The Northern Cypriot Dream

The First Wave of Immigration from Turkey to north Cyprus – 1974-1980

Helge Jensehaugen

Master’s Thesis in History, submitted to the Department of Archeology, Conservation and History

The University of Oslo

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Summary

After the division of Cyprus in 1974 into a Greek-Cypriot south and a Turkish-Cypriot north, approximately 30,000 immigrants from Turkey moved to north Cyprus. The period 1974 to 1980, during which time these immigrants came to northern Cyprus, is referred to as the first wave of immigration. This thesis seeks primarily to answer the question: Why did the immigrants leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and why did they migrate to northern Cyprus? There are a lot of misperceptions about the immigration of people from Turkey to north Cyprus, which makes this thesis important in creating an accurate and much-needed debate. In short, one should view the first wave of immigration as a result of the employment of state mechanisms, as well as traditional push-pull factors in the context of crisis in Turkey, coupled with opportunities and a need for labor in north Cyprus. Furthermore, family members and other persons of authority, such as imams, were central in encouraging more people from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus during the first wave of immigration. In that way immigration from Turkey was kept alive with a steady flow of immigrants throughout the seven-year period following the division of the island. The immigration from Turkey was characterized by being heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, in contrast to the common view of the immigrants as an exclusively “Turkifying” force.
Preface

A few years ago, at the American University in Washington D.C., I had the Cyprus conflict as a case study in my Peace and Conflict Resolution class. I had hardly heard of the conflict on the Eastern Mediterranean island before this. Therefore, thanks must go out to Michael Eleftherios for having sparked my initial interest in and awareness of Cyprus and the conflict there, and providing the unique opportunity of meeting and discussing the issue closely with central political, diplomatic and civil figures. The rewarding educational trip to Cyprus with the American University in Washington D.C. initiated an academic interest in Cyprus so great that I have, since that semester, devoted much time and effort into first writing a bachelor’s thesis on the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and now submitting this master’s thesis on the Turkish immigration period following the intervention in 1974. Jan-Erik Smilden, my supervisor during my bachelor’s thesis a couple of years ago, is owed great thanks for upholding my interest in the Cyprus conflict, and encouraging me to continue my studies on Cyprus by writing a master’s thesis on the subject.

Throughout the two-year master’s program at the University of Oslo my supervisor, Hilde Henriksen Waage, has been a great help and inspiration in making this project possible. I am grateful for all the time and energy she has devoted to ensuring that this thesis has been as linguistically, and not least, as academically accurate as possible. Thanks, also, to all of her other master’s students who have read through the various chapters and given constructive comments and suggestions for improvement throughout the entire process. Henriksen Waage’s contact network and experience with the subject have also been of invaluable importance, as she has helped me connect with the wonderful and resourceful people at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) Cyprus Centre (PCC) in Nicosia. Without PCC senior researcher Mete Hatay, my thesis would simply not be possible. He has provided so much of his time and knowledge in helping me with my project and setting up meetings and interviews with both central political figures and Turkish immigrants from the period in question. I owe him considerable gratitude for all the help he has given me prior to, during and after my stay in Cyprus. All those who allowed me to interview them for this thesis also deserve acknowledgement, thank you all. Thanks go out also to everyone at PRIO Cyprus Centre: Harry Tzimitras, Guido Bonino, Ayla Gürel and Olga Demetriou, for letting me use their resources, networks and offices, and for giving me their advice.
Thanks, also, to Einar Wigen, Martin Nome, Gina Lende, Antonis Hadjikyriacou, Costas Constantinou, Pinar Tank and Kristian B. Harpviken for their encouragement, interest in my project, for their advice on literature and people to contact about the subject, and for reading through my project description.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my nearest and dearest. Firstly, thanks to Kristin Bjørnstad for her patience with me during my work on this project, and for putting up with my constant mention of Cyprus. You have helped me through all my ups and downs during this tough, but rewarding work, and for that I am eternally grateful. Not least, thanks for having taken the time to read through the thesis and for giving excellent feedback. Thanks, also, to my parents for having taken interest in and supporting my project throughout the entire process. This also goes to my brother and his wife, who even visited me in Cyprus while I was there collecting sources.

These two years have been a very rewarding time both socially and academically, and that is in large part owed to my fantastic co-students at the University of Oslo who have made my studies and student years very memorable.
Abbreviations

AP - Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
CGP - Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Trust Party)
CHP - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
CTP - Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party)
EOKA - Ethniki Organosis Kypros Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GNP - Gross National Product
HDI - Human Development Index
HP - Halkçı Parti (Populist Party)
İTEM Law - İskan, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası (Resettlement, Land Distribution, and Equivalent Property Law)
KUK - Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşcular (National Liberators of Kurdistan)
MHP - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
MSP - Millî Selâmet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
PCC - PRIO Cyprus Centre
PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker’s Party)
PRIO - Peace Research Institute of Oslo
SBA - Sovereign Base Area
TC - Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic)
TFSC - Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TKP - Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi (Communal Liberation Party)
TMT - Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organization)
TRNC - Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UBP - Ulusal BIRLIK PARTİSİ (National Unity Party)
UNFICYP - United Nations Force in Cyprus

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1. Introduction

Despite being Europe’s longest ongoing conflict, the Cyprus dispute is relatively unknown. At the same time, the Cyprus conflict is a very known and discussed topic among Cypriots, obviously, and Turks and Greeks. The history of modern Cyprus is broadly speaking characterized by a two-sided narrative, pertaining to each of the two ethnic groups on the island (although there are alternative leftist histories on both sides). For the Turkish-Cypriots the conflict started with the inter-communal violence that plagued them throughout the 1960s, with particularly 1963-64 and 1967 as excessively violent years. On the Greek-Cypriot side, the Turkish invasion in 1974 is seen as the beginning of the dispute.\(^1\) Since the division of the island in 1974, no solution has been reached between the two sides. One of the major points of contention between the two communities is the presence of immigrants from Turkey.

**Subject of research**

This thesis studies the first wave of immigration from Turkey to northern Cyprus; that is in the period from 1974-1980. In 1974 Turkey intervened in Cyprus in response to the Greek-led *coup d'état* toppling the Cypriot President Makarios III. In addition to having been the President of Cyprus since the island gained its independence in 1960, Makarios was also the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus. As a result of the intervention, Cyprus was divided into two: a Turkish-controlled north Cyprus in possession of approximately 36 percent of the island, and the independent Republic of Cyprus in the south. When Cyprus was divided in 1974, the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community, with the help of Turkish authorities, initiated a policy of encouraging people from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus.\(^2\) This happened in the context of a population vacuum in the north created by the exodus of Greek-Cypriots who were displaced or fled to the south, away from the advancing Turkish army.

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From which areas of Turkey did these immigrants leave, what social strata did the migrants belong to, and what was their ethnic composition? Why did they leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and why did they migrate to northern Cyprus? Also, importantly, why were the immigrants from Turkey needed in north Cyprus in this period? Lastly, was the first wave of immigration successful in contributing to both an economic and political independence from the Greek-Cypriot south?

Although it is quite clear that the Turkish immigrants came as part of a deliberate policy to consolidate Turkish-Cypriot control over northern Cyprus and ensure economic self-sufficiency from the Greek-Cypriots, the PRIO Cyprus Centre (PCC) senior researcher Mete Hatay points out that many of the Turkish immigrants came to northern Cyprus on their own initiative. This mainly applied to those who came after 1979, but also to those who came throughout the first wave of immigration. This suggests that it must have been more advantageous for many to leave mainland Turkey and start a new life in northern Cyprus. This, in turn, strengthens the assumption that either all, or at least some of the three main factors this thesis seeks to study, namely the social, economic and political situation, were more opportune in north Cyprus than in the areas of mainland Turkey where the majority of immigrants came from. The fact that the Turkish authorities offered “land, houses and livestock to villagers who would migrate to Cyprus” was, unquestionably, a major factor involved when they made the decision to move there. The social anthropologist Dr. Yael Navaro-Yashin argues that “[m]ost settlers are in Cyprus because they had experienced difficulties, some social, some economic, some political, in Turkey.” Due to the immigrants’ mostly humble background, they were, after the initial Turkish-Cypriot enthusiasm for them, often looked down upon. Those who emigrated from Turkey were mainly disadvantaged, both economically and socially. Furthermore, many were chosen for migration to north

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Cyprus because they were victims of developmental projects, resulting in the destruction of their villages and homes, which were occurring across Turkey at the time.\textsuperscript{6}

The Turkish-Cypriots increasingly view the immigrants from Turkey who now reside in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an “other”.\textsuperscript{7} Navaro-Yashin, writing about the Turkish immigrants on Cyprus, claims that “[c]onflict with “Greek Cypriots” did not preoccupy or worry them [the Turkish-Cypriots] as much as their everyday experiences of living with settlers from Turkey”.\textsuperscript{8} There is a popular and typical perception that the Turkish immigrants are voluntarily an extension of Ankara’s policies. Many Turkish-Cypriots feel that the presence of the Turks from the mainland is contributing to their cultural elimination, and that they are becoming a minority in their own country.\textsuperscript{9} However, the arrival of the immigrants should be seen in light of differing living conditions in Turkey and northern Cyprus during this period.

Therefore the migration should rather be analyzed from the perspective of the economic, political and social conditions under which the new Turkish immigrants lived, and the opportunities they expected from migrating to north Cyprus. This contradicts the view of the immigrants as colonizers from Turkey, which political scientist Christos P. Ioannides and other critics have described them as.\textsuperscript{10} In fact, professor Neophyto Loizides argued that “the overwhelming majority of settlers opted to abandon their villages in Anatolia for economic reasons, not ideological ones”.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, many were forced to move from their villages in Turkey due to the construction of dams and highways, and the consequent destruction of their homes. Moreover, landslides and other natural disasters affected many. Since space opened up in north Cyprus following the division of the island, many were relocated there.


\textsuperscript{7} The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not recognized by any countries, except Turkey.

\textsuperscript{8} Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”, 87.

\textsuperscript{9} Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”, 94.

\textsuperscript{10} Ioannides, Christos P., \textit{In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province}. New Rochelle: Caratzas, 1991, 188.

Literature

Between 1974 and the 2003 the borders between north and south were closed, which has effectively restricted communication and contact between the two communities. This has in effect led to a lack of knowledge about one another, and in turn created many misconceptions and myths about the other. One of the things that are especially prone to misunderstandings and exaggerations, are questions regarding immigration from Turkey to north Cyprus after 1974. There are great arguments on both sides as to how many immigrants from Turkey there really are in northern Cyprus as a result of the immigration. While discussions on this topic have raged in Cyprus, between north and south, few have researched this aspect of the Cyprus conflict. This has both posed a challenge, and sparked an interest in studying it. The lack of research on Turkish migration to north Cyprus means that there is not a great deal of literature dealing specifically with the subject. Furthermore, the primary sources and archival information available on the topic are not mapped out. Although this certainly has been a challenge, it makes this thesis all the more necessary and therefore has been an incentive to produce new and much needed research.

Despite the lack of literature on this specific subject, there exists a broad catalogue of books, articles and dissertations specifically on the Cyprus conflict, and on the history of Cyprus in general. This conflict awakens strong feelings within both communities on the island, and within Turkey and Greece. Therefore, much of the literature on the conflict is very biased one way or the other. This is especially the case with historical works, as each side uses history to prove that they are the true victims in the dispute. Although this is mostly the case with authors that are Greek-Cypriot, Turkish-Cypriot, Greek or Turkish, it also occurs in works by academics that are none of the above. Thus, in reading works on Cyprus, as with everything else, one must obviously be very careful and be aware of how the authors approach the conflict. This is especially the case in the subject of those who migrated from Turkey to northern Cyprus in the period 1974-1980. They are often referred to as “settlers”, but as the anthropologist Rebecca Bryant stresses, “they do not resemble settlers in other colonial

13 Hatay, Mete, Beyond Numbers, vii-viii.
15 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, vii.
16 Papadakis, History Education in Divided Cyprus.
nationalist projects”. Therefore, this thesis will for the most part refer to those who came to north Cyprus in this period as immigrants, rather than “settlers”. This is in order to accentuate that although they mostly came as part of an immigration policy, they moved in pursuit of an improved life. They were for the most part subjects, rather than objects.

The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), which has offices in Cyprus, the PRIO Cyprus Centre (PCC), has a specific Project Group working on “Settlers and Immigrants in Cyprus”. Its project leader, Mete Hatay, has written at least two major reports regarding those who have come from Turkey to north Cyprus. He has mapped where the majority of the immigrants originally came from: The majority moved to north Cyprus from the East and West Black Sea sub-regions; Central Anatolia; and Southern and Southeastern Turkey. These were, and still are, disadvantaged regions of Turkey, where the living conditions were, and continue to be, generally lower than elsewhere in the country. Interestingly, many of the immigrants had no previous knowledge of where Cyprus was.

Hatay seeks to demystify the debate on “settlers” and immigrants from Turkey. He has therefore done a lot of work with the censuses that have been carried out in northern Cyprus. It has been claimed that Turks were encouraged to move to north Cyprus in order “to strengthen the position of parties supporting the regime of [north Cyprus’ first President] Rauf Denktaş.” Hatay refutes this argument, and shows that the immigrants have various party affiliations, and have not contributed to Denktaş’s victories to the extent that is commonly believed. Hatay has also questioned the widespread belief that the Turkish-Cypriots have been outnumbered by mainland Turks.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, on the other hand, discusses the “settlers” as colonizers, and argues that the inflow of immigrants from Turkey, and the outflow of native Turkish-Cypriots have turned the latter into a minority in northern Cyprus. In terms of how many Turkish immigrants who now reside in north Cyprus,

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18 Hatay, *Beyond Numbers*; Hatay, *Turkish Cypriot Population*.
19 Hatay, *Beyond Numbers*, 12.
numbers vary between a low of 70,000 and a high of 160,000.\textsuperscript{23} All the reports agree that “[m]ost of the settlers were transferred to Cyprus as the result of a decision of the Turkish authorities”.\textsuperscript{24} According to Alfons Cuco, reporting for the European Council’s Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, “the settlers had preserved their original social, economic and cultural characteristics.”\textsuperscript{25} His report appears to have a lot of similarities with the Cypriot government’s views on northern Cyprus. They argue that the immigrations, or “settlers” in their view, should be moved back to Turkey because they allegedly are turning the local population into a minority. Cuco also expresses the common misconception, refuted by Hatay, that the “settlers” mostly vote for Denktaş’s political party.\textsuperscript{26} These two reports, however, do not focus on where the immigrants came from in Turkey, what the social and economic situation was there, and why they chose to start a new life in Cyprus. There is generally a lack of detailed comparative discussion and analysis of the social, economic and political situations in the two countries in the period, a deficit this thesis seeks to reverse.

A handful of books, and some dissertations, have also been of help in gathering information on the issue. Kjetil Fosshagen’s master and PhD theses in anthropology both discuss the settlement of people from Turkey in northern Cyprus, and study their co-existence, or in many cases the lack thereof, with the local Turkish-Cypriots.\textsuperscript{27} Navaro-Yashin studies the same subject in his contribution to the book Divided Cyprus.\textsuperscript{28} He points out that the “[s]ettler communities from Turkey are not homogeneous; they have a complex composition.”\textsuperscript{29} That is, the first wave of immigration consisted of members of different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. This is contrary to the reports conducted by the Cypriot government and the EU, which seem to view the immigrants as more or less uniform.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{itemize}
\item Hatay,  \textit{Turkish Cypriot Population}, 48; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”.
\item Cuco, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”.
\item Cuco, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”.
\item Fosshagen, Kjetil, “‘We don’t exist’: Negotiations of history and identity in a Turkish Cypriot town.” Cand. Polit. Degree. University of Bergen, 1999; Fosshagen, “Island of Conjecture”, 209.
\item Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”.
\item Navaro-Yashin, “Ethnography of Cyprus”, 91.
\item Cuco, “The Demographic Structure of Cyprus”; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”.
\end{itemize}
Professor of political science Clement Dodd has studied the economy and politics of northern Cyprus. He shows that similarly to most societies having gone through a recent war, north Cyprus was in a difficult situation, both economically and politically, following the invasion in July-August 1974 and the consequent forced departure of Greek-Cypriots.\textsuperscript{31} There was an abundance of agricultural land, and a lack of labor in northern Cyprus, which made it more inviting for immigrants from Turkey. Considering that the mainstream of the Turkish immigrants were “impoverished, landless peasants from Anatolia”, moving to the fertile and land-abundant Cyprus seems quite logical.\textsuperscript{32}

**Sources**

There are some great obstacles in studying this aspect of the Cyprus conflict. First of all, the realization that the state-encouraged immigration of people from Turkey to north Cyprus was illegal by international law, as according to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its 1977 amendment, has in turn affected the availability of archival sources regarding this policy.\textsuperscript{33} Tamer Gazioğlu, Chief of Resources, Inventory and Statistics Section in the Ministry of Housing and Rehabilitation in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus from 1975, admitted that no information gathered in this period on the settlement and immigration of people from Turkey was kept or stored.\textsuperscript{34} This obviously places limitations on the research that can be carried out on the subject. However, interviews with key political actors, officials and immigrants have been central to this thesis. The politicians and officials have been surprisingly open about the process. This is notable, considering that there are no documents available on the subject of the first wave of immigration, as such documents were either destroyed or not kept.

Despite the general lack of documents in state archives, some of the interviewees had some primary sources available that they had kept. This is one of the major advantages in using oral sources, particularly in such cases where archival sources are difficult to find or non-existent. Historians Knut Kjeldstadli and Paul Thompson highlight that informants often produce items, pictures or documents, and that this “could be the most valuable by-product of

\textsuperscript{32} Ioannides, *In Turkey’s Image*, 39.
\textsuperscript{34} Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Gazioğlu, Tamer in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 21 February 2013.
an interview.”

Mustafa Yeşil, for instance, whose father was responsible for the migrants to north Cyprus from his town in Turkey, had some important documents revealing how organized the migration process was. Yeşil, who I interviewed, immigrated to north Cyprus along with his family in 1975. Neriman Çakır, a second-generation immigrant who has written extensively on second- and third-generation immigrants from Turkey, has shared her knowledge on the subject and provided some photographs of immigrant families from the period in question. Yusuf Suiçmez, one of the four Suiçmez children that moved to northern Cyprus in 1975, also provided some photographs during my interview of him and his family of their migration from Turkey. Hakkı Atun, the first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, shared some reports he had authored about the immigration process.

In using interviews as sources, it is important to find informants that are representative and relevant. Furthermore, it is important to collect a wide range of interviews in order to more accurately complete the puzzle that is the past. Altogether, I have interviewed 23 people, of whom 16 were immigrants, five were politicians or officials during the first wave of immigration, and two were academics on the subject. Most of the interviewees have been open and willing to share their name and where they were from. However, some of the immigrants wished to remain anonymous, which has been respected.

A lot of invaluable information has been gathered from these interviews. In order to obtain the most accurate and factual accounts, the interviews have been conducted with non-leading questions. Kjeldstadli has pointed out that one may better trust accounts that are formed from open interviews where the interviewer has not posed leading questions, but rather allowed the interviewee to tell a more or less continuous, uninterrupted story about a period or event in their lives. At the same time, it is important not to allow the interview to “degenerate into little more than anecdotal gossip.” Therefore, the interviews conducted for this thesis have, in order to allow for comparison and a piecing together of the puzzle that this period

represents, asked a set of common and routine questions to the interviewees about their geographic, ethnic, religious and linguistic origins and backgrounds, when they left Turkey and where they settled in north Cyprus.\footnote{9}

Importantly, the immigrants that have been interviewed have told their stories in their native tongue, Turkish, and thus language has not been a hindrance for them in telling their memories. In order to gather information and sources for the thesis, I have taken lessons in Turkish, and learned basic oral and written Turkish as well as learning about Turkish culture. In addition, I have received invaluable aid from the senior researcher Mete Hatay, who has functioned as an interpreter and contact person in these interviews to make sure that all the information needed was passed over and understood. My knowledge of the language and Turkish customs gave the interviewees a sense of trust and confidence in me. The politicians and officials, on the other hand, most of who have studied in Great Britain or the US, were interviewed in English, so that all technical and political terminology was properly grasped.

One of the advantages of using oral sources is that it better allows one to get “behind stereotyped or non-committal generalizations to detailed memories”.\footnote{41} However, it is important to be critical of all sources, especially oral ones. The period in question was nearly four decades ago, and it is therefore not always easy for the interviewees to remember the events in great detail. One must take into account and be aware that memories and oral recollections of them are prone to forgetfulness and mistakes.\footnote{42} For the immigrants, however, the immigration process naturally represented a great change and turning point in their lives. Therefore, they tend to remember the period in great detail. Moreover, Kjeldstadli highlights that with time one is able to speak more balanced and neutrally about an event in the past because one has had the time and distance to reflect about it. In turn, interviewees are often more willing and able to share their experiences as well.\footnote{43} However, it is obviously important to be critical of all interviewees. They may attempt to protect themselves and their families by hiding certain information or details. Therefore, in order to obtain various experiences and stories to crosscheck, it has been critical to interview many different immigrants from this period.

\footnote{40}{Thompson, \textit{Oral History}, 168.}
\footnote{41}{Thompson, \textit{Oral History}, 170.}
\footnote{42}{Kjeldstadli, \textit{En innføring i historiefaget}, 196.}
\footnote{43}{Kjeldstadli, “Kildekritikk”, 69.}
Interviews serve the subject of this thesis particularly well because they contribute to an enlivenment to the immigration process and a proximity to the immigrants themselves. It contributes to the humanizing of them as subjects. Furthermore, anecdotes about particular memories, for instance the welcoming ceremony many experienced when they arrived in north Cyprus, add an element of color to the thesis.  

In the case of the politicians and officials, things may have been added or left out in order to save face, both on their own behalf and on behalf of the state they played a crucial role in setting up. It is therefore crucial to be critical of the information given by them. Nevertheless, Atun, north Cyprus’ first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, held that “there is nothing to hide.” This statement must be taken with a pinch of salt. It is natural to presume that it was said in order to appear reliable, but the fact that records were destroyed or not kept implies that the Turkish-Cypriot authorities indeed feel – or at least felt – a need to hide something. On the whole, however, all interviewees, both politicians and officials, and immigrants, seem to have been more or less reliable, honest and open. PRIO Cyprus Centre (PCC) senior researchers Mete Hatay and Ayla Gürel, the two academics interviewed for the thesis, have been important and have contributed to filling the holes left by the lack of archival sources and intermittently evasive officials and politicians.

While there is a general lack of archival sources specifically on the migration and immigration process, there is a set of sources on economic and political aspects of northern Cyprus in the same period. In addition, there is a set of documents written by Atun, found in the archives, that outline the methodology involved in resettling Turkish-Cypriot refugees from South-Cyprus, and he has held, in a private interview with the author, that much the same methods were used in settling immigrants from Turkey. The illegality of the immigration process has obviously led to a silencing of the subject. However, now that many decades have passed since it happened, those involved seem to be willing to discuss it after all these years. This has made this research possible and important.

44 Rosander, Göran, “«Muntlige kilder» – Hva og hvorfor” in Hodne, Kjeldstadli & Rosander (eds.), Muntlige kilder: 11-21, 21; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Yeşil, Mustafa in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, conducted on 8 April 2013. See chapter 5 of this thesis.
45 Interview with Atun.
Theory

Professor John McGarry, in his article “‘Demographic engineering’: the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation”, has examined the ways in which states can encourage or force the movement of an ethnic group to another region, that is “demographically engineer” an area. He argues that there are two different groups who move or are moved in this process, either “agents” or “enemies”. “Agents” are, according to McGarry, given advantages such as housing, work and/or land. They are provided for in a new location because they “are intended to perform a function on behalf of the state.”

McGarry claims that “[a]gents are settled in particular regions to consolidate the state’s control of the area and its resources”, and are in that way used as demographic facts on the ground in order to solidify the state’s control over a disputed area. “Enemies”, on the other hand, are seen as a problem for the state in the areas that they currently inhabit, and are moved elsewhere in order to minimize the chances of conflict. The risks feared include secessionism or revolts in general, which are attempted solved by moving these trouble groups to other regions where they might not have the same opportunities to mobilize. He continues by claiming that in times of inter-state conflict and crisis, states become especially attentive to the question of minorities, and control of peripheral areas.

