

Korean Culture and Transformation of National Identity

- A research into six types of South Korean culture-related texts



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It does not matter how slowly you go as long as you do not stop.

- Confucius

Abstract

This thesis investigates how the Korean national identity has been constructed in Korean culture-related texts aimed at two different groups, overseas Koreans and foreigners, by comparing Korean culture-related texts published especially after 2000s. It mainly demonstrates the interrelation between the Korean government's overseas Korean/foreigner policy and the 'collective/social/cultural memory' building in culture-related texts. It shows that 'collective/social/cultural memory' has been appropriated for the needs of the Korean government in the neo-liberal globalization process that has taken place in Korea. At the same time, the thesis also presents the ambiguity of the criteria which can draw a line between overseas Koreans and foreigners in recent times, because the '*gukmin*' (Nation people in Korean) as a citizenship identity is becoming reinforced (which can include both groups into the same category). However, I pose that the multicultural perspective still was not deeply considered in this transformation of the national identity. For the Korean government, both groups are still regarded as objects to be socialize into the Korean way. The most interesting finding is the 'ethnicized' concept '*gukmin*', which is generally deployed by appealing to ethnic attachment to the nation indirectly. Particular elements (Korean, indigenous, traditional) still prevail in most culture-related texts. With politically conservative shift trends in Korea, there was also generally found conservative reinterpretations of the 'collective/social/cultural memory' throughout most of the culture-related texts.

Acknowledgment

The writing of this thesis has benefited enormously from academic and moral support from my supervisor Prof. Vladimir Tikhonov (Park, Noja). I want to show my best respect and gratitude to him.

I confess here that the growing concern on understanding my own identity after I moved to Norway, a country which is very far from South Korea, led me to this study. Nevertheless, over the years, this writing has been a great academic challenge. The topic of the thesis was more complex than I had expected at first, and I came across many obstacles along the writing process, but I am happy to say that the process of writing this thesis has further deepened my understanding of my own culture thus helped me a lot to be better equipped as a Korean/Korean culture educator.

Maybe I could not reach the end if I didn't get the endless mental support and attention from my mother, friends, my previous Korean school students and colleagues.

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In this paper, except the proper noun which already fixed internationally, I used the revised Korean romanization system when I romanize Korean such as name of the book, figure, place and so on. Before, the most commonly used system in academic area was McCune-Reischauer romanization. Here I contrast between McCune-Reischauer and revised Korean romanization system. For example:

Han'guk - Hanguk

Tangun - Dangun

Söul - Seoul

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Abbreviation

3D	Difficult, Dirty, Dangerous
CERD	Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
EKFN	Ethnic Korean with Foreign Nationality
EPS	Employment Permit System
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
KNA	Korean National Abroad
KHEI	Korea High Education Institute
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM MRTC	The Migration Research & Training Centre by International Organization for Migration in Republic of Korea
MCST	Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKA	Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Overseas Korean Act)
OKF	Overseas Korean Foundation
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
UN	United Nation

Korean words

<i>Bangongjuui</i>	Anticommunism
<i>Bukhanitalchumin</i>	North Korean defector
<i>Chaebol</i>	Conglomerate
<i>Chon</i>	(Relatedness of family members)
<i>Dangun</i>	(shaman priest or origin of Korean race)
<i>Daehan maeil sinbo</i>	Korea Daily News
<i>Daehan-minguk</i>	Republic of Korea
<i>Dangnae</i>	Relatives
<i>Danyil minjok</i>	Homogeneous ethnic group
<i>Dayinjong, damunhwa sahoe</i>	Multiethnic, Multicultural society
<i>Dongpo</i>	Compatriot
<i>Geunmyeon</i>	Diligence
<i>Goryoyin</i>	Russian-Korean
<i>Gukmin</i>	Nation people, Citizen
<i>Gukka</i>	Nation, State
<i>Gyeorae</i>	Ethnic people
<i>Hallyu</i>	Korean Wave
<i>Han-minjok</i>	Korean ethnic people or homogeneous people
<i>Hanbok</i>	Korean dress
<i>Hangeul hakgyeo</i>	Korean language school
<i>Hangeul</i>	Korean language / Korean writing system
<i>Hanguk hakgyo</i>	Korean school
<i>Hangukin</i>	Korean people
<i>Hanguk gukmin</i>	Korean citizen
<i>Hanguk Jeongsin Munhwa Yeonguweon</i>	Korean Spiritual Culture Institute
<i>Hanguk gyoyukwon</i>	Korean education institute
<i>Hanok</i>	Traditional Korean housing
<i>Hongyik yingan</i>	To benefit mankind
<i>Hyo</i>	Filial piety
<i>Hyeopdong</i>	Cooperation
<i>Hunminjungum</i>	(The book that explained about Korean language system)

<i>Ilminjuui</i>	One nation principle
<i>Jajo</i>	Self-help
<i>Jaeoe dongpo</i>	Overseas brethren
<i>Jaeoe Dongpo Beop</i>	Overseas Koreans Foundation Act
<i>Jaeoe dongpo Shinmun</i>	Newspaper for overseas brethren
<i>Jemi-gyopo</i>	American-Korean
<i>Jesa</i>	Memorial ceremony (for ancestor)
<i>Joguk</i>	Ancestral Land
<i>Jokbo</i>	Genealogical record
<i>Josang</i>	Ancestor
<i>Joseonjok</i>	Chinese-Korean
<i>Juche</i>	Self-reliance
<i>Kimchi</i>	(Name of one of Korean food, pickled vegetable)
<i>Pitjul</i>	Consanguinity
<i>Ppalli ppalli</i>	Hurry Hurry
<i>Saemaeul Undong</i>	New Community Movement
<i>Segye hanminjok chukjeon</i>	World ethnic Korean Festival
<i>Segehwa</i>	Globalization
<i>Taeguekki</i>	Korean national flag
<i>Makkulli</i>	(Korean traditional rice wine)
<i>Minjok</i>	Ethnic group
<i>Minjok-gukka</i>	(Ethnic group based) nation
<i>Minjok gongdongchae</i>	Ethnic community
<i>Minjok juche-seong</i>	Ethnic national identity
<i>Munjung</i>	Clan
<i>Ondol</i>	(Korean traditional floor)
<i>Soju</i>	(Korean rice alcohol)
<i>Uri gyeræ</i>	Our ethnic people
<i>Uri minjok</i>	Our ethnic people
<i>Yushin</i>	Revitalizing Reforms system

1. Introduction

1.1. Motivation for the study

During the one and a half years of voluntarily work as a Korean language teacher in a Korean language school in Oslo, I had a chance to look through the Korean culture-related textbooks for overseas Koreans sent from Korea. Since over 90% of the students in school were Norwegian, the texts were written in a too strongly ethnic-nationalistic way to be used as teaching material in my class. Then I tried to find suitable Korean culture-related textbooks for foreign students by myself. There were quite a few choices. And even though I just had a quick look, I found that textbooks for foreign students differed in a positive way both in contents and scope as well as in rhetoric style from the ones for overseas Koreans. Moreover, due to unfavorable school conditions I had to be in charge of both Korean children (one of their parents is a Korean) and Norwegians (both Korean adoptees and ethnic Norwegians) in the same class. So whenever I tried to be properly equipped for the class, I fell into a dilemma. Namely, what kind of attitude as a Korean language/culture teacher do I have to have towards each of them? And this concern led to me studying more about the current trend of Korean overseas-Korean/foreigner policy and culture-related textbooks for the respective groups.

1.2. Presentation of research questions

This paper presents my research on recent Korean official overseas-Korean/foreigner policy and how it influences the Korean national identity revealed in the culture-related textbooks for heritage learners and non-heritage learners, respectively.

Subsidiary questions are as follows: 1) What are the different approaches taken by different governments, and to what extent do they differentiate from each other? 2) How are these overseas-Korean/foreign policies reflected in the respective culture-related textbooks? 3) Which social and cultural features have been taken for granted (from a cultural essentialism perspective) in recent culture-related textbooks respectively? 4) How is the cultural code evaluated by the author? As Korean indigenous culture or as general, shared East Asian culture? 5) What kind of memories are glorified, and how are they glorified? 6) How is it influenced in terms of its content selection and explanation of memories by publisher background (sponsorship by conglomerate or the state)

In addition to these research questions, I want to examine the following hypotheses:

A-1) Although the texts for non-heritage learners to emphasize ‘universalistic (Western, foreign, modern) elements’ (Shin, 2006: 119), there are ‘particularistic (Korean, indigenous, traditional) elements (Shin, 2006: 119) as well as in the text for heritage learners.

A-2) With the political shift from liberal to conservative in 2008 in recent South Korea, there is a certain tendency towards a conservative reinterpretation of the culture in culture-related texts.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Nationalism

Nationalism is the political ideology that aims to define the individual's self-identity or emotional attachment to one's nation. Nationalism is also connected to national identity. It involves the individual's solidarity, behavior to support one's state's decisions and guidance.

There are two major perspectives on the origins and foundations of nationalism. One is the 'modernist' perspective, which describes nationalism as a recent phenomenon which has developed with the modernity of the nation. It premises a structured modern society to exist. The other is the 'primordialist' perspective, which describes nationalism as a human instinct mechanism which has evolved from the organization of the group in order to feel a sense of belonging.

Nationalism could also be interpreted as a 'belief that citizenship in a state should be limited to one ethnicity, one culture, one identity group' (Kymlicka, 1995: 16). Nationalists often adopt their national identity from the historical development. And there is commonly found a response from the nationalists when the influential groups are 'unsatisfied' with the traditional identities because of the inconsistency between their characterized social order and the experience of that social order by its members, resulting in a situation of anomie that nationalists seek to resolve. (Motyl, 2001: 262) This anomie results in a society reinterpreting identity in order to create 'a unified community'. (ibid. : 262). This development may be the internal structural issues or the result of resentment by an existing group or groups towards other communities, especially foreign powers that are or are deemed to be controlling them.(ibid. : 262)

Nationalism is also criticized because it disregards the individual identity and view the individual only as a member of the society, in which the society defines the identity and not the individual and gives elites and political leaders potential opportunities to manipulate or control the masses. (Heywood, 2000: 256)

National flags, national anthems and other symbols of national identity are normally perceived as extremely important symbols of the national community.(Billig, 1995: 72) Nationalism can be combined with many other concepts. Here I list three types of nationalism which will appear in this study.

a. Ethnic nationalism

In ethnic nationalism, nation is defined by ethnicity or race. The main discourse among ethnic/ethno-nationalists is that ‘nations are determined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry’ (Muller, 2008) And it posits the condition for membership of the nation-states as common blood. In other words, nationality or citizenship is determined by *jus sanguinis* (the right of the blood, descent from a person of that nationality). Korea was ‘relatively’ ethnically homogeneous country.¹ Thus ethnic nationalism was easily deployed with the doctrine of one ethnic group with one culture. It was even strengthened during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945).

The sociologist in nationalism, Anthony Smith remarks that the term ‘ethnic nationalism’ or ‘ethno-nationalism’ is coined with non-Western concepts of nationalism, which are contrary to the Western view of a nation determined by its geographical territory. In the diaspora studies, the nation with this non-geographical boundary is applied to conceptualize collective identity of dispersed ethnics.(Safran, 2008) In the overseas Korean policy and cultural-related texts for heritage learners, ethnic nationalism is well represented.² Ethnic nationalism is often seen as dangerous, divisive and destructive, normally contrasted with political nationalism, which is viewed as civic, integrative and constructive.

b. Political nationalism

Political nationalism (or Civic nationalism) is a non-xenophobic form of nationalism which contains the values of freedom, tolerance, equality and individual rights. (Miller, 1995) It is often encouraged in multiethnic/cultural countries where ethnic nationalism is difficult to construct aiming to achieve ‘unity’ among peoples with diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. In these countries, citizenship is determined by *jus soli* (law of the soil, regardless of one’s parents’ origin), that is, it is linked to the state where they are born. It reinforces the national identity building by the connection with territory, not with their ethnic-origin. Civic nationalists often emphasize the needs of such national identity building in relation to democracy. Because it motivates citizens to participate actively in the nation derived from political legitimacy.

¹ Many scholars agreed with the point that 90% of the population in Korea were of the same ethnic group historically. However the composition of ethnic groups has diversified with a lot of foreign migrant in recent time.

² This will shed more light on Part A.

The recent Korean government (specially from the Rho Mu Hyun administration, 2003 - 2008), it was attempted to inspire political nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism.³

c. Economic nationalism

Economic nationalism is based on the policies of domestic control over economy - labor, industry and capital formation in the process of a nation's active protection and promotion of industry. Economic nationalists advocate restrictions on labor migration, movement of industry and capital. Through all recent Korean governments' foreign labor policy, control of labor migration number (particularly, low skilled/waged foreign worker) has been reinforced. Whereas businessmen and foreign investors were actively received. Furthermore, due to the growing popularity of Korean pop culture overseas, the Korean government supported private enterprises' cultural contents business economically or even planned Korean culture (food, language) globalization project.⁴ These can be seen as a case of economic nationalism expression.

2.2. Collective memory

Collective memory is constructed narratives of shared tradition and history to give the members of a certain group/society a sense of community. And this social group is more or less like 'Imagined Community' (Anderson, 1983). The community could be formed by the same ethnicity or territory which is based on ethnic/political nationalism.

To bind the members of the community together, collective memory often concerns stories of origin, symbols, historical figures, traditional values, rituals, religions, cultural assets (architecture, art, music etc), food, clothing, housing and so on.

Emile Durkheim (1858 - 1917), the scholar who did prime research on collective memory discourse, specially noted that 'traditional religious rituals', which can transmit traditional beliefs, norms and values, play a most important part in enabling individuals/groups through their memory to connect with their past and maintain continuity⁵

Maurice Halbwack (1877 - 1945), a student of Durkheim, the first sociologist who employed the term 'Collective memory', did the foundational research on societal remembrance, particularly, on

³ This will be covered in Part A in detail.

⁴ Foreign labor policy and cultural businesses will be covered in Part B in detail.

⁵ Durkheim, Emile. (1912, 1995) *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*.

individuals' understanding of a social context. He claimed that every individual's private memory can be understood in the context of the group or organization which they belong to. It can be a family, school or nation-state. And Individuals remember 'the memory' which is constructed by groups. He also insisted that 'the memory' is constructed to fulfil the group's own concerns and interests. Namely, the group selects different memories and reconstructs the past in order to explain current matters and their concerns. The process is about choosing which events are remembered, deleting those that are eliminated and rearranging events to adapt to the current society's narrative. Borrowing Nora's (1996) words, I in addition want to point out that groups (elites, political leaders in power) produce 'simulations of natural memory' to support emerging nation-state. They select certain dates to commemorate, deliberately get rid of others from representation (collective amnesia), and invent a tradition to strengthen collective memory. Collective memory is becoming both a tool and an object of power.

Furthermore, Hobsbawm (1992) 's 'invention of tradition' extended Nora's version of collective memory in relation to modernity. He pointed out that 'social changes' that occurred in the process of modernity destroyed customs. And this required the formation and adjustment of (new) traditions for the purpose of establishing legitimacy and solidarity. The invented traditions form certain values for individuals to adopt in order to create a social identity and the rituals and symbols are used to be integrated into the modern society.

Bodnar's (1993) view represented one further step from Halbwachs'. He pointed out that collective/public memory is not focused on the accurate representation of the past, but on the needs of 'both the present and the anticipated future'. This premises that public memory stabilizes the societies' status quo. He also defined it as the official memory, which is different from vernacular memory⁶. The sanctification of the official memory means groups (who obtained the power)'s will to represent the selected memories.

Through the memory studies, collective memory discourse has developed its meaning and interpretation by many scholars. Again, to summarize, it is a manipulated memory to fulfil the needs of the influential groups of the society. It can also be changed constantly by the nation-state's modernity process. 'Collective memory' is the most influential concept in this culture-related texts analysis in terms of national identity.

⁶ It is the memory formed by people which can be conveyed immediately to the masses.

2.3. Cultural essentialism

To begin with, 'culture' refers to 'the way of life of a group of people'. More specifically, it means how they behave as a member of a group and how they live their lives. (Kidd 2002: 6) It is a difficult term to define because of its character of perpetual change in time and space.

As for the essentialist account of culture, I want to borrow Wikan's (Grillo 2003: 158; Wikan 1999: 62) definition. That is, culture is 'static, fixed, objective, consensual and uniformly shared by all members of a group'.

'Cultural essentialism' is the idea that culture in the anthropological sense determines individual and collective identities.(Grillo, 2003: 160) In detail, it is a system of belief grounded in a conception of human beings as 'cultural' subject, i.e. bearers of a culture, located within a boundaries world, which defines them and differentiates them from others.(Grillo, 2003:158)

The essentialist way of culture also entails a biological determinism, which is that the cultural traits and differences (fixed, solid almost biological - Gilroy, 1987: 39) are inheritable. (Grillo 2003: 160) In this context, 'cultural membership' is normally synonymous with ethnicity. Such cultural/ethnic identity in cultural essentialism has features like 'historic', 'rooted', 'authentic' and 'traditional' (Augé, 1999: 99; Parekh, 2000: 154). In the multicultural context, cultural essentialism is often presented as 'cultural conservatism'.

3. Methodological Reflection

3.1. Selection of materials

To find the answers to my research questions and whether relevant hypotheses are right, I examined the following 6 textbooks:

Part A. 2 kinds of texts published by the Korean Government organization for heritage learners:

(A) *Hanguin-ui saenghwal* (The Living of Korean) vol.I-II by National institute for International Education, 1992

(B) *Hangeul-hakkyo haksangyong hanguk-munhwa* (Korean culture for overseas Korean school student) by The Educational Foundation for Koreans Abroad, 2005

Part B. 4 kinds of texts published by 4 different publishers for (mostly) non-heritage learners⁷:

(C) *Tongeuro ingneun hangukmunhwa* (Korean Culture for curious new comers) by Bakijeong publisher, 2009

(D) *Oegugineul wihan hanguk, hangukin geurigo hanguk munhwa* (Korea, Korean and Korean Culture for Foreigners) by Bogo publisher, 2009

(E) *Oegugineul wihan hangukmunhwailkki* (Readings in Korean Culture for Foreigners) by Episteme, Korean Broadcasting and Communication University publisher, 2010

(F) *Oegugineul wihan hangukmunhwailkki* (Readings in Korean Culture for Foreigners) by Beautiful Korean School, 2011

For convenience, hereafter I'll mention the above texts as A to F instead of their full names.

General description of each text book and the reason why I selected these text books

Text A consists of vol.I (Ethic, Folk, Etiquette) and II (Geography, Politics, Economy, Society and Culture), 364 pages in total, divided in nine chapters. It contains both Korean and English texts.

⁷ As these text reveal on their foreword, some texts include ethnic Koreans for its target reader.

Text B is one slim volume, 120 pages in all, divided into ten chapters such as Korea, rituals in Life, living cultures, holidays and seasonal customs, folk games, folk art and religions, traditional crafts, world cultural assets and remains. It is only written in Korean.

Text A is adjusted for overseas Koreans in general, the subject coverage is broader than text B, while text B is aimed at children in overseas Hangeul school. Subjects cover only Text A's vol.1's content. Generally, the depth of narrative in text B is quite shallow, simple, short. However, it's edited in an attractive way with lots of big and high quality colored illustrations.

