Fixing a ‘failed’ State

Actors’ security perspectives and the challenges of achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia

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Master Thesis in Political Science
Department of Political Science
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Spring 2013
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Me and my clan against the world
Me and my family against my clan
Me and my brother against my family
Me against my brother

Somali proverb (quoted in Harper 2012:11)
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Fixing a ‘failed’ state: actors’ security perspectives
and the challenges of achieving a coherent international policy

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Abstract

Somalia is a war-torn country which has been perceived as a security problem threatening not only the security of its own population, but also regional and international security. This thesis studies five international actors and their engagement in Somalia. Their perspectives on security are explored and the coherence in their policies is discussed. The actors chosen for the study are the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the United States, the European Union (EU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The thesis argues that actors’ security perspectives are similar. To a large extent, they pursue the same goals inside Somalia, they give significance to the employment of the same measures, and in this process they secure the same referent objects. Actors are united in their support to institution building, and their policies seem centred on securing the state. However, in spite of having similar perspectives, they do not seem able to develop coherent policies. This is especially evident when looking at the AU and UN strategic reviews which both reflect on future missions in Somalia without coming up with a joint suggestion for the future, or a solution to current challenges for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). One important reason for this is that actors’ self-interests prove decisive when burdens are to be shared. Although numerous coordinating bodies have been established, actors are unsatisfied with the results. From a more critical perspective, it is also possible to argue that coherence will be lacking as long as the Somalis are not provided with sufficient ‘local ownership’.

The thesis uses theory from security studies as a basis for posing the research question. When exploring the answer I draw upon various theories which can inform the study; theory on state building, peace building and theory of change. To answer the research question, key informants were interviewed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in Nairobi, Kenya. Literature, in the form of official documents, mission descriptions, news articles and former research, has also been consulted to triangulate the data collected during fieldwork.
Preface

The Somali territory lay to the east during the entire flight from Nairobi to Addis Ababa. Ten minutes before we landed on Ethiopian soil, the man in the seat next to me asked me what business I had in Addis. I answered that I was working on a thesis about international engagement in Somalia.

“I used to work in Somalia, for the UN,” he said.

Startled to learn that I had spent the last hour and a half sitting next to a person with first-hand knowledge, I quickly asked what he thought about the UN’s engagement. He replied:

“Cynics are former idealists. If the UN had actually followed its strategic objectives, and its plans, we would have a different situation today.” When I asked why this was not the case, he shrugged his shoulders and said that the big stakeholders have their interests and that this becomes the decisive factor. On a rather sombre note he added;

“If people really knew how the system worked, I would be out of a job.”

Then the doors opened, and the man continued to transit.

Working on this thesis has been an experience in appreciating the value of comprehending the views of others. I am most grateful to all informants who took the time to meet me during my three-week stay in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. Their hospitality and genuine interest in communicating their views has been an extraordinary help for me when working on this thesis. I want to thank my supervisor Karin Dokken for all her reflections and advice, and her genuine support throughout the process. Further, I would like to thank the staff at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); in particular, my thanks go to Nina Græger and Tore Bjørgo for giving me the opportunity to benefit from NUPI’s resources, to Francesco Strazzari and Susan Høivik for all useful comments, and to Cedric de Coning for providing contacts in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. I would also like to thank the foundation Fritt Ord for providing funding for my fieldwork, and my excellent fellow students Emilie Oftedal and Maren Maal for five years of challenging academic discussions and deep friendship. Lastly, I am extremely grateful to my supportive family and friends, and my boyfriend Thomas, who always told me ‘T’inquètes pas, tu vas réussir’. While it is good to be rational, a bit of idealism can sometimes help.
# List of Abbreviations

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EU NAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Somalia</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group for Somalia</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>P3</td>
<td>France, the UK and the United States (the Western UNSC-members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSSF</td>
<td>Somali Security Forces</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSOA</td>
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1 Introduction

Unless the international community can resolve the problem of Somalia, they cannot achieve their own security interests (Informant G 22.01.2013).

Somalis see too much interference from the international community as a destabilizing factor (Informant A 15.01.2013).

This thesis examines policies directed toward what has been considered the failed state of the world, Somalia. Instead of focusing solely on the problems of the country itself, I will draw attention to the various actors who have effectuated security-political measures towards Somalia, compare their perspectives on security and discuss the coherence in their policies.

The Horn of Africa, consisting of Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Sudan, has for years been subject to internal conflicts, instability and insurgency movements (Mesfin 2011:3-4). After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the region received new international attention as it was feared that especially Somalia with its lack of government structure could be used as a safe haven by terrorist groups. More recently, the Somali insurgency group al Shabaab (‘youth’) has been put on the US list of terrorist groups (Landinfo 2012:2). This group has carried out attacks not only within the country, but also elsewhere in the region, Kenya in particular. Moreover, the group has proclaimed its allegiance to al-Qaida. Thus, Somalia has become a security concern stretching over national, regional and international dimensions. The terrorist threat, together with concerns about piracy and the general instability in the country, has led a wide range of actors to direct their policies towards Somalia.

These actors are situated at various levels in the international system. National, regional, continental and international players are involved, each with a specific culture and history. The point of departure in this thesis is an interest in what kinds of synergies this creates.

1.1 Research question

After the Cold War, the frame of what is considered ‘security matters’ has been significantly expanded. The changes relate to what one should secure, from what the subject should be secured and how this is to be done (Buzan et al. 1998:36, Collins 2010:2). In this thesis, this is conceptualized as a security perspective. In light of the literature (ibid), a security perspective is defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object
to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. Thus, actors project a security perspective through the policies they develop.

The traditional perspective was that the state should be secured against attack from another state actor through military defence (Collins 2010:2). In the concept of human security, the referent object of security policies was changed, and the people became the object to be secured, not the state as such (ibid). Concepts of state security and human security might be regarded as two ideal forms of security perspectives. A broad debate on security has evolved, highlighting also other concepts of security such as economic security, food security and regime security (Collins 2010:2-10). When a range of actors are involved in policymaking towards the same country, it becomes interesting to analyse whether their measures are based on similar security perspectives, and whether this has implications for policy coherence. ‘Coherence’ is here defined as a situation where actors operate and develop policies so that efforts pull in the same direction.

The research question in this thesis has two parts. First: To which extent do international actors involved in Somalia have similar security perspectives? And secondly: What are the main challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia?

There are several reasons for asking these questions. The first question can be seen as a contribution to the academic debate within the discipline of security studies on what it is that actors choose to secure. Also the second question is of interest in academic terms, as it seeks to explain the principal factors that challenge coherence. When the thesis asks these two questions together, it is because it is considered relevant to analyse whether differences or similarities in actors’ perspectives has an influence on policy coherence. A finding where differences in actors’ perspectives lead to a lack of policy coherence would be in line with constructivist perceptions of international relations where ideas and actors’ views of the world are accorded considerable weight (see Wendt 1999:135-136). However, this thesis does not predict a specific causality between the findings in the two questions. The argument is rather that it is relevant to study these two questions together, as this can inform the research of security studies, by shedding light on the importance of differing or similar security perspectives among actors. In this way, the thesis seeks to explore new ground.

To answer the research question the concepts ‘security perspective’ and ‘coherence’ are operationalized in chapter four. However, to be able to answer the first part of the research
question it is also necessary to consider how security perspectives are formed – especially within complex organizations. This is discussed in section 3.1, which explains the theory foundations of the thesis.

1.2 Delimitations, method and scope

Time constraints made it necessary to narrow down the selection of actors in the study, and the aspects in relation to which they are analysed. The choice of actors is presented below. But first, this section will briefly reflect on important areas that fall outside the scope of this research.

The thesis studies the engagement of international actors in a country which itself has a range of interesting actors, most notably in the form of clans and regions which have obtained a degree of autonomy from south-central Somalia and the capital Mogadishu. The stories of Puntland and Somaliland, and the significance of clan politics in Somali society, are indeed fascinating subjects to study, but they are not given primary importance in this thesis – simply because this research centres on the engagement of international actors. That said, the study is by no means detached from the local context. Although the focus is on international actors, the analysis includes evaluations of whether their policies are locally attached or based on ‘local ownership’. As chapter three will show, local attachment can be considered of primary importance both when evaluating actors’ measures, and when evaluating policy coherence. Moreover, the thesis studies policies and engagement directed towards Somalia only. This is an important delimitation, as the Horn of Africa in many ways can be considered a regional security complex, where policies and action in one part of the Horn may have major implications for conflicts in other parts of the region. This is typical of African regions where informal cross-national processes may have stronger force than the formal processes of the state itself (Dokken 2010:352). However, such a broader study would have been difficult to conduct within the timeframe available.

There are many international actors involved in Somalia, either by physical presence or through political, financial and diplomatic means. Five actors are studied in depth here: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the United States and the United Nations (UN). Of these, the AU and the EU are present with troops on Somali soil and in Somali waters; the UN and the United States have
been military present through peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the 1990s, and IGAD was originally intended to be present through the mission IGASOM which stranded and consequently led the AU to deploy the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. Thus all five actors have been involved in the planning and/or execution of security-political operations in Somalia. In addition, all actors are at the present time actively directing security-political measures of military, technical or diplomatic character towards Somalia. ‘Measures of technical nature’ include, for example, the contribution of materiel to AMISOM operations. Of course, there are other possible candidates for this study, such as NATO, Turkey and the Arab League. Some of these actors will be commented on in the thesis, but the main analytical focus remains on the five above-mentioned actors. This is largely due to time constraints. In the case of Turkey this is also because my efforts at establishing contact with Turkish representations in Nairobi and Addis Ababa during fieldwork did not succeed.

Further delimitations of the study are related to a key challenge for the research: gaining access to information. It is obviously impossible to access all or most intelligence material that could be of interest when analysing an actor’s approach towards Somalia. What is possible, however, is to study other actions, such as engagement in operations or the provision of financial or logistical support. Through interviews it is also possible to obtain information regarding priorities and which policy areas actors are interested in pursuing. Published strategy documents and reviews can also help in understanding the actor’s security perspective. However, strategic documents might not capture which policies are actually given priority on the ground. To develop a more comprehensive picture of the actors’ perspectives, interviews serve as an essential source of information.

To gather information, I conducted fieldwork in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and in Nairobi, Kenya. The fieldwork was conducted over three weeks, two of which I spent in Nairobi. Two types of informants have been interviewed: primary informants are spokespersons who represent one of the actors analysed; secondary informants are other diplomats, professors and experts, such as non-governmental workers, who have obtained in-depth knowledge useful for shedding light on the research question. In total 18 informants were interviewed, 17 during fieldwork and one in Norway. Of these, 11 informants represented one of the five actors studied, and seven informants were from the academic world, NGOs and other diplomatic institutions. All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form. Literature has also been
consulted: primary literature in the form of official documents from governments and organizations, and secondary literature in the form of previous research and news articles.

The focus on actors’ policies towards Somalia only implies that the study has a narrow scope, where results cannot be automatically generalized to other cases. However, the study does involve comparative elements, as it compares how various actors choose to direct their security policies and measures towards the same state or region. Thus, although the study cannot be used for direct generalization, it may prove relevant for other cases through contingent generalization – a limited generalization which for instance can be used to fill out the cells of a more comprehensive theory (George and Bennett 2005:112). The study might help in identifying specific problems that must be dealt with to be able to conduct coherent policies, when political actors placed on different levels in the international system are operating in the same country. Such prospects for generalization will above all apply when the policies are directed towards states with similar features, often described as ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states. In this way the study will provide information of relevance for more than the Somali case. However, it must be noted that each and every state is characterized by specific internal conditions that make it unique. Any generalizations should therefore be conducted with caution.

1.3 Earlier research – contextualization

There has been considerable research on several fields linked to the research question of this thesis. Much has been written about Somalia, terrorism and piracy. Likewise, much has been written about the initiatives of the African Union, the UN and other international actors in the Horn of Africa. There have been studies reflecting on the lack of policy coherence or differences in approaches amongst international actors (see Sabala 2011, Kagwanja 2006, Tadesse 2004). However, fewer studies have compared the involvement of various international actors, and none – to my knowledge – have studied the five actors chosen here for comparison with an explicit focus on their perspectives on security. Further, I know of no studies that enquire whether such perspectives can inform the apparent lack of coherence. This is where this thesis seeks to fill a gap in the current research picture.

The closest we come to research conducted on this topic are perhaps studies carried out by Medhane Tadesse (2004), assistant professor of history at the Kotebe College of Teachers’
Education in Addis Ababa, and by Peter Kagwanja (2006), research director of the Democracy and Human Rights Program at the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa. According to both these authors, the US focus on the war on terror after the events of 9/11 has affected thinking about security in the Horn of Africa. Tadesse (2004) claims the new focus on terrorism has led to a refocusing, away from human security aspects, which were important in the 1990s, to new security paradigms more focused on state security and militarization. In this way, Tadesse points out how international actors may have influenced the security perspectives in the region. He asks what is risked if excessive militarization of security is undertaken in a region where the state apparatus and the institution of democracy are weak. Kagwanja (2006:84) points out that greater coordination between national and international initiatives in the Horn of Africa is necessary both to fight and prevent terrorism, and to prevent the war on terror from undermining democracy and stability in weak democracies. Thereby he touches on a vital question of this thesis: to what extent the efforts of various actors pull in the same direction.

Further academic contributions have been made by Kizito Sabala (2011), political officer at IGAD Liaison Office Nairobi and doctoral candidate at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies at the University of Nairobi. Sabala (2011:114) notes that there are many international actors that promote both security and insecurity in Somalia. He holds that, while international and regional approaches have been motivated by the war on terror and counterpiracy, the main efforts to solve the conflict should address the fundamental issues. To Sabala (2010:114,111) the core question is this: what is needed to achieve a stabilized Somalia with a government that has the capacity and effectiveness to deal with the country’s problems? Terrorism and piracy have served to “divert attention and resources from the real issues and the search for a political solution to a political problem”; as Sabala remarks, “pirates were not born in the ocean” (2011:111). Further, he stresses the importance of designing an effective diplomatic strategy in which cooperation is rethought (2011:115). In this way actors with negative influences can be excluded and the true interests of Somalia can be given priority. As a first step he sees genuine support for the UN-led process as necessary, even though the process has had its flaws (2011:113). Sabala’s contribution can thus be seen not only as an analysis of the actors involved and an evaluation of their cooperation, but also as an argument for studying the actors’ underlying perspectives and objectives, as he points out that external actors are in fact not dealing with what needs to be dealt with.
This research project is situated between two areas of research. On the one hand, the study concerns empirical research on actors’ policies toward Somalia, as does the research of Tadesse, Kagwanja and Sabala. On the other hand this thesis relates to research in the field of security studies and on the subject of coherence, drawing on wider theoretical or conceptual debates. Chapter three presents how such debates can be used to shed light on the research.

1.4 Outline of the thesis

Chapter two gives background information about the diverse security challenges in Somalia and the international engagement in the country. Chapter three presents the theory and conceptual debates applied in the analysis. The chapter shows how this thesis is situated within the broader field of security studies, and discusses the concept ‘referent object’ and which measures actors can use to secure a referent object in a country like Somalia. Finally, the chapter discusses how various theoretical perspectives can be used to explain which factors influence coherence in policymaking. Chapter four outlines the methodology employed in the thesis and provides an operationalization of the concepts security perspective and coherent policies.

The analysis starts in chapter five. Here, I analyse to what extent actors have a shared security perspective, which provides an answer to the first part of the research question. This is done through analysis of the five areas which were defined through the operationalization of the concept security perspective. Briefly put: strategic objectives, objectives for engagement in Somalia, security political measures, actors’ views on al-Shabaab and the referent objects of actors’ policies are discussed. Chapter six provides an answer to the second part of the research question. The chapter begins by presenting two examples of lack of policy coherence. Thereafter, it analyses what the challenges to coherence are, in light of the debates in chapter three. Coordination between actors, local ownership and national interests are analysed as influential factors.

The final chapter concludes by summarizing the main findings of this study. The two research questions are first answered separately. Thereafter the chapter analyses the answers to the two questions seen together. The choice of theory is discussed, and suggestions are offered as to which broader conclusions may be drawn from the research. Finally, the chapter provides some reflections on the future of Somalia, in light of what the analysis has revealed.
2 Empirical background

The main problem afflicting the Republic of Somalia is that it is at war with itself, with the region and with the international community (Sabala 2011: 96).

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to aspects of the Somali history and the history of international engagement in Somalia that are important to consider when researching and answering the research question. A brief overview of recent Somali history, from the fall of Syad Barre until the election of a new president in September 2012 will set the scene. After this, security political challenges and threats to international, regional and national security are presented in section 2.2. The chapter ends with a presentation of the five actors whose policies are analysed.

2.1 Historical overview

After decades under colonial rule and a period as a UN protectorate, the independent Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960. In 1969 Mohamed Syad Barre seized power, and when his government collapsed in 1991 the Somali civil war broke out in full scale. In 2000 the Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed, followed in 2004 by the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Nairobi, Kenya. The TFG first met in Somalia in 2006, because of security concerns (Sabala 2011:109). On 20 August 2012 the first federal Parliament since 1991 was instated. A new temporary constitution was adopted, and on 10 September the parliament chose Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the new president of the Federal Government of Somalia (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:42). Somalia today is a state operating with at several separate administrative entities. The South Central Somalia has until recently had the TFG as its central government. Another entity is Puntland which declared autonomy as a federal state in 1998. Somaliland is a separate entity which has earlier sought independence from the Republic of Somalia (McKay 2011: 229), but has not been recognized as an independent state. More recently, Galmudug declared autonomy within a federalized Somalia in 2006. The region of Jubaland which borders on both Kenya and Ethiopia declared its autonomy in 2010.

The Somali society is organized along vertical patrimonial clan-lines, and Islam is the strongest horizontal identity which cuts across these (Sabala 2011:97). Since the outbreak of the civil war the Somali conflict has revolved around political leadership and clans fighting
for control (ibid). The breakdown of law and order created an environment where groups actively sought profit in activities that undermine peace (Sabala 2011:98). Local warlords ruled different parts of the country, which made it impossible for the TFG to exercise effective control over parts of Mogadishu and in southern and central parts of the country (Sabala 2011:109).

The Islamic Court Union (ICU) controlled Mogadishu and large parts of the southern Somalia from the summer of 2006. In December the same year Ethiopian forces marched to Mogadishu in support of the TFG. This caused a splinter group from the ICU, al-Shabaab, and other rebel movements to attack the Ethiopian forces and the TFG in Mogadishu in March 2007 (Landinfo 2012:2). The international community called on Ethiopia to withdraw its forces, but realized that the presence of troops was essential to prevent the Somali state from relapsing into chaos (AMISOM 2008). The same year the African Union’s peacekeeping mission AMISOM therefore landed in Mogadishu to support the TFG, after the initial plan of an IGAD-led mission had stranded (ibid). Although AMISOM is described as a peacekeeping force, my informants agreed that it is a peace enforcement mission. The mission first consisted of soldiers mainly from Uganda and Burundi, and has grown to a force of over 10 000 soldiers (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:42). The Ethiopian forces finally withdrew from Somalia in 2009, but intervened again on 20 November 2011 (New York Times 2011b). Only a few days earlier, on 16 November, the Kenyan government sent 2000 soldiers over the border to Somalia, claiming that al-Shabaab threatened the Kenyan tourism industry (Hansen 2012:6). These soldiers were later incorporated into AMISOM.

### 2.2 Threats to national and international security

In the Failed States Index 2012, Somalia was ranked at the top of the list as the most ‘failing’ country in the world (Messner 2012:4). The concept ‘failed state’ has been used by Western government actors and policy analysts who have sought to describe the alarming proliferation of civil conflict, the fragmentation of state institutions and the deterioration of security conditions (Nay 2013:326-327). The instability and violence in Somalia has been perceived as a threat on several levels in the international system. First and foremost the instability and violence has implied a threat to the human security of Somali citizens. Somalia has a population of around 10 million, of which 1.3 million are internally displaced refugees (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:38). There are also 1 million refugees from Somalia currently in
other countries (ibid), with the biggest part in the world’s largest refugee camp in the north of Kenya (Flyktningehjelpen 2012:4). Insecurity manifests itself not only in fear of violence, but also in food insecurity and lack of possibilities. Some 70 % of the population of Somalia is under 30 years of age (UNDP 2012: xix). The unemployment rate for youth between 14 and 29 is 67%, which is one of the highest in the world (ibid). Lack of employment topped the scale when youths in Somalia were asked to rank their frustrations in the 2012 Human Development Report on Somalia (UNDP 2012: xx). This jobless and uneducated youth is the most vulnerable group in Somalia. They are also a major risk factor in regard to criminal behaviour: for example, youth constitute the bulk of the participants in the terrorist insurgency group al-Shabaab (ibid).

Developments in Somalia have further been perceived as a threat to security in the broader region and internationally. In 2008, al-Shabaab was put on the US list of terror organizations (Landinfo 2012:2), and the same year the head of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) stated that the organization was a terrorist organization (NTB 2011). Kiras (2010:187) defines terrorism as

[T]he sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response.

In recent years al-Shabaab has carried out several attacks in Kenya, mainly using grenades, and the country has also received threats of bigger terrorist attacks on national buildings (allAfrica 2012). In this way al-Shabaab has come to constitute a significant threat to regional security. Together with AMISOM, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces managed to drive al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and several areas of Somalia in the course of 2012 (Hansen 2012:6). Important progress was made when the Kenyans, under AMISOM, captured the city of Kismayu from al-Shabaab at the end of September 2012 (Daily Nation 2012b). This led to positive reports in the Kenyan press, declaring that the time has come for professionals to invest in Somalia (Daily Nation 2012a).

In early February 2012 al-Shabaab tightened its ties to al-Qaida, with the al-Shabaab leader Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair pledging loyalty to al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (CNN 2012). However, Guglielmo (2011) claims that it is erroneous to hold up al-Shabaab as evidence of al-Qaida penetration in the Horn of Africa, or to analyse al-Shabaab solely within a global perspective:
If we consider al-Shabaab as a movement totally alien from the Somali social context we risk obscuring its real substance. The organization has been able to adapt itself to the dynamics of the Somali conflict, either benefiting from them or, in some cases, becoming a victim of the country’s instability (2011:137).