People may also simply move on their own initiative through ordinary push-pull factors, such as socio-economic considerations. Nevertheless, McGarry argues that “[p]olitical authorities can manipulate push-pull factors” in a way that hides forced or encouraged movement behind a veil of seemingly normal economic or social factors. In the case of north Cyprus, promises of a better life, through the provision of housing and land, certainly contributed to the considerable extent and amount of immigrants in this period. To the extent that Turkey carried out “demographical engineering” in northern Cyprus, in the sense that McGarry applies the term, it may seem that both “agents” and “enemies” were encouraged and/or forced to immigrate. There are many cases in which state-encouraged immigration occurs following a country’s procurement of new territory. In north Cyprus there was a need for the

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47 McGarry, John, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 614-615, 619.
48 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 616.
49 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 625.
50 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 617, 619.
Turkish-Cypriots to cement their control over their new territorial acquisitions.\textsuperscript{51} There were also significant agricultural resources that needed to be taken care of. This was an incentive to settle “agents”. Turkey, in the period in question, certainly fits the description of being crisis-ridden, economically, socially and politically, which may have been a factor involved in moving “enemies” away from Anatolia. Was this the case with the first wave of immigration to north Cyprus? Were minorities among those who moved from Turkey to northern Cyprus in this period?

Professor Robert Jervis, in his work \textit{Perceptions and misperceptions in international politics}, observes that “[d]ecision-makers assimilate evidence to their pre-existing beliefs without being aware of alternative interpretations”.\textsuperscript{52} The authorities are simply so convinced of their established ideas, that all information given or acquired is interpreted as proof of their biases.\textsuperscript{53} This is a notion that to a great extent may be seen in the case of Cyprus as well, especially in the Greek-Cypriot view on the Turkish immigrants, but also among many Turkish-Cypriots who gradually became more critical of the immigration from Turkey. The researcher Mete Hatay argues that “[b]y referring to them as ‘settlers’, the implication is that all Turkish nationals present on the island arrived and continue to arrive as part of a state policy of ‘colonization.’”\textsuperscript{54} In order to analyze and test such statements, one must ask: What kind of conditions did those who immigrated to northern Cyprus leave behind in Turkey? Why were they willing to leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and start new lives in north Cyprus?

There is a widespread view that the original Turkish-Cypriot population is a minority in their own country because of the immigration of people from Turkey. This perception is largely the result of a misinterpretation of the census numbers, which reveal that the \textit{de facto} population of Turkish nationals, that is counting all the people who happen to be in northern Cyprus at the time of the census, is greater because of Turkish tourists, students, seasonal workers and the around 30,000 military personnel present in the north. None of these have either voting rights or TRNC citizenship. Hatay points to the 2006 census, which reveals that there is a much larger number of Turkish-Cypriots than Greek-Cypriots have assumed, and

\textsuperscript{51} McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 629-630.
\textsuperscript{53} Jervis, \textit{Perceptions and misperceptions}, 181.
\textsuperscript{54} Hatay, \textit{Turkish Cypriot Population}, 5.
that the *de jure* population count, that is those with permanent residence at the time of the census, shows a greater number of Turkish-Cypriots compared to Turkish nationals.\(^{55}\) Nevertheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus’ report, “Illegal Demographic Changes”, makes use of terms such as ethnically cleansing in explaining that “[t]he constant influx into the occupied area of settlers from mainland Turkey takes place in parallel with a continuous outflow of indigenous Turkish Cypriots”.\(^{56}\) This evidences a failure to properly examine the issue, and shows that convictions that may be based on rumors may prevail. That makes this research ever the more important and pivotal in discussing the future of a potential solution to the Cyprus conflict.


\(^{56}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”.
2. From Ottoman Conquest to Turkish Intervention

Cyprus has been under the possession of most of the great civilizations and powers in the Mediterranean region, most importantly the Ancient Greek, Byzantine, Venetian and, not least, the Ottomans. Before it got its fragile independence in 1960, it had also belonged to the British Empire. All of these cultures have undoubtedly made their mark on the island. However, the Greeks were the only people to really settle on Cyprus before the Ottomans came in 1571. Thus, the Ottoman arrival on Cyprus created the bi-communality that would be the central challenge for the island in the future age of ethnic nationalism. In combination with other outside factors, the bi-communal character of Cyprus led to its physical and political division in 1974.

Ottoman rule: 1571-1878

Before the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, in 1571, the island had been ruled by Venice. Their rule had been utterly corrupt. Moreover, the Venetians ruled the island in a feudalistic manner. Had it not been for the Ottomans, Cyprus could very well have been Catholic. Such was the extent of the Venetians’ Latinisation of Cyprus according to the historian and journalist Jan-Erik Smilden. Due to the Venetians’ suppressing politics, the Cypriots, broadly speaking, greeted the Ottomans with open arms and relief. The millet system, which followed Ottoman conquest, gave the Greek Orthodox population on the island control over their own institutions, such as education and religion. The millet system was an essential part of Ottoman governance, wherein the non-Muslim population was granted the right to organize their own religious community in which their own rules applied and their own language was spoken and taught in. It may rightly be argued, therefore, that the Greek

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Orthodox population had more rights and self-autonomy under the Ottomans. They reinstated the power of the Greek Orthodox archbishop, who, in accordance with the *millet* system, regained the control over his subjects and the right to collect taxes from them.\(^{62}\)

The Ottomans immediately set out to settle their own population on their newly conquered territory. However, they were unable to encourage people to willingly move to Cyprus. Settling in Cyprus simply did not seem attractive. The island lacked fertile, grazing land. As a result, the Ottomans had to resort to the forced resettling of people from Anatolia.\(^{63}\) This was a central part the Ottoman practice of establishing a Muslim population “along sensitive frontiers and in other areas of strategic importance.”\(^{64}\) Initially, able peasants were moved to the island.\(^{65}\) But in 1572, the Ottomans changed their minds: they decided that one in ten families from four randomly selected Anatolian provinces should be picked out to move to Cyprus, and that those “who registered but did not leave were to be hanged”.\(^{66}\) However, those sent to the island were given certain advantages, such as being exempt from paying taxes over a two-year period; in addition they were given land.\(^{67}\)

Why do states encourage the movement of peoples from one place to another? According to Professor John McGarry, both “agents” and “enemies” are moved or encouraged to move in this process. “Agents” are given benefits in the new area because they are sent to serve a purpose for the rulers.\(^{68}\) In the case of Ottoman Cyprus, the initial settlers were moved there in order to secure and affirm Ottoman control of the island. “Enemies”, on the other hand, are considered to be a threat or a problem in the areas that they currently inhabit, and are therefore moved elsewhere in order to minimize their potential for revolt.\(^{69}\) The Ottomans eventually had to resort to sending criminals who were expelled from Anatolia to Cyprus.\(^{70}\) “[U]nruuly religious students, brigands and minor officials who had fallen from favour”, and generally those “considered a threat to the stability of society” were forcibly moved to the island.\(^{71}\) In this way the Ottomans, during their reign over Cyprus, from 1571 until 1878, changed the demographics of the island and steadily increased the percentage of Muslims. By

\(^{62}\) Smilden, “When the Turks saved the Greek Cypriots”, 72.

\(^{63}\) Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 161.

\(^{64}\) Volkan & Itzkowitz, *Turks & Greeks*, 126.

\(^{65}\) Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 161.

\(^{66}\) Smilden, “When the Turks saved the Greek Cypriots”, 75.


\(^{68}\) McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 619.

\(^{69}\) McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 617. See chapter 1 of this thesis.

\(^{70}\) Inalcik, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, 123.

\(^{71}\) Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, 162.
1600, 85 percent of Cyprus’ population was Greek Orthodox, and 15 percent were Muslim. The ratio had changed to 72 and 24 percent respectively by the end of Ottoman rule in Cyprus in 1878.\(^2\)

**British rule: 1878-1960**

In return for their help against the Russian attacks on the Ottoman Empire in 1877 – an offensive that threatened to completely alter the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean – Britain was given Cyprus through the Cyprus Convention on 4 June 1878. At first the British leased Cyprus until they annexed it in 1914, and finally it became a Crown Colony in 1925. Initially, the British saw the control over Cyprus as vital in order to protect the Suez Canal, and thus the safe passage to India. Furthermore, it was argued that the possession of the island was crucial in maintaining power in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, this would change in 1882, when Britain took control over Egypt. Therefore, after having acquired Egypt, the British did not devote as much attention to Cyprus.\(^3\)

Nevertheless, the militarily strategic value of Cyprus, as illustrated by the British bases on the island, would later prove to be quite important after all, particularly during the Cold War.\(^4\)

For the most part, the British maintained the Ottoman system of religious division. This was particularly true within education, where Christians and Muslims remained separated and were taught by Greek and Turkish teachers respectively. Furthermore, schoolbooks were imported from Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and after 1923 from Turkey.\(^5\) In this way, the school system resulted in “constructing Greek and Turkish identities among the respective Christian and Muslim populations.”\(^6\) From this point on forward, it makes more sense to refer to the two communities by their ethnicity: Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot.

It was under British rule that the two ethnic groups of Cyprus drifted apart, and irredentist feelings bloomed among them. Since Greece had achieved independence already in 1830, Greek nationalism became a potent and influential force among the Greek-Cypriot population in Cyprus quite early. The idea of incorporating Cyprus into the Greek state, or *enosis* (a

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\(^2\) Ioannides, *In Turkey’s Image*, 9; Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 143

\(^3\) Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 11-12, 16, 27, 29; Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*, 12.


\(^5\) Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*, 12; Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 26.

\(^6\) Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*, 12.
Greek word meaning union) grew out of the *Megali Idea* (Greek meaning The Great Idea). This Greek nationalist concept revolved around uniting all Greeks and recreating the Byzantine Empire in a more modern form.  

Turkey, on the other hand, became independent nearly a century later, as a result of the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War. From 1908 until 1913 Ottomanism had been the ruling ideology of the declining Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism sought to keep the empire glued together through awarding equal rights to all Ottoman subjects, regardless of language or religion. Turkish nationalism, which came in two opposing forms, developed relatively late compared to other ethnic groups in the region. Pan-Turkism desired a union consisting of all Turks and Turkic peoples. The second type of Turkish nationalism saw only Anatolia as the homeland for a Turkish state, and rejected the ambition of gathering Turks from outside of the Anatolian heartland. The latter became the version of Turkish nationalism employed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s founding father and first President. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot Muslim population, rather than developing their own equivalent to enosis, initially became more closely connected to the British. They were a relatively small minority and saw the British as the best guarantors of their safety and well-being.

Nevertheless, the situation in Cyprus was closely connected to developments in the mother countries. The Greek dream of the *Megali Idea* and the Greek-Cypriot equivalent of enosis illustrated the way ideas and aspirations in Greece affected and inspired the Greek-Cypriots. The same was the case for the Ottoman Empire’s, and later Turkey’s effect on developments on the island. In 1923, for example, after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, which ratified a mandatory population exchange between Greece and Turkey, Turkish-Cypriots were encouraged to move to Turkey. 9,310 Turkish-Cypriots moved to Turkey in this period.

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80 Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 27.
During British rule the ethnic identities of the two communities on Cyprus were truly developing and the populations were being pulled apart. Although it was largely due to “irredentist propaganda on the part of the Greek and Turkish states”, it was also a result of “demands for freedom, equality, and representative politics” developing among the islanders during British rule.\(^2\) The problem was that these desires were ethnically motivated. Parallel to this development the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, were increasingly getting involved in the question of the future of Cyprus. Greece declined when Britain offered them Cyprus in 1915 in exchange for entering on the British side in World War One. Nevertheless, Greece involved itself in the question of Cyprus. Moreover, the idea of *enosis* had many supporters in Greece. However, due to British pressure on Greece, and Greece’s reliance on Britain, the Greek government did not dare be too aggressive on supporting union with Cyprus.\(^3\)

Furthermore, in 1930 Greece and Turkey reached an agreement in which it was decided to engage in peaceful co-operation. The period from 1930 until the Second World War may thus be characterized as a Greek-Turkish *détente*, which neither side desired to jeopardize over Cyprus.\(^4\) Thus, Greece did not get involved with Cyprus to any large extent until after the Second World War. The Turkish government, on the other hand, did not take much interest in Cyprus at all until the mid-1950s. Turkey’s delayed interest in Cyprus may be linked to the predominance of Kemalism in the ruling circles of the government since the independence of the country. This is the ideology born out of Kemal Atatürk’s views on the construction and policies of the Turkish state.\(^5\) Important in this respect is “the Kemalist dictum of the avoidance of involvement in extra-territorial conflicts”.\(^6\) However, although the Turkish government was reluctant to get involved in Cyprus, both the press and the general public in Turkey took a strong stance in the question of Cyprus’ future.\(^7\)


\(^{4}\) Volkan & Itzkowitz, *Turks & Greeks*, 124, 134; Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 32.


\(^{6}\) Bolukbasi, “Turkey’s Policy Towards Cyprus”, 35.

\(^{7}\) Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 138.
The road to a fragile independence: 1950-1960

By the 1950s a series of developments drastically changed the situation on Cyprus, and both Greece and Turkey got more involved in the question of the island’s future. Greece, which had just come out of a civil war and could therefore focus more outward, became increasingly preoccupied with Cyprus from 1949 on forward and paid close attention to the situation on the island. Moreover, there was widespread support for enosis among the Greek public, which made it hard for the Greek government to ignore developments there. In mid-January 1950 Bishop (soon to be Archbishop) Makarios organized a plebiscite on the union of Cyprus with Greece. The tally showed that 96 percent of the participating Greek-Cypriots supported enosis. The landslide result of this plebiscite caused a reaction in Turkey and generated a Cyprus policy by the Turkish government. Turkey realized that it could no longer ignore the Cyprus question. In addition, popular opinion in Turkey required government action. When students took to the streets in most of the major cities in Turkey, Fuat Köprülü, the Turkish foreign minister, stated that Turkey sought to preserve the status quo of Cyprus and would intervene to prevent enosis.\textsuperscript{88}

The British ignored the outcome of the plebiscite. As a result, the immediate Greek-Cypriot goal became to bring the question of Cyprus’ union with Greece and thus effectively the end of British rule to the United Nations. Central in this policy was the newly elected Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus Makarios III (elected in 1950).\textsuperscript{89} In bringing the issue into the United Nations, Makarios internationalized the Cyprus question. The British further complicated the situation by promoting Turkey’s involvement in the question and made the argument to the Greek government that Cyprus was important to Turkey as well.\textsuperscript{90} Thus it may be argued that the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, were pulled into the question of Cyprus from forces within Cyprus and by the British. At the same time, popular opinion within their own borders required attention and forced a policy of some kind.\textsuperscript{91} The Turkish and Greek governments “were drawn into the maelstrom of the Cypriot developments”.\textsuperscript{92} Also, the Cold War initially gave Turkey greater leverage on the international scene. Turkey became a full member of NATO already in 1952, and was one of

\textsuperscript{89} Makarios III will henceforth simply be referred to as Makarios. Kitroeff, “Cyprus, 1950-1954”, 72-73.
\textsuperscript{90} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 41-42.
\textsuperscript{91} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 41.
\textsuperscript{92} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 41.
few NATO countries that bordered directly to the Soviet Union. It was thus seen as an important political and military outpost for the West in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{93} This perception of having leverage encouraged Turkey to take a firmer stance on Cyprus. Furthermore, Turkey felt threatened by the growth of pan-Arabism among its Middle Eastern neighbors, thus creating an incentive to acquire some sort of power on the island in order to gain a geographically strategic base.\textsuperscript{94}

The United Nations General Assembly did not take a stance on the Cyprus question and thus avoided adopting a resolution. Consequently, the Greek-Cypriot leadership, which had decided to bring the question into the UN in the first place, realized the need for a different approach. Colonel George Grivas formed the Greek-Cypriot guerilla organization National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (\textit{Ethniki Organosis Kyron Agoniston}: EOKA) with support from Makarios. Grivas was a Greek-Cypriot who had fought for the Greeks in the Turkish-Greek War in the 1920s, and who was an ardent supporter of the \textit{Megali Idea}. EOKA’s primary goal was the union of Cyprus and Greece. Although both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership claimed that EOKA sought to harm Turkish-Cypriots, the organization was designed to fight solely the British in order to end colonization and ultimately carry out \textit{enosis}. However, the goal of \textit{enosis} was by definition discrimination against the Turkish-Cypriot minority, who did not wish to become an even smaller minority as a part of Greece. Even if EOKA did not aim to harm Turkish-Cypriots in their fight for de-colonization, they certainly were directly affected. Hundreds of Turkish-Cypriots were wounded or killed as a result of the EOKA campaigns in the period 1955-1958.\textsuperscript{95}

In the same period the Turkish-Cypriots developed their own version of \textit{enosis}, namely \textit{taksim}, or the division of Cyprus. In fact, the Turkish-Cypriots established their own guerilla group, the Turkish Resistance Organization (\textit{Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı}: TMT), “which also used terrorist methods like their Greek-Cypriot counterparts.”\textsuperscript{96} In reaction to EOKA’s violent campaigns and their strives for the union with Greece, violent anti-Greek protests broke out in Istanbul and Izmir on 6 September 1955, resulting in the death of sixteen

\textsuperscript{93} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, 235.
\textsuperscript{94} Markides, “Cyprus since 1878”, 16.
\textsuperscript{95} Ioannides, \textit{In Turkey’s Image}, 54; Volkan & Itzkowitz, \textit{Turks & Greeks}, 134-137.
\textsuperscript{96} Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 12.
Greeks. This is yet another example of the interconnectedness between events in Cyprus and the two mother countries.

The changing nature of the Cyprus conflict, from a colonial conflict to an ethnic conflict with international ramifications, thus also required new solutions. The ethnic violence that had broken out in 1955 and intensified through the end of the 1950s had resulted in great casualties in both communities. This period resulted in the death of 55 Turkish- and 60 Greek-Cypriots, while the number of wounded was 86 and 98 respectively. The great rift between the two communities and the ensuing violence had proven the need for a creative solution deemed acceptable to both parties: sufficient safety for the Turkish-Cypriot minority and an acceptable level of self-determination to the Greek-Cypriot majority. Although Turkey and Greece initially had been hard on their respective demands – the Greeks seeking enosis, and Turkey desiring partition, or at least a strong degree of political influence coupled with a military base on the island – they both somewhat receded in 1959 and agreed to find an alternative solution and achieve Cypriot independence without carrying out neither taksim nor enosis. It is perhaps surprising that Turkey as suddenly as they had become involved in the dispute, changed their policy and overarching goal on the Cyprus issue. This turn-around may be explained by a desire by both Turkey and Greece to restore their friendly relations of the 1930s.

The geopolitical situation at the end of this decade may give a clue as to why this ambition resurfaced. Although NATO certainly needed Turkey as Europe’s easternmost frontier against the Soviet Union, Turkey arguably needed NATO even more. This was especially true as Iraq retreated from the Baghdad Pact in 1959 following nationalist coup d’état in Baghdad in 1958, and, together with Syria and Egypt, approached the Soviet Union in order to obtain weapons and economic support. Turkey thus not only viewed the Soviet Union itself as a threat, but also the growing strength of pan-Arabism. Since a majority of NATO countries were supporters of Cyprus’ independence, and Greece did not exclude withdrawing from NATO on the basis of Cyprus, Turkey saw the necessity of toning down its aspirations. In that sense Turkey may initially have overplayed their hand in using the Cold

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97 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 95.
98 Markides, “Cyprus since 1878”, 17; Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 87-88, 92.
100 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 88.
War setting as a pretext for their original hard position on Cyprus. Turkey may have overestimated its importance in the NATO alliance and its leverage vis-à-vis the other members. At the same time, unlike Turkey, Greece depended on the Western Alliance completely. Thus, as both Turkey and Greece had over-estimated their influence in the region, the need for compromise became clearer. Greece, Turkey and Great Britain got together to discuss and outline Cypriot independence at the Zürich and London conferences of 1959. In classic colonial spirit, the Cypriots, both the Turkish- and the Greek-Cypriot communities, were completely left out of the talks. To prevent a war between Greece and Turkey was the primary goal, with the independence of Cyprus simply as a means of reaching this goal.\textsuperscript{101}

The two conferences led to final agreements on Cypriot independence. These were signed on 19 February 1959 in London. The result was the formation of the Republic of Cyprus, which came into being on 16 August 1960. Many observers described its constitution as ineffectual.\textsuperscript{102} The dividing policy pursued by the British had prevented the evolution of a specific Cypriot identity. In its place, separate Turkish and Greek identities had been strengthened and were increasingly in opposition to each other. Therefore the constitution was built along consociational lines, meaning that the ratio of parliamentary membership was based on ethnic affiliation. Although there were approximately 18 percent Turkish-Cypriots and 81 percent Greek-Cypriots in Cyprus at the time, membership to the House of Representatives was set up on a 30:70 ratio. In order to close down this gap the Turkish-Cypriot minority, 30 percent of the members, were awarded the right to veto. This same ratio was applied to the public service in general, deeming it quite ineffective.\textsuperscript{103} According to the political scientist Joseph S. Joseph, “the state never functioned properly.”\textsuperscript{104} In addition to the specific set-up of the House of Representatives, the President of Cyprus was set to always be a Greek-Cypriot, while the Vice President would always be Turkish-Cypriot.\textsuperscript{105}

Also imbedded in the new Cypriot constitution were three treaties directly involving foreign countries, thus further limiting authentic Cypriot independence. First, the Treaty of

\textsuperscript{101} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 88; Asmussen, Cyprus at War, 12; Markides, “Cyprus since 1878”, 17.
\textsuperscript{103} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 14; Joseph, Cyprus, 25; O’Malley & Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, 79.
\textsuperscript{104} Joseph, Cyprus, 26.
\textsuperscript{105} O’Malley & Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, 78; Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 96.
Establishment allowed the British to maintain 256 square kilometers on the island and set up the Dhekelia and Akrotiri Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which both the British and the Americans saw as vital to preserve Western influence and power in the area, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 106 Second, the Treaty of Alliance gave Turkey and Greece the right to military posts on the island, in total amounting to 650 Turkish and 950 Greek soldiers. The treaty was constructed so as to protect the two communities from being attacked by the other. It was also a part of the designs for the third treaty, namely the Treaty of Guarantee, which allowed for a trilateral, bilateral or unilateral – by Turkey, Greece and/or Great Britain – intervention in order to prevent the union between Cyprus and a second country. 107

In extension of direct Greek and Turkish presence on Cyprus, as provided by these treaties, the two mother countries continued to provide school curricula and teaching staff as part of the persisting policy of separated education based on ethnicity, with roots from the Ottoman millet system and British colonial policies. This was therefore a further obstacle to creating a common Cypriot identity. 108 The imported material and staff from the mother countries “implanted a Greek or a Turkish identity with matching nationalism and the concept of an enemy”. 109 The Treaty of Guarantee attempted to prevent political union between Cyprus and a second country, that is either Turkey or Greece. However, since both Greece and Turkey had been included in the internal affairs of the island, there already was a strong cultural union between the mother countries and their respective ethnic brothers in Cyprus. 110

Even though the complicated system of power-sharing that was constructed in the Cypriot constitution was created to avoid further bloodshed, a major problem remained in that the underlying conflict was not properly addressed, namely a strong sense of ethnic separation between the island’s populations. The more or less peaceful co-existence, in which the two communities originally had lived until the end of the British colonial period, had to some extent broken down in the 1950s. Separation within education prevailed and cultural ties were drawn between each ethnic group and their respective motherlands, rather than between the two communities. Thus, it was obvious that both taksim and enosis were goals still pursued, rather than abandoned. Inter-communal violence was therefore bound to spread once

106 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 95.
107 Joseph, Cyprus, 21.
108 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 26-27.
109 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 97.
110 Joseph, Cyprus, 21.
again unless serious steps were taken towards creating a common identity. Although the period from 1960 to 1962 may be characterized as peaceful years in Cyprus, its brevity reveals the true lack of success in curbing the violence that the 1950s featured.\textsuperscript{111}

**Constitutional breakdown: 1963-1967**

Neither of the two communities was willing to reduce or disband their paramilitary forces, resulting in the upholding of the Greek-Cypriot EOKA and the Turkish-Cypriot TMT.\textsuperscript{112} This again illustrates the lacking trust in the constitution that had allegedly been created to keep inter-ethnic violence from reoccurring. There seemed to be little reason to trust each other studying Makarios’ speech in September 1962, in which he declared that as long as the Turkish-Cypriots remain on the island “the duty of EOKA cannot be considered as terminated”.\textsuperscript{113} The Turkish-Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, continued to insist that partition would be the only solution if the protection of their minority could not be ensured.\textsuperscript{114}

