“Men without land, and land without men”

A case study of rural movements in Paraguay 1954-2012

Camilla Kleiberg Jensen
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Abstract

The “pink tide” in Latin America has shown us that social movements can sometimes be important components of democratisation processes. Weak social movements, on the other hand, are not able to gain representation within the state, and are not able to challenge the state or pressure governments into adopting policies that are in the interests of the movements. Some of the world’s most uneven land structures are found in Latin America, along with relatively large rural populations. It is therefore important to understand rural movements, as they often represent the poor and the marginalised in the countryside. The objective of this thesis has been to study the fragmentation in rural movements in Paraguay across three time periods: authoritarianism, transition, and consolidation. The aim has been to understand the fragmentation that causes relatively weak rural movements in Paraguay. Findings in this study reveal that the fragmentation in the rural movements is owed to uneven land holdings, reinforced by differentiating policies and treatment by the state, as well as differences in ideology and identity. The weak social movements of Paraguay can be interpreted as a problem of democratic deficit. Continued fragmentation can perhaps mean that the movements won’t play a role in the democratic consolidation process in the future. Paraguay today has not been entirely capable of shaking off the repression and criminalisation of social sectors that shaped former regimes, which signifies that representation and participation is limited: the movements voice their claims, but they are not heard.
Acknowledgements

The quotation in the title of this thesis has previously been used to describe Paraguay, and it seems just as suitable today¹.

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All mistakes and flaws in this thesis are mine alone.

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¹ Villagra et.al. 1989:35
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List of abbreviations

ANR: (Asociación Nacional Republicana) National Republican Association (Colorado party)

APC: (Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio) The Patriotic Alliance for Change

CEB: (Comunidad Esclesial de Base) Christian Base Communities

CLIBCh: (Coordinadora de Líderes Indígenas de Bajo Chaco) Coordination of Indigenous Leaders of the Lower Chaco

CONAMURI: (Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciónes de Mujeres Trabajadoras Rurales e Indígenas) National Coordination of Organisations of Female Rural Workers and Indigenous

CONAPI: (Coordinacion Nacional de Pastoral Indígena de la Conferencia Episcopal Paraguaya) National Coordination of Indigenous Pastoral of the Episcopalian Conference

DAI: (Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas) Department of Indigenous Issues

EZLN: (Ejercito Zapatista para la Liberación Nacional) Zapatista Army of National Liberation

IBR: (Instituto de Bienestar Rural) Institute of Rural Welfare

INDERT: (Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Rural y de la Tierra) The National Institute of Rural Development and Land

INDI: (Instituto Paraguayo del Indígena) The Paraguayan Institute of Indigenous

FAPI: (Federación por la Autodeterminación del pueblo Índigena) Federation for the Self-determination of the Indigenous People

FARC: (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FMLN: (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional) Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

LAC: (Ligas Agrarias Cristianas) Christian Agrarian Leagues

MST: (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra) Landless Workers Movement

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NSM: New Social Movement

OLT: (Organización por la Lucha de Tierra) Organisation for Land Struggle

POS: Political Opportunity Structure
1 Introduction

A “pink tide” has swept across Latin America since the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Forces of the political Left were gaining ground, where a number of governments shifted from conservative to progressive Left governments. This political repositioning is referred to as a “pink tide” (Bull 2013:98; Motta and Nilsen 2011:1), or the “new left” (Cannon and Kirby 2012:3-4). Examples of this trend have been observed in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay and Argentina in the South, as well as some countries in Central-America (Cannon and Kirby 2012:12). In many of these countries, social movements helped these new Left governments gain power through their mobilisation (Bull 2013; Cannon and Kirby 2012:8; Zibechi 2012). The social movements have thus hoped for a stronger representation in the state (Bull 2007:64). In Bolivia, the indigenous organisations, the peasants and the trade unions managed to stand united, and to elect Evo Morales for president in 2006. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa was also elected on a broad popular basis aided by social movements in 2006 (e.g. Zibechi 2012), including a re-election in 2013. The civil society is deemed to be of great importance when it comes to democratisation (e.g. Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Cannon and Kirby 2012; Diamond 1994; Törnquist, Webster and Stokke 2009). Civil society is often understood as organisation that is not part of the state or the political society (Diamond 1994:7). Social movements form part of civil society, and consist of actors with a shared identity linked by informal networks and who are engaged in conflicts (Diani 1992). Rural movements such as indigenous and peasant organisations have often formed important parts of the social movements that brought the “pink tide”-governments to power, either through direct or indirect support (Bull 2013; Zibechi 2012).

Contrary to what some expected with the rise of globalisation and modernisation, the peasantry has not disappeared; in fact, some of the most militant social movements in the global South are rural movements (Moyo and Yeros 2012; Giarracca 2004:15). Often, rural movements of indigenous and peasants are fiercely opposed to the neoliberal policies of the state in these countries, and for a protection of natural resources (Giarracca 2004:18; Petras and Veltmeyer 2002:60). They may even represent “…the most important sources of democratic transformation in national and international politics” (Moyo and Yeros 2012:6).
Rural struggles are a global phenomenon, from Zimbabwe to India to Latin America, not to mention the rural struggle against the political centre in the 18th and 19th century in Scandinavia (Bull 2007). Such types of struggle are often militant and revolutionary, with examples like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru, or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Southern Mexico (e.g. Cannon and Kirby 2012; Moyo and Yeros 2005). In Brazil, the struggle for land has led to the formation of the Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST)), which is considered the world’s largest peasant movement (Bull 2013).

However, in Paraguay the situation at first glance appears different from other Latin American countries. Vegard Bye depicts Paraguay as the country with “…perhaps the most reactionary power structures in the whole of Latin America” [author’s translation] (Bye 2010:195-196). At the same time it is a country that has a very inequitable distribution of land distribution (Bye 2010:224; Hetherington 2011:73). In 2008, opposition leader Fernando Lugo managed to win the presidential election, a contestation comparable to David’s fight against Goliath (Bye 2010:217). Lugo thus became the first president in Paraguay not hailing from the political party of the former dictatorship, the ANR (the Colorado party), or the Liberal party. He belonged to a centre-left coalition party called The Patriotic Alliance for Change, usually referred to as APC. On 22nd of June 2012, Lugo was impeached by the parliament in what has been termed an unconventional political deposition. Many countries, including neighbouring Argentina, condemned the act and called it a coup, resulting in the expulsion of Paraguay from the regional organisation of cooperation Mercosur (Paz 2012:28). Even though social and rural movements mobilised for the election of the progressive Lugo, there was never a true “pink tide” in Paraguay.
1.1 Research question

That the rural movements of Paraguay seem to be relatively weaker than in other Latin American countries, stems from the fact that they are seemingly unable to mobilise together and to unite for a common cause and gain representation. Because of this, their collective size does not seem to represent an opposition to the state, and therefore they are not able to challenge the power and the structures of the state, as we have seen in other Latin American countries. The result of this is a seemingly incapacity to voice their claims, or to achieve the fulfilment of their claims toward the state. This leads us to the research question:

*How can we explain the relative weakness of the rural movements in Paraguay?*

The main hypothesis is that a fragmentation in the rural movements causes indigenous and peasants organisations not to mobilise strongly together. The research objective in this case study is to analyse what may help explain the fragmentation in the rural movements in Paraguay across time. The aim of the thesis is not to conduct theory testing, but to use theory to “shed light on the empirical findings” through a theoretically interpretive case study. This signifies that a theoretical framework is used to structure the empirical findings (Andersen 1997:68-69). The study is above all empirically driven.

The case in this study is the rural movements in Paraguay, analysed over time. The study emphasises three time periods: i) the rural movements during the Stroessner-regime (1954-1989), ii) the rural movements during the transition towards democracy (1989-2008), and iii) the rural movements during the consolidation process (2008-2012). These periods mark important cleavages in Paraguayan politics. My units of analysis are the Christian Agrarian Leagues (LAC), the Organisation for Land Struggle (OLT), Coordination of Indigenous Leaders of the Lower Chaco (CLIBCh), Tierraviva, Federation for the Self-determination of Indigenous (FAPI), National Coordination of Rural Female Workers and Indigenous Organisations (CONAMURI), and the Carperos2. These were chosen because they are

2 *Carpa* means tent, so the Carperos is literally ”the tenters”
estimated to be representative of the rural movements in Paraguay, although not representative of social movements in Paraguay in general. They are indigenous organisations, peasant organisations, NGO’s, and newer forms of organisation, which represent the different types of rural mobilisation that exists in Paraguay.

1.2 Knowledge gap and relevance

The study seeks to make a contribution to the debate on the role of social movements in democratisation in Latin America. Fragmentation in social movements in the global South is relevant in a broader context because it may create a lack of representation and participation, which is a democratic deficit-problem (cf. Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist 2004; Törnquist et.al. 2009; Stokke and Törnquist 2013). This is because fragmented social movements are relatively weaker. Strong social movements are important in the notion of substantive democratisation.

For many years, academics and international institutions were mainly occupied with the procedural aspects of democracy, such as access to information and free elections. In more recent years, scholars are increasingly paying more attention to substantive democratisation (e.g. Bull 2013; Harriss et.al 2004; Stokke and Törnquist 2013; Törnquist et.al. 2009; Zibechi 2012). Substantive democratisation tries to move beyond the formal and procedural definitions of democracy, and also include normative aspects of democracy. In the words of Harriss et.al (2004): “…whether they [democratic principles, institutions and citizenship rights] have real meaning for people” (2004:6). Many of the countries in the global South fulfil many procedural democratic features, and yet they may in some ways not be considered fully democratic. At the same time there are in many places in the global South an on-going process of depoliticisation of democracy: an unfilled gap between the people and the state that leads to a lack of substantive democracy (Törnquist et.al. 2009). A different way to formulate this may be that “…politics are turned into merely bureaucratic and technical problems” (Hetherington 2011:7). A situation where there are flawed linkages between the civil and political society (e.g. social movements and organised politics) is one of the reasons for this depoliticisation of democracy (Harriss et.al 2004:10). The solution is increased popular
influence over the political decision-making process and an alteration of power relations (Bull 2013; Stokke and Törnquist 2013; Törnquist et.al 2009). This is what can be viewed as the result of the “pink tide” in many places.

In some places in Latin America the “pink tide” has led to a change in the composition of the political elites, while social movements have simultaneously gained more political access (Bull 2013; Cannon and Kirby 2012). This is seen as an attempt to oppose depoliticisation, where citizens are able to gain “…popular control of public affairs” (Törnquist et.al 2009:10). An example of this is Brazil, where participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre has allowed citizens to gain participation (Houtzager and Lavalle 2009:40). Transformative politics, such as this, arises from simultaneous pressure from below and politics from above (Stokke and Törnquist 2013:6-7). However, in Paraguay, a more progressive Left president was elected in 2008, yet there has been no “pink tide”. This will be used as a background for exploring rural movements in Paraguay.

There are few systematic studies on the rural movements in Paraguay, combining both indigenous and other peasant mobilisations in order to uncover their apparent fragmentation that leads to a relative weakness. This study therefore seeks to fill a knowledge gap about a country that is understudied (Stabili 2012:138), and simultaneously present a unified study of the rural movements, where indigenous and other peasant organisations are incorporated into one study. As we have seen, Paraguay stands out from other countries in the region, and may therefore be labelled a deviant case.

The focus is on the peasant\(^3\)- and the indigenous organisations of the rural movements, because the Paraguayan population is one of the most rural in Latin America (Hetherington 2011:10). An important feature that the groups within the rural movements share is their struggle for land, and land is also what creates the greatest social and political conflicts in Paraguay (e.g. Hetherington 2011).

\(^{3}\) The term ”peasant” is here understood as smallholding or landless peasants, and rural workers.
1.3 Research design and structure of thesis

The research objective and the research question of this thesis clearly speak for a qualitative case study. The question is “whether and how”, rather than “how much” (George and Bennett 2005:25). Therefore, semi-structured qualitative interviews have been preferred in this study. The thesis aims to be a theoretically interpretative case study, which implies that the focus is on using theory to delimit the empirical material, and not to test theory or contribute to theory development (Andersen 1997:69). The goal is not to present an exhaustive discussion on the vast literature of social movements, but to present a theoretical framework that structures the empirical material so it can be discussed and analysed in light of the theory. In order to obtain the research objective, the thesis reviews existing literature on social movements in general, and Latin America in particular, including literature on indigenous and other peasants. The empirical data was collected during a one-month-fieldwork in Paraguay, where published sources were retrieved and fifteen semi-structured research interviews were conducted. Written sources have been used to provide a more general picture of the situation of the rural movements in Paraguay across time, whereas the qualitative interviews have been used as supplementary sources in order provide more specific information of the units of analysis.

The semi-structured interviews with representatives of the rural movement have been carried out to capture the views of certain key informants regarding the reasons for the aforementioned supposed fragmentation and resulting weakness in the rural movement. In addition to interviews with organisations, various researchers specialised in this field of study have been interviewed in order to gain knowledge on the mechanisms behind the weakness from a different point of view. All organisations will be discussed more thoroughly in chapters 3.2 and 4.2.2.

The first part of the thesis establishes the concept of ‘social movement’ and then outlines the general debate around social movements and reasons for mobilisations. The theory presented will be used to structure the analysis and to pose some research hypotheses. The theoretical and analytical framework in chapter 3, presents the three time periods within the case, earlier
research, and the research hypotheses. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the methodology of the thesis, as well as validity- and reliability issues. In the second part of the thesis, chapter 6, the empirical findings are presented, divided into three different sub-chapters – one for each time period. After this, the time periods and the research questions are discussed in combination, and the theory is evaluated. Some implications for democracy are also evaluated. A summary and conclusion is presented in the seventh and final chapter.
2 Perspectives on social movements: theoretical framework

This chapter will first and foremost present a definition of social movement. Thereafter, earlier research and different perspectives on social movement mobilisation will be outlined. Because Paraguay is a deviant case, and there are perhaps few theoretical assumptions about the supposed relative weakness of the rural movements, it would not be desirable to conduct theory testing. Instead, the goal of the thesis is to contribute to finding explanations that can be further tested at a later stage. The theories presented here are meant to provide different perceptions of why social movements emerge and mobilise, which this thesis will use as a measure for their relative weakness or strength.