Al-Shabaab was probably formed in 2003, but the movement first increased radically during the Ethiopian occupation between 2006 and 2009 when many saw it as the lone defender of Somalia after the ICU had splintered and moved its leadership abroad (Guglielmo 2011:127), into Yemen and Eritrea (Sabala 2011:101). The cross-clan structure of the movement is also a crucial factor for its survival and proliferation, as this has allowed it to operate in several parts of the country and recruit and access supplies in different areas (Guglielmo 2011:127).

While al-Shabaab has concentrated its attacks on the Horn of Africa, it has constituted a threat to Europe and the United States because it has attracted citizens of Western countries to leave for Somalia and join the organization. According to journalist Mary Harper (2012:99), the FBI estimates that between September 2007 and October 2009 more than twenty Somalis from the diaspora left the US state of Minnesota to join the Islamist insurgency in Somalia. In 2010 fourteen American Somalis were charged with acts of terrorism, including the provision of materiel and funds to al-Shabaab, in the United States (Harper 2012:100). From Europe it has also been underlined that the British citizens who carried out the London bombings in 2004 were of Somali ethnicity. The image of Somalia as a terrorist threat has further components as well. Primarily Somalia posed a terrorist threat because it was used as a transit point for the terrorists who carried out the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, and the bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa in 2002 (USIP 2004:9). Evidence indicates that both al Qaida members and members of the Yemeni Sulieman Abdulla have moved freely between Kenya and Somalia and resided in Mogadishu (USIP 2004:9-10).

In addition to terrorist and insurgency threats, problems of piracy and warlordism have contributed to the destabilization of the country. Piracy has been an increasing problem in Somali waters for the last 10 years (Bjørlo and Gjelsvik 2012:4). The problem may be understood “both as an outgrowth of the war economy as an outcome of a weak or non-existent state power and an inadequate police and coast guard” (ibid). However, reports from 2012 show that piracy has now become much less successful and thus less profitable. As of the end of September 2012, only five ships had been seized by pirates, whereas 47 ships had been captured in 2010 and 25 ships in 2011 (Aftenposten 2012).
2.3 International actors involved

This section concentrates on the five actors studied in this thesis. As the actors will be thoroughly analysed later, the section outlines each actor’s relation to Somalia only briefly.

The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in 1992, through the Security Council’s resolution 751 (Sabala 2011:106). The goal of the operation was to impose a ceasefire inside Somalia. UNOSOM II, established in March 1993 also included enforcement measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The mission was withdrawn in 1995 (ibid: 107). Currently, the UN engagement is divided between two political missions, the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), and what is normally referred to as the ‘Country Team’ (CT) for Somalia. The Country Team consists of 24 agencies, funds and programmes including UNDP Somalia, which is located in Nairobi (UNCT Somalia 2010).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was originally a forum for dealing with issues related to drought and development, established by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda in 1986. Today the organization can also be considered a security-political actor (Dokken 2008:19). IGAD played an important role in the Eldoret-Mbagath Peace Process which started in October 2002 (Sabala 2011:100). The most important outcome of this process was the development and adoption of the Federal Charter which led to the formation of the TFG. Since 2002 IGAD has maintained a strong focus on Somalia, especially through the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation. The main task of this political office has been to follow up the implementation of the Eldoret-Mbagath Process. The office has dedicated itself to mobilize resources for the TFG and has sought to play a coordinating role (Informant O 01.02.2013).

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has had UN approval under Resolution 1744. The mission was deployed in February 2007, first for a period of six months (Sabala 2011:99). Up until 2011 AMISOM deployed troops only from Uganda and Burundi and until 2010 the combined force in Mogadishu consisted of 5250 soldiers, which was 3000 fewer than the minimum number required (Sabala 2011:99). Several countries have trained AMISOM soldiers, including Kenya, Djibouti, Turkey and Sudan (ibid). In late November 2011 Kenyan and Ethiopian forces was sent into Somalia, as these neighbouring countries felt
the unease of the situation. AMISOM assumed official command over the Kenyan troops on 6 July 2012 (AMISOM 2012b).

The European Union’s engagement in Somalia has political, diplomatic, civilian, military, humanitarian and developmental dimensions. Together these constitute the EU Comprehensive Approach (European Commission 2012a). The EU is one of the largest financial donors to AMISOM through the African Peace Facility. In March 2012 the EU allocated €67 million to support AMISOM (European Commission 2012a), bringing the total contribution to AMISOM through the Peace Facility up to €325 million. This funding is used to cover allowances for soldiers, operational running costs, transportation, medical expenses, housing, and fuel and communication equipment (ibid). The EU Training Mission also trains Somali Security Forces. In early 2013 the training mission’s mandate was extended until March 2015 (East African 2013). The EU is present in Somali waters through the European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR – Atalanta). The operation, launched in December 2008, is provided with a UN mandate to protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), and shipping related to AMISOM’s activities (EU NAVFOR).

The United States suffered the loss of 18 of its soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 in the incident which has become known as ‘Black Hawk *Down’. This has influenced the US approach towards Somalia ever since, and has resulted in statements like that made by the Obama administration’s top State Department official for Africa, Johnnie Carson, who said: “We do not want an American footprint or boot on the ground” (New York Times 2011a). However, the United States is active in the region through the military programme Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa, which was established in 2002 and is based in Djibouti. In June 2012 the Obama administration acknowledged for the first time that the US military have conducted drone strikes in Somalia (Wall Street Journal 2012). Not much is known about the extents and depth of the US counterterror involvement in Somalia. However, the United States is a large player in Somalia in other areas as well. USAID conducts projects in the spheres of governance, food security, education and economic growth (USAID 2013), and the United States also supports AMISOM and UNSOA. Since 2007, the United States has provided $340 million in assistance to AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and provided approximately $150 million for its share of assessed costs for UNSOA (Swan 2012).
3 Theory

This chapter establishes the theory foundations of this thesis, and presents discussions on theories and concepts referred to in the analysis. I begin by situating this thesis within the field of security studies and security theory. To explain what is meant when this thesis assumes that actors – including organizations – can have a security perspective, the chapter draws on constructivist and intergovernmentalist theory. This explanation, given in section 3.1, is important not only while it establishes the theory foundations; it is also of significance for the choice of method presented in chapter four, because basic assumptions on how a security perspective is formed have implications for how such a perspective can be studied.

The analytical framework relating to the first part of the research question is presented in section 3.2. Section 3.2.1 discusses how the pursuit of different policies can enhance the security of different referent objects. The chapter then takes a closer look at two theory debates which can be connected to security perspectives in the Somali case. The first concerns which policies one should start implementing in a state that lacks basic governance structures, often referred to as a ‘failed’ state. This is of significance because an actor who wishes to ‘fix’ or ‘build’ a state will secure referent objects in the process. The second debate concerns which measures should be used when seeking to counter terrorism, and is of interest because the choice of measures is part of an actor’s security perspective, as shown in the operationalization in chapter four. Section 3.3, presents theory on coherence which will be used when analysing the second part of the research question. This section discusses what can influence coherence, in light of the various theory perspectives. Factors highlighted here are later analysed in chapter six.

3.1 Theory foundations of the thesis

Security studies is a sub-discipline of international relations (IR) which includes studies on core assumptions regarding ‘what is to be secured’ and ‘how’ (Collins 2010:2). Building on Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) and Collins (2010), a security perspective is in this thesis defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. Thus, an actor’s security perspective is displayed through the policies it develops. As discussed below, different theory
perspectives will give different answers as to how an organization can have a security perspective.

Security theory is a specific subset of security studies, because it, unlike the larger discipline, deals explicitly with theory (Wæver and Buzan 2010:465). Security theory can, according to Wæver and Buzan, be defined as “theory that aims at the understanding and/or management of security issues” (2010:464). This theory can at different points in time resemble developments in general IR theory, as is the case for the constructivist approach to security and international relations (2010:465). Other security theories such as deterrence theory and theories on securitization, as promoted through the Copenhagen School, were originally specific to security studies, and not a part of the general field of IR (ibid). Wæver and Buzan note differences in security theory developments within the United States and Europe; and explain this by the fact that while the United States sees itself as the actor that shapes the world – and therefore needs information about cause and effect – Europe takes a different position towards security where problematizing and a wider definition of security becomes possible (2010:474-475). This thesis seeks to contribute this ongoing theory development.

The thesis shares with Wæver and Buzan (2010) the desire to problematize the concept of security within a wider framework. This is why it explicitly seeks to compare security perspectives, and to relate a discussion of security perspectives to a discussion of coherence in policies. As proponents of the Copenhagen School, Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde are known for their theory of securitization. Securitization refers to the process whereby “an issue is framed as a security concern and hence treated as a prioritized matter by top leaders […]” (Stokke 2011:329). This process takes place through speech acts (Mutimer 2010:91). These considerations clearly widen the possibilities of what can be considered ‘security policies’. As securitization theory focuses on the processes of creating a security issue through speech acts, securitization is often analysed through discourse analysis, although this is not the only method that can be used (Buzan et al. 1998:177). By contrast, this thesis focuses on outcomes. Instead of analysing discursive processes establishing how actors have come to obtain their perspectives; the focus is on what the perspectives are – and whether actors’ security perspectives are a factor which can explain the degree of coherence in policies. Still, it is of interest to consider how actors’ perspectives are formed, because understanding the process behind a perspective will make it easier to also understand what the perspective is. While the thesis assumes that actors have adopted a perspective on security, it does not blindly follow
Wæver and Buzan (2010) in assuming that speech acts are the basis for a security perspective. I argue it is necessary to draw on theoretical pluralism in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of how an actor’s security perspective is formed.

The actors studied in this thesis are different from each other through the fact that their decision-making processes are different and that they to lesser or greater extent are unitary actors. This has significance when one is to understand how actors’ perspectives are formed. Hill and Smith (2011:8) underline how the comprehension of the EU in international relations is not gained by using only one theory; “[…] pluralism is required when seeking to explain and understand the EU’s international relations. No one approach, whether broad-brush as in realist, rationalist, and constructivist, or more specific, as in geopolitics, intergovernmentalism […] comes near being adequate by itself”. Following Hill and Smith, this thesis draws on several theories and concepts in seeking to capture what an actor’s security perspective is and how it is formed. Hill and Smith (2011) are clear about the difficulties that arise when using different, possibly incompatible, theories in analysis, but they hold that a combination of theoretical understandings is “inevitable in any attempt to do justice to complexity” (ibid). Such a solution is not necessarily in contradiction to the research of Wæver and Buzan, as they write that “[t]he different new schools in Europe increasingly intersect and form a field with opportunities for a new generation to combine and innovate across the theories” (Wæver and Buzan 2010:481). Here it will be argued that both constructivist and intergovernmentalist theory can provide useful lenses for viewing and understanding how an actor’s security perspective is formed.

While realist theory sees inter-state collaboration on security issues as a rare an unnatural phenomenon (Glaser 2010:17), intergovernmentalist theory provides an explanation as to how organizations can develop and implement policies in the realm of security, highlighting the organization as a bargaining forum. Robert Putnam (1988) sees cooperation in liberal organizations as a two-level game where the outcome of political bargaining at the national level is deciding for which options states have available in international bargaining. This means that national affairs have priority, and that, although international organizations can play a role, the combinations of alternatives available in international negotiations can be strictly limited. This is an interesting view to consider, as it will imply that a security perspective within an organization may be the output of a bargaining process in which strong
states can play a strong role, but where other states also possess joint power over the decision-making process.

Constructivist and critical approaches emphasize the importance of cognitive factors in the elaboration of foreign policy, a field largely ignored by the positivist methodology of realists and liberalists (Andreatta 2011:35). Constructivists emphasize that norms and institutions are of significance in international relations (ibid: 36). Using a constructivist perspective, an organization in itself is not merely able to develop a security perspective – it is also likely to do so. Some constructivist approaches see organizations as catalysts for a process whereby states become socialized and institutional aims and perspectives are developed (Smith 2004b:100). Other constructivist claim that although states do not transfer sovereignty to the organizations and in theory still possess ultimate control, in practice states will follow ‘rules of appropriateness’ developed within the organization (March and Olsen 1998). Using a constructivist perspective, it is thus likely that the organization not only has a security perspective, but that this perspective is the outcome of the process of organization in itself – not a reflection of the views of strong state actors. Constructivist thought opens up the possibility of seeing the formation of a security perspective within an organization as a dynamic process where several types of actors at various levels are involved. A constructivist perspective allows us to overcome the rigid agent–structure divide and to conceptualize agents and structures as ‘mutually constitutive’ (Wendt 1987:360).

It can thus be argued that a security perspective can be formed both as a consequence of intergovernmental bargaining and through a process of constructions. If we open up for the use of several theories to analyse actors’ perspectives, amongst them constructivist thought, we must clarify the issue of epistemology. While constructivism sees social life as a construct, it has been argued that the objective study of social life is impossible given a constructivist perspective. Although the Copenhagen School is regarded as constructivist, its proponents have argued for the possibility of conducting research through a largely positivist epistemology. They recognize the social construction of social life, but argue that the construction in the security realm in “sufficiently stable over the long run that it can be treated as objective” (Mutimer 2010:91). This thesis will here follow the adherents of the Copenhagen School in claiming that, although security perspectives might be subject to change, they are sufficiently stable over time to be studied through positivist methodology. However, as I assume that both intergovernmentalism and constructivism can have
explanatory power in forming actors’ security perspectives, the use of discourse analysis – as promoted in securitization theory – seems insufficient as a method. As described in chapter four, the use of elite interviews supported by literature reviews is believed better enable a thorough analysis.

3.2 Analytical framework: Security perspective

Having argued that an actor’s security perspective can be influenced both by bargaining processes and through the development of norms and values inside an organization or a state, let us turn to some theory debates which will be used explicitly in the analysis of the first part of the research question.

3.2.1 Referent object

When analysing an actor’s security perspective, the referent object of actor’s policies is essential. A referent object is the thing to be made secure through security policies (Collins 2010: 2). According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:36), a referent object is that which one can point to and say “It has to survive; therefore it is necessary to…” An important distinction in the security literature is drawn between state-centric approaches to security, and human security approaches, which view the state and the human being, respectively, as the object that needs to be secured. In modern history, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, one has traditionally sought to secure the state; and the traditional measures to this end have been the use or threat of military force through war, deterrence, alliances and more recently arms control (Collins 2010:7). In the 1990s, the human security agenda contributed to a shift of attention, towards human suffering as a central concern in international relations. Human security has been defined as “the protection of individuals and communities from war and other forms of violence” (Kerr 2010:124). The human security approach can be linked both to early liberal writing on equality and freedom, and also to critical security theory which sees state-centric and military security as a flawed approach (ibid: 122). The launching of the report The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, and the subsequent significance of the R2P norm in international politics, as in the war in Libya, can be seen as a direct consequence of a heightened awareness of the importance of human security. This awareness has to a large
extent been brought on by experiences of genocide and ethnic cleansing in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo ( Mutimer 2010:88).

After 1990, security studies have been widened to comprise not only human security, but also concepts such as economic security, environmental security, regime security and food security (Collins 2010). These can be seen as overlapping concepts, but they also have a distinct focus of their own. However, what is considered referent objects does not appear to change. In most approaches to security, human beings and the state remain the two principal objects to be secured. Environmental security and regime security may be the two toughest competitors in this sense, as they open up for interpretations of the environment as a value in itself that needs protection (Barnett 2010:224), and the regime as the object to be secured rather than the state as such or the people in it (Jackson 2010:187). Regime security is typically adopted as a strategy within weak states, where the ruling elite are particularly vulnerable to security threats from within (Jackson 2010:185). Jackson writes that in practice state security and regime security become indistinguishable in a weak state, and draws on Somali experiences in particular:

Because of the fusion of state and government, when a particular regime is overthrown, as the Syad Barre regime was overthrown in Somalia, the entire apparatus of the state collapses too. In this sense, weak-state security ‘is’ regime security. (2010:191)

The analysis will show that the distinction between state security and regime security in Somalia is diffuse today as well.

What is seen as a referent object will in turn have consequences for what are viewed as security political measures. For instance, it is difficult to draw a line between security policies and development policies because some development policies can enhance human security. Within the human security perspective we find one broad and one narrow school (Kerr 2010). According to the broad school of human security, insecurity includes freedom from want (ibid: 124). This implies that also food security, economic security and various development aspects can be included in the category of ‘human security’. By contrast, the narrow school focuses on freedom from fear. This means that human security becomes more linked to physical violence or terror. Kerr (2010:127) does not see these two forms of human security as contradictions, as she claims some other researchers do. Her argument is that issues which concern scholars of the broad school, such as poor governance and poor state capacity, can be
considered independent variables that ultimately cause insecurity in the narrow sense, as in the form of violence between social groups. Likewise, human security concerns in the narrow sense can cause poverty and unemployment. In this way Kerr links the concerns of the broad and the narrow school together in a circular causal relationship:

![Diagram showing a circular causal relationship between human security concerns in the broad and narrow schools.](source: Kerr 2010: 127)

When analysing actors’ security perspectives, it is therefore important to open up for the possibility that an actor pursuits human security in a broader form.

### 3.2.2 Securing objects in a ‘failed’ state

By definition a ‘failed’ state will neither be successful in securing its population nor in securing the state as such (see Nay 2013:326-327). While it has been debated whether the term ‘failed state’ is a correct description of the Somalia (Harper 2012:105), it is clear that Somalia has long been without a central system capable of providing its citizens and the state itself with security. There is a massive literature on how to deal with state failure. When analysing an actor’s security perspective, it is relevant to examine debates highlighting how actors should precede when intervening or engaging in a state with a dysfunctional political system. The debate revolving around whether the process should be elite-driven and whether strong institutions should be introduced first is of particular interest, because different approaches indicate the use of political measures which to varying degrees will increase human security, state security or regime security. As shown in the analysis in chapter five, actors’ choice of measures will be central to the analysis of the actors’ security perspectives.

Several traditions within academic research see state building or democracy building as an elite-run process. One of these is the institutions first approach (Törnquist 2011: 825). In this
approach, institution-building and the introduction of law and order are seen as vital for securing state stability. Proponents argue that institution-building is so essential for stability that this must be introduced before liberal reforms and free elections, since liberal reforms and elections can otherwise be open to abuse of power, and ‘premature democratization’ can breed violence and political instability (ibid). Thus, this is an argument which centres on first securing the state institutions or the state as such, although the rationale behind this also is linked to a wish of securing the population.

The institutions first approach can be connected to Fukuyama’s (2005) work on state-building which highlights the need to know more about how we can transfer strong institutions to developing countries and weak states. “Particularly in the developing world, weak, incompetent, or non-existent government is the source of severe problems” (Fukuyama 2005: xviii). In building post-conflict states like Somalia, he therefore advises three stages (2005:135-136). After an initial phase of foreign provision of stability through security forces and police and technical assistance, actors must concentrate on creating self-sustaining institutions in phase two, and strengthening state authority in phase three. The institutions-first approach is also connected to the sequencing argument, which has roots in the work of Samuel Huntington in the 1960s (Törnquist 2011:825) and later has been promoted by Mansfield and Snyder (2007). This argument holds that it is dangerous to press states to democratize before the necessary preconditions are in place (Mansfield and Snyder 2007:5), and that democratization can be achieved through modernization pressures within the existing state apparatus (ibid: 6).

The ‘institution first approach’ was originally part of a reaction towards extensive use of market liberalisation as means of peacebuilding and democratization, methods that for instance were criticized by Paris (2004). However, the emphasis put on ‘institutions first’, has in its turn been criticized. In his study of the peace processes in Aceh, Indonesia, Törnquist (2011:825) brings to bear a different perspective on how democratic developments can be introduced in a state recovering from violence. While the institutions first argument is more focused on elite action, what Törnquist calls the transformation argument has greater focus on processes. This argument holds that stable democratic relations can be established in a recovering state through processes whereby actors and institutions influence each other in seeking to reform the relations of power (Törnquist 2011:825). The argument is connected to Carothers’ call for ‘gradualism’, a strategy to create space and mechanisms for political
competition even under difficult political conditions. Carothers (2007:17) challenges the ‘institutions first’ argument in particular, as he claims it could be used by political leaders to legitimate lack of democratic reform while one is ‘waiting for’ sufficiently good institutions.

Although some of this writing is concerned with states with strong central governments or dictatorships, the literature can provide a background for analysing developments within Somalia, where there is currently a policy vacuum in which actors can choose to pursue either the path of ‘institutions first’, building the central institutions – or a path of transformation whereby processes are put into place to facilitate bottom-up capacity-building and popular participation in a Somali reconciliation process. While a strategy of ‘transformation’ implies taking the population’s needs into account furthering some degree of human security through democratic decision-making power at the local level, the ‘institution first’ argument can become a means for setting state security or regime security first, as it focuses on the elites and central institution building.

3.2.3 Approaches to countering terrorism

When analysing actors’ security perspectives in this thesis, their perceptions of al-Shabaab will be treated as a case-specific and integral part of their security perspective, while the threat of this group is seen as a substantial factor for actor involvement. Differences in perceptions of terrorist organizations have resulted in two main strategies for countering terrorism: one of combat, and one of negotiation. In both cases, critics will claim that the option – be it negotiations or military defeat – is unattainable, because they see the terrorist organizations differently.

In his article ‘Addressing terrorism: A theory of change approach’ John Paul Lederach (2012:7) distinguishes between a strategy of isolation and a strategy of engagement, writing that isolation “essentially proposes a strategy of identifying, targeting and limiting individuals and groups who espouse violence defined as terrorism”. Isolation can entail cutting of financial networks or targeting the group militarily, as done by AMISOM in Somalia. However, some claim that traditional military strategy cannot be used against terrorists. Terrorists often prove willing to sacrifice their own lives – which makes it hard to deter them. Moreover, they are geographically mobile, and organized in networks where actors in the field do not have direct contact with leaders – and that makes it difficult to know exactly where to direct policy measures (Lutz and Lutz 2010:341). Similarly, a terrorist group is
difficult to defeat by military means as it is part of the country’s population and can be reabsorbed into the general population when it pleases. The presence of terrorist threats can thus be seen as a challenge to strategy as such, and to strategic theory as an academic field.