For the heritage learners, only these two textbooks are offered by the Ministry of Education. So I had nothing but these two texts to study for my research. Text A was published in 1992, but it was still distributed to overseas Korean schools in 2012 (the year I worked as a Korean school teacher). So I considered that text A could be compared with texts C / D / E / F - which were all published after 2009. Text B was published in 2005 for children in Korean schools. I have included this text in the research to see the changes at different publishing times for the heritage learners.

Text C consists of twelve chapters divided into four big themes such as Nature and people, Living culture, Spirit culture and Leisure culture. 312 pages in total. Written only in Korean.

Text D consists of nine chapters including Korean natural environment, history, historical figures, values, language, literature, religions, living culture and cultural assets. 480 pages in total. Written only in Korean.

Text E consists of nine chapters mainly about value culture such as Korean familism, groupism, authoritarianism, culture of conformity pursuit and communication, Confucianism and dynamism, passion and excitement, multi-religion society and religious perspective, freewheeling chic and beauty and the change in value consciousness. 443 pages in total. Written in both in Korean and English.

Text F consists of seven chapters such as food/clothing/shelter, I/you/we, finding happiness, over the border, youth/love/marriage, daily life/leisure/popular culture, Korean language and literature. 215 pages in total. Only written in Korean. It is edited with lots of colorful and fancy photographs.

A large amount of culture-related texts for foreigners have been published especially since 2007.

But I chose those four texts in order to have meaningful material to research from the perspective of popularity measured by sales volume in online bookstores⁸ and diversity in contents and publication backgrounds.

Text C / D / E / F were published during the Lee Myung Bak regime (2008 – 2013). And the intended audience was foreigners with a high proficiency in Korean. Therefore, its depth of description and narrative style is much more elaborate than text A and B.

For further specification, Hannah Park, author of text C has both academic experiences as a Korean culture lecturer in China for several years and from political participation in a Korean food globalization project. Text D shows a similar contents selection and editing method as the texts for heritage learners (Text A / B). Text E mostly deals with values in Korean cultures and is quite distinctive compared to other texts. It has been selected as the best scholarly book by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) in 2011. Text F was published with the active sponsorship of the Samsung Foundation of Culture.

Table 1. Comparison between Korean culture-related textbooks

Text	A	B	C	D	E	F
Publishing time	1992*	2005	2009	2009	2010	2011
Target of readers	overseas Koreans	overseas Koreans (Children)	Foreigners / Multicultural families / Overseas Koreans	Koreans / Ethnic Koreans	Foreigners	Foreigners
Level of difficulty	Intermediate	Elementary	Advanced	Advanced	Advanced	Intermediate
Publication background	Government	Government	Private	Private	University	Private**

* Text A was still in distribution in 2012

** Text F was published by the enterprise's sponsorship

⁸ Text C / D / E / F are the most selling culture-related texts for foreigner in Korean online bookstore www.aladin.co.kr in May 2014 now.

3.2. Definition of Heritage learners and Non-Heritage learners

a. Heritage learner

In this research, heritage learner means those who are learning Korean Language and culture and also have an ethnic Korean background. There are adult heritage learners who migrated for different reasons such as refuge, adoption in their early years or their second generations who have now only ethnic Korean features but not any social connection with Korea. And child heritage learners are normally those living in foreign countries with their ethnic Korean parents who are resident employees. They can already speak Korean with their family members, but need education in Korean ethnic culture. Some child heritage learners are from marriage migrant families. One of their parents is ethnic Korean and they have more difficulty in learning Korean language and culture with a half ethnic Korean background. By the level of difficulty and its theme, textbooks A and B take chiefly those 'child heritage learners who are ethnic Koreans' as their main readers.

b. Non-heritage learner

Non-heritage learners are those who are learning Korean Language and culture but have a non-ethnic Korean background. Normally they are marriage immigrants, international students and those who are just interested in Korean language and culture. Textbooks C - F, all readers are supposed to be adult foreigners who have already a good understanding of the Korean language. However, the border between Heritage learners and Non-heritage learners has become weaker recently. As appeared in Text C and D culture-related texts have begun to be addressed to a mixed readership. They are addressed to both adult heritage learners (ethnic Korean migrants) and adult non-heritage learners (marriage immigrants, international students etc).

3.3. Methodology : Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

In evaluating my hypothesis, as a primary approach, I draw a categorized chart by coding data of cultural items with the purpose of controlling and comparing different types of texts. At this stage, I refer much to advanced research, *A foundational research on selecting the items of Korean culture education - by comparing literatures, teaching materials, and research data on the current status of educational institutions* by Kang and Hong (2011). For the next step, I employ CDA with several

theories (refer to 2.2) based on basic content analysis of explanations of memories, which can help me to see more clearly the different perspectives on each value and historical/social event for the different groups (heritage learners or non-heritage learners). In CDA research, the insight into the 'Problems' such as social/political inequality, power abuse or domination is adequately produced. As a methodology, CDA is generally used in humanities and social sciences research areas. But it does not limit its analysis style to certain structures of the text, but systematically relates these to structures of the sociopolitical context.

4.1 Part A

4.1.1. Contemporary South Korean Identity politics and Overseas Koreans

First of all I want to clearly define the term ‘contemporary’. ‘Contemporary’ in the research here indicates approximately the last 20 years, that is, from the nineties to the present. This is because the time period is matched with the publishing and distribution time of culture-related texts for overseas Koreans (1992-). In the nineties, the overseas expansion of the South Korean conglomerates, changes on the labour market, as well as the end of the Cold War and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC led to the South Korean government, namely the Kim Young Sam government (1993-98), beginning to show a new interest in national problems in relation to ‘globalization’ (*segehwa*). With this external environment shift, the South Korean government's internal characteristics obviously also changed. Since it was the first civilian government in South Korean history, there was an emotional basis for celebrating becoming a democratized country and finally one of the developed countries. In response to globalization, South Korea's new self-confidence also influenced national agendas, especially through the overseas Korean Policy, hoping that overseas Koreans would play in the ‘Korean way of globalization’ process.

Meanwhile, by way of this external environmental shift, the characteristics of the overseas Koreans Policy also changed dramatically between that of before the nineties and after the nineties.⁹ Moreover, from Kim's regime, overseas Koreans were considered as the medium that contributed to the motherland's furthered economic prosperity and showed a developed national image abroad. For Korea, the status of overseas Koreans seems very special. Even though capitalism and neoliberalism has been influenced into over almost every sector of society ever since the financial crisis of 1997, which was the trigger for threatening the cherished traditional Confucian values of Korean society, such as humanism/human rights, etiquette, loyalty and so on, microscopically, still, there remains the Confucian (ritual) tradition for keeping 'race/ethnic' succession in the family throughout the society. Moreover, as for national identity, the notion of an ethnically homogeneous nation/race was

⁹ Before the nineties, the official Overseas Koreans Policy was basically for Koreans who lived in USA and Japan. It was impossible to discuss those who lived in PRC and the Soviet Union which were communist areas, since anti-communism was based on the whole national policy under the confrontational circumstances between the north and south in the Cold War era. In this light, it can be seen that the actual policy for overseas Koreans was begun from the nineties.

reinforced as a result of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, and is deeply rooted. In this sense, overseas Koreans are deemed still as members of the family/nation by most domestic Koreans, even if they don't live within Korea or necessarily have any understanding of their motherland anymore. This 'bloodline consciousness' was, in fact, in a sense, reinforced by neoliberal capitalist regime in the post-1990s world, since feeling threatened by 'boundless competition' and relativization of the nation-state's boundaries, Koreans tended to stick to the certainties of the inherited beliefs in the ethno-nation as one blood family.

Contrary to the above-mentioned basic emotional assumption, that is, 'South Korea is the nation of ethnic nationals and overseas Koreans are hailed as shared blood brothers', in reality, as objects of the policy, overseas Koreans are evaluated quite differently in light of economic or political interests. Economically, overseas Koreans were divided by expected income level - high/low wage workers. Politically, they were divided according to their countries of residence: Thus there were those from the developed allied nations such as USA, Japan and those from the nations that had recently become economically important such as PRC, countries in Central Asia and so on. And this binary grouping by the legislators gave rise to instability and inconsistent legislation measures in every regime.

Recognizing this major premise, in this chapter, I will try to illuminate the origins of the overseas Koreans Policy and its development, and also its policy characteristics and the process of overseas Koreans' status transition in the recent 20 years. Since the nineties, in South Korea, the president has been replaced 4 times, and every time when the regime shifted, there followed changes in the policy for overseas Koreans. Among other things, for this chapter, it is important to redefine the term 'overseas Koreans' and grasp the status quo of it. The definition of overseas Koreans has been very contentious and has been amended several times.

4.1.1.1. The definition of ‘Overseas Koreans’

The concept of overseas Koreans is quite ambiguous. To define this more accurately, it is desirable to distinguish two categories; by a general one and a legal one:

a. General definition¹⁰

Commonly, overseas Koreans means the ethnic Koreans who reside abroad. But its concept is very controversial. That is because there exist many similar terms used in South Korea instead of the term ‘overseas Korean’. For example, instead of the adjective ‘overseas’, there can be used ‘foreign-residing’, ‘individual country (for example, Japanese-, German- etc.)-residing’. And also instead of the noun ‘Koreans’, there can instead be used ‘compatriot’, ‘Korean residents’, ‘Korean nationals’, ‘Korean immigrants’ etc. That is, it can be ‘Japan-residing compatriot’, ‘Koreans residing in China’, ‘Korean national residing in the USA’, ‘Korean immigrants in Russia’, etc. All these terms have been used even in government official documents. (Kim Bong Sub, 2009: 42)

Meanwhile, this term is also used in Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF), a semiofficial governmental organization which is charge of general business for overseas Korean.

b. Legal definition

The legal definition of overseas Koreans is the concept for use in legislation in relation to overseas Koreans. There are two kinds of legislation related to overseas Koreans: One is the Overseas Koreans Foundation Act (*Jaeoe Dongpo Beop*)¹¹ which was passed in 1997 during the Kim Young Sam government. The other one is the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Overseas Korean Act, OKA) which was passed in 1999 during the Kim Dae Jung government (1998-2003). And again, overseas Koreans were divided into two groups: ‘Korean nationals abroad’¹² and ‘Ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality’¹³ To be specific, ‘Korean nationals abroad’ refers to those Korean nationals who reside or stay short term abroad, and ‘ethnic

¹⁰ In this text research, the general definition of overseas Koreans is used.

¹¹ By this act, the OKF was founded for undertaking the national education of overseas Koreans.

¹² Korean nationals abroad includes marriage emigrants who have obtained residence permits in their host countries, overseas students, and sojourning employees.

¹³ Chinese-Korean (*joseonjok*), Russian-Korean (*goryoyin*) and Koreans residing in Japan (*zainichi*) in Japan form the majority of ethnic Korean with foreign nationality

Koreans with foreign nationality' refers to those ethnic Koreans that, while residing abroad, have become citizens of their host countries. It is clear to see the wide scope of Korean nationals abroad. However, in the case of ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality, there have been several amendments to its definition, since they are distributed worldwide, and its scope depends on certain criteria¹⁴. It had been controversial by the reason of its discriminative character during the Kim Dae Jung's presidency.

4.1.1.2. The Current Status of Overseas Koreans

Overseas Koreans by the legal definition are categorized into two. But the one used by the OKF is the general definition that they are all ethnic Koreans, no matter which nationality they hold or where they live. OKF estimates puts the number of overseas Koreans at having reached approximately 7,200,000, and they are largely distributed in Asia, America and Europe, located in 151 different countries: 2.7 million *joseonjok* (Chinese-Koreans) in China, 2.1 million *jaemi-gyopo* (Korean-Americans) in the US, 900,000 *zainichi* (Koreans in Japan), 500,000 *goryoyin* (Russian Koreans) in Central Asia, almost 170,000 adopted Koreans and tens of thousands of others spread throughout Canada, Russia, South America, West and Southeast Asia and Europe. And that corresponds to about 14% of the South Korean population, also 9% of population of both North and South (of Korea). Meanwhile, the greater part of overseas Koreans are mainly distributed in these four countries: Russia (later the Soviet Union and Central Asia), China, Japan and the USA. In the the post-colonial period, which began in the late 19 century i.e. including the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) and the Korean war (1950-1953) etc, Korea had the greatest number of overseas compatriots in history.¹⁵

¹⁴ A more specific criterion was required for overseas Koreans to set the exact legal effect scope of OKA. Therefore, in 1999 (during the Kim Dae Jung government), it has been set as a criterion for the year 1948 (the year that the republic of Korea was established). Namely, Only those who emigrated after the year 1948 are accepted as overseas Koreans. By this, the law is mostly applicable to Korean nationals abroad. But it gave rise to the exclusion of *josenjok*, *goryoyin* and *zainichi* who emigrated before 1948. Since they took up the biggest part of all overseas Koreans, the legislation excluding them was not very good. By the Roh Mu Hyun government (10.2004), the criterion was amended so that OKA included also those who emigrated before 1948.

¹⁵ Regarding the Korean diaspora, the modern exodus of Korean people began in the year 1860, when the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897) began to crumble, caused by the outbreak of famine and impoverished conditions in the northern provinces (Lee Kwang-Kyu, 2000: 6-13) The first wave of emigrants found their way to the Russian Far East territory bordering present day North Korea, and from 1869 Koreans started to pour into Chinese Manchuria in great numbers. From the 1880s, Korean students started to go over to Japan, and in 1903 emigration to the United States began in the form of indentured labour. (Lee Kwang-Kyu, 1993)

4.1.1.3. The Origin and Development of the Overseas Korean Policy

Regarding the history of the Korean diaspora policy, the issue of overseas Koreans was raised for the first time at a governmental level already in 1971 (Yi Hyongkyu, 1999; Yoon In-jin, 2002). So below I will shortly write about its main features before the nineties.

After the Korean War in 1950, ideological conflict was directly expressed between North and South Korea. During that period, the overseas Korean Policy in South Korea was basically a part of the policy of 'systemic competition' against North Korea. Any support to the rival regime in the North by the overseas Koreans was to be precluded, and their loyalty to the anti-Communist regime in the South had to be strengthened. It was mainly to assist competition with North Korea, prevent pro-North Korean activity and interrupt with action against possibly pro-North Korean Activity. In this light, the movement for those ethnic Korean emigrants who resided in China and socialist block countries was greatly restricted. On the other hand, overseas migration was encouraged specially during the Park Jung Hee government (1961-79), as a solution of resolving the exploded domestic population.¹⁶ And it was also aimed at securing foreign currency that was transferred to mother land by the overseas Koreans, as it was considered as critical source to boost national economic development under the name of '*joguk gundaehwa*' (Modernization of the Fatherland).¹⁷ (Lee *et al*, 2007) At first, overseas labor migration increased as mine workers and nurse were dispatched to (West) Germany in the early 1960s, followed by large-scale construction worker's migration to the Middle East in the 1970-80s. Yet, another key factor that influenced outward movement was the amendment of Immigration Act of the United States in 1965¹⁸. As a result, the number of Korean (permanent) migrants to the United States also rose significantly during the Park's regime. Before the 1990s, US became the largest emigrant country for Koreans.

¹⁶ During the period of 1965-75, the rate of increase of population was 44% in South Korea, from 24 million to 34,6 million. This was much faster than GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rate so it was considered a threat that would hinder sustainable economic development. (Lee *et al*, 2007: 142)

¹⁷ Autocrat Park Jung Hee's coup in May 1961 was portrayed as an effort to achieve 'modernization of the fatherland'

¹⁸ In 1965, the United States Immigration Act amended the visa issuing system from the order of ethnic group (Asian was limited) to nationality. The same amount of visa was issued to the all countries migrants.

(1) The Kim Young Sam government and the Globalization Promotion Committee
(1993.2–1998.2)

The actual beginning of the overseas Korean Policy is from the Kim Young-Sam regime, which claims to support globalization. In the inaugural address titled ‘Creation of the New Korea’ of President Kim Young Sam, he distinctly appealed to the huge and widely scattered Korean diaspora to play an essential role in globalization:

“My 70 million fellow compatriots both in Korea and foreign countries! If we don’t actively handle this situation in a changing world, we will sink before joining the advanced countries. If we don’t leap, then we are going to fall behind. This is a solemn question of national survival ... My 50 million overseas compatriots who live all over the world with national pride, your homeland will be reunited in this century and it will be a homeland of freedom and peace. Let’s cooperate both at home and abroad and mark a new era of proud Korean people.”

‘70 million fellow compatriots both in Korea and foreign countries’, ‘question of national survival’, ‘50 million overseas compatriots’, ‘unified homeland’... To be considered such expressions, President Kim emphasizes national unity by appreciating overseas Koreans as part of an inner group. However, such changed overseas Korean politics looks like pretty much inspired by the notion of Greater China (Da Zhonghua 大中华) that was developed in the late 1980s as a global Chinese community by the studies of Aihwa Ong (1999: 55-83). In her examination of China’s diaspora policy and construction of a disembedded global Chinese public culture in cyberspace, the concept of ‘Chinese-ness’ was based on China’s economic policy.

In 1995 President Kim Young Sam launched the Globalization Promotion committee and announced its blueprint for how globalization was to be achieved.

“Globalization must be underpinned by ‘Koreanization’. We cannot be global citizens without a good understanding of our own culture and tradition. Globalization in the proper sense of the word means that we should march out in the world on the

strength of our unique culture and traditional values. Only when we maintain our national identity and uphold our intrinsic national spirit will we be able to successfully globalize.”¹⁹

Gi-wook Shin (2003) analyses how globalization is strengthening nationalism in the country and calls this development ‘the paradox of Korean globalization’. Others asserts that this phenomenon is an international feature for post-colonial nation states, particularly, as a reactive politics of identity and a fundamentalist strategy of resistance against Westernization (Hall, 1996; Kang, 1999; Park C S, 1999; Smith, 1995). To embody the overseas Koreans policy, the OKF was established under the Foreign Affairs department in 1997. The overseas Korean policy was actively carried from the same year when a financial crisis occurred in South Korea. Because of this, it seemed to be needed for several significant reasons in 1997: Mainly because the overseas Koreans were in high demand for their potential in remedying the economic crisis. Above all things, to follow the U.S-led globalization, overseas Koreans could be an important medium to lead the economic and political development. Economically, the low waged overseas Korean (*joseonjok, goryoyin*) laborers who were attracted to the country by the time of the newly established diplomatic relations with the PRC and the former Soviet Union, were expected to work in many small and medium-sized enterprises that were experiencing manpower shortages. They welcomed those low waged laborers who were fluent in Korean and had great understanding in Korean culture. On the other hand, by strengthening the economic ties with overseas Koreans, it was expected of them to invest in their mother country.

Politically, South Korea was full of confidence by the self-awareness of becoming a developed country. By joining OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (December, 1996), it showed off the developed global Korea image abroad through overseas Koreans, hoping overseas Korean to play the role of political leverage in foreign countries. It was obvious that the Kim Young-Sam regime set the direction for the overseas Koreans policy which is maintained until now. However, the immature legal institutionalization necessitated many follow-up actions by the next regime.

