A state of their own?

The relationship between international and local actors in statebuilding in South Sudan

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Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies
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21.05.2013
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http://www.duo.uio.no

Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo
Abstract

In July of 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest state after seceding from Sudan. This marked the start of a statebuilding process, where South Sudanese and international actors together aim to build sustainable institutions where there had previously been almost no government structures.

This study investigates how the relationship between international and local actors affects statebuilding in South Sudan. This question is vital, as the main objective in statebuilding is to over time develop a state capable of functioning without international assistance. The research presented in this thesis is based on document studies and qualitative interviews with personnel on both the international and South Sudanese side.

I have mapped out the control of decision-making and resources, as well as capacity building, and will show that whilst the South Sudanese government has ownership of major decisions within statebuilding, the international community still has significant influence, partly due to their own policies. In this picture, the lack of capacity in the South Sudanese government is also important. I will argue that statebuilding in South Sudan benefits from there being efforts to establish local ownership, but that international actors may need to intensify attempts to foster ownership through capacity building and a stronger emphasis on long-term efficiency.
Acknowledgements

There are many people who deserve to be thanked for helping me on the road to finishing this thesis. First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, whose bookshelves, knowledge and comments have been extremely useful throughout this year.

I would also like to thank those who helped me by sharing advice and contacts for my trip to South Sudan, as well as Fritt Ord and the University of Oslo for providing the financial support that made fieldwork possible. A big thanks to Nyiel and to Stein Rosenberg, who improvised as nurses when I was sick and far away from home.

I am especially grateful to those I interviewed – thank you for sharing your time, viewpoints and experiences. This thesis could not have been written without your contributions.

I also want to thank fellow students, friends and family for outstanding support and for reminding me that there is life outside the thesis. For invaluable feedback and for taking the time to proofread my thesis even though you didn’t have to, thank you Aaron, Ann-Therese and pappa Ragnar.

Aaron, you deserve special thanks for being patient and encouraging during this past year. I promise to become a real person again now.

Guri Nordgreen Romtveit

Oslo, 21st May 2013
Abbreviations and acronyms

CBTF   Capacity Building Trust Fund
CPA    Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GoSS   Government of the Republic of South Sudan
JDT    Joint Donor Team
NGO    Non-governmental organisation
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SSDP   South Sudan Development Plan
UNCT   United Nations Country Team
UNDAF  United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS  United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNSC   United Nations Security Council

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1 Introduction

The world has never faced a greater challenge within statebuilding than South Sudan.

Hilde F. Johnson (Bistandsaktuelt, Nov. 2012)¹

On the 9th of July 2011, tens of thousands of South Sudanese celebrated independence in the streets of the new capital, Juba. The day had come after decades of violence, displacement and suffering for the people of South Sudan. Separation from the North had come at high cost, and at the time of independence there were still key issues in the relationship between the two countries that had not been resolved.

Aside from the outer challenges, the government of South Sudan faced the formidable task of building a new state from scratch. In a country devastated by one of Africa’s longest civil wars and held back by centuries of underdevelopment, this was not going to be an easy undertaking. In fact, so many challenges lay ahead for the world’s newest state that Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN, Hilde F. Johnson, claimed that statebuilding had never been this challenging anywhere.

It is in this context that statebuilding now takes place in South Sudan. In a partnership between the South Sudanese government and international donor countries, agencies and organisations, core functions of governance are to be put in place. They include the rule of law, provision of basic services, management of natural resources and a strengthening of the economy (UNSC 2011:2). South Sudan has achieved statehood, but has only just begun its transformation into a functioning state. It is part of this process that forms the core theme of this thesis.

1.1 Research question

Statebuilding involves “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen state institutions where these have seriously been eroded or are missing” (Caplan 2005). Up until today, the track record of international statebuilding can at

¹ My translation.
best be described as mixed, as the international community struggles to find the optimal methods to achieve their objectives. Still, the demand for international assistance in statebuilding has been growing in recent years, as functioning institutions have come to be considered a prerequisite for sustainable, peaceful states (Paris and Sisk 2009b:1-2).

Initially, institutions will be heavily supported by international actors, but over time, the political accountability is to be handed over to a national, sovereign centre of power (Wesley 2008:373-374). The goal of eventually transferring authority to national actors is an important component in statebuilding, because building a state that is self-sufficient not only allows international actors to withdraw from the country and focus the attention elsewhere, it also guarantees the national population's right to self-determination under international law (Narten 2009:252). In practice, however, achieving this has proved challenging, and international actors are often the real drivers in statebuilding (Donais 2009:4).

In this thesis, I wish to delve deeper into the relationship between international and local actors, in order to see how it affects statebuilding today. The word “relationship” undoubtedly has many meanings and interpretations, but for the purpose of this thesis I am referring to the ways in which international and national institutions deal with each other in terms of decision-making, control of resources and capacity building. The reason for this is that I consider these factors to be the more politically relevant aspects of the relationship between a host country and its international statebuilding partners. One key concept connected to these is local ownership of statebuilding, which will be a central theme in this thesis.

The purpose of looking at this relationship is to see what effects it has on developments within statebuilding. I have chosen to examine this question through a qualitative case study of South Sudan.

Hence, the research question that I aim to answer is:

*How does the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors affect statebuilding in South Sudan?*

South Sudan is an interesting case to study when it comes to statebuilding, firstly because of its topicality in international affairs. Not much has been written on the statebuilding ventures in the country, making it possible to uncover new information through a case study. Also, at a
time when experiences in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq have led the international community to scale back both in rhetoric and ambition for what external actors can achieve, South Sudan stands out as one of the only remaining large statebuilding projects, which is an argument for studying it closely.

South Sudan is a new nation. Hence, there has not been much time to engage in statebuilding. Moreover, South Sudan is widely thought to face significant challenges to statebuilding, making even a relatively successful statebuilding process a long-term one (Lacher 2012; Hemmer 2012). Because of this, there is a limit to what conclusions can be drawn from studying South Sudan at such an early point in time. Notwithstanding this limitation, South Sudan still has great relevance in international affairs. The fact that statebuilding in South Sudan looks to be a lengthy affair with many possible pitfalls makes the critical study of statebuilding in this country, even early on in the process, especially important.

1.2 Methodology

In order to be able to provide an answer to the research question, I conducted interviews in Juba in January 2013 with international and South Sudanese personnel that have knowledge on statebuilding in the country. In these interviews, I aimed to uncover the nature of the relationship between the two sides. My questioning included what the South Sudanese role is in planning and implementing projects, the extent of international influence, and how the issue of capacity affects the process. In order to limit the scope of the thesis, I confined the queries to the situation on the national level in South Sudan from independence until January 2013.

Through a study of publicly available documents, I have also attempted to give a general overview of actors, priorities and funding within statebuilding in South Sudan. This chapter is included to provide a background on which to understand the research question and answers.

1.3 Composition of the thesis

The structure of this thesis is laid out as follows: Chapter 2 provides background for today’s statebuilding in South Sudan, including the parts of modern history that have relevance for the research question. Within this chapter is an assessment of the institutional foundations for
statebuilding at the time of independence. **Chapter 3** constructs the theoretical framework for this thesis through a review of literature on statebuilding and an account of the theoretical arguments that will guide data collection. **Chapter 4** accounts for the methodological choices made in order to answer the research question as well as possible, including interviews/fieldwork and document studies. In chapters 5 and 6, I present the results of the research. In **Chapter 5**, I will provide an overview of statebuilding activities in South Sudan, in order to provide the knowledge framework for results of the interview analysis, which are laid out in **Chapter 6**. Concluding remarks are given in **Chapter 7**.
2 Background for statebuilding

Figure 1. Map of Sudan and South Sudan. Source: Thomas (2010). The map has been edited to reflect the independence of South Sudan.

In the following chapter I will give an outline of the parts of Sudanese/South Sudanese history that bear significance for the statebuilding that is taking place in South Sudan today.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide information on contextual factors that are important for understanding the current situation. I will first review long lines in Sudanese history, including the colonial periods and two civil wars. Thereafter, I will summarise the events surrounding the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ultimately lead to South Sudan becoming an independent state. Finally, I will assess the institutional foundations for statebuilding in South Sudan.

2.1 Long lines in Sudanese history: a story of underdevelopment for Southern Sudan

2.1.1 Early modern history

The account of modern Sudanese history starts with the Egyptian conquest of Sudan in 1820-1821, which brought the country under Ottoman Turkish rule. The Egyptian rulers reinforced patterns of economic subjugation that were already in place in Sudan, where the area around the capital of Khartoum, the Nile River Valley, was developed, while the rest of the country was exploited for its resources. The peripheries of Sudan were heavily taxed and formed the basis for lucrative trades in ivory and slaves (Natsios 2012:39). It was during this period that a divide between Northern and Southern Sudan began to form, as the leading Arab tribes in power in Khartoum developed a stake in keeping the South down (D. Johnson 2011:4-5).

From 1883 followed a short period where the Mahdists, a Sudanese religious group, ruled the country. Under their authority, the first attempts were made to Islamise Sudan. In 1889, however, foreign forces again established ownership over Sudan when Britain conquered the territory. The Anglo-Egyptian rulers governed the North and South differently, as past governments had not really established control in the South, and there were few existing governance structures to base the rule on. The British had also decided to develop Southern Sudan as African, not Arab, and considered it part of East Africa (D. Johnson 2011:9-12). The Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule made positive contributions to Sudan in the form of

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2 Southern Sudan is used to denote the parts of Sudan that in 2011 became South Sudan.
3 Egypt was then part of the Ottoman Empire.
4 Egypt a British colony at the time, and Sudan officially belonged to Egypt.
education, commercial development, infrastructure and governance. This was, however, mostly confined to the Nile River Valley in the North. Southern Sudan remained largely underdeveloped, and traditional, loose tribal governance structures were allowed to persist (Natsios 2012:54).

2.1.2 Independence


There was a sense of worry in the South that independence would only represent transitioning into another colonial period – this time with Northern Sudan as the overlord (Natsios 2012:61). Few Southerners had any experience with civil administration, and as independence drew near, decisions were made without their consultation. Issues important to the South, such as federalism and the role of religion in the state, had not been resolved prior to independence. A “Sudanisation” commission, charged with staffing the civil service after the British left, filled most senior positions in Southern administration with Northerners (Collins 2005:31).

In 1954, after elections in Sudan where a Northern party had formed a government, Southern Sudanese leaders convened a conference in Juba. It was declared that independence from Egypt was only desired if there was either federalism within Sudan or self-determination for the South. Their demands were not heard (D. Johnson 2011:27-29). Discontent was growing in Southern Sudan.

2.1.3 The First Civil War and the Addis Ababa Agreement

In 1955, a mutiny started in the town of Torit in Eastern Equatoria and spread to other garrisons in Southern Sudan. The uprising caused the British to hurry their departure from the country, as they did not wish to be responsible for a colony they were not in control of (Natsios 2012:60-61). Sudan was declared independent on January 1, 1956.
In 1958, the Sudanese army overthrew the democratically elected Sudanese government. The new government advanced ideas of unifying Sudan through Arabisation and Islamisation in the South. Africans in the South reacted with resentment and later rebellion (Collins 2005:33-35). An exile political movement was formed that would later become the core of the guerrilla army known as “Anyanya”. By the early 1960s, the fighting had reached the level of civil war. In 1964, 5000 irregular troops were fighting the First Civil War in Sudan (H.F. Johnson 2011:4).

Due to lack of internal cohesion, the Anyanya rebellion did not represent a significant threat to the Northern government, although fighting intensified after 1964 (Natsios 2012:64). The government was however not able to defeat the rebels militarily, and President Jaafar Nimairi therefore sought a political solution to the conflict. Negotiations started in Ethiopia with the Southern Sudan Liberation Front, lead by Joseph Lagu, who had managed to establish a unified command of Southern opposition. The signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 granted Southern Sudan a single administrative region and certain administrative powers (D. Johnson 2011:36-40).

2.1.4 The Second Civil War

Certain forces in Southern Sudan were not content with the Addis Ababa Agreement. In addition, important parts of the agreement were never implemented, and the South was not given the resources for development that it had been promised. Among the central issues in the eleven year-long peace were conflict about the Southern region’s borders, dissatisfaction with how Southern guerrilla soldiers were absorbed into the Sudanese army and the role of the Southern government in resource management after oil was discovered in 1974 (D. Johnson 2011:43).

In 1983, President Nimairi reversed his previous stance on secularism in the country in order to shore up his support, and started advocating the Islamisation of Sudan. The Southern Regional Government was dissolved and Sharia law imposed on the whole of Sudan. Following this, development funds for the South declined, and the pattern of resource exploitation intensified with decisions to place oil refineries in the North and to build a canal that would divert Southern water resources (D. Johnson 2011:46-47). These developments finally tipped the balance over from hostility to civil war (H.F. Johnson 2011:5).
When being ordered to move North, Southern soldiers mutinied in Bor in 1983. The soldiers thereafter fled to the bush and formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a guerrilla movement under the leadership of John Garang\(^5\) (Collins 2005:37-38). This marked the start of the Second Civil War. It was to become much more serious than the first, both in terms of geographical reach, civilian displacement and lives lost.

The Ethiopian government, under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, provided international support for the SPLA. This influenced the movement’s political stance on the future of southern Sudan, as Ethiopia could not support a separatist movement in fear of setting precedence for Eritrean separatist forces. Thus, the SPLA’s programme was one of revolution, rather than secession, even though the latter remained an unspoken option. The SPLA developed a broad language of underdevelopment for the whole of rural Sudan, in order to appeal to other regions suffering under the rule of the government in Khartoum (D. Johnson 2011:62-65).

The government employed a strategy of supporting tribal militias to fight the SPLA and terrorise the civilian population. This allowed Khartoum to wage war through surrogates whilst dismissing the fighting as mere tribal conflict (D. Johnson 2011:69, 76). The Southern movement was however more coherent than during the First Civil War, and gained momentum until 1991, when Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia fell and there was a serious internal split in the SPLA (ibid.:91-94).

The SPLA was at the time not a very democratic movement, in the sense that members did not have institutionalised ways to question the chosen strategy of leader John Garang. Officially, the movement’s political wing was subordinate to the military wing. In 1991, two commanders\(^6\) claimed Garang’s leadership had become too autocratic and that Southern Sudan should seek to gain independence from the North. In August that year they announced the overthrow of Garang. The fighting that ensued took on a tribal character and lead to large-scale civilian suffering and death. In addition, it made it possible for the Northern government to regain military initiative. Even though “The Nasir Faction” wanted full sovereignty for Southern Sudan, they received support from the Northern government, which pursued a strategy of divide and conquer in the South (D. Johnson 2011:92-99, 111).

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\(^{5}\) In this thesis, I will often keep with the Sudanese custom of referring to people using their first names, e.g. John Garang (de Mabior).

\(^{6}\) One of them was Riek Machar, the current Vice President of South Sudan.
The overthrow of Garang proved not to be successful, and The Nasir Faction gradually lost what little support it had. The SPLA managed to reunite the movement and halt the momentum of the Northern government forces by 1994/1995. This came partly due to increased international sympathy for the movement and Khartoum’s support for extremist Islam, which caused loss of international support (D. Johnson 2011:100-102).

The split in the SPLA also put peace back on the table. Whilst talks in Nigeria in 1992 failed, IGAD\textsuperscript{7}-sponsored talks in 1993/94 lead to a declaration of principles that included secularism and self-determination for the South. Although the government in Khartoum broke off the negotiations, the Southern opposition had been brought closer together on their causes and solutions for ending the war (D. Johnson 2011:101-105). Furthermore, the principles gained international support, which meant that there was an international consensus on self-determination for Southern Sudan (Abulemoi 2011:54). The SPLM/A had also held their first national convention since its foundation and had started a slow transition from a purely military organisation to a wider political and social organisation (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:95).

The government in Khartoum was still attempting to win over the SPLA by pursuing alliances with opposing Southern groups. Despite this, the SPLA was advancing, and it was becoming increasingly clear that neither side could win the war militarily. Ultimately, the military stalemate, along with significant domestic and international pressure on the Sudanese government, paved the way for peace negotiations (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:98-105).

2.2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The peace process from 2002 to 2004 ended in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The first protocol in the agreement, the Machacos Protocol, which was based on the 1994 IGAD principles, was signed in 2002 and became the foundation for future negotiations. With the guidance and pressure of the UK, USA and Norway (“The Troika”), a further five protocols were signed in the following two years. These contained agreements on

\textsuperscript{7} The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, an East African regional development organisation.
security, wealth sharing (including oil revenues), power sharing, the Abyei region and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan regions (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:106-109). The two parties had thus managed to agree on ceasefire, federalism and revenue sharing, in addition to the all-important referendum (Belloni 2011:414-415). Sudan had emerged from a state of civil war that with the exception of eleven years had lasted since 1955.

The implementation of the CPA proved challenging. Both governments lacked a competent bureaucracy, and the required good faith to implement the agreement was non-existent. Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir and President of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir\(^8\) managed to resolve certain smaller issues, while the larger disputes remained unsettled. Each side accused the other of not complying with the agreement (Natsios 2012:185-186). Although the CPA included the wording that the parties were to “make unity attractive”, the SPLM gradually retracted from national politics and concentrated instead on securing a referendum for the South (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:19). In the end, nearly all parts of the CPA were delayed, apart from the independence referendum.

Despite not perfectly implementing the stipulations in the CPA, the two sides more or less successfully achieved a balance in the period 2005-2011, where relations remained relatively calm and the agreement was not revoked. Ultimately, the South gained independence in 2011 with the acceptance of the regime in Khartoum. For this reason, the CPA must be considered at least a partial success (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:134).

All in all, the history of Sudan and South Sudan is one of exploitation of the South, which resulted in civil conflict where both sides caused massive human suffering. This same history eventually resulted in a referendum where 98% of Southern Sudanese voted to secede from Sudan. How ready was South Sudan for this to happen? The foundation for statebuilding is discussed in the next section.

### 2.3 The foundation for statebuilding in South Sudan

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\(^8\) Kiir succeeded John Garang, who died in a helicopter crash on July 30\(^\circ\), 2005.
In this country, they are starting from not even scratch; they’re starting from minus something.