Lederach (2012) highlights that a strategy of *isolation* limits the possibilities for contact, consultation and dialogue, with blacklisted groups. This is opposite of the other strategy, *engagement*, which refers to strategies that require contact, consultation and dialogue. According to Lederach: “strategic peacebuilding suggests that engagement must happen with a wider set of people and stakeholders at multiple levels of society than is typically undertaken in official processes” (2012:7). In this way *engagement* forms a non-violent change strategy based on understanding and deliberative dialogue which is contrary to that of *isolation* (ibid: 8). Moreover, increased engagement will increase the awareness of key grievances and concerns which in turn will increase the capacity to deal with these grievances and diminish the justification for violence (ibid:12). In addition, Lederach notes, the strategy can lead to the consideration of alternative views of contested issues and history, and it can increase wider participation and influence the rise of alternative leaders (ibid).

Here we may note that the *engagement strategy* is based on the assumption that terrorists can be understood and that terrorists are open to change. This is in contradiction to arguments presented in connection with strategies of isolation, which stress that terrorists are unlikely to be deterred because they are unchangeable in their ways and in their radical behaviour. The belief that terrorists are not open to negotiations also furthers the legitimacy of the use of military measures for countering terrorism. Thus, assumptions of what a terrorist group really is can influence the choice of strategy. As we will see in chapter five, this will be an important consideration in the analysis of actors’ perceptions of al-Shabaab.

### 3.3 Analytical framework: Coherence

This section of the chapter establishes the analytical framework for the analysis of the second part of the research question. First, it is necessary to establish what we mean by ‘coherence’. Next, factors which can increase or hinder policy coherence are discussed in light of various theory perspectives in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. When analysing the challenges of reaching a coherent policy in Somalia in chapter six, the discussions provided here will be of central importance.
Policy coherence in its strictest sense can be deemed to be an unattainable goal; still, it can be considered a guiding principle (Gebhard 2011:124). In asking *what are the main challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia?* this thesis therefore seeks to understand which factors influence coherence. ‘Coherence’ as a term is used in a multitude of ways in the scholarly literature. In this thesis, it will be used in describing external relations between one actor in the international system and other actors. Coherence is here defined as; a situation where actors in the international system operate and develop policies so that efforts pull in the same direction. This builds on the *OECD Policy Brief* (July 2003:2) where policy coherence is defined as: “the systematic promotion of mutual reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives”.

According to Gebhard (2011:106) coherence has two dimensions. The *technical dimension* implies that problems of coherence can be of procedural art, occurring because of difficulties in reconciling different channels of policymaking. For instance, coherence can be lacking if there is disagreement between actors on how to deal with financial problems. The other dimension is the *policy dimension*. Here, lack of coherence relates to clashing political agendas or conflicting strategic objectives. Fundamental differences in security perspectives can thus be seen as a factor which can cause lack of coherence in the second form, because a difference in security perspective will imply a difference in objectives (see section 4.2). This thesis opens up for the possibility of seeing coherence in terms of a *third* dimension. In line with de Coning’s (2012, 2013) use of complexity theory – described below – coherence can also be seen as a concept which must possess a *local dimension*. This understanding is based on the perception that for coherence to exist it must be context-specific (de Coning 2012:290)

In studying coherence in security policies in Somalia, insight from other disciplines should be taken into consideration. Peacebuilding is defined by de Coning (2012:1) as the range of political, security and developmental actions undertaken by the international community and local actors to help consolidate peace. Literature on peacebuilding is therefore highly relevant for this case. According to de Coning (2012:1) there exists a ‘coherence dilemma’ in peacebuilding. Building on Dan Smith (2004a), de Coning notes a persistent gap between the assumption in the peacebuilding community that improved coherence leads to greater efficiency and effect, and the fact that significant attempts to improve coherence have not been particularly successful.
3.3.1 The significance of coordination and self-interest

From an intergovernmentalist or realist viewpoint, lack of coherence between actors engaged in security policies is only natural, as all states are expected to pursue their own national interests. In structural realism, this is based on the perception of states as security-seeking entities within an anarchical system, where *relative gains* are more important than *absolute* gains (Glaser 2010:21). Increasing absolute gains is therefore not a sufficient cause for cooperating, as this poses the dilemma of “which state will gain more” (ibid). Based on intergovernmental theory of two-level games, it could be argued that lack of coherence between actors is in fact a probable outcome. If there is no binding forum where states and organizations bargain at a higher, ‘third’ level, organizations are likely to enter the policymaking field with differing ideas as to what should be done and how it should be done, thus conducting incoherent policies. While the UN could be considered such a ‘third level’ bargaining forum for states, it does not facilitate for bargaining between organizations. However, coherent policies would be a probable outcome if the actors essentially want the same thing and stand to gain from the same policies.

Still, even though actors gain from the same policies, this does not automatically lead to coherent policies. The concept of burden-sharing has been used by Hallams and Scheer (2012:313) to describe the need expressed by the United States for Europe to take on more of the financial burden of NATO operations. Burden-sharing can relate to budgetary means, but also to matters of supply of personnel, as the potential loss of lives represents a substantial burden. The disagreement between actors on who is to take the burden could represent a threat to coherent policies in a case where actors choose to pursue policies which imply less costs, without agreeing with other actors on who is to take on the most substantial ‘burden’. This challenge to coherence is commented on in chapter six.

A liberal view of international relations, which accord less significance to the importance of two-level games, implies more positive prospects for coherent policymaking. Based on liberal thoughts on the importance of integration between states, one could assume that more cooperation between states or organizations will lead to more coherence in policymaking. This is because frequent interaction, according to liberal views, can enhance the commonality of interests and also reinforce the prospects of cooperation (Andreatta 2011:35). Based on a similar logic, also constructivist theory can be used to argue that closer cooperation and coordination between actors will lead to a more coherent policy. For instance, Wendt
(1999:257,299) argues that social interaction among states can lead to more friendly ‘cultures of anarchy’ where ideas are shared and states help each other. A prerequisite for such positive prospects of coherence must therefore be that actors engage frequently with each other. The proposition that closer cooperation and efforts of coordination will lead to more coherence is here called the coordination assumption. In answering what the main challenges for achieving an international coherent policy is, actors’ efforts at coordination are discussed in chapter six.

Also analysed in chapter six is whether the prospects for coherence can change with shifts in an actor’s priorities. Scholars often use the concepts of ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’ in describing actor priorities; and matters of national security have traditionally been seen as ‘high politics’. However, in 1977 Keohane and Nye argued that ‘low politics’ of economics and welfare were becoming ‘high politics’, because international relations are steered by a complex interdependence between nations and people, which has made military instruments of less use (1977:24-26). While it is normally assumed that an actor’s fundamental preferences do not change, the society in which actors operate does change. When studying actors’ engagement in a foreign county, we should realize that changes within that country, changes at home and changes in other parts of the world can influence an actor’s engagement. This is because such changes can mean that the specific problem the actor is engaged in moves a step up or a step down on the ‘high low’ policy scale, in absolute or relative terms. In considering whether actors are able to establish coherent policies, it should therefore be taken into account that actors’ priorities can change, creating an unstable environment for the development of coherent policies. Changing priorities can be analysed as a threat to coherence within both a constructivist and an intergovernmentalist framework; it is not that the actors’ fundamental preferences as such change, but that their priorities change in parallel to external developments.

3.3.2 The significance of local ownership

Complexity theory provides an alternative answer to how coherence can be established and why incoherence exists. De Coning employs complexity theory to inform the peacebuilding ‘coherence dilemma’. His essential argument is that local ownership is vital for the establishment of coherent policies (de Coning 2013:3). Complexity theory addresses multi-agent systems that adapt and change according to changes in the environment. However, they do this without any kind of central control mechanism or strategic plan (ibid). This
understanding of the complexity of social systems leads de Coning to define coherence in another manner:

[C]oherence should be understood to pursue an optimal level of cooperation among agents in a given context. In a complex-systems context, the concept thus recognises that what is optimal will be determined by the specific context within which the system is operating (2012:290).

In this way the local context is essential for the establishment of coherence. As described above, this can be understood as a third dimension of coherence as a concept.

De Coning writes of the need for local ownership in peacebuilding in particular: “Peacebuilders need to concede that they cannot, from the outside, definitively analyse complex conflicts and design ‘solutions’ on behalf of a local society” (2012:iii). However, the claim that local ownership is essential for introducing sane policies in a fragile state has been put forward in several fields. In suggesting how states and democracies can be ‘built’, Western actors and scholars have been criticized for trying to introduce Western models in non-Western societies. As any society is made up of complex systems which have developed over time, an outside actor cannot simply introduce an institution from another society and expect good results.

[T]he ability of external agents to gain knowledge of the complex social systems we are dealing with in the peacebuilding context is inherently limited. [...] We are not able to know enough about these systems to predict their behaviour using a linear cause-and-effect science model. Nor can we transfer one model that seemed to work well in one context to another and expect that it would work equally well there (de Coning 2013:4).

What a model consists of varies within the literature, but in general the term refers to guidance or impositions (here: from the West) regarding the forming of basic features in the society. Criticism has been directed at the use of structural adjustment programmes in which liberal reforms have been imposed on African countries in ‘exchange’ for the right to receive aid (Nustad 2006:237). Evidence of the inapplicability of Western models can also be found in Europe. Mair (1997:176-179) notes how the introduction of democratic party systems in Eastern Europe has not always succeeded, because these party systems are based on developments that were specific in time and place for Western Europe. Coherence, as it is viewed in complexity theory, is unlikely to be achieved in war-ridden countries where such models are imposed because this gives little room for local ownership.
Criticisms of the enforcement of ‘models’ are often linked to criticisms highlighting the use of ‘buzzwords’ or ‘framing’ within the development realm. Transparency, good governance, capacity building and institution building are examples of what has been termed ‘buzzwords’ in the development literature. These are all words that sound ‘good’, and which have been considered important ‘values’ by international actors. However, according to Cornwall (2007:474), these words are “vulnerable to appropriation for political agendas that are far from those that the social movements that popularized their use had in mind”. In this way a term like ‘local ownership’ can harbour multiple agendas. ‘Framing’ focuses on the use of such words or concepts in the interest of strong actors. Through ‘framing’ powerful players can draw attention to a specific issue and determine how this issue will be viewed (Bøås and McNeill 2004:1). The promotion of ‘good governance’ is according to Taylor (2004:124) a powerful example of how an idea can be constructed by the North and imposed as ‘common sense’ in the South. In the light of complexity theory, such a process will impede the development of coherence, as coherence hinges on local ownership.

Taking complexity theory into account will imply – not only that lack of coherence can be caused by lack of local ownership – but also that coherence cannot be achieved unless local ownership exists. The use of such a theory perspective implies that studying policy coherence only amongst international actors in insufficient, and that a true study of coherence must involve a wider analysis capturing the context, i.e. the country in which the policy is conducted. Looking at coherence through the lens of complexity theory will further have significance for whether coordination as such should be seen as a factor that promotes coherence. Based on the view that local ownership is essential to coherence, it seems evident that coordination between actors will lead to greater coherence only where such coordination is firmly rooted in local circumstances. Coordination which takes place merely between international actors can, according to this perspective, not be seen as a factor that will in itself ensure coherence. This aspect is discussed in section 6.3.
4 Methodology

This chapter seeks to create transparency regarding the research process. In short, the research strategy chosen for answering the research question is a single case-study, conducted through qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews during fieldwork. This chapter presents the operationalization of the concepts ‘security perspective’ and ‘coherence’. The research design will be discussed in relation to established methodological frameworks, as those of Adcock and Collier (2006) on measurement validity, and Cook and Campbell’s (1979) concepts of validity. Last, the chapter discusses interviews during fieldwork as a research method, and presents choices made in relation to the fieldwork.

4.1 Generalization and internal validity

Many researchers, among them Lijphart (1971:691), claim that case studies lack substantial qualities when it comes to generalizing from one research project into ‘general truths’. The potential for generalization is the main component in what Cook and Campbell (1979) call ‘external validity’. For Lijphart (1975:159-160) generalization is regarded as both a goal in itself, and a requirement for a study to prove that its conclusions are valid and reliable. Lijphart (ibid) links the low potential for generalization to the fact that the case study involves few units of analysis and many variables. This argument has been countered by George and Bennett (2005:110-121) who hold that the case study can be used as a basis for generalization under certain circumstances. They argue the case that is studied needs to be selected with care, and that a well-chosen case can contribute to partial generalizations and theory generation, the latter through ‘theory generating’ cases (ibid).

According to Gerring (2007:38), case studies are most useful for generating hypothesis, not for testing them. Building on George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007), this case study takes the form of an inductive theory-generating study. That the study is inductive implies that theory is generated through research, instead of research being used to test theories (Bryman 2004:266). The study aims at developing theoretical understanding of perspectives and strategies held by different actors in an area where societal structures have broken down and various threats impose risks not only nationally, but also regionally and internationally. The study does not aim to develop a new, grounded theory that immediately can be transposed in other settings: this is impossible within the given timeframe. Instead, the study
should be regarded as a building block in the development of theory on actors’ perspectives towards a weak state which poses security risks on multiple levels, building on already existing theory. In this way, this case study can also be considered a stepping stone on the path towards more generalizable theory.

In spite of his critique of the case study’s generalizing potential, Lijphart (1971:691) acknowledges that the case study has one great advantage – prospects for providing internal validity. Internal validity concerns the interpretation of causal mechanisms in the analysis (Lund 2002:106). When a link is established between two variables, the problem is to establish the causal relationship between them (Cook and Campbell 1979:50). Threats to establishing the causal relationship are uncertainty regarding the direction in which the causality is moving, and whether there are other underlying or intermediate variables that interfere (Lund 2002:116). It can be argued that not only does a case study provide good prospects establishing the causal mechanisms: it offers better prospects than if the study were based on quantitative research. This is because case studies, when well-constructed, “may allow one to peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect” (Gerring 2007:45). Thus the use of a case study does not only facilitate in depth research of the five actors’ perspectives, it also provides better possibilities of achieving good internal validity in the study of the second part of the research question where it is asked which challenges (X) that affect policy coherence (Y).

4.2 Operationalization

A ‘concept’ is a building block in theories, a word or symbol that represents an idea (Manheim et al. 2006:19). When this thesis studies to what extent actors have a shared security perspective, ‘security perspective’ takes the form of a background concept, “the broad constellation of meanings and understandings associated with a given concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001:531). Moving from this to a systematized concept is a process conducted through reasoning and in the light of the goals of the research (ibid). The concept is systematized through a definition. ‘Security perspective’ has been defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. The systematized concept is the basis for operationalization in a research process.
To be able to investigate whether the five actors have a similar security perspective, we must operationalize the theoretical definition of ‘security perspective’ given above. This is in line with level three in Adcock and Collier’s model for conceptualization and measurement in research; the development of indicators by which the concept can be measured. For a concept to be useful it needs to have ‘empirical referents’, which makes it directly or indirectly observable (Manheim et al. 2006:20). In this study, an actor’s security perspective will be measured along the lines of the following questions, which can be considered as indicators:

1. How is the problem defined: what is the over-all main concern that the actor has regarding Somalia?
2. What are the main goals that the actor seeks to achieve through its presence?
3. Which measures does the actor want to apply?
4. How is al-Shabaab perceived? (case-specific question)
5. Who or what is being secured through the actor’s policies?

Question four differs from the others as it is specific for the Somali case. As terrorism is a core concern for many of the actors engaged in Somalia, it seems necessary to incorporate a question dealing specifically with al-Shabaab. The question is highly relevant, as the fight against al-Shabaab has entered a new phase, and crucial to future security in Somalia is the question of which measures are taken to prevent the development of a type of insurgency already seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. While measures, and especially measures that are not yet in place, are hard to study, the analysis focuses on actors’ perceptions of al-Shabaab. As the theory chapter shows, this can be of central importance because differing perceptions of a terrorist group can be vital for which policies are adopted. To establish a clear image of actors’ perspectives, it is also relevant to ask interviewees to which extent they feel their organization or state differs from other actors along the lines of these five questions.

To develop a thorough understanding of each actor’s security perspective it can be useful to ask representatives other questions that will help develop an image of the actor. Useful information includes questions on the length of actors’ engagements, and questions on perspectives in specific policy areas that are viewed as central to security. The length of engagement can be seen as central to the actor’s security perspective, as it can say something about why the actor is involved, by noting when the actor first got involved, and when the
actor intends to withdraw its engagement. The appendix includes a list of questions that were asked to develop a better understanding of the actors’ perspectives.

In answering part two of the research question it has been necessary to specify what is meant by *coherence*. Coherence was defined in the introductory chapter as a situation where actors operate and develop policies so that their efforts pull in the same direction. According to Gebhard (2011:106) coherence has two dimensions; a *technical* dimension and a *policy* dimension, and, in line with de Coning (2012:290), a *local* dimension was added in chapter three. Following Gebhard (2011:124), the thesis sees coherence as a guiding principle which in its ideal form always can be considered to be challenged.

To develop good indicators for the second part of the research question, is somewhat less straightforward, as we need to develop a broad understanding of actors’ policies in order to be able to detect possible constraints to coherence. Thus, the interview might take a less structured form when searching for an answer to this question. Some questions that are relevant as indicators for answering this part of the research question will focus on coordination and actors’ experiences. A valid answer will depend on the respondent’s knowledge and willingness to contribute information. In addition to asking representatives these questions, it is therefore desirable to ask independent experts about their opinions and experiences. Questions regarded as valuable indicators are:

1. Are there political or structural contradictions which impede coherent policymaking?
2. Are there financial or logistical contradictions which impede coherent policymaking?
3. To what extent are you as an organization/state coordinated with others?
4. Are there institutionalized meetings between your organization/state and others?
5. Have some actors pursued policies that were unwise in the opinion of people in your organization?

In addition, it can be useful to ask questions relating to issues known to have been subjected to discussion. Examples of such questions are presented in the appendix.

### 4.3 Measurement validity

A study has good measurement validity if the scoring of units on the indicators is reliable, and if the indicators themselves reflect the operationalized concept (Adcock and Collier
Here, the scoring on the indicators has been conducted according to information provided through semi-structured interviews and information derived from official documents and earlier research. Thus, the potential threats to good measurement validity can occur either in the development of indicators or in the scoring of units on the indicators. The latter is often termed a ‘reliability problem’ (ibid: 531).

Adcock and Collier (2001) propose several ways of testing measurement validity. Content validation is the examination of whether the indicators that have been developed can capture the systematized concepts adequately. This includes an evaluation of whether key elements have been omitted in the indicators, and whether inappropriate questions are included. In this thesis, such an evaluation implies considering whether the questions presented in section 4.2 cover the concept ‘security perspective’ as it is defined above, and whether the questions developed for the second part of research question are sufficient.

The development of indicators is connected to literature in the field of security studies and on the subject of coherence. The indicators have been further developed through reasoning and in the light of knowledge on the current situation in Somalia. Thus, the indicators should reflect the systematized concepts well, but it is difficult to be certain. One advantage of a qualitative study is that it opens up for flexibility in the development of concepts during the phase of data collection (Bryman 2004:269-270). This means for example that if, during research, it is discovered that actors differ or agree along the lines of a dimension that appears central for the concept ‘security perspective’ but has not been included, it will be possible to add such an indicator to the concept, or exclude one that appears irrelevant. In addition, other sources such as strategy papers, news articles and earlier research, will be consulted in an attempt to obtain a thorough understanding of each actor. In this way, the data is triangulated in cases where other information sources are obtainable (Woodhouse 2007:169). As noted in the next paragraph, the use of semi-structured elite interviews will further enable good measurement validity, as it is possible to benefit from the knowledge of the informants.

4.4 Interviews during fieldwork as a method

Given the operationalization of the concept ‘security perspective’ and the theory discussions on how such a perspective should be considered to be formed, it can be argued that the research question will best be answered by using interviews as a research method and by
supplementing the research with literature reviews. This is because the operationalized questions are of a character that can make it difficult to obtain the information by other means. This section begins by explaining why Nairobi and Addis Ababa were chosen as fieldwork locations. Next, I present the selection of informants and the choice of semi-structured interviews; and finally elaborate on some challenges which occurred during fieldwork.

4.4.1 Choice of location

Having decided to study the policies and perspectives of actors engaged in Somalia through interviewing, I had to consider how to obtain relevant information for analysis. Many asked if I was going to Somalia. There are several reasons for why I did not go there. First of all, there were many reservations and doubts, expressed by the university as well as by my family. However, I also spoke to several people who underscored that there were currently safe areas where I might go in Somalia. The decisive factor was that I simply did not have enough time to establish good connections and a network of personal security. Had I been working on a project with a larger time frame, I would probably have been able to conduct some research within Somalia in a safe manner. In addition, however, travelling to Somalia would entail considerably higher expenses.

I saw it as necessary for the research to go to Nairobi – independently on whether I had travelled to Somalia or not. This is because many actors have representations in Nairobi and there is a large international community dealing with Somalia who is situated there. When I chose to go to Addis Ababa in addition it was because the African Union is based there and because actors such as IGAD have representations in Addis Ababa, not least the IGAD facilitation office for Somalia. I found it highly useful to meet people working in the two cities, and I am sure this has given me a broader understanding of the organizations and the actors. One interviewee (Informant Q 09.02.2013) working in Addis Ababa also noted that the differences in geographical location between Nairobi and Addis Ababa have led to some differences regarding how internationals see Somalia – those based in Nairobi being more occupied with the South-Central and areas bordering on Kenya. Having visited and talked to representatives in the two cities, I felt better equipped to analyse the broader international engagement. Because I had been advised that there would be more relevant actors to interview in Nairobi, I chose to spend two weeks there and one week in Addis Ababa. Realizing that my
time in Addis Ababa would be short, I worked intensively to get as many interviews there as possible. In the end I conducted seven interviews in Addis Ababa and ten in Nairobi. A few interviews were cancelled in each location.

