

The U.S. Involvement in Somalia in the post-Cold War Years:

An Illustration of the Tension Between Interests
and Principles in American Foreign Policy

Bjørg Marie Eide Wennesland



A Thesis Presented to the Department of Literature, Area
Studies and European Languages
University of Oslo

Supervisor: Mark Luccarelli

ENG4790 - Masteroppgave i engelsk, lektor- og adjunktprogrammet
Credits: 30

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the MA Degree

Spring Term 2013

The U.S. Involvement in Somalia in the post-Cold War Years:

An Illustration of the Tension Between
Interests and Principles in American Foreign Policy

© Bjørg Marie Eide Wennesland

2013

"The U.S. Involvement in Somalia in the post-Cold War Years: An Illustration of the Tension Between Interests and Principles in American Foreign Policy"

Bjørg Marie Eide Wennesland

<http://www.duo.uio.no/>

Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

IV

Abstract

Thomas M. Magstadt asserts that one of the hallmarks of American foreign policy is the constant tension between power and principles. In this thesis, 'interests' replace the term 'power' with the purpose of illustrating how the tension of interests and principles in American foreign policy was evident in the USA's involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s. The tension became particularly evident in the USA's withdrawal from the war-torn, failed state in 1994 when the interests of President Clinton's administration prevailed over principles of securing human rights and spreading democracy. This thesis further suggests that one of the significant factors that affected the outcome of the tension include the aspect of conducting a strategic and economic centered foreign policy in the post-Cold War years. Moreover, operational issues such as the Somali resistance to nation-building, the crucial role of the media as well as co-operational challenges between the USA and the UN are, in this thesis, claimed to have had more immediate effects on American policy makers in this context. The operational issues fortified the American unwillingness to stay militarily involved in Somalia, and contributed to letting interests prevail over principles.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my most sincere gratitude and thanks to my supervisor Mark Luccarelli for his constructive criticism and inspiring comments and questions during the course of writing this thesis.

A heartfelt thank you goes to my uncle Jan Terje Våga, for taking the time to evaluate and comment on my work.

My deepest thanks go to Thomas - my beloved husband and fellow student - for engaging in my thesis by always giving valuable and inspiring feedback. Thank you for always backing me and believing in me. Our children **Jakob** (1 year) & **Ingrid** (due in April): Thank you for being the most encouraging surprises ever, and for always making Mamma so enormously happy and proud. ***This is for you.***

Table of Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Background	1
1.2	Power, Interests and Principles.....	2
1.3	Research Question	5
1.4	Methods and Sources.....	7
2	The Cold War Legacy: Interests and Principles.....	9
2.1	The Post-Cold War Period.....	9
2.2	Two Administrations and Their Policies	10
2.3	The Case of Somalia	14
2.4	Somalia and the Two Administrations.....	15
2.5	Interests and Principles.....	18
3	Domestic Issues: Presidential Succession, Economy and Oil Addiction.....	23
3.1	Presidential Succession	23
3.2	Economy, Oil & Strategic Considerations	24
4	Operational Issues	31
4.1	The American Approach and Somali Reception.....	31
4.2	The Impact of the Media.....	34
4.3	The USA and the UN.....	38
5	Conclusion	47
	Abbreviations	51
	Works Cited	53

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The history of the Federal Republic of Somalia is a tragic tale of how an African land was destabilized by European colonialism. European colonial powers took interest in Somalia after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The British used Somalia as a provider of food when passing the Gulf of Aden on their way to India. France, Italy and an African neighbor, Ethiopia, soon joined Britain in a complicated partition of Somaliland into five different political entities. When Somalia regained its independence in 1960, a struggle to reunite with the Somali people situated in Kenya, the Republic of Djibouti (former French Somaliland) and the Ogaden region (border region possessed by Ethiopia) began. This is claimed to be the root of Somalia's political turmoil since independence.¹ Somalia looked to the Soviet Union for support during the Cold War, but General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and eventually sympathized with the USA by the end of the 1970s. The Ogaden region became a new site of Cold War rivalry, and a guerilla war broke out in 1988.² Eventually the Somali government collapsed. Since the breakdown of the government in 1991, Somalia has been struggling to get back on feet. The population has suffered humanitarian disasters, such as famines, due to climatic factors that have ruined crops. Local impediments including internal conflicts, terrorism and corruption have played a prominent role in the extremely slow progress.³

The peacekeeping mandate of AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) was implemented in Somalia 2007, with the approval of the UN, to protect and enable the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI's) to carry out their functions. The background

¹ Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State. The Impact of the Colonial Legacy* (London: HAAN Publishing, 1996), pp 13-17 & p 67

² Walter S. Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994," *Joint History Office. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (2005), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/somalia.pdf> (Accessed November 26th 2012). 6

³ John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders* (London: HAAN Publishing, 1994). 20

was that the ICU (Islamic Courts Union) had gained control over Mogadishu, and there was a concern that this would obstruct a national reconciliation congress.⁴ Somalia has made progress owing to AMISOM, after it drove Al-Shabaab (a radical sub-group derived from ICU) from the capital of Mogadishu in August 2011. In September 2012, a presidential election was completed, and an *Aftenposten Innsikt* article from the same month called "Transition to Fragile Peace in Mogadishu" (my translation) reports that conditions in Somalia are slowly improving.⁵ Somalia still has the dubious honor of topping the lists of the world's failed states for the eighth year in a row.⁶ After 22 years of being in a state of emergency, it can be argued that the international community has failed to make proper efforts to help Somalia recover.

Having the more exclusive privilege of leading the international community, the USA has a long history of intervening militarily and diplomatically in foreign nations. Despite a history of constant competition between the contradictory tendencies of isolationism and internationalism in foreign policy, the USA has promoted its core values of freedom and democracy when conducting military operations abroad. Another hallmark of American foreign policy, scholar Thomas M. Magstadt holds, is the tension between power and principles.⁷

1.2 Power, Interests and Principles

Foreign policy can be defined as a set of ideas and strategies aimed at promoting the national interests of sovereign states in an environment of anarchy.⁸ Self-interests must hence be seen as a vital part of a nation's foreign policy, and must naturally be taken into consideration by policy makers. Foreign policy should also be influenced by a set of ideas and values. According to Magstadt, American foreign policy has been characterized by a tension and struggle between the pursuit of power and principles since the

⁴ AU, "Amisom - African Union Mission in Somalia," The African Union, <http://amisom-au.org/>. (Accessed January 20, 2013).

⁵ Susan Schulman, "Overgang Til Skjør Fred I Somalia," *Aftenposten Innsikt* No 8, 2012.

⁶ J. J. Messner, "Somalia Tops the Failed States Index," The Fund For Peace <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=node/123> (Accessed November 12th, 2012).

⁷ Thomas Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy* (Washington: CQ Press, 2004). 1

⁸ Ibid. 5

founding of the nation.⁹ By this he means that national ambitions “create temptations ... that militate against the strict observance of moral principles.”¹⁰ By the term ‘power’, Magstadt refers to the opportunity a state has to execute foreign policy based on its own interest. He goes on to say that “to understand America’s role in the world ... it is necessary to understand how and why the relationship between the nation’s principles and its interests have changed over time.”¹¹ In the discussions of this thesis, the terms ‘self-interests’ or ‘interests’ will deliberately replace the term ‘power’, because the former two are less complicated to concretize when discussing a given period of time.

Principles can be understood as maxims aimed at functioning as guidelines when conducting foreign policy. Magstadt lists seven such maxims that allegedly have been adopted selectively by American presidents throughout times. The list includes principles such as “Avoid hypocrisy (practice what you preach)” and “Encourage democracy and freedom, but respect the right of other nations to decide for themselves whether to revolt or submit to tyranny.”¹² According to the same scholar, principles are more sustainable than moral doctrines, because the use of doctrines is highly time-limited and will eventually lose its relevance. The Truman Doctrine, for example, makes little sense without the Soviet threat. Also, the so-called Bush Doctrine from 2002 that suggests a preemptive military strategy towards ‘evil states’, and at the same time promises to use military force to secure “free and open societies,”¹³ appears somewhat excessive and hard to accomplish today, ten years after it was launched. Both lose much of their relevance without the immediate threat that encouraged the doctrines in their political context. Principles, on the other hand, tend to bear the changes of both domestic and foreign political focus. America is founded on the principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’, and these principles have survived presidential shifts and the changes in the international political environment.¹⁴ When the USA entered World War I in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the securing of world democracy. Franklin D. Roosevelt made the population believe that the purpose of World War II was to fight totalitarianism, and George W. Bush convinced America that the purpose behind the

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. 1

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid. pp 227-229

¹³ Ibid. 225

¹⁴ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 9

invasion of Iraq in 2003 was to fight terrorism and evil regimes.¹⁵ Since the end of World War II, the American population has generally accepted the belief that world peace is dependent on political democracy. Americans were convinced of an interdependent relationship between democracy and prosperity: democracy creates prosperity and prosperity encourages democracy.¹⁶ Policy makers' use of moral principles to rationalize foreign military interventions is nothing new. This does not mean, however, that moral principles actually are the motivating factors for intervening militarily; self-interests tend to be. The following brief survey of the USA's relationship with the African continent during the Cold War will illustrate these arguments.

Sub-Saharan Africa has posed intricate challenges for America since the outbreak of the Cold War. The end of colonialism left many African states politically unstable, which made the region fit for great-power rivalry. The region was attractive to America for several reasons. The access to raw materials was perhaps the most important: Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Namibia and South Africa were among the largest suppliers of respectively cobalt, oil, manganese, uranium and platinum to the USA. American policy makers under the Carter Administration believed that stabilizing Africa through "African solutions"¹⁷ of aid and trade would be a good way of protecting U.S. national interests. By the 1980's, the USA had secured its influence on the African continent. There still existed a significant concern, however, namely the rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, a conflict that Moscow already was diplomatically engaged in.¹⁸ American engagement in Somalia could hence be seen as an extension of American strategic policies known as "containment."¹⁹ After the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994 (and the unwillingness to intervene in Rwanda the same year despite clear evidence of ongoing genocide), the moral relativism of the policy makers in Washington was revealed. Magstadt asserts that this is a general tendency of U.S. foreign policy:

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Thomas Paterson, J. Clifford, S. Maddock, D. Kisatsky, & K. Hagan (ed.) *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895), 7th Edt*, vol. 2 (Boston Wadsworth, 2010). 233

¹⁷ Ibid. 404

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 9

America nearly always acts – or intends to act – on its interests. But unlike the others [the other Great Powers], America always *pretends* to act on principle, and Americans with rare exceptions actually believe it when presidents justify, and apologists memorialize, America's self-interested actions in glittering moral terms.

²⁰

In the struggle between interests and principles, interests tend to win. This is not an exclusively American tendency, but the USA may be criticized for often justifying its military interventions with moral principles, such as freedom and democracy, where the protection of own national interests are the actual reasons. James McCormick expands this view, asserting that the USA has been “particularly sensitive to reconciling its actions with moral principles, perhaps more so than many others.”²¹ The other wars mentioned above, Word War I and II and the invasion of Iraq, also serve as examples of this.

Magstadt emphasizes the importance of taking potential blowbacks into account when using military power to promote world democracy. The invasions (and defeat of) the so-called ‘rogue states’ Iraq and Afghanistan testify to the fact that the USA definitely is capable of invading rogue states; the problems appear when the question of ruling occurs in the defeated state.²² Besides, people in sub-Saharan Africa could associate peacekeeping and nation-building with imperialism. These are challenges that need to be taken into consideration. The U.S. involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s can illustrate such difficulties.