Hilde F. Johnson, in Okstad and Blom (2013)

Independence day on July 9, 2011, marked the official beginning of South Sudan’s transition from a marginalised, overexploited and underdeveloped Sudanese region to a sovereign country. The establishment of the state of South Sudan meant that there was a new country in the world more underdeveloped than almost any other. In fact, South Sudan literally ranked “off the charts” on some UN indicators for underdevelopment (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:169). In 2010, the UN published a report on development in Southern Sudan that was given the telling title “Scary Statistics”. What was the state of South Sudanese institutions at independence? The starting point for statebuilding activities is important to clarify in order to interpret what has happened since.

### 2.3.1 Institutional legacy

Historically, South Sudan has consisted of tribal societies without centralised power\(^9\). This, together with the consistent underdevelopment of Southern Sudan meant that there was little experience in government or bureaucracy at the time of the signing of the CPA. The process of developing a network of functioning institutions was, and still is, hampered by the lack of precursors in much of the country and the associated low number of trained civil servants (Lacher 2012:9).

The lack of basic infrastructure, legacy of insecurity and weak markets serve as structural obstacles to statebuilding. The state has little reach in much of the country and most of the rural population does not take part in the monetised economy (Lacher 2012:5-7). This is an obstacle for increased taxation, which is an important determinant for a strong state (Braithwaite 2010). The access to oil revenues may also contribute to there not being strong incentives to expand the network of taxation in the country.

When the CPA was signed in 2005, there were no institutions in Southern Sudan with the capacity to handle the enormous challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. Structures for

\(^9\) Exceptions: the Shilluk and Azande kingdoms.
dealing with national planning and public finances had to be built from scratch. Moreover, only a few people had experience from the 1972-1983 period, which was the last time the South had any real self-government. Only a small number of people had experience from government work in Khartoum or abroad (OECD 2010a). All in all, the country scored low both on institutional and human capacity.

2.3.2 Institutional development during the CPA period

How much did the CPA period prepare the South Sudanese state for independence? The years between 2005 and 2011 arguably had the potential to serve as a preparatory period for statebuilding. Still, not many actors recognised this, as it had not yet been made clear that the result of the referendum would be independence for South Sudan (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:142). As mentioned, the CPA contained language that required for the parties to “make unity attractive” in the years before the referendum was to take place. A consequence of this was that there was little possibility to discuss a potential Southern secession and what this would mean for the South in terms of governance (Hemmer 2012:2). Instead of preparing for independence, international actors stuck to the principle of neutrality before the result of the referendum was clear (Opseth 2012). All in all, statebuilding in South Sudan got properly underway only after the referendum in January of 2011.

It would, however, not be right to say that no statebuilding had occurred in the years 2005-2011. Governance structures had been established in areas that had previously just seen Sudanese repression or rebel disarray. Governmental structures, such as ministries and commissions, were set up in ten states. There had also been some advancement in infrastructural and financial development, although both sectors remained very underdeveloped at independence. The Northern government also controlled financial and monetary matters in the period. All in all, the CPA period can be seen as somewhat of a “head start” to statebuilding, but it was far from what it could have been. It is thus fair to conclude that the period was a missed opportunity for statebuilding (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:172-177; Belloni 2011).

2.3.3 The SPLM/A

Initially, the SPLM/A was not very concerned with being an alternative government that would provide services in the South (D. Johnson 2011:105). It was a top-down military
organisation more concerned with fighting the North than ensuring the development of Southern Sudan. They relied on traditional governance structures, chiefs and tribal leaders, to maintain order. Service delivery, to the extent that there was any, was the responsibility of NGOs (World Bank 2010:9).

The CPA not only ended the civil war, it also confirmed the SPLM/A as the South’s governing party and gave it a role in the Government of National Unity, which was the Sudanese government in the transitional period. At the time of the signing, the SPLM/A had started the transition from guerrilla movement, but had still not assumed the identity of a government (Badiey 2007:4). It also carried with it a history of corruption and poor quality of financial management (World Bank 2010:11).

Since independence, the SPLM has dominated the government in South Sudan, but is marked by serious internal divisions. Political contestation happens largely within the party. This is partly because President Salva Kiir has since 2005 pursued a strategy of accommodating political opposition. Although an effective strategy to keep the country united, it can be said to hamper institutional efficiency and inflate public budgets\(^\text{10}\) (Lacher 2012:5-6). All in all, the SPLM/A faced serious organisational challenges as the biggest actor in the new state of South Sudan.

### 2.4 Conclusion

Historical developments have resulted in South Sudan becoming an independent state. But the same history has also failed to prepare South Sudan for statehood. When summing up this chapter, it is easy to agree with Hilde F. Johnson at least in that statebuilding in South Sudan is a formidable task for both international and South Sudanese actors.

With this context in mind, I will now delve deeper into the literature on statebuilding, with the objective of constructing the theoretical framework needed to help answer the research question posed in Chapter 1.

\(^{10}\) As much as 40% of South Sudan’s budget has been spent on salaries, in particular for the army (Natsios 2012:212).
3 Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I will give an overview of scholarly discussion on statebuilding today and use this to build the theoretical framework for fulfilling the research objectives. I will first go through some key concepts for this thesis. Thereafter, I will review the debate on statebuilding, firstly discussing whether we should engage in statebuilding at all, and secondly what flaws and opportunities for improvement exist within statebuilding. Finally, I will discuss what this means for South Sudan and conclude by explaining what interview questions I asked to be able to find out how the relationship between local and international actors in South Sudan affects statebuilding.

3.1 Key concepts

3.1.1 Statebuilding

As stated in the introduction, Statebuilding refers to “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen state institutions where these have seriously been eroded or are missing” (Caplan 2005). When using the term statebuilding in this thesis, I am referring to post-conflict\textsuperscript{11} statebuilding activities undertaken by international institutions and individual countries, in cooperation with national authorities in the country in question.

Whilst statebuilding and peacebuilding are often used interchangeably in academic literature, they are not synonymous. Call (2008:5-13) for instance, argues that statebuilding efforts will not automatically contribute to peace in a country, and consequently treat the terms as conceptually different. In a similar way, Paris and Sisk (2009b:14) define peacebuilding as “efforts to create conditions in which violence will not recur” and classify statebuilding as a subcomponent of peacebuilding. I believe this clarification is useful to keep in mind.

Notwithstanding this distinction, some authors will use the term peacebuilding in instances that by Caplan’s definition will qualify as statebuilding. In fact, when using the terms

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11} The term post-conflict is contested, as societies that are given this label are often less ordered and peaceful than the term suggests. I have chosen to use it for lack of a better alternative.}
peacebuilding and statebuilding, scholars often refer to the same international missions and activities. This is a symptom of statebuilding and peacebuilding being connected concepts and the resulting tendency for debates on the two to converge (Lotz 2010:223). For this reason, lessons and arguments put forward in relation to one concept will often also be applicable to the other.

3.1.2 Local ownership

Local ownership is seen as essential to guaranteeing sustainable solutions in a statebuilding environment, as it ensures that strategies have solid domestic support. First formally endorsed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in 1995, it has since become a central objective in international activities, so much so that “[e]very UN mission and development programme now stress the importance of local ’ownership’” (Chesterman 2007:7; 2002:41). Local ownership is key to the discussion on the relationship between local and international actors, as it is connected to the aspects of decision-making, resource control and capacity building that I mentioned in the introduction.

Scholars who write about local ownership often spend considerable efforts trying to precisely define the concept without arriving at a consensus definition. This lack of clarity in fact leads many international agencies to avoid operationalising it altogether. In practice, the term is used to describe nearly the whole continuum of relations between local and international actors, from simple acceptance of international statebuilding activities to full local command. For the most part, however, local ownership is defined by scholars as involving a measure of control on part of the national authorities (see for instance Donais 2009; Narten 2009). It is therefore not enough for the government to be informed or consulted of processes and strategies in order for it to be true local ownership; they are to take part in management and decision-making.

With this in mind, a useful definition of local ownership in the context of statebuilding is:

The process and final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning and decision-making, the practical management and implementation, and the evaluation and control of all phases of state-building programs up to the point when no further external assistance is needed (Narten 2009:254).
In the literature, it is often unclear who the “owners” in local ownership are, whether it’s a country’s population or its government. Choosing local partners is also a common issue in international missions (Narten 2009:260). Because South Sudan has only just begun its democratic process and because this is also not the topic for this thesis, I have chosen to interpret local ownership as referring to a country’s government. It is clearly not the only possible interpretation, and it would be fruitful to examine ownership in the wider sense as well, though I have chosen not to do so here.

It is also clear that local ownership is a matter of degree. Accordingly, the transition to local ownership can be a gradual process (Hansen and Wiharta 2007:xv). When discussing local ownership, it is therefore not a question of either/or, but rather of more or less local ownership.

What are the reasons for the emphasis put on local ownership? Two main arguments are increased self-determination and improved efficiency in statebuilding. Both of these will become evident later in this thesis.

### 3.1.3 Capacity building

Lack of capacity can be seen more or less as a necessary feature for an international statebuilding mission to take place. After all, the reasons for international involvement are almost always related to the incapacity or malevolence of the sitting government. Consequently, a change of management structures is called for (Chesterman 2007:4). This change is largely captured in the term *capacity building*, which can be defined as increasing the “political, economic and social capacity in terms of human, institutional, material and financial resources to execute necessary roles” (Shinoda 2008:100). The ability to achieve the goal of a sustainable state where authority has been transferred to local counterparts depends to a large extent on having built the necessary capacity in the local government (Hansen 2008:49).

It is evident that capacity building is closely related to local ownership. Firstly, one may assume capacity building to be beneficial for local ownership because it involves locals in the reform process, fills gaps in abilities and enhances the legitimacy of the government (Hansen 2008:49-50). Secondly, if there is lack of capacity to govern, one may also assume that there
is lack of capacity for local ownership. This has consequences for the ability to achieve local ownership early on in statebuilding missions, an issue that will be dealt with in section 3.6.

After having outlined key concepts for this thesis, I will now present key debates in the literature on statebuilding, starting with the fundamental question of whether statebuilding is a task suited for the international community.

### 3.2 Should we be engaging in statebuilding at all?

The relationship between local and external actors is highly relevant in international statebuilding, and should therefore be at the centre of the debate on it. The main reason for its relevance lies in the very nature of statebuilding itself. Although international actors aim to assist the local actors in creating sustainable self-government, the power exercised will in practice involve some level of intrusion into a sovereign state’s internal affairs (Paris and Sisk 2009a:305). With this tension in mind, it may be fruitful to briefly discuss the merits of international statebuilding overall before delving into particular issues and practices. Indeed, some authors are essentially arguing that solutions would more sustainable if international actors did not interfere in statebuilding, meaning there would be no relationship between local and international actors to discuss. The first question then is: should international statebuilding take place at all?

Although international statebuilding is frequently criticised, not many scholars would argue against engaging in it altogether. Jeffrey Herbst stands as one of the few exceptions, declaring that the international community should “let states fail” (2004). Herbst is arguing that we should instead solve the issues of weak states and civil unrest by allowing for what he thinks are more sustainable solutions, like secession and the annexation of territories. Similarly, Jeremy Weinstein (2005) argues that states’ “autonomous recovery” results in more sustainable situations and consequently that international statebuilding should not automatically be the preferred method. Instead of international intervention, conflicts should more often be allowed to reach their “natural end”, in order to achieve lasting peace.

As mentioned, these authors represent the minority amongst international relations scholars. The majority would dispute the argument based on two factors. Firstly, it has not been conclusively proven that a peace achieved without any outside help is more sustainable than
peace achieved with outside help (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Secondly, one might also argue that the potential price of such a strategy may be too high, due to the threat it poses to civilian populations, and to the fact that it is rarely possible to contain civil conflict within a state (Paris 2004:232).

There are, however, many authors who criticise the practice of statebuilding as fundamentally flawed. These can be characterised as negative towards statebuilding, although they have not put forward a specific alternative to it, like Herbst and Weinstein above.

3.3 The inherent flaws of statebuilding

Both scholars who position themselves as negative towards statebuilding and those who are supportive emphasise the flaws evident in statebuilding up to today. What divides them is therefore not whether or not they see statebuilding as a success or not. In fact, there is a general agreement that the track record of statebuilding is unsatisfactory. Instead, the main divergence in standpoints concerns to what extent these flaws are open for repair or not – essentially, whether success in statebuilding is logically impossible or just empirically challenging. This debate has important consequences for whether there can be bright future for statebuilding in places like South Sudan. The question then is whether there is potential to do better, or if statebuilding as a practice has certain characteristics that cause it to be unlikely to ever succeed. This is the topic for the following sections.

It could of course be argued that if serious flaws in statebuilding cannot be remedied, then this should have consequences for whether or not international statebuilding ventures should be undertaken in the future. Few scholars seem to take this argument very far, however, and instead settle for suggestions such as “there is a need to seriously and critically examine any demands that we deepen, intensify and perfect such technologies and knowledges of intervention” (Bhuta 2008:534).

3.3.1 Sovereignty and self-determination in the presence of international statebuilding

The arguments that highlight the negative sides of statebuilding often focus on the fundamental characteristics of it. As mentioned, statebuilding as it is understood here
involves international actors undertaking actions to reform, establish or strengthen institutions in a country. This has been argued to threaten the principle of sovereignty in international relations (Fukuyama 2004:96-97). Sovereignty refers to a state’s inherent right to govern itself and is considered an intrinsic part of the concept of statehood (de Brabandere 2009:82). According to the critics, the presence of international actors that assume some or many governance functions in a country constitutes a breach of this principle.

Some see this breach as problematic from an academic standpoint, arguing that modifying the principle of sovereignty “means that the bottom effectively drops out of the discipline” of international relations theory (Bickerton et al. 2007:3). Others, however, assert that few are willing to defend the principle of state sovereignty in its pure form anymore, as history has shown that “not all sovereignties are created equal” (Fukuyama 2004:104). In other words, they argue that reality has proved challenging to the theoretical concept, making recognition of sovereignty today contingent on performance in relation to international criteria.

According to Eric de Brabandere (2009), to say that statebuilding violates sovereignty is a misconception of sovereignty as a concept. Sovereignty must be seen as distinct from the competences and administration of a state, he argues, in the sense that transferring administrative powers to international actors does not imply that international actors are taking on the sovereignty of the country in question: “On the contrary, the transmission by a state of its administering power and competences to another entity can be seen as the exercise of the rights of a sovereign state.” Being sovereign is, quite simply, part of being a state (2009:82-83). This is true regardless of whether international actors are assisting local actors in exercising the functions of the state. Stephen Krasner, on the other hand, argues the legal definition to be only one component of what sovereignty entails. In addition, he submits, sovereignty also means that external authorities do not have the right to interfere in decision-making and that the state is the highest political authority in a country (Eriksen 2008:233). Statebuilding could interfere with both these understandings of sovereignty.

Introducing a more complex understanding of sovereignty then becomes closely tied to self-determination. Self-determination can be divided into external and internal self-determination, where the former refers to a contested right to independence from other
countries\textsuperscript{12}, and the latter to “the right to choose [the] form of government and to determine the social, economic, and cultural policies of the state” (A. Cassesse, quoted in de Brabandere 2009:71). The internal aspect of self-determination has the most relevance to the current situation in South Sudan, as secession has already been achieved.

Can the right to self-determination be upheld when international actors are in control of some or all of the government and institution building? According to Christopher J. Bickerton, the presence of international actors reduces the political space available to the country’s population, thereby threatening the right to internal self-determination. In his view, “[t]he existence of state-building indicates how weak political belief in the principle of self-determination has become” (Bickerton 2007:98). Citizens are left as “passive recipients” of institutions that are being created without sufficient input of popular will. These institutions therefore end up lacking the required roots in society (ibid.:93-96). Similarly, Chandler (2010:149-150) argues that the states being constructed in statebuilding missions do not enjoy self-determination and political autonomy, resulting in states with little connection with their societies and a marginalised political process.

This points to a serious logical problem with statebuilding: if international statebuilding missions are a threat to sovereignty and self-determination, this runs counter to the aim of establishing a sovereign, self-determining state. International statebuilding, then, is working against itself. In other words, the theoretical arguments of scholars like Bickerton, Bhuta and Chandler would lead us to expect international statebuilding to be setting itself up for failure: “Many problems of state-building flow from this basic contradiction between the exercise of external power and the necessity of domestic foundations” (Bickerton 2007:96). In South Sudan, for instance, the massive presence of international organisations, donor representatives and NGOs working to build institutions in the country would in effect lead to there being less room for the leaders of South Sudan themselves to create a state in its own image. The presumed outcome is a weak state without the ability to govern effectively.

At the same time, it is possible to argue that if one sees the international presence as an instrument for achieving self-determination, their presence cannot automatically be claimed to infringe on this right. It is important to note that this does not grant international actors the right to define what form of government that is to be put in place (de Brabandere 2009:72-

\textsuperscript{12} For an overview of this discussion, see de Brabandere (2009:70-73).
74). It could, however, mean that statebuilding in itself cannot automatically be said to break with the principle of self-determination. What is missing from this argument, however, is an admission that if allowing the presence of international actors is a choice, one must examine the host country’s capacity to make that choice freely. When the donors and the UN have the resources and organisational capacity that a state cannot do without, inviting them into the country is not necessarily a real choice. Consequently, the capacity and involvement of local actors becomes a consideration in the debate on how statebuilding affects self-determination.

3.3.2 Local ownership as a means to achieve self-determination

The self-determination criticism has not been left unaddressed in statebuilding missions. There is an awareness that institutions must be based on the will of local actors, not on international prescriptions for how to carry out institution building. Partly for this reason, international statebuilding missions almost always aim to achieve local ownership of the process (Narten 2009:253).

Local ownership can be seen as a counter-weight to claims mentioned above, that international statebuilding involves a loss of self-determination on part of the local authorities. Because it leaves more control with local actors, it reduces the weight of arguments that statebuilding harms self-determination, even if it cannot be said to make them invalid. Local ownership thus helps statebuilding look less like a colonial activity, and more like a legitimate enterprise (Chesterman 2007:20). One should therefore expect that successful local ownership leads to institutions with deeper roots in society and more locally tailored solutions overall. In summary, local ownership is seen as necessary for achieving statebuilding aims. Without it, missions will be less efficient.

