000s, the influence of such actors on political outcomes in international relations was described as ‘extraordinary’ (Risse 2002: 255). Whereas some scholars have welcomed the growth and influence of transnational actors (e.g. Florini 2000), others have been critical of processes they regarded as part and parcel of the expansion of a global capitalist hegemony (Gill 1995). Some scholars have discussed this phenomenon as a process that undermines or marginalizes the status and power of states in global politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998), while others argue to the contrary that, by working with and through non-state actors, states are behaving in accordance with a new governmental rationality (Neumann and Sending 2010).

Transnational actors can come in many different forms and shapes, ranging from social movements and international non-governmental organizations to multinational business corporations. For analytical purposes, Risse (2002: 256) distinguishes among the various non-state actors along two dimensions: their internal structure and their motivation. Are we dealing with formal organizations or more loose networks of organizations and individuals? Are these actors primarily motivated by instrumental goals of ‘profit’ for their own sake, or are they motivated by a desire to promote a particular idea of a ‘common good’?

In my dissertation, I am concerned with the latter category of transnational actors, more specifically those referred to as transnational advocacy networks. In my examination of these actors, I draw extensively on the seminal work of Keck and
Sikkink (1998), whose study of transnational advocacy networks in the mid-to-late 1990s is still regarded as one of the most comprehensive attempts to theorize the role and influence of transnational advocacy networks in international relations. What distinguishes advocacy networks from networks of professionals or experts, or what Haas (1992) has called ‘epistemic communities’, are shared principled ideas or values. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 8–9) define transnational advocacy networks as networks ‘organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to rationalist understandings of their “interests”’.

Keck and Sikkink argue that you would typically find advocacy networks emerging in connection with value-laden debates on issues such as human rights, the environment and women’s rights. Their preferred method in changing the behaviour and ‘interests’ of states and international organizations is persuasion. This is achieved by providing convincing arguments, based on updated information and expert input on issues and challenges states often find to be complex and difficult to grapple with.

The information that advocacy networks provide is based on facts (technical and statistical information) and on testimonies (stories told by those affected negatively by current practices), and is typically of a kind that would not otherwise have been readily available or stems from sources that otherwise would not have been heard (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 10). This leaves advocacy networks with considerable power and influence on how issues are interpreted and translated.

One reason for why transnational advocacy networks have been effective in value-laden debates, Keck and Sikkink argue, is that they operate in domestic and international politics simultaneously. This makes it possible for them to draw on a wide variety of human and material resources. The extent to which they manage to
take advantage of this pool of resources depends on the density of the network and the speed and quality of the information flow between the various actors in it. Movement of funds, provision of training services/capacity-building, and circulation of personnel within the network are also regarded as being crucial to a transnational advocacy network’s success.

Keck and Sikkink (1998: 9) identified the following categories of actors as major players in advocacy networks:

1) international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations;\(^\text{13}\)
2) local social movements;
3) foundations;
4) the media;
5) churches, trade unions, consumer organizations and individuals;
6) parts of regional and international nongovernmental organizations; and
7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments.

Keck and Sikkink emphasize that not all of the above-mentioned actors have to be present in transnational advocacy networks. What they found, however, was that international and domestic NGOs played a central role in each of the cases of successful advocacy networks they had researched.

\(^{13}\) Since the late 1990s, one subcategory within this category has mushroomed: that of think-tanks. In order to be close to their main targets (governments and international organizations), think-tanks are often headquartered in national capitals or in major cities such as Brussels, Geneva or New York. They have become increasingly influential players in developing and changing international politics. For more on this, see, for instance, the Think Tanks and Civil Society Project (http://gotothinktank.com), which conducts research on the role of think-tanks and publishes annual reports ranking the most influential think-tanks in various areas of global concern.
Keck and Sikkink published their influential research towards the end of the 1990s. Since that time, the number of private actors and advocacy groups with a global outreach has continued to grow rapidly. Access to modern information technology has not only increased their ability to organize and collaborate across borders and influence political change both nationally and internationally, but also reduced the costs of advocacy work quite dramatically (Joachim 2007; Paul 2004). In the context of the UN, this new reality has made it ‘imperative to better understand how the third UN interacts with the first and the second UN’ (Weiss et al. 2009: 3).

Since the founding of the UN, NGOs have enjoyed official consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The UN has regarded consultations with NGOs to be particularly relevant and useful on issues pertaining to health, labour and social policy – but not on issues regarded as ‘hard security’ (Paul 2004). Further, the UN Charter does not provide for any formal NGO relations with the Security Council, and during its first 50 years of operations the members of the Council were reluctant to make any changes to this procedure. In spite of this, international advocacy networks have expanded their relations with the Security Council considerably (Paul 2004). As will be discussed in the sections below, the role played by transnational advocacy networks in relation to the emergence and diffusion of the WPS norm is an example of such an expansion of relations with the UN Security Council.

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14 In 1948, 41 NGOs were granted consultative status with the ECOSOC. By 1968, the number had increased to 180. In 1992, the figure stood at 724, whereas 2,050 NGOs had consultative status in 2000 (Paul 2004). At the time of writing (March 2013), the number has reached 3,900. Source: [http://csonet.org](http://csonet.org) (last accessed 28 March 2014).
2.3 Norms in International Relations

Keck and Sikkink’s work on transnational advocacy networks is closely associated with their theory of how international norms emerge and diffuse, also known as the ‘norm life cycle’ theory. According to this theory, norm entrepreneurs, including those in transnational advocacy networks, are central to the successful diffusion of new international norms. Before I go into this theory in more detail, I will give a short review of the international norms literature within international relations.

Normative and ideational concerns have always informed the study of international politics (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, such concerns did not take up much space in the scholarly literature until the early 1980s, when Steven D. Krasner (1983) introduced his theoretical work on regimes. At the time, international relations scholarship was dominated by realist and neorealist thinking. Realists would typically argue that dominant regimes and norms are reflections of the material (economic and political) interests of the dominant states. Moral or idealistic norms such as human rights norms would only matter if they served the material interests of those states (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). According to Sikkink (1998: 518), the regime scholarship of the early 1980s pawed the way for an alternative body of work focusing on the role of ideas, norms and social construction processes in explaining state behaviour (see, for example, Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Krasner 1983; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986).

International relations scholarship on the power of international norms can be roughly divided into three schools or phases (Zwingel et al. 2014). Whereas scholars in the first phase were concerned about discussing the global relevance of norms and

\[\text{Krasner argued that cooperation is possible in an anarchic society of states, and that state behaviour and cooperation are regulated through various regimes. He defined regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’} \quad (1983: 2)\]
ideas as opposed to simply the material interests and power of states, scholars in the second phase focused on the role of institutions and different types of actors in setting agendas and diffusing norms (Finnemore and Kikkink 1998; Joachim 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the third phase, scholars have become more critical towards the assumption that norms generally seem to emerge within the auspices of global institutions like the UN and then diffuse or ‘trickle down’ to the regional or state level. In this body of norms literature, notions of ‘norm translation’ or ‘norm negotiation’, along with ‘norm location’, have become more prominent, depicting an understanding of norms as being generated in various sites and in multidirectional processes (Acharya 2004; Bailey 2008; Coleman 2011; Elgström 2000). Feminist scholars with an interest in international norms have been particularly concerned with issues of ‘norm translation’, predominantly in relation to the emergence and diffusion of global gender norms, along with the transnational aspects of these processes (Krook and True 2012). According to Zwingel et al. (2014: 184), the feminist literature has made important theoretical contributions to the norms literature, particularly in teaching us ‘to understand “global gender norms” as a principally unfinished discourse rather than a fixed set of ideas to be domestically implemented’.

Within the norms literature, feminist scholars writing about norms have found their home among mainstream scholars with a constructivist orientation. This orientation has dominated the international norms literature since the turn of the century (Hurrell 2002). Some of the constructivist scholars have set their mark more than others. Among these are Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. Although situated within a constructivist theoretical school, they have criticized constructivist frameworks – like other theoretical frameworks within international relations – for being too static in explaining international norms. The dominant theoretical
frameworks did not properly account for how norms change, they argued. How, for instance, might one explain the rise of human rights as an issue that impacts state behaviour? Dominant theories within political science, such as realism and rational choice, have tended to ‘dismiss them [human rights] as marginal, insignificant or an ideological cover beneath which economic groups or hegemonic countries pursue their interests’ (Sikkink 1998: 517). Contrary to these views, Sikkink argues that human rights concerns cannot be regarded as marginal in international relations of today. Rather, they have become a crucial international issue area that impacts state behaviour in its own right.

There is no agreement in the international relations literature as to how international norms best can be theorized. One of the most influential theories, however, is the norm life cycle theory developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Built, among other things, on a thorough study of how the human rights norm emerged and diffused internationally, this theory has become a central point of reference and inspiration for scholars interested in international norms. The thematic study from which it is derived also makes this theory particularly suitable to include as a key element in the analytical framework developed for the present dissertation.

2.3.1 The ‘Norm Life Cycle’

In explaining how international norms influence state behaviour or come to define the behaviour of ‘good states’, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to a three-stage process where norms in the first stage \emph{emerge} (‘norm emergence’), and in the second phase reach a stage of broad acceptance (‘norm cascade’ or diffusion),\footnote{They borrow the term ‘norm cascade’ from legal theorist Cass Sunstein (1997).} before in the third and last stage being accepted as a matter of course (‘norm internalization’). The first
two stages are divided by a ‘tipping point’, at which a critical mass of relevant actors adopts the norm (see Figure 2).

*Figure 2: Norm Life Cycle*

Why and how does a new international norm emerge? Usually, it emerges to fill a normative gap in the current practices of international politics. A new problem or challenge may have emerged to which the international society of states does not have an adequate response. Another explanation could be that major structural changes to the international system lead to substantial changes in perceptions of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In such situations non-state actors and transnational advocacy networks often play key roles in defining the problem, prescribing the solution and reframing dominant concepts.

