Fighting Someone Else’s Battles?

Norway’s Cooperation with the European Union on Security and Defence

Kathinka Louise Rinvik

PECOS4094: Master’s thesis

Peace and Conflict Studies (PECOS)
Dep. of Political Science, Faculty for Social Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Spring 2014

Word Count: 34 999
Fighting Someone Else’s Battles?
Norway’s Cooperation with the European Union on Security and Defence
Abstract

While not a member of the European Union, Norway is the non-member that contributes to most of its operations. Traditionally, the level of democratic control has been lower in security and defence policies because it has been the preserve of the executive, and because an effective policy requires secrecy and flexibility. However, there has been a ‘democratic turn’ in security studies the last couple of decades. One result is that some argue that it is as relevant to examine the degree of democracy in foreign, security and defence policies as in any other areas. One of the goals defined in Norwegian security policy is to maintain Norwegian sovereignty and manoeuvrability. The Norwegian Armed Forces are subject to civilian control, and by having a political leader there is a clear link to the principle of democratic control over the military powers. Nevertheless, not many questions are raised concerning the democratic legitimacy of Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence. This thesis draws on different methodological approaches in order to get a fuller picture of the cooperation, asking whether the political or the military aspect of the cooperation has the biggest democratic weaknesses and what might explain the further will to cooperate.

Key words: ARMED FORCES – COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – DEMOCRACY – DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT – EUROPEAN UNION — NORDIC BATTLE GROUP – OPERATION ATALANTA – SOVEREIGNTY
Acknowledgements

This thesis is the result of my lifelong deep fascination with the EU as well as for security and defence policy. It is a privilege to have had the opportunity to combine two passions!

There are many people who deserve my never-ending gratitude for helping me through this process:

I am first of all thankful to my supervisor Nils Petter Gleditsch who took on the supervising in January after some initial difficulties. He did so with an optimism and interest which was pivotal for the finishing months of work. To my friends and coworkers at Folk og Forsvar for providing me with time and understanding, as well as comforting words, during busy writing periods. Also, special thanks to my colleague Lieutenant Commander Lars Andreas Rognan for helping me get in touch with useful informants in the Norwegian Armed Forces. I am of course also thankful to all of those who let me interview them for this thesis, for being willing to take time from their busy schedules and talk to me about their work and experiences.

My friends Irene and Karoline deserve my gratitude for useful comments and discussions, so do also Henrik, Ingrid and Cecilie for sympathy during rough patches. I am thankful to my mother, for supporting me in all my endeavors. To the love of my life, my fiancé Øivind, without whom my life would be but a bleak imprint of what it is today. For useful comments and discussions, endless love, patience and support, through both ups and downs, and for (still) wanting to spend the rest of his life with me! Last, but definitely not least, I am grateful to my beloved father, who never got to see the finished result and who is deeply missed, but is nevertheless always watching over me and reminding me that I can do whatever I set my mind to.

For all of your help I am forever grateful, and the final responsibility for any faults and errors in this thesis are entirely my own.
If you’re never in over your head, how will you know how tall you are?

T.S. Eliot
# Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations............................................................................................................ XV

List of Translation of Official Norwegian Names................................................................. XVI

List of Tables and Figures..................................................................................................... XVII

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Presentation of the Subject................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Research Question............................................................................................................. 3

1.2 Fields of Study ................................................................................................................. 4

1.3 Previous Studies ............................................................................................................. 5

1.4 Outline of the Thesis .................................................................................................... 7

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 9

2.1 Democratic Deficit: What is it?.................................................................................... 9
   2.1.1 Democratic Deficit in Security and Defence Policy ............................................. 10

2.2 Representative Democracy: Input and Output .......................................................... 11
   2.2.1 Input .................................................................................................................... 12
   2.2.2 Output................................................................................................................ 13

2.3 Why Countries Contribute in International Operations ............................................ 14

Chapter 3: Research Methods

3.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 17

3.1 Research Design: Case Study ..................................................................................... 18
   3.1.1. Selection of In-depth Studies ............................................................................. 18

3.2 Methodological Approach: Triangulation .................................................................. 20

3.3 Data ............................................................................................................................. 20
   3.3.1 Document Analysis ............................................................................................ 20
   3.3.2 Interviews ......................................................................................................... 22
      3.3.2.1 Selecting Informants ................................................................................... 23
3.3.2.2 Conducting Interviews ................................................................. 23
3.4 Potential for Inferences .................................................................... 24
  3.4.1 Validity and Reliability ................................................................. 24
  3.4.2 Selection Bias ............................................................................. 25

Chapter 4: Background

4.0 Introduction .................................................................................... 27
4.1 The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defence Policy .............................. 27
4.2. The CSDP Decision-making Process .............................................. 30
4.3 The Norwegian Model – Cooperation with the EU in CSDP ................ 31
  4.3.1 The Quest for Participation ......................................................... 31
  4.3.2 Finding New Solutions ................................................................. 33
  4.3.2 Norway’s Agreements with the EU on Security and Defence .......... 36
  4.3.3 Norway’s Participation ................................................................. 36

Chapter 5: Political Analysis

5.0 Introduction .................................................................................... 39
5.1 Input ............................................................................................... 39
  5.1.1 Getting Information ................................................................. 40
  5.1.2 Participation ............................................................................. 42
  5.1.3 Possibilities for Influence .......................................................... 46
5.2 Output ............................................................................................. 47
  5.2.1 Public Awareness ................................................................. 48
  5.2.2 Public Debate ................................................................. 50
  5.2.3 Public Opinion ................................................................. 51
5.3 Summing Up .................................................................................. 53

Chapter 6: Military Analysis

6.0 Introduction .................................................................................... 55
6.1 Working with the EU on Military Issues ........................................... 55
8.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................... 85

8.1 Is there a Democratic Deficit? .................................................................................................................................................. 85

8.1.1 Political Aspect .................................................................................................................................................................. 85

8.1.1.1 Input ............................................................................................................................................................................. 86

8.1.1.2 Output .......................................................................................................................................................................... 86

8.1.2 Military Aspect .................................................................................................................................................................. 87

8.1.2.1 Political Level ............................................................................................................................................................... 87

8.1.2.2 Military Level ............................................................................................................................................................... 88

8.1.4 Summing Up ...................................................................................................................................................................... 88

8.2 Why the Continued Cooperation? .......................................................................................................................................... 89

8.3 Does it Matter? ......................................................................................................................................................................... 91

8.5 Broader Implications .............................................................................................................................................................. 92

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................................... 95

Appendix I – Original Quotations ............................................................................................................................................ XXI

Appendix II – Norway’s Agreements with the EU on Foreign, Security and Defence Policy XXX

Appendix III – Interview Guide .................................................................................................................................................... XXXII
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoC</td>
<td>Committee of Contributors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy (after 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community (EEC, ECSC and Euratom combined, 1957-1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community (1951-1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>Agreement on the European Economic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community (1957-1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy (before 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (after 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBG</td>
<td>European Union Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJK</td>
<td>Norwegian maritime special operations forces unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBG</td>
<td>Nordic Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act (1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>The United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Translation of Official Norwegian Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Name</th>
<th>Norwegian Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The (Norwegian) Armed Forces</td>
<td>Forsvaret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Committee</td>
<td>Utenrikskomiteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Committee</td>
<td>Europautvalget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Extended Foreign and Security Policy Committee</td>
<td>Den utvidede utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian maritime special operations forces unit</td>
<td>Marinejegerkommandoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services</td>
<td>Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All other translations in the thesis were made by the author. Quotes translated from Norwegian are marked with a number. Please consult appendix I for a complete list of original quotes.
List of Tables and Figures

Tables
Table 4.1   Goals in Norwegian Security and Defence Policies       page 29
Table 4.2   Norway’s Participation in EU Civilian and Military Operations page 37

Figures
Figure 5.1   Norwegian Public’s View on Participation in EU-led Operations page 52
Chapter 1 Introduction

The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected

Sun Tzu

1.0 Presentation of the Subject

The monopoly on the legitimate use of force was essential in the creation of modern states, and ‘ensuring accountability to citizens for the use of military force was a central component of the struggle to establish democratic forms of government’ (Ku 2004: 33). Military power is thus inherently connected to national sovereignty as well as to its democratic foundation. Yet, the increasing trend of conducting military operations under the auspices of international institutions after the end of the Cold War presents evident challenges to both sovereignty and democratic accountability for the individual countries involved (Hänggi 2004: 3). Due to different kinds of partnership agreements, non-members are also welcome to participate in the military operations under the auspices of international institutions. However, the impact on national control might be unclear. The theme of this thesis is cooperation on security and defence between individual countries and organisations of which they are not a member, using Norway’s cooperation with the EU as a case.

To deploy and use military force is one of the core decisions to be taken in any political system. In theory, ‘democracy always implicitly presumes unlimited civilian supremacy over the command of the armed forces – anything short of that defines an incomplete democracy’ (Born 2006: 150). Carnovale (1997) argues that this is because democratic control provides the military with legitimacy. In praxis however, because the state’s most important task is to protect its citizens and territory, military and security policy has conventionally been sheltered from the public domain, ranging from external diplomacy to participation in military operations. This means that questions of national security are often exempted from both the public eye and the democratic processes regarded as natural in other policy areas. However, although many national parliaments in democratic countries traditionally have had weak oversight or control over policies concerning national security, ‘democratically-elected legislatures are increasingly unwilling to leave use of force decisions to the executive alone’ (Ku 2004: 39). In Norway, the Extended Foreign and Defence Policy Committee was established in 1923 in order to provide the Parliament with a role in the policy formulation and control of the foreign policy not given in the original system of power distribution.
However, meetings are closed and records exempted from the public’s eye for 30 years. This praxis is nevertheless under pressure. A proposal has been put forward by four then Socialist Left MPs for the Norwegian Constitution to be altered, allowing for more openness and public debate concerning military participation abroad. The proposal states that a constitutional change will allow for ‘a more transparent and democratic debate in and outside of the Parliament concerning very difficult questions’ and ‘to open what today are closed [meetings in the Extended Foreign and Defence Policy Committee]\(^1\) (Grunnlovsforslag 2011-2012).

The European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has gradually shifted towards a ‘Brusselisation’, moving more of the decision-making from the member states to Brussels and supranational decision-making (see for example Breuer 2010; Gourlay 2004: 183; Howorth 2012; Knutsen 2000; Sjursen 2011a, 2011b). The tension between closer national scrutiny on the one hand and supranational decision making on the other raises the question of whether or not a democratic deficit has emerged in the CSDP (see among others: Crombez 2003; Græger 2005; Koenig-Archibugi 2002; Majone 1998; Sjursen 2011a, 2012a; Wagner 2004, 2005, 2007). Within the democratic deficit literature, the CSDP has received relatively little attention, but given the ‘democratic turn’ in security and defence literature some scholars argue that it is as relevant to examine the degree of democracy within these policy areas as in any other. The accountability to citizens for both the internal and external use of force is viewed as central to democratic governance, illustrated by the fact that ‘adherence to the principle of democratic control of armed forces and the security sector in general has become basic requirement for membership in international organizations of democratic states’ (Greene 2004: 4). From this broader perspective of democratic accountability, there is a growing consensus that there are democratic weaknesses to the EU cooperation on security and defence, especially because ‘national parliament’s capacity to control executive decisions to use military force has been weakened by the ESDP (...) this weakening of parliamentary control at the national level has not been compensated at the European level’ (Wagner 2004: 2).

If this is the outlook for the EU member states, then the issue should perhaps loom even larger for a non-member state which participates in EU operations. In the Norwegian case this is particularly pertinent because the ‘loss of sovereignty’ argument was central when the Norwegians twice voted ‘no’ on EU membership. Despite the ‘no’ vote, and although the
opposition against Norwegian EU membership never has been larger, *de facto* integration into the EU has accelerated since 1994. Norway’s security and defence policy was considered to be of such high importance that it could not be part of the EEA Agreement. However, the Norwegian government has through several bilateral agreements joined the EU security and defence cooperation as well.

1.1 Research Question

One of the goals defined in Norwegian security policy is to maintain Norwegian sovereignty and manoeuvrability. In the Norwegian constitution §25 there is a prohibition against leaving the country’s military forces in service of foreign powers, and that it must never be used outside the Norwegian boarders without the consent of the Parliament.¹ There is also a more general prohibition against transfer of sovereignty to another country or institution. Although the Norwegian Government has a foreign policy prerogative according to the Constitution, this does not mean that the Parliament can be ignored. In important foreign policy issues the Government must consult the Parliament in the Extended Foreign Policy Committee. In addition, as Andenæs (1976: 276; also cited in Stavang 2002: 98) argues, the prerogative is remnant of a distribution of power otherwise abandoned. The Norwegian Armed Forces are subject to civilian control, and by having a political leader, the Minister of Defence, there is a clear link to the principle of democratic control over the military powers.

Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence policy has since 2000 been marked by an ever closer cooperation without the demand for any special arrangements for Norway as an ‘outsider’. The cooperation is twofold; the political aspect, which is the day-to-day cooperation, and the military aspect, which is the cooperation concerning concrete military contributions. The latter is however also divided into two levels; the political level, constituting civil servants as part of the democratic chain of representation, as well as the military level, consisting of military personnel participating in the actual operations. It is possible that the cooperation will affect these two aspects differently. Based on this, the research question I seek to answer in this thesis is twofold:

Is the (potential) democratic deficit greater in the political aspect or in the military aspect of Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence policy?

And further:

What might explain the further will to cooperate with the EU, despite the observed democratic weaknesses?

First of all, the research question addresses what kind of shortcomings this cooperation has both at the political and military aspects. Relevant within the political aspect is what possibilities there are for getting relevant information, participating and influencing. In addition, despite the conventional government prerogative in security policy, the public legitimacy of international alliances and operations remains important in a representative democracy. Relevant within the military aspect is what room of manoeuvre and scope for influence Norway can draw upon at both the political and military level during participation in EU-led operations. The second part of the research question examines what might be the motivating factors for the continued cooperation with the EU, given that there are democratic weaknesses.

The analysis will draw upon elite interviews with people working with this cooperation both on a day-to-day basis as well as those participating in the operations. They will be able to say how they experience the Norwegian sovereignty, room of manoeuvring and possibilities for participation in decisions concerning Norwegian involvement, two aspects very relevant when assessing a potential democratic deficit. This analysis is highly relevant when it comes to any non-members participating in military operations under the auspices of international institutions, and can thus be placed in a broader analysis of limitations to such countries’ influence on military operations.

1.2 Fields of Study

The most important military alliance for Norway is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, many of the EU members are natural allies for Norway, and as they have started closer cooperation in the fields of foreign, security and defence, successive Norwegian governments have perceived it natural to follow suit. Norway has since 1994 had a formalised
cooperation with the EU through the EEA Agreement. In addition to this, several other bilateral agreements have been made, making Norway the non-member working closest with the EU also in the foreign, security and defence policy field (NOU 2012: 733). This thesis will focus on this security and defence cooperation. The political and military analyses are based mostly on interviews and document analysis, but while the political analysis is more general, the military analysis is illustrated by two in-depth studies as space limitations does not warrant a complete examination of all the Norwegian contributions; Norway’s contribution to Operation Atalanta, EU’s counter piracy endeavour in the Gulf of Aden, and Norway’s participation in the EU Battle Groups.

The participation in NATO is rarely subject to discussion, as Norway is a full member with equal rights as other members to contribute to decisions on force deployment and operations. What is striking is the lack of debate when Norway has participated in EU-led operations. No questions are raised over the implications of participating in operations led by a Union of which Norway is not a member and thus does not have equal rights as the other countries. Against the backdrop of the ‘democratic turn’ in the study of security and defence policy, as well as a general accept that also this policy field should be subject to democratic standards and control, it is necessary to examine the EU-Norway cooperation closer.

The time-scale for the thesis will be limited to the period from 2005 to the present. Although Norway first formalised its cooperation with the EU on security and defence in 1988, this perimeter is set because the cooperation has evolved much since then. In addition, it was not until 2005 that Norway agreed to participate in the EU Battle Groups, one of the two in-depth studies. Further, the elite interviews conducted as part of the data collection are all with people who have worked on this cooperation since 2005, and there is thus no foundation for making conclusions on the period prior to 2005. This thesis will not attempt to explain any variation of the cooperation over time as it is the cooperation in its current form which is relevant to study.

1.3 Previous Studies

In Norway, there have been debates as to whether or not there is a democratic problem with the EEA Agreement in general (See among others Eriksen 2008a, 2008b; Seierstad 2004; Sverdrup and Melsæther 2004). There are also studies in Norway on EU’s security and
defence cooperation in general (see for example Matlary 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2009; Rieker 2009, 2012; Rieker and Ulriksen 2003; Sjursen 1998). In recent years, many studies have been conducted on a potential democratic deficit of the EU security and defence policy, underscoring the fact that there has indeed been a ‘democratic turn’ in security studies (see Crombez 2003; Koenig-Archipugi 2002; 1996; Majone 1998; Rosén 2008; Sjursen 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b; Wagner 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). One of the most extensive works is the edited volume ‘The Double Democratic Deficit’: Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices’ (Born and Hänggi 2004), which examines participation in operations led by the UN, NATO and the EU. It concludes that ‘the democratic and especially parliamentary accountability of the use of force under international auspices is problematic at both the national and the international level. This leads to the ‘double democratic deficit’, within and outside the nation state’ (Born 2004: 203).

There are also international studies on the Norwegian cooperation with the EU on security and defence (see among others Andersson 2006; Archer 2005; Bailes et al. 2006). Their focus have, however, been the Battle Group concept, the Nordic countries’ relations to the EU’s security and defence policy or Norway’s cooperation with the EU in general, and not the democratic dimension of the cooperation. In the autumn of 2011 the government-commissioned report ‘Outside and Inside: Norway’s Agreements with the EU’ was published. This report was mandated as an overview of Norway’s cooperation with the EU, both through the EEA Agreement as well as all the bilateral agreements. However, it only presented facts and did not conclude on any normative questions. One of the chapters concerned the cooperation on foreign, security and defence policies.

Norwegian studies on the cooperation with the EU have mostly focused on the changing Norwegian relationship towards the ESDP/CSDP (see for example Flikke 2001; Græger 2002; Knutsen 2010; Rieker 2006; Sjursen 1999, 2000, 2008). However, two studies by Sjursen are especially relevant for this thesis. In a study of the arguments in the Norwegian Parliamentary debate on participation in the Nordic Battle Group, Sjursen argues that security and defence policy is normally thought to be exempted from democratic scrutiny. Nevertheless, there has been a shift in this trend the last couple of years, and with that shift there may be need for a closer look on the Norway-EU cooperation in the field of security and defence in order to see if there are any democratic challenges (Sjursen 2008). On the occasion of the 200 year celebration of the Norwegian Constitution, the edited volume ‘The Norwegian Paradox’
(Eriksen and Fossum 2014b) was published with the primary aim to ‘clarify the democratic implications of Norway’s EU association’ (Eriksen and Fossum 2014a: 18). In it, Sjursen (2014) has written a follow-up to the 2008 article, where she asks if Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence is democratically problematic with reference to the principles of autonomy and accountability. Her study concentrates on the relationship between the Norwegian executive and legislative branch, but also concludes that Norwegian citizens are excluded from the processes, that they have little control over the agenda and few possibilities to influence the decisions which in return have an impact on their lives. She finishes by arguing that it is not impossible to combine the need for efficiency and secrecy in this policy field with more participation (Sjursen 2014: 195). This thesis seeks to contribute to the sparse literature in Norway concerning the cooperation with the EU on security and defence from a democratic perspective, by conducting a thorough analysis of the cooperation from both the political and military aspects, with emphasis on how this cooperation actually plays out.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

The second chapter discusses theories relevant for answering the research questions, mainly focusing on how to study democratic deficits and input/output theory. The different methods used in this project will be outlined in the third chapter. Chapter four is a background chapter, explaining the main developments in Norwegian and EU foreign, security and defence policies. In addition there is a summary of Norwegian cooperation with the EU in security and defence policies. Chapters five and six are this thesis’ main analytical chapters. Chapter five contains the political analysis, addressing the issue of what kind of limitations there are in the Norway-EU cooperation on CSDP in a democratic context. Chapter six contains the military analysis which is illustrated by the two in-depth studies and examines if there are limitations on the cooperation at the military aspect. Chapter seven will, based on the findings in chapters five and six, discuss what might explain the continued willingness in Norway to cooperate further with the EU. Chapter eight contains concluding remarks.
2.0 Introduction

Norway has a traditional role as a peripheral nation geographically placed far from the world’s financial, cultural and political centres, and in the years after independence in 1905 Norwegian foreign and security policy was oriented towards isolationism. In addition, after many hundred years under foreign rule, the desire for sovereignty and independence is placed deep in the Norwegian bone marrow (Semundseth 2004: 28; Tamnes and Eriksen 1999: 1). When the Norwegians voted ‘no’ on EU membership both in 1972 and 1994, one of the main arguments against membership was that it would include loss of sovereignty to the EU institutions (Eriksen 2008b: 368). The solution to how the Norway-EU relationship would work after the no-vote was the EEA Agreement, but whether or not this protects the Norwegian sovereignty to a satisfactory extent, is still much debated. According to Eriksen (2008a) ‘Some say that the no-movement won in 1994, but have lost every single day since then. What is nevertheless sure, is that democracy has lost’. One of the central ideas behind the representative democracy is that that the voters’ preferences should be reflected in the policy output, as well as have a satisfactory degree of representation on the policy input side. This is also regarded as a building block of Norwegian society, and it is reasonable to question how this is affected when one adds EU to the equation.

This chapter is divided in three parts, where the first defines democratic deficits. The second part outlines the main relevant theories used to answer the first part of the research question, while the third part outlines the framework for answering the second part.

2.1 Democratic Deficit: What is it?

Democracy is a contested concept and it is important to find a suitable definition of democratic legitimacy or democratic deficit. Majone (1998: 14) argues that a democratic deficit, taken literally is ‘an absence or incomplete development of institutions which we take for granted in a parliamentary democracy’. ‘Democratic deficit’ can however also be viewed as a collective term of a set of problems or faults like technocratic decision-making, lack of transparency, insufficient public participation, excessive use of administrative discretion,
inadequate mechanisms of control and accountability. These problems can especially arise whenever important policy-making powers are delegated to bodies or institutions separated from the government, like the EU, i.e., ‘institutions which by design are not directly accountable to the voters or to their elected representatives’ (Majone 1998: 14-15). Wagner (1996: 7) follows this train of thought and argues that one can divide democratic legitimacy into three areas; 1) legitimacy as ensured by effective governance (government for the people or output legitimacy); 2) legitimacy as ensured by participatory procedures (government by the people or input legitimacy) and; 3) compliance with international law.

The democratic deficit debate in EU was triggered when the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum in 1992 because it indicated the declining consensus among the citizens and the governments in the process of European integration (Wagner 2004: 2). Because national governments have delegated some sovereignty to EU institutions, some political decisions are no longer made exclusively by national parliaments but also by Commission officials, expert networks or ministers in negotiations which are not always by consensus. In extension, parliaments are no longer the unquestioned centre of democratic deliberation and decision making. However, ‘only representative institutions can ensure the very equal access to deliberation that characterizes democracy’ (Peters et al. 2011: 1).

2.1.1 Democratic Deficit in Security and Defence Policy

Security policy is commonly known as a country’s ‘politics towards its surrounding which aims at maintaining territorial integrity and the state’s and citizen’s security with regard to military or violent threats from outside its borders’ (Claes and Førland 2010: 163). Because the point of departure for the defence policy is the security challenges which may demand use of the armed forces, the defence policy is a major part of a country’s security policy. Security and defence policies have undergone a transformation from focusing on territorial defence to the projection of security abroad (Comelli 2010: 80).

