Language and World View

Mind Style in Mark Haddon's *The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time*

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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction/motivation

This is a stylistic study of Mark Haddon's *The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time* (2003). Although Jeffries and McIntyre (2010) claim that stylistics does not necessarily imply literature data, it has traditionally concerned itself with "the study of language as used in literary texts, with the aim of relating it to its artistic functions" (Leech and Short 2004: 13). My main motivation for conducting a stylistic study is that I have always been interested in the language in literature, as I believe that an analysis of the language in a literary work can lead to a fuller understanding and appreciation of it. This thesis is concerned with the notion of *mind style* and how it is depicted in Haddon's novel. Before we explore this notion further, however, it is important to introduce the key feature of any stylistic study: the text itself.

1.2 *The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time*

The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (henceforth *Curious Incident*) was published in 2003 and is Mark Haddon's first novel for adults (although it was also published as a children's book). It received positive reviews and won the Whitbread Book of the Year 2004, among other prestigious awards.

The novel is narrated by 15-year-old Christopher Boone, who lives with his father (henceforth Father) in Swindon, England. Christopher suffers from Asperger's Syndrome and is therefore not good at reading faces, cannot imagine things that have not happened and does not like social encounters because he often fails to understand the intentions of others. However, he is very good at mathematics and has a very logical and scientific way of looking at things. He needs things to be "in a nice order" (p. 31[1]) and does not believe in the things he cannot sense. Naturally, then, he likes murder mystery novels, especially Conan Doyle's books about Sherlock Holmes. Furthermore, he abhors lies and the colors brown and yellow.

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[1] Page numbers refer to the 2005 Vintage Future Classics edition of *Curious Incident*. When referring the novel I will always refer to the page(s) as *p.* (or *pp.*). The references to the theoretical literature, on the other hand, will be in accordance with the Harvard style manual.

When Christopher one day finds the neighbor's dog, Wellington, dead and apparently killed with a garden-fork in the neighbor's garden, he decides to find out who killed it and to write a murder mystery novel about it. Father warns him to stay out of "other people's business" (p. 26), but Christopher does not listen and starts looking for evidence in the neighbor's (whom he refers to as Mrs Shears) garden and asking the other neighbors what they know.

Among other things, he finds out that his mother and Mr Shears had a relationship before she died of a heart attack two years ago. When Father finds out about this he takes Christopher's book from him and makes him promise not to investigate further. However, Christopher is intent on solving the murder mystery and finish his book. But when he starts looking for it in Father's room, he finds not only his book, but also a series of letters from his mother revealing that she is not dead, but that she left Father and him to live with Mr Shears in London. Christopher is shocked, and when Father finds him lying sick on his bed he finally tells him the truth: When his mother left them, Mrs Shears and he began seeing each other, but it did not work out as he hoped. After they had had a big fight one evening, he stormed out of her house, only to find himself being attacked by Wellington in the garden, and in a fit of rage and frustration stabbed him with Mrs Shears' garden fork. When Christopher hears that Father is a murderer and has lied to him, he is terrified and decides to run away from home to live with his mother in London. However, Christopher has never been further away from home on his own than the local shop, and the trip turns out to be a challenging experience, not least because of his inability to block out sensory stimuli.

He eventually finds Mother in London, and refuses to come home and live with Father again. However, he is due to take the A-level exam in Swindon soon. Meanwhile, Mother's relationship with Mr Shears comes to an end due to his refusal to take care of Christopher, and she takes Christopher back to Swindon. Here Father buys him a dog in order to gain back his trust. Christopher takes the exam and gets an A, and states that he knows he can do anything now because he solved the murder mystery, he went to London on his own, he found his mother, he was brave, and he wrote a book.

1.3   Aim of the thesis and the notion of mind style

Due to Christopher's condition, his way of viewing and thinking about the world is different from that of most people. The aim of this thesis is to explore his mind further by way of looking at his language, that is, see how his language choices indicate and reflect different aspects of his cognitive habits and word view: his *mind style*.

The term *mind style* was coined by Roger Fowler in *Linguistics and the Novel* (1977) to refer to "any distinctive linguistic presentation of an individual mental self" (ibid. 103). As one of the founders of critical linguistics, Fowler believes that the language we use reflects our attitudes. In other words, we cannot say or write something without conveying, consciously or unconsciously, our attitude about that something. Fowler believes that the same semantic content can be expressed in many different ways, and thus echoes Chomsky's (1957) claim that language has two levels of representation, the *deep structure* and the *surface structure*. The deep structure is the propositional or semantic content, while the surface structures are the *transformational* realizations of the deep structure. Fowler claims that in texts a writer's consistent choice of surface structures (whether this be conscious or not) from among possible alternatives of expressing his intended deep structures cuts "the presented world to one pattern or another, [giving] rise to an impression of a world-view" (Fowler 1977: 76).

In *Linguistic Criticism*, Fowler (1986) explores the notion more thoroughly, defining it as "the world view of an author… narrator, or a character, constituted by the *ideational structure* of the text" (150, my emphasis). This notion of "ideational structure" is developed further by Fowler from Halliday's theory of Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG). SFG has a functional and semantic approach to language and sees grammar as a meaning-making resource in social settings (Nørgaard 2003: 13). It presupposes that language has three main functions: to represent the world, to establish and maintain social relationships and to organize messages to indicate how they fit in with the wider context. These are termed the *ideational* metafunction, the *interpersonal* metafunction and the *textual* metafunction, respectively (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). The ideational metafunction has two sub-functions, the *experiential* and the *logical*. The experiential metafunction can be explored by analyzing language in terms of *transitivity*, i.e. analyzing clauses in terms of processes, participants and circumstances (see Chapter 3). The logical metafunction, on the other hand, has to do with the expression of

certain fundamental logical relations that are encoded in language, such as coordination or subordination. Fowler's (1986) notion of *ideational structure* is both simpler and more complex than Halliday and Matthiessen's (2004) *ideational metafunction*. On the one hand, he simplifies it, as he does not adopt all the specific terminology of their transitivity analysis. On the other hand, he includes *vocabulary* and *syntactic structure* in his notion of "ideational structure". In practice, Fowler's *syntactic structure* is the near equivalent of Halliday and Matthiessen's *logical metafunction*. His reason for including syntactic structure and vocabulary is that they both influence and indicate the range of the author's/narrator's/character's experience and how s/he structures it (Fowler 1986: 151). For example, if a narrator avoids a notion it can be the sign of a lack of a specific vocabulary (*underlexicalization*), while an overly frequent usage of parataxis can denote a lack of perspective and ability to distinguish important messages from non-important ones.

Before we explore one of Fowler's mind style studies, it is important to look at Halliday's famous essay "Linguistic Function and Literary Style: An Inquiry into the Language of William Golding's *The Inheritors*" (2002 [1971]), as it served as inspiration for Fowler's mind style theory. The essay can be seen as the first study of mind style, although Halliday does not in fact use the term himself. This is because he demonstrates how consistent transitivity choices in literary texts can reveal a particular way of seeing the world. He analyzes the transitivity patterns in three passages from Golding's *The Inheritors*, which is about the prehistoric struggle for survival between *homo sapiens* and the Neanderthals, resulting the latter's extinction. According to Halliday (2002), the passage told from the point of view of a Neanderthal man, Lok, has different transitivity patterns than the one told from the humans' point of view. The world from the human point of view does not seem to be very different from that of modern man, as the predominant transitive pattern is that of Material transitive clauses with a human Actor. Thus the overall impression is one of people reacting to and *shaping* their environment. Lok, on the other hand, seems to have a limited cognitive capacity as he does not seem to comprehend the relationship of causation: people (including himself) seem to move aimlessly, rarely acting directly on objects in their physical environment. For example, most clauses are intransitive Material clauses that describe simple movements, and many of the Actors are body parts rather than whole beings. Examples are "His ears twitched" and "His nose examined this stuff" (Golding 1955, cited in Halliday 2002:121). Furthermore, many of the movements in Lok's visual perspective are caused by his antagonists, but he fails to understand this. Instead, objects seem to move on their own

accord, for example "The bushes twitched" or "A stick rose upright and… began to grow shorter at both ends" (ibid.). Cumulatively, the transitive patterns in this passage construe a world where there is constant activity, but where there is no distinction between human and inanimate movements, and there is not much understanding of how this movement is caused.

Fowler further developed the theory in the previously mentioned works in several studies. In *Linguistics and the Novel* (1977), for example, he analyzes the mind style of Lambert Strether, the main character in Henry James's *The Ambassadors*. The third person narrator in the novel deliberately restricts what he tells us about what Strether has experienced, and relates the experiences "in a style which displays the quality of the character's estrangement with the world" (1977: 109). Fowler notes that James's heroes are so consistently afflicted with this mind style that it might be said to be James's own. Nevertheless, Strether's mind style is characterized by repeated transformational patterns of *nominalization* of thought processes, utterances and adjectives. Examples are "consciousness", "remark", "sense", "suitability" and "quality" (James 1903, cited in Fowler 1977: 111-112). The nominalizations denote inactivity and little strength of will, but also the *objectification* of emotions and qualities:

> It is as if his feelings are disconnected from his own psyche; as if his perceptions assail him from outside, beyond his control; as if he relates to others and himself only through intermediaries; and it seems that he pictures others as suffering the same divided self (Fowler 1977: 112).

Fowler also notices that Strether is the Patient in many clauses, for example "[T]his lady [had] a perfect plain propriety…that struck him" (ibid.). Thus the overall impression is one of a passive man who has no control over his perceptions, feelings and personal evaluations of others.

Leech and Short (2007) have developed Fowler's notion of mind style further. They agree with Fowler that mind style is "essentially a question of semantics" (ibid.: 156), but they have a somewhat different analytic approach. In all their analyses, they have a number of stylistic categories that they use as their point of departure, considering everything from complexity of noun phrases to frequency of adjectives to figure of speech. They claim that good stylisticians will become alert to those features of style which call for more careful investigation, *style markers*, which define the particular style in question (2007: 56). In short, Leech and Short have the same analytic approach to the study of mind style as they have for all other stylistic phenomena.

They further claim that, in principle, all texts convey a mind style "because no kind of writing can be regarded as perfectly neutral or objective" (Leech and Short 2007: 151). Consequently, there are two ways one can analyze mind style in literature. If one defines it broadly as *world view* one can analyze, for example, the mind style of particular authors, like the "Joycean" mind style (i.e. what world view is conveyed through Joyce's language choices in his works). But one can also view it more restrictedly as a realization of a narrative point of view and analyze the mind style of a character or narrator in prose fiction. In this case, one focuses on how systematic linguistic choices reflect the workings of individual minds in the literary work. It is this second view of mind style that will be the topic of this thesis, as we will explore how Christopher's mind style can be reflected in the consistent choice of certain surface structures. Most work on mind style has also focused on the minds of characters or first-person narrators as it is then easier to detect an unusual or deviant world view (Semino 2007: 155; Leech and Short 2007: 162).

In *Style in Fiction*, Leech and Short (2007) give examples of "normal" mind styles as well as more unusual ones. Of particular interest to this study is their analysis of the highly unusual mind style of one of the narrators in William Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*, Benjy. In the passage that Leech and Short are studying he describes a game of golf, but certain foregrounded linguistic features suggest that he does not actually understand what he is watching, thus suggesting that he is mentally subnormal in some way. First of all, the lexis is characterized by simple words (maximally disyllabic), few adjectives and concrete nouns. None of these nouns are related to the game of golf, however; for example, Benjy uses *table* instead of *tee*. This avoidance of specific golf terms suggests an underlexicalization on Benjy's part. Further, there is a heavy repetition of lexis, phrases and clauses. For example, *fence* is repeated eight times, *flag* five times, *go* eight times, *the bright grass twice*, and *I went along the fence* three times. This indicates that Benjy does not have the ability to use abstract terms or refer to the things mentioned by using (for example) synonyms or near-synonyms. Cumulatively, these linguistic features denote a simple and very restricted mind style.

When it comes to syntax, it is characterized by simple and compound sentences, for example "They went across the pasture" and "Luster came away from the flower tree and we went along the fence and they stopped and we stopped and I looked through the fence while Luster was hunting in the grass", respectively (Faulkner 1929, in Leech and Short 2007: 163). The coordination makes the logical connection between the sentences less explicit and the

communicative effect of the clauses less clear. Benjy also uses transitive verbs like *hit*, *throw* and *hunt* as if they were intransitives ("He hit"), thus seeming to not perceive any purpose to the golfers' actions. Leech and Short (2007:165) note that the preference for coordination to subordination is common in the writing of young children. Cumulatively, then, these linguistic features indicate that Benjy has a child-like mind and an imperfect understanding of cause and effect. Benjy's cognitive limitations are further reflected in sentences like "the flag flapped on the bright grass and the trees" and "they were coming toward where the flag was", denoting that he has a two-dimensional view of what we see a three-dimensional world and that he gives primacy to the visual field in which objects reside instead of focusing on the objects themselves, respectively (Leech and Short 2007: 165). Thus we see that in his child-like view on reality, Benjy's mind is quite similar to that of Lok in Halliday's (2002) study.

Leech and Short also notice Benjy's immature grasp of the conventions for distinguishing old and new information and synthesizing it. This is reflected in the already mentioned preference for coordination to subordination and repetition instead of substitution of pronouns or near-synonyms. However, this inability to make the text easier to read for the reader is a stylistic effect on the part of Faulkner as it gives the illusion that there is no narrator-reader relationship; rather, it seems that we are "overhearing" Benjy's ordering of his direct sensory impressions.

In their study of mind style, Leech and Short (2007) only consider the pure narrative paragraphs in the passage from *The Sound and the Fury*. Semino (2007: 163) claims that this has also been the tendency in other studies. However, in her mind style review "Mind style twenty-five years on" (2007), she proposes that *any* part of the narrative allows inferences on the workings of a character's (or narrator's) mind, including the presentation of a character's conversational behavior (e.g.in the form of direct speech) (ibid.: 163, 164). Here pragmatic theories become highly relevant. Traditionally, pragmatic theories have been applied in studies where the characters' deliberate and conscious communicative strategies (mostly in dramas) are the primary focus. However, Semino argues that one can also infer the peculiar workings of a character's mind through the salient and systematic patterns in his or her communicative behavior, especially if this behavior can be seen as non-deliberate. Semino actually uses a small passage with direct speech from the novel which is the object of the present study, *Curious Incident*, to demonstrate this. The selected passage is the novel's first dialogue when Christopher has found Wellington dead in Mrs Shears' garden and is

interrogated by a policeman about what has happened. Semino (2007) argues that Christopher consistently fails to observe Grice's (1989) maxims of Quantity and Relation in the dialogue as he either gives too much or too little information to the policeman. For example, he answers that he is "16 years and 3 months and 2 days" (p. 7) on the question of how old he is, which is of course more information than is necessary. At the same time, he provides too little information when he answers "the dog is dead" (ibid.) on the question of what is going on. Semino further argues that Christopher's non-observation of the maxims is an infringement, that is, a non-voluntary non-observation of them (see **2.2**). His infringement of the maxims thus leads the reader to infer that he has some form of cognitive impairment, namely an inability to assess what normally counts as the "appropriate level" of detail in communication and construct the minds and mental states of other people (Semino 2007: 166).

In recent years, studies of mind style have expanded from the traditionally semantic and functional theoretical framework to include cognitive linguistic theories. For example, Semino and Swindlehurst (1996) employ Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Cognitive Metaphor theory, which claims that pervading patterns of conventional metaphorical expressions (e.g. *How should I spend my time?*) in language reflect conventional patterns of metaphorical thought (e.g. TIME IS MONEY), known as *conceptual metaphors*. While Lakoff and Johnson focus on the relationship between conventional metaphors and the world view of a particular culture, Semino and Swindlehurst (1996: 147) explore how "consistent and nonconventional metaphorical patterns within a particular text reflect the conceptual system of its creator". This "conceptual system" can be said to be the writer's idiosyncratic cognitive habit or their way of making sense of the world, that is, their mind style. In "Metaphor and mind style in Ken Kesey's *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*" (1996), they argue that the main character Bramden's narration is characterized by nonconventional metaphorical expressions drawn from the source domain of MACHINERY. For example, he refers to society as "the Combine" (alluding to combine harvesters), the mental hospital in which he resides as "a factory for the Combine… for fixing up mistakes made in the neighborhoods and in the schools and in the churches" and the patients in the hospital as "machines with flaws inside that can't be repaired" (Kesey 1962, cited in Semino and Swindlehurst 1996: 154- 155). Semino and Swindehurst (1996) argue that the prominence of the MACHINERY source domain in Bromden's mind can be explained by the fact that he is an electrician and that he suffered a mental breakdown during an air raid in World War II. His frequent use of mechanical metaphors can then be seen as a reflection of his cognitive habits and limitations, as he seems

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to use his knowledge of machinery to compensate for his inability to fully understand people's minds and society at large.

McIntyre's (2005) study "Logic, reality and mind style in Alan Bennett's *The Lady in the Van*" can also be seen as an example of a non-traditional take on mind style. Here McIntyre argues that the idiosyncratic use of logical reasoning can be seen as an indicator of mind style as he claims that the unusual mind style of the character Miss Shepherd is conveyed through her consistent logical leaps. More specifically, she draws conclusions that do not logically follow from the premise and are thus inductively invalid. For example:

[Context: Miss Shepherd is painting her van.]

Alan Bennett 1   What kind of paint are you using?

Miss Shepherd   The shade is crushed mimosa.

Alan Bennett 1   But it's gloss paint. You want ear enamel.

Miss Shepherd   Don't tell me about paint. I was in the infants' school. I won a prize for painting.

(Bennett 2000, cited in McIntyre 2005: 28)

Here we see that Miss Shepherd's speech involves a premise (*I won a prize for painting when I was in infants' school*) and a conclusion (*therefore I know about paint*), but of course this conclusion does not logically follow from the premise. It seems that Miss Shepherd does not see the distinction between painting pictures in primary school and painting vehicles, and thus sees no difference in the types of paint needed for these two different activities. McIntyre (2005) claims that the logical leaps Miss Shepherd consistently makes throughout the play combine to convey an idiosyncratic mind style which can be seen as a result of guilt and paranoia caused by her culpability in a fatal road accident many years before.

This guilt is also conveyed through her unwillingness to commit herself to any proposition or answer questions directly. Thus she frequently uses modal markers such as modal auxiliaries and often flouts Grice's maxims. For example:

Alan Bennett 1   How long have you been living in the van?

Miss Shepherd   Who says I live here? I may spend the night there on occasion but it's only a pied-a-terre.

Alan Bennett 1   Where do you live?

Miss Shepherd   I got it to put my things in, though don't spread it around.

(Bennett 2000, cited in McIntyre 2005: 37)

Here Miss Bennett uses the modal auxiliary *may* and flouts the maxim of Relation to generate the implicature that she does not live in the van, although Bennett knows that she does (it is presupposed in his first question).

However, as Fowler (1977) stresses that the linguistic surface patterns identified in a literary text must be consistent and systematic in order for them to convey a mind style, a pure qualitative analysis of mind style such as that of Leech and Short (2004) and McIntyre (2005) might not be enough. McIntyre and Archer (2010:169) argue that qualitative analyses of mind style ignore the difficult notion of consistency due to the problems of measuring it. However, qualitative studies of mind style cannot be complete without some measure of consistency that can support the qualitative analysis. The consistency of the linguistic features can be measured by looking not at the number of instances of a particular indicator of mind style, but at the *statistical significance* of its occurrence within a text (ibid.).

McIntyre and Archer (2010) investigate how a semantic computational analysis of Alan Bennett's drama *The Lady in the Van* can provide quantitative support for McIntyre's (2005) qualitative analysis of Miss Shepherd's mind style. In order to test McIntyre's qualitative study, McIntyre and Archer (2010) used the web-based text analysis tool Wmatrix to identify the key words and key semantic domains in Miss Shepherd's speech. By comparing the most frequent words and semantic domains in the play to those of several reference corpora and calculating which one occur significantly (in terms of statistics) more in the target text, Wmatrix found the words and semantic domains that were over-represented in Miss Shepherd's speech compared to the larger corpora. Among other things, Wmatrix found that words related to crime and law and order (e.g. *justice* and *rights*) and religion (e.g. *God* and *Catholic*) were key words. This, McIntyre and Archer (2010) suggest, could be related to Miss Shepherd's guilt of abandoning the scene of the road accident. Further, a key semantic domain was that of LIKELY (i.e. modal expressions), which supports McIntyre's claim that part of Miss Shepherd's unusual mind style is a reluctance to commit herself to anything and answer questions directly. Thus McIntyre and Archer's conclusions are (1) that the mind style exhibited by Miss Shepherd is consistent, as those elements of Miss Shepherd's speech identified by McIntyre as contributing to the creation of her mind style are statistically significant within the whole text of *The Lady in the Van* and (2), that a quantitative analysis of a literary texts can indeed provide support for qualitative studies of mind style.

1.4   Methods, plan and theoretical fundament of the thesis

In order to explore Christopher's mind style, both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in this thesis. First I did several close readings in order to find the style markers in the novel (or the foregrounded linguistic patterns) and thus the characteristics of Christopher's mind style. In Chapter 2 I argue that these characteristics are mainly reflected in patterns of cohesion and coherence. Further, since mind style is traditionally "a question of semantics", Chapter 3 contains a transitive analysis of a representative chapter of the novel and a discussion of what the foregrounded transitive patterns indicate about Christopher's mind style. However, as McIntyre and Archer (2010) stress that qualitative studies of mind style cannot be complete without some measure of consistency that can support the qualitative analysis, Chapter 4 presents the results of a quantitative key word analysis of the novel by means of the Wordsmith Tools concordancing package (Scott 2013). The main aim of the key word analysis is to see if the linguistic patterns I identify in the qualitative analyses can be proved to be consistent through the presence of certain key words, or if the key words indicate some new patterns.

The fundamental approach to stylistics in this thesis is based on that of Leech and Short (2007) as the arguments about Christopher's mind style in Chapter 2 are built on the basis of the style markers or linguistic patterns identified in the novel. As we have seen, cohesion and coherence form part of Halliday's textual metafunction while transitivity belongs to the experiential metafunction. Thus the theoretical fundament in the thesis is Halliday's Systemic-Functional Grammar. However, since theories on coherence have been strongly influenced by pragmatics in the last years, Grice's maxims become highly relevant in the depiction of the coherence patterns projecting Christopher's mind style. In this way we see that all aspects of Fowler's ideational metafunction are present in the thesis as well: In Chapter 2 vocabulary becomes important in the cohesive patterns of lexis, while syntactic structure is relevant in the depiction of coherence patterns. Further, transitivity is the main subject in Chapter 3, but we use Halliday and Matthiessen's (2004) more advanced analysis and terminology.

