The Polish worker in Norway
Emerging patterns of migration, employment and incorporation after EU’s eastern enlargement

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Jon Horgen Friberg
Summary

The Polish worker in Norway: Emerging patterns of migration, employment and incorporation in the wake of EU enlargement

In 2004, Poland’s accession to the EU triggered what is now considered to be the largest migration flow to Norway in history. In the next seven to eight years, well over a hundred thousand Polish workers were recruited to work in construction, manufacturing, low-skilled services and agriculture. This thesis explores the ways in which Polish migrant workers have adapted to and become incorporated into Norwegian society during these initial years of an emerging migration system. The main research questions are:

- What factors and processes lead some Polish labour migrants to settle down in Norway and others to return to Poland? In a context of free movement, how do these migrants adapt and make decisions about length of stay, settlement and return migration?

- Under what conditions and to what extent are Polish migrant workers incorporated into the regular Norwegian labour market? What opportunities do they have to improve their position over time? What kinds of barriers do they face in the Norwegian labour market?

- Are Polish migrant workers likely to remain employed or do they risk exclusion from the labour market over time? How does structural change in the labour market in the wake of migration interact with processes of labour market exclusion?

Drawing on different theoretical concepts derived from economic sociology and the sociology of immigration (including segmented labour market theory, social network theory and embeddedness), this thesis addresses a central theme: the complex relationship between large-scale labour migration and structural changes in the labour market and the ways in which these changes shape the opportunity structures that face migrant workers. The analysis is based primarily on two methodologically innovative surveys conducted using Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) to study Polish migrants in Oslo in 2006 and 2010 and qualitative interviews with Polish migrants and Norwegian employers.

The study finds that although many migrants return home after a period of temporary work, many others go through a gradual process of settlement (often despite their original intentions) that can be conceptualized as three stages of migration. Although their freedom of movement as EU
citizens provides an opportunity to extend the open-ended phase of migration for much longer than in the past, a gradual settlement process often occurs, shaped by family life and social networks and by opportunity structures in the labour market. I argue that because the migrant workers are recruited to satisfy a permanent need for labour and because family life and social obligations place considerable constraints on transnational and circular adaptations over time, a substantial share of them will most likely end up settling permanently in Norway. The analyses thus suggest that some contemporary accounts emphasizing the fluidity and transience of today’s intra-European East-West mobility may be slightly premature. In the wake of large-scale recruitment of migrant workers, migrant-intensive sectors have gone through extensive structural changes involving casualization of labour relations, ethnic segmentation and the rise of new forms of labour-market inequality between native and immigrant workers. In their efforts to access stable employment, Polish migrants face several obstacles, including cultural constructions of otherness and employers’ notions of nationally ascribed suitability for different kinds of work, typically framed in terms of different “work cultures”. Often used by the migrants themselves when competing for jobs and assignments, such stereotyped notions become self-fulfilling prophecies which shape labour demand and help migrants access peripheral parts of the labour market, while restricting their opportunities for upward mobility. The study found that atypical and precarious employment substantially increased the risk of unemployment in a period of labour-market uncertainty and lowered demand after the international financial crisis. Combined with the gradual process of settlement, the establishment of new precarious and substandard immigrant niche employment segments, and the barriers migrants face when trying to access more stable employment, the analyses suggest that Polish labour migrants may risk facing more traditional “integration problems” related to labour-market exclusion and short employment careers.
The main findings are disseminated in four articles:


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6. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The central research questions

Contributions to the literature on East-West mobility and migration in Europe

Class, welfare and migration in a global economy

Trajectories of long term incorporation: an agenda for future research

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THE ARTICLES

I: Respondent Driven Sampling and the structure of migrant populations

II: The stages of migration: from going abroad to settling down. Post-accession Polish migrant workers in Norway

III: Culture at work: Polish migrants in the ethnic division of labour on Norwegian construction sites

IV: The guest-worker syndrome revisited? Migration and employment among Polish workers in Norway’s capital
1. Introduction

Focus and background of the dissertation

Polish labour migrants are now the largest immigrant group in Norway and are among the most recent in terms of length of stay. In the 1980s Norway received a few thousand Polish political refugees in the wake of the Solidarnosc uprising, and after the collapse of communist rule, through the 1990s and beyond, thousands of temporary seasonal workers found their way to Norway via bilateral agreements on temporary work in agriculture. But it was Poland’s membership in the EU that paved the way for today's large-scale migration flows. When eight former communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe joined the European Union in 2004 and gradually became part of the European internal market for free movement of labour, services, goods and capital, giving their citizens the right to travel, take up employment and settle anywhere among the “old” EU and EEA members states, this sparked the most significant population movements on the European continent since World War II, with Poland as the dominant sending country. By January 2008, the Polish central statistical agency estimated that more than two million Poles had left for Western Europe (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008). The international financial crisis which struck later that year dampened but in no way halted the outflow. Their main targets were Germany, UK and Ireland, but relative to population size, Norway quickly emerged as an important destination. In 2011, the Polish statistical bureau had registered 56 thousand citizens staying in Norway for more than three months. Between May 2004 and November 2011, more than 140,000 Polish citizens had been registered by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. During the same period, the population of registered settled Polish immigrants grew ten-fold, from six and a half thousand in 2003 to almost 70,000 in January 2012. In addition to the registered settled population, between 12 and 18 thousand Polish workers were registered every year as “workers on temporary stay” in Norway. However, the distinction between these categories remains largely administrative. Many workers on temporary stay

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1 The title of this thesis is a partial reference to the title of a landmark study in the history of sociology, namely The Polish peasant in Europe and America, published in 1918-1920 by William Isaac Thomas and Florian W. Znaniecki.

later settle and many settled migrants return home. By subtracting the stock numbers from the total inflow, we can deduce that at least 70 thousand have left after being registered in Norway, but the real number is higher because many short-term migrants and posted workers are never registered. Although exact numbers on the stocks and flows of migrant workers are difficult to obtain, there is no doubt that migration from Poland in the years since 2004 constitutes the largest single migratory flow to Norway in history.

Figure 1 Stock of Polish-born population in Norway, 2002–2012

Table I Registered employment sectors among Polish migrants in Norway, 4th quarter 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment sector</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial manufacturing, mining and extraction</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary agency work (almost exclusively serving construction and manufacturing)</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning and services</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, transport and storage</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, education and public services</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No info</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Statistics Norway
The majority of these workers have been recruited to perform relatively low-skilled work within a few specific sectors. Today constituting a significant part of the workforce in parts of sectors such as construction, manufacturing and low-skilled services, the recruitment of Polish immigrant workers (followed by significant but smaller numbers of Lithuanian, Rumanian and other Central and Eastern European migrants) have had a profound impact on these labour markets.

Although the EU accession in 2004 represented a watershed for the labour market in many sectors, labour migration was not then a new phenomenon in Norway. The country’s recent immigration history dates back to the arrival of labour migrants from the Mediterranean, the Middle East and South Asia from the late 1960s until the 1975 immigration stop, and family and humanitarian migration in the following decades. When Polish workers started arriving in large numbers after 2004, immigration-related issues were already among the most controversial and hotly debated issues in Norwegian policy. However, this new labour migration differed in many ways from the types of migration flows which had dominated the preceding decades. This applies particularly to mobility conditions. Within the framework of the EU’s free movement of labour and services, Polish workers were able to move, work and acquire social rights in various member states for shorter or longer periods of time, without having to deal with border controls or residence permits. Cheap flights and internet based communication meant that work in another country no longer had to involve a permanent relocation or any mental or social re-orientation towards the receiving country. The EU internal market thus facilitated transnational and circular migration patterns on a completely different scale than previous guest-worker and humanitarian immigration. How these new mobile workers would adapt to this new institutional context, either by temporary work, long-term circular and transnational commuting, or gradual settlement and community formation would depend on conditions largely outside the control of state policies.

Another feature that distinguishes the recent migration from Poland from other types of immigration to Norway has been the pivotal role of the labour market. Before 2004, thousands of Poles had come each summer as seasonal workers in agriculture, and this pattern continued relatively unchanged after the accession (Rye 2007). The economic boom between 2003 and 2008, with its huge demand for labour in the construction industry and in parts of industrial manufacturing such as shipyards and food processing, led to the recruitment and employment of the
majority of the new migrant workers. With employers eager to exploit this new pool of seemingly cheap and flexible labour, and migrant workers often willing to work for substandard wages and working conditions, fears of so-called social dumping and deteriorating labour standards in the wake of migration became a recurrent theme in the Norwegian labour discourse. Construction and manufacturing primarily attracted male workers, but Polish women also came, although in much smaller numbers, to work, to join their husbands already working in Norway, or both. Many found employment in cleaning, both within a fast growing market for informal domestic services and in the regular cleaning sector. Furthermore, sectors such as hotels and restaurants, day care and public health services would also gradually attract more female immigrants from Poland. In just a few years, labour markets in many sectors were transformed in the wake of migration. New organizational forms, new hierarchies and boundaries between different groups of workers, and new employment niches arose as a result of how employers, clients and businesses, and the workers themselves adapted to the new situation.

Main research questions

The overall research question of this thesis is how Polish labour migrants make decisions and adapt to and become incorporated into Norwegian society in this initial phase of a new and evolving Polish-Norwegian migration system. The first and most fundamental question is, of course, whether or not they are going to stay and for how long. During the first years after 2004, the vast majority of Polish migrant workers were men who had left their families behind in Poland to work in Norway for what they and their employers usually considered to be a limited period of time. In other words, they were not expected to become incorporated in Norwegian society at all beyond a brief guest appearance in the workforce. Today we know that although many have returned home and many live their lives as transnational commuters travelling back and forth between work in Norway and family life in Poland, substantial and increasing numbers have settled and brought their families to Norway, and a more permanent Polish community consisting of men, women and families has become established.

The second question involves the central role of the labour market: as the main driver of migration flows, the first and foremost arena which shapes the migrants' encounter with Norwegian society, and a gateway to other social rights. Therefore, the structure of labour demand and employment
relations is of vital importance for the opportunities and conditions facing Polish immigrants in Norway. Since 2004, Polish workers have been recruited primarily for relatively low-skilled work in a narrow set of industries. In these sectors, flexible and temporary forms of employment quickly emerged in order to recruit and accommodate the use of migrant workers. These new forms of employment stood in stark contrast to the otherwise highly regulated Norwegian labour market. Some migrants were hired through the rapidly expanding temporary staffing industry (spearheaded by firms like Adecco, Manpower and Jobzone); others were employed by Polish subcontractor firms that offer labour-intensive services to Norwegian clients or they found work in a growing market for illegal and undeclared work for private households or in the bottom of the supply-chain in construction, manufacturing or services. Despite their significant differences, these kinds of employment usually provide insecure jobs with low pay and little status, often involving hard physical labour. These are exactly the kind of jobs that are otherwise associated with short employment careers and risk of labour-market exclusion.

This leads to the third question: What happens to those who stay in Norway? Do they remain confined to these (often newly established) niche markets at the bottom of the Norwegian labour market or do they manage to access more stable, better paid and more diverse types of employment as they learn the ropes and acquire the necessary language skills? The overall research problem can be formulated as three groups of interconnected questions:

- **What factors and processes lead some Polish labour migrants to settle in Norway and others to return to Poland?** How do these migrants adapt and make decisions about length of stay, settlement and return migration in a context of free movement?

- **Under what conditions and to what extent are Polish migrant workers incorporated into the regular Norwegian labour market?** What opportunities do they have to improve their position over time? What barriers do they face in the Norwegian labour market?

- **Are Polish migrant workers likely to remain employed or do they risk exclusion from the labour market over time?** How do structural changes in the labour market in the wake of migration interact with the processes of labour market exclusion?
Focusing primarily on the first six years after the EU enlargement, this study will not provide the final answers to any of these questions. The goal of the study is to explore emerging patterns and processes of migration and incorporation in this new and evolving migratory system. Although conclusive answers about the outcome of ongoing processes are impossible to produce, an analysis of these processes as they unfold may point towards some possible long-term trajectories. Furthermore, by investigating the conditions and adaptations of Polish workers in the Norwegian labour market, the study also explores how this market is being transformed in the face of growing internationalization and cross-border mobility and it points towards some possible consequences for work and welfare in Norwegian society.

The structure of the thesis
This dissertation is based on a collection of four articles. The articles will later be presented in more detail. They will be referred to with numerals I to IV.

Article I
Respondent Driven Sampling and the structure of migrant populations (with Cindy Horst as a second author)

Article II
The stages of migration. From going abroad to settling down: Post-accession Polish migrant workers in Norway

Article III
Culture at work: Polish migrants in the ethnic division of labour on Norwegian construction sites

Article IV
The guest-worker syndrome revisited? Migration and employment among Polish workers in Norway’s capital

This introduction is the first of six chapters in the Foundation. The second chapter presents the specific historic and institutional context of labour migration from Poland to Norway. It starts by analysing the historical conditions in Poland which laid the ground for large-scale emigration; then describes the EU accession in 2004 and the gradual eastward enlargement of the open European labour market and the development of a new East-West European migration system; before analysing structural changes in Norwegian society which have shaped labour demand and the policy responses to increased migration. Chapter three presents theoretical concepts and perspectives. The goal here is not to present a specific theoretical model of analysis, but to review the concepts and theoretical contributions that have proven useful in the empirical analysis. Chapter four presents the
methodology and data sources that have been applied in the analyses. The study is an empirically
grounded multi-methods case study, based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. The use of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) for collecting representative survey data about a transient and hard-to-reach population and the methodological challenges associated with doing qualitative interviews with the help of an interpreter are discussed in some detail. Chapter five summarizes the articles, and chapter six is an overall conclusion in which the main research questions are addressed, as well as the study’s contributions to the literature and its implications for further research.
2. EU enlargement and the changing context of migration

The article format provides limited space for contextual elaboration, so I will therefore describe in more detail here the historical, structural, economic and institutional setting for migration between Poland and Norway in the years after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. First, I address the historical context of migration from Poland and the structural changes in Polish society that paved the way for large-scale emigration and then discuss the gradual and asymmetrical opening up towards free movement and the implications this had for the scale and pattern of East-West migration in Europe. This chapter concludes with a discussion of how particular features of Norwegian society have shaped the context of reception for Polish labour migrants, including the structure of labour demand in migrant intensive parts of the Norwegian labour market and policy changes in response to this recent wave of labour migration.

