

Class Voting and Value Orientations

The fourth generation

Peter Egge Langsæther



Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Oslo

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Peter Egge Langsæther

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Abstract

The most important questions in the study of class voting during the last few decades have been whether, to what degree, and why class voting has been declining. Usually, a dichotomous left-right party choice variable has been utilized. This may have distorted de-alignment and realignment, as the rise of the New Left and the New Right has changed the relationship between the social classes and the political parties. In this thesis, we utilize a party family dependent variable on contemporary data instead. We first describe the class basis in 18 West-European countries for all the party families, showing that the party families normally grouped into the “Left” and “Right” categories indeed have quite different class bases. The strength of class voting also varies by party family. We then test one of the mechanisms connecting class to voting, namely the role of value orientations. This means that we see how much of the bivariate association between class and voting that disappears when controlling for these intermediate variables. What we find is compelling evidence of the need for a more nuanced party choice variable: The amount of class voting accounted for by the value orientations varies between the party families. The thesis thus i) describes the class basis of the West-European party families; ii) tests a mechanism through which class has its effects on voting; iii) proves the need for a more nuanced, “4th generation” dependent variable.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Class has always been an essential component of political analysis. Karl Marx and Max Weber made the concept central to the social sciences, and since Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work on cleavages it has also been central in political science and the study of the evolution of party systems.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized two cleavages connected to social class. The first is the conflict between labour and capital, workers and owners. This conflict led to a certain convergence between Western European party systems, as all countries developed parties representing the workers. However, after the Russian Revolution, not all of these were Social Democratic anymore. Neither did the conflict lead to convergence in the representation of the owners' interests, which were represented by a number of different types of parties. The second cleavage connected to class is the conflict between producers and consumers of agrarian products. This cleavage has often been integrated into existing parties, although in the Nordic countries it contributed to the development of a new party family – namely, the Agrarian parties (see also Knutsen 2006: xi-xii).

However, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) never provided a clear-cut definition of a cleavage. We will thus rely on Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995), who provide a three-part definition of cleavage. First, a cleavage is based on long-lasting social divisions that create “objectively” identifiable groups within a society – like classes, religious denominations, and so on. Second, the members of these groups share a common way of life, giving rise to shared value orientations within the groups. Finally, a cleavage needs to be organizationally institutionalized, for instance in a political party or a church (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 494).

Since the 1950s and 1960s, the class cleavage has been a central explanation for voting patterns in Western Europe. For some, such as Lipset et al. (1954) or Downs (1957), this is simply because people belonging to a certain class have common economic interests, and they vote in line with their material class interests. Those with few resources are in favour of redistribution because they want more, and those with many resources are against it because they do not want to share. But if that were all there was to it, we might as well use income instead of class as the independent variable. Since many within a class do not vote according to their economic class interests, something else must also be at stake. This could be the

common experiences and social networks members of a class often share. It could also be because class membership affects other aspects of our lives, such as our values or political attitudes, and thus indirectly explains our voting (Manza et al. 1995: 140). As mentioned, this is incorporated into the very definition of cleavage given by Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995). It is the last idea that will be tested in chapter 4 in this thesis, when we will see how much of the effect of class on voting that is indirect through value orientations.

1.1 The Study of Class Voting: A Brief History

On the basis of the research problems, the hypotheses, the measurement procedures, and the employed methods, Nieuwbeerta (1995) categorized the literature on class voting into three “generations”.

The first generation of class voting research was conducted during the 1950s and 1960s. The scholars involved studied whether or not there was a relationship between class and voting through the use of cross-tabulations. These were usually based on a dichotomous measure of class (manual/non-manual) and a dichotomous measure of political parties (left-wing/right-wing). The so-called Alford index (Alford 1962) was the dominant measure of class voting (Jansen 2011: 22; Knutsen 2007). This is simply the percentage difference between manual and non-manual occupations in left-wing voting (Alford 1964: 79-80).

The second generation, which was born in the late 1960s, improved research in several ways. The class schemas were more nuanced than the manual/non-manual divide and linear regression replaced cross-tabulations as the most common method of analysis. Prominent contributions to this generation were Franklin et al. (1992) and Inglehart (1977; 1990). The goal was to increase the explained voting variance by including more variables, notably value orientations (Jansen 2011: 23; Knutsen 2007: 458). The first two generations came to a few broad conclusions: In all Western democracies, members of the manual class were more likely to vote left-wing than members of the non-manual class. Also, the strength of class voting varied significantly between countries, and had declined in most countries in the post-war period (Nieuwbeerta 1996: 346). Class voting was most important in Scandinavia and Great Britain, where it also decreased the most, and least important in the US and Canada (Evans 1999: 5).

The first two generations also made some attempts at finding explanations for the differences in levels of class voting. Some of the explanations considered were income inequality, social

mobility, and the politicization of class issues (Alford 1964), religious and ethnic fragmentation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1979), the standard of living (Kerr et al. 1960), the unionization rate of workers (Korpi 1983), and the rise of New Politics (Inglehart 1977; 1990). However, the empirical tests were bivariate and usually based on crude measures of both class and party choice – e.g. the Alford index (Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999: 124).

In the mid-1980s, the third generation of class voting research came forth, criticizing both the measure of class and of class voting. The dichotomous class schema was seen as too crude (see also Erikson et al. 1979: 415). According to scholars like Heath et al. (1985) and Hout et al. (1993), important changes in the class structure had emerged during the last decades, rendering the manual/non-manual divide less relevant. This was both due to the fact that the working class was diminishing, and that the middle class was getting larger and more heterogeneous (see also Nieuwbeerta 1996: 360-361). Evans (1999: 8-11) also criticized the Alford index for obscuring variations within the non-manual and manual classes.

The class measure was further developed and scholars regularly used internationally comparable and standardized class schemas, like the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class schema (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Heath et al. (1985) and Thomsen (1987) also criticized the Alford index for being sensitive to the general popularity of the parties, and argued that it was necessary to use relative measures (like log odds ratios) instead of absolute ones.

Nieuwbeerta (1995) categorized his own important study as belonging to the third generation. In one of the most expansive studies of class voting conducted at the time, he wanted to describe both the variations in relative class voting between countries and within countries over time in light of the critiques raised by the third generation. He found that the third generation scholars had a point: *Some* of the variation between countries and over time was due to the use of the Alford index. However, important variations still remained, and there was a clear decline in class voting throughout the period. In addition, the relative and absolute measures of class voting did not yield substantially different conclusions (Nieuwbeerta 1996: 370-371). Nieuwbeerta (1996: 371-372) ends by urging future research to *explain* the differences in class voting and to distinguish between *all* parties in the party system.

Hout et al. (1995) introduced the *kappa* index, which allowed for just that: A more differentiated party choice measure (Jansen 2011: 24-25). They also distinguished between traditional class voting, i.e. the Alford index, and total class voting, which includes *all* effects

class may have on voting, not only on voting left-wing versus right-wing (Hout et al. 1995: 806). We will return to the kappa index in section 2.3.

What explanations were suggested by the third generation for the variations in class voting? Nieuwbeerta (1996) argues that social characteristics (such as value orientations or standards of living) and political characteristics (such as party polarization) were suggested in some very tentative analyses. Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) used multilevel techniques and cross-level interaction terms to find that ethnic and religious diversity reduced class voting. They also found that increased union density was positively associated with class voting between countries, but negatively associated with class voting over time within-countries.

While the third generation improved and discussed the dichotomous class variable and the relative versus absolute measures of class voting, they did not (with a few exceptions) pay sufficient attention to the problems related to the dichotomous party choice variable.

1.2 The State of the Art: The 4th Generation

Knutsen (2007) launches a possible fourth generation. He suggests that the class cleavage cuts across the left-right division of parties: the New Left parties are more popular amongst the higher educated and the new middle class, whereas the Radical Right is more popular amongst the less educated and workers (see also Knutsen 2004: 195). Hence, it is necessary with a more detailed party choice variable. This issue has formerly been raised by Evans (1999: 12-15), who claims that the dichotomous party choice variable is affected by changes in the relative size of the different parties labelled as “left” and “non-left”, *and* misrepresents class-party *realignment* as *dealignment* (for instance if manual workers stop voting for the left and start voting for the radical right).

Expanding on Hout et al.’s (1995) distinction between total and traditional class voting, Knutsen (2006) categorizes the parties in eight European countries into ten party families and analyses *total* class voting over time. The correlations between party choice and social class still show a clear average decline from the 1970s to the 1990s. Total class voting was largest in Denmark in the 1970s and 1980s and lowest in Germany, but converged at a low level in the 1990s as the countries with the highest total class voting also saw the sharpest decreases (Knutsen 2006: 181-183). These findings are in accordance with findings from the third generation, especially those of Nieuwbeerta (1995).

Knutsen (2007) launches the new approach with a nuanced party choice variable as a possible new generation of class voting research. Whereas Knutsen (2007) mainly discusses the dependent variable, Jansen (2011: 24-29) claims that there has also been a change in the research problems and hypotheses, as well as the measurement procedures and analyses strategies. In Jansen's view, only a few studies have tried to systematically *test* the explanations suggested in the literature, namely Nieuwbeerta (1995, chapter 4), Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999), and Knutsen (2006). Jansen (2011: 25) argues that the explanations usually fit two categories: Sociological and political explanations. The sociological hypotheses, regarding the *demand-side*, include changes in the composition of classes or the values of the classes (so-called "bottom up" explanations). The political hypotheses, covering the *supply-side*, include party polarization and the class basis of electoral appeals ("top-down" explanations). The class measures encompass post-industrial, revised class schemas. The techniques used are notably multinomial and conditional logistic regression.

According to Jansen (2011), the fourth generation is in its early years, and his own analysis is one of its contributions. Nevertheless, in the comparative part of his thesis he is still using the dichotomous party choice variable (Jansen 2011: ch. 3). In the second part of his analysis, covering only the Netherlands, albeit over time, he uses a party choice variable categorizing the parties into the old-left, the new-left, the liberal right, and religious parties. Thus only the second part may be said to belong to the fourth generation, if we stick to the definition suggested by Knutsen (2007). Jansen (2011: 200) himself criticises his pooled analyses for their "low level of detail in measuring cleavages and cleavage strength". But even the analysis of the Netherlands could be more detailed in its measure of party choice: The four categories are not exhaustive.

In the fourth generation part of his study, Jansen (2011: ch. 4) finds that social explanations as well as political ones are important to explain the decline of class voting in the Netherlands. For instance, the differences between classes with respect to economic ideology weakened over time – although holding this ideology constant only partly explained the decline in class voting in the Netherlands in the period 1971-2006. After controlling for bottom up explanations, it turns out that the parties' economic left-right position does impact class voting, whereas their position on the cultural dimension does not (Jansen 2011: 198-199).

The latest major addition to the class voting literature at the time of writing, Evans and de Graaf (2013), advocates a fourth generation approach by arguing that parties need to "diverge

on matters of relevance to people in different classes or with differing levels of religiosity for there to be class and religious differences in party preferences” (Evans and de Graaf 2013a: 7). The goal of the book is to test sociological explanations versus political ones, in particular whether the positions of parties on class and religious issues affect the level of class and religious voting.

The comparative part of the book is testing these explanations on fifteen Western democracies from 1960-2005, although with a dichotomous dependent variable. While some of the decline in class voting is explained by changes in party positions and party polarization, important declines in class voting remain even after controlling for these two factors. This is in line with other third generation findings, as already discussed. Nevertheless, the authors admit that this might be due to the collapsed party choice variable, “ignoring the complexity of the ‘new left’ and the ‘new right’” (Evans and De Graaf 2013b: 392).

The case studies that follow are usually applying a fourth generation dependent variable. These show a more nuanced picture. In only four of the twelve countries studied, namely Australia, Britain, France and Spain, do the authors find a clear decline of class voting. In two countries, West Germany and Italy, there is a modest decline. There is stability in Canada, Denmark and East Germany. In Poland they find alignment, in the US realignment, and in the Netherlands decline and then realignment (Evans and De Graaf 2013b: 394). It is also interesting to note that in the Australian case study, one of the four showing a clear decline, the party choice variable was still dichotomous (Marks 2013: 149).

The authors also attempted to explain the changes or stability in class voting. In most countries, the changes were explained by top-down (i.e. political) processes. The lack of decline in Canada and Denmark were accounted for by top-down stability. In Australia, the decline was accounted for by both political and sociological factors. The decline and realignment in the Netherlands, as well as the alignment in Poland, were explained by bottom-up processes (Evans and De Graaf 2013b: 394).

1.3 The Aim of the Thesis – Filling the Gaps

This thesis’ aim is to fill certain gaps in the newly formed fourth generation of class voting studies. Until now, these studies have mostly been divided into two parts: One comparative, large-scale part, followed by one or more case studies (see Jansen 2011; Evans and De Graaf 2013). Only the case studies have actually measured total class voting by using fourth

generation party choice measures. The comparative parts have commonly been using the traditional left-right dichotomous party choice variable, measuring what Knutsen (2006) labelled “overall left-right class voting” (i.e. detailed class schema but dichotomous party choice variable). This is partly due to the fact that these studies are longitudinal, often covering most of the post-war period. As Evans and De Graaf (2013a: 12) put it, “[a]lthough it would be ideal to have strictly comparable measures for each case, this is not feasible in a project that covers so many surveys across such extensive periods of time.” Also, these longitudinal studies have tended to focus mainly on whether or not and to what degree class voting has been *declining* within countries over time, without enough emphasis on the variation between countries (see also Knutsen 2004: 2).

This thesis, on the other hand, will measure *total* class voting in a comparative setting. By limiting the cases in time, we avoid several of the problems related to non-comparable cases. We also change the focus from the question of decline and change over time to the question of how the situation is today. With the possible exception of Knutsen (2006), this will be the first full-fledged comparative fourth generation study. Hopefully the end result will cast light upon both the need for a more nuanced party choice variable *and* class voting and its mechanisms in Western Europe. Given that most studies even today use a dichotomous left-right dependent variable, the findings may have huge implications as to whether or not this practice should continue.

We will further attempt to disentangle the relationship between class and voting by testing one of the *mechanisms*. This means that we will try to say something about *why* there is an association between structure and vote. Thomassen (2005: 6-7) writes that there are three main schools of thought in this area. First, the political-psychological approach, which emphasizes that party identification, developed early in life, shapes people’s political attitudes, perceptions, and political behaviour. The second school is based on Downs’ economic theory of democracy. This school claims that ideology, notably the left-right dimension, is used to reduce information costs for voters, who assess parties based on political issues and government performance. Finally, we have the political-sociological approach, represented by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in the European context. They claim that the cleavage structure is reflected in differences in value orientations, which again affect voting. This is evident in their description of parties as “*alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body politic*” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5, italics in

original). While acknowledging the role of economic interests in group preference formation, they emphasize the conflict over norms and values in all of the four cleavages (see for instance Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 11; 15; 19). When it comes to the specific issue of class voting, they write that “[c]onflicts between workers and employers have always contained elements of economic bargaining, but there have also often been strong elements of cultural opposition and ideological insulation.” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 18). Amongst more contemporary scholars, Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995: 494) even includes value orientations as a part of the *definition* of a cleavage, as formerly mentioned: “...a cleavage engages some set of values common to members of the group; group members know a ‘common life’ in so far as they share the same value orientation.” (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995: 494).¹

In chapter 4, we will test the mechanism suggested by the political-sociological approach. We will compare the bivariate relationship between class and party family specific voting with class voting after controlling for the most important value orientations. How much of the effect of class is indirect through value orientations? Which value orientations account for most class voting? How does this differ between party families? These are central questions to be answered in the last two chapters of this thesis. Evans (2010) is highly critical of the lack of work in this area. Our analysis does exactly what he recommends:

“Multi-variate analysis should preferably start with reduced form models that contain only structural characteristics. More elaborate specifications that include both structural and potential mechanisms can then be introduced in a path-analytical framework that allows explicit tests of the role of perceptions and attitudes in connecting structural positions and political preferences.” (Evans 2010: 638).

Nevertheless, before we can test mechanisms of class voting, we need to describe the phenomenon properly. This is what we will do in the third chapter. A detailed description of the class basis of the party families in eighteen West European countries will give us an impression of the need for a more nuanced party choice variable. Notably, we will be able to ascertain whether some of the non-manual classes vote for the New Left and whether the manual classes vote for the New Right. We might also discover other patterns that we have not hitherto found. We will see whether parties belonging to a certain party family have the same class basis or not. The strength of class voting, described for instance by Knutsen (2006)

¹ For a more in-depth discussion of the three schools of thought, please refer to Antunes (2010)

via the kappa index, will also be disentangled. We will see which classes that contribute to the strength of class voting. What classes vote disproportionately in favour of each party family and which do the opposite? Does this differ between countries?

In sum, the aim of this thesis is twofold: To *describe* the class basis of the West European party families and the strength of class voting; and to test one of the *mechanisms* creating the differences we discover. It is hoped that in doing so, some light will also be shed on the methodological issue of what dependent variable to choose in future studies of class voting.

Chapter 2: Research Design

2.1 Data: The European Values Study 2008

The European Values Study (EVS) is a decennial survey, occupied with the values of Europeans. There are six main topics: Life, Family, Work, Religion, Politics, and Society. We will be using the latest version at the time of writing, i.e. the one from 2008. The interviews were conducted face-to-face by trained field workers who made at least three revisits in case of not reaching the respondent at the first visit. All countries employed a representative multi-stage random sample of the adult population of 18 years or older. The sample consists of approximately 1,500 respondents for each of the 47 countries/regions, although there is some covariation between the size of the samples and the size of the population in the countries/regions. All information in this section is gathered from their website.²

The specific data set we are using is an edited version of the EVS 2008 where only the relevant West European countries are kept. We have a total of 25,299 respondents from 18 countries. The country samples vary from 808 in Iceland to 2,038 in Germany. Detailed descriptive statistics are to be found in the appendix, section A.2.

2.2 Variables

2.2.1 The independent variable: Social class

Social class is obviously a key concept in studies of class voting. As mentioned in section 1.1, the first two generations used the simple manual/non-manual divide when studying class voting (Alford 1962), but this way of measuring class was increasingly criticized and rendered less relevant throughout the third generation of class voting studies. The most important alternatives today are different variations of the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class schema and variations of the class schema of Daniel Oesch (2006a).

The EGP class schema was first developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979), and then updated and improved by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). The class schema is based on a distinction between the position of an individual within labour markets and production units. First a distinction between employers, employees and the self-employed is drawn,

² <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu>

derived from both the Weberian and Marxian tradition (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37). Distinctions are drawn between large employers and small employers, and, within the latter group, between those belonging to industry and agriculture. The self-employed are also divided into an industrial and an agricultural component (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 36). However, the basic distinction in the schema, according to Knutsen (2006: 14) is within the category of the employees. These are separated depending on their relationship to their employer.

A main distinction here, following Weber, is between employees with a *service relationship* to their employer and those with a *labour contract*. If the employer has delegated authority to the employee or the employee uses specialized knowledge and expertise, there is a service relationship between the two. These positions are usually characterised by a certain amount of autonomy, and the performance of the employee is based on a degree of moral commitment rather than external sanctions. The relationship requires that the employer invests *trust* in the employee, and is usually a rather durable relationship. Those with a labour contract, on the other hand, usually perform more or less routinized tasks under supervision, and are paid in wages rather than salaries (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 41-42). However, the service relationship and the labour contract must be seen as ideal types, and many occupations fall in-between. On this basis, the EGP schema differentiates between the eleven classes outlined in figure 2.1.³

[Figure 2.1 here]⁴

However, this theoretical 11-class schema is not very suitable for empirical analysis. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 35-37) insist that some classes must be collapsed to ensure cross-national comparability and to avoid cell counts that are unreliably low. Our collapsed six class schema is based on the collapsed five class version of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979: 425), except that we have kept the distinction between skilled and unskilled manual workers. This is because there are some theoretical reasons to believe that these groups may differ in terms of support for certain party families (see chapter 3).

³ Due to the extensive use of this schema in class research during the last decades, a further introduction seems redundant. The interested reader may consult Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: chapter 2).

⁴ Sometimes it is not possible to place the tables or figures where they are supposed to be, for reasons related to layout and text flow. In these cases, we have written where the table or figure ideally should be, like here, and then it is inserted as soon as possible after this.

Figure 2.1: The EGP 11-class schema.

Employers	Large			Class I	
	Small	Industry		IVa	
		Agriculture		IVc	
Self-Employed	Industry			IVb	
	Agriculture			IVc	
Employees	Service Relationship	Professional, higher technical, administrative and management	Higher grade	I	
			Lower grade	II	
	Intermediate	Routine, non-manual	Higher grade	IIIa	
			Lower grade	IIIb	
	Lower technical, and manual, supervisory			V	
	Labour Contract	Manual	Industry	Skilled	VI
				Unskilled	VIIa
Non-industry			Agriculture	VIIb	

Based on figure 2.1 in Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 36.

On the other hand, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to combine the farmers with the petite bourgeoisie. As we will see, Oesch (2006b: 269) categorizes both farmers and other self-employed as petite bourgeoisie, based on theoretical arguments about their employment status (self-employed) and their marketable skills. The traditional Marxist use of the term includes farmers (Kitschelt 1994: 26). It is also common in the empirical parts of the literature to combine the two groups (see for instance Evans and De Graaf 2013), and they do indeed vote rather similarly.⁵

Another reason to combine the groups is that there are so few farmers (and also rather few petty bourgeois) within most countries that the estimates of class voting for these groups in the survey material are surrounded by extreme uncertainty. Any findings would be severely limited by doubt of whether they are a property of the sample or the population. Also, like Ivarsflaten and Stubager (2013: 124), we want to avoid too small categories. Empty cells make it impossible to calculate log odds ratios. There is one drawback, however: Keeping farmers as a separate class would make it easier to analyse the class cleavage in the *commodity* market, namely the one between producers and consumers of agricultural products (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This would be particularly relevant when analysing the class basis of the Agrarian party family (see section 3.4).