Both sides waited for an opportunity to prove that the constitution could not bring about the desired peace, and thus carry out their original ambitions, i.e. \textit{enosis} and \textit{taksim}. Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriot minority, although fully aware of the total ineffectiveness of the constitution, persisted on retaining the advantages they had been given, such as the right to veto. In an attempt to override these minority privileges, the Greek-Cypriot leadership, with Makarios in the lead, suggested a thirteen-point modification of the constitution.\textsuperscript{115}

Both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community rejected these amendments, as they took away the very privileges that had made them accept the constitution in the first place. Especially threatening to them was Makarios’ proposal to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee, which gave Turkey, along with Greece and Great Britain, the right to intervene if union between Cyprus and a second state was carried out.\textsuperscript{116} The situation created by Makarios’ thirteen points was indeed so tense that even the smallest incident could escalate into civil war. This is precisely what happened on 21 December 1963. What started as an insignificant

\textsuperscript{111} Joseph, \textit{Cyprus}, 21; Richter, \textit{History of Modern Cyprus}, 97.
\textsuperscript{112} Ioannides, \textit{In Turkey’s Image}, 130.
\textsuperscript{113} Volkan & Itzkowitz, \textit{Turks & Greeks}, 138.
\textsuperscript{114} Joseph, \textit{Cyprus}, 28.
\textsuperscript{115} Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 13.
\textsuperscript{116} O’Malley & Craig, \textit{The Cyprus Conspiracy}, 91.
incident in the old-town of Nicosia, involving a standard ID-inspection of a small group of Turkish-Cypriots, quickly spread into violent riots throughout Cyprus. As a result, both EOKA and TMT mobilized, and both groups carried out indiscriminant killings, plundering and pillaging.\footnote{Richter, \textit{History of Modern Cyprus}, 120-121.}

The initial Christmas massacre, as the Turkish-Cypriots referred to the first days preceding 21 December, spread quickly across the island.\footnote{Richter, \textit{History of Modern Cyprus}, 120-121.} Greek-Cypriot “paramilitary, running amok, murdered women and children, plundered and destroyed Turkish property and took hostages.”\footnote{Richter, \textit{History of Modern Cyprus}, 121.} The escalation of what started as a minor episode resulted in a civil war lasted until 10 August 1964. 174 Greek-Cypriots and 364 Turkish-Cypriots were killed in this period.\footnote{Meyer, James H. “Policy Watershed: Turkey’s Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 1974.” \textit{Case Studies in International Diplomacy}. WWS Case Study 3/00. Princeton University. 28 Oct. 2010, accessed 01 Mar. 2011. <http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/cyprus.pdf>, 10.} As opposed to the ethnic violence that took place in the 1950s, this civil war resulted in the physical separation of the two communities, and the creation of Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. Approximately 60 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot minority moved to the established enclaves (see Map 1 below). The majority of them lived in these areas until 1974, when the Turkish invasion led to the actual partition of Cyprus.\footnote{Ioannides, \textit{In Turkey’s Image}, 130-131.} Consequently, the ethnic separation of the Cypriot population has been more or less constant from 1964 until today.\footnote{This separation has been given a new dimension ever since people from Turkey increasingly immigrated to Northern Cyprus from 1974 onwards: See chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.} Once the civil war broke out and enclaves were in place, the Cypriot government broke down, and Turkish-Cypriot representatives were excluded since Greek-Cypriot representatives held meetings in the Greek sectors of the island.\footnote{Volkan & Itzkowitz, \textit{Turks & Greeks}, 140.} From this point forward, therefore, the Cypriot government and parliament refer only to Greek-Cypriots.
Since the Turkish-Cypriots were excluded from government, as a result of them living in enclosed enclaves separate from the Greek-Cypriot majority, they established their own institutions through which they governed themselves. Initially, in 1963, a General Committee was set up to take care of the everyday needs of the Turkish-Cypriot population. In December 1967, in response to the reemergence of inter-communal violence, a Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration replaced the less comprehensive General Committee. This administration was involved with everything from resettling the Turkish-Cypriot refugees from around the island to education and the running of the economy. In this way the Turkish-Cypriot minority were becoming more independent in their isolation from the rest of the island. As the situation seemed to be at a standstill, despite the absence of serious inter-communal violence after 1967, the Turkish-Cypriots established the Turkish-Cypriot Administration in 1971. A further step towards political separation was taken in September 1974, after the Turkish intervention had divided the island, when the Turkish-Cypriots formed the Autonomous Turkish-Cypriot Administration. The eventual independence of the Turkish-Cypriot population in 1983, with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), therefore, is the result of these gradual developments from 1963.


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124 The spots represent Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. Source: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~zafer/maps.html
Through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, adopted on 4 March 1964, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established. This peacekeeping force was set up in order to secure peace and prevent further outbreak of violence. The first troops arrived on the island on 14 March 1964. This was a direct response to Turkey’s threat, the same month, of military intervention if violence against Turkish-Cypriots did not cease.\textsuperscript{127} Despite the introduction of the UNFICYP forces in mid-March 1964, fighting continued in Cyprus, and when the Greek-Cypriot parliament agreed to “establish an army and to import large quantities of arms”, Turkey saw no other option than to intervene militarily.\textsuperscript{128} Fearful of Soviet involvement in the Cyprus conflict, the United States’ President Lyndon B. Johnson discouraged, in a strongly worded letter to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Turkey from intervening.\textsuperscript{129} This letter, popularly referred to as the Johnson Letter, “destroyed the Turkish primal trust in American leadership.”\textsuperscript{130}

Compared to the violence of 1963-1964, the period from August 1964 to November 1967 was relatively calm. However, it too led to casualties. 60 Greek- and 109 Turkish-Cypriots were killed in the latter period.\textsuperscript{131} An explanation for the decline in violence is that the two communities for the most part lived in separate areas and were protect by UNFICYP forces. However, since occurrences of inter-ethnic violence did persist, Turkey got involved once more. While Greece largely remained outside the conflict in the earlier civil war, it got increasingly involved in the situation of 1967. Greece became a military dictatorship in 1967 and, as a nationalistic government, desired to reinforce the fight for enosis.\textsuperscript{132} Since the junta takeover in Greece in 1967, the country’s “policies toward Cyprus led from one disaster to another.”\textsuperscript{133} Since the civil war in 1964, when the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities were to a large extent completely separated, the latter had experienced an economic growth that far surpassed that of the other, more isolated, community. The economy of the Greek-Cypriot sector became stronger even than that of Greece.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{129} Asmussen, Cyprus at War, 13.
\textsuperscript{130} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 131.
\textsuperscript{131} Meyer, “Policy Watershed”, 14.
\textsuperscript{132} Markides, “Cyprus Since 1878”, 20; Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 129; Bolukbasi, “Turkey’s Policy Toward Cyprus”, 40-42.
\textsuperscript{133} Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 144.
\textsuperscript{134} Asmussen, Cyprus at War, 13.
Parallel to this development, Makarios’ international influence had grown immensely. He had become a central actor among the non-aligned of the Cold War. Thus, enosis seemed less appealing to the Greek-Cypriot leadership in this period because a union with Greece would reduce Makarios’ importance. At the same time, Makarios continued the division between the two ethnic groups. He insisted on the maintenance of the (Greek) Cypriot National Guard despite the continued presence of UNFICYP forces and the armies of Turkey and Greece, as ratified by the Treaty of Alliance. This led to further fears among the Turkish-Cypriot minority for their safety. All of these dynamics were bound to cause a new rift in the fragile triangle, consisting of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

When inter-ethnic violence again broke out in November 1967, a Greek-Turkish conflict appeared probable. Similarly to the crisis in 1964, which nearly caused an intervention by Turkey, the situation in 1967 threatened to internationalize the conflict. Even a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union could have taken place as a result of the developments. This was largely because the Soviet Union supported Makarios with weapons, while at the same time eyeing the Greek military junta in Athens with great skepticism. As both Greece and Turkey were NATO members, it was highly undesirable for the United States that a conflict between them could break out. Therefore, the US, once again, used its powerful influence to stop Turkey from intervening in 1967. However, similarly to prior crises and their conclusions, “a settlement of the broader ethnopolitical conflict never came within sight … the basic problems of Cyprus remain[ed]”. The two communities still lived separately, and the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves remained in place. Despite having lost face by being prevented from intervening a second time, Turkey was able to exert some influence and carry out certain important changes. Turkey, in fact, used pressure to force Colonel George Grivas and his paramilitary men in the (Greek) Cypriot National Guard out of Cyprus along with 15,000, out of 17,000 Greek soldiers stationed in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the two thousand that remained would some years later prove to be integral in a new and even bigger crisis.

135 Asmussen, *Cyprus at War*, 13.
136 Joseph, *Cyprus*, 70-71;
137 Joseph, *Cyprus*, 70.
139 Volkan & Itzkowitz, *Turks & Greeks*, 140-141.
Turkey’s intervention: 1974

The crisis, which truly and markedly changed the history of Cyprus, occurred in 1974. The relationship between the Greek-Cypriot leadership, with Makarios in the lead, and Greece, ruled by a military junta since 1967, had ebbed. The Greek National Guard, stationed on Cyprus as a part of the Greek contingent stipulated in the Treaty of Alliance, organized a coup against Makarios on 15 July 1974. Their aim was to carry out enosis. Turkey therefore decided to act. Turkey felt that it had been humiliated in the two previous crises when they were prevented from intervening, something they saw as an affront to their perceived legal right to protect their ethnic brothers. The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, elected in 1973, made it clear to the Turkish parliament that Turkey would “act more assertively … to put an end to the ‘humiliations’ suffered in … Cyprus.” The opportunity to do so came when, as a result of the coup against Makarios, the coup-makers appointed Nikos Sampson as the new President of Cyprus. Sampson had come to be known as a Tourkofagos (Greek meaning Turk-eater) during the civil war of 1963-1964, when he was directly responsible for the death of 20 Turkish-Cypriots. Choosing Sampson as the new leader was a grave mistake, one that was sure to be viewed with great suspicion and fear from both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots.

The Greeks may have realized the risk involved in this decision. Therefore they attempted to remedy the provocation through trying to prove that the coup was an internal conflict between Greek-Cypriots. In fact, the coup had been carried out because the Greek military junta viewed Makarios with great skepticism, and he was seen as the “only reason that Enosis had not been implemented.” There had been no attacks on the Turkish-Cypriots on the first day of the coup. Nevertheless, this was irrelevant to Turkey, which used the Treaty of Guarantee as a pretext to intervene in Cyprus. This treaty gave the three guarantor powers the right to intervene, multilaterally if possible, or unilaterally if not, in order to prevent the political union between Cyprus and a second state. It was hardly a secret that the Greek government was involved in the coup, and it was even less of a secret that Sampson and EOKA B (a new and more extreme version of the original EOKA), which he led, desired to

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141 Joseph, Cyprus, 72-73.
142 Bolukbasi, “Turkey’s Policy Toward Cyprus”, 42.
143 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 179.
144 Drousiotis, Makarios, Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Turkish Invasion. Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, 2006, 30.
unite Cyprus with Greece.\textsuperscript{145} Turkey, in full accordance with the treaty, consulted Great Britain with a proposal to intervene in Cyprus to restore the 1960 constitution and reinstate Makarios as President. If the British had agreed to join the Turkish, Turkey would most likely not have been able to split the island in two as it did in August 1974. In that case, an intervention would be carried out from the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs), which were both in the south, areas further away from Turkey and thus harder to control and maintain.\textsuperscript{146}

When the British refused to get involved, Turkey took matters into their own hands and intervened unilaterally. Turkish troops landed in Girne in northern Cyprus on 20 July 1974, only five days after the coup. There has been a lot of speculation about how Turkey was able to mobilize so quickly, and some claim that it must have been the result of an American conspiracy to divide the island.\textsuperscript{147} However, the northern coast of Cyprus was and still is only 75 kilometers from Southern Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey had been prepared to intervene in Cyprus twice previously. As opposed to the two previous occasions, it was now much easier for Turkey to intervene because it had improved its military technology.\textsuperscript{148} In addition, the Greek National Guard contingent on the island had been greatly reduced after the crisis of 1967. This increased both the likelihood of a Turkish intervention and the prospect of success.\textsuperscript{149} In direct opposition to the previous crises, NATO took a conciliatory stand towards Turkey and the alliance’s Secretary-General, Joseph Lüns, argued that “Turkey was more important for the Alliance than Greece. If there were a Turkish intervention, world opinion would back it.”\textsuperscript{150} It was therefore made quite clear to Turkey that they would be given the green light, and there seemed to be little risk in intervening.

Turkey’s military operation may be divided into two phases. The first phase was an intervention. In fact, the Turkish delegates at the NATO Council meeting on 21 July claimed that Turkey intervened on Cyprus in order to reestablish “normality and constitutional order”.\textsuperscript{151} In other words, it would adhere to the rules and stipulations of the Treaty of Guarantee. Already by 22 July 1974 Turkey concluded a victory that resulted in the fall of the

\textsuperscript{145} Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 43, 17; Volkan & Itzkowitz, \textit{Turks & Greeks}, 144.
\textsuperscript{148} Ioannides, \textit{In Turkey’s Image}, 144.
\textsuperscript{150} Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 90.
\textsuperscript{151} Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 101.
Greek military junta and the ousting of Nikos Sampson. Thus, only two days after military intervention, Turkey had fulfilled its role as a guarantor power. Nevertheless, it did not stop there. Despite the ceasefire that was instated after Turkey had taken Girne on 22 July, Turkey continued to mobilize troops to the island. Furthermore, in direct opposition to both its stated goal, and its right as a guarantor, Turkey was responsible for numerous violations of human rights, such as attacks on civilians, raping, plundering and treating prisoners poorly.\footnote{Richter, \textit{History of Modern Cyprus}, 187.} It was therefore no surprise that Turkish-Cypriots were harmed and subject to violence only after Turkey intervened, at which time “the National Guard started an all-out attack on Turkish-Cypriot villages and quarters of mixed villages and towns.”\footnote{Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 100.} What was at first an internal Greek conflict, therefore, had, through a spiral of violence, developed into yet another inter-communal conflict.

Despite the ceasefire from 22 July, violations and troop movements continued on both sides. Two peace conferences were held at Geneva, the first from 23-31 July, and the second from 8-13 August 1974. However, no solution was reached. As a result, Turkey decided to initiate a second operation. The second military operation was an outright invasion. It resulted in the division of the island.\footnote{Asmussen, \textit{Cyprus at War}, 152.} At this point “Turkish and Greek roles vis-à-vis the status quo have … been completely reversed, with Ankara openly advocating the overthrow of the 1960 accords and Greece defending them.”\footnote{Meyer, “Policy Watershed”, 20.} Whereas the first operation was allegedly intended to prevent \textit{enosis} and in that way reestablish the original constitution, the second operation clearly served to create a permanent and strong Turkish presence on the island.

After the invasion ended on 16 August 1974, Turkey possessed 36 percent of the island, protected by a substantial force of 40,000 troops.\footnote{Bolukbasi, “Turkey’s Policy Toward Cyprus”, 44; Richter, \textit{History of Modern Cyprus}, 194.} Both communities were affected by the violence. 700 Greek and 250 Turkish soldiers lost their lives, while 192 Greek- and 965 Turkish-Cypriots were killed in the 1974 war. An even more emotional matter, still subject to heated debates on both sides, regards the 2,001 still missing persons from both communities,
of which there are 1,508 Greek-Cypriots and 493 Turkish-Cypriots. As with most wars, neither side had a monopoly on victimhood, just as neither had a monopoly on perpetration.

**Population vacuum**

In addition to the relatively high number of casualties and missing persons, a population vacuum was created through the vast numbers of internally displaced persons. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 240,000 internally displaced as a result of the division of the island, of which approximately 180,000 were Greek-Cypriots who moved south, and 60,000 were Turkish-Cypriots that went north. This was a great amount, considering that in 1974 the entire population of the island amounted to around 600,000. The exodus of 180,000 Greek-Cypriots from the part of the island now in Turkey’s hands therefore resulted in a population vacuum in the north. It is in this context that the Turkish government and the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community, seeing the need to fill this vacuum, initiated a policy of encouraging people from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus.

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158 Author’s e-mail correspondence with Ishak, Nasr, UNHCR Representation in Cyprus, 18 Apr. 2011; Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 14.
3. Developments in northern Cyprus 1974-1980

As with any area involved in a war, the Turkish intervention of July and August 1974 had significant negative impacts on the political, social and economical development of northern Cyprus. Although north Cyprus, which consisted of 36 percent of the island, possessed fertile lands and the most developed tourist areas of Cyprus, it was the hardest hit economically. This was largely due to a population that was too small to fully take advantage of the economic potential of the north. However, it was also attributable to its lack of international recognition. Politically, the Turkish-Cypriots became even more isolated than before, and they were the clear losers despite the military superiority of Turkey, which intervened in their favor. The international community made its stance clear on 1 November 1974 when resolution 3212 was passed in the UN General Assembly with 117 votes for, no votes against, and no abstentions. It called for all foreign troops to withdraw and for all states to uphold the independence of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Rauf Denktaş, Vice President and international representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community, accentuated that he sought either a federation with considerable autonomy for the Turkish-Cypriot community or the establishment of a totally independent Turkish-Cypriot state. The Turkish-Cypriots, due to their isolation from the international community, were in dire need of support from Turkey, which was their only source of economic and political assistance. As a result, after 1974, the political, social and economic structures of northern Cyprus were increasingly influenced from Turkey.\(^{159}\) It was in this context of close co-operation with Turkey, that the first wave of immigration was made possible.

**Initial political developments**

Much of the relocation of populations between north and south was done by the end of 1974 as people on both sides had fled due to the war. However, most of those remaining on the “wrong” side of the buffer zone were transferred after August 1975. The Vienna III Agreement had been concluded on 2 August 1975 between Denktaş as representative of the

Turkish-Cypriot community and Glafcos Clerides as representative of the Greek-Cypriots.\textsuperscript{160}

The Vienna III Agreement stipulated the following:

1. The Turkish Cypriots at present in the south of the island will be allowed … to proceed north with their belongings … with the assistance of UNFICYP.
2. … the Greek Cypriots at present in the north of the island are free to stay and be given every help to lead a normal life, including … [the] freedom of movement in the north.
3. The Greek Cypriots at present in the north who, at their own request and without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move to the south, will be permitted to do so.
4. UNFICYP will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the north.
5. … priority will be given to the reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the south, to the north.\textsuperscript{161}

The Turkish-Cypriots, in contrast to what Vienna III actually stated, interpreted the agreement as a population exchange and referred to it “as the ‘1975 Vienna Population Exchange Agreement’ or the ‘Voluntary Re-Grouping of Population Agreement’”.\textsuperscript{162} A great majority of the Turkish-Cypriots who found themselves in South-Cyprus following the war took up on the offer, stated in the agreement, to move north. Thus, after a couple of months only 130 Turkish-Cypriots remained in the south. The Greek-Cypriot population in northern Cyprus, on the other hand, dwindled at a slower pace (in 1978 there were still 1,600 Greek-Cypriots living in north Cyprus).\textsuperscript{163} The movement of Greek-Cypriots from north Cyprus to the south and Turkish-Cypriots living in Southern Cyprus moving in the opposite direction was largely done with the aid of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). They helped transport people across the buffer zone, and provided the refugees with food and relief supplies.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{160} Necatigil, \textit{The Cyprus Question}, 128.
\textsuperscript{163} Gürel & Özersay, \textit{The Politics of Property in Cyprus}, 17-18; “Interview Granted By Rauf R. Denktas, President Of The Turkish Cypriot Federated State Of Cyprus To Dr. Peter Sechmid On 12 July 1978.” Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 873.
The Turkish-Cypriot’s erroneous reading of the agreement was due their principle view on the solution to the Cyprus conflict, namely that “bizonality is the key parameter of a settlement”. Therefore, as a consequence of the agreement, both the north and the south of the island were more or less completely ethnically cleansed by 1975. The Turkish-Cypriot interpretation of the Vienna III Agreement was a major element in their design to turn Cyprus into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. These terms, like almost every element in the Cyprus conflict, meant different things to the two parties involved. As opposed to the Turkish-Cypriot view, the Greek-Cypriots did not see a need for a rigid ethnic separation between the two communities. In other words, there was simply talk of two federal units, forming a Federal Republic. For the Turkish-Cypriots, a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation consisted of two strictly geographically and ethnically separated autonomous states, unified politically as a Federal Republic of Cyprus.

A major political step towards this goal was taken half a year before the completion of the separation of the two communities. On 13 February 1975, the Turkish-Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Denktaş, formerly the Vice President of the Turkish-Cypriot community, became President of this newly proclaimed federated state. The international community, this time through the UN Security Council, unanimously condemned the development and reiterated that the Republic of Cyprus was the only recognized entity on the island. The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 was another major step towards the political independence of the Turkish-Cypriot community, which had slowly begun with the establishment of the General Committee in 1963 and developed through the formation of the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration in 1967, the Turkish-Cypriot Administration in 1971 and finally the Autonomous Turkish-Cypriot Administration in 1974.

The Turkish-Cypriot efforts at increasing their independence, including the creation of a federal state in Cyprus, only made them more isolated internationally. As a result, they sought further support from Turkey, still the only country to recognize their political aspirations. This resulted in a more or less complete reliance on Turkey. Although the actions

166 Richter, *History of Modern Cyprus*, 203-204.
167 Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem*, 78-79; Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 195.
of the Turkish-Cypriots after the completion of the Turkish intervention were internationally condemned, the Turkish-Cypriots were positive towards Turkey’s actions and viewed them as saving them from the harsh conditions under which they had lived in the enclaves throughout the 1963 to 1974-period.\textsuperscript{170} Safety from Greek-Cypriot violence was their primary concern. Turkey’s intervention meant they were now protected both by a UN buffer zone that cut across the island, and by a large Turkish army contingent stationed in the north.\textsuperscript{171}

The international community was very critical of Turkey’s actions in Cyprus. In response to the Turkish army’s continued presence in northern Cyprus, the United States implemented an arms embargo on Turkey, despite the fact that they were both NATO members. The American arms embargo lasted until 1978 and is a vivid illustration of the political isolation Turkey faced as a result of the 1974 intervention. The United States had, ten years earlier, in the Johnson Letter, made it clear that it would punish Turkey if it were to use American weapons in any prospective invasion of Cyprus. This spurred anti-American sentiments among both Turks and Turkish-Cypriots, who saw the international community’s reactions as unfair and one-sidedly in favor of the Greek-Cypriots.\textsuperscript{172} The presence of the Turkish army made the international community even more skeptical of the self-proclaimed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The international community’s reaction to the role of the Turkish army in the north confined “the Turkish-Cypriot state-building ambitions to the establishment of a kind of huge enclave fully dependent on Ankara’s support.”\textsuperscript{173} It was assumed that Turkey stood behind every Turkish-Cypriot move towards increased independence. However, as may be seen by the development of Turkish-Cypriot political bodies prior to Turkey’s 1974 intervention, the Turkish-Cypriots actively and independently moved towards sovereignty. The truth is therefore more nuanced.

The political developments in northern Cyprus following the division of the island were, according to the historian Christoph Ramm, characterized by “the effort to create a kind of ‘Little Turkey’, with the Turkish Cypriot administration attempting to shape the society of northern Cyprus according to the Turkish model”.\textsuperscript{174} The Kemalist ideology, based on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s political efforts and views when he founded the new Turkish state

\textsuperscript{170} See chapter 2 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{171} Ker-Lindsay, \textit{The Cyprus Problem}, 48; Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 186.
\textsuperscript{172} Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 196; Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, 276. See chapter 2 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{173} Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 208.
\textsuperscript{174} Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 191-192.
in 1923, was central to the Turkish model referred to by Ramm. It focused on the need to create a secular and ethno-nationalist state. Denktaş declared the need to be devoted to the principles of pluralism and democracy. These became central aspects of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.\(^{175}\)

However, certain subjects were not to be open to neither pluralism nor democracy in the unrecognized state where Denktaş became President. The view on the Cyprus conflict and on the Greeks, the Greek-Cypriots and the outside world was regarded as issues central to “the preservation of ‘unity and togetherness’” and was therefore “a central element into the state’s foundations.”\(^{176}\) These restrictions on political views were outlined in the Law on Political Parties, which was adopted at the same time as the proposed constitution was unveiled in May 1975. All political parties in northern Cyprus were prohibited from discrediting Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his historical role in founding the Turkish Republic; refuting the cultural link between the Turkish-Cypriot community and the greater Turkish nation; and to criticize the Turkish intervention in 1974 and claim that it was illegal.\(^ {177}\) It is clear, in light of these restrictions, especially the final point, that Turkey was an important model for northern Cypriot politics.