2.1 Defining social movement

The concept of social movement is widely debated in the literature, and there is not one universally accepted definition. The definition needs to exclude other forms of collective action, organisation and mobilisation while simultaneously including the diverse forms of social movements that exists.

Sidney Tarrow focuses on contentious collective action as the most fundamental aspect of social movements, and defines social movements as “…collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 1998:3-4). In this view, social movements exist in relation to other social actors, such as elites, for their success. Furthermore, Tarrow focuses on groups of individuals “…sharing resources in pursuit of collective goals” (in della Porta and Diani 2006:19). This definition of social movements focuses on the interaction between different actors. Other definitions focus more on the reasons and consequences of collective action. In this view, social movements can be understood as collective behaviour, reflecting frustration and social crises that bring with them new norms and rules (della Porta and Diani 2006:12-13).
Mario Diani (1992) defines social movements as informal networks between actors who share a collective identity and who are involved in conflicts. This definition of the concept of social movement distinguishes it from other forms of organisation between individuals and groups, like “interest groups, political parties, protest events and coalitions”. Another characteristic of social movements according to Diani is that these movements stand on the same side in a conflict (Diani 1992:1-2). In this way social movements are defined in terms of both loose and more formal, organised parts (Diani 1992:12). In this concept also lies the idea that the different movements to a certain extent meet and cooperate about a common vision, and beliefs, while still taking care of their own specific identity. This definition differs from that of Tarrow in that it does not focus on external actors.

During the social and economic changes of the 1980’s (economic crises, structural adjustment programs, transitions to democracy in many parts of the world), researchers drew their attention to the emergence of new social movements (NSM). These movements were thought to appear as a response to demands from below to systemic flaws; institutions and states could not fulfil the needs of the people (Escobar and Alvarez 1992:24). But were they new actors with new forms of activism, or simply old actors with new social practices? NSMs in Europe and elsewhere in the West emerged as a result of post-materialism, and include among others environmental and feminist movements, and are typically fronted by the educated middle class. The focus of many (new) social movements in Latin America is still centred on achieving basic material welfare (Santos 2001:177).

The definition of NSM does not sufficiently cover both traditional social movements such as peasant organisations and newer forms of collective action, such as indigenous organisations often are described as being. Furthermore, we are not interested in the consequences of collective action, nor actors outside the movements. The thesis will therefore use the definition of social movement as presented by Diani. The rural movements in Paraguay are in accordance with this operationalization in that it consists of different organisations and groupings that are engaged in a rural struggle to obtain land and increased representation. We
are interested in gaining knowledge about the perceptions of actors in the rural movements, and their relations to the state and institutions, and not to other actors, such as elites.

### 2.2 Structural perspective

Among the first to study social movements were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and many scholars are still influenced by their work, including many Latin American scholars. Gramsci is also very influential in this school of research. Marx saw social movements, conflicts and collective action as a result of structural issues of society, so-called structuralism, or materialism (Escobar and Alvarez 1992, Tarrow 1998, della Porta and Diani 1999). They see social conflicts as the result of structural issues imbedded in society. This is a bottom-up perspective because the organisation of society will cause conflicts, and therefore mobilisation.

Barrington Moore Jr. claimed that: “...the process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail. It culminates during the twentieth century with peasant revolutions that succeed” (cited in Skocpol 1994:213). Theda Skocpol (1994) compares some of the first studies of peasants and revolutions in the third world (Wolf 1969, Migdal 1974, Paige 1975, Scott 1977) (Skocpol 1994:214). They have different perspectives on which type of peasants who are mostly likely to start a revolution. Because some of these scholars that Skocpol contrast against one another don’t seem to measure the same thing, or use the same definitions, makes it harder to compare them (Skocpol 1994). But this literature on peasant revolt, in search of a causal chain of action, ends up overlooking country-specific differences (Escobar and Alvarez 1992:92).

Land structures in Latin America are to a large degree characterised by uneven land holdings. The latifundio-system is a Latin American concept and reality, and it refers to large stretches of land owned by powerful landowning elites. The latifundio-system was established during the colonial period in most Latin American countries, although in Paraguay it was in fact
established after the Triple Alliance war (1865-1870), after independence (Fogel 2001:25; Villagra, Casaccia and Ayala 1989:31).

Alain Touraine (1989) takes on a class perspective when explaining the emergence of the social movements of Latin America. He outlines the latifundio system of Latin America as the basis of the structural relationship that exists between the social actors, and the resulting class conflicts. Peasant organisations had exogenous help from the church and intellectuals; they had political and economic objectives. Indigenous organisations on the other hand, were more culturally oriented. And because indigenous are not an exploited class, in this view there does not really exist indigenous movements (Touraine 1989:211). The indigenous have been submitted to racism, and have been viewed as inferior, and subject to domination. Even though they might rebel, indigenous organisations are not able to establish national organisations (Touraine 1989:212).

Raúl Zibechi (2012) claims that social movements that sprung up in Latin America in the 1980’s and 1990’s are different from “old” social movements, yet also different from NSM (Zibechi 2012:13). They “…have their roots in three main ideological currents: Christian Base Communities linked to liberation theology; indigenous insurgents with a non-western cosmovision; and militant revolutionary guevarism” (Bull 2013:102; Zibechi 2012). Zibechi further makes some observations that the (new) Latin American social movements share, including the occupation of territory, autonomy, the development of stronger identities, and new forms of action and activism (Zibechi 2012:14-18).

The notion of autonomy is very present in the line of thinking of many structure-oriented researchers. Atilio Borón is less assertive when it comes to the autonomy of social movements. He declares that a social sector, because of lack of resources, cannot alone radically transform a society. But Left-parties also need to learn from social movements and apply different forms of struggle, not just through electoral channels (Borón 2006:8-9).
Although social movements have created spaces for representation within the state, especially where there are progressive Left-governments, this has also led to an alienation of many people from participation, and so they seek other spaces where they may be more autonomous (Zibechi 2011:3). This yearning for autonomy is one of the most important traits of Latin American social movements, and which Zibechi prefers that they not lose (Zibechi 2012).

### 2.3 Institutional perspective (POS)

The problem with the structural way of explaining social movements is that by focusing on societal factors, it ignores the individual and its propensity for engaging in collective action. According to Sidney Tarrow (1998) structuralists like Marx and Engels overlooked, or did not pay sufficient attention to important aspects of collective action, such as culture and politics. Individuals were supposed to act according to a more or less predetermined history; after capitalism there will be socialism and so on, and the theories connected to structuralism fail to provide an adequate answer as to why social classes sometimes don’t mobilise (Tarrow 1998:11).

Charles Tilly (1978) outlines five components of collective action: “interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself” (Tilly 1978:7). Collective action is the result of the structures and resources of the group and the opportunities handed to them by outside actors, and it’s success or failure is dependent of these factors (ibid.). This means that collective action may be triggered if the structures and resources of the group change, or the opportunity structure provided by other actors changes. Opportunity is shaped by the repression/facilitation-dimension, whereby the contender must assess the cost of mobilisation and collective action in relation to the opposing actor, for instance the government (Tilly 1978:100). Social movements are the results of sustained collective action by a group of people who share the same beliefs (Tilly 1978:9).

Peter Eisinger (1973) defines political opportunity structure (POS) as “…the degree to which groups are likely to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (cited in
McAdam 1996:23). Sidney Tarrow gives a similar definition of political opportunity, where the political system “…provide[s] incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 1998:77). And the dimensions that may trigger protest are connected to the stability or instability of the political alignments, whether elites are divided or not, the presence or absence of allied elites (especially Left-parties), and the repression/facilitation-dimension – the state’s propensity to repression (Tarrow 1998:78-80). This means that if there is a change in the elite composition, mobilisation may be triggered: if a movement becomes allied with a political party, if elites are unstable – for instance during a transition, or if there is more or less repression/inclusion – after a transition towards democracy, or a coup.

The POS-framework is by some scholars viewed as something that is often misused; in the words of William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer: “Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all” (Gamson and Meyer 1996:275). This is partly because it is difficult to define the chain of causation – if there is opportunity in the political structure, this may lead the movements to action. But it may be assumed that this also works the other way around: movements might cause opportunity. The POS-framework has most often been developed and applied by different scholars analysing Western cases. Many academics of different disciplines have added and subtracted from the different POS-theories as they have seen fit (from the list and dimension of opportunity between politics and movement), giving rise to criticism (e.g. Escobar and Alvarez 1992).

2.4 Post-structural perspective

Judith Adler Hellman critiques the structuralists for being too concerned with autonomy and strong opposition to political parties. They are also too preoccupied with the small and autonomous social movements, so that in a way they negate their chance for unification and growth (by not linking themselves to political parties and other organisations) (Hellman 1992:55-56). The post-structural view on social movements is concerned with different ideas and identities, and strategy, and where identities are socially constructed (Escobar and Alvarez 1992:5).
Escobar and Alvarez (1992) draw a line between strategy and identity-research. The former is dominant in the Anglo-Saxon world, and is preoccupied with strategy, participation and rationality of the movements. Theories on identity dominate in Latin America and continental Europe. They “emphasise the processes by which social actors constitute collective identities…” (Escobar and Alvarez 1992:5). Latin American social movements are not only political and/or economic, they are also cultural, and so theory about social movements must also include this aspect (Escobar 1992:64, Alvarez et.al. 1998:6). Through the construction of collective identities social actors “…create democratic spaces for more autonomous action” (Escobar and Alvarez 1992:4-5). This means that social movements seek to challenge the power structures and create more spaces for participation, as well as offering different views on development issues. It was believed that culture was more important for the NSMs than the old social movements, that is for instance, more important for indigenous and less so for peasants. Cultural politics can be defined as conflicts between social actors “…shaped by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with each other” (Alvarez et.al. 1998:7). “The cultural politics of social movements often attempt to challenge or unsettle dominant political cultures” (Alvarez et.al. 1998:8).

Orin Starn combines theories of NSM (particularly collective identity) and peasant revolts, and claims that research on NSM ignores the peasants because they are often seen as un-modern and therefore unimportant social actors (Starn 1992:90-91). Starn claims that it is important not to overlook the “small” revolutions. A peasant revolution like such of the twentieth century might not happen today, but this does not mean that the peasant mobilisation that does appear is insignificant or unimportant. Seeing as a large-scale Marxist revolution and overthrow of capitalism (as outlined by for instance Wolf) isn’t likely to happen, we must also recognise that many peasant rebellions are what Starn calls “erupt and fizzle”. By this he means that most violent uprisings die away rather quickly, and “…suggest that peasant movements should not be squeezed into the progressive linear designs of most conventional brands of Western historical vision”. And although social movements in Latin America are diverse, most peasant protests are in opposition to the state and/or the landowners, and it is important not to fit them into the same ideological mould (Starn 1992:95).
If there is a difference in the perception of identity, a divide between different sectors of the movements may appear. For instance Kay B. Warren’s analysis of Guatemala found that the Pan-Mayan movement challenges the “unified social movement paradigm”, which guided important elements of the grassroots Left through the early 1990s” (Warren 1998:166). He found that some indigenous were not comfortable with the framing of the Western neoliberalism as the main oppressive force (Warren 1998:167). Warren further claims that many of these Mayan activists and scholars resent being represented by others (Ladinos or foreigners) (Warren 1998:169). Critics of this movement argue that they are not able to mobilise because their main concern is cultural issues, and that this makes them a weaker movement. They should instead concentrate on material issues, such as land (Warren 1998:174-176). This creates a “material-cultural divide” which might cause splits between indigenous and other peasants (Warren 1998-178-180).

A lot of literature on NSM seems to claim that only social movements that are in complete opposition to the state are “pure” enough. This is because only then are they truly autonomous and in control of their own identity, instead of having to bargain with actors in the institutionalised political arena. Starn critiques the perspective of many researchers who claim that popular movements that interact with organised politics end up losing their autonomy and identity in return. Starn on the other hand, says, “…this position, I believe, unwittingly propagates Marxist orthodoxy, wherein only total rejection of the system counts as good politics” (Starn 1992:105).

The post-structuralists are criticised for overlooking, or even ignoring, organised politics, such as political parties. Harriss et.al (2004) believe that this fragmentation between what they call civil and political society is a problem (2004:14-15). Harriss (2005) critiques what many post-structuralists call “new politics”, whereby the basis of this new politics must be the civil society and local organisations, especially as the political parties generally are in decline (Harriss 2005:2-3). He finds that this new politics is not as including as it claims to be, but on the contrary excludes the marginalised and poor actors (Harriss 2005:4).
Many scholars have viewed social movements as apolitical and autonomous, and as simply desirable in itself: “the fetishism of autonomy”. This may be harmful for the research in this area because it seems to favour the small and struggling social movements, and disregard the larger movements (or organisations) that ally themselves with others to achieve their goals, for instance a political party (or coalition of parties), a governmental institution or some charismatic leader (Escobar and Alvarez 1992:54-57).
3 Analytical approach

In this section, background information on Paraguay will be presented first. After this, the characteristics of the units of analysis – organisations within the rural movements – will be laid out. As previously established the thesis will focus on three time periods: the authoritarian regime, the transition, and the consolidation period, which will be used when showing the research hypotheses in the final section of this chapter.

3.1 Paraguay

Two large political parties, the Colorados and the Liberals, have dominated Paraguayan politics. The former were in power from 1887 and until 2008, including the years of dictatorship under general Alfredo Stroessner (1954 – 1989).

The general level of trust in politics and democracy is considered to be low in Paraguay; in 2002 only 7 per cent were satisfied with the democracy, contrary to somewhere between 56 per cent and 65 per cent elsewhere in Latin America. Only seven out of every hundred persons trust in political parties, and the fall of the authoritarian regime was supported by only 38 per cent of the population, and 63 per cent claimed that it did not make any difference whether the government was democratic or not (Riquelme 2003b:55-56).