⁵ I have calculated the percentages of farmers and petty bourgeois voting for different parties in different countries separately. For most party families (with some exceptions, like Agrarian and Radical Right parties), these groups tend to vote rather similarly.

Table 2.1 shows how the applied class schema in this thesis compares to the original 11-class schema.

Table 2.1: The Applied Class Schema

Types of occupations, EGP	Classes and terms used in this study
Class I: Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors	Higher Service Class
Class II: Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small business and industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees	Lower service class
Class IIIa: Higher grade routine non-manual employees (administration and commerce)	Routine non-manual employees
Class IIIb: Lower grade routine non-manual employees (sales and services; other rank-and-file employees)	
Class IVa: Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees	Petite bourgeoisie
Class IVb: Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees	
Class IVc: Farmers and smallholders; self-employed fishermen	
Class V: Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers	Skilled manual workers
Class VI: Skilled manual workers	
VIIa: Semi- and unskilled workers (not in agriculture)	Unskilled manual workers
VIIb: Agricultural workers	

Source: Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero 1979: 420; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 36.

The other major modern alternative is the class schema of Daniel Oesch (2006a). While he does include hierarchical divisions through employment relationships and marketable skills, like Erikson and Goldthorpe, he adds a horizontal dimension to it: the *work logic*. Jobs within the same employment relationship may differ significantly in their setting of work process; their relations of authority; their primary orientation and the skill requirements (Oesch 2006b:

265-268). With these traits, Oesch (2006b: 269) creates a 17-class schema based on four different work logics (independent; technical; organizational; interpersonal service) and four different marketable skills (professional/managerial; associate professional/managerial; general/vocational; low/unskilled). This schema does to a greater extent than the EGP schema take into account the increasing heterogeneity of the service class⁶, like the distinction between socio-cultural specialists, higher-grade managers and technical experts.

While the schema of Oesch is highly interesting and increasingly popular (see for instance Kitschelt 2013: 229-231), we will stick with the EGP class schema in this thesis. First and most importantly, this is still “the only systematically validated measure of class position available for use in this sort of large scale comparative project” (Evans and De Graaf 2013a: 13). Also, we want to shed some light upon the need for the fourth generation party choice variable. Hence it is an obvious advantage to be able to compare our findings with those of the third generation – which usually applied this schema.

Our EGP class variable is based on question 112 in the EVS 2008 questionnaire, where the respondent is asked the title of his or her main job (or, if not employed at the moment, the title of the last job) and question 112a, where the respondent is asked what kind of work he/she does or did do most of the time. On the basis of these two questions, the interviewer codes the job using the ISCO88 system. These codes are transferred into the full 11-class EGP schema. We then created the EGP6-variable by combining some classes as shown in table 2.2. For descriptive statistics, please refer to appendix A.2.1, which also shows considerable cross-national variations in class composition.

2.2.2 The dependent variable: Party choice

The need for a more nuanced party choice variable in the class voting literature was discussed in section 1.2. Here, we will rather focus on the concrete operationalization. In a case study, one could simply use the national parties as individual nominal vote options; but comparative studies need to categorize the parties into some form of party families (Knutsen 2004: 14; Mair and Mudde 1998: 212).

Party families may be classified by criteria such as names, historical traditions and origins, party programmes or memberships in transnational party organisations (Mair and Mudde 1998). The classification used here will be based on the first three of these. I follow Knutsen’s

⁶ According to Kitschelt (2013: 231), this class «blows apart» because they differ on a number of dimensions.

approach, which is built upon former classifications like von Beyme's (1985).⁷ The categorization includes ten party families: Communist, Left Socialist, Green, Social Democratic, Agrarian, Ethnic/Regional, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Radical Right parties (Knutsen 2004: 14-19; Knutsen 2006: 34-39). The parties are categorized into the different party families based on Knutsen's expert judgement, rather than for instance party manifestos or voter surveys (see Bakker and Hobolt 2013: 31).⁸ We will discuss these party families more in detail in chapter 3.

Classification of parties into party families poses several challenges, although we avoid some of them here. First, the party family schemas may be geographically limited to Western Europe, for which they were usually developed. This is no problem here, as this thesis limits itself to that particular geographic area. Second, time may render the party families increasingly outdated as politics change (Mair and Mudde 1998: 215). This should not pose any problems: The classification used is recently developed (Knutsen 2004; 2006), and the analysis is not cross-temporal.

We have chosen a "vote intention" approach to measure party choice, namely question 75a in the EVS 2008. In other words, the respondents answer what party they would vote for if a general election were to be held the next day. This question avoids recall problems one might have if asked what one voted for in the last election, which could turn out to be several years ago (Knutsen 2004: 19). When the respondents have indicated that they would not vote, we have used question 75b, asking what party appeals the most to the respondent. On the basis of these two variables, we have constructed a *party family* preference variable. As we utilize the same data set as Knutsen (2012), this party choice variable is constructed in the exact same way as his (see Knutsen 2012: 11). Descriptive statistics may be found in section A.2.2 in the appendix.

There will be one section for each party family to be analysed. The dependent variable will consist of a dichotomy coded 1 if the respondent voted for the particular party family (or declared it as the most appealing) and 0 if the respondent voted for any other party family. Responders who did not vote or did not reply to any of the two questions above are excluded from the analysis.

⁷ This is, in turn, built upon an expansion of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) conflict model, with 10 conflicts considered to shape the West European party systems (von Beyme 1985: 23-25)

⁸ For a full list of exactly how each party was coded, please refer to section A.1.1 in the appendix.

2.2.3 The intermediate variables: The value orientations

As mentioned in chapter 1, we wish to assess the relevance of value orientations as intermediate variables between social class and voting. Values are here defined as “conceptions of the desirable which are not directly observable but are evident in moral discourse and relevant to the formulation of attitudes” (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995: 46). To translate unobservable values into an empirically useful device, van Deth and Scarbrough (1995: 41-43; 46) consider attitude patterns which are constrained by the values, called *value orientations*.

While van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) identifies three important value orientations, later work has expanded on this. Knutsen (2012: 4-5) argues that there are five important political value orientations that are relevant for explaining party choice in modern, West-European societies. The first two are derived from the structural cleavage model of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). These are often said to belong to “Old Politics”, meaning that they are related to traditional conflicts in industrial societies. The religious cleavage has given roots to a religious versus secular value orientation. Here, religious values, such as traditional and Christian morals, stand against secular values where people wish to make their own decisions without the guidelines of the church. The Industrial Revolution, in turn, gave rise to a value orientation related to economic ideology, often referred to as economic left-right values or left-right materialist values. The main issues in this value orientation are related to questions of economic (in-)equalities, ownership of the means of production, and conflict over the desirability of a market economy (Knutsen 1995: 160).

Based on a discussion of former works in the subfield, Knutsen (2012: 5-6) uses three value orientations related to “New Politics”, meaning that they are connected to post-industrial conflicts. The first of these is the libertarian-authoritarian value orientation. While libertarians emphasize self-actualisation, autonomy, openness and self-betterment, the authoritarians are concerned with ideas of law and order, authority, discipline, and dutifulness. While both Kitschelt (1994, 1995) and Flanagan (1987) include items related to immigration, patriotism or resistance to ethnic diversity at the authoritarian pole, these have been singled out by Knutsen (2012: 6) as a value orientation in and of themselves. Environmental versus economic growth values are the last, and perhaps most manifest, value orientation related to New Politics.

Utilizing the same data set as Knutsen (2012), namely EVS 2008, we are able to use the exact same operationalization of these value orientations that he did. While the details are to be found in the appendix, a short note should be made here. The indexes were constructed by combining the answers to several substantial questions related to the value orientations at hand. The only exception to this is the religious-secular value orientation, where several substantial questions of the religious beliefs of the respondent were asked and used as a proxy of their religious-secular values. To our credit, we avoid ideological self-placement scales. These receive heavy criticism from scholars such as Evans (2010: 636-637) for confusing the independent and the dependent variable.⁹

To be able to comprehend the analyses in chapter 4, it is vital to know the direction of the indexes. They all go from 0-10. A high score on the economic left-right value orientation (*economic ideology* in chapter 4) indicates a leftist position. A high score on the religious-secular value orientation (*religiosity*) indicates a high level of religiosity. High scores on the environmental versus growth value orientation (*environmental values*) are more concerned with the environment. Higher scores on the libertarian-authoritarian value orientation (*libertarianism*) imply a higher level of libertarianism. The immigration value orientation (*immigration orientations*) has a high score when the respondent is positive to immigration and immigrants. The exact operationalization and construction of the value orientation indexes are discussed in section A.1.2, and descriptive statistics are available in section A.2.3.

2.3 Research Strategy

2.3.1 Description

In chapter 3, we will describe the class basis of the party families in Western Europe. There will be one section for each party family. We will start with a short theoretical subsection with some hypotheses of what to expect from the bivariate relationship between class and voting for the particular party family.

The hypotheses are derived from theoretical expectations of where the classes and party families are positioned in the two-dimensional Western European political space. Inspired by Kitschelt's (1994) framework, we assume that the political space is divided by an economic

⁹ In other words, many voters will for instance place themselves in the «Left»-category if they vote for a party on the Left and vice versa, yielding an overlap between the independent variable (in this case the economic left-right value orientation) and the dependent variable (party choice).

axis (*socialist-capitalist*, in Kitschelt's terminology) and a value axis (*libertarian-authoritarian*). Whereas West European politics were formerly concerned with mainly a materialist conflict of distribution and control of the means of production, modern society has seen an increase in highly educated, client-oriented, female employees. This shift, in turn, has changed the political space from "a simple alternative between socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing the left-libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives" (Kitschelt 1994: 30-31). Kitschelt (1994: 20-27) discusses the position of the different layers of society in this two-dimensional space (see figure 2.2).

[Figure 2.2 here]

This model is our starting point. As we see in figure 2.2, Kitschelt argues that the petite bourgeoisie is both most authoritarian and most economically right-wing. People in low-skill jobs in domestic services and manufacturing are positioned as centrist on the economic axis and authoritarian on the value axis. These are similar to our unskilled workers. Those with "high skill jobs in internationally competitive and service sectors" are assumed to be somewhat less authoritarian, but still centrist economically speaking. The administrative and manual public sector jobs are considered to be somewhat libertarian and left-wing. Liberal professionals and corporate organization men are mostly regarded as authoritarian and economically right-wing. High-skill employees processing symbols and clients in the private sector are fragmented when it comes to economic ideology, but are libertarian. Employees with high education processing symbol and clients in the public sector are placed in the left-libertarian corner of the two-dimensional space.

However, we cannot use this model in its current form, as Kitschelt's classification of social groups differs from the EGP schema. Notably, Kitschelt separates private and public jobs, which our schema does not; whereas our schema separates the manual and service sectors; which Kitschelt does not always do. The main point is that we will use the same *framework*. We will rely on theoretical and empirical contributions throughout chapter 3 and 4 to position the EGP-classes within the two-dimensional political space. We will, as mentioned in section 2.2.3, analytically distinguish the value axis into three different New Politics components: Environmentalism, immigration values, and libertarianism proper. After positioning the classes, we will do the same for the party families. This is similar to what Kitschelt (1994: 30-37) does when he discusses the current positioning and possible future strategies for social democratic parties (see Kitschelt 1994: 32).

Figure 2.2: Ideology and occupational groups in advanced capitalist democracies




Figure 2. Ideology and occupational groups in advanced industrial democracies.

Source: Figure 2 in Kitschelt (1994: 27)

As this is a study of the demand-side of politics, the position of the party families are extracted from relevant literature and assumed to be the same across individual party family members. In reality, individual parties within a party family may of course differ from these positions. Future research should follow the approach recently developed by Evans and De Graaf (2013), integrating the demand and supply side of politics to model the party specific positions – but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The hypotheses are thus also based on a Downsian (1957) view of voting, where we assume that voters normally try to minimize the political distance between the party they vote for and their own views (although in some cases this view may be qualified, see for instance section 3.3.1).

After developing the party family specific hypotheses, we move on to present an empirical part where the support of the party family according to class within each country is presented. By looking at the shares of each class voting for the given party family in each country, we can see whether the class basis is the same for all parties in the party families. The log odds ratios are usually considered in the class voting literature because they are insensitive to

changes in the overall support for parties or party groups (Knutsen 2006: 52). Although this study is not longitudinal, log odds ratios will be used because they are also insensitive to *differences* in the overall support for parties.

There are, however, three problems with log odds ratios. The first is that, although the measure is insensitive to differences in the overall support, small parties are in a way more likely to obtain large (positive or negative) log odds ratios by chance, because a one percentage point increase in support in one social class (which is by far within the margin of error) will increase or decrease the log odds ratio by much more for a party with 1% of the total votes than for a party with 10% of the total votes. This may be dealt with to a certain extent by being especially aware of the absolute percentage differences when considering differences in support for very small parties between social classes. If deviations from the expected log odds ratio pattern in chapter 3 are found to be due to tiny parties, they will not be discussed in detail.

The other problem is that a log odds ratio by definition is a comparison of *two* groups. It shows us how the classes vote compared to the reference group, in our case the unskilled workers. What we need is a coefficient for the total relationship between class and voting. Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) launched the *kappa index* for this purpose, which measures total class voting. By using the standard deviation of the log odds ratios of the classes, we can measure the difference in voting behaviour between the classes. The higher the value, the more the classes differ in their voting behaviour. Whereas the kappa index does not tell us whether the parties within a party family have the *same* class basis, it does give us a handy measure of the *strength* of class voting; i.e. how much the classes differ in voting for each particular party in the particular party family (see also Knutsen 2006: 52-53).

The third problem is that no log odds ratio (and hence no kappa value) can be obtained when a party has no voters in the sample belonging to a particular class in a particular country. This is especially likely when considering the support of small parties within small classes, like the support of the Norwegian Left Socialists within the petite bourgeoisie. As mentioned, this is one of the reasons as to why we combined the farmers with the petite bourgeoisie.

Finally, we conclude chapter 3 by comparing the strength of class voting for each party family. We will do this by calculating the mean of the kappa values for each party within a party family, and a kappa value based on the mean support of the party family. The first measure will illuminate how class based a party family is; the second will help us see to what

degree the party family has the *same* class basis in all countries. We discuss this further in section 3.9.

2.3.2 Testing mechanisms: Multilevel logistic regression

To test one of the mechanisms leading to the differences we find between the classes, we will first analyse the bivariate relationship between class and voting for each party family (model 1 in chapter 4). As the model will be logistic (see below), the coefficient for each class will be their log odds ratio compared to the unskilled workers, our reference group. Based on these log odds ratios, we may calculate a kappa value (the standard deviation of the log odds ratios). The kappa value obtained from a logistic regression without controls is labelled “gross kappa” by Hout et al. (1995: 809), measuring total class voting. In our case we will refer to it as measuring “total *party family specific* class voting”, as our analyses are done separately for each party family.

For each analysis, we will exclude the countries which do not have the relevant party family in its political system. The dependent variable will be a dichotomy: Voting for the specific party family versus voting for any other party family. As Dolezal (2010: 542) did in his analysis of Green voting, we will exclude non-voters and respondents who did not answer the question of what they voted for or what party that appeals the most to them.

Second, we will control for each of the value orientation variables discussed in section 2.2.3 one by one, and see how these change the class coefficients (model 2-6 in chapter 4). As we do not expect any single value orientation to account for all of the class voting, we need a way to measure *how much* of the class voting that is accounted for. We will do this by calculating a kappa value for each model, based on the coefficients of the classes. Hout et al. (1995: 809) refers to this as the “net kappa”. Considering the change in the kappa value after controlling for a value orientation (net kappa) compared with the kappa value from the bivariate model 1 (gross kappa), we will see how much of the total party family specific class voting the value orientation accounts for. It should be mentioned that as the log odds ratios are non-linear measures, a 20 % reduction in the kappa value does not necessarily equal a 20 % reduction in class differences. The reduction in the kappa values, i.e. in total party family specific class voting, will be seen as a rough measure of how much of the class differences the value orientation accounts for.

Finally, we control for all the value orientations at the same time (model 7 in chapter 4), to see how much of the total party family specific class voting they account for together. We will

refer to this as “direct party family specific class voting”. In Hout et al.’s (1995) terminology, we compare the gross kappa with the net kappa.

To visualize the results, we also calculate and plot the predicted probabilities¹⁰ of voting for the particular party family for each class, for a selected few of the models most relevant to our hypotheses. If the differences in predicted probabilities are reduced at any given level of the control variable, the magnitude of the reduction is a sign of how much of the bivariate class-voting relationship we have accounted for.

We need to choose a statistical model that is suitable for the purpose. There are several special statistical traits we must account for with the research question at hand. First, the dependent variable for each analysis will be dichotomous, as mentioned in section 2.2.2. Thus we must use logistic regression to avoid predictions outside the possible range (0-1) and to avoid violation of certain assumptions of linear regression (see Skog 2004: 352-353, 360, 377).

In addition, also the general assumption that every respondent is independent of all other respondents (Skog 2004: 380) may be violated. In many cases respondents are more similar to each other within a given country than between countries: There is *within-country homogeneity*. The respondents are *nested* in their national political systems, meaning that they belong to a country with a political system which has a homogenizing effect on them. This affects the standard errors, as we assume more information from each respondent than we actually obtain (see Bickel 2007: 145; 180).

For each party family to be analysed, we will first test whether the statistical dependency between respondents in each country is large enough to need to be dealt with by for instance multilevel analysis. Since this is multilevel logistic regression, we may perform a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the residual variance at the country level (also called, more generally, “level 2 variance” or “cluster variance”) equals 0. In other words, we test the null hypothesis that the intercept does not vary between countries (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 536). This test is performed for each subchapter before analysis commences, although we expect this test to show country level residual variance – after all, we already know that the support for the party families varies in different countries.¹¹

¹⁰ The predicted marginal or population-averaged probabilities; not the mean or mode of the predicted subject-specific probabilities (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 548-557).

¹¹ As these tests predictably gave the expected results in all cases, they are not reported. The interested reader may be sent the test results on demand.

We can deal with this statistical dependency in several ways. We could use a fixed effects model by incorporating dummy variables for each country except one – this would, however, require a huge amount of extra parameters to be estimated (17 in the case of the Social Democrats) and thus not be very efficient. It may also give inconsistent estimates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 557). We could use ordinary logistic regression with cluster robust standard errors, thus “controlling” for the dependency as a statistical nuisance, or we could use multilevel logistic regression, which considers the variances as interesting in and of themselves. In this thesis, we will employ the latter. This method should be of huge interest to the class voting literature, as it makes it possible to calculate how much the effect of class varies between countries and how much of this variation we can “explain” by adding country level variables, like party polarization or GDP/capita. However, with a class schema of six classes suspected to have non-linear effects, we would have to run a model with six random parameters (the random intercept and five random slopes), meaning that six coefficients are allowed to vary between countries. Logistic multilevel models are computationally demanding even with just the random intercept.¹² For this reason, such a study must be left to others with more computer power, manpower, and time than those we dispose of at the moment.

This is also an important reason for running separate analyses for each party family, rather than running a single multinomial logistic regression where all party families are analysed at the same time. In multinomial logistic regression, each variable would have one coefficient for each category of the dependent variable except the reference category. Even the simple bivariate model with six classes and eight party families would yield more than 35 parameters.

Another issue is that of sample size. Our analyses naturally include between 18 (countries with Social Democratic parties) and 5 (Agrarian) level 2 units. Although there is some disagreement on the topic, a much cited “rule of thumb” is that we at least need 30 level 1 units in each of at least 30 level 2 units to get reliable variance estimates (the *30/30-rule*, see Kreft (1996)). There have also been some discussions about possible bias in coefficients and

¹² and the increase in calculation time is approximately proportional to the number of random coefficients times the number of integration points used (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 541). In this study, the number of integration points has been gradually increased until the results are stable. This has been done for each and every model, as recommended by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012: 540).

standard errors of level 2 variables, but these are not relevant here, as we will not include level 2 variables in this thesis. However, later studies should look closer into this, as mentioned.

In any case, as Andrew Gelman (2014) has briefly argued, multilevel analysis could be used at any number of level 2 units. This is due to the fact that a non-multilevel analysis is equivalent to a multilevel analysis where the level 2 residual variance is set to 0 or infinity, which hardly can be said to be better than a biased estimate. Nevertheless, the intercept variances and changes in these between the models will only briefly be commented upon, and they will not be given considerable weight in our interpretation of the results. For the analyses with the fewest level 2 units, like those including Agrarian parties, we will not discuss the intercept variances at all. When it comes to possible bias in the estimation of the fixed effects in the multilevel models, we will also run all models with an ordinary logistic model with cluster robust standard errors. If these differ substantially from the estimates from the multilevel models, this will be commented upon.

Finally, there is some confusion as to whether or not to use survey weights and how to use them in multilevel logistic regression. The standard function for multilevel logistic regression in Stata at the time of writing, *xtmelogit*, does not even allow the use of weights. Kolenikov (2008) explains this: “The basic reason is that the weights can apply to different levels, and there is no literature consensus as to what’s the best way to go about that even in simpler linear models...”

