Protests and the Corridors of Power

*How American Realism Ignores the Potential Power of Social Movements to Affect International Relations to America’s Disadvantage*

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**Protests and the Corridors of Power**: How American Realism Ignores the Potential Power of Social Movements to Affect International Relations to America’s Disadvantage

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Abstract:
This thesis claims that in the international realist tradition, the potential of social movements to affect politics is ignored. Therefore, there is no warning about such movements to be found in the texts of realism. The debate about whether the United States is a nation that adheres to the principles and assumptions of international realism theory is a very contentious one. This thesis will strongly argue that she in fact does, and provide cases to confirm that assertion.

Social movements often react to realist policies. In the cases used here – the United State’s relations to Iran and Chile – they reacted against coups and the support for authoritarian rule. In both cases, the potential for social movements to affect U.S. foreign policy were either totally ignored or underestimated in political elite circles and in the international relations milieu.

This oversight has had large consequences for the U.S.’ standing in the world and her power to affect international politics. In South America, social movements against authoritarian rule, and later, against certain economic policies, have been instrumental in diminishing U.S. influence on that continent. Now, the same dynamic is playing itself out in the Middle East.

This thesis argues that the hole that exists in realism theory where social movements should be needs to be filled if the theory is to stay relevant.

Acknowledgements:

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Thanks also to him and Professor Mark Luccarelli for many hours of interesting and engaging conversations. And to my fellow students, without whom these years would have been far less entertaining and rewardin
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I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: "Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed.
And on the pedestal these words appear:
`My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings:
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!'
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away."

- “Ozymandias”, Percy Shelley
Introduction;
- hypothesis and variables

The concept of the “fog of war” is well known. An antagonist can plan strategically and tactically during hostilities, but chances are high that his plans will get at least partially lost in this fog. This concept should be expanded to include other aspects of international relations such as development economics and geopolitics. In the fog of international relations, there are foghorns called theories. These foghorns are constructed to have some points of reference in the study and planning in the fog of international relations. Each theory aims to explain how international relations work, and they each have their own particular “sound”. Some politicians and academics choose their foghorn and stay put. Others travel between or among them or try to construct their own. Some people attempt to describe them, expand on them or test them for missing tones in their acoustic range. This thesis is an attempt at one such test. A test of a particularly popular foghorn; the theory called “International Realism” and its connection to United States foreign policy.

International Realism is the most used and cited theory for explaining international relations. The basic assumptions are of an anarchic international ordering principle where power rules and idealism, altruism and international law are secondary considerations, if that. States and their leaders rule the chessboard in a way that most serves their national interests, and they do so supremely. This thesis claims that for the United States, this theoretical outlook has been a driving force of behavior, and the nation’s actions often demonstrate this even though many American politicians would disagree with this assertion.

The theory has different strains. There is - among others - defensive realism, offensive realism, human nature realism, structural realism and neo-classical realism; all stretching back to the Greek historian Thucydides. From him, the theory moves through such classic writers as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Richelieu, Bismarck and Carr, before traveling to the U.S. where it finds its present intellectual home, and where most of the influential realist theoretical thinking has been done since its ascent to the top of international relations studies. From Hans Morgenthau through Kenneth Waltz, Samuel Huntington, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer, Jack Snyder and Stephen
Walt, the academic contribution to the field from America has been unrivalled. America is also, in its role as a superpower and one of the few “test case nations” of superpower behavior, ideal for evaluating the results of realist policy planning and behavior.

As in all theories with any significant level of abstraction, there are holes and missing pieces. In his expansion of realist theory as put down in his book *From Wealth to Power*, Fareed Zakaria exposes one such missing piece as he qualifies the theory’s quite narrow focus on “real” power when it comes to assessing state behavior. Zakaria notes that the ability of a state’s leader to harness its resources is – in addition to the sum of power held by that nation - also important. He uses the example of the United States in the late nineteenth century to show how she was powerful enough to expand outside of her own borders, but did not do so because of domestic political disagreements. This strife led to the president’s lacking ability to command the total power of his nation. This is one example of limits of the explanatory power of traditional realism. Zakaria calls his expansion of the theory “state-centered realism”, and his arguments are generally accepted. Inspired by his attempt to plug a hole in the theory – or expose a blind spot, if you will – this thesis aims to do the same; the blind spot being a lack of focus in realism theory on social movements and their potential effects on international affairs.

Zakaria - like basically all realist academics through history – leaves out the potential power of any given population to affect international politics. He focuses on institutions and political elites and their ability or unwillingness to lend their own power for foreign policy purposes. From the old, classical works through the American theorists of our time, the pinnacles of power occupy the entire field of vision in realism. As a consequence, foreign policy planners relying on realism theory do not factor in the potential of popular social movements as they formulate policies and doctrines. Social movements among the general population therefore have a tendency to come as a surprise to policy planners, and do not show up on their radar screens until they have toppled regimes or in other ways disrupted the plans and strategies set out by power elites. And the populace, when involved in actions and movements to change regimes and policies, often work against realist policies. Examples of this will be provided in chapters 2, 3 and 4.

So why focus on the theory of realism in particular? Because the theory exerts a marked dominance on international relations studies and as a framework for thinking about international
politics. Donald M. Snow argues that realism has been at the core of our understanding of geopolitics, and asserts that the realist paradigm has been “central to the operation of the international system and American attitudes towards the world.”¹ He claims that it has not only been an academic and intellectual exercise, but “a practical guide for political leaders as they conduct foreign policy.”² Views such as these on the importance of the theory are commonplace, also when describing the writers connected with it. Thomas Hobbes, for example, has been described as having dug the channel in which his intellectual followers swam,³ and realist Hans Morgenthau is often lauded as the father of the international relations discipline. In the introduction to the 7th edition of his book Politics Among Nations, editors Thompson and Clinton lavish praise on him, claiming that “If our discipline has any founding father, it is Morgenthau” and that the work “remains the single most influential text on international relations.”⁴ As the framework and its proponents are of such importance, the need to test the explanatory power of realism is paramount. Secondly, as will hopefully become clear in following chapters, foreign policy actions planned from a realist perspective seem to be well suited as kindling for sparking social movements.

Chapter 1 is on the theory itself and this missing focus. To anyone familiar with international relations theory, the claim that social movements are ignored by realism may seem obvious. But a thesis like this cannot be grounded on fiat statements. A thorough search through some of the most important texts of the theory is therefore needed to cement the claim. As a result, the first part of this chapter is a text of descriptive content describing the basics of the theory. The second part is an analysis on how some core texts of realism fails to account for the effects of social movements. This tests the first independent variable of the thesis.

Chapter 2 uses the case of U.S./Iran relations to test the rest of the thesis’ variables, and try to cement them for further exploration in chapters to come. We do so by using empirical historical data from 1953 until the present. Then, American behavior toward Iran is analyzed using basic tenets of realism as a framework. We explore how the United States used realist principles in its behavior towards Iran from the early 50s to the late 70s, how this was anathema to the Iranian populations wishes, and how their reaction to that behavior came with costs to the United States in the long run.
Chapter 3 uses another case built on the same mold. This chapter is focused on Chile, starting with the U.S.-backed coup against the government of Salvador Allende in 1973. We do the same analysis of U.S. behavior as in chapter 2, before moving on to the social movement that rose against the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 1983. Regional patterns are also brought into this chapter. This is necessary to make a good comparison of these two cases in our last chapter. The thesis asks whether or not social movements have been a driving force behind the fact that many now consider South America to be the United State’s “lost backyard.”

Chapter 4 first does a comparison between our two cases, and draws some conclusions from that. Then we need to briefly discuss whether realism is a descriptive or a prescriptive theory when it comes to American foreign policy, and if the policies that the U.S. followed in out two cases are mandated by realism. We explore whether the social movement reaction to foreign policy is prevalent enough to form a pattern worth substantial attention, i.e. if it has become a structural modifier important enough to merit further research inside the theoretical framework of realism and justify an expansion of it. We then reach a conclusion to the thesis and discuss the future potential effect of social movements on international affairs. Have they earned a place in international relations theory, or is R. B. J. Walker right to say that:

"To place the two terms “social movements” and “world politics” into conjunction is to invite serious conceptual trouble. On the face of it, the elusive transience of the one is no match for the monolithic presence of the other, fables of David and Goliath notwithstanding."  

This thesis then, challenges notions about America’s exceptional role in the world. Not by disputing her power and influence - which are unquestionable - but by addressing notions about the U.S. as a nation of special qualities that lifts her above the raw power game of international relations. Notions of selflessness and idealism. Realist John Mearsheimer claims that most American do not like realism. According to him, they tend towards thinking that America is a “good” state, and that she has qualities that set her apart from the melee. Realism theory disputes such ideas of uniqueness. Liberalism, on the other hand, distinguishes between good and bad states in its framework. “Not surprisingly, Americans tend to like this perspective, because it identifies the United States as a benevolent force in world politics and portrays its real and potential rivals as misguided or malevolent troublemakers.” This thesis finds its place in American Studies by commenting on these claims.
There are numerous definitions of social movements, and they differ in their details. The thesis will touch upon a number of them, which means that any definition will have to be quite broad. The definition used here is mostly derived from Porta & Diiani\textsuperscript{8} and from Dr. Erica Chenoweth. When we talk about social movements in this thesis, we assume the following:

1. Social movements mainly have their basis in civil society and population, not in political elites or established political parties. Other elites, such as intellectual or religious ones, often play a limited part.

2. They are involved in conflictual relations with clearly defined opponents. The movements used in this thesis are almost exclusively geared toward regime change, meaning that their opponents are the government itself and its external supporters.

3. They are linked together almost exclusively by informal networks. They do not possess the organization communications networks that government agencies have at their disposal.

4. They share distinct collective goals and aims. Without collective goals and aims, no social movement can be coherent over time, which is a prerequisite for the next defining point.

5. The definition “social movement” demands a series of actions that are components of long lasting campaigns. One demonstration or one strike does not make a social movement unless it is linked with numerous other such actions.

6. They are overwhelmingly non-violent in nature. We use this defining feature to not entangle the thesis into civil wars and diverse degrees of armed insurrection.

7. They are based on voluntary participation.
Five variables, three independent and two dependent, underpin this thesis:

Independent variable 1: The basic assumptions and texts of realism ignore the potential power of social movements.

Independent variable 2: American foreign policy has overwhelmingly been in line with – or been based upon – realism.

Independent variable 3: Social movements often come as reactions to realist policies.

Dependent variable 1: As a result, the diverse wills of populations and the different actions that populations can take have not been a factor in foreign policy planning, which means that social movements more often than not come as surprises.

Dependent variable 2: This lack of focus has had – and continues to have – large detrimental effects on American power and standing in the world in the long run.

A note on methodology is necessary. This thesis does not attempt to establish conclusions by researching new data. It attempts to bring together diverse and large sets of information and data that rarely overlap, and thereby reach a new analysis. As this entails bringing together different fields of study - American Studies, International Relations studies, studies on social movements that are usually placed in sociology - the subject matter is broad and diverse. We will therefore have to rely on other academic’s analysis to a degree that may not be typical for a master’s thesis. When this is necessary, the thesis will attempt to establish those analyses as near consensus explanations. It is also written on the assumption that realism is the best explanatory theory we have of international relations, and should be read from that perspective.
1. **Realism;**
   - its theoretical foundations and its blind spot concerning people power

This first chapter has two functions. Firstly, it is meant to be a theoretical backdrop for the chapters to follow. Analysis from the theory will mostly be done in chapters to come. It contains a brief overview of realism and its history, relaying on interviews done for the thesis, some textbooks on international relations in general, and most importantly on some of the texts that are generally agreed to be core to realism as it has progressed.  

Some key parts of each text is given extra attention to explain the development of the theory and its various dimensions, and to highlight considerations important to this thesis. Where for example E. H. Carr is focused on describing the folly of utopianism, John Mearsheimer’s approach may be better on the disguising of realist policies as ideology. Kenneth Waltz’ rigorous attention to levels of analysis is used to frame this thesis theoretically. Some topics are explanatory factors that will be used in later chapters, such as the balance-of-power framework, for which we will use Hans Morgenthau. We will assume some knowledge of the framework from the reader.

Secondly, the chapter lays out the foundations for a discussion of our Independent Variable number 1: “The basic assumptions and focus of realism ignore the potential power of social movements.” This is done by discussing what – if anything – is said about social movements and people power in the texts already mentioned. This variable will then be used in coming chapters.

**Basic assumptions**

A defense is needed or the slightly hubristic project of describing such a rich textual tradition as American realism as part of a master’s thesis. As mentioned, there are different strains within the theory. But we are looking for something that seems to be missing from the theoretical framework *as a whole*. The differences between the strains are therefore mentioned but downplayed. This approach is indeed plausible, as no matter which strain of realism one

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1 The core texts used are E. H. Carr’s “The Twenty Years Crisis”; Hans Morgenthau’s “Politics among Nations”; Kenneth Waltz’ “A Theory of International Relations; John J. Mearsheimer’s “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, Jack Snyder’s “Myths of Empire”. Mentions will also be made of Thucydides’ “The Peloponnesian War”, Nicollo Machiavelli’s “The Prince” and Thomas Hobbes’ “The Leviathan”. Other texts and lectures on realism will also be referred to.
describes – be it defensive, offensive, structural, ethical or state centered – they will not be confused with or mistaken for any of the other dominant theories within international relations studies such as international liberalism, critical theory or the economically focused theories of empire coming from Marxism. The similarities between the strains and the grounding principles they are all founded upon are marked and clear, revealing what William Wohlforth calls a “striking family resemblance.” And as one of the fathers of the theory Hans Morgenthau writes: “The difference then, between political realism and other schools of thought, is real and profound.”

William Wohlworth is tasked with summarizing realism in the *Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. He presents his basic assumptions under the rubric “Realism’s Unity: The Signature Argument,” and proceeds to summarize the entire theory as a distinct project with features separating it from its competitors. Richard Betts – although remarking that there are differences of opinion between realists when it comes to specific situations - argues the same, and finds that the main point that differentiates realists from idealists is that they focus on how:

…policy options depend on and will affect the balance of power in the international system, as opposed to what the legal or moral principles in disputes are, which are the priorities to idealists.”

We therefore, in line with these scholars, assume wide similarities among the different strains of realism. We continue from there as we go through some of the basics of those strains in more detail and link them to the writers who provided and expanded upon them. But first, a set of basic assumptions from the framework as a whole is needed Three lists of such assumptions from different sources are included as appendix 1, two of them specific to different versions of the theory. But for now, we use a list of meta-assumptions from the *Oxford Handbook of International Relations*’ “working definition of the tradition of realism”, where four basic parameters are used to enshrine the theoretical framework. This is a shortened version of those parameters:

1. Groupism. Politics takes place within and between groups. This to provide survival above subsistence level. Any social group can be placed within this framework. But the assumption that nation states are the most important entities is illustrated in the fact that the authors uses the term “state” for any further reference. And nationalism is seen as the most important glue for cohesion within groups.
2. **Egoism.** Narrow self-interest is what drives and motivates policy actions. Classical Realism will place this assumption at the feet of human nature, while Structural Realism will focus on the international system as a steering force. But the conclusion of egoism is the same.

3. **Anarchy.** There is no overarching government with absolute power of sanctions to rule international relations. Any state has to look out for itself. Or as John Mearsheimer puts it; there is no 9/11 to call.\(^\text{12}\)

4. **Power Politics.** In the absence of a global governing body with the authority to rule – what Thomas Hobbes called a Leviathan – national power is found at the “intersection of groupism and egoism.” In this framework, might does not make right, but it certainly defines possible and impossible in international relations and plays a pivotal part in policy planning. Power comparisons and balance also define the planning and decision making of states.

We give extra attention to three American realists; Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. While we go through their contribution to realism theory, we keep an eye on the older foundational texts of the framework that have already been mentioned and refer back to them when useful or necessary.

Realism had a re-birth after World War II, as what seemed to many realists to be wishful thinking and idealism had not contributed to keeping the world at peace. E. H. Carr was one of these realists, likening the behavior of Great Britain and the U.S. in the run up to the war to alchemists wanting to believe that gold could be made from plainer metals, saying that this was how “wishing prevails over thinking.”\(^\text{13}\) Realism, on the other hand, represents a “necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism.”\(^\text{14}\) American post-war realists, starting with Hans Morgenthau and his *Politics among Nations*, certainly agreed with him. It is also in this period that realism theory became more formalized, most notably through this book by Morgenthau, which contained the first systematic set of principles on the theory in the 1954 edition. This set is provided in appendix 1 to this thesis. The concept of the balancing of power that is so important to realism was set out in this book in more clarity than before, and Morgenthau spends a large part of his text describing this phenomenon when it comes to the years leading up to World War II. If one was looking for a centerpiece in *Politics among Nations*, one could do worse than to choose this quotation describing power balancing:
Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system. Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power position. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from their adversary. … Whether a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is, then, a matter not of principle but of expediency.15

He also lays out some of the points brought forth by earlier realist writers like Thucydides and Hobbes in theoretical terms. Thucydides explained that it was the Spartan fear of Athenian growth that sparked the Peloponnesian war. And the issue of arms races and growing fear, by some called the Hobbesian Trap,16 is explained by Morgenthau in a precise manner:

….State A resorts to certain measures defensive in intent, such as armaments, bases and alliances, with respect to State B. The latter, in turn, resorts to countermeasures, for it now sees State A embarking upon a policy of imperialism. These countermeasures strengthens the initial misapprehension, on the part of State A, of State B’s policies, and so forth.17

Up to this point, and including Morgenthau’s work, the human nature perspective of the use of power was basically accepted. From this perspective, seeking power is something imbued in the nature of man. The foundation for this mainly comes from Thomas Hobbes, who stated that if man is left without an enforcers of rules and order – what he called a Leviathan – humans would descend into a state of nature where there would be “….continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”18

From this classical human nature focus, we move to the two main proponents of structural realism, American realists Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Waltz, in his Theory of International Politics, takes the theoretical rigor of realism to new levels. Most importantly, he rejects Morgenthau’s notion that the nature of states can be found mirrored in the nature of man, and that this explains state’s behavior. To Waltz, the structure of the international system is the driver of state’s behavior, thus the label “structural realism” is created. This international structure forces certain behavior independent of any particular nation’s qualities. The first half of his book – and much of the rest – reads more like a textbook on theory in general than a proposal of a specific theory, with multiple examples from other scientific fields to illustrate his points.11

Waltz’s main focus is to show the difference between systems level theory and unit level theory (i.e. the international level vs. the state level). Waltz theory (later also to be called defensive

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11 For example, he uses economic theory and its separation of micro and macro, and the natural science's distinction of the Newtonian and the quantum levels of physics to display the usefulness of separating levels of analysis.
realism) is on the system level, and he calls into question the importance of unit level behavior and its influence on the system of international relations. He calls such frameworks reductionist theories. We use more space on Waltz then on the other core texts, as this is a good place to situate this thesis theoretically. First, let us consider Waltz’ arguments for rejecting the reductionist approach.

Waltz thinks that studying unit attributes – i.e. national attributes – is fruitless as a component of a search for an explanation of the international system, as he sees a persistent likeness in state behavior in spite of individual internal differences. He faults most thinkers for this approach, as they often fail to see the systemic causes that play on units. He includes in this critique realist thinkers such as Morgenthau and Kissinger, the latter of which claimed that states with revolutionary attributes are the ones causing war on the international stage, meaning that some states are more warlike than others. To Waltz, this is a faulty assumption. He rejects this notion of the importance of differences as an error in the level of abstraction that is needed. To him, states are:

….alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their ability to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function. … One has to be impressed with the functional similarity of states and, now more than ever before, with the similar lines their development follows.

They are, even if capabilities differ, “functionally undifferentiated.” As a result, we cannot create a coherent theory of the international system by summing up the foreign policies of the nations in it. Waltz claims that it is necessary, therefore, to lift the abstraction of one’s theory away from specific state behavior and the particular relations they have to each other. This is structural realism at its peak.

This is of importance to us, as what we consider here is the behavior of units in relation to each other within the system that Waltz describes. From Waltz' perspective, this thesis would be of a reductionist nature. This thesis does not attempt, however, to build a new theory. It attempts only to expose a blind spot in an already existing one, and to point to the importance of this blind spot in the everyday life of international affairs. The claims made here are more practical and mundane in this respect. The point here is that to be a successful unit within the structure – a successful nation state in the international order – the actors need to be able to foresee to a certain extent how other units will behave and how this will change the connecting lines between units...
inside the structure. It is in this regard that we discuss how important social movements are as a factor of change that plays upon units. This really makes it a description of foreign policy – its considerations, actions and planning – not a description of international relations on Waltz’ level.iii But the paper lives comfortably inside Waltz’ boundaries on the unit level, and only describes one single part of the interactions between those units. When Waltz reiterates that the level of abstraction is not great enough in most students, and that “students of international politics have tried to get closer to the reality of international practice and to increase the empirical content of their studies”,21 this thesis can comfortably plead “Guilty, your honor.” Although we will see later on, tentatively, that as “the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units,”22 social movements reacting to foreign policy have a part to play in that they can affect power shifts between units.

John Mearsheimer’s version of the theory is most often called “offensive realism.”iv Mearsheimer names his version of realism in this way because he sees states as being inherently offensive and aggressive mostly as a means of defense inside a structure that demands it. Aggressive means for defensive ends would be a short summary of his perspective. His focus and conclusions are geared towards any given state’s desire to survive, as he says that without surviving, any states other wishes and wants cannot be fulfilled. This offensiveness leads him to a very pessimistic conclusion indeed, even for a realist:

\[
\text{Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to seek a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival.}^{23}
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So to him, great states do not only wish to be relatively stronger than their potential rivals. They want to be the unrivalled hegemon, as the best way to ensure your survival is to be, as he has expressed it, the “biggest and badest dude on the block.”24 As a result, great powers are fated to clash, not only to become hegemons themselves, but to deny that position to others. So where some former theories have claimed that great nations seek just as much power as necessary for their survival, and that they first and foremost are interested in protecting their existing position

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iii We will also briefly connect with the version of realism called “neo-classical realism”, where considerations of differences among units are more in focus. Fareed Zakarias work, the main inspiration for this thesis, falls within this category.

iv The basic assumptions and the resultant behavior of Mearsheimer’s realism is listed as appendix 1.
Mearsheimer claims that nation states will always want more power in the interest of defense. This sometimes-excessive strength is needed because other states may be aggressive, ambitious and untrustworthy even if your nation is not. Mearsheimer presents three perceived facts – familiar in nature from previous texts – that to him cement this view of the offensive as necessary for the defensive:

1) The absence of any real global authority
2) All states have some offensive military capability
3) States can never be sure about other state’s intentions, especially in the long run.

He echoes Waltz’s analysis in saying that realist behavior is guided by the structure of the system, and in rejecting the human nature form of behavioral motivation. According to him, there is no “animus dominandi” - no type A personality - that guides nations. They are simply steered towards aggression by the situation they are in. This situation, to Mearsheimer, is genuinely tragic and depressing, and leads states to behave in destructive ways.

A few more points about realism need to be made before we end this section of the chapter. For this thesis, the aspect of morality in international affairs is important, as social movements often form as a result of what the organizers of such movements see as immoral behavior from another party. The skepticism on the part of most realist thinkers towards pursuing goals and objectives on moral grounds is moreover often mentioned. Not only is it a part of the political prescriptions of realism that morals should not intrude too much on policy planning, as moral and idealistic choices have a tendency to be pursued with excessive vigor and catastrophic results. Morals have little place in the explanatory part of the theory as well. This is most purely expressed in a dialogue from the work of Thucydides that has followed modern realism as long as it has existed and is often said to be the best expression of the theory and its outlook. In this dialogue, Athenian emissaries explain to the little island state of Melos why Athens will attack them if they do not follow their instructions:

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\(^{\text{v}}\) Mearsheimer holds Morgenthau and Waltz to be the first theoretical realists, saying about Carr that there is «no theory in his book». 
Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that...you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.²⁶

In a world of such actors, many realists would say that it is impossible to keep true to ones moral compass, as this would be dangerous. According to another classical realist, Nicollo Machiavelli, “The human condition does not permit it”²⁷, as he explains that:

…..there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation….. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity.²⁸

But this notion of a total lack of moral considerations in realism has some ambiguities to it. Writing specifically on the ethics of realism, Jack Donnelly cites realist thinkers who make this claim loud and clear, calling their assertions the “familiar calls for an amoral foreign policy.”²⁹
But there are, as Donnelly points out, certain challenges to this view:

Sophisticated realists, however, acknowledge that the “realities” of power politics are but one dimension of an adequate theory or practice of international politics. Initial appearances to the contrary, most leading realists grant ethics a necessary if subordinate place in international relations…..³⁰

Richard Betts, on the other hand, explains that realism should be “understood in terms of utilitarian and/or consequentialist versions of morality.” Planning from what is and not for what ought to be – from what is possible and not from what is desirable – cannot be immoral as long as the task at hand is security. Realists, he says, worry about paving the road to hell with good intentions.