There is disagreement in the international norms literature as to which factors or conditions are necessary to set the process of moving from the first to the second stage in motion. Realist theorists would argue that in order for a norm to emerge and diffuse, it is necessary that a hegemonic state pick up the norm and pursue it in
practical policy (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Other states will then follow. The motivation for hegemonic states to pick up new norms would be purely material. Finnemore and Sikkink take issue with the realist approach, claiming that it does not adequately explain the origins of social purpose of the actions of hegemonic states on, for instance, human rights. Neither does the realist approach explain instances when norms emerge and cascade without a hegemonic state in the lead, as was the case with the ban on landmines for instance (Cameron et al. 1998).

According to Sikkink (1998: 518), ‘norms research suggests that the origins of many international norms lie not in pre-existing state interests but in strongly held principled ideas (ideas about right and wrong) and the desire to convert others to those ideas’. This phenomenon is termed ‘moral proselytizing’ (Nadelmann 1990), and those individuals that carry it out ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’. In the case of human rights, for instance, a few key individuals were instrumental in putting the issue on the international relations agenda (Jolly et al. 2009). However, as Sikkink (1998: 518–519) points out, ‘it is often the collaboration among norms entrepreneurs inside governments, those within international organizations, and non-governmental actors that leads to the emergence of human rights norms’. Still, such close networking is not always a sufficient condition for norms to emerge and diffuse.

Support for a new norm relies both on the strength of the normative argument put forward by norm entrepreneurs (in language, information and symbolic activity) and on the power of facts to support and dramatize their argument. Successful norm entrepreneurs can redefine an activity as wrong. Sikkink argues, the emergence of human rights policies is not a simple victory of ideas over interests: ‘it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape understandings of national interests’ (Sikkink 1998: 519). Those states that adopt human rights policies do not neglect their national
interests. Rather, they have gone through a fundamental shift in their perceptions of their long-term national interests.

2.3.2 Norm Cascading

Once norms have emerged, there are no guaranties that they will diffuse and impact policy. There are many hypotheses in the literature that seek to explain the conditions under which norms will be influential. Sikkink makes particular mention of the hegemonic socialization approach and the domestic to international projection approach. She is sympathetic to both approaches, particularly the latter, but argues that neither approach properly explains why normative changes (or internationalization) in some instances takes centuries, while in other cases it can be a question of years or a few decades. As a response to this puzzle, she argues that not all norms are equal, and introduces the idea that some norms have an intrinsic quality that gives them force and influence (Sikkink 1998: 520). Human rights norms have such an intrinsic quality, since ‘they prescribe rules for appropriate behaviour and they help define liberal states’. Compliance with the human rights norms ‘becomes part of the yardstick used to define who is in and who is outside of the club of liberal states’.

There are many norms linked to the idea of liberal states, but only those that ‘resonate with basic ideas of human dignity common to most cultures’ will have powerful transnational effects (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 907). Keck and Sikkink

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17 According to Sikkink, scholars in favour of the hegemonic socialization approach argue that the most influential norms are those being advocated the most by hegemonic actors (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). Those in favour of the projection approach argue that influential norms are those norms that first became entrenched at the domestic level (in a wide range of states, not just in a hegemon) and then are projected internationally. On the latter, see for instance Lumsdaine’s (1993) work on norms about foreign aid.
(1998) argue that there are two broad categories of norms with such transnational effects:

1) those involving bodily integrity and prevention of bodily harm for vulnerable or ‘innocent’ groups; and

2) norms for legal equality of opportunity.

The rise of human rights as a central issue in international relations thus rests on the norm entrepreneurs’ abilities to frame and speak to these common values that are believed to transcend different cultural or political contexts. Norms in the first category, focusing on the protection of vulnerable or innocent groups from bodily harm, seem to have the strongest cross-cultural quality. The cross-cultural quality of the second category of norms, emphasizing equality of opportunity, is perhaps less obvious.

The normative framework on WPS encompasses both categories of norms, although, as will be discussed below, the protection dimension of this framework appears to have expanded faster than the equal opportunity dimension. This could indicate that norms on bodily integrity and protection from bodily harm enjoy a stronger cross-cultural quality than those on equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, the proliferation of state bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming in the majority of national governments throughout the world might support the argument that this second category of international norms also has a cross-cultural element. The diffusion of such gender machineries at the national level has important feedback effects on international relations, it is claimed (True and Mintrom 2001: 28).18

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18 True and Mintrom (2001) argue that the global diffusion of state-level bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming is unprecedented in the postwar era. At the time of writing, more than 100 states had such machineries in place. They claim that the diffusion of such machineries has been facilitated by the role played by transnational networks, in particular by the transnational feminist movement.
Both the life cycle theory of international norms, and the analytical framework for understanding the role and influence of norm entrepreneurs and transnational advocacy networks elaborated upon above, grew out of empirical case studies of how international norms have emerged within the sociopolitical/development pillar of the UN system. This is the pillar that handles issues traditionally referred to as *soft politics*.\(^{19}\) It is thus particularly interesting to explore the relevance of these theoretical perspectives when they are applied to a case from the realms of what has traditionally been perceived as *hard politics* (international security). More than 15 years after Keck, Sikkink and Finnemore (individually and/or together in various constellations) first began publishing books and articles on international norms emergence and the role of transnational advocacy networks, their argument about the influence of human rights on international politics still seems relevant. The emergence of the WPS agenda is a case in point. This particular norm emerged in a period when the distinctions between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ politics, as well as the concepts of ‘human security’ and ‘state security’, were increasingly both blurred and criticized, in part because the nature of war had changed.

### 2.4 The Changing Concept of Security and ‘New Wars’

#### 2.4.1 The Changing Concept of Security

As pointed out in Article I of this dissertation (Tryggestad 2009), the adoption of UNSCR 1325 did not happen in a vacuum, but in a particular historical context in international relations and UN affairs. With the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflicts changed, as did the concept of ‘security’. During the Cold War years, wars were primarily fought between states, over territory or ideology. Few seemed to

\(^{19}\) For more on the two pillars within the UN, and the relationship between soft and hard politics, see Article I in this dissertation (Tryggestad 2009).
question the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of UN member states. The end of the Cold War not only spurred a proliferation of wars and conflicts internally in states, but also led to upheavals in the international security architecture and a renewed optimism about the collective security concept and the role of the UN Security Council in securing world peace.

A number of new UN-mandated peace operations were launched, including operations defined as humanitarian interventions (Berdal 2003a; Malone and Wermester 2001). The principles of ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘non-intervention’ were no longer regarded as absolute, and a debate arose about the need to broaden the security concept to also include considerations of ‘human security’ (Chopra and Weiss 1992; Deng et al 1996). A core document in this debate is the Responsibility to Protect report, which came out of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). This document laid the foundation for the endorsement of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) norm by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit. According to Weiss (2011: 225), ‘R2P redefines state sovereignty as contingent rather than absolute, and R2P locates the responsibility for human rights in the first instance with the state’. Further, ‘if a state is unwilling or unable to honor its responsibility, or itself becomes a perpetrator of atrocities’, the responsibility to protect the victims of such atrocities rests with the international community of states.

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20 The end of the Cold War spurred a large debate within the discipline of security studies on how to define or conceptualize security. A call was made for a definition of security that goes well beyond that of the security of states. New ‘schools’ within security studies emerged such as ‘critical security studies’ (see for example Buzan 1991 and Wendt 1995) and ‘securitization theory’ (see for example Wæver 1995). Security theories and the concept of security will not be discussed in debt in this dissertation, beyond that of relating the changes in the security concept to the debates on ‘Responsibility to protect’ and the ‘new wars’, which had a strong influence on the UN discourse and policy development on peace and security matters in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War.
The R2P debate was informed by an understanding of conflicts in the post-
Cold War era as playing out primarily within states, as being complex and fought over
identity, and where civilian populations were deliberately being targeted to a much
larger extent than had previously been the case.21 Whereas international humanitarian
law (or the law of war) provides a set of rules and regulations for the type of interstate
warfare common in the 19th and 20th centuries – among other things to reduce the
impact of war on civilian populations – in the conflicts of the 21st century civilians
had become both a means and a target of military action.

2.4.2. The ‘New Wars’

The changes in the nature of conflicts that appeared most visibly in the early to mid-
1990s did not just lead to the R2P debate and a reconceptualization of security; they
also prompted the emergence within international relations of the ‘new wars’ theory.
A central scholar within this theoretical school of thought is Mary Kaldor. In her
influential book New and Old Wars (1999), Kaldor outlines an ideal type of the ‘new
wars’ in the post-Cold War era. She contends that the logic of these wars is
qualitatively different from that of ‘old wars’ in four different ways. First, rather than
being fought between regular state armies, they are decentralized and fought by
various combinations of actors, ranging from regular armed forces to jihadists and
private security companies. Second, ‘new wars’ are not fought over territory in the
geopolitical sense or over ideology, but for identity construction. Third, ‘new wars’
will rarely be played out in classical battles. Rather, the preferred method is to gain
control over civilian populations. This is achieved by using violence to instil fear and
displace groups of civilians. Fourth, while interstate wars usually are financed through

21 An obvious exception in terms of civilian suffering and casualties in ‘previous wars’ is World War
II, which is regarded as the deadliest military conflict in history.
taxation of the population, contemporary wars are often financed by, for example, looting or kidnappings or by the conflict actors being closely associated with organized criminal activity. Because of the inherent logics of these ‘new wars’, the parties to the conflicts tend to develop ‘predatory social relationships’ and a vested interest in continuing the violence. This makes ‘new wars’ complex, persistent and difficult to end.