¹⁹ Quoted by Alford, 1999; Committee for Globalization Policy, 1998; Ha, 1999; Yi Jeong Duk, 2002; Hubinette 2006)

(2) The Kim Dae Jung Government and the Overseas Korean Act (OKA) (1998.2–2003.2)

The case for legal institutionalization of overseas Koreans Policy which began in Kim Young Sam regime, became more concrete in the Kim Dae Jung government. Below is the relevant part of President Kim Dae Jung's inauguration speech:

“The new government will make stronger efforts to fortify closer overseas compatriots ties and protect their rights and interests. We will help actively overseas compatriots as people of Korean nation origin to have pride and comfort when they perform their duties as citizens in their host country.”

The Kim Dae Jung government was in succession to the previous regime's overseas Koreans Policy, but the scope of overseas Koreans was made more specific, from ‘ethnic Korean people’ to ‘people of Korean nation origin’. Simply put, it emphasized more attachment to citizenship than ethnicity. In particular, if overseas Koreans had been considered as member of the Korean people in the Kim Young Sam regime, they were re-evaluated as an object for mutual network with the mother country in the Kim Dae Jung regime. This perspective change was especially accelerated after experiencing the economic crisis in 1997, because of the globalization process and regional collaboration trends.

However, the legislation process for overseas Koreans did not correspond with the government policy's objects. For OKA²⁰ that was passed in 1999, overseas Koreans were categorized by two – Korean National Abroad (KNA) and Ethnic Korean with Foreign Nationality (EKFN). And as the legal standard for overseas Koreans was limited to ‘those who emigrated after 1948’, most *joseonjok* and *goryoyin* couldn't be applicable by OKA²¹. During the discussion of law, there was the objection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was anxious for national security problems such as diplomatic friction with Chinese government who had fear of ethnic group division by ethnic Korean Chinese away from China and of the Ministry of Labor, which insisted that the

²⁰ The standard for foreigners and Ethnic Koreans with Foreign Nationality (EKFN) was obscure, so the special law for EKFN could be assumed as discrimination. On the other hand, PRC and Russia, being multiracial countries, expressed concern about nation division because of OKA. Thus, the original legislation, the Special Act on Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (1998) – including free travel, suffrage, and right to work in public sector etc. became downsized to OKA. And it did not include suffrage and the possible work types were limited.

²¹ Prior to 1945, Manchuria, Japan and the Russian Maritime Province was three principal regions to which Koreans emigrated to seek new political or economical opportunities. (Kim,1971)

government should protect the domestic labor market.²² Therefore, as a matter of fact, the government restricted the immigrants of ethnic Koreans with foreign nationality (especially *joseonjok* and *goryoyin*). In actuality, the introduction of the new standard was a way to legitimize discrimination among overseas Koreans by their economic condition. With this, the overseas Korean policy became divided into OKA by the Ministry of Justice and Overseas Korean Foundation Act by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

One interesting thing is, during Kim's presidency, adopted overseas Koreans also began to be regarded as overseas Koreans, as a goal of exerting national influence. During this period, adopted Koreans were specially treated by the government because of the increased international adoption in connection with the economic crisis and numerous family break-ups resulting in so-called 'IMF orphans'²³.(Hubinette: 2006). Official statistic shows that the number of Korean adoptees were estimated to be circa 110,000 in 2002.²⁴

(3) The Roh Mu Hyun government and the Working Visit Visa Programme (2003.2–2008.2)

The Roh Mu Hyun government maintained the previous overseas Korean policy, but took on an aspect to make up for the problems that appeared during the policy process. (OKF: 2006). In this regime, '1948' which was the critical standard to be accepted as overseas Korean was abolished by the decision on unconstitutionality in 2004. And the criterion was extended to 1922, so almost all the ethnic Koreans were formally eligible for the visa as overseas Koreans. Samuel Kim (2000: 262) labelled this legislation change as being 'hyper-nationalistic', which means the Korean nation-state has introduced a new principle of Korean citizenship based on a global 'bloodline' or *jus sanguinis*, and redemarcated its borders, turning every ethnic Korean around the world into a potential Korean national subject. Originally, the former one was presented in order to restrict sudden indiscriminate influx of *joseonjok* and *goryoyin* labourers. So there was needed to make an additional legal system for this group. The 'Working Visit Visa Programme' (2005)²⁵ was created

²² Most of EKFN who want to work in South Korea were low educated and low-paid workers. So they got jobs in simple labor areas. And legislators considered that those labor areas should be preserved for domestic job seeker.

²³ Facing the IMF financial crisis in 2007, a lot of families who got severe economic problems but couldn't find their way to make a living abandoned their children to orphanages.

²⁴ Ministry of Health and Welfare.

²⁵ There was the 'Industrial Trainee System' (1993-2006), which had operated as to solve small/medium sized industry labor shortages by employing foreign laborers especially from China and other Southeast Asian countries as trainees during 1-2 years. It did not distinguish between overseas Koreans and foreigners. But In Roh's regime, the 'Industry

as this measure. This was designed only for *joseonjok* and *goryoyin* (but mostly *joseonjok*²⁶) to expect them to work for small/medium sized businesses, assuring the free travel and work permit in 5 years (H-2 visa). This is because the role of *joseonjok* was considered mightily important in the Korean economic situation in Roh's regime.

Through pursuing the policy of neo-liberalistic growth which was gradually begun from the financial crisis onward, effective pay rate has gradually become low, in general. Yet, the gap of wage level between the major and small/medium sized business became bigger. And these domestic circumstances intensified many Korean job-seeker to evade to work for those small and medium sized enterprises.

However, in this situation, *joseonjok* were preferred in Korea for several reasons. First of all, since the real income level in Korea was 4-5 times higher than in China²⁷, the *joseonjok* were willing to work in those 3D (Difficulty, Dangerous and Dirty) work sites where most Korean people avoid getting into. Second, they were already fluent both in the Korean and Chinese languages, never inferior to native speakers, and also understood well both countries' culture. So even though they were low educated/waged workers, they were actually a precious human resource for most Korean businesses that were in a high degree dependent on exports to China²⁸. Third, same ethnicity was also non-negligible, advantageous element for them. Most Korean people, especially those who are middle-aged have a tendency to show more sense of closeness toward ethnic Koreans than foreigners who are of a different race²⁹. With these conditions, they were employed in the 3D industries mainly in service area.

Additionally, overseas Korean visa (F-4 visa) was arranged for those high educated/waged overseas Koreans such as CEO, international companies executives staff, advocate, doctor and so

training program' was abolished, and new systems 'the Employment Permit System (EPS)' were introduced to organize temporary foreign labor intake. And there were two major programme within the EPS: 'the Working Visit Visa programme (H-2 visa)', which was only for overseas Korean from China and the former Soviet Union and 'the General Employment Permit Visa programme' (E-9 visa), which was for general foreign workers. The Working Visit Visa Programme was an experimental program before allowing free visiting and overall work permits to all Overseas Koreans (Overseas Korean Foundation: 2006).

²⁶ In 2008, *joseonjok* made up up to 98.5% (302,048) among total applicants for the 'working visit visa programme', referred by the foreigner immigration monthly statistics report (november 2008) by the Ministry of Law.

²⁷ One anonymous *joseonjok* said, the real income level in Korea was extremely higher than China during this period. If they worked in restaurant in Korea for 3 years, the income was almost so high that they could buy a house in Yoengil in China.

²⁸ China has been the largest trading partner with two-way trade for South Korea in the recent 10 years.

²⁹ It was very dominant to appeal 'homogeneous race' for middle-aged Korean people during their national education period in Korea.

on. And they were mostly from the West, such as USA, Canada and Australia etc, and made up merely 10% (30,000) of total overseas Koreans in South Korea in 2006.

Meanwhile, compared to ‘the Working Visit Visa Programme’, ‘The General Employment Permit Visa Programme (2004-)’ has been adopted by non-ethnic Korean workers, it was also designed to support the small/medium sized enterprises in labor shortage problem. This system is also in use in Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The main feature of this system is that it is only available for 3 years stay in Korea (renewal is not possible), and to bar applicants from settling down the system is restricted to apply to single male workers. And there was restriction on change of workplace during those 3 years, while for work permits in most countries in Europe, there was no restriction on change of workplace.

In the meantime, from this period, the overseas Korean policy gradually combined with the multicultural policy because the number of marriage immigrants exceeded 100,000 from the 2007. But this was apparently different matter with overseas Koreans labour polices since the multicultural policy object was only for non labour migrants (mostly, marriage immigrants). So it focused more on cultural education as a part of promoting social integration.

(4) The Lee Myeong Bak government and the Integrated Overseas Koreans Network System (2008.2-2013.2)

The overall policy in Lee’s regime was biased in favor of major conglomerate. And with this overall trend, overseas Koreans policy was mainly based on conferring benefits on the elites. So in this period, while basically maintaining the policy of previous regimes, an extra system was added to attract more highly educated/waged overseas Koreans to contribute to their mother country. There are three additionally imposed policies. First, it is the introduction of limited dual nationality system. At first, the recognition of dual nationality was negatively discussed because of the failure in duty of military service and tax payment in Korea. Yet, it was justified by the aim of securing foreign talented people and was enforced from 2011³⁰. But, because of this system, Lee Jung Hee, a

³⁰ By the existing Korean Nationality Act, the dual nationals who were born abroad had to give up one of their.

South Korean politician from the Unified Progressive Party, has been condemned as this revision is privilege only for those 4,000 elites, who make up only 0.01% in South Korea.³¹ Second, the Lee regime devised several network projects which are called ‘Overseas Koreans Network System’, ‘Integrated overseas Korean Data Base System’, and ‘Korean Businessman Network System’. Third, to those Chinese-Koreans whose visit work permits (H-2) were expiring, Overseas Korean visa (F-4, F-5)³², was issued, but it was limited to those skilled workers who passed national technical qualification tests during their 5 years stay in Korea.

Meanwhile, for Korean nationals abroad, the voting system from abroad was adopted in this regime (2009). The 27 countries among 30 OECD countries, already carried it out and South Korea was one of rest three countries with Turkey and Hungary.³³ Since the number of Korean nationals abroad amounted to over 2 million (5% of total South Korea population) in 2012, their franchise was important in South Korean politics. This made Korean nationals abroad to pay more attention to their motherland’s politics. In the 18th presidential election which was held on 19th December in 2012, Korean nationals abroad had 7.09% voting rate of total electorates (71.2% of total registers). Still it is not such a high rate compared to France which showed an average of 20% of total electorates.

4.1.1.4. The Characteristics of Contemporary Overseas Korean Politics

Overseas Korean policy came up in front when the national economic crisis was imminent as a result of the unreasonable globalization trend. And Overseas Koreans were considered as important human resource which can be helpful in the nation’s development drive both internally and externally. Here, the two main features can be listed through the recent four governments’ overseas Korean policy. First, it is very clear to see that overseas Korean policy is totally connected with the national economic situation and discriminately applied by Overseas Koreans’ economic competence: high-waged/educated vs low-waged/educated workers. Its beginning was the OKA in Kim Young Sam’s regime which was introduced to enable Overseas Koreans to be hired in business area by legalizing the *joseonjok* and *goryoyin* staying in Korea. This was the expected measure after

³¹ <http://blog.daum.net/jhleeco/7701124> (accessed 6.march.2013).

³² This enabled EKFN (mainly *joseonjok*) to stay 2 years, and was renewable in South Korea. H-2 visa was valid to stay 5 years after the date they entered but renewable only in PRC. And it brought about much economic inconvenience to them.

³³ <http://www.dongponews.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=13516> (accessed 6.March.2013).

having established new diplomatic relation with PRC and Russia. The most obvious fact for concealing the economic discrimination on the national level was the regulation (i.e., follow-up measure) which is ‘the year 1948’, the established year of ROK, setting as definition criteria whether one is overseas Korean in Kim Dae Jung’s regime. That is because most of *joseonjok* and *goryoyin* (mostly low waged / educated workers) were ruled out by then. And most *jemigyopo*(high waged/educated workers) were included. In Roh’s regime, targeting *josenjok*, ‘Visit Work Program’ had been designed to utilize those low waged workers (who have utility value but undervalued workers) as remedy policy for small/medium businesses domestic manpower shortage. Adversely, the highly educated/waged Overseas Koreans (mostly *jemigyopo*) were specially preferred in the Lee’s regime, by recognition of dual-nationality, business network system for those elites. Though its direction was different from previous regime, it still showed dichotomous view in overseas Korean policies, so it is just like a two-way mirror. One interesting thing is , this economic dichotomy is very much like the political one. That is, well-educated, high proficiency overseas Koreans are mostly located in USA and Japan, which are also political allies with South Korea, while low-educated and low waged overseas Koreans are mostly resided in the PRC and CIS countries (Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), which are also having strategical (economic) diplomatic relations with South Korea.

Second, contradicting above mentioned economic differentiation among overseas Koreans, the notion of ‘homogenous ethnicity’ seems to still mean a lot in contemporary South Korea’s overseas Koreans politics. And this ethnicity self-awareness plays the key role in unifying not only all nationalities of overseas Koreans but also overseas Koreans and Korean people. According to a citizen’s multiculturalism receptivity degree survey of 2,500 Koreans who were aged between 19 to 74, requested by Ministry of Women and Family, researched during one month in 2011, showed 86.5 percent of respondents answered ‘blood’ is the most important national identity as recognizing a Korean.(Hangyerae News, April 4, 2012) The strong attachment based on ‘blood’ is often mirrored in public sphere by broadcasting prominent ethnic Korean sports figures such as Jung Dae Se and Hines E. Ward.³⁴

³⁴ Jung Dae Se (Korean descendants in Japan), the renowned North Korean national soccer team player, and Hines E.Ward (mixed blood Korean, holding USA citizenship), the famous american football player received Korean public attention even though their nationality was not any more Korean.

In a few words, the contemporary South Korea overseas Korean politics are the part of South Korea's case of globalization. South Korea now possesses 7 million overseas compatriots and this amount is unprecedented. Taking advantage of this global man power is an attempt to build a new global Korean nation. In other words, through the flow of ethnic Koreans inside and outside of Korea, by utilizing its flow of capital or labor force, Korea's globalization is in a continuous process. During the globalization process, overseas Koreans become the critical medium in Korean capital's overseas investment and also in the promotion of Korean product sales abroad.

4.1.1.5. Cultural education business and others for overseas Koreans

OKF is the biggest organization which conducts educational and cultural projects for overseas Koreans ever since its foundation in 1997. It was established as the government body dealing with the overseas brethren (*Jaeoe dongpo*), who are officially defined as human resources and national assets in the country's globalization plan. (Cheong, 2003; Lee Jeanyoung, 2003)

They hold various type of conferences and events like the World ethnic Korean Festival (*Segye hanminjok chukjeon*) (from 1989), the publishing of newsletters and magazines (*Jaeoe dongpo Shinmun*), the organizing of visiting and educational programs, the compilation of information databases and directories, the networking of businessmen and community leaders, artists, filmmakers and authors, the creation of a cyber-community on the Internet (*Hanminjok Network*), including a dating service, and the financing of immigrant Korean schools (*hangeul hakgyeo*) and associations and so on. And all these programs are directly connected with the Global Korean community building and ethnic mobilization on an international level. (Hubinett: 2006)

Culture education business has the longest history (1997-) among projects run by OKF. It is supported by several types of Korean educational organization abroad: (Korean language) school, *Joseonjok* school, *goryoyin* school in CIS countries, Korean school (*hanguk hakgyo*, school running the same curriculum with domestic education system established in the area where many Korean nationals abroad reside) and Korean education institute (*hanguk gyoyukwon*, run by Ministry of Education, dispatched public education agents from Korea). It is estimated that there are around 2000 organizations (mainly Hangeul Schools) abroad by the OKF's report. Hangeul schools, which are founded spontaneously in most countries where few KNA reside, run by unskilled education

volunteers (mainly by overseas Koreans, overseas students) under very poor conditions.³⁵ OKF is supporting part of the operation fee (classroom rent, teacher's labor cost, materials expenditure, special occasion fee) and distributing textbooks by the educational institution's scale differentially. In addition, they provide teacher training program for teaching ability improvement of volunteers.

Apparently, cultural education business for retaining Korean diaspora communities' ethnic identity is the most fundamental base for success of Korean version of globalization in the long term. However, recent businesses launched by OKF concentrate more on caring leaders in overseas Korean community (2010-) with the program of building cyber information centers for global Korean businessmen, Korean businessmen festival, inviting next generation leaders to Korea. Furthermore, there are also various businesses for overseas Koreans implemented besides OKF, 'KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) overseas Korean Awards' are one of the most prominent of them. It's awarded to overseas Korean leaders who are considered most needed and suited for the overseas Korean policy object, becoming the most effective means to include those influential overseas leaders in its community.

³⁵ Whereas the area where many Korean nationals abroad reside such as the Americas, England and Turkey etc in Europe in being run systematically through donation and labor division.

4.1.2 Findings

In the modern Korean political discourse, there is hardly a more influential concept than ‘*minjok*’, which originated in 1990s, the time of enlightenment. However, it has changed its meaning several times. In the early days (1894-1904), ‘*minjok*’ was nothing more than a commonly used pronoun for ‘the people’ or ‘small sized ethnic group’ (Kwon, 2007). However, during the Japanese colonial era, nationalist historians such as Shin Chaeho (1880-1936), Yi Kwangsu (1892-1950), and Choe Namson (1890-1957) absolutized *minjok* as the ‘blood community’³⁶. Regardless of being leftist or rightist, all rationalized it as such a concept. It is equivalent to so called ‘family’, which can draw a line between ‘we’ and ‘others’. The notion ‘*minjok*’ took a more concrete shape as ‘*danyil minjok*’ which means ‘group based on homogenous descent’, furthermore as ‘group sharing common territory, culture, language, history and fate’. In particular, ethno-nationalist Yi Beomsoek (1900-1972), who also served as the very first Prime Minister (1948 - 50) in South Korean government history, eulogized the ‘*danyil minjok*’ as the reason that the Korean nation is the most ideal of all the nations in his book *the Nation and the Youth* (Yim, Jeongmyeong, 2012). And in his theory of ‘National and State supremacy’, he asked that the Korean people should sacrifice everything that belonged to them for the nation and the state (Yim, Jeongmyeong, 2012).

‘Dangun’ always brought up in the ‘*minjok*’ discourse . He is the figure who is considered as the origin of the pure Korean race in the racial spirit history dimension. There have been arguments for and against the Dangun realism. The real existence of Dangun is considered especially important for the racially centered nationalists, because the racial nation history can be calculated to approximately 5,000 years since the foundation of Gojoseon (B.C 2333-B.C 108), which is known as the earliest Korean state established by Dangun. In the case of North Korea, it has been claimed that Dangun does not really exist, it is rather a myth which was created by Marxist scientism. Interestingly, in 1993, North Korea advocated Dangun’s existence by reporting excavation of the royal tomb of Dangun in Peongyang.³⁷ Then, in 1995, South Korean nationalist, fascist and the

³⁶ According to Kwon (2007)’s research on ‘The Concept of ‘Nation (*minjok*)’ in 1905-1910 - Focused on Korea Daily News’, the term ‘*minjok*’ whose particular meaning is ‘ethnic unity/blood community’ began to appear many times in the Korea Daily News (*daehan maeil sinbo*) from the 1906-07 after the 1905 Protectorate Treaty between Korea and Japan was concluded.