The models in this thesis are normally run with the regular *xtmelogit* command in Stata, unweighted. To test the robustness of the results – to test whether they are sensitive to small changes in the model specifications – all models are also estimated with the *gllamm* command (see Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004), which allows the use of weights. We will run three alternative specifications: One with total weights on level 1, one with total weights on level 2, and one with separate level 1 and level 2 weights. The models will also, as mentioned, be run with a fourth alternative specification: Ordinary logistic regression with cluster robust standard errors and applied importance weights. If the results differ substantially from those reported in chapter 4, this will be commented upon in footnotes as the “alternative specifications”. The results from all the alternative specifications are available upon request.

In chapter 5, we will conclude the thesis by summing up how much class voting each value orientation accounts for on average, and how this varies by party family.

Chapter 3: The Class Basis of the West-European Party Families

There is no way to explain a phenomenon which we have not yet described properly; or else we would not know what to explain. What follows is a complete description of the class basis of West European parties belonging to either of the party families mentioned above, with two exceptions. The Communist parties have so few voters in the samples from most of the countries (there are exceptions, like Greece and Portugal) that there are plenty of empty cells. This ruins the calculation of log odds ratios and highly affects the kappa values. Thus, there is no subchapter for the Communist parties. Also, the ethnic-regional parties are not presented in this chapter. These are very few (*Svenska Folkpartiet* in Finland; the *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* in Belgium; and the Scottish Nationalist Party and *Plaid Cymru* in Great Britain) and very different from each other – they are also popular with different classes.

First, we will briefly discuss what class basis to expect for each party family given the literature; then we will assess the class basis empirically. The hypotheses about what to expect necessarily include explanatory claims (or at least correlational ones) that attempt to justify the bivariate relationship between class and voting, but notice that even when the class basis is as predicted, this does not confirm the causal claims. True predictions do not necessitate true explanations. In chapter 4, however, we will attempt to test some of the explanations.

The hypotheses are as mentioned mainly derived from theoretical expectations of where the classes are positioned on the two political axes of Kitschelt (1994). These are the economic axis (socialist-capitalist) and the value axis (libertarian-authoritarian). As discussed in chapter 2, we split the New Politics orientations – or what Kitschelt called “libertarianism” – into three value orientations: Environmentalism, immigration orientations, and libertarianism proper. The working classes are assumed to be economically progressive (left-wing), and the service classes to be economically conservative (right-wing). On the other hand, we expect the middle class to be libertarian and the working classes to be authoritarian. We also expect these values to affect voting. These statements are broadly supported in the literature (for a short review, see Achterberg 2006: 241-242). We will go in-depth on what to expect from each social class in the sections to come.

3.1 The Left Socialist Parties

The Left Socialist (hereafter: LS¹³) party family is based on a *post-materialistic* conflict of values, rather than a materialistic conflict of resources (Oesch 2013: 31), although its roots are partly to be found in economic left-opposition to the Social Democrats. After the suppression of the reform movements in Hungary in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in 1968, communism lost much of what was left of its credibility as a progressive force. At the same time, social democracy had prospered with the growing economy which went into recession in 1973, bringing with it the fall of Keynesianism and leaving social democracy in disarray. In the years that followed, the Communist and Social Democratic parties no longer hegemonized the Left, thus opening space for new leftist parties (Eley 2002: 5-8). Among the most successful of these still in existence is the Danish *Socialistisk Folkeparti*. The parties in this party family typically combine a leftist economic view with a libertarian or post-materialistic value stance on issues such as abortion, the protection of the environment, participatory democracy and gay rights (Eley 2002: part IV).

3.1.1 Hypotheses

According to Oesch (2013: 31-32), the rise of the New Left and the Radical Right has been interpreted as signs of the end of class politics, as these parties no longer were based in particular social groups. However, Oesch strongly contends this interpretation and claims that the New Left and Radical Right have diametrically opposed class structures. This is in line with the view of Herbert Kitschelt (1994) that modern societies are divided along a libertarian-authoritarian axis which is based on cultural and value issues (lifestyle, sexuality, immigration, and so on). Kitschelt suggests that the New Left occupies an extreme position along this axis, near the libertarian pole.

Let us first consider the workers. As will be explicated in greater detail in section 3.8 on the Radical Right, workers are especially negative to immigration, both for economic (domestic and international competition) and cultural reasons. In addition, they are prone to authoritarianism due to a comparably low level of education. Kitschelt (1994: 27) places the “low-skill jobs in domestic services and manufacturing” as one of the most authoritarian groups in modern societies. The high skill jobs in the internationally competitive manufacturing and service sectors are seen as occupying a middle ground in this respect. Both

¹³ A list of all abbreviations used in this thesis is to be found in the appendix. The abbreviations and the full names will be used interchangeably based on esthetical considerations.

groups are seen as occupying a centre position along the economic axis in Kitschelt's framework. However, Knutsen (1995: 179-180) anticipate that the working class will be more left materialist. Administrative and manual public sector employees are regarded as more socialist. We suspect that the routine non-manual employees in the EGP schema are more likely to vote Socialist Left than the workers as the former are more often public employees and also (per definition) working in the service sector, which is less affected by economic competition from abroad.

The petite bourgeoisie (which includes the farmers) combines low education and strong authoritarianism with higher income and more right-wing economic views than the workers (see Kitschelt 1994: 27).

The LS parties are believed to occupy an extreme left-libertarian position in Kitschelt's framework, i.e. be libertarian on issues like crime, sexuality and immigration, while favouring redistribution or at the very least a large public sector. Thus, the following hypotheses may be extracted:

Hypothesis 3.1.1: The petite bourgeoisie is least likely to vote Left Socialist

Hypothesis 3.1.2: Unskilled manual workers are more likely to vote Left Socialist than the petite bourgeoisie, but less so than the other classes

Hypothesis 3.1.3: Skilled manual workers are more likely to vote Left Socialist than the unskilled ones, but less likely than the non-manual employees

If these hypotheses turn out to be true, the idea that we need a more nuanced party choice variable is strengthened, as they imply that workers disproportionately rarely vote for this party family, which would be considered "Left" when using the dichotomous dependent variable. This could partly explain why traditional and overall left-right class voting seem to be declining.

The service classes in many ways occupy the other extreme of the petite bourgeoisie when it comes to the value axis. Highly educated, skilled and seldom facing economic competition from immigrants, the service classes are likely to be libertarian. This is in line with Inglehart's (1990) argument that in modern society, the affluent are less occupied with material questions, and more with *post-materialistic* issues – which overlap to a certain degree with what Kitschelt terms "libertarian" values (Achterberg 2006: 240). However, the group is divided when it comes to the economic axis. Whereas some scholars, like John Goldthorpe

(1982), claim that the service classes will be *conservative*, others have claimed that they are more fragmented (see Knutsen 1995: 181; 2006: 6-7). Assuming that the service classes are the most libertarian along the value axis and fragmented along the economic axis, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3.1.4: The service classes will be most likely to vote Left Socialist.

3.1.2 The Class Basis of the Socialist Left in Western Europe

Table 3.1 shows the percentage of the respondents in the EVS data that said they would vote for the Left Socialist party in their national elections, by country and class. The calculated kappa value for each party is observed in the column to the right.

Table 3.1: Support for the Left Socialist parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Denmark ¹⁴	14	24	32	4	15	20	21	0.77
Finland	3	3	7	5	15	13	6	0.73
Iceland	13	25	25	19	11	20	20	0.37
Norway	10	7	7	3	0	6	7	-
Sweden	4	8	8	4	9	8	8	0.38
Ireland	3	5	9	4	18	17	10	0.73
Germany	12	11	9	6	14	12	11	0.30
Luxembourg	2	4	1	0	1	1	2	-
Netherlands	10	11	16	1	12	16	12	1.00
France	4	6	5	5	11	8	6	0.38
Greece	15	21	8	5	9	10	10	0.53
Italy	5	2	4	4	4	1	3	0.64
Portugal	11	17	9	3	5	2	7	0.83
Spain	17	14	8	3	10	7	9	0.56
Mean	9	11	11	5	10	10	9	

Hypothesis 3.1.1 is generally confirmed. The petite bourgeoisie is least likely to vote LS in most countries, although there are some exceptions. The *Vasemmistoliitto* (LWA, Left-Wing Alliance) in Finland is even less popular amongst the service class, which is normally the most eager supporter of this party family. The LWA was formerly a Communist party. Although it has taken sincere steps in a post-materialist direction, it still has retained some of

¹⁴ The countries are sorted first by region, then alphabetically within the regions. This is done to facilitate regional comparisons.

its Old Politics profile, and it takes time to change the electoral base. In addition, the Green party in Finland has been dominant on New Politics issues, decreasing the political space for a whole-hearted New Politics turn for the LWA (Ziliacus 2001). In Iceland both the skilled workers and the higher service class are less prone to support the *VG* than the petite bourgeoisie. In Portugal the unskilled workers are – barely – less likely to vote for the *Bloco de Esquerda* (Left Bloc) than the petite bourgeoisie. This might also be due to issues of political space. The Portuguese party system includes both a sizeable Communist Party and a Social Democratic party which are both popular with the workers (see table 3.3).

Given that hypothesis 3.1.1 is generally supported, the first part of hypothesis 3.1.2 is also, per definition, generally supported. In most countries the Socialist Left is less popular with the petite bourgeoisie than with the unskilled workers. However, the unskilled manual workers are in general not the second least prone to vote Socialist Left. The higher service class votes less for the Left Socialists than the unskilled workers do. For the skilled workers, the picture is mixed. In most Nordic and Western Central European countries, they are less likely to vote Left Socialist than the unskilled ones, contrary to hypothesis 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. In all Southern European countries except Greece, the voting pattern is in line with hypothesis 3.1.2.

Contrary to the second part of hypothesis 3.1.3, the routine non-manual employees also show a mixed picture. In the Nordic countries they vote similar to or more in favour of the Left Socialists than the skilled workers. In the Central West, the pattern is the opposite. In the South, the picture is mixed. Hypothesis 3.1.3 is thus not generally confirmed.

The lower service class is the class that is most inclined to vote for the Left Socialist parties only in a few countries, contrary to hypothesis 3.1.4. However, the lower service class is consistently amongst the most ardent supporters of the Left Socialist party family. This could reduce traditional or overall left-right class voting, but not total class voting. The higher service class is divided. In some countries, they are most likely to vote LS, such as in Spain and Norway. In France and Sweden, they are least likely to vote LS.

We also notice that there are considerable cross-national variations in the strength of class voting for the Socialist Left. We see that total LS class voting is particularly strong in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy and Portugal, and particularly weak in Germany, Iceland, Sweden, and France. Greece and Spain are in intermediate positions.

3.2 The Green Parties

The Green parties were created in response to materialism and as a protest against the growth-orientation of society (von Beyme 1985: 24). Their main concern is, obviously, the protection of the environment, but their agenda usually also contain other elements of post-materialism, such as an emphasis on participation, democracy, the right to privacy, women's rights, and so on (von Beyme 1985: 130-131). The Global Greens, an organization with 91 Green parties as members across the globe, includes these themes in its 2012 Charter (GlobalGreens 2012).

3.2.1 Hypotheses

Green parties are part of the same New Politics category as the Left Socialist parties. In fact they could be seen as even more extreme “post-materialists” than the Left Socialists, as many of them share the view that material politics are no longer of fundamental importance, whereas the Left Socialists often emphasize their socialist views along the economic axis. Indeed, this has led observers such as von Beyme (1985: 131) to note that these parties do not seem to have any common class basis. He is sceptical of the claim that the new middle class will form the social basis of the Green parties. This is partly because he finds that it is difficult to position these parties along the economic axis, and that there is considerable cross-national variation in these parties orientations’ along this axis (von Beyme 1985: 132). He also notes that these parties have a tendency to gather some protest votes, blurring the social basis even more. Dolezal (2010: 536) claims that cleavages have not been seen as relevant for Green parties and that their “very existence has also been interpreted as an indicator of the overall decline of cleavage politics per se”, although he strongly contends this.

We suspect that the new middle class will be somewhat more likely to vote Green than other classes. This includes the upper service class. High education gives them a certain post-materialist value basis¹⁵, and since the Green parties are not necessarily socialist on the economic axis like the Left Socialists, the high income of the higher service class perhaps does not affect the Green vote.

We develop the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3.2.1: There will be no large differences between the classes.

¹⁵ Although here we would benefit from the use of Oesch's (2006) class schema to differentiate between groups within the service classes (see Dolezal 2010: 537-538).

Hypothesis 3.2.2: We expect the service classes (both higher and lower) to vote somewhat more in favour of the Greens than the other classes.

3.2.2 The Class Basis of Green Parties in Western Europe

Table 3.2: Support for Green parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Finland	18	21	18	3	5	15	16	0.78
Sweden	7	12	13	7	1	7	10	0.80
Ireland	3	10	7	0	1	2	5	-
UK	7	10	9	10	5	10	9	0.25
Austria	21	18	17	5	9	7	14	0.63
Belgium	14	20	18	9	6	6	13	0.55
Germany	12	15	13	9	9	6	11	0.35
Luxembourg	14	22	18	14	11	12	16	0.29
Netherlands	5	10	3	5	2	4	6	0.54
Switzerland	14	19	15	0	11	5	14	-
France	9	13	11	5	10	10	10	0.34
Italy	2	3	3	0	1	2	2	-
Mean	11	14	12	6	6	7	10	

Hypothesis 3.2.1 receives no support from the data. Even in the UK, the country with the *smallest* class differences, the Green party still has twice as much support amongst the lower service class (10%) as amongst the skilled workers (5%).

Hypothesis 3.2.2 is supported, but needs some adjustment. The lower service class is in fact the most ardent supporters of the Green parties in ten of the twelve countries. This is in line with the findings of Dolezal (2010) in his analysis of 12 countries, although he utilizes a different class schema than ours. In Austria, this role is held by the higher service class, and in Sweden by the routine non-manual employees. The Green parties are thus clearly socially based in the service classes, notably the lower one.

What we did not anticipate was that the *routine non-manual employees* would reveal themselves as the second most eager supporters of the Greens in eight of the twelve countries. The exceptions are the Netherlands, where the higher service class is second; Austria, where the lower service class is second; and of course Sweden where the routine non-manual employees are most Green of all the social classes. In addition, they are marginally below three other classes in the UK: 9% of the routine non-manual employees vote Green, whereas 10% of the lower service class, petite bourgeoisie, and unskilled workers do the same.

The higher service class is third most likely to vote Green in nine out of twelve countries. The exceptions are the UK (7%); Austria (where it is most prone to vote Green); and France where the skilled and unskilled workers vote approximately as Green as the higher service class, while the lower service class and routine non-manuals are even Greener.

The conclusion, contrary to the claims of von Beyme (1985), is that Green parties are indeed class based parties. We also notice the cross-national differences in class voting for Green parties. It is especially high in Finland and Sweden ($>.70$), and low in the UK, Germany, Luxembourg, and France ($<.40$). Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands are in intermediate positions.

3.3 The Social Democratic Parties

The Social Democratic parties were the first parties to extend the political space in Western European party systems from the battle over the principles of the French revolution between the Conservatives and the Liberals, to the battle over the principles of economic (re-)distribution – materialism (von Beyme 1985: 59-60). Although these parties often started off with a Marxist outlook, the conflict after the Russian Revolution split the Marxists off into Communist parties in many countries, thus moderating the Social Democratic parties (Brandal et al. 2013, von Beyme 1985).

3.3.1 Hypotheses

The Social Democratic parties used to be class parties *par excellence*. They originated as the representatives of the workers in the conflict between labour and capital and they are the only party family to be represented in *all* Western European countries (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Knutsen (2006: 54) claims that “the parties that can be expected to be most strongly anchored in social classes are the parties based on the cleavages that sprang out of the Industrial Revolution”, and then suggests that these are the Communist, Social Democratic, and Liberal parties.

Kitschelt places the workers in a centre-left position when it comes to economic policy. He does not differentiate between skilled and unskilled workers in this regard. He does, however, see the unskilled ones as somewhat more authoritarian (see figure 2.2).

Where should we assume that the Social Democratic parties are placed in the two-dimensional political space? Originally, these were no doubt close to the socialist pole on the economic axis. Today, however, this depends on what strategy they chose when the political space

turned two-dimensional. According to Kitschelt (1994: 32-33), they would be well-advised to turn more libertarian and more economically right-wing, to keep the votes of the educated workers in internationally competitive manufacturing industries who no longer support growth of the public sector. Arzheimer (2013: 78-79) claims that this has indeed happened in many cases. Von Beyme (1985: 75) also notes that the social democratic parties have changed their strategy and expanded their target group, becoming catch-all parties rather than appealing solely to workers.

It is far from easy to theorize about the class basis of the Social Democrats. Many of these parties have, as mentioned, gone through important changes, like the British party which changed profoundly under Tony Blair. In addition, the political space has changed dramatically for many Social Democratic parties, with the rise of the “new worker parties”, namely the Radical Right (see section 3.8).

And there is more to this party family than only the Downsian version of politics. The historical legacy cannot be dismissed, especially of the close ties between the trade unions and the social democrats (see for instance Brandal et al. 2013: chapter 1-4 for a historical overview). In spite of possible recent changes, the Social Democrats are likely to be seen as parties representing the economic interests of the workers against those of employers and owners. Although probably weaker than before, we hypothesise a linear relationship: The more the class is affiliated with the economic interests of workers, the more support for the labour parties.

Thus we need to rank the classes on the basis of their economic interests. Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006) discuss this issue based on three criteria: Economic security, economic stability, and economic prospects. Economic security is measured as experience of unemployment: This is highest for the unskilled workers, then the skilled workers, then the three non-manual classes, and lowest for the petite bourgeoisie¹⁶ (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006: 113-114). Economic stability is measured by what kind of pay one receives. The pattern is similar: The classes characterised by a labour contract have less economic stability than those characterised by a service relationship. The exception is the petite bourgeoisie, which is marked by the most instability due its class position, earning their money through market transactions (Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006: 116-121). Finally, the economic prospects are

¹⁶ Although the authors specify that there are other sources of economic insecurity for the petty bourgeoisie

measured as the relationship between earnings and age. These show a similar ranking of the classes, although the position of the petite bourgeoisie is somewhat unclear due to methodological problems and underreporting of income (Goldthorpe and McKnight: 121-129). Kitschelt suggests that the petite bourgeoisie are most right-oriented in economic questions (see figure 2.2). Based on this information, we rank the classes as follows:

Hypothesis 3.3.1: The classes will vote in the following rank (from highest to lowest probability of voting Social Democratic): 1) Unskilled workers; 2) skilled workers; 3) routine non-manual employees; 4) lower service class; 5) higher service class; 6) petite bourgeoisie.

3.3.2 The Class Basis of the Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe

Table 3.3: Support for the Social Democratic parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Denmark	17	23	20	12	27	29	22	0.37
Finland	10	19	26	2	40	24	19	1.19
Iceland	35	25	25	14	32	23	26	0.40
Norway	26	26	35	14	30	45	30	0.50
Sweden	17	18	37	11	49	47	29	0.79
Ireland	7	12	10	0	9	7	8	-
UK	17	23	36	28	28	44	29	0.42
Austria	27	21	33	25	40	50	33	0.44
Belgium	16	19	18	14	38	40	24	0.56
Germany	17	21	28	15	24	29	24	0.31
Luxembourg	20	19	26	11	39	29	24	0.51
Netherlands	11	15	18	7	22	26	16	0.50
Switzerland	21	22	20	22	13	25	21	0.26
France	26	26	34	9	31	32	28	0.54
Greece	38	24	33	34	27	36	33	0.23
Italy	32	39	33	30	30	29	33	0.15
Portugal	11	38	36	24	44	40	37	0.64
Spain	25	40	50	43	53	56	48	0.44
Mean	21	24	29	18	32	34	27	

The hypothesis is by and large supported. The total mean shows the exact same order as hypothesised. The social democratic parties are most popular amongst the unskilled manual workers in most of the countries, and the skilled workers follow suit, although in some cases (most noteworthy Finland, Iceland, and Luxembourg) the order is reversed. In Ireland, the

Labour Party is second *least* popular amongst the unskilled workers, but then the Irish Labour Party is also a very special case (see for instance Orridge 1974; von Beyme 1985: 65). In Italy, the *Partito Democratico* (PD) is *least* popular amongst the unskilled workers, although they are only 1-2 percentage points behind the other groups except the low service class, with which the PD is most popular.

The routine non-manual employees make up the third largest group of social democratic voters, as hypothesised. This holds true in most countries, although in some countries the Social Democrats are slightly more or slightly less popular with this group. For instance, in France, the *Parti Socialiste* is *most* popular with the routine non-manual employees, but only by two percentage points more than the unskilled workers and three more than the skilled ones.

The service classes are generally second least prone to vote for the European labour parties. There is no large difference between the higher and lower service class in total, although the higher service class to a somewhat lesser degree votes in favour of labour parties, as hypothesised. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, there are rather large differences between the two classes (in Greece the *PASOK* are more popular amongst the higher than the lower service class). In Iceland, the *Samfylkingin-Jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands* is most popular with the higher service class.

The European labour parties are least popular with the petite bourgeoisie in total. This is also true in 11 of the 18 countries. However, in the UK, Spain and Portugal, the Social Democrats are even less popular with the higher service class. In Austria the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs* (SPÖ) is least popular with the lower service class. In Switzerland, the *Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz* has the support of approximately a fourth of all classes except the skilled workers, which for some reason avoid this party.¹⁷

We note that total SD class voting is extremely high in the case of the Finnish *Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue* ($\kappa > 1$). This is due to the fact that this party has extremely low support amongst the petite bourgeoisie (around 2%), whereas it ranges from 10-40% in the other groups.¹⁸ Total SD class voting is also relatively high in Sweden, Belgium, the

¹⁷ Perhaps because they vote *en masse* for the Swiss radical right party, *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (see section 3.8.2)

¹⁸ The Finnish petite bourgeoisie generally votes for the Radical Right (29%), the Agrarian party (26%) and the Conservatives (24%).