Poland as a sending country

Migration from Poland in historical perspective

2004 marked a significant shift in the conditions of migration for Polish citizens, but it was only the latest in a long line of dramatic events that have shaped Poland’s migration history. The late nineteenth century saw a mass emigration of impoverished peasants from the eastern parts of Poland and Jews fleeing violent pogroms and general hostility. By 1914, 3.5 million had left (Iglicka 2001:32, cited in White 2011:31). Their main destination was the United States, as chronicled in the sociological classic *The Polish peasant in Europe and America* (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918–1920), but Poles also emigrated to other European countries, such as Germany, and to Canada and Australia. Between the two world wars, another two million left, and by the eve of the Second World War, Poland had established strong migratory links to countries across Europe and in North America, many of which boasted a significant Polish Diaspora. While much of this migration proved to be long-term settlement, a complex infrastructure for cyclical and temporary migration to nearby countries had also been established. WWII and its aftermath led to a chaotic mass displacement, expulsions and resettlements of Poles, Germans, Ukrainians, Belorussians and Lithuanians, as Poland’s borders shifted to the West, and to the settlement of Polish former soldiers in several European countries (Burrell 2009). From 1944 to 1989, the communist regime sought to control and
limit emigration—at least of ethnic Poles. Despite harsh restrictions on travel, including difficulties of passport acquisition, the regime could not completely prevent migration (Stola 2010). Both migrations to the United States as well as income-seeking “tourist” travel to Western Europe gradually picked up in the post-war period, and by the 1980s, migration had soared in response to economic chaos and political repression. According to Jaźwińska-Motylska and Okólski (1996) more than two million Poles emigrated in the 1980s, almost half to Germany. A few thousand migrants (many of them highly educated intellectuals and dissidents) settled in Norway as political refugees in the early 1980s. Highly educated and politically active, many of these refugees would later leave their mark in Norwegian cultural and academic life (e.g. musician/artist Andrej Nebb and Professor Nina Witoszek). With the collapse of communist rule in 1989, a new era of migration was under way as restrictions on outward travel were removed. Although Polish citizens were not usually allowed residency in any Western European countries, emigration rose steadily in response to economic hardship in the wake of a rapid transition to market economy. During this period, the selection of migrants shifted from refugees fleeing political oppression and limited opportunities in the 1980s to workers fleeing economic chaos and underemployment during the restructuring of the Polish economy of the 1990s. Germany was still the favourite destination, but other countries also received substantial numbers, although these migrants were usually forced to travel illegally or on tourist visas and to work in the informal sector (unless travelling via one of the many bilateral agreements on temporary and seasonal work between Poland and several Western European countries that were established in this period, such as the Polish-Norwegian agreement on seasonal migration to the agricultural sector set up in the early 1990s). The often risky and sometimes illegal labour migration between 1989 and 2004 was typically not long-term settlement migration; this option was usually out of reach. Instead, a culture of westbound temporary and circular “income-seeking travel” (Morawska 2001) was established based on the practice of “earning there but spending here”. Marek Okolski labelled this “incomplete migration” (2001), as temporary undocumented or seasonal work in the West was seen as just a part of the general livelihood strategies of households based in Poland.

Post-communist social transformations of Polish society

It is during the transformative post-communist era from 1989 to 2004 that we can find some of the underlying causes for the extraordinary rise in migration after 2004. First of all, more than a century
of outmigration had led to the establishment of strong transnational links to Polish diaspora communities in western European countries. Although most post-communist migrations were temporary and circular, millions of Polish citizens had gained experience from clandestine trips working abroad and had established contacts with employers and personal links to settled Polish migrant communities. These experiences and links could later be mobilized for legal migration after the borders were (gradually) opened after May 2004.

Second, the post-communist restructuring of the Polish economy and labour market had disrupted and transformed Polish society in a way that had created a mobile population prone to migrate. The economic shock therapy of the early 1990s displaced large parts of the workforce from their former livelihoods in the traditional labour-intensive agricultural sector and a protected industrial sector under communist rule and left them searching for new opportunities. All in all, Poland managed the transition to market economy more successfully than many other former East bloc countries. According to White (2011), by 1996, GDP had outstripped 1989 levels and it continued to grow in the following years. Still, unemployment was relatively high throughout the post-communist era: From 0.3 % in January 1990, it rose sharply to 16.9 % in July 1994; from 1994 to 1998, it fell but then started to rise again during an economic downturn around the turn of the century; it peaked at 20.7 % in the first quarter of 2004, just on the eve of EU accession; after 2004, unemployment (partly influenced by soaring out-migration) fell to a low of 6.6 % in the third quarter of 2008, only to rise again to 10.6 % in the first quarter of 2010. However, these numbers mask both significant regional differences and a relatively low (about 60 %) rate of employment. Small towns dependent on one or a few large employers often leave a population highly vulnerable in times of economic disruption and change. In some important sectors, structural insecurity and underemployment has become an industry standard rather than a phenomenon related to any particular economic hardship. For example, the Polish construction sector has gone through extensive restructuring in Poland’s transition from state socialism to a neoliberal market economy and is characterized by widespread use of informal or irregular employment, large seasonal variations in production, low wages and unstable employment (Eldring and Trevena 2007). Despite the all-time low overall levels of unemployment in 2007, a survey that year showed that as much as 37 % of the population had experienced unemployment (Gwiazda and Roguska 2008:93, cited in White 2011). There is a general notion in Poland that the transition to market economy had created both winners
and losers. This is, for example, reflected in Polish politics, where the Law and Justice Party (one of the most popular parties in the less-developed eastern parts of Poland) explicitly presents itself as a champion of “transition losers” (Ibid:28). Arguably, the uneven economic development and transformation had created tension and uncertainty and a sense of relative deprivation in certain parts of the Polish population which upon EU membership could be translated into motives for emigration.

Third, Poland experienced an educational boom during the post-communist era that was not matched by increased job opportunities for people with higher education. Around the turn of the millennia, only slightly over one tenth of the Polish population had university degrees, but almost half the population between 18 and 24 were enrolled in higher education (Gwiazda and Roguska 2008:109, cited in White 2011). According to Fihel and Kaczmarczyk (2009), Poland has been suffering since 2004 from “brain overflow”. Young people migrate to Western Europe straight from graduation because they do not see any opportunities in the Polish labour market. Related to this educational boom is a linguistic reorientation over the last two decades, from Russian to English, which has lowered the bar considerably for westbound migration. Under communist rule, Russian was taught as a second language in Polish schools; in 1991, this was changed to English. As a result, today’s young people, the more educated in particular, speak English, while older Poles, the less educated especially, know Russian but little or no English. This shift from Russian to English as a second language is illustrated by a survey which showed that in 1996, 40 % of 18–19 year olds reported that they spoke English well enough to have a conversation with a foreigner; for Russian, the corresponding number was 46 %. In 2008, 80 % reported that they had mastered English, while only 7 % could say the same about Russian (White 2011).

At the eve of the eastward EU enlargement, Western Europe was well on its way into an economic boom with a surging demand for labour in many countries. According to Eurostat, Poland’s gross wage level stood at about 23 percent of the average wage level in the “old” EU countries (Friberg et al 2012:159). With a long history of outmigration and strong transnational links to diaspora communities in Western Europe, a flexible, unstable and uneven labour market, low employment rates and a surplus of educated youth linguistically reoriented towards the west, Poland had a huge untapped potential for emigration when the borders were opened. In other words, the
stage was set for the largest and most rapid population movement on the European continent since
the Second World War.

**EU enlargement and the emergence of a “new” migration system in Europe**

On 1 May 2004 Poland and seven other former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe
joined the European Union and the common European market for capital, goods, labour and
services.³ According to Brücker et al. (2009:2), the eastward enlargement was historically
unprecedented: Differences in wages, income and employment between the old and new member
states were significantly larger than those of previous enlargements; and unlike the earlier southern
enlargement in which large parts of the migration potential had already been realized through guest-
worker migration before accession, the iron curtain and the maintained immigration restrictions
between East and West Europe up until 2004 had prevented large-scale movements.

A gradual and asymmetrical opening towards free movement

Due to widespread fears that the low wage level and high unemployment in accession countries
would lead to massive westbound migration which in turn would create labour-market imbalances,
undermine working conditions and place additional burdens on welfare expenditure in destination
countries, member states were allowed to postpone the free movement of labour for up to seven
years. The subsequent gradual opening towards free movement was asymmetrical in at least two
important ways that affected the shape and pattern of migration.

First, there was an asymmetry between countries in how and when borders were opened.
Sweden, UK and Ireland, opened their labour markets from day one.⁴ Other countries, such as
Norway and Denmark, applied liberal restrictions granting access, but on the condition that
applicants could document full-time employment that met regular standards of wage and working
conditions. Like in the UK and Ireland, access to social benefits was also restricted. The remaining

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³ These countries were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

⁴ UK and Ireland did retain some restrictions. Workers from the new member states could freely take up work in any
sector, but were obliged to register for temporary residency permits which could be revoked in case of unemployment
and their access to social benefits was restricted during their first year of residence.
old EU/EEA countries adopted tighter restrictions. In many cases (such as Germany and Austria), the transitional restrictions were just a continuation of pre-2004 immigration restrictions and usually consisted of a combination of quotas of various sizes, permits for seasonal workers, and limited access to occupations and sectors with labour shortages based on some sort of labour-market demands testing. While most countries adopted at least partial restrictions during the first phase (2004–2006) of the transitional period, a substantial number of countries removed the barriers to labour mobility during the second phase (2006–2009): Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain in 2006, Netherlands and Luxembourg in 2007, and France in 2008. Denmark removed restrictions for workers in firms bound by collective agreements in 2007 and the remaining restrictions in 2009. Norway also removed transitional restrictions in May 2009. Only Germany and Austria maintained their restrictions throughout the entire transitional period; they were lifted on 1 May 2011.

Second, there was an asymmetry in the regulation of different kinds of mobility. The transitional restrictions only applied to the free movement of workers seeking direct employment in host-country firms. Labour mobility in the form of temporary posting of workers in connection with service provision was not subject to restrictions. Services included subcontracting, labour hire and temporary employment agencies. Even without transitional restrictions, the mobility of labour and services was subject to different sets of rules regarding registration, taxes and social benefits. In the years following the EU enlargements, the boundary between the mobility of labour and the mobility of services received much attention and was the subject of bitter dispute. Concerns over “social dumping” were often associated with the regulation of service mobility and posting of workers (Dølvik and Eldring 2008). The EU’s 1996 Posted Workers Directive (Directive 96/71/EC) sought to balance the conflicting considerations between the right of free movement of services and the right to protect domestic labour markets, for example by determining what sort of rules and regulations host countries are obliged to follow regarding foreign service providers or what sort of rules and regulations (particularly regarding wages) host countries are allowed to impose upon foreign service providers (Dølvik and Visser 2009). The exact interpretation of the directive has

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5 With the exception of Germany and Austria, who also restricted the free movement of services.
become a central issue in a series of legal disputes in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), such as the Laval/Vaxholm, Viking Line, Rüffert and Luxemburg cases, which have put national systems of worker protection under considerable stress. Because of the many EU/EEA rules that can be applied to different kinds of mobility, combined with national legislation on different kinds of labour relations, employers in destination countries can choose to recruit migrant workers through several channels, including direct employment of foreign EU/EEA nationals in their own firm; procurement of services from a foreign EU/EEA firm which brings its own employees; hiring workers from a foreign EU/EEA firm (e.g., a foreign temporary staffing agency); hiring foreign EU/EEA workers from a national firm (e.g., a domestic temporary staffing agency); and procurement of services from a EU/EEA one-man firm. Because these different legal forms of labour mobility to some extent are covered by different rules for tax, social benefits, wage determination, working conditions and responsibilities, all parties involved—from clients and employers, through middle-men and commission-takers, to individual workers—have an incentive to choose the kind of arrangement that is most economically beneficial to themselves (Dølvik and Friberg 2008). Although all parties involved have an interest, these interests are often conflicting (as the relationships between the interests of employers, middle-men and workers usually are), and the different actors’ relative power and opportunities in choosing the best option for themselves are obviously not equal. The channel through which labour migrants were recruited would thus have important implications for their opportunities and conditions in their host country labour markets.

New patterns of migration

The opening of the European labour market to free movement for citizens from Poland and the other accession states was a differentiated or asymmetrical process in terms of time (restrictions were gradually removed over seven years), geography (some countries opened up before others), and worker category (mobility of labour was usually restricted and mobility of services was not). In terms

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6 In all of these cases, the EU court has ruled in favor of economic freedom over worker protection (see http://www.etuc.org/r/846).
of migration flows during the first years after 2004, three main effects of the way that the European labour market was opened can be observed.