1.3 Research Question

Based on the discussions above, the framework of this thesis is a modified version²³ of the one presented by Magstadt; that principles and interests often becomes rivals in the foreign political arena. The aim is to examine how the tension and divergence between the two was evident in the USA's involvement in Somalia in the 1990s. Necessary to add to the discussion are questions of *why* the Somalia-involvement triggered this tension,

²⁰ Ibid. 241

²¹ James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, 5th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2009). 22

²² Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 231

²³ I have deliberately replaced the term ‘power’ with ‘interests’

which gives the opportunity to highlight and discuss some of the challenges that American policy makers may face when confronted with humanitarian crises in peripheral corners of the world. This is the background for my research question, which is as follows:

How may USA's involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s illustrate the tension between interests and principles, and which factors may have affected the outcome of this tension?

The principles that I discuss are the ones explicitly stated by the presidents as well as the ones that are included in their preferred political direction. The intervention is discussed briefly in the light of President George H.W. Bush and the new interventionism. The withdrawal is discussed in relation to President Clinton who expressed his support of human rights and democracy, and to the implications of his liberal internationalist approach – a political direction closely tied with Wilsonianism.

The term 'interests' is frequently used. It should be emphasized that in Chapter 2, it refers to the interests implicitly belonging to the policy that the presidents conducted, to merely illustrate how the expressed principles eventually were subordinated. In Chapter 3, however, it refers to more explicit strategic and economic interests of foreign policy relevance.

Apart from the introduction (Chapter 1) and the conclusion (Chapter 5), this thesis consists of three main chapters. In *Chapter 2. The Cold War Legacy: Interests and Principles*, the apparent tension between principles and interests in relation to Somalia is main focus. The chapter centers around the arguments in *Chapter 1. Introduction*, and focuses on how the American presidents in the post-Cold War years approached the problems in Somalia, and seeks to explain this in the light of their expressed political and moral principles and interests. Chapters 3 and 4 seek to identify circumstances that may explain possible reasons for the divergence of interests and principles in this context. *Chapter 3. Domestic Issues* centers on some of the American domestic issues in the post-Cold War years such as the presidential election of 1992, together with more foreign policy relevant economic and strategic concerns, and aims at explaining how these issues were relevant parallel to the operations in Somalia. The findings of Chapter 3 may

seem to reinforce the argument of Chapter 2. *Chapter 4. Operational Issues* elaborates some of the operational challenges related to the intervention in Somalia. The discussions include central arguments for U.S. withdrawal, such as how (and why) the operations eventually caused riots in the Somali community, the vital role played by the American media, and how the quality of the UN/USA collaboration may have affected the American policy makers. Among other issues, this chapter includes brief discussions concerning nation-building, peacekeeping and imperialism to illustrate some the complex issues that emerged in relation to the USA/UN cooperation; however, the main purpose of the chapter is to point at more external impediments to American policy makers' willingness to stay intervened in Somalia than the lack of strategic interests.

My basic argument is that there was an obvious tension between principles and interests in the case of Somalia, where interests prevailed over principles. The USA was reluctant to retain a full military intervention in Somalia in the 1990s due to a lack of strategic interests. At the same time, external factors such as the presidential election, other foreign operations, the impact of the media, as well as general issues of peacekeeping and nation-building apparently complicated the situation further.

1.4 Methods and Sources

The method used in this thesis is a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include speeches, government documents, and newspaper articles from the relevant period of time. Secondary sources that should be emphasized include *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*, where Thomas M. Magstadt gives a short, but critical account of the U.S. handling of regional crises, as well as a wide-ranging survey of the tension between power and principles. *American Foreign Relations: A history (vol II, since 1895)* by Paterson et al. has also contributed with a comprehensive survey of how American interventions often correlate with strategic interests. Robert L. Ostergard Jr.'s criticism of American foreign policy in "The Failure of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: From the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea" from 2006 provided insight in American interests in the relevant period of time. In "Paving the Road to Hell - The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping" from 2000, Max Boot analyzes failures of UN peacekeeping in general; he thus contributes

somewhat objectively in this context. The former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker is critical of the UN response to U.S. contributions in Somalia in his article "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong" from 1995. Both articles were published in *Foreign Affairs* by the end of year 2000 and hence, each in their own way, reflects authentic frustration over U.S. and UN intervention. Philip Cunliffe's article "Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today" from 2012 and Michael Maren's book *The Road To Hell* from 1997 should also be added on the list of useful debate and critique of the operations in Somalia. *The Collapse of the Somali State. The Impact of the Colonial Legacy* from 1996, written by the Somali-British scholar Dr. Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe's book provides for a profound and valuable "insider's" survey of the Somali cultural history. John Drysdale served as an adviser to the UN during the operations in Somalia, and shares valuable knowledge and criticism in his *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* from 1994.

2 The Cold War Legacy: Interests and Principles

The discussions of this chapter center around how the political principles of the two American presidential administrations during the Somalia operations were related to the articulated political interests. It should be emphasized that the term *interest* in this context refers to the (somewhat vague) political vow of reinforcing the American economy, because this chapter seeks to focus on the *tension* between interests and principles. A more exhaustive discussion of concrete economic and strategic interests will be elaborated in Chapter 3, to illustrate the arguments presented in this chapter.

President Bush initiated the intervention in Somalia, and President Clinton decided to withdraw before peace was established. The principles and interests of the latter administration will be emphasized in the discussion due to the fact that he initiated the withdrawal from Somalia; the policies of the former administration is also highly interesting, but will in this context be subordinated due to the focus of this thesis. The policies of the Bush Administration will nevertheless be surveyed and discussed, because it will function as a comparison and complementation in the discussion of the Clinton Administration. It is also relevant to see the policies of President Clinton in the light of his predecessor, to understand some of the flexibility demanded of foreign policy, which again is highly affected by the international landscape as well as national concerns. The political principles of the two administrations will be transferred to the Somalia operations, and the chapter eventually concludes that the withdrawal was a consequence of a divergence and tension between principles and interests – where interests prevailed in the motivation for the policy makers to make the choices they made.

2.1 The Post-Cold War Period

When the Soviet Union dissolved and the end of the Cold War was a fact, the world changed in several ways. Firstly, a half-century of great power rivalry ended, and the USA stepped forward as the prominent leader of the international community. Secondly, a period of stability ended. The Cold War had had a stabilizing effect because of the

bipolar balance of power, but now, other nations were free to participate in a great power race. Weapons of mass destruction constituted one of the global issues in the post-Cold War era. Regional wars and instability, global economy and a new balance of power, environmental issues, population pressure, diseases and famine were other issues of importance.²⁴ For the USA, this presented new challenges. A new foreign political agenda had to be established to replace the containment of communism and to address the emerging global issues. President Bush and President Clinton would bear the responsibility of pointing out the new direction for the USA.

2.2 Two Administrations and Their Policies

[George H.W. Bush] had the good fortune to be at the helm when the policies of the past four decades bore the sweet fruits of victory, but the economy turned sour; [Bill Clinton] had the good fortune to be president when the economy was vibrant, but the world turned sour.²⁵

2.2.1 The Bush Administration

George Herbert Walker Bush became the USA's forty-first president in 1989, and thus took over the presidential seat in a politically significant period of time: the end of the Cold War and the following transition from great power rivalry to U.S. hegemony.²⁶ The need of a new set of a foreign political roadmap arose. Stephen J. Stedman suggests the term 'new interventionism' as suitable for the foreign policy that President Bush conducted, claiming that the guiding principle of this idea was "the international community's obligations to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its people."²⁷ This political tactic included the possibility to use unilateral action if needed. Michael J. Glennon asserted (as early as 1999, I would point out) that the international consensus on when (or not) to intervene in other nations would fade away and remain as a vague memory from the twentieth century.²⁸ He claims, moreover, that by embracing the new interventionism in the wake of the Cold

²⁴ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 466

²⁵ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 165

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," *Foreign Affairs* 72(1992-1993). 9

²⁸ Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law," *ibid.* 78, no. 3 (1999). 1

War, the USA implicitly abandoned the original UN limitations on foreign intervention in local conflicts.

Interventionism is nothing new in American foreign policy. It can be seen as a vital part of one of the two competing tendencies that have shaped American foreign policy since the founding of the nation, namely isolationism and internationalism.²⁹ The USA embraced internationalism during the Cold War, to strategically secure its interests by remaining visible in the world community. The new interventionism arose as a branch of this period of internationalism, and can be interpreted as a development from 'visibility' to 'heavy responsibility'. Being the world's sole superpower, the USA took on the responsibility of playing the role as world police force. Glennon calls this tendency "America's new willingness to do what it thinks right."³⁰ Magstadt asserts that the new interventionism was accompanied by a new kind of realism as well, which consisted of a combination of strategic and humanitarian values.³¹ Generally, President Bush was applauded for being pragmatic in a time where efficacy was needed, but his critics nevertheless charged him for being a leader without a particular vision, who sought to manage a chaotic world rather than change it.³²

2.2.2 The Clinton Administration

To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well as at home. There is no longer division between what is foreign and domestic. The world economy, environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race--they affect us all. ... When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community defied, we will act -- with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary. ... Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause. (From President Clinton's first inaugural address) ³³

²⁹ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 3

³⁰ Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law." 2

³¹ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 176

³² Ibid. 189

³³ William J Clinton, "Inaugural Address (January 20, 1993)," The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46366> (Accessed November 11, 2012).

President William J. Clinton took office in 1993. He was “untested”³⁴ in national politics, and preferred to focus on domestic rather than foreign politics, promising to revive the economy and carry through reforms in the social fields of health care and welfare.³⁵ Magstadt observes that the administration’s main foreign political aim was to improve the global economy because the domestic economy would benefit from it. The interdependent relationship between global and U.S. economies was based on the fact that the USA at the time was the largest exporter *and* importer of goods (and services), and consequently was depending on a stable and growing world economy.³⁶ In the field of foreign policy, the Clinton Administration embraced a liberal internationalist approach.

Roland Paris defines liberal internationalism as the “assumption that the surest foundation for peace ... is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.”³⁷ He goes on to suggest that liberal internationalism appears to have guided most of the actors engaged in peace building in the wake of the Cold War. Liberal trade policies, market-oriented reforms in former Communist states of Europe and regional conflict management were all favorable to the Clinton Administration’s attempt to maintain a strong world economy. But there existed a divergence between the domestic economy at the time, which was slowly improving when President Clinton took office, and the unstable conditions in many corners of the world. This presented a challenge to the ideals and democratic values that President Clinton embraced, and which he expressed in his first inaugural address cited above. Magstadt further stresses that a foreign policy that emphasizes global economy depends on multilateral cooperation, which was one of the main reasons for the strong preference President Clinton had for operating multilaterally through international organizations such as the UN, the IMF, NATO and the like.³⁸ He also pledged to advance multilateral solutions to global issues such as human rights and terrorism through the aforementioned organizations and institutions.³⁹

³⁴ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 178

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid. 180

³⁷ Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997). 56

³⁸ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 180

³⁹ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 445

One central principle of liberal internationalism is the Wilsonian belief in democracy as a premise for peace. According to Robert W. Tucker, internationalism and Wilsonianism naturally belong to each other.⁴⁰ Scholars therefore frequently refer to "liberal Wilsonian internationalism"⁴¹ as a general phrase. One of the essential principles of Wilsonianism is that there is a relationship between a democratic and a peaceful world, as expressed in President Wilson's assertion that "a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations."⁴² Arguably, it early became the centerpiece of the Clinton Administration: it was announced that the strategy of 'enlargement of democracy' would replace the Cold War's containment of communism.⁴³

A question that arises is why the promotion of democracy is, and has been, so important to the USA; could American national interests and foreign political aims benefit from expansion of democracy? A brief answer is *yes*, based on the following claims. The American victory in the Cold War was believed to be dependent on the expansion of democracy. Relations both within and between democracies are often perceived as more stable and pacific; democracies could thus be said to be easier to cooperate with where vital interests are at stake.⁴⁴ In other words, the spread of democracy can arguably prevent or decrease regional conflicts – and as a consequence hence reduce the pressure for the USA to intervene militarily where there are no obvious strategic interests. This may again reduce the possibilities for economic (as well as human) costs. One can also assume that the stabilizing effects of democracy may positively affect global trade, which would be an extra interesting factor for the liberal internationalist Clinton Administration due to its focus on global trade. It could thus be reasonable to claim that the assumed preventive nature of democracy has been an important factor for U.S. policy makers through times. This factor, together with the aspect of trade relations, may have been important reasons to continue to embrace democracy enlargement in the

⁴⁰ Robert W. Tucker, "The Triumph of Wilsonianism?," *World Policy Journal* 10, no. 4 (1993). 84

⁴¹ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 212

⁴² Cited in Tucker, "The Triumph of Wilsonianism?." 95

⁴³ Tony Smith, "Wilsonianism," *Encyclopedia of the New American Nation*, <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Wilsonianism.html#b> (Accessed December 17, 2012).