We hope with this thesis to obtain new insights as to how different linguistic patterns and methods can complement each other in the exploration of mind style. More specifically, we

want to see how mind style can be explored through not only the experiential metafunction, but also the textual metafunction, and how a quantitative analysis of a literary text can serve to support the findings derived from qualitative analyses.

2 Cohesion and Coherence

In this chapter we will look at how consistent, foregrounded patterns of cohesion and coherence can be said to be an indicator and a reflection of Christopher's unusual mind style. I will argue that his mind style is reflected in his inclusion of visual elements in the creation of cohesion and coherence (**2.3.1**), in his inability to synthesize information and distinguish between Given and New (**2.3.2**), and in his infringement of Grice's maxims of Quantity and Relation (**2.3.3**). Before we look at these consistent linguistic structures in the novel, however, we must define the terms *cohesion* and *coherence*, and the difference between them.

2.1   Cohesion, Coherence and the textual metafunction

Cohesion and coherence are related, but nevertheless different, terms. Both are networks of relations that organize and create a text, but while cohesion is a network of *surface* relations which links items in a text, coherence is the *underlying* network of conceptual relations in the surface text (Baker 2011: 230). Thus cohesion is objective, while coherence is subjective, in that judgments concerning it may vary from receiver to receiver. It follows then that cohesive items are often important, but not necessary, for creating coherence.

In order for us to better understand the difference between the two terms we must explore Halliday's notions of text and the textual metafunction further. Halliday sees the text as a semantic unit (as opposed to a grammatical unit) that can be spoken or written and which functions as "a unity in some context of situation" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 293). As previously mentioned, the textual metafunction has to do with the organization of messages so that they fit in with the wider context. In other words, it is "the resource for creating discourse" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 87). According to Halliday and Matthiessen, the textual metafunction is realized by *cohesive* and *structural* textual resources. The cohesive resources contribute to cohesion, and, if used "appropriately", to the perceived coherence of text. In contrast, the way in which the structural resources are used only affects the perceived coherence of the text. The cohesive resources consist of Reference, Substitution, Ellipsis, Conjunction and lexical cohesion, while the structural resources are made up of Thematic and Information structure. In our presentation of the textual metafunction in **2.1.1** and **2.1.2**

below, we will mainly focus the cohesive resources and Information structure as these are the most relevant for the analysis in **2.3**.

2.1.1 The cohesive resources: Cohesion

Cohesion is one of the things that make a text a text and not just a collection of unrelated sentences; it is what gives texts their "texture". Perhaps the most extensive work on cohesion is Halliday and Hasan's *Cohesion* (1976), but since it forms a part of SFG, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) naturally also dedicate a certain amount of space to its description. Cohesion refers to the lexicogrammatical and semantic relations "which work…either within or across sentences" and which "have evolved specifically as a resource for making it possible to transcend the boundaries of the clause" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 323; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 87, 532). These relations of Reference, Ellipsis, Substitution, Conjunction and lexical cohesion are formal features that can be identified in the text and which "tie" the text together, thus creating cohesion.

Reference refers to linguistic entities of which meaning identification relies on another item in the text, that is, they *refer* to some other entity in the text. If reference items refer to something that has already been mentioned in the text, they are *anaphoric*. In contrast, they are *cataphoric* if they refer to something that is to be mentioned later in the text. For example:

1. It was nice in *the police cell. It* was almost a perfect cube […] (p. 17)

2. *These* are some of my Behavioural Problems

   A) Not talking to people for a long time.

   B) Not eating or drinking anything for a long time. […] (p. 59)

In (1) above, *it* refers anaphorically to *the police cell*, while *these* in (2) refers cataphorically to both the compound noun *Behavioural Problems* and the behavioral problems themselves. Both anaphoric and cataphoric reference are *endophoric* because they refer to something (animate or inanimate) inside the text. However, reference items can also point to something outside the text (i.e. the world), in which case they are *exophoric*. Halliday and Hasan (1976:18) claim that only endophoric reference is cohesive, as exophoric reference only links the language with the context of the situation.

There are three types of reference: personal, demonstrative and comparative (Halliday and Hasan 1976). Personal reference is used to refer to participants and is realized by personal pronouns, possessive pronouns and possessive determiners. Example (1) above, for instance, is an example of personal reference realized by the third person pronoun *it*. If the speaker uses demonstrative reference, s/he identifies the referent by locating it on a scale of proximity. It is realized by demonstrative pronouns, demonstrative determiners and adverbial demonstratives, in addition to the neutral definite article *the*. Comparative reference has to do with contrast. General comparison expresses likeness between things, and is realized by adjectives and adverbs of comparison like *same*, *such* and *differently*. Particular comparison, on the other hand, expresses comparison in terms of quality or quantity. It is realized by ordinary adjectives and adverbs in comparative forms (i.e. comparative adjectives and adverbs) [2] like *more, fewer* and *better*, or *so/as/more/less/equally* plus comparative adjectives and adverbs. (3) and (4) below are examples of demonstrative and comparative reference, respectively:

3. And then I was in a smaller room underground and there were lots of people and there were pillars which had blue lights in *the* ground around *the* bottom of them and I liked *these*, but I didn't like *the* people […] (p. 212)

4. And then we walked back through the tunnel, but it wasn't *so frightening* this time because there was a policeman with me" (p. 186).

There are also two special types of reference: extended and textual reference. This is a type of reference where the thing referred to is not a noun phrase, but a longer portion of text. The difference between them is, according to Halliday and Hasan (1976: 52), that extended reference refers to a "thing" (but not in the narrow sense of a participant), while textual reference refers to a *fact* (i.e. a process or a sequence of processes).The reference items which can have extended and textual reference are the personal pronoun *it* and demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that*. Halliday and Hasan (ibid.) provide an example which illustrates the difference between the two types of reference: "It rained day and night for two weeks. The basement flooded and everything was under water. It spoilt all our calculations." Here, the last *it* can either refer to event of heavy rains and flooding (i.e. the "thing"), in which case it has extended reference, or the fact that it rained so much, (the "metaphenomenon"), in which case it has textual reference.

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[2] Halliday and Hasan (1976) distinguish between adjectives and adverbs of comparison and comparative adjectives and adverbs.

While Reference is a relation on the semantic level, **Substitution** and **Ellipsis** are relations on the lexicogrammatical level. The former involves the replacement of an item with another, while the latter consists of the omission of an item. There are three forms of substitution and ellipsis: nominal, verbal and clausal. In nominal Substitution, a noun is replaced by the pro-form *one(s)*, in verbal Substitution it is replaced by the pro-verb *do*, while the pro-forms *so* and *not* substitute clauses. Examples of nominal, verbal and clausal Substitution (respectively) are:

5. And then I imagined crossing out all the possibilities which were impossible, which is like in a maths exam when you look at all the *questions* and you decide which *ones* you are going to do and which *ones* you are not going to do […] (p. 162)

6. [Sherlock Holmes] is very intelligent and he solves the mystery and he says "The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any chance ever observes." But he *notices them*, like I *do*. (P. 92)

7. I asked *if I could still do my A-level*. And Siobhan said, "I think *so*" (p. 256).

Some examples of Ellipsis are:

8. There was no one in the street so I crossed [Ø] and [Ø] walked up the drive to Mrs Shears' house. (P. 160)

9. And she said, "I bet you're very good at maths, aren't you?" And I said, "I am [Ø]." […] (P. 71).

Conjunction refers to "non-structural, text-forming relations" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 320-21), which means that they are not encoded in the form of linguistic structures but linkages between the components of a text. In other words, it refers to those words, phrases and expressions which function as Conjuncts syntactically and which link together sentences in a text. These might be coordinating conjunctions, adverbs like *therefore* and *however,* or prepositional phrases and expressions like *on the contrary* and *as a result*. According to Halliday and Hasan (1976)[3], there are four categories of conjunctions: additive, adversative, causal and temporal. Additive Conjunction includes forms like *and*, *or, furthermore, that is,* and *similarly*, while *but, in fact, instead, in any case* and *anyhow* are examples of adversative Conjunction. The causal relation is realized by forms such as *so, because, consequently* and *for this purpose*, while temporal Conjunction includes for example *then, in the end, at the same time, an hour later* and *in short*. The following examples illustrate the four categories:

10. People believe in God because the world is very complicated and they think it is very unlikely that anything as complicated as a flying squirrel or the human eye or a brain could happen by chance. *But* they should think logically and if they thought logically they would see that they can only ask this

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[3] Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) classify conjunctive relations somewhat differently (i.e. Elaboration, Extension and Enhancement), but the conjunctive relations themselves are the same as in Halliday and Hasan (1976).

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question because it has already happened and they exist. *And* there are billions of planets where there is no life, but there is no one on those planets with brains to notice. (P. 203)

11. And I saw a man with a newspaper and a bag of golf clubs go up to one of the doors of the train and press a big button next to it and the doors were electronic and they slid open and I liked that. *And then* the doors closed behind him. (P. 191)

12. [T]here were too many things to look at and too many things to hear. *So* I put my hands over my ears to block out the noise and think.

In the first example, we have the additive Conjunction *and* and the adversative Conjunction *but*. *And then* in the second example is a temporal Conjunction, while *So* in the third example is a causative Conjunction.

Finally, **lexical cohesion** is "the cohesive effect achieved by the selection of vocabulary" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 274). Since it is established through the structure of the vocabulary, it is, like Substitution and Ellipsis, cohesion on the lexicogrammatical level. There are two types of lexical cohesion: Reiteration and Collocation. Reiteration is the repetition of a word by exact repetition (i.e. the same word), a synonym (or near- synonym), a superordinate or a general noun. In some cases the reiterated words have reference as well, which creates a "double" cohesive tie. They are then accompanied by the definite article *the* or a demonstrative determiner like for example *that*. Examples of Reiteration are:

13. *The dog* was lying on the grass in the middle of the lawn in front of Mrs Shears' house. Its eyes were closed. It looked as if it was running on its side, the way *dogs* run when they think they are chasing a cat in a dream. But *the dog* was not running or asleep. *The dog* was dead. (P. 1)

14. Then it was 1:20 a.m. but I hadn't heard Father come upstairs to bed. I wondered if he was asleep downstairs or whether he was waiting to come in and kill me. So I got out *my Swiss Army knife* and opened the saw blade so that I could defend myself. […] And when I got downstairs… I looked round the door of the living door. Father was lying on the sofa with his eyes closed… I wondered if he was pretending to be asleep. So I gripped *the penknife* really hard and I knocked on the doorframe. (P. 153)

15. I saw my book was inside [the shirt box]. Then I didn't know what to do. I was happy Father hadn't thrown my book away. But if I took the book he would know I had been messing with *things* in his room and he would be very angry […] (P. 117).

In the first example we have two instances of exact repetition (*the dog*) which have a double cohesive tie because they refer to *the dog* in the first sentence. *Dogs*, on the other hand, is a case of Reiteration without reference. *The penknife* in the second example is a synonym of *Swiss Army Knife* and thus also has the same reference. In the third example we have an instance of Reiteration by a general noun. Christopher has here just described all the things belonging to Father he has "messed with" in the search for his book (like the bed and boxes in the cupboard), and now he refers to them as *things*.

The second type of lexical cohesion is Collocation. By *collocation*, Halliday and Hasan do not mean what is perhaps the most common sense of the word today, i.e. "a combination of words in a language, that happens very often and more frequently than would happen by chance" (*Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*). Rather, *Collocation* refers to words that are either related semantically or they "[tend] to share the same lexical environment" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 286), i.e. they belong to the same semantic field. The former includes complementaries, synonyms, antonyms and hyponyms, while Halliday and Hasan (ibid.: 285) mention *garden…dig* and *ill…doctor* as examples of the latter. In *Curious Incident,* lexis related to detective fiction (e.g. *red herring* and *prime suspect* (Pp. 40, 56)) creates Collocation.

Although Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) and Halliday and Hasan (1976) state that cohesion is lexicogrammatical and semantic relations that work within or across sentences, they only analyze cohesive relations *between* sentences. This is because they are "the ONLY source of texture, whereas within the sentence there are the structural relations themselves" (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 9). In other words, within sentences, cohesive relations can be governed by rules and so are not crucial for distinguishing one text from another. However, this is only completely true for Reference; the others are mostly unaffected by sentence structure. Furthermore, Thompson (2004: 197) points out the difficulty of deciding whether long strings of co-ordinate clauses should be treated as one clause complex or not. Since this thesis is concerned with deviant cohesion choices, it is important to include all levels of cohesive relations and not just those between clause complexes, because they all reflect Christopher's mind style.

Further, Halliday and Hasan's claim that only textual elements form cohesive ties may be seen as a limitation to their theory. Baker (2011: 223), for instance, argues that non-textual elements such as pictures and illustrations can also contribute to making a text cohesive by establishing cohesive ties with textual elements. In **2.3.1** we will explore how the foregrounded non-textual elements to a large degree contribute to the cohesion and perceived coherence of *Curious Incident* and that these reflect a certain aspect of Christopher's mind style.

2.1.2 The structural resources: Thematic and Information structure

Below the clause complex, the grammar creates discourse by structural means, namely Thematic and Information structure. The Theme system construes the clause as a message, made up of Theme and Rheme, while the Information system construes the *information unit* into Given and New information (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 88). The distinction between Theme and Rheme is speaker-oriented in that it is about what the speaker chooses to take as his point of departure. Given and New information, on the other hand, is listener-oriented , as it is about what part of the message is known to the hearer and what part is new. However, both are *speaker-selected*, because "the organization of the message into information units of given and new reflects the speaker's sensitivity to the hearer's state of knowledge in the communication situation" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 93, Baker 2011: 156).

Theme is, according to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 79), the first experiential constituent (i.e. one that plays a role in transitivity) in the clause, while Rheme is what the speaker says about the Theme and represents the information that the speaker wants to convey to the hearer. In other words, it fulfills the communicative purpose of the utterance. Thematic structure shows the method of organization and development in a text and thus affects its perceived coherence (Thompson 2004: 165; Fries 1994: 232).

Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) believe that Information structure is primarily a feature of spoken rather than written English. Each information unit consists of either Given and New information or only New information and it is realized phonologically as a tone group, with the tonic accent falling on the new element. This new element carries the information focus and is the device by which speakers highlight the core of the message. The unmarked order of information is for the speaker to place the Given information before the New one. This is called the principle of end-focus (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990). However, the boundaries of Given and New information cannot be determined on phonological evidence alone. Although the tonic accent normally falls on the last item, it still does not tell us where the Given element stops and the New one begins. Therefore it is important to also look at the surrounding *context*. Thus Halliday and Matthiessen suggest that the main way of distinguishing between Given and New information is to ask if it is presented by the speaker as *recoverable* or not to the listener. If it is represented as recoverable it is Given, and if it is not, it is New. Thus Given information may be something mentioned before, something that is

present in the context or it may be presented as Given for rhetorical purposes. Similarly, New information may really be new, but it can also be something that is mentioned before but that is unexpected.

The importance of context in distinguishing between Given and New information also suggests that one can look at written language in terms of Given and New as well. Baker (2011: 159) points out that many of the devices used to signal information status are common both in spoken and written language. For example, in both spoken and written English definiteness (e.g. in the form of the definite article or demonstrative determiners) is associated with Given information and indefiniteness (e.g. in the form of the indefinite article) with New information. Similarly, Given information tends to be grammatically subordinate (e.g. in the form of postmodifiers and subordinate clauses) to other information in both types of language use. Other devices that signal Given information are definite noun phrases, pronouns and Ellipsis (Brown and Yule 1983: 174). Lastly, *it*-clefts and pseudo-clefts can also signal information status (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 95). In *it*-clefts, the New information is typically the predicated Theme (e.g. "*It is water* I want") while the Given information is in the subordinate clause following it (i.e. "I want"). Contrastingly, the New information in pseudo-clefts is not the equative Theme, but the element following it. Consequently, in "What I want is water", "What I want" is Given information while "is water" is New.

There is a close semantic relationship between Thematic and Information structure, as the information unit is typically co-extensive with the clause (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 93). Thus the Theme often falls within the Given information while the New falls within the Rheme. However, Halliday and Matthiessen (ibid.) point out that "[t]he environment will often create local conditions which override the globally unmarked pattern of Theme within Given, new within Rheme" and that the speaker can exploit the system to produce rhetorical effects.

However, if we are to consider how a text is perceived as coherent, it is not enough to look at Halliday's structural resources. This is because meaning is not solely constructed from the formal features of language, but also from context and people. In other words, we must distinguish between *semantic* and *pragmatic* meaning (Cook 1989). How does this affect the perceived coherence of a text?

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2.2   Pragmatics and coherence

Brown and Yule (1983) argue that cohesion alone is never sufficient in order to identify a text as a text. A text is simply what "hearers and readers treat as [a text]" (ibid.: 199). This is connected to what we said earlier about the subjectivity of coherence. How is it possible that a text without cohesive links might still be perceived coherent? Brown and Yule's answer is that if a piece of language is presented as text, the receiver will try to impose a coherent interpretation of it. In other words, receivers always have an *assumption of coherence*. Halliday (1985: 314) similarly notes that "[p]eople go to great lengths to interpret as text anything that is said or written, and are ready to assume any kind of displacement – some error in production, or in their understanding – rather than admit that they are being faced with a 'non-text'". In addition to this, receivers always make an effort to arrive at the writer's or speaker's *intended meaning* in producing the linguistic message, using their knowledge about the world and determining what inferences are to be made. The most important pragmatic theories concerning the intentions behind our language use are Austin's (1962) speech act theory and Grice's (1989) theory of implicatures. Let us look at them more closely in turn.

Austin (1962) believed that there is more to language than the meaning of its words and sentences. We do not just use language to say things, but also to *do* things, that is, perform actions. Thus it is important to distinguish between the meaning of the words in an utterance and the action that is performed by uttering those words. Austin differentiates between the *locution*, *illocution* and *perlocution* of the utterance. The first is the actual words uttered, the second is the intention behind the words, while the third is the effect of the illocution on the receiver. Consequently, a direct speech act is when the locution and illocution match, while an indirect speech act is when they do not. For example, when Christopher is at the police station at the beginning of *Curious Incident*, the policeman interrogating him says the following:

> 16. I have spoken to your father and he says you didn't mean to hit the policeman. (P. 22)

The locution here is a statement (i.e. stating that Christopher's father said that he did not mean to hit the policeman), but the illocution is a yes/no-question (i.e. "Is it true what your father says, that you didn't mean to hit the policeman?"), which means that it is an indirect speech act. However, Christopher does not see this and chooses to say nothing because "this wasn't a

question" (ibid.). The desired perlocution from the policeman's point of view here was for Christopher to say "That is true" or something similar. Instead, Christopher is still, as he generally does not understand indirect speech acts (see **2.3**).

Grice's (1989) implicature theory tries to explain how people get from the level of the speaker of hearer's expressed meaning to the intended meaning. He claims that in every act of communication the participants share the assumption that the other participant cooperates with him/her in order to make the communication flow as easily as possible. Grice (1989) refers to this principle as the Cooperative Principle and defines it as follows: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (ibid.: 26). The Cooperation Principle is formulated as a series of four sub-maxims, of quantity, quality, relation and manner. These can be summarized as follows (Grice 1989: 26-7):

Maxim of Quantity

- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange)
- Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality

- Do not say what you believe to be false.
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relation

- Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner

- Be perspicuous.
- Avoid obscurity of expression.
- Avoid ambiguity.
- Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
- Be orderly.

However, participants in communication often fail to observe the maxims in various ways. First of all, a participant may violate a maxim. Here s/he breaks a maxim on purpose and intends for his or her interlocutor not to notice this. Perhaps the most frequent violation is that of the maxim of Quality (i.e. lies). Secondly, a participant may opt out of a maxim, which means that s/he clearly signals that s/he refuses to be bound by the Cooperation Principle. For example, when politicians answer "No comment" to a question they cannot or will not answer

they opt out of the Cooperation Principle. Thirdly, interlocutors may *flout* a maxim. This means that the participant fails to observe a maxim because s/he wishes to prompt the receiver to look for a meaning which is different from, or in addition to, the expressed meaning. Flouting a maxim generates what Grice (1989: 26) refers to as a *conversational implicature*. When a participant flouts a maxim, s/he blatantly fails to observe it (at the level of what is said) with the deliberate intention of generating an implicature. The following dialogue from *Curious Incident* might serve as an illustration:

> 17. And I said, 'Where is 451c Chapter Road, London NW2 5NG?' And he said, 'You can either buy the A to Z or you can hop it. I'm not a walking encyclopedia.' And I said, 'Is that the A to Z' and I pointed at the book. And he said, 'No, it's a sodding crocodile.' (P. 229).

Here Christopher is in a shop in London, asking if the man at the counter knows where the address of his mother's home is. Christopher does not understand that the book that the man is holding in his hand is the A to Z, so he asks the unnecessary question (in the man's opinion) of whether the book is in fact the A to Z. In answering "No, it's a sodding crocodile", the man at the counter is ironical, which is a flouting of the Maxim of Quality. As he does this, he generates the implicature that it is indeed the A to Z.

Lastly, a maxim may be *infringed*. This refers to the situation where a participant fails to observe a maxim, but not with the intention to deceive or to generate an implicature. Rather, the participant is simply unable to observe it. This may be because s/he is tired, drunk or cognitively impaired in some way. In example 17 above, for instance, Christopher infringes the maxims of Quantity and Relation by asking "Where is 451c Chapter Road, London NW2 5NG?" and not simply "Where is Chapter Road?". These infringements can be explained by Christopher's idiosyncratic cognitive abilities, in this case his excellent rote memory, which we will explore further in **2.3.3** (see also Semino 2007 and **1.3** on Christopher's infringements of the maxims in dialogues).

Austin and Grice were "ordinary language" philosophers and their theories were originally meant to describe the spoken communication of everyday life. However, as a text is also an act of communication, his theory can be applied to discourse analysis as well (Cook 1989). Thus, Brown and Yule (1983: 84), for example, claim that the Maxim of Relevance in the context of discourse equals "making your contribution relevant in terms of the existing topic framework". The topic framework represents, in simple terms, the shared knowledge between the participants at a particular point in the discourse. Being relevant when creating discourse

thus means either to speak topically, i.e. making the contribution fit closely to the most recent elements incorporated in the topic framework, or speaking *on* a topic, that is, concentrating on one particular entity, individual or issue. From this follows that a text can be perceived as incoherent if the producer of the text does not observe one or more of the maxims, especially the Maxim of Relevance.