This notion that realism is immoral is sometimes coupled with the misunderstanding that realist prescriptions for policy planning are inherently and inevitably aggressive. As an example of the contrary; a substantial number of realists were signatories to a letter adamantly advising President Bush not to attack Iraq in 2003.³¹ Realism does not dictate that states attack each other if peaceful co-existence is to their advantage (although Mearsheimer would claim that they often do so). This misinterpretation ignores major historical facts, for example that the U.S. détente
with China – a decidedly non-aggressive policy shift – came out of the logics of realism. As Richard Betts explains about (most) realists: “They are hawks about preparing capabilities for war, but much less so about fighting wars when they can be avoided.”\textsuperscript{32} For smaller states, peaceful co-existence and the increased importance of international institutions and law are essentials of realism, as these frameworks function as protection against more powerful states.\textsuperscript{33} So a “sophisticated realist” – in the words of Donnelly – may well come to different conclusions than any particular policymaker. These two issues of amorality and aggressiveness should be remembered for our conclusion chapter, where they are brought back into this thesis.

The issue of international institutions often comes up in realism. This was the major concern of Thomas Hobbes, who argued for a Leviathan that could wield supreme power in the interest of peace. In his eyes, and in the eyes of realists in general, the lack of real sanction power for such institutions render them and the covenants they are based upon useless, as “Covenants, without the Sword, is but Words”\textsuperscript{34}. Hobbes Leviathan could take three forms:

a) Of one man. For those who like it; a Monarchy. For those who do not; a tyranny.

b) An assembly of whoever wants to join. For those who like it; a Democracy. For those who do not; anarchy.

c) An assembly of a select few. For those who like it; an Aristocracy. For those who do not; Oligarchy.\textsuperscript{35}

The international institutions we have created for ourselves to replace this Leviathan are, to most liberals at least, institutions created to soften power politics through frameworks of international law and collaboration. Realists, on the other hand, consistently see them as just additional playgrounds for the same power game between states, as exemplified by Hans Morgenthau:

The United Nations was intended at its inception to serve as an instrument of China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, and of their allies, for maintaining the status quo as established by the victory of these nations in the Second World War. …. The ideology of the United Nations is, therefore, used by these different nations for the purpose of justifying their particular interpretations and disguising their particular claims.\textsuperscript{36}
Richard Betts explains that realists would say that it is not international law that matter; it is the interpretation of international law by the most powerful states in the system that counts.\textsuperscript{37} International institutions are according to him made by the nations included in them, and the opportunity to exert power within them are merely a reflection of power on the outside. We will get back to this at a later stage, both in assessing if American foreign policy is realist in nature and with regards to international economic institutions and social movements in South America.

To sum up this part of chapter one; we get a picture of an explanatory theory that is geared towards power politics of interests; with anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system in the absence of an overarching \textit{Leviathan} to control the international system; nation states as the primary actors in that system; and a near absence of moral considerations in planning and policy actions. Jonathan Glover explains that “Force is the ultimate arbiter and any diplomatic policy that does not rely on carrots and sticks will not get you very far. Without a club in the closet, without a credible threat of force, policy becomes bluff, bluster.”\textsuperscript{38} The primary purpose of any given state’s actions is to further or protect its own interests, and this is done within a balance of power regime where the nation’s power relative to others decides and guides the actions it can and does take. We can end with another to-the-point quotation from Machiavelli, which gives us the basic flavor of the realist perspective concerning aspects such as morals, international institutions, fear of others and the importance of power:

\begin{quote}
Between an armed and an unarmed man there is no comparison whatsoever and it is not reasonable for an armed man to obey an unarmed man willingly. It is impossible for them to work together well.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\textit{Whispers of People Power}

From this theoretical context, we move to the issue of social movements in relation to realism. What, if anything, do these scholars of international realism have to say about social movements and their potential to affect international relations? This is a core question for this thesis and the basis for our first independent variable. We therefore spend time not only on the American post-war realists, but on some of the older texts on which their theoretical expansions are based, starting with Nicolla Machiavelli and his classic, \textit{The Prince}. 
Machiavelli recognized the potential power of the common man – the population over which a Prince rules – to a larger extent than most modern realists, at least to a certain degree. In brief passages he explains that any Prince must have the friendship of the common people, for without this he cannot make himself secure. This presented a ruler with certain problems, as he will also have to deal with the nobles. He may be beholden to the nobles for helping him into power or he may have problems keeping them in rains by fear. The problem consists of pleasing both the common man and the nobles, as “…one cannot honestly satisfy the nobles without harming others. Their (the common people’s) desire is more just than that of the nobles – the former do not want to be oppressed, while the latter wants to oppress.” In essence, a ruler can do without the nobles but not without the people, as he has to live with them. Had political rulers and realist thinkers of our own time heeded Machiavelli’s opinion that “The one who builds on the people do not build on mud, but on strength. They are more loyal and less deceitful than the nobles,” then the particular set of historical examples that will be discussed later in this thesis may well have looked very different. But still, the general focus of The Prince is overwhelmingly on the ruling elites and the power game amongst them. The comments mentioned here are distinctly untypical of the rest of the book.

Thomas Hobbes writes about domestic political strife, but his reflections are easily placed into an international setting. In his framework, there is a clear denial of the right of the people to overthrow their Leviathan. No social movements allowed, in other words. The people “don’t ever really get the chance in Hobbes to come together and unmake the government. Why? Because that would open the door back to the chaos of the state of nature, which is the state of war.” The Leviathan, be it person or system, should have the right to name its own successor, thereby perpetuate a system of total rule over those who have once willingly given the Leviathan their power. This is in direct contradiction to, for example, the ideas of the Declaration of Independence, and would certainly be part of the explanation of the unpopularity of realism in the U.S. The only caveat to this rule is if the Leviathan loses the ability to protect people from others, in which case any man is free to assume a state of nature, and do whatever is in his power to protect himself. But basically, uprisings are forbidden in Hobbes’ realist framework, for “Rebellion is but Warre renewed”, and war is what the Leviathan is there to protect people from. But if a people where to try to throw off their ruler, Hobbes at least recognizes one of the first rules in any playbook of a social movement trying to effect regime change; “Take away in
any kind of State, the Obedience, and they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved.” The idea that any ruler is dependent upon the obedience of his people is repeated ad nauseam in writings on social movement tactics.

In The Twenty Years Crisis, E. H. Carr talks about academics, intellectuals and politicians. The masses are mentioned from time to time, but mostly in the capacity of a passive onlooker without any real agency who either supports or does not support the actions of his or her government. He writes about how important the judgment of public opinion seemed to be for many of the drafters of the rules of the League of Nations, including the person of initiative in that case, President Woodrow Wilson. These are ideas rooted in American political tradition. Public opinion would be the judge and the sanction of these rules, the drafters claimed. As Lord Cecil said it (and many others, including Wilson and Bentham, said similar things): “By far the strongest weapon we have is the weapon of public opinion.” But Carr, as most realists, is not inclined to give this weapon much agency. He counters the claimed importance of public opinion with the example of the impotence of it regarding the Manchurian crisis, where there was public outrage without consequence. And he gives more examples of where the will of the people – who wanted “the high things; the right things; the true things” – had no effect at all. He talks briefly about this public opinion, but only in the perspective of how the dominant group can use propaganda for its purposes and impose their opinions on the public, and have it “harnessed to military and economic power.”

In his discussion, popular or public opinion and the power you wield by using and controlling it is an instrument of the state and of the powerful. It is not something to be feared from the inside, and not something that can change conditions on its own.

Although his mentions of social will and efficacy is negligible taken as part of the book as a whole, he does recognize the importance of a few revolutions that could fall under the category of social movements. The Bolshevik revolution is one of them. Another was the French Revolution, which “inaugurated the period of history now coming to a close.” These cases are mentioned as transformations of nation states, but they are interesting to Carr only as occurrences of elite power shifts, not as people power events.\[^{vi}\] Maybe we can find some of the explanation for this lack of focus in Carr’s total misunderstanding of non-violent action, as he claims that:

\[^{vi}\] They also fall outside our definition of social movements, as they were violent to a high degree.
…the simplest form [of divorcing power from politics] is the doctrine of nonresistance. The moral man recognizes the existence of political power as an evil, but regards the use of power to resist power as a still greater evil. This is the basis of such doctrines of nonresistance as those of Jesus or Gandhi, or of modern pacifism. It amounts, in brief, to a boycott of politics.\textsuperscript{46}

Gandhian tactics are nothing if not heavily engaged in politics. It is active and political resistance to the core. A “boycott of politics,” as Carr calls it, would be the exact opposite of the Gandhian creed, as Gandhi explains that the power that lies within social movements “…is not “passive” resistance; indeed it calls for intense activity. The movement in South Africa was not passive but active.”\textsuperscript{47} What would, for example, the non-violent Civil Rights Movement be if it were not highly political? Carr’s mistake here seems to be that he equates resistance with violence and violence with power. If this is how Carr sees social movements as a force and as a strategy, and if it displays the level of understanding he has of such movements, no wonder it has no place in his book. To Gandhi again, on the force of non-violent conflict making, as if he was addressing the British Carr directly:

It is totally untrue that it [nonviolence] is a force to be used only by the weak so long as they are not capable of meeting violence by violence. This superstition arises from the incompleteness of the English expression.\textsuperscript{48}

The will of the people is also mentioned briefly and on occasion in Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations. In his chapter on the Essence of National Power Morgenthau includes it, but in the same way as Carr. Morgenthau comments on the population as if they are mere recipients of propaganda. “The government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave.”\textsuperscript{49} The political elites, says Morgenthau, are the ones we talk about when we talk about nations and power. “They are the individuals who … wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation.” The people, in this description, are “to a much greater extent the object of power than it is the wielder.”\textsuperscript{50} So again, the people are more to be used than to be considered when it comes to foreign policy. Echoing Carr on this subject, Morgenthau concludes that:

…a world public opinion restraining the foreign policies of national governments does not exist. …… Modern history has not recorded an instance of a government having been deterred from some foreign policy by the spontaneous reaction of a supranational public opinion.\textsuperscript{51}
It is therefore with some irony one can read his complaint that world public opinion is understudied.\textsuperscript{52} The necessity of popular support for foreign policy is mentioned as Morgenthau goes through a nation’s elements of power, but the populace is not left with much dignity in these paragraphs. The statesman is here the careful thinker, the temporized compromiser and long-term planner. The public mind is “unaware of the fine definitions” of the statesman’s thinking and only wants quick results, as it will “sacrifice tomorrow’s real benefits for today’s apparent advantage.”\textsuperscript{53} The public mind and its preferences are therefore mostly unsound and fickle. The gap between what the public wants and what is actually good foreign policy is described as unavoidable. Foreign policy is, in the most clearly stated way, only for political elites to consider.

As we have seen, Kenneth Waltz firmly rejects any consideration at the national level, and by extension national social movements and their possible effect on the international structure. As national social movements first and foremost changes states internally, they are simply not considered at all in his *Theory on International Politics*. In the whole book, two slight references are made to the will of people or their power to affect foreign policy. First; Waltz quotes Hume’s comments on the need to have the participation of some of the people to be effective, and concludes that “The governors [of Hume’s period] being few in number, depend for the exercise of their rule on the more or less willing ascent of their subjects.”\textsuperscript{54} To Waltz, this means that any nation that cannot rule itself cannot have any real impact on the governing of international affairs. Second; he remarks briefly that there is the potential of internal public opposition stopping the United States from adventurous policies,\textsuperscript{55} but it is hard to see how this could happen given the unimportance of public opinion described earlier. At that, the consideration of any will of the people in the 200+ pages of the book stops.

In all the other works that have been considered this far, there are at least minute glimpses of “the people” and their role. In his *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer mentions this aspect not at all. Again people are – when considered – mere numbers to measure a state’s potential power; in economic terms on and in military terms.\textsuperscript{56} No further space is therefore spent on Mearsheimer’s work at this stage. As a general comment on this book in relation to the others we have discussed, Mearsheimer uses more historical examples in his book than for example Waltz do. One of the consequences of this is that we will revisit Mearsheimer more than the other authors in the chapters to follow.
As mentioned, the neoclassical version of realism claims that paying more attention to internal state conditions is a legitimate enterprise, meaning that unit level analysis leaves the door ajar for social movements to be considered. After all, Kenneth Waltz – although very important in the history of the development of realism – has no veto power on what the theory should include. Gideon Rose writes that theorists using the neoclassical perspective – including the already mention Fareed Zakaria – follows a framework that “explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables.” Furthermore, “systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level,”\textsuperscript{57} to produce certain foreign policy choices. These theorists see the world of politics as more murky and difficult to read than the structural realist framework implies. In other words, scholars need their foghorns. Jack Snyder’s work \textit{Myths of Empire} has come up as a suggestion on where to look for social movements within this version of realism. It is true that unit level characteristics – states’ internal conditions – are given more weight here. But after reading Snyder’s book and numerous articles on neoclassical realism, this author is in agreement with Dr. Erica Chenoweth,\textsuperscript{vii} who when asked directly about this issue states that:

\[
\text{…. they (neo-classical realists) are still thinking about it on elite politics level, that you might get a certain set of advocacy organizations that only matter when they persuade a certain power elite to take it seriously. And the response to that is really a function of the elites having been persuaded rather than that the movement generated a pulling away of that pillar of support.}\textsuperscript{58}
\]

As Snyder’s book is not counted as among the most important leading, traditional, core texts on realism, and as it does not include social movements in any meaningful way, we will not spend more time on it here. As Gideon Rose says; for the neo-classical realist, foreign policy is the realm of “political leaders and elites.”\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{Chapter Conclusion; The Missing Focus Confirmed?}

So have we found, in our journey through some of the major texts on realism, a substantial lack of focus on social movements and people power? Is the first and most important variable for this thesis confirmed? To counter the argument from apologists of deistic religion that the existence of God can never be totally disproven, Bertrand Russell hypothesized a teapot

\textsuperscript{vii} Dr. Chenoweth will be used as a reference several times in this paper. She has moved from being the founder of the Program on Terrorism & Insurgency at Wesleyan University to being a member of the academic advisory board for the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict. Her resultant combination of knowledge both of international relations and social movements makes her very useful for our purposes.
in orbit around the moon. The existence of this teapot, Russell claimed, can never be totally disproven, just like God. In the same vain, this or any other paper cannot plausibly prove without doubt a total absence of meaningful focus given to social movements within the realist tradition. That would entail a line-by-line reading of all texts written on the theory; an impossible task. What *is* possible is to underline the most used basic premises of the tradition at large and point to the absence of social movements and people power as factors within those. And as we have seen, these factors are clearly missing from the framework given by the core texts that we have searched, and that are generally seen as representative for the realist theory. Not only are they missing as factors; in most of the occasions that the potential power of the public is mentioned, it is *actively dismissed* as a source of change and influence. The pages read in the books and articles on realism researched for this thesis runs to some 3000 pages. But the scattered mentions of public power and the effect they can have on political outcomes would scarcely fill a 5-page article in *Foreign Policy Magazine*. It would seem from this reading that our independent variable 1 stands on very firm ground indeed.

We might ask why there is this missing focus? There are multiple potential reasons. First and foremost, the number of significant social movements with an impact on foreign policy is on the rise. And their efficacy is getting better and better. In a survey of 323 social movements of significance in the 20th century, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan show how the number has exploded, at least quadrupling in intensity over the last century.60 This means that empirical data was for many of the realist writers – at least up until Morgenthau – simply not available. Dr. Chenoweth has shifted her research from international security to social movements, and has met a near total absence of overlap in academic work in the two fields. She describes the security field in which she teaches to be a “silico,” where there was a culture of “guns, bombs, or nothing’s happening. There is violence, or there is nothing.”61 She presents her own thoughts on the subject when questioned about it thusly:

You might imagine a couple of different explanations. One would be that there is actually kind of a groupthink that happens on elite levels where all you are really talking to are other elites who share the same basic frame of thinking that you do. Then it’s just something that’s not really on your radar. Another reason might be that it’s actually…..there are sort of bureaucratic things that keep you isolated from the realities of the power structures in your society, and then there might be that there is too much variation that people are not yet convinced that they [social movements] matter.62
Gene Sharp, by many seen as the dean of writing on nonviolent conflict, echoes these sentiments when interviewed:

I think they [i.e. political elites] are stuck in the old preconceptions. … That violence is the real power. Also, if violence is the real power, there are people in that society that couldn’t without violence maintain their control over society… And they don’t understand nonviolent struggle in depth at all. Just very superficial understandings. Lots of preconceptions.63

Waltz’ levels of analysis schema is certainly another reason. From this perspective, national social movements have no place, as these play themselves out on the less interesting unit level. But there are many other realists who discuss national characteristics more than Waltz do, and the subject of social movements and any power of the public is still missing from their texts.

When it comes to seeing states as simple units, many are critical. Charles Bright and Michael Geyer decries the notion of the state as a “container” – an entity to be studied in isolation from other such entities – and presses for a comparative outlook that would open “the space to see the multiple levels on which historical processes work, and to hear the multitude of voices,… that were silenced by the self-enclosed discourses of the nation.”64 They are writing about North-American studies specifically, but the sentiment can easily be lifted into this thesis. David Noble, also talking about the North-American Studies field of social science, comments on how “scientific communities cluster around paradigms – hypothesis – about the nature of reality. Members of these communities, accepting the reality of their paradigms, then proceed to solve problems defined by their shared hypothesis” 65, and then come up short because no theory explains everything. From views like these, we might imagine a “textile theory of international relations studies” that has as its single assumption that “powerful men in suits study only other powerful men in suits.” After all, there is some truth to R. B. J. Walkers claim that “judged from the regal heights of statecraft, social movements are but mosquitoes on the evening breeze, irritants to those who claim maturity and legitimacy at the centers of power.”66
2. Case Study 1, Iran;
   - two shifts and a failure

As its first case to investigate our other variables, this paper will use the Iran/US relation as it has played out over the past six decades, focusing mainly on two political upheavals. The chapter has five parts to it, and they follow the remaining list of variables as they have been laid out in the introduction. Part one is on the coup against the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and the American relationship to Iran in the years that followed it. It is important to note that before the coup, America was not generally seen as an antagonistic state in Iran, like Russia and Great Britain were. There was much admiration for the US and for the U.S. representatives in the country, as we will get back to at the conclusion of the chapter. The national leader to re-emerge after the coup, Shah Reza Pahlavi, was far more Western oriented and in line with the foreign policy- and economic interests of the U.S. than the Mossadeq government that preceded him. From a realist perspective, orchestrating such a coup would seem sensible enough, as American economic and political interests were seen to be protected. This first part consists of empirical historical data, and forms the background against which we will test our variables through analysis.

Part two tests independent variable 2 against American foreign policy behavior towards Iran from 1953 to 1979. It applies realism assumptions to the historical record to see if this case confirms the variable. In part three, we check for the motivations behind the revolution that overthrew the Shah of Iran in 1979 to see if this confirms our independent variable 3. Part four, applies the conclusion from the first chapter on the blind spot of realism when it comes to social movements. This is our test of dependent variable 1. Finally, we use the antagonistic relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the '79 revolution to confirm dependent variable 2.

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viii In our definition of social movements, there is a point on the nonviolent nature of movements. The 1979 Iranain Revolution was, contrary to some perceptions, overwhelmingly nonviolent. There was violence – such as the Tehran hostage taking and the repression of liberal elements in Iran - after the Revolution. But that does not influence the availability of the Revolution as a test case in this thesis.
The 1953 Coup and the Enduring Friendship

First, we dispense with a question that has been debated for decades; was the U.S. involved in the coup in Iran in 1953 in a substantial way? Claiming U.S. involvement is no longer controversial as new sources of information have emerged. President Obama openly acknowledged this fact in his speech in Cairo shortly after his inauguration. So we use only a page or so laying that issue to rest by quoting former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the CIA itself. Albright commented that the U.S. and Iran should come closer to each other, as there is “so much common ground” between the two peoples. But, she says:

…that common ground has sometimes been shaken by other factors. In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Massadegh. The Eisenhower Administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. …. Moreover, during the next quarter century, the United States and the West gave sustained backing to the Shah’s regime. Although it did much to develop the country economically, the Shah’s government also brutally repressed political dissent.

In 2011, the CIA further declassified internal documents on the coup. One of these papers was written in the 1970’s, and said that even though most writers on the coup got the outcomes of the events right, they missed something essential:

The point that the majority of these accounts miss is a key one: the military coup that overthrew Mossadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government.

This last quotation also brings to the fore the importance of Western involvement, as it more or less claims that the coup would not have happened without it. This claim is echoed strongly in a firsthand account written by Kermit Roosevelt, the main American organizer in the crucial stages of the coup. Stephen Kinzer and others also describe the Shah, who was to become the new Iranian leader after the coup, as scared, indecisive and weak, and as the “most serious obstacle” for the on-the-ground Western planners and executers of the coup. For our purposes, this is all that needs to be said about the coup itself. Details pertaining to its execution are not important to us, as they are not useful tools for our analysis. In the analysis part of this chapter, we look for the motivations behind the involvement and apply assumptions from realism.
to them. To take Professor Steven Lobell’s advice about this thesis: “You have to demonstrate bias. You can’t just go with outcomes, you have to demonstrate intention.”

We move quickly to the strong bonds of consecutive American administrations to the Shah regime between 1953 and 1979. But first, a look into the behavior of this regime in that period is needed. After all, the policies of a nation such as the United States – touting its ideals of democracy, freedom, free trade and international law – should be affected by its partner’s record on human rights and democracy. That is, if her policies are based on any theory of international relations other than realism.

As there is general agreement and consensus on the claim that the Shah ruled Iran “repressively, savagely, corruptly and in imperious isolation”, it is not necessary to build this argument in a longwinded way. The Shah always refused such claims, but the empirical foundations for them are solid. Some quotations from international authorities on human rights and international law are given, before we move on to how U.S. foreign policy connected to the Shah regime in those years.

Amnesty International described the Shah regime and its policies in 1976. It wrote a report at the time telling stories of, among other things, ruthless and extreme political persecution by SAVAK security forces, politically motivated killings, terrible prison conditions, large networks of secret civilian informants, non-existant freedom of speech and assembly and a culture of fear that saturated the whole nation. The International Committee of the Red Cross mirrored the claims in 1977 when it documented torture techniques used on over 3000 political prisoners. Other aspects of Iranian life were also described in harsh words. Lengthy excerpts from both reports are attached as appendix 2.

In addition to the direct repressive actions described in those reports, which included the decimation of the oppositional left wing of Iranian political life, the repercussions of the economic priorities of the Shah were a major problem. Many Americans, including President Eisenhower, were often exasperated because of his almost singular focus on military expenditure. As a result of these priorities, the rest of the nation lagged behind its potential speed of development. As Amin Saikal writes:

ix The Organization of Intelligence and National Security. It was operational from 1957 to 1979.
...the high military expenditure added significantly to Iran’s rising inflation (about 30 percent in 1976/1977), and was funded at the cost of more rapid development of the social sector,... For example, despite triumphant claims by the government since the mid-1960s, about 60 percent of the Iranian people still could not read or write.... By 1977, Iran’s general economic and social situation appeared grim. The country was beset by numerous problems, including spiraling inflation, increasing corruption at all levels, ..., and mounting social and economic inequalities....

This is the backdrop of human rights violations to which American administrations had to make their decisions on how to relate to the Shah regime. Had democracy promotion and human rights been of real significance to the U.S. at the time, these facts should certainly have caused some consternation. We will point back to these issues when motivations for the 1979 Revolution are discussed later in the chapter.

The relationship between the two nations had its ebbs and flows over these decades. There were, among other things, disagreements on the level of military expenditure, especially during the Kennedy period. As the relationship was based to a large extent on an individual connection to the Shah, there were also fluctuations in personal relations. But as an overall rule, the mutual cooperation was unbroken. The relationship with the Shah grew to become a warm one through much of the 1953 - 1979 period. Particularly while embroiled in Vietnam, the U.S. came to appreciate “loyal, uncritical and helpful allies like Iran,” and Shahram Chubin describes him as being “treated like an Elder Statesman.” But in the interest of clarity, some limitations are needed on the empirical data to be used in the analysis. We need to pick a President to consider. The 1953 coup was orchestrated during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. But if we are to build on the claim that the U.S. is mostly motivated by realism, we need a harder case than those of presidents Eisenhower or Nixon. They are generally understood to be realists, and so were their closest foreign policy advisors John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger. We need empirical data from a President who is not usually described as a realist.

