Rational Irrationality: Analysis of Pakistan’s Seemingly Irrational Double Game in Afghanistan.

Osman Siddique
Preface

The purpose of this thesis has been to present the reader with an interesting analysis of one interesting phenomenon. I have tried to deliver insights that have academic weight and in that quest not focused too much on the number of pages and the number of words I may or may not have. Whether I have succeeded or not is up to the respective reader to decide. I have given the best of my abilities to this analysis and I hope it comes across.

This thesis would not have seen the light of day without the guidance and help from Mr. Anders Kjølberg. His experience in the field of research and knowledge on international security policy has given this thesis a clear path to follow, for which I am very grateful. I would also like to thank professor Matlary for her course on international security policy which gave me much of the empirical basis for this topic. A big recognition goes to all the lecturers and professors at HIBU for shaping much of my interest in the field of Political Science in general. I would also like to thank Mr. Tsebelis for answering the e-mail I sent him in the very early stages of this work.

Whatever analytical flaws this thesis may or may not have, alongside all the translations from Norwegian to English remain my own.

The biggest acknowledgement goes to my Parents, siblings, friends and wife to be, for keeping me grounded and in line. Without them nothing would have been possible. Last but not in any way the least, a big thank you to God for giving me common sense.

Oslo, May 2013.

Osman Siddque
Executive Summary

Pakistan has been involved in the global war on terrorism since its very beginning. Pakistan has continuously been acknowledged as an integral part of the Afghanistan puzzle and at the same time often been blamed for tolerating Afghan Taliban. This duplicity makes for the alleged double game the U.S blames Pakistan for playing.

This thesis equips a Pakistan-centric view on what is known as Pakistan’s alleged double game and through various findings argues that what may seem a seemingly irrational double game, is only so on the surface. On a domestic level Pakistan is involved in a game with Afghanistan where Afghanistan uses ethnic ties with Pashtuns to cause instability inside Pakistan. As a counter strategy Pakistan uses Afghan Taliban as a tool to exert influence in Afghanistan so that Pakistan’s own sovereignty would not be challenged. On a regional level Pakistan is involved in a game with India which Pakistan perceives as their biggest threat. Both states are in a contest with the other over influence in Afghanistan. India uses Northern Alliance as their proxy against Pakistan in Afghanistan, and Pakistan answers by using Afghan Taliban. The fact that Afghanistan and India are becoming closer allies and India is being promoted by the U.S makes Pakistan fearful over being trapped between hostile fronts. In order to break this development Afghan Taliban becomes Pakistan’s safest bet to purify Afghanistan from any outside influence. On the international level Pakistan’s friendship with China is providing them with a strategic edge over India, something they did not receive from the U.S. As the U.S is getting more involved with India, Pakistan and China are forming their own strategic alliance for mutual gains.

After filtering Pakistan’s strategic behavior through three different arenas of analysis, the findings suggest that Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game seems like a rational balancing act between what they perceive to be their national interests. Perception seems to be reality therefore to deem Pakistan as an irrational actor is to simplistic. By using the Nested Games theory the rationality behind Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game becomes clearer than what it is usually portrayed to be.
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1 Introduction

This thesis will examine the seemingly irrational behavior of Pakistan resulting into the infamous alleged double game and try to answer the question; is Pakistan’s irrational behavior rational? Is there any sort of logic behind the double game Pakistan is being accused of frequently? In order to answer these questions, this analysis will focus on all the sub-games Pakistan is involved in at the same time on different levels and how it translates into what seems as a double game in the American mind. To achieve this, this analysis will utilize George Tsebelis’ Nested Games framework in a qualitative manner and try to examine Pakistan’s strategic behavior on the domestic, regional and international arena. Within these arenas, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan, India and China will be used as a possible explanatory variables.

Pakistan has proven itself to be an asset to America in the pending war against terrorism. Even though the ties between the two countries have historically been turbulent, Pakistan has pulled its weight and played a significant role in capturing high profile Al-Qaeda officials and at the same time being an important base for the war in Afghanistan. However in recent years America and the west in general have had a growing skepticism towards Pakistan and the role the state is playing considering the return of a stronger Taliban, the growing militancy in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the local support for this militancy in the tribal areas. Finding Osama bin laden in Pakistan just a few miles from an army compound was the last straw which led to the Pakistani role being scrutinized heavily from the international community. Recent Wikileaks documents that point towards an alleged support to Taliban insurgency from Pakistan’s military added additional fuel to the fire.

From an American point of view Pakistan is playing a double game, meaning being an ally in the war against terrorism and simultaneously providing support for various jihadist groups, such as Afghan Taliban. Seen from an American perspective and from the perspective of the coalition forces in general this strategy is highly irrational. Why would a country pledge allegiance to a cause and at the same time work against the same cause? This seems irrational considering the stakes involved; loosing American support and aid money, which Pakistan is dependent upon especially for their military and security apparatus. The main research question is: can Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game be rational if the domestic, regional and international levels are considered?

Keywords: Pakistan, USA, Afghanistan, India, China, Double Game, Nested Games, Irrationality
1.1 Topic of interest

The term “great game” was used by British imperialists in nineteenth century to describe the British and Russian tug of war in Afghanistan (and Central Asia) (Rubin and Rashid 2008: 1). Over a century later the game between the great powers in Afghanistan continues. Some players are old, others are new and their involvement has changed. This new chessboard battle gave birth to the term the “the new great game”.

This new great game is the baseline for my analysis. As China rises as the new superpower of East Asia, and India as the rising power of South Asia, Pakistan finds itself in the middle. Pakistan is also a key ally of the United States in the war against terrorism in the neighboring country of Afghanistan, not only sharing borders but also much of the ethnic and linguistic population in the northern tribal areas. This makes Pakistan an interesting case to study in relation to Afghanistan’s stability and peace and being a political unstable country with a nuclear arsenal.

After President George W. Bush gave the world his famous dichotomous alternative – either with us or against us \(^1\) Pakistan, then led by President Musharraf extended full support to the anti-terror cause (Ahmad 2012: 115). Pakistan support for the United States was of extreme importance. Considering the situation the U.S and NATO was about to engage in, Pakistan’s strategic location was uncontested and pivotal for US and NATO (Ahmad 2012: 113). As years went by and the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, so did the relationship between Pakistan and USA. The reason for this is that Pakistan is being accused of supporting jihadist groups such as Afghan Taliban (Hansen 2012: 144) Haqqani network, Sipah-e-Sahaba etc. in other words the same groups US and NATO are out to get. From an American/NATO perspective this seems to be a highly irrational strategy. Why would Pakistan support the war against terrorism and at the same time undermine its success by supporting the enemy?

\(^1\): CNN.com: ‘You are either with us or against us’, November 06, 2001.
Keep in mind the stakes that are involved for Pakistan; billions of American dollars in military and civil aid and trade agreements and US support in the realm of security in general. This irrationality as seen from the U.S./NATO perspective is the core of my research question. Given that in IR theory all states are assumed rational, concluding a country like Pakistan to be irrational is a breach of that assumption. The research question aims at explaining why this alleged irrationality could be rational after all, meaning that Pakistan’s irrational strategies may only seem irrational on the surface and explicitly from an American point of view. Is it possible to find the genuine agenda of the Pakistani state and their rationale if we dig deeper into their security strategies and policy?

In order to do that, I will analyze Pakistan’s strategies and policies towards the United States of America in Afghanistan, through three different dimensions; first the domestic political arena of Pakistan, secondly the regional political arena and thirdly the international political arena.

In the domestic political arena I will emphasize Pakistan’s issue with Afghanistan and the contested Durand Line- the border between the two countries, and how this issue leads to ethnic nationalism spillover from Afghanistan to Pakistan concerning the Pashtun population. Then I will try to show how Afghan Taliban fits in in this sub-game as a solution and what gains they give to Pakistan. In the regional political arena I will emphasize what role India plays in this nexus and how India’s strategies and approaches to Afghanistan pose a great security challenge to Pakistan. Also here Afghan Taliban will be included as a possible game solver for Pakistan. In the international arena the emphasis will be on Pakistan’s relationship with China and how this relationship changes the regional prospects even further. Concerning the core of the alleged double game, the international arena will not be linked to Pakistan’s relationship with Taliban. Afghan Taliban as an explanatory variable have more significance in the domestic and regional arena. However, Pakistan’s relationship with China especially after the killing of Osama Bin Laden contributes to the alleged double game in the sense that Pakistan is first and foremost an ally of US in the war against terrorism, but still enjoys close and intimate ties with China, a rising superpower that the USA sees as an adversary. Due to Pakistan’s relationship with China Pakistan has chosen to do things that are in direct opposition with their relationship with USA. The basic assumption of the alleged double game is also seen here, the fact that Pakistan chooses to align itself more and more with China
in spite of USA being their biggest economic and security contributor. This is also an irrational move seen from an American perspective.

This at times strange relationship Pakistan has with the U.S is interesting and have steered my interest in this subject. The overall questions I am interested in are: A) Can Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game in the Afghanistan stage be rational? B) Will China be a contributing factor to this double game?

The main rationale behind this approach is to see if Pakistan’s seemingly irrational behavior is rational after being filtered through these arenas. To answer these questions I will apply Tsebelis’ concept of Nested Games in a qualitative manner. The original model in itself is quantitative but qualitative versions of this theory have been used. I will specify the theory and the research question even further later on in the methodology chapter, and also explain the structures of causality between Pakistan and USA and the different sub-games Pakistan is involved in. The most interesting period concerning Pakistan’s double game is after 9/11, however many of the explanations has roots that dates as far back as the independence of Pakistan in 1947 and the Cold War era.

1.2 South Asian Regional Security Complex: Why the focus mainly is on South Asia

Pakistan is a part of a bigger region with its own dynamics and differences. Some political and strategic tendencies are common for many of the countries and in some ways they differ, still this cluster of countries in the south Asian region has its own peculiarities that are interesting for the study of international security policy.

The South Asian security complex was initially defined by Buzan and Wæver in Regions and Powers from 2003. The theoretical insight and the conclusion in regions and powers are still to this day regarded as being an extremely valuable contribution to the study of post 1989 security dynamics (book review by Kavalsaki 2004) , and for the study of the field in general. However, an interesting article from Buzan in International Studies from 2011, is even more relevant for my thesis, because in this article Buzan analyzes the south Asian regional security complex (henceforth shortened RSC) explicitly, and includes the changes that south Asian RSC has gone through from the time the Regions and Powers was written.
The main conclusions drawn in Regions and Powers were that (1) South Asian RSC was moving towards a slow transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity (Buzan 2011: 2). Bipolarity was when Pakistan and India was considered equal rivals, the change to unipolarity represent the fact that India has grown stronger as Pakistan has gotten weaker. (2) the second argument was that the rise of China was creating a center of gravity that were interconnecting the South Asian RSC with the East Asian RSC (Buzan 2011: 2). China is not a part of the South Asian RSC, it is a part of the East Asian RSC, however India and China as two emerging powers could link both regions together creating a Asian Supercomplex (Buzan 2011: 8). South Asian RSC is described as a region where changes are slow, not sudden and dramatic (Buzan 2011: 2).

Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are a part of the South Asian RSC, which makes Buzan’s analysis relevant for my case study (other countries in south Asian RSC are Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh etc.), especially when it comes to shed light over how interconnected the countries in this regions are. South Asian RSC is known for ethnic and religious diversity and political divisions that are able to produce political violence. (Buzan 2011: 2). This explains Pakistan, India and Afghanistan’s domestic politics; the ethnic and sectarian fractions in Pakistan, Naxalites in India and the various clans in Afghanistan are good examples of political violent groups inside these countries (Buzan 2011: 5). In the cases of India and Pakistan, political parties and actors are known for trying to play or to manipulate these tensions (Buzan 2011: 5). Even though South Asian RSC has undergone changes, according to Buzan the overall picture presented in Regions and Powers remains unchanged (Buzan 2011:4).

The key link between the domestic dimension and regional dimension in the South Asian RSC is the ethnic and religious turbulence which has an spillover effect across borders in this RSC (Buzan 2011: 6). Caste politics in India, religious politics in Pakistan and issues concerning ethnicity in Afghanistan has a cross border impact on each of these countries. These dynamics are not only creating issues in their respective domestic political environment, but also creating uncertainty in their relationship with each other (Buzan 2011: 6). There is also continuity in water disputes between these states (Buzan 2011:6). The relationship between the two major powers in this region, Pakistan and India remains unchanged through a “war” of the intelligence agencies, blame games, mutual interfering in each other’s domestic issues (Buzan 2011: 5). There is a lack of mutual cooperation norms in
South Asian RSC and the interregional trade in this region has been one of the lowest in the world (Buzan 2011: 6). This eliminates economic interdependence as a way of counter-balancing each other as a strategy (Buzan 2011: 6).

China’s rise as an emerging power in Asia as a whole is connecting the South Asian RSC with the East Asian RSC. We see that through China’s much heavier involvement in South Asia through involvement with Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka (Buzan 2011: 9). China’s stance in South Asia is also very clear in its relationship with India. These two powers have strategic interactions with each other more as rivals than enemies (Buzan 2011: 9), however China is a counterweight to India’s rising ambition as a superpower in the South Asian RSC and beyond. India and China have a border dispute they have fought over earlier and they are in competition with one another which is seen by their involvement in each other’s home regions (India cooperating with Myanmar and Vietnam, and China’s relationship with Pakistan) (Buzan 2011: 9). On a more global perspective the U.S is aware of China as a rising power and therefore welcomes India’s engagement in the wider region. China as an undemocratic rising power is seen as a challenge to US, the leading democratic superpower in the world. These two giants interact with each other through involvement in the South Asian RSC, USA being involved heavily with Pakistan, and with strengthening ties with India. China on the other hand also enjoys good relations with Pakistan, and uses Pakistan as a gateway to keep India in check (will be discussed more during the main part of the analysis). With American longstanding involvement in the South Asian RSC, not at least through Afghanistan, this RSC becomes a nexus that transcends many different levels, from domestic, to regional to inter-regional and global. Buzan introduces the term decentered globalism, which means that the international system will be dominated by several great powers and no superpowers (Buzan 2011: 14). This explains the ongoing dynamics in the South Asian RSC, with India as a potential great power, Pakistan as a weaker, but nuclear capable state, and China in the East Asian RSC as a counterbalance to India. Buzan’s conclusions are that the domestic and regional and inter regional level has largely remained unchanged from his and Wæver’s initial analysis (Buzan 2011: 16). The most substantial change he recognizes is on the global level, where India and China will be great powers (not superpowers-decentered globalism), and USA will not remain the superpower for long (Buzan 2011: 16).

From Buzan and Wæver’s concept of regional security complex we clearly see how similar and interconnected the states in the South Asian RSC are. Logically what happens in one state
could possibly have a spillover effect across that states borders, as already described concerning ethnic and religious tensions. Therefore whether it is Pakistan, India or Afghanistan, these countries security policies is to some extent a result of their threat perceptions from each other. If we add China into this mix we see that China has the potential of changing the South Asian RSC into an Asian Supercomplex, dependent on their involvement in the region. Buzan’s analysis point’s towards more involvement from China. The U.S has always been present in the region and now faces difficult choices of strategies since their status as a superpower is diminishing, and two other great powers in interconnected RSC’s are making their way. The regional security complex theory eloquently shows why this particular region is of importance and of interest in the study of international security policy, and my thesis will stay closely linked to the overall concept of South Asia as a regional security complex.

1.3 The Pakistani Security Dilemma

The passage concerning the South Asian regional complex was a wider description of the interconnectedness of the South Asian (and part of the East Asian) states, their similar political dynamics and security challenges. This section will explain why this analysis is primarily going to be Pakistan-centric.

The concept of Security Dilemma was first presented by John Herz and is not only a core contribution to the field of international relations, but to the study of political science in general. Herz defines security dilemma as a vicious cycle of power and security where one group (or individual in a wider society) have concerns about being dominated or annihilated by another group. This leads to a strive for power and security, which in turn leads the other party to feel insecure and do the same, and since no one can feel perfectly secure in a world of competition, this goes on and on in circles (Herz 1950: 157).

A classic example of the security dilemma concerning Pakistan is its nuclear program which was a reaction to Indian nuclear capabilities (Tabassum 2012: 228). The nuclear race between Pakistan and India may be one of the most obvious cases of security dilemma between the two states however; the history between these two countries is filled with wars and conflicts. The unresolved Kashmir issue is an example of ongoing conflict between these states, the independence of Bangladesh is an example of war between Pakistan military and Bengali
separatists with Indian backing (Rubin 2012: 53-54). Both countries take policy developments in in their rivaling country into account in formulating their own policies (Kumar 2003: 115). In Kumar’s analysis of India, Pakistan and Chinas power cycles it is apparent that India and Pakistan have been involved in an arms race from the 1950’s and onwards (Kumar 2003: 116). This security dilemma is now showing itself less through the classic nuclear stance and more through proxies, especially in Afghanistan. Still it is argued for that the core issue is Kashmir and Pakistan and India’s constant balancing and counterbalancing each other in Afghanistan may be an extension of that conflict. As Tadjbakhsh points out the road to Kabul is partly through Kashmir (Tadjbakhsh 2011: 49).

According to Georg Sørensen (2007), the classic security dilemma is in sharp decline (even eradicated among postmodern states) (Sørensen 2007: 362). Developments like territorial integrity and economic interdependence has decreased occurrence of interstate conflicts (Sørensen 2007: 361). This does not mean that the security dilemma is irrelevant. The security dilemma especially in third world countries and in weak states takes another form; Sørensen calls it the insecurity dilemma (Sørensen 2007: 362, 365). Insecurity dilemma is where a state’s threats are internal rather than external (Sørensen 2007: 365). Rather than a threat from the outside, the security concerns are from within the states own borders and the state itself sometimes poses a threat to the population (Sørensen 2007: 365). This is a dilemma from the perspective of the state’s citizens because they don’t know what to expect from the state (Sørensen 2007: 365). In other words the state is not guaranteeing the security of the population.

Naveed Qaisar (2011) attributes the security dilemma of third world countries to states without cohesive nationalism, states with weak institutions, and states with legitimacy problems (Qaisar 2011: 17). This could shed a shallow light over why the Pakistani policy makers are overly occupied with security issues.

The security or insecurity dilemma is attributed to weak states. Pakistan is often regarded as a weak state which can be seen by the internal rather that external threats they have and are dealing with. Growing militancy from jihadist groups like Taliban, a history with ethnic violence and vast history of sectarian violence could all be apt explanations of the weak center of the Pakistani state. Vali R. Nasr’s (2000) article on Pakistani sectarian violence gives an accurate description of the weakening of Pakistan concerning domestic violence. He claims that the sectarianism has increased as the center of the state has weakened (Nasr 2000: 181),
implying that there is a linear relationship between sectarianism and state power. According to Nasr, the inadequacies of the Pakistani state can be seen in the fact that various government from 1988-1999 were unable to stop or control sectarian violence (Nasr 2000: 181). Another proof towards the weakening of the center is that the power is shifting from governmental institutions to local powerbrokers in areas where violence has historically occurred.

