Nordic Cooperation on Expo ’70

By Catharina Backer
Acknowledgements

The idea of studying Nordic cooperation on World Expositions first came from Nikolas Glover when I was writing my Bachelor’s degree at Stockholm University. He had a hunch that there was something worth looking into in the archives from Office for Information and the Collegium for Sweden Information Abroad at the Swedish National Archives – and it was. First I wrote my Bachelor’s thesis on Nordic cooperation on Expo ’70, then Glover wrote a chapter in a book, also including Expo ’67. In this research both Golver and I only used Swedish sources. This thesis also includes Norwegian material. The possibility of studying a question from different countries’ perspective has been very interesting and a great opportunity for me (and of course a lot of hard work). I am very thankful to Nikolas Glover for giving me the original idea and for excellent help and interesting discussions over the last years.

The best help I could ever have got from a supervisor I have got from Helge Pharo. You have been incredible. Thank you.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>ANMFA</td>
<td>The Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry</td>
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<td>BIE</td>
<td>The Bureau International des Exposition</td>
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<td>CG</td>
<td>Commissioner General</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>The European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>The European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>FNI</td>
<td>The Federation of Norwegian Industries</td>
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<td>JAL</td>
<td>Japanese Air Lines</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>The Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>The Nordic Council</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Norwegian Shipowner’s Association</td>
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<td>OCIA</td>
<td>Office for Cultural Interaction Abroad</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Scandinavian Airlines System</td>
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<td>Scandinavian Pavilion Committee</td>
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<td>USIA</td>
<td>The United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>VG</td>
<td><em>Verdens Gang</em></td>
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1. Introduction
Foreign policy is a wide concept, and politicians and bureaucrats concerned in this field have a large variety in questions to deal with. One of the more peripheral of them is whether or not a state should attend World Expositions. Even though it is a minor part of a large field, it is of interest to study the process of bureaucrats and representatives of private sectors making foreign policy decisions on behalf of a state. This Master’s thesis is concerned with this theme using an example of how the Nordic countries worked together to present the Scandinavian Pavilion at the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970.

1.1 Theme of the Thesis and Research Questions
The general theme of this MA Thesis is how a minor foreign policy issue was handled in the 1960’s. The specific example is how and why the Nordic countries cooperated on decisions leading to a joint pavilion at Expo ’70 in Osaka. To show this, I have chosen four main topics that are relevant in this respect. The first one is what World Expositions are, who participates at these, and for what reasons. The fears of reprisals are also dealt with, and the question of how real they were. The second topic is how decisions are made in foreign policy bureaucracies. The patterns may not be entirely representative, but are sufficiently so as political interests and bureaucratic patterns emerge. The third topic is questions concerns Swedish, Norwegian and Danish cooperation and conflicts, a Norwegian distrust of the Swedes, and the answer by the Swedes being somewhat amused by the Norwegian antipathies. The fourth topic regards how the decision makers handle culture differences, and how this affect foreign policy decisions.

Linking World Expositions to foreign policy is not very common whether foreign policy or expositions are the points of departure. Thus, I have found it useful to present what these expositions are in general, the purpose of them, and reasons for attending them in the introductory chapter, in addition to presenting Expo ’70 more explicitly. Since the research chapter is based on topic and not chronology, I have chosen to present the chronology of the Nordic process, first leading up to the decision and then to the exhibition itself, in the Introduction. Here, also theory of the bureaucracies in Norway and Japan is presented, and I have explained my method in
depth. The context of the Cold War, Nordic cooperation in general, and the nature of Scandinavian relations to Japan are found in the Context chapter.

1.2 What are World Expositions?

The first World Exposition was held in London in 1851, and until the 1920’s there were held many international expositions. The participating countries, regions, organizations and private companies had to invest great resources to attend these exhibitions. The frequency of them made it almost impossible for states to be able to attend every exhibition they were expected to participate at. To reduce the costs, the participating states gathered in Paris in 1928 to negotiate and the result was the Paris Convention that has regulated international exhibitions since. This agreement resulted in the establishment of an organization – the Bureau International des Exposition (BIE). The task for this organization is to ensure that all the member states comply with the agreement, and deciding in which category international exhibitions are.

All member states are obliged not to participate in or support international expositions that are not in accordance with the Paris Convention and therefore not sanctioned by the BIE. The most important terms are that an organizer of a World Exposition cannot take any fees for renting out pavilion areas, duration cannot be longer than six months, and two such exhibitions cannot be followed without a given time in between.¹

The Convention divides international exhibitions into two categories. The exhibitions in the first category (World Expositions) are supposed to illustrate the development of humanity in all areas. The nations participating have to build their own pavilions, but they do not have to pay rent for the area the pavilion is situated. World Expositions are not commercial, and the pavilion cannot look like a trade fair. In the second category (International Expositions), nations cannot participate; instead private companies and international organizations are the main exhibitors. They do not have to build their own pavilions, but instead they have to pay rent to the organizers. International Exhibitions can be directed towards increased sales and exports. World Expositions are given a theme, which often can include almost anything as long as it deals with the development for the humanity. Every nation chooses its own theme for their pavilion, but it must be related to the overall Expo-

¹ Archive of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ANMFA), 47.2/53, 28.03.67, Kjell Öberg, 'Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970', 06.03.67 Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff
theme. At some exhibitions, it has been accepted that several countries go together in one pavilion. Pavilion exhibitions have to be exhibitions of ideas. If the commercial aspect was too obvious, the exhibition was heavily criticized, as happened to Japan in Expo 67. They had to change their exhibition after opening. This had the consequence that BIE warned Japan, at several occasions, that Expo 70 could not have the character of a trade fair. Japan had thus been very restrictive even towards Japanese private firms who wanted to participate with pavilions. Even they were not allowed to be commercial, and instead had to present ideas as well.

Even though World Expositions cannot be commercial, Kjell Öberg at the ‘Collegium for Sweden information abroad’ (and hereafter referred to as the Information Collegium) did not conclude that World Expos lacked commercial significance. What impact such expositions may have for export industries depend on how the participants manage to exploit the attention and goodwill the Expo presents. He therefore concluded that World Expos might be good for exporters in an indirect way.

Up until 1966, the time gap between two World Expos had to be two years. From 1966 onwards it was changed till six years. This is why Japan, when the country applied in 1965, was allowed to arrange Expo ’70 in 1970, only three years after the one in Montreal. The reason why the time interval was changed was that a majority of the member states had found the costs of participating at World Expos exceeded the gains. They were skeptical about the value of such exhibitions overall when the aim was to present humanity’s development, because the technical development was too rapid to present at World Expositions.

When states celebrate anniversaries or other major historical happenings, it is customary for other states to participate in the celebrations. This is especially important when there are close political or economical ties between them. Often, World Expositions are linked to such anniversaries in the host country. This was the case when Canada was given the right to organize a World Exposition in 1967, but before this, the Soviet Union was the planned organizer in 1967. It was their fiftieth years anniversary for the Russian Revolution. When they turned down the offer, Canada got the opportunity. In 1967, Canada celebrated hundred years of sovereignty

2 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 28.03.67, Kjell Öberg, 'P M regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970', 06.03.67 Attached to letter from Norwegian Ambassadador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff
3 MFAA, 47.2/53, 28.03.67, Kjell Öberg, 'Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970’, 06.03.67 Attached to letter from Norwegian Ambassadador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff
within the British Empire. The World Exposition in Osaka in 1970 was also linked to an anniversary. In 1970, Japan celebrated approximately hundred years since the Meiji Restoration – which meant the start of Japan opening up to the rest of the world.

A World Exposition implies quite considerable costs for participating countries, but even more so for the host country. For the hosts, there is a lot of prestige at stake. A large part of the prestige is connected to the number of participating countries. When a state chooses to organize a World Exhibition as a part of their anniversary, participation can be one way of showing respect and willingness to celebrate the host country. If a country chooses not to participate, it may be considered less than friendly or bad mannered at best, which in turn can lead to less goodwill and more difficult conditions for trade. When Sweden chose not to attend the World Exposition in Brussels in 1958 due to the large costs it would have resulted in, critique was raised afterwards, both from abroad and from the exporters in Sweden. Afterwards, Sweden clearly felt the pressure of attending the next World Expositions held in the 1960’s. To avoid loosing goodwill also in Canada, Sweden took the initiative to participate at Expo ’67 together with the other Nordic countries. When they cooperated, the costs could be held down and it made it bearable to attend the exposition. The five Nordic countries thus had a joint pavilion at Expo ’67 with separate exhibitions for each country.

1.3 The World Exhibition in Osaka in 1970
Japan joined the BIE in 1965, and almost the first thing they did was to apply for a World Exposition to be held in Osaka in 1970. Because of great economic development and an “almost perfectly conducted Olympic Games” in 1964, they now wanted to continue to show Japan to the world by hosting a World Exposition in Osaka in 1970. 1970 would roughly coincide with the Centenary of the Meiji Restoration, which was a starting point for Japan’s modernization. According to the Norwegian Ambassador, Japan expected a large deficit on the exposition budget, which made him conclude that the Japanese people wanted to invest heavily in its own future. The Japanese Ambassador to Norway later also pointed out that Japan “has a firm determination to spare no effort to ensure that this Exhibition will succeed

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4 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Kjell Öberg, 06.03.67, 'Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Attached to 28.03.67, letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff
5 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.03.65, Letter from Ambassador Thommessen to the NMFA
6 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.03.65, Letter from Ambassador Thommessen to the NMFA
in all respects”. The BIE accepted Japan’s application in May 1965, and working committees were already in place by the end of the year. The Soviet Union and the United States had by that time indicated they would participate.

The World Expo in Osaka was the first Expo held outside Europe and North America. The overall theme was entirely at the core of BIE’s directions: “Progress and Harmony for Mankind”. Osaka was Japan’s largest industrial hub, with a population of 3.2 millions in the city, 12 millions when adjoining areas were included. The organizers calculated in 1966 with a total of 30 million visitors at the Expo, which was a low estimate compared to the actual number. It became the most visited World Expo since the beginning in 1851, with a total number of 63 million visitors. It stood as the record until 2010, when the World Expo in Shanghai broke the record. Also economically, Expo ’70 was a success – quite unusual in this context. By hosting a World Exposition, Japan wished to show the World its “industrial confidence and technical sophistication offering more practical applications of technology already introduced to the public at earlier fairs”. The exhibition was still criticized for lacking major innovations, and for having a grey and boring architecture.

1.4 Previous Research
There are many books about World Expositions, starting with the first one in 1851 and until the last one in Shanghai in 2010. These are informative when studying the items on display, how big they were (countries attending, area and visitors), and how the pavilions and the items exhibited were presented. Several of the books written are concerned with architecture and design, which is hardly surprising. Every pavilion had a unique architecture made by the best architects in the pavilion’s country. Also the best designers a country could produce made the interior design and exhibition inside the pavilion. One good example of this kind of literature is World’s Fairs, which goes through all the major international exhibitions between London in 1851 and Hannover in 2000. The focus of the book is how the exhibitions as a whole, and some of the pavilions, were presented with regard to architecture and design. The

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7 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.12.66, Letter from the Ambassador of Japan, Oslo, to the Norwegian Minister og Foreign Affairs, John Lyng
8 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.03.65, Letter from Ambassador Thommessen to the NMFA
11 Mattie: World’s Fairs.
decision making process is not in focus. Still, historical evidence may illustrate some political reasons of for example why a country would want to host a World Exposition. The focus is not on how and why the pavilions ended up as they were, and there is little evidence of the connection between World Exhibitions and foreign policy.

Research on international exhibitions in countries exists. In a Nordic context, this is mostly the Stockholm Fairs in 1897 and in 1930. To some extent, the research concerns not only the design, but also the historical context of the fairs. Still, they were far from World Exhibitions in the definition of BIE. Instead, they are national or Scandinavian exhibitions. In the Swedish examples, there is no evidence of Nordic cooperation.

A Norwegian Master’s Thesis from The University of Oslo concerns the Norwegian exposition in Christiania in 1914. The interaction between the Scandinavian countries is one of the main subjects of the thesis. It is of course interesting that the Scandinavian countries had debated participation at fairs earlier on, but the national exhibition in the Frogner Park in 1914 is something totally different from what a world exposition was in 1970. First of all, it was not states that wanted to present their best achievements to the people of the world, but Norwegian private companies that wanted to sell more products to the Norwegian consumer. In the end, Sweden and Denmark sent some delegates to visit, so there was some kind of international public present. It was still more like a trade fair.

Nikolas Glover has in his PhD thesis, National Relations, Public diplomacy, national identity and the Swedish Institute 1945-1970, dealt with the topic of public diplomacy and soft power with Sweden as an example. This is a very relevant study showing the value of soft power as a means in Swedish foreign policy in the years from 1945 to 1970. Glover also shows the importance the Swedish Institute had for Sweden’s soft power abroad. Among other topics, Glover is concerned with how

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actors and interests show Sweden to the World, in different ways at different times. Thus it is an interesting study, though not directly concerned with World Expositions. Also, Glover has a strictly Swedish focus.

In my Bachelor’s Thesis at Stockholm University, I studied the Scandinavian participation at Expo ’70, using far less archive material than in this thesis, and with a different theoretical framework. After giving me the idea and supervising me, Glover went further and wrote a chapter in Communicating the North, dealing with Scandinavian participation at Expo ’67 and ’70. His focus is not as much of the decision-making process, but more on the ways in which countries present themselves to the world – it has more of a soft power and public diplomacy angle. These studies are merely from a Swedish point of view. Even though some research already has been done, there is still plenty of material and interesting research questions to explore. This is especially true with regard to detailed research on the decision making processes and the role of the bureaucracy. Still, especially Nicholas Cull has done research on the role of World Expositions in a Cold War context. Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan have written about the cultural Cold War.

1.5 State and Politics in Japan

It is not easy to understand the Japanese state and how power sharing is constituted. The Dutch journalist, writer and professor in Comparative Politics Karel van Wolferen argues that there is a fiction that Japan is a sovereign state with central organs of government that could recognize what was good for the country and bear ultimate responsibility for national decision-making. For other countries it was difficult to interact with Japan if they concluded there was no state, so they assumed that there was one. Even if van Wolferen possibly constructs a picture that is a little bit of a caricature, he serves to pinpoint problems that are of relevance for my thesis.

Statecraft up to 1990 was very different in Japan than in Europe. Certain ministry officials and some political cliques and clusters of bureaucrats-businessmen

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were running the country. Subordinate to these, there were many others who were not a part of the core, but still a vital part of the system. Among them were agricultural cooperatives, the police, the press and gangsters. These were the components of the ‘System’. Van Wolferen labels the political powerprocess ‘the System’ because it denotes little more than the existence a set of relationships, with reasonably predictable effects, between those engaged in socio-political pursuits. The term ‘system’ is also frequently used to suggest an arrangement of inescapable forces against which the individual is helpless without resort to violence. It hints at something beyond the range of the potentially corrective powers of democratic politics; it is something that cannot be reasoned with – although it may occasionally be duped. As it happens, the Japanese are rarely allowed to forget the existence of socio-political arrangements that are infinitely stronger than any kind of might the individual could ever bring to bear on them and have, at best, only a dim notion of changing them. The term ‘system’ is very useful when speaking of political Japan.

The System is distinguished from the state, because no one is ultimately in charge, and even though there is a hierarchy, no one is at the top of it. Van Wolferen suggests that these semi-autonomous components, that have flexible powers that weaken the authority of the state, do not have any central body to lead them. There were no supreme institutions with ultimate policymaking jurisdiction. Japan had all the state institutions and the political positions as Western liberal democracies, but the power was not in the hands of the official leaders. The Prime Minister or other power-holders were, according to van Wolferen, limited in the way that he would be unable to deliver on promise if the System would want it differently. As a Minister in the Government, the main task was to defend their ministry against potentially antagonistic interest groups in the System.

On paper, Japan had a liberal democratic system with free elections and several potentially parties to vote for. In reality, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the only government option. According to van Wolferen, LDP got their required 48 per cent of the votes, and thus maintained themselves in power, by

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18 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 5
19 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 43-44
20 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 5
21 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 6
22 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 126
gerrymandering, by using money to assure votes, and using propaganda to make people believe that LDP was the only option for rural areas if they wanted to have infrastructural improvements. Because the opposition parties are happy not to be in power, LDP could go on and continue in office – something they have done since 1955 with only short-term exceptions.

Several observers have argued that it is the bureaucracy that holds the power over the Japanese state. According to van Wolferen, “in the everyday business of governing Japan, groups of officials, especially those of the ministry of finance, international trade and industry, construction, and post and telecommunication, wield a great deal of power, definitely more than they are theoretically authorized to exercise. They restrain, control and provide spur for the economy. They make nearly all laws – which if not everything, is quite something in terms of measurable power. These laws are almost always rubber-stamped by the Diet, and the bureaucrats typically proceed to use them as means to achieve their own cherished aims. Their informal powers, moreover, give them even greater control over the realms of social activity for which they are formally responsible. This informal power, because it is not exposed to debate about merits, is very open-ended.” This description leads van Wolferen to label Japan as an “authoritarian bureaucratic state”.

But, it is not perfect as a description of Japan either. Van Wolferen also discuss the power of the zaikai – the broad circle of top business functionaries, especially those who speak through the business federations. Still, he thinks it is the easy way for foreigners to claim that it is this group that holds the power. It is just because it is what the foreigners see when meeting the Japanese in business settings.

Since no one was holding power in a central state, van Wolferen asks if the Japanese people actually needed a state? From 1945 and well into the 1970s, the Japanese had little need to worry about whether they were a state or not. They were rarely called upon to act as a political entity. Instead, they heavily relied upon the USA for military protection, and thus did not have to worry about national security.

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23 Gerrymandering is practice that attempts to establish a political advantage for a particular party or group by manipulating district boundaries to create partisan advantaged districts.
25 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 33
26 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 33
27 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 34
28 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 35
29 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 40
Thus, Japan became totally dependent on the USA, not only for security, but also for diplomacy.³⁰

When they had no need for a strong central state, Japan solved their political issues in a way that must have been very strange to Europeans. If they had not pretended to have a well-functioning state, in the way as they had the institutions and ministers of a Western democracy, it would probably have been easier to understand that things were not as the Europeans were used to. It is understandable that it became difficult for the Scandinavians to grasp how to handle negotiations with the Japanese, because no one knew who actually was in charge of, or held the power to decide, anything.

1.6 Method

The archives I have used for searching for relevant documents are the Archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (ANMFA), the National Archives of Norway (NNA), and the Swedish National Archives (SNA).³¹ The result was approximately two thousand pages of documents regarding the World Exposition in Osaka, of different character, in addition to all the documents I have read regarding the Expositions in Brussels 1958, New York 1965, Montreal 1967 and Philadelphia (planned for 1976). After reading everything, Expo ’70 was the one that stood out as the exposition with the most fascinating stories that could give answers to questions of general interest. Still, some lines will be drawn to earlier exhibitions.

All the different archives have to some extent overlapping content of documents. Some of the reports have been possible to avoid reading in depth several times, but copies of letters, telexes and other documents of that kind has been important to read in the context it has been placed in by the bureaucrats in the different archives. I have mostly referred to the ANMFA, but often the same documents have been found in different archives at the SNA and in the NNA. To reduce the length of the footnotes, I have chosen to refer to one of the archives only.

Often, handwritten comments to the content of the letter have been added, and the comments have given valuable information. Thus, it has been worthwhile reading

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³⁰ van Wolferen, *The Enigma*, p 41
³¹ At the SNA I have read archives from The Scandinavian Avilion Committee, The Swedish Information Office/Upplysningsberedningen, The College for Information on Sweden Abroad, and Svenska Institutet. At the NNA I have gone through the Ministry of Trade's archive on World Expositions from 1930s to 1976. At the ANMFA I have gone through "Borlegningsperioden 1960-1969", Volume 1-8.
the same documents several times. Most of the documents are written by machine, and I have had close to no problems with handwriting. Sometimes I have at first had problems understanding who the author of comments was, but it has always been possible to sort out after some research.

The material contains letters, telexes and telegrams to and from Scandinavian ambassadors, different bureaucrats, politicians and private organizations and companies involved in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark, and officials and private sector representatives from Japan. A large part is memorandums and minutes of meetings from different Scandinavian committees both in Japan and in Scandinavia, some are protocols from parliamentary debates, and some are newspaper articles. There were also a number of drafts of speeches telling how the Scandinavians wanted to present themselves at official dinners in Japan and when Japanese officials visited Scandinavia. A lot of correspondence between the Norwegian Royal Castle and the Foreign Ministry was saved in the archives, due to the planned visit of the Crown Prince Harald's visit to Expo '70. So also in SNA regarding the Crown Prince’s visit for the Sweden Day. Negotiations between the Scandinavian Expo ’70 Committee and constructors, hotels in Japan, and others providing different practical solutions are also saved in the archives.

It has not been possible to include all of the material I have found in this thesis. I have thus seen it necessary to choose the stories that I have found the most interesting, and exclude a number of potentially interesting parts of history. I have thus chosen to focus on the documents regarding how the bureaucrats and the other actors made decisions and negotiated with each other in the process of deciding whether or not to participate, and which theme the pavilion would have. I have also focused on inconsistencies among the involved actors – for instance what they said internally and what they said to the press.

There are some challenges when using this kind of material. Often, letters are sent from one person to another, without copying them to the sender’s archive. This makes it difficult to know if every letter written is saved. The Foreign Ministries and the Ministries of Trade have been, as it seems, good at saving copies of their own letters, and thus the same documents are filed at both the sender’s and the receiver’s archives. Thus, I have read the same letters several times at different archives. Still, this has not been a waste of time, because other letters and documents that follow the ones I already have read often puts the “old” letter into a new context. When this
happened, it was easy to think that the information was complete after understanding the new context. I still have no guarantee that there were no phone calls in between without any written reference or documents that have got lost, with information that could change the context and thus also this thesis.

When reading the documents, stories come forth, and it is easy to think that all the information needed would be found in the archives. This is not necessarily true, but to diminish the risk, I have used several archives, but it would be surprising if there were not any more relevant documents somewhere. The archives in especially Denmark, but also in Finland and Iceland, are of course places where more information could be found. Also Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) may have relevant material. I have not had enough time and capacity to go through these archives, but I am certain that most of the relevant documentation for the themes I have chosen to include in this thesis was filed in the archives that I have consulted. Other stories making Denmark or Finland the lead may be possibly found in Danish and Finnish archives, but that is most doubtful. I have also read documents that give indication of possible further discussions in the archives from Norway and Sweden. Still, when little more evidence of this has been revealed, I have chosen to focus on the stories that are better documented. On basis of this, I have made the selection of the themes.

Due to the space limitations, I have not been able to include in depth description of all the interesting parts of the process, even when documentation is satisfactory. It has been necessary to focus on certain questions, and thus I have chosen to find the themes that are both well documented and of general interest. I have done this with as little speculation as possible, even though it has not been possible to avoid completely. Where archives do not on their own suffice to explain what we see, I have taken the liberty to draw conclusions that cannot be directly verified, as long as they do not conflict with the available evidence.

The reality and time the actors lived in also gives a challenge to the reader of such documents. Not all information was necessary to document. When reading letters with negative or positive attitudes towards for instance participation at Expo ’70, without any argumentation for or against, it may appear peculiar to the reader and difficult to understand why the sender was positive or negative. Sometimes, I have found the reasons in the historical context. Thus, understanding the 1960’s, both in Japan and in Scandinavia, has been important to be able to draw conclusions. The
understanding of statements has at several times increased remarkably when reading books on bureaucracy, relations between Scandinavia and Japan, and on Nordic cooperation in general. Still, I have not read every book on the topic and more secure conclusions could probably have been draw by knowing even more of the context.

There is no guaranty that all the information is present. It is impossible to be sure that every conclusion drawn in this thesis is correct because the actors had information in front of the process, which for them was obvious, but not necessary is obvious today. I have thus tried to make it clear when I know that the information is incomplete, and when it is speculations, though there are never any wild guesses. All speculations are based on the documents that give clear indications in one way or another. Silence, for instance, can give indications of realizing defeat, but it is also possible that some documents proving otherwise are missing.

Many of the letters and notifications are written directly after decisions were made in meetings or as conversations by telephone were finished. When this is the case, it is less of a challenge knowing who had said what. Still, different actors had different motives, and some minutes of the same meeting written by two people are slightly different. This indicates that even though the time elapsed between the meeting and the production of a report is short, the reader cannot be completely sure that all the involved parties agreed on the content. Often, these meetings were documented by more than one, and the pattern in difference between individual actors sometimes becomes an interesting feature on its own.

But some of the most valuable documents for this thesis are memorandums and reports of the processes, often summarizing months of work. These reports are not written directly after important events, and the question of bad memory is of course present. In most cases, it is easy to recognize traces of previous reports, minutes of meetings and memorandums. Thus, the reports written afterwards are often based on material produced closer to the events. Even so, the time elapsed between productions of documents and the meeting or conversation the document is referring to, can be a problem. It is often clear that the actors did not remember very well what actually was said or done, even though documents are written just months afterwards. Of course, this can lead to misinterpretations. Still, by reading several documents on the same topic, most of the misunderstandings can be avoided, and often the faulty memory of the actors can be interesting on its own. Sometimes it is obvious that
they could not have forgotten certain incidents, but still left it out of reports. Why this is done is not always easy to tell, but this is potentially also interesting to discuss.