3.1.1 Political history 1954-2012

The Stroessner-regime (1954-1989) was effectively an alliance between “the Colorado party, the armed forces and the state” [author’s translation] (Pozas 2012:22). The regime survived for such a long time due to this alliance, and a clientelism that controlled the population (ibid.). Although some rural movements did start to appear during the 1980’s after long years of repression, they did not represent a significant threat towards the regime of General
Alfredo Stroessner, because the civil society in general had been “depoliticised and demobilised” by the regime (Lambert 2000:381-382).

During the 1980’s, changes began to tear the regime apart. Economic crisis, and the end of the cold war meant that the USA diminished its support to Paraguay. There were also internal divisions within the Colorado party, which led to a loss of legitimacy. The transition towards democracy in 1989 was an elite-driven transition. It was the coup by General Rodriguez that eventually deposited Alfredo Stroessner between 2 and 3. February 1989. This means that the transition process was led and controlled by conservatives (Carreras 2012:70; Lambert 2000:382). All in all it was a military coup, initiated from above and not from popular pressure, where the important actors under the authoritarian regime played important roles in the opening-process (Carreras 2012:71-72).

Elections were held shortly after the transition in 1989. The candidate for the Colorados was the coup-maker Rodriguez (Richer 2006:60). Rodriguez was a supporter of the Colorado party, so the ties between the military and the party continued (Lambert 2000:382). This has shaped Paraguayan politics for a long time, and hindered further democratisation (Lambert 2000:380). In the following elections until 2008, Colorado-candidates won all presidential elections, although not all elections were considered free and fair (Lambert 2000:383).

The transition period lasted some twenty years, from 1989 to 2008; due in part to the fact that the military and persons connected to the military still retained much power after the transition, including former political and economic elites (Carreras 2012; Hetherington 2011; Pozas 2012:23; Lambert 2000:385). In addition, the Colorados was still the strongest political party, and held power and government and also controlled the bureaucracy. The new regime excluded opposition actors (whom were also excluded during the authoritarian regime) “…in a context which limited the rise of changes guaranteeing change in continuity” (Carreras 2012:73). All of these factors contributed to preventing a consolidation of the democracy. Even though democratic liberties were introduced, such as free and fair elections, a new constitution, and freedom of expression, the civil society lacked the material resources to be
able to actually gain political influence or achieve political power. The civil society was weak and unable to mobilise, and there was little cooperation between movements and political parties; the opposition was divided (Carreras 2012:74).

3.1.2 The historical roots of the land structures in Paraguay

The land structures as we know them today were established after the Triple Alliance war (1865-1870) with the emergence of the latifundio-system. Before this war, land in Paraguay was state-owned, but laws were passed that allowed for privatisation of land. Because of these laws, most estates were sold to private owners, especially foreigners, between 1883 and 1885 (Villagra et.al. 1989:34). It was after this that the latifundio system was established and consolidated, whereas in most other Latin American countries, the system of the latifundio was established during the colonial period (Fogel 2001:25; Villagra et.al. 1989:31). Paraguay also stands out from other Latin American countries in that the number of inhabitants was low, especially after the war, and the amount of unused land was large (Hetherington 2011:72).

Between 1885 and 1914, approximately 23 million hectares were sold to foreigners, and marks the start of the process of “extranjerización”, or foreignisation (Fogel 2001:27). Native Paraguayan peasants were marginalised and their access to land generally worsened at the expense of foreign investors (Fogel 2001:28-29). The state retained an alliance with these latifundistas, in the sense that laws concerning land and colonisation were in favour of the latifundistas. This further enhanced, and reproduced, the social and land-related inequalities (Fogel 2001:30).

The land-related development in Chaco is somewhat different. Because of the harsh conditions in the Chaco, the Spanish conquistadors had great difficulty gaining control over the area. This meant that the indigenous populations remained relatively independent. “Neither Paraguayan independence or the Triple Alliance war had great. …consequences for the Chaco…” (Vázquez 2005:185-187). The land in Chaco was deemed to be of lesser value
than the land in the Eastern region, and the state implemented laws to populate the region (Vázquez 2005:187). At the end of the 19th century, the biggest landowner in Chaco was Carlos Casado, of Spanish origin. It is claimed that he owned territory that was “more than Belgium and Luxembourg put together” (Vázquez 2005:188-190). Chaco was until the 1940’s an economic centre in Paraguay, with for instance extraction of tannin, but many businesses left after this (Vázquez 2005:192).

The notion of *tierra malhabida* may be translated into ill-gotten land, and is very present in Paraguayan society. The term refers to what peasants see as land appropriated illegitimately (Hetherington 2011:69). A lot of this ill-gotten land was distributed under the Stroessner-era, to his family and friends, as well as to large companies and Brazilians (Hetherington 2011:69; 2011:73). This redistribution was carried out by the IBR (The Institute of Rural Welfare) (Espinola 2008:130). The IBR and the Estatuto Agrario (the land reform-laws) were created in 1963, replacing the former land reform of 1940. The aim of the land reform, handled by the IBR was to create colonies where peasants were granted plots of land (Fogel 2001:45; Espinola 2008:130). However, the foreigners represented a certain model of development and modernisation, and this was the justification of the IBR for transferring land to others than the (original) beneficiaries, that is smallholding- or landless peasants (Espinola 2008:130). In 2002, the Agrarian Statutes were modified (Hetherington 2011:105). The Agrarian Statutes were revised in 2002, and Indert replaced the IBR (Hetherington 2009:225).

Whereas many South American governments in the 1970’s tried to integrate the periphery with the centre, this was not the case in Paraguay, where there was rather an emphasis on the eastern region: the march on the east (Vazquez 2005:197). The Paraguayan state prioritises the central and eastern region, further marginalising the Chaco area. As opposed to the frontier departments in the east, in the Chaco area there is no great eviction of peasants (Vázquez 2005:204-205).

Generally, the land above the river Paraguay, in Chaco, is drier, while the land in the central and eastern part is considered very fertile (Hetherington 2011:10). The landscape of the two
regions is reflected in society and politics. The central and eastern region of Paraguay is usually referred to as the prosperous and fertile region that inhabits political power as well as the national identity. Opposed to this is the Chaco-region, which is seen as “…a dead space, without infrastructure…” (Vázquez 2005:183). And whereas the central and eastern region is seen as the real and true Paraguay, Chaco is seen as the backwards Paraguay, although this part covers 60 per cent of the country (Vázquez 2005:183; Hetherington 2011:10). In 1991, 32 per cent were considered landless peasants, and the numbers were more or less the same in 1997/1998 (Lambert 2000:388; Riquelme 2003b:58). Of the 2 per cent indigenous that inhabit Paraguay, 50.7 per cent live in the central and eastern region, and 49.3 in the Chaco-area. But, in the Chaco, the indigenous alone constitute 50 per cent of the total population (Quiroga 2012:102-103). All of the Chaco area represents only 3 per cent of the national population (Fogel and Riquelme 2005:184). Some calculations claim that peasants account for around 20 per cent of the population, and they are mostly situated in the eastern parts, on the border to Brazil. Smallholding peasants are considered to inhabit 83 per cent of Paraguayan farms, and they own 4 per cent of cultivated land (Hetherington 2011:2).

Land holdings are unevenly distributed in Paraguay, and most of the land is concentrated on few owners. The table presented below shows that this picture has not changed substantially the last thirty years⁴.

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Conflicts concerning land are very prominent in Paraguayan society, and they involve political, economic, social and environmental issues⁵. The main actors in these conflicts are: the state and its institutions, the landowning elite, and the rural movements – indigenous and

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⁴ The table is based on figures from Villagra et.al. 1989:25-36; Nagel 1999:152; Bye 2010:230; Norad 2011:9
⁵ See for instance: Fogel 2001; Fogel and Riquelme 2005; Hetherington 2011; Nagel 1999; Riquelme 2003; Villagra et.al 1989
other peasants. The peasant population in Paraguay constitutes around 20 per cent of the total population, most of them being smallholding or landless peasants living in the eastern parts of the country (Hetherington 2011:2).

3.2 Presentation of organisations

This was the first national peasant organisation of significance in Paraguay was the LACs. It has laid the foundations for later mobilisation, so it is important to analyse. The LACs emerged in the 1960’s and they were repressed to extinction in the seventies, and finally disappeared in 1975. After the repression of the LAC there was little mobilisation until the very last years of the regime, and many organisations emerged during the transition. The LACs is the only organisation to be considered in the first time period. Even though their base was religious, their central claim was recuperation of land and critique of the suppressive Stroessner-regime (Hetherington 2011:29). The LACs operated in different communities and each organisation was quite autonomous, with different practices (Telesca 2004:80-81). Their organisation was characterised by a flat, horizontal structure, without any clear leadership (Telesca 2004:109-110).

OLT was established in 1993. This organisation is analysed because it emerged during the early years of the transition period. Their main goal is an integrated land reform, which in addition to land distribution also focuses on political and social changes in society. They are a grassroots organisation (Lidia Ruiz, OLT).

Tierraviva was established in 1994. It is a human rights-NGO covering the lower Chaco-area, and working with different indigenous organisations, first and foremost CLIBCh. The NGO offers legal help to communities to make claims within the judicial system, either nationally or in international courts (the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) (Norad 2011:26). It has around fifteen employees, many of them lawyers. They are funded by the Rainforest Foundation Norway and other international NGOs.
CLIBCh was established in 1996 because “they saw a need to organise” [Carlos, CLIBCh]. 60-65 indigenous communities in the lower Chaco area are represented in this organisation. CLIBCh was chosen because they have decided to use more radical tactics in their struggle: they are becoming more “active”, and because they have managed to make themselves more visible. In Paraguay, NGO’s support different indigenous organisations, as sort of intermediaries. The relationship between Tierraviva and CLIBCh represents one of these (Norad 2011:27). The main goal of the CLIBCh is to provide an arena for organisation of different communities, and to recover land. In addition, they wish a stronger recognition of indigenous rights, participation and representation. They are a grassroots organisation, but aided by Tierraviva and the rainforest Foundation Norway.

FAPI is a national indigenous umbrella organisation. FAPI was established in 2000, and it “…enjoys credibility and respect at the highest level…” (Norad 2011). FAPI represents seven organisations in the Chaco area, and six in the east. One of their main objectives is autonomy. It has managed to achieve national recognition because of “…a high level of organizational capacity and is also able to represent the indigenous peoples before State agencies and institutions…[FAPI] has participated in several national and international fora…” (Norad 2011:15-32). They are financed by the Rainforest Foundation Norway, among others. Lawyers work with this grassroots organisations on a voluntary basis.

CONAMURI was established in 1999 and it is a women’s organisation. It is a joint organisation, in the sense that it’s focus is on both indigenous and other peasants. This is one of the not so common examples in Paraguay of an organisations that covers both indigenous and peasants. The organisation covers basically all the departments of the country. Their goal is to represent women across class and ethnicity. Their aims are also connected to distribution of land and alimentary sovereignty.

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6 conamuri.org.py
Los Carperos was established towards the end of Lugo’s term, in 2010. Its structure is less hierarchical than the traditional peasant organisations, and it’s claimed that they use other, more spontaneous, methods. The organisation emerged as an opposition to what they claim is the co-optation of the traditional peasant organisations by the government of Lugo. There is no known financing of this organisation, and no employees. Their main goal is to attain land.

The reason for the selection of these organisations will be accounted for in chapter 4.2.2, as well as an assessment of their representativeness.

### 3.3 Research hypotheses

The main research hypothesis is that fragmentation in the rural movements leads to relatively weaker rural movements in Paraguay. In this chapter, some assumptions will be laid out concerning the possible reasons for this fragmentation. They are based on the theoretical framework and the empirical background-chapter on Paraguay presented in chapter 2 and 3. The point of this thesis is not to confirm or to disprove the assumptions laid out in this chapter. Even though the main goal is not to test the theory, the theoretical framework will be tested implicitly, by showing how a theory can be used to shed light on certain aspects of the empirical analysis, and to show if it can provide us with some insight about the mechanisms and the dynamics that may exist.

Based on the structural perspective laid out in the theoretical framework, and assumptions about the empirical findings, we can make the assumption that structural conditions contributes to creating fragmentation in the rural movements. This structural condition is land, because it is assumed that the latifundio-system creates uneven land structures. There is a geographical separation between the central and eastern Paraguay, and the Chaco area. While foreignisation is present in both these areas, the land concentration and soya production is greatest in the more densely populated eastern departments bordering Brazil. This is also the most conflictive area in relation to land issues. Our first hypothesis is: **Different land structures cause fragmentation in the rural movements in Paraguay.**
Similarly, from the theoretical framework on the institutional perspective, POS will facilitate or repress mobilisation. This means that the limitations that the state and its institutions place on the rural movements affect mobilisation. Developing this perspective, we might find that the policies of the state affect mobilisation. Based on joint theoretical and empirical assumptions, we may find that the state has enacted different policies towards different sectors of the rural movement, thus contributing to fragmentation in the rural movements. Our second hypothesis is: The policies of the state towards different sectors of the rural movements have contributed to a fragmentation.

The last hypothesis is based on the post-structural perspective. The different sectors within the rural movements are thought to have developed different identities and ideologies, which leads to fragmentation in the rural movements. Our third hypothesis is: The indigenous and other peasants do not share a common identity and ideology, which leads to a fragmentation in the movement.

Because all these hypotheses contribute to explaining the research question, a unified hypothesis can be articulated:

The fragmentation in the rural movements in Paraguay can be explained by differences in land structures, which is further enhanced by the differentiating policies of the state and differences in ideology and perception of identity, and this fragmentation leads to weaker rural movements.
4 Methodological reflections

This chapter outlines the qualitative case study and the theoretically interpretive case study, followed by the choice of case. Thereafter, the method applied is presented through a discussion on qualitative interviews, as well as an ethical discussion and an evaluation of the interviews in the study: the choice of analytical units and their representativeness. Lastly, a discussion on validity and reliability is provided.