⁴⁴ Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994). 39

beginning of the 1990's, when the global public opinion naturally looked to the world's sole hegemony for initiative and responsibility.

Clinton became president in a particularly demanding period of time; globalization was the new buzzword, a new world economy and world order was to be established, and due to its, in the words of Magstadt, "self-appointed role as the world's archetype of democracy"⁴⁵, the USA faced questions of whether or not to intervene in regional, local wars that would not necessarily affect U.S. interests directly. Somalia would represent one of these issues.

2.3 The Case of Somalia

A full-scale guerilla war broke out in Somalia in May 1988, after years of political turmoil that had lasted ever since General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and broke Somali ties with the Soviet Union in 1977. Somalia simultaneously shifted to the U.S. side, and a military tension for control over the Ogaden region between Somalia and Ethiopia became another site of Cold War rivalry.⁴⁶ The warring and the alarming conditions in Somalia called for international response. The UN and the USA responded, providing for almost three years of peacekeeping between April 1992 and March 1995. These years may be divided into three phases: 1) UNOSOM I (April – December 1992) was a UN-led operation that eventually collapsed and called for help from the USA, who established 2) UNITAF (December 1992 – April 1993), a multinational force led by the USA. The U.S. troops withdrew and left the mission to 3) UNOSOM II (May 1993 – March 1995), a UN-led operation that expanded the humanitarian mission to include nation building.⁴⁷

The UN looked to the USA for help when UNOSOM I met severe resistance in Somalia. President George H.W. Bush was reluctant at first, but eventually agreed to establish a multinational force to secure the humanitarian mission in December 1992 due to the dreadful conditions of a starving population in the war-torn nation. Almost 30,000

⁴⁵ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 179

⁴⁶ Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994". 6

⁴⁷ Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (1995 (May. - Jun.)). 4

American troops entered Somalia with the aim of restoring order, feed the hungry and eventually hand over the peacekeeping mission to the UN. Operation Restore Hope, as the intervention was named, succeeded in feeding the starving people and partially in encouraging diplomatic contact between the warlords. The setback started when the UN, including 8,000 American soldiers, took over and tried to restore political stability.⁴⁸ The warlord in control of Mogadishu, General Mohamed Farah Aideed attacked the peacekeeping troops, and in October 1993, nineteen U.S. Army Rangers died in a firefight. More than 1,000 Somalis died in the same fight. The world stood by their television sets, shocked by images of dead American soldiers being dragged around in the streets of Mogadishu. President Clinton withdrew all American forces by April 1994. In May 1994, he announced, moreover, that the USA would not intervene in regional conflicts unless the following conditions were present: solid public backing of intervention, security threat to the USA, multilateral participation under UN authorization and limited goals were clearly articulated (in particular that the USA would, generally, take no responsibility for nation-building).⁴⁹

2.4 Somalia and the Two Administrations

The decision to withdraw from Somalia in a time of crisis naturally poses questions such as *why* did the Clinton Administration choose to depart, despite his recently expressed principles of multilateral cooperation, and to secure human rights and democracy? This section will illustrate how the somewhat untidy handling of the crisis in Somalia may reflect how political and moral principles and interests diverged. The relationship between interests and principles in the initiative to *intervene* will be discussed first; still, the decision to *withdraw* that follows will be main focus.

⁴⁸ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 452

⁴⁹ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 184 & "Presidential Decision Directive 25: U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," (The George Washington University Website: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050394.pdf> (Accessed November 26, 2012), 1994).

When the crisis in Somalia was a fact, humanitarian organizations, the media as well as congressional leaders from both parties explicitly stated their anticipation of U.S. involvement. Images of starving Somali children reached the American public, urging Washington's policy makers to react.⁵⁰ Due to the uncontested hegemonic position of the USA in the post-Cold War world, there was, according to Magstadt, "increasing pressure on the president ... to act out of *principle* (my emphasis) in instances where innocent lives rather than vital national interests were at stake."⁵¹ Magstadt calls Somalia a chance for the USA to try a new foreign political principle that combined liberalism and pragmatism together with idealism and American problem solving.⁵²

Due to the expressed expectations, President Bush had no choice but to intervene on humanitarian grounds, and hoped that the American troops could restore order and eventually turn peacekeeping duties over to the UN.⁵³ UNITAF was approved by the UN, but still coincided with the new interventionist principle of unilateralism due to the American leadership. At the same time, UNITAF was a multinational operation, composed by almost 30,000 American troops and 17,000 troops from over 20 other countries.⁵⁴ Despite his label of a new interventionist, then, President Bush conducted his second multilateral operation within his one-term presidency (having recently invaded Kuwait as part of a UN authorized war).

The intervention can be interpreted as principally and morally right in the light of the humanitarian conditions that people of Somalia suffered from. At the same time as sympathy may have been a factor, the value of leading a multinational operation in a time where the USA had to be extra offensive on the international arena, is striking. Magstadt holds that the decision to intervene only makes sense in the light of the several tragedies worldwide that followed after the Soviet Union's breakdown, and the fact that Somalia was even a former Cold War ally.⁵⁵ It could be reasonable to claim that the intervention was based on national strategic interests (which will be elaborated in

⁵⁰ Jonathan Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (1997). 385

⁵¹ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 186

⁵² *Ibid.*, p 175

⁵³ *Ibid.* ; Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 452

⁵⁴ UN, "Somalia - Unosom I. Background Text,"

<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> (Accessed January 18, 2013).

⁵⁵ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 176

Chapter 3) and external expectations more than on humanitarian principles. President Bush was criticized for not having a political vision, or road map, to follow. This may again have been disadvantageous to his successor, President Clinton, who inherited the 'problem' of an intervention in Somalia that he had to find a solution to.

The fact that President Clinton expressed a favoring of multilateralism concurs with the UN/U.S. collaboration in Somalia. The quality of the cooperation would, however, prove crucial for the operations. A central argument that will be elaborated in Chapter 4 is that one of the failures with the Somalia operation was the handing over of peacekeeping duties from the USA to the UN.⁵⁶ The apparently poorly prepared transfer to the UN can nevertheless bear witness of a lack of American moral engagement and willingness to continue the engagement in Somalia. Besides, a preference for multilateralism calls for cooperation. A badly organized transfer to the UN, followed by withdrawal, is arguably an example of poor teamwork. It can be argued that the USA faced challenges in parts of its internationalist-oriented policy, specifically its preference for multilateral cooperation. In the resulting confusion of ends and means, principles became somewhat less important, especially in the case of Somalia.

At the same time, UNITAF's achievements allegedly surpassed the initial goals of securing the humanitarian relief. Walter S. Poole calls the short-term humanitarian mission a success: it improved conditions in Somalia.⁵⁷ Chester Crocker stresses, among other accomplishments, the demonstrating of military predominance without favoring or disfavoring any national icon, and encouraging restoration of the police and government functions at the same time as they removed heavy weapons from conflict sites.⁵⁸ The USA also made national sacrifices: by June 1994, \$1.3 billion were spent on the involvement in Somalia. In addition, the total cost of lives was 32, and 172 were wounded.⁵⁹ The spending of lives and money is obviously not a premise for success, but it bears witness of a U.S. willingness to improve Somali conditions while situated there. President Clinton's decision to withdraw from Somalia was nonetheless popular. Magstadt even calls the withdrawal "President Clinton's finest hour as commander in

⁵⁶ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong.", pp 4-6

⁵⁷ Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994".

⁵⁸ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." 4

⁵⁹ Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994". 68

chief.”⁶⁰ Chapter 4 argues that the American public eventually became immensely dissatisfied with the American intervention in the wake of the violent incidents of October 1993, which could explain Magstadt’s choice of words.

2.5 Interests and Principles

One can argue that Clinton struggled more than his predecessor with balancing his proclaimed principles of multilateralism, human rights and democracy to ensure peace, with his political interests that focused on economic growth. Apparently, the enlargement of democracy and multilateralism would prove beneficial to the USA and may constitute an interdependent chain of interests together with economic expansion. Enlargement of democracy could improve the international economy, create peace and stability and thus possibly prevent pressure on U.S. intervention. This would again benefit U.S. economy, and a well-functioning international cooperation would ease U.S. economic and logistic issues. Paris, on the other hand, criticizes liberal internationalism for not being a very effective paradigm for implementing stable peace in war-torn regions; political and economic liberalization has ironically proved to incite destabilizing consequences such as obstruction of peace or even new fights.⁶¹ Belloni illustrates this argument by claiming that

When ... economic liberalization are advanced as key intervention strategies in a context dominated by ethno-national mobilization on the basis of identity, they are unlikely to work ... Political leadership bent on plundering the assets of the state and those of ordinary people, makes ... economic liberalization *counterproductive* (my emphasis).⁶²

When the principle of ‘democracy enlargement’ is seen in the light of this criticism, it can hardly deserve to be called a principle; it is more akin to a badly camouflaged self-interest. President Clinton’s critics were frustrated by his tendency to neglect the principles of his campaign promises on behalf of negotiation and compromise, and that

⁶⁰ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 187

⁶¹ Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." 56

⁶² Roberto Belloni, "Rethinking "Nation-Building": The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, no. Winter/Spring (2007). 101

this was a weakness due to his inclination to be too morally confused to take wise decisions under pressure.⁶³

The humanitarian considerations in Somalia were eventually subordinated to the national interests that focused on strategic and economic growth, an argument that will be elaborated in Chapter 3. This apparent tension and divergence of interests and principles in the case of Somalia withdrawal (and other regional conflicts in the same period) can be seen as a setback for U.S. policy makers in this period of time, because it revealed attitudes that were akin to moral indifference in conflicts where national interests were not directly affected. A cable sent by Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, to the State Department in 1992, prior to the intervention in Somalia, revealed attitudes that would follow some of the central U.S. actors in Somalia during the intervention:

Somalis ... are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run attacks.... If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu. To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)?⁶⁴

The Joint Staff allegedly shared the sentiments that are exposed here, although not as explicitly stated. Statements such as these raise the question of what position morality issues have in politics. Before concluding this section, it may be worth discussing the relevance of the political labels of idealism and realism.