However, when relating pragmatics to the coherence in literary texts, it is important to distinguish between the author and the narrator(s) of the text. For example, if the narrator fails to observe several of Grice's maxims, the reader must try to find the reason why the author has chosen for his/her narrator to do so. In other words, the author does not observe the maxims on part of the narrator because s/he wants say something about the narrator, that is, s/he wants the reader to make inferences about *why* the narrator does not observe the maxims.

In the next section, we will explore how foregrounded patterns of cohesion and coherence in the novel indicate and reflect different aspects of Christopher's mind style. The novel is thus seen as a communicative tool between the author and the reader in which the reader infers Christopher's mind style based on the consistent linguistic patterns in his language.

2.3 Cohesion and Coherence in *Curious Incident*

In this section, we will argue that Christopher's inclusion of non-textual elements in the creation of cohesion and coherence (**2.3.1**) reflects the fact he is a visual thinker, while his problems with synthesizing information for the reader's benefit, his tendency to not distinguish between Given and New information (**2.3.2**) , and his infringement of Grice's maxims of Quantity and Relation (**2.3.3**) reflect his need for clarity and structure, his inability to construct the minds and mental states of other people (including the reader), his inability to distinguish major from minor information, and his imperfect understanding of cause and effect. In **2.3.4** we will argue that the consistent linguistic patterns dealt with in sections **2.3.1-3** combine to create the impression of a childlike mind which the reader is likely to associate with Christopher's condition.

2.3.1 Visual elements in the creation of cohesion and coherence

Curious Incident has foregrounded visual elements such as pictures, illustrations, tables and photographs. These visual elements form cohesive ties with textual items and thus contribute to the overall coherence of the novel. Interestingly, some of the cohesive items are Reference items while others clearly refer to non-textual elements, but are not classified as Reference by Halliday and Hasan (1976). Further, there are items that create cohesive ties with the non-textual elements without referring to them.

Chapter 3 and 173 (pp. 2-3 and 156-7, see Appendix 1) in the novel can serve as illustrative examples of this type of cohesion. In Chapter 3, the determiners *this* and *other* in lines 3, 6 and 11 refer cataphorically to the pictures below, while *it* in lines 5 and 8 and *these* in lines 13 and 14 refer anaphorically to the pictures above. *Them* in line 14 refers to both *these faces* in the same line and the pictures themselves. Similarly, in Chapter 173, *this* in line 27 refers cataphorically to the illustration in line 28. The noun *dinosaur* in line 32, however, does not have reference according to Halliday and Hasan, but we can nevertheless see that it clearly refers to the illustration in line 33. The picture in line 20 (in Chapter 3), however, does not seem to be referred to in line 19 or 21. Rather, it seems like it is a replacement for the adjective *confused* or the like. Thus we might say that the picture creates a strong cohesive tie with the rest of the sentence that stretches from line 19 to line 21 and thus creates coherence. This incorporation of visual elements to the text makes these elements highly integrated into the rest of the text, especially in the cases where an illustration replaces a word.

Christopher's heavy use of visual elements in his narrative to create cohesion and coherence can be said to indicate and reflect the fact that he is a visual thinker, which people with Asperger's Syndrome tend to be (Grandin 1995:141). Being a visual thinker means one does not think in language or words, but pictures or videos. Temple Grandin, the most accomplished and well-known adult with autism in the world, explains visual thinking in this way: "All my thoughts are like playing different tapes in the videocassette recorder in my imagination" (ibid: 142). Similarly, Christopher states that his memory is "like a film" (p. 96) which he can rewind to any time in the past and remember everything the way it was at that exact time. Consequently, visual imagery is an important aspect of Christopher's thinking process and thus his mind style. In the novel, then, Christopher often explains his thoughts by using illustrations, like in Chapter 173 where he includes illustrations of the constellation Orion to explain how the stars making it up, and thus stars in general, can be combined to

form *any* figure. Other times he uses illustrations to show what he sees in his head, like in Chapter 179 and 191 (pp. 162-3 and 181-3, respectively).

2.3.2 The synthesis of information and distinguishing between Given and New information

The other linguistic feature related to cohesion and coherence is Christopher's inability to synthesize information for the reader's benefit and distinguish between Given and New information. The linguistic patterns indicating this inability are his avoidance of complexity at phrase level, his repetition of lexis and sentence structures, his preference for coordination to subordination, and his tendency to present Given information as New. These linguistic patterns can be said to reflect certain aspects of Christopher's mind style, namely his inability to construct the minds and mental states of other people, his need for order and clarity, his inability to distinguish between minor and major information and his imperfect understanding of cause and effect.

Avoidance of complexity at phrase level and reiteration of lexis and sentence structures

We will first look at how Christopher's avoidance of complexity at phrase level and repetition of lexis and sentence structures indicate and reflect that he is unable to construct the minds and mental states of other people and that he has a strong need for order and clarity. However, while we in **2.3.1** analyzed the linguistic structures before we noted how these were related to Christopher's mind style, we will here start in the opposite direction. This is because his inability to construct the minds and mental state of other people and his need for order and clarity are more complex aspects of his mind style and must therefore be explored more in detail before we are able to see the connection between these and the observable linguistic structures.

The first thing that is important to note is that Christopher's problems with synthesizing information and distinguishing between Given and New information are similar to those of Benjy in in *The Sound and the Fury* (Leech and Short 2007, see **1.3**). However, while Benjy's lack of consideration for the reader is to give the illusion that we are "overhearing" his thoughts, this is not the case in *Curious Incident*. This is because the latter is supposed to be a murder mystery novel that Christopher is writing in his notebook and which he refers to

metalinguistically several times (for instance "This is a murder mystery novel" on p. 5). What may then be the reason for Christopher not taking the reader of his detective story into consideration?

I propose that the reason is that he lacks a *theory of mind*, that is, he is unable to construct the minds and mental states of other people. The majority of children with autism lack this ability (Dodd 2005:40, see also Semino 2007). The fact that Christopher does not have a theory of mind is shown in the many times in the novel where he has trouble understanding the intended meaning behind people's utterances and reading facial expressions and emotions. He states that talking to people is "like being in a room with a one-way mirror" (p. 29) because the people talking to him are able to read emotions in his face while he is not able to do the same on them (i.e. they can "see" him while he only sees the mirror, that is, himself). The fact that he has trouble understanding the intended meaning behind people's utterances is reflected in that he does not understand indirect speech acts and implicatures (as seen in examples (16) and (17), respectively), which means that he only understands the literal meaning of what is said. This is also indicated by his inability to understand metaphors (for example *the third degree* (p. 83)). Lastly, his inability to construct the minds and mental states of other people is reflected in the fact that he cannot lie (p. 24). Lying, in essence, is theory of mind in action, as it refers to "the act by which one deliberately makes a false statement with intent to instill false beliefs into the mind of the statement's recipient" (Talwar et al 2007: 804). Thus, in order to lie successfully, the lie-teller must be able to have an appropriate assessment of his/her own and the recipients' mental states. This is precisely what Christopher lacks.

How is his lack of a theory of mind a reflection of his inability to synthesize information and distinguish between Given and New? The answer has to do with the reader also being another person than Christopher: since Christopher cannot construct the minds of other people he cannot construct the mind of the reader either. Thus the fact that he does not synthesize information and distinguish between Given and New and thus does not take the reader into consideration reflects that he is not actually able to construct the mind of the reader.

However, if Christopher does not have a concept of a reader one might ask why he is writing a book at all. This brings us the other aspect of his mind style, namely the need for order and clarity. He identifies himself with Sherlock Holmes and wants to solve a murder mystery like his hero. Thus originally Christopher only wants to solve the murder mystery of who killed Wellington. He does not start to write about it until Siobhan, his teacher, gives him the

assignment to write a story. He states that murder mystery novels is the only types of books he likes to read and therefore it is the only type of book he would like to write. Gilbert (2005: 244) suggests that the reason for this is that murder mystery novels "support Christopher's desire for a highly delineated existence. In writing his detective story he attempts to read and shape the apparent random nature of the world around him". This is because

> [i]n its classic form … [detective fiction] provides the reader with the stimulation of being presented with a riddle combined with the reassurance of knowing that there will always be a solution. In detective fiction, if not life, Christopher can understand the rules of the game. (ibid.)

This statement suits well with Christopher's description of detective fiction: "In a murder mystery novel someone has to work out who the murderer is and then catch them. It is a puzzle. If it is a good puzzle you can sometimes work out the answer before the end of the book" (P. 5). Thus Christopher's decision to solve the murder mystery and write a book about it is most likely based in his need to bring a chaotic world in to order. The world can be seen as confusing by most, but a person with autism struggles even more with putting it into order as people suffering from this condition are frequently unable to filter out irrelevant or distracting details from their environment. They tend to have excellent rote memory abilities, but at the same time have problems with processing sensory stimuli (Dodd 2005: 160). In other words, they remember everything they have seen, heard, smelled and so on, but are not able to distinguish important stimuli (i.e. stimuli that that change or confirm their world knowledge) from non-important ones (i.e. stimuli that is not relevant for their world knowledge). As they are visual thinkers, the visual sense becomes especially important and they possess remarkable abilities to remember things that they have seen. Christopher is no different, as he states that he "see[s] everything" and so is able to remember details about people and objects, like the number of holes in Mr Jeavon's shoes (p. 5, see also **2.3.3**). In general he has a very good memory, which helps him write down everything he has done and observed in his book (including all the dialogues he has participated in). However, he is not able to filter out important stimuli from non-important ones and can easily suffer from stimulus overload in new surroundings:

> And when I am in a new place, because I see everything, it is like when a computer is doing too many things at the same time and the central processor unit is blocked up and there isn't any space left to think about other things. And when I am in a new place and there are lots of people there it is even harder because people are not like cows and flowers and grass and they can talk to you and do things that you don't expect, so you have to notice everything that is in the place, and also you have to notice things that might happen as well. (P. 177)

This is indeed what happens on his trip to London. Especially in the underground station in London he has to put his hands over his ears, close his eyes and groan (which he frequently does when he is uncomfortable) in order to block out the overwhelming visual and auditory stimuli.

This combined with his lack of a theory of mind indeed transforms the world into a chaotic and confusing place with too many things to notice. Consequently, Christopher's management of the chaos around him is prevalent throughout the book. Most importantly, it is reflected in his love of mathematics and logic, his great belief in the scientific explanations for natural phenomena and his fear of getting "lost in time" (p. 195). He stresses that the most important thing is that "things [are] in a nice order" as he can actually be illogical when it suits him (p. 31). Because he is afraid of the indefiniteness of time he tries to control it by having an extremely strict timetable for every day in the week. Thus he has surrounded himself with numbers, formulas and science in every aspect of his life so as to not be overwhelmed by its chaos. Christopher's need to put the world into order might then explain why he writes a murder mystery novel without considering potential readers; it is simply a way to cope with reality.

As we have explored Christopher's lack of a theory of mind and his need for order and clarity, we will now look at the linguistic patterns which indicate and reflect these aspects of Christopher's mind style. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, these patterns are Christopher's tendency to avoid complexity at phrase level and repeat lexis and sentence structures. Let us first look at the former. Christopher tends to avoid having qualities of nouns functioning as premodifiers in the noun phrase and instead puts them in relative clauses functioning as postmodifiers (like in (18), (19) and (20)), or in co-ordinated sentences (like in (21)):

18. [P]eople used to call children like the children at school *spaz* and *crip* and *mong* which were nasty words. (P. 56)

19. I went and got my waterproof which is orange. (P. 108)

20. [Y]ou could join up the dots in any way you wanted, and you could make it look like a lady with an umbrella who is waving, or the coffee maker which Mrs Shears has, which is from Italy, with a handle and steam coming out […]" (P. 156)

21. And a voice said, 'I don't care whether you thought it was funny or not,' and it was a lady's voice. (p. 233)

In (18) *nasty words* could have functioned as a premodifier for the complex noun head *"spaz" and "crip" and "mong"* (i.e. *nasty words like "spaz" and "crip" and "mong"*), while the noun phrase *my orange waterproof* would have been less deviant than *my waterproof which is orange* in (19). Similarly, the relative clauses *who is waving* and *which is from Italy* in (20) would be more natural as adjectives functioning as premodifiers (i.e. *waving lady* and *Italian coffee maker*, respectively). In (21) the quality of the noun *voice,* the fact that it belonged to a woman, is "postponed" to a coordinating clause. A less deviant structure would have been to have the quality premodifying the noun (*a lady's voice*) and omit the coordinating clause completely. We see that Christopher's tendency to avoid complex noun phrases reflects his inability to synthesize information for the reader's benefit, which again can be said to be an indication of his lack of a theory of mind.

The second linguistic pattern which is an indicator of his lack of a theory of mind and need for clarity and order is his deviant repetition of lexis and sentence structures. In some cases it would have been better to replace the reiterated item with a Reference item or omitting it completely (i.e. Ellipsis), while in other cases a simple restructuring of the sentences would have been enough to make the information more synthesized and according to the norms of Information structure.

Let us first look at the cases where Christopher repeats lexis and sentence structures instead of including Reference items and Ellipsis. Chapter 2 in the novel (see Appendix 1) can serve as an illustrative example of the foregrounded reiteration and avoidance of Reference. In general, there is a heavy repetition of the noun *dog* in this chapter. It occurs twelve times, and ten of these cases refer to Wellington the poodle (*dogs* in line 44 and *a dog* in line 48 are examples of lexical cohesion by reiteration and are not foregrounded). This repetition of simple lexis is quite similar to that of Faulkner's Benjy. The repetition could have been avoided in line 48 by using ellipsis (*in the dog* is unnecessary), but in lines 44 to 47 (from *But the dog…* to *…fallen over*) we see that Christopher's main tendency is to reiterate where the structure demands a pronoun reference. In these sentences, the indefinite pronoun *it* would be preferred to *the dog* in all cases except, perhaps, in line 44 in normative language use. However, there are cases of Reference in the chapter as well. These are *its* in line 43, *it* in lines 43, 53 and 56[4], *him* in line 58, while the definite article *the* (in all the instances of *the dog*) refers cataphorically to *Wellington* in line 53. However, this does not change the fact that

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[4] *It* in line 49 refers anaphorically to *a dog* in line 48.

there is deviant reiteration of *dog* in cases where reference pronouns are structurally more appropriate. Similarly, *fork* is repeated five times in lines 45 through 48, mostly accompanied by the definite article. Here however, the only deviant reiteration is in the sentence *the points of the fork must have gone all the way through the dog and into the ground because the fork had not fallen over* (lines 45-47), as the second instance would have been replaced by the pronoun *it* in normative language use.

Next, Christopher repeats lexis and sentence structures instead of omitting them, that is, instead of using Ellipsis. Let us first look at the repetition of lexis. We have already seen one example of this from Chapter 2, but in order to illustrate this further we will look at the last part of Chapter 167 (p. 154-5, see Appendix 1). First of all, we see that Christopher avoids ellipsis in compound sentences where the two event verbs have the same subject and where the events expressed by the verbs happen in sequence, as in *I went into the kitchen and I picked up my special food box* (line 59) and *I went round the back of the shed and I squeezed into the gap between the wall of the shed and the fence* (lines 65-6). In these sentences, the subject in the second clause (*I*) could have been omitted as the reader infers that it is the same subject as in the first clause. In contrast, the second *I* in *Then I sat down and I felt a bit safer* (line 67) is not unnecessary because *feel* is a stative verb. Thus we see that Christopher specifies the subject *I* both in sentences describing a series of events and sentences that do not. Further, the sentence stretching from lines 64 to 67 (*It would be a bit warmer in the shed but I knew that Father might look for me in the shed, so I went round the back of the shed and I squeezed into the gap between the wall of the shed and the fence, behind the big black plastic tub for collecting rainwater*) includes four instances of *the shed*, two of which could have been omitted. *In the shed* in line 65 would have been replaced by the reference adverb *there* in normative language use, while the second instance (including *of*) would have been omitted completely. This would also be the case of the second *eat something* in line 71. In contrast to Reference, Ellipsis is not structurally necessary within the sentence, but these cases are nevertheless deviant.

An example of how Christopher repeats sentence structures instead of using Ellipsis can be provided from Chapter 103:

> 22. Then I listened to the sounds in the garden and I could hear a bird singing and I could hear traffic noise which was like the surf on a beach and I could hear someone playing music somewhere and children shouting. And in between these noises, if I listened very carefully and stood completely still, I could hear a tiny whining noise inside my ears and the air going in and out of my nose. (P. 87)

Here we see that the structure *I could hear* is repeated four times throughout the passage, mostly in coordinated clauses. The less deviant choice would be to avoid coordinating clauses, omit the last two instances of the repeated subject and verb in the first sentence and instead have a heavy object at the end (i.e. *I could hear a bird singing, traffic noise which was like the surf on a beach, someone playing music somewhere, and children shouting*). This pattern is related to Christopher's avoidance of complex noun phrases and tendency to coordinate clauses which we will look at later.

Interestingly, however, Christopher does not, with the exception of a few cases, avoid Ellipsis in his speech. This might be an example of the fact that the foregrounded linguistic patterns are only consistent to a certain degree. We must remember that ordinary dialogue "depends" much more on Ellipsis than written language (Thompson 2004), and a dialogue without Ellipsis would therefore be very cumbersome to both write and read and perhaps distract the reader from the content of the utterances. In the parts with direct speech in the novel, there are only three cases where Christopher avoids using Ellipsis. In the first two cases, he is interrogated by a police officer, the first time in Mrs Shears' garden when he has just found Wellington dead, and the second time when he is at the police station (pp. 8 and 22, respectively). In both cases, the police officer asks him if he was the one who killed Wellington, and in both instances he avoids using Ellipsis (i.e. answering "I did not kill the dog" instead of a simple "No"). These two cases could also be explained by Christopher's need for clarity: He considers the murder of Wellington as much of a crime as the murder of a human being and therefore answers completely unambiguously.

The third case might be accounted for differently. Here, Father's friend Rhodri asks him how he is doing, whereupon he answers "I'm doing very well, thank you" (P. 83) without any form of Ellipsis. Christopher explains that this is "what you're meant to say", thus suggesting that this is a phrase he has memorized to use in this type of situation. This again reflects his already mentioned problems with social interaction.

Examples of how Christopher tends to repeat lexis and sentence structures instead of restructuring the sentences can be found in his descriptions of the chest pains he has in moments of great stress and/or fear. On page 153 he describes them for the first time as "a pain like someone had blown up a really big balloon inside my chest". Afterwards, he consistently uses the phrase "feel the feeling like a balloon inside my chest" (p. 159, 208,

217) whenever he has chest pains. According to Halliday and Hasan (1976), *feeling* is not a reiteration of *feel* because they do not belong to the same word class. However, if we interpret the word *near-synonym* broadly, we might say that it is indeed a case of reiteration because the noun and the verb have the same root (*feel*) and thus are, in a way, near-synonyms. Gutwinski (1976: 81), for example, has this liberal stance on the word, as he states that "[a] lexical item formed on the same root may have cohesive properties similar to those of a synonym". Thus we might say that Christopher reiterates lexis and sentence structures in a deviant way instead of restructuring the sentences. For example, he could have written *I felt the pain in my chest again* or simply *I had chest pains*.

Christopher's repetition of lexis and sentence structures instead of restructuring the sentences in addition to his avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis are tokens both of his problems with synthesizing information for the reader's benefit and distinguishing between Given and New information. This is because Reference by pronouns, Ellipsis and different sentence structures, i.e. not repeating the same lexis or sentence structures, make the reading process easier by signaling what is Given information (as we saw in **2.1.2.**). The fact that Christopher reiterates Given information in full then becomes foregrounded. It is not that difficult to see how these linguistic patterns reflect his lack of a theory of mind, as his inability to adapt the text for the benefit of the reader by not repeating Given information reflects that he does not have a concept of other people's minds. However, it is perhaps necessary to explain how it reflects his need for order and clarity. If we look at the Reference and Ellipsis not from the perspective of how they make the text coherent, but from the perspective of what they actually do, we might say that that Ellipsis equals omitting pieces of language while Reference equals replacing the item referred to with a different word class. From Christopher's perspective, then, Ellipsis and Reference probably disrupt the order and clarity of things. We might say then that he does not see the repetition and the avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis as deviant language use, but rather thinks of it as making the world more orderly by calling things what they are and not omitting pieces of language. In sum, these surface structures reflect Christopher's inability to synthesize information and distinguish between Given and New, which again reflects his lack of a theory of mind and his need for order and clarity.

Preference for coordination to subordination

The next consistent linguistic pattern denoting Christopher's problems with synthesizing information and distinguishing between Given and New does not solely reflect his lack of a theory of mind, but also that he is unable to distinguish between major and minor information and that he has an imperfect understanding of cause and effect. It concerns his preference for coordination (especially via *and*) to subordination.

An extract from Chapter 113 (pp. 96-8, see Appendix 1) can serve as an illustration of this. If we look at the altogether fourteen sentences in the passage in terms of syntax we see that there are two simple sentences, four complex sentences and eight compound sentences. There are of course subordinate clauses within the compound sentences themselves, like for instance in the sentence stretching from lines 94 to 97 (*And if someone is lying…an epileptic fit*). However, this does not change the fact that compound sentences make up the majority of the sentences in the passage. The majority of the coordinated clauses are connected by the coordinating conjunction *and,* but there are also instances of *or* in line 97. Two of the sentences have more than two coordinated clauses: the sentence stretching from lines 85-90 (*And she jumped..."You can do it"*) has no less than nine coordinated clauses, while the one stretching from lines 90-92 (*And after a while… I felt better*) has five. The many coordinated clauses following one another give a rushed feeling to the text which again reflects Christopher's state of panic in the situation described in the narrative. This is a general tendency in the novel, as for example when Christopher tells the story of how he started screaming in the car when his mother offered to drive home two children from his school:

> 23. I started screaming in the car because there were too many people in it and Jack and Polly weren't in my class and Jack bangs his head on things and makes a noise like an animal, and I tried to get out of the car, but it was still going along and I fell out onto the road and I had to have stitches in my head and they had to shave the hair off and it took 5 months for it to grow back to the way it was before. (P. 196)

Further, there are cases in the passage, as in the novel in general, where Christopher coordinates clauses where subordination would have been preferred in normative language use in order to make the logical connection between the clauses more explicit and distinguish between Given and New information. These are *And then she finished sunbathing and went into the water to swim* in lines 81-82 and *And I stood in the water. And Mother said, "Look. It's lovely"* in line 85. In the first case, the first clause would have been better as a subordinate adverbial clause of time (i.e. *When she finished sunbathing…*) in order to make the time relation between the clauses clear and background the Given information (i.e. that she was

sunbathing). Similarly, in the second case the two simple sentences could have easily been united into one complex sentence where the Given information, that he stood in the water, is placed in a subordinate non-finite adverbial clause of time (i.e. *When I was standing in the water…*).