Netherlands, and Portugal. It is low in Denmark, the UK, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, and extremely low in Greece and Italy (0.16 and 0.10).

3.4 The Agrarian Parties

The Agrarian parties were created in response to one of the two class cleavages, namely the conflict between producers and consumers in the commodity market. As mentioned, this cleavage has been integrated into existing parties in most Western European countries, but in all the Nordic countries independent Agrarian parties were established to protect the interests of the agrarian producers (Knutsen 2006: xi-xii). This was in part due to the fact that in these countries, there were important cultural barriers between rural and urban areas. This cultural conflict was added to the already bitter economic conflict, combining to make both conflicts worse (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 44-46).

3.4.1 Hypotheses

It is challenging to study the class basis of the Agrarian parties. First of all it is hard to distinguish the *economic* from the *cultural* conflict. Second, we would expect simply that the rural producers of agrarian products vote disproportionately in favour of these parties, while the urban consumers do not. In the EGP class schema, the producers would correspond to the farmers (here included in the petite bourgeoisie) and the agricultural workers (here part of the unskilled workers). The class schema was simplified this way to make possible the analysis of the other party families without getting too many empty cells. However, it distorts the analysis of the Agrarian parties. To remedy this, I have done the analyses also with the more extensive EGP class schema, but the results are merely commented on here, not analysed fully. Future research should focus on separate analysis of this party family with a suitable class schema.

As the Agrarian parties are clearly representatives of the interests of a very particular group, namely the rural producers of agricultural products, we expect these to vote Agrarian. The industrial areas are often concentrated near or in the cities, and so are the workplaces related to higher education and finance. We thus expect the workers and middle classes to be mostly urban, with the exception of the unskilled workers, because they include the agricultural workers. In the countries with Agrarian parties, there are a total of 717 people in the “unskilled worker” category. Of these, about 10% are farm labourers. We derive the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3.4.1: The petite bourgeoisie is most likely to vote Agrarian

Hypothesis 3.4.2: The unskilled workers will also vote somewhat more in favour of the Agrarian parties than the rest of the classes, except the petite bourgeoisie

3.4.2 The Class Basis of the Agrarian Parties

Table 3.4: Support for the Agrarian parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Denmark	35	27	24	59	27	24	30	0.53
Finland	10	14	12	39	5	14	14	0.72
Iceland	5	11	16	20	15	19	13	0.51
Norway	2	7	5	29	6	10	7	0.88
Sweden	5	4	2	15	3	4	4	0.66
Mean	11	12	12	32	11	14	14	

Hypothesis 3.4.1 is strongly supported. The petite bourgeoisie is most likely to vote Agrarian in all countries, with a great margin everywhere but Iceland. This is mostly due to the farmers, although the Agrarian parties are popular also with the other parts of the petite bourgeoisie.

When we separate the farmers from the petite bourgeoisie, we get the pattern in table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Support for the Agrarian parties among petite bourgeoisie and farmers, in percent

	Petite bourg.	Farmers
Denmark	50	71
Finland	28	59
Iceland	20	26
Norway	13	60
Sweden	6	45
Mean	23	52

The largest difference between the two classes is in Sweden, where very few of the petite bourgeoisie vote for *Centern* (6%), whereas almost half the farmers vote for this party.

Hypothesis 3.4.2 is supported by the data in Finland, Iceland, and Norway, where the unskilled workers are second most likely to vote Agrarian. In Sweden, they are about as likely as the other classes (4%) except the petite bourgeoisie which is about three times as likely to vote Agrarian (15%). In Denmark, 24% of the unskilled workers vote Agrarian, compared with 24-35% for the other classes. The Agrarian party family may thus contribute to reduce traditional and overall left-right class voting somewhat, at least in three countries, as the

unskilled workers vote slightly in favour of this party family which is normally considered as part of the “Right”.

Total Agrarian class voting is especially strong in Norway, notably because of the large difference between the petite bourgeoisie (29%) and the other classes (2-10%). Total Agrarian class voting is also rather strong in Sweden, for the same reason (15% versus 2-5%), and Finland (39% vs 5-14%). It is moderate in Iceland, but rather weak in Denmark, in spite of the fact that an impressive six out of ten petty bourgeois vote Agrarian. This is because *Venstre* is rather popular in all classes, with support ranging from 24% amongst the unskilled workers to 35% amongst the higher service class.

3.5 The Liberal Parties

The Liberal parties of today have their roots in the liberalism and radicalism of the 18th century, leading back to the conflict with the old regimes over the values of the French Revolution (von Beyme 1985: 31-35). Together with the Conservative parties, these were usually the earliest parties to form.

3.5.1 Hypotheses

Liberalism is, and has always been, connected to the protection of the bourgeois concept of private property. At the same time, liberals have been engaged in the support of human and civil rights, pluralism and regionalism, education policy and *social* liberalism (von Beyme 1985: 36-39). Today, other post-materialist values such as environmental protection and personal privacy have become important for liberal parties. We position the Liberal party family as a *right-libertarian* party family – right-leaning on the economic axis, libertarian on the cultural axis. Von Beyme (1985: 44-45) discussed the loss of middle class monopoly and the erosion of the Liberals’ social basis due to the decline of the old middle class, but he predicted (rather correctly; see the next subsection) that the new middle class gradually would replace the old as the social basis of the Liberal parties.

Due to the new focus on some post-materialist issues, it could be that the service classes will vote disproportionately in favour of the Liberals. In addition, Knutsen (2006: 54) identifies the Liberal party family as the strongest defender of the capitalists in the conflict between labour and capital. We hypothesize the opposite pattern of the Social Democrats: the more the class is tied to capitalist economic interests, the more popular the Liberals will be with the class (see section 3.3.1 for a discussion of how the class interests were derived).

Hypothesis 3.5.1: The classes will vote in the following rank (from highest to lowest probability of voting Liberal): 1) petite bourgeoisie; 2) higher service class; 3) lower service class; 4) routine non-manual employees; 5) skilled workers; 6) unskilled workers.

3.5.2 The Class Basis of the Liberal Parties in Western Europe

Table 3.6: Support for the Liberal parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Denmark	11	11	5	1	5	1	7	0.96
Norway	9	7	6	1	4	3	6	0.64
Sweden	17	11	7	4	3	2	9	0.83
UK	22	15	13	5	16	12	15	0.52
Austria	5	7	5	0	0	1	4	-
Belgium	26	15	18	34	12	11	17	0.51
Germany	14	14	8	20	8	5	10	0.52
Luxembourg	26	15	15	22	22	22	19	0.26
Netherlands	22	15	12	26	18	5	16	0.58
Switzerland	25	20	19	19	9	12	19	0.43
France	16	18	16	20	12	6	15	0.46
Portugal	25	22	31	27	27	40	31	0.27
Mean	18	14	13	15	11	10	14	

The hypothesis is generally confirmed, with one exception. Comparing the total mean, we see that the higher service class is even more supportive of the Liberals than the petite bourgeoisie (18% vs 15%). This is true in seven of the twelve countries, whereas the classes are more equal in the remaining five.

This is partly due to the fact that the farmers, who are economically right-wing and culturally authoritarian, are not particularly prone to vote Liberal (this was confirmed by analysing the class basis with farmers separated from the petite bourgeoisie). The other classes are in general ranked as hypothesised.

Breaking it down by country, the Liberals are most popular within the higher service class or the petite bourgeoisie in all countries except Austria and Portugal. The lower service class is most prone to vote for the Austrian *Liberales Forum*, whereas it is surprisingly the unskilled workers who vote most for the *Partido Social Democrata*. This is, however, a somewhat special version of a Liberal party, which its name also suggests. Note also that in the UK and in Norway, the petite bourgeoisie is *least* likely to vote Liberal.

The unskilled workers act as hypothesised in 7 out of 12 countries, and in three of the remaining five countries they are the second least likely to vote Liberal. In the UK and Norway, this is due to the aforementioned voting of the petite bourgeoisie. In Luxembourg, both the lower service class and the routine non-manual employees are less likely to vote Liberal than the unskilled workers. In Switzerland, the skilled workers have a lower log odds ratio than the unskilled ones. The last country is Portugal.

The skilled workers are less prone to vote Liberal than the unskilled in all countries except Luxembourg (equal proportions), Switzerland, and Portugal. They are less likely to vote Liberal than the rest of the classes in all countries except Norway and the UK (as mentioned), the Netherlands and Portugal. In the Netherlands, both the lower service class and the routine non-manual employees are less likely to vote Liberal than the skilled workers.

Total Liberal class voting is by far most widespread in the Nordic countries. This is because the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers almost never vote for this party family (1-4%), whereas the service classes often do (7-17%). Total Liberal class voting is very low in Portugal and Luxembourg, while it is at a moderate level for the rest of the Liberal parties.

3.6 The Christian Democratic Parties

Religious parties were often formed as a part of the counter-reaction to Liberal or secular legislation in the 19th century, especially related to education. However, they did not turn into mass parties until after the Second World War. Today, they vary from the Protestant parties in Scandinavia to the Catholic ones in Belgium and Austria (von Beyme 1985: 81-85).

3.6.1 Hypotheses

The Christian Democratic parties see themselves as somewhat outside the two political axes, and they are generally against the class war. Compared to the pre-war religious parties, the Christian Democratic parties established after the Second World War were cross-confessional, i.e. no longer strictly Catholic, and thus increased their cross-class appeal. They also incorporated a number of central, shared values in the time after the war, like support for human rights, anti-communism, and democracy. In addition, they want to even out the differences between the social classes: “More than other parties, the Christian Democrats stress that they are *catch-all parties*” (von Beyme 1985: 93). Kalyvas and van Kersbergen (2010: 187) explain that the need to incorporate diverse class interests within the parties also

created a successful appeal across classes and sectors outside the parties, and that the CD parties have emphasized religion at the expense of class.

Knutsen (2006: 55-56) also emphasizes their cross-class appeal, although he suggests that they may enjoy more support in the rural parts of the population due to their more conservative stances in several cultural issues, *and* because the rural population usually is more religious than the urban. This is mostly relevant to the petite bourgeoisie (which includes farmers) and the unskilled workers (which include agricultural workers).

Hypothesis 3.6.1: We expect no great differences between the classes.

Hypothesis 3.6.2: The petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers will be somewhat more prone to vote Christian Democratic than the other classes.

3.6.2 The Class Basis of Christian Democratic parties

Table 3.7: Support for the Christian Democratic parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Finland	3	3	3	0	0	1	2	-
Norway	4	5	12	1	4	3	6	0.69
Sweden	4	6	2	2	0	6	4	-
Ireland	24	27	25	32	22	14	23	0.33
Austria	31	23	20	42	18	22	24	0.40
Belgium	22	27	24	30	25	23	25	0.14
Germany	41	37	39	43	39	38	39	0.09
Luxembourg	28	30	29	42	13	23	27	0.48
Netherlands	21	17	21	34	16	28	21	0.34
Switzerland	15	10	14	17	10	15	13	0.34
Italy	13	11	12	8	9	7	10	0.24
Mean	19	18	18	23	14	16	18	

As we see, hypothesis 3.6.1 is supported by the data. The CDU/CSU in Germany is the most extreme case of a cross-class Christian Democratic party: Its support ranges from 37% in the lower service class to 43% in the petite bourgeoisie, and the kappa value is merely 0.09.

There are no large differences between the classes, as indicated by the low kappa values. The only notable exception is the Norwegian *Kristelig Folkeparti* (KrF) with its kappa of 0.66. This is due to the routine non-manuals voting disproportionately in favour of the KrF (12%), at the same time that the petite bourgeoisie does not vote for the KrF (1%). The other classes vary from 3-5%.

In Luxembourg, the *Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei* also has a somewhat higher kappa value than the others, namely 0.36. This is mainly caused by the great support amongst the petite bourgeoisie (42%) and the low support amongst the skilled workers (13%). The other classes vary from 23-30%.

Hypothesis 3.6.2 also gets some support, but only for a limited area. The petite bourgeoisie is the most likely to vote Christian Democratic in all countries in Central Western Europe (which counts six out of ten relevant countries). In the Nordic countries, however, it is amongst the rarest supporters of Christian Democracy – perhaps because the Nordic countries have Agrarian parties, which the farmers largely flock to. This idea is strengthened by the fact that when analysing farmers separately from the petite bourgeoisie, the Christian Democratic support amongst the petite bourgeoisie falls drastically in Central Western Europe, but not in the Nordic countries.¹⁹ The low petite bourgeoisie support for CD parties in the Nordic countries could also be due to the fact that these parties are more left-wing than their Continental counterparts (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 188). The hypothesis does not seem to hold when it comes to the unskilled workers.

3.7 The Conservative parties

Conservative parties were amongst the first to develop, usually as a defensive response to Liberal parties. Although they have gone through considerable ideological changes, they still share scepticism to rapid change and faith in traditional values. What have changed, however, are their economic policies – these have become more or less neoliberal since the 1970s. We may thus describe these parties as right-authoritarian in general, which is also what Kitschelt (1994; 1995) suggests.

3.7.1 Hypotheses

The shift in economic policy is partly due to the changing class basis of the Conservative parties. While originally existing for the nobility and clergy, they have become increasingly popular amongst the upper middle classes and even in some parts of the working class (von Beyme 1985: 46-51). However, with the strong emphasis on neoliberalism as some of the old Liberal parties moved towards social-liberal positions, we expect the Conservatives to be “the parties for the bourgeoisie and the upper-middle class” (Knutson 2006: 55; see also von

¹⁹ In fact, between 26 (Iceland) and 71 (Denmark) percent of the farmers in our sample vote Agrarian in the Nordic countries, and only 0-4% vote Christian Democratic. On the other hand, around 70% of the farmers in all Central Western European countries vote Christian Democratic (except in Switzerland, where only 17% do so).

Beyme 1985: 50-52), and inversely, the nemesis of the working class – along the economic axis. Given the former discussion of the economic interests of the classes, this also implies that the petite bourgeoisie may vote disproportionately in favour of this party family.

The value axis, however, complicates the picture. First of all, there is some considerable variation between the parties in this regard (the Norwegian Conservatives, for instance, describe themselves as both conservative *and* liberal, see Høyre 2014). Also, whether workers will vote for this party family or not, given that they share their somewhat authoritarian outlook but not their economic policies, depends on whether the economic axis or the value axis is most important. Here, we will assume that Old Politics are still more important than New Politics for Conservative voting, and thus that the workers will not vote Conservative. The petite bourgeoisie, sharing both the economic *and* value outlook of the Conservatives, will vote disproportionately in favour of this party family.

Hypothesis 3.7.1: The higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie will be most likely to vote Conservative

Hypothesis 3.7.2: The workers (of all sorts) will be least likely to vote Conservative

Hypothesis 3.7.3: The lower service class will be in a middle position between the workers on the one hand and the higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie on the other

3.7.2 The Class Basis of Conservative Parties

Table 3.8: Support for Conservative parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Denmark	15	7	5	16	6	4	8	0.60
Finland	45	35	21	24	11	8	29	0.76
Iceland	39	26	29	37	21	27	30	0.31
Norway	29	24	12	15	11	5	18	0.67
Sweden	43	35	20	46	17	11	28	0.71
Ireland	47	31	41	34	41	45	40	0.23
UK	47	43	36	38	36	22	38	0.37
France	34	22	18	41	16	14	22	0.54
Greece	30	22	26	38	35	27	31	0.27
Italy	27	21	19	31	26	32	26	0.25
Portugal	18	0	4	6	0	0	2	-
Spain	46	31	27	42	31	22	30	0.37
Mean	35	25	22	31	21	18	25	

Hypothesis 3.7.1 is supported. It holds in seven out of 12 countries. The exceptions are Finland, Norway, and the UK, where the lower service class is more likely to vote Conservative than the petite bourgeoisie. In addition, the unskilled workers are about as prone to vote *Il Popolo della Libertà* as the petite bourgeoisie is. Ireland is, as usual, different from the other countries. Here the Conservative party is *least* popular amongst the lower service class and the petite bourgeoisie.

Hypothesis 3.7.2 is also strongly supported. In seven out of 12 countries, the unskilled, skilled, and routine non manual employees are less likely than the other classes to vote Conservative. In Iceland, Greece, and Portugal, the lower service class is least likely to vote Conservative. In Italy, *Il Popolo della Libertà* (PdL), a somewhat untypical Conservative group, is actually relatively popular with both the skilled and unskilled workers.

Hypothesis 3.7.3 receives much less support. The lower service class does only take this middle position in Denmark, Sweden, France, and Spain.

Total Conservative class voting is especially important in the Nordic countries (except Iceland), and to some degree in France. It is lower in the other countries, especially in Ireland with a kappa value of only 0.14.

3.8 The Radical Right Parties

The Radical Right party family (from now on: RR) is perhaps the most studied party family, which explains why this subsection is somewhat longer and more theoretically sophisticated than the others. The RR is one of the main reasons as to why we need to stop measuring party choice as left versus right. As Rydgren (2013: 1-3) writes, the RR has started changing its economic policy from neo-liberal to centre or even leftist policies, but the main reason that workers vote for the RR is that they agree with its *socio-cultural* rightist policies – i.e. its stances in questions such as immigration and authoritarianism (see Kitschelt 2013).

3.8.1 Hypotheses

The RR is often labelled the “new worker parties”. In the literature we find several theoretical arguments of why this is so. One kind of explanation is *economic*. Workers tend to be the “losers” (economically speaking) of modernization and globalization due to both increased economic competition domestically from immigrants (over jobs and social services), and due to increased competition internationally from countries with lower labour costs. Thus they

tend to vote in favour of parties which are against both immigration and globalization – i.e. the RR (see Betz and Meret 2013: 109-111; Oskarson and Demker 2013: 175; Oesch 2008).

A second kind of explanation is *cultural*. Due to low education, workers are claimed to lack the cognitive development necessary to prevent generalizations and scapegoating; to lack the teaching of communicative interaction skills and the socialization of specific norms related to avoiding prejudices, and so on. Hence they are more prone to have authoritarian values and to feel threatened by foreign cultures, and thus vote for anti-immigrant and authoritarian parties like the RR (Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013: 126, 131; Coffé 2013: 138; Oesch 2008). This should also mean that unskilled workers are even more likely than skilled workers to vote for the RR, as they have lower education and are more directly exposed to the economic competition of immigrants. Based on these theoretical arguments, we deduce the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3.8.1: Workers will vote disproportionately in favour of the RR

Hypothesis 3.8.2: Unskilled workers will vote more in favour of the RR than skilled workers

Based on the theoretical arguments above, we may infer that the highly educated or high income groups will show the opposite tendency. The middle classes are *winners* of globalization – especially the sociocultural specialists – and thus not likely to vote for the RR (Bornschiefer and Kriesi 2013: 17).

Hypothesis 3.8.3: The RR will be least popular amongst the service classes.

According to Kitschelt (2013: 230-232), there is no reason to distinguish between manual and non-manual labour, as these groups are performing analytically similar tasks. It has also been noted that the routine non-manual employees are similar to manual workers in their low salary, absence of career structure, low workplace autonomy, and so on (Evans 2005). Thus one might think that they will vote like the manual workers. However, they are less exposed to competition from immigrants and/or economic competition from developing countries. This goes in particular for the ones employed in the public sector. We therefore hypothesise a middle position for the routine non-manual employees.

Hypothesis 3.8.4: The routine non-manual employees will vote more in favour of the RR than the service classes, but less so than the workers.

The small business owners are also somewhere in between: They are characterized by a lack of education, but they are not bad off in terms of income and they have a certain preference

for *laissez-faire* economic policies, and thus face no trade-offs in voting for the radical right (unless it keeps moving to the left in economic questions). Bornschier and Kriesi (2013: 17) predict that many potential supporters of the RR are to be found within this class. Farmers, with their typically low education and rural conservatism in matters of culture and values, may also be supporters of this party family (Kitschelt 1994: 26). Thus:

Hypothesis 3.8.5: The petite bourgeoisie will vote more in favour of the RR than the service classes, but less so than the working classes.

3.8.2 The Class Basis of the Radical Right in Western Europe

Table 3.9: Support for the Radical Right parties in percent, according to class

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman.	Petit bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work.	Total	Kappa
Denmark	4	4	8	8	18	20	9	0.69
Finland	5	6	12	23	18	19	11	0.64
Norway	17	19	20	33	40	24	22	0.42
Austria	12	26	21	23	30	16	21	0.39
Belgium	4	3	8	6	12	9	6	0.50
Germany	1	1	2	0	6	6	3	-
Luxembourg	2	2	5	8	5	4	4	0.61
Netherlands	4	2	3	3	7	3	3	0.35
Switzerland	17	15	24	33	39	31	22	0.46
France	1	2	2	3	2	8	3	0.78
Greece	1	5	4	3	7	8	4	0.66
Italy	6	1	0	7	0	0	2	-
Mean	6	7	9	12	15	12	9	

In general, hypotheses 3.8.1, 3.8.3, 3.8.4 and in 3.8.5 receive support from the data, whereas 3.8.2 does not. The workers vote disproportionately in favour of the RR – in fact, the skilled workers are the most eager supporters of these parties. Thus the second hypothesis does not receive support – the unskilled workers only vote more in favour of the RR than the skilled ones in Denmark, Finland, and France.

Unsurprisingly, the service classes are the least eager supporter of the RR. This holds true in all countries except the Netherlands, where the party is tiny (3 %). As we see, the RR is second most popular amongst the petite bourgeoisie, and is basically at the level of the workers – in other words, even more prone to voting RR than hypothesised.