By expressing a strong preference for multilateral organizations and economic cooperation, President Clinton was generally perceived as a political idealist. In contrast, realists tend to express a greater trust in unilateralism and favor balancing power. President Clinton was compared to John F. Kennedy, who had described himself as an "idealist without illusions."⁶⁵ Perhaps this generally idealistic orientation helps explain allegations made by President Clinton's critics, namely that he never developed a foreign policy grand strategy, but dealt with issues as they arose.⁶⁶ Idealists tend to believe that humans are essentially good, but become confused by poorly managed institutions. They

⁶³ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 179

⁶⁴ Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994". 69

⁶⁵ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 25

⁶⁶ Ibid. pp 177-178

also regard morality as a better guide to action than self-interests are. Idealists are still careful not to emphasize the aspect of morality too much in foreign policy. However, the traces of moral relativism in the case of Somalia corresponds more with realism than with idealism, because realists emphasize the fact that morality may impede the real pursuit of national interests.⁶⁷ It could thus be claimed that President Clinton leaned toward realism in his decision to withdraw from Somalia. Magstadt also holds that President Clinton's emphasis on self-interests can bear witness to a realist influence, and adds that this was actually widely recognized although the administration often was perceived as liberal-idealistic.⁶⁸ It would, however, be awkward to make a strict division of idealism and realism; one rarely sees *either* only realism or idealism when analyzing foreign policy strategies and principles. On the contrary, the two concepts are often fused, with a tendency towards one of them. President Clinton nevertheless surprised the world with his realist approach to foreign policy in this case.⁶⁹

At the same time, one should ask whether or not it is (morally) wrong to conduct a foreign policy based primarily on self-interests. Interests would naturally play an important role in the implementation of foreign policy. Still, self-interest alone should arguably not steer the decisions that are made. Crocker stresses this argument when he says that it cannot be U.S. policy to protect the world's oil supply but ignore genocide (said in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda).⁷⁰ Arguably, the context must be taken into consideration: a situation where the world's sole superpower faces a humanitarian tragedy in a war-torn, peripherally situated fellow UN member state, and besides a former Cold War client, should call for humanitarian considerations and solidarity. The relevance of the fact that Somalia was a former Cold War client was even emphasized in the beginning of the intervention in 1992.⁷¹ Based on these arguments, there should have been more emphasis on the moral considerations in the case of Somalia rather than on explicitly exposing the realist tendency of letting national interests come first.

⁶⁷ Ibid. pp 24-25

⁶⁸ Ibid. 26

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia. Not Everything Went Wrong", pp 7-8

⁷¹ Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994". 9

The policies of the early 1990s caused broad confusion over the USA's role in the new world order, and the variation in U.S. response to regional conflicts reinforced this perplexity. Richard Haass briefly surveys what he calls limited military interventions carried out by the Clinton Administration; Somalia and former Yugoslavia being two of them. Haass ironically states that in Somalia, "the administration inherited a humanitarian mission only to expand it and then withdraw hurriedly when eighteen servicemen lost their lives,"⁷² and goes on to say that the critics blamed the USA for intervening too late in Europe while withdrawing too quickly from Somalia. Crocker explains the failure of the Somalia case as being a consequence of "strategic confusion followed by a lack of political will."⁷³ This can again fortify the claim that there was a clear tension between the principles and interests in the case of Somalia, and that U.S. policy makers seemingly relied too much on external expectations. President Clinton was clearly politically and principally bewildered when it came to taking decisions in regional conflicts, Somalia being a prime example, and both presidents gave in for domestic and international pressure.⁷⁴

A question that emerges in this context is *why* Somalia came to suffer from this tension; which factors were crucial when concluding that Somalia was not politically significant enough for the USA to remain militarily engaged?

⁷² Richard N. Haass, *War of Necessity / War of Choice. A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). 155

⁷³ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." 5

⁷⁴ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 188

3 Domestic Issues: Presidential Succession, Economy and Oil Addiction

This chapter presents and discusses some domestic issues that may explain some of the questions that arise in relation to the evident tension between interests and principles. The discussion in section 3.1 centers around how the presidential election of 1992 may have distracted American policy makers in the period of the Somalia operations. Thereafter, a discussion of some of the USA's vital interests will follow in section 3.2. In this chapter, the term *interest* refers to strategic and economic interests. Section 3.2.1 includes a discussion of how and why the USA's addiction to oil can be said to have steered much of the foreign political agenda of this period, and section 3.2.2 elaborates and illustrates how strategic concerns characterized some of the important (non-) interventions that the USA conducted during the first years of Clinton's presidency.

3.1 Presidential Succession

A presidential election is a comprehensive process. The candidates must watch their steps and weigh their words to avoid controversies in the run-up to the election night. The election of 1992 was no exception. As stated, the presidency of George H.W. Bush was generally perceived as a success, much due to his foreign political accomplishments. Some were therefore surprised when Bill Clinton won the election. He may have been surprised himself, seen from a foreign political perspective; the departing President Bush bequeathed some unfinished foreign operations to his successor, the intervention in Somalia being one of them.

The presidential transition of 1992 may be said to have entailed three important consequences for the American involvement in Somalia. Firstly, the run-up to the election may have affected the decision to intervene. Mermin asserts that the forthcoming presidential election played a vital part in the American approach to Somalia in the first place, because American inaction in Somalia could have resulted in

high political costs for both parties in 1992.⁷⁵ The media widely reported from the crisis that unfolded in Somalia, as discussed in Chapter 4, thus a potential unveiling of moral relativism could have been crucial for the sitting president during the election campaign. Secondly, Crocker holds that Somalia unluckily experienced what he calls the “steep learning curve of an inexperienced administration,”⁷⁶ meaning that President Clinton’s lack of foreign political experience largely influenced the decisions that were made from early 1993. The criticized transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II could be relevant in this case; a more experienced president could have taken other decisions in such a critical period. Thirdly, the fact that the implementation of UNITAF was conducted amid the election may in addition have influenced the quality of the U.S. approach to Somalia. For instance, Crocker claims that the “coordinated and politically astute operating strategy”⁷⁷ of U.S. Ambassador Robert B Oakley and U.S. Marine General Robert Johnston was interrupted by the presidential transition. By this he probably refers to the fact that a presidential transition calls for logistic changes and hence preoccupies (and distracts) the policy makers for a period of time, especially when there is a shift from Republican to Democratic administration, as was the case in 1992/1993. The presidential shift also entailed a shift of political focus, as mentioned earlier. The Democrats constituted the majority of both the House and the Senate in 1993, which was an advantage for the new president and his interests, and President Clinton was first and foremost determined to improve the American economy.⁷⁸

3.2 Economy, Oil & Strategic Considerations

In the 1950s, the USA generated about 50% of the world’s GDP. By the 1990s, however, the GDP share had declined to 22%, over a half of what it generated some decades

⁷⁵ Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy." 396

⁷⁶ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." 3

⁷⁷ Ibid. 4

⁷⁸ "Majority Leaders of the House (1899 to Present)," United States House of Representatives: Office of the Historian and the Clerk of the House's Office of Art and Archives, <http://history.house.gov/People/Office/Majority-Leaders/> (Accessed January 7, 2013); "Majority and Minority Leaders and Party Whips," The United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Majority_Minority_Leaders.htm#4 (Accessed January 7, 2013).

earlier, due to the fact that the World economy was ascending.⁷⁹ During the 1980s, the USA had moved from being the world's main creditor to becoming the biggest debtor. In his presidential campaigns, President Clinton pledged to focus on a continued reinforcement of the economy.⁸⁰ As stated earlier, his foreign political agenda was driven by economic motives, because of the belief in reciprocity between the international and American economy.⁸¹ President Clinton succeeded in his work to improve domestic economy. Even after a "cloud of impeachment" after the sex scandal in 1997 his popularity was sustained, Magstadt tells us, because of a "buoyant economy."⁸² The interest of improving the domestic and international economy motivated for a more international burden sharing during his terms in office. Oil constituted a crucial part of American economy, and stable conditions on oil-rich parts of the world were hence of American interest to safeguard the international economy. The following discussion reveals how the American interest in, or 'addiction to', oil influenced policy makers in the post-Cold War period.

During the Cold War, regional instability was of geopolitical relevance because it presented new sites of great power rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union. Somalia was, as aforementioned, one of the 'battle fields' of the Cold War. Somalia thus occupied a relatively strategic importance for the U.S. in the transfer from the 1980s to the 1990s. According to Magstadt, the decision to intervene in Somalia in 1992 was motivated, above all, by the country's geographical proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and hence to important oil supplies.⁸³ In the first years of the 1990s, then, Somalia apparently was of some interest for American policy makers; first strategically, and later *potentially* economically. Seemingly, this relative political relevance diminished as issues more relevant to the U.S. arose. After the Cold War, the U.S. policy makers could ignore regional conflicts when it did not directly threaten U.S. interests.⁸⁴ Arguably, one vital and economic interest of the USA was, and is, to protect the world's oil supplies and search for new sources of petroleum to "remain politically, economically and militarily

⁷⁹ James F. Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," *Survival* 45, no. 4 (2003). 102

⁸⁰ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 165

⁸¹ Ibid. 180

⁸² Ibid. 179

⁸³ Ibid. 175

⁸⁴ Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." 88

competitive.”⁸⁵ The Middle East interventions of the early 1990s may illustrate the U.S. interest in securing oil supplies; a survey of some of the most relevant events in this relation will therefore follow in the next subsection.

3.2.1 Oil and Economic Considerations

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 called for U.S. attention. The concerns centered around the possibilities that Saddam Hussein might come to invade Saudi-Arabia. This would have affected the USA in the sense that Saudi-Arabia was a strategic partner and besides a major petroleum-producing ally. 700,000 American troops were sent as part of a multinational peacekeeping force in November 1990. The U.S. mandate was expanded with UN approval, and in January 1991 Operation Desert Storm started bombing Iraq and Kuwait. Some weeks after, in February, some 100,000 allied ground forces invaded the areas, and after only 100 hours of fighting on the ground, all parts signed an agreement of cease-fire. The USA suffered the immediate loss of 148 deaths and 458 wounded.⁸⁶

The war against Iraq had impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process, a process that the USA was highly engaged in. After the negotiations in Oslo, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had a friendly meeting and signed an agreement on the distribution of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank at President Clinton’s office in September 1993.⁸⁷ American engagement in such a peace process would definitely be strategically advantageous to the USA, due to the fact that Israel is an important ally in the Middle East, and also because the Palestinian side represents the Arab people. President Clinton furthermore continued to involve militarily in the Middle East to fight Saddam Hussein; a missile attack was launched in Baghdad in 1993, and 36,000 American troops were sent to Kuwait to daunt Iraqi forces in 1994.⁸⁸ Military and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East was an important part of American foreign policy in the early 1990s, arguably encouraged by the importance of the oil.

⁸⁵ Robert L. Ostergard-Jr., "The Failure of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: From the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 7(2006). 49

⁸⁶ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. pp 459-461

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

The American addiction to oil is regarded as one of the roots of America's foreign policy failures in the post-Cold War era.⁸⁹ In political scientist Robert L. Ostergard Jr.'s opinion, the major contradiction in American post-World War II foreign policy has been that the U.S. government has been willing to promote the Wilsonian vision of spreading democracy, but that the actual aims primarily have been to protect national American interests, as discussed in Chapter 2. Ostergard Jr. notes that President George W. Bush's State of the Union Address in 2006 concluded that "America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world."⁹⁰ The President correctly identified this as a problem for the USA. More importantly, he implicitly admitted to be a part of the criticized foreign policy contradiction, due to the many years of U.S. military involvement spent to stabilize the Middle East region, and particularly his own intervention in Iraq. Ostergard Jr. holds that "...the only lessons that we have learned in the past fifty years of dealing with the Middle East is that we need a new gas station because the old one is now in a bad neighborhood."⁹¹ He compares the Middle East to a future West Africa, cautioning against a negative development similar to the one we have seen in the Middle East region for the past 30 years.⁹² The background for the comparison is that over the past decade, the USA has increased its engagement in West Africa because of constantly emerging oil supplies in areas such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola. Ostergard Jr. warns that, due to the already existing problems of civil unrest, corruption, ethnic conflict and other issues, the USA must take into consideration that U.S. involvement might be looked upon as a source of instability.⁹³

Oil was not the only concern of American policy makers in the early 1990s, however. Having recently 'won' the Cold War, the USA had to focus on foreign operations that were of strategic relevance as well. The Balkan crisis in Europe and the Rwandan genocide nagged American policy makers, but the different approach to the two humanitarian crises gives evidence to how President Clinton prioritized strategic over humanitarian concerns.