Another challenge is how big the culture gap actually was. The Japanese had their phrases and ways of speaking, in addition to a different perception of what would be appropriate behavior in meetings and negotiations. Did the Scandinavians fully understand the Japanese platitudes? Would they, for instance, believe the Japanese negotiators when they were saying that “the Japanese people would be disappointed” if the Scandinavians did not attend the exposition? The Japanese people probably did have few ideas of Scandinavia, and the only reason why they could be disappointed would be that five countries would not join. Due to the prestige in having many countries participating at World Expositions, it would be noticed if there were 65 instead of 70 countries present at Expo ’70. But if the people would be directly disappointed with the Scandinavians is difficult to understand. Did they understand the argumentation literally, or did they have an understanding of the different cultural ways? I choose to credit the Ambassadors and trust that they were not naïve. They could not have taken the feelings of the people as valid arguments. When they reported the arguments home, it is probably just the Japanese talking, and words repeated by the Scandinavians. Of course, the Japanese Expo Committee, politicians and bureaucrats working with this could feel disappointed if the Expo ’70 did not break any records or if the exhibition would not be a great success. It is thus a challenge to know how the Japanese arguments were received in Scandinavia. These differences would also potentially make them more insecure in which way they would answer, and also more insecure with regard to what actually would happen if they did not attend the exposition. Would the Japanese people perhaps stop buying anything from Scandinavia? Would this make any difference in exports to Japan? How much knowledge did the Scandinavian bureaucrats actually have of Japan? By contextualizing, some of this is possible to answer in a general way, but how much influence the arguments using the Japanese people’s feelings actually had is difficult to say. Did the Ambassadors reporting the platitudes home understand the content of these better than the receivers in Scandinavia? How much more understanding of Japanese culture and practices did they have? When they argued hard for Scandinavian participation, were they more Ambassadors for Japan in Scandinavia than for Scandinavia in Japan? It is challenging to read out the intent and hidden agenda of argumentation.
1.7 Chronological Overview

In August 1966, all the Nordic countries received invitations to participate at the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970. Because of the forthcoming World Expo in Montreal opening in March 1967, none of the Nordic countries were especially interested in participation. The costs were high and the gain too small. Thus, little effort was used on Expo 70 before the spring of 1967. When research was made on what involved parties thought of Nordic participation at Expo ’70 during the spring of 1967, most of the exporters were negative to participation. Still, the Norwegian Shipowner’s association, the Ambassadors in Tokyo, some Swedish exporters and especially SAS reacted strongly against the negative attitude among the bureaucratic and political decision makers in Scandinavia. SAS was eager to be present, but wanted to avoid the area for cooperation and instead situate their restaurant at the site for national pavilions. They thus needed a country to cooperate with. The Swedish Government had notified SAS in early July 1967, that there would be no Nordic cooperation at Expo ’70.\(^{32}\) SAS certainly had an interest in showing Scandinavian flags at the Expo, and a suggestion to continue the fruitful cooperation from Montreal came natural.\(^{33}\) Earlier restaurants managed by SAS Catering at Swedish and Scandinavian pavilions had been successful, both financially and because of the reputation the pavilions got. The restaurants had received good reviews and contributed to making the pavilions more frequently visited than Scandinavian countries could hope for with the limited resources they had. Both SAS and the participating states had gained goodwill due to the good food served at the pavilion.\(^{34}\)

Because Sweden had shown most interest in participation, SAS chose to negotiate with the SMFA. Thus, in July 1967, The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA) met with other Swedish interested parties and SAS to negotiate on a possible cooperation to build a restaurant at the nation area at Expo ’70. The Swedish intention, which they discussed with the chairman of the Japan Association for the 1970 World Exhibition, Yoshimura Kanno, was that the exhibition part of the pavilion would be small and that the main part would be a restaurant run by SAS.

\(^{32}\) ANMFA 47.2/53, Erik Paalsgaard, 22.11.67 and Telex from SMFA to NMFA, 07.07.67
\(^{33}\) ANMFA 47.2/53, Erik Paalsgaard, 22.11.67
\(^{34}\) ANMFA 47.2/53, Erik Paalsgaard, 22.11.67
Catering. This was a solution that would make participation affordable for Sweden, and it was acceptable, and even welcomed, by the Japanese Expo organizers.\textsuperscript{35}

In the fall of 1967, SAS demanded that the other two Scandinavian countries would join the cooperation, or else they would not contribute. Finland and Iceland were also welcome to join. This had been the Swedish intention all along. In January 1968, a meeting was held in Copenhagen and a possible Nordic participation was discussed. Several representatives from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden attended the meeting. Representatives from all the Nordic countries had been positive to participation, with the condition that the cost was kept as low as possible. They also agreed that it was of interest to have a restaurant, and that SAS Catering should run this.

The company with most experience from construction in Asia was a Swedish constructor of industrial buildings, Svenska Industribyggen AB (SIAB), and their expert engineer Edlind was concerned that the costs would escalate if they waited long to start constructing the pavilion. They also agreed on hiring the Danish architect Bengt Severin to draw the pavilion. In total, the costs would be approximately 10 million NOK.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus, after some negotiation, all the five Nordic countries cooperated on presenting one joint pavilion with one exhibition at the pavilion, representing the Nordic region as one unit, sharing the pavilion with the SAS Catering restaurant. Without any disputes or negotiations, they chose to continue using the name they had used in Montreal – the Scandinavian Pavilion – even though this was not accurate, but easy for the public in the far East to understand.

The next issue to decide was how they wanted to present Scandinavia. During the spring of 1968, this was heavily debated and misunderstandings of the process occurred. On February 21, a meeting was held in Stockholm, where Öberg presented a draft of a pavilion theme: environmental protection. The meeting agreed on presenting other possible options in mid-March, so that they could decide the theme on the Copenhagen meeting on March 20. At the meeting, no other real proposition was presented, just loose ideas, but nothing like the Swedish one. Öberg had written memos on the theme and got an expert (Hans Palmstierna) to write a memo on environmental challenges that the Nordic region faces at the time. Even though the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{ANMFA 47.2/53, 14.07.67, Letter from Ambassador Almqvist in Japan to the SMFA.}
\footnote{ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Knut Thommessen}
\end{footnotes}
Danes and Norwegians were not perfectly happy with the suggested theme, they managed to change the title from being negatively focused, into being *Environmental Protection During Increased Industrialization*, and were thus able to agree. The theme was decided at the March 20 meeting. Also, they agreed on a timeframe for finding the best design for the exhibition. In April a memo containing background information on the theme would circulate. This information was meant to help the selected architects and designers from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to come up with suggestions of how the interior of the pavilion and the exhibition might be. At the March 20 meeting, Finland announced that they would join the Scandinavian pavilion, even though previously had informed the Japanese authorities of their no show.

The Danish architect, Bent Severin, who was responsible for the exterior design of the pavilion, came to the meeting and showed his draft of the pavilion. From Swedish industry had suggested that the roof of the building should be 1 meter higher than it was planned to be. Mowinckel-Larsen did not want this, due to the extra costs. Norway was not able to pay more than agreed on at the Stockholm meeting in February. Even though he states this clearly here, the pavilion roof was raised by 1 meter. It does not seem that he exercised much influence over the situation at these meetings.

At the next meeting in Stockholm on May 15, all the architects, designers and the members of the Scandinavian Committee would meet and be briefed on the subject. The contest entries had to be submitted before July 1, ant the competition closed on September 1. At the May 15 meeting, the Norwegians reacted to the theme, and still considered it not to be agreed on. They said the Norwegians were not happy with it, and that they came to the meeting to discuss it further. They clearly felt that the Swedes had overrun them in the process. How this is possible, after what they had written themselves in memos and minutes of meetings is somewhat hard to understand. This will be discussed in depth later. Still, by July 1968 they had solved the problems, and the Swedish proposal of environmental protection under industrialization, while at the same time displaying Nordic topography and culture. The next question up for debate was how to find the architect for the exhibition. The architect of the exterior had been appointed by SAS even before the negotiation started with the Scandinavian countries, so the construction could start at a very
early stage. This was a good way to save money, but no one was very happy about the design. Still, the interior had to be as remarkable as possible.

To decide who would get this honorable mission of all the skilled and clever Nordic designers and architects, the Danish Honorary Commissioner General, Kristen Bo, and the General Secretary of the Norwegian Trade Fairs, Edward Mowinckel-Larsen, suggested that a competition possibly would be difficult, and that they rather should agree on one highly distinguished one. The leader of the Information Collegium and the Swedish Honorary Commissioner General, Kjell Öberg, said that he already had announced the competition in Sweden and that they therefore did not like the idea of changing this. Still, if they could agree on one architect, he was open for this solution as well, though he thought it would be hard. Öberg had his way once more, because it was the most logical suggestion. They thus agreed to appoint two architects from each country (Finland could appoint one) and have a competition among the chosen ones. An information meeting would be held in Stockholm regarding the theme and other questions they might have. A program for the competition would circulate in late March or early April, and the meeting would be held at the end of April. The short time frame was important due to the desire to reduce costs. If they started the construction process early, they would not suffer from inflation.

Thus, in May they asked SIAB to send all the needed documents to Japan, in order for everything to be set for construction start in July 1968. Still, the Scandinavians feared the Japanese bureaucracy and the import regulations, which could delay the process. At the Kyoto conference, the Scandinavians were reassured that the building process would go on as planned, as the Japanese were very cooperative. The Japanese representatives promised to do what they could to stretch and bend the regulations, even though Ambassador Thommessen was sure that conflicts would occur, and that the Embassies would have to intervene and that the Japanese Government had to make great exceptions. The Japanese gave the impression of being aware of possible problems, and promised to be flexible.

The problem here was the official appointment of the Commissioner General. All the five Governments had to do this in order for the CG, Svan A. Hansson, to sign the official contract. After he signed it, the construction could start. The Ground Breaking ceremony thus took place in late July, as the second first of all the 70 pavilions.
All the competitors in the architectural competition had received additional information on the theme, after deciding this at the CG meeting in Oslo on July 1. In September, the design competition was closing. A Danish proposal named “± and –“ won. It was pictures projected from the ceiling that could be caught by a white cardboard when walking through the exhibition hall. The pictures showed challenges to the environment in industrialized countries, and solutions on how to solve these issues. They also had pictures and information on the walls, in addition to an information desk. The Scandinavian Pavilion was one of the first nation pavilions to be finished, and due to this, they managed to keep the costs down and to get a lot of publicity and goodwill in Japan. The pavilion theme was heavily criticized in Scandinavia, especially in Norway where they could not see the gain for the exporters in connecting them to environmental protection. In Sweden, they were more certain that it would become something positive, and they were right. Japanese press and politicians loved the Scandinavian Pavilion, because it raised a question of interest for the world and humanity, which was, and is, the overall aim for World Expositions in general.

2 Context

2.1 Soft Power and The Cold War
Foreign policy is policy directed towards state interests in relation to international surroundings.\textsuperscript{39} The term includes the goals governmental representatives try to achieve outside the boundary of their own state, the values that constitute the basis for the goals and the means or instruments that are used to achieve the goals, and the decision making processes where foreign policy is created.\textsuperscript{40} Foreign policy is thus actions state institutions perform in relation to other states, to strengthen their national interest. It is states that publicly decide and present their foreign policies, and the focus is on how a state relates to other states. This, however, does not mean that there cannot be other organizations, institutions and individuals that can influence the foreign policy, and the foreign political actions, of a state. Thus, governments might also use sub-national and international institutions and organizations to conduct its foreign policy in action.\textsuperscript{41}

With time, the concept of foreign policy has been extended from being concerned solely with territorial security and political sovereignty, to encompass a broader understanding, including other areas of international relevance. This is especially evident when the technological and economical development made states interact both more frequently and more intimately. Examples of such recent areas of foreign policy are trade, finance, resources management, research and science, environmental protection and migration.\textsuperscript{42}

Many have defined the concept of power. Bertrand Russel laid the foundation of the causal power definition by saying that power is to achieve more of your own goals than others with the same goals.\textsuperscript{43} The definition used in this thesis is Joseph Nye Jr.’s. His definition is that to hold power is to get the outcome that you want.\textsuperscript{44} For states, the aim is to make other states do as your own state considers important. The state with the greatest possibilities of acheiving this, is the one with the most

\textsuperscript{39} Fermann, Gunnar i Jon Hovi & Raino Malnes (red.): Normer og makt. Innføring i internasjonal politikk, (Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, 2001), s. 192.
\textsuperscript{40} Fermann: Normer og makt, s. 193.
\textsuperscript{41} Fermann: Normer og makt, s. 195.
\textsuperscript{42} Fermann: Normer og makt, s. 197.
\textsuperscript{43} Osterud, Oyvind i Normer og makt.
\textsuperscript{44} Joseph Nye, Jr.: Soft Power. The means of success in world politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), s. 1.
power. This can either happen through hard power – military force or coercion – or through soft power: "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas, and policies". As an example: If exports increase and receive a greater part of, and a larger responsibility for, a country’s national budget, it will become ever more increasingly important for a state to maintain good relations with the importing country, especially important when there are alternative sources for these imports. The level of soft power of the state will affect the economy, and thus, both soft power and trade policy are important parts of a state’s foreign policy.

The importance of being able to influence the citizens of other states becomes increasingly important as states develop increasing web of linkages due to more intertwined ties between states. If people look at a state with positive eyes, among other benefits, products from this country are presumed to sell better. Propaganda and other means to influence the opinion in other states has thus become an important part of the instruments of foreign policy. The more goodwill a state possesses in international settings and among people in other countries, the more soft power it also enjoys. This process of states interacting with people and private actors in other states is the subject of Public Diplomacy. An important reason for states to use as large resources on a World Exposition as is the case exactly this: To influence what other state’s popular opinion think and believe.

At the dawn of the World Expositions in the late 19th Century, the exhibitions were an important arena for communication between states. It was a place where new technology and design could be displayed and where states could compete in being the most developed in these areas. It was, as the Swedish Cultural Historian Anders Ekström, put it: “The Olympic Games of Culture”. They were arenas for friendly and peaceful competition between states. After World War II World Expositions became the cultural battlefield of the Cold War. In this way, World Expositions developed into being an increasingly important part of countries’ foreign policy.

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45 Nye: Soft Power, s X (i “Preface”)
46 Trade policy has always been part of foreign policy, certainly in the case of Norway, cfr Løvland in 1905, but they were to a degree considered separate strands for some time.
48 Ekström: Den utställda världen, s. 18.
The Cold War developed into a competition on several fields between the liberal USA on the one hand, and the communist Soviet Union on the other. For a long time, the most popular way of looking at the Cold War was to divide the World in two. The bipolar World had to giant fighters, who fought a cold war for survival. The two superpowers never met in direct, hot conflict, but in several wars and conflicts around the world they helped, more or less, one party each with weapons and/or economical support war fought by proxy. The aim was to follow the realist way of the systemic survival, where "two giant countries faced each other and battle it out for world supremacy by most means short of all-out war, until one of them was too exhausted to fight any longer".50

As the concept of power changed, the understanding of the Cold War also became somewhat different. Among historians and experts in international relations, the Cold War is now seen as being "more about ideas and beliefs than about anything else".51 The Cold War was thus not just an arms race, but also a competition in ideology and culture. In the USA, it was the United States Information Agency (USIA) who held the responsibility during the Cold War for "the US government’s attempts to explain itself to the world".52

In the period after World War II, it was of great importance for the USA to gain cultural supremacy in addition to the political to prevent the Soviet Union from increasing their power and becoming stronger than USA.53 Thus, the USA and the Soviet Union developed a competition over soft power. Both from the Soviet and the American side, propaganda was directed towards the intelligentsia in the other country, in order “to influence the supposedly influential”.54 But this propaganda war was not just directed towards the opposition or the rest of the developed world. Also, popular opinion in the Third World was important. In this regard, “by the 1950’s, Expos, World’s Fairs and international trade fairs had become a major focus point for ideological confrontations, a series of opportunities for each side to set out their views of the world, their own achievements and aspirations”.55

53 Masey &Morgan: Cold War Confrontations, s. 10.
54 Masey &Morgan: Cold War Confrontations, s. 11.
55 Masey &Morgan: Cold War Confrontations, s. 11.
Jack Masey and Conway Lloyd Morgan argues that the reason why World Expositions became important, was that

These exhibitions were an opportunity to speak to and influence diverse groups, and because of the size of the exhibitions, also a pretext to address a broad number of issues and present a myriad of opportunities for involvement and connection at the same time.\textsuperscript{56}

Thus, there is research showing the linkage between American efforts to project soft power around the world, and the increasing importance of World Expositions. Projecting ideas and images of own culture is important even for those who are not engaged in a struggle for global supremacy, and the governing elites, politicians of small states, also think their contributions may be important to make a mark for themselves and to promote the common global good.

\textit{2.2 Nordic Cooperation from WWII to 1970}

Traditionally, it is argued that successful Nordic cooperation is dependent on the topic and the area of cooperation. The argument is that if cooperation has been connected to security policy, the Cold War would limit such cooperation. Still, the five Nordic countries opened their borders during the Cold War so that people could move internally from a NATO country to a Soviet friendly state, without a passport.\textsuperscript{57} Also the establishment and the ongoing work of the Nordic Council, the cooperation on the common labor market and on cultural affairs have been successful. On other policy areas, the region has not been able to cooperate, even though it has little to do with defense policy and the Cold War. During the Cold War, it is also possible to argue that much of a country’s foreign policy was connected to security issues. Therefore, regional cooperation would be very difficult if it was related to that policy area.

Examples of cooperation between Nordic countries that was not successful and still not a question of national security may be found in different development aid projects. On the other hand, we find examples of success in cooperation in larger organizations like UNESCO and the World Bank. I will, through examples from Nordic cooperation history, argue that it is the national interests of the Nordic states that provide the premises for the possibility of cooperation.

\textsuperscript{56} Masey & Morgan: \textit{Cold War Confrontations}, s. 11.

\textsuperscript{57} The requirement of having passport when traveling in Nordic Region was revoked in 1952, and a more extensive pass union was established in 1958.
Presenting Norden, as one unit, is not a strong enough argument for cooperation per se. Instead, if the involved countries all benefit individually by cooperating, they will cooperate. In addition to this, Nordic region is not the only arena for cooperation. If it is beneficial to a state to cooperate on a larger arena, they will try to accomplish this. If it is not beneficial to cooperate with other states, in the Nordic region or elsewhere, they will avoid it. In this chapter, I will show some examples of Nordic cooperation that are found in the history of development aid, UNESCO, the World Bank, EFTA, Council of Europe, NORDEK and the Nordic Visa- and Passport Union.

In the period after World War II it was perceived to be in the interest of small countries to help avoid major international conflicts and the UN thus became important in Nordic foreign policies.\(^{58}\) Another, intertwined, way of contributing to stabilizing the world was found in development aid. Economic development was seen as crucial for avoiding economic crisis and social unrest, which in turn was seen as leading to political extremism and war. From a security perspective, it was thus important to help development countries establish democracies and to help a free economy to grow.\(^{59}\) Development aid is thus a part of Western European small countries’ security policy during the cold war.

In a world where small states cannot compete with the larger ones with regard to finances, people or military, it is important to find other branding possibilities. The Nordic countries have found one in being idealist. In Norden, it was argued that it was a moral duty to help developing countries, and at the same time it is important to show the world how good they are in doing so. Through foreign aid, the Nordic countries were able to build soft power and goodwill. Two examples from the history of Nordic development aid cooperation will demonstrate this, but the examples also show that Nordic cooperation is only useful when it is positive for branding individual states.

Due to limited knowledge and resources, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden started cooperating on development aid in the early 1960’s. Under the supervision of the Nordic Ministerial Council, the Nordic Board was set to administer

\(^{58}\) Eriksen, Knut Einar & Helge Øystein Pharo: *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, Bind 5, Kald krig of internasjonalisering 1949-1965*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), s 17

the joint projects from 1961. As a main recipient country, they chose Tanzania, much because of tight personal connections between Olof Palme and Julius Nyerere, and a Swedish radical missionary, Barbro Johanson, who eventually became a minister in Nyerere’s government. In the 1960’s, one Swedish led and one Danish led project were established there. The first project was led by Sweden and Nämnden för Internationell bistånd (NIB), the forerunner of Sida. The Nordic Tanganyika Center opened its doors in 1964, providing educational efforts at different levels, focusing on agriculture, education, health and administration.

Even though the Center was a success with regards to development work, the administration of it was less of a success, both in Tanzania and at home in Nordic countries. Because it was a project led from Sweden, the Nordic administration was located in Stockholm. It was also Sweden that contributed the most (50 per cent) to the project financially, but had only one fourth of the decision making power. The difficulties in administering it can be seen as a reason why development aid cooperation has not been more regular part of the Nordic cooperation. Still, the motives behind the project were to a great extent need for visibility, international attention and political marketing of the Nordic countries. In fact, aid efforts may in general be seen also as political marketing. In Tanzania, the word ‘Nordic’ was often confused with ‘Norway’, something that bothered the Swedes. Because of less opportunities of placing one’s own flag on the map than expected and difficulties with the administration, the Swedes withdrew from the project. The Swedish retreat from the project led to a transfer of the Tanganyika Center from the Nordic Board to Tanzanian administration in 1970. During the 15 year period of Nordic cooperation on foreign aid, the four Nordic countries that participated had both acquired knowledge and finances to administer their own projects. Because of the possibility of building soft power for one individual state and the possibility to increase their international goodwill in addition to the role that development aid got in the countries’ foreign policy, it was more beneficial to work on their own than together as one unit. Cooperation was not needed anymore, and the interest in formalizing Nordic

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60 The Nordic Board consisted of heads of Nordic aid agencies, members of the Nordic aid agencies’ boards, and Members of Parliaments from all the four Nordic countries involved.
62 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
63 Engh and Pharo: “Nordic cooperation in providing development aid”, p. 119.
64 Engh and Pharo: “Nordic cooperation in providing development aid”, p. 121.
cooperation on development aid had disappeared. Thus we may conclude that the national interest is of more importance than Nordic cooperation.

The Danish project was intended to help strengthen the rural areas through cooperatives and local democracy, all in the social democratic spirit. When the president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, changed the whole foundation, took away the local democratic elements and even forced people to move into villages/ujamaas in 1976, little was left of the social democratic foundation from the outset in the early 1960’s. The political system went from being proto-democratic with a social democratic government, to being a one party state, with less democratic elements and without an organized opposition. Still, the Nordic countries continued their work in Tanzania. Jarle Simensen argues that this was much because of the charismatic appearance of Julius Nyerere and his personal ties to Nordic politicians. Kristian Paaskesen has another interesting answer to why the Nordic development aid continued in Tanzania.

Each Nordic country was given a project to administer by Nordic Board. The climate at the Board was not one where it was easy to criticize the others. As the Finnish representative Pär Stenbäck put it: “[t]o criticize one another would be like shooting oneself in the foot”. If the weaknesses of one of the projects would come into the open, it would probably end with critique against the other projects as well. Suddenly, the whole Nordic cooperation project on development aid might come to a halt.

It would be normal to think of a well-functioning cooperation between states that it would be possible to criticize and discuss joint projects. When a project was developing into something completely different than it was supposed to be, and in addition gave support to changes forced upon the population by the state, it would be normal for Nordic states to discuss and possibly end the project. Because of the situation in the Nordic Board, the project continued.

It must have looked from the outside as if the Nordic countries actually were able to cooperate, and they in turn did not want civil society to discuss the Board’s

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66 Simensen: Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, p. 141.
67 Simensen: Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, p. 142.
69 Quoted in Paaskesen: “A Bleak Chapter”, p. 463
matters. They feared that if the debates were to become public, they would lose control. If the public at home would know what was going on, both in Tanzania and on the Board, it would probably affect the relationship with Tanzania. This was not what anyone wanted. It was too much prestige involved. Development aid is and was important in building Nordic countries’ soft power. Tanzania was chosen to be the main recipient country, and it would be harmful to admit that the relationship and the efforts invested in Tanzania did not work the way it was supposed to.

The Nordic countries were far behind in the race of being forerunners in development aid, compared to other countries, up until the mid-1960s. From then on, they made a major effort to make it to the top. Afraid of losing goodwill and possible soft power, the Nordic countries continued their work in the Nordic Board. Even though it may have looked like the Nordic Board functioned well in regard to Nordic cooperation, the case of the Danish led project in Tanzania shows that this is hardly true. Without a climate of open discussion and internal critique, it was more like international branding projects for individual countries, and a major loss of prestige if the projects were to fail.

Several Nordic cooperation projects that have been initiated, have failed due to better options for one of the countries involved. It is therefore possible to argue that cooperation is something a country chooses only if it is in its national interest. If a country suddenly gets a better option, it will leave cooperation and go solo instead. Examples of this can be found in the different economic cooperation projects in the 1950’s and the 1960’s.

Denmark was the most eager to get the customs union agreement in place in the 1950’s, due to the necessity of selling their agricultural products abroad. The difficulties in such economic cooperation were the different needs in the Nordic countries. If Danish agricultural products were sold cheap in Norway, Norwegian agricultural products would lose out, and the same was supposed to be true when Swedish industrial products were to compete with Norwegian industry. The goods Norway sold abroad were in large part sold to markets outside Norden, and they had therefore less interest in a free trade area in the Nordic region. Thus, the Nordic negotiations were never formalized into binding agreements. When the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) became an alternative to a smaller Nordic economic cooperation

70 Paaskesen: “A Bleak Chapter”, p. 456
in 1960, it was seen as more favorable, especially for Denmark. The Nordic negotiations failed.

The most impressive attempt was yet to come. In the late 1960’s, the Nordic countries (still especially Denmark) needed more international cooperation in the economic area. Because of the veto from France to block Great Britain from the European Economic Community (EEC), no other countries were allowed to enter either. Thus, Denmark was held outside a market they badly needed. Much because of the need for a trade community, Denmark pushed for a Nordic solution. It was the second best option, but the EEC was blocked and they needed a bigger market. The Danish Foreign Minister argued, in 1965, that together, the Nordic countries would not only get the sum of the combined efforts on the international arena, but the product of it.  

At the end of the 1960s, the Nordic countries thus started working intensely to establish an economical agreement, NORDEK. At the Nordic Council’s 18th session in the beginning of 1970, it was unanimously accepted. The aim of NORDEK was to help the different Nordic exporting economies. But, when Charles de Gaulle surprisingly resigned in 1969, it was clear that membership in EEC was again possible to obtain, and Denmark and Norway started negotiating with the EEC in June 1970. This was not acceptable for Finland that had to balance between trying to be associated as a westernized country, but still not provoke the Soviet Union. Without Finland, NORDEK failed, and Denmark became a member of the EEC in 1972. After this, Denmark, that had been most eager to establish an economic cooperation in Nordic region, had an even better solution to the export problem. Thus, a Nordic trade union was redundant, and NORDEK was the last attempt at creating a Nordic economic community.

It is obvious that the feeling of being Nordic and the product of the combined efforts this would give, which was the Danish arguments for cooperation in NORDEK, was not as strong when EEC became a real opportunity. At the same time, Finland also had difficulties of cooperating in a Nordic Region with one of the others as members of the EEC, which by the Soviet Union was seen as the economic part of NATO. Each of the Nordic counties had each own agenda. When it was beneficial to

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cooperate, attempts were made to establish such. But when the cooperation did not coincide with the nation’s interest, the Nordic cooperation was easy to surrender.