In sum, we see important differences between the classes in their propensity to vote for Radical Right parties. Interestingly, these differences seem to have the same base in most

countries. For instance, the RR is least popular in the service class everywhere but Italy; usually with the higher service class being most reluctant to vote for them. The working class and the petite bourgeoisie together form the core electorate of the radical right in all countries except Germany, France and Italy. The electorates of the three German RR parties and the French *Front National* are comprised almost solely of workers. The Italian RR is based on a surprising alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the higher service class.

Total Radical Right class voting is especially important in Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and France. It is least important in Norway, Austria, and the Netherlands.

A main point to take from this subchapter is that the West European Radical Right is clearly a class-based party family, with the petite bourgeoisie and the workers as its core electorate. As this differs from the other categories of non-socialist party families, the fourth generation party choice variable seems to be needed for a more nuanced understanding of class voting.

3.9 Conclusion: How strong is the class basis?

The kappa measure introduced in section 2.3.1 has been used throughout this chapter to measure how *strong* class voting is for each party – how much the classes vary in their voting. In this subsection, we will comment on the fuller picture by showing the difference in class voting by *party family* instead of showing the difference in class voting by national parties *within* a party family.

In table 3.10, two measures are included. First, the mean of the kappa values for each individual party within a party family. This tells us how strong total party family specific class voting is, as a whole. Second, we show a kappa value calculated with the mean total support for the party family in each class. This indicates to what degree the party family specific class basis is the *same* in all countries. That explains why the latter is consistently lower than the former. Imagine, for instance, a hypothetical party family with only two parties, which are both highly class based. Party A has strong support in the service classes and amongst the routine non-manual employees and party B has an equally strong support in the working classes and the petite bourgeoisie. In this case, both parties would have a high kappa value, yielding a high mean of the two kappas. However, the mean support of the party family would yield a lower kappa value, as this party family could now seem to be approximately equally supported by all classes.

We believe that the parties that were created as part of the two class cleavages will have a stronger class basis than the other parties – i.e. the Agrarian parties, the Social Democrats, and the Liberals. Parties based on cleavages that cross the class cleavage, like the Christian Democrats, are expected to show the weakest class voting.

The results should ideally be compared to former studies, but as this is amongst the first comparative analyses of total party family specific class voting ever undertaken, there is not much to compare to. Knutsen (2006:66-68) analysed total party family specific class voting with the mean kappa value as a measure. However, his analysis used a somewhat different class schema, was longitudinal (covering the time period 1975-1997), and included only eight of the eighteen countries studied here. It is thus not evident that the results are comparable. At the very least, it means that where our findings diverge from his, there are at least three possible interpretations. First, that the total party family specific class voting was different in 2008 and in the period 1975-1997; second, that it was different in the ten countries not included in Knutsen's analysis; and third, that it is different due to the use of somewhat different class schemas.

Knutsen (2006: 67) found that the old class parties, i.e. the Communists, Social Democrats, and the Liberals, were most firmly anchored in social classes. He found that the New Politics parties (the Green, the LS, and the RR) were class based, but to a much lower degree than the old class parties. He also found that the Christian Democrats were not very class based. Table 3.10 displays the results from our own analysis.

[Table 3.10 here]

As hypothesised, the Christian Democrats contribute least to class voting, independent of what kappa measure we are considering. This is in line with Knutsen's (2006: 67) results. It is more surprising that the Social Democrats and the Conservatives appear to be comparatively little class based – especially the Social Democrats were believed to have a strong class basis. Only the Christian Democrats have a lower mean kappa value than these two, whereas only the Christian Democrats and the Liberals have a lower kappa based on mean support.

Table 3.10: Kappa values for each party family²⁰, ranked by mean of kappas (high to low)

Party Family	Mean of kappas	Kappa based on mean support
Agrarians	0.66	0.47
Left Socialists	0.60	0.31
Radical Right	0.55	0.36
Liberals	0.54	0.22
Greens	0.50	0.39
Social Democrats	0.49	0.32
Conservatives	0.46	0.31
Christian Democrats	0.33	0.18

The Agrarian parties, representing the producer pole of the agrarian class cleavage, are in the top, as expected. This is true for both kappa measures. The Liberals are almost as class based as the Radical Right, based on the mean of the kappa values – in line with both our theoretical expectations and Knutsen’s (2006) empirical findings. However, their kappa based on mean support is less than half of the first measure – only 0.22. The only party family with a lower kappa based on mean support are the Christian Democrats. This means that the Liberal parties do have a firm anchoring in social classes, but in *different* social classes in different countries.

Even with the mean of the kappa values, the Liberal parties are just slightly more class based than the Greens. This post-materialist party family, deemed to have no particular class basis (von Beyme 1985: 131), appears to be quite class based indeed. In fact, the Green party family has the second highest kappa based on mean support, meaning that these parties have one of the most consistent class bases in all countries. While not in line with our theoretical expectations or the findings of Knutsen, this is in line with Dolezal’s (2010) empirical findings.

It is especially interesting to note the top three, and compare this result to the following statement: “The rise of the New Left in the 1980s and the Radical Right in the 1990s has been widely interpreted as the demise of class politics” (Oesch 2013: 31). Oesch was right to

²⁰ Parties with empty cells are excluded from the calculation, as no kappa value could be obtained. These are limited to the Left Socialists in Norway and Luxembourg; the Greens in Ireland, Switzerland, and Italy; the Liberals in Austria; the Christian Democrats in Finland and Sweden; the Conservatives in Portugal; and the Radical Right in Germany and Italy.

contend this view. Although the Left Socialist parties have different class bases in different countries, as is noticeable when comparing the mean of the kappas to the kappa based on mean support, the Left Socialist and the Radical Right are both amongst the party families that contribute *most* to class voting as measured by the mean of the kappas. As we saw in section 3.1.2 and 3.8.2, this is partly due to workers voting disproportionately *for* the Radical Right and “against” the Left Socialist parties; and due to the service classes voting the opposite way. We want to underline that this reduces *traditional and overall left-right* class voting, but not *total* class voting, which is the most valid measure. The need for fourth generation class voting studies is obvious.

Chapter 4: Class Voting and Value Orientations

Like the previous chapter, this chapter is divided into subchapters for the party families. Although chapter 2 gave a thorough summary of what we will do in this chapter, a brief reminder is called for.

For each subchapter, we will first show the bivariate relationship between social class and party family specific voting (model 1). This will show us whether the classes vote significantly different from each other – recall that no significance tests were performed in chapter 3. All the social classes will be compared to the unskilled workers, who are chosen as the reference group. We will calculate a gross kappa value based on the coefficients of the social classes, i.e. the log odds ratios (cf. chapter 2). We will also visualize the results by plotting the predicted probabilities of voting for the party family for each class.

We will then attempt to learn more about how class and voting are related and how this relationship varies between party families. We will control for the value orientations discussed in chapter 2 and see how this changes the coefficients of the classes (and thus the kappa value); in other words, how this affects the party family specific class voting (models 2-6). We remind the reader that the value orientations are centered around their mean. Hence the intercept is interpreted as the log odds of an unskilled worker with a mean value on the relevant value orientation voting for the specific party family.

Finally, we will control for all the value orientations at the same time (model 7). We can then calculate kappa values based on the coefficients and see how they change for each model. This will give us a measure of how much total party family specific class voting the value orientations account for. In other words, the more the kappa value is reduced, the more of the differences between the classes are accounted for by the five value dimensions – although, as specified in chapter 2, there is not a linear relationship between reductions in total party family specific class voting and reductions in class differences.

The results will be evaluated relative to some hypotheses we develop in each subchapter. These will generally be based on the theoretical parts of chapter 3. Some models will be visualized by plotting the predicted probabilities, which will be compared to the plot of the first model. The choice of which models to visualize is made by considering the relevance of the model to the developed hypotheses.

4.1 Value orientations and Left Socialist class voting

In section 3.1 we labelled the Left Socialist parties as *post-materialistic*. Our hypotheses were based in part on assuming how the classes related to issues like the environment, immigration, and libertarianism. LS parties have a clear New Politics profile, related to environmental protection; ecological concern; promotion of minority rights and feminism; promotion of libertarian values, and so on (Zilliacus 2001: 34). Kitschelt described these parties as extreme libertarians along the value axis. There is thus reason to believe that New Politics values, related to immigration, libertarianism, and environmental protection, will be more important in accounting for class differences than Old Politics values. As these parties are especially regarded to be *libertarian* (see for instance Knutsen 1995: 163, Zilliacus 2001: 34), we believe that this value orientation will account for most class voting of the ones regarded here. We develop the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.1.1: The New Politics value orientations will be more important in accounting for total LS class voting than the Old Politics value dimensions.

Hypothesis 4.1.2: The libertarian-authoritarian value orientation will be most important in this regard.

The results from the analysis of LS voting are shown in table 4.1. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between class and LS voting. We note that the petite bourgeoisie is significantly different (at the 1%-level) from the unskilled workers, as expected. There is *no* difference between the skilled and unskilled workers. The other differences are not significant at any reasonable level. Figure 4.1 visualizes these results by plotting the predicted probabilities of voting LS for each class. The figure reveals the small differences between the classes, with the petite bourgeoisie differing somewhat from the rest.²¹ While this may be surprising given the high mean kappa value for this party family, it merely reflects the fact that the Left Socialists have somewhat *different* class bases in the different countries. For instance, the Irish *Sinn Fein* is highly popular with the working class, and unpopular with the service class, whereas the Spanish *Izquierda Unida* shows the opposite pattern. The results mimic those of the *mean* support for the party family in section 3.1, which for instance was 10% for both the skilled and unskilled workers.

²¹ Note that the y-scale goes from 0-0.1 in the figure, not to 1.

Table 4.1: Left Socialist voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	-0.19 (0.11)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.29 [*] (0.11)	-0.22 (0.11)	-0.41 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.39 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.27 [*] (0.12)
Lower service class	0.06 (0.10)	0.21 [*] (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.11)
Routine non-manual	0.10 (0.10)	0.21 [*] (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)
Petite bourgeoisie	-0.81 ^{***} (0.16)	-0.49 ^{**} (0.16)	-0.79 ^{***} (0.16)	-0.83 ^{***} (0.16)	-0.84 ^{***} (0.16)	-0.85 ^{***} (0.16)	-0.52 ^{**} (0.16)
Skilled workers	-0.00 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic ideology		0.46 ^{***} (0.02)					0.41 ^{***} (0.02)
Religiosity			-0.15 ^{***} (0.01)				-0.12 ^{***} (0.01)
Environmental values				0.20 ^{***} (0.02)			0.14 ^{***} (0.02)
Libertarianism					0.21 ^{***} (0.02)		0.09 ^{***} (0.02)
Immigration orientations						0.19 ^{***} (0.02)	0.12 ^{***} (0.02)
Intercept	-2.37 ^{***} (0.20)	-2.73 ^{***} (0.23)	-2.42 ^{***} (0.20)	-2.38 ^{***} (0.21)	-2.33 ^{***} (0.19)	-2.39 ^{***} (0.21)	-2.69 ^{***} (0.24)
Intercept variance	0.479 (0.192)	0.625 (0.247)	0.485 (0.194)	0.555 (0.221)	0.406 (0.164)	0.547 (0.218)	0.671 (0.265)
<i>N</i>	12014	12014	12014	12014	12014	12014	12014

Standard errors in parentheses. ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

We also note the country level residual variance of 0.479. This is the variance of the intercept, i.e. the variance of the log odds of voting Social Democratic for the unskilled workers. It is hard to interpret in and of itself as it is the variance of a log odds (LEMMA 2014a), but we will return to it when we compare models later.

Table 4.2 portrays the kappa values based on the models in table 4.1. For models 2-7, the absolute and relative change from the kappa value from model 1 is shown. We see that the class coefficients from the bivariate model 1 yield a kappa value of 0.31. As expected, this is similar (in fact, it is identical) to the kappa based on mean support in section 3.9.

Figure 4.1: Predicted probability of voting Socialist Left, by class




Table 4.2: The kappa values from the Left Socialist voting models²²

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1: Class only	0.31	-	-
Model 2: Class and economic ideology	0.16	-0.16	-50 %
Model 3: Class and religiosity	0.31	-0.01	-2 %
Model 4: Class and environmental values	0.31	0.00	-1 %
Model 5: Class and libertarianism	0.29	-0.02	-6 %
Model 6: Class and immigration orientations	0.31	0.00	0 %
Model 7: Class and all value orientations	0.20	-0.12	-37 %

Model 2 controls for economic ideology. The more left-leaning voters are more likely to vote LS than the right-leaning voters. It is highly interesting to notice that the class coefficients have changed dramatically. Notably, table 4.1 shows that the coefficient of the petite bourgeoisie is halved. The kappa value is reduced by 50%, to 0.16, as we can see in table 4.2. This means that when controlling for economic ideology, only half of the total LS class voting remains. The difference between the unskilled workers on the one hand, and the lower service class and the routine non-manual employees on the other, has increased and is now significant.²³ At the same time, the level 2 variance has *increased* to 0.625. This could for instance be due to the classes having different ideologies in different countries, and this could be correlated with the popularity of the LS parties in the mentioned countries.²⁴ It should,

²² Rounded to the second decimal, which is why some of the relative changes might not correspond perfectly to the absolute ones.

²³ This is only the case in one of the four alternative specifications.

²⁴ The variance increases in four of the five remaining models, although less dramatically. This will not be commented upon as the interpretation remains the same.

however, be duly noted that changes in level 2 variance must be interpreted with a solid dose of caution in multilevel logistic regression (see LEMMA 2014b). Therefore, such changes will be observed and sometimes commented upon, but not given much weight.

Model 3 controls for religiosity, which is negatively associated with voting LS. The only class coefficient that undergoes noteworthy change is that of the higher service class, which is now significantly different from the unskilled workers.²⁵ The kappa value remains almost the same.

Model 4 controls for environmental values. Predictably, voters whom are more preoccupied with preserving the environment also vote more often for the LS parties, in line with New Politics theory. Contrary to hypothesis 4.1.1, however, controlling for environmental values does not account for any of the differences between the classes. No coefficients are substantially changed, and the kappa value thus remains the same.

Model 5 controls for libertarianism, which as expected is positively related to voting LS. Otherwise it looks like model 3: Stable kappa values and no important change in coefficients except for the higher service class. This is highly surprising and contrary to both of our hypotheses. There is, however, a reduction of about 15% in the level 2 variance,²⁶ indicating that the different distribution of libertarianism in the different countries may account for some of the between-country differences in LS voting.

Model 6 controls for immigration orientations. Positive attitudes are connected to an increase in LS voting. Otherwise it is similar to model 3. Again this is contrary to hypothesis 4.1.1.

Model 7 includes all the value orientations. There are no important changes in their coefficients other than that of libertarianism, which is halved. Compared to model 1, the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers are reduced, whereas the difference between the higher service class and the unskilled workers increased. The kappa value is reduced by 37% percent, implying that direct LS class voting is 37% lower than total LS class voting. In other words, the value orientations account for 37% of the total LS class voting.

²⁵ This is also only the case in one of the four alternative specifications.

²⁶ This is calculated by subtracting the level 2 variance in the relevant model from the level 2 variance in the model only accounting for class (model 1), and dividing it by the level 2 variance in model 1 ($0.479 - 0.406 / 0.479 \approx 0.152$).

It may seem counter-intuitive that economic ideology alone (model 2, 50%) accounts for more total LS class voting than including all the value orientations at the same time (model 7, 37%). Here, controlling for economic ideology reduces the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers at the same time that it is increasing the difference between the lower service class and the routine non-manual employees. Thus, these log odds ratios are closer to the mean of the coefficients, meaning that the kappa – the standard deviation of the coefficients – is heavily reduced. The last model, however, only reduces the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers (there is no significant difference between the two other mentioned classes and the unskilled workers), reducing the kappa to a lesser extent.

In sum, LS voting is class based, although the class basis differs between countries: In some countries, the LS parties are worker parties; in others, they are most popular with the service classes. This could be due to the profile and history of the party. To what degree have former Communist parties been able to successfully change into New Politics parties? It could also be connected to issues of political space. Some parties are facing competition over the worker vote by Social Democratic and/or Communist parties, while others are facing competition over the service class vote from Green parties.

The value orientations account for about 37% of the total LS class voting, but surprisingly the most important value orientation was economic left-right views, connected to Old Politics. None of our hypotheses received support from the analysis. To visualize these findings, figure 4.2 and 4.3 plots the predicted probabilities of voting LS for each class given their, respectively, economic ideology and libertarianism (with all other variables held at their observed values).²⁷ These are chosen to show the unexpected high importance of economic ideology and vice versa for libertarianism, compared to our hypotheses.

Figure 4.2 shows that there are important variations in the differences between the classes at different levels of economic ideology, where the *right*-wing voters almost never vote LS regardless of class, whereas notably the petite bourgeoisie and the higher service class vote less LS than the other most *left*-oriented voters. Figure 4.3 shows, in contrast, that the difference between the classes is rather similar at all levels of libertarianism.

²⁷ They were also plotted with all other variables held at their mean; this did not affect the plot much.

Figure 4.2 may give the impression of an interaction effect – it may seem like the effect of class is larger at more leftist economic views. There is, however, no interaction. The transformed variables increase linearly, but given the logarithmic transformation, this yields a non-linear increase in the predicted probabilities. Thus the higher the “original” predicted probability of voting LS for a class, the more it will increase as economic ideology becomes more leftist.

Figure 4.2: Predicted probability of voting LS by class and economic ideology





Figure 4.3: Predicted probability of voting LS by class and authoritarian-libertarian values



4.2 Value orientations and Green class voting

In section 3.2, the Green parties were discussed as extreme post-materialists with environmental protection as their *raison d'être* (see also Dolezal 2010: 541). We expect the economic growth versus environmental protection value orientation to account for most class voting. Although we found that the Green parties did have a class basis in the service classes, we also emphasized that the Green parties sometimes deny the relevance of materialist issues altogether. Green leaders have often claimed that they are standing outside of the traditional political division between left and right (Dolezal 2010: 537). At the same time, they take a clear pro-immigration and pro-libertarian stance (Dolezal 2010: 542). In other words, there is reason to believe that there are other issues than the material ones that create the class differences in Green voting. We thus expect the value orientations connected to New Politics to be more important than the ones connected to Old Politics. We develop the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.2.1: The New Politics value orientations will be more important in accounting for total Green class voting than the Old Politics value dimensions.

Hypothesis 4.2.2: The environmental value orientation will be most important (of the ones considered here) in accounting for total Green class voting

The analysis of Green voting is displayed in table 4.3. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between class and Green voting. First, there are no significant differences between the petite bourgeoisie, the skilled workers and the unskilled workers. Second, we note that the higher service class, lower service class, and the routine non-manual employees *do* differ significantly from the unskilled workers. The ranking of the classes is similar to the one discovered in section 3.2. Table 4.4 displays the kappa values from the models. The kappa value from model 1 is 0.38. This is again, as expected, highly similar to the one displayed in section 3.9, namely 0.39.

[Table 4.3 here]

Model 2 controls for economic ideology. It is interesting to note that being leftist in economic ideology is positively related to voting Green. This is in contrast to the claims of scholars such as Talshir (2002: 12) that the question of economic redistribution or control over means of production does not matter at all for Green politics (see Dolezal 2010: 541). However, unlike the case for the Left Socialists, economic ideology seems to account for very little of the class

differences in Green voting. There is basically no change in the kappa value. The coefficients of the three classes that did differ from the unskilled workers are slightly increased, whereas that of the petite bourgeoisie is slightly reduced. Model 3 tells us that being religious is weakly, negatively associated with Green voting. Controlling for religiosity has practically no impact on the class coefficients or the kappa values. As such it is unimportant in explaining class differences, although it does account for some 13% of the between-country variance in Green voting.

Table 4.3: Green voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	0.49 ^{***} (0.13)	0.64 ^{***} (0.13)	0.45 ^{***} (0.13)	0.40 ^{**} (0.13)	0.22 (0.13)	0.26 [*] (0.13)	0.07 (0.13)
Lower service class	0.86 ^{***} (0.11)	0.95 ^{***} (0.11)	0.83 ^{***} (0.11)	0.73 ^{***} (0.11)	0.63 ^{***} (0.11)	0.69 ^{***} (0.11)	0.47 ^{***} (0.12)
Routine non-manual	0.65 ^{***} (0.12)	0.70 ^{***} (0.12)	0.67 ^{***} (0.12)	0.57 ^{***} (0.12)	0.48 ^{***} (0.12)	0.59 ^{***} (0.12)	0.44 ^{***} (0.12)
Petite bourgeoisie	-0.17 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.19)	-0.24 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.19)
Skilled workers	0.00 (0.15)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.16)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic Ideology		0.16 ^{***} (0.02)					0.07 ^{**} (0.02)
Religiosity			-0.09 ^{***} (0.01)				-0.06 ^{***} (0.01)
Environmental values				0.36 ^{***} (0.02)			0.33 ^{***} (0.02)
Libertarianism					0.23 ^{***} (0.02)		0.12 ^{***} (0.02)
Immigration orientation						0.26 ^{***} (0.02)	0.22 ^{***} (0.02)
Intercept	-2.74 ^{***} (0.19)	-2.83 ^{***} (0.19)	-2.75 ^{***} (0.18)	-2.77 ^{***} (0.18)	-2.68 ^{***} (0.19)	-2.80 ^{***} (0.21)	-2.80 ^{***} (0.19)
Intercept variance	0.331 [*] (0.149)	0.326 [*] (0.147)	0.288 ^{**} (0.130)	0.263 ^{**} (0.122)	0.310 ^{**} (0.139)	0.386 [*] (0.172)	0.285 ^{**} (0.132)
N	10797	10797	10797	10797	10797	10797	10797

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.4: Kappa values from the Green voting models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0,38	-	-
Model 2	0,39	0,01	2 %
Model 3	0,38	0,00	-1 %
Model 4	0,34	-0,04	-10 %
Model 5	0,31	-0,08	-20 %
Model 6	0,30	-0,08	-21 %
Model 7	0,25	-0,14	-36 %

Model 4 adds environmental values to social class. Obviously enough, caring for the environment is positively, even *most* positively, linked to Green voting. Different distributions of environmental values in the different countries account for about 20% of the between-country variance in Green voting. However, it only accounts for a small portion of the class differences. The net kappa value after controlling for environmental values is about 10% lower than the gross kappa value, i.e. the total Green class voting, and the coefficients are slightly changed. In sum, environmental values are very important for Green voting, but not for accounting for class differences, contrary to hypothesis 4.2.2. It is still more important than the Old Politics cleavages, strengthening hypothesis 4.2.1.