⁸⁹ Ostergard-Jr., "The Failure of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: From the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea." 47

⁹⁰ Ibid. 47

⁹¹ Ibid. 53

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

3.2.2 Strategic considerations

After the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992, Bosnian Serbs began terrorizing Bosnian Muslims through actions that can be classified as ethnic cleansing. Mass murders of Muslims and raping of Muslim women were some of the horrors executed by Serbian soldiers. As many as 150,000 people had been killed by the beginning of 1993. President Clinton was reluctant to intervene, being advised not to by the Pentagon. After years of evaluating the situation by observation and sending of warnings to the Serbs, Clinton decided in mid-1995 to authorize covert American support to the Croatian army and intensified NATO air strikes. American forces eventually constituted one third of a NATO force that aimed at assisting in peaceful reconstruction⁹⁴ of the state.⁹⁵

In the same period, genocide developed in the more geopolitically peripheral state of Rwanda in early 1994. Despite reports of massive-scale killing (800,000 dead as of April 1994), the USA refused to intervene.⁹⁶ Journalist James Bennet⁹⁷ claims that President Clinton's announcement of May 1994, stating the prerequisites for intervention in regional wars (summarized in Chapter 2, section 2.3, this thesis), was actually a codified decision of not intervening in Rwanda.⁹⁸ Utterances from President Clinton during his tour in Africa in 1998 strengthen the assumption that the U.S. officials knew more than they immediately admitted. The New York Times (NYT) recounted parts of President Clinton's statements and excerpts from his apology speech to Rwanda. The rationale for this, as stated above, was that the Clinton Administration refused to intervene: it rather evacuated U.S. citizens and instructed officials not to use the term "genocide."⁹⁹ According to NYT, President Clinton implicitly acknowledged the American failure, namely the unwillingness to help, when he met half a dozen survivors. He moreover proclaimed that "we in the United States ... did not as much as we could have and should

⁹⁴ My point is that American forces eventually joined the NATO forces; how the NATO force actually implemented the reconstruction will not be discussed in this context

⁹⁵ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 450

⁹⁶ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 187

⁹⁷ Previous editor-in-chief of the (foreign affairs-focussed) magazine *The Atlantic*

⁹⁸ James Bennet, "Clinton in Africa: The Overview; Clinton Declares U.S., with World, Failed

Rwandans," *The New York Times*(March 26, 1998),

<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/26/world/clinton-in-africa-the-overview-clinton-declares-us-with-world-failed-rwandans.html> (Accessed December 12, 2012).

⁹⁹ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 453

have done to try to limit what occurred in Rwanda in 1994,"¹⁰⁰ thereby admitting that the USA did not do what they had the capacity to do. In his official speech, President Clinton apologized for not calling the past crimes by their rightful name.¹⁰¹ Paterson et al. states that the genocide in Rwanda exposed the moral relativism of U.S. foreign policy and thus put American policy makers in an awkward position.¹⁰²

Magstadt explains the reluctance to intervene in Rwanda as being a direct consequence of the lack of strategic interests.¹⁰³ The US humanitarian failure in Rwanda is indisputable; the late response to the Balkans can be deliberated. The fact that the USA eventually did intervene in the latter conflict may attest to the humanitarian principles and concerns of American policy makers. At the same time, one must take into consideration that the Balkans constitute a large part of the European continent. President Clinton's preference for multilateral and international cooperation would arguably imply a strong relationship to the newly strengthened EU, which had expanded its organizational strength (and changed its name from EEC) in 1993.¹⁰⁴ Contributing to creating peace in Europe would naturally be a favor for the EU, and a good relationship to the EU would be strategically advantageous to the USA after the Cold War. The cases of Rwanda and the Balkans strengthen the assumption that humanitarian concerns were secondary during Clinton's presidency. This again fortifies the findings of Chapter 2, where it is claimed that the expressed principles were subordinated the interests in the case of Somalia.

Somalia may have been somewhat strategically interesting in the beginning of the 1990s, being situated on the Horn of Africa, a relatively geopolitically strategic site due to its border to the Gulf of Aden – the seaway gate to the oil-rich Middle East. This *may* have been a motivating factor for the successful achievements that were made in Somalia during the years of U.S. involvement. Still, it is highly relevant to see the politics of the early 1990s in the light of Ostergard Jr's criticism of the American oil addiction.

¹⁰⁰ Bennet, "Clinton in Africa: The Overview; Clinton Declares U.S., with World, Failed Rwandans".

¹⁰¹ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 453

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 187

¹⁰⁴ EU, "Basic Information on the European Union," The European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (Accessed December 21, 2012).

The economy in the same period forced the USA to focus on more relevant conflicts where oil supplies were actually threatened, and therefore engaged heavily in the Middle East and Europe, both militarily and diplomatically. Engaging in the Middle East where oil supplies were vulnerable and engaging in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Cold War can both be seen as economically and strategically relevant. Ostergard Jr criticizes the USA for being unable to act effectively outside its own interests, claiming that the operation in Somalia is a good example of this.¹⁰⁵

Evidence suggests that the domestic concerns of the early 1990s clearly influenced American policy makers both in the decisions to intervene in and to withdraw from Somalia. Implications of the presidential transition, the U.S. economy and the importance of oil together with strategic concerns in the wake of the Cold War all together influenced American foreign policy in the early 1990s. The findings of this chapter reinforce the findings of Chapter 2, and concretize some of the foreign policy interests that played a vital part in the tension between interest and principles in the case of Somalia.

¹⁰⁵ Ostergard-Jr., "The Failure of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: From the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea." 43

4 Operational Issues

This chapter seeks to explain some of the operational factors that may have been essential for American policy makers in the tension between interests and principles. The factors that will be elaborated are a) the Somali resistance and the following consequences, b) the role of the media and c) the implications of the quality of the UN/U.S. cooperation.

Section 4.1 will survey and discuss some of the aspects of the American approach and the signals communicated to the Somali population, to explain the response and resistance that eventually led to 'The First Battle of Mogadishu', which was arguably a crucial factor for withdrawal. Section 4.2 will discuss and argue that the media played a significant role both in the decision to intervene and withdraw. Section 4.3 include a discussion of some of the cooperational issues between the UN and the USA, and propose these as constituting a third factor to obstruct U.S. willingness to stay militarily intervened in Somalia.

4.1 The American Approach and Somali Reception

The arrival of the UNITAF troops in 1992 caused almost no Somali resistance, thanks to a well-performed diplomatic preparation in advance.¹⁰⁶ Somali General Aideed preferred U.S. to UN leadership; he even welcomed the troops in advance. American Ambassador Robert B. Oakley succeeded in persuading the two main Somali adversaries, Mahdi and General Aideed, to sign an agreement on December 1992.¹⁰⁷ Ambassador Oakley and General Aideed met regularly, and it was claimed that they seemed to enjoy each other's company.¹⁰⁸ The U.S. relief mission succeeded, but 1993 would be a year of new challenges. First, American soldiers were involved in unfavorable episodes in the approach of a foreign culture. John Drysdale emphasizes an episode where American Harrier jets flew over Mogadishu to mark their presence during the celebrations of the

¹⁰⁶ Richard W. Stewart, "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)," US Army Center of Military History Online, <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm> (Accessed November 29, 2012). 9

¹⁰⁷ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. 87

¹⁰⁸ Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell* (New York: The Free Press, Simon & Schuster, 1997). 220

end of Ramadan in March 1993. Drysdale asserts that devaluating attitudes or behavior conducted by foreign visitors towards Somali values and integrity would provoke the public, and that this was an example of such behavior.¹⁰⁹ Second, and perhaps more importantly, the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the following expansion of UNOSOM II's mandate to include nation-building provoked the prominent Somali warlord, General Aideed. The practical implications of the nation-building mandate will be discussed later in this chapter; in this context the relevance is that the expansion made General Aideed (who had been positive to U.S. leadership) disapprove and protest to the UN organization of foreign forces. In June 1993 General Aideed's Somalia National Alliance forces ambushed UNOSOM II forces and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. This incident led to a warrant of General Aideed, issued by UN Special Representative for Somalia Admiral Jonathan Howe.¹¹⁰ This resulted in a more complex and complicated operation; unexpected, armed local resistance became a daily threat to foreign operators, both military and civil. In July, four western journalists were killed (and exposed post mortem) by a crowd as a reaction to an American helicopter attack on an Aideed compound.¹¹¹ More relevant, and arguably an important factor for U.S. withdrawal, are the incidents of October 3rd and 4th. These incidents, popularly referred to as 'Black Hawk Down' or 'The First Battle of Mogadishu,' became a turning point for U.S. engagement in Somalia. One of the tragic results of the battles was the episode where a provoked Somali crowd dragged around dead American soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu after two American Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. Eighteen American soldiers died in the firefights during these days.¹¹²

Michael Maren questions the integrity of the operations in Somalia and holds that the violent events that occurred in 1993 "were not an aberration; they were, in fact, foreign aid carried out to its logical extreme. Foreign aid run amok."¹¹³ By this he stresses the fact that the Somali resistance may be understood as a side effect of an unfavorable development in the initial humanitarian mission. It would be reasonable to conclude that the transfer from humanitarian aid to military fights caused the Somalis to interpret

¹⁰⁹ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. 94

¹¹⁰ Stewart, "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)". 16

¹¹¹ Ibid. 16

¹¹² Ibid; Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. 452

¹¹³ Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 218

American and UN action as imperialistic. In Max Boot's words, the West is once again intruding on the sovereignty of failed states around the world.¹¹⁴ This time, however, it is to fight for humanitarian motives rather than gaining new territories. Philip Cunliffe holds that a comparison of similarities between peacekeeping and imperialism is inevitable due to the fact that "peacekeepers are sent to pacify unruly ... territories, using deterrence and force, and propagating ideals and institutions [and] values espoused by the most powerful members of the international system."¹¹⁵ Catherine Besteman asserts that the [media coverage of the] Somali crisis illustrated the powerful postcolonial assumption of those who believed that colonialism *improved* Africa by creating European style nation states.¹¹⁶ Paris further calls peacebuilding¹¹⁷ an "enormous experiment in social engineering ... that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict."¹¹⁸

The fact that peacekeeping missions may have similarities with imperialism presents ethical issues that are hard to ignore. One could ask whether the initial aims of the intervention in Somalia were even humanitarian; even though the American interest in Somalia diminished when more strategically relevant regional conflicts emerged, it could be argued that the interest in Somalia initially derived from the wish to *secure* territories that were of American interest, first strategically in the wake of the Cold War, later because of the oil supplies in critical proximity. The expansion of UNOSOM II's mandate to include nation-building would naturally imply the presenting of ideals and institutions influenced by the democratic values of the West. It is relevant to consider what signals the U.S. and UN operations may have communicated to the Somali population. In fact, the nation-building resolution raised Somali skepticism about the

¹¹⁴ Max Boot, "Paving the Road to Hell - the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping (*Review Essay*)," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (2000). 146

¹¹⁵ Philip Cunliffe, "Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today," *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 4 (2012). 439

¹¹⁶ Catherine Besteman, "Representing Violence and "Othering" Somalia," *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (Feb, 1996) (1996). 122

¹¹⁷ Peacebuilding and not peacekeeping: his points nevertheless applies to this context, because UN's mandate eventually expanded to nation-building

¹¹⁸ Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." 56

objectives of the operation.¹¹⁹ The implications of the new resolution will be discussed in subsection 4.3.3 in this chapter.