First of all, the eastward enlargement led to a massive increase in migration from east to west. Economic projections before 2004 grossly underestimated the migration potential (see, for example, Boeri and Brücker 2001, Alvarez-Plata et al. 2003 and Dustman et al. 2003). Although reliable estimates of how many people migrated from the new to the old EU member states are difficult to obtain, these migration flows are today considered to be the most significant population movements within the continent since the Second World War. By 2008 it was estimated that as many as two million workers had left Poland alone (Kaczmarzyk 2010). They were followed by hundreds of thousands of migrants from the Baltic States. Second, migration flows were diverted from nearby destination countries (such as Germany and Austria who applied restrictive transitional restrictions) towards new destination countries (such as the UK, Ireland, and the Scandinavian countries, who applied liberal restrictions and was becoming increasingly accessible with the rapid establishment of cheap airfares) (Brücker et al. 2009, Engebersen et al. 2010). When Rumania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, similar numbers left in an even shorter period of time, mostly heading for Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal (Ibid.). Finally, the asymmetrical regulation of labour and services created incentives for employers to organize the use of foreign labour in the form of posting of workers rather than the direct employment of workers. The effects of such circumvention were particularly evident in Norway and Denmark, where transitional restrictions took the form of minimum wage requirements for individual labour migrants which did not apply to posted workers (Dølvik and Eldring 2008). For example, surveys among employers in Norway show that the opportunity to avoid employer responsibility by hiring migrant workers through transnational subcontractors, temporary staffing agencies and self-employed contractors facilitated strategic adaptations and changing labour strategies in many industries in the years after 2004 (Andersen et al. 2009).

Norway as a destination country

Of the more than two million Poles who left Poland during the first few years after 2004, most headed to larger destination countries, but few could rival Norway for number of migrants relative to population. Norway probably absorbed a total number of workers from the new EU member
states equal to more than ten percent of its total labour force in just six to seven years after 2004 (although not all were present at the same time). Comparable numbers are difficult to obtain in many other European countries, but a comparison of the Nordic countries, which have similar registration systems, shows that Norway received more migrants from the new EU member states during this period than all the other Nordic countries combined (Friberg et al 2012).

A brief look at the average wage levels in different European countries may suggest why. According to OECD, the average gross hourly wage for Norwegian wage earners in 2007 was 26.14 euros: 179 percent of the average for the “old” EU countries (EU15) and almost eight times that of the average hourly gross wages of Polish wage earners (3.34 euros). With its sustained unemployment level below three percent during the entire post-2004 period it is no surprise that Norway stands out as one of the most—if not the most—attractive destinations in Europe for migrant workers. This was further accentuated during the international economic downturn in the wake of the financial crisis, from which Norway—largely unaffected by the crisis—emerged as comparatively even more attractive.

However, this also means that the scope for low-wage competition is considerably higher in Norway than in most other European destinations: Norwegian employers can offer migrant workers wages and working conditions that are substantially below those of its natives, yet remain attractive in terms of absolute earnings. At the same time, Norway has some of the highest price levels in Europe. Therefore, the incentive for engaging in transborder activities is substantially higher in Norway than in many other destinations: As long as their earnings are to be spent back home, migrant workers can reap the full benefits of these economic differentials, creating strong incentives for temporary and circular migration, sending remittances home, or engaging in transnational commuting between families in Poland and work in Norway. Similarly, the relative cost of settlement (i.e., earnings would be spent in Norway rather than Poland) is particularly high in Norway. This facilitated quite different patterns of migration and employment in Norway than in destination countries with lower wage and price levels: stronger concentration and segmentation in the labour market and more trans-border activities. 7

Finally, the compressed wage structure and the

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7 This finding refers to an ongoing research project titled “Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the Nordic countries: Patterns of migration, working conditions and recruitment practices”, coordinated by me and funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers. Results will be published in late 2012/early 2013.
rather inaccessible Norwegian language means that Norway is first and foremost an attractive
destination for low-skilled workers who can find employment in those relatively few occupations
that do not require Norwegian language skills. Therefore, Polish migrants coming to Norway are
quite different from the majority of post-2004 emigrants who are, according to Pawel Kaczmarczyk
(2008), mostly young men and women, relatively well educated, single, and with language skills, who
migrate to Ireland and the UK, where they work in a wide range of service occupations. Polish
migrants coming to Norway are usually older, predominantly men, and quite often married; most of
them do not have higher education or any particular language skills and they typically leave their
families behind in Poland when they first arrive (Friberg and Tyldum 2007, Friberg and Eldring
2011).

Changing structure of labour demand in migrant intensive industries
Despite its continued reliance on certain primary extractive industries (such as oil and fisheries),
Norway has since the 1970s developed into a post-industrial society based on technology and
knowledge-intensive production. With some of the highest and most “compressed” wages levels in
the world, traditional labour-intensive manufacturing has (as in much of the Western world) largely
been outsourced to countries in Eastern Europe and Asia where labour costs are far lower. With a
growing population of welfare dependants seemingly unable to compete in an increasingly
demanding labour market, it has often been argued that low-skilled workers, workers with weak
language skills in particular, are particularly difficult to integrate in the Norwegian labour force
(Hernes 2010). This raises the question: Why have Norwegian employers, over the course of a few
years, been able to recruit and employ probably as much as 200,000 Eastern and Central Europe
workers, most with low education and limited skills and who in most cases did not know a word of
Norwegian?

First, it could be argued that the alleged declining need for low-skilled labour in advanced
industrial societies is exaggerated. Several types of low-skilled activities in the construction industry,
hotels and restaurants, hospitals and many other service enterprises cannot be outsourced to low-
cost countries. For every banker, engineer, public administrator, doctor, journalist, designer,
marketing executive and scientist working in the knowledge-intensive economy, there is a need for
someone to build, clean and refurbish their offices and their homes, to serve them food and drinks,
and to take care of their children, their sick and their elderly. This is no less true in Norway than in other Western countries, yet this is rarely reflected in official policy. More specifically, over the last few years, certain parts of the Norwegian labour market have undergone social and structural changes that both increased the need for and reduced the supply of exactly the kind of workers that many thought would be redundant in the modern age: Workers who were willing and able to perform hard or boring physical labour at low rates and under flexible conditions. In the following I will describe these changes in the five different sectors that would become the most important employers of Polish migrant workers: agriculture, domestic services, temporary staffing, construction, and ship building.

Agriculture: Until the 1980s, farmers had relied on local women and teenagers to do the summer harvesting. Although production was becoming increasingly mechanized, some harvest activities/tasks, such as picking strawberries, could only be performed manually and required considerable amounts of backbreaking physical labour. But housewives were becoming few and far between and increasingly affluent teenagers were no longer willing to spend their summer holidays bent over strawberry fields to earn pocket-money. Persuading native Norwegians to pick strawberries was becoming increasingly expensive, and local producers who were hard pressed by competition from imported goods were not eager to incur this increased cost. The solution came in the early 1990s in the form of the bilateral agreements on temporary seasonal migration from Poland and other nations. In other sectors, similar shifts in both demand and supply of labour did not become evident until the eastward opening of the labour market in 2004.

Domestic services: a common trade among young rural-urban migrating women in Norway until the Second World War, had during the mid to late twentieth century been wiped out by decreasing class differences, new household appliances and the single-breadwinner model which had given women from the working, middle and upper middle class a certain pride in keeping their

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8 Educational policy documents (see St.meld. nr. 44 (2008–2009)) have used projections from Statistics Norway estimating that the need for unskilled labour is rapidly declining and that by 2025 the share of unskilled workers in the labour force would be only 3.5 percent. However, these projections were based on definitions that deviate from international standards. When their definitions in 2010 were updated to EU standards, the number of unskilled workers needed in 2025 jumped from 3.5 to more than 20 percent. See [http://www.klassekampen.no/58169/article/item/null](http://www.klassekampen.no/58169/article/item/null).
homes tidy themselves (Alsos and Eldring 2011). However, by the turn of the millennium, social changes had made this increasingly hard to accomplish: Women had entered both higher education and the labour market, and Norway displayed some of the highest rates of female employment in the developed world. Gender-equality norms in the domestic division of labour had become widespread, yet proved difficult to realize in everyday life, and “time-squeeze” (“tids-klemma”) had become a defining concept of Norwegian family life. At the same time, the average Norwegian family had gained purchasing powers formerly unimaginable. More and more families resorted to the au-pair scheme for domestic services; it was originally intended as a cultural exchange programme but in recent years became a labour migration programme for domestic servants from Eastern Europe and South East Asia (Øien 2009). For migrant workers willing to perform cheap and casual services for households (particularly cleaning) there was a huge untapped market, and this became Polish women’s main entry point to Norway’s post-2004 labour market.

Temporary staffing was banned outside traditional office occupations until 2000, and its legalization did not seem to have an immediate effect, because very few native Norwegians were willing to work through agencies except as office temps. Since 2004, however, this has changed dramatically: Temporary staffing agencies came to play an important role as facilitators for migration by actively recruiting workers in Poland and the Baltic States, while promoting migrant workers as a cheap and flexible source of labour to new client industries without the risks and costs related to in-house employment. The number of persons employed in temporary staffing rose from about 20,000 in 2003 to well over 60,000 in 2008, and temporary staffing expanded rapidly into new sectors and occupations such as construction, manufacturing, food processing and health care (Nergaard et al. 2011). This increase was almost exclusively new migrant workers; Swedes in health care and Central and Eastern Europeans in construction and manufacturing. According to administrative employment statistics from Statistics Norway, the immigrant share of employees within temporary staffing increased from well below 10 percent in 2001 to about 50 percent in 2010. The Norwegian temporary staffing industry operates largely outside the framework of collective agreements and is subject to quite liberal regulations compared to neighbouring countries. For example, there are no rules on equality of treatment with inhouse employees; permanent employees in temporary staffing are not entitled to guarantee pay between assignments; and restrictions on labour hire in the Working Environment Act remain dormant or easily circumvented in many industries. This makes
temporary staffing a flexible, low-cost and low-risk way of employing large numbers of migrant workers without the responsibilities associated with in-house employment.

The construction industry is labour intensive, project based and highly sensitive to business cycles and it soon became the largest employer of migrant workers from Poland. The majority of construction workers are still native born, but over the past decade, the industry has gone through extensive structural changes that have made it completely dependent on using migrant labour as a cheap and flexible additional workforce. Twenty years ago, contractors would perform all phases of production themselves using their own employees, but as a result of increasing competition, process specialization has gradually occurred, involving a stronger dualization between core and peripheral workers. At first, this was done through the use of specialized subcontractors and labour pooling among construction firms. After 2000, temporary staffing agencies started to supply flexible non-specialized workers, usually from Sweden, but until 2004, it was difficult to find workers who were willing to work through agencies. After 2004, the use of temporary staffing and posting of workers through transnational subcontracting exploded, and today migrant workers are the main supply of flexible labour, usually working for minimum wage—far below the average wages of native workers.

Today’s typical construction firm in one of Norway’s larger cities has a minimum core staff of specialized employees who are usually natives or Nordic speakers, and the rest of its fluctuating, project-dependent labour needs are met through the use of different kinds of atypical externally affiliated migrant workers. During the same period, a large market for building and refurbishing services to domestic households has emerged. Largely outside the scope of regulation and often performed as undeclared work, this has become another important market for Polish construction workers.

The ship building industry has gone through similar changes as the formal construction industry. A cornerstone of many Norwegian coastal communities, ship building is cyclical, labour intensive and highly sensitive to international competition (Hervik et al. 2005). Thanks to a high level of specialisation, Norwegian shipyards managed to stay competitive, but by the mid 2000s, Norway’s high labour costs and difficulties in maintaining a labour force that was flexible enough to fit the cyclical pattern of production drove the industry to outsourcing more and more of its production to low-cost countries such as Poland or Romania. Before 2004, the trend seemed to be that engineering, design, coordination and administration soon would be the only part of ship
building projects to be performed in Norway, while the actual labour-intensive production would move to Central and Eastern Europe or Asia where workers were more accessible and less expensive.\(^9\) After 2004, however, employers were able to move the foreign workers from abroad and maintaining production in Norway. And that is exactly what happened: Today, migrant workers hired through temporary staffing agencies and foreign subcontractors often make up more than half of the workforce in many large shipyards (Ødegård and Andersen 2011).

The common denominator for all of these sector-specific developments has been the evolvement of separate niche markets of secondary employment largely reserved for migrant workers and partly outside the otherwise highly regulated Norwegian labour market based on standards laid down in centralized collective agreements. It is today almost impossible to find native Norwegians working in labour-intensive agricultural harvesting, as domestic cleaners for private clients, or among the flexible reserve army of construction and manufacturing workers loosely affiliated to their workplaces through temporary staffing agencies or transnational subcontractors\(^{10}\). Partly because these kinds of jobs provide too low status, too low pay and too little financial security to attract native workers and partly because any willing native workers would by now probably find it difficult to gain access to or communicate with their largely Polish co-workers. The Polish dominance in certain segments of the labour market is illustrated by anecdotal evidence which suggests that many Lithuanian workers (the second largest group of labour migrants from the new EU member states) have to learn Polish to access construction jobs in Norway. As substantial parts of production have become based on types of employment that are considered inappropriate or undesirable by natives, the demand for migrant workers who are willing to accept them has become a structural and enduring feature of the Norwegian labour market.

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\(^9\) Referere til innlegg fra Norsk Industri på Fafo Østforum – de hevdet at uten EU-utvidelsen ville dagens norske skipsverft vært flyttet ut.