The fact that Christopher tends to prefer coordination to subordination reflects his lack of a theory of mind as it indicates that he does not have a concept of a reader. It might also reflect his inability to filter out irrelevant or distracting details from his environment. We might say that just as he cannot distinguish between important and non-important stimuli he cannot distinguish major from minor information in his writing, and so avoids subordination. However, his preference for coordination to subordination might also reflect his imperfect understanding of cause and effect. The fact that he presents most information in compound sentences signals that all information has equal value, and this undifferentiated view of the world suggests that he cannot see the relation between events. He seems to stand outside of the world, observing it from a distance. This is quite similar to the mind style of both Faulkner's Benjy and Golding's Lok (Leech and Short 2007, Halliday 2002 [1971]).

Presenting Given information as New

Lastly, Christopher's problems with distinguishing between Given and New information are shown in his tendency to describe some characters as if they are presented for the first time, that is New information, when they are Given. This is the case of his pet rat Toby and Mr Jeavons, the psychologist at his school. Let us look more closely at each case in turn. Christopher first introduces his pet on page 16, as *Toby, my rat*. He then quite naturally presents him as a known referent on pages 23 and 27, that is, simply referring to him as *Toby*. On page 41, however, he again refers to his pet as New information, referring to him as *Toby, my rat*, as if he has forgotten that he has mentioned Toby previously in the discourse. In contrast, Mr Jeavons is referred to as Given information when he is presented for the first time. Christopher seems to mention him in passing as one of the people who, like Christopher, does not know what a metaphorical passage from Virginia Woolf's *The Waves* means: "What does this mean? I do not know. Nor does Father. Nor do Siobhan and Mr Jeavons. I have asked them" (p. 5). He further states that Mr Jeavons smells of soap and wears brown shoes "that have approximately 60 tiny circular holes in each of them" (ibid.). Introducing characters as Given information is very common in modern literature as it makes the reader

curious to know more about the character and pursues him/her to make inferences about the character in question. However, in *Curious Incident*, we do not hear more about Mr Jeavons until page 31, where he is introduced as the school's psychologist. It seems then that Christopher has forgotten that he has mentioned him before and "again" introduces him to the reader, that is, he is presented as New information.

The fact that Christopher presents Given information as New also indicates that he lacks a theory of mind. However, the fact that he can forget that he has introduced a character before might also indicate that he has some form of cognitive impairment. As Lok represents the Neanderthal man and Benjy is a person with severe autism (Leech and Short 2007, Halliday 2002 [1971]), they are far more mentally subnormal than Haddon's Christopher. However, from what can be seen in the information structure analysis of *Curious Incident*, it seems that the cognitive impairment entailed by Asperger's syndrome is visible in the linguistic choices.

2.3.3 The infringement of Grice's maxims

In **1.3** we saw that Semino (2007) has demonstrated that Christopher infringes Grice's maxims of Quantity and Relation in verbal communication. Similarly, in **2.3.2** we saw that Christopher does not understand indirect speech acts and implicatures in conversations and that this reflects his lack of a theory of mind. However, his infringement of Grice's maxims of Quantity and Relation is also a consistent linguistic pattern in the narrative passages and this directly affects the perceived coherence of the text. We see this in Christopher's peculiar descriptions of the other characters and in his frequent explanations of known and unknown matters. As in the deviant patterns of cohesion and coherence above, Christopher's infringement of the maxims are informative for the reader as they lead to inferences of *why* he infringes them (Semino 2007, see also **1.3**). So we might say that while Christopher the narrator infringes the maxims, Haddon the author flouts them in order to generate implicatures about Christopher's mind style. We will see that Christopher's infringements can be said to reflect the fact that he lacks a theory of mind, that he is unable to distinguish major from minor information and that he has a strong need for clarity and order.

First of all, Christopher infringes the maxims of Relation and Quantity in his description of the other characters in the novel. There are two instances that especially stand out due to the descriptions being placed in separate paragraphs. The first instance is in Chapter 4:

24. Siobhan said that I should write something I would want to read myself. Mostly I read books about science and maths. I do not like proper novels. In proper novels people say things like, "I am veined with iron, with silver and with streaks of common mud. I cannot contract into the firm fist which those clench who do not depend on stimulus." What does this mean? I do not know. Nor does Father. Nor does Siobhan or Mr Jeavons. I have asked them.

Siobhan has long blond hair and wears glasses which are made of green plastic. And Mr Jeavons smells of soap and wears brown shoes that have approximately 60 tiny circular holes in each of them.

But I do like murder mystery novels. So I am writing a murder mystery novel. (P. 5)

We see that the topic here is literature and murder mystery novels. As Christopher mentions Siobhan and Mr Jeavons, however, he decides to include a character description of them in a separate paragraph before he continues on his topic. Similarly, in Chapter 15, pages 32-3, the topic is his career opportunities as, as he calls himself, "[a person with] Behavioral Problems" (p. 59). Here he mentions that his classmate Francis' older brother Terry calls him a *spazzer*. Then, in the middle of his argumentation of why he is in the wrong he includes a one-sentence description of him ("Terry has a tattoo of a heart-shape with a knife through the middle of it", p. 33). In these two descriptions, we see that he infringes the maxim of Relation in two ways. First, he fails to speak topically, i.e. make the contribution fit closely to the most recent elements incorporated in the topic framework (see **2.2**), which makes the text seem less coherent. Secondly, the descriptions of the people contain irrelevant information in that they do not tell much about the person and they are not relevant for any subsequent developments in the plot. We might also say that Christopher infringes the maxim of Quantity in these detailed descriptions because they are "more informative than is required". The two descriptions seem somewhat forced and unnatural, which is easily explained by Christopher's statement that he has only included descriptions in his book because Siobhan told him that he should include "one or two details" about the people in his book "so that [they can] make a picture of them in their head" (p. 85). Christopher's purely detail-oriented descriptions, however, do not tell anything that actually helps the reader make a mental picture of the person. Consequently, they produce a comic effect which is not intentional from Christopher's side.

The description of Rhodri in (25) below is interesting as it is, like the first two examples above, actually placed in a separate paragraph. However, Christopher is not speaking non-topically in this case because Rhodri is actually the discourse topic here. Nevertheless, he infringes the maxim of Relation and Quantity because his description does not really say much about Rhodri as a person and contains many irrelevant details:

25. Rhodri was wearing a pair of white dungarees which had dirty marks all over them and he had a gold ring on the middle finger of his left hand and he smelled of something I do not know the name of which Father often smells of when he comes home from work. (P. 83)

The rest of the descriptions about other people are similar to the ones above except that they are not placed in separate paragraphs. Some examples can be seen below:

26. The policewoman had a little hole in her tights on her left ankle and a red scratch in the middle of the hole. The policeman had a big orange leaf stuck to the bottom of his shoe which was poking out from one side. (P. 7)

27. [The police inspector] had a very hairy nose. (P. 23)

28. [Father] was wearing a lumberjack shirt. (P. 62)

The fact that Christopher infringes the maxims of Relation and Quantity in his attempt to describe the other characters probably reflects his lack of a theory of mind. This prevents him from getting to know the people around him and thus he cannot describe anything except what he is actually able to observe: the number of holes in their shoes or the many stains on their pants. In other words, he cannot describe the characters in a relevant way because cannot see what is relevant about them. As he cannot construct the minds and mental states of the people around him, he cannot construct the mind of the potential the reader of his book either. Thus he cannot estimate what constitutes as relevant or the right amount of information for him or her.

Furthermore, Christopher infringes the maxims of Quantity and Relation in providing irrelevant and a large quantity of information about things. More specifically, he provides detailed explanations of everything from PIN number to his thought processes. Some of these explanations are relevant and do not contain too much information, like his explanation of the various types of heart attack or what a planisphere is (pp. 36-7 and 158, respectively). This is because most readers do not know these things from their world knowledge and the information is necessary in order to fully understand Christopher's arguments. However, he also provides information about things that the reader already knows from his or her world experience. Examples are his explanations of white lies (p. 62), marriage and divorce (p. 55), PIN numbers (p. 168) and adverts (p. 218). Let us look more closely at the last example:

29. And adverts are pictures or television programs to make you buy things like cars or Snickers or use an Internet Service Provider. But this was an advert to make you go to Malaysia on a holiday. And Malaysia is in Southeast Asia and it is made up of peninsular Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak and Labuan and the capital is Kuala Lumpur and the highest mountain is Mount Kinabalu, which is 4,101 meters high, but that wasn't on the advert. (P. 218)

Here we see that he starts with explaining what an advert is, which is of course irrelevant because the reader knows this from his/her knowledge about the world. Then he continues with providing facts about Malaysia, seemingly just imparting all the information he has in his head due to his excellent rote memory abilities without being able to stop.

Like in the character descriptions, this genuine inability to assess what information is relevant and how much detail is required probably reflects his lack of a theory of mind. In other words, one might argue that he provides explanations about things already known to the reader because he has no way of knowing of what the reader in fact does and does not know and thus cannot not know what the "appropriate" level of detail in communication is. However, his many explanations can also be accounted for by his inability to filter out irrelevant or distracting details from his environment. In **2.3.2**, we saw how this aspect of Christopher's mind style might explain his preference for coordination to subordination. Here we might say that just as he cannot distinguish important from non-important information in his environment he cannot distinguish important or relevant information from non-important or irrelevant information in his writing and thus provides all the information he knows about almost everything. We also stated in **2.3.2** that his inability to filter out non-important stimuli is probably the reason for his need for clarity and order. Thus his many explanations can also be accounted for by this latter aspect of his mind style. His many explanations can then be seen as a reflection of his need to bring the world into order and in that way understand it better.

One might also argue that Christopher's reiteration of lexis and sentence structures (dealt with in **2.3.2**) is an infringement of the maxim of Quantity. For example, when he consistently repeats *the dog* in Chapter 2 (see Appendix 1) he makes his *contribution more informative than is required* by repeating Given information.

2.3.4 The childlike nature of Christopher's mind style

Combined, the consistent linguistic patterns dealt with in sections **2.3.1-3** create the impression of a childlike mind. First, the visual elements give connotations to children's literature, indicating that Christopher's mind is more childlike than that of the average 15-year-old. Further, Brown and Yule (1983: 172) note that it is common to reiterate Given information in children's books while Jeffries and McIntyre (2010: 85) point out that children's literature often has very explicit cohesion, especially reiteration. We have noted

earlier that Christopher is not writing his murder mystery novel for anyone other than himself and that the reiteration and avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis is due to his emphasis on order and clarity as well as his lack of a theory of mind. Nevertheless, the reiteration and avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis also suggest that he does not have a developed vocabulary, and this underlexicalization denotes a simple and childlike mind style.

Further, Christopher's frequently irrelevant and detailed-oriented explanations (**2.3.3**), although seemingly involuntary, resemble those of children who want to demonstrate their knowledge. Similarly, the fact that Christopher presents Given information as New and thus seems to have forgotten that he has introduced a character earlier might also be said to resemble the mind style of a child.

Furthermore, Leech and Short (2007) state (as first noted in **1.3**) that the preference for coordination to subordination is typical of children's writing as they often lack perspective of what constitutes minor and major information or they do not know how to distinguish between the two in written compositions. Related to this is the fact that Christopher has a tendency to start sentences with *and* (as can be seen in the novel extracts in Appendix 1). As Halliday and Hasan (1976: 233) point out, this sentence-initial *and* is typical of children's writing. It has solely the function of a sentence linker and thus loses its cohesive power.

The language patterns indicating a childlike mind style might explain the reason why *Curious Incident* was also published as a children's book in spite of it originally being written for adults and first published as an adult novel. However, there are also structures that denote the opposite mind style, that is, a complex one. Space prevents us from going much into detail here, but we might mention, for example, that he uses somewhat formal lexis like *frightened, Mother* and *Father* in addition to the uncontracted form of *HAVE*. In addition, certain non-linguistic features such as the footnotes, appendix and the fact that the chapters are given prime numbers instead of cardinal numbers also indicate that Christopher has a more complex mind style. This may reflect that Asperger's Syndrome seems to imply the paradoxical combination of retardation and advancement for the person suffering from it. For example, Christopher observes everything in his surroundings, but has problems with reading basic human emotions. Similarly, he is a mathematical prodigy, but at the same time does not understand the concept of money (as demonstrated on page 189 when he gives five ten-pound bills for a train ticket only costing 17 pounds). Also, the scientific and philosophical matters he is interested in are of course far beyond a child's grasp in terms of complexity. This might

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be transferred to the language structures discussed above. For example, there is a contrast between the childlike inclusion of illustrations to the narrative and the advanced arguments to which the illustrations are added (like in Chapter 173) and between his preference for compound sentences and the many subordinated clauses within those sentences. The minds of Lok and Benjy (Leech and Short 2007, Halliday 2002 [1971]) are not paradoxical in nature like that of Christopher and denote only a simplicity which hinders them from functioning in accordance with the rest of the world. Christopher's mind style, on the other hand, is both simple and complex, and thus he provides a unique perspective of the world that is at the same time as naïve and simple as that of a child and as learned and complex as that of a highly competent adult.

2.4   Summary

In this chapter we have analyzed the linguistic structures that are related to cohesion and coherence in *Curious Incident* and which indicate and reflect different aspects of Christopher's mind style. In **2.3.1** we saw that the many visual elements in the novel form cohesive ties with textual items and thus contribute to the overall coherence of the novel. Some of the cohesive items are Reference items, while other elements like nouns which are traditionally seen as non-reference items clearly refer to the non-textual elements. Further, there are items like complete sentences that create cohesive ties with the non-textual elements. Christopher's heavy use of visual elements in his narrative to create cohesion and coherence can be explained by the fact that he is a visual thinker.

In **2.3.2** we analyzed the linguistic structures which demonstrated his inability to synthesize information for the reader's benefit and distinguish between Given and New information. These are his avoidance of complexity at phrase level, a tendency to reiterate lexis and sentence structures and avoid Reference and Ellipsis, his preference for coordination to subordination, and present Given information about characters as New. We argued that his inability to synthesize information for the reader's benefit and distinguish between Given and New reflects Christopher's inability to construct the minds and mental states of other people, his need for order and clarity, his inability to distinguish minor from major information and his imperfect understanding of cause and effect.

In **2.3.3** we argued that Christopher regularly infringes Grice's maxims of Relation and Quantity by providing detailed descriptions and information which is often irrelevant for the subsequent plot development or is not topical. His infringement of the maxims probably reflects his need for order and clarity, that he lacks a theory of mind and that he is unable to distinguish major from minor information in general.

Lastly, in **2.3.4** we argued that all of the linguistic patterns dealt with in sections **2.3.1-3** combine to create the impression of a childlike mind. However, other linguistic patterns (for example those of lexis) and the content of the novel might be said to create the opposite impression. It was suggested that this reflects the complexity of Christopher's condition.

3 Transitivity

In this chapter we will look at how transitivity patterns can be an indicator and a reflection of Christopher's mind style. We will first present the experiential metafunction of language as defined by Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) (**3.1**) before we analyze exemplary passages from *Curious Incident* in terms of transitivity and discuss what their transitivity patterns can say about Christopher's mind style (**3.2**).

3.1   The experiential metafunction and transitivity

According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), the experiential metafunction of language is mainly concerned with how meaning is represented in the clause. As mentioned in **1.3**, the grammatical system by which this is achieved is that of transitivity. Here, of course, the term *transitivity* is used in a much wider sense that that employed in traditional grammars, i.e. a way of distinguishing between verbs according to whether they have an Object or not. Halliday and Matthiessen rather see it as a way of showing how speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality and account for their experience of the world around them. Transitivity carries out this experiential function by *expressing processes* through the grammar of the clause. Halliday (1985) explains this thus:

> What does it mean to say that a clause represents a process? Our most powerful expression of reality is that it consists of 'goings-on': of doing, happening, feeling, being. These goings-on are sorted out in the semantic system of the language and expressed through the grammar of the clause. (ibid.: 101)

The semantic processes expressed by the clauses have three components. These are (1) the process itself (expressed by the verb phrase), (2) the *participants* involved in the process (typically realized by noun phrases), and (3) the *circumstances* associated with the process (normally expressed by adverbial and prepositional phrases).

There are six types of processes, namely Material, Mental, Relational, Verbal, Behavioral and Existential, and they each have their own types of participants. We will now present each process type and the participant roles associated with it in turn before we look at the different types of circumstances in which the processes may occur. Whenever possible, illustrative examples will be provided from *Curious Incident*.

3.1.1 Material processes

Material processes are the most frequent category in transitivity (Matthiessen 1999, see also **3.2.3**) and are principally "processes of doing-and-happening" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 179).Thus Material processes can often be probed by the questions *What did s/he do?* and *What happened to her/him?* Every Material process must have an **Actor** which performs the physical action, even though it is not always expressed in the clause. Some Material clauses also have a participant that is affected by the action of the process, namely the **Goal**. We may say that the first question above is relevant for Material clauses with Goals, while the second one is relevant for Material clauses without Goals. Examples (1) and (2) below illustrate Material clauses with and without a Goal:

1. {I looked at him for a long time. Then he snored and} [*Actor*] I [*Process: material*] jumped. (p. 153)

2. [*Actor*] He [*Process: material*] had made [*Goal*] my supper. (P. 62)

Other participants that may be involved in Material processes are **Recipient, Client** and **Scope**. The first two are defined in this way by Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 191): "They represent a participant that is benefiting from the performance of the process. The Recipient is one that goods are given to; the Client is one that services are done for". In other words, they together correspond to the Indirect Object in traditional grammar. Examples (3) and (4) below illustrate the two participants, respectively:

3. I gave *him* the fifty pounds […] (P. 189)

4. I made *myself* a raspberry milkshake […] (P. 100)

The Recipient and Client are subtypes of the participant **Beneficiary** which can occur in all types of processes except Existential (see **3.1.6**), but is mostly associated with Material and Verbal (i.e. the Receiver, see **3.1.4**) processes.

Scope, on the other hand, can be seen as an alternative participant to Goal. In other words, it occurs in intransitive Material clauses where there is a noun phrase following the verbal group (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). It seems to be an extension of the verbal group as it "either (1) construes the domain over which the process takes place… or (2) construes the process itself" (ibid.: 192). As Thompson (2004: 107) points out, Scope can be said to be a "circumstantial element disguised as a participant" because it, like an adverbial, specifies an aspect of the process. In short, it can be seen as a nominal group that "works together with the verb to express the process" (ibid.). Examples are:

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5. I can play *computer games* for a whole week […] (P. 243)

6. [I couldn't hear] *what* he was singing […] (P. 228)

Both examples construe the domain over which the process takes place. *Computer games* specifies the aspect of *play*, while *what* specifies the aspect of *singing* in the subordinate clause *what she was singing*.

3.1.2 Mental processes

Mental processes deal with the internalized world inside our heads, as opposed to Material clauses which deal with the goings-on in the external world (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 197). They can be divided into four main groups: Perception, Cognition, Emotion and Desideration. Common to them all is that they have the participants **Senser** and **Phenomenon**. The Senser is the person who perceives, thinks, feels or wants, while the Phenomenon is the person, object, abstract idea or fact that is perceived, thought, wanted or felt (ibid.: 201, 203). Verbs that may serve as Process in clauses of Perception apart from *perceive* are for example *sense, see, notice, feel, taste* and *smell*, while *think, believe, know* and *understand* may function as Process in clauses of Cognition. Desiderative processes can be realized by verbs such as *want, wish, decide, plan* and *determine*, while Emotive processes can be realized by verbs such as *like, love, hate, fear* and *enjoy*. Below are two examples from each group:

7. [H]e *saw* a ghost in a shoe shop […] (P. 125)

8. I *could smell* his aftershave […] (P. 202)

9. I *think* flying is good (P. 199)

10. [I cannot tell jokes because] I *do not understand* them. (P. 10)

11. I *wanted* a drink of orange squash before I brushed my teeth and got into bed […] (p. 27)

12. So I *decided* that I would leave the book where it was […] (P. 118)

13. But I *do like* murder mystery novels. (P. 5)

14. [These are some of the reasons] I *hate* yellow and brown. (P. 105)

One of the distinct features of Mental processes is that they are able to project, that is, "instate another clause as a locution or an idea" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 337). Mainly Cognition and Desideration processes project because the Phenomenon usually already exists in Perception and Emotion processes. Thus in these clauses the Phenomenon tends to be

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either an *act* realized by is a *macrophenomenal* clause or it is a *fact* realized by a *metaphenomenal* clause. In examples (15) and (16) the Phenomenon is realized by macrophenomenal clauses:

15. [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, perception*] could hear [*Phenomenon*] birds singing. (P. 159)

16. [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, emotion*] like [*Phenomenon*] being on my own. (P. 71).

Processes of Cognition and Desideration, on the other hand, tend to bring ideas and wishes into existence, that is, they project them. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) name the projected clause the *idea clause*. In transitivity analysis, the projected idea clause is not labeled as a participant. Instead it can be analyzed on its own. Thus (17) below can be analyzed thus:

17. [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, desideration*] have decided ‖ [5][*Process: material*] to give [*Recipient*] my chapters [*Goal*] prime numbers. (P. 14)

Example (18) provides an illustration of a Mental process of Cognition projecting an idea:

18. {Sometimes I look up into the sky and} [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, cognition*] think ‖ that there [*Process: existential*] are [*Existent*] molecules of Mother [*Circumstance*] up there. (pp. 43-44)

However, as we will see in **3.2**, Perception and Emotion clauses are also able to project.

3.1.3 Relational processes

The third major group of processes is Relational Processes. Relational clauses have to do with characterization and identification and can be defined as processes of *being* and *having* (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 210). We can identify three types of Relational relationships, namely Intensive, Circumstantial and Possessive, and each of these comes in two distinct modes of being: Attributive and Identifying. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) identify Intensive processes, that is, clauses of being, as the main group. We will therefore explore this group first.

In **Attributive Intensive clauses** an entity has some class attributed to it. This class is the **Attribute** while the entity to which it is attributed is the **Carrier**, as for example (19) below:

19. [*Carrier*] All the other children at my school [*Process: Attributive Intensive Relational*] are [*Attribute*] stupid. (P. 56)

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[5] «‖» indicates that the following clause is projected.

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Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) identify four main characteristics of Intensive Attributive clauses. First, the Attribute construes "a class of thing" and is typically indefinite in that it is an adjective, a common noun or a noun with the indefinite article (ibid.: 219). In (19) above, for example, the Attribute is realized by the adjective *stupid*. Secondly, the verb or verbal group realizing the process is an ascriptive verb assigning its Carrier to membership in some class. In (19) above, then, the ascriptive verb *be* assigns the children at Christopher's school to a class of less intelligent people. Further, the Attributive Intensive clauses are probed by interrogatives like *what* (*…like?*) and *how?* Thus we can identify (19) as an Attributive Intensive clause because it is possible to ask *What are all the children at Christopher's school like?* Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these clauses are not reversible. Thus it is not possible to reverse (19) above to **Stupid are all the other kids at my school*.