The other administrations in the White House during the period from 1953 to 1979 were those of Kennedy, Johnson, Ford and Carter. The Carter administration was in power during the crucial years building up to the 1979 Revolution. He came into office at a time when the Revolution was already under way, which means that the whole relationship between Carter and the Shah unfolded under those circumstances. His defeat to President Reagan and his legacy is also intimately connected to the Iranian Revolution, by some called Carter’s “greatest and most significant defeat.” He is also the President – maybe coming in a close second to Woodrow
Wilson – to be most often mentioned as focused on international peace and human rights. We therefore keep to his administration as our case. There is no doubt much truth to the statement of the Jimmy Carter Library & Museum when it says on its website that Carter, during his term as president, “championed human rights throughout the world.” 82 At least more than most of his predecessors. That view is prevalent in mainstream academic literature, so this is another characterization that we can dispense of in a page or so. This is an excerpt from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Historian’s biography about Carter:

Carter believed that the nation’s foreign policy should reflect its highest moral principles—a definite break with the policy and practices of the Nixon Administration. In 1977, Carter said, “For too many years, we’ve been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We’ve fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is sometimes best quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.” 83

Carter had several foreign policy achievements to his name, among them the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. 84 But what we are looking for here are actions taken for reasons of altruism-, human rights- or democracy promotion that are contrary to or not in line with American national interests. In short; we are looking for anti-realist behavior. We can see that such accomplishments as the Camp David accords – positive as they may be – are not contrary to American interests. They are what Richard Betts calls cases of convergence; where national real interests are in line with a nation’s stated ideals. 85 They are therefore not in contradiction to realism even though they may have been achieved chiefly for purposes other than self-interest, and are not useful to us as a test of the assertions of this thesis. The question is: How are real interests weighed against principles? Surely, the human rights focused and idealistic Jimmy Carter would be the President to display counter-realist behavior. 86 With regards to Iran, his idealism was to be tested. If realism is not ingrained in American foreign policy and the main driver of policy actions, we should see a set of behaviors from this administration during the reign of the Shah that defies the assumptions of realism. What does the evidence tell us?

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82 It is prudent to take a brief interlude at this point – where we will critique President Carter’s actions - to remind the reader that this thesis does not seek to moralize on the foreign policy actions described here. The actions taken against principles of democracy and human rights may be seen as necessary or good in a wider context or under any given analysis, and other nations may have acted in exactly the same way. These are mere factual statements, not the moral assertions of the author. The only moral considerations in question are those of the recipient population, who reacts in response to foreign policy actions, wrongly or rightly.
Carter did indeed insist on a re-examination of the relationship with Iran as he entered the White House. He wanted to transcend the Cold War and bring more democracy, human rights and institutionalism to Iran, and was uncomfortable with the person-to-person nature of the relationship.\textsuperscript{86} He had, among other things, criticized the arms deals made with Iran.\textsuperscript{87} The Shah mirrored these misgiving, and was very insecure about Carter as the elections came closer. His Court Minister Asadollah Alam at one point called Carter “no more than an ignorant peasant boy.”\textsuperscript{88}

So at the start of the Carter Presidency, hope \textit{was} expressed and felt in the moderate, liberal and reform friendly parts of the Iranian population. Amin Saikal is among many who points to the fact that the Shah found it necessary to liberalize the domestic political landscape to a certain degree at this point to react to the perceived shifts in policy in the White house. He reshuffled his government and put in liberal politicians. The press was given marginally more freedom to criticize the government, and the SAVAK was instructed to reign in the worst parts of its repression.\textsuperscript{89} Perceived changes in American foreign policy seemed, at least to some, to be working its magic.

But Iranian liberal’s hopes for real changes in the relationship were quickly dashed as the Shah visited Carter in Washington in November 1977. Any meaningful open critique and pressure was absent as the Shah was given a friendly welcome. The speeches that Carter held in the Shah’s honor signaled both the nature of the years to come and the political continuity of American administrations since 1953:

\begin{quote}
We are bound together with unbreakable ties of friendship, of past history, a mutual commitment to the present and to the future. Our military alliance is unshakable, and it’s an alliance that is beneficent in its impact on the rest of the world. …. The Shah has been to our country more than a dozen times. His first meeting with an American President was in 1943, when President Roosevelt was in Tehran at a conference there; and subsequently he’s met with every President we’ve had–with Truman and with Eisenhower, with Kennedy and with Nixon, with Ford and myself, with President Johnson. And this is a continuation of a growing understanding of one another.\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Upon the Shah’s return to Tehran, the brief period of relative liberalization in Iran was over. Repression by security forces increased immediately. The U.S. State Department clearly knew about this as they noted in a memo that the human rights situation worsened in December
of this year. Dissidents were arrested in higher numbers, opposition groups had to go back under ground, and revolutionary activities were curtailed substantially. In January, several people were killed in Qom under a violent crackdown on demonstrations. A probable reason for this rise in repression – one recognized by basically all sources on the topic used in this thesis – is that Carter’s clear show of support meant that the Shah no longer had to risk his hold on power to appease Carter and his perceived human rights focus, and was thus free to suppress political antagonism and to treat his population violently and brutally.

To cement the friendship further, Jimmy Carter flew to Iran for New Year’s Eve the same year, where more praise was lavished on the Shah for his leadership. The aforementioned Court Minister Alam changed his tune: "Carter is beginning to see sense. He’s no longer preaching the same old nonsense he did during the election." The support took more concrete manifestations than mere words in speeches. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance quickly confirmed the sale of 160 F-16’s to the Shah. And despite of furious opposition from Congress, Carter approved the sale of 7 of the highly secret Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) for delivery in 1982 (the deal, because of the revolution that was to come, never came to pass). In fact, the arms sales to Iran increased under Carter, jumping from an estimated 10,4 billion U.S.D of orders placed during Nixon/Ford, to 12,2 billion U.S.D placed in the briefer period from Carter inauguration to the Revolution was a fact. It was now clear to Iranian opposition groups that no meaningful help was forthcoming from Washington from this president either. Carter’s credibility was to them permanently damaged beyond repair as he continued to support the Shah and his repressive regime.

Even as the SAVAK were killing people in larger and larger numbers deep into the revolution proper, Carter reiterated his position of support. Two days after what has become known as “Black Friday” in 1978, when about 100 people were killed during protests in Tehran, Carter took time out from his role in the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks to call the Shah and proclaim his sympathy at what must for the Shah be “a difficult time." As a final show of support to the Shah and of determination to thwart the civilian uprising that so clearly mirrored the will of the Iranian people, the White House took action to try to repeat their successful

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91 To defend the statement that the Revolution was indeed a reflection of the will of the people of Iran in general, we can use the fact that the 1979 Revolution was the social movement with the highest percentage of participation in Dr. Chenoweth’s book, where she lists 323 different social movements.
operation in 1953 by staging a countercoup to the Revolution as it was in its last phase. President Carter assigned General Robert E. Huysen “to rally Iranian military commanders and help them prepare for a last resort coup d’état.”

Huysen entered Iran in January, shortly before the fall of the Shah, and is described by Charles Kurzman as “the most eager hardliner on the military side” in Iran at the time. The White House had supported violent repression since the start of the revolution, and as we have seen, instances like the Black Friday massacre had not changed that. Zbigniew Brzezinski had on several occasions telephoned the Shah and encouraged him to be firm, and riot police gear was sent from the U.S.. A statement was sent to the ambassador in Tehran, leaving little doubt about U.S. preferences:

If there is uncertainty either about the underlying orientation of (a civilian) government or its capacity to govern, or if the army is in danger of becoming more fragmented, then the shah should choose without delay a firm military government which would end the disorder, violence and bloodshed. You should tell the shah the above clearly, stating that U.S. support is steady and that it is essential, repeat essential, to terminate the continuing uncertainty.

But at this point, the majority of the armed servicemen in Iran did not put faith in the American ability to organize resistance, and Huysen’s mission failed only days after his arrival.

These are the displays of friendship and support that the world saw, while in internal discussions in the U.S, things were not always as simple. Many writers and academics agree that Carter was indeed torn between real interests and his devotion to international law and human rights. Some in the State Department and in the Tehran embassy were calling for the Shah to broker a power-sharing deal with the opposition in Iran, while there is ample evidence to suggest that Zbigniew Brzezinski pulled Carter towards the level of support that was given. What we can see personalized in Carter is the conflicting pressures of idealism and realism that a nation such as the U.S. is destined to feel if it is to retain a position of hegemony. Peter Rodman describes the struggle:

What confronted and frustrated Jimmy Carter was a group of midlevel State officials intellectually and morally opposed to the shah on human-rights grounds, optimistic about America’s natural affinity with a revolution they continued to see as broad-based and reformist, and tenaciously bending the implementation of U.S. policy in their preferred direction whatever instructions they received from the president. Carter and Brzezinski were unable to impose their will on a determined Foreign Service, especially when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance acted as the spokesman and champion of the department’s view.
But for all practical purposes, Carter and Brzezinski did not budge, and provided the Shah with support through the Revolution. In this way, and until the bitter end, the Shah regime enjoyed the *almost* unquestioned support of Carter’s human rights focused administration, in practice if not always in rhetoric. Luca Trenta calls the period of the Carter administration a process of going “from the initial hope to the final rage” for large portions of the Iranian people.  

The icing on the cake – the last proof to them that many Iranians had read the situation right – came when Carter admitted the deposed Shah into the U.S. after his humiliating de-throning. Carter partook in the Shah’s humiliation in no uncertain terms; the hostages that were to be taken in the U.S. embassy in Tehran were set free as soon as his term ended with defeat to Ronald Reagan.

**Behavior Analysis from Realism**

We have been through most of the necessary empirical case data for an analysis to work. From here, that analysis will be a mix between the variables of this thesis and the assumptions of the theoretical framework of realism. The foundations of our independent variable 1 were laid in the first chapter, as we saw that there is close to no mention of social movements and people power in these specific core texts of realism. We now move to Independent variable 2, which states that American foreign policy has overwhelmingly been in line with – or been based upon – realism. To assess this statement in our case, we apply some realist assumptions to the motivations behind American policy behavior. What motivated the planning of the coup and the support for the Shah? Were these motivations in line with the assumptions of realism? Two motivations are most usually put forward; the economics of oil and Cold War power balancing with the Soviet Union.

In 1953, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) owned the vast majority of Iranian oil resources and controlled its production and distribution, but found its ownership challenged from within Iran. The moderate nationalist and democratically elected Mohammad Mossadeq became Premier of the Iranian Majles (Parliament) in 1951 on the back of overwhelming popular support. The platform that brought him this support had two main pillars; nationalization of the oil resources and free and fair elections. On March 14th 1951, the Majles accepted with a large majority Mossadeq’s one-article bill on oil nationalization, which stated:
For the happiness and the prosperity of the Iranian nation and for the purpose of securing world peace, it is hereby resolved that the oil industry throughout all parts of the country, without exception, be nationalized; that is to say, all operations of exploration, extraction, and exploitation shall be carried out by the government.\textsuperscript{100}

Even though oil in Iran was not controlled or owned by American interests directly, two aspects made it essential to the U.S. that the status quo was upheld. Firstly, there was the issue of oil prices and availability for the Western oil importing and –consuming nations.\textsuperscript{101} Western oil companies controlled large portions of oil concessions in the third world at the time, often on agreements deemed unfair in years to come. This system, largely based on the wishes of the consumers of oil rather than those of the sellers, had a stabilizing effect on the global market that was only to be broken after the establishing of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), and that organization’s politically grounded oil embargos. Indeed, the Iranian government could have been happy with smaller production quotas than AIOC had been, threatening global oil price stability directly. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, even though often sympathetic to Third World nationalism, fully supported the British in that “…oil produced in Persia must be subject to British control and distribution” and that “no arrangement could be made which would upset the world oil market.”\textsuperscript{102}

Secondly, Iranian oil nationalization was the quintessential “threat of a good example.”\textsuperscript{xiii} To many American foreign policy analysts, oil companies and politicians, the threat was all too clear. They echoed the British Persian Oil Working Party in their concerns as they drew up a list of assets that could be threatened if Iranian nationalization was successful:

…oil in Iraq, the Gulf, Burma and Indonesia; major investments in the commonwealth, including Pakistan, India and Ceylon; copper, sulfur and iron ore in Spain; tin and copper in Portugal; lead and rubber in Burma; teak, tin and rubber in Siam; rubber in Indonesia; tin in Bolivia; copper and nitrates in Chile; and magnesium and nickel in Greece\textsuperscript{103}.

American oil companies saw the same domino effect threatening their interests and investments. Some of them urged armed intervention as the Iranian debacle threatened American concessions in for example Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, the later of which took “an unhealthy interest” in the goings on in Persia.\textsuperscript{104} Simply put, as one oil expert put it; “If the idea got around that oil concessions could be broken without compensation, the monarchs and the politicos of the

\textsuperscript{xii} A term later coined by Oxfam in a report on Nicaragua being an example for the rest of South America in opposing American foreign policies.
Middle East would lose no time proving that they too were sovereign.”

A stark reminder of this potential regional contagion effect of active anti-imperialism was the welcome that Mossadeq received in Egypt, where state leaders basked in the sunshine of the man who dared to speak and act so boldly against the Western powers. President Eisenhower himself told the National Security Council that it had to work against any solution that “might have very grave effects on United States oil concessions in other parts of the world.”

The New York Herald Tribune saw no reason to couch its language as they bluntly wrote that if the U.S. was not firm on Iran, “all the little Musaddiqs elsewhere would be tempted to make trouble.”

Professor Ervand Abrahamian concludes that the coup had the desired effect on this threat: “…the coup set back by at least two decades the whole process of oil nationalization throughout the world – especially in the Middle East and North Africa.” The process was not stopped on a permanent basis, but delayed considerably. Also, the concessions given to American companies grew to 40% of available Iranian resources after new deals were signed with the new Shah government in 1954.

The other most cited reason for involvement in the coup is that of power balancing between the two superpowers of the era. Iran, in its specific geographical position, was a key piece of geography for the United States, serving as a buffer against the Soviet Union in the North. Western statesmen of the time had a tendency to see the political landscape in the Middle East strictly as a subcategory of Cold War superpower competition, and did not hold much trust in the claims of Arab nationalists that they were mostly interested in independence. Neutrality would not be accepted. And as John Mearsheimer says, Iran and Turkey were especially important ideological battlegrounds.

In his comments on this, Mearsheimer focuses on the geopolitical and the structural, not on oil. And this no doubt motivated many American officials. Shortly before the coup, President Eisenhower was elected to the Presidency, and he took with him the two Dulles brothers – Allen and John Foster – as CIA director and Secretary of State respectively. All three are usually described as Cold Warriors to the fingernails, with the Cold War dynamic front and center in their thinking and planning. Several events also fueled the fear of Soviet intentions at the time, the first of them being the Soviet refusal to withdraw their soldiers from Northern Iran after their World War II occupation of it, and their arming of local militias sympathetic to them staying.
From the end of World War II, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet empire. Communist governments were imposed or took over in Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, in Hungary and Poland in 1947, in Czechoslovakia on 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia followed, and in Greece homegrown communism was on the rise. In China, Mao Zedong won a civil war in 1949. In response to all this, President Truman had created the CIA, and in 1950 the National Security Council wrote the influential document called NSC-68 on containing Communism. Truman formulated his foreign policy doctrine following the same logic. These were truly innerving times.

In a CIA document from this period – “Battle for Iran” – George Kennan’s analysis of these matters was given importance. On assumptions based partly on his work, the CIA stressed the possibility that Russia might “resort to military expansionism” in Iran if not checked, the importance of both local and global imbalances of power that might result in favor of the Soviet Union, and that “secondary and tertiary areas must not be neglected.” The summary of the paper concludes that it was this analysis that informed U.S. policy planning and policy towards Iran.112 “It was the potential of those risks to leave Iran open to Soviet aggression – at a time when the Cold War was at its height … that compelled the United States [blacked out] in planning and executing TPAJAX [operation code name].”113 And in addition to Iran falling to Communism, the CIA wrote, this could lead to a domino-effect of communism spreading in the area akin to the potential model made famous in the case of Vietnam.114

The question of whether American officials really saw communism as a threat in Iran at the time – from internal or external forces – has been challenged. Abrahamian is one of those who cite numerous American and British sources in politics and intelligence to try to demonstrate how the communist threat was seen as limited, and how it was intentionally overblown in media. As the former U.S. ambassador to Teheran wrote: “Mossadeq … was seeking not a better deal, but – God forbid, the horror of all horrors – to make Iran “neutral” in the cold war.”115 So the politics of Mossadeq, the strength of the Iranian Communist Party and the intentions of the Soviets have been questioned as grounds for intervention. But for our part, we will accept the non-controversial claim that Cold War balancing was a driver for the coup, and that the Communist threat was indeed seen as real. It was important for the U.S. to keep the Soviet Union from obtaining hegemonic status in the region, and Iran was a key actor in this respect.
Some question whether there is good reason to separate these two motivations at all. Access to oil is part of any consumer nation’s power base. Oil had, especially since the First World War, changed the power distribution of the world. It was the lifeblood of any industrial nation. Says Hans Morgenthau:

It is now a material factor whose very possession threatens to overturn centuries-old patterns of international politics. So it is for this reason that Great Britain, the United States, and, for a time, France embarked in the near east on what has aptly been called “oil diplomacy”—that is, the establishment of spheres of influence giving them exclusive access to the oil deposits in certain regions.\textsuperscript{116}

George Kennan, at the time charge d’affairs on Moscow, echoes the view that oil is a resource important enough to consider as part of a nation’s strength as he wrote:

The basic motive of recent Soviet action in Northern Iran is probably not need for oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area coupled with the concern for prestige. The oil of northern Iran is important not as something Russia needs but as something it might be dangerous for anyone else to exploit. … The Kremlin deems it essential to its security that no other great power should have even the chance of getting a foothold there.\textsuperscript{117}

We have considered the two most cited motivations for the 1953 coup and the continuous support of the Shah; resource economics and power balancing. Are these motivations in line with the assumptions of realism? As the former leader of Iran has been called “the Shah of Shahs” and “the King of Kings,” we may call the assumption of national self-interest as a driver for foreign policy the “assumption of assumptions” in the realist framework. In all the lists of assumptions presented here, self-interest is a key part. The Oxford Handbook holds as its assumption number 2 that “Narrow self-interest is what drives and motivates policy actions”. Donald Snow in National Security for a New Era has self-interest as a component of assumptions 2, 3 and 4, with the last of these also including scarcity of resources. Morgenthau lists “interest defined in terms of power” as an assumption.

Both the most cited reasons for U.S. behavior are reasons of self-interest. The first is focused on national self-interest and power on economic terms. It concerns stable resource prices in an international market in which the U.S. is a consumer, and the status of American resource concessions elsewhere. The second is focused on self-interest concerning national survival and power balancing with Iran as a part of a coalition in a bipolar system, or what the CIA called a “defense chain” around the Soviet Union. Both interests were pursued in opposition to the
democratic will of the Iranian people, as shown by the fact that the Mossadeq government was voted in through democratic elections and with the support of several large-scale civil uprisings behind him. This is also in breach of stated American foreign policy goals such as promoting democracy, human rights and a free market, the last of which is a key assumption of the liberal framework. According to Sayigh and Shlaim, this behavior was part of a larger pattern in the Middle East: “The Cold War created an international climate were authoritarianism, at the very least, were not discouraged,” and it provided a “convenient excuse for anti-democratic practices.”\textsuperscript{118} This was true for both sides to the larger conflict. As for America, Sayigh and Avi Shlaim claims that whenever her “strategic interests in the cold War clashed with the values she espoused, it was the latter that were sacrificed.”\textsuperscript{119} We can conclude that American actions in the period were in perfect symmetry with this most important assumption of realism; a focus on self-interest.

Two other assumptions of realism, those of an anarchic international system and the lack of an overarching Leviathan with powers of sanction on units in that system, are at play. In this case study, we can use the example of a legal case being brought to the Court of International Justice in The Hague to illustrate. AIOC and Great Britain claimed in the case that Iran could not break its contractual responsibilities by nationalizing British oil concessions. Iran claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the matter. In July 1952, the Court sided with Iran. As soon as the verdict was in, its authority was flouted by the U.S. and Britain. International law and its institutions, so often derided by realist theorists, were sidelined. This dynamic is in line with most realist’s views on how international institutions work, and how they are seen as useful as long as they are in line with the self-interests of the strong. We have already seen in chapter 1 how Betts, Mearsheimer and others comment on this, and how Carr called international institutions “transparent disguises of selfish vested interest”\textsuperscript{120} and the “weapon of the stronger.”\textsuperscript{121} Morgenthau reiterates the dynamic of powerful nations controlling international institutions when he writes about the United Nations, saying that the superpower game “completely dominates the distribution of functions in the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{122} This is another realism assumption confirmed in our case.
Most realists would hold that power in international relations is a zero sum game, meaning that if Iran did not fall under the influence of the West, she would fall under that of the Soviet Union. The wish to exempt one’s opponent from having influence in an area is often referred to as “strategic denial” in realism. Indeed, Morgenthau uses Iran as an example when he writes that:

…this pattern is visible, for instance, in the competition between Great Britain (A) and Russia (B) for the domination of Iran (C), in which the struggle for power between the two countries has repeatedly manifested itself during the last hundred years.¹²³

In our case, substitute the U.S. for Great Britain, and the competition is instantly recognizable. The Iranian situation in concepts of realism in the larger context of power balancing is also clearly visible, such as Mearsheimer’s concepts of bandwagoning and buckpassing. Buck-passing is mainly a feature of a multipolar system, especially a balanced one where there are no major states viably able to dominate the whole system alone. Simply put, the buck-passer “simply wants someone else to do the heavy lifting.”¹²⁴ Bandwagoning is to concede one’s own power (relatively) to another state in order to gain a firm alliance with that state, which may very well be seen as a dangerous aggressor.¹²⁵ During the Cold War, a large portion of the states in the world fit this description, joining forces with one or the other side in the hope of security, thusly opening up for foreign power influence in their domestic politics. The U.S./Iran relation certainly fits the bill on both counts. The Shah government needed protection in the Cold War, political support to stay in power and economic aid. The U.S. needed a partner in the geographically important Central Asia to stave of communist expansion and access to oil as an important part of its power base. Both states understood and played upon these two tactics.

There are several more realist assumptions and dynamics we could point to. Morgenthau’s second assumption says that real power is always in the background as diplomacy and cooperation is played out. We have not been through the diplomatic attempts at getting to a solution of the oil crisis of 1953, but there were several. And as those diplomatic attempts failed, real power in the form of a military coup stepped up stage. The amoral nature of international relations that is so important to realism is reflected in Morgenthau’s assumption 5. Moral considerations, as we have seen, played no part in the coup and the following relationship. Indeed, Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, in their book Ethical Realism, call the toppling of the Mossadeq government a “grave laps of moral judgment”.¹²⁶ Mearsheimer’s assumption number
3, which states that no state can be certain of the future intentions of other states, also describes the worries of communist encroachment in Iran coming from the Eisenhower administration.

We can see clearly then, that the motivations behind American actions – orchestrating a coup and supporting a repressive and brutal regime – were in line with several of the basic tenets of realism, and in breach of many of her own stated principles and the assumptions of competing theories. Independent variable number 2 is safely confirmed.

**The 1979 Revolution; A Reaction to Realism Policy**

Independent variable number 3, states that social movements often come as reactions to realist policies. The 1979 Revolution and the motivations of its organizers are used to test this variable. Again, we are not discussing the details of the Revolution itself, as that is of little interest to us. We are looking for reasons and reactions. To test this, we look into two things; who were the participants in the revolution, and what were their motivations?

The Revolution is very often described by *the outcome that resulted from it.*

“The Islamic Revolution” is the name most often used. The name itself suggests that the Revolution was triggered by religious fundamentalism, and that social or economic motives had little or nothing to do with the actual actions taken by its participants. And religious aspects did of course play a role. The clerics and the mosque networks were of importance. Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile in Paris as the movement was heating up, held enormous moral authority. And the mosque network, maybe the largest organized network in the country, added considerable organizational abilities to the movement. There were in the vicinity of 9.000 mosques in Iran at the time. Like the churches used during the Civil Rights movement in the American South, these semi-safe havens, which were in accordance with the specific traditions of Shia Islam not directly controlled by the state, “provided the infrastructure” of much of the revolution where organizers could meet, plan and grow stronger. But large parts of the religious establishment and the majority of Muslim leaders and scholars were not active in the revolution. As Charles Kurzman notes, backing up his claim by referring to many interviews of activists; “state repression kept all but the most committed Islamists from daring to protest.”

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xiii Seen through this lens, we could call the Egyptian uprising that resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt during the Arab Spring an “Islamic revolution”, which of course it was not.
Ayatollah Khomeini also rejected the socio-economic as a background for the uprising: “We have not made the Revolution for cheap melons, we have made it for Islam.” But his assertion cannot be taken at face value. It is clear that he did not rouse his followers to action from his exile before he “considered the movement to be viable.” It is fairly ordinary for different groups in revolutions and movements to haggle for credit, as credit for change brings more credibility in the political competition that so often ensues between them in the end. So Western media and academia are not alone in their exaggerated focus on Islamism as an overwhelming driving force of the revolution. From the Islamic Republic of Iran’s side, calling the revolution exclusively Islamic is an effective political tactic, lending credence to the rule of the Ayatollahs. As Kurzman explains:

In the same way that it suppressed liberal hopes for Iran’s future, the Islamist government (that came onto power after the revolution, red.) also suppressed liberal versions of the past. Suppression extended even to the name given to the past: the Islamic Republic of Iran refers to the “Islamic Revolution,” specifically to exclude liberal participants and aspirations.