Local ownership is, however, not hailed by all as an absolute solution for the self-determination problem. The criticisms of local ownership are based mainly on local ownership not being what it is intended to be, as there is in practice often only a very low degree of local ownership, with the term being interpreted to entail mere consultation on, or simply acceptance of international actors’ actions. John Pender argues that local ownership in effect means handing over responsibility to local actors whilst retaining power with the international actors (Pender 2007:117). This has the consequence of making local ownership into a cover for the infringement on a people’s right to self-determination. Pender’s argument
may be seen as part of what David Chandler has termed as “empire in denial”: international actors engaged in statebuilding deny their real power and thereby evade accountability for their actions (Chandler 2006:1). One reason may be that international actors are not prepared to accept the consequences of local ownership in practice.

This line of reasoning is not an argument against local ownership as a good thing per se, but rather an admission of the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, for international actors to relinquish control over their funds and projects:

> [T]he empirical record suggests that peacebuilding in practice more closely resembles an externally driven exercise in both state building and social engineering. Local ownership of governance, in other words, is accepted in theory but rarely practiced (Donais 2009:4).

Accordingly, we often see more conditionality and international control than what is dictated by the objective of local ownership.

The question then is how local ownership works in practice. If local authorities have real control over decisions, planning, activities and resources this is a solid argument to say statebuilding can happen without serious infringement on a state’s right to self-determination, and consequently without working against its own objectives. In statebuilding, the roles that local and international actors take on in their relationship are therefore of critical consequence.

### 3.4 “Fail Again. Fail better”\(^{13}\): criticisms and recommendations for statebuilding

As mentioned, the main fault line in the debate on statebuilding does not go between for and against, but rather in whether or not the practice has serious inherent flaws that are not open for repair. In the following section, I will discuss the items in the debate on statebuilding that are perhaps less fundamental than the issue of self-determination. Although there is also a clear line here between the critics and supporters of statebuilding, the issues that are raised may potentially be addressed within the context of statebuilding. In both sections covering

\(^{13}\) Originally a phrase from Samuel Beckett’s *Worstward Ho*, used in the context of statebuilding in Chesterman (2011:11).
criticism and recommendations there are points that may lead to better results from statebuilding if taken into account.

3.4.1 Criticisms

Statebuilding is too universalistic in its goals

International actors within statebuilding are criticised for applying universal prescriptions to widely varying circumstances, particularly when it comes to what kinds of institutions are to be created (Sending 2009:8). Common goals usually include aims of a liberal democracy, with a functioning market economy and Western bureaucratic norms (Egnell 2010:466). Critical scholars do not argue that these solutions cannot have positive effects, but rather criticise how they are held to be appropriate in every country, almost regardless of local context. There is, according to Nehal Bhuta, too much of a “one size fits all” approach to statebuilding: “the practices of state-building authorize a kind of claim to knowledge about heterogeneous social spaces and territories … that places these spaces within a homogeneous plane” (2008:534).

These arguments have relevance for the relationship between local and international actors. Assuming that there are universal solutions to implement in statebuilding means that there is less room for locally adapted goals for what kind of state is being established. How this happens in practice ranges from ignorance of local context to full override of local wishes (Chanaa 2002:47).

The argument that solutions should be less universalistic should not be taken to mean that international actors should not learn from previous missions. It is clear that these can offer valuable lessons to improve policies elsewhere. It can, however, help explain the poor record of statebuilding. According to Sending (2009:9), universal knowledge tends to be privileged over local knowledge and solutions. This is taken to be detrimental for the prospects of success in statebuilding.

Statebuilding is seen as technical, not political

Another criticism against statebuilding is the tendency to view it as an endeavour that can be successful if specific actions are taken. According to Nehal Bhuta, statebuilding today is wrongly treated like something void of politics and history where institutions can be created and made to give the desired outcomes, no matter the context (Bhuta 2008:526). In other
words, whilst the previous criticism dealt with the *aims* of statebuilding, this addresses the *means*. Both are tied to the lack of locally tailored solutions in statebuilding.

In the opinion of Bhuta and others\(^\text{14}\), building a state from the outside is not a technical matter. Instead, they argue that statebuilding is a highly political and controversial enterprise, advancing a set of Western, liberal solutions in the countries where statebuilding takes place. Former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, also spoke in support of such a view:

> At times, the international community has approached peacebuilding as a largely technical exercise, involving knowledge and resources. The international community must not only understand local power dynamics, but also recognize that it is itself a political actor entering a political environment (quoted in Paris 2009:60).

In sum, the methods of statebuilding are treated as a form of expertise, whilst critics of this assumption argue that there can be no such thing (Bhuta 2008:523-526). International statebuilding consequently deserves to be more critically examined, and uncertainties and issues related to the practice should be acknowledged.

### 3.4.2 Recommendations for improving statebuilding

While the above arguments indicate that statebuilding practices are highly flawed, the other strand of the literature features a discussion on *how* international statebuilding can be improved upon so that we may have more success in the future. Statebuilding is here viewed as a task that is simply “too important to abandon”, and the discussion on ways to make better statebuilding is therefore critical (Paris and Sisk 2009b:14). The following section provides a summary of central recommendations.

**Coordination**

Improved coordination is among the commonly proposed solutions for improving statebuilding efforts. Statebuilding involves a large number of national and international actors, from both public and private sectors, to cooperate in a coordinated manner (Conig 2008:88). Cedric de Conig identifies four elements of coordination: (i) within-agency coherence, (ii) coherence between agencies in a government, (iii) coherence among external actors and (iv) coherence in the policies of external and internal actors, called *alignment*.

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\(^{14}\) See for instance Chandler (2010).
The latter element is the most central for the purpose of this thesis.

Around the year 2000, international missions were diagnosed with “an immense coordination problem” that was harming efficiency. Among the causes of this problem was the number of actors, resource constraints and competitions for influence. These are issues pertaining to the organisation of international operations (Paris 2009:58-59).

In addition to organisational challenges, lack of coordination may also stem from actors disagreeing on how to manage international statebuilding. This problem is of a more political nature, and cannot easily be mitigated through organisational solutions for improving coordination (Paris 2009:56-60). For instance, if local and international actors have diverging opinions on how to manage statebuilding activities, it can lead to issues in coordinating activities, which again would reduce efficiency in statebuilding. Improving alignment is both important and challenging, in particular because it relates to the question of how much control to allocate to local actors and how much to international actors, in essence how to operationalise local ownership (Conig 2008:96). I consider alignment to have particular relevance for this thesis.

**Local ownership**

In addition to representing a chance to preserve self-determination, local ownership is also lifted up as a necessity for operational efficiency. It is thought to contribute to the construction of state institutions in as little time as possible (Barnett 2006:110). The objective of constructing a self-sustaining, functioning state implies that the government should at one future point in time be able to govern without outside assistance. This exit strategy reduces the risk of creating a dependency on international support that may potentially lead to “never-ending” missions (Paris and Sisk 2009a:308).

If we cannot build sustainable, self-governing states as efficiently without local ownership, ownership is necessary for achieving the goals of international statebuilding. This ties in with the argument on how institutions must be firmly rooted in society in order to function properly. In sum, local ownership is seen as increasing the effectiveness of international statebuilding missions and is therefore recommended as an important part of the solution for future statebuilding.

**More realistic ambitions**
A better fit between the means and mandate is argued to be essential for the further success of international statebuilding. This was among the central findings in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, “The Brahimi Report” (2000). Means-mandate discrepancy is largely a problem of underfunded missions, as well as the failure to recognise that statebuilding is a long-term process that requires a matching commitment of resources (Paris and Sisk 2009b:13).

Related to this, some recommend a more realistic approach to what external actors can achieve overall. Fukuyama argues that there are “grave limitations” to the abilities of external actors to create demand for institutions, no matter the resources allocated for this purpose (2004:35-39). Chesterman et al. argue in similar terms that “[s]tates cannot be made to work from the outside. International assistance may be necessary, but it is never sufficient to establish institutions that are legitimate and sustainable” (2005:384). From this follows that states must, at least in part, be constructed from the inside. The implication of this is for statebuilders to reduce their ambitions unless there is genuine political drive inside the country. Extensive statebuilding missions will not be successful without a balance in the relationship between local and international actors in this area.

Most scholars who recommend realism in statebuilding seem to argue for restraining ambitions, as the resources available for statebuilding are likely to always be limited. These arguments have also been put forward in relation to statebuilding in South Sudan. In the report “South Sudan: Statebuilding and its Limits”, Wolfram Lacher recommends a more contained strategy for South Sudan, arguing that the political circumstances make success in a larger, more comprehensive statebuilding mission unlikely to succeed (Lacher 2012).

**Better management of complexities in statebuilding**

In addition to better coordination, local ownership and a match between means and mandate, Paris and Sisk (2009b:13-16) argue that the most important improvement that can be made in international statebuilding is acquiring a deeper understanding of the complexities of statebuilding. Understanding that situations are complex and that not all statebuilding activities are mutually reinforcing may lead to them being managed better, the authors argue (2009a:310-311).

Again we see that there is much agreement on flaws in international statebuilding, but
different viewpoints on whether and how they can be tackled. Paris and Sisk agree that some issues are hard to avoid in statebuilding, but that planning for them and recognising them means statebuilding missions can improve in the future. This may also enhance sensitivity to local circumstances and what is possible within the given context.

Having explored the key criticisms and recommendations for statebuilding, I now wish to further discuss how capacity is linked to ownership, which has particular relevance for the topic of this thesis.

### 3.5 Can there be ownership before capacity?

In order to succeed in building a self-sustaining state, where government is fully in the hands of legitimate local authorities, international actors must engage in capacity building. As mentioned, this is important in a statebuilding context, as the international engagement often happens precisely because of the incapacity of existing governance structures (Chesterman 2007:4). The lack of capacity has consequences for how we see the relationship between local and international actors.

In the definition I presented in section 3.1.2, local ownership is both as a process and an outcome in the statebuilding process. This part of the definition is contested. Chesterman (2007:20) argues that when there is not sufficient capacity among local actors to govern a country, local ownership cannot be the means of statebuilding. In these contexts, local ownership can only be the end. According to this line of reasoning, mission mandates should only refer to local ownership as an objective. Chesterman’s argument has particular relevance early on in the statebuilding process, thereby making it relevant for the case of South Sudan. Although some capacity-building efforts have been underway since the conclusion of the CPA, South Sudan has only had a short time as an independent state, and we must take into account that the government of South Sudan may not yet be capable of achieving local ownership. In the words of Hideaki Shinoda:

> It is not sufficient to simply respect ownership. It is more important to introduce the moral and strategic perspective to foster ownership considering the possible and desirable course of its development (Shinoda 2008:101).
However, an early disregard of local ownership may potentially result in a situation where international actors wield too much power over the situation. The lack of self-determination resulting from local ownership merely being a long-term goal may lead to discontent in the local population or government. This would then be detrimental both to capacity-building and to statebuilding as a whole (Donais 2009:15). In other words, if there is no local ownership as a means in statebuilding, it may be difficult to achieve it in the end as well. This argument favours introducing local ownership regardless of capacity levels, as the success of statebuilding depends on the process being controlled by local forces.

It becomes clear that international statebuilding is fraught with dilemmas and trade-offs. It seems on the one hand that it may be inadvisable to have local ownership without first building capacity. On the other hand, capacity building without local ownership risks the statebuilding mission being unsuccessful. Can one have the one without the other? Or does this discussion simply point to the possibility that local ownership can only be introduced at a gradual pace, as capacity for governing increases? I aim to gain insight into these questions through the study of the case of South Sudan.

3.6 Review: focus for data collection

3.6.1 What are the implications for South Sudan?
As demonstrated in the foregoing sections, relationship between international and local actors is highly relevant to international statebuilding. It matters greatly for what kinds of results we can expect from statebuilding. For this reason, I here wish to consider contributions from the literature and what implication they have for statebuilding in the case of South Sudan.

There are few scholars who argue we should avoid international statebuilding altogether. Furthermore, the aim of research for this thesis is positioned within the framework of statebuilding, as my objective is to understand how the relationship between international and local actors affects statebuilding in South Sudan. For these reasons, it makes little sense to further discuss in this thesis whether or not to engage in statebuilding. I have therefore not collected data on this matter.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, some scholars claim that there is little chance of success in statebuilding due to certain logical breaches in the concept itself. The presence in a country of external actors who are supposed to construct sustainable, independent institutions is in this view impossible, as the international presence undermines the very self-determination it is intended to support. In South Sudan, one would expect to see lack of progress in statebuilding owing to international presence if this was the case. In my opinion, however, it is not reasonable to conclude that the imbalance in the relationship between international and local actors who are part of statebuilding means that success is not at all possible. It may still work against the objective of self-determination in the host country, however, which points to the importance of local ownership of statebuilding activities. If local authorities have sufficient control over activities, funds and institutions (local ownership), this can be argued to mitigate problems associated with statebuilding from the outside.

I have mentioned several recommendations on how to improve the track record of statebuilding as suggested in the literature. In addition to local ownership one can expect better results if solutions are adapted to local circumstances, if there is coordination between actors, if expectations are more realistic and if the complexities of statebuilding are better managed. Although these factors are all relevant for statebuilding in South Sudan, I will focus on those that I view as having particular relevance to the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors in South Sudan statebuilding. These include the local authorities’ role in statebuilding (local ownership), whether activities are tailored to local circumstances and the extent to which there is coherence in the policies of external and internal actors (alignment).

Additionally, the potential relationship between local ownership and capacity building is important for statebuilding in South Sudan, as independence is fairly recent and there was little pre-existing capacity for government in the country (cf. Chapter 2.3). One can therefore expect there to be a higher focus on capacity building, and for there to be less local ownership on the part of the South Sudanese government.

**3.6.2 Questions to guide data collection**

In the earlier sections of this chapter, I have addressed important aspects of the debate on statebuilding activities that have relevance for answering the research question. As mentioned
in the introductory chapter, I wish to focus on the relationship between international and local actors within statebuilding in South Sudan and more specifically, on decision-making, resource control and capacity building. Below, I will present aspects relevant to answering the main research questions in this thesis.

The discussion in the previous sections points to the importance of local ownership both as an instrument for successful statebuilding and as a way of achieving a higher degree of self-determination, even in the presence of international actors. Accordingly, I wish to investigate the degree of local control and involvement in South Sudan’s statebuilding process. Who controls the planning and implementation of statebuilding projects? Which side takes initiative? What conditions are attached to funding from international actors?

These questions direct attention to the relationship between local and international actors in the context of local ownership vs. international direction and control. The answers will inform us on whether local actors in South Sudan have ownership over statebuilding processes and resources, which affects conclusions on the degree of self-determination awarded to the South Sudanese population by international actors. Moreover, the degree of local ownership may also affect the effectiveness of statebuilding in South Sudan, which has consequences for the future prospects for the country.

I also wish to look into the issue of capacity building in South Sudan. Do South Sudanese authorities have the capacity to govern effectively? What kind of capacity building is taking place? Does lack of capacity stand in the way of local ownership of the statebuilding process? As mentioned, lack of capacity may influence the ability of local actors to take on ownership in statebuilding processes, thus presumably making local ownership more of an end than the means of statebuilding. It is important to examine the status of capacity for government in South Sudan, as it may impact the balance of power between local and international actors and thereby the efficiency of statebuilding in South Sudan.

In addition to examining the issues of local ownership and capacity building, it can also be worthwhile to try and describe the relationship between local and international actors on the whole in the statebuilding process. Do South Sudanese and international actors share goals for what kind of state they are creating? Are there any conflicts of interest? These questions have an obvious “face value” in that they are interesting questions to get the answers to, but they also influence the impact of the questions previously asked. In essence, if South
Sudanese and international actors are aligned when it comes to the design of the state, one can assume that lower levels of local ownership to have fewer practical implications. If, on the other hand, there are significant divergences in the views of local and international actors in this respect the consequences of the level of local ownership can be expected to be more far-reaching.
4 Research design and methodology

In this chapter I will explain the choices I have made relating to research design and methods, in essence, how I will answer the questions laid out in the previous chapter. Special focus will be placed on issues relating to my fieldwork in Juba, South Sudan, in January 2013 and on concerns of reliability and validity. I will finish the chapter with a discussion of the implications of asking a rather broad question for this thesis.

4.1 Research design: case study

The purpose of the research design is to ensure that the research question can be answered in the most accurate way possible (de Vaus 2001:16). As I have already laid out in previous chapters, this thesis is designed as a case study of the relationship between international and local actors in statebuilding in South Sudan.

Gerring (2007:20) defines a case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)”. Similarly, George & Bennett (2005:17) define a case as “an instance of a class of events”. These definitions fits with the belief that case studies do not just provide information about the case itself; they may also present an opportunity to generalise. This impels me to ask: What is South Sudan a case of? It is clear that it could be a case of many things – post-conflict reconstruction, governance in Africa, a new state, or secession, just to name a few. In line with the topic of this thesis, however, I see South Sudan as a case of international statebuilding. It is a case where international actors are attempting to “establish, reform, or strengthen state institutions where these have seriously been eroded or are missing” (cf. Caplan). Consequently, this is the population that I will attempt to shed light on.

The validity of generalisation is strong if it is done based on relevant attributes to the case (Kvale 1996:232-233). It is unlikely that findings from South Sudan can say something about all statebuilding cases, but rather on cases that have similarities when it comes to the relationship between local and international actors. A more detailed discussion of the attributes of the South Sudan case, and thereby the wider relevance of the findings of this study can be found in Chapter 7 (Conclusion).
What are the strengths and weaknesses of choosing a case study when studying international statebuilding? On the one hand, one of the main drawbacks of case studies are the possibilities for generalisation, i.e. *external validity* (Gerring 2007:43). As mentioned, case studies do not preclude generalisations to other cases, but this can still be argued to be more challenging than with other methods. Because South Sudan is only one case in a population that includes several others, it is difficult to say something certain about the population in general without studying other cases. Additionally, it is difficult to assess whether South Sudan is a representative case of the population of statebuilding. Notwithstanding this, it could be possible in this study to add to the information available on statebuilding based on empirical findings from South Sudan.

On the other hand, the kind of depth offered in a case study provides us with an insight we arguably do not get when doing large N studies. This leads to a hope of achieving a higher understanding of the complexities of South Sudan as a case, and what processes and mechanisms are at work in the country (George and Bennett 2005:19-22). A case study, I believe, will be an effective way of uncovering valuable information about statebuilding. As John Gerring points out, “much of what we know about the empirical world has been generated through case studies” (Gerring 2007:20). Case studies have also previously been used to examine the relationship between local and international actors in statebuilding processes.

### 4.2 Method: interviews

The topic I have chosen suggests a qualitative study, as the relationship between international and local actors is not easily quantifiable. Furthermore, because of the current nature of the South Sudan case, not much material has been written reflecting on statebuilding efforts in the country. This is an argument for the collection of primary data, as little secondary material is available. For this reason, I chose to travel to South Sudan to conduct interviews. In addition to this fieldwork, I used documents available on statebuilding in the country as an additional source of information (see 4.3 for a discussion on this).

15 See for instance Narten’s study on Kosovo (2009).
In order for a study to be considered relevant and useful, reliability and validity should be assessed. The concept of *reliability* concerns whether a study is repeatable, meaning that the same measurement process will yield the same result. *Validity* means measuring what we intend to measure (Bryman 2008:31,149). The following sections will address how validity and reliability were considered in the data collection, along with the associated strengths and challenges.

### 4.2.1 Selection of interviewees

When assessing the validity and reliability of data from interviews, the selection of interviewees as well as the execution of the interviews is important. In order to properly answer the research question, I conducted interviews with national as well as international actors. International actors are central to forming strategies and providing resources for statebuilding. They are therefore natural choices in the sample of interviewees. In order to give a balanced account, however, South Sudanese actors were also part of the target sample. Getting both perspectives served to shed light on the relationship that is the topic of this thesis, which has thereby increased the validity of the study. This is especially important because the perspectives of local actors are often overlooked in statebuilding literature. Seven interviewees were international personnel working from within South Sudanese government institutions, which I believe provides additional insight into this relationship.

Within qualitative research, *purposive sampling* is often recommended. Purposive sampling is based on knowledge about the population and research objectives and “entails an attempt to establish a good correspondence between research questions and sampling” (Bryman 2008:458). In this thesis, this means seeking out and selecting interviewees that have been involved in the statebuilding efforts in South Sudan, specifically international or local actors who have cooperated with counterparts on the other side.

Purposive sampling can be done through *snowball sampling*, where the researcher makes contact with a small group of people relevant to the research topic and then uses them to establish contact with others, making the size of the sample grow like a snowball (ibid.). This sampling method is recommended for interconnected populations that are hard to reach and identify (Chambliss and Schutt 2012:124). I consider this to be an accurate description of the population of statebuilding experts in South Sudan and therefore chose this method for my fieldwork in South Sudan.
I found getting interviews with South Sudanese personnel to be a methodological challenge. Non-South Sudanese interviewees were easier to contact and schedule interviews with, but they generally did not have many tips for South Sudanese counterparts that I could speak with. An important reason for this seemed to be that skilled South Sudanese government employees are overworked and have little time for “extras”, like participating in research. By simply presenting myself in various ministries in Juba, I still managed to secure interviews with South Sudanese government officials, even if they were not as many as I had hoped for.

As a consequence of the sampling method, just three out of 24 interviewees were women. Without knowing more about the population that the interviewees were sampled from, I cannot assess how much this deviates from its gender distribution. I have no reason to assume that this influenced answers, but it is still important to consider as possibly affecting the reliability of this study.

### 4.2.2 Conducting interviews

Interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews, which allowed for me to get answers to my research question whilst still allowing interviewees to talk in depth about their situation and raise topics they thought were relevant. This flexibility, coupled with the possibility of asking follow-up questions, contributed to more information being uncovered than if the interview had been more structured (cf. Bryman 2008:438). The fact that I asked the same main questions for all interviewees increases the validity of the study, as I can be confident that variation in replies is due mostly to real variation, and not to the interview context (ibid.:194). The interview guide is included in Appendix 2.

The interviews were recorded in order for me to better concentrate on the conversation with the interviewee and respond to their statements with probes and follow-up questions if needed. The recordings were also helpful in achieving accuracy in the data analysis (see 4.2.3) (Bryman 2008:456)

Before travelling to Juba, I was prepared for lack of openness and/or “donor talk” (i.e. speaking in line with donors’ values instead of own opinions) on part of the South Sudanese interviewees. When conducting interviewees, however, I did not experience this as being a problem, and also tried to detect any inconsistencies by asking questions in different ways (for instance through asking both to what extent South Sudanese actors controlled decisions
and thereafter what the international role was in decision-making). Additionally, the possibility to remain anonymous may have made any interviewees with concerns more open (see 4.2.4). It is however, always important to acknowledge that all interviewees may give biased answers, even if they are experts on the subject (Kvale 1996:286).

4.2.3 Data analysis

Transcribing the interviews

The interview recordings were transcribed into written form. According to Kvale (1996:169), there is no correct way of transcribing data, but the way in which it is done should be clearly stated when reports are made based on the material. In my study, interviews were transcribed word by word, including repetitions and fillers\textsuperscript{16}, in a written style\textsuperscript{17}. I included descriptive information such as pauses, laughter and emphasis, as this could be of use in the analysis of the interviews. Grammatical errors were not corrected in the transcripts. When quoted in this thesis, however, small errors have been corrected and fillers and repetition of words have been removed. I made this decision in order to make the language more fluent and readable in the final text.

Three interviews were conducted in Norwegian (all others in English). I chose to do this with interviewees with whom I shared a common language, because I believed it would make the interviewees more comfortable. Transcripts of these interviews are also in Norwegian, and only quotes in the final thesis are translated. Translation clearly adds another conversion step to the data analysis, although I believe that I have stayed true to the original meaning.

It is important to acknowledge that it is the interviews that are the empirical data for this thesis, and not the written transcripts. Transcribing involves transforming the data from an oral to a written form, which necessarily involves some interpretation and removes some of the contextual information. There is also room for error (Kvale 1996:167). As I was often not able to choose the meeting place for interviews, I could not influence the noise level. As a consequence, audio quality was a challenge in certain recordings, which may have had an effect on the accuracy of the transcripts. In these cases, I made sure to take note of any

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\textsuperscript{16} Fillers are words and phrases meant to string together sentences, such as “like”, “you know”, “I mean” and “basically”.

\textsuperscript{17} E.g. writing “going to” instead of “gonna”. I have kept contractions, e.g. “I’m”, and “you’d”.
uncertainties instead of guessing what the interviewees had said in order to minimise damage to reliability.

**Coding and analysing data**

Rubin and Rubin contend that “[q]ualitative analysis is not about mere counting or providing numeric summaries. Instead, the objective is to discover variation, portray shades of meaning and examine complexity” (2005:202). To reflect this complexity in a thesis, however, it is necessary to map out some of the concepts and patterns that are present in the interviews. For this reason, I first coded the data. *Coding* can be defined as “taking raw data and raising it to the conceptual level” and is a “dynamic and fluid process” (Strauss and Corbin 1998:66,101). Through coding one identifies concepts in the data and relate these concepts to one another. Codes were based on questions asked and the answers to them, frequently mentioned concepts and themes found when comparing interviews (cf. Rubin and Rubin 2005:210-215).

After the initial process of coding, I then summarised and clarified what I had found, linking concepts and attempting to find patterns and stories in the coded data. These patterns were then integrated into the research findings presented in Chapter 6. An important part of this process was making sure that these findings were consistent with the original interviews, to ensure reliability (cf. Rubin and Rubin 2005:224-227).

### 4.2.4 Ethical considerations

When undertaking fieldwork in post-conflict settings, it is particularly important to be aware of one’s role as a researcher and to “ensure the participants’ dignity, privacy and safety” (Scheyvens et al. 2003:140). As a researcher, one has to make sure that one minimises the negative impact on the environment one enters into, in other words adhering to the principle of “Do No Harm” (Wood 2006:379).

**Informed consent**

A central aspect of minimising any negative impact of my fieldwork is *informed consent*. According to Scheyvens et al., “[i]nformed consent is when a potential participant freely and with full understanding of the research agrees to be part of the project” (2003:142). The interviewee should be given full information about what the research is to be used for, as well as knowing that he/she can withdraw themselves and their statements from the research process at any time (ibid.:142-143).
In order to fulfil these requirements, I obtained written consent from the participants in the study. In this process, I presented interviewees with information about the research, voluntary participation and data handling. This gave the interviewees the option of consenting to being interviewed based on comprehensive information about the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study (cf. Wood 2006:379).

**Anonymisation and confidentiality**

When giving their consent to be interviewed, interviewees were presented with the choice of whether or not to be anonymous in the final thesis. *Anonymity* refers to “the researcher’s responsibility to keep the identity of the participants private, if they so wish, so that they will not be personally identifiable in any outputs” (Scheyvens et al. 2003:146). I gave interviewees the option of anonymity in order to allow them to speak freely, but also to avoid employees in larger organisations having to clear their statements with communications departments, which would have complicated data collection. Eleven interviewees chose to remain anonymous in the final thesis.

To make the thesis easier to read, I have given substitute South Sudanese or international names to the interviewees who chose to remain anonymous. The international names are all English names\(^{18}\), although these interviewees were in fact of varying nationalities. I chose to do this in order to not give away more information about the interviewees than necessary.

Equally important, the broader term *confidentiality* “recognises that a researcher may be entrusted with private information”, and involves the interviewees knowing that the statements they give will be stored safely and not used for other purposes than the research. Guarantees for confidentiality were given to interviewees before the interview. In order to protect the privacy of interviewees, the codebook containing interviewees’ names and interview number was stored in an encrypted folder on my personal computer. All notes, recordings and transcripts will be deleted when the thesis is published. In November 2012, the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), the official authority for data protection in research for Norwegian universities, approved my plans for anonymisation and data handling.

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\(^{18}\) Names reflect accurate gender.
Anonymisation and confidentiality are measures carried out for ethical purposes that may to some extent weaken the reliability of the study, as it would be more difficult to repeat the study when names and transcripts are not public. This shows that methodological choices often involve trade-offs. In this matter, I considered the gain from protecting the privacy of the individuals participating in the study to be greater than the loss in reliability.

4.3 \textbf{Method: document study}

Official reports and web pages are the main sources for the information presented in Chapter 5, which gives an overview of statebuilding in South Sudan. I accessed publicly available reports, plans and web resources in order to provide this overview. The selection of sources was based on relevance as well as availability. The following section will present some of the main methodological considerations I encountered when analysing documents.

4.3.1 Reliability and validity

In order to maximise the reliability of document studies, it is essential to assess the document’s source (Who wrote it? What is the purpose of the document?), contents (What does it say? How should we interpret it?) and relevance (Is the information credible?) (Kjelstadli 1992:161-162). This points to the importance of being critical of written sources and understanding that all sources, even official reports, have an author with a purpose, and that this will influence the contents. This is also true when it comes to reports on statebuilding.

The reports used in this thesis are almost exclusively by representatives of international agencies and donors. The level of South Sudanese input is therefore arguably less than ideal. Even documents released by South Sudanese authorities may have been written by international actors, as many South Sudanese government institutions have international staff. For instance, the process of designing and writing the South Sudan Development Plan\textsuperscript{19} was characterised by an “intense engagement of the [UN]” (UN 2012). This may mean that the presented image of statebuilding activities in South Sudan is biased towards the international

\textsuperscript{19} The South Sudan Development Plan is a strategy document published by the South Sudanese government to dictate priorities for development 2011-2013. International actors also adhere to the priorities listed in this plan (see Chapter 5).
perspective, which could constitute a threat to the validity of the study. Nevertheless, as the purpose of using these sources was to access factual information about actors and activities in South Sudan, it may be argued that this has less of an impact than if the documents were used to assess more contested aspects of statebuilding. Still, it is important to keep in mind throughout the analysis.

4.3.2 Methodological challenges

Access to current information was a challenge in the search for information about statebuilding in South Sudan. Statistics and reports are always published after the fact, and are as such never completely up to date. This has particular significance when writing about South Sudan, as independence is very close in history and the context is constantly changing.

Among the key information to present when analysing statebuilding in South Sudan is the financial flows involved. While it is possible to access complete budgets for most single organisations, the complexity of the overall picture made mapping out financial transactions challenging. For instance, a sum of money may be transferred from the a donor’s foreign aid budget to a pooled fund, and thereafter to an NGO operating in South Sudan. The same money would then be reflected in the budgets of all three of these organisations. Because of this challenge, I chose not to aim for a complete picture of finances in statebuilding in South Sudan, and instead present individual figures for important organisations and countries. My hope is that this way I have still managed to give an accurate and informative presentation of statebuilding in South Sudan.

4.4 Validity concerns from asking broad questions

Throughout this chapter, I have tried to emphasise reliability and validity concerns where appropriate. However, one overarching issue deserves more attention: the topic discussed in this thesis is somewhat broad.

The validity of conclusions made from this research may be threatened by the fact that questions asked are too broad. For instance, I chose not to focus on one specific international actor in South Sudan, such as the UNDP, key donors or the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMISS), but instead on this group as a whole. Answers to the research question could potentially have been different had I focused on specific actors instead of grouping them all...
together. Similarly, a more detailed and accurate image of specific sectors such as security or economic administration could have been provided instead of an overall picture. Choosing not to may have weakened the validity of this study.

This issue could be argued to be a common trade-off faced by researchers everywhere: do we study the general or the specific? Do we choose to seek broad or deep knowledge? In this project, I concluded that gaining knowledge about statebuilding in South Sudan as a whole would be beneficial. A different decision could have been made as well, but then I would not have been able to discuss some of the overarching issues that arise within statebuilding missions. Since the volume of research on statebuilding in South Sudan is fairly small, I concluded that this would be a productive approach to the topic.

After discussing methodological choices, I will now turn to the findings of this study, firstly by giving an overview of statebuilding in South Sudan.
5 Statebuilding in South Sudan: actors, funding, priorities and activities

The international presence in South Sudan is significant. A large share of funds, projects and personnel are directed towards humanitarian aid, as the country continues to have grave needs in this area. At the same time, statebuilding is a key priority for international efforts in South Sudan, particularly since independence. In this chapter, I will provide a short overview of statebuilding in South Sudan – the structure of the state, key international actors and their budgets, as well as statebuilding activities. The information presented here is based on reports, web pages and other publicly available documents. Any currency not originally stated in US Dollars has been converted using historical exchange rates from the time of the source’s publication.

The reason for the inclusion of this chapter is to provide a basis for which to understand the complex scene that is South Sudan, especially when it comes to statebuilding. In other words, I intend for this chapter to lay the foundation for the following chapter, where I will present the results from interviews conducted on the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors within statebuilding in South Sudan.

It is important to note that the South Sudan statebuilding system is highly complex, both in terms of organisation and funding. Also, a comprehensive mapping of actors, priorities and activities has to the best of my knowledge not been carried out to date. For this reason, an accurate assessment of all statebuilding actors and activities in South Sudan is challenging, and I do not make the claim that the following presentation is a perfect reflection of all the ongoing activities and actors in the statebuilding in South Sudan. Rather, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic understanding of the activities and actors taking place in the South Sudanese statebuilding. I have also chosen not to focus strongly on NGOs, as these have less relevance for statebuilding as relating to the national authorities of South Sudan.

5.1 The structure of the new state

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20 See for instance UNOCHA’s weekly humanitarian bulletins: http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/
The South Sudanese state is governed by a transitional constitution, which is a continuation of the constitution that governed Sudan in the CPA period (LeRiche and Arnold 2012:153). Originally meant to finish their work in January 2013, the constitutional review commission was in February 2013 granted two extra years to fulfil their mandate (Bakhita Radio 2013).

The structure of the government is as follows:

![The Government of South Sudan](image)

*Figure 2. The structure of the government of South Sudan. Source: (GoSS 2013a).*

The transitional constitution gives fairly extensive powers to the executive branch, headed by the president of South Sudan. The president has the power to appoint holders of judicial posts and sign bills passed by the National Legislature into law. In addition, the president oversees the system of South Sudan’s ten states and has the power to fire elected governors\(^{21}\). Also, the president appoints independent commissions and chambers. There are 29 ministries in South Sudan (GoSS 2013a). The current government has its authority from the 2010 Sudan elections.

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\(^{21}\) A power President Salva Kiir did in fact use in January of 2013, when he dismissed the Governor of Lakes state, Chol Tong Mayay (Sudan Tribune 2013).
The National Legislature of South Sudan consists of two chambers: The National Legislative Assembly and The Council of States. It approves budgets, passes laws, ratifies treaties and oversees the performance of national institutions. In addition, it can summon ministers to answer questions and cast a vote of no confidence against ministers and the vice president. However, it cannot do so against the president (GoSS 2013a).

The Judiciary in South Sudan consists of a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, High Courts, County Courts and also gives the possibility for the convening of special tribunals (GoSS 2013a).

5.2 International actors in South Sudan

The Government of South Sudan lists both individual countries and international organisations as its development partners (GoSS 2012a). In addition, there are a multitude of NGOs present in the country, some of which perform tasks that are related to statebuilding, such as the strengthening of civil society groups (GoSS 2012b:4). In the following sections, I will present key donors, funds and international organisations within South Sudan.

5.2.1 Donors and pooled funds

Donor countries provide the funds, and are as such principal actors for statebuilding in South Sudan. South Sudan is a major recipient of official development assistance, collecting almost 1087 million USD in 2011 (OECD 2013). The largest bilateral donors for South Sudan are USA, EU, Netherlands, UK, Norway, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Spain and Germany (GoSS 2012b:23)22. Aid numbers are not as readily available for non-OECD countries and none of these are listed as official development partners. Nevertheless, China is also a significant donor in South Sudan, pledging 31.5 million dollars in aid in 2011 as well as providing significant loans (Sudan Tribune 2011; China 2011; Perlez 2012). Aid is also given by countries such as Egypt, which pledged 26.6 million USD for South Sudan in 2012 (Kortam 2012).

22 2010 numbers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aid (Million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>48.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>35.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>162.86 (includes Sudan. Donations to South Sudan in 2010: 118.9 million USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>17.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>60.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>31.79 (includes Sudan. Donations to South Sudan in 2010: 20.8 million USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>707.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Official aid to South Sudan from key donors. Source: OECD (2013), for EU and Spain: GoSS (2012b).

Around 44% of aid is provided bilaterally, whilst the rest is directed through multilateral organisations or pooled funds (GoSS 2012b). Most OECD donors, apart from the US, have opted to channel parts of their aid into funds instead of allocating them to projects directly. The Joint Donor Team (JDT) is an example of such efforts, where Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK have combined to manage several pooled funds and coordinate aid for specific purposes (Bennett et al. 2009:3).

The biggest of the pooled funds has been the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), managed by the World Bank. UN agencies, the GoSS and NGOs all implement projects funded by the MDTF (Schomerus and Allen 2010:92). The fund was meant to be able to deploy resources for urgent programs and projects aimed at reconstruction and rehabilitation in conflict affected areas (World Bank 2011:2). The MDTF spent 194.5 million USD in 2010, 9.9 million of which was contributed by the GoSS (MDTF 2011).

A fund central within statebuilding is the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF). The fund’s objectives are to support capacity building in the public sector, for instance through strengthening human resource and financial systems. The CBTF is managed by the Joint Donor Team (JDT 2013). The CBTF’s indicative budget in 2012 was 10.54 million USD. Donors include Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United

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23 Shares of aid allocated to pooled funds, 2010: EU 19%, UK 80%, Norway 45%, Netherlands 68%, Canada 37%, Denmark 10%, Sweden 60%, Spain 65%, Germany 18%, USA 0% (IDC 2012:28).
Kingdom (CBTF 2012:34, 9). Also relevant, the Strategic Partnership Agreement was a pooled fund seeking to support the UNDP’s work in strengthening governance and rule of law in South Sudan (JDT 2013).

Finally, there are several funds for service delivery and humanitarian aid in South Sudan, including the Basic Service Fund (BSF)\(^{24}\) the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)\(^{25}\), the South Sudan Health Pooled Fund\(^{26}\), the Emergency Medicines Fund\(^{27}\) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria\(^{28}\).

Several funds, such as the MDTF, were phased out in late 2012. There has been constant discussion on how best to administer aid in South Sudan, and the efficiency of pooled funds has been pulled into question. Also, an increasing number of individual donors now have offices in South Sudan, making them more capable of managing bilateral donations (Baffoe 2013). The South Sudanese government still urges donors to pool funds as much as possible.

Due to low financial capacity and corruption issues in South Sudan, almost no funding is channelled directly through the South Sudanese government. Instead, funding for statebuilding is allocated to commercial service providers or international organisations and NGOs (DFID 2013a:2).

### 5.2.2 International organisations

According to the UK’s International Development Committee, “the UN is by far the most established multilateral actor in South Sudan” (2012:29). The United Nations presence in South Sudan is comprised of humanitarian aid, development assistance and peacekeeping. The UN Country Team (UNCT) consists of 22 agencies focusing on humanitarian aid and development, and is headed by the UN Resident Coordinator (UN 2013). Its estimated resource requirements for 2012 and 2013 combined is 1188 million USD (UN 2012). The biggest agency within the UNCT is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)\(^{29}\), an agency that is also a key implementer of statebuilding activities in South Sudan.

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\(^{24}\) The BSF had a 32.05 million USD budget in 2012 (BSF 2012:1).
\(^{25}\) The CHF had expenditures of 98.76 mill USD in 2012 (CHF 2013).
\(^{26}\) The SSHPF has an expected budget mid-2012 – January 2016 of 193.2 million USD (DFID 2012:1).
\(^{27}\) The EMF has a total budget 2012-2013 of 15.4 million USD (DFID 2013b).
\(^{28}\) In 2012, the GFATM disbursed 15 million USD in South Sudan (GFATM 2013).
\(^{29}\) The UNDP’s 2012/2013 resource requirements are 278 million USD (UN 2012).
The UN peacekeeping mission, UNMISS, was established on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate issued in July 2011 for an initial period of one year, which has since been renewed and is currently valid until July 2013. UNMISS is unique in South Sudan as its presence is mandated by a UNSC resolution, not simply by invitation from South Sudan. Part of the mandate of UNMISS is to strengthen the justice and security sectors in order to maintain peace and stability, meaning that it plays a large role in statebuilding within these sectors (UNSC 2011).

Partly due to the lack of infrastructure in South Sudan, UNMISS is an expensive peacekeeping operation (IDC 2012:34). UNMISS’ budget from June 2012 to July 2013 is 876 million USD (United Nations General Assembly 2012).

Other international organisations present in South Sudan are to a lesser extent involved in the implementation of activities and more on the side of funding: The World Bank’s presence in South Sudan has mainly (though not exclusively) been limited to managing trust funds for reconstruction and development in the country. South Sudan has also been a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since April of 2012, which has a trust fund for macroeconomic capacity building in South Sudan (IMF 2012; Hagan et al. 2012). Finally, the African Union has taken a central role in mediating and supervising negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan (All Africa 2013).

### 5.2.3 Aid coordination structure in South Sudan

In order for all actors in South Sudan to work towards priorities outlined in the SSDP, a structure of coordination between South Sudan and its development partners has been established (GoSS 2011:139):
Important to mention within this structure are the Sector Working Groups (SWG). The SWGs have a key role in planning and budgeting for their respective sectors. Institutions present budgets to the SWGs, which then consider these budgets and cooperate with donors to finance plans (GoSS 2012b). These sectors are: accountability, economic functions, education, health, infrastructure, natural resources, public administration, rule of law, security and social & humanitarian affairs (GoSS 2011).

Having outlined important actors, I will in the following sections detail statebuilding activities in South Sudan, firstly by mentioning important documents that govern them, and thereafter through an overview of issue focus and projects.

### 5.3 Key documents

The CPA established the Government of Southern Sudan, and gave the South Sudanese the opportunity to move to a more active participation in the region’s development. This is in contrast with the passive receiving of development assistance that had characterised the
international-South Sudanese relationship during the war (Pantuliano 2009:2). After independence, the GoSS made the **South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP)**, which covers the period from independence until the end of 2013. This plan is the main policy document for statebuilding, both on the international and on the South Sudanese side. International activities are to be planned and executed according to it: “It is crucial that development assistance is directed towards the Government’s top priorities, where it is likely to have most impact in the implementation of the SSDP” (GoSS 2011:xxi).

The SSDP articulates the overall goal for the state to “[e]nsure that by 2014 South Sudan is a united and peaceful new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all” (GoSS 2011:41). In line with this, four main pillars of national development priorities are set out: (1) good governance, (2) economic development, (3) social and human development and (4) conflict prevention and security (GoSS 2011:41-42).

**The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF),** the overarching steering document for the UN system in South Sudan (excluding UNMISS), is meant to support the key priorities in the SSDP. The UN also had a large role in helping the South Sudanese to develop the SSDP, their role described as “intense engagement … in the formulation process”. The UNDAF priorities correspond with the SSDP, and has in addition an aim for the establishment of rule of law, which is seen as a subcomponent of pillar 4 (UN 2012:4-9).

Despite the SSDP being the key document for development in South Sudan, there has been a proliferation of plans and strategic frameworks in the country. According to results from the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, this is common in fragile state contexts and is caused by a fragmentation of donor-funded activities in conjunction with weak leadership on part of the receiving state (OECD 2010b:43). Other initiatives include the G7+, a fragile state initiative for defining important priorities, as well as a core functions exercise, an attempt to focus on essential features of government (GoSS 2010; G7+ 2010). The pillars of the SSDP are still considered the most important planning framework for development in the country.

UNMISS is governed through its mandate, **UN Security Council Resolution 1996** (2011), which stipulates that the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan is to support the consolidation
of peace in order to strengthen South Sudan’s ability to govern “effectively and democratically”. It focuses on security and justice in particular, and underlines that UNMISS is to strengthen the government’s capacity to perform important tasks within these sectors. The resolution stipulates close cooperation with South Sudanese authorities and international organisations in order to achieve this goal (UNSC 2011:2).

5.4 Issue focus and projects within statebuilding

What activities are undertaken within statebuilding in South Sudan? This section is based on an analysis of publicly available documents and web pages of key donors, funds and international organisations and their projects and priorities in South Sudan30.

The international actors I have studied all have humanitarian components of their operations in South Sudan. Although humanitarian aid may also (or should ideally) contain a capacity building component to prepare the South Sudanese for independent delivery of services, the main objective is to provide a service that there is a need for, and often not to train the South Sudanese in doing it themselves. I chose therefore not to categorise it as a statebuilding activity.

Donors and international organisations generally conform to the priorities, or pillars, of the South Sudan Development plan when designing statebuilding activities, i.e. governance, economic development, social and human development and conflict prevention and security. Within statebuilding, donor activities are directed both at developing systems and on improving human capacity in government institutions. These can both be seen as components of improving governance. As an example of projects within this area, the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF), which receives funds from seven donor countries, has implemented or is in the process of implementing an electronic payroll system, a pension system, a centre for government accountancy training, core skills training for public employees and a database for

human resources in the public sector. These projects are all implemented with the Ministry for Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development.\(^3\)

Capacity building can also be illustrated with a project called the IGAD project, where 200 civil servants from neighbouring countries Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have come to South Sudan for a period of two years to pair up with South Sudanese employees and train them. This project involves a variety of sectors, for instance health, human resources, management and administration (da Costa et al. 2013, forthcoming:15). The Ministry of Labour manages the project in partnership with the UNDP.

In all sectors, a central purpose for donors is to strengthen financial systems and accountability. According to the Government of South Sudan, thirteen donors were active in the area of accountability in 2010 and 2011, notably the USA and the CBTF. In this sector you also find anti-corruption/transparency efforts and work to support the National Audit Chamber. This work is for instance done through the placement of international advisers in the ministries and agencies. Another example is the World Bank’s project in the National Bureau of Statistics, where international employees are helping to establish systems for collecting information on markets and prices from all over South Sudan.

Additionally, international actors support South Sudanese institutions core public administrative functions, such as planning government activities and drafting legislation. For example, Norwegian advisers have helped draft the legislation on oil revenue management for South Sudan, by educating government employees on revenue management and finances and helping to draft the bill.

International actors in South Sudan also target the justice system as part of statebuilding efforts. This includes institutional development such as the strengthening of the courts at all levels of government, but also the integration of tribal, non-state justice traditions in South Sudan. Canada also provides support for the Constitutional Review Commission.

Furthermore, the security sector is an important area for international statebuilding in South Sudan. After decades of war, security institutions like the army and the police have serious needs for reform, both in terms of individual training and in institutional reform and “right-sizing”, as these institutions are generally seen as being significantly over-staffed. UNMISS

\(^3\) Hereafter the Ministry of Labour.
has particular responsibility when it comes to security sector reform, although other actors
(like the UK, the Netherlands and Canada) also have projects in this area.

Finally, democratisation and civil society are targets for statebuilding. There are many
components to this work, including preparations for the planned 2015 elections, which
include support for a national census and capacity building within the SPLM.

In terms of the methods employed, there are both workshops and trainings for South
Sudanese civil servants, as well as international advisers/consultants embedded in ministries
for shorter or longer periods of time. Additionally, international staff may at times perform
functions in the South Sudanese government, either to get a system in place that the South
Sudanese can then learn how to use, or to demonstrate how something is done.

Having presented an overview of important actors, priorities and activities in South Sudanese
statebuilding, I will now turn to the findings from my fieldwork in South Sudan in order fulfil
the research objectives of this thesis.
6 Findings and analysis

The following chapter is based on 24 interviews conducted in Juba, South Sudan, in January 2013, as well as on some secondary material. Name, nationality and position of all interviewees are listed in Appendix 1. The purpose here is to answer the research question presented in the introductory chapter: How does the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors affect statebuilding in South Sudan? As previously stated, I have defined the most relevant aspects of this relationship to be decision-making and control of resources within statebuilding as well as capacity building.

As discussed in the Chapter 4, the views and information presented by the people interviewed for this study may not represent the whole picture of statebuilding in South Sudan, nor may all statements given be without bias. However, these interviews can still be argued to provide valuable information that is not available elsewhere, and can therefore be used as data material for conclusions on the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors and how it has affected statebuilding in the time period between independence and January 2013.

The information gathered in the interviews suggests two trends within statebuilding in South Sudan: one on a higher, decision-making level, the other on a lower, practical level. On the higher level, South Sudanese and international actors have agreed on a shared vision for what kind of state South Sudan is to be, and the South Sudanese government has a degree of ownership in the form of power to make decisions regarding major developments in the country. In line with what I presented in the chapter on theoretical foundations, this can be argued to affect statebuilding in South Sudan positively, as the process is governed along shared goals, and a significant measure of control is in local hands.

On the lower level however, the image is more complex. Here, the challenges associated with statebuilding in general, particularly the relationship between local and international actors, become evident. In practice, the South Sudanese may not agree with their international counterparts on how to achieve shared goals or how to make priorities within these goals. International influence is also significant due to their resources and policies, and the South Sudanese government’s lack of capacity to fully take ownership of statebuilding in South Sudan. All in all, these challenges have important implications for how we view the prospects for success in statebuilding in South Sudan.
These trends will dictate the structure of this chapter. Findings on the relationship between local and international actors will be presented, along with their consequences for ownership. In conclusion, I will assess what implications this has for statebuilding in South Sudan.

6.1 On a higher level: shared goals and South Sudanese ownership

6.1.1 Shared vision for South Sudan

Most of the people interviewed are of the opinion that international and South Sudanese actors largely have the same goals for what kind of state is being established in South Sudan. These goals are formally expressed in the South Sudan Development Plan, where the overarching objective is to “[e]nsure that by 2014 South Sudan is a united and peaceful new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all” (GoSS 2011:41). Both international and South Sudanese actors subscribe to these overarching goals. Several people interviewed emphasised that the international and South Sudanese actors share the same broad principles for South Sudan:

I think the broad paradigm is generally shared. I think the broad paradigm is a Western style democracy, with a free-market economy and separation between church and state (Lewis Keller [Interview]).

As mentioned in Chapter 3, whether or not international and South Sudanese actors have similar goals for statebuilding will have consequences for how much the degree of local ownership affects statebuilding. If the two sides are not aligned, any influence of international actors has larger practical implications. The fact that goals overall are the same may make international influence in statebuilding less important. An example of this is the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which is written in accordance with principles set out by South Sudanese counterparts.

6.1.2 Efforts to foster South Sudanese ownership

*We really try to work directly alongside the government. We really don’t want to be the capacity replacement program.*

Daniel Carner, Capacity Building Trust Fund [Interview].
Local ownership is an official aim within statebuilding in South Sudan. The foremost expression of this is the manner in which international actors stand behind and aim to support the South Sudan Development Plan. Many interviewees brought this up as the absolute starting point for statebuilding in South Sudan, both for international and South Sudanese actors. This can be seen as a signal that there is a hierarchy of policies in South Sudan with local priorities at the top. This indicates that the South Sudanese have ownership of these goals.

A specific example of efforts to achieve local ownership can be found within the UNDP: every UNDP project has a government institution that it supports. Projects are developed and implemented “not just with the government, but through the government” (Josh Field [Interview]). The CBTF is another example, which although it is funded by the Joint Donor Team, is governed through a steering committee chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and also includes representatives from other ministries, in addition to lead donors and the UNDP (Daniel Carner [Interview]). This is a common structure of governing projects in South Sudan. These examples suggest that, as in the literature on statebuilding, there is recognition amongst practitioners in South Sudan that ownership is necessary for success in statebuilding: “it is pointless for outsiders to develop institutions that are not anchored locally” (Kersten Jauer [Interview]).

The South Sudanese government controls major decisions

With only a few exceptions, almost all interviewees say that the South Sudanese government is in control of overall policy and statebuilding in South Sudan. Both South Sudanese and international actors take the initiative for new policies. Interviewees from both sides expressed the view that the ultimate decision-making power rests with the South Sudanese and that the international role is to provide advice and technical assistance to them in how to use this power. In our interview, the Secretary General of the South Sudanese government stated:

The issue of statebuilding remains squarely a responsibility of the nation of South Sudan, with the government having the great privilege of turning to its partners and friends in the international community for advice (Abdan Agar Jok Nhial [Interview]).

There are at least two reasons mentioned in other interviews for why the South Sudanese are in control of major decisions relating to statebuilding. Firstly, both international and South Sudanese believe that it should be this way. As mentioned, local ownership is a stated goal in
most projects, and this can be seen as an expression of this aim. Secondly, the South Sudanese government is consistently showing the interest and will to control decisions on policy and statebuilding. An UNMISS representative captures the situation like this:

[The South Sudanese] make their own decisions. The UN has never made any decisions for the government. They have not even attempted to do so, and even if they tried, the government will never accept it. Our role is consultative. Our role is advice. Our role is bringing issues to their attention (Rod Adams [Interview]).

In other words, attempts by the international community to bypass the government of South Sudan or launch an initiative without local acceptance would not be allowed by the South Sudanese. A UNDP employee seconded to the South Sudanese government simply states that any such efforts “will just be blocked” (Joseph Denson [Interview]). This political will to govern is by some seen as a legacy of the South Sudanese fight for independence:

The South Sudanese are very proud people who have had to be very stubborn and persistent in their fight for independence for many decades. And that has, I think, created a spirit of resilience inside people, and it has also nurtured people's desire for autonomy and self-control and pursuing goals in a steadfast and almost stubborn manner (Kersten Jauer [Interview]).

In the interviews, there was a tendency for the South Sudanese interviewees to put more emphasis on the South Sudanese government controlling statebuilding in South Sudan, with international partners merely assisting them in reaching their goals. There can be many reasons for why this was the case, and I will not go deep into speculations on why the perspectives of South Sudanese actors differ slightly from the internationals in this particular study. Still, one theory for why this is the case can be found in the desire for autonomy mentioned above. South Sudanese individuals may believe that it is the South Sudanese government’s right to make decisions, which could lead them to believe to a greater extent that it is in fact so.

**South Sudan going against international advice**

The South Sudanese government does not do everything that the international community recommends, which can be taken as further support for the argument the South Sudanese government controls major policy decisions in the country. Several interviewees mention vital issues in which South Sudan has gone against international will.
of the South Sudanese government explained in our interview that international opinion is evaluated before decisions are made on whether or not it serves South Sudan’s national interests, and that it does not carry any special weight beyond that:

And so [if] our national interest is seen to diverge from that of international actors, it is most likely that the government of South Sudan will take unilateral direction and ignore what the international actors say. If the leadership thinks that it is the best interest of South Sudan to go its way alone and not abide by the advice of friends from the international community. ... There have been times where it has happened, ... like when the South decided in January last year to shut down oil production (Abdan Agar Jok Nhial [Interview]).

The issue of stopping oil production and the following austerity measures featured most prominently in the interviews as an example of South Sudanese autonomy. The decision to halt oil production was made against explicit warnings from the international community, as oil revenue made up 98% of total government revenue at the time, and the loss of these revenues would have serious effects on the state of the economy.\textsuperscript{32,33}

Another example of the South Sudanese going their own way include the management of the currency, the South Sudanese Pound, which has been “totally nationally driven ... they’ve ignored every single bit of advice that's come from the World Bank or the IMF pretty much” (Lewis Keller [Interview]). All in all, this empirical evidence supports the South Sudanese ability to take control and go against international advice in cases that are important to them.

The South Sudanese government has become more assertive since independence

Interviewees emphasise that the South Sudanese government has become more assertive in the eighteen months since independence. Prior to 2011, international actors had a much larger role in identifying the needs of Southern Sudan than what they do now (Rebecca Nyiel Chol [Interview]). Since then, in the words of a UNICEF official, “the body language of politics has shifted very radically” and the South Sudanese are now “putting their foot down” in their relations with donors and international agencies (Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen [Interview]).

\textsuperscript{32} At the time of the interviews, many internationals interviewed expressed that they, and the international community in general, had later acquired greater understanding for the decision to stop oil production. This shift had happened because of a) the uncompromising behaviour of Sudan in negotiations and b) the South Sudanese government’s success in avoiding economic collapse even in the context of austerity.

\textsuperscript{33} Oil production was finally restarted on April 12, 2013 (Al Jazeera 2013).
An illustration of this development can be seen in legislation currently being drafted by the South Sudanese government on the regulation of NGOs and their activities. The draft bill that was being circulated in January of 2013 included demands that NGOs contribute to local capacity building, and that a government commission is to approve funding for organisations in South Sudan (GoSS 2013b). If the contents of this draft bill get passed into law, the Government of South Sudan will have increased their control over the humanitarian sector significantly. This is a sector that has traditionally been without much government control or oversight due to the emergency nature of humanitarian assistance. A UN employee interpreted this as “a sign that the government is starting to really feel that it is in fact governing a country and that it calls the shots” (Lewis Keller [Interview]).

Furthermore, South Sudan is a founding member of the G7+, which has released “The New Deal”, a set of principles for international engagement in fragile states. This initiative represents a quest for an increase in ownership for the states involved in spite of the fragility of their institutions. The key objective is to achieve “country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment” (G7+ 2011). South Sudan’s engagement in The New Deal signalises a will to take ownership of statebuilding, even if its institutions are weak (Kersten Jauer [Interview]).

To sum up, almost all persons interviewed see the South Sudanese government as the ones making important decisions on major policies and activities within statebuilding. According to one interviewee, “they are very concerned with not being a subdivision of some big international organisations” (Jan Persson [Interview], my translation). There are also several examples of the South Sudanese choosing to dismiss international advice. In other words, South Sudanese leadership has both the power and the political will to exert control over major developments within statebuilding in South Sudan.

6.1.3 Summary
What I have argued thus far presents one of the trends found when analysing the data material from the interviews I conducted in Juba. On a higher level of policy making and statebuilding in South Sudan, the local actors seem to be in the driver’s seat and big policy

34 The G7+ has eighteen members, including Afghanistan, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia and Timor-Leste (G7+ 2013).
decisions have to be made with South Sudanese consent. International actors aim for local ownership, and the South Sudanese government displays a strong political will to govern the country they have fought to free.

As the theoretical chapter states, ownership means not simply to be informed or consulted, but taking active part in managing statebuilding activities. Based on the data material available for this study, there is at least some success in achieving this. Hence, it is possible to assert that ownership is not just rhetoric in South Sudan; there are actual efforts for the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors to be one where the South Sudanese government is in charge and international actors are technical advisers, funders and teachers. This ownership also seems to be increasing.

6.2 On a lower level: challenges to ownership

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the pattern of South Sudanese ownership is not the only trend evident in South Sudanese statebuilding. On a lower, practical level, the reality is more complex, as factors on both international and South Sudanese sides make ownership more challenging.

6.2.1 Goals: differences in priorities and doubts of intentions

The challenge isn't so much what the goals are. I think the goals are shared between South Sudan and the international community. … The challenge is that in a context like this, it's very difficult to prioritise within that. So what should we do? Everything! When should we do it? Right away! What would you like to do first? Everything! (Daniel Carner [Interview]).

As mentioned in section 6.1.1, all actors in South Sudan subscribe to the same overarching goals for the state, and are as such pulling in the same direction. This is an important conclusion, as it indicates that international actors in South Sudan are mainly supporting the South Sudanese efforts at constructing their own state.

Many people interviewed, however, pointed out that the story of goals and visions for South Sudan is more complex. Even though overall goals are the same, practice can be entirely different:
I think everyone has these large, lofty goals in mind. I mean, who doesn't want peace? Or who doesn't want jobs and economic growth and whatnot? But I think all the donors and the government probably have different views on how they should go about that (Michael Hook [Interview]).

Some suggest that there may be different priorities within goals, immediately making the situation more complex (Daniel Carner [Interview]). International and South Sudanese actors may hold contradictory views on what should be accomplished first. For instance, the South Sudanese actors are said to have put more emphasis on sovereignty, national security and securing their borders with the North, which as an example may have lead the government to see an oil production stoppage as the right decision, even if it were to cause harm to the economy. The international community, on the other hand, has put more emphasis on education, health and economic development, which consequently lead them to recommend a different decision (Michael Hook [Interview]).

**Are the South Sudanese just agreeing with donors to get what they want?**

A few interviewees take the argument on practical differences in goals to an even more critical level, believing that the South Sudanese are not as invested in the idea of a “Western style” state as their official position would suggest. This charge is based on the actual practices of the South Sudanese government, which suggest in some ways that officials may to some degree be paying “lip service” to international aims for a democratic, transparent state, whilst in practice acting in ways that are counterproductive to achieving those goals:

> A lot of it is just words. People will agree with the donors, and they'll say ‘yes, we'll do this’. And there'll be some meetings and some conferences and there'll be endless foreign consultants who make a lot of money out of setting up systems and giving advice. But does it really work? Are people really committed to it? Local government, is it really committed to it? Well, I doubt it (John Ashworth [Interview]).

As support for their claims, interviewees pointed to vast corruption problems, nepatrimonial hiring practices and lack of media freedom in the country as evidence that the South Sudanese in reality do not share the same vision as the international community and the South Sudanese *official* position would suggest:

> The way they formulate in presence of development partners their goals and how they want to use the budget and so on might not be the same they talk among themselves. I mean, how otherwise could you explain that four billion dollars are stolen? (Joseph Denson [Interview]).

Joseph Denson, a UNDP adviser, is referring to official reports made in June of 2012, where President Kiir stated that South Sudanese officials had stolen four billion US dollars from
official funds (Holland 2012). One person interviewed, an adviser in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning\(^{35}\), further explained that many in the South Sudanese elite may benefit from official statebuilding goals not being realised:

I think there are people in the system with a completely different agenda. Where the agenda is the more chaos there is and the fewer structures there are, for instance in oil revenue management, the bigger is the potential for [them] to grab some of the revenues (Mark Blank [Interview], my translation).

It is difficult to establish what the facts are regarding what the South Sudanese government really thinks and how this relates to what they say and do. At the same time, one can convincingly theorise that South Sudan gains from going along with international visions even if they do not fully share them. The gains could come both in the form of resources and in keeping an alliance with Western governments that can be useful in dealing with the threat from Sudan.

On the whole, there are many signs that international and South Sudanese actors may not always be acting with the same vision in mind, which can be detrimental to reaching their shared goals. This can be interpreted both as a sign of differing priorities and as dishonest intent on the South Sudanese side. In support of the second explanation, diverging goals were argued by Wolfram Lacher (2012) to be an issue for statebuilding in South Sudan. As support for this, he brings up the South Sudanese unwillingness to reduce the size of the armed forces, as well as high levels of corruption and human rights abuses.

Interestingly, the undersecretary in the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports\(^{36}\), Dr. Jok, makes the point that whether the goals for statebuilding in South Sudan converge does not matter because this area is the prerogative of South Sudanese politicians, not internationals:

The main goal is to establish a stable, secure, prosperous country. ... And anybody who wants to help from outside through this process would have to make that their goal as well. And so I'm not aware of any external actors whose goal is different from that. So I would say yes, the goals are the same (Dr. Jok Madut Jok [Interview]).

\(^{35}\) Hereafter the Ministry of Finance.  
\(^{36}\) Hereafter the Ministry of Culture.
However, conditions in South Sudan may mean that different actors are pulling in different directions, which is likely to be affecting statebuilding in significant ways. Dr. Jok may be correct in that South Sudanese goals are ultimately what should govern statebuilding in South Sudan, but if international and South Sudanese actors are not working for the same goals in practice, this can still be said to be an important finding.

Another argument that was put forward in the interviews is that South Sudan is not a homogenous entity with one set of goals, which may help explain the diverging practices. This may be true for any state, but arguably more so for South Sudan, which is a highly fragmented state characterised by intense ethnic struggles (Matthew Hunter [Interview]). Almost all interviewees emphasise the lack of a national unity as being a serious problem for South Sudan after independence. This could help explain developments in South Sudan.

To sum up, a majority of the people interviewed emphasise that goals for the state of South Sudan are a more complicated matter than simply agreeing to the overall goals of a peaceful, prosperous, democratic South Sudan. In practice, priorities within these goals differ, and several practical examples highlight how the practices of the South Sudanese government are inconsistent with the overall goals. The chief implication of this is that international and South Sudanese actors are not fully aligned in their practices for statebuilding in South Sudan, which makes the level of ownership have wider consequences.

### 6.2.2 International resources lead to influence

As mentioned, almost all interviewees hold the view that the control of major decisions rests with South Sudanese authorities. While this conclusion may be true, there is still a vast international presence in the country, described by one UN employee as “probably the largest statebuilding project ever undertaken in recent times”, with South Sudan receiving “unfathomable sums” from international donors (Lewis Keller [Interview]). Some interviewees think that an effect of this is that whilst control formally lies with the South Sudanese and they are very interested in exercising this control, in practice, the international community wields a lot of influence:

Ideally you'd want [for the South Sudanese to be in control]. I think that's what donors say. But I think in reality, often what happens is the donor has the money, and they tend to drive the decisions (Michael Hook [Interview]).
Similarly, an SPLM employee that I interviewed cited South Sudan’s need for support from the international community as a reason for why they have influence over what happens in South Sudan:

We are a young nation and we feel that we need the support of each and everybody who is of a good will toward us. And that also ties our hands on ordering things around (Joseph Kuol Madut [interview]).

As a resource rich country\(^\text{37}\), South Sudan does in theory have the funds to accomplish things without international assistance, which would presumably reduce international leverage (Kersten Jauer [Interview]). However, at the time of the interviews, these resources were largely unexploited. The halt in oil production changed the financial situation in South Sudan in a way that may have strengthened the influence of international actors further:

There are two major sources of revenue in South Sudan. One is oil, which we don't have at the moment. The other one is donor money. So the donors have a huge amount of influence (John Ashworth [Interview]).

Even interviewees who firmly claim the South Sudanese to be in control of decisions in South Sudan admit to some international influence in the country. The undersecretary in the Ministry of Culture stated that:

How decisions are made in these institutions is entirely the sovereign role of a country. So clearly, most of it is controlled by South Sudanese. But the influences from outside are unquestionably there, but I don't know exactly how you quantify it. ... It's very benign, but the influence is there. It comes through funding (Dr. Jok Madut Jok [Interview]).

Accordingly, few interviewees are willing to contend that the international presence in South Sudan does not carry with it any significant influence. This influence is, as Dr. Jok correctly observes, difficult to measure exactly, as it could sometimes be less formal than direct decision-making. With this in mind, it is possible to argue that South Sudanese dependency on international assistance, particularly in the form of money, leads to influence over statebuilding activities. Following this, South Sudanese ownership over activities is arguably diminished.

\(^{37}\) The World Bank classifies South Sudan as a “lower middle income” country, with a GDP per capita (in 2011) of 1520 USD, more than twice that of neighbouring Kenya (World Bank 2012b; Danielewitz 2012). The country also has a “huge but largely unrealized agricultural potential” (World Bank 2012a).
Interestingly, one interviewee argued that the influence of the internationals is not as big as their resource spending would predict:

You look at the US and they provide four hundred million dollars a year to South Sudan, but if they want to sit and meet with the president, they still have a very difficult time doing that. ... Our ability to influence on a grander scale I don't feel is proportionate to the kind of support that we're providing (Josh Field [Interview]).

This could be seen in relation to section 6.1, where I conclude that South Sudanese actors have the ultimate control over major statebuilding decisions in South Sudan. The large influx of money may not have as much of an influence because this influence is in part mitigated by the South Sudanese will to control decisions and the international community’s wish that they do so as well.

In relation to this, it is important to underline that even though there is international influence, donors and agencies cannot accomplish anything that they wish for. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are limits to what international actors can achieve on their own, regardless of how powerful or resourceful the international presence is. A clear illustration of this in South Sudan is the issue of reducing the size of the armed forces. Up to forty per cent of the South Sudanese budget goes to the army, the police and the national wildlife service – what an international adviser with the Ministry of Finance labelled “basically paying salary for people who have guns” (Adam Whitford [Interview]). International actors put pressure on the GoSS to reduce this (Rod Adams [Interview]).

Secretary-General of the GoSS, Abdan Agar Jok Nhial, argues that it is impossible to fire people who have spent decades of their life fighting for the country’s independence without facing serious opposition, possibly even armed rebellion. Additionally, the looming threat of a return to war with the North makes the South Sudanese cautious in reducing the size of their military forces. Accordingly, the South Sudanese government is not very susceptible to international pressure in this matter.

A possible inference to draw from this is that international influence differs between sectors and issues, depending on how high the issue is on the South Sudanese agenda:

Maybe in areas where they don't mind so much, they would let a development partner go ahead. But in everything that is of importance to the government they will make sure that they are the ones to decide (Joseph Denson [Interview]).
In conclusion, the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors in South Sudan is not one where international actors are without influence. The large amounts of donor resources being poured into South Sudanese statebuilding are sorely needed, which in turn changes the power relationship between the international and local actors. As one interviewee put it, “the donors have the money and they can always leave or stop funding things” (Michael Hook [Interview]). Even though it would presumably take a lot for international actors to abandon projects they have invested in, it could still be considered a credible threat. International actors potentially have a considerable influence on statebuilding in South Sudan in practice. The end result is a lower degree of South Sudanese ownership than what was demonstrated when only looking at a higher level of statebuilding.

6.2.3 International policies for effective statebuilding affect degree of ownership

As mentioned in section 6.1.2, local ownership is an official objective in statebuilding in South Sudan. International actors have policies in place to make this happen. Notwithstanding these efforts, the data material for this study also suggests that the quest for local ownership is fraught with challenges. Challenges that ultimately make the degree of ownership in South Sudan lower than what is aimed for. A reason for this shortcoming may be that the other aspects of international statebuilding policies do not leave sufficient room for local ownership to be realised in practice.

To continue the example from the UNDP, even though all projects in the agency are implemented through a government institution, this is no guarantee for *substantive* engagement by the government. Matthew Hunter, a UNDP employee working in a South Sudanese ministry, believes that the South Sudanese government is not sufficiently engaged in the projects: “I think they're definitely being more consulted on certain initiatives. They're informed, but not engaged as much as they should be” (Matthew Hunter [Interview]). Several other interviewees describe the governing of projects to happen through steering committees with both international and South Sudanese members. Although this guarantees involvement, it does not automatically mean there is ownership.

In other words, some interviewees think local ownership is partly just rhetoric, something the international actors wish for in theory, but to a lesser extent see through in practice. David
Deng Athorbei, the Minister for Electricity and Dams, claimed that lack of ownership might even cause the South Sudanese to become *spoilers* in the statebuilding process:

They don't let us control the aid on the ground. ... And that makes spectators, and at times we become the spoilers. Because we see like, it doesn't belong to us. It's somebody else’s activity. And you can feel when you don't own something, there are times when sometimes, some of us become spoilers (David Deng Athorbei [Interview]).

Accordingly, interviews reveal that ownership is not always practiced within statebuilding in South Sudan. Even though South Sudanese actors have control over major decisions and developments in the country, on lower levels their role is perhaps more of a consultative nature. As mentioned in the chapter on theoretical foundations, this cannot be counted as local ownership, since local counterparts do not control activities. In the following sections, I will lay out ways in which international policies for statebuilding may be contributing to less ownership on the part of the South Sudanese.

**International actors fail to tailor solutions to local needs**

Even though the international community has a policy of promoting ownership, they bring with them certain pre-determined solutions for how best to build up state institutions in a post-conflict setting. Even though these may have proven successful in the past or for other reasons are considered appropriate, this may lead to statebuilding that is to a lesser extent tailored to South Sudanese circumstances and needs. Many interviewees criticise the international community for implementing solutions not based on South Sudanese wishes:

It's all veiled and couched in a language ... ‘we want to hear about your problems, but actually, here's the one we're going to solve for you, whether it's a problem or not.’ There’s a real tendency to do that in South Sudan. We come with an already loaded, pre-loaded cartridge, and we've already written the script. The ink is already dry (Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen [Interview]).

This suggests that international actors rely too heavily on previous experiences and existing expertise, thereby ignoring local solutions. SPLM employee Joseph Kuol Madut lamented international agencies’ tendency to act as though they know better than the South Sudanese:

The USAID … when they are given money for example for bridges. They build a number of bridges here, which is good for us. … Let’s say we tell them it should be in Northern Bahr-El-Ghazal, and they say ‘no, it should be in Central Equatoria’. You know? They will not meet our need! … So that's why I think even if the money is given by the international community, when they are on the ground they should also try to see
what is it that the people want. ... Most of them are not doing that. I am sorry to say this. Most of them are not doing that. They only wake up on the morning, say ‘we want to do this in this area’. They will just do it without consultation with the government (Joseph Kuol Madut [Interview]).

It is important to acknowledge that this is not necessarily happening with any malicious intent on part of the international agencies. The solutions presented by international actors may simply be seen as objectively better for the development of the state. Moreover, in an informal conversation I had with a diplomat in Juba\textsuperscript{38}, South Sudanese wishes were characterised sometimes as being based on concerns other than efficiency, such as asking international partners to build a hydro power plant three times the size of what they needed, simply because this was the size of the hydro power plant built in Sudan. Matthew Hunter with the UNDP also argued that when South Sudanese counterparts come up with initiatives, they are sometimes impossible to carry out: “if they're good ideas, they're taken into account. But some requests are just impossible. Because what it often boils down to is more money” (Matthew Hunter [Interview]).

Several interviewees report of communication issues between international and South Sudanese actors that work to reinforce the discord between international and local solutions. For instance, international actors may use language and develop plans that are too complicated for South Sudanese counterparts with a lower capacity to understand (Rebecca Nyiel Chol [Interview]). This may lead to a situation where actors from the two sides are not on the same wavelength:

Very often we miss each other, like Boeings in the night. ... There's a lot of that, this tendency to deeply misunderstand each other (Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen [Interview]).

Von Habsburg-Lothringen, an advisor for UNICEF in South Sudan, is of the opinion that this miscommunication is sometimes intentional, used as a tool by international personnel to get what they want without having to factor in local wishes:

What I’ve noticed is a tendency … for internationals to try to overwhelm their counterparts. If they see it as an opportunity, … they overwhelm them with the words until the counterpart kneels (Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen [Interview]).

\textsuperscript{38} 29.01.2013
Interestingly, interviewees who are internationals with more than fifteen years’ experience from South Sudan had a tendency to be more critical than other internationals interviewed of the international community’s inability to listen to South Sudanese actors and understand their culture as a way of adapting statebuilding activities to local circumstances. John Ashworth, a South Sudan analyst, argues that ideally, statebuilding “takes a lot more listening” than what international actors have the time for now. As an example, he points to an international “obsession” with plans and planning, which he claims runs counter to both effective action and to South Sudanese culture:

Planning is not a strong point in South Sudan. … It takes up virtually the entire energy of that organisation for weeks and weeks. … [Then] something changes and you suddenly find that even the people you made the plan for are not really willing to support you in carrying out the plan. … Let me not be too extreme, I’m not totally against planning, of course we have to plan to some extent. But I found that the level of planning which has been imposed on us has not been very helpful (John Ashworth [Interview]).

It should be noted, however, that although many interviewees argue that international actors do not sufficiently tailor solutions to local needs, not all agree. One case mentioned as an example of the opposite, is the judicial system, where the institutions that are being put in place are designed to co-exist with the traditional tribal justice systems that have been functioning at times when there was no South Sudanese state (Kersten Jauer [Interview]). It should therefore not be taken from this that international actors are not trying to adapt solutions to South Sudanese circumstances, only that persons interviewed think they are not doing this to a sufficient extent.

Several interviewees, both international and South Sudanese, argue that the international community do not properly understand the reality of South Sudanese statebuilding. Particularly, the international community seems to expect a lot of progress in statebuilding than what is realistic after what is in fact a relatively short period of time. The Minister of Electricity and Dams spoke out against this way of looking at things and the negative consequences he sees it having:

They raise the stakes so high. They want us to perform as in the First World. They want us to perform like Norway and America. … So most of them criticise us for not performing well. And this thing has a negative
effect on our performance, because the little that we make, the little improvement we make may be too slow, but for us it’s a giant step … (David Deng Athorbei [Interview]).

The international community is seen by a majority of interviewees to be acting on the basis of short-term perspective in South Sudan, and not tuned into the fact that statebuilding, no matter how successful, will take a long time. Project cycles are rarely longer than just a few years, and organisations and donors are looking for results right away, without putting enough emphasis on the sustainability of projects:

What is happening now is you're getting these short-term projects or these pockets in capacity building, but very often they collapse just as soon as the money and the donor goes away. ... The government does not have the capacity to take it over, and the investments made are not covering enough ground to actually make it more sustainable. It's just not possible (Matthew Hunter [interview]).

This tendency is reinforced by the high turnover of staff in South Sudan. Interviewees claim the average time spent in South Sudan by international personnel is between six and nine months. Dan Eiffe, a UNDP political adviser with over 25 years experience in South Sudan, argues this is too short: “There's not enough memory here. Institutional memory” (Dan Eiffe [Interview]).

One way in which to counteract the effects timeframes that are shorter than needed, is to plan for longer periods of time even though funding may not be certain for more than a few years. As an example, the Capacity Building Trust Fund has developed a five-year plan despite the fact that the CBTF is to be phased out at the end of 2013. “We’re hopeful,” Daniel Carner said in our interview, “that something replaces the CBTF and can pick up and continue in some of those areas where we’re ending.”

All things considered, the international community seems to be carrying out policies for statebuilding in South Sudan that in some instances contradict each other. On the one hand, experiences from other countries that are seen as having value for South Sudan are being used to design statebuilding solutions. For instance, one could argue that learning how to plan for projects is very important and that the South Sudanese should engage in this activity even if their history of civil conflict has left little room for planning in the past. Joseph Denson, a UNDP employee embedded in South Sudanese government, argues that the ability to plan is in fact one of the skills that has improved in South Sudan in the past few years: “You could see that there was a lot of focus on planning in the past years, so the planning is actually one of the things that is comparably working well.” (Joseph Denson [Interview]).
On the other hand, several interviewees argue that the South Sudanese government must be given the possibility to construct its own solutions, even if these are not the most effective or optimal. Michael Hook, who works for the World Bank, challenged the concept of “best practices”, arguing that what is best for any country is to develop its own solutions, not to be taught how to do what other countries have developed in different circumstances. Similarly, Minister for Electricity and Dams, David Deng, argued that developing your own solutions is a way of learning, and that trial and error is an important part that international actors are keeping the South Sudanese from learning: “They tend to prevent us from making mistakes. Because you must make mistakes in order to learn” (David Deng [Interview]). Bringing in “best practices” from other situations may as such be leading to a lower degree of local ownership in South Sudan.

**No direct budget support**

Normally, international development assistance comes with conditions for what kinds of policies are to be pursued. I asked interviewees questions about these conditions in order to gain a picture of what international actors demand in South Sudan and how this affects the control of statebuilding. The interviews revealed that conditions attached to aid are not too relevant in the South Sudanese context, as there is no direct budget support to attach conditions to.

As stated in the previous chapter, South Sudan is not considered to have the financial systems in place to be able to handle aid in the form of direct cash transfers. Corruption is also a significant problem. Because international organisations and donors need to be able to adequately account for how taxpayer money is spent, they are very careful with any sort of money transfer to the South Sudanese government. For instance, in 2011 and 2012 combined, only twelve million dollars were transferred to the South Sudanese government from UNDP and UNICEF. These funds were transferred in line with the UNs Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT), which is a method for assessing risk in transferring money. Most funds go directly to the implementer of a project, almost always an NGO, contractor or UN agency, even if the South Sudanese takes an active part in planning it. Direct support to the South Sudanese government is usually not cash, but instead in the form of things like vehicles and buildings (Joseph Denson; Josh Field; Daniel Carner; Kersten Jauer [Interviews]).
According to one interviewee who works for the CBTF, to some South Sudanese the policies against direct transfers is an understandable fact. South Sudan is simply not yet ready: “Most of our government counterparts readily say to us - please don't [give us budget support] right now. It’s not the right time” (Daniel Carner [Interview]). Similarly, a senior official in the Ministry of Labour said she understood the strict rules for international funding, as creating a confidence between donor and government on what funds are being used for is a good thing (Rebecca Nyiel Chol [Interview]).

Even though parts of the South Sudanese government express an understanding for the fact that funds cannot be given directly to them, there also exists strong voices for more money to flow through South Sudanese institutions. Josh Field, a UNDP employee, indicated that this is sometimes a cause of disagreement in the relationship between international and South Sudanese counterparts:

> It is definitely sometimes a cause of discussion. I hear sometimes a disagreement between the government and the UN for doing trainings on the ground. We always say we're going to do the training with government, and usually we do. But government will be wanting to actually hold on to that cash and to distribute that cash to purchase whatever. And obviously we have to be very careful with that, so sometimes that can be a cause of disagreement and discussion on how best to manage that (Josh Field [Interview]).

A policy of not transferring money directly to the South Sudanese government may lead to increased confidence between partners that money is being spent where it is supposed to. Local actors may also take as much (or as little) part in planning and decision-making, regardless of what channels funds take. However, it does mean that South Sudanese institutions have less “hands on” involvement in any given project than if the money was being spent by South Sudan. Additionally, direct monetary support is worth aiming for in statebuilding, as it allows for a smaller role for international actors. Josh Field argued that building this capacity will be important to ensure South Sudanese independence of international actors in the future:

> That, for UNDP would be our exit strategy, once we've built the capacity of national institutions to not just have the technical knowledge of the thematic areas we're working in, but also the financial systems to manage aid bilaterally. … At the end of the day we want to leave South Sudan knowing full and well that we've put those systems in place (Josh Field [Interview]).
A recent donor conference in Washington, D.C. addressed the idea of granting on-budget support as South Sudan improves its financial accountability. The plan is to provide the first budget support, 200-250 million USD, in the 2013/2014 fiscal year, which may then become the first step towards increased ownership in this area.

Even though there is no direct budget support, cooperation with international partners does come with certain conditions. These are often tied to the sound management of projects, such as the existence of proper plans for projects and clear fiscal procedures. Anti-corruption and transparency requirements are also commonly mentioned conditions in the interviews. All in all, conditions are tied more to procedures than policy, although this too can be argued to be a “Western” form of managing activities that the South Sudanese would most likely not have engaged in without international assistance.

In conclusion, there are several aspects of international policy that influence their relationship with local actors in South Sudan in ways that constrain local ownership. Some of these policies seem to be undertaken in order to increase efficiency of statebuilding activities, but have the (unintended) consequence of reducing the degree of ownership.

**6.2.4 South Sudanese lack of capacity leaves room for international community to influence statebuilding**

All interviewees held the view that lack of capacity is a significant challenge for the South Sudanese government. The general educational level in the country is extremely low and very few people have experience with functioning bureaucracies or democratic governance. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that employees in the ministries are often hired not on the basis of their skills, but instead because of their track record from the civil war: “A lot of people are in positions due to their previous roles in fighting for the freedom of the country. Which is understandable, but it creates a challenge in terms of operations of government” (Daniel Carner [Interview]). The lack of capacity is a factor both on an individual level and on a systemic level.

Does this lack of capacity leave more control to international actors? Several interviewees say yes:

In some ways [lack of capacity gives international actors more influence]. Because when most international actors come, they come with the right equipment, the right knowledge to carry out their duties. And when
you compare them to us on the other side, we are at a disadvantage because we do not have the experience of knowing how to do things right since this is our first time doing it (Rebecca Nyiel Chol [Interview]).

International actors often lay out alternatives when there are political choices to be made within government. For instance, an international adviser set to help write a law for the management of oil revenues held trainings and workshops on what models had been chosen in other countries, in order for them to have the knowledge of available options and best international practice (Mark Blank [Interview]). Although this addresses some concerns of universalist international statebuilding solutions, South Sudanese counterparts often lack the capacity to assess available alternatives independently:

It's often not that they know different ways of planning and budgeting and could then say 'no, let's do it differently, this is better for here'. … Often the counterpart doesn't have an opinion because there is no technical knowledge on the subject, so there's not much of a discussion. It's rather like an explanation (Joseph Denson [Interview]).

The power to present the government with alternatives would presumably carry with it a certain amount of power, although it does not mean there is an intention to take over control of South Sudanese policies:

My experience is not that donors are deliberately managing processes because they see it as advantageous to manage them themselves instead of the government managing them. To the degree that processes are being managed [by international actors] it is because there is a lack of competence on the other side of the table, and then you try the best you can to help (Mark Blank [Interview], my translation).

Moreover, higher levels of government in South Sudan are seen to have better capacity for government (Nina Pedersen [Interview]). This could help explain how there is more ownership at higher levels than on lower levels.

**The issue of capacity substitution**

Many interviewees, particularly internationals working within South Sudanese ministries, mention capacity substitution as an issue; in some instances international advisers end up doing the work for South Sudanese counterparts that they are supposed to be mentoring. One reason for why this is happening is that having international advisers present can have an unintended pacifying effect on the South Sudanese: “the risk is … that we end up working for
them, doing their job. And that they sit back, relax, enjoy the ride” (Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen [Interview]).

Furthermore, the international adviser may simply be more efficient, which can provide a powerful incentive for doing instead of teaching (Jan Persson [Interview]). An international adviser in the Ministry of Finance described the dilemma like this:

If the Minister of Finance asks the department to do something, you can choose whether to do it yourself within a half hour or you can spend two weeks doing competence building. The latter is maybe what you ideally should be doing, but then the Minister of Finance wouldn’t be very happy. ... So I don’t have a good answer (Mark Blank [Interview], my translation).

Similarly, the international advisers in the ministries being more efficient may lead to some tasks being carried out almost entirely by international employees. Daniel Carner with the CBTF, who works closely with the Ministry of Labour, described a situation where this was an issue:

In different ministries, key ministries, everybody has put technical advisors. So if we write a letter to one of those ministries, it's quite likely that some of those technical advisors will write a letter back to us. So now who have I sent a letter to? And what kind of reply had I had? Have I had conversation with myself effectively? (Daniel Carner [Interview])

UN adviser Kersten Jauer stated in our interview that some things are simply too important for the proper functioning of the state to leave until the South Sudanese counterparts have attained the required skills to do it themselves:

Mentoring takes time. Many of the challenges that South Sudan faces need to be addressed often very quickly. ... If you shut down oil production then you quickly need redesign the budget from scratch. And then if oil comes back on you need to redesign the budget from scratch ... So what I’m trying to say here is that it's normal that outsiders perform different functions (Kersten Jauer [Interview]).

In other words, there are tasks that are considered to be so crucial that there is not time to train a South Sudanese before getting it in place. Jauer continues by acknowledging that this can be a delicate balance: “it's always a challenge to make sure that you are not substituting for work that could be done by someone from South Sudan.” When I asked how he thought the international community was doing in facing this challenge, he replied, “I think most
other people would say it's probably mixed. In the sense that it could probably be going better” (Kersten Jauer [Interview]).

A useful example of this problem is found in the IGAD project, a capacity building initiative where 200 civil servants from neighbouring countries are to be “twinned” with South Sudanese counterparts for a period of two years. Although the project is seen as successful in building capacity, interviewees argued that capacity substitution is an issue in the project (Matthew Hunter; Lewis Keller [Interview]). Likewise, a report on the project says:

[A group of civil service support officers] ended up with no twins. For the most part this group appears to have worked as normal employees performing line functions effectively substituting rather than developing capacity. Some of these have still managed to induce behavioural change and/or improve processes and institutions through their sheer presence (transforming by example). However, the sustainability of these achievements may be questionable as the knowledge of why changes were made may not have been transferred (da Costa et al. 2013, forthcoming:18).

In sum, the significant capacity challenges that the South Sudanese government faces both on a human and systemic level may be opening up for more influence from the international side, to the point where they are in fact the ones carrying out statebuilding activities. Capacity building seems to require a balance that is difficult to strike in South Sudan, and capacity substitution is an issue.

It is important to emphasise that this does not erase the fact that a considerable amount of capacity building is taking place in South Sudanese government institutions and that this capacity building is leaving the South Sudanese with the skills to take more control over statebuilding activities. In line with this argument and the discussions in Chapter 3, capacity building is possibly the most central tool for increasing local ownership in South Sudan, a fact evidently recognised by international actors, who put a great deal of focus on it.

Capacity substitution is therefore not the dominating trend in South Sudan. It is however, a serious issue, one that many interviewees seemed to view as something that is difficult to avoid, and that represents “a missed opportunity for [the South Sudanese] to learn” (Josh Field [Interview]). The effect of this is presumably that the international community is not teaching its South Sudanese as much as it could be doing:
I think lack of capacity within the government creates a situation in which they're less capable of taking ownership because they're less capable of implementing. But that shouldn't be an excuse for the lack of ownership. Because we are here to build capacity. And I think as the international community, we have an obligation to engage the government whether their capacity is low or not … But it's a very difficult issue because I know that the UN for example is really trying … Government ownership over the sort of strategies and policies of development within the country is one of the top priorities in all UN agency agendas. But there's always a disconnect between policy and implementation (Matthew Hunter [Interview]).

6.3 Effects on statebuilding

The interviews conducted with international and local actors within statebuilding in South Sudan have revealed useful information on statebuilding in South Sudan. The purpose of the interviews was to collect information that could help answer the research question “How does the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors affect statebuilding in South Sudan?” Although the analysis and conclusions made here are based on the interviews I conducted in South Sudan only, they reveal important information on the matter.

Through the interview analysis, I have uncovered two trends in this relationship. On the one hand, the South Sudanese government has the power to make major decisions within statebuilding and they have set visions for the state that all sides subscribe to. This suggests a considerable amount of ownership on part of the South Sudanese, which is also a stated aim for international actors in the country. On the other hand, realities on a lower level are more complex, with resources, international policies and lack of capacity challenging local ownership. What do these findings imply about statebuilding and its prospects for success?

6.3.1 How does the relationship affect statebuilding?

Why focus on local ownership?

With the findings of this chapter in mind, it is appropriate to discuss in detail how these aspects of the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors are affecting statebuilding in South Sudan. As stated earlier in this thesis, I understand the most relevant aspects of the relationship between local and international actors to be decision-making, resource control and capacity building. The relationship between local and international actors is therefore closely tied to the aim of local ownership: in a situation where one side has the majority of experience, competence and resources, how much the other side is in control will have significant consequences for whether or not statebuilding is a success. Local
ownership of decisions and resources is an important determinant for success in statebuilding, whilst capacity building is a critical tool for achieving local ownership, and through this secure sustainable institutions. Finally, within all this, the alignment between the two sides is an important determinant of how the degree of local ownership influences statebuilding.

In chapter 3, I laid out central debates on statebuilding today, and argued that one of the more important discussions within this field is on the threat posed to self-determination by international statebuilding missions and how this affects the chances of successful statebuilding. An important conclusion from this debate is that local ownership of statebuilding activities may help contain this threat, and that local ownership is most likely a necessary feature for success in statebuilding. Following this line of thought, it is important to examine different factors that affect local ownership in South Sudan, as they have a significant impact on statebuilding. This becomes even more important when you consider that the focus in this thesis is not on statebuilding in general, but specifically on the relationship between international and South Sudanese actors. Therefore, local ownership has been emphasised in this chapter.