Kaldor has been criticized for making too much out of the ‘newness’ of contemporary wars (Berdal 2003b). Many of the traits she defines as ‘new’ can also be found in the ‘old’ wars, they argue. Kaldor (2013) does not dismiss these arguments as empirical facts. She contends, however, that “‘new wars’ should be understood not as an empirical category but rather as a way of elucidating the logic of contemporary war that can offer both a research strategy and a guide to policy’ (Kaldor 2013: 1). What is ‘new’ about contemporary wars is their transnational connections, which make it difficult to distinguish between what is state or non-state, what is external or internal, and what is war or crime. Following from this, Kaldor continues, the international society needs to develop programmes and strategies for conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding that take account of this new logic of contemporary conflicts. The problem, according to Chinkin and Kaldor (2013), is that scholars, policymakers and legal advisers have retained an ‘old war thinking’ in addressing contemporary peace and security matters, particularly when it comes to how gender dynamics are understood in contemporary conflicts (see also Hernes 2008).

2.4.3 The Construction of Gender in War

War-fighting has always been a highly gendered enterprise, closely associated with stereotypical perceptions of masculinity and femininity (Cohn 2013; Elshtain 1987;
Wars have been fought, and are still fought, predominantly by men. Thus, men have also throughout history made up the majority of direct battle deaths. War-fighting is regarded as an activity closely associated with what is regarded as masculine values such as physical strength and aggressiveness. In war narratives, soldiers are typically depicted as the heroes who provide protection to the vulnerable groups in society, generally understood as women and children. According to Chinkin and Kaldor (2013), the protector–protected dichotomy has through centuries served to legitimize war and raise public support for the sacrifices made by young men who risk their lives in battles. This dichotomy has also served to portray women as physically weak and passive, traits traditionally associated with femininity. Such associations have effectively disguised the multiple roles women play during and after conflicts, including their potential contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It has also contributed to devaluing the feminine values associated with being a woman, in favour of the masculine values of men, in matters of international peace and security.

The significance of how gender relations are constructed is particularly evident in the prevalence of rape and other forms of sexual violence in ‘new wars’. In wars fought over identity, traditional gender roles and differences are often reinforced. Men are typically hailed as the hero warriors and protectors of a certain ethnic group, while the women of the same group are hailed as the ‘mothers’ of the nation (on account of their birth-giving functions). In wars over identity, violence is directed towards the civilian population of ‘the other’ groups, and often the women of ‘the others’ in particular. Thus, in a great number of contemporary conflicts, women’s bodies have become ‘the new battlegrounds’ (Snyder et al 2006; Zarkow 2007). Although rape and other forms of sexual violence have been pervasive in wars
throughout history (Skjelsbæk 2001), Chinkin and Kaldor (2013: 175) argue that the instrumentalization of sexual violence in ‘new wars’ makes this particular type of violence different from how it appeared in ‘the old wars’. In the ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War era, rape has increasingly appeared as a strategy or tactic of war (Skjelsbæk 2011; Wood 2011). Chinkin and Kaldor argue that it is in these distinct gendered logics of ‘new wars’ that the potential for transformation of violent conflicts lies. However, this has not yet been fully acknowledged by the international society.

It was precisely the international community’s lack of gender-sensitive approaches to conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding, particularly in relation to the wars in the Balkans, that sparked the campaign for WPS in the mid-to-late 1990s. A normative gap was identified, and a transnational network of women’s and human rights advocates began to lobby for a change in how peace and security matters were handled within the auspices of the UN. A decade and a half later, an international normative framework on WPS is formally in place. However, as Chinkin and Kaldor (2013: 183) point out, ‘the implementation of international norms is critical if we are to begin to address the problems that arise from new wars’. The implementation – or influence – of the WPS norm on UN peace and security politics is a key issue in this dissertation. However, before I move on to discuss that issue, I will first provide an outline of the research design and methodology.

3. Research Methodology

Research on international norms is closely associated with constructivist theories and qualitative research methods. Proponents of quantitative research methods have often accused international norms research of being too unscientific. Not only is the researcher’s objectivity or critical distance to her research object questioned, so is the
validity and verifiability of the data generated through the qualitative methods that have been applied.

International norms and their influence on policy change are by nature difficult to measure. How do we know whether a norm exists? How do we know in a given context that it is the norm itself, and not other factors such as material power politics, that impact a specific policy outcome? How do we unpack the processes and mechanisms at play in moving a norm from one phase in the norm life cycle to the next? And how do we go about uncovering who the most influential actors are, and the dynamics between them, in a complex international setting? In this chapter, I will provide an outline of the methodological choices made, including research design and sources of data, in my case study research on the international normative framework of WPS.

3.1 Research Design

The primary focus of my research is the dynamics involved in the emergence and diffusion of the WPS norm in and around the security pillar of the UN, with a particular emphasis on the strategic levels of discourse and policymaking. Research on highly political processes taking place within the auspices of a large international organization such as the UN is a complex undertaking, perhaps particularly so when the process under study is one of international norm emergence. In the case of this dissertation, I am studying the emergence and diffusion of a normative framework that in recent years seems to have had a considerable impact not only on the peace and security discourse and policy development within the UN, but also beyond in UN member states and regional organizations. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892), ‘we can only have indirect evidence of norms just as we can only have
indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action (interests or threats, for example). However, since norms embody shared moral assessments, they ‘prompt justifications for action and leaves trails of communication among actors that we can study’.

It is difficult in one single case study to generate data that give the full picture or accurate descriptions of the trails and causal mechanisms at play in a complex process of norm emergence and diffusion. Nevertheless, the aim of my research, like that of most case studies, ‘is to develop as full an understanding of that case as is possible’ (Punch 1998, cited in Silverman 2010: 138). To do this, I have found process tracing to be a useful method, and it is one that is often applied in the empirical norms literature (Checkel 2001; Kollman 2007).

3.2 Process Tracing

Process tracing is a method that has become increasingly popular in qualitative research in the social sciences over the last couple of decades. The method has become particularly popular and much discussed since the publication of George and Bennet’s (2005) book Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. This book provides a detailed account of how to go about applying the process tracing method in qualitative research, particularly in relation to within-case analysis.

George and Bennet (2005: 6) define process tracing as ‘the use of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case’. What the researcher attempts to do by applying process tracing is ‘to identify the intervening causal process – the
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’ (George and Bennet 2005: 206).

Bennet and Checkel (2013: 6) point out that the term ‘intervening variable’ might lead to confusion, since social scientists are used to thinking of variables either as causal (independent) or caused (dependent). The definition of process tracing suggests both that the intervening variable is fully caused by the independent variable(s) preceding it, and that it transmits this causal force to the dependent variable. The intervening variable should rather be regarded as ‘diagnostic evidence’, not as a variable. ‘Diagnostic evidence indicates the kind of process taking place but does not transmit any independent effects on the dependent variable’. Consequently, Bennet and Checkel (2013: 7) define process tracing as ‘the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purpose of either developing or testing hypothesis about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case’.

George and Bennet (2005: 17) define ‘case’ as ‘an instance of a class of events’. Examples of such classes of events are revolutions, democracies and wars (Bennet and Checkel 2007). Following on from this definition of ‘case’, ‘within-case evidence’ is defined as ‘evidence from within the temporal, spatial, or topical domain defined as a case’ (Bennet and Checkel 2007: 8). The ‘case’ in this dissertation is the normative framework of WPS, which is an instance of a class of events called ‘international norms’. The aim of process tracing is ‘to obtain information about highly specific events and processes’, not to make generalizations from a given sample to a larger population (Tansey 2007: 768).

Following from the above definitions, process tracing is a method that requires the collection of a large amount of data from a broad variety of sources. George and
Bennet have been criticized for focusing too much on archival and documentary research, equating process tracing with the methods of historians (Odell 2006). Tansey (2007: 766) criticizes them for paying too little attention to interviews as an important source of data in process tracing, and argues that ‘elite interviews’, in particular, are highly relevant for process tracing in case study research. If the goal of process tracing is to collect data on specific events and processes, document studies are not enough. It becomes important to identify and interview those political actors that played key roles in the events and processes in question. And this, in turn, will have implications for one’s choice of sampling techniques.

3.3 Sampling of Interviewees

In process tracing, it is more important to draw a sample of interviewees that includes the most important actors in the specific process to be studied, rather than drawing a representative sample of a large population of actors for generalization purposes. Random sampling runs against the logic of process tracing, according to Tansey, since one runs the risk of excluding key respondents from one’s study. Rather, in a process tracing study, interviewees are sampled with a view to reducing randomness, which makes non-probability sampling the most appropriate approach.

The sampling of interviewees in my own process tracing study followed the non-probability approach suggested by Tansey. For studying a process of international norm emergence and diffusion at the strategic level of an organization like the UN, ‘elite actors’ appear to be particularly interesting sources of information. They can provide information that does not appear in formal documents, such as divergent views that are not expressed in final outcomes. Thus, already early on in the process of drawing up the research design for my study, I found that it was more
relevant to identify and interview a smaller group of individuals known to have played key roles in the particular process in which I was interested, rather than conducting a large-\(n\) interview study. Also, both time and resources put constrains on how many individuals I could interview. Therefore, I found it particularly important to draw a sample that was representative of the wider population of various actors (UN staff, UN member state diplomats and NGO/civil society representatives), without doing this according to principles of random selection.

In 2005/2006, when I was beginning to plan the research design for my study of the WPS norm, the available secondary literature on WPS suggested that certain individuals within three different but distinct categories of actors in global governance – UN member states, entities within the UN system and NGOs – had been more central than others in, first, setting WPS on the UN agenda and, then, advancing its diffusion. Drawing on this literature, the first step for me in sampling interviewees was to identify who these individuals were. Two main approaches were applied in deciding which criteria to follow in this identification and selection process: the positional criteria approach and the reputational criteria approach (Tansey 2007: 770).