4.4.2 Informants

Before leaving Norway I set a goal of interviewing at least two key informants representing each of the five actors studied during the fieldwork. In addition I wanted to interview more independent experts on the field. In the case of one actor – the United States – I managed to get only one interview. In the case of the EU and the UN I got three interviews. In total 18 people were interviewed, 17 of whom were interviewed during fieldwork. Of the 18 who were interviewed, 11 represented one of the actors studied and seven represented other bodies. Of these seven, three were from the academic world, one was from an NGO and three were diplomats working for their country’s embassy. Three of the people interviewed during the fieldwork were Somali by nationality or ethnicity. Only two of the interviewees were women. During the fieldwork I tried to increase the rate of Somalis interviewed by asking interviewees for Somali connections. I was also aware of the low share of female informants and tried to do what I could to get interviews with female experts without detaching myself from the research goal of interviewing elites and experts in the field.

As pointed out by Goldstein (2002:669) a primary concern for research that builds on interviews is to get the interview. With this in mind, I started building contacts early on. By participating at the conference of Somali Studies International Association at Lillehammer early in October 2012, I established contact with several scholars, among them Ibrahim Farah of the University of Nairobi. By attending the launch of the UNDP report on Somalia’s country programme at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs, I also established contact with the Country Director of UNDP Somalia, David Clapp. Both these contacts were willing to put me in contact with relevant informants. Further, in the field I used ‘snowball sampling’, a technique whereby one asks the interviewees if they know of any other people that it would be good to interview. This provided access to other valuable sources.

Although I had established contacts in advance, there is always a risk of interviews being cancelled once the fieldwork has started. Non-response among certain informants can lead to biased results, causing random and systematic errors in research (Goldstein 2002:669), which in turn will affect measurement validity. A prime concern was the necessity of getting
interviews with representatives of all the five actors in focus in this study. Unfortunately, I could obtain only one interview with a US representative. On the other hand, Goldstein (2002:670) has noted that an advantage with elite interviews is that it is often easier to know something about attitudes and characteristics of the non-respondents. This does not mean that one is free to interpret based on information obtained elsewhere. But such information can in this case help to inform the analysis of the United States, together with the primary information obtained through interviewing. As the United States is a substantial actor that other actors are aware of, I believe I have enough information to include it in the analysis. In addition, as Goldstein (ibid) notes, elite interviews have the advantage that in cases where information about an actor is absent, the lack of knowledge can be exposed in the thesis. This is opposed to the use of questionnaires where the researcher does not know anything about who the non-respondents are. Thus, I decided to treat the United States as an actor in this analysis, commenting on any specific matter where my information is limited.

4.4.3 Semi-structured interviews

The thesis is based on the use of semi-structured interviews. This typically refers to a context where the researcher has a list of questions that are posed to all informants, but where the questions can be general in form and there are possibilities to follow up on questions if interesting information is provided (Bryman 2004:113). The order in which the questions are posed can also vary from interview to interviews (ibid). Semi-structured interviews often use open-ended questions (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:674). This is also the case in this thesis, and for several reasons. First, the use of open ended questions is an advantage when the contextual nuance of the response is of importance. In this study where actors’ perspectives are analysed it is essential to establish the context within which informants’ statements are made. This requires more attention from the interviewer than in typical highly structured interviews (ibid). Further, there has been limited research on the security perspectives furthered by various actors in Somalia, which makes it more difficult to formulate close-ended questions. Thirdly, in line with Aberbach and Rockman, one can argue that open ended questions will maximize response validity. This is because “open-ended questions provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks” (ibid). In seeking to determine the actors’ security perspectives, I saw it as important that informants should be given the opportunity to frame statements in their own way. Fourthly, elites or highly educated people seldom like being put in the straitjacket that close ended
questions can be (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:674). As the informants interviewed for this study are experts on their field, they might dislike questions that do not allow them to give their own interpretations. Rather, as Leech points out, “semistructured interviews allow respondents the chance to be the experts and inform the research” (2002:665).

Unstructured interviews would have provided even greater possibilities for informants to elaborate on their own views. The disadvantage is that unstructured interviews offer fewer possibilities for comparison. As comparison of actors is important in this case, unstructured interviews are less suitable. In addition it can prove difficult to get information on the research subject if the interview is unstructured and leaves space open for discussion of a range of themes and subjects. I therefore found semi-structured interviews to be the most useful research method.

4.4.4 Challenges during fieldwork

Most of the fieldwork was conducted without substantial problems. Much time was spent calling, e-mailing and interviewing informants. On a few occasions I experienced that informants had to cancel meetings. This concerned representatives from the UNDP, the EU and two representatives from the AU. This presented a problem, as my time in the field was limited and the cancellations often were announced only a short time before the interview was supposed to take place. Therefore I did not have time to contact and meet anyone else as a substitute for the interviews that were cancelled. However, having conducted 17 interviews in the field in total, I am satisfied with the outcome of the fieldwork.

Another challenge was deciding on the form of the interview when in the process of interviewing. As explained above, I had decided to use semi-structured interviews, and had prepared an interview guide of 20 questions that I saw as relevant for answering the research question. However, I was soon impressed with the substantial knowledge among my informants. Many of them had followed Somalia issues for decades, and they possessed in-depth knowledge that put much information I myself had obtained in a different light. That made it inadvisable not to benefit further from their information. This in turn, led the interviews to take a form that expanded more in the direction of the unstructured interview. The interviews were still were conducted in a semi-structured manner – as I guided the informant and made sure that I thought the subject of the conversation was relevant to the research. However, the interviews became less structured than what I had originally
anticipated, as many of the questions I posed were follow-up questions to the information provided by the interviewee, and not the initial questions I had prepared. In any case, towards the end of an interview I glanced quickly through the main questions, to make sure that the most important areas had been covered.

I see it as an advantage that informants were given space to talk about their views and concerns. This led many of them to open up sometimes offering critical perspectives regarding their own organizations or their state. This presented a new challenge, as it became necessary to distinguish between the informants as representatives speaking on behalf of an actor and informants as individuals with their own opinions and sometimes disagreeing with the actor they represented. As criticism from within can be a very valuable source of information, I chose to let informants speak on behalf of themselves. However, I often included some questions on what views the actor itself had on a matter when I felt this information was necessary. One consequence of letting the informants speak their minds about the actors they represented is that it became necessary to anonymize the informants. This I have done by not mentioning the title or the name of the informant, only what kind of institution the informant represents. I discussed with each informant whether or how he or she could be quoted. Although it would have been advantageous for the transparency of the research process to name all informants, I concluded that more would be gained than lost by anonymizing the informants. This is because, in many cases, only anonymization would make the actors speak their minds freely.
5 Analysis of Security Perspectives

To what extent do international actors involved in Somalia have similar security perspectives?

This chapter includes part one of the analysis, and analyses to what degree regional and international actors in Somalia have a similar security perspective. The analysis is based on the definition and operationalization of security perspective given in chapter 4. Extensive interviewing was undertaken during fieldwork to get a broad and comprehensive understanding of actors’ perspectives. The results are organized and presented in line with the operationalization of the concept, which provided five questions (section 4.2).

In the following, actors’ main concerns and their main goals – questions one and two – are analysed together, as an actor’s definition of the problem and an actor’s main goal, by consequence are closely connected. This analysis is conducted on two levels: first, at an overall strategic level, and second, at the level of Somalia. This is done because actors simultaneously can pursue overall strategic objectives based on national interest and objectives more narrowly focused on Somalia. After these two analyses are presented in section 5.1 and 5.2, section 5.3 will discuss which measures actors want to use in pursuing their security politics. Section 5.4 presents an analysis of actors’ perceptions of al-Shabaab. Section 5.5 draws on the responses provided in the four first sections, and discusses what the referent object or objects for the actors’ security policies is: who or what is being secured in Somalia? Finally, section 5.6 provides an answer to the first part of the research question.

5.1 Problem definition and strategic objective

This section reflects on self-interest as a predominant factor in determining actors’ strategic objectives. Thereafter, it discusses more closely to what extent each actor has a strategic objective, and what this is. I highlight the role single states can play within an organization when determining what key problems are and what strategic objectives should be. This is in line with intergovernmentalist thought on how actors’ security perspectives are formed.

During fieldwork, several informants reflected openly on the significance self-interest had for the involvement of their state or organization. Actors’ perceptions of the overall problem and
actors’ strategic objectives are clearly guided by self-interest. A US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013) stated frankly:

*The most pressing issue for us is counter-terrorism. [...] Honestly, governance and other issues are interesting and important aspects, but for us this is just a vehicle to make Somalia less threatening to us, and to the region.*

In the same vein an EU diplomat stated:

*Implicitly, what Europe is buying with the money put into African peace and security is security in Europe, secure trade and a way to manage migration (Informant Q 09.02.2013).*

In the diplomatic circles the weight of self-interest seemed so evident that it was even frowned on if a country portrayed its involvement as driven by a purely humanitarian agenda. One diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) commented that Turkey was naïve in portraying itself as having no agenda or interests in Somalia, claiming that the Turkey aimed to be a progressive power in the region and to secure business growth. “We know what moves the world. It is not a scandal. You [Turkey] did well under the humanitarian crisis – and now you have business in Somalia. Good for you.” On the other hand, countries such as Norway have shown that a humanitarian agenda can go hand in hand with national interest. As Norwegian diplomat, Informant P (01.02.2013) explained; Norway’s engagement in Somalia is closely linked to the fact that Norway wishes to present itself as a strong actor in matters of peace and reconciliation. As highlighted by academics such as Terje Tvedt (2003), Norway can be seen as having a national interest in presenting itself as a peace-nation.

Looking more closely at the objectives stated by US and EU diplomats, it is clear that these are related to problem definitions based on past experiences. The July bombings in London in 2005 were carried out by British youths of Somali origin (Informant Q 09.02.2013). The Americans have on several occasions dealt with youth of Somali origin leaving the United States for training camps in Somalia (Harper 2012:99), not to mention the fact that Somalia played an important role as transit and residence country for the terrorists who bombed the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 (USIP 2004:9). For the EU, matters of trade and migration are perhaps as important as security, or at least more pressing on a daily basis. “Any European trade which goes through the Red sea and the Suez Canal has got higher overheads because of Somali piracy,” explained one EU-diplomat (Informant Q
09.02.2013). The weight put on self-interest revitalizes the classical realist assumption that national interest trumps in determining an actor’s foreign policy.

The case of the EU also shows that national interests can coincide and be expressed in the form of a larger, regional self-interest, shaped through intergovernmental negotiations. The funding provided to AMISOM through the EU’s African Peace Facility, and the spending of the money on Somali affairs is subject to unanimity vote in the EU (Informant Q 09.02 2013). However, it is still possible that strong states in the EU play decisive roles, as demonstrated by Matlary (2009:126) in the case of the EU’s involvement in Congo in 2003 where the decisions of France and the UK proved decisive. In commenting on whether particular countries are driving the foreign engagement, an EU-diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) answered: “Yes, it is bound to be true. Different countries have different historical backgrounds with particular areas.” Especially pertinent in this regard are the former colonial powers in Somalia: Italy and Great Britain. France is also not to be forgotten, as has repeatedly shown dedication to a strong EU foreign policy (Matlary 2009:79). A French initiative was a significant contributor for the initiation of operation Atalanta. When chairing a UN Security Council meeting in September 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy told the council:

*France stands ready to ensure security for the assistance provided by the World Food Program in Somalia for a period of two months using naval military resources. [...] I call on all those who wish to do so to join this initiative (AFP 2007).*

This indicates, in line with intergovernmentalist theory, that strong actors can use multinational organizations as forums for influence.

Compared to the clearly stated objectives of the United States and the EU, it is more difficult to grasp whether the UN has a strategic objective. This is largely the case because the UN itself is not a unitary actor in Somalia. As explained in chapter 2, UN engagement in Somalia consists of two political missions and a set of specialized agencies together constituting the ‘Country Team’ for Somalia. The Country Team is under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator and Designated Official for Security (UNCT Somalia 2010). The Country Team does not share leadership with the two political missions who are under the leadership of the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General, a position held by the head of UNPOS (ibid). This structure, and the fact that all UN bodies operating inside Somalia have their own tasks and mandates, results in a split approach by the UN in Somalia, something which was criticized by several informants. Whether the
political missions and the Country Team should be gathered under one SRSG (Special Representative to the Secretary General) was being reviewed in the UN strategic review at the time of writing. Such a joint structure would coordinate the UN bureaucracy internally. At the time of my fieldwork, it was clear the humanitarian bodies within the UN did not favour a joint structure, as this would lead them to compromise their operations. One informant (B16.01.2013) explained: “It is not necessarily good to be associated with the political side of the UN”. The UN can also be considered split between the UN secretariat and agencies on one side and the Security Council on the other. Especially prominent in decisions are the UK, the United States and France – popularly referred to as the P3. One informant (K 29.01.2013) states: “There is a clear distinction between the P3 and the Secretariat. It is ultimately not the UN Secretariat but the member states that decide, through the Security Council.” When put together, these circumstances make it difficult to pin-point exactly what a UN strategic objective would be. When a UN informant (B 16.01.2013) was asked what the current position of the UN was in Somalia, he answered: “I am not sure the UN has a position.” The complex system of agencies within the UN bureaucracy, with different leaderships, combined with Security Council actors which have the final say, makes it reasonable to question whether the UN as a whole has a clear objective for its engagement in Somalia.

The mandate of AMISOM has from the outset been to support the Transitional Federal Institutions in Somalia;

\[...\] in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to create conditions conducive for long term reconstruction and development (AMISOM 2012a: 4)

While AMISOM has engaged in war fighting with al-Shabaab, counterterrorism does not seem to be the overarching goal of the operation. An informant in AMISOM (L 29.01.2013) puts it this way: “We will win the war only when I see the government respecting the constitution and being inclusive.” The objective of stabilizing the country can be related to regional self-interest, while the instability of Somalia has had large regional consequences. Kenya currently hosts the world’s largest refugee camp with Somali refugees; there have also been several attacks by al-Shabaab both in Kenya and Uganda, and Somalia has been described as “a front in a proxy war” between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Woldemichael 2011:5). A more indirect objective, as stated by AMISOM representatives, is to demonstrate African capability and leadership in affairs on the African continent.
We are creating a precedent for what peace enforcement should look like. [...] The interesting experience with this operation is that this is African led, African owned. [...] We have received support from western countries and we are most grateful, but this [an African led operation] is what works. (Informant L 29.01.2013)

The representative goes on to mention that the experiences of AMISOM in Somalia are being reviewed by actors involved in Mali. The informant predicts a future where AU operations in Africa can become the new and improved standard peace operations. Although the mission has cost the lives of many African soldiers, it should not be forgotten that soldiers and states have benefited economically from the fact that Western countries have put money into African security and defence. This creates some economic motivation for AMISOM, its soldiers and the participating countries to continue deploying soldiers. Thus, the case of AMISOM shows that engagement based on self-interest also can be connected to goals of demonstrating capacity and capability. Still, we should bear in mind that the countries actively involved in AMISOM are countries in the same region, whose national security can be threatened as a result of Somali instability.

As for the greater African Union, the strategic objectives of the IGAD countries can be linked to the need for regional stabilization. However, many informants pointed out the interests of neighbouring countries Kenya and Ethiopia as complicating factors. Both these countries have substantial Somali populations, and there has been fear within these countries of a ‘Greater Somalia’ policy (Woldemichael 2011: 7). In addition, the Kenyans may have benefited hugely from the uncontrolled trade over the Somali border. One diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) explained: “Sugar is smuggled into Kenya through Kismayo. It is coming in illegally, not being taxed. If it were to stop, Kenya would run out of sugar in a day.” Another diplomat agreed that smuggling was taking place: “Sugar in normal times. Now there will be Kenyan elections in March, which means money [is smuggled in] for the campaigns, and possibly weapons for after the results.” This suggests that both countries have considerable interests in keeping a friendly local administration in the Jubaland region which borders on their countries, and it has led many to describe the situation as Kenya and Ethiopia needing a ‘buffer zone’ in Somalia. A UN employee (Informant E 18.01.2013) says: “Kenya has said themselves that they want a ‘buffer zone’ to enable the refugees to go back.” Senior researcher Morten Bøås explains that a great fear for Ethiopia is that the Ogaden Liberation Front in Ethiopia would gain access to the sea. As the Kenyans historically have had a strong relationship with the Ogaden, Kenyan security is a slap in the face for Ethiopian security.
(Bøås 2013, seminar discussions at FAFO). However, relations between the countries have improved.

In 2012 IGAD developed a Grand Stabilization Plan for south-central Somalia. One of the central tasks of the plan is the establishment of local administration in Somalia (IGAD 2013). An informant (D 17.01.2013) connected to IGAD describes Kenya and Ethiopia as dominating actors within IGAD with the potential of driving IGAD initiatives in the directions of their own benefits. This informant explained that after Kenya and Ethiopia entered Somalia with military forces in the region of Jubaland, they needed an umbrella under which they could operate. They therefore adopted the IGAD Stabilization Plan, and developed a ‘Jubaland initiative’ under it. “The Jubaland initiative was technically led by IGAD, but practically led by Kenya and Ethiopia” (ibid). Kenya and Ethiopia also took central positions in the forming of the Joint Committee which would drive the IGAD Stabilization Plan. Informant D mentioned several problems in this process. First, the committee was chaired by Kenyans and Ethiopians – and not by Somalis; second there were no other IGAD countries present; third the committee was dominated by representatives of Somali origins – who could be suspected to have clan interests; and forth on the Kenyan side the work was led by people from security agencies. Regarding the latter point the informant explained his view on the IGAD Stabilization Plan and the Jubaland initiative as follows:

*In my view this is not a security problem per se. This is a political problem. [...] We are talking about issues of development and governance. [...] When the new Somali president wanted to be briefed, he asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya. However, they had been side-lined by the Kenyan intelligence service and the national defence. They did not know anything about what was being done.*

This suggests that national interest is not only a decisive factor in explaining what IGAD sees as problems and main goals: national security concerns can also lead to securitization of issues that are not necessarily security issues *per se*, such as the question of local governance. This is in line with constructivist thought on the securitization of issues, as defined by Stokke (2011:329).

In conclusion, the actors involved in Somalia seem largely driven by self-interest, reflecting to large extent realist perceptions of international relations. In the case of the United States the role of national interest seems to be particularly clear. Still, the engagement of actors through multinational organizations should be interpreted in a wider theory framework. Intergovernmental explanations then seem best suited. In the case where actors are
multinational organizations, agendas can be driven by strong actors with vested interests, as seems to be the case in IGAD. This is also to some extent the case for the AU where the countries in the Horn of Africa have shown greater leadership and initiative. Still, we should note that neither Kenya nor Ethiopia played a major role in AMISOM from the start. Such an absence from the scene of neighbouring states with questionable interest could be attributed to the need to establish legitimacy for the operation. Organizations can also be driven by a common agenda, which seems to be the case regarding the EU. At last, it is not to be forgotten that intergovernmental organizations can suffer from lack of capability in forming a clear, joint strategic objective. In the UN, the organizational structure itself and the high number of member states influencing it creates a complex bureaucracy through which policies are directed. Although mandates are given and objectives are stated, it is difficult to grasp whether the UN really has a clear objective for its engagement in Somalia.

5.2 Actors’ objectives inside Somalia

Despite differences in strategic objectives we can observe convergence regarding the goals actors set for Somalia itself. During fieldwork it became clear that the overall objective actors have for Somalia is that the country is stabilized, creating room for some sort of security – the nature of which will be discussed in section 5.5. In spite of concerns raised as to the motives of Ethiopia and Kenya, it seems that also these countries wish for stabilization in some form, as portrayed through the initiatives the two countries showed in taking on the IGAD Stabilization Plan. Looking further into actors’ current objectives, we can observe that a common goal seems to have developed since September 2012. In short, there is agreement on the need to support the new, current government among staff in the UN, the EU, the United States, the AU and IGAD. Often mentioned in the same breath is the need for security sector reform, meaning the need for the development of a Somali police, Somali security forces and other rule-of-law institutions. These goals can be linked to an understanding of the principal problem of Somalia as being the lack of effective rule and government institutions.

Support for the government is here treated as an objective actors have, because the strong wish to support the government which actors display implies a certain degree of detachment regarding which policies this support will result in. Based on the interviews conducted, it seems fair to argue that actors in general are saying ‘we wish to support the government in all they do’ and not ‘we wish to support the government because they will do x, y and z’. As the
support for the new government represents the clearest development in actors’ objectives for Somalia, and because this support can be judged somewhat more controversial than a general objective of establishing stability, the discussion here will focus upon this.

The election of President Hassan Sheik has been met with positive responses from the international community. Of the 18 diplomats, academics, higher officials and aid workers interviewed for this thesis, 17 expressed a positive attitude towards the new government and a new, genuine sense of optimism. These numbers can by no means be generalized, but they do demonstrate that there has been a shift in the international community towards more optimism. However, most interviewees also underlined the many tasks that remain to be done.

The shift in attitudes following the presidential election seems to have created a new joint agenda, namely to give lead to the new government, to support central institution building under the new government, and to support the new government’s initiatives. The initiatives are based on a six-pillar structure carved out by the elected president Hassan Sheik Mohamud. From the six pillars he has defined three pillars as first priorities; security, judiciary and public financed management (Informant M 30.01.2013). In parallel the president wishes to build 5 small projects in 72 districts: a school, a well, a police station, a health centre and a local administrative building. An EU diplomat (Informant M) expressed his consent to this approach by stating: “This is exactly what we think it is reasonable to start with.”