We see that Pakistan’s security dilemma is similar to the dilemma any given third world country would face; the main characteristic would be the domesticated nature of threats however; the military establishment as an actor in foreign and security policy has historically been preoccupied with India, and not so much on internal threats. We see some of the consequences of this at present time, where various insurgent groups such as Pakistan Taliban and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) have grown to be bigger threats than first anticipated. We could say that Pakistan fits within the framework of the security dilemma of third world country. However Pakistan’s emphasis on external threats rather than internal ones, when internal threats are becoming stronger, is a characteristic not found in many countries, and seems to be a breach of the notion around insecurity dilemma. This also explains why Pakistan is an interesting unit of analysis; the fact that academically, Pakistan’s political and strategic nature finds itself between many concepts and theories, all that explains much, none that explains everything. This coupled with the fact that this notorious political unstable and democratically weak state with a high rate of military interventionism and with nuclear capabilities makes Pakistan a key state for the further evolution of stability or instability in the South-Asian region. The contours of Pakistan’s insecurity dilemma will be clearer as we go deeper into the lack of nationalism, lack of cohesive policy to deal with various challenges and the weak state governing, further in this analysis. Both the classic security dilemma in relation to India and the insecurity dilemma concerning internal threats are present in Pakistan.
2 Methodological Approach

When one is making a general research design the various decisions that are made are as I see it based on preferences. One may prefer a strictly measurable and quantifiable phenomenon or one that is not as easy to measure and quantify. The division in social science research is between quantitative research and qualitative research. This thesis is based along qualitative lines. It is important to keep in mind George and Bennett’s (2005) argument that the critique of case studies is influenced by assumptions from statistical methods (George and Bennett 2005: 6). The disciplines have different logics. In my analysis I will try to explain the logic behind a qualitative approach and the logic behind my own case study. Case study is not the best tool for analyzing causal effects, which is statistical and quantitative study’s domain. However when it comes to analyzing causal explanations that are a part of a unique case or analyzing causal mechanisms, case-study is a strong methodology (Andersen 2007: 591).

2.1 Specifying case and terms

My analysis is as mentioned a qualitative case-study. My main N of analysis is Pakistan. The focus lies on what I have termed the seemingly irrational double game. It is important to clarify what this term actually means. The double game is the peculiar relationship Pakistan has with the U.S. It is a double game because Pakistan is frequently blamed for tolerating and at times supporting the Afghan Taliban, at the same time as helping the U.S fight terrorism in the same area. This is a paradox. This game is seemingly irrational because the whole strategy of helping Afghan Taliban against the U.S and be a U.S key ally at the same time seems logically irrational. This irrationality becomes even more prominent when we actually are to grasp what important role the U.S plays for Pakistani security apparatus. I use the term seemingly irrational because before we analyze the depths of Pakistan’s security and foreign policy, we cannot determine if they are irrational or rational. For now they appear to be irrational.

This case study is characterized with thick descriptions, which usually refers to studies that are out to explain some unique phenomenon, where understanding actors and factors around important context play an important role (Andersen 2007: 594). This uniqueness is the seemingly irrational double game itself. Because of this, it is difficult to place this case explicitly under one type of case or another. This case study would however resemble two
connected methods. Firstly I could argue that this is what Lijphart (1971) classifies as an *interpretive case study* (Lijphart 1971: 692). What characterizes this type of case studies is **A)** case selection based on interest and not formulation of general theories (Lijphart 1971: 692). I chose this case and research question almost completely because of my own interest and curiosity concerning the much debated double game. Another characteristic is **B)** the use of established general proposition in order to shed some light over a case rather than improving generalizations. This is the reason this method is also often seen as “applied science” (Lijphart 1971: 692). In my case, I use Nested Games theory in order to shed light over one rather unusual case. This type of case study is not valuable in relations to theory building according to Lijphart (Lijphart 1971: 692).

This case study could also be placed rather close to what George and Bennett call the *congruence method* (George and Bennett 2005: 181). According to George and Bennett, the analyst begins with a theory and then tries to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a given case (George and Bennett 2005: 181). This is the main characteristic of this method. According to Andersen (2007), in the congruence method the starting point could be a case that is representative for a theory, or a hypothesis about unique contexts in a case (Andersen 2007: 599). If the outcome of a case is consistent with empirical predictions, it implies that there is some sort of causal connection present (Andersen 2007: 599). In my case, the double game Pakistan is allegedly playing is representative to the Nested Games theory that states that players are involved in different games at the same time, and that the game should be extended in order to fully understand the rationality behind different strategies. At the same time I am using the theory to assess and predict some future outcomes and developments.

### 2.2 Nested Games Framework

George Tsebelis developed and introduced the concept of *Nested Games* (Tsebelis 1988: 145) when studying French electoral coalitions. The concept originally belongs to the study of comparative politics and is a development of standard *Game Theory*. In his study of French electoral coalitions, Tsebelis considers political parties as actors that are pursuing strategies in two different and connected arenas (Tsebelis 1988: 145). The choices these parties make have an effect on the balance of force both within and between each coalition (Tsebelis 1988: 146). The game that Tsebelis is studying is nested inside the game between coalitions (Tsebelis 1988: 146). For further purposes it would be wise to define Nested Games and Tsebelis
himself describes this concept as following: “[…] Nested Games are a way of transplanting context into game theory. In fact, instead of assuming that people play games in a vacuum, it shows that these games are embedded in some higher-order network. In my approach this higher order game determines the payoffs of the players. Parties therefore find themselves in situation where their payoffs vary according to the specific balance of forces between coalitions, and have to choose strategies that will have implications for the balance of forces both within each coalition and between coalitions” (Tsebelis George: Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1988, p 146, Cambridge University Press).

The real essence of this concept is that actors are involved in several games at the same time, and the strategic choices these actors makes in one game has implications for the other games they are involved in (Tsebelis 1988: 168). As Tsebelis points out in the definition above, actors in this concept do not play in a vacuum. In my thesis the game will not be a classic USA vs. Pakistan (A vs. B) game. Pakistan’s relationship or game (alleged double game in question) with USA is nested inside the games it is involved in on a domestic and regional (to some extent also international) level. In its most basic form, Nested Games is a quantitative approach to cases with several actors involved in several games. Tsebelis’ own analysis is quantitative, statistical with game theoretic equations. Other scholars, for example Jesse, Heo and DeRouen, used the same approach also more quantitatively. However Jesse, Heo and DeRouen’s (2002) study of economic liberalization in South-Korea is more classic game theoretical by design, rather than statistical like Tsebelis. Andreas Schedler (Schedler 2002) introduces the term “Nested” two-level game in his study of authoritarian rule and electoral manipulation, which is a hybrid approach somewhere between Tsebelis and Putnam. Even so, his research design is more similar to Tsebelis, with two connected arenas.

For the purpose of this thesis the Nested games concept is going to be strictly qualitative. This seems to be a paradox when I initially mentioned that the concept in its basic form is quantitative. However Nested Games has been used in a qualitative manner before and the most prominent work in this regard according to me is done by FFI (Defense research establishment), through Kjølberg & Nyhamar and Bruusgaard. My thesis is going to be modeled along the same qualitative lines. In Kjølberg and Nyhamar’s report the focus lays on the constraints and the opportunities a small state like Norway has in international operations (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 6). One important part of Tsebelis’ Nested Games approach is
the notion of seemingly irrational political behavior (Tsebelis 1990: cited in Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 13). Seemingly irrational behavior (or choices) is the “smoking gun” of Tsebelis’ approach. This irrational behavior refers to choices one political actor makes that seems irrational on the surface. According to Tsebelis one actor can be involved in several arenas and games simultaneously, and what then seems to be irrational from one point of view may seem rational if one is to include all the other arenas and extend the games that actor is involved in (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 13). Since the actor himself is concerned with what the consequences of choices in one arena means for the others, his or hers behavior only analyzed on one arena or level may seem irrational (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 13). In Kjølberg and Nyhamar’s report the emphasis is on how a smaller states government is involved in three different arenas;

the domestic arena- where the government has to seek political support and legitimacy for their chosen actions (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 14), the institutional arena- how a small states contribution to the NATO alliance needs to be evident and visible in order to for example have some sort of influence on USA (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 16), and the operational arena- where one state has to consider how to contribute and what strategies to follow in order to be seen as a relatively successful ally (Kjølberg, Nyhamar 2011: 23). The same logic is applied in Bruusgaard’s (2006) analysis of conflicts in the Barents Sea. She argues that what seems as irrational behavior in the main “game” one actor is involved in, may only seem irrational because the analyst has not considered the several sets of sub-games he or she is involved in (Bruusgaard 2006: 11). She uses the conflict between Norway and Russia in the northern fishery regions, and explains how Russia’s seemingly irrational behavior is rational after examining the sub-games between Putin’s administration, and other actors in the wider fishery complex on a federal and regional level (Bruusgaard 2006: 21). Bruusgaard and Kjølberg & Nyhamar has two different cases for examination, however the punch line is the same; to explain seemingly irrational behavior from examining different arenas of interaction and choices one political actor is a part of at the same time. (Both articles are translated freely from Norwegian, all flaws in capturing their essence or conclusions remain my own)
2.2.1 My Nested Games- causality and variables

The same logic of the Nested games approach will be applied in my analysis. The seemingly irrational “smoking gun” being the alleged double game Pakistan is accused of playing. After filtering their strategic choices through a domestic, regional and international arena, I will try to uncover if their behavior as a political actor is rational or not. In this context the overall structure of Nested Games will be like following;

(Figure 1) Nested Games Rationality Structure, D = Domestic, R= Regional, I= International)

Seemingly Irrational Behavior → Figure 1 explains how the basic Nested Games structure in this analysis is going to be. The essence is to uncover if Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game is a rational game or not, after it is filtered through DRI levels. In simpler words, is Pakistan’s behavior as the international community perceives it; insane or is it actually coming from an intelligent place and/or considerations for state security?

The three arenas for scrutiny here are in themselves home for their own sub-games. If we scrutinize the domestic arena (D) we will see the sub-games Pakistan is involved in with different actors. The same with the two remaining arenas and the actors in the sub-games changes from one arena to another. Pakistan being the main player/actor held constant in all arenas. USA is also a constant in all arenas, but not as a variable with any explanation of its own, rather just to portray that the double game in question is between Pakistan and USA, and the various sub-games has an impact on these countries relations with each other. Keeping this in mind, it would be necessary to illustrate the causality between the various sub-games in the aforementioned arenas;

The overall causal structure of the sub-games on all the arenas is as I have concluded the same:
Double game

Y

Sub-Games

Causal explanation

USA

PAK

Y2

X1 X2 X3 X4

(Figure 2: basic causal structure of the sub-games within various arenas. The overall structure remains the same, even though the number of actors from one arena to the other changes)

Figure 2 gives a basic illustration of the causal structure of the sub-games Pakistan as a political actor is involved in. The relationship between USA and Pakistan is the main focus. It is at present time viewed as an alleged double game, which may or may not be irrational after being seen through the various levels. From this perspective the double game in question becomes the dependent variable $Y$, and the independent variable $X_1$-$X_4$ becomes explanatory variables in their arenas. This relationship is summed up in the figure. The line I have termed $Y_2$ illustrates that the alleged double game is seen irrational only if we focus on the relationship between USA and Pakistan, ignoring the sub-games. However, $Y_2$ is an extension of that double game, and after being filtered through the variables at the sub-game level it returns back to the double game variable meaning; either the variables caused the alleged double game to be rational or they didn’t. The assumption made here is that one or more of the three independent variables ($X_1$, $X_2$, $X_3$ and $X_4$) is a causal explanation to the alleged double game. In this manner $Y$ and $Y_2$ becomes two sides of the same variable, one being the obvious irrational without the sub-game level ($Y$), and the second being the same variable being scrutinized from the perspective of the sub-games ($Y_2$). This reasoning fits well within the framework of Nested Games. Nested Gamed rejects the fact that two players play a game back and forth in a vacuum, which would be the case if we ignore the sub-games
in figure 2. Y2 is an extension of the same game which is an assumption that Nested Games make (Tsebelis *op.cit.* 11-12).

The basic structure of the sub-game level remains unchanged throughout this analysis, however the number of independent variables that are present from one arena to the other changes. X1-X4 will not all be visible at the same time. For example X1 and X2 could be present at the same time on one arena then be switched (one or both) with another variable when the analysis moves to the other arena. To put it in context regarding this analysis; Afghan Taliban would be present on both the domestic and the regional arena, whilst the focus changes from Afghanistan on the domestic to India on the Regional arena. China becomes a variable that stands alone.

After having discussed the overall questions that has shaped my interest in the field in the introduction chapter, it would be wise to formulate my research questions and hypotheses before we move on to the analysis:

**Q1: Is Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game towards the U.S, rational if it is analyzed through the sub-games Pakistan is involved in on a domestic and regional level?**

*H1: Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game is a result of the sub-games they are involved in with Afghanistan and India*

**Q2: Will China be a contributing factor to this seemingly irrational double game as it gains more influence in the region?**

*H2: Some sort of seemingly irrational double game will continue as China becomes a more influential player in the region.*

### 2.2.2 Operationalization

In order to narrow down the existing measurement potentials, I am choosing to focus on the different strategies, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India are using in the Afghanistan stage, and likewise the strategies China is using in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I believe this would be the most effective way to operationalize my independent variables. To have states as independent
variables may be atypical. Still, I am interested in their presence in the Afghanistan stage; therefore it would be necessary to have state as actors. This is also what general IR theory teaches us. To focus on these states strategies vis-à-vis each other would give indications on how various games between Pakistan and Afghanistan or India is played, and what effect it would have on Pakistan’s relations to the U.S. For example, Afghanistan’s strategy of supporting separatist movements inside Pakistan, gives Pakistan the incentive to use Afghan Taliban against them. This in turn has an effect on Pakistan’s relationship with the U.S and contributes to the irrational double game. The contribution to the game is that as long as Afghanistan threatens Pakistan’s interests, they don’t have any incentive to cut loose Afghan Taliban, and therefore a double game is formed. Pakistan keeps the U.S as allies on one side, and to guard own interests deals with Taliban as well. This is just one example, all the strategies will be analyzed during the empirical chapters. The various strategies push the irrational double game in one direction or the other. The dependent variable is on its part in theory at least, dichotomous. The seemingly irrational double game will be influenced by the independent variables and either is irrational, or rational. Logically it cannot be both. The dependent variable is operationalized on an empirical assumption. Meaning, that it is in the current literature assumed and often argued that Pakistan in playing a double game. Without any deeper scrutiny of Pakistan’s strategies in Afghanistan towards the U.S, I would have to assume likewise. This assumption then gives the opportunity and incentive to dig deeper into this seemingly irrational double game, and uncover if it is a double game or not. The independent variables – the states that are involved in a game with Pakistan, will be the causal explanation of the seemingly irrational double game Pakistan is accused of playing.

The assumptions I make regarding rationality is from its most basic form in IR-theory, and one of the first things students of IR are taught. In this thesis a rational actor is a state that chooses behavior, policy and/or strategy that best achieves its goals or maximizes own gains. Even if a state was to choose a strategy that was considered flawed or discriminatory etc. as long as their goals are achieved they would still be rational actors.

2.3 Assessing validity

Case studies have an advantage over statistical methods when it comes to internal validity (George and Bennett 2005: 19). Likewise, statistical or large N studies are more useful in relation to external validity. Case studies lack the potential of representativeness and
generality, because a case study by definition only includes one, or a small number of cases (Gerring 2007: 43).

My case study is more connected to internal validity rather than external. This is sensible because this is after all where qualitative research excels. I will argue that this thesis is strong when it comes to internal validity. I back this statement with an argument presented in George and Bennett (2005); the concept I am trying to measure is like many others in social sciences difficult to measure (George and Bennett 2005: 19). In order to measure something that I have termed a seemingly irrational double game, one needs to rely on causal mechanism at play. If this thesis was to be statistical the obvious problem of available data /datasets would be apparent. It would be extremely difficult to collect quantifiable data on a country that is accused of double dealing another. In a case study I am able to analyze the less obvious indicators of a difficult theoretical concept by focusing more narrowly on one social phenomenon. This leads me to Gerring’s (2007) argument; a well-constructed case study allows the analyst to dive into the box of causality (Gerring 2007: 45). This means that empirically, if my case study is conceptualized optimally I can like Hume’s billiard ball see the different X’s interact with Y (Gerring 2007: 45). In my case I can “see” these strategic interactions through the various strategies chosen by the states included. This would give me an indication on how some strategies can be causal explanations to the alleged double game.

The potential of several causal paths’ that leads to Pakistan’s seemingly irrational behavior are present; however by deeply studying one path I can contribute to the field by either eliminating it as a factor or including it as one. The path I see fit to analyze here is firstly the states Pakistan is most involved with, and off course the path of explaining this game from a security policy point of view. The causal mechanism’s in play would be for example, India’s presence in Afghanistan and their established consulates near the Pakistan-Afghan border (Indian strategy), that strikes fear in Pakistan thus leading them to use Afghan Taliban as a hedge against them, at the same time be American allies in the fight against terrorism. From an American point of view this seems like an irrational double game. This is the interaction where X (Indian strategy in this case) interacts with Y/Y2 (the double game). This is a very shortened and shallow example of the more complicated interactions. If this case study is constructed well, the internal validity has academic weight. At the end this is up to the respective reader to judge.
2.4 Methodological Pitfalls

No research design is perfect. Whether it is a qualitative or a quantitative study, all research designs will have potential pitfalls and researchers often have to make choices between sacrificing one methodological choice for another. For example I choose to focus more on internal validity by focusing on one unique case, rather than external validity where I can make comparisons and generalizations.

One potential weakness of my research design is the problems that might occur in relation to selection bias. Selection bias normally occurs when the relevant case/cases are self-selected by the researcher, or selected along the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005: 23). My case is indeed self-selected and is selected along the dependent variable (the double game). This is a potential weakness that could lead to inferences that are not correct. In statistical studies this is a big problem and statistical researchers normally do not choose cases on the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005: 23). However George & Bennett (2005) also argue that selecting cases on the dependent variable can have its advantages; one could discover which variables are not sufficient or necessary for one outcome (George and Bennett 2005. 23). From this perspective selecting a case on the dependent variable, such as I have done may have its uses after all. I could discover the sufficient and/or insufficient variables to my research question, which could in fact be useful for later studies.

Another potential problem my research design has is the problem that could occur concerning degrees of freedom. The problems around degrees of freedom usually occurs when the researcher has little available empirical or theoretical data on the subject, or when there is a lack of relevant cases for comparison (Andersen: 2007: 597). As a result the inferences that are drawn may be incorrect because the researcher has a small number of observations (Andersen 2007: 597). One obvious weakness in my design is the fact that I don’t have another case I can compare Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game with. The reason for this is simple; no other state is showing this type of political behavior, too my knowledge. I make up for this potential weakness in my design by having available empirical and theoretical data. I have studied the field my case falls under and have good amount of literature, mostly which is academic and peer reviewed.