It has traditionally been argued that security and defence policies are allowed a higher level of secrecy compared with other policy areas, and ‘expectations of adequate democratic legitimacy and accountability in these domains are therefore lower’ (Comelli 2010: 82). In addition, the functioning of security and defence policies are based on command, obedience and secrecy, and ‘the military logic is very different from the public and deliberative decision-making that characterises democracies’ (Wagner 2005: 11). Some decisions in foreign and
security policy can however have a dramatic impact on citizens’ lives, and the argument can therefore be made that also this policy area demands democratic control and legitimacy. With the launch of EU-led civilian and military missions in 2003, the focus on democratic deficit in this area has indeed increased (Comelli 2010: 81), some arguing that ‘Parliaments are all the more important to ensure this democratic control as the number of civil society organizations concerned with foreign and security policy has remained relatively low when compared to other issue areas’ (Peters et al. 2011: 1). In Norway the structure of the Armed Forces could in itself be evidence of the relevance of democratic control in security and defence policies; The Armed Forces is under political control and it is the Norwegian Parliament which decides what operations to participate in, how to structure the Armed Forces, the budget and the acquisition of new materials. The Government has the executive responsibility for the military and civilian preparedness during peace time and for the leadership of the combined military and civilian capabilities during war (Bjørlo and Eriksen 1999).

When studying the democratic deficit in the EU, most of the literature has focused on the legislative process itself and the role of public opinion therein, the argument being that the ‘EU does not function well as a democracy because there is no European public opinion, no European electorate, no “European demos”’ (Crombez 2003: 105). Furthermore, the focus has been on the expanding supranational element in EU and the role of the European Parliament as the only publicly elected institution in the EU structure. According to this, the democratic deficit consists of lack of public support as well as poor representation in the decision-making process. When it comes to the democratic challenges of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the focus has been the degree of supranationalism as well as the degree of national parliamentary control over operations, and not so much the public opinion (Crombez 2003; Majone 1998; Sjursen 2011a, 2012a; Wagner 2004, 2007). This thesis uses elements, such as public support and representation, from the general democratic deficit debate as a foundation in both the political and military analysis, supplemented with the degree of supranationalism/national control element from the more specific CSDP studies in the military analysis.

2.2 Representative Democracy: Input and Output

Norway has a representative democracy, meaning that there ought to be a similarity between the political decisions being made, and the people’s wishes (Claes et al. 2003: 63). At the core
of the representative democracy is therefore the idea that the people, indirectly by voting on political parties in elections, participate in choosing the policies they are exposed to. Crombez (2003: 4-5) argues that one can take two distinct approaches when defining what constitutes a democratic deficit. Firstly, one can focus on the output of political processes, i.e., the legislation and regulations that emerge from it. If the voter’s policy preferences are not reflected in the output, this is an indicator of a democratic deficit because it touches upon the core of every democracy; voters elect representatives to govern on their behalf according to their wishes. Secondly, we can concentrate on the political process itself and its inputs and study whether or not the voters are adequately represented in the different steps of the process and have the means to exercise influence on it. If they do not, this can also be an indicator of a democratic problem.

Crombez’ definition is originally thought to assist in determining whether or not there is a democratic deficit between the EU institutions and the European citizens. However, it is fully possible to adapt this definition to the cooperation between Norway and the EU, analysing whether or not the public’s opinion is being followed (output) and whether the voter’s representatives are adequately represented in the different steps of the decision-making process (input).

2.2.1 Input

It is essential in a democracy that the citizens are not subjected to any laws which their representatives have not participated in making. The main question is therefore if people are adequately represented in the political process itself. Especially two concepts are relevant when discussing democratic deficits and the input side; ‘accountability’ and ‘co-decision’. Accountability pertains to the public control over the elected representatives’ actions through elections, and co-decision is the participation in decisions concerning own situation. When analysing the input side one can for example focus on the three main concerns for the Norwegian Government with regard to the EU-Norway cooperation on security and defence; getting information, participation and possibilities for influence.

Getting information is paramount in any relationship or cooperation. In this case, what is significant is whether or not Norway has access to relevant information. If not, this might be considered as a weakness in the relationship. Participation is also a relevant measure of possible democratic weaknesses, as it is important to be represented in the relevant discussion
fora as well as have access to meetings. It is, however, not only enough to have representation on paper if the representatives do not enjoy speaking, proposing, vetoing and voting rights. The possibilities for influence can be viewed in different ways. Firstly, one should be able to have some sort of possibility to influence during the decision-making process, or at the very least during the decision-shaping process. Another important aspect is whether or not there is any national room of manoeuvring, for example veto rights at the last moment, or that the final proposal has to be approved by national parliaments. Simply put: the possibility to have the last and final word with regard to decision-making concerning own country, citizens and laws. This right is of course important in theory as well as in praxis in order to truly possess national sovereignty. Unlike EEA regulations, EU directives on security and defence are not implemented into Norwegian laws. Hence, it is essential to look at the actual participation in operations and the degrees of freedom that Norwegian personnel enjoy.

2.2.2 Output

Domestic variables can have an impact on how security influences state decisions because democratic governments must consider their political survival as well as being concerned with the state’s survival (Davidson 2011: 14-15). In a democracy, there is a need for public awareness and public debate. Some would argue that this is not the case with regard to security and defence policy because this is part of a nation’s vital interests and therefore exempted the public eye. This may have been true some decades ago, however:

With the end of the Cold War and the changes in the security policy in the 1990s and 2000s, the presumed consensus of values has been weakened both nationally and internationally. Following this, arguments against openness and democratic control of the security and defence policy are put under pressure\(^5\) (Sjursen 2008: 332)

Do people get what they want? In a representative democracy, public opinion is important because there should be a similarity between the political decisions being made and the people’s wishes. For example, the Europeanisation of commodity markets was considered democratically legitimate because ‘a majority of citizens demanded competitive industries (...) and interdependence rendered national policies increasingly incapable of providing these public goods’ (Wagner 2005: 11). Since the start of the European integration there has been a linkage between the public opinion and the democratic legitimacy of the further integration.
After the Danes rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, public opinion was however taken even more seriously as an indicator of democratic legitimacy; ‘The Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty caught many by surprise and demonstrated that the politics of European integration could no longer flourish without popular support’ (Wagner 2005: 12).

By assuming command of military operations the EU must also assume responsibility for potential casualties. The decision-makers in Brussels and in the member states should thus be aware of the public’s opinion on the matter (Wagner 2005: 5). In Norway the EU question has been a highly polarising issue, dividing the people and the political parties in two camps. Because the EU has been such a sensitive topic, the public opinion has always been regarded as highly relevant; best illustrated by the fact that Norwegian EC/EU membership was put to a referendum. One can argue that by putting the membership question to a vote, the Norwegian Government has made the public opinion on the EU matter a standard for democratic deficit.

2.3 Why Countries Contribute in International Operations

The first part of this thesis’ research question will be analysed in chapters five and six through the theoretical framework discussed above. Based on those results, chapter seven will discuss the second part of the research question; how it is possible to explain the continued integration into the EU security and defence policy. This chapter will be based on the following framework:

Davidson (2011) presents four explanations of a country’s will to participate in international operations; 1) alliance value; 2) threat to national interest; 3) public opinion and; 4) identity. According to Davidson (2011: 15), ‘when the state values its relationship with its ally, it has more incentive to contribute to maintaining and strengthening the alliance’. Secondly, when the target of the operation is a threat to a state’s national interest, it will be more willing to contribute to an operation than otherwise. Further, ‘threat to national interests’ can be defined as ‘a direct or potential – due to geographical proximity – threat to the state’s territorial integrity or its citizens, the state’s economy (including significant economic interests abroad), or a natural resource of major economic or security significance’ (Davidson 2011: 16). The third motive is public opinion. This can play a role because a government will always be concerned with re-election. However, studies suggest that this only has an impact on security policy decisions like intervening when the opposition has the same stand as the public, and it
can be linked to a real threat of government change (Davidson 2011: 18-19). Lastly, what kind of identity the state has might also have an impact; does it for example ‘see itself as a state that wages war, engages in peace operations, acts in support of the United Nations, etc.’ (Davidson 2011: 25-26). In addition to these, one might add a fifth motive: 5) gaining influence. When it comes to contribution in operations led by an international organisation, it might be possible to argue that a state will base its contribution not (only) on any of the above mentioned motives, but because it seeks to gain influence in the system. This might especially be true when it comes to non-members.
Chapter 3  Research Methods

Argument is conclusive, but it does not remove doubt so that the mind may rest in the sure knowledge of the truth, unless it finds it by method

Roger Bacon

3.0 Introduction

In order to answer the first part of the research question, it is necessary to examine the degree of democratic deficit associated with Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence policy. Given the definition of democratic deficit developed in chapter two, the central issue is how the input/output theory can be used in a satisfactory fashion with regard to validity and potential for inferences.

One can argue that this thesis is oriented towards what Mahoney and Goertz (2006: 230-232) coin ‘effects-of-causes approach to explanation’ as the goal is to research the consequences of Norway’s security and defence cooperation with the EU. However, in drawing its observations from what is essentially a single case, it lies closer to the qualitative school as defined by the same authors. This is a school of research that typically seeks to account for a specific outcome through a causal argument that is guided by theory yet allows for contextual complexity. Such an approach is clearly represented in the current project, most explicitly seen in the second part of the research question: why Norway has opted for the particular relationship to the EU within the area of military and security policy. To the approach echoes what Levy (2008: 4-5) defines as a theory-guided case study where the intent is to use theory to construct an empirical analysis in order to answer the research question. The theory-guided study is essentially idiographic, as the intention is to explain the outcome in the specific case rather than drawing general inferences. However, as argued by Gerring, a case study is rarely exclusively inwards-oriented. While the main emphasis is on the case of Norway, that case also serves as a point of departure for what Gerring (2007: 71) defines at a hypothesis-generating case study. The findings address a democratic challenge with relevance beyond the relationship of Norway to the EU, and as a first step, conclusions might be generalisable in a tentative form to security and defence cooperation between other non-members and the EU, or even non-members and NATO.

Based on Majone’s definition of democratic deficit described in chapter two, and the following operationalisation by Wagner, this chapter presents the research methods used to
answer the research question. This chapter is divided in four main parts; first, the thesis’ research design based on case study is presented before the methodological approach of triangulation. The third part presents the data, while the fourth part examines the potential for inferences.

3.1 Research Design: Case Study

With regard to this thesis, Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence is the case study which one would draw inferences from. There are two main reasons why a researcher may wish to use case studies in his study. Firstly, the researcher may want merely to achieve a more complete understanding of the unit. In this case the unit will be viewed as interesting per se, thus without being connected with a larger population. Secondly, one can use case studies as a tool in order to either develop or test theories, hypotheses, or concepts of a more general nature, which is mirrored in Gerring’s (2007: 20) definition of case study as ‘the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases’. Yin (1994) conceives of the case study as empirical research of a phenomenon in its natural context. A researcher will accordingly use case studies when he wishes to achieve a parallel understanding of phenomenon and context, either because he believes that context has a direct effect on the phenomenon under study, or because the difference between phenomenon and context is blurred.

In this thesis, Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence is regarded as interesting to study as a phenomenon, but the results might also be generalisable to similar cooperation in other countries. The case is complex, however. It has both political and military aspects, where the latter to a large degree consists of participation in EU-led operations. In order to analyse the military aspect, it is thus necessary to delimit the analysis. I choose to do so by designing two in-depth studies among the different operations Norway has participated in. However, as the case in question remains Norway’s participation in CSDP, these examples are approached as within-case evidence, the use of which are similar to the case-study techniques (cf. Gerring 2007: 11). The sections below discuss the use of these in-depth studies.

3.1.1. Selection of In-depth Studies

Quantitative researchers argue that it is of great importance that the units used in the study are randomly selected to ensure a high degree of external validity. In qualitative research
however, the sample is by definition small which makes random selection problematic and also generates serious biases. It is thus argued that the case(s) must be selected non-randomly in a theory-guided process, and on the basis of the way in which it is situated within the population (Gerring 2007: 86-90; King et al. 1994: 124-125; Levy 2008: 8). There are consequently several different types of case studies, defined in accordance with the aim of the study.

In the military analysis, two in-depth studies are used to illustrate the cooperation. I have chosen participation in Operation Atalanta and the Nordic Battle Groups because of their influential role in making the EU an international actor, also with regard to hard security. Especially because of their importance in the quest of making the EU a military actor on the international scene, it is interesting to examine the Norwegian role in these two elements. Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence is mostly defined by invitation from the EU to participate in operations. It is therefore natural to choose one such operation to illustrate the cooperation, and furthermore that the operation is the one with the biggest Norwegian contribution, Operation Atalanta. There is however also another element to the cooperation, the agreement on participation in the EU Battle Groups. This is in many ways a more integrated cooperation, and whereas participation in concrete operation is decided upon after it is clear what the operation is, being part of a Battle Group on stand-by for six months not knowing where it might be deployed, a potential different thing. The in-depth studies used in this thesis are thus not randomly selected and can be classified as typical cases as defined by Gerring (2007: 91-93) because they are typical examples of the cooperation between Norway and the EU in this policy field and are therefore also representative.

Although in-depth studies may not be well suited for statistical generalisation, they can be useful in analytical generalisations where the goal is to generalise, expand and test theories rather than trance tendencies in a population (Yin 2003). Just like case studies, the use of in-depth studies will often suffer from low external validity, a problem which increases when the number of examples used is low. In this thesis there are only two in-depth studies and although they are typical/representative, there is no guarantee that these two alone can provide any facts about Norway’s military cooperation with the EU which can be generalised. What they however can do, and why they are used despite their low external validity, is to illustrate important aspects of the cooperation. In addition, although an increasing number of examples are beneficial in hypothesis-testing studies, the same is not necessarily true for hypothesis-
generating studies: ‘If the population of cases about which we want to theorise is relatively small … it may be preferable to have fewer cases. The more cases used to construct a theory, the fewer that remain for testing it, since tests can only be conducted on cases (or aspects of cases) that were not used to construct the theory’ (Levy 2008: 8). A large degree of information connected with Norway’s security and defence policy is classified information and one natural consequence is that one has to keep in mind that the information presented here might not paint a complete picture.

3.2 Methodological Approach: Triangulation

The concept of triangulation is originally used in navigation and military strategy as the use of multiple reference points to locate an object’s exact position (Jick 1979: 1). Triangulation in a social sciences context means that the researcher is not satisfied by only using one approach, viewpoint or understanding of the phenomenon under study, the goal being to enhance the validity of conclusions drawn (Denzin 2009: 300). The methodological approach chosen in this thesis is the between-method triangulation described by Denzin (2009: 301) as using different methods on the same subject. By combining different methods in the study of Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence, a greater potential for inferences and a higher level of validity will hopefully be achieved.

3.3 Data

The data used in this thesis are restricted to informants and documents. This study requires a foundation of official, neutral information found in documents, but in order to examine if there is a democratic deficit, it is also necessary to combine the documents with informants who deal with the practical aspects of the agreement. The data in this study are thus:

- Official documents like minutes from debates in Parliament, speeches, expositions, white papers, reports, newspaper articles
- Interviews with people working with Norway’s cooperation with the EU on security and defence, both with the political and military aspects of the cooperation
- Relevant opinion polls

3.3.1 Document Analysis

Documents are written in a given context with a goal, meaning that documents as sources not only reflect the understanding and knowledge during the time it was written, but also the
purpose it was meant to serve. It is thus important to be aware of what kind of documents one is analysing. Because the necessity for secrecy plays a central role in the security and defence policy, minutes from the meetings in The Extended Foreign- and Defence Policy Committee are exempted from the public for 30 years, and it is not known what is discussed (Sjursen 2014: 177-178). The documents that perhaps would be among the most relevant for this thesis are thus unavailable. Consequently, the transcribed debates in Parliament as well as speeches, expositions and white papers will be the main documents analysed, in addition to newspaper articles. Minutes from meetings of the European Committee can also be relevant in some instances, although the committee primarily is concerned with EEA issues. When it comes to the open debates in Parliament, the relevant information the documents can provide is what kind of argumentation the representatives made, i.e., did they argue pro or con based on democratic values or principles, or did other concerns play a larger role. The same will be relevant when it comes to the newspaper articles; what is the focus of the articles, and what is the main argumentation based upon.

With regard to finding the relevant documents, speeches, expositions, white papers, reports and minutes from open hearings in Parliament are accessible to the public and quite easy to find on the web pages of the Parliament and the Ministry of Defence. The newspaper articles used are based on searches made in the digital archives of the four national newspapers Dagbladet, VG, Aftenposten and Dagsavisen, conducted using some relevant words like; ‘Atalanta’, ‘Battle Group’, ‘innsatsstyrke’, CSDP, ESDP, ‘EU + sikkerhet’, ‘EU + forsvar’. There were some variations of the functionality of the digital archives, sometimes making different results appear from time to time, and it is thus difficult to make any conclusive argument based on the results of the newspaper articles. However, one can use them as an indicative of a general trend.

There are of course limitations when it comes to document analysis. For example, there is the question of source reliability, meaning ‘whether or not a document accurately records something that really happened’ (Trachtenberg 2006: 146). In addition, a researcher has to take into consideration who wrote the document, as well as why and when it was written, When it comes to the transcribed debates from Parliament, I would, for obvious reasons, argue that it is safe to assume that the document actually records the debate, and that there is

---

2 ‘innsatsstyrke’ is the Norwegian equivalent to Battle Group, ‘EU + security’, ‘EU + defence’
no problems with who wrote it, when and why. One might argue that the white papers have few weaknesses and that they are quite reliable sources, at least when it comes to examining the Government’s view. With regard to transcribes speeches or newspaper articles, one perhaps has to be more aware of personal opinions. However, official speeches by various ministers may nevertheless be taken as a good measure on the Government’s perspective. In addition, potential weaknesses related to speeches and newspaper articles, might be solved by finding documents from different sources concerning the same event and comparing them.

3.3.2 Interviews
The use of interviews as research method is fruitful when the researcher needs to know ‘what a set of people think, or how they interpret an event or series of events’ (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673). In this thesis, the interviews are used to shed light on how the cooperation between Norway and the EU actually is perceived by the people working with it on a day-to-day basis. It is for example possible that there are democratic weaknesses in theory, but that these are not really relevant due to how the practical cooperation is managed, or the other way around.

Interviews can be a good way to gain insight into a complicated event as it allows the researcher to ask about an actor’s motives, thoughts and reflections with regard to the phenomena under study. There are, however, several drawbacks connected to this method as well. This first, and perhaps most evident, is that conducting interviews is a quite time-consuming process and it can also turn out to be quite costly. Another problem is that as time passes by memories change, chronologies can get rearranged, details are forgotten and some events might be given greater weight in hind-sight (Fujii 2010; Wedeen 2010). When interviews are conducted simultaneously with the events under study, a problem that might occur is whether or not the interviewees have a good enough overview over the situation. Furthermore, one evaluation that the researcher must make, is whether or not the information is reliable, meaning are the interviewees telling the truth, or are they embellishing or even making up the facts? (Wedeen 2010: 256).

In this study, the informants were first and foremost asked about their own experiences and views. With that in mind, the potential for methodological weaknesses are limited. In addition, they were all well familiarised with the terminology and were talking about a subject they know very well. However, the fear of memory being distorted and details forgotten are of
course still present. One way of reducing this weakness was to interview several people on the same issues. To a very large degree, the results were that their perception of events was the same, making this particular weakness smaller. One additional problem one can encounter is that the interviewees might have a different perception of events according to what their role or position is. This problem is hopefully reduced by interviewing actors with different roles like military-, political- and civil society actors. Lastly, as this thesis deals with topics which might be politically sensitive, there is the possibility that some informants refrain from telling the truth. However, this is hopefully avoided as the informants were promised anonymity.

3.3.2.1 Selecting Informants

‘In a case study, respondents are selected on the basis of what they might know to help the investigator fill in pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper alignment of pieces already in place’ (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673). The informants used in this thesis are not randomly selected; they are people believed to have especially useful knowledge. However, there was also an element of ‘snowballing’ when locating relevant people to interview. The interviews conducted can be classified as elite interviews which can be used ‘whenever it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic at hand’ (Leech 2002b: 663). The informants consists of two groups; Firstly, persons representing Norway in the formal political cooperation with the EU on security and defence, as well as military advisers, who despite being military personnel, have a job advising the political representatives. The second group consists of Norwegian military personnel who have participated in Operation Atalanta or the Nordic Battle Group.

3.3.2.2 Conducting Interviews

There are many different types of interviews, structured in different ways according to what the goal of using this particular method is for the study. In this study, semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were conducted (Leech 2002a: 665). Through semi-structured conversations, the interviewer is much freer to form the interview according to what is revealed by the informants. This interview style requires an interview guide (See Appendix III) made up by the questions the interviewer seeks to ask as a starting point. The interview guide will give the interview some structure as well as serve as a reminder for the researcher. In addition to making sure the points from the interview guide is covered, the whole point of a semi-structured interview is that the interview might take an unexpected turn due to new information, and the researcher needs to be prepared for this.
3.4 Potential for Inferences

These ways of collecting data are much debated. Using qualitative methods does not ensure an objective approach, and this might contribute to lowering the study’s potential for inferences. The goal of this thesis is to be able to say something about the democratic quality of the cooperation between Norway and EU on security and defence, and one could perhaps argue that this is a hypothesis-generating study as the results can be used as a basis for future studies of similar relationships. There are however of course several threats to a study’s potential for inferences.

3.4.1 Validity and Reliability

Validity refers to ‘measuring what we think we are measuring’ (King et al. 1994: 25), and can be divided into external and internal validity, where external refers to the representativeness of the sample, and internal refers to the correctness of a hypothesis with respect to the sample (Gerring 2007: 217). Because case studies only consist of one or few cases, they are often considered to suffer from a problem of low external validity. However, for the same reason case studies’ virtue is that they normally have a high degree of internal validity; ‘it is easier to establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case (or a small number of cases) than for a large set of cases’ (Gerring 2007: 43). The reasoning for choosing the triangulation approach in this thesis has been to maximize the potential for both kinds of validity. Reliability is chiefly concerned with making sure the method of data gathering leads to consistent results. It means that ‘applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure’ (King et al. 1994: 25). With regard to this thesis, the use of official documents and opinion polls will secure a high degree of reliability, while interviews conducted by other researchers, at other points in time, with different informants might lead to other conclusions.

Validity and reliability issues when conducting elite interviews are widely recognised, and there are several ways of minimising these problems. First of all, using multiple sources is always a good idea, especially in this thesis where they are asked about own experiences. Elite interviewing is, however, very time consuming, and especially if one has to travel in order to conduct them there has to be a limitation that might reduce the study’s validity and reliability (Berry 2002: 679-682).
In this thesis the topic might be sensitive for people on both the military and the political side, and another problem that might arise is exaggeration. The interviewees might perceive of their role and their influence as much higher than it really is. Again, conducting multiple interviews with people in the same position, might contribute to a more balanced picture of the situation. In addition, the way the interview is structured may have an impact on the data reliability and validity (Leech 2002b: 665). Unstructured interviews can often take unexpected directions and is perhaps better as a source of insights that as a source of reliable data. Structured interviews can lead to high data reliability but low content validity if the researcher fails to ask relevant questions. Lastly, semi-structured interviews, the approach used in this thesis, can ‘provide detail, depth, and an insider’s perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing and the quantitative analysis of interview responses’ (Leech 2002a: 665).

3.4.2 Selection Bias
When generating inferences, one should always try to use data which are unbiased, meaning correct on average. One such bias is selection bias, ‘choosing observations in a manner that systematically distorts the population from which they were drawn’ (King et al. 1994: 27-28). When random selection of in-depth studies is problematic, selection is done according to the researcher’s intentions and consistent with the research objectives. The decision as to which units to select is crucial for the degree to which the research can produce determinate and reliable results (King et al. 1994: 128). Fortunately, ‘in qualitative research selection bias will mean that the true causal effect is larger than the qualitative researcher is led to believe’ (King et al. 1994: 130). The results are also biased in a predictable way, and can be taken into account.