Nevertheless, the Turkish President at the time, Fahri Korutürk, denied allegations that Turkey was behind all political developments in north Cyprus and claimed that “the new constitution was no more than an internal reorganization intended to ease movements towards a federal state in the course of time.”\(^ {178}\) Vedat Çelik, Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the time, held that Turkey did not intervene directly in the politics of north Cyprus, although it may have provided “suggestions and recommendations” to the Turkish-Cypriot administration.\(^ {179}\) At the same time, he argued that “we were very, very careful not to associate ourselves, or identify ourselves with any political party in Turkey … It was the Turkish government [we] had the allegiance [to] … [we]

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\(^ {175}\) Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti [Turkish Federated State of Cyprus], Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti Anayasası [The Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus]. Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti, 1975. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 36; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Atakol, Kenan, in Lapta, Girne district, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 12 March 2013.

\(^ {176}\) Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 193, 197.

\(^ {177}\) Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 197-198; TRNC Archive Doc. No. 36.

\(^ {178}\) Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 106.

\(^ {179}\) Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Çelik, Vedat, in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 11 March 2013.
needed their support, full support in each and every sector”.\(^{180}\) This reveals the true nature of dependence and loyalty.

While the Law on Political Parties had some questionable aspects undermining its democratic credibility, the discussions around the proposed constitution revealed that democracy was, in other questions and matters, an underlying principle. The constitution disclosed in May 1975 received criticism from a large group of politicians in northern Cyprus. The main argument against the proposed constitution was that the President received too much power. In its initial draft it was proposed that the President could appoint and dismiss ministers at will. Furthermore, the President could take exceptional measures in any event he considered dangerous to the security of the state. Both of these points were harshly criticized. Whereas the first point was amended, the second was completely removed.\(^ {181}\) These developments reveal that political participation was a growing phenomenon in north Cyprus following the division of the island. Nevertheless, certain aspects were not subject to discussion, namely the Cyprus conflict.\(^ {182}\) Therefore, “opposition was mainly motivated … by constitutional, ideological, and policy differences related to the internal problems of Northern Cyprus.”\(^ {183}\)

On 8 June 1975 the constitution, with a more parliamentarian character and some important revisions made, was brought to a referendum. 99.4 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot electorate (with a 72 percent turn-out) voted in favor of the revised constitution.\(^ {184}\) The constitution outlined that the Turkish Federated Republic of Cyprus was a republic, with the President as the Head of State. Under the President was a Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister as its head. Rather than being a proclamation of independence, the constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus underlined that once the Federal Republic of Cyprus was declared, it would make up the Turkish entity of this federation.\(^ {185}\)

Prior to the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and the passing of the constitution, the only political party in northern Cyprus was the Republican Turkish Party

\(^{180}\) Interview with Çelik.
\(^{181}\) Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 107.
\(^{182}\) Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 108.
\(^{183}\) Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 108.
\(^{184}\) Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 108.
(Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi: CTP), founded in 1970. Ahmed Berberoğlu was the leader of the party until Özker Özgür became its new party leader in 1976. Both were critical of Denktaş’s clear domination in Turkish-Cypriot politics. Following the debates on the draft constitution in 1975, a series of new political parties were formed. The first new party, founded in August 1975, was the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti: HP), which described itself as a social-democratic party. In reaction to the forming opposition to the ruling right-wing Turkish-Cypriot administration, Denktaş established the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi: UBP), which has been the most important and influential party in north Cyprus since its founding in October 1975. Early on, HP faced an internal dispute and lost many of its central members who broke out of the party and formed the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi: TKP) in March 1976. This newly founded party became one of the central actors in the opposition against Denktaş and the UBP.186

On 20 June 1976 both presidential and general elections were held in northern Cyprus. Denktaş achieved a clear victory in the presidential elections, receiving 77.6 percent of the votes. Meanwhile his party, the UBP, was the clear winner of the general election with 53.7 percent of the votes. Receiving 20.2 percent of the votes, the TKP became the second biggest party.187 The TKP had undoubtedly hoped for and expected better election results. After all, the UBP leadership had been the ruling elite in the Turkish-Cypriot community since the division of the island. Moreover, the domestic situation in northern Cyprus was plagued by a troubled economy.188

During UBP’s time in power, from 1976 to 1981, the party fielded three Prime Ministers.189 Nejat Konuk’s cabinet faced “accusations of inefficiency and impropriety”, and the economic difficulties that characterized northern Cyprus challenged UBP’s popularity.190 Faced with opposition both from within and from outside the party, Konuk resigned in April 1978 and was succeeded by Osman Örek whose goal was to improve the economy, the Achilles heel of the UBP and northern Cyprus. Although the economic situation was somewhat improved

186 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 170; Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 199-200.
187 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 110.
188 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 201; Tatar, Rüstem Z., “Economy of Turkish Federated State of Kıbrıs”. Ticaret, Sanayi ve Turizm Bakanlığı [Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism], Kıbrıs Türk Federede Devleti [Turkish Federated State of Cyprus]: Lefkoşa, 1981. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 966.
189 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 110-121.
190 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 111-114.
through increased trade with and aid from Turkey, the Örek government began to come apart at the seams through various cabinet resignations. In November 1978, only six months after becoming Prime Minister, Örek resigned. Mustafa Çağatay, Minister of Health in Örek’s cabinet, became the new Prime Minister. One of his first acts was to send a delegation to Turkey to obtain further economic support. In securing a bigger aid package, the Çağatay government was initially able to mollify criticism from the opposition, both within the UBP and from other parties. By using Turkish Lira, northern Cyprus linked itself closely to the Turkish economy, thus limiting their financial autonomy. Turkey’s economy deteriorated considerably during Çağatay’s period as Prime Minister. Coupled with the Turkish military coup on 12 September 1980, this caused repercussions in the economy in the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Çağatay’s government survived the crisis.191

Despite the internal problems and difficulties that the UBP government faced, Denktas distanced himself from everyday domestic politics of north Cyprus and was “quick to assert that government was not his responsibility”.192 The initial powers proposed for the president in the first constitution were removed through critical debates on the matter. Denktas’s political role lay elsewhere, namely continuing to represent the Turkish-Cypriots in international talks on solving the Cyprus conflict.193 Çelik claimed that both he and Denktas, as they were busy with negotiating on a solution to the conflict, “had no time whatsoever [for] … internal administrative problems” in this period.194

**The inter-communal negotiations**

Despite the small size of Cyprus, the conflict there received major international attention. Greece and Turkey were deeply involved due to the cultural ties between their respective ethnic brethren on the island. During the Cold War, both Britain, which until 1960 had Cyprus in their colonial possession, and the US took an increasing interest in the conflict because of the geopolitical position of the island. The UN had been involved in attempting to solve the Cyprus conflict ever since the civil war that started in 1963. In 1964, it set up an international peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, to prevent further violence.195 After the division of the island a series of new inter-communal negotiations were set in motion. They were

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191 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 114-117.
192 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 111.
193 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 111.
194 Interview with Çelik.
195 See chapter 2 of this thesis.
initiated both through encouragement from Britain, the US and the UN, but also through
efforts made by both Denktaş, as the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community, and
Clerides, representing the Greek-Cypriots.196

Denktaş and Clerides initiated negotiations during the last few months of 1974. They were
able to make unprecedented progress in their negotiations on how to solve the conflict. On 6
November 1974 Clerides noted that returning to the Cyprus of 1960 would not be realistic,
mainly because Turkey would not approve of such a move. Therefore, he argued, a federal
solution should be sought.197 This statement was warmly welcomed by the Turkish-Cypriots,
and “Denktash called his attitude realistic and constructive.”198 Another hint at a possible
success in the negotiations between Clerides and Denktaş was that the latter revealed a
potential openness towards making territorial concessions. Nevertheless, he also stated that
he would not hold talks with Makarios if he were to return to the island from his exile
following the coup d’état. Makarios’ return, however, was imminent and therefore Clerides’
time as negotiator was running out. Most Greek-Cypriots regarded Makarios as a hero,
because he had been the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus since 1950 and was Cyprus’
first President.199 The Greek-Cypriots were for the most part negative to Clerides’ approach
because, they argued, he made too many concessions. The Greek-Cypriots were therefore
pleased to find that Makarios, who they knew was going to take a tougher stance against the
Turks and the Turkish-Cypriots, returned to the island on 7 December 1974.200

The negotiations between the two parties were temporarily suspended as a result of
Makarios’ return to Cyprus. Both Denktaş and Turkey refused to negotiate on Makarios’
terms, which he had stated on 22 November 1974 to be the total withdrawal of all Turkish
forces and the return of Greek-Cypriot refugees to the north. Furthermore, Makarios was not
willing to accept the Turkish-Cypriot desire for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, but could
offer working towards a multi-regional federation.201 Whereas a bi-zonal federation implied
two ethnically and geographically separated areas, a multi-regional federation was not
acceptable to the Turkish-Cypriots as it meant creating a series of disconnected Turkish-
Cypriot islands in a larger Greek-Cypriot sea, which evoked memories of the enclaves of the

197 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 201.
198 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 201.
199 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 201. See chapter 2 of this thesis.
200 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 201-202.
201 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 202-203.
1960s and 1970s. The Turkish-Cypriots could not accept such a solution as their security and safety from inter-communal violence was their primary concern. Such security would be harder to ensure with disconnected zones. Despite these disagreements, the two parties came together in April 1975. They were encouraged to do so by the United Nations Secretary-General at the time, Kurt Waldheim. It culminated in the High Level Agreement of 1977.\textsuperscript{202}

One of the clichés of the Cyprus conflict is the notion of missed opportunities. The inter-communal negotiations are a clear example. The High Level Agreements reached between Denktaş and Makarios in 1977, were similar to the principles discussed three years earlier between Denktaş and Clerides. However, the High Level Agreements were more comprehensive and, more importantly, agreed to by all.\textsuperscript{203} These agreements were the biggest breakthroughs in moving towards a solution to the Cyprus conflict, and “until today it is the basic feature of all solution proposals.”\textsuperscript{204} The principles agreed to between Makarios and Denktaş in February 1977 were the following:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.
4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.\textsuperscript{205}

Clearly, these four points were solely a framework for how any future solution should be carried out. Moreover, the points were all quite ambiguous, particularly points 1 and 2, which represent the more recurrent areas of contention between the two communities. The Turkish-Cypriots, for instance, desire two separated entities with great restrictions on migration between the two areas.\textsuperscript{206} This is first and foremost suggested as a form of security for the


\textsuperscript{203} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 209, 211.

\textsuperscript{204} Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 212.


\textsuperscript{206} Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 78-79.
Turkish-Cypriot minority, but also “in order to preserve the homogeneity of the units”. However, this notion of homogeneity is somewhat obscured when analyzing the immigration of people from mainland Turkey in the period 1974-1980, as they were of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. The Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, view the principles of the freedom of movement, settlement and property as central to accepting any solution. A major breakthrough with the 1977 agreements, however, was that Makarios reversed his initial stance of rejecting a bi-zonal federal solution, which he had held onto ever since negotiations had started. Another major point of disagreement was that of the economy in any future federal solution. In the Turkish-Cypriot view, the economies of the two communities should remain separated “until the economic gap between the two Cypriot communities … is removed and confidence is restored between them”.

For these reasons, among others, the High Level Agreements reached between Denktas and Makarios in February 1977 did not lead to anything more than an ambiguous, normative list of guidelines for what any future solution should look like. When Makarios died suddenly on 3 August 1977, Spyros Kyprianou became acting president in the Republic of Cyprus, and thereafter represented the Greek-Cypriots in the talks.

Despite the change of guard in the Greek-Cypriot leadership, no major breakthroughs followed between the two parties. UN Secretary-General Waldheim was able to bring Kyprianou and Denktas together for renewed negotiations in May 1979, which resulted in a ten-point agreement. The agreement, however, barely contained anything new compared to the High Level Agreements in 1977. Most of the points simply reiterated the need for continued talks. Nevertheless, some important subjects were added: first, the issue of Maraş, an abandoned, ghost-like suburb of Gazi Mağusa in northern Cyprus, was to be prioritized in future talks so that a large group of Greek-Cypriot refugees could promptly return; and second, Cyprus should be completely demilitarized so as to extinguish the Turkish-Cypriot fear for their safety and prevent the union with another state or outright secession. Despite

207 Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, 148.
208 See chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
210 Richter, History of Modern Cyprus, 210; Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 49-50; Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, 128-132.
211 Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, 149.
212 Denktas, The Cyprus Triangle, 84.
the agreement, further talks on 15 June 1979 quickly broke down. The political and physical division of the island continued and deepened.214 One major point that was left out of the inter-communal discussions altogether: The issue of the Turkish immigrants who had moved, and continued to move, to northern Cyprus following the Turkish intervention in 1974.215

Social changes
The political and cultural ties to and influences from Turkey strengthened the popular view that Turkey was in control of and had responsibility for every action and move taken by the Turkish-Cypriots towards increased independence. Nevertheless, many of the Turkish principles of which the self-proclaimed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was based on, such as secularism, were already central to the Turkish-Cypriot community. An effect of the British colonial period from 1878 to 1960 had been the reduced role of religion in Cyprus, especially among the Turkish-Cypriots.216 As for ethno-nationalism, many Turkish-Cypriots had since the mid-1950s viewed themselves as a part of the Turkish nation, as Turks of Cyprus.217 For them, the post-1974 situation was viewed as “the fulfillment of their old dreams of cultural reunification with the Anatolian ‘motherland’ and the world of Turkishness.”218 The constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus specifies that the “Turkish Cypriot Community is an inseparable part of the Great Turkish Nation”.219

The increasing presence of immigrants from mainland Turkey augmented the sense, outside the north, that Turkey was colonializing northern Cyprus. The Greek political scientist Christos P. Ioannides, for instance, argues that the immigration from Turkey caused a “cultural transformation of the occupied territory of Cyprus into a province of Turkey.”220 He also argues, based on the knowledge that an increasing number of churches in northern Cyprus were converted into mosques, that the north was being Islamized.221 Ramm counters this view by claiming that “the practice of converting Orthodox churches into mosques … was less religiously motivated than it symbolized the claim to ethnic Turkish cultural
hegemony over the north.” Turkish-Cypriots were largely quite secular, and despite the increased number of mosques in northern Cyprus after the division of the island, few attend prayer in the mosques on a regular basis. However, the majority of the immigrants who arrived in north Cyprus after 1974 were farmers from Central-, Southern- and Eastern-Anatolia, and the Black Sea region of Turkey. These areas were more traditional and religious. Despite the influx of more religious immigrants and the fact that numerous Imams, salaried by the Turkish government, were sent to Cyprus from Turkey, there is little evidence that northern Cyprus overall became more religious in the period 1974-1980. The Greek-Cypriots’ notion of the social changes brought to north Cyprus with the Turkish immigration, and their consequent political attitude towards the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, was largely shaped by the adaption of preordained perceptions, as Professor Robert Jervis would argue, of the Turkish-Cyprus and their self-proclaimed federated state.

Another area of social change in northern Cyprus in this period was the Turkish-Cypriot policy “to remove many Greek elements of the pre-1974 cultural landscape from the now Turkish Cypriot territory”. For the most part this involved changing place names from their original Greek names into Turkish ones. There were three categories of village-(re)naming: one, villages that were already culturally Turkish-Cypriot, and had Turkish names, were not renamed; two, villages that had both a Greek and a Turkish name prior to 1974 either took on solely the Turkish name or was completely renamed; three, villages that were entirely Greek-Cypriot before 1974, and therefore only had Greek names, were resettled by both Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south and immigrants from Turkey, and were renamed altogether. The goal of this policy was to do away with “Greekness, where it was symbolised in place-names” in northern Cyprus. Greek names of towns and villages were removed from maps and signs, resulting in an eradication of Greek culture and language. The

222 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 192.
223 Morvaridi, “Social Structure and Social Change”, 266.
226 Jervis, Perceptions and misperceptions, 409.
228 Landbury & King, “Settlement renaming”, 364.
only exception being the Karpassia Peninsula, where the few remaining Greek-Cypriots have upheld Greek elements.\textsuperscript{230}

Renaming villages, in addition to the aforementioned practice of turning churches into mosques, was a part of the desire to “Turkify” the north and create “an ‘ethnic democracy’ only for Turks.”\textsuperscript{231} Furthermore, it was part of the policy of achieving cultural and political independence from the Greek-Cypriots. Another means to reaching this goal was the removal and eradication of symbols and elements of Greek and Greek-Cypriot culture and history, replacing them with Turkish ones, such as statues of Kemal Atatürk.\textsuperscript{232} These policies appear to have been steps towards creating a wholly independent Turkish-Cypriot state, rather than a Federal Cypriot Republic. “The main strategy of Turkification was to convince the newcomer Turks from Turkey … and the Turkish Cypriots … that this is a Turkish place, both in the present and for a future that is detached from the past.”\textsuperscript{233} Cyprus was being transformed into two geographically and culturally separated parts.\textsuperscript{234}

**Economic developments**

The area in which the developments in northern Cyprus were mostly controlled and influenced by Turkey was that of the economy. During the civil war period of 1963-1974, the Turkish-Cypriots mainly lived in enclaves out of reach of the Cyprus government and were therefore hardly involved in the politics and economy of the state. Their main concerns were security and providing for basic needs. The length of the period in which they were absent from government meant that they were to a large extent inexperienced in the fields of public and economic management.\textsuperscript{235} Therefore, although in control of fertile and agriculturally opportune areas after the Turkish intervention in 1974, “the Turkish Cypriots had to start from very little when Northern Cyprus claimed its own boundaries and identity and installed its own government”\textsuperscript{236}.

\textsuperscript{230} Landbury & King, “Settlement renaming”, 364.
\textsuperscript{231} Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 208.
\textsuperscript{235} TRNC Archive Doc. No. 81; Interview with Atakol.
In addition to inexperience, the Turkish-Cypriots were unable to become politically recognized internationally. They faced political and economic boycotts from abroad. This played a big role in making the situation in north Cyprus difficult. Moreover, many of the sectors of the northern Cypriot economy were underemployed due to the population vacuum created by the forced exodus of circa 180,000 Greek-Cypriots. Further, the economic situation was characterized by high inflation rates, rising cost of living and labor unrest. According to Hakkı Atun, north Cyprus’ first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, there were three main economic objectives for the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in this period, namely “to direct the economy, to make best use of the idle factors of production, [and] to prepare the way to planned economy.” Turkey attempted to save the damaged northern Cypriot economy by contributing to funding the budget, giving aid and sending experts and not least immigrants, who could fill the thin workforce.

Approximately 33 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot budget came from Turkey. This has led some, such as Ioannides, to argue that “[i]n the economic realm, Turkey dictates the policy to be followed” by the Turkish-Cypriots. This assessment is to a great extent correct. Dr. Erdal Onurhan was directly involved in this process, and asserts that “there were several public enterprises formed right after 1974” in order to get the economy running. There were public enterprises for the major production areas of the northern Cypriot economy: industry (Sanayi Holding), shipping and airfreight, and citrus (Cypruvex). Initially, 52 percent of the shares of these companies were owned by the Turkish-Cypriot government.

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238 Atun, Hakki, “Report of Proceedings on Resources & Development in North Cyprus”, 103-104. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 89.

239 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 207; Interview with Atakol; Interview with Çelik; Interview with Atun; Author’s private interview with Dr. Erdal Onurhan at Middle East Technical University Northern Cyprus Campus in Kalkanlı, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 18 April 2013.. See chapter 5 of this thesis.

240 Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 117.

241 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 186.

242 Interview with Onurhan.
while the remaining belonged to Turkish public enterprises within the same field of production.243

In 1974 the Turkish-Cypriots adopted the Turkish Lira as their legal tender, and with it came the high Turkish inflation that characterized the Turkish economy of the 1970s.244 Furthermore, Turkey, despite having been underdeveloped in most regions, subsidized the northern Cypriot economy.245 One must view this in light of the international community’s and the Greek-Cypriot embargo of north Cyprus, economically and politically. In addition to the lack of international recognition, northern Cyprus, being recognized only by Turkey, experienced slower economic development than Southern Cyprus. North Cyprus was only half as productive overall as the Greek-Cypriot side and, within the agricultural sector, only 30 percent as productive. Furthermore, the average Turkish-Cypriot earned about one fourth as much as a Greek-Cypriot.246

How can these discrepancies and inequalities be explained? While both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot administration claimed that it was wholly because of the embargo, the Greek-Cypriots pointed towards “bad management, lack of investment and corruption” in northern Cyprus.247 It was, for instance, paradoxical that even with the agricultural potential of north Cyprus, they were to a large extent dependent on imported food from Turkey. The Greek-Cypriot authorities tend to claim that “70-80% of the economic resources of Cyprus are in the area of the Turkish Federated State”.248 The President of the Supreme Court of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the time, M. Necati Münir Ertekün, on the other hand, submits the following numbers: roughly 18 percent of the water resources; 30 percent of the agricultural productive land; two percent of the minerals; and two percent of the productive forests.249 While the former estimates exaggerated the percentage of economic resources in Turkish-Cypriot possession following the island’s division, Ertekün underestimates. The truth is likely found somewhere on the lower end of the medium between these numbers. The point

243 Interview with Onurhan.
244 See chapter 4 of this thesis.
246 Olgun, “Economic Overview”, 272, 277.
248 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 81, 26.
249 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 81, 26.
is that despite having resource potential, northern Cyprus’ economic development was slow. The reasons for this discrepancy is probably due to both inefficient policies, however, it may also be explained by lack of international recognition and the consequent embargo.

One of the reasons for the need to import food was that only about 68 percent of the farmland in northern Cyprus was used, the rest remained fallow. Furthermore, many of those who migrated to the north from Turkey were not adequately suited to farming the new land they moved to.\(^{250}\) This was due to differing conditions compared to those where they came from. Denktaş blamed the Turkish government “for an arbitrary selection of labourers from Anatolia”.\(^{251}\) Thus, the poor economic development of northern Cyprus was a result of lacking recognition and therein being embargoed, but also for unwise and inefficient policies.

The immigration of mainland Turks to northern Cyprus must be seen as a result of Turkish-Cypriot reliance on Turkey after the intervention in 1974. The economist Mustafa Ergün Olgun notes that “[t]he smaller and more isolated … a country is, the more it drives towards further co-operation and integration with a friendly regional power”.\(^{252}\) Northern Cyprus was certainly both a small and an isolated entity, and its relationship with Turkey has since 1974 been characterized by close cooperation in both economic, social and political terms. This, in addition to a dire need of labor, particularly within agriculture, is the context in which the first wave of immigration from Turkey took place. The political, social and economic situation in Turkey in this period also meant that it was seen, by many, as opportune to migrate to north Cyprus.

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\(^{250}\) See chapter 5 of this thesis.
\(^{252}\) Olgun, “Economic Overview”, 183.

The situation in Turkey during the 1970s and early 1980s was characterized by political and social turmoil. Furthermore, Turkey was marked by an economic crisis, approaching total economic collapse. These elements resulted in widespread violence, at times reminiscent of a civil war. The violence was religious and political in nature. In this period, also ethnicity became an increasingly important element in Turks’ identity, creating a great potential for social turmoil. None of the governments in Ankara were able to sufficiently deal with politically and ethnically motivated violence and the economic crisis. These internal changes led to migration both within Turkey, and labor migration to Western Europe. Parallel to these developments, the situation in northern Cyprus, after the Turkish intervention of 1974, created a need for labor from Turkey. Why did people migrate from Turkey in this period? What role did the Turkish government have in this process?

Political instability in the 1970s

In January 1974, Bülent Ecevit had formed a weak coalition government between his Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: CHP) and the National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi: MSP). But Prime Minister Ecevit was seen as a national hero after his successful intervention in Cyprus in July and August of the same year. Seeking a stronger and more stable government, he resigned on 18 November 1974 and called for early elections, hoping, and believing, that his success in Cyprus would lead to a swift electoral victory. Presumably he would have won through a landslide, such was the extent of his status as a national hero for the Turks.