Above, we have seen examples of difficulties in Nordic cooperation, but there are several examples of successful attempts as well. In 1948, the requirement for a visa when working in another Nordic country was abolished, due to the many refugees working in other Nordic countries after the Second World War and the paper work this caused. In 1952, the Nordic Passport Union was established. From that point on, all Nordic citizens could move from one Nordic country to another without a passport, which is quite interesting regarding the geographical and political position Nordic Region had in the Cold War. It worked well, and the reason why it was established in the first place was primarily self-interest.

When the Council of Europe was established in 1949, there were only ten member counties. Among them were Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and the impact the Nordic states had were strong. Today, there are 47 member states, and the feeling of drowning is thus greater. The Nordic countries, often together with the Baltic ones, go together and become 8 out of 47. This obviously increases their political clout. Still, it is only when it is beneficial and in the nations’ interests to do so this is possible to achieve, and Kjell M. Torbiörn argues that if the cooperation had been formalized, it is less probable that it would function well.

There have been several successful cooperation projects in larger organizations, like UNESCO and the World Bank. In UNESCO, the Nordic countries started cooperative talks in the 1950s. By pooling together material and intellectual resources, they hoped to increase the total Nordic influence in the organization. Also, when Finland became a member in 1956, it was important for Finland to distance itself from the status as being an eastern bloc state and they needed the cooperation to build a stronger Nordic identity. Thus, at the end of the 1950s, the organization of the Nordic work in UNESCO was changed and cooperation became more stabilized. In the General Assembly, the instructions to delegates were that they should acknowledge all the Nordic countries’ positions, and representatives met regularly during the sessions to consult. One of the changes was that Nordic

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72 Finland became a member in 1989.
73 Kjell M. Torbiörn: “Nordic and Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the Council of Europe” in Götz and, Haggrén; Regional Cooperation and International Organizations, p. 172.
74 Heidi Haggrén: “The ‘Nordic Group’ in UNESCO. Informal and practical cooperation within the politics of knowledge” in Götz and, Haggrén; Regional Cooperation and International Organizations, p. 91. All information in the paragraph on UNESCO is found in this article, pp. 88-111.
Region started to have joint delegates, representing the region as one. In this way, Nordic Region always had a representative on the board, and joint influence increased. In addition, a shared office for the Nordic countries was established. When the work load increased, they divided it internally. It meant that each country had responsibility for different areas, even though they all represented the entire Norden. If one of the countries were not entirely up to date on one question, they would trust the others and vote the same as the others on most issues.

The traditional view has been that it was possible to achieve this because of, in the Cold War context, cooperation was limited to the low-tension fields of culture and education.\textsuperscript{75} Without contesting this entirely, I will argue that cooperation worked because it was in the national interest of all the Nordic states. UNESCO is, as Haggrén points out, an organization with low-tension policy areas. This makes it easier to cooperate than on fields regarding national security. Still, I would argue that this is merely one factor, and that the national interests of the Nordic countries were the most important. Nordic cooperation in UNESCO gave the opportunity for Finland to brand itself as something other than an Eastern Bloc country.

The areas of culture and education opened up for possibilities of branding Nordic Region as forerunners in these areas, which could build soft power and increase influence both in UNESCO, and in other similar areas and organizations. To do this, more resources were needed than each of the countries on their own was willing to put in. Each of the Nordic countries and their policies would drown in the large organization. By pooling, they could achieve more than they were able to do on their own. The Nordic welfare states were quite uniform in fields like education and culture. In addition, the results of UNESCO negotiations became UNESCO policies, not policies associated by individual states. The resources put into UNESCO didn’t give as much credit in the end for each state, so the output of the investments was limited. Thus, it was in the national interest of the Nordic states to cooperate.

Much of the same is true for Nordic cooperation in the World Bank, even though the structure of the organization in the Bank was different from that of UNESCO. The board consisted of 22 executive directors, and 17 of these represented more than one state.\textsuperscript{76} Only the five biggest contributors had their own director.\textsuperscript{77} The

\textsuperscript{75} Haggrén, «The ‘Nordic Group’ in UNESCO», p. 104.
fact that the Nordic countries had one joint director was thus not exceptional. Ahead of the weekly board meetings, the Nordic countries conferred with each other to always be up to date with World Bank policies. Together, they established a Nordic Office at the World Bank and thus made it easy to cooperate on a daily basis. Traditionally, Nordic Region gave one speech at the Annual Meeting. In some cases, if one of the countries disagreed to the majority position it was informed that one country disagreed with the general Nordic view, but it was seen as unfortunate. From a Nordic point of view, it was expected that a joint position would give more influence on the organization than if they presented divergent views.\textsuperscript{78} To sum up the Nordic cooperation at the World Bank, we can establish that it worked well.

According to Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, the Norwegian World Bank policy was only to a limited extent based on self-interest. The closest attempt was to give Nordic citizens work at different levels in the organization. The aim was development aid, not to develop the Nordic economies or to gain loans in foreign currencies.\textsuperscript{79} It was easy to cooperate, because the interests of the Nordic states were not to benefit from the result of the Bank policies. They were not receivers of the aid given. Instead, Nordic Region wanted to contribute to development aid, and worked together to achieve this through the United Nation and other associated organizations, like the World Bank. But World Bank policies, like the policies of UNESCO, were not something specific Nordic, nor Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian or Swedish. The best way of influence the total outcome was to be united, and thus have more impact. The cooperation in the World Bank thus shows us that when it is in the self-interest of the Nordic states, they can accomplish cooperation without tension and difficulties.

With this in mind, the rest of the thesis will have a frame of being one of the Nordic cooperation projects that were a success, even though the cooperation was not perfect. At several times there were conflicts and misunderstandings, but at the end it was the national interest that won the battle. None of the involved countries saw it as fruitful to break out and go solo. It would be loss of prestige and costly at the same time – thus, they all did their best to keep the peace.

\textsuperscript{77} The five countries were the USA, Great Britain, Western Germany and Japan.
\textsuperscript{78} Hagtvedt Vik, \textit{Norge og Norden i Verdensbanken}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{79} Hagtvedt Vik, \textit{Norge og Norden i Verdensbanken}, p. 47-48.
2.3 Scandinavian Relations with Japan

Until the Meiji-restoration in 1868, Japan had been isolated to the world. After this, the opening up was slow. In the early years after World War II, Japan had little contact with Western Europe, but had close ties with the US. USA occupied Japan until 1952, and also afterwards helped economically to rebuild the country. When Japan gained political control, they were free to conduct economical diplomacy as they wished.\textsuperscript{80} The US helped Japanese products to find their way into Western markets. With American help, Japan rose to become an economic superpower during the decades after World War II. In the mid 1950s, Japan applied for GATT membership. 94 percent of all imports were liberalized following this, but imports still took place according to complicated licensing rules and heavy subsidizing from the Export and Import Bank of Japan.\textsuperscript{81}

Japan was also backed by the US when applying for OECD membership in 1964, in spite of Western European protest. The political and economical relations between Japan and the US were of vital importance during the Cold War, but the relationship to Western Europe was still not very close. Thus, Japan had limited, though increasing contact with Western Europe in the 1970s.

With the exception of shipping, commercial relations between Norway and Japan were limited well into the 1960s.\textsuperscript{82} Exports to Japan were small compared to imports. The Norwegian historian Eldrid Mageli refers to Statistics Norway which classified Japan under ”other countries” to show how little importance Japan had for Norwegian exports in 1969.\textsuperscript{83} The same is true for the rest of Western Europe in the decades after the World War II: Japan has had an export surplus and has been reluctant to reduce this.\textsuperscript{84} Still, between 1963 and 1967, import to Norway from Japan had increased remarkably.\textsuperscript{85} This was especially true for import of ships. In 1963, Norway did not import any, but in 1967 they imported ships worth 1,594.6 million NOK. The import from Japan (without ships) increased from 92.5 millions in 1963 to 148.7 million NOK. The total of exports from Norway to Japan also increased – from 27.7 million NOK in 1963, to 161.2 million NOK in 1967. The import of ships from

\textsuperscript{81} Mageli, 2006, p 66
\textsuperscript{82} Mageli, 2006, p 60
\textsuperscript{83} Mageli, 2006, p 61
\textsuperscript{84} Mageli, 2006, p 62
\textsuperscript{85} ANMFA 47.2/53, 23.07.68Memorandum, Nils Fredrik Aall.
Japan in 1967 constituted 40 percent of Norway’s total import of ships. Other products they imported were machines, electrical equipment and vehicles, consumer goods like photo equipment, optical and other instruments, sports equipment and others. But they also imported clothing and textiles worth 30 million NOK, and also rubber goods, glass, porcelain and steel. The exports without ships doubled six times from 1963 to 1967, whereas the total exports increased by 50 percent in the same period. In 1967, Norway exported goods worth 161 million NOK, and it was food (mostly meat and cheese), metal (iron and nickel) and machines and appliances (pumps, loading and unloading machines, and electric engines). As it seems, especially the Norwegian shipping industry had large interests in Japan, but there were also other markets interested in Norwegian goods. The remarkable thing here is the deficit in terms of great imports, but limited exports to Japan.

In May and June 1963, a Norwegian industrial delegation went to Japan to investigate the possibilities of increasing their exports. They realized that the Japanese tried to be self-sufficient on all equipment used. In spite of all the formal liberalization of trade, The Norwegian Export Council found that protectionism in the shipping equipment industry in Japan was maintained.86 Import restrictions were strong in Japan until the end of the 1980’s. In 1976, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), as the Export Council had done in 1963, considered the export possibilities as small. Not because of formal restrictions, but because the Japanese business practice with administrative guidance implied a number of time consuming, expensive and complicated rules for imports. The NMFA wrote “The problem is that in several cases it is impossible to point out the existence of trade barriers”.87 So even though there were no official barriers on trade, there were a number of other obstacles, even though not easy to concretize, that made increased exports very difficult. It was unofficial, but still very real.

The official statement was that Japanese import was totally free. On paper it was, but in practice the Norwegians experienced something else. For Norwegian ship equipment industry, it was very difficult to get into the Japanese shipbuilder’s market. But according to the Japanese Ambassador to Norway, the shipbuilders decided entirely by themselves, without any instructions, from whom they wanted to buy

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86 Mageli, 2006, p 66
87 In Mageli, 2006, p 63
equipment. Still, access for Norwegian shipping products was blocked by two Japanese financial arrangements: a rule stipulating that imported products could not exceed five percent of the total building costs, and favorable loans given to Japanese producers.

Van Wolferen argues that it is a fiction that Japan was a capitalist, free-market economy. Instead, he suggests there was no free market in Japan, and the strength of the Japanese economical system was the connection between bureaucrats and industrialists. The bureaucrats never attempted to gain full power over non-governmental corporations. The bureaucrats guided the economy, and used businessmen as their antennae. In order to get information of what was happening far away from the center, they were constant monitoring the experiences of capitalist trying to find new ways of expanding their businesses.

The reason why the economy was prosperous was due to areas of industry that showed prospects were stimulated by fiscal policies favoring investment. Industries considered of strategic importance were carefully nursed and protected against genuine foreign competition. Industries in trouble were temporarily protected, but if a dead end was met, it was easy to abandon it by policies forcing reorganization. It was thus a partnership sealed by a shared industrial policy and trade strategy. Market freedom was considered to be not a goal desirable in itself but one of several instruments for achieving the paramount aim of industrial expansion.

It was difficult for the Norwegians to prove that there was a specific limit to how much they could buy from Norwegians, but shipbuilders in Japan still did not buy the Norwegian goods. Even though officials in Japan refused that they used any restrictions, a specialist at the Japanese Shipowners’ Association admitted in 2004 that the Japanese Government had adopted several measures to protect its shipbuilding industry until the 1980s, when the Government had started to encourage imports.

In the 1970s, the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan criticized the Norwegian efforts in Japan. The argument was that Sweden and Denmark had more personnel stationed there and had thus better possibilities of exporting goods. Tore Bøgh at the

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88 Mageli, 2006, p 68
89 Mageli, 2006, p 66
90 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 6
91 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 7
92 Mageli, 2006, p 68
Norwegian Export Council, replied in 1977 that the main problem for the Norwegians was not little effort or too few people from the Norwegian side, but rather the Japanese attitude towards imports of finished goods. 'All of Japanese industrial society appears mainly concerned with sales. Imports, except raw materials and intermediate goods, are regarded as something close to treason'.

For SAS, the 1960’s were important in relations to Japan. The North Pole route between Copenhagen, Anchorage and Tokyo was opened in 1957. It was soon obvious to SAS that the frequency of two flights a week did not suffice to handle all the passengers wanting to travel from Scandinavia to Japan. Thus, they wished to increase the landing rights in Japan to three times a week. Japanese Air Lines (JAL) was not in favor of this, even though SAS and the Scandinavian Governments were willing to grant JAL additional landing rights in Scandinavia. Negotiations between the Scandinavian and Japanese Governments were held in 1967 and 1968. The Scandinavians did not make any progress, and was at times frustrated and angry about the way the Japanese negotiated.

Japan became an economical world power in the years after WWII, even though it did not behave the way the rest of the world expected a world power to behave. In the late 1960’s, the rest of the world were advised to wait for the Japanese internationalization, but it took time, and thus in the late 1980’s, the international community got tired of waiting. The problem was easy to grasp in economics: the Japanese surplus in trade was $44 billion in 1984, $56 billion in 1985, and $93 billion in 1986, and it was impossible to change that. It is not only that they exported more than they imported, by doing so they also undermined Western industry. After the New York and London stock market crash in October 1987, Japanese stocks reached a new, high level. The Japanese exploited the situation and started to invest in foreign real estate, and bought foreign banks and corporations. Some Europeans and Americans understood, somewhat belatedly, that Japan was playing a completely different game than the game they had invented and still played.

93 in Mageli, 2006, p 69
94 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p. 1
95 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 2
96 van Wolferen, The Enigma, p 2

3.1 The Organization of Expo Participation in Scandinavian

3.1.1 Sweden
The Information Collegium was established to coordinate the official Swedish information abroad. Official Swedish participation at trade fairs was decided after recommendation from the Swedish Export Association (Sveriges Allmänna Exportförening). Due to their extensive knowledge of Swedish exporters’ interests, their statements were crucial in deciding which efforts would be made. They made surveys in countries, which possibly could be of significance for Sweden. The people monitoring the stands or pavilions were often from Chamber of Commerce or the Embassy. The Export Association often also sent people, and they tried to get more people from the private sector to take a part – which was not often the case.

The Information Collegium had state funding, and financed official performances at international exhibitions and trade fairs. If the Export Association gave positive indication on a trade fair, they would be given funds to spend. The Association would then administer the participation in cooperation with the Swedish Chamber of Commerce or the Embassy. Private firms financed their own participation. The official funding covered, completely or partially, joint efforts. At a trade fair, the Export Association would construct a pavilion or stand, and Swedish firms could rent space in this pavilion. The products shown were thus decided of the firms renting from the Association. Participation in World Expositions was not included in the procedure described above. The final decision was made by the Information Collegium, but first after making extensive research. It was possible to ask for extra funding from the Government and Parliament, if participation needed funding beyond the budget of the Information Collegium.

In one way, it seems that the Swedes are well organized. Still, there was confusion on who decided and funded what internally. According to Gunnar Lonneus at the Swedish Institute, three Swedish institutions dealt with approximately the same

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97 NAS F1 a: 176. 6.1., 05.03.68, P. A. Sjögren
questions regarding information of Sweden abroad. This was confusing for many Swedish export companies who wanted to attend trade fairs abroad. These three institutions were the Information Collegium, the Information Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish Institute. These three filled different functions in almost the same area.

The Information Collegium was planning and coordinating all officially financed information work abroad, which meant coordinating commercial information measures abroad. Information Office was collecting marketing data and general information abroad, and was thus the link between information offices in Sweden and information gathered abroad, mostly done by Embassies and Consulates. The Swedish Institute was the organization responsible for marketing, production and distribution of goods and services in the information field.

3.1.2 Norway and Denmark
In contrast to Sweden, Norway had no Norwegian Institute or anything similar to the Information Collegium. If Norway were participating at an international exhibition or trade fair that needed resources from the Government, it had to be approved each time by the Storting. At the Foreign Ministry there was an Office for Cultural Interaction Abroad (OCIA), but it had little to do with exhibitions. Instead, its purpose was to communicate Norwegian culture. World Exhibitions were not seen as a part of this effort. It was the Ministry of Trade that had this responsibility, and at the NMFA, it was the office for international trade that managed cases like World Expositions. Obviously, the Norwegians thought of efforts of this kind as increasing exports to foreign countries. It had little to do with reputation management or creating goodwill. In other areas, Norway sought to build reputation – for instance in development aid and peacekeeping and peace negotiations. Thus, it is not the case that Norway in the 1960s was unaware of the importance of building a reputation abroad to use for her own good. World Expositions was just not a part of this effort. For Norway, World Expositions were merely a way of increasing exports.

In September 1967, the Norwegian parties involved parties had discussed the matter and agreed that if they did not attend the exposition, it might have negative

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98 SNA, F 1 a: 176. 6.1., 25.11.69, Gunnar Lonneus
99 Utrikesdepartementets informationsbyrå
100 Kontoret for kulturelt samkvem med utlandet
effects on export possibilities, aviation and shipping interests. The Ministry of Trade was given the authority to continue the negotiations, as long as Sweden and Denmark intended to participate. The negotiations were halted because of the deadlock in the SAS-JAL negotiations, but were restarted at the beginning of 1968. The Norwegian Minister of Trade, Kåre Willoch, thus recommended to the Government in February 1968 that Norway say yes to participation at the World Expo in 1970, on the condition of cooperation with Denmark and Sweden, and that the Parliament would approve.

Because there was no such office like the Swedish Information Collegium, there was no money put aside for the purpose of promoting Norway at World Exhibitions. Thus, the politicians had to take the question each time to the Storting, and it would be debated there every time the budget was expanded. This seems to be a more cumbersome and time-consuming practice, when comparing to the Swedes who had outsourced the questions to bureaucrats who could make the decisions and take the responsibility. They did not need to get every decisions sanctioned by the Parliament.

The situation in Norway was that they needed exceeding resources over and above the approved budget from the Government to participate in Osaka. The Minister of Trade in the meeting of the King in Council on March 15 1968 recommended approving a proposition to the Parliament to appropriate another million for “Other Trade Purposes”. It was thus seen as a trade purpose to attend Expo 70, not as a foreign policy strategy to present Norway abroad, and thus increase goodwill or improve the image of Norway (reputation management).

A memo written by Gunnar Odd Hærum, the Director of the Foreign Ministry’s 3rd Trade Policy Office, illustrates the problem with regard to who made Norwegian policies. It seems that there was no general approved way of handling world exposition issues, and that they had to find a way of starting off every time the question came up. Hærum and the Director of Trade, Per Glad, discussed the question of the Norwegian Working Committee and the Norwegian Commissioner to the Nordic Expo 70 group. Glad found it appropriate that Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs (not a governmental institution, even though partially funded

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{ANMFA}, 47.2/53, 19.02.68, Kåre Willoch.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{ANMFA}, 47.2/53, 19.02.68, Kåre Willoch.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{ANMFA}, 47.2/53, 28.02.68, G O Hærum.
by the Government) should be the Commissioner, because of his experience, which would make it easy for him to handle the tasks. The Norwegian Trade Fairs would thus be the place where the secretary was situated. Glad thought it best for the Norwegian Export Association and the Norwegian Ship Owner’s Association were represented at the Working Committee. He found it less important that the Government or any other state institutions be included in the committee. Hærum replied that it probably would be best if the Government in one way or another was represented, and Glad agreed, but did not wish that the Ministry of Trade (his own Ministry) would be the one who had to do it. When Per Borgen at the NMFA read this, he noted in the margin that it was perhaps not necessary for the Government to be represented, but he would find this strange due to the fact that it was the Government that paid the whole project. He also noted that he did “not realize that Norway did not have direct interests to safeguard both in the working committee and later at the exposition itself”. He then suggested that both Hans Ganestad and Hæreum would be well suitable for the task. Responding to the Ministry of Trade, the Foreign Ministry found it “highly desirable to be represented” at the working committee. Thus, Per Borgen became a member. He was the Head of the Culture Department at the NMFA, and it is one of few exceptions to the rule that offices and ministries concerned with exports and trade handled the Norwegian Expo ’70 participation. Borgen never argues against that exports were the main purpose of the Norwegian efforts, and he never argues that Norway should use the possibility of increasing its goodwill. In addition, he argues in favor of Hæreum being the one sitting in the Norwegian committee – probably because he considered it being a question of trade policy. Why Borgen ended up in the position does not come clear, but it seems as also he thought increased exports to Japan was most important.

The Norwegian Government had, as already mentioned, recommended that the Parliament supply extra funding for the Expo 70 pavilion. The national budget for 1968 was already approved, and no funding was included for the Expo 70 pavilion. Thus, Parliament had to agree to an additional appropriation for this purpose. The negotiation in Parliament is of interest to understand the way the Norwegian politicians thought of World Exhibitions. The proposition was passed in the end, with

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104 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 28.02.68, Per Borgen (handwritten comment) to G O Hæreum.
105 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 15.03.68, Per Borgen/G O Hæreum.
only two against.\textsuperscript{106} Olav Langeland (The Centre Party), when presenting the case to Parliament, was well aware of the argument against participation. He acknowledged the problem of spending a large amount of money on an exposition that gave no real evidence of gain in terms of increased exports. Expo 70 could give Norway no real material gain, and thus they should use the money on trade fairs instead. This is in accordance with how most politicians and bureaucrats in Norway thought of World Expositions – they were more to increase exports than to secure and strengthen goodwill abroad. It explains why it was the Ministry of Trade and the Office of Trade Policy at the Foreign Ministry that had the responsibility for this kind of questions. But even if it was quite expensive to participate (3 million NOK), Langeland suggested that Norway could not afford to abstain. He used increasing exports and imports from and to Japan as his main argument, and that Expo ’70 would be an opportunity to show Norwegian products to an unaware Japanese public. He also noted that Nordic cooperation had been tested in Montreal, and that the experiences made from this could be used to make it better this time. Here, there is an intimation of Nordic cooperation in Expo ’67 being somewhat difficult.

Paul Thyness (Conservative) was clearly against an extra grant for Expo ’70. He reminded the Parliament that World Expositions are not trade exhibitions, and that they could not have a commercial character. Even though he thought it was important to do information work abroad, he considered Norway to be a small country with limited resources and that the gain from World Expositions was too insignificant compared to the input. He admitted that World Expositions could, more indirectly, give Norway goodwill that potentially could result in increased exports and more tourism, but he considered it as easier to achieve this through more direct procedures. In contrast to Langeland, who emphasized the high costs, Thyness considered 2,75 million NOK to be a small number. He compared it to the budget they had agreed on for 1968, which in total was 15 355 millions. Still, it was a large amount compared to similar measures, and he thought the money could be better spent elsewhere. He connected the issue with the Office of Cultural Interaction Abroad (NMFA), which had less annual funding than Expo 70 would get. He is one of few who saw the connection between these two, and stressed the building of goodwill abroad in addition to focusing on more sales and exports. He would thus give the money to the


Office of Cultural Interaction Abroad and through this would improve the perception of Norwegian culture and performance in different areas far more efficiently. He still saw the importance of export promotion, for instance through Norwegian weeks at international trade fairs.

At a World Exposition, Norway would have to compete for attention with great nations like the USA and Soviet Union. He considered the competition too hard. With the limited resources Norway had, little had been achieved by participating in Brussels and in Montreal, he argued. The exhibition in Brussels had not given the visitors any idea of Norway as a democratic country, high social standard, and high technological level. No one got the impression that Norway was one of the leading shipping nations in the world, a beautiful tourist destination or a country with culture and design as important factors in daily life. He was not impressed with the result. In addition to this, the pavilion in Montreal had a restaurant owned by SAS and it was a success in terms of profit. The same was meant to be in Osaka, and he could not understand why Norway should sponsor a company that was not fully Norwegian. He then referred to the Exporter’s Association, who had given advice against participation, as had most of the Norwegian business sector (except the shipowners). As a conclusion, he argued, the money was needed to present Norway abroad, but that World Expositions were not the place to spend them.

Responding to this, Willoch stressed the importance of the exhibition in Japan. It was the first World Expo in Asia, and it marked the 100 years since the Meiji restoration, which was a turning point in Japan’s history both economically and politically. It represented a shift from Japan being a feudal country to becoming a centralized state.107 As a result of this, it was expected to get a lot of attention. Willoch argued that the Government had recommended participation first of all for reasons of international relations, and also because of foreign economic policy concerns. Participation could give a possible goodwill gain of significance, and abstaining would possibly give a negative effect on export possibilities and for the aviation and shipping interests. Willoch agreed that World Expositions were not commercial, but he disagreed that it would not have any commercial side effects. He also reminded the Parliament of the recommendation from the Nordic Council regarding a joint effort at the Expo 70. He referred to the report from NC on the

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cooperation in Montreal, which concluded that the Nordic cooperation on Expo 67 was most positive. It seems like the Montreal experience was used for whatever they thought suitable on different occasions. Thus, it is plausible to think that the cooperation at Expo 67 was neither particularly positive nor negative.

Willoch argued that the costs would be lower for the Expo 70 pavilion than the one in Montreal, something he considered as remarkable. He also pointed out that the Ministry of Trade rarely asked for extra funding, and when they now chose to do so, it was because they thought it would give valuable positive effects. He answered his own question on whether or not World Exhibitions had any appropriate place in the modern world, by saying that Expo 70 already had been giving great attention and that he considered it wise for Norway to participate. He answered the critique against SAS, and their possible profit, by saying that they had pressured SAS as far they possibly could.

The next speaker, Bodil Aakre (Conservative), argued that if Norway were the only Nordic country to abstain, it would not favor the relationship the export industry already had established with Japan.

Tryggve Bratteli was concerned in the same ways as Thyness, but Bratteli would still vote in favor of the proposal because of how the case stood. He considered World Expositions to be an obsolete form of international relations. He acknowledged that the number of participants could be of significance for a host country’s prestige. Norway could possibly offend Japan by not attending Expo 70. Still, he did not think that it would be much of a goodwill gain or increased exports by participating at World Expositions.