It is of course possible to argue that the interviews might be subject to selection bias. The informants were chosen both by suggestions from other informants as well as by conscious choice. However, there is reason to believe that the consequences of a potential bias would be more prominent in the military aspect because there are far more people involved in the actual operations than at the political aspect. With regard to the in-depth studies and the potential for selection bias, there is no reason to believe that participation in operation Atalanta would differ considerably from participation in other EU-led operations. In addition, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the cooperation today, and as this is the most recent operation with Norwegian participation, there is reason to believe that there is not serious selection bias
present. Participation in the Nordic Battle Group is the only one of its kind, which both is why it was selected in the first place as well as the reason for there being no selection bias.
Chapter 4  Background

No foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none

Henry A. Kissinger

4.0 Introduction

There are many factors being taken into consideration when a country’s security and defence policies are being formulated. Some are constant, like geography and resources; others can be changing, like economy, ideology and historical events. Because these factors will vary from country to country, it is natural that countries will formulate different security goals, and cooperation can therefore be difficult (Lantis and Howlett 2013). It is however also clear that some countries to a large degree will have similar security interests, i.e., countries which share the same ideology or the same threats due to geographical location. Most often, these similar security interests result in alliances of different duration. In the EU, there are 28 countries, all with different history, resources, geography and economy, but which still try to cooperate and coordinate their security policies. The non-EU country Norway still has security interests so similar to those of the EU members that close cooperation might be natural.

This chapter is divided in three parts. Firstly it will outline the basic details of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the development of the Norwegian security and defence policies, as well as the present priorities and guidelines. Secondly, it summarises the main aspects of the CSDP decision-making process, before the development of Norwegian cooperation with the EU on security and defence matters is outlined in part three.

4.1 The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defence Policy

4.1.1 The Norwegian Armed Forces

The Norwegian Armed Forces are the state’s tool for maintaining Norway’s security against external threats and consist of the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army. In addition both the Home Guard and the Civilian Defence are important contributors. In total the Norwegian Armed Forces consist of 24,450 personnel and a full mobilisation of approximately 70,000 combatant personnel (IISS 2013: 161).
According the Norwegian Constitution the King of Norway is commander-in-chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, a power which today is executed by the Government. The management of the Norwegian Armed Forces is twofold. The Minister of Defence represents the political leadership and is responsible for shaping, running and controlling Norwegian security and defence policy. The Chief of Defence heads the military organisation which also entails the role of top military advisor for the Ministry of Defence. The Government has the executive responsibility for the military and civilian preparedness during peacetime and for the leadership of the combined military and civilian capabilities during war. The Chief of Defence is in command of the Armed Forces during peace time, and the Government’s closest military adviser during war (Bjørlo and Eriksen 1999: 135-136). It is evident from the structure that the Norwegian Armed Forces are under political control and it is for example the Norwegian Parliament which decides what operations to participate in, how to structure the Armed Forces, the budget and the acquisition of new materials. Because the political control over the Norwegian Armed Forces is so clear, the question of democratic control with regard to participation in EU-led operations becomes relevant.

4.1.2 Norwegian Security and Defence Politics

Norway is a relatively young nation, achieving full independence in 1905, and has always had a special pull towards the two Atlantic powers Great Britain and the US (Knutsen 2000: 18; Tamnes and Eriksen 1999). When the Second World War broke out, Norway’s initially sought to continue its neutral policy from the First World War, a course that was terminated by the German invasion 9 April 1940. The security and defence policy after 1945 was naturally marked by the unexpected German occupation and the shared border with the Soviet Union, and Norwegian foreign policy has consistently been ‘a balancing act between internationalism and national self-assertion’ (Østerud 2005: 713).

After the Second World War it also became clear that ‘few if any single countries – and in particular no small European country – could realistically hope to survive entirely free of defensive alliances’ (Samstag 2011: 11). Because of the Norway-Soviet border, NATO was the apparent option for Norway during the Cold War (Skogan 1985: 39-41). After 1945, Norwegian defence policy has rested on four pillars; armed forces prepared for conventional invasion, allied military support, full mobilisation and the Total Defence Concept (Bjørlo and Eriksen 1999: 135-136). With the Cold War ending, the conditions for Norwegian foreign
policy changed dramatically. No longer was the Soviet threat lurking in the back of every decision which allowed greater manoeuvrability (Nyhamar 2006: 149).

Table 4.1: Goals in Norwegian Security and Defence Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals in Norwegian Security Policy</th>
<th>Goals in Norwegian Defence Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• To prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to Norwegian and collective security</td>
<td>• Alone and together with Allies, to secure Norwegian sovereignty, rights and interests as well as maintaining Norwegian freedom of action in the face of military or other pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To contribute to peace, stability and the further development of the international rule of law under the auspices of the UN</td>
<td>• Through participation in multinational peace operations authorised by UN mandate and through international defence cooperation, to contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international law and respect for human rights, and to prevent the use of force by state and non-state actors against Norwegian and international security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To uphold Norwegian sovereignty, rights, interests and values, and to protect Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military or other pressure</td>
<td>• To counter all kinds of assaults or attacks in order to safeguard Norwegian and collective security and, together with Allies, to contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other Allies in accordance with our NATO Treaty obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Together with our Allies, to defend Norway and NATO against assault or attack</td>
<td>• To contribute to safeguarding the security of Norwegian society, saving lives and limiting the consequences of accidents, natural disasters, assaults and attacks by state or non-state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To protect the society against assault and attack from state and non-state actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Forsvarsdepartementet 2013: 2-3.

The main goal in the Norwegian security policy is today to maintain Norway’s fundamental security interests, mainly preserve sovereignty, territorial integrity, as well as political manoeuvrability. The defence policy states what the Norwegian Armed Forces shall contribute to reach those goals. Details of the goals in Norwegian security and defence policies are listed in table 4.1. The main lines in Norwegian security and defence policy are marked by continuity, but at the same time they have to be adapted to changes in the international community (Forsvarsdepartementet 2012: 9).

According to international law, the use of military force is only legal in individual or collective self-defence, or if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorises it (UN 1945: chapter VII). UNSC can either decide to establish an UN-led operation, or give regional actors mandate to lead. Since 1945, Norway has participated in 100 international operations, in 40 countries with more than 100,000 soldiers (Forsvaret 2012: 2-3). There is a long tradition, and a cross-party consensus, that Norway shall only participate in international
operation if there is at least one UN resolution supporting it. This is because the UN-mandate gives the international operation and the force legality and legitimacy under international law (Forsvaret 2012: 10-11). This principle can further be seen as an underscore of the focus on legitimacy also present in the Norwegian security and defence policy.

4.2. The CSDP Decision-making Process

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the operational part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and many of the key actors and institutions involved in CSDP are the same as those responsible for the wider CFSP. The European Council and the Council of Ministers play the key roles in strategic guidance and decision-making, while the High Representative is concerned with consensus building and implementation. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) plays a major role in exercising political control and strategic direction of CSDP operations, and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) composed of the member states’ chiefs of defence or their military advisers provides input to PSC on military matters. In addition, the member states’ defence ministers sometimes join the Foreign Affairs Council meetings when security and defence issues are discussed (Mix 2013: 5-6).

When the member states by consensus determine that EU action is appropriate, a large framework for comprehensive approach to international crisis management is activated. First, a Crisis Management Concept describing the EU’s political interest in the conflicts and the proposed aims and objectives of the CSDP mission is drawn up. Second, when this document is agreed to by the PSC it is formally adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the High Representative. The third step is for the PSC to ask for different military strategic options, police strategic options of other civilian strategic options to be elaborated by the EU Military Staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability.

Once the PSC agrees upon which option to pursue, the Council can take the decision to act. The Foreign Relations Counsellors (known as the Relex Group) draw up the legal act by means of which the Council formally establishes the operation. The fourth step is to approve the Concept of Operations and the Operation Plan, two detailed planning documents with a concise outline of how the operation is intended to fulfil its objective. It is also accompanied by guidelines on the use of force and the documents have to be approved by the PSC and the
Council. This is however only the formal procedures and steps may be added or skipped due to time pressure in a crisis situation (Rehrl and Weisserth 2010: 57-60). Concerning decision-making for using force the EU has always acted on UN mandates. However, in the EU strategic plan (ESS) there is no explicit condition for such a mandate. The EU may thus potentially use force autonomously, like NATO did in the 1999 Kosovo bombings (Matlary 2009: 62).

The role of the European Parliament is consultative as it can ask questions and adopt recommendations, but depends to a large degree on the goodwill of the High Representative and the member states to take its views into account. With regard to the national parliaments, there is no standard way in which they are engaged in European security affairs or no guarantee that national parliaments are involved at all. The arrangements for national control range from an ex ante veto power over troop deployment in Germany to a complete lack of parliamentary involvement in Belgium or Greece (Peters et al. 2011: 5). Third countries, like Norway, do not have any role in the formal decision-making process.

4.3 The Norwegian Model – Cooperation with the EU in CSDP

In addition to the EEA Agreement, Norway has since the 1990s sought closer cooperation with the EU on most of its other policy areas. Today there are 74 agreements between Norway and the EU, the result being that Norway is the third country working closest with the EU (NOU 2012: 35 author's own italics). The section below summarises the efforts made by the Norwegian Government to achieve the best possible cooperation with the EU on security and defence. This sets the stage for the further analysis in chapters five and six, showing what the initial Norwegian thoughts concerning participation were when it became evident which way it was heading and acting on the basis of the Norwegian ‘no’ to EU membership in 1994.

4.3.1 The Quest for Participation

In the early 1990s Norwegian EC/EU membership became increasingly relevant, especially because both Sweden and Finland had sent their applications, and in December 1992 Norway followed suit and officially applied for membership. In the white paper ‘On EU membership’ it is argued that ‘It is with a continued focus on NATO and through membership in the EU that our country best can face the security challenges we will meet’ (St.meld. 1993-1994:

3 The EU uses ‘third country’ when referring to non-members.
It is further argued that ‘Participation in EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will provide new opportunities to secure paramount national interests and strengthen Norway’s possibilities to gain international acceptance for our priorities’ (St.meld. 1993-1994: chapter 2.7.2). It is clear from the document that foreign and security concerns played an important part for the Norwegian Government in justifying Norwegian EU membership to the public. What is however also evident is the emphasis put on participation in security matters of national interest: ‘It is however important that Norway can participate fully in the European cooperation in this field [security and defence]. We must avoid a set-up where decisions concerning our own security is taken without Norwegian participation’ (St.meld. 1993-1994: chapter 2.7.2). This view is also underscored by then Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland in her exposition to Parliament on the Norwegian application for EC/EU membership in 1992:

It creates problems for us that Norway does not participate in all the fora where our European allies unite to form common views on foreign and security matters. To us it is of the outmost importance to be able to speak on our own when those countries closest to us define their common security. One important reason why Norway should apply for membership in the EC is that only in that way can we reach complete influence on the European cooperation on foreign and security policy. (Brundtland 1992)

During the EU membership negotiations in 1994, Norway enjoyed full privileges in the CFSP, participating in the working groups on the same basis as EU members. When the Norwegian majority voted against membership, Norway had to leave all the committees (Knutsen 2000: 20). NATO remained the main fundamental in Norwegian security and defence policy, but at the same time a growing fear of marginalisation emerged in Norway. The Ministry of Defence stated that ‘Our non-membership of the EU, and thereby our relatively limited ability to influence European collaboration in matters of security policy, cannot be fully compensated by Norway’s membership of NATO’ (Forsvardsdepartementet 1995: chapter 2.3.2). The concern of Norway’s non-membership with regards to security policy was also voiced by then Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo when the EU held an intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 1996, leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam and further security cooperation: ‘As Minister of Defence, I cannot avoid bringing to your attention that
our absence at the EU IGC in 1996, may have great consequences to our security policy interests”\(^\text{10}\) (Kosmo 1996).

The Western European Union (WEU) was created in 1954 for members states of either the EU or NATO, functioning as a bridge between the two. After the 1994 referendum the Norwegian Government agreed upon an associated membership in the WEU, providing Norway with ‘the right to speak and make proposals, as well as access to all relevant information and documents’ (Rieker 2006: 287). WEU itself was not regarded as an important defence organisation in Norway, rather it was seen as a way of providing a linkage to the EU security and defence cooperation (Græger 2005: 92; Rieker 2006: 287). This is well illustrated by then Minister of Defence Kosmo, who argued that the associated membership in the WEU could counterbalance some of the disadvantages of not being an EU member:

> Norway does not have the opportunity to participate in these discussions [EU security and defence cooperation] in the same way as with a membership, but I will remind you that Norway is an associated member of the WEU. It is a platform that will be very important to us, and we will seek to take full advantage of the associated membership.”\(^\text{11}\) (Kosmo 1995)

The prospect of transferring some of the WEU’s functions and capabilities to the EU thus worried the Ministry of Defence: ‘A more pronounced integration of the WEU in the EU should allow Norway even less possibility of exerting influence on the development of European security policy, given our non-membership of the EU’ (Forsvarsdepartementet 1995: chapter 2.3.4).

4.3.2 Finding New Solutions

With the St. Malo declaration it became evident that the EU was taking on an increasingly larger role in European security and defence matters and the sentiment in the Norwegian Government was that now was the time to seek a more integrated relationship. Then Minister of Defence Dag Jostein Fjærvoll expressed the growing concern:

> We must acknowledge that if the development is heading towards a common European foreign and security policy, Norway will be facing challenges of
considerable dimensions ... only through a very active participation in relevant fora, in NATO and the WEU, can we make sure that our interests are maintained.12

(Fjærvoll 1999)

Then Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebæk went even further in his conclusions on how to protect Norwegian interests: ‘in practice this will have to be ensured by involving Norway in discussions on defence and security policy issues within the EU’ (Vollebæk 1999). This view, as well as the concern for what form this cooperation would take, is also reflected in a white paper: ‘[WEU] will be phased out as an operative organisation as the tasks are transferred to the EU. ... Non-members of the EU must seek association schemes to the new EU cooperation, solutions that will not be equivalent to full participation’13 (St.meld. 2000-2001: 50). Transferring the WEU into the EU structures meant that Norway would lose this link into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and all efforts were put into trying to secure the best possible association. Again the focus was put on gaining possibilities to influence and participate, as illustrated by the Pro Memoria sent by then Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk to all EU and NATO members before the Helsinki EU summit in December 1999, proposing that:

Norway and other non-EU allies should take part in day-to-day consultations and activities relating to security and defence issues in the proposed Political and Security Committee and in subsidiary working groups ... with the right to speak and make proposals, and have access to all relevant information and documents.

(cited in Græger 2005: 93)4

The demand for influence went so far as the Norwegian Government stressing that ‘access to all relevant information about ESDP on a basis going beyond ad hoc cooperation was necessary’ (Græger 2005: 93). The Norwegian optimism, voiced by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk, was extensive, if not naïve:

The Government’s point of departure is therefore that Norway’s rights as an Ally, and associated member of the WEU, must be maintained in any future solutions that may change the cooperation between the EU, the WEU and NATO. In practice this will

---

4 The original document could not be located, and the solution of citing Græger’s reference to the same quote was thus opted for.
have to be ensured by involving Norway in discussions on defence and security policy issues within the EU. ... It is the Government’s impression that key Allies fully acknowledge Norwegian needs and that they welcome Norway’s initiatives. They are prepared to consider solutions that also safeguard Norwegian interests.

(Vollebæk 1999)

This was basically a demand for the same position within the ESDP as Norway had enjoyed in the WEU as an associated member. The demands were turned down by the EU members out of fear that if granted, they could undermine the EU’s decision-making autonomy. There was still hope of achieving ‘satisfactory association for Norway and other allied non-EU countries to the new structures established in the EU. This work has the Government’s highest priority’14 (Vollebæk 2000). At the Nice EU summit in December 2000 it was decided that there were to be two annual meetings between the Political and Security Committee and the six non-EU NATO countries, so-called PSC+ (EC 2000: annex VI, chapter IV). But as then Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorbjørn Jagland pointed out: ‘The solutions for consultation and cooperation that the EU now seems to have agreed upon for so-called third-countries, are not as good as the Government would have wanted’15 (Jagland 2000). The result was that Norway was de facto ‘excluded from information and debates about European security and defence policy issues’ (Græger 2005: 94). At the same time, however, the Schengen Agreement was also integrated into the EU. Norway did manage to continue its privileges in the new structure, enjoying a formal role in the decision-shaping process and access to the Council also today (Finstad 2014: 107).

Although the conditions were rejected, this ‘did not lead to a change in Norwegian policy. Instead of becoming more reluctant to contribute to the ESDP, [it] rather showed an increased willingness to participate’ (Rieker 2006: 284). The focus shifted from trying to obtain a position in the decision-making process to seeking out what Norway could offer the EU in terms of personnel and troops. The increased willingness to participate although requests for influence were denied might illustrate a belief that although membership was not an option, cooperation could still be valuable. Participation in operations could perhaps secure some level of insight as well as some form of consultations, not excluding Norway completely and avoiding the marginalisation feared by some Norwegian officials. The strategy, it appears, concerned how to get a foot inside the door even if full access was denied in the absence of EU membership.
4.3.2 Norway's Agreements with the EU on Security and Defence

Twelve bilateral agreements have been agreed upon concerning the cooperation between Norway and the EU on security and defence over the years, of which eight have been signed in the last decade (See appendix II). Most of the agreements concerns Norway’s possibility to participate in EU missions, crisis management and operations. The agreements are activated by invitation from the EU and the Norwegian Government is free to accept or decline the invitation, except perhaps with regards to the contribution to the Battle Groups. Norway has accepted the majority of these invitations (NOU 2012: 723-724).

One example illustrating the similarities between Norwegian foreign, security and defence policies and those of the EU, are the alignment request Norway receives from the EU. Quite often, the High Representative makes statements on behalf of the EU members concerning different aspects of the foreign, security and defence policy, for example condemning the violence in Syria. When this happens an invitation is sent to Norway asking if Norway agrees with the statement made and wishes to be mentioned in the official papers. There is very little debate on whether Norway should accept this or not. Norway aligned itself with 518 EU declarations in the period mid-2008 to mid-2011, amounting to 94 percent of the total requests (NOU 2012: 731-732).

4.3.3 Norway's Participation

The twelve bilateral agreements do neither give Norway the right to participate in developing EU foreign policy strategies nor formal rights to participate in shaping those parts of CSDP which have consequences for Norway. Some of the agreements do however allow for Norwegian participation in the management of operations. Before 2004, Norway’s participation in EU-led operations was agreed upon from case to case, in 2004 however, a framework agreement was signed opening up for Norwegian participation in the future, but without any obligations from either side (NOU 2012: 730). Norwegian contributions to EU-led operations are listed in table 4.2.
### Table 4.2: Norway’s Participation in EU Civilian and Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Cost in mill. NOK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Police and civilian</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCORDIA</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Proxima</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPT</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Police and civilian</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ache Monitoring Mission</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL A</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>137.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL C</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR ATALANTA</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>150-155</td>
<td>Frigate with crew</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>399-404</td>
<td></td>
<td>463.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NOU 2012: 734-735.
5.0 Introduction

As seen in chapter four, Norway stood at a crossroads as the European security cooperation drew closer, having to acknowledge that NATO no longer was the only forum where relevant security issues were discussed. That some premises of what Norwegian defence policy should contain are set outside Norway’s borders is not a new phenomenon, indeed, in one form or another, it has been a feature of ‘small-statedness’ accompanying Norway ever since independence was obtained in 1905. What is new with the Norway-EU cooperation, however, is that the agenda is set by Norway’s allies in meeting rooms closed for Norwegians. Although the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in theory is intergovernmental, a ‘Brusselisation’ has occurred also in this policy area, indicating that the foundation is no longer traditional diplomacy but rather a complicated web of national and transnational actors and institutions interacting on a day-to-day basis, forming common viewpoints across national interests (Sjursen 2008: 326). This is a web to which Norway as non-member does not have open channels of access, and it naturally leads to questions pertaining to possible ways of participating in and influencing the decision-making.

In mapping out the prevailing arguments in the late 1990s, as done in chapter four, the fear among Norwegian officials was threefold; not having access to relevant information, limited points of access/participation, and not having enough influence on the CSDP. This chapter scrutinises the input and output aspects of the cooperation, focusing on precisely how this cooperation functions today and how it is perceived – by the practitioners and by the public. This chapter consists of two main parts where the first examines the input side and the second the output side.

5.1 Input

In 1994, standing on the outside looking in was the essential dilemma facing the Norwegian Government. As illustrated in chapter four, it is evident from numerous sources that the Norwegian Government feared the consequences of the referendum with regard to the limited ways to exercise influence on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is equally
evident that these fears were enhanced rather than allayed in the following years. In his exposition to Parliament in 1999, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk acknowledged that ‘Since 1980 Norway has maintained contact and pursued a dialogue at various levels with the EU about foreign and security policy. … Experience has shown that it is mainly up to us to contribute to this cooperation in such a way that it is meaningful for all parties’ (Vollebæk 1999). A similar view is found in a white paper following the change of government in 2000:

The Government regards the biggest political challenge for Norway to be that the EU-countries are establishing a forum for continuous debates on European security and defence issues. … Countries outside of the EU will not be granted association equivalent to full participation. Consultations, dialogue and participation in crisis management operations will, according to the Government, only partly compensate the Norwegian non-membership.¹⁶

(St.meld. 2000-2001: 52)

The concerns voiced in official documents and by several ministers can be regarded as threefold; first of all the fear that Norway would be ‘out of the loop’ and not be able to get a hold of relevant information; secondly, the concern of being excluded from the fora where discussions would take place, i.e., rights of participation; and lastly, the distress over what kind of possibilities Norway would have to influence the security and defence cooperation. The analysis of the input aspect of the cooperation below is divided in three parts based on these three concerns, examining what the present day experience is when it comes to the EU-Norway cooperation on security and defence.

5.1.1 Getting Information
The EU has established two fora for information exchange with third countries such as Norway; PSC+ and EUMC+.⁵ They function, however, as a setting where the EU provides general information on the development of the CSDP, and not the complete picture or details (Interview 9). It is clear from various speeches, expositions and white papers examined that the lack of participation in relevant fora was seen as a major challenge because it would by default also limit the access to relevant information. When it became evident that Norway would not be granted any privileges, it was thus necessary to identify alternative routes to

---

¹⁶ Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) + relevant partner countries.
information. The answer was to be our neighbours. Then Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo expressed this clearly:

The result [of the referendum] makes it more difficult to adapt to an ever more changing world because we are not present in those fora where decision concerning us are made. We must thus use more efforts to promote Norwegian interests ... To Norway, our rejection of EU membership has increased the need to extend our bilateral connections to close allies in Europe and transatlantic, and to our neighbours Sweden and Finland.17

(Kosmo 1995)

This view is also reflected in official documents: ‘For Norway it will be of great importance to maintain the dialogue with Denmark, Finland and Sweden about EU developments’18 (St.meld. 1997-1998: chapter 3.3.4), as well as in a more recent speech by then Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold: ‘As the only non-EU member among the Nordic and Baltic countries, this [Nordic] cooperation gives Norway more insight into the security political thinking in the EU. All in all, this is important in an enlarged EU where it is increasingly more difficult for Norway as an outsider to be heard’19 (Devold 2005). The informants confirm that they look to EU members’ delegations and in particular the Nordic countries, when they search for information. One informant, although emphasising that the relationship between the EEAS and Norway has been good from the start, states that:

In my day-to-day work, generally, I have to be the one to initiate contact, mainly towards other countries’ delegations and the EEAS. ... Often it would be easier to get sensitive information from national delegations. ... The EEAS should have a more neutral role and they will be more careful with giving out information, especially when it comes to different member countries’ position on issues. By contrast, a member country might be more willing to comment upon other member countries’ positions.20

(Interview1)

‘It is crucial for us to have a direct dialogue with the other member states’, another informant confirms, before adding: ‘it isn’t an ideal situation, but it is manageable’21 (Interview 6). The informants however also underscores that personal relationships to a large degree determine the access to information:
People there are to a large degree quite helpful but this is of course determined upon personal relationships. ... But one can of course then look at what kind of information one receives. And if you are on good terms with other countries’ delegations, one can receive a lot of information.22

(Interview 1)

However, although the other Nordic countries might be willing to pass on information when asked, when it comes to getting information one of the main concerns is knowing when there is relevant information to get: ‘We aren’t part of any permanent fora in which we are currently informed about what is happening in the CSDP area. Consequently it is sometimes more *par hasard* that we find out about new issues that are being discussed’23 (Interview 1). During an orientation in the European Committee, Minister of Defence Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide admitted that the Government is hoping for a more systematic and early exchange of information in the years to come (Søreide 2013b). In addition, one thing is getting information on issues that are not that sensitive, but if Norway disagrees with the EU countries, information might be harder to come by: ‘I have not experienced a situation where we disagree on something of high importance to us, but even in such a case we would probably have some difficulties in getting complete information’24 (Interview 1). This then naturally leads us over to the fear of being left out of relevant fora.