³⁷ However, there is a controversy over its authenticity since Pyeongyang, the reported location of Dangun royal tomb, does not agree with the historical records of Gojoseon’s location, which has been presumed to be in Liaoning (a province which is positioned in the northeast area in PRC).

first Minister of Education, An Hosang (1902-1999) went to North Korea to participate at the memorial event of Dangun's ascension, even though it was not allowed by national security law. This apparently shows both North and South Korean leaders strongly idolizing '*minjok*' ideology in 1990s. However, recently, with the growing foreign population at home, multiculturalism is advocated generally in South Korean politics, but North Korea severely criticized it for being a race mixing policy controlled by the American Imperialist conspiracy in the review of Rodong News published on 27 April 2006.

'*gukmin*' which is a modern political concept, also began to be used in the 1900s, meaning almost the same as '*minjok*'. It means 'the nation people' or 'the citizen' which is connected with '*gukka*' (the State). In Korea, '*gukka*' was considered to be an extended family. So the word '*minjok-gukka*' was also coined. Both the term '*gukmin*' and '*minjok*' were merged as the concept of 'the people' during 1905-1910 (Kwon, 2007). However, completely stripped of national sovereignty, as the Japanese intensified cultural assimilation in the 1930s, '*minjok*' gradually split away from the '*gukmin/gukka*' and had a more natural meaning of union tinged with a sense of anti-colonial resistance against Japan (Kwon, 2007). This is also because '*gukmin*' had the meaning of 'Japanese subject' of the Empire of Japan in the period of Japanese occupation. From then on, Korean national identity is based on '*minjok*', and racially sensed '*minjok*' always became the precondition to be the '*gukmin*' in South Korea.

a. Race

"Everyone has their 'joguk"³⁸. My 'joguk' is Daehan Minguk (the Republic of Korea)." (Text A vol.I: 2 ; Text B:1)

Though there is a more than 10 years gap of publishing time between the two texts, the contents (even the order of chapters) are considerably alike. Both texts also begin with the same sentence like above. In reality, most overseas Koreans are not anymore holding South Korean citizenship.

³⁸ The term '*joguk*''s literal translation is 'ancestral land'. It is a compound word between ethnocentric term '*josang*' (ancestor) and modern political term '*gukka*'. So the '*joguk*' is the term which has magnified the 'blood relation' between the individual and the state.

But by the '*joguk*', all ethnic Koreans become assured of their unavoidable genetic root wherever they are now. Thus they now belong to the Republic of Korea. With this prerequisite, Koreans as '*minjok*' are defined as ethnically and culturally homogenous. It was repeatedly described how they became 'ethnically homogenous' and why they would inevitably become an ethnically homogenous nation due to their long national history.

Such '*minjok*' ideology completed in the colonial era is still repeated in these culture-related texts for overseas Koreans, and it seems to be very useful since this category is inclusive of every Korean without regard to age, gender, or status distinctions (Shin, 1999: 339). So the main discourse of the text is that *minjok* is distinctive with its pure genetic line and its glorious history and cultural heritages.

'*Minjok*'s distinctiveness, begins with the birth of '*minjok*'. Then Dangun, the figure of Korean historical origin and his thought *hongyik yingan* (to benefit mankind) are introduced. However, the narrative style in the story of Dangun is quite confusing. On the one hand, it presents Dangun as if he is a real being of '*minjok*'s origin by stating that he founded the first Korean state Gojoseon in 2333 B.C. His direct descendants are also said to be the founders of the successive dynasties of Buyeo, Goguryo, Baekjae, and Silla, thus assuring continued state legitimacy and direct descent from the founder (Pai, 2000: 58). On the other hand, Dangun is defined as a common noun of a 'shaman priest' and is also described as a 'mythical savior' (Pai, 2000: 58) which '*helped raise national consciousness and unify their race into a single entity against repeated suffering from external invasion*' (Text A vol.1: 19). Such a self-contradictory and conflicting stance on Dangun has also been discovered in early nationalist Choe Namson's Dangun studies. He was also in a contrary position between an ideological approach (Dangun as '*minjok*'s origin) and a scientific approach (Dangun as common noun, religious origin). Though Choe reported a series of research into Dangun mythology in 1920s, he claimed again Dangun was not a myth but indeed a historical figure (Shin, 2006: 53) parallel with Amaterasu represented as Japanese historical founder in dispute with Japanese nationalist historians in 1930s.³⁹ This was strongly criticized by the well-known Marxist historians such as Baek Namun on the grounds that Dangun ideology or Dangun realism is just a Koreanized variant of Japanese militant imperialist ideology (Yu, 2009).

³⁹ It is the nationalist way of 'self-comfort' (Park Noja *et al*, 2011: 55), nationalist historian An Hwak(1886-1946) also showed the same attitude with Choe Namson. He conceptualized Dangun religion as *minjok* religion in order to challenge Japanese 'Shinto' as the national religion, which is imposed by Japanese social evolutionary nationalist Katō Hiroyuki (1836—1916). An also emphasized '*hwarangdo*' as the original form of 'Joseon (prehistoric dynasty of Korea)s *bushido*' against Japanese '*bushido*' (warrior spirit) which was popularized as 'essence of Japanese national spirit' by Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933) (Park Noja *et al*, 2011: 55).

Specially, in the text A, civil political elements such as ‘*Taeguekki* (national flag)’ or ‘The rose of sharon (national flower)’ is described in a nationalist way as a ‘national peril’ (Shin, 2006: 118) recollection, which makes readers emotional. For example, it is highlighted as:

“it serves as a symbol of our people’s independence movement during the Japanese colonial period, the Taeguekki together with our race has shared great joy and sorrow.”(Text A vol.1: 5-6); *“it represents the righteousness of our people who have overcome repeated difficulties and hardships...”*(Text A vol.1: 9); *“the meritorious traditional values enabled Koreans to maintain their national identity as a homogeneous people through numerous foreign incursions and social disturbances following them.”*(Text A vol.1: 39)

Such ethno nationalistic narrative is complemented also by the illustration worshipping to national flag by children that are citing the Pledge of Allegiance which contains the terms with ethno nationalistic and fascist militant remnants such as ‘*minjok*’, ‘*joguk*’, ‘body’ and ‘soul’: *“I, in front of the proud Taeguekki, swear to be loyal to the eternal glory of ‘minjok’ and ‘joguk’ with my ‘body’ and ‘soul’.”*⁴⁰ This reveals the truth of ‘*gukmin*’ discourse that the notion of ‘*gukmin*’ is based on ‘*minjok*’ (ideology) in South Korea. This further explains the saying that *“blood is thicker than water”* (Text A vol.I: 10) which is typically used when people emphasize the intimacy between community and cultural heritage such as the Korean language system, which is described as *“the language containing ‘minjok’s spirit, and is also scientific, easy to learn and write and even aesthetically pleasing.”* (Text A vol.I: 11).

In addition to that, there are found lots of ethno nationalist conceptual vocabularies such as ‘*gyeora*’ (nation), ‘*dongpo*’ (compatriot), ‘*pitjul*’ (consanguinity) and compound words like ‘*minjok gongdongchae*’ (ethnic community), ‘*minjok juche-seong*’ (ethnic national identity), ‘*han-gyeora*’ (homogeneous nation), ‘*han-minjok*’ (homogenous community), ‘*uri gyeora*’ (our nation), ‘*uri minjok*’ (our ethnic community) and so on, which were also once employed by Korean nationalists for anti-colonial purposes.

⁴⁰ However, in 2007, the verse ‘the eternal glory of *joguk* and *minjok*’ was changed to ‘the liberal and righteous Korea’, and the verse ‘with my body and soul’ was totally deleted. It shows that the representation level of ‘the principle of ‘bloodline’ of *jus sanguinis*’ (Shin, 2006: 234) has drastically been degraded in Roh's presidency. It seems that it reflected several values such as personalization, individualization during the neoliberal time and the flow of transnationalism and stronger individual human right senses accepting multiculturalism.

However, this narrative logic, i.e. the term nation, or *minjok/gyeora* combined with ethnicity or race can be also found in other countries. For example, in Germany and Japan, the nation was based on the idea of race or *volk*, a group with common cultural and racial features, and ethnic or racial consciousness was promoted as a marker of the modern nation (Shin, 2006: 117). While in England, France and USA, where the nation consisted of integrated diverse ethnic groups under a centralized bureaucratic state, the formation of a nation was based on common civic and political elements (Shin, 2006: 117).

Nonetheless, it did not preclude, of course, the multiple cases of ethno-racial or religious discrimination against a variety of minorities by the majority throughout the histories of those countries.⁴¹

To turn to the other text B, the most distinct feature found in it is the diminished frequency of ethnic nationalist terms and no reference to Dangun and Hwarangdo which is considered as critical contents in nationalist history. Maybe it is because text B is compiled just for children who have never received any education that it does not include any serious history. However, even though it has a simplicity of rhetoric style, there are lots of similarities in representing the main discourse such as ‘our ancestral land is the republic of Korea’, ‘the nation history begins from the time immemorial’, ‘the nation has great cultural heritages’ and so on.

It seems that the overall cultural, historical, or rhetorical arena of Korean ethics in the text A still contains many remnants of colonial logic evolved from the ethnic nationalism constructed by colonial racism and assimilation policy during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945). For nationalist intellectuals, it was an inevitable choice to keep the national identity through preserving *minjok* and securing ‘(traditional) national culture’ to avoid becoming assimilated. During the process of ‘creative appropriation of Japanese official concepts’, the elements which demonstrate the uniqueness and greatness of the Korean nation such as ‘national heroes’ like Dangun, ‘national spirit’ like Hwarangdo which is cultivating patriotism by physical training, ‘national culture’ like the Korean language, which was nearly getting lost through Japanese oppression policy, were recognized as critical ingredients in the formation of ethnographical national history. And these are the repertory revealed in culture-related texts for overseas Koreans continuously.

⁴¹ For example, in France, legal prohibition of the Islamic scarf (hijab) in public schools (1989) led to the controversy over the discrimination against Islamic minorities. In England, Roman Catholics had no suffrage for a long time, and were also restricted from entering the major British universities until the wide range of Catholic emancipation movement in 19th century. Anti-miscegenation laws in the United States are also a representative case. The law against racial mixed marriage between black and white people existed until 1967.

The contemporary sense of ethnic unity or '*minjok*' ideology⁴² is the natural extension of historical experiences (Shin, 2006: 5), and the word '*minjok*' is continuously used in nationalist political discourse during the modernization process both in South Korea and North Korea.

b. Culture

Hammerly (1982) describes three discourses of culture, a division that helps us to think that culture is a concrete unit. They are achievement culture, behavioral culture, and informational culture. Achievement culture makes up by the things about which a society is proud: scientific Korean language system and it's inventor the King Sejong; informational culture represents the set of knowledge that well-socialized people are expected to know: geographical information such as population, regional characters and the main industries of the country; behavioral culture is the set of behaviors that is shared by a group of people: In Korea, it is considered to be rude if young people eat before older people when they eat together. In the above division, in both text A and B, the achievement and informational cultures are by and large given more weight than behavioral culture.

When it comes to the contents characteristics, the general view of national culture especially in the contents of 'Family System and Family Ritual'(Text A, chapter II; Text B, chapter 2), 'Annual custom and Folk game' (Text A, chapter IV; Text B, chapter 7), 'Life(food, clothing, housing)' (Text A, chapter.V; Text B, chapter 3-5), 'Art and Craft' (Text B, chapter 9), 'Cultural heritages' (Text B, chapter 10) are exclusively about the traditional culture which exists in a traditional society. Thus, Korean culture is attributed to the specific time period and space, which does not any more exist in present Korea. This 'old model' of culture Wikan described as (1999: 62) "static, fixed, objective, consensual and uniformly shared by all members of a group" and Baumann (1999) called it 'essentialist', Hann (2002) 'totalitarian'. This cultural essentialism's flow, i.e. defining what is 'our' culture, was articulated well mainly by twentieth century anti-colonialism. (Static) Cultures

⁴² Nowadays '*minjok*' ideology is mostly well played when it comes to discuss '*minjok/joguk* unification' in the name of nation destiny in both South and North Korea. Previously, it was also well employed in their respective system. For instance, in South Korea, during the Park Jung hee's regime (1963-1979), 'anti-communism' was state main policy. in the setting of North Korea as public enemy, '*minjok*' as 'the people' applied to appeal the solidarity in the course of exploitation of working class during the economic development policy. Whereas, in North Korea, the utility of '*minjok*' ideology in *juche* (self-reliance) thought, which is appropriated version of universalistic thought of Communism in the North Korean context (Shin, 2006: 76), is very much resemble to 'what the earlier Korean nationalists had advocated in the face of the national peril'(Shin, 2006: 93). That is, North Korea recognizes the today's situation as 'national survival in a hostile international environment' (Shin, 2006: 93).

determine individual and collective identities, cultural membership is thus virtually synonymous with ethnicity (see also Hann, 2002). The principal community attachments which define peoples and their identities are 'ethnic'; ethnic communities are defined by their cultures (Augé, 1999: 99; Parekh, 2000: 154); and such attachments, identities, and cultures are 'historic', 'rooted', 'authentic' and 'traditional'. However this culture could be deprived or replaced by others, it gave rise to 'cultural conservatism', a way of thinking, in which cultural authenticity must be protected like a rare species. (Grillo, 2003) In this sense, such 'cultural anxiety' or 'cultural conservatism' often expressed by insuring valuable traditional values and at the same time posing the western culture as an incursive cultural force that threatened to undermine the very core of Korean national identity. I quote some examples below:

“The strong sense of old moral values helped Koreans become the master of alien cultures on the basis of their traditional cultures”. (Text A, vol.I: 39); “Today various foreign sports have penetrated Korean society. Its concomitants are worship for material wealth, superficialism and sensualism which may turn out to be detrimental to our own values. At this time, the revival of the traditional folk games is crucially important as a way to seek harmony with new cultures. Koreans overseas should learn and develop a new awareness of their own precious heritage so that they actually participate in the promotion of better understanding of Korea on the part of foreigners with whom they are brought into daily contact.” (Text A, vol.II : 167-168) ; “In the 20th century, national tragedy such as the Japanese rule and the Korean War changed our traditional culture a great deal. Especially in recent years, the influx of foreign culture and rapid economic growth have caused cultural conflict.”(Text A, vol.II : 125)

On the other hand, while the textbook essentializes the 'Korean folk ways of life' into an almost eternal, unchanging core of 'Korean-ness', in reality, the nationalist emphasis on 'folk culture' has a rather short history in Korea. Moreover, the way 'Korean ways of life' were conceptualized, was strongly influenced by the Japanese folklore scholarship. According to Janelli (1987)'s study, today's South Korean folklore scholarship has mainly set the direction by the four major folklorists - Choe Namsun, Yi Neunghwa, Son Jintae, and Song Seokha. Under the colonial period, the folklorists influenced by the well-known Japanese folklorist, who introduced the term 'folklore' first in the East, Yanagita Kunio's view of 'studying folklore could better understand the character of *minjok*'.i.e., folklore is the contents of ethnology (*minjok* study). So Korean nationalistic folklore

discourse emerged also with '*minjok*' ideology. At an initial stage, both Choe and Yi especially did more research on Korean shamanism and mythology. Choe tried to set the Dangun as shaman ruler and Dangun myth as folk religion's origin (By declaring the time of the nation's origin almost at the same time as with the Japanese one, his research instilled the Korean national pride)⁴³, Yi extended his research area beyond shamanism to all religions such as Buddhism, Christianity and Taoism in Korea. Korean folklore scholarship developing concurrently with cultural nationalism naturally became strongly nationalistic and also historical in its orientation. However, after Korea's liberation from Japan, Son and Song, by contrast, covered a much broader range of topics⁴⁴, and was acquainted with folklore movements both in Japan and Europe (Edward B. Tylor's theory and other British anthropologists and folklorist such as Andrew Lang, Edwin S. Hartl and James G. Frazer whom Tylor inspired) (Janelli, 1987: 35). They even tried not to follow Japanese folklores methodology and their insights, but it was hard not to do that since Japanese folklorists also reference lots of British evolutionary folklorists who are the most authoritative in folklore society. The present outlook of Korean folklore scholarship largely attributed by Son (Janelli, 1987: 41) who was much inspired by romanticism and nostalgia rather than cultural nationalism (Janelli, 1987: 40). Eventually, the formation of current Korean folklore scholarship has been influenced by both Japanese and Western intellectuals-tradition. In text A, there coexist both a wishful and a nationalistic rhetoric style, while it is principally presented in informational rhetoric style in text B.

Thirdly, the most distinctive characteristic of Korean culture represented in the text is that it represents an extremely idealized Confucian ideology. It is especially found in chapter II. 'Family System and Family ritual' (*The Living of Korean* vol.I: 42-97). In a Confucian society, the most important value is family root and the realization of an ideal harmonious society by expanding the family hierarchy to society:

“by the teaching of Confucius, Koreans acquired the proper deportment and decorum...In the Confucian ethic, the family was considered very important...Society was regarded as the aggregation of families and an individual behavioral pattern shaped at home was believed to form the basis for social life.” (Text A vol.1: 42-43).

⁴³ For Choe, having long history same with Japanese one meant Korean were not inferior to Japanese in colonial period.

⁴⁴ His writings cover folktales, shaman's songs, folk speech, folk beliefs and ritual practices, material culture, and a variety of different social customs; and he utilizes archaeological data, linguistic affinities, and human morphological similarities to determine the origins of the Korean people and their subsequent history (Janelli, 1987: 25).

Thus, plenty of words which showing Confucian values such as '*hyo*' (filial piety), patriarchy, traditional husband and wife's duty, duty of the oldest son in the family, huge kinship and '*chon*' (the relatedness of family members), '*dangnae*' (the relatives), '*munjung*' (clan), '*jokbo*' (the genealogical record), '*jesa*' (memorial ceremony for ancestor) are explained. In the case of memorial ceremony, it is found that it introduced in great detail the types of ceremony, the types of the ritual food to be prepared, the rule of ritual performance and the order of ceremony. It also in great detail presented the greeting way with traditional manner, by presenting different styles between man and woman. And I think it is worth mentioning the Korean (ideal) national identity characterized as 'idealized woman's image' in Confucian morality society by Jager (2003). "*Loyal wife*", "*chaste widow*", which is defined as the proper attitude toward their husbands, are the main principle to accomplish the hierarchical structure in the family and further in the society, which is dominated by men. Therefore, woman's strict sexual conduct is especially important to retaining successive 'Pure descent'. Keeping ancestor worship led by male descent in Confucian Korean society meant such women's duty was well kept. Adversely, the discontinued relationship between husband and wife means symbolically the breakdown of the nation. So this 'virtuous' traditional woman's image is naturally projected into the ideal national identity as a means of keeping the racial (inner) 'purity' or the changeless Korean essence from the (outside) foreign 'contamination'. Furthermore, this image of 'obedient' wife to husband in the family exactly can be applied to 'obedient' people of the nation state. In this sense, the text visualizes the (traditional) authoritarian Korean society as the Korean nationhood but as way of establishing the legitimacy of the (economically centered) overseas Korean policy, all ethnic overseas Koreans are required to build such an ideal Confucian ideology in order to be part of their motherland.