The first group of interviewees were identified according to their formal positions in relation to the issue area under study, and partly by their names being explicitly referred to in the literature. Largely they were elite actors, such as high-level diplomats within the UN Secretariat and in UN member states, high-level politicians in member states, and leaders/key personnel in NGOs (primarily women’s rights organizations). These individuals were influential, first-hand witnesses to the process I wanted to study.
After the first round of sampling, I applied the snowball method of sampling additional interviewees. This is a method that can be very useful in research on political processes, since the most influential actors in such processes are not always those that are the most well known to the public (Tansey 2007: 770). Many of the interviewees in my first sample came up with new suggestions for other people that might be useful for me to interview. This kind of peer recommendation as a criterion for selecting interviewees is what Tansey refers to as the reputational criteria approach. In my study, these new suggestions were often highly influential lower-level diplomats serving as advisers to ambassadors or gender experts within UN entities and NGOs. The new suggestions were cross-checked. If a name appeared several times, that served as an indication that this was a key person to interview.

Sampling of new interviewees was also done with an eye to their formal position in relation to the process under study. This was particularly important in my research on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (see Articles II and III in this dissertation). The Peacebuilding Commission research was a ‘real time’ case-within-the-case study. Many of those who had been central to the process of integrating WPS concerns in the setup and formative resolutions of the Commission were still holding the same positions they had held in that early, formative phase. Their first-hand witness accounts were particularly valuable, since these shed valuable light on the key role of individuals (among member states, in the UN system and in NGOs) in promoting the normative framework of WPS. This is a type of information that is not found in formal UN documents.

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22 Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique most often used in sociological studies. It is a sampling technique in which a small pool of informants nominates, through their social networks, other participants who meet the eligibility criteria and could potentially contribute to a specific study. The term ‘snowball sampling’ reflects an analogy to a snowball increasing in size as it rolls downhill (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball_sampling, last accessed 12 April 2014).
Although the ‘WPS community’ in New York is fairly small, I took care to make my group of informants as diverse and representative as possible, including not just UN staff, member-state representatives and NGOs known to be very active in promoting the WPS agenda, but also individuals representing member states regarded as more critical. Having informants representing different groups of actors and interests allowed me to check and double-check the information gathered, thus strengthening both the reliability and the validity of my data.

Altogether 35 individuals were interviewed as part of the data-gathering for the three articles included in this dissertation. In addition, my analysis builds on a number of informal conversations with people professionally related either to those interviewed or to the process itself.

3.4 Sources of Data

In case studies, data gathered as part of process tracing can be used for many different purposes, including gathering basic information about the case, filling in existing historical accounts, finding omitted variables and hypotheses, and uncovering causal processes (Tansey 2007). The data gathered in my research serve a combination of these purposes.

As already alluded to in my elaboration of process tracing as a method, official documents and interviews have been particularly important sources of data for my research. A number of additional sources of data have also been made use of. In this dissertation, ‘sources of data’ is understood to include the following categories:

- official/formal documents (reports, resolutions, strategies, guidelines, etc.);
- academic publications (articles, books);
- NGO reports;
• news articles (paper and Internet);
• interviews and informal conversations (with UN staff, member-state diplomats and politicians, NGO representatives, individual experts);
• participant observation of UN meetings (open and closed) and seminars organized by NGOs, member states and UN entities individually or in collaboration.

Interviews, informal conversations and participant observation in and around UN Headquarters in New York took place in the period 2006–2010. The data generated during this period form the basis for the research output in the three articles included in this dissertation. I went on annual week-long field trips (November 2006, June 2007, November 2008, February 2009 and October 2010). Some interviews and conversations have also been conducted in Oslo with Norwegian diplomats and other categories of informants (including international informants). I have continued to visit New York regularly since 2010, with a view to keeping myself updated on what I regard to be an ongoing process of norm diffusion. The information gathered during the more recent field trips informs my analysis of the post-2010 period.

Below, I will discuss each of the various sources of data in more detail, outlining how and why I found them useful in my research.

3.4.1 Official/Formal Documents

According to Dunn (2008: 88), what is thought of as ‘official data’ have traditionally been treated as the most ‘legitimate’ sources of data within the political science discipline. By ‘official data’, he refers to sources such as government documents, speeches by state leaders and the writings of political elites. In the research for this
dissertation, official data have included reports by the UN Secretary-General and expert groups appointed by various UN entities, resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly, and statements, speeches and press releases. These official data were very important for documenting the formal sequence of events in terms of the decisionmaking processes on WPS and how the normative framework has increasingly become integrated into formal documents and procedures.

Whereas researchers studying processes within international organizations such as the UN only a decade ago would have to spend weeks and months on archival searches in New York to document the complete trajectory of formal decisionmaking, today it is generally not difficult to access this type of information. In recent years, the UN has gone through something of a revolution in terms of making all official documents available online in all official languages. The electronic archives date back to the earliest days of the organization, and the more up-to-date documents are rapidly posted on the UN webpage. Security Council documents are made available only days (in some cases hours) after being passed. Also, verbatim transcriptions of Security Council meetings/debates are made readily available. The electronic search engine has been upgraded, making the organization and its archives more easily accessible and user-friendly for researchers.\footnote{For more information, see UN Documentation Centre (http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml) and the UN Documentation Research Guide (http://research.un.org/en/docs/symbols).} This makes UN studies based on archival sources possible without the researcher even having to go to New York. Also, the archives are trustworthy in the sense that there is a high probability that one will actually be able to access all of the existing formal documents that relate to a particular issue.

The UN also offers e-subscription to UN documents, including the *UN Journal*. This is a daily publication that UN staff and diplomats claim they can hardly
live without in their day-to-day work. The *UN Journal* provides a full overview of meetings that are to be held (where and when), topics to be discussed and related documents. More important, perhaps, for research purposes is the complete list of official documents issued on a particular day (accessible via hyperlink) and a summary of the meetings held the previous day.\(^{24}\) The *UN Journal* is an important source of information for keeping track of relevant events and ensuring that one obtains documents relevant for one’s research.

The challenge for a researcher studying processes taking place in and around the UN – and particularly in and around the highly politicized UN Security Council – is to access and generate the ‘unofficial’ data. When an issue finally reaches the Security Council agenda for formal debate and action, it has usually been subject to intense debate and negotiations ‘backstage’, and the outcome has in most cases already been decided before the matter is voted upon (Hurd 2007; Malone 2004; Nagelhus Schia 2011). In order to capture the mechanisms at work both ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ in relation to the WPS case, secondary literature (academic and NGO), interviews, and informal conversations with UN staff, UN diplomats and NGO representatives were important additional sources of data.

3.4.2. Secondary Literature

In the early phase of my research, secondary literature was an important source of information for drafting a first narrative or sequence of events for how WPS emerged and diffused. At that time (2005/2006), the available academic literature on WPS was limited. Thus, secondary literature produced and published by NGOs closely associated with the WPS campaign became very important. Some of the most useful

reports have been those coming out of the office of the New York-based NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO Working Group), a group coordinating the WPS advocacy efforts of altogether 16 women’s and human rights organizations. This group has been and continues to be a driving force in WPS advocacy work and works very closely with both UN member states and the UN system. The NGO Working Group is perceived by the latter two groups of actors to operate professionally and to provide reliable information. This professionalism and reliability are also reflected in the Group’s publications, which are well referenced.

Additional publications produced by individual member organizations of the NGO Working Group have also served as important sources of information for my research. The information provided by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), perhaps the most active and prominent member of the NGO Working Group, should be highlighted in particular. WILPF’s Peace Women Project, a webpage dedicated to the monitoring and promotion of the WPS norm, is a rich source of information. On this webpage, a directory of relevant WPS literature from around the world can be found, as well as the key official documents from the UN. In addition, WILPF keeps track of all of the UN member-state National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 that are available at any particular time, including their full text in various languages. ‘Shadow reports’ to the official WPS progress report of the UN Secretary-General can also be found on this webpage. The latter type of secondary literature has been a particularly useful source of information for my research on the institutionalization of the normative framework on WPS in international law, as the Peace Women Project (in collaboration with the NGO Working Group) tracks how

25 The WILPF Peace Women Project can be found at http://www.peacewomen.org (last accessed 12 April 2014).
WPS is referenced and integrated in, among other things, Security Council resolutions.

Another useful source of information has been the publications coming out of the Security Council Report think-tank, which is also based in New York.\textsuperscript{26} In addition to a monthly publication (\textit{The Security Council Report}) providing an overview of upcoming issues on the agenda of the UN Security Council, the organization also publishes reports that provide in-depth examination of thematic issues on the Council’s agenda, such as WPS. All of its reports include a separate section on ‘Council dynamics’, in which analysts elaborate on the expected outcomes of certain processes, which member states will most likely vote for/against various agenda items, the reasoning of the various member states, etc. Security Council Report, which is affiliated with Columbia University in New York, is regarded as an authoritative source of information for UN scholars. In relation to my own research, it has been an important source of ‘back stage’ information on the process of interest. In many instances, it has helped me to identify which countries – and thus which diplomats – would be particularly interesting to approach, what questions to ask, and what data to look for.

3.4.3. Interviews

Semi-structured interviews of elite actors have been another important source of data in my research. According to Tansey (2007: 766-768), elite interviews can serve the following purposes:

1) to corroborate early findings;

2) to establish what a particular group of people think on certain issues;

\textsuperscript{26} For more information on Security Council Report, visit http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
3) to make it possible to make inferences about the beliefs of a wider group without interviewing everyone from that group; or

4) to make it possible to reconstruct an event or set of events.