5.1.2 Participation
‘Norway looks forward to fully participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’25 then Minister of Trade Bjørn Tore Godal emphasised in his speech on the opening of the membership negotiations between Norway and the EU in 1993 (Godal 1993). The focus on complete participation in EU security and defence cooperation runs like a red thread through various speeches and official documents in the time leading up to the negotiations, but also afterwards, when the result of the referendum made it clear that alternative solutions had to be found. Then state secretary Gunnar Heløe stressed that the Norwegian Government was doing its best: ‘We are putting great emphasis on securing satisfactory solutions for Norwegian participation when it comes to the development of the ESDP in general, and crisis management in particular’26 (Heløe 2002). However, sometimes that is easier said than done, as then Minister of Defence Devold acknowledged in a speech:
EU is creating its own security and defence dimension among the member states – without complete Norwegian participation. ... In line with the enlargement there is an increased tendency for informal consultations within and between the organisations to have an increased importance. ... Norway is not a part of the EU, and in NATO the processes are increasingly marked by the fact that “someone has been talking together”. Norway is basically not first in line for participation in these conversations.\(^{27}\)

(Devold 2002)

Even in more recent years, it is evident that the concern for the lack of participation has not been completely solved. Rather, the continued integration of the EU members is creating new challenges for Norway with regard to participation. Although a white paper points to four annual meetings as the most important forum in the cooperation: ‘The Minister of Defence is invited to meetings with the EU troika four times a year. During these meetings Norway is informed and consulted on important ESDP issues, in addition to put forth Norwegian sentiments’\(^{28}\) (St.meld. 2005-2006: 28), then Minister of Defence Grete Faremo displayed a rather less optimistic note when accounting for the situation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

We are witnessing a changing EU, also in the security and defence policy area. For me it has for example become harder to achieve political contact and dialogue with the EU. The old ‘troika meeting’ where I met with the EU political leadership four times a year has been discontinued and has not been replaced with a solution satisfactory to us.\(^{29}\)

(Faremo 2010)

The people working with the political day-to-day cooperation on security and defence between Norway and the EU are also quite frank in their assessment of the situation:

It’s been problematic for many years now. Before the Lisbon Treaty we had these four annual meetings, and although the level of relevance varied, at least we met with the EU in a formal setting and there was always the possibility of informal corridor talks.
They [the EU] promised to replace this forum, but this has not been done to a satisfactory degree and this is something we are still working on.\(^{30}\) (Interview 6)

Almost every day meetings in different working groups take place. You always have to contact other people to get to know what was discussed. This would in principle also be the case if something that may concern us should be on the agenda.\(^{31}\) (Interview 9)

One informant points to the PSC+ and EUMC+ meetings as the formal point of access for issues relevant to Norway, but also notes that these most often function as a way for the EU to keep the partner countries informed, not substantial discussions (Interview 3). Participating in meetings or other fora might not be that important as long as one gets hold of the relevant information through other channels, and as the previous section clearly illustrated, other countries’ delegations are willing to pass on this information. However, knowing what information to ask for is drastically limited when one isn’t part of the day-to-day discussion, and as one informant states, there might be other consequences of not being present as well: ‘You often feel like you are a bit behind and always dependent upon someone else’s assessment of a situation or a case ... We are dependent upon other countries good-will’\(^ {32}\) (Interview 1). In addition, relying on information assessed by other countries might be problematic. There might be questions of possible ulterior motives and only passing on certain information, or just because one relies on others to determine what is relevant and not. As one informant argued:

I know from experience from other international organisations that sitting in on relevant meetings provides a very different frame of reference. ... When you have got hold of a document, you can of course read it and assess it based on prior knowledge or through speaking with people. But what happened in that room, during that meeting? How was the atmosphere? Who said what? You won’t get that full picture, and that is an evident drawback. And this is of course the case in most policy areas, but it is perhaps even more apparent in the security and defence area because there are so few points of access. In that sense, we are perhaps more at a disadvantage here than in those policy areas where the EEA agreement gives us a certain access.\(^ {33}\) (Interview 1)
One apparent way of gaining participation would be to take advantage of the system with nation experts. The EEA Agreement leaves Norway with an opportunity to take part in the decision-shaping of the policy concerning the Internal Market. This means that although they do not have any seats in the EU institutions, they still have some influence in the preparatory stage either through the submission of EEA/EFTA comments or national experts in the European Commission committees (Claes 2003). Although security and defence policy is not part of the EEA Agreement, one very clear way of getting more information as well as a possibility for both participation and influence would be to have a national expert stationed at the EEAS. According to informants, this has been discussed in Norway:

> It would have been extremely useful for us and we would get a completely different insight. It would of course have been an international civil servant, he would not be there for Norway, but that is the way with the national experts, and it goes without saying that it would in any case be extremely useful.34

(Interview 1)

The Norwegian Government has also tried to place a national expert in DG MARKT due to the new EU defence directives on the surveillance of the market. This was also turned down by the EU: ‘They said that there was no use for additional staff in the most relevant section as it was fully manned. We believe however, that part of the reason might have been that they weren’t interested in having a non-EU member working in this particular area, because surveillance of the defence market is so sensitive’35 (Interview 1).

Some improvements on the possibilities to participate have nevertheless been made recently. One informant revealed that the prospect of getting a national expert in the EEAS might actually be within reach (Interview 9). In the semi-annual exposition to Parliament on the EU, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide revealed that he had, as the first Norwegian minister ever, been invited to meetings in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and had the opportunity to present Norwegian viewpoint on the High North and the Middle East (Eide 2013: 3338). Nevertheless, before the European Council meeting on security and defence in

---

6 The Internal Market and Services Directorate General (DG MARKT) is one of the Directorates General and specialised services which make up the European Commission. Its main role is to coordinate the Commission’s policy on the European Single Market and to seek the removal of unjustified obstacles to trade, in particular in the field of services and financial markets (EC 2014).

---
December 2013, Norway sent a non-paper\textsuperscript{7} which clearly indicated that the present solutions for participation are not good enough. The document lists several suggestions on ways to strengthen the cooperation through more frequent dialogues and meetings, indicating that there still is discontent concerning the current arrangements (Non-paper 2013). When there clearly are strong limitations on the possibilities to participate, the possibilities to influence becomes even more important, as it is can be seen as the last way of restoring the democratic balance.

5.1.3 Possibilities for Influence

One of the initial concerns in Norway when the EU Helsinki summit made it clear that the privileged position from the WEU would not be continued within the EU context, was what the possibilities for influence would be:

This [inclusion of WEU in the EU] will represent a challenge for Norway because important discussions and decisions concerning European security issues and European crisis management operations will take place in fora where Norway has little influence.\textsuperscript{36}

(NOU 2000: 38)

There is some indication that Norwegian efforts to influence must have been heard in the EU. For example, one informant revealed that the reason why Norway has not participated in an EU-led operation since Atalanta is because the invitations aren’t received early enough to get through the necessary national procedures, i.e., that Norway gets involved too late in the process. However, Norway has made it clear that if the EU wants to include partners, they must notify possible candidates earlier, and there have been clear improvements in this regard (Interview 6). However, getting partner countries to contribute to operations is an issue which is very much in the EU’s best interest. Especially because of the financial situation in Europe, where many countries are experiencing cuts in the defence budgets, the EU is to a degree dependent upon the partner countries for contributions. From an interview with another informant, it is evident that the possibilities for influence in general are few, and that efforts must be directed towards the other Nordic countries and not the EU when there is a discussion of particular interest for Norway.

\textsuperscript{7} In EU jargon, a non-paper is a discussion document designed to stimulate discussion on a particular issue.
If there should be an issue on the agenda on which we have a strong opinion or feel is very important, then we will try to influence the other member states, and especially the other Nordic states. It is, however, always important to do this as early as possible, before there is too much prestige in the issue and the discussion is locked.³⁷

(Interview 9)

The analysis of the input side has shown that the three main fears from the late 1990s of limited access to information, few possibilities for participation and influence are still very much present in the cooperation today. The possibilities for participation might even be worse now than before the Lisbon treaty discontinued the four annual meetings. However, the analysis has also shown that while an outsider status is very much the case on paper, many of the shortcomings it entails are compensated for through close participation with Sweden and Finland, as well as other willing EU member states. What emerges is a relationship of information rather than participation. It is a relationship where Norway to a large extent depends on friends on the inside to download information from the decision-making fora as well as up-loading Norwegian views. The limitations of this form of surrogate representation will be further discussed in chapter seven.

Given the close communication lines with its Nordic neighbours, this semi-attachment to the EU security and defence policy has worked relatively well in the pursuit of national interest on a day-to-day basis. However, it is an arrangement whose functional effectiveness is not matched by democratic accountability. In any representative democracy, there should be a clear chain of representation, so that the public can have the possibility to hold their representatives accountable. An examination of the output side is thus warranted.

5.2 Output

Because the EU has been such a sensitive topic in Norway, the public opinion has always been regarded as highly relevant and by putting the membership question to a vote on two occasions the Norwegian Government has also made the public opinion a standard of legitimacy. In democracies there are established procedures for authorising the use of military forces, and popular support is vital if a government is to persist in a military operation over time. In addition, informal factors, such as media or public opinion, play an important role in providing accountability, a role which increases with the level of violence and risk of an
operation (Ku 2004: 39-44). In a democracy, the principle of accountability – the peoples’ right to demand justifications for the Government’s actions and demand its deposition if it isn’t satisfactory – is vital, and there is no reason why this principle should not also apply to security and defence policy (Sjursen 2014: 179).

Because the Norwegian people did not have the chance to vote on participation in the CSDP, one could say that there is an obvious democratic deficit already at that point. However, in a representative democracy, the government is elected by a parliamentary majority representing the voters, a mandate which also extends to international agreements. It is not practical for the people to vote on every single issue, and it is not custom to issue referenda over questions of war, security and defence, or bilateral agreements. Therefore, there is a robust argument to be made that this does in fact not pose a democratic problem. In addition, one might also argue like then president of the Foreign Policy Committee, Thorbjørn Jagland, during a Parliamentary debate: ‘when even leading no-politicians from 1994 have wanted this form of cooperation [CSDP], one can argue that it is acceptable with regard to the referendum in 1994’ (Stortinget 2004: 756). Nevertheless, as cooperation could include Norwegian soldiers going to war, it is relevant to examine the output dimension of the cooperation further. The following section is divided in three parts; public awareness, public debate and public opinion, with emphasis on the latter.

5.2.1 Public Awareness

It is difficult to make any statements concerning public awareness in Norway when it comes to Norway’s participation in CSDP as there are no previous published studies on this area, nor has it been possible to conduct such a study in relation to this thesis. One study did however ask respondents to characterise their own knowledge of the EU and the bilateral agreements. One third answered that their knowledge of the EU was ‘good’ or ‘very good’, but one third also admitted to having ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ knowledge of the EEA Agreement and 50 per cent said the same about Schengen (NOU 2012: 283-284). CSDP was not explicitly part of the survey, but as the EEA Agreement is the most extensive and well-known of the Norway-EU agreements, it is safe to assume that the public knowledge on the CSDP cooperation isn’t significantly higher. Even though there aren’t any studies to base conclusive arguments on, one might nevertheless be able to make some general assumptions with regard to the level of public awareness. One can for example argue that public awareness must be based on getting information from somewhere and consequently examine what kind of information is
available, arguing that the less information accessible to the public on the topic, the lower the general public awareness will be.

There is a limited focus on learning anything concerning EU or Norway’s relationship with the EU besides the two referenda in the curriculum or achievement goals for the lower and upper secondary school in Norway (NOU 2012: 288-289). Looking through publications by the Norwegian Armed Forces with information on participation in international operations, the clear focus is on NATO and the UN, with cooperation with the EU mentioned almost like an afterthought: ‘Other organisations also conduct peace operations, among others the EU and OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Norway has contributed to both’ (Forsvaret 2012: 10-11). The picture is of course different if one examines the academic literature, but that is not representative reading material, nor is perhaps white papers and official speeches. The extensive ‘Outside and inside’ report was also aimed at increasing public awareness, and had a separate chapter on security and defence, the media coverage of the report did however focus on the chapters concerning the EEA. It is of course also doubtful if the report will be read by anyone not especially interested in the Norway-EU relationship, but the report is nevertheless accessible to the public and is perhaps the best source to increase awareness on the topic available today.

Newspapers should be the best way to get information to the public, but searching through the archives it is clear that the security and defence dimension of the Norway-EU cooperation in general has not been in focus. There was some mentioning of the EU’s initiatives for closer security and defence cooperation at the beginning of the 2000s, but not much since then, except a few articles concerning the participation in both Operation Atalanta and Nordic Battle Group, as the next chapter will illustrate. Studies of the media coverage of the EU-Norway relationship in general indicate a similar trend where some issues are occasionally well covered, but that media attention in general is low. In addition, the trend is that EU is covered as a foreign policy issue, without attention brought to the consequences for Norwegian domestic policy (NOU 2012: 285). All in all, the indication seems to be low public awareness of Norway’s participation in CSDP, which naturally has consequences for the public debate, an important element in a democracy.
5.2.2 Public Debate
The question of Norwegian EU membership caused debates and mobilised the public in a way never before or after seen in Norway. It has deeply divided the Norwegian public as well as politicians, and is said to be one of the major cleavages in Norwegian politics. The debate concerning the question of a potential EU membership is, however, in sharp contrast to the (lack of) debate concerning Norway’s actual relationship with the EU. Issues linked to foreign policy, like which priorities are to be followed or political decisions, are not open to critical public debate in the same way as domestic policy is (Sjursen 2014: 179). However, as MP Kristin Halvorsen argued during a Parliamentary debate:

There is a need for a much greater openness when it comes to important and essential foreign policy questions. ... There are many important constitutionally as well as political questions that should be examined, and that both the media and the public should have insight into the discussions.40

(Stortinget 2004: 760)

Foreign, security and defence policy is not a prominent issue in parliamentary elections in Norway, in which the EU question is also absent. Not even during the two referenda, when the EC/EU debate was at its largest, was the security and defence dimension in focus. As illustrated in chapter four, the different speeches, expositions and white papers examined clearly show that security and defence policy was a central issue for the Norwegian Government in the time leading up to the referendum in 1994. It was underscored that it was important to be part of the EC/EU because it would provide access to relevant security and defence discussions, and that it was important to be present there. This is quite surprising when examining the public debates on the prospective EU membership which largely consisted of arguments concerning fisheries, oil, farming and the welfare state (see for example Jenssen et al. 1998; Jenssen and Valen 1996; Pettersen et al. 1996). The concern among the Norwegian officials was thus not really reflected in the public debate, in which security and defence issues were absent.

However, questions of sovereignty were very much part of the EU membership debates, so national control, regardless of policy area, is clearly important to the public. This is underscored by the fact that much of the public debate today on Norway’s association with the EU in general is focused on what issues are decided outside Norwegian control. However,
the security and defence cooperation is not part of the public debate, and when newspaper articles are published on this topic it is first and foremost by political scientist with the CSDP as their field of expertise. The ‘Outside and inside’ report was nevertheless widely covered in national newspapers in 2012 and the debate which followed was again focused on whether or not the cooperation with the EU in general led to any loss of sovereignty. With so little debate on Norway’s participation in the CSDP, the question remains if there is enough foundation to base any public opinion on.

5.2.3 Public Opinion
There is a broad consensus across political parties on Norwegian foreign, security and defence policy, and a change of government does not entail drastic policy changes. Consequently, Norwegian foreign-, security and defence policy has been quite absent from the election campaign agenda (Narud et al. 2010: 336). Since the end of the Cold War the Norwegian Armed Forces have undergone restructuring and the primary task is no longer territorial defence, but rather participation in international operations. This restructuring has taken place virtually without any public debate but studies find a weak tendency showing that ‘the majority wants protection of own country rather than participation abroad’41 (Narud et al. 2010: 343).

Searching for opinion polls conducted on the EU security dimension in the archives of the Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services (NSD) it is evident that not much focus has been on this aspect of the Norway-EU relationship. In 1994 one poll showed that 38.7 % believed Norwegian EU membership would be an advantage when it came to Norwegian defence and security (i.e., the territorial defence and security of Norway and not participation in the EU security dimension per se) (Opinion 1994). A 1996 poll did however show that a majority of 55.6 per cent believed that even if Norway was a member of the EU, defence policy should be decided upon by the Norwegian Government (NSD 1996). Since the 1990s the polls conducted have been on membership of aspects of the EEA Agreement, and not even the public opinion on the Battle Groups, the most controversial topic, has been measured to my knowledge. Even in the extensive ‘Outside and Inside’ report in which one section was dedicated to public opinion, the polls conducted were only concerned with the EEA Agreement or Schengen (NOU 2012: 279-284).
The results from the only opinion poll available on Norwegian participation in the CSDP showed that in October 2013 only a weak majority (53 per cent) believed that Norway should participate in the EU security cooperation, involving EU-led military operations (Folk og Forsvar 2013). The opinion poll has included this question since 2003, and is therefore a good source for the trend over time. From 2003 to 2007, the support was quite high and stable, around 74-80 per cent, then came a major fall in public support, from 81 per cent in 2007 to 66 per cent in 2008. Since then, the trend has been gradually declining, to 53 per cent in 2013.

Figure 5.1: The Norwegian Public’s View on Participation in CSDP

In light of the previous discussions of public awareness and public debate, it is natural to question what foundation this public opinion is based upon. Without much information on what the cooperation with the EU in security and defence actually entails, there is naturally little debate, and one might also argue that the opinion on the matter might not be founded on enough facts or knowledge. However unfounded, it is nevertheless the public opinion, which is what the elected representatives are commissioned to govern by, and could be viewed as an informal guideline when the security and defence policy is formulated. In that case, it is perhaps worrying that at the same time as the public’s support for cooperation with the EU in security and defence has declined, the actual cooperation has grown even closer.

Source: Folk og Forsvar 2013, author’s own translation.
5.3 Summing Up

Comparing the prevailing fears of the late 1990s mapped out in chapter four to the cooperation today, the most interesting observation is the following: Due to fears of not getting relevant information, limited or non-existing possibilities for participation and influence, the Norwegian government originally sought an associated membership in the CSDP. A recent white paper states that: ‘For the Government, it is essential to organise the work with the EEA Agreement, as well as our other agreements with the EU, in a way that maintains the core principles such as openness, participation, co-decision, and effective governance in the best possible manner’ (St.meld. 2012-2013: 23). However, when analysing the input side it is evident that the cooperation today is marked by broad participation and contribution of Norwegian personnel and troops, while at the same time there hasn’t been any real solutions to the three challenges expressed by the Government in the late 1990s. Getting information is not viewed as very difficult, but has to be done through other member states, which raise the question of knowing when there is relevant information to ask for. With regard to participation, Norwegian representatives have very few points of access and in the cases where they are invited to meetings or other relevant settings, these are experienced as opportunities for the EU to inform, rather than to discuss matters or exchange views – which naturally also lead to there being quite few opportunities to exert influence. Again, this results in dependence upon other countries to represent Norwegian interests and views. This is not regarded as particularly problematic for those working with Norway-EU relations on a day-to-day basis. It does nevertheless raise questions of democratic accountability as those de facto representing Norway are not elected by the Norwegian public or even held accountable by someone elected by the Norwegian public.

Looking at the output side, it is evident that there is not much public awareness or public debate when it comes to Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence. However, Norway’s sovereignty with regard to the EU in general has always been at the core of the EU debates, and there is no reason to believe that this would be any less so with regard to security and defence. The lack of debate might therefore perhaps be traced to the fact that there is less awareness of the cooperation with the EU in this area, as it is NATO which is first and foremost associated with security and defence. Although the public opinion on Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence has been declining, it might
therefore be questionable what this opinion is founded upon of knowledge. Nevertheless, in a representative democracy public opinion should be followed, no matter how it was formed.
Chapter 6  Military Analysis

I am not afraid of an army of lions led by a sheep; I am afraid of an army of sheep led by a lion
Alexander the Great

6.0 Introduction
Norway has participated in numerous military operations under the auspices of NATO or the UN since the end of World War II. Contributions to these operations are well known and very often not controversial at all. However, the security and defence cooperation between Norway and the EU also consists of a military aspect based on Norwegian contributions to EU-led operations. To this date, Norway has contributed in eleven EU-led operations, both civilian and military, actually making Norway the non-member participating in most EU-led operations. In addition to participating in EU-led operations, Norway has since 2005 contributed to the Nordic Battle Group and has thus been on stand-by in two periods, spring 2008 and spring 2011. Through this agreement, there is a possibility that Norwegian men and women can be deployed in missions led by the EU at very short notice. What makes the case of the Battle Groups particularly interesting is that it is a permanent contribution to an integrated unit under command of a union of which Norway is not a member.

The military aspect of the Norway-EU cooperation can be divided into two levels; the personnel working in the Ministry of Defence with the military cooperation at the political level, and the military personnel participating in the actual operations where Norway takes part at the military level. This chapter is divided into three main parts. It starts out with an analysis of how the military cooperation works on the political level, before the second and third part examine the military level, illustrated by the two in-depth studies, Operation Atalanta and the Nordic Battle Group respectively.

6.1 Working with the EU on Military Issues
6.1.1 Getting Information
At the political level, when Norway is participating in an EU-led activity, there seems to be no problem of getting the information required: ‘If the information is relevant for Norway because we are participating in an EU activity, we normally get all the information we need’43 (Interview 3).
In the previous chapter it became evident that information on on-going processes most often has to be obtained through the other Nordic states. When it comes to information that might be relevant to Norway, but not linked to actual participation, different informants also confirm that the best way to get information might not be through the EU institutions:

Information EU shares with its partners must be approved by the member states. The consequences are therefore that one has to use other “sources” in order to get hold of information not officially distributed by the EU ... In my experience, some of the other member states are very much helpful when it comes to providing information we can’t get hold of through formal channels.44

(Interview 3)

The informal contact with the member states is crucial. It is not like they are distributing the documents, but we at least get the chance to take a look at them. In my experience they are willing to share information with us, but it is of course a mutual deal. As long as we have something relevant to contribute with and they find us interesting, the possibility of gaining access to information is much larger.45

(Interview 6)

All in all, getting the required information does not seem to be viewed as problematic for the informants working with the military aspect of the Norway-EU cooperation. Even if there is no talk of actual military contribution, the other Nordic states are willing to share information with Norway. As with the political aspect, there is nevertheless also the question of knowing when to ask for information, and knowing what is happening. This leads us to the possibilities for participation in relevant fora or meetings.