The pure/beautiful female body as 'most valued possession' (Enloe, 1989: 54) and symbol of '*minjok*' was commonly valued in multiple nationalistic discourses. For instance, during the war between Afghanistan and the United States, the veiled female image totally covered in burqas was justified as symbolized religious support in Afghanistan, whereas with Western eyes it was seen as the oppression of women and justified USAs military action to save her.(Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003: 210) On the other hand, Ahmed-Ghosh further points out, the Indian beauty queens in world beauty pageants reveal traditional roots (by waving their flag) and the national image as a liberal and modern nation simultaneously.

During the colonial period (1910-1945) in Korea many Korean nationalists argued that the national Korean character was a failure because it was based on the tradition of Korean Confucianism, which was continued from the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910). The nationalists

criticised the Confucian scholar-bureaucrat for being inefficient, and thought it had badly influenced the national Korean character. Dictator Park Jung Hee (1963-1979) denounced the nations 'backwardness' by copying the early nationalist conceptual vocabulary of national self-critique of Korean 'backwardness'. To overcome the nation's economic retardation, the 1961 military coup d'état was glorified as the beginning of a revolution. And Park supported the 'modernization' centered national agenda such as Five-Year Economic Plans. Also, he invested to make Admiral Yi Sun-sin (who pulled a great victory in struggle with Japan during the late sixteenth century)'s memorial temple, Hyunchungsa, a sacred place (1969), 'to hide his previous pro-Japanese activity'⁴⁵ and now to stand against Japan' (Jeon, 2000). The historical icon of strong army, Admiral Yi's worship fortified the militarized atmosphere in the whole nation and maximized the defensive 'minjok' discourse against Japan. In 1972, for the success of the *Yushin* (Revitalizing Reforms system) long-term seizure of power, the 'return to the traditional spirit culture' movement initiated with the 'modernization without westernization discourse' (Yi gyuho, 1977). Modernization is originally implied in westernization, and westernization based on democracy could bring about an 'identity crisis' (more specific, regime collapse). Therefore, 'secondary Confucianization' as a political discourse began in earnest, while '*Juche*' was established as the monolithic ideology in North Korea around the same time. Korean Spiritual culture Institute (*Hanguk Jeongsin Munhwa Yeonguweon*, also known in English as Academy of Korean Studies), which was launched in 1978, was the most representative organization performing restoration of Confucian ideology. Advocating the Confucian value, keeping the harmonious hierarchical rule based on age, lineage, and status was a good way to persuade the majority against the absolute reign and workers had to accept the world's longest working hours and the worst working conditions in the name of the national slogan of 'modernization of the fatherland' above all things.⁴⁶ Having confrontation with systematic competition against communist North Korea and promoting *Saemaeul Undong* (New Community Movement)⁴⁷ based on the values of *geunmyeon* (diligence), *jajo* (self-help) and *hyeopdong* (cooperation), the 'modernization' process was accelerated and Park's dictatorship was legitimized.

⁴⁵ He had a big complex about his previous pro-Japanese activity such as his career as a Japanese military officer in Manchuria, and acquiring economic compensation from Japan for their historical failure during the conference between South Korea and Japan, which was not quite accepted by majority in anti-Japanese sentiment.

⁴⁶ This came to establish the capitalist strategies, 'Confucian capitalism' in the 1990s. And this was not unique to Korea, but considered as the East Asian identity. Longtime leaders of Southeast Asia, especially Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore also have advocated it. (Shin, 2006: 218) This is also agreed by Berger and Hsiao (1988), who mentioned that developmental ethic has been associated with Confucianism in Korea. And Shin (2006) furthermore added that nationalism ('minjok' ideology) was the linkage to capitalism in the process of Confucian ethic transformed from a hindrance to a promoter of capitalism.

⁴⁷ '*Minjok*' as 'life community' was applied in *Saemaeul Undong*. It is the South Korea's rural communities' movement aiming at economic growth of the rural area, launched in 1970. However Jeon Jaeho (2000) argues that it has worked to fortify the *Yushin* system rather than to develop a rural society.

In addition, as Park actively supported folklore scholarship in the name of cultural heritage preservation and restoration, the Confucian rule and its culture was re-illuminated in Park's regime. The most typical figure was the King Sejong the great, who is typified as the most benevolent ruler and inventor of *Hangeul*, the Korean writing system in Joseon dynasty, which was a traditional Confucian society. All this is reflected in the text as it is, by representing the illustration of King Sejong the great (Text A vol.II,: 129; Text B : 10) and his great invention Hunminjungum (the book that explained about Korean language system) (Text A vol.II: 130 ;Text B : 11)

Fourthly, it stresses the nation's uniqueness by presenting cultural heritages as the Korea-centered view. In other words, the universal phenomena or common Asian culture often changed into Korean ethnic culture. For example, the (Confucian) family system and ritual, annual customs such as Sol, Dan-o, Hansik, Chuseok and the food culture "rice as main staple food" can be largely seen as a common pan-Asian culture. But in the text, these features constitute part of a distinctive Korean culture. The origin of this particular cultural formulation can also be explained by Korean cultural or ethnic nationalist resistance against colonial discourse and policy cast back to 1920-30s.

c.Politics

"Daehan Minguk (Republic of Korea) 'was the new name of our country, inherited from the provisional government in Shanghai which had opposed the Japanese occupation. "Daehan" is a historical name for our country, while 'Minguk' means a republic in which sovereignty resides with the people." (Text A vol.I: 3)

An analysis of the political contents of the text shows, most noticeably, that it contains no mention of 'North Korea' at all, but merely as limited information in terms of the demographic and geographic situation⁴⁸ from the South Korean point of view. The hegemonic discourse of the South Korean state constituted North Korea as Other. The nation's legitimacy is established by directly inheriting the pre-Korean's provisional government in the Japanese colonial period, but denying the existence of North Korea. Thus politically, as Em (1993: 462) has pointed out, it has become the

⁴⁸ Demographically, they are described as a South Korean population increased by the people who came down from the north after the Korean War (1950-1953) (Text A vol.II: 29). Geographically, the area in North Korea was represented as part of (South) Korea. For example, Pyeongyang, the capital of North Korea now was spoken of as the capital of Goguryo (37 B.C - 668 A.D), which was one of the ancient three kingdoms that existed in the Korean peninsula (Text A vol.II: 48).

main ground not only as the glorious origin of the South Korean state, but it also has reshaped the discourse of nationalism in South Korea by positing as nationalist the resistance on which the Republic of Korea has built its legal basis. Interestingly, Jager in her monograph *Narratives of Nation Building in Korea* (2003), asserts that the rejection of the state-sponsored view of North Korea as an 'enemy' (stressed by Jager) brought about the creation of a new 'romantic' narrative strategy. "Thinking of the two Koreas as lovers, struggling to overcome the division, challenged decades of Cold War rhetoric that portrayed communist North Korea as the South's foreign foe". And South Korea as the hero/heroine of this romantic story, becomes the "patriot-lover who struggles to overcome the division by actively resisting the 'evil' (stressed by Jager) powers that seek to separate him/her from his/her loved one".

During the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Mu Hyun presidencies (1998-2008), South Korea's inter-Korean policy was named 'the Sunshine policy', which is aiming at peaceful unification through cooperation and conversation between North and South Korea. Naturally, defining North Korea as enemy in public during this period was rejected. Such a peaceful mood is also reflected in the texts. There is no more mention of North Korea as an 'enemy', but only focusing on the prospect of peace-oriented unification. (Text A vol.II: 70-71)

Secondly, the democracy which is combined with the national historical tradition led to the Korean view of democracy. It insists that "democracy in Korea was evolved from the Dangun, the mythologic founding father of the Korean nation, with the phrase 'hongik-ingan' (to be of benevolence) and developed through the Three Kingdoms period, the Goryeo period, the Choson Dynasty period and became a valuable basis for Korean democracy to grow and prosper." (Text A vol.II: 57). This is a recurrent, rhetoric style in this text, as I mentioned before. 'Hongik-ingan' is the core educational philosophy stressed by the An Hosang's *Ilminjuui* (one nation principle) under the first South Korean government of Yi Seungman (1948-1960). An asserted that South Korea needed a new ideology neither democracy nor communism, but some intrinsic value adapted in our way. The one nation principle was claimed as state ideology, which is based on homogenous 'minjok' in 'gukka', aiming to have an ideological confrontation with communists⁴⁹ (Park, 2007: 355).

With such a heavy dependence on history, modern time values are legitimized. However, on a

⁴⁹ However, *ilminjuui* (one nation principle) was gradually replaced by *bangongjuui* (anticommunism).

macroscopic level, it underlines universalism and idealism as demonstrated in the human rights declaration in France (Text A vol.II: 72) and general information about basic principles of democracy such as human dignity, freedom, and equality; basic concepts of the constitution such as popular sovereignty, liberal democracy and international peace; basic rights of citizens such as respect of human beings, the right of equality and freedom and suffrage; basic social rights such as citizens duty; government organization and function and so on. (Text A vol.II: 52-84)

Thirdly, triumphalism is principally emphasized in the text through the economic development process from the pre-modern time in South Korea. Describing the impoverished economic situation in the Japanese colonial time and showing the picture of devastated Seoul in the Korean War, the nation's modernization with economic success is obviously contrasted. In particular, the success of the economic development project which was led by Park Jung Hee in 1960s and 1970s was critical in the Korean modernization process. To understand how it was possible, Shin (2006) insists that it is required to understand how 'developmental psychology' (Shin, 2006: 104) has developed among Koreans during that period. For this, people generally maintain that nationalism originated in a single blood line and shared ancestry contributed to establish the collectivism or we-ism. By this sense of oneness as a basis, Confucian values such as hierarchy, harmony and loyalty to authority were accentuated on the state level. Therefore, Koreans as a collective unit could push ahead with the patriotic collective goal of national economic development. By showing in the day and night view of fancy Seoul with (Text A vol.II: 146, Text B: 5-6), with the icon of King Sejong, the 'excellent' ruler in traditional Confucius dynasty (Text A vol.II: 129, Text B: 5,10), the economic success in the Korean way was seen as a great victory. In this way, the conclusion was that "*the economic (free market) system of South Korea is superior to the controlled economy in North Korea*".(Text A vol.II: 111-112)

Lastly, the idealized Korean society is artificially presented in the extreme, while hiding the numerous social conflicts. In the contents of the social security system in Korea, Korea visualizes itself as the nation providing livelihood protection, industrial accident insurance, medical insurance and a national pension system. And there are also presented pictures of day care centers, public health center treatment, housing aid (apartment complex), safety in the industrial settings and welfare facilities for the handicapped (Text A vol.II: 157-160). In reality in Korea, the social security system is mainly available for those who are already in stable workplaces, not for the majority in the temporary positions. However, in conclusion, it accents that the individual should cultivate the spirit of self-help in solving his or her own problems for themselves rather than relying

too much on government protection. (Text A vol.II: 162-163) The famous British theorist in the Victorian era, Smiles's book *Self-Help* was introduced to Korea at first as *jajo-ron* in Choe Namson's translation at the turn of twentieth century. It is about the individual having to seek their success by their own effort, not to expect the support from the traditional Confucian family or agrarian community, or even the modern concept of the nation state. This was established as one of the famous discourses from this time.

According to Son (1998)'s research in the construction of medical insurance in South Korea, though South Korea succeed in building up the nationwide medical insurance coverage in a very short time by benchmarking that of Japan in 1970s under the 'authoritarian' regime, it is still far from comprehensive in comparison with those found in many advanced countries. Currently, the most demanding social welfare system is the pension system. But it is in a very early developmental stage. The system is only available on a voluntary basis, and is even unstable due to the weak national finance expected as a result of the high life expectancy and low birth rate. The 'Self-Help' discourse is quite convenient to mention in South Korea's situation, because the nation state is truly unable to cover all those growing single person-households who are excluded from the family and social relations as the society is becoming more and more liberalized and urbanized.

Viewing the text A and text B together, a collective racial identity of '*minjok*' is formulated as a community which shares blood and destiny with overseas Koreans. The relation between 'blood community' and their 'ancestor land' is fixed, unalterable, predestined. *Minjok* discourse critically works for the 7 millions' 'Imagined Communities'(Anderson, 1991). So it is not important where they live or what citizenship they have now. In other words, a 'collective memory' (Halbwachs, 1992) is developed as follows: because 'we' are '*han-minjok*' (one ethnic family) therefore 'we' are 'South Korean'.

Gradually, their 'collective proud history' took shape as the nation has a five thousand years history and beautiful traditional/intrinsic values - Confucianism and unique cultural assets, also the nation accomplished an enormous economic development and democracy. Park Jung Hee style's embellished traditional Confucian ideology is considered as the most critical in all this historical process. It helped the nation to last up to now thus presented as 'most-preserved', 'ideal' spiritual value by readers. In so doing, *minjok's* behavior also expected to possess absolute admiration (with Korean etiquette showing traditional Confucius virtue) toward the *gukka*: be obedient to their superior (ancestor/nation). In modern times, it can also be translated as: do contribute to your

motherland!

With the flow of neo-liberalization and globalization South Korea has changed a lot in the recent 20 years. However, the *minjok* essentialist text, which was published in the 1990s, is still distributed to overseas Korean language Institutes even after 2008 without any contents modification. This can be seen as *minjok* essentialism being still valid in overseas Korean politics even in 2000s.

On the other hand, in text B, there is no direct mention of '*danic minjok*', and 'Dangun'. And ethnocentric words are much less used. In this sense, it seems that the degree of *minjok* ideology is also becoming weak at the same time.

4.2 Part B

4.2.1. Contemporary South Korean Identity politics and Foreigners

In this chapter, I want to define ‘contemporary’ as the recent 10 years (2003-). This is mainly because most of the Korean culture-related texts for foreigners were published from 2007 onwards. And to understand the official policies that influenced the national identity building in those texts, I set this background frame from the Roh Mu hyun government period (2003-2008).

The foreign population in Korea has explosively increased since 1998. In the beginning, the foreign population was mainly composed of the overseas Koreans, particularly by the *joseonjok* who came as job seekers after the newly established diplomatic relationship with the PRC. However, the composition of foreigners in South Korea started to slowly diversify, and those who came to South Korea afterwards were not only job-seekers but often came for other reasons such as travel, study, marriage, etc. In 2007, the total foreign population of South Korea reached 1 million, and by 2013, it amounted to more than 1.4 million - representing 2.5% of the country’s population. These changes triggered the discussion whether South Korea is moving into a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. This evolving immigration landscape has had a significant impact on Korean society. In recent years, the Korean government adopted new laws and regulations in relation to foreign immigration policy. On the other hand, it has intensified various cultural projects in connection to globalization policies.

This continuous popularity of South Korea among foreigners in the Nineties came from several reasons. First of all, it is the relatively stronger economic growth⁵⁰ which is mainly led by high-value product exports by major conglomerates and the present state of industrial structure (increases in manufacturing and a continuous demand for workforce), South Korea still seems that an attractive nation which foreigners who are mostly from the PRC and Southeast Asia, steadily come to look for work.

In the international context, it comes from the improved national image enhanced by overseas economic expansion of Korea's major companies such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG etc. and also by

⁵⁰ However, the internal economic index in Korea is distinctly serious when it comes to the general households debt rate which is increasing annually. Especially, ever since the global economic crisis in 2008, it is severely depressed. The amount is higher than of the average of OECD nations. In 2013, it was more than quadrillion. Consequently, the domestic demand and further investment is in a severe decreasing tendency.

the higher international status due to South Korea's hosting of a variety of international events beginning with the 1988 Seoul Olympics. In addition, an emotion-laden and stylish national image was additionally strengthened by growing Korean Pop culture popularity (the Korean wave⁵¹ , *hallyu*), which is based on TV-series, film and music in Asia, and has been maintained from the 1990s. The enormous popularity of Korean (pop) stars who have not only good looks and style but are also culturally familiar enough to Asians to lead to an exceptional interest in South Korea. And this desirable image formed by a perfect combination of a developed nation and a dynamic pop culture made a fantasy which could cover all the ongoing negative facts and phenomena which were scattered in current Korean society. This influenced to form both political and economical prestige in Asia. And this could directly attract a lot of foreign tourists and international students, thus it stimulated rapid growth of the entertainment business, tourist industry, (Korean language) education business, and general Korean product sales etc.

With the above-mentioned as background, in the 2000s, the domestic migrant policy was divided into two: one for foreign labor control, the other one for foreign residents social integration. It is rather typical for foreign resident policies of many countries. And the composition of foreigners was diversified to foreign workers, marriage immigrants, international students, and others. As for the social integration, marriage immigrants and their children were considered the most important.

On the other hand, as part of its diplomatic strategy, the Korean government is trying in various ways to promote the Korean Wave and to enlarge its coverage to general Korean culture. In 2013, the Export-Import bank of Korea decided to provide loan or credit guarantee worth 1 trillion won (\$917 million) to entertainment and food firms⁵². And the government directly organized cultural projects like Korean food and Korean language globalization. (These projects will be shed more light on in 4.2.1.4.). Intrinsically, all these projects are aiming for the increase of the Korean firms' profits and political influence in the world with USA as its role model. Taken as a whole, it seems that it helped a bit to elevate general awareness enlargement of the nation (Korea) in the world.

⁵¹ The Korean Wave was started by TV series success in mainland China in 1992 at first, and then it spread to other Asian countries which have cultural closeness with Korea. During the 1990s, TV series were based on Confucian values such as filial piety, family and generation, marriage etc. However, it expanded its popularity base to the world by using universalistic cultural codes in the 2000s. The main content of the Korean Wave is also changing from TV-series during the 1990s to music in the 2000s. The popularity is maintained by generalized use of digital technology such Internet and SNS (Social Network Service) and continuous K-pop contents supplied by major entertainment companies.

⁵² http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/02/602_130133.html. Eximbank to finance 'hallyu' business (accessed on March 21, 2013)

In this chapter, I will try to illustrate further the identity policies directed at foreigners in contemporary South Korea comparing mainly two recent governments periods (2003-) and its predecessor. I will also cover some cultural businesses for foreigners run by the government both domestically and abroad. It is important to know the term ‘foreigner’ which is quite complex combining several different groups together, and its current status in South Korea.

4.2.1.1. The ‘foreigner’ in South Korea and their current status.

The overall number of foreign immigrants in South Korea had been increased constantly already from the late 1980s. Holding worldwide sports event like the Olympics (1988) was a good chance to popularize the developed national image from war-ravaged poor nation. During the 1990s, the composition of the foreign population was mainly by foreign workers (including overseas Koreans with foreign nationality) from China and Southeast Asian countries. To turn to the 2000s, the increasing rate is on a great upturn, and its composition is more diversified, which was chiefly low/less skilled foreign labors before, to marriage immigrants, international students, migrated children and north-Korean defectors and so on. However, the majority of foreign population is still foreign workers. In 2012, the entire number of foreigners staying in South Korea amounted almost to 1.4 million mainly from Japan (36%) and China (23.7%). The majority’s age are ranged in 20 – 39, which is the economically active population.