There is also an obvious lack of representativeness in my case. Pakistan is the main N of analysis, and there is little potential of generalizing to a wider population with only one N.
However, even if Pakistan is the main N, I analyze India and Afghanistan’s foreign policy within the context on a deeper level, the same with China and the U.S where it is applicable. In that way it could be argued that this case study, though not directly, is able to on some level represent characteristics of foreign policy in the South-Asian states. According to George and Bennett (2005), case study researchers do not aspire to generalize to a wider population (George and Bennett 2005: 30). Still, both George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007) point towards the fact that case studies should partially shed light to other cases (George and Bennett 2005: 5, Gerring 2007: 20). This case may not be able to represent a much wider population, however it could potentially produce explanatory richness which is also one important factor in qualitative studies (George and Bennett 2005: 31).
In this chapter the focus will be on the domestic arena of Pakistan. A domestic arena implies the domestic political environment in Pakistan. This chapter is two-folded; first Afghanistan’s disputes and relations with Pakistan will be highlighted in order to specify what grievances Afghanistan has with Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan’s perception of Afghanistan’s strategies will be scrutinized and then the emphasis will be transferred to what strategies Pakistan chooses to “win” the game with Afghanistan. Afghan Taliban will be introduced as a possible solution in the latter.

Considering the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Taliban nexus, Ahmed Rashid is a great contributor through his various scholarly publications. He has written extensively on the Afghanistan issue (Rashid et al 2008, 1999). Usama Butt and Julian Schofield have also contributed to the field through their analysis of Pakistan’s strategies from a geopolitical point of view, where they include both domestic and external influences in Pakistan’s foreign policy (Butt and Schofield 2012). Ijaz Khan scrutinizes Pakistan’s foreign policy and their strategic culture in order to shed light over their policies after 9/11 (Khan 2012). These authors are the main contributors to the field I am interested in, however there are a many scholarly articles I am going to use in my further analysis. In this chapter, considering ethnic nationalism and border disputes, Haleem (2003), Qureshi (1966), Hassan (1962) and Saikal (2006, 2010), Ghufran (2009), Cohen (2002), F.H. Khan (2005) are central contributions. All these authors have contributed to the overall field of what I have named the domestic arena. Considering this chapter the literature above is what I have understood as the previously relevant work done in the field that was most important to mention. Other scholars may be used to gather historical information and will be referred to as I go. Qureshi and Hassan’s articles are from the 60’s, however just as I preferred to use Herz’s classic article concerning the security dilemma I prefer to use Qureshi and Hassan’s original articles instead of using other recent articles that have their work as their baseline.

“Indeed, Afghans are not the only victims of the Afghan tragedy. Pakistan has suffered in multiple ways” – (Amhad Shamshad 2012: 118)
3.1 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: Impact and Spillover

Pakistan and Afghanistan are two similar countries in many respects; they share the same frontiers, and share much common cultural and religious traditions (Hassan 1962: 1). President Hamid Karzai has portrayed Afghanistan and Pakistan as two inseparable brothers. The term two inseparable brother may give the illusion of good neighborly relations between these two countries, which sadly is not the case. Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan has historically been dominated by a border dispute.

3.1.1 What is the Durand Line?

The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is called the Durand line and is named after Sir Mortimer Durand who is credited with negotiating the border as it is today (Hassan 1962: 15). The borders of present day Afghanistan were largely settled by two rivaling powers: imperial Britain and tsarist Russia (Saikal 2006: 130). At that time Britain had strong presence in India (India in the colonial era refers to present day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The competition between Britain and Russia in Afghanistan was called the great game and the Durand line is a reflection of British strategic interests’ vis-à-vis Russia (Saikal 2006: 131). The Afghani state did not have much to say in this matter because it needed the support of the British imperial power in order to secure their national stability, the Afghani kings were politically weak at that point (Saikal 2006: 132).

The Durand line became an issue after 1947 when Pakistan came into being as a new state with a Muslim majority. Afghanistan argues that the agreement was with British-India and not with the newly created Pakistan and wanted a renegotiation of the agreement (Saikal 2006: 132). Afghanistan had apparent problems with the fact that Pakistan had inherited the Durand line from Britain. This argument is not valid according to Hassan (1962) who gives two main reasons for the validity of the agreement.

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2: BBC.co.uk: Karzai accuses Pakistan of 'double game' over militants, October 03, 2011.
1) The Durand line was accepted as the international border through the agreements of 1905, 1919 and 1921, signed between Britain and Afghanistan (Hassan 1962: 15).

2) Hassan points towards a legal principle: “res transit cum sua onere”, which states that all treaties concerning boundaries (of the extinct state, British-India), remains valid and all responsibilities are transferred over to the newly created state, in this case Pakistan, a fact that according to Hassan has been reaffirmed by the British government on several occasions (Hassan 1962: 15).


According to the arguments above the transfer of sovereignty does not delete the validity of the original agreement. The Durand line has since 1947 been challenged by Afghanistan and the acknowledgment of this border has led to a lot of resentment from Afghanistan towards Pakistan. The relations between the two countries reached an all-time low in 1961 when the Durand line issue caused border clashed between the two countries, and eventually led to break down of all diplomatic ties (Saikal 2006: 133). This cut-off was initiated by Afghanistan, and Pakistan answered by blocking the Afghanistan’s transit-trade. Since
Afghanistan is a landlocked country this move had great economic impact on Afghanistan (Saikal 2006: 133). According to Saikal (2006) Afghanistan uses this border dispute more than Pakistan for domestic and foreign policy purposes (Saikal 2006: 134), which was seen in Afghanistan’s relationship with Soviet at that time (Soviet supported Afghanistan’s challenge of the Durand line). After Soviet had invaded Afghanistan a turn of tide came for the Pakistani state. At that time the President of Pakistan was General Zia-ul-Haq (came into presidency after military coup’d etat). Pakistan started eyeing a role for itself as a frontline state in determining Afghanistan’s future (Saikal 2006: 134), and had the support of U.S, China and other Muslim countries to do so. General Zia had one clear objective upon playing a role in Afghanistan: making sure that the Durand line issue remains buried (Saikal 2006: 134).

3.1.2 Ethnic-nationalism: Pashtunistan and Afghanistan

We have uncovered that the Durand line is an issue we are yet to find out why it is one. Similar to the chapter above I am currently analyzing this dispute through a Afghani lens, the reason being that it is useful to see what grievances Afghanistan and the tribes in the Durand line area have against the state of Pakistan, and then focus on how Pakistan as an actor perceives these grievances. Another reason is that much of the historical background predates Pakistan as a state.

12.5 million People making a total of 42% of the population in Afghanistan and approximate 30 million making up 16% of all Pakistani citizens link themselves to the Pashtuns (alternative spellings: pashtoon, Pashto, pakhtun etc.) or the Pashtun tribe (Saikal 2010: 6). In Pakistan these 30 million are all concentrated around the former province of NWFP (north-west frontier Pakistan) now re-named as Pakhtunkhwa, which is the area that straddles around the Durand line. Even though they are many in numbers, they have never had an own state. From their point of view the Durand line is an artificial border that separated the Pashtun tribes and undermined their potential for unity (Saikal 2010: 7). Their pursuit for self-rule and independence is normally termed as Pashtun-nationalism (Saikal 2010: 6). If the Durand line is eliminated we get what the Pashtun’s regard as their rightful homeland; Pashtunistan (Saikal 2010: 5).

The Pashtuns share the same language, culture, historical memories, religious orientation etc. which rightfully makes them an ethnic group (Saikal 2010: 5) separate from any other in
Pakistan. Pashtun-nationalism consists of the notion of unity on both sides of the Durand line, and they have never acknowledged this border. This is seen through the fact that the Durand line is notoriously porous and the Pashtuns in particular crosses the border almost as they please. According to Qureshi (1966) the social structure of the Pashtun tribe is based on what he calls patriarchal kinship; every Pathan (he or she who is a Pashtun or a member of the Pashtun tribe is also referred to as a Pathan) has the same male ancestor, which in return means that all Pathan are cousins (Qureshi 1966: 101). From the Pashtun tribe’s rationale, the Durand line does not only dissect their rightful homeland in between two states, it also keeps them away from their family on the other side of the border. Pashtun-nationalism has historically been a nuisance and a worry for the state of Pakistan.

(Image 2: the area that the Pashtun’s consider their homeland) (Image 3: the concentration of the Pashtun tribe, a linguistic map)

Image 3: from UCLA language material project: http://www.lmp.ucla.edu/Profile.aspx?LangID=64&menu=004
In the images above we see what is perceived as Pashtunistan is on both sides of the Durand line. Pashtunistan has never officially existed in form of a region or state with its own borders and boundaries, therefore the map over what someone would perceive as Pashtunistan differs greatly. *Image 2* includes the province of Balochistan which is included in many maps, however according to Qureshi the inclusion of Balochistan is questionable since the Baluchi’s consider themselves as a different ethnic group and consists of Indian as well as Brahui elements, none which would be regarded as Pashtun (Qureshi: 1966: 99). *Image 3* from UCLA’s language material projects shows the linguistic concentration of the *Pashto* speaking population (the official language of Pashtuns). By comparing the two images we can clearly see that the area claimed by Pashtuns is disproportionate to their actual concentration.

Afghanistan has since the making of Pakistan supported the claim and demand for an independent and/or autonomous Pashtunistan (Saikal 2010: 8, Ghufran 2009: 1101). The essence of the Afghani argument is simple; the Pashto speaking tribes in Pakistan should have been given the choice to opt out when Pakistan was declared an independent state (Hassan 1962: 14). In this manner Afghanistan is a big contributor to the sometimes spurious rise of Pashtun-nationalism. Those who oppose this argument often point to the fact that all tribes in the Pakhtunkhwa area pledged allegiance to Pakistan in 1947 (Hassan 1962: 16), on the other hand even if they pledged allegiance they never had the choice of choosing independence (Saikal 2010: 8). The only choices they had were between India and the newly created Pakistan. Afghanistan uses Pashtun-nationalism as a strategy against Pakistan in order to pursue own interests, both historically and currently. Almost all governments in Afghanistan have shown support for the Pashtunistan cause. For instance in 1955 then Afghani Prime Minister Sardar Daud openly criticized Pakistan concerning their political aspirations over the radio which inspired an anti-Pakistan demonstration, leading to Pakistan’s flag being replaced by the flag of Pashtunistan in Pakistani embassy in Kabul (Qureshi 1966: 105). In a later incident, Afghanistan became the only country in the world that voted against Pakistan’s admission in UN due to the Pashtunistan issue (Hassan 1962: 16). Pashtun-nationalism and demands for Pashtunistan is as some have argued an reaction to the dominance Punjabi’s has in the country in almost every aspect (Ghufran 2009: 1097)

As a rational actor in pursue of its own interests Afghanistan’s support for Pashtunistan is out of rationality and not solidarity (at least not only solidarity). Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country it relies heavily on neighbors and maybe most on Pakistan. Supporting the
claim for Pashtunistan and using it as a strategy is rooted in the belief that Pashtunistan as an 
independent entity would have very close links to Afghanistan (Saikal 2010: 8), this could be 
attributed to ethnic, cultural, linguistic solidarity, kinship etc. this strategy gives at least two 
payoffs for Afghanistan; 1) to end the Durand line issue with Pakistan, a border that 
Afghanistan has never recognized as valid (Saikal 2010: 8). 2) Secure access to Baluchistan 
greater Pashtunistan), the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (Saikal 2010: 8) since 
Afghanistan is deprived of access to sea and relies heavily on Pakistan. Pashtun-nationalism 
functions as a strategic asset towards Pakistan, a country that in many respects is perceived as 
being more powerful than Afghanistan. This strategy was conceived as strong especially 
during the Soviet invasion due to soviet’s support for Afghanistan’s Pashtunistan policy 
(Saikal 2010: 8). If Pashtunistan was to exist Afghanistan could secure a trade route through 
the new territory that it shares ethnic ties with and almost completely ignore Pakistan, which 
in return would have negative consequences for Pakistan. From 1961 and onwards, 
Afghanistan used Pashtun nationalists as proxies against Pakistan (Rubin 2012:51). This 
relationship shows that Afghanistan’s actions have had, and still has the potential of great 
impacts in Pakistan. Clearly Afghanistan does not have the capacity to send troops into 
Pakistan’s northern areas and considering the land-locked status of Afghanistan, this strategy 
may have been the only card Afghanistan had to play, and one it played well.
3.2 Pakistan’s side of the story

Pakistan is a country with a peculiar political nature. In this chapter I will start by discussing the military’s role in the political realm and how in certain areas their views and perceptions are dominant. Then I will start connecting the dots between Afghanistan’s chosen strategy of backing Pashtun-nationalism to Pakistan’s chosen strategies and how they seek to win the game they are involved in with Afghanistan.

3.2.1 The Military as a Political actor

“The establishment” is a common word in Pakistan referring to a political/military coalition that dominates the politics (Cohen 2002: 118). From the states very inception generals have actively interfered and mingled with Pakistani politics (Cohen 2002: 111). Pakistan has had one military leader after another as head of state which has moved the military in a position to really define the state (Cohen 2002: 112). Even with civilian governments, military dominance continues in many areas (Cohen 2002: 112). Haleem (2003) calls this heavy military influence on domestic and foreign politics indirect praetorianism (Haleem 2003: 467). Direct praetorianism refers to direct military rule. The role of the military in Pakistan is so strong that almost no government has been succeeded by another elected government, on almost all occasions either the military has dismantled a sitting government and/or prime minister or it has been ousted by an alliance between the military and presidents (Cohen 2002: 112, Haleem 2003: 467).

The significant role that the military plays in Pakistani politics is often attributed to a colonial legacy (Cohen 2002: 113, F.H Khan 2005: 4). The British colonial rulers had a close working relationship with what was then the Indian military. The Brits saw landlords as greedy, politicians and bureaucrats as corrupt all out to exploit the poor Indian peasants (Cohen 2002: 113). In this manner already from the colonial era the military saw itself as the guarantor of the state (F.H Khan 2005: 4). The military is commonly known as a sophisticated and developed institution, however that may be more due to the fact that all other state institutions in Pakistan have failed (Cohen 2002: 113). According to Cohen the objective of the military is to model the society after the military structure, which includes for example to have educational qualifications to hold any positions in office (Cohen 2002: 113) and to have a role in society similar to the Turkish military without the secularism (Cohen 2002: 113). In order
to achieve these goals the military makes alliances with political parties and in the most extreme case these alliances often facilitate a coup. Likewise in order to secure their political position various political parties join hands with the military (Haleem 2003: 470), creating the famous establishment.

If there is one dimension of Pakistan’s politics where the military has complete domination and control over decision making it most certainly is in foreign and security policy (Khan 2012: 7). The reasons for military domination are many: domestically- frequent ethnic (and sectarian) clashes has fostered a security-centered environment (F.H Khan 2005: 3, Haleem 2003: 472), regionally- the perceived threat from India has played a major role (Khan 2012: 3), on top of all border disputes with India and Afghanistan has secured military’s role in the political dimension (F.H Khan 2005: 3). The concentration of power is within the infamous establishment; however within the military much of the power is concentrated around Pakistan’s intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (shortened ISI). Khan (2012) draws a parallel between ISI and CIA and states that the CIA is a developed agency in a developed state; however the ISI is a developed agency in an un-developed state which in turn results into ISI having an exaggerated role within security policy (Khan 2012: 9). Because of the dominance the military has within the state they have a “veto” over any attempt to change Pakistan’s identity and discourse (Cohen 2002: 120). Because of the military’s political nature it often meddles with internal political affairs to save and guard own interests (F.H Khan 2005: 5).

3.2.2 Pakistan’s threat perception

Michael Rubin (2012) makes an important observation when he states that India may be the biggest external threat in the eyes of Pakistani policy makers, however ethnic nationalism poses a challenge just as big and threatens the states very existence (Rubin 2012: 49).

From the beginning the state of Pakistan, whether it had a civilian government or a military rule, has had a dismissive attitude towards ethnic-nationalist claims. When it comes to Pashtun-nationalism the essence of the argument has been that it is a product of Afghanistan’s ruling elite’s imagination (Qureshi 1966: 108). To this day the ethnic cleavages define Pakistan’s society to a great degree alongside identity based on religion. Pashtun-nationalist claim autonomy and sovereignty, Balochistan-nationalist expects the same and have been involved in a low intensity guerilla war with the army for a number of years. The population
in the Sind province also define themselves along linguistic lines different from all other and the Punjabis dominate the military and almost all other state institutions which is perceived as unjust to all other ethnic groups. The ruling elite and the military in Pakistan (which mostly consists of Punjabis) has always seen Pashtun-nationalists as disloyal and met them with a suspicious attitude (Khan 2012: 24). The reason behind that is often portrayed by experiences in history. From the Pakistani establishments’ point of view Pashtun-nationalist are almost explicitly led by former members of the Indian Congress (Khan 2012: 25). Pashtuns as an ethnic group enjoyed good representation in Indian Congress before partition and was seen upon as friends and allies of India, which is seen through the personal and good relationship Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Pashtun leader, known as the frontier Gandhi) had with Mahatma Gandhi himself. In the eyes of Pakistan’s rulers Pashtun-nationalists are influenced by Afghanistan and enjoys good relations with Afghan rulers, and Afghanistan enjoys good relations with India. This triangle is perceived as dangerous in the mind of the establishment, the military in particular. This threat perception makes Pakistan as a political actor come to the conclusion that Pashtuns can’t be trusted due to their relations with Afghanistan and indirectly also India (Khan 2012: 25).

The events of 1971 changed Pakistan’s perceptions towards ethnic-nationalist claims. A country that was made on the basis of a Muslim unity, lost over ethnic and linguistic cleavages stripping Pakistan from a large territory then known as East Pakistan, present day Bangladesh (Rubin 2012: 53). The separation of Bangladesh imprinted in the mind of the military in particular that ethnic-nationalism posed a real threat and that Pashtun-nationalism (or baloch-nationalism) could not be ignored as an mere irritant anymore (Rubin 2012: 53) The fear that drives the establishment is the fear of an ripple-effect. Bengalis have already been successful in claiming independence; Pashtun-nationalists could potentially do the same and strip away another chunk of the country, then the Baluchi’s, Sindh’s etc. Just as Bangladesh found an ally in India, Pashtun-nationalists found an ally in Afghanistan (Rubin 2012: 53-54). Determined not to let history repeat itself Pakistani rulers sees Pashtuns less as citizens and more a separatist group that constantly needs to be counterbalanced and held in check. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan brought a change of tide for Pakistan. Because of the invasion the Pashtunistan issue remained on hold. However during this period Pakistan was presented with an opportunity to achieve several goals using proxy soldiers and groups as strategic depth, a strategy that especially ISI is famous for.
3.2.3 Enter Taliban

Just as Afghanistan supported Pashtun-nationalist groups in Pakistan, Pakistan answered by supporting extreme Islamic movements in Afghanistan (Rubin 2012: 54). This is a strategy that the ISI adopted during the Soviet invasion and onwards, a strategy that had American support during this time period. This strategy had two aims:

- A) deterring Afghanistan’s expansionism by pressuring them from within (Rubin 2012: 54)
- B) Support religious movements that would have broad appeal without the ethnic-territorial claims (Rubin 2012: 54)

Geopolitically the U.S led by the Carter administration had to co-operate with Pakistan. After Soviet invaded Afghanistan it also controlled it’s northern borders, Afghanistan is a landlocked country and using Iran as an alternative route was also impossible because of the Iranian revolution (Rubin 2012: 55). In order to support mujahidin groups U.S had to go through Pakistan. Since ISI controlled the transport of weapons into Afghanistan at that time, they almost had the exclusive opportunity to choose which of the resistance groups to support or not, which gave them a huge leverage (Rubin 2012: 55). According to Michael Rubin the aid from US and Saudi Arabia to resistance groups in Afghanistan during the 80’s reached 630 million dollars (Rubin 2012: 55).