6.1.2 Participation

When examining various speeches and white papers, it becomes clear that the fear of not having the possibility to participate in the decision-shaping or decision-making process also concerned the military aspect of the cooperation. Then Minister of Defence Bjørn Tore Godal was quite clear on the importance of participation:

Acknowledging that our aims and objectives in the field of security are fully in line with those of the EU, I want to underline that the assignment of Norwegian forces to
European-led operations must be seen in the context of our future participation in the EU decision-shaping process. This goes for the process leading up to any operation as well as in the more generic discussions within the ESDP framework. Being part of this decision-shaping process is crucial both in order to facilitate Norwegian decision-making and for constitutional reasons as regards the deployment of Norwegian forces abroad. Of significant importance in this regard are the possibilities for access of Norwegian military officers to work in close co-ordination with the EU military staff.

(Godal 2000)

The EU Nice summit in 2000 established formal fora between the EU and contributing third countries; four annual meetings between the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the establishment of an ad hoc Committee of Contributors (CoC) with each operation (EC 2000: annex VI, article VI). When talking about the possibilities for participation in the political aspect of the cooperation, informants revealed that they weren’t invited to relevant meetings, discussions, debates etc, but also that: ‘The exception is when Norway is contributing to an operation. Then we will be part of the Committee of Contributors, a forum that includes all countries participating in the actual operation, for discussing issues related to the operation.’

(Interview 1). However, not all the experiences with the Committee of Contributors are that positive:

The Committee of Contributors has all in all been an all right forum for information, but not good enough. The agenda has often been for the EU to give us information on what’s going on now, not a real discussion about challenges, plans, security threats, personnel tasks, i.e., not a substantial discussion of the operation.

(Interview 6)

On the other hand, as one informant argues, although the Committee of Contributors might not function as well as Norway would have liked: ‘Taking part in the Committee of Contributors is positive because it provides a point of access, and it might be useful also to get information on other CSDP issues, which can be useful in a broader context’

(Interview 1). Nevertheless, the only real point of access is the Committee of Contributors, and the experiences are mixed, which naturally also have consequences for the possibilities to exert any influence.
6.1.3 Possibilities for Influence

After having participated in EU-led operations in the Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the first few years of the new millennium, it became evident that the hopes for Norwegian influence perhaps were a bit too high:

Norway’s ability to influence the EU European Security and Defence Policy is minimal. Our role in ESDP is clearly less than compared to the rights we enjoyed as associated member in the Western European Union (WEU). As a so-called third country will Norwegian influence on the practical implementation of EU-led peace operations also be limited.49

(St.prp. 2003-2004: 20)

While interviews with informants show that getting information or participating isn’t considered very problematic for those working on the military aspect of the Norway-EU cooperation, the possibilities for influence might in reality be more limited. The meetings established at Nice did not really provide any real possibilities for influence as they took place after all discussions had been conducted and an agreement between the EU members had been reached (Rieker 2006: 289). The perception that these meetings do not provide any real possibilities for influence is also confirmed by informants: ‘I am invited to meetings that are directly linked to activities which Norway have decided to participate in, but I do not experience that this primarily is done in order to listen to our points of view but rather to give us information’50 (Interview 3). A consequence is that: ‘when it comes to activities or operations we are not directly participating in, an indirect approach via the other member states is the best possibility for influence’51 (Interview 3). As mentioned above, Norway’s possibilities for participation are quite limited to the Committee of Contributors, and one might argue that that is also the place where Norway is best positioned to influence. A white paper clearly shows that this has also been the realisation in Norway:

It is important for the EU to maintain its autonomy in decision-making processes in cooperation with third-countries. Norwegian influence on operations we participate in must be done through the Committee of Contributors for each operation. From the Norwegian side, great emphasis is put on making these committees work as planned.52

(St.meld. 2005-2006: 28)
A more recent white paper states that: ‘Norway participates in the Committee of Contributors for each operation which provides good possibilities for influence’ (St.meld. 2012-2013: 31). However, informants reveal that the reality of the CoC might not that voiced in the white paper:

In the Committee [of Contributors] the countries have rights pertaining to their specific contribution, not necessarily regarding every question related to the operation as such. ... Norway and other partner countries have pointed out that when meetings in the Committee of Contributors take place, the EU at 28 has often already discussed and in fact decided upon most issues of relevance. The Norwegian view has been that the meetings in the Committee of Contributors should take place first, and then the EU could continue to discuss afterwards the issues they needed to sort out among themselves. (Interview 1)

On the other hand, one informant stressed that in recent years and especially due to the financial crisis and cuts in defence budgets, more EU members have shown interest in the partner countries:

Sweden, Finland, Great Britain and the Netherlands are all very interested in the partner countries and are interested in listening to our points of view and experiences. So there is a small group of countries which discuss these matters with us before the big EU meetings so that they can keep our points of view in mind. (Interview 6)

As with many other sides of the cooperation, this might not be the ideal way to do things, but it nevertheless illustrates that Norway has managed to find a way to make it work, mostly by relying on other countries both to get information and to represent Norwegian views. In order to get a full picture of the Norway-EU relationship on security and defence, it is however also necessary to examine the military participation in actual operations. The remainder of this chapter is therefore devoted to the two in-depth studies; Operation Atalanta and the Nordic Battle Group.
6.2 In-depth Study 1: EUNAVFOR Atalanta

The situation in the Gulf of Aden escalated at the turn of the century, and a number of incidents made the international community even more aware of the fact that some kind of international action was needed (Nincic 2009: 78-79). In May 2008 the United Nations Security Council adopted a series of resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter condemning acts of piracy as well as authorising the use of military means to combat it. In December 2008 the EU launched its first naval military operation, European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta, to fight piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. The aim of Atalanta was not to replace, but to complement various operations already in the area by NATO or other independent states (Peters et al. 2011: 3). According to the Council (2008: 1), the NAVFOR forces can use military force to ‘contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of act of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast’ and to escort WFP vessels to carry humanitarian aid to Somalia. The operation is part of the CSDP, and thus the member states could decide whether or not they wanted to contribute militarily to the operation and all operational costs were covered by the participating states. However, the military operation is conducted under common EU command (Riddervold 2011: 4). The operation has been extended a number of times, but is planned to end in December 2014.

In the Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 where Operation Atalanta is established, article 10 states that ‘Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU or to the single institutional framework, and in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the European Council, third States may be invited to participate in the operation’ (EC 2008: article 10). In August 2009, Norway became the first non-EU country to contribute to the operation, sending the frigate KNM Fridtjof Nansen with a crew of approximately 150 from amongst others the Norwegian maritime special operations forces unit (MJK) to the Gulf of Aden. The reasons why Norway contributed to this operation are not hard to come by; Norway is the sixth biggest shipping nation in the world, and of the approximately twenty thousand merchant vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden annually, around five per cent are owned or controlled by Norwegian ship-owners (Kristiansen et al. 2011: 14-15).

---

9 Number six measured by gross register tonnage, number five measured by number of vessels, number four measured in monetary value (Kristiansen et al. 2011: 14).
6.2.1 Participating in an EU-led Operation

‘Third States making significantly military contributions to the EU military operation shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as Member States taking part in the operation’ the Council Joint Action states (EC 2008: article 10). As seen above, the quality of the Committee of Contributors has in the past not been good enough viewed from the Norwegian side. However, some improvements were made with regard to Operation Atalanta: ‘the meetings were more frequent and absolutely of more substance than earlier. I would say that Operation Atalanta is the operation that has worked best’ (Interview 6). As Norway has not participated in any EU-led operation since Atalanta it is difficult to say if this has been a permanent turn for the positive or if this was a onetime improvement.

During the actual operation there are no signs that Norway was in any inferior position: ‘Not once did I get the feeling that Norway was treated differently than the other participating EU nations. ... The only thing is that we could never been given the position of command vessel, has we had during NATO’s Ocean Shield, as a non-member’ (Interview 4). Thus, during the actual operation, there does not seem to be any challenges for Norway as a non-member. In addition, from the military perspective, there are no evident problems related to Norway’s outsider status in defining the principles for the operation: ‘Most of the procedures used in EU operations are very similar to those used in NATO because NATO has a longer tradition for these operations than the EU. So basically, they have just built on the same rules. They use the same principles’ (Interview 8). In sum, there does not seem to have been any challenges during the actual operation, but one might imagine that there would be some public debate concerning Norway sending such a huge contribution to an operation led by the EU. Especially because NATO had an on-going operation in the area at the same time, question might arise why Norway contributed to the EU instead.

6.2.2 Public Debate

A scrutiny of newspaper articles concerning the Norwegian contribution to Operation Atalanta shows that the participation is not depicted as controversial. Most of the articles are informative in the way that they explain the situation in the Gulf of Aden and what Norway is contributing with, not much emphasis is however put on the EU. Aftenposten published a three-page feature article on KNM Fridtjof Nansen a few months before departure to the Gulf of Aden where ‘EU’ only is mentioned once, in a small box of facts: ‘The mission is part of
EU’s “Operation Atalanta”\textsuperscript{59} (Bentzrød and Skodvin 2009). In other newspaper articles during the six months Norway contributed, there is some mentioning of the work being done, the pirate situation in general, but not any debate. An exemption is a comment in VG asking why Norway is contributing to an operation where they have no influence on the operation since Norway as a non-member doesn’t participate in the relevant fora: ‘Minister of Defence Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen met with the EU defence ministers 18 May. But when they were to discuss Operation Atalanta, she had to leave the room’\textsuperscript{60} (Astrup 2009: 47). However, this single observation did not stir up any wider public debate. The lack of controversies concerning Operation Atalanta might be explained by Norway’s long tradition of seafaring and an understanding of Norway’s large interest in the area. However, the lack of debate is also in line with the general lack of debate on security and defence issues.

6.2.3 Parliamentary Debate

Due to the foreign policy prerogative executed by the Government, it is only necessary to seek the Parliament’s approval in issues of special importance. None of the EU-led operations Norway has contributed to has been debated in Parliament (Sjursen 2014: 184). It might be difficult to imagine that none of these agreements would be of special importance, but this has not been critically discussed as such by neither the Government nor the opposition in any open sources (NOU 2012: 741). There has thus not been any Parliamentary debate concerning Norway’s contribution to Operation Atalanta. The only mentioning of Atalanta occurs in a few questions from MPs to the Minister of Defence concerning the safety of vessels of national interest in the area. The Norwegian contribution to Operation Atalanta has probably been dealt with in the Extended Foreign and Defence Committee, but as already noted those records are not available to the public. It is therefore impossible to examine if there has been any discussion of whether or not participation would be problematic from a democratic aspect. However, the lack of openness on these issues which are clearly not even of special importance could be said to have an effect on the level of public awareness on the Norway-EU cooperation.

6.3 In-depth Study 2: The Nordic Battle Group

The idea of Battle Groups was born at the Helsinki Council in 1999 (EC 1999). However, it was first agreed upon by the EU Military Committee on 14 June 2004 after UK, France and Germany had presented a document proposing that the EU should develop a ‘number of
battle-group sized forces available to undertake autonomous operations at short notice, principally in response to requests from the UN’ (ISS 2005: 10). The Battle Groups are characterised as ‘the minimum concentration of militarily forces capable of autonomous action as well as performing a “bridge” function while larger military units are assembled’ (Jacoby and Jones 2009: 5).

The size of the Battle Groups vary from 1,500 to 2,200 troops which are to be deployed five to ten days after a Council decision, being able to operate autonomously for at least 30 days. The Battle Groups consist of troops from different countries and two Battle Groups are on stand-by during a six month period (Jacoby and Jones 2009: 5-6). In 2004 Sweden, Finland and Norway declared that they would create the Nordic Battle Group (NBG), and shortly thereafter Estonia and Ireland joined as well. Sweden assumed leadership and it is currently the only Battle Group composed entirely of smaller EU member states and the only one where a non-EU member participates (Andersson 2006: 37). The NBG has been on stand-by two times, spring 2008 and spring 2011. Next rotation will be spring 2015.

6.3.1 Being Part of an Integrated Force: The Cooperation in Praxis

A Swede participating in the 2011 NBG admitted: ‘It did cause some amusement as to why Norway wished to participate without being member of the EU. ... but Norway was a country as any other in the Nordic Battle Group, the non-membership in the EU did not cause any difficulties from my point of view’ (Interview 7). The agreement on Norway’s participation in the NBG is said to be more ‘positive’ than other agreements between Norway and the EU on foreign and security policy because it gives Norway the ‘right’ to participate (Sjursen 2008: 326-327). However, Sjursen (2014: 186) also argues that: ‘A “no” from Norway could stop the entire operation. Thus, in reality, one could say that this agreement obligates Norway to contribute forces when and where the EU decides’. In order to find out if the agreement is problematic from a democratic point of view, it is necessary to examine how this cooperation works in praxis, as well as the so-called ‘national veto’, before examining the public and parliamentary debates.

6.3.2.1 Getting Information

In an integrated force as the Nordic Battle Group is, it is important to get relevant information in order to best be prepared for what might happen. Then Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold said in an exposition to Parliament that: ‘In order to ensure a proper national decision-
making process, we have from the Norwegian perspective *preconditioned that we will have access to all relevant information before and during a crisis*. This is especially important because the formal decision from the EU is taken in the EU council without our participation.”63 (Devold 2004b: my own italics). From the political point of view, it seems that there should be no problem getting information, because: ‘the Swedes are bound by the agreement to keep us informed when we are on stand-by’64 (Interview 6). Once again, Norway is thus relying on the Swedes in order to be informed about what is happening in the EU concerning the Battle Group they are contributing to. On the military side, for those participating in the actual Battle Group, one informant said that all in all there was a good flow of information, but were also was quite clear on the limitations:

Sweden was the framework nation and they did a good job passing on information, but the information travels up through the Swedish system, then over to Norway at the same level, and then down to us. It takes a long time, and not all information gets through. ... I had to search for information and take initiative when I had a feeling that information was “stuck” somewhere. But when I went directly to the Swedish platoon chief, he gave me what I asked for. However, there are also issues with regard to security clearance on the information, often it had to be adjusted to the appropriate security level before it could be handed over, and who knows what got lost on the way.65

(Interview 5)

### 6.3.2.2 Participation

We have seen that when Norway is contributing to an EU-led operation, representatives will participate in the Committee of Contributors. The Battle Group is, as discussed earlier, somewhat different than participation in regular operations and a closer examination of the possibilities for participation is thus warranted. First of all, it is evident from interviews that there is a divide with regard to participation. At the political level:

we would normally not be part of early discussions on whether the Battle Groups on stand-by are to be deployed or not, but we will be kept informed informally about what is being discussed. ... The question is of course if the EU will be quick in informing us, but in this case we can rely on the Swedes and Norway will of course pay extra attention when we are on stand-by. We could also receive information more
formally, through the particular fora for exchange of information with third countries, such as PSC+ and EUMC+, but these meetings do not take place very often. If a possible deployment should be discussed when Norway is part of one of the battle groups on stand-by, we will have to stay in close touch with Sweden, as framework nation.66

(Interview 1)

The challenge of not being present at meetings where the EU is discussing whether or not to use the Battle Groups is confirmed by another informant: ‘Chad was mentioned once as a possible EU operation, and it was debated if a Battle Group could be used. But we weren’t there. It is a real challenge not to be part of the Political and Security Committee (PSC)’67 (Interview 6). However, when it comes to the military level during the actual training period or stand-by period, there were no experiences of being left out of relevant meetings or fora:

I was invited to all relevant meetings, and I didn’t once feel that we were treated differently than the other participants just because Norway isn’t part of the EU. I had the same rights as everyone else to speak, made proposals, vote and so on. ... There was no situation where I felt that the other’s had privileges which I didn’t due to our non-membership. But we did of course joke in informal settings about what on earth Norway was doing participating in the EU Battle Group.68

(Interview 5)

This is also confirmed from the Swedish perspective as a framework nation: ’There were no meetings or similar settings where we had to exclude the Norwegians because of their non-membership. They were treated just like any of the other nations’69 (Interview 7). In addition, while Norway does not participate in the EU meetings discussing the Battle Groups in general, there are some possibilities to participate in other fora when it comes to the Nordic Battle Group:

We are invited to participate from the very beginning when the stand-by period is drawing closer. It works excellent! We were even invited to join the EU force generating conference just because we have participated in the Nordic Battle Group in
previous stand-by periods, before it is formally decided that we will join the next rotation.70

(Interview 6)

6.3.2.3 Possibilities for Influence

At the political level, informants are clear on the fact that there are no real possibilities for influencing the preliminary processes of the Battle Groups in the EU institutions: ‘We depend on the Swedes to promote our points of view. It is far from ideal. That we make the political decision to contribute forces without being part of the organisation is a challenge’71 (Interview 6). As with the possibilities for participating, we can clearly see a divide between the political and military level: ‘The Battle Group concept has always functioned quite well with regard to training, discussion and influence during the training or stand-by period’72 (Interview 6). During the negotiations before the 2011 contribution, an informant underscored this point: ‘I did not once feel that Norway was somehow in another position than the EU member states’73 (Interview 2).

During the training period before the 2011 stand-by, one informant said that there were real possibilities of influencing the training: ‘During exercises, one way to train is to run scenarios or cases. I had some experiences from other training exercises which I wanted them to play, and whenever I took initiative to change some aspects of the scenario, this was taken into consideration and added to the training’74 (Interview 5). That Norway was sidelined with the other nations, and that there were real ways of exerting influence, was also confirmed from the Swedish perspective: ‘Before the stand-by period, we had several meetings concerning training, education and so on where all participating countries had the possibility to influence the outcome. During the actual stand-by, I also had meetings in Norway in order to discuss the progress’75 (Interview 7).

One might argue that the findings show that participation is not a problem at the military level, or in fora discussing the actual contributions or formation of the NBG. However, there are clear limitations concerning the decision to actually use the Battle Group on stand-by. The lack of information, the dependence on Sweden and the limitations on influence on the political level, might have greater consequences when it comes to contribution to the NBG than any regular EU-led operation because it is an integrated unit. A closer examination of the so-called ‘national veto’ is thus necessary.
6.3.2 A ‘National Veto’?

The Norwegian participation in the NBG differs from participation in regular civilian or military missions and operations in one important aspect; the fact that it is an integrated force on stand-by. With regard to other EU-led missions or operations, Norway will have the possibility to contribute after the operational details are set. The implication could be an ‘entrapment’, having to contribute in an operation which Norway otherwise would not like to be part of. This is sought solved through section 6.1 of the Memorandum of Understanding creating the NBG, which states that: ‘While the Battle Group will be deployed following relevant EU decisions, any commitment by the Participants to deploy their forces will only take place after a decision by the respective and competent national authorities in accordance with their national Constitution, legislation and policy decisions’ (MoU 2005: 6). This section secures national control over where Norwegian forces are deployed. However, as Crombez (2003: 17-18) notes:

if forces have been integrated, any state’s decision not to participate in a mission de facto frustrates the entire deployment, because other state’s forces cannot work effectively without the missing state’s contribution. As a consequence, states whose forces have been integrated on an international level may come under heavy peer pressure from those states that advocate the use of the joint forces.

It is evident that the main question is how operative the Battle Group would be if one of the participating countries withdraws its contribution. This would be the case for any Battle Group, but perhaps even more so with regard to the Nordic Battle Group which only consist of small states, where one can imagine that every contribution is vital. Although the possibility exists in theory to withdraw from deployment, it might be more difficult in praxis. This view is also underscored through interviews with informants working at the political level of the cooperation:

If a situation should arise where the Battle Group is to be deployed and Norway wishes to withdraw, it may be a very difficult political decision to make for Norway. It would of course be hard for any country participating in the battle group, including EU members, to make such a decision, but a member state could try to prevent a decision to actually deploy from being taken.\(^76\)

(Interview 1)
We do have the possibility to withdraw of course, but it is evident that it would be difficult, if the EU had decided upon deployment, for us to withdraw our contribution. It would have to be a very extraordinary situation, like if we felt that not all appropriate procedures were in place for example. We can withdraw in theory, but it would cause a major problem.

(Interview 6)

The Nordic Battle Group, or any other Battle Group for that matter, has never been deployed, and it is thus difficult to predict what implications a possible attempt to withdraw from the operation would have. However, the vulnerability of such an integrated troop was illustrated during the NBG training period before the stand-by in 2011. The military police part of the NBG consisted of 35 people from all the participating countries in total, of which 20 were Norwegians. During a coordinated exercise in Sweden where the object was to train as an integrated unit and prepare for the stand-by period, there wasn’t enough money to send all 20 Norwegian military police officers, the result being that only two people showed up. ‘It was supposed to be a coordinated exercise and all the other countries sent their contribution to Sweden. We sent two out of 20 men. We literally ruined the entire exercise for the military policy part of the Nordic Battle Group’ (Interview 5). The reaction from one of the Swedes in charge was perhaps not surprising:

This decision had major consequences for the Nordic Battle Group. My personal opinion is that this decision could have risked the lives of the soldiers in the unit as it consisted of 2/3 Norwegians who didn’t get the possibility to train together. … I do not think Norway should be given the possibility to participate on the next NGB rotation unless they guarantee complete participation in exercises.

(Interview 7)

Although only a training exercise, this episode underscores the vulnerability of the Battle Groups when one part of the unit is missing. However, as one informant said: ‘For us at the military level, the “veto” to participate is not an issue. We are concerned about training and equipment, and go where we are told to go to solve the tasks we are told to solve. The rest is up to the politicians’ (Interview 5). Not surprising, there is a clear division in focus from the military level and the political level, but it is also important not to forget the public level.
6.3.3 Public Debate

Whereas participation in Operation Atalanta, or any other EU-led operations for that matter, has not caused much public debate or discussion, the proposal to contribute to the Nordic Battle Group, or the ‘EU Army’ as it was often referred to in the media, actually did cause quite a stir. When examining newspaper articles concerning the NBG participation it is evident that the major concern among the public was the constitutional issues this cooperation would entail (see for example Børresen 2004b; Eidem 2004). Then Minister of Defence, Devold, joined in on the public debate, stressing that: ‘There is however a clear requirement that the decision to use the contribution will be decided upon by Norwegian officials, that Norwegian participation in the planning and implementation of the operation is maintained and that a use of the forces is in line with international law’\textsuperscript{81} (Devold 2004a). This did not reassure the public, and the debate continued focusing on the constitutional issues relating to being part of an integrated force under EU-control and the use of the ‘national veto’: ‘... Brussels has not been handed a carte blanche. They [EU members] maintain their interests within the EU through on-going participation in the planning and development of concepts and doctrines for the use of these forces and through the formulation of the basis for the decision to deploy them. Norway is not part of this’\textsuperscript{82} (Børresen 2004a: 10).

However, after the decision had been made that Norway would participate, the public debate faded away and during the two stand-by periods, the only media reference have been of an informative art. During the 2011 NBG rotation, the EU discussed whether they should use the Battle Group on stand-by in Libya. This was debated in public in the other countries which would have been affected, but neither discussed in the Norwegian Parliament nor present in the public debate (NOU 2012: 743). On 25 February 2014 a press release from the Ministry of Defence announced that Norway also will participate in the spring 2015 NGB stand-by (Forsvarsdepartementet 2014). The press release was cited in newspapers, but there was no debate. The lack of debate on security and defence issues is quite normal in Norway, but it is nevertheless surprising that an issue which initially created such a stir now only reaches the newspapers in a factual way. However, this might also indicate, if not support then at least acceptance of government policy and thus also reduce the democratic weakness at the output side.
6.3.4 Parliamentary Debate

Whereas contributions to EU-led operations have caused few, if any, parliamentary debates, the NBG issue actually sparked quite a discussion. Originally, the Government wanted to discuss the matter of possible participation in the Nordic Battle Group in the Extended Foreign and Defence Policy Committee and not as an open debate in the Parliament. However, the opposition demanded open debate and the Government gave an orientation in 2004, which was succeeded by Parliamentary debate (Sjursen 2014: 185). One might expect to find that the Parliamentary debate was centred on constitutional issues or very important matters, as is the usual reason for moving a discussion from the Extended Foreign and Defence Policy Committee to Parliament.