Model 5 controls for libertarianism, which is positively related to Green voting. Controlling for this variable renders the difference between the higher service class and the unskilled workers halved and non-significant. The differences between the lower service class and the routine-non manual employees, on the one hand, and the unskilled workers on the other, are reduced. Total class voting as measured by the kappa value is reduced with 20%, thus accounting for twice as much class voting as environmental values. This gives support to hypothesis 4.2.1, whereas hypothesis 4.2.2 is disconfirmed.

Model 6 includes immigration orientations, and being more positive to immigration increases the chance of voting Green. Controlling for this variable also reduces the between-country variance. The class coefficients are reduced²⁸ and the kappa value is reduced by more than 20%. The conclusion is the same as for model 5: hypothesis 4.2.1 is supported, while 4.2.2 is disconfirmed.

The final model includes all variables. The difference between the higher service class and the unskilled workers is rendered non-significant and with almost no magnitude. The log odds

²⁸ In the four alternative specifications, the coefficient of the higher service class is even rendered non-significant

ratio of the lower service class is halved; that of the routine non-manual employees reduced by a third. The kappa value is reduced by 36%. In addition, although less important, the economic ideology and libertarianism coefficients are approximately halved.²⁹

In conclusion, the value orientations account for about 36% of the total Green class voting. The Old Politics values were of almost no importance in this regard, whereas the New Politics-orientations mattered. This was as expected, and hypothesis 4.2.1 was greatly supported. However, it was surprising to see that libertarianism and immigration orientations were more important in accounting for class differences than were environmental values. Hypothesis 4.2.2 was disconfirmed.³⁰

Visualizing these findings, figure 4.4 plots the predicted probabilities from model 3 of voting Green for each class, by religiosity levels. There are two things to note: The Old Politics dimension religiosity has no strong impact on the likelihood of voting Green (although we see that the most religious people are somewhat less likely to do so). Also, the class differences do not vary much by level of religiosity (although the classes are somewhat more homogenous at the higher religiosity levels).

[Figure 4.4 here]

Compare this to figure 4.5, plotting the predicted probabilities of voting Green by class and environmental values. These are obviously important, and the differences between the classes vary from barely existent (at low levels of environmentalism) to highly salient (at high levels of environmentalism). These plots are meant to visualize the support our analysis gave to hypothesis 4.2.1; namely that the New Politics value orientations would account for more class voting than the Old Politics value orientations.

[Figure 4.5 here]

²⁹ In the four alternative models, some coefficients are significant at a less strict level than here.

³⁰ A closer analysis revealed why: The classes do in fact *not* differ greatly in their environmental values.

Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities of voting Green by class and religiosity





Figure 4.5: Predicted prob. of voting Green by class and environmental values



4.3 Value orientations and Social Democratic class voting

In section 3.3, we mentioned that the Social Democratic parties are amongst the old class parties, created as part of the class cleavage that developed with the Industrial Revolution. We theoretically justified our hypothesis about the likelihood that the different classes would vote SD by discussing the classes' economic interests. These were measured by their economic

security, economic stability, and economic prospects. We now assume that these interests will affect economic ideology. Our hypothesis in this chapter is then as follows:

Hypothesis 4.3.1: The most important factor (of the ones considered here) accounting for total SD class voting will be economic ideology.

The results from the analysis of SD voting are shown in table 4.5. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between class and SD voting. As we see, all the classes differ significantly from the unskilled workers at the 0.1% level when it comes to SD voting, except for the skilled workers whose difference is significant at the 5% level.³¹ The ranking of the classes is similar to the one found in section 3.3.2.

[Table 4.5 here]

Table 4.6 portrays the kappa values based on the models. We see that the class coefficients from the bivariate model 1 yield a kappa value of 0.30 – compared to 0.32 in section 3.9.

[Table 4.6 here]

Model 2 controls for economic ideology. Unsurprisingly, the more left-leaning voters are more likely to vote SD than the right-leaning voters. It is more interesting to notice that the class coefficients have changed. The kappa value is reduced by 20%, to 0.24. The skilled workers no longer significantly differ from the unskilled ones. Different distributions of economic values in the countries also account for some 10% of the between-country variance in SD voting.

Model 3, 4 and 5 controls for, respectively, religious beliefs, environmental values, and libertarianism. We see that being religious is weakly, negatively associated with voting SD. The two other coefficients are not significant at any reasonable level and have no magnitude to speak of. None of these three value orientations account for any between-country variance and none of them change the kappa values. In all three models, the difference between the skilled and unskilled voters remains significant.

³¹ The results are similar in the alternative specifications, except that the difference between the unskilled and skilled workers is only significant at the 10% -level in the *gllamm* and *logit* models (this is true for model 3, 4 and 5 as well).

Table 4.5: Social Democratic voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	-0.71 ^{***} (0.07)	-0.55 ^{***} (0.07)	-0.73 ^{***} (0.07)	-0.71 ^{***} (0.07)	-0.72 ^{***} (0.07)	-0.84 ^{***} (0.07)	-0.64 ^{***} (0.07)
Lower service class	-0.57 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.49 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.58 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.56 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.57 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.67 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.55 ^{***} (0.06)
Routine non-manual	-0.30 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.27 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.30 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.30 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.30 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.36 ^{***} (0.06)	-0.28 ^{***} (0.06)
Petite bourgeoisie	-0.82 ^{***} (0.08)	-0.66 ^{***} (0.08)	-0.82 ^{***} (0.08)	-0.82 ^{***} (0.08)	-0.82 ^{***} (0.08)	-0.83 ^{***} (0.08)	-0.66 ^{***} (0.08)
Skilled workers	-0.14 [*] (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.16 [*] (0.07)	-0.14 [*] (0.07)	-0.14 [*] (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic ideology		0.23 ^{***} (0.01)					0.22 ^{***} (0.01)
Religious beliefs			-0.03 ^{***} (0.01)				-0.03 ^{***} (0.01)
Environmental values				-0.01 (0.01)			-0.04 ^{**} (0.01)
Libertarianism					0.01 (0.01)		-0.04 ^{***} (0.01)
Immigration orientations						0.11 ^{***} (0.01)	0.10 ^{***} (0.01)
Intercept	-0.63 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.72 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.63 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.64 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.63 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.60 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.71 ^{***} (0.11)
Intercept variance	0.21 ^{***} (0.07)	0.19 ^{***} (0.07)	0.21 ^{***} (0.07)	0.21 ^{***} (0.08)	0.21 ^{***} (0.07)	0.20 ^{***} (0.07)	0.18 ^{***} (0.07)
N	15609	15609	15609	15609	15609	15609	15609

Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 6 controls for attitudes towards immigrants. Being more positive to immigration increases the log odds of voting SD. Immigration orientations account for some between-country variance and, in fact, increase the kappa value by 10%, notably because the service classes now differ more from the workers.

Model 7 includes all the value variables. It accounts for some 14% of the between-country variance and reduces the kappa value by 13%. The difference between skilled and unskilled voters is rendered non-significant in both model 6 and 7. Again it might seem counter-intuitive that controlling for all value orientations (model 7) reduces class voting by less than when controlling only for economic ideology (model 2). This might be due to the fact that


immigration orientations, which are included in model 7, actually were masking class differences.

Table 4.6: The kappa values from the Social Democratic voting models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0.30	-	-
Model 2	0.24	-0.06	-20 %
Model 3	0.30	0.00	0 %
Model 4	0.30	0.00	0 %
Model 5	0.30	0.00	1 %
Model 6	0.33	0.03	10 %
Model 7	0.26	-0.04	-13 %


To visualize the results, figure 4.6 plots the predicted probabilities from model 1. We see that, for instance, the unskilled workers (probability $\approx .35$) are 84% more likely to vote SD than the petite bourgeoisie (probability $\approx .19$).

Figure 4.6: Predicted probability of voting Social Democratic by class



In figure 4.7 we have plotted the predicted probabilities of voting SD for each class by economic ideology, i.e. the predictions from model 2. The goal is to visualize the reduction in the class differences: These are smaller at each ideological level compared to the differences in figure 4.6. Amongst the most right-leaning voters, the predicted probability of voting SD is about 63% higher for the unskilled workers than for the petite bourgeoisie, compared to 84% in the predictions from model 1. Amongst the most left-leaning, the same distance is only about 36% (0.60/0.44).

Figure 4.7: Predicted probability of voting Social Democratic by class and economic ideology



In conclusion, the full model reduces direct SD class voting with about 13% compared to total SD class voting. It is also clear that differences in economic ideology are by far most important in accounting for differences in SD voting between the classes; in fact, controlling for this variable alone reduced total SD class voting by a fifth. Immigration orientations seem to matter as well, whereas libertarianism, environmental values and religious beliefs are less important in accounting for between-class differences.

4.4 Value orientations and Agrarian class voting

In section 3.4, we emphasized the cultural and economic conflict between rural and urban areas, producers and consumers of agricultural products. Still, it is not obvious that economic ideology will reduce class voting in this case. The variable is mainly concerned with the role of the state in the economy and in redistribution between individuals. We suspect that the petite bourgeoisie might be *against* this form of redistribution, at the same time as they are in favour of redistribution to the rural industry through subsidies to agriculture. This is untestable with our variables. However, if economic ideology explains any class differences here, we suspect it will be due to the petite bourgeoisie being economically right-wing, rather than having agricultural interests.

On the other hand, parts of the cultural conflict might be traceable in our variables. Torben Worre (1980: 308-309) claims that the farmers "...constitute a rural subculture more

influenced by tradition and religion than the urban one.” Our religiosity variable is an obvious choice to measure the effect of religion. Tradition may be traced in our libertarianism and immigration orientations variables. Taken together, we expect that:

Hypothesis 4.4.1: Religiosity will account for total Agrarian class voting

Hypothesis 4.4.2: Libertarianism and immigration orientations will account for total Agrarian class voting

Table 4.7: Agrarian voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.29 (0.17)	0.00 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.16)	0.10 (0.16)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.17)
Lower service class	0.01 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.16)	0.01 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.14 (0.16)	0.13 (0.16)	0.08 (0.16)
Routine non-manual	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.17)
Petite bourgeoisie	1.30 ^{***} (0.18)	1.04 ^{***} (0.18)	1.28 ^{***} (0.18)	1.27 ^{***} (0.18)	1.32 ^{***} (0.18)	1.32 ^{***} (0.18)	1.03 ^{***} (0.19)
Skilled workers	-0.11 (0.20)	-0.21 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.12 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.20)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic ideology		-0.28 ^{***} (0.03)					-0.25 ^{***} (0.03)
Religiosity			0.07 ^{***} (0.02)				0.07 ^{***} (0.02)
Environmental values				-0.15 ^{***} (0.03)			-0.10 ^{**} (0.03)
Libertarianism					-0.12 ^{***} (0.03)		-0.06 [*] (0.03)
Immigration attitudes						-0.11 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.06 [*] (0.02)
Intercept	-2.14 ^{***} (0.36)	-2.12 ^{***} (0.37)	-2.16 ^{***} (0.36)	-2.16 ^{***} (0.37)	-2.24 ^{***} (0.35)	-2.23 ^{***} (0.36)	-2.25 ^{***} (0.38)
Intercept variance	0.550 (0.356)	0.593 (0.385)	0.549 (0.355)	0.603 (0.390)	0.534 (0.346)	0.565 (0.366)	0.612 (0.396)
N	4261	4261	4261	4261	4261	4261	4261


Model 1 shows that the small differences we saw between the classes in section 3.4 are not significant, except from the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled workers, which is large and highly significant (this is true when comparing the petite

bourgeoisie to any of the other class as well). The results are visualized in figure 4.8. We also note the kappa value of 0.51 (compared to 0.47 in section 3.9), confirming the strong class basis these parties have in the petite bourgeoisie.

Table 4.8: Kappa values from the Agrarian models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0.51	-	-
Model 2	0.45	-0.06	-11 %
Model 3	0.50	-0.01	-2 %
Model 4	0.49	-0.01	-3 %
Model 5	0.49	-0.02	-4 %
Model 6	0.49	-0.01	-2 %
Model 7	0.41	-0.09	-18 %

Figure 4.8: Predicted probabilities of voting Agrarian, by class




Controlling for economic ideology in model 2, which as expected is negatively associated with Agrarian voting, we see that the difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the other classes is somewhat reduced. The kappa value decreases by 11%. As mentioned, we believe that this is due to the petite bourgeoisie’s right-wing stance in economic issues not related to agricultural subsidies.

While religiosity is positively related to Agrarian voting, as expected, it is surprisingly and contrary to hypothesis 4.4.1 not accounting for Agrarian class voting. The coefficients and the kappa value remain more or less the same in model 3. Hypothesis 4.4.2 is also disconfirmed: While libertarianism and positive attitudes towards immigration are negatively associated

with Agrarian voting, neither account for any class differences. The same is true for environmental values. The full model confirms these findings.

Figure 4.9: Predicted probabilities of voting Agrarian, by class and religiosity



We may conclude, contrary to what we expected, that the petite bourgeoisie does not vote more Agrarian than the other classes due to its religiosity, authoritarianism or resistance to immigration. Figure 4.9 displays visually that hypothesis 4.4.1 is disconfirmed: No matter what level of religiosity the respondents are at, the class differences remain basically the same. Perhaps this would look different if our class schema were more detailed and distinguished between the farmers and the rest of the petite bourgeoisie, or between the agricultural workers and the unskilled ones, which one could have done in a separate analysis of this party family. In any case, future research should look into the attitudes towards *agricultural* economic value orientations as a way to explain class differences in Agrarian voting. Agricultural economic ideology is something apart from economic left-right ideology, which we examined here.

4.5 Value orientations and Liberal class voting

In section 3.5, we described the Liberal party family as the strongest defender of capitalist interests in the conflict between labour and capital, and suggested an opposite class pattern of the Social Democrats, due to economic ideology. However, we also classified these parties as *right-libertarian* and occupied with some post-materialist issues. Many of these are related to liberalism in the broad term. Building on the discussion in chapter 3, it is natural to

hypothesise that economic ideology will account for most total Liberal class voting. Also, we would expect that the New Politics value dimensions are of a certain importance. We land on the two following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.5.1: The most important value orientation accounting for total Liberal class voting will be economic ideology.

Hypothesis 4.5.2: The New Politics value orientations will also matter, especially libertarianism.

The findings from analysing Liberal voting are shown in table 4.9. Model 1 shows that the higher service class is most likely to vote Liberal, followed by the petite bourgeoisie and the lower service class. The routine non-manual employees follow suit. The skilled workers do not differ significantly from the unskilled ones. The ranking is the same as found in section 3.5.2. The kappa value from this model is reported to be 0.30 in table 4.10, somewhat higher than the 0.22 found in section 3.9.

[Table 4.9 here]

Model 2 shows us that being economically left-wing reduces the chance of voting Liberal, as expected. It also reduces the difference between the higher service class and the unskilled workers, and between the petite bourgeoisie and the workers. The kappa value is reduced by 20%, as portrayed in table 4.10. This is in support of hypothesis 4.5.1.

Model 3, 4, and 5 are highly interesting: It seems that religiosity levels, environmental values and even *libertarianism* do not affect Liberal voting at all. The coefficients are non-significant and with pathetic magnitudes. In addition, neither of these three value orientations account for class differences. Neither the class coefficients nor the kappa values are changed to any notable degree. Model 6 shows that positive attitudes towards immigrants are positively related to Liberal voting, but controlling for this variable does not account for much of the class differences. There are some slight changes in the class coefficients, yielding a 4% reduction in the kappa. Hypothesis 4.5.2 is disconfirmed. The final model summarizes what we have seen in the other models. The kappa value is reduced somewhat more than in model 2, now by 30%.

Table 4.9: Liberal voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression³²

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	0.88 ^{***} (0.10)	0.72 ^{***} (0.10)	0.87 ^{***} (0.10)	0.89 ^{***} (0.10)	0.86 ^{***} (0.10)	0.85 ^{***} (0.10)	0.63 ^{***} (0.11)
Lower service class	0.56 ^{***} (0.10)	0.48 ^{***} (0.10)	0.55 ^{***} (0.10)	0.57 ^{***} (0.10)	0.53 ^{***} (0.10)	0.53 ^{***} (0.10)	0.41 ^{***} (0.10)
Routine non-manual	0.33 ^{**} (0.10)	0.32 ^{**} (0.10)	0.33 ^{**} (0.10)	0.34 ^{***} (0.10)	0.32 ^{**} (0.10)	0.32 ^{**} (0.10)	0.28 ^{**} (0.10)
Petite bourgeoisie	0.58 ^{***} (0.13)	0.39 ^{**} (0.13)	0.58 ^{***} (0.13)	0.58 ^{***} (0.13)	0.58 ^{***} (0.13)	0.58 ^{***} (0.13)	0.37 ^{**} (0.13)
Skilled workers	0.09 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)	0.09 (0.12)	0.10 (0.12)	0.09 (0.12)	0.10 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic Ideology		-0.20 ^{***} (0.02)					-0.21 ^{***} (0.02)
Religiosity			-0.01 (0.01)				-0.01 (0.01)
Environmental values				-0.03 (0.02)			-0.02 (0.02)
Libertarianism					0.02 (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)
Immigration orientations						0.03 [*] (0.01)	0.05 ^{**} (0.01)
Intercept	-2.42 ^{***} (0.21)	-2.41 ^{***} (0.22)	-2.42 ^{***} (0.22)	-2.43 ^{***} (0.22)	-2.41 ^{***} (0.22)	-2.41 ^{***} (0.21)	-2.38 ^{***} (0.23)
Intercept variance	0.473 (0.200)	0.500 (0.211)	0.483 (0.204)	0.479 (0.203)	0.496 (0.210)	0.466 (0.197)	0.533 (0.225)
N	11502	11502	11502	11502	11502	11502	11502

Standard errors in parentheses. $p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, $*** p < 0.001$


³² The alternative models yield similar results, although many coefficients are somewhat closer to zero. At the same time, the standard errors are increased in many of the models. Thus quite a few of the coefficients are rendered non-significant, especially in the robust logit models. The results from all of the 28 alternative specifications are available upon request.

Table 4.10: Kappa values from the Liberal voting models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0.30	-	-
Model 2	0.24	-0.06	-20 %
Model 3	0.30	0.00	-1 %
Model 4	0.30	0.00	0 %
Model 5	0.30	-0.01	-2 %
Model 6	0.29	-0.01	-4 %
Model 7	0.21	-0.09	-30 %


The bivariate relationship is visualized in figure 4.10. The class differences are moderate: The higher service class has a more than twice as high chance of voting Liberal than the unskilled workers.

Figure 4.10: Predicted probability of voting Liberal, by class



In figure 4.11 we see that economic ideology matters for Liberal voting, and that it accounts for some of these class differences. For the most right-wing voters, the probability of voting Liberal is about 60% higher for the higher service class than for the unskilled workers, compared to over 100% in figure 4.10. For the most left-wing voters, the class differences are negligible.

Figure 4.11: Predicted probability of voting Liberal by class and economic ideology



4.6: Value orientations and Christian Democratic class voting

In section 3.6, we emphasized the cross-class appeal of the Christian Democrats, which might in part be due to the religious cleavage cross-cutting the class cleavage. In that case, rather than accounting for the class differences, religiosity should account for class *similarities*: The voters may vote in line with their religious identity rather than their class identity. In other words, workers and routine non-manual employees, who are more religious than the service classes, will vote CD to a larger extent than their class interests imply. On the other hand, the service classes, whom are most secular, will vote CD to a lesser extent than their class interests imply.³³ Thus the distance between the classes will be rather small. However, when controlling for religiosity, this distance should increase.

Also, we mentioned that the petite bourgeoisie might tend to vote for this party family due to, for instance, its conservative stances in cultural issues and its relatively high religiosity levels. If this is the case, then:

Hypothesis 4.6.1: The class differences will increase when controlling for religiosity

Hypothesis 4.6.2: The difference between the petite bourgeoisie and the other classes should decrease when controlling for libertarianism

³³ In our data, the classes rank in the following order from secular to religious: Higher service class; lower service class; skilled workers; routine non-manual employees; unskilled workers; petite bourgeoisie.

The results of the analysis are displayed in table 4.9. Model 1 is evidence of what we suspected: The class differences are small. The kappa value is only 0.18, identical to the one we found in section 3.9. Even more impressive, *only* the petite bourgeoisie is significantly different from the unskilled workers.³⁴ In model 2, we see that some of this difference is accounted for by economic ideology, as the coefficient of the petite bourgeoisie is reduced and significant at a less strict level. The kappa value is reduced by 19%. As expected, being left-wing is negatively associated with CD voting. The results are visualized in figure 4.12.