However, the right-wing political parties in Turkey refused to allow early elections. They were determined to avoid a strong CHP government led by Ecevit. It was therefore suggested that CHP and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi: AP) could form a coalition. But Süleyman Demirel, leader of AP, refused to join such an alliance. In place of elections, Demirel formed a new coalition government, the Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe), in March 1975. This was a coalition government made up of four parties on the right: the Justice Party, the National Salvation Party, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: MHP) and the Republican Trust Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi: CGP). The MHP was by many seen as a neo-fascist party, whose paramilitary arm, the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar), became increasingly involved in the violence that plagued Turkey from the mid-1970s. The leader of the MHP, Alpaslan Türkeş, became the Minister of State in this government. He reorganized the ministry, and consequently “the police and security forces became thoroughly infiltrated by neo-fascists loyal to Türkeş.” Thus started the political violence between left and right that became one of the main characteristics of 1970s Turkey.

The National Front coalition and the neo-fascist elements prevalent within the government, particularly in the police and security forces, became an increasing embarrassment to Demirel, whose coalition was harshly criticized by the liberal press in the country. In April 1977 he therefore decided to hold elections in the summer. In times of crisis, such as the one Turkey faced in this period, voters normally neglect the smaller parties. The 1977 election was a good example of this trend. Turkey seemed to enter a period characterized by a two-party system consisting of a large CHP and a large AP.

Leading to the election, Turkey entered an excessively violent period, with May Day 1977 as a climax. In response to the increase of political violence, carried out mainly by neo-fascist elements, the left organized a demonstration on Taksim Square in Istanbul on 1 May “as a show of strength against what it described as ‘the rising tide of fascism’.” The rightist paramilitary groups answered the protests with an outright attack on the demonstrators, resulting in the death of 34 people. This show of strength from the right did not, however, intimidate people from participating in the 1977 election, which saw a nearly four percent

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Ahmad, “Politics and political parties”, 252; Altunışık & Tür, Turkey, 40; Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 154-155.
Howard, The History of Turkey, 153.
Ahmad, “Politics and political parties”, 252.
Zürcher, Turkey, 262-263.
Ahmad, “Politics and political parties”, 253; Zürcher, Turkey, 261.
increase in voter turnout from the election of 1973. Although Ecevit and the CHP won the election with 41.4 percent, they were 13 seats in parliament short of being able to form a majority government. Ecevit thus attempted to form a minority government, but did not receive the needed vote of confidence from the parliament. As a result, Demirel formed a new National Front coalition on 21 July. However, the second National Front government was unable to survive after local elections in December 1977, and on 31 December they received a vote of no confidence, and the cabinet was disbanded.260

In January 1978 Ecevit again formed a government consisting of CHP members and independents. The independents were mainly former AP members who had broken out in response to Demirel’s National Front coalitions. This government was, similarly to every government between 1973 and 1980, both weak and short-lived. The political violence and troubled economic situation Turkey found itself in resulted in yet another government being disbanded in October 1979. The by-elections of October 1979 revealed a steep decline in support for CHP and a sharp increase for AP. As a result, Demirel again came to power, this time with a coalition of AP members and independents, without the controversial MHP. Ecevit and his party had clearly lost the influence and popularity they had gained after the successful intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Demirel and the AP, however, were not victors in the Turkish political scene either. On 12 September 1980, the military resumed power in the third military coup in two decades. The military had already in 1979 hinted at the need to carry out a coup due to the pressing issues of the economy and not least the civil war-like conditions throughout Turkey.261

The combination of “[l]egitimacy crisis, economic crisis and crisis of the political system were all acting together by the end of the 1970s, feeding into a deadlock in the country.”262 There were, according to professor William Hale, two reasons for the collapse that led to the 12 September 1980 coup in Turkey: “a mounting economic crisis and … a catastrophic decline in law and order”.263 At the same time, however, from the 1960s through the 1970s, Turkey went through some important, positive developments. For instance, the Gross National Product (GNP), which represents the total production of services and products in a

261 Zürcher, *Turkey*, 262.
262 Altunışık & Tür, *Turkey*, 41.
263 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 222.
country in a year, grew on average 4.3 percent from 1963 to 1977. In addition, Turkey climbed on the Human Development Index (HDI) scale in the same period. HDI combines education levels, literacy rates, life expectancy rates and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person to generate a score between zero and one (zero being the lowest, one being the highest). Nevertheless, Turkey was plagued by large regional inequalities, which retarded development in certain areas. The regional differences were a result of incorrect policies and differences in human and natural resources within Turkey.264

**Economic and social turmoil**

Turkey was in a deep crisis during the 1970s. One of the major reasons for this instability was the economic crisis that characterized Turkey during the same period. The troubled economy in Turkey was in turn largely due to the oil crisis that hit the world after the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East in 1973. Another factor negatively influencing the Turkish economy was the Cyprus intervention of 1974. In addition to the immense costs involved in the two interventions of July and August, Turkey had to continually use a lot of resources in aiding the Turkish-Cypriots, politically, militarily and economically. They were deeply involved in the construction of a Turkish-Cypriot northern Cyprus, and much of the latter’s state budget came directly from Turkey.265 Furthermore, the United States suspended their military assistance to Turkey in response to the interventions.266 All of these factors had a negative effect on the Turkish economy. However, it was not only outside factors that hit Turkey’s economy hard.

The Turkey of the 1960s had witnessed economic growth and a significant increase in its HDI score in 1975. These decades were also marked by “major infrastructural projects, especially the construction of highways and dams.”267 Nevertheless, the GDP per capita did not grow significantly. This was mainly due to regional inequalities, but also in large part due to the population growth, which averaged around 2.4 percent in the same period. Parallel to this population growth, there was an immense increase in the urban population, which led to both social and economic unrest in the main cities. Both Ankara and Istanbul grew

265 Interview with Atun; Interview with Onurhan. See chapter 3 and 5 of this thesis.
immensely between 1950 and 1980, increasing their populations by over two and three million respectively. This urban growth was obviously coupled with a move away from the countryside. In fact, the percentage of the rural population in Turkey was less than 50 percent by the mid-1980s. This migration away from the countryside may largely be explained by the increased use of machinery in agriculture, such as the employment of fertilizers and tractors. In addition to the increase in people moving from the countryside to the cities within Turkey, there was a vast increase in labor emigration to other countries, primarily Germany. This was due both to a need for labor in those countries and the obvious sense of opportunity for the Turkish immigrants. For the same reasons, moving to northern Cyprus was also seen as favorable for some. While there was a decreasing need for agricultural labor in the Turkish rural areas, there was an increasing need for such labor in north Cyprus.

Inflation rates increased notably during the same period and reached a staggering 90 percent in 1979. This rise in inflation devalued workers’ salaries, making it harder to survive on their wages. Furthermore, unemployment rates grew, from an already high level, considerably during the 1970s. By 1977, the number of unemployed officially stood at 1.5 million, an increase of nearly one million since 1967. University and high school students therefore had few opportunities once they had finished their education, a source of great frustration among Turkey’s youth. This may be seen as a major source of the political violence that plagued Turkey in the 1970s. Moreover, these factors led many to realize the value of moving elsewhere in an attempt to better their lives.

In addition to the troubled economic situation, causing political left-right confrontation, social factors increased the degree of ethnicity as an identity marker in Turkey. Ethnic and religious differences were engaged during this period and, together with the economic hardships many experienced, formed an explosive mixture. These ethnic and religious differences were not entirely new. Most had existed since Ottoman times. As a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the size of the different ethnic and religious populations had diminished. Nevertheless, there were still a significant number of different ethnic and religious groups in the Turkish Republic. There were certain regions of Turkey in which

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269 See chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis.
Turkish was not the dominant language. Historically, the Kurds were “categorized on the basis of ethnicity and not religion. Even though [they comprised of] … Muslim and non-Muslim segments” and spoke another language. Kurdish was not the only other language that was prevalent in certain regions. Immigrants from the Balkans, North Caucasus and Crimea, who spoke other languages than Turkish, were predominant in some provinces. In addition to ethnic and language differences, there were religious divisions, particularly between Sunni and Alevi. These different groups took an increased stance on the left-right spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to a reinforced ethnic and religious dichotomy, which in turn resulted in a combination of political and ethnic violence.

The Alevi community is a good example in this regard. In the Ottoman Empire they were “disdained by both Sunnis and Shi’is” and became “the largest religious minority in the Turkish republic”. Historically, they were oppressed by the Sunni Ottoman administration and were therefore generally supporters of secularism and the political left. As this period was characterized by an upsurge in violence between the left and the right, the Alevi community was also affected. They were for instance the primary victims of the massacres in Kahramanmaraş, in Southeastern Anatolia, in 1978 and Çorum, in the West Black Sea sub-region, in 1980, which combined left around 130 dead and many others injured. In addition to this religious-cum-political conflict line illustrated by the Alevi example, there was a religious-cum-linguistic-cum-political divide between a large Kurdish minority and the Turkish majority that increasingly became visible. In some areas of the country, mainly in Eastern Anatolia, local militias claimed land along ethnic or religious lines, and often undertook the role of the local government. Within the ethnic groups there were also political conflicts, for instance between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan: PKK) and the National Liberators of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşculari: KUK). These conflicts were also brought to the bigger cities through migration.

275 Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 320-321; Bozarslan, Hamit, “Kurds and the Turkish state” in Kasaba (ed.), *History of Turkey Volume 4*: 333-356. There is, however, little or no proof that such clashes extended to Northern Cyprus in connection with Kurdish migration to the island.
In the outskirts of the three biggest cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, shantytowns were being set up by the vast influx of migrants, who had left the countryside in search for work. These shantytowns were vernacularly called *gecekondu*, literally meaning built at night, an illustration of the haste with which they were constructed. Characteristic of these neighborhoods, therefore, was that they lacked basic infrastructure such as a sewage system, water supply and electricity. As a result, they initially became small entities where the migrants took on roles normally handled by the government. The migrants set up their own communities within these shantytowns, usually in accordance with where they originally came from. People from the same villages settled in the same areas. In that way the shantytowns were an extension of their Anatolia villages.  

Therefore, the political, ethnic or religious conflicts that had affected their lives in the countryside were imported into these shantytowns. Another element of frustration, leading to further political violence in the cities, was that few of those moving to the cities were able to find work in the industrial sector. Many had to take on irregular and part-time jobs as street vendors and the like. Moreover, a system of social security was not yet thoroughly developed in Turkey. Over half of the working population in Turkey did not have any social security at all. Within the industrial sector, roughly 70 percent of the workforce had social security. All of these factors contributed to the growing political violence that plagued Turkey in this period and led to many desiring a move to somewhere else, for instance north Cyprus.

While there was increased violence in the urban centers as a result of the population explosion that the cities experienced, the areas that were mostly affected by political violence were non-urban. The most troubled areas of Turkey were the Mediterranean, Southeastern Anatolian and Eastern Anatolian regions, in large part corresponding with the areas most of the migrants to northern Cyprus came from. While Western Turkey experienced a somewhat economic resurgence, these areas in Anatolia were poor and underdeveloped. Turkey was characterized by regional inequalities so vast that they retarded the economy overall. Southeastern Turkey, for instance, faced the lowest literacy rates, with the greatest literacy gender gap. Furthermore, it was characterized by the highest birthrates. Economic difficulties, coupled with ethnic contentions, particularly between Kurds and Turks, made

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Eastern Anatolia a powder keg for social and political unrest.\textsuperscript{278} It is, therefore, no consequence that the majority of migrants to north Cyprus came from these regions of Turkey.

**Turkey and population movements**

Turkey was not unfamiliar with population exchanges and population movements. Since towards the end of the Ottoman Empire and well into the construction of the Turkish Republic, there were widespread population movements and exchanges of various ethnic and religious groups. After the Treaty of Lausanne, concluded in 1923, Greece and the newborn Turkish Republic exchanged some 1.5 million people. This exchange consisted of approximately 500,000 Muslims who moved from Greek territories to the newborn Turkish Republic, and circa one million Christians moving in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{279} Furthermore, as part of a policy to “Turkify” the Kurds of Turkey, the Turkish Republic, beginning in the 1930s and continuing well into the 1990s, often moved Kurds from mainly Kurdish areas of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia to areas where fewer Kurds resided. Moreover, Yörük tribes, a semi-nomadic people mainly living in the Mediterranean region of Turkey, had been relocated within the empire throughout the Ottoman period.\textsuperscript{280}

Hakkı Atun, north Cyprus’ first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, stated that Turkey was an invaluable resource in the process of encouraging people from Turkey to migrate to northern Cyprus, as “[t]hey had a great experience in this matter because of the problems that they went through after the [1919-1923] independence war. And they always had to resettle people from trouble areas: From dam areas, from forest areas”.\textsuperscript{281} Thus Turkey had a lot of experience in this regard, and was a useful and competent expert for north Cyprus in the immigration process and the construction of a Turkish-Cypriot northern Cyprus.

**Migration from Turkey**

The large majority of the migrants who went to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration were from the Trabzon province in the East Black Sea sub-region; the Samsun province of


\textsuperscript{279} Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 131-132; Bolukbasi, “Turkey’s Policy Towards Cyprus”, 34. As a part of this population exchange, some nine thousand Turkish-Cypriots moved from Cyprus to Turkey: See chapter 2 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{280} Kirişci, “Migration and Turkey”; Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire*, 79.

\textsuperscript{281} Interview with Atun.
the West Black Sea sub-region; the Konya province of the Central Anatolia region; the Adana, Antalya and Mersin provinces of the Mediterranean region; the Diyarbakır province of the Southeastern Anatolian region; and the Muş province of the Eastern Anatolian region (see Map 2 below). This coincides with where the bulk of both those who migrated came from, both within Turkey, and those who moved abroad. Moreover, the ethnic make-up of the Turkish immigrants was heterogeneous. They were of many different backgrounds: Turkish; Yörük; Laz, a people from the East Black Sea sub-region; and Kurdish were among the most common ethnic and linguistic groups in the first wave of immigration.

Map 2: Provinces from which the majority of immigrants from Turkey migrated.

The British journalist Christopher Hitchens claimed “the immigrants were of a rather motley sort – unwanted in their places of origin, often with criminal records”. There is no proof that the Turkish immigrants in this period were criminals, while there may, of course, be minor cases in which that was true. At large, those who migrated to northern Cyprus were

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282 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12; Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, 228.
283 Ekenoglu, Basak, “Ethnic Identity Formation of the Kurdish Immigrants in North Cyprus: Analyzing Ethnic Identity as Social Identity and the Effects of Social Otherization in North.” Master thesis from University of Amsterdam, 2012, 7; Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 36-39. The heterogeneity of the immigration is also confirmed by various interviewees, both of immigrants themselves and politicians/immigration officers: Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Suiçmez, Yusuf in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, conducted on 15 February 2013; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous in Minareliköy, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, conducted on 15 February 2013; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Çağlayan family in Kayalar, Girne region, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 17 February 2013; Interview with Gazioğlu; Interview with Atun; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Yel, Kadir in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, conducted on 8 April 2013; Interview with Yeşil; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with an Yörük immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, conducted on 8 April 2013.
normal, disadvantaged people seeking to improve their lives. The large majority of those who left Turkey for north Cyprus “opted to abandon their villages in Anatolia for economic reasons, not ideological ones.”\textsuperscript{286} None of those interviewed cite ideological conviction as the main reason for migrating to northern Cyprus. Yusuf Suıçmez who migrated in 1975 from Dağardi, Beşköy, in the Trabzon province, claimed that they had heard of the situation on the island in 1974 on the radio, and that they thought “it was [a] Turkish country and [that] the Greeks … attacked the Turks there and so we were going to help them”.\textsuperscript{287} Nevertheless, both he and his brothers, Musa and Halil, held that the lack of work opportunities and consequent economic difficulties in Turkey were the main reason for leaving the country and migrating to north Cyprus.\textsuperscript{288}

The migrants were, for the most part, disadvantaged laborers or farmers mainly from areas of Turkey in which there were few work opportunities or where entire villages and towns were being uprooted due to large development projects, such as the construction of major dams or highways. In these cases the inhabitants of such places were informed of the imminent destruction of their houses and were told to apply for relocation.\textsuperscript{289} Atun, for instance, refers to the immigrants from Turkey as “the refugees that came from Anatolia” due to the unfavorable conditions they left.\textsuperscript{290} This was a common practice in 1970s Turkey because of these large economic development projects, which were seen as a way of improving the fragile Turkish economy. Naturally, it often took a long time for resettlement applications to be handled. However, once Cyprus was divided and the opportunity to move those in need of resettlement to northern Cyprus opened up, many applicants could finally start new lives there. Ali Kemalkürt and his family, after having applied for resettlement 10 to 15 years prior to the 1974 intervention, eventually resettled in north Cyprus in 1975.\textsuperscript{291}

The Kemalkürt family’s village in the Trabzon province of the East Black Sea sub-region was in danger of being destroyed by landslides. Nearby villages had been ravaged by

\textsuperscript{286} Loizides, “Migration and settler politics in Cyprus”, 395.
\textsuperscript{287} Interview with Suıçmez, Yusuf
\textsuperscript{288} Interview with Suıçmez, Yusuf; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Suıçmez, Halil in Değirmenlik, Lefkoşa district, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 16 February 2013; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Suıçmez, Musa in Değirmenlik, Lefkoşa district, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 16 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{289} Bryant & Yakinthou, Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey, 27; Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12; Interview with Atun.
\textsuperscript{290} Interview with Atun.
\textsuperscript{291} Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12; Interview with Yeşiş; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Kemalkürt, Ali in Değirmenlik, Lefkoşa district, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 16 February 2013.
landslides, and many inhabitants, both in the neighboring villages and in Kemalkürt’s village, had been settled elsewhere: Some in the Hatay province, in Southeast-Anatolia; some in the Van province, in Eastern Anatolia; and others on Gökçeada Island, in the Aegean Sea.\textsuperscript{292} After 1974, however, new opportunities arose in north Cyprus. Therefore, while earlier the households that were uprooted due to such projects in Turkey were moved to new locations within Turkey, often without many chances of finding new work or obtaining decent housing, land and houses were freed up in northern Cyprus and available for many of these families. It is therefore wrong to assert that Turkey chose people to come to north Cyprus willy-nilly, as Hitchens and other critics of the process allege.

The Çakır family who moved from Yıldızlı, a village near Trabzon, in the eastern Black Sea region of Turkey, explains that the Turkish authorities “didn’t send a call to every village, they usually sent to the villages … in need”.\textsuperscript{293} That is, inhabitants of villages that were affected by either man-made destruction, such as the construction of dams, or natural destruction, such as landslides, as in their case, were asked to leave. The Turkish government specifically chose people from areas that were going to be used for large projects such as deforestation or the redirection of major rivers, waterfalls and other waterways.\textsuperscript{294} This practice of relocating families in Turkey in need, seemed to be the common denominator. It applied to most of the families that were interviewed, who were either affected by natural or man-made destruction of their homes or villages.

The majority of those who were chosen for migration to north Cyprus were victims of the developmental projects that were occurring across Turkey at the time. However, villages with limited work opportunities, where the inhabitants mainly lived hand-to-mouth, were also often selected for potential migration. Kadir Yel, who migrated from near Kozan, in the Adana province of Turkey, to northern Cyprus with his family in 1976, told of difficult living conditions in his hometown. His father worked with mining, and it is fair to assume that their lives were difficult. In cases such as these, some people were particularly selected and promised housing and land in north Cyprus in order to encourage people to migrate.\textsuperscript{295} Imams, village elders and others with authority and a high standing within the community,

\textsuperscript{292} Interview with Kemalkürt.
\textsuperscript{293} Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Çakır family in Sadrazamköy, Girne region, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 17 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{294} Interview with Atun.
\textsuperscript{295} Interview with Yel.
were specifically picked out for such purposes. Suiçmez recounted that those who were “controlling and managing all this immigration process … pursued him [my father] … he was an imam there, an influential man, so he also motivated people to immigrate.” 296 35 out of 300 families from Suiçmez’s village migrated to northern Cyprus in the first wave of immigration. The proportionately large number of families who migrated to north Cyprus from this particular village may be attributed to the influence of the imam and the legitimizing effect he likely had. These were not villages in danger of being destroyed as a result of landslides, deforestation or dam construction. On the other hand, there were few work and economic opportunities, and it was likely perceived that northern Cyprus would be a considerable improvement. 297 In the words of Kemalkürt: “the life [in Turkey], the conditions [in Turkey], brought us here [to north Cyprus]”. 298

The expectations were obviously not always fulfilled. Many of the immigrants, and some officials, interviewed, remembered some families from their villages returning back to Turkey because their experiences in northern Cyprus did not reflect their expectations, or what they claimed they were promised by the authorities. 299 Yusuf Suiçmez claimed that a person from his village in Turkey, who moved to north Cyprus at the same time as the Suiçmez family, returned to Turkey and “killed the kaymakam [the governor of the provincial district]” because “they lied to them” about what would await them in northern Cyprus. 300 Many myths surrounded the expectations of north Cyprus and the opportunities such a move would present. Many were in turn disappointed. The Çakır family, for instance, were told that Cyprus was “a paradise”. 301 They were told that the crop yield would be more favorable in Cyprus than in Turkey and that the size of the fruit and vegetable would be considerably larger on the island. When they came to the island, however, many found that the weather conditions, marked by high temperatures and scarce rain, were harsh and less favorable for agriculture. 302

296 Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez.
297 Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez.
298 Interview with Kemalkürt.
299 See chapter 5 of this thesis. Interview with Suiçmez; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with Çakır family; Interview with Gazoğlu; Interview with Yeşil; Interview with Suiçmez, Halil.
300 Interview with Suiçmez, Yusuf.
301 Interview with Suiçmez, Yusuf.
302 Interview with Çakır family; Interview with Çağlayan family. See chapter 5 of this thesis.
The combination of such expectations, myths and influential people encouraging resettlement, together with a lack of opportunities in Turkey, likely led such a proportionately large number of migrants to decide to move to northern Cyprus in the first wave of immigration. McGarry argues that push and pull factors may be created or exaggerated by political authorities in order to encourage a desired migration.303 This certainly seems to be the case here. Calls were made over the radio, through the muhtars (the village head), Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ consulates, and/or visiting government officials for labor, agricultural and otherwise. Moreover, in line with McGarry’s theory, they were promised free housing and land in north Cyprus.304

Although Turkey was plagued by ethnic and political violence during the period of the first wave of migration to northern Cyprus, there is little indication that “enemies”, in the way McGarry applies the term, were sent to north Cyprus.305 It may be true that the Turkish authorities traditionally saw both Yörük and Kurds as a state liability, the former because of their nomadism.306 The latter due to their, in the eyes of successive Turkish governments, un-Turkishness, with “strong tribal affiliations and weak economic integration with the rest of the country.”307 Even though particularly the Kurds were involved in much of the ethnic and political violence of this period, there is little or no evidence showing that Kurds were especially chosen to be moved to northern Cyprus “so that they could be more easily controlled and subjected to assimilation pressures” the way they often were in the 1980s and 1990s within Turkey.308 In the case of the Yörüks, it is likely that resettlement to north Cyprus was a dual solution: “Turkey has been trying to settle Yörüks for … ages”, and many Yörüks had, in this period, themselves applied for resettlement.309

After such calls for migration were made, those who had applied for resettlement on prior occasions, such as the Yeşil and Kemalkürt families, and those who were interested in trying their luck and starting a new life elsewhere, were told to meet at a specific location at a

303 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 617, 619. See chapter 1 of this thesis.
304 Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12; McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 619; Fosshagen, Island of Conjecture, 209.
305 See chapter 1 of this thesis.
306 Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, 52; Bozarslan, “Kurds and the Turkish state”, 333; Kirişci, “Migration and Turkey”, 179.
307 Bozarslan, “Kurds and the Turkish state”, 335.
308 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 625.
309 Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Hatay, Mete in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 8 April 2013.
specific time. They had to provide a picture of the family (see Pictures 1-3 below), and sign a declaration accepting the rules and regulations of the resettlement process. The rules were basic: 1. Ten copies of a 6x9 picture with all the family members who were migrating had to be handed over to the local Land and Housing Directorate (Toprak ve İskân Müdürlüğü in Turkish) within maximum three days; 2. Each family could bring possessions amounting to a maximum of 500 kilograms; and 3. Those who had reported their interest for resettlement in Cyprus were to meet at a specified location at a specified time. Those who failed to do so would automatically and immediately lose their spot.\textsuperscript{310}

Picture 1: The Suiçmez family. Family picture required for resettlement.\textsuperscript{311}

Picture 2: Unknown family. Family picture required for resettlement.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{310} Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İl Toprak ve İskan Müdürlüğü [The Turkish Republic Provincial Land and Housing Directorate], “Duyuru Antalya Valiliğinden” [Announcement from the Antalya Governorship], 3 April 1975. Document in the possession of Mustafa Yeşil; Antalya Valiliğinden [Antalya Governorship], “Önemle duylurulur” [Important Announcement], 29 May 1975. Document in the possession of Mustafa Yeşil.