4.1 The qualitative case study

John Gerring claims that case studies are especially appropriate in exploratory studies (Gerring 2007:40). Y-centred research is when the researcher is concerned with the outcome of an event, and where the purpose is to generate new hypotheses (Gerring 2007:76). The aim of this study is to explore the rural movements of Paraguay, so a case study is the preferred research method, because it allows us to explore “complex events” (George and Bennett 2005:45). On the other hand, some of the risks in a case study are the risk of “case selection bias” and the limited degree of generalizability that one achieves (George and Bennett 2005:22-28).

Studies that do not aim to develop theory, but to apply generalisations to shed light on certain issues are called theoretically interpretive case studies (*teoretisk fortolkende casestudier*) (Andersen 1997:68). In this research design, concepts and theory are used to “…summarise or structure an empirical material“ [my translation] (Andersen 1997:69). There are some challenges connected to this research design. The more general the theory or concepts, the easier it can be applied to different empirical material, which might lead to the organisation and analysis of the empirical data to be less specific. The other challenge is that the concepts and theories chosen by the researcher influence empirical findings; it is subjective. This type of case study can also be used to give a “…simple summary of a complicated empirical process” [author’s translation] (Andersen 1997:69). To be able to structure the empirical data
easier, and to avoid the challenges mentioned, three different theoretical perspectives are chosen: the structural-material, institutional, and post-structural. The empirical material is categorised according to these perspectives.

4.1.1 Case selection

As opposed to large-N-studies, case selection in case studies must be based on other criteria than randomness (Gerring 2007:88-89). A deviant case stands out from other cases in that it doesn’t seem to comply with established theory on the area, or that it breaks with “common sense”. This means that a case may be chosen on “general expectations” (Gerring 2007:105-106). Deviant-case studies are also exploratory, which makes such a study an initial study for later analysis (Gerring 2007:107). In many places in Latin America, social movements are strong, but contrary to expectation, Paraguay seems to have relatively weaker social movements. This makes Paraguay a deviant case on this matter.

4.2 Qualitative interviews

Unstructured or semi-structured interviews are different from quantitative interviews like surveys, in that the qualitative researcher is more interested in the respondents’ views on certain issues or events. Because of this, the interviews are more flexible and follow-up questions are usually a part of the interview session, and the interviews are not limited to certain prefabricated questions and answers. The thesis is interested in the views of people connected to the rural movements, and therefore semi-structured interviews have been applied. As noted earlier, the topic of research is relatively new, and qualitative interviewing provides the flexibility needed to perhaps adjust the research design, for instance adjustment of the research questions.

In qualitative interviews with key informants we are interested in gaining the knowledge that only the interviewee possesses, that is information from the actor’s point of view or information “that is not publicly available” (Andersen 2006:281). In this thesis, the interviews
are meant to be “unique data” to supplement the written sources, and to gain insight into the thoughts and views of persons connected to the rural movement (Andersen 2006:281-282). Within qualitative interviewing, there are two main positions at opposite ends of the spectrum. One is constructivist and the other is positivist, and difference lies in how to interpret data: in what degree to believe that what the informant says, is “true” (Andersen 2006:295). This thesis has tried to find a middle position. The qualitative interviews are the thoughts and views of persons connected to the rural movements, and many of the authors have links to social movements in Paraguay. Therefore, the thesis is perhaps closer to constructivism. “Facts” have been sought through written sources; the interviews have been used to complement these, as a source for “interpretation and understanding” (Andersen 2006:291).

Another important aspect when conducting qualitative interviews is completeness and saturation. These aspects are not necessarily about the number of interviewees, but about getting the right answers, that is the answers to the questions you are asking (Rubin and Rubin 1995:73). If the same findings have been found in other similar cases, the researcher can be confident that the findings are somewhat generalizable. Interviews with persons in different organisations, with different background (academics, lawyers, and “ordinary” people), and of different gender were conducted. The intent was to test the generalizability; if these different persons all gave the same or similar answers, then the data is more reliable, and one may have greater confidence in the results (Rubin and Rubin 1995:74). The purpose of the interviews was to attempt to understand a complex political and social situation that there is not easily obtained information on. But, together with collection and analysis of literature (more usually than not only published locally), it is believed that there is a possibility of generating (new) hypotheses about an understudied country and phenomenon.

4.2.1 Thoughts on ethics, culture and language

When interviewing activists it is important to keep in mind that they often harbour deep emotions in relation to the interview topics, related to beliefs, ideology and personal experiences. To overcome these difficulties the interviewees were approached with an open
mind, and given the impression of wanting to learn from them, and their point of view. At the same time, it was important not to disguise the intention of the interview and research (Woliver 2002:677). In constructing the interview guide, and in the interview situation, it was especially crucial that they were given time to speak their mind on issues they deemed as relevant. This was deemed important because activism, especially in the “global south”, is sometimes outright dangerous. In the specific case of Paraguay, many activists have been assassinated, and many of the persons interviewed had lost family and friends. It was important to appear understanding and patient, but also somewhat impartial and open, also because this helped gain trust within the different communities and organisations, something that Woliver defines as important (Woliver 2002:677-678). At the end of each interview, the interviewees were presented with an open question, so that they could express what they believed to be of special relevance, in accordance with Woliver’s recommendation.

A potential issue with the interviews is the language barrier. When doing research in a different linguistic and cultural setting from one’s own, there is always the risk of something (possibly important) being “lost in translation”. To avoid this, all interviews were recorded and transcribed, which simultaneously enhances reliability-issues.

4.2.2 Interviews and interviewees

Fifteen interviews were conducted over the course of a four week-fieldtrip in Paraguay in February 2013. Some of the organisations were chosen and contacted before the fieldwork, based on contacts in Norway (the Rainforest Foundation Norway), and other interviews were gained through a snowballing-method. This method proved to be useful, especially as Paraguay is a relatively small country, and so is the activist- and academic circles. An interview guide was prepared beforehand, to ensure that the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, to make comparison between the interviews easier. The interview guide consisted of different themes and questions, but often it was superfluous, as the interviewees, when allowed to talk freely, most often touched upon all the questions and

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7 A list of the interviewees is provided in Annex 1.
subjects outlined in the guide. This made it easier to attain the role as “researcher willing to learn” which possibly made the interview situation less frightening. In five of the interviews (the indigenous leaders of the CLIBCh), the interviewees preferred speaking in their own language, so an interpreter was present. The interviewees trusted this interpreter, but there is always a chance that the interpreter “overlooked” something when translating into Spanish, or perhaps had difficulties translating some parts, although this was never pointed out to. All the remaining interviews were carried out in Spanish. The length of the interviews varied, but approximately they lasted around 30-45 minutes.

Tierraviva and FAPI are NGO’s working for indigenous organisations, as sort of intermediaries. FAPI is the largest indigenous organisation in Paraguay. OLT is a national peasant organisation, and therefore important, and the thesis also includes an interview with a person living on the frontier to Brazil, the most conflictive area regarding land struggles in Paraguay. CONAMURI is a women’s organisation, of both peasants and indigenous. Interviews with researchers were conducted because they potentially provide a different perspective.

Contact with Tierraviva and FAPI were arranged before the field study by contacting the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation. They work with seven indigenous organisations in Paraguay, working to regain land and strengthen indigenous culture and language. Contact with CLIBCh was gained through the “intermediary” NGO Tierraviva. Contact with OLT, CONAMURI and CONAPI were gained through other contacts, so a snowballing-method was used.

The organisations are grassroots organisations of peasants (LAC, OLT and the Carperos), of indigenous (CLIBCh and FAPI), of both sectors (CONAMURI), and an NGO (Tierraviva). These are the main types of organisations that exist in Paraguay. Some are national (OLT, FAPI and CONAMURI) and others are regional (LAC, CLIBCh, Tierraviva and the Carperos). Some are especially relevant for certain time periods: LAC under the Stroessner-
regime, and the Carperos emerged during the Lugo-government. The remaining emerged during the transition period (1989-2008).

An interview with National Coordination of Indigenous Pastoral of the Paraguayan Episcopalian Conference (CONAPI) was also conducted, but is not one of the units of analysis. A peasant in the eastern region of Curuguaty was also interviewed. Data concerning the LAC and the Carperos were mostly gained through written sources, as well as from other informants.

The analysis will also use written sources, so that interviews function as supplements. Paraguay is a small country and with relatively few inhabitants, and it is likely that there is a possibility of generalisation within the case. That is, the organisations chosen as units of analysis are assumed to be somewhat representative of the rural movements in general, although not of all social movements in Paraguay.

4.3 Discussion of validity and reliability

George and Bennett (2006) claim that one of the strengths of the case study is its strength in achieving conceptual validity (George and Bennett 2006:19). This is what can also be referred to as measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 2001:529). The qualitative case study achieves a higher internal validity than external validity (Gerring 2007:39). Because internal validity concerns causation, this is not relevant for this study, since it will not assess the chain of causation. In a study that is empirically based, for instance an exploratory, theoretically interpretive study like this one, it is harder to identify the chain causation accurately. External validity refers to the possibility of generalisation. This is also less relevant for a theoretically interpretative case study (Yin 1989:40). Construct validity refers to whether we are using measurements that are actually measuring what we wish to. To increase construct validity, it is important to determine what exact changes one is actually trying to uncover, and then finding the appropriate way to measure this (Yin 1989:41-42). This thesis examines the changing mobilisation of two groups across time within the rural movement, the indigenous,
and other peasants. This is studied through literature analysis and semi-structured qualitative interviews. The construct validity is improved by using multiple sources (Yin 1989:97; Berry 2002:680). Construct validity is greater if the interviewees have the same perception (saturation), and if they are allowed to review the study before publishing (Yin 1989:145). All informants have been given the chance to verify the thoughts and opinions expressed in the interviews prior to publishing, thus providing greater construct validity. The interviewees had the same perception on many topics, so it is believed that saturation has been achieved.

To improve validity- and reliability issues in interviews it is important to document, for instance through a recorder. It is also important that the study is verifiable (Andersen 2006:291). All interviews have therefore been recorded and transcribed. External reliability is difficult to achieve in qualitative research because one cannot “…freeze a social setting…” (Bryman 2004:273). All the names of all informants are provided, as well as the time and place of each interview. This heightens reliability and makes the study more easily traceable, as it makes it more probable that a different researcher conducting the same interviews would get the same answers. Higher reliability is also achieved if an outside person reading the study is able to trace the research process, so the thesis has aimed to be open (Yin 1989:102). Multiple sources of information are used to avoid a too strong bias.

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8 Transcriptions can be provided upon request.
5 Analysis

The empirical data presented below is categorised into the three time periods: i) the authoritarian regime of Stroessner (1954-1989), ii) the transition towards democracy (1989-2008), and iii) the consolidation period (2008-2012). The data is classified according to each theoretical perspective and its respective hypotheses, as laid out in chapter 3.3.

5.1 The Stroessner-regime

A lesser degree of mobilisation and fewer rural movements, compared to later periods, marked this period of authoritarianism. Yet, this period also gave rise to one important movement – the LACs. They influenced and inspired and laid the foundation for the movements that arose later. This chapter will focus on the LACs, and also generally on the regime.

5.1.1 Structural

The new land laws initiated by Stroessner in 1963, the Agrarian Statutes and the IBR, made it possible for foreigners to buy land in the frontier regions, which was previously not possible. Furthermore, the executive power could grant land to persons that would not otherwise be included in the land reform (Fogel 2001:45). The state’s role in this process, and the distribution of land contributed to a demobilisation of the peasantry. This happened despite the fact that most fertile and desirable land was given in large amounts to foreigners and others who did not comply with the land distribution-rules (Fogel 2001:38-39). During this period, landless peasants organised spontaneous colonisations that created stronger solidarity among the peasantry, and these took place in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country (Fogel 2001:41-43). Even though this process of foreignisation is not entirely new, it greatly intensified with these new land laws and through the IBR. Accumulation of land in the
border-regions by Brazilian descendants increased, and it created a basis for great conflicts (Fogel 2001:52).

From 1970-1980, the growth in the agricultural sector stood at 6.7 per cent (whereas in 1960-1970 the growth was 3 per cent, and 1980-1985 it was 3.6 per cent) (Fogel 2001:51). It seems clear that at the height of the authoritarian regime, agricultural policies and expansion were pursued in order to modernise and expand the agricultural sector. It can be assumed that the IBR both contributed in creating, and in upholding the minifundio and latifundio-system. Because of this, Paraguayan peasants are either smallholding peasants (minifundistas) or landless, even today (Villagra et.al. 1989:37).

The Paraguayan equivalent to the Christian Base Communities (CEB) of other Latin American countries is the LACs. They were created in 1960 (Telesca 2004:63). They emerged due to land conflicts, and were one of the most important organisations in the country (Riquelme 2003a:11). The strongholds of the LACs were in the department of Misiones, but they were also present in many other departments, all of them in the Oriental region of Paraguay. The National Federation of Christian Agrarian Leagues (FENALAC) was established in 1964, and received support from peasants, workers and priests from different congregations (Espínola 2008:136-137).

Las Ligas…a very strong and important movement. …this coincides…with the introduction of the first Brazilian entrepreneurs [Luis Galeano].

Towards the end of the 1970’s, spontaneous occupations by peasants created conflictive situations (Fogel 2001:49). This coincides with the repression of the Ligas Agrarias Cristianas, during the 1970’s. Towards the end of the authoritarian regime, peasant mobilisation intensified, and took on a national character (Fogel 2001:54). The 1980’s were characterised by economic crisis, especially in the agricultural sector. This sparked mobilisations and land conflicts from the mid-1980’s (Riquelme 2003a:12).
During the Stroessner-regime, we began to see the contours of the new landholding elite, the Brazilians and their descendants. They were favoured under the authoritarian regime, as it was believed that they would modernise the agricultural production of Paraguay. Yet, with their continuing accumulation of land, also came great conflicts and mobilisations by peasants. Due to their expanding territorial control, the Brazilians were simultaneously gaining economic and political power. During the years 1983 to 1986 the occupation of land intensified, and about 15 000 families mobilised during this period. At the same time (1982-1989), the production of soya almost tripled (Fogel 2011:53).