Due to the absence of a functioning local government, the Somali population was now under control of external actors. The (initially named) humanitarian mission had developed into a chase for warlord Aideed, using all means deemed necessary. During the crucial battles of October 3rd and 4th, more than 500 civilian Somalis were killed when American soldiers invaded a neighborhood looking for General Aideed.¹²⁰ The external actors that were supposed to provide humanitarian aid had become warriors due to the warlord's resistance to the nation-building project, and innocent civilians became the victims. Maren holds that Somalia is not a story of "how a humanitarian mission became a military adventure [but] how the people running a humanitarian mission became so dedicated to their cause that they started to see strafing, bombing and killing as humanitarian acts."¹²¹ The anger and frustration that arose among the Somali population is arguably understandable.

The pervasive Somali resistance was of such an extent that U.S. policy makers had to reconsider the aims of their involvement in UNOSOM II. The USA was in an awkward situation, having to rapidly decide where to go from here, and the worldwide media coverage did little to relieve the emerging public pressure.

4.2 The Impact of the Media

The most visible elements of the suffering-pictures of starving, fly-covered children-appeared nightly on American television screens.¹²²

A clearly famished child with an anxious look on his face fronted the cover of the *Time Magazine* in December 1992. The headline "Somalia. The U.S. to the rescue" covers his forehead.¹²³ The same month, Cable News Network (CNN) reported about the crisis in Somalia: "... here carried out with such violence, there is nothing left of civil society, only

¹¹⁹ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." 5

¹²⁰ Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 217

¹²¹ Ibid. 218

¹²² Stewart, "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)". 6

¹²³ "Time Magazine Covers," Time Magazine online, <http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19921214,00.html> (Accessed January 18, 2013).

anarchy.”¹²⁴ These are two examples of influential media sources that reported from Somalia in the period around the intervention in 1992. Sandra T. Barnes asserts that media information is a key influence on makers of foreign policy, and that U.S. involvement in Somalia was triggered by the media coverage.¹²⁵ Also Jonathan Mermin observes that television coverage inspired American intervention in Somalia and points to the fact that after Vietnam, Somalia was regarded as the most often cited case of media influence on American foreign policy (in 1997, my comment).¹²⁶ An illustrating example of this is that Senator John McCain allegedly told a Senate committee in the early 1990s that he had gathered most of his information about Somalia through the media.¹²⁷

Journalists and reporters have an exclusive power of influence that derives from, among other things, the possibility they have to angle the events they report. In Drysdale’s opinion, media worldwide mistakenly exaggerated reports of Somali conditions. In reality, the dreadful situation was in reality restricted to a total of 12 percent of the total Somali population, while the media expressed that the issues were countrywide.¹²⁸ In the words of Maren, “the worse it looked the better it sold.”¹²⁹ In addition to make efforts to explain the background and give impressions of the extent of the tragedies that took place, the coverage of events in Somalia was widely framed as something that the USA could help improve.¹³⁰ According to Besteman, U.S. journalists searched for a way to *explain* the violence that occurred in Somalia after the fall of General Siad Barre. She observes that the media coverage was largely centered on how the tribal and clan rivalry had led to anarchy, and further criticizes the American media for portraying U.S. intervention as a “civilizing mission.”¹³¹ With the recently ended Gulf War in mind, Somalia became compared to Bosnia as a morality test for President Bush’s foreign

¹²⁴ CNN, “History of Somalia Prior to Present Anarchy,” (Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 1992). Cited in Besteman, “Representing Violence and “Othering” Somalia.”, 122

¹²⁵ Sandra T. Barnes, “Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy,” *African Studies Review* 48, no. 1 (2005). 18

¹²⁶ Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy.” 385

¹²⁷ Barnes, “Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy.” 17

¹²⁸ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. 86

¹²⁹ Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 213

¹³⁰ Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy.” 389

¹³¹ Besteman, “Representing Violence and “Othering” Somalia.” 123

policy, and according to Maren, the press made considerable contributions to this effort.¹³² UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali stressed the importance of not ignoring the incidents in Africa because of a “rich man’s war”¹³³ in former Yugoslavia. After the large-scale media coverage of Somalia, evidence of inaction would have tarnished the image of the American policy makers, which could have resulted in high political costs in a period with a forthcoming presidential election.¹³⁴

4.2.1 The Withdrawal and the Media

After October 4th 1993, media reports from Somalia allegedly changed; from broadcasted images of American soldiers rescuing Somali children, the Somali population had become the enemy. In Maren’s words, the humanitarian intervention had turned into a “military assault.”¹³⁵ In a news story published in *The New York Times* on October 7th, we meet the family of deceased Corporal Jamie Smith (age 21) who lost his life in the Battle of Mogadishu. He had reported that regular Somali people were “friendly and hardworking,”¹³⁶ but that the problem was that it was hard to separate the good from the bad. He had moreover expressed fury over the fact that “General Aideed’s militiamen often “mulitated” their opponents after killing them.”¹³⁷ According to Barnes, there was immense public pressure on policy makers to disengage when media coverage intensified and revealed unpleasant details of how American soldiers where treated post mortem.¹³⁸

In his address to the nation on Somalia held on October 7th, President Clinton started by saying “A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying ... This past weekend we all reacted with anger and horror as an armed Somali

¹³² Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 207

¹³³ Ibid. 207

¹³⁴ Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy.” 396

¹³⁵ Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 217

¹³⁶ Robert Hanley, “The Somalia Mission; Relatives Recount Dreams of 2 Killed in Somalia,” *The New York Times*(October 7, 1993), <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/07/world/the-somalia-mission-relatives-recount-dreams-of-2-killed-in-somalia.html> (Accessed January 5, 2013).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Barnes, “Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy.” 18

gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers.”¹³⁹ By his choice of words he implicitly illustrates and acknowledges the power and impact of the media. The President further presents the plan to withdraw the American troops after having secured that the Somalis will be able to take care of themselves: “we may need up to 6 months to complete these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal. We'll do what we can to complete the mission before then. All American troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st.”¹⁴⁰ The President withdrew all American forces in May 1994. About the withdrawal of the American troops, Maren says, “the story was over. The predictable tale of famine ... had become an American story ... a failed but exiting hunt for a fugitive warlord, and then an American tragedy.”¹⁴¹

The observant American apprehended the tendency of media influence, and some were openly critical. In a chronicle published in *The New York Times* in 1993, political scientist George Kennan, criticized the public and political acceptance of the Somalia operations for being a result of the exposure in American media. He further calls it an “emotional reaction,”¹⁴² and continues by questioning the tendency of American foreign policy to be “controlled by popular emotional impulses, and particularly ones provoked by the commercial television industry.”¹⁴³ Mermin, on the other hand, adds an interesting observation: whereas media clearly influenced the public and policy makers, governmental actors often influenced television actors in advance. He refers to the fact that Somalia appeared frequently on television in advance of the decision to intervene, but claims that this was due to influential politicians who expressed to journalists that Somalia constituted a concern for American policy makers and therefore needed media coverage. Mermin hence illuminates the fact that even if it is widely accepted that media affected U.S. policy makers in the case of Somalia, one must not underestimate the

¹³⁹ William J Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Somalia (October 7, 1993),” *The American Presidency Project* <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=47180> (Accessed November 11, 2012).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 213

¹⁴² George F. Kennan, “Somalia, through a Glass Darkly,” *The New York Times* September 30th, 1993(1993), <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/30/opinion/somalia-through-a-glass-darkly.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (Accessed October 29th, 2012).

¹⁴³ Ibid.

reciprocity of the policy makers' influence on the media.¹⁴⁴ The notion that policy makers were blindly steered by media influence must thus be understood as a highly subjective observation. Media nevertheless proved to play a crucial role both considering the U.S. intervention in and withdrawal from Somalia.

This section has shown how the expansion and development of the operation in Somalia eventually provoked the Somali population. This led to a hideous public celebration of the death of American soldiers. The humiliation of dead American soldiers during 'The First Battle of Mogadishu' was a crucial factor for the timing of the American withdrawal and the media was evidently one of the main influences in this decision. The media's role was essential in the determination to first intervene, and then to withdraw the American troops from Somalia shortly after. Another factor for the unwillingness to stay longer in Somalia is the complicated and inefficient cooperation between the USA and the UN.

4.3 The USA and the UN

This section will present some aspects of the U.S./UN cooperation in Somalia that may have negatively affected the quality and outcome of the operations, and hence implicitly contributed to a lack of American policy makers' willingness to remain militarily engaged in Somalia. There were both cooperation- and communication issues in the collaboration, which would prove critical in the approach of a failed state. A brief survey of the U.S./UN relationship will introduce this section to illustrate the relation between the two.

Ever since the end of World War II, when the American public strongly preferred to be part of an international collective security fellowship, the USA has been a permanent member of the Security Council (UNSC). The USA thus has the controvertible honor of being part of a power elite constituted by Russia (former USSR), China, France and Britain.¹⁴⁵ The USA is arguably a prominent actor in the UN, much due to the important role in funding it: U.S. contribution alone provided for 22% of UN's total budget in

¹⁴⁴ Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy." 386

¹⁴⁵ Paterson, *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895)*, 7th Edt, 2. pp 204-210

2012.¹⁴⁶ According to their online resources, the UN pledges to “prevent disputes and crises from escalating into larger and costlier tragedies for nations, peoples, regions and the world.”¹⁴⁷ In the early 1990s, the USA had recently experienced a successful U.S./UN cooperation in the Gulf War. In Somalia, however, the cooperation between the two arguably proved crucial for further U.S. involvement.

4.3.1 A Model for Post-Cold War Intervention? UN Possibilities and U.S. Responsibilities

The UN has been criticized for the relativistic attitudes that were expressed through the quality of the Somalia intervention. According to critics, Somalia became an innocent and random victim of the new UN era that followed the end of the Cold War. Magstadt calls Somalia a “test case”¹⁴⁸ for the UN’s new possibilities after the removal of the veto power’s permanent deadlock in the early 1990s. The USA – Soviet Union rivalry was no longer a constraint for the Security Council. Maren holds that through the operations in Somalia the UN was “creating a model for post-Cold War intervention.”¹⁴⁹

In the words of Drysdale, UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali used Somalia as a “guinea pig to prove or disprove the viability” of what the author calls the “Boutros-Ghali doctrine,”¹⁵⁰ a doctrine that implied the replacement of sovereignty by *universal sovereignty*. This meant that the rights of individuals had to be internationally protected and that the UN had the responsibility to initiate the enforcement of peace and security wherever necessary. One of the problems was that the UN lacked the capacities to conduct an operation of such size in Somalia.¹⁵¹ When the USA offered to organize and lead a limited enforcement operation under the authority of the UNSC, the principles of Boutros-Ghali could be set to life. Resolution 794 authorized “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in

¹⁴⁶ UN, "Assessment of Member State's Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for 2012 " United Nations Secretariat, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/SER.B/853 (Accessed January 10, 2013).

¹⁴⁷ "Promoting Peaceful, Political Solutions to Conflict," The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/> (Accessed December 15, 2012).

¹⁴⁸ Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. 175

¹⁴⁹ Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 219

¹⁵⁰ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. 84

¹⁵¹ Ibid. 84

Somalia,"¹⁵² and the USA took on the task of improving Somali conditions through the humanitarian mission of UNITAF.