Bratteli considered the notion of World Exhibitions at the Nordic Council to be less positive than Willoch did. Bratteli had the impression that the Nordic Council was not in favor of World Exhibitions, but if the small states in the region had to participate, it would be better to cooperate.

Canada had put pressure on Norwegian authorities to participate at Expo ’67 because of the prestige involved, and Thyness suggested that this might have happened from Japan as well. Willoch used the argument of the courtesy of participating at Expo 70 because of the celebration of 100 years of openness, but Thyness recalled that there was a celebration for Canada as well. He suggested that this would be an argument with regard to all future World Exhibitions. He then asked the question one more time if the export industry would absolutely loose as
much as previous speakers had argued. He argued that business was determined on other criteria than participation at World Expositions. In addition, he did not want Norway to necessarily be a part of Scandinavian cooperation, because of the fear of drowning. He did not see the point in participation if Norway could not sell more products to the host country, and by being a part of Scandinavia, Norway would lose more than they would gain.

Willoch said it was strange if Nordic Council’s point of view was what Bratteli said it was, because the recommendation was so clear. He concluded that he would not give any recommendation to Stortinget about how to vote, but that because the process had gone so far, it could cause problems for Norway in Japan if many delegates would vote against the proposition. Bratteli reacted to this, and said that no one should put pressure on delegates of Stortinget to vote for or against a proposition in this manner. At the end, only two delegates voted against the proposition, and the funding was granted. The debate gives an indication on how the Norwegian politicians thought of World Expositions in general, if Norway should attend these and also how the Norwegian organized their work.

The Norwegian Committee especially established for the Expo ’70 consisted of Nils Fredrik Aall from Ulefoss, Edward Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs, Per Borgen, Head of the Culture department at the NMFA, Otto Christian Malterud at the Norwegian Export Association, Odd-Leif Skundberg, Norwegian Shipowner’s Association, and Odd Grann, Norwegian Trade Fairs. Their mandate was to organize the Nordic joint pavilion together with equivalent committees in the other Nordic countries. The Ministry of Trade was the one to appoint the Norwegian General Commissioner. The Committees’ secretariat would be placed at the Norwegian Trade Fairs.

It is striking that only one of the representative at the Committee was ministry employed, and that the daily work would be handled by a non-governmental foundation. It was the Ministry of Trade that had the responsibility, but it was not represented at all in the Committee. Even though participation in World Expositions was not regarded as the most important effort made in the foreign policy, it is still strange that almost the entire question was put in the hands of people representing

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108 Ulefoss is a Norwegian company producing windows, doors and walls.
109 Norwegian Trade Fairs is a foundation consisting of The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), the Enterprise Federation of Norway (Virke), and others.
110 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.04.68, Kåre Willoch.
private interests. Only one of the members of the Norwegian Committee was employed by the state. The ministry in charge that, according to the Norwegian point of view, had the most to win from attending was not interested in participating in the committee. In Sweden, the question was handled by the Information Collegium, which was state funded and with the former Ambassador Kjell Öberg as its leader. The approaches of the two neighboring states were strikingly dissimilar.

As the preparatory phase of the Norwegian participation at Expo ’70 ended, Mowinckel-Larsen decided to step down during the summer of 1968 and leave the Norwegian committee.  

111 Nils Fredrik Aall took over as the Norwegian Honorary Commissioner General, or the leader of the Norwegian Expo 70 committee, appointed by the Norwegian Government on July 12.  

112 At this point, the Norwegians were not very well organized. It seems that they were struggling with the organization and communication, something Öberg also noticed. At the Stockholm meeting on May 15, 1968, according to Öberg, two Norwegians met, both claiming to represent the National Association of Norwegian Architects.  

113 In order to appoint members to the referee committee, this dispute had to be solved. To Öberg, this dispute seemed somewhat amusing, or even helpless. And thus, it might have been a very good thing for Norway that Mowinckel-Larsen stepped down as the Honorary CG and was replaced by Nils Fredrik Aall.

This shift was due to Mowinckel-Larsen’s retirement from his position at the Norwegian Trade Fairs. Odd Grann succeeded him. Grann took responsibility and informed the rest of the Norwegian Expo ’70 Committee of how the future work would best be done.  

114 He divided the process into three stages: the first step would be completed in September 1968, when the Architectural competition would be finished. In the same period, fundraising had to be done, to finance extra activities. The second stage would commence after the architectural competition was completed and the work to realize the winning suggestion started. He reminded that the nationality of the winner mattered, with regards to who would administer this work. He claimed that since the Danes had the main architect and SAS Catering, and the Swedes had the entrepreneur and the Commissioner General, it would not be strange if Norway would

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111 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 13.08.68, Nils Fredrik Aall.
112 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.08.68, Sven A. Hansson.
113 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Memo by Knut Thommessen.
114 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Odd Grann, undated, summer of 1968.
be chosen to be responsible for the pavilion theme administration and implementation. He added “If we wish to?” If they did not take any responsibility for any part of the cooperation, it could lead to being overshadowed and left out in decisions that could matter for the presentation of Norway abroad. At the same time, to administer a part like this took extra resources and time. If they wanted to administer, and had the arguments of why they would be the obvious choice, it must have been strange to the Norwegians if they still did not get it. At the same stage, they had to have the extra finances in place, and they had to start preparing for PR measures in Japan. The third stage was to finalize the work and to tweak the “Norwegian participation” in Japan. They also had to conduct the PR initiatives in Japan. Grann stressed the importance of the work they had to do outside the pavilion, and they hoped that the Embassy could help both with research and actual performance. This was late compared to the Swedes, who already had made a survey on Sweden in Japan a year before.

Grann also pointed out that the Expo committee was the deciding party in administering the Norwegian participation at Expo ’70. The Commissioner General had the Norwegian Trade Fairs’ Secretariat (with Odd Grann as their leader) at his disposal. An account with the Government funding would be established at the disposal of both Nils Fredrik Aall and Secretary General Grann. The daily work and follow through of the decisions made at the committee would be conducted according to agreement between Commissioner General Aall and Secretary General Grann.

In the Norwegian and Swedish archives, there is little evidence of the way Denmark organized its work. In the Norwegian archives it is (of course) possible to trace the structure of the Norwegian organization. It is also easy to find the Swedish organizational structure from the Swedish archives. In the Swedish archives, it is little evidence for how Norway and Denmark organized their work. The difference is that it is also easy to find the Swedish organizational structure in the Norwegian archives. The Swedes informed the Norwegians of how they organized their work. Can this be because Sweden was better organized and had a structure that was easy to explain? Were they better organized? Or was it just more information going out? Was it perhaps that the Swedes thought the Norwegians needed some help to find their way? Because the scope of this thesis is limited, I found it hard to also include the Danish

115 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Odd Grann, undated, summer of 1968, “Hvis vi ønsker dette?”
archives. Thus, I have little certain knowledge of how the Danes organized their work.

Still, one Danish newspaper op-ed article gives an indication on how the Danish work was organized. It is an answer to a critical voice asking in what way Denmark should be presented to the outside world at World Exhibitions, because Denmark could not compete with the superpowers and their resources, and could therefore not expect to have the most impressive pavilion and exhibition. Also, critique was directed towards the bureaucrats, who should take more responsibility, it was argued. The author, permanent undersecretary Kai Johansen, regretted that the public debate of Denmark’s participation had begun so late, after the framework of the exhibition already was in place. Denmark was a part of the Scandinavian cooperation together with SAS Catering.

Denmark could not compete with the Soviet Union or the US when it came to recourses, but at Expo ’67, Czechoslovakia had impressed the public, and shown that smaller states could impress the public. They communicated a message that attracted people’s attention, and thus smaller pavilions could be successful as well. It was not all about the size of the economy, Johansen argued.

Johansen responded to the critique of bureaucrats not taking their responsibility by stating that it was not they who had the mandate to make any decisions regarding a possible Danish participation, the budget, range or the content of such participation. Instead, it was politicians and people from the business community, that made these basic decisions, as it should be in a democracy, he wrote. After they decided, they could delegate responsibility to bureaucrats.

Johansen was not fully satisfied with this system. Old ways of thinking and old habits stopped the renewal of these processes, and he suggested that there was something wrong with the organization and the administrative structure. The process of deciding until the product was finished, was perhaps logical at one time, but was probably not logical anymore. Johansen suggested that they had to shake everything up and come up with new solutions on how to administer tasks like Denmark’s participation at World Expositions, and thus new form of cooperation between the business sector and governmental institutions. The aim was to attract attention to Denmark abroad, and to do this he suggested that more of the people concerned with

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116 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 18.09.68, Permanent Undersecretary Kai Johansen, in Danish newspaper *Politiken*. 
national trade fairs had to be brought into the work on international World Expositions.

The challenge was to cooperate in a new way. Information efforts abroad were spread out on different persons in different positions in different organizations and institutions. Nobody knew the plans and ideas of the others. The Ministry of Culture administered cultural agreements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies abroad, the Danish Business Fund and the export sector administered combined cultural and business oriented measures. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Press and Information Department administered the general information from books, booklets, and magazines. The Danish Society was giving general information about Denmark abroad, and Dansk Samvirke administered the contact with Danes living abroad. World Expositions were placed under the Committee of Exhibitions Abroad, which had their secretariat at the Council of Industry (Industrirådet). Samvirkerådet, which was a cooperation body for institutes and others who worked for knowledge of Denmark abroad, was a subject to the Prime Minister’s Office. Also, the private sector had efforts abroad, which could interface with the above-mentioned institutions.

No one of these worked against each other, but extensive cooperation was not in place. There had been efforts to start coordinating the efforts better, but each institution’s self-interest stopped such development, Johansen argued. Thus, when the bureaucrats were criticized for not taking their responsibility of Expo ’70, Johansen reminded that it was to give them more power than they actually had. He welcomed the debate on how to organize Denmark’s participation at future World Expositions in a better way, but argued that this had to come from politicians, not from the bureaucracy. Still, it is evident that the situation on Norway and Denmark has more similarities than the two of them had to the better-organized Sweden, that already had made an effort to administer such tasks in a more streamlined way. But the Danes were clearly more concerned with projected Denmark abroad than were the Norwegians. If we look at the number of institutions, it was somewhere in between Norway and Sweden.

The impression is that in Norway, every change of budget had to be approved by the Parliament, which made the Expo 70 process in Norway much more political than in Sweden. The freedom of taking action on behalf of Sweden was, as it seems, placed in the hands of bureaucrats who had the authority to create a small part of
Swedish foreign policy as long as they reported to the politicians. There are almost no traces of governmental politicians in the Swedish material, whereas the Norwegian Minister of Trade is highly involved in the matter. In Norway, a small part of the Government Budget was reserved for trade fairs and other information/propaganda efforts abroad. A small office at the Foreign Ministry dealt with propaganda, but they were not heavily involved with the World Expositions. In Norway it does not seem that world expositions were seen in the context to reputation management. In Norway Expos were about exports. The Ministry of Trade and the Foreign Ministry’s 3rd office for trade policy handled negotiations with Denmark and Sweden. In Sweden, the Information Collegium, funded by the Government, was in charge. They complained of limited resources, but at the same time they could spend them as they wished. Their mandate was to spread information about Sweden to the rest of the world, and to build a good reputation abroad to increase Sweden’s goodwill. The main difference between the two countries was that Sweden had an office for information abroad that was active and which connected world expositions to a broader information purpose, whereas Norway connected world expositions mostly to exports, shipping and aviation and put the responsibility for this at the Ministry of Trade. The political aspect was thus higher in Norway than in Sweden. This can in turn explain why Sweden was more prepared and more efficient when decisions were made.

3.2 The Decision Making Process
The financial gain from a possible World Exposition participation was generally seen as low when compared to the relatively high cost demanded.\textsuperscript{117} Because of this, Sweden and Denmark had decided not to participate at the World Expo in Brussels in 1958, but both countries had bitter experiences after this non-participation.\textsuperscript{118} The Swedish information office, Upplysningsberedningen, which was the forerunner of the Information Collegium, was heavily criticized in Sweden afterwards for making this decision, and made the Swedish Government decide to participate at the World Expo.

Exposition in Seattle in 1962. The decision had come close to the Expo start, and thus also the preparations had started late. This was seen as the reason why the pavilion had been poorer and more expensive than it otherwise might have been. After this, Swedish representatives had learned their lesson and contacted colleagues in their neighboring countries in 1963 to discuss a possible joint representation at the World Exposition in Montreal in 1967.\textsuperscript{119} To avoid the same result as in Seattle, Sweden wanted to start the preparatory phase early and cooperating with the other Nordic countries. The result was a shared pavilion at Expo ‘67, though with separate exhibitions. They managed to limit the costs to a total of 18 million Swedish kroner in total divided on the five countries, when comparable countries spent 20 millions on their separate pavilions. The good economic result was seen as dependent on cooperation, a quick decision, as well as a quick start with preparations.\textsuperscript{120}

3.2.1 Sweden

In August 1966 the Scandinavian Governments received invitations to participate at the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970.\textsuperscript{121} Expo 67 in Montreal was the main priority at this time, and the governments of Scandinavia did not want to take on a new effort of this magnitude just three years after Expo ’67.\textsuperscript{122} If they chose to participate, the already stretched budget would once again be spent on a World Exposition. Because of this, in early September 1966, the Information Collegium decided to discourage the Swedish Government from participating at the World Expo in 1970, but the decision had one precondition: that the other Nordic nations agreed to abstain.

In November 1966, the Swedish Ambassador Almquist in Tokyo gathered representatives from Swedish industry in Japan, Kjell Öberg, and a representative from the Swedish Ministry of Trade in Tokyo. The reason for the meeting was that Almquist wanted state representatives and people from Swedish business sector to discuss the matter of Swedish participation at Expo ’70. Because Kjell Öberg at the

\textsuperscript{119} Expo ’67 lasted from March to September 1967.
\textsuperscript{120} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.03.67, Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg. Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67.
Information Collegium was reluctant to participation, the Ambassador wanted to present the views from the Swedish interests in Japan.

One of the representatives, Mr. Hoshino, who worked for the Swedish company Götaaverken in Japan, was alarmed by the negative attitude, and referred to the possible negative reactions this might have on Swedish export opportunities in Japan. The Japanese officials and industry apparently expected Sweden to participate. Swedish industry in Japan was thus afraid of the possible retaliation the Swedes could expect in case of a Swedish no show, as well as the possibility of being forgotten “by the Japanese people and industry”. The image of Sweden in Japan was that Sweden was “the welfare state, the social model country, which all countries should imitate”. The rest of the group was not too worried that exports from Sweden would suffer, either direct or indirect, but worried that “the favorably disposed Japanese people would be disappointed”. This in turn might lead to less Japanese goodwill, and instead be replaced by annoyance and less interest in Sweden, which possibly would be noticed for a long time afterwards.

At the same time, Ambassador Almquist stressed that to build goodwill in Japan, it was necessary for Sweden to participate at the Expo, and that the Japanese, “as all Asians, nurse their grievances; they don’t forget easily”. He was thus worried that abstaining would have long time effects, and that financial arguments presented by the Information Collegium were not strong enough to justify non-participation. He argued instead that participation had to be put into a larger picture and that it was necessary for Sweden to participate. They also discussed Nordic cooperation at the meeting. To save money, they could build a joint pavilion, but would not recommend more extensive cooperation than what they would have in Montreal.

123 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 04.11.66, Memo by Ambassador Almquist, after meeting at the Embassy, 01.11.66, attached to letter from Ambassador Almquist to the SMFA.
124 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.11.66, Memo by Ambassador Almquist, after meeting at the Embassy, attached to letter from Ambassador Almquist to the SMFA, 04.11.66. In Swedish: "(…) velfärdslandet, det sociala modellandet, som alla länder borde efterlikna".
125 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.11.66, Memo by Ambassador Almquist, after meeting at the Embassy, attached to letter from Ambassador Almquist to the SMFA, 04.11.66.
126 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 04.11.66, letter from Ambassador Almquist to the SMFA. In Swedish: "(…) är som alla asiaternas långsinta; de glömmer inte lätt".
127 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 04.11.66, letter from Ambassador Almquist to the SMFA.
128 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.11.66, Memo by Ambassador Almquist, after meeting at the Embassy, attached to letter from Ambassador Almquist to the SMFA, 04.11.66.
Kjell Öberg also reported from the meeting and stressed that only one representative used a positive argument (higher direct export possibilities) in favor of Swedish participation. At the same time this representative discouraged Nordic cooperation. Several argued for a small Swedish exhibition, with the argument of being afraid of the negative consequences on Swedish exports if they were not there. Some did not fear negative consequences at all.129

This is not quite the same impression Almquist gave. The two Swedish men had obviously different interests, and when reporting home they stressed different aspects of the meeting. Öberg would rather spend the limited resources he had on other efforts than yet another World Exposition. Almquist was stationed in Tokyo and obviously wanted more Swedish representation in Japan. This divergence in interests can explain the small gap between the two documents, which both were meant to be informative for the decision makers back in Sweden.

After the meeting, more exporters of Swedish goods to Japan announced their concern about the possible negative consequences on exports.130 The argument for participation grew stronger, not because anyone wanted to participate, but because they were afraid they couldn’t afford not to. It was argued by the Swedish Exporter’s Association that not to have the means to participate would be met with more understanding in Europe or America than in Japan. Abstaining would be interpreted to mean that Sweden “did not fulfill her obligations towards her selves”, which apparently was very serious in Japan.131 In that way, it would be risky not only economically, but also politically, not to participate. The Exporter’s Association obviously had interest in Swedish participation, but argued that it was not only exporters who could loose from abstaining. The reputation of the Swedish state was also a part of this, and the more prominent the political argument was, the more responsibility rested upon the government. Öberg argued that if the negative arguments were decisive, the Swedish pavilion should be as small as possible – it was his budget that would suffer from the increased responsibility of the state.132 He still

129 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.03.67, Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg. Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67.
130 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.03.67, Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg. Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67.
131 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.03.67, Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg. Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67.
132 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Memo regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg, 06.03.67. Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67.
warned that the quality had to be in the top range in order not to compromise the reputation Sweden had on this area.

As early as December 1966 the Swedes had begun to lobby for a Nordic small-scale joint exhibition, where one country would have the mandate to represent the other countries in one pavilion. The Swedes didn’t really want to participate, but because of pressure, they had to look at solutions of how participate and at the same time spend as little money as possible. Nordic cooperation was seen as the best way to achieve this.\textsuperscript{133} Sweden was thus the initiator of cooperation, whereas Denmark at that time saw it as too costly, even if the Nordic countries were to cooperate.\textsuperscript{134} Finland gave no indication of whether they wanted to participate or not.\textsuperscript{135} Norwegian participation was seen as doubtful in late 1966.\textsuperscript{136}

Öberg was very impressed with the Nordic cooperation in Montreal.\textsuperscript{137} It went remarkably well, he noted, but he wouldn’t recommend that they did the same thing one more time. They had five General Commissioners; they used five different architects and five other architects who were responsible for each country’s exhibition. The many different opinions obviously led to technical and administrative complications. Instead of having five committees who had to agree on every part of the pavilion, he suggested that the five Nordic countries would have one pavilion altogether, with only one exhibition. He wanted one of the five countries to organize the pavilion on behalf of the others, and that the others contribute only financially. He suggested that the country in charge could be Finland.

Öberg’s suggestion of Finland as the leader was not seriously debated in the Scandinavian Committee. The reason was probably that Finland did not wish to take the responsibility alone. In addition Denmark and Norway may have suspected Öberg of having an ulterior motive: to run the pavilion by proxy. Thus, they did not even bother discussing it.

Why Öberg suggested this is uncertain. No memo or minute of meeting is informative when comes to different viewpoints. Probably, Denmark and Norway thought it was too unrealistic to even bother debating. Still, it is interesting to

\textsuperscript{133} ANMFA, 47.2/53, Letter from the Norwegian Chargé d’Affairs a.i., Per Haugestad, 22.12.66.
\textsuperscript{134} ANMFA, 47.2/53, Letter from Sven Refsal at The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo, to the NMFA, 02.01.67.
\textsuperscript{135} ANMFA, 47.2/53, Letter from Chargé d’Affairs a.i., Ivar Eriksen, to the NMFA, 30.12.66.
\textsuperscript{136} ANMFA, 47.2/53, Memorandum from the NMFA, 13.01.67.
\textsuperscript{137} ANMFA, 47.2/53, P M regarding the Word Expo in Osaka 1970, Kjell Öberg, 06.03.67 Attached to letter from Norwegian Amabassador to Sweden, C.-H. Nauchhoff, 28.03.67
deliberate on. Perhaps it was because Finland was smaller and contributed with less money than Denmark, Norway and Sweden did in Montreal. Finland also possibly had the least interest export-wise in Japan, and thus had less to lose and could be the less biased leader. If Sweden, Denmark or Norway were responsible for representing the other three as a unit, it would have been almost impossible to agree on who would be the leader state. None of them would trust the others to take all three countries’ interests equally seriously. If one of them would present all of them, it could easily be directed towards promoting their own exports. Was it Öberg’s suggestion because Finland was close to Sweden, with its Swedish minority, and close ties? Denmark and Norway would probably be difficult to control, but Finland might be easier to influence for Öberg and Sweden? There are no answers to these questions in the material I have found, but it might be both the neutral position Finland had and the possibility of influencing them that lead Öberg to suggest Finland. The question that is harder to answer is why Öberg thought Finland would take on this responsibility when they had so little interest in Japan. Did he hope that Finland’s negativity could change, and thus make the whole region commit to participation, if they were given such a distinguishing position? But the negativity towards participation was not changing after Öberg’s suggestion of cooperation.138

In April 1967, Finland had decided not to participate at the Expo 70 even though the other Scandinavian countries would participate.139 Denmark was negative, but opened up for participation if Sweden and Norway said yes. Swedish industry had pushed for participation because of the fear of the possible negative effects of abstaining. Some of them assumed that the pressure from Japan was stronger because they had attended the Montreal Expo than it would have been if they were not present at Expo ’67. Because of the pressure from the exporters, the Swedish Government was more willing to participate and hoped for Nordic cooperation.

A survey made in Japan on Sweden showed that the Japanese did not think of Sweden as having highly developed manufacturing industry. Öberg considered Expo ’70 to be a good opportunity for correcting this perception. The survey Sweden made in Japan also shows that Sweden was ahead of the others in preparing for a smart

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139 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
presentation at Expo ’70. There were several lessons learned by this survey – first of all what kind of perception Japan had of Sweden and Scandinavia, but also that the perception was so wrong that Swedish planners had come to realize that the likely gains in terms of an enhanced reputation might make the Expo investment worth while.\textsuperscript{140}

3.2.2 Norway

The archive of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry indicates little Norwegian correspondence or interest in the Expo until the end of 1966. Even though Expo ’67 was soon to start, it was just a little more than three years until Expo ’70 would open its doors. Participation at a World Exposition is quite a large project for a country. It demands much planning, time and financial resources.\textsuperscript{141}

In January 1967, the Norwegian Minister of Commerce, Kåre Willoch, visited Japan. Ahead of this trip, it was expected that Norwegian participation at the Expo would come up as one of the main questions for the Minister. The most important, a Foreign Ministry official advised, was for Willoch not to give any negative impression about Norwegian participation. Instead, he had to be “benevolent and positive to Norwegian participation if he should hope to be able to spread goodwill in Japan at the moment”.\textsuperscript{142} Also the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan prepared Willoch for this question and recommended that Willoch be positive without giving any definite answers. He still concluded that participation would be “of greatest significance for our goodwill here in this country. Unfortunately, one must certainly expect that participation will be costly, the question is only whether we can afford not to do it”.\textsuperscript{143} Even though Willoch never got the question while in Japan, the way the bureaucrats informed him says something about how the Norwegians thought of the question in early 1967.\textsuperscript{144} There was at least not a total ignorance of the effects on goodwill for Norway and exports if the decision would be negative, or even if they

\textsuperscript{140} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.07.68, Kjell Öberg. Attached to Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka Committee at the Norwegian Export Council, 14.06.68
\textsuperscript{142} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.11.66, Letter from Bjarne Grindheim at the NMFA. In Norwegian: “(…) velvillig og positiv til Norges deltagelse hvis han skal håpe på å kunne spre good-will i Japan for nærværende”.
\textsuperscript{143} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.12.66, Letter from Knut Thommessen to the NMFA. In Norwegian: ”(…) av største betydning for vår good-will her i landet. Dessverre må man sikkert regne med at en deltagelse vil bli kostbar, spørsmålet er bare om vi har råd til å la det være.”
\textsuperscript{144} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 07.04.67, Memorandumby Norwegian Foreign Ministry
gave that impression before the decision was made. This was state officials, and not the exporters. At the same time, almost all of the Norwegian interests in Japan were negative to Norwegian participation – they could not see any positive effects that could come from this. As earlier mentioned, they had made extensive research on how to increase Norwegian exports to Japan. They had failed to find any solutions, due to the Japanese system of exporting as much as possible and keeping imports at a minimum. The Norwegian exporters was thus not unprepared, they did not just see the point in participation.

On April 21, 1967, six months after Sweden had done the same, NMFA arranged a meeting with The Export Council of Norway, the Norwegian Shipowner’s Association (NSA), the Norwegian Association of Manufacturers, Ministry of Commerce, The Norwegian Trade Fairs and SAS. The Export Council of Norway was negative because they could not see any commercial results from attending World Expositions; it would be a waste of money. They acknowledged the PR value of participation, as well as the negative effect it could cause in Japan, but for them this did not outweigh the costs. They had not directly surveyed the possible interest for this exhibition among exporters of food, textiles or marine equipment. In one way this might seem surprising that they recommended no-show before knowing what their members wanted. Still, they knew the Japanese system and thus assumed that there was no hope to increase exports. The Export Council did not see it as necessary for Norway to participate even if Sweden and Denmark would, because Norway often abstained from exhibitions and trade fairs (because of limited resources) when the others participated.

David Vikøren at NSA had also not yet asked their members what they thought about Norwegian participation. He still expected that The NSA wanted Norway to participate. This was due to Japan’s increasing market for marine equipment, which could make it worth the effort to appear at the Expo, he said.

Was he sure the market was increasing? This was not in accordance with the report from the delegation visiting Japan in 1963. Still, the trade relationship with Japan in the shipping sector grew – the Japanese sold more and more ships to

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145 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
146 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
147 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
Norway, and thus it was still important to keep the relationship between Norway and Japan good, even though the Norwegian deficit was large.