According to our hypotheses concerning landholding and that it will cause fragmentation in the rural movements, it seems that peasants in the central and eastern parts mobilised because of what they believed was unjust land relations, however the indigenous in Chaco did not mobilise to the same extent. This supports our assumption that the latifundio caused fragmentation in the rural movements in this era.

5.1.2 Institutional

When Stroessner came to power, a portion of the peasantry supported him as he claimed to represent them. They supported Stroessner because of his populist rhetoric, promises of land reform, and wide use of clientelism, which created a link between the Colorado party and the peasants. Although the reform was carried out slowly, many peasants did gain land in the colonias under this regime (Hetherington 2011:13-14; 2011:194). However, because the land reform was not entirely successful, support diminished among many peasants.

The LACs were under increasing repression from the Stroessner-regime from the end of the 1960’s until the especially repressive year of 1976 (Telesca 2004:11; Hetherington 2011:29; Hetherington 2011:83). The Church withdrew its support and the movement was without alliances in their fight against the repressive state (Espínola 2008:142). After 1976 the LACs ceased to exist (Telesca 2004:84). Leaders of the movement were tortured and killed,
however, the LACs still laid the basis for new peasants organisations that emerged at a later point (Espinola 2008:142). Some claim that the history of this first phase of peasant organisation makes the current organisations stronger (Espinola 2008:143). Lidia Ruiz from OLT expresses it like this:

The peasant organisations today are what we call "the children" of the LAC [Lidia Ruiz, OLT].

The only channel of representation that existed during the authoritarian regime was through the Colorado party (Telesca 2004:117). To achieve a parcel of land from the state under the Stroessner-regime, it was necessary to be a Colorado-member. This also applied if one wanted to be a civil servant (Telesca 2004:34). So, the system of clientelism was widespread. The LACs represented a threat to the regime because the peasants were able to organise themselves, and therefore no longer mere “…passive subjects…” and because they challenged the state’s control over civil society, where there was a direct link between the Colorado party and society (Telesca 2004:119).

The result of the laws and policies of the IBR and the Agrarian Statute was that the land bordering Brazil turned into a land monopoly, through accumulation of land owned by foreigners, which enhanced the “foreignisation”-process (Fogel 2001:46). The departments in the eastern region most affected by the foreignisation, Amambay, Alto Parana, Canindeyú, were simultaneously the poorest areas of the region (Fogel 2001:47). The policies of the regime were such that agricultural modernisation was pursued, however, at the expense of the smallholding peasants. This capitalisation of the agriculture prioritised intensive exploitation of the land, and therefore created even greater conflicts between the latifundistas and the peasants.

For Stroessner, the indigenous were “…obstacles to the national economic development…” (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:83). The first state institution established concerning indigenous issues was the Department of Indigenous Issues (DAI) in 1958, under the National Defence
Ministry. The DAI implemented the policies of the state in accordance with their assimilation
plan (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:83-84). When the land reform was created, communitarian
indigenous land was not recognised, although the DAI created some 33 indigenous ‘colonies’.
 Likewise, the constitution of 1967 did not recognise the indigenous peoples, and made no
references to their rights. The implication of this was that the indigenous were not protected
against expulsion from their native lands, discrimination, or even massacre. By the 1970s, the
national policies of assimilation turned instead to total exclusion (Gaska and Ferreira
2012:85-86). Due to national and international pressures, Stroessner was forced to pass a law
in 1981 recognising the existence of indigenous peoples of Paraguay (Gaska and Ferreira
2012:122-126). The Paraguayan Indigenous Institute (INDI) was established in 1975, and
replaced the DAI, and its mandate was to control the activities and actions of the national and
international NGOs (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:88).

While the land reform under Stroessner was the ticket for the peasants to perhaps gaining full
citizenship, the indigenous were completely excluded from this project (Hetherington
2011:101). The land reform of Stroessner (“the march to the east”) meant that indigenous
people were pushed out of their territory, which created a rural “antagonism” (Hetherington
2011:102). Up until the 1970s indigenous living in the eastern parts of Paraguay were
completely excluded from the national development projects, and they “…had no recourse at
all to protect themselves from being hunted and massacred” (Hetherington 2011:122). We
may therefore claim that the indigenous peoples of Paraguay have been totally excluded from
the nation building-process during the authoritarian regime, while simultaneously the peasants
were considered the future for the development of the nation. Peasant mobilisation also
occurred because Brazilians and other foreigners were prioritised over Paraguayan
smallholding or landless peasants. Even though the process of foreignisation is not new, it
greatly intensified with the accumulation of land in the border-regions by Brazilian
descendants, and it created a basis for great conflicts (Fogel 2001:52). The LACs were seen as
a threat, and therefore fiercely repressed. Their mobilisation was not facilitated by the state,
and the opportunity structures worsened when the regime realised the potential mobilisation
force of the LACs. This supports our hypotheses that the policies of the state and differing
political opportunity have caused fragmentation in the rural movement due to the fact that
they have been treated differently.
5.1.3 Post-structural

The LACs were inspired by liberation theology, but they became “…increasingly secular, and most of the movement’s leaders eventually left the church altogether” (Hetherington 2011:29). The LACs were political, but without any connection to a political party, so they were autonomous, however, still revolutionary (Telesca 2004:112-113).

The policies of the Stroessner-regime towards the indigenous have been labelled an “ethnocide project”, because the aim was to assimilate the indigenous people into the Paraguayan state (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:83). The reason for this accusation is that the indigenous were forced to refrain from their traditional way of life, which meant losing their culture.

The origin of the LACs is somewhat disputed. Some claim they were established by priests, others that they sprung out of the communist party, or that syndicalist members founded the Ligas. Others claim that they were not established by the peasants alone (Telesca 2004:49). At least there was cooperation with workers’ organisations and youth organisations (Telesca 2004:80-81). The name is even contested; in the archive of terror – the archive that registered the actions, arrests and tortures of citizens by the government – found in 1992, the name Peasant Agrarian Leagues (Ligas Agrarias Campesinas) is used instead of Christian (Cristianas), perhaps to try to make the repression that was documented less frightening. In this way, communist peasants were tortured, and not Christians (Telesca 2004:65).

Until the 1970’s the LACs were mostly a few religious organisations concerned with the liberation of peasants. This is the first phase of the movement (Espinola 2008:135). Jesuit priests supporting the LACs contributed in establishing a theoretical focus, the liberation theology, and the syndicates contributed with their organisational skills. After some time, the LACs concentrated their claims on larger issues than earlier, such as occupation of land and
demonstrations. It was recognised that if they (the LACs) wanted to keep their identity intact it was important to stay united. In addition, they were kept together by a common enemy (Espínola 2008:139). All in all, this period was generally a time of change within the Catholic Church worldwide, for instance through the Second Vatican Council, and the Conference in Medellin –which is often referred to as the period of awareness (Espínola 2008:136-137).

For the Stroessner-regime, the LACs were considered a threat because they were seen as political actors and communists. The LAC-communities on the other hand, developed as a counter-hegemonic force with a distinct ideological, political and moral direction. This manifested itself in the fact that the movement was an interlocutor with the state; the aim of the LACs was to influence the state (Espínola 2008:140-141). The repressions by the government did not completely wipe out peasant mobilisation per se, although the LACs ceased to exist. The effect of exclusion and repression was radicalisation, and many moved towards an orthodox Marxism, as they went underground only to arise towards the end of the regime (Hetherington 2011:83, Riquelme 2003:11).

During the Stroessner-regime the Colorado party had many supporters among peasants, but as the land reform and rhetoric of the regime failed to live up to expectations, many turned against the state. This created a form of solidarity that bound the peasants together, further strengthening their identity (Hetherington 2011:29).

Our hypothesis on identity and ideology assumed that the lack of a shared ideology and identity contributes to fragmentation in the rural movements. This chapter has shown that the peasants during the Stroessner-regime gained an ideological consciousness that the indigenous did not. This lends support to our assumption that there is fragmentation in the rural movements due to different ideologies and identities, and the basis for this was laid under the Stroessner-regime, aided by the regime’s policies of difference.
5.2 Transition towards democracy

This chapter focuses on a general basis on the transition period in terms of the political changes that occurred, and is also supplemented with reflections of the organisations that emerged: OLT, CLIBCh, Tierraviva, CONAMURI and FAPI.

5.2.1 Structural

From 1989, with the coup d’état that produced the fall of the authoritarian regime, a process of recomposición of peasant groups and organisations [began] [Luis Galeano].

The number of land occupations increased just days after the coup against Stroessner, and social movements again started to mobilise, especially peasant movements. During the days of the coup (2. and 3. February 1989), landless peasants occupied plots of land in eastern departments of Paraguay. In 1989 there were 87 conflicts related to land (Riquelme 2003a:12-13). After a period of harsh repression of land occupying peasants in 1990, there were fewer occupations and fewer conflicts in the following years (Nagel 1999). Although hopes were high during the first period of the transition, it soon became visible that the social and political system would remain unchanged with the new political regime. The landowners still remained allied with the state and its government.

After the transition in 1989 the new president Andrés Rodríguez (1989-1993) declared “war” on the land occupants. A law proposition was put forward in 1990, which declared that persons that had engaged in land occupations were not to be considered under the land reform. Redistribution of land was the result of pressure from peasant organisations through occupations, and not through the land reform itself. This lead to a situation where the landless
were criminalised. It is assumed that approximately 434 land conflicts have occurred between 1989 and 1999 (Riquelme 2003:3-4).

One indigenous community that would later form part of the CLIBCh started the process of regaining territory after the transition. Gabriel Fernando Costa recalls the events related to the recovery of land:

The formal struggle, the legal struggle, administrative of the community, started in 1991-1992, and this was because before this we never had the need to title our land and ‘have’ land, because the land was ours. We never needed this, and then we saw the need… …it was important because as time was passing, land was being occupied by others not from the indigneous world: foreigners, Paraguayans…We were living in a place where the land we were on, was appropriated by a foreign company. So…in this time, the opportunity opened so that the indigneous could recover their land[s]. So … we started fighting to recover a part of our territory [Gabriel Fernando Costa, CLIBCh].

The struggle of this community continued after the CLIBCh was established in 1994, and they regained their land in 2011. This may function as an example of the lack of a clear strategy for redistribution in Paraguay. This also serves as an example of the power of the landowners in land-related conflicts. The latifundio-system which is widespread in Latin America, is also present in Paraguay. This system of land structure creates inequality through the latifundio-system, and may result in increased mobilisation. An example of this is the aforementioned community of indigneous leader Costa:

…it this story of struggle, we had in close coordination with the CLIBCh…during all this time that we were fighting for our land, to recover our land, we were victim to two attempts of eviction by the ‘titled owner’ of the land, and we would not have got our land if it was not for the mobilisations we did [Gabriel Fernando Costa, CLIBCh].
One of the most conflictive issues in the rural movements has been the increasing production of soya. Although soya has been produced in Paraguay since the seventies, the production increased significantly during the 1990’s and especially the 2000’s. In the 1970’s there were 150 000 Brazilians in Paraguay, and by the end of the 1990’s the number was 500 000, who soon controlled the eastern departments that border to Brazil (Souchaud 2005:20; Hetherington 2011:61). Soya is mostly cultivated in the Eastern region of Paraguay, and especially the areas bordering on Brazil and Argentina – Alto Paraná, Itapúa and Canindeyú. These three departments only make up 11 per cent of the national territory, but produce 84 per cent of all cultivated soya in the country, and 83 per cent of all agricultural production in Paraguay (Fogel and Riquelme 2005:18-19). Between 55 per cent and 60 per cent of the farms over 1000 hectares in the eastern regions bordering Brazil, are owned by Brazilians or Brasiguayos⁹ (Fogel 2012:13). In 2004, Paraguay was the fourth largest producer in the world with 2 per cent of the total produced (Fogel 2005:37). However, while the soya production and exportation intensified so did the rural poverty. The percentage of rural poor (extreme and non-extreme) in 1995 was 30.3 per cent, and in 2002, this number had risen to 46.4 per cent (Fogel 2001:55). In 2001, 73 mobilisations in relation to land occurred, which was the highest number since the transition year of 1989 (Riquelme 2003b:61). This should be analysed in the context of expanding soya production and increase in rural poverty.

Brazil and the Brazilians are the main producers in the soya-boom, because they have the human and technological resources, as well as the necessary funding. The land is also much cheaper in Paraguay than in Brazil, which represents a great incentive for the Brazilian immigrants. And unlike Brazil, Paraguay has no laws prohibiting foreigners from obtaining land on the frontiers. There is therefore a link between the expansion of soya production and Brazilians, pushing Paraguayan peasants out and creating land and environmental conflicts (Fogel 2005:40-41). Peasant mobilisation is stronger in areas where the production of soya is greater, because it causes more conflicts between the large landowners and the smallholding or landless peasants (Fogel 2005:55; 2005:87-93). An informant from CONAMURI provides her perception of why there is a conflict between Brazilian landowners and smallholding peasants:

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⁹ Brasiguayos are descendents of Brazilians.
They were supported by subsidiaries, cooperatives, all this. They don’t pay taxes… The conflict is not because one is Brazilian, and the other is Paraguayan. The conflict between peasant and landowner is over the model of production. …they have incredible privileges. Extract, extract, extract! And the others [peasants] want a more sustainable model, more respectful to custom, and way of life [Sofía Espíndola, CONAMURI].

The departments of conflict are not only those on the border to Brazil, because as the soya production has expanded, so have the conflicts. The eastern region, including interior departments, is influenced by the Brazilian immigration. There are also some small-, medium- and large landholding Paraguayan elites that are in alliance with the Brazilians (and therefore the Paraguayan state and government) (Albuquerque 2005:151). The main reasons for the conflicts, especially in the frontier regions, may roughly be distinguished into three factors: i) norms established during the two (somewhat simultaneous) dictatorships in Brazil and Paraguay that favoured geopolitical expansion, ii) an absent Paraguayan state in these regions, especially during the 1970s, and iii) the use of nationalist rhetoric by the Paraguayan civil society, especially the peasant movements (Albuquerque 2005:176). This comes to show that the pattern concerning land structures continued during the Stroessner-regime had impact well into the transition period. The latifundio-system prevailed after the fall of the authoritarian regime, creating conflicts and inequality.