When talking of the current objectives for Somalia, representatives from various actors directly and indirectly stated their desire to support the current government. These are only some of their statements:

A US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013):

*On the agenda now is capacity building. Of national security forces, and of the Somali government, so that they can create credibility and show that they are able to provide services. AMISOM has created some space – let’s do something about it. So far the momentum is good – it seems like it is all coming together. There is genuine hope with the new government.*

EU diplomats:

*In order to make the need go away you are going to have to build a state. The EU from a political perspective is very interested in building the administration, the local and the federal. I do not think the EU will do this directly, but we have a lot of money for those who will do it (Informant Q 09.02.2013). Stability, including security sector reform is one of the main interests for us (Informant M 30.01.2013).*
A UN employee (Informant E 18.01.2013):

There are a range of issues to be done. Local governance structures must be set up, there must be created some sort of trust in the government providing security rather than armed groups and clan militias. The government must become able to deliver services and health care, and there must be a process of truth and reconciliation.

An AMISOM officer (Informant L 29.01.2013):

Governance is at the heart of everything. The priority is governance and rule of law. Building all-inclusive institutions and providing services. Then we must begin the process of healing and reconciliation.

An IGAD employee, Somali Facilitation Office (Informant O 01.02.2013):

The lead role now is played by the Somali government. Our office needs to define its role again. We must support and assist the new government in real institution building.

These quotes show actors’ positive attitudes towards the new government, and the weight actors put on institution building. This is an interesting observation for several reasons. First, because it is a significant breach compared to the general attitude towards the former Transitional Federal Government. Second, because this shows the weight actors put on central institution building. Not only do actors underline the need for such institutions, but an institutional change in itself is what has brought around a change in attitudes and a new optimism. This is interesting because it demonstrates that actors put much weight on institution building, in line with an ‘institutions first’ approach to state development and stabilization. The apparent disadvantage of such an approach is, as reflected on in chapter three, the threat of disconnect between an elite responsible for institution building and the wider population. Being a country which has repelled attempts on creating a central administration for over 20 years, Somalia is likely to be very vulnerable to such a disconnect.

In her book Networks of Dissolution Simons (1995) analyses the Somali society as culturally and tribally fractured creating centrifugal forces which has caused dissolution of the Somali state. Building a central Somali administration from the top-down which is accepted by all Somalis is therefore not an easy task.

The use of the ‘4.5’ formula whereby the seats in the parliament are divided equally between the four principal clans (the Dir, Darood, Issaq and Hawiye), and whereby the minority clans together are given half as many seats as a principal clan, has been an attempt to secure a link between the central governance structure and the general population. However, neither
appointment to the parliament nor the presidential position in 2012 was subject to popular voting. Not all see the ‘4.5’ formula as a sufficient factor ensuring a link between the general population and the central administration. An experienced worker from an international NGO (Informant H 24.01.2013) stated: “The current government is an absolute mess. Public support outside Mogadishu is very limited.” The informant sees the optimism towards the new government on behalf of the international community as driven by discourse. “What gets funded in Somalia is subject to the discourse of international actors. It has been counter-terrorism, counter-piracy. Now, it is the new government.” This statement opens up for the possibility of seeing policy goals in Somalia as ‘framed’ by the international society. The process whereby powerful actors determine how a specific policy is viewed, thus limiting critical views on the policy (Boås and McNeill 2004:1).

However, international actors themselves can also be subject to rhetorical influence. In answering why the presidential election culminated in such a positive international response, an EU diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) said:

*He [the president] is reasoning straight on what the country has to do. From the six pillars, he has chosen three for immediate focus. [...] This is an achievement because the rhetoric so far has been grand plans and financial schemes to get as much money as possible. [...] On the other side of the coin: having been involved in civil society, he knows how to talk to us.*

This comment shows that also the rhetoric of the president himself has been influential in shaping the optimism in the international society.

Having underlined that supporting the current government seems to have become an objective in itself among actors, it is important to note that each mission that has been created for Somalia on behalf of actors as the UN, the AU and the EU has a mandate and specific objectives they pursue. Which concrete objectives the missions pursue will depend on which mandate is given. Consequently, actors will to some extent pursue different objectives, but these objectives can all be seen as part of a bigger mutual objective of stability seeking. However, because of recent developments, several of these missions are now in a phase of uncertainty. While the IGAD Stabilization Office says it has to determine a new role for itself (Informant O 01.02.2013), the UN Strategic Review has concluded that UNPOS in its current form will cease to exist (What’s in Blue 2013b). Also AMISOM’s future is uncertain, not only for financial reasons (this will be discussed in chapter 6), but because the context in which they are operating is changing as al-Shabaab have withdrawn from many areas. Actors
have seen it as necessary to review the mandates and missions they have assigned, because they view the current situation as a significant change in the state of affairs. This is particularly evident in the cases of the UN and the AU, where two strategic reviews were initiated.

Thus, what actors see as current objectives in Somalia is in motion. Stability is still an objective actors can unite around, but at the same time we are experiencing mission objectives in flux and an evolving of agendas. In this situation one of the clearest actor objectives is to support the new government and institution building. This corresponds to established theory on institution building as highlighted by the ‘institutions-first’ approach. However, as the current government is not popularly elected, this also poses questions regarding how actors assume that wider stability will be achieved in Somali regions far from the capital.

5.3 The choice of measures

This subchapter highlights which measures for stability and securement actors are especially concerned with at this phase in Somalia. ‘Measures’ refer to which physical implementations or structural changes actors see as the priority when pursuing their objectives. While highlighting the heavy weight put on AMISOM and the building of national security forces and central institutions, the chapter will also comment on the significance actors are giving to more humanitarian measures and to a decentralized approach.

The actors studied agree to a large extent on which measures one should prioritize at this point. The current phase is dominated by a debate on how AMISOM can continue, and how and when AMISOM eventually can be phased out and replaced by another mission or by the Somali Security Forces (SSF) – all in parallel to the development of the SSF and rule of law institutions. Both AMISOM itself and the building of the security forces and institutions can essentially be seen as measures used to stabilize and secure the country. As explained in the previous section, the weight put on central institution development is significant. However, the research has revealed that all actors to some extent value a combination of institutional development and humanitarian measures. This is for example demonstrated in the EU ‘comprehensive approach’ (European Commission 2012a), which proclaims that the EU will contribute to the social and economic development of Somalia, in addition to acting on the more specific mandate to deter and prevent piracy (EU NAVFOR).
A humanitarian issue that gets much attention is the issue of providing basic social services to the population. The government and international actors seem to agree on the significance of efforts being set in at local levels. There is an agreement on the need to provide social services to the population, and there is a wide spread understanding of the need for the government to be the provider. This is because the central administration in this way can prove their legitimacy out in the districts by showing that they can provide for their citizens. As a representative from AMISOM (Informant K 29.01.2013) put it: “If the government cannot demonstrate ‘this is what it means to have a government’, then it has a problem.” The weight put on provision of services in the districts goes hand in hand with a new attention regarding the success of local and regional forms of governance in more stable parts of Somalia. In 2010 the United States adopted a ‘dual-track approach’, signifying that there should be some recognition for the achievements in more stable regions of Somalia, such as Punland and Somaliland, and putting weight on the importance of civil society groups and clan leaders (USAID 2011). The US move towards greater focus on the benefits of federalism was made in parallel to moves towards a localized focus on behalf of other actors. A diplomat from the UK (Informant I 24.01.2013) states that the UK to a slightly greater extent than the United States wishes to support localized processes for achieving stability.

Our view is that areas that have become stabilized in Somalia have done so in a localized manner. So what we want to support are localized processes – even at village level. We want to try to consolidate some stability and expand upon that. At the same time we want to support the national government as well. To some extent like the US has done with its dual-track approach.

These developments are positive from the point of view of theoretical work focusing on transformation, where processes are established whereby “actors and institutions affect each other in attempts to reform rather than adjust to the relations of power, thus advancing towards democracy and peace” (Törnquist 2011:825). However, for the time being it remains unclear what these localized processes will look like and when they will be implemented.

Several interviewees also highlighted that the instability of Somalia and the recruitment to extremism has been affected by the lack of job opportunities for young men. However, the subject is not necessarily at the top of the agendas. One representative (Informant J 25.01.2013) from the UN said:

We discuss job creation, but you will not see it in the Secretary General’s report. Economic development is an area the UN needs to focus more on. But it is not as if we
are getting pressure from the Security Council. It does not get the amount of attention as it should.

Youth unemployment is one of the factors that are widely accepted to be of importance when it comes to preventing recruitment to extremist groups. This is for example shown in the research on Somalia by Bjørgo and Gjelsvik (2012: 7). The fact that a UN employee calls for larger commitment in this field, is therefore an interesting observation. A lack of initiative in this field can provoke questions regarding how concerned actors really are in implementing measures locally instead of centrally.

Based on the discussion of strategic objectives in section 5.1 it seems plausible to ask whether the measures actors give significance to regarding the development inside Somalia are in line with their greater strategic objectives. More specifically one could ask if the apparent focus on local initiatives is genuine. One EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) explains it this way:

If I had to play the devil’s advocate and agree with the critics, I would say; nothing has changed. We still maintain the same interests. We will go on with Atalanta. The US will go on and try to limit the expansion of fundamentalism and Islamism. As will Kenya and Ethiopia [continue to pursue their interests]. But, this new situation allows us to do all this a bit closer to what Somali intellectuals define as the problem. Because of the stability, we are now able to move on to addressing the root causes.

Building on this description, one can conclude that strengthening local structures is not first priority for actors as the EU and the United States. However, the new phase Somalia has entered allows the actors to be more concerned with such issues. Interestingly enough the statement demonstrates that even though one has been aware that there are root causes to be dealt with, these root causes have not been the primary target for polices. Combined with the large focus on AMISOM, Atalanta, institution-building and security sector reform, this indicates that actors first and foremost have sought to implement stability from the top and down, instead of working from the bottom and up through localized processes. Preceding in this manner is in line with the *institution first* approach, in which one prioritizes strengthening the rule of law and state capacity over democracy (Törnquist 2011:823), but contradicts ideas of *transformation* which highlights the need for building local capacity (ibid). Such an approach also contradicts basic assumptions of *complexity theory* which assumes that external agents have limited possibilities to gain knowledge of complex social systems (de Coning 2013:4), and that the top-down introduction of models enhancing stability therefore is likely to fail.
To sum up, the actors seem to agree to a large extent on which measures it is important to prioritize at this point. They wish to implement a wide range of measures focusing on the development of local and federal governance structures, and security sector reform in parallel to the providing of services to the population. Through interviews representatives from different actors agreed to a large extent on the range of root causes that needed to be addressed and which broader measures that were necessary. Weight is given both to centralized and decentralized measures, but there seems to be more focus on centralized measures as institution building and security sector reform. This creates uncertainty regarding whether processes will be put in place to facilitate for a transformation process in Somalia. At the same time, similar attitudes do not necessarily lead to coherence and joint efforts in policymaking and implementation. Financial capacities and maybe ultimately the actor’s will to invest time, money or personnel can affect what each actor contributes with at the end of the day. This will be further discussed in chapter 6.

5.4 Perceptions of al-Shabaab – implications for counter-terrorism measures

The theory chapter debates how differing perceptions of a terrorist group can affect which measures an actor will use to put an end to the violence. Two types of strategies are outlined in line with the work of Lederach (2012:7); those of isolation and engagement. This section will compare the differing views on al-Shabaab found among informants. It should be noted that the informants’ views shared here might be influenced by their personal stances, and are not necessarily official views expressed on behalf of the actors. However, this is of less significance as the point is to highlight that differences in perceptions exists and that these have significance when considering whether it could be an option to negotiate with al-Shabaab.

Informants’ views on al-Shabaab extend between two extremes; to look at al-Shabaab a solely local Somali problem of despaired, jobless and war-ridden youth, and to see it as an international terrorist organization. Following these two perceptions is the notion that al-Shabaab is a pure local or global problem. While no actor takes either of these extreme positions, informants do hold differing perceptions on what al-Shabaab really is. An interesting analogy was given by an AMISOM informant (K 29.01.2013) who compared the organization to an onion:
The al-Shabaab is a wing of a global Islamic movement whose objective is to put the entire world under strict sharia rule. They believe this is non-negotiable. Composition of the organization is like an onion, it has layers. There are those who are fascinated, there are those who are there for economic gains. There are those who are coerced or manipulated. But some believe they are God’s messengers, crusaders in their own right. This is the core of al-Shabaab.

The statement is interesting because it places the global aspect of al-Shabaab at the core. It will therefore in the following be called the international core-view. This core assumption will have implications for whether the actor sees an engagement strategy, in Lederach’s terms, as a possible counter-terror measure. The AMISOM informant explains his view:

There have been those who renounce violence. As long as you renounce violence we will talk to you. Some of these will be low level, some high level [within the organization]. [...] For those at the core it is unthinkable to negotiate.

We should be careful to conclude from this that AMISOM would pressure against negotiations with al-Shabaab if the government wished to enter into some kind of negotiations. However, we should neither assume that the perceptions of actors inside the mission are without significance. It is therefore interesting to compare this view to the view of other informants.

An EU informant (Q 09.02.2013) explains that the general European view is that one should talk to whoever is willing to talk, but that a conversation with some of the extreme Islamists in al-Shabaab is not going to be constructive. He explains the ideal approach like this:

Politics should always lead, and the military should follow. Political change should be reducing the issue, picking off the pieces that can be dealt with until you have got the one piece you cannot deal with left. Then you deal with that piece on its own [using other measures, as military]. I think that is the approach to Shabaab.

This can be regarded as another way of seeing the al-Shabaab organization as an organization with layers. Not necessarily by looking at the extreme Islamists as the core and the heart of the organization, but by looking at them as the one piece you cannot deal with through political means. I will call this the political-military piece view. Such a view could seem strikingly similar to the first, but when it comes to possibilities for negotiating with al-Shabaab as a group – the two views imply quite different possibilities. While both views highlight that there are al-Shabaab members that could be reintegrated into society, the international core-view presupposes that the heart of the organization is made up by actors that will not negotiate. An actor holding such a view will hardly press for negotiations with
the al-Shabaab as a group, as they believe the ones in control will not want this. The actor is thus likely to choose *isolation* over *engagement*. In comparison the *political-military piece view* says nothing about which of the pieces of the organization that is really in charge, it merely supposes that there are separate entities that has to be dealt with differently. This will theoretically imply that conducting negotiations with the organization remains an option if certain leader figures are part of a *political piece* of the organization. In this way, the choice between *isolation* and *engagement* remains open and subject to evaluation.

However, there are other factors than mere perceptions that decide politics. A UN employee (Informant E 18.01.2013) notes that the listing of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization, by actors such as the United States and the EU, creates problems for negotiations.

*This means in effect that any official from these countries or the UN cannot engage directly with al-Shabaab, even if it is about peace-making. If they had decided to come to the table to negotiate a peace agreement it is a big question of whether the UN would be allowed to negotiate with them.*

The quote shows that single actors’ views and perceptions can have large systemic consequences, as it disables the one international actor – the UN – which many countries pursue their policies through. Since much funding to Somalia goes through the UN system and the many actors engage politically and diplomatically through the UN, the binding of the UN is the binding of many.

Lederach (2012:7) attributes such listing policy specifically to the *isolation strategy* as it identifies individuals that can be targeted with military measures. In addition he claims the policy works directly against *engagement*, as it legally withholds other actors to engage with the listed groups (ibid). Among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and in civil society there have been strong reactions towards both the implications of the listing of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization and towards the counter-terrorist approach that central actors support. NGO informant H (24.01.2013) expressed clear criticism of both the United States and the UN; stressing that counterterror legislation is destructive for peacebuilding efforts:

*It is impossible to negotiate with al-Shabaab today. One is not allowed a number of things because of the legislation. This legislation is in force all over the world. US legislation has extraterritorial effects. [...] The UN should not moan about it. They should change it. They are part of that legislation.*
The representative draws a quite different image than other actors when describing what the al-Shabaab as an organization really is, highlighting the historical aspects of Islamism as a Somali phenomenon inside an otherwise quite moderate Islam state.

It is practically impossible to wipe out al-Shabaab. They are part of the whole structure. Since the 70s movements like this have come and gone, and adapted to the environment at the time. In the 80s it was al-Itihaad. The Soviets struck them militarily, and they went back under. Then some of them came back as the ICU. When Ethiopia sent forces into Somalia, the ICU went back under. Some of the people from ICU are now in al-Shabaab. It is a Somali thing. How are you supposed to stamp out something that is so profoundly a part of the Somali society? How beat it militarily? You cannot!

This statement is interesting as it draws a quite different image than the international core view of al-Shabab. Based on such a historical view the nature of al-Shabaab is described as genuinely Somali.

The historical view makes the matter of negotiation and engagement more feasible as a policy option. On the question of what international actors should do in the matter of dealing with al-Shabaab, the NGO representative answers:

There is no room for peacebuilding organizations. They [international actors] can make it possible to sit down and talk to al-Shabaab. The time will come when you have to negotiate with them, if not now – then in thirty years. We must find out what they really want, but why wait for another thirty years?

Based on a historical view of al-Shabaab, engagement seems not only more obtainable – as the organization is seen as a locally rooted phenomenon – but also more necessary. Negotiation seems necessary, in this perspective, because the rise of Islamist groupings in Somalia is seen as a recurring event only temporarily interrupted by various military interventions from outside actors. The writings of journalist Mary Harper can be used to support such a view. Harper reflects on a series of issues that are of interest. Having explained that Somalis have generally practiced a tolerant and moderate type of Sunni Islam, Harper (2012:74-76) says that there are precedents for violent political Islam in Somalia, the earliest example being Seyyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan’s jihad against colonial forces in the twentieth century.

Thus, differing views as to what al-Shabaab is can lead to differing views on the possibility of negotiating with the group and therefore also differences in what actors perceive as policy options. Fundamental questions that remain are how the organization in itself is built up, who
the leaders are and how much power these leaders have over the organization. These are important questions while were it to be the case that the leadership is clearly internationalist jihadist, it will reduce hopes of success of an engagement strategy. Harper (2012:86) notes that al-Shabaab is such a secretive movement that it is difficult to establish exactly what it is fighting for and who its leaders are. “Both its ideology and its leadership appear to change fairly regularly (ibid).” However, in March 2011 Harper secured a telephone appointment with the Islamist leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, and she asked what al-Shabaab was fighting for. Aweys answered (Harper 2012:88):

*We are fighting for three reasons. First, our country has been invaded. Secondly, we are being prevented from practicing our religious beliefs. Thirdly, we are fighting against those who are blocking the interests of our people by preventing them from establishing an Islamic government.*

If these are the reasons of Aweys’ support for Somali jihad, it does not come forward as non-negotiable terms. Aweys further explained the organization’s relationship to al-Qaida in this way:

*We share a way of thinking with al-Qaeda, but as our country has been militarized for so long, we don’t need any outside help. Al-Shabaab does not have an administrative relationship with al-Qaeda.*

This statement counters an international core-view on Somalia, as it underlines the independence of al-Shabaab from its ‘brother-organization’.

Taking Aweys’ statements into account it is interesting to review the views of one of the strongest actors in the counterterror field, the United States. A US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013) speaking on the issue of possibilities for negotiation with al-Shabaab said the following:

*There are two al-Shabaabs. The first is the global jihad group. Those would never be willing to negotiate. [...] The second group keep their eyes wide open. They work with al-Shabaab, some as financial supporters. [...] A Camp David agreement with al-Shabaab is not going to happen, but the bulk of al-Shabaab is already being reconciled through the clans. [...] Success will not come through negotiations with Shabaab, but with gradual change. It is a waste of time talking to the hardcore guys, but we must also win over 18-year-olds in need of a job. Some may be worked up when Hassan Sheik makes statements on the need to reconcile, but the serious policymakers understand the need for this. The hard question is if somebody we perceive as a threat would reach out to Hassan Sheik. I do not see that happening. Maybe you could see someone like Aweys in negotiations. I do not know our official line on this.*
This statement is interesting because it proposes that reconciliation and negotiation is something which will happen at a low-policy level, through the clans. This might be a correct description of what has happened so far, but at the same time the view seem to exclude the possibility of a public negotiation process led by central leader figures in al-Shabaab. The statement is also interesting as it displays the intrinsic dilemma of what would happen if a leader figure as Aweys actually wanted to come to the table to negotiate in the open. Although the diplomat underlines the right of the president Hassan Sheik to reconcile with former extremists it is clear that a situation where prominent figures seek open negotiations would constitute a dilemma.

The fieldwork has thus shown that, among the actors in the international community, views differ as to what al-Shabaab is. An international core view, a historical view or a political-military pieces view will have different implications when it comes to the matter of whether or not an actor would encourage an engagement strategy. The nature of an engagement strategy could also be disputed. While some highlight that reconciliation with terrorists – to the extent that it can be done – will be a low-level process, others disagree. A Somali scholar (Informant G 22.01.2013) expressed a clear view on the matter. He firmly claimed:

\[
\text{The government of today has to negotiate with al-Shabaab. There is a less extremist element in al-Shabaab. They need to talk to them. This is essential to establish peace and security.}
\]

The statement is not necessarily contrary to the statements of the US representative, as also he said that Hassan Sheik is in his right to seek reconciliation with former extremists. However, there are differences as to what actors assume to be the core, who is assumed to be willing to negotiate and which form one is willing to let this negotiation process take. Using Lederach’s theory of change we see that while a political-military piece view and a historical view imply possibilities for engagement, an there is little probability that actors with an international core view will use such strategies. Rather, these are likely to use strategies of isolation, which is what has featured counterterror work in Somalia up until now.

5.5 The referent object

Having written about the strategic objectives of actors, the more imminent objectives for actors’ engagement in Somalia and the measures actors emphasize, it seems reasonable to then ask; what exactly is being secured through the actors’ engagement? As presented in the
theory chapter this is a question of an actor’s referent object as described by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:36).