For the NSA, Expo 70 was more interesting than the Expo in Montreal, and Vikøren was afraid of the negative consequences if abstaining. He also noted that he hoped Norwegians would not oppose other Nordic countries’ participation, and that if one of the others participated, Norway should join them. Due to the shipping interests Norway actually had and needed to protect in Japan, it is surprising that this association did not push harder to make Norway participate at Expo ’70 (even though he said they probably wanted Norway to participate). They had not yet even discussed the matter, and Vikøren did not know for certain that they wanted Norway to be present – he just assumed. No real surveys or investigations had been done before late April.

The NSA – finally, I would add – gave an official opinion four weeks later.148 Japan was a significant market for Norwegian shipping and they strongly recommended that Norway should show their flag at the Expo ’70. They also stressed the negative effects if they did not participate. They considered the Osaka exhibition more important for Norwegian interests than the Expos in Brussels in 1958 and in Montreal in 1967 – at both of which Norway chose to be represented. For NSA, it was a matter of finances whether Norway should cooperate with other Nordic countries, but they reminded the NMFA that Mowinckel-Larsen thought it would be dangerous to start a bilateral cooperation with Sweden because they would be too domineering.

Since Denmark and Finland were negative, the Norwegian Trade Fairs had recommended that Norway presented a pavilion on its own, and thus the NSA thought so too.

The Federation of Norwegian Industries (FNI) did not give any indications of their stance before May 1967. They had not yet discussed the topic prior to the April meeting, but they supported the views of the Export Council.149 In May 1967, The FNI explained their view to NMFA. They could see no gain regarding increased export possibilities if Norway were to participate. The only possible negative effect was loss of goodwill, which they saw as a small hazard if the other Nordic countries

148 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 19.05.67, Letter from Odd-Leif Skundberg, The Norwegian Shipowners Association, to NMFA
149 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
also abstained. If one of the other wanted to be represented, Norway should be at the Expo ’70 as well.

The Director of Trade at the Norwegian Ministry of Commerce, Per Glad, noted that he had discussed the matter with Kåre Willoch. The Minister was positive to Norwegian participation because of possible negative effects on Norwegian export in case of abstention, especially if the other Nordic countries were considering representation. They had not discussed the possibility of a joint Swedish and Norwegian pavilion, but this could be the solution. Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs warned against this since he was persuaded that it “would be dominated by the Swedes”.

In early May 1967, Edward Mowinckel-Larsen argued that the cheapest option was for Norway to build its own pavilion in Norway and ship it to Japan – if Norway would participate. He found that this would be a better option than to go along the Swedish path. He was skeptical of cooperation with the Swedes, as seen several times, which is worth noticing. Norway’s Ambassador to Japan argued in favor of participating, not surprisingly. He wrote that it would be of great importance for the export industry, and worried if Norway could afford not to participate at Expo 70, which had “extreme importance in Japan”.

SAS was interested in a Nordic participation. Still, SAS was not the one arguing most in favor. The airline only noted that participation was of only indirect interest for SAS. This is noticeable both because the SAS card would be a strong negotiation card later in the process, and because they must have started negotiating with the Swedes already. Either the representative from SAS was not completely honest with the Norwegians at this meeting or he could have been misinformed, but this is not likely. SAS had started negotiating with the Japanese on landing rights, and a good relationship between Scandinavia and Japan was important to succeed in this negotiations. It was, after all, negotiations between Governments – not between SAS and JAL. SAS could thus not be ignorant as to whether it was considered desirable that Scandinavia be present at Expo 70.

In May, most of the organizations promoting Norwegian goods abroad (except for NSA and the Ambassador) discouraged Norwegian participation because it would

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150 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
151 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.05.67, Memorandum by Edward Mowinckel-Larsen, the Norwegian Trade Fairs
152 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 02.05.67, Knut Thommessen to NMFA
153 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.04.67, Minutes of meeting at the NMFA
go beyond the limited resources available to trade fairs and other exhibitions that directly influenced Norwegian exports. They were aware of the strong pressure Japan would put on Norway, but they still thought the negative effects would be less than the costs of participation.\textsuperscript{154} It is also noticeable that the Norwegians were so little prepared compared to the Swedes who had debated the question for several months already. This can of course be due to lack of understanding. It is possible they did not understand how much prestige this was for the Japanese, and how this indirectly could affect Norwegian exports. Norway had been present at the World Exposition in Brussels, and did not experience the same negative effects as the Swedes and the Danes did after Expo ’58.

The NMFA had a meeting with representatives from Denmark and Finland on Expo 70 in late June 1967. It is striking that no Swedes were present at the meeting, but the reason for this cannot be found in the documents. Everyone present was negative to participation due to the costs. The impression was that Sweden also was more reluctant than before.\textsuperscript{155} The Swedish reluctance was confirmed by Mowinckel-Larsen a week after the meeting, but had given indication that they were planning on making a definite decision in the near future.\textsuperscript{156} This was clearly not quite true. Sweden had planned a meeting with SAS, because SAS urged them to join their restaurant project, but the other Scandinavians were ignorant of this. Perhaps the Swedes kept away from the meeting, just to avoid telling the others of their plans with SAS, before they were secured.

Whether Mowinckel-Larsen was aware of the Swedes negotiating with SAS is uncertain. Why would he otherwise have said they were negative? Had he received all information from the Swedes, or did he interpret the answers he got according to his own preferences? Or did he have full information, but trying to influence the Finns and the Danes in any particular way? These questions are not easy to answer, but it would be strange if the Swedes had given him totally misleading indications. Mowinckel-Larsen was constantly skeptical of the Swedes and afraid they would run the show. It is possible to argue that it was his age – he was retiring during the summer of 1968 – and possibly his memory was not the best. He was born in the

\textsuperscript{154} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 08.05.67, Letter from Gunnar Jerman at The Export Council of Norway
\textsuperscript{155} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 28.06.67, Memorandum by NMFA
\textsuperscript{156} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 28.06.67, Memorandum by NMFA
period when Norway was a province of Sweden, and this might of course influence on his skepticism against the Swedes.

The misunderstanding and possible misinterpretation of the Swedish position is not necessarily only Mowinckel-Larsen’s fault. Perhaps they were indirect in their answers on whether or not they were planning to participate, but it would have been surprising if they gave clear indications to Mowinckel-Larsen that they were more negative than earlier and at the same time were negotiating with SAS. Perhaps the negotiations between SAS and Sweden had not yet started, but some kind of contact must at least have been established. I have not found any evidence on when SAS and the Swedes first started talking, other than Sweden informing all interested parties on July 7 that Nordic cooperation was failing.\textsuperscript{157} At the same time, they informed of their negotiation with SAS and SAS Catering.

To sum up, two days before the information of the cooperation between Sweden and SAS, the status according to NMFA was that Finland decided not to participate, and they had notified Japan of their decision.\textsuperscript{158} Denmark was negative, but was open for participation if the other Nordic countries decided to participate. The most important part for Denmark was that they did not want Japan to know this before the aviation negotiations continued in September. Sweden was determined \textit{not to participate}, but could change their minds if Denmark and Norway decided to go. The Swedish condition was that it would be a joint Nordic performance. Norway had not made up its mind either, and was in a situation where they could be decisive for Nordic participation over all. Norway wanted to wait for a clarification from the shipping sector, and how \textit{they} would react if Norway abstained. The conclusion was that in case of a negative decision, it was of great importance to keep this information away from the Japanese until at least after the next negotiation rounds regarding aviation rights in September.\textsuperscript{159} It was thus a very negative climate for participation only three years ahead of the opening of Expo 70. But the Norwegian view of the situation was somewhat incomplete. It most have been based on the information Mowinckel-Larsen gave the NMFA in late June 1967, stating that the Swedes were negative to participation. Instead, the Swedes had gone further on their own with their attempt of establishing some kind of representation at Expo ’70.

\textsuperscript{157} ANMFA, 47.2/53, Telex from the SMFA to the Swedish Embassy in Japan, undated, J.Nr. 13138 UD, 1967.
\textsuperscript{158} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.07.67, Memorandum by Hærum at the NMFA
\textsuperscript{159} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.07.67, Memorandum by Hærum at the NMFA
The Norwegians in general did not want participation. Still, arguments were raised in favor if Sweden and Denmark would participate. The same way of argumentation is used in Sweden and Denmark. It seems that no one really wanted to make the final decision. Why is that? Was it a game of chicken – where they just waited for someone else to loose their nerve? This would lead to one of the countries eventually making a decision that would influence the others to participate or abstain. If one of them would make the decision, they could also be blamed for it afterwards and thus be one taking the burden of responsibility. On the other hand, and probably more accurate, it could be a game of “Passing the Buck”. In that case, no one wanted to take the responsibility. Instead, they hoped that one of the other would take charge and make a decision that would affect the decision of the other Scandinavian countries. In this case, they could wait it out and blame the lack of vigor on the others if nothing happened. This is exactly what happened.

In early July, the SMFA stated that the attempts to establish a Nordic exhibition in Osaka were definitely without results. The only option for Sweden to be represented was to start cooperating with SAS Catering, they argued. The reason for participation was the friendship with Japan, which they did not want to jeopardize. When the SMFA argued like this, it looks as if Sweden all along had pushed for participation, which is not entirely true. Towards the Norwegians, they had given the impression of being quite negative all the way. But this was perhaps just a part of the negotiation game. I have found no evidence of why the Swedes acted in this way.

One of the most eager advocates of Norwegian participation at Expo ’70 was the Ambassador to Japan, Knut Thommessen. But that was in the beginning of 1968. Some months later, he had changed his position radically. When the Norwegian Osaka Committee met him in mid December 1968, Thommessen was asked to inform the members of the committee on how it was to work in Japan and what he as Norway’s representative in Japan would consider to be the outcome of the participation at Expo ’70. Thommessen stressed the importance of personal contact with the Japanese. He recommended strengthening the Embassy with more personnel, but it had to be Japanese-speaking secretaries. In his opinion, engaging a Norwegian

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160 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 07.07.67, Telex from SMFA
161 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 07.07.67, Telex from SMFA
162 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 02.01.69, Odd Grann.
trade secretary who solely would work with Expo ’70 was of no interest. He agreed that the Deputy Secretary should be Norwegian, but that he only should work in Japan before and during the exposition. Any follow-up work would not be necessary.

According to Thommessen, some work could be done with regard to tourism – Japan were the host of the Winter Olympics in 1972. Except for this, little could be done to increase exports to Japan. They could work to continue the exports already in place, but there were no basis to extend this. He suggested Norway had to take one step at a time. First of all, they could engage a deputy secretary, but he reserved against hiring this person afterwards. As a second step, he would apply for more resources for more information work.

Per Borgen commented to this in the margin of the memo that “Thommessen’s statements highly astonished those present.”163 It is striking that Thommessen was negative both to the suggested trade secretary, but also to the possible gain from Expo ’70. He had argued in favor of Norwegian representation at the exposition all the way, and had never said anything of his expectation that nothing good would come out of it – and that the best they could hope for was a status quo regarding exports.

Even though Thommessen felt he was misunderstood, and corrected the statements in a letter in mid-January 1969, the impression is still the same. He wrote that Norwegian participation was based on political grounds and that the Government decided to participate, even though the exporters recommended against this.164 Norwegian participation was in most part due to the large shipping interests and freight on Japan.165 Regarding exports, the large number in 1967 (161 million NOK) would not be the same in 1968, because the total amount of 35 million NOK from whale meet would disappear. Thus, Thommessen suggested that Norwegian exporters had to be happy if exports could be held at a level around 150 millions annually. To increase Norwegian exports to Japan was difficult, he argued. The main purpose of participate at Expo 70 would be to consolidate the position Norway already had, both for ship owners and for exporters. 25 percent of the Norwegian merchant fleet worked in Japan, but the future grand plans of Japan to increase their own fleet was the Norwegian position uncertain. Norwegian ship owners had to work hard to maintain their position. To hold up the export would thus be a big enough task, Thommessen

163 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 02.01.69, Per Borgen, handwritten comment to Odd Grann.
164 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.01.69, Knut Thommessen.
165 In Norwegian: ”fraktinntekter på Japan”.
argued. The most important was thus, as the Embassy saw the situation, to extend the Embassy’s trade representation, first and foremost on the Japanese side by hiring more Japanese people. He agreed that the Deputy Commissioner General should be Norwegian, but how the Embassy could use this person afterwards was uncertain. It would depend on the qualifications of the person.

In less than a year, Thommessens argumentation towards the Norwegian Expo ’70 Committee had changed drastically. Still, two months later, when he was interviewed by Morgenbladet in February 1969, he shook his head over the low interest by Norwegian exporters to Japan. He found it strange that both The FNI and the Export Association dissuaded Norwegian participation, because they felt it was waste of money. He said to the reporter:

I was particularly struck by the low interest from the exporters when our participation was accepted by Stortinget. Our annually export to Japan is 150 million kroner; one could thus believe that our exporters would show more enthusiasm. The exports by the way decreased al little in 1968 due to a stop in whale meet, but we hope the numbers will go up again in 1969.”

This is far from what he said at the meeting with the Norwegian Osaka Committee, both according to the minute of the meeting, and to his letter afterwards. Why he was so inconsistent is difficult to say. He might in fact be astonished over the low response from the Norwegian exporters because the possibilities were in fact large, or he wanted to put responsibility on them in public, to blame someone for the modest presentation Norway had on Expo 70 (or for any other reason). He was however very inconsistent in what he said publicly and how he argued internally, and also very conflicting in his own argumentation over time.

3.3 Pressure from Outside

3.3.1 SAS
SAS was negotiating with Japanese authorities on aviation rights in Japan during the same period. The first evidence on this being of importance for the Osaka negotiations and vice versa is from July 3, 1967. The working group for the rights was

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166 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 18.02.69, Morgenbladet.
167 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Morgenbladet, 18.02.69. In Norwegian: ”Da vår deltagelse ble godtatt av Stortinget var jeg særlig slått av hvor liten interessen var på eksphold.”
informed in late June that the Nordic countries had decided not to participate in Expo ’70. The Permanent Undersecretary Bernstrøm stressed the importance that the Japanese should be held ignorant of this information until the next part of the aviation negotiations were completed in September 1967. The reason was that it seemed as Japan considered participation at the Expo exceedingly important. If they knew that the Scandinavian countries would abstain, it would “rest heavily over the aviation negotiations in the Scandinavian country’s disfavor”. He then asked for a “foolproof” solution in order to prevent the Japanese from hearing about the negative decision at that point.

Much because of these negotiations, SAS had given clear indications in early summer 1967 of the importance of Scandinavian participation. If this was not possible, they were interested in running a restaurant at Expo ’70 by themselves. It was unfortunate to be at the area for private companies, and they would rather be present at the area for state pavilions. Because of the interest among Swedish exporters to Japan, who were reacting stronger to the negativity in Sweden than the Norwegian and Danish exporters did, the Swedish Government was more willing to be welcoming to participation than Denmark and Norway. Thus, SAS Catering had a meeting with Kjell Öberg in July 1967, together with Swedish Industry and Exporters, Swedish Foreign Minister, and SIAB.

The result was five alternative possible solutions. Either Sweden participated alone together with SAS Catering, Sweden and one of the other Nordic countries cooperated with SAS Catering and for each country that joined in, the area would increase, or they kept the initial 1200 m2 regardless of how many of the other countries that participated. Either way, the pavilion had to be official, so that there would be no rent. If SAS Catering wanted to be at Expo ’70 without state cooperation, they had to place the pavilion at another part of the exposition site, and they would have to pay rent. This would be a far less favorable location, and much more expensive.

168 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 03.07.67, Memorandum by Bjarne Grindheim at the NMFA
171 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 22.11.67, Erik Paalsgaard.
In Montreal, SAS Catering had run the restaurant at the Scandinavian Pavilion. They had cooperated with the Swedish construction company SIAB, and when SAS wanted representation at Expo ’70 as well, it was natural to ask SIAB to draw and construct the restaurant. Thus, when they started negotiation with the Swedes on whether they could cooperate also in Osaka, they already had plans on how the architecture of the restaurant would be. It was modified because they needed area for the exposition part of the pavilion, and also changed when the designers of the pavilion theme had given their opinion. To get started as soon as possible with the construction at the exposition site, they did not start from scratch to find a new constructor and a new architect. They neither change more than necessary, even though critique of the exterior was raised in the Scandinavian Pavilion Committee.

The NMFA thought the process of participation was failing on July 5, 1967. This was completely untrue. Instead, the process speeded up. In mid July, the SMFA gave the Embassy the authority to apply for an option on space at the exposition area. This was basically the same as giving a positive answer to the Expo 70 Committee of Swedish participation. Probably, Sweden had prepared for this over a longer period than they had given indication of to the Norwegians (probably the Danes and Finns as well, but I have no evidence for this).

During the summer, Sweden had drastically changed their position, at least in saying. During a two-week period, they went from being negative to participation, to being so positive that they even gave Japan positive indications. The other Nordic countries were curtly informed that the time for talk was up and the attitude was harsh: they informed the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Shipping of their new decision, stating that they wanted Nordic cooperation, but would do it on their own if necessary. The cooperation with SAS on a restaurant was a solution they could not be sure that the organizers would accept, but when they got the needed approval, it was seen as win-win situation. Sweden would gain goodwill in Japan, without spending too much money because SAS would contribute. At the same time, they put pressure on Denmark and Norway. If one of the Nordic countries would be present,

172 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Telex from the SMFA to the Swedish Embassy in Japan, undated, J.Nr. 13138 UD, 1967.
173 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 25.07.67, Letter from G. Von Sydow to the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Shipping, and ANMFA, 47.2/53, Telex from the SMFA to the Swedish Embassy in Japan, undated.
174 Swedish National Archives (SNA) SE/RA/420250/E I, 01.08.67, Kjell Öberg, "Memo regaring the World Exposition in Osaka”
174 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 16.08.67, Letter from Mowinckel-Larsen to the NMFA
the others would loose even more goodwill than if none of them were represented. It looks like a calculated risk from the Swedish side. They knew that Denmark and Norway had to join, and they would, because they had taken the initiative, have the upper hand in the joint venture. This would give them a better position when the anticipated Nordic cooperation began. Suddenly, Norway had lost what seemed like a balancing position, which could have put them in the leading role in a possible joint Nordic project. Sweden had taken charge of the situation instead, and won the game of *passing the buck*.

In response to this, Mowinckel-Larsen informed the NMFA of his view on the situation. He would not give any definite statement as to whether Norway should participate, before the agreement between SAS Catering and Sweden was in place. Still, Mowinckel-Larsen warned once again against cooperation with the Swedes. From what he had seen of the Swedes, he thought it wise to “show great caution when it comes to a Norwegian exhibition participation”.

### 3.3.2 The Nordic Council
On February 20 1968, the Nordic Council recommended that the Governments of the Nordic countries secure Nordic cooperation at the Expo 70. The minute of meeting shows that Iceland was positive, but that Finland had not yet decided whether to participate. It was very important for the Nordic Council that all the Nordic countries acted jointly. They pointed out the positive experience that the Montreal cooperation had given them. The pavilion in Montreal had been visited by seven million, and the Nordic Council suggested that the commercial and informational outcome was greater than if they had presented themselves as five different countries. Also the lower costs of cooperation were stressed, but the most important issue was that the Nordic region manifested its interdependence to the rest of the world. The Nordic Council had earlier stressed the greater impact the region had together on the information area compared to what each of the countries could do on its own. Also, the rest of the world had historically looked at the Nordic region as one unit, and that this notion was still strong, especially in places far from the Nordic region. A Nordic pavilion would easily coincide with the notion of the region in Asia, they argued. Thus, it was important that they took care to nurse interest for the region in the Eastern hemisphere by cooperating on the Expo 70 pavilion. Still, that the Nordic Council encouraged the

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175 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 20.02.68, Nordic Council
Nordic Governments to work together is hardly new. If something were somewhat near a possible joint project, the Nordic Council would recommend it being a reality. For them, it was crucial to keep the image of the joint Nordic region strong.177

3.3.3 Japan
Because of the reluctance of the Nordic governments to participate, the Japanese government sent their Special Representative for Expo '70 together with a man with the somewhat peculiar title “the Expo 70’s Chief of Propaganda” to Scandinavia in May 1967. They wanted to meet with key decision-makers regarding Expo 70, including the Minister of Commerce.178 A dinner was planned for the delegation in Oslo. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry was afraid at this point that Norwegian participation could not be avoided, even though no one really wanted to.179 Therefore, to prepare the delegation for the official dinner, he wrote that “Under these circumstances, there should probably not be held any real speech during the dinner – there would be very little positive to say.”180

In August 1967, the Danish Ambassador to Japan, Zytphen-Adeler, had a meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Takeo Miki.181 The Ambassador expressed his hope for a positive outcome of the forthcoming aviation negotiations in Stockholm in September. The Foreign Minister could not give any direct response to this, but answered instead by mention the negative Danish attitude regarding Expo 70, which had made him disappointed. Denmark was present in Montreal, and Miki claimed that for Denmark, the Japanese market was at least as important as the Canadian. He hoped that Denmark would reconsider in the question, and after all participate at the exposition. He intended to invite the Nordic Ambassadors to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the matter more. For the Ambassador, it was obvious that the Japanese Government, Japanese authorities, and the Japanese public found it important that as many countries as possible would participate at the Expo. He warned that the negative side effects and the loss of goodwill in Japan would be great if Denmark did not partake.182

177 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 20.02.68, Nordic Council
178 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 18.04.67, Memorandum written by G. O. Hærum
179 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.05.68, Memorandum written by G. O. Hærum at the NMFA
180 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 09.05.68, Memorandum written by G. O. Hærum at the NMFA. In Norwegian: "Under disse omstendigheter bør det vel ikke holdes noen egentlig tale ved middagen - det vil være meget lite positivt å si."
181 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 17.08.67, Letter from Ambassador H. Zytphen-Adeler to the DFM
182 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 17.08.67, Letter from Ambassador H. Zytphen-Adeler to the DFM
The link between the aviation rights and the Expo was at this point explicit. The Danish Ambassador forcefully pointed out the fear when stating that the question would not be without influence on the outcome of the forthcoming aviation negotiations in Stockholm and that the Japanese attitude during this could be far more positive than expected at this moment, if one could announce the Japanese that the question of the three Scandinavian countries’ participation at EXPO 70 was taken into renewed consideration.  

Obviously, the plan of keeping the negative attitude towards participation a secret had failed, and this could have consequences that influenced the negotiations on landing rights. This is a good example of situations where participation at World Expositions has larger consequences than the goodwill effects achieved after the end of the World Exposition. The negotiations in front may be of importance for other questions regarding the host country and potential participating countries – in this case landing rights for SAS in Japan. Thus, World Exposition may have a wider importance for countries’ foreign policy than merely gain or loss of goodwill. Still, the importance of world expositions should not be exaggerated. For the Scandinavian countries in the 1960’s, it cannot be seen as crucial to their foreign policy. Instead, as in this case, it should merely be seen as a tool to gain other goals than as a goal in itself.

In late August 1967, the NMFA arranged a meeting with Norwegian interested parties. The situation was not the one Norway wanted, because the negative information had leaked to the Japanese. They, in turn, had put more pressure on the Scandinavians to try to convince them of changing to a more positive attitude towards participation. In a note to the NMFA, the Japanese Ambassador to Norway pointed out the great economical interests Norway had in Japan. The NSA was still interested in Norwegian participation, and was positive to cooperation with the Swedes, as proposed in early August, but rather not represented by a restaurant run by SAS. The FNI had not changed their view either; they were still negative to participation due to the small interests in Japan of Norwegian manufacturing industries. The Ministry of

183 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 17.08.67, Letter from Ambassador H. Zytphen-Adeler to the DFM. In Danish: ”(…) at spørgsmålet ikke vil være uden indflydelse på udfaldet af de forestående luftfartsforhandlinger i Stockholm og at japansk indstilling under disse kunne blive langt mer positiv end i øjeblikket ventet, såfremt man kunde meddele japonerne, at spørgsmålet om de tre skandinaviske landes deltagelse i EXPO 70 var taget op til fornyet behandling.”  
184 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 25.08.67, Minute of Meeting at the NMFA
Trade had not yet decided. They were positive to participation, but feared the costs. Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs saw it as possible to present a small exhibition linked to the restaurant, but warned that no single Scandinavian country should be able to have a dominant position. Once again he warned about the Swedes, even though it is not stated explicitly here – he might have been worried about the Danes, but this is less likely. The NMFA wanted to meet informally with the other Foreign Ministries and discuss the matter. Mowinckel-Larsen liked the idea; especially since they had to decide which area at the exhibition ground they wanted. He suggested that a Norwegian should go to Japan to look into this, something which Per Borgen thought should be discussed with the others first. Here it obviously was of high importance for Mowinckel-Larsen to take control over the situation. He always was worried that the Norwegian interests might suffer from the Swedes’ domination. And he was right. Borgen noted that Norway had more interests in Japan than Sweden and Denmark, something that Principal Officer at the NMFA backed up. He thought Norway had the largest economic interests in Japan, and therefore should take the lead, and let the Swedes and the Danes comply with them. If this was the NMFA’s position, I think they were a little late. The Swedes were already in the forefront of the possible participation. It is strange that the NMFA did not see this before, and thus made an effort earlier. Now, they had to follow the Swedish line. Director General Stokke at the Ministry of Trade was not so sure about Norway having the greatest interests in Japan. He noted that Sweden and Denmark had large industrial interests, and this seems true. Norwegian shipowners had of course large interests in Japan, but had not made any effort to affect the Norwegian Government in any convincing way. It was after all Swedish industry in Japan that had, together with SAS, managed to make Sweden turn in a positive direction because of the potential loss of goodwill and exports.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Miki, summoned representatives from Sweden, Finland and Norway to a meeting at the Japanese Foreign Ministry in late August 1967 so that they could communicate his personal wish that the Nordic countries could find possibilities of joining the Expo ’70. He had already spoken to the Danish Ambassador. Finland had notified the Japanese government of their negative response, but Miki wanted the Ambassador to push for reconsideration. The

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185 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 30.08.67, Letter from Chargé d'affairs at the Norwegian Embassy in Japan to the NMFA,
Swedish Ambassador informed that Sweden would participate, and informed of the measures taken to prepare for this. The Norwegian Ambassador could not give any definite answer as to whether Norway would participate or not, but informed that they would consider it together with Denmark and Sweden.