\textsuperscript{311} Picture provided by Yusuf Suiçmez.

\textsuperscript{312} Picture provided by Neriman Çakır.
Civil servants met those who showed up at the designated location, and accompanied them onto buses (see Picture 4 below). These buses took the migrants to larger towns or cities in the province where busloads of migrants from nearby villages also gathered. The most typical assembly towns and cities were Çaykara and Sürmene (East Black Sea); Çarşamba (West Black Sea); Konya (Central Anatolia); Antalya and Adana (South-Anatolia); Muş and Diyarbakır (East- and Southeastern Anatolia). From these places a new set of buses stood ready to take the migrants to the port city, Mersin, whence ferries transported them to Gazi Mağusa in north Cyprus. On the buses to Mersin doctors and nurses accompanied the migrants, according to the Suiçmez family, to take care of any medical needs that might arise. Depending on the distance the migrants had travelled to reach Mersin, some stayed one night in a hostel before boarding the ferryboats bound for Cyprus the next morning. Obviously, the entire resettlement process was “paid by the state: the transfer, [and] the… tickets to the ferryboat”.  

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313 Picture provided by Neriman Çakır.
314 Although they are the only interviewees who specified that there were medical personnel attending to them, others recounted that there was at least one civil servant per bus accompanying them.
315 Interview with Suiçmez, Yusuf; Interview with Halil Suiçmez; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with an Yörük immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous; Interview with Çakır family; Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12.
316 Interview with Çakır family.
In addition to influential people such as imams and village elders encouraging villagers to migrate to north Cyprus, family members and neighbors who had taken up the call and already moved to the island often sent letters back home and convinced more to come.\textsuperscript{318} In some cases, the head of the family went to Cyprus to find out if it was worth moving. One interviewee, a Kurd who migrated to Minareliköy in the Lefkoşa district of northern Cyprus, stated that his village near Muş in Turkey was slowly but steadily being flooded due to the construction of a nearby dam.\textsuperscript{319} Erection of this dam began “early in [19]75, so they [the authorities] told people it [the village] is going to be underneath the water.”\textsuperscript{320} He recounted that he chose to move to the island because he had been told that there was a need for hocas, or religious teachers, there. After he moved there to become a religious teacher, he convinced all his relatives from his village in Turkey to come as well. In order to keep the extended family close and intact, many continually attempted to encourage more relatives to migrate to northern Cyprus.\textsuperscript{321}

Migration to north Cyprus was in that way kept alive from the end of 1974 to 1980, through state encouragement, encouragement from influential community leaders, and invitations from family members. Thus, both ordinary and “manipulate[d] push-pull factors” influenced migrants from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus.\textsuperscript{322} After the coup d’état in Turkey on 12 September 1980, migration to northern Cyprus halted for a few years. Due to the martial law

\textsuperscript{317} Picture provided by Neriman Çakır.
\textsuperscript{318} Interview with Yel.
\textsuperscript{319} Interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous.
\textsuperscript{320} Interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous.
\textsuperscript{321} Interview with a Kurdish immigrant who wishes to remain anonymous; Interview with Çakır family.
\textsuperscript{322} McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 619.
that was put in place following the coup, it was hard for ordinary Turks to obtain a passport, and the permission to leave the country, according to Hatay. Thus, 1980 thus marks the end of the first wave of Turkish migration to north Cyprus. So, between 1974 and 1980, northern Cyprus had to deal with settling a substantial amount of immigrants who left less privileged areas of Turkey.

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323 Interview with Hatay; Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 7, Table 1.1.
5. The northern Cypriot Dream: Turkish Immigration to north Cyprus 1974-1980

The division of Cyprus resulted in a Turkish-Cypriot north and a Greek-Cypriot south. As a result of the 1974 war and the consequent Vienna III Agreement of 2 August 1975, there was an exodus of a total of about 180,000 Greek-Cypriots from the northern part of the island. Furthermore, approximately 60,000 Turkish-Cypriots arrived in the north by the end of 1975. Thus, the north experienced a net loss of circa 120,000 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{324} Consequently, the authorities in northern Cyprus concluded a “co-operation and development project” with Turkey.\textsuperscript{325} This agreement aimed at facilitating the incorporation of the 90,000 refugees and immigrants that entered north Cyprus in the period from 1974 to 1980. Approximately 30,000 of those who arrived were immigrants from Turkey. They were of various ethnic, linguistic and geographic backgrounds.\textsuperscript{326} Why were the immigrants needed in northern Cyprus in this period? How did the immigration process work, and to what extent was it successful in contributing to an economic and political independence from South-Cyprus?

Resettling Turkish-Cypriot refugees

For the new Turkish-Cypriot political entity in northern Cyprus, one of the main economic objectives was “to make best use of the idle factors of production”.\textsuperscript{327} One of the most important aspects of taking advantage of idle resources was encouraging immigration from Turkey. However, the first task was the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriots who moved to northern Cyprus from South-Cyprus following the 1974 war. From 20 July 1974 until the end of 1975 more than half of all Turkish-Cypriots were displaced as a result of the war. Many of them moved north, with the aid of UNFICYP, after the signing of the Vienna III Agreement on 2 August 1975, as stipulated in the agreement’s first article.\textsuperscript{328} The Turkish-Cypriot

\textsuperscript{324} E-mail correspondence with Ishak. See chapter 2 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{326} Atun, “Kıbrıs’ta Göçmenlerin İnsanı”.
\textsuperscript{327} TRNC Archive Doc. No. 89.
refugees from the south were obviously also a vital group for the use of the resources that were suddenly in Turkish-Cypriot hands after the division of the island. Furthermore, they were crucial for the creation of a Turkish-Cypriot political entity. In fact, article 32 (2) of the constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) specifies that “[r]efugees shall have priority in the distribution of land.”

Resettling Turkish-Cypriots from the south was of primary concern and therefore had priority initially. Consequently, a ministry with the main objective of housing the internally displaced Turkish-Cypriots, and settling immigrants from Turkey, was set up following the division of the island. According to Hakkı Atun, who was the first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, and Tamer Gazioğlu, Chief of Resources, Inventory and Statistics Section in Atun’s department, there was a concise methodology used in the process of resettling both Turkish-Cypriots from Southern Cyprus and settling immigrants from Turkey. Comparing the process with the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s, Atun argued, in a personal interview, that the case of northern Cyprus “was much more orderly and scientific.” It involved preparing a list of all the properties and land that Turkish-Cypriots left in the south. Furthermore,

\[\text{[t]he same survey was carried out for each empty settlement in the north, and the number and type of the existing houses, shops and workshops and the amount and type of agricultural resources, existing infrastructure and means of communications and degree of accessibility was found out.}\]

Due to the large exodus of peoples from the North compared to a much smaller influx, “the land and settlements, houses and villages, even parts of towns were empty. So we had to house these empty settlements, and we had to irrigate and look after the land”, stated Atun. This was a massive undertaking. The human implications were great, as many of the refugees had been displaced on prior occasions following civil strife in the 1950s and 1960s. Many were afraid of living in the south as a consequence of the war.

At first it was widely believed that resettlement and movement to the north was only a temporary measure that would be reversed once the situation on the island calmed down again, and a solution to the conflict was found. This had partly been the case during the

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329 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 36.  
330 Interview with Atun; Interview with Gazioğlu.  
331 Interview with Atun.  
332 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 89, 104.  
333 Interview with Atun.  
334 See chapter 2 of this thesis.
previous periods of civil strife. Therefore, many saw the movement to the north as only an interim situation. Gazioğlu admitted that even on the administrative level, many thought it was only temporary. As a result, “no title deeds were given and people never spent even one penny to paint, [or] to repair the homes that they were living in, because they thought ‘this does not belong to me, why should I invest money in it? I might be thrown away one day’”. As time went on, and a solution was not yet reached, ownership rights were eventually given to those Turkish-Cypriots who had left properties in the south and moved north. Political pressure and dissatisfaction from the refugee population resulted in the Resettlement, Land Distribution, and Equivalent Property Law (İTEM Law) for the handing over of such ownership rights. It was passed on 3 August 1977. The law aimed to make legal the policies carried out between 20 July 1974 and 3 August 1977 in regards to the “provision of land, equipment, livestock and loans to those in the agricultural sectors” and “provision, in accordance with family size, of adequate social housing and essential household goods” to both refugees and immigrants. Thus, the law was both retroactive and proactive.

The Turkish-Cypriots refugees who had been given properties in the north were given ownership rights and therein the right to sell and pass on their new properties in accordance with the İTEM Law. With the definitive possessory certificates, showing that the properties awarded to the displaced persons legally belonged to them, the Turkish-Cypriot refugees “started to repair their houses … to upgrade them, to paint them … to add a new room next to it”. Both parallel to and following the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot refugees, immigrants from Turkey were settled in northern Cyprus using a similar methodology.

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336 Interview with Gazioğlu.
337 Interview with Gazioğlu.
338 Commonly referred to as the İTEM Law: İskan, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası in Turkish.
339 Interview with Gazioğlu; Interview with Atun; Gürel, Displacement in Cyprus Report 4, 23-24.
340 Interview with Gazioğlu; Author’s private audio-recorded interview with Gürel, Ayla in Lefkoşa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted on 21 February 2013.
Immigration from Turkey

Already on 9 September 1974, not yet a month after the completion of Turkey’s second intervention in Cyprus, “Turkish mainland authorities announced that 5,000 farm workers were to be sent to Cyprus as ‘seasonal workers’ to look after the abandoned farms and orchards.”341 The Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the time, Vedat Çelik, insisted that contrary to widespread belief, it was the Turkish-Cypriot authorities that demanded the importation of a labor force from Turkey. According to him, the Turkish authorities did not promote the immigration of mainlanders.342 Nevertheless, they were vital in order to carry out the migration process. With vast amounts of land compared to population size, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities needed to make up for the loss through the importation of Turkish labor from mainland Turkey. In the calls for labor that were sent around to villages in Turkey, it was specified that people were needed to improve the economy of the region, especially within the agricultural sector.343 Çelik argued that “we had to bring in labor force from Turkey because … although we now consider ourselves to be populated, then we were very, very under-populated and we couldn’t cope with the agricultural requirements at the time.”344

Immigrants who came in the first wave of immigration lived in a total of 87 locations. At the time there were three cities and towns and 200 villages in northern Cyprus, meaning that nearly half of all villages, towns and cities were used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey. All four districts, Girne; Gazi Mağusa; Lefkoşa; and Larnaka, that fall within the borders of northern Cyprus, were used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey. For the most part, the immigrants were given houses and land in villages and towns that were in the periphery, and far away from the major cities and towns. The villages Sadrazamköy, in the Girne district, and Dipkarpaz, in the Gazi Mağusa district, are the best examples of this practice. Notably, the villages in the immediate surroundings of the main cities were not used to house the immigrants. The villages and towns of Alaköy; Haspolat; Minareliköy; Balıkesir; and Değirmenlik, on the outskirts of the capital, and Tuzla; Mutluyaka; Yeni Boğaziçi; and Mormenekse, surrounding Gazi Mağusa, are exceptions in this regard. None of

341 Hitchens, Cyprus, 105.
342 Interview with Çelik.
343 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İl Toprak ve İskan Müdürlüğü [The Turkish Republic Provincial Land and Housing Directorate], “Duyuru Antalya Valiliğinden” [Announcement from the Antalya Governorship], 3 April 1975. Document in the possession of Mustafa Yeşil.
344 Interview with Çelik. See chapter 4 of this thesis.
the major cities, with the notable exception of Gazi Mağusa, housed immigrants. The majority of these 87 locations were mixed. That is, they were inhabited by the original Turkish-Cypriot population, Turkish-Cypriot refugees and immigrants from Turkey (and, in a very few cases, in the Karpassia Peninsula, the original Greek-Cypriot inhabitants, of which there were 1,600). However, there were only a few villages that were entirely occupied by immigrants from the mainland. The most peripheral area of north Cyprus, the Karpassia Peninsula, was widely used for housing immigrants from Turkey, and became inhabited mostly by these newcomers. The cities and towns that were important for citrus production, such as Güzelyurt and Marählen, a suburb to Gazi Mağusa, were importantly used for the settlement of immigrants. Another notable trend was that villages along the northern coast of Cyprus, especially west of Girne, housed immigrants from the Black Sea region of Turkey.  

Map 3: Cyprus after 1974 division.  

346 Source: http://www.cyprus-maps.com/maps/Cyprus_big.gif
Map 4: Gazi Mağusa city and surroundings, north Cyprus.

Map 5: Karpassia Peninsula, north Cyprus.

Map 6: The Mesarya plain, north Cyprus.

The circles in these maps represent locations inhabited by immigrants.
Those who came as part of “[t]he systematic settlement policy pursued by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot government” were a part of both a political and economic deliberation. 348 The political aspect involved increasing the population of north Cyprus, and the consolidation of an independent Turkish-Cypriot entity in the north. The economic aspects of the policy were means of reaching the same goal: independence from the Greek-Cypriots in the south through economic self-sufficiency. Notably, most of the immigrants in the first wave were farmers sent to northern Cyprus in order to cultivate the fertile agricultural lands abandoned exodus of Greek-Cypriots. Although it is clear that many of the immigrants were subject to a planned settlement policy, the immigrants mainly moved away from areas of Turkey characterized by harsh living conditions. Therefore, they saw an opportunity in moving to northern Cyprus, where they were given dwelling, land and agricultural equipment according to their family size. 349 The İTEM Law defined those who were eligible to receive property in north Cyprus, and stipulated that “persons who were forced by Turkish authorities to change location [due to the destruction of villages because of the construction of dams and highways, or landslides]” and “persons who were approved to be settled because their labour, know-how and capital could assist in overall development” in northern Cyprus, were intended for settlement. 350

348 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 215.
349 See chapter 4 of this thesis. Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 216-218; Hatay, Beyond Numbers, 12.
According to Hitchens there were three facts regarding Turkish migration to northern Cyprus, all of which were, in his eyes, indisputable.\textsuperscript{351} One, the process of immigration was “hasty and inept”; two, “it was connected to the plans of extremist forces in Turkey”; and three, “it was not a success with the indigenous Turkish Cypriots.”\textsuperscript{352} The first point is arguably a claim with relatively good backing. President Denktaş complained about the selection of Turkish immigrants and argued that they were not necessarily cut out for the work they came to northern Cyprus for. The large amount of immigrants coming into northern Cyprus in just a seven-year period, from 1974 until 1980, gives perspective to the haste with which it was carried out.\textsuperscript{353} Atun specifies that the authorities needed to be quick and timely in the immigration process because “there were gardens in need of irrigation, land waiting to be cultivated and fruit trees that needed to be picked.”\textsuperscript{354} There was therefore an urgent need for sufficient labor from Turkey, who could carry out these needs.

Hitchens’ second and third arguments are more debatable. Dr. Erdal Onurhan, Cabinet Minister in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus throughout the 1980s, claimed in a personal interview that Turkish immigrants were invited to north Cyprus solely to aid with “the basic necessity at that time, to get things going”, and that there was no other reason that they came.\textsuperscript{355} He thereby attempted to negate the idea that immigrants were brought to alter the demographics of Cyprus. Although Onurhan may be biased in this regard, and perhaps was reluctant to admit that the immigration process was part of a deliberate plan to alter the population, there is no specific evidence suggesting that there were any ideological intentions in the Turkish immigration process. Nevertheless, there was a clear economic aspect, with a political intention of self-sufficiency from the Greek-Cypriots.\textsuperscript{356}

In addition to the labor immigration, there was also a group of Turkish soldiers who had either participated in the Turkish intervention of 1974 or had been part of the Turkish military contingent stationed in Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance, who settled in north

\textsuperscript{351} Hitchens, Cyprus, 109.
\textsuperscript{352} Hitchens, Cyprus, 109.
\textsuperscript{353} The number of immigrants in this seven-year period lies between 30,000 and 45,000 depending on the source. It is difficult to know the exact amount, as it has not been affirmed and recorded, but it is likely to be 30-45 thousand.
\textsuperscript{354} Atun, “Kıbrıs’ta Göçmenlerin İskanı”, 387.
\textsuperscript{355} Dr. Erdal Onurhan was Assistant General Manager at Sanayi Holding, a public enterprise in north Cyprus, from 1978 until 1981 and has been a Cabinet Minister and Member of Parliament in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on and off throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Interview with Onurhan.
\textsuperscript{356} Dodd, “From Federated State to Republic”, 105.
Cyprus following the 1974 war. In addition, families of soldiers who had lost their lives in the intervention were invited to move to north Cyprus. They were given land, housing and immovable property and citizenship by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and were often cited as proof that Turkey was “Turkifying” northern Cyprus through militarization. However, relatively few soldiers and veterans moved to north Cyprus following the war. It may be true that a long-term goal was to change the overall demographics of the island for a more favorable ratio for the Turkish-Cypriots, a desirable side effect of the need for a large workforce. But the primary goal of the immigration, at least in the beginning, was arguably to rebuild the economy of northern Cyprus and enable unused land to be cultivated.

Sarah Ladbury, an anthropology researcher on the Turkish-Cypriot people, claims that by 1977, excluding the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, there had been a population increase of 40,000 in northern Cyprus compared to before 1974. Although some of this increase was made up of Turkish-Cypriots returning to Cyprus after having previously migrated to Great Britain, Australia, USA, Canada or another country, the number was so substantial that the main source must be found elsewhere. In response to criticism from both the Greek-Cypriots and the international community regarding the scale of immigration from Turkey, many politicians and representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot administration have exaggerated the volume of returning Turkish-Cypriots émigrés from the aforementioned countries. They have been quick to defend the considerable increase in population in this period by citing a larger influx of returning Turkish-Cypriots and thus understated the extent of the immigration from Turkey. Though there certainly were those who came back to Cyprus after earlier having migrated abroad, numbers reveal that a total of 16,519 Turkish-Cypriots emigrated from Cyprus between 1955 and 1973. Therefore, assuming that they all returned, approximately half of the population movement would be made up of Turkish immigrants. However, that would be an erroneous assumption as there continued to be a considerable Turkish-Cypriot community in the aforementioned countries following the events of 1974.

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357 See chapter 2 of this thesis for a discussion on the Treaty of Alliance.
360 Interview with Çelik; Altan, Mustafa Hapim, “Facts on the Demographic Structure of Cyprus”. Lefkoşa, 31 May 1991. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 1688.
361 Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image, 18.
The immigrants from Turkey were described as “villagers from Anatolia and the Black Sea region, uneducated and poor”. This made them prone to discrimination from the Turkish-Cypriot population. While it may be true that later immigration led to widespread discrimination and racism against Turkish immigrants, initially it appears that the Turkish-Cypriots generally greeted them with open arms. The first immigrants of the 1970s were mostly seen as saviors, viewed as an extension and representatives of Turkey, which had saved the Turkish-Cypriots from perceived inevitable destruction and annihilation, according to most immigrants, politicians and officials interviewed.

Yusuf Suiçmez, who came to northern Cyprus towards the end of 1975 from the Trabzon province of the East Black Sea sub-region of Turkey, remembers the reception and attitudes that they were met with from the Turkish-Cypriots. He recalls that “they [the Turkish-Cypriots] were very respectful to the Turks [immigrants]”. There may also have been a feeling of appreciation and admiration for the Turkish immigrants, and a realization that “they came here, they shared their lives with you and they contributed to the economy, they contributed to the security, they contributed to … social life”. Atun concurred, and commended the Turkish-Cypriot population because, according to him, “nobody complained that we brought the people from Turkey.”

Mustafa Yeşil is an Yörük, a Turkish semi-nomadic group who mainly live in the mountains of southern Anatolia, immigrant from the Antalya province of Southern Turkey. He recounted of a festival having been arranged for the arriving immigrants in the port city of Gazi Mağusa, the normal port of entry for the immigrants, in celebration of their arrival to northern Cyprus. They were met with music and a barbeque party, at which “[t]hey sacrificed the lamb, and they played the drums and horns.” This hints of an enthusiasm and appreciation for their new compatriots who were essential for a quick economic recovery and were seen as a vital helping hand for the Turkish-Cypriots and their new political entity.

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362 Ladbury, “The Turkish Cypriots”, 320.
363 Ladbury, “The Turkish Cypriots”, 320.
364 Interview with Atun; Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez; Interview with Çelik; Interview with Atakol.
365 Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez.
366 Interview with Çelik.
367 Interview with Çelik.
368 Interview with Atun.
370 Interview with Yeşil.
However, the immigrants were not necessarily cut out for the jobs that were short of labor, such as citrus husbandry. One of the problems was that the Cypriot climate was notably different from that of the places where the majority of immigrants came from in Turkey. The most vivid example was that of those who came from the Black Sea region, an area that has the most rain in Turkey. In comparison, “[t]he climate of Cyprus is typically Mediterranean with strongly marked seasonal rhythm in respect of temperature, rainfall and weather generally.” Cyprus gets notably less rain than most parts of Turkey and notably less than the Black Sea region. Most of the immigrants interviewed described the weather and heat in Cyprus as fiery and cited the lack of water as a major problem for farming on the island. The fruits and vegetables grown in Cyprus were often different from those in Turkey and particularly from the Black Sea region. Consequently, the authorities sent officials from “the agricultural ministry … to teach them [the immigrants] … how to cultivate” the crops that they were not used to from their points of origin.

In addition to the difficulties within the field of agriculture, there were major obstacles in setting up a new independent political entity for the Turkish-Cypriots, especially economically. The Turkish-Cypriots had been excluded both from the political and economical developments of Cyprus during the civil strife in the 1960s and therefore had to start largely from scratch in 1974 with little or no experience within these areas. Because of this, there was a dire need of expertise from Turkey in order to kick-start agricultural production, which was the main source of income for northern Cyprus. However, as with the example of the immigrants from the Black Sea region of Turkey, those who came to north Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily right for the agriculture on the island.

There was a major need for a labor force, particularly within the field of citrus production, which was north Cyprus’ main export. In 1977 agricultural goods constituted 77.5 percent of

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371 Hitchens, Cyprus, 109.
373 TRNC Doc. No. 89, 103.
374 Interview with Atun; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with Yeşil; Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez; Interview with Çakır family.
375 TRNC Doc. No. 89, 103; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with Yeşil; Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez; Interview with Çakır family.
376 See Chapter 3 of this thesis.
377 Olgun, “Economic Overview”, 270-271; Interview with Atun; Interview with Gazioğlu.
all exports, while citrus fruits alone amounted to 65.7 percent of agricultural exports.\textsuperscript{378} In some cases, even if immigrants were settled in distant villages far away from the nearest citrus fields, they were transported long distances every day to pick citrus in areas such as Güzelyurt or the outskirts of Famagusta, as this clearly was the most important product.\textsuperscript{379} Kadir Yel, an immigrant from Adana, who arrived in northern Cyprus in 1976 at the age of 8, recounted that every weekend they travelled over 100 kilometers from his village, Büyük Konuk in the Karpassia Peninsula, to the citrus fields of Güzelyurt to pick fruits. This was not an uncommon practice, and Yel’s story does not appear to be exceptional. In north Cyprus agricultural production, in general, and citrus production, in particular, used outdated methods and relied heavily on labor.\textsuperscript{380}

**Settlement assistance**

In order for the settlement process to proceed as smoothly as possible, the authorities initiated a program of settlement assistance. Each village, or in some cases groups of villages, were assigned one or two iskan rehberi (or housing guide) who took care of both those who were resettled from the south and those who were settled from Turkey. The iskan rehberi arrived in villages that were intended for settlement and prepared the houses and lands for the arrival of refugees and immigrants. Once villages were inhabited and people settled in, the guides lived in the villages with those who had moved there, and provided assistance with anything that was needed. Sometimes these guides stayed up to two years in the village to make sure that it was a smooth transition for those who moved there. It was also to show that the people were not abandoned and forgotten by the authorities, according to Gazioğlu, who was an iskan rehberi in 1974 in Çatalköy (a village mainly inhabited by returning Turkish-Cypriot refugees, and not used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey), in the Girne district of north Cyprus.\textsuperscript{381}

In addition to the iskan rehberi that lived in the villages with the settled immigrants and refugees, Gazioğlu stated that “we were sparing houses for teachers and sending teachers from center to there to live and they were living [in] those houses … In larger villages we

\textsuperscript{378} TRNC Archive Doc. No. 905.
\textsuperscript{379} Interview with Çakır family.
\textsuperscript{380} Interview with Yel; Interview with Çakır family. Neriman Çakır, a second generation Turkish immigrant, has collected pictures from a large set of immigrants from Turkey who came to north Cyprus in the first wave and found that citrus picking appears to be the most common occupation regardless of where one settled.
\textsuperscript{381} Interview with Gazioğlu.
were allocating houses to the police families.” This reveals the permanence of the settlement project and the goal of creating a durable and stable community for both the Turkish-Cypriot refugees and the immigrants from Turkey.