During the orientation from then Minister of Defence Devold on 30 November 2004, the main point was that Norwegian participation was an important way of showing the continued support to the development of the EU defence and security policy, that the Battle Group concept was welcomed by the United Nations, as well as underscoring that this was done in complete understanding with NATO. However, she also addressed the concerned voiced by the opposition that there would not be possible to withdraw the Norwegian contribution from deployment: ‘Let me make it quite clear that Norway will maintain full national decision-making power with regard to which operations Norwegian forces will participate in’83 (Devold 2004b: 604). This did not reassure the Parliament, and to a large degree, the parliamentary debate on 3 December 2004 was centred around the constitutional challenges of the agreement, which are unlike any issues linked to the other agreements with the EU on this policy area. While then Minister of Defence Devold paid little attention to the possible constitutional challenges related to the participation in her exposition, and rather focused on the UN and NATO, the Parliamentary debate to a large degree centred on the ‘national veto’ previously discussed. There were several representatives arguing that the possibility to withdraw the Norwegian contribution might apply only in theory:

Thorbjørn Jagland (Labour): What we are now talking about, is joining military units which are to be deployed on short notice by agreement in the European Council. They are at disposal. It is clear that it is not easy to join such a unit if we at the same time should be able to vote no on joining the operations that are decided on.84

(Stortinget 2004: 756)
Kristin Halvorsen (Socialist Left): We are not in principle against contributing personnel to individual operations in cooperation with the EU. But there is an important difference between this and a permanent contribution to a Battle Group, a decision which will not be made from time to time. … It is difficult to imagine that Norway will be able to withdraw from such a group.85

(Stortinget 2004: 760)

However, there was also some arguing that the question of the ‘national veto’ is of less importance because Sweden and Finland will represent Norway to a satisfactory degree. As Inge Lønning (Conservative) argued:

It is complicated to cooperate on equal footing with other countries within an organisation of which one is not a member. … But when it comes to the danger of Norway being trapped, it is worth recalling that decisions by the EU council must be unanimous. The two countries we are going to cooperate with, we know reasonably well historically – Sweden and Finland – and there is little reason to believe that any of them are less vigilant and less peace-loving than Norway.’86

(Stortinget 2004: 762)

This might be a valid argument, as there in principle aren’t many conflicting views on security and defence matters between Norway and its European allies. However, from a representative democracy perspective, it is much more problematic for the Norwegian public to be dependent upon the security and defence assessment of representatives whom are not accountable to Norwegian voters. In addition, as Kristin Halvorsen (Socialist Left) argued: ‘I believe that in most cases, the political opinions of Sweden and Finland with regard to participating in a Battle Group would be consistent with the Norwegian assessment. But that's not the point in this case. The bottom line when it comes to the constitutional questions in this case, is what our real rights are if a disagreement would arise’87 (Stortinget 2004: 762). A valid point, because although the security and defence assessments of the Nordic states might be quite similar, it is also worth noting they have chosen quite differently with regard to alliance affiliation, underscoring that similar security assessments haven’t always been the case.
The discussion of the theoretical vs. real possibilities of the ‘national veto’ reached a peak in an exchange between MP Jon Lilletun (Christian People’s Party) and MP Øystein Djupedal (Socialist Left), the latter arguing that the socialising force and the pressure to agree necessitated a confirmation that the formal possibility to withdraw the Norwegian contribution also is a real possibility. Lilletun answered that: ‘representative Djupedal will get that “confirmation”. It is evident that there has to be a real possibility, not just a formal one’$^{88}$ (Stortinget 2004: 764). The ‘confirmation’ notwithstanding, not everyone seemed to be at peace by this exchange: Marit Arnstad (Centre) contented that ‘before the EEA Agreement, Gro Harlem Brundtland assured us that the veto right was negotiated in order to be used. Every day after that agreement was adopted, the yes parties have informed us that the veto right cannot be used. I assume that that will be the case this time as well’$^{89}$ (Stortinget 2004: 765).

Then Minister of Defence Devold ended the debate by stating that her experiences with NATO made her feel that the right to withdraw the contribution was real because: ‘In praxis the situation is that the possibility of an operation is discussed long before a formal decision is made. ... it is not likely that the EU council would submit a proposal to vote when they know that the current Battle Group is not willing to act’$^{90}$ (Stortinget 2004: 772). This must have reassured the representatives, because the proposal was passed by the Parliament in 2005, against the votes of the Centre and Socialist Left. However, based on the previous findings, it is perhaps surprising that this should be the case. There are discussions in the EU before the final decision to use the Battle Groups is taken, but Norway is not part of them, and must rely on Sweden and Finland to promote the Norwegian opinion. Also meaning that if Norway does not want to use the Battle Group but Sweden and Finland does, Norway must rely on Sweden and Finland to be the ‘bad guys’ and stand firm against EU pressure on using the Battle Groups. In a recent white paper the formulation of the ‘national veto’ is a bit vague: ‘The Norwegian Government will in each case assess whether there is a sufficient basis in international law for using the Norwegian contribution’$^{91}$ (St.meld. 2012-2013: 31). This formulation implies that if Norway does not want to contribute to the Nordic Battle Group, the contribution can only be withdrawn with reference to international law, not national interests. This is in line with the assessments made by informants in this thesis, but not with the assurance given during the Parliamentary debate. Despite MP Lilletun’s ‘confirmation’ it is thus not evident that the ‘national veto’ is more than just a theoretical formality.
6.4 Summing Up

This chapter has examined the military aspect of Norway’s cooperation with the EU by using two in-depth studies as illustrations; Norway’s contribution to Operation Atalanta and the Nordic Battle Group. Findings clearly illustrate that when it comes to the actual participation in military operations or during the NGB stand-by period, Norway is treated like any other EU country with regard to getting information, participating in relevant forum as well as possibilities for influence.

However, it is also evident that the situation is quite different for those working at the political level before the contribution where it is first of all is evident that there are mixed experiences with the Committee of Contributors in general, but also that the committee worked very well during Operation Atalanta. However, participation in operations is done after the mission is decided upon in the EU, meaning that Norway knows what they are agreeing to when they contribute. Contributions to EU-led operations are not viewed as very problematic, and based on interviews with informants one can argue that the national interests are well secured during the operations. This is perhaps also the reason why contributions to these operations have not been regarded as of special importance and thus not been debated in Parliament. Participation in Operation Atalanta did not cause any real public debate.

What is perhaps most controversial, is the participation in the Nordic Battle Group. This is evident because it caused both public debate and Parliamentary debate, two rare occurrences with regard to Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence. The main focus in both was the ‘national veto’, and how real the possibility to extract the Norwegian contribution really is. During the public debate, then Minister of Defence Devold stressed that the decision to use the contribution would be made by Norwegian officials and that it was a clear requirement that Norwegian participation in the planning and implementation of the operation is maintained. However, as interviews illustrate, there are neither possibilities for participation at the political level in the planning process nor are there possibilities to directly influence the decision on where the NBG should be deployed. It is also worth noting that on the political level Norway is dependent upon other countries both for representation and influence. While contribution to the Nordic Battle Groups to a large degree differ from participation in regular operations, interviews reveal that the practical part of the participation
does not pose any problems with regard to neither getting information, participation nor possibilities for influence.
7.0 Introduction

This thesis has illustrated that from a democratic point of departure, there are clear weaknesses to the cooperation between Norway and the EU on security and defence. These challenges are however more prominent in the political aspect of the cooperation as well as at the political level in the military aspect. While there may be sound arguments to continue the military relationship, a political vantage point would suggest that integration without participation is insufficient. Arguments to this effect were however rarely heard in the late 1990s when the Norwegian demands for association within the new EU security dimension on the same terms as within the WEU structure were rejected. Since then, the Norwegian attitude has rather been to show a continued will to cooperate even closer with the EU without substantial demands for more influence or participation.

This might seem strange from a democratic perspective, and it is thus interesting to further examine what might explain this continued will to cooperate. As chapters five and six clearly showed, much emphasis is put on the fact that other countries, notably Sweden and Finland, are EU members and thus can represent Norwegian views, and that this ‘solves’ the democratic challenges. The first part of this chapter discusses the possibilities and limitations of the ‘solution’ of being represented by other countries. The second part will, based on the theoretical approach presented in chapter two, discuss what might explain Norway’s continued cooperation with the EU in security and defence.

7.1 The ‘Solution’: Representation by Others

Throughout the white papers, speeches, newspaper articles and interviews conducted, the main arguments for why the democratic weaknesses are not problematic in praxis is 1) that Norway’s interests are the same as those of the EU, often underscored by the fact that Norway joins a substantial majority of EU statements and; 2) that Norway’s neighbours and close allies, in particular Sweden and Finland, will represent Norwegian views in the EU system. Because these two arguments in many cases are viewed as the ‘solution’ to the democratic problems, it is relevant to examine them more closely.
‘Norway and the EU countries share a common set of values, assessments and often the same priorities’ (St.meld. 2012-2013: 55). This fits well with what Burke (1792: 4.6.61) terms virtual representation: ‘... in which there is a communion of interests, and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them’. However, one important aspect of this kind of representation is that the representatives act as trustees – with the liberty to define what the interests of those represented are and how these might best be achieved (Fossum 2014: 121). The argument that the lack of Norwegian representation in the EU security and defence policy is less challenging because Norway and the EU share common interests and values is therefore also problematic.

The other much used argument is that other countries will represent Norwegian interests and views in the EU context. This fits the ‘surrogate representation’ term presented by Mansbridge (2003: 524) where ‘legislators represent constituencies that did not elect them. They cannot therefore be accountable in traditional ways’. Surrogate representation differs from virtual representation because it is based on a clear identification between the representative and the one being represented. This form of representation is however also questionable. One aspect is the democratic legitimacy of representatives that are not elected and thus not accountable. Another aspect is to what degree this system actually works to a satisfactory degree.

When asked how helpful the other Nordic countries were with providing information in CSDP matters to Norway, one informant stressed that: ‘I have not experienced a situation where we disagree on something of high importance to us, but even in such a case we would probably have some difficulties in getting complete information’ (Interview 1). This view is also confirmed by several politicians. When one Swedish member of the European Parliament (MEP) was critical to the Norwegian excise duty on hard cheeses, then leader of the Foreign and Security Policy Committee, Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide (2013a), argued that: ‘what Norway now has done – justified or not – will make him more reluctant to speak on Norway’s behalf in the future’. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, has also argued that: ‘It is many years since Norwegian governments had to let go of the idea that Swedish and Finnish membership in the EU would provide Norway with any advantages. Diplomats reveal that the effect sometimes is the complete opposite’ (Støre 2009). This also seems to be the perspective from other countries. A Swedish informant revealed to a Norwegian
journalist that: ‘Sweden will speak on behalf of Norway in the EU when it coincides with Sweden’s interests’ (Mathismoen 1996: 14). One of the main faults with the surrogate representation related to the Norway-EU cooperation is thus that there are not any institutional mechanism in place which can guarantee that the other countries actually perceives themselves as representatives for Norwegian interests. Nor are there any mechanisms which ensure that the representatives will emphasise Norwegian interests. In addition, there is a trend towards more supranational decision-making in the CSDP which might impact how effectively other countries will be able to represent Norwegian viewpoints and interests.

It is evident that the ‘solutions’ often presented to the democratic weaknesses are less than ideal in several ways, most of all because there are no formalised relationship between Norway and the countries that are thought to act as representatives. As Fossum (2014: 126) argues: ‘Choosing not to be politically represented only works as long as one is capable of setting the framework for what one can decide upon, in addition to being in control of the areas where one has chosen not to be represented. In the case of Norway, neither presumption is present’. Keeping in mind Majone’s (1998:14-15) definition of democratic deficits as something occurring when institutions (or people) ‘which by design are not directly accountable to the voters or to their elected representatives’, it is thus unclear whether or not virtual or surrogate representation actually can be labelled ‘solutions’.

7.2 How to explain the further Will to Cooperate?

Although the Norwegian demands for participation in the ESDP in 1999 were rejected, this ‘did not lead to a change in Norwegian policy. Instead of becoming more reluctant to contribute to the ESDP, [it] rather showed an increased willingness to participate’ (Rieker 2006: 284). There clearly are democratic weaknesses related to the cooperation, as well as limitations to the ‘solutions’. It is reasonably to question what might explain the continued will to cooperate, as there evidently must be something ‘trumping’ democratic concerns. As mentioned in chapter two, one could argue that state motives for joining in on international operations can be: 1) alliance value; 2) (threat to) national interest; 3) public opinion and; 4) identity (Davidson 2011: 14-26). In addition one might add a fifth motive: 5) gaining influence. It is possible to use these five motives as a framework to analyse what might explain Norway’s continued will to contribute to CSDP and EU-led operations. As there has not been much public debate or discussion concerning participation in CSDP or EU-led
operations, white papers, speeches and the Parliamentary debate concerning the Nordic Battle Group (NGB) will be the relevant sources in this discussion.

7.2.1 Alliance Value

It is natural to assume that Norwegian politicians would continue to seek cooperation and integration with the EU if they valued the alliance, i.e., if they perceived that the EU was an important friend to have in a security policy context. It is clear that alliance value can explain some of the will to cooperate, but perhaps surprisingly enough it is not necessarily the EU alliance which is considered valuable. During the NGB Parliamentary debate more emphasis was placed on both the NATO and the UN than the EU. Then Minister of Defence Devold argued that participation in the NGB was a way of ‘strengthening Norway’s ability for efficient military interactions with European partners, also in NATO’\(^9\), and that several important NATO allied countries had encouraged Norway to participate (Devold 2004b: 604). In addition, she said that: ‘it is indeed important for our position in NATO that we participate in the EU cooperation. 19 of my NATO colleagues participate in precisely the EU ministers of defence meetings’\(^9\) (Devold 2004b: 770). The focus on NATO was also emphasised by MP Morten Høglund (Progress Party): ‘[it is] important for us is that this is coordinated with NATO as far as possible and that it occurs in a close dialogue with our other allies, in this case primarily the United States. We are also pleased that the headquarters is situated in the UK which, as we see it, can attend the transatlantic connection in the best possible way’\(^10\) (Stortinget 2004: 759).

In addition to NATO, a majority of the comments during the debate mentioned the positive role the Battle Groups might have for the UN as an argument for why Norway should participate, MP Jon Lilletun (Christian People’s Party) emphasised that: ‘the UN has a growing need for forces which on short notice can contribute in important operations. There is an urgent need to strengthen the UN’s crisis management ability, particularly in Africa’\(^10\) (Stortinget 2004: 763). In addition, the fact the UN was positive to the Battle Groups, was emphasised by many, among others MP Trine Skei Grande (Liberal Party) who argued that: ’during his visit in Ireland in October, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasised how important it is for the UN crisis management ability to strengthen EU capabilities and coordinate EU efforts. This has been important to the Liberal Party’\(^10\) (Stortinget 2004: 767). The last alliance mentioned numerous times during the debate, was the Nordic cooperation. Then Minister of Defence, Devold, said in her exposition to Parliament that one of the reasons
why the Government wanted to participate in the Nordic Battle Group was because it would: ‘... contribute to the strengthening of the Nordic military cooperation and make it more targeted’\textsuperscript{103} (Devold 2004b: 604). This was obviously also important to other parties, and MP Grande (Liberal Party) stated that: ‘For the Liberal Party it is an important point that Norway has been invited by our neighbours Sweden and Finland to participate in the Nordic Battle Group’\textsuperscript{104} (Stortinget 2005: 2601).

Not much emphasis was actually put on the EU and that participation in the NBG was important in the Norway-EU relationship. This might be surprising as participation in an EU-led Battle Group has to be considered an EU matter. However, NATO has always been Norway’s security guarantee number one, and it is very unlikely that Norwegian politicians would do anything to step on NATO’s toes. On the contrary, considering this close relationship, it is more likely that encouragement from NATO for Norway to join the NGB would be of considerable importance.

7.2.2 (Threat to) National Interest

When looking at the EU-led operations which Norway has participated in, seven out of eleven have been located in the former Yugoslav countries. The remaining four have been in Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories and the Gulf of Aden. The majority of the Norwegian contributions have thus taken place in an area often defined as Europe’s backyard. The fear of destabilisation in the former Yugoslav countries and possible spill-over to other European countries was also a concern in Norway, also illustrated by the fact that Norway also joined the much debated 1999 Kosovo bombing by NATO without a UN mandate. In addition, the fact that the largest contribution has been to the Gulf of Aden underscores the importance of threat to national interests as a motivating factor, as many of the ships passing through the area can be traced to Norwegian interests in one way or the other.

If one examines the cooperation with the EU in security and defence in general and not only look at the concrete operations, national interests also play an important role. MP Odd Einar Dørum (Liberal Party) argued that: ‘Norway needs friends, and by helping others, it is possible to call upon our friends in a situation where it is needed’\textsuperscript{105} (Stortinget 2007: 802). Then Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, commented on Dørum’s argument by saying that: ‘also through our cooperation and our dialogue with those we cooperate with, can
we make them look to the high north – make them see that this is a strategic area of importance far beyond Norway’s borders.\textsuperscript{106} (Stortinget 2007: 803). That participation was seen as a possibility to influence EU’s focus on the high north was also voiced by MP Morten Høglund (Progress Party) during the NGB debate: ‘our hope with participation is of course that it might lead to something more that contributing to concrete missions. We hope that we by this can contribute to getting the EU to focus at the high north, at that we in this way might secure or national security interests in a better way than if we didn’t contribute’\textsuperscript{107} (Stortinget 2005: 2594).

By looking at which operations Norway has contributed to, it is evident that the threat to national interest might play an important role in explaining the will to contribute, the operations had a value of its own for Norway. However, it is also evident that national interests in general might also explain the continued cooperation. Participation is to some extent seen as a possible way to secure interest for the high north in the EU, an area prioritised by successive Norwegian Governments. Lastly, one might also detect a fear of marginalisation among the politicians, as voiced by MP Thorbjørn Jagland (Labour): 'What is now happening, is that among others Sweden and Finland will have a greater influence on the development of defence and security policy than Norway will.'\textsuperscript{108} (Stortinget 2004: 756).

7.2.3 Public Opinion
According to Davidson (2011: 18-19), public opinion can affect a state’s willingness to contribute to international operations because a government always is concerned with re-election. If the public demand contribution, the Government will be more likely to contribute. In the case of Norway’s participation in EU-led operations, it is safe to assume that we can rule out any pressure by public opinion to contribute, as this thesis has shown that public debate on this area is nearly non-existing.

The only case of debate was connected to the participation in the NGB in which the opposition to Norwegian participation was prominent. It might be surprising that the Government decided to participate in the NGB despite the public concern. However, studies suggest that public opinion only has an impact on security policy decisions when the opposition has the same stand as the public, and it can be linked to a real threat of government change (Davidson 2011: 18-19). In the case of the NBG, there was a broad majority in the
Parliament for Norwegian participation, and thus no real threat of government change connected to the decision.

7.2.4 Identity
Analysing arguments during the Parliamentary debate, it is evident that focus was put on an understanding of how Norway should act in the international community. Much emphasis was put on Norway as a peace loving nation with a long tradition for peacekeeping as a justification for contributing. Then Minister of Defence Devold said during her exposition to Parliament that there were three reasons why the Government wanted to contribute to the NBG; first of all because they supported the development of CSDP in full understanding with NATO (see alliance value), and: ‘secondly, because Norwegian participation in a Nordic Battle Group would be a continuation of the traditional Nordic cooperation on peace operations. ... Thirdly, Norway will by participating contribute to a strengthening of UN’s crisis management ability[109] (2005: 604). This was an argumentation supported by many other speakers as well, for example by MP Kristin Halvorsen (Socialist Left) who said that: ‘it is not wrong that Norway participates in military peace operations. We believe that we can have a duty to participate in certain contexts’[110] (Stortinget 2004: 760).

The Norwegian identity as an important contributor to international peace operations was thus a central motivating factor for participating in the NBG, but also by looking at the regular EU-led operations Norway has participated in one might trace evidence of the importance of identity. While the operations in the Balkans as well as in the Gulf of Aden can be explained by threat to national interests, the operations in Indonesia, Middle East and Afghanistan are areas in which Norway traditionally has been much involved. Norwegian contributions to those operations might be because of a feeling of connection to the countries in the area.

7.2.5 Gaining Influence
In 2000 the focus in Norway shifted from trying to obtain a position in the decision-making process to seeking out what Norway could offer the EU in terms of personnel and troops. For example, at the capability commitment conference in November 2000, ‘Norway proposed that its entire newly established task force should be earmarked for international operations to EU’s military headline goals’ (Rieker 2006: 288). Knowing that membership was not an option, participation in operations would perhaps nevertheless secure some level of insight as well as some form of consultations, not excluding Norway completely and avoiding the
marginalisation feared by some Norwegian officials. The strategy, it appears, concerned how to get a foot inside the door even if full access was denied in the absence of EU membership.

Græger (2005: 94) however, argues that ‘while a “troops-for-influence” strategy has paid back vis-à-vis the US and NATO (cf. The locating of NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre in Norway), it has so far not been an effective way of obtaining political influence upon the ESDP’. Nevertheless, the strategy, or belief that contributions might create opportunities for influence, is evident from various sources. As MP Høglund (Progress Party) argued during the NBG Parliamentary debate: ‘Our goal has to be to provide Norway with the best possible security and influence. We are therefore choosing a line where we, despite a principled opposition towards the EU defence dimension ... say that we wish to participate in order to get a foot in the door’\textsuperscript{111} (Stortinget 2004: 759). MP Jagland (Labour) agreed, saying that it is ‘important to participate in what is happening, although the arrangement never will be completely satisfactory as long as we are not a member of the EU’\textsuperscript{112} (Stortinget 2004: 757).

In a white paper, this was voiced even more clearly:

> The development of the European security and defence policy and the increased importance of the EU might achieve in international security, implies that continued Norwegian cooperation with the EU can contribute to Norway gaining access to decision-making processes of importance to Norwegian security.\textsuperscript{113} (NOU 2007: 15)

A few years later, this perception is still very much prominent. A recent white paper claims that:

> Through participation we are make ourselves relevant and are gaining insight and possibilities to influence. This happens in the field where we are present, but also at the higher levels through formal and informal contexts in Brussels. Norway contributed to the EU police operation in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 with a larger contingent than any of the EU member states. This gave Norway co-decision in the operational dispositions.\textsuperscript{114} (St.meld. 2012-2013: 58)
One might argue that the belief that continued contributions might provide possibilities for insight and influence, to a large degree can explain why Norway continues to integrate into the CSDP despite the democratic weaknesses. However, one might also argue that the effect might not have been as intended. Norway is the third country contributing to the most EU-led operations, nevertheless, there does not seem to be clear that this has provided Norway with greater possibilities in the EU. As chapters five and six illustrated, although Norway is treated as any other EU member during an operation or the NGB, the exclusion from relevant meetings, the restricted ways of influencing directly as well as the mixed experiences with the Committee of Contributors paint a much more sombre picture. When asked if contributing led to more influence, one informant said: ‘in the long run it means something for our general standing – that we are being noticed. But I do not believe that we should have an illusion that it will give us any greater influence’115 (Interview 1).