No other country than the Nordic ones was invited to a meeting like this. Miki said that it was of special interest for Japan that the Scandinavian countries were present at Expo ’70. He looked upon them as the gateway to Europe. The aviation agreement had made Japan and Scandinavia neighbors. The Japanese people considered Scandinavia as good friends, because of the idealism and way of living of the Scandinavians. It would cause great disappointment in Japan if the Scandinavian countries abstained from the exhibition. Here again, the arguments of the feeling of the Japanese people were used to convince the Scandinavians of the importance of their participation.

Soon after, on August 30, the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry, Kanno, announced by telephone that he would come to Norway in mid-September 1967 to ask the Minister of Trade, Kåre Willoch, to make a quick and positive decision regarding Norwegian participation at Expo 70.186 This sounded strange to the Norwegians; especially as Foreign Minister Miki did not mention this at the meeting with the Ambassadors August 24, nor had anyone else.

Kåre Willoch produced a memo for a Cabinet Meeting in the beginning of September 1967, where he noted that the Japanese, in several ways, saw it as important that the Scandinavian countries would participate. The Norwegian Export and FNI did not recommend Norway to spend money on this, but SAS and the Shipowners were positive, because of the potential loss of goodwill, which an abstention could lead to. Sweden had taken the initiative for Scandinavian cooperation on a small scale, where SAS would take on a great deal of the costs. At the Cabinet Meeting, Willoch wanted a preliminary decision to be made. A separate Norwegian pavilion would be very expensive, and could not be recommended. At the same time, it would not be advisable either to stay away if Sweden and Denmark participated, and a joint pavilion would not be alarmingly expensive. He also noted that “it would be very hard to refuse participation if Sweden decides to participate, too, (which we probably have to count on), even if the other Nordic countries

186 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 30.08.67, Letter from Chargé d’Affairs at the Norewegian Embassy in Japan to the NMFA,
abstain”187 Here, Willoch is clearly alarmed by the possibility of Sweden participating alone. He considered the goodwill-loss greater if Sweden participated and Norway abstained, than if both decided not to be present.

As earlier noted, it seems like it was a calculated risk for Sweden to be so sure of cooperation. Sweden knew the others had to join if they gave impression that they would do it anyhow. The loss of goodwill for a country that abstained was higher if another comparable country would participate. Willoch’s conclusion was that Norway should continue negotiating with the other Nordic countries and Norwegian commercial interests, and that they should participate at the lowest possible cost. If the decision to participate were to be taken, it would be important to make it sooner than later. If negative, it could wait. Both options were based on how to make the goodwill loss the smallest possible.188

The Scandinavians were initially hopeful that the SAS aviation rights would have been conducted before any Expo decision had been made. That proved to be a false hope as negotiations were postponed until early 1968. Thus SAS became a pawn rather than a trump in the game.189 Sweden had reserved an area at the Expo ground, which they obtained on a temporary basis and they only had the rights of the spot to the end of the year. When the aviation negotiations were postponed, they had to prolong. The two questions were interrelated, and manipulated by both sides.

The Norwegians were more reluctant to state that without a positive solution of the aviation rights negotiations, they would definitely abstain from Expo ’70. Instead, they wanted Sweden to take the initiative and summon a meeting when a preliminary budget was in place, which depended on SAS Catering. Thus, everyone agreed on waiting for a concrete offer from SAS Catering, which would be followed by a Swedish initiative for a Nordic meeting where further steps would be taken regarding practical questions in the matter.190 They would inform that the Scandinavian countries worked on a positive solution that would make them able to participate, but that the Japanese stance in the aviation rights negotiations made it difficult, though they would not place an ultimatum of not participating if the negotiations failed. They did not mean to communicate this directly to the Japanese,
but at the same time, they would not give the Japanese any ultimatum or answer with this if asked.

The Danish business sector was not interested in Danish participation, and therefore the Government was reluctant at best. In addition, the Danes claimed that their experiences at the Montreal Expo were of a negative kind, and for that reason as well they were disinclined to participate.\textsuperscript{191} I have found no indications in the Norwegian or Swedish archives of such dissatisfaction on the part of any of the Scandinavians, and the Danes did not elaborate on the issue. Thus we do not know what caused the Danes to consider the Montreal experience a negative one. Perhaps it was the old argument of little outcome of the large expenses and thus not worth it, or it could have been dissatisfaction with the cooperation. Anyhow, they were reluctant to participate at a point where Sweden had made it almost impossible for them not to join.

The aviation rights negotiations were adjourned on September 14 without any other agreement than to continue in January 1968.\textsuperscript{192} According to one of the Japanese delegates to the meeting in Stockholm, the negotiations had been very difficult and acrimonious.\textsuperscript{193} Apparently, the Japanese delegates had been shocked by the Swedish Foreign Minister’s angry outburst directed at the Japanese Ambassador at the meeting, which in turn had led to resentment not only at the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm, but also home in Japan.\textsuperscript{194} The Stockholm meeting in September made for somewhat strained relations, but matters improved when the Japanese Minister of Transportation visited Denmark later in September 1967. The Counselor for International Affairs at the Ministry of Transportation, Mr. Yoichi Hayashi, met the Norwegian Ambassador Thommessen in Tokyo after the Minister’s return to Japan. Hayashi told Thommessen that the Minister felt that the Danish way of presenting the question was far more appropriate than the Swedish one. Thommessen answered him that he was sorry that the negative outcome of the meeting might result in Scandinavia abstaining from Expo ’70, because it was SAS that would make it possible for them to be represented. They would not contribute if the negotiations failed. Mr. Hayashi replied that they did not pair aviation rights with other questions,
and that traffic rights were strictly a question of aviation, nothing else.\textsuperscript{195} This was clearly not the case, but for some parties it seems like it was important not to talk about the connection openly - as is evident when the Norwegian newspaper \textit{Verdens Gang} interviewed SAS on the connection in September 1968.\textsuperscript{196} According to Thommessen, the Swedish Minister felt that SAS and Sweden were badly treated by the Japanese, and thus the outburst at the meeting in Stockholm. But also the Norwegians felt they were badly treated by the Japanese, and he told Hayashi that a negative outcome would affect the relationship also between Japan and Norway. He also stressed that Japan was the 7\textsuperscript{th} most important trading partner for Norway, which required increased transport capacity between the two countries.\textsuperscript{197} Thommessen obviously made no attempt to separate the two questions, as both SAS did afterwards and Hayashi tried to do when talking to Thommessen.

Hayashi then said that the Japanese Ministry of Transportation was positive to the increase to three SAS flights a week, but that JAL objected. Hayashi said the Ministry put as much pressure at JAL as they possibly could, but they had to keep in mind that the president of JAL could walk in and out at Prime Minister Sato’s office as he wished, and thus the Trade Ministry had to be very cautious in bringing critique to the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{198}

The problem was that SAS wanted permission to land in Japan three times a week, not two. The number of people traveling on the North Pole Route increased, and more flight were necessary, the Scandinavians argued. There would even be possible for Japan Airlines to land three times in Scandinavia each week, if they wished so. According to SAS, another flight a week would give approximately 30 million SEK more each year. The costs of participation at the Expo would be around 10 million SEK.\textsuperscript{199} The Danes used the argument that if Japan were more positive to this, the Scandinavian business sector would see it as more interesting to participate in Expo ’70, and thus it would be possible to produce the collect funding needed.\textsuperscript{200}

The Swedish Trade Minister, Gunnar Lange, told his Japanese counterpart, Mr. Konno, that Sweden was positive to participation, but that the short time between

\textsuperscript{195}ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.10.67, Memo, Knut Thommessen to NMFA
\textsuperscript{196}ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.10.68, \textit{Verdens Gang}
\textsuperscript{197}ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.10.67, Memo, Knut Thommessen to NMFA
\textsuperscript{198}ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.10.67, Memo, Knut Thommessen to NMFA
\textsuperscript{199}ANMFA, 47.2/53, 28.09.68, From article “Lättare för SAS om Sverige deltar i Expo 70” English: “Easier for SAS if Sweden participate at Expo 70” in Swedish paper \textit{Veckans Affärer}
\textsuperscript{200}ANMFA, 47.2/53, 17.09.67, Memo to the Danish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
the two Expositions in Montreal and Osaka made it difficult to find the money. SAS was initially interested in contributing to the Swedish pavilion, Lange said, but the negative results of the Aviation Rights negotiations constituted a serious hurdle. The Japanese Minister said he would inform the Minister of Transportation of this view.²⁰¹

Also the Norwegian Prime Minister, Per Borten, met with Minister Konno in September 1967. He, as Lange, also favored a Norwegian participation in Osaka, but feared the financial costs. This would be easier if SAS would contribute, he argued, something they would consider if the aviation rights were granted. Konno replied in the same way as he had done with the Swedish Minister and would pass the question on to the Government when he returned to Japan.²⁰² These episodes show that the aviation rights were used as an important argument when negotiating the participation in Expo 70. Or the other way around – Expo 70 was used to achieve goals that were important for the Scandinavian countries. In this way, World Expositions were a part of the foreign policies that is not possible to see when visiting an exposition or pavilion. It is probably not only the Scandinavian countries that tried to accomplish own agendas in the process before accepting participation at exhibitions. In this way, World Expositions becomes a part of the game played at the international arena in more ways than is seen at the surface.

Were the Scandinavian Governments prepared at this time to finance participation if the aviation negotiations favored SAS? The sources do not give explicit evidence about this. It looks like they felt they had to participate in one way or another, and that they are pressured into this, but that they wanted to gain something from it. Exactly how important aviation rights were for the Scandinavians is not possible to read from the documents. On the one hand, SAS clearly wanted additional landing rights, and the Governments clearly used Expo ’70 to achieve that. On the other hand, the Scandinavian governments initially were not keen to participate. They were brought to change their minds by Japanese pressure by means of the landing rights issue above all, and by SAS pressure. If this is true, they used the aviation negotiations to have some gain, in a situation that was locked already. Both sides tried to bring other issues to bear on Expo ’70 participation. A Swedish magazine wrote in October 1967 that it would be easier for SAS to succeed in their negotiations if the Scandinavian countries said yes to participation at Expo 70. This

²⁰¹ ANMFA, 47.2/53, 19.09.67, Per Ølberg at NMFA, Trade Office
²⁰² ANMFA, 47.2/53, 20.09.67, Memo, NMFA
information apparently came from a Japanese source.\textsuperscript{203} The same article quotes Kjell Öberg who suggested that there were no positive arguments in favor of participation.\textsuperscript{204}

For a host country like Japan in 1970, there must have been several negotiations like this. It was possible loss of prestige if large countries abstained, and also if several small countries choose not to participate. Japan managed to get 70 countries to be represented at the Expo, which is high. If half of them negotiated like the Scandinavians did, it must have been at a high cost in different areas in trade and foreign policy. Still, they clearly considered the goodwill gain from arranging a World Exposition as higher than the overall costs. It is thus important not only to look at the documented costs of everything from making the site ready for construction work and setting up all the pavilions to the salaries for staff, but it is also important to take into consideration the costs that are hidden in pre-Expo international negotiations.

The Nordic Council (NC) sent a recommendation to all the Nordic governments in October 1967.\textsuperscript{205} The Council had long wanted more joint Nordic representation abroad, and was pleased with the efforts made at the World Expo in Montreal in 1967. They wished the next one would go even further, by having a joint exhibition at the pavilion, and not divide the pavilion into five different parts – one for each country. They also suggested that the Nordic countries would have one joint Commissioner General to coordinate the work, instead of having five who had to agree in everything before any decisions could be made. A handwritten remark on the left margin of the letter shows that the Norwegians marked it as important.\textsuperscript{206} The pavilion was in fact organized with one joint Commissioner General and as one exhibition, not divided into separate ones for each country. It was therefore NC who suggested the result, even if the Swedes presented it later. Maybe it thus was more difficult to reject the offer of participation, when NC was in favor and also had suggested how to manage it.

\textsuperscript{203} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 12.10.67, Memo by Jan Ölander
\textsuperscript{204} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 28.09.68, From article "Lättare för SAS om Sverige deltar i Expo 70" English: "Easier for SAS if Sweden participate at Expo 70" in Swedish paper "Veckans Affärer"
\textsuperscript{205} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.09.67, Eino Sirén (President of the NC)
\textsuperscript{206} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 29.09.67, Remark by Hærum. In Eino Sirén (President of the NC)
In October 1967, SAS decided to participate if certain conditions were fulfilled. All the three Scandinavian countries had to join; if the budget were exceeded the extra costs had to be divided on all of the participants; and that negotiations between SAS Catering and the Nordic nations could not be started before the end of the negotiations on aviation rights in mid-November. Regardless of the outcome of the JAL-SAS negotiations, SAS saw the positive aspects of showing the flag in Japan. It would be of less interest if they could not have more frequent flights, and it would be difficult to justify spending the requested amount of money if they did not get the landing rights. The new requirements from SAS thus put Sweden in a situation where they had to pressure the others to join. It was important for Sweden to be represented at Expo 70, not only because of SAS (they held more shares in SAS than the others), but also for other exporters of Swedish goods to Japan. Followed by this, when SAS directly joined the two issues, it was even more important to have a positive outcome in the aviation negotiations. It is also possible that the process of negotiation and talking to different actors present in Japan – both at the Embassies and in private firms – had made the Scandinavians at home more aware of the importance of being present at Expo ’70. By talking to people with more knowledge and negotiating internally, it is possible that more understanding of the situation came forth. Especially the experience Denmark and Sweden had after their no-show at Brussels in 1958 could have played a part. Probably, not everyone knew about the negative effects this had on exports to Belgium and the loss of goodwill this resulted in, and it was probable that this could have the same influence in Japan. Japan was seen as something unknown and special, but they could not be certain that the Japanese would treat the countries, which did not come to Expo 70 better than Belgium did. In fact, it is more likely that they regarded the goodwill loss in Japan harder to win back than the loss they had in Belgium. Still, the Brussels experience had made them realize that not being present at World Expositions actually could have the consequences some of the actors warned against.

One of the actors who warned against this was the Norwegian Ambassador Thommessen, who welcomed the new possibility for Norway to participate at Expo 70. Earlier he had tried to persuade the Foreign Ministry to accept the fact that it was important to participate. The only objection he had was of practical character: that the

\[207\] ANMFA, 47.2/53, 22.11.67, Erik Paalsgaard
area at the pavilion for an exhibition was small when the SAS Catering restaurant took the better part of the space. He also warned that one of the countries might find more resources at a later stage and through this overshadow the others.208

In January 1968, SAS, SAS Catering and the Scandinavian countries met in Copenhagen to negotiate participation at Expo 70.209 At first, the offer from SAS/SAS Catering was too small for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. At this stage, Sweden and Norway considered participation to be too expensive and they considered the possibility of cancelling both the negotiations and the Expo participation, even though they had been positive at the beginning of the meeting. Denmark was eager to continue the negotiations with SAS/SAS Catering and did not want to give up the possibility of participation at the Expo. It is remarkable that Sweden was willing to give up and that it was Denmark that pushed forward at this stage. After all, it was Sweden that had the option for the pavilion area and had managed to get Denmark and Norway in a positive direction. It might also be a part of the negotiation to put pressure on SAS to contribute more than they initially wanted to. Both Sweden and SAS were far into in the process at this stage, and it would not have been easy for either of them to suddenly drop out. During the negotiations it seems like SAS also was more reluctant at this stage than they were 6 months earlier. Thus, it is plausible to think that it was merely negotiation tactics to be that negative to participation during the meeting.

The negotiations with JAL had not been successful and the possibilities of increasing frequencies were small. Therefore, it was less interesting to spend resources in Japan – because of the restrictive aviation policies – than in Northern America where there were better possibilities of increasing the number of flights, SAS argued. Thus, they were more reluctant to spend the same amount of money on Japan as they had spent in Montreal.210 Department Chief Müller from the Danish Ministry of Trade was surprised by this, because he had the impression that is was important for SAS that Scandinavia participated at Expo 70 because of the aviation rights negotiations. Also Kjell Öberg noted that it was mostly because of SAS that they considered participation at Expo 70, and if it was of lesser interest for SAS to be there

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208 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.12.67, Ambassador Thommessen
209 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 15.01.68, G. O. Hærum, 3rd Trade Political Office, NMFA
210 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 12.01.68, Minute of Meeting
than first expressed, a reevaluation of participation had to be done. SAS did not respond directly to this. In separate meeting session, which SAS and SAS Catering did not attend, the representative from Denmark’s Foreign Minister, Müller, suggested that it was not of crucial significance that SAS/SAS Catering was in.

Mowinckel-Larsen at the Norwegian Trade Fairs agreed with this. They were actually willing to pay for a pavilion without SAS contributing. Öberg agreed. Groot (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) suggested that without a restaurant, it would lead to a less impressive pavilion. Öberg replied that it would be less expensive when they did not have to contribute to the SAS Catering restaurant. The most important argument was that they would be there to show their flags, and in that way they would avoid the possible goodwill-loss in Japan. This was new. All the Scandinavians were at this point positive to participation even is SAS/SAS Catering did not contribute. The possibility of loosing goodwill was suddenly higher on the agenda than before. I have not found any evidence for the reasons for the sudden change in attitude. This seems very odd. It might be because they acquired more knowledge as time went by, and it might be a result of other negotiations that are not present in the archives I have read. It might also be a part of the negotiation with SAS and SAS Catering – they were not dependent on them to realize the project. Thus, SAS could not dictate the conditions and the Scandinavian Governments would have a better hand when playing the game.

At the end of the meeting, an agreement was made where SAS/SAS Catering took greater risks and contributed somewhat more than they initially had suggested. The representatives from Denmark, Norway and Sweden concluded by recommending their governments to accept the conditions and cooperate with SAS/SAS Catering on a pavilion at Expo 70. It seems that the negotiators from the Scandinavian Governments had succeeded in pushing SAS into taking responsibility they did not want to take in the first place.

The whole process to get the Nordic governments to participate is pushed forward by pressure from outside. First, none of them wanted to make the effort. Then SAS and other Swedish exporters pressured Sweden into negotiations. This, in turn, made Denmark and Norway more positive – they could not refuse if Sweden participated. It was Kjell Öberg’s impression that if Denmark, Norway and Sweden

\[211\] ANMFA, 47.2/53, 12.01.68, Minute of Meeting
participated, then Finland would join in as well. After all, the Nordic Council had recommended a joint Nordic pavilion at Expo ’70. If Finland joined, Iceland had to participate too – even though it would have to be symbolic. It is obvious that pressure from outside has been a major source of participation at expositions. No one actually wanted to participate, but at the same time they have to if the economical interest are strong enough, and that in turn leads to a domino effect by forcing other countries to join as well. For Finland, World Expositions was a good opportunity to be associated with their western neighbors. Participation of this kind could not offend the Soviet Union, which they had a friendship agreement with. At the same time, Finland would not want to be associated with Eastern Block countries as a Soviet satellite state, and by presenting themselves as a part of Scandinavia, it was possible to contribute to avoidance of this. Iceland did not have the same problem of balancing in the Cold War. For them, it was merely an issue of economy. They had no major exporters to Japan, and no real interest in representation at Expo 70. For them, the pressure came from being part of the Nordic region, and from the Nordic Council.

Finland opened up for participation if the conditions were acceptable. First, they had decided not to participate, but then Japan laid pressure on the Scandinavian countries, much because of SAS, and they decided to participate after all, Finland found a possibility to join. Because SAS had been the main reason for the others to participate, Finland used this as a reason to contribute to less – after all, they did not have any interest in SAS increasing goodwill in Japan. Why they wanted to contribute, even at a lower cost than the Scandinavian countries, is not clear according to this document. Officially, it had to do with recommendation from Nordic Council. This can of course be the whole truth, and it shows the ability the Nordic Council had to influence the Nordic Governments. NC wanted the Nordic region to present itself as a unit abroad, and this was in several ways in Finland’s interests as well.

In a meeting at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in March 1968, it was discussed whether Finland should be allowed to pay less than the others because of the SAS question. The Norwegians did not consider SAS as a valid argument for

212 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 12.01.68, Minute of Meeting
213 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 12.01.68, Minute of Meeting
214 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 07.03.68, Brede Stabell
215 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 08.03.68, Asammbssador Knut Thommessen
Finland to pay less than the three Scandinavian countries. Why they thought so is not clear. It was in fact a valid argument, because SAS was the main reason for the Scandinavians to participate. It seems that they just thought it would be for their own good if Finland contributed with the same amount, and thus lowered the cost for Norway. The issue was to be discussed at the Copenhagen meeting on March 20, and the question is whether Norway brought this up or not. Probably, the argument drowned in Finland’s and Sweden’s views and Mowinckel-Larsen did not manage to come through with his/Norway’s thought in the matter.

Öberg was often the only Swedish representative present at meetings and negotiations. Two or three different persons often represented Norway. One could think that more people to argue a case would give more credibility and thus make a greater impact. Still, Öberg managed to be a driving force. The reason for this can of course be that he was better prepared and knew the stuff better. Another possibility, and it does not rule out the first, is that he had mandate to talk and decide on behalf of Sweden, something the Norwegian representatives never had. The Norwegians had to bring back results from negotiations for consideration in Norway, before any decisions could be made. In theory, this would probably apply to Öberg as well, but it seems like he has the position of doing and deciding what he thought was best.

His minute of January 12 meeting illustrates the differences. There is no evidence that the Norwegian Government agreed to participate at Expo 70 before the next meeting held in Stockholm in February 1968. Still, the Swedish Embassy in Japan had notified the General Commissioner for Expo 70 that Scandinavia would participate.

Öberg’s minute of the January meeting stated that “Denmark, Norway and Sweden agreed on creating a joint Nordic exhibition and to designate a general commissioner”. Handwritten remarks were made by G Hærum, who attended the meeting in Copenhagen, that what they “agreed on in Copenhagen was to recommend to the governments that the guidelines suggested here should be followed: of course no final decision was made.” He added that, “most likely, everything would be as outlined by Öberg”. He furthermore agreed with Per Borgen (NMFA), who also noted
in a handwritten remark that a Commissioner General’s power had to be restrained and his power should be precisely expressed.\textsuperscript{220} The fear was probably that one country would enjoy too much power if the position were not restrained in any way. They could not count on a Norwegian being appointed as General Commissioner, and did not like the idea that a Swede was most likely to get it.

Another memo from Öberg was attached to the Minute of Meeting from July 1, 1968. The memo was written June 14 in Stockholm.\textsuperscript{221} The memo regarded the process from 1967 until June 1968. The question whether the Nordic countries would participate at Expo 70 started in the spring of 1967. The attitude was at that time negative in all the Nordic countries. Companies with commercial interests in Japan stressed that abstaining possibly could have negative effects, and this fear was especially strong among Swedish companies and SAS. Talks with SAS during the summer of 1967 opened up for a possible Scandinavian participation, even if it would be in a modest way.

The talks resulted in a meeting in Copenhagen on January 12, 1968, with representation of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Government (as Öberg cites from the Danish Minute of Meeting). Öberg points out that Norway had several delegates present: Director of Trade Glad from the Ministry of Trade, Office Director Hærum from the NMFA and Secretary General Edward Mowinckel-Larsen from the Norwegian Trade Fairs. He does not remind the reader of who represented Denmark or Sweden, so this memorandum must have been written for the Norwegians to understand what happened during the receding 6 months.

According to Öberg, the meeting led to a preliminary agreement between the Nordic countries of a joint pavilion at Expo 70, and that they would cooperate with SAS Catering. They also agreed that a working committee would meet in Stockholm on February 21 to discuss a draft agreement, how to organize the cooperation and the theme of the pavilion. They also agreed on starting the construction of the pavilion in 1968.

At the meeting on February 21, Mowinckel-Larsen was present. The Norwegian and the Danish delegates informed that they soon would give an official notification of their participation, and the Swedes informed that they already had done...

\textsuperscript{220} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 31.01.68, Per Borgen, Handwritten remark at the last page of Kjell Öberg, 19.01.68
\textsuperscript{221} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.06.68, Kjell Öberg.. Attached to Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka Committee at the Norwegian Export Council, 01.07.68
so. Because Japan needed an answer, the meeting decided that Sweden would say that they intended to participate together with Denmark and Norway.

### 3.3.4 Short Memory

In October 1968, critique was raised towards the Danish participation at Expo ’70. Much of this was directed towards the architecture of the exterior of the Scandinavian Pavilion. There had been no competition to decide which project or architect who would get this honorable task. When the contract was signed between the Scandinavian countries and SAS, SAS Catering already had engaged Bent Severin, who already had started the process. Because SAS Catering had the exterior design ready when entering the cooperation, the critique was raised that the Scandinavian participation at Expo ’70 due to pressure from SAS. The Danish Government denied this. In the beginning, Denmark had decided not to participate at all, because the Danish industry and exporters found it of little interest. The gain was too small compared to the costs. Denmark changed in the question, but it was not SAS who made the Danes change their mind. Instead it was pressure from Japan that was the decisive factor for the Nordic countries, the article argues.

As a comment to this, Hærum at NMFA wrote “It was certainly neither of these, at least not on our behalf!” in margin. For him, it was clear that it was neither pressure from Japan nor SAS that made Norway participate. Instead, it was solely the Norwegian economical interests in Japan that were decisive. How correct this was is debatable. The Norwegians did not see too much interest in participating before SAS and Sweden agreed on cooperation. The Norwegian Export Council and the Indistriforbundet was negative towards Norwegian Expo ’70 participation, but the Shipowner’s Association was positive. SAS put pressure on Sweden, first to establish a pavilion for SAS and Sweden, then to make Denmark and Norway join. SAS was obviously very important to make the Scandinavian countries participate at Expo ’70. Pressure from Japan is also evident, and this is in one way also connected to the pressure from SAS. The aviation negotiations were important in this regard, but also the Japanese performed other form of pressure. It is of course of interest that the

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222 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.10.68, ”EXPO-70 OG JAPANSK PRES” in Danish Foreign Ministry’s News Agency/Udenrigsministeriets Nyhedsoversigt, Denmark

223 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.10.68, ”EXPO-70 OG JAPANSK PRES” in Danish Foreign Ministry’s News Agency/Udenrigsministeriets Nyhedsoversigt, Denmark

224 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.10.68, ”EXPO-70 OG JAPANSK PRES” in Danish Foreign Ministry’s News Agency/Udenrigsministeriets Nyhedsoversigt, Denmark. Comment by Hærum, NMFA. In Norwegian: “Det var da sandelig ingen av delene, i et hvert fall for vårt vedkommende”
official stance in Denmark was that Japanese pressure was decisive, whereas Norway reject that it was pressure from outside in any form that made them participate.