In **Identifying Intensive clauses**, on the other hand, a thing has an identity assigned to it. That which is to be identified is labeled the **Identified**, while that which identifies the Identified is labeled the **Identifier**. Identified tends to be Given information while Identifier tends to be New information. Example (20) below can illustrate this:

20. [*Identified*] Rhodri [*Process: Identifying Intensive Relational*] is [*Identifier*] the man who works for Father.

Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 228) state that Identifying Intensive clauses have four main characteristics that stand in contrast to those of Attributive Intensive clauses. First, the Identifier is typically a definite nominal group like *the man who works for Father* in (20). Secondly, the verb or verbal group realizing the process is an equative verb like *be* in example (20). Further, the Intensive processes in this mode are probed by interrogatives like *which?, what?* and *who?*. Thus we can identify (20) as an Identifying Intensive clause because we can ask *Who is Rhodri?* Lastly, unlike Attributive Intensive clauses, these clauses are reversible. It is thus easy to reverse (20) above to *The man who works for Father is Rhodri*.

Thompson (2004: 99-100) also includes some points on how to distinguish between the Attributive and Identifying Intensive clauses. For example, he claims that if one or both participants is an embedded clause the process is Identifying rather than Attributive. Further, if it is possible or not awkward to replace the verb or verbal group by *represent/be represented by* the process is Attributive rather than Identifying.

According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), the participants in Identifying Intensive processes can also be classified in terms of **Token** and **Value**. While Identified and Identifier are related to Information structure, Token and Value have to do with the external semantic properties of the entity identified in the clause. Thompson (2004: 120) suggests that "the more generalized is the Value while the specific embodiment is the Token". For example, in example (20) we may say that *Rhodri* is the Token while *the man who works for Father* is the Value. Thus we may say that analyzing Identifying clauses in terms of Identified and Identifier, as in the analysis of Theme and Rheme, helps us to see the method of development in the text, while a Token and Value analysis shows the broader concerns of the writer and what his or her ideological standpoint might be. This is because the Value "reveals what values the writer (and ultimately the culture that he or she is part of) uses to categorize the Tokens that he or she deals with" (Thompson 2004: 98). Consequently, it is necessary to analyze Identifying Intensive clauses both in terms of Identified and Identifier and Token and Value. Both Token and Value can correspond with both Identified and Identifier.

The two other Relational relationships, Circumstantial and Possessive clauses, also come in the two modes of being. **Relational Circumstantial processes** are, as the name suggests, processes that involve circumstantial elements like time, place, manner and cause. Examples of Attributive and Identifying Circumstantial Relational processes can be seen in (21) and (22), respectively:

21. And then [*Carrier*] I [*Process: Attributive Circumstantial*] was [*Attribute*] at the bottom of the escalators […] (P. 215)

22. [*Identified/Token*] The next day [*Process: Identifying Circumstantial*] was [*Identifier/Value*] Saturday […] (P. 45)

Relational Possessive clauses, on the other hand, have to do with ownership. The category of Possessive clauses includes possession in a broader sense, like part-whole relations (e.g. body parts), containment, involvement and so on. In this type of Relational clause, the participants can also be seen in terms of who/what possesses and who/what is possessed. Examples of Attributive and Identifying Possessive Relational clauses, respectively, are shown below:

23. [*Carrier: possessor*] Siobhan [*Process: Attributive Possessive*] has [*Attribute: possessed*] long blonde hair. […]

24. [*Identified/Token: possessed*] {The special food box on the shelf} [*Process: Identifying Possessive*] is [*Identifier/Value: possessor*] mine. (P. 83)

3.1.4 Verbal processes

The fourth major group of processes is Verbal processes, which can be defined as verbs of saying (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 252). *Saying* is here interpreted in the broad sense as it covers both verbal and symbolic exchanges of meaning. Nevertheless, all Verbal processes relate to the transfer of messages through language. Verbal processes must have a **Sayer**. The Sayer is typically human, but can also be other things in symbolic exchanges, like *my watch* in *My watch says it's half past ten*. An example of a Verbal process containing only the process and the Sayer is:

25. But [*Sayer*] you [*Process: verbal*] shouted. (P. 134)

Verbal processes can also have three other participants, namely **Receiver, Verbiage** and **Target**. The first two are oblique participants, that is, participants that are not crucial for distinguishing Verbal processes from other types of processes (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). The Receiver is a type of Beneficiary and represents the participant to whom the saying is addressed, like for example *me* in (26):

26. Father told me to behave. (P. 130)

The Verbiage corresponds to what is actually said, that is, the message itself, and is realized by a nominal group. Examples are *a lie* in (27) and *a question* in (28):

27. [And I realize] I told a lie in **Chapter 13** […] (P. 176, original emphasis)

28. Instead she asked me a question. (P. 74)

According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), direct and indirect speech cannot be Verbiage because they are projected clauses. Thus we analyze the reporting clause and the reported clause separately, as in (29) and (30):

29. [*Sayer*] I [*Process: verbal*] said, ‖ '[*Actor*] I [*Process: material*] didn't kill [*Goal*] the dog.' (P. 26).

30. [*Sayer*] A man…[*Process: verbal*] asked ‖ if [*Carrier*] I [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] was [*Attribute*] OK. (P. 250)

Lastly, the Target refers to what or whom the saying is directed at. It is different from the Receiver in that it can be non-human and only occurs in certain types of Verbal clauses,

namely those including verbs that are "targeting activities" like *praise, insult, abuse, flatter, blame* and *criticize*. Thompson (2004: 101) illustrates this type of participant with the following example:

31. She keeps rubbishing me to the other people at the office.

In (31) *me* is the Target, while *to the other people at the office* is the Receiver.

3.1.5 Behavioral processes

Behavioral processes can be seen as intermediate between Mental and Material processes. They convey mostly human physiological and psychological behavior like breathing, smiling, dreaming, staring and coughing (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 248). Because of their intermediary position between Mental and Material clauses they are the least distinct process type. For example, Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 251) classify verbs as *sing* and *dance* as Behavioral processes, but they can easily be seen as Material as well. Thompson (2004) argues that their intermediary position allows us to distinguish between "purely mental processes and the outward signs of those processes" (ibid.: 103). In other words, we can classify *see* as a Mental process of Perception, while *watch* and *look* are classified as Behavioral because they are *conscious* physical acts involved in perception. Similarly, we can distinguish between *hear* and *listen* in this way.

All Behavioral processes have the participant **Behaver**, which is typically a conscious being. The examples below can serve as illustrations:

32. And then [*Behaver*] she [*Process: behavioral*] laughed. (P. 3)

33. [*Behaver*] I [*Process: Behavioral*] listened [*Circumstance*] very carefully. (P. 87)

Behavioral clauses might also have a second oblique participant, namely the **Behavior**. The Behavior has the same function as Scope in Material clauses, i.e. it specifies an aspect of the process. For example, in (34), taken from Thompson (2004: 104), *a faint yawn* is the Behavior:

34. She gave a faint yawn.

3.1.6 Existential processes

The final process type is Existential, which simply expresses the existence of something (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 256). *There* does not have a role in transitivity as it is not a participant or circumstance. In traditional grammar it goes by the name of *existential "there"* and functions as an anticipatory subject. The typical verb realizing the process in Existential clauses is *be,* but other verbs like e*xist, occur* and *happen* can occur as well.

The entity or event that is said to exist is labeled **Existent**. The Existent can be any kind of phenomenon that can be construed as a "thing". Thus it can, among other things, be a person, an object or an institution. There are no other necessary participants except Existent in Existential processes, but Circumstances are not unusual. Examples of Existential processes are:

35. And there [*Process: existential*] are [*Existent*] billions of planets where there is no life. (P. 203)

36. There [*Process: existential*] are [*Existent*] some cows [*Circumstance*] in the fields. (P.174)

3.1.7 Circumstances

As we have seen in the previous sections, circumstances occur freely in all types of processes. As they are realized by circumstantial Adjuncts, they encode the background against which the process takes place. According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), there are nine different types of circumstance. However, only a short introduction of each group is included as space prevents us from going into much detail. Note that our account of circumstances is based on that of Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), but we also include adverbial clauses as one of the forms in which they may appear (see **3.2.1**).

The first type is Circumstance of **Extent**. It deals with how the process extends in space and time. It can be divided into three subgroups, namely Distance (*how far?*), Duration (*how long?*) and Frequency (*how many times?*). For example, in (38) below *for more than 6 minutes* is a Circumstance of Extent, more specifically Duration:

37. She was inside the house *for more than 6 minutes*. (P. 53)

The second type of circumstance is that of **Location**, which construes the location of the unfolding of the process in space and time. It has the subgroups Place (*where?*) and Time (*when?*). Examples are:

38. We have a pond *at the school*. (P.125)

39. *When I got home*, Rhodri was there. (P. 83)

In (39) *at the school* is a Circumstance of Place, while the adverbial clause *when I got home* in (40) can be seen as a Circumstance of Time.

Further, we have Circumstance of **Manner**. This type of Circumstance deals with how the process is realized. The subgroups are those of Means, Quality (both can be probed by the interrogative *how?*), Comparison (*what like?*) and Degree (*how much?*). These subgroups can be more difficult to distinguish than, for example, those of Location, so it is perhaps necessary to give a little information about what items that can realize them. Circumstances of Means are typically introduced by *by, through, with* and *by means of*. Examples of Circumstances of Quality, on the other hand, are *in a dignified manner, with dignity, together* and *separately*. Circumstances of Comparison are typically introduced by *like, unlike* and adverbs of comparison (see **2.1.1**). Lastly, Circumstances of Degree are realized by adverbs of degree such as *much* and *considerably*. Example (41) below can serve as an illustration. Here, *a lot* is a Circumstance of Degree:

40. I looked at the sky *a lot*. (P.158)

The fourth main group of circumstances is that of **Cause**, which has to do with the reason that the process is realized. Like the other main groups, this one also has several subgroups, namely those of Reason (*why?*), Purpose (*what for?*) and Behalf (*who for?*). Examples are, respectively:

41. And then I could hear people moving again *because it was quieter*. (P. 216)

42. *In order to do this* he has brought a huge dog from London […] (P. 89)

43. And I said, "Can you look after Toby *for me*?" (P.165)

In (42), the adverbial clause of reason *because it was quieter* can be seen as a Circumstance of Reason, while *for me* in (43) is a Circumstance of Behalf.

The fifth main group of Circumstances is **Contingency**, which "specifies an element on which the actualization of the process depends" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 271).This group is also divided into three subgroups: Condition (*if*), Default (*unless*) and Concession (*although*). Examples are *if you get married in a church*, *unless it is a bad simile* and *even though it is the middle of the day*, respectively, below:

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44. *[I]f you get married in a church* you have to promise that you will stay together until death do us part. (P. 55)

45. And a simile is not a lie, *unless it is a bad simile*. (P. 23)

46. [I]t is very quiet *even though it is the middle of the day*. (P. 243)

Further, we have Circumstance of **Accompaniment**, which Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) claim correspond to the interrogatives *and who/what else* and *but not who/what?* We can distinguish between two subcategories, namely Comitative (*with/without who /what*) and Additive (*as well as/instead of who/what*). Examples are, respectively:

47. [P]eople do a lot of talking *without using any words*. (P.19)

48. Then he would only have one person to look after *instead of two*. (P. 136)

The next type of circumstance is that of **Role**. This type construes the meaning *be* and *become* circumstantially and corresponds to the Attribute or Value in Intensive Relational clauses. The subcategories are Guise (*what as?*) and Product (*what into?*). Examples are, respectively:

49. *As a young boy*, he spent long hours with his father. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 274)

50. Proteins are first broken down *into amino acids*. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 275)

The eighth group of circumstances is **Matter**. This type is probed by the interrogative *what about?* and is the circumstantial equivalent to Verbiage. Matter is expressed by prepositions such as *about* and *concerning*. An example is *about it* in (51) below:

51. I am writing a book *about it*. (P. 48)

The last group of circumstances is **Angle**. It can be said to represent the source or viewpoint of the process and this is also the names of its subgroups. Source is usually introduced by prepositions such as *according to* and *in the words of*, while Viewpoint tends to be introduced by *to, in the opinion of* and *from the standpoint of*. Examples are:

52. Torture and sexual violence against prisoners is widespread in jails across the United States, *according to a report*. (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 276)

53. [H]e understood that you were [*sic.*] realy important *to me*. (P. 135)

3.2   Transitivity in Curious Incident

3.2.1 Preliminary notes

The chapters in the novel can be divided into two types: Those containing Christopher's thoughts and opinions on something and those containing his experiences and concrete goings-on. Chapter 59 (pp. 38-41), on the other hand, is one of the few chapters including *both* Christopher's thoughts and him "being a detective". Thus I chose it because it can be seen as a representative passage of the whole novel. A full analysis of the chapter can be found in Appendix 2, where the text is divided and numbered according to *T-units*, i.e. an independent clause with all the clauses that are dependent on it (Thompson 2004: 156, see also Fries 1994). This contrasts with Halliday and Matthiessen (2004), who see the clause as the main unit for transitivity analysis and consequently analyze all ranking (i.e. non-embedded) clauses within the clause complex separately (as for example in the analysis on pp. 304-5). Thompson (2004: 113), on the other hand, argues that adverbial clauses, although formally ranking clauses, can also function as Circumstances because they can stand in the same experiential relation to the process in the dominant clause as for example prepositional phrases. Thus, like in his Theme analyses, he considers the T-unit as the main unit for analysis, which will also be the policy in the present thesis.

As we are here investigating the mind style of Christopher, we will not consider the passages of direct speech originating from Siobhan and Mrs Shears in the discussion. Furthermore, in order to restrict the discussion, we will only include finite clauses and disregard non-finite ones. Sentence fragments that do not contain processes will not be considered either. Lastly, projected clauses, ranking clauses and non-ranking clauses within ranking and non-ranking clauses will not be considered. Projected clauses within projected clauses (as in for example T-unit (1)), however, will be included,[6] as (1) it is difficult to see if they are hypotactic or paratactic clauses and (2) they include some interesting transitivity patterns. Similarly, the processes of coordinated clauses within ranking and non-ranking clauses (e.g. the adverbial clause of reason in T-unit 82) will be considered. The processes that are considered in the analysis and discussion below are marked with colors in Appendix 2.

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[6] Except, of course, in the cases where the projected clause within the projected clause contains direct or indirect speech from someone else than Christopher.

Since the ideational metafunction is concerned with goings-on in the world, all textual and modal elements will not be considered in the analysis as they do not play a role in transitivity. Examples are conjunctions and Conjuncts (e.g. *and, because, besides*), Disjuncts (e.g. *probably*), existential *there,* grammatical and modal auxiliaries (e.g. *BE, might, should*), and vocatives (e.g. *Christopher*).

Lastly, even though the processes and participants seem easy to categorize in theory, this is more complicated in practice. Thompson (2004: 117) stresses the "fuzziness" of the categories. In practice, he notes, some examples "fit smoothly into the categories as defined, while others seem to include less typical elements of meaning or to show a blend of two categories". I encountered many "fuzzy" examples in the novel passage that I analyzed. However, it is necessary to categorize an example as one or the other in the end. If the results are as fuzzy as the categories, it is difficult to discuss them properly and come to any proper conclusions.

We will first present the results of the analysis (**3.2.2**) before we consider how the foregrounded transitivity patterns can be said to project certain aspects of Christopher's mind style (**3.2.3**).

3.2.2 Analysis

Table 1 below gives an overview of the processes in main clauses, projected clauses, ranking clauses (all adverbial clauses except one non-restrictive relative clause in T-unit 66), and non-ranking clauses:

Table 1- Overview of process types in Chapter 59

	Material	Mental	Relational	Verbal	Behavioral	Existential	SUM
Main	28	16	11	17	2	2	76
Projected	8	3	1	1	2		15
Ranking	6	4	2	3	1	3	19
Non-ranking	6	1	7	1		1	16
SUM	48	24	21	22	5	6	126
Percent	38.1	19.0	16.7	17.5	4	4.8	100

We see that the most frequent process type is Material, which represents 38.1 percent of the total number of processes. It represents the largest group in all types of clauses except non-

ranking clauses, where Relational processes are slightly more frequent. Mental, Relational and Verbal processes are almost equally frequent, Mental processes being slightly more frequent than the latter two. Behavioral and Existential processes are the smallest process groups, representing approximately four and five percent, respectively. The majority of the processes (76 out of 126) occur in main clauses.

Let us look at the Material processes first. If we look at the processes in the main clauses in terms of transitivity (in the traditional meaning of the word), only seven have Goals. The majority (15) occur with Circumstances of Time and Place. In fact, the great majority of these types of Circumstances (10 out of 17 and 14 out of 17, respectively, see Table 7 below), occur within Material processes. In contrast, most of the Material processes within the projected, ranking and non-ranking clauses (16 out of 20) have Goals. Tables 2 and 3 below show what entities function as the Actor and Goal in the Material processes in the text, respectively:

Table 2- Entities functioning as Actor

Actor	Main clauses	Ranking	Non-ranking clauses	Projected clauses	SUM
Christopher (I)	14	2	3	2	**21**
Father	3	2			**5**
Mrs Shears	4	2	1	3	**10**
People	2		1		**3**
Who(ever)	1		1	3	**5**
Unknown (passive)	2				**2**
Tea	1				**1**
The fork	1				**1**
SUM	**28**	**6**	**6**	**8**	**48**

Table 3- Entities functioning as Goal

Goal	Main clauses	Ranking	Non-ranking clauses	Projected clauses	SUM
Toby	1				**1**
Wellington	1	1	1	7	**10**
The fork	1				**1**
what you can't do (it)	1				**1**
A mug of tea	1				**1**
The door	1	1			**2**
The shed	1				**1**
[Father's] van		1			**1**
Lots of things		1			**1**
What I am told			1		**1**
what			2		**2**
Gardening tools			1		**1**
SUM	**7**	**4**	**5**	**7**	**23**

We see that in almost half of the Material clauses, Christopher is the Actor. In ten of the processes, Mrs Shears is the Actor, while Father functions as Actors in five processes. Most of the sentences are active as passive sentences solely occur in cases where the Actor is unknown to Christopher (T-units 56 and 62). However, there are also eight other Actors which have unspecified reference, namely *people* and *who(ever)*.There are two cases of a non-human Actor, namely *tea* and *fork,* in T-units 43 and 61, respectively:

54. *Some of her tea* spilled onto the carpet.

55. *It* [*the fork*] was lying on the bench by the window […]

If we look at the entities functioning as Goal, Wellington serves this function in almost half of the cases and seven out of ten of these occurrences are in projected clauses. Only one of them is in a main clause. No other referents except *door* and *what* occur more than once as Goal.

Approximately one fifth of the clauses are Mental. The largest subgroups are Cognition and Perception, as their frequency is 9 and 10 out of 24, respectively, and these frequencies are spread evenly in different clause types percentagewise. There is only one Emotive process, namely *like* in T-unit 20:

56. And I like [the fact that Siobhan tells me exactly what I'm not allowed to do].

In Table 4 below we see that Christopher is the Senser in the majority of the processes:

Table 4- Items functioning as Senser

Senser	Main clauses	Ranking	Non-ranking clauses	Projected clauses	SUM
Christopher (I)	14	4		2	**20**
you	1				**1**
Siobhan	1				**1**
Mrs Shears				1	**1**
Father			1		**1**

There are no foregrounded patterns in the Relational processes except that *this* functions as Value in four of the cases. In these cases *this* has textual reference (see **2.1.1**).

Verbal clauses make up 17.5 percent of all processes, and 22.4 percent of the processes in main clauses. The majority of them (17 out of 22) appear in main clauses. The large majority of the Verbal processes project; there are only six cases of Verbiage in the chapter, namely:

57. But they don't tell you *how long to be quiet for*. (T-unit 5)

58. When she tells me not to do something she tells me exactly *what it is I am not allowed to do*. (T-unit 19)

59. When she tells me *not to do something…* (ibid.)

60. She didn't answer *my question*. (T-unit 45)

61. When I got home I said *hello* to Father. (T-unit 79)

62. …when other people tell you *what you can't do* (T-unit 29)

Table 5 below demonstrates the items functioning as Sayer:

Table 5- Items functioning as Sayer

Sayer	Main clauses	Ranking clauses	Non-ranking clauses	Projected clauses	SUM
Christopher (I)	5			1	**6**
Mrs Shears	5				**5**
Siobhan	3	1			**4**
People	2	1			**3**
The sign	1		1		**2**
The Bible	1				**1**
Father		1			**1**

We see that Christopher is the Sayer in most cases, but is closely followed by Mrs Shears and Siobhan. In other words, here Christopher is less dominant as the Agent participant than in Material and Mental processes.

There are five Behavioral clauses in all in the chapter (in T-units 33, 36, 49 (two in the projected clause) and 60 (in the adverbial clause of time). Only two of these appear in main clauses (T-units 33 and 36). Further, two have Christopher as a Behaver while Mrs Shears is the Behaver in three of them. Similarly, of the total six Existential processes in the chapter, two appear in main clauses (T-units 13 and 14) while three appear in ranking adverbial clauses of reason (in T-units 7, 36 and 62).

It is also interesting to see what participant roles Christopher most frequently inhabits compared to other people:

Table 6- Transitivity concordances

	Christopher	Mrs Shears	Siobhan	Father
Actor	21	10		5
Senser	20	1	1	1
Phenomenon		2		

Carrier	3	1		
Assigner		1		
Sayer	6	5	4	1
Behaver	2	3		
SUM	52	23	5	7

We see here that Christopher is the most frequently mentioned participant in the chapter, most often functioning as Actor or Senser. Besides him, Mrs Shears quite frequently is the Actor. However, she is a much more diverse participant than Christopher as she has many different participant roles in the chapter. Siobhan and Father do not have many functions: Siobhan is mostly the Sayer, while Father is most frequently Actor.

Lastly, I analyzed the Circumstances in each T-unit (i.e. not within projected, ranking and non-ranking clauses). Table 7 below illustrates the frequency of the different types of Circumstances and if they are realized by an adverb, an adverbial or prepositional phrase, or an adverbial clause. Table 8 illustrates with what process they occur in the chapter.

Table 7- Circumstances I

		Adverbs or phrases	Adverbial clauses	SUM
Location	Time	10	7	**17**
	Place	17		**17**
Cause	Reason		7	**7**
	Purpose	1		**1**
Contingency	Condition		1	**1**
	Concession		1	**1**
Manner	Quality	3		**3**
	Means	2		**2**
	Comparison	1		**1**
SUM		**34**	**16**	**50**

Table 8- Circumstances II

		Material	Mental	Verbal	Relational	Existential	Behavioral
Location	Time	10	1	5	1		
	Place	14		1		1	1
Cause	Reason	2	2	1	1		1
	Purpose						1
Contingency	Condition	1					
	Concession		1				
Manner	Quality	3					

	Means	2					
	Comparison					1	
SUM		**32**	**4**	**7**	**3**	**1**	**3**

In Table 7 we see that there are 50 Circumstances in all and that most of them (36 out of 50) are realized by adverbs or phrases. The most common group is that of Location, and Time and Place are equally frequent (17 instances each). Cause is the third largest group, but is significantly less frequent than Location. The majority of the Circumstances realized by adverbial groups are Time or Reason Circumstances. In Table 8 we see that (as previously mentioned) the majority of the Circumstances occur in Material T-units, and most of these Circumstances belong to the subgroups of Time and Place. However, five Time Circumstances also appear in Verbal T-units.

3.2.3 Transitivity patterns and mind style

The chapter is dominated by Material processes with Circumstances of Time and Place and Christopher as Actor. The majority of the Material clauses can be probed by the questions *What did I (Christopher) do?* and *What happened to me?* Thus it seems that Christopher is mainly concerned with his own experiences in the external world. The majority of the Material processes in the main clauses (23 out of 28) occur in the second part of the chapter where Christopher is "being a detective" and trying to find out who killed Wellington the dog.

There are some similarities between the transitivity patterns of Material processes in this chapter and those in Golding's *The Inheritors* and Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* (Halliday 2002 [1971], Leech and Short 2007, see also **1.3**). The most important similarity is that in all three texts the narrator avoids transitive main clauses. Unlike Golding's Lok and Faulkner's Benjy, however, Christopher does not use transitive verbs as if they were intransitive. Rather, he uses intransitive verbs or verbs that can be both transitive and intransitive. Examples are:

63. Father often drives at over 30 mph in a 30 mph zone. (T-unit 9)

64. That evening I went to Mrs Shears' house and knocked on the door... (T-units 31-32).

Like Lok, Christopher frequently combines Place Circumstances with Material clauses. However, while Lok's Material processes often have body part or object Actors, Christopher's Actors tend to be human beings, mostly himself. Further, when Lok is the Actor

his movements are often aimless, for example "He rushed to the edge of the water and came back" (Golding 1955, cited in Halliday 2002 [1971]: 121). Lok does not understand that he is being attacked; he only grasps movement, that something is happening, but he does not understand fully how and why it is happening and so he moves aimlessly around. In contrast, Christopher's movements in Mrs Shears' garden are highly purposeful as he is investigating the murder of Wellington. In the sentence "I made sure that there was no one watching and climbed over the wall and walked down the side of the house into her garden to the shed where she kept all her gardening tools" (T-units 53-55), for example, the Material processes are events following each other in time and all serve a predetermined purpose: to find Wellington's murderer.

The fact the most frequent Circumstances are those of Place and Time and that these Circumstances very often combine with Material processes cumulatively indicate that Christopher puts a heavy emphasis on when and where events happen. This suits well with my argument in **2.3.2** that Christopher has a strong need for order and clarity. Especially the heavy use of Circumstances of Time suit well with his statement that he is afraid to get lost in time and so keeps a strict control over it. Consequently, there are many "unnecessary" Circumstances of Time in the sense that they repeat Given information, e.g. *when he is driving his car* (T-unit 11), *when she tells me not to do something* (T-unit 19), *when other people tell you what you can't do* (T-unit 29) and *when I got home* (T-unit 79). This is related to Christopher's avoidance of Ellipsis and Reference, (see **2.3.2**) as these instances could have been omitted or/and replaced by a Reference item. The fact that he then includes them indicates that he has a strong need to keep check of time.

However, as we mentioned in **3.2.2**, most of the Material clauses in the ranking clauses, non-ranking clauses and projected clauses have Goals. In the projected clauses all of the Goals are Wellington. This can be explained by the fact that the typical proposition in the projected clauses is "[Actor] killed Wellington". We might then say that even though the main clauses most frequently have no Goal, the fact that most subordinated and projected clauses have it suggests that Christopher, unlike Lok and Benjy, is fully aware that he and other people act upon objects and other people: Examples are:

65. But whoever had killed [*Wellington*] had killed *him* with Mrs Shears' fork. (T-unit 68)

66. When other people tell you what you can't do they don't do *it* like this. (T-unit 29)

However, as we saw in **3.2.2** (examples (54) and (55)), there are two foregrounded cases where the Actor is not human, namely in T-units 43 and 61. Even though these cases are similar in transitivity, only T-unit 43 is deviant and thus foregrounded. This is because although *lie* in T-unit 61 is a Material process, it is a stative verb and so almost becomes a Circumstantial Relational process. Thus the fork does not seem to have a life on its own. The T-unit is only a description of what Christopher sees through the window of the shed. T-unit 43, on the other hand, is quite similar to Lok's typical Material clauses with an object Actor and a Circumstance of Place (e.g. "a stick rose upright"). Here Christopher has just knocked on Mrs Shears' door and told her that he wants to find out who killed Wellington. Then, instead of describing how Mrs Shears reacts to this statement he describes what *some of her tea* did, which suggests that he does not understand that Mrs Shears is actually responsible for the tea spilling. This again can be said to indicate and reflect the fact that Christopher does not have a theory of mind (see **2.3.2**), as he does not seem to understand that his statement might be upsetting and that Mrs Shears quite understandably reacts with surprise or mild fear which causes her to spill her tea. Thus he only describes what he is able to observe and understand: the tea spilling.

Here Christopher's mind seems to be quite similar to that of Lok, who fails to understand that objects do not have a life of their own but that human beings control and move them (thus in the example above the stick did not rise by itself; it is rather a human being that is drawing a bow and planning to attack him). It seems then that Christopher understands that human beings other than himself influence and act upon people and objects only when these actions do not imply much psychological reasoning. This is reflected in that the all Material processes which have Goals in the chapter are all pure physical processes with no psychological implications, e.g. *drive vans* (T-unit 11), *do things* (T-units 15 and 30) and *open the door* (T-unit 34).[7] The exception, of course, is *kill someone*, as murder is an action with highly complex and often irrational psychological reasons. However, we see that Christopher simplifies it all as he only asks the question of *who* killed Wellington, not *why*. At one point in the novel he does actually think about the cause behind it, but he is nevertheless unable to understand that killing a dog could also be an irrational and spontaneous action:

> And as I was crossing the street I had a stroke of inspiration about who might have killed Wellington. I was imagining a Chain of Reasoning inside my head which was like this:

---

[7] These are paraphrases; for the exact wording see Appendix 2.

1. Why would you kill a dog?

a) Because you hated the dog.

b) Because you were mad.

c) Because you wanted to make Mrs Shears upset.

2. I didn't know anyone who hated Wellington, so if it was (a) it was probably a stranger.

3. I didn't know any mad people, so if it was (b) it was also probably a stranger.

4. Most murders are committed by someone who is known to the victim. In fact, you are most likely to be murdered by a member of your own family on Christmas Day. This is a fact. Wellington was therefore most likely to have been killed by someone known to him.

5. If it was (c) I only knew one person who didn't like Mrs Shears, and that was Mr Shears, who knew Wellington very well indeed.

This meant that Mr Shears was my Prime Suspect.

When Christopher then later in the novel discovers that it was his own father who murdered Wellington he gets terrified of him exactly because he does not understand the reason behind his action. For Christopher, the fact that his father should kill a dog in a fit of rage without a rational motive is utterly inconceivable to him. It seems then that Christopher's lack of a theory of mind prevents him from understanding Material processes with more complex relations of cause and effect involving psychological reasoning.

When it comes to the transitivity patterns of the Mental processes it is interesting to see that the large majority of the them are Perceptive and Cognitive and that Christopher mainly is the Senser. If we look closer at the Mental processes of Perception, eight out of ten have *see* as the verb realizing the process (the remaining two being *hear*). These foregrounded processes of visual perception fit well with our previous observations that Christopher is a visual thinker and "sees everything" (**2.3.1** and **2.3.2**, respectively). The foregrounded Mental processes of Cognition, on the other hand, probably have to do with several sections of the chapter being Christopher's thoughts and theories on the Wellington murder mystery and his role as a detective. Examples are *[I was] finding things out* (T-unit 82), and *I wondered if Mrs Shears had killed Wellington herself* (T-unit 67).

It is interesting that there is only one Mental process of Emotion (T-unit 20) in the chapter. Considering the fact that this is a first person narrative, we might say that the lack of expressions of emotion is foregrounded. However, it is important to acknowledge that emotions are not solely expressed by means of Mental processes of Emotion and consider

emotional expressions in other processes. Nevertheless, I found only one more expression of emotion in the chapter, namely in the Attributive Intensive Relational process in T-unit 82 (*and [I] felt happy because I was being a detective and finding things out*). Thus we can state for certain that the lack of expressions of emotion really is foregrounded. This can be connected to Christopher's condition, as Dodd (2005: 181) points out that people with autism do not only have problems recognizing emotions in others; they also "frequently have difficulty identifying their own feelings, dealing with them, controlling them and sharing them with others." This fits well with the near absence of emotional expressions in the novel and Christopher's thoughts on them:

> [P]eople's brains are like computers… And people think they're not computers because they have feelings and computers don't have feelings. But feelings are just having a picture on the screen in your head of what is going to happen tomorrow or next year, or what might have happened instead of what did happen, and if it is a happy picture they smile and if it is a sad picture they cry. (P. 148)

We see that Christopher's vision of the brain as a computer simplifies the notion of emotions remarkably. This aspect of Christopher's mind style seems to be similar to that of Kesey's Bromden (Semino and Swindlehurst 1996, see also **1.3**) as Christopher here seems to use his knowledge of computers to compensate for his inability to fully understand people's minds. Further, there are many examples in the novel of the fact that he has a different emotional register than most people. A very illustrative example is Christopher's reaction when he is told that his mother has died of a heart attack: "I said, 'What kind of heart attack?'" (p. 36). He is simply surprised because he knows that healthy people like his mother do not tend to get heart attacks. Similarly, he does not have an emotional reaction when he hears that his mother and Mr Shears had an affair. His explanation is that Mother is dead and there is no point feeling anything for something which is not there. In this way we see that an absence of a certain linguistic pattern, not only its presence, can project a certain mind style.

In light of all this, it is interesting that there actually are other Sensers in the chapter apart from Christopher himself. These are *you* in T-unit 6, *Father* in T-unit 15 (in the non-ranking clause), *Siobhan* in T-unit 18, and Mrs Shears in T-unit 44 (*you* in the projected clause), respectively:

67. Or you see a sign which says **KEEP OFF THE GRASS**…

68. Also I don't know what Father means when he says "Stay out of other people's business"…

69. Siobhan understands.

70. I said, "Do you know who killed Wellington?"

However, in reality (67) cannot be said to be an exception from the rule that Christopher is Senser. According to Quirk et al (1985: 354) the generic *you* can be a case of the speaker "appealing to the hearer's experience of life in general" or it can refer to the speaker's life and/or experiences, and the generic *you* in (67) seems to be a case of the latter as most people do not get confused when they see this kind of sign. The fact that Father, Siobhan and Mrs Shears function as Sensers in (68), (69) and (70), on the other hand, indicates that there is an inconsistency in the linguistic patterns suggesting that Christopher lacks a theory of mind, because here Christopher actually seems to understand that somebody other than himself has a mind, and in the case of Siobhan, what they are thinking. The explanation for this probably lies with the author: Mark Haddon has stated that *Curious Incident* is neither based on research nor on direct experience with sufferers of Asperger's Syndrome, and that his goal was not to make Christopher "medically correct" but rather a "believable" and "empathetic" character (Haddon 2004). Thus, these cases might be seen as Haddon's way of making Christopher a character for whom the reader would more easily develop empathy and not see him as a person who, in Mr Shears' words, does not "ever, ever think about other people" (p. 252).

The fact that the large majority of the Verbal processes project instead of containing a Verbiage can be explained by the fact that Christopher's narrative contains quite a large amount of dialogue and most of it is presented in direct speech. This could be seen as another indicator of Christopher's lack of a theory of mind and thus his difficulty of understanding the intended meaning behind people's utterances (see **2.3.2**) because by projecting clauses of direct speech he simply repeats what people have said instead of giving an individual synthesis or interpretation of it. In other words, since he does not understand the illocutionary meaning behind people's utterances he simply repeats the utterances instead of stating their meaning. Thus eleven out of the total 22 Verbal processes are realized by the verb *say*. The only speech act verbs present denote simple speech acts related to interrogation, e.g. *ask*, *answer* and *reply*. Similarly, the six Verbiages present in the text are mostly nominal *wh*-clauses, *question* being the only speech act worded in the chapter. The fact that Christopher prefers to repeat people's utterances can also be said to reflect his excellent rote memory abilities. One might then argue that he repeats other people's utterances not only because he does not understand the meaning behind them, but also because he remembers them so well.

There are very few Behavioral processes in the chapter, which might also reflect Christopher's lack of a theory of mind. If we look at the individual cases, we see that like in the Mental processes there is an emphasis on the visual sense: three out of five of the processes are realized by the verbs *watch* and *look* (the last two instances are realized by the verb *wait*). In the three cases where Mrs Shears is the Behaver, the Behavioral processes are quite simple, realized by the verbs *watch* and *wait*. Thus we can say that even though Christopher here uncharacteristically describes the behavior of someone other than himself, he still does not seem to know much about the actual workings of Mrs Shears' mind.

As we saw in Table 6 in **3.2.2**, Christopher is the most frequent participant in the chapter by far, mostly functioning as Actor and Senser. This might of course be explained by the fact that he is the first person narrator of the novel. However, it might also reflect his lack of a theory of mind. In other words, he is the most frequent participant because he is only able to write about experiences from his point of view. He cannot imagine the thoughts of other people and so does not write about them either. This is reflected in Table 6 above, as we see that although Mrs Shears is a quite common participant in the chapter, she mostly realizes the participant roles in processes denoting simple actions in the external world; Actor and Sayer in Material and Verbal clauses. Siobhan and Father are not frequent participants, but the roles they have are similarly connected to the external world. Siobhan is most frequently Sayer: while Father is Actor.

Since we are concerned with the foregrounding of transitive patterns it would be interesting to compare the process frequencies in this chapter to a certain norm. Matthiessen's (1999) study "The system of transitivity: An Exploratory Study of Text-based Profiles" could be said to provide such a norm, as the study is an analysis of the transitivity patterns in different registers (approximately 14,500 words altogether) in order to see, among other things, how the different processes types are typically represented in texts. Matthiessen (1999: 16) found that Material processes typically represent 51 percent of the processes, Mental processes 9 percent, Relational 23 percent, Verbal 10 percent, Behavioral 5 percent, and Existential 2 percent. If we compare these frequencies to those in Table 1 in **3.2.2** we see that they are quite different for all process groups except Behavioral. Especially Mental and Verbal processes are much more frequent in *Curious Incident* (by10 and 7.5 percent, respectively)*,* at the expense of Material and Relational clauses (which are, respectively, 12.9 and 6.3 percent less frequent). This fits well with our argument that Christopher puts a large emphasis on what is

going on in his own mind and that the novel contains a large amount of direct speech because of Christopher's frequent reiteration of people's utterances. In this way it seems that Christopher's lack of a theory of mind is the most important aspect of Christopher's mind style according to the transitivity patterns in Chapter 59. However, we must remember that Matthiessen's (1999) frequencies derive from different text types while *Curious Incident* is a first person narrative. Thus it seems natural that there are more Mental and Verbal processes here than in texts in general. Further, Matthiessen uses quite a small sample of texts and so one might question how typical or normal these frequencies really are. In order to be able to do draw more firm conclusions, one would ideally need to compare the process frequencies in *Curious Incident* to those in a larger corpus of first person narratives, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.

3.3   Summary

In this chapter we have looked at the transitivity patterns in Chapter 59 in *Curious Incident* and argued that they can be an indicator of and reflection of Christopher's mind style. For the most part the transitivity patterns have the same mind style implications as the patterns of cohesion and coherence.

The most frequent process type is Material with Christopher as Actor. The typical pattern is an intransitive verb combined with a Circumstance of Time and/or Place, which indicates that Christopher is concerned with order and clarity of time and space. The Material processes occurring with Goals are all pure physical processes with no psychological implications, which reflects Christopher's cognitive limitations due to his lack of a theory of mind. Further, the fact that the most frequent group of Mental processes is Perception reflects that Christopher is a visual thinker and remembers everything he has seen. There is only one Mental clause of Emotion, indicating that Christopher has a difficulty with identifying and expressing his feelings. The fact that the majority of the Verbal processes project instead of containing a Verbiage indicates that Christopher has difficulty with understanding the intended meaning behind people's utterances.

If we also consider the fact that Christopher is the most common participant in the chapter, we might say that the transitivity patterns in sum reflect his emphasis on his own experiences and

his limitations in understanding those of others. In that way the transitivity patterns cumulatively reflect the main aspect of Christopher's mind style: his lack of a theory of mind.

4 Measuring consistency: Key words in *Curious Incident*

Chapters 2 and 3 were qualitative analyses of cohesion, coherence and transitivity patterns in selected passages of the novel. In this chapter I want to see if a quantitative analysis of *Curious Incident* provides support for the qualitative analyses in Chapters 2 and 3. In other words, I want to see if the linguistic patterns I identified in the previous chapters can be proved to be consistent through the presence of certain key words, or if the key words indicate some new patterns. In order to do this I carried out a key word analysis of the novel using Wordsmith Tools concordancing package (Scott 2013). First I will introduce the Key Words tool in Wordsmith Tools and the way in which I performed the key word analysis (**4.1**), before I present the results and discuss what they indicate about Christopher's mind style in light of the claims in the previous chapters (**4.2**).

4.1   The Key Words tool in Wordsmith Tools

A key word analysis attempts to identify the individual words that characterize a text or corpus, that is, words that are statistically more likely to occur in the *target corpus* than in the *comparison* or *reference corpus*. The target corpus is relatively homogeneous, for example, as in this case, a literary text, while the comparison corpus is a larger, more general corpus of texts. The comparison corpus is used to represent the "typical" patterns of use, thus making it possible "to empirically identify distinctive linguistic patterns in the target corpus that depart from those typical patterns" (Biber 2011: 16). These distinctive patterns can then said to be consistent and have stylistic significance, that is, they are foregrounded.

In order to find a text's key words, one has to first use the Word List tool in the target and reference corpora. This tool lists all the words in a text from most frequent to least frequent. The Key Words tool then compares the word frequencies in the two corpora and identifies the key words in the target corpus through a log-likelihood statistic (Scott 2001: 59).

The target corpus, the electronic version of *Curious Incident*, consists of 62,000 words and is simply a PDF version of the novel converted to a text file (required by Wordsmith). Biber (2011: 17) points out that the reference corpus should not be too large and general as one then identifies more general words associated with a high level register rather than distinctive

words used in a particular target corpus. Consequently, the Freiburg-Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of British English (FLOB) was chosen as reference corpus. This corpus is not too large; it consists of 500 2000-word texts (i.e. 1,000,000 words in all), of which 126 are fiction texts. The rest are, among others, newspaper texts, religious texts and science texts.[8] As this corpus is quite small and the fiction genre is overrepresented, it is more specific than for example the British National Corpus (BNC) and should therefore be more suitable as a reference corpus for *Curious Incident*.

4.2   Key words in *Curious Incident* and their mind style implications

Table 1 below lists the top thirty key words in *Curious Incident* identified by Wordsmith:

Table 1- Top 30 key words in *Curious Incident*

1	' [apostrophe]
2	I
3	T
4	and
5	said
6	because
7	didn'
8	S
9	you
10	I'
11	don'
12	my
13	then
14	Father
15	like
16	me
17	Christopher
18	M
19	Shears
20	wasn'
21	Mother
22	couldn'
23	it'

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[8] For further information about the FLOB corpus, see http://www.helsinki.fi/varieng/CoRD/corpora/FLOB/

24	You'
25	Going
26	Train
27	So
28	Siobhan
29	It
30	Wellington

If we look at the table we see that Key Words tool includes the apostrophe as a key word, in addition to the contracted forms of *not*, *is* and *am* and the genitive *-s*. (*T* and *M* refer to *not* and *am*, respectively, while *S* refers to both *is* and the genitive *-s*). These will of course not be considered in the discussion. Further, key words such as *didn'*, *wasn'*, and *it'* are not considered either, as their "keyness" can be explained by the fact that the language in *Curious Incident* is probably more informal than that of the texts in FLOB. The reason that Wordsmith identified the apostrophe and cases such as *wasn'* as key words might be related to our statement above, that the electronic version of the novel is a converted PDF file and not formatted into a "real" corpus, in which case cases such as *wasn't* would not have been identified as *wasn'* and *T* but *was* and *n't*. Lastly, the names of the characters in the novel, like *Christopher, Father* and *Siobhan*, are of course more frequent in the *Curious Incident* than in FLOB and so cannot be considered important key words. The words on the list that might then be considered "real" key words and should consequently be looked further into are *I, and, said, because, you, my, then, like, me, going, train* and *so*.

First, one could argue that the keyness of *I, my* and *me* could be due to the fact that the novel is a first person narrative. One the other hand, one might say that the keyness of the first person pronouns and determiners reflects Christopher's focus on his own experiences and alienation from others. This resonates to Chapter 3, where we saw that the transitivity patterns cumulatively gave the same impression, for example in the fact that Christopher is the most frequent participant in the processes. Interestingly, Semino (2007) compared the frequency of *I* in *Curious Incident* to its frequency in the first-person section of the Lancaster Speech, Writing and Thought presentation corpus, and it was proven to be a key word even then. Thus it seems that our claim that an important part of Christopher' mind style is a focus on himself and his own experiences is supported in this quantitative study.

In light of this, it is interesting that Wordsmith also identifies *you* as a key word in *Curious Incident*. I drew a random sample of 100 (of a total 890) instances in order to see if these were cases of the second person pronoun or the generic *you*. The results showed that 55 of instances derive from someone other than Christopher, and most of these instances are second person pronouns referring to Christopher. In other words, they tend to occur in direct speech when other people are talking to him. The rest of the instances, then, derive from Christopher. However, only four of these cases are second person pronouns, two of which appear in questions where Christopher asks someone whether they know who killed Wellington. The rest (i.e. 41 instances) are cases of generic *you*. In **3.2.3** we saw that Christopher used the generic *you* in T-unit 6 in Chapter 59 (see Appendix 2) and that he was here really referring to his own experiences rather than appealing to those of the reader. However, the 41random instances from the novel show somewhat different results. Some of them are similar to T-unit 6 and clearly only refer to Christopher's experiences, for example:

1. [Y]ou couldn't tell what colors the cars would be during the day. (P. 248)

2. It is like when *you* are upset and *you* hold the radio against your ear and *you* tune it halfway between two stations so that all ***you*** get is white noise… (P. 8, bold indicates that this was the example found by Wordsmith)

3. But when other people tell ***you*** what *you* can't do they don't do it like this. (P. 39)

4. [A lino cut] is when *you* draw a picture on a piece of lino and Mrs Peters cuts around the picture with a Stanley knife and then ***you*** put ink onto the lino and press it onto the paper (p. 35)

Here we see that even though Christopher uses the generic *you* he is only able to see things from his own perspective and so really refers to his own experience instead of generalizing and defining. In example (4) it seems that Christopher does not use the generic *you* correctly, as a definition should be as general as possible. This is a clear example of how Christopher is not able to see beyond his own frame of experience and is thus a strong indicator of his lack of a theory of mind. Nevertheless, the majority of the instances of generic *you* are used correctly and occur mainly in Christopher's frequent explanations and definitions, which we argued in **2.3.3** tend to be infringements of the maxims of Quantity and Relation. Examples are:

5. I don't like lots of people I don't know and I hate it even more if I am stuck in a room with lots of people I don't know, and a train is like a room and *you* can't get out of it when it's moving. (P. 196)

6. [I]f *you* are lost and ***you*** need directions *you* can ask a policeman. (P. 187).

7. [W]hen *you* get married it is because ***you*** want to live together and have children (P. 55)

Further, many of the instances of generic *you* appear to be referring to people's general experience, for example:

8. It is like being in a restaurant like when Father takes me out to a Berni Inn sometimes and *you* look at the menu and *you* have to choose what you are going to have. (p. 105)

9. And if *you* go off in a spaceship and ***you*** travel near the speed of light… (P. 193-4)

10. But in life *you* have to take lots of decisions and if *you* don't take decisions *you* would never do anything because ***you*** would spend all your time choosing between things *you* could do. (P. 106)

The fact that Christopher quite frequently seems to refer to the reader's or people's experience of life in general is interesting in light of our argument that he lacks a theory of mind. However, this could be explained by our argument in **3.2.3** that Haddon wished to make Christopher a more empathetic character. Thus by making Christopher use the generic *you* and in that way communicate with the reader, Haddon makes Christopher a character for whom it would be easier to develop empathy. However, this sample is too small to draw any final conclusions. One would need to analyze a much larger sample of cases of generic *you* than 41 instances, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. What we might conclude, however, is that *you* appears as a key word in *Curious Incident* due to (1) the large amount of direct speech in the novel and (2) Christopher's frequent explanations and definitions of things that are known to the reader (see **2.3.3**).

The fact that *and* was revealed to be a key word fits well with my arguments in **2.3.2** and **2.3.4** that Christopher prefers coordination to subordination and that he starts many sentences with this conjunction. It is interesting, then, that *because* is a key word, as it introduces the subordinate adverbial clauses of reason. Examples are:

11. Then I could hear that he was crying *because* his breath sounded all bubbly and wet, like it does when someone has a cold and they have lots of snot in their nose. (P. 143)

12. Mr Jeavons said that I liked maths *because*…there was always a straightforward answer at the end… This is *because* Mr Jeavons doesn't understand numbers. (P. 78)

13. And then I couldn't think of anything *because* my brain wasn't working properly. (P. 141)

14. And then I stopped running *because* I was breathing really hard and my legs hurt. (P. 171)

In my qualitative analyses *because*-clauses were not foregrounded. If we look at Table 7 in **3.2.2** we see that *because*-clauses constitute seven out of sixteen adverbial clauses functioning as Circumstance in Chapter 59, but as these are not large numbers they were not considered in

the discussion in **3.2.3**. This is then a good example of how a quantitative analysis of literary texts can identify patterns that were otherwise missed in a qualitative analysis. However, the keyness of *because* is not completely unrelated to our discussion of Christopher's mind style in the previous chapters. This is because the semantic property of this word and *so*, namely cause, could be said to be related to my arguments in Chapter 2 and 3 that Christopher has a strong need for clarity and order, has an imperfect understanding of cause and effect and provides many explanations. In other words, we might say that he strives to understand the cause behind everything precisely because he finds it difficult to understand the causality behind the events of the world. However, as we see in examples (13) and (14), Christopher also uses adverbial clauses of reason to explain his thoughts and actions. In this way it seems that he considers the reader of the novel, which, as in the case of his use of the generic *you*, does not go well with our argument that he lacks a theory of mind. However, as in the case with the generic *you*, this might be Haddon's way to make Christopher more accessible to the reader. By making Christopher explain why he thinks and behaves the way he does, the reader understands him and is way of seeing the world better. Thus the keyness of *because* can be explained both by the fact that Christopher is concerned with the cause behind events of the world as well as Haddon's need to explain Christopher's behavior.

As in the case of *you*, the fact that *said* is a key word could be said to reflect the great amount of direct speech in the novel, as we saw in Chapter 3. Thus it reinforces our claims in Chapter 2 and 3 that Christopher has difficulty with understanding the illocutionary force behind people's utterances and therefore only repeats what they say instead of giving a personal interpretation of it by including speech act verbs such as *warn* and *demand*.

Further, the keyness of *then* suits well with our argument in the previous chapters that Christopher has a need for clarity and order and is afraid to "get lost in time": *Then* realized five of the seventeen Circumstances of Time in Chapter 59 (see Appendix 2), and we saw in Chapter 3 that the Circumstances of Time were foregrounded in general. The keyness of *then* might also be explained by the fact that Christopher quite often combines it with *and* as in *and then*. By using the Concord tool I found that there were 254 instances of this construction in the novel. Examples are:

15. *And then* Father nodded and didn't say anything for a short while. (P. 261)

16. *And then* I heard the roaring and I lifted Toby up and grabbed him with both hands… (P. 224)

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17. *And then* he sat down next to me and said, "So, where does your mother live?" (P. 185)

The fact that this construction is foregrounded reinforces our argument that Christopher's mind style resembles that of a child (**2.3.4**), as this is a typical informal expression children use in narratives.

Wordsmith also identified *like* as a key word. Given the fact that it can belong to many different word classes depending on the context, I drew a random sample of 100 (of a total 446) instances. The results showed that the large majority of the instances (96 of the 100) derived from Christopher. Further, in the majority (69 out of 100) of the instances *like* was a preposition while it was a verb in the rest (i.e. 31 instances). Examples (18) and (19) below illustrate the former while the last two are examples of the latter:

18. [H]is voice sounded tiny and far away, *like* people's voices sometimes do when I am groaning and I don't want them to be near me. (P. 142)

19. And I felt *like* I felt **like** when I had flu and I had to stay in bed all day and all of me hurt and I couldn't walk or eat or go to sleep or do maths. (P. 216)

20. I said, "I think I'd *like* the pink squares but not the yellow squares…". (P. 53)

21. I *like* Sherlock Holmes and I think that if I were a proper detective he is the kind of detective I would be. (P. 92)

As *like* is most frequently a preposition in the novel, its keyness is probably connected to our previous argument that Christopher provides explanations. As we can see in (18) and (19), he often uses the word to give examples and make comparisons. The fact that there are 31 cases of the emotion verb *like* does not necessarily prove wrong our argument in **3.2.3** that Christopher does not tend to express his emotions as there are many other ways to do this than through *like*. In other words, we might say that Christopher does not express emotions frequently, but when he does he often does it by way of *like*. Of course, a more comprehensive study of Christopher's use of emotional expressions and modality would be needed to be able to be able to draw any firm conclusions, but that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.

Further, it is interesting that *going* appears to be a key word. Since the verb in the *–ing* form can form part of the informal future expression *BE going to* in addition to being a lexical verb, I drew a random sample of 100 (of a total 206) instances in order to see what the tendency was in *Curious Incident*. In all, 27 of the instances were a case of main verb *going* while 72 were part of the future construction. There was one instance that did not belong to either,

namely *And everyone turned round to see what was* going *on* (p. 134). However, 34 of these instances do not originate from Christopher. Of the instances that do originate from Christopher, 23 are cases of the main verb, while 43 are cases of *going* forming part of the future construction. Thus we see that the future construction *BE going to* is foregrounded in the novel, something that we did not find in the qualitative analysis. Due to the large amount of Material clauses found in Chapter 3 it is interesting that it is not the main verb *go* denoting movement that is foregrounded, but the future construction. *BE going to* is the informal variant of the *will* future construction, and its general meaning is "future as outcome of present circumstances", which can in turn be divided into two sub-meanings: "the future outcome of present intention" and "the future outcome of present cause" (Leech 2004: 56). Thus, *BE going to* often refers to the immediate future, especially if there is no time adverbial in the clause or utterance. Examples of the construction are:

22. I do not like people shouting at me. It makes me scared that they are *going* to hit me or touch me… (p. 4)
23. But you don't know if you are *going* to like something because you haven't tasted it yet, so you have favorite foods and you choose these, and you have foods you don't like and you don't choose these, and then it is simple. (P. 107)

However, he also frequently uses *BE going to* to indicate what he intends to do:

24. I decided that I was *going* to find out who killed Wellington even though Father had told me to stay out of other people's business. (P. 38)

25. I'm *going* to do my A-level maths next month. And I'm *going* to get an A grade." (P. 71)

Christopher's preoccupation with the future can be seen as a reflection of his strong need for clarity and order. As the future is uncertain and unknown it fills Christopher with anxiety:

> And it's best if you know a good thing is going to happen, like an eclipse or getting a microscope for Christmas. And it's bad if you know a bad thing is going to happen, like having a filling or going to France. But I think it is worst if you don't know whether it is a good thing or a bad thing which is going to happen.

In Chapter 2 and 3 we saw how Christopher's fear of uncertainty and the unknown was foregrounded through (among other things) his strong emphasis on clarity and order in the linguistic structure (i.e. his avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis) and his frequent time adverbials. In this way the fact that *going* is a key word confirms the results of our qualitative analysis of Christopher's mind style.

Interestingly, *train* is one of the key words in the novel. However, it probably does not have to do so much with Christopher being interested in trains as it has to do with his lexical

repetition and avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis. Christopher does not express a special interest in trains, even though his mother mentions that he liked to play with a train set when he was little (pp. 131-2). However, as Christopher uses a considerable amount of space in his novel to describe his journey from Swindon to London and his experiences in London, trains indeed become important. Christopher uses the word both to refer to the train *to* London as well as the metro *in* London, and as he has never travelled by train before he describes all the new experiences. Thus we can say that the combination of the fact that Christopher uses a considerable amount of space to describe his journey to London and that he prefers lexical repetition to Reference and Ellipsis probably makes *train* a key word in the novel. For example, in example (26) below the word is repeated nine times:

26. And then I heard the sound like sword fighting and the roaring of a **train** coming into the station and I worked out that there was a big computer somewhere and it knew where all the **trains** were and it sent messages to the black boxes in the little stations to say when the **trains** were coming, and that made me feel better because everything had an order and a plan.

    And the **train** came into the little station and it stopped and 5 people got onto the **train** and another person ran into the little station and got on, and 7 people got off the **train** and then the doors closed automatically and the **train** went away. And when the next **train** came I wasn't so scared anymore because the sign said ***TRAIN* APPROACHING** so I knew it was going to happen. (P. 222-3, my emphasis)

4.3   Summary

The fact that *I, and, my, me, said, because, then, like, going, train* and *so* are key words all support the claims made about Christopher's mind style and the linguistic patterns projecting that mind style in Chapter 2 and 3. In other words, the quantitative key word analysis of the novel suggests that the linguistic patterns I identified in the qualitative analyses seem to be consistent throughout the novel. The keyness of *I*, *my* and *me* reflects Christopher's focus on his own experiences due to his lack of a theory of mind, the keyness of *and* reflects his preference for coordination to subordination, and the fact that *said* is a key word reflects his problems with understanding the illocutionary force behind people's utterances. Further, the keyness of *because, so, like, then* and *going* can be explained by Christopher's need for order and clarity, his fear of uncertainty and the unknown, and his frequent explanations of things that are known to the reader. The fact that *train* is a key word can to a certain degree be said to reflect Christopher's avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis. However, the fact that Wordsmith identified *you* as a key word indicates that Haddon has prioritized making Christopher an empathetic character rather than a representation of a person with Asperger's

Syndrome, as Christopher mainly uses the generic *you* to refer to the reader's general experience. This is also indicated by the fact that Christopher frequently uses *because*-clauses to explain his thoughts and actions, which can be seen as Haddon's way of making Christopher more accessible to the reader.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to explore Christopher's mind style in *Curious Incident*, that is, see how his word view and cognitive habits can be indicated by and reflected in his consistent linguistic choices. In order to do this, both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed. The theoretical fundament was Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar, but pragmatic theories on discourse coherence were utilized as well. It has been argued that Christopher's idiosyncratic mind style can be reflected in patterns of cohesion, coherence and transitivity and that the consistency of these patterns can be proved by way of a quantitative key word analysis.

5.1   Main findings

In Chapter 2 we analyzed patterns of cohesion and coherence and claimed that they indicate and reflect different aspects of Christopher's mind style. First, we found that there are many visual elements in the novel that form cohesive ties with textual items and thus contribute to the overall coherence of the novel, which might be explained by the fact that Christopher is a visual thinker. Further, there are linguistic structures which demonstrate his inability to synthesize information for the reader's benefit and distinguish between Given and New information, namely his avoidance of complexity at phrase level, a tendency to reiterate lexis and sentence structures and avoid Reference and Ellipsis, his preference for coordination to subordination, and present Given information about characters as New. We argued that his inability to synthesize information for the reader's benefit and distinguish between Given and New could be said to reflect Christopher's lack of a theory of mind, his need for order and clarity, his inability to distinguish minor from major information and his imperfect understanding of cause and effect. It was also argued that Christopher regularly infringes Grice's maxims of Relation and Quantity by providing detailed descriptions and information which are often irrelevant for the subsequent plot development or are not topical. This probably also reflects his need for order and clarity, his lack of a theory of mind and his inability to distinguish major from minor information in general. Lastly, in **2.3.4** we argued that all of these linguistic patterns combine to create the impression of a childlike mind. However, other linguistic patterns and certain non-linguistic elements can be said to create the

opposite impression (i.e. a complex mind style), which might reflect the complexity of Christopher's condition.

In Chapter 3 we looked at the transitivity patterns in a representative chapter of the novel in order to see what they would say about Christopher's mind style. The transitivity patterns mostly seem to have the same mind style implications as the patterns of cohesion and coherence. First, we found that Christopher is the most common participant in intransitive Material processes that contain Circumstances of Time and/or Place, which probably reflects that Christopher is concerned with order and clarity of time and space. The Material processes that do occur with Goals are all pure physical processes with no psychological implications, which can be said to reflect Christopher's cognitive limitations due to his lack of a theory of mind. Further, the fact that the most frequent group of Mental processes is Perception indicates that Christopher is a visual thinker and remembers everything he has seen. There is only one Mental clause of Emotion, indicating that Christopher has a difficulty with identifying and expressing his feelings. Lastly, the fact that the majority of the Verbal processes project instead of containing a Verbiage reflects Christopher's difficulty with understanding the intended meaning behind people's utterances and the large amount of direct speech in the novel. The transitivity patterns cumulatively reflect Christopher's emphasis on his own experiences and his limitations in understanding those of others, i.e. his lack of a theory of mind.

In Chapter 4 we performed a key word analysis of the novel in order to see if the quantitative analysis would support the findings from the qualitative analyses in Chapter 2 and 3. The fact that *I, and, my, me, said, because, then, like, going, train* and *so* are key words suggests that the linguistic patterns identified in the qualitative analyses seem to be consistent throughout the novel. While the keyness of *I*, *my* and *me* can be said to reflect Christopher's focus on his own experiences due to his lack of a theory of mind, the fact that *and* is a key word reflects his preference for coordination to subordination. Further, they keyness of *said* indicates his problems with understanding the illocutionary force behind people's utterances. The fact that *because, so, like, then* and *going* are key words can be explained by Christopher's need for order and clarity, his fear of uncertainty and the unknown, and his frequent explanations of things that are known to the reader. The keyness of *train* can to a certain degree be said to reflect Christopher's avoidance of Reference and Ellipsis. However, that fact that Christopher frequently uses *because*-clauses to explain his thoughts and actions indicates that Haddon has

prioritized making Christopher an empathetic character rather than a representation of a person with Asperger's Syndrome. This is also indicated by the keyness of *you*, as Christopher mainly uses the generic *you* to refer to the reader's general experience.

In sum, there are the two aspects of Christopher's mind style that we have most frequently come back to in the thesis, namely his lack of a theory of mind and his need for order and clarity. In other words, the majority of the linguistic patterns in the novel partially or wholly indicate and reflect these aspects of his mind style. An explanation for this might be that our lives frequently consist of human interaction, and the fact that Christopher is unable to fully interact with other people and communicate his thoughts can then be seen as a large hindrance to his complete understanding of reality and, consequently, his need to bring it to order.

5.2   Limitations and suggestions for further research

Due to the limited scope of this study, there are of course many aspects of Christopher's mind style that were not explored and which might be investigated further in subsequent research on this fascinating novel.

Since *Curious Incident* makes use of more semiotic modes for its meaning-making than just wording, it would have been interesting to perform a multimodal stylistic analysis of the novel.[9] In Chapter 2, we explored the way in which visual elements contribute to the creation of cohesion and coherence in the novel (see **2.3.1**). However, as briefly noted in **2.3.4**, there are also non-linguistic features in the novel suggesting a more complex mind style, for example certain aspects of the layout (e.g. the use of footnotes and appendix). Since the patterns of cohesion and coherence cumulatively project a childlike mind style, it would have been interesting to look at textual and non-textual features of the novel suggesting a more complex one and thus hopefully get a more balanced picture of Christopher's mind style.

Further, the textual metafunction was not fully explored, as we did not consider the Thematic development of the novel. As the Thematic development influences the perceived coherence of a text, an analysis of Christopher's Theme choices would have highly topical. In addition,

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[9] For an account on multimodal stylistics, see for example Nørgaard (2010).

the transitive analysis was applied only to a single chapter in the novel, and a broader selection might have given other results.

5.3   New insights

We hope to have brought forth new knowledge to the study of mind style by exploring the way in which a narrator's mind style can be reflected in a variety of linguistic patterns, and especially how patterns of cohesion and coherence, and not only transitive patterns, can be indicators of mind style. We also hope to have shown that how qualitative and quantitative methods can supplement each other in mind style studies.

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Appendix 1- For Chapter 2 (*Cohesion and Coherence*)

Chapter 3 (pp. 2-3)

1   My name is Christopher John Francis Boone. I know all the countries of the world and their

2   capital cities and every prime number up to 7,057.

3   Eight years ago, when I first met Siobhan, she showed me this picture

4

5   and I knew that it meant "sad," which is what I felt when I found the dead dog.

6   Then she showed me this picture

7

8   and I knew that it meant "happy," like when I'm reading about the Apollo space missions, or

9   when I am still awake at 3 a.m. or 4 a.m. in the morning and I can walk up and down the

10   street and pretend that I am the only person in the whole world.

11   Then she drew some other pictures

12

13   but I was unable to say what these meant.

14   I got Siobhan to draw lots of these faces and then write down next to them exactly what they

15   meant. I kept the piece of paper in my pocket and took it out when I didn't understand what

16   someone was saying. But it was very difficult to decide which of the diagrams was most like

17   the face they were making because people's faces move very quickly.

18   When I told Siobhan that I was doing this, she got out a pencil and another piece of paper and

19   said it probably made people feel very

20

21   and then she laughed. So I tore the original piece of paper up and threw it away. And Siobhan

22   apologized. And now if I don't know what someone is saying, I ask them what they mean or I

23   walk away.

Chapter 173 (pp. 156-7)

24   Between the roof of the shed and the big plant that hangs over the fence from the house next

25   door I could see the constellation **Orion.**

26   People say that **Orion** is called Orion because Orion was a hunter and the constellation looks

27   like a hunter with a club and a bow and arrow, like this

28

29   But this is really silly because it is just stars, and you could join up the dots in any way you

30   wanted, and you could make it look like a lady with an umbrella who is waving, or the

31   coffeemaker which Mrs Shears has, which is from Italy, with a handle and steam coming out,

32   or like a dinosaur

33

34 And there aren't any lines in space, so you could join bits of **Orion** to bits of **Lepus** or

35 **Taurus** or **Gemini** and say that they were a constellation called **the Bunch of Grapes** or

36 **Jesus** or **the Bicycle** (except that they didn't have bicycles in Roman and Greek times, which

37 was when they called **Orion** Orion).

38 And anyway, **Orion** is not a hunter or a coffeemaker or a dinosaur. It is just Betelgeuse and

39 Bellatrix and Alnilam and Rigel and 17 other stars I don't know the names of. And they are

40 nuclear explosions billions of miles away.

41 And that is the truth.

Chapter 2 (p. 1)

42 It was 7 minutes after midnight. The dog was lying on the grass in the middle of the lawn in

43 front of Mrs Shears' house. Its eyes were closed. It looked as if it was running on its side, the

44 way dogs run when they think they are chasing a cat in a dream. But the dog was not running

45 or asleep. The dog was dead. There was a garden fork sticking out of the dog. The points of

46 the fork must have gone all the way through the dog and into the ground because the fork had

47 not fallen over. I decided that the dog was probably killed with the fork because I could not

48 see any other wounds in the dog and I do not think you would stick a garden fork into a dog

49 after it had died for some other reason, like cancer, for example, or a road accident. But I

50 could not be certain about this.

51 I went through Mrs Shears's gate, closing it behind me. I walked onto her lawn and knelt

52 beside the dog. I put my hand on the muzzle of the dog. It was still warm.

53 The dog was called Wellington. It belonged to Mrs Shears, who was our friend. She lived on

54 the opposite side of the road, two houses to the left.

55 Wellington was a poodle. Not one of the small poodles that have hairstyles but a big poodle.

56 It had curly black fur, but when you got close you could see that the skin underneath the fur

57 was a very pale yellow, like chicken.

58 I stroked Wellington and wondered who had killed him, and why.

Chapter 167 (pp. 154-5)

59 I went into the kitchen and I picked up my special food box. I unlocked the back door and

60 stepped outside. Then I held the handle of the door down as I shut it again so that the click

61 wasn't too loud. Then I walked down the bottom of the garden.

62 At the bottom of the garden is a shed. It has the lawn mower and the hedge cutter in it, and

63 lots of gardening equipment that Mother used to use, like pots and bags of compost and

64 bamboo canes and string and spades. It would be a bit warmer in the shed but I knew that

65 Father might look for me in the shed, so I went round the back of the shed and I squeezed into

66 the gap between the wall of the shed and the fence, behind the big black plastic tub for

67 collecting rainwater. Then I sat down and I felt a bit safer.

68 […]

69 I opened up my special food box. Inside was the Milky Bar and two licorice laces and three

70 clementines and a pink wafer biscuit and my red food coloring. I didn't feel hungry but I

71 knew that I should eat something because if you don't eat something you can get cold, so I ate

72 two clementines and the Milky Bar.

73 Then I wondered what I would do next.

Chapter 113 (pp. 96-7)

74 If someone says to me, "Christopher, tell me what your mother was like," I can Rewind to lots

75 of different scenes and say what she was like in those scenes.

76 For example, I could Rewind to 4 July 1992 when I was 9 years old, which was a Saturday,

77 and we were on holiday in Cornwall and in the afternoon we were on the beach in a place

78 called Polperro. And Mother was wearing a pair of shorts made out of denim and a light blue

79 bikini top and she was smoking cigarettes called *Consulate* which were mint flavor. And she

80   wasn't swimming. Mother was sunbathing on a towel which had red and purple stripes and

81   she was reading a book by Georgette Heyer called ***The Masqueraders***. And then she finished

82   sunbathing and went into the water to swim and she said, "Bloody Nora, it's cold." And she

83   said I should come and swim, too, but I don't like swimming because I don't like taking my

84   clothes off. And she said I should just roll up my trousers and walk into the water a little way,

85   so I did. And I stood in the water. And Mother said, "Look. It's lovely." And she jumped

86   backward and disappeared under the water and I thought a shark had eaten her and I screamed

87   and she stood up out of the water again and came over to where I was standing and held up

88   her right hand and spread her fingers out in a fan and said, "Come on, Christopher, touch my

89   hand. Come on now. Stop screaming. Touch my hand. Listen to me, Christopher. You can do

90   it." And after a while I stopped screaming and I held up my left hand and spread my fingers

91   out in a fan and we made our fingers and thumbs touch each other and Mother said, "It's OK,

92   Christopher. It's OK. There aren't any sharks in Cornwall," and then I felt better.

93   […]

94   And if someone is lying on the floor at school, I do a **Search** through my memory to find a

95   picture of someone having an epileptic fit and then I compare the picture with what is

96   happening in front of me so I can decide whether they are just lying down and playing a

97   game, or having a sleep, or whether they are having an epileptic fit. And if they are having an

98   epileptic fit, I move any furniture out of the way to stop them from banging their head and I

99   take my jumper off and I put it underneath their head and I go and find a teacher.

Appendix 2- Transitivity analysis for Chapter 3 (*Transitivity*)

Chapter 59 (Pp. 38-41)

1. [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, desiderative*] decided ‖ [10]that [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, cognition*] was going to find out ‖ [*Actor*] who [*Process: material*] killed [*Goal*] Wellington [*Circumstance: contingency, concession*] even though Father had told me to stay out of other people's business.

   ➔ …even though [*Sayer*] Father [*Process: verbal*] had told [*Receiver*] me ‖ [*Process: material*] to stay [*Scope*] out of other people's business.

2. [*Identified/Value*] This [*Process: identifying circumstantial relational*] is [*Identifier/Token*] because I do not always do what I am told.

   ➔ because [*Actor*] I do not [*Circumstance: location, time*] always [*Process: material*] do [*Goal*] what I am told.

      … [*Verbiage*] what [*Receiver*] I [*Process: verbal*] am told

3. And [*Identified/Token*] this [*Process: identifying circumstantial relational*] is [*Identifier/Value*] because when people tell you what to do it is usually confusing and does not make sense.

   ➔ …because [*Circumstance: location, time*] when people tell you what to do [*Carrier*] it [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] is [*Circumstance: location, time*] usually [*Attribute*] confusing and [*Process: material*] does not make [*Scope*] sense

      …when [*Sayer*] people [*Process: verbal*] tell [*Receiver*] you [Verbiage] what to do

         …[Goal] what [*Process: material*] to do

4. For example, [*Sayer*] people [*Circumstance: location, time*] often [*Process: verbal*] say ‖ "[*Process: attributive intensive relational*] Be [*Attribute*] quiet,"

5. but [*Sayer*] they [*Process: verbal*] don't tell [*Receiver*] you [*Verbiage*] how long to be quiet for.

---

[10] "‖" Indicates that the following clause is projected.

➔ [*Circumstance: extent, duration*] how long [***Process: attributive intensive relational***] to be [*Attribute*] quiet for.

6. Or [*Senser*] you [***Process: mental, perception***] see [*Phenomenon*] a sign which says **KEEP OFF THE GRASS**

    ➔ [*Sayer*] which [***Process: verbal***] says ‖ [***Process: material***] **KEEP OFF** [*Scope*] **THE GRASS**

7. but [*Sayer*] it [***Process: verbal***] should say ‖ [***Process: material***] **KEEP OFF** [*Scope*] **THE GRASS [***Circumstance: location, place***] AROUND THIS SIGN** or [***Process: material***] **KEEP OFF** [*Scope*] **ALL THE GRASS** [*Circumstance: location, place*] **IN THIS PARK** [*Circumstance: cause, reason*] because there is lots of grass you are allowed to walk on.

    ➔ … because there [***Process: existential***] is **[*Existent*]** lots of grass you are allowed to walk on.

      … [*Goal*] you [***Process: material***] are allowed to walk on.

8. Also [*Actor*] people [***Process: material***] break [*Scope*] rules [*Circumstance: location, time*] all the time.

9. For example, [*Actor*] Father [*Circumstance: location, time*] often [***Process: material***] drives [*Circumstance: manner, quality*] at over 30 mph [*Circumstance: location, place*] in a 30 mph zone

10. and [*Circumstance: location, time*] sometimes [*Actor*] he [***Process: material***] drives [*Circumstance: location, time*] when he has been drinking

    ➔ …when [*Actor*] he [***Process: material***] has been drinking.

11. and [*Circumstance: location, time*] often [*Actor*] he [***Process: material***] doesn't wear [*Scope*] his seat belt [*Circumstance: location, time*] when he is driving his van.

    ➔ …when [*Actor*] he [***Process: material***] is driving [*Goal*] his van.

12. And [*Circumstance: location, place*] in the Bible [*Sayer*] it [***Process: verbal***] says ‖ [*Actor*] *Thou* [***Process: material***] *shall not kill*

13. but there [***Process: existential***] were [*Existent*] the Crusades and two world wars and the Gulf War

14. and there [***Process: existential***] were [*Existent*] Christians killing people [*Circumstance: location, place*] in all of them.

    ➔ … [***Process: material***] killing [*Goal*] people

15. Also [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, cognition***] don't know [*Phenomenon*] what Father means when he says "Stay out of other people's business" [*Circumstance: reason, cause*] because I do not know what he means by "other people's business" [*Circumstance: reason, cause*] because I do lots of things with other people, at school and in the shop and on the bus

   ➔ [*Phenomenon*] what [*Senser*] Father [***Process: mental, desideration***] means [*Circumstance: location, time*] when he says "Stay out of other people's business"

   ... when [*Sayer*] he [***Process: verbal***] says ‖ "[***Process: material***] Stay [*Circumstance: location, place*] out of other people's business"

   ➔ …because [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, cognition***] do not know [*Phenomenon*] what he means by "other people's business"

   … [*Phenomenon*] what [*Senser*] he [***Process: mental, cognition***] means [*Circumstance: matter*] by "other people's business"

   ➔ …because [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] do [*Goal*] lots of things [*Circumstance: accompaniment, comitative*] with other people, [*Circumstance: location, place*] at school and in the shop and on the bus

16. and [*Identified/Value*] his job [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] is [*Identifier/Token*] going into other people's houses and fixing their boilers and their heating.

   ➔ [***Process: material***] going [*Circumstance: location, place*] into other people's houses and [***Process: material***] fixing [*Goal*] their boilers and their heating.

17. And [*Carrier*] all of these things [***Process: attributive intensive, relational***] are [*Attribute*] other people's business.

18. [*Senser*] Siobhan [***Process: mental, cognition***] understands.

19. [*Circumstance: location, time*] When she tells me not to do something [*Sayer*] she [***Process: verbal***] tells [*Receiver*] me exactly [*Verbiage*] what it is that I am not allowed to do.

   ➔ … When [*Sayer*] she [***Process: verbal***] tells [*Receiver*] me [*Verbiage*] not to do something

   … [***Process: material***] not to do [*Goal*] something

   ➔ [*Identifier/Value*] what [*Identified/…*] it [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] is […*Token*] that I am not allowed to do.

   … [*Goal*] that [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] am not allowed to do.

20. And [Senser] I [*Process: mental, emotion*] like [Phenomenon] this.

21. For example, [*Sayer*] she [*Circumstance: location, time*] once [*Process: verbal*] said, ‖ "[*Actor*] You [*Process: material*] must never punch [*Goal*] Sarah or [*Process: material*] hit [*Goal*] her [*Circumstance: manner, quality*] in any way, Christopher.

22. Even if [*Actor*] she [*Process: material*] hits [*Goal*] you [*Circumstance: manner, quality*] first.

23. [*Circumstance: contingency, condition*] If she does hit you again, [*Process: material*] move [*Circumstance: location, place*] away from her and [*Process: material*] stand [*Circumstance: manner, quality*] still and [*Process: material*] count [*Scope*] from 1 to 50,

    ➔ If [*Actor*] she [*Process: material*] does hit [*Goal*] you [*Circumstance: manner, degree*] again

24. [*Circumstance: location, time*] then [*Process: verbal*] come and tell [*Receiver*] me [Verbiage] what she has done

    ➔ … [*Goal*] what [*Actor*] she [*Process: material*] has done,

25. or [*Process: verbal*] tell [*Receiver*] one of the other members of staff [*Verbiage*] what she has done."

    ➔ … [*Goal*] what [*Actor*] she [*Process: material*] has done

26. Or, for example, [*Sayer*] she [*Circumstance: location, time*] once [*Process: verbal*] said, ‖ "[*Circumstance: cause, condition*] If you want to go on the swings and there are already people on the swings, [*Actor*] you must [*Circumstance: location, time*] never [*Process: material*] push [*Goal*] them [*Circumstance: location, place*] off

    ➔ If [*Actor*] you [*Process: material*] want to go [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the swings and there [*Process: existential*] are [*Circumstance: location, time*] already [*Existent*] people [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the swings

27. [*Sayer*] You [*Process: verbal*] must ask [*Receiver*] them ‖ if [*Actor*] you [*Process: material*] can have a go.

28. And then [*Actor*] you must [*Process: material*] wait [*Circumstance: location, time*] until they have finished."

    …until [*Actor*] they [*Process: material*] have finished."

29. But [*Circumstance: location, time*] when other people tell you what you can't do [*Actor*] they [***Process: material***] don't do [*Goal*] it [*Circumstance: manner, quality*] like this.

➔ … when [*Sayer*] other people [***Process: verbal***] tell [*Receiver*] you [*Verbiage*] what you can't do.

…[*Goal*] what [*Actor*] you [***Process: material***] can't do.

30. So [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, desiderative***] decide [*Beneficiary*] for myself [*Goal*] [*Phenomenon*] what I am going to do and what I am not going to do.

➔ [*Goal*] what [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] am going to do // [11] and [*Goal*] what [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] am not going to do.

31. [*Circumstance: location, time*] That evening [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] went [*Circumstance: location, place*] round to Mrs Shears's house

32. and [***Process: material***] knocked [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the door

33. and [***Process: behavioral***] waited [*Circumstance: cause, purpose*] for her to answer it.

➔ … [***Process: material***] to answer [*Scope*] it.

34. [*Circumstance: location, time*] When she opened the door [*Actor*] she [***Process: material***] was holding [*Goal*] a mug of tea

➔ When [*Actor*] she [***Process: material***] opened [*Goal*] the door

35. and [*Actor*] she [***Process: material***] was wearing [*Scope*] sheepskin slippers

36. and [*Behaver*] she [***Process: behavioral***] had been watching [*Behavior*] a quiz program [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the television [*Circumstance: cause, reason*] because there was a television on and I could hear someone saying, "The capital city of Venezuela is… (a) Maracas, (b) Caracas, (c) Bogota or (d) Georgetown."

➔ because there [***Process: existential***] was [*Existent*] a television on // and [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, perception***] could hear [*Phenomenon*] someone saying, "The capital city of Venezuela is… (a) Maracas, (b) Caracas, (c) Bogota or (d) Georgetown."

➔ … [*Sayer*] someone [***Process. verbal***] saying, ‖ "[*Value/Identified*] The capital city of Venezuela [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] is … [*Token/Identifier*] (a) Maracas, (b) Caracas, (c) Bogota or (d) Georgetown."

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[11] "//" signals that the clauses within the embedded clause are coordinated.

37. And [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, cognition***] knew ‖ that [*Value/Identified*] it [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] was [*Token/Identifier*] Caracas.

38. [*Sayer*] She [***Process: verbal***] said, ‖ "Christopher, [*Actor*] I really [***Process: mental cognition***] don't think ‖ [Actor] I [***Process: material***] want to see [*Goal*] you [*Circumstance: location, time*] right now."

39. [*Sayer*] I [***Process: verbal***] said, ‖ "[*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] didn't kill [*Goal*] Wellington."

40. And [*Sayer*] she [***Process: verbal***] replied, ‖ "[*Goal*] What are [*Actor*] you [***Process: material***] doing [*Circumstance: location, place*] here?"

41. [*Sayer*] I [***Process: verbal***] said, ‖ "[*Sayer*] I [***Process: verbal***] wanted to come and tell [*Receiver*] you ‖ that [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] didn't kill [*Goal*] Wellington.

42. And also [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, cognition***] want to find out ‖ [*Actor*] who [***Process: material***] killed [*Goal*] him."

43. [*Actor*] Some of her tea [***Process: material***] spilled [*Circumstance: location, place*] onto the carpet.

44. [*Sayer*] I [***Process: verbal***] said, ‖ "Do [*Senser*] you [***Process: mental, cognition***] know ‖ [*Actor*] who [***Process: material***] killed [*Goal*] Wellington?"

45. [*Sayer*] She [***Process: verbal***] didn't answer [*Verbiage*] my question.

46. [*Sayer*] She just [***Process: verbal***] said, ‖ "Goodbye, Christopher,"

47. and [***Process: material***] closed [*Goal*] the door.

48. [*Circumstance: location, time*] Then [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] decided to do [*Scope*] some detective work.

49. [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, perception***] could see ‖ that [*Behaver*] she [***Process: behavioral***] was watching [*Behavior*] me and [***Process: behavioral***] waiting [*Behavior*] for me to leave [*Circumstance: cause, reason*] because I could see her standing in her hall on the other side of the frosted glass in her front door.

    ➔ … [***Process: material***] to leave

    ➔ … because [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, perception***] could see [*Phenomenon*] her standing in her hall on the other side of the frosted glass in her front door.

    … [***Process: material***] standing [*Circumstance: location, place*] in her hall on the other side of the frosted glass in her front door.

50. So [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] walked [*Circumstance: location, place*] down the path and out of the garden.

51. [*Circumstance: location, time*] Then [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] turned [*Circumstance: location, place*] round

52. and [***Process: mental, perception***] saw ‖ that [*Actor*] she [***Process: material***] wasn't standing [*Circumstance: location, place*] in her hall any longer.

53. [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] made [*Scope*] sure that there was no one watching

    ➔ … that there [***Process: existential***] was [*Existent*] no one watching.

      … [*Behaver*] no one [***Process: Behavioral***] watching

54. and [***Process: material***] climbed [*Circumstance: location, place*] over the wall

55. and [***Process: material***] walked [*Circumstance: location, place*] down the side of the house into her back garden to the shed where she kept all her gardening tools.

    ➔ [*Circumstance: location, place*] where [*Actor*] she [***Process: material***] kept [*Goal*] all her gardening tools

56. [*Goal*] The shed [***Process: material***] was locked [*Circumstance: manner, means*] with a padlock

57. and [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] couldn't go [*Circumstance: location, place*] inside

58. so [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] walked [*Circumstance: location, place*] round to the window in the side.

59. [*Circumstance: location, time*] Then [*Carrier/Possessor*] I [***Process: attributive possessive relational***] had [*Attribute/Possessed*] some good luck.

60. [*Circumstance: location, time*] When I looked through the window [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, perception***] could see [*Phenomenon*] a fork that looked exactly the same as the fork that had been sticking out of Wellington.

    ➔ When [*Behaver*] I [***Process: behavioral***] looked [*Circumstance: location, time*] through the window

    ➔ [*Carrier*] that [***Process: attributive intensive relational***] looked [*Attribute*] exactly the same as the fork that had been sticking out of Wellington.

      … [*Actor*] that [***Process: material***] had been sticking [*Circumstance: location, place*] out of Wellington.

61. [*Actor*] It [***Process: material***] was lying [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the bench by the window

62. and [*Goal*] it [***Process: material***] had been cleaned [*Circumstance: cause, reason*] because there was no blood on the spikes.

➔ …because there [*Process: existential*] was [*Existent*] no blood [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the spikes.

63. [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, perception*] could see [*Phenomenon*] some other tools as well, a spade and a rake and one of those long clippers people use for cutting branches which are too high to reach.

➔ [*Actor*] people [*Process: material*] use [*Circumstance: cause, purpose*] for cutting branches which are too high to reach.

➔ … [*Carrier*] which [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] are [*Attribute*] too high to reach.

64. And [*Carrier/ Possessor*] they all [*Process: attributive possessive relational*] had [*Attribute/Possessed*] the same green plastic handles [*Circumstance: manner, comparison*] like the fork.

65. [*Value/ Identified*] This [*Process: identifying intensive relational*] meant [*Token/ Identifier*] that the fork belonged to Mrs Shears.

➔ that [*Attribute/Possessed*] the fork [*Process: attributive possessive relational*] belonged to [*Carrier/Possessor*] Mrs Shears.

66. Either that or [*Carrier*] it [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] was [*Attribute*] a *Red Herring,* which is a clue which makes you come to a wrong conclusion or something which looks like a clue but isn't.

➔ [*Carrier*] which [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] is [*Attribute*] a clue which makes you come to a wrong conclusion or something which looks like a clue but isn't.

➔ … [*Initiator*] which [*Process:-*] makes [Actor] you [*-: Material*] come [*Circumstance: location, place*] to a wrong conclusion or something [*Carrier*] which [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] looks like [*Attribute*] a clue but isn't.

… but [*Process: attributive intensive relational*] isn't.

67. [*Senser*] I [*Process: mental, cognition*] wondered ‖ if [*Actor*] Mrs Shears [*Process: material*] had killed [*Goal*] Wellington [*Circumstance: manner, means*] herself.

68. But [*Circumstance: contingency, condition*] if she had killed Wellington herself, [*Circumstance: cause, reason*] why had [*Actor*] she [*Process: material*] come [*Circumstance: location, place*] out of the house [*Circumstance: manner, quality*] shouting, "What in fuck's name have you done to my dog?"

➔ But if [*Actor*] she [***Process: material***] had killed [*Goal*] Wellington [*Circumstance: manner, means*] herself

➔ … [***Process: verbal***] shouting, ‖ "[*Goal*] What in fuck's name have [*Actor*] you [***Process: material***] done [*Client*] to my dog?"

69. [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, cognition***] thought ‖ that [*Actor*] Mrs Shears probably [***Process: material***] didn't kill [*Goal*] Wellington.

70. But [*Actor*] whoever had killed him had probably [***Process: material***] killed [*Goal*] him [*Circumstance: manner, means*] with Mrs Shears' fork.

➔ [*Actor*] Whoever [***Process: material***] had killed [*Goal*] him

71. And [*Carrier*] the shed [***Process: attributive intensive relational***] was [*Attribute*] locked.

72. [*Identified/Value*] This [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] meant [*Identifier/Token*] that it was someone who had the key to Mrs Shears's shed, or that she had left it unlocked, or that she had left her fork lying around in the garden.

… that [***Value/Identified***] it [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] was [*Token/ Identifying*] someone who had the key to Mrs Shears' shed // or that [*Attributor*] she [***Process: attributive intensive relational***] had left [*Carrier*] it [*Attribute*] unlocked, // or that [*Assigner*] she [***Process: identifying intensive relational***] had left [*Token/Identified*] her fork [*Value/Identifier*] lying around in the garden.

…who [***Process: attributive possessive relational***] had [*Attribute*] the key to Mrs Shears' shed,

… [***Process: material***] lying [*Scope*] around [*Circumstance: location, place*] in the garden.

73. [*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, perception***] heard [*Phenomenon*] a noise

74. and [***Process: material***] turned [*Circumstance: location, place*] round

75. and [***Process: mental, perception***] saw [*Phenomenon*] Mrs Shears standing on the lawn looking at me.

➔ [***Process: material***] standing [*Circumstance: location, place*] on the lawn looking at me.

… [***Process: Behavioral***] looking [*Behavior*] at me

76. [*Sayer*] I [***Process: verbal***] said, ‖ "[*Senser*] I [***Process: mental, perception***] came to see [*Phenomenon*] if the fork was in the shed."

➔ if [*Carrier*] the fork [***Process: attributive circumstantial relational***] was [*Attribute*] in the shed.

77. And [*Sayer*] she [***Process: verbal***] said, "[*Circumstance: contingency, condition*] If you don't go now [*Actor*] I will [***Process: material***] call [*Goal*] the police [*Circumstance: location, time*] again."

➔ If [*Actor*] you [***Process: material***] don't go [*Circumstance: location, time*] now

78. So [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] went [*Scope*] home.

79. [*Circumstance: location, time*] When I got home [*Sayer*]] I [***Process: verbal***] said [*Verbiage*] hello [*Receiver*] to Father

➔ When [*Actor*] I [***Process: material***] got [*Scope*] home

80. and [***Process: material***] went [*Circumstance: location, place*] upstairs

81. and [***Process: material***] fed [*Goal*] Toby, my rat,

82. and [***Process: attributive intensive relational***] felt [*Attribute*] happy [*Circumstance: cause, reason*] because I was being a detective and finding things out.

➔ … because [*Carrier*] I [***Process: attributive intensive relational***] was being [*Attribute*] a detective // and [***Process: mental, cognition***] finding [*Phenomenon*] things out.