\(^{10}\) Native workers still make up the majority of employees in temporary staffing agencies catering to traditional office occupations. In construction and manufacturing, however, migrant workers dominate (Friberg et al., forthcoming 2012).
“The Norwegian social model” facing labour migration

The “Norwegian social model” is usually defined as a particular version of the so-called Nordic social model that is distinguished by comparatively generous "universalist" redistributive welfare states, well-regulated labour markets covered by encompassing collective agreements, and high levels of participation and equality in the labour market (Dølvik, Goul Andersen and Vartiainen 2011). Historically and institutionally nationally bounded in their essence, it has been argued that the two main institutions on which this model rests (the regulated labour market and the welfare state) execrates the need to protect the boundary between insiders and outsiders on the one hand and to integrate newcomers into its existing institutions to maintain them, on the other (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010). However, in the case of free-moving labour migrants, the state lacks any means of regulating their entry or residence for either selection criteria or restrictions in numbers. It has also abandoned the kind of integration policies that apply to humanitarian immigration such as state subsidized language training. It is therefore entirely up to the functioning of the labour market to both regulate entry (because work is the primary requirement for residency and access to other social rights) and accommodate incorporation into Norwegian society. Labour market regulations are, thus, the only form of regulation present in what could otherwise be labelled the “immigration regime” and the “integration regime” facing free-moving labour migrants. However, existing labour market regulations in Norway were not oriented or scaled to cope with labour migration of this magnitude.

For example, unlike most continental European countries, Norway and the other Nordic countries do not have statutory minimum wages, and there is no tradition for state involvement in wage setting (Stokke 2010). Wages are regulated through voluntary but centralized collective agreements between the social partners. But unlike the other Nordic countries, Norway’s union density and collective agreement coverage is relatively low: Denmark and Sweden have a union density of about 70 percent; Norway has a union density of only slightly over 50 percent (Eldring and Alsos 2012). In the affected industries, this number is substantially lower, which means that large parts of the Norwegian labour market are unregulated by either statutory regulations or collective agreements. As Dølvik and Eldring (2008) point out, collective agreements tend to have a norm-setting effect on unregulated parts of the labour market as long as access to labour remains restricted. When the EU enlargement provided employers with sudden access to a large untapped reservoir of workers, there were few regulatory counters to the establishment of new low-wage
niches outside traditional labour market structures either within firms that were not organized or through outsourcing, subcontracting and labour hire from temporary staffing agencies and transnational service providers.

After 2004, it soon became clear that the Norwegian model of labour market regulation based on voluntary collective agreements and enforcement was challenged by the large-scale mobility of labour from low-cost countries. “Social dumping”, usually quite loosely defined as low-wage competition and labour standards substantially below established standards in Norwegian working life, has been high on the agenda since 2004, both within the trade union movement and in the centre-left coalition government which came to power in 2005. A steady stream of media reports describing exceptionally low wages and exploitative working conditions among Polish and other Central and Eastern European migrant workers regularly made headlines in the years after 2004. Aside from consideration for the well being of the migrant workers themselves, social dumping is considered problematic for the Norwegian social model for at least three main reasons: First, low-wage competition may lead to wage depression and deteriorating labour standards for native workers. Second, even if low wages and precarious conditions only apply to migrant workers (for example, because native and migrant workers perform complementary rather than competing functions) increasing labour market inequality in itself is considered problematic in a social model which values limited socio-economic differences and social cohesion. Third, low-wage competition and labour market flexibilization, whether or not induced by migration, can have unforeseen side effects in a generous universal welfare state, because the lack of economic security that the labour market provides may well translate into pressure upon welfare-state services and benefits. Studies have shown that earlier waves of labour migrants to Norway, who also displayed exceptionally high rates of employment, were pushed out of employment and into welfare dependency over time (Bratsberg et al. 2010). In May 2011, a government appointed commission assigned to investigate the relationship between migration and the welfare state delivered its report: It indicated that better integration of labour migrants into regular employment was needed to prevent the kind of marginalisation, exclusion and rising welfare dependency experienced in the wake of the 1970s’ guest-worker migration (NOU 2011:7).

As a response to these challenges, a wide range of measures have been launched to prevent social dumping in post-2004 Norway. First, transitional restrictions applied from 2004 to 2009
required full-time work at Norwegian pay as a prerequisite for granting residency permits. In parallel, the 1993 law on extension of collective agreements has been used by the unions to demand (and get acceptance for) generalization of minimum wages and some other items in several migrant-labour intensive sectors such as construction, agriculture, shipyards and recently, cleaning. Decided by the “Tariffboard”, such extensions have won bipartisan acceptance in construction, agriculture and cleaning, but have been contested by the employers in export-oriented industries such as the shipyard sector. Due to such divisions as well as scepticism of extending collective agreements among many unions, legally binding minimum wages (extended collective agreements) thus far only apply to about 10 per cent of the Norwegian labour market. Several key measures in the government’s action plan to combat social dumping by strengthened control and enforcement (e.g., chain liability responsibility for a main contractor) only applies in the four sectors with legally extended minimum wages. While mandatory ID cards have been introduced in the construction sector, new registration schemes have been established for foreign subcontractors and staffing agencies and an authorization scheme is underway in cleaning. Most of these measures have stronger state involvement in labour affairs and more statutory regulation and government enforcement. In the areas with extension, this entails a closer interplay between statutory measures and collective agreements, which represent a novelty in the Norwegian social model. So far, the social partners have been cautious in activating these new, forceful mechanisms, raising questions about how to develop a more encompassing, efficient regime for regulation and control of minimum wages. A number of disputes relating to the design and implementation of anti-dumping policies suggest that Norway is still in an early stage of adjusting its labour regime to the rise in low-wage competition in the enlarged European labour market (Friberg, Tronstad and Dølvik 2012).

Conclusions
In this chapter I have sought to elaborate on the historical context relevant for understanding the scope and structure of labour migration from Poland to Norway in the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. In Poland, this context includes a long history of out-migration; strong migratory links to Western European countries, including Norway; and structural and economic changes in the post-communist era that have contributed to making large parts of the Polish population prone to see migration as a feasible livelihood strategy. At the European
supranational level, the EU enlargement in 2004 and the subsequent gradual and asymmetrical opening towards free movement contributed to divert and redirect migration flows into different channels and to new destinations. In Norway, an ongoing economic boom as well as structural and demographic changes in many sectors and labour markets has created a specific need for cheap, flexible, and semi- and low-skilled workers. At the same time, a less than encompassing regulatory labour market regime with plenty of opportunities for establishing parallel and substandard niche employment markets had facilitated large-scale recruitment and employment of migrant workers outside and below the regular domestic labour market at highly flexible conditions and relatively low pay. It is within this context that the migration and incorporation of migrant workers into Norwegian society must be understood.
3. Theoretical perspectives

According to Barbara Schmitter Heisler (2008), immigration theory has largely focused on three questions: 1) why does migration occur (theories of migration)? 2) what happens to the migrants after their arrival (theories of integration/incorporation)? and 3) what are the consequences of their presence (theories of the consequences of migration)? Studying recent immigrants in an open-ended process of migration and settlement in a context of free movement, such a division fits badly with my topic of research. Because the motives and channels through which migrants move are so closely related to the ways in which they adapt and become incorporated into Norwegian society, it makes little sense to distinguish between the migration process and the subsequent integration or adaptation. The mechanisms and decisions involved in the migration process itself (such as labour market change and the establishment of transnational social networks) shape the way migrants are introduced and adapt to their host society. Furthermore, as open-endedness and circulatory migration patterns have been identified as defining features of post-accession migration from East to West in Europe, most migrant workers remain in a process of migration, constantly having to decide where to go and how long to stay even long after their arrival in the host country. Likewise, because the structural changes that come about in the wake of large-scale migration have a fundamental bearing on both the further migration process and the opportunity structure of individual migrants, it makes little sense to distinguish the consequences of migration from the causes of migration or from the incorporation of migrants—at least not in this initial phase of a new emerging migration system. Finally, much of the extensive literature on immigrant incorporation under the heading of integration theory or assimilation theory has been of limited relevance because of its focus on the long-term processes of incorporation and the role of the state, while as my subjects are so recently arrived and remains so much outside the reach of public integration policy. This means that although immigrant incorporation lies at the heart of the analysis, it has been the more general migration theory which has proven more fruitful. Three themes will be addressed in this chapter: 1) a dynamic understanding of how social structures at the micro, meso and macro levels shape the migration experience and are in turn shaped by migration; 2) a discussion of complementary theoretical perspectives on the interdependent relationship between labour markets
A dynamic approach to labour migration

Thirty years ago, theoretical attempts to explain the origins and processes of international labour migration were largely divided between two competing approaches that sought to explain international migration as a result of either micro level individual choices or the workings of macro level social structures. Neoclassical economics portrayed migration as the actions of rational utility-maximizing individuals who respond to international differences in wages and unemployment by investing their human capital wherever it gave the highest return. If the expected benefits outweighed the psychological, social and material costs of moving, migration would occur (Lewis 1954, Todaro 1969, Todaro and Maruszko 1987, Borjas 1989). This dominating perspective was challenged in the 1970s and 1980s by Marxist oriented sociologists under the banner of World Systems Theory. They explained migration as a result of structural imbalances of power and dominance between core and peripheral countries of the political economic world system and the restructuring of traditional livelihoods following the colonial and post-colonial penetration of capitalism into less-developed nations (Portes and Walton 1981, Petras 1981, Sassen 1988, Morawska 1990).

Although both micro economic and macro structural explanations of international migration are still employed, today’s mosaic of approaches to international migration is much more diverse, in both theoretical underpinnings and the factors considered important for understanding the migration process. Most importantly, newer approaches introduce a number of institutions and structures at the meso level which contribute to shaping the migration process. The so-called New Economics of Labour Migration introduces households as decision makers that diversify risks and respond to local market failures by sending their members to work abroad temporarily (Stark and Bloom 1985, Taylor 1987, Stark 1991). Labour-market segmentation theory focuses on institutional features of modern labour markets, ethnic status hierarchies in employment and the interplay between labour market dualization in receiving countries and structural demand for immigrant workers (Piore 1979, Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Social capital theory and social network theory explain the perpetuation of international migration, through the accumulation of transnational
interpersonal relationships that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination countries, increasing the likelihood of movement by lowering the costs and risks of migration and by constituting a form of social capital which can be translated into employment opportunities and social support abroad (Levy and Wadycki 1973, Massey et al. 1987, Massey and Espinoza 1997, Munshi 2003, Ryan et al. 2008). At the same time, renewed debates about immigrant assimilation and transnationalism are redefining the relationship between migrants and their countries of origin and destination (Portes and Zhou 1993, Alba and Nee 2003, 1997, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Glick Schiller et al. 1995, Faist 2000, Kivisto 2001).

Although the concepts and explanations derived from these theoretical approaches propose alternative and sometimes contradictory explanations, they nevertheless have something in common which has been helpful in guiding the investigation and making sense of empirical data in this project. Although the sociological scholarship on migration often present an (at least implicit) critique of neo-classical economic theory that dominated the field for a long time, this critique is not primarily directed towards the assumption that individuals are rational economic actors in their pursuit of a better livelihood. Labour migration is obviously one of those human endeavours that involve some kind of purposeful action. Economic motives are of course not the only ones relevant: non-economic motives may also be pursued, such as the quest for approval, love, status and power, or actions guided by moral considerations. Furthermore, consequences do not necessarily follow intentions: Many of the most profound outcomes of migration and adaptation (such as settlement or assimilation) are in fact often unintended consequences of the purposeful pursuit of some other goal (Alba and Nee 1993). Nevertheless, despite all the constraints of rationality, the important choices that people make in the process of moving and adapting to life in a new country are purposeful in the sense that interests and incentives matter.

In sharp contrast to the neo-classical economic approach, however, recent sociological approaches to labour migration share a view of migration as more than the result of atomized individual decisions in response to a world of macro structural determinants. The actions, decisions and adaptations involved in migration are also at some level embedded in relationships, structures and institutions that are social in nature and which are best conceptualized on the meso level: families and households, local communities, transnational social networks, local labour markets, institutions, organizations and status hierarchies. In this respect, much of today’s migration theory
owes some intellectual debt to Mark Granovetters’ (1985) work on the “embeddedness” of economic action. Granovetter distinguished between “relational” embeddedness, which refers to economic actors’ personal relationships with one another, including the normative expectations, quest for mutual approval and reciprocity transaction between individuals on the one hand, and “structural” embeddedness, which refers to the broader network of social relations in which these actors belong which generate more general normative expectations and valued rewards on the other (Portes 1995: 6). A basic starting point of my analysis is that the process of migration and adaptation, in addition to micro level characteristics of individuals and macro level structures, is shaped within such relationships and networks of relationships on the meso level.