For my research project, elite interviews served important functions in two ways in particular: First, the interviews were important as a means of verifying the WPS narratives put forward in official documents and the secondary literature published by academics and NGOs. Second, the interviews were important for reconstructing the sequence of events in relation to the WPS agenda.

The majority of the interviews conducted for this dissertation were tape recorded and later transcribed. In addition to the interviews, data have also been generated from a number of informal conversations with UN staff, diplomats and NGO representatives as opportunities arose. The majority of the interviews were conducted in New York, but some also in Oslo and some by phone. Some of my interviews were followed up by additional questions via e-mail.

Although only a few of those interviewed are directly cited in my study, all of the interviews have been important in terms of providing background information on how the WPS norm emerged, who the key actors were, their reasoning for promoting this particular agenda, how I might proceed, and where I might look for further information. In interviewing, I used a technique similar to what Gusterson (2008: 104) has described as ‘branching’ and ‘building’. I started out with a set of core questions that were posed to every informant (age, educational background, current employment and work description). From there on, each interview was tailored to each individual’s interest and institutional identity (‘branching’), and each interview to a large extent also built on earlier interviews (‘building’). Since I had the
opportunity to follow a distinct process quite closely over several years, interviews conducted one year would build on interviews conducted in the year(s) before. This made it possible to trace/account for changes and new developments. It also allowed me to account for my own deepening understanding of the issue area.

3.4.4 Participant Observation

Gusterson (2008) talks about participant observation as a particularly effective method for exploring the differences between ‘frontstage’ (the formal) and ‘backstage’ (the informal). As a scholar within international relations/political science, it was never an option for me to carry through an ethnographic study. Still, an element of ethnography was applied, although not of the ‘deep hanging out’ nature that social anthropologists or ethnographers would think of when referring to participant observation. I did not spend a long period of time among UN staff and diplomats to, in Gusterson’s (2008: 99) words, ‘join in the flow of daily life while also taking notes on it’. Over a period of five years (2006–2010), I spent one week every year at the UN for data-gathering purposes. In addition to conducting interviews, I also attended, as an observer, numerous meetings (both open and closed) of UN entities and UN missions, as well as seminars and workshops organized by the NGO community in New York. Observation of UN meetings, in particular, provided me with insights into the organizational culture and work procedures of the organization, and deepened my understanding of the politics of decisionmaking at the UN. These meetings also served as an important source of information on the diverging views of member states that do not necessarily appear in the final and official versions of outcome documents.
Public seminars organized by NGOs only or by NGOs in collaboration with UN member states and UN entities have also served as important sources of information for my research. Observing these seminars was particularly useful since many of them had women from conflict areas attending to give testimonies to UN official and UN member state diplomats. I found myself to be in the midst of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) description of how transnational advocacy networks operate, being able to observe at first hand how advocacy was played out and responded to by the target audience (UN diplomats and UN member state officials). This kind of participant observation was particularly useful in relation to my research on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (Articles II and III).

3.5 Reflections on Methodology

Gusterson (2008) talks about how, while conducting semi-structured interviews, he found himself not only having conversations with individuals but also with a single entity or ‘discourse community’. This was also my experience. The WPS community is a distinct discourse community consisting of a relatively small number of individuals who are instrumental in defining the agenda, who see themselves as ‘guardians’ of the WPS narrative, and who have a strong sense of shared values and are fighting for the same cause. Many of my informants clearly also regarded me as being a member of this same community (by virtue of me being a women, coming from a ‘WPS-friendly’ UN member state, and having served as a consultant to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the production of Norway’s National Action Plan).

Under such circumstances, a researcher can easily go blind and find that her research concludes in a manner that serves the discourse community, her funder and/or ‘the cause’. The danger of becoming too close and ‘embedded’ with one’s
research objects is particularly prominent when one’s research is government-funded, when one has had a long working relationship with one’s funder, and when many of one’s informants also represent one’s funder or have close political or donor ties to one’s funder.

The way in which I tried to avoid this was to constantly be self-reflective regarding my own role, the methods I applied, and how I applied them. In order to increase the robustness of my findings, emphasis was put on data triangulation, the cross-checking of my data by drawing information from multiple sources. This revealed, among other things, the under-communication in much of the secondary literature of the influential role of actors other than NGOs in promoting the WPS agenda, as well as important processes taking place within the UN system beyond the entities dealing with women’s rights (Tryggestad 2009).

As outlined above, interviews have served as an important source of data in my dissertation research. I had the privilege of gaining access to a number of key individuals playing important roles in the process under study. However, once a first contact has been established, the next challenge is to have individuals share information or data during an interview. This will only be achieved if the researcher manages to build trust and rapport, which can be particularly challenging in cases where research is conducted on politicized or sensitive issues. Building rapport is about ‘establishing trust and familiarity, showing genuine interest, assuring confidentiality, and not being judgemental’ (Glassner and Loughlin, cited in Miller and Glassner 2004: 133). Silverman (2006: 110) adds that it is about attempting to see the world from the viewpoint of respondents without ‘going native’, something that can be very hard to do. Trust can be built by being open about who you are, and what
the aims and purposes of your project are, and by offering to share findings with the individuals or organization in question.

Many researchers also apply the ‘known sponsor approach’ (Shenton and Hayter 2004: 224). Being open about who is sponsoring your project lends a kind of ‘official status’ to the project and might strengthen the credibility of the researcher(s) involved in the eyes of the informants. However, there are also major concerns associated with the ‘known sponsor approach’: ‘Researchers may suffer by being continually seen as extensions of their political sponsors within the setting despite their denials to the contrary’ (M. Punch, cited in Shenton and Hayter 2004: 224).

In order to build trust with my interviewees, I took care to obtain their informed consent to be interviewed. Interviewees were provided with my background information, including my institutional affiliation to an independent research institute in Norway, and an outline of the research purpose. I generally also applied the ‘known sponsor approach’, being open about the fact that the research was being funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As a consequence of my adoption of the ‘known sponsor approach’, I experienced on several occasions the challenge of having to get my informants to understand that I was an independent researcher, not an official of the Norwegian government. This experience naturally led me to question the validity and reliability of the data I had obtained during the interview. Did the interviewee share with me her true opinions and views? Or did she give me the data or information she expected that I would like to hear, based on her knowledge of Norway both as a key donor and as a key actor in promoting the WPS agenda?

The information provided in interview situations takes on a particular form, a form that might have been different if another person had asked the same questions.
The interview subject constructs the narrative according to his or her social world (Miller and Glassner, 2004). This is a problem endemic to all sorts of interview research, but perhaps particularly when the ‘known sponsor’ strategy is applied on research topics of a political nature. In order to strengthen the reliability and validity of data, emphasizing triangulation of data from different sources became important. In addition to official sources of information (such as formal documents) and interviews, observation also played a key part in my data generation. This source of information was particularly important for tracing the unofficial aspects of the process under study.

4. Article Findings

4.1 Article I: ‘Trick or Treat’

The first article included in my PhD dissertation addresses the issue of norm emergence and how the normative framework of WPS came to be institutionalized in international law through the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325.

When I began my research on UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda, the existing literature suggested that it was the intensive lobbying by a transnational advocacy network of women’s groups that led to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Anderlini 2007; Cockburn 2007; Meintjes et al. 2001; Porter 2007). In my article, I do not dismiss the pivotal role of this transnational network. On the contrary, my data largely confirm this narrative. What was missing in much of the literature, however, was a more nuanced analysis that took account of factors such as the ‘external environment’ or ‘opportunity structures’ (Joachim 2003), as well as the role of other actors, in the agenda-setting processes.
In the ‘Trick or Treat’ article, I argue that changes in international relations at the time were particularly conducive to the adoption of the UNSCR 1325. The end of the Cold War changed the nature of conflicts and opened up for a widening of the previously state-centric concept of security, which came to increasingly include considerations of human security. The WPS agenda belongs to a family of interrelated normative agendas that blossomed in the 1990s, including ‘Children in Armed Conflicts’, ‘Protection of Civilians’ (the Responsibility to Protect, R2P). The post-Cold War change in the external environment opened up a window of opportunity for the international women’s movement and norm entrepreneurs within the UN system and among member states to reframe and expand the women’s human rights norm to also make it applicable to international peace and security.

The international women’s movement managed not just to take advantage of this external opportunity structure. Article I also shows how the various women’s organizations succeeded in setting WPS on the agenda by mobilizing their individual organizational structures in a very efficient and strategic way, not least by joining forces through the establishment of a transnational advocacy network for WPS. This network was spearheaded by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, headquartered in New York. This group consisted of a number of internationally acknowledged women’s and human rights organizations, each pulling together a large amount of human and material resources. By allying with a carefully selected group of member states and key UN entities dealing with women’s issues, they managed to gain access to the UN Security Council. Through a multitude of advocacy efforts, including the provision of updated and accurate information and the bringing in of women from conflict zones to testify before the Security Council, they managed to convince the members of the Security Council of the importance of
adopter a resolution that acknowledged that women’s human rights were also integral to matters of international peace and security.

In tracing the trajectory of the normative framework of WPS, I also found that lobbying efforts and policy development processes within the structures of the UN Secretariat dealing with peace and security matters (primarily the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) had played an important role in advancing the agenda. Acknowledgement of these processes was largely missing from the WPS narrative at the time. Article I also addresses the key role of dedicated norm entrepreneurs among a handful of UN member states in this early phase of norm emergence.

Published in December 2009, the article does not actually term or discuss WPS as ‘a norm’ or ‘a normative framework’. Nor did my informants at the time refer to it as ‘a norm’. Throughout the article, it is discussed as an ‘issue area’. The article concludes, however, that it is an issue area that has been acknowledged in a surprisingly short period of time. The article ends by contending that WPS is a new norm in the making. However, the further diffusion of the norm will continue to be dependent on the triangle of actors that initially campaigned for the adoption of UNSCR 1325.