Here I define the term ‘foreigner’ which is collective meaning of several foreign groups. And I list each group by the order of meaningful numbers among foreign population in South Korea in the 2000s. All the numbers in this chapter are based on monthly reports from the Ministry of Justice on January, 2012.

a. Low/less skilled foreign workers (includes part of overseas Koreans with foreign nationality)⁵³

⁵³ Even though I already wrote about the status of overseas Koreans (with Foreign Nationality) in a previous chapter (refer to 4.1.1.2), it was mainly about the general description in worldwide distribution. In terms of low skilled ethnic Korean workers, current policy is not showing explicit position whether to manage them as a foreign workforce or to treat them equally with other overseas Koreans. However, they are maintained as part of a temporary workforce connected to specific industry and are subject to close government management and regulation. Meanwhile, the Korean government put them in a privileged position by giving them special permissions, which is not available to non-ethnic Korean foreign workers, such as freedom of employment in service industries and freedom to change worksites. Nonetheless here I include low-skilled ethnic Korean workers with Foreign Nationality (overseas Korean with foreign nationality) as part of foreign workers.

Low/less skilled foreign workers are those recruited for temporary periods through the Korean government manpower supply agreements with other countries mainly in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam, Philippine, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Nepal etc. as a measure for solving the labor shortage in manufacturing businesses domestically from the 1990s. The number of low/less skilled workers is one of the main agents who contribute to total foreigner growth rate in recent 5 years, and accounted for 536, 803 in 2012 which is 90% of the total of foreign workers in South Korea. And more than half of total foreign workers are ethnic Koreans. That's because the government gives privileges to ethnic Korean workers by giving longer period working permit and them the right to choice of worksite freely while it is totally restricted for non-ethnic Korean workers.

b. High skilled foreign workers

High skilled workers are those who have high education (4 years university level) and professional work experience such as doctors, lawyers, professors, CEOs, artists etc. They numbered only 47,638 in 2012 and represented approximately 10% of the total foreign workers in South Korea. This highly contrasted ratio with low skilled foreign workers have direct relevance to the Korean government's restrictive employment policies for this group. There are great amounts of highly educated domestic job seeker, and the domestic unemployment rate is still very high. So the Korean government discourages its further growth in Korea.

c. International students

International students are those taking degrees and learning Korean language at the universities, mainly from Asian countries such as PRC, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Japan and so on. International students are continuously increasing during the 2000s, and it was only 11,646, but it reached 86,999 in 2012.⁵⁴ More than 70% of them are from the PRC. There are two main reasons why there are so many Chinese students among those international students. First of all, China's significant economic growth rate in 2000s made available those middle class background students in China to take additional education in overseas. Meanwhile, South Korean diploma is becoming more and more prestigious back in China since the number of the Korean enterprises in China is increasing. Also its relatively inexpensive price-level and geographic proximity compared to Japan, USA and other

⁵⁴ However, in 2009, due to the influence of the global economic crisis, the increase rate of international students has shown a slight downward tendency.

European countries is good reason to choose Korea. Second of all, many (private) universities in Korea offers low entrance requirements and half or free tuition fee to international students to attract them as many as possible. This is because many universities judged by government their globalization index by the number of the international students. And most of private Korean universities are facing financial loss and total closing because of the decrease of the domestic student number.

d. Marriage immigrants

Marriage immigrants means those who had non-Korean nationality before they come to Korea by marrying a Korean spouse. After 2000s, international marriage has drastically increased. According to marriage registration and population census statistics, 70% of marriage immigrants are women and they are mostly in demand by two groups of Korean men: young unmarried men in rural areas and urban divorced or unmarried men. This is because these groups of men have specially difficulty with finding Korean wives. With the progress of urbanization, 80% of young women were moved to major city. So it was getting difficult for young men in rural villages to find a woman to marry. And urban divorced or unmarried men are mostly situated in low social economic status. And in domestic marriage market, those men seldom have chances to get matched. After all, these migrant foreign wives are eventually incorporated in low social background even after they immigrate to the new country. The nationalities of marriage immigrants are gradually diversified but consist mostly of PRC and Southeast Asians.⁵⁵ Above all, the rapid growth of international marriage in 2000s are enabled by the generalization of the overseas travel and information technology usage, while it was only an option for the wealthy in the nineties. In particular, Internet based social media made it possible to cope with actual distance between the countries. The total number of marriage immigrants in 2012 already amounted to 144,851. Even though its proportion in total foreigner population is not so great, but soon it became the most cared-for group since they were expected to give birth to the 2nd generation of Koreans for the status quo and increase of population which is directly connected to national interests. Therefore, this group has received intensive attention from the government as the object that should quickly assimilate into society.

e. Overseas Korean with foreign nationality

⁵⁵ According to the international marriage registration, most Korean Chinese women as well as men tend to marry divorced Koreans, whereas Southeast Asian women tend to marry rural men.

This group holds Overseas Korean Visa (F-4), which is able to stay as long as they want in Korea, are mostly high skilled workers or their family dependents. They are mostly from USA and Japan etc. They are differentiated with low-skilled ethnic Korean workers such as Korean Chinese and are registered as temporary foreign workers and can get F-4 visa after proving if they are qualified for further stay in Korea by taking extra certificates and getting certain work experience. The number of this group is not so big, compared to low-skilled ethnic Koreans. But in the recent 5 years, the increase rate of this group is also becoming the main agent with the growing number of low/less skilled foreign workers that contribute in the total foreign growth rate. It was only 19,000 in 2002 increased to 141,909 in 2011.

f. Others

- Foreign investors and businessmen

Foreign investors and businessmen are the most privileged group among foreigners and specially cared for by the Korean government. Normally, foreign (direct) investment refers to a over one hundred million won (around 1 million US dollar) scale of investment, ownership of more than 10% of domestic corporation stock or over 5 years loan by foreign investment corporation from their mother company overseas.⁵⁶ It was always encouraged to attract them by the South Korean government. However, especially the Lee Myung bak regime, focused more on promotion with various liberalized measures such as the property investment immigration system (the foreign investors can receive temporary residence or permanent residency visa if their investment exceeds a certain amount of money), generous tax incentives (tax exemption benefit during the stock transfers) and so on.

- Migrant children

Migrant children are those who stay with their migrant parents (mostly foreign workers, marriage migrants) who have not acquired Korean nationality during their residence in Korea, or those born to migrant family during their residence in Korea. Most of these migrant parents are not having the visa which allows them to stay long term or accompany their family. Therefore, their children become undocumented. In recent times, there are new increasing cases like migrant

⁵⁶ http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1140. (Accessed on May 16th, 2014).

children who were invited by their parent (foreigner) who has a Korean spouse.⁵⁷

Migrant children became a social problem as the number of illegally staying foreigners increased during the 1990s. Since most of them have illegal status, there is no exact statistics for this group. However, in the 2000s, with the governmental treatment to decrease the number of illegal aliens, migrate children are also becoming documented so as to enroll in school and take medical services.

- North Korean defectors

North Korean defector (*bukhanitalchumin*) is a legal term meaning a Korean who has an address, immediate family, a spouse, or a job in North Korea and didn't acquire any other nationalities than Republic of Korea after escaping from North Korea. North Korean defectors have existed since right after the division of country. North Korean defectors are accepted as citizens of South Korea in conformity with the South Korean constitution which does not consider North Korea as a nation. Therefore, acceptance of North Korean defectors to South Korea is under the concept of reinstatement of nationality.

From the date of the ceasefire agreement (July 1953) up to 1989, the number of North Korean defectors was very few. During that time, the main reason to come to the South was for seeking political freedom. From the 1990's, its number had gradually increased due to the severe food shortages brought by large-scale flood damage and drought in North Korea. After 2000, the number of people escaped from North Korea is steadily growing and many of them decided to enter into South Korea.⁵⁸

In total foreigners composition, it shows that the most prominent and distinct part of foreigners are two groups: low/less skilled foreign workers and marriage immigrants. In a sense, this proportion is the exact result from government policy originated by the needs for maximizing national interests. The increase rate of low skilled foreign labour population is a direct result of the labour policy which is meant for supplementing the manpower in the labour market. And, also, the increase in marriage immigrants is connected with the needs of single people looking for partners domestically as well as the issues needed to be resolved with the national population decreasing. Population aging is in progress at rapid rate in Korea. And the birth rate is constantly falling at the

⁵⁷ IOM MRTC special issue no.1 Key Migration Issues for the Republic of Korea: 2010

⁵⁸ The accumulated number of North Korean defectors was only 1,406 in 2000 but exceeded 20,000 in 2010.

same time. It is because the social welfare system is weak and the expenses for children which should be covered by the family is too burdensome. Therefore young Korean people avoid getting married and have children as well. The marriage immigrants growth is actually part of a welcomed and planned national policy in this point of view.

In the next chapter I'm going to look more into national policies regarding foreigners in the recent 10 years. It will be more about why and how different group of foreigners were planned for the national agenda and the future.

4.2.1.2. The Development of the Foreigner Policy in the Contemporary era

The concept 'Foreign or immigration policy' currently is different compared with the 1970-80s. Until the late 1980s South Korea was a migration 'sending' country, and within South Korean society the term 'migration' generally meant overseas migration. However from the late 1980s, the immigration of foreigners rapidly increased and the number of foreigners immigrating into South Korea currently exceeds the number of South Koreans migrating overseas.

Between 1989 and 1991, when the Cold War was in its terminal stage, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe served as a momentum to accelerate so-called globalization. Another important reason for globalization's triumph was the deepening of reform policies in China. Globalization can be defined in many different ways. However, in case of South Korea, it means more or less neo-liberal globalization⁵⁹ i.e., more specifically 'boundless capitalism', 'borderless labour market' which enables exchange of labour and capital between countries with less intervention of the country. So, the key of the national policy was shifted from a security agenda to an economic one. Also South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with ex- or present communist countries such as Russia, PRC, Vietnam, and Eastern European countries while expanding economic and cultural relations with those countries, which subsequently led to vigorous personal and economic exchange. Considering the fact that the majority of foreign workers presently residing in South Korea are from PRC and Vietnam, this shift in the history of international relations surely had a major influence on the flow of migration.

⁵⁹ David Woodward and Andrew Simms (2006) explained also about neo-liberal globalization and it includes liberal market rules from the government regulation which could reduce profits, cutting public expenses for social welfare, privatization (selling state-owned enterprises, goods and services to private investors), eliminating the concept of the public good' or 'community' and replacing it with 'individual responsibility.

Before 1990s, the most biggest and only foreigner group in Korea was Chinese immigrants.⁶⁰ There co-existed both persecution and preference against them. The most representative preference treatment was establishment of special schools for Chinese immigrants only. But it was not granted as regular school, students from those schools were discriminated during college entrance process. They mostly suffered from severe discrimination policies such as restrictions on land ownership, restriction of naturalization etc. And it gave rise to remigration for most of them to other countries such as USA and Japan. Land ownership restriction only became relaxed when the foreign exchange crisis occurred in 1997.

Multiculturalism and multicultural policy was never seriously considered during 90s. Even though there existed Chinese immigrants, they were rather considered as strangers who should keep distance from the nationals. The Chinese immigrants number was only a few. Even so, the number of foreign workers had been increased during this time by the industrial trainee system for the substitute Korean workforce in small-medium sized companies which is inspired by model of labour policy in Japan, but they couldn't be the catalyst for the multicultural policy because of their short time period staying. In addition, international marriage was regarded as prerogative to the wealthy, because overseas trip was only available for them since it was very expensive.

However, moderated priced overseas flight ticket and generalized internet use helped many Koreans to find their spouse in other countries. And this growing number of marriage immigrants led to change from the homogeneous nation based politics to so called multicultural society politics in South Korea.

From the Roh Mu hyun government, it began to shape as 'Multicultural policy or migration policy' which is especially caring for marriage immigrants and improving their social integration. The enforcement of this policy coming partly from the President Roh's personal background as a left-leaning human rights lawyer and also from the aim to elevate the national image after United Nations (UN) human rights committee' emphatic protest against the dominant concept of '*danyil minjok*' in South Korea. They expressed concern that it can be racial discriminative to the mixed blooded people as impure.

From the Lee Myung Bak government, the 'Foreigner policy' became to shape more as 'foreign residents policy' by the demand for foreign immigrants settlement and integration.

⁶⁰ The first Chinese immigrants in modern times came to Korea in 1882. This Chinese immigrants community grew very fast by their inborn business skill until 1945 when the Korean government was established. However, they were oppressed by various discriminating policies by the government, and it resulted that 20,000 Chinese immigrants which is almost half of the total Chinese immigrants migrated to another country in late 1970s. However, the economic crisis in 1997 as a momentum and also the growing Chinese economy in the world, the Korean government changed their attitude to Chinese immigrants by expecting their role as medium between Korea and China (Cho 1997).

(1) The Roh Mu Hyun government and Appearance of Multicultural Policy (2003-2008)

During Roh's government, foreign labor policies were developed by differentiating non-ethnic Korean foreign labor and ethnic Korean foreign labor. This was done along the Japanese pattern. The *nikkei* (ethnic Japanese) workers who were mostly from Latin America were treated differently. As I mentioned before, the full scale new foreign labor system, the EPS was introduced in 2004. This was basically framed by the research 'Introduction of the Employment Permit System of Foreign Workers', conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 2000. It comparatively analyzed EPS and work permit system of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Germany, and suggested the 'principle to preferentially hire native workers' and the 'principle of non-discrimination' as a policy stance.

In fact, however, foreign workers human rights violation case such as delayed payment of wage, long labour hours, insulting and physical attacks were brought up constantly. And voluntary movement to protect foreign labour workers human rights by the religious communities which started from 90s were continued also.

The General Employment Permit system is one of EPS which are available non-ethnic foreign worker, while the Working Visit System is allowed employment for ethnic Korean workers residing in China, and from the CIS Countries. The EPS continues to play a significant role in providing low-skilled labor in South Korea. However, many of them stayed illegal since they didn't come back to their country even after their staying for 3-4 years. And their unregistered status left many social problems such as growing number of crimes rate⁶¹ and undocumented (migrant) children rate etc. For resolving this problem, there was granted a general amnesty for unregistered foreign workers.

In spite of these adverse effects of the (temporary staying) foreign labor migrant system, President Roh began to embrace the (permanent) immigration with the worry of low birth rate and aging population. As of the survey in 2006, South Korea scored the lowest fertility rate⁶² among OECD countries. The reason for the low birth rate in recent Korea is generally because of the weak welfare system. Even though there exists an institutional welfare system for small children's parents

⁶¹ Crime rate for foreigners is much lower than for locals in Korea. However, in the mass media, those crime by foreigners are more often covered than those by locals.

⁶² It is the number of children expected to be born to women aged 15 to 49, South Korea marked 1.13 while the average was 1.65. In this trend, it will decline in total population since 2020 and consequently will cause the decrease of the total number of labor population.

which is not so good enough by comparison with those Scandinavian countries well-known parenting system, it is difficult to get utilized by parents in reality.⁶³ Moreover, too expensive expenses in an overheated private education market for children and high prices of university entrance fee also influenced this negative index.

In this background, it became unavoidable to embrace the marriage immigrants who are needed to maintain the country's population.

Among the migration people, an influx of foreign brides has been evident in the 2000s, and it has effected crucial changes in the concept of national identity for those Koreans who strongly believe in a homogenous-ethnic nation state. The increasing marriage immigrants gave rise to new social issues such as social inequality expansion and racial discrimination. Most of this type of international marriage family were situated generally in the low-income bracket. In addition, their mixed blood children were often challenged by their companions in school.

As a consequence, in the mid 2000's, the end of Roh's presidency, mixing blood was also considered as the way of globalization and the term 'Multicultural policy' or 'foreigner policy' especially for marriage immigrants was newly come to the fore.

On the other hand, along with the spread of the Korean Wave, and government and university efforts as part of the globalization policy, the number of international students was increased from the 2000s. It looks very critical to attract more international students at both government and university level. The current number of Korean students abroad is more than 6 - 7 times larger than the number of foreign students in South Korea. And the balance of overseas payment in education have been in severe deficits. Also, hundreds of universities in domestic are at a risk of being closed down due to an insufficient number of students. It is especially serious for many private universities because the number of private universities take up almost 85% among the total number of universities according to research by KHEI statics.⁶⁴ (It was 366 in total in 2012)⁶⁵ And in case of Korea, most of the students want to go to public universities in the metropolitan area which has

⁶³ In Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Norway, small children's parents get paid during their 44 - 54 weeks parental leave with 80 - 100% wage and paternal quota is also generally encouraged. In case of Korea, there are also 1 years paid leave but only with 40% wage for both parents who have child under 6 year old. Parental leave with a low degree of economic support make parents not to choose the option either. And also by the corporate culture in Korea, it is not generally applied since it is not secure to keep the previous position after their leave, especially in the private sector. So women tend to quit their job after they get married or pregnant spontaneously in Korea.

⁶⁴ Starting from the second half of the nineties, the overheating of Korea's need for higher education lead to the establishment of very many new higher education institutions, especially private ones, due to the simpler procedures of these private ones.

⁶⁵ It is including both 2 years colleges and 4 years universities.

better university assessment and cheaper tuition fee than private universities.⁶⁶ So it is fully encouraged for them to attract as many international students as possible to fill the vacancies. They often offered incentives to international students such as reduction of tuition or specially adjusted course and valuation basis.

(2) The Lee Myung Bak government and The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2008-2013)

From this regime, The First Basic Plan for immigration policy (2008-2012), which was basically take foreigner as residents, took effect, whereas foreign labor policy became subordinate to the immigration policy.

Lee Myung Bak government's agenda was to fortify competitiveness of few major conglomerates (*Chaebol*). And they especially extended a special favor to high skilled foreign workers and outstanding talented people in relation to foreign labor politic and presented an amended administration system for their convenience: online visa applying system, simplified employment process, relaxed requirements for citizenship. In addition, more than 2000 talented foreign scholarship students were invited by government. Also, to attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), permanent residence permits could be applied for those who invested over 1 million US dollars at the resort in Pyeongchang where the Winter Olympic Games in 2018 is planned.⁶⁷ While EPS which was started in Roh's regime for low-skilled foreign labour didn't develop anymore. But it rather tried to limit the number of low-skilled foreign labour such as longer trial period for domestic job-seeker and reinforced provision for return trips after visa expiration. With the worry of illegal foreigners staying, it substantially turned more conservative toward foreign workers regulation compared to the previous regime. In Roh's presidency, the 'First Basic Plan for Immigration policy (2008-2012)' was the administration's policy based on the stances on treatment of foreigners as residents which included social security. However, marriage immigrants were mostly cared here with the great focusing on their integration into Korean society, while undocumented migrants are completely excluded from social security by deporting them.

⁶⁶ Universities in South Korean have the following ranking: public university in Seoul (Seoul national university) > few private universities in Seoul > public universities in major cities > most of private universities in non-major cities. Therefore, the local private universities which take up the majority of the total universities in Korea were not preferred by the students.

⁶⁷ <http://media.daum.net/politics/others/view.html?cateid=1020&newsid=20110212031306961&p=khan> (accessed on 18.4.2014).

Several measures were taken to enrich the intercultural sensitivity of the South Korean public by an attempt to reduce prejudice and an unfair treatment against foreign brides and their children. At schools, those efforts include revising the textbook which formerly put an emphasis on the pride in mono-ethnic nation, providing teachers with training in multi-cultural concepts and matters, as well as comprising extra multi-cultural programs into each grade of pedagogy from pre-school to university level. Campaigns made for the general public also include promoting mass media to produce diverse programs that can raise multi-cultural sensitivity extensively.

