From Porcupine to Tiger

An Analysis of Discourses and Changes in Indian Climate Politics

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOISIS  Alliance of Small Islands States
BASIC  Groups of Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRIC  Refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China
CBDR  Common but differentiated responsibility
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism
CSE  Centre for Science and the Environment
CII  Confederation of Indian Industry
COP  Conference of Parties
EU  European Nation
FICCI  Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GHG  Greenhouse Gases
GoI  Government of India
G8  Group of Canada, France, Italia, Germany, Russia, Japan, the UK and US
G8+5  Group of G8+Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South Africa
G20  Group of the 20 largest economies
G77  Group of developing countries
IYCN  Indian Youth Climate Network
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPCC AR4  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report
ISI  Import-substitution industrialisation
MoEF  Ministry of the Environment and Forest
MW  Megawatt
NAM  Non-Alignment Movement
NAPCC  National Action Plan on Climate Change
NGO  Non-governmental organization
NSD  Norwegian Social Science Data Service
PAT  Preform, Act and Trade
PPP  Purchasing power parity
RG  Radical Green discourse
SAPCC  State Action Plans on Climate Change
TERI  The Energy and Resource Institute
TW  Third World discourse
UN  United Nations
UNCED  UN Conference of Environment and Development
UNFCCC  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
WRI  World Resource Institute
WWF  World Wide Fund for Nature
WW  Win-Win discourse
“To see ourselves as others see us is a rare and valuable gift, without a doubt. But in international relations what is still rarer and far more useful is to see others as they see themselves” (Barzun 1965:426)
1. Introduction

“All countries should take binding commitments in an appropriate legal form,”¹ former Indian Minister of the Environment and Forest Jairam Ramesh said in a speech during the international climate negotiations in Cancun, Mexico in 2010². The statement provoked a heated debate in India. The Centre for Science and the Environment (CSE), a central Indian non-governmental organization (NGO), said Ramesh had dropped a bombshell. ³ A former Indian government official said Ramesh was departing from India’s official position.⁴ How could a seemingly general statement be perceived as a bombshell? In this thesis I seek to answer that, and more precisely, present an analysis of different discourses and changes in Indian climate politics.

Discourse analysis’s popularity is growing in studies of environmental politics. Hajer states that environmental politics “has increasingly become a conflict of interpretation in which a complex set of actors can be seen to participate in a debate in which the terms of environmental discourses are set” (1995:15). Dryzek (2005) discusses different environmental discourses and political anchoring and Pettenger (2007c) discusses various social constructions of climate change. Furthermore, Hajer (1995) demonstrates the usefulness of discourse analysis in his study on transformation of discourses on acid rain in the Netherlands and Britain in the late 1980s and 1990s. Liftin (1994) has studied the changing international discourse about global ozone depletion in the 1980s. These studies have in common something which I stress in this thesis: that discourse analysis does not merely suit the study of language, but is useful in the study of material dimensions of the world as well – such as environmental politics and policies.

Several scholars (Atteridge et.al 2012, Dubash 2012b, Shina 2011 and Sengupta, 2012) identify changes in Indian climate politics in recent years. The Indian government has taken a number of significant steps in developing a domestic climate policy, such as the launch of the

²Hereafter I will refer to the climate negotiations in Cancun, Mexico in 2010 as ‘Cancun’ or ‘Cancun 2010’. Later on I will make use of the same simplification when discussing the climate negotiations in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009 and in Durban, South Africa in 2011.
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008. In the lead-up to Copenhagen 2009 India made shifts in her approach to the international climate negotiations, most notably by taking on voluntary carbon intensity cuts. Several scholars have looked at the drivers of these changes, but only a few studies (Atteridge et al. 2012, Bidwai 2012, Dubash 2012c, Sengupta 2012) investigate ideational aspects of the changes. Dubash (2012a, 2012c) and Bidwai (2012) identify discourses in Indian climate politics. I am seeking to contribute to the existing knowledge on Indian climate discourses by doing a discourse analysis which emphasizes other aspects. In this study I aim to grasp some of the breadth of Indian climate discourses. The focus is not on specific policy oriented discourses, but rather the larger context of how national interest, identity, development and justice are framed within climate discourses.

Since Durban 2011, the main focus in international climate politics has been the design of a future climate agreement, which is supposed to be finalised in 2015. Discussions about effort sharing of emission reductions include a debate on the role of the emerging economies in the future climate regime. What responsibility do emerging economies such as India have? Developed countries increasingly envisage an evolving and dynamic framework for the new agreement, which dismantles the “firewall” between developed and developing country found in the Kyoto Protocol from 1997. As the European Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, said: “We are crossing the bridge from the old climate system to the new system. Now we are on our way to the 2015 global deal” (IISD 2012:28). To explore and understand India’s objectives in international climate politics in this study, I attempt to see “her as she sees herself”.

**Objective and research questions**

The objective of this study is to understand discursive drivers of change in Indian climate politics. This is based on the fact that scholars have identified changes in Indian climate politics the recent years. Atteridge et al. (2012) explain that many analyses of Indian climate politics have focused on material aspects. They therefore argue that ideational drivers should be studied as well. This thesis seeks to contribute to closing this knowledge gap.

In order to reach the objective of the study I have formulated two research questions. The first research question is:

1. **Which discourses about climate politics exist among key actors in the national climate debate and policy-making in India?**
By ‘Indian climate politics’ I mean political strategies and policies at the national level. This includes both domestic policies as well as India’s approach to the international climate negotiations (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC). I see climate politics regarding the national level and international climate politics as interrelated. This research question will be treated in chapter five. The second research question is:

2. In which ways have discursive changes contributed to changes in Indian climate politics in recent years?

This question is based on discourse theory which assumes that policies flow out of the dominant discourses, and that discursive change is thus a premise for policy change (Hajer 1995, Cass and Pettenger 2007). With ‘recent years’ I mean the time period from 2007, when India started to develop national climate policies. Research question two will be discussed in chapter six.

**Key terms and India**

Before turning to the substantive chapters, some clarifications of key terms and Indian politics and society is useful. I understand the term politics broadly, and as processes beyond party politics. Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) argue that in discourse analysis politics must be understood as how we continuously construct the social world in certain ways and thus exclude other ways. Policy, I understand as specific decisions and strategies decided by governmental bodies. The environment can be understood as a collective term for environmental concerns that have gained attention since the 1960s. Broadly, environmental politics is about “how humanity organizes itself to relate to the nature that sustains it” (Dryzek and Schlosberg 2005:1). Environmental politics include other areas of political concern as well, including poverty, social injustice, education, the economy, international relations and human rights, as these areas influence our environment (and vice versa) (Dryzek and Schlosberg 2005).

*Climate change* has come to play an important role within environmental politics. This is partly due to the global nature of climate change and “the pervasiveness of the interest of the carbon economy within the global economic system” (Adger et.al 2001:697). *Climate* is the average weather, and climate change is a significant and lasting change in the statistical distribution of these patterns over a period of time. These changes can occur in temperature, precipitation and wind, from what is normal in a geographical area. The climate has always been changing, but current changes happen in such a rapid manner that they seriously affect
life on Earth. Changes in atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs), land cover and solar radiation alter the energy balance of the climate system. Due to human activities, the global GHG emissions have grown since pre-industrial times, with an increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004 (IPCC 2007). IPCC (2007) states with very high confidence that the net effect of human activities since 1970 has been warming, and that human activities have influenced other aspects of the climate as well. Adaptation and mitigation are two important terms in the context of climate change. Adaptation refers to initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change effects. Mitigation means implementing policies to reduce GHG emissions and enhance carbon sinks (IPCC 2007).

India is a federal parliamentary union with 28 states and 7 union territories. I refer to India as ‘she’ since this is normal practice among many Indian writers. The capital of India is New Delhi. Because New Delhi today has been engulfed in the wider city of Delhi (Malone 2011), I use the name Delhi to denote India’s capital. The Indian Parliament consists of two chambers; the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and the Council of States (Raiya Sabha). The two largest political parties, the Indian National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party, compete for the governing position. Since 1989 they have alternated to make coalitions with smaller parties in order to form majority governments (Fisher 2012). The present Prime Minister and Head of Government is Dr. Manmohan Singh from the Congress party, who has been in office since 2004 and was re-elected in 2009.

India is the world’s largest democracy and the world’s fourth largest contributor to GHG emissions after China, the USA and the EU. The country has the world’s fifth largest coal reserves and 63% of the domestic commercial energy requirements are met by coal, while 30% is covered by oil and gas. India depends on energy imports - 70% of the petroleum is imported. An increasing share of the coal consumed is also imported, because much of the country’s own coal is located in remote areas (GoI 2012). According to Atteridge et al. (2012), India’s status as a net importer presents a potential threat to the goal of achieving high rates of growth. 30% of India’s total energy consumption is renewable; the majority of this is traditional and non-commercial energy such as dung and firewood (Rai and Victor 2009). India’s energy efficiency has improved over the years, as reflected by continuous decline in

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emissions intensity; between 1990 and 2005 the emissions intensity declined by 17\% (Fujiwara 2010).

To overcome the huge poverty challenges, economic development is the main priority among Indian politicians. Two thirds of the Indian population live on less than 2 USD (PPP) per day,\(^6\) and 56\% do not have access to electricity (Dubash 2011). India is also one of the countries projected to be most vulnerable to climate change impacts, especially considering the country’s high dependence on the agricultural sector (Fisher 2012). Since the opening of the Indian economy in 1991, the country has emerged as a powerful economic and political actor on the global scale. India has experienced stable economic growth during the past decade with especially high growth in services such as telecom, information technology and finance (GoI 2012). India is expecting a continued high growth, and is planning for annual 8\% growth in GDP the next four years (GoI 2012a).

**Structure of the thesis**

The thesis is organized in seven chapters, presenting the theoretical and methodological design, as well as the empirical findings and analytical conclusions.

In *chapter two*, I explain my methodological perspective, the methods I have used in data production and the analytical strategy. I also critically reflect upon my own role in the research process.

In *chapter three*, I discuss different theoretical approaches to climate politics, and I outline my own theoretical perspective. I explain how constructivism in general, and discourse analysis in particular, can be used to study changes in politics.

In *chapter four*, I present the backdrop for my analysis: Indian foreign policy and history of climate politics. I outline changes in Indian foreign policy, and economic and political strategy from 1991, and describe how climate change was first constructed as a political topic in India in the 1990s.

In *chapter five*, I present an analysis of three climate discourses among key actors in the climate debate in India: The Third World discourse (TW), The Win-Win discourse (WW) and the Radical Green discourse (RG). I emphasize how the discourses contain different meanings of national interest, identity and climate change.

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In chapter six, I present actors who articulate elements that challenge the long-standing dominance of the TW in India. I discuss the emergence of national climate policy and discursive struggles over India’s approach to the international climate negotiations. In addition, I highlight perspectives and actors that are excluded from the climate debate and policy-making in India.

In chapter seven, I sum up the analytical findings. I conclude that there are different perspectives on climate politics among key actors in the climate debate and policy-making in India and that the emergence of the WW can explain some of the recent changes in Indian climate politics. Finally, five appendixes are attached: the list of informants, the interview guide, the consent form, a timeline for events in Indian climate politics and a description of other Indian climate discourses.
2. Methodology and methods

In this chapter I will present the methodological perspective known as social constructivism, which has inspired this study, as well as my stands in some classical social science debates. I will also explain and critically reflect upon the research process, including the production of data (mainly interviews) and the analysis process. The specific techniques for production of data are what I call methods. I will emphasise that a researcher is not a neutral observer, and therefore influences the research process.

Methodological perspective: social constructivism

Social constructivism (from now on constructivism) is a generic term for a range of new theories about culture and society. The approach is associated with post-structuralism and emphasizes the importance of language in our understanding of the world. Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) refer to Burr’s four characteristics when explaining constructivism. First, constructivism holds a critical position towards knowledge. Our knowledge about the world cannot be seen as an objective truth. Second, our ways of seeing the world are embedded in history and culture. Our world view could have been different, and can change over time. Third, our ways of understanding the world is created and sustained through social processes. Fourth, there is a connection between knowledge and social practices. In certain world views some forms of actions are natural and others unthinkable, thus different perspectives on the world produce different social practices.

Some critics of constructivism argue that when knowledge and social identities are socially constructed, it means that there are no constraints and patterns in the social world. Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) see this as a simplified picture and argue that most constructivists see the social world as regulated. For example, language has regularities which can be analysed. And even though knowledge and identities in principal are contingent, they are always relatively closed in concrete situations.

Constructivists argue that the social reality is not objective, nor external to the researcher. Constructivism recognizes the important role of the observer and society in constructing the patterns that we study in social science (Moses and Knutsen 2007). In constructivism it is not believed that research will lead to a presentation of an objective truth: “Rather than
uncovering true account, constructivists seek to capture and understand the meaning of the agent performing it (...). If something appear real to the social agent, then it may affect his behaviour and have a real consequence for the society around him” (Moses and Knutsen 2007:11-12). Consequently, I do not aim to present the truth about discourses and changes in Indian climate politics. I rather present a set of different perspectives among key actors in the climate debate, as well as an analysis of how these perspectives interact with the politics of climate change in India. I will emphasize what appear real to the informant and not control whether this is “true”. For example, when informants argue that international pressure has been an important driver of change in Indian climate politics, I assume that it has had an impact and I am not interested in assessing the degree of international pressure in itself.

Jørgensen and Philips (1999) argue that research is a discursive construction which is a part of the discursive struggle within a research field. This applies for my study as well. Based on the constructivist understanding of knowledge it is challenging to argue that the researcher’s representation of the world is more valid than other kinds of representations. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999), the problem of the researcher being part of the society he or she studies is at a philosophical level not fully possible to solve: “The researcher always has a position in relation to the phenomena, and this position will always be part of deciding what he or she can see, and what he or she puts forward as results. And there will always be other positions, where the reality would look different” (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999:32-33, my own translation). However, this does not mean that all research and all representations are equally valid. It is stringent use of theory and methods that legitimize production of scientific knowledge (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Critical reflexivity, which I will discuss later, is another reply to the challenge of the trustworthiness of a researcher’s representation.

Pettenger (2007a) argues that constructivism is a useful approach to studies on climate politics. She argues that climate change must be understood from the context of social settings, because “the perceived material reality of climate change is defined in social settings by scientists and policymakers” (Pettenger 2007a:4). Pettenger also claims that constructivism holds promise to understand changes, something which is important in my thesis. Emphasizing the construction of social structures (as discourses and norms) by agents, as well as identifying ways in which these structures, in turn, influence and reconstruct actors leave space to explore processes of political change.
Discourse and materiality, and discourses as structures

Discourse analysis rests upon the fundament of constructivism and provides both methods and theory that are central to this thesis. I will go deeper into discourse theory in chapter three, but I will now discuss methodological aspects of the approach. Discourse analysis is concerned with studying meaning. It does this where meaning arises – in the language. A discourse can be defined as certain ways to talk about and understand the world (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Some of the fundamental discussions within social science concern the relationships between the ideational and material and between agency and structures. These are also debates within approaches to discourse analysis.

The main differences between two of the classic discourse analytical approaches, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory and Fairclough’s (2010) critical discourse analysis, is the understanding of the scope of discourses: Whether discourses fully constitute the social world or if discourses are also being constructed by aspects of the social world (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999); in other words, whether one should distinguish between the discursive and non-discursive world in discourse analysis. Laclau and Mouffe do not distinguish between discursive and non-discursive practices. Torfing explains that Laclau and Mouffe’s conclude:

[T]he more we analyze the so-called non-discursive complexes – political interventions, technologies, productive organizations, etc. – the clearer it becomes that these are relational systems of differential identities, which are not shaped by some objective necessity (God, Nature or Reason) and which can only therefore be conceived as discursive articulations (1999:90).

Laclau and Mouffe thus argue that all practices are discursive, and that materials (for example economy, infrastructure and institutions) are also discursive. Fairclough on the other hand distinguishes between discursive and social practices in his three dimensional model. Every use of language is a communicative action that has three dimensions; text, discursive practice and social practice. All three elements should be analysed; text and discursive practices can be studied by discourse analysis, but social practices should be studied by use of other social theories (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999, Neumann 2001). According to Fairclough social practices need to be understood by other approaches than discourse analysis, due to them being driven by other logics. Such logics can be economic logics or institutionalisation of certain forms of social action (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Jørgensen and Phillips elaborate this view: “Discursive practices reproduce or change the other social practices, the same way as other social practices the other way around shapes the discursive practices. Together, the discursive and the other social practices constitute our surrounding world” (1999:28, my own translation).
For Laclau and Mouffe there is no such dialectic relationship between discourses and social practices, because everything is discursive, and discourses fully constitute our world. Torfing emphasizes that the way Laclau and Mouffe see the material world as discursive is not the same thing as questioning the very existence of objects: “For example, a stone can be discursively constructed as a projectile or as an object of aesthetic contemplation, but it is still the same physical object” (1999:94). My methodological perspective is inspired by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory; I assume that the material and the ideational are complexly interwoven and interdependent.

Another classical debate within social science is the relationship between agency and structures. Laclau and Mouffe see discourses as similar to structures in the way that they exclude other possibilities. When discourses are established as totalities they exclude other meanings and relationships. The excluded possibilities are called the discursive field. At the same time, the concept of discourse is somewhat different to structure in the way that discourses do not “possess the same determining power as the concept of structure since it has fully dispensed with the idea of an organizing centre that arrests and grounds the play of meaning” (Torfing 1999:81-82). In other words, discourses inform rather than guide social interaction. And there is never a total fixation of meaning; discourses are always being constructed in relation to the discursive field.

The notion of instability in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory has been criticized for overestimating the possibility for change in discourse and underestimate the structural limitations that actors operates within. For example, Chouliaraki and Fairclough have criticized Laclau and Mouffe for neglecting that not all individuals and groups have the same possibilities to articulate elements in a new way and thus create change (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Pettenger (2007a) explains that constructivists with varying degrees and points of emphasis focus on agency and structures. Nevertheless, when allowing for ideational factors actors gain agency. Agency is here understood as “the ability to make choices as social beings interacting with structures” (Pettenger 2007a:6). I understand structures as socially constructed, as discourses much like Laclau and Mouffe, which enables and restricts human action.

**Qualitative research and the production of data**

Qualitative research is in its broad sense concerned with elucidating human environments and human experiences through a variety of conceptual frameworks (Winchester and Rofe 2010).
Qualitative methods seek to go into depth, and emphasize meaning, while quantitative methods highlight broader patterns and numbers (Thagaard 2009). Thagaard (2009) further explains that qualitative methods are characterized by close contact between the researcher and the people being studied, for example in participating observation and interviews. Since constructivism acknowledged that researchers influence the research, it makes sense to say that the researcher produces data rather than collects data (Aase 1997). I want to understand different perspectives on Indian climate politics, and therefore qualitative research was a natural choice. Furthermore, interviews were a natural choice of method in order to gain insight into the perspectives of the key actors. I undertook interviews during a fieldwork visit to Delhi, India, from late-August to mid-October 2012.

My study is a qualitative inductive single case-study, using discourse analysis. A case study is an intensive study of an individual, group or place over a period of time and is often done in situ (Hay 2010). Cases are examples of more general process or structures which can be theorized (Bradshaw and Stratford 2010). My case is an example of changing climate discourses in the context of international climate politics in an emerging economy.

Choosing the topic

The decision to study Indian climate politics is first and foremost based on a theoretical interest in how constructions of meaning influence politics, a passion for climate politics and some familiarity with Indian climate politics. Prior to my fieldwork I had been to India several times, including living in rural India and in Delhi. During my time as an intern at the Norwegian Embassy in New Delhi, spring 2011 for five months, I followed the debate on Indian climate politics closely by reading newspapers and attending seminars. Between 2010 and 2012 I also followed the international climate negotiations and I attended four international climate negotiations meetings (Cancun 2010, Durban 2011 and two intercessional meetings in 2010 and 2012) as a civil society participant. Based on these two experiences I became interested in the different perspectives that were being articulated in Indian climate politics. Furthermore, because India is an emerging power, a major emitter in terms of total GHG emissions and a key player in international climate politics, it is important to understand perspectives that guide climate politics in India.

Neumann (2001) argues that cultural knowledge is necessary in order to perform discourse analysis. Based on my stays in India I had general knowledge about Indian society and
politics prior to my fieldwork. From my work on international climate politics I also had cultural knowledge about that context.

Sources of data – interviews, participation and text
During the fieldwork in Delhi I conducted 20 interviews, two informal conversations and two observations. The informants are all actors in the debate on climate politics in India (a detailed list of informants are found in appendix I). I interviewed five current or former government officials, from the Ministry of the Environment and Forest, the Ministry of External Affairs and India’s Planning Commission. Furthermore I interviewed three researchers who have been working extensively on climate change and three journalists who have been covering climate change politics for Indian newspapers. I also interviewed eight civil society actors from various NGOs or independent activists who work on climate change. Lastly, I interviewed one person from the solar energy business sector. Initially, I did not emphasize the business sector, because it traditionally has not been very engaged in climate politics in India (Das 2012) and it has not appeared to be very vocal in the public debate as far as I had observed. However, during the fieldwork I learned that business, mostly through the Confederation of Indian industries (CII) and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) is playing an increasingly importantly role in Indian climate politics. Unfortunately, the limited amount of time prevented me from getting interview with representatives from CII or FICCI. In order to balance this data bias I have sought insight in business perspectives by reading academic work on the role of business as well as statements made by CII and FICCI.

Some of my informants belong to more than one of the category (government officials, researchers, journalists, civil society actors and business actors). Bidwai (interview 28.9.12) for example, is an activist, researcher and political analyst and commentator. I see all my informants as actors in, as well as experts on Indian climate politics, but to different degrees. Some of the informants are mostly analysing Indian climate politics (journalists and researchers), while others are more actively involved in the debate and policy-making (officials and civil society actors).

All of my informants, except one, live in Delhi. How can I legitimate talking to only some few actors in Delhi when my topic is Indian climate politics and India is a diverse and large federal state? Sabtier (in Hajer 1995) argues that policy changes are best analysed as a
struggle between competing advocacy-coalitions at the level of policy-making. Hajer furthermore argues that recent work in political science and sociology suggests that the play of political forces within a given policy domain (defined as those organisations that deal with a specific substantive issue) is the most important determinant of the way in which substantial policy issues are dealt with. Structuring ideas are generated and put to work in the close interaction that takes place between various actors within that domain (1995:69).

Bidwai (2012) explains that the debate about national policy-making on climate politics in India mostly takes place within a small circle of actors in Delhi. As already discussed, I have not intended to access and present a representative selection of perspectives on climate politics among Indians. I believe that my informants helped me gain insight in some of the perspectives among the key actors on national climate politics in India.

In addition to the 20 interviews, two informal conversations are part of my data production. I talked with one foreign diplomat in Delhi and one civil society actor. The conversations were similar to the interviews, but because the informant preferred an informal conversation, I did not use the tape recorder and the conversations were even more unstructured than the interviews.

The observations were based on two seminars that I attended during the fieldwork. One seminar was a civil society forum arranged by the international NGO Focus on the Global South on the 8th of October 2012. The other was an international conference about energy access on the 9th and 10th of October 2012 arranged by the Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy and the CII. These observations were interesting because they represent two very different forums for climate change debate in India. Focus on the Global South’s seminar gathered grass root activists to discuss how to build a climate movement in order to impact national Indian climate politics and the international climate negotiations. The international energy access conferences gathered ministers and government officials from all over the world, as well as representatives from the energy businesses to discuss how to make renewable energy more profitable and accessible.

In addition to the relatively formalised production of data which I have described above, the analysis in this thesis is also based on other experiences, observations and conversations (before, during and after the fieldwork). Some of my understanding is based on conversations with Indian friends. For example, during the fieldwork I spent time with friends who are involved in climate politics, by working for environmental NGOs. It was fruitful to be able to
ask them about things I had not understood from the interviews and share some of my preliminary analysis with them.

The interviews, conversations and observations are my main source of data. However, I have also analysed documents, like the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), Greenpeace India’s report *Hiding Behind the Poor*, Centre for Science and the Environment’s report *Global warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism* and transcriptions of Parliamentarian debates on climate change. An advice which I followed was Neumann’s (2001) suggestion of starting with analysing texts which are often referred to. Neumann also explains that because politics are struggles between often named groups and persons it is easy to access conflicts and texts that are being debated. This can help to identify meetings between different perspectives. I accessed conflicts between different actors by reading news articles commenting on important episodes in Indian climate politics, such as India’s appearance at Cancun 2011.

*Identifying informants and conducting interviews*

I identified informants by doing purposive selection. I wanted to talk to central actors with different perspectives on Indian climate politics. According to Hesselberg (2012), in qualitative studies it is important to make a well-reasoned selection of informants with different characteristics: “This will ensure that the range of views, narratives or other data probably includes interesting variations” (Hesselberg 2012:25). My informants have different characteristics by belonging to different groups of actors (government officials, researchers, journalists, civil society actors and business actors) in the Indian climate debate. Although there are age differences, the informants are biased towards middle aged men. There are only four women among my 22 informants. This is due to the fact that many of the central actors in the climate debate, and Indian politics in general, are men. I identified central actors and institutions by reading news articles and academic work, as well as based on my prior experience with the field. I also asked Indian friends familiar with Indian climate politics to suggest whom I should contact. During interviews I also used the snowball method; I asked the informants to suggest other people I should contact.

I contacted all the informants by e-mail and some also by phone. I was conscious of how I presented myself. In every e-mail I explained my project and why it was interesting for me to talk to the person. It was fairly easy to access informants. Most of the researchers, journalists
and civil society actors who I contacted replied positively. Government officials were more difficult to access, so I contacted more of them.

Except from one phone interview, I did all the interviews and conversations face-to-face. Most interviews were conducted in the informants’ offices, while a couple were done in cafés, one in a bar and one in an informant’s home. To interview people in their offices is often preferable, since the informant feels safe and comfortable there (Hesselberg 2012). The interviews conducted in cafés also worked well. The atmosphere was informal. The interview with the most informal atmosphere was the one conducted in a bar, indicating that location actually matters for data production.

I started every interview with thanking the informants for taking their time and afterwards I presented myself and my motivation for doing this study. I explained that I believe more understanding among different countries is needed in order to ensure better cooperation on climate change solutions, something which I believe this was important in order to gain trust from the informant. I went through a consent form (appendix III), asked if the informant preferred to be anonymous and whether she/he was OK with the interview being taped.

I based my interviews on an interview guide (appendix II). The interview guide consisted of four topics and sub-questions for each topic. I decided on these topics based on my research questions and my previous knowledge about Indian climate politics. Based on readings, I assumed that equity, and environment/development linkages were important factors in Indian climate discourses. The first version of the interview guide was made before going to field, and then adjusted during the fieldwork. The sub-questions were adjusted to fit the specific informant prior to each interview. I prepared for each interview by looking at the informant’s contributions to Indian climate politics, in case he/she had made statements that would be interesting to investigate during the interview. I undertook open-ended, semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are content focused and interview guides are used in a flexible manner (Hesselberg 2012).

I started the interview with the question: “What is the debate on climate politics in India centred around?” The informants often touched upon some other topics as well, which I followed up with sub-questions. Towards the end of the interview I checked if we had talked through all the five topics. I combined the semi-structured interviews style with more specific questions about topics that the informant had special insight in. Based on Aberbach and
Rockman (2002) I think it is suitable to ask open-ended questions when doing elite interviews and moreover when you want to access the informant’s own perspectives. They argue:

Open-ended questions provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks. This increases the validity of the responses and is best for the kind of exploratory and in-depth work we were doing, but makes coding and then analysis more difficult (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:674).

Furthermore, “[e]lites especially – but other highly educated people as well – do not like being put in the straightjacket of close ended questions” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:674).

For example, when the informants responded to my question “What is the debate on climate politics in India centred around?” it was interesting for me which topics and connections they first articulated.

I ended all the interviews by asking the informant if he/she had something to add and if they thought it was something important that I should have asked. Every day I wrote field notes with reflections from the interviews or things I had read or experienced that day.

**Critical reflexivity**

In human geography and other social science disciplines the social nature and constitution of our research is increasingly being acknowledged through the concept of critical reflexivity. According to Dowling “being reflexive means analyzing your own situation as if it were something you study” (2010:31). Lemning (in Nilssen 2012) emphasizes three categories of reflexivity: First, how the researcher’s presence impacts the situation and thus the informant’s behaviour. Second, the relationship between the researcher and the informant, and thus what kind of information the informant gets. Third, how the researcher’s understandings impact which questions he/she asks, how he/she asks them and who he/she asks them to.

My being a Westerner and a young woman had an impact on the interview situation and the information I received from my informants. Hesselberg (2012) stresses that the way the researcher dresses has influence on how the informant sees the researcher. For the interviews I made sure to dress according to Indian norms about how women should dress, by wearing long pants and covering my shoulders. I also wore the Indian scarf ‘dupatta’, which indicated that I am familiar with Indian costumes and embrace them. The informants’ understanding of me and my background also has an impact. The informants related to me not only as a researcher, but as an individual with certain background and opinions. Some informants might have seen me as a critical outsider who believes India is not doing enough to solve climate change. I was worried that if they saw me in that way they would not share their opinions
about Indian climate politics, but rather wanted to paint a perfect picture. Moreover, I was worried that this could make the interviews uncomfortable.

During the coding of my interviews I discovered that some informants were eager to correct the impression of India and Indian climate politics according to some myths they believe exist in the West. Government officials did this to the greatest extent, but other informants also shared the impression that Indian climate politics are misunderstood in the West. I acknowledge that the informants’ impression of me influenced the production of data, but I also tried to “control” their understanding of me by explaining my motivation for doing this study at the beginning of every interview. I said that I was doing this study in order to understand different perspectives about climate politics in India, something which I believe there is little understanding of in the West.

Some informants, mainly the civil society informants, probably saw me more as “one of them”. Sometimes I mentioned that I had attended international climate negotiations as a civil society representative. Moreover I spoke “their” language; I used acronyms from the negotiations and I understood references which they made to specific negotiators and episodes. I believe this created trust and understanding between the informants and me. On the other hand, there is a risk that the informants may not tell me things that were obvious to them, but that could still have been of interest to me.

The relationship between the informants and me also impacted the information. Most of my informants were educated middle-class men in relatively powerful positions. The Indian society is very hierarchical and patriarchal, so when I am a young female student it is obviously a biased power balance. My source of power was the knowledge and experience I already had with Indian climate politics. I therefore felt more comfortable when I went from asking open question to more specific questions, and thus could demonstrate that I had done some “homework” in gaining knowledge about Indian climate politics. I had met a couple of the civil society informants at international climate negotiations before, something which made me comfortable to ask freely. In many of the interviews with civil society actors, journalists and researchers I felt free to ask about anything. Since the government officials are more directly involved with policy making, I felt it was a risk that they understood my question as criticism.

My prior knowledge about Indian climate politics, background and opinions about climate politics also had an impact on the whole research process, including what questions I asked.
and who I asked them to. I have prior experience from an environmental NGO and have worked in international climate politics from a climate justice angle. My interest in climate politics started with a realization that climate change is fundamentally unjust; the ones who have done the least to cause climate change are the ones to be the most affected. Because of my background and that I identify myself with the climate justice movement. I might have been more interested in interviewing different kinds of civil society actors than other scholars who have studied Indian climate politics. It might also be that this thesis is biased towards representing the civil society informants’ perspective on Indian climate politics, because I tend to agree with many of their positions and views.

**Analysing qualitative data and studying meaning**

In qualitative research there is a fluid divide between collecting data and analysis. Thagaard states that: “Analysis and interpretation start already when contacting the informants” (2009:110, my own translation). Nevertheless, the analysis process in qualitative research often refers to the time when the researcher goes from interaction with informants and starts analysing and interpreting the text that have resulted from the fieldwork. One way of analysing qualitative data is to analyse verbal and visual forms of expressions (Thagaard 2009). Discourse analysis falls into this category.

The analysis process can be understood as a dialogue between ideas (theory) and evidence (data), where the ideas help the researcher to make sense of the evidence and the evidence is used to extend, revise and test ideas (Ragain and Amoore 2011). My analysis process was done in a dialogue between theory and data, but in an inductive manner. I obviously had some knowledge about Indian climate politics and ideas before starting fieldwork, but I had not made an analytical framework on beforehand, and the ideas were more based on my previous personal experience with Indian climate politics than on theoretical perspectives. I have hence been inspired by the approach ‘grounded theory’, which emphasize that social researcher’s concepts about the world should be developed from and have their roots in the concept voiced by the people whose lives and activities are being studied (Cloke et al. 2004). My theory chapter was written after the fieldwork and after I had coded all my transcripts and had a picture of what my findings were. I wanted the data to guide the choice of theory rather than the other way around. For the rest of the process I was continuously going back and forth between theory and data. The theory helped me make sense of the data, but the data also made me examine and reflect on theories.
Coding the data

Coding is something which we all do daily without necessarily thinking about it, as Cope states: “Being in the world requires us to categorise, sort, prioritise, and interpret social data in all of our interactions. Coding qualitative data is merely a formalisation of this process in order to provide some structure as a way of conveying our interpretations to others” (2010:293). Coding is a tool to partly reduce, partly structure and partly analyse data material (Cope 2010). After I had transcribed all my interviews, I created descriptive codes based on the topics in my interview guide and analytical codes labelling different meanings. For example, I coded text about climate equity with a yellow colour (descriptive code) and different ways to talk about climate equity with labels such as ‘per capita’, ‘North/South’ and ‘intra-state’ (analytical codes).

Nilssen (2012) argues that the analysis should start by doing open coding. Open coding is inspired by grounded theory and implies approaching the data material with an open mind. In other words being open to what the data material is “telling you” (Nilssen 2012). During the coding process I did my best to keep an open mind, and hence I discovered things in my data material that I had not paid attention to before. For example, I realised that some informants attempted to correct an image of Indian climate politics which they thought exist in the West. By coding such statements I became aware of assumptions about me and my background. This demonstrates, as Cope (2010) argues, that coding opens the opportunity for self-reflexivity as well.

Coding helped me structure the data and to do a thorough inductive analysis. When applying the analytical codes I paid attention to the elements which were given different meanings. I found that there were different ways of defining for example India’s identity, India’s interest, the relationship between climate politics and economic growth, climate change and of course, the very meaning of what India should do on climate change. Putting the different meanings of these elements together made me go from codes to identifying discourses. I put the elements together by investigating what linkages and lines of reasoning the informants made. First I discovered that there were two sets of discourses about Indian climate politics. After spending some more time analysing the data material I discovered that some informants expressed views which were substantially different from the two discourses I had identified initially. They made articulations which were in opposition to the two other discourses and introduced elements which the two other discourses were silent about. I started to code these articulations as ‘critique’ and discovered that these could also be categorised as a discourse.
After identifying the three sets of discourses about Indian climate politics in my data material, I went to literature on environmental discourses to investigate dominating discourses on climate politics internationally. Discourses in Indian climate politics do not exist in isolation from ideas and linkages made in climate politics elsewhere, and the larger political context in India.

**Ethical considerations**

Qualitative research contains personal connections, interpretations and experiences. Research takes place in a society with social norms and structures, and the presentation of the research can affect the society that has been studied (Dowling 2010). It is therefore important to consider formal as well as informal demands for ethics in the research process. Ethics in research is about how the researcher interacts with the informants and the field that he/she is studying. Ethics can be defined as the responsibility for and obligations to the people involved in the research process, especially the informants (Dowling 2010). The formal set of demand for research this study considers is outlined by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD). This project was approved by NSD and has been carried out in accordance to their principles.

**Anonymity and informed consent**

When doing research it is crucial to respect the privacy of the informants. Participation in the project must be voluntary. The researcher should ensure informed consent from the informants, and make sure that the presentation of the research will not harm the informants or the society that has been studied (Dowling 2010). As mentioned all my informants were informed about my research project when I asked them to participate, and were asked to sign the consent form (see appendix III). It is impossible to ensure informed consent when doing observations. The observations I am building upon in my analysis are from public meetings. Views expressed at meetings that I attended during my internship at the Norwegian Embassy in New Delhi are not presented as the information might have been of confidential character.

The informants were always given the choice of being anonymous. Most of the informants expressed no wish to be anonymous. A few, mostly government officials, preferred to be anonymous. Indian researchers informed me that government officials normally prefer to be anonymous because it gives them a chance to speak more freely. Even though most

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7 For more information about the ethical requirements see NSD’s webpage: [http://www.nsd.uib.no/](http://www.nsd.uib.no/)
Accessed 19.04.2013
informants did not wish to be anonymous, I still had to consider whether they should be anonymous or not in my thesis. According to Dowling (2010) it is the responsibility of the researcher to judge whether naming the informants can harm them in any social or physical manner. Most often it is the social manner which is most relevant to assess in social science research, at least for my project. I had to assess whether presenting of the informant’s expressions could harm their position or integrity.

I have chosen to mention the names and positions of the informants who did not express a wish to be anonymous (except for one exception discussed below). Because the informants are educated, accustomed to journalists and researchers, and no personal information were shared, I believe the lack of confidentiality cannot harm them. However, I have chosen to protect the sources in a few cases. A couple of times informants expressed critique of other actors in the climate debate, which would seem harsher in print than in an informal conversation.

The one informant I decided to make anonymous is a youth climate activist who volunteers with the Indian Youth Climate Movement. The interview with him was of an informal character where I did not use a tape recorder, and therefore the transcript rests more on my own interpretation of what he said than the other interviews. Furthermore, he is younger and in a less powerful position than my other informants. To make an individual anonymous goes beyond not mentioning an informant’s name. If I had specified the positions of the government official informants and the specific role they have had in Indian climate politics, anyone who knows the field could easily have identified them. Some of the data which I share could have appeared more reliable to the reader if he/she had known more about the informant’s position. However, this could in no way surpass the ethical consideration of protecting the informant’s privacy.

Summary
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, with a constructivist approach to knowledge it is challenging to argue that a researcher’s representation is more valid than other kinds of representations (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). According to Bradshaw and Stratford (2010) rigour in qualitative studies means establishing trustworthiness of the work. The trustworthiness of academic work depends upon academic standards regarding the use of for example theory, methods, ethical guideline and reflexivity. The representation in this thesis is based on experience with the field of climate politics in general, and Indian climate politics in
particular over several years. Moreover, the representation is based on in depth interviews with central actors in Indian climate debate and policy-making at the national level. The interviews have been conducted in a proper manner taking into considerations formal and informal ethical demands. The findings presented in this thesis arise from an inductive analysis process and not by applying theory as a “straight jacket” on the data. At the same time the findings have been contextualised by using theory and drawing upon other scholars’ work on environmental discourses and social constructions of climate change. I believe my research process, and the explanation and reflection upon it bring trustworthiness to the representations which this thesis contains.
3. Theory

In this chapter I will discuss theoretical approaches used in studies of climate politics and outline the theoretical framework of this study. First, I will discuss materialist and constructivist approaches to climate politics. I will explain how a social constructivist approach differs from materialist approaches within international relations (IR). I will argue that constructivism, by emphasising ideational rather than material elements can highlight aspects of climate politics which are often overlooked. Second, I will discuss discourse analysis and how to identify and analyse environmental discourses. I will emphasise the role of social construction of interest, identity and climate change. Third, I will discuss the role of actors in discourse analyses, and how one can study political and social outcomes of discourses.

Approaches to climate politics in IR

International politics is when states negotiate, cooperate or enters into conflicts, as well as when organizations or groups in one country try to influence what happens in another country (Hovi and Malnes 2011). Studies of international politics are about studying interaction between states and consequences of these interactions, such as international regime creations and changes in the economic division of labour between states (Fermann 2011). Whereas international politics is focused on state-state relations, international relations (IR) is the study of all transnational relations (Freeman 2011). Foreign policy analysis is a sub-area of IR and can be described as:

the study of the management of external relations and activities of nation-states, as distinguished from their domestic policies. Foreign policy involves goals, strategies, measures, methods, guidelines, directives, understandings, agreements and so on, by which national governments conduct international relations with each other and with international organizations and non-governmental actors. It is their attempts and efforts to influence the goals and activities of such actors, whom they cannot completely control because they exist and operate beyond their sovereignty (Jackson and Sørensen 2007:223).

Freeman (2011) argues that as soon as the foreign policy is acted out and there is an interaction between states the study area is moved from foreign policy to international politics. Furthermore, it is important to mention that the term ‘policy’ in foreign policy implies that the focus is on the concrete policies and political decisions rather than on the more general politics. However, this does not mean that the politics of foreign policy is irrelevant to analyse (Freeman 2011). There is no clear cut between domestic politics, foreign policy and
international politics or international relations. Some IR-scholars, such as Putnam, emphasize that national governments participating in international relations are embedded in their domestic societies. Putnam brought attention to the interaction between domestic and international scale as he argues: “Much of the existing literature on relations between domestic and international affairs consists either of ad hoc lists of countless ‘domestic influences’ on foreign policy or of generic observations that national and international affairs are somehow ‘linked’” (1988:430). Putnam’s theory of the two-level game holds that the main purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies compatible with the international economic. Based on Putnam I assume that the domestic and international are closely linked, and as Bulkeley states: “In order to examine the politics of climate change, the perspective offered by international relations scholars need to be tempered with a recognition of political and subpolitical processes occurring at a variety of scales that constitute, constrain, and enable political action” (2000:744).

**Materialism**

Studies of climate change politics within IR as well as studies of national policy making often have a materialist focus. Materialism holds that material elements are the most important. Materialist theory in the context of IR “focuses on how the distribution of material power, such as military forces and economic capabilities, defines balances of power between states and explains the behaviour of states” (Jackson and Sørensen 2007). Rowlands (2001) explains that the materialist approaches of realism and neorealism have been influential approaches in IR after the Second World War. Regarding climate change, “an international relations neorealist would look to the distribution of power among the world’s states in order to assess the prospects of cooperation” (Rowlands 2001:44). Power in this context could be the possession of military strength, in economic terms or more importantly as argued by Rowlands (2001); the ability of actors to use their power to change global climate change. Consequently it assumed that ‘major powers’ will determine the international response to climate change.

A common approach in current IR studies on international climate politics is regime theory. International regimes can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given arena of international relations” (Krasner 1983:2). Regime theory is often compared to neorealism. However, neorealism is an approach to explaining many types of phenomena, such as war, alliances and trade politics. Regime theory, on the other hand, is a set of approaches and
explanations of one phenomenon: the role of international institutions for interaction among states. The focus on institutions in IR places regime theory within the liberal tradition and regime theory is sometimes labelled neoliberal institutionalism (Stokke 2011, Rowlands 2001). Different approaches within regime theory explain why and under which conditions states create institutions. Stokke (2011) divides different regime theory approaches into three categories: interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based approaches. Interest-based approaches are tied to the rational direction in IR and draws upon game theory. They look at how international regimes can make it easier for states to realize common interests. Power-based approaches are similar to interest-based approaches, but add emphasize on the distribution of power among states and are therefore building upon neorealism. Knowledge-based approaches put discourses, ideas and learning first, and hence move in a constructivist direction. The various approaches in regime theory emphasize material and ideation aspects to different degrees, but they share the focus on the international arena and the interaction among states.

**Social constructivism**

Rather than emphasising material factors I will look into the importance of ideational factors in climate politics. In the early 1980s constructivism became increasingly popular, especially in North American IR studies. During the Cold War there had been a clear pattern of balancing power between the two blocks lead by the US and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, when the situation turned more fluid and open, neorealist theory was not sure about the future development of the balance of power (Jackson and Sørensen 2007). Constructivists claimed that neorealist uncertainty was closely connected to the fact that the theory is overly spare and materialistic, moreover constructivists argued that a focus on thoughts and ideas leads to a better theory about power balance (Jackson and Sørensen 2007).

I understand constructivism both as a meta-theory about the social world (as discussed in chapter two) and as a substantive theory of IR which I discuss in this chapter. The term constructivism was first used in IR by Onuf (1989), but Wendt is often seen as the father of social constructivism in IR. Wendt argues that neorealism and neoliberalism are under-socialized, that “they pay insufficient attention to the ways in which the actors in world politics are socially constructed” (1999:5). Constructivism rejects a one-sided material focus and argues that the most important aspects of international relations are social:

The social and political world, including the world of international relations, is not a physical entity or material object that is outside the human consciousness. Consequently, the study of international
relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors in the international scene as well as
the shared understanding between them (Jackson and Sørensen 2007:162).

Constructivists emphasize ideational factors rather than, or in addition to material ones, also at
the national level of politics. Constructivists see foreign policy analysis as an intersubjective
world, whose ideas and discourses can be investigated in order to end at a better theoretical
understanding of the process (Jackson and Sørensen 2007). Some constructivists claim that
identity, rooted in ideas and discourses, is the basis for construction of interests and thus lie
behind any foreign policy (Hopf 2002, Wendt 1999) (I will elaborate on this later in this
chapter).

seven case studies that illustrate the usefulness of social constructivism in studies of climate
politics. Pettenger argues that a focus on ideational factors “does not negate the power of
material realities, but rather, assist in the understanding of how material realities gain meaning
through social interaction” (2007a:6). Without the materiality of increased GHGs in the
atmosphere, there would not have been climate change. On the other hand, the phenomenon
of climate change and solutions to it are understood differently by different people. I do not
argue that constructivism should replace materialism in studies of climate politics, but rather
that constructivism can bring attention to other elements, like the importance of norms and
how different actors’ arguments and perspectives compete to gain influence.

Pettenger (2007a:8) argues that constructivism is useful for studies of processes of change. I
assume that political changes follow ideational changes: “If the thoughts and ideas that enter
into the existence of international relations change, then the system itself will change as well,
because the system consists in thoughts and ideas” (Jackson and Sørensen 2007:162). Hovden
and Lindseth (2004) in their study of Norwegian climate policy demonstrate how new social
constructions of climate change can contribute to explaining shifts in policy. They argue that:

> Climate change cannot be established as an environmental problem by its own force: it needs to be
> represented through concepts, terms and the communication of scientific knowledge. Climate politics,
> therefore, depend not only on actors and interests, but also on the power of the various discourses that
> emerge from the representation of the climate issue (Hovden and Lindseth 2004).

There are two main constructivist approaches in IR; norm-centred and discourse analytical
(Pettenger 2007a). The norm-centred approach focuses on norms as a set of expectations to
which agents attach some sense of obligations to themselves. This has been referred to as soft
constructivism as it leans more heavily toward rationalism and a positivist methodology than
discourse analytical approaches (Pettenger 2007a). One of the main criticisms of the norm-
centred approach is that it lacks agency; that is investigating how norms translate to actions and how and why actors choose to follow or reject certain norms. The discourse analytical perspectives lean more heavily towards critical theory and a rejection of positivist thinking than the norm-centred approach, as it seeks to uncover how shared meanings are privileged or marginalised (Pettenger 2007a).

**Discourses, the environment and climate change**

In social sciences discourse analysis emerged in the context of the wider post-positivist tradition, but discourse analysis has deep historical roots in the analysis of ideology, rhetoric, the sociology of science and language (Hajer 1995). A discourse can be defined as a certain way to talk about and understand the world (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Or more specifically, as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations, that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995:44). Dryzek (2005) explains that each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that provide the basic terms of analysis, debates, agreements, and disagreements. If such shared understandings did not exist, it would be hard to imagine problem-solving in environmental politics at all, as we would have had to continually return to the first principles.

**Discourse analysis**

The concept of discourse includes an idea of the language being structured in different patterns that our expressions follow (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999). Discourse analysis is an attempt to make sense of the regularities and variations in what is being said and written, and try to understand the social backgrounds and social effects of modes of talking (Hajer 1995). For Adger et al. discourse analysis consists of three main steps; “analysis of regularities in expression to identify discourses; analysis of the actors producing, reproducing and transforming discourses; and social impacts and policy outcomes of discourses” (2001:684). These three elements will guide the structure of my analysis. However, I will emphasize one element which needs to be included in the first step. According to Dryzek (2005) it is important to understand the history of discourses as well, because former constructions impact current discourses.

**Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory**

Discourse analysis is not one approach, but a set of different approaches and theories. I will draw mostly upon Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory because it is most consistent with
my methodological perspective (as described in chapter two). Laclau and Mouffe’s major work on discourse theory is the book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985). Their discourse theory assumes that due to the instability of language meaning is never fixed. This gives room for constant struggles over defining identity of society; there are always struggles between different discourses to obtain a hegemonic position. For Laclau and Mouffe the task of the discourse analyst is to follow these struggles over defining society (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).

Laclau and Mouffe understand discourse as a fixation of meaning within a certain domain. A discourse is created through the process of articulation. Articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of an articulation practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulation practice, we will call a discourse” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:105). The different signs within a discourse are called moments. A discourse is furthermore established by meaning crystallizing around some nodal points. Nodal points are privileged signs, that other signs are organized around and get their meaning in relation to. Discourses are established as totalities when signs are established as moments through relations to other signs, and hence are excluding other types of meaning that the signs could have had and the other ways they could have been related to each other. Laclau and Mouffe call all the possibilities that the discourse is excluding the discursive field. Discourses inform social interaction, but there is never a total fixation of meaning. Discourses are always being constituted in relation to the discursive field. Different definitions of signs can challenge the moments in the discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999).

*Social construction of interest, identity and climate change*

Dryzek (2005) explains that discourses construct meanings and embody natural relationships. I will now discuss the role of identity, interest, as well as different meanings and relationships within the constructions of climate change.

Within constructivist IR the role of identity in formation of interests and hence foreign policy is being emphasized. Some scholars (Hopf 2002) emphasize domestic sources of ideas and identities while other scholars (Wendt 1999) focus on the discursive interaction among states for the formation of identity. Within IR, identity is understood as “a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understanding” (Wendt 1999:224). Neumann (2001) emphasizes that in a discourse analytical approach identity is political, as identity is constitutive. This is in contrast to a material understanding of identity, where identity is traced
back to questions of material interests or national interests. Hopf (2002) argues that identity should be understood through empirical and inductive research and rejects many of the common assumptions about identities. He rejects the material assumption of identities as markers of distributions of power and identities as intentionally and strategically chosen. Furthermore, identity can only be understood relationally (Hopf 2002, Wendt 1999, Neumann 2001). One needs to relate oneself to other groups, and Self is therefore defined in relation to Other.

Hopf (2002) studied identities in Moscow in 1955 and 1999 and found that reconstruction of domestic identities goes a long way in explaining Soviet/Russian foreign policy change. He further aims to bring societies back into constructivist IR, and urges that the “domestic society, its identities, discourses, and relationships to the state, must be brought back into any constructivist account of world politics” (Hopf 2002:278). Norm-centred IR tends to pay insufficient attention to the domestic context in which any international norm is embedded. Furthermore, constructivist IR tends to see state identity primarily as a product of interaction among states (Hopf 2002). Hopf (2002) disagrees with this and explains that the understanding of formation of identity is partly linked to how others are understood. He emphasizes that state identity is being constructed at home as well as in interaction with other states:

Finding out precisely how a state’s identity affects the construction of its interests vis-a-vis another state demands that the social context in which that state’s collection of identities is being discursively constructed to be investigated as deeply and broadly as possible. This means exploring not how the state’s identities are produced in interaction with other states, but also how its identities are being produced in interaction with its own society and the many identities and discourses that constitute that society (Hopf 2002:294).

Based on Hopf (2002) I assume that national identities are constructed domestically, as well as in interaction with other states. Few studies are done on the role of national identity in climate politics. However, Pettenger in her study of environmental norms in the Netherlands found that social identity strongly influences climate action: “The Dutch perceive themselves as part of a global world and thus greatly interdependent” (2007b:68). Because the country is very vulnerable to sea level rise, the Dutch know they depend on outside ideas and events as well as the need to protect themselves from the threat of climate change. Therefore, the government clearly believes that its approach to climate action needs both domestic and international action (Pettenger 2007b).
How national interests are understood is closely linked to the understanding of identity. In IR literature, interests are often seen as a state’s main driver. Wendt explains that within realism it is believed that “states do what they do because it is in their national interests, and that the national interest is self-regarding with respect to security” (1999:113). Constructivism does not question the importance of national interests, but is interested in how interest is socially constructed and linked to identity (Hopf 2002). The argument is that ideas, or discourses, constitute interest (Wendt 1999). Hopf emphasizes that a “constructivist account of identity at the domestic level promises to indigenize the formation of interest by connecting them theoretically and empirically to identity and its associated discursive practices” (2002:16).

Paterson and Stripple (2007) argue that whether climate change is constructed as a threat or opportunity is important for climate policy. For example, some GHG emission reduction policies in EU, such as energy efficiency, balance of payments benefits and technological innovations are constructed as an opportunity. By contrast, in the US climate change is, by many powerful actors, constructed as a major threat to competiveness, jobs and sovereignty (Paterson and Stripple 2007). Whether climate change is constructed as a threat or opportunity touches upon how the relationship between climate policy and economic growth is constructed. Related to this, Dryzek (2005) argues that all environmental discourses have to be positioned in the context of the industrial society. Industrialism, he argues, may be characterised with an “overarching commitments to growth in the quantity of goods and services produced and to the material wellbeing that growth brings” (Dryzek 2005:13). Environmental discourses cannot simply see the terms of industrialism for given, but must depart from these terms. The departure can be reformist or it can be radical; a general distinction which is often made between environment and climate discourses is therefore between radical and reform-oriented (Dryzek 2005). Some environmental discourses are operating within the existing economic and political paradigm, suggesting minor changes which can make it more sustainable. Other discourses suggest a radical different economic and political model.

Another element which Paterson and Stripple (2007) point out is the importance of how climate justice or the related concept of “burden sharing” of GHG emission reductions is constructed. Such constructions have territorial dimensions. For example, in the international climate negotiations territoriality of states has made mark on the definition of justice, since justice is structured in terms of the rights and responsibilities of states (Paterson and Stripple
2007). Other ways of defining climate justice promoted by different actors are for example per capita emissions or historical emissions.

**Environmental discourses**

Much of the analyses of environmental discourses, such as the theorization of ecological modernisation and green radicalism which I will present, are grounded in Western societies. The importance of the colonial history makes it fruitful to distinguish between green radicalism in general and green radicalism in the global South, and I will therefore look at both.

**Ecological modernization**

According to Hajer (1995) the policy-oriented discourse of ecological modernization has been influential in environmental politics since the 1980s. The discourse “assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care of the environment” (Hajer 1995:25). It is thus reform-oriented. Moreover, it holds that a decentralized liberal market order can provide flexible and cost optimal solutions to the climate change problem. Ecological modernisation thus contains a “cost-effective” way of addressing climate change and frames climate change as an opportunity for states and business (Paterson and Stripple 2007).

Ecological modernization includes an assumption that economic growth and the resolution of environmental problems can, in principle, be reconciled (Hajer 1995). This assumption builds upon the notion of mutually reinforcing links between economic growth and environmental protection proposed by the Brundtland commission and their concept of sustainable development in *Our Common Future* (WCED 1987). The win-win relationship between economic growth and environmental protection is grounded in the premise that environmental degradation can be decoupled from economic growth. According to Hajer (1995) the Brundtland report can be seen as one of the paradigm statements of ecological modernization. Dryzek (2005) however, emphasizes some main differences between ecological modernization and sustainable development. He argues that ecological modernization has a sharper focus on exactly what needs to be done with the capitalist political economy in order to protect the environment. Furthermore, ecological modernization does not entail the justice dimension central to the sustainable development discourse. Therefore, Dryzek argues, sustainable development speaks more explicitly to the global South than ecological modernization. However, the word ‘modernization’, just like ‘development’ connotes
progress and hence ecological modernization is linked with the ever-popular notion of social progress. No tough choices need to be made between economic growth and environmental protection in present and long term future (Dryzek 2005). The discourse of ecological modernization is not one united set of ideas and it can mean different things to different actors in different places. And although the ecological modernization is not hegemonic in the sense that no other discourse can be found in the environmental domain, it has since the 1980s become the credible way of “talking green” in the environmental policy making sphere (Hajer 1995).

Green radicalism
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2007) argue that during the past decade the dominant discourse of ecological modernization has been challenged by counter-narratives aiming to redefine the basic principles of climate governance towards equity and ecological sustainability. A set of such different counter-narratives are what I call green radicalism. Central to green radicalism is the recognition of ecological limits and that the natural relationship between humans and nature has been violated. Consequently, it advocates for equality across people and nature (Dryzek 2005).

One can distinguish between radical and reform-oriented green radicalism. A radical version of green radicalism challenges the neoliberal approaches to climate governance found in ecological modernization and it advocates for a fundamental transformation of consumption patterns in the global North and abandonment of capitalism. Climate justice is central to this discourse, and concerns “the fair distribution of the costs associated with the mitigation of climate change among states, as well as the compensation to poor countries for their disproportionate vulnerability to severe climate events” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007:133). The reform version of green radicalism emphasizes multi-stakeholder participation in climate change politics, especially civil society participation, and argues that this will bring legitimacy and expertise to the process of decision-making. The reform-oriented discourse also focuses on locating climate change within a wider sustainable development agenda, North-South equity and inter-generational justice. According to (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007) the reformist version diverges from the radical by conditionally embracing for example the “co-benefits” embedded in the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon market. However, in difference from the win-win rhetoric of the ecological modernization discourse, the reformist discourse underlines that sustainable development synergies can only be realized if norms of equity, participation and accountability inform the global carbon market.
Greenough and Tsing (2003) explore environmental discourses in the global South with focus on Southeast Asia. One area of environmental engagement which they identify is;

a postdevelopment ‘southern environmentalist’ mobilization since the 1970s in which values of social justice, on the one hand, and indigenous, romantic, or scientific nature appreciation, on the other, blend to contest top-down developmentalism as well as neocolonial protectionism (Greenough and Tsing 2003:x).

This approach includes some of the elements of the green radicalism just described. Green radicalism in the global South entails an international understanding of environmental justice or climate justice. Environmental justice, from a Southern perspective is often framed in a North/South context where the North is seen to owe an ecological debt due to unfair appropriation of ecological space (Anand 2004, Martinez-Alier 2002). The concept builds upon the discourse of limits to growth, but departs in the way it emphasizes equity. Interestingly, the ‘limits to growth idea’ was initially perceived by Southern environmentalists as a neocolonial device used by the North to yield power over the South (Dryzek 2005, Joshi 2011). Najam (2004) states that many developing countries have seen the North’s environmental concerns as an effort to sabotage the South’s developmental aspirations, and they have therefore advocated their right to development (Koeing 1994). The environmental justice argument is strongly linked to the demand for structural changes, and thus to the North-South politics of the 1970s that arose from the proposal of a New Economic Order. Former colonialized countries sought to challenge the unfair terms of trade with industrialised countries and demanded changes that would enable the South to achieve self-sustaining economic growth and industrialisation (Najam 2004).

Green radicalism in the global South needs to be understood in the context of the colonial history as the discourse of postcolonialism is of great importance. The term postcolonialism is sometimes used simply to refer to the period after colonisation and the introduction of political independence. However, for the purpose of this study the term refers to “new forms of domination that follow and extend old imperial lines of unequal interconnections” (Nash 2004:105). According to McLeod (2011) important contributors to postcolonial literature are Fanon who wrote about psychological effects of colonialism, Said’s study of the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised, and Spivak and other so-called subaltern studies scholars. McLeod explains that Spivak explores the possibilities of recover the voices of those who had been made subjects of colonial representations, particularly women.
Joshi (2011) explains that within postcolonial geography the North/South divide is challenged by accounts of dynamics of ‘internal colonialism’, emphasising both hierarchies of power within the post-colonial states as well as imperialism which goes beyond states and accounts for power of multilateral capital. Implicated in these arguments are “the problematization of elites in colonial locations as a key obstacle to eliminating global inequalities” (Joshi 2011:27).

Shiva (2008) reflects the postcolonial discourses in her writing about climate change and development. According to Shiva ‘Western knowledge systems’ are in themselves colonizing as they emerge from a dominating and colonializing culture, and that ‘traditional’ knowledge is made to vanish in their interaction with the dominant (Shahjahan 2005). Shiva states that: “Development cannot be defined by the colonizer” (2008:14). She describes the current path of development as eco-imperialism:

[Eco-imperialism] includes the control over the economies of the world through corporate globalization and transformations of resources and ecosystems of the world into feedstock for an industrialized globalized economy. (…) Eco-imperialism is a mechanistic paradigm, based on industrial technologies and economies that assume limitless growth. It is the poor and other species who, in a world of limited resources, lose their share of the earth’s resources through overexploitation by the rich and the powerful. Instead of restraint and limits, the imperialist project seeks to increase corporate control over resources. Eco-imperialism is intolerant of the freedom of others, be it other communities, other countries, or other species (Shiva 2008:15-16).

Postcolonialism can be seen as anti-modernization and anti-globalization, as for example in the way Shiva (2008) uses the term eco-imperialism in the quote above. The current climate regime, including emission trading mechanisms, is seen as a false solution. Shiva states that: “Through emission trading, private polluters are getting more rights and control over the atmosphere, which rightfully belongs to all life on the planet” (2008:18). The green radicalism of the global South is often similar to the radical version of green radicalism addressing inequality between the North and the South, suggesting structural changes and rejecting ‘Western’ concepts of development. Shiva (2008) suggests not merely an energy shift, but rather a paradigm shift: From a reductionist worldview to a holistic one based on interconnections, from a mechanistic paradigm to an ecological one and from consumerist definition of being human to one that recognizes humans as conservers of the earth and creators of wealth with nature.

**Discourse, actors and politics**

I will now discuss material aspects of discourses. Discourses are embedded in actors, institutions and politics, and are thus not only text and speech “floating around” (Neumann
2001). Inspired by Adger et al., discourse analysis, in addition to identifying and analyse discourses, should consist of an “analysis of the actors producing, reproducing and transforming discourses; and social impacts and policy outcomes of discourses” (2001:684).

**Actors and power**

Actors are those who produce, reproduce and transform discourses through written and oral statements as well as practices (Adger et al. 2001, Hajer 1995). Without agents promoting discourses, struggling over them would not exist (Liftin 1994). Actors relate to each other, and although actors “do not necessarily know each other, or may not even have met (…) they place themselves around certain discourses which they employ when they engage in the discussions about climate policy” (Hovden and Lindseth 2004:66). Investigating how actors create and use discourses opens for an understanding of power relations among actors and discourses. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2007) argue that political power stems from the ability to articulate and set the terms of a discourse. Similarly Dryzek argues that discourses are “bound up with political power. Sometimes it is a sign of power that actors can get the discourse to which they subscribe accepted by others” (2005:9). Pettenger (2007a) furthermore investigates the dialogue between power and knowledge in how climate is constructed. She emphasizes that knowledge, and the people who produce knowledge, can be understood as a form of power. In the “expert-driven global environmental change research, scientific knowledge, techniques, practices and institutions enables the production and maintenance of discourses” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007:125).

The notion of agency in discourse analysis has in recent studies been emphasized by concepts such as ‘knowledge brokers’, ‘policy networks’ and ‘discourse coalitions’. (Bulkeley 2000, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007, Hajer 1995, Hovden and Lindseth 2004). A knowledge broker is a person or institution serving as an intermediary, with the aim to develop relationships and networks between producers and users of knowledge. The concept of knowledge brokers can help in see the linkages between power, knowledge and actors (Pettenger 2007c). Policy networks arise as interest groups gather around one or more government department in the hope of influencing policy, and are integrated into the policymaking process by states that need their participation (Bulkeley 2000). The concept of policy networks can help identifying which actors to study and moreover how to understand the interaction among these actors. Some scholars argue that the policy network approach can help in analysing policy process and outcomes as well, as explanations of policy stability and change can be sought in the process of inclusion and exclusion of participants and ideas.
Bulkeley 2000). Hajer’s (1995) concept of discourse coalitions is a way of understanding policy networks. He claims that in the struggle for discursive dominance, coalitions are formed among actors that, for a variety of reasons, are attracted by the same story-lines.

Policy and exclusion as outcomes of discourses

Policies can be understood as outcomes of discourses. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand explain how policies are not understood as neutral tools within discourse analysis:

Discourse analysis can be brought to the forefront of the analysis of power and policy. Policies are not neutral tools but rather a product of discursive struggle. Accordingly, policy discourses favour certain descriptions of reality and hereby empower certain actors while marginalizing others (2007:125).

Dryzek explains that “impact of discourses can often be felt in the politics of governments or intergovernmental bodies and in institutional structures” (2005:20). When discourses become embodied in institutions they constitute “the formal understanding that provides the context for social interaction, on a par with formal institutional rules” (Dryzek 2005:20). Neumann (2001) emphasizes that discourse analysis should aim to understanding material dimension of discourses (not only identify and understand discourses). This must be done through analysing the ideational (or linguistic) and the material in a holistic perspective and that this can be done by seeing discourses as both linguistic and material phenomena. The material aspect of discourses, as for example climate policy, can be studied through the concept of institutionalisation of discourses. Neumann (2001) defines an institution as a symbol based program that regulates social interaction and has a materiality. Consequently, the institutionalisation of a discourse is when a set of expressions and practices are formalised. They then become routinized in policy practices and institutions (Hajer 1995).

There are different kinds of outcomes of discourses. Sometimes the effects of discourses are not seen in policies or institutions of governments, but rather take place elsewhere. For example, green radicalism has helped individuals and societies to create alternative political economies relying on self-sufficiency (Dryzek 2005). Another outcome of discourse is exclusion; discourses restrict and enable actors. Hajer states that: “Discourses imply prohibitions since they make it impossible to raise certain questions or argue certain cases [and] they imply exclusionary systems because they only authorize certain people to participate in a discourse” (1995:4). As explained in chapter two, a dominant discourse serves as a structure in the way certain meanings and relationships are being naturalised as the truth and alternative meanings are seen as illegitimate. Pettenger argues that the understanding of exclusion is central for constructivism in general: “Constructivism allows us to view climate
change from a new perspective with the hope of uncovering processes, actors and structures that have been obscured in the current framing of climate change” (2007a:7).

As mentioned, social constructivism in general, and discourse analysis in particular hold the potential to assist in the understanding of the processes of change (Pettenger 2007c). Change in the course of climate policy requires a shift in the underlying discourse, because “climate policies flow out of the dominant discourses and the associated construction of the problem” (Cass and Pettenger 2007). In order to properly understand changes in policy it is therefore necessary to investigate how dominant discourses change.

**Discursive change and policy change**

By rejecting Fairclough’s (2010) dialectic relationship between discursive and social practices, one cannot explain changes in discourses by changes in social practices (since social practices are understood as also discursive). In other words, one cannot explain discursive change by simply pointing at “external” factors or episodes which have affected the discourses. However, in line with Laclau and Mouffe I assume that there is a constant struggle of defining society, and hence changes in discourses can always happen through the process of articulation. Discourses are shaped and changed though fixation of meaning, and elements in the discursive field can become moments.

Pettenger (2007c) points at the importance of knowledge, power and actors in processes of change in climate politics. Knowledge creation and science constitute a possibility for change by constructing climate knowledge (Cass and Pettenger 2007). Lahnse states that science is “situated knowledge and a potential vector for hegemonic power” (2007:189). Another opportunity for change emerges in the conceptualization of humans as actors in the climate change debate (Cass and Pettenger 2007). In this regard, it is important to ask; who is dominating the debate and what interests underlie their actions?

When studying processes of change and how discourses emerge and become dominant one should pay attention to the economic and political context as well. Climate policy discourses can obtain legitimacy and gain power by suiting with the larger discursive context of the economic and political paradigm. Conca argues that “the ways in which we perceive and respond to ecological interdependence are likely to be structured along modern, sovereign, capitalist lines” (quoted in Paterson and Stripple 2007:165). From this I understand that climate change constructions and solutions are likely to be in line with the dominant overall political and economic paradigm. Hajer (1995) for example, states that the emergence of
ecological modernization must be understood against the backdrop of changing socio-economic parameters, such as the changing economic and political context after the Second World War.

Discourse analysis is increasingly applied in studies of climate change policy and politics. Scholars find it useful because “environmental change in general and climate change in particular are permeated by a struggle over meaning and symbolic representation (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007:125). Discourse analysis is fruitful in order to understand politics, change in policy, as well as exclusion of actors and perspectives. According to Hajer and Versteeg one of the main contributions of discourse analysis is the study of environmental politics: “discourses shape what can and cannot be thought, delimit the range of policy options and thereby serve as a precursor to policy outcomes” (2006:178).

**Summary**

In this chapter I have argued that constructivism, by emphasizing ideational elements, can highlight aspects of climate change that are often overlooked by materialist approaches. I have argued that in order to understand international climate politics one need to investigate how states’ climate politics are discursively constructed within their domestic societies.

Furthermore, I have explained that the discourse analysis in this study will follow Adger et al.’s three steps; “analysis of regularities in expression to identify discourses; analysis of the actors producing, reproducing and transforming discourses; and social impacts and policy outcomes of discourses” (2001:684). In addition the study will start with investigating the history of discourses. Previous constructions of climate politics influence current discourses and thus current climate politics, and the recent changes in Indian climate politics must be understood in the context of changes in the larger paradigm of foreign policy and economic and political strategy. When identifying and analysing climate discourses I will draw upon Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of discourse theory, in assuming the existence of constant discursive struggles among various discourses. I will apply their concept of nodal point to identify the centre of discourses. Furthermore, based on Wendt (1999) and Hopf (2002) I assume that the social construction of identity and interests matter in climate policy discourses. As discourses define meanings and relationships I will also investigate different meanings of climate change; whether it is constructed as a threat or opportunity, and different understandings of climate justice.
I will also study actors which produce, represent and transform discourses in the national climate debate in India. I assume that change in the dominant discourse can happen when powerful actors make articulations which challenge the dominant discourse, and that scientific actors can serve as ‘knowledge brokers’. Policy flows out of the dominant discourse and policies can thus be studied through Neumann’s (2001) concept of institutionalisation of discourses. Hajer (1995) assists in understanding the power dimension of discourses, and I will pay attention to how dominant discourses exclude alternative perspectives and the actors representing them.
4. Indian foreign policy and history of climate politics

Based on Dryzek (2005) I assume that history matters for discursive constructions. Malone (2011) emphasizes that the ways Indians conceive of their country and its historical development is of vital importance for India’s contemporary international relations, and Sengupta (2012) highlights the importance of understanding the deep historical roots of Indian climate politics. I will in this chapter discuss Indian foreign policy and economic strategy post-independence and the transformation in the 1990s, as well as the social construction of climate politics in the 1990s in India.

Indian foreign policy: from porcupine to tiger

When climate change first emerged as a political topic in India it was seen as a foreign policy issue, and foreign policy traditions were therefore important for how climate change was first constructed as a political topic in India.

Non-alignment and an inward-looking industrial strategy

Jakobsen (2000) explains that the direction of India’s early position on climate change was formulated within the traditional Nehru line. Nehru was India’s first prime minister after independence, and served concurrently as a Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, for a period of 17 years (1947-64). He shaped India’s foreign policy around enduring principles of international peace and security, nonalignment, self-determination for colonial peoples and support for international organisations (Jakobsen 2000). Non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and equity were related and important principles (Tharoor 2012).

India got her independence at the time of the beginning of the Cold War and was very particular about not choosing sides; nonalignment thus became a principle at the heart of Indian foreign policy. Tharoor (2012) explains that “[w]e had spent too long time with foreigners deciding what was good for us internationally; we were not going to mortgage our freedom of action or decision to any alliance when we had just begun to appreciate the value of our own independence” (2012:9). Non-alignment was a way of securing sovereignty and avoiding compromising it through the compulsion of bloc politics. Mohan (2004) explains that India believed that independent nations emerging out of the shadow of colonisation could follow a third way, one different from the capitalism of the West and socialism of the East.
India furthermore believed that collective economic bargaining with the advanced nations was necessary to improve the conditions in developing nations. The formation of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1961 was an institutionalisation of that belief.

India took sovereignty and non-interference beyond avoiding formal alliances. Tharoor (2012) states that Indian leaders, like most of the leaders of post-colonies, were convinced that the independence they had fought for so long only could be guaranteed through economic independence:

Self-reliance and economic self-sufficiency were a mantra for more than four decades after independence, and there were real doubts as to whether the country should open itself further up to the world. Whereas in most of the West most people axiomatically associated capitalism with freedom, India’s nationalists associated capitalism with slavery – for, after all, British East India Company had come to trade and stayed on to rule (2012:4).

Sharma (2009) explains that there was a broad consensus among the country’s political and economic elite that the quest for national self-reliance could best be achieved through planned economic modernisation centred import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), also known as ‘inward-looking industrial strategy’. Sharma states that “Nehru, the chief advocate of ISI argued passionately that without such a coherent and bold industrialisation strategy, India’s economy was doomed to suffer from its peripheral status in the global capitalist economy and remain perpetually poor and underdeveloped” (2009:28). For Nehru industrialisation was the responsibility of the national state; the private sector had to be guided in the desired direction by the state and foreign economies should play only a marginal role. There are hence parallels with India’s development strategy post-independence and development strategies based on dependency theory thinking. The foreign policy in newly independent India and the inwards looking development strategy that India pursued at that time were closely connected.

**The 1991 liberalization and foreign policy changes**

Mohan (2004) argues that India since 1991 has crossed the Rubicon of the former premises of how she engages with the external world. He claims that fundamental change in foreign policy takes place only when there is a revolutionary change either at home or in the world. India confronted such situation nationally and internationally in 1991: “The old political and economic order at home had collapsed, and the end of the cold war removed all benchmarks that guided India’s foreign policy” (Mohan 2004:xiii). At home India was in the process of economic and political reforms. In 1991, after a balance of payment crisis, India liberalised her economy. By mid-1980s a number of factors had caused the economic situation to deteriorate (Sharma 2009). The profligate expansionary fiscal policies of the central
Government to support growing levels of government expenditures contributed to a sharp increase in the central government’s fiscal deficits and a mounting foreign debt burden: “By late 1990, the combined gross fiscal deficit of government at all levels had grown to a staggering 10 per cent of GDP” (Sharma 2009:76). Faced with a severe balance of payments crisis and foreign debt, the Indian government had to ship part of the country’s gold reserves to London to serve loans from among others the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Tharoor 2012). Emergency assistance from the IMF came with its usual conditionality and the Congress-led government, led by Prime Minister Narashima Rao, implemented a wide range of economic reforms (Sharma 2009). The reforms transformed India, from a “regulated control-bound, inward-looking economy into a market-friendly, outward-looking one. In effect, the area of economic liberalisation had begun” (Sharma 2009:76). India became more integrated in the world economy and hence the foreign policy needed to be changed.

Mohan (2004) discusses five related transformations of Indian foreign policy in the 1990s. First, India experienced a transition from national consensus on building a socialist society to a consensus on building a capitalist society. Despite the nonalignment approach, India had close ties with the socialist bloc during the Cold War. From the 1990s it was believed that the success of Indian foreign policy would depend on the pace of India’s globalisation and her relations with the West. Second, was a new stress on economics in foreign policy. Mohan explains that: “Having got into the groove of socialist rhetoric, Indian diplomats had little time for commercial diplomacy in the past. Now they were marketing India as a big emerging market and the biggest new information technology power” (2004:xix). India started to seek foreign direct investment (FDI) and access to markets in the developed world. Third, India undertook a transition from Third Worldism to the promotion of own self-interests. Even though the Third World rhetoric remained popular, India started to ask what multilateral diplomacy could do for India, rather than what India could do for multilateralism (Tharoor 2012). India started her campaign for a seat in the UN Security Council, something which implied that India was interested in being part of managing the international system and not “remain just a protesting leader of the Third World” (Mohan 2004:xx). Fourth, rejecting the anti-Western mode of thinking was another related transition. Tharoor (2012) and Mohan (2004) argue that the biggest change in the foreign policy have been the shedding of the anti-West orientation. Fifth, was a transition in Indian foreign policy from idealism to pragmatism. India had seen her role in international politics as the harbinger of principles that could transform the world, and was presenting herself as if from high moral ground (Tharoor 2012).
India post 1990 was no longer convinced of her moral uniqueness and began to think of itself as a nation like several others in quest of greater power (Mohan 2004).

One can say that India’s foreign policy has gone from being a Third World leader to preparing for a seat at the highest table of global diplomacy (Mohan 2004). Or, India has moved from the high ground to the high table (Malone 2011). Mohan (2004) also gives the transformation a good illustration; India has gone from a porcupine to a tiger. India was a vegetarian, slow footed and prickly porcupine:

The famous defensiveness of the porcupine became the hallmark of India’s approach to the world. India was a reactive power; when the world impinged on it, India out up its sharp quills to ward of threats. The quills symbolized the principles of fairness, justice and equality as defence against what India saw as unacceptable demands from the international system (Mohan 2004:260).

In the 1990s India reformed her economy to facilitate globalisation and the imperatives of the foreign policy dramatically changed. The new dynamics is symbolized by a tiger; a strong animal which also does not give in, but is also versatile and quickly moving. As a tiger, India became more self-confident and advanced new ideas.

The transformation of Indian economy and foreign policy has happen though a process of discursive struggle, and India’s development path is continuously being debated. India’s current Prime Minister believes in further integration in world politics and economy. In 2004, he outlined India’s global philosophy as ‘cooperative pluralism’. He enshrined the concept with the Sanskrit phrase and Hindu philosophy of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ – which means the whole world is one family. This statement represents a belief in cooperation in multilateral organisations, a desire to transform them constructively and “a recognition that with greater power and influence come responsibility in international affairs” (Mohan 2004:264). Tharoor argues that India can play an even more important role in shaping the global order than she is currently doing. He states that India is in “a position of responsibility at the world stage, from a post-colonial concern with self-protection to a new role in participating in the making of global rules and even playing a role in imposing them” (Tharoor 2012:15). Other scholars are more critical about India as a global power. Guha states in an article in Financial Times that:

Yet the truth is that India is in no position to become a superpower. It is not a rising power, nor even an emerging power. It is merely a fascinating, complex, and perhaps unique experiment in nationhood and democracy, whose leaders need still to attend to the fault lines within, rather than presume to take on the world without.8

Guha points at domestic challenges such as corruption and argues that India first and foremost needs to deal with these issues. Tharoor (2012) also acknowledges unfinished domestic agendas, but believes that foreign policy can be an instrument to help fulfil them. While he argues for continued integration in global politics and economics, Guha is more critical about India’s liberalization process all together:

Economic liberalization has created wealth and jobs, and a class of entrepreneurs unshackled by the state. But its darker side is manifest in rising income inequalities and sweetheart deals between politicians and favored businessmen, leading to the loss of billions of dollars to the public exchequer. (...)
The reform and renewal of public institutions has been ignored. It is this neglect that has led to a steady corrosion in state capacity, as manifest in the growing failure to moderate inequalities, manage social conflict, and enforce fair and efficient governance.⁹

Shrivastava and Kothari (2012) also question the benefits of India’s economic reforms. They state that the reforms since 1991 have brought great material benefits to the richest 10 to 25% of India’s population, but at the same time spelt further disaster for the poor. They also point at environmental degradations as a result of economic liberalization. To go deeper into the overall debates about India’s development strategy and foreign policy is beyond the scope of my thesis. However, I will come back to different views on development strategies when discussing different discourses on climate politics in chapter five.

History of climate politics in India
I will now look at how environmental concerns and climate change was constructed when it first emerged as a political issue in India, as well as explain India’s traditional climate policy.

The Other’s agenda
As discussed in chapter three, when environmental concerns entered the international agenda, many developing countries, including India, feared that this would take attention away from poverty eradication. This fear was reflected in former Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi’s famous speech at UN’s first environmental conference in Stockholm in 1972. Gandhi said: “We do not wish to impoverish the environment any further and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of large numbers of people. Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?” (Gandhi 1972). From this quote we see that poverty was perceived as a more pressing issue for India. Gandhi furthermore pointed at the difference in responsibility for poor and rich:

When they themselves feel deprived, how can we urge the preservation of animals? How can we speak to those who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, the rivers and the air clean when

their own lives are contaminated at the source? The environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty (1972).

In this statement we see that environmental protection is not perceived as an issue for the poor. The last sentence in the quote is often understood as referring to a conflict between development and environmental protection. According to Atteridge et al. (2012) tensions between the goals of development and environmental protection were widely influential in the early environmental policy in India.

When climate change emerged as a political topic internationally it was, like environmental concerns, seen as the West’s agenda and not as a priority for India. Wilhite (1990) emphasizes that climate change was seen as belonging to a larger set of global problems, such as poverty, which have their roots in global relations. He states that “for Indians, both inside and outside the government, to agree to limit the agenda to a discussion of greenhouse and ozone problems is in itself a compromise” (1990:43). Climate change was a narrower agenda than what the Indian government wished to see at the international arena. Jakobsen (2000) studied India in the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) process (1990-92). She argues that throughout the preparation process India expressed that climate change was not a priority, and that “[g]overnment officials repeatedly stressed that India is a developing country with many other important priorities. Employment, the eradication of poverty and economic growth were stressed as being more significant domestic issues” (1999:198).

**Equity and post-colonialism**

According to Dubash (2012a) climate equity was early established as the dominating frame of climate politics in India. Climate equity was understood predominantly in a North-South context around dividing up global commons. The understanding of equity is linked to the need to differentiate responsibility. Jakobsen (2000) states that Indian officials, during the early climate negotiations, were keen on stressing differentiation in order to assure that India had to do little in terms of GHG reductions the coming years. Pachauri (2003) explains that India and other developing countries emphasised the importance of equity consideration during the formation of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). One equity principle that India has promoted is ‘equitable access to carbon space’ and thus the per-capita approach to effort sharing of GHG emission reduction. The argument behind the per capita approach is that every human being on earth should have certain entitlements to opportunities for development and progress (Pachauri 2003). The following statement by India’s chief
negotiator to the UNCED Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, illustrates the link between equity and the per capita approach:

The problem of global warming is caused not by emissions of greenhouse gases as such, but by excessive levels of per capita emissions of these gases. If per capita emissions of all countries had been on the same level as that of developing countries, the world today would not have faced the threat of global warming (quoted in Jakobsen 2000:190).

In the quote Dasgupta emphasizes that climate change is not everyone’s responsibility and that only excessive emissions have caused climate change. The Indian government proposed that the objective of the UNFCCC should be that emission in different countries over time should converge at a common per capita level (Jakobsen 2000). India has also promoted the principle of ‘common, but differentiated responsibility’ (CBDR) as a guiding principle of the UNFCCC.

The colonial history had a strong influence on the construction of climate change in India. Vihma (2011) argues that Gandhi’s speech entailed a foreign policy dimension which had an anti-North streak and captured a historical perspective of the colonial past. The speech reflects a belief that international structures are still in disfavour of developing countries and a fear that measures to combat environmental problems will put further pressure on the South. Gandhi stated that: “the ecological crises should not add to the burdens of the weaker nations by introducing new considerations in the political and trade policies of rich nations” (1972). Jakobsen (2000) explains that Indian officials involved in the UNCED process expressed that developing countries had been taken on board to solve a problems of the rich, industrialised North without proper compensation. Advocating developing countries’ equal right to development and growth has thus been important to India’s strategy in the negotiations (Hallding et al. 2011). India has tended to perceive herself as the leader of the developing countries in opposition of the ‘green imperialism’ of the North, in line which what I have described as the early foreign policy tradition in India.
Coalition of ministries and NGOs

Jakobsen (2000) explains that Centre for Science and the Environment (CSE) and some few other non-governmental actors, like The Energy and resource Institute (TERI), were very influential in Indian climate politics in the early 1990s. At that time the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) was relatively new to the issue of climate change. TERI is a major professional, non-profit research organisation and CSE is more a traditional “watch dog” and grassroots organisation. Basically, TERI and CSE share the same position on climate change and support the government’s position that industrialised countries must be held responsible for their emissions (Jakobsen 2000).

CSE became particularly influential in Indian climate politics after they published the report *Global Warming in an Unequal World* (Agrawal and Narain 1991). The opening sentence states that “[t]he idea that India and China must share the blame of heating up the earth (...) is an excellent example of environmental colonialism” (Agrawal and Narain 1991:1). The report critiqued a statistical analysis done by the American think tank World Resource Institute (WRI), which had calculated the South’s share of the accumulation of atmospheric CO2 to be 48%. Agrawal and Narain’s (1991) recalculated WRI’s numbers on the basis of the same estimates, but with a per capita distribution of the world’s ‘sinks’ and found that the South could only be held accountable for 33% of the global GHG emissions. The report also questioned the motivation for the WRI report: “The WRI report is entirely designed to blame

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developing countries for sharing the responsibility for global warming” (Agrawal and Narain 1991:1).

According to Dubash (2012a) the CSE report made lasting substantive points in Indian climate discourse. One is that climate responsibility should not be framed in terms of annual emission flows, but rather in terms of each nation’s cumulative contributions to emission stock in the atmosphere (historical emissions). Another one is that each individual should have access to the atmosphere’s resources, and hence the notion of a per capita allocation principle. Furthermore, Jakobsen (2000) argues that the CSE report politicised the construction of climate change in India. Government officials, as well as NGOs adopted the understanding that climate change was not simply an environmental problem, but also about development and general North-South political and economic discrepancies. The views expressed in the report influenced the formation of India’s negotiation approach and to a great extent also defined Indian civil society and media perceptions of what constitutes fairness in the climate debate (Billet 2009, Dubash 2012c).

India’s climate position has been based on a broad political consensus that climate change is caused by the developed countries and that it is their responsibility to mitigate (Hallding et al. 2011). Sengupta (2012) explains that for the most 20 first years of international climate negotiations there was a general domestic consensus within India; that India’s international position on climate change was legitimate, valid and did not require change. He states that “[o]ne of the striking features that illustrates this pan-national feeling is that even environmental NGOs that actively criticized the government’s domestic environmental policies at home, rallied to strongly defend its foreign policies on climate change abroad” (Sengupta 2012:113). For example CSE, has, as showed above, played a critical role in developing normative arguments used by the Indian Government in the climate negotiations. Also the media have tended to support the position of the Government, as Billett states that “the national Indian press set up a strong nationalistic position on climate change that divides the issue along both developmental and postcolonial lines” (2009:1).

Jakobsen (2000) argues that while a small exclusive group of environmental activists and experts had exceptionally good access to early climate policy-making, MoEF became more self-reliant during the 1990s. Policy-making on India’s climate position has been kept primarily at the technocratic level, as the topic has attracted only limited interest among politicians. The involvement of the Parliament, The Cabinet or the Prime Minister is rare and
the reported procedure is for the MoEF to brief the Prime Minister before major international meetings (Jakobsen 2000). Sengupta claims that the closed policy-making on climate change contributed to continuity in India’s climate position for a long time:

Formulating India’s external climate policy has traditionally been the preserve of a relatively small group of serving and retired government officials and diplomats, who have been engaged in climate negotiations since its earliest days, and who believe they are right, and have found little reason to change their world views and normative positions on this issue over time (2012:113).

Jakobsen (2000) also finds India’s climate change and that environmental policy tends to be personality-driven. Influential individuals include Nitin Desai, Prodipto Ghosh, Amb. C. Dasgupta and Syam Saran (Never 2011).

It is important to mention that even though climate change for a long time only was a foreign policy area, national policies related to GHG emissions existed. India has pursued policies to reduce energy consumption, especially oil consumption and to deal with environmental problems for decades (Parikh 2003). Energy conservation and increased energy efficiency have gradually taken an important place in the energy sector in India. In the 8th five year Plan (1992-1997) for example, policies and allocations to improve energy efficiency were outlined (Parikh 2003, Jakobsen 2000). Another area of focus has been promotion of renewable energy. Because of the emphasis to find, develop and exploit other non-conventional energy sources the Government of India made a department under the Ministry of Power into the separate Ministry of Non-Conventional energy sources in the 1970s (Parikh 2003).

The early construction of climate change politics in India resembles what I described as green radicalism in the global South in chapter three, and is clearly in line with the post-independence foreign policy tradition discussed in this chapter. According to Dubash (2012a) the early framing of climate politics in India with strong focus on equity has proved to be durable, leading to consistency in the negotiating position over two decades. After having discussed the context and history of Indian climate politics, I will now look at current perspectives in Indian climate debate and policy-making.
In this chapter I will perform the first step in discourse analysis by analysing regularities in expression in order to identify discourses (Adger et al. 2001). I will present three discourses on climate politics among key actors in the national climate debate and policy-making in India: the Third World discourse (TW), the Win-Win discourse (WW) and the Radical Green discourse (RG). The discourses are stereotyped categories of a set of views rather than single perspectives. I will present the discourses’ different constructions of India’s national interest, national identity and climate change. At the end of the chapter I will discuss convergences and divergences between the discourses, and how they can be understood in the context of general environmental discourses.

The Third World discourse
The Third World discourse (from now on TW) is similar to what I described as the first constructions of Indian climate politics in chapter four. The centre of the TW is the construction of India’s national interest as economic growth, and the line of reasoning in the discourse can be summarised as: (1) Economic growth is India’s national interest, (2) climate politics is a threat to growth, and hence (3) India needs to protect her space to growth and focus on development. A classical statement by actors holding the TW is that “India is a developing country which needs to grow”.

Growth as the national interest
The construction of India’s national interest as economic growth constitutes the centre or the nodal point of the TW. The construction of national identity as a developing country and a conflict between growth and environmental protection are important elements related to the primacy of growth. Rajamani explains that many actors in the debate on climate politics believe that:

"Everything should centre around development, that development is the primary driver of all our policies, and we will address climate change to the extent we can within the context of development. And I guess those people who believe that, also believe that, given the sort of toxic nature of the international climate politics, we will not have an equitable international agreement. So we should focus on what we can do domestically, and we should focus on our priority, which is development. So that, I would say, is one broad set of perspectives (interview 31.8.12)."
The informant explains development as India’s main national interest by saying it is the primary driver and that development considerations decide to what extent India should deal with climate change. Several other informants state that development, or economic growth, is the first priority for the Government of India. Khalid explains that: “for us the primary thing is that growth is first. We have to keep that in mind that India has to grow” (interview 12.9.12).

In the TW the main way to assess development is as annual GDP growth. Poverty alleviation and development is understood as following naturally from high GDP growth. Furthermore, energy security is closely linked to economic growth. Informants mention energy security as an important driver of energy policies. And one informant (interview 11.10.12) explains that India has promoted renewable energy before it was part of the international debate on climate change and hence energy security in itself has for a long time been important to India’s growth discourse.

In the TW climate policy is seen as in conflict with growth. As described in chapter four the idea of such a conflict has long traditions in India and was reflected in Indira Gandhi’s speech in Stockholm in 1972. Sethi states that: “There is a trade-off between, when looking at domestic politics, either investing in growth in existing path lines or try to build a more resilient society” (interview 30.8.12). Especially when it comes to energy, there are many trade-offs, proponents of the TW argue. Sethi says that: “If you only have this much amount of money, do take it out and say we will allow more people to live in the dark for a while and invest in solar because it is going to take longer to get solar to every house. I think these are the kind of trade-off” (Interview 30.8.12). Another informant states that attempting to use less fossil fuel becomes controversial politically:

There is obviously a trade off as I said, I mean if you are going to talk about how do we deal with climate change, then at the national level you have to think in terms of how do I start using less and less fossil fuels, how do I start using more and more of renewable energy, how do we take steps in order to reduce energy subsidies, increase energy efficiency, all those become very, very controversial political issues (interview 25.9.12).

In chapter three I argued that the social construction of interest is closely linked to identity. Hopf (2002) argues that accounting for identity can help in understanding construction of national interests. I find that the construction of India’s interest as growth is linked to the construction of ‘Us’ as a former colony and a developing country. It is argued that growth needs to be first priority since India is a developing country. Bidwai explains that a classical Indian position is: “India is still a poor country, it is a developing country and it needs to grow. Growth is the key to reduce poverty and therefore our emissions are going to increase”
Furthermore, in the international climate negotiations it is being emphasized that India has this place as a nation which is on the path of growth (Goswami, interview 17.9.12). In the construction of national identity in the TW, colonial history is also important. As described in chapter four, climate politics has for a long time in India been constructed as neo-colonialism – as a new way to sabotage the South’s development. Bidwai (Interview 28.9.12) explains that anti-colonialism has been carried over in North/South structures in the climate debate in India.

**Climate politics as a threat to growth and climate justice North/South**

In the TW climate change impacts are not constructed as a major threat to India. International climate politics, on the other hand is seen as threat to India’s main interest of growth. Goswami (interview 17.9.12) explains that fear that climate policies will harm India’s economic growth is at the heart of the whole climate debate in India. She states that:

> The whole debate, whether it is on climate change per se or on the environment, is centred on one simple fact: how it impacts economic growth? The concern is very simple, that nothing that happens should affect economic growth. It is the only single concern in the entire argument (interview 17.09.12).

Similarly as in the quote, Dubash (2012c) explains that the global pressure to mitigate is by many actors seen as a greater or more immediate threat than the impacts of climate change. The fear that climate politics will harm India’s economy is a logical outcome of the belief in a conflict between development and environmental protection (when climate change effects are not considered as a threat).

Within the TW climate change is also constructed as strongly unfair. Climate justice is framed in the same North/South context as when climate change first emerged as a political issue in India. Climate change is seen as the West’s problem and responsibility. It is seen as unfair that developing countries should suffer from a problem they have not contributed to, and moreover clean up the Other’s problem. The pressure upon India and China to restrain emissions is seen as the same as asking these countries to make sacrifices. A former government official argues that these kinds of calls mean: “That we should limit our development aspiration, so that the world can be saved. While the rest of the world which has got there, you know continue as they are. If sacrifices have to be made, it needs to be a sacrifice that puts everybody under the same footing” (interview 11.10.12). Mandal (interview 4.9.12) explains that many actors on climate politics in India believe that taking mitigation measures is the same things as letting the poor remain poor. And more specific to let people remain without access to electricity. Therefore, international climate politics need to be
designed based on the ‘polluter pays principle’ as Raghunandan (interview 24.9.12) explains. The TW holds that “climate change actions has to be done on the basis of equity and CBDR” (interview 11.10.12) and emphasizes the role of historical emissions of the West and the per capita approach to burden sharing.

**Economic growth and protecting the space for growth**

Domestically, the TW holds that India needs to focus on growth. This is illustrated by Mandal’s expression:

> For India and for the Indian Government development is still the number one issue. And for whatever they will be pushing, even if it have a negative wearing on climate change, there will push it forward. Because they will say that: well, we need to develop, otherwise we cannot be sustainable (interview 12.9.12).

To focus on growth and development domestically comes out of growth being first priority and the believed conflict between development and environmental protection. As I argued in chapter three, whether climate change is constructed as an opportunity or threat matters for the position on climate policy. However, as seen in the quote there is another interesting element to it as well. Mandal explains that it is argued that India needs to grow in order to tackle climate change better later. A higher “development level” is thus seen as a precondition for being sustainable and the stand on national climate politics can be described as “Growth first, climate action later”. Or as Rajamani puts it; “development is the best response to climate change” (2009:361). Some actors holding the TW argue that the focus on growth provides space for India to take some climate change measures, which are consistent with development objectives (interview 8.10.12). Nevertheless, according to Raghunandan, many actors in the climate debate, believe there is no reason for India to consider climate policies:

> There are still many people in India who believe; we have not caused the problem, this is not a problem that we have made, so those who have caused the problem, they should solve it. This means America must do, Europe must do, Japan must do, Australia must do – why should we do anything? We don’t need to do it. Because doing anything means affecting our economic growth. There are many who believe that (interview 24.9.12).

Internationally, the most important thing for India, argued by actors holding the TW is to preserve India’s space to develop. When the international negotiations are seen as a threat to growth and when growth is the national interest, this is a logical position. A statement by a former government official reflects this view:

> The most important element is that India has to preserve its development space. And taking up legally binding GHG limitations targets is likely to constrain our development space, and particularly for the reason that over the next couple of decades at least we do not see that there is much prospects to replacing coal for our energy needs by renewables (interview 11.10.12)
As seen in the quote above it is believed that international obligations can constrain India’s development by putting a cap on growth in energy consumption. The focus on defending India’s position leads to a defensive approach to the negotiations; India should be strong and resist any pressure to take on obligations. The focus on preserving India’s space for development also leads to an emphasis on equity principles in the international climate regime. Raghunandan (interview 24.9.12) argues that equity is constructed as a narrative in order to preserve India’s right to development. The principles of equity and historical emissions have been the cornerstone of how India looks upon mitigation and international cooperation on climate change (Sethi, Interview 30.8.12). According to Raghunandan (interview 24.9.12) there is a broad agreement, both inside and outside the government, that any form of burden sharing of emissions reductions in the international negotiations needs to be based on equity. He states that: “There should be a principle of fairness and a principle of whoever has the most responsibility for the problem should have the most responsibility for the solution” (interview 24.9.12). The demand for an equitable regime is a common position for all the three climate discourses, but the discourses contain different meanings and ways of emphasising equity.

As described in chapter four, the per capita approach to equitable burden sharing of emission cuts has had a strong standing in India. A former government official informant explains how the per capita approach is based on the need to differentiate between countries:

So it is not correct to say that every country is responsible for causing this problem because it emits CO2. Only those which have excessively high levels of emissions historically are responsible for the problem. And it should be their responsibility to address the issue (…). So, what is excessive? Then we initiated the principle that every human being has an equal right to the global atmospheric resource (interview 12.10.12).

As seen in the quote the per capita principle is based on the ‘polluter pays principle’. Bidwai explains that the classical Indian stand holds that: “We will guarantee that our per capita emissions, which are very low, will not increase to the level of the North” (interview 28.9.12). The TW’s position on international climate politics is that equity should form the basis of an agreement, and more specifically that the objective of international climate politics should be to reach per capita emissions convergence. Furthermore, informants emphasise that equity goes beyond mitigation in the international negotiations. An informant explains that she would like to see a discussion in the international negotiations on: “How should equity be discussed in finance? How should equity be talked about in technology transfer? Across the
board, so it is just not something within mitigation, not just burden sharing or carbon budget, but moving beyond that” (interview 18.10.12).

The Win-Win discourse
The construction of India’s national interest as growth also constitutes the centre in the Win-Win discourse (from now on WW). However, growth and climate change are understood differently, and thus the WW has a different position on India’s climate policy. The main line of reasoning in the WW is: (1) India’s national interest is economic growth, (2) but climate impacts are a threat to growth and climate policy can be win-win, so (3) India needs to take some climate measures and be more pro-active internationally. I find that a construction of national identity as an emerging economy is often used within the WW, and a classical statement could be “India is an emerging economy and needs to take the responsibility which follows”.

Growth and climate policy as win-win
As in the TW, the nodal point in the WW is economic growth. Rajamani explains one of the perspectives within the debate on climate politics in India in the following way:

Quite apart of what is happening at the international level, quite apart from what the Americans are doing or not doing, we need to focus on what we can do, because climate change is a serious threat, it is going to affect our economy, it is going to affect our monsoon, it is going to affect our agriculture, so we need to take it seriously, and not tie our actions or inactions to American actions or in actions, or Chinese actions or inactions. We should think of it independently because it is a serious threat and we need to take it seriously. And in that context we should do what we can anyway. So, energy efficiency is a win-win, renewables, in many respects is a win-win for us. If we take strong actions in those areas it would also benefit us in terms of providing energy security for us, and there are sorts of any sorts of benefits for doing it anyway. So, at least, as far as those actions are concerned, we should take it seriously and we should do it seriously. And we should perhaps be more proactive in setting the agenda in the international negotiations, rather than always having a defensive attitude (interview 31.8.12).

The quote above touches upon many elements of the WW which I will discuss, such as India’s vulnerability to climate change and the belief in win-win policies. In the WW, development and climate policies are seen to be in a win-win relationship, rather than in a conflict like in the TW. The win-win relationship builds upon the notion of decoupling which I mentioned in chapter three Some informants talk specifically about the possibility of decoupling growth from emissions. Mandal states that “the whole policy on emission reduction as intensity is actually to decouple the development and emission increasing in income” (interview 4.9.12). Informants furthermore state that India should do what is beneficial in any case. Rajamani states that “we are taking actions where we can, where we think there are climate co-benefits we take them. So, development actions with climate co-
benefits, rather than climate actions with developmental co-benefits” (interview 31.8.12). The concept of co-benefits implies that some climate policies can serve India’s growth interest and development goals. Actors holding the WW argue that climate policies can help India reach developmental goals such as energy security, energy access for more people and that energy efficiency is economically beneficial regardless of climate change. Energy security, a more sustainable energy mix and using resources more efficiently is very central to the climate debate in India (Sethi, interview 30.8.12).

Some actors also see advocating for more renewable energy as a window of opportunity to push the Government to be more ambitious on climate change mitigation. Krishnaswamy (interview 4.9.12), a civil society actor, suggests that one should look at climate measures as development policies or energy access improvements rather than mitigation. He states that:

I am telling to the Indians: Do not treat it as climate mitigation, but renewable energy and energy access as something you have to anyways do. If you treat it as mitigation, then you will see it as it carbon mitigation, but it is more developmental policies (interview 4.9.12).

Furthermore, he argues that you should look at mitigation from a domestic perspective, more in terms of addressing inequalities and inclusive growth within India. This demonstrates that elements of the WW is relating to frames from the early constructions of climate change. The statements from the informant above show that it is sensitive to talk about mitigation in India since it has been constructed as the West’s responsibility and a threat to growth. Renewable energy on the other hand, is less controversial since it helps energy security.

In the TW it is emphasized that India is a developing country which needs to grow. The WW contains another construction of national identity; India is an emerging economy which needs to take responsibility. Gupta (interview 27.9.12) explains that some actors in climate policy-making in India see the country more as an emerging economy than a developing country. Some informants emphasize that India has more capabilities than before, and more than poorer developing nations. For example, Goswami (interview 17.9.12) emphasizes that India is in a different position now than in 1992 when the UNFCC was established. Rather than emphasizing the colonial past and exploitation of developing countries, India’s future as a super power is emphasized in the WW. A government official informant (interview 8.10.12) points at the fact that India is seeking a more important role in the public diplomacy and therefore should be more proactive in international climate negotiations.
Climate change as a threat and opportunity

In difference from the TW, climate change impacts are constructed as a threat to India in the WW. By articulations of India’s vulnerability climate change is introduced as a threat to India’s growth. Several informants state that India is one of the most vulnerable countries to the effect of climate change. Panwar points to India’s vulnerability and says “it is in India’s interest to take action on climate change, because of the vulnerable position in which we have so many poor people, such a large coastline, high density of people, (...) and our agriculture depend too much on the monsoon” (interview 1.10.12). Another informant is also concerned about the agricultural sector due to sea level rise; “if there is raising sea level, then large parts of the coastal areas, which are also very important areas for agriculture production, they might be affected, salinity might increase and low-lying areas might go under water” (interview 25.9.12). Khalid states that a possible effect of climate change is increased migration from neighbouring countries like Bangladesh (interview 12.9.12). Gupta (interview 27.9.12) argues that there is increased awareness in India about how climate change is affecting India’s national GDP growth. From this we see that climate change in the WW is framed as a threat to national security and national economy. Fisher (2012) also finds that some new frames and storylines about climate change in India emphasize climate change as a concern to national security.

Climate change is also seen as an opportunity in the WW, in two different ways. The first way in which climate change is framed as an opportunity is that climate policies can be positive for India’s national economy. This builds upon the notion of win-win policies, and holds that climate policies actually can trigger economic development in India. Khalid (interview 12.9.12) states that climate change should not be seen as a burden for India, but rather as an opportunity; especially as an opportunity for entrepreneurs in the renewable energy sector. One way that climate policy is seen to help economic growth in India is through international mechanisms such as CDM projects (Das 2012). Fisher (2012) explains that it is being framed that India can become leader in green technologies, following the example of China. Sengupta (2012) explains that there is a growing sense in India that taking proactive action on climate change can position India well in order to benefit from the emerging growth and business opportunities in clean technology and the transition to a more energy efficient form of energy secure development.
The second way in which climate change is seen as an opportunity is the international climate change negotiations as an arena where India can improve her reputation, something which can help India reach international ambitions. Goswami says:

I think India could be much more positive when it comes to climate change in the negotiations. (...) India plays a far way to defensive game and India shouldn’t. If India actually much plays a much more positive game it is better for us, it is better for the country (interview 17.9.12).

Some informants argue that India should be more proactive because a strong climate regime is in the interest of vulnerable India, and others say it is important when India seeks a greater role in international diplomacy. As mentioned in chapter four, India is seeking to have more influence in international politics, by for example having a seat in the UN Security Council. Tharoor states that to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council “goes to the heart of the new set of aspirations that prevails across the Indian middle class and its elite for a meaningful role on the global stage” (2012:367). A government official (interview 8.10.12) states that in order for India to get a meaningful role in international diplomacy India needs to be more pro-active in the international climate negotiations and not be seen as a “naysayer”. Similarly a former member of the Planning Commission states that India needs to take action on climate change “for our own reputation” (interview 5.10.12).

**Climate co-benefits and a more proactive India**

Even though the TW and WW have the same centre they have quite different positions on what India should do on climate change. The TW holds that India should focus on growth domestically and be defensive internationally. The WW rather holds that it is in India’s interest to take action on climate change. The belief in win-win policies emphasise on India’s vulnerability makes it possible to argue for climate policies within the frame of a national interest in growth. It is argued that it is in India’s own interest to implement climate policies:

India is not responsible for climate change, but yet we would like to do for our own interest, energy security and other things, we should reduce our energy consumption. And as a part of that you know carbon emissions can also be reduced. India has a great interest in global climate, because India is highly vulnerable to climate change (interview 5.10.12).

In the quote above the informant operates within the frames of India’s national interest. We can see how the articulation of India’s vulnerability is used in the argumentation for climate action.

When it comes to the national WW position on climate change, it can be called “greening growth”. The WW holds that India’s future development should be less carbon intensive, but
not that India should take measures to reduce total emissions. India should do “what is beneficial anyway”, like increase the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix, improve energy access by providing solar power and improve energy efficiency in industries. Some informants also argue that India can do even more in terms of mitigation domestically if international support is provided. For this technology transfer and financial support from developed countries is central (Krishnaswamy, interview 4.9.12). Within the WW it is, as in the TW, emphasised that climate change is a problem caused by the West. However, many informants argue that the responsibility is not merely the West’s. They want India to contribute to the solutions to climate change.

In terms of India’s role in the international negotiations it is argued that India should play a more proactive role. As Rajamani puts it; “we should perhaps be more proactive in setting the agenda in the international negotiations, rather than always having a defensive attitude” (interview 31.8.12). Some informants argue that being more proactive implies being pragmatic regarding the principles in the Convention, which the Government of India often has emphasized. Sethi (interview 30.8.12) argues that the principles of equity and historical emissions have a strong position within the government, at the same time as there are some actors who would call them old fashion. He explains that some actors would say:

We can manage - let’s not stick to the old principles. We look upon them more as say chunks out of history, of middle 80s, principles which were set at the time when the Berlin wall was falling down. A lot has changed since then. So some of them believe it is archive and under the current geopolitical scenario it is difficult to see how they can sustain it (interview 30.8.12).

In the quote above the informant explains that some actors say it is difficult for India to promote the same principles as before, due to how the world and India herself has changed. Jogesh (interview 31.8.12) explains that some actors have tried to redefine what the equity principle should mean to India. The WW’s international position is more pragmatic regarding equity principles than the TW.

The Radical Green discourse
While the TW and the WW are centred on the construction of India’s national interest as economic growth, the Radical Green discourse (from now on RG) has a radically different nodal point. The centre of the RG is social justice and ecological sustainability. The line of reasoning within this discourse is: (1) India’s growth strategy cannot provide justice and ecological sustainability, (2) there is great disparity in wealth and emissions, and (3) India needs a different development strategy all together. The RG does not contain a construction of
one single national identity, it rather emphasizes that India is a divided society and actors holding the RG have a more internationalist orientation.

**Social justice and ecological sustainability**

The RG challenges the centre of the two other discourses by questioning the construction of one national interest and whether that interest is growth. Bidwai argues that the national interest in growth is an elitist construction, and that emissions are growing in the name of the poor, but not benefitting them (interview 28.9.12). Several informants argue that the liberal growth strategy is not benefitting the poor and cannot lead to a low carbon society in India. Bidwai states that: “A lot of people are completely disillusioned with ‘GDPism’; the obsession with GDP growth. We have seen two decades of high growth and that growth has made very little difference to the vast majority of the poor” (interview 28.9.12). Raghunandan states: “We have GDP growth at 8%, but a poverty removal at 2%” (interview 24.09.12). Several informants explain that the growth has not reached the poor because ‘trickle down’ is not working. This quote illustrates this opinion:

> So for us growth mean 8% GDP, 9% GDP, 10% GDP, rather than really inclusive growth. So then there have been lots of studies and debate on that, but then governments after government have always pursued GDP as a way forward. For India the growth theory has been that if the GDP goes up, the purchasing power increases, when the purchasing power increases the, you know that theory, more jobs are created, if more jobs are created it will trickle down to rural areas - some nonsense theory (Krishnaswamy, interview 4.9.12).

The quote above shows that the informant is critical about the strong focus on GDP and the belief that this will reach the poor in India. Informants argue that India’s current climate policy, as well as the growth strategy is not good for the poor. Hande states that: “I do not agree with the stance, because (…) I would pick a stance which is actually good for the poor, but large coal fire plants and nuclear is not going to help the poor” (interview 13.9.12). Jogesh (interview 31.8.12) argues that the national climate policy is not pro-poor. Several informants argue that in the same way as growth will not trickle down to the poor energy will not trickle down. As Raghunandan puts it; “just because I generate energy doesn’t mean that energy will flow to the villages. So I think if you got to reach energy into the rural areas you must specifically target rural areas, only then you will reach” (interview 24.9.12).

Bidwai questions the construction of one national interest; “as if there is something common called a national interest in a class society. It is bullshit!” (interview 28.9.12). Informants argue that presenting India as a developing country hides the internal differences. The focus on per capita emissions “hides the vast differences that exist between the rich and the poor
and their emissions” (Bidwai, interview 28.9.12). On the other hand, presenting India as an emerging economy is based on elitist aspirations, as Bidwai states: “Nobody except the elite and policy circles will talk about India being an emerging power. It means nothing to those people! What does India in G20 means to them?” (interview 28.9.12).

Within the RG it is also being emphasised that climate policy-making in itself is elitist. Informants argue that there is no proper involvement of civil society actors in the decision making process. An informant (interview 2.10.12) argues that there is a huge governance and transparency issues in Indian climate policy, since there is only a few big institutions with influence. Hande (interview13.9.12) emphasizes that the poor should be included in the policy-process as stakeholders.

The RG can be understood as a counter-discourse to both the TW and the WW since it questions their centres. Actors who hold the RG advocate for equity and redistribution rather than GDP growth. Bidwai says: “We have had enough of growth, we need equity and redistribution. We need a more balanced growth; even if it is less growth it does not matter” (interview 28.9.12). The RG is thus not centred on an understanding of what is India’s national interest, but rather what is good for the poor. In addition to being centred on social justice, ecological sustainability is also a nodal point. For example, Shrivastava and Kothari (2012) suggest a different development path for India, by going from ‘developmentality’ to ‘ecologicality’. Ecologicality should be based on the two fundamental principles ecological sustainability and human equity. Ecological sustainability to them means continuing integrity of the ecosystems and ecological functions and human equity compromise a mix of features, like equality in opportunity and full access to decision-making forums for all. The RG thus constitutes a system critique of India’s development strategy and policy-making process.

The understanding of ‘Us’ in the RG emphasizes India as a divided society. It is emphasized that needs and capacities differ a lot among people within India. The socio-economic differences within India are sometimes being referred to as “there are two Indias within India” (Mandal, interview 04.10.12) and India and Bharat:

That we have come to live in two countries, India and Bharat, has long been widely recognized. And yet, it is a fact whose full implications remain undigested, even as schism between the two gets wider due to the policies of the past several decades. While the two countries are joined at hip – like Siamese twins - they continue to drink at different waterholes. While one grapples with problems of obesity, the other is malnourished. While one shops in dazzling malls, the other finds it every day more difficult to buy what is sold in the local bazaars. If one seeps down the new expressway in luxury sedans, the other gets packed into rickety buses headed for a very different direction (Shrivastava and Kothari 2012:11).
As seen in the quote the presentation of two “Indias”, or two identities of India, is a way of emphasizing the internal inequalities in the country. Actors holding the RG also seem to have an internationalist perspective, in difference from a more nationalist perspective within the TW and WW. I understand internationalism as a perspective where you emphasize not only being citizens of a country, but also of the world. Internationalists furthermore believe in international solidarity and are often supportive of international organizations, such as the UN. Hande, for example, states that “rather than just talking about what India wants (…) you should look at the world as one and what are the policies that can affect the earth wholly” (interview 13.9.12). Other informants emphasize that India should seek what is good for the poor, rather than thinking of national interests.

**Climate change as a threat to the poor and climate justice rich/poor**

In the RG climate change is seen as a threat to India’s poor. In the WW the main focus is on India’s national vulnerability, while in the RG on the other hand, the focus is on poor peoples’ vulnerability to climate change. In a report published by Greenpeace India (2007) the emphasis on the poor’s vulnerability is clearly stated. The report states that:

> While the rich can invest in diverse, assets the poor only own one shelter and probably a piece of land and some cattle, all of which are affected by extreme weather conditions. Experience tells us that recovery from extreme weather events like floods and storms in poor underdeveloped areas takes far longer than in affluent areas (Greenpeace India 2007:5).

In the quote above Greenpeace India highlights that poor people are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than the rich. Some informants are worried that people’s vulnerability to climate change is not addressed properly. Raghunandan says: “I don’t think the realization of these impacts has yet fully percolated down into people’s minds; either at government level or people’s level, industry level, farms level” (interview 24.9.12).

I have discussed earlier how climate justice in a North/South term has been an important frame in Indian climate politics. The RG challenges the North/South framing and the per capita approach, by arguing that the focus should rather be on climate justice in terms of rich/poor. Hande argues that the whole climate politics debate has gone wrong by being about the developed world versus the developing world:

> I would rather have a debate between the rich and the poor. What are the policies that need to be done? Because, if you look at the climate impacts, developed versus developing country debate; the rich in India gets away, because they hide behind the poor. And the poor in the United States are lost because everyone thinks that US is a rich country. And what is the difference between a poor in Sri Lanka and a poor in India and a poor in Africa? (interview 13.9.12).
In the quote Hande challenges national borders and North/South as the dividing line for climate justice. This view is thus challenging the construction of Indian national interest by not having a national perspective but rather a more internationalist perspective. In the TW the oppressed, the Subaltern, is India as a country. In the RG on the other hand, the poor, regardless nationality, are the Subalterns. The exploiting subject is the rich elite, also within India.

Actors holding the RG challenge the ‘per capita approach’ to burden sharing. Bidwai (interview 28.9.12) argues that “per capita emissions are highly differentiated in societies like India. And it makes no sense” (interview 28.9.12). The RG does not accept to only talk about India’s low average per capita emissions, since they emphasize disparity in emissions between people in India. Jogesh explains:

It is a very logical argument, the whole idea about the common, but differentiated responsibility, the idea of burden sharing, the idea of historical emissions, and the fact that there have to be a per capita calculations, these are very logical. You know, if you have not seen other contexts as well, the context being that India is now the third largest emitter (...). You know, a lot of people are not being told that that the increases in emissions are not coming because poor are taking up carbon space, but increasingly it is double counting amongst slightly more affluent, which is a smaller portion for sure (interview 31.8.12).

In the quote Jogesh questions the ‘per capita approach’ by arguing that it allows the rich in India to increase emissions. The aim of the Greenpeace India report *Hiding Behind the Poor* was to raise the debate of equity within India and it asks: “Is there climate injustice happening within India?” (2007:2). The report presents data on emission disparity within the country and argues that India is hiding behind its poor population when using its low per capita emissions as a reason for not having to take on mitigation actions. The report asks: “Is it not the obligation of the Indian government which demands differentiated responsibility in the international arena to establish the same within India?” (Greenpeace India 2007:4).

**Equity domestically as well as internationally**

Nationally, the position on climate change politics within the RG is that India needs a different growth strategy all together. It is argued that the current strategy does not benefit the poor and will not lead to a low carbon growth. India hence needs a development strategy which is more focused on social justice, redistribution and ecology. A different growth strategy comprises that India can do more in terms of climate change if rich sectors of societies are targeted. Hande questions the current Indian policy on climate change:
India is a big country and today the solutions cannot be banded and say this is the solution for the rich and this is the solution for the poor. (...) You see people living in Gurgaon – how can we create a uniform climate change policy for living in Gurgaon and remote parts of Orissa? (interview 13.9.12).

Gurgaon is a satellite city to Delhi and Orissa one of India’s poorest states. In the quote the informant implies that there are different needs and capacities among people in India. Several informants argue that Indian climate policy could be more ambitious if one tried to reduce emissions among the rich. Raghunandan explains how he thinks India can do more through addressing inequality domestically:

See, just as we argue internationally that the richer countries need to do more and the poorer countries need to do less, same thing applies within India. Richer people in India, but more than that, richer sector of the economy, some sectors of the economy and some sections of society can take more burdens so as to allow some sections of the country and some sectors of the economy to grow. For example rural energy consumption needs to go up. One of the ways for rural energy consumption to go up is for urban energy consumption to come down and doesn’t mean reduction of urban emissions, it means slowing down of the urban energy growth (interview 24.9.12).

In the quote Raghunandan suggests focusing on equality in consumption and living standard within India, in the same way as India is promoting justice between North and South internationally. Some actors holding the RG refers to Gandhi ideology when promoting focus on social justice within India. Bidwai states:

The climate debate should provoke serious engagement with Gandhian legacy of austerity, premised upon a radical critique of industrialism and consumerism. Mahatma Gandhi theorised a way of life that seeks harmony with nature. He also stipulated an overarching criterion for evaluating all ideas about progress: ask what they would do for the poorest of the poor (2012:xx).

From this quote we see how the RG has radically different visions for India, it does not talk about the need for high GDP growth, but harmony with nature and what is good for the poor. Within the RG there is also a strong focus on the need for climate adaptation policies. Informants argue that Indian policy-makers have neglected adaptation priorities and thus the needs of the poor.

When it comes to the international position it is argued within the RG that India could be more proactive. Bidwai states that “you can blame the North and rightly so, but the South has also not been very forthcoming, especially these big powers which we are expecting to play a role” (interview 28.9.12). Raghunandan says that “we are not part of the problem, but we can be a part of the solution” (interview 24.9.12). Informants want India to take a stronger position to secure a legally binding and fair climate agreement. They think India has supported the creation of a loose regime because of fear of having to take on legal commitments. Civil society actors argue that large developing countries like India are increasingly promoting the same position as developed countries (observation 810.12). Hande
says that he wants India to take ambitious actions for the poor at home and “go to the negotiating table and say: this is what I will do for 500 million people. Now tell me what you are going to do. Rather than saying: you do not do and then I will not” (interview 13.9.12). In addition to promoting what is good for the poor, actors holding the RG also point at what climate science demands. Raghunandan (interview 24.9.12) points at scientific arguments which suggest that in order to avoid global increase in temperature by two degrees, developing countries’ emissions need to derive from their baseline emissions. Furthermore, he argues that India has more capabilities than many poor countries:

I think India has more capabilities than Bangladesh, Somalia, Nigeria and Burkina Faso. Then if we have greater capabilities, which means we have a stronger economy, better technologies and good industrial infrastructure I should be able to contribute more (interview 24.9.12).

The RG’s position, that India needs to be more proactive, is not because this can gain Indian interests, but rather that it is necessary in order to combat international climate change.

Summary
I will now discuss how the three sets of discourses converge and diverge on different elements, and how they can be understood in relation to general environmental discourses. But first I will sum up the main elements in the three discourses (figure 2).

The concept of discourse contains the analytical point that something can mean different things to different people, in different contexts and traditions (Neumann 2001). In this chapter I have showed how climate politics is constructed differently by different people within the debate and policy-making on climate politics in India. The TW’s centre is the construction of India’s national interest as economic growth. Climate change is seen as a Western agenda and international climate politics is seen as a threat to the growth interest. The TW’s position on what India should do in international climate politics is therefore to protect India’s right to growth. Nationally, India should focus on development. The centre of the WW is also a national interest in growth. The discourse contains an acknowledgement of India’s vulnerability to climate change, and climate change is thus seen as a threat to economic growth. In contrast to the TW, the WW also sees climate change as an opportunity for India. Following the position is that India should green her growth nationally and be more proactive in the international climate negotiations. The RG is not centred on one national interest and questions the very concept since it sees India as an unequal society. The centre of the RG is social equity and ecological sustainability. Climate change is constructed as a threat to the poor in India and the need for internal equity is emphasised in addition to North/South equity.
The RG wants India to pursue a different growth strategy and internationally be more pro-active based on what is good for the poor and demanded by science.

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<th>Win-Win (WW)</th>
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**Figure 2: Indian climate politics discourses**

As mentioned previously, the discourses I have presented are stereotyped versions of a more complex reality. The borders between the different discourses are fluid, as there are overlaps on some elements. On the other hand, there are strong divergences on other elements. The TW and WW are both constructed around the centre of a national interest in growth. The constructions of national interests are very strong and the other elements to a great extent follow from that. The TW’s construction of growth can be traced to Nehru’s growth strategy from post-independence, as described in chapter four. He believed that India had to ensure complete sovereignty through economic independence from the West. Development would be ensured by planned economic modernisation and inward-looking industrial strategies (Sharma 2009). This growth strategy falls into the dependency theory tradition. The construction of growth in the WW, on the other hand, can be traced back to the liberal and outward-looking growth strategy from the reforms of 1991. This strategy resembles a neoliberal version of modernisation theory. Even though the TW and WW contain different growth strategies, the primacy of growth makes them closer to each other than to the RG. Also, seeing the TW and WW in a historical context, the WW can be seen as renewed version of the TW (although both exist in the current debate).

The RG is critical about the very construction of national interest and the centre is rather social justice and ecological suitability. While the TW and WW are embedded in elite circles, the RG is embedded in civil society movements. According to Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) the life of ‘Mahatma’ Gandhi has had a considerable influence on the environmental movement in India. From the Chipko movement to the ‘Save the Narmada movement’, environmental activist have relied on Gandhian techniques of non-violence and polemics against heavy industrialisation. In contrast to Nehru, Gandhi’s understanding of colonialism
implied that India should not emulate Western patterns of industrial development. Gandhi’s visions for development were village-centred; he suggested decentralised economic and political power and villages to be in control of their own affairs. Gandhi’s strategy for development and the RG’s position thus fall into the alternative development thinking. The environmental movement in India often holds that Gandhi had outlined a plan of ecological sound development, and that this was set aside by Nehru, who imposed on independent India his own model of capital-intensive, energy-intensive, environmental destructive economic development (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997). The inspiration of Gandhi helps in understanding the centre of the RG. Gandhi believed in voluntary simplistic as an alternative to modern lifestyle, which one of his famous quotes illustrates: “Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s need, but not every man’s greed” (Schumacher 2010:34).

There are elements of convergence also between the RG and TW in the way they both emphasise climate justice. I have explained how North/South equity is central in the TW and RG, and how the latter in addition emphasizes internal equity. The two founding fathers of India, which the discourses get inspiration from both emphasised liberation. Nehru emphasised the liberation of India, colonies and former colonised countries, and called for a more just world order. I have also explained how Gandhi focused on liberation as social justice, and especially liberation for rural India. The WW on the other hand is more silent on equity and possesses a more pragmatic orientation.

The WW and RG both emphasise vulnerability and thus climate change as a threat. The WW focuses on the vulnerability of national security and national growth, while the RG focuses on the vulnerability of poor people. The emphasis on climate change as a threat makes the WW and RG more proactive than the TW on what India should do on climate change. Regarding the national position on climate change, the TW represents a status quo-position and holds that India should focus on growth. The WW’s position is a reformist position by arguing that green future growth is possible within India’s current economic and political paradigm. The RG’s position is a radical version by calling for a different growth strategy all together. Regarding the international position, the WW and RG similarly argue that India should be more proactive, while the TW holds a defensive position. The WW and RG contain different reasoning for India to be more proactive. The WW holds that it is in India’s national interest to engage more proactively in order to get a better reputation. The RG holds that India needs to take proactive climate action in order for the international problem of climate change to be solved. The latter is thus an internationalist approach, while the former is nationalistic.
When it comes to the international position, it is a strong divergence between the TW and WW. The TW, as mentioned, holds that India first and foremost should protect her space for growth and thus be defensive, while the TW wants India to be more proactive. These different international positions are also linked to the different constructions of ‘Us’. The construction of national identity becomes important when interacting with other states internationally. The TW’s position is in line with the foreign policy-thinking in India post-independence, where India saw herself as a leader of the Third World block and as from the high moral ground. The WW is closer to the new thinking in foreign policy after 1991, where India is seen as an emerging power and seeks a seat at the high table of international diplomacy.

The TW and RG can be understood as two different versions of green radicalism. In chapter three I explained that the green radicalism discourse in the global South is characterised with an emphasis on climate justice and seeing climate politics as eco-imperialism (Shiva 2008). The TW is a state version of green radicalism, as it focuses on injustice between Northern and Southern states. The RG is a civil society version of green radicalism which not only focus on the structural injustice globally, but also emphasizes ‘internal colonialism’; which points at hierarchies of power within a post-colonial state as well (Jogeshi 2011). Furthermore, both suggest radical shifts; the TW in international order and North/South relations and the RG in the very development strategy of India. The WW on the other hand, can be understood as a version of ecological modernisation. It is more silent on equity and it is reform-oriented. 

Hajer (1995) explains that ecological modernisation does not entail the same justice dimension as other environmental discourses. The WW, just like ecological modernisation, furthermore holds that economic growth and environment can be reconciled in a liberal market oriented economy. This win-win relation is grounded in the premise that environmental degradation can be decoupled from economic growth.

The three sets of discourses which I discuss in this chapter are identified through an inductive analysis process. However, I acknowledge that other scholars have done work on Indian climate discourses. Dubash (2012a, 2012c) and Bidwai (2012) identify three stereotyped discourses about Indian climate politics each, which have some similarities with the discourses I have identified (appendix V). All the classifications emphasise different constructions of the relationship between economic growth and climate policy and the role of equity. However, Dubash’s and Bidwai’s classifications are more policy oriented than mine. I have attempted to investigate how elements such as the construction of national interest, identity and development are constructed in the context of climate change. Dubash’s and
Bidwai’s work have not recognised the radical growth critique which I have identified in the RG. This might be because their studies are oriented towards discourses which have influenced climate policy, and as I will come back to in chapter six, the RG exists outside the small policy circle of policy-making on climate change in India.

In the beginning of the chapter I presented the discourses as three separate social constructions of climate politics in India. I will use the three discourses furthermore in the analysis, and hopefully prove that they are useful categorisations. However, it is important to acknowledge that discourses do not exist in isolation from other ideas and that there are several ways of classifying Indian climate discourses.

In this chapter I have showed that there are different perspectives on climate politics among key actors in the climate debate and policy-making in India. And furthermore that different constructions of national interest, identity and climate change lead to different positions on what India should do on climate change. It is often argued that social constructivism and discourse analysis can be used to highlight aspects of politics that are overlooked by materialist approaches (Wendt 1999, Pettenger 2007c). I have demonstrated that discourse analysis can also be used in order to analyse central elements in materialist approaches to climate politics, such as national interest. By investigating how national interests are socially constructed and related to identity one can indigenize and domesticize the formation of national interests. In have showed that India’s national interest in terms of climate politics is constructed in different ways, and that national interests in this case are therefore not something static and pre-given.
6. From discursive change to policy changes

In chapter three I argued that discourse analysis consists of three main tasks. The first of these were completed in chapter five when the different discourses were identified. In this chapter I will focus on the two other tasks Adger et al. (2001) suggests: Analyse the actors producing, reproducing and transforming discourses, and then the social and policy outcomes of these discourses. First, I will discuss discursive elements which have emerged in the climate debate in India and challenged the dominance of the TW. I will present actors who have represented these elements and how they have contributed to redefining how India’s national interest is constructed in the context of climate change. Second, I will look at the emergence of national climate policy in India from around 2007 and how it can be understood as an institutionalisation, or a political outcome, of the WW. Third, I will discuss to what extent the WW has also been institutionalised in India’s position to the international negotiations. Fourth, I will discuss exclusion as an outcome of the dominant discourses. I will investigate to what extent perspectives within the RG and actors promoting these perspectives are excluded from the debate and decision-making process on climate change in India.

Discursive elements challenging the dominance of the TW

As described in chapter four, climate change was for a long time only a foreign policy issue in India. A small discourse coalition dominated by Ministry of the Environment and Forest (MoEF) was deciding on India’s position. India’s main objective internationally was to protect India’s space to grow by promoting the need for an equitable regime. The principles of CBDR, historical emissions and the per capita approach were central to India’s position. Nationally, India focused on growth. In other words, the TW was institutionalised in Indian climate politics. I will in the first part of this chapter discuss discursive elements and actors which have challenged the dominance of the TW and contributed to a redefinition of what India’s interest means in the context of climate politics.

More actors and diversity in the climate debate

Several informants state that more actors became active in the climate debate in India around 2007. A former government official (interview 12.10.12) explains that over the last five years the larger public has become more involved, due to increased awareness about the challenge of climate change. State governments, the larger section of research institutions, a large
number of NGOs, the press and the business community are now interested in climate politics. Jogesh states that:

It is no longer just NGOs or research organisations like The Energy and Resource Institute and Centre for Science and the Environment driving the debate, but a host of economics, academics, scientists, former diplomats and dedicated in-house reporters opining on the economics and ethics of the climate issue (2012:278-279).

In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published their fourth assessment report, IPCC AR4 (IPCC 2007). The same year IPCC and Al Gore Jr. jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize. Several informants argue that this was an important trigger for debate and awareness about climate change in India. The fact that the chair of IPCC is the Indian researcher Pachauri (he is also the general director of TERI) helped bring attention to the findings in the report in India. Krishnaswamy says that “one thing was the IPCC report, and the fact of the matter that the IPCC was headed by R. K. Pachauri. So, you have an Indian there and R. K. Pachauri has been a fairly powerful guy” (interview 4.9.12). He furthermore explains that Pachauri has direct lines to the Prime Minister as well as to the leadership in several Indian states.

Several informants say that around 2007 climate change was increasingly reported in Indian media. Gupta states that “until 2007 it was a very small thing. They had a climate negotiation in New Delhi [in 2002] and none of us knew about it. (…) It was hardly reported” (interview 27.9.12). Sethi (interview 30.8.12), a journalist in Times of India, states that climate change reporting peaked in that newspaper in 2007. Because it was in the run-up to the Copenhagen 2009, it was enough pressure and climate change became a topic in domestic policy. Jogesh explains that even in local language newspapers journalists and the public started to discuss climate change and ask: “What does climate change mean for India?” (interview 31.8.12). As more actors, including journalists became engaged in climate change the representations in media became more diverse. As described in chapter four, the Indian press has tended to represent the TW when writing about climate politics. Jogesh, a former journalist, explains that before Copenhagen 2009 criticizing India’s position was regarded as anti-nationalistic, as “you are not thinking about the country’s development, you are not thinking about the country’s need for carbon space, the need to develop, the need for growth” (interview 31.8.12). Jogesh (2012) finds in a study of articles on climate change in Indian English language newspapers between September 2009 and March 2010 that climate action was not ‘Othered’ in Indian press to the same extent as before. A noteworthy number of pieces state that emerging economies, including India, need to do more in terms of climate action. Jogesh
(2012) also finds that the risk and impacts of climate change were discussed in the newspapers.

*The articulations of India's vulnerability*

Many informants articulate that India, due to her vulnerability should take action on climate change. Panwar (interview 1.10.12) states that during the last seven to nine years there is a growing realization that it is in India’s own interest to give priority to climate change. Bidwai explains that increasingly people believe that “independent from what happens at the international negotiations, India has to do a lot for the sake of its own people, for reducing its emissions and becoming less dependent on fossil fuels and moving towards a low carbon economic trajectory” (interview 28.9.12). As discussed in chapter three, knowledge creation and science constitute a possibility for change by constructing climate knowledge. Many informants talk about increased knowledge and awareness about India’s vulnerability as something relatively new which has been an important driver for climate policy. Informants explain that the IPCC report achieved much attention in the public debate in India. Other reports from various research institutes also contributed to increased awareness about climate change. Gupta (interview 27.9.12) states that National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) was a reaction the IPCC report, as well as economic reviews which quantified the effects of climate change on the Indian economy. He explains that “they quantified that climate change is costing India 2,6 % of India’s GDP. And 2,6 % of the GDP of a big country like India is a huge amount. So all this together brought that realization that; yes, there are some things we need to do” (interview 27.9.12). A former government official (interview 12.10.12) states that science in general was a driver for increased focus on climate change in national policy making domain around 2007. The IPCC, Pachauri and other Indian climate researchers and research institutions seem to have acted as ‘knowledge brokers’ and brought increased attention to climate change in India. Being an Indian seems to have made it easier for Pachauri to serve as an important knowledge broker. Climate science was no longer something which merely the Western scientists and politicians talked about. This is in line with Lahsen’s (2007) point that policy-makers in the global South have hesitated to accept the objectivity of climate science when Northern scientists and institutions have been dominant.

India’s vulnerability to climate change as a reason for taking action has been articulated by both politicians and civil society actors. For example, WWF India has since 2005 had a India Climate Witness program, where the goal has been to “raise awareness of climate change, by involving Indian communities most impacted in broadcasting the impacts they’ve witnessed,
in order to inspire increased action and proactive solutions”. Former Minister of the Environment and the Forest Ramesh has often articulated that since India is vulnerable to climate change it is her own interest to take climate action. For example, when he informed Parliament about India’s intensity target he said: “More than the international community, we have to show action to our own people — to those living in the Sunderbans, in the northeast, in the Himalayas — that the government was serious about tackling climate change”. In this statement climate change is not ‘Othered’, it is rather emphasized that Indians will feel the effects and it is thus in India’s interest to take action. Ramesh explains that he intentionally has highlighted India’s vulnerability: “Ever since I became the Minister (…) I have been trying to spread this message that the most vulnerable country in the world to climate change is India” (quoted in Prabhu 2012:238). Gupta (interview 27.9.12) argues that Ramesh did this strategically in order to push the debate in India, to show that it is in India’s interest to take action on climate change.

As described in chapter five, the TW holds that climate politics is a threat to India’s growth, and it is therefore not in India’s interest to take action on climate change. The articulation of India’s vulnerability challenges this construction by emphasizing that climate change will have an impact on India’s people and economic growth. Consequently, it is argued that it is in India’s own interest to develop and implement climate policies. India should take action on climate change not because the West has been telling India to do so, but because it is in India’s self-interest.

**The articulations of climate policy as an opportunity**

According to Dubash (2012c) an important element which has emerged in Indian climate debate is that not all climate mitigation needs to be at the cost of growth or poverty alleviation. Energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives are seen as important for India to increase energy security, energy efficiency and cost-competitiveness for industries. Climate change policies are thus not seen as in conflict with development, and climate change constitutes an opportunity. As one informant explains, is the climate debate “is essentially linked up with the whole issue of India’s development prospects, and perhaps much more specifically with respect to energy security” (interview 25.9.12). Jogesh says that “the benefits are so many if

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11 WWF India: http://www.wwfindia.org/about_wwf/reducing_footprint/climate_change_and_energy/solution/adaptation_and_impacts/climate_witness/ Accessed 29.03.2013

we implement our reforestation projects. Not just as far as climate change is concerned, but in several other ways as well” and furthermore that “a lot of advocates in India is trying to put forward is that we should focus on these kinds of actions” (interview 31.8.12). These articulations show a faith in positive co-benefits with climate policies.

Parts of the business sector have increasingly been seeing climate policy as an opportunity for India (Das 2012). Traditionally, the Indian business sector has not been active on climate change. When India’s development space is set to be safeguarded there has been no reason for the business community to be worried (Goswami, interview 17.9.12). Never (2011) finds that the business angle to climate change has had a buzz since 2007, and particularly since 2009. According to Pulver (2012) the two Indian Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), have not been active as policy advocates towards India’s position to the climate negotiations, but they have incorporated climate change into their domestic agendas. Measures to reduce GHG emissions have become popular among Indian businesses. For example, energy efficiency was seen as a way to ensure cost competitiveness for Indian companies (Das 2012). Energy costs have increased in India and is compelling business to be more efficient, “so they are doing it, not for the climate reasons, but they are doing it for their own economic reasons for cost purposes, which also give an indication as to what tools policy should use” (Raghunandan, interview 24.9.12). Already prior the launch of the national climate policy in 2008, CII was a pioneer in energy efficiency in buildings, something which was instrumental in providing a direction for the policies on energy efficiency (Das 2012). Another way in which the business sector has seen climate change as an opportunity has been by Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. Das states that CII was important in pushing the government to create policy that allowed industry to participate in the CDM: “In order to attract investment to India, CII argued that the CDM should be developed as an efficient mechanism that uses market principles” (2012:251).

Another way, in which climate change has been constructed as an opportunity, is climate action as a way for India to gain a better reputation in international diplomacy. Sengupta (2012) explains that India’s emergence as one of the key powers of the 21st century has generated greater global expectations of it playing its full part as a responsible member of the international society. Raghunandan explains that the pressure was building up from 2007 and onwards also because climate action was part of the bargain for India to be part of G8+5: “if you are going to be part of the G8+5 which became the G20, then you need to step up and do
some of these things” (interview 24.9.12). More important than the international pressure in itself, is the belief that India can benefit from living up to the expectations. As described in chapter four, India has ambitions about sitting at the high table of global diplomacy. As one government official puts it:

On the one hand we want to be part of the G20 and we want the UN system to be changed so that we have a seat in the Security Council permanently. On the other hand we cannot only be a naysayer in the international discourse, so we have to have a different nuance to our position (interview 8.10.12).

In the quote it is articulated that India needs to change the international climate position in order to be seen as a legitimate actor in other areas of international diplomacy. Another way to improve India’s reputation internationally has been to develop national climate policy. Many informants state that international expectations were an important driver for the development of national climate policy. Jogesh states that the NAPCC “was coming from a place where they wanted to show that we are trying to do work, to showcase intent and effort, from the feeling that we had been too obstructionist” (interview 31.8.12). A former government official explains that “we needed to present to the world that: look, we were taking action on our own, without waiting for finance and technology to come from the West” (interview 11.10.12).

As discussed in chapter four, the Prime Minister believes India should play a proactive role in multilateral forums. According to one informant the Prime Minister “believed in a proactive approach, where we are seen as a problem-solver (…), not as a problem” (interview 8.10.12). The Prime Minister said at the launch of the NAPCC that “Climate Change is a global challenge. It can only be successfully overcome through a global, collaborative and cooperative effort. India is prepared to play its role as a responsible member of the international community and make its own contribution”\(^\text{13}\). From this quote we see that climate change is not articulated as only the responsibility of the West, but also something which India will contribute to solving. Ramesh is another actor which has represented that climate change can be an opportunity. He has argued that visionary actions on both climate mitigation and adaptation need to be taken in India’s own self-interest.\(^\text{14}\) A government official (interview 8.10.12) says Ramesh believed that India has to be more engaged in the international process. Even though he argued that India did not cause the problem of climate


change, he believed that India still should take responsibility and do her share. India could still grow at 8 to 9% a year, but should grow more sustainably.

The first time Ramesh was seen by the wider public as someone trying to change the policy gear was in October 2009, when a letter from him to the Prime Minister leaked to the media (Sethi, interview 30.8.12). According to Times of India Ramesh, in the letter, suggested changes in Indian climate stance based on concerns that India was seen as a “bugbear” by developed countries. Ramesh promoted the idea that India should delink herself from the G77 group, junk the Kyoto protocol and take on GHG emission reductions under a new deal without guarantee of finance and technology. Ramesh wrote: “The position we take on international mitigation commitments only if supported by finance and technology needs to be nuanced simply because we need to mitigate in self-interest.” And furthermore that there could be positive advantages by taking a more proactive stand, like increased chance to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Ramesh also claimed, in the letter, that it was important to bring India closer into a set of powerful countries, like G8 and G20, and that India would find herself comfortable around that high table (Sethi, interview 30.8.12). According to Atteridge (2010) a desire among political leaders in India for global status is a strong factor in Indian foreign policy, which contributes to motivating a shift in India’s traditional approach to climate negotiations.

In the TW a conflict between climate policy and development is constructed. The articulations of climate policy as an opportunity in the different ways described above challenge this construction. It is argued that climate policies can serve other primary priorities and thus be in the interest of India.

From an internationalist and equity perspective: India can do more

Some civil society actors have also increasingly challenged the dominance of the TW. Lele (2012) states that since around 2005, with the impacts of climate change being clearer, there has been a greater engagement by Indian environmentalists with the question of climate mitigation. As described previously, knowledge about vulnerability and climate science in general has got increased attention in India. Some of the findings in IPCC report regarding

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mitigation were picked up and used by some civil society actors. In the report it is stated that in order to limit global warming to two degrees, developing nations also have to contribute:

Under most of the considered regime designs for low and medium stabilization levels, the emissions from developing countries need to deviate – as soon as possible – from what we believe today would be their baseline emissions, even if developed countries make substantial reductions (Gupta et al. 2007:775).

Raghunandan points at this finding and states:

The evidence shows that whatever be the historical responsibility, unless India, China, Brazil and Mexico also make significant contributions towards reducing emissions, not necessary reducing absolute emissions, but reducing the rate of growth of emissions, this problem cannot be solved (interview 24.9.12).

Some civil society actors and individuals started to challenge India’s climate policy and argue that “India can do more”. They argued for climate action, not on the basis of India’s national interest, but based on climate science and how India should contribute. The position is thus based on a more internationalist perspective than what is found in the TW and WW. Some civil society actors emphasize that India is different from poorer developing countries and has more capabilities to undertake climate action (Raghunandan, interview 24.9.12). They believe India should be more proactive, and according to Jogesh, “there is clearly 1/3, in terms of civil society organisations and experts, believing that we are not picking it up, we are still sticking to our standpoints from the Kyoto-days and we need to do something” (interview 31.8.12). Some Indian scholars, such as Rajamani (2009), also argue that India should play a more proactive role. Rajamani states that India must “look beyond its national interests, narrowly perceived, and engage in and catalyse actions that reflect solidarity with the international community” (2009:264).

The All India People’s Science Network was the first civil society actor who suggested a change in India’s mitigation targets (Raghunandan, interview 24.9.12). Raghunandan, who is a member of the network, explains that based on the IPCC report they realized that “India could no longer take the positions that it will not contribute to the solutions” (interview 24.9.12). The All People’s Science Network published in 2007 a statement which suggested that “India should conditionally offer to reduce its emissions growth rate provided that the developed countries agreed to undertake the deep cuts to reduce their emissions as called for by AR4” (Raghunanadan 2012:176). The network’s idea rapidly gathered momentum within civil society and was endorsed by many NGOs, think thanks, experts and social movements. It led to a campaign named Campaign for Progressive Climate Action and Policy, which was launched by a statement with specific demands to the Prime Minister in November 2009. The
submission was signed by almost 70 individuals and organizations. Almost all the big environmental and developmental NGOs like Oxfam India, Greenpeace India, WWF India joined the campaign. CSE was the only big environmental NGO which did not join (Raghunandan, interview 24.9.12).

Raghunanadan explains that when they started to go to seminars and meetings and promote the position, they expected stones to be thrown at them: “because nobody had said this before, the general popular assumption of everybody was: this is a problem caused by the global North so why should the developing countries do anything? It is their problem, they have to solve it” (interview 24.9.12). Surprisingly, they did not get stones thrown after them, and Raghunanadan believes this was partly because they are associated with the Left. People thought that “the Left cannot be doing this because the US wants them to do this” (interview 24.9.12) and thus saw them and their position as a legitimate. The All India People’s Science Network is part of a larger movement which is called The People’s Science Movements (Varma 2001). The organizations within the movement work in different ways in the interface between science, technology and society. Most of the movement’s organizations focus on grassroots activities, are influenced by Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence, tolerance and self-reliance and they “advocate for changes in structured inequality and empower people to stand for themselves” (Varma 2001:4797). The initiative by The All India People’s Science Network demonstrates that the grassroots organizations, as well as a broader coalition of civil society actors, were challenging the long-standing dominance of the TW.

Other civil society actors as well started to engage in the debate about Indian climate politics. In 2007 Greenpeace India published the report *Hiding Behind the Poor* with the objective of pushing the Government on domestic action on climate change (Krishnaswamy, interview 4.9.12). The report presents data on emissions disparities within India and argues that India is hiding behind its poor population when using its low per capita emissions as reason for not having to undertake mitigation actions. The report thus raised the question of internal equity, and it states: “If the upper and middle class do not manage to check their CO2 emissions, they will not only contribute to global warming, they will also deny hundreds of millions of poor in the country, those who will be the most severely impacted by climate change, access to development” (Greenpeace India 2007:2). In this quote we can see how Greenpeace India used much of the same rhetoric as Indian climate negotiators, but applied it on the domestic

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17 Campaign for Progressive Climate Action and Policy: http://progressiveclimatepolicycampaign.ind.blogspot.no/ Accessed 29.03.2013
inequality rather than international. Krishnaswamy (interview 4.9.12), co-editor of the Greenpeace India report, says that Greenpeace India received a lot of “flak” from the Government after the publishing. The report created debate domestically, and other actors have continued to question domestic inequality in emissions. The report got attention internationally as well, the US and EU’s negotiators pointed at the report and said to India: “oh you talk about equity and look at this report Hiding Behind the Poor” (Krishnaswamy, interview 4.9.12). According to Dubash (2012c) the ‘hiding behind the poor debate’ has nuanced the climate debate in India by embedding it within development challenges, rather than only considering them as a diplomatic problem. Chakravarty and Ramana (2012) argue that the report was an important intervention in the Indian climate debate. Pointing at the inequality in emissions is a manifestation of the longstanding debate about India’s development path.

The articulation from civil society that “India should do more” challenge the construction of national interests in both the TW and the WW, since it is based on climate change as an international problem which India needs to contribute solving. The articulations explained above are not framed within the national interest in growth, but rather that climate action is in everyone’s interest. The ‘hiding behind the poor debate’ has challenged the definition of climate equity in the TW by promoting internal equity as well as equity in the North/South context.

I will now sum up in which way all of the articulations described in this part have led to a discursive shift. The articulation of India’s vulnerability and climate change as an opportunity have contributed to redefining India’s interest on climate change. A former member of the Planning Commission sums up India’s motivation for developing national climate policy and illustrates this point:

The driving force [for national climate policy] was the realization that we are extremely vulnerable to climate change. And if we are so vulnerable then we just cannot say ‘no, no, no’, we have to make sure that we take more proactive actions to make sure that the world acts. And we have to take actions for our reputation” (interview 5.10.12).

It is difficult to assess exactly where the new elements which I have discussed are coming from. According to Cass and Pettenger (2007) a weakness of discourse analysis is to explain why particular discourses emerge and why some become dominant. I also see this as a challenge, but at the same time I believe the larger discursive context can help in this matter. The articulation of India’s vulnerability and climate policy as an opportunity fit within the
dominant international environmental discourse of ecological modernization, as well as within the liberal development paradigm which India is pursuing. I have also showed that several powerful actors have articulated elements within the WW discourse.

The articulations of India’s vulnerability to climate change and climate policy as an opportunity have contributed to redefine the construction of India’s interest on climate change. The articulations have challenged the TW and caused a discursive shift towards dominance of the WW. Researchers and research institutions, some politicians like Ramesh and business actors have been important in representing the WW. I have also shown that articulations from civil society actors have challenged the dominance of the TW. These are operating outside the frame of India’s national interest, and rather represent the RG. In the last part of this chapter I will discuss to what extent the RG has influenced Indian climate policy.

**The development of national climate policy**

I will in this part discuss to what extent the discursive shift towards the WW has been institutionalised in national climate policy in India. As argued in chapter three, the course of climate policy requires a shift in the underlying discourse, as “climate policies flow out of the dominant discourses and the associated construction of the problem” (Cass and Pettenger 2007:237).

*The Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change*

Before 2007, no comprehensive domestic climate policies can be identified in India (Never 2011). However, in 2007 an institutional initiative indicated that climate change was going from only being foreign policy to entering the domain of domestic policy-making as well. This move shows that the TW lost dominance, as the TW holds that climate change is merely the West’s responsibility and not something India should deal with nationally. The Prime Minister established a high level advisory panel on climate change named the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change in June 2007.\(^\text{18}\) A former government official (interview 12.10.12) explains that this came out of the realization that coordination among ministries was necessary in order to deal with climate change nationally. Some ministries are more powerful than others and it would not have been possible for MoEF to intervene with the other ministries affairs. The informant states that:

So, I think there was a feeling that the only way we could do this was by establishing a council directly under the Prime Minister, which includes all the ministries’ concerns. That was the level which had to resolve these differences, and that is how it was possible to come out with a national action plan on climate change. I do not think any single ministry would have been able to produce such a document (interview 12.10.12).

The establishment of the council demonstrates that climate change was considered important enough to be given higher political priority. The council was established with the Prime Minister as the chair and with 25 members from inside and outside the Government. The council was set to focus tasks such as developing a coordinated response to issues relating to climate change at the national level, and monitoring key climate change policies. Another indicator that the Government considered climate change as important nationally was when the Prime Minister’s appointed the experienced diplomat Saran as India’s special Envoy for Climate Change in April 2008.

The National Action Plan on Climate Change

As a result of the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change’s task to coordinate response to climate change at the national level, they launched the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) (GoI 2008) in June 2008. The council gave the broad parameters of India’s national climate policy by introducing of eight different missions in the NAPCC. More detailed plans of the different missions have been or are currently being developed by the respective ministries in charge of implementing the missions. The eight missions are: National Solar Mission, National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency, National Mission on Sustainable Habitat, National Water Mission, National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystems, National Mission for a Green India, National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture, National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change (GoI 2008).

A former government official (interview 25.09.12) explains that when the council started to work on the climate action plan, energy security immediately became a central element. He states: “We started to look at what would be some of the focus areas for climate change; the basic sort of strategic act that we focused on was climate change and energy security. These are two sides of the same thing” (interview 25.9.12). In line with the WW, we see that the council from the very beginning attempted to find win-win policies. The informant explains further:

If we look at India’s developmental prospect there is no doubt that whether from the point of view of energy security or from the point of view from climate change it makes sense for us to move away from

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our current dependence upon fossil fuels to a pattern of growth, to a pattern of consumption, which is based more and more on renewable sources or clean sources of energy. There is no way that we can escape that particular reality that we have to make that shift. But the good news is that while we are making that shift you are also dealing with the climate change (interview 25.9.12).

The informant explains that in terms of energy security, India has to make a shift to renewables, and fortunately this makes sense in terms of climate change as well.

The NAPCC institutionalised many elements of the WW. The understanding of climate change as a threat to India is reflected in the NAPCC. It is stated that climate change can “adversely affect the livelihood of its people”, and since the economy is closely tied to natural resources, India may face a major threat in changes in climate (GoI 2008:3). The belief in synergy between climate mitigation and developmental needs is also found to be institutionalised. The first priority is still development, as it states that “maintaining a high growth rate is essential for increasing living standards of the vast majority of our people and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change” (GoI 2008:4). Furthermore, it states that the eight missions are designed to address the urgent and critical concerns of the country with co-benefits of addressing climate change (GoI 2008). Many informants argue that NAPCC represents an attempt to find good win-win solutions for development and climate change. An informant states: “If you look at the National Action Plan on Climate Change it says we will do things that are in our own interest in any case which have co-benefits for us” (interview 5.10.12).

The NAPCC as well demonstrates that energy security is at the centre of climate policy development in India. The National Solar Mission and the National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency were often highlighted when discussing the NAPCC with informants. The two missions were the first to have their final plans approved by the council and have come the furthest in terms of implementation (interview 25.9.12). The National Solar Mission has the target of deploying 20,000 MW of grid connected solar power by 2022 and at reducing the cost of solar power generation by various policies. When the mission was launched by the Prime Minister in January 2010, he said: “If the mission is to become a reality, we will have to create many solar valleys on the lines of Silicon Valley that is spurring our IT industry across the country”\(^\text{21}\). The Prime Minister indicated that solar energy is a business opportunity

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for India and can be the “next scientific and industrial frontier in India after atomic energy, space and IT”.

The National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency is set to enable about INR 75,000 crore (USD 13.6 billions) worth transactions in energy efficiency and save about 5% of annual energy consumption by 2015. One of the main initiatives under this mission is the Preform, Act and Trade (PAT) Scheme, which is a “market based mechanism to enhance cost effectiveness of improvements in energy efficiency in energy-intensive large industries and facilities, through certification of energy savings that could be traded” (GoI 2008:5). Market based systems like the PAT Scheme are typical solutions in liberal environmental discourses like the WW in India and the discourse of ecological modernization, which I have described in chapter three. Ecological modernization holds that market mechanisms can provide flexible and cost optimal solutions to the climate change problem (Hajer 1995).

**National consensus on a co-benefit approach**

After the launch of the NAPCC there have been other climate initiatives in India as well. In 2010 the Indian Government established the Expert Group on Strategies for Inclusive Growth to sketch out a low-carbon strategy for inclusive growth for India’s 12th five year plan (2012-2017). In an interim report the group argues that with the planned GDP growth, the emissions intensity can be reduced with 35% by 2020 if international finance and technology transfers are provided (GoI 2011). In the 12th five year plan the overall objective is a faster, sustainable and more inclusive growth (GoI 2012a). In the plan, a new policy initiative on ‘Clean Coal’ was introduced. This initiative is about:

How do we improve the efficiency of coal so that every tonne of coal produces more megawatt of energy than before and how do we ensure that the emissions from coal burning is reduced. So, even though we are not able to vine ourselves away very quickly from coal based power, we are trying to make coal plants as efficient as possible (interview 25.9.12).

Coal plants will be made more efficient by introducing new technology, and it is stated that adaption of clean coal technology can “save as much coal as would be saved by installation of ten times the solar power capacity” (GoI 2012a:119). The initiative shows that Indian climate policy is centred on greening future growth, and that use of new technology and efficient use of resources are central in national climate policy-making.

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The WW has support among key actors in the debate on climate politics, and I have showed that it has been institutionalised in national climate policy. As Dubash (2012c) puts it, domestic policy seems to have settled around the co-benefit approach. However, based on Laclau and Mouffe (1985), I assume that there is never complete closure around one discourse and discursive struggle thus exits. Some civil society actors argue that the NAPCC is not sufficient and advocate for more radical changes in India’s development. Other actors represent the TW, or at least elements of that discourse. Disagreements during the drafting process of the 12th five year plan demonstrate that different views exit among actors in India’s Planning Commission and the MoEF. The finalisation of the 12th five year plan was delayed with several months due to disagreements on several topics, including climate policy. The Planning Commission, which drafts the plan, attempted to make changes in India’s climate policy which MoEF did not accept (Jogesh, interview 31.8.12). According to Times of India, the Planning Commission wished to increase the intensity target, and suggested that reductions in GHG emissions should not depend on funds from developed countries. MoEF did not accept this and asked the Planning Commission to make the draft in accordance with existing policies on climate change. This demonstrates that the TW still has some institutional embedding in MoEF. Some officials in MoEF, and former officials, who are still influential, hold on to elements of India’s traditional stand, while the Planning Commission and the Low Carbon Committee hold that India should take climate action in the form of co-benefits policies (Rajamani, interview 31.8.12). The deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, Singh Ahluwaila, is seen as being close to the Prime Minister, and as someone who has tried to progress India’s climate policies (Sethi, interview 30.8.12).

The disagreements about the 12th five year plan seem to mostly concern how national climate policy should relate to international climate politics. Therefore, despite some disagreements, the WW has a strong position in Indian national climate policy. Several informants argue that there is a greater agreement regarding what India should do nationally than internationally on climate change. Raghunandan explains that the climate debate is now about: “How much can India do? And what are the benefits? The win-win? And the win-lose? (…). The debate is no longer about: Should India do? That is done (interview 24.9.12).”

In this part I have showed that the discursive shift to the WW has been institutionalised in national climate policy. India has since 2007 developed national climate policies within the co-benefit approach of greening future growth.

**Porcupine or tiger in international climate politics?**

After explaining how the WW has been institutionalised in national climate policy I will discuss if the same change from the TW to the WW has taken place in India’s approach to the international climate negotiations. Panwar emphasizes that one has to distinguish between the debate on national and international climate politics in India:

So when we look at climate policy we have to look at it from two different lenses, one is the international lens and second is the domestic lens. Domestically, there is sort of agreement amongst the major players that; yes issues like energy efficiency, low carbon path, deserve priority. Internationally, also we are committed that these deserve priority, but it is a matter of principle on which India is raising these points, and the principles are the same as I told you earlier (interview 1.10.12).

The principles which Panwar refers to are the principles of equity and CBDR, which have been at the centre of India’s international stand on climate change.

**The carbon intensity target, Copenhagen and Cancun**

The launch of NAPCC did not indicate a shift in India’s approach to the international climate negotiations as it did for national climate policy. In NAPCC India formalised the pledge that India’s per capita greenhouse gas emissions never would exceed that of the developed world (GoI 2008). This was a pledge that the Prime Minister first made at the 33rd G8 Summit which took place in Heiligendamm in Germany in June 2007 (Sengupta 2012). The pledge is in line with the per capita approach which has been central to India since the very beginning of the international climate debate. However, in 2009 changes in India’s position to the international climate negotiations were made. India’s first sign of derivation from her traditional position was when the Prime Minister agreed to the two degree goal at the Major Economies Forum meeting in July 2009 (Rastogi 2011). This indicated a change since India had not before agreed to something which could indicate a goal for peak in emissions. Furthermore, in December 2009, just before Copenhagen, India launched a voluntary commitment to reduce emission intensity of GDP with 20-25% by 2020 compared to 2005-

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28 India and four other emerging economies (China, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa) had been invited for that meeting. The emerging economies have since 2005 often been invited for dialogue with the G8 on issues such as international trade and climate change.

29 The term ‘the two degrees goal’ refers to the political goal that the increase in global temperature should be below two degrees Celsius. The goal is based on findings in the IPCC AR4 (IPCC 2007).
levels. The launch of the intensity target marked a shift not only because India agreed to undertake mitigation actions, but even more so because India agreed to do so without any international financial support, something which was “a clear indication that India understood and acknowledged its own responsibility and was ready to engage proactively” (Rastogi 2011:132). Another major change in India’s approach to the climate negotiations process was the appearance of the BASIC group in Copenhagen. It is a bloc of the largest developing countries - Brazil, South Africa, India and China, which work together on climate change issues. The formation of BASIC signalled that these countries saw their responsibility towards climate change as different from the rest of the developing countries (Rastogi 2011). BASIC was formed as a response to international pressure (Hallding et al. 2011), and in order to defend themselves and have a greater influence on the process (Vashist, interview 3.9.12, interview 8.10.12).

Sengupta (2012) explains that it became further clear that India was reconsidering her international stand on climate change when Ramesh in the six months leading up to Copenhagen actively attempted to reframe India’s traditional position. Ramesh argued that India should be more pragmatic in the international climate negotiations, and he invoked the concept of equity a number of times (Vihma 2011). Ramesh questioned the per capita approach to equity, and said that the per capita “cannot be the only point” (quoted in Prabhu 2012:238). Atteridge et al. (2012) and Hallding et al. (2011) claim that there was evidence of new substance in India’s stance by the time of Copenhagen, by for example the reframing of ‘equitable access to carbon space’ to the vaguer concept of ‘equitable access to sustainable development’.

According to Rastogi (2011) India made a shift from emphasizing principles of equity and historical responsibility to a more pragmatic and solution-based approach at Copenhagen.

India was perceived as a constructive player during Copenhagen 2009 and Cancun 2010. In Copenhagen India acted as a ‘deal-maker’ by helping to find middle ground between USA and China by introducing the concept of ‘international consolations and analysis’ in the

30 The pledge excludes emissions from agriculture; hence it primarily focuses on industry (Fujiwara 2010).
33 ‘Equitable access to sustainable development’ is generally considered as more pragmatic than ‘equitable access to carbon space’ largely because the former is needs-based while the latter is rights-based’ (Hallding et al. 2011)
difficult negotiations on verification of climate actions (Rastogi 2011). At Cancun India was again applauded as a ‘deal-maker’, and Ramesh was credited for playing a key role by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Espinosa, who was leading the negotiations (interview 8.10.12).

Many informants describe Ramesh as someone who reformed or intended to reform India’s position to the international climate negotiations. Never (2011) also finds that the appointment of Ramesh in May 2009 is seen by many actors as a turning point in Indian climate politics. Malone (2011) explains that the Prime Minister was concerned that India was perceived as a defensive and obstructionist actor in the international climate negotiations, and therefore appointed “one of India’s most talented and mediagenic younger politicians, Jairam Ramesh, to the environmental portfolio” (Malone 2011:265). Chaudhury argues it was Sonia Gandhi, the president of the Congress Party, who wanted to have Ramesh as the minister and that: “Putting a growth hawk on the green seat was meant to send a powerful political message: the growth story needed to transform itself and internalise green values”34. Ramesh was certainly given some sort of mandate from the top political level to reform Indian climate politics. He himself indicated that he had been instructed by the Prime Minister to play a constructive and proactive role in the climate change negotiations. During a Parliamentary debate Ramesh said: “the Prime Minister’s instructions to me were: ‘India has not caused the problem of global warming. But try and make sure that India is part of the solution. Be constructive; be proactive.’” (quoted in Prabhu 2012:238). In a press release about priorities for global engagement in August 2009, the Prime Minister stated that “India should play a role in the international arena in a manner that makes a positive contribution to finding solutions to major global challenges, whether in the field of trade or climate change”35. As mentioned previously, the Prime Minister has since he took the position in 2004 promoted that India should contribute constructively in multilateral forums.

According to a government official (interview 8.10.12), Ramesh was an important driver of the decision by India to take on the intensity target, and it was based on his understanding of what role India should play in international climate politics. The government official also emphasizes that other important actors were supportive: “Obviously he cannot decide these things on his own. So he had the support of the Prime Minister of course, and of Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, who heads the Planning Commission. It was sort of a joint idea” (interview

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Accessed: 04.04.2013
The Prime Minister, Ramesh and Singh Ahluwalia were all central actors in the design of the economic reforms which India implemented from 1991 and onwards, and seem to be actors who want India to be further integrated in the global economy and more engaged in international diplomacy. Ramesh was an important initiator of the formation of the BASIC group as well (Gupta, interview 27.9.12).

**Discursive struggle over India’s international position**

The two years Ramesh was the Minister of the Environment and Forest (May 2009 to July 2011) was “a period of some turmoil in the policy discourse and the rhetoric” (Rajamani, interview 31.8.12). Many of the changes that Ramesh initiated and statements he made were met with loud critique by other actors. Based on Neumann (2001), I assume that when representations create a lot of reactions and heated debate it is a meeting between discourses, and articulations are challenging a dominating perspective. Ramesh’s proposals, in the leaked letter to the Prime Minister were criticized by some of his colleagues in the MoEF. The Congress party distanced itself from Ramesh’s controversial stance and Ramesh was forced to reiterate his support for the Kyoto Protocol (Rastogi 2011). The launch of the intensity target was also meet with scepticism, “the opposition and other senior members of the Indian delegation expressed concerns about India offering a unilateral pledge without any reciprocity from developed countries” (Rastogi 2011:136). After Copenhagen some senior negotiators from the MoEF decided to leave the negotiation team due to their disagreements with Ramesh (interview 12.10.12). Saran also left his position as the Special Envoy on Climate Change after these negotiations. In Indian media it was speculated if this was partly because he had a different approach than Ramesh. After Copenhagen, India’s role in international climate politics was debated in the Parliament. Ramesh was criticized by Members of the Parliament for having agreed to a peaking of global emissions and to verification of emission reduction valid for both unsupported and supported action (Prabhu 2012). It was also debated that the Copenhagen Accord says that funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as small island developing states, least developed countries and Africa. Ramesh stated:

> We are not in the same category as Bangladesh or Maldives or Ethiopia or Saint Lucia Granada. There are countries in Africa, countries in small island States, countries in Asia which require more

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36 In 1991 Dr. Manmohan Singh was the Finance Minister, Ramesh was adviser to the Prime Minister and worked in the Finance Ministry, and Singh Ahluwalia was the commerce secretary.


urgently than us for adaptation and mitigation. A country like India should be able to stand on its own feet and say we will do what we have to do on our own (quoted in Prabhu 2012:245).

From Ramesh’s statement we see that defining who “India is” in the context of international climate politics was part of the debate.

The most heated debate on climate politics in India took place after Cancun 2010. During these negotiations Ramesh diverged from the prepared speech and said: “All countries should take binding commitments in an appropriate legal form.” 39 The statement indicates that India would take on binding emission reductions commitments, and it therefore triggered an intense debate in India, with a lot of criticism from the opposition, some NGOs and the media. The statement was seen as “a move to boost image”. 40 When returning from Cancun, Ramesh got a lot of flak for “giving in to the West” and the US (Goswami, interview 17.9.12). CSE said the statement was a “complete departure from India’s traditional position in climate change negotiations”, that “Jairam drops a bombshell [and] blast a hole in India’s negotiating stand.” 41 Ramesh explained to the media that he had been under tremendous pressure from for example the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOISIS) to make such a statement. Later on the Prime Minister distanced himself from Ramesh’s statement and he said “our position is clear” (interview 12.10.12).

The debates about India’s international climate position can be understood as a meeting between the two discourses WW and TW. Seniors in the MoEF, as well as the CSE, have responded to Ramesh’s presentation of the WW by presenting the TW. Although the former actors might agree that India should take climate action nationally, they do not want India to take on international obligations or let go of the per capita approach to effort sharing. India has emphasized that the intensity target is voluntary. However, some of the actors subscribing to the TW believe that “this entire process taking target is one which is fought with danger” (interview 8.10.12). They think that if India starts going down the road of emission reductions there will not be international climate justice and India will all the time be asked to do more and more. The TW and WW contain different constructions of India’s national identity which it seems impossible to unite in the international approach. Gupta argues that “it is growing at least for six-seven years it has been there; there is actually a huge debate within the

Government of India, between various ministers, on whether India is still a developing country or an emerging economy” (interview 27.9.12). He argues that various actors do not agree whether India should present herself as a developing country or emerging economy:

Those ministries which are dependent on aid, their work has a lot of dependence on aid; environment, health, rural development, education, they would like India to be continued to called a developing country, because only the you will get NORAD to give you money, or SIDA to give you money, US Aid to give you money. But other ministries, ministry of external affairs, commerce ministry, finance ministry who like to India to be called an emerging country because then you get the private sector investment into the economy (interview 27.9.12).

Gupta argues that Ramesh and the Prime Minister are among the actors who want to present India as an emerging economy, but that there is “zero agreement within the Government, zero agreement within the Cabinet of ministers” (interview 27.9.12).

**Durban and towards a new climate agreement**

In a Cabinet reshuffle in June 2011 Ramesh was shifted to Minister of Rural Development, and Natarajan was appointed the new Minister of the Environment and Forest. 42 As the Minister of Rural Development, Ramesh got a seat in the Cabinet and thus a higher position within the Government. At the same time, many see the reshuffle as result of Ramesh being too proactive in the international climate negotiations, and more importantly on national environmental concerns such as being reluctant with granting licenses to industry projects. Goswami says; “I do not think climate alone was the reason, it might have been the icing on the cake. I think it was the fact that he was tough pushing environmental laws” (interview 17.9.12). There are different opinions on exactly what the change of minister meant for India’s climate position, and whether the changes have been to the good or bad with Natarajan as the new minister. As Sethi puts it, “it has been, some would say a course correction direction, and others would say a step back, depending on your world view” (interview 30.8.12). However, a general opinion is that India was pursuing a more traditional approach at Durban 2011. Goswami argues that India was “much more reactive” in Durban (interview 17.9.12). And another informant sates that suddenly we played the “equity card” again (interview 2.10.12). In Durban and following negotiations “the Indian Government pushed really hard for equity to figure in the agreement” (interview 18.9.12).

At Durban a mandate for negotiating a new international climate agreement was discussed. Natarajan emphasized India’s need for space to grow and that equity principles should figure in the mandate:

As a developing country, the principles of equity and CBDR are central for us. India is asking for space for basic development for its people and poverty eradication. Is this an unreasonable demand? Former Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi said that poverty is the greatest polluter and development is the greatest healer. Equity has to be the centerpiece of the Climate discussion and our negotiations should be built on it. We cannot accept the principle of CBDR to be diluted. The firewall of CBDR must not be broken. Equity in the debate must be secured (2011).

In the quote above Natarajan presents some of the central elements in the TW, by referring to Gandhi’s notion of poverty as the greatest polluter. The principle of equity and CBDR were in the end not mentioned in the mandate for negotiating a new agreement (the Durban Platform, Decision 1/CP.17 2011) which came out of Durban. Since Durban, an important position for India has therefore been to stress that the Durban Platform states that a new agreement will be “under the Convention”. Equity and CBDR are important principles in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (also referred to as the Convention) (UN 1992). India argues that these principles are therefore applicable for the new agreement.

When commenting on the outcome of Durban, Natarajan stressed that: “Under the Convention means CBDR and equity being very important” (2012). Furthermore, she said that: “We need to ensure that our people get a fair share of global atmospheric resources, which allows the necessary space to grow and access to food, water and energy. Future agreements therefore need to be equitable and not just fair and ambitious” (Natarajan 2012). Even though Natarajan refers to the need for Indians to get a fair share of global atmospheric resources, the per capita approach does not figure as the preferred operationalization of equity in India’s recent submission (GoI 2012b, GoI2013, GoI 2013a). For India, the principles of equity and CBDR imply that: “Irrespective of the legal form of the final arrangements, the developing countries targets cannon be binding” (Natarajan 2012) and developing countries’ targets should be determined on the basis of voluntary choice (GoI 2012b). In a recent specification of how India understands “under the Convention” it is stated that “an arrangement ‘under the Convention’ may not in any way, explicit or implicit, reinterpret or rewrite the Convention, neither can it re-case the Annexes provided in the Convention” (GoI 2013:2). The annexes of the Convention (UN 1992) classify the countries which are developed and developing. By referring to the annexes, India is indicating that the she wants the same operationalization of equity and CBDR as in the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, and thus see her place in the future agreement as a developing country. This is in sharp contrast to how developed countries see the design of the new agreement, as mentioned in chapter one.
The TW dominates the international positions

There have been some changes in India’s approach to the international climate negotiations, most notable the launch of the intensity target. As Jogesh puts it, “in 2009 with Ramesh, it was a big shift; the fact that India said it was willing to take something like carbon intensity target” (interview 31.8.12). However, it is important to note that India not need do much in order to reach the voluntary intensity target. As mentioned in chapter one, India has experienced a continuous decline in emissions intensity of growth the last decade (Fujiwara 2010). This experience reassured other policy-makers that the intensity target was something India easily could undertake (Bidwai 2012).

The new elements in India’s appearance at Copenhagen and Cancun seem to be more due to Ramesh’s personality and firm beliefs, than an institutionalisation of the WW in the MoEF and the Government. Goswami states: “I think it is more personality driven than anything else. How each minister comes with their own conception and own understanding of how best to dress up national interests” (interview 17.9.12). Ramesh had a “problem-solving mood” and “he was not really thinking in terms of historical principles or what had gone on before”, while Natarajan and bureaucrats in MoEF have a more “principled approach” (Rajamani, interview 31.8.12). A former government official argues that Ramesh was pushing a position that is different from the majority position in the Government:

Essentially he delinked the Indian position from that of the G77 and the BASIC group. And this is not something which is politically acceptable in India. He does not have a single Member of Parliament to support this course of action. He was tolerated for some time, for nearly two years, the Prime Minister is a very patient man, but then the Prime Minister had to remove him (interview 11.10.12).

Furthermore, Krishnaswamy states that even though India became a little more proactive during the time of Ramesh, “the position of India didn’t really change, despite the fact that from an outsider’s perspective Ramesh brought a lot of change” (interview 04.09.12). The moves under Ramesh seem to have been more in strategy, rather than substance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012). At the MoEF’s webpage it is emphasized that India’s position did not change between Copenhagen and Cancun, and Durban: “India’s position on the negotiating issues is guided by the principles of the Convention. Even while advancing its voluntary efforts in order to demonstrate its adherence to the objectives of the Convention, India's position remains firmly rooted in these principles”.43

43 MoEF: http://moef.nic.in/modules/others/?f=durban-faqs Accessed 03.05.2013
In this part I have demonstrated that there have been discursive struggles between the TW and WW over India’s position. Some actors, Ramesh in particularly, have represented the WW and tried to reform India’s position in line with what I have described as a new thinking in Indian foreign policy in chapter four. These attempts have been meet with strong criticisms from officials in MoEF, the opposition and some NGOs. This demonstrates that the TW still is institutionalised. Furthermore, as I have shown above the TW seems to be reflected in India’s position since Durban 2011.

Other scholars have emphasized changes in India’s international climate stand. Sengupta (2012) argues that the consensus around the traditional position is not as strong as before, and Bidwai states that: “The recent evolution of India’s foreign policy has been described rather pithily as movement ‘from the high (moral) ground to the high table’. This description could equally apply for the trajectory of India’s climate policy and its global negotiations stance” (2012:104). Rastogi (2011) states that India as an emerging economic power has understood that she cannot continue to portray herself as a developing country with no climate responsibility. However, these studies have not looked at India’s position after the change of minister. I agree with Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2012) who argue that at Natarajan largely returned to earlier rhetoric at Durban. It seems like India has returned to her traditional porcupine strategy. However, the tiger might reappear soon, as several studies (for example Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012 and Vihma 2011) argue that it is an underlying tendency of a more proactive approach regardless of the personality of the minister. Due the general tendencies in Indian foreign policy since the 1990s, this seems likely.

I will now summarise this part. While there has been a transition from the TW to the WW in national climate politics, this is not the case for India’s approach to the international climate negotiations. Dubash (2012c) argues that even though there is a considerable convergence on the framing of climate change within India this convergence does not translate to a strategic unanimity on a negotiating position. Even though elements of the WW figure as India’s position during the time of Ramesh, the TW and the porcupine strategy seems to be currently dominating India’s international climate position.

**Radical critique dismissed as illegitimate**

In this part I will analyse the social outcome of the dominance of certain discourses, as Adger et al. (2001) argue one should pay attention to policy and social outcome of discourses. The outcomes of discourses are not only felt in policy and institutions, but also in exclusions. As
argued in chapter three, discourses define the range of policy options and operate as resources which empower certain actors and exclude others. I will now discuss to what extent perspectives within the RG and actors promoting these perspectives are excluded from the policy debate and the decision-making process on climate change in India.

**Radical growth critique and adaptation priorities marginalised**

The RG’s national position holds that India needs a different growth strategy, and several civil society informants argue that the NAPCC does not sufficiently address climate change. Raghunandan says that “a movement has been made in terms of energy efficiency, (…) but I do not see any other areas” (interview 27.9.12). Bidwai (interview 28.9.12) argues that India’s growth strategy is characterized by “GDPism” and calls for a radical change in development path. Bidwai (2012) criticizes India’s growth strategy from a climate change and development angle, and argues that the growth model India is pursuing has not worked for India’s poor and cannot contribute to low carbon growth.

The radical critique of India’s development path seems to be excluded from the climate debate and policy-making in India. An informant (interview 2.10.12) argues that the Government has yet not started to consider what kind of growth India should have and if India should aspire to grow at all. The centre of both the TW and WW is India’s national interest in economic growth and this has been naturalized as the only legitimate way to talk about climate policy. The construction of national interest in growth thus serves as a structure which excludes other perspectives and actors promoting them. Shrivastava and Kothari argue that “[t]he all-pervasive nature of the ‘development’ ideology makes any presentation of an alternative vision rather difficult” (2012:255). Even though the radical growth critique within the RG is being dismissed, some of its articulations seem to have influenced Government in terms of domestic action. In the first part of this chapter I discussed the Campaign for Progressive Climate Action and the ‘hiding behind the poor’ debate. These calls from civil society actors “to do more” are based on a different reasoning than that within the WW, but the calls for a more proactive approach at times overlap. It seem like the RG has had some influence when it overlaps with the WW. This shows that the borders between the RG and WW are not clear, as discussed in chapter five.

Some informants also criticise the NAPCC for not being pro-poor and not putting enough emphasis on adaptation. Jogesh says that NAPCC “came from the intention to tackle, at some level vulnerability, but does not seem to be pro-poor” (interview 31.8.12). Raghunandan
(interview 24.9.12) argues that India is yet not serious about adaptation. According to Bidwai (2012) there is no comprehensive plan for adaptation in India. He argues that India must develop such a plan in order to empower poor and vulnerable people to cope with the effects of climate change. The Indian Government claims that it spends 2.6% of GDP on adaptation, but several activists and scholars, including Bidwai, argue this it is not a valid claim:

this is the sum-total of the budget of all its social sector programmes, including the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), and healthcare, sanitation, women and child welfare, and many other existing schemes. This does not legitimately qualify for the description ‘adaptation’ (2012:40).

Vashist (interview 3.9.12) argues that India neglects adaptation in the international negotiations as well. He states that “Indian negotiator has been able to represent 30% of the population by only talking always about mitigation. They have not been able to put forward an adaptation agenda” (interview 3.9.12). The Climate Action Network South Asia, a network of civil society organisations, has been telling Indian negotiators that when you talk about vulnerability – you need clarity on what you want to do on adaptation (Vashist, interview 3.9.12). From this we see that that adaptation is a priority for actors holding the RG, both in terms of national and international climate politics. To promote adaptation priorities is seen as a way to put forward the needs of the poor and the ‘Subalterns’ in India.

I have argued that India’s vulnerability is an important discursive element in the WW. However, this does not lead to a strong focus on adaptation priorities in the WW, and thus India’s climate policy. The link is often made from vulnerability to mitigation efforts, rather than to adaptation. Many informants, in line with the WW, state that India is vulnerable and therefore it is in India’s own interest to undertake mitigation efforts. Moreover, constructed linkages in the WW seem to exclude adaptation priorities. The WW is characterised with positive linkages between energy efficiency, energy security, cost effectiveness and climate policies. Difficult questions about vulnerable groups and adaptations do not fit into these linkages, and the overall liberal paradigm of economic growth the discourse is associated with. The TW, on the other hand, does not prioritize domestic climate action at all since climate change is merely the responsibility of the West and India should focus on growth.

As discussed previously in this chapter, some of the motivation for India to develop the NAPCC was international pressure and the belief that India can benefit from being perceived

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as a proactive actor on climate change. International pressure to undertake climate action is understood in terms of mitigation. A civil society activist expresses concerns that climate policy is developed because of international pressure. The activist argues that the policy reflects the interest of the Indian elite who wish to bring India to the high table (observation 8.10.12). Raghunandan is also concerned about drivers of climate policy in India and argues that it leads to a neglect of adaptation:

My concern has been that this shift has taken place not as a result of domestic advocacy and understanding of the domestic imperatives, but was a shift of position taken in order to appease or please the international powers. (...) So, I think that the weakness of that is if you are only responding to international pressure then there is a limit to what you will do. I believe that India has not sufficiently, even at the official’s level, appreciated the full extent of impact that climate change is going to have within the country (interview 24.9.12).