In a newspaper article in Verdens Gang (VG), a Norwegian representative – without a name – was answering the critique raised in Denmark. Here, the Norwegians admitted that the relationship with the aviation negotiations had played a part, but the main reason for the Government to participate was shipping interests. Willoch had reminded Stortinget of this at the Parliament debate: Japan was the second largest market for Norwegian shipping services. Also, several Norwegian shipowners build their ships in Japan, and several Norwegian companies exported goods to Japan – among them equipment for ships and goat cheese.

VG also asked SAS if there was any connection between the World Exposition and aviation rights.225 The deputy PR director Sjögren at the head quarters in Stockholm denied any connection between the two questions. He stressed that they did not influence any governments in this way. Instead, he thought the decision to participate was base don an increasing understanding of the importance of Japan and their development, and that they had an understanding that it would be somewhat strange if they did not participate in the first World Exhibition in Japan. He admitted that the decision could have been made with regard to general economically considerations where SAS was on of many factors, and perhaps also with regards to specific companies, where SAS’ aviation rights was a major reason for participation. He still stressed that the question of landing rights was determined by hard facts of traffic and freight volumes, but added that negotiations of this was held between governments. He denied that landing rights and participation on Expo 70 was connected from SAS’ side, and said he had never heard of any such connection internally in SAS. The connection is obvious when looking at earlier documents, but clearly no one wanted the public to know. Officially, there were no connection between SAS’ negotiations with Japan and the Nordic Expo 70 participation.

Even though the VG article gave no name of the Norwegian official representative leaking the information, it is exactly the same arguments as Hærum commented in the margin of the Danish article. For Hærum to argue like he did must either be an example of his ignorance or yet another example of the strangely short memory among Norwegian bureaucrats. Or did he “forget” the reasons deliberately,

225 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.10.68, Verdens Gang
because he wanted to sell the other reasons to the public? It is at least quite easy to understand that VG had talked to someone at the NMFA. Even though they did not refer to any singular person, it was the same arguments presented in the paper as the comments written to the Danish article. This is also puzzling. Why did Hærum (or whom it was) not want to be presented by name in the paper? The article refers only to the government’s position, even though it is clear VG got the information from a source. It looks like propaganda, and SAS backed the arguments. Was this because it was not suitable to connect landing rights with other issues – possibly to protect SAS?

Aall held a press conference in Oslo to inform the press of the designers and the theme of the pavilion. Here, he stressed that the Scandinavian countries did not make any decision to participate based on SAS. He said the decision was made “totally independent of the initiative from SAS”.226

3.4 The Pavilion Theme
Before February 1968, the pavilion theme had not been discussed in depth. The spring of 1968 would still be months with much misunderstandings and disagreement.

In the middle of February, Kjell Öberg produced two memorandums for the meeting in Stockholm on February 21. One concerned the theme of the pavilion; the other was about personnel and how to administer the work ahead of the expo.227 He considered that the presentation at Expo ’70 would be modest, and reminded the reader that the Scandinavians did not participate to impress, but rather to avoid damage if they did not attend.228 He still thought it to be important that the exhibition was of the best possible quality, and had several suggestions on how to achieve this. As a general frame on how to find the pavilion theme, he suggested that the theme should illustrate a problem the Scandinavian countries faced, and suggestions on how to solve these problems. These problems should be of the highest importance in the Nordic region, it had to be relevant for Japan as well. In addition to this, it should be relevant for exports to Japan, for aviation and for shipping. At the meeting in February 1968 Swedish delegates handed out a memorandum for discussion regarding

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226 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 26.10.68, Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, In Norwegian: “Brukseier Aall slo fast at de nordiske lands beslutning om deltagelse på verdensutstillingen i Osaka var tatt helt uavhengig av SAS’ initiativ.”
227 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 19.02.68, Kjell Öberg
228 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Kjell Öberg, 19.02.68, ”Diskussionspromemoria angående nordiska temat i Osaka 1970”
the theme, which stressed that the theme should meet certain criteria: it should illustrate problems and solutions of high relevance both for the Nordic region and for Japan, and even though the exhibition was not of a commercial character, it was commercial interests that motivated participation (export, aviation and shipping). The theme would have to be in compliance with this, but at the same time there should not be any likeness with a trade fair. The memo also stressed that Nordic cooperation, the industrial level of development, and the communication with Japan should be incorporated. The conclusion was thus that the Nordic exhibition should illustrate the Nordic environment, the threats against it and the efforts made to preserve it.

The most relevant topic Öberg could find that matched all the desired criteria, was how to protect the environment. It was relevant for Japan and for the Nordic region, he argued. Öberg argued that several Nordic thrusts had been made to address the environmental problems. Sweden brought them up in the Nordic Council, but even if none of the others argued that it was of little importance, they did not see the environment as an important issue either. The question is if this was merely a Swedish attempt to find a way of increasing goodwill on an area that had not been taken by anyone else. They wanted to hold the first UN conference on environmental issues, which they did in 1971, and it fits perfectly into the plan to set environmental protection on the agenda for Expo ’70. At this stage, they already had arranged a competition for Swedish designers regarding the theme, which they hoped to use in a future exhibition abroad. The Swedes were well prepared and acted quickly.

It is, however, fascinating that they would try to connect shipping and aviation with environmental protection. SAS was one of the major reasons for Nordic participation at Expo ’70. Thus, increased flights to and from Japan were one of the issues the Scandinavians wanted to achieve by attending the exposition. Obviously, they did not think of airplane pollution as a major problem when deciding the theme. This may of course also apply to shipping, though oil spills were becoming a problem. The explanation of what we today see as inconsistency, can be that time has passed, and so did the meaning of environmental protection. In the late 1960’s, almost no one in Scandinavia cared for the environment – at least not in the same way.

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229 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.06.68, Kjell Öberg, Attached to Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka Committee at the Norwegian Export Council, 01.07.68
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/34597/Malmer_masteroppgave.pdf?sequence=2
as today. Global warming alarmed no one. The focus was on people’s health problems connected to littering and pollution. It was thus smog from industry and cars, more than from aircrafts that was meant to be at the center of attention. The hope was that the exhibition might stimulate Japanese tourism to the Nordic region through traveling with SAS over the North Pole. Today, it would be odd to connect increased tourism by airplanes with environmental protection, but it was not like that in 1968.

In mid February 1968, the Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo was requested to meet at the Danish Embassy to discuss possible participation, and their views would be forwarded to the February 21 meeting in Stockholm. The Danish Foreign Ministry wanted to know how the Scandinavian Ambassadors could imagine what (an) inter-Scandinavian pavilion might be like. According to Counselor Prøitz, who was the Norwegian representative at the meeting, they discussed different theme possibilities: Environmental Destruction and Conservation; Modern Living; Industrial Design; Quality and Specialization; and How We Live and Work. Prøitz did not recommend any of the solutions, and instead he forwarded the question to the Ambassador. He understood that there probably would be difference in opinion in the three countries – some might want greater emphasis on the character of the individual countries. After deliberating on the question, they agreed that the Swedish proposal of environmental conservation deserved closer attention. An exhibition on this theme would probably be of great interest for the Japanese. Japan with its large cities fought the problems of pollution, and they would therefore probably welcome such an exhibition. The theme was seen as original, and as a possibility to show the Scandinavian welfare state and their highly developed industry and science.

Öberg also suggested a timeframe of how to find a designer for the pavilion. If the budget could be set and the program could be agreed upon before March 8, the competition could start April 16 and the designers could be appointed May 1. It was important to find the designer as soon as possible, so that he could start cooperating with the constructors as soon as possible. None of the others in the Scandinavian Committee had shown any signs on being as prepared for this meeting as Öberg was. He got most of his ideas through, the deadlines were a little longer, but they were good ideas and no one else came up with anything comparable. Still, it was ambitious of Öberg to think that everyone at the meeting would love his ideas, and in two weeks

231 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Knut Thommessen
approve on his theme suggestion, and have the competition winner ready on May 1.

Instead, at the February 21 meeting, they agreed that all countries had to present a proposal for the theme of the joint exhibition, and also suggest architects and designers who could join the pavilion design competition. Before March 15, each country should take up for discussion and make a draft of program, theme and budget, which could circulate before the next meeting in Copenhagen on March 20. A program proposal with theme and budget would be distributed in April, with closure of the designer competition on July 1, and finally a decision would be made at a meeting on a winning designer on September 1.232

The meeting was informed that the Swedish Ambassador in Tokyo had already notified the Japanese authorities that the Scandinavian countries would participate with a joint pavilion.233 This must have come as a surprise for the Norwegians, since the Storting had not yet approved this. The meeting then decided that all the Nordic countries were to notify the Japanese General Commissioner for the Expo ’70 that they intended to participate. The Norwegian participation was officially confirmed March 6, 1968, with the disclaimer that the Storting needed to approve.234 The area for the Scandinavian pavilion was reserved and the contract signed by the three nations’ Ambassadors in late March. As we shall see later, this was not sufficient, because the Commissioner General had to sign the contract, but it gave a clear indication on the commitment of the Scandinavian countries.

All the different minutes of the meetings are quite clear when comes to dates of when different decisions were to be made, and also which suggestions had been presented regarding the pavilion theme. Even Mowinckel-Larsen’s reports are clear on this. Still, the Norwegians, with Mowinckel-Larsen as their leader, misunderstood and complained to the top. He claimed that he, and the rest of the Norwegian representatives, were not aware of the timeframe, and thus that the Swedes had fooled Norway to accept an unacceptable theme. Still, Mowinckel-Larsen wrote minutes of meetings that clearly show that he was aware of decisions made at these meetings. The Swedish minute of the meeting confirms the one by Mowinckel-Larsen.235

232 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.02.68, Minute of meeting
233 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.02.68, Official minute of meeting, Stockholm
234 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Memo Knut Thommessen
235 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.02.68, Minute of meeting, Stockholm
At the February 21 meeting, Mowinckel-Larsen was the only Norwegian representative. He emphasized at the meeting, and in his report, that at the next meeting there would be only one representative from each country. At the Stockholm meeting, Sweden had three and Denmark five representatives. Iceland and Finland had one each, and SIAB and SAS were also present. The one Norwegian voice was probably not so loud compared to those of the others, and that is perhaps the reason why Mowinckel-Larsen stressed the importance of one delegate per country for the next meeting. The report is in Swedish, but at the end there is an addition in Norwegian regarding this. The NMFA got the protocol from Norwegian Trade Fairs where Mowinckel-Larsen was the director, and thus it is plausible to think that he himself added the remark to the protocol.

At a pre-Copenhagen meeting in Oslo at the NMFA on March 18, the Norwegians analyzed the forthcoming meeting’s agenda. Among the topics was the question of pavilion theme. Clearly, they were aware of the fact that this would be discussed. Still, it is not clear whether they knew that a decision would be made in this regard. At the preparatory meeting, they only talked of the fact that the question would be brought up, not what the Norwegian position would be. They were supposed to give a suggestion of a theme to present to the Nordic delegates, but there was not produced any such suggestion from the Norwegian side. The minute of the meeting did not require Mowinckel-Larsen to take any particular stance on the question either. Because he did not have any authorization to make decisions on behalf of Norway, he had nothing else to do but take the views of the other Nordic delegates back to Norway for further discussion. He was the only Norwegian delegate at the Copenhagen March 20 meeting.236

At the meeting, several Danish propositions were submitted even though nothing on paper. They were just headlines without any presentation or motivation. The only serious suggestion was Öberg’s environmental theme. The discussion ended with the proposal from Denmark to change the negative connotation in the Swedish proposal to “Environmental Protection Under Industrialization”. Everyone agreed, and Öberg later recalled that the meeting assumed that a decision was made regarding the pavilion theme.237

236 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.06.68, Kjell Öberg, memo of the process. Attached to Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka Committee at the Norwegian Export Council, 01.07.68
237 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Knut Thommessen
Mowinckel-Larsen wrote an unofficial memorandum after the meeting in Copenhagen March 20 where he reported the long debate about the theme of the pavilion. He also conveys that the meeting would suggest the theme to be environmental protection in industrial societies, but that they at the same time would show the Scandinavian topography and the culture. The official minute of the meeting stated that the theme of the pavilion was the subject of a long and lively debate. Öberg considered that his own suggestion of environmental protection was best suited. Smog was a common problem in Japan, which made the question interesting in the host country. Mowinckel-Larsen stressed the importance of the increasing economical interests they had in Japan, and Bo agreed that the business sector had to be a part of the theme as well. Öberg agreed that they had to present the Nordic region as highly industrialized, and still show the means by which they try to reduce the pollution. Kai Johannesen, Permanent Undersecretary in Denmark, suggested that Öberg’s proposal was too abstract, and that they instead would gain more by focusing on shipping.

The meeting at last agreed on the elements constituting the theme – with the title *Protection of the Environment During Increased Industrialization*. The intention was to show “the highly industrialized Scandinavia, the mobile element, the communication point of view, the Nordic cooperation, the cultural aspects with basis in environmental protection, and the technical element”. The title was wider than the original suggestion from Öberg, but at the same time, no other suggestion was forwarded, and thus, when everyone agreed on this new theme, Öberg had won through with his vision.

There is a discrepancy between Mowinckel-Larsen’s memorandum and the official one. Mowinckel-Larsen thought it was just a suggestion, whereas the official minute of meeting said it was decided. Why the Norwegians did not react to the minute of the meeting is strange, since Mowinckel-Larsen had another notion of the outcome of the meeting. If he had objected to this when he first received the minute of meeting from Stockholm, the whole misunderstanding could have been much smaller and easier to handle. No one else reacted to the differences in interpretations either.
At the next meeting in the Scandinavian Pavilion Committee on May 15, the Norwegian Honorary Commissioner General Nils Fredrik Aall met for the first time. According to Öberg, he was obviously not informed of the decisions made at the meeting on March 20. As it was understood by Öberg, this was due to Mowinckel-Larsen being too occupied with the Shipping Exhibition in Oslo to keep his Norwegian colleagues informed in addition to that Aall had been absent due to a trip with the Norwegian King (Olav) to the United States. Aall had to accept that five decisions already were made, even though he was not aware of this: the contract with SAS Catering; which entrepreneur and architect to hire for the pavilion construction; who would be the Nordic CG; and the pavilion theme. Aall thus had to work under the assumption that this was correct. He also agreed on appointing two architects from each country to participate in the competition of designing the pavilion exhibition. They also decided on the number of representatives for the referee committee, in addition to how they would be organized.

A meeting in the Nordic Osaka-Committee was planned in Oslo on May 15. Here, Mowinckel-Larsen was prepared to discuss the theme, and to decide how to present the region at Expo ’70. This meeting was cancelled, but another meeting was held in Stockholm the same day.241 Architects and the jury for the architectural competition were summoned together with the representatives from the national Expo ’70-committees in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The agenda was to present the competition and the pavilion theme. The Stockholm meeting gave no opportunity to deliberate on this, which made Mowinckel-Larsen disappointed, and he had to realize that the pavilion theme already was decided.

To inform the architects of such an unusual theme that few people had much knowledge about, Öberg had asked a specialist, Hans Palmstierna, to write a document with background information on environmental issues that could be used when planning the exhibition. The memo Palmstierna wrote was called Avoid the Point of No Return. Mowinckel-Larsen had the impression that this theme would kick back at the manufacturing industry and shipping as the reason for the environmental degradation and the pollution. This could be seen as an unwelcoming patronization in an industrialized country like Japan with a dense population that had strong nationalistic feelings of its own ability to solve problems, he argued. Thus, he could

241 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.05.68, Memo by Edward Mowinckel-Larsen
not see that Norwegian interests could gain from this theme and he asked the Minister if he could contact his colleagues in all the Nordic countries as soon as possible. He also argued that the possibilities of theme were not consistent with what the Norwegian Storting had approved as a Norwegian presentation at Expo 70.\textsuperscript{242}

The Scandinavian Embassies had in February, as we have seen, approved of the environmental theme, and suggested that this was very suitable for Japan. The Ambassadors welcomed it. It is thus quite peculiar that the Norwegian Minister of Trade, Kåre Willoch, was persuaded to call the Swedish Foreign Minister, Torsten Nilsson, and afterwards write a letter to him explaining that the Norwegian interests were not taken care of.\textsuperscript{243}

In the letter, Willoch informed Nilsson that the Norwegian Expo Committee had complained to him regarding the pavilion theme, which they felt they had not the opportunity to discuss in depth.\textsuperscript{244} According to Willoch, a Swedish proposition under the name “Avoid the point if no return” had been presented as a \textit{fait accompli} at a meeting in Stockholm May 15. Attempts from the Norwegians to discuss this further had been turned down. The Norwegian Committee disagreed on the topic, and Willoch stated that he agreed with the Norwegian Committee. He considered it not to be in accordance with the preconditions that were discussed in the Norwegian parliamentary debate. The Swedish proposal was of great interest, he wrote, but from a Norwegian point of view, it was unnatural to use it in a setting like this. Willoch then asked Nilsson to intervene and to put pressure on the Swedish Committee so that they would agree on discussing the matter one more time. Willoch hoped they could find a theme that all the participating countries could accept.\textsuperscript{245}

It is somewhat striking that Willoch sent this letter to the Swedish Foreign Minister, and not to the Danish as well. The Danes were also present at every meeting. The Norwegians complained about not having had the opportunity to discuss the theme. At the Copenhagen meeting on March 20 they also had discussed the theme, so there was no immediate reason why the Norwegians did not complain to the Danes. Probably, the most natural thing to do in this situation, if they considered the cooperation to be equal, Willoch would have addressed his letter both to the Swedish and to the Danish Foreign Ministers. It is obvious that they considered the Swedes as

\textsuperscript{242} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 21.05.68, Edward Mowinckel-Larsen
\textsuperscript{243} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 22.05.68, Kåre Willoch
\textsuperscript{244} NNA, RA/S-5006/E/Ea/L0210, 22.05.68, Kåre Willoch, letter to Torsten Nilsson
\textsuperscript{245} NNA, RA/S-5006/E/Ea/L0210, 22.05.68, Kåre Willoch, letter to Torsten Nilsson
the strongest negotiator in general, and Öberg in particular, and thus the one to complain to.

The confusion in the Norwegian camp is obvious. Mowinckel-Larsen had attended meetings and written minutes of these afterwards, and thus informed the Norwegian delegation of the situation. Still, he himself and the others seemed unaware of the situation in May 1968. In March, Aall was the Norwegian representative at the Copenhagen meeting, and could do nothing else than follow what the others decided, even though he was not informed prior to the meeting. The Norwegians always had people present at meetings, there were always official minutes of meetings written, and the Norwegians should have been well informed of all decisions. Still, they acted confused.

Whether they had an extremely bad memory, or it was a part of some game strategy, is hard to say. If their memory was that bad, it is strange they did not read the memos and minutes of meetings one more time to be sure they were right before asking the Minister of Trade to help. Another option is that they just pretended to have bad memory, and used this as an opportunity to oppose to the Swedes, but in that case they lied to the Minister and asked him to complain to his Swedish counterpart who had nothing to do with the matter. As the Swedes must have viewed the case, he made an utter fool of himself. We may assume that they concluded Mowinckel-Larsen was the instigator and may have put it down to poor memory or possibly downright dishonesty.

From the memos and minutes produced by and sent to NMFA, the Norwegian Ambassador Thommesen was able to understand the whole picture, without any problems. It was not that complicated to understand that the Swedes (and Danes) were right.\(^{246}\) It might be possible that Thommesen had access to more information than Mowinckel-Larsen and Aall had in Oslo. Thommesen could possibly have read Swedish documents that Aall and Mowinckel-Larsen not yet had seen. A good working relationship between the Norwegian and Swedish ambassadors might be a reason the reason for Thommesen’s well-informed position. Still, the Norwegians complaining to the Swedes were not badly or wrongly informed. They clearly knew that they had missed the opportunity to influence the process, and were probably disappointed. Unfortunately for Willoch, it was he who lost the most credibility next

\(^{246}\) ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.06.68, Telegram from Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo
to Mowinckel-Larsen – who made a fool of himself at several occasions.

Even though the Norwegians felt overshadowed by the Swedes and possibly rather would break out of the Scandinavian project than to be overruled once more, Thommessen warned against this. He understood that Mowinckel-Larsen and the other Norwegians back home were afraid of the strong Swedes, but tried to reassure them that there was no danger to this.

An example is that he reminded them of the evaluation committee which consisted of three Swedes, two Norwegians, two Danes and two Finns, “as it will be seen solid non-Swedish majority”.247 Here, he reassured the reader that the Swedes would not have the majority and thus could not decide alone. The fear of the Swedes was obvious, and they clearly did not fear Denmark or Finland in the same way. Why Sweden would have one more member at the committee than the others is perhaps a bit strange, but Thommessen did not think that this was of any great importance. Instead, he reminded the NMFA that the crucial part was Norwegian participation. A Scandinavian pavilion might build a platform for national manifestations and a starting point for commercial contact and information activities of great importance for Norway. The pavilion theme was of relatively less importance. The advice from the Embassy was thus not to jeopardize the Norwegian partaking in the Scandinavian cooperation – according to Thommessen, it was not in the national interest of Norway to withdraw.

Öberg was deeply concerned with the situation, and hoped that the misunderstanding about the MEMO would be solved so the Norwegians would be able to uphold the decisions made in Copenhagen.248 The process had come too far to halt, because the architects already had received the information based on the decisions made in March 1968. If new inter-Scandinavian deliberations had to be made on the pavilion theme, the process had to take a pause and the time frame would have to be expanded, as followed by this, also the costs would rise. Öberg was aware that the Norwegians perhaps thought the theme did not coincide with the shipping interests, but reminded that shipping was of little importance for the rest of the Scandinavian countries. Also, it was important, Öberg claimed, to keep the theme that had interest in all the Nordic countries as well as in Japan. From Sweden, and surely

247 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.06.68, Telegram from Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo. In Norwegian: "som det vil sees solid ikke-svensk majoritet".
248 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 05.06.68, Knut Thommessen
also from Denmark and Finland, they would probably argue for holding on to the theme they had agreed on. Öberg thought this was the best foundation for making a joint exhibition, which also coincided with the Japanese theme program.

Nilsson had little to do with the Swedish Expo ’70 participation, and forwarded it to Gunnar Lange, the Swedish Minister of Trade. It took some time for him to reply, due to Öberg being absent. Lange could not give any statement without Öberg informing him first. The Minister totally relied on and trusted the man Sweden had made in charge of their information work abroad. The Swedish system worked in the way it should – they were better organized than the Norwegians. One person had the authority to make decisions without interference from politicians. In Norway, on the other hand, the ones who were handling the question were not able to manage the situation and asked politicians for help. Mowinckel-Larsen had misunderstood the situation, even though present at meetings where decisions, and time frames for future decisions, were made. Still, Mowinckel-Larsen persuaded Willoch to deal with the issue, something that must have been awkward to the Swedes. It must have looked like the Norwegians were even more poorly organized than they actually were.

Anyhow, Gunnar Lange replied to Willoch in June 1968. He attached a memo written by Öberg, stating that all delegates were agreed in the theme. At the same time, he stressed the problems they would face if they would cancel the competition at that point. Thus, he suggested that they would leave the theme as it was until the competition was finished. Afterwards, they could look at the results – and possibly discuss the theme then. It was Lange’s personal opinion that there must have been a misunderstanding, which could best be solved by a meeting between the delegates from all the Nordic countries. And so it went.

On July 1, 1968, a meeting was held in Oslo to discuss the pavilion theme. Present were Kristen Bo, Olle Herold, Kjell Öberg, Nils Fredrik Aall, in addition to Sven A. Hansson and Edvard Mowinckel-Larsen. They discussed in depth the course of the preceding discussion, but the minute of meeting did not emphasize the different arguments in the debate. It was written in Norwegian, and perhaps Aall did not wish to make this matter larger than it already was. Instead he stated that the theme they previously had agreed on would stand, and focused on the extra information they would give the architects participating in the architectural/design competition.

249 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 25.06.68, Gunnar Lange
250 SNA SE/RA/420250/E I, 01.07.68, Minute of meeting, SPC
The Norwegian Expo 70 Committee also had a private meeting on July 1.\textsuperscript{251} Nils Fredrik Aall informed the Norwegian Committee of the proceedings at the Scandinavian Committee. With a very difficult starting point, the Norwegians were trying to change the theme of the pavilion, he told them. Aall informed that even though the starting point was difficult, they had achieved significant changes, and he said he was pleased with the result. Of course, all the Norwegians would have liked another theme, but because the name was changed from the negative “degrading” to the more positive “environmental protection and environmental creation”, the possibility was better for creating something good.\textsuperscript{252} This seems to be more rhetorical than real. The theme was never said to be the negative version that the Norwegians claimed it was. As the minute of meeting from the Norwegian Committee’s session suggests, the Norwegians considered that a new and far better situation had been established after the meeting with the Scandinavian Committee the same day.

This sheer phantasy is obvious misleading, whether intentionally or not hardly true. The Norwegians had not achieved anything at that meeting, other than agreeing on what already had been agreed on earlier the same year. It seems like they were ignorant of the reality of the situation, and it must have been strange to the other Scandinavians that they were so pleased with the result after the July 1 session. This holds for both the theme and the situation of the Joint Commissioner General. Is it possible that they were that ignorant? Or did they just pretend, just to avoid having to admit that they were wrong? The others must have seen that they did not achieve what they thought they had achieved, and that must have been even stranger to them. Otherwise, they argued in this way to let others in Norway believe they had achieved more than they actually did. The conclusion of the Norwegian meeting was in any case that Norway would not withdraw from the Nordic cooperation. This was in fact a threat and would have caused large consequences, more than they possibly could afford. They decided to write a telegram for the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, stating that “After all that has happened up until now, and after the Chairman’s

\textsuperscript{251} ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.07.68, Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka Committee at The Norwegian Export Council

\textsuperscript{252} In Norwegian: “Miljøbevarende og miljøskapende”
successful negotiations today, the Committee members have decided to continue in the Committee and let it constitute itself”.