Even with these institutional efforts, it is hard to change the deeply- rooted ethnic prejudices among the majority of Koreans. In 2010, the pitiable sentiment toward marriage immigrants suddenly rose when a Vietnamese marriage migrant, Thach Thi Hoáng Ngoc, was murdered by her Korean husband, who had a history of mental problems, only seven days after she arrived in Korea. This led to the protection movement of marriage migrants. After this it strengthened control over marriage match-making businesses. In addition, it also limited the issuance of visas to foreign spouses who might be victimized through their international marriage by evaluating the standards of international marriage applicants (especially men) about their financial status, health condition, divorce history, criminal record etc.

On the other hand, on an international level, the government started to support the growth of Korean Cultural Industry in the name of Korea's national competitiveness reinforcement policy. *Hangeul* (Korean letter), *Hanbok* (Korean dress), *Kimchi* (Korean food) etc. was selected as symbolic Korean cultural content. As benchmarked neighbor countries 'soft power' projects such as Chinese Confucius institute and Japanese food success, King Sejong Institute (2008-), Korean Food Globalization project (2009) were launched and run by the Lee Myung Bak government. I will explain these businesses more in chapter 4.1.1.5.

4.2.1.3. The Characteristics of the Contemporary Foreigner Politics

During the 2000s, 'Foreign policy' became different with those in 1990s in general. The catchphrase 'Multiethnic, Multicultural society (*dayinjong, damunhwa sahoe*)' which had firstly been shown in Roh's regime, is representing its characteristic change from 'globalization of labor in 1990s' to 'globalization of population in 2000s'. Even so, the foreign labour policy was a totally different sector with the 'Multicultural policy'. The Multicultural Policy which is mainly

favorable to marriage immigrants, also influenced the general laxer attitude to foreign temporary workers.

However, it is hard to say every foreign group is cared for to the same degree by the South Korean government. Under Lee's regime which is advocating elitism, foreigner policy is still very restrictive to those majority foreign (simple) labor's population whether they are overseas Koreans or not. As of 2012, among around 1 million of the total foreign population in South Korea, only 4% of them acquired Korean citizenship, and the majority were marriage immigrants, while most of foreign workers were excluded. Even they work to contribute for the 'national economy', it is basically blocked for them to be the member of nation. This is obviously contrasted to the case in Norway. All foreign (temporary) workers who have worked legally for three years in Norway have right to apply for a permanent residence permits⁶⁸

But in Korea, the Multicultural Policy in the 2000s is mainly focused on marriage immigrants and overseas Koreans, who are already considered as their family members and they only make up 20% of the total foreigners in Korea. It is proudly reported by media that the numerous free Korean courses is operated by every almost local government in the name of helping their rapidly adapting to daily life in Korea.

With the growing foreign population in the 2000s, the ethnic oriented term '*minjok*' is becoming more and more inappropriate in the modern national identity building process in Korean society. The symbolic event which is showing the change of the term from '*minjok*' to '*gukmin*' is the World Cup hosted by both Korea and Japan in 2002. By this opportunity, Korea's national image had improved as the World Cup host country, so '*gukmin*' as the member of the 'proud' nation was naturally more generalized to be used than '*minjok*'. According to Korean general society investigation in 2000s, it is on upward trend on thinking that they are proud of being Korean. In this way, during the neoliberal globalization process, Korea had kept on economic and political development, 'national' status has thus elevated, and it became to appear both an opportunity and a problem. As for the opportunities, ethnicity is becoming less important in acquirement of Korean citizenship. According to the Social Department research, the tolerance index toward different ethnicities has elevated more than 20 ranking levels ever since 1995 among OECD nations. But for the problem, North Koreans and ethnic Korean Chinese are no more considered as 'unconditional' compatriots who had always become a prime consideration object in the foreigner policy before, but

⁶⁸ www.udi.no

now as a non-members of the nation, more or less as foreigner. This has reflected through foreign and foreigner policy in Lee's regime: by taking firm stand on North Korea and a favorable stand on rich and well educated foreigners who can contribute to national competence.

However, even though the multicultural policy had been carried out from the 2000s, ethnic nationalism still remains highly prominent in the society as years go by. In the same research, Koreans showed high acceptance of foreigners as their 'colleague', 'neighbor' or 'friend', while it represented still difficulty to accept them as a family members such as their spouse or spouse of their children. Thus most Korean people think that it is very positive to have immigrants when it comes to socioeconomic needs of the nation, but basically it is commonly found that they don't want to take responsibility of conflicts results from economic inequality. Such an ambivalent attitude toward immigrants makes social distance between foreigners and ethnic Koreans grow larger. And this may be the reason of unprovoked hatred between two groups. Lawyer Hwang, Pilgyu from Public Human Rights Act Foundation in his column in the Law Journal⁶⁹ of September 2013 point out that the Korean government holds unfair views toward foreigners who have low education, and are thus considered less helpful to the national economy. They only focus on foreigner's crimes which were reported by internet based anti-multicultural society communities. He also blamed that government take those negative awareness as a majority's opinion.

In the perspective of human rights and institutional systems, contemporary foreigner policies in Korea are improving to control better the amount of foreign workers and to care for those marriage immigrants and their multicultural families as years go by. However, at the same time, there is growing racism and xenophobia among Koreans. The leading internet community site, Ilbe, which has many extreme right political users is one example of it.⁷⁰ They are showing extreme exclusivism and violence against women, people who have different political views, migrant worker, homosexuals, and handicapped people. And in recent times, articles with anti-multicultural policy view on this site led to growing xenophobia against marriage immigrants and their children.⁷¹ In other words, today's multicultural policy in Korea is immature in the true sense of the term, rather contributing to serve specific interests - economic and demographic purposes. That is, firstly, policies for the marriage immigrants are the solution to the decrease in total population

⁶⁹ <http://news.lec.co.kr/index2.html?pressNum=00751&pressDate=2013-09-13&type=oldpaper> (accessed 19 May, 2014)

⁷⁰ www.ilbe.com

⁷¹ 8 year old 'little PSY', Hwang minwoo who became famous by his acting in South Korean singer, PSY's music video 'Gangnam style', was attacked by Ilbe users racist comment because of his multicultural family background: <http://news.nate.com/view/20130502n18588?mid=e0102> (accessed on May 16, 2014).

which is the concern for the crisis of the ultimate fate of the nation. Secondly, policies for the foreign workers are to solve the manpower shortage problem of small-medium sized enterprises by controlling the exact number of the migrating population which will not influence the Korean domestic job-seekers employment rate.

By and large, the foreign worker policy had influenced positively on the low cost and the growth of production for the domestic companies by hiring low paid workers. According to an empirical analysis on Economic Impact of Migrant Workers in Korea by IOM MRTC (2011), foreign workers employment did not replace the domestic workers chance to work, but rather complemented it.

However, the foreign labour policy is always accompanied by difficulties having control over them (all migrant workers). Their temporary residing time period always has the possibility to degrade them into illegal workers. Once their status becomes illegal, they suffer in blind spots where there is no social safety. This bring about not only increased administration expenses such as reparation and welfare by the government but also poor or 'even worse' working condition, such as no payment, inhuman treatment for the (illegal) migrant workers in the black labour market. (Regardless of their legal residence status, low educated migrants workers inhuman treatment in their working place was always general issues during all recent years.)

Nonetheless, they are also to be expected to perform as bridge between Korean and their country, by advancing Korean companies expansion to their country or exportation of Korean equipment as they are already get used to handle it.

Active marriage immigrant policy should be maintained to secure national population in South Korea But if there is not accompanied the racial equality awareness, racism will be stronger with the growing tendency of the socioeconomic gap between ethnic Korean families and multi-cultural families.

Whether it is immigrant workers or marriage immigrants, the total foreign population growth in Korean society will bring foreign culture and life-related industry growth in the future, and an overall change in attitude towards foreigners. I also expect the culture will be more diversified and the globalization and multicultural society can be accomplished in the true sense of the term.

4.2.1.4. Cultural education business and Cultural policy for Foreigners

Domestic

A. Social integration programs

The Korean government operates the Social Integration Program for foreign immigrants in Korea. This program was implemented since 2009, based on Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea. All immigrants and citizens in Korea, can participate in the Social Integration Program. But since its implementation in 2009, the major participatory groups in this program have been foreigners with Korean ethnicity and immigrants by marriage. Virtually, these groups are the most essential target of the integration policy, and the program is designed basically for marriage immigrants. Thus, 70% of the participants are marriage immigrants. The Social Integration Program largely consists of courses on Korean language and courses on understanding Korean Society.

B. Study Korea Project⁷²

The Study Korea Project is the program for invitation and expansion of the international students into Korea. Almost every major university in Korea provides special admission of the formal course for them and have also launched the Korean language education courses as compulsory courses⁷³.

What is worth to notice in the Lee's regime, is that they are trying to utilize these foreign students as professional manpower by supporting them to take internship programs in domestic companies after they have finished their studies in Korea. This is somewhat contrasted with before when they took them only as consumers of the education system. However, according to an annual report on resident foreign population by the Ministry of Justice (2009), only less than 15% of the international students want to work further in Korea after their studies.

Foreign

A. King Sejong Institute (2008 -)

⁷² Refer to a news release from the Ministry of Education on 4 August 2008.

⁷³ The most famous institutions such as Yonsei university, Seoul National University, Gyeonghee University published many textbooks for the language courses by the governmental support. Besides the institutes also arranges cultural activities such as traditional manner courses, traditional music courses, and Korean cooking practice courses, etc.

The King Sejong Institute is a Korean culture and language educational institute organized by the government. Following the multicultural policy in the recent government, this organization plays a pivotal role to serve Korean language education for foreigners both domestically and abroad. The range of the projects and institution buildings is growing at a rapid pace with the growing popularity of Korean pop culture. Currently it is found in total 117 institutes in 51 countries. This organization contributes to the growing fandom of Korean culture around the world. Therefore it is considered one of the most strategic foreign-related businesses. This organization is inspired by similar educational organization in the neighboring country, China. China has been running the Confucius Institutes for promoting Chinese language and culture since 2004.

B. The Korea Foundation (1991 -)

This organization is working for general cultural exchange as part of foreign policy. Their business is more focused on promotion of Korean studies in universities in overseas and cultivating important foreign figures through the channels of academic exchange.

C. Korean Food Globalization Project (2009 -)

This famous project which is inspired by Japan was carried forward by Kim Yunok, the wife of President Lee Myung Bak, which was aiming at elevating Korean food to the status of one of those five famous foods in the world until 2017. However, this project was blamed by excessive waste of national budget and no results⁷⁴. Through this project, one most interesting thing is that Korean culture promoting business such as Korean food as well as Korean pop culture is pushing ahead by national scale without any self-reflection in recent time.

D. Korea culture and information service (1971 -)

This organization originates from the Overseas Information Office in the seventies, founded during the Park Jung Hee military regime. As the change of characteristic of the government, its business has also changed from observation of overseas Koreans during the seventies to today's international cultural exchange business. Nowadays it is mainly working for supporting the Korean

⁷⁴ <http://www.koam114.com/?p=8274> 'Korea Food globalization project, waste the tax-payer's precious money'

cultural centers overseas and promoting the national image.

As stated above, cultural education business and cultural policy for foreigner is largely designed for two groups: resident foreigners in Korea and overseas foreigners. And its education object is mainly marriage immigrants (by the social integration program), international students (by Study Korea Project) internally. And overseas Koreans or Korean-friendly foreigners (by King Sejong Institute) and Korean study researchers (by The Korea Foundation, Korea culture and information service) externally. In other words, education objects are largely these three groups now: marriage immigrants (foreigners but Korean nationality), overseas Koreans (ethnically Koreans but foreign nationality) and pure foreigners (unrelated to Korea, but having favorable attitude towards Korea). Before multiculturalism became more common in Korean society, education business was mainly done for overseas Koreans' 'national spirit cultivation' (nationalist indoctrination) or supporting overseas Korean researcher outside Korea. However, in 2000s when many marriage immigrants and international students came to Korea, many social integration program were developed mainly for the marriage immigrants. It is showing new expanded business such as Study Korea project which is to foster international students in Korea, which is contrasted with the Korean Foundations supporting work for international researchers outside Korea. On the other hand, there has been numerous Korean education institutes in overseas before The King Sejong Institute's foundation. But it is now merging under the King Sejong Institute, tried to build up bigger and standardized program for the cultural education business. And the students also diversified from the overseas Koreans mainly to different nationalities foreigners.

By these domestic and foreign cultural businesses and changing trends in recent times, language and cultural education's main object has also changed from the ethnic Koreans to non-ethnic Koreans, or somehow it showed a tendency of consolidation of these two groups. This transition also gave rise to new Korean cultural identity in the so-called 'multicultural society. And this is what I want to research in this study. In the next chapter, I'm going to illuminate how the Korean ideal cultural identity has changed in various culture-related text after 2000s, the transition period of the cultural education business.

4.2.2. Findings

Whether it wanted it or not, South Korea after the 2000s became on the surface a multi-cultural society given its more diversified foreign population. While it was much easier to deal with its unitary culture for a homogeneous nation before, now it needs a new cultural/national identity which can be shared equally by people who have a diverse ethnicity, culture, religion etc. background. The term 'multiculturalism' has come up with this background.

In globalization trends around the world, migration has generalized. It includes both influx of migrant foreigners in Korea and efflux migrant Koreans to overseas countries. Therefore, concern on migrant minorities has increased, so the term 'diaspora' also naturally has arisen together with multiculturalism in South Korea. Diaspora means 'scattered people' in Greek. In the case of Korea, it refers to overseas Koreans. The appearance of the concept 'diaspora' meant the collapse of the limitations of national borders. And overseas Korean's national identity has been challenged constantly by the difference between their mother country and their present dwelling country. On defining diaspora identity, scholars often use the term 'hybridity'⁷⁵ which can describe well the state of being neither indigenous nor exogenous. (Agnew, 2005: 12; Code, 2000: 260) In their dual and dilemmatic consciousness, Agnew (2005), points out further on the tendency of diaspora individuals' emotional attachment to the symbol of their ethnicity (cultural and ethnic heritage) and their homeland.

With the growing popularity on the research about 'multiculturalism' and 'diaspora' in the academic field, the needs of transnational identity which can bind those two different minority groups (foreigners in Korea and overseas Korean) together has gradually matured. In this context, I explored how 'Korean-ness' as a new collective identity has been defined in the Korean culture-related texts in the transnational flow.

a. Race

As I mentioned before (see 2.1.1), the Korean typical racial term *minjok* was earlier the most essential concept when we defined Korean ethnic identity in overseas Korean (heritage learners) culture-related texts. Since the multiculturalism came to the fore in full scale in the Korean society,

⁷⁵ 'Hybridity', used initially by theorist Bhabha (1994), developed from a biological concept of constant change or adaptation, can be deployed in various area such as race, culture, language and art.

the term *minjok* was gradually recommended not to be used in publications.

Yet, as an ‘inherited racial memory’ (Jan, 1995), *minjok* was still mentioned in several contexts with descriptions of Korean history, origins and national symbols. e.g explanation of Dangun myth and *Taeguekki* (Text C: 33 ; Text D: 129).⁷⁶ However, in general, it was represented in a neutral way in their interpretation and narrative style. Also, in both text C and D, Korea was described as a single ethnic nation in the past, but it was also mentioned that for the present time, it is no longer a homogeneous country with the influx of marriage immigrants and foreign workers.

On the other hand, in the more recent texts E and F, *minjok* and related ethno-nationalist terms do not appear.⁷⁷ And the political objective/neutral term *hangukin* (Korean people) and *hangukgukmin* (Korean citizen) were generally used in all the texts. In 2007 the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in the UN has pointed out that the ‘pure-blooded’ ideology and the notions of ethnic homogeneity have resulted in various forms of discrimination in Korea (Wagner, 2009). As a result of such a warning, it seems that all the texts for foreigners reflected the acceptance of racial perspective criticism. Yet, though all the texts were mentioning the necessity of tolerance and understanding towards foreigners, all the contents were described only about Korean culture. (although this might be ‘What Korean culture is’). Nothing is mentioned about foreigners’ life and their culture in Korea. Such cultural presentation appears under the disguise of multiculturalism. Even though harmonization with the foreign population is repeated on the surface, it rather shows the intention to socialize them into what they consider the standard, mainstream culture of South Korea. In reality, the representation appearing in some texts seemed closer to the cultural assimilation way, suggesting expected readers to blend in to the wider ‘host’ culture (especially Korean traditional culture). The most of the texts (C / D / E) included etiquette in the family such as complicated titles for family members and extremely traditional ancestral ceremony procedures which were expected to be learned by foreigners.

Of course, such contents could be interpreted as an attempt to integrate diverse diasporic groups, since the target readership of the texts includes both foreigners and overseas Koreans. But all in all, given the Korean government's active tactics such as social integration programs, especially these

⁷⁶ In the foreword of text C and D, it was mentioned that both foreigners and overseas Koreans were their target of readers. I assume that the reason why the usage of ‘*minjok*’ appears is because of a part of readers being ethnic Koreans. Furthermore, there is still found the usage of these ethno-centered term, e.g.: *wuri minjok* (our ethnic people), *wuri nara* (our nation) , *wuri geul* (our language), *danyil minjok* (single ethnic race), *han gyeo-rae* (homogeneous nation).

⁷⁷ There were no found contents of national ethic in text E and F.

targeting marriage immigrants, it is more proper to see that pre-existing notions of Korean national identity with traditional character in the texts are still continued (Text C / F) or even stronger than before (Text D).

Secondly, The new self-image for the nation (The Republic of Korea) and the nationals (Koreans, '*han-gukin*') was concretized with additional image/identity, i.e., the country keeps refined traditional values (Confucianism) , but has also dynamism, and the people have both patience and passion.(Text C, chapter 1) Meanwhile, the term 'dynamism' started to be used in Korea since 2000 as the national official slogan 'Dynamic Korea'. To appeal the new national brand image to potential foreign visitors, government even made short advertisement with the catchphrase. As if culture-related texts go with this flow, especially text C also described the 'dynamism' in Korea with the national events such as the 'gathering gold movement in 1997'⁷⁸, 'Street cheering for the South Korean soccer team during the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan'⁷⁹, and also with the great economic development history achieved in a very short time, leading IT industries and popularity of Korean pop culture (*hallyu*) overseas.

In the meantime traditional cultural items also effectively utilized to show modern Korean charm. e.g. Korean dress (*hanbok*) with beautiful color, traditional housing (*hanok*) with oriental elegance, traditional healthy food (*kimchi*) and the unique language system (*hangeul*) etc. (Text C: Chapter 1, 4, 5, 6; Text D: chapter 5, 8; Text F: chapter 1, 2, 7)

In this way, strengthened identity as a *gukmin* (Nation people) and *gukka* (Nation) (whereas *minjok* and *minjok gukka* was most dominant in text A) appearing in texts for foreigners are related in contemporary Korea's need for new identity. Since political concept '*gukmin*' can embrace people of different races and nationalities (i.e., marriage immigrants, international students, migrant workers etc.) in Korea. And refined and elevated national identity is a very important prerequisite to make them all be proud to be members of the '*gukka*'.