From the very start ISI actively promoted national interests and therefore refused to recognize any resistance group that was not religiously based (Rubin 2012: 55). ISI found Gulbudin Hekmatyar to be the closest to its policies because he was the most militant resistance leader of all, emphasized religion over ethnicity and supported Pakistan’s Kashmir cause against India (Rubin 2012: 55-56). The U.S seemingly had no problems with favoring Hekmatyar because Pakistan and US had two very different approaches; the U.S only saw Afghanistan in the context of Cold War, Pakistan on the other hand had broader views and wanted to strengthen religious movements at the expense of Pashtun-nationalistic movements (Rubin 2012: 56). As long as the job was being done the U.S didn’t have any big objections. In the end Soviet did withdraw and the United States just walked away leaving a vacuum behind that Pakistan had to fill (Rubin 2012: 56). In the aftermath Pakistan continued to support Hekmatyar when various governments in Afghanistan tried to take control and was seen upon
as non-friendly to Pakistan in the eyes of ISI and the military (Rubin 2012: 56). In the end Hekmatyar did not succeed in consolidating control over Afghanistan and retired (Rubin 2012: 56).

No one can really pinpoint when the Taliban emerged, however according to Ahmed Rashid 1999) they first emerged in 1994 (Rashid 1999: 24). Taliban – literally meaning students in Pashtu, hailed from religious schools (madrasahs) in Pakistani refugee camps, most of the being Afghani citizens belonging to the Pashtun-tribe (Rashid 1999: 24). They gained momentum while fighting other mujahedin groups for control and the ISI quickly moved in to support them (Rubin 2012: 56). It is important to realize that the structure of this strategy was already in place because of the Soviet invasion and Hekmatyar, the strategy being supporting religious movements in Afghanistan. As Taliban gained more and more control over Afghanistan, ISI and the military realized that Taliban was the perfect solution to secure their national interests; Taliban promoted an ideology based on religion and not ethnicity, they did not pursue territorial claims over across the Durand line and rapidly gained control over Afghanistan (Rubin 2012: 57; Khan 2012: 31). In sum Taliban secured a pro-Pakistan rule in Afghanistan (Rubin 2012:57) which has always been Pakistan’s main goal in Afghanistan. Khan (2012) repeats the same argument saying that Taliban became tool for a very specific policy where ending territorial claims was a big part (Khan 2012: 35).

### 3.2.4 Domestic Politics- role played by political parties

In order to support Taliban as their proxy-soldiers, the Pakistani establishment had to make them more digestible to the public. In this process many political parties has had an influence in shaping perceptions about the Afghan Taliban. After giving a short intro into the role of the political parties the main discussion around the alleged double game will continue.
The nationalists are all those who draw their base from Jinnah’s (founder of Pakistan) part secular and part anti-Hindu movement of Pakistan’s independence (Khan 2012: 87). Mostly consisting of centrist parties (some leaning towards the left) like Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League (both fractions PML-N and PML-Q), most of the bureaucracy, and military (Musharraf was closer to these) (Khan 2012: 87). This group is known for their anti-India views, strong role of the military in foreign policy, the Kashmir issue, friendship with China, emphasis on security policy and therefore views Afghanistan through its relations with India and the Durand line issue (Khan 2012: 87). For the Nationalist’s the support for Taliban is not a policy, but means to achieve certain foreign policy goals (Khan 2012: 87). The end justifies the means, and there is an agreement amongst this group that Afghan Taliban is still the best bet for achieving policy goals (Khan 2012: 88). Some within this group however have criticized this approach.

The religious right parties were mostly represented by the MMA coalition (Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal) which was a coalition of 5-6 religious parties (not to be confused with religious extremist parties) that became important for Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. These were pro Afghanistan resistance and Afghan Taliban and propagated the idea of a holy Jihad against the Soviets during the Cold War (Khan 2012: 90-91). Individually, the parties that made this coalition have a well-documented relationship with the military (Khan 2012: 91). The coalition no longer exists, but the parties that took a part in this former alliance have overlapping views concerning Afghanistan.

The Liberals is a very marginal voice in Pakistan’s society mostly consisting of academics, NGO’s, Human Rights groups and the former communist party (Khan 2012: 92). These
believe in a distance from Afghan Taliban, however they are not part of the ruling elite and therefore often ignored (Khan 2012: 92, 95). The Nationalist centrist view has been important in the use of Afghan Taliban for achieving goals in Afghanistan; however the MMA has been most vital in giving Taliban an ideological base in all provinces of Pakistan and inspiring young men to join them. Their voters are in the NWFP area (and Balochistan).

### 3.2.5 Taliban as the solution: solving the domestic game

The attack on World Trade Center changed the scenario completely for Pakistan. Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan through Taliban was criticized and Pakistan was under pressure to do something (Rubin 2012: 58). After Richard Armitage’s famous “cooperate or be bombed” threat, Pakistan led by General Musharraf agreed to support the U.S in any way possible (Rubin 2012: 58). However, it is important to keep in mind that Pakistan was mainly chasing national interest and the support for US did not just spur out of solidarity. From the very start Pakistan was actively propagating their desire for a post-Taliban government that was Pakistan-friendly (Rubin 2012: 58). Pakistan had one clear demand; Northern-Alliance is not to hold a dominant position in post-Taliban government in Afghanistan (Rubin 2012: 58). This was essentially the worst case scenario for Pakistan. Northern-alliance was a resistance group in Afghanistan that was mostly made up of non-Pashtuns and was pro-India and anti-Pakistan (Rubin 2012: 58). Just as ISI and the military had been using Afghan Taliban as their foot soldiers, Indian government had been using northern alliance (hereafter NA) as theirs (with Iran). President Bush assured Pakistan’s government and promised that NA would not take complete control (Rubin 2012: 59). Eventually Pakistan’s worst case scenario became a reality; President Bush did not hold his promise and NA won. This marked the beginning of the infamous double game Pakistan stands accused of (Islam 2012: 90).

Afghanistan’s government blames Pakistan for the resurgence of Taliban something that has caused damage to their relationship with each other (Islam 2012: 90). The tensions between Pakistan and US are also increasing and have done so since President Bush’s second term. In the long list of accusations some of the most debated are; supporting Afghan Taliban with weapons, supplies, sanctuaries, logistical support, funding, training etc. (Islam 2012: 90). Whether ISI/military has ever provided Taliban with arms has never been proved (Islam 2012: 91). The seemingly irrational double game began during Operation Enduring Freedom
Pakistan agreed to support the U.S in fighting terrorism, but always kept in mind that Taliban could serve as strategic assets on a rainy day. In order to fulfill their obligations towards the U.S and at the same time secure their national interests Pakistan chose to battle Al-Qaida and not Afghan Taliban (Islam 2012: 92). This strategy seems to be the essence of the alleged double game. To pursue Al-Qaida meant to pursue what was mostly foreign soldiers on Pakistani soil which was unproblematic; to pursue Taliban was to pursue their strategic depth in Afghanistan which was problematic especially since victory was claimed by NA. Pakistan is to this day acknowledged as a driving force behind the capturing of Al-Qaida officials, and as long as Pakistan kept defeating Al-Qaida which was the primary objective of operation enduring freedom, the U.S did not question any other aspect of their strategies (Islam 2012: 92). This stance from the U.S gives a strong indication of the fact that U.S officials were oblivious over whatever game that was being played in Afghanistan. As long as their primary objectives were being met, they did not feel the need to scrutinize anything on a deeper level. From this point of view the seemingly irrational double game Pakistan is accused of playing has always been unfolding itself behind the curtains and been a surprise and a rude awakening for the U.S.

Pakistan is a country with weak nationalism. The idea of Pakistan has never been enough to produce unity amongst the different ethnic and linguistic groups in Pakistan. The only binding element Pakistani state has had is the unity amongst people is threat perceptions from external actors, mostly India, and most importantly religion. This is the reason behind the fact that Pakistan has always found religion to be the best tool of foreign policy (Khan 2012: 19). Since the tradition of nationalism is un-cohesive in Pakistan the rise of several ethnic-based separatist groups has been an issue, mixed with the memory of Bangladesh Pakistani establishment is determined to keep Pashtun-nationalists at bay since they are considered as the most prominent ethno-nationalist separatist movement. The game Pakistan is playing with Afghanistan over the Pashtunistan issue has implications for Pakistan’s domestic environment, and in order to win this game religion as a policy tool once again became essential:
(Table 1: Domestic Level Game: strategies and counter strategies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Level</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
<th>AFGHANISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Border Dispute</td>
<td>Border Dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Support religion-based groups to block ethno-nationalist movements: Afghan Taliban as strategic depth</td>
<td>Support Pashtun-nationalists in their claim for a homeland: Pashtun nationalism as strategic depth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>Block any attempt of separation from Pashtun-nationalist and have a friendly government in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Gain access to sea and not be landlocked and dependent on Pakistan, use new autonomous Pashtun province as ally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>More success</td>
<td>Less success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 4: Domestic level game structure)

Pakistan’s approach has been more successful because Pashtun’s are deeply religious and have always identified them with Muslim’s from pre-partition India (Qureshi 1966:122). Therefore the usage of religious groups (particularly during the Soviet invasion) to include everyone under one religious umbrella has been a strategy that Pakistan has had success with. Afghan Taliban was just a new group that fitted to this already well-established strategy. Furthermore Afghan Taliban has been a guarantee for Pakistan in order to secure a
government in Afghanistan that is friendly and easily influenced. Pakistan’s strategy of using Afghan Taliban as strategic assets has been the more dominant strategy compared to Afghanistan’s strategy. This can be seen in the fact that Pashtun-nationalistic claims for Pashtunistan, although not eradicated have been very silent in the recent decade (with some spurious incidents), and Afghanistan’s strategy has not made any progress for several years. The strongest indicator may be that Afghanistan is now searching for other strategies, one being closer to India- Pakistan’s biggest adversary, which gives the impression of the that they are searching for other ways than an alliance with Pashtun tribes in order to reach their goals.

In the minds of Pakistani establishment there has always been a concern about a US withdrawal that will leave behind a divided Afghanistan that functions as a magnet for ethnic-nationalism. Now that US forces have announced their withdrawal in 2014 the strategic alliance with Afghan Taliban becomes even more crucial. The biggest incentive to keep Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset on this arena is the fact that Pakistan is trying to secure its territorial integrity and is afraid of that after US departure the issue of Pashtunistan will be revived (Islam 2012: 93).

Pakistan and the U.S are two extremely different countries with different threat perceptions and interests that have for many years repeatedly been thrown in alliances (Rubin 2012: 45). Both countries have always had different policy interests and strategic aspirations, however because of Pakistan’s geo-strategic location they have continuously worked together reluctantly. The U.S gains access and routes into Afghanistan through Pakistan and Pakistan gains financial support. Both countries have fundamentally different understandings of their national interests (Rubin 2012: 45), the U.S initially saw the South-Asian region in general only through the Cold War lens (Rubin 2012: 45). During the Cold War and the in the war against terrorism the U.S demands Pakistani assistance without actually acknowledging Pakistan’s own security concerns (Rubin 2012: 46) thus signaling that Pakistan is a mean to the U.S in order to reach another goal. As a result the relationship between US and Pakistan bears resemblance to clientelism⁴; the U.S keeps paying for political support and Pakistan complies superficially. The smoking gun of the alleged double game is that over the many decades of Pakistan-U.S relations, the U.S has grown more and more suspicious over Islamist movements and Pakistan on the other side with its history of separatist movements and Bangladesh, considers ethnic movements a greater threat (Rubin 2012: 45). Two countries
with total opposite perceptions are not likely to reach a compromise in Afghanistan, at least not for the foreseeable future (Rubin 2012: 45).

This relationship is illustrated in figure 3 and table 1. The seemingly irrational double game being the dependent variable \(Y\) is at the same time a logical game when the game is extended and analyzed through the sub-games Pakistan in playing at the same time. \(Y_2\) represents this extension. The relationship between Pakistan and the U.S is a seemingly irrational double game only if it is seen as a game between the U.S and Pakistan and furthermore if it is only seen in the context of the war in Afghanistan. If we follow the path from \(Y_2\) down to the sub-game level we see that Pakistan is in a game with Afghanistan over territorial integrity and therefore chooses Afghan Taliban as a game solver which in this context is a more successful strategy. The parenthenses (brackets) in the figure shows that Taliban as the chosen game strategy is more dominant than Afghanistan’s strategy. If Afghanistan’s strategy was the winning strategy then the bracket would face the other way. The thick line that spurs from \(X_1\) - Afghanistan variable is the sum of the rational game; a causal explanation on the alleged double game which is changed into a rational game after having been filtered through the domestic sub-game level, which in this instance is Pakistan and Afghanistan’s territorial issues. This causality must be understood in the framework of Nested Games. The domestic sub-game Pakistan is involved in with Afghanistan is being played at the same time as Pakistan is involved in a turbulent relationship with the U.S. That is the reason behind the fact that the game between US and Pakistan seems irrational on a superficial level, and seems very rational if we see that Pakistan is involved in a different set of game with Afghanistan over territory. The sub-game level Pakistan is involved in has a direct impact on its relationship with the U.S - meaning that the dispute with Afghanistan translates into a contribution towards the double game on the domestic arena, because the U.S has not successfully been able to acknowledge Pakistan’s own security concerns and only dealt with them as clients (Rubin 2012: 49). In order to secure what Pakistan’s military consider as national interests the available literature suggests that Pakistan is running with the Afghan Taliban and hunting with the U.S at the same time (Islam 2012: 95).

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4: Christophe Jaffrelot, Ashley J. Tellis: Containing or Engaging Pakistan? An American Dilemma, carnegieendowment.org, November 18, 2011
### 3.3 Conclusion on the domestic arena sub-game

Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan has historically been dominated by a back and forth proxy conflict over territory that is dominated by Pashtun-tribes, a territory that Pakistan as a new state inherited from the British Empire. This was met with bad reactions in Afghanistan who claimed the territory as theirs first and later propagated the territory as either a new land for the Pashtun’s or an autonomous region for fellow Pashtun-tribesmen. Afghanistan’s chosen strategy in order to gain access to sea and Central-Asian states and to diminish their status as a landlocked country that is overly dependent by Pakistan, was to support Pashtun-nationalists in their claim and struggle for carving out their own historical homeland in the disputed territory named Pashtunistan. With Afghanistan’s backing Pashtun-nationalists were both politically and militarily in a conflict with the Pakistani state. Pakistan on the other hand answered Afghanistan’s aspirations by using the same strategy with some modifications; instead of focusing on ethnic groups, Pakistan used religious groups in Afghanistan as proxies and the dominant group that became Pakistan’s asset in the 90’s was the Taliban. As long as Taliban was receiving Pakistani support and gaining ground over everyone else in Afghanistan they secured a Pakistan-friendly and easily influenced government in Afghanistan. One of the biggest gains for Pakistan using this strategy is that as long as Taliban is a dominant force in Afghanistan, the Pashtun-nationalistic claims remain on hold due to Taliban placing religion over ethnicity.

Pakistan’s strategy was to counterbalance pan-ethnic claims with religion which has been a more successful strategy than the one chosen by Afghanistan. Since Pakistan is involved in this game with Afghanistan, their relations with US is often perceived as a dual policy or an irrational double game. However it is only an irrational double game if it is analyzed superficially as an A vs. B game between U.S and Pakistan where Pakistan seemingly enjoy US aid and helps the enemy. The information available suggests that Pakistan’s strategies may be as rational as any other states. To protect own territory from separatist movements is a genuine security concern especially when Pakistan already have felt the consequences of losing over ethnic cleavages in the case of Bangladesh. National security interest is linked with sovereignty and territory and even if some of the domestic issues are difficult to understand because they take a backseat to the Global war on terror (shortened GWOT) they are nevertheless existing and real concerns. These strategic interactions are analyzed through the framework of Nested Games that suggests that what may seem irrational on one level,
may be rational if we extend the game and take a look at other relevant levels. In conclusion; Pakistan’s behavior is irrational if it is only seen as a game between Pakistan and U.S. Giving it the domestic context of protecting own territory from Afghanistan’s influence and counterbalancing ethnic-nationalistic groups, this alleged seemingly irrational double game becomes rational, especially within the realm of security policy and national sovereignty issues. The framework suggests several levels of scrutiny; therefore the domestic level is only part of the explanation behind the perceived double game.
When a discussion revolves around Pakistan’s foreign policy the inclusion of India is inevitable. Both states are locked in a rivalry that spans over six decades and both countries contribute significantly to each other’s threat perceptions, which is seen through the endless strategies and counter strategies they employ against the other. This section analyzes how Pakistan is locked in an enduring rivalry with India and how this rivalry is showing itself in Afghanistan. Furthermore this section will also analyze how the sub-game Pakistan is involved in with India, unfolds itself as the U.S demands Pakistan’s support in the war against terrorism and therefore contributing to the seemingly irrational double game. Conclusively I will also try to connect the domestic level with the regional level and try to explain how Pakistan’s sub-games relate to their relationship with Afghan Taliban and how this translates into a seemingly irrational duplicity towards US.

The most significant contributors about the regional aspect of Pakistan’s game and strategies on a regional level in relation to my thesis are; Hanauer and Chalk’s (2012) occasional paper published by the RAND Corporation that deals specifically with Pakistan and India’s strategies in Afghanistan towards each other. Buzan’s (2002) analysis on India as an emerging power in South-Asia and how it changes the security dynamics in the region towards a more hegemonic role for India is also a significant contribution. Qandeel Siddique’s (2011) report on Pakistan’s future policy in Afghanistan where Pakistan’s threat perception towards India as a player in Afghanistan are highlighted, and ISI’s aim for gaining strategic depth are discussed is also an important contribution within this field. Tadjbaksh’s (2011) paper published by Peace Research Institute Oslo where she utilizes Buzan’s RSC-theory to analyze India and Pakistan’s rivalry in Afghanistan is an important and often cited contribution in the field. Ganguly and Howenstein (2009) paper on the ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan in the Afghanistan context where India’s strategies in Afghanistan from a trade and economic angle is discussed is also central to my thesis. Basu (2007), an article that highlights India’s goals and opportunities in Afghanistan, and Pakistan as a challenger to the success for these aims will also be used in this section. When I am discussing the rivalry between India and Pakistan to give an impression if their historical and current relations, Goertz, Jones and Diehl’s (2005) article on “punctuated equilibrium”, will be an important contribution. Many of the articles and authors above also connect Pakistan and India’s rivalry in Afghanistan with their classic dispute over Kashmir. In the short passages where I am discussing Kashmir...
explicitly Schaffer’s (2009) book on America’s role in the lengthy Kashmir dispute, will be a central contribution. Much of the same literature as in part 3 will also be used here on an ad hoc basis such as; Butt and Schofield (2012), Khan (2012), Rashid (1999), Rubin and Rashid (2008).