In 1975, before the Vienna III Agreement between north- and South-Cyprus had been concluded, “statistics of the empty houses in villages, or empty villages … and empty neighborhoods of villages” were gathered and prepared for the settlement of both Turkish-Cypriot refugees and Turkish immigrants. Lists containing the size of the properties, number of rooms and the furniture and other goods left in the houses, were prepared in order to allocate housing in a fair and just manner according to family size. In contrast to the case of the immigrants from Turkey that were to arrive, the authorities already knew, more or less, which villages to provide for the arriving displaced Turkish-Cypriots who were either waiting in the south or in the British Sovereign Bases (SBAs), Akrotiri and Dhekelia. “The villages they [the Turkish-Cypriot refugees] were going to be located was known and … how many houses is going to be need[ed] was also known”, thus it was easier to prepare villages and houses for the Turkish-Cypriot refugees. In fact, according to Bryant, [T]he Turkish Cypriot administration resettled Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south as villages, hence as communities, and indeed appears to have taken some effort to guarantee that the villages in which they resettled in some way resembled their own.

Therefore, those villages and/or neighborhoods of villages that were not assigned for the arriving refugees could be mapped out and lists could be prepared for immigrants from Turkey coming to the island. Those villages that were easily accessible and closer to town centers were for the most part intended for the refugees from the south. Villages far from the center, for instance the Karpassia Peninsula (vernacularly referred to as Cyprus’ panhandle, due to its shape – see maps 3 and 5), which were hard to access, were therefore largely left for the immigrants from Turkey, as the Turkish-Cypriots did not want to live in such isolated locations. Thus, one may claim that the authorities were more sensitive to complaints from Turkish-Cypriots, and gave them priority in the settlement process. Nevertheless, it did occur that immigrants were unsatisfied with the location that they had been settled in and the

382 Interview with Gazıoğlu; Gürel, Hatay, Trimikliniotis, Demetriou, Bryant & Yakinthou, Mapping the Consequences.
383 Interview with Gazıoğlu.
384 Interview with Gazıoğlu.
385 Interview with Gazıoğlu.
386 Bryant, The Past in Pieces, 13.
387 Interview with Gazıoğlu; Bryant & Yakinthou, Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey, 27.
house or land that they had been assigned, and accordingly were moved elsewhere and given a new home. Gazioğlu recalls one such particular situation:

we entered in Turunçlu … it was a mixed village before. And we … went there and repaired the houses, upgraded them for regular living. And we took a small group of villagers from Turkey … to move there … And one or two, maybe they were like leaders … they said: ‘We don’t want to [be] located in these houses, they are old’, because the good houses were located by the … Turkish-Cypriots living there … And we had not enough good houses there, and the houses that we wanted to locate them in, they didn’t want … And what happened? We were moving … ‘This village, Mousoulita [its Greek name], Kurudere [its Turkish name] … we didn’t have allocated anybody there yet, let’s try this village.’ … And we allocated them in this village.388

Suiçmez recounts of a similar experience, as an immigrant:

At first they settled us on [the] mountain … Mersinlik … But they told us that we would be settled in Değirmenlik, Kythrea [its Greek name] but they sent us to another place. My father, also other people, they objected and they wanted to see the place that [was] promised and they came to Değirmenlik.389

Thus, although the authorities were more prone and inclined to give the Turkish-Cypriot refugees precedence and priority in the settlement process, complaints from immigrants, in particular from village heads or similar leader figures, could affect the settlement of such groups. Some even threatened to return to Turkey in order to be given better houses.390

Like the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, the immigrants from Turkey were allocated land and housing according to family size. Therefore, the list of property was compared with the list of families arriving from Turkey and the properties in question were categorized according to size and capacity. Each village available for settlement was then divided into groups of houses according to size. They were then assigned a letter denoting its category, for example “A” for the largest houses, and a number within that group. The family list was subsequently grouped according to size and each family was given the corresponding letter denoting its category.391 Then, upon arrival to the village, each family picked a number within its group and was allocated a house, “like a lottery”.392

As opposed to the Turkish-Cypriots whose houses were for the most part ready to be moved into immediately, the immigrants from Turkey normally had to spend some time in temporary housing in Gazi Mağusa, the port of arrival into northern Cyprus, before being

388 Interview with Gazioğlu.
389 Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez.
390 Interview with Gazioğlu.
391 Interview with Gazioğlu.
392 Interview with Gazioğlu.

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sent to the villages from which they could pick a house. The amount of time spent in Gazi Mağusa, though, varied from case to case. Sometimes villages were ready to be moved into within one or two nights upon arrival in northern Cyprus. In other cases, families spent up to a month living in a school dormitory or similar temporary housing in the port city. There were also some families who did not have to spend any time in Gazi Mağusa, and they were moved directly to their assigned village. In such instances, other family members or people from the same village in Turkey had already settled in a location where other houses were available to be moved into. Nevertheless, such instances appear to be the exception, and the rule seems to be that at least some nights were spent in temporary housing. While in Gazi Mağusa they were provided with all their meals, and they were taken care of until the villages for settlement were ready.393

Not only houses were given to the immigrants. There was also a methodology involved in handing out farmland to the arriving families. Like housing, land was distributed according to the size of the family. On average 153 dönüm of dry farmland was distributed to families of five.394 However, farmland giving higher yields, such as citrus orchards, potato fields and vegetable fields, was awarded in smaller sizes. The Ministry of Resettlement, as it was renamed in 1976, equated 153 dönüm of dry farmland with 15 dönüm of citrus orchards and 12 dönüm of potato and vegetable fields. In many cases land of that size was not available for distribution, in which case the difference between 153 dönüm and the amount of land handed out to a family was compensated through other goods or property, such as extra livestock, a shop or credit to be used in the co-operatives.395 In the words of Atun, those who did not receive the amount of land that was the norm, “were subsidized, they were reinforced by animals, [banana, olive or carob] trees”.396

However, according to professor Morvaridi, the norm of 153 dönüm, or the equivalent of other farmland, did not always apply, and he claims that “each village had a norm determined by the Ministry [of Resettlement]”.397 After the passing of the İTEM Law, in 1977, land ownership was standardized to a larger degree. Turkish-Cypriots who had lived in northern

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393 Interview with Yusuf Suicmez; Interview with Yeşil; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with Çakır family; Interview with Yel.
394 Dönüm is a measurement of land-size used in the Ottoman Empire. The size of one dönüm varies between different countries of the former Ottoman Empire. In northern Cyprus, one dönüm equals 1,338 m².
395 Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, 223-225; Interview with Gazioglu.
396 Interview with Atun.
397 Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, 225.
Cyprus prior to the division, and who had less than 80 dönüms of land were given more land in order to balance the land distribution across both the new and the old inhabitants of north Cyprus.\(^{398}\)

In addition to these policies of land distribution, each village had co-operatives that had stored “[l]ivestock, wheat, barley, tractors and other equipment left behind by Greek Cypriots”, which they allotted to those in need of such goods.\(^{399}\) Nevertheless, there was not enough equipment and livestock left behind. In many cases the animals that were abandoned by the Greek-Cypriots were dispersed or unaccounted for as a result of the war. In order to make up for such losses and provide sufficiently, sheep were imported from Anatolia by the thousands. Furthermore, cows were bought and brought in from the Netherlands.\(^{400}\) Another vital need for the agricultural laborers to carry out their work was money to buy crops. The co-operative system provided the farmers with credit, which “financed them to grow … their crops, to sell them, and then pay back.”\(^{401}\)

“There was an urgent need to maintain and protect certain types of agricultural resources like orchards, greenhouses and especially vast citrus orchards … before they could be allocated to the people.”\(^{402}\) The norm was to allocate land and housing immediately. However, in the cases of vital land for the economic sustainability of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), such as the ones listed above, co-operatives and public enterprises were established “for the maintenance and management of these resources.”\(^{403}\) Once production of such vital goods and products came back on its feet, the authorities “transferred all the production units … to private companies, or to private people”.\(^{404}\) Atun and Gazioglu proudly asserted that the setting up of a Turkish-Cypriot political entity was a kind of social experiment.\(^{405}\) Housing and land was awarded “according to … social needs. It was like communism, in brackets”, in the words of Gazioglu.\(^{406}\)

\(^{398}\) Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, 225.
\(^{399}\) Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, 225.
\(^{400}\) Interview with Atun.
\(^{401}\) Interview with Atun.
\(^{402}\) Atun, “Development in North Cyprus”, 105.
\(^{403}\) Atun, “Development in North Cyprus”, 105.
\(^{404}\) Interview with Onurhan.
\(^{405}\) Interview with Gazioglu; Interview with Atun.
\(^{406}\) Interview with Gazioglu.
As it takes some time to settle in a new home and village, the authorities provided meals and food until the immigrants could provide for themselves.\textsuperscript{407} Therefore, the villages were equipped with a “moveable kitchen from Red Crescent”, which cooked and prepared meals for the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{408} Furthermore, while preparing the villages and houses for new inhabitants, equipment and furniture were collected from the abandoned Greek-Cypriot homes. These goods and properties were stored in what were colloquially referred to as “loot depots”, and the iskan rehberi were responsible for redistributing these goods according to the needs and sizes of families.\textsuperscript{409}

In addition, food depots were set up in and around groups of villages, from which the inhabitants could collect rice, pasta and other food and household goods in exchange for the ration cards that they had been given. Normally, people were given ration cards for one year, with which they were given staple foods every day in order to get by while they were trying to work the land and kick-start agricultural production again. Some, however, have reported of receiving food from ration cards for almost two years. In these cases, however, they were part of the very first immigrants. Because it was a pioneering project, and it took time for the system to run smoothly, it usually took longer for them to settle down than for those who came later.\textsuperscript{410}

In addition to settlement offices in the various villages and groups of villages, there was a central levazım, or supply, office located in the capital, Lefkoşa, which provided “refrigerators … necessary equipment to us[e in] their houses. Cooking units, … washing machines if they existed. All kind of apparatus necessary in the houses”.\textsuperscript{411} After a few years, when the settlement process had come along more or less smoothly, the iskan rehberi pulled out of the villages and the number of settlement offices were reduced to only the largest cities and towns: Gazi Mağusa, Lefkoşa, Girne, Güzelyurt and İskele.\textsuperscript{412}

\textsuperscript{407} Interview with Gazioğlu.
\textsuperscript{408} Interview with Atun.
\textsuperscript{409} Bryant, \textit{The Past in Pieces}, 144.
\textsuperscript{410} Interview with Yeşil.
\textsuperscript{411} Interview with Gazioğlu.
\textsuperscript{412} Interview with Gazioğlu.
The heterogeneity of the immigrants

The immigrants from Turkey were a very heterogeneous group. The former Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot Dr. Fazıl Kutçuk claimed that, due to this heterogeneity, the immigrants “had sectarian conflicts among them … lived away from each other because of blood feuds and who belonged to two different faiths.” While there is little evidence to back this story of blood feuds, it is true that the immigrants came from many different locations in Turkey. The ethnic make-up of the Turkish immigrants was also heterogeneous. Therefore, it is very erroneous to view the immigration as a homogenous “Turkifying” force as many critics of the process maintain. In truth, the immigrants were of many backgrounds and were by no means a purely ethnic Turkish group.

The complexity of the group leads many, like Hitchens and Kutçuk, to argue that there were inherent problems between the members of the different ethnicities. There is little proof to confirm or discard this assertion. Nonetheless, most immigrants interviewed have not spoken of any conflict between immigrants of different backgrounds. Moreover, politicians and officials involved in the immigration process deny that there were cases of ethnic violence. However, some have told of confusing encounters with immigrants of another ethnicity and an inability to understand the language spoken by the other. There were some instances in which Laz, in encounters with Kurds, thought that they had run into Greek-Cypriots because of linguistic differences. This gives an impression of the complexity and variety represented among the immigrants from mainland Turkey.

Atun, Atakol and Çelik negate that there were big issues and cases of violence between members of different ethnic groups in the immigration process. The authorities lacked the resources and the time required to divide villages along ethnic lines, as they perhaps desired to do. Regarding this question, Atun stated that “there wasn’t a direct policy not to mix them [the Turkish immigrants]. So eventually they had to intermix and live together, and we managed it, both with our local people and for the refugees [sic] that came from Anatolia.” Nevertheless, there was an attempt to keep members of Turkish villages intact and in that way settle entire villages into new ones in northern Cyprus, so that in many cases entire

413 Hitchens, Cyprus, 111.
414 See Chapter 4 of this thesis.
415 Interview with Yusuf Suiçmez.
416 Interview with Atun; Interview with Atakol; Interview with Çelik.
417 Interview with Atun.
villages were inhabited by people from the same village or district in Turkey. This seemed to have been a goal for many of the immigrants themselves as well.\(^\text{418}\)

For the most part, however, villages were mixed in the sense that there were the original Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants, Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south and Turkish immigrants from different locations in Turkey. In addition to attempting to keep villages more or less intact when moving them to northern Cyprus, the authorities aimed at moving people to villages that they thought resembled the places that the immigrants came from in Turkey. Looking at the map of the distribution of immigrants from the Black Sea coast of Turkey, for instance, reveals that such immigrants mainly inhabit villages along the northern coast of Cyprus.\(^\text{419}\) Atun confirmed that this was largely how it was done: “the people from Turkey, mainly from Black Sea area, were settled along the coast. Not all of them, but most of them”.\(^\text{420}\)

Although there is little proof of widespread conflicts between the Turkish-Cypriot population and the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus, there were some cultural differences and difficulties in terms of adaptation for the immigrants in their new setting. Compared to where many of the immigrants came from in Turkey, Cyprus was more developed and modern. Many were therefore unaccustomed to Western toilets (known as à la franka toilets in Turkish), and luxuries such as bathtubs and modern kitchens equipped with modern electric- or gas stoves.\(^\text{421}\) According to Gazoğlu, who remembers receiving a number of complaints from Turkish immigrants regarding their houses, “[t]he houses … was not according to their daily living standards. Their social and economic situations and their daily living standards.”\(^\text{422}\) In some cases it was a challenge to convince the immigrants that they had been given adequate housing, and some complained of being handed incomplete or inadequate homes. Gazoğlu recounted situations in which families from mainland Turkey complained to the authorities about being given a house without a kitchen because the house lacked a wood-burning iron stove, which was what they were used to cook from in their homes in Turkey. He also recalls seeing bathtubs used as troughs for animal feeding because those that had been given homes furnished with bathtubs had never seen such a thing and did not know its conventional use. In

\(^{418}\) This is the case of Sadrazamköy, as confirmed in an interview the Çakır family.

\(^{419}\) Gürel, Hatay, Trimikliniotis, Demetriou, Bryant & Yakinthou, *Mapping the Consequences*.

\(^{420}\) Interview with Atun.

\(^{421}\) Interview with Gazoğlu.

\(^{422}\) Interview with Gazoğlu.
addition, he remembers having visited numerous families who converted their à la franka
toilets into squat toilets (known as à la turka toilets in Turkish). 423

Such observations and memories led Gazioğlu to conclude that “they [the Turkish
immigrants] were … very far back compared with our [Turkish-Cypriots’] social lives. They
were more … conservatives.” 424 It was not easy for the immigrants from Turkey “where
styles of work and living are quite different in some important respects from those of the
Turkish Cypriots.” 425 In addition to being treated differently by the government, as seen by
the example of the title deeds, the immigrants later faced discrimination from the population
at large. 426 There was, and remains to be, a sense among Turkish-Cypriots that they
themselves are “Turks, but they have developed a culture with its own norms, values and
belief systems”, which has increasingly become threatened by the influx of immigrants from
the more traditional and religious areas of Turkey. 427

After the initial enthusiasm for the Turkish immigrants slowly waded, there developed an
identity distinction between Turkish-Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey specific to the
class and social standing of the mainland Turks. The Turkish-Cypriot community generally
and historically associate themselves with the more secular cultural elite in Turkey. The
immigrants from Anatolia, who were mainly workers or farmers, were therefore seen as more
backward than the progressive Turkish-Cypriots. 428

While Turkish-Cypriot refugees were given title deeds following the passing of the İTEM
Law, immigrants from Turkey were not granted the same rights. This was, arguably,
because the Turkish-Cypriot administration wanted to prevent the Turkish immigrants
from selling the property and moving back to Turkey. 429 The difference in treatment
between the two groups obviously led to resentment among the immigrants. The
restrictions on land ownership meant, both in theory and in practice, that those from
Turkey had secondary status in comparison to both the Turkish-Cypriot refugees and the

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423 Interview with Gazioğlu.
424 Interview with Gazioğlu.
425 Morvaridi, “Demographic Change”, 234.
428 Morvaridi, “Social Structure and Social Change”, 266; Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 305-306.
429 Ramm, “Turkish Cypriots, Turkish ‘Settlers’”, 218.
Turkish-Cypriots already living in northern Cyprus. Thus, with the combination of having to adjust to new surroundings and a new way of life and not receiving the same privileges as the Turkish-Cypriot refugees, the Turkish immigrants were often in a more difficult situation than the population at large.\textsuperscript{430} The policy of not offering title deeds to the Turkish immigrants was by many seen as unfair. However, northern Cyprus “needed people to exploit the resources … and to establish a proper administration.”\textsuperscript{431} “[W]e were afraid lest they sold it [the property] and run back to Turkey. Because we needed them for the production, they came here. We needed the labor force”.\textsuperscript{432}

**Assistance from Turkey**

Turkey was the central actor in dividing the island after its intervention in July and August 1974, and therefore had to assist the Turkish-Cypriots in developing north Cyprus. Furthermore, it also had extensive historical experience with population exchanges and movements. Turkey’s past of “Turkifying” areas has often been cited by opponents of the Turkish immigration as proof that Turkey was applying the same methods for the same effect in northern Cyprus.\textsuperscript{433}

Furthermore, the fact that Turkey was so involved in the process has led many to apply the term “settler” to describe the mainland Turks who came to northern Cyprus after 1974.\textsuperscript{434} The anthropologist Rebecca Bryant, who has written extensively on the Turkish-Cypriot people and northern Cyprus, argues that the Turks who came in this period “do not resemble settlers in other colonial nationalist projects such as Israel, in that many did not come of their own volition, and quite a few knew little about Cyprus when they arrived.”\textsuperscript{435} Not only were many unable to locate Cyprus on a map prior to arriving, they often had no other option than to leave their homes and villages in Turkey, for various reasons. This is perhaps why Atun refers to the immigrants from Turkey as “refugees”.\textsuperscript{436} However, they were given houses and land upon arrival and, in most cases, citizenship to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (and became citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after its unilateral

\textsuperscript{430} Interview with Atun; Interview with Gazioğlu.
\textsuperscript{432} Interview with Çelik.
\textsuperscript{433} Ioannides, *In Turkey’s Image*. See chapter 4 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{434} Ioannides, *In Turkey’s Image*; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”.
\textsuperscript{435} Bryant & Yakinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*, 27.
\textsuperscript{436} See chapter 4 of this thesis. Interview with Atun.
declaration of independence in 1983), either immediately upon arrival or later. During the first wave of immigration, approximately 25,000 immigrants from Turkey were given citizenship of the TFSC. This led many, especially in the south, to look at them as colonizers whose objective was to take advantage of the Turkish-Cypriots and forever change the demographics of the island. This view has from the 1990s and 2000s gained influence in the north as well, and there is an increasing fear among the Turkish-Cypriots that they are being “outnumbered by immigrants from Turkey.” However, this view is more based on later immigration waves than on the first wave.

The “co-operation and development project” agreement between the northern Cypriot authorities and Turkey was, in addition to aiming at the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot refugees, also designed to coordinate the settlement of immigrants from Turkey into the new Turkish-Cypriot state. Moreover, there was a need for assistance within fields of economics and everyday affairs. In order to carry out such co-operation and facilitate Turkish assistance, a Co-ordination Committee was set-up in 1976, which discussed such matters and projects. This committee consisted of the Turkish-Cypriot President, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the two governments, and the Turkish Ambassador to north Cyprus. With a direct link to the Turkish government, cooperation and coordination in projects requiring Turkish help was made more efficient.

Turkey, as the only country that recognized and assisted the Turkish-Cypriot fight for independence, was an invaluable resource and partner for the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Atun attributes practically all developments and improvements in northern Cyprus to the help and assistance given to them by Turkey. He argued that it is futile for Turkish-Cypriots to criticize Turkey’s role in northern Cyprus because, “we need [and needed] the support of Turkey and … in the construction of all infrastructure: roads, airports, harbors, ports, even small towns, irrigation systems, everything was done by Turkey.” In order to finance these projects, Turkey provided money “through TC

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437 Bryant, *The Past in Pieces*, 43.
438 Bryant & Yakinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*; Ioannides, *In Turkey’s Image*; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”.
439 Bryant & Yakinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*, 27; Hatay, *Turkish Cypriot Population*.
440 See chapter 3 of this thesis.
441 Interview with Atakol; Interview with Çelik.
442 Interview with Atun; Interview with Atakol.
443 Interview with Atun.
Yardım Heyeti, the Turkish Aid Programme. The Turkish-Cypriot authorities and cadres lacked the knowledge and experience to carry out such an expansive project without the help from Turkey.

“Turkey practically helped us in every problem that we had, whether it was an administrative problem, [or] an import-export problem”. This is how Kenan Atakol, the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy in 1974 and Minister of Education, Culture and Training in 1977, saw it. Also in the field of Turkish immigration, Turkey played an invaluable role in assisting the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Without Turkey’s help, it would not be possible to welcome such a large Turkish labor force.

In addition, Turkey sent experts within the fields of manufacturing, engineering and economic planning. Onurhan, prior to being Cabinet Minister, was Assistant General Manager of the public enterprise Sanayi Holding. This public enterprise “tried to accommodate all the production … plants that was left behind [in the north]”. In connection with that, Onurhan had to confer with the Turkish authorities, which helped kick-start production in north Cyprus by “sending their engineers, by sending their production managers over here [northern Cyprus] and telling us how to do it”. The field of industrial production and manufacturing was somewhat of a special case because during the civil strife of the 1960s the majority of the Turkish-Cypriots lived in enclaves spread across Cyprus. These enclaves constituted approximately three percent of the island. Consequently, the Turkish-Cypriots stood for only circa two percent of the gross national product (GNP) of the country’s entire economy. Moreover, the Turkish-Cypriots were traditionally occupied with agriculture and public service, not commerce and manufacture. Therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot population had little or no experience with industrial production and expert help was thereby especially needed within this field.

Atun reveals the importance of Turkish assistance in this process of resettling both Turkish-Cypriot refugees and settling immigrants from Turkey:

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444 Interview with Atun.
446 Interview with Atakol.
447 Interview with Onurhan.
448 Interview with Onurhan.
449 Interview with Onurhan.
450 Olgun, “Economic Overview”, 270; Interview with Onurhan.
at beginning, my Ministry, Housing and Rehabilitation, got almost one third of the [total state] budget and it was all sent from Turkey. We repaired the houses; we financed the people to buy tractors, to buy crops. So the Turkish Agricultural Bank, or Türkiye Ziraat Bankası, financed this. And eventually, in a way, we borrowed this money from Turkey … but eventually we didn’t pay it back. So it was, in a way, a donation from Turkey.\textsuperscript{451}

He continued to underline Turkey’s crucial role for the Turkish-Cypriots in stating that “the role of Turkey in this [process], financially, technically, was very effective and was very necessary.”\textsuperscript{452} Without Turkey, the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot refugees and the settlement of Turkish immigrants would likely not be possible. Furthermore, the setting up of a Turkish-Cypriot state in northern Cyprus would undoubtedly border the impossible without Turkish assistance.