Realist Samuel Huntington strengthens this perspective by simply viewing other activist groups involved as “moderately Islamic” backing up the more extreme “storm troopers,” and leaving out other motives than the religious one. But this view is misleading and simplified. Those interested in the revolution itself – those researching social movements as a phenomenon specifically – tend to find differing motivations, leaning more towards the socioeconomic and the political than towards the religious. The diverse set of participants and organizers of the Revolution illustrate the diverse grievances that set it off. Far from being controlled by Mullah’s and mosques exclusively, Erica Chenoweth writes the following about the starting phases of the revolution:

Following a typical revolutionary pattern, it was the Iranian middle class and liberal intellectuals, long-standing targets of the Shah’s repression, who initiated organized dissent, demanding political reforms and liberal freedoms.

Joining these groups were students, Marxists, merchants, bazaaries, poor people and factory- and oil workers, who far outnumbered the religiously motivated participants. Along with Dr. Chenoweth, other academics used in the research for this thesis – among them Gene Sharp, Stephen Zunes, Charles Kurzman, Maciej Bartkowski and Jack DuVall – all write from the social movement perspective, and they all come to the conclusion that the above-listed groups played
the most significant part in the revolution. And motivations other than religious ones are not hard to find.

Socioeconomically, we can find issues very familiar to anyone who has looked into Western labor movements. In “Workers and Revolution in Iran,” Assef Bayat does extensive field research on working conditions in Iran in the 70s. He lists laws broken in the workplace, such as the “failure to provide an adequate supply of drinking water; to maintain sanitary lines the work-sites, corridors and warehouses; to dispose of sewage and other factory refuse; to provide showers for the workers in poisonous and dusty works; to provide lockers and clean eating places.” In Tehran, he finds paint and foam factories were 35 of the 39 workers were under medical treatment for lung disease, and where 5 workers had recently died from “industrial gradual death.” The numerous interviews cited in the book, of which we will include parts of two, reads like something taken right out of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle:

This place is full of dust and poisonous chemicals. We work with industrial alcohol here, now we have damaged lungs. And we have pains in our legs. … This job is damn heavy, very heavy. I’ve recently had rheumatism, I’ve got backache.

Bloody paint; my lungs now pain me. … There are numerous problems but nobody cares. Even of somebody appears here they always try to postpone action. I’ve got sciatica and hearing loss. I’ve had it for two years. In the hospital they said: you’ve had a defective ear since childhood! How come two years ago, before I came here, it was OK?

With conditions like these prevalent throughout the country, the working class of Iran needed no Mullah to come from Paris or any Quran verses to tell them to be deeply dissatisfied. In one large oil field strike in 1978, the demands were many, and reflected the wishes of the liberal- and working class component of the Revolution. They demanded the end to martial law, full solidarity with striking teachers, release of political prisoners, re-nationalization of the oil industry, all communication in Persian, for all foreign workers to leave, an end to discrimination against woman at the workplace, better housing for workers, new retirement rules, and the dissolution of the SAVAK, which enjoyed close ties to the CIA with regards to training and operations. There is not much religion in that list of demands. Kurzman cites a study made in 1972 that concluded that 44% of Iran’s population was undernourished, with 23 percent receiving less that 90% of their minimum daily calories. These grievances have been cited by large numbers of Iranians as their motivations for protesting.
Politically, the Shah created a one-party state. The opportunities for expressing one’s political views were severely limited, and any critique made of the regime in media or in political gatherings had dangerous ramifications. The repression was so harsh that the coup in ‘53 and its aftermath lead to “the destruction of the secular opposition.”\textsuperscript{139} Amnesty International and Red Cross reports already cited in this chapter – complaining about prison conditions, torture and arbitrary arrests – are directs comments on this political repression. Those leftists, liberals and Marxists still left after so many years of repression wanted their organizational freedoms, but were given none. As a consequence, the only possible outlet that was available in the end was active protesting and resistance. The growth of the Second National Front – the re-borned party of Mossadeq and his followers – after the relative easing of repression immediately after Carter won the White House illustrates the yearning for political freedom and plurality. Maryam Namazie’s view on the Revolution summarizes these claims: “There was never an Islamic revolution in Iran. It was a left leaning revolution that was suppressed by a far-right Islamic movement.”\textsuperscript{140} In other words; the revolution was not based mostly on religious grounds, but on the political, social and economic problems that resulted from the rule of the Shah.

After looking into the disparate motivations behind the 1979 Revolution, we have to remind ourselves how the U.S. was connected to Iranian domestic conditions, both in real terms and in the minds of those who orchestrated the uprising. All the domestic considerations that have been discussed here cannot be divorced from American foreign policy actions. Consider as an example the limited changes in repression that the election of President Carter brought in Iran. The Iranian people saw directly and in real time how American rhetoric impacted their own freedoms during that period. At the most basic level, the Shah Reza Pahlavi regime and all the grievances directed against it existed because of American foreign policy actions during the coup and the continuing defending of Western interests in the decades that followed it. As CIA documents show; without the U.S, no 1953 coup. Meaning that without the U.S. and her realist actions, there would have been no Shah regime at all to react against.\textsuperscript{xiv} This fact, whether openly stated and recognized by participants or not, is key to understanding the larger dynamic we are looking for. This, off course, had direct links to the Revolution. As Chubin writes:

\textsuperscript{xiv} That is off course a partly counterfactual statement, as the Shah could potentially have come back to power if the Mossadeq government had failed on its own. But given the overwhelming support that Mossadeq enjoyed in the Iranian population, claiming that as a possibility would take massive evidentiary backup.
U.S. support for the Shah meant that it was associated with his policies, internal and external, whether or not they represented U.S. Policy. Iranians came to see him as the West’s creature, merely a puppet controlled from a distance. Opposition to the Shah’s domestic policies was the principle motor for the revolution. Inevitably this came to include its foreign orientation and alignment, which were seen as the factors which enabled the regime to stay in power so long.\textsuperscript{141}

On the basis of the academic works cited, we can conclude that the Revolution was a direct reaction to policies enacted in Tehran as a result of actions taken by Washington. The Huntingtonian brushing aside of the very real grievances of the population by citing religious fervor and extremism is erroneous and simplified, and brings us no closer to an explanatory model that could be useful in the future when assessing social movement reaction to foreign policy actions. Our independent variable 3 – that social movements often come as reactions to realist policies – is strongly confirmed within the parameters of this case.

\textit{The Blind Spot}

Independent variable 1 was established in the first chapter. This is closely connected to dependent variable 1, which states that as a result [of the lack of focus on social movements], the will of populations and the actions that populations take have not been a factor in foreign policy planning, and more often than not come as surprises. As if on cue for this variable, Hans Morgenthau points to the failure of foresight related to the 1979 Revolution as he explains that:

In 1979 the intelligence community, and more particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, was criticized for their failure to warn American policymakers of the upheavals that culminated in the Shah of Iran’s ouster. President Carter himself took the unprecedented step of publicly reprimanding the highest authorities in the intelligence field for their lack of foresight. What accounts for this failure of foresight on the part of otherwise intelligent and responsible people? The answer lies in the nature of the empirical material with which these individuals had to deal.\textsuperscript{142}

And he would be correct if the analytical perspective used is exclusively that presented in the core texts of realism. Had there been more interest in the dynamics and history of social movements and public opinion, this empirical material would have looked very different. We will shortly comment on that empirical data. But the very framework that Morgenthau and his fellow realists provide ignores the dynamics that could have provided clues to the future in this specific situation. But as realist Steven Lobell said; focusing on such things as social movements “takes your eyeball off of what is really important.”\textsuperscript{143} In the case of Iran, the tight end ran up and
caught the ball in front of the wide receiver who paid no attention to him because he focused exclusively on the ball. Morgenthau continues:

Could one have pinpointed in time the outbreak of popular discontent? If the answer is in the affirmative, what could the United States have done about it? The answer to the second question is, at best: very little.\textsuperscript{144}

Again, focus on social movement potential could have told the CIA and the politicians they advise that their own policies were a significant part of the reason why popular discontent blossomed in the first place, as this case study demonstrates. With this information front and center, U.S. policymakers could have stopped the behavior that encouraged revolutionary sentiment, such as advising the Shah to use the SAVAK and other forces of authority in a brutal manner. So in fact, there was a great deal that the United States could have done had her radar been more receptive.\textsuperscript{xv}

The empirical material that Morgenthau laments the absence of was in fact, for anyone interested in it, quite informative and substantial. In \textit{Recovering Nonviolent History}, Nikki R. Keddie writes about the “recurring strategic alliance between sections of the clergy; the bazaar merchants; and the secular, generally modernizing and nationalist elite” which came together on numerous occasions in Iran from the late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century onwards, culminating in the 1979 Revolution.\textsuperscript{145} This broad alliance, with its goals and demands, achieved many significant changes to Iranian politics in the years preceding the Shah regime. Furthermore, they often cooperated because of common external enemies; “All of these episodes involved, to a greater or lesser extent, efforts to throw off foreign control of the Iranian economy and to build an independent society and state,” this coupled to a corrupt national elite. This long chain of events – of which a brief list is attached as appendix 3 – forms a tradition of protest in Iran. It should surely have been taken as what Morgenthau calls “empirical material,” and it is reasonable to say that they should have informed American foreign policy planners more than they did. The empirical historical data was in fact right under the surface, available at a scratch. Furthermore, there are those who see social movements inherent in the cultural/religious history of Iran, going back to the Zoroastrian tradition:

\textsuperscript{xv} The picture painted here is simplified to some extent. There were some people who warned Washington of the ensuing trouble, both in the CIA and from the embassy in Tehran. Those warnings, mixed and somewhat overwhelmed by assurances that the Shah sat safely on the Peacock Throne in Tehran, were not heeded until the Revolution was well under way.
The Zoroastrian religion taught Iranians that citizens have an unalienable right to enlightened leadership and that the duty of subjects is not simply to obey wise kings but also to rise up against those who are wicked. Leaders are seen as representatives of God on earth, but they deserve allegiance only as long as they have farr. A kind of divine blessing that they must earn by moral behavior.\textsuperscript{146}

To Kinzer, this influence helped shape the Shiite version of Islam, with its dissident martyrs Ali and Hussein. Ismail made himself shah in 1501, and ingrained in the system that followed was a separation of the clerics and the political leaders. In this way, political leadership could be held responsible from the religion. Popular uprisings are then justified through the religion itself, as the uprising would not necessarily be against the clerical leadership, but against the secular state. “Ultimately, this belief gave the Shiite masses, and by extension their religious leaders, the political and emotional power to bring temporal regimes crashing down.”\textsuperscript{147} Kurzman backs up this claim, and writes that Shia Islam is specifically seen by many as being “conducive to a revolutionary mindset.”\textsuperscript{148} Coming from a realist perspective, this would not have caused your radar screen to bleep. Religion plays basically no part in that framework, and would have given Washington no warning.

Views on how much weight was actually given to the developing discontent in Iran differ. It is natural here to keep to the Carter administration, as that was the one in power in the crucial last period before the revolution, and as that is our case when it comes to White House behavior. It is hard to get a clear grasp on who thought what before 1978 and 1979. There were a few who saw the weakening of the Shah and the growth of opposition, and who reasoned that this should be given more attention. Especially at lower levels in the state department and among area experts. There were people who lobbied for trying to reach a deal with moderate elements in the opposition.\textsuperscript{149} The Tehran embassy personnel was a mixed bag, but the prevalent behavior was one of taking the Shah at his word as American diplomatic isolation from the rest of the population grew.\textsuperscript{150} While the Defense Intelligence Agency saw it as most likely that the Shah would retain his grasp on power for at least the next ten years, John Stemper in the embassy in Tehran wrote home to Washington that people in Iran were beginning to “think the unthinkable.”\textsuperscript{151}

But at that stage, it was too late. This is key to understanding what is meant by “foreseeing” in this thesis. It is of scant use to “foresee” a revolution when that revolution is well under way and unstoppable, especially when the period that brought it forth lasted for 26 years.
and covered five different American administrations. Predicting the fall of the Shah two weeks before he stepped down is not predicting the revolution itself. This thesis has consulted a large number of books on the revolution, each containing numerous quotes from political, diplomatic and intelligence sources. And what seems to be in common for the overwhelming majority of them is a lack of foresight until the last moment. And that is not prediction useful as a planning tool for international relations. One does not predict that a car is about to start if one simply notices that it is already accelerating. It also seems clear that the further up the political ladder one climbs, the more inertia was in effect. Kurzman claims that “the White House did not want to think the unthinkable.” And the State Department concluded in an internal analysis that “we were unprepared for the collapse of the Pahlavi regime because we did not want to know the truth.”

We will let President Carter further confirm dependent variable 1 for us, as he describes how the 1979 Revolution surprised American policy planners en masse:

...it was a blow to the United States when the Shah was deposed. He had been a close associate, an ally with, I think, if I’m not mistaken, seven presidents who preceded me, and we never dreamed that the Shah was likely to be overthrown by his own people. But when he became embattled by attacks from his own people at home, and particularly from the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was issuing broadcasts and tape recordings from France, we gave the Shah every possible legitimate support.

Hindsight is 20/20. But taking into consideration the history of social movements in Iran exemplified in appendix 3 and the discontent of the Iranian people in general, it seems negligent to overlook the potential for a forceful social movement at the time.

Aftermath and Long Term Consequences

The relationship succeeded in line with its goals for 26 years. Mossadeq was toppled and never regained his political power. Nationalization of Iran’s oil resources was reversed. And Shah Reza Pahlavi, reinstated as a consequence of Western actions, took his cues regarding ideological and political Cold War partnership from the U.S. and Great Britain. But this was a short-term success. Ervand Abrahamian presents his view on that matter, and gives food for thought on one
of the claims of this thesis; that raw realism is indeed short-term thinking, *un*realistic in the long term:

For those eager for instant gratification, 1953 was a resounding success. For those thinking about long-term repercussions, 1953 harbored innumerable dangers – some that continue to haunt us in the twenty-first century.\(^{155}\)

Dependent variable 2 states that *this lack of focus [on social movements] has had – and continues to have – detrimental effects on American power and standing in the world in the long run.* And the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution is a good case to confirm this assertion. The first thing to note when it comes to the consequences of the Revolution is that Iranian behavior in the immediate aftermath broke with many basic tenets of realism. There was a focus on non-alignment and independence and a rejection of alliance building as the Ayatollah proclaimed: “Neither East, nor West, Only the Islamic Republic.”\(^{156}\) The new leadership simply “rejected the traditional calculus of power.”\(^ {157}\) It did not employ Mearsheimer’s buck-passing and bandwagoning strategies, and foreswore the chance to balance the nuclear power of its neighbors on religious grounds.

Going back to before 1953, we should also remember that it was the coup that brought the United States into Iranian history in a negative way for many Iranians. Before that, Great Britain was the basic enemy and Americans were mostly seen as potential friends. Earlier administrations had laid much of the foundations for what could have become a more far-reaching partnership had the U.S. sided with the will of the Iranian people and not with British oil interests and its own (partly justified) concerns about Communism and resources. In 1919, President Wilson had been the only world leader who had sided with Iran in its demands for compensation from Britain and Russia for the consequences of their invasion of Iran during WWI.\(^ {158}\) Later, President Truman and Dean Acheson were, according to Kinzer, both “determined to show people in poor countries that the United States, not the Soviet Union, was their true friend.”\(^{159}\) Kinzer quotes one graduate from one of the few schools for girls in Iran at the time, as she describes a typical view of America:

> Americans were regarded with almost universal admiration and affection. The American contribution to the improvement and, it was felt, the dignity of our impoverished, strife-torn country had gone far beyond their small numbers.….Without attempting to force their way of life on people or convert us to their religion, they had learned Persian and started schools, hospitals and medical dispensaries all over Iran.
And as the following interview that Kinzer presents shows, it therefore came as a surprise to many that the U.S. acted in the way it did when the game come down to its final inning in 1953:

Why did you Americans do that terrible thing? We always loved America. To us, America was the great country, the perfect country, the country that helped us while other countries were exploiting us. But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. I can tell you for sure that if you had not done that thing, you would never have had that problem of hostages being taken in your embassy in Teheran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, why did you do it?160

As for the long-term effects of the 1953 - 1979 events, the consequences are vividly presented to us on a daily basis. Iran is now one of the two nations left in the former “Axis of Evil” trifecta. She finances groups that are working against America and her allies in the region, most prominently Hamas and Hezbollah. She has been involved in the violent, deadly and long drawn insurgency in Iraq. As Mark Gasiorowski of the Louisiana State University writes; “U.S. complicity in these events figured prominently in the terrorist attacks on American citizens and installations that occurred in Iran in the early 1970s, in the anti-American character of the 1978-1979 revolution, and in the many anti-American incidents that emanated from Iran after the revolution, including, most notably, the embassy hostage crisis.”161

Iran has been under heavy American-led economic sanctions for quite some time because of the nuclear issue, which might be the most flammable issue in American foreign politics today, notwithstanding the Ukrainian situation that also came about as a consequence of a social movement. We have seen the Obama administration cautiously closing in on serious talks after the newly elected President Hassan Rouhani made conciliatory remarks in his first speeches. This diplomatic approach – the first serious one in decades – has been met with ferocious opposition among congressmen and senators alike, and from both sides of the Congressional isle. We have also seen reports about a possible coalition between Israel and Saudi Arabia, where the potential option is to attack Iran militarily if any American/Iranian nuclear deal that is not seen as stringent enough goes through.162

There are also regional aspects to consider. In addition to the direct problems and challenges that Iran imposes, it is clear that actions such as the 1953 coup and the support given to the Shah regime inflames anti-American sentiment in a wider context, especially among populations in the Middle East. It eats away at the trust a nation needs to cooperate with others. It
deflates the potential soft power that many argue is of growing importance in international affairs. This distrust is the main reason given by the Obama administration for not strongly supporting the Green Revolution, Iran’s latest example of a social uprising. The Ahmadinedjad government promptly reminded everyone willing to listen that the United States had backed a coup in Iran before, and accused her of trying to do so again. The American President’s support can now be used as an arrow in the quiver of anyone targeted by such uprisings in large parts of the world.

Stephen Walt, another prominent American realist academic, sees the same dynamic at play in our time. Speaking at the Current Strategy Forum, he claims that one main reason for the rise of the U.S. after World War II was that “We had considerable good will and prestige around the world, in part because we supported de-colonization.” As we have seen, this good will was reflected in large portions of the Iranian people. He then goes on to say that America has lost the power to control events in South East Asia, in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the rest of the Middle East. In effect:

The Arab Spring caught us by surprise... In the future, a lot of Arab governments are going to be more responsive to popular sentiment than they have been in the past. And because the United States is still very unpopular in much of the Arab and Islamic world, our capacity to determine what will happen in any of those countries, is quite limited.

He paints a picture of a foreign policy that has stayed much the same since the Iranian lesson should have been learned, as he says that the U.S. is:

…..getting support from some of these governments. The government of Jordan and certainly from the Mubarak government in Egypt was... In part we were buying their cooperation on issues we cared about by providing them with various amounts of assistance. But this doesn’t do very much to affect the attitudes of individual Egyptians. And that works as long as those governments remain intact. But as we’re now seeing in the Egyptian case, it starts to fray once you have more popular sentiment playing a role in politics.

To conclude this chapter in the order of our variables; it seems clear that the U.S. acted in line with realism assumptions in its dealings with Iran from 1953 to 1979. The positive image that the United States enjoyed before 1953 was destroyed by its own actions to protect its own interests, as fitting with a realist perspective. Those actions were taken in contradiction to international law and the principles that the United States claims to hold on furthering human rights and democracy. We can also conclude that the Revolution was indeed a reaction to
policies, not a result mainly of religious fervor. It seems very clear that it came as a surprise to the U.S. foreign policy milieu, even though the historical record should have informed U.S. policymakers on the likelihood of such a movement. The reactions to those actions have also caused numerous problems for the U.S. since. U.S. participation in the 1953 coup is what “made the United States a key target of the Iranian revolution.”166 Abrahamian – tongue in cheek – ends his book with the note that Mossadeq would have been amused had he known that the U.S. had to deal with “the likes of Khomeini and Khamenei.”167 This case then, confirms all the variables in this thesis. From the perspective of this thesis, the blind spot on the potential power of social movements to affect American future relations to Iran seems negligent in the extreme.
3. **Case Study 2, Chile;**  
- a tentative pattern in South America

Our second case study – that of Chile – involves many of the same dynamics as the first one. The similarities and differences between them make for a useful comparison, and the thesis will analyze the comparative nature of the cases in the final chapter. The Chile case may not be as clear with regards to some of our variables as the situation discussed on Iran, but developments in Chile from 1983 to 1988 are chosen because they can be placed within a regional context. The most illustrative case for the normalcy of U.S. intervention and support of autocratic rulers is clearly South America. Since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine (and especially the Roosevelt corollary that was to follow it in 1904), many American policymakers have seen South America as the United States’ backyard, her playground, her domain. With an unrivalled influence on the western hemisphere in the time frame that we are discussing, and a chance to play out its policies mostly unhindered by other significant powers, the behavior of the U.S. on this continent is as good a yardstick as any for evaluating the nation’s typical foreign policy preferences during the Cold War. Such preferences have often been to support or plan coups against democratically elected leaders and to support right wing authoritarian regimes.xvi For as President Nixon said about the overthrow of President Allende in Chile: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”168

The timeline will mostly be limited to the Cold War years. And as mentioned, the Chilean case is viewed in a regional context. There are two reasons for this; first, this thesis claims that there is a pattern to be found in realism policy behavior and reactions to it. Enlarging our analysis beyond single nations is a way to tentatively test this pattern hypothesis without the discussion becoming too broad. There will therefore be references to the regional context where this is appropriate. Second, there are differences between the two cases that are best analyzed through a regional perspective. The behavior of the Carter administration and the attention to revolutions are two of these factors that are revisited in the final chapter.

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xvi Schmitz’ definition of right-wing dictators/authoritarians is “any anti-democratic regime that is not socialist or communist”. This definition, although very broad, is one that we can adapt in this thesis.
The analysis largely follows the path and order of the first case. First, comments are made on United States participation in the 1973 coup against the Allende government and the support that was given to the authoritarian General Augusto Pinochet in the years that followed. But in this case as in the previous one, the details of the coup and of the support that was given to Pinochet’s regime are not very important, as we are looking for motivations behind behavior, not coup tactics. Then we go through the motivations for this U.S. involvement that are most usually suggested by scholars, and check if they are in line with the assumptions of realism. A discussion on the Chilean social movement that was in effect from 1983 and 1988 follows, focusing on its motivations and its connections to U.S. policies. We end with a discussion of the long-term aftermath, which expands the discussion not only geographically but temporally. This last part is later expanded upon in the concluding chapter.

**The 1973 Coup and the Fluctuating Relationship**

“The exact role the United States played in the coup is still debated. What is certain is that Nixon welcomed the overthrow of Allende and extended immediate support to Pinochet despite the brutal killings, torture and imprisonment of his political opponents.”

This is one of David F. Schmitz’ comments on U.S. involvement in the coup against President Allende. He is certainly right that some of the details of U.S. actions are somewhat hazy. But as documents about the coup have been declassified – from the so-called ITT/CIA scandal in 1974 and the resulting Church Committee revelations, through the more than 24 000 documents released through the Clinton administration’s Chile Declassification Project – there is now no doubt that the Nixon administration did far more than “welcome the overthrow” of Allende. Internal CIA documents delivered from CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to the CIA station in Santiago on October 16th, 1970 reveals that it was “...firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup.” Peter Kornbluh of the National Security Archives – whose mission it is to disseminate and organize declassified papers – claims that from the election of Allende in 1970 to the coup proper in 1973, “most of the U.S. government would now [after Allende’s inauguration] be involved in a long-term, expanded effort to destabilize the Chilean government – economically, politically, and militarily.” The CIA and several U.S. private companies also helped organize, finance and support the forces and individuals that were to assume power after the coup. This was done by weapons deliveries, organizational support,
financial aid to the army and police and through propaganda efforts that were synchronized with some of the largest media corporations in Chile. Simultaneously, economic levers were being pulled to sabotage Allende’s government. Simply put; the issue of whether or not the administration of President Richard Nixon actively supported the coup is not in dispute. The Church Committee settled that question decades ago:

Covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence Agency spent three million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome of the 1964 Chilean presidential elections. Eight million dollars was spent, covertly, in the three years between 1970 and the military coup in September 1973, with over three million dollars expended in fiscal year 1972 alone. ¹⁷²

We will therefore not spend much space on proving it. We will rather use declassified material in our analysis of the motivations of the Nixon administration, which was in power at the time of the coup.