⁷⁸ It was the voluntary movement of selling out gold (private property) to the government to support financial crisis in 1997.

⁷⁹ It was a voluntary public gathering by more than 1 million people who wear identical red T-shirts in Seoul city hall square.

b. Culture

First of all, the space and time for the description in culture-related texts is expanded from old times to modern times. In the cultural contents for foreigners, a great amount of modern culture and behavioral culture content is included.⁸⁰

As for modern cultural contents, national events (1988 Seoul Olympic, 2002 world cup), Korean identity (Hangeul, Seoul, ‘hurry hurry’ culture⁸¹, Confucian dynamism, *jae-* (財) tech⁸², education fever, multiculturalism) and Korean life-style (Shopping, Transportation, Well-being trend, Internet culture, Karaoke, Korean Wave - Korean pop music, drama and film, alcohol and socializing parties after work for communication) etc. are newly included in text for foreigners.

One most distinct feature in describing Korean modernity, it is the always emphasized inherited traditional values and its prestige at the same time. For example, ‘Seoul’ is explained as a well-balanced capital city with both traditional cultural assets and modern features: finances, digital technology and knowledge industry (Text C: 58; Text F: 34), ‘Hangeul’ is illustrate as one of the most scientific, creative and easy to learn language system which was inspired by the structure of articulation and designed for commoners in the 15th century by King Sejong (Text C: 33; Text D: 158; Text F: 182). ‘Street cheering for the South Korean soccer team during the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan’ is described as Korean’s fever revealed from racial spirit trained through the traditional family community (Text C: 26; Text F: 60). In some cases, transitional values and morality, especially ‘Korean Confucianism’ was even more highlighted and described as main standard in the course of Korean modernization. There was found repeated explanation like: Korea could overcome economic crisis through familism⁸³ and the spirit of sacrifice equating nation with family, derived from Confucianism. (Text E: 36) And it was found that the reason for major enterprises success and rapid economic development in present day in the ‘hurry hurry’ culture and education fever based on ‘Confucian dynamism. (Text E: 136-148) In other words, modern Korean identity formation in the texts is primarily based on traditional values, Confucianism, and become

⁸⁰ For the categorization of culture, I referred to Kang and Hong’s foundational research on item selection on Korean culture education (2011). Culture can divided to traditional culture/modern culture by period division. And it can be also achievement culture / informational culture / behavioral culture by Hammely (1986)’s cultural type division.

⁸¹ *ppalli ppalli* in Korean.

⁸² ‘財’, this Chinese character means ‘wealth’, ‘tech’ is abbreviation of technique. So it is compound word of ‘wealth + technique’. It means the control and management technique to earn money.

⁸³ Family as the strongest type of union between peoples in Korea, family as a group become the most important than individual family member.

the grounds to glamorize modern components of Korean society.

In case of text E, it mainly dealt with spiritual culture/value culture based on Confucianism. Its contents are distinctly distinguished from other texts in terms of content composition way - cross cultural approach, the in-depth narrative style and some degree of criticism acceptance. Familism, groupism⁸⁴ and authoritarianism⁸⁵ and so on in the modern Korean society are take for granted in the name of legacy of Confucianism. However, it developed the Confucian cultural code from the viewpoint of East Asian culture but not only from the Korean native culture. To explained this, it sited very conservative political scholar, Samuel Huntington(1996: 140)'s remark in his book *The clash of the civilization* that the economic success in Asia is basically because of the values such as order, discipline, familism, diligence, collectivism and moderation which is originated from Confucianism. This citation demonstrates also textbooks own conservatism.

And it also compared the culture between the East and the West. Independent society (West) versus interdependent society (East), western individualism (society) versus Korean groupism (society), authoritarianism culture (East) versus equality-oriented culture (West), feminine society (West) versus masculine society (East). Meanwhile, it also mentioned some negative sides of Confucian values. For instance, as for filial piety and the culture of ancestor worship ceremonies, Korean women take too much unnecessary burdens, such as obligations to always serve the family elders and perform a great deal of housework (Text C: 16). As for groupism, it ignores individuals' ability and personality (Text C: 63). As for authoritarianism, it hinders individual freedom and democracy in the society. Nevertheless, such values are supported to explain uniquely Korean cultural phenomena and features of modern Korea and suggested its harmonization with Western values such as individualism and egalitarianism.

Second, modern popular/mass cultural items are further enriched by mentioning traditional high culture elevation in culture-related texts. High culture is the one that related with upper class and elite group. Text D included most such high culture-dominated contents.⁸⁶: national representative figures such as kings, generals, scientists, scholars, physicians in history (text D, chapter III),

⁸⁴ It is originated from familism. By differentiation between 'we' (inner group) and 'everyone else' (outer group), it strengthens the solidarity of the inner group.

⁸⁵ It is characterized by blind submission to authority derived from differences in age, rank, and gender.

⁸⁶ Text D showed most similar contents composition style with text A / B. For reference, cultural items influenced by Korean Wave such as Korean pop music, drama and film were no found for text for overseas Koreans - text A/B. In some way, it seems that it was unable to contain it in case of text A. Because its early publishing time (early 1990s). However, text B which published in 2005 didn't included it either, but was only traditional cultural items centered edition.

national cultural assets such as temples, palaces, architectures, castle, royal tombs, *goindol* (Korean dolmens), historical record in Joseon dynasty, Buddhist scriptures, ceremony music for royal ancestral temple and so on (Text D, chapter VIII).

Not only for the traditional culture, but also for general promotion of an elevated national image, modern popular culture and its products were effectively borrowed. Mike Featherstone (1991) pointed out that creation/establishment of the self-identity in postmodernity is correlated with the creative uses of popular cultural products or commodities. The newly added Korean pop culture and pop culture products and commodities in the texts are thus the way to see the how Korean cultural self-identity is constructing now. With the textual description of *Kimchi* (food), *Ondol* (traditional floor), well-being trend (healthy life style), busy daily life of university students/office worker, love and marriage trends for the youth, *Soju* and *makkuli* (traditional Korean rice wine) and so on, Korean pop cultural products which can presents those above mentioned all together in most effective way (visual representation) were introduced. In reality, Korean pop culture is consumed a lot overseas. It became the most appealing part for foreigners to learn Korean language and culture. However, the images and the signs used in these TV series, film and pop music often glamorized the real world but made consumers to believe it as 'hyper real' thing. Yet, the romantic and active daily images directed by charming looking celebrities and combined moralizing messages on the screens were effectively used in the text to depict favorable Koreans modern life style but also keep ideal value.⁸⁷

Third, an essentialist view of culture, which is often founded in all kinds of written culture-related texts, was pervasive, especially in text D. To normalize and standardize the Korean culture, MCST adopted 100 *minjok* culture symbols in 2006.⁸⁸In so doing, it became the standard ethnic culture index for the contents of culture-related texts for foreigners which were published after 2006. According to Grillo (2003: 165), the discourse of 'cultural essentialism' is grounded in 'cultural fundamentalism'. And it is the idea that culture in the anthropological sense which is considered as '*biological*' and '*inheritable*', determines individual and collective identities. And in the essentialist perspective, the culture is defined as 'static, fixed, objective, consensual and

⁸⁷ However, Korean Wave contents are based on not only modern culture but also traditional culture. Historical TV series such as *Jumong* (story of progenitor of *Goguryo* dynasty (B.C 37-A.D 668), *Daejangguem* (story of court lady cum female doctor in Joseon dynasty) which were very popular overseas were deployed to support beautiful visual representations of national image. (Text C : 254-262; Text F: 160-167)

⁸⁸ It includes 2 symbols of *minjok*, 19 symbols of territory and nature. 17 symbols of history, 34 symbols of society and life, 9 symbols of religion and thought, 19 symbols of language and art. All symbols are related with traditional culture.

uniformly shared by all member of a group'. In a multicultural context, such essentialist attitudes in the text can be read as 'cultural racism' - not accepting different cultures. By 'absolutizing' traditional ethnic culture of majority member of the society, minorities are forced to learn the mainstream culture to be Korean or act in a Korean way. Grillo (2003) finds the reason of such cultural conservatism in the 'cultural anxiety' generated by globalization and neo-liberalization which threaten ethno-racial identity. This cultural 'anxiety' have also something common with growing right-wing xenophobia in contemporary Korean society.

c. Politics

As the publication of the culture-related texts for foreigners started in full scale from the 2007, most of the texts were published during the Lee's regime. Before Lee, there were 2 liberal⁸⁹ administration (Kim and Roh's regime), when Lee became the president, conservative New Right governing party⁹⁰ accused the previous 10 years by liberal administration as 'lost decades', tried to differentiate them from the before.⁹¹

After New Right group seized the power, it was interesting to see how this political change influenced to culture-related texts for foreigner. Above all things, it is apparently changed to a favorable attitude in description with president Park Jung hee and his military dictatorship.

In the text C, existing designation for Park Jung Hee's '*coup d'etat*' was changed to '*military revolution*' (Text C: 189). In the text D, it also mentioned positive assessment for Park by the foreign media or foreign text book such as '*Park as one of 20 most influential people in 20 century Asia by USA newsweekly Time*', '*Although he had a dictatorial tendency, Park changed the economically weak country to strong industrial country in his longest presidency in Korean history*', also Park as '*strong leader who lead South Korea from the agriculture to an industrial country*'. It also described the reason of previous president Roh's (liberal party) suicide in very short and skeptical way: '*Roh committed suicide because he could not adapt to reality.*' (Text

⁸⁹ In South Korea, Kim and Roh's regime often called as 'leftist'. However, both administrations were promoted basically anti-labour policies, so strictly speaking, they hardly can be characterized as 'leftist'. It is more proper to see them as 'liberal' and Lee' regime as 'conservative'.

⁹⁰ They mostly consist of former students and societal activists who became more conservative with time and renounced their older convictions.

⁹¹ <http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=65192> 'New Right's confident confession, We are pro-Japanese' (accessed by 13.May 2014)

D:126)

Such a conservative swing in politics was also reflected in passive attitudes toward North Korea. It was not a big difference how to see the North Korea compared to text A and B (refer to 4.1.2). Only in the text F, it was included a little bit of contents about North Korea such as the 'North-South family reunion in 2002 and 2007' and the 'North-South joint declaration in 2000'.

While all other texts were publicized by university publishers (Text E) or private publishers (Text C / D), In case of text F, it was publicized by great sponsorship from the one of the leading conglomerates, 'Samsung' cultural foundation.

In this publishing background, text F has its uniqueness as a fancy visual representation of modern and traditional symbols such as *Kimchi*, *Hanbok*, mobile and internet, Confucian royal ancestor worship ceremony. On top of that, it also represent Korean dynamism by depicting a phase of urban daily life of upper middle class people: university students in Seoul who is totally busy with both caring her examination results and building her specialty (group activities, voluntary work) which would be helpful in seeking job later, salary man who work for big company and so have quite good economic standards is but still suffering from high private education fees for his children. And the well-being trend in the cities, such as eating organic food and so on. However, it showing its limitations that the presented upper middle class life style can't be representative for the vast number of Koreans. The social stratum gap between the upper class and lower class in Korea had grown because of neo-liberal economic policies. Most of the normal people are actually situated in the lower stratum by income index. Throughout the refined conservative cultural symbols representation and upper middle class identity generalization, text F directly visualizes the political conservatism trends in Korea.

Flourishing culture-related text publications for foreigner after 2000s is reflecting the rapid social change in South Korea: Globalization acceleration and emergence of multiculturalism. During this social and political change, national identity (that existed originally) had to be reconstructed also. It was my research question in the beginning to find out the changes in the national identity which is revealed in these texts.

Back to the basics, what is the role that culture plays in society? It is socialization of the individual to fit in to the group. The founder of classical structural sociology, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) suggested 'collective identity' which is instilled during the socialization process. And this is made up of 'collective representations': shared norms and values that place special significance upon the group. He added that sentiments created and developed in the group have a greater energy than purely individual sentiments. (Durkheim, 1972)

Since there was many variations among culture-related texts in diverse criteria⁹² such as publishing background, writer/editor's personal educational/political background, targeted readers/learners and so on, it was somewhat complicated to formulate a conclusion, still here I try to summarize three general trends I found during the research for part B as below:

1. Racial identity as an ethnically homogeneous nation became weaker in general. But ethnicized political identity as *hangukin*, member of the South Korean nation, is accentuated; be that as it may, it is difficult to say it has turned to multi-racial perspective completely. In case of text D, ethnic identity became rather strengthened, and reflected New Right(extreme liberalist) political tendencies. All texts mentioned about increased number of foreign population in Korea but text contents were only about ethnic Korean culture. Multiculturalism has not been deeply reflected in the true sense of the term.

2. By taking advantage of the Korean Wave, modern popular cultural items (sports, consumer goods, pop music, soap operas, film etc) are utilized to glamorize/justify traditional high culture and folk culture. And it itself comprised modern Korean cultural identity. In some way, contemporary popular and mass culture was magnified in comparison with the traditional folk culture in text F. However, as for the universal problem appeared all the texts, it ignored individuals self-class identity but generalize the life style of part of the class which are good to introduce to (expected foreign) readers.

3. It showed big differences in terms of its contents selection and narrative style by the texts with different publishing background (text D / E / F). In case of text D (private publisher), it reflected

⁹² However, I judged that it is meaningful only to list the differences between texts by publishing backgrounds in this research.

pro-government attitudes, conservative cultural selection with traditional achievement culture⁹³ as main theme. In case of text E (university publisher), there was found some self-critical attitude in description with traditional spirit culture with the trial to see the Korean culture as East Asian regional culture. In case of text F (conglomerate sponsorship), it represented modern behavioral culture and charming traditional items as main contents, visualized busy upper middle class Korean's daily life and idealized Korean tradition.

Still, all these culture-related texts exhibit a lack of multicultural view, and insufficient consideration for the varied racial, cultural and religious backgrounds of their foreign readership. As for 'collective cultural identity' appeared in these culture-related texts, 'Korean-ness' is being depicted in much more traditional way than its appearance in reality. It is imminent in cultural assimilationist attitudes: urge learners to cultivate Korean traditional values, to socialize them in a (more traditional) Korean way than the normal Korean people's way. The only difference is indirectly appearing ethnic identity. Of course, there was found some traces of different approach toward culture such as text E. Yet, most of the texts are showing Korean culture superiority with the addition of charming Korean Wave contents. In the flow of multiculturalism and globalization, the definition of 'Korean-ness' is becoming more and more conservative.

⁹³ Refer to 4.1.2.b

5. Conclusion

The research question which this study seeks to answer is: ‘What is the recent Korean official overseas Korean/foreigner policy and how does it influence the Korean national identity revealed in the culture-related textbooks for heritage learners and non-heritage learners, respectively’.

Considered in a broad view, recent Korean governments (1992 - ?) have shown a gradually liberalized trend in harmony with the neoliberal globalization tendency in the world. It led to a multi-layered foreign labor policy (low-skilled , specialist / investors) which was solely economic-interest centered, and a compassionate marriage immigrants policy which was also related to economic interests (maintenance of entire labor force) in the long run.

In this way, political leaders in power and elite groups in Korea are setting their national goal as the maximization of national competitiveness. Whether they are ethnic Koreans or non-ethnic Koreans (various foreigner groups), the most important thing is to unify them as one community to increase national power. Therefore, a glorious national memory is selected and reprocessed to fit this need. This ‘manipulated glorious national memory’ is well represented in culture-related texts. This is apparent, on the one hand, in how ethnic Koreans (heritage learners), are being reminded of their strong emotional attachment to their roots (ethno-nationalism) and, on the other hand, in how selected and idealized traditional values and a cool image of dynamic Korea are being instilled into non-ethnic Koreans (non-heritage learners).

Even though the way to instill the ‘well-appropriated memory’ differs somewhat from one group to another, it is gradually becoming meaningless to separate these two groups. As this has already been seen in the culture-related texts for foreigners (they are aimed at both groups as a target reader), the term ‘*minjok*’ is replacing ‘*gukmin*’, which can embrace both ethnic Koreans and non-ethnic Koreans at present. Also the ‘appropriated’ cultural knowledge, which can cover both groups, is becoming standardized. This is because non-ethnic Koreans (marriage immigrants etc) are also considered as objects to be socialized to the Korean way. In the end, both groups are expected to share the same identity with the ‘appropriated traditional culture in the modern way’. The obsession with traditional culture is also interpreted as a conservation tendency (longing for our roots) with the awareness of a cultural threat (cultural anxiety) in the process of globalization. Because essentialized traditional culture can be the core of a distinct inner group and outer group.

All in all, it should have become obvious that there is no distinction between ‘we’ and ‘others’ in the process of modern Korean national identity building as it appears in culture-related textbooks

because there are only ‘we’ and ‘we (potential members)’. Therefore, there is no need to differentiate between the knowledge for Koreans and for foreigners. There is a long way to go to achieve multiculturalism in Korea.

In this way, my private, painful question, how to be a literally ‘good’ Korean-Korean culture educator in the multi-ethnic environment is not yet solved totally. But, at least, I as a pro-multiculturalist can now conclude that it should be my endless concern to find out the best way to mediate the differences between Korean-Korean culture and every single learner’s ethnic, linguistic, religious culture.

Lastly, I conclude this study with the answers to the two hypotheses I suggested at the beginning of this research.

A-1) Yes. In most texts both for heritage learners and non-heritage learners, there can still clearly and strongly be found ‘particularistic (Korean, indigenous, traditional)’ elements. However, in the texts published after 2000s (that is, text B / C / D / E / F), it was representing universalistic value (Western, foreign, modern) value on the surface. At the same time, political nationalism was also encouraged ‘but’ with the term ‘ethnicized’ *gukmin*.

A-2) Yes. With the political shift, from liberal to conservative, conservative reinterpretation have appeared in most culture-related texts. If the conservative political party seize their power longer in the neoliberalism acceleration in South Korea, I expect that such reinterpretation will influence a lot the previous memory (shared national identity). For instance, stronger stance on North Korea.

Research Limitations

Above all, it was impossible to compare the culture-related texts, which have different backgrounds under exactly the same conditions with the publishing time, target of readers, level of difficulty and so on. In the case of text A, there is more than a 10 years time gap separating it from other texts. Thus, it did not contain the same cultural information as the others. I should have found texts for foreigners published in the 90s for the comparison group. However, there were not many text publications for foreigners in the 90s as it was not so popular to learn Korean for foreigners as

it is now. Yet, as text A was still in distribution in 2012, in order to see the identity building trend in a wide perspective, I still considered it as relevant to be included in this research.

Secondly, 'Culture' and 'identity' are very abstract concepts to handle and are thus difficult to limit or categorize. Every text the authors selected showed different contents, even though they were all classified as culture (education) text. There were not many comparable historical culture texts to be found either which were already easily and clearly categorized as 'History'. At the beginning, I wasted a huge amount of time on this problem. In this study, I have tried to reduce it to three categories, namely race / culture / politics. However, there is still some overlapping because of the ambiguity of the concept of culture. And somehow I thought that it is better to have flexibility in a CDA study.

Lastly, I admit that I did not carry out a deep study of the educational backgrounds and political views of the authors during this research. That could have turned out to be a very important factor for the cultural contents and narratives. In a future study, therefore, I suggest to include in-depth interviews with authors.

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