Model 3 controls for religiosity, which is of course positively related to CD voting. The kappa value is only raised by 3%, which is in line with hypothesis 4.6.1, although it is a smaller increase than expected. However, the kappa value does not distinguish between significant and non-significant coefficients. It is crucial to notice that both the higher and the lower service class now have almost doubled their coefficients *and* these have become significant at the 5% and 1%-level, respectively. This supports the hypothesis.

Controlling for environmental values (model 4), which are negatively associated with voting CD, changes little except that the higher service class is now significantly different from the unskilled workers at the 5%-level.

Model 5 includes libertarianism, which naturally is negatively associated with CD voting. Quite contrary to hypothesis 4.6.2, no reduction in the petite bourgeoisie coefficient is observed. In fact, the coefficients of the higher and lower service class, and even the routine non-manual employees, increase and turn significant, at the 1% and 0.1%-level. The kappa value increases with 12%, and the level 2 variance is reduced with some 10%. This means that the higher and lower service class, and the routine non-manual employees, differ from the workers at the same level of libertarianism, but that they have a different distribution of libertarianism which conceals this. This is confirmed upon closer analysis: The three classes mentioned have the highest libertarian values of all, whereas the workers are closer to the authoritarian pole. Still, hypothesis 4.6.2 is disconfirmed.

³⁴ This is true also for the gllamm models. In the robust logit model, not even the petite bourgeoisie differ significantly from the unskilled workers.

Table 4.11: Christian Democratic voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	0.17 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.32** (0.10)	0.22* (0.10)	0.38*** (0.10)	0.23* (0.10)	0.43*** (0.11)
Lower service class	0.11 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.21* (0.09)	0.18 (0.09)	0.29** (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)	0.34*** (0.10)
Routine non-manual	0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)	0.25** (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	0.21* (0.10)
Petite bourgeoisie ³⁵	0.49*** (0.12)	0.37** (0.12)	0.54*** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.53*** (0.12)	0.49*** (0.12)	0.50*** (0.13)
Skilled workers	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic ideology		-0.12*** (0.02)					-0.09*** (0.02)
Religiosity			0.24*** (0.01)				0.23*** (0.01)
Environmental values				-0.14*** (0.02)			-0.13*** (0.02)
Libertarianism					-0.19*** (0.02)		-0.11*** (0.02)
Immigration orientations						-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Intercept	-1.94*** (0.29)	-1.91*** (0.30)	-2.21*** (0.31)	-1.99*** (0.29)	-2.09*** (0.28)	-1.97*** (0.29)	-2.33*** (0.30)
Intercept variance	0.883 (0.386)	0.898 (0.393)	0.971 (0.424)	0.891 (0.390)	0.787 (0.345)	0.863 (0.378)	0.937 (0.409)
N	9658	9658	9658	9658	9658	9658	9658

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model 6 shows that being positive to immigrants and immigration is weakly, negatively associated with CD voting. It does not affect class voting much: The kappa value is stable and the coefficients change little, although the higher service class now differ significantly from the unskilled workers at the 5%-level. The final model controls for all variables. This has approximately the same effect as controlling for religiosity or libertarianism alone: The coefficients of the higher and lower service class, and the routine non-manual employees, turn


³⁵ The petite bourgeoisie does not differ significantly from the unskilled workers in the robust logit model. In the gllamm models, they are usually similar to the ones displayed here.

significant. Otherwise there is little change, as shown by the tiny 3% increase in the kappa value.

Table 4.12: The kappa values from the Christian Democratic voting models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0.18	-	-
Model 2	0.15	-0.04	-19 %
Model 3	0.19	0.01	3 %
Model 4	0.19	0.01	3 %
Model 5	0.20	0.02	12 %
Model 6	0.18	0.00	1 %
Model 7	0.19	0.01	3 %


Figure 4.12: Predicted probabilities of voting Christian Democratic, by class



To illustrate the small difference between total and direct CD class voting, figure 4.13 shows the predicted probabilities of voting CD, by class, from model 7. As we see, this is highly similar to the predicted probabilities from model 1 in figure 4.12, although notably the petite bourgeoisie is slightly closer to the other classes.

Summing up, CD voting is not very class based. This seems to be in part due to the religious cleavage cross-cutting the class cleavage, and due to different distributions of libertarianism in the classes. The small class differences we *did* see in model 1 were partly accounted for by economic ideology.

Figure 4.13: Predicted probabilities of voting Christian Democratic, by class



4.7: Value orientations and Conservative class voting

In section 3.7 we took note of the Conservative parties' scepticism to rapid change and faith in traditional values. We also emphasized their passage to neo-liberal economic policies since the 1970s. We concluded that Old Politics would still be more important than New Politics. We thus expect economic ideology to account for most class differences. However, we also expect that the classes will differ in libertarianism, and that this will account for some class differences in Conservative voting due to these parties' focus on traditional values.

Hypothesis 4.7.1: Economic ideology will account for most total Conservative class voting

Hypothesis 4.7.2: Libertarianism will account for some total Conservative class voting

Table 4.13 displays the result. In model 1 we see that there are rather important class differences, symbolized by the kappa value of 0.35 (compared to 0.31 in section 3.9) displayed in table 4.14. The ranking of the classes is the same as in section 3.7.2.

[Table 4.13 here]

Model 2 shows that being left-wing in economic issues is strongly and negatively associated with Conservative voting. It also lends strong support to hypothesis 4.7.1: All coefficients are reduced, some drastically. The difference between the skilled and unskilled workers is no longer significant. The kappa value is reduced by a third.

Table 4.13: Conservative voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression³⁶

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	0.98 ^{***} (0.09)	0.68 ^{***} (0.09)	1.01 ^{***} (0.09)	1.01 ^{***} (0.09)	1.15 ^{***} (0.09)	1.17 ^{***} (0.09)	0.96 ^{***} (0.10)
Lower service class	0.48 ^{***} (0.08)	0.33 ^{***} (0.09)	0.51 ^{***} (0.08)	0.53 ^{***} (0.08)	0.65 ^{***} (0.09)	0.64 ^{***} (0.09)	0.57 ^{***} (0.09)
Routine non-manual	0.22 [*] (0.09)	0.19 [*] (0.09)	0.21 [*] (0.09)	0.25 ^{**} (0.09)	0.34 ^{***} (0.09)	0.30 ^{***} (0.09)	0.31 ^{***} (0.09)
Petite bourgeoisie	0.83 ^{***} (0.10)	0.51 ^{***} (0.10)	0.83 ^{***} (0.10)	0.84 ^{***} (0.10)	0.86 ^{***} (0.10)	0.85 ^{***} (0.10)	0.55 ^{***} (0.10)
Skilled workers	0.22 [*] (0.10)	0.14 (0.11)	0.25 [*] (0.10)	0.22 [*] (0.10)	0.27 [*] (0.10)	0.20 (0.11)	0.17 (0.11)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic ideology		-0.47 ^{***} (0.02)					-0.45 ^{***} (0.02)
Religiosity			0.06 ^{***} (0.01)				0.05 ^{***} (0.01)
Environmental values				-0.15 ^{***} (0.02)			-0.09 ^{***} (0.02)
Libertarianism					-0.16 ^{***} (0.01)		-0.09 ^{***} (0.02)
Immigration orientations						-0.16 ^{***} (0.01)	-0.11 ^{***} (0.01)
Intercept	-1.71 ^{***} (0.26)	-1.74 ^{***} (0.29)	-1.72 ^{***} (0.26)	-1.74 ^{***} (0.26)	-1.81 ^{***} (0.26)	-1.80 ^{***} (0.25)	-1.89 ^{***} (0.28)
Intercept variance	0.739 (0.319)	0.932 (0.396)	0.726 (0.314)	0.739 (0.319)	0.772 (0.334)	0.686 (0.297)	0.869 (0.372)
N	9805	9805	9805	9805	9805	9805	9805

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The third and fourth model controls for religiosity and environmental values. Being more religious is positively related to Conservative voting, unlike environmental values. However, these value orientations do not account for class differences. The coefficients and the kappa values remain more or less the same.

The fifth model controls for libertarianism, which as expected is negatively associated with Conservative voting. Contrary to hypothesis 4.7.2, it does not account for class differences. In

³⁶ The results are similar in the alternative specifications, although some coefficients are not significant or significant at a lower level.

fact, it was masking class differences: The coefficients are larger compared to model 1, and the kappa value increased by 10%. This might be for the same reason that class differences in CD voting increased when controlling for religiosity. The service classes are the most libertarian classes, which might make them less inclined to vote Conservative than their class interests imply. Nevertheless, hypothesis 4.7.2 is disconfirmed.

Model 6 includes a control for immigration orientations. Being positive to immigration is negatively related to voting Conservative. Otherwise this is rather similar to the libertarianism-model. The coefficients of the service classes are larger than in model 1, and the kappa value is increased by 15%. This is probably for the same reasons as mentioned for model 5: The service classes are also the most positive to immigration and immigrants. At the same time, the difference between the skilled and unskilled workers is no longer significant. Finally, model 7 includes all variables. There is not much to say; most coefficients change as we expect them to, given the results from the other models. The kappa value is reduced by 11%.

Table 4.14: The kappa values from the Conservative voting models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0,35	-	-
Model 2	0,23	-0,12	-34 %
Model 3	0,36	0,01	2 %
Model 4	0,36	0,01	2 %
Model 5	0,39	0,04	10 %
Model 6	0,40	0,05	15 %
Model 7	0,31	-0,04	-11 %

To visualize these results, figure 4.14 displays the predicted probabilities of voting Conservative from model 1, by class. Figure 4.15 displays the predicted probabilities from model 7, by class and economic ideology. We note the huge impact of economic ideology on Conservative voting, and also how it accounts for class differences, in line with hypothesis 4.7.1.

[Figure 4.14 here]

[Figure 4.15 here]

Figure 4.14: Predicted probabilities of voting Conservative, by class





Figure 4.15: Predicted probabilities of voting Conservative, by class and economic ideology



4.8 Value orientations and Radical Right class voting

In section 3.8, we mentioned that the workers – the “losers” of globalization – are against immigration both due to the economic competition they face from immigrants and due to cognitive differences related to education. This last point also affects their authoritarian values. The service classes were thought to be at the opposite pole, as “winners” of globalization. For the petite bourgeoisie, the rural conservatism was mentioned as well. We

emphasized the post-materialist status of the RR party family. From the discussion in section 3.8, we may develop the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.8.1: The Old Politics value orientations will not be accounting for total RR class voting

Hypothesis 4.8.2: The authoritarianism-libertarianism value orientation will account for some total RR class voting

Hypothesis 4.8.3: Immigration orientations will account for some total RR class voting

The findings are reported in table 4.15. The first, bivariate model confirms what we found in section 3.8: The Radical Right is most popular with the two working classes and the petite bourgeoisie. Although the ranking is the same, there are in fact no significant differences between these three groups. The routine non-manual employees cover the middle ground, whereas the service classes are not prone to vote RR. Total Radical Right class voting is strong: The kappa value from model 1 is 0.43 – somewhat higher than the 0.36 we found in section 3.9.

[Table 4.15 here]

Model 2 shows that being left-wing in economic issues is negatively associated with RR voting. There is also some support for hypothesis 4.8.1: The coefficients are somewhat higher, the kappa value is increased by 8% (confer table 4.14). This implies that economic ideology was masking some class differences. We note that, for instance, the absolute value of the coefficient of the petite bourgeoisie is doubled and significant at the 5%-level³⁷; the service classes are also more different from the unskilled workers in this model.

Model 3 controls for religiosity. Religiosity, somewhat surprisingly, is negatively (although weakly) associated with RR voting. However, it does not account for any class voting: The coefficients and the kappa value are stable. Thus, we may conclude that hypothesis 4.8.1 is supported: None of the values associated with Old Politics account for class voting. The same is true for environmental values (model 4): It is weakly, negatively associated with RR voting, but does not affect class voting.

³⁷ It is only significant in one of the four alternative specifications.

Table 4.15: Radical Right voting and value orientations: Multilevel logistic regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Higher service class	-0.96 ^{***} (0.13)	-1.13 ^{***} (0.13)	-0.99 ^{***} (0.13)	-0.96 ^{***} (0.13)	-0.88 ^{***} (0.13)	-0.45 ^{***} (0.14)	-0.63 ^{***} (0.14)
Lower service class	-0.82 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.91 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.84 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.81 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.75 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.39 ^{**} (0.12)	-0.49 ^{***} (0.12)
Routine non-manuals ³⁸	-0.46 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.49 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.46 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.45 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.41 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.17 (0.12)
Petite bourgeoisie	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.33 [*] (0.14)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.29 (0.15)
Skilled workers	0.23 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)	0.20 (0.12)	0.23 (0.12)	0.25 [*] (0.12)	0.27 [*] (0.13)	0.21 (0.13)
Unskilled workers	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Economic ideology		-0.17 ^{***} (0.02)					-0.11 ^{***} (0.02)
Religiosity			-0.05 ^{***} (0.01)				-0.05 ^{***} (0.01)
Environmental values				-0.05 [*] (0.02)			-0.04 (0.02)
Libertarianism					-0.07 ^{***} (0.02)		0.04 (0.02)
Immigration attitudes						-0.51 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.51 ^{***} (0.02)
Intercept	-2.22 ^{***} (0.29)	-2.18 ^{***} (0.29)	-2.21 ^{***} (0.29)	-2.22 ^{***} (0.29)	-2.27 ^{***} (0.30)	-2.85 ^{***} (0.30)	-2.80 ^{***} (0.29)
Intercept variance	0.928 (0.388)	0.892 (0.373)	0.916 (0.383)	0.929 (0.388)	1.01 (0.421)	0.974 (0.429)	0.882 (0.369)
N	11266	11266	11266	11266	11266	11266	11266

Table 4.16: The kappa values from the Radical Right voting models

	Kappa	Absolute change	Relative change
Model 1	0,43	-	-
Model 2	0,46	0,04	8 %
Model 3	0,43	0,00	1 %
Model 4	0,43	0,00	-1 %
Model 5	0,40	-0,03	-6 %
Model 6	0,24	-0,19	-44 %
Model 7	0,28	-0,14	-34 %

³⁸ In the robust logit specification, the coefficient of the routine non-manual employees is not significant. Nevertheless, they are similar to the results displayed here in all the gllamm-models.

The fifth model includes libertarianism. As expected, libertarians are less likely to vote RR than authoritarians. However, its effects on class voting are somewhat peculiar. First of all, it is reducing class voting by 6%, which is less than might be expected. This is notably due to the service classes becoming slightly more similar to the unskilled workers. At the same time, the difference between the skilled and unskilled workers becomes significant at the 5%-level due to a very small positive change in its magnitude.³⁹ The evidence is not clear on hypothesis 4.8.2.

On the contrary, hypothesis 4.8.3 is very strongly supported by model 6, which includes attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. Controlling for these attitudes almost *halves* the total RR class voting. The difference between the higher service class and the unskilled workers is reduced by a third; the one between the lower service class and the unskilled workers is halved and significant at a less stringent level. The difference between the routine non-manual employees and the unskilled workers is more than halved, and no longer significant even at the 5%-level (while it used to be significant at the 0.1%-level). The only difference increasing slightly is that of the skilled workers, showing that some of the difference between these and the unskilled ones was masked by immigration orientations.⁴⁰

The final model includes all covariates. This model looks like the others, with a few exceptions. First, libertarianism and environmental values are no longer significantly affecting total RR voting. Second, the difference between the skilled and unskilled workers is no longer significant.⁴¹ Also, the reduction in the kappa value is 34% instead of 44%.

[Figure 4.16 here]

Figure 4.16 shows the predicted probabilities of RR voting by class, from model 1. As we see, the skilled workers have a three times higher chance of voting RR than the higher service class.

[Figure 4.17 here]

³⁹ Although this only holds in one of the four alternative specifications.

⁴⁰ Even more coefficients were rendered non-significant in three of the alternative specifications.

⁴¹ In addition, the higher service class coefficient is not significant in the robust logit model. The lower service class coefficient is not significant in the robust logit and one of the gllamm models.

Figure 4.16: Predicted probability of voting Radical Right, by class




Figure 4.17: Predicted probability of voting Radical Right, by class and immigration orientations




Figure 4.17, on the other hand, visualizes the results from model 7, by class and immigration orientations. We note the huge impact of immigration orientations on RR voting, *and* the reduction in class voting. Amongst the most sceptical to immigration, the skilled workers are only 65% more likely to vote RR than the higher service class, compared to the mentioned 300% in model 1. At the *four* most immigrant-friendly values of the spectre, the absolute differences are negligible, and the relative ones are also much lower: The skilled workers are 23% more likely to vote RR than the higher service class at the most immigration friendly part of the scale.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Summary: Total party family specific class voting in Western Europe

Table 5.1 displays a summary of how much the kappa values were reduced for each party family by each value dimension. As we see, economic ideology was clearly most important in explaining class differences, reducing the kappa values by 20% on average. We also note that this effect varies quite a lot between the party families: Economic ideology accounts for half the total LS class voting; a third of the total Conservative class voting; a fifth of total Liberal, SD, and CD class voting; about a tenth of total Agrarian and RR class voting; and none of the total Green class voting. Religiosity, on the other hand, accounts for almost no class differences at all. Environmental values account for some total Green class voting, but are otherwise not important.

Table 5.1: Summary of the reductions in total party family specific class voting

Kappa reductions, %	Model 2 Economic ideology	Model 3 Religiosity	Model 4 Environmental values	Model 5 Libertarianism	Model 6 Immigration orientations	Model 7 Full model
Left Socialism	-50	-2	-1	-6	0	-37
Green	2	-1	-10	-20	-21	-36
Social Democracy	-20	0	0	1	10	-13
Agrarian	-11	-2	-3	-4	2	-18
Christian Democrats	-19	3	3	12	1	3
Liberals	-20	-1	0	-2	-4	-30
Conservatives	-34	2	2	10	15	-11
Radical Right	-8	1	1	6	-44	-34
Mean	-20	0	-1	0	-5	-22

Libertarianism has a mean kappa reduction of zero. Unlike religiosity, this is not because it is unimportant in accounting for class differences, but rather because it in some cases accounts for class differences, while in others it is masking class differences. We note especially that libertarianism explains a fifth of the total Green class voting. It also accounts for six percent of total LS class voting and four percent of total Agrarian class voting. The class voting

increased for the CD, Conservative, and RR party families – by 12, 10 and 6 percent, respectively.

Immigration orientations give perhaps the clearest example of a value orientation that has different impact on total class voting for different party families. It accounts for almost half of total RR class voting, and a fifth of total Green class voting. At the same time, it is increasing total Conservative class voting by 15 percent, and total SD class voting by 10. It has no notable impact on total LS, Agrarian, or CD class voting.

Direct party family specific class voting (model 7) is 22% lower than total party family specific class voting. Direct class voting is strongly reduced compared to total class voting for four party families: The Left Socialists, the Green parties, the Radical Right, and the Liberals. For these four, direct class voting is more than 30% lower than total class voting. It is very interesting to note that three of these four party families (the LS, the Green, and the RR) are connected to New Politics.

Direct SD and Conservative class voting are reduced by 13 and 11%, respectively. Direct CD class voting is barely affected compared to total CD class voting. This is because controlling for economic ideology reduces direct class voting, while including the other value orientations (especially libertarianism) increases class differences.

In sum, it is clear that the value orientations account for different amounts of total party family specific class voting, and that these effects vary from party family to party family. It is also clear that the five value orientations do not account for *all* of the bivariate association between class and voting. Future research in this area might wish to include variables related to other possible mechanisms, like the role of objective class interests or the social networks members of a class are embedded in.

5.2 Conclusion: The Future of the Fourth Generation

After criticizing the formerly used inadequate class dichotomy between manual and non-manual classes, Evans (2010: 636) writes that

“[o]f even more concern is the minimalist version of political choice – left versus non-left – used in research across systems with varying dimensionality, and the obscuring of ‘New Right’ or ‘New Left’ bases of vote in unhelpfully aggregated categories.”

In this thesis, we have emphasized the critique of the dichotomous left-right party choice variable commonly applied in the class voting literature. Rather than paying lip service to this

critique and then following up with pooled analyses employing the dichotomous left-right party choice variable anyway, we have consistently used a fourth generation dependent variable in our comparative analysis, measuring total class voting. We have seen that there are indeed considerable differences in the class bases of the party families that normally would have been forced into the “Left” or “Right” categories. This means that former analyses that have employed the old party choice variable will benefit from being replicated with a proper measurement of party choice. In addition, the class bases discovered might have been even more consistent if we used a class schema that recognizes the divisions within the service classes (see Evans and de Graaf 2013b: 402). It would indeed be interesting to replicate this study with the class schema of Oesch (2006), and compare the findings.

Furthermore, we have seen that about a fifth of the total party family specific class voting was accounted for by five central value orientations, with economic left-right ideology as the most important one. The attempt to test the mechanisms through which social class has its effects on voting was fruitful; and as Evans (2010: 637) strongly advocated, future research should pay more attention to this aspect of the association between structure and vote. In this line of research, it is equally important to keep the fourth generation dependent variable. As we have shown, the value orientations account for different amounts of total class voting for the different party families. The whole value orientation model accounts for almost 40% of the bivariate association between social class and Left Socialist voting, but it accounts for none of the class differences in Christian Democratic voting.

The history of the study of class voting is a history of ever more nuanced analyses and measures, yielding ever more valid conclusions. Throughout the last decades, the scholars have gone from absolute to relative measures of class voting. We are no longer using the over-simplistic division between manual and non-manual occupations; we now have complex class schemas developed for post-industrial societies at our disposal. It is about time that we also stop using the over-simplistic division between left and right parties. The fourth generation is here to stay.

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Appendix

A.1 Variable operationalization

The operationalization of social class is thoroughly discussed in chapter 2, thus it is not repeated here.