**4.1 Pakistan-India relations**

The issues between these countries are multi-dimensional; however similar to the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute, the core issue between Pakistan and India is also territorial. Kashmir, a territory both states consider as their own has produced resentment between both. Even as the status quo concerning the Kashmir dispute is cold, both rivals have shifted focus to Afghanistan and continue to play a game of strategic depth against the other in order to gain more influence for themselves and at the same time undermine the others.

**4.1.1 An Enduring Rivalry**

It is important to understand the rivalry between India and Pakistan; however this famous rivalry is well documented through books, scholarly articles, TV documentaries, historical accounts etc. I will try to shift the focus from re-telling what the rivalry is about to an aspect I find equally interesting and one that is more relevant to this analysis; a discussion around why the rivalry has endured for so many decades.

According to Goerts, Jones and Diehl (2005) only 5% of all rivalries develop into enduring rivalries, however once started they last average of 40 plus years (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 743). States must invest great amount of attention to intelligence gathering and rivalry specific policy, often at the expense of other concerns or policy areas (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 743). For example focusing on rivalry specific policies may lead to big military spending and costs, at the expense of trade and other policy areas. This has to an extent been and still is a typical characteristic of Pakistan. The military as a political actor in Pakistan (ibid. 28) with its India-centric views on security policy leads to big military spending in Pakistan (Kumar 2003: 117) often at the expense of welfare, economic and other domestic
policy areas. Basis for the main dispute behind India and Pakistan’s rivalry is Kashmir, an area both countries claim as a part of their sovereign states. Pakistan and India emerged out of a conflict between the Muslim league and the Indian Congress and resulted in a division of united India by religious cleavages (Buzan 2002: 2). To make a long story short, areas with Muslim majority became a part of Pakistan, with the exception of Punjab and Bengal areas, both which were split and shared between the two states 5. When then British left, the status of Kashmir remained undetermined 6 however Pakistan’s argument is that since the partition was on the basis of religion an overwhelming majority in Kashmir is Muslim, therefore in Pakistani leaders mind rightfully theirs. Unable to resolve these kinds of disputes quickly in the initial phase, such rivalries become enduring (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 748).

Over time rivalries tend to become a part of domestic policies (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 748), and any leader who wishes to seek peace would in theory be unable to, this is due to restrictions by domestic audiences who sees such strategies as unacceptable (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 751). For example if a leader in any political party in Pakistan or India abandons the Kashmir cause for peace or better relations between their respective rivals, one could assume that they would not be able to get enough votes or political support to come in to a position where they can make these kinds of decisions. The authors suggest that rivalry maintenance is due to the entire history of the rivalry and not a single event (Goertz, Jones, and Diehl 2005: 752). The history between India and Pakistan go from a bitter independence, to the Kashmir dispute, a dispute over the Siachen-glacier and cross-border terrorism on both sides (allegedly) (Buzan 2002: 3), all components suggesting that this rivalry is and will continue to be an enduring one. The longer a rivalry stays alive, less likely it is to end (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 754), and the rivalry between Pakistan and India is almost 70 years old.

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6: Dr. Crispin Bates: ‘The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies’, bbc.co.uk
A change of status quo between rivals comes through a political shock that changes the preferences of two rivaling states (Goertz, Jones and Diehl 2005: 748), the partition between India and Pakistan were the last event that could be seen as a political shock. A shock of that magnitude has not yet been observable.

As long as Pakistan continues to see Kashmir as their “jugular vein” and India sees it as an “inseparable and integral part” of their territory (Tadjbaksh 2011: 9), these states will be stuck in the same path and locked in hostile interactions against the other. Even though Kashmir is at stalemate, Afghanistan has been an arena where the same rivalry continues in another form.

4.1.2 India's regional threat perception

India and Pakistan has from the 1947 partition and onwards been two opposites. After Soviet invaded Afghanistan, India chose to be closer to the Soviet camp (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 127), whereas Pakistan became an American ally. Politically India is seen as the largest democracy in the world, and Pakistan on the other hand is more authoritarian with governments and structures that at times lacks legitimacy (Buzan 2002: 15). The military in Pakistan stays heavily involved in domestic politics and in India the military has remained subordinate to the civilian rule (Buzan 2002: 7). Historically, the making of Pakistan posed a threat to India because; a newly established homeland for Muslims could lead to claims for independence among the large number of other ethnic groups that lived in India (Buzan 2002: 3). All the differences aside, there are also similarities between the two rivals. There is a similarity between their domestic politics and how they impact their foreign politics (Tadjbaksh 2011: 13). Both countries mold threat perceptions at each other’s expense for domestic political purposes (Buzan 2002: 3). The continuation of posing the other as their biggest external threat could be a result of the fact that they have fought three wars; in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, had four clashes that possibly could have led to wars in; 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1999 (Buzan 2002: 3), and have had around 40 other smaller disputes.

India’s biggest threat in Afghanistan is anti-Indian terrorism which India believes comes from ISI supported groups (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 11). This threat assessment is due to India being attacked by terrorists inside its own borders, for instance in the Mumbai 2008 attacks which they have traced back to LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) an extremist group that has allegedly been backed by the ISI (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 11). Therefore logically one of India’s main goals in Afghanistan is to curb Pakistan and Afghan Taliban’s influence (Hanauer and
India is aware of Pakistan’s heavy influence in Afghanistan, and Pakistan has successfully kept India out of Afghanistan by for example restricting their trade access to Afghanistan (Basu 2007: 94). Furthermore the former Taliban rule completely isolated India from Afghanistan (Basu 2007: 90). A great worry for India is that the U.S and Afghanistan has shown a tilt towards peace talks with Taliban. Now that the U.S has announced withdrawal in 2014, India’s biggest worry is that incorporating Afghan Taliban in a new government would be at the expense of the groups they supported earlier against Afghan Taliban and Pakistan (Uzbeks, Tajiks, NA) and this would mean a strategic victory for Pakistan8 (Tadjbaksh 2011: 44).

Secondly, India draws a parallel between Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and their role in Kashmir. After the Soviet invasion when the United States left, according to India Pakistan used the same mujahedin soldiers in Kashmir, and Taliban made a return with Pakistan sponsored militant groups in Kashmir (Basu 2007: 97). According to Ganguly and Howenstein (2009), there is a correlation between the militancy across the Durand line, and the rise of militancy across the Line of Control in Kashmir (line of control: border line that separates Indian and Pakistani part of Kashmir) (Ganguly, Howenstein 2009: 132). Even with Pakistan’s numerous objections, India’s involvement in Afghanistan has visibly enlarged after 2001 when Taliban was assumed defeated (Basu 2007: 84), and the evermore close relations between India and Afghanistan in turn shapes Pakistan’s threat perceptions.

### 4.1.3 Pakistan's regional threat perception

It is commonly argued that Pakistan is losing ground to India in their rivalry and that India is the stronger rival in the classic sense in terms of military, economy, population etc. (Buzan 2002: 1, Tadjbaksh 2011: 11-12). On the other hand this rivalry is continuing because of nuclear parity (Buzan 2002: 15), and also in relation to the Kashmir dispute where insurgency tactics equipped by Pakistan has proved to prevail (Tadjbaksh 2011: VI, 11).

India is considered Pakistan biggest external threat (ibid 9), and therefore the perceptions about Indian strategies and goals will mold Pakistani responses whether it is in Afghanistan or in Kashmir. Pakistan’s threat perception in Afghanistan is unsurprisingly India-centric (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25). Pakistan suspects India for wanting to reunite the sub-continent, and India has threatened to reabsorb Pakistan in the past (Buzan 2002: 2-3). In the mind of the Pakistani establishment, India has never accepted Pakistan as an independent
Pakistan’s India policy is one side of its Afghanistan policy (Siddique 2011: 41), because Pakistan views both as interconnected arenas.

The most significant threat and fear in the minds of the Pakistani government has always been the possibility of being trapped or fall for Indian encirclement strategies, or a two-front situation where Pakistan is in between a hostile India from the east, and a hostile or India-friendly Afghanistan to the west (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25, Khan 2012: 25, Siddique 2011: 18, Rubin and Rashid 2008: 32). As a result Pakistani military in particular has an overall objective of “sanitizing” Afghanistan from any outside influence, especially Indian (Siddique 2011: 18). The increasing number of Indian consulates in Afghanistan fuels Pakistan’s paranoia. The Pakistani establishment sees increasing Indian consulates as a worry, and believes that Indian intelligence service RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) fuels insurgencies in Balochistan and in Pashtun dominated FATA to cause violent unrest (Siddique 2011: 43-44). Besides an embassy in Kabul, India has consulates in Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif (Siddique 2011: 43). In addition Indian paramilitary personnel are stationed in Afghanistan to protect these consulates and to protect Indian construction workers (especially from the Border Roads Organization) (Siddique 2011: 43). The increasing Indian presence is troublesome for Pakistan; however in the past, Pakistan has always been successful in keeping India and Afghanistan apart. Therefore a rude awakening for the Pakistani establishment has been the fact that India and Afghanistan are becoming closer allies.


9: A classic Hindu-Nationalist, view on Pakistan. For more information on Hindu-nationalism see Swamy 2003, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
4.1.4 Increasing tension: Afghanistan’s friendship with India

Afghanistan is often portrayed as the stage where regional powers meet (Siddique 2011: 41), which I have mentioned in the chapter concerning the domestic arena. Pakistan and India have their ambitions and goals in Afghanistan, and so does Iran, China, Japan amongst others (Siddique 2011: 41). In this chapter Afghanistan will also serve as the stage where Pakistan and India compete with each other, however Afghanistan is not only a neutral bystander in this situation.

India and Afghanistan have enjoyed a friendly relationship from the time their first official friendship treaty was signed in 1950, and historically India has had good relations and supported as well as dealt with every government that has had the political power in Afghanistan (Siddique 2011: 41, Basu 2007: 84). This was a part of the Indian Afghan-policy; not to interfere with Afghanistan’s internal issues (Basu 2007: 84). This policy proved to be a resilient one due to the fact that India has a good amount of support within the Afghanistan parliament (Siddque 2011: 42).

Afghanistan is increasingly getting more pro-Delhi and taking a few steps away from Islamabad. According to Ganguly & Howenstein (2009), India is winning the Afghani public opinion (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 130). This could be a result of Indian investments and aid in Afghanistan. The amount of Indian money directed towards Afghanistan surpasses Pakistan’s economic contributions easily (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 130). India has managed to gather a lot of goodwill on the ground and in the minds of the general public through targeted forms of assistance; infrastructure building, scholarships for Afghani students who wants to study in India and so on (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 131).

The core issue between India and Pakistan is as mentioned earlier the Kashmir-dispute. The seems to suggest that Pakistan and India’s behavior and competition in Afghanistan is an extension of their main dispute, and Afghanistan as a stage is just a new arena where the unresolved struggle between India and Pakistan is taking place (Rubin and Rashid 2008: 31, Siddique 2011: 23).
Figure 4 illustrates how both India and Pakistan enter this game in Afghanistan against each other from a Kashmir-centric view. Therefore, even if both states have strategic interests and ambitions in Afghanistan one states loss or victory in this game would also have implications for their status in the Kashmir-dispute. The illustration above is just a way of showing the causality between Afghanistan as the center stage and Kashmir as the main unresolved issue. Both countries strategic interactions with each other are colored by their participation in the Kashmir dispute as well and one could say that Kashmir is a part of both states rationality in engaging each other.

Neither Kashmir nor Afghanistan will be analyzed in the regional level game. Kashmir is a part of India and Pakistan’s enduring rivalry and has molded perceptions of one state in the other. Afghanistan was explicitly analyzed in the domestic arena, in this chapter Afghanistan is the arena where India and Pakistan face off. When Afghanistan is taking part in this rivalry it’s either in the benefit of the one or the other. Afghanistan’s own preferences and strategic gains in the regional level will not be a part of this analysis.
4.2 Regional Level Game: Rivalry in Afghanistan

In this section the focus will be on the India and Pakistan’s aims and goals in Afghanistan, and the strategies they choose to reach these goals. At the same time, both countries are playing a game with each other over influence in the region, and their strategies should be understood as rational strategies in a game.

4.2.1 Indian interests and strategies in Afghanistan

India’s goals and ambitions in Afghanistan most certainly involves undermining Pakistan’s influence, however; Delhi’s overall policy is to advance domestic and regional interests independently of their rivalry with Pakistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: ix). India is also out to expand their role in the wider region (Buzan 2002: 19), and to gain respect as a leader in South-Asia and beyond (Tadjbaksh 2011: 43). As Buzan observes, India’s political ambitions have grown with their economy and they view China as their main rival, often arguing that the quest for nuclear status was because of China (Buzan 2002: 1, 18). No matter what India’s objectives in Afghanistan are, Pakistan is their biggest obstacle (Basu 2007: 94).

After the 2008 Mumbai attack India has had an overarching goal to prevent anti-India terrorism in the region, militarily if needed (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 11). India has been successful in preventing an anti-India front in the South-Asian region mostly through bilateralism and trade with smaller states so that the necessity to oppose India’s rising status is eradicated amongst the smaller states in the region (Buzan 2002: 3). One of India’s main goals in Afghanistan is to undermine Pakistan’s heavy influence, as well as Taliban (Hanauer, and Chalk 2012: 11). Indian government is aware of the fact that a pro-Delhi regime in Kabul will eventually have a sobering impact on Pakistan (Basu 2007: 95). In order to achieve their goals and strategic interests, India has utilized a number of well calculated strategies, some are closer to classic “hard” strategies, and some are strictly from the realm of “soft “power”.

Sine Pakistan has long been able to block Indian access to Afghanistan, and Taliban has opposed Indian presence under their rule, one of the most important strategies India used immediately after Afghan Taliban was ousted as a result of the GWOT was to; establish diplomatic presence in the country (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14). After Taliban’s presumable defeat India reopened its embassy in Kabul. This strategy facilitated many advances for the Indian government; one was to be able to build relationships with local
leaders in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14). By building closer ties to powerful leaders on the grass root level India was able to promote and facilitate trade, investments and regional development (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14). Alongside the main embassy in Kabul, India expanded their presence by opening four consulates in Afghanistan (Siddique *op.cit.* 46). The strategy of establishing presence gives India the following gains; for the first time in a long time India entered the Afghanistan stage as a player with physical presence and was well within close proximity to Pakistan. *India is now able to monitor Pakistan’s activity in the region and keep a close eye on Pakistan, through intelligence gathering* (Siddique 2011: 43, Tadjbaksh 2011: 43). Through their diplomatic presence in Afghanistan India is now much more in a strategically capable position to meet their overall goal of preventing anti-Indian terrorism from this region.

A second strategy India had utilized is as following; *to maintain their relationship with the NA* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14). This is basically a hedging strategy. To maintain their ties with NA gives them the opportunity to hedge against a potential Afghan Taliban return, and counterweight Taliban and the dominance of Pashtun’s (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14-15). Since the NA is mostly made up of Uzbeks and Tajiks that has opposed Pakistan backed Pashtun mujahedin’s in the past, NA gives India a strategic asset in Afghanistan. This strategy gives one important gain to India; *If Pakistan is ever tempted to use anti-India proxies, India has the opportunity and ability to do the same through the NA* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15). As it is becoming clear, India is emerging as a challenging player in an arena that has historically been dominated by Pakistan.

**4.2.1A: “Soft Power”: Political Strategies**

Another set of strategies that the India government has in its bag of tricks are their “soft power” strategies. India’s goal is to integrate Afghanistan into regional economic structures, and hopes to win the hearts and minds of the average Afghani citizen (Hanauer and Chalk 2012:14).

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10: Jayanth Jacob: *India Shuffles its Northern card*, Hindustan Times, August 09, 2010.
On a political level, one of the strategies that India is using is; *supporting the government of Hamid Karzai* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14). India continuously works to strengthen the Karzai government, building democratic institution with multi-ethnic participation, and to train and improve Afghanistan’s security forces (Hanauer and Chalk 2012:14). This strategy gives the Indian government following gains; *it minimizes the domination of one ethnic group (namely Pashtuns), ensures that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for Pakistan-backed groups, and gives India influence in the Afghanistan parliament* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14)

The second political strategy India is following is; *to support political reconciliation in Afghanistan* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15). India is worried about the 2014 withdrawal and fears that Pakistan and ISI will move into a position where they can dominate the political room and discourse in Afghanistan like they have before (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 12, 15). In order to block Pakistan’s potential dominance India has even agreed to negotiate with Taliban leaders that renounce violence (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15). This well-crafted strategy gives the Indian government the following gains; *India gets a seat at the negotiation table, and by having a voice in the reconciliation process they are able to counter Pakistani ambitions* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15).

### 4.2.1B: “Soft Power”: Economic Strategies

India’s economic soft power may be one of its most important strategies in its arsenal. India’s goal is to promote stability and of course to increase their own influence through economic policy tools (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15-16).

India’s policies have been more concerned with choosing the economic route in Afghanistan, rather than the military one (Siddique 2011: 8. 47). One of the strategies Indian government is pursuing is; *to provide developmental aid* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15-16). India has as of early 2011 provided around 1.3 billion dollars to Afghanistan, which makes them Afghanistan’s biggest South-Asian donor, and the fifth largest worldwide (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 16, Siddique 2011: 42). In order to marginalize groups like Taliban, Karzai needs to create jobs since poverty is a big problem in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15). The gains India receives in this strategy is as following; *by offering programs to enhance good governance in Afghanistan, Karzai’s governments legitimacy gets enhances and in return*
India and Afghanistan ties becomes stronger (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 16). To have an India-friendly regime in Afghanistan is strategically important.

Another very important strategy India has utilized is; the construction of Zaranj/Delaram highway in 2008-2009 (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 17). This highway is India’s alternative trade route to Afghanistan. An detailed description of this road is given by Basu (2007): “(…) it (India) is cooperating with Tehran to in developing the Chabahar port on the Makran coast near Iran-Pakistan border, which has road connections with Afghanistan’s western frontier’s; from there, India is building a link road to the central circular highway of Afghanistan” (Partha Pratim Basu: India and Post-Taliban Afghanistan: Stakes, Opportunities and Challenges, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, 94, 2007, Sage publications). The significance of this construction is recognized by most of the relevant authors under this chapter (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 17-18, Basu 2007: 94, Siddique 2011: 42, Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 136, Tadjbaksh 2011: 36).

The construction of this road is undoubtedly because of expanding trade relations with Afghanistan, and opening up a supplier and buyer market to speed up Afghanistan’s maturity process (Basu 2007: 93). However, this roads most important function is to undercut
Pakistan’s dominance and influence in trade with Afghanistan (Basu 2007: 94, Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 17). As mentioned several times earlier, Afghanistan’s landlocked status makes it totally dependent on Pakistan, all trade routes to Afghanistan goes through Pakistan. Pakistan has numerous times before blocked Indian goods to pass their territory. The gains for India through this strategy are enormous; *Zaranj/Delaram road and Chabahar port undermines Pakistan’s Gwadar port built by China’s backing and takes away Pakistan’s opportunity to block Indian goods* (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 18), *it increases trade with Afghanistan and undermines Pakistan’s monopoly in relations to trade, and most importantly it gives India clear access to oil and mineral rich Central-Asia* (Siddique 2011: 42), *furthermore it reduces Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan* (Ganguly and Howenstein 2009: 136). With India’s economic growth it is estimated that by year 2030, India will have to import more that 80% of its fuel (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 12). To build trade-relationships with Central-Asian states is high on India’s agenda, as well as Pakistan’s. India is also working on a railway that will connect the Chabahar port with the mineral rich Hajigak area in Afghanistan 11.

These constructions have the potential to rework the geopolitics of the region (Basu 2007: 94). India’s strategies and potential gains in Afghanistan are increasing and increasingly worrying Pakistan. The soft power that India exerts is great and Afghanistan has much to gain from this partnership, which makes Pakistan believe that it’s losing its strategic advances. Military power is the only area where India has not projected any might (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 22). However, Pakistan considers Afghanistan its backyard also implements numerous strategies in order to win the game over India.

### 4.2.2 Pakistan’s counter strategies in Afghanistan

Pakistan’s regional policy concerning Afghanistan is a zero-sum game with India (Siddique 2011: 41). Every strategic advance for India is a disadvantage for Pakistan, and therefore the overall ambition for Pakistan’s establishment in Afghanistan is to simply block Indian influence. Indian ambitions to some extent transcends their rivalry with Pakistan, however Pakistan’s ambitions remain India-centric.

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11: Jayanth Jacob, Saubhadra Chatterji: Indias Track 3: Afghan-Iran rail link, Hindustan Times, November 01, 2011.
Pakistan’s strategies must be understood against their overall fear about being caught in between India and Afghanistan (Siddique, 18, ibid. 46). This perception of threat is deep-rooted in Pakistan’s counter-strategies against India.

Pakistan is out to block Indian influence in Afghanistan because the Pakistani military and intelligence service, as well as the establishment and many political parties perceives India to be an threat to their territorial integrity (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25). One of the main reasons behind this perception is India’s role in the creation of Bangladesh (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25). In Pakistani decision makers mind, whatever India does in Afghanistan, whether it is economic assistance, development or building infrastructure- is a strategy against Pakistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25). Indian strategies are multi-dimensional; India is also out to project its role as a regional power. Indian strategies are many in numbers and more from a liberal-soft power point of view. Pakistan’s strategies are more colored by realism. Their most important objective is to undermine India; however blocking Indian penetration into Afghanistan gives many gains in different ways.

One of the main strategies that Pakistan has utilized, both historically and recently is; to use extremist groups as a hedge against India in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 28, Siddique 2011: 18, Rashid 1999: 28). The number of groups that have been used as proxies from Kashmir to Afghanistan are many, however as discussed in the domestic level game, Afghan Taliban has proven itself to be the most effective extremist group for Pakistan’s goals (Siddique 2011: 18). This strategy is known as “strategic depth” (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25, Siddique 2011: 18). Pakistan seek to have a pliant regime in Kabul which is necessary to keep India out, and the strategic depth doctrine is a strategy that involves the ability to not only retreat to Afghanistan in case of a Indian invasion, but also to deter India to further involve itself with Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 26). Similar to the domestic game, the Afghan Taliban enters the regional arena as a problem solver for Pakistan. If Taliban is the dominant group in Afghanistan with their heavy emphasis on religion, India will never be able to secure ties and trade with Afghanistan, which was the case during the Taliban regime from 1996. The strategic depth doctrine is credited to the “S-Wing” of the ISI, a department within the ISI that deals with extremist groups outside Pakistan (Siddique 2011: 21). “S-Wing” is made up of retired military officers, and allegedly their activities remain hidden from the top leadership of the ISI (Siddique 2011: 21).
4.2.2A Enter Taliban: gains in the regional level game

The gains the Pakistani military in specific enjoys by using Afghan Taliban as a proxy are multi-faceted. Therefore before we discuss what other strategies Pakistan is currently employing, it would be useful to assess how Afghan Taliban gives Pakistan a strategic edge over India.

Pakistan believes that Indian consulates in Afghanistan are being used for intelligence operations against Pakistan and fueling insurgencies within Pakistani soil, whether it is true or not- India denies the allegations (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 14). There are currently around 4000 Indian citizens in Afghanistan working on different reconstruction and development programs (Siddique 2011: 42). In order to break India’s increasing influence in Afghanistan Afghan Taliban has been making India a very specific target for attacks, allegedly with ISI’s backing. A bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul by Afghan Taliban has in India been interpreted as ISI’s way to undercut Indian influence (Siddique 2011: 43). In February 2009, Taliban attacked a guesthouse in Kabul that was popular amongst Indian visitors, and it was later revealed that at least one of those who were killed was an agent for Indian RAW (Siddique 2011: 43). This attack was also in Indian’s mind the handwork of ISI (Siddique 2011: 43). It is argued that this could be because of the increase of Indian consulates near the Afghan-Pakistan border, and also because of the fact that Pakistan believes that Indian supports insurgencies inside Pakistan.

One other increasing concern for Pakistan is the Zaranj/Delaram road which actively breaks Pakistan’s monopoly on Afghanistan trade and access. As Pakistan is losing their unilateral position in Afghanistan trade, Afghan Taliban has actively targeted road workers in Afghanistan. According to Basu (2007), there is a connection between Pakistan’s worry in relation to India’s penetration into Afghanistan’s trade, and the fact that Afghan Taliban has increasingly disrupted road projects in Afghanistan (Basu 2007: 110). Using Afghan Taliban as their foot soldiers may have been a very strategically significant move for Pakistan’s intelligence agency and military. According to Indian Defense Review, the Zaranj/Delaram highway is under Taliban control.

The reason for this takeover by Taliban is that the highway runs through the Nimroz province, which is under Afghan Taliban domain. According to Indian Defense Review, this was stated by Afghan Taliban themselves through a press release (see footnote 14). The most strategic significant move by India to undermine Pakistan’s influence has according to the Indian Defense Review themselves, been doomed irrelevant. According to the article published by Indian defense review, the suspicion falls on the ISI. If the ISI was behind this strategy or not, it was nevertheless highly successful. According to Hanauer and Chalk (2012), this is also to be expected concerning the railway connecting Chabahar port to mineral rich Hajigak (Ibid. 53). This railway would also have to go through the same province, giving Pakistan another strategic victory (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 18). As we have seen thus far, Afghan Taliban has proved itself to be an important strategic asset to Pakistan’s intelligence service and military. Some of the most important strategies employed by India have actively been undermined by Afghan Taliban, which in nature is anti-India (Siddique 2011: 46). Taliban has also at times been active against India in relation to the Kashmir dispute which makes them of even greater significance for ISI. Taliban at times serves several purposes.

**4.2.2B Other counter strategies in Afghanistan:**

Another strategy Pakistan is using besides using Afghan Taliban as a hedge against Indian is; to make itself essential to reconciliation talks in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 29). Pakistan has several times shown that they are an essential piece in the Afghanistan puzzle, and according to Tadjbaksh (2011) they have done so successfully (Tadjbaksh 2011: 45). The main goal behind being essential in reconciliation talks in Afghanistan is to not be bypassed in the endgame in Afghanistan, especially in the post-2014 period. Pakistan has demonstrated their ability to influence peace talks in Afghanistan by for instance preventing moderate Taliban leaders from participating in talks with Karzai’s government (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30). They have taken into custody Afghan Taliban leaders that were out to reach a settlement with the central government in Kabul independently of Pakistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30, Siddique 2011: 48), showing the world that they are influential players in the game. By using this strategy Pakistan has at least three significant gains; 1) they are able to control who participates in the reconciliation process (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30), 2) they position themselves to play a central role in the process and discussions on ending violence in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30), 3) they send out a clear message to all parties

Dawn.com: “India arrests suspect in 1999 Kandahar hijacking”, September 13, 2012:
Involved that they are able to obstruct negotiations that does not serve their own interests (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30).

On the economic front Pakistan has extended development aid to Afghanistan and have promoted Afghan exports (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30). Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA agreement) where Pakistan permits Afghan products and goods to be exported to Indian markets, and in return Pakistan’s government gets access to Central-Asia (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 30-31). By allowing Afghanistan’s goods to travel to Indian markets, which is a financially significant market for Afghanistan, they send the message that the trade relations between Afghanistan and India needs to go through Pakistan. Pakistan has long blocked any attempt of a two-way trade between India and Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 31). This economic strategy gives the following gains; it makes sure that Pakistan’s influence on Afghan-trade does not get challenged by India. Pakistan stands as Afghanistan’s most important trading partner after USA (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 32).

High on Pakistani government’s agenda is to secure access and built trade relations with Central-Asia (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 31). Just like India, Pakistan is in an urgent need to secure import of oil and gas (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 31). A proposed pipeline called the TAPI-pipeline (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India pipeline) will provide around 15% of Pakistan’s current energy consumption (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 31). The strategy Pakistan uses here is: to promote regional relations, however at the same time try to block India out of this deal by using religion as a policy tool (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 31). Pakistan tries to use religious and historical links to reach agreements and deals with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Hanauer, Chalk 2012: 31). The gains for Pakistan’s government are; secured relations with Central-Asian states, and be able to use Gwadar port in trade with Afghanistan and countries beyond (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 31), and in return to undermine India and Iran’s Chabahar port.

In order to reach desirable goals in Afghanistan, Pakistan would have to have a pliant and cooperative regime in Kabul. If a pro-Pakistan group like Afghan Taliban does successfully penetrate the political regime in Kabul and takes a part in the ruling coalition in Afghanistan, the gains for Pakistan would be many. In Pakistan’s perspective this is the biggest security they have against India’s ambitions as a regional power that could trap Pakistan between hostile fronts.
The relationship between the U.S and Pakistan is similar to the domestic level defined by hidden agendas where both sides want to use each other as means to an end (Islam in 2012: 104-105). As US tries to pressure Pakistan into doing more concerning counter-terrorism efforts against Afghan Taliban, Pakistan looks towards the U.S in relation to the Kashmir dispute with India (Siddique 2011: 66). This relationship is getting even more complicated as Pakistan gets more and more dependent on American money, the general public is getting more and more anti-American (Siddique 2011: 52, 55). According to a Gallup Survey 59% of Pakistani’s believes that the United States is the biggest threat to their nation, and only 11% sees Taliban as a risk (Siddique 2011: 55).

The trust deficit between Pakistan and the U.S is getting wider, and even more so when India comes into this equation. Pakistan’s biggest anxiety is that India will take a leading role in Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario with support from the U.S. Therefore to prevent India from filling this vacuum Pakistan sees Afghan Taliban as their safest bet (Siddique 2011: 54-55).

(Table 2: Regional level Game: Strategies and counter strategies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Level</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue</strong></td>
<td>Border Dispute/ battle over Influence in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Border Dispute/ battle over Influence in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td>Proxy: Taliban as a hedge to undermine Indian influence</td>
<td>Great amount of Soft Power, also keeping ties with NA as a hedge strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gain</strong></td>
<td>Keeps a dominant role in the Afghanistan end-game, and avoids encirclement by India.</td>
<td>Prevents anti-India terrorism from Afghanistan’s soil, gains status as a regional superpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Success</strong></td>
<td>Success in keeping Kabul weak and undermining Indian influence.</td>
<td>Success in Soft Power strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The essence of the seemingly irrational double game on the regional level seems to be; as Pakistan is considered a key ally in the Afghanistan stage, there is an increasingly visible presence of India in Afghanistan supported and encouraged by the U.S and Afghanistan. (Islam 2012: 93). From the American point of view, India could function as a counterweight to China (Tadjbaksh 2011: 34). Traditionally the U.S has been dependent on Pakistan to fight Islamic extremism, therefore to accommodate Pakistan the U.S had asked India to remain in the sidelines (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: x). However, the increasingly closer relations between India and the U.S have been a factor of worry for Pakistan. India and USA signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2004, and one year later the U.S pledged assistance to Indian civilian nuclear sector (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: x). When President Bush refused to sign a similar agreement with Pakistan stating that India and Pakistan are two different countries with different needs, this trust deficit widened even more (Tabassum 2012: 239). In the mind of the Pakistani establishment, the closer ties between India and Pakistan echoes the history, India benefitted from American tolerance when they conducted nuclear tests, and on
the other hand Pakistan was actively discouraged (Tabassum 2012: 226). This has led the ruling elite in Pakistan to believe that in the end they will have to be protectors of their own interests.

*Figure 5* illustrates how the seemingly irrational double game towards the United States, is a rational double game from the sub-game level. Similar to the domestic level game, Pakistan’s preferred strategy is to use Taliban as a hedge and proxy against India. India on the other hand keeps their relationship with NA in order to counterbalance Afghan Taliban and Pakistan if needed. The difference between the domestic level and the regional level game is the “triangle” that appears to be forming between USA, India and Afghanistan, illustrated on the left side of figure 5. The Karzai government has and is responding positively to India; furthermore Karzai continues to strengthen ties with India at Pakistan’s displeasure (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 22). According to a 2009 ABC News/BBC poll, referred to in Hanauer and Chalk’s paper, 74% of ordinary Afghans held favorable opinions towards India, and only 8% saw Pakistan in a positive light (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 23). These numbers demonstrates that Indian soft power is winning the hearts and minds of the ordinary citizens in Afghanistan. India’s no-strings attached strategy has made them valuable partners for Afghanistan (Hanauer, Chalk 2012: 23). As a result, Kabul would probably welcome and encourage more involvement from India (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 3). The argument is similar when it comes to the American point of view. The economic and developmental contributions India is providing is perceived as being significant (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: xi). The American Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has even urged India to take a bigger military role in Afghanistan through training Afghani security forces. As mentioned earlier, the U.S has in the past discouraged India from taking an active role in Afghanistan due to Pakistan, therefore an appeal like the one made by Mr. Panetta marks a policy shift in the U.S, aimed to move away from Islamabad (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: xi). The United States is increasingly tilting towards the belief that India has more to offer in Afghanistan than Pakistan (Hanauer, Chalk 2012: xi). India’s soft power strategies are successful and Pakistan has not been able to project soft power in any significant way in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 35). In despite of that, Pakistan has been successful in keeping Kabul weak and off balance (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 32).

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As a result not only has Karzai’s government been unable to assert control over Afghan Taliban, but has also been unable to make the alliances his government wishes to make. The ISI and the Pakistani military are still very much in control (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 32). India’s soft power strategies may be resilient; however they have not been able to undermine Pakistan. Almost every aspect of India’s success is dependent on the fact that Taliban does not emerge as a strong player. Taliban’s involvement in any shape or form wrecks Indian ambitions (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 23). Whereas India is struggling to make itself a valuable player in the Afghanistan reconciliation process, Pakistan has made itself valuable and indispensable (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 29). Through Taliban, Pakistan has undermined Indian influence concerning the alternative trade route, since Taliban has actively taken control over the province where the Zaranj/Delaram highway passes (Ibid. 56). Pakistan has also undermined the influence from Indian consulates which is seen through that the Afghan Taliban is making Indian workers targets. Even though India’s efforts are welcomed, it is by no means in the position it wishes to be. India’s efforts have not yet reached the point of being indispensable in the minds of the same powers India wants to impress (Tadjbaksh 2011: 45).

India has from the start opposed the inclusion of Taliban in a post-2014 government in Afghanistan in any shape or form. However India is now in a position where they have had to realize that this could be a possible outcome. Therefore the willingness to negotiate with moderate Taliban leaders may show a policy shift in India; however it could also be evidence of the fact that they could not exert enough power to keep Taliban out. The inclusion of Taliban to secure a friendly government in Afghanistan is Pakistan’s strategy and India’s turn towards negotiating with moderate Taliban leaders could be understood as a strategic victory for Pakistan; Pakistan successfully pressed their agenda on to India. This is illustrated in figure 5, the smaller black bracket pointing towards Taliban shows that India is able to push back to some extent, whether it may be through soft power or the usage of NA. Even if this is the case the fact remains simple, Pakistan’s usage of Afghan Taliban as a proxy against India has not only undermined Indian influences in many areas, Pakistan has also shown that it is an important part of the Afghanistan puzzle, and that Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan negotiations is inevitable (Tadjbaksh 2011: 45, 49). The dominance of Pakistan’s chosen strategy over Indian is shown by the thicker red bracket pointing towards India in the figure.

The U.S is aware of Pakistan’s continuing significance even if the relationship between the two is at a low point. At one point when a US helicopter raid fired at a Pakistani military
outpost killing and injuring numerous Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan responded by closing the NATO supply route, a valuable route that transfers up to two-thirds of the alliance’s shipment\textsuperscript{17}. In another incident where US forces killed two Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan responded by closing the Torkham Gate Border from where non-lethal cargo is transferred on a daily basis (Siddique 2011: 24). NATO apologized for this incident (footnote 17). This shows that Pakistan has on several occasions reminded the international community of their importance (Siddique 2011: 24).

This seemingly irrational double game is now being played because the U.S demands Pakistan’s support in the GWOT and at the same time ignores their security concerns by encouraging greater Indian role. What seems as an irrational double game is only so, on the surface between the U.S and Pakistan. As illustrated in figure 5, the game is extended if we follow the Y2 line which travels through the sub-game level. Substantially this means that Pakistan’s behavior towards the U.S is a result of the fact that India is securing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan. This Indian strategy is welcomed by the U.S and Afghanistan (the triangle shape in the figure). In order to secure what Pakistan sees as their national interests some fractions of the ISI and the military has been tolerant towards Afghan Taliban. As Rashid points out, Islamabad would never drop its support to Afghan Taliban because they guaranty an ally in the form of a friendly government in Kabul, and give its army a strategic depth over India (Rashid 1999: 29). Furthermore if the ISI was to drop their support it would have a bad effect on the Kashmir cause, the core issue between Indian and Pakistan (Rashid 1999:28). As we see in figure 5, Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game is a result of the developments that are taking place in the region, particularly the greater involvement of India. The domestic level game and the regional level game would also be more interconnected as Afghanistan and India’s relations grow stronger. Afghanistan’s claims for Pashtunistan will be backed by India, because India desires this outcome (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 25).

\textsuperscript{17} Shams Momand: ‘Pakistan stops NATO supplies after deadly raid’, November 26, 2011, Reuters.
4.4 Conclusion on the Regional Level

Many of Pakistan’s fundamental goals in Afghanistan are inconsistent with the goals the U.S has (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 43). As Nasir Islam (2012) points out there is a contradictory nature to Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan; Pakistan is the problem and the solution (Islam 2012: 105). Nevertheless, Pakistan has acquired a place in the game (Islam 2012: 106). It remains to be seen if the Pakistani establishment will use their influence over the Afghan Taliban to secure peace in the region, however this also depends on whether the other players in the game – the U.S, India, Afghanistan – continues to play a zero-sum game with Pakistan or not (Islam 2012: 106).