4.2 Article II: The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Gender: A Case of Norm Reinforcement

The second article included in my dissertation picks up on the issue of norm emergence and diffusion where it was left in the first article. For international norms to move from an emergent phase and into a phase of diffusion (cascade) and broad acceptance, one would often find that some sort of organizational institutionalization of the norm has taken place. Half a decade after its adoption, to what extent had the
WPS issue area emerged as an institutionalized set of norms with influence on UN peace and security matters? Article II seeks to provide an answer to this question through an empirical study of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which at the time of study was an entirely new UN entity. The establishment of the PBC was endorsed by the UN World Summit in October 2005, and the entity became operational in June 2006. It was established to fill an organizational gap in the UN system in terms of providing post-conflict countries with rapid peacebuilding assistance. In my article, I contend that the PBC was a particularly fitting case to study. As a new entity, one would expect it to embody the dominant norms and ideas in contemporary UN thinking on peace and security, including that of WPS.

My study produced a number of findings. First, in comparison with other UN bodies dealing with peace and security matters at the time, I found that women’s concerns and interests were surprisingly well integrated into the formal documents outlining the overarching rationale and mandate of the PBC. This was also the case with the strategic documents developed for the first two countries to be referred to the Commission (Burundi and Sierra Leone). This was indicative of a norm in diffusion. Second, the inclusion of women’s issues and concerns in the formal documents and deliberations of the PBC did not happen by itself. Once again, it was an outcome of active and at times intense lobbying by civil society activists, a handful of member states, and women’s activists working from within the UN. Largely, it was the same groups of actors (and also some of the same individuals) that had been active in lobbying for the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Third, and this was perhaps the most surprising finding, once gender issues had been put on the agenda of the PBC, the relevance of this normative framework for peacebuilding activities was acknowledged without much resistance or discussion among the Commission’s 31 member states.
These included member states representing the G-77, which otherwise often are quite vocal in a negative sense on issues pertaining to women’s rights, particularly those regarding reproductive health. A synthesis report from the PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) even stated that UNSCR 1325 constitutes a normative framework that has enjoyed widespread acceptance in different sessions of the WGLL (Tryggestad 2010: 165).

Nevertheless, the article contends that although the WPS had come a long way towards being accepted as a legitimate normative framework with relevance for peacebuilding, it was still in a phase of norm emergence. At the time of my research (2006–2008), it was a normative framework in need of additional organizational institutionalization if it were to reach the tipping point that would take it into the phase of norm diffusion (cascade).

Article II concludes, as did Article I, that the successful diffusion of this normative framework continued to be dependent on the lobbying efforts of norm entrepreneurs among member states, within the NGO community and in the UN system. However, the achievements made in relation to the PBC served as an important reinforcement of WPS as an international normative framework in the context of international peace and security.

4.3 Article 3: State Feminism Going Global: Norway on the UN Peacebuilding Commission

The third and final article in my dissertation addresses the issue of institutionalization of international norms in the foreign policies of UN member states. This is elaborated upon through a study of the role Norway played as WPS norm entrepreneur while
serving as co-chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and chair of the PBC Burundi Country Configuration from 2006 to 2008.

The article explores how, inspired by normative ideals and visions of ‘the good society’, Norway has been among the most active UN member states in promoting the WPS agenda. Once the call was made by the UN Secretary-General in 2004, Norway was one of the first member states to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Adopted in March 2006, the Norwegian NAP had a strong impact on the ongoing deliberations at the time on what Norway’s peacebuilding policies should look like. Implementation of the WPS framework ended up being listed first among thematic priorities when the Platform for Norway’s Membership on the UN PBC was formulated.

The study finds that Norway played a very active role as WPS norm entrepreneur while serving on the PBC. Being a co-chair of this new body, and chair of the PBC Burundi configuration, Norway had a unique opportunity to promote norms and values regarded as important to Norwegian foreign policy, including women’s human rights. And Norway seized that opportunity. Through direct interventions and negotiations, the Burundian government was persuaded to include language on UNSCR 1325 and WPS in the strategic framework on peacebuilding for Burundi. Also, in close collaboration with the international advocacy network on WPS, Norway was instrumental in securing women and women’s organizations seats at the table when national peacebuilding strategies and priorities were discussed.

The article concludes that by playing such an active role as norm entrepreneur during its PBC membership period, Norway did not simply contribute to a formal reinforcement of the normative framework of WPS internationally. By integrating this normative framework in its foreign policy, and actively pursuing its implementation,
Norway also reinforced its own standing within the international community of states. Norway’s role was applauded by other member states and the UN Secretariat, as well as the NGO community.

5. Discussion of Findings in Articles and Beyond

5.1 Where Is WPS in the ‘Norm Life Cycle’?

Whereas the articles in this dissertation conclude that WPS is a norm in a phase of emergence, developments in recent years bring evidence of this norm now having entered what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) refer to as the phase of norm cascade (or diffusion). In the background section of this dissertation, I argue that the WPS norm reached a tipping point, moving it from the norm-emergence to the norm-cascading phase, around the time of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in 2010. The anniversary served as an important mobilizing event, not only for the UN system but also for a number of member states and regional organizations. For a norm to have reached the phase of norm cascade, or diffusion, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that three types of institutionalization most likely have occurred: institutionalization in international law, institutionalization in the rules of the multilateral organizations, and institutionalization in bilateral foreign policies of UN member states. In the following, I will use this categorization as the point of departure for the discussion of article findings as well as more recent expressions of norm diffusion.

5.1.1 Institutionalization in International Law

One expression of the institutionalization of a new normative framework in international law is the adoption of Security Council resolutions. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000 has been followed by the adoption of six subsequent
resolutions under the WPS umbrella: UNSCR 1820 (June 2008), UNSCR 1888 (September 2009), UNSCR 1889 (October 2009), UNSCR 1960 (December 2010), UNSCR 2106 (June 2013) and UNSCR 2122 (2013). Each of these resolutions is more specific and prescriptive in terms of actions than UNSCR 1325. Together, these seven resolutions have firmly established WPS as a formal item on the agenda of the Security Council.

Although regarded as soft law (see article I for a discussion of the legal status of UNSCR 1325), follow-up resolutions reinforce the initial normative framework and strengthen the judicial status of the WPS agenda within international law. Therefore, Security Council resolutions should not ‘be scoffed at’. They emerge ‘from the highest pinnacle of the international lawmaking apex, and communicate an evident normative weight’ (Aoláin 2013: 59). It is worth noting that there was a time span of eight years between the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the passing of the first follow-up resolution. All the follow-up resolutions were adopted in the time period 2008–2013, which strengthens my argument that this norm reached a tipping point around the time of the 10th anniversary in 2010. The anniversary served as a reminder to the UN system and the UN member states of their normative and legal commitments, and the fact that progress with implementation thus far had been slow. It is also worth noting that four out of the six follow-up resolutions to UNSCR 1325 highlight one dimension of the normative framework of WPS in particular, that of sexual violence against women in conflict. The growing support for this particular dimension of the larger WPS framework seems to support Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) argument that norms that address issues of protection from bodily harm have more of a cross-cultural quality than other norms.
The transnational advocacy network on WPS not only has been heavily involved in advocating for the adoption of the additional resolutions by, for example, writing letters of concern to members of the Security Council and organizing meetings with individual member states. Its members have also been instrumental in drafting the text of many of these resolutions, organizing workshops and seminars and producing background material, including policy recommendations.

In the early years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the annual open debates on progress with implementation were accused of being primarily rhetorical acts (Cockburn 2007). However, in the course of recent years, WPS concerns are increasingly being addressed in the work of the Security Council (NGO Working Group 2010, 2012, 2013; Peace Women Project 2010). This is evident in the language of presidential statements (PRSTs) and resolutions (country-specific and thematic), as well as in the attention paid to the WPS agenda in thematic debates.27 The trend has been consistent, but seems to have gained momentum in the last couple of years (NGO Working Group 2013).

The ‘thickness’ of the institutionalization in international law can be questioned, though, as the Security Council seems to address WPS concerns in an inconsistent manner. In some conflict situations, WPS concerns are fully addressed and integrated into every aspect of resolution texts. In other situations, WPS concerns are hardly being mentioned. As pointed out by the NGO Working Group (2013: 16), ‘this may suggest that progress remains dependent on individual policy makers taking the initiative in negotiations and deliberations, rather than the Council approaching these matters via institutionally engrained mechanisms of accountability’. Both

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27 This was the case, for example, when the Security Council discussed post-conflict peacebuilding on 29 October 2010. Rather than placing the Secretary General’s report on ‘Women and Peacebuilding’ on the agenda of the open WPS meeting that same month, the report was discussed in relation to the broader peacebuilding agenda.
Articles II and III in this dissertation address the importance norm entrepreneurs have played in advancing the WPS agenda. Although now in a process of rapid diffusion, WPS still seems to be dependent on the advocacy efforts of the transnational advocacy network on WPS for this process of diffusion to continue. The WPS norm has still a long way to go to reach the final phase of the norm life cycle — that of norm internationalization.

5.1.2 Organizational Institutionalization

Also within the UN Secretariat, a number of initiatives and policies have been launched in recent years in direct or indirect support of a more rapid implementation of the WPS agenda. One of the most noteworthy initiatives is the reorganization of what used to be called the UN Gender Machinery into a new organizational entity, UN Women.28 UN Women, which has been operational since 1 January 2011, is headed by an Under-Secretary-General, who is also a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Senior Management Group. The upgraded status of both UN Women and its leader is an expression of the heightened status of women’s rights issues at the UN, included those related to WPS.