Table II: Micro, meso and macro level factors that shape the opportunity structures of migrants

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<thead>
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<th>A) Micro level</th>
<th>B) Meso level</th>
<th>C) Macro level</th>
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<td>Income differentials</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Income level</td>
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<td>Welfare policy &amp; social rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family status</td>
<td>Ethnic status hierarchies</td>
<td>Immigration policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II provides a brief overview of some of the factors at the micro, meso and macro level that influence and shape the migration process. Although all of these factors can be identified as causing migration, all of them are, in turn, affected by migration and they shape the opportunity structures facing migrants. To understand how a shift in focus towards meso level social structures may alter our understanding of the migratory process, it is useful to contrast the ways these factors shape and are shaped by migration to those of the macro level. At the macro level, large income differentials, labour demand, unemployment levels (high in sending areas – low in receiving areas), or liberal immigration regimes and generous welfare policies may all be identified as causing migration. But after migration occurs, it tends to affect these macro level factors in ways that weaken subsequent migration pressure. For example, labour immigration may weaken the bargaining power of workers and unions and thus lead to stagnation or depression of host-country wages, making it less attractive
for potential immigrants. Demographic changes and increasing ethnic diversity following immigration may lead to calls for stricter immigration policy or to declining support for generous welfare programs, which may reduce migration flows. In sending countries, out-migration may lead to labour shortages, falling unemployment rates or wage inflation, and these reduce migration potential. In other words, migration tends to involve negative feedback loops at the macro level.

At the meso level, however, feedback loops tend to be positive. The meso level social structures that cause migration—from transnational migrant networks and communities (e.g., websites, associations, specialty shops and church services for Poles in Norway), a formal “migration industry” consisting of everything from labour recruitment agencies (e.g., Adecco training camps in Poland), cheap airlines (e.g., Norwegian’s daily low-cost flights to several Polish destinations) and cell phone operators (e.g., Lebara), or ethnic niches in the labour market that generate demand for a specific kind of workers (e.g., female Polish domestic cleaners or male Polish construction workers rented through agencies)—are all produced and reproduced as a direct result of the migration process itself. Once they are established, they alter the social structure in ways that significantly increase the likelihood of further migration. And while the negative feedback loops found on the macro level tend to occur slowly and subtle and are often extremely difficult to measure (for example, the general wage depression one could expect from migration tends to be obscured by the very same positive economic cycles and forces that caused migration in the first place), the positive feedback loops generated by migration at the meso level happen instantly and are easily observed. This is central to the concept of cumulative causation in migration theory. Cumulative causation, first described by Myrdal (1957) and later applied to migration by Massey (1990), proposes that each act of migration alters the social context in ways that induce more subsequent migration through a number of socioeconomic mechanisms. Migration is thus not a series of individual acts of migration; it takes on a systemic character. Examples of cumulative causation are the expansion of social networks and migration capital and labour market segmentation that is, when certain types of jobs become “immigrant jobs” (jobs that natives shun and immigrants try to escape from) creating a constant demand for new migrants to fill positions in the bottom of the hierarchy. The notion of cumulative causation stands in stark contrast to the predictions of the neo-classical equilibrium model, which assumes that migration automatically leads to an equilibrium state in which the forces that generate migration cease to operate. Instead, migration takes on a systemic character, in which
each migratory system is shaped in space and time by forces that are specific to each historical and institutional context. Understanding the more general patterns that explain why such migratory systems sometimes “take off” to become large-scale movements and sometimes do not, and how the interactions between opposing forces are structured into different stages in time until they ultimately stop, is one of the frontiers of interdisciplinary theoretical migration research (de Haas 2010, Bakewell 2010).

**Labour migrants and labour markets: concepts and perspectives**

Any analysis of the processes and outcomes of labour migration will have to involve an understanding of the labour market as an important driver of migration flows, as one of the primary arenas shaping the lives of migrants and one of the first institutions in receiving societies to absorb their impact. In this paper, I present three different perspectives on the relationship between labour markets and immigration. Although these perspectives are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive, they direct attention towards different influencing factors. Following Table II, the standard economic approach to migration and labour markets focus primarily on micro level individual responses to macro level determinants; both the segmented labour-market approach and network theory focus explicitly on social structures on the meso level, which contribute to shaping migration patterns and outcomes and are in turn, shaped by migration.

**The standard economic approach to migration and labour markets**

The standard economic approach to labour migration offers a straightforward analysis of migration resulting from international differences in labour demand and supply. Countries with large amounts of labour and small amounts of capital produce low equilibrium wages and those with small supplies of labour and large supplies of capital produce high equilibrium wages. Market forces then “push” and “pull” capital and labour in opposite directions. Borjas (1990) uses the concept of a “global migration market”, where rational individuals calculate the net returns on their human capital in different countries by multiplying the productivity of human capital in destination countries with the probability of finding employment and subtracting the psychological, social and material cost of moving.
The migrants’ opportunities in the labour markets of their host countries are determined by their human capital, defined as investments in human resources, such as education, skills and experience (Becker 1975). The more human capital, the more productive and attractive workers are on the labour market. Migrants may fare worse than natives in the labour market because they have less education and skills than natives; because their education and skills are not relevant or not recognized in the host country; because they do not speak the language of the host country; or because they lack knowledge of local customs and norms of social interaction. Later versions also focus on social capital or network resources in the formation of human capital (Coleman 1988). Country-specific human capital can only be attained in the host country and is often lacked by recent migrants, particularly in the beginning of their stay. As migrants learn the language, acquire knowledge of how the labour market functions, obtain country-specific education, and access more contacts in the majority population, the occupational attainment and earnings of immigrants and their descendants will converge with that of the majority group (Chiswick 1978, Borjas 1985, Chiswick and Miller 2003).

Assuming that labour markets are relatively uniform and competitive and that the price of labour behaves like that of other commodities, standard economic models predict a fall in general wages as a result of immigration. However, economic models that account for labour markets being structured by different kinds of skills and job categories predict that only the workers who have the same kind of skills and training as those performed by migrants will be negatively affected in terms of wage depression and job displacement; workers with complementary skills and jobs are positively affected by migration (Roed and Schone 2007). For example, increased access to waiters will drive down the wages of other waiters, but it will increase the productivity and demand for chefs. Increased access to low-skilled workers will have a negative impact on the wages of those low-skilled native workers who compete for the same jobs, but it will increase the productivity and demand for many types of high skilled labour.

**Segmented labour markets and migration**
Segmented labour-market theory sought to expand economic theory’s narrow focus on markets by directing attention to institutional features of labour markets and to jobs as markers of social status as well as a source of income. First developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971) and later applied to the
study of migrants by Piore (1979), the theory suggests that the calculations of individual migrant workers are not the primary driver of migration flows; instead, it is the “chronic and unavoidable” demand for immigrant labour in modern labour markets. This is related to the duality between labour and capital and the cyclical nature of business demand: while labour is a variable factor of production that can be laid off in times of low demand and thus bear the cost of its own unemployment (or depend on welfare state insurance), capital is not. If you buy an expensive machine, you need to make the down payment for it, even if demand for the products it produces fails. Therefore, capitalists seek to meet the stable proportion of demand by capital intensive production and the fluctuating component by adding labour. Workers in the capital intensive primary sector get high paying, stable jobs because they need considerable and often firm-specific knowledge and experience to perform and therefore, employers must invest in their skills, training and loyalty. As a result, they become expensive to let go: like capital. In the labour-intensive secondary sector, however, workers may be laid off at any time with little or no cost to the employer. These jobs are not only low paying; they are highly unstable and often unskilled and give few prospects for mobility. On the macro level, segmented labour markets are often associated with deindustrialisation and economic restructuring in the knowledge and service driven economies of Western Europe and North America after the 1970s that created an “hourglass economy” with substantial numbers of jobs in the top and bottom, but few in the middle (Kivisto and Faist 2010:41). On the meso level, segmented labour markets have been associated with Atkinson’s (1984) model of the flexible firm, which differentiates between an internal primary workforce and an externally affiliated peripheral workforce (for a detailed and up-to date account of flexible firms and labour market segmentation, see Kalleberg 2003). Segmented labour market theory proposes that native workers are often unwilling to take on peripheral low-status jobs not just because they generate low pay, but also because they infer low status. This is called hierarchical constraints on motivation. In the past, such jobs were often performed by women and teenagers—people who only periodically entered the labour force and whose main income and social status came from other sources. Today, developments in the educational system and women’s increased labour-market participation have drained this extra labour reserve. Employers are, however, unwilling to raise the wages in such jobs to attract the necessary labour, as would be predicted by standard economic theory. Not just for the obvious reason that this will increase the labour cost in the bottom of the
hierarchy, but because this may trigger structural inflation. If the lowest ranking workers get a raise, this will lead to “knock-on” claims by groups of higher status who wish to maintain wage differentials with those perceived as of lower rank. The dual nature of modern labour markets (based on the distinction between capital intensive and labour intensive production) combined with hierarchical constraints on motivation, fear of structural inflation, and the changing demography of native labour forces creates structural labour shortages in the bottom (or periphery) of the labour market. The result is a constant demand for people who see work mainly as a source of income and are willing to take low paid, low status jobs. This is where migrants come into the picture. They fit the bill for several reasons: They are typically inclined to compare jobs in the destination country with the conditions and options available back home (a so-called dual frame of reference [Waldinger and Lichter 2003]); they have limited alternatives in the host-country labour market due to poor language skills and often restricted access to benefit systems; and they have families to support in their countries of origin. As a result, migrants are often willing to accept jobs with conditions refused by natives, making them popular with employers who are unwilling to raise wages or improve working conditions to staff unattractive jobs. According to segmented labour-market theory, it is the demand for and sometimes active recruitment of migrant labour by employers in destination countries which is the most basic causal force driving modern labour migration flows.11

Segmented labour market theory is more ambiguous when it comes to the migrants’ opportunities over time in their host countries. Unlike traditional industrial labour markets which provided relatively stable employment and where motivated hard workers could work their way up from the assembly line to mid-level management positions, the modern dual-labour market provides few opportunities for going from the secondary segment into the primary one, except through higher education. As a result of economic restructuring, social mobility through the life course of the individual worker is, according to some writers, much more difficult now than in the past. The question is not whether the migrants themselves will be able to work their way up to middle-class

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11 The dual nature of modern labour market also gives rise to a growing demand for immigrant labour at the other end of the skills spectrum, in technology and knowledge intensive production, with increasing attempts by firms and governments to attract highly skilled foreign workers (Baganha et al. 2006). Recent Polish migrants in Norway, however, tend to belong to the first kind, recruited to fill labour demand in the bottom end of the labour market.
status in their host countries but whether their children will (Portes and Zhou 1993). This narrative of a growing gap between the top and bottom ends of the labour market is particularly related to the new economy of global cities in Western Europe and the United States. In Norway, the situation may be less accentuated, not least because the Norwegian welfare state itself provides a large number of relatively stable jobs that are available to immigrants, especially women.

Piore’s original book (1979) states that migrants tend to be found in the secondary peripheral parts of the labour markets because of a particular characteristic of the immigrant experience and the fact that most labour migrants at first only plan to stay temporarily. Unlike native workers, who see work as a source of social status, prestige and self realization, recent immigrants were, according to Piore, only concerned with economic survival. Uprooted from their social surroundings, with no status to defend in the host country, always having at least one eye focused on the situation back home, migrants were perfect workers in the transient secondary labour market where jobs come and go. Only if and when they became more settled and brought their families would their situation and perspective change, and they would seek out more stable employment. More recent contributions still invoke this “dual frame of reference”, but place more emphasis on the practices of employers and the social production of labour demand. According to this perspective, recruitment practices are directly related to the employers’ sense of whether the ability and suitability of various groups of workers match particular jobs. In other words, not only do labour markets consist of different segments, but the employers’ sense of the suitability for specific jobs may be determined categorically, based on gender, age, race, ethnicity or migration status etcetera. “To each category of person, a type of job” (Waldinger and Lichter 2003: 8). With limited information about each individual applicant, ethnicity, nationality or race may serve as a proxy for the skills and desirability of workers (Moss and Tilly 2001, Shih 2002, Waldinger and Lichter 2003). In a racially conscious society (a common description about the United States, but probably fitting in Norway as well), some employers may prefer to employ foreigners to “distance” themselves from the moral economy of the labour being done. Although they might baulk at employing “their own kind” to do dirty, dangerous and difficult work for very low rates of pay, they can find it easier to employ those who are coded as “other” (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003: 40). Furthermore, the dual frame of reference is not just a lens through which recent migrants view their options, but serves as a justification for employers who offer migrants sub-standard working conditions (Maldonado 2009). Research in the
United States and the United Kingdom shows how employers often deploy common racial, ethnic or national stereotypes when seeking to hire specific migrant groups or allocating particular tasks to particular nationals creating a “Hiring Queue”, a nationality based “shorthand” over whom to employ for which type of jobs (Wills et al. 2009). This practice may seem discriminatory, but while research on discrimination usually focus on why employers do not want to hire migrants or ethnic minorities, the “hiring queue” also explains why some groups may be preferred for certain kinds of jobs and others excluded. Therefore, migrant workers’ opportunities in the host country are not related to only the human capital accumulated by individuals, but also to the social status of the particular group with which they are associated.

Segmented labour-market theory predicts quite different consequences of labour migration than the standard approach. According to the standard approach, each act of migration reduces equilibrium wages and thus incentives to migrate, until migration flows stop. According to segmented labour market theory, however, migration flows are primarily driven by labour demand. When employers get an opportunity to fill certain types of jobs with migrants, job status and labour standards start to deteriorate. Those who can, seek employment or income elsewhere, and new migrants are needed to fill the bottom vacancies. Labour market segmentation is therefore a cumulative process: both a cause and a consequence of international migration.