Even though the U.S encourages a greater role for India in Afghanistan, Indian should be aware of the consequences of some of the strategies it has utilized. By using the NA as a hedge, India could in fact inspire more violence in the region between the ethnic factions in Afghanistan (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 15). The same goes for Pakistan. If Pakistan only maintain their strategic depth doctrine, it could in fact play into India’s advantage and push Afghanistan and India even closer (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 33). As Tadjbaksh (2011) argues, both Pakistan and India have economic interests in the region and instead of maintaining a rivalry, cooperation could benefit all parties involved too much greater extent (Tadjbaksh 2011: 45). It has been argued that realism is insufficient in explaining the characteristics in Europe; however realism is still applicable in South-Asia. If India assumes the role the U.S wants it to, and exerts the amount of money and manpower needed to be a dominant player in Afghanistan, then Pakistan could feel pressured enough to use harder strategies against India, including striking back to undermine their influence (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 51).

Pakistan’s future approach in Afghanistan will shape the development in the region, and for now the decision makers in Pakistan have not had an incentive to drop their strategic depth approach. Especially when the U.S is courting India, Pakistan will probably take some deliberate steps away from the U.S and try to guard its interests single-handedly. The U.S realizes whether it is in terms of supply routes or military operations, it is not possible to bypass Pakistan in any sort of end-game in Afghanistan. American and Indian objectives are for the first time in a long time overlapping and particularly from the American point of view, a stronger India in the region functions as a counterweight to China (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: xi). The U.S needs to realize that this move could push Pakistan closer to China and to
some degree even has, which is not in the best interests of the U.S or India. Conclusively an argument given by Tadjbaksh (2011) comes in mind: Pakistan’s behavior may change if their insecurities vis-à-vis India are addressed (Tadjbaksh 2011: 49). Both Pakistan and India needs guaranties against each other and the U.S is in a positions to provide that (Tadjbaksh 2011: 49). Furthermore, Tadjbaksh argues that a regional approach to Afghanistan would be difficult if the core issues in this security complex are not resolved (Tadjbaksh 2011: 49). Ergo, the U.S may have to deal with the fact that the road to Kabul partly goes through Kashmir after all (Tadjbaksh 2011: 49).
The Pakistan-China relationship is enduring and the phrase “All-weather friends” is commonly used in news and scholarly articles. This friendship is based on a common threat perception of India which both seeks to counterbalance in the South-Asian region (Schofield 2012: 151). China had a great deal of involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. There is a sharp contrast between the relationship Pakistan has with China, and the relationship they have with the U.S and NATO. Pakistan has closely cooperated with China to suppress insurgencies in the Xinjiang province, on the other hand been reluctant to do the same with USA and NATO concerning Afghan Taliban (Schofield 2012: 151). This speaks volumes and gives an impression of how important relations with China are for the Pakistani establishment.

This chapter is about how Pakistan’s relationship with China puts the strategic interactions in the region on a slightly different trajectory. This chapter could be understood as an attempt to analyze Pakistan’s likely responses to the fact that India and the U.S is forming an alliance. The focus will be on how China enhances Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis India and the U.S, and how China’s entrance in this nexus gives a different dynamic to the seemingly irrational double game in the Afghanistan stage. The entrance of China on this arena could also provide us with some predictions about the development in this region in the years to come.

The most central contributions in this field are the same authors I have been using in the domestic and regional arena, such as; Butt and Schofield (2012), various articles of Ahmed Rashid (2008, 1999) and also news articles of Rashid that are continuously being published or have been published in different papers and magazines. Khan (2012), Hanauer and Chalk’s (2012) paper from the RAND corporation will also be used. Siddique (2011) and Tadjbaksh (2011) are also making an appearance. Ayesha Siddiqa’s (2012) report on Chinas role in Pakistan supported by NOREF and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be a new and useful addition. David Scott (2008) and his geopolitical view on China and India is going to be used. Kissinger’s (2011) latest book, a rich and detailed account of Chinese history and politics is also a new and useful addition.

“China's friend is our friend, and China’s enemy is our enemy” – Former P.M Yousaf Raza Gilani (Tribune.com.pk: published April 02, 2012: [acquired: May 14, 2013.]
5.1 China, India and Pakistan Nexus

Part of the glue that holds China and Pakistan together is their mutual distrust of India. Before any account of Pakistan and China’s strategies towards India and partly the U.S is given, it is important to discuss the reason behind the rivalry between the two giants of Asia. One important matter to keep in mind is as I have mentioned earlier, the international level game does not involve Taliban as a “game solver” for Pakistan. In the previous analysis concerning the domestic and regional level Afghan Taliban in many ways became the solution to Pakistan’s problems. In the international level China is largely the answer to Pakistan’s prayers, as they are playing a similar role to Pakistan, which the U.S is playing to India. Afghan Taliban had the most explanatory power in the first two arenas; however they will also be discussed and mentioned where it is appropriate. To explain the difference between the domestic, regional arena and the international arena; Afghan Taliban was and is largely Pakistan’s proxy against India, and a tool to secure national interests especially when it comes to Afghanistan. In the international arena Pakistan is playing the role of a Chinese Proxy to balance India, and partly to limit the American penetration into the region.

5.1.1 Sino-Indian war: Himalayan border dispute and Aksai Chin

The Sino-Indian border dispute concerned two territories in the high Himalayas (Kissinger 2011: 184-185). One of them was what China considered as being “South Tibet”, which India administrated as the state of Arunachal Pradesh in the southern parts of the Himalayas (Kissinger 2011: 185). In the western part the disputed territory was known as Aksai Chin (Kissinger 2011: 186).

Tibet was historically ruled by the Qing Dynasty, but got substantial amount of autonomy as the years passed on (Kissinger 2011: 185). After 1912 when the Qing Dynasty ended, Chinese governance and presence in Tibet had shrunk severely (Kissinger 2011: 185). At this time British authorities and India convened a conference with Chinese and Tibetan representatives where the borders between India and Tibet were to be marked (Kissinger 2011: 185). This conference was shortly after the fall of the Qing Dynasty and China did not have much force to contest the developments that were taking place, other than stating that China had a historic claim to Tibet (Kissinger 2011: 185). British and Tibetan representatives signed a following document to mark the lines, which was not signed by China who argued that Tibet was a part
of China and was not entitled to exercise any form of sovereignty (Kissinger 2011: 186). The disputed area was marked by the official McMahon Line, which China refused to recognize and the area under dispute was effectively under Indian administration (Kissinger 2011: 186). China made no effort to contest the decision other than refusing to recognize its validity (Kissinger 2011: 186).

The western part of the mountain range housed another territory that both China and India were claiming called Aksai Chin (Kissinger 2011: 186). This territory has arguably been one of the main reasons behind the bad relationship these states have. This territory is inaccessible from India, still in the 50’s India included it as well as the McMahon Line in all of its maps (Kissinger 2011: 186). China offered a deal to India; acceptance of the McMahon Line in return for recognition of China's claims for Aksai Chin, an offer that prime minister Nehru rejected by not answering it (Kissinger 2011: 187). To make a long story short, Indian strategy was to send in troops in to the disputed area and to fire if necessary on the basis that Chinese were intruders on Indian soil (Kissinger 2011: 187). Mao’s response was to avoid a big crisis and ordered Chinese troops to withdraw somewhere around 20 km, a move which India wrongfully interpreted as Chinese weakness and further ordered their troops to keep pushing forward as far as possible (Kissinger 2011: 187). To answer India, China’s decision was a decisive and massive assault to produce a shock that would force India to the negotiation table, a strategy that worked and China returned to the line it was claiming (Kissinger 2011: 190-191). Similar to China's response concerning the Arunachal Pradesh area, India has not recognized the territory as Chinese, however they have not tried to contest it either (Kissinger 2011: 191).

These events shaped the perceptions both states have of each other. For India, China is an aggressor state with the capabilities to fight and possibly defeat India. This is seen in the fact that India argues that their nuclear program was initialized because of China (Buzan op. cit. 49). China on the other hands sees India’s increasing quest for superpower status as a threat, especially now when India is forming an alliance with the U.S (Malik 2002: 1).
5.1.2 China in Pakistan: everything that the U.S is not?

Pakistan and China have been strong strategic partners since 1963 which is seen through high-level visits, civilian, military and elite contacts (Schofield 2012: 151). This relationship is also popular in both countries (Schofield 2012: 151). China is also Pakistan’s most reliable arms supplier (Schofield 2012: 152).

The current relations between Pakistan and China were to a large extent shaped by the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan (Schofield 2012: 153). India’s nuclear capabilities accelerated China’s military aid to Pakistan (Schofield 2012: 153). This was and still is largely due to the perceived threat both states have from India. Chinese policy towards Pakistan is pretty clear cut; China relies on Pakistan to counterbalance India, suppress Islamic terror in the Xinjiang province, function as a gateway to the oil producing states in the Persian Gulf and to break USA’s encirclement strategies of China (Schofield 2012: 155). Pakistan depends on China for support, especially against India and to receive weapon technology since Pakistan is not able to produce military technology as rapidly as India (Schofield 2012: 152). China’s support to Pakistan’s nuclear program started already in 1976 between Mao Zedong and Zulfikar A. Bhutto (Schofield 2012: 157). After France cancelled a uranium processing facility in Pakistan and later on refused to sell Pakistan tritium alongside Germany and Japan, China stepped in to assist (Schofield 2012: 157).

It is important to mention that during the arms race between India and Pakistan, the U.S had a very inconsistent policy in South-Asia (Tabassum 2012: 226). The U.S was ineffective when it came to influencing India not to acquire nuclear weapons, and when India did achieve a nuclear status the U.S kept trying to prevent Pakistan from acquiring it (Tabassum 2012: 226). According to Tabassum (2012), India largely benefitted from American tolerance and Pakistan did not (Tabassum 2012: 226). The important twist during this time period was China’s reaction. When Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, China condemned both India and Pakistan’s tests however; China largely blamed India for the nuclear showdown in South-Asia, and stated that Pakistan’s tests were a result of Indian bullying and mild attitude adopted by the international community (Tabassum 2012: 235). Strong relations between Pakistan and China can be related to data: according to Schofield (2012) only 16% of Pakistanis view the U.S in a positive light whereas 84% views China positively (Schofield 2012: 152). This is substantially very interesting because the U.S is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and still isn’t receiving the positive reception from the average Pakistani, as China is
doing (Schofield 2012: 162). The heavy influence China has in Pakistan is of major concern to the U.S (Schofield 2012: 152), and of course India. In the next sections we will see that the tightening alliance between India and the U.S is steadily being matched by an even stronger Chinese involvement in Pakistan.

5.1.3 China the Game changer

As discussed earlier the U.S is making their relationship to India amongst their top foreign policy priorities, due to the fact that a closer involvement with India could advance American geopolitical goals (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 45). One of the strategic advances that India provides the U.S is to counterbalance China’s increasing influence in the region (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 45). India is also increasingly building ties with countries that are in close proximity to China such as Vietnam, and could potentially build a naval base in Vietnam as well (Siddiqa 2012: 5, Scott 2008: 10). Furthermore as discussed in the regional level game, the U.S is more and more determined alongside Afghanistan to let India play a bigger role in the Afghanistan stage. India’s increasing role in the region and especially in Afghanistan has not gone unnoticed in Beijing (Scott 2008: 8).

China has sent a strong and clear signal to the U.S; they will counter Washington’s tilt Towards India (Schofield 2012: 155). As India-U.S goals and interests for Afghanistan are overlapping, China’s interests are doing the same with Pakistan. China is supportive of Pakistan’s quest for neutralizing Kabul as an Indian friendly regime as long as their investments in Afghanistan are not undermined (Schofield 2012: 162). After the 2005 US-Indian nuclear framework agreement which Pakistan was excluded from, China signed its own agreement with Pakistan to build a second reactor in the country (Schofield 2012: 158). China is continuously trying to break Pakistan away from the U.S and IMF’s influence through aid (Schofield 2012: 155). China has already achieved a relationship with Pakistan that is not similar to the patron-client relations that the U.S and Pakistan has. China is also providing Pakistan with sensitive satellite intelligence (Schofield 2012: 155). Because of China’s investment in Pakistan, Pakistan is largely able to resist the U.S especially when it comes to non-proliferation (Schofield 2012: 162). It seems as if the strategic partnership with China is providing Pakistan with an edge over India, something the U.S was not interested in providing. Chinese assistance has enabled Pakistan to out-produce India in nuclear weapons, a
development the U.S is not too happy about (Schofield 2012: 157). It is also estimated that China will out-produce American warheads in the next decade (Schofield 2012: 157).

One of the most central parts of Indian foreign policy is still to prevent Chinese influence in the region (Scott 2008: 12). As both China and India sees each other as competitors, their strategies and counter-strategies takes place on many different levels. I.e. when India wanted to include Afghanistan in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), Pakistan tried to turn the table on India by making Afghanistan’s entry conditional on China getting an observer status (Scott 2008: 11). Fearful of what this might do to Indian interests India insisted on Japan’s status as an observer as well in order to counter China, and later on even successfully granted the U.S an observer status (Scott 2008: 11).

In terms of geopolitics, China and India are going head to head. India builds relations with countries in Central-Asia, a region China is keen on securing ties with as well (Scott 2008: 12). On the other hand China’s successful cooperation with Sri Lanka, a country within close range of India is a punch towards India and the U.S, especially when Sri Lanka is promoting a greater Chinese role in the region. China is giving both India and the U.S a run for their money when it comes to Afghanistan. According to Siddiqa (2012), China signed a contract with Kabul concerning the Aynak copper deposit, a deal worth 80 billion dollars (Siddiqa 2012: 7). China is also heavily investing in mining projects in Pakistan (Siddiqa 2012: 7).

Another increasing concern for India is the fact that China is increasingly visible in Pakistan. According to Schofield (2012), there are around 10 000 Chinese workers in Pakistan, alongside 120 Chinese companies working on infrastructure (Schofield 2012: 159). Sometimes these workers are subject to kidnapping by Baloch militants (and other groups) (Schofield 2012: 159). This is interesting because as discussed in the regional level analysis, Pakistan suspects India for using Baloch militants as their proxies. It would not be unthinkable that India may have equipped Baloch militants as proxy against China.

As Siddiqa points out, China would probably be a key investor in the post-2014 Afghanistan as well as Pakistan (Siddiqa 2012: 10). China and India are in a direct competition over securing energy resources. For China, Pakistan is a valuable access to the Gulf and Central-Asia through the valuable Gwadar port which is very important to China (Siddiqa 2012: 6).

China took over the administration over the strategically located Gwadar port \(^{19}\), which in Indian minds is a big matter of concern \(^{20}\) since it could be used as a base for the Chinese Navy. Pakistan for its part can only see benefits from the fact that China is getting more invested with the region.

China has seemingly positioned themselves where they are being hailed as important allies in Pakistan. One part of China’s policy in Pakistan has been to deal directly with right-winged parties like *jamaat-ud-dawwa*, and even gone as far as blocking moves against them in UN (Siddiqa 2012: 6). Right winged parties like these are ideological partners of the Afghan Taliban. Another important right-winged party, JUI, which is also seen as a pro Taliban party has even publically advocated a defense pact with China (Schofield 2012: 161). These political forces inside Pakistan are not pro-America in any way and the U.S is not keen on their political views either. Still the interesting gain for China’s policy vis-à-vis the U.S is that the various jihadist groups in Pakistan border areas show restraints towards China and considers them more friends than foes, which is not the case when it comes to the U.S (Siddiqa 2012: 6). Furthermore, the most interesting gain is that the Taliban does not obstruct or oppose Chinese presence in Pakistan (Siddiqa 2012: 6). This indicates that China and Pakistan manages the militancy problem the U.S is continuously facing to mutual advantages (Siddiqa 2012: 6). The fact that Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups that strongly oppose American presence seemingly are unaffected by Chinese presence is a strategic edge the U.S has not been able to gain in the whole period they have been involved in the region. This could be due to the fact that China recognizes the importance of militant groups in Pakistan’s foreign policy (Schofield 2012: 161). Additionally, they have never pressured Pakistan to distance themselves from any group because China does not wish to interfere with Pakistan’s domestic politics (Schofield 2012: 163). The strategies that China has chosen to approach Pakistan with have made them popular amongst the public.


\(^{20}\): The Herald.com.au: ‘*India Worried by Chinese-run Pakistan port*’, February 19, 201
5.1.4 Still the same old game?

The million dollar question when it comes to the entry of China as a key player in this region is; will Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game continue? To make prediction is not a method that is favorable within political science. This shorter chapter discussing China’s role is not my way of foreseeing the future, it is a way of interpreting empirical evidence to cast some sort of light over the future development, some of which we are already seeing.

From the Pakistani point of view there are almost no obvious negatives concerning a closer cooperation with China. As mentioned, China needs Pakistan to counterbalance India; indirectly Pakistan needs to play the role of a Chinese proxy, a role they are seemingly playing happily. The mutual distrust over India and the increasing American tilt towards India is something that both states perceive as a negative. Hanauer and Chalk (2012) mention that one of Pakistan’s likely responses towards an American backed India in Afghanistan will be; to turn increasingly towards China for military and development assistance to block India, and gain additional military capabilities through China to use against India if needed (Hanauer and Chalk 2012: 7). At the same time the U.S is still Pakistan’s largest trading partner (Schofield 2012: 162). The shadow of a potential grand game on an international level is visible. Pakistan is getting closer to China at the same time as being a key US ally in Afghanistan. This is not a new development since Pakistan and China have always been strategic partners; however the new face within this partnership is China’s position to challenge the U.S in this region.

Pakistan’s tilt towards China is because of their goals in the region and Afghanistan is overlapping, and quite opposite of what the U.S wants (Schofield 2012: 162). Through a stronger partnership with China, Pakistan’s national interests are met more accurately. First of is the most obvious; through a strong relationship with China Pakistan is better equipped to stand against India. Both China and Pakistan see the counter balancing of India as an important goal. Secondly, through China’s membership in SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) Pakistan is able to increase its influence in Central-Asia for trade, and gain a strategic depth in the region as well, something Pakistan already is doing (Schofield 2012: 154). Furthermore, Pakistan could potentially use their relations to China in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India in their favor. Historically, China has supported Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue, however they changed their stance to neutrality in 1974 and propagated joint resolution from 1980 and onwards (Schofield 2012: 156). Still, China is a
strong international power and Pakistan has on several occasions pointed towards their interest for China to use their influence to resolve the dispute (Schofield 2012: 156). Pakistan can through China secure energy resources; therefore it was of strategic significance that China took over the administration of the Gwadar Port. Concerning Pakistan and China’s immediate neighborhood; China is not in the favor of an India-friendly Afghanistan therefore they do not oppose Pakistan’s proxy strategies, something the U.S does openly. According to Scott (2008) China’s game against India is using encirclement strategies and India is trying to do the same however, if the strategies of China and India are analyzed, Chinese encirclement has proved itself to be more effective (Scott 2008: 18, 20). The fact that China is undermining India is in itself the biggest gain and advantage for Pakistan.

It is difficult to say if the same sort of double game will persist or not, still some indications of a duplicity towards the U.S from Pakistan has been observable when China has entered the stage. The most recent and famous appeared in the aftermath of the Osama bin laden operation in Pakistan. Allegedly, ISI invited Chinese military engineers to access the wreckage of the Black Hawk helicopter that crashed in Abbottabad. According to the U.S, this was done despite the fact that the CIA requested Pakistan not to do so. The issue of contention between the U.S and Pakistan was that Pakistan allegedly let Chinese engineers examine the tail of the crashed helicopter that contained classified radar evasive technology. Pakistani officials have denied the allegations, however the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S as a result are at a low point.