**Was it a success?**

Both at the time, and retrospectively, many have questioned whether the immigration process was a success or not. When asked what he thought was the biggest mistake made by the government in the resettlement process, Gazioğlu responded: “allocating land to the people from Turkey in Famagusta [Gazi Mağusa], Maraş.”\textsuperscript{453} This response falls in line with the criticism that the people who moved to northern Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily cut out for the tasks for which they came to the island. There were difficulties for them in adapting to life in the island compared to the life they were used to in Turkey. The example of Maraş, which is a suburb to Gazi Mağusa, the second largest city in northern Cyprus, second to the capital Lefkoşa, is illustrating in this regard. Only the very first immigrants were settled in this area as it later turned out to be problematic, both for a future settlement to the Cyprus conflict and due to overproduction and a subsequent deterioration of the agricultural land.\textsuperscript{454}

Approximately 3,000 Turkish immigrants were settled in Maraş. They were mainly working in the citrus orchards and later with greenhouse farming, once the water became salinized due to over-use. The interesting thing, however, is that many of those settled in this urban center, at the fringes of which there were citrus orchards, were Yörüks. They are a semi-nomadic

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\textsuperscript{451} Interview with Atun.

\textsuperscript{452} Interview with Atun.

\textsuperscript{453} Interview with Gazioğlu.

\textsuperscript{454} For a discussion on the settlement of the Cyprus problem and the peace talks, see chapter 3 of this thesis. Turkish Cypriot Community Office Of the President, “North Cyprus Project: Purchase of Rotary Drilling and Anchillary Equipment.” Nicosia, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, October 1977. Source found in Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi [National Archives and Research Center], Girne, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Doc. No. 332.
people from the Mersin and Antalya provinces of Turkey. Many of them were used to living in tents and travelling around with their herded animals. Upon arriving in Gazi Mağusa, therefore, some described it as being “like New York.” Some were overwhelmed by the differences that greeted them and returned to Turkey, while others refused to live in the apartments given to them, and moved into tents in the citrus orchards.

In response to the question whether mistakes were made in the immigration process, Onurhan responded that “it could be organized better … You had to fill in a gap very rapidly.” The haste with which people were needed seemed to be the biggest challenge in the process, and he held that “[i]t was probably not very regulated at that time.” Although that may be true, the large group of immigrants who moved to northern Cyprus in this seven year-period were settled in their villages and distributed houses and land relatively quickly and effectively. Atun insisted that “the amount of 30,000 [Turkish immigrants in the first wave of immigration] was more or less calculated”, however, he also held that the immigration process was “done in a very hasty manner”.

Priority was given to the goal of the “creation of employment as quickly as possible and the direction of people to production”, thereby kick-starting both the immigrants’ personal economy and the economy of the new state. From 1975 to 1980 there was an average growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18.75 percent, with highs of 62.2 percent in 1975 and 31.3 percent in 1976. Furthermore, every sector of the economy experienced notable growth in this period. Such growth “may be attributed to efficient utilization of human and natural resources”. In addition to such economic improvements, north Cyprus experienced great social developments. Thus, coupled with the Turkish-Cypriot refugees who were resettled in the north, the immigrants from Turkey directly contributed to the economic growth and social developments of the new Turkish-Cypriot political entity created.

455 Interview with Yeşil; Interview with Hatay; Kasaba, A Moveable Empire, 21.
456 Interview with Yeşil.
457 Interview with Yeşil.
458 Interview with Onurhan.
459 Interview with Yeşil.
460 Interview with Atun.
461 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 89, 105.
463 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 343.
464 TRNC Archive Doc. No. 1564.
following the 1974 war. Politically, however, northern Cyprus may seem to have become more isolated and condemned internationally as a result of the immigration from Turkey. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its 1977 amendment deem settlement policies in occupied territories illegal, the state manipulated push-pull factors, in Professor McGarry’s terms, were therefore unlawful by international law. This, in addition perceptions and misperceptions, in the words of Professor Jervis, about the immigration process by both Greek-Cypriots and the international community, deepened the quagmire of isolation for the new Turkish-Cypriot state.465

465 Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 88; McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 619; Jervis, Perceptions and misperceptions.
6. Conclusion

The Cyprus of 1980 was characterized by two separate parts, a Turkish-Cypriot north (approximately 36 percent of the island) and a Greek-Cypriot south, which were divided by an UN-controlled buffer zone horizontally cutting through the island. In the seven-year period from the division of the island in 1974, until the end of the first wave of immigration from Turkey in 1980, this physical division developed into a social, economic and political dissolution between the two communities. Due to the large exodus of Greek-Cypriots from the north and a comparatively low influx of Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south, there was a need in northern Cyprus for immigrants from Turkey. They were needed in order to work towards its goal of economic self-sufficiency and political independence. What areas of Turkey did these immigrants leave, what social strata did the migrants belong to, and what was their ethnic composition? Why did they leave their homes in Turkey in this period, and why did they migrate to northern Cyprus? Lastly, was the first wave of immigration successful in contributing to both an economic and political independence from the Greek-Cypriot south?

From Ottoman conquest to Turkish intervention
Cyprus has been affected by the civilizations and powers that have controlled it throughout history. Prior to the Ottoman takeover of the island from the Venetians in 1571, its inhabitants were primarily a Greek-speaking Greek Orthodox population. The Ottomans settled Muslims from Anatolia in order to consolidate their power in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the two communities largely coexisted in relative peace throughout the Ottoman period. It was not until the mid-1800s that trouble appeared to surface. When the British were given possession of the island through an agreement with the Ottoman Sultan, a continued policy of separating the social and political spheres of the two communities through, for instance, separate education based on curricula from Greece and Turkey, the bi-communal character of Cyprus increasingly became a source of ethnic violence.

From the mid-1950s the violence in Cyprus developed into a civil war-like situation, where the two communities had separate goals: the Turkish-Cypriots seeking taksim (division of the island) and the Greek-Cypriots sought enosis (union between Cyprus and Greece). Developments on the island had repercussions on the relationship between Greece and
Turkey. Both countries supported their ethnic brethren on Cyprus and were therefore increasingly involved in international discussions on the future of the island. Despite the deteriorated situation in Cyprus between the two communities, Turkey and Greece were able to come together with Great Britain in 1959 and agree on the independence of Cyprus. This independence was accompanied by three treaties, namely the Treaty of Guarantee; the Treaty of Alliance; and the Treaty of Establishment, which could be said to limit the degree of authentic sovereignty for the Cypriots. These treaties were meant to secure British (which still has two military bases on the island), Turkish and Greek interests on the island, thereby creating and intensifying difficulties and potential for future conflict.

Due to the nature of the Cypriot form of government, consociationalism, which bases parliamentary membership on ethnic affiliation, many observers viewed Cyprus’ independence and political system as a sham. The Turkish-Cypriots were given 30 percent of the seats in parliament, and veto power, due to their minority status. The Greek-Cypriot majority viewed this as unfair and unworkable. Therefore, Archbishop and President Makarios proposed a thirteen-point amendment to the constitution. The Turkish-Cypriots refused to accept such changes, as they were afraid that it would negatively affect them. Already in 1963 a new civil war-like situation broke out on the island. The violence developed further, and a majority of the Turkish-Cypriot population was forced into enclaves throughout Cyprus. This effectively cut them out of the economy and politics of the country. This isolation had repercussions for northern Cyprus after 1974 and resulted in a need for aid from Turkey, in the form of social, economic and political help. The Turkish-Cypriots were to a great extent ostracized throughout the 1960s until the Turkish intervention in 1974.

When the extremist Greek-Cypriot organization EOKA B, with the aid of the military junta ruling in Greece at the time, organized a coup d’etat against Makarios on 15 July 1974, Turkey saw the need to intervene in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriots. Although Turkey had desired to do so on previous occasions in the 1960s, they had been stopped by the United States. This time, however, enosis was the stated aim of the coup-makers, which spurned Turkey to refer to its right to intervene in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee. Initially, and in line with the stated treaty, Turkey sought to intervene bilaterally with Great Britain. If Britain had accepted, the outcome of the intervention could have been different as it would likely have taken place from the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in the south. However, Britain refused to participate, and on 20 July 1974 Turkey, intervening unilaterally, landed in Girne.
in north Cyprus. The military operation took place in two phases. The first operation was completed already on 22 July and resulted in the fall of the Greek military junta and the ousting of President Nikos Sampson. Thus, Turkey had fulfilled its duties as a guarantor power. Nevertheless, Turkey, after two peace conferences failed in Geneva, initiated a second military operation on 14 August. Two days later, on 16 August, Turkey completed their invasion and the Turkish-Cypriots ended up controlling 36 percent of the island.

**Developments in northern Cyprus 1974-1980**

Since the division of Cyprus in 1974 into a Turkish-Cypriot north and a Greek-Cypriot south, the two communities have become increasingly separated, not only physically but also culturally, economically and politically. The 1974-1980 period was characterized by the development of two more or less mono-ethnic states, one internationally recognized and the other solely recognized by Turkey. The fact that northern Cyprus has only received recognition from Turkey, has contributed to the increased reliance on the Turkish government for both economic and political developments. Furthermore, social changes have been influenced by both the presence of immigrants from Turkey and by the economic and political aid the Turkish-Cypriots received from Turkey.

The economic situation in northern Cyprus following the war was difficult. Inflation and unemployment rates were high, and due to a labor shortage it was hard to take advantage of the citrus fields and production plants now in its possession. In addition to labor shortages in most aspects of the economy, the Turkish-Cypriots, because of their isolation in enclaves from the mid-1960s, were inexperienced within politics and economics. Although they had now achieved the independence from the Greek-Cypriots that they had perhaps sought throughout the 1960s, they relied increasingly on help from Turkey, both in regards to labor and expertise.

Much of the state budget in northern Cyprus in this period came directly from Turkey. Hakkı Atun held that this money was initially intended as a loan, but that once it was clear that the Turkish-Cypriot government were unable to repay it, it was given to them as aid. The Turkish government owned almost half of the shares in the main Turkish-Cypriot public enterprises,

466 Interview with Atun.
Sanayi Holding and Cypruvex. Furthermore, northern Cyprus introduced the Turkish Lira as the legal tender, thereby practically importing the fiscal characteristics of Turkey.

Developments within northern Cyprus have been interpreted from outside as being wholly controlled from Turkey. Although there certainly were grounds for such a conclusion, it was only part of the truth. The lack of international recognition, the failure of the inter-communal negotiations and internal political movements and opinions within the Turkish-Cypriot community has affected the changes that occurred in northern Cyprus during this period. Nevertheless, there are strong parallels between events within Turkey in the same period and developments and changes in north Cyprus.

**Migration in a context of economic, political and social crisis**

From 1974 to 1980, Turkey faced an economic, political and social crisis. Although the 1950s and 1960s saw an increase in the country’s Gross National Product (GNP) and Human Development Index (HDI), the country was, largely due to regional differences, characterized by an economic disaster in the period 1974-1980. Unemployment rates were extremely high, and inflation rates deemed workers’ salaries difficult to survive on. In addition, as a result of large development projects, many areas of Turkey were affected by the construction of large dams or highways. Furthermore, land slides and other natural disasters destroyed many villages. Politically the country faced violence between left and right, and ethnically motivated fighting. None of the governments in this period, of which there were a few because of political crises, were able to deal with these issues.

Due to these problems, many migrated from the countryside to the cities. The three largest cities in Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, grew immensely in this period. However, life was not necessarily improved by moving into the city. In addition to urban migration, many Turks moved to Western Europe, especially to Germany, in the same period. It had also been normal for people in Turkey to move to other villages and rural areas if their villages were destroyed as a result of the construction of dams, highways or landslides. As space opened up in northern Cyprus, following Turkey’s intervention there, it was now possible to send victims of such development projects to new homes. The fact that many of the immigrants had to leave Turkey as a result of the destruction of their villages, and that many of them, due
to a difficult economic situation, sought a new life in north Cyprus, has led Atun to call them “refugees”.467

Those who migrated from Turkey and went to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration, were a composite group. The majority came from less developed regions of Turkey, namely the Black Sea (East and West), Central Anatolia, the Mediterranean region, Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia. In addition to a large geographic diversity, the migrants were of different ethnic backgrounds. The most common were Turks; Yörük; Laz; and Kurds. It is therefore erroneous to view them as a “Turkifying” force, sent to northern Cyprus in order to increase the percentage of Turks on the island, although the vast majority were Turks. Furthermore, it is inaccurate to claim that northern Cyprus became mono-ethnic following the division of the island. It is true that Greek-Cypriots left for South-Cyprus (except for approximately 1,600 Greek-Cypriots who mainly lived in the Karpassia Peninsula), thus making north Cyprus more or less ethnically cleansed of Greek-Cypriots. However, the influx of people from Turkey of different ethnic backgrounds meant that northern Cyprus did not become strictly mono-ethnic. Therefore, while the immigrants were “agents” in the sense that they were encouraged to move to north Cyprus in order to contribute to the economy and consequently to the self-sufficiency and independence of the Turkish-Cypriots, they were not necessarily “agents” in the sense that they represented one ethnic group sent to increase the demographic percentage of that ethnicity.

Although the immigrants were a very heterogeneous group in regards to ethnicity, they were rather homogeneous socially speaking. For the most part they were agricultural laborers, and thus largely economically disadvantaged and uneducated. Hence, traditional push-factors appear to have played an important role in the first wave of immigration, contrary to common belief among many Greek-Cypriots, politicians and researchers. Whereas these characteristics later made many of the immigrants from Turkey victims of discrimination from the Turkish-Cypriots, those who migrated from Turkey in the first wave of immigration were welcomed with open arms and seen as saviors. This was mostly owing to the fact that there truly was a dire need for labor in the north Cyprus. It also has to do with the notion that Turkey was seen as the protector of Turkish-Cypriots and had saved them from perceived imminent destruction following the Greek-Cypriot coup d’état in July 1974. The immigrants from

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467 Interview with Atun. See chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
Turkey were seen as an extension of the savior, Turkey, and they were thus generally welcomed as heroes initially.

The Turkish government co-operated closely with the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in the immigration process. Turkey had historical experience with population movements, as seen by the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s. In addition to this event, Turkey had broad experience with moving Kurds and other non-Turks to other parts of Turkey in order to “Turkify” them. There is little or no proof, however, that “enemies”, in the way professor McGarry applies the term, were encouraged to leave Turkey.\textsuperscript{468} It may appear to have been coincidental that members of different ethnic groups, such as Kurds and Yörüks, left Turkey and moved to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration. A lot of people had to be resettled within Turkey throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century due to development projects and consequent destruction of villages, and in many cases people of these ethnicities coincidentally inhabited these villages.

Because of Turkey’s experience with population movements, both between countries, such as with Greece, and within Turkey, it was a valuable and able partner in the immigration process. Specific areas of Turkey were selected to encourage migration to north Cyprus. The authorities sent out calls to those districts of Turkey that were the most disadvantaged. Furthermore, village officials selected village elders, imams and others of high standing in the community to encourage people to sign up for resettlement in northern Cyprus. Imams were particularly useful to the authorities as they gave legitimacy to the process. Thus, push-factors were decisive, but the authorities were also adept at employing and actuating such factors, as evidenced by the legitimizing effect of imams and other community leaders.

These methods were mainly used to encourage those who were simply disadvantaged. In villages and districts where people’s homes were threatened from destruction as a result of the construction of dams and the like, the Turkish government obviously knew who and what would be affected. Therefore, people were told to apply for resettlement in advance. Before the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the norm had been to relocate families to other places in Turkey, a practice that often took a long time to carry out. However, with the opening up of space in northern Cyprus, many could be relocated immediately and be provided with

\textsuperscript{468} McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”, 616-617.
housing and land. Those that moved to north Cyprus were allowed to bring with them 500 kilograms of possessions per family. Upon departure they rallied in designated locations and were brought to Mersin from where they were transported by ferry to Gazi Mağusa in north Cyprus. Accompanying them on this journey were officials from Turkey and, in some stated cases, nurses. Once in northern Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities had to find a way to settle them and make sure they could begin working within those fields that they were needed in order to kick-start the economy and gain the political independence the Turkish-Cypriots had been seeking.

**The northern Cypriot dream: Turkish immigration to north Cyprus**

As a result of the war in 1974 and the consequent Vienna III Agreement, 180,000 Greek-Cypriots moved south and approximately 60,000 Turkish-Cypriots moved in the opposite direction. People from both communities on the “wrong” side of the buffer zone left or escaped to the other side with the help of the UNFICYP forces in Cyprus. Subsequently, northern Cyprus experienced a net loss of 120,000 people. It is in this context of a population vacuum that the people who had been encouraged to move from Turkey, through normal and engineered push- and pull-factors, in order to improve their lives could come to north Cyprus.

This vacuum brought with it a lack of labor within most sectors of the northern Cypriot economy. It was therefore possible for the immigrants from Turkey to obtain work immediately upon arrival to the island. Furthermore, immigrants from Turkey were promised housing, land and other immovable property in north Cyprus. In that way pull-factors were manipulated, in accordance with McGarry’s theories, in order to appeal to immigrants from Turkey. It was therefore a relatively easy choice for most of those who migrated from Turkey. People who had moved to northern Cyprus in this period therefore also encouraged family members back in Turkey to move. In that way the immigration process, through traditional and manipulated pull-factors, was kept alive both by the authorities and those who had already moved.

In order to allow for the immigration of approximately 30,000 people from Turkey, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities had a detailed and concise methodology. The settlement of immigrants from Turkey occurred almost parallel with the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriot immigrants from South-Cyprus. Priority was given to the latter. Therefore, the most central
villages were reserved for such refugees. Furthermore, the Turkish-Cypriots were quite early given ownership rights to the houses and land that they were given in northern Cyprus. They were given houses and land more or less in accordance with the amount of property that they had left in Southern Cyprus. This is one of the major differences between the methodologies used for providing property for refugees compared to for immigrants. Those who came to north Cyprus from Turkey were handed out houses in accordance with need. That is, the size of the property given depended on the size of the family. While the Turkish-Cypriots usually were resettled in villages and towns near the cities and in other central locations, the immigrants from Turkey were normally settled in more peripheral areas, such as the Karpassia Peninsula. There were, however, more central areas, for instance in and around Güzelyurt and Gazi Mağusa, which were used to settle people from Turkey. This was largely due to the citrus fields that existed there. Even in those cases where people were settled in areas far away from the citrus fields, immigrants were transported long distances every weekend in order to pick fruits. These examples illustrate that immigration from Turkey was first and foremost intended to fill the labor shortage within certain economic fields, particularly within citrus and other agricultural production, making them, in that sense, “agents”.

The problem in this respect, however, was that many of the immigrants who came to north Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily cut out for the agricultural production that they were put to work in. This was largely due to a significant difference in the climate. It was especially true with those who migrated from the Black Sea region of Turkey. Many of the fruits and vegetables grown in Cyprus were different from those that the immigrants were used to. Therefore, it was difficult for many of the immigrants to adapt. As a result, the authorities saw the need to send officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy to teach the newcomers how to grow and pick these fruits and vegetables. This was not the only form of aid and assistance that was given to the immigrants. Each village used for the settlement of refugees from South-Cyprus and/or immigrants from Turkey was assigned one or more *iskan rehberi*, or housing guide, who lived in the village and helped out with anything that the inhabitants might have needed. These guides stayed in the villages for up to two years in order to provide for a smooth transition. Furthermore, the immigrants were given ration cards with which they could collect staple foods, usually for up to a year. In that way the immigrants could focus on working the land and kick-starting agricultural
One may question whether the first wave of immigration was a success. The degree of success, however, depends on whose and what perspective one takes. The labor shortage that characterized northern Cyprus following the division of the island was, for instance, largely solved by the first wave of immigration. Consequently, the new state could take advantage of the natural resources available, particularly the citrus fields. However, in some cases, as with Maraş, irresponsible overproduction deteriorated the agricultural land. This consequence falls also in line with the notion that the first wave of immigration took place too quickly, with too many immigrants (approximately 30,000) in a short time span. Although Atun claimed that the amount of immigrants was more or less calculated, it was clear that the challenges this immigration process would lead to were not necessarily foreseen and thought out. The fact, for example, that not all refugees from South-Cyprus were resettled in northern Cyprus prior to settling immigrants from Turkey posed a challenge. Turkish-Cypriot refugees were given priority and were normally given the best houses and land in more central locations than the immigrants from Turkey. This sometimes led to resentment among the immigrants.

At times the immigrants were not given land and housing in the village that they were initially promised. Furthermore, there were many myths surrounding a move to north Cyprus to the extent that one may call it the “northern Cypriot dream”. When such high expectations were not fulfilled, some immigrants decided to move back to Turkey. The majority, however, stayed in north Cyprus and presumably improved their lives and personal economy. They were arguably decisive in improving the economy of northern Cyprus, which experienced an average growth in gross domestic product of nearly 20 percent as well as growth in practically all sectors of the economy. The realization that there was a need for labor from Turkey created an initial enthusiasm for their arrival, as vividly illustrated by the welcoming ceremonies recounted by some of the interviewed immigrants.469

**The northern Cypriot Dream in a Context of Reciprocal Need**

One of the things that make this research important is that the subject is surrounded by misperceptions. This is largely due to the fact that the borders between north- and South-
Cyprus have been closed between 1974 and 2003. As a result of the division and a lack of communication and openness between the two sides, misperceptions and misconceptions have flourished about the other side. This is particularly true of the issue of the immigrants from Turkey, as they have been branded as “colonizers” and “settlers” by the Greek-Cypriot authorities. This is ignoring the fact that there are many Turkish students and seasonal workers in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as north Cyprus has been known since 1983, who cannot be regarded as permanent residents, and certainly not as “colonizers”. At the same time, however, there are a lot of internal misperceptions about the immigration process among the Turkish-Cypriots as well. After an initial reaction of enthusiasm for the immigrants, many Turkish-Cypriots view the immigration wave with skepticism and are fearful of becoming a minority within their own state. The subject is thus surrounded by myths and misconceptions, which makes objective research on why the immigrants left Turkey and pursued new lives in the newborn Turkish Federated State of Cyprus important.

The first wave of immigration from Turkey to north Cyprus from 1974 to 1980 in some ways fits professor John McGarry’s theory of “demographic engineering”. His basic argument is that “agents” and/or “enemies” move, or are moved, in such a process. Such movements often occur following a war or in the context of crisis. “Agents” are meant to play a consolidating role, solidifying the state’s control over a specific area or region. Therefore, they are normally enticed to move by promises of housing and land. This was certainly the case with the immigrants from Turkey, who were not only promised a house, land and work in north Cyprus, but were also lured by notions and presentations of northern Cyprus as a type of dreamland with great opportunities and possibilities. The immigrants from Turkey were needed in north Cyprus in order to ensure Turkish-Cypriot economic and political independence and self-sufficiency from the Greek-Cypriots. In contrast, “enemies” are viewed as a trouble group in the particular place they currently inhabit and are thus moved elsewhere in order to minimize their ability to mobilize against the state. Although members of different ethnic and religious backgrounds moved from Turkey to north Cyprus during the first wave of immigration, there was little or no proof or indication that “enemies”, in McGarry’s use of the term, were moved to northern Cyprus. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that ethnic and linguistic minorities were among those who moved from Turkey to northern Cyprus in this period.

470 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, “Illegal Demographic Changes”.
471 McGarry, “‘Demographic engineering’”. 
While it is to a great extent accurate to describe many of the immigrants from Turkey as “agents”, who were moved to north Cyprus in order to contribute to the Turkish-Cypriot consolidation of their new state, ordinary push-pull factors certainly played a pivotal role as well. The political, economic and social situation in Turkey at the time was detrimental, and the society was crisis-ridden, particularly in the regions of Turkey that most of the immigrants came from. Therefore, a desire to improve one's life played an important role for most of the immigrants in this period. However, in line with McGarry’s theory, the authorities in northern Cyprus manipulated pull factors by providing housing and land. On the whole, one should view the first wave of immigration as a result of the employment of state mechanisms, as well as traditional push-pull factors in the context of crisis in Turkey coupled with opportunities and a need for labor in north Cyprus. After all, most of the immigrants who came from Turkey in the first wave of immigration were disadvantaged people seeking to improve their lives. This was either due to a difficult economic situation in Turkey, or because their villages and homes were being destroyed as a result of the construction of dams and highways or through landslides and other natural disasters.
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