Global status as a driver for national climate policy seems to lead to a neglect of adaptation priorities at the national level of climate policy. Vashist argues that it is much more focus on adaptation to climate change in the State Action Plans on Climate Change which have been or are in the process of being drafted by Indian states (interview 3.9.12). The state Governments do not have the same foreign policy context as the national Government, and this is arguably one of the reasons for states to prioritize adaptation more.

The RG actors dismissed as anti-nationalistic
Informants argue that there is a divide among civil society on climate change in India, between those who are nationally oriented and those who have an internationalist perspective. Informants argue that the once who are nationally embedded have the most influence. Sethi says “there is a clear division among civil society, there are those who are more aligned with international NGOs and those who are not” (interview 30.8.12). A former government official argues that some civil society groups in India, like CSE, are largely on the same page as the Government in terms of their international position, while “there are some other civil society groups that want to pursue a more Western oriented line. They are advocating for a change of course which would take into account European perspectives” (interview 11.10.12). In Indian foreign policy there is a tradition of consensus, that “united we should face the world” (Bidwai, interview 28.9.12). Many of the actors within the Indian Government, media and civil society have the same agenda in international climate politics, which is to protect India’s interests. CSE for example, is often very critical towards the Government on domestic environmental policy, but in the international negotiations they stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the Government (conversation, CSE employee 18.9.12). CSE sees climate change as a national issue and finds it hard to collaborate internationally with other NGOs, since “in a
way climate change is a global issue with very strong national borders” (conversation, CSE employee 18.9.12).

In chapter five I discussed that the TW and WW are centred around national interests, while the RG has an internationalist orientation. Some actors who subscribe to the RG criticize the Indian position to the international climate negotiations for being nationalistic. Bidwai (interview 28.9.12) thinks that the Indian climate position is nationalistic since it is based on national interest in economic growth and thus holds that India should not accept any obligation at all.

To challenge India’s international position or question the national interest in growth in general, is not seen as legitimate by actors holding the TW and WW. Actors representing the RG are often dismissed as anti-nationalistic or representing Western interests. I understand this as an effect of how the RG challenges the construction of national interest in growth in both the TW and WW. Bidwai is critical towards the tradition of consensus among various actors on the international position and states: “People say to me: Why do you criticize India so bitterly when you are abroad? Why should I change because I go abroad?” (interview 28.9.12). An informant from the Indian Youth Climate Movement (interview 2.10.12) tells that a government official once questioned their incentives and asked if they represented a company or Western interests. Another informant argues that the youth activists are seen as closer with the international movement, “for them solidarity crosses borders (…). They will feel closer to you, just across the ocean” so they will be more “we all have to mitigate” (conversation, CSE employee 18.9.12).

Other scholars have also found that radical actors are being dismissed in Indian politics. According to Guha the dominating perception of environmentalists in India has during the 1990s gone from “being seen as capitalist cronies to being damned as socialist stooges”. Shrivastava and Kothari (2012) argue that the Indian Government is becoming increasingly intolerant of public criticism, and is starting to categorize as ‘Maoists’, ‘Naxalites’, ‘extremists’ or ‘terrorists’ anyone who dissents from the Government’s economic policy. Bidwai argues that grassroots people’s movements calling for climate actions are “shunned by the government which sees them as adversaries and anti-development mavericks or Luddites – out to sabotage industry, mining, irrigation and constructions projects, and the prospects of rapid growth itself” (2012:84). The grassroots movements also get little attention in

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mainstream media, which are generally hostile to them, while more policy-oriented NGOs have better access to media as well as government officials (Bidwai 2012).

In addition to not being seen as legitimate actors, the RG also seems to be excluded because of a lack of public participation in climate policy-making in India. Vashist says: “It seems like they are still in the colonial hangover of policy making” and the decision-making is “in the hands of few people, rather than making it a public and proactive engagement” (interview 4.10.12). According to Rajamani (2009) the NAPCC was developed without consultative exercises, and the subsequent missions have been developed by ministries only sometimes conducting consultations. The Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change only has one civil society representative, which is the director of CSE Narain. She is also the only women on the council. Furthermore, an informant (interview 2.10.12) points at the fact that it is often only big Indian institutions that get to influence climate.

Within the RG there is a hope that that the course of Indian climate politics will change as pressure from grass root movements increases. Bidwai (interview 28.9.12) thinks that coastal traditional fishermen, pastoralists and health workers will come to play an increasingly important role. They will experience the effects of climate change and raise their voice. Furthermore, he argues there is already a growing demand for climate action from the grass root movement, especially channelled towards state Governments. “This kind of debate I would like to see grow”, he states.

Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the role of actors in representing, reproducing and transforming discourses, as well as outcomes of discourses in policy and exclusion (figure 3). I have explained how elements from the WW have re-constructed what India’s national interest in growth means in terms of climate change and been institutionalised in national climate policy. In terms of India’s approach to the international climate negotiations I have showed that there have been discursive struggles between the TW and WW. And even though there have been some changes, most notably the launch of India’s intensity target, the TW seems to be institutionalised as India’s current international climate position. I have also showed how the strong construction of India’s national interest as economic growth silences alternative perspectives and actors representing the RG. Actors presenting the RG are dismissed as anti-nationalistic, having western perspectives and by the relatively closed climate policy-making process itself.
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<td><strong>Approach to international climate politics</strong></td>
<td>Durban 2011 and afterwards</td>
<td>Intensity target Copenhagen 2009 Cancun 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Anti-nationalistic” “Western” Closed policy-making process</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Figure 3: Actors, and outcomes of climate discourses in India**

In this chapter I have made use of Adger et al.’s (2001) suggestion to focus on actors who produce, represent and transform discourses. Moreover, I have used Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (2007) notion of how knowledge and scientific actors contribute to production of discourses. I discussed in the first part of this chapter how knowledge about India’s vulnerability has been important for the emergence of the WW. Indian scientists and research institutions have served as important knowledge brokers. Furthermore, I have shown how some actors, officials and business actors in particular, have influenced policy-making by gaining support for their views. One the other side, many civil society actors representing alternative perspectives have been silenced. I will stress, as Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2007) argue, the need to study how actors create and use discourses as a way of understanding power relations among actors and discourses. A lot of the political power stems from the ability to articulate and set the terms of a discourse.

Many discourse analytics argue that scholars doing discourse analysis should put a greater emphasis on material dimensions of discourses. I find the concept of institutionalisation of discourses (Neumann 2001) and outcomes of discourses (Adger et al. 2001) useful. I have demonstrated that the emergence of national climate policy in India from 2007 can be understood as flowing out of the emergence and dominance of the WW. The emergence of the WW and the development of national climate policy in India fit with the dominating discourse of ecological modernization. Hajer (1995) argues that this has become the legitimate way of “talking green” internationally, something which also seems to be the case for national climate policy in India.
In chapter three, I argued that in order to understand changes in discursive dominance and climate policy one have to pay attention to the larger economic and political context as well. Based on Conca (in Paterson and Stripple 2007) I argued that the ways in which we perceive and respond to ecological interdependence are likely to be structured along modern, severing, capitalist lines. This seems to be the case for Indian national climate policy, and can be understood in the context of the liberal economic reforms implemented since 1991.

In international climate policy, the WW has not been institutionalised to the same extent as in national climate policy. As discussed in chapter five, the TW and WW are similar in the way economic growth constitutes the centre. In terms of national climate policy, they both hold that growth is the most important, but the WW adds that the growth can be greener. The decision to develop national climate policy is not a radical change from the TW, since all the missions in NAPCC are designed in order to contribute positively to development, either in terms of energy security or more efficient use of resources. It is stated explicitly in the NAPCC that the main objective is development, and that climate mitigation or adaptation come as co-benefits (GoI 2008).

Regarding the international position, it is a greater divergence between the TW and WW. The TW has a defensive approach, while the WW wants India to be proactive. The construction of national identity is also important when it comes to the international arena, and to go from having the role as a developing country to an emerging economy in the international climate regime would have been a radical change. This greater divergence between the TW and WW on international climate politics might be the reason why there have been more discursive struggles in terms of the international position and not a clear shift to the WW in India’s international climate position.

In chapter three, I argued that powerful discourses exclude alternative meanings and that actors promoting them are being seen as illegitimate. Discourse analysis is increasingly being used in studies of material dimensions such as climate policy. However, I will argue that in order to properly understand the power of climate discourses scholars should put even more emphasis on the perspectives which are not being materialized. I have showed how the RG and actors promoting these perspectives are being silenced. This is problematic in terms of democratic principles, as well as in respect to how important elements such as adaptation and growth critique gain little attention in the climate debate and policy-making in India.
7. Conclusion

The objective of this study is to understand discursive drivers of change in Indian climate politics. In order to reach the objective I have investigated discourses about Indian climate politics among key actors in the national climate debate and policy-making. I have also investigated in which ways discursive changes have contributed to changes in Indian climate politics the recent years.

Three different climate discourses
As I explained in chapter five, there are different perspectives on Indian climate politics among key actors in the national climate debate and policy-making in India. I have identified the Third World discourse (TW), the Win-Win discourse (WW) and the Radical Green discourse (RG). The TW and WW are similarly centred on a construction of India’s national interest in economic growth, while the RG centres on social justice and ecological sustainability. Even though the TW and WW have the same centre, they contain different positions on what India should do in terms of climate change. In the TW, it is not in India’s interest to take action on climate change; action is merely the responsibility of developed countries and poses a threat to India’s growth. In the WW on the other hand, it is in the interest of India to undertake climate policies. It is believed that it can help reach developmental goals, such as energy security and energy access, as well as contribute to reach international ambitions, such as a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Furthermore, India’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change is emphasized as a reason for interest in undertaking climate policies. The RG contains a more internationalist and radical perspective and therefore rejects the construction of national interest in economic growth. It argues that India needs a different development strategy which is less focused on GDP growth, and that India should undertake climate policies based on what is demanded by science and needed to ensure social justice.

A win-win approach to national climate policy
In chapter six I explained that there have been changes in Indian climate politics the recent years (appendix IIII). The development of national climate policy since 2007 in India can be understood as an institutionalisation of the WW. Actors in the climate debate and policy-making have articulated elements which have challenged the traditional construction that it is
not in the interest of India to undertake climate policies. Some researchers, NGOs, business actors, and politicians, such as the Prime Minister and Ramesh, have been particularly influential. One important discursive change has been the increased emphasis on India’s vulnerability. Another one is that climate policy increasingly is constructed as an opportunity, rather than a threat to India’s growth. Climate policies are seen as positive for developmental goals and as a possibility to become leading in green technology. They are also seen as positive in terms of enhancing India’s reputation internationally and thus reaching international ambitions. These discursive changes have contributed to a reconstruction of what the national interest in growth imply for climate policy; from not taking action on climate change and resist any pressure to do so to undertaking climate policies nationally.

In 2007, institutional initiatives were taken towards developing national climate policy. The Prime Minister established the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change and appointed a special Envoy for Climate Change. Subsequently, India launched the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008, with eight different missions on climate adaptation and mitigation. Thus, discursive were institutionalised in national climate policies. These climate policies are designed in order to reach development objectives, and at the same time make future economic growth greener.

Still a developing country in international climate politics

In terms of India’s approach to the international climate negotiations, an institutionalisation of the WW has not taken place. There have been some changes in India’s approach, most notably by the launch of the voluntary intensity target in 2009. During Copenhagen 2009 and Cancun 2010, India also appeared as a more proactive player than before. However, the latter change seems to have been because of Ramesh’s personality and his firm beliefs, rather than a new position and new strategies institutionalised in the Ministry of the Environment and Forest (MoEF) and the Government of India. There have been discursive struggles over India’s approach to the international climate negotiations. Many of the changes Ramesh initiated and articulations he made, have been met by strong criticism from some NGOs, such as The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), former climate negotiators, the opposition and the media.

Even though there have been some signs of India emerging as a tiger in international climate politics, the TW and porcupine-India still seem to dominate India’s approach. Based on
India’s appearance at Durban 2011 and recent submission to the UNFCCC process, I have showed that India still see herself as a developing country within international climate politics.

**Methodological and theoretical lessons, and remaining questions**

One of the main findings from this study is that national interest is socially constructed. By identifying the three different discourses about Indian climate politics I find that constructions of India’s interest on climate politics is linked to the construction of identity, climate change effects and climate policies. This shows that national interest is not something static and pre-given as often assumed in materialist approaches to politics. As Hopf (2002) argues, the construction of interest can be studied through empirical and inductive research paying attention to discourses and identities within the domestic context. Furthermore, as Paterson and Stripple (2007) argue, whether climate change is constructed as a threat or an opportunity matters for climate politics. In the case of national climate policy in India, the construction of climate change impacts as a threat and climate policies as an opportunity have been important for the decision to undertake climate action.

The main finding regarding discursive change and policy changes in Indian climate politics is that ideational factors can drive policy changes. As Hajer (1995) and Cass and Pettenger (2007) argue, changes in policy flows out of changes in the dominant discourse. The emergence of the WW and the broad consensus around the co-benefit approach has facilitated the development of national climate policy in India. Regarding India’s approach to the international climate negotiations, on the other hand, there have been discursive struggles rather than a discursive shift.

Based on my study, I support Pettenger’s (2007a) statement that constructivism is useful for research on political change. She argues that “[o]ne of the most important contributions of constructivism is the ability to illustrates changes in values, identities, strategies and policies that focus on material forces alone cannot explain” (Pettenger 2007a:12). By investigating ideational factors, actors and structures, one can get a deep understanding of the process of policy change. Many scholars have stressed the importance of using discourse analysis to understand materiality, such as climate policies. I have found the concept of institutionalisation of discourses (Neumann 2001) and outcomes of discourses (Adger et al. 2001) useful. However, I would like to stress that discourse analysis should not merely focus on how discourses become materialized, but also investigate the process marginalization. I have found that the construction of India’s national interest in growth leads to an exclusion of
alternative perspectives and the actors presenting them. Actors presenting the RG are dismissed as anti-nationalistic and for having sold out to the West. By studying how some perspectives and actors are seen as illegitimate, one can get a deeper understanding of the power of discourses. Furthermore, it is likely that new and alternative perspectives can be useful in order to meet the immense challenge of climate change. New ways of seeing the problem can open up for new solutions as well.

Even though discourse analysis has proved to be useful in my study, I would like to point at some weaknesses as well. As Cass and Pettenger states: “It is analytically easier to describe the underlying discourses and normative debates than it is to understand how the dominant discourse has emerged” (2007:238). I have found it challenging to understand how the WW has emerged and become dominant in Indian national climate policy. I have attempted to solve this challenge by paying attention to actors who have articulated elements within the WW, and the power of these actors. I have also sought to understand why the discourse became dominant by seeing how it fit into the larger context of economic, social and foreign policies in India. However, I agree with Cass and Pettenger (2007) in that there is a need for a deeper understanding of agency in discourse analysis. It is important to better understand to what extent actors can produce new discourses, and to what extent actors are restricted by already existing constructions. I hence argue that agency/structure dynamics could be further elaborated on within discourse theory. I think further conceptualization of agency also is important in order to understand the process of marginalization. Scholars should seek to answer questions such as: How do some essential actors marginalize alternative actors? In order to answer this, and related questions, I assume that textual analysis needs to be combined with doing interviews and observations. The processes of marginalization might be difficult to access by text, but is likely to be accessed by talking to and interacting with different actors in the study area.

A lot of questions remain to be asked and answered about Indian climate politics. I have discussed climate politics at the national level, but much of India’s climate measures will be planned and undertaken by state level governments. Further research on Indian climate politics should therefore be directed towards investigating the dynamics of the development of State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) in India. At the state level there might be a different set of actors and different priorities in climate policy-making. For example, in many of the Indian states, foreign development agencies seem to have been more involved in policy-making on climate change than they have been at the national level. Several informants
have also pointed out that the SAPCCs put more emphasis on adaptation than the national level climate policies.

Another interesting research area would be to look further into the role of India in the international process of developing the post-2015 climate agreement. India and other emerging economies have come to play a key role in international climate politics the recent years, and will continue to play an important role in the design of the new international climate regime. Probably will they have a more central role than ever before in the design of an international regime. As my study demonstrates it is of particular importance to understand how historical roots and constructions of national identity influence India’s international climate positions. This might be the case for other emerging economies, which also have experienced great economic and political transformations recently. How these countries see themselves in the new regime does not only rely on statistical data of GHG emissions, but also to a great extent discursive constructions. What role emerging economies take in solving climate change will have an immense effect on the prospects of climate change as well, and scholars should seek to further understand how “they see themselves” within international climate politics.

As I have explained, Indian climate politics have in recent years been characterized by changes and discursive struggles. The development of national climate policy signals that the country wants to be a tiger – to be proactive on climate politics. However, India’s role in the international climate negotiations since Durban 2011, demonstrates that the tiger is yet to let go of her historical quills.
REFERENCES


Government of India (GoI) 2013a. Submission by India. On the wok of the Ad-hoc Working Group on


Universitetsforlag, Fredriksberg.


APPENDIX I: LIST OF INFORMANTS

Nitin Sethi, interview 30.8.12
Assistant Editor at the Times of India.

Lalvanya Rajamani, interview 31.8.12
Professor at Centre for Policy Research.

Anu Jogesh, interview 31.8.12
Research Associate at Centre for Policy Research. Former journalist CNN-IBN and Forbes India.

Srinivas Krishnaswamy, interview 4.9.12
Chief Executive Officer in and funder of Vashudha Foundation, and board member of Climate Action Network International. Former head of the Climate and Energy Unit in Greenpeace India and Climate Policy Adviser in Greenpeace International. Co-editor of Hiding Behind the Poor (Greenpeace India 2007)

Dr. Manowar A. Khalid, interview 12.9.12
Environmental consultant. Former Field Director at Earthwatch Institute, Deputy Director at Amity university and Associate Fellow at The Energy and Resource Institute (TERI).

Harish Hande, interview 13.9.12
Co-founder of SELCO.

Urmi Goswami, interview 17.9.12
Special Correspondent at the Economic Times.

Interview 17.9.12
Employee at Centre for Science and the Environment (CSE).

D. Raghunandan, interview 24.9.12
President of All India Science Network and Member of Delhi Science Forum.

Interview 25.9.12
Former government official.

Joydeep Gupta, 27.9.12
Environmental journalist and South Asia Director of the Third Pole Project. Former General Secretary of the Forum of Environmental Journalists in India.

Pratful Bidwai, interview 1.10.12
Activist, journalist and political analyst. Holds the Chair in Social Development, Equity and Human Security as a visiting Professor at the Council for Social Development, Delhi and founding-member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India).

Dr. T. S. Panwar, interview 1.10.12
Director Climate Change and Energy Programme at WWF India. Former Director of the Energy, Environment and Policy Division at The Energy and Resource Institute (TERI).
Interview 2.10.12
Member of the Indian Youth Climate Network.

Sanjay Vashist, interview 3.10.12
Director of Climate Action Network South Asia.

Tirthankar Mandal, interview 2.10.12
Programme Coordinator at Climate Action Network South Asia.

Interview 5.10.12
Former member of India’s Planning Commission.

Interview 8.10.12
Government official.

Interview 11.10.12
Former government official.

Interview 12.10.12
Former government official.

Conversation, 18.9.12
Employee at Centre for Science and the Environment (CSE).

Conversation 11.10.12
Foreign diplomat in India.
APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE

a) The debate and the important actors

What is the debate about Indian climate politics (in India) centred around?

Who are the main actors in Indian climate politics (ministries, institutions, organizations, persons)?

What are the different perspectives seen among different actors?

b) Equity and Indian climate politics

In what way is equity related to Indian climate politics? What does equity means to India?

Is it fair that India should mitigate emissions? What do you think?

c) The relationship between development and environment

How is economic growth related to Indian climate politics?

How do you see the relationship between development/economic growth and environmental protection/mitigation policies (win-win or contradictory)?

d) Indian climate politics and recent changes

Have there been changes in Indian climate politics the last years (last five to six years)?

What do you think about these changes?

What have been the reasons for these changes?

Which actors have been driving these changes or been trying to change Indian climate politics?

e) Other

Is there something else you would like to add?

Is there something else that I should have asked about?
APPENDIX III: CONSENT FORM

I am a master student in Human Geography at University of Oslo and I am doing my master thesis on Indian climate politics. I am studying the debate about Indian climate politics in India and looking at how different perspectives in the debate interact with the development of Indian climate politics.

In order to answer my research questions I wish to interview 15 to 20 actors in Indian climate politics. The questions I want to ask will be about their opinion about national Indian climate politics and the international climate negotiations. Furthermore, I want to ask about changes in Indian climate politics the recent years and what are seen as the main drivers of those changes. I prefer to use a sound recorder and make notes during the interview. The interview will take approximately 40 minutes, and the participants and I will together decide upon time and place.

The interview is voluntary and participants can withdraw at any time during the interview. If participants decide to withdraw from the project, all data given by them will be deleted immediately. All data material gathered during the research project will be treated confidential, and all participants will be anonymous in the published master thesis (if they wish to be anonymous). All data material will be anonymous and deleted when the research project is finished, within the end of 2013.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me on: [contact data provided]. You can also contact my supervisor, Prof. Kristian Stokke at the Department for Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo: [contact data provided].

Declaration of consent:

I have received information about the research project and I am willing to participate.

Signature…………………………………………………………Phone number…………………………
**APPENDIX IV: TIMELINE FOR EVENTS IN INDIAN CLIMATE POLITICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>The Prime Minister announces that India’s per capita emissions will never exceed the once of industrialized countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>The Prime Minister sets down the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>The Prime Minister’s appoints Shyam Saran as India’s special Envoy for Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>Launch of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>The Prime Minister agrees to the two degrees target at the Major Economies Forum meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>India launches a voluntary commitment to reduce emission intensity of GDP with 20-25 per cent by 2020 compared to 2005-levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Climate negotiations in Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
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<td>December 2009</td>
<td>The appearance of the BASIC group</td>
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<td>December 2010</td>
<td>Climate negotiations in Cancun, Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2011</td>
<td>The Expert Group on Strategies for Inclusive Growth launch their interim report</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Cabinet reshuffle and change of minister in MoEF from Ramesh to Natarajan</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2011</td>
<td>Climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>Launch of the 12th five year plan and the Clean Coal Mission</td>
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APPENDIX V: OTHER INDIAN CLIMATE DISCOURSES

Dubash (2012a, 2012c) identifies what he calls three archetypical political perspectives on climate change held within India: The growth-first realist, Sustainable development realists and Sustainable development internationalists. The Growth-first realist perspective holds that the climate debate in itself is a threat to Indian interests; “climate change negotiations are a geopolitical stratagem by industrialised countries to contain new and emergent economics powers, particular China, but also India, Brazil, and South Africa” (Dubash 2012c:202). The global pressure to mitigate is seen as a greater or more immediate threat than the impacts of climate change. Therefore, the priority is to continue India’s high growth rate, resist any efforts to change growth strategy and advocate for equity among nations internationally. The growth-first realist perspective is similar to my TW. Both of Dubash’s two other perspectives, in contrast to the first, start with premise that climate change impacts pose a serious threat to India. Furthermore, both perspectives suggest that the rich world is using India as an excuse for inaction and stress the need for an equitable regime. The Sustainable development realists are cynical about the international climate negotiations, where they see outcomes as increasingly inconsistent with addressing historical responsibility and equity. Due to this, advocates push for more environmental sustainability and internal equity by pursuing an environmental co-benefit strategy at home. This perspective contains elements which I have included in the WW, but also an element of the TW by being cynical about the international negotiations. The Sustainable development internationalist, on the other hand “holds that India can and should make a difference to global negotiations dynamics by explicitly aligning Indian interests with a strong global climate change regime” (Dubash 2012c:204). Advocates of this view are more likely than the two former to anticipate economic gains if India develops low carbon technology. The major difference to the Sustainable development realist view is openness to exploring linkages of national measures to the international regime and believing this will challenge industrialised countries to take on more ambitious mitigation targets (Dubash 2012c). This perspective contains the same approach to the international negotiations as I have described for the RG, but does not call for the same radical shift in national development strategy.

Bidwai (2012) also identifies three different perspectives that he argues dominate the Indian climate policy discourse: Cynicism of the indifferent outsider, Engagement with entitlement and Bargaining-oriented pragmatism. The Cynicism of the indifferent outsider perspective holds that “the climate crisis is ‘their’ (the North’s) problem; we have nothing, or very little to
do with it. ‘They’ created it, they aggravated it, now they must resolve it” (Bidwai 2012:98). The stand’s advocates furthermore argue India must concentrate on rapid GDP growth and protect their space to do so in the UNFCCC process. This discourse is similar to Dubash’s Growth-first realist perspective and the TW in my study. The Engagement with entitlement advocates believe in real engagement with the UNFCCC process and also in taking domestic actions independently of the negotiations, by embracing low-carbon development and make early investments in renewable energy. The perspective stresses that the Indian population and Indian economy will suffer from the consequences of climate change and India should therefore become part of the solution by working for a strong and enforceable agreement. However, India must not compromise on the North’s responsibility for reductions, or on the rights of all human beings to equal per capita emissions. This discourse thus entails elements similar to what I have included in the WW. Bidwai’s (2012) third identified stand, Bargaining-oriented pragmatism, emphasizes bargaining in contrast to principles, rights and entitlements and thus represents a pragmatic view. Advocates of this perspective are indifferent about the outcome of the UNFCCC process, other than it should not impose cap on emerging economies emissions. Rather it focuses on getting the most out of the climate regime, such as the financial mechanisms and CDM. According to Bidwai (2012) some of the advocates of this perspective look for climate-unrelated ‘grad bargaining’ such as a permanent seat for India in the Security Council. This perspective contains the element of international ambitions which I have included in the WW.