Networks, social capital and immigrant employment niches
Some early immigration scholars tended to see migrants as “the uprooted”, to quote a classic title in American immigration history (Handlin 1951). For example, in Piore’s original theory of the link between segmented labour markets and migration, the immigrant worker was the closest thing to the rational “Homo Economicus” that a social researcher could expect to find: the secondary labour market in which he lived was a world without structure, where workers lacked durable social relationships in a context where they are “divorced from a social setting” (Piore 1979:55). More recent migration scholars, however, show us the opposite. Migration research conducted over the last three decades has shown how the process of migration itself is a network-driven phenomenon and that newcomers are often linked by dense connections to other migrants, including veterans who use their inside information to recruit their friends and relatives. Interpersonal relationships that link migrants, ex-migrants and non-migrants in countries of destination and countries of origin
through bonds of kinship, friendship and common community origin and identity are recognised as one of the most important factors in explaining the process of international migration today, because they reduce costs and risks involved in migration and increase its rewards (Massey et al. 1998; Arango 2000). These networks are often the most valuable asset held by migrants looking for openings in the labour market of a new country. According to Waldinger and Lithceter (2003), these networks are so powerful because they also serve the employers, who, uncertain about the abilities and trustworthiness of new applicants, can rely on the informal networks of staff members who can vouch for the newcomer and who will have an interest in the new recruit performing satisfactorily.

The study of social networks and informal relationships between co-ethnics has brought new insights to the study of segmented labour markets and immigration. In their study of Cubans in Miami, Portes and associates (Portes and Bach 1985, Portes and Jensen 1989) found it necessary to expand the typology of a dual labour market with a third segment: immigrant enclave economies consisting of immigrant entrepreneurs as well as immigrant workers. Although wages in the ethnic enclave may be low, jobs here may offer a kind of solidarity and support which increases the prospects for upward mobility compared to jobs in the outside secondary economy. Ethnic minority entrepreneurs have a good chance of making it big because of their access to social capital and cheap labour and a demand for particular goods and services within the ethnic enclave economy. However, true ethnic enclave economies are few and far between. The Cuban enclave in Miami, Chinatown in New York and San Francisco, and the historical Little Italy are the most famous, but no similar enclaves have been described in Europe (Portes 2010). On the other hand, immigrant employment concentration in certain parts of the labour market is very common on both sides of the Atlantic. On that basis, Roger Waldinger and associates developed a model of ethnic niches, which, contrary to ethnic enclaves, do not require immigrant entrepreneurs, but emerge when a group is able to colonize a particular sector of employment in such a way that members have privileged access to job openings while restricting others (Waldinger 1994, Waldinger and Bozorghmer 1996). The Norwegian labour market has plenty of markets that resemble ethnic niches, such as the Pakistani taxi drivers of Oslo, the Tamil and Russian fish processing workers, Philippine sailors and au-pair workers, and Swedish bartenders. To that list we can add several niches in which recent Polish migrants are strongly overrepresented, such as seasonal agricultural work, domestic cleaning and refurbishing and labour intensive subcontracting in the construction sector and shipyards. While the
early literature on migrant social capital and social networks often emphasized the positive effects these networks have for migrants negotiating an often hostile new environment, recent scholars have called for increased attention to the diverse forms these networks may take and the different functions—both positive and negative—they may have for participants (Ryan et al. 2008). Although ethnic networks and niches may provide migrants with basic requirements, such as initial jobs opportunities and housing, they may also exacerbate competition, rivalry and exploitation within these closed networks (Ibid.).

Niche employment will, however, affect the way in which immigration in turn affects native labour markets. If the colonization of a niche happens fast, it may be felt to be crowding out native workers who formerly dominated the niche. But ethnic niche formation may also happen through natural replacement: Jobs within the niche become both less attractive and less accessible to natives, who thus enter in fewer numbers or seek employment elsewhere. However, for some Polish employment niches in Norway (e.g., domestic cleaning), the entire market is new, and in those cases, native workers will only be affected as consumers with access to cheaper services.

**Free movement, “temporariness” and settlement**

In public policy and administrative registration systems, it is common to distinguish between temporary and permanent migration. In reality, the two are not easily separated. After all, whether a migration has been temporary or permanent cannot be determined until the migrant dies or returns (and even if they return we do not know if the return is temporary or permanent). Historical attempts to manage different kinds of temporary migration programs have often failed, as initial temporary migration turns permanent. In their account of the migration process Castles and Miller (2009) argue that migrants tend to go through a gradual process of settlement:

> Although each migratory movement has its specific historical patterns, it is possible to generalize on the social dynamics of the migratory process ... Most economic migrations start with young, economically active people. They are often “target earners”, who want to save enough in a higher-wage economy to improve conditions at home, by buying land, building a house, setting up a business, or paying for education or dowries ... As time goes on, many erstwhile temporary migrants send for spouses, or find partners in the new country. With the birth of children, settlement takes on a more permanent character. (p. 88–89)
This narrative of the classic migration experience following a certain path has in recent years been challenged, both by new theoretical conceptualizations of the relationship between home and host societies and by empirically based studies of the particular conditions of migration from Central and Eastern Europe after EU accession. “Temporariness” has been widely identified as a central aspect of East-West migration in Europe since 1989, reflected in concepts such as “fluid” or “incomplete” migration (Jazwinska and Okólski 2001) and “lasting temporariness” (Grzymala-Kazłowska 2005). But opinions have differed over whether this pattern of transient and partial mobility would continue after the EU accession: On the one hand, migrants were now free to take up work and settle for as long as they wanted. On the other, they were free to return or travel back and forth without fear of losing residential rights. Eade et al. writing in 2006 on Polish migrants in the United Kingdom found that migrants could be divided into four separate categories based on their expectations and plans for the future and their strategies of adaptation to their countries of origin and residence.

But however nicely they may fit the empirical evidence at a certain point in time, in light of Castles’ and Miller’s observations, is this kind of categorisation the best way to understand the temporal dynamics of the migration process over time? After all, it is difficult to know if people belong to different categories of migrants or are merely in different stages of the migration process. Engbersen, Snel and De Boon (2010) use the notion of liquid migration—paraphrasing Zygmunt Bauman’s work on “liquid modernity” (1999) and “liquid life” (2005)—and argue that the open-endedness related to transitory and temporary patterns of transnational work and living between East and West in Europe is qualitatively different from many earlier migrations. A similar position is advocated by Adrian Favell (2008a): He argues that post-accession migrants are “more likely to engage in temporary circular and transnational mobility, governed by the ebb and flow of economic demand, than by long-term, permanent immigration” (pp. 703) and that our standard theoretical accounts of immigration, integration and citizenship are unable to grasp the reality of this elusive phenomenon (Ibid).

In some ways, this position echoes the criticism of migration theory raised under the loose heading of migrant transnationalism in the 1990s. The earliest and most vocal proponents of the concepts launched the idea of transnationalism as an attempt to reconceptualize the entire field of
international migration by questioning the very basic units of analysis, namely migrants and the state, and by making a case for the introduction of two new terms that would more or less replace them: transmigrants and transnational social fields (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Basch et al. 1994 and Glick Schiller 1997). Just as recent scholars have argued that post-accession East-West migration in Europe is qualitatively different than earlier migrations, they argued that the current migration experience as such is qualitatively different than past migration, due to changing means of communication and travel. Today’s migrants’ “… networks, activities, and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies. Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:1). They argued that this calls for a new theoretical and conceptual approach to immigration, “discarding previous categorizations of return, circulatory or permanent immigration” (Glick Schiller 1997:158). In the next decade, the concept of transnationalism was extensively criticized, then redeveloped as a less ambitious middle-range theory and finally accepted as one of many analytical tools by the general-migration scholarly community (Portes et al. 1999, Faist 2000, Kivisto and Faist 2010).

It may now seem that the scholarly perception of the novelty of free moving European migration is going through a similar development. It may have more liquid or transient features than many other migration streams due to the macro level institutional freedom of the European Area, but the local forces related to families and networks and local communities, labour markets and identities, which tend to bind people to particular places, are still significant for today’s free-moving European labour migrants. Anne White (2011), writing on Polish families in the UK, points out that the open-endedness of today’s free-moving Polish migrants is not in itself a new phenomenon: Migrants have always had to explore different options and alternatives. The newness of today’s free-moving Central and Eastern European migration experience is that this open-ended phase can extend much longer than in the past, and with less risk. She points out, however, that while this freedom is obviously a privilege, it may also come with a cost, as migrants are pulled between different, often-conflicting expectations and demands, between here and there, with life suspended in the balance.
Conclusion
The goal of this chapter is not been to present a specific theoretical model of analysis, or to derive specific hypothesis which can be tested against the empirical evidence. Rather, it is to review different concepts and theoretical contributions that have proven useful in empirical analysis of similar phenomena elsewhere, and develop a conceptual tool-kit consisting of what Blumer (1969) called sensitizing concepts. Contrary to “definitive concepts” that provide specific prescriptions of what to see, “sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look” (pp. 148), and can, according to Blumer, guide the researcher into asking the right questions and help make sense of the findings by recognizing what is and is not important based on concepts and ideas that have proven fruitful in other empirical contexts. In my own empirical research, several concepts and ideas developed within the migration literature have provided such insights. This includes a dynamic understanding of the migration process, as being embedded in and causally linked in complex ways, to networks and structures at the micro, macro and meso level, through feedback mechanisms and cumulative causal chains. I have found it particularly important to complement basic economic understandings of how labour markets operate, with an understanding of how they are embedded in informal social networks and ethnic-status hierarchies and niche formation among workers as well as the specific social organization and structure of labour demand developed within firms and industries. Finally, particular attention has been drawn to how such embedded processes of decision making and adaptation take place within an institutional context of free movement, which in many ways has the potential of dissolving traditional distinctions between temporary and permanent migration and between social life-world of origin and destination places, by facilitating new and transient forms of transnational movements and engagements.
4. Methodology and data

This chapter describes the methodology and data applied in the study. I outline the general methodological approach which I have followed during the research and then describe the overall design of the study and the data sources used. A substantial part is then devoted to discussing the use of Respondent Driven Sampling as a survey methodology. Finally, challenges related to doing qualitative interviews with the help of an interpreter are discussed in detail.

An empirically grounded contextual approach

In an attempt to identify the basic practical methodologies in use in the social sciences today, Lars Mjøset (2009) distinguishes between three main practical philosophies under which he identifies different concepts of theory:

- The standard attitude is based on the philosophies of natural science, including logical positivism, Poppers critical rationalism, and analytical philosophy. Typical research methods include mathematical modelling and simulations (economics, game theory) and hypothesis testing through statistical analysis of large datasets (variable oriented sociology). The former is related to an idealizing concept of theory, and the latter to a law-oriented concept of theory.

- The social philosophical attitude is based on the philosophies of the humanities, phenomenology, hermeneutics and (post-)structuralism. Typical research methods are interpretative analysis of texts, narrative or discourse analysis, using classical texts to reconstruct social history or deconstructing social categories and historical accounts. This attitude may be divided into reconstructionist and deconstructionist concepts of theory.

- The contextualist attitude is, unlike the others, based on philosophies developed within social sciences themselves, including US pragmatism and European critical theory. Typical research methods are qualitative studies including participant-observation, open ended interviewing, and comparative work on distinct case histories. These methods imply direct or indirect involvement with the people and cases studied. Grounded theory and critical theory are two well-known examples of methodologies within the contextualist attitude.

Similar positions can be identified within the field of migration studies. The standard attitude—usually related to an idealizing concept of theory based on econometric modelling—is most commonly applied within economic migration research. To date, the most ambitious attempt to construct a law-oriented general theory of migration from the field of sociology is found in the work
of Douglas Massey and collaborators (Massey et al. 1998, Massey 1999), who test the explanatory power of the major competing theories in the field. After concluding that they are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive, Massey (1999) provides a synthetic explanation of international migration, its perpetuation, and the cumulative processes that over time bring migration flows to an end. While admitting that his synthesis is somewhat incomplete, his ultimate goal is to unite the different theoretical positions into a single theory of international migration, echoing the epistemological position of Robert K. Merton (1968): The covering law model of the natural sciences provides the normative ideal, but due to the immaturity of social science, that ideal has to be realized sometime in the future.

In contrast to those who try to synthesize or evaluate explanatory theories, others argue for deconstructing and re-conceptualizing the basic categories used by migration scholars, similar to what Lars Mjøset calls the social philosophical attitude. Writers within this position often argue that the categories used by states to control migrants (labour, refugee and family) should not be used as analytical categories by migration scholars and that the old dichotomies of migration research (internal-international, forced-voluntary, temporary-permanent, legal-illegal) tend to blur in today’s diverse global patterns of migration (King 2002). From the position of feminist and post-colonial theory, standard migration theory has been extensively criticized for its male bias and for its inherent ethno-centrism. This latter call to transcend ethnocentrism in migration studies often includes deconstructionist concepts of theory, critiquing a modernist development paradigm accused of privileging the view from the West (Favell 2008b). The call to transcend ethnocentrism and methodological nationalism has also come in the shape of attempts to reconstruct the migration process within an existing social-philosophical tradition, such as Ewa Morawska’s (2001) proposition for a general theory of migration based on Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration. The most influential attempt at reconstructing migration theory, however, has come from scholars working under the loose heading of migrant transnationalism, which was discussed in the previous chapter.

The position adopted in this thesis is more in line with what Mjøset calls the contextualist attitude, which also has its proponents within migration scholarship. One important feature of such an approach is to aim for theoretical explanations of the middle range whose validity is limited to a certain context. Alejandro Portes (1999) argues that migration simply encompasses too many different social phenomena on too many different levels, which, albeit interrelated, requires separate
attention. Mid-range theories targeted at questions of limited scope are therefore preferable to all-encompassing theories of migration. Stephen Castles (2010) advocates linking migration research to the specific historic context of globalisation and social transformation. Following an apparently grounded theory approach, he summarizes the process of theory formation in four stages.