Literature on security studies highlights how the thought on referent objects have changed and evolved over time (Collins 2010:2). In the case of the policies of the AU, the EU, IGAD, the United States and the UN in Somalia the previous discussions have highlighted objectives related to both national security and the stability of Somalia. In addition weight has been put on both providing social services to the people and supporting the central administration in Somalia in institution building. There are thus a number of facts that can support various arguments regarding what should be assumed as the referent object in Somalia. It is possible to claim that the referent object is the Somali state, as much weight is given to central institution building. The focus on humanitarian measures, dual tracks and provision on basic services to the Somali people could support the argument that the Somali population is targeted as the referent object. At the same time, one can argue that the referent object is the actor itself. It is for example clear that the EU wishes to secure its member states and the European population when directing policies and finances towards Somalia. This draws a complex image of what is being secured through actors’ policies.

The first conclusion that must be drawn from this is that it seems strict to claim that a policy can have only one referent object. Rather, one actor can have multiple referent objects when pursuing its policies. There appears to be no doubt concerning the fact that the United States and its inhabitants are referent objects for US policies in Somalia, as a primary concern for the United States is the fear of the Somali terrorist threat spreading internationally. Likewise it seems clear that European states and inhabitants are referent objects for the EU’s policies. At the same time, it is obvious that the action of these actors is affecting the security situation within Somalia. It is clear that their policies – regardless of which original intentions lay behind it – affects what is being secured in Somalia. A parallel securement of national interests and securement of something within Somalia must be said to be present in the actions of all regional and international actors directing security policies towards Somalia. This is not very surprising as such a double securement process is a logical consequence when assuming that self-securement and self-interest is primary. Still a double securement process requires that one assumes that the security policies implemented abroad will have implications for the local security situation – something which seems natural to assume.
Moving on from describing the actor itself or the member states’ citizens as referent objects, it is interesting to discuss what exactly is being secured within Somalia. An imminent question seems to be whether *human security* or *state security* is being promoted, the two possibilities respectively implying that the human being or the state itself is being targeted as the *referent object*. Looking at the sum of actors’ policies discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3 it is obvious that considerable attention is given to securing central institutions and the Somali government. This clearly favours a view of the Somali state as a referent object, and is in line with traditional thought on referent objects as described by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:36).

The mandate given to AMISOM is one supporting factor in this regard. AMISOM is based on a mandate to secure the transitional federal state institutions – not the people (Informant L 29.01.2013). Although the mission mandate is to conduct peace support operations in Somalia “in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN)” (AMISOM 2012a), the mandate does not speak specifically of the protection of civilians. Rather, the mandate includes providing protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs); supporting dialogue and reconciliation, assisting in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP); supporting disarmament and stabilization efforts; monitoring the security situation; facilitating for humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and internally displaced, and finally, protecting AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defence (ibid). One AMISOM officer (Informant L 29.01.2013) says he remember this fact being debated, and explains that although the forces will do what they can to protect civilians this cannot be their mandate because they then would encounter a difficult dilemma as to who they should choose to protect. They simply do not have enough soldiers to protect the general population, and could be accused of taking side by protecting some. It thus seems unquestionable that although one may assume that the mission has a positive effect on human security, the referent object of AMISOM’s involvement is the central institutions.

Prioritizing to secure central institutions is in line with considering the state as a referent object. However, as the Somali state is extremely fragile, and the central institutions so far are instruments for the sitting government which are not well connected with the regions, an interesting question is whether actors supporting central institution building and protection are targeting the sitting *regime* more than the state in itself as a referent object. As mentioned in
chapter three, regime security is one of the few perceptions challenging the state or the human being as referent objects. Regime security is typically adopted as a strategy within weak states by weak states elites (Jackson 2010:184). This type of security is “the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule”, and differs from state security which is “the condition where the institutions, processes and structures of the state are able to continue functioning effectively, regardless of the make-up of the ruling elite” (Jackson 2010:187). However, in a weak state, as Somalia, state security is to a high extent connected to the sitting regime as the current government and central governing bodies to a certain extent is the only central structure the state possesses. For the time being, the protection of central institutions does not amount to much other than the protection of the government and the few bodies around it. The real test as to whether support for these bodies is a measure for securing the state or the regime will come with time.

Another aspect to consider is what will happen with AMISOM’s mandate now that the war-fighting has lessened, and al-Shabaab has retreated, fled or hid in remote parts of the country. The civilian component of AMISOM is very weak compared to its military component, and several of the interviewed representatives claim it needs to be strengthened. Informant P (01.02.2013) also confirmed that there is interest within the AU in strengthening this component. This could mean a change in the mission mandate from the focusing on the state or regime as the object to be secured to incorporate a stronger human security aspect. At the same time, an EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) highlights that what is needed now is not military to defeat the terrorists but a police force to ensure that citizens live in a society with law and order. I asked the diplomat whether it was a challenge for AMISOM – which up until now has had a military focus – that the peace enforcement mission is coming to a different stage where military battles are less usual. He answered:

*Yes, it is a challenge for all peacekeeping. It is as true for UN peacekeeping as for African. If you go to the international community and say you need 20 000 people to deal with problems in the DRC, you get 20 000 soldiers. What you actually need is 18 000 policemen and 2000 soldiers. [...] What a large part of Somalia now needs is more policemen.*

A change in deployment of forces or a change in the mandate for AMISOM itself could imply a change in what is being targeted as a referent object. However, these changes are yet to come.
Humanitarian policies can be seen as means for creating human security. Chapter three presented two definitions of human security, the narrow definition focusing on freedom from violence and threat and the broad definition focusing on freedom from want. Building on Kerr (2010:127) and her causal model of human security which connects the broad and the narrow definitions; humanitarian policies can be regarded as policies which increase human security in all forms. This is because humanitarian measures will increase human security in the broad form, which in turn – according to Kerr (ibid) – increases human security in the narrow term.

Considering humanitarian policies as a contribution to human security opens up for seeing a range of actors as treating the Somali population as referent objects.

The EU has a UN Security Council mandate to protect shipping off the coast of Somalia. The mandate involves:

>[T]he protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping; the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia; the protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis (EU NAVFOR).

The protection of shipping in the Gulf of Aden is in the EU’s self-interest. More than 15 % of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden annually, and this includes a significant part of European energy and commodity supplies and exports (Helly 2009:394). However, the initiation of Operation Atalanta was based UN concerns over the need to protect World Food Programme shipments, as clearly stated in Security Council resolution 1838 (UNSC 2008), and reflected in the French answer to the call from the UN which initiated the operation (AFP 2007). The operation can thus in parallel be seen as providing security for the EU and as a human security measure in Somalia. The EU is also a large actor in Somalia in humanitarian terms. Every year, millions of euros are disbursed through the European Commission Development Programme (EU Delegation to Kenya, Somalia Unit 2012). The main areas of European Commission development cooperation were in 2012 set to be governance, education, economic development and food security (European Commission 2012b). Given these developmental efforts, the EU can be said to be furthering human security.

Because of the security situation, the number of actors which have operated directly on the ground in Somalia is limited. Many organizations are directing their humanitarian support through the few actors that are present. The UN is a strong civil actor through a range of its agencies such as the World Food Programme, UNDP and UNICEF. Some UN agencies are
among the ones that have been present, although the reminder of the organization has been criticized for its lacking presence. Although several actors are involved in humanitarian affairs in Somalia, some actors are also criticized for their humanitarian engagement. A criticism directed towards US Aid has been that the organization goes in to local communities which for long have been isolated, with such great amounts of money, that it is disrupting other low scale initiatives and creates hostilities over resources in the local environments (Informant I 24.01.2013). The argument that foreign aid can be disruptive for human development and security is a well-known argument in the development literature, promoted by scholars such as Moyo (2009). This shows that humanitarian action not necessarily implies human security.

In addition, one can question whether the promotion of human security in the broader sense is equal to treating human beings as referent objects. Following de Wilde et al. (1998:36) a referent object is “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”. While certain types of emergency relief with little doubt can be attributed to policies where the donor sees the referent object as existentially threatened, this consideration casts doubts on whether it would be correct to claim that the Somali population is a referent object for security policies if for example an actor contributes humanitarian funding to school constructions. Such considerations narrow down the possibility of which developmental policies one can view as increasing the security of the Somali population as a referent object. Although certain ‘broad school’ humanitarian policies as the provision of emergency relief still can be considered as deliberately increasing the human security of a referent object, it seems clear that the promotion of human security in the narrow sense is closer connected to the treatment of the population as a referent object of security.

Considering whether there are actors who promote human security in the narrow form inside Somalia, it is interesting to observe that the rule of Islamist, fundamentalist groups – and even the rule of al Shabaab – in some cases have been described as ensuring some degree of human security. In interviewing people from villages under al-Shabaab rule, journalist Mary Harper received the following comments from a man living in the al-Shabaab controlled town of Jowhar, ninety kilometres north of Mogadishu:

*The first and most important thing I would like to say about life in Jowhar is that there is security in the town. There are no bandits or robbers because al-Shabaab would cut off their hands or worse if it caught them. The threat of this kind of punishment really works. The good security situation means that people are free to move around in*
Jowhar [...]. But freedom of movement is the only type of freedom we have (Harper 2012: 71-72).

Also the rule of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 was to some degree appraised because the ICU ensured a degree of peace and stability which enabled people to feel safe. However, the sense of human security that the ICU or al-Shabaab have assured at certain points in time is limited by the groups’ own rules and regulations for what was regarded as legitimate behaviour. In the terminology of Isaiah Berlin (see Riley 2008:107) it is possible to say that people achieved a *negative* freedom – a freedom in which one is dependent upon the institution imposing the freedom – in its hardest sense. It becomes difficult to agree that the ICU ensured human security as the use of punishments under the ICU were breaching what the UN defines as human rights. Still it is interesting to observe that law and order was established. Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan (2007:4) write this in their paper ‘The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’: “The courts achieved the unthinkable, uniting Mogadishu for the first time in sixteen years, and re-establishing peace and security.” A Somali refugee gives a similar description:

*When the UIC came into the country they made safety and peace for the citizens a priority. They made sure that every robber gave up his gun, all the video spots were closed, every qat seller stopped selling poison to people, everything was calm and quiet. And it was really what the people wanted, after living in war for sixteen years. It was like Allah answered all our prayers (Somali quoted in Lindley 2010).*

The consideration that the Islamic Courts were able to impose a degree of human security in the country puts the Ethiopian intervention in 2006 in an interesting light, as Ethiopia to a large extent received positive response from the international society and the United States when it intervened to fight the movement in 2006. Informant N (31.01.2013), a US diplomat, confirms that the removal of the courts was in the US interest at the time. Although the ICU rule could be described as extremely tough, the fact that they did constitute a stabilizing and securing element inside Somalia, points towards the conclusion that outside actors saw their own states as primary referent objects and instead of seeing the Somali population as such, in this case.

To sum up, considerable attention is given to securing central institutions and the Somali government. AMISOM’s mandate is one example of this. These findings can support the conclusion that the actors are treating the Somali state as a referent object. However, it can also give rise to the question of whether the regime, more than the state, is treated as a
referent object. Here, it should be mentioned that the Somali government seems to have a genuine concern to provide for the people of Somalia, and essentially, if human security is to be ensured it is necessary to have something more longstanding than an NGO or an international organization to ensure this security. The most common source of human security is the state itself. While humanitarian measures can be seen to enhance human security, the current humanitarian involvement on the part of international actors cannot be considered as directed exclusively towards the population as a referent object for security. An expansion of AMISOM’s mandate to include a more civilian focus would possibly change this.

5.6 A similar security perspective

The analysis in this chapter has shown many similarities in the security perspectives of the actors which are analysed. Actors have similar perspectives on which developments should take place inside Somalia, although their engagement is steered largely by national interests.

National interest or self-interest trumps as a decisive factor in explaining why actors engage in security political affairs in Somalia. Intergovernmental theory with elements of realist thought is well suited to explain how strong actors’ security perspectives can dominate the perspectives of the organization, as in the case of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s dominant role in IGAD’s Somalia affairs. However, the case of the EU also clearly shows that states in an organization can have shared interests when engaging in security political affairs abroad. Intergovernmental theory on two level games highlighting the possibility for actors to use an international organization as a legitimizing body (Matlary 2009:93) is well suited to explain why strong actors will engage in security policies through multinational organizations. At the same time, the case of the UN casts doubts on whether constructivist approaches focusing on norm diffusion and the development of a common agenda can explain how an organization’s security perspective is formed. The apparent lack of a joint security perspective in an organization as diverse as the UN strengthens the assumption that an organization’s security perspective is an outcome of a bargaining process.

The fact that states are pursuing their own interest does not mean that actors are pursuing different goals in Somalia, or that they are agitating for the use of dissimilar measures. Actors are targeting a multitude of referent objects through a multitude of measures, but to a large extent their views concur. The principal referent objects seem to be the actor or the actors’
member states themselves and the state of Somalia, represented by the current and recently elected government. This is in line with traditional perceptions of the state being a primary referent object, as highlighted by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:36). This focus upon the state is reflected in the goals actors set for their engagement in Somalia, and the measures they want to introduce. While actors do focus on the importance of pursuing decentralized policies and humanitarian policies, more weight seems to be given to institution building and support to the government, amongst all the actors that are analysed. This is in line with traditional perceptions of state building, as proclaimed by Mansfield and Snyder (2007); highlighting the need for institutions first and claiming that democratic elections first can be introduced at a later stage. According to plans, the first general election for the presidential position in Somalia is set to take place in 2016 (African Elections Database 2012). The enormous focus that has been given to support to the current government blurs the distinction between treating the state as a referent object and treating a regime as a referent object. A focus on institution-building might be necessary in the Somali case because the state has very few governing structures in place. However, a focus upon the building of institutions from above must also be considered a warning sign exactly because the society has few governing structures. This is because a system implemented from above inhabits the risk of alienating the population unless substantial channels for public participation are put into place, in line with theory on transformation as promoted by Törnquist (2011).

An area with somewhat less resemblance between actors is that of how al-Shabaab is perceived. The differences found here indicate that there are differences in how actors wish to pursue counter-terrorism in Somalia. However, the largest difference was not found between the actors but between informants representing the actors and informants from civil society or academia. In analysing the statements made by the informants, I detected three different views on al-Shabaab, which in turn will entail different prospects regarding whether isolation or engagement could be used as a strategy. While the strategy employed up until now has been that of isolation, some informants from civil society and academia were clear in their judgement that engagement is the only solution to the problem of al-Shabaab violence. A UN representative also expressed concern for the lack of possibility for an engagement strategy where negotiations were initiated.

The next chapter discusses whether the shared perspectives on Somalia imply that efforts pull in the same direction, creating coherence in policies.
6 Analysis of Policy Coherence

What are the main challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia?

Coherence is defined in chapter three as a situation where actors in the international system operate and develop policies so that efforts pull in the same direction. The concept is given three dimensions; the technical and the policy dimension, as described by Gebhard (2011:106), and the local dimension, as described by de Coning (2012:290). This chapter will start by presenting examples of lack on coherence in two specific cases. First, the lack of coherence in the case of the AU and UN strategic reviews is discussed to show lack of coherence along the technical and policy dimension. Thereafter section 6.2 argues that the lack of substantial contact between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ donors can be a problematizing factor for coherence. Section 6.3 analyses whether there is lack of coherence along the third, local dimension, and provides an answer to whether lack of local ownership can be considered a challenge for policy coherence in the Somali case. Thereafter the thesis moves on to discussing whether two other propositions, introduced in chapter three, have explanatory power. First, the assumption that more coordination is needed to establish coherence is analysed in section 6.4. Second, conceptual work on ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics and ‘burden-sharing’ is used to discuss which significance self-interest and actors’ priorities should be given when analysing policy coherence in the Somali case.

Initially, I argued that based on constructivist thought one could assume that differences in security perspectives would increase the chances of incoherent policymaking. Likewise, similarities in security perspectives would increase the chances of policy coherence. This is because constructivist thought gives primary value to actors’ ideas and perceptions, elements that are basic to an actors’ security perspective. While chapter five shows that there are great similarities in actors’ security perspectives, section 6.1 and 6.2 will show that there is lack of policy coherence. Consequently, my initial assumption is proven to be wrong. To answer the research question, it is therefore necessary to focus on other possible explanations to the lack of policy coherence. This is what is done in sections 6.3 to 6.5. The chapter concludes that there is lack of coherence in security policies in Somalia. While the coordination assumption is insufficient in explaining the lack of coherence, complexity theory provides useful insights. However, the significance of national interest and actors priorities should not be forgotten.
6.1 The strategic reviews

Since AMISOM was established, it has been clear that the mission was supposed to be temporary, and that a UN peacekeeping mission was to take over at one point. Wakengela (2011:387) writes that the dominant view within the UN – the one shared with major powers as the United States – is to wait until conditions are ‘conducive’ to international intervention. He writes: “Such conditions have failed to materialize for 14 years”. At the time of the fieldwork, a key concern among actors related to where funding for a continued AMISOM mission would come from. So far the EU has provided the bulk of the funding through the African Peace Facility. An EU diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) explained that they have made it clear to the AU and to others that they will not be able to continue this funding.

We will run out of money by the end of March, and we have reserves to July. [...] The EU is stretched. There was an attempt from the AU to call on twenty of their own member states asking for support to complement the EU, but no one responded. Not even to say they had received the letter.

While the funding for AMISOM is running out, the landscape of conflict inside Somalia is changing much due to AMISOM’s efforts. At the time of writing, there was no evident solution to how a military mission in Somalia could continue. This section will demonstrate how the case of the strategic reviews shows lack of coherence both along a technical and a policy dimension.

In 2012 and early 2013 both the UN and the AU decided to conduct strategic reviews. The AU strategic review presented three options for a continued mission in Somalia: “Option 1: Handover AMISOM to the UN; Option 2: Enhance AMISOM, and; Option 3: Establish a new joint AU–UN mission (AMISOM Strategic Review Team 2013: ii).” The Review Team argued that the status quo is not tenable, because AMISOM does not currently have enough resources available to support the government of Somalia in recovering the entire territory of the country in time for the general elections in 2016 (ibid). They therefore concluded:

As the status quo is not an option, and option 1 (UN peacekeeping) is not feasible at this stage, the remaining options are option 2 (enhance AMISOM) and option 3 (a new joint AU–UN mission). As option 2 does not provide for sustainable and predictable funding for AMISOM, the Review Team therefore recommends option 3 (ibid).

However, the AU Review Team’s recommendation of altering the mission to a joint one was not being coordinated with the recommendation coming out of the UN strategic review.
The UN strategic review came up with four options. Of the four, the Secretary-General recommended option C – the establishment of a UN Assistance Mission that would replace the UN Political Office for Somalia (What’s in Blue 2013a). This option implied that a new mission would deliver political and peace-building support. In practical terms UNPOS in today’s form would cease to exist and UNSOA would be integrated into the new mission (ibid). However, the UN Country Team would remain as a structural separate entity outside the new mission, implying that there would still not be one main leadership of the UN contributions in Somalia. The other options were a joint AU–UN support operation (option A), a fully integrated UN peace-building mission where the Country Team is structurally included (option B) and a UN peace-building mission with a separate UNSOA (option D). Option A would have been the one closest to the AU recommendation.

At the time of the fieldwork the reviews were conducted, but not yet official. However, several of the informants were well placed and had already read the reviews or documents describing them. An EU informant (Informant M 30.01.2013) explained the main problem with the reviews:

*Unfortunately there are two reviews. The two come out with options for the way ahead. In the headings the options are not dissimilar. The UN has four options – the AU has three. In detail the options are very different.*

Informants pointed out that in concrete terms the option of “a united AU–UN mission” did not represent the same thing in the two reviews. One informant (M 30.01.2013) claimed that the UN idea of a joint structure was “not joint at all” as it left the AU with a military job and left the political work and some humanitarian work to the UN. The informant claimed the UN would not be sufficiently linked to what was going on, on the ground, stating: “If the military command is on one side and the political on another it poses problems” (ibid). Thus, not only were the organizations proposing options dealing with different aspects of the international engagement in Somalia, but on the one option that was on the paper for both organizations the implications of the option was not really similar.

Informants also expressed disappointment over the fact that the work was not more closely coordinated. The EU diplomat explains: “My impression is that the AU was ready to do a joint review with the UN, while the UN was not” (ibid). The fact that the reviews were not ready at the same time for consideration in the Security Council which holds the power, illustrates the lack of coordination between the reviews. On the 14th of February the Security
Council received a briefing on Somalia by Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé Brook Zerihoun. Zerihoun then presented the Secretary General’s latest report on Somalia which treated the four options of the Strategic Review. The internet magazine *What’s in blue* which provides knowledge on the work of the Security Council wrote the day before the briefing:

*Another area where Council members may be looking for more clarity is on the process surrounding the AU’s strategic review of AMISOM as there seems to be some frustrations that the AU still has not submitted its report on this to the Security Council. It seems the AU Peace and Security Council is not scheduled to meet until 27 February to discuss the outcome of the review and only after that will the AU report be forwarded to the Council. This will not leave much time for Council members, who are likely to have already started negotiations on a draft resolution, to take into account any requests from the AU relating to AMISOM before the current Council authorisation of the mission expires on 7 March (What’s in Blue 2013a).*

This shows that the UN Security Council had very little time to take into account the views of the AU strategic review before deciding on which route the organization was to take forward. As the AU mission AMISOM is completely dependent on the UN mandate it is noteworthy that the two organizations did not manage to find a solution so that opinions from both reviews were heard before decisions were taken. As the preferred option by the AU Review Team was closest to the UNs option A, a decision in which the UN discarded option A (in its own review) would in practice be the same as discarding the preferred option of the AU Review Team without having read the arguments of why this option was preferred by the AU. The example fits Gebhard’s (2011:124) description of lack of coherence along the technical dimension where procedural problems can occur because of difficulties in reconciling different channels of policymaking.