The peasants during this period mobilised against the Brazilian expansion, and whereas the Brasiguayos claimed that they were contributing to economic development, Paraguayan peasants disagreed (Alberquerque 2005:150-151). Conflicts over land (including occupation of land) between the peasant movement and landowners are not only directed towards the landowning Brazilians, however, also towards other foreign landowners, as well as Paraguayans, especially those Paraguayan landowners that benefitted from the Stroessner-regime by gaining land illegally, \textit{tierra malhabida}. 
We have seen that the transition period did not substantially change the land structures in Paraguay. The foreignisation-process continued, and expanded with the soya boom in the second half of the transition period. Especially conflicts in the central and eastern regions intensified even further. The differences in land holdings; the accumulation and foreignisation process in the central and eastern parts, and the continuation of the land structures in the Chaco area, where indigenous are struggling to regain land, supports our hypothesis that land structures cause fragmentation in the rural movements.

5.2.2 Institutional

The INDI after 1989 promised that recuperation of land would happen faster, and it seemed that the state was more willing to listen to indigenous problems and concerns and issues. A consultative unit (*Junta Consultiva*) was established, with some representatives from indigenous entities (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:201-202). With support from the Catholic Church, the indigenous mobilised from 1990 to ensure the rights of the indigenous in the new constitution (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:209). In the end, they were included in the convention that was to establish the new constitution, but they were not allowed to vote (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:212). When the new constitution was finalised in 1992, six of the demands of the indigenous were implemented in it (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:216).

The constitution of 1992 declares that the indigenous have certain rights (group rights), for instance a declaration that they are considered the original people of Paraguay, which means that they were there before the State of Paraguay was established. Despite this they are not recognised as the owners of their ancestral territories, which causes further exclusion (Ayala 2005:61-62). Paraguay has also ratified the ILO Convention 169 on indigenous rights (Norad 2011). Despite a promising start, the situation for the indigenous did not improve much, although there was an opening in the state allowing greater representation, and greater mobilisations of indigenous (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:203-204). The transition process after the coup in 1989 to some extent excluded the indigenous, and it was deemed as something that went on “…between Paraguayans and that did not involve the indigenous” (Gaska and Ferreira 2012:201).
The former rhetoric of nationalism and legalism the peasant movements utilised after the transition to legitimise their mobilisations and occupations, turned against them and the peasants were seen as opportunistic, and accused of creating disorder. This was also the discourse of the media. Whereas the media in the beginning supported the peasants, it soon turned against them (Nagel 1999:166-167). By 1992 land occupying peasants “…were depicted as instigators of violence, threatening development and prosperity” (Nagel 1999:171).

Even though different sectors of the social movements mobilised together after the fall of the authoritarian regime, fragmentation soon developed. Due to the lack of spaces for solving conflicts related to land within the state, both conflicts and occupations were met with violence against peasants (Fogel 2006:98). The state neglected to solve social problems (Riquelme 2003a:21). Despite a transition away from authoritarianism, power remained with the Colorados (Richer 2006:60).

During the transition civil society took advantage of the arising opportunity windows for mobilisation, but they were not able to influence or partake in the transition, and they have “…had a more significant influence in defending democratic gains against the forces of authoritarianism than in influencing fundamental policy decisions” (Lambert 2000:394). Others find that the process towards transition to democracy did not produce windows of opportunity for the peasants (Fogel 2001:56). The process was elite-driven, and the latifundistas did not lose their political and social power (Fogel 2001:56). There were 51 115 plots of land given to peasants between 1989 and 1999, but this was due to the state giving in to land occupations, and not as a direct consequence of an implementation of a land reform which is the intention of the IBR (Fogel 2001:56).

One of the most significant mobilisations, and crisis, in Paraguayan history is the Paraguayan March, named after the month it happened (23. – 26. March). It was a reaction to the murder
of the vice-president Luis María Argaña March 23. 1999. The result of these actions was that the president Raúl Cubas was forced to step down due to popular mobilisation when it became clear that the president and general Lino Oviedo were responsible for the murder. They exiled to Brazil and Argentina, respectively (Pozas 2012:23). These events might even be called “…the single most important period of the transition” (Hetherington 2011:51). They marked the beginning of the end for the ruling Colorado party. The mobilisation led to the creation of several new more ideologically oriented political parties, thus creating a “true multi-party-system” (Pozas 2012:23-24). Students initiated the Marzo Paraguayo mobilisations. At this exact time, many peasants were in Asunción to manifest against cotton-prices, and ended up in front of the Congress with the students, and against the oviedistas\textsuperscript{10}. In fact, many peasants supported Lino Oviedo, so more than anything; the Marzo Paraguayo was a victory for the students, although it has been framed a mobilisation success that united different sectors of the civil society (Hetherington 2011:56).

The following government after the deposition of Cubas and Oviedo, led by president Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003-2008), caused a crisis in the Colorado party, and also sparked mobilisation. Opposition forces from left to right, including peasant organisations, mobilised against the president. The Marzo Paraguayo and the presidency of Duarte Frutos were important in reducing the legitimacy of the Colorado party. The government of Duarte Frutos extensively criminalised and repressed social movements, including rural movements (Palau and Ortega 2008:104). Then Lugo emerged, uniting different sectors from the political right to the left. All these were fundamental factors that led to the loss of the Colorado party in the presidential elections in 2008. Because the state and its institutions lacked legitimacy among the people, an outsider like the ex-bishop Lugo represented the Catholic Church, and was therefore seen as incorporating a “moral authority”. In addition, he was able to fill a gap within the Paraguayan society with his charismatic leadership that unified the country (Pozas 2012:25-26).

The state during this period did not recognise that the indigenous have a different identity and different needs than other groups in society, and that they needed spaces of political

\textsuperscript{10} Oviedistas are supporters of the general Lino Oviedo.
representation of their own. This was one of the most central claims of the indigenous: their own spaces or institutions where they can truly articulate their demands and gain representation and participation. Furthermore, there was a contradiction between what the state claimed to be (multicultural and –ethnic) and what it actually was (monocultural and –ethnic). Historically, this has led to the state to deny the indigenous participation. One of the reasons for the tensions between indigenous and other groups in society was caused by this policy of the state, which affects the interaction between the different groups in society (Ayala 2005:60). This difference is explained by an informant from FAPI:

There are judicial differences between the indigenous and other peasants. One group is a people, and the others are inhabitants. They are two legally different peoples. There are different nations [Mirta Pereira, FAPI].

We can conclude that the transition brought some changes such as increased individual freedom and freedom of press, as well as free and fair elections. However, at the same time many things remained the same, such as the close ties between politics and the military, and the strong continuation of the Colorado party and its elites (Lambert 2000:394). Judging by the number of conflicts, not much changed between 1989 and 1999, and the conflicts were mainly situated in the areas of “colonisation and modernisation”, that is the eastern region (Riquelme 2003a:13). It has been claimed that the expansion of the Brazilian soya producers undermines Paraguayan national institutions because they control increasing amounts of land (Fogel 2005:93). They are accused of “…transplanting their institutions, their norms and their national power” (Fogel 2005:95). This causes a situation where the border departments are controlled by, and often from Brazil, and the Paraguayan state loses its sovereignty because it cannot exercise control over its own territory (Viladesau 2012:50). The frontier is economically and politically subordinated neighbouring Brazil (Fogel 2005:95-97).

Pressure from below through mobilisation and land occupation forced land redistribution, as the institutions designated to these tasks were unable to lead a well-institutionalised distribution. It seems that redistribution of land to indigenous and other peasants remained
almost arbitrary. There was less repression in this period, and there was greater political opportunity, and there were more mobilisations than during the previous regime. Crisis within the ruling party and divided elites contributed to creating opportunity for movements to mobilise. The policies of the state continued to disfavour peasants and indigenous in land redistribution, which became even more evident with the soya boom that escalated during the late 1990’s and 2000’s, which was especially evident in the central and eastern regions of the country, where the Brazilians and Brasiguayos were given privileges over Paraguayan peasants. Even though the constitution makes special claims to rights of indigenous, and can even be considered one of the most progressive constitutions of Latin America, the state does not comply (Norad 2011). This offers support to our hypothesis that the policies of the state contributed to a fragmentation in the rural movements, through a continuation of the policies of difference that we found under the Stroessner-regime.

5.2.3 Post-structural

As we have seen, under the Stroessner-regime, the poor and the peasants were incorporated into a clientilistic state, and the peasants were told that they embodied the future of the nation. During this period peasants could not openly criticise the regime or the ruling Colorado party. The peasants used the nationalist rhetoric and symbols of the earlier regime, because in this way, their claims for land were in opposition to foreign landowners, and therefore not a direct critique against the policies of the state, which favoured the foreign landowners. This also meant that the claims for land and occupations were not class-based, because this would have been interpreted as communist (Nagel 1999:157).

Peasants continued using the old rhetoric of the previous regime, which they had incorporated, and portrayed themselves as the bearers of the nation and the future (Hetherington 2011:14). However, after the transition, peasants were increasingly regarded as a backward group. This led to a conflict between peasants and a new societal group that may be labelled the ‘new democrats’ (Hetherington 2011:26). These new democrats emerged after the transition, and many of them are urban and educated people, in strong opposition to the former regime. They are teachers and professors, or they work in media and NGO’s. What
binds them together is that they view peasants as traditional, and therefore irreconcilable with modernity and democracy.

In 2002 a national census estimated that 1.7 per cent of the population were indigenous (which is close to 90 000 people) (Ayala 2005:62). The indigenous have often been excluded in studies on social forces (Ayala 2005:57). They were also excluded from the political and social arenas of society, however they have managed to arise as actors with their own identity. The difference in ethnicity is one of the reasons for this lack of common identity, as expressed by this interviewee from CONAMURI:

…a person from the peasantry…a peasant woman for example, and an indigenous woman,… they both ethnically are descendants from guaranies\textsuperscript{11}, but one of them identifies as indigenous, and the other doesn’t, but believes she is mestiza\textsuperscript{12}, for example. And this mestizaje is not so much biological, but rather politico-ideological, I think [Sofía Espíndola Oviedo, CONAMURI].

The organisation of indigenous in Paraguay is situated around the leaders of communities. These leaders are seen as spokespersons for their respective communities, although this has been seen as a backward model of organisation that belongs to the past, like they are chiefs of their tribes and its members are ignorant. This way of organisation amidst indigenous is different from other places in Latin America, especially in the altiplano, where organisation is more hierarchical. The organisation of the indigenous in Paraguay can be labelled minimalist, where such hierarchical structure does not exist (Ayala 2005:65). The meaning of minimalist refers to their non-rigid structure of organisation, which some claim is one of the reasons they mobilised at a later stage than other groups in civil society. In addition, the indigenous organisations are generally much less ideological than peasant organisations.

\textsuperscript{11} An indigenous people
\textsuperscript{12} Mestizos are of joint indigenous and European descendant.
The indigenous communities have recognised the need to strengthen their organisations, which has led to the intermediary, communitarian and regional organisation. Many new organisations have been established, but not many have lasted. Two of the most relevant are CLIBCh and FAPI, because they have been able to voice the claims of the indigenous. The Presidente Hayes-department is one of the most conflictive regions for the indigenous in Paraguay, and this is where the communities that make up the CLIBCh are situated (Ayala 2005:66). The indigenous have in recent years attained a stronger identity, a stronger consciousness surrounding the notion of being indigenous. In light of this, some indigenous movements have emerged that are more political, and also more ideological, and working to gain political influence by aligning with political parties in elections (Ayala 2005:67-68). Yet, the electoral channels are perhaps not sufficient for the indigenous to gain political influence, seeing as they are too few to make an electoral impact. The indigenous need to form alliances with other non-indigenous groups to gain real representation (Ayala 2005:69). One informant from Tierraviva reflects on other reasons why indigenous organisation is relatively weaker:

…one reason [for the weak indigenous organisations] is demographic. They are around 130 000/140 000…Electorally, they are not important, they do not pose a sector of interest for the political parties…only about half [of the indigenous population] are registered voters….they can be important in local elections, but not in general [national] elections. This is why they are not prioritised in national politics [Oscar Ayala, Tierraviva].

Oscar Ayala claims that it is exactly the notion of ethnicity that demarcates the indigenous organisations from other organisations, and which defines their own separate identity (Ayala 2005:67). This identity of ethnicity is shaped by “…sociocultural factors, symbolic, common norms, patterns of behaviour, language, social organisation, historical tradition, among others…” [author’s translation] (Ayala 2005:67).

During the colonial period, the notion of ‘indigenous’ was used to differentiate between the colonised and the coloniser. The indigenous were deemed to be different in culture and ethnicity, whereas the peasants were fighting against being different (Hetherington
This means that while peasants have struggled to gain full citizenship and participation by claiming that they are not different, indigenous groups have used this difference to make claims to individual and groups rights. Although there are peasants who are indigenous, and vice versa, the concepts are clearly separated, and being peasant most often means not being of indigenous descent (Hetherington 2009:237). Even though persons may identify with, and even use, both concepts, “…the labels mark different political modes which rarely overlap” (Hetherington 2011:100). The exclusion of indigenous has been very articulated, while the exclusion of peasants has been less so. This also leads to a situation where peasants are not prone to fight for indigenous rights (Hetherington 2011:101). Concerning our theoretical framework and hypothesis, it is clear that the lack of a strong collective identity causes fragmentation in the rural movements.

Being a peasant in Paraguay means identifying with the struggle for land that has been going on since the 1960s (Hetherington 2011:2). An informant from CONAMURI expresses that peasant identity is therefore more closely bound up with ideology, history and class, rather than ethnicity:

But I think that before, there was more political influence in the peasant struggle, a strong influence by a Marxist political ideology… And the process of organisation in the indigenous communities is more respectful of their ancestral norms, the caring for the environment, the spirituality… and a social class relation, which I think is different [Sofía Espíndola Oviedo, CONAMURI].