But as we are interested in social movements as a reaction to specific U.S. foreign policy, it is useful to assess how important U.S. involvement was for the coup to happen at all. If her actions were inconsequential, the argument of this thesis would fall apart. But there was a clear lack of enthusiasm for a coup in Chile at the start of Allende’s term in office. This was true for political elites, in the military establishment and in the public realm. U.S. Ambassador to Santiago Edward Korry wrote in 1970, before Allende had taken office, that the Chilean army would not do it on their own: “We believe it now clear that the Chilean military will not, repeat not move to prevent accession barring unlikely situation of national chaos and widespread violence.”¹⁷³ The leading opposition candidate, Eduardo Frei, was also contacted by U.S. operatives to convince him to back a coup against Allende, but with no luck. Frei did not want to abandon the strong democratic tradition in Chile, and the same could safely be said of the army chief General René Schneider. There was also “no public mood” according to U.S. ambassador Korry, for a putsch to deny Allende his presidency.¹⁷⁴ The first “hot” action that was taken to destabilize conditions in Chile at the time, the attempted abduction of General Schneider that resulted in his death, according to Kornbluh only “produced an overwhelming public and political repudiation of violence and a clear reaffirmation of Chile’s civil, constitutional tradition.”¹⁷⁵ It was therefore to become the task of the CIA to change this climate of calm into one of socioeconomic chaos. In a CIA cable dated September 17, 1970, this is clearly stated: “We
conclude that it is our task to create such a climate climaxing with a solid pretext that will force the military and the president [sitting president Frei] to take some action in the desired direction.\textsuperscript{176}

It is hard to state in absolute terms whether a coup would have happened without active U.S. involvement, but the available evidence does not suggest that it would. South America specialist Professor Benedicte Bull, when asked this question directly in an interview for this thesis, also expresses serious doubt that the army would have dared attempt such a coup on its own.\textsuperscript{177} In many other nations on the continent, yes. But not in Chile, says Bull. So in Iran, there would clearly have been no Shah without U.S. involvement. In the case of Chile, the most that can be said without risking an overstatement is that there very probably would have been no Pinochet government without U.S. involvement. It is crucially important to have this active U.S. role in mind at all times as this case is developed.

The relationship that the U.S. had to the Pinochet regime, especially in the first crucial years of his reign, was a close one. It was more fluid over the long term than the relationship to the Shah in Iran was, but the first years following the coup were years of close cooperation and support. The Nixon administration immediately changed their economic policies toward Chile as Pinochet came to power. As the attempts to sabotage the Chilean economy under Allende stopped, financial aid quickly shot up to a level far exceeding what it had been in the years before Allende was elected,\textsuperscript{178} thus kick starting the rebuilding of the Chilean economy that the coup-makers had promised. For example, U.S. AID’s Food for Peace program grew from 14.7 million U.S.D in the three years before the coup, to 132 million U.S.D in the three years following it. In fiscal year 1975 – 76, Chile received 80% of all U.S. AID grants to the South American continent.\textsuperscript{179} Freed from obstructionist U.S. policies, the international lending and aid institutions followed the U.S. example. The U.S. pushed hard for the Paris Club debt rescheduling that gave Chile’s economy an important boost, and made it possible for the regime to buy the equipment needed to keep its population constrained. The new economic conditions led to Chile becoming the fifth largest arms buyer in the world. Equipment, the overwhelming majority of which was bought from the U.S., did not limit itself to military armaments. It also included large caches of riot gear, small arms and munitions and other equipment best suited for domestic repression.
Covert operations support was also extended. This included information gathering and dissemination and training of security personnel. The Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters, flew to Santiago on a personal visit to Pinochet. In March of 1974, the CIA hosted future high-level officers of the much feared and reviled newly established secret police, the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), at Langley. Those talks resulted in, among other things, at least 8 CIA specialists traveling to Chile on training missions for the Chilean secret police. Many Chilean army and police personnel were also trained in the School of the Americas at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. Most importantly, the CIA station in Santiago spent much time and effort on improving the image of the regime both internally and externally.

All in all, U.S. support was crucial for the effective consolidation of the military regime under Pinochet. As Ambassador to Santiago David H. Popper expressed it, the U.S. provided “absolutely vital assistance to the Chileans [the Pinochet regime] in their first years.” President Gerald Ford continued the support started by Nixon. In 1976, two years into the Ford presidency, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger again reiterated U.S. support for Pinochet in private conversation with him; “In the United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here…We want to help, not undermine you.” Combining the active role of the U.S. in plotting the 1973 coup and the crucial aid given to the coup regime in its infancy, we can see that U.S. foreign policy was as tightly knit to domestic conditions in Chile under the Pinochet regime as it had been in Iran under the Shah.

As in Iran, this political and financial support for Pinochet was extended despite of full U.S. knowledge of detentions, killings, torture and suppression of basic civic freedoms throughout the country. A Department of State briefing paper – *Chilean Executions* – that was prepared for Secretary of State Kissinger in November 1973, clearly showed that the White House had full knowledge of the brutality used in the immediate aftermath of the coup. The paper stated that 13 500 citizens had been rounded up in raids and mass arrests, that torture was used on a large scale and that there had been “rather frequent use of random violence.” The tally of deaths in the report is a little confused, but the numbers used are in the thousands. It even recognizes that a number of those executed were petty criminals, apparently killed in “a puritanical,

xvii Tellingly, attached to this memorandum was another report, informing Kissinger that a new credit line of 24 million USD to buy feed corn had been opened to help the military regime with food production.
crusading spirit – a determination to cleanse and rejuvenate Chile.” Similar memoranda were written during the entirety of Pinochet’s reign. Some of them, like the October 25th 1973 CIA report on the death squad often called “the Caravan of Death,” were detailed enough to describe lethal wounds and victims’ places of burial. Although the numbers of killed and detained declined as the new security regime was consolidated, there was no lack of knowledge in the White House about conditions in Chile. The activities described in internal U.S. documents included ongoing use of torture, disappearances and summary executions by the DINA. Later, the records also include the development and production of what is now known as Sarin gas, an activity for which an FBI Memorandum was written in December of 1981. Despite all this knowledge, U.S. support continued.

As mentioned earlier, the relationship was not to be as smooth as with the Shah. The revelations of the Church Committee shook the U.S. foreign policy milieu and prompted Congress to take measures to change traditional policies toward South America. After the coup, there was a new sense of urgency for many to criticize dictators like Pinochet. In 1974, American military aid for Chile was suspended on a temporary basis – it expired in June 1975 – despite the efforts of the Nixon and Ford administrations to keep support at a high level. The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was established, and each American embassy was instructed to appoint a human rights office from its staff. In 1975, the Harkin amendment said that American foreign aid and support should be conditioned on the human rights record of any given nation, and in 1976 the arms suspension was brought back into effect. In order to soften the critical gaze of Congress, President Ford’s administration tried to convince Pinochet to reform his human rights image to make cooperation easier in the U.S., and Kissinger wrote to Pinochet that any aid that the U.S. was able to give was linked to the perceived human rights situation in Chile. So despite serious misgivings in parts of the Washington establishment, and despite of deep knowledge of Chile’s poor human rights record, executive administrations did their best to keep Pinochet on the list of preferred partners. As in our first case, U.S. support for the regime continued despite of the democratic will of the populace that had been expressed via the election of Allende, and despite of gross human rights violations that the U.S. administration was clearly aware of. No Lockian, liberal base for foreign policy would fit with this behavior.
Behavior Analysis from Realism

What motivated this behavior on the part of the U.S., and were those motivations in line with the assumptions of realism? There are two main suggestions as to which factors guided U.S. administrations at the time. Economic interests and the need for natural resources is one of these. Cold War power balancing regarding Communist containment is another. We start by assessing the finance and resources suggestion.xviii

There were several large U.S. private companies heavily invested in Chile at the time, some of them in industries that exported resources to the U.S.xix The numbers vary, but according to David F. Schmitz, Allende’s presidential bid posed a threat to “U.S. private investment of more than 750 million U.S.D.”xviii Chilean copper was a major industry of investment for American companies. By the mid-20th Century, el Teniente was the largest underground copper mine in the world (20 million U.S.D annually) and Chuquicamata was the biggest open-pit copper mine (30 million U.S.D annually).xviii They were owned by American companies, the Kennecott Copper Corporation and the Anaconda Copper Company respectively, and the two companies accounted for over half of Chilean exports and a third of its tax revenue.

Before President Allende’s successful bid for the presidency, Chile’s extraction of copper ore had been under a process of nationalization for quite a while. Under President Eduardo Frei, the Chilean state bought 51% of the mining industry. This effort culminated under Allende, who successfully fought for a full nationalization without compensation. The day of the official takeover was celebrated as the Day of National Dignity (Dia de la Dignidad Nacional).

Another major U.S. investor was ITT. It owned 70% of Chitelco, the company that controlled the Chilean telecommunications infrastructure, which was another target of nationalization for President Allende.xxx In the election season that brought Allende to office, ITT covertly sent 350 000 U.S.D to rightist candidate Alessandri, and arranged for other American businesses to send another 350 000 U.S.D. CEO Harold Geneen pledged one million dollars toward any organization that could halt Allende’s rise to the top, and board member McCone was

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xviii Connected to this suggestion is also an ideological fight between different economic models, but this is a controversial issue that we will come back to in our concluding chapter.
xix Chile was not a significant export market for the U.S. at the time. It is almost never mentioned as an aspect of the U.S.-Chilean relationship, so we will not concentrate on that.
xxx ITT also owned several other properties and stocks in Chile, such as two Sheraton hotels and Standard Electric. According to Stephen Kornbluh, ITT’s investments in Chile came to 153 million USD.
a former director of the CIA who was still on the CIA payroll as a consultant.\textsuperscript{191} ITT was also the source of documents that prompted the Church Committee’s interest in the Chilean coup, as these documents proved that the CIA had been covertly involved in the planning of it.\textsuperscript{192}

ITT and the copper mining companies were not alone. The Chile Ad Hoc Committee was formed by several U.S. companies including ITT, Kennecott, Anaconda, Firestone Tire & Rubber, Bethlehem Steel, Charles Pfizer, W. R. Grace, Bank of America, Ralston Purina and Dow Chemical. The group was set up to work with the U.S. government to “handle the Chile problem,” by “office closings, delayed payments, slow deliveries and credit denial.”\textsuperscript{193} “Not a nut or bolt”\textsuperscript{194} was to be imported to Chile from these private firms as long as Allende was in power. This worked well, and had large impacts on parts of the Chilean infrastructure such as buses and taxis. CEO Kendall from \textit{Pepsi-Cola} and Rockefeller from \textit{Chase Manhattan Bank} were also among the earliest partners in talks on how to stop Allende. Both companies had substantial financial interests in Chile. There is no doubt that several U.S. companies worked from the premise that removing Allende by a coup was in their self-interest.

But the economic perspective alone does not seem to justify the overthrow of a foreign government from the U.S. state perspective. Investments were important to specific private companies, and these companies had (and still have) considerable ability to influence U.S. policy makers. But on the whole, neither exports to nor imports from Chile were large enough to make a significant impact on the bottom line of the United States as a nation. Copper was, as we have seen, the most important export for Chile. But at the time of the coup the U.S. was the largest copper producer in the world. Chile still holds the largest copper reserves in the world, but according to the U.S. Geological Survey’s Mineral Commodities Summaries of 1998, the U.S. holds the second largest (17\% compared to Chile’s 28\%),\textsuperscript{195} rendering copper from Chile less crucial than for example oil imports from the Middle East or controlling the global oil market. Dr. Benedicte Bull, when interviewed for this thesis, concurs with that view. The left of South America, she says, is wrongly focused on the resource aspect of inter-American relations. She points to the fact that heavy Chinese investments in resource industries in South America have not been met with significant action from North America.\textsuperscript{196} Imports have been important at times, but not so crucial as has traditionally been said. At the time of the coup, the U.S. only received about 10\% of Chilean overall exports. From the early days of U.S. adventurism in Latin
America, it has also lessened considerably as a percentage of U.S. imports. This thesis, then, rejects the resource and financial explanation for intervening in Chile (and in South America at large in this period). But as this explanation is so often asserted, it had to be given attention as an option over a few pages so as not to leave the reader with the impression that it had not been considered.

As a factor in this case, then, the relative non-importance of purely economic considerations seems to mirror the relatively sparse focus given to economic matters in realism. Financial matters do not occupy much space in the realist texts used in this thesis. This might seem odd, as they are given considerable importance on the occasions that they are mentioned. John Mearsheimer, for example, notes that “economic might is the foundation of military might.” Therefore; “great powers aim to maximize the amount of the world’s wealth that they control.”197 But financial interests are not a frequent visitor to the lists of realist assumptions that we use. And it is not a convincing factor as an explanation for the U.S. involvement we have discussed.

To find what seems to be the most influential motivation behind the support of the coup and the regime that followed, we will need to get much closer to the basic tenets of realism. We start from a regional context and place our case study of U.S.-Chile relations within that perspective. To some extent, this thesis builds this argument on the analysis of inter-American relations presented in the works of Lars Schoultz and David F. Schmitz. David Schmitz works his way through U.S. relations to rightwing dictators in two volumes. The material on South America is extensive, and encompasses the Cold War on both sides temporally. He looks for U.S. justifications for and reasons behind supporting such regimes. In Lars Schoultz book National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America, he is specifically searching for what motivates U.S. policy toward Latin America. Not what the facts are, but what U.S. policy makers perceive the facts to be, and therefore base their decision-making and analysis on. He does this by interviewing large numbers of policymakers, including congressmen, senators, members of the foreign policy milieu, area experts and officials in institutions such as the State Department and Pentagon. In his interviews, economic considerations are sometimes mentioned and natural resources are touched upon at intervals. But in the overwhelming majority of them, the two main goals he finds fall squarely within our second factor and firmly within realism theory of global power balancing. The two goals are strategic denial and power projection. These two authors
reach similar conclusions, but from two different angles. So do most other academics read while researching for this thesis.

“The quest for stability has been the basis for U.S. policy toward South America for nearly two centuries,” writes Schoultz. David Schmitz also finds that this is the most important reason why the U.S. has supported so many authoritarian regimes in the region: “Dictatorships and military rule served American interests well by preserving order, controlling radical reform movements, and protecting American investments while obviating the need for U.S. intervention,” he says. And the Cold War period is to him simply a differentiation in the form of this idea; it is not new in nature. As the established regional hegemon, there is no benefit to be had for the U.S. from change, as that can only weaken America’s position and shake the security it has gained: “This basic causal linkage – instability in Latin America causes a threat to United States security – is the cognitive bedrock of United States policy toward Latin America.”

But stability, in the analysis of both Schoultz and Schmitz, is only a tool to reach the two goals already mentioned; strategic denial and power projection.

The first goal to be considered her is strategic denial. Since the 1823 Monroe Doctrine stated that the Western hemisphere was exclusively a United States sphere of influence, the U.S. has strived to place South America under U.S. control militarily, meaning that no foreign power should exert military influence over it. In time, this goal was achieved. The continent may not have been crucially important in itself – or in Roberta Cohen’s words, there was a “relative absence of strategic concerns” in South America – but foreign powers should by no means become such a concern. U.S. behavior toward the continent during the Cold War reflected this. For the U.S., it was very important to deny the Soviet Union South America’s resources. These were “…resources that the United States may not want but that we cannot permit others – specifically the Soviet Union – to have.” In a realist zero-sum and power-balancing world this is familiar territory, and we also recognize this resource-denial rational from our first case.

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xii Schoultz also spends considerable space on the discussion between US policy makers as to what causes instability. This is an interesting discussion that touches upon our topic, but sadly, we do not have the space available here to give that discussion its due attention. Suffice it to say that the two main sides of the debate that Schoultz finds are: the one that says poverty and deprivation causes instability; the one that says that a few (often foreign) Communist agitators cause instability.

xiii Schoultz concludes of his interviewees that «…these officials would be relieved if Latin America did not exist. Give these officials the opportunity to choose between the continued physical existence of our neighboring republics to the south, on the one hand, and a vast ocean broken only by the ice packs of Antarctica, on the other, and the probability is quite high that they would
Schoultz finds two categories of resources that, according to his interviewees, should be denied to other powers. The first category is military bases. Schoultz finds the danger of the Soviet Union establishing meaningful military bases in the South American continent to be very low, despite of the events of the Cuban missile crisis. We will later see this view reflected by the Church Committee on Chile. Schoultz also claims that U.S. bases on the continent and the access to sea routes have never been crucial to U.S. global safety. The Caribbean basin and the Panama Canal are far more important from an economic perspective, he writes. At the time of his writing (1986), the U.S. spent only about 0.5 % of its worldwide total of military expenditures on Latin American bases, most of which served as training- and test facilities. According to his interviewees, there was also scant focus put on the possibility of Latin American countries lending any meaningful help in case of larger scale military conflict. He quotes one such official saying that the idea of South American countries being able to “defend anything” from large-scale conventional attack “falls within the realm of the comic.” In other words; the U.S. seeks to be the unrivalled hegemon of the region not first and foremost for the access to such strategic resources, but to deny them to others.

The second power-balance motivation Schoultz finds in his interviewees, and by far the most important one, is that of power projection. His subjects repeat ad nauseam that U.S. control over South America should be visible and unquestioned, and that any breach of this situation would be seen as weakness in the face of adversity. This would signal to her allies that the U.S. could not be trusted in times of turmoil, and to her adversaries that her deterrence was not to be taken seriously. In the aftermath of a strategic loss such as Vietnam, signaling strength was more important than ever for the U.S.. Schoultz dedicates several pages to quotations from interviewees expressing this sentiment (Appendix 5), and leaves no doubt that at the time of his writing this is by far the most important motivation for policy actions in South America. We can use one of Schoultz’s quotations from Henry Kissinger here to clarify what is meant:

A lot will depend on how Central America comes out. If we cannot manage Central America, it will be impossible to convince threatened nations in the Persian Gulf and in other places that we know how to manage the global equilibrium.
Greg Grandin, author of the Pulitzer Prize winning *Empire’s Workshop*, concurs and brings the “little important resources” of South America and the need to signal strength to the world nicely together. South America is the exact right place to use to send such a signal, he states: “I think it turns out that Central America’s importance resided exactly in its unimportance.” In a similar comment, Roberta Cohen calls South America a continent in which there was a “relative absence of strategic concerns.”

The case of Chile fits well into this regional frame of thought. The mass of declassified documents regarding Chile from this period relates mostly to specific plans and actions taken by U.S. institutions and agencies. But there is also important information about motivations to be found within them. Conversations, letters and telephone calls to and from different policy makers, including President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, reveals why overthrowing Allende was of importance. What follows is a sample collection of such comments from the period in which the policy toward the Allende government was set. The case may be seen as overstated here. But as it may be seen as controversial, it is important to demonstrate that the policy was the foundation of the actions that were to come, and how it moved up the chain of command as it was being formulated, starting with advisory institutions such as the CIA and experts in the State Department:

October 29th, 1970: The National Security Study Memorandum 97 – NSSM 97 – written in cooperation by the CIA, the Defense and the State Departments, states that there are “no vital national interests within Chile,” although economic losses would be “tangible.” In addition, there would be no significant shift in the balance of military power worldwide by losing access to the country’s resources. According to the paper, the cost would be psychological; hemispheric cohesion would be threatened and a successful Allende government would mean a psychological setback for the U.S. and a “psychological advance for the Marxist idea.” Stopping Chile’s socialist project was a question of “prevention of its influencing the rest of Latin America to follow it either as a model or through its external policies.”

November 5th, 1970: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger takes these considerations further in a memorandum for President Nixon written in preparation for a meeting at the National Security Council (NSC). In this document, Kissinger expands the ideas coming from NSSM 97 to include the global perspective:
… what happens in Chile over the next six to twelve months will have ramifications that will go far beyond just U.S.-Chilean relations. They will have an effect on what happens in the rest of Latin America and the developing world; on what our future position will be in the hemisphere; and in the larger world picture, including our relations with the U.S.S.R. They will even affect our own conception of what our role in the world is. …. The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on – and even precedent value for – other parts of the world, especially in Italy. … our failure to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin America and Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long considered our sphere of influence. … It’s [Chile’s] model effect can be insidious. 211

November 6th, 1970: The next quote shows how President Nixon accepted the logic coming from his advisors, if he did not hold these opinions already. The quote is from the minutes from the NSC meeting that followed the Kissinger memorandum. President Nixon speaks:

If Chile moves as we expect and is able to get away with it – our public posture is important here – it gives courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America. …. Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he [Allende] can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success.” … If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile and have it both ways, we will be in trouble. … No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this way. 212

June 11th, 1971: President Nixon comments further in a telephone conversation between himself, Secretary of State Kissinger and John B. Connally, where he looks back at past failures to follow the course that is now being planned for Chile:

…it’s just the fact that if you start doing it, it’s going to encourage others to go and do likewise. And I think John’s point is that some place along, maybe we ought to find a place to kick somebody in the ass. Now, you know, we didn’t kick Velasco [Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru, 1968-1975]. 213

In another conversation from the same day, featuring President Nixon, Kissinger and Harry Haldeman, Kissinger stated that “unless we become too dangerous to tackle, there’s gonna be a constant erosion of our international position.” Nixon concurred with this view, explaining that during the days of John Foster Dulles, “people were just too afraid to tackle us.” 214

March 5th, 1975: In the Church Committee process that followed the disclosure of U.S. covert involvement in the coup, President Gerald Ford summarizes the same sentiment by telling Senator Church that “We are a great power and it is important that we be perceived as such.” 215
In declassified papers from the period, the motivations represented in these quotes clearly stand out. There is therefore no reason to doubt that they reflect the thinking of the Nixon White House. One aspect – resources and financial interests – has been rejected here as to weak on explanatory power. Two others – strategic denial and power balancing – have been accepted. Do we find these motivations echoed in realism texts? As we start applying the theory to this data, we can first say that the support for the coup in Chile and the regime that followed was clearly based on self-interest on the part of the U.S.. It was not in Chile’s interest that U.S. power be projected or that other potential powers were kept from having an influence on her. It was not in the Chilean people’s interest that their democratic process was violently overturned. As a theoretical concept in realism, self-interest was treated thoroughly in our first case, and doing so again here would be redundant. We therefore move to the two power balancing aspects of the motivations we have found and what realism has to say about them. Power balancing as a theoretical concept has already touched upon in the part of the first chapter concerning Hans Morgenthau (page 9) and in our first case. There, the focus was mainly on building alliances to balance the power of one’s adversaries. This case gives us an opportunity to dig further into this important concept.

Strategic denial as a concept is instantly recognizable to anyone familiar with realism. It is a way of balancing power by keeping important resources out of the hands of one’s adversary, and thereby consolidating one’s own power relative to other states. As realism sees the global power distribution as a zero-sum situation, denying resources to others is almost as important as gaining access to them for one’s own nation. In the case of South America, strategic denial was done to keep the U.S. status as the regional hegemon, which the U.S. could never hope to achieve in the region in which Iran is situated. The clearest voice on hegemonic status from our collection of realists is John Mearsheimer and his offensive realism focus on survival. He claims that states do not only want to be relatively stronger than others in their own region. He asserts about states that “…their ultimate aim is to seek a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival.” In South

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**Footnotes:**

xxiii Schoultz defines hegemony as a situation of domination, not just having a sphere of influence, which is where he puts Europe and the Middle East. He adds that “Hegemony is such a natural feature of inter-American relations that it often goes unrecognized.” Page 285. The US, in this picture, has the right to support their side of any conflict and to intervene when needed, but the Soviet Union has no right to do the same.

xxiv Mearsheimer is one of those who claims that being a regional hegemon is really all any particular state can hope to achieve, as reaching global hegemonic status is inconceivable and without precedence in history.
America, he claims, the U.S. has been successful in achieving this goal, and “the United States is the only regional hegemon in modern history….“ The fact that the U.S. was able to achieve regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere – done for realist reasons – has to Mearsheimer been the prime cause of America’s dominant role in the last century. “This impressive achievement, not some purported noble behavior toward the outside world, is the real basis of American exceptionalism in the foreign policy realm.” Mearsheimer would certainly concur with Schoultz’ interviewees on the importance of strategic denial in the case of South America. We can see two sides of the same coin in our two cases; in South America, the U.S. strove to keep its hegemonic status. In Iran, she strove to deny the Soviet Union that status in Central Asia. We can conclude that this first explanatory suggestion is in line with realism.

Projecting power and credibility was the second power-balancing goal that Schoultz found in his interviews, both in the case of Chile specifically and toward South America in general. And as we have seen, in multiple written and spoken statements from declassified documents from the period leading up to the coup, this motivation was of primary importance to policymakers in the White House at the time. If Chile were allowed to defy the U.S. in her own sphere of influence, the signal sent to the world about U.S. power would be detrimental to her diplomatic strength. As in the case of Iranian oil nationalization, the “threat of a good example” had to be avoided. Or in a more radical analysis, “successful defiance” could not be allowed.