It is worth underlining that all other actors seemed to want a joint review which would set the scene for the continued international engagement in Somalia. An EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) explains that the AU expressed wishes on producing a joint report, but that this was not a wish from the UN:

*What the AU wanted was at worst to get to a point where they both had finished their reviews and then to produce at least complementary reports to the Security Council. [...] The UN does not want a joint report because their report is about the internal affairs – it is not really about Somalia.*

The fact that the UN review is about the internal structure of the UN bodies dealing with Somalia was demonstrated through the debate between the actors in the Security Council.
Much of the debate concerned whether the UN Somalia should be one entity under one SRSG, or whether it should keep its structure having different leaders for the humanitarian, Country Team section and the political missions. On 28 February the independent organ Security Council Report published the March Monthly Forecast. They then wrote that there seemed to be a wide range of views among Council members.

Most favor either option B [a fully integrated peacebuilding mission] or option C [the assistance mission recommended by the Secretary-General], with the Council split between the two. Dynamics seem to be driven both by the Somali government’s support for option B as well as concerns raised by the humanitarian community about the risks of structurally integrating the UN Country Team (Security Council Report 2013).

The fact that the UN review was mostly UN-internal while the AU review discussed the way forward for a military mission in Somalia, is demonstrative in showing that the processes lacked coordination. Informant Q (09.02.2013) commented further on this:

The UN review is really UN-internal. Somebody described it as moving the deck chairs on a boat. It is not about Somalia, while the AU review is.

On 6 March the Security Council adopted a solution most close to option ‘C’. The solution did to some extent incorporate the wish of the Somali government to be able to deal with ‘one’ UN by requesting that the UN Country Team be structurally integrated in the mission within January 2014. The humanitarian side was expected to be less happy with this result as some feared it would politicize their humanitarian work (What’s in Blue 2013b). However, the solution said little about the way forward for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

In the meantime the AU had reacted on the negative response by the UN for a joint mission. The AU had instead asked for support for enhancing the AMISOM in line with option B in their review. The day before the council meeting 6 March, it was anticipated that the Security Council would request the AU to consider providing funding for AMISOM themselves. What’s in Blue (2013b) wrote:

Notably, it seems the draft resolution does not address the AU’s call for the UN to authorize an ‘enhancement of the support package’, nor does it respond to the AU’s decision in the Peace and Security Council Communiqué of 27 February to broaden AMISOM’s mandate to a ‘multidimensional Peace Support Operation’.

This shows clear incompatibilities between the AU and the UN strategic reviews as this attitude does not meet the concerns and demands set out in the AMISOM review where the
Review Team clearly asked for a joint mission to be able to deliver a sustained funding for the operation.

The lack of UN willingness to take over a mission after AMISOM, was by several informants been credited to the negative experience of the UNISOM II mission, and the memory of the 18 US soldiers who were killed in 1993. Looking back, former UNISOM II Force Commander Bir (2008:47) has written:

*The UN at the time was not ready for such tasks [...]. The UN, in short, was not the proper organization to manage the large, complex and ambitious operation in Somalia. [...] Only if the UN acquires the necessary structures might it be able to carry out peace enforcement operations.*

Wakengela (2011:387) writes that “it remains to be seen whether the UN will attempt to engage directly with the strongest ‘peace spoilers’ in Somalia, al-Shabaab,” or if the UN will “passively observe AMISOM’s debacle almost in the same way as it [the UN itself] retreated from the country some 14 years ago”. Several informants highlighted that the UN does not want to be involved in ‘peace enforcement, which is currently a correct description of the mission (Informant K 29.01.2013), and that the UN have been clear in stating that they do not want any ‘boots on the ground’ (Informant M 30.01.2013). This view is confirmed by Adebajo (2011:175) who writes: “Following the Somali debacle, the administration of US president Bill Clinton placed severe restrictions on the approval of future UN missions.”

While the previous paragraphs have shown that the strategic reviews have suffered from lack of coherence along a technical dimension, these statements indicate that there is also more lack of coherence along a policy dimension. The discussion in chapter five showed that the goals of the actors to a large extent are similar. However, what seems a larger problem is the UN’s lack of will to invest further finances or to scarify Western soldiers’ lives in the mission. Informant M (30.01.2013) was especially critical in this regard, stating “the UN wants to do all the fancy stuff, such as ‘peace building’, leaving the Africans to be killed”.

The differing reviews present an example of lack of coherence. Because policies are not developed in a joint matter the reviews have led to a policy vacuum as they give no answers to how a peace enforcement or peacekeeping mission can continue. The apparent agreement on the need for coherent policies combined with the lack of coherent results is a reflection of what de Coning calls the ‘coherence dilemma’. The process around the two strategic reviews
has led to a state of affairs where policies are not pulling in the same direction, and instead of developing coherent policies this could endanger the AMISOM mission at a critical time.

6.2 ‘Traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ donors

Another example of lack of coherence is related to the ‘non-traditional’ donors; Turkey and the Gulf countries. This section argues that the connections between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ donors are too poor, and that this endangers a joint pull of efforts and thus the making of coherent policies. The focus here is on relations between Turkey and Western actors, while Turkey is said to be the most influential actor in Somalia amongst the states which are called ‘non-traditional’ donors.

All informants mentioned that Turkey in particular and the Gulf-States were becoming players to be reckoned with in Somalia. However few had much insight in their policies. One diplomat (F 21.01.2013) said: “Turkey has become and wants to be a regional power and play a role on the global scene. But we do not know enough about what their goals really are.”

This statement is worth noticing while Turkey has become a large actor in Somalia. Turkey was the first country to reopen an embassy in Mogadishu in 2011, and established itself as a strong actor in Somalia after the country provided massive humanitarian aid to Somalia during the 2011 East Africa drought. The Turks have also started building infrastructure and are doing construction work, such as renovating the international airport and the national assembly. Most noteworthy is also the fact that Somali–Turkish relations date back to the Middle Ages. This makes Turks oppose the Western label ‘non-traditional donor’. Based on the assumption provided in the theory chapter, that coordination increases chances for coherence, it seems natural to conclude that other actors should be coordinating with Turkey, if the goal is to establish coherent policies.

One Somali scholar (Informant A 15.01.2013) with links into the current Somali government explained that there are hopes of a bilateral defence pact between Turkey and Somalia, and that there have been extensive conversations between Turkey and Somalia on a number of security political issues. When confronting other actors with this information people would neither deny nor confirm the information, as they did not feel they had information enough to be certain of an answer. Regardless of the accuracy of the information, this does tell something regarding the extent to which information is shared between Turkey and other
actors. On question of why the Somali government preferred this cooperation with Turkey, the Somali scholar said that Turkey is not pressing on a model, they want to listen to the Somalis, and Turkey is a Muslim state that has close historical links to the country. The Somali further elaborated that “The government is trying to replicate a more moderate Islamism, more moderate than the one al-Shabaab stands for, but not secular and offensive.” (Informant A 15.01.2013). Based on this perspective it is possible to argue that cooperation with Turkey is not only necessary because it is a substantial actor – it could also provide Somalis with some sort of a role model for a moderate Muslim state. Taking the actors’ security perspectives and their fear of fundamental Islamism into account, such a role model for Somalia would seem advantageous for all actors. Thus, it seems all the more surprising that the contact between Turkey and other actors has been so marginal.

One reason, given for the lack of contact is the fact that Turkey has wanted coordination efforts to take place within Somalia while others have preferred such meetings to be held on safer grounds. In an anecdote, an informant (J 25.01.2013) explains that during the conference for the International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia in September 2011 a meeting was held on the side with the intention of inviting Turkey and the ‘non-traditional donors’ to the table. The person who was the EU representative at the time had had come on a bit strong towards Turkey in the meeting, and was met with the clear response from the Turkish representative who said: “Coordination happens in Mogadishu. We are in Mogadishu. Welcome to Mogadishu.” After this statement the Turkish representative stood up and left the room. During fieldwork I tried to contact the Turkish embassies in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. However, the response given was that the only embassy dealing with Somali affairs was the one in Mogadishu. This is in itself a telling fact, as all other actors seem to have at least some form of representation in Nairobi – in general this is also their main representation to Somalia. By this comment I do not claim that Turkey should be dealing with Somali affairs in Nairobi. However, it is worth noting that the literal lack of ‘common ground’ has impeded contact among the actors. As Turkey is such a substantial actor inside Somalia and an actor which has shown itself to operate on its own terms in its own ways, it seems reasonable to argue that lack of contact in this case also implies a great danger for lack of policy coherence. Currently, actors are becoming more positive regarding setting up representations inside Somalia. There is therefore a possibility that coordination with Turkey will increase.
It seems that the challenge of common policy development between the Turkey and Western actors is not only one of location, but also one of communication and anticipation. At the last Ankara meeting in January 2013 Western diplomats were surprised and caught off guard as the Turks chose to come to the table with a proposal for the training of the Somali Security Forces, without giving the other representatives enough time to read through and prepare themselves for a debate on the matter. As explained by one of the informants, this broke with what other actors understood to be diplomatic customs. The reaction of the Western diplomats was to push back the suggestion. Informant J (25.01.2013) explains:

_Usually documents are shared in advance. People have to have time to look at it and digest. You do not want surprises in the diplomatic circle. [...] It is not clear if the push-back was because the Turks shared their proposal on the day of the meeting and people did not have enough time to digest and consult, or if people were against the proposal._

Regardless of whether actors were sceptical towards the idea that the Turks would take on a project for training the Somali Security Forces, or only felt they did not have enough time to prepare, the incident does show that there is limited contact or insufficient communication. If the international society is to develop coherent policies regarding Somalia it seems essential that policies at some level are coordinated with such a substantial actor as the Turkish government.

### 6.3 Local ownership

The theory chapter proposes that local ownership is necessary for the development of coherent policies, by building on complexity theory and the work of de Coning (2012, 2013). This subchapter will discuss whether coherence along a _local_ dimension exists in Somalia, and comment on why lack of local ownership can be considered a challenge for policy coherence in the Somali case.

During the fieldwork, criticism was formed concerning the necessity of developing specific institutions in Somalia. The critics ask whether the choice to develop certain institutions were taken because Somalia needs the institution or whether it was done because everybody assumed it was necessary based on an idealized state model. Questions that were asked were: _Does Somalia really need a constitution? The Brits don’t have one. Does Somalia really need an army? Japan has a defence force_ (Informant J 25.01.2013). Another level of criticism goes
deeper and asks whether the entire Western-dominated state-building project in Somalia is flawed because the Somali society works on a completely different logic. The consequence of this line of thinking is that all state-building efforts by the West in Somalia necessarily will fail unless the actors make fundamental changes in their approach. One NGO worker put it this way:

*Structural issues inside Somalia will not be resolved by this international intervention as it is currently designed. [...] We have to accept what the people in Somalia want. To a certain extent we are forcing on a European model. [...] There are core values we should pursue, but the state does not need to be modelled after the one we know. By pushing on to Somalia what we have negotiated over centuries in our culture at a specific moment in time, we are presenting a technical solution to Somalia which might not work (Informant H 24.01.2013).*

The idea that what the West obtained at one point in time cannot be forced into another societal system at another point in time is a well-known thought reflected in various research papers (see Mair 1997, Nustad 2006). As indicated in the chapter three, this is also a subject in complexity theory, as presented by de Coning (2013:4): “The linkage between history, culture and institutional legitimacy is, from a Complexity perspective, emergent from the local, not derived from the Universal.” Thus, as de Coning notes, an institution or societal service as a police service is not a neutral institution that can be replicated in any society.

Based on the interviews conducted, I would say that the actors studied do seem very aware of the fact that Somalia is a society with a specific culture and history which makes the direct transfer of any European model to the country complicated, if not impossible. Although actors highlight the need to support the new central administration, they all give some weight to the need for local initiatives and the need to take features as clan leadership into account. However, while opinions were clear when it came to how security sector reform should take place – actors became a lot less specific when talking about exactly how local initiatives should be formed and how clan leaders should be incorporated into new governance structures. Thus, it seems reasonable to ask whether actors at the end of the day will direct measures towards stabilization and security in Somalia which is not based on a traditional Western way of thinking. The AU and IGAD stand out in this context because they are not Western actors. However, they are heavily dependent on funding from Western actors. De Coning also reflects upon this matter in his recent ‘Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local’, which was published 22 February 2013 after a visit to Mogadishu:
De Coning explains that ‘local ownership’ has become a buzz-word for most foreign actors. He writes that the word is there in every document “yet no one really expects it to be meaningfully pursued” (ibid). These thoughts are much in line with the experiences I myself had during the fieldwork, as local ownership was talked of but concrete examples of how it were to be pursued seldom were given. In reality the only clear strategy for establishing local ownership for the peacebuilding process was to support – at least in speech – the central government’s initiatives for local development.

When promoting ‘local ownership’, a distinction can be drawn between support for the local elite’s preferences and institution building at a high level, and the support for more profound local initiatives. This is for instance the essence in the difference between a transformation argument and an institution-first argument, as proposed by Törnquist (2011:825). It can be argued that there are some paradoxes regarding the outspoken support for local, traditional initiatives on one side, and the weight put on support for the Mogadishu based government and central institution building on the other. The fact that many of the interviewed representatives highlighted the need for focus on local processes makes the strong emphasis actors put on the current government and building of central institutions seem somewhat particular. A ‘dual-track model’, as referred to in chapter 5.3 might seem convincing in theory, but the question is what the ‘new’ local track really consists of. An important consideration seems to be whether international actors – recognizing the need for an element of bottom–up governing in Somalia – should state some clear objectives in this regard. The alternative seems to be for international actors to step back and direct all their support through the government. This is a difficult debate, because a strong support for bottom–up initiatives essentially could undermine the current government; a government which might be the largest hope Somalia has had for a long time. Another complicating factor is that such bottom–up initiatives could end in a governance structure that most Western states would not identify with and thus could have difficulties in accepting. At the same time, it must be said that the current government has made substantial promises regarding reaching out to the regions. This could be the key fact which explains the great enthusiasm for the current government: The new government – with its discourse on reaching out to the regions – facilitates for international actors so that these can support a traditional state model and traditional central
institutions building, while at the same time feeling that the particularity of Somalia is being considered and dealt with by the government itself. The fact that the current government itself seems to be genuinely occupied with establishing local legitimate administrations and providing basic services to its people must be considered as extremely positive in this situation. However, as Carothers (2007:17) comments, elite discourse on democratization and outreach to the population must not become a measure which ensures a political elite to hold on to power.

When looking at the local ownership of the Somali elite compared to the international community, there is little doubt that the inauguration of the new president in 2012 and the following election of a new parliament in many ways represented a shift in the possibilities of Somalis to obtain local ownership in policymaking. An indication of this could be said to be found at the Core group meeting which took place in Addis Ababa in October 2012. The meeting was the first Core group meeting after the inauguration of the new president, and the new Somali leadership had a representative present. An EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) explains that people spoke of three interesting statements after the meeting. First, one of the central donor nations talked of mutual accountability. This is opposed to before when the international society was talking about holding the TFG accountable. “This is totally different. The Somali government can now hold the international society responsible, as well as the opposite,” explained the informant. Second, the Somali government representative who was present had said that whatever happens from now on will be Somali led and Somali owned. This also constituted a turn of affairs. Third, the chair of the meeting talked of a paradigm shift in the way the international community deal with the situation.

The approach of the international community towards Somalia [before] was incredibly paternalistic, saying; ‘we will tell you how it happens’. I would say particularly the UN agencies have had real autonomy to do what they wanted in Somalia. In other countries they would need to discuss what they wanted with the country’s government. Now they do [in Somalia also]. (Informant Q 09.02.2013).

The three statements from the Core group meeting are interesting because they together highlight the need and urge for a new direction in policymaking where actors will not be able to pursue whatever policies they want without consulting with the Somali government. To the extent that these statements draw a realistic picture of what future policymaking in and towards Somalia should look like, it is a positive sign for the future indicating more coherency, based on the assumption that local ownership furthers coherence.
However, what becomes a predicament and what should be considered a great concern for the execution of local ownership is the fact that international actors are absorbing the time and capacity of the government. An example of this is the constant activity which is taking place in coordinating bodies and meetings. One diplomat says:

*This is pulling leaders out of Somalia every time. We will hardly see a cancellation of the meetings, but it would be good if people could discipline themselves. There is a tendency of continued growth of coordinating bodies.* (Informant F 21.01.2013, text translated).

In his latest contribution, de Coning (2013:1) expresses a similar view, saying that the absorption of Somali capacity is going on even when Somali leaders are not leaving Somalia. He writes that:

*The reality is sadly that the limited governing capacity that the President and his government have is being overwhelmed by the transaction costs of needing to engage with these international actors. Instead of governing Somalia, the President and his cabinet are forced to meet with and react to each of the proposals offered by his country’s international partners.*

De Coning (ibid) observes that this is a necessity to keep sorely needed resources flowing to Somalia, and claims international actors do not recognize the significance of this problem.

Coherence, as defined through the use of complexity theory, must be said to be lacking in Somalia. One important reason for this is, as de Coning (2012:290) supposes, is the lack of local ownership. It seems that all actors agree on the need of some kind of local ownership. This is in line with de Coning’s (2012, 2013) use of complexity theory, and Törnquist’s (2011) *transformation argument*. However, actors apparent accept for a ‘local ownership agenda’ is by critics interpreted as discursive and not leading to practical results. We can observe that although international actors have talked of a new willingness to give local ownership to the Somali elite, they have no clear strategies or initiatives at play to enhance local ownership in the form of genuine local initiatives. At the same time, the government is constrained from pursuing such efforts as international actors are taking up time and energy.

### 6.4 The coordination assumption

The theory chapter proposes that frequent coordination between actors will lead to more coherence, and calls this the *coordination assumption*. This section analyzes whether this assumption gives explanatory power in the case of policy development in Somalia.
Actors engaged in Somalia have been involved in a number of coordinating bodies. One of the central coordination bodies is the International Contact Group (ICG) for Somalia, originally made up by a small number of central actors such as the United States, the UK and Italy. It has now grown to over 40 countries, and a number of international organizations are represented as actors in the group. The ICG meets two times a year once in the north and once in the region. A Norwegian diplomat (Informant F 21.01.2013) explains that as the group has become so big that it has also lost its efficiency. Another coordinating body is the P3+, a group made up by three Security Council actors (the US, the UK and France) which has expanded to include countries as Italy and the three Scandinavian countries. A more recent grouping of interest is the Core group. An EU-diplomat (Q 09.02.2013) explained that the Core group initially started as a preparation meeting before the London ICG conference in February 2012, a conference which attracted enormous amounts of people. Central actors such as the AU, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia met for discussions before the ICG meeting. This group has afterwards continued to as an ‘ad on’ at the back of other meetings. There have also existed coordinating bodies as the CISS ExCom (Coordination of International Support to Somalis Executive Committee) made up by donor countries, the World Bank, and the UN Resident Coordinator. The World Bank and the Resident Coordinator have been co-chairs in this committee which was being closed down at the time when the interview was conducted. The Norwegian diplomat also mentioned a donor country coordination organ – the Somali Donor Group – where Norway was co-chair in 2012. The United States, the EU, the UK through their office DIFID (Department for International Development) and Sweden have been co-chairs for the group in recent years.

This listing shows that there is a range of coordinating bodies at play for which policy development towards Somalia is the primary concern. The Norwegian diplomat says:

*There is not lack of international meetings. The ICG just had a meeting in Ankara. The Brits are inviting all to a meeting in London in Mai. The EU wants a high level meeting in Brussels.* (Informant F 21.01.2013, text translated)

When evaluating policy coherence, one can thus not blame actors for not doing anything to coordinate their policies. However, the high number of meeting is apparently not fostering results. The diplomat comments:

*Coordination is not good enough. The UN is not even coordinated with itself. There is lacking coordination between UNPOS and the UN Country Team for Somalia, and there is lacking coordination between the UN and the AU.*
This comment was reflected in the views of many of the interviewed sources during the fieldwork. Most sources were disappointed at the effect of participating in coordinating bodies, feeling that discussions in these bodies did not yield results. Sources were also generally disappointed by the level of coordination within the UN and between the UN and the AU, as noted in section 6.1.

The acknowledgement that actors have been involved in a range of coordinating bodies poses a problem for the coordination assumption. The repeated meetings between actors have not led to coherent policy development. Thus, we can conclude that it is not the lack of efforts to coordinate which challenges the coherence in actors’ policies. Instead, it seems clear that national or even personal interests hinder the development of coherent agendas. During the fieldwork one single phrase was repeated again and again from different informants: “Everybody wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.” The fact that the phrase was pronounced by so many informants, is telling in itself for its reliability. The reasons given were simple; to have the lead, to take the credit and to be able to control the funding that went into a project was considered to be of value for each actor involved. A few informants went as far as claiming there was a certain degree of childish competition between the actors. Others mentioned the fact that many employees were based in temporary positions, and to be in lead of a project was essential for keeping the money flowing and maybe eventually for keeping your job. Thus not only national interest, but also personal interest could create obstacles for the development of policies which are pulling in the same direction. However, the case of Turkey shows that although efforts at coordination do not seem to be sufficient for the development of coherent policies, it seems reasonable to argue that coherence is more likely to occur if policies are coordinated. One might even consider it as a necessary variable. According to De Coning and Friis (2011:271) coordination can provide a space for coherence to emerge. They hold that actors who “enter into a meaningful comprehensive relationship, will tend to form a coherent core”.

Another reason given for the lack of successful coordination is that coordination is taking place outside Somalia, away from the local realities. From the perspective of complexity theory, coordination from within Somalia is more desirable as this will further the possibilities for establishing local ownership over the coordinating process. A positive factor in this regard is that more and more actors now are considering establishing representations in Mogadishu (Informant F 21.01.2013).
6.5 National interest revisited

Realist theory argues that states need to rely on their own capabilities, their power, to achieve international goals (Glaser 2010:17). In this sense realism sees national security as ‘high politics’ and as the state’s primary interest (Glaser 2010:20). According to such a view establishing coherent foreign security policies towards a country like Somalia is not only difficult because actors might have different interests, but possibly also unachievable because there may be little reason for actors to cooperate. According to Waltz, cooperation is not an attractive solution, because what counts is ‘relative gains’ (Glaser 2010:21). However, there are also other perspectives on which factors should be deemed as ‘high politics’. In the late 70s, Keohane and Nye (1977:24-26) argued that economic politics had become ‘high politics’, because of the mutual interdependence amongst nations made military measures of less use. Matlary (2009) argues that public opinion in member states is vital for which foreign policy action that is taken in her book European Union Security Dynamics: In the new national Interest. Using intergovernmental theory on two-level games, she believes that domestic policies ultimately can be decisive for the action taken by multinational institutions such as the EU. Intergovernmental theory can also be connected to debates on burden-sharing as described by Hallams and Scheer (2012). This debate highlights that a decisive factor in policymaking is actors’ will to take the burden, when several actors gain on the implementation of a policy. Thus, the debate on burden-sharing shows that an actor’s self-interest is not only related to security: self-interest can also entail avoiding financial burdens or loss of good-will from the opinion at home.

This section of the thesis argues that both economic burden-sharing and media coverage is influencing the contributions by single states and organizations, and that fluctuations actors’ priorities can lead to unsustainable policies towards Somalia causing less coherence in policies. However, this subchapter also argues – in line with thought which gives primary significance to national security – that a decisive factor for these fluctuations is the developments inside Somalia where al-Shabaab no longer constitute a major threat. As actors are profoundly guided by their security interest, the positive developments in Somalia have caused some actors to consider reducing their engagement.

Chapter five highlights that although security perspectives amongst actors in Somalia are similar, actors have one main factor in common which splits them: that of national or self-
interest. The chapter shows that Somalia has been considered to be of importance to national security by influential actors like the United States and the EU. Figuratively speaking, we could say that Somalia was placed at an elevated point on a ‘high low’ policy scale. What happens then, when these threats are no longer as substantial as before?

Statements by elite informants indicate that the so far successful – although not complete – defeat of al-Shabaab has firm implications for the prospects of further involvement by a key actor as the United States. A US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013) stated that there is a sense of fatigue amongst both Americans and Europeans, and that people are asking themselves of when they will be done:

*In some ways good news are bad news. We have reached the end of the transition in Somalia. There is a handful guys left in al-Shabaab that we worry about in regard to reaching out to Europe and North America. If these are arrested or killed, I can see it; people will be saying ‘ok, next challenge’. I hope that will not happen, but there is an understandable fatigue. People are waiting for the point when we can say, ok – things are on the right track.*

This quote clearly shows that perceptions of national security and national interest are of high significance when it comes to international engagement in Somalia. This creates an uncertain image of which significance actors will put into following up the situation in Somalia – for example in matters relating to human security – when the threat to Western countries’ national security is eliminated. This insecurity also implies an insecurity regarding which policies will be developed or implemented.

However, it is not only the scaling down of Somalia as an international threat that creates uncertainties about further involvement. Other substantial factors are the rescaling of priorities and the cost in money, time and personnel that are brought on by other ‘competing’ challenges posed by Islamists gaining ground in Africa. When speaking of the fatigue in the international community regarding Somalia, the US diplomat stated: “Mali accelerates this process.” He further explained: “In the US we say there is ‘the Washington Post effect’. The newspaper drives the conversation” (Informant N 31.01.2013). While Mali has been creating headlines in debate-setting newspapers time and again the last months, Somalia has received less attention. A quick search on the Norwegian newspaper database Retriever shows that during the two months from 11 January 2013 to 11 March 2013 ‘Mali’ is mentioned in the title in 505 articles while ‘Somalia’ appears 41 times in a title. This fact might not be a surprise as the developments in Mali in this period were substantial. However the point is, in
line with the view of the US diplomat, that political pressures and debates concerning Mali risks driving Somalia – as a subject of debate – into the shadows. Other diplomats were supporting this view making statements such as: “People are saying; now we need to move on and think about Mali” (Informant Q 09.02.2013). What the informant calls ‘the Washington Post effect’ fits well with Matlary’s understanding of ‘the new national interest’, because it highlights how the public opinion can have an influence on policymaker’s decisions. Matlary (2009:74) explains this interest as a consequence of actors’ interest in conducting policies which are legitimate in the eyes of the public opinion.

Adding on the fact that the public and politicians are directing their attention towards Mali is the issue of time and personnel spent, and the economic funding of the operations. The US diplomat (Informant N 31.01.2013) explained the realisms of prioritizing African crises:

> There are a number of donor meetings, and how much time is there for Somalia and Mali? Some say you can only be occupied with two African crises at the time. The third drops of the chart. Now we have North Africa, Mali and Somalia.

During the fieldwork I personally experienced some of these effects: scheduled interviews were rescheduled and cancelled because of upcoming and spontaneous Mali meetings on three occasions, and I also spoke to a diplomat whom had experienced that a meeting was cancelled for the same reason. When the actors are faced with a new crisis, time necessarily becomes a shortage.

The same can be said about finances. One diplomat said:

> Mali will maybe cost a billion dollars a year. This is money that needs to be reprioritized from other expenses. This could mean less to others. This is a potential danger [for Somalia] with Mali (Informant P 01.02.2013).

Of the pure financial contributors to Somalia, the EU stands out as it has provided the large share of direct financial funding to AMISOM through the African Peace Facility. However, all actors are aware that there the official EU funding for AMISOM will not last much longer. One EU diplomat (Informant M 30.01.2013) explained the dilemma of continued support for AMISOM which has been absorbing the major share of the Peace Facility which is also intended for other African crisis:

> We will run out of money to AMISOM by the end of March, and we have reserves to July. [...] We will contribute to Mali 50 million initially. We will contribute to the South African Republic, and we have a request from Congo. Mali is making the
headlines, and one of our member states [France] is actively involved. AMISOM needs an alternative because we cannot sustain it anymore.

While this quote highlights which financial consequences the operations in Mali have for Somalia, another EU diplomat (Informant Q 09.02.2013) underlines that Mali is not the only reason for the reduced EU funding for Somalia in the future: “Even if Mali hadn’t come up AMISOM is becoming so expensive that we do not have it [the money] anyway.” The lack of sustained funding for AMISOM is further complicated by the lack of clarity and cohesion in the AU and UN strategic reviews. An alternative where the UN took over the mission would provide a solution to the financial problems for the mission. However, the fact than the UN does not want to take on the mission or enter into a joint structure, will according to the AMISOM strategic review report lead to a situation which is not sustainable (AMISOM Strategic Review Team 2013:ii). When Somalia represents less of a threat than before and large contributions are made elsewhere this further complicates the project of establishing a clear and coherent option for a future peacekeeping or peace enforcing mission in Somalia. At the same time, all representatives from the United States, the EU, the UN, the AU and IGAD that were interviewed during fieldwork agreed that AMISOM is still needed for some time in Somalia. This complex situation resembles dilemmas referred to in the literature as burden-sharing, where actors who agree on goals will disagree on who is to finance and provide other services in an operation (see Hallams and Schreer 2012). As demonstrated in section 6.1, the problem of burden-sharing relating to the continuance of a peace enforcing mission in Somalia can be seen not only as a financial problem, but also as a matter of who are to place soldiers’ lives on the line for a common cause.

Financial burden-sharing problems are not only affecting coherent policy development in the case of AMISOM. One EU diplomat (Informant C 17.01.2013) highlights that the same problem emerges in the case of the development of the Somali Security Forces (SSF):

*The AMISOM exit option must involve a timetable for the handover to Somali Security Forces. A key issue here is to pay their [the SSF’s] salaries. At the moment the US is the main contributor and Italy is paying, but it is not enough. People are still not getting their salaries. Either they are not paid enough or they are not paid regularly. This leads to a situation where one cannot trust the loyalty of the security forces.*

The diplomat further explains how also legal frameworks can present a complicating factor:
According to rules and regulations the EU cannot pay salaries for third countries’ armies. We can pay the police, but not the armies. We can train armies, but we cannot pay them. However, single states, as Italy, can.

This shows that not only burden-sharing but also legal frameworks can influence policymaking and ultimately have significance for international policy coherence.

Two conclusions can be drawn regarding the significance of national or self-interests for policymaking: First, it is beyond doubt that national or self-interest is a significant factor in policymaking. This was shown in the analysis in chapter five, where it was established that actors’ initial involvement in Somalia was based on self-interest. The chapter also showed that while all actors are steered by self-interest this does not necessarily lead to differing policy goals among actors. However, the weight of self-interest can lead to difficulties in burden-sharing amongst actors, as is shown through the example of the difficulties in establishing who should bear the financial burden for a peace enforcing mission in Somalia, and who should place their soldiers at disposal. These burden-sharing dilemmas can cause lack of coherent policymaking, as is shown in the case of the AU and UN strategic reviews.

Second, we can conclude that changes in actors’ priorities – caused by change in physical circumstances – are likely to influence coherence. Added up, the situation which portrays itself is a complex pattern of wishes and demands. Economic considerations are weighed against the urgency of the Somali ‘threat’. This is topped by changes in priorities caused by the Mali situation. The urgency of Mali itself can be further exacerbated through ‘The Washington Post effect’ and maybe also influenced by the fact that France, a substantial actor in the EU and within the P3, has particular and stronger interests in Mali. This creates uncertainty around the genuine engagement of actors in Somalia in the future. The EU says they are fatigued, the United States says attention is going elsewhere as Somalia is no longer an urgent threat. The UN is constrained by the interests of the P3 members. When the sustainability of the international engagement is put into question, there is risk of a policy vacuum where it is not clear in which direction efforts will be pulling. The lack of clarity regarding the continuation of a peace enforcing or peacekeeping mission in Somalia can be interpreted as a sign of this.
7 Conclusions

This thesis has analysed the security perspectives and policies of five major foreign actors engaged in Somalia: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, the European Union, the United States and the United Nations. The overarching research question was divided into two parts. It first asked: To what extent do international actors involved in Somalia have similar security perspectives? and secondly: What are the main challenges in achieving a coherent international policy towards Somalia?

This chapter sums up the main empirical findings and the theory-oriented reflections they have triggered. The first two sections respectively answer the two parts of the research question, while section 7.1.3 reflects on the combined findings. Section 7.2 confronts the choice of theory and indicates some generalizable conclusions we can draw from this case study. The last section offers some reflections on the future.

7.1 Main findings

This thesis has shown that while international actors engaged in Somalia have quite similar security perspectives, and while there is a will to coordinate, there is still a lack of coherence in international policymaking. To some extent, this lack of coherence can be attributed to lack of local ownership in policymaking. However, this is not sufficient to explain the lack of coherence in all cases. Significance must also be given to actors’ self-interests, and within this the problems of burden-sharing and changes in actors’ priorities.

7.1.1 A similar security perspective

Security perspective was defined as an actor’s view on what constitutes a threat to security, what the principal object to be secured is, and by which measures it is to be secured. Looking at the goals actors pursue in Somalia, the measures they emphasize and the referent objects they address, we have seen striking similarity in actors’ perspectives. As shown in section 5.1, their engagement in Somalia is fundamentally influenced by the perception that the instability in the country constitutes a danger to their own security or that of their member states. In this way each actor itself is a referent object. However, actors pursue the security of multiple referent objects through their stated goals for Somalia and the measures they emphasize. Most
notably, they pursue state security through their goals and the measures they apply. However, in a state like Somalia there is a thin dividing line between state security and regime security. Some significance is accorded to the Somali population as a referent object, but in many ways the pursuit of human security seem to have secondary status among the actors studied.

Sections 5.2 and 5.3 analysed actors’ security perspectives in terms of their pursuit of goals in Somalia and the choice of measures. The analysis showed that actors’ pursuits inside Somalia largely fit the framework of the ‘institutions first’ approach, which focuses on the need to establish strong institutional bodies and rule of law before seeking to introduce more democratic processes, such as the holding of general elections. This prioritization strengthens the security of the state and the regime – but it cannot be said to give primary importance to the human being as a referent object.

Actors’ security perspectives were shown to be similar, but two modifications should be noted. First, actors are primarily involved in Somalia on the basis of their own self-interest. Although this self-interest does not lead the various actors to pursue goals within Somalia that are substantially different, the self-interest of each actor is necessarily specific to that actor and therefore represents a differentiating factor. Secondly, there are differences within the international community as to how al-Shabaab is perceived. Informants give differing explanations as to what or who al-Shabaab is: some describe the group as having an international core, whereas others see it as a genuinely Somali phenomenon. This difference has important ramifications. The first perception implies that one cannot negotiate with al-Shabaab; but seeing the group as a genuinely Somali phenomenon implies the opposite. Given a historical view, the conflict with al-Shabaab, or militant Islamism in Somalia in general, cannot be resolved in any other way than through negotiations. The greatest differences in perceptions here were found between the actors analysed and informants from civil society. However, an informant from the UN also raised concerns regarding the blacklisting of the group which in practice makes it impossible for either the UN or civil society actors to attempt to reach out to al-Shabaab.

7.1.2 Lack of policy coherence

Coherence was defined as a situation where actors in the international system operate and develop policies so that efforts pull in the same direction. Initially, two dimensions were
attributed to the concept: a policy dimension and a technical dimension. Through the use of complexity theory, a third dimension was added – the local dimension.

The case of the AU and UN strategic reviews shows that organizations are not able to overcome financial difficulties and self-interest to develop a mutual solution which can ensure a sustained peace-enforcing or peacekeeping force in Somalia. The case demonstrates a clear lack of coherence along both the technical and the policy dimensions. The lack of will on the part of the UN to engage peacekeepers on the ground in Somalia is incoherent with the AU policy of seeking a joint mission or a handover to the UN. There was also incoherence along the technical dimension, as the UN Security Council held a decisive meeting on the UN report even before the AU report had been submitted. The two organizations have not proven capable of finding a solution to the financial problems relating to a continued mission. In addition, the lack of constructive dialogue between ‘traditional’ and ‘untraditional’ donors gives rise to the question of whether coherence can be said to have been achieved when an influential actor like Turkey is operating on its own premises, without substantial contact with Western actors or Western coordinating bodies. These cases suggest that coherence in some cases may be substantially weakened as a result of poor coordination between actors. This is the case when lack of coordination leads to a policy vacuum, as in the case of the strategic reviews. It is also the case when lack of coordination leads to lack of substantial contact with, or understanding of, an important actor – as in the case of Turkey.

The use of complexity theory implies a widening of the coherence concept, and an incorporation of a third dimension: local ownership. Complexity theory suggests that coherence should be understood as the pursuit of an “optimal level of cooperation among agents in a given context” (de Coning 2013:4). Such a use of the concept thus implies that what is optimal will be determined by the specific context. Opinion differs on whether the Somalis have ‘enough’ local ownership over the ongoing process in the country. While optimists claim times are better than ever, sceptics hold that ‘local ownership’ is used only as discourse or a ‘buzzword’ and that the country is undergoing changes based on Western conceptions and models. The criticisms can be separated into two levels: the belief that the Somali government itself lacks autonomy in its relations with international actors, and the belief that the initiatives in general are too centrally focused and not sufficiently local. The fact that few actors spoke of specific goals in creating a ‘second’, local policy track supports the assumption that there is lack of local ownership in the second sense. This can be seen not
only as a challenge for coherence – it is also questionable from a transformation perspective of how genuine democratic governance can be achieved.

In considering the coordination assumption, this thesis has shown that the coordination between influential actors cannot in itself be deemed sufficient for establishing coherent policies. This is demonstrated by the fact that numerous coordinating bodies have been established, and yet all informants expressed disappointment regarding the outputs of these. Building on the case of Turkey, it could be argued that coordination will increase the chances of coherent policies – but it does not seem sufficient for establishing them.

National interest or self-interest was mentioned by informants when explaining why actors who favour coordination do not want to be coordinated. It was also given consideration in the case of the lack of coherence in the AU and UN strategic reviews, as the UN’s lack of interest in a UN mission in Somalia derives primarily from the Western countries’ unwillingness to risk the lives of Western soldiers. The case of the reviews shows that burden-sharing dilemmas can arise between actors who have the same goals but who consider the financial costs of a mission to be too high. This suggests that self-interest is a significant factor which can hinder the development of coherent policies.

Given that self-interest is of importance, we should also consider the implications that changes in actors’ priorities have for coherence in policymaking. The analysis has shown that changes in the physical environment, inside Somalia and in Mali, have led actors to change priorities according to what they see as their highest interests. This can serve as a further destabilizing factor that influences policy coherence.

7.1.3 The significance of self-interest and local ownership

The analysis has shown that the initial assumption of this thesis – that similar security perspectives would lead to greater policy coherence and vice versa – was incorrect. Two factors in particular can explain why similar security perspectives are not sufficient to ensure policy coherence.

The first explanation has a basis in theory. Building on complexity theory, one can argue that coherence will always be lacking if there is not sufficient local attachment. The fact that substantial international actors share a security perspective will thus not be sufficient for
coherence. What ‘counts’, for coherence, is whether the policy is context-specific and based on local ownership. Based on this explanation, the discrepancy in the findings should come as no surprise because the first part of this thesis studied perspectives at the international level, whereas coherence, according to complexity theory, is dependent on the local level.

The second explanation can be given independently of whether one assumes that coherence as a concept should have a local dimension. This explanation sees self-interest as fundamental in determining an actor’s policies. Self-interest is decisive not only because it determines the actors’ initial and general involvement; it is also of central importance when actors are to share burdens amongst themselves through intergovernmental or inter-actor negotiations and talks. Even if actors primarily have a shared perspective, it is therefore difficult to decide on substantial policies which will involve that someone can take the credit, someone must pay the financial costs and someone must sacrifice soldiers’ lives. The case of limited success in coordinating the AU and UN strategic reviews and the lack of coherence in peace-making and peacekeeping policies which this implied is an illustrative example of this.

### 7.2 Confronting the choice of theory

In this thesis I have shown how theory on security can be used to operationalize actors’ security perspectives, and facilitate for comparative analysis of actors’ policies. Although initially intending to analyse the possible link between actors’ security perspectives and coherence in policymaking, I must conclude that I found no such causal relationship in the case of Somalia, and that lack of policy coherence is caused by other factors. Thus, my choice of using security theory to inform challenges of coherence did not provide the necessary analytical tool.

However, this process did reveal information of significance in terms of theory. The presence of similar security perspectives, implying that actors had common objectives for Somalia, combined with lacking coherence in policymaking, resembles ‘the coherence dilemma’ as described by de Coning (2012). While de Coning shows that complexity theory, with its weight on local ownership, can explain the coherence dilemma, I argue that actors’ self-interest and issues of burden-sharing also play a significant part in creating ‘the coherence dilemma’.
The study can to some extent be used to draw contingent generalizations. Such generalizations can be made towards cases where international actors are engaged in policymaking in countries with security problems that affect national as well as international security. First, we can conclude that the existence of differing national interests does not necessarily mean that actors will pursue different goals inside the host country. Next, we can say that even if the security perspectives are equal, this will not necessarily lead to coherent policies. Reasons for this can be the lack of local attachment in policy development, or it can be the significance of self-interest. Self-interest can influence actors so that they hold back on funding, refuse to put personnel on the ground in the country, or simply cause actors to shift their priorities and divert the focus and resources away from the state in question.

### 7.3 Concluding reflections

Somalia is at a crossroads. Many have described the situation as a ‘window of opportunity’. Among my informants, a substantial majority expressed that they had more hope than ever for the country. In this situation, calls for local ownership have become strong. However, a turn in circumstances where international actors withdraw completely from engagement in Somalia seems highly unlikely. This suggests that we must accept the reality that international actors will remain involved at some level, and must work on developing local ownership to the process. In many ways, it is important to support the new central administration. However, it should be clear that supporting the current government should not imply designing the form of governance and administration. Neither should it mean ignoring the fact that there are entities and regions in Somalia not entirely comfortable with the central administration at present. A reasonable approach would seem to be to support government efforts to reach out to local communities with basic services and to build local legitimate administrations. It is also important to support dialogue between the different levels of society, always bearing in mind that Somalis should have some type of local ownership over this process as well. One step in this direction is the ‘dual-track approach’, which implies recognition at a certain level of what has been done in Somaliland and in Puntland. However, much still remains to be done.
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Appendix

Interview guide

Questions measuring security perspectives:

Main questions:
1. How is the problem defined: what is the over-all main concern that the actor has regarding Somalia?
2. What are the main goals that the actor seeks to achieve through its presence?
3. Which measures does the actor want to apply?
4. How is al-Shabaab perceived?
5. Who or what is being secured through the actor’s policies?

Additional questions:
6. When did the actor become involved?
7. Why did the actor become involved at this time?
8. How long will the actor be involved?
9. When AMISOM eventually draws out – what is needed to follow up?
10. Who will provide this support?
11. Which engagement does the actor see for itself in relation to Somalia in the future?

Questions measuring coherence:
1. Are there political or structural contradictions which impede coherent policymaking?
2. Are there financial or logistical contradictions which impede coherent policymaking?
3. To what extent is are you as an organization/state coordinated with others?
4. Are there institutionalized meetings between your organization/state and others?
5. Have some actors pursued policies that were unwise in the opinion of people in your organization?

Additional questions:
6. Which role does the actor see for Somali clans in the future?
7. Does the actor have a position regarding Jubaland?
8. What is the actor’s vision of Somalia’s future state (centralized/federalized)?
9. Is the governmental system in Puntland a model for the future?
List of informants

Interview in Norway, preparation for fieldwork:

Stig Jarle Hansen, 07.01.2013
Associate Professor, Noragric, Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås

List of informants in the field:

Informant A, 15.01.2013, academia
Informant B, 16.01.2013, UN
Informant C, 17.01.2013, EU
Informant D, 17.01.2013, IGAD
Informant E, 18.01.2013, UN
Informant F, 21.01.2013, diplomatic representation
Informant G, 22.01.2013, academia
Informant H, 24.01.2013, non-governmental organization
Informant I, 24.01.2013, diplomatic representation
Informant J, 25.01.2013, UN
Informant K, 29.01.2013, AMISOM
Informant L, 29.01.2013, AMISOM
Informant M, 30.01.2013, EU
Informant N, 31.01.2013, US
Informant O, 01.02.2013, IGAD
Informant P, 01.02.2013, diplomatic representation
Informant Q, 09.02.2013, EU