UN Women is a composite unit that has merged four previously distinct UN units mandated to work on gender equality and empowerment of women in different ways.29 The purpose of merging the four entities was to accelerate the UN’s work on women’s issues. It is expected that the bringing together of resources and mandates in this way will lead to greater impact. The inter-agency cooperation on women’s rights

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28 In July 2010, the UN General Assembly agreed to establish the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), A/RES/64/289, 2 July 2010.
29 The four entities were the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI); the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW); the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM); and the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW).
within the UN system dates back to the 1970s and the planning and preparation of the first international Women’s Conference in Mexico City in 1975 (Jain 2005). In 1996, the cooperation was formalized through the establishment of the Inter-Agency Committee on Women and Gender Equality (IACWGE). The purpose was to improve coordination of policies regarding women’s rights and gender equality within the UN system. In 2001, the name of this committee was changed to the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE). Over the course of the following years, a number of Task Forces on various sub-issues have been established by IANWGE, including one on Women, Peace and Security (in February 2001). In 2011, IANWGE recognized that the work of this Task Force was not of a temporary nature and established a Standing Committee on Women, Peace and Security. The Standing Committee consists of representatives of most of the major departments, funds, programmes and special agencies within the UN system. It meets quarterly or on a need-based basis and is chaired by UN Women. The Standing Committee on Women, Peace and Security has a particular responsibility for following up on the Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security (2011–2020), which contains targets and indicators for the UN system-wide implementation of the WPS agenda. Representatives of the transnational advocacy network on WPS (including the NGO Working Group) are always invited to participate as observers in the meetings of the task force.

All the four units, which previously were referred to collectively as the UN Gender Machinery, have in different ways and capacities played important roles in promoting the WPS agenda and in developing policies for its implementation. However, UNIFEM has by far been the most influential, working closely with both member states and the transnational advocacy network on WPS in developing and
implementing policies at UN Headquarters, as well as operational activities in conflict/post-conflict countries. UNIFEM has played a particularly active role in assisting conflict-affected member states in developing NAPs. In order to strengthen national planning on implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent WPS resolutions, UNIFEM has since 2009 supported a multi-country initiative to assist countries in producing meaningful and practical indicators to be able to track progress with implementation.30

Another important organizational development within the UN Secretariat is the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SRSG on Sexual Violence). The establishment of such a position within the UN management group was called for in Security Council Resolution 1820 of June 2008. This resolution, which is one of the follow-up resolutions to UNSCR 1325, addresses the part of the WPS agenda that is particularly concerned with issues of sexual violence against women in armed conflicts. The first SRSG on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict was appointed for a two-year term in February 2010. 31 The mandate of the SRSG is to lead, coordinate and advocate for efforts to end sexual violence against women and children in conflict and war. It is worth noting that the SRSG was not appointed to work on the full WPS agenda but on one of its dimensions only, that of sexual violence. Once again, this could be said to strengthen the argument that norms addressing issues of bodily harm have a greater cross-cultural quality, thus making them more universally acceptable than others.32

31 Swedish Margot Wallström was the first SRSG on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. She stepped down in February 2010 and was replaced by Zainab Bangura from Sierra Leone.
32 Unlike the UN, which has appointed a SRSG with a mandate limited to that of fighting and preventing Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, NATO and the African Union have respectively appointed a SRSG and a Special Envoy, both mandated to work on the full WPS agenda.
The appointment of an SRSG on Sexual Violence is clearly an expression of organizational institutionalization of the WPS norm, and had long been lobbied for by the transnational advocacy network on WPS. The members of the network were also actively engaged in identifying qualified candidates for the position.

5.1.3 Institutionalization in Foreign Policies of UN Member States

Successful diffusion of an international norm is dependent on member states’ compliance with and implementation of the norm in their domestic and foreign policies. Several developments in recent years indicate that the WPS agenda enjoys growing normative support among member states.

As outlined in Article I of this dissertation, around the time of the adoption of UNSCR 1325 a group of member states, coordinated by Canada, came together in New York and established a ‘Friends of Women, Peace and Security Group’ (Friends of WPS). This group is still active and meets regularly to exchange information on national policies, to discuss various initiatives for the advancement of the WPS agenda, to advocate or negotiate for gender-sensitive outcomes of various UN processes, etc. The group was formed primarily by member states from the so-called Western European States and Other Group (WEOG) at the UN. For many years, the membership of the Friends of WPS was stable and counted around 30 member states. In the years leading up to the 10th anniversary, the membership grew to around 45, and more UN member states expressed an interest in joining. The expansion of the group made it more cross-regional, including member states such as Bangladesh, Chile, Morocco, South Africa and Tanzania. The criterion for becoming a member is a strong commitment to the WPS agenda. The Canadian chair does not actively reach

33 For more on the emergence of ‘friends groups’ within the framework of the UN, see Whitfield (2007).
out to UN member states to recruit group members. Rather, interested member states approach Canada and ask whether they can join. Although having too many members can make it difficult for the group to function effectively, the growing interest in joining the group is a welcome development, according to the Canadian coordinator of the group. A large group of members strengthens the legitimacy of the group and reinforces the normative status of WPS.

The Friends of WPS group works closely with various UN entities, the NGO community, research institutions and think tanks. These groups of actors are also invited to attend the meetings of the Friends of WPS as observers. Among the NGOs invited is the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO Working Group).

The Friends of WPS was particularly active in 2010 on initiatives leading up the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325. For example, in preparation of the upcoming report of the Secretary-General on women’s participation in peacebuilding, Friends Group members Canada and Denmark, together with the International Peace Institute (IPI), hosted one of the first discussions on the subject matter. Seven indicators came out of this process, and these were included in the final report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (UN Security Council 2010a). The Friends of WPS was also heavily involved in the process of mobilizing UN member states to make the most out of the Security Council open debate marking the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325. One of the mobilizing events was a high-level ministerial meeting in

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34 Information shared by coordinator in interview with author, October 2010.
36 See below for more on the NGO Working Group.
September 2010 entitled *1325 Call To Action*, initiated and organized by the Friends Group, under Canadian leadership. Thirty-five countries gave statements, and fifteen ministers attended, together with other leaders of national governments. The purpose of the meeting was to raise awareness among UN member states and to have them prepare stronger national commitments at the upcoming open debate of the Security Council in October.\(^{37}\)

Another important, and perhaps more explicit, expression of norm institutionalization in foreign policies is the growing number of National Action Plans (NAPs) adopted by UN member states. In a Presidential Statement following the open meeting on WPS in October 2004, the Security Council encouraged member states to implement UNSCR 1325 at the national level, including through the adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs).\(^{38}\) In UNSCR 1325, the Security Council urges UN member states specifically to increase the representation of women at all decision-making levels and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It also urges member states, among other things, to increase funding for gender-sensitive training efforts internationally and to mainstream a gender perspective in national training programmes.

The first country to adopt an NAP was Denmark in 2005, followed by Norway, Sweden and the UK in 2006. In the years that followed, a number of European countries adopted NAPs. Most of these countries were also members of the Friends of Women, Peace and Security group in New York. Not only were a majority of these NAPs developed in close cooperation or consultation with national women’s NGOs, of which many formed part of the larger transnational advocacy network on WPS; but in many instances NGOs have also, through lobbying efforts, been

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\(^{37}\) Interview with coordinator, October 2010.

instrumental in initiating the development of NAPs. Also, there were extensive consultative processes among this first group of UN member states to adopt NAPs, seeking advice and lessons from one another on how to go about developing their respective NAPs.40

In the period 2009–2011, a particularly rapid growth in NAPs can be observed (see Figure 3 below). I argue that this growth can be ascribed to the mobilizing event of the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in October 2010. This event reminded concerned UN member states of their commitments, and to many of these states their lack of compliance with/implementation of UNSCR 1325 became visible and embarrassing.

Figure 3: Overview and Timeline of Adopted National Action Plans


39 In the case of Norway, for example, the Norwegian chapter of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) played a lobbying role. WILPF is a key actor in the transnational advocacy network on WPS, both as a member of the NGO Working Group and through its own separate advocacy project called PeaceWomen, spearheaded by WILPF’s New York office.

40 This was particularly the case among the Nordic countries.
At the time of writing (March 2014), 43 UN member states have adopted NAPs, including the USA. Several more member states are in the process of developing NAPs, including Japan. Among these are also a steadily growing number from the global South, including post-conflict member states. In a great number of states from the global South, NAPs are often initiated and developed by domestic women’s groups and/or women’s organizations with close connections to the larger transnational advocacy network on WPS, and in close collaboration with relevant UN entities such as UN Women. Other post-conflict member states have developed their NAPs in close collaboration with European UN member states with NAPs. So-called twinning-projects, by which donor countries with NAPs support countries from the global South in developing their NAPs, are examples of such collaboration. The processes of developing NAPs for the implementation of the WPS agenda are generally characterized by strong collaboration between different groups of actors and the exchange of lessons and good practices. Although not discussed in much detail in this dissertation, the growing number of action plans indicates that the normative framework of WPS is beginning to impact policies on the ground in conflict affected/post conflict UN member states.

5.2 The WPS Process – The Ideal Type Model of Tripartite Collaborative Governance?

The most recently published feminist-inspired literature on the UN and the WPS norm documents the role that a host of women’s and human rights organizations, as well as

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41 For an updated list of UN member states with NAPs, see http://peacewomen.org/naps/list-of-naps (last accessed 12 February 2014).
42 It is worth noting that it is quite uncommon for the USA to adopt NAPs for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions.
43 This has been the case with member states such as Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
44 Nepal’s adoption of a NAP on WPS in 2011 is the outcomes of a twinning project with Norway.
individual activists and experts, played a role in the campaign to have UNSCR 1325 adopted—and later their role in advocacy for its implementation (Cockburn 2007; Hudson 2010; Olonisakin et al. 2011). UNSCR 1325 is a remarkable resolution in the sense that it is one of very few—if not the only one—that has a global constituency of civil society organizations and institutions behind it (Barnes 2011). A number of prominent NGOs headquartered in Europe and North America have their own programmes, projects and campaigns to promote the WPS agenda globally.45 In addition, some of these organizations have joined forces and founded the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO Working Group), which is headquartered across the street from the UN Secretariat building in New York.46 As documented and discussed in the articles included in this dissertation, the NGO Working Group works closely with both the UN system and UN member states in advancing and implementing the WPS norm.