Max Boot is among the critics who claim that the U.S. intervention in Somalia was a failure due to the rapid withdrawal of all troops from UNOSOM II.¹⁵³ Crocker, on the other hand, refers to the fact that a quarter of a million lives were actually saved during the course of the years of involvement in Somalia, to question the frequently used term 'failure' in relation to the outcome of the operation.¹⁵⁴ He further asserts that Operation Restore Hope was in fact quite successful in their peacekeeping work; actually, there were almost no violent incidents from February to May 1993. Hope emerged in the Somali community due to positive developments in several areas of public life; markets reopened and there was elaborated a plan of restarting a Somali national police force.¹⁵⁵ At the same time, Crocker emphasizes that the transition from U.S. to UN leadership failed because the U.S.-led forces conducted a more united and coherent operation than their UN successors. This again constituted a factor for a weak and inefficient transition of control.¹⁵⁶ Despite the fact that the UNITAF operation made important achievements, problems of efficiency and logistics emerged in 1993 in the transfer of control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

4.3.2 Organizational Challenges: Inefficiency and Communication Issues

[Almost] everyone involved in peace operations praises coordination in theory, in practice nobody wants to be "coordinated," that is, lose decision-making power and operational autonomy. Nevertheless, coordination is necessary, particularly to devise suitable intervention strategies that coherently incorporate human rights components in addition to neo-Wilsonian precepts.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² UN, "Resolution 794,"

([http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794(1992))) (Accessed December 15, 2012): United Nations Security Council, 1992).

¹⁵³ Boot, "Paving the Road to Hell - the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping (*Review Essay*)."¹⁴⁷

¹⁵⁴ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong."³

¹⁵⁵ Stewart, "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)".¹³

¹⁵⁶ Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong."⁴

¹⁵⁷ Belloni, "Rethinking "Nation-Building": The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion."¹⁰⁸

One of the reasons why the implementation of the UN-led forces in 1993 became widely criticized for being inefficient was that only 30 % of the UN staff was in place in the time of transfer.¹⁵⁸ This was allegedly due to the slow passage of Resolution 814, which expanded UN's mandate to include nation-building.¹⁵⁹ Other shortcomings of UN bureaucracy were highly evident. Understaffing and incompetence compounded some of the challenges. For instance, important economic means needed in June 1993 were not provided until January 1994. These factors made, in Poole's words, "failure almost inevitable."¹⁶⁰ Ken Menkhaus is of the same opinion, using the word "clumsily"¹⁶¹ when describing how the (lack of) UN-initiated events of 1993 through 1994 made the situation worse for Somalia. Even months after Operation Restore Hope ended, it was still unclear whether the UN or the USA was in charge of running UNOSOM II. Still, the UN was not the only scapegoat in the transitional period. The fact that only 30% of the UN staff was in place in the time of transfer implies that USA handed over the operational responsibility to a leadership that hardly existed. Crocker points out that the transfer could have been more successful if the USA had been willing to secure a more gradual transition to UNOSOM II, and that they therefore are partly responsible for the failure.¹⁶² Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe adds that the political approach where U.S. ambassador-at-large Robert B. Oakley bargained with the famine-responsible warlords General Aydiid and Ali Mahdi to ensure a smooth arrival for U.S. troops was actually interpreted by the warlords as the legitimization of the warlords' authority. This allegedly undermined the UN's own program for dealing with the problems.¹⁶³ One question that emerges in the wake of these findings is how a planned transition of power between two prominent peacekeeping actors could be of so poor quality. One suggestion is that the aims of the operations were diverging, and hence caused logistic as well as moral issues and challenges.

¹⁵⁸ Stewart, "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)". 15

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Poole, "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994". 70

¹⁶¹ Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: 'They Created a Desert and Called It Peace(Building)'," *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 120 (2009). 223

¹⁶² Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." 6

¹⁶³ Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of the Somali State. The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*. 130

4.3.3 Diverging Aims

Even though the USA withdrew the UNITAF forces in 1993, American troops constituted a significant part of the new UNOSOM II. However, the aims of the two operations diverged. UNITAF was primarily a humanitarian intervention. This generally entails a military intervention aimed at providing food, medicine and shelter, and often has short-term goals.¹⁶⁴ Whereas the humanitarian intervention of UNITAF mainly focused on protecting relief supplies, UNOSOM II's mandate was, as mentioned, expanded to include nation-building. This implied major intervention in several levels of the Somali society.¹⁶⁵ Political scientist Benjamin Miller defines nation-building as the emergence of "growing loyalty of the citizens to the state due to non-material symbolic functions provided by it,"¹⁶⁶ a process that implies that the respective population merges into a more unified people with common history within an integrated nation-state. Nation-building mainly entails the use of what Miller calls soft non-material factors, which can be exemplified by state-sponsored public education, the national media and the like.¹⁶⁷ Nation-building could result in peace: if the process is completed so that a coherent state emerges, the wish to continue armed conflict between the warring parties would most likely decrease.¹⁶⁸ The new UN resolution aimed at, among other things, reestablishing Somalia's political institutions. However, a nation-building operation would prove difficult in Somalia due to issues that include some practical and moral challenges of approaching a failed state.

A failed state may be explained as the result of the combination of state weakness and national incongruence.¹⁶⁹ State failure often implies political factions competing for control of (parts of) the state.¹⁷⁰ David Storey observes that certain African states, Somalia being a classic example, are practically ungovernable due to such tendencies; that lack of a functioning central state clears the way for warlords, and that this helps

¹⁶⁴ Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 69, no. 3 (1993). 445

¹⁶⁵ Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." 89

¹⁶⁶ Benjamin Miller, *States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). pp 71-72

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ David Storey, *Territories. The Claiming of Space.*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge 2012). 140

maintaining the state failure.¹⁷¹ Somalia is a case in point, a country where warlords control various territories. In the failed state of Somalia, with the absence of a local government and police to keep the peace, it eventually became dangerous for aid workers to move around. They risked being killed, robbed or held hostages – but without a functioning banking system they had to negotiate with cash, which presented other difficulties.¹⁷²

In Roberto Belloni's opinion, nations cannot be 'built', at least not when the effort is made within a short period of time, which is typical of interventions in weak states.¹⁷³ Adam Roberts address the lack of a "serious long-term purpose"¹⁷⁴ in Somalia, asserting that the U.S. government spoke about how they would get out of Somalia before they had even intervened. As stated, UNITAF was initiated to last from December 1992 until March 1993. UNOSOM II took over in 1993, and withdrew in March 1995. In Paris' opinion, the duration of peacebuilding operations should be extended from the current norm, of one to three years, to seven to nine years.¹⁷⁵ Even though peacebuilding is slightly different from nation-building, Paris' suggestions are arguably applicable to the latter goal as well. James Dobbins is of the same opinion, suggesting that five years seem to be a minimum of time required in order to successfully accomplish a transition to democracy.¹⁷⁶ In other words, evidence suggests that the duration of and efforts made by both the UNITAF and UNOSOM II operations were too short to be able to accomplish the aims of nation-building and democratization. Dobbins' analysis from 2003, which concludes that accomplishments and post combat-related deaths (PCRD) are related to the number of troops, seems to fortify the arguments presented above.

Dobbins has analyzed the American role in nation-building since WWII. He observes that in the early 1990s, there was particular emphasis on avoiding U.S. casualties. In Somalia, the USA suffered a total of 43 so-called post-combat related deaths (PCRD).¹⁷⁷ This number may appear as relatively low, considering the fact that U.S. troops were situated

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Maren, *The Road to Hell*. 219

¹⁷³ Belloni, "Rethinking "Nation-Building": The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion." 108

¹⁷⁴ Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights." 441

¹⁷⁵ Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." 58

¹⁷⁶ Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." 105

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 92

militarily in Somalia for two years. In the 1990s, however, this number was unfavorably high seen in relation to the accomplishments that were made, compared to the 1990s-experiences in Kuwait (148 deaths¹⁷⁸) and Haiti (4 PCRD).¹⁷⁹ The intervention in Kuwait was not a nation-building engagement however, but a war that was won in a relatively short period of time. For this reason, Dobbins does not include the Gulf War in his analysis. The number of casualties seen can still be considered as relevant to include in this context as a comparison to the number in Somalia. Dobbins interestingly observe, however, that the number of U.S. casualties in nation-building is higher when the number of stabilization troops has been low. He implicitly suggests that if the number of troops is, in his words, "adequate,"¹⁸⁰ the number of casualties will decrease. In fact, in the aftermath of the battles of early October, the USA increased its military presence in Somalia. This was, however, allegedly to "facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops,"¹⁸¹ not to reinforce the effort to capture General Aideed.

Dobbins explicitly asserts that one of the reasons for failure in Somalia was the (poor) level of effort the USA and the international community made in relation to Somalia.¹⁸² One can argue that this failure was reinforced by the badly organized transition of leadership, as argued in subsection 4.3.2 of this chapter. If the operations had been more coordinated and secured a more flexible and coherent transition of leadership, UNOSOM II could have functioned as an extension of UNITAF and hence increased the possibilities of successful achievements. In addition, according to Dobbins' analysis and the arguments of duration, a fruitful approach to the challenges connected to intervening in a failed state could have involved using American troops to reinforce the UNOSOM II's attempt at nation-building. Reinforcement rather than withdrawal after 'The First Battle of Mogadishu' might have produced better results. A reinforcement of American troops would, on the other hand, called for a consensus on which approach that would secure a positive development in Somalia. Among the moral considerations related to intervening in a failed state, the next section will include aspects of peace enforcement and the

¹⁷⁸ Referred to as "deaths" and not "PCRD" because Dobbins does not include Kuwait in his analysis

¹⁷⁹ Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." 92

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. 93

¹⁸¹ Stewart, "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)". 24

¹⁸² Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." 99

concept of humanitarian wars to relate these to the issues that emerged in the UN/U.S. co-operation.

Paris asserts that approaching a war-torn state with the aims of peacebuilding¹⁸³ built on liberal internationalist principles, typically including the implementation of democracy and capitalism, is a fruitless task due to the lack of institutional structures in the target state.¹⁸⁴ Belloni, on the other hand, asserts that democracy and peace can be achieved in weak states, but it requires considerable international support.¹⁸⁵ Moral issues that emerge in this context include whether or not the international community should impose peace militarily through humanitarian wars and nation-building. Boot appears to be generally critical to UN intervention. He claims that when the UN uses force, "results are often pathetic"¹⁸⁶ due to the resources and aims of the "various national contingent"¹⁸⁷ that constitute the troops of UN operations. He further asserts that the UN is not an effective independent force, and that there is need for what he calls strong proconsuls rather than bureaucrats, as he criticizes the UN for being constituted by. He refers to David Rieff who argues for the USA and its allies to "undertake liberal imperialism,"¹⁸⁸ holding that it would be a more efficient and successful solution if the USA took more control outside of the UN. Importantly, Boot's article was published in 2000, three years prior to when the USA actually took more control outside the UN and invaded Iraq – an operation that has been widely criticized since then.

One of the problems with Rieff's suggestion still appears to be in situations when and where the USA lacks vital strategic interests, such as in Somalia. The fact that the UN provides collective security based on human rights, secures peoples in peripheral states the safety of protection. At the same time, one can question the aspect of human rights when seeing it in relation to the critique expressed by Maren referred to in section 4.1; that peacekeepers tend to become so dedicated to their cause that they see bombing as a humanitarian act. In this context it is relevant to cite Adam Roberts, who calls the

¹⁸³ He calls the operations in Somalia *peaceenforcement* rather than *-building*; his criticism is nevertheless considered relevant in this context

¹⁸⁴ Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." 56

¹⁸⁵ Belloni, "Rethinking "Nation-Building": The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion." 101

¹⁸⁶ Boot, "Paving the Road to Hell - the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping (*Review Essay*)."¹⁴⁵

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

concept of humanitarian war an “oxymoron.”¹⁸⁹ He still concludes that, in the end, it remains an “uncomfortable possibility, and may sometimes be the only alternative to failure and retreat.”¹⁹⁰ Important to add is that the intervention in Somalia was initiated due to the lack of a functioning government, and not against the will of a government.¹⁹¹ The use of armed forces thus seemed inevitable to be able to successfully address the aims of the operations in the failed state of Somalia, since there lacked a coherent part to negotiate diplomatically with.