Hetherington (2011) claims that the transition project has pitted two groups against each other: the peasants and the ‘new democrats’ (Hetherington 2011:26). However, it has also intensified the differences between indigenous and peasants. So in fact, three groups have been pitted against one another. The indigenous have been excluded from the national development projects of the authoritarian regime, and the transition period, and the peasants have “lost” the little support they had under the Stroessner-regime. The policies and actions of the state during the transition period has led to a deepening of the fragmentation in the rural movements in the sense that it has further contributed to the lack of common ideology and
identity. The peasant mobilisations were soon after the transition criminalised, and the rhetoric surrounding this sector soon presented them as obstacles to modernity and democracy. Indigenous were incorporated in the new constitution drafted three years after the transition, thus seemingly strengthening their identity, although this “progressive constitution” does not seem to have lived up to its contents.

5.3 Consolidation of democracy

This chapter focuses on a general basis on the consolidation period in terms of the changes that occurred, and is also supplemented by reflections of, and on, the organisations: OLT, CLIBCh, Tierraviva, CONAMURI, FAPI and the Carperos.

5.3.1 Structural

Lugo was elected on a promise to implement a land reform, and peasant organisations started to occupy land when it became known that he had won the presidential election. It soon became clear that the new government did not have a plan for how to implement this reform. Towards the end of 2008, conflicts between peasants and soya-producers intensified, and OLT occupied territory in three places in 2009. Peasant organisations in general mobilised and demonstrated all over the country. Yet, the INDERT bought around 4500 hectares in 2008, and nearly 32 000 hectares in 2009, which is a significant increase in land distributed (DCP-Py 2010).

The indigenous in the Chaco area had problems regaining their land due to a state that is unable to fulfil its duties and promises as a state. It seems that land, ancestral or through the landreform, continues to be acquired through mobilisation and occupation and not as a consequence of the institutionalised policies of the state or its institutions, as expressed by an informant from CLIBCh:
I remember that we did several demonstrations accompanied by the CLIBCh...in 2011 [the state] returned our land[s]...in July 2011 we recovered our land. But the rescue was the accompaniment that we had from the organisations, and above all, the form of struggle we carried out to recover our land. It was not something spontaneous on the part of the state, it was the mobilisations, the claims, the campaign included... we feel that we are no longer landless [Gabriel Fernando Costa, CLIBCh].

The state does not comply with rulings in international courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that establishes indigneous ownership to land Many communities have therefore been forced to take on a more activist line in their mobilisations. This includes occupation of land according to one interviewee from CLIBCh:

The community is turned into a source of cheap labour for the ranchers. But also, they use the strategy of not giving us work...to discourage the struggle...we have used all the peaceful methods, and we have everything in our favour, we have the law in our favour, we have an international sentence in our favour, we have a sentence ... from a supranational organ.

We saw that there was no other way, if not the reoccupation of land, the community has already decided to reoccupy the land...we have lost hope...that the state can comply with the community, and with the indigneous in general. There are other similar cases, that have experienced the same...we have communicated with other communities, with other indigneous organisations... [Carlos, CLIBCh].

Attempts were made to balance the unequal land structures during the Lugo government. Most movements, especially indigenous, claim that this was mere rhetoric without results. There was seemingly an even greater emphasis on debates of land reform and peasant participation than redistribution of indigenous land and indigenous participation. According to our hypothesis surrounding land structures, this can support the claim that the fragmentation in the rural movements were upheld during the government of Lugo due to a continued uneven land holdings system.
5.3.2 Institutional

Most Paraguayans considered the election of Lugo the country’s consolidation of democracy. That the APC were able to win the presidency signified a rupture with the old regime. There was a change in the composition of actors, and new issues were brought to the fore (Carreras 2012:67). However, an informant claims that the anticipated changes were only a rhetoric, or discourse, on behalf of Lugo:

What Lugo did, was [have] a language more favourable to the peasants and indigenous. A language. But it never materialised. But, this language bothered the oligarchy, a president who spoke to peasants and indigenous… [Ramón Fogel].

Lugo was elected on a broad popular basis, and much of the reason for his victory was support from social movements. At the same time, the social movements were not unified continuously. Right after the election of Lugo, the number of land occupations intensified. It seems that the peasants were the most eager to mobilise after it was known that Lugo won, and they were able to overcome their internal fragmentation (Palau and Ortega 2008:110). Spaces of representation were created to present proposals to the new government, like the Social and Popular Front (*Frente Social y Popular*). Several peasant organisations participated, but no indigenous organisations did (Palau and Ortega 2008:108-109). Many indigenous also experienced this difference, although it soon became clear that Lugo was almost powerless in opposition to the conservative majority in the parliament. An interviewee from CLIBCh reflects on why there were no substantial changes during the Lugo government:

There was definitely a great debate, and more attention, and we were given more participation, or the indigenous people were more listened to. But substantially, there were no changes, because the change needs to come with not only the president, but also the parliament, and the other powers…The parliamentaries during the Lugo period were conservative, and they did not
respond to the line of Lugo, and they were not preoccupied with social problems, like the
problems of the peasants [Carlos, CLIBCh].

The government of Lugo invested in gradually generating free health services, and generally
increased the public investments between 2008 and 2010 (Pozas 2012:31). Lugo launched a
democratic debate in 2008, calling for a deepening of democracy with a focus on more
participative democracy. However, this discourse was opposed by the parliament and the
conservative media (Pozas 2012:34). Many discovered that the election of Lugo brought few
changes, as expressed by many of the interviewees. One informant from CLIBCh provides his
opinion as to why the government of Lugo was unable to create changes in public politics:

Without the support from parliament for the public politics that he [Lugo] wanted to carry out,
were no good, and this is what happened to Lugo. It is true that the indigenous were more
listened to, but substantially there was no change, a significant one that in the future could
install a practice [Carlos, CLIBCh].

After Lugo was elected, criminalisation of the social sectors continued, as evictions and
arrests of peasants carried on. An anti-terrorism law was approved in 2010, which further
accentuated this prolongation of criminalisation. The analysis of many peasant movements is
that this all contributed to a demobilisation of the peasant organisations (DCP-Py 2010).

The policies of the state regarding land distribution for indigenous did not change
substantially, the INDI also remained more or less the same (Quiroga 2012:86). FAPI and
Tierraviva are among the organisations that reflected upon the role of INDI, which they claim
is insufficient:

With the election of Lugo in 2008, the indigenous put forward a proposal, that the INDI needed
to stop being a simple institution … and become more specialised, and become a ministry. [But]
there were never any changes! It was only a proposal, and there were no substantial changes in the INDI. It’s objective and technical capacity has been the same the last thirty years [Mirta Pereira, FAPI].

There have been attempts at consultations in INDI. In 2011 when INDI was making a prioritisation of land…they arranged a meeting, planned…this was an attempt of consultation. There have other attempts, but these can’t be called consultations [Ireneo Tellez, Tierraviva].

An interviewee from CLIBCh expresses an example of lack of representation on behalf of indigenous and their communities. His example shows that the state does not seem to take indigenous views and claims into consideration:

An example of the lack of this participation, real interlocution towards the state is exactly, precisely, the fact that we brought the case to an international organ. Because here, there is no mechanism to resolve the land conflict. The one who decides if he wants to sell the land, is the rancher. The state, it’s not the state, the state renounces its sovereignty in favour of the rancher. Not in favour of the indigneous, when it should have been the other way around. Because here, the one who pressures is not the state, it is the one that has the land of the indigneous, which in many cases is tierra malhabida as well, it is land that we don’t know how they got. It is land that has an almost illicit history, of eviction…one of the principal responsables is the parliament, which is the political power por excelencia in the division of power in the Paraguayan state, it is very acquiescent to what the ranchers want, or other groups in power…it should be the other way around [Carlos, CLIBCh].

The fall of Lugo

After the parliamentary impeachment of Lugo in 2012, many organisations claim that the situation turned to the worse. The advances and the limited representation under Lugo soon
faded away. An interviewee from CLIBCh provides his opinion on this matter, claiming that both the state and the people were influenced by this coup in a negative manner:

After the fall of Lugo, there was much recession….In all the international organs that they had participation [the state] like Mercosur, Celac. And many other politico-economic spaces, they were expelled. This was negative not only for the indigenous, but for everyone…The state has no fear…The process that was created during Lugo, there has been a rupture in this process…With Lugo there was a process of conversation, dialog, and there were created tripartite tables, it was also the first time that we talked with the [land]owner. And then there was a rupture. Everyone now has to start again, from zero, in this moment. After this there was a recession, there was a lack of an interventionist politics [by the INDI], in the communities, for instance when in came to droughts [Carlos, CLIBCh].

The rupture that was sparked by the impeachment of Lugo in 2012 also continues to delay legalisation or titling of indigenous land. Indigenous leaders from CLIBCh express their opinions on this matter, claiming that neither during Lugo nor the government that followed, were they able to claim the land that has been established as lawfully theirs.

We believed that, with a specific obligation, against the state in the moment of the release of the sentence from the interamerican court, we believed that we were going to get more possibilities, but this is not what happened, we see that there is much deterioration….Because of a lack of an integral attention to the indigenous community [Carlos, CLIBCh].

To end this process we lacked the last step, which is the title…The Indi needs to deliver [this] to the community, and as long as this does not succeed, we are not going to feel completely secure [Gabriel Fernando Costa, CLIBCh].

These serve as examples of the inability of the state to carry out their policies, and to sufficiently give the indigenous participation and representation. In the end, public institutions are not trusted, as expressed by an interviewee from CONAMURI:
There is no clear politics for health services, education...The institutions of the state have no credibility in the countryside [Sofia Espíndola Oviedo, CONAMURI].

After 2008, there were not many fundamental changes, but the indigenous issues were put up for debate. There was limited participation for this sector, combined with a politics of assistentialism (asistencialismo). After the fall of Lugo, there have not been any advances, only setbacks (Quiroga 2012:85-86). Peasants have occupied indigenous land, and this problem worsened after the Curguaty massacre in 2012. There was a conflict between peasants and indigenous after the coup in 2012, where Indert promised to buy land to the peasants, but some of this land was inhabited by an indigenous community (Quiroga 2012:90). Lugo promised much, but did not keep many of them, at least in relation to the land issues. His dismissal “did not create big reactions...in the indigenous communities” (Quiroga 2012:86). This has contributed to upholding the fragmentation in the rural movements in Paraguay.

**New forms of struggle**

Los Carperos emerged as a sort of ad-hoc peasant organisation around 2009-2010. They use different strategies that the old peasant organisations, and the organisational structure is less hierarchical. The Carperos claim that the reason they emerged is because the ‘traditional’ peasant organisations did not want to upset the Lugo-government. The Carperos were unsatisfied with the government, and found that the traditional peasant organisations had been somewhat co-opted by the state. They therefore saw a need to create a new organisation of peasants, towards the end of Lugo’s government (Fogel 2012:15-16). Their main goal is to gain land, but also to reform the agricultural model of production and exportation (Fogel 2012:25). But they have had internal problems with the leaders of the organisation and diverging views of what measures to use: some are more radical than others (Fogel 2012:18). It is assumed that they have around 50 000 adherents (Fogel 2012:16).

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13 Asistencialismo is very present in the political discourse in Latin America. It refers to the fact that governments use welfare programs and hand-outs directed at the poor.
This was one of the great problems of Lugo. He did not know how to handle this relation [between peasants/organisations and the state]. He co-opted peasant organisations, prevented force/strength/pressure [fuerza]…a new thing emerged – the Carperos. Los Carperos…mobilised more…More capacity to claim as well. More potential, basically [Ramón Fogel].

They [the Carperos] will be co-opted by the new government. They have already been co-opted by the coup-makers [golpistas]. They offer them something…They don’t have a future without a relation to the government, the opposite from under Lugo. With Lugo, those who were allies were the traditional organisations, the Carperos were distanced. They [the Carperos] have more capacity to negotiate now [Ramón Fogel].

Others are sceptic towards the Carperos; Makina Paredes lives next to the area where the conflict (and massacre) happened in June 2012 that led to the deposition of Lugo. She lost two brothers in the confrontation between the peasants and the police. Her scepticism displays the fragmentation in the rural movements:

They are ‘other people’ that weren’t here before. After the massacre, they arrived. I think that they are taking advantage of [the situation] because here, people were killed, and they have to respect that [Makina Paredes].

Other organisations also express a certain apprehension in relation to the Carperos, as for instance this interviewee from CONAMURI:

Los Carperos are very different from peasants in their methods. They are not as consolidated as the old organisations. They have no history, and they are more spontaneous. They use the media [juegan a un mediatismo]. They have a discourse that is very…directed towards that this can be solved through violence…from what I’ve heard [Sofia Espíndola Oviedo, CONAMURI].
As we have seen in relation to land, the policies of the state remained unequally distributed among indigenous and other peasants under the government of Lugo as well. A lack of implementation of rulings in international human rights courts, has led to frustration towards the state and its institutions in many indigenous communities. The apparent lack of inclusion of indigenous during the Lugo government supports our hypothesis that the policies of the state cause fragmentation in the rural movement. The policies of the state and the government of Lugo in general seemed to benefit peasants to a greater degree, which led to peasants being seemingly more positive towards Lugo, while many indigenous more were sceptic. The emergence of the Carperos, a group of landless peasants, also accentuate this fragmentation.

5.3.3 Post-structural

The perception of land differs between indigenous and other peasants. The OLT wishes this to be specified in a land reform.

For us it’s a space for production and reproduction. For them it’s life itself…Peasants gain a plot of land, and the indigenous gain a territory. This needs to be integrated in the land reform. These are the claims we have suggested [Lidia Ruiz, OLT].