The NGO Working Group was initially formed to advocate for the adoption of a Security Council resolution on WPS. The forerunner of the working group was the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus, a group of international NGOs, coordinated by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). During the 1998 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) a conference was organized that took stock of progress in terms of the implementation of the 1995 Beijing Platform of Action. The outcome of this conference was that the women’s activists decided to shift strategy ‘from getting armed conflict on to the UN “women agenda” to getting

45 Examples of such organizations are International Alert in London, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Geneva, and the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, coordinated from New York.

46 The founding members of the NGO Working Group were Amnesty International, International Alert, the Hague Appeal for Peace, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, the International Peace Research Association, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Later, the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice also became involved. An updated list of current members is available at www.womenpeacesecurity.org.
“women and armed conflict” on the main agenda’ (Cockburn 2007: 140). Subsequently, the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus in May 2000 changed its name to the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. Members of the group were instrumental in putting together the first draft text of UNSCR 1325 and were actively lobbying Security Council members, providing them with the most up-to-date research and empirical data on the situation of women in armed conflict.

Working closely with UNIFEM (now part of UN Women), the NGO Working Group also invited a number of women from conflict zones to New York to give testimonies before the Security Council members in the Arria formula meeting organized a day before the open debate leading up to the adoption of UNSCR 1325.47 This mixed strategy of trying to influence and persuade states to change their policies by making use of both hard facts and testimonies is what Keck and Sikkink have described as the favoured ‘work method’ of transnational advocacy networks.

Once UNSCR 1325 was adopted, the NGO Working Group changed its strategy and decided to take on an advocacy and watchdog role in relation to the actual implementation of UNSCR 1325.48 The NGO Working Group has continued to work closely with UN member states, giving particular priority to the members of the UN Security Council. It meets regularly with those member states that are regarded as being the most strategically important at any particular time, provides them with

47 The bringing in of women from conflict areas to testify before top-level politicians to influence and change their ‘hearts and minds’ was first applied as an innovative strategy at the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, to bring attention to the issue of conflict-related sexual violence against women (Gierycz 2001). Bringing victims of landmines in to testify was also used as a very effective strategy in the campaign to ban landmines (Cameron et al. 1998).

48 The NGO Working Group defines its mission as being ‘to collaborate with the United Nations, its Member States and civil society towards full implementation of SCR 1325 and all other Security Council resolutions that address women, peace and security, including ensuring the equal and full participation of women in issues relating to peace and security. Using SCR 1325 as our guiding instrument, the NGO Working Group promotes a gender perspective and respect for human rights in all peace and security, conflict prevention and management and peacebuilding initiatives of the United Nations.’ Source: http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/ (last accessed 21 April 2014).
relevant information and policy advice, and is generally regarded as an increasingly professional lobbyist. Its most recent initiative is the Monthly Action Points (MAPs), which aim to provide the Security Council members with analysis and concrete suggestions on how to implement the normative framework of WPS in the country situations that at any time are on the Council’s agenda.49

Even more interesting, in relation to the scholarly discussions on the role and influence of different types of actors in global governance, is the role the NGO Working Group is playing as adviser/expert in the meetings of both the UN member state-initiated Friends of WPS Group and the UN Inter-Agency Committee on Women, Peace and Security. This testifies to the NGO Working Group’s influential role in policymaking. By positioning itself as it has done, the NGO Working Group also offers an effective and influential channel through which grassroots women’s organizations in conflict/post-conflict countries can access the strategic level of the UN and make themselves heard in situations where they have trouble establishing a line of communication with their own national governments, and perhaps also with local UN representatives (Barnes 2011). The example of the UN PBC and women’s organizations in Burundi, explored and discussed in Articles II and III of this dissertation, serves as a case in point.

6. Concluding Remarks

When scholars within the disciplines of international relations and UN studies discuss the role and influence of civil society in global governance in general, and on matters of peace and security in particular, the campaign to ban landmines is generally the

49 For more on the purpose of the MAPs, see http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/advocacy/map/. (last accessed 12 February 2014).
The key role the transnational advocacy network on WPS has played (and is still playing) in advancing the normative framework of WPS, and prompting policy change, is hardly ever discussed. McGann and Sabatini (2010: 70) even contend that ‘transnational advocacy groups are generally not well integrated into policymaking and tend to operate more like “outsider groups”’. My research on the WPS case brings evidence to the contrary. Rather than being an ‘outsider group’, the transnational advocacy network on WPS has been closely intertwined with both the UN system and UN member states in developing and advancing the normative framework of WPS, and thereby prompting change in UN discourse and policy on peace and security matters. The transnational advocacy network on WPS has developed a variety of strategies and avenues for influence. The inclusion of the NGO Working Group at the meetings of both the member state-governed ‘Friends of WPS’ and the UN-governed Inter-Agency Committee on Women, Peace and Security exemplifies how the tripartite model for collaborative governance (between the first, the second and the third UN) has reach a high level of institutionalization.

The role and influence of NGOs and civil society actors are often referred to as something new to international relations, emerging in the post-Cold War context. My research on the emergence and influence of the normative framework on WPS shows that the central role of the international women’s movement in advancing normative agendas on women’s rights at the UN, in close collaboration with entities within the UN system and groups of member states, is not a new phenomenon. It can be dated back to the founding of the UN and the role that women’s rights activists played in having the word ‘women’ – rather than the gender neutral term ‘people’ –

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50 See, for instance, McGann and Sabatini (2010), Neumann and Sending (2010), and Weiss and Thakur (2010).
written into the UN Charter (Tryggestad 2009). Rather than being a new phenomenon, this collaboration represents continuity, but this time in a new arena within the UN system – the peace and security arena. The end of the Cold War was particularly conducive to this normative expansion to happen.

In the ‘Background’ section of this dissertation I argue that the WPS norm currently is in a process of rapid diffusion. Whereas the articles included in Part II of the dissertation discuss WPS as an emerging normative framework, in Part I of the dissertation I show how the norm reached a tipping point around the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in 2010 and entered the norm diffusing phase. I have also shown how this diffusion process has continued to accelerate in the years following the 10th anniversary, and also prompted similar processes in regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African Union (AU). Until now, the norm diffusing process has followed a linear development towards an ever-increasing institutionalization of the norm in the UN system and among UN member states. However, there are two ‘trends’ that might impact the ongoing process of norm diffusion in a negative direction. First, there seems to be a trend among UN member states towards emphasising the protection dimension of the WPS norm, rather than the more progressive participation dimension, that makes women into key, active agents in peace and conflict matters. The extent to which the full WPS agenda will continue to be pursued in the implementation efforts of the UN will probably depend on the continued lobbying efforts of the transnational advocacy network on WPS. Second, as new powers such as Brazil and China emerge on the international scene, some uncertainty can be observed as to the future strength and influence of normative frameworks like WPS. Neither of these UN member states have been particularly vocal advocates of
normative frameworks like WPS, nor do they have a track record of close collaboration with civil society organizations. These are trends that call for further research and might have implications for policy development both within the UN and in UN member states in the years to come.
7. References


**NGO and Expert Commissions Reports**


UN/UN System Documents


**Government Documents**


8. Appendices – Interview Guides

Appendix I: Interview Guide (Semi Structured) – General on WPS

1. What is your age?

2. What is your current occupation?

3. What is your educational and occupational background?

4. For how long – all together – have you been working for/with the UN?

5. How would you describe your familiarity with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?

6. I would like you to think back on the years/time immediately before Resolution 1325 was adopted. Could you elaborate on how and why you think this resolution came about at the time it did?
   a. Internal processes
   b. External events

7. Who were the main advocates/actors in lobbying for Resolution 1325?
   a. Within the system?
   b. NGOs/advocacy networks?
   c. Member states?
   d. Individuals?

8. Was the advocacy for this resolution an outcome of a planned strategy?

9. Can you recall obstacles/resistance? If so; what sort? And by whom?

10. What is your view on the current status of Resolution 1325 and its implementation? Has it made any difference?
    a. At headquarters
    b. In the field
    c. Among member states (in member states)

11. What do you think are the current obstacles to its full implementation?

12. Who are the main actors today in advocating/lobbying for Resolution 1325?

13. Based on your long experience working for/with the UN, have you witnessed any changes in attitudes (for better or worse) towards gender or women’s issues in general?
Appendix II:

Interview Guide (Semi Structured) – PBC Study/Burundi

1. What is your current position?

2. What is your educational and occupational background?

3. How would you describe your familiarity with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security?

4. What is the status of this resolution in your country?
   a. National action plan?
   b. Government support/acknowledgement?
   c. Active NGOs?
   d. Which parts of the resolution do you regard as particularly relevant to your country?

5. External partners?

6. How familiar are you with the UN Peacebuilding Commission and its work with the developing a peacebuilding strategy for Burundi?

7. What was your role?

8. Could you describe the process of having gender language and gender concerns included?
   a. What were the obstacles – if any?
   b. Who were the main actors?
   c. What was the role of the Norwegian chairmanship?

9. Has the peacebuilding strategy made any difference in terms of women’s impact and involvement in the peace process?
List of Dissertation Articles

Article I:


Article II:


Article III:
