Security and Inclusive Citizenship in the Mega-City
The Pacification of Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro

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Aknowledgements

This project has been a work in progress that has been with me around the clock for quite some time now. It has been a challenging, yet rewarding period, and it is with mixed feelings I now close the door to this chapter of my life.

There are many people I would like to thank for their support throughout this process. First of all I would like to thank my supervisor, Einar Braathen, for giving me the opportunity to go to Rio de Janeiro through taking me in on his research projects the spring of 2012, which gave me the inspiration to continue with the topic of the pacification for this thesis. I highly appreciate your guidance, support and feedback throughout the last year. I also want to thank Geruza and her family for taking me in and introducing me to Rocinha. Without their help, this project would not have been the same. Thank you Rafa for being my rock in Brazil and keeping me up when I've been frustrated. I am also grateful to Kari and Katie for reading through draft versions and providing valuable feedback. Finally, a big thank you to my family for being there and supporting me when I needed it the most, especially to my dear sister Ilene for always believing in me and pushing me on!

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Map

Map over central Rio de Janeiro. The dots show the (approximate) locations of the favelas I mention throughout this thesis. From http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/south-america/brazil/rio-de-janeiro/

Black= Rocinha   Orange= Vidigal   Red= Cantagalo   Green= Santa Martha

Picture taken from my home in Rocinha, portraying the favela and the contrast to the neighboring middle-class neighborhood of São Conrado.

List of acronyms

AM: *Associação de Moradores*/ Resident Associations

AMABB: *Associação dos Moradores e Amigos do Bairro Barcelos*/ Association of the Residents and Friends of the Barcelos Neighborhood

BOPE: *Batalhão de Operações Especiais*/ Special Operations Battalion

CHISAM: *Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Area Metropolitana do Grande Rio/* Coordination Agency for Habitation in the Social Interest of the Greater Rio Metropolitan Area

FAFEG: *Federação das Associações de Moradores do Estado da Guanabara*/ Federation of the Favela Associations of Guanabara

FGV: *Fundação Getúlio Vargas*/ Getúlio Vargas Foundation

FAMERJ: *Federação das Associações de Moradores do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*/ Federation of Residents' Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro

FAPERJ: *Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do* Rio de Janeiro*/* Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo Foundation for Research of the State of Rio de Janeiro

IBGE: *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística/* Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics

IPP: *Instituto Municipal de Urbanismo Pereira Passos/* Pereira Passos Mucicipal Institute of Urbanism

ISER: *Instituto de Estudos da Religião*/ Institute for the Study of Religion

NGO: Non Governmental Organizations

PAC: *Programa de Aceleração de Crescimento*/ Program of Accalerated Growth

PM: *Polícia Militar*/ Military Police

PRONASCI: *Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania*/ National Program of Public Security and Citizenship

PT: *Partido dos Trabalhadores*/ Workers' Party

UPP: *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*/ Police Pacifying Units

UPMMR: *União Pró-Melhoramentos dos Moradores da Rocinha*/ Union for Improvements for the Residents of Rocinha

SMH: *Secretaría Municipal de Habitação*/ The Municipal Secretary of Housing

1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

According to a UN-Habitat report from 2008, Brazilian cities have the biggest disparities in income distribution in the world (UN-Habitat 2008: 70). Few places is this as obvious as in Rio de Janeiro, where the urban development has been characterized by a fragmentation or dualization of the socio-political space between the formal city and the urban informal settlements known as *favelas*. Simply defining favelas is difficult. In English texts, the word is often translated as "slum" or "shantytown", with little explanation as to what that actually means in the Brazilian context. The definition used by the municipality in the 2011 Master Plan[1] of sustainable urban development is as follows:

> *"An area predominantly used for housing, characterized by the occupation of lands by a low-income population, precarious urban infrastructure and public services, narrow pathways with irregular alignments, lots of irregular size and shape, and unlicensed constructions in violation with the legal patterns."[2]*

Because of the difficulty in finding an English word that covers all of the connotations of a favela, I will refer to the informal settlements as favelas throughout this thesis.

According to The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE 2010) 22% of the population of Rio de Janeiro today live in favelas. Throughout their history, the favelas have been rejected by the "formal" city and have continually been threatened by destruction (Perlman 2010: 26). The public did not formally acknowledge the favelas, symbolically exemplified by refusing to mark them on maps of the city where they remained as blank spaces until the 1980's. As the favelas were constructed as opposing entities to the official city in the public imaginary, so were their inhabitants. The *favelados*, pejorative for the people inhabiting these territories, have been perceived as intimately linked to all the problems associated with the favelas. When the drug trafficking emerged in Rio de Janeiro in the 1980's and found a stronghold in the favelas, regular residents within these territories were considered as accomplices of the drug traffickers because of neighborhood relations, kinship or economic and political ties. In the public imaginary, there were no innocents in the

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[1] The Master Plan (*Plano Diretor*) lays down the guidelines for the urban development of the city.
[2] Available at: http://www2.rio.rj.gov.br/smu/compur/pdf/LC111_2011_PlanoDiretor.pdf Last accessed May 13th 2013.

favelas. The police took a militarized approach to combating the drug trafficking, and the social conflict in the city became formulated as a "war". This discourse of war against the drug factions has maintained and reproduced stereotypical notions of the favelas as inherently violent, creating and simultaneously justifying specific forms of state management of these territories and their populations while reproducing dynamics of segregation in the city (Leite 2012: 375).

In recent years, Brazil has experienced strong economic growth and is now the world's sixth largest economy (Inman 2012). Under the leadership of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff and the center-left PT (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) administration the last decade, Brazil has received international attention for major oil discoveries, stable economic and political governance and a growing middle class. The federal government has chosen to invest heavily in infrastructure, logistics and welfare measures to ensure stable economic growth in the future.

After it was announced that Brazil and Rio de Janeiro were to host the Soccer World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016, the country has placed itself in the international spotlight. This represents opportunities for increased trade, investments and economic growth, and the ability to distinguish itself as a major political and economic actor. It however also demands that Rio de Janeiro confronts the statistics where it exhibits poor rankings, such as indicators on crime, violence and inequality. The favelas represent a pressing image of these issues in the city. The hard-hand policies of the police interventions in the favelas within the discourse of war had proved incapable of reducing the levels of crime and were losing political legitimacy. In order to improve the security situation in Rio de Janeiro before the international sport events a new public security program called the pacification program (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* or Police Pacifying Units/UPPs), was developed in 2007.

The pacification program is based on the following goals: i) take back state control over communities currently under strong influence of ostensibly armed criminals ii) give back to the local population peace and public safety, which are necessary for the full exercise and development of citizenship[3] and iii) contribute to breaking with the logic of "war" that now exists in Rio de Janeiro. It does *not* have among its objectives to i) end drug trafficking ii) end

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[3] *exercício e desenvolvimento integral da cidadania.*

criminality iii) be a solution for all communities or iv) turn itself into the panacea for all socio-economic problems in the community (Henriques and Ramos 2011: 243).

As a contrast to the offensive police interventions of before, the program relies on the permanent placement of Police Pacifying Units in the communities, and by 2016, 40 UPP units will be installed covering approximately 200 of Rio de Janeiro's 1,000 plus favelas.[4] Through combining security with urban upgrading interventions and increased access to social services, the program aims to bridge the gaps between the favelas and the rest of the city. The underlying logic is that peace and public safety are preconditions for the exercise and development of citizenship. The question is how and whether this process is representing an approximation process between the highly segregated territories within the city.

1.2 Research Questions

Questions of citizenship and security have been intimately linked throughout the history of Rio de Janeiro. The favela residents have been constructed as a threat, as non-citizens, in the public imaginary and have therefore not had access to the same rights and services as other inhabitants of the city. The Pacification program is promoted as a new approach to governmental interventions in the favelas; combining proximity policing and infrastructural, social and economic projects in order to bridge the gaps between segregated territories and populations. Both the residents and the government hope the pacification can represent an approximation process between the "pacified" favelas and the "asphalt", which the formal city is often called as a contrast to the narrow, unpaved pathways of the favela. What is meant by approximation is however not given and depends on who talks about it and what interests are at stake.

I want to look at what the pacification means in practice; in the everyday life in the areas that are occupied and in the perceptions of the diverse actors that are affected and/or involved, to evaluate what kind of approximation process the pacification program produces. I take as a starting point the objectives of the pacification program to take back the state monopoly of power, bring peace and public safety to the communities, break with the logic of war and promote the exercise and development of citizenship. I see these as interrelated aspects within

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[4] According to the IBGE 2010 Census, there are a total of 1,332 favelas in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

the larger objective to promote an approximation process of segregated territories within the urban fabric.

The pacification process is a project in the making, and it is too early to say what it will mean for the urban integration in the long run. What we *can* say something about today, however, is:

1. How do the residents of a pacified favela as of today consider the program and its effects on security and on their sense of citizenship?

2. Does the pacification program in their eyes represent a step towards inclusion of the favela and its residents in the city on more equal terms?

As such, the interrelationship between security and inclusive citizenship promoted by the pacification as of today is the topic for this thesis.

1.3 Methods

According to Thagaard (2009: 11) the validity of the results of a research project depends on whether the foundation for the knowledge gathered is made explicit. This introduction chapter will present the data-gathering method, the process of analysis and the interpretative framework that underlie the results presented in order to meet the standard of constructing validity.

1.3.1 Research method

There are a variety of methods available to conduct social research, of which the distinction between qualitative and quantitative studies is an important divide. Neuman (2000 cited in Thagaard 2009: 17) depicts the difference between quantitative and qualitative studies as the difference between studies of variables relatively independent of social context compared to an interpretation of processes in relation to the social context they are part of. Qualitative research is by definition exploratory, and intent to do an in-depth portrait of the topic of interest. There are an extensive number of qualitative designs available to the researcher, corresponding to the different topics and questions at the base of the research.

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According to Yin (2009: 2), case studies are the preferred method of research when i) *how* and *why*-questions are being posed; ii) the investigator has little control over events; and iii) when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of evidence (Stake 2005: 246). Historically they have been considered a "soft" form of research, being prejudiced because of the lack of rigor of case study research which can allow equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings. Case study research has also been criticized for taking too long, resulting in massive, unreadable documents providing little basis for scientific generalization (Yin 2009: 15). In spite of these concerns, case studies can provide valuable information in terms of investigating contemporary events in depth and within their real-life context, combining multiple sources of evidence in a way that provides holistic insights. As long as the researcher is aware of the many potential pitfalls and make a clear outline on how the data has been gathered and analyzed, a case study is a valuable method for exploratory research.

The selection of the case

There are several variations within case studies as a research method. Firstly, there are both single and multiple case studies (Yin 2009: 19). According to Stake (2005: 247) case studies may also be distinguished by the intent of the case analysis. He distinguishes between intrinsic and instrumental case studies. With the former, the focus is on the case itself because it presents an unusual or unique situation that is worth investigating. With instrumental cases, on the other hand, the researcher focuses on an issue of concern and selects one or several bounded cases to illustrate this issue. My research can be seen as a single instrumental case study. My starting point was to investigate the current transformations in security policy and urban management in Rio de Janeiro and how it plays out in a localized setting.

There are many favelas that could have been interesting to choose as my case. Vila Autódromo, Morro da Providência, Manguinhos and the Aldeia da Maracanã are examples of communities that are seeing more direct impacts of the forced removals and overstepping of the institutional framework of human and civil rights related to the process of preparing Rio de Janeiro for the upcoming mega-events. These are just a few examples of other cases that

could have given valuable insights in the ongoing processes. I however chose the community of Rocinha as my case, and did so because of various reasons.

The case

Rocinha is situated on a mountainside in the Sona Zul, the central part of the city, between some of the most expensive neighborhoods of the city. The latest census from 2010 determined that Rocinha has approximately 70,000 residents (IBGE 2010), however, the residents themselves believe there are up to 150-200,000 inhabitants. It is the biggest favela in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, and one of the biggest in Latin America.

Rocinha was occupied by the military police in November 2011, and the UPP was officially inaugurated almost a year after, September 20th 2012. I chose Rocinha as my case because of the timing of my field work; I was there for the one year occupation of the territory, which was an interesting timing. Rocinha also has symbolical value in terms of being the largest favela in the city and playing a central role in the social imaginary as it was the center of the cocaine trade led by the city's perhaps most famous drug lord, Nem, the last six years before the pacification. Finally and maybe most importantly, is the fact that I had not come across any extensive research done on the pacification of Rocinha.

Data gathering methods

Case studies as a qualitative research method rely on multiple sources of evidence, converging data in a triangular fashion (Yin 2009: 114-116). Yin (2009: 101) distinguishes six sources of evidence in case study research; documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artifacts. The various sources of evidence are highly complementary, and a good case study will therefore want to combine multiple sources of evidence. My data is a combination of direct and participatory observations, interviews and a collection of various other sources of material such as documents, documentaries, newspaper cuttings and statistics. I will specify some of the rewards and challenges of these different types of data below.

To gather the material I conducted a three month long field work from October 2012 to January 2013. This thesis is based on Thagaard's (2009: 65) definition of fieldwork as the phase of the research process where the researcher leaves the research institute and goes into

"the field". Based on this conception of fieldwork, it becomes clear that the fieldwork is not a choice of method; rather, it is a phase of the research project.

Except for two weeks in Copacabana in the beginning of my stay, I lived in Rocinha during the extension of my fieldwork. In addition to giving me insights and information I otherwise would not have been able to obtain, I felt that living in the community gave me increased legitimacy as a researcher; it felt like people saw that I was genuinely interested in their perspective and more willing to share their experiences than if I had just came for the day. According to Ragin and Amoroso (2011: 46) the fact that the researcher places him or herself in the situation of the informants can be valuable in itself in the sense that the informants feel they have a voice that is worth listening to. Certainly, the idea that living there was "less exploitative" than not living there might be just a personal feeling rather than a well-grounded scientific argument. I had little to offer in return for the time, effort and patience of the people of Rocinha who invited me into their homes and lives. Therefore I felt the least I could do was to show them that I did have a genuine interest in getting to know their perspective, and I felt that the only way to do so was to participate in the local reality full time.

My entrance to the community was through a woman I had met when I lived in Rio de Janeiro in the beginning of 2012. She proved to be a valuable informant. Well-known in the community, she and her family gave me the initial entry, helping me to find a place to live in a relatively safe area, and introducing me to the community and some key actors. Later on I used the so-called snowball method (Johannessen 2010: 109) to get in touch with more residents. As I speak Portuguese, I was able to integrate well with the local residents and avoided potential biases and things that might be lost in translation if I had used an interpreter.

Direct and participatory observation; informal conversations

Participatory observation is a mode of observation in which the researcher is not merely a passive observer; instead, he or she might assume a variety of roles within a case study situation and might participate in the events being studied (Yin 2009: 111). Throughout my time in Rocinha, I was observing and participating in the daily life and activities of the residents. I participated in events, reunions and meetings, did my shopping in the local stores and produce markets, and went to family dinners, birthday parties and concerts. I soon realized that the most valuable information was to be found in informal interactions at

unexpected moments. I moved to Rocinha because I wanted to experience first-hand the daily life and challenges of living in a favela, and was rewarded with insights that I probably never would have thought about had I not spent such an extended time in the community. Just a few examples could be the water or electricity disappearing for hours or days at the time, having to wade through sewage water close to 50 cm deep when it rained, not being able to find public transportation at night or a place to throw away my garbage during the day, and climbing up and down the endless, slippery steps of the steep internal pathways carrying heavy grocery bags in the blistering heat of the *carioca*[5] summer. As one-time incidents these might seem like small issues, but they shape and form the reality for the residents that have to put up with the poor quality of the public services day after day. I also got to know the rewards of living there, such as the close-knit community bonds, being on first-name basis with the guy in the fresh produce stall, the laid-back atmosphere surrounding a Sunday *pagote* party, the simple joys of cold beer, barbecued *picanha* meat and good conversation, and the incredible openness and generosity of the residents.

Observational evidence is often useful in providing additional information about the topic being studied (Yin 2009: 110). By being present over an extended period of time I could observe, among other things, how different the presence of the police and other public agents was in the favela compared to other neighborhoods of the city and how this affected people in their everyday lives. I also observed how the much talked about governmental interventions, such as the Niemeyer Bridge, the health clinic and the sport complex,[6] worked in practice, which did not always correspond to the official story. This gave me valuable insights into the interrelationships between the state and the inhabitants.

When I conversed with people in informal settings, such as on the street, in bars/restaurants, at parties or informal dinners in people's homes, I would take mental notes which I would write down in my field diary when I returned home each night. To keep the interaction as natural as possible I would mainly take notes at the end of the day and not in front of the informants as I was worried a notebook would make people uneasy (Grønmo1996: 84). I however always carried a small notebook so I could write down a particularly important quote, number or likewise.

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[5] Slang for Rio de Janeiro.
[6] See section 4.1.1 and 5.1.5.

The major problems related to participant-observation according to Yin (2009) have to do with the potential biases produced. The researcher might get too involved in the participant role compared to the observer role, the researcher might "go native" and become a supporter of the group or organization being studied, or he or she might have to assume positions or advocacy roles contrary to the interests of good social science practice (Yin 2009: 112). It is easy to get sympathy for the informants and I found myself being emotionally involved in the stories and lives of especially my main informant, who included me in her family activities and was a big assistance in suggesting people for me to talk to. On a couple of occasions I left the community for weekend-trips outside of Rio de Janeiro which I felt was useful to clear my head and get some distance. I also focused on not relying too much on the contacts I got through the network of my key informant; I wanted to talk to other people whose opinions might be different from those in her social circuit. Another issue is related to the role I played within the community. I had several international friends who were journalists and photographers, of which two of them at one point were making a reportage on the pacification of Rocinha. If I was together with them in the community, the residents would not distinguish our projects from one another. On a couple of occasions this placed me in uncomfortable situations when they would ask residents questions that I was not comfortable with. To distance myself I tried to avoid mixing contacts and did not work with them.

The aspiration was to evaluate what is currently going on in the community taking into account the existent social, cultural, economic and political structures, in order to understand the impact and thus the positive and negative consequences of the pacification and the governmental interventions. I have focused on talking to local actors rather than state agents. There is an abundance of public documents, news articles, books etcetera that quotes the "brains" of the project and display the official arguments. What lacks in the public debate is the voice of the residents, the ones that have to live with the consequences of this major intervention every day. I therefore wanted to first and foremost listen to their voice, which is often drowned in the narrative of the so-called experts.

Interviews

In addition to the informal interaction with residents throughout my stay, I wanted to conduct some interviews with certain key actors in the community; such as local leader figures, NGOs, the Residents' Associations and the UPP police. These interviews were conducted to

see how people and organizations who work directly with the community view the impacts of the pacification and the ongoing processes. According to Yin (2009: 106) interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information. Both Thagaard (2009) and Valentine (2005) state that the goal of qualitative interviews is to get the informant to tell their version about events; how they view the world and the values they subscribe it.

Interviews in qualitative research can take various forms; from surveys to in-depth interviews to focused interviews, depending on the type of information the researcher is looking for. An in-depth interview is according to Yin (2009: 107) an interview where the researcher asks key respondents about the facts of a matter as well as their opinions about events. The interviews I conducted were in-depth interviews in accordance with Yin's classification. They were of an informal nature where I had prepared some topics and questions beforehand, but not a questionnaire. Different people were interesting because they could enlighten different topics and perspectives, and as such I did not feel there was a need for a standardization of the questions as the goal of the interviews never was to quantify the material gathered. Thagaard (2009: 89) describes informal interviews as a conversation between the researcher and the informant. The main topics are decided beforehand, but the informant can address new topics during the interview, and the researcher can adapt the questions to the information that comes up during the conversation. An advantage with this type of interview is that the researcher has the flexibility to adjust the direction of the conversation, and topics that the researcher might not have thought about can surge. I was also able to adjust the questions in accordance with information I had received in former interviews.

I performed a total of 16 interviews, involving 18 people. Qualitative interviews often focus on an individual person. Group interviews are another method, where several people discuss a topic and the researcher plays the part as the moderator, leading the direction of the discussion (Thagaard 2009: 90). The majority of my interviews were interviews of a single individual, based on the idea that it is easier to create a safe environment and build trust with the informant with just the two of us present. However, I did end up conducting three group interviews of two people. In these cases I had intended to talk to both of the informants, and they happened to be at the same place at the same time and suggested we would do it together. Two of these interviews worked well. The first group interview I conducted was however not so successful, as I had wanted to talk to the informants because of different

reasons and was not able to get the information I had wanted from one of them.[7] I therefore did a follow-up interview with her.

For some of these interviews I brought a tape recorder to tape and later transcribe the interviews. Thagaard (2009: 102) states that the advantage of taping interviews is that it gives the researcher flexibility to concentrate on the informant and how he or she reacts to the questions and the setting. A lot of information aside from the conversation in itself surges in an interview setting. In the cases where I was able to use the tape recorder I found it beneficial and useful, as I could concentrate on the informant and the surrounding setting when I was not bound to taking detailed notes. However, many of my interviews were not taped. Two people were uneasy about the idea of being recorded so I respected their wish to not tape the interview without pushing it.[8] On other occasions I found that recording was impractical or impossible due to the setting of the interview in a location with a lot of background noise, which I had not been able to predict and avoid. In these situations I took thorough notes which I wrote down as soon as I returned home, along with other observations and personal reflections around the interview (as I did with all the interviews). I do not feel like the essence of the interviews got lost by not tape recording them as my notes were thorough enough to reconstruct the conversation. In the appendix I have a list over the interviews performed as well as the other actors I have quoted, where I specify whether the interview was tape recorded or not.

Seminars

In addition to the data gathered in the community of Rocinha, I also participated in some events outside of the community itself. Two seminars were particularly fruitful in terms of meeting other researchers, activists and residents working with the pacification. The first one; *Favela é Cidade! As UPPs, a proposta de Pacificação e a População do Rio de Janeiro* (The favela is the city! The UPPs, the pacification proposal and the population of Rio de Janeiro) was arranged by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Santa Martha on November 16th

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[7] Group interview with João and Juliana November 5th 2012; a local politician and an NGO leader working with health issues.
[8] One was the President of a Residents' Association, who was uncomfortable about being interviewed in the first place because of the focus on the bonds between the Residents' Associations and drug traffickers, which I will come back to. The other one was a former drug trafficker, who also felt uncomfortable about being recorded because of the sensitivity of the information.

and 17th.[9] The second one; *Unidades de Policia Pacificadora: Debates e Reflexões* (Police Pacification Units: Debates and Reflections) was arranged by ISER (the Institute for the Study of Religion) the 18th and 19th of November.[10] Both of these institutes have been active in producing research on the pacification process.

1.3.2 Process of Analysis

"What we call our data is our own construction of other people's construction of what they do" (Geertz 1973: 9). "The researcher has to reconstruct people's construction of what they do and why and later interpret this through synthesizing their explanations and actions" (Ragin and Amoroso 2010: 58).

In research, there are two broad methods of reasoning that are referred to as deductive and inductive approaches. Where deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific, inductive reasoning works the other way; moving from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories. While these two methods are usually regarded as exclusive, there are other alternatives. According to Alvesson and Skjöldberg (2009: 4) abduction is the method most commonly used in case based research processes. Abduction highlights the dialectical relationship between theory and data. More than a mix between inductive and deductive approaches, it adds new, specific elements. In its focus on underlying patterns, it differs from the two former models in that it includes *understanding* as well. In the abductive approach, the analysis of the data plays a key role when it comes to developing ideas, while the theoretical framework of the researcher provides perspectives on how the data can be understood (Thagaard 2009: 194). The process of analysis in abductive studies is characterized by an alternation between the study of previous theory and empirical data, and both are continually reinterpreted and adjusted in the light of each other (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 4). My process of analysis has been characterized by abduction. It is not separate from the time spent collecting data; rather, it started during the fieldwork and has been a continuous process. With this approach to the process of analysis, it follows that the analytical framework (which will be presented in the following section) has continuously evolved throughout my time working on this thesis as part of the analytical process. Initial

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[9] For the complete program, visit: https://www.facebook.com/#!/events/383643548382724/ Accessed April 22nd 2013.

[10] For the complete program visit: https://www.facebook.com/ArmaBranca/posts/573241982689789 Accessed April 22nd 2013.

theoretical propositions were challenged by rival hypotheses, or contrasted from the data I found in the field (Yin 2009: 124). This inspired further research on other theories, and created new categories of analysis. I am thus not testing opposing hypothesis in this thesis, but presenting the analytical framework that in my opinion corresponds most accurately to the data I found in the field.

1.3.3 Ethical dilemmas

Kvale (1996: 237) states that the validity of a research project depends on whether the study is conducted in an ethically responsible manner. Thagaard (2009: 25) emphasizes informed consent, confidentiality and lack of negative effects on the people subject to the research as basic ethic principals for social research.

Informed consent means that the research project is only initiated after one has obtained the participants' free and informed consent. That consent is free, means it was issued without external pressure. Being informed means that the informant knows what the project is about, what it will be used for, and what they say yes to by participating in the project (Thagaard 2009: 26). When talking to people in the field, I would explain that I was doing a research on the impact of the governmental interventions on the community. Any time I would talk with people about something relevant for my research either in an interview or in informal conversations that I would later write down, I would make sure they knew that the information would be confidential. Confidentiality means that those participating in the research project are entitled to trusting that all information they provide will be treated confidentially (Thagaard 2009). People were surprisingly open and willing to share even quite sensitive information about topics such as corruption, bonds with drug traffickers, their own involvement in illicit activities, etcetera. With the history of police-resident relations in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro you do not have to go many years back in time to where talking about these topics with an outsider could have led to serious consequences from either the drug traffickers or corrupt policemen if it became known. I therefore wanted to make it clear to people that the information would be confidential. This means that the research material has been made anonymous. As a researcher, I had to be careful about how I stored my material to make sure sensitive data could not be related to individuals in case of a robbery, for example. In this research, I have coded the informants according to their position (resident, undefined NGO leader, etcetera). However, some of the informants were public

figures where it would not be difficult for people interested to find out who it is (such as the current presidents of the AMs). I considered further anonymizing them, but as I do not provide any sensitive information that is not already public, and they had agreed to me using the interviews for this thesis, I kept it at that.

The issue of confidentiality leads to the question on whether the research project will have negative consequences for those who choose to participate in it. Thagaard (2009: 29) says that ideally there should be reciprocity between what researchers' gain of information and what informants get for being a part of the survey. In practice, however, that is hard to accomplish. I am privileged in being able to travel abroad and conduct research for a master thesis, and I therefore worried it would easily become an asymmetrical relation between me as a researcher and the informants as "objects" (Ragin and Amoroso 2011: 105). Ragin and Amoroso (2011: 46) claims that the fact that the researcher places him or herself in their situation can be valuable in itself in the sense that the residents feel they have a voice that is worth listening to. However, I am without a doubt the party that has gained the most from these interactions. The most important aspect of this point I however see to be regarding the possible negative consequences for participants in the research project. To minimize such risks I have focused on the anonymity of the participants, not revealing sensitive information that can be traced back to an individual, and assuring people knew and agreed that what they told me would be used in this research.

1.3.4 Validity and reliability

Validity can be understood as the legitimacy of the research and interpretations of the researcher, or to what extent the interpretation in a good way represents the social phenomena to which it refers taking into consideration the researcher's own background and theoretical framework (Hammersley 1990: 57). To establish the quality of any empirical social research, there are several things that should be accomplished. There are different types of validity within qualitative research, regarding how the researcher presents and uses the evidence gathered and make a clear logical approach to the process of analysis.

The analysis is based on the material gathered during my fieldwork, which focuses on the case of Rocinha and the residents of Rocinha's perceptions of the pacification. However, I also use secondary sources and material gathered in other parts of the city with the intent of placing Rocinha in a conversation with the ongoing processes in Rio de Janeiro in general. It

is however not given that my findings or my case has transferability; one cannot assume that the empirical evidence I have found automatically corresponds to the perceptions of all of the residents in Rocinha or to these processes in other pacified favelas. While the favela residents are often imagined as a specific type of person; the *favelado* with the social (and racialized) connotations that implies, few elaborate on the diversity within the community. According to the residents themselves Rocinha has an estimated population of up to 200,000 people of all ages, educational backgrounds and socio-economic positions. I have not been systematic in my selection of residents to talk to, so I cannot claim the views and perspectives I have gathered to be statistically representative. People have different interests, experience different consequences, and demonstrate different attitudes to the pacification depending on the context. Through presenting my data and clarifying the way it has been gathered I however believe this thesis to be a good contribution to understanding the ongoing processes in Rocinha, which again serves as a contribution to understanding the processes in Rio de Janeiro in general.

In the process of gathering information there is always a risk of biased information; especially from primary sources. Informants might have a "second agenda" in what they want to portray. It will inevitably be in the interest of the UPP police, for example, to focus on the positive things they are contributing with in the community, while a resident that has been a victim of police abuse might portray a solely negative image of the police. Due to inevitable biases it is important that the information collected is cross-checked from various sectors and sources within the community. I have tried to always take into consideration what position my informants are talking from, and when I quote from the interviews I make it a point to comment on the context where I feel this is necessary to clarify the background for the statement.

This section has explained my methodological approach to the collection of data and the analysis of the material. The next section will focus on the theoretical framework that forms the foundation of my analysis.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

The pacification project is a public security initiative in the city of Rio de Janeiro, conducted by the state military police within the national border of Brazil. Yet, I think it is fruitful to see

this project in connection with a broader international context of security issues in relation to neoliberal urban management which has been decisive for the creation of the pacification program and the shape it has taken. This section will start by introducing the ongoing process preparing Rio de Janeiro for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic games in 2016. Then, it will move on to a discussion around what kind of security regime is being implemented in the favelas with the pacification. Finally, it will introduce a discussion on citizenship and participation. This will serve as my interpretive framework throughout the rest of the thesis to evaluate the interrelationship between security and inclusive citizenship produced by the pacification program.

1.4.1   Neoliberal governance and urban management

According to Harvey (2005) and Hackworth (2007), political and economic practices and thinking since the 1970's have been characterized by a decisive turn towards neoliberalism. Building on classic liberal values, neoliberalism proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey 2005, ii). This framework, we will see, impacts the way security and urban development is conceptualized and therefore shapes the pacification project both when it comes to its ideological background, its execution and its consequences.

With the turn towards neoliberalism that has characterized world politics and economy since the 1970's, urban areas are increasingly becoming attractive places in which to invest. The neoliberal reform agenda is based on public sector restructuring in accordance with the standards of the new public management, private sector participation and processes of decentralization (Zérah 2009). This has had a profound impact on urban politics. Neoliberal governance is a form of city governance that seeks a flexible, market friendly and market oriented planning. The common interest of earlier modern planning has had to yield to a postmodern world of multiple interests where reason and general standards give way to compromises and case by case negotiations (Vainer 2011: 4-5). Business and business opportunities are essential foundations for the new city and the new urban planning that corresponds to the fluxions of the market. Different authors have termed this new strategic planning either *ad hoc* urbanism (Ascher 2001) urban entrepreneurism (Harvey 2005) or *cidade empresa* (Vainer 2011).

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The neoliberal ideology reflected in the mode of city governance and as a driver of urban change in Rio de Janeiro today is part of the processes of liberalization, globalization and flexible modes of production that are currently occurring on a global scale. With Brazil's booming economy, the finding of mayor new oil reserves, and the upcoming sporting events of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, Rio is at the center of the world's attention. More than a mere tourist attraction, these events will provide Rio with a valuable opportunity to place itself on the world map as a major political and economic actor. The "marvelous city"[11] is reinventing itself in its quest to attract tourists, investments and capital, and a major urban renewal initiative has been launched to prepare the city for what's to come. This process is radically transforming the urban space as well as creating new patterns of governance.

According to Mascharenhas (2012: 96), Rio de Janeiro has two antagonistic models of urban management. On the one hand, you have the Master Plan inspired by the 1988 Constitution, which was widely debated and implemented in 1992. This Master Plan is based on a prioritization of public over private interests, and contains guidelines when it comes to a democratization of access to land, infrastructure, urban services and a democratic management of the city. It incorporates the framework of the Right to the City, a concept first introduced by Henri Lefebvre in his book *Le Droit à la ville* (1968). It can shortly be summarized as the right to dispute the appropriation of urban space by those who would subject it to the logic of the market, while defending the needs and desires of the majority and reaffirming the city as a site for social conflict (Lago 2012). On the other hand, you have the Strategic Plan of Rio de Janeiro which was elaborated in 1993 and 1994 and approved the year after by the municipality, private companies and business associations, without democratic channels of participation (Vainer 2000: 106). This powerful coalition would mark the start of a gradual transition towards a regime of flexible accumulation in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

In business, efficient management relies on the ability to take advantage of opportunities faster than the competitors. In the view of strategic planning, the city itself should function as a company. Political control and bureaucracy, such as responding to the institutional rights and guidelines of the Constitution or the Master Plan, erodes a city's capacity to take

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[11] *A cidade maravilhosa*- the city of Rio de Janeiro became famous as the "marvelous city" in the end of the 19th century. See section 2.1.

advantage of business opportunities, and, consequently, come across as efficient and competitive (Vainer 2011: 5). To put into action a model of strategic planning therefore means overriding this legal framework, implying the denial of the city as a political space (Mascharenhas 2012: 96). This process of de-politicization has to be legitimized. This is where the project of turning Rio into an Olympic city comes in.

1.4.2 Mega-events and a state of exception

According to Vainer (2000), the overriding of institutional guidelines and implementation of a neoliberal regime can only happen by unifying the city around a common project. In Rio, the Olympic Games have served as the pretext, and two elements have been instrumental in this process; the generalized sense of an urban crisis, and the patriotism of the city (Vainer 2000: 92). The city's patriotism led to a profound sense of pride among the inhabitants at the prospect of hosting a global mega-event. Becoming an Olympic city has been the obsession of the *carioca* government, led by former mayor Cesar Maia (1993-1996 and 2000-2008). The city first applied to host the 2004 games, and won the 2016 games. The sense of crisis, on the other hand, stems from the escalating violence associated with the war on crime that has characterized the city since the 1990's. In situations of crisis or war, exceptional actions are justified by the exceptional circumstances, leading to the acceptance of measures outside the legal framework. This permits the physical elimination of not only political opponents, but also of entire categories of citizens that are perceived as external and non-integral with society (Foucault 2003; Agamben 2005). Police abuse of civil and human rights in the favela has therefore been legitimized by the situation of "war" the city was perceived to be in.[12]

In Rio, the urban crisis authorized and demanded a new form of power constitution in the city. The prospect of the benefits of the interventions that would come with turning Rio into an Olympic city facilitated stepping outside the institutional framework when necessary. Looking at the recent evolution of the legislation and urban practices in Rio, it is not hard to find examples of flexibilization in accordance with neoliberal governance. The City Statute from 2001, for example, opens up for so-called PPPs (public private parcels/consortiums) to go outside the current legislation of municipal law and the Master Plan when it comes to the use and occupation of the soil, changes in standards for construction and the regularization of

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[12] See section 2.1.2

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constructions, renovations or extensions (Article 32 paragraph 1 and 2, in Vainer 2011). The practice of legal exception has thus been authorized, consolidated and legalized.

A new model of post-modern planning based on flexibility and competitiveness has redefined the ways dominant interests make themselves present in the city. The forms of illegality and exceptions to the institutional order are multiplying with the new emergency of the city: the mega-events. In order to prepare the city for the World Cup and the Olympics basic democratic rights are put on hold and the municipality is governed in accordance with the principles of the market. In the process of political and urban reform that has accompanied the construction of Rio as an Olympic city, Rio has been turned into a space for business, and no longer a space for political and democratic debate. The permanent sense of emergency has made Rio today a "city of exception" (Mascarenhas 2012; Vainer 2011), based on the theories of Agamben (2005) Poulantzas (1977, 1986) and Vainer (2000, 2011) about the state of exception. According to urban planner Raquel Rolnik; "the mega-events legitimize the "city of exception". The "benefits" and "legacy" the constructors promote are imposed at the expense of poor communities and slums that are located near the sports facilities and the main access roads" (Carta Capital 2010). These changes in the urban management of Rio have been instrumental in bringing forth the pacification program.

1.4.3 Securing neoliberal development

According to Samara (2010, 2011), urban governance in a neoliberal environment is often driven by security concerns over protecting public order and economic growth, especially in highly unequal cities (such as Rio de Janeiro). As with Cape Town in front of the 2010 World Cup (see Samara 2010: 560), Rio de Janeiro's quest to position itself on the global stage has resulted in two conflicting agendas. On the one hand, the desire to reach global city status in terms of attracting international investment, economic growth and tourism in order to demonstrate (Western) goals of urban achievement (Robinson 2002) demanded that the city would deal with the notorious insecurity that has given the city a reputation for being a dangerous place to visit. In order to secure the peace in the city as a whole, improving Rio's reputation and thereby securing investments, the pacification program is reclaiming monopoly of power over strategically located favelas that have "threatened" the sense of security in the city. On the other hand, the reputation of Rio de Janeiro as one of the world's most unequal cities demanded the need to implement pro-poor strategies to address the legacy of social and

spatial inequalities. The pacification therefore does more than just reclaim monopoly of violence; it also brings "developmental" measures to the pacified favelas. Through the federal PAC (Program for Accelerated Growth) program, pacified favelas like Rocinha are receiving investments in infrastructure and urban upgrading. The UPPs depend on PAC for their budget, which also is the principal fund for infrastructure associated with the World Cup and Olympics. This underlines the linkage between the pacification and the mega-events.

The main investments in Rocinha through the PAC program have been big, spectacular projects such as a major sport complex and a bridge by the famous architect Oscar Niemeyer,[13] striking symbols on how the government is spending an historic amount on previously neglected territories. Entering Rocinha today, you are welcomed by these landmark constructions and the brightly painted façades of newly renovated houses.[14] The government claims that these interventions will promote a more equal access to services in the pacified favelas. The community without a doubt needs urban upgrading projects. The question is, however, how to interpret these developmental interventions and the inclusion they allegedly promote.

According to Li (1999: 295), concerns with welfare and improvement fall under the rubric of "development" and provides many governing regimes with a significant part of their claim to legitimacy. The rationale for "development" as an activity of nation-states draws on the more general logic of governmentality, defined by Foucault (1991) as the "art and activity of rule". Within a Foucauldian understanding of governmentality, development can therefore be understood as a project of rule. Joseph and Nugent (1994) argue that "development" in its national dimensions can be considered one of the more significant "everyday forms of state formation", which, like for example education and public administration, offer an arena in which the state can reaffirm its *raison d'etre*. Development authorizes state agencies to engage directly and openly in projects aimed at transformation and "improvement" of the communities, and through asserting a separation between the state (which does the developing) and the population (which is the object and recipient of development) these developmental interventions stand out as politically charged arenas in which relations of rule are reworked and reassessed (Li 1999: 297). Within a framework of neoliberal urban

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[13] See section 5.1.5

[14] See appendix 4 and 5 for pictures of the entrance of Rocinha before and after the PAC projects. The brightly painted façades of the houses were renovated with resources from PAC, they however only painted the side facing the highway and the houses didn't receive any other improvements.

governance currently going on in the city, the PAC projects can be interpreted as a demonstration of power; the state reclaiming and "colonizing" these territories as part of a neoliberal "development" process in the city. They are powerful symbols of how Brazil under PT has formulated a social democratic approach that combines economic concerns for growth with social concerns for the poor. They are also a daily reminder to the residents that the state has entered and is now governing these spaces.

1.4.4 Biopolitics and the management of "the other"

In addressing concerns about how security and development policy areas are increasingly interconnected with the (neo) liberal turn the last decades, scholars have picked up on Michel Foucault's ideas of biopolitics and governmentality. A series of lections he held at the Collège de France in the 1970's under the title "Society Must Be Defended" have recently been translated to English (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2008). While Foucault himself did not write directly about development, biopolitics, liberalism and development have been interpreted as intimately connected.

With the emergence of neoliberalism, life itself becomes an economic instance and, as such, passes to be managed so as to optimize it (Foucault 2003). Foucault's concept of biopolitics is a regulatory power that seeks to control and administer life by intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (Duffield 2007: 16). Rather than exercising power over the individualized bodies, it is a power that manipulates, stimulates and observes collective phenomena such as birth rates, mortality and duration and conditions of life (Duarte 2008: 3). Foucaults' understanding of the biopolitical takes life as the principal referent object for security discourses and practices. In an era where power must be justified both rationally and politically, biopolitics represents an inversion of the sovereign power to kill; it is a power to generate life. Yet, while it is about the life and vitality of a population, this does not mean that it represents a decrease in violence compared to a sovereign power. Rather, securing the life of some implies and demands the destruction of the life of others. The paradox of biopower is that it at the same time is about fostering life and has the ability to disallow life "to the point of death" (Duffield 2007: 34). In this power game, there is a separation between those beneficial to civilization, that will live, and those who are deviant and weak, who will be left to die; either literally or metaphorically through processes of marginalization or exclusion. The political conflicts of present times no longer express the

antagonist opposition between two opposing parties according to the Schmittian opponents Friend-Enemy. The enemies are not just political opponents, but biological entities that by their mere existence threaten the survival of society. As such, the enemy can no longer just be defeated, but must be exterminated. The genocides, concentration camps and "fortress Europe" of the 20st century are examples of the violence of the biopower.

Inspired by the works of Foucault, but also the reflections of Walter Benjamin, Hanna Arendt and Carl Smith, Giorgio Agamben has written about the state of exception. Agamben (1995) shows how the effects of the decisions made by the state (or whoever has the sovereign power) can lead to the exclusion of somebody from the political community and the protection provided by its laws and rights. This "bare" or "naked life" represents persons or groups of persons that others, with impunity, can treat without regard for their psychological and physical well-being. Throughout the history of favela-state relations, there has been a progression of discretionary and coercive measures over the "other" of the favela supposedly threatening the well-being of the social body. The public security policies in Rio de Janeiro in the 1990's was characterized by a discourse of "war" against the criminal drug traffickers in the favelas, and the media and the police reproduced the slogan "a good criminal is a dead criminal" (Fridman 2008: 77). In their interventions in the favela the police did not distinguish between regular residents and the traffickers, often leaving many dead in the aftermath of their interventions.[15] As such, the favela residents, through their perceived connection with crime, were treated as *bare life* free to be killed without it representing a homicide in accordance with Agamben's theories.[16]

The hard-hand police interventions had proved incapable of lowering the violence. They also lost legitimacy in a world increasingly preoccupied by civil and human rights and a Brazil governed by a center-left administration promoting pro-poor policies and fighting inequality. While less violent than earlier police interventions, the UPPs establish a permanent militarized regime in the pacified favelas that go beyond combating the drug traffickers. In order to neutralize the threat these territories and populations are seen to pose to the rest of the city, a biopolitical regulatory regimen is implemented that manages the life of *all* favela

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[15] See sections 2.1.6 and 3.1.1.

[16] Agamben's negative analysis of biopolitics is challenged by Robert Esposito, who in *Bios* (2008) elaborate on immunity as an *affirmative* biopolitics; based upon the politics of life (biopotenza) as opposed to a power over life (biopotere). I however find Agamben's analysis of the relationship between biopolitics and the state of exception to be fruitful when looking at the pacification in light of historic relations between the favela and the asphalt and the continued construction of the favela residents as "the other" also with the Pacification.

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residents. It is virtually always in the name of human rights or the preservation of life that interventions are legitimized and justified, reinforcing the biopolitical paradox that the maintenance of life requires the destruction of other life forms.

The theory presented so far represents the framework I will use in chapter 2, 3 and 4 to look at the logic that has shaped the public security policies in the favelas historically and the logic that shapes the pacification process today. In its connection to the mega-events and neoliberal management, the pacification program is related to the state of exception and the treatment of the favela residents as *bare life* that shaped earlier public security policies in the favelas. The question is therefore whether the pacification represents a clean rupture with the favela-asphalt dichotomy. This has implications for the official goal of the pacification of promoting "full exercise and development of citizenship" (Henriques and Ramos 2011: 243) in the favelas.

1.4.5 Citizenship and participation

The institutional framework of Brazil guarantees participatory governance, which Mitlin (2004: 4) defines as a governance that places a particular emphasis on the inclusion of the people, especially the poor. The stress on the notion of *inclusion* implies that the democratic credentials of urban governance and its articulation with representative democracy are at the core of understanding participatory governance (Zérah 2009: 856). However, in the process of making Rio de Janeiro an Olympic city, the institutional framework guaranteeing participatory governance is contested by a flexible model of urban management.[17] The new plan is no longer guided by the right to the city and social participation principles; rather, the strategic plan is steered by business demands and interests with the goal to make the city more "attractive" in the international market (Braathen et al. 2013: 9). This has implications for whether the pacification program can promote a "full exercise of citizenship" as it states in its goals.

The favela residents have had the liberal right to vote that is part of a modern democracy, yet, they to a large degree have lacked a hands-on relationship with the state on the ground. According to Heller and Evans (2010: 309-310) citizens are made not only at the national level through constitutions and elections, but also in their day-to-day engagements with the

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[17] Not that it has ever worked according to the framework. See for example Batista Vasconcelos (2008).

local state. In spite of an institutional framework guaranteeing universal rights to all Brazilian citizens, the favela residents' relationship to the state has been characterized by what Holston (2007) has termed "differentiated citizenship". Holston (2007: 7) suggests that the simultaneous presence of universal inclusion and massive inequality in Brazil has been negotiated through a citizenship that is qualified by a range of socio-economic, political, racial and cultural markers. These markers constitute the means through which to include people in the polity while maintaining their exclusion from substantive rights. The most direct relationship the residents had with the state was with the police apparatus, which was an accomplice of the multiple abuses against the favela residents. A situation in which one can vote freely and have one's vote counted fairly but cannot expect proper treatment from the police or the courts puts into serious question the component of democracy and severely curtails citizenship (O'Donnell 1993: 1361).

The pacification program brings with it new spaces of citizen engagement. According to Barbosa (2012) a principal feature of the UPP as a community policing program is, or should be, the joint participation of the residents in the production of order and the management of safety in the local communities. The program's success will ultimately depend not only on effective and sustained coordination between police and state/municipal governments but also on favela residents' perception of the legitimacy of the state (Jones and Rodgers 2011). To be a legitimate power it is essential that the state knows and understands what the residents themselves want from the pacification process and the interventions that come with it. As such, the pacification program relies on building and maintaining relationships with the favela residents.

If the pacification is to bridge the gap between the favela-asphalt dichotomy, and not just represent another way of imposing territorial control in a long history of socio-spatial discriminatory public security initiatives, the challenge is developing and sustaining a more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process than what is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone (Gaventa 2006). Gaventa (Ibid.) advocates for what has been termed the "deepening democracy" approach, which grows out of a long tradition of participatory democracy. In this view, democracy is not only a set of rules, procedures and institutional design. Full democratic citizenship is attained not only through the exercise of political and civic rights, but also through social rights; to be gained through participatory processes (Gaventa in Cornwall and Coelho 2007: xii).

In evaluating whether the pacification process confronts favela residents' unequal inclusion in the city, I will take as a starting point the spaces of dialogue and participation that are created with the pacification and the dynamics of participation within them. In assessing these spaces, I will use the distinction between *invited* spaces; which Cornwall (2002) defines as spaces where citizens are invited by external agents to participate, and *invented* spaces which are spaces where citizens innovate and create their own opportunities and terms of engagement (Miraftab 2004).

1.4.6 Concluding remarks

This section has introduced a theoretical framework to contextualize the pacification program both on an ideological level and in relation to the current transformations the city of Rio de Janeiro is undergoing. It also introduces a framework of citizen participation that goes beyond the right to vote and advocates participatory governance. While this is guaranteed by the Brazilian framework the favela residents have not had access to decision-making processes because they have not been seen as citizens on equal terms. Today, the strategic plan of neoliberal management further challenges the access to citizen participation; not just for the favela residents but for all of the citizens of Rio de Janeiro. Together, this section will serve as my framework for assessing the inclusiveness of the current urban management and the pacification program as a product of this throughout the rest of this thesis.

2   The Divided City

According to the State Secretary of Security, José Mariano Beltrame (2010*);*

"The pacification has one objective and it is very clear: to tear down the walls around the favelas that have been imposed by the force of arms. If you enter an area dominated by traffickers or the militia, you have to account for your coming and going (...). It is unacceptable that citizens have to be accountable to an armed person who is not a server of the state."

The main objective of the pacification in the words of the Secretary of Security is thus to regain territorial control through obtaining monopoly of violence. But what is the cement of these walls that have surrounded the favelas that Beltrame wants to tear down? Today's pacification approach is not formatted in a vacuum; rather, it is formed by past approaches and experiences, as well as public opinion, federal policies, and other factors. It is impossible to understand the failures, successes, and challenges of public security approaches in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro without understanding the historical side of favela-state interactions. While the introduction chapter looked at the theoretical and ideological background of the pacification in a wider perspective of global tendencies when it comes to urban management and public security, this chapter will focus on the socio-spatial history of Rio de Janeiro and the public policies towards the informal settlements, before introducing the pacification Program.

2.1   Socio-Spatial Historic Background

2.1.1   The historic construction of the favela-asphalt dichotomy

In the end of the 19th century Rio de Janeiro became known as the "marvelous city", celebrated for the beauty of its nature, the friendliness of its people and the vitality of the popular culture. Parallel with the production of the image of the city a tropical paradise, however, the favelas sprung up as aberrations on the modern city. Unpaid veterans and other poor migrants unable to find affordable land innovated and built their homes steep on the hillsides that are so characteristic of Rio's landscape.

Though physically intertwined with the formal city, the favelas represented a world apart. Today considered an urban phenomenon, the favelas were initially seen as a rural world

within the city. The book *Os sertões* (Cunha 2001) about the battle of Canudos between the recently formed Republic and the "salvages" from the interior of Bahia was influential in the social and political thinking of the Brazilian elite at the time. The image of the *sertões*, or the people from the interior described in this book serves as an origin myth for the favela discourse. Former soldiers from the battle of Canudos settled in the Morro da Favella, today known as Morro da Providência, in the late 1800s. This was the first favela in the city and gave the favelas the name they go by today (Valladares 2005). The former duality between the interior and the urban costal landscape (*sertão/litoral*) was thus transformed to the duality of the city versus favela. As the recently formed Republic was undergoing a nation-building process led by the white elite of European heritage, the favela populations were objectified as a "moral stain" on the nation they were constructing. The favelas represented a threat to the social and moral order of society as a whole, and needed to be contained to ensure that their pathologies (and poor residents) did not spill into the rest of the city. Mayor Pereira Passos' urban renovation and beautification plan from 1906 marked the first favelas for removal, with the object of sanitizing and civilizing the city (Valladares 2005: 24).

Up until the 1930's the growth of the favelas remained quite slow, but this decade marked the start of a process of "favelization"[18] which would only intensify in the following decades. As a result of the structural transformations promoted by the progress of modern capitalism, rural migrants unable to find work in the countryside were pouring into the big cities. As there was a shortage of affordable housing, the majority ended up in self-constructed shacks in the favelas. No longer able to ignore their presence, the 1937 *código de obras* (code of construction) officially recognized the existence of favelas in the city and the need to improve the living conditions of the favela residents. It however stated that the formation of new favelas, or the construction of new houses or improvement of existing ones, was absolutely prohibited (Valladares 2005: 52).

The 1940's and 50's represented a new era of political relations between the favela residents and the city. The favelas now constituted a big part of the population, and consequently, potential voters. Under Vargas, who was declared the "father of the poor", it was no longer acceptable to intervene in the urban spaces considered problematic without considering the fate of their residents. The first proletarian parks were constructed, removing people from the favelas into new provisory neighborhoods. These parks were not just about housing but also

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[18] *Favelização;* a process of proliferation of the favelas.

for the "civilization" and reeducation of the residents, correcting personal habits to incentivize the choice of better housing in the future (Burgos 1998: 28). As such, the racialized discourse of the white elite's nation building process in the late 1800's was still present in the government's handling of the favelas, as the culture of the poor and mainly black residents continued to be seen as a problem. The proletarian parks were supposed to serve as transition housing; they however proved to be a massive failure. People never moved on, and in the census of 1950, only a few years after their construction, these parks were classified as favelas themselves (Valladares 2005: 69).

The period of the military dictatorship again redefined the public policies towards the informal settlements. In the late 1960s and early 70s the vast majority of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro were targets of public removal policies. The federal government founded the Coordination Agency for Habitation in the Social Interest of the Greater Rio Metropolitan Area (CHISAM) in 1968. CHISAM defined the favelas as an "abnormal within the urban environment" and saw favela removal as an essential step towards integrating favela residents into society. In the first seven years of CHIS AMs existence, about 70 favelas were removed and 100,000 people were forcibly relocated. The residents were moved to new housing units in areas distant from the city center, such as Cidade de Deus, Vila Kennedy, Vila Aliança and Vila Esperança, all constructed with financial support from the US government (Oliveira 2012: 45). This focus on removal and construction of new popular housing was only partially successful, as it addressed the issue as a mere problem of balancing the spatial distribution of the population without considering housing in the urban context (Andrade and Valverde 2003: 57). Brazil went from being a mainly rural country to being 56 percent urbanized in 1970 and over 80 percent urbanized today (IBGE 2010). This massive urbanization process placed a major pressure on the housing market in the city, especially for affordable housing. The favelas therefore grew uncontrollably.

With the political opening in the end of the 1970's and the transition to democracy in the mid-1980's, state policies towards the informal settlements were revised again. As they had proved incapable of solving the housing deficit in the city, the removal policies were put to an end and the public debate shifted to concentrating on the necessity of integrating the favelas in the city (Oliveira 2012: 47). The legal framework of the new urban order was enshrined in the 1988 Constitution, which recognized the social right to housing and the right to regularization of consolidated informal settlements. The election of Leonel Brizola as

governor of the state of Rio on a platform that supported building relationships with favelas and the Residents' Associations (*Associações de Moradores* or AMs) was also central. Recognizing the large potential voting base the favelas represented, Brizola initiated mayor urban upgrading programs in the favelas. These included *Proface* (1983-1985), which sought to bring basic sanitation, lighting and garbage collection to the favelas, *Cada Família um Lote*, a property regularization program distributing land titles, *Mutirão*, a project that used work force from local community in construction work, and finally the *Favela-Bairro* project, launched by the municipality in 1993, that proposed to upgrade all of the city's favelas (Oliveira 2012: 47-49).

2.1.2 1980's and 90's- the discourse of war consolidates

While the 1980's and Brizola meant a transition from extermination policies to urban upgrading of the favelas that did not mean that the tensions between the favelas and the rest of the city were easing up. The emergence of the drug trade in the 1970's had made the favelas centers of drug trafficking, as the narrow pathways on unmapped, unpatrolled hillsides and weak state presence made them ideal for drug traffickers who could defend themselves against rivals and elude police capture. As both international and domestic demand for cocaine grew, traffickers and criminal groups were growing and competing for power with the Residents' Associations inside the favelas. They had the financial resources to provide assistance to favela residents in a variety of ways, maintaining order and providing social assistance in areas where public services where limited at best. This led to the notion that gangs could provide for the community as well as, if not better than, the state and the AMs, weakening both the civil society in the favelas and the fragile state presence (Fridman 2008; Perlman 2010).

While there had certainly been violence and crime in favelas earlier too, it had been on an extremely small scale compared to the escalating violence after the emergence of the drug trade. The violence associated with the drug trafficking grew in frequency and intensity throughout the late 1980's and 90's, and assaults, robberies, kidnappings, shoot-outs and *balas perdidas* ("lost bullets" striking innocents caught in a cross-fire) became everyday security issues. This reinforced the image of the favela as a threat to the civilized order of the formal city, now because of its connection to organized crime. The rhetoric of the perceived threat of the favela thus evolved from being focused on sanitary or hygienic issues, or the

threat of the "dangerous" popular classes, to the supposedly violent and criminal nature of the favela residents (Valladares 2005; Leite 2000, 2012; Machado da Silva 2008).

2.1.3 The dichotomous relationship between the favela and the asphalt

Since the beginning, the favelas have represented a radical otherness in relation to the rest of the city and society, in other words, as "other places" or heterotopias, in the sense proposed by Foucault in his lecture *Of Other Spaces* from 1967 (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986). The favela can be seen as a heterotopia in the Foucauldian sense; a space detached from the norm of the ordinary city. Contrary to the utopias, that have no real space, the heterotopia features an actual physical space, a space occupied by "the others", those who deviate from the norm. According to Leite (2012) the favelas have been constituted in the social perception as "other places" because of a sociability perceived as averse to the dominant norms and values. This dichotomous relationship can also be seen in light of Charles Tilly (1998). In *Durable Inequality* (1998) Tilly claims that social inequalities are relational and rooted in power asymmetries. He argues that most forms of inequality are organized around binary or hierarchically bounded categories such as male/female, black/white, or, in the case of hierarchical inequalities, class and caste (Heller and Evans 2010: 307). The dichotomy between the favela and the asphalt throughout the history represents the kind of opposition pair that Tilly describes. While the content of the favela discourse has changed over the last century, its dichotomous relationship to the official city in the public imaginary has sustained. Tilly claims that durable inequalities persist because socially constructed categories do the work necessary to keep them in place (Tilly 1998). Dominant groups have an interest in reproducing their privileges and do so through an "economy of practices" (Bourdieu 1984) that enforce the boundaries of the privileged and ensure ongoing exclusion (Heller and Evans 2010: 307). The construction of the favela/favelado discourse in the public imaginary is a continuous process, and while imagined in line with Anderson (1983) the categories do real work of exclusion. The almost systematic association between poverty and violent crime from the 1980's and onwards made the favela synonymous with a space outside of the law, where criminals and police were constantly fighting. The city was seen as irremediably divided (Ventura 1994) and perceived to be in a state of war, which had important implications for citizenship and access to the city for the favela residents.

2.1.4 Urban violence- the discourse of the violent sociability of the *favelados*

Different interpretations on the topics of citizenship and human rights were disputed in Rio de Janeiro in the 1990's and the 2000's by the security apparatus, the media, by successive governments and civil society organizations. The public policies towards the favelas fluctuated between two general categories; traditional "hard hand" security approaches that focused heavily on the role of the police and the BOPE elite squad, and more progressive policies that attempted to address not just symptoms but also the underlying causes of violence and insecurity (Leite 2000; Tierney 2012).

Academia, NGOs and civil society organizations advocated for a public security policy under democratic control, and demanded respect for the human and civil rights of the populations affected by police violence (Leite 2000: 74-79). The hard hand perspective, on the other hand, tended to regard human rights as a mere bureaucratic framework that favored the criminals. The people living in the favelas were considered accomplices of the criminals because of neighborhood relations, kinship or economic and political ties (Leite 2012: 380). The favela was seen as a territory for non-citizens, subjected to a force rival to that of the state, the so-called law of the traffickers. As follows, in the public imaginary, there were no innocents in the favelas. As exceptional circumstances (such as war) require exceptional measures outside the democratic and institutional normality, police violence and civil rights violations were to a certain degree justified as part of the game.

According to Foucault (1979) crime and criminals are socially constructed. This in turn creates the category of "potential criminals" based on the potential of a subject to commit acts of crime because of earlier actions, social position, physical or moral aspects, the way they dress or other determinants. The view that one can foresee comportments based on psychological tests, criminal antecedents, or the location where people live or work give base to the conceptualization that some individuals or groups have inherent characteristics. In Rio de Janeiro, the social construction of the favela residents as "carriers of dangerousness" served as a justification for the police institution to intervene in the favelas to prevent crime and protect the city from the perceived threat of the "potential criminals" which the favela was seen to harvest and represent.

In an interview 24th of October 2007, Governor Sérgio Cabral suggested that abortion, which is illegal in Brazil, could function as a form of violence control in the favelas. On why he was in favor of women's right to end unwanted pregnancies, he stated that:

"It has everything to do with violence. If you look at the number of children per mother in Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, Tijuca, Méier and Copacabana (upper middle-class neighborhoods) it is a Swedish pattern. Then, look at Rocinha. It is the pattern of Zambia, Gambia. It is a factory producing marginals."[19]

The Governor bluntly stated that legalizing abortion to lower the number of children born in the favelas could serve as a measure to reduce violence and with that, purify the city. He thus directly contrasts the perceived threatening, violent sociability of the favelados to the citizens in formal neighborhoods who need to be protected from the former.

2.1.5 State absence, state presence

As we see, the favelas have always been constructed as a world apart. The nation-building process that started with the white elite looking towards Europe in the 1800's has been a process of exclusion of those who do not fit the mold of the "imagined community" of the nation (Anderson 1983). Since the 1960's, post-colonial writers have questioned the way the European nation-state has served as an explicit or implicit model for other countries, defining the categories through which the rest of the world is interpreted and understood. With this historic backdrop, Das and Poole (2004) called for a political anthropological exploration of the "margins of the state", leaning on the work of Foucault. These "margins" are neither defined by geographic frontiers nor referring to areas where the state presence is fragile or non-existent, rather, the margins of the state are seen as territories or populations that are produced as marginal by the dynamic of the modern state (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 53). Whether the favela is the "margins of the state" in a concrete manner, as in an area lacking state presence, or in a more postcolonial understanding, has been part of the debate on urban violence in Rio de Janeiro.

According to Arias (2006: 3) there have been two divergent explanations of violence in the informal settlements of Rio; the divided city approach and the state accomplice approach. Both focus on the role of the state and the police in catalyzing and intensifying violence. The first asserts that the state has long been physically and symbolically absent, or at least distant,

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[19] Freire (2007)

from the informal settlements where violence has been concentrated. The absence of the state left these spaces unprotected and permitted non-state armed actors to establish order. The criminals' territorial control removed the zones of urban poverty from the state and created an archipelago of independent areas that the rule of law could not reach (Soares 2000: 269). The favelas were seen as violent territories and the populations that lived there as accomplices of the agents of violence; the traffickers. This view has its origins in the perceptions of the favelas as an "other", as presented in the dominant public narrative of the "legal versus illegal city" and "the state within the state". These myths have sustained a grand part of the interpretive package that has shaped the policies towards these territories and the horizons of the proposals and measures to control and reduce the problem of urban violence in Rio de Janeiro (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 49). However, while this view provides valuable insights into the way people, police and politicians in Rio have perceived the problem of violence and drug trafficking, it does not go far enough in examining how the deep interconnections among state officials and favela leaders have contributed to the urban violence (Arias 2006: 4).

Urban violence is more than a simple synonym with common crime or with violence in general. Criminal conduct is often explained because of a low cost of opportunity, where disorganization in the administration of the justice system leads to "temptations" (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 39-44). This kind of explanation falls back on an understanding that there is a lack of laws and rules that is the problem and therefore the reason for urban violence. This is an overly simplified way of explaining the urban violence as we know it in Rio. As we've seen through the socio-spatial history of Rio, the escalating crime and violence in the city in general and in the favelas in particular cannot be interpreted as a mere consequence of a low cost of opportunity, but must be seen in relation to a centuries long history of marginalization and exclusion. Following that line, the second explanation of violence sees the state as very present in the informal settlements, but in different ways than in the formal city. This view claims that the state has been present in ways that actually deepen the violence. Although the relationship between the favela and the formal city has been socially conceptualized as a binary opposition in a Tillyan view, there has not been a water-proof barrier between the two in practice. Through threats of removal, urban upgrading projects, police interference and clientilistic political relations, the public power has been very much present in the lives of the favela inhabitants. The traffickers have been involved in networks that bring together civic leaders, politicians, police and the criminals, linking

trafficker dominated favelas with Rio's broader political and social system (Arias 2006). According to Soares (2000), the drug dealers could never have maintained power if they did not have solid support within the state apparatus. The police institutions themselves also acted as instruments of repression.

2.1.6 The military police institution

The military police (*polícia militar* or PM) has its origins in the National Guard (*Guardia Nacional*) founded by Emperor Dom Pedro in 1831 which served as a private army for the royal family (Barman 1999: 37). The police was thus initially intended for the protection of the elite and the government, not the citizens, of Rio, and this legacy has continued to shape the institution. From its earliest days, the military police has been described as fighting a war, but unlike a war against an external enemy on the battlefield, the objective was not to exterminate or eliminate an adversary. Rather, the goal was repression and the maintenance of order, enabling the city to function in the interests of the class that made the rules and created the police to enforce them (Holloway 1993: 37).

During the military regime (from 1964 to 1985) the PM was institutionally subsumed under the armed forces. Of the many institutional transformations with the democratic transition, the one institution that was not democratized was the security apparatus (Leeds 2007: 22). While legal norms were revised, norms of accountability were not. Laws of exception were issued to accommodate police oversteps or conceal them from outside scrutiny, and within the discourse of war, shifting legal boundaries blurred the tenuous distinctions between the legal use of force and illegal repression (Caldeira and Holston 1999: 700). Police violence actually peaked during the democratic era, when more civilians have been killed annually by the police than the total disappeared during the military dictatorship.

The BOPE and the PM have never been trained to recognize the humanity of the favela residents. When the police climbed the hills of the favelas, it was with the mentality and tactics of an occupying army. They approached in tanks known as the *caveirão*, or the big skull, with machine guns pointing out from underneath armor-plated hoods. The symbol of the BOPE elite squad is a skull with a sward pointed downwards through it, on a black background with two crossed pistols. This symbol is quite emblematic for the attitude of the BOPE police. The skull symbolizes death, the sward signifies combat and its position through the skull indicates war. The black background represents mourning and the pistols the

emblem of the military police (Hinton 2009: 218).[20] This is far from a protect- and serve-mentality, at least towards the favela population seen as enemies because of their perceived connections with crime. Between 2003 and 2007, 5,669 people were killed by the police. Although almost all of the deaths were registered as *acts of resistance*, meaning as a consequence of the victim putting officers' or others' lives at risk, research done in 2003 shows that 65% of those killings had unmistakable signs of execution (Soares 2009). When people are killed in confrontation with the police, the article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedures states that the police agent, who is at the same time the perpetrator and the witness, shall make a statement of what happened that goes to the register of deaths. This not only concealed and justified executions, but also made it impossible in practice to file a prosecution, thus excluding the police from the law (Leite 2012: 381). The result was the impunity of the police agents.

Notoriously corrupt, police officers have been known for taking bribes from traffickers in return for looking the other way. When deals went sour, the police would not shy away from using violence. In their repression of the traffickers, and in their collusion with them, the military police gave the criminals legitimacy by making the violence of the state almost indistinguishable from that of the traffickers (Tierney 2012: 25). While the discourse of war and the notion of the violent sociability of the favela residents shaped the public opinion and policies towards these territories, the state presence and the police themselves, as well as the degradation and illegitimacy of institutions, have been instrumental in escalating the armed conflict.

2.2 From a Metaphor of War to a Discourse of Peace

The hard-hand public security initiatives proved inefficient in combating the urban violence and the drug trafficking, much of it because the police institution itself was an accomplice. With the transformations in the city, state and federal governments since the turn of the century, Brazil's position internationally as a center-left developmental state (Heller and Evans 2010) and an international focus on human and civil rights, the situation was becoming unbearable. The war on crime had produced an image of the city as irredeemably divided and dangerous and with no respect for the human rights of its inhabitants, which was becoming an "anti-postcard" for Rio de Janeiro (Ventura 1994).

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[20] See Appendix 5 for illustration.

In 2007, the Brazilian federal government created a national program for public security, called PRONASCI. The main objective of PRONASCI was to combat crime, violence and insecurity that were results of unstable conditions. PRONASCI introduced the concept of "citizen security" to Brazil, which represents a security policy directed more towards the citizens through practices focused on prevention rather than repression (Souza and Compans 2010). The creation of PRONASCI resulted, among other things, in the state of Rio de Janeiro being given a greater autonomy in forming its security politics. The year 2007 therefore marked the start of a new era in security in Rio de Janeiro, and the initially federal measure of the PRONASCI was instrumental in leading up to the creation of the UPP program at state level in Rio de Janeiro. When Eduardo Paes was elected as the successor of Cesar Maia as mayor of Rio de Janeiro in January 2008, all three levels of government (municipal, state and federal level) were from allied political parties for the first time in nearly three decades. This alignment of forces and interests has translated into political and financial support for the UPP program from all levels of government. From 2006 to 2010 investments in public security were increased by 47% in Rio de Janeiro (Urani, Giambiagi and Souza 2011: 86).

Before moving on to the practices of the UPP police, it is important to keep in mind that the pacification is far from becoming the generalized approach to policing in the favelas. By the time the UPP is slated for completion in 2016, only some 200 of Rio's 1,000 plus favelas will have been "pacified", although the number of police personnel in the city is due to double from 32,000 to 64,000 (Teixeira 2011). The fact that the favelas that are to receive this program are the centrally located or symbolically loaded ones[21] has led Mulli (2011), Machado da Silva (2010) and others to speculate whether it is merely a temporary effort to stall the violence and secure the city in front of the World Cup and the Olympics. Many of the favelas on the outskirts of the Rio are equally, if not more, violent than the ones being pacified. However, the violence there does not "spill" into middle-class neighborhoods in the same degree. In the rest of the city's favelas it is still the metaphor of war that shapes the public security policies and the police activity.

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[21] Such as Cidade de Deus, one of the resettlements formed in the 1960's when the city was systematically removing favelas from the center. It is famous from the movie with the same name from 2002.

2.2.1 The pacification approach

The pacification is a three step process that starts with the occupation of the territory by the PM and the BOPE elite squad. The date of the occupation is always announced beforehand, giving the drug traffickers time to leave the area to avoid confrontations. An announcement was made a week in advance of BOPE's intervention in Rocinha in November 2011, and despite anticipation of resistance, no shots were fired. Once the initial territorial takeover has been carried out, the police forces identify and remove sources of resistance and criminal elements in a second phase focusing on stabilizing the area. During this phase, BOPE forces are stationed inside the favela around the clock. While this occupation is supposed to be a short transitioning period, in Rocinha it took 10 months from the time BOPE entered the favela until the UPP was officially inaugurated September 20th 2012. During this time, the police were charged with several offenses that made it difficult for the community to distinguish the new policing approach from the discriminatory police they know all too well from earlier interventions. A dossier produced by the coordination office of the Civil Police Intelligence revealed that police officers had been taking bribes of an initial 200,000 Reais followed by a monthly allowance of 80,000 Reais for not interfering with the drug trade in the internal alleys of Rocinha, restricting the patrolling to the main roads (Veja 2012). In addition, three police officers were charged with rape. According to the residents I spoke to this was an unstable period where the sense of security was worse than before the pacification.[22] Gradually people however got used to the police presence and the situation stabilized. That is when the third phase of the occupation began, which is the community/proximity policing where UPP units are deployed on a permanent basis.

While the average number of inhabitants per police officer in the state of Rio de Janeiro is 405, in UPP communities that number is 101 (Urani et al. 2011: 91). 700 UPP officers patrol the streets of Rocinha 24/7, and the community has received 100 high definition surveillance cameras. If you rely on the official figures on the population count, it is the most heavily monitored area in the world (BBC News 2013). Through cameras and police officers present around the clock people are constantly monitored. Supporters claim that this high rate allows the UPP officers to engage in proximity policing, getting to know the community and the

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[22] See section 3.1.4.

inhabitants and developing a relationship of trust. Alternatively, you can see it as creating a police state, a big brother-society where everything you do is monitored.[23]

Although portrayed as innovative, the pacification program is not a new idea, but based on past attempts at police reform. Colonel Nazareth Cerqueira, commander of the PM in Rio de Janeiro from 1983 to 1987 and from 1991 to 1994 as the first civilian policeman rather than and army officer to hold this position, was responsible for bringing the philosophy of community policing to Brazil. Contemplating the role of the military police in the democratic era, he sought an alternative to police repression because he saw that it was ineffective in reducing violence and incompatible with democracy (Tierney 2012: 31). Rio has had several earlier community policing programs; including the *Posto de Policiamento Comunitário* (Community Police Posts), *Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário* (Integrated Center of Community Policing), *Batalhão Comunitário* (Community Battalion), and the more recent *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE) (Police Grouping in Special Areas) (Melicio, Geraldini and Bicalho 2012: 607). In general these programs did not last long as they have lacked political support and financing, and the police were often far outnumbered by drug traffickers. Compared to these earlier proximity policing attempts, that all proved to be failures, the UPPs have received wide support and backing from the media, business, politicians and society in general.

Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012) problematize the policing model of the UPP and the lack of clear definitions and goals of the program. They claim that the UPPs are not a program or model of neither policing nor public security; rather, they represent an assembly of policing experiences. In treating the UPP as a model of policing, the official discourse sells the pacification as something that is going to "save" the favela populations. The UPPs are however far from a consolidated practice, and Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012: 13) claim that promoting the UPP as such reveals the farce of this experiment which in many ways has become a program of major prestige for Governor Sérgio Cabral and Mayor Eduardo Paes to prepare the city for the Rio +20 conference, the World Cup and the Olympics.

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[23] See section 3.1.3.

2.2.2 More routine, less exception

For all the questionable aspects of the pacification; from the selection of favelas for pacification to the lack of clear definitions and goals of the program to the actions of the UPP police, the pacification can still have positive effects in the local setting. And while we can, and will, criticize the problematic sides of the pacification program there are some obvious improvements that come with the it that deserve to be mentioned, such as the changes in police action.

The pacification produces some effects in the daily lives of the residents that are almost immediate, the permanent presence of the police and the cease of fire being the most dramatic ones. Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012: 15) see the cease of fire as as much of an everyday life question as a political question. The cease of fire refers both to the fact that the pacification puts a halt to the vicious circle of police interference in the favelas that dramatically shaped the lives of the residents there, and that it represents a change in the public security policy towards these territories. No longer seeking confrontation but avoiding it, evident from the beginning of the occupation where they announce the date in advance in order to avoid a shoot-out, the pacification police is certainly a relief from police business as usual in Rio. This leads to an instant reduction in the fear of a violent death, not mainly because of the exit of the traffickers, but because of the changes in the police institution within the favela.

As such, while pacifying the informal settlements the pacification process is also pacifying the military police institution. The UPP police receive training in sociology and human rights in order to break with the historic framing of the *favelados* as criminals and non-citizens. Looking at the statistics, it can seem as if it has given results. In 2007, the deadliest year on record, 1,330 people in the state and 867 in the city of Rio de Janeiro were killed by the PM as an *act of resistance*. In 2012, however, the correspondent numbers had dropped to 415/283 people (Instituto de Segurança Publica). Although still high on a per capita basis, this represents a dramatic decline for a five year period. As the statistics from Soares (2009) reported that a high level of deaths at the hands of the police have had unmistakable signs of execution, the issue of corruption that has characterized the PM institution is another concern the pacification is trying to address. In an attempt to prevent corruption among UPP officers, the program only recruits officers straight from the academy (except for the captain and some administrative posts) (Melicio, Geraldini and Bicalho 2012: 607). Beltrame argues that if officers have been on the job outside UPP bases hey might have been "spoiled" as they are

likely to have learned how to take bribes and other bad practices (Damasceno 2011). Ensuring that UPP officers are held accountable for their actions is crucial to building legitimacy with favela residents. While it is naïve to think that the UPPs are incorruptible the UPP approach might help reduce this problem. As UPP officers are stationed in the communities on a long-term basis, building personal relationships with the residents, this might facilitate the possibilities of allegations of abuse of authority (Melicio et.al 2012).

2.2.3 Concluding remarks

In his influential work Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes described the hypothetical "natural condition of men living together without a common power to keep them in awe as a "state of nature" or a "state of war" (Doyle 1997: 114). To avoid the terror of a state of natural war people create a social pact, rendering some rights for the sake of protection from the Leviathan, the sovereign authority. In the context of war in Rio, the favelados were perceived as barbarians invading the city, breaking the social contract. The demands for order and hard hand policies were therefore justified in order to uphold the civilized order in the city. As the state, through the UPP police, now is taking over the role as the Leviathan in the favelas, life gets more of a feeling of routine, and less of exception. A study released by the Laboratório de Análise de Violência found that the inauguration of UPPs has reduced the rates of violent deaths by up to 78 percent (Averbuck 2012). A big step forward with the pacification is thus that fear of death ceases to be people's number one concern in pacified favelas (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 16). This might be modest, and taken for granted other places, but the fear of death was a central aspect of everyday life before. Yet, following Hobbes, when the fear of death ceases to be the central aspect of collective life, the Leviathan soon ceases to be enough for the necessities and horizons of coexistence (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 16). Security is about more than lack of fear of death. It is also about securing other civil and human rights that all Brazilians have a Constitutional right to; such as housing, health and participation.

This chapter has addressed the historic construction of the favela as "the other", the historic hard-hand police interventions that have been justified because of the perceived threats these territories constitute, and the agenda of the pacification that claims to break with this past. The next chapters will look at the localized outcomes of this policy when it comes to effects on security and citizenship for the residents. Are the pacified favelas included in the social pact of the rest of the city?

3   Enforcing Security

The State Secretary of Security José Mariano Beltrame (2010) has stated that the main objective of the pacification is to break down the walls imposed by non-state armed forces surrounding these territories. The socio-spatial history of Rio de Janeiro however shows how the cement of the walls erected around the favelas goes beyond the armed force of illicit criminal groups. Rather, the wall to be torn down is as much of an ideological wall; the symbolical threat of the "other" to the well-being of the social body that has been constructed through centuries of racism, marginalization and exclusion. Since the favelas first emerged, the public policies towards the informal settlements have been motivated by seeking to contain and control them, because of the constant fear that the favela would spill into the city (*o morro descer*) (Leite 2000: 77). The *favelados* have been seen as a "carriers" of dangerousness, justifying police action and violence in the favelas. Although the automatic connection between the favela and violent crime is biased, the reality is that violent crime and its victims have been highly localized in these territories. This provides the justification for the security intervention of the UPPs in the favelas. A headline of the pacification has been the decline in the number of homicides in pacified favelas, and the state government has also drawn attention to several opinion polls that show people "feel" safer after the implementation of the UPPs (see for example Globo 2012). The picture on the ground is however inevitably more complicated.

This chapter will look at what kind of security regime is being implemented and whether it breaks with the construction of the favela as "the other" that has characterized favela-state relations.

3.1.1   Violence and governance

In the eyes of the governmental agents, the violence of the traffickers was seen as dangerous, destabilizing and threatening. Authorities allege that they are liberating the communities by freeing them from the traffickers' rule, which, in the words of deputy commander of the Rocinha UPP, will open up the community for the state to enter with services.[24] While the state sees security as a precondition for development, the residents do not necessarily prioritize the same way. In Vidigal, a favela located next to Rocinha in the south zone of the

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[24] Interview with Subcomandante Medeiros, December 14th 2012.

city, a study conducted before the community was pacified showed that the residents put security in the sixth place over urgent needs in the community, behind other priorities such as infrastructure, education, health and leisure (Oliveira 2012: 53). As with the study from Vidigal, the residents of Rocinha that I talked to throughout my stay all claimed that the most urgent needs of the community continue to be, as they were before the pacification, health, education and sanitation. *Not* security. Actually, many feel that the security situation has gotten worse since the pacification, which I will come back to.

With security seen as state control over the means of coercion, insecurity in the informal settlements builds on assumptions about the weakness of the Brazilian state and the failure of public institutions. As such, there is a sense of competition over the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and of the state failing to deliver security as a public good. Tilly (1985) would however have pointed out that one should not confuse violence by non-state actors as non-state violence. As Arias (2006) also argues, the high level of violence in the favelas is a result of state complicity, not state absence. Police practices of extortion, negotiation and dealings with the traffickers are among the principal reasons why violent crime surged in the favelas, disqualifying the arguments of the public security apparatus about the "war" that should be conducted against these territories (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 63).

Charles Tilly has written extensively about the relationship between violence and the state. The key question for Tilly was always "what does violence do", and from this, he considered the subsidiary question "whose interests does it serve" (Jones and Rodgers 2011: 984). According to Tilly, violence is best understood as concerning social ties, within structural conditions (Tilly 2005). If we ask, like Tilly, what violence *does*, violence in the favelas was often an end game to a process of dispute resolution, either between drug factions for control over territory or with the police or the military. Such violence is undoubtedly often terrifying and has many innocent victims. However, violence rarely occurs without rules or on a zero-sum basis. Violence in the case of the drug traffickers was clearly a tool of governance that incorporated behavioral norms, welfare distribution and conflict resolution (Jones and Rodgers 2011: 990).

The "law of the trafficker" was a system of governance that grew over the years and was present where the state was absent, a system with clear rules and consequences that would not only oppress but would also support and help the community. While the "law of the

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trafficker" was brutal, many saw it as just. The traffickers upheld a zero tolerance on robberies, assaults and sexual violence towards women, among other things. The rules were clear, and people knew the consequences. According to a former drug trafficker from Rocinha;[25] "if somebody had a robbery, or if a woman was beaten by her husband, they could go to the traffickers who would gather witnesses for a trial. If the defendant was found guilty, he was banished from the community or shot." There were therefore very low indices of crime in the community. In the words of another resident; "In Rocinha, the level of violence was zero."[26]

The traffickers, often born and raised in the favela, had strong connections to the local community. They would reinvest some of the surplus in the community; paving roads, constructing community centers and aiding some of the poorest residents by providing food and necessities. In return, people gave their loyalty and kept their mouths shut. The drug lord in Rocinha the last 6 years, Nem, was therefore a highly popular leader:

"Many saw him as an idol. Nem He was everything to them. Why everything? Because that child grew up knowing that Nem helped the grandmother that was about to die, that child grew up knowing that Nem bought milk when the family couldn't. (…) if you needed medicine, the traffickers would come. If a person from the community would die, and the family didn't have the money to pay for a funeral, the traffickers did. Who did the social work for the whole community? The traffickers."[27]

"I'm not telling you that the drug trafficking was right. The law is the law, what is right is right. But in a certain way, for those who were attended, marvelous. What is it the people want? Attention."[28]

The most unfair violence in the eyes of the residents was the "lost bullets" striking innocents in shoot-outs and the violence of the police. While the traffickers had close knit bonds to the

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[25] Interview with Gabriel, November 29th 2012

[26] Interview with a former president of the AMABB Residents' Association on December 5th 2012. With the alleged bonds between the AMs and the drug traffickers, one could question the possible biases in this statement. Later in the interview, he said he had been childhood friends with the former drug lord Nem. However, throughout numerous conversations with residents I was told how the violence under Nem in their eyes had been "justified" compared to police violence. While the level of violence certainly wasn't "zero" this statement seems to incorporate the perceived difference between police violence and the violence of the traffickers.

[27] Interview with Luiz, December 5th 2012. While Luiz had personal bonds with Nem, I talked to numerous other people about how the level of violence had been lower under Nem. Do the residents want the drug lords back? Not necessarily. Nem was only the leader for 6 years, and the so-called drug wars between different factions at the turn of the century were a bloody affair that nobody wants to go back to. These statements can seem in relation to a frustration over the UPP Police that is not living up to the expectations of being a more civilized police force. People view the "past in terms of the present".

[28] Interview Thiago, January 1st 2013.

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community and only hurt those who clearly went against their rules, police violence was perceived as despotic, arbitrary and irrational. The police practice shaped by the logic of war was an aggressive approach where they would enter the favela seeking confrontation. Often counting on the element of surprise, they would be met by resistance from the traffickers resulting in a shootout. The police would not distinguish between traffickers and regular residents who happened to get caught in the crossfire. In their interaction with the locals everybody was treated as potential criminals. There was therefore no logic or justice to their violence in the eyes of the residents, it could strike anyone, at any time, and the police were rarely held accountable for their actions.

According to Machado da Silva and Leite (2008), people's number one complaint was not the police violence in itself, but the fact that the police did not distinguish between different categories of people within the favela. The residents all understood the violent methods of the police as a necessity, which can be related to the fact that they were used to a hard-hand governance from the traffickers. Their complaint was that the police did not distinguish between *gente de bem,* regular residents, and criminals in their interactions with the community (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 63). The favela residents' "aversion" of the police institution and their agents has been interpreted as a connivance with violent crime within the discourse of war (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 62). As we see, however, it is not that people made an active choice between the police and the traffickers. While the police would enter and leave again, the residents of the favelas had no choice but to coexist with drug traffickers that were progressively equipping themselves with firearms in order to hold the fort against rival factions and the police.

Through the proper historic constitution of the police, always withheld from the democratic control of the society, the "license to kill" resulted in a power that produced obscene and perverted arrangements in the name of "order" and "security" (Fridman 2008: 78). Back to a Tillyan perspective, the violence of the police served another purpose than that of the traffickers. While the violence of the traffickers was governance, the violence of the police operations was to create fear to "keep people in their place" (Machado da Silva 2008). In sum, the police action was conceived as opaque and unpredictable, and many residents therefore feared the police more than the traffickers (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 16). They could not trust a public security that did not include them; in agents of the state that did not acknowledge their citizenship, that neither recognized nor protected their lives and rights, and

who's presence in the favela always meant an attack on their physical integrity (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008: 62).

3.1.2 Enforcing security

The pacification program has changed the public security policies in the favelas from pure military interventions to proximity policing combining security and developmental measures. The fact that they announce the occupation in advance to avoid armed confrontation can be seen as a step away from business as usual for the Rio de Janeiro military police. Yet, this is still a war, no doubt about it, even in the way people talk about it (the nine day *war* of Alemão, for example). Already in the first phase of the pacification the link between the program and a demonstration of power is confirmed as the BOPE battalion claims control of the territory through the use of weapons, helicopters and tanks. While the exceptional politics of the earlier hard-hand military approaches are displaced by a softer "pacifying" police force, the UPP police are still a clearly a violent power. As the UPPs patrol the streets in bulletproof vests with the finger on the trigger of their machine guns, they leave no doubt that they are still an authority that imposes their power through the threat of violence.

The UPP units establish permanent bases in the *favelas* that they pacify and become the first point of contact with the state for local residents, through which they request public goods and services. Interestingly, in this aspect the UPP police share a lot of characteristics with the policies of the drug traffickers they try to distance themselves from. Juliana, the leader of an NGO in Rocinha, claims that the urban upgrading and social programs coming to the community with the pacification program are *politica cala-boca* (politics to shut you up).[29] You do not bite the hand that feeds you. The gratefulness, towards the drug trafficker that gives your grandmother medicines or the state which has started providing services, keeps people in a debt of gratitude. Still, one should not forget that business is business. While Nem might have played the part of the benevolent criminal, people never forgot that if they went against his rules, the consequences were brutal. In a similar manner, the benevolence of the state programs is only accompanying a process of claiming control over the territory. The underlying power structure is still the Tillyan hierarchical opposition pair of state-favela where the state, represented by the police, has the definition power.

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[29] Interview with Juliana, November 8th 2012.

"It is the weapon that commands, it continues the same way. Bermuda shorts and flip flops are changed for police uniforms, but it follows the same logic."[30]

Again, the favelas understand and respect the fact that it is the job of the police to control and combat the drug trade and that this demands an authoritarian police. Yet, a continued criticism is the lack of distinction between criminals and non-criminals. Many, especially young black men, feel constantly mistrusted in their own neighborhood after the pacification as the UPP will stop random people on the streets to ransack them with the justification of looking for drugs.[31] This differentiated treatment of poor, black men in the favelas is seen as a racialized and discriminatory policy that underlines the historic distance between the police and the local community as well as supporting the connotation between favela residents and crime. As a resident of the favela Borel noted at a two-day seminar about the UPPs;

"Security? The right to come and go? Everybody has to keep their documents on them, never knowing when you're going to be searched for drugs, be forced up against a wall. It is mentally exhausting, leaving home early, going back to the community late, knowing that there is always a possibility you'll be suspected of something. There is still a lot of fear." [32]

While promoted as a program to spur an approximation process between the favela and the asphalt, the UPP police practice in the favelas can be seen as a "differentiated policing of space" (Samara 2010, 2011). The pacification represents a police mechanism that is exercised according to the spatial configuration of the city. The UPPs are only stationed in favelas, while the other neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro fall under the jurisdiction of the civil police. The unequal treatment of the *favelados* by the UPP police compared to citizens of the asphalt by the civil police can be seen as a "differentiated management of illegalities" in the words of Foucault (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986). According to the Brazilian researcher Sonia Fleury "this is not public policy. It is public, but it is completely local. Public, but not really, it is not for everybody. "[33] Fleury underlines the fact that the UPP police only covers a certain segment of the population; the poor residents of the favelas. As the UPPs are supposed to be permanent rather than a transitioning police force, such location-specific policing can be seen to constitute the actual work of spatial production, reinforcing the socio-spatial contours between different populations of the city rather than bridging the gaps (Samara 2011: 16-17).

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[30] Interview with Vinicius, November 29th 2012, referring to the stereotypical outfit of a young drug trafficker.
[31] Interviews with Gabriel November 9th and Gustavo November 27th, informal conversations with others. They all claim that young, black men are targeted by the UPP police.
[32] *Favela é Cidade* seminar in Santa Martha, November 26th 2012.
[33] *Favela é Cidade* seminar November 26th 2012.

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Although it can be contended that the UPPs are perhaps a more sophisticated form of social control than the earlier police interventions, they also respond to a long-standing desire to segregate the poor from the rich. As such, this practice expresses and reproduces segregating dynamics in Rio de Janeiro. In this perspective, UPP is becoming an instrument for disempowerment and management of favela residents rather than representing a way to control crime in the selected areas.

3.1.3 What kind of security regime?

As the UPP police are taking over monopoly of violence in the favelas, it is argued that they are positioning themselves as the new *dono do morro*[34] or Leviathan in the community. The *dono do morro* has historically been the community leader within the favelas and who would mediate when there were conflicts and keep order in the state's absence. When the traffickers started controlling the favelas it was the drug lord that became the *dono do morro*. The fact that he is the *dono*; the owner, points to a position of great centralized power over who comes and goes and what can or cannot be done within that space. Because of the power centralized in the UPP police today, Mulli (2011) and others with him worry that the pacification will turn each newly pacified neighborhood into a quasi-police state. A powerful symbol on how the Rocinha UPP police are claiming the position of authority from the traffickers is the placement of the UPP police headquarters. It is located on top of the favela on what according to former trafficker Gustavo[35] is the exact spot where the traffickers would execute people in the past, which has profound symbolic value.

The fact that the pacification is "taking back" these territories from non-state armed forces does however not mean that the UPPs represents a clean transfer of power and management form one institution to another. This is first and foremost because in a Foucauldian perspective, power is not something one can possess. Power does not exist in a fixed structure; rather, power is inscribed in historical, flexible relations (Foucault 1979). The state presence through the pacification program is more than the UPP Police claiming monopoly of violence from the drug traffickers. The police do not produce governance alone. Rather, they work together with a diversity of actors that are all part of transforming the reality in pacified favelas. Public agents, Medias of communication, NGOs and a variety of other actors are

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[34] "owner of the hill" or local strongman.
[35] Interview November 29th 2012.

intertwining in the production of the "pacified" reality. The state presence embodies the series of projects, interventions and actors that are entering the community with the pacification and that generate substantial effects on the social and individual bodies of the residents of pacified favelas. What we are seeing is a change from an instrumental and personalized (sovereign) power embodied in the drug lord to a more complex non-instrumental and depersonalized "Foucauldian" power- a biopower.

Foucault has described biopower as a regulatory power that controls and manipulates what can and cannot be done in a society through intervening in all processes that constitute human life (Foucault 2008). Biopolitics talks the language of promoting life and well-being for the population, just as the pacification program claims that it is bringing peace and development to the pacified favelas. The paradox of biopolitics is however that it is at the same time has the ability to disallow life "to the point of death" (Duffield 2007: 34). Even if the hit-and-run technique of earlier police interventions to a large degree are replaced by a proximity policing approach, the UPP police still have power over life and death, at least in a metaphorical sense in terms of control over acceptable and non-acceptable life-forms.

Throughout the socio-spatial history of Rio de Janeiro, the politics of the state have frequently justified their interventions in the favelas with the objective to promote integration to the city. The necessity to *change values* to guarantee the *favelados'* access to citizenship is an underlying presumption that has characterized the governmental interventions in the favelas. Since the days of the "urban sanitizing" projects in the beginning of the 20th century, to the proletarian parks incentivizing "better" choices for the *favelados* and the urban upgrading and removal policies, the government has wanted to develop citizenship in territories and populations not seen as having this. In line with these historic interventions, the pacification program goes beyond reclaiming the monopoly of violence. The pacification program is about more than security in a strictly military sense; it is also a project to "civilize" the residents as a precondition for their integration with the city. The pacification program as biopolitics is changing the dynamics of power and what constitutes acceptable and non-acceptable behaviors in the community. Pacifying these territories is done through regularizing the sociabilities of *all* the favela residents, not just the traffickers, to change the dynamics of these territories from "factories producing marginals" (Freire 2007) to civilized spaces in order to reduce the threat they pose to the rest of civilized society. The devices through which this is

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done are many; such as discourses, regulations, administrative means and police activity that represses activity that is not considered civilized (Leite 2012: 384).

An example is how the UPP police control the popular culture of the *funk*[36] in pacified favelas. The favelas have been famous for wild funk parties thrown by traffickers where there was a wide access to drugs, people would dance with uninhibited sexual undertones, and the lyrics of the songs would glorify violence and the different drug factions. With the pacification, funk parties have been prohibited in many UPP favelas with the justification that the parties were encouraging criminal activities. The prohibition of funk parties can be seen as a way of controlling the impure activities of "the other" in that the police are shutting down activities they do not like or understand. While the so-called *prohibidão*, funk songs with lyrics glorifying different drug factions, are prohibited by Brazilian law, the prohibition of funk parties in general has not been received with open arms by young people in the favelas. According to a *funkeiro*, a funk DJ/musician from Santa Martha:

"The funk expresses the reality of the favela in its own language. There are political funks, religious ones and the prohibidão. *Funk gets a lot of negative attention because of its misogynist lyrics and the* prohibidão. *But that is just an excuse, they can criticize that kind of attitudes, but not the music in itself, it's not the music's fault."*[37]

On December 9th, Santa Marta arranged a hip-hop event, gathering people of all ages from the community. It was supposed to last until midnight, but at 11 P.M. the UPP police shut down the event which was not popular among the residents.[38] FGV-researcher Sónya Fleury argues that the UPPs represent a "citizenship of exception" in that the favelas cannot have these kind of parties as it is not accepted as culture.[39]

The biopolitical paradox is that that the maintenance of subjective life requires the destruction of other life forms. The state not only intervenes in the biological life of individuals or groups, regulating behavior to guarantee life, but also controls the potential of life and life forms. Certain aspects of local culture (informal organization of housing and services,[40] funk music and parties, etcetera) are banned or reorganized in line with "proper" culture. The state is trying to integrate the favelados' forms of sociability to the dominant culture and norms,

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[36] Brazilian style of music.
[37] *Favela é Cidade* seminar, Santa Martha November 26th 2012.
[38] See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FM3KOBaNnaU for a YouTube video from the police shutting down the event. It shows the residents' dissatisfaction with the police. Last accessed May 14th 2013.
[39] *Favela é Cidade* seminar November 26th 2012.
[40] See section 4.1.4.

making them civilized at last, in order to reduce the threat their uncivilized behaviors are seen to constitute to the rest of society. The pacification thus produces biopolitical discourses that "make live and let die" through deciding what activities and behaviors are acceptable (Melicio et al. 2012). This represents a side-tour from a political conceptualization of citizenship as civil rights to a more culturist conceptualization that subordinates the demands for rights to the acquisition of a cultural passport, to be obtained by transforming a population viewed as uncivilized to reeducated individuals through the teaching them about good identity (Farias 2007 in Birman 2008: 110).

While other UPPs have maintained the zero tolerance for funk parties, in Rocinha, the parties actually started up again a couple of months ago. They are however not what they used to be before the pacification. The big arena on top of Rocinha, famous for the parties the traffickers would throw back in the day, now hosts a "peace dance" every Saturday organized by the police. Where the old parties would be free, the entrance fee today is 10 or 20 Reais for either regular entry or the "VIP" lounge, which many of the young in Rocinha cannot afford. The parties today therefore draw a different crowd of middle-class residents from the asphalt and foreigners. The security is no longer handled by teenage drug traffickers but by off-duty policemen from the Gávea police station.[41] This is not only interesting because it evokes questions about the double roles of policemen in a city notorious for militias. It is equally interesting as a project of controlling or subverting popular culture.

The example of funk music brings together all the underlying issues of the civilizational character of the pacification. On the one hand the favela and its culture is seen as dangerous, unstable and unmoral, and must be controlled. This is why funk parties were prohibited in many pacified favelas. On the other hand, the funk is widely popular, and not allowing these parties was undermining the legitimacy of the UPP police. Instead of maintaining the prohibition, funk parties in Rocinha were legalized so as to manage this aspect of the favela culture. By calling it a "peace dance" it exemplifies how the governance in a biopolitical manner is produced through regulation and manipulation. The funk parties in Rocinha used to be the prime symbol of the parallel power of the drug lord. Today, they have been made "peace parties" celebrating the pacification in accordance with Pelbart (2003) who claims that forces of creation, singularities and alternative lifestyles are "kidnapped" in a biopolitical game of forced inclusion.

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[41] Interview with Julia at the *Baile da paz* (peace dance) December 1st 2012.

3.1.4 New sense of insecurity

The pacification process produces effects on the individual and social bodies of the community that goes beyond the state reclaiming monopoly of violence or providing basic services. The presence of the UPPs and the new rules that come with the new governance leads to changing power relations and dynamics within the community, which has effects on the sense of security. In their reactions to unsocial behavior, the police have to follow a different logic than the traffickers in accordance with a state of justice. They cannot take immediate action and beat up a rapist like the traffickers would do before. After decades of dealing with a police that would not do anything for them, many people are uneasy about going to the police to file a report. When I asked UPP deputy commander Medeiros about the spaces for dialogue between the police and the residents, he answered: "The dialogue with the population is always open, we are here (…) the door is always open to the population."[42] After decades of police violence, however, it is not straightforward for the residents to go to the headquarter of the police to make a demand or denounce an abusive officer, especially since they know the officer will most likely be patrolling the streets of the community the day after and there is no telling what the reaction will be. For those who do, the solving rate of the Brazilian civil police is not the highest. As a consequence, the profile of crime has changed in pacified favelas.

When the police entered Rocinha, a period of increased violence followed. There was a surge in crimes such as violence against women, assaults, fighting and robberies, all crimes that were forbidden and practically non-existent under the traffickers. According to data from the Institute of Public Safety the rates of crime increased significantly in Rocinha from 2011 to 2012 (Rousso 2012). During the first nine months of the year after the occupation, there was an 74% increase in rapes, and a 50 % increase in violent deaths.[43] Many residents have expressed that this is related to a lack of imposing the law on behalf of the police.

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[42] Interview December 14th 2012. In addition, a citywide phone line for making denouncements against UPP Police officers has been established. However, both residents in Rocinha and Santa Martha that I talked to complained that they had received little information about this, and that they didn't know the number.

[43] An interesting contrast to other pacified favelas, where the murder rate has dropped significantly. This has to be seen in relation with the relative stability of the community during the reign of Nem, who had made a truce with rival drug factions and the Military Police, reducing the war over the territory. Residents I talked to claimed that the first 6 months after the occupation were very unstable, which is what probably has resulted in these statistics, but that the situation today has settled to what resembles a sense of "peace", as the Rousso (2012) article also states.

If we go back to different ways of conceptualizing urban violence as done by Machado da Silva and Leite (2008: 39-44), crime can be seen as a result of low costs of opportunity. In light of this, some might have been opportunistic; taking the lack of imposing the law by the force of arms by the UPPs compared to the traffickers as a window of opportunity for crime. An example is the case of the nephew of my main informant. The day before I arrived in Rocinha, he had been beaten up at a dance by a man that thought he was flirting with his girlfriend. He had to go to the hospital and needed facial surgery. Apparently, two UPP policemen had been close, but had not interfered when his friends asked them to do so because "it was not in their instructions". The following days this was the main subject of conversation in the social circuit of my informant, and many expressed anger at the police because of their negligence. With the traffickers, they said, this would have been impossible. But today, the police are present and do nothing. What kind of security is that?[44] After the incident, the mother of the aggressor went to the hospital to apologize on behalf of her son. The family of the victim however wanted more; they wanted him to pay for the cost of surgery. This is a case they could have taken to the traffickers before, they said, but now they had no bargaining power, and they did not think that going to the police and filing a report would take them anywhere. This shows how people feel like the police are not able to protect the local residents in the same way as the traffickers were.

At the same time, using Machado da Silva and Leite (2008) again, "low cost of opportunity" is too narrow of an explanation to explain crime in the favelas, also after the pacification. Leaning on the explanation that people are taking advantage of the situation could explain some of the cases. Yet, you could also see the increase in violence and crime it in relation to the generalized sense of insecurity and limbo that has characterized the community since the pacification. For all the talk about the pacification as a long-term initiative, there is no saying what will happen after 2016 when the Olympic Games are over and the financing runs out. After all, they are just one in a long line of public security interventions in the favelas of which none have given the residents a reason to trust in the state and the police so far. As the following statements from residents show, people do not believe that the UPPs are going to be permanent.

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[44] Personal communication with several residents in November 2012.

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"The investments they are doing today are precisely for (...) the World Cup, the Olympics. Are they going to be permanent? I don't think so (...) it is just for a period." [45]

"I think that- and hopefully I'm wrong- but I think it might just be a temporary cleansing until the end of the Olympics."[46]

Rather than permanent, the UPPs feel more like a suspension of routines. This generates a sense of insecurity and people not knowing what the rules and consequences are with substantial effects on the sense of security in the community.

3.1.5 Concluding remarks

The question of the perceived dangerousness of the favela population is about the potential to transgress; whether dangerousness and criminal behavior is naturally embedded in individuals or groups. It is easier said than done to break with the historical framing of the favela as the *source* of the problems associated with crime and drug trafficking rather than this being a result of a lack of state presence and a history of exclusion and racism (Machado da Silva 2010). As Foucault (2003: 15) inverts Clausewitz's proposition by saying that politics is the continuation of war by other means, what occurs beneath the semblance of peace in Rio de Janeiro is far from politically settled. Security is not necessarily peace, at least not in Rio. The pacification, never mind its name, is far from a peaceful process. By claiming that the favelas need to be pacified, favela life continues to be implicitly seen as an opposition to peace. As Machado da Silva (2011) has pointed out, you only need a pacifying police in areas where there is no peace.

While the UPP police takes over the role as the Leviathan in the community, the governance produced by the pacification goes beyond reclaiming monopoly of violence. The UPPs represent a power that controls all aspects of life in the favela communities, with major impacts on the everyday life in the community. While the rhetoric of the governmental agents is that they are bringing peace and development to communities that have been under the rule of despotic traffickers, the story coming from the communities show a different side of the story. The "security" coming with the pacification has so far not contributed to increased sense of security in Rocinha for the residents. It is however contributing to increased security in a different aspect, which is the topic for the next chapter.

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[45] Interview with Bruno, November 29th 2012.
[46] Interview with Matheus, November 13th 2012.

4 "Opening up" the Favela. Neoliberal Governance and Urban Renewal.

According to Subcomandante Medeiros, deputy commander of the Rocinha UPP Police;

"The police is not the protagonist here, and does not want to be either. We came to remove the community from the drug trafficking so that the basic social services can enter the community."[47]

On the question on what the pacification will mean for the residents, he answers: "Inclusion. The process of the pacification is inclusive". According to the local UPP police themselves, then, they are in Rocinha to be a door opener for the state to enter. They claim the security aspect of the pacification is merely facilitating the developmental interventions that will include the favela residents in the city. This process can be interpreted as the state finally stepping up to its responsibilities as a modern democracy when it comes to guaranteeing security and basic social services to the residents. In practice, however, the interrelations between security and development that are illustrated through the UPP example raise important issues concerning the sequencing of development measures linked to security provision. Not only is security seen as a precondition for development, the pacification merges the two in a way that is clearly biased towards security (Jones and Rodgers 2011: 991). One can also ask about the rationale behind the development or urban upgrading of these territories and what kind of inclusion it promotes.

This chapter will look at the pacification in light of a neoliberal urban renewal process. Peace and public safety are seen to "open" these areas for the state to enter with urban upgrading programs that will include the resident in the city. What kind of inclusion is coming from these interventions?

4.1.1 Rebranding of the city

In 2012, the Institute for the Study of Religion (ISER) and the Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo Foundation for Research of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) conducted a research on the UPPs and their impacts on the everyday life in pacified favelas (Rodrigues, Siqueira and Lissovsky 2012a). They found that with the pacification, one of the main focuses

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[47] Interview December 14th 2012.

of public managers and private agents was turning the favela more accessible for the rest of the city (Rodrigues and Siqueira 2012: 19).

In order to produce an image of a "sellable" city in front of the mega-events; a city that can be a recipient of resources, investments, tourism and economic gains, publicity strategies of *branding* the urban space gain influence (Jaguaribe 2011: 330-331). In that aspect, security is essential. Security is related to liberty- in the possibility for circulation and consumption, and Rio de Janeiro's reputation as a violent city was hindering competiveness. Improving the security in the city could therefore be seen as a strategy that could increase investments and economic growth. With the changes in urban management over the last decades intensified with the urban renewal process in front of the mega-events, there has also been a change in the conceptualization of the favelas on behalf of the government. While the hills and mountainsides of the favelas were seen as wasteland a century ago when the favelas first emerged, they are today considered prime pieces of real estate in the center of the city. As areas to a large degree outside of the formal economy they also represent areas of capitalist interest. Securing these territories is therefore doing two things: it is rebranding the city; making the city as a whole safer, and as a consequence attracting international capital and investments. It is also securing the immediate locality of the favela attracting market forces and investments into the pacified favelas. Although the increased access to public services and infrastructure are vital for the improvement of the quality of life of the residents, these interventions are doing a specific symbolical work with impacts that reach beyond security or higher standard of living in the immediate locality.

4.1.2 "Opening up" the favela

In the city's Master Plan elaborated in 1992, there was a change in the definition and perception of the favelas. The favelas ceased to be defined in terms of value judgments and moved on to be juridically described as integral parts of the reality of the city in a classification based on legal and structural aspects.[48] There is however still no consensus on how to define a favela. Despite having status as a *bairro*[49] since 1993 (UPP Social),[50] Rocinha

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[48] Since 1968 they had been defined as an "abnormal within the urban environment", see section 2.1.1. The current definition of favelas is presented in the introduction 1.1.

[49] Bairro can be defined as "legal neighborhood".

[50] According to Andrade and Valaverde (2003: 59) Rocinha was transformed into a bairro by a municipal decree in 1986. Yet, it was first in 1993, through municipal law, that the physical borders of Rocinha were defined (UPP Social).

continues to be characterized by favela features when it comes to the spatial and social organization of the community. In the lower part you can find all the services of a formal neighborhood; from banks and supermarkets to gyms and hair salons. The further up the hill you go, however, the more precarious the living conditions get. Compared to the neighboring middle-class neighborhood of Gávea, Rocinha demonstrates quite different socio-spatial characteristics. According to a Human Development Report of Rio de Janeiro prepared by the United Nations in 2001, Gávea had the second highest HDI (Human Development Index) of the city at 0.89 on a scale of 0 to 1, while Rocinha had the forth worst at 0.59. Half of the population of Gávea had higher education, while 20% of the residents of Rocinha were illiterate and only 2% had access to university courses. In Gávea, the average monthly income was USD $ 2,042 while in Rocinha it was only USD $ 214 (Leitão). Although formally a *bairro*, few residents regard Rocinha as such. A local NGO leader and tourist guide said:

"I do not consider it a bairro. *Look at the big knots of electricity wires, the open sewage, the unreliable electricity and water supply. Copacabana, Flamengo, Botafogo- those are* bairros. *They don't have those kind of issues."*[51]

The President of the Residents' Association UPMMR similarly claimed that:

"To say that Rocinha is a bairro *is a big lie. Rocinha is still not a* bairro. *I will only consider Rocinha a* bairro *when it has all the infrastructure of a* bairro."[52]

The different waves of urbanization projects and state interference over the last decades have placed Rocinha in a hybrid situation, where formality and informality mingle and clash. As the majority of the city's favelas were targeted by removal policies in the 1960's and 1970's, Rocinha suffered three partial removals during this period. The residents were relocated in distant neighborhoods such as Paciência, roughly 45 kilometers west. The residents however returned to Rocinha because of its central location and access to services. These removals therefore did not stall the growth of the favela. In 1980 Rocinha was selected as a pilot area for an urban upgrading program organized by the Municipal Secretary of Social Development (SMD). Breaking with earlier removal and urban upgrading policies, this program did not include demolition of existing housing, but wanted to upgrade existing structures and provide infrastructure (Andrade and Valverde 2003: 58). The *Favela-Bairro* program that aimed to improve the urban infrastructure within the city's favelas also contributed with improvements;

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[51] Interview with Gabriel, November 9th 2012.
[52] Interview November 23rd 2012.

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however, these interventions were not able to keep up with the massive growth of the community.

The largest urban upgrading intervention Rocinha has seen so far stems from the federal infrastructure program called the Program of Accelerated Growth (PAC[53]) which was launched in 2007. Through the first phase of this program, Rocinha received projects such as a new Sport Complex, a health clinic, a community center and a bridge designed by the famous architect Oscar Niemeyer. Through the PAC-programs Rocinha will receive investments for 1,6 billion Reais (Barros 2013). This process opens up a window of opportunity to make Rocinha more of a *bairro* and less of a favela in practice. Becoming more of a *bairro* can mean different things, however.

In May 2011, The Municipal Secretary of Housing (SMH) and the Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP) conducted a study which concluded that 44 of the city's favelas would pass to be classified as *bairros*, because they supposedly have access to the same basic services enjoyed by residents of the asphalt (Daflon 2011).[54] According to Oliveira (2012: 50), these areas had not made any significant advances in terms of urban upgrading prior to their change of status, and several were still under the rule of traffickers and militias. Considering the present elements in the definition of a favela, both in its legal (land ownership) as well as structural characteristics (constructions, household density, street layout, public services etcetera), these territories continue to be characterized by features that makes it valid to classify them as favelas according to the definition quoted in the introduction. So why were they renamed?

Just the term "favela" in itself carries a symbolical baggage that distances these territories from the rest of society. The documentary *5X Pacificação*[55] states that one of the arguments given to renaming favelas as *bairros* is so that the citizens (understood as those from the asphalt) can enter, shop and start a business. "They call it a *bairro* to avoid the stigmatization

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[53] The PAC program was launched in Rocinha before the Pacification. As the program is still not completed but conceived as an integral part of the governmental interventions in Rocinha today by the residents, I use the projects that are already completed to illustrate how the residents perceive the entrance of the state and the ongoing process surrounding the remaining PAC 1 projects to be implemented and the upcoming PAC 2.

[54] The headline of the newspaper article about this research was "the city of Rio gains 44 ex-favelas", as if they had not been a part of the city before but could now be included, now that they no longer classified as favelas. This is quite emblematic for the way the favela is still conceptualized as a space outside regular society.

[55] Documentary portraying the pacification of 5 favelas. More information available at: http://5xpacificacao.com.br/ Last accessed May 7th 2013.

of being a *morro*."[56] The reclassification of former favelas as neighborhoods are ways of symbolically cleansing the stigma the favelas and their populations carry, allowing the asphalt to enter. According to the *Comitê Popular da Copa e Olympiadas* (2013), a civic committee following the process of making Rio de Janeiro an Olympic city, the municipality is trying to reduce the visibility of poverty in the city as part of a project of rebranding the city in front of the mega-events. The committee uses as an example how the municipality demanded that Google reduced the presence of favelas on their maps in addition to removing the word "favela" from the names of these territories. Another example is how municipality is building a large wall between the highway connecting the main airport to the center of the city and the adjoining favelas, allegedly to protect the residents from the noise. Critics claim that this wall rather is meant to hide this unattractive first impression of the city from the tourists (Consetino 2013). Other places people are forcefully evicted in order to make space for the arenas that will host the mega-events, as is the case of the Vila Autódromo community in the Jacarepaguá neighborhood.[57] In the process of making Rio an Olympic city, poor territories are being forcefully removed both in the virtual world and in real life. Whether through constructing walls to hide poverty, changing the names of the areas from favelas to *bairros* or constructing big, visual projects displacing the original settlements, the current governmental interventions in the favelas contribute to a process of "reimagining" Rio de Janeiro and the favelas' place in the city.

After decades where the name Rio de Janeiro would make people think of violence and crime, the city is reconstructing the image of the "marvelous city". The favela's place in this process is central. No longer mere threatening, dangerous spaces outside of civilized society, the pacified favelas are today spaces of economic and touristic interest. An illustrative example is the role pacified favelas played under the Rio+20 international climate summit in June 2012. While the government had the army and war tanks guarding the entrance of Rocinha when Rio hosted the climate summit in 1992, things had changed drastically when they arranged the Rio+20 twenty years later. Six months after being pacified there was no need for the army maintaining a security wall around Rocinha. Visits to pacified favelas were part of the official program, and representatives from all over the world were shown around in areas that just a few years earlier had been seen as inaccessible to anyone but the residents themselves. The

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[56] Quote from the Documentary *5 x Pacificação*. *Morro* is Portuguese for hill or mountaintop, and is another word for favela because of their stereotypical location on the hillsides.
[57] Settlement of approximately 500 families that is slated to be evicted for the construction of Olympic arenas. See Braathen et al. (2013).

local authorities showed off how they had regained control over the previously considered ungovernable space, and demonstrated the social, cultural and infrastructural services residents had received. This shows how the favelas' place in the social imaginary has changed, both when it comes to the threat and the potential they pose.

4.1.3 Symbolical cleansing?

"There was a time when it was difficult here in the community. If you said that you were from Rocinha, it was impossible to find work, because Rocinha was very hard core. Hard core- it made people scared, just the name Rocinha."[58]

The statement above describes how the framing of Rocinha residents has hindered their access to the city and citizenship in the past, because of the identification between Rocinha and crime. As the UPPs are stationed in the favelas on a permanent basis, this gives the police opportunities to relate with the residents in everyday situations, not just the exceptional police interventions of before. New assemblages are therefore being created in the relationship between residents and police in UPP communities, which Melicio et al. (2012) claim could be leading to a pulverization of the previous dichotomies of favela and asphalt, of good and bad, criminals and citizens, serving as a kind of "symbolical cleansing" of the favela residents. While a news article regarding Rocinha in the past most likely would have been related to drug trafficking and violence, articles about social programs, infrastructure projects and other success stories are now reaching the headlines of Rio de Janeiro newspapers. People from the asphalt are therefore not as quick to automatically link *favelado*-criminal as before, and in that way it can seem as if the pacification has contributed to the residents being more accepted as "*gente de bem*" in relation to citizens from the rest of the city.

Even if the name Rocinha does not place fear in people's eyes like before, that in itself is not a process of inclusion. One resident who has family in Copacabana says he will go there and they will say- "oh, now you're all better, right? Now you have it *bomzinho* (good)?"[59] He says the attitude of people from outside of the favelas is as if they had been domesticated by the traffickers and that they now have been "freed" from their repressors by the police. While the pacification has contributed to giving the favela a more positive image which has "opened" them up for the outside world to enter, Rodrigues and Siqueira (2012: 16) question what is being done to open the rest of the city to the favela residents. The discrimination of the favela

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[58] Interview with Luiz, December 5th 2012.
[59] Interview with Bruno, November 29th 2012.

residents is not restrained to their association with crime. It is about more than that; it is about the highly unequal relations in Brazil and the distance between rich and poor. This is not necessarily something that is addressed by the symbolical cleansing of the pacification. In the words of one resident;

"The stigmatization of the favela is nothing new; it's from before the drug trafficking, that's just an excuse. The discrimination doesn't happen here, in the favela- it's down there, in the house of the Dono *where the maid or the doorman works. Even if the high class knows that their employees are living in "safer" areas, it doesn't change their relations."[60]*

People from the asphalt are no longer afraid, but seem to expect them to feel privileged to live in a "pacified" community. As a woman from Cantagalo remarked;[61]

"When they (people from the asphalt) talk, it is as if formerly there were no services here, like there was nothing here, that it is the government that is bringing it now."

Not only ahistorical in that it disregards the multiple abuses the state has been an accomplice of in these communities, this attitude also ignores all that the residents have been able to construct through decades of struggles in spite of all the obstacles that had to be overcome. The favelas were not just territories of misery and criminals, but communities with many of the services of a formal neighborhood. Today, this seems lost to the outside world; there is little recognition of the things that did function before the pacification. The residents feel like they are expected to be grateful for what the state is giving them, which are services, but not necessarily better than what they had before. An example is the television. With the informal *gatonet* they had access to hundreds of channels practically for free, with the legalization and formalization of these types of services they now have to pay 35 Reais per month for cable from the private company Sky TV.

4.1.4 The entrance of the market

According to the governor Sérgio Cabral, the entrance of capitalism in pacified favelas is an essential aspect of the pacification. He has stated that "we have to keep doing construction projects, but capitalism has to enter more and more, to generate a win-win situation in the community"[62] (Schmitt 2011). In the past, it was seen as too dangerous to invest in the favelas

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[60] Interview with Bruno November 29th 2012.
[61] Cantagalo is another favela is the sooth zone of Rio de Janeiro, which was pacified in 2009. Statement from Bianca at the *Favela é Cidade-* seminar November 27th 2012.
[62] He is referring to Rocinha.

because of the drug factions that controlled the areas. Crime in itself was framed as a security threat because of the danger it was thought to pose to market-led growth. Through securing and "rebranding" these areas, making them safer for outsiders, the pacification has served as a door opener for the market and private interests to enter the favela, who now claim their part of these territories. According to Samara (2011: 3-4) city authorities in many prominent cities of the global South work closely with business elites to implement urban security management strategies for the purpose of reclaiming and revitalizing core urban spaces to anchor citywide development. The UPPs represent a practice of policing within neoliberal governance in which security, its understanding and practice are closely linked to the growth requirements of the market (Samara 2010). Following the line of Samara, the pacification process exemplifies how the neoliberal state uses security and developmental interventions as one coincident process of "securing the peace" in the city in general. The favelas represent both an unacceptable threat to the civilized order, which must be eliminated for security reasons, and spaces of economic interest.

In the state absence, an informal organization of everything from television and electricity to garbage collection had emerged. With the pacification comes a "shock of order" to formalize businesses and real estate as the city government introduces *mutirões de formalização* (formalization task forces) as part of the program *Empresa Bacana* (Cool Company) (Urani et al. 2011). Communities with UPPs have also received a new program called *Comércio Legal* (Legal Trade), which has brought representatives from financial institutions, micro-entrepreneurs and local business people together to discuss future possible economic growth through incentives and credit lines (Willis 2012). David Harvey (2003) has argued that capitalism has launched the world on a new wave of "enclosing the commons". Typically, the right to commons is privatized, and services that used to be informally taken care of; like electricity, water, internet connection and public transportation, are substituted by the formal economy. With the pacification the general informality of the favelas is being formalized. This criminalization of the previous informal structures, as well as the implementation of state laws and regulations, is a way to include the residents in the state bureaucracy. The positive aspects of this process are that people are gaining formal inclusion. The access to papers on their property opens up for taking up loans, for example. On the other hand, it has some negative side-effects. Residents complain that their duties have arrived before their rights; whereas the formalization of the many informal structures and activities has begun, residents

still lack access to services such as a juridical body, proper health care and well-functioning education, to name a few.

Making the favelas more accessible for outside actors and interests is starting to show results. Businesses in favelas with UPPs are growing 23 percent faster than in the rest of the city, and it is the bigger businesses that have been attracted by the pacification that have seen the highest levels of growth. The FGV-researcher Marcelo Neri states that:

"A big hamburger company that is attracted by the pacification and the possibility of advertising its product might be invading a (smaller) Brazilian barbeque business."[63]

In Rocinha, residents remark that:

"Ricardo Electrico (a chain store selling electric goods) entered a little bit before the pacification; one or two weeks. Casa Bahia (another store) entered now. These big companies that are coming here, the community accepts them really well, but at the same time they are not going to give any benefits to the community at all. On the contrary; the small businesses that exist here in via Apia (the main street by the entrance of Rocinha) are not going to be able to compete with them. So they will have to close."[64]

"The big companies that enter ruin the local economy. A product in Casa Bahia might be 900 Reais, while it is 500 Reais in a local store. But because you can parcel up the payment there, a lot of people prefer it. Local business is not surviving...it is not better for the community, but people are short sighted." [65]

Throughout most of the last century, the fear of *o morro descer*; the fear that the people from the hills of the favelas would descend and invade the city, was strong in the public imaginary (Leite 2000: 77). In the words of Matheus; "The threat is no longer of the favela invading the asphalt, but of the asphalt invading the favela."[66]

4.1.5 Gentrification

While rents in Rio in general are exploding because of a real estate speculation in front of the upcoming mega-events, the rents in favelas that have installed UPPs have increased an additional 7 percent over the city average since 2008 (Neri 2011: 31). Because of their central location, the pacified favelas constitute prime pieces of real estate with some of the best views

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[63] Willis (2012).
[64] Interview with Matheus November 13th 2012.
[65] Interview with Luiz December 5th 2012.
[66] Interview November 13th 2012.

in the city. The tight relationships between urban authorities and private real estate developers in the largest and most prestigious projects of the city suggest that capitalist-bureaucratic logics steer the machine of slum upgrading in Rio de Janeiro (Braathen et.al 2013: 38). The favelas are being invaded by the middle class and tourists that can no longer afford living in the other neighborhoods in the center. Earlier they would have been intimidated by the security situation, but that is no longer an issue in favelas that have installed UPPs. Tourists pay up to 1,000 Reais per month for a small apartment in Rocinha. Compared to areas like Ipanema and Copacabana this is a good deal, but when the average price of a similar apartment was 300 Reais before the pacification, this has had a huge impact on rents in general for the locals. In addition, the general prices has increased by an average of 18,5 percent in the year that has passed since the occupation of Rocinha.[67] Many families cannot afford the transformation of the area into a regulated part of the city and have had to move out of the centrally located favela to cheaper neighborhoods on the outskirts of the city.

"A time is going to come when Rocinha no longer has residents from Rocinha. Because they are not going to be able to pay the rents, the prices are really high."[68]

This gentrification process has been named *remoçao branca,* or white removal. Rio has been unique in that the favelas are wedged between middle-class areas, whereas other cities generally have slums on the outskirts. No longer the forced removals of earlier decades, this is still a process of socio-spatial segregation corresponding to a framework of a state or city of exception (Agamben 2005; Vainer 2000, 2011).

4.1.6 Security for whom?

Not only does the pacification improve the security and reputation in the city of Rio in general in front of the mega-events, it also makes the favelas themselves safer for outsiders to enter. The UPP police are establishing a particular type of security which is clearing the way, so to speak, for neoliberal development in the communities. The pacification is thus situated in relation to the shifting meanings of security in a (neo)liberal world and the city's emphasis on economic growth, where the attempt to develop the favelas is through a law-enforcement-driven urban renewal process. The pacification as such is about securing investments in front of the mega-events, both by opening up the favelas for the market and by neutralizing the

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[67] See Attachment 1.
[68] Interview with Matheus, November 13th 2012.

security threat the *favelados* were posing to economic development in the rest of the city. The worst consequence of this new urban planning, in the point of view of the Brazilian urban planner Raquel Rolnik, is the contempt of the poorest and most marginalized inhabitants (Carta Capital 2010). Forced removals, police corruption and lack of compliance with the institutional framework and civil and human rights are some of the abuses that have been reported in the process of adapting the city to the mega-events. It is therefore relevant to ask *who* the security is for when talking about the pacification as a public security initiative.

Chapter 3 talked about the relationship between security and governance, and showed that the construction of the *favelados* as a "violent other" that has upheld their unequal inclusion in the city inherently continues with the pacification. These territories and populations are still seen as constituting a threat to the sense of security in the city. This chapter argues that they therefore have to be "pacified" in order to fulfill the economic potential of both these spaces and the city in general. As the city of exception undergoes the transformations necessary to construct the Olympic city, security for favela residents therefore comes second to the security in the rest of the city. The biopolitical aspects of the pacification are no less violent in its means and consequences than earlier state interventions in the favelas. While the violence of the police is not as concrete as before; while the "war" is not as visible, the *remoção branca*, the suppressing of local sociabilities and increasing levels of crime and insecurity demonstrates the violence inherent in the pacification as a biopolitical regime.

4.1.7 Concluding remarks

I started this chapter with a statement from the deputy commander of the Rocinha UPP Police claiming that the pacification is an inclusive process. If the pacification is promoting inclusion, it is on the premises of the state. The entry of social services and urban upgrading programs seems increasingly to be at the service of the market interests and tourism, to the point where the benefits to community residents appear to be a consequence and not the cause of these practices. In the militarization of space, the UPPs represent a routinization of a state of exception.

While the pacification might strengthen some rights, it at the same time represents a democratic setback in that it puts the right to security (for certain sectors of the society) in front of other rights. With the construction work of the PAC projects, many residents have been forced to move, receiving little or no information nor compensation. In spite of the City

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Statute requiring that all urban policies be subject to popular participation, the process surrounding the selection and implementation of these projects was to a little degree subjected to public insight. This represents a democratic setback not only for favela residents, but all Brazilian citizens, as the urban management of the "city of exception" systematically goes outside the institutional framework. The involvement of the residents in decision-making processes surrounding these type of interventions will be the topic for the next chapter.

5 Citizenship and Participation

The last chapter argued that the pacification police are not mainly an instrument to solve the "problem of violence" in the favelas. Rather, they are a device for the neoliberal state, present in the favelas to solve another issue: to open up for neoliberal management and economic development of these territories. The intensification of the neoliberal model of urban management brings with it mayor impacts on the conceptualization, construction and execution of citizen participation in the city.

According to Miraftab and Wills (2005: 201) the protagonists of the drama of citizenship created under the conditions of neoliberal urban policies are the urban poor. For all the institutional innovations in Brazil the last decades, there remains a gap between the legal and technical apparatus that has been created to institutionalize participation and the reality of the effective exclusion of poorer and more marginalized citizens (Cornwall and Coelho 2007: 3). This is especially evident in the territories directly affected by the process of creating the Olympic city, such as the pacified favelas. There, people's institutional rights have had to succumb for the "well-being" of society in general, defined within a neoliberal discourse of economic development. This process is however not uncontested, neither in the city as a whole nor in the different pacified favelas. I mentioned the *Comitê Popular da Copa e Olympíadas* as one of the civil society movements that accompany the politics and interventions of the government and report abuses and violations. The municipal elections in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 have been characterized as a political spring (*primavera carioca)* by the student mass where the socialist candidate of the PSOL-party (*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*), Marcelo Freixo, received wide support and created a public debate around the processes the city is undergoing. There are also forces within the favelas that struggle for a participatory process, which will be the topic for this chapter.

5.1.1 Spaces of citizen participation

The historic spaces of participation in the favelas have been the Residents' Associations. There are also other actors present; like NGOs, churches, alternative media channels and local leader figures. The pacification program has also brought with it new mediators between the

favela and the city; the UPP Police, the UPP Social[69] and the *Câmara Communitaria*[70] being the most central ones in Rocinha.

Cornwall (2002) and Miraftab's (2004) have introduced the conceptions of *invited* and *invented* spaces of citizenship describing the opposition between spaces created by external agencies into which people are invited to participate and spaces where citizens innovate to create their own opportunities and terms of engagement. These spaces are never neutral. Infused with existing relations of power, interactions within them may come to reproduce rather than challenge hierarchies and inequalities (Cornwall 2004: 81). Cornwall (2002) warn us that invited spaces of participation are easily reduced to top-down appeal boards where citizens have no real bargaining power. Rather than dismissing these spaces as undemocratic, however, one has to look at the dynamics of participation within them. Miraftab (2004) has underlined the significance of expanding the arenas of practicing citizenship to include both invited and invented spaces of citizenship. As invited spaces involve both civil society and the state, they potentially offer a great scope for reconfiguring power relations and extending democratic practices (Gaventa 2004; Rodgers 2007). The "strategic reversibility" (Foucault 1991: 5) of power relations means that such governmental practices and "regimes of truth" in themselves are always sites of resistance and produce possibilities for subversion, appropriation and reconstruction (Cornwall 2004: 81). I will therefore add *inverted* spaces as a third category; describing spaces that have gained a different character than what they originally started out as.

As a basis to assessing the current spaces for citizen participation and the dynamics within them in Rocinha, I want to start with a brief historic contextualization of associative life in the community. Then I will discuss the spaces of citizenship engagement after the pacification and the entrance of the neoliberal state to see what bargaining power the residents have within these spaces. The new dynamics of participation and dialogue with the government is an essential aspect of evaluating the possible approximation process between the favela and the asphalt promoted by the pacification program.

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[69] UPP Social coordinates the different municipal interventions in pacified favelas. See section 5.1.4.

[70] The *Câmara Comunitaria* was created by the neighborhoods of Rocinha, São Conrado and Gávea to accompany the PAC projects (thus before the pacification). The *Câmera* has had groups working of different topics, and both community leaders and state/municipal agents have participated in reunions. See section 5.1.8**Error! Reference source not found.**.

5.1.2 History of associative life

The favelas of Rio de Janeiro have a long history of popular organization where several informal systems developed within the favelas to keep order in the state's absence. Churches, NGOs and grassroots' organizations have been active providing social services and making demands on behalf of the residents. The most central civil society organizations within the favelas, however, have been the Residents' Associations who have won many political struggles over improvements in the communities. The first AMs in Rio de Janeiro were formed in the 1940's with support from the political left, churches, and the state itself (Arias 2006: 23-25). Rocinha has had various Residents Associations, of which two are active today. The first one, AMABB (The Association of the Residents and Friends of the Barcelos Neighborhood), formed when people moved to the area for the construction of the Niemeyer highway and the tunnel that goes underneath the community. At the time Rocinha still did not exist, only the area called Barcelos, which gave name to the Association. As the community grew it eventually merged with what today is Rocinha. The second and biggest AM in Rocinha is UPMMR (Union for Improvements for the residents of Rocinha), which was founded in 1961. While AMABB works primarily with the lower part of the community, UPMMR represents all of Rocinha and has been the institution representing the community in dialogue with the government.

The AMs in favelas throughout Rio de Janeiro were created by residents in order to make demands and improvements. They had different work groups working on specific areas that would dialogue with the community about the needs and bring their demands to the state and municipal governments. Together, the AMs in the city formed coalitions; first the Federation of the Favela Associations of Guanabara (FAFEG) and then, after the fusion of the city and the state of Rio de Janeiro in 1975, the Federation of Residents' Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ) (Perlman 2010: 27). These federations enjoyed considerable autonomy and had a great deal of bargaining power over candidates for positions in the City Council until the mid-1980's (Perlman 2010: 28).

Effective electoral competition is the *sine qua non* of any democracy and critical for an effective civil society. If the so-called democratic consolidation of the 1980's amplified the electoral franchises and the party-political competition, little was done to advance the construction of a plural and democratic public sphere (Machado da Silva and Leite 2004). The democratic opening and the shift from extermination policies to a focus on upgrading the

favelas enabled the establishment of a dialogue between favela residents and the state, yet, it also opened new spaces for the spread of clientilist policies. Rodrigues et al. (2012: 54) claim that the AMs in Rio de Janeiro have been seen by the state as a possibility to politically subordinate the favelas. If the state on the one hand would listen to the demands from the representatives, they would on the other hand try to transform the AMs into "*braços estatais*" or the state's right hand within the communities. According to one resident of Rocinha;

> *"They were the state's right hand within the community rather than a mediator between the state and the community."*[71]

Residents I've spoken seem to agree on the fact that the AMs in Rocinha were organizations that *de fato* represented the residents up until the beginning of the 1980's. They were created by the residents as invented spaces of participation, in line with the classification of Cornwall (2002: 50) as "forms of action where citizens innovate to create their own opportunities and terms of engagement". Over time, however, clientilist relations started to change the dynamics of the Associations. In Rio de Janeiro, a system has developed where the AMs were able to acquire public services through what is referred to as *político da bica d'agua*. This is a clientilistic practice where a politician with close bonds to the community would guarantee some improvements, such as electricity or the pavement of a road, in return for votes (Rodrigues et al. 2012: 54). When Brizola was first elected governor in 1982 this clientilist relationship between the AMs and the state consolidated. According to one interview I had,[72] he would use the AMs as apparatuses of personal power, promising projects and getting votes and popularity in return. The following quote is from a former president of AMABB, and describes how he would go forth to dialogue with the state apparatus:

> *"I have a direct contact with the governor, with the secretary of the governor (..) When we were in the AM we were always making demands, we saw we needed sewage, went there and made a solicitation, there was a road that was broken and we would request improvements. This way we got to know them, we went there, sometimes we were attended, other times not, but in a certain way we became friends."*[73]

As the quote demonstrates, and in accordance with Rodrigues et al. (2012), the power of the AMs was depending more on the political contacts and personal network of the leaders rather than their ability to organize the community to put pressure on public agents. Slowly, the role

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[71] Interview with Bruno, November 29th 2012.
[72] Interview with Rafael, November 30th 2012.
[73] Interview with Luiz, December 5th 2012.

of the AMs in the relation between the residents and the state was being inverted. From the demands being bottom-up, the dialogue became top-down. This transformation of the AMs from a representative organ to managers of public resources gradually emptied them of political content and transformed a good part of the local associations into representatives for the public power within the community (Burgos 1998: 31).