Power projection is not a bullet point in itself on any of the lists of basic assumptions used here. But it is easily found in our realism texts in general. “All politics,” says Hans Morgenthau, “domestic or international, are in one of three states: to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.” As point two on his list of assumptions, we find the assertion that politics always has to be backed up by a perception of power. In order for diplomacy to be credible, power has to be projected. For as Mearsheimer says in his third assumption, one state can never be certain of the future intentions of another state. This is the thinking that was behind President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous saying “speak softly, and carry a big stick” and his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Serge Ricard argues in Presidential Studies Quarterly that this corollary turned Monroe’s defensive doctrine into an offensive one. It turned it into a doctrine that indicated that “the U.S. claim [to hegemony] would be backed up by arms.” Without such

xxv Mearsheimer’s list of assumptions is included in Appendix 1.
a threat, says Ricard, the claim of hegemony would have no credibility. And such threats must from time to time be proven credible. The second explanatory factor we have found – power projection - is therefore also in line with the prescriptions of realism, as the coup against Allende was to be used as a demonstration of the credibility of such arms.

To summarize this part of the chapter, we can see that U.S. behavior related to the coup and the regime that followed (until the end of the Ford administration) was indeed in line with realism. Firstly, it was done for self-interest. And as we saw, there was no enthusiasm among the population for a coup in Chile after Allende’s democratic victory, meaning that the U.S. acted in defiance of the majority of the population and the democratic will that was expressed through that victory. The reasoning behind U.S. actions was mostly based on strategic denial and power projection, which are two important parts of the balance of power concept in realism. The economic aspect, this thesis has argued, was important to certain parts of U.S. private interests, but not important enough for the U.S. as a nation to explain the actions taken. This case has therefore confirmed our Independent variable 2, which states that American foreign policy has overwhelmingly been in line with – or been based upon – realism.

The 1983 to 1988 Movement; A Reaction to Anti-Democratic Realism

In assessing the social movement that lasted from 1983 to 1988, we have to examine two aspects. First; was it a social movement according to our definition as laid out in the introduction? One of the defining features of social movements used here is that they “mainly have their basis in civil society and population, not in political elites or established political parties.” In this particular movement, there was an intermingling of the purely socially popular and the politically established, which means that we have to tackle this issue to be honest in the analysis of the thesis’ hypothesis. Second; can this movement – by motivations and goals – be clearly connected to U.S. realism policies?

We will start with the first of these issues. Among those who study social movements, this movement is not controversial with regard to who participated in it. But it is harder to strictly separate the social movement aspect from the established political aspect. In this case several established parties, especially the Christian Democratic Party of former presidential candidate Eduardo Frei, joined the movement as it grew. There were also several former politicians in exile
who worked on an international level to have Pinochet removed. These people and organizations were, to varying degrees, to be involved in and/or incorporated into the movement. This duality might be best illustrated by the fact that Rodolfo Seguel, the leader of the miners’ union who was instrumental in starting the movement, was also a member of the Christian Democratic Party. But first and foremost, the movement was started and driven by civilian participation. And like so many other movements of this kind, it took its main strength from numbers, which only the populace can provide.

The movement was prompted by the workers of the El Teniente copper mine – Chile’s “knights of labor.”222 It started in earnest on May 11, 1983. That day’s demonstrations started tentatively with small-scale work stoppages and work slowdowns. But at 8 o’clock that evening, the tensions of the day erupted into banging on pots and pans, with barricades and bonfires being built in the poorer parts of Santiago and cars honking in the streets.223 This collective action broke the fear of government repression to a large extent, and was to grow into a nationwide chain of events. After this day, protests were planned on a monthly basis. Carlos Huneeus describes a dynamic in this period in which the established political elites prompted their networks into actions only after the civil protests had some success, in the same way that Ayatollah Khomeini waited for opportunities to open up for his supporters.224 In early August 1983, a broad coalition of political activists was created; the Alianza Democratica (AD). This alliance was composed of both established political groups and civil society organizations ranging from the far left to the far right; socialists and capitalists alike. The alliance decided to work in a nonviolent fashion,xxvi and therefore excluded some of the most radical communist groups in Chile.225 Other such alliances were also to be created as the years passed.

In the final stages of the movement, and heading toward a 1988 plebiscite that Pinochet seemed sure to win, tactics included voter registration drives that were inspired by the work of the U.S. League of Woman Voters and the Civil Rights Movement. This initiative, called Participa, successfully registered 4 million new voters. The new votes turned out to be absolutely crucial to the opposition, which won the plebiscite and thus ended the Presidential reign of Pinochet, even though he was to stay on as chief of the armed forces. Peter Ackerman and Jack

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xvi There is general agreement among the scholars used in this thesis that the smaller violent groups in play in Chile at the time – often called radical flanks – did have significant negative impact on the movement as a whole, as they very often have. But they were not a party to the wider social movements under discussion here. A thorough discussion of this dynamic must be left for other texts.
Duvall conclude that the nonviolent popular movement, in this way and others, was the “catalyst for his downfall.” It seems safe to say that without the social, popular aspect of the movement, the established political forces would not have prevailed. As Genaro Arriagada put it, the Alianza Democratica “viewed the protests as the social pressure that should bring the government to negotiation.” Meaning that without the popular protest part, there would be no room for the established political groups to maneuver and negotiate.

The movement also created slow shifts in U.S. policies that Chilean opposition politicians had not been able to achieve. After the summit meeting of the Alianza Democratica and the killing of some protesters during demonstrations in the months that followed, the Reagan administration started making changes to its personnel in Santiago by replacing some very outspoken pro-Pinochet representatives with officials more focused on human rights and democratic progress. This came as a direct result of the violence provoked by the resistance movement. In January 1986, Senator Edward Kennedy visited Chile and further boosted the confidence of the opposition. But this semi-support for the pro-democracy demonstrators was not a consistent message from Washington. In July of 1986, while new U.S. ambassador Barnes participated in a funeral for a 19-year old protester who had been torched by carrabineros, Senator Jesse Helms, visiting Chile at the time, called the protesters “communist terrorists” and lambasted the media for taking pity on them.

The transition to democracy in Chile is sometimes described as a consensus among political elites, but this is a clear simplification and an error in focus. In an exhaustive Oxford University study of civil resistance and power politics, Carlos Huneeus concludes that:

Mass mobilization from 1983 to 1988 severely weakened the legitimacy of General Augusto Pinhochet`s authoritarian regime, led to his defeat in a plebiscite on its continuation in October 1988, forced the regime to accept the result, and culminated to a transition to civilian rule in March 1990.

He describes a situation in which established and elite political forces were both brought together and given space to maneuver by the social movement, thereby giving them leverage. The research done for this thesis strongly concurs in this view. We can conclude that Pinochet’s authoritarian regime did indeed fall at the hands of a popular uprising, not as a result of established party politics or actions by political elites.
With regard to the second question – to connect the movement to U.S. foreign policy – we need to establish what the movement fought for and against. The demands of the movement evolved over time. It started with specific grievances coming from the miners. These were practical aspects of payment and labor practices connected to their everyday situation, as had also been the case on previous occasions of local protests. But as the protests progressed, the demands of the protesters widened to include broader political issues such as decrying the detention of political opponents of the regime. What was to become the main demand of the movement quickly emerged; to re-establish democracy. The stated goal of the Alianza Democratice was to put pressure on the regime to involve the opposition in dialogue to obtain this objective. It drew up a list of demands that was presented to the regime, and the list started with the demand for Pinochet’s resignation. The miners’ protests had grown into a regime-change movement. In 1985 the Alianza, much bigger than at its birth, arranged a summit meeting of key leaders. They wrote The National Accord for Full Transition to Democracy (Acuerda Nacional), and the name of this accord perfectly reflected the goal they fought for; a return to democratic order, which meant the abdication of President Pinochet.

The fact that the goal of the movement was clear and simple and the motivations behind it were uncontroversial makes it easy for us to look for any connection to U.S. policy actions. As we have seen, the main goal as defined by the major organizations of the movement was re-democratization. It was not a movement agitated for by foreign Communist agents in the interest of some foreign power or ideology. As U.S. Ambassador White said, “What we basically are confronting is an authentic revolution, born out of despair and discouragement because of a lack of economic opportunity and because of a distortion of the political process.”

Before the coup in 1973, the democratic tradition of Chile has been described as much stronger than most nations on the continent, and Allende was elected in line with those traditions. Only with the regime of General Carlos Ibanez that lasted from 1927 to 1931 had this tradition been broken before in Chile in the 20th century. Democracy, in other words, existed in Chile before the 1973 coup. And as we have seen, the chance of a coup without U.S. action has been deemed unlikely. U.S. policy actions were instrumental in taking away what the protesters were aiming to restore. We can therefore conclude that the social movement to a large extent came as a reaction to U.S. realist foreign policy. The participants tried to overturn what the U.S. supported coup had done, thereby reaffirming our third independent variable. This social movement, along with so many
others, proves Kenneth Waltz wrong when he writes that “neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has to make itself acceptable to other states.”

The Not-Quite-So-Blind Spot

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, some variables are less clear in this case than in the first. With regard to Chile, this is true for our first dependent variable; that social movements mostly come as surprises to policy planners. Firstly, there was considerable political resistance toward the Pinochet regime from the start, and this was well known in the U.S.. Secondly, the social movement analyzed here grew over a long time, making it easier to react to. We can therefore say that this social movement did not come as a surprise in the same way that the Iran ’79 revolution did.

But it is clear that the U.S. administrations that supported the coup and the Pinochet regime – especially in the years up until 1985 – did think it probable that the regime would survive politically. For the policy actions of U.S. planners to make any sense whatsoever, we will have to assume that they planned for the continuing political survival of the Pinochet regime. We have to assume that they planned for the regime to withstand the opposition from other politicians and from the populace. Any other assumption would mean that we think that U.S. administrations actually placed their money on a horse that they thought would lose. Clearly, then, U.S. foreign policy planners underestimated the opposition to Pinochet, of which the 1983 - 1988 social movement was a crucial part. In that sense, the first dependent variable is definitely confirmed.

Now for the caveat related to this variable, which will include the regional perspective. As stated, there was some sensitivity toward internal Chilean opposition in the U.S.. This sensitivity seems to be very solidly connected to the historical experience of social change in South America as a whole. Many more opinion makers were aware of this potential problem than seems to have been the case with regard to Iran. There are several cases of U.S. policymakers trying to blunt the swords of the authoritarian leaders that they supported. This has come out of the realization that, as Lars Schoultz puts it:
Looking back at the post-war history of the United States policy toward Latin America, all policy makers recognize that Washington has made some serious blunders. Perhaps the most serious of these is the repeated tendency to befriend and support Latin American governments that fail to command the respect of their own people.\textsuperscript{235}

He then states that this error has often been made as a consequence of “a lack of foresight.”\textsuperscript{236} (This is a main point for his thesis; that the kind of realism policies we are examining here are short-term in nature, and have negative long-term consequences.) In the cases of President Batista in Cuba, President Zomosa in Nicaragua, Duvallier in Haiti and President Trujillos on the Dominican Republic, efforts were made to modify their authoritarian behavior. This skepticism toward human rights abuses was not mainly grounded on moral considerations, but on the recognition that the outcomes for the U.S. could be bad in the long run, as too much repression could lead to revolutions.\textsuperscript{237}

The Cuban 1959 Revolution is a prime example of this dynamic.\textsuperscript{xxvii} The Kennedy administration recognized that President Batista’s brutality and repression was a significant factor of recruitment for the far left and tried to foster centrist parties as a viable alternative to radical left leaning groups. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote to Kennedy that “If the possessing classes in South America made the middle class revolution impossible, they will make a workers-and-peasants revolution inevitable.”\textsuperscript{238} Secretary of State Viron Vaky, who was against the coup against Allende, wrote to Kissinger that “Unjust situations are unstable over the long run.”\textsuperscript{239} Mark Falcoff wrote on the subject in 1986. This was after the violent overthrow of President Somoza in Nicaragua but before the end of the Pinochet regime. From our 2014 vantage point, his warning sounds somewhat prophetic:

… conservatives have begun to wonder aloud whether the problems the United States presently faces in Nicaragua might not have been avoided by a more timely and decisive turn away from Somoza. Though there are great differences between the two countries (Nicaragua and Chile), for purposes of broad foreign policy conceptualization, recent events in Managua serve as a warning of what could happen in Santiago.\textsuperscript{240}

But despite of these misgivings, the impulse to support right wing authoritarian regimes against the democratic will of electorates was strong and lasting. The Reagan administration largely continued this behavior toward numerous other nations on the continent throughout its lifespan, despite the warnings of writers such as Falcoff and policy makers such as Viron Vaky. Not only can this tradition of support for such governments be established all the way back to the

\textsuperscript{xxvii} Make a note here about other examples preceding Chile. El Salvador and so forth.
start of the 19th Century, as Schmitz so convincingly does. There are still glimpses of this antidemocratic behavior to be seen at present. In 2002, a violent coup overthrew President Chavez in Venezuela for two days. The sitting U.S. administration was quick to blame the coup on Chavez: “…undemocratic actions committed or encouraged by the Chavez administration provoked yesterday’s crisis in Venezuela” by attempting to “suppress peaceful demonstration.” This turned out to be false. There is also substantial evidence to suggest that the Bush administration was familiar with plans for a coup. This is one example of the antagonism that still exists between the U.S. and governments of the left on the continent. The recognition of the 2009 coup government in Honduras is another example.

Taking all these disparate opinions and examples into consideration, our first dependent variable is confirmed. If we cannot say that the social movement that overthrew Pinochet came as a complete surprise we can say that the potential of it was underestimated, and that its success was not planned for. And this conforms to a regional pattern. Lars Schoultz describes a pattern in South America where low-level instability grows into social movements and then mushrooms into high-level instability. At that point, he writes, U.S. policy makers notice and start taking some action. In other words; such movements are not on the radar screen before it is too late. The Reagan administration, being in power at the time of Pinochet’s end as president, and “faced with the violence of the repression and the risk of polarization” that was provoked by the social movement, had to react to events instead of planning for them.

**Long Term Legacy; Loss of Control and a New Spark Ignited**

There was no Ayatollah waiting in the wings to take power in Chile. There has never been nuclear antagonism or open military hostility between the U.S. and Chile after 1988. And there has never been any real threat that any foreign power competitor of the U.S. could come in and establish itself there. But we do not need these factors to establish the validity of our second dependent variable, which simply states that social movements reacting to U.S. realism policies have had “detrimental effects on American power and standing in the world in the long run.” A loss of influence over domestic Chilean politics would have been all we needed to confirm it, and such influence naturally falls when a nation’s partner in leadership falls. But most importantly – as we have seen from the motivations behind the 1973 coup – the U.S. clearly lost the ability to
project power in Chile. Their patron in the country lost control, which reflects badly on any superpower. Its preferred policies were halted and reversed, displaying a lack of control over the continent that was seen as so damaging by many policy makers. This alone confirms our second dependent variable.

But the legacy of the 1983 - 1988 social movement and of U.S. behavior in Chile connects strongly with a regional pattern. The social movement we have discussed came at a major shift in international politics, as the Berlin Wall fell the year after it ended. The U.S./South America relationship shifted from the Cold War dynamic and became more focused on economic issues. And the continent’s social movements changed with it. With Chile, we saw the last of the “traditional,” South American anti-authoritarian topplings of which there has been so many on this continent. But many also see the first struggle against a new contentious issue in South America; neo-liberal economic politics imposed by U.S.-led international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. We have considered Chile in a regional context several times in this chapter, especially when it comes to U.S. realist behavior and analysis toward the region. But it is with regard to social movements against these economic policies we find the most important extra-national aspects of the Chile case.

With the Pinochet regime came the advent of neo-liberal economic policies to South America. As Greg Grandin writes, the inauguration of the “brutally competitive global” economic policies of the Washington Consensus happened first in Chile. The main manual for these policies in South America, often called El Ladrillo (The Brick), was printed out in haste as the 1973 coup was under way. It was written by a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago under a Chile/U.S. student exchange program that was started long before the coup. The “Chicago Boys” as they were to be known, described by Carlos Huneeus as “one of the two main civil power groups within the [Pinochet] regime,” were enthusiastic supporters of neo-liberal policies. In Chile, Huneeus claims that these policies were the cause of two major recessions, a 40% poverty rate and the dismantling of a “relatively advanced welfare state.” Indeed, Huneeus reminds us that what prompted the Chilean miners into action in the first place was an economic crisis with many of the same characteristics that would follow in other countries

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xxviii Other examples are the movements in El Salvador in 1944, the Sandinista overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979, the movements that overthrew governments in Bolivia in 1977 and 1985 and many more. Several smaller movements, such as the famous Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who demonstrated for years to demand information about their disappeared children, also fit into this category.
subjected to the Washington Consensus, neo-liberalism and the policies of the Chicago Boys, making this movement a potential candidate for the first movement of its kind in South America. This was the start of something that was to grow very big indeed, and have links to the larger, international Global Justice Movement. Indeed, the coup and the Pinochet regime is somewhat of an icon for that movement, which has been so instrumental in pushing U.S. influence out of South America. But this is only a primer for us so far. We revisit the anti-neoliberal fire that was sparked in Chile in our conclusion chapter, where we discuss the future potential of social movements to affect international relations.

In conclusion, the Chilean case has confirmed our variables. Our first independent variable – that realism ignores the potential of social movements - “belongs” to chapter 1, and has not been tested here. But we have seen how U.S. actions and considerations toward Chile (and the continent at large) can be explained through realism’s assumptions of self interest, power balancing, strategic denial and power projection, and therefore confirms our independent variable 2, that American foreign policy has overwhelmingly been in line with – or been based upon – realism. We have seen how the successful 1983 - 1988 social movement reacted against those policies by trying to regain the democratic order that U.S. policies had been instrumental in taking away, thereby confirming our independent variable 3, that social movements often come as reactions to realist policies. U.S. policymakers underestimated the potential of the popular and political resistance in Chile as they planned for the future. Dependent variable 1 has therefore also been confirmed, albeit not as clearly as in our Iran case. Dependent variable 2 states that this lack of focus has had – and continues to have – large detrimental effects on American power and standing in the world in the long run. We have seen how the social movement thwarted the main goals of U.S. policy toward Chile, namely to retain political stability, project power and demonstrate credibility. The “continues to have” part of that variable will also be revisited in our conclusion chapter, as social movements reacting to U.S. policies toward South America are far from over. We have also tried to place the Chilean case in a regional context to tentatively demonstrate a larger pattern.
4. Emerging Pattern and Conclusion;
   - a hole that must be filled

There are several issues that need to be discussed in this final chapter. The main assertion of this thesis is that there is a hole in realism theory where social movements should be, and that such movements will punish realism behavior for this oversight on the international stage. Therefore, this chapter will focus more on the rising importance of social movements, their growing efficacy, their consequences and their rightful place in international relations.

But first, before any hard conclusions on that theme are drawn, the thesis needs to address some simplifications that have been made regarding realism behavior. These are simplifications that an attentive reader familiar with the theory may well have noticed. The discussions that follow are not directly aimed at the main point of the thesis – the blind spot and its consequences. But as any questions concerning these simplifications are aimed at the biggest and most difficult to prove of the variables that this thesis is based on, it is important to comment on them to show that they have been considered during the writing process. Among them are: Is realism theory prescriptive in addition to being descriptive? Are the policies discussed in this chapter mandated by realism? Could other forms of behavior in the cases also be called realism? We start with these issues in this chapter, not so much to resolve them as to make sure we have not missed important considerations. When these issues are dispensed with, the chapter can end with a more grounded conclusion. This discussion on realism behavior starts with a comparative look at how President Carter behaved with regard to our two cases.

**President Carter and the Bookends of Realism**

Some of the variables in this thesis are very broad. The broadest one is the second independent one. It states that American foreign policy has overwhelmingly been in line with – or been based upon – realism. This claim cannot be definitively resolved in a master’s thesis, as it spans a long history and a library of actions. Two cases of such behavior have been presented here, with one hinting at a regional pattern. That is hardly proof of a consistent, long-term and all encompassing pattern. But the comparative analysis that is undertaken here certainly points in the
direction of confirmation. It points to a pattern where any given policy is constrained by the
demands of realism, which functions as roadblocks to limit one’s options. Like bookends limiting
what range of intellectual ideas are available for practical use.

With the inauguration of Carter in 1977, the focus of the U.S. on human rights grew
considerably stronger. Much because of the revelations of the Church Committee, Carter’s
foreign policy outlook was on the ascendancy in the U.S. at the time, and he would use this
political zeitgeist to pressure several governments to follow his prescriptions. Simply put, he had
some newfound leeway to push for idealism in U.S. foreign policy. But as we saw in chapter 2,
his support for the Shah was strong and in line with previous administrations excepting for a brief
interlude of criticism at the start of his term. We considered that relationship in the case study
regarding Iran, but we need to comment more on Carter’s behavior toward the Pinochet regime,
which followed different paths. To what factors can we attribute these differences? The regional
attributes of our two cases are important keys to understanding this.

For President Carter, pressuring former right-wing allies was a balancing act. He
understood that changes would not be global and overnight, so he had to continue some of the
policies that he deplored. But he saw a change in policies as a more effective way of combating
communism, while at the same time aligning more with his ideals.250 The Carter administration
preferred to push for human rights in South America with what Roberta Cohen calls “quiet
diplomacy.”251 When this did not have the required effect, public statements were made in an
effort to hasten results. Carter criticized Pinochet – and other such dictators of the region – in
domestic political speeches and in speeches at institutions such as the Organization of American
States (OAS) and at the United Nations.

Diplomatic connections were changed; while leaders in exile and opposition activist
representatives were received at the highest levels of government, no head of a South American
military regime was ever invited to Washington during Carter’s term.252 These tactics of
diplomacy came in addition to the most important sanctions, which were of the financial kind.
Aid to Chile was almost entirely halted, especially after the Letellier murder in Washington in
1976. The Carter administration also voted against all loans from international institutions. Cohen
writes that as a result, “It has been estimated that Chile lost between $500 and $700 million in
World and Inter-American Bank loans between 1976 and 1980.”253
Some political results were achieved; from 1977, there was a drop in the number of human rights violations in Chile. Repressive policies were softened and some political prisoners were located and pardoned. The DINA was disbanded the same year, restrictions on political party activity was somewhat lifted and disappearances almost stopped. According to Schmitz, Pinochet “…ordered the release of over three hundred political prisoners, changed trial procedures for those held by the military, closed two detention centers, and promised future elections and a return to democratic government.” So in the case of Chile – and although he walked slowly - Carter held quite firm throughout his term on his focus on human rights. His success was limited, but he had at least demonstrated that the U.S. could put pressure on South American governments without losing them to the Soviet bloc. He also released the U.S. from complicity with Santiago’s actions and human rights record, although contacts with repressive regimes did increase at the end of his term, much due to Cold War dynamics elsewhere.

All these rhetorical and political actions stand in sharp contrast to Carter’s policies toward the Shah regime in Iran. As pressure was put on Pinochet and the economy of Chile, praise was lavished on the Shah, who was sold military equipment and given other kinds of aid until the end. It is in light of these differences that we must consider the regional aspects of our cases.

A remarkable consensus on the United States’ relation to South America, including Chile, was found in the literature that was researched for this thesis. Contrary to widespread opinion, South America is not described as important to the U.S. in its own right. As we have seen, its natural resources are described as of significance at times, but not crucially so. There were – despite the Cuban missile crisis – no significant power competitor based there. It was not strategically important for other regions than itself, geographically separated as it is from other continents. For these reasons, the writers used here consistently describe it as an area of economic and political experimentation and testing for the U.S. This analysis has been found in many fields of study and stretch over a considerable period of time. And as we are looking for a regional pattern, we need to expand our scope beyond the Carter administration itself. As it breaks with several widely held opinions, this may be seen as a controversial analysis to base a conclusion on. Therefore, we have to belabor the point to a certain extent, and beg patience of the reader.

Peter Kornbluh claims that “distant and small though it is, Chile has long been viewed universally as a demonstration area for economic and social experimentation.” He describes
how Chile became a designated “showcase” for President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress in 1964, where it was used to demonstrate how bolstering centrist, middle class parties would stave off far left violent revolutions.\textsuperscript{257} The new economic model employed in Chile after the coup has prompted many to point to a similar dynamic under the Nixon administration. Mark Falcoff writes that Chile “was discovered as the venue of a promising new experiment in free-market economics.”\textsuperscript{258} This followed a decades-long dispute about economic models in Western countries, where Keynesian economics won the debate after the Second World War. This outlook was the guiding theoretical influence on the New Deal, the creation of the international Bretton Woods institutions and a guide for rebuilding national economies after the destruction wrought by the war, exemplified most famously by Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{259} The competitor – the liberal, free-market models presented by economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago – was largely rejected. Naomi Klein spends much of her book \textit{The Shock Doctrine} to show how U.S. supporters of this framework were disappointed by the relatively progressive and centrist domestic economic policies of President Nixon. They were not able to put their economic theories into life in the West. Instead, they were able to put their theories to the test in Chile, which she calls “the first laboratory” of neo-liberalism.\textsuperscript{260} In the time immediately following the coup, Friedman kept in personal touch with his Chilean colleagues in the “Chicago Boys” group and with President Pinochet himself.\textsuperscript{261} In 1976, \textit{The New York Times} penned an article tellingly called “Chile, Lab Test for a Theorist,” pointing to this relationship:

\begin{quote}
It is not often that a leading economist with strong views is given a chance to test specific prescriptions for a very sick economy. It is even more unusual when the economist’s client happens to be a country other than his own.\textsuperscript{262}
\end{quote}

The experimental nature of U.S. policies under Presidents Kennedy and Nixon stayed the same with Carter. Roberta Cohen writes of Carter that he tested his new policies in South America, a continent in which there was not much chance of nations falling under the direct control of the Warsaw Pact. “The relative absence of strategic concerns” there made experimentation possible and not too risky.\textsuperscript{263} Lars Schoultz leans on the analysis of Howard J. Wiarda of the Wilson Center when he says that it was the lack of potential for a hot superpower war that made Carter test policies in South America that he would not dare test in Iran.\textsuperscript{264} David Schmitz refers to recommendations to President Carter from the State Department that the U.S. should select “a limited number of worst cases,” one or two in a region, to test its policies.\textsuperscript{265}
We can also note that the experiment-analysis continues with the President that followed Carter. Greg Grandin for example, builds that experiment analysis into a convincing book-length case in his *Empire’s Workshop*. He describes – among other things – how the Reagan administration used the proxy wars in Central America as “a dress rehearsal for the gathering forces of the new right”:

> Even as he acted with moderation in other areas of the world, Reagan could give the region to movement conservatives; the forces, the activists that brought him to power, with little fear of consequences.”

Because of the overwhelming consensus that was found on this issue during research, this thesis accepts the two main aspects of inter-American relations we have discussed; that South America is not very important to the U.S. in and of itself but rather as an area for power projection, and that the continent has been used for experimentation and for testing policies.

Both of these aspects are unthinkable in the case of Iran. First; as we saw in chapter 2, the importance of controlling oil supplies from Iran was of immense concern to Western powers at the time. The dangers of restrictions on exports and of setting an example of nationalization of resources were deeply alarming to the U.S. Second; other major powers, particularly the Soviet Union, were heavily involved in the area. There was an intense competition for influence in several nations such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and in Iran itself. Due to simple facts of geography, Iran also fell naturally inside a Soviet sphere of influence. We have already seen how John Mearsheimer argues that no power in the world can ever hope to be more than a regional hegemon. And the U.S., as influential as it has been in several countries in the area, has never been close to enjoying hegemonic status there. This has had limiting effects on political maneuverability.

This discussion of the Carter presidency with regards to our two cases speaks to the second independent variable of this thesis on the U.S. following realism principles, even though it does not prove it to be a generic rule without exception. What we can establish, though, is that even for an idealist like Carter, the concerns of realpolitik are hard to transcend. When he had the opportunity to press his idealism relatively hard without too high risks, he did so. The Pinochet regime was both rhetorically and economically pushed to change, and there was not much danger of serious blowback from the global power balancing perspective. But when faced with hard
realpolitik and limited space in which to move – as in Iran – he had no option but to choose the path of realism. He defended U.S. interests by supporting the Shah to a much larger degree than he did with the several South American, pro U.S. dictators in power at the time, regardless of the human rights record of the Shah regime. Simply put; when the bookends of realism stand further apart, more intellectual and political material is contained between them, and your range of idealist options is wider. With regard to Chile, the shelf of options was wider than with regard to Iran. This comparison, then, is a reflection on how realism limits the flexibility of idealism in U.S. foreign policy history, and is partly meant to remedy the hubristic nature of the variable under discussion. In cases such as these, idealistic and principled policies are only followed when they are in convergence with realism principles of self-interest.

The realism texts used here are replete with similar U.S. examples of convergence and of power politics hidden in liberal language. The Marshall Aid program following World War II is one such example. In this case, many European states, along with Japan, were given aid to rebuild after the Second World War. That program is often described as altruistic, but it was also built to provide the U.S. and her allies with strong nations as a bulwark against Soviet aggression from the East. Would all that money have been spent if it had no positive effects for the U.S.? We will never know, but a realist would probably say no. The creation of international institutions of law and finance are seen in the same way by all realists referred to here. According to E. H. Carr, President Wilson simply shifted his language and phraseology to suit the policy he was interested in when he tried to launch the League of Nations. Erecting supranational institutions of international law to keep the peace, says Carr, is a method the strong use to deny the competition of the weak. To him, it simply is a “transparent disguises of selfish vested interest.” Law is to Carr as it was to Hobbes; a command: *Ius est quod iussum set.* “That is right which was commanded.” To Carr, therefore, the whole Wilson persona was one of “high-sounding moral rhetoric” based on “…little more than an idealistic fig-leaf masking America’s ambition of extending its own influence at the expense of others.”

John Mearsheimer leaves no doubt as to what his opinion is of those who are “fooled” by political jargon; politicians tend to keep their policies “couched in the language of liberalism.”
Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. In essence, a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{269}

To Mearsheimer: “It should be obvious to intelligent observers that the United States speaks one way and acts another.”\textsuperscript{270} This political doublespeak is truly a recurring theme in realist writings. Such convergence has also been mentioned with regards to Carter’s human rights focus. One document from his term, *Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28: Human Rights*, states that the new human rights focus in South America was not only one of morals and altruism. According to the memorandum, it was also “based on national interest as well as our moral tradition and legal obligation.”\textsuperscript{271}

It is very hard indeed, in the history of international relations, to find a political action that cannot in some way be pressed into the explanatory framework of realism. The test of whether any act is realist or not could be if the good of the whole or of some other nations is simply put before the good of one self. As Carr says: The “ethical harmony” is one achieved by the sacrifice of interest, which is necessary precisely because no natural harmony of interests exists, especially with regard to the zero-sum nature of power distribution.\textsuperscript{272} What we are looking for then, in assessing whether or not a politician fits the realist mold, are actions taken that are detrimental to the self in order to serve the good of others. And as what is good for the whole is often good for one self, such actions are very hard to find.

**Further Questions on Realism Behavior**

Again; this thesis argues that a hole in realism theory leads to disadvantageous effects for the U.S. over the long run. For this to be true, realism theory has to have some assertive influence on actual, real world U.S. foreign policy decisions. Any reader of this thesis may claim that the convergence between real world policy actions in the cases presented and the theoretical framework of realism are mere coincidences. Simply put; if the policies that have been discussed are indeed in line with realism, is that because realism theory is prescriptively influential in addition to being descriptive? This discussion also addresses the duality of the second variable – that U.S. foreign policy behavior has been in line with *or* based upon realism. We have already seen in the introductory remarks how Donald Snow claims that the theory is “central to the
operation of the international system and American attitudes towards the world,” and a “practical
guide for political leaders.”273 But there are differing views on the subject, and three different
options present themselves:

Alternative A: Realism theory is simply formed to explain what has already happened,
and is therefore purely descriptive. Commenting on the prevalent outlook of his time, E. H. Carr
writes that “It has become a commonplace to say that theories do not mold the course of events,
but are invented to explain them.”274 For this to be true, realism theory should have no impact on
the minds of all the numerous U.S. policymakers that have studied issues in international
relations. But Carr wrote at the very start of international relations studies, in a situation where
these theories had had little time to affect political thinking in a systematic way. And a theory
needs time and testing to be applicable as a tool for policy planners. Which brings us to the next
alternative.

Alternative B: Realism theory is prescriptive and informs policy actions. If a politician is
convinced that the world works according to realist assumptions, and that this view is informed
by the theory itself, then that politician is likely to react and plan accordingly. Using theories that
are formed on the basis of history is like learning from history itself, and which policy planner
would argue that this is not a prudent idea? And seeing that realism has been a dominant
descriptive theory of international relations for decades, claiming that policymakers do not take
ideas from it seems far-fetched in the extreme, unless they are in open opposition to it.
Mearsheimer, using President Clinton’s relying on a liberal theory of international affairs as an
example, is adamant that theory directly influences political decisions. To him, the liberal
theoretical outlook shaped Clinton’s foreign policy. Where some see theory as belonging only to
academics, he claims that this view is wrongheaded:

Indeed, all students and practitioners of international politics rely on theories to
comprehend their surroundings. Some are aware of it and some are not, some admit it
and some do not; but there is no escaping the fact that we could not make sense of the
world around us without simplifying theories.275

On this alternative, the prevalence and longevity of realism and its outlook must to some
degree affect policy makers regardless of stated preferences, even if it should be on a
subconscious level. Its proponents are among the most lauded thinkers in intellectual history, and
the framework is known to all those who study international relations. It is a meme with
considerable pedigree. And as philosopher Daniell Dennett says; any powerful meme filters down to your thinking. The texts of Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Morgenthau and other famous realists would in his description be “bedrocks” and “fixed points” in most discussions on international relations. The “thinking tool” that is realism would be an “intuition pump.” Through general discourse and studying, it would be an “app downloaded to our necktops,” influencing any President whether he or she likes it or not.

Alternative C: As Richard Betts says; It is a little of both. This is a view that comes up again and again in discussions of realism. The aforementioned Dr. Chenoweth, when directly asked the question of how much the theory in itself affects policy, had this to say:

I think quite a lot. I think like it or not, the basic assumptions that realism makes about the things that motivate great power politics are either internalized by political elites, or they actually pretty well describe how those political elites actually do behave in given conditions. And so, I think in general that realism has had a pretty big impact on the way people think about how the world works…….So in that sense I think that I’m on the fence as to whether this is descriptive as a theory or whether it’s prescriptive as a theory.

This thesis has been written on the assumption that alternatives B and C are more correct than alternative A, and the view here is basically in line with Dr. Chenoweth’s analysis. Any meaningful argument for alternative A has certainly not been found during the research for it.

This leads to the last question of this part of the chapter; if realism is also prescriptive, then exactly what does it prescribe? Again, any reader may point to other directions that could have been used under the umbrella of realist policies. Therefore we have to ask; does it mandate the set of policies that have been under discussion here? The answer to this question is clearly “no”. Realism is an overall theoretical framework, not a policy cookbook, and ethical and moral considerations can be implemented into its framework. These issues were discussed in the first chapter, where amorality and aggressiveness as policy prescriptions were qualified. Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman argue for a shift in U.S. foreign policy in their book Ethical Realism. Realist policies should, they assert, be built around “prudence, patriotism, responsibility, study, humility and a decent respect for the views and interests of other nations,” as opposed to the kind of realism that is “cynical, indifferent to the long-term interests of humanity and attracted to ruthlessness for its own sake.” True, the book is first and foremost a reaction to the neo-

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xxix The verbatim question was: How much do you think the theory has translated into actual policy decisions and policy actions?
conservative policies of the Bush-era, usually not called realism. But the authors nevertheless attempt to soften the most aggressive and brutal aspects of realism as it is often interpreted - not first and foremost because this is ethical, but because it is in America’s own self-interest. “Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear,” they quote Edmund Burke as saying. And mirroring one of the basic claims of this thesis – that the kind of behavior displayed on these pages is short-term in the extreme – they conclude that classical, Kissinger-type realism lacks any sense of long-term goals. The framework they describe would probably not lead an American president to act in the ways described here, but rather to seek cooperation.

For example; an American realist President could easily have come to the conclusion that it would be in his or her best self-interest to cooperate with the Mossadeq government for long-term gain. A President could have calculated that the risk of losing direct control over Iranian petroleum resources was a chance worth taking to not antagonize that state, and to show other states in the region that his nation can be trusted to not act in an aggressive manner. He could use power or the threat of it to try to keep the Soviet Union out of Iran in other ways. He could also have decided to help South American nations build democratic institutions and bank on the possibility that this would have led to friendly relations, instead of supporting authoritarian regimes to keep stability. And that this would help build steadfast partnerships in a world of power balancing that would free up his military and economic resources for actions elsewhere. We have seen how one policymaker said that supporting democracy in Chile and the rest of South America was also in self-interest. Could bare realism have been a guide in this direction? Yes, it could have. The policy of détente – planned and executed by realists – is an example of this. Note, though, that the suggestions from Lieven and Hulsman are all suggestions of convergence, not “anti-realism”.

So the point of this thesis is not to say that the actions taken in our cases are mandated by realism, or that realism provided no alternative. It is simply stating that the actions taken are well within the borders of what realism behavior often looks like. That U.S. behavior regarding Iran and Chile followed the basic assumptions of the theory. It is also to say that the actions taken cannot be better explained by any rival theory of international relations.
The Future of Social Movements in International Affairs

After this necessary theoretical detour, we are back to the core theme of the thesis. We need to take a look at the role played by social movements in the contemporary period and the present. For this thesis to have any real world relevance – and for an idea like this to be able to affect how realism theory is seen from a U.S. perspective – social movements must be shown to have large and systemic impacts on U.S. relations to other states stretching far beyond the two cases that we have focused on. Preferably, they must also be shown to be growing in importance over time. Luckily, the empirical record on this is clear and unambiguous.

To measure the efficacy of non-violent movements as compared to violent ones, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan use 323 such movements occurring between 1900 and 2006 in their study of the subject. This work measures the difference in success rates between violent and nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, and presents explanations for why the latter is more effective than the former. In the field of social movements studies it is generally considered a revelation, and it has taken that academic milieu by storm as it presents the first rigorous quantitative study of its size. Point 6 in our list of defining features of social movements states that they are "overwhelmingly nonviolent," (which excludes the "violent" category of the following three charts). Both our cases have conformed to that definition. The same goes for the other movements we have and will comment on in this thesis. In this thesis, therefore, these charts are only used to show numbers of instances and of efficacy of the nonviolent category. In illustration 1.1, the only relevant category for our purposes is therefore the “nonviolent” one, which is the one where the number of instances has grown the most. And the rise that Chenoweth and Stephan find in the number of such movements is significant. From basically zero at the start of the last century, instances peaked at 30 at the end of the 1980s before it dropped off slightly. Note that this record stops before the economic crash of 2008 and the many social movements that have arisen in the Arab Spring.

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xxx It is important to note that the movements they used were of the big and difficult kind, meaning struggles to secede from states and topple dictatorial and authoritarian governments. There are no cases of demonstrations to, for instance, improve working conditions and/or raise wages or other more mundane matters of domestic politics in their dataset.

xxxi It has won its authors, among other acclimates, the International Studies Association’s Karl Deutsch Award, the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving world Order, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award, and landed one of its authors, Dr. Chenoweth, on the Foreign Policy Magazines 100 Global Thinkers list.
Illustration 1: Frequency of nonviolent and violent campaigns by their end years


Not only is the rise in the number of such movements very considerable, but as illustrations 2 and 3 show, their rate of success is also rising. As in all human endeavors, people learn from past experience with regards to which tactics work and which do not. The literature on tactics and strategy is growing, and the opportunities for spreading that literature has exploded along with communication technology. As an example, large numbers of both Farsi and Arabic versions of a 60-year-old cartoon booklet on the Montgomery Bus Boycott was found on Tahrir Square in Cairo during the anti-Mubarak uprising there. And serious academic works by authors like Gene Sharp - whose literature on nonviolent civil disobedience and the effects it inspired during the Arab Spring earned him a shared first spot on the 2011 *Foreign Policy Magazine’s Top 100 Global Thinkers* - is spread all over the world. Groups researching social movements, such as the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) in the U.S. and the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) that was established by activists who overthrew the Milosevic regime in Serbia, disseminate knowledge to active and would-be activists across borders. In many universities, courses on these issues are being implemented. As a result, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the efficacy of such

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xxxii This author has personal knowledge of two people who were denied entry into Iran because they carried copies of Sharp’s books in their luggage.
movements will lower in the future. Unless, of course, repressive states also take knowledge from lessons that have been learned.

**Illustration 2: Number of nonviolent campaigns and percentage of their success, 1940-2006.**

![Graph](image)


**Illustration 3: Success rate of nonviolent campaigns by decade, 1940-2006.**

![Graph](image)

These are not state-against-state movements, and can therefore not be compared to wars. But the difference in success rate between nonviolent and violent campaigns should also prompt some rethinking of power as it is often defined. U.S. support for dictatorial regimes, especially the financial part of that support, is very often geared toward military aid. In both our cases, sales of weaponry and riot equipment to the regimes in power were a crucial part of the relationship. Arming violent insurgencies has also been done on many occasions, such as in Nicaragua with the Contras. But these numbers might be taken as a reason to redirect financial support in the future, and concentrate it more on the potential power of civil society instead of the traditional power structures. Instead of financing political elites and military leaders, financing civic society groups might be the new norm of political intervention if policymakers take these numbers seriously.

True, large social movements based in civil society are not very conducive to manipulation from abroad. Financing readily definable and traditional power structures is much easier. Some assertions can be found that the U.S. has been behind large-scale nonviolent revolutions, especially the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe. These charges are also made regarding the Euromaidan movement that overthrew the Yanukovich government in Ukraine and prompted the East/West crisis we are now witnessing. But no well-documented case of this has ever been established. The general agreement among scholars of such movements is that they can be supported from abroad - which often entails financial aid - but they cannot be started or controlled from abroad. The U.S. does funnel considerable amounts of money through sources such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) into politically active organizations in politically important nations like Ukraine. According to its own website, NED gives financial support in the range of 2.8 million U.S.D annually to different Ukrainian NGOs. But for 800 000 people to mass on Maidan Square in Kiev over a period of months takes real domestic

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As Hans Morgenthau is often said to be the first to set realism theory on an academically precise footing, and as we have so far not attempted to define power, using his definition of it seems proper. On page 33 of *Politics Among Nations*, he writes that: “When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men. ……Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. …..It may be exerted through orders, threats, the authority or charisma of a man or of an office, or a combination of any of these. …..Political power must be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence. The threat of physical violence in the form of police action, imprisonment, capital punishment, or war is an intrinsic element of politics. When violence becomes an actuality, it signifies the abolition of political power in favor of military or pseudomilitary power”. One would be hard pressed to fit the idea of people power into this definition.
grievances that the U.S. simply cannot conjure up. Professor Stephen Zunes speaks frankly about this in an article in *Foreign Policy in Focus*:

> While the United States has had significant impact (mostly negative in my view) in a lot of places, we are not omnipotent. There are real limits to American power, whether for good or for ill. Not everything is our responsibility. This is certainly the case with Ukraine.²⁸⁶

> The assertion that inevitably follows is that it might be near impossible to control or finance large-scale civil uprisings from abroad. But the least one could do is to not spark them against one’s own interests.

> The numbers presented here should be enough to incorporate social movements into one’s foreign policy plans and contingencies. But they are generic numbers, and not specific to movements influencing the U.S. So in the interest of establishing a pattern specific to this thesis, we can quickly mention a few cases that are directly relevant to us and that have directly impacted on the international relations situation of the U.S., starting with South America.

> Venezuela is a good place to start. The colorful former President Hugo Chavez has left an enormous mark on South American politics since his inauguration in 1999. A social movement did not give him the presidency. He was a former army commander who was elected by normal democratic principles. But a social movement did save his political life and helped spread the influence of his policies to the rest of the region. In 2002, a coup was successfully implemented against this leftist leader. True to form, the U.S. was quick to excuse the new right wing government, claiming that the military coup resulted from "undemocratic actions committed or encouraged by the Chavez administration".²⁸⁷ There are also suggestions that U.S. officials knew of the coup beforehand.²⁸⁸ But in response to the news of the coup, hundreds of thousands of people flooded into Caracas and surrounded the Miraflores Palace where the coup plotters resided. Within two days, Chavez was reinstituted.²⁸⁹ Eirik Wold, Venezuela-expert and unlicensed biographer of Hugo Chavez, describes this as the first time a leftist, anti-U.S. leader of Chavez’ format has politically survived a right wing, U.S.-backed coup,²⁹⁰ marking an important change in intern-American relations. Venezuela continues to be a thorn in the eye of the U.S, challenging its policies in the United Nations and actively supporting some of its antagonists, such as Cuba and Iran.

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In Bolivia, social movements have at least twice this century thrown off U.S.-backed military governments (1977 and 1982)\textsuperscript{291} and once stopped a military coup (in 1979). The present President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, is the direct result of domestic social movements.\textsuperscript{292} These movements have been a mix of indigenous rights movements and those reacting to neo-liberal economic policies imposed by the U.S. and international financial institutions. The Bolivian Water War is stuff of legend for the so-called International Global Justice Movements. In Cochabamba, Bolivia’s second largest city, the distribution and control of water resources was privatized and sold to U.S. company Bechtel. The resulting rise in water prizes and problems with availability for the poor – among other things, the contract stipulated that it would no longer be legal to gather rainwater on rooftops- sparked a successful movement that cost Bechtel its contract and strongly diminished U.S. influence on the economic regime of Bolivia.\textsuperscript{293} The Morales government is now one of those most critical of U.S. foreign policy on the continent.

In Ecuador, the government of President Raphael Correa was also brought to power as a result of a social movement. This president has given us one of the clearest examples of the new climate in U.S./South American relations and how pertinent this change is to the classical considerations of power in realism. When asked during a trip to Italy why he wanted U.S. personnel out of a military base in Manta in Ecuador, Correa replied that “We'll renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami -- an Ecuadorian base, … If there's no problem having foreign soldiers on a country's soil, surely they'll let us have an Ecuadorian base in the United States.”\textsuperscript{294} While it is true that former Ecuadorian military junta leader and friend of the U.S., Alfredo Ernesto Poveda Burbano, moved to Florida after withdrawing from political life in Ecuador, this is probably not what Morales had in mind when he jokingly suggested a military base there. The fact that whistleblower Julian Assange resides in the Ecuadorian embassy in London also does little to soften U.S./Ecuador relations.

Brazil is by a wide margin the biggest economy in South America. This state has, according to former World Bank economist Raj Patel, been heavily involved in halting international economic policies pushed by the U.S. through international institutions.\textsuperscript{295} Former President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, who was instrumental in staking out an independent economic course for Brazil, has been seen by many as a powerful champion for developing countries throughout the world. It is hard to quantify exactly how much credit should be given to
social movements for his rise to power. But when asked directly about this, two of the academic South America experts interviewed for this thesis, Benedicte Bull and Eirik Wold, agreed that it is hard to imagine him in office without the backing of powerful social movements. Some of these Brazilian movements also took inspiration from the political survival of President Chavez in Venezuela, displaying a region wide effect of political contagion.

The collective effects of these and other domestic movements are absolutely key in understanding the diminishing U.S. influence in South America. Several more could have been added to this list, but this representative selection will have to do for this thesis. As for examples of these effects, troublesome Venezuela provides a clear one. In March 2014, the Organization of American States (OAS) was asked by President Obama’s administration to vote on a resolution for intervention in Venezuela because of social unrest there. The result was telling. 29 of 32 voters – the U.S., Canada and Panama voted in the affirmative – not only rejected the proposal, but wrote a new declaration rejecting foreign intervention and expressing its “…appreciation, full support, and encouragement for the initiatives and the efforts of the democratically-elected Government of Venezuela” and calling for a peaceful settlement. Furthermore, the text proclaim that “the United States cannot support this declaration because … it does not adequately reflect this Organization's commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in the hemisphere.”

Many on the left have traditionally seen the Washington-based OAS as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S. is still providing 40% of the funding for it. But the U.S. now suffers from “diplomatic isolation” in the organization. Without apparent irony, and without taking in the new relative disinterest felt for U.S. political demands on the continent, Republican representative from Florida Ileana Ros-Lehtinen complained that there was now a danger that the organization could “self-destruct into irrelevance.”

The Middle East has been through a period of social movement unrest not seen before in modern history. Many of these movements can be directly linked to the foreign policy of the U.S. as they have often reacted to governments backed by her in a similar fashion and for similar reasons as in our two cases. Egypt is the prime example of this. For decades, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, only beaten by Israel. President Mubarak has been a stable partner of the U.S. since his inauguration. This followed the Presidency of Anwar Sadat which, after a decades long power competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for
influence in Egypt, ended with him turning to the U.S. as his Cold War ally. And again, the movement that overthrew the authoritarian Mubarak regime came as a surprise. We were all witnesses to the Obama White House flailing for foothold during the so called Tahrir Square uprising, not knowing which horse to bet on, changing its messages as events unfolded. As the fall of Mubarak became more and more probable, the White House slowly shifted its rhetorical support toward the protest movement. There was clearly no pre-written plan to tackle this contingency. Meanwhile, some academics focusing on social movements had been alerted to the possibility of such an uprising since labor unrest flared in several smaller Egyptian cities in 2008, for which the now-famous April 6th Youth Movement in Egypt is named. Professor Stephen Zunes, who is used on several occasions in this thesis, saw civil society groups and protests grow in number, and wrote in late 2010 that: “Indeed, Egypt could very well be where the next unarmed popular pro-democracy insurrection takes place of the kind that brought down Marcos in the Philippines, Milosevic in Serbia, and scores of other autocratic regimes in recent decades.”

Among the many other Middle Eastern nations who have experienced similar events in the past few years - Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, the botched nonviolent campaign in Syria and the one now growing in Jordan - Bahrain is of particular interest to us. Hosting the 5th U.S. Navy fleet, this small piece of land is of high strategic significance to the military reach of the U.S. As U.S. (and European) policymakers saw that the fall of Mubarak grew more and more plausible, support was eventually extended to the Tahrir protesters. This did not happen in Bahrain. As that movement grew it was not given the same level of attention, and support for it was almost non-existent. The U.S.’s most important ally in the region, Saudi Arabia, sent in tanks and armed military personnel to assist the Bahraini government in quelling the uprising without serious reaction from the White House save some rhetorical condemnations. Again, realist considerations seem to have carried the day. It is nearly impossible to judge where the Arab Spring movements will end and in which direction these nations will go. But there is no doubt that the U.S. now, again, finds itself reacting to events it did not plan for because of social movements that it did not foresee.