7.3 Summing Up

There are evident democratic weaknesses related to Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence policies, and as this chapter has shown, the two most commonly mentioned ‘solutions’ also fail when subjected to closer scrutiny. A closer examine of what might explain the continued Norwegian will to cooperate is thus warranted. Out of the five motives examined in this chapter, it is evident that public opinion has little explanatory value as there is little public debate combined with a broad majority in the Parliament and thus no fear of government change. Both threat to national interests and identity can to a large degree explain why Norway has contributed to the EU-led operations it has. In addition, the reference to Norway’s traditional role in peace operations was often referenced during the NBG Parliamentary debate. With regard to the NBG, it is also surprising how often alliance value was mentioned, most of all because it was referred to NATO, the UN and the Nordic cooperation much more often than to the EU. The fact that both NATO and the UN supported the Battle Group concept and welcomed Norwegian participation seems to have played a large role. Although both alliance value, threat to national interest, as well as identity seem to explain much of why Norway continues to cooperate with the EU in security and defence, there also seems to be much emphasis on the idea that contributions might lead to influence. This belief has been voiced quite clearly in several white papers and speeches, but as the findings in chapters five and six illustrated there might be reason to assume that the effect has not been quite as hoped.
8.0 Introduction
When it comes to ‘high policies’ like foreign, security and defence policies it is often accepted that decisions and information can be exempted from the public eye. However, there has been a ‘democratic turn’ resulting in more focus on this policy area in connection with discussions of democratic deficits. With respects to Norway, the main focus has traditionally been on whether or not the EEA Agreement has a democratic deficit, but not much attention has been devoted to the democratic aspects of the security and defence cooperation. At the same time as a very clear majority of the Norwegian people is against membership in the EU, the integration continues. One example is the fact that Norway is the country outside the EU which participates most in its military and civilian operations. This close cooperation naturally leads to questions of Norwegian control and influence as a non-member in the EU. When it comes to cooperation on security and defence it is also highly necessary to raise these issues because it can result in sending Norwegian men and women to war. In particular the question; are we at risk of fighting someone else’s battles?

8.1 Is there a Democratic Deficit?
The Norwegian fears connected to being outside the EU security and defence cooperation has since the 1990s been threefold; 1) not getting relevant information; 2) being excluded for meetings, discussions and fora, i.e., participation, as well as; 3) not having possibilities to influence the process. Today, it is evident that these concerns are still very much present but also that democratic weaknesses are more present in some aspects of the cooperation than others.

8.1.1 Political Aspect
When studying the many speeches and various white papers from the 1990s, it is evident that there was a lot of emphasis on the importance of Norwegian association with the (then) ESDP in order to secure national interests. If one compares the many efforts made to include Norway in the relevant fora on security and defence policy and the way the cooperation is
organised today, it is not difficult to argue that the efforts to a large degree have been unsuccessful.

### 8.1.1.1 Input

First of all, interviews illustrate that the way to get relevant information is not necessarily directly from the EU/EEAS, but rather through other countries’ delegations. However, a problem related to this is the fact that Norway thus is bound by another country’s assessment of a situation, and what is relevant information to pass on. Also, there is no automatic in this exchange, and consequently another challenge is how to know when there is relevant information to ask for. Both of these issues are closely related to the fact that Norway is excluded from participation. Several informants focus on the drawback of not being present at relevant meetings, fora or discussions. One informant compared it to personal experiences in a NATO context, and emphasised how important it is to be present in meetings to get a feel of the atmosphere and experience the discussions first hand.

In addition, not being present naturally also limits the possibilities for influence. Based on official documents, not being present or being able to exert influence is not viewed as very problematic as other countries, particularly Sweden and Finland, are present. However, there are limitations to this strategy of surrogate representation, first and foremost because it is not institutionalised. On the input side, it is evident that Norway is dependent on other countries to get information, as well as represent Norwegian views. This might not be problematic as long as the interests and views are concurrent, but it is however more questionable how well this will work on issues where the interest are diverging. In addition, it is also reasonable to question how far other countries will go to secure Norwegian interest if the efforts make them unpopular in the EU. Nevertheless, some informants also point to issues where there seems to be made improvements to the Norway-EU relationship, for example with regard to more frequent meetings and the possibilities of getting a national expert in the EEAS.

### 8.1.1.2 Output

In a representative democracy, public opinion is important because there should be a similarity between the political decisions being made and the people’s wishes. Since the start of the European integration there has been a linkage between the public opinion and the democratic legitimacy of the further integration. The output side of the political aspect is nevertheless a bit more difficult to analyse than the input side. This is first of all due to the
lack of sources. There are no published studies on the public awareness concerning Norway’s cooperation with the EU in security and defence, and only one opinion poll on the issue. This naturally limits the foundation for drawing inferences. However, it is also evident that there is very little debate concerning the Norway-EU cooperation in this field, which might suggest massive public support. In that case, the democratic weaknesses would not be that grave, as public support increases the democratic legitimacy in a representative democracy. On the other hand, if the lack of public debate is a consequence of low public awareness or knowledge of the cooperation, then there might be cause for concern. In addition, one should not ignore the fact that the opinion poll shows that the public support for the contribution to EU-led operations is declining dramatically, although there still is a marginal majority in favour.

The fact that the possible participation in the Nordic Battle Group actually did cause a public debate, is however perhaps an indicator of the first – that the public awareness is good. If that is the case, it is nevertheless worth discussion why the public concern in the NBG case wasn’t taken more seriously into consideration. The Government originally didn’t think the debate was important enough to be taken to Parliament, but the opposition and the public obviously felt otherwise. This illustrates that more openness also in issues pertaining to security and defence is warranted. Why the public concern didn’t affect the outcome could either be because it didn’t cause enough debate, it was largely centred on newspaper comments by over average EU-interested people, or because the large majority for the participation in Parliament made sure there was no fear of losing government position.

8.1.2 Military Aspect
The military aspect of the cooperation is a bit more complex than the political aspect discussed above as it is divided into two levels; a political level and a military level. The political level pertains to the actual operations and not the general day-to-day political aspect. The military level contains the actual participation in EU-led operations or the Nordic Battle Group by Norwegian military personnel.

8.1.2.1 Political Level
On the political level of the military aspect there seems to be democratic weaknesses similar to those found in the input side of the political aspect. Getting information is viewed as difficult, and again the solution seems to be Sweden and Finland. Participation and influence
should in theory not be a cause for concern as the Committee of Contributors (CoC) is supposed to secure Norwegian participation and influence during an operation. However, informants reveal that the experiences are mixed, and that the CoC often works more like a channel for the EU to inform Norway what is going on and not at a forum for discussions, as most of the framework for the operation already has been decided upon in an EU-only setting. This naturally is cause for concern as there is talk of Norwegian men and women participating in an operation where the access for Norwegian representatives on the political level is restricted, underscoring the sensation of ‘fighting someone else’s battles’.

8.1.2.2 Military Level
Looking at the military level it is evident that there are no democratic weaknesses as Norway is treated just like any other participating country. This goes both for access to relevant information, participation and possibilities for influencing. In one area, however, are the implications of Norwegian participation unclear; the ‘national veto’ concerning the Nordic Battle Group. As the analysis in chapter six clearly illustrates, it is uncertain how real Norway’s possibility to withdraw the contribution would be if the EU decides that the Battle Group should be deployed. In relation to this, the divide between the military level and the political level of the military aspect is quite clear. While there seems to be no discrimination against Norway at the military level, neither during the training period nor the stand-by period, there are clear limitations at the political level as Norway is not part of the discussions whether or not to deploy the NBG.

8.1.4 Summing Up
In a speech, then Minister of Defence Bjørn Tore Godal made it quite clear that ‘... the assignment of Norwegian forces to European-led operations must be seen in the context of our future participation in the EU decision-shaping process. This goes for the process leading up to any operation as well as in the more generic discussions within the ESDP framework’ (Godal 2000). According to this thesis, it is however not evident that this is fully maintained. At the political aspect, or the ‘more generic discussion within the ESDP framework’ as Godal says, the situation is that Norway is totally dependent upon other countries to get relevant information, to be represented as well as to influence. Norway is thus not part of any decision-shaping process in the CSDP field. At the military aspect, the picture is a bit more nuanced as Norwegian personnel are treated just like those from the EU countries during an operation, but Norway is nevertheless not present in the ‘process leading up to any operation’ to a
satisfactory degree. It is thus evident that there are certain democratic weaknesses related to this cooperation. However, it is also evident that there in general seems like the democratic weaknesses are more prominent in the political aspect of the cooperation than the military aspect. This entails that while Norway might have little influence on the political level, these democratic weaknesses might be counterbalanced at the military level, which one might argue at the end of the day also is the most important as it pertains to those actually risking their lives. However, one cannot dismiss that the limitations at the political level of the military aspect, especially with regard to the NBG and the CoC, are problematic.

One might argue that as long as there is a broad consensus in Parliament on the continued cooperation with the EU in security and defence, as well as little public debate (if it is not due to low public awareness), the democratic weaknesses in the political aspect are not of great concern. In that case, the main issue is related to participation in the Nordic Battle Group and whether or not the right to withdraw the Norwegian contingent after deployment is real or theoretical, as this has been the only issue to raise both Parliamentary and public debate.

### 8.2 Why the Continued Cooperation?

When there obviously are democratic weaknesses in this policy field, it is naturally to question what might motivate the continued will to cooperate. As discussed in chapter seven, there might be five different motivating forces behind continued integration and contributions; 1) alliance value; 2) (threat to) national interest; 3) public opinion; 4) identity and; 5) influence. Analysing the arguments made during the Parliamentary debate on the possible Norwegian participation in the Nordic Battle Group, the most controversial issue in the entire EU-Norway cooperation in security and defence, several of these motivations appeared important.

The reference to Norway as a country with a long tradition in peace operations, as well as a special duty to assist, was made several times and from representatives from both the Government and the opposition. This can be closely linked to alliance value, which surprisingly enough did not refer to the EU but rather NATO, the UN and the Nordic cooperation. The importance of the UN and the legitimacy of international norm and laws have a very important role in Norwegian foreign policy, and it is thus not surprising that UN’s support of the Battle Group concept was focused upon. Neither is the emphasis on NATO,
which is viewed as Norway’s most important security guarantee. It is nevertheless striking that most of the argumentation focused on what role these Battle Groups might have in an UN or NATO context rather than the fact that they are controlled by the EU. Further, when looking at the contributions to military operations in general, it is clear that a majority take place in areas of national interest to Norway. In addition, participation has been viewed by several representatives as a way of getting the EU to focus on other areas of interest to Norway, particularly the high north. This also brings us to the motive which seems to be one of the major forces behind the continued will to cooperate with the EU, the idea that it might lead to influence without being a member.

The findings in this study show that when participating in Operation Atalanta and the Nordic Battle Group, Norway is in many ways treated like the EU member states. The Norwegian participants in both case studies all underscored during the interviews that they never experiences any situations where it became clear that Norway is not an EU member. As long as national control is maintained, as also the informants argue it is, then contributing to missions and operations might indeed be a way of gaining access to some fora and an insight into the CSDP processes that are otherwise closed from Norwegian participation. It can be a way of getting a feel of the atmosphere. However, this thesis illustrate that even at the political level of the military aspect, there are clear limitations to Norway’s possibilities for participation and influence, especially because the Committee of Contributors has not always functioned as intended. In addition, although contributions might lead to some form of insight into the CSDP machinery, it may never completely make up for the non-membership. One informant compared the situation to the NATO membership:

We have a totally different possibility to influence in NATO. As a full member, we take part in all the meetings and our points of view have to be taken into consideration. We also have a much better overview, earlier access to information and insight into what is happening in both the formal and informal areas. In other words; we have first-hand access to the full and complete picture of things.\(^{116}\)

(Interview 1)

Another reason why the cooperation continues despite obvious democratic weaknesses might be because they to a large degree are allocated at the political aspect rather than the military. Severe weaknesses in the military aspect would in many ways potentially be far graver. This
could also be illustrated by the massive debate concerned participation in the NBG. Nevertheless, the same debate also illustrated that completely other arguments were made for why Norway should participate rather than references to democratic principles and control. It sometimes even seemed like the arguments centred on a belief that other issues such as alliance value and national interests would trump democratic or constitutional concerns.

8.3 Does it Matter?

This thesis has established that there definitively are challenges related to the cooperation between Norway and the EU in security and defence matters, and that these might be labelled as democratic weaknesses based on the input/output theory. Further, it is evident that the ‘solutions’ of virtual and surrogate representation also have their limitations, especially because they aren’t institutionalised. Nevertheless, the cooperation apparently functions well enough; there hasn’t been any major debate neither in Parliament, nor has there been major public debate. As Sjursen (2014: 187) notes, it is a paradox that it isn’t the elected representatives that have hindered the Government from entering into even more extensive agreements with the EU – it is the EU itself by maintaining a clear divide between members and non-members. Thus, the apparent question is: does it matter if there are democratic weaknesses?

One informant admits that ‘it is not ideal to participate without being member. That is why the Norwegian policy is to contribute forces through NATO and the UN as a first priority. But we also contribute to EU-led operations and that can be viewed as problematic’ (Interview 6). The prerogative of the executive branch is often legitimised by referring to the long-standing consensus concerning the ‘long lines’ of Norwegian foreign policy (Sjursen 2014: 179). When it comes to Norway’s relationship to the EU, it is no secret that there traditionally isn’t much consensus to talk about. However, when it comes to the security and defence dimension, there does not seem to be much discontent either, and as long as the public is content, it is not apparent why the democratic weaknesses should be problematic, other than on a democratic theory level.

Nevertheless, the well-functioning of the cooperation as it is today seems to be dependent upon good relations with Sweden and Finland, the main providers of information and the countries representing Norwegian interest. As long as there are concurrent interests the
limitations to this arrangement might only be minimal, although there is a lack of institutionalisation. The question is what happens the day there are diverging interest. All in all, it is argued, Norway and the neighbouring countries have similar interests. That is true, but as chapter seven illustrated, the issue of divergence need not be major in order to complicate the surrogate representation, like the Norwegian cheese toll illustrated. In addition, it is clear that there are different assessments present also in the security and defence dimension, one only need to point out the different choices made in the Nordic countries with regard NATO/EU affiliation, or that the EU (and NATO) member Denmark chose not to be part of CSDP. In addition, the fact that the CSDP is moving towards a supranational decision-making structure, begs the question of how effective other states can secure Norwegian interests. The motivating factors which can explain why successive governments have sought closer cooperation might take precedence over the democratic weaknesses. However, both identity, alliance value (especially because the reference seldom is made to the EU), as well as national interests can all be achieved through membership and active participation in the UN and NATO. The only motivating factor left, which might also be the most important one, is influence in the CSDP. This turns into a vicious cycle because the close cooperation leads to the democratic weaknesses which it is supposed to alleviate. So it does matter. Not necessarily because the cooperation today is not working properly due to the democratic weaknesses, but rather because the world is in constant development, and one never knows what choices will have to be faced or decisions made in the future.

8.5 Broader Implications

As democratic control of the armed forces is a trait present in modern democracies, the findings in this thesis aren’t only of interest in the Norway-EU relationship. They might also be generalisable to other countries contributing to operations led by an organisation of which they are not a member. In addition, certain elements of the study might also be valid for more general inferences. The study of Norway’s participation in Operation Atalanta might be generalisable to the other operations Norway has participated in, the potential limitations to the ‘national veto’ in the NBG is relevant for all contributing nations, and the limitations at the political aspect might also be valid for other policy areas where the cooperation between Norway and the EU is regulated through bilateral agreements, like Schengen.
Even though the democratic aspect of Norway’s relationship with the EU has been much focused upon in the general literature, this approach is only marginally present in the security and defence studies. Although the aim of this thesis has been to help fill this gap, this is an area where further research is warranted in order to get a better picture of the democratic consequences of the cooperation. First of all, a study of the public awareness or knowledge of this cooperation might provide useful insight into the output legitimacy. If the public awareness turns out to be high, it might contribute to justify the argument that low public debate is a sign of broad public support. Further, a more detailed study of how the surrogate representation works might provide useful insight into this ‘solution’ to the democratic weaknesses. Lastly, a more detailed examination of the Committee of Contributors would also help shed light on an important aspect of the cooperation, and could possibly illustrate that it works better than first assumed.

Norway is part of Europe, and has to be associated with the EU in one way or another. When it became clear that Norway would not be a member of the EU, and further that the WEU would be integrated into the union without the continuation of Norwegian participation, it became evident that it would cause problems. Most fears were connected to getting information, participating and influencing, all natural consequences of non-membership. As the discussion in chapter seven illustrated, one of the main arguments for the continued cooperation with the EU despite of these democratic weaknesses, has been that cooperation will solve some of these problems because contributions might lead to influence. However, as this thesis has shown, it is not evident that the democratic weaknesses are alleviated by this ‘troops-for-influence’ strategy, nor that there should be reason to regard the motivating factors to have supremacy over the democratic weaknesses. It seems that the most apparent solution to the democratic weaknesses would be to secure better agreements or arrangements with the EU, efforts which seems to be fruitless, only underscoring the weak position Norway has. Norwegian national interests, it is argued, are secured by other countries in the EU system. It does however seem hard to come by a national interest more important than participation in decisions concerning Norwegian security and defence.
Bibliography


Folk&Forsvar (2013) 'Årlig meningsmåling om holdninger til deltakelse i FN, NATO og EU [Annual Opinion Poll on Norwegian Public Opinion on Participation in UN, NATO


St.meld. (2012-2013) 'EØS-avtalen og Norges øvrige avtaler med EU: Sentrale prioriteringer og virkemidler i norsk europapolitikk [The EEA Agreement and Norway's Other Agreements with the EU: Main Priorities and Tools in the Norwegian European Policy]', St.meld. nr. 5, Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet.

St.prp. (2003-2004) 'For budsjettermen 2004 [For the Budjet Term 2004]', St.prp. nr 1, Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet.


Stortinget (2005) "Møte fredag den 3. juni 2005. Sak nr. 1 "Debatt om Forsvarsministerens redegjørelse vedrørende EUs innsatsstyrker, forhåndslagring og den videre innsatsen i Afghanistan" [Meeting Friday 3 June 2005. Issue nr 1, "Debate on the Exposition from the Minister of Defence concerning the EU Battle Groups, Advance Storage and the


Appendix I – Original Quotations

Chapter 1

1 En mer gjennomsiktig og demokratisk debatt i og utenfor parlamentet om svært vanskelige spørsmål ... å åpne det som i dag er lukket (i dag konfererer kun DUUFK i lukkede møter).

2 Avklare de demokratiske implikasjonen av Norges EU-tilknytning.

Chapter 2

3 Onde tunger vil ha det til at Nei til EU vant i 1994, men har tapt hver dag siden den gang. Ett er i alle fall sikkert, demokratiet har tapt.

4 Den politikk overfor omverdenen som tar sikte på å opprettholde territoriell integritet og statens og borgernes sikkerhet med tanke på militære eller voldelige trusler utenfra.


Chapter 4

6 Det er med fortsatt satsning på NATO og med deltagelse i EU at vårt land best kan møte de sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer vi vil stå overfor.

7 Deltakelse i EU’s felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske samarbeid (FUSP) vil gi nye muligheter til å ivareta grunnleggende nasjonale interesser og bidra til å styrke Norges muligheter for å få gjennomslag internasjonalt for saker vi prioriterer.

8 Det er imidlertid viktig at Norge kan ta fullt ut del i det europeiske samarbeidet på dette området. Vi må unngå at beslutninger som angår vår egen sikkerhet blir tatt uten norsk deltagelse.

9 Det skaper problemer for oss at Norge ikke deltar i alle de fora der våre europeiske allierte samles om felles holdninger til utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske spørsmål. For oss er det av størst betydning å selv kunne tale vår sak når de land som står oss nærmest definerer sin felles sikkerhet. En viktig årsak for at Norge bør søke om medlemskap i EF er at vi bare på denne måten kan oppnå full innflytelse i det europeiske samarbeidet om utenriks- og sikkerhets politikken.

10 Som forsvarsminister kan jeg allikevel ikke unnlate å gjøre oppmerksom på at vår manglende deltagelse på EU’s Regeringskonferanse i 1996, kan få stor betydning for våre egne sikkerhetspolitiske interesser.

11 Norge har ikke anledning til å delta i disse diskusjonene på samme måte som ved et medlemskap, men jeg vil minne om at Norge er assosiert medlem i VEU. Det er en plattform som blir meget viktig for oss, og vi vil søke å utnytte det assosierede medlemskapet maksimalt.

12 Vi må erkjenne at dersom utviklingen går i retning av å utvikle en felles europeisk utenriks- og sikkerhets politikk, vil Norge stå overfor utfordringer av anselige dimensjoner ... Bare gjennom en meget aktiv deltagelse i relevante fora, i NATO og VEU, kan vi bidra til å sikre at våre interesser ivaretas.
Appendix I

13 Den vest-europeiske union (VEU) vil utfases som operativ organisasjon etter hvert som EU overtar disse oppgavene. … Ikke-medlemsland i EU må da søke tilknytningsordninger som ikke vil kunne være på samme nivå som full deltakelse.

14 … å oppnå tilfredsstillende tilknytning for Norge og de andre allierte ikke-EU-landene til de nye strukturene som nå etableres i EU. Dette arbei det har høyeste prioritet i Regjeringen.

15 de konsultasjons- og samarbeidsordninger som EU nå ser ut til å være enige om for såkalte tredjeland, er ikke så gode som regjeringen hadde ønsket.

Chapter 5

16 Regjeringen anser at den største politiske utfordringen for Norge ligger i at EU-landene nå oppretter et forum seg imellom for løpende drøftelser av europeiske sikkerhets- og forsvars-politiske spørsmål. … Land utenfor EU vil ikke kunne få tilknytningsordninger som tilsvarer full deltakelse. Konsultasjonsordninger, dialog og medvirkning i konkrete krishåndteringsoperasjoner vil etter Regjeringens syn bare i noen grad kunne kompensere for at Norge ikke er del av dette løpende samråd.

17 Utallet [av folkeavstemningen] gjør det vanskeligere å tilpasse seg en stadig mer omskiftelig verden, fordi vi ikke er med i alle de fora som fatter beslutninger som angår oss. Vi må derfor bruke mer krefter på å fremme norske interesser. … For Norges vedkommende har vårt nei til medlemskap i EU forsterket behovet for å bygge ut de osidige forbindelser med nøie allierte i Europa og transatlantisk, samt våre naboland Sverige og Finland.

18 For Norge vil det være av stor betydning å opprettholde dialogen både med Danmark, Finland og Sverige om utviklingen i EU.

19 Som eneste ikke-EU medlem blant de nordisk-baltiske landene, gir dette samarbeidet samtidig Norge økt innsikt i den sikkerhetspolitiske tenkningen i EU. Alt i alt er dette viktig i et utvidet EU hvor det er stadig vanskeligere for Norge som utenforland å bli hørt.

20 Jeg må ta initiativ til kontakten til daglig, og vi går heller på andre medlemslands delegasjoner og EEAS… Du kan lettere få sensitiv informasjon fra de nasjonale delegasjonene. … EEAS skal jo være mer nøytral og de vil være forsiktige med å utlevere informasjon, særlig med tanke på andre medlemslands holdninger til saker. Til kontrast er et medlemsland kanskje mer villig til å kommentere andre medlemslands holdninger.

21 Helt avgjørende for oss er det jo å ha direkte dialog med medlemslandene. … Det er ingen ideell situasjon, men den er håndterbar.

22 Jeg vil si at stort sett er folk imøtekommende, men mye avhenger av personlige forhold. … Men så kan man jo selvfølgelig se på hva slag informasjon man får. Og er man på god fot med andre lands delegasjoner, så kan man jo få mye informasjon.

23 Vi er jo ikke inne i noe permanent fora hvor man kan få beskjed om hva som skjer på CSDP. Dermed blir det mer par hasard at man får viste om et nytt tema som blir diskutert.

24 Jeg har ikke opplevd en slik situasjon hvor vi er uenige om noe med stor betydning for oss, men selv i en slik situasjon vil vi nok ha problemer med å få fullstendig informasjon.

25 Norge ser fram til full tut å delta I den felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken.

26 Vi legger stor vekt på å oppnå tilfredsstillende ordninger for norsk medvirkning når det gjelder utviklingen av ESDP generelt, og krishåndtering spesielt.
EU utvikler en egen sikkerhets- og forsvars-politiske dimensjon mellom sine medlemsland – uten fullverdig norsk deltakelse. … Etter hvert som flere medlemsland innlemmes øker tendensen til at utformelle konsultasjoner innenfor og mellom organisasjonene får økende betydning. … Norge er ikke med i EU, og i NATO bærer prosessene stadig mer preg av at "noen har snakket sammen". Norge står i utgangspunktet ikke først i køen for å få innpass i disse samtalene.