1) Empirical studies on specific migration experiences;
2) The construction of middle-range theories of migratory processes, within the context of the wider social relations of globalization and social transformation;
3) Drawing out the key lessons of the middle-range theories to build a broader conceptual framework, to provide theoretical and methodological orientation for future migration research;
4) To use the conceptual framework as a basis for developing themes, research questions and methods for the next round of empirical research.

Castles underlines that research does not start with a tabula rasa, but follows a cyclical pattern, and migration scholars can build on many years of empirically grounded migration research to start their work at any one of these stages (Ibid:10). In this project, I follow a similar strategy. I do not aim towards uncovering general relationships between abstract variables that can be applied to labour migration anywhere in the world. Neither do I aim to deconstruct or criticize the concepts and categories commonly used by policy makers or academics. My goal is to construct empirically grounded explanations and understandings for a specific migration experience, drawing on lessons from earlier research. The context I invoke is not that of global processes of social transformations, but a more limited context of specific social changes in Norway, Poland and the EU. The conclusions are, however, limited to this specific context. Generalizations beyond the specific case of Polish migrants in Norway in the years after 2004 (such as Polish migrants in a different time or place or recent migrants from other countries in Norway) must rely on a type of conditional transferability rather than statistical generalization: Patterns, processes and mechanisms described within one field of research may be relevant for understanding similar phenomena within a different setting, but one must take into account the specific local context and conditions.12

12 This type of generalization is sometimes referred to as naturalistic generalization (Stake 2008), transferability (Lincoln and Guba 2008), analytic generalization (Yin 2003) or moderatum-generalization (Williams 2000).
A mixed-methods research design
The overall study was designed as a single case study of Polish migrants in the capital city of Oslo, Norway, based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Two representative surveys of the Polish migrant population in Oslo were collected at two different points in time. The studies were based on Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS), a sampling and estimation technique especially designed to produce unbiased estimates in hidden and hard to reach populations where no sampling frame exists. The first study was conducted in late 2006, just two and a half years after the EU accession and in the beginning stages of the emerging new Polish-Norwegian migration system; the second, three and a half years later, in early 2010 when the transitional restrictions on free movement had been lifted, Polish migrants had established themselves as the largest immigrant group in the country, the recruitment and employment of Polish labour had become an integral part of business strategy in many labour markets, and the international financial crisis had at least dampened the Klondike-ish labour demand in some sectors. In both the 2006 survey and the 2010 survey, more than 500 Polish migrants were interviewed face-to-face by a team of Polish speaking interviewers. Combined, these surveys provided detailed information about more than 1,000 recent Polish migrants: their individual characteristics, migration and employment histories, working conditions in Poland and in Norway, evaluations of their own situation, and aspirations for the future. These surveys were, however, not used primarily for complex statistical analysis of relationships between variables, but to provide a “thick description” of the situation, allowing for comparisons of different groups of Polish migrants along several variables, at two different times.

The interpretations and explanations of differences between subgroups and the changes that have occurred between the two surveys rely upon analyses of qualitative data collected between the two surveys. The primary qualitative data consists of interviews with 40 Polish migrants: 25 men and 15 women. The selection of respondents for the qualitative interviews was based partly on what Gomm et al. (2000) refer to as empirical sampling: Based on the first survey, respondents in the qualitative were selected with the goal of covering the variation within the population in terms of gender, occupational position and legal status. The selection of respondents for qualitative interviews was to some extent also based on principles of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967). For example, after interviewing a number of migrants who had decided to stay in Norway and a number of migrants who were undecided about their future plans, ten return migrants were
Interviewed in Poland. That way the accounts of those who had returned home after working in Norway could be compared with those who intended to stay. In addition to interviews with migrants, employers and managers in eight construction firms were interviewed to explore the changing structure of labour demand in this most important sector of employment for Polish migrants (see in particular article III).

The analyses have also made use of available statistical sources based on official registers. Good-quality administrative data on migration is difficult to obtain within a context of free movement, but two sources have been particularly useful: the most important, the Directorate of immigration’s (UDI) database of residency permits granted under the transitional restrictions, which were in operation from 2004 to 2009 and Statistics Norway’s (SSB) population register which contains information on migrants who register as settled in Norway (those who state that they intend to stay for more than six months); and registry-based employment statistics which also contain information on workers on temporary stay. The first set of data (UDI) was used to analyse patterns of return migration (see article II); the second source of data (SSB) has been used for contextual descriptions and as a basis for empirical validation of survey results.

I should mention that during the work with this thesis, I have been part of a larger research team at Fafo, working on mobility and labour markets in the wake of EU enlargement which has organized monthly seminars, “Fafo Østforum”, and conducted different kinds of commissioned and basic research (see http://www.fafo.no/Oestforum/index.html). In this capacity, I have talked to a substantial number of people, including Polish migrants, experts, trade union activists and leaders, employers and business leaders, over the course of several years, and I collected specific data for commissioned research on several topics related to post-accession labour migration. Although I do not refer to these conversations as interviews nor list all the sources of data that have been collected for other projects, the insights and information gained from them has been useful in framing the analyses in this thesis.

Combining qualitative and quantitative methods in a mixed methods approach is sometimes referred to in terms of “triangulation” (an analogy with navigation) where several fixed references are combined to determine an unknown point. This idea of triangulation, implying a convergence on a single point of “truth”, requires not only a shared epistemological framework in mixing methods but also a research design that coordinates the different methods of addressing the same question.
(Carling 2007). An alternative to the triangulation approach is the idea of combining methods for the sake of multiple alternative perspectives. The basic ontological assumptions of this view is that reality is subjective and multiple, as seen by participants in the study (Creswell 2003). Empirical data are not just “social facts” waiting to be uncovered independent of the way they are produced; instead, different kinds of methods may produce different kinds of “truths” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). I adopt a combination of these two positions. In parts of the analysis, qualitative and quantitative methods will be used separately in the analysis of different sub-questions; in others, they will be combined to add context or to generalize limited aspects of specific cases to larger populations. In some cases, different kinds of data will be used for a kind of triangulation. For example, I use registry based data to validate estimates based on Respondent Driven Sampling, and I use the findings from the first RDS survey to guide the sampling of qualitative respondents. Furthermore, the quantitative data will for the most part be used in a “qualitative” way: to give a thick description of particular cases (for example different aspects of the labour market situation for Polish migrants within particular industries or geographical areas) rather than causal modelling. Choice of methodology should reflect the research problem at hand as well as be used in a way that is logically consistent with key assumptions about social reality and how that reality is “known”. Making knowledge claims about an objective reality is different than making knowledge claims about how individuals interpret reality. The size, distribution and composition of migrant flows and the labour market outcomes in terms of wages, employment contracts and social benefits will rely on available register data and survey data. In exploring how migrants perceive their situation in terms of constraints, hopes, fears and plans for the future, perceptions of job desirability, status hierarchies and strategies of social mobility, the qualitative interviews will play a more important role. But the two types of data will not be analysed in isolation. Although it is common in sociology to distinguish between causation and meaning, we know from the works of Max Weber that social meaning is indeed causal to social action (Byrne 2009). The qualitative data will for example, be used to trace processes and propose casual mechanisms that can explain the patterns observed in the quantitative material.
The Polonia surveys and the use of Respondent Driven Sampling

Recent labour migrants travelling and working under conditions of free movement are not an easy population to target in social science research. Although the Nordic countries have registry-based data of exceptionally good quality compared to most European countries, not all migrants are included in them and they provide only limited information about the migrants. A more in-depth understanding of the specific conditions of migrant workers, including their subjective evaluations of their own situation requires interview data. And while qualitative interviews and case studies may shed light onto important processes and dynamics in specific instances, they leave little scope for inferring general conclusions to a larger population. Quantitative survey data, given a sound method of sampling, can provide both in-depth information and the opportunity to draw more general conclusions. However, no complete sampling frame exists from which to draw a sample of Polish migrants, because only some of them are found in ordinary population registers. Furthermore, they have high levels of mobility; many of them live in unconventional housing and many work long hours making them difficult to reach. Finally, there may be privacy concerns related to legal status or employment relations, making some of them uneasy about participating in ordinary surveys. Ordinary sampling techniques will therefore produce highly biased samples and low response rates and thus data with limited validity. As a response to these challenges, Fafo has employed a sampling technique called Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) to study Polish migrants living in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik. RDS was first developed by Douglas Heckathorn (1997) and later refined by Heckathorn and associates (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004; Heckathorn 2002, 2007; Wejnert and Heckathorn 2008; Volz and Heckathorn 2008; Wejnert 2009) as a method to produce statistically unbiased estimates from samples of hidden and hard to reach populations where no sampling frame exists.

The RDS method consists basically of two elements: A structured way of collecting a broad sample covering the entire variation within the target population using a type of chain referral sampling based on specific procedures, and mathematical estimators which take account of the bias that results from the network-based sampling procedure. Sampling begins with a set of non-randomly selected seeds. These seeds recruit their peers, who in turn recruit their peers, etcetera. Recruits are linked by coupons with unique identifying numbers, and each recruit is given a small quota of coupons enabling recruitment (in our case two). A double system of incentives—
respondents are given (usually monetary) incentives both for participating in the survey (primary incentives) and for each successful new recruit they provide (secondary incentives)—ensures that both selfish monetary interest as well as peer pressure or the desire to help out a friend works to secure high recruitment (for a discussion on the ethical considerations of paying respondents, see Tyldum 2011). As the process moves forward, recruitment chains follow what is known as a first order Markov chain. From this follows that, given a sufficient number of recruitment “waves”, that the final sample will at a certain point reach a state of equilibrium in which new recruits are independent of the original seeds. However, although the sample is independent of its own starting point, it may still be biased, and for several reasons. First of all, people with large personal social networks within the target population will have a greater probability of being included in the sample. Second, people tend to recruit people who are like themselves in some ways. If this tendency for systematic in-group recruitment (called homophily) differs between different subgroups within the population, some groups in the sample might be overrepresented. When collecting the data, researchers therefore measure the personal network size of each respondent (the number of people the respondent knows within the target population) and keep track of who was recruited by whom using the coupon system. This information about network size and transition probabilities (the share of respondents with characteristic A, who recruited respondents with characteristic B and vice versa) is then used to weigh the data using specialized software, called RDS-AT.

RDS has first and foremost been used in research on HIV prevalence among high-risk groups such as injection drug users, men who have sex with men and commercial sex workers (see for example Johnston et al. 2010, Uusküla et al. 2010). RDS is, however, also well suited for studies on migrant populations. Two functional assumptions in RDS methodology are that respondents know one another as members of the target population (relationships are reciprocal) and that respondents are linked by a network composed of a single component (Volz and Heckathorn 2008). RDS surveys often involve problems defining the survey population in a way that the respondents and recruiters themselves understand who we wish to interview. If the incentives used are high enough, there can also sometimes be a problem of false respondents: Respondents falsely claiming to belong to the survey population, in order to claim incentives. Some of these problems are much less prevalent for migrant populations, because migrants can be relatively easily classified and identified as members of a population, for example, through language. Furthermore, migration is a
highly networked phenomenon, and migrants typically rely on a wide network of friends, family members, colleagues and acquaintances to access information and resources in the host country. These dense networks make for smooth and effective recruitment in RDS. Recent Polish migrants are also a relatively homogenous population in terms of class and cultural characteristics, reducing “bottlenecks” between different subpopulations in the recruitment chains, making the sample reach a state of equilibrium faster. Focusing on one particular migrant group also makes it possible to set up a fieldwork organization where all interaction with respondents, including vouchers, information material and the interviews themselves can be conducted in their native language.

The first Polonia survey was conducted as a pilot study in Oslo in 2006 by the Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Research with assistance from the Centre of Migration Research in Warsaw and funding from the Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian Ministry of Labour. The survey gathered data on the working and living conditions of Polish migrants in Oslo, and its results were published in a report the following year (Friberg and Tylldum 2007). In 2010, the study was replicated with funding from EEA Grants and the Norwegian Ministry of Labour. Again, the main results were published in a report the following year (Friberg and Eldring 2011). Each time, more than 500 Polish migrants were interviewed face to face by a team of Polish-speaking interviewers. On average each interview took about 45 minutes to complete. Limiting the data collection to Oslo naturally excludes parts of the migrant population working in important sectors such as agriculture and ship-yards. Nevertheless, by applying RDS in this way, we are able to give a comprehensive picture of the migrant population in Oslo at each point in time, irrespective of the migrants' legal status or registration.

RDS is a relatively new sampling method – especially within migration research – and some observers might ask how reliable results obtained from RDS really are. We may differentiate between three ways of validating data obtained through RDS. First of all, estimates can be validated through computational validation. This means that given a number of functional and analytic assumptions (see box), it can be mathematically calculated that the RDS estimators will provide unbiased population estimates. I will not go into the details of computational validation here, but refer interested readers to Heckathorn (2002), Salganik and Heckathorn (2004), Heckathorn (2007) and Volz and Heckatorn (2008).
Calculation of sample size requirements, design effects and confidence intervals is complicated by the peer-driven nature of RDS sampling. It has been common to take into account a design effect of 2, meaning that an RDS sample would have to be twice as large as an ordinary random sample in order to produce estimates of equal accuracy (Salganik 2006). However, recent developments in RDS computation have enabled more accurate calculation of design effects based on the degree of homophily (tendency for in-group recruitment) within the RDS sample (Wejnert et al. 2012). This means that the design effect in RDS samples is both sample specific and variable specific. Thanks to these innovations it has been possible to calculate design effects and confidence intervals for key variables. For the 2010 Polonia survey, these are presented in table x.