This situation must have been embarrassing especially for Willoch, who had to take the official embarrassment. He was the Minister of Trade and should be able to trust the information he was given by the bureaucrats involved. He clearly was misinformed. But it was not only embarrassing for Willoch. It must have been embarrassing for the whole Norwegian group, and maybe especially for Mowinckel-Larsen. In most respects, he was not a good negotiator on behalf of Norway, and he did not seem well prepared for the task. Perhaps a good thing both for himself and for the Norwegian group: Mowinckel-Larsen resigned due to his age.

The Norwegian skeptical view of the pavilion theme was proven unnecessary by the welcome it had in Japan. It was of great interest in Japan at the time, and the interest also increased during the expo’s opening period. The great press coverage of the pavilion was argued to be due to the pavilion theme. A normal national pavilion bragging about the glory of the nation would never get this much attention. The theme gave the Scandinavian pavilion character which made it possible to compete in terms of attention from the press with many times larger pavilions. One Japanese newspaper even said it was the only pavilion worthy of a World Exposition. In Japan, the pavilion theme was a great success.

Still, the Norwegians did not recommend any further inter-Scandinavian participation at future World Expositions, mostly due to the theme and exhibition, which the Norwegians thought was too complicated and difficult to understand. The reason why they did not manage to stop the theme was, as Grann recalls it afterwards, that the Norwegian Osaka Committee (NOC) was established too late. The theme was already decided on, “after Swedish initiative and argumentation” when the NOC was appointed by Royal Resolution in April 1968. Even though

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253 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.07.68, Minute of Meeting, Norwegian Osaka Committee at The Norwegian Export Council. In Norwegian: “Etter det som hittil er passert og etter formannens fremgangsrike forhandlinger i dag besluttet komiteens medlemmer å ville fortsette i komiteen og la denne konstituere.”


256 NNA RA/S-5006/3/Ea/L0211, 27.02.72, “Report”, Odd Grann

257 NNA RA/S-5006/3/Ea/L0211, 27.02.72, “Report”, Odd Grann
they protested on a political level, nothing could be done. The theme was decided, and even though it did not suit Norway, it was highly appropriate for some of the others. Grann reminded of some facts:

Many Swedish manufacturing industries work on the world market with environmentally friendly products, launched in the spirit of our time. The Swedish docent Palmstierna wrote the memo of the theme, without anyone asking him to do so. Sweden had, except for their national day, also a special environmental protection-day in Osaka, on May 21. Sweden shall in 1972 organize a large international conference on the environment in Stockholm, organized by the UN. It was obvious to Grann that the suggested theme was part of a larger project for the Swedes. Even though he did not approve, he gave the Swedes credit by recognizing their clever ability to maneuver the whole region to endorse their activities.

3.5 Appointing the Commissioner General
In February 1968 Kjell Öberg wrote two memos ahead of a meeting held in Stockholm on February 21. The second note Öberg made was on how to organize the joint Scandinavian work and personnel before and during the Expo. The precondition was that it would be only one exhibition in the joint pavilion – not like the one in Montreal with five different exhibitions. If this could be the case, the Scandinavian Pavilion only needed one Commissioner General (CG). As a comment to this, Per Borgen at the NMFA wrote “NB!” in the margin of the document. Further on, when Öberg’s suggested that the CG should have as much freedom of action as possible, he wrote “NO!” Also the suggestion that the Board, consisting of representatives from the five countries, was only to give advice and not to execute and decide – that was instead the responsibility of the CG – Per Borgen once again put “NO!” in the margin. He had earlier concerned himself with the issue of Sweden getting too much power over the process and thus leaving Norway behind. He was clearly alarmed by the power a CG could get. The fear of Sweden is particularly evident with regard to Öberg’s suggestion that the secretary of the board should be

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258 NNA RA/S-5006/3/E/Ea/L0211, 27.02.72, “Report”, Odd Grann
259 NNA RA/S-5006/3/E/Ea/L0211, 27.02.72, “Report”, Odd Grann
260 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 19.02.68, Kjell Öberg, “Diskussionspromemoria om personalorganisation för skandinaviska paviljonegn vid Expo 70 i Osaka”
located in the hometown of the CG. In the margin, Per Borgen wrote “Stockholm!” which suggests that he feared that all decisions would be made by a Swede, and that Norway would be placed on the sideline.

Little happened in this matter before the Scandinavian Committee met in Stockholm on May 15 1968. Öberg brought up the question of who would succeed Folke Claesson as the joint CG. Aall then submitted a request that each country have their own CG, but Öberg informed that the SPC had decided, at the meeting in Copenhagen on March 20, to have one joint CG. The Norwegians had once again misunderstood the process, and Aall was not informed of what had earlier been decided. He suggested that they would have a deputy CG, something Kristen Bo supported. The suggestion might be put forward because Aall, with Bo’s support, wanted to divide the power on two persons, and not let the Swedes have total domination. Öberg suggested Sven A. Hansson as the joint CG. Olle Herold was positive, he knew him from years back, and thought he would be perfect for the job. Hansson apparently knew Japan well and he would soon know Japanese. If the SPC did not agree on having Hansson as the joint CG, Öberg would hire him as his “Japan Man”. They thus decided to hire Hansson as the acting CG and later consider his status.

A General Commissioner’s meeting was held in Kyoto in late May 1968. Thommessen participated as the Norwegian representative, whereas Sweden sent Kjell Öberg, Folke Claesson and the soon to be joint Nordic CG, Sven A. Hansson. The main objective for the Scandinavians at this meeting was to investigate the Japanese reaction to the wish of starting to construct the Scandinavian pavilion as soon as possible after the first possible building start on July 1. They aimed at having it finished before the end of 1968. It was important for them to start early, due to anticipation of inflation and thus increasing costs the closer in time to the Expo the construction got started. Because of the hurry they were in, they needed to officially appoint Sven A. Hansson as the Scandinavian CG. Thommessen asked the NMFA to appoint him as soon as possible, in order for him to sign the official documents on behalf of the five countries. It was important that Hanson as the CG signed the official

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261 SNA SE/RA/420250/E I, 15.05.68, Minute of meeting
262 Folke Claesson had turned down the offer due to personal reasons.
263 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.06.68, Knut Thommessen, letter to NMFA.
264 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 06.06.68, Knut Thommessen, Memorandum after attending the CG meeting in Kyoto. Attached to Knut Thommessen, 06.06.68, letter to NMFA.
contract, Thommessen argued, but he could not do this before all the five Governments had officially appointed him.

Öberg also tried to influence the Norwegians back home. He sent a telegram from Kyoto to make the others follow Sweden and appoint Hansson as joint CG. The Norwegians did not think that this was very urgent, and did not see the complications that the representatives in Japan worried about. In Norway, they did not fear that appointing a joint CG right away would make any difference, since it had not made any difference in Montreal. Therefore, they answered the telegram from Öberg that they did not want to take a stand on the question of who would be appointed CG before the planned meeting in Oslo on June 26 1968.265

In reply, the NMFA received a telegram from Öberg June 14, 1968.266 Here, he explains in depth why Norway had to appoint Hansson right away. The Swedish Embassy had received a telegram from Japanese authorities that the Expo 70 Secretariat, as a formality, as soon as possible needed official notification that Hansson was appointed the Nordic Joint Commissioner General. When talking to the Japanese Commissioner General Hagiwara in Kyoto, he advised that Sven A. Hansson be appointed forthwith by all the Nordic countries. At a later stage, all the countries should appoint national CGs, with the titles of “Honorary Commissioner General”. At the conference in Kyoto, it was obvious to the Scandinavian participants that the Japanese held hard on formalities. Permission to start constructing was conditional on a participation contract signed by the Nordic CG. The application for a building permit had to be signed by the CG and it was estimated that it would take minimum three weeks to investigate the application. If they wanted to start building the pavilion in early July, and thus avoid extra expenses due to inflation, it was important that Hansson would sign the papers while still in Japan. With this in mind, Öberg asked one more time that Norway would appoint Hansson as the joint Nordic CG.

Nils Fredrik Aall informed the NMFA that the Montreal experience had not shown any indication that the appointing of a joint CG had any significance for the construction start.267 He confirmed that the delegates at the meeting in Stockholm in mid May had agreed on asking Hansson to be CG. At the same meeting, they agreed

265 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.06.68, NMFA, telegram to SMFA
266 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 14.06.68, Kjell Öberg
267 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.06.68, Nils Fredrik Aall
to postpone the decisions of national CGs until Öberg came back from Kyoto. Even though Öberg and Thommessen explained that the Japanese had made them understand how important the appointment of the CG was, and thus the situation had altered, the Norwegians at the NMFA and in the Norwegian Expo ’70 Committee did not want to listen to this. They would not change anything of what had previously been decided.268

There were no other suggestions than Hansson of who would become the joint Nordic CG. Why the Norwegians could not appoint him before the meeting in June is therefore strange. It is likely that the Scandinavian representatives attending the General Commissioner’s meeting in Kyoto would have more information about how the Japanese worked than Norwegians in Norway. Japan could have had more strict rules than Canada had in these kinds of questions. At least, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry did not have any other information than this. Still, they did not want to follow the recommendations from the Scandinavians present at the conference in Japan. Among them was Thommessen, the Norwegian Ambassador to Japan, and there is no evidence of him disagreeing with Öberg. Why Norway was so skeptical is therefore somewhat strange. Was it because they did not want to follow everything Öberg asked them to do? Was it just to make him wait? This must have been strange to the delegates present in Japan, because it was obvious to them that it was important to appoint Hansson as soon as possible. If the Norwegians were right, on the other hand, and it did not matter if they appointed Hansson two weeks sooner or later, it is strange that Öberg pressed for a quick decision. When dealing with the Japanese, no one really knew what to expect, so the Scandinavians present in Japan were probably right to worry anyhow. If it was true, as Öberg wrote in his second telegram, that the Japanese were strict with rules and regulations, it seems strange that the Norwegian would halt the process. Why would this be so important for the NMFA? It doesn’t seem as a question to argue too much about, but it puts the Norwegians in a position of unwillingness to cooperate.

This question was raised in the same period that Norway had to admit they had misunderstood the process of the pavilion theme. Perhaps their reluctance to officially appoint Hansson would just be a demonstration of their independence. It is likely that they would not do whatever Öberg told them to, because of annoyance with

268 ANMFA, 47.2/53, 01.06.68, Nils Fredrik Aall
the process so far. Still, this is a somewhat childish behavior, so could this be the case? Yet there is no other explanation to the delay. The Norwegians appointed Hansson in late July, several weeks after the other Nordic Governments had done the same. There were no other options, so it could not be that the Norwegians wanted to debate whether they wanted Hansson or not. The only plausible explanation is that the Norwegians wanted to mark position. It is striking that they would jeopardize the construction start by not appointing Hansson, when they knew that delays would possibly be of great significance for the budget. They were aware that the longer they waited, the costs would increase due to other nations also needing the same work force to construct their pavilions, which would push the prices up. They could in fact possibly lose quite a lot of money on this game, if the Japanese and their bureaucracy, whom no one understood, made them postpone the construction start.

At the end, the problem was solved and the Swedish Ministry of Trade announced Sven A. Hansson to be joint Scandinavian CG on June 28, 1968. The Danish Foreign Ministry followed on July 4, 1968.269 The Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry announced the same on July 17, 1968.270 The NMFA did not consider it proper to appoint a Nordic joint Commissioner General by a Royal Resolution. Instead, it was a task for the Honorary Commissioner General.271 If this was as important as they argued, they could have appointed Aall right away, and then he could have appointed Hansson. This would have solved the problem quite easily, but still they waited until July 12, 1968, to appoint Aall.272 After this, Aall appointed Hansson as the CG on behalf of Norway.

When the Norwegian Honorary Commissioner General finally officially appointed Hansson as the CG, the construction could start. Even though it was a few weeks after the anticipated date, the Scandinavian was the second pavilion to have its groundbreaking ceremony. The first one to start building a pavilion was Canada, who had the honor of being the first because they were the last host of a World Exhibition. Thus, it is clear that the delayed notification from Norway actually did not have much real significance – the Norwegians were right, but considering the country they were in, the Norwegians could not be sure of this. It was a risky game they played, even though they were not aware of it because of their own ignorance of the Japanese

269 SNA SE/RA/420250/E I, 04.07.68, B. Raavad, DFM
270 SNA SE/RA/420250/E I, 17.07.68, Väinö Leskinen, Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland
271 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Per Glad, NMT, 12.07.68
272 ANMFA, 47.2/53, Per Glad, NMT, 12.07.68
ways. It went well, but at the same time it made them look stubborn and stupid, because they jeopardized the budget of all the five countries. What they gained from marking position here is uncertain. Perhaps they just wanted to show the Swedes that Sweden could not always dictate Norwegian behavior.
4. Conclusion
This thesis has delineated and discussed an example of Nordic cooperation in the field of foreign policy. In this example, we have seen what World Expositions are and for what reason they are hosted and attended, and we have seen how decisions were made within foreign policy bureaucracies. Also, we have seen an example of Nordic cooperation, in addition to an example of how the culture gap between the Scandinavian countries and Japan was handled by the Scandinavia policymakers.

How to present a country at a World Exhibition and how negotiations with other countries are performed are parts of a country’s foreign policy, though they are not of the most central questions. For states like the USA and the Soviet Union, World Expositions were of importance, because the cultural part of the Cold War – the one that fought for people’s hearts and minds – was of great importance. This fight for goodwill abroad was also important for smaller states. If the soft power increased, also smaller states had the possibility of influencing international politics.

The awareness of this is seen in how the Scandinavians looked at development aid. From the 1950s and increasingly so from the late 1960s, when these countries really expanded the number of aid projects, they were initially not at the top of the League of donors. But by identifying the value of being looked upon as altruistic, and working strategically to achieve this, the Scandinavian countries gained positions as particularly generous donors possess positions as “good” states. The Scandinavians together with the Dutch are seen as the UN norm countries. This in turn, gives more influence over certain questions in international relations than would be warranted by that exceed the size of the populations and economies.

Even though the USA and the Soviet Union identified World Expositions as important for their public diplomacy and level of soft power, the Norwegians concerned with these questions were largely ignorant of or lacked interest in the soft power implications. Instead, they recognized the value of Word Expositions as merely export related. The question was not placed under the OCIA at the NMFA, but under

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273 The Scandinavians were laggards with regard to how much they transferred, but they were not slow in getting on the bandwagon. Norway was the first non-colonial state to provide bilateral development aid. See “Conclusion” in Thorsten Borring Olesen, Helge Pharo and Kristian Paaskesen (eds.), Saints and Sinners: Official development aid and its dynamics in a historiacal and compararative perspective. (2013, Oslo, Akademika Forlag)

274 Borring Olesen, Pharo and Paaskesen: Saints and Sinners, see “Conclusion”
the Ministry of Trade. They realized it was a question that the NMFA also had to deal with, but it was still not placed under OCIA. It was the 3rd Trade Policy Office that dealt with the question, even though Per Borgen was a member of the Norwegian Osaka Committee.

The somewhat striking feature of the Norwegian way of organizing their participation is the lack of bureaucratic capacity for handling the question. The most important Norwegians in this regard were first Edward Mowinckel-Larsen, and after he resigned, Nils Fredrik Aall replaced him as the Norwegian Honorary Commissioner General. At the Norwegian Trade Fairs Odd Grann was the replacement, and he also became increasingly important to the Norwegian work with Expo ’70. Mowinckel-Larsen and Grann were both the CEOs of the Norwegian Trade Fairs, and not employed by the state. Neither was Aall, who was the owner and CEO of a Norwegian manufacturing company. Still, they were the ones making foreign policy decisions on behalf of Norway. Of course, they also had bureaucrats like Hærum, Glad and Borgen, but they were not present at any important meetings with the Scandinavian Pavilion Committee (SPC). They were not the ones taking any decisions. This is different from how the Swedes organized their work. It was the former Ambassador Öberg, who at the time was the leader of the Information Collegium, who had most to say with regard to Swedish World Exposition participation.

Another difference is the way politicians were involved in the process. In Norway, the bureaucrats were more in the background, while the politicians, both the ones in parliament and in government, were more active than was the case in Sweden. The difference in organization clearly was a contributory cause of misunderstanding in the spring of 1968, though sheer incompetence possibly also played a role. But that incompetence was also a consequence the organizational set-up. The Norwegian committee was not yet established – it had not yet been appointed by the Storting. Thus, Mowinckel-Larsen considered himself not in a position to make any decisions on behalf of Norway. For Sweden, the approval for Öberg to decide was given when he was employed years before, and they did not have any problems of the same nature. When Aall was officially appointed, it was too late to make many of the important decisions regarding how to present Norway.

At no point were the soft power implications mentioned or even considered by the Norwegians, the virtually lone opposing voice Thyness excepted. As almost all
the Norwegians involved saw it, going to Osaka boiled down to economics, export gains possibly, but certainly the need to avoid being blackballed. The only reason for attending Expo ’70 was to increase exports to Japan, and participation was seen as otherwise unnecessary. They had already established that the possibilities of increasing market shares were low in the foreseeable future. For Sweden, things were different because they came to see attendance at World Expositions as merely export increasing efforts. They also saw it as a way of increasing goodwill, and thus, to be present at Expo ’70 could have greater impact than merely market shares. The Norwegians, as we have seen, were very impressed afterwards of the Swedish way of negotiating and exercise power over the inter-Nordic debates. Because Öberg was such a good negotiator – he was both well prepared and smart, and took control over the process – the example in the thesis shows that Sweden was able to demonstrate which of the Nordic countries that were best at using soft power. It is of course possible and likely that the Swedes appreciated the importance of soft power better, but as much, the Swedish bureaucracy was better fitted to the task.

In Norway the Expos were not about soft power. Furthermore, with the exception of development aid, Thyness and the tiny office in the Foreign Ministry, soft power issues in Norway were at the best on the back burner. Still, it would have been likely that the process of deciding the theme for the pavilion could have spurred the debate of how to increase the Norwegian soft power. Still I have found no evidence of such. The only issue they were concerned with was that the environmental protection-theme would not be of any help for Norwegian exports. Instead, they wanted something more closely related to the shipping industry. The Swedes were, on the other hand, better prepared. Öberg had prior to the decision of Scandinavian participation at Expo ’70 organized a designer’s competition of how Sweden could install a pavilion with a theme concerning questions of the environment. In 1972, Sweden wanted to host the first UN conference on challenges to the environment. It seems as Sweden had a long-term strategy of being a forerunner on the area of environmental protection. The Scandinavian Pavilion at Expo ’70 fitted perfectly in this strategy. None of the other Nordic countries had ever thought of the possibility of selling their country to the world as environmentally friendly. By being better organized, and clearly more in tune with emerging international environmental trends, they steamrolled the neighbors into submission.
One of the arguments used was that environmental issues were of great interest in the host country. I have not found evidence of how Sweden knew that it would be a success in Japan, but they were obviously anyhow right. During the exhibition period, the debate in Japan on these issues flourished and gave the Scandinavian Pavilion much more attention than they probably expected, possibly excepting the Swedes. This was fortunate, and valuable especially to Sweden and its long-term strategy. By the mid 1960s the environmental problem was high on the agenda in the USA, not the least due to Rachel Carson’s book *Silent Spring.* We may perhaps assume that Carson made more of an impact in Sweden at an early stage than was the case in Norway, and Japan was obviously afflicted by these challenges. To choose the environment as the pavilion theme was a clever move.

The literature on the post World War Japanese state paints a picture of one that in terms of political authority and decision-making differs fundamentally from Scandinavia. The Scandinavians were clearly both clueless about and frustrated by what they were up against. This is evident in the situation where the Swedish Minister has an outburst during the landing rights negotiations – he obviously did not understand the Japanese ways of negotiation.

It must have been difficult for the Scandinavians when asking a question and never getting a straight answer – they could never know who in Japan actually made the decisions. Still, when the delegation of Scandinavian Ambassadors, Öberg and Hansson went to the Commissioner General’s meeting in Kyoto in the spring of 1968, they were worried that the Japanese bureaucracy would make the construction of the pavilion hard. At the meeting, they were assured that the Japanese authorities would make an effort to keep it as simple as possible, and the Scandinavians were actually able to start constructing the pavilion only weeks after all the Nordic Governments had appointed the joint Commissioner General and Hansson had signed the official documents. The Japanese must have made an effort to make it easier for the participating countries to deal with their bureaucracies.

This willingness to cooperate in a, for Europeans, understandable way, might be evidence of the urge to win some of the goodwill Japan obviously wanted by hosting such a time- and cost consuming event a World Exhibition is. The exhibition was just one of three such huge international events that Japan hosted in the 1960s

275 Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring,* (1962, Greewich, Connecticut)
and 70s: in 1964, they hosted the Summer Olympics in Tokyo and in 1972 they were the hosts of the Winter Olympics in Sapporo. During this period, Japan clearly wanted to increase the awareness of the country among people, international organizations and politicians around the world. This is one of the ways of constructing goodwill abroad, and all these events are good for a county’s interaction with people of other states. It was certainly a part of Japan’s public diplomacy strategy.

The reason for Nordic participation is not uniform in all the countries, but for all of them, some kind of pressure from outside is evident. None of them were positive when they first received the invitation to attend Expo ’70, but when SAS and other Swedish representatives from the manufacturing industries reacted on the negative reception, Sweden changed. Denmark and Norway were unwilling to participate as long as none of the other Nordic countries were positive. When Sweden decided to join, with or without the others, Denmark and Norway suddenly had no choice. For both of them, it was unthinkable to abstain if one of the others would go. This would reflect badly on the one staying home; the loss of goodwill would be too great. They could bear the loss in Japan if all of them decided not to be present, but to be the only one staying away appeared to carry unacceptable political and economic risk. For Finland, the recommendation from the NC was important. When the Nordic countries could cooperate, and Finland could appear as a part of a Western European region without provoking the Soviets, it was in their national interest to cooperate on a Scandinavian pavilion at the Expo ’70.

As the example of the Expo ’70 shows, it was important for Japan to have the Nordic countries at the exhibition. They put relatively much pressure on Scandinavia to attend, by inviting to meetings in Japan and visiting Ministers in Scandinavia. It is obvious that it was a great deal of prestige involved, and the consequences of disappointing the Japanese were difficult to predict. Because SAS was important to the Scandinavians, the uncertainty of possible retaliation from the Japanese must have been an important factor when deciding. Thus, it was in the national interests for the Scandinavian countries not to provoke the Japanese. Because it was a negative argument in favor of participation, they wanted to make the costs as low as possible, and thus the best option was Nordic cooperation.

Cooperation is therefore possible if it is in the national interest of the Nordic countries to join in different projects. When it is of no national interest anymore, or possibly seen as directly contrary to the national interest of any one of them,
cooperative attempts fail. This is evident in the case of for instance the many customs union proposals, monetary unions, and especially in the abortive negotiations for a Scandinavian defense union during 1948-49, as well as in different development aid projects. In other areas, also of potentially high security risks during the Cold War, the Nordic countries could establish well-functioning cooperation. The best example is the passport union established in the beginning of the 1950’s. Other cooperation projects have functioned well, as is seen in UNESCO and the World Bank. A very good example of well-functioning cooperation is the NC. Still, the NC has only power to give recommendations to the Nordic governments, but because of them, several projects of smaller and larger scale have been initiated. Some of these projects are in the area of high politics; some are not. Of course, the high politics include questions that are of key national importance. Thus, cooperation may be feasible also in sensitive areas of national importance. But still it is not the area of politics that determines the outcome of the cooperation; it is basically the national interest.

World Expositions are not crucial to a state; it is not a question of national survival. It can be of importance for some part of public diplomacy, and for export interests. But often, the expenses required from each of the countries presenting a pavilion are so high it is considered not being worth it. To be able to attend anyhow, it is a viable option to present joint pavilions together with likeminded and similar countries, from for example the same region. Still, in retrospect the Norwegians were not happy with the cooperation, and Grann recommended not cooperating again. At the World Expositions held afterwards, in Sevilla in 1992, in Lisbon in 1998, in Hannover in 2000 and in Shanghai in 2010, most of the Nordic countries have participated, but never again with a joint pavilion.

In this thesis, we have seen that it turned out to be more in the national interest of all the Nordic countries to continue cooperation than abandon it. Even though the Norwegians on several occasion felt that the Swedes were running all over them, as they did in the confusion over the pavilion theme on environmental protection, they did not want to stop cooperating. They could have decided not to participate at all, if the presentation was not in the national interest of Norway. In a short-term perspective, it probably was surprising and unwelcomed in Norway – it was not a pavilion theme Norwegians understood the value of. But the Swedes had foreseen this theme as one of international interest, and has been a forerunner on the field since the beginning of the 1970s, starting with Expo ’70, continuing two years after with
the first UN conference on environmental concerns. Norway also could have chosen to present their own pavilion at Expo ’70, if it had been seen to be in their national interest. None of these alternatives were as attractive as continuing the cooperation with the rest of the Nordic region. Thus we may infer that there were no persuasive arguments for doing it alone, by staying away or going for a separate pavilion. And thus, it proved possible by default to cooperate with the rest of the region.

This thesis concerns the Nordic cooperation on the World Exposition in Osaka in 1970. It analyzes an example of the ways in which foreign policy is made, especially in Sweden and Norway and on a field that is not at the core of a state’s foreign policy. It is also concerned with the culture gap between the Nordic region and Japan in the 1960s, what reasons states have to attend and host World Exhibitions, and it concerns Nordic cooperation in general. It has been great working with this material, but even though I have extended the research material compared to previous research, Nordic cooperation at World Expositions before Expo ’70 has not yet been fully analyzed. Nor has archives in Denmark, Iceland and Finland regarding World Expositions. I am sure there are plenty more research of interest to be done on the field – especially to also include archives from Denmark and to analyze the Nordic cooperation at Expo ’67 in depth.
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Appendix

The Main Bureaucrats and Politicians Involved


**Nils Fredrik Aall** – born 1911. Norwegian estate owner and CEO of Aall-Ulefos Brug.


**Sven A. Hansson** – the joint Nordic Commissioner General at Expo ’70.

**Kjell Öberg** – born 1913. Leader of the Collegium for Sweden Information Abroad from 1962.