6.3.2 What are the implications of findings for statebuilding in South Sudan?

As I have argued, when it comes to decision-making, there is a significant degree of ownership in South Sudan on a higher level, both due to the international policies aiming for local ownership, and to the strong political will to govern evident in South Sudanese officials. The presence of a degree of genuine ownership means that there is a higher chance of statebuilding succeeding in South Sudan than if the international community had taken more control of decision-making. This because institutions are likelier to be rooted in society and supported by national elites. Even if, by any account, statebuilding in South Sudan is a long-term process, an important step in the right direction is control by local actors, with outsiders acting as support. The fact that clear efforts have been made to have this happen is a positive sign for statebuilding. Even more important, ownership seems to be on the increase, which is promising for the future of South Sudan.

Despite the fact that ownership efforts contribute to progress in statebuilding in South Sudan, I have directed considerable attention in this chapter to the factors that seem to challenge this progress. These are challenges that to some extent were predicted in the literature review
presented in Chapter 3. Some are rooted in the basic imbalance of statebuilding relations, where a strong and resourceful group of actors come to the aid of a weak, fledgling state. In our interview, UN adviser Kersten Jauer reflected on this relationship:

The challenge of building new institutions in an entirely new country is tremendous. ... they are complex, they take long time, and they also require help from the outside. ... And that necessarily introduces some kind of imbalance. An imbalance that it's important to handle responsibly so that over time the imbalance reduces and international systems become less and less important (Kersten Jauer [Interview]).

In South Sudan, the international community is the strong party, and yet the inexperienced local hosts are to direct and control the process. Several contradictions in policies are consequences of this imbalance, contradictions that sometimes affect the statebuilding process in a negative way. As stated in this chapter, international actors have a degree of influence on the lower levels of statebuilding in South Sudan that counteracts the success in achieving ownership on higher political levels. This influence comes both because of policies for effective statebuilding, resources and lack of capacity on the South Sudanese side. The resulting lower ownership in practice works against some of the positive signs seen at the higher levels.

**Control of resources** is closely connected with the aspect of decision-making, as many decisions are in fact about how to spend resources. South Sudan formally has full control of its own resources, and natural resources may help them increase local ownership, since they can rely less on international actors. They are, however, relatively small compared to international resources, even more so in the context of the stop in oil production. The significant influx of funds from donors to South Sudan arguably gives international actors considerable influence over statebuilding in practice. International resources are also where the South Sudanese have less direct control, as there is almost no direct transfers to the government, only to implementers of projects.

The dependence on and lack of control of international resources can be argued to be detrimental to statebuilding success long-term. The South Sudanese actors can participate in planning but have less control over resource spending. This points to practical ownership of resources being more of a consultative nature, which as I discussed, stops it from being true ownership. As a consequence, the efficiency of statebuilding in South Sudan is compromised.
While this may be true, using aid budgets in the most efficient way is a natural goal for international actors, since they are after all managing taxpayer money, and want maximum returns. Furthermore, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that international actors sometimes know better than local actors, and that their desired solutions represent more effective use of funds. Equally important, it is also likely that those seeking to establish institutions in South Sudan can learn from experiences in countries like Timor-Leste, and thereby seek out solutions that give positive results without having to spend resources developing new methods. Still, the signs that the international community may be ready to transfer more funds to the South Sudanese government is a positive development.

What do these findings suggest? In essence it can be argued that effective solutions for statebuilding here and now may sometimes be a contradiction to fostering local ownership, especially if local opinion contradicts what is deemed to be international “best practice”. In the words of prominent scholar Francis Fukuyama (2005): “There are, of course, many drawbacks to letting the locals take the lead. The first is that they may make bad choices.” Conversely, without local ownership, we run the risk of the local authorities turning into spoilers, as cabinet member David Deng stated in our interview.

Both decision-making and resource control are influenced by the degree of alignment between international and South Sudanese actors, i.e. whether or not they agree on how to do statebuilding. Notwithstanding the advantages of shared overall goals, South Sudan clearly has challenges in implementing these goals and prioritising within equally pressing matters. If international and South Sudanese actors are not aligned on how to do statebuilding, the degree of ownership will have increased practical implications. All in all, not agreeing on what priorities to pursue in statebuilding must be said to harm efficiency for statebuilding in South Sudan.

The issue of capacity building also ties into questions of what is efficient when it comes to statebuilding in South Sudan. As a rule, local actors will start out with low capacity for governance. In South Sudan, this is especially true, as there were almost no existing governance structures at the time of the CPA signing in 2005. Capacity building is therefore naturally a central priority for international actors in South Sudan. This has a positive effect on statebuilding, as it is continually increasing South Sudanese actors’ capacity for local ownership. The focus on capacity building and the best methods for achieving goals is important for successful statebuilding in South Sudan.
What the interviews show, however, is that capacity building is not happening at optimal speed. This is in part because there are so many urgent tasks to be completed, and international actors simply do them better. It goes without saying that capacity substitution does not serve a good purpose in South Sudan.

A possible consequence of this is that capacity building for long-term efficiency needs to be emphasised even more relative to doing what is efficient short-term in order for statebuilding to succeed. As an example of a situation where this is working was given by Joseph Denson, who works with the GoSS in assisting in public financial management. He does not face the issue of capacity substitution because capacity building is his principal task: “Of course, I could draft a budget within a few days, but that’s not the purpose. If it’s delayed then it’s delayed”.

The suggestion that capacity building should overshadow other activities in order to raise the degree of ownership in South Sudan may however be a problematic one, particularly when operating in a country with as many and grave needs as South Sudan. Local ownership is, after all, not the only requirement for successful statebuilding. For this reason, it will perhaps be necessary to accept local ownership at a lower degree than what it would be if all other concerns were ignored. What matters, then, to accomplish success in statebuilding in South Sudan is that as capacity increases, so does local control of activities on all levels: “Initially, yes, we may be doing more of the heavy lifting, but seeing that wane is what counts” (Josh Field [Interview]).

Is there an inherent tension between effective measures and local ownership? Although I can only conclude based on my own data material, it would seem that there is. In the short run, efficiency concerns defend international actors taking more control over decisions and resources in order to implement solutions that are seen as the best for South Sudan. Sometimes, efficiency even comes in the way of teaching South Sudanese how to do the same things. In the long run, however, local ownership is necessary for achieving the sustainability needed for statebuilding to succeed.

In South Sudan, this tension is manifesting itself in a somewhat contradictory approach to statebuilding, where the aim is for locals to take the lead, but the plans and decisions we wish for them to arrive at are to some extent already decided upon. In order to enhance the
prospect for statebuilding, perhaps some short-term efficiency concerns must be let go in order to better balance this dilemma.

Statebuilding in South Sudan is still in an early phase, and hopefully the degree of ownership will increase in years to come, provided that efforts are made to increase the rate of capacity building and perhaps also allow for mistakes to be made if this means increased ownership. It is vital for the international community to balance this right. If the South Sudanese do not view the state institutions and projects as theirs, they may act to spoil instead of strengthen them and thereby hinder success in statebuilding. After all, “no one ever washes a rented car”\textsuperscript{39}.

\textsuperscript{39} Quote attributed to former U.S. treasury secretary Larry Summers (quoted in Fukuyama 2005).
7 Conclusion

If we have learned anything in the past decade and a half ... it is that we know relatively little about how to transform war-torn countries into stable societies.

(Paris 2009:58)

The history of South Sudan is a story of exploitation, war, and finally independence. The South Sudanese have been given a rare chance to make it on their own; to build a state for their people than can give its population what they were deprived of under the rule of Khartoum. Still, building a state with functioning institutions is a challenging task. Because of this, South Sudan needs a tremendous amount of support from outside actors. The international community has responded by devoting itself fully to the South Sudanese cause, allocating vast amounts of resources to the country. Based on this, you could conclude that statebuilding in South Sudan has been given a unique opportunity for success.

In this concluding chapter, I will summarise my findings and relate these to the main research questions and theoretical framework outlined earlier in this thesis. Furthermore, I plan to discuss other factors that may be just as important for explaining the developments within statebuilding in South Sudan since independence. Finally, I will discuss what relevance the South Sudanese case can have for statebuilding elsewhere, by reviewing aspects of this case that can form a basis for generalisation.

7.1 Summary of findings

How is the relationship between local and international actors affecting statebuilding in South Sudan? I have found, as argued all through this thesis, that the relationship between local and international actors has important consequences for statebuilding in South Sudan. One way in which this is expressed, is through the attempts to establish local ownership in the country, which is an important determinant for long-term successful statebuilding.

On a higher level, I found positive developments in these efforts, whilst on the lower level, ownership was challenged in many ways, in part by more pressing, short-term efficiency concerns. As this thesis has demonstrated, much of this is arguably rooted in the difficult balancing involved in establishing institutions through a partnership of strong, resourceful
international actors and an inexperienced national government. Although efforts are made to succeed in this balancing act, things could be going better, and if they did, statebuilding in South Sudan would have higher prospects of succeeding.

These findings are to a large extent in line with the literature on the subject, as discussed in Chapter 3: local ownership, whilst important for long-term efficiency in statebuilding, is difficult to attain in practice, and sometimes becomes a mere show of consulting with local actors. However, it must be argued that international actors in South Sudan have succeeded, at least in part, to establish some local ownership. It is as such not impossible to achieve in practice, but there are other concerns to balance it with, concerns that arguably lead to efficient statebuilding in the short run.

What the findings of this study confirms, is that lack of capacity influences local ownership, and thereby success in statebuilding. It may therefore be said to fit the discussion in Chapter 3; establishing true ownership over statebuilding activities before the local counterparts have the capacity to take this ownership will be a challenging task. For this reason, international actors may also need to consider whether to shift the balance away from short-term efficiency concerns in favour of longer-term ownership and sustainability, through an even stronger focus on capacity building. These are the main findings of this thesis.

7.2 Other factors influencing statebuilding in South Sudan

As I have argued, the relationship between local and international actors is vital to understanding statebuilding in a post-conflict situation. It is however, not the only element of a statebuilding context that matters; local ownership may be necessary to succeed in statebuilding, but it is not sufficient. Therefore, I will in this section discuss other factors that influence and challenge statebuilding in South Sudan. There are of course many things to mention, but I wish to focus upon three items:

Firstly, domestic conflict. There is a tendency in the literature to overplay the significance of international actors and their actions when sometimes, domestic factors are simply more important than what the international community does. South Sudan may be one of those situations: “What really matters for statebuilding is messy domestic politics. You can say that
a large part of South Sudanese statebuilding is basically uninfluenced by the international community” (Adam Whitford [Interview]).

Central to the discussion of statebuilding in South Sudan is the persistently high level of conflict in the country. As mentioned, almost all interviewees I spoke to mentioned lack of national unity as obstacle for statebuilding in South Sudan, even though I did not ask questions about it. The conflict levels in border areas and in the state of Jonglei are so severe that they dominate the political scene in South Sudan. A consequence of this may be that South Sudanese politicians do not have the possibility to act in accordance with plans for statebuilding, even if they may want to, because other concerns matter more. For instance, how can the South Sudanese reduce the number of soldiers when they fear both aggression from the North and internal rebellion? The institution strengthening objectives of trying to downsize the army to professionalise it and to reduce budgets would have problems competing with these concerns.

Secondly, the financial situation of South Sudan has put severe constraints on statebuilding. The government has had to cut a large portion of its budget in the past year to deal with the stop in oil revenues, which reduced government activities across the board. This oil stoppage had at the time of my fieldwork been in effect for a year, and was having a significant impact on the South Sudanese economy. One of the results of this policy is a shift in focus away from development and towards humanitarian efforts (IDC 2012:3). Interviewees also said this was the case:

In the context of austerity, I think the South Sudan Development Plan has sort of been tucked away and you've had a lot of other things that have come up, especially the recent conflict between North and South, that has deviated resources away from development and put it back more into a humanitarian phase (Josh Field [Interview]).

Thirdly, the existence of many international actors may also lead to a lack of coordination between international parties that acts to slow progress in statebuilding (cf. Chapter 3). Put simply, there are “too many cooks in the kitchen” (Lewis Keller [interview]). This also makes it harder for the South Sudanese government to prioritise, as international actors are pulling in different directions. An embedded adviser in the National Bureau of Statistics offered this analogy:

Imagine trying to build a house for yourself, but you have like a hundred different contractors and architects and designers. They're willing to pay for different parts of the house, but they all want to design it
differently and they can't agree. ... That's kind of the way it works around here. It's really messy (Michael Hook [interview]).

These are just three factors that are of relevance in South Sudan. Altogether, they present significant challenges to institution building. Without resolution or improvement, they will continue to do so, with the consequence that statebuilding in South Sudan will be all the more demanding. In conclusion, statebuilding in South Sudan is more complex than the relationship between local and international actors, although this is an important part of it.

7.3 The wider relevance of results

How can South Sudan be used to shed light on other cases? As mentioned in Chapter 4, case studies like this one may have relevance to other cases in the defined population. In order for the generalisation to make sense, however, it must be made on attributes relevant to the case. The issue then is to define what types of cases South Sudanese statebuilding are relevant for, with a particular focus on the relationship between international and national actors. A discussion of this can help make this thesis relevant for not just South Sudan, but for other cases as well, and is therefore an exercise worth undertaking.

When focusing on the relationship between local and international actors, there are three dimensions that strike me as relevant to base considerations of generalisation on. Firstly, what is the background for international presence? Invitation or military intervention? South Sudan is a case of statebuilding after invitation from national authorities, and we can consequently assume that it is less relevant to generalise findings to cases like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the international presence was a result of international military intervention, a fact that would presumably affect the relationship between actors significantly.

Secondly, is it a new state or not? This may bear effect on the relationship between local and international actors, as it has consequences for what sort of structures exist in the country, and thereby how much assistance is required. This dimension is one where South Sudan bears resemblance with Kosovo and East Timor, as they were both new states with little institutional foundation on which to base the new state. One can therefore expect to see similar issues arise in these cases and cases like them. In cases where there were established colonial structures, the results may be different.
Thirdly, what is the degree of international intrusiveness in the country? Limited or extensive? This continuum can range from simple statebuilding assistance in fairly “established” countries, to international administration, where external actors have taken over nearly all authority over the government. Examples of the latter are Kosovo and East Timor, whilst South Sudan would somewhere in the middle of this continuum. Following this, you could hypothesise that some of the issues observed in this study may be even stronger in these first cases, as the international influence was even bigger. South Sudan may here have more similarities with countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia, where the international involvement was not as strong.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to thoroughly go into the characteristics of other statebuilding cases. I can therefore only hint at what group of cases these results can be used to shed light on. These dimensions do however suggest that similar challenges and effects may be found in statebuilding cases where statebuilding is a result of invitation from the host country, where the state in question is newly formed and where the international authority assumed is not very high, but international presence is still extensive. In addition, dimensions that have less to do with the relationship between local and international actors may be relevant, such as whether or not there has been a civil war, or the economic potential present in the country.

7.4 A long road ahead

*But to the extent that we depend on others, our liberty is incomplete. We must be more than liberated. We must be independent.*

President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit (2012).

South Sudan is one of the only remaining large statebuilding missions in the world today. What happens here will surely influence whether and how missions are undertaken in the future. This is a strong argument for taking the findings presented in this thesis, as well as future research on statebuilding in the country into account, and working hard to improve and develop how statebuilding is done. The story of statebuilding in South Sudan has a beginning that speaks of strong will, cooperation and challenges. It is up to the South Sudanese people and government, in partnership with the international community, to write the rest.
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## Appendix 1 – List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Samson Wassara</td>
<td>Dean of College for Social and Economic Studies, University of Juba</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>18.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jok Madut Jok</td>
<td>Undersecretary, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>21.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edla Muga</td>
<td>Women’s Rights and Gender Advisor, The Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>22.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isac Kenyi</td>
<td>Former peace activist</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>25.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kuol Madut*</td>
<td>Holds senior position in Department of Political Affairs in the SPLM.</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>25.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Deng Athorbei</td>
<td>Minister of Electricity and Dams, former Minister of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>27.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdan Agar Jok Nhial</td>
<td>Secretary General of the Government in South Sudan</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>28.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Nyiel Chol*</td>
<td>Senior official in the Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>29.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Deng Akec*</td>
<td>Senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation</td>
<td>South Sudanese</td>
<td>31.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Blank*</td>
<td>Embedded adviser in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>15.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Denson*</td>
<td>Project Specialist, UNDP. Seconded to the South Sudanese government.</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>17.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josh Field*</td>
<td>Works for the UNDP.</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>21.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis Keller*</td>
<td>Works in the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office.</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>21.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Ashworth</td>
<td>Sudan/South Sudan Analyst. More than 30 years of experience in South Sudan.</td>
<td>International/UK</td>
<td>22.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nina Pedersen</td>
<td>Civil Society Director, Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>International/Denmark</td>
<td>22.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan Eiffe</td>
<td>Political Adviser for the UNDP. More than 25 years of experience in South Sudan.</td>
<td>International/Ireland</td>
<td>24.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rod Adams*</td>
<td>Senior official, UNMISS</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>26.01.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand Von Habsburg-Lothringen</td>
<td>Consultant for UNICEF. More than 15 years of experience in South Sudan.</td>
<td>International/UK</td>
<td>28.01.2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This is not the interviewee’s real name. A substitute name has been used to comply with the respondent's request for anonymity.*
Appendix 2 – Interview guide

Main questions are in bold. The other questions are optional/varied between interviews.

Introduce thesis and consent form

Could you tell me a little bit about what you do here, what your role is?

How would you describe the South Sudanese’s role in planning statebuilding measures in South Sudan?
Would you say they control the decisions?
How much control would you say international actors have over decisions?
Who takes the initiative in statebuilding activities?

What kinds of conditions are attached to funding from international actors?
Would you say that the South Sudanese officials are able to influence these conditions?
Why do you think are there conditions?
What do you think would happen without these conditions?

What challenges do the South Sudanese authorities have to overcome before they can govern effectively?
Do you think that lack of capacity stands in the way of local control of statebuilding?

Do South Sudanese and international actors have similar goals for statebuilding?
Are there any conflicts of interest or are interests coinciding?
What happens if South Sudanese actors have wanted to do something that international actors did not agree with?

Is there anything you want to add about that we haven’t talked about yet?
Can I get back to you if I have any further questions?
Is there anyone of your colleagues or others that you think I can be able to contact for an interview?