Forsvarsministeren blir invitert til møter i EU troikaformat fire ganger i året. Under møtene med troikaen blir Norge informert og konsultert om viktige saker innenfor ESDP, og har videre mulighet til å legge frem norske synspunkter og vurderinger.

Vi ser et EU i endring, også innenfor det sikkerhets- og forsvars-politiske området. For meg har det for eksempel blitt vanskeligere å komme i politisk kontakt og dialog opp mot EU. Det gamle "troika-møtet" der jeg møtte EUs politiske ledelse fire ganger i året er avviklet og ikke blitt erstattet på en for oss tilfredsstillende måte.

Det har vært en utfordring over ganske mange år. Før Lisboa-traktaten kom hadde vi jo disse fire møtene i året, med ulik grad av relevans på de møtene. Men uansett så møttes man, så man fikk direkte informasjon. Og i korridorene møtes man jo også på tommanshånd. Selv om de lovet at de skulle erstatte det med noe nytt, men ikke god nok slik vi så det. Vi jobber faktisk med det fortsatt i dag.

Nesten hver dag er det slike møter i arbeidsgrupper osv. Du må kontakte andre om hva som ble diskutert. Dette vil i prinsippet også være tilfellel om noe som angår oss står på agendan.

Man føler ofte at man er litt på etterskudd og er alltid avhengig av EEAS eller andre nasjons vurdering av en sak. … Vi er avhengig av andre lands godvilje.


Det ville vært ekstremt nyttig for oss og hadde man fått en helt annen innsikt. Da hadde det jo vært en internasjonal tjenestemann, han hadde jo ikke vært der for Norge, men sånn er det jo med de nasjonale ekspertene, og det sier seg jo selv at det likevel ville vært ekstremt nyttig.

Da fikk vi tilbake beskjed om at i seksjonen var de ikke interessert og de hadde nok folk. Og det tviler vi litt på. Del av grunnen var nok muligens at de ikke var interessert i et ikke-medlemsland der fordi overvåkningen av forsvarsmarkedet er så sensitivt.

Dette vil kunne representere en utfordring for Norge ved at viktige diskusjoner og beslutninger om europeiske sikkerhetsspørsmål og europeiske krisehåndteringsoperasjoner finner sted i fora hvor Norge har liten innflytelse.

Hvis det er en sak på agendan som vi føler sterkt for eller mener er veldig viktig, så vil vi selvfølgelig gå hardt ut mot andre medlemsland og særlig de nordiske landene tidlig for å prøve å påvirke. Det er alltid viktig å gjøre disse tingene tidligst mulig før det går for mye prestisje i det og ting har låst seg fast.


Også andre organisasjoner har stått bak fredsunionsjoner, blant dem EU og OSSE (Organisasjonen for sikkerhet og samarbeid i Europa). Norge har bidratt til begge.
40 Vi har et behov for en mye større åpenhet når det gjelder viktige og vesentlige utenrikspolitiske spørsmål. … det er mange viktige både konstitusjonelle og politiske spørsmål som bør belyses, og der både presse og opinion ellers bør ha innblikk i hvor diskusjonene faktisk går.
41 er det en svak tendens til at flertallet ønsker beskyttelse av eget land framfor innsats i utlandet.
42 For Regjeringen er det avgjørende å innrette arbeidet med EØS-avtalen, samt vårt øvrige avtaleverk med EU, på en måte som ivaretar sentrale prinsipper som åpenhet, deltakelse, medbestemmelse og effektiv styring på best mulig vis.

Chapter 6

43 Hvis informasjonen er relevant for Norge pga. at vi deltar i en EU aktivitet får vi normalt den informasjonen vi trenger.
44 Informasjon som EU deler med partnere må godkjennes av medlemslandene. Konsekvensene er gjerne at man må benytte andre «kilder» for å få tak i informasjon som ikke blir fordelt offisielt fra EU. … Jeg opplever at enkelte andre medlemsland er meget behjelpelig med og skaffe til veie informasjon som vi ikke får via offisielle kanaler.
45 Den uformelle kontakten er avgjørende. Det er jo ikke slik at de formelt deler ut dokumentene, men vi kan få se dem. Min erfaring er at de er villige til dette, men det er jo gjensidig. Så lenge vi har noe relevant å bidra med og de finner oss interessante, så er det også mye større mulighet for å få tilgang.
46 Unntaket er når Norge deltar i en operasjon. Da etableres en Committee of Contributors, et forum for alle land som deltar i den aktuelle operasjonen, for å diskutere relevante ting for operasjonen.
48 Bare det å være del av bidragsyterkomiteen er jo positivt fordi det i det minste er et innslagspunkt, og vi kan få en følelse av atmosfæren som kan være nyttig i en større kontekst.
49 Norges evne til å påvirke EUs felles sikkerhets- og forsvars politikk er minimal. Vår rolle i ESDP er klart mindre enn sammenlignet med de rettigheter vi hadde som assosiert medlem av Den vesteuropeiske union (VEU). Som såkalt ”tredjeland” vil også norsk innflytelse på den praktiske gjennomføringen av EU-ledede fredsoperasjoner være begrenset.
50 Jeg blir inviteret til møter som er direkte knyttet til aktivitet som Norge har besluttet å delta i, men jeg opplever ikke at dette primært er for å høre våre synspunkter, men for å gi informasjon.
51 Når det gjelder aktivitet eller operasjoner som vi ikke er direkte deltager i så vil en indirekte tilnærming gjennom medlemsland være den beste måte å påvirke på.
52 Det er viktig for EU å bevare sin beslutningsautonomi i samarbeidet med tredjeland. Norsk innflytelse på operasjoner vi deltar i må utøves gjennom bidragsyterkomiteene for de enkelte operasjoner. På norsk side legges det stor vekt på å få disse komiteene til å fungere som planlagt.
53 Norge deltar i bidragsyterkomiteen for de enkelte operasjoner, noe som gir gode muligheter til innflytelse.
I komiteen har land rettigheter knyttet til deres bidrag, ikke operasjonen som helhet … Norge og andre partnerland har bemerket at når møtene i CoC finner sted, så har EU28 allerede diskutert seg imellom og avgjort mesteparten av de relevante sakene. Det norske synet har også vært at møtene i CoC skal holdes først, også kan EU diskutere videre etterpå de sakene som de trenger å diskutere seg imellom.

Sverige, Finland, britene og Nederland er veldig opptatt av partnerland og opptatt av å høre våre synspunkter og erfaringer. Det er en liten gruppe av land som diskuterer med oss før større EU møter slik at de kan bringe inn våre synspunkter.

Atalanta var nok bedre der. Hyppigere møter, og absolutt mer substans. Det var i min mening nok den operasjonen som har fungert best.

Ikke én gang følte jeg at Norge ble behandlet annerledes enn EU nasjonene. … Det eneste er at å få den rollen som flaggskip i styrken, som under NATO’s Ocean Shield, det ville ikke vi kunne fått som ikke-medlem.

De fleste prosedyrer EU har, de er veldig like de man bruker i NATO. For NATO har kjempe lang tradisjon, EU har ikke like lang tradisjon. Og da har man egentlig bygget på det samme regelverket. Man bruker de samme prinsippene.

Oppdraget er en del av EUs “Operasjon Atalanta”

Forsvarsminister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen møtte EUs forsvarsministre 18. mai. Men når de skulle diskutere Operasjon Atalanta måtte hun forlate rommet.

Det vakte viss munterhet om hvorfor de ville delta uten å være medlem i EU. … Men å sikre en forsvarlig nasjonal beslutningsprosess har vi fra norsk side forutsatt at vi får tilgang på all relevant informasjon i opplopet til og under en krise. Dette er særlig viktig med tanke på at den formelle beslutningen fra EUs side tas i EUs råd uten vår deltakelse.

Der er Sverige forpliktet til å informere oss om vi er på stand-by.

Svenskene som var lead nation var flinke til å sende informasjon. Men dette går opp i systemet i Sverige og så over til Norge og ned igjen. Det tok veldig lang tid, og det var ikke all informasjon som kom oss i hende. … Jeg måtte lete etter informasjon og ta initiativ når jeg følte at den var ”stuck” noe sted. Men når jeg gikk til den svenske troppssjefen og ba om informasjon så fikk jeg den. Men der kommer jo også sikkerhetsklareringen inn. Ofte måtte den justeres til riktig sikkerhetsnivå, og hvem vet hva som gikk tapt underveis.

Vi er ikke med på diskusjonen om BG skal settes inn eller ikke, men vi vil bli holdt informert om hva som diskuteres. … Men spørsmålet er om EU vil være raske til dette. Men her kan vi stole på svenskene. Men vi er på beredskap vil Norge følge ekstra med på hva som skjer. Vi kan også få informasjon mer formelt gjennom de fora for informasjonsutveksling med tredjeland, som PSC+ og EUMC+, men disse møtene finner ikke sted veldig ofte. Hvis en mulig deployering skulle diskuteres mens Norge er del av en Battle Group på stand-by, vil vi måtte holde tett kontakt med Sverige som ledernasjon.

Tsjad var oppe til diskusjon i Rådet en gang. Om man skulle sette i gang en operasjon, også dukket spørsmålet opp om ikke BG skulle brukes. Men da er vi jo ikke der. Det vil alltid være en reell utfordring at vi ikke sitter i PSC.

Jeg fikk delta på alle relevante møter, og følte ikke at jeg ble behandlet annerledes enn andre deltakerland på grunn av ikke-medlemskapet. På møtene og øvelsene hadde vi de samme rettighetene, talerett, stemmerett, osv. … Det var ingen situasjon hvor jeg
følte at andre hadde andre privilegier som jeg ikke hadde. Men vi tullet om det på
bakkrommet om at hva i all verden gjør Norge her?
69 Det var ingen møter eller sånt hvor jeg måtte sende ut nordmennene på grunn av ikke-
medlemskap. De ble behandlet akkurat som alle andre.
70 Der er vi med fra start når beredskapperioden nærmer seg. Det går helt utmerket! Og vi ble
inviteret til en styrkegenereringskonferanse av EU fordi vi har deltatt i NGB tidligere, 
før det trengt tatt er vedtatt at vi skal delta igjen.
71 Vi er avhengig av svenskefor å promotere våre synspunkter. Det er ingen ideell
situasjon. At vi politisk beslutter styrkebidrag uten a vi er med i den organisasjonen
det er jo klart en utfordring,
72 BG konseptet har alltid fungert godt i den forstand at påvirkning, trening, diskusjon osv
alltid har fungert godt under trening eller stand-by perioden.
73 Jeg følte aldri at Norge på noen som helst måte var i en annen stilling enn EU
medlemmene.
74 På øvelser så er en måte å trene på å kjøre scenarios eller cases. Jeg hadde noen erfaringer
som jeg ville at skulle spilles inn. Og når jeg tok initiativ til å endre noen aspekter ved
scenarioet, ble det lett til etterretning og lagt til.
75 Før stand-by hadde vi flere møter om trening, utdanning osv hvor alle deltakerland kunne
påvirke. Under stand-by hadde jeg også møter i Norge for å diskutere fremgangen.
76 Hvis det oppstår en situasjon der de skal deployeres og Norge sier at dette kan vi ikke stå
bak – så vil det være en tøff politisk beslutning av Norge å ta. Det vil det selvfølgelig
for ethvert land som deltar i Battle Groups, også EU-medlemmer, men et medlemsland
kan prøve å hindre at avgjørelsen om å deployere tas i utgangspunktet.
77 Vi har muligheten til å trekke oss ut selvfølgelig, men det er klart, det skal holde ganske
hardt at EU har bestemt seg for en operasjon, også legger vi ned et "veto" da måtte det
være en helt spesiell situasjon. At vi ikke opplevde at alle prosedyrer var på plass for
eksempel. Vi kunne jo trukket ut vårt bidrag, men det ville skapt et stort problem.
78 Det skulle være en koordinert øvelse i Sverige og alle andre land sendte deres bidrag til
Sverige. Vi stilte med to av 20. så vi ødela bokstavelig talt hele øvelsen for de andre
MP nasjonene.
79 Avgjørelsen hadde store konsekvenser for Nordic Battle Group. Min personlige mening er
at avgjørelsen kunne ha risikert livet til de andre soldatene i enheten fordi den bestod
av 2/3 nordmenn som ikke hadde mulighet til å trene sammen. … Jeg synes ikke
Norge bør få tilbudet om å delta neste rotasjon uten at de garanterer full deltakelse på
øvelser.
80 På militært nivå var ikke reservasjonsrettet noe issue. Vi var opptatt av øvelse og utstyr, og
vi drar dit vi får beskjed om å dra, for å lose de oppgaver vi får beskjed om. Resten er
opp til politikerne.
81 Det er imidlertid en klar forutsetning at beslutningen om bruk av styrkene vil fattes av
norske myndigheter, at norsk medvirkning i planlegging og gjennomføring av
operasjonene blir ivaretatt, og at en insetting av styrkene er forankret i folkeretten.
82 … ikke gitt Brussel noen blankofullmakt. De ivaretar derimot sine interesser innenfor EU
gjennom løpende deltagelse i planlegging og utvikling av konsepter og doktrine for
anvendelse av styrkene og gjennom utforming av beslutningsgrunnlaget for å sette
dem inn. Det er Norge avskåret fra.
83 La meg gjøre det helt klart at Norge vil beholde full nasjonal beslutningsmyndighet i forhold
til hvilke operasjoner norske styrker skal delta i
84 Det som det nå er snakk om, er at vi skal være med i militære enheter som skal kunne settes
inn på kort varsel etter vedtak i EU:s råd. De skal stå til disposisjon. Det er klart at det
ikke er enkelt å være med i en slik enhet hvis vi samtidig skal kunne si nei til å være med i de operasjonene som bestemmes.

85 Vi er heller ikke prinsipielt sett uenig i å stille personell til enkeltoperasjoner i samarbeid med EU. Men det er en viktig forskjell mellom dette og en forespørsel om et permanent bidrag til en kampstyrke, altså ikke en sak som skal avgjøres fra gang til gang. … det er vanskelig å se for seg at Norge skal kunne trekke seg ut av en sån gruppe.

86 Det er komplisert å samarbeide på lik fot med andre land innenfor en organisasjon som man ikke er medlem av. … Men når det gjelder faren for at Norge her skulle bli fanget, er det grunn til å minne om at beslutninger i EU's råd må være enstemmige. De to land vi her skal samarbeide med, kjenner vi rimelig godt historiesk – Sverige og Finland – og det er liten grunn til å tro at noen av dem er mindre påpasselige og mindre fredelskende enn Norge er.

87 Jeg tror at i de aller fleste tilfellene vil det være slik at de politiske vurderingene fra Sveriges og Finlands side i forhold til å delta i en kampstyrke vil være overensstemmende med de vurderinger man gjør i Norge. Men det er jo ikke poenget i denne saken. Poenget når det gjelder de konstitusjonelle spørsmålene i denne saken, er jo hvilke reelle rettigheter vi har dersom uenighet skulle oppstå

88 Den ”bekreftelsen” skal representanten Djupedal få. Det er heilt klart at det må vere ei reell mulighet, ikkje berre ei formell.

89 Før EØS-avtalen forskrikt Gro Harlem Brundtland at vetoretten var framforhandlet for å brukes. Og hver dag etter at den avtalen ble vedtatt, har ja partiene brukt til å fortelle oss at vetoretten ikke kan brukes. Jeg regner med at det er det som kommer til å skje også denne gangen’

90 I praksis vil det nemlig være slik at man diskuterer muligheten for en operasjon lenge før det ligger an til en formell beslutning. … det er heller ikke sannsynlig at EU's råd vil legge fram til avstemning et forslag når de ved at den aktuelle kampgruppen ikke er villig til å stille

91 Norske myndigheter vil i hvert enkelt tilfelle kunne vurdere om det er et tilstrekkelig folkerettlig grunnlag for å stille det norske styrkebidraget til disposisjon.

Chapter 7

92 Norge og EU-landene har felles grunnverdier og vurderinger og har ofte like målsettinger.

93 Jeg har ikke opplevd en slik situasjon hvor vi er uenige om noe med stor betydning for oss, men selv i en slik situasjon vil vi nok ha problemer med å få fullstendig informasjon.

94 det Norge nå gjorde – rett eller ikke – gjør at det vil sitte lenger inne for ham å tale Norges sak i en ny sammenheng.

95 det er mange år siden norske regjeringer måtte la alt håp fare om at svensk og finsk medlemskap i EU skulle gi Norge viktige fortrinn. Diplomater kan fortelle at virkningen av og til er sikk motsatt.

96 Sverige taler Norges sak i EU når det sammenfaller med Sveriges sak.

97 Å velge å ikke være politisk representert fungerer så lenge man er i stand til å bestemme rammene for hva man selv kan bestemme over, og i tillegg har kontroll over de feltene hvor man har valgt å ikke være politisk representert. For Norges del er ingen av de to forutsetningene til stede.

98 Norsk deltagelse vil dessuten styrke vår evne til effektiv militær samhandling med europeiske partnere, også i NATO.

XXVII
faktisk viktig for vår posisjon innad i NATO, at vi også tar del i samarbeidet som pågår innad i EU. 19 av mine NATO-kolleger deltar nemlig nettopp i EUs forsvarsministremøte.

vi er opptatt av at dette samkjøres med NATO så langt det er mulig og at det skjer i en nær dialog med våre andre allierte, som i dette tilfellet først og fremst er USA: Vi er likeledes tilfreds med at hovedkvarteret er valgt lagt til Storbritannia, som, slik vi ser det, kan ivareta den transatlantiske forbindelse på en best mulig måte

FN trenger i økende grad muligheten for styrker som på kort varsel kan stille opp i viktige operasjoner. Det er et stort behov for å styrke FNers evne til krisehåndtering, ikke minst i Afrika

Under sitt besøk I Irland i oktober understreket FNers generalsekretær Kofi Annan, hvor viktig det er for FNers evne til krisehåndtering å få styrket EUs kapabilitet og koordinering av EUs innsats. Det har vært viktig for Venstre

Det vil bidra til å styrke det nordiske militære samarbeidet og gjøre det mer målrettet.

For Venstre er det også et viktig poeng at Norge er blitt inviteret av våre naboland Sverige og Finland til å delta i en felles nordisk innsatsstyrke.

Norge har bruk for venner, og ved at vi selv stiller opp sammen med andre, går det også an å kalle på venner i en situasjon hvor det er bruk for det.

at vi også gjennom vårt samarbeid og gjennom vår dialog med dem vi samarbeider med, kan få dem til å se mot nord – få dem til å se at dette er et strategisk område som er viktig langt utenfor Norges grenser.

vårt håp med deltakelse er selvfølgelig at i kan oppnå noe mer enn å delta i noen konkrete oppdrag. Vi håper at vi med dette kan være med og bidra til å rette fokus for EU nordover, og at vi på denne måten kan få ivaretatt våre nasjonale sikkerhetsinteresser bedre enn om vi lot være å delta

Det som nå skjer, er jo at bl.a. Sverige og Finland vil få større innflytelse over utformingen av forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikken enn det Norge vil få.

For det andre vil norsk deltakelse i en nordisk innsatsstyrke innebære en videreføring av det tradisjonelle nordiske samarbeidet om fredsoperasjoner. … For det tredje vil en fra norsk side ved å delta bidra til å styrke FNers evne til krisehåndtering.

Etter SVs oppfatning er det ikke galt at Norge deltar i militære fredsoperasjoner. Vi mener at i kan ha en plikt til å delta i visse sammenhenger.

Vårt mål må være å gi Norge mest mulig sikkerhet og innflytelse. Vi velger derfor en linje der vi, tross en prinsipiell motstand mot EUs forsvarsdimension … sier at vi vil være med for å kunne få et ben innenfor. … viktig å kunne koble seg på det som skjer, selv om en ordning aldri vil kunne bli fullgod så lenge vi ikke er medlem av Norges grenser.

Utviklingen i den europeiske sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikken og den økte betydning EU kan få for internasjonal sikkerhet, innebærer at fortsatt norsk samarbeid med EU kan bidra til at Norge får innflytelse i beslutningsprosesser av betydning for norsk sikkerhet.


På sikt så har det noe å si for vår generelle standing, at vi blir lagt merke til, men jeg tror ikke at vi skal ha en illusion om at det kan gi oss noen større grad av innflytelse.
Chapter 8

116 Vi har en helt annen påvirkningsmulighet i for eksempel NATO. Som medlem sitter vi jo inne på alle møter og våre synspunkter blir tatt hensyn til. Vi har et bedre overblikk, tidligere tilgang på informasjon, og innsyn i hva som rører seg i både de formelle og uformelle områdene. Med andre ord har vi førstehåndstilgang til det fulle og hele bildet.

117 Det er ikke ideelt å delta uten å være medlem. Det er jo derfor norsk politikk er at styrkebidrag skal gjennom NATO og FN som prioritet en. Men vi deltar også i EU operasjoner, og det kan bli sett på som problematisk.
Appendix II – Norway’s Agreements with the EU on Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

1988 Agreement on bilateral consultations on foreign policy questions between Norway and the EEC Presidency after an exchange of letters between Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg and the EU Presidency at the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher

1992 Agreement between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the members of the Western European Union EU and Norway, Iceland and Turkey on associated membership in the WEU

1994 Declaration on political dialogue attached the EEA Agreement. Concretised in 1995 in a joint declaration of the EEA Council, after an exchange of letters between Minister of Trade Grete Knutsen and the EU Presidency at the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé

1996 Security Agreement between Norway and the Western European Union

2001 Agreement between Norway and the European Union on Norway’s accession to the Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001 establishing a European Union Satellite Centre

2002 Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway on the Kingdom of Norway’s participation in the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

2003 Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on the Kingdom of Norway’s participation in the European Union force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

2004 Agreement between Norway and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information

2004 Agreement between Norway and the European Union on the participation of Norway in the European Union Police Mission in Macedonia

2004 Framework agreement between Norway and the European Union on the participation of Norway in the European Union crisis management operations

2005 Memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of defence of the Republic of Estonia and the Ministry of defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of defence of Norway and the Government of Sweden concerning

XXX
principles for the establishment and operation of a multinational battle group to be made available to the European Union.

2006 Cooperation Agreement (Administrative Arrangement) between the Ministry of Defence and the European Defence Agency (EDA)

Appendix III – Interview Guide

The informants consists of two groups; Firstly, persons representing Norway in the formal political cooperation with the EU on security and defence, as well as military advisers, who albeit being military personnel, have a job advising the political representatives. The second group consists of Norwegian military personnel who have participated in the Nordic Battle Group and Operation Atalanta, selected exactly because they have participated in the practical military side of the Norway-EU cooperation. As the interviews were semi-structured, the questions asked naturally varied to some degree. There was however a basic set of questions used as a general framework:

1. General questions
   a) What is your background?
   b) In your job, what are your main tasks and responsibilities?
   c) In what way are you in contact with the EU in your work?

2. Questions pertaining to getting information
   a) Do you get all the relevant information you need to do your job safeguarding Norwegian interests?
   b) Where do you normally get this information from?
   c) How straightforward do you experience that it is to get hold of this information?
   d) What do you perceive of as the most challenging with this way of getting information?

3. Questions pertaining to participation
   a) What possibilities are there for participation in the CSDP/during an operation?
   b) In what way are you participating in the discussions, meetings, fora etc?
   c) How is this participation arranged? (Formal, informal, regular, irregular etc)
   d) How do you experience these arrangements for participation? (What works well, and not so well?)
   e) At what point in the process is Norway represented?

4. Questions pertaining to possibilities for influence
   a) In what way can Norway influence the CSDP/the operation?
   b) How do you experience your possibilities to exert influence?