The Boutros-Ghali doctrine may seem to have been counterproductive due to the emerging cooperation issues between the UN and the USA. This deeply affected the Somalis who had already lost their sovereignty to the UN.¹⁹² With the lack of credibility among the Somali population, the target group of nation-building, the UN faced challenges hard to overcome and withdrew UNOSOM II in March 1995.¹⁹³ The problems also affected the USA, because they may have tarnished the belief in prolific co-operational accomplishments due to the different and diverging aims of the operations that again presented logistic and moral dissension connected to intervening in a failed state. To cite Adam Roberts, the USA was “as anxious as ever not to tarnish its self-image as an anti-colonial power.”¹⁹⁴ The issues of nation-building, duration of the operations, and of whether to impose peace through military action or not, highlight some of the deficiencies related to the Somalia operations that are connected with peacekeeping in general. This thesis will not try to suggest proper solutions to these issues. They are rather discussed to stress the fact that they deeply influenced the UN/U.S. collaboration in Somalia and thus weakened the willingness for American policy makers to remain militarily engaged.

¹⁸⁹ Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights.” 429

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. 448

¹⁹¹ Ibid. 440

¹⁹² Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. 14

¹⁹³ UN, “Unosom Ii - Background,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html> (Accessed January 22, 2012).

¹⁹⁴ Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights.” 447

5 Conclusion

The initial research question asked was a) how USA's involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s may illustrate the tension between interests and principles, and b) which factors that may have affected the outcome of this tension. This thesis suggests that an answer to a) is that the tension was visible both in the decision to intervene and to withdraw from Somalia. President Bush initiated the intervention, a decision that was morally right, but evidence suggests that the intervention was influenced by public pressure and expectations (due to media exposure) and strategic concerns rather than humanitarian principles. The withdrawal, initiated by President Clinton, illustrates the tension even more. Based on the findings in Chapter 2, there was a clear tension and confusion between President Clinton's political and moral principles of multilateralism, human rights and democracy, and interests that concerned economic growth, in relation to the involvement in Somalia. This tension eventually reached a point where interests prevailed, and the USA withdrew its troops. The thesis further proposes, as an answer to b), that factors affecting the American policy makers in the relevant tension were composed of domestic (American) issues and operational challenges.

The domestic issues include the presidential election in 1992, which due to its pervasive dimension implied a distraction from the situation that developed in 1992, as well as a change of political direction (from a Republican to a Democratic administration) and the transfer to a foreign politically inexperienced president. The domestic issues presented in Chapter 3 also include political concerns that emerged in the wake of the Cold War. The economic and strategic interests of Clinton's presidency implied the so-called oil addiction and strategic interventions conducted to maintain American influence and authority in the international landscape. The evident strategic focus of the Clinton administration may have been reinforced by the operational challenges that emerged in Somalia.

Operational challenges in this context encompass how the approach of American and UN peacekeeping forces may have resembled imperialism and therefore incited the local population. The tension between the local population and the peacekeepers eventually escalated and reached a turning point in 'The First Battle of Mogadishu' on October 3rd

and 4th 1993. The media coverage played a vital part in influencing the American public and policy makers by the angling of the new stories from Somalia, and proved particularly crucial after the incidents in October 1993. Also presented as another factor that arguably played an important role in the decision to withdraw all troops from Somalia is the evident unfavorable transfer from U.S. to UN responsibility in 1993, which was reinforced by dissension around the mandate of nation-building between the two.

This thesis aimed at highlighting the tension and divergence of principles and interests and proposing concrete factors that may have influenced American policy makers to make the decisions they made in the Somalia operations. Based on the findings, however, it is necessary to emphasize some of the nuances in foreign policy; how resolutions and decisions are highly influenced by external factors (seen in relation to the operational issues) and not merely self-interests. At the same time, extra efforts are seemingly made where strategic interests are present (as they arguably were in the Balkans and Kuwait). In the words of Adam Roberts:

There is need for a healthy dose of scepticism about the self-congratulatory assumption that certain actions by great powers are purely 'humanitarian' ... Interests, prudence and political opportunism remain key factors in state behaviour, and have powerfully influenced decisions favouring humanitarian action in some situations, and opposing it in others.¹⁹⁵



Weaknesses and Shortcomings

The reasons for withdrawing that are proposed in this thesis include aspects of the collaboration between the UN and the USA. The IR (International Relations) concepts of peacekeeping and nation-building are broad areas of study that needs a more thorough and critical analysis than this thesis has been able to provide. It would have been interesting to discuss the actual outcome of the nation-building and peacekeeping missions, and to look at the long-term implications of the operations in Somalia.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 446

However, questions and discussions connected to the two IR concepts were merely intended to illustrate the dilemmas that American policy makers probably faced in cooperating with the UN, to explain some of the criticism of the weak transition of leadership. The limited extent and formal restrictions of this thesis prevented me from elaborate these concepts any further. In addition, as stated in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was to highlight and discuss the tension and divergence between principles and interests in relation to the operations in Somalia, and to look at factors that may have affected the outcome of this tension. Future students of NORAM may still find it helpful and interesting to focus more on issues connected to general IR concepts that occur in relation to American foreign interventions.

Abbreviations

AU	The African Union
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
EEC	The European Economic Community
EU	The European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
NYT	The New York Times
PCRD	Post-Combat Related Death
TFI	Transitional Federal Institutions
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II

Works Cited

- AU. "Amisom - African Union Mission in Somalia." The African Union, <http://amisom-au.org/>. (Accessed January 20, 2013).
- Barnes, Sandra T. "Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy." *African Studies Review* 48, no. 1 (2005): 1-22.
- Belloni, Roberto. "Rethinking "Nation-Building": The Contradictions of the Neo-Wilsonian Approach to Democracy Promotion." *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, no. Winter/Spring (2007): 97 - 109.
- Bennet, James. "Clinton in Africa: The Overview; Clinton Declares U.S., with World, Failed Rwandans." *The New York Times* (March 26, 1998).
<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/26/world/clinton-in-africa-the-overview-clinton-declares-us-with-world-failed-rwandans.html> (Accessed December 12, 2012).
- Besteman, Catherine. "Representing Violence and "Othering" Somalia." *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (Feb, 1996) (1996): 120-33.
- Boot, Max. "Paving the Road to Hell - the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping (*Review Essay*)."
Foreign Affairs 79, no. 2 (2000): 143-49.
- Clinton, William J. "Address to the Nation on Somalia (October 7, 1993)." The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=47180> (Accessed November 11, 2012).
- . "Inaugural Address (January 20, 1993)." The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46366> (Accessed November 11, 2012).
- CNN. "History of Somalia Prior to Present Anarchy." Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 1992.

Crocker, Chester A. "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (1995 (May. - Jun.)): 2-8.

Cunliffe, Philip. "Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today." *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 4 (2012/08/01 2012): 426-42.

Dobbins, James F. "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." *Survival* 45, no. 4 (2003/12/01 2003): 87-110.

Drysdale, John. *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*. London: HAAN Publishing, 1994.

EU. "Basic Information on the European Union." The European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (Accessed December 21, 2012).

Glennon, Michael J. "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (1999): 2-7.

Haass, Richard N. *War of Necessity / War of Choice. A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

Hanley, Robert. "The Somalia Mission; Relatives Recount Dreams of 2 Killed in Somalia." *The New York Times* (October 7, 1993). <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/07/world/the-somalia-mission-relatives-recount-dreams-of-2-killed-in-somalia.html> (Accessed January 5, 2013).

Issa-Salwe, Abdisalam M. *The Collapse of the Somali State. The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*. London: HAAN Publishing, 1996.

Kennan, George F. "Somalia, through a Glass Darkly." *The New York Times* September 30th, 1993, (1993). <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/30/opinion/somalia-through-a-glass-darkly.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (Accessed October 29th, 2012).

Magstadt, Thomas. *An Empire If You Can Keep It – Power and Principles in American Foreign Policy*. Washington: CQ Press, 2004.

"Majority and Minority Leaders and Party Whips." The United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Majority_Minority_Leaders.htm#4 (Accessed January 7, 2013).

"Majority Leaders of the House (1899 to Present)." United States House of Representatives: Office of the Historian and the Clerk of the House's Office of Art and Archives, <http://history.house.gov/People/Office/Majority-Leaders/> (Accessed January 7, 2013).

Maren, Michael. *The Road to Hell*. New York: The Free Press, Simon & Schuster, 1997.

McCormick, James M. *American Foreign Policy and Process*. 5th ed. Boston: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2009.

Menkhaus, Ken. "Somalia: 'They Created a Desert and Called It Peace(Building)'." *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 120 (2009/06/01 2009): 223-33.

Mermin, Jonathan. "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (1997): 385-403.

Messner, J. J. "Somalia Tops the Failed States Index." The Fund For Peace <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=node/123> (Accessed November 12th, 2012).

Miller, Benjamin. *States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Ostergard-Jr., Robert L. "The Failure of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy: From the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Guinea." *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 7 (2006): 43-57.

Paris, Roland. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 54-89.

Paterson, Thomas, J. Clifford, S. Maddock, D. Kisatsky, & K. Hagan (ed.) *American Foreign Relations, a History (since 1895), 7th Edt.* Vol. 2, Boston Wadsworth, 2010.

Poole, Walter S. "The Effort to Save Somalia. August 1992 - March 1994." *Joint History Office. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (2005).
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/somalia.pdf> (Accessed November 26th 2012).

"Presidential Decision Directive 25: U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." The George Washington University Website:
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050394.pdf> (Accessed November 26, 2012), 1994.

Roberts, Adam. "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 69, no. 3 (1993): 429-49.

Schulman, Susan. "Overgang Til Skjør Fred I Somalia." *Aftenposten Innsikt*, No 8, 2012.

Smith, Tony. "In Defense of Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 34-46.

———. "Wilsonianism." *Encyclopedia of the New American Nation*,
<http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Wilsonianism.html#b> (Accessed December 17, 2012).

Stedman, Stephen John. "The New Interventionists." *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1992-1993): 1- 16.

Stewart, Richard W. "The United States Army in Somalia (1992 - 1994)." US Army Center of Military History Online, <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm> (Accessed November 29, 2012).

Storey, David. *Territories. The Claiming of Space.* 2nd ed. London: Routledge 2012.

"Time Magazine Covers." Time Magazine online,
<http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19921214,00.html> (Accessed January 18, 2013).

Tucker, Robert W. "The Triumph of Wilsonianism?". *World Policy Journal* 10, no. 4 (1993): 83-99.

UN. "Assessment of Member State's Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for 2012 " United Nations Secretariat,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/SER.B/853 (Accessed January 10, 2013).

———. "Promoting Peaceful, Political Solutions to Conflict." The United Nations,
<http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/> (Accessed December 15, 2012).

———. "Resolution 794."
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794(1992)) (Accessed December 15, 2012): United Nations Security Council, 1992.

———. "Somalia - Unosom I. Background Text."
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> (Accessed January 18, 2013).

———. "Unosom Ii - Background." The United Nations,
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html> (Accessed January 22, 2012).