A.1.1 The coding of parties into the party family variable (original name in italics)

Communist parties

Austria: Austrian Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Österreichs*)

Denmark: Red-Green Alliance/Unity List (*Enhedslisten*)

France: French Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Français*)

Greece: Communist Party of Greece (*Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas*)

Italy: Communist Refoundation Party (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista*) and Communist Workers' Party (*Partido Comunista del Lavoratori*)

Luxembourg: Communist Party (*Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuerg*)

Norway: Red (*Rødt*)

Portugal: Democratic Unity Coalition (PCP/PEV)⁴²

Switzerland: Labour Party (*Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz*)

Socialist Left parties

Denmark: Socialist People's Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*)

Finland: Left Alliance (*Vasemmistoliitto*)

France: Left Wing Extremist parties⁴³

Germany: Left party (*die Linke*)

Greece: Coalition of the Radical Left (*Syriza*)

Iceland: Left-Green Movement (*Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð*)

Ireland: Sinn Féin

Italy: Left and Freedom party

Luxembourg: Left party (*Déi Lénk*)

Netherlands: Socialist party (*Socialistische Partij*)

Norway: Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk venstreparti*)

Portugal: Left Bloc (*Bloco de Esquerda*)

Spain: United Left (*Izquierda Unida*)

Sweden: Left Party (*Vänstern*)

⁴² The Democratic Unity Coalition is an electoral and political coalition between the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Ecologist Party "The Greens" (PEV). Since the Communist Party is the major force inside the coalition, the coalition is grouped as a communist party.

⁴³ Revolutionary Communist League, Workers' Struggle and Workers' Party

Green parties

Austria: Green party (*die Grünen*)

Belgium: Green party (*Groen, Ecolo*)⁴⁴

Finland: Green League (*Vihreä liitto*)

France: Green party (*les Verts*) and other environmental parties

Sweden: Green Party (*Miljöpartiet de Gröna*)

Germany: Greens (*die Grünen*)

Ireland: Green Party

Luxembourg: Greens (*Déi Gréng*)

Netherlands: GreenLeft (*GroenLinks*)

Switzerland: Green party (*Grüne Partei der Schweiz*) and Green Liberal party (*Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz*)

UK: Green Party

Social Democratic parties

Austria: Austrian Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*)

Belgium: Socialist parties (*SP.A-Spirit*⁴⁵ and *Parti Socialiste*)

Denmark: Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterne*)

Finland: Social Democratic Party of Finland (*Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue*)

France: Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*)

Germany: German Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)

Greece: Panhellenic Socialist Movement (*PASOK, Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα*)

Iceland: Alliance party (*Samfylkingin-Jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands*)

Italy: Democratic party (*Partito Democratico*)

Luxembourg: Socialist party (*Lëtzebuenger Sozialistesche Aarbechterpartei*)

Netherlands: Labour party (*Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA*)

Norway: Labour party (*Arbeiderpartiet*)

Portugal: Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*)

Spain: Socialist Workers' Party (*Parti Socialista Obrero Español*)

Sweden: Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti*)

Switzerland: Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz*)

Ethnic/Regional parties

Belgium: New Flemish Alliance (*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA*)

Finland: Swedish People's Party (*Svenska folkpartiet*)

Italy: Lega Nord

Spain: Convergence and Unity (*Convergència i Unió, CiU*), Republican Left of Catalonia

⁴⁴ For Belgium, there will usually be both a Flemish and a Walloon party within the party families

⁴⁵ SP.a-SPIRIT is a Belgian electoral coalition between the Flemish parties Socialist Party Different (SP.a) and Spirit.

(*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, ERC), Basque Nationalist Party (*Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea*, PNV), and other regional parties .

Agrarian parties

Denmark: Agrarian Liberals (*Venstre*)
Finland: Centre party (*Suomen Keskusta*)
Iceland: Progress party (*Framsóknarflokkurinn*)
Norway: Centre party (*Senterpartiet*)
Sweden: Centre party (*Centerpartiet*)

Liberal parties

Austria: Liberal Forum (*Liberales Forum*, LiF)
Belgium: Liberal parties (*Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten*, VLD, and *Mouvement Réformateur*, MR)
Denmark: Radical Liberals (*Radikale Venstre*)
Germany: Free Democratic party (*Freie Demokratische Partei*, FDP)
France: Democratic Movement (*Mouvement démocrate*) and New Centrist party (*Nouveau Centre*)
Luxembourg: Democratic party (*Demokratesch Partei*)
Netherlands: People's party for Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD)
Norway: Liberal party (*Venstre*)
Portugal: Social Democratic party (*Partido Social Democrata*, PPD/PSD)
Sweden: Liberal party (*Folkpartiet liberalerne*)
Switzerland: Radical party and Liberal party
UK: Liberal Democrats

Christian Democratic parties

Austria: Austrian People's party (*Österreichische Volkspartei*, ÖVP)
Belgium: Christian parties (*Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams*, CD&V, and *Centre démocrate humaniste*, CDH)
Finland: Christian Democrats (*Kristillisdemokraatit*)
Germany: CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) and CSU (*Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*)
Ireland: Fine Gail
Italy: Union of the Centre (*Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro*)
Luxembourg: Social Christian party (*Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei*)
Netherlands: Christian Democratic Appeal (*Christen-Democratisch Appèl*)
Norway: Christian People's party (*Kristelig Folkeparti*)
Sweden: Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*)
Switzerland: Christian Democratic Peoples' party (*Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz*)

Conservative parties

Denmark: Conservative People's party (*Det Konservative Folkeparti*)
Finland: National Coalition party (*Kansallinen Kokoomus*)
France: Union for a Popular Movement (*Union pour un Mouvement Populaire*)
Greece: New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία)
Iceland: Independence party (*Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn*)
Ireland: Fianna Fail
Italy: People of Freedom (*Il Popolo della Libertà*)
Norway: Conservative party (*Høyre*)
Portugal: Popular party (*Partido Popular*)
Spain: Popular party (*Partido Popular*)
Sweden: Conservative party (*Moderata samlingspartiet*)
UK: Conservative party

Radical Right parties

Austria: Freedom party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*) and Alliance for the Future of Austria (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich*)
Belgium: Vlaams Belang and Front National
Denmark: Danish People's party (*Dansk Folkeparti*)
Finland: True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*)
France: Front National and National Republican Movement (*Mouvement National Républicain*)
Germany: Republican party (*Die Republikaner*), National Democratic party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) and People's Union (*Deutsche Volksunion*)
Greece: Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός)
Italy: Tricolour Flame
Luxembourg: Alternative Democratic Reform party (*Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei*)
Netherlands: Freedom party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*)
Norway: Progress party (*Fremskrittspartiet*)
Switzerland: Swiss People's party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*)

Other parties

Iceland: Citizen movement (*Borgarahreyfingin*)
Belgium: Lijst Dedecker
France: Minor left-wing parties; Hunting, Fishing, Nature, and Tradition (*Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions*); Movement for France (*Mouvement pour la France*)
Ireland: Independents
Italy: Italy of Values (*Italia del Valori*)
Netherlands: D66, Christian Union, SGP Reformed party, Party for the Animals (*Partij voor de Dieren*), and Group Verdonk

A.1.2 The construction of the value orientation indexes

The value orientations are constructed the exact same way as in Knutsen (2012). The following is based on Knutsen (2012: 27-31).

Religious/secular values

(Q30) Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?

a) God, b) Life after death, c) Hell, d) Heaven, e) Sin (V119-V123)

An index from 0-5 is constructed based on the number of beliefs the respondents hold.

V129 (Q36) How important is God in your life? (1-10)

This scale is transformed (not collapsed) to a scale with values from 0 to 5, and then added to the scale for religious beliefs. The final index is then an equal-weighted additive index between the two components, religious beliefs and importance of God with values from 0 to 10. A high score on the index indicates a religious orientation; a low score indicates a secular orientation.

Economic left-right values

The index is based on the following variables in the dataset and the question number in the questionnaire:

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility

V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control

V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives

V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership

V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful

The variables were tapped by a question battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located to the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The question was formulated as follows: “On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?”

V194 (Q58A): Individual/state responsibility

“Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves” versus “The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”.

V197 (Q58D): Economic freedom/control

“The state should give more freedom to firms” versus “The state should control firms more effectively”.

V198 (Q58E): Income equality/incentives

“Incomes should be made more equal” versus “There should be greater incentives for individual effort”.

V199 (Q58F): Private/public ownership

“Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” versus “government ownership of business and industry should be increased”.

V196 (Q58C): Competition good/harmful

“Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas” versus “Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people”

Environmental values

The index is based on the questions in Q85 (V295-301).

“I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?”

V295: I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution

V296: We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support

V297: When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences

V298: Human ingenuity will insure that the earth remains fit to live in

V299: The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations

V300: Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature

V301: If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe

All items are then based on four-point Likert item (“Agree strongly”, “Agree”, “Disagree” and “Disagree strongly”). The neutral alternative “Neither agree nor disagree” was not

included. The index is an equal-weighted additive index (0-10) where support for environmental values has the highest values.

Q85C/V297 was not asked in the Swedish population. As such, they had missing values on this variable and have all been given the value 5.5. This ensured that we could keep all the indicators for the rest of the 17 countries. However, to make sure that this did not affect the findings, we created a new environmental values variable which excluded v297 and hence all the Swedish respondents had proper values on this variable. We then ran all the analyses in this thesis again. No results were changed substantially. Almost all coefficients remained the same, and the few that did change were changed by a magnitude of 0.01-0.03.

Libertarian-authoritarian values

These orientations are tapped by several personal values that are found in different questions and value batteries. Below the questions for the various items are outlined. The values or response alternatives that tap libertarian and authoritarian values are indicated with (lib.) or (auth.) respectively.

V101 (Q20) Follow instructions

People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that one should follow instructions of one's superiors even when one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one's superiors' instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. Which of these two opinions do you agree with?

- 1 – Should follow instructions (auth.)
- 2 – Must be convinced first (lib.)
- 3 – Depends
- 8 – Don't know (spontaneous)
- 9 – No answer (spontaneous)

V167 (Q49) Love parents

Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with?

A: Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them;

B: One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes

1 – Tend to agree with statement A (auth.)

2 – Tend to agree with statement B (lib.)

8 – Don't know (spontaneous)

9 – No answer (spontaneous)

V204 (Q62) Greater respect for authority

Q62 Here are two changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?

Greater respect for authority

1 – good

2 – bad

3 – don't mind

8 – don't know

9 – no answer

Q52: Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!

INTERVIEWER: CODE NOT MORE THAN FIVE!

V170 A *Good manners (auth.)* 1 2 8 9

V171 B *Independence (lib.)* 1 2 8 9

V172 C *Hard work (auth.)* 1 2 8 9

V173 D *Feeling of responsibility* 1 2 8 9

V174 E *Imagination (lib.)* 1 2 8 9

V175 F *Tolerance and respect for other people* 1 2 8 9

V176 G *Thrift, saving money and things* 1 2 8 9

V177 H *Determination, perseverance* 1 2 8 9

V178 I *Religious faith* 1 2 8 9

V179 J *Unselfishness* 1 2 8 9

V180 K Obedience (auth.) 1 2 8 9

V181 None (spontaneous) 1 2 8 9

1 – mentioned

2 – not mentioned

3 – don't know

4 – no answer

Only those item that are in italics are used to tap the libertarian-authoritarian dimension.

The index was constructed as an equal-weighted index with value from 0 to 10. A high score on the index indicates a libertarian orientation.

Immigration orientations

These orientations are tapped by six questions which are asked in a battery where the respondents were shown a card with two opposite statements located at the endpoints of a scale from 1 to 10. The questions were formulated as follows:

Q78: “Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? (from 1 to 10) “

A (V268): Take jobs

“Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country” versus “immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country”

B (V269): Cultural life undermined

“A country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants” versus “a country’s cultural life is not undermined by immigrants”

C (V270): Crime problems

“Immigrants make crime problems worse” versus “immigrants do not make crime problems worse”

D (V271): Welfare

“Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system” versus “immigrants are not a strain on a country’s welfare system”

E (V272): Threat to society

“In the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society” versus “in the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society”

F (V273): Customs and traditions

“For the greater good of society it is better if immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions” versus “for the greater good of society it is better if immigrants do not maintain their distinct customs and traditions, but adopt the customs of the country”

An equal-weighted additive index was constructed on the basis of these six items. The index has values from 0 to 10, and a high score indicates a non-restrictive view on immigration and a positive view on immigrants.

A.2 Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics are for all units that are included in the analyses in this thesis, i.e. excluding those that have missing values on the party family or social class variable.

A.2.1: Social class

Table A.1: Social class in percent, by country

	Hi serv.	Lo serv.	Rout nman	Petite bourg.	Skilled work.	Unskilled work	N
Austria	13,5	18,9	30,0	9,3	12,2	16,0	813
Belgium	15,2	30,0	16,1	6,6	12,4	19,9	1068
Denmark	20,3	26,5	20,4	6,6	10,4	15,7	1190
Finland	25,7	26,2	22,6	7,9	7,6	10,0	738
France	15,9	28,5	20,2	6,5	11,6	17,3	1059
Germany	12,3	18,6	24,5	5,0	21,8	17,8	1244
Greece	10,4	13,9	15,6	35,6	8,8	15,8	800
Iceland	17,3	32,3	16,9	11,1	9,8	12,8	533
Ireland	8,9	19,9	30,0	7,5	11,7	22,0	583
Italy	13,5	24,5	17,8	16,2	11,4	16,5	702
Luxembourg	15,3	28,1	22,0	5,9	11,0	17,7	745
Netherlands	21,4	30,0	21,6	7,9	7,6	11,5	1267
Norway	20,7	25,7	24,9	7,7	8,7	12,2	942
Portugal	4,9	11,1	22,5	9,2	18,8	33,6	596
Spain	7,8	12,0	26,3	11,8	12,8	29,3	782
Sweden	15,5	33,0	25,3	5,7	8,7	11,8	858
Switzerland	22,1	31,1	23,1	5,4	9,7	8,6	698
Great Britain	20,0	25,7	20,7	7,4	8,8	17,3	1022
Total	16,0	24,6	22,1	9,2	11,4	16,7	15640

A.2.2: The party families

Table A.2: Support for the party families in percent, by country

	Communist	LS	Green	SD	Etnreg	Agrarian	Liberals	CD	Cons.	RR	Other	N
Austria	1,6		14,8	32,5			3,6	23,9		21,0	2,7	813
Belgium			14,4	25,3	7,2		17,3	24,3		6,1	5,4	1068
Denmark	1,8	20,4		22,8		29,7	6,7		8,3	8,7	1,4	1190
Finland		5,8	16,1	18,3	1,8	14,0		3,0	26,7	12,5	1,9	738
France	3,9	5,9	10,2	28,7			14,3		22,5	3,0	11,5	1059
Germany		19,0	10,0	22,9			9,1	33,6	0,0	3,5	1,9	1244
Greece	7,6	9,1		33,6				0,0	32,0	4,0	13,6	800
Iceland	0,0	20,6		25,7		12,9		0,0	29,3		11,4	533
Ireland		8,9	5,0	8,9				22,8	41,5		12,9	583
Italy	6,3	3,1	2,1	32,9	8,4			9,4	25,4	2,3	10,1	702
Luxembourg	2,7	2,0	17,2	24,7			19,1	26,3		3,5	4,6	745
Netherlands		11,0	5,9	16,2			14,3	24,5		2,8	25,3	1267
Norway	2,1	7,0		29,1		7,9	6,2	5,2	18,2	22,6	1,8	942
Portugal	11,2	5,0		40,3			32,7		2,2		8,6	596
Spain		8,2		48,8	5,5				30,4		7,0	782
Sweden		7,7	9,1	29,6		4,4	8,9	4,0	28,4		7,9	858
Switzerland	2,6		14,2	20,9			19,2	12,8		22,1	8,3	698
Great Britain			8,3	29,4	2,2		15,0		38,2		7,0	1022
Total	2,0	7,8	7,3	26,9	1,4	4,1	9,6	11,3	15,5	6,3	8,0	15640

A.2.3: The value orientations

Table A.3: Economic ideology, from right (0) to left (10)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Austria	4,54	1,56	0,00	9,56	813
Belgium	4,52	1,53	0,00	10,00	1068
Denmark	3,77	1,63	0,00	10,00	1190
Finland	4,68	1,82	0,00	10,00	738
France	4,60	1,71	0,00	10,00	1059
Germany	4,48	1,67	0,00	9,33	1244
Greece	5,13	1,78	0,00	10,00	800
Iceland	4,07	1,65	0,00	9,56	533
Ireland	4,04	1,40	0,00	8,44	583
Italy	4,54	1,71	0,00	9,11	702
Luxembourg	4,32	1,49	0,00	10,00	745
Netherlands	4,29	1,40	0,00	9,11	1267
Norway	3,93	1,59	0,00	8,89	942
Portugal	4,39	1,29	0,00	9,33	596
Spain	5,11	1,39	0,00	10,00	782
Sweden	4,00	1,88	0,00	10,00	858
Switzerland	4,04	1,57	0,00	9,33	698
UK	3,76	1,57	0,00	9,11	1022
Total	4,33	1,65	0,00	10,00	15640

Table A.4 Religiosity, from low to high

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N
Austria	4,97	3,03	0	10	813
Belgium	3,83	3,12	0	10	1068
Denmark	2,97	2,59	0	10	1190
Finland	4,30	3,32	0	10	738
France	3,70	3,21	0	10	1059
Germany	3,42	3,31	0	10	1244
Greece	6,81	2,67	0	10	800
Iceland	5,09	2,94	0	10	533
Ireland	6,93	2,75	0	10	583
Italy	6,08	3,13	0	10	702
Luxembourg	4,20	3,03	0	10	745
Netherlands	4,25	3,36	0	10	1267
Norway	3,51	3,22	0	10	942
Portugal	6,18	2,63	0	10	596
Spain	4,60	3,14	0	10	782
Sweden	2,76	2,98	0	10	858
Switzerland	4,82	2,98	0	10	698
UK	4,79	3,45	0	10	1022
Total	4,43	3,29	0	10	15640

Table A.5: Environmentalism, from low to high

	Mean	SD	Min.	max	N
Austria	6,27	1,59	1,07	10,00	813
Belgium	6,14	1,57	0,00	10,00	1068
Denmark	6,16	1,49	0,36	10,00	1190
Finland	6,69	1,67	1,43	10,00	738
France	6,60	1,49	1,43	10,00	1059
Germany	6,02	1,64	0,71	10,00	1244
Greece	7,20	1,31	2,50	10,00	800
Iceland	5,46	1,49	0,71	9,64	533
Ireland	5,63	1,56	1,07	10,00	583
Italy	6,30	1,35	1,79	10,00	702
Luxembourg	6,67	1,42	1,43	10,00	745
Netherlands	5,61	1,33	1,43	9,64	1267
Norway	5,92	1,66	0,71	10,00	942
Portugal	6,21	1,43	2,14	9,64	596
Spain	6,35	1,49	1,79	10,00	782
Sweden	5,50	0,00	5,50	5,50	858
Switzerland	6,69	1,46	0,36	10,00	698
UK	5,94	1,50	1,07	9,64	1022
Total	6,17	1,53	0,00	10,00	15640

Table A.6: Authoritarianism (low) – libertarianism (high)

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N
Austria	5,46	1,93	0,00	10,00	813
Belgium	3,72	2,02	0,00	10,00	1068
Denmark	5,66	1,86	0,00	10,00	1190
Finland	5,41	1,80	0,00	10,00	738
France	3,86	2,08	0,00	10,00	1059
Germany	5,20	1,94	0,00	10,00	1244
Greece	4,12	1,82	0,00	10,00	800
Iceland	4,87	1,90	0,00	10,00	533
Ireland	4,16	1,74	0,00	8,75	583
Italy	3,80	1,83	0,00	10,00	702
Luxembourg	4,07	1,95	0,00	10,00	745
Netherlands	4,57	1,90	0,00	10,00	1267
Norway	5,81	1,75	1,25	10,00	942
Portugal	3,26	1,59	0,00	8,75	596
Spain	4,15	1,84	0,00	10,00	782
Sweden	6,04	1,94	0,63	10,00	858
Switzerland	5,06	1,97	0,00	10,00	698
UK	3,87	1,83	0,00	9,38	1022
Total	4,66	2,05	0,00	10,00	15640

Table A.7: Immigration values, from negative to positive

	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	N
Austria	3,79	2,36	0,00	10,00	813
Belgium	3,93	2,11	0,00	10,00	1068
Denmark	4,97	2,00	0,00	10,00	1190
Finland	4,85	2,30	0,00	10,00	738
France	5,15	2,26	0,00	10,00	1059
Germany	3,91	1,91	0,00	10,00	1244
Greece	4,16	2,18	0,00	10,00	800
Iceland	5,21	2,00	0,19	10,00	533
Ireland	3,99	1,95	0,00	10,00	583
Italy	4,87	2,31	0,00	10,00	702
Luxembourg	5,16	2,10	0,00	10,00	745
Netherlands	4,62	1,85	0,00	10,00	1267
Norway	4,45	1,90	0,00	10,00	942
Portugal	5,00	1,62	0,74	10,00	596
Spain	4,81	1,87	0,00	10,00	782
Sweden	5,16	2,51	0,00	10,00	858
Switzerland	4,51	2,01	0,00	9,81	698
UK	3,63	2,19	0,00	10,00	1022
Total	4,53	2,15	0,00	10,00	15640

A.3 Abbreviations

CD: Christian Democratic/Christian Democracy

LS: Left Socialist/Left Socialism

RR: Radical Right

SD: Social Democratic/Social Democrats/Social Democracy