In the mid-1980's, with the entrance and consolidation of power of the drug factions, the un-democratic dynamics of the AMs further developed. The traffickers started paying interest to the election of the presidents of the associations and presented candidates for election (Zaluar and Alvito 1998: 212). According to Luiz, no one was elected without the approval of the traffickers.[74] Several AM leaders have been murdered because of conflicts related to the drug trade, latest in March 2012 (after the pacification) when the president of AMABB was killed in a drive-by shooting. In addition to controlling the AMs the traffickers also had tight bonds to politicians and local city councilmen, and there is a long history of corruption scandals that branches well into the municipal/state power apparatus. As an example, both the current presidents of the Rocinha AMs and several former ones I have talked to have ran for elections and have been accused of using their position to buy votes. Thus, it can seem as if the AMs had been reduced to being an electoral trampoline or a space for the individual interests of certain leaders, all with tight bonds to the traffickers.

There have been and continues to be some strong leader figures in the community also outside of the AMs, but their possibility of action has been restrained by the political system of clientilist relations and the limitations set by the traffickers. There is currently a variety of NGOs in Rocinha, working mainly with children with arts, sports or educational classes. In general they have small, centralized areas of impact that are not political, and many of them are today funded by foreign capital. The evangelical churches also have a strong position within the community as providers of various social services. As of today, there is little cooperation between these different actors. The leader of one NGO was very skeptical of the AMs saying that "I'll tell you what, I'm 21 years old and I only heard about the work of the Association recently."[75] The President of UPMMR, on the other hand, said that "I do not see a

[74] Interview December 5th 2012.
[75] Interview with Matheus, November 13th 2012.

single improvement here in the community done by NGOs".[76] The Secretary of AMABB said:

"We do not have a close relationship (with the NGOs). We don't try to get in contact with them a lot, because the majority are foreigners. They are very... 99 percent of them don't do anything." [77]

When I asked people if there had been other spaces where residents would organize themselves to make demands since the AMs lost their function as representatives for the community in the dialogue with the government, the answer was straight forward; "the drug trafficking kills".[78] The violence and the fear of the drug traffickers put limitations on the actuation of politicians, community leaders and the AMs. As this brief historic contextualization demonstrates, the AMs, as originally invented spaces, were inverted because of clientilistic relations, the state transforming them to its "right arm" within the community, and the drug traffickers. The other civil society actors in the community were mainly non-political providers of services, with the exception of a few local leader figures. The situation in Rocinha when the UPPs entered in 2011 was thus a fragmented and fragile civil society in large part controlled by the traffickers.

The proximity policing approach of the pacification program is stepping away from the discourse of war and police business as usual. The promise of the UPPs is historic: it is inclusion. Inclusion however demands involvement. According to Barbosa (2012) a principal feature of the UPPs as a proximity policing project should be the joint participation of the public in the production of order and the management of safety in the local community. Taking Barbosas line of argument as a starting point, the Pacification project relies on building and maintaining relationships with the favela residents if it is to be an inclusive process. That also means that they will have to change the culture that has grown over the last decades where people do not make demands and organize themselves because of fear of the traffickers and create a population that knows their rights and demands it. Is that something the government really wants?

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[76] Interview November 23rd 2012.
[77] Interview November 30th 2012.
[78] Interview with Rafael and Felipe November 30th 2012.

5.1.3 The UPP police and the AMs

One of the aspects of Rodrigues' et al. (2012) research on the UPPs was the impact the UPPs had on the Residents Associations and associative life in pacified favelas. They interviewed people from thirty-eight different Residents' Associations and according to their findings, twenty-five out of thirty-three presidents of the AMs say they have a very good or a good relationship with the UPP police and only three said to have a bad relationship. Twenty-six of the presidents said that the UPP police participated regularly in the activities and events organized by the AMs. The majority claimed to not have lost ground to the UPPs when it comes to implementation of projects, although the researchers found evidence that there might not have been new projects started up by the AMs after the arrival of the police (Rodrigues et al. 2012: 69). Interestingly, this picture is a sharp contrast to what I found in Rocinha, where the relationship between the AMs and the UPP police is constrained at best.

In accordance with the brief history of the AMs in Rocinha above, the residents I spoke to seemed to agree on the fact that the process of the AMs losing legitimacy had started in the 1980's. The leadership of the AMs themselves, however, stated the entrance of the UPP police as the most decisive turning point for their position within the community. According to the secretary of AMABB;

> *"They (the police) entered and cut the bond that the community had with the association (...) if people have problems, they do not come here anymore. They go straight to the police (...) because the police commander himself said so. He said: before, Nem was in charge here. Today, I am. The UPP police doesn't have any contact with us and totally discredited us."[79]*

Luiz, a former AMABB president, similarly claimed that "Everything today is directly with the UPP. They completely withdrew the credibility of the Resident Associations."[80] The current President of AMABB complained about the inexistent relationship between the UPPs and the AMs, saying he had expected the UPP commander to approach the AM when they entered to learn about the situation in Rocinha from the people who "knew the community the best". They never did, which he thinks is because of the alleged bonds between the AMs and traffickers. Luiz also thought that the UPP police should have opened a dialogue with the AMs who- in spite of having historical ties to the traffickers- also know the residents and the

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[79] Interview with Geraldo, November 30th 2012.
[80] Interview with Luiz, December 5th 2012.

needs of the community. "The UPP doesn't have the local knowledge,"[81] he said. As a response to these allegations, the Rocinha UPP deputy commander Medeiros said that:

"The Residents Associations had a connection with the trafficking. We don't talk with the enemy; we don't accept an illegal project. So the dialogue is cut off, precisely because the Association has, or had, a connection with the drug trafficking. It is impossible to work together with illegality."[82]

As we can see, the relationship with AMABB and the UPP is non-existent. I also interviewed the president of the other Residents Association UPMMR, who agreed to talk to me on certain conditions; saying "I will not talk about the pacification or politics." He had recently been involved in scandal when he ran for city councilman and was charged of having connections with the traffickers and buying votes. I therefore did not get any concrete information from UPMMR about their relationship with the police, but from what he did *not* say, the attitude of the police, and from what residents have commented, UPMMR seems to have lost influence after the pacification as well.

Rafael, the leader of an alternative media channel within Rocinha, claimed that there is no longer a need for the AMs in Rocinha. As the historic role of the AMs to a large degree had been reduced to being a mediator between the state and the traffickers, they to a certain degree lost their function with the pacification as other mediators have entered. While they might not have had been very representative the last decades, they were still a space for some social programs and services that was important for the community.

"Today, the role of the AM, we have social services (...) to know if the children are studying, if that person needs anything, there are people here that don't have any documents, and that doesn't know how to get them, we (...) help that person get his or her documents. We also have a list over job vacancies here; we have a partnership with companies."[83]

AMABB provide similar services as UPMMR. However, they complain about lack of resources and legitimacy since the entrance of the UPPs which is seriously undermining the work they used to do. In the words of the secretary of AMABB:

"For all the projects that we had, that were in execution, they (the police) are trying to shut them down. Take the children out of the classes, precisely to discredit us. We had a cultural calendar, we had ballet, dance, and martial arts, lawyers who were experts in civil

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[81] Interview with Luiz, December 5th 2012.
[82] Interview December 14th 2012.
[83] Interview with Sebastião, the president of UPMMR, November 23rd 2012.

rights, criminal justice and labor (...) and look how the place is now[84] (...) the projects we had in the community that were working, that were the AM, they stopped. We used to distribute food baskets, vegetables, medicines, (...) everything with our own means. As soon as the UPP arrived, it all ended."[85]

TIM, a cell phone company, had been supporting AMABB with 20,000 Reais per month. Other actors, such as local businesses, would also support the AMs financially. When the UPP entered and the AMs lost legitimacy they lost resources as well, as the private donors no longer wanted to be associated with the discredited associations.

5.1.4 New spaces of dialogue: the UPP Social

While state-society relations are at the core for the understanding of embeddedness for the politics of the developmental state, the state's most crucial interlocutor- civil society- is according to Evans and Heller (forthcoming) the most ambiguous and ambivalent of actors. Civil society actors are not inherently democratizing, and can do anything from expand right-based conceptions of democratic inclusion, serve as an extension of state hegemony, or devolve into involuntary forms of retrenchment (Evans and Heller forthcoming). Tilly (2004) agrees that not all social movements are democratic, often making demands in the name of particularized conceptions of "the people". He nonetheless claims that they have democratizing effects: "Social movements assert popular sovereignty (...) the stress on popular consent fundamentally challenges divine right to kingship. Social movements pose a crucial question: do sovereignty and its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in the people it claims to represent?" (Tilly 2004: 13).

Heller and Evans and Tilly underline the importance of having an active civil society. With the pacification program the AMs have lost their privileged position in the community as the mediator between the community and the government. The government has supported the creation of new spaces of citizen participation in accordance with the institutional framework demanding participatory governance. However, one cannot assume that these "new democratic spaces" it will automatically become a "space for change" (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) where the residents can realize their rights and claim substantive citizenship. That will depend on dynamics of participation within them.

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[84] I was there at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and except from two people at the front desk, the president, the secretary and one resident, the place was empty.
[85] Interview with Geraldo, November 23rd 2012.

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The UPP Social[86] is the government's response to a space for dialogue with the residents of pacified favelas. This municipal program has the explicit objective of coordinating the interventions of the various organs of the municipality in pacified communities and promote partnership with the state and federal governments, as well as the private sector and the civil society, to execute social programs (Leite 2012: 383). According to the official webpage of the program, the UPP Social has three main objectives; i: contribute to the consolidation of peace and the promotion of local citizenship in the pacified territories; ii: promote urban, social and economic development and iii: carry out the full integration of these areas with the rest of the city (UPP Social Programa).

The UPP Social of Rocinha was inaugurated on November 1st 2012. The president of the Pereira Passos Institute and coordinator of the UPP Social program, Eduarda La Rocque, opened the meeting by saying that: "Today, with this dialogue, we are going to show the activities that have already been carried out in Rocinha, as well as hear the demands of the local population". According to Leite (2012), residents have two main criticisms to the UPP Social, the first one being that it is not very efficient in promoting a real articulation between the diverse institutions and the residents. The Rocinha UPP Social meeting was held during the day on a weekday, which made it difficult for people to attend even if they had wanted to. The form of the meeting was a board of governmental agents that talked through most of the meeting about the projects and services in the community, and then there was room for comments from residents in the end. Keeping in mind that Rocinha has close to 200,000 inhabitants by unofficial counts, this can hardly be called a participatory space. A resident from the favela Cantagalo stated the following about the experience with the UPP Social in Cantagalo:

"The UPP Social doesn't open up for discussing the budget with the communities. People need to participate, have control over the budget, know how much the projects costs, we need transparency and control over the public budget. But in Brazil that is always lacking, leading to corruption and lack of transparency. This is not democratic."[87]

Spaces for public involvement become sites for citizen participation only when citizens gain meaningful opportunities to exercise voice and hold to account those who invite them to participate. This represents the difference between spaces where participation is reduced to

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[86] The UPP social is independent of the UPP Police, in spite of the name. It was initially a state project but the project has been handed over to the municipal government.
[87] Bianca, Favela é Cidade- seminar November 27th 2012.

top-down appeal board to inform residents about decisions already made, or spaces of bottom-up citizen participation where the residents are actively involved in the selection and formation of projects and programs in their community (Cornwall 2002). In practice, the UPP Social as of now represents a top-down appeal board or a pure informational space that informs the residents what projects are selected on their behalf. This becomes even clearer in the light of the following statement by the Secretary of Security Beltrame as quoted in Leite (2012: 384):

"I have received and visited the residents of these communities frequently. There is a tremendous social debt that stems from the colonization of these lands. The majority are blacks, browns, mulattos, poor and very poor. There are deficiencies so big that it is necessary to help them to ask, because it is difficult for them to prioritize emergencies."

The last sentence; that they need help to choose because it is difficult for them to prioritize, does according to Leite reveal the implicit meaning of the pacification program. The pacification program is not only about needs and emergencies, but equally about making the *favelado* a future citizen through disciplining and civilizing the residents into making better choices when it comes to what kind of demands they make, how they behave and what constitutes civilized behavior.

5.1.5 The PAC-projects and participation

Not only allowing but encouraging community input in the projects and interventions coming to the communities could help the UPPs build relationships with residents and gain legitimacy in the community. However, as it is difficult for the residents to make the "right" choices, their access to decision-making processes is limited. As chapter 4 demonstrated, the PAC interventions can be seen in light of a framework of neoliberal urban renewal. The favourization of the kind of "statement" projects that have been prioritized have been a topic of debate in the communities, as has the process of selecting the projects for implementation.

The *Câmara Communitaria* is a chamber that was created by the neighborhoods of Gávea, Rocinha and São Conrado to accompany the PAC 1 projects in 2007. It consisted of participants from neighborhood associations, NGOs, local leaders and governmental agents. I have received ambiguous reports as to how this worked; some claimed it represented a space for dialogue while others said they had no real decisive power over the projects selected nor

over the budget. As one resident complained, the projects that are destined towards Rocinha did not go through a process of real dialogue with the community:

"The dialogue between the state and the residents, they don't do that. For example, if there is a project, PAC 2, I think they should have an assembly, with a group of residents, invite residents from the community to discuss issues of interest for the PAC 2 with residents from Rocinha. They don't do that. They have a finished package; this is what we are going to bring to Rocinha. Sometimes what they send to Rocinha is not needed here. There are other priorities. Today, for example, Rocinha has the highest indices of Tuberculosis in Brazil. I ask you, where is the prioritization of health?"[88]

The PAC 1 was placed on hold in 2011 when roughly 70% of the work had been completed; yet the public authorities had exceeded the initial budget by about 35% (Daflon and Berta 2011). When the PAC 1 ran out of money it was the kindergarten and sewage the community had been promised that were down prioritized. Residents claim the government is failing to address the most urgent needs of the community; such as inadequate garbage collection, water access, sewage and public transportation. Many residents have expressed concern that they are bringing in big, visual projects to revitalize the area and make it more attractive for the middle-class without taking into consideration the current residents and their requests.[89] Local resident Gabriel[90] worries that the different projects are simply status projects the government is using to boast to the rest of the country and the world how they are investing in the poor in the favelas. He uses the 18 million Reais Niemeyer Bridge as an example, which connects Rocinha to the Sport Complex across the highway.[91] As Brazil's most famous architect and the master mind behind the urban planning of the capital Brasilia, any project with Niemeyer's name on it is bound to draw attention. Gabriel says they could have built a simple bridge for a fraction of the price and spent the rest of the money on the more "boring" but at the same time urgent needs of the community. There is an open gutter running past the Sport Complex and the new bridge where the stench of sewage is strong. But as he ironically pointed out; nobody could see that on the inauguration pictures. According to the residents of Rocinha;

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[88] Interview with Luiz, December 5th 2012.
[89] Both PAC 1 and 2 have projects like sewage and infrastructural upgrading on the agenda. But if you look at the budgeting, the prestige projects are taking an unproportional amount of the resources when taking into consideration the precariousness of these needs.
[90] Interview November 9th 2012.
[91] See Appendix for picture.

"In Rocinha there are public services. There are schools, the sport complex, the UPA (health clinic), police, the library/community center. The problem is that in itself, these are just empty buildings. It is not enough that the state constructs these nice buildings. A library is nothing but a book deposit unless one works actively to go out and involve the community, get them to use it. (..) They do the inauguration; show pictures in the media, say look what we build here! But if the services don't work, if people feel like they are discriminated and not listened to at the UPA, if they never use the library, it is not really a service."[92]

"We have for example the library of Rocinha. I think it is a governmental program that is very... we use a term: para ingles ver.*"*[93]

Para ingles ver is a Brazilian expression saying that something is just for the sake of appearances. That is an expression that frequently was used by the residents when talking about the projects that had come to the community. They come as a "finished package" designed by agents from the outside that appear to have a specific agenda in their selection of programs in terms of rebranding the area. The remaining PAC 1 projects are about to be initiated along with it the second phase of the program; the PAC 2. The biggest investment of the PAC 2 will be the implementation of a cable car after the model of the one constructed in the Complexo Alemão.[94] It is estimated that the cable car will use up to 70 percent of the 750 million set aside for PAC 2 and it will do very little to better the quality of life for Rocinha's residents. What it will do, however, is portray a more positive image of the community to the outside.

5.1.6 Participation as a spatial practice

Foucault argues that "space is fundamental in an exercise of power" (1984: 252). Making available, claiming and taking up spaces therefore need to be seen as acts of power. Lefebvre (1991) has similarly pointed out that the "spatial practices" associated with notions like empowerment and participation constitute and are constituted by particular ways of thinking about society and are in themselves acts of power. "Space is a social product… it is not simply "there", a neutral container waiting to be filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control, and hence of domination, of power" (Ibid.: 24). Cornwall (2002: 50) argues that spatial practices like community meetings and community action plans do not just

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[92] Interview with Bruno, November 29th 2012.
[93] Interview with Matheus, November 13th 2012
[94] The cable car in Alemão has been widely criticized for being a showcase for tourists rather than what the residents themselves would have chosen, and there was no involvement of the residents in the planning. So far the cable car plans in Rocinha have not been discussed with the residents there either.

presuppose its existence; they *perform* and in some senses *create* it. Those who engage in these practices, who make and fill particular spaces, are positioned actors. Discourses of participation make available particular subject positions for participants to take up, bounding the possibilities for agency (Ibid.).

When residents make demands, it is not enough that the demands are legitimate; they have to be *perceived* as legitimate, meaning that they are vocalized by persons that are recognized as legitimate actors. The favela residents' accept as legitimate participants in the public debate has historically been limited because of their association with poverty, crime and "uncivilness" in the social imaginary. Historical bonds between the AMs and drug traffickers contributed to undermine their independence and legitimacy in the eyes of the authorities (Perlman 2010). At the same time, other actors (national and international NGOs, policy makers, businessmen, researchers, UPP Social and so on) all have their own opinions on what should be done in the community and how. These tend to have more experience in dealing with the state bureaucracy, and their proposals thus appear as more legitimate than those coming from neighborhood councils or local leaders, despite the fact that these actors do not necessarily have ground contact with the local environment. Being constructed as "beneficiaries" or "users" intrudes on what people are perceived to be able to contribute or entitled to know or decide, as well as on the obligations of those who seek to involve them (Cornwall 2002: 50). As Beltrame stated that the favela residents need help selecting projects, they are reduced to being beneficiaries of benevolent state programs rather than being seen as citizens capable of selecting for themselves. What follows is a paternalistic policy where the residents are expected to be grateful for what the state is giving them rather than given real spaces to actively present demands as they might make the "wrong" choices. This seriously undermines the "full exercise and development of citizenship" stated in the agenda of the pacification.

This is again related to the second issue of the UPPs in the eyes of Leite (2012), which is how the leadership of some UPPs are usurping the representation of the base organizations, becoming the voice of the community. While other pacified favelas have more active UPP Social branches, in Rocinha the UPP Social was quite absent; there was only one meeting during my time in the community. In Rocinha it is therefore the UPP police that is the most active state agent within the community, and whom in many ways has taken over the role as

mediator between the community and the state. This raises questions about the militarization of the channels of dialogue with the state.

5.1.7 The UPP police as mediator

As the state on the streets, or its most visible aspect in the informal settlements, the UPP police are the locus of community concerns and interlocutors with public authorities. In 2010 Machado da Silva (2010) expressed concern that the UPPs would become a way of "policing" state-favela relations. Leite (2012) confirms this, showing how the UPPs are becoming the spokesman for the community instead of the Residents' Associations or other representative agents. Instead of just cooperating with the community in order to make police work more efficient and effective, the UPP police officers are themselves acting as agents of social development, doing work that police do not usually do (Mulli 2011). As the AMABB Secretary claimed that the UPP commander in Rocinha entered the community stating that "before, Nem was in charge here. Today, I am"[95] the UPP Commander in Rocinha fulfills the fear of Machado da Silva (2010) and Mulli (2011) that the police are positioning themselves as the new *dono do morro*. The UPP Police commander has a position of great centralized power in the pacified favelas, which according to FGV-researcher Sonya Fleury is one of the main issues of the UPP police.

> *"The state is not a person. It cannot be personal, there has to be clear rules. (…) Yes, there are police officers that are doing a great job, but it is the system we are criticizing."[96]*

The statement was made at the *Favela é Cidade*-seminar as the discussion revolved around the difference in leader style between the current and former UPP commanders of Santa Martha. The previous commander; a woman, had been well liked in the community. The current one, however, is not popular at all. He is an ex-BOPE commander that was in charge of occupying the community, and the popularity of the UPPs has gone down since he took over the leadership. This is just one example of how the relationships between the UPPs and the communities play out differently in different contexts, depending on the leadership of the UPP Police commander. As Fleury stated, the personalization of the leadership of the UPP Police is very problematic. It severely undermines the legitimacy of the UPPs if it is reduced to depending on the popularity of leader style of the commander in charge.

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[95] Interview with Geraldo, November 30th 2012.
[96] At the *Favela é Cidade* seminar in Santa Martha November 26th 2012.

When state agents claim that the pacification and the interventions are going to be a joint project, constructed with the participation of the community, the residents do not know how to relate to that. "They are the public power, we are the residents, the civil society" a resident stated at the ISER-seminar December 19th 2012. The favela-state relationship has always been antagonistic and it continues to be so. The pacification program is not a program with cooperation on equal terms; one part has the decisive power, and that is the state. At the *Favela é Cidade*-seminar they had purposely not invited the police because they wanted people to be able to speak their minds freely. Yet, non-credentialed police officers were present, filming the meeting. This presence of the police was highly uncomfortable as the violent suppressive police of before is not far in the back of people's minds.

The popular participation as of today is militarized, no longer by the traffickers but by the police. There is a large amount of power centralized in the figure of the UPP commander, where he or she has the power and authority to control everything from opening hours, when and where people can throw parties, to what kind of music they can play; as shown in chapter 3. Pelbart (2003) argues that through creating a regularized regime that control all aspects of life, the UPPs are creating new forms of exclusion and exploration. The lack of consideration for the residents' demands in this process because they are not seen as citizens who know what is "best" for them leads to the conclusion that the pacification follows in the footsteps of the proletarian parks and other governmental interventions that were going to civilize the residents and teaching them to make "better" choices.

5.1.8 Space for change?

In Rio de Janeiro, the pacification represents a rupture of the routines in the favelas, the same way the entrance of the drug traffickers, state removal policies and urban upgrading projects have changed the local dynamics and threatened the *status quo* before. The communities have had to readjust to new realities before which takes time, new issues arising along the way. They are however not just passive recipients of state policies. As I started out saying in the introduction to this chapter, there are forces both outside and within the favelas fighting for a transparent and participatory process. Braathen et al. (2013) claim that inhabitants of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro have found various ways of defending themselves against removals and taking part in local decision-making processes. In Vila Autódromo in Jacarepaguá and Morro da Providência the Residents' Associations have been revitalized by the threats of

removal. In a citywide perspective, new spaces of participation and contestation; such as people's forums, committees and councils, have been created over the years.

In Rocinha, the process of creating representative bodies for citizen participation has been slow. After years under the rule of drug traffickers where it was potentially life-threateningly dangerous to organize opposition, the residents seem demobilized and fragmented. Rocinha has also not been faced with the threat of massive removals such as Morro da Providência and Vila Autódromo, which spurred mobilization in those communities. As of today, the civil society within Rocinha therefore does not appear as a social collective. There is however a demand for participation in Rocinha and some spaces are being created outside the spaces that the governmental organs bring to the community. There are a few local independent Medias, such as TV Tagarela and Viva Rocinha, who use social media to make demands and complaints and spread alternative information. They are active in the public debate and have managed to lay pressure on governmental agents. There are also smaller political forums that work with young people about different topics; such as Rocinha's Cultural Forum and Rocinha Sem Fronteiras.

Braathen et al. (2013: 22) underline the significance of activists and NGOs from outside of the communities of Vila Autódromo and Morro da Providência in strengthening the collective struggles in these communities. There, the local coalitions managed to link up with external political events such as the Rio+20 conference and the Peoples' Summit in June 2012, and they have also brought in the ombudsman and other public legal experts dedicated to the defense of the citizens' rights. The assistance from external human rights activists and judicial devices has been of significance in Rocinha as well, as an example from the different processes surrounding two of the PAC 1 projects in Rocinha demonstrates. The construction of the Sport Complex demanded the removal of many residents who received little information and low settlements; as low as low as 5,000 Reais. According to Luiz[97], his sister-in-law got 11,000 Reais for her house and had to move to Pedra da Guaratiba, two hours outside the city, because she could no longer afford to live in Rocinha. When the new main road inside Rocinha (Rua 4) was constructed a while later, public defenders followed the case closely at the request of the residents. The majority received new PAC apartments on the same location, and those who did not, received fair settlements of 40-45,000 Reais. While popular organization in Rocinha is fragmented, this shows that there are actors that have been

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[97] Interview December 5th 2012.

able to put up resistance. Also within the invited spaces there is room for involvement and change.

The *Câmara Comunitaria* was inactive during my stay as the PAC projects were placed on hold. I was therefore not able to participate in any reunions. It is however an historic space in that it includes Rocinha and the two neighboring middle-class neighborhoods. That alone, people claim, served to reduce stigma and bridge the gap between these territories and populations. It has also built up legitimacy with the governmental agents. The manager of the Rocinha UPP Social, Edgar de Alcancar, stated that he is initially against having the UPP Social as a forum for dialogue between the residents and the government; as "there is already the *Câmara Comunitaria*. The municipality should bring things to the forum, and discuss the management of the territory with the forum there."[98]

The UPP Social manager Edgar de Alcancar and members of the *Câmara Comunitária* hosted a meeting on December 6th 2012 about the future creation of a *Comitê Gestor* which I participated in. It will have two meetings per month; the first will be an open reunion that gathers residents to give them a space to express themselves, and the second meeting will be with the *Câmara Comunitaria* to bring forth their demands. Every month will have one specific topic on the agenda (health, education, sanitation). This *Comitê* will hopefully serve as a space of dialogue between the residents of Rocinha and the government.

> *"A local Comitê Gestor will be a space for dialogue (...) The Comitê Gestor, via the Câmara Comunitaria, will dialogue with the public power. It will reduce the hierarchy."[99]*

As such, there is hope that the *Comitê* improves the channels of dialogue coming from the bottom-up. It is too early to say how it will work in practice, but the point to be made is that there are forces working within the invited spaces such as to create more democratic channels of participation. It is also interesting that the manager of UPP Social is so supportive of this project; he however also said that "there is going to be resistance, especially from the public power who does not like to be challenged", summarizing the challenges to create spaces of citizen participation that have real influence on decisions made.

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[98] Edgar de Alcancar December 6th 2013, at a meeting with community leaders forming a *Comitê Gestor*.
[99] UPP Social manager of Rocinha Edgar de Alcancar, December 6th 2012.

5.1.9 Concluding remarks

The neoliberal management of Rio de Janeiro today shapes the "inclusion" that comes with the pacification program as a product of the current transformations in the city management. The inclusion we are seeing is first and foremost of the territory of the favela, and not of the residents. In spite of a framework of participatory governance, the favela residents are still not seen as citizens who know what is "best" for them and are thus not given real access to the decision-making processes. There is an uneven balance of power and clear desired outcomes with the projects and interventions that are coming to Rocinha as part of the pacification process. In the end, it becomes evident that there are a very limited number of people whose views are accounted for when deciding which realities should be created through the UPPs.

Decisive for whether it in the long term will prove to be an inclusive process; a process of approximation between segregated territories and populations, will depend on whether the pacification breaks with the differentiated citizenship that has characterized these territories' relationship to the state. As of today, the favela-state opposition pair however seems to maintain. New spaces and mediators are created, but this is not as prominent as the continuity of the hierarchical favela-asphalt discourse mediated through the UPP as the state's *braço armado* within the community. As Tilly (1998) claims that durable inequalities persist because socially constructed categories do the work necessary to keep them in place, the content of the favela and asphalt categories is evolving but the poor continue to be marginalized in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

Yet, as the AMs were inverted from bottom-up to top-down spaces, there is no saying the UPP Social, the *Câmara Communitária* or other spaces of favela-government dialogue cannot become spaces of democratic participation. The pacification program is a process in the making, and even if the dynamics of the state is authoritarian at the moment it is not uncontested. How this process is going to play out is difficult to say. It depends on the shape that it will take in the months and years to come and the adjustments the state, the police and the residents will make.

6 Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have discussed the interrelationships between security and inclusive citizenship as produced by the pacification program. While criticizing aspects of this program one should not forget that it is widely praised by many people in the receiving communities as well as in the rest of the city. Even the most skeptical acknowledge that the UPPs do indeed mark a doctrinal and operational departure from police strategy as usual by moving away from a heavy-handed approach and instead establishing a permanent police presence in the communities. The pacification has led to a drop in violence and murder rates, both in pacified favelas and nearby neighborhoods. The UPP police recruits receive training in civil and human rights, and the military academy is currently rushing to train recruits ahead of the mega-events when Rio de Janeiro will be on display to the entire world. By that time it is estimated that the city will have more UPP police officers than conventional military police. This is a significant step forward compared to previous attempts at police reform that only involved a handful of police officers, and leaves hope that it will not be just a temporarily security fix but rather translate into a permanent governance approach. People have expressed hope that the pacification will lead to the breaking down of old stereotypes and resentment between police and residents in the long run as they now have to coexist on a daily basis. Without "throwing the baby out with the bath water" it is however important to criticize the less savory aspects of the program and the effects it produces because it is possible- and necessary- to transform and improve the UPPs.

Returning to my initial research questions i) how do the residents of a pacified favela as of today consider the program and its effects on security and their sense of citizenship and ii) does the pacification program in their eyes represent a step towards inclusion of the favela and its residents in the city on more equal terms, I will try to summarize my findings.

6.1.1 Security for whom?

The pacification of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro is not an ahistorical program, but must be seen in relation to the historic relations between the favela and the city, shifting perceptions of security in today's globalized world and the ongoing process of neoliberal urban renewal in Rio de Janeiro. It would be difficult to discuss the pacification as a public security program

without taking into consideration the ongoing project of making Rio de Janeiro an Olympic city that has been instrumental in bringing forth financing and political support for this program. Seeing the pacification in light of this multifaceted background brings forth the processes that influence the program on an ideological plan as well as giving a framework to interpret the effects it produces both in the affected communities and in a citywide perspective.

In Rio de Janeiro, the favelas slated for pacification are part of the central urban landscape, but have always been seen as a world apart. The violence and crime related to the drug trafficking in these favelas was however not confined to these territories but "spilled" over to the asphalt, creating fear and insecurity in the whole city. As heavy-handed police interventions were losing political support and had not proved efficient in combating the violence and insecurity in the city, the pacification program was created as a new approach. Through combining proximity policing, social programs and urban development projects in strategic favelas, the program aims to improve security in the city as a whole while promoting an approximation process between the pacified favelas and the rest of the city.

Some of the residents in pacified favelas are indeed benefiting from this program. The government is investing an historic amount in pacified favelas through PAC. These urban interventions are intended to bridge the gap between the services offered in the favelas and the rest of the city. As such, the Sport Complex is historic in that it attends residents from both Rocinha and the middle-class neighborhood of São Conrado. However, the residents complain about their lack of access to decision-making processes in the selection of these projects. The residents are not given substantial room to influence the things coming to their community radically transforming the reality because they are still not seen as citizens who know what is "best" for them

The neoliberal urban management in the city is challenging the institutional framework of participatory governance. The city of exception and strategic planning process is undermining the access to inclusive governance, not just for the favela residents but for the residents of the city as a whole. However, those who experience the most dramatic consequences of the neoliberal development are the urban poor, through a process of social, spatial and political exclusion. The revitalization of the territory, the formalization of informal structures and the entrance of the market has led to increased prices and a gentrification process in pacified favelas as people cannot afford the transformation towards a formal neighborhood.

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"When they say integration- they are only talking about integration to the market, to consumption; inclusion in the capitalist system. They are not talking about urban integration, of more citizenship. They talk as if this will be an automatic effect of being integrated economically, but in reality it has an opposite effect; as the process of white removal shows."[100]

As this resident from Cantagalo summarizes; the inclusion that comes with the pacification program is first and foremost an inclusion through consumption. It is problematic if actors from the "outside"; such as the real estate market, business that gain entrance to new markets, neighboring middle-class neighborhoods and investors involved in the project of making Rio an Olympic city, gain *more* from these interventions than the local residents. Then the pacification program turns from being a program promoting "peace and development" in the favelas and this becomes the side-effect of a project of capitalist expansion within a neoliberal urban renewal process. If the pacification becomes a project of making the favela more accessible to the rest of the city- and not in reverse- it hardly constitutes an inclusive process.

The pacification program is not just reclaiming the monopoly of violence as a first step towards bringing services that will include these territories and populations in the city, even if the State Secretary of Security and the UPP police in Rocinha stress this aspect of the program. It is also a program that has improved the security in the central areas of the city, amending the reputation of Rio de Janeiro as a violent and dangerous place. As chapter 3 demonstrated; the sense of security within pacified favelas has not necessarily increased. While the fear of death by "lost bullets" has decreased (with impacts that should not be ignored), new forms of violence have surged; such as robberies, violence against women and assaults. This is creating a different sense of insecurity. People also increasingly fear for their future; whether they will be able to afford to continue living in their community with the escalating prices. In addition, the residents worry what will happen after the Olympics if the financing runs out and the traffickers come back or militias start controlling these territories. This sense of limbo and uncertainty that characterizes pacified favelas severely curtails the "security" the pacification supposedly brings to these communities. It is therefore highly relevant to ask the question: "security for *whom*?" when talking about the pacification as a public security program as it seems as if the security it provides is first and foremost for the asphalt, not the immediate locality of the favela.

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[100] Bianca from Cantagalo, *Favela é Cidade-* seminar November 27th 2012.

I started out by stating that what is meant by approximation is not given and depends on who talks about it and what interests are at stake. It is too early to say what impact this program will have on the favelas' position within the city in the long run. However, what we are seeing so far is that there is a discrepancy between how the governmental agents and the favela residents visualize the "inclusion" that the pacification is supposed to bring. Where the local residents hope it will open up for giving them access to the city and services on equal terms with residents from other neighborhoods, the "inclusion" and "approximation" it has proved to bring so far can be seen as more of a process of opening up the favela to the outside world. According to Braathen et al. (2013: 10), in the opinion of some civil society leaders in favelas in Rio, the ruling coalition wants the integration of the favela territories, but not of the favela residents.

While the pacification is "reimagining" the favelas and their place in the social imaginary, that in itself does not lead to reduced inequalities and inclusion of the favela residents in the "imagined community" of Brazil or the city of Rio de Janeiro. Rather, they continue to be seen as a threat, or more specifically, an obstacle, to the development of the city. The informal structures and so-called violent or uncivilized sociability of the *favelados* stand in the way for the neoliberal economic development of these territories and the city as a whole. The residents have to be civilized and integrated, not for their own good, but for the well-being of society in general, defined by the elite subjective. The pacification talks the language of promoting "life", peace and development, but it at the same time produces exclusion, marginalization and "death" in a biopolitical metaphorical sense for those who cannot keep up with the changes.

As we can see, there is still a long way to go before this policy, if implemented from a more horizontal perspective, can contribute towards the integration of the urban fabric and to end the long-established opposition between the favelas and middle class neighborhoods.

6.1.2 Questions for further research

I have wanted to do an exploratory research of what the pacification program as of today has meant in the perspective of the residents of a pacified favela, and how this can be connected to a wider theoretical framework on security, urban development and citizen participation. While I have tried to portray the underlying ambiguities of this process, there are obviously many aspects I have had to exclude because of the limits to what a single researcher can do

with a Master thesis. My contribution to the field has been through placing the case of Rocinha within an ongoing discussion on the pacification program. While I by no means believe to have covered all of the issues arising with the pacification of Rocinha, I hope this thesis can add to the body of material assessing the dynamics within pacified favelas.

Approaching the pacification from the point of view of a political scientist, a social anthropologist or an urban geographer will raise different questions and give different perspectives on the ongoing processes. One of the biggest challenges in writing this thesis has been the interdisciplinary character of the master program in Latin American studies. The lack of rules and guidelines in terms of selecting the analytical and methodological approach has been rewarding in that I have been able to draw from a variety of disciplines. At the same time, the lack of rigor has been challenging as I have ended up with both an analytical framework and a research method that I had little previous experience with from my background in social anthropology. I landed on the analytical framework used throughout this thesis through an abductive process where I found it to be what best corresponds with what I encountered in the field in light of my topic of interest; the perspective of the residents. However, other approaches that could have provided valuable insights could have been through focusing on the views of the police or other governmental agents; how they view the pacification, their role in the community and the effects the pacification produces.

Even within the framework of security and citizen participation that I have chosen there is plenty of room for further research both in Rocinha and in comparison with other favelas. How the *Comitê Gestor* and other current and future spaces of participation are able to articulate the residents' view in dialogue with the governmental agents in the process of deciding and implementing the remaining PAC interventions is a point to follow up on. How the relations between the UPPs and the civil society will evolve is another aspect. I was surprised by how different the relationships between the AMs and the UPP Police seem to have played out according to the leadership of the UPPs in different favelas, which could provide material for future comparative studies. What will happen to the sense of security in the community as the UPP police consolidates is another point.

These are just a few aspects that deserve further attention. As the pacification is a process in the making, it will be important to follow the process closely in the months and years to come from a variety of approaches.

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Appendix

1. Rising prices in Rocinha since the occupation. From http://extra.globo.com/

INFLAÇÃO NA COMUNIDADE SUBIU 18,49% APÓS A OCUPAÇÃO

SUBIU	2011	2013	VARIAÇÃO
Corte de cabelo feminino	R$ 15	R$ 30	100%
Corte de cabelo masculino	R$ 8	R$ 12	50%
Academia	R$ 60	R$ 70	16,67%
Lan house	R$ 1	R$ 2,50	150%
Mototáxi	R$ 2	R$ 2,50	25%
Pão francês (5 unidades)	R$ 1	R$ 1,25	25%
Refrigerante 2 litros	R$ 3,99	R$ 4,09	2,51%
Cerveja em lata	R$ 1,49	R$ 1,59	6,71%
Sabonete	R$ 0,85	R$ 1,15	35,29%
Pasta de dente	R$ 1,39	R$ 1,99	43,17%
Sabão em pó	R$ 6,09	R$ 6,99	14,78%

SUBIU	2011	2013	VARIAÇÃO
Arroz (kg)	R$ 2,55	R$ 3,35	31,37%
Feijão (kg)	R$ 2,45	R$ 3,69	50,61%
Farinha de trigo (kg)	R$ 2,69	R$ 2,79	3,72%
Farinha de mandioca (kg)	R$ 2,49	R$ 4,29	72,29%
Óleo de soja	R$ 3,15	R$ 3,79	20,32%
Comida a quilo	R$ 27,90	R$ 29,90	7,17%
Cimento (saco)	R$ 24,50	R$ 28	14,29%
Tijolo	R$ 0,62	R$ 0,80	29,03%
Botijão de gás	R$ 44,80	R$ 49,50	10,49%
Alcatra (kg)	R$ 19,99	R$ 22	10,06%
Acém (kg)	R$ 9,99	R$ 11	10,11%

MANTEVE-SE ESTÁVEL	2011	2013	VARIAÇÃO
Lavagem de moto	R$ 10	R$ 10	-
Joelho	R$ 2	R$ 2	-
Prato feito	R$ 13,90	R$ 13,90	-
Picolé	R$ 0,70	R$ 0,70	-
Copo de sorvete	R$ 1	R$ 1	-

DESCEU	2011	2013	VARIAÇÃO
Detergente	R$ 1,29	R$ 1,15	-10,85%
Cafezinho	R$ 1,20	R$ 1	-16,67%
Coxinha	R$ 2,50	R$ 2	-20%
Açúcar	R$ 2,65	R$ 1,99	-24,91%
Leite (litro)	R$ 2,30	R$ 2,15	-6,52%

Média geral de aumento: 18,49%

A pedido do EXTRA, o economista André Braz, da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), calculou a inflação na Rocinha entre dezembro de 2011 e janeiro de 2013, para saber como foi a variação dos preços no período pós-ocupação policial.
A cesta de produtos do EXTRA é uma amostra e não representa a inflação oficial da Rocinha, mas o cálculo foi feito com base nos pesos que a FGV utiliza em seus cálculos de inflação.

2. List over Interviews

Name	Resident?	Theme	Remarks
"João"	Rocinha	Local activist, ran for city councilmen, former president of AMABB	Group interview November 5th recorded, but background noise made it hard to transcribe. Notes.
"Juliana"		NGO Leader	Group Interview November 5th follow-up interview November 8th, not recorded, good notes.
"Lucas"	Rocinha	Evangelical Priest	Interview November 9th, not recorded.
"Gabriel"	Rocinha	NGO Leader, runs favela tours and a blog	Interview November 9th, not recorded.
"Matheus"	Rocinha	NGO leader	Interview November 13th, recorded.
"Sebastião"	Rocinha	President of UPMMR	Interview November 23rd, recorded
"Gustavo"	Rocinha	Former drug trafficker	Interview November 29th, not recorded at the request of informant. Informal conversations throughout the stay.
"Bruno"	Rocinha	Youth activist, worked with alternative media	Group interview November 29th, not recorded, good notes.
"Vinicius"	Rocinha	Youth activist, worked with alternative media	Group interview November 29th, not recorded, good notes.
"Raimundo"	Rocinha	President of AMABB	Interview November 30th, not recorded at the request of informant, good notes.
"Geraldo"	Rocinha	Secretary of AMABB	Interview November 30th, recorded.
"Rafael"	Rocinha	Long-time activist, works	Group interview November 30th, not

|		with alternative media	recorded, good notes.
"Felipe"	Rocinha	NGO leader	Group interview November 30th, not recorded, good notes.
"Julia"	Rocinha	In charge of arranging events, head of security for the Peace Dance	Interview December 1st. Not recorded.
"Luiz"	Rocinha	Former president of AMABB	Interview December 5th, recorded.
Edgar de Alcancar		UPP Social manager	Meeting + short interview on December 6th, not recorded. Good notes.
Subcomandante Medeiros		Deputy commander Rocinha UPP Police	Interview December 14th, recorded.
"Thiago"	Rocinha	Local activist, community leader	Interview January 1st 2013, recorded.

3. Other people quoted

"Bianca"	Cantagalo	Resident	Favela é Cidade- seminar November 27th 2012.
Sonya Fleúry		FGV researcher	Favela é Cidade- seminar November 26th to 27th 2012.
Luis Carlos Fridman		CEVIS researcher	Favela é Cidade- seminar November 27th 2012.

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4. Picture of the entrance of Rocinha portraying the Niemeyer highway entering into the tunnel connecting Rocinha to Gávea and the Niemeyer bridge.

From http://architecturalgrammar.blogspot.no/2011/06/oscar-niemeyer-footbridge-rocinha.html

5. Before and after the PAC- upgrading of the bridge and the façades.

From http://www.luminidesign.com/

6. BOPE- logo