Another famous contradiction concerning the U.S and Pakistan relationship is that Pakistan increasingly conducts counter-terrorism operation with and without China in order to hunt down militants from the Xinjiang province. The ETIM movement (The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement) has caused uprisings in China since the 90’s (Schofield 2012: 160). When China found out that ETIM benefitted from external assistance namely from Taliban and other Pakistan based insurgent groups, China put considerable pressure on Pakistan to suppress this movement (Schofield 2012: 160-161).

The interesting fact is that Pakistan was strongly supportive of China’s request, and indicated that good relations with China is much more important than the risk of losing support amongst domestic Islamic groups (Schofield 2012: 161). Pakistan proceeded and even killed high profiled ETIM leaders (Schofield 2012: 161). Pakistan takes a total opposite stance in combating insurgencies when it comes to the U.S and China. Even though Pakistan was most important in capturing Al-Qaeda officials in the early years of GWOT, they have never compromised domestic groups that could function as strategic assets towards India for the sake of the U.S.

5.2 Conclusion on the International Arena

Pakistan’s alleged invitation to Chinese engineers and their efforts to combat terrorism on China’s behalf, and not doing the same for the U.S highlights the strong influence China has in Pakistan, and not the influence of Taliban sympathizers in ISI and the Pakistan military (Schofield 2012: 162). As Schofield argues (Schofield 2012), China will most likely meet US moves to improve their strategic cooperation with India with an equal response through Pakistan (Schofield 2012: 162). Both India and Pakistan are to some extent caught in the middle in an increasing competition between China and the U.S.

Schofield (Schofield 2012) argues that, if Afghanistan was to draw away from India and move towards China, then China could pressure Pakistan into negotiating peace with Afghanistan along the lines of 1963-1973 period (Schofield 2012: 162). If China penetrates Afghanistan in the same manner as they have Pakistan, then China would be able to compete with America in the infamous Afghanistan stage. Even though China has much investments in Afghanistan, Siddiq (2012) points out that China has not shown any interest in helping the U.S, NATO or Karzai at this time (Siddiq 2012: 6). China is at this point concerned with blocking India, however China would not benefit from an India-Pakistan war (Schofield 2012: 154). China needs Pakistan to maintain the status quo and to facilitate an alternative trade route to energy resources (Schofield 2012: 162). As long as Pakistan shows restraints towards India in terms of a conflict and still distracts them from obstructing China, then China keeps giving Pakistan rewards in terms of investment and etc. China wants Pakistan to focus on economic growth and become self-sufficient (Schofield 2012: 162).
Keeping in mind our overall framework of Nested Games: it seems as if some level of a seemingly irrational double game could still be a part of the U.S-Pakistan relationship, when we are discussing China’s role in this region. The reason for this seems to be that the U.S finds in India what Pakistan finds in China, something they don’t find in each other: overlapping goals and agendas for Afghanistan and the South-Asia region in general. Furthermore, until there is a clear endgame in Afghanistan the U.S and Pakistan will most likely continue to be in an unwilling alliance with each other due to American involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s strategic location and proximity to Afghanistan. Since none of them are in the present state to completely cut ties with the other, some sort of double dealing will exist on both sides: The U.S will continue to promote Indian presence in Afghanistan and promote India to play a role in the entire region to counter China. Pakistan will keep moving closer to China in order to balance India and to be in a favorable position vis-à-vis China if Beijing decides to play a crucial role in post 2014 Afghanistan. At the same time both the U.S and Pakistan will continue to be in an uneasy alliance. This is a simplified, however very basic structure of what the international level game seems to be like. The same basic Nested Games argument could potentially apply on this level as well: on the surface Pakistan’s behavior towards the U.S seems irrational, however if we extend the game and dig deeper, China as an ally and India as an adversary and American ally, could throw some light of rationality on Pakistan’s actions. Whether the international level dynamics will come to this extend or not remains to be seen as time passes. China provides Pakistan with strong alternatives; an alternative power to undermine India, and an alternative partner instead of the U.S.
6 Conclusions: Connecting The Threads

The main goal of this thesis was to analyze Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game in the Afghanistan stage, mainly towards the U.S. In order to examine this irrationality I applied a qualitative approach on the Nested Games theory, to see if Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game is only so on the surface. In order to determine if Pakistan is a rational actor or not, this thesis tries to analyze Pakistan’s strategies in relation to their security concerns on a domestic, regional, and international political level.

6.1 Discussing the findings

The term double game is used often when it comes to Pakistan’s role in GWOT. To the extent I have analyzed the empirical data available within the field; the term double game may be true from one point of view; however it also gives an overly simplistic image of the actual interactions in this context. On the basis of this alleged double game I had one main research question and one hypothesis:

Q1: Is Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game towards the U.S rational, if it is analyzed through the sub-games Pakistan is involved in on a domestic and regional level?

H1: Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game is a result of the sub-games they are involved in with Afghanistan and India

In the discussion concerning the domestic arena, the main issue was between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s backing and support of Pashtun-nationalism was Afghanistan’s strategy to gain influence in a Pashtun dominated autonomous province in Pakistan. This strategy would facilitate alternative trade routes so that Afghanistan would not be completely dependent on Pakistan. Furthermore, backing Pashtun-nationalists could also lead to unity on both sides of the contested Durand line and hopefully form a greater Pashtunistan. The findings on the domestic level game suggest that Pakistan is fearful of a spillover effect as a result of Pashtun-separatist aspirations, backed by Afghanistan. Such claims could spill over to other provinces such as Balochistan and Sindh. Pakistan’s leadership also has unpleasant memories from a similar situation, namely the separation of East-Pakistan. In order to keep Pashtun-nationalist claims under check Pakistan moved itself into a position of exerting great influence in Afghanistan, particularly during the Soviet invasion. The ISI had a great edge
over decision making when it came to back militant groups against Soviet forces, a strategy the U.S was a part of. The ISI only chose to support militant movements that were religiously based. Using religion as a tool of policy was a strategy that had success and Afghan Taliban became the most strategically important religiously based group that received support. Afghan Taliban’s heavy emphasis on religion over ethnicity made them a perfect tool to achieve Pakistan’s primary goal: have a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul that would not support aspirations for an ethnic based separatist movement in Pakistan. Afghan Taliban became a very specific strategic asset for Pakistan, and through them the Pakistani establishment could secure what they perceived as their national interests domestically, which was to block ethnic-nationalism spillovers from the Pashtun’s to other provinces. History was not to repeat itself, and Taliban became useful and highly successful.

Concerning the regional arena and the game played there, the central players are India and Pakistan. Empirical evidence shows that their classic rivalry is enduring and continuing in Afghanistan. Both states are utilizing strategies and counter strategies against the other; however Kashmir is still the core of their dispute. India has played an increasingly visible role in Afghanistan. Their economic policies such as aid and investments are making them favorites in the Kabul parliament and public opinion. The soft power India has in Afghanistan is of significance. India’s approach to Afghanistan would not only put India in a position to have influence in the wider region, but also to be in a strategic important position to monitor Pakistan which India suspects of anti-Indian activities. Furthermore, India is aspiring to be accepted and recognized as a global power and therefore needs to have heavy influence in its immediate neighborhood. India has also remained a backer for the NA to undermine Pakistan backed militant groups.

The findings in the regional level game suggest that Pakistan is worried about India’s increasingly visible role in Afghanistan, the Pakistani establishment and the ISI suspects India for using their consulates and embassy in Afghanistan to monitor and cause unrest inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign and security policy is highly India-centric and Pakistan perceives every interaction with India as a zero-sum game. Therefore, Pakistan’s overarching goal is to block and undermine Indian influence in Afghanistan whenever and wherever it is possible. In order to achieve this Pakistan utilizes Afghan Taliban as their proxy. Taliban’s religion centered views is of advantage for Pakistan. Since India is a non-Muslim country, they are natural targets for Afghan Taliban. Afghan Taliban has facilitated Pakistan with an
opportunity to undermine India by for example attacking their consulates, and attacking
Indian workers in Afghanistan that are involved in different infrastructure projects. Another
great advantage for Pakistan is that the Afghan Taliban is sympathetic to Pakistan’s position
in the Kashmir dispute. Afghan Taliban has also supplied manpower in Kashmir against
India. Various strategic moves that India has made in Afghanistan, for instance the
construction of Zaranj/Dealaram highway, have been obstructed by Afghan Taliban. This
strategy is called “strategic-depth doctrine” and is often credited as the handwork of ISI. India
is a visible force in Afghanistan, however India has not yet reached the level of influence
Pakistan enjoys.

There is an intersection between the domestic and the regional level games that is being
played. India is moving closer to Afghanistan as Afghanistan is doing the same deliberately to
move away from Pakistan’s control. This fuels another fear in Pakistan, the fact that Pakistan
will be trapped in a two-front situation between hostile India and an India-friendly
Afghanistan. Afghan Taliban breaks this perceived encirclement strategy on the behest of
Pakistan by keeping India out of Afghanistan so that close relations between the two are
difficult. India is also out to cooperate with Afghanistan to gain access to Central-Asia, for
Afghanistan this means that their status as a landlocked country could be broken. As
mentioned above, Taliban’s hijack of the Indian highway that was to stretch from Iran to
Central-Asia through Afghanistan is under Afghan Taliban control. The outcomes in the
domestic level game would have implications for the regional level game as well, which is
also within the logic of Nested Games.

As Pakistan is involved in different games on different levels they are at the same time
American allies in GWOT. All their strategies must be understood against this background.
Pakistan and the U.S are in something that could be understood as a forced alliance where
both are guarding their own interests. That’s essentially what the double game consists of.
Pakistan needs to secure its own strategic and geopolitical interests, something they feel the
U.S is not willing to do, which is seen through the U.S increasing relationship with India and
backing of India, and their continuous criticism of Pakistan’s efforts. Therefore, from the sub-

game level where Pakistan finds itself in a two-front situation with India on one side and
Afghanistan on the other, their seemingly irrational double game seems less irrational all
things and levels considered. If we were to analyze all findings from the Pakistan’s point of
view we find that perception is reality. Pakistan’s reality is that they are being abandoned by

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the U.S after investing many years in Afghanistan, and potentially being encircled by India with the help of Afghanistan. Their strategies for guarding own national interests could be named controversial, however in my mind not irrational. This is why I initially started by saying that the term double game may be too simplistic. What is allegedly a seemingly irrational double game seems less a double game and more a balancing act between several actors and fronts. This is also an argument that Butt and Schofield make (Butt and Schofield 2012: 9). On the basis of the empirical arguments presented I would conclude that \( H1 \) is confirmed. Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game towards the U.S is rational if the sub-game level is taken into consideration. The sub-games on the domestic and regional level are causal explanations of Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game.

Concerning the role China could play within this context I formed a secondary research question and hypothesis. Even though the main part of this thesis was the first research question where Afghan Taliban was included, the chapter concerning the international arena was one attempt at shedding some light over the possible future developments:

**Q2**: *Will China be a contributing factor to this seemingly irrational double game as it gains more influence in the region?*

**H2**: *Some sort of seemingly irrational double game will continue as China becomes a more influential player in the region.*

China enters this game as an actor that has the potential to change the strategic interactions in this region. China as a rising and influential player has much of the same aspirations as Pakistan considering the endgame in Afghanistan and the common threat perception towards India. Because of Pakistan’s strategic importance for China as a gateway to oil and mineral rich Central-Asia and the gulf region, China has enough “carrots” to influence Pakistan to distance itself from the United States. This would also be a likely situation in the future as Pakistan is losing their strategic importance for the U.S for the first time in a long time. The U.S supports increased Indian role in Afghanistan and the wider region and is building a strategic partnership with India that worries the Pakistani establishment. As long as the U.S and India find themselves on the same side, Pakistan will most likely keep moving towards China. This is a development that would probably not serve US interests due to the fact that the U.S is not in a position where the can fully replace Pakistan with another state. The U.S has yet to find a better alternative than Pakistan when it comes to the situation in Afghanistan.
China is not only undermining India in South-Asia and Afghanistan, it is also challenging the U.S in the same region and has not yet shown any interest in using their power to help the U.S or the NATO in any substantial way. If China was to successfully play a significant role in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 2014 withdrawal, Afghanistan could possibly perceive China as a fitting choice for strategic partnership rather than India. China’s entry in this region would more likely contribute to a continuation of a double game type relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. As the U.S and Pakistan has one official “on the paper” alliance, both states would on a sub-game level move closer to India and China respectively. As I have argued in this thesis, both states are in an alliance that is out of necessity rather than solidarity. I would argue that H2 is only partly confirmed. China’s entry as an influential player would contribute to a double game between Pakistan and the U.S however; it is only a double game if the alliance between Pakistan and the U.S continues. The events of the last few years have shown that the U.S in particular is not too interested in being reliant on Pakistan. In that case it would not be a double game, Pakistan and China would most likely be a rather visible partnership against India and the U.S’ influence in the South-Asian region. Still the hypothesis is partly confirmed because the presence of China in this nexus leads to a continuation of the seemingly irrational strategic interactions in this game, and changes the dynamic’s since Pakistan gets more powerful vis-à-vis India and is able to resist American pressure in quite a few areas due to China’s backing. Even if the alliance between Pakistan and the U.S is uncertain, the sub-game Pakistan is involved in with China is partly a causal explanation to Pakistan’s seemingly irrational double game on the international arena.

6.2 Potential consequences of Pakistan’s strategies?

Pakistan’s strategies towards the U.S in the Afghanistan stage have not been without its share of negative consequences. One of the consequences of being Afghan Taliban backers has been the formation of a Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: TTP). The Afghan Taliban is a more local jihadist groups with nationalist views, whereas the TTP subscribes to Al-Qaeda mindset, and it known for being strongly anti-Pakistani state (Stratfor, Global Intelligence 2013: 1). Pakistan’s quest for including Afghan Taliban in a Post-2014 coalition in Afghanistan has been due to managing and silencing its own domestic insurgency. Even though the Afghan Taliban is not anti-Pakistani state, they are nevertheless ideological brothers of the TTP. TTP enjoys safe havens in Afghanistan and occasionally conducts
attacks on governmental targets in Pakistan. If the Afghan Taliban was to be a part of a governmental coalition, the Afghan Taliban and TTP could be manageable, however if the Afghan Taliban was to dominate a political coalition, it would provide the TTP with more support (Stratfor, Global Intelligence 2013: 3). According to Stratfor’s report (2013), Pakistani leaders have even reached out to anti-Taliban fractions in Afghanistan and tried to build relations with them in order to keep Afghan Taliban in check, in case of a nightmare scenario in post 2014 Afghanistan (Stratfor, Global Intelligence 2013: 3). This is one interesting development; Pakistan has allegedly tried to balance Afghan Taliban with groups that Pakistan has targeted through Afghan Taliban in the past. The main aim for Pakistan is that if the Afghan Taliban is incorporated into the political realm in Kabul, then Pakistan could also incorporate TTP and the tribal areas in to the political core in Pakistan. This logic is uncertain. The TTP sees the Pakistani state as un-Islamic and the inclusion of Afghan Taliban in politics may not have any effect on Pakistan’s domestic problems with TTP (Stratfor, Global Intelligence 2013: 3). Secondly, this strategy stands and falls with the inclusion of Afghan Taliban into political mainstream and as of recently talks with Afghan Taliban has stalled 23.

The problems TTP poses for Pakistan has implications for the International level as well. A growing insurgency inside Pakistan would be a troubling factor for China in relation to the Muslim minority in the Xinjiang province. A growing insurgency within Pakistan could potentially influence Uighurs in the Xinjiang province and as a result cause tension between China and Pakistan. This argument is plausible because Uighurs have been affiliated with the mujahedin’s and fighters in Afghanistan in the past (Rashid 1999: 31). Pakistan is dependent on China when it comes to military aid, therefore if China was to suffer from TTP activities the consequences for Pakistan could be disturbing. China would potentially be an influential actor in the post-2014 Afghanistan; however as of now the main contribution to Pakistan’s security apparatus is and for a long time have been the U.S. Apart from promoting India to be a stakeholder in Afghanistan, the U.S is also continuously searching for new routes for logistical purposes in Afghanistan. American trust in Pakistan has suffered in the recent couple of years, and if the U.S decides to pull all economic and military support to Pakistan it would most definitely be noticed, and Pakistan would be perceived as an unreliable state in the minds of the international community in general. This would be unfortunate because Pakistan relies on economic help from external actors, including the EU. In conclusion: one of the most significant consequences Pakistan has suffered in their involvement in GWOT and
their strategies in the Afghanistan stage has been the formation of TTP, a highly anti-state-Pakistan based fraction of the Taliban. They have for a number of years now been involved in a conflict with state troops. They also regularly conduct attacks on governmental and civilian targets inside Pakistan.

One of the reasons this thesis has been an absolute pleasure to write is that the research question and the main topic is dynamic and evolving on a day to day basis. This can also be seen in the fact that many of the newspaper articles I have referred to in the footnotes are recent. Many suspenseful developments are to be seen in this region in the immediate future. One of them would be the elections in Pakistan that would have some implications on Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, and the type of government coalition that comes victorious out of these elections (left, right, etc.) would have different strategies in dealing with the domestic insurgency issues.

I chose the Nested Games approach alongside my counselor Mr. Anders Kjølberg, and for what it is worth I think it was a wise choice. Nested Games generally summed up how I thought of the interactions in this region and because of Mr. Kjølberg I was able to put an academic tag on it. Using the framework of Nested Games made it easier to analyze and to “clean” or simplify the complicated strategic interactions in this region, and shed a light on what I thought was most interesting. For this reason gratitude must be given to Mr. George Tsebelis himself, because he answered my e-mail in the very initial phase of this thesis and assured me that I can use his theory within the realm of IR as long as I specify the gains in different games.

It would be interesting to see how additional research within this field would be conducted. If I was to continue to research this field I would also have considered to include the potential role Iran and Saudi-Arabia could play in Afghanistan after the 2014 withdrawal. As I have understood both Iran and Saudi-Arabia have stakes involved and Iran works closely with India, as Saudi-Arabia often supports and backs Pakistan. Additionally, it would have been extremely interesting to see what kind of a settlement the coalition forces reach in terms of number of boots on the ground in Afghanistan after the withdrawal. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Afghan Taliban are included or excluded from a potential place in the political realm in Afghanistan, and what implications this would have both for the U.S efforts
and the domestic politics in Pakistan. Even though the official exit date has been announced, I don’t think the interesting developments and dynamics from a security policy point of view will diminish in this region.


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**Figures and images:**

- **Figure 1-6:** self-made in Microsoft Word, and Paint.
- **Table 1-2:** self-made in Microsoft Word.
- **Image 3:** UCLA language material project: [http://www.lmp.ucla.edu/Profile.aspx?LangID=64&menu=004](http://www.lmp.ucla.edu/Profile.aspx?LangID=64&menu=004) [acquired 05.02.2013]
- **Image 4:** Chabahar port and Zaranj/Delaram highway: Screeenshot from Google Maps, marked route is self-made.