The mobilisation by indigenous organisations seems to have risen since the transition period. There are indications that perhaps the indigenous are gaining a stronger identity, and stronger organisations. One example of this is FAPI, which is a relatively recent organisation that works nationally with indigenous as an “umbrella organisation”.

At the same time, the Carperos arose during the Lugo government, and even though there is no open conflict between them and the traditional peasant organisations, there is still scepticism both ways. The traditional organisations accuse the Carperos for not being clear on what they wish to achieve, and how. The Carperos on the other hand claim the traditional
organisations were co-opted by the Lugo government. The Carperos do have a different ideology and identity-perspective.

Although there has been a rapprochement between peasants and indigenous, there is still a rather strong divide between these two sectors, and racism towards indigenous is still widespread (Hetherington 2011:102).

The policies of the state during the Lugo government have further deepened the fragmentation in the rural movements in relation to ideology and identity. That not all sectors of the peasantry felt included under this government, led to the emergence of the Carperos. They seem to be characterised by arbitrariness in relation to organisation structure, and a seemingly less accentuation on ideology. The indigenous appear to have acquired a deeper sense of identity and ideology in the last years, including stronger organisations. The government continued to accentuate the differences between the indigenous and other peasants, thus contributing to further fragmentation.
6 Discussion of research hypotheses

We started out by posing the research question: *how can we explain the relative weakness of the rural movements in Paraguay?* Then we presented the main hypothesis, which stated that, a fragmentation in the rural movements lead to what seems like relatively weaker rural movements in Paraguay. Further, an assumption was based on the theoretical and empirical expectations:

*The fragmentation in the rural movements in Paraguay can be explained by differences in land structures, which is further enhanced by the differentiating policies of the state and differences in ideology and perception of identity, and this fragmentation leads to weaker rural movements.*

It is clear that land structures cause grave conflicts in Paraguay. The latifundio-system was continued under the Stroessner-regime, where the notion of *tierra malhabida* arose. During the transition period there was a strong criminalisation of the rural movements, and in the second half of this period the soya-boom and Brazilian immigration escalated. Whereas peasant mobilisation for land in central and eastern Paraguay has a relatively long history, indigenous mobilisation is more recent, and only the last 10-15 years becoming has it become more present on the national arena. The reason for this seems to be that there is a greater land concentration in the soya-regions bordering Brazil. Many peasants are left without land, and without work, as the soya production is intense and technologically advanced, and therefore does not need much manual labour. The conflicts in the central and eastern parts of the country are more numerous and also more violent. In addition, peasants in the eastern and central regions of the country have occupied indigenous land, thus pushing this sector out. In the Chaco area, indigenous have struggled with unresponsive state institutions and large landowners, but the land disputes have often been transferred to supra-international organs, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. There were small changes under Lugo, and according to many, almost insignificant. He was unable to carry out what the rural
population anticipated the most – a land reform. All these factors indicate reasons for the fragmentation in the rural movement.

During the Stroessner-regime, the policies of the state excluded indigenous, and to a somewhat larger degree included other peasants through the land reform and national rhetoric. Because it was an authoritarian and repressive regime where the civil society was oppressed, there was not much opportunity for rural movements to mobilise. Especially the indigenous peoples were oppressed, and they were excluded from national development projects. Indigenous organised very little, as the repression and exclusion of this group from society was fiercer. The transition period led to opportunity windows for both indigenous and other peasants. Peasant organisation had previous experience and used the nationalist rhetoric of the former regime in order to gain support and to justify their land occupations. Indigenous groups and communities were starting to organise themselves, and organisations emerged during the 1990’s. The second part of the transition period was marked by instability. The Marzo Paraguayo, internal divisions in the Colorado party and lack of legitimacy among the people characterised this period. The opposition was completely excluded during the transition process, and they remained marginalised until Lugo was elected in 2008. In this scenario of exclusion, opposition forces, left-parties and social movements were unable to grow and gain strength as an oppositional force able to challenge the Colorado-hegemony. The conservative parties (especially the Colorado party) are very strong, and the Left is weak and fragmented.

The state has institutionalised representation through the Indert and Indi, but this representation is very limited. Most indigenous and other peasants do not achieve the representation they want or need through these institutions, so they use other methods. They occupy territory and block roads, and the state answers with repression and a criminalisation of the social sectors. In addition, Brazilian immigrants are given perks by the state, and they have economic and political power. This is seen as a threat to national sovereignty.
Policies towards peasants have been more accommodating than what they have been towards the indigenous, where politics has been centred on assistencialism. This has led to a greater marginalisation of the indigenous in the Chaco area than of the peasants in central and eastern Paraguay. The state has not presented many channels of representation, except for some brief openings right after the transition towards democracy in 1989 when the conflict level and land occupations rose, and some attempts at inclusion and representation under Lugo. The land conflicts intensified after the election of Lugo, perhaps the rural movements saw a window of opportunity. The indigenous organisations in this study concur on the fact that although there was rhetoric of inclusion and a general debate on indigenous issues, there were few substantial and lasting measures. These indications point towards a reason for the fragmentation in the movements because of the differentiating policies the state exercised towards the rural movements.

When the LACs emerged, it was with support from the church inspired by liberation theology. After the repression of the LACs, peasant organisation went underground and returned during the last years of the authoritarian regime, and they had become more radicalised and Marxist. Peasants in the oriental region are therefore more ideologically oriented, towards Marxism. Indigenous in the Chaco are not so much involved in national and Marxist, left-wing policies. Peasants in the central and eastern regions have identified themselves as the future of the nation under Stroessner, and separate from the indigenous in Chaco. The marginalisation of the indigenous has led them to form an identity apart that is not reconcilable with the peasant identity in the oriental Paraguay. The recent emergence of the Carperos has contributed to a further fragmentation in the rural movements. They have a different structure of organisation and are less ideologically oriented.

Today, there are some examples of an overcoming of the fragmentation, like CONAMURI. But there is still fragmentation in the rural movements, mostly due to structural reasons (foreignisation and soya boom in the central and eastern parts) and identity (diverging identities and ideology). The emergence of the Carperos accentuates the differences between the peasant organisations. This fragmentation in the Paraguayan rural movement leads to a
relative weakness because, in many cases, it seems they are also struggling against each other, for instance when peasants occupy indigenous land.

This discussion lends support to our hypothesis that the land structures, further enhanced by the differentiating policies of the state and differences in ideology and identity do affect the fragmentation in the rural movements. The result of this fragmentation is an apparent weakness. Weak social movements can be a democratic deficit-problem, as marginalised sectors of society run the risk of remaining underrepresented or unrepresented. Weak social movements are also not able to challenge the policies and performance of the state. There is a possibility that the fragmentation and weakness are also due to continuous repression and criminalisation of the social sectors by the state. If social movements are consistently prosecuted and always in opposition to the state, this may demobilise movements as there is little opportunity structure for mobilisation. Yet, it seems that this exclusion has also radicalised many organisations in Paraguay. However, we have seen that under the government of Lugo, movements were demobilised, and some claim co-opted by the state, which led to the emergence of a new peasant organisation. And during the consolidation period of 2008-2012, the movements were not able to challenge the state sufficiently so as to push for reforms, such as a land reform, as we have seen in countries of the “pink tide”.

6.1 Evaluation of the theoretical framework

Explaining mobilisation in the light of structuralism, peasants are understood as class-conscious. If there is aggravation, this should cause rebellion, or even revolution. This means that “unsatisfied” peasants “should” revolt. This view is class-based, and indigenous, according to this view, do not constitute a class, and cannot be expected to mobilise. According to a structural view, social movements become less autonomous and less prone to mobilisations under progressive governments. This premise is only present in our last case, the consolidation period 2008 – 2012.
According to a structural class-perspective, peasants and indigenous are completely different sectors because the indigenous do not form a social class, like the peasants (cf. Touraine). Therefore, the indigenous are not as prone to large mobilisations or strong organisation on the national level. But, the NSM-research of the 1980’s showed us that indigenous do in fact mobilise. Examples like Bolivia and Ecuador demonstrate that they can make an impact on the national level, and the example of Mexico shows us that they are able to build strong and autonomous organisations. In addition, they are often in alliance with other actors, such as peasants. In relation to autonomy, some organisations in Latin America, like the MST in Brazil, are supported by a political party. But others, like the Zapatistas, remain autonomous from organised politics. In Paraguay, the rural movements today are quite autonomous. Although some organisations supported Lugo, there was never a direct and lasting link between a unified rural movement and the APC. Many claim that they wish to remain autonomous. If we analyse the empirical material in light of the theoretical framework, structural reasons such as class conflicts and the land situation does affect the degree of rural mobilisation in Paraguay, although this mobilisation perspective is not a sufficient explanation.

If political opportunity is present, then movements have a chance of gaining access to the state and influence in politics. This opportunity is a result of certain factors: political alignments, elites, allies in the political system, and the degree of repression or facilitation. According to this view, POS should not be very present in the first time period, and therefore we should expect to see fewer mobilisations, according to theory. The level of suppression should be higher than the degree of facilitation. In the second and the third time, we might expect more mobilisations if there is less repression, instable political alignments, divided elites and, if the movements have political allies. We have seen that the opportunity structures are limited, and there is a degree of repression and criminalisation. In addition, there are few allies in the political system.

According to a post-structural perspective, identity is an important part of social movements. Collective identity can unify a social movement. The rural movements in Paraguay do not have a strong collective identity. The indigenous in the central and eastern Paraguay work
with other peasants, such as in CONAMURI, yet the indigenous in Chaco are very separated from the peasants in the eastern and central regions. This lack of identity inhibits their collective mobilisation.

6.2 Consequences for democracy

Before the parliamentary impeachment of Fernando Lugo on 22 June 2012, it was interpreted that democracy was slowly being consolidated in Paraguay, although the state was assumed to be of weak democratic quality (Pozas 2012). Diego Abente Brun (2012) argues that the level of democracy in Paraguay is weak due to a weak state (“an absent state”), where it is unable to perform its functions, and where civil society is inadequately represented in the state (Brun 2012:44). However, there was more participation, and civil and political rights were improved (Carreras 2012:80). Paraguayan NGOs and academics have condemned the acts that led to this deposition. In the introduction, the “pink tide” of Latin America was outlined. With the election of the centre-left president Fernando Lugo, hopes were high concerning the realisation of a more representative and participatory democracy. With the events in June 2012, along with the elections spring 2013 where the Colorado party assumed presidential political power and a majority in parliament, it is clearer than ever that this tide has yet to reach Paraguay. According to the organisations studied, there has been a democratic deterioration since June 2012. Adding to this is the weakness and fragmentation in the political opposition (Riquelme 2005:55-56). This weakness could be interpreted as a problem of democratic deficit. The findings in this study have revealed that there is a fragmentation in the rural movements, caused by land structures, differentiating state policies and difference in ideology. This fragmentation gives weak rural movements, which can be a democratic problem. If this fragmentation continues, it can mean that unified social movements will not be part of the democratic consolidation of strengthening democracy and influencing decision-making and challenging the power of the state. The conclusion is that the movements voice their claims, but they are not heard: representation and participation seems to be limited in Paraguay today.
7 Concluding remarks

Returning to the research question of this study, we can understand the relative weakness of the rural movements in Paraguay, by way of fragmentation. By analysing the rural movements in Paraguay over time, we have found that there is a fragmentation in the rural movements. This is supported by the fact that the different groups within the movement are not able to mobilise together. Yet, we can see signs that this fragmentation can be overcome, through the example of CONAMURI. The reasons why the indigenous and other peasants mobilise are due to questions about land: structural reasons. Yet, structural reasons alone do not explain this fragmentation. The fragmentation in the rural movements is also due to the differentiating policies of the state, enhanced by differences in ideology. The foundations for this fragmentation were laid during three time periods lined out in the analysis: i) the Stroessner-regime (1954-1989), ii) the transition period (1989-2008), and iii) the period of consolidation (2008-2012). This fragmentation can have implications for the consolidation of democracy in Paraguay.

7.1 The road ahead

Seeing as this is an exploratory study, it seems natural that the next step should be to examine the hypotheses further. One way to do this is to use a different research strategy to explore the research question and the hypotheses. Seeing as the case of rural movements in Paraguay is a case of rural movements in the developing world, a comparison to other Latin American countries could provide us with a deeper knowledge on this topic. A comparison with Honduras, a country that is in some respects similar to Paraguay, could be especially fruitful. This could potentially provide us with a deeper knowledge on fragmentation in rural movements, and its effects on democracy.
Bibliography


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## Annex 1: Table of interviewees

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Time and place</th>
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<tr>
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<td>CLIBCh</td>
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<td>Henryk Gaska</td>
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Annex 2: Interview guide

Facesheet information

• Name of organisation
• Name of person
• Age
• Gender

Specific information

• What position do you hold within the organisation?
• Number of years employed/associated with the organisation?

About the organisation

• When was the organisation founded?
• How many employees/ how many work there?
• Tell me about the work of the organisation
• Tell me what you see as their vision
• What other organisations are working on similar issues?
• Do you cooperate with other organisations?
• How is the organisation financed?
• Is this organisation similar to other types of organisations working on the land issue?
• Do you identify with other organisations?

The land conflict

• Tell me about the land conflict as you see it
• Do you see it as an organised movement?
• Who are the actors in the land conflict?
• Tell me about the indigenous and the campesino struggle for land, and
does it differ from one another?

Relation to political party/ party alliance

• Are you, or have you at any point been, in alliance with, or supported by political parties?

Relation to the state

• …or with state institutions?
• How do you see the role of the state in the land conflict?

”Changes”

• Have there been any changes within the organisation?
• Have there been any changes in the land conflict?
• …were there any changes during the government of Lugo?
• What events led to these junctures?
• Have your views on the land issue changed over these years/since you started working here?
• What do think will happen after the elections this spring?
• Where do you see the future for the organisation?
• Will there be any changes after the presidential election?
• Do you think there are any chances of a new land reform?
• Any channels of representation or consultation at the communal, regional, or national level?
• With what means do you work to confront the land issue/ the state/ the landowners? Legal means (Constitution, ILO-convention, Estatuto Agrario…), or other?