The traditional U.S. support for dictators in this region also leads to understandable antagonism from citizens. Yemenite Nobel Peace Prize winner and Arab Spring organizer
Tawakkul Karman echoes these feelings in a speech at the Brecht Forum in New York, where she says that the U.S. has “transitioned from being the leader of the free world to a watch dog for tyrant regimes.” And after years of supporting and financing dictatorial rulers in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and several other countries, how could it be otherwise? And why should American opinions be heeded after such a history? The Independent’s experienced Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk – in a piece named Who cares in the Middle East what Obama says? - summarizes the feeling of many Egyptians who saw President Obama not putting his full support behind the pro-democracy uprising until the result was all but given:

Obama’s failure to support the Arab revolutions until they were all but over, lost the U.S. most of its surviving credit in the region. Obama was silent on the overthrow of Ben Ali, only joined in the chorus of contempt for Mubarak two days before his flight, condemned the Syrian regime – which has killed more of its people than any other dynasty in this Arab "spring,” save for the frightful Gaddafi – but makes it clear that he would be happy to see Assad survive, waves his puny fist at puny Bahrain's cruelty and remains absolutely, stunningly silent over Saudi Arabia.302

These movements have all been domestic in nature. But not all social movements are, and there is a growing network of communications being built for many different causes. Many of these have fought U.S. policies. The four South American national movements mentioned in this chapter were all connected by their common opposition to the neo-liberal economic framework we visited in our chapter on Chile. And as Professor Stephen Zunes writes:

While most of Latin America is now under democratic governance, the rise of neo-liberal economics and structural adjustment programs imposed by international economic institutions has created a crisis for the poor, working-class, indigenous peoples and some sectors of the middle class. This has led to the growth of hundreds of grassroots nonviolent campaigns for economic justice.303

These grassroots campaigns have strong international ties. And they have clear motivations and critiques to put forward. This thesis will not try to defend or lambast these motivations, just explain them, as their outlook on these economic systems differ from those of most politicians. Where politicians (and many academics) discuss economic models concerning developing nations as failures or successes, the participants in the Global Justice Movement mostly see neo-liberal policies as mechanisms for purposefully enriching developed nations such as the U.S. They suspect that rich countries have administered and distributed a large part of their development assistance in accordance with their own political, financial and national security priorities.304 The most academically lauded writer that is often referred to in these
movements is probably two-time Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz. As a former chief economist for the World Bank, he has had an inside view of the workings of the international institutions who have been proponents of the Washington Consensus. When his book *Globalization and its Discontents* was published in 2002, he was the first high-ranking voice from within the system to criticize the Consensus so strictly. Many of his statements and views fit the Global Justice Movement’s views as he explains why growth in South America under these new policies have been so dismal:

U.S. trade representatives… when we send them off to Geneva, we don’t say come back with a fair trade agreement. If he did that, he would be fired. We say, come back with the best agreement for America, and what we really mean is; come back with the best agreement for those who are giving large campaign contributions.  

Stiglitz describes a process of globalization based on neo-liberal policies that political leaders of developing countries have not been able to stop. But with the concerted efforts of numerous social movements, especially with synchronized events during the anti-WTO riots in Seattle in 1999, this changed:

…until the protestors came along there was little hope for change and no outlets for complaints. …it is the trade unionists, students, environmentalists – ordinary citizens – marching in the streets of Prague, Seattle, Washington and Genoa who have put the need for reform on the agenda of the developed world.  

With these riots, the ongoing round of trade talks referred to as the Uruguay Round stopped, and they have not been advanced on their old foundations again. As in Chile, it was social movements who gave political elites in developing countries in South America the leverage to halt economic policies pushed by the U.S. and her Western partners. The focus of this global conflict has been very attuned to the South American situation. It is not an accident that most of the World Social Forums - an umbrella event for the diverse organizations in the Global Justice Movement - have been held in Porto Allegre in Brazil. Claiming that these protests are a reaction to realism policies would take considerable intellectual contortion, as they are in opposing neo-liberal economics. It could off course be argued that these policies are also pushed by Western nations in self-interest, but that would take us on unnecessary tangents. It could also be argued that they are struggles against powerful international institutions set up to protect powerful states, as all realists used here claim in the first chapter of the thesis. But they are
mentioned here mostly as an example of the newfound strength of social movements to change policies that political leaders were not able to change on their own.

**Conclusions on the Basics and Needed Changes to Theory**

This thesis set out to check a number of variables. The first one of these – that the basic assumptions and texts of realism ignore the potential power of social movements – was tackled in the first chapter. There we saw how some of the most important texts of the American realist tradition – and some of the classical ones preceding them - almost totally ignored the potential of social movements to affect international relations. Some scholars mentioned the subject only in passing, some ignored it totally, while others mentioned it only as something that has no potential to affect international politics at all. We even saw one of the classical realists deny the right of the people to change their government once such a government, the Leviathan, was established. That variable is strongly confirmed.

The second independent and most difficult to establish variable – that American foreign policy has overwhelmingly been in line with – or been based upon – realism – is a thread throughout the thesis. Needless to say, the realists that are featured in the thesis would strongly concur with this variable. And the thesis is written on the basis that realism is the best of the explanatory theories on international relations available to us. The two case studies that are used also confirm this behavior. In both cases self-interest, power balancing, power projection and an amoral understanding of politics are displayed - in line with the most important assumptions of realism. The comparative discussion on the cases also points in the direction that realism limits other policy directions that any given U.S. President can follow. All these facts and considerations are in line with the variable. But establishing the variable as an ironclad and overarching rule would be a Herculean task - one that the most esteemed academics in the field have not been able to accomplish. The realists used here have tried, but their theory is by no means accepted by all, even though it clearly is the most influential of the theories at hand. But for the purposes of this Master’s thesis, we can safely consider the variable confirmed within the scope that is discussed and evaluated.
Both of the cases that have been considered are in line with the third independent variable – that social movements often come as reactions to realist policies. Social movements are a very elusive phenomenon. There is no limit to what they can react against or try to achieve. There are many sociological theories developed to explain and describe them. But this thesis’ author has not come across one that describes them all adequately. The writing of Charles Kurzman on the Iranian Revolution is illustrative. This revolution is not particularly strange, extreme or difficult to describe in empirical language. But Kurzman tries to place it within 8 different sociological theories, and all of them fail as explanatory frameworks. Resource mobilization theory, relative deprivation theory, political opportunity theory, collective behavior theory, in addition to frameworks created by for example de Tocqueville and Crane Brinton, are just some of the theories Kurzman brings to his discussion. And none of them, to his mind, explains this revolution fully. This is the reason why the variable contains the word often. But as a part of this set of variables, constructed to test an overall hypothesis, it has been confirmed.

The first dependent variable says that as a result, the diverse wills of populations and the different actions that populations take have not been a factor in foreign policy planning, which means that social movements more often than not come as surprises. For this variable to be confirmed, there has to be foreign policy behavior that does not consider popular will as an important enough factor that it should be followed, even though it does not conform to the short-term interests of your own state. Both the cases used here display such behavior. In both cases, the democratic will of populations, as demonstrated through free and fair elections, was flouted by U.S. policymakers. In Iran, a Revolution to overthrow the Shah was not seen as possible until it was too late. In Chile, the potential for such a revolution was clearly underestimated. This confirms this variable. But many other cases can be mentioned to strengthen this confirmation considerably. The Arab spring has just rattled a collective Western policy community that was taken completely by surprise. But the most famous example of shock factor must be the fall of the Berlin Wall. Describing that event as a result of social movements would take a thesis in itself, as many scholars would not agree with the description. It is not surprising that scholars of international relations and international policymakers who neglect to plan for social movements also neglect to consider them in their post hoc explanations. But it is this author’s assertion that the Solidarity movement in Poland, the weekly hundreds-of-thousands-strong Leipzig marches, the singing revolution of Estonia and numerous other such campaigns along with the untenable
communist economic model were far more instrumental in bringing down the Soviet Russian empire than Ronald Reagan or any other U.S. president ever was.

The last dependent variable, that this lack of focus has had – and continues to have – large detrimental effects on American power and standing in the world in the long run, is also confirmed. Two cases of this have been used here, and many more mentioned. The change in U.S. relations to South America and the present flux in which the U.S./Middle East relations finds itself is enough to strongly confirm this variable. The missing progress of trade talks and other aspects of the Washington Consensus is another example. We cannot possibly list all the social movements that are, at this very minute, working against U.S. interests as the U.S. state defines them, and there is no telling where the next ones will appear. But their effects have definitely been felt.

We have seen how John Mearsheimer rightly claims that in the international system, there is no 911 for states to call. There is nobody on the other end. Realists in general would agree with him on this point. But the black population of South Africa called 911, and they were answered by a large international social movement that helped them in their successful struggle against Apartheid - contrary to official American foreign policy actions such as President Reagan’s veto on sanctions against the South African government. The people of underdeveloped countries in South America called 911 on economic issues, and they were answered by the Global Justice Movement, who helped them halt the further implementation of neo-liberal economic policies on their continent by actions such as the 1991 Seattle riots. Against American economic interests. The people of Palestine is now calling 911 with their calls for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israeli occupation. And their call is answered by a fast growing international action in response - against American foreign policy wishes. Peoples have developed a growingly successful 911-system, and the efficacy of that system is improving. And seeing its history of successes, it seems negligent not to heed it.

The U.S. is probably the power that has most been the target of social movements, domestic and international. If that is indeed the case, it would not be surprising, seeing how ubiquitous the nation has been in international affairs. It was a long time ago that Henry Cabot Lodge could state that the U.S. had “a record of conquest, colonization and territorial expansion unequaled by any nation,” and that statement would not be less true after the 21st century. But
the U.S. is not the only state that has felt the impact of such movements. China, Russia, France, Great Britain and most other significant powers have - at one time or another – been confronted by movements that affected their foreign policies. Some of them are contending with this issue right now. Ukraine is merely the last example of how large impacts social movements can have and what they can trigger. A good case could even be made that a social movement/revolution is what prompted the first steps that the U.S. made outside its own borders once the North American continent had been consolidated. A riot on Cuba against the Spanish state was a crucial part of U.S. politicians’ justification for invading that island. A coveted resource was suddenly available through a pretext of helping a rebellious population against tyranny and imperialism.

Does any of this mandate a change in realism theory? Realist scholar Dr. Steven Lobell told this author that there are several issues that realism theory does not cover. Global warming, pandemics and terrorism were mentioned as some. A theory cannot cover everything, he said. And this thesis does not object to that statement. But social movements, when thoughtfully placed in history and given their rightful place as a force of change, cannot be one of those missing issues anymore. They are now a structural modifier of such importance that they have to be included in any theory that seeks to describe international relations, or to give a sound footing on which to stand while planning one’s foreign policy. According to graph 1.1, which showed a large growth in the number of social movements in the past century, it is entirely understandable that realists from the first half of this century did not place much importance in these movements. The empirical data simply was not there, even though the basic intellectual framework of protest and civil disobedience had been in place for centuries. But that has changed. Leaving their potential out of one’s planning should be inexcusable by now. To quote Dr. Chenoweth again:

> It behooves scholars, policy makers, resistance leaders, and the media to increase their understanding of how, when and why nonviolent campaigns [the tactics of most social movements] achieve goals that have eluded armed fighters for decades.\(^\text{309}\)

What might a redirection of such a powerful theory lead to? In the first place, it would tell policymakers to respect the wishes of other nation’s populations to a larger degree. Depending on systems and partners that repress foreign populations might be beneficial in the short term. But from the perspective of this thesis, it is costly in the long term. We saw in the second chapter how Morgenthau claimed that “The public mind” is willing to “sacrifice tomorrow’s real benefits for today’s apparent advantage.”\(^\text{310}\) This thesis strongly claims that, if true, the public mind is
certainly not alone in this error. China is described by John Mearsheimer as “a realist country par excellence.” But how would China manage its future growth if it respected the argument presented here? Would it regret its support of the authoritarian regime in Sudan, where social movements are now on the rise? Would it regret its decision to display an opportunistic policy by sending arms to Mohammar Kaddafi right before he was toppled? Would the U.S. not respect the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain more if it considered the possibility of its future success? Would it reconsider its behavior regarding the 2009 coup in Honduras? Would these reconsiderations not have potential positive effects on the potential for conflict in the future. This is hard to say, but it should at least be given its due consideration within the theoretical framework of realism.

Social movements are, off course, getting more attention in some quarters. Lieven and Hulsman applaud the neoconservatives under Bush for the realization that “The internal nature of foreign countries matters as never before to American security.” And as the most important ideological struggles are happening within countries, they rightly claim that it is important to show that the US is not intrinsically hostile to them. Henrik Thune is a senior researcher for the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute. When interviewed on this subject, he clearly stated that what has happened in the Middle East as a consequence of the Arab Spring should lead to a rethinking of how the U.S. has acted toward that region, and that this wave of social movements comes with “a historical foreign policy cost” to the West. For from playing the “political elite game” that has been played until now, this new situation commands that the old “manipulative, strategic, chess-like, Kissinger-oriented way of being a realist” is in “dire need of renovation”. “Something fundamental has happened that we do not yet understand. But the calculations that Western powers make need to be changed,” he claims.

And social movement activists can no longer be seen as the David to a state’s Goliath. Or as R. B. J. Walkers said in the second chapter, as “mosquitoes on the evening breeze.” That view of activists as naïve has to be remedied. As Gene Sharp says, “I think that claim of naiveté has been broken through quite a bit by the events of this last year [the Arab Spring]. If it hasn’t, there is a real problem.” Radical intellectual and experienced protester Noam Chomsky relays in an interview to this author that social movements activists are becoming more and more accepted. With the Vietnam War, it took years for protests to grow, he says. With regard to Iraq, they
started even before the war started, and they were far bigger in size.\textsuperscript{316} A lengthy portion of the interview concerning this theme is provided as appendix 4.

More research is absolutely needed to test the claims in this thesis further, as the consequences of such a “renovation” could be substantial. To stay relevant in the future, realism needs to catch up with these epiphanies. Because we can clearly see how social movements have affected U.S. foreign policy from start to finish. From its own birth, with a decade of nonviolent actions preceding its violent revolutionary campaign against the world’s most powerful empire. Through the first steps it took outside its own borders, ostensibly to support an uprising against Spain in the Caribbean. Through internal movements challenging its own adventurous foreign policies in Vietnam to great effect. Through its battles with the numerous such movements in its own “backyard” that has resulted in the diminishing influence it asserts in that region. Through rebellious assertions of national independence in the Middle East and Asia that has challenged its resource needs. Up to the new and difficult tensions it is presently experiencing with The Russian Bear as an effect of the Euromaidan movement. And we have seen how the number of social movements and their ability to affect political change has grown more and more. Power, in classical realist terms, should be reconsidered as a consequence of these facts. Because the concept of what power \textit{is}, in classical realist terms, is being challenged at unprecedented levels. And there is no reason to believe that this will change in the immediate future. Realism is increasingly inaccurate as an explanatory theory and as a policy tool as long as it ignores these movements. As Machiavelli said; “The one who builds on the people do not build on mud, but on strength.”\textsuperscript{317} Ozymandias, in the poem that set this thesis on its course, built his towering structures on sand. The U.S. - along with rising powers such as China - should heed Machiavelli’s words and learn what Ozymandias never learned; that raw power is a fickle thing when built on weak foundations.
5. Appendix

Appendix 1:

Donald Snow’s list of realism assumptions in *National Security for a New Era*:

1. The international system is composed of sovereign states as the primary units in both a political and legal sense.
2. Sovereign states possess vital interests and are the only units in the system entitled to vital interests.
3. Vital interests become matters of international concern when conditions of scarcity exist and are pressed by competing state actors.
4. When issues involving scarce resources are present in the relations between sovereign states, then power must be used to resolve the difference.
5. The exercise of power is the political means of conflict resolution in international relations.
6. One political instrument of power is military force, which is one option for resolving differences between states.\(^{318}\)

This is an edited list of Hans Morgenthau’s basic assumptions from his 1953 edition of Politics Among Nations:

1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. And as conflict and self-interest are driving forces of human nature, these forces are ever-present in relations between human made institutions, such as nation states and international institutions of cooperation. In this way, he expands Hobbes focus on human nature into international relations. Later, he writes that “*The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. ...The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human association, from the family, through fraternal and professional association and local political organizations, to the state.*”\(^{319}\)
2. The main signpost…is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Although diplomacy is a vital part of Morgenthau’s framework, real power is always in the background as diplomacy and cooperation is played out.

3. *Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally valid.* In short, all states will act almost similarly given any specific set of conditions. “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. …whenever they (nations) strive to realize their goals by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.” \(^\text{320}\)

4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. Morgenthau asserts that international agreed upon morals play on the possible interests available to nation states, in that a pragmatic leader will not include in his interests a goal that clearly breaches these morals on a fundamental level. “...these moral principles have been so powerful as to exclude from the sphere of political interests, such aims which could only be pursued by violations of those fundamental rights.” \(^\text{321}\) This seems on the face of it to be a rather naïve statement coming from a realist, and it will be challenged with gusto in chapter 3, where we will discuss patterns of realism behavior in U.S. foreign policy.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. This, to Morgenthau, would be idealism specific to a given nation state, and the attempt to press one’s own moral aspirations on others holds within it great dangers to peace and stability.

6. The difference then, between political realism and other schools of thought, is real and profound. \(^\text{322}\)

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism framework is based on five specific assumptions, and they mirror to a large extent those used by Morgenthau and in the *Oxford Handbook*. They are, in shortened form:

1. States are the principle actors in the system, and they operate in an anarchic environment.
2. All states have *some* offensive military capability.
3. States can never be certain of the intentions of other states. *The aforementioned lack of focus on social movements might be suitable here, as they often change the intentions of states, as in the `79 Iran Revolution.*

4. The highest goal of states is to survive. *Because if you do not survive, you cannot pursue any other goals.*

5. States are strategic calculators.323

These assumptions give us three forms of behavior:

1. States fear each other. It varies, but this is the tendency. Suddenly, a neighbor has overwhelming capabilities and malign intentions. Plus, there is no 9/11 to call.

2. Self-help. You have to protect yourself, as there is scant help to get from other states unless you are in effective organizations.

3. As power distribution is a zero-sum game, states try to maximize their relative power.

**Appendix 2:**

From Amnesty International’s report on Iran from 1979:

“Prisoners held in pre-trial detention in the Committee and Evin prisons have no contact with other prisoners, or with the outside world, and are subjected to torture. They are locked up in small, damp cells with only a straw mattress on which to sleep. In these prisons, as in others, the extremes of temperature in Iran are an important factor. ….. Food is usually inadequate and of poor quality and this often leads to malnutrition, food poisoning or chronic illness. Medical treatment is practically non-existent and prisoners are hardly ever seen by a doctor, sent to hospital or allowed to receive medicines. ….. Maltreatment and torture do not always cease after trial and in some cases prisoners who are regarded as being difficult are sent back to the Committee or Evin prisons for further torture.”324

From a report written by the International Committee of the Red Cross:

“In addition to the violations already referred to there is little respect demonstrated for human rights in many other areas of Iranian life. Freedom of speech and association are non-existent. The press is strictly censored, …. Trade unions are illegal and workers' protests are dealt with severely, sometimes resulting in imprisonment and deaths. Academic freedom is also restricted
and students and university teachers are kept under surveillance by SAVAK. A recent account concerns a professor of literature who was harassed, beaten, arrested and tortured because his courses had been deemed as not conforming to the "ideology" of the "White Revolution" of the Shah, in that he had failed to refer to it.”

Appendix 3:

The Tobacco Protests of 1891 – 1892. These protests were massive and wide spread, and caused the government to cancel important concessions to British companies.

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 (1905 – 1911). The motivations behind this period’s uprisings were strikingly similar to those of the ‘79 Revolution. The results were a major reorganization of Iranian political life, including a written constitution and a parliament.

Workers Protests of 1929. This was but one of many actions in an active period. In 1919, the Anglo-Persian Agreement was met with the same, and when this occurred again in 1946, the number of oil strikers alone had grown to 80.000.

The Nationalization process of 1951 – 1953. The process itself involved multiple social movements and civil actions, such as strikes, boycotts and demonstrations. These movements demonstrated the popular support of Mossadeq and his nationalization policy.

The July Uprising, 1952. In July 1952 Mossadeq stepped down as premier to force a test of his political power. People rose en masse, and Mossadeq was reinstated within days.

The ‘53 Coup. As we have seen, the streets and the people on them were major tools for Kermit Roosevelt and others who planned the coup. According to Roosevelt, the coup would be made first and foremost on the streets.

The 1960’s protests. Large social movements and protests occurred during the 60’s, forewarning anyone interested about the potential that was still there if well organized.

Appendix 4:

Noam Chomsky in interview, Oslo, September 5th 2011.
Every movement that we take for granted; abolishment of slavery, woman’s rights, Anti-nuclear movements, they were all very marginal and very bitterly attacked. I mean that’s true of almost all of them. Take say just the notion of intellectuals. I mean it came into common usage at the time of the Dreyfus trial. And the way history relates it they were sort of courageous, outspoken, defenders of rights and freedom, which indeed they were. But they all had to flee France, they were very marginal, they were bitterly denounced by the academic intellectual establishment, and the mainstream was…to say that they were marginalized is a bit of an understatement. And so it continues to the present. Let’s say Bertrand Russell. Certainly the leading or one of the leading intellectuals of the 20th Century. He was very effective, especially in the peace movement. He and Einstein for example were the leading spokespersons for eliminating nuclear weapons. He was thrown out of his academic position in England for protesting the First World War. He was refused academic appointments in the United States. Vilified by the government, by the press, ridiculed by the intellectual community. That’s…go back to classical Greece. The man who was accused of corrupting the youth of Athens (unintelligible) was derided by elite opinion, not by the public. Take the Antiwar movement in the United States in the 60’s. Take a look at the press commentary and elite intellectual opinion. It was vilified. But at the end of the war about 70% of the population described the war as, and I’m quoting, “fundamentally wrong and immoral, not a mistake”. It’s a view you cannot hear expressed, find expressed, in the liberal press and the mainstream press, but that’s 70% of the population.

Let’s say woman’s rights. Say my grandmother’s generation. It didn’t exist. It wasn’t an issue. My grandmother would say she wasn’t oppressed, that’s just the way life is. By the time you get to my mother’s generation, she knew she was oppressed, but that’s the way it is. But she’s conscious about it. You get to my daughter; she’s not even talking about it. The world has just changed. Changed because of a lot of activism. And always against elite, mainstream opinion, establishment opinion. And for very good reasons; they don’t want to lose privilege. Since they basically run the (unintelligible). Take something that’s still contested, gay rights. It wasn’t contested a few years ago. It was considered so totally outrageous, you couldn’t even talk about it. In Britain, for example, a reasonably free society. 50 years ago, they …the government literally murdered one of the 20th Centuries leading mathematicians, Alan Turing. And also one of the British War heroes, one of the people who decoded the German codes. He was a
homosexual and they forced him to undergo some crazed treatment which rendered him blind. And until a few years ago it was in most American states illegal, considered a crime. Now, it’s changed.

Take the environmental issue. Not a small thing. The future existence of the species depends on it. In the 1960s it didn’t exist. (unintelligible) It really took off in the 70s, and by now it’s quite a substantial movement. So that’s the way it’s gonna be all the time. But if you just take a look at the world, it’s changed a lot. Take say in Norway. It was a great Norwegian criminologist, Christie I think his name is. Take a look at his book. I think until the early 19th Century, there were very few prisoners in Norway. In the reason is that, say if somebody was accused of shoplifting, they didn’t have to throw him in prison. You just drive a stake through his hand. They don’t do that in Norway today. And it’s not because the state changed. It was because popular movements changed it.

Johnson could never call a national mobilization [In Vietnam]. It was a major war. But he couldn’t do what Roosevelt did. (…….) Too much public opposition. So they had to fight a gun-and butter war. They had to…the result was, the economy went onto a tailspin. If you have a national mobilization, wars are very good for the economy. So during the Second World War, industrial production practically quadrupled. (……..). But during the Vietnam War, the economy moved to stagflation. And that’s probably the main reason why the business community turned against it. It’s not described that way, but if you look at it it’s a major achievement of popular action.

With Vietnam, it took years before there could be any protest. I was right in the middle of it. We couldn’t have a meeting in Boston. A Liberal city. It would have been broken up by demonstrators with the liberal Boston Globe applauding. This was at a time when there were hundreds of thousands of American troops there, and the place was practically destroyed. In the case of Iraq, it was the first time in history when there was massive public mobilization before the war was officially launched. That sent a message. It said you can’t go too far. In fact the Bush administration never did anything remotely what Kennedy did in Vietnam. It didn’t prevent tremendous destruction, but…
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