Table III RDS point estimate, 0.05% confidence intervals and design effect for key variables in the 2010 Polonia survey data set.\textsuperscript{13}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RDS point estimate</th>
<th>0.05 % Confidence interval</th>
<th>RDS Design effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not having spouse</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>21-29 %</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed by Polish firm</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>12-18 %</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing work for household clients</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>27-37 %</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction work</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>53-66 %</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>17-27 %</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed at time of survey</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>25-34 %</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While some studies based on simulated data suggested that RDS samples could have very large design effects, and thus highly unstable estimates (Goel & Salganik 2010), the calculations based on the 2010 Polonia survey suggests a relatively small design effect – most lying somewhere between 1 and 2, and thus providing quite reliable estimates. It should be noted that calculations of confidence intervals and design effects have not been carried through throughout the analyses in this thesis, the reason being that the RDS-AT software necessary for producing these estimates is not very user friendly for doing multivariate analyses. In order to effectively analyse the data, a specific set of

\textsuperscript{13} I would like to thank Lisa G. Johnston at University of California, San Francisco, for providing the template for calculating these estimates.
weight were calculated in RDS-AT based on core variables, and then exported as stratified weights
to SPSS. This allowed for easier and more effective analyses of the data, but prevented calculation of
confidence intervals and design effects in the further analyses. The calculations presented in table IV
should therefore be used to assess to reliability of the analyses in the absence of significance testing
on each specific result.

Table IV Functional and analytic assumptions of RDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional assumptions</th>
<th>Analytic assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Respondents know one another as members of the target population.</td>
<td>1) Respondents can accurately report their personal network size within the target population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Respondents are linked by a network composed of a single component.</td>
<td>2) Peer recruitment is a random selection from the recruiter’s network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Sampling occurs with replacement.</td>
<td>3) Each respondent recruits a single peer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Heckathorn 2007

Computational validation and the calculation of confidence intervals and design effects rest upon
certain assumptions about the structure of the target population and the recruitment process itself,
which are referred in table IV. A second approach to validation of RDS data is thus to test
empirically whether these assumptions hold true in real life. We may call this *analytical validation.*
Some of the assumptions obviously do not—such as the assumptions that sampling occurs with
replacement and that each respondent recruits a single peer (in the Polonia surveys they recruited
two)—but this has little bearing on the results. In the 2010 survey, we tried to test the assumption of
peer recruitment as a random selection from the recruiter’s network. First, respondents were asked
how many of the people in their network belonged to different categories of relationships, and then
we asked the respondents about their relationship to the person who recruited them. As Table V
shows, there is a relatively good (although not perfect) fit between the average composition of
respondents networks and the people they were recruited by, indicating that the assumption of
random selection from the recruiter’s network is not too far off the mark in the case of our surveys.
Table V The average composition of respondents’ personal social network and the share of respondents who were recruited through different relationships (N=501)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruited by</th>
<th>Composition of network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleague</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stranger</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, empirical validation is a more direct form of testing whether the results from our population estimates fit the real distribution of the population. One way of doing that is to check for consistency. This is possible in our case because the Polonia study in Oslo was conducted twice. If the methodology gives valid estimates of the population, we should expect to find the same results for phenomena which there is no reason to expect having changed in the period between 2006 and 2010, and if we find diverging results in 2006 and 2010, this should be accounted for by real changes in the population. Table VI illustrates our findings regarding family status and age. We can find no reason to believe that the share of migrants who do not have a spouse would have changed substantially in this period, and as the table shows, we get the same result, 28%, in both surveys. The share having their spouse in Poland or Norway respectively, however, is expected to have changed as a result of settlement and family reunification. And as the table shows, our results reflect such a change. In the case of the respondents’ age, a similar pattern is observed. There is no reason to expect a change in the average age of male workers and neither do we find one (37 years in both surveys). The estimated average age of women, however, has changed from 27 to 34 years. This is consistent with expectations because the females in 2006 largely consisted of young workers without family obligations and in 2010 to a much larger extent consisted of wives and girlfriends who had come to join their men and these women were, not surprisingly, slightly older. Overall, we find no change in the variables that is not expected to have changed in the population, and where we do find substantial changes, these changes are consistent with theoretically hypothesized changes in the population.
Table VI Checking for consistency: Family status and average age for men and women. Polish migrants in Oslo in 2006 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family status</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has no partner</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner living in Poland</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner living in Norway</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>37 years</td>
<td>37 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>27 years</td>
<td>34 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By replicating results in two different samples we get a firm indication that the estimates drawn from RDS samples are relatively consistent. However, this confirms only the consistency of the methodology, not its accuracy (i.e. it may replicate the same errors in a consistent way). Another way of empirically validating the estimates is to compare them to some known quantity. Usually, this is not possible, because RDS is normally applied to study hidden and hard to reach population, where no such known quantities exist. Recent Polish migrants in Norway are, however, only a partially hidden population. On those migrants who register themselves as settled, Statistics Norway can provide reliable data on some variables. In the 2010 study, 69 percent of the sample reported to have changed their residency to Norway. By selecting only this part of our sample and comparing it to numbers obtained from Statistics Norway about Polish migrants settled in Oslo, we could check our estimates against comparable register data.

Table VII Checking for accuracy: Comparison of registry data with unweighted sample proportions and weighted RDS estimates. Polish migrants in Oslo 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population register, Polish settled migrants in Oslo (Statistics Norway)</th>
<th>Survey respondents who filed for residency in Oslo (69%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unweighted sample</td>
<td>RDS weighted estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female share</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than 30</td>
<td>36 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 50</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered unemployment</td>
<td>15.4 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table VII shows, the weighted RDS estimates for the 69 percent of the population who reported to have filed for residency in Oslo are quite close to the official registry data for the same group. On female share, the RDS estimates only “miss” by one percentage point. Regarding age groups younger than 30 and older than 50, our estimates seem to be slightly less accurate, but only miss by a few percentage points. One variable of particular interest was unemployment, because one could believe that unemployed people would be overrepresented using this methodology, simply because the unemployed typically have more time and less money. However, the RDS estimates only miss by 0.6 percentage points—an accuracy that must be regarded as very high taking account of the sample size. Of further importance is that when comparing the unweighted sample to the weighted estimates in how well they match registry data, we find that the weights consistently pull the estimates in the right direction (except for those younger than 30, who are not affected). From this—combined with the computation of design effects and confidence intervals as well as the analytic validation presented above—we may conclude that the RDS methodology works according to its purpose by adjusting for biases in the sample and that the final estimates drawn from the sample provide a reasonably reliable and accurate description of the target population.

**Challenges of doing qualitative interviews with an interpreter**

I do not speak Polish and most Polish migrants in Norway do not speak Norwegian. Few of them are fluent in English either. So the qualitative interviews had to be conducted with the help of a Norwegian speaking interpreter of Polish background. The methodological challenges associated with cross-cultural studies with the use of interpreters have rarely been dealt with in the research literature, and these challenges are devoted little space in the studies where interpreters have been used (Wallin and Alström 2006). The notion that social reality is constructed and communicated through language is a fundamental sociological insight; it seems obvious that using an interpreter raises a number of problems. The interpreter may influence the respondent to respond in line with their own “preferred” answer or what they think is the “right” answer; they may interpret the stories of the respondents based on their own preconceived understanding; the interpreter may translate only the words but not the cultural significance of what is said, so that important information is lost; the interpreter may use the researcher's own categories (with which they quickly become familiar) at the expense of the respondent’s own experience-based concepts which are lost in translation; facial
expressions and body language that normally underpin and add nuance to the words in a normal conversation are difficult to understand in an interpreted conversation; and subtle information such as the sequences of wording, how different statements are positioned in relation to the conversation partner's statements, pauses, speaking platitudes, and ambiguous words and phrases, may become “lost in translation”. How big or manageable these problems are depends on the basic epistemological question of what kind of knowledge is accessible through qualitative interviews in the first place. In his review of the literature on qualitative interviews, Clive Seale (2006) finds two main positions on the kind of data a qualitative interview actually provides:

- **Naturalistic approach—the interview as a resource**: Qualitative data tell us something about reality “out there”. What people talk about in the interview provides insights on lived experience and social reality.

- **Constructionist approach—the interview as an object of research**: Qualitative data are constructed jointly by the researcher and the respondent within the social setting of the interview and says little about outside reality. Interviews provide data on how people talk about certain issues in particular social settings.

The naturalistic approach relies on some form of ontological realism; that is, the notion that social reality is real and exists independent of the researcher’s perception of it. Several different theoretical traditions in sociology can be classified under the label of realism, although with very different perceptions about which properties of society (structures, mechanisms, systems, norms, discourses, etcetera) that are truly “real” (Hacking 1999). But the naturalistic approach to qualitative interviews also requires that one can access unfettered knowledge about this social reality through the accounts provided through qualitative interviews and this is obviously a much bolder claim. At the other end of the spectrum, we find the ethno-methodology tradition of qualitative inquiry, which claims that reality is primarily constructed in specific instances of social interaction. According to this view, what’s important is how the interview is performed by researcher and respondent in community: how people present themselves as good respondents, how the researcher and the respondent respond to each others' positions and jointly construct a common understanding of reality, etc. (Silverman 2005). From this perspective, using an interpreter would offer almost insurmountable problems. Most empirically oriented sociologists will adhere to a position somewhere in between these two: Qualitative interviews may provide us with insights about lived reality “out there”, but
these insights are not constructed independently from the relationships and interactions of the research process.

What has been written about the use of interpreters usually relates to professional interpretation in litigation, immigration administration and interpretation for the hearing impaired. In this literature, a naturalistic approach dominates. The focus is on a correct translation of what is being said, and skills and techniques (such as how the two parties sit in relation to each other) are used to minimize the impact of the interpreters’ presence (Wallin and Ahlstrom 2006). The goal is usually *interpreter neutrality*, which can be understood in two ways: In linguistic terms, it's about the extent to which the interpreter faithfully relates to the content and form of the statements to be translated. On another level, it's about the relationships to other participants that the interpreter engages in during the conversation and the impact the interpreter has on what is being said (Metzger 1999). Metzger describes what she calls "the interpreter's paradox", a situation many interpreters find themselves in. While most interpreters strive for neutrality, studies suggest that this is almost impossible to achieve and that the mere presence of the interpreter has a significant effect on interaction (Tate and Turner 1997, Wadensjö 1998). So, many interpreters question whether they should attempt to minimize their effect on the situation or be free to interact on an equal footing with the other participants in the conversation (Metzger 1999).

A fruitful intermediate position between constructionism and naturalism can find inspiration in a pragmatist approach to social scientific practice. Pragmatism emphasizes social science practices as an integral part of the social production of knowledge in society (Mjøset 2009). Data are constructed socially, not just in the interview situation, but with the help of a linguistic and cultural repertoire that is taken from outside. Neither researcher nor informant is a *tabula rasa*, and both parties bring their external reality to the interview. It is important to be aware of how the interview’s relationships help shape the data. When an interpreter is brought into the interview, the relationship between all three parties must be taken into account in terms of how people position themselves to each other and the expectations that they have for each other. For example, one must be aware of how the informant and interpreter relate to each other's social positions. National divisions such as culture, class and gender differences, regional differences, ethnic differences and age differences may play a role in relation to how the participants position themselves. As a "foreigner", the researcher
might have difficulties spotting these expectations and relationships between the interpreter and informant.

In my case, the interpreter was a young female Polish social science student in Norway, which had several implications for how she—as an interpreter—related to the Polish, mostly male, working class respondents. For example, it became clear quite early that it could be difficult to conduct interviews in cafes, bars or other casual social settings, because some respondents would be more preoccupied with flirting and showing off to the interpreter than engaging with my questions. The class relations in the interview setting also became more pronounced as some respondents displayed signs of a certain wariness of whether my interpreter would look down upon them as being mere workers.

In this situation I found that, instead of striving for interpreter-neutrality, it was advantageous to involve the interpreter in the ongoing analysis through constant debriefing and conversations around what goes on in the interviews, as well as research questions and initial interpretations. This was an advantage of using a social-science trained interpreter, who could actively contribute to the research process. A practical challenge was to actually gain access to what the respondents and the interpreter were talking about in Polish, because time constraints and the social setting only allowed for partial translation. In my case this problem was “solved” by recording all interviews on tape and then having everything transcribed by the interpreter directly into English. Although much may still have been lost in written translation, accessing the full interpretation of the interview talk-sequence provided valuable information on how the interpreter and respondent would reach a common understanding of the concepts I use, and how the cultural aspects of what is said is transmitted and translated.

Ethical challenges of paying informants

The respondents all received a small sum of money for their contribution to the study. In RDS, monetary incentives for participation and recruitment are integral to the method. But also in qualitative interviews I found that a small reward made it easier to access respondents that otherwise had little time or interest in participating in research. There are legitimate ethical concerns regarding this practice. The most important relate to the issue of informed and free consent. When doing research on groups that are in a potentially vulnerable economic situation, monetary incentives may
lure people into giving information that they otherwise would not want to share, for example about things that are illegal, associated with social stigma or emotionally painful to talk about. My informants talked about illegal work and tax evasion, exploitative employers and emotionally painful separation from families, and many of them were in dire straits financially. Did paying them somehow violate the principle of free consent? This is a legitimate concern, but I argue that payment was ethically sound, for two reasons. First of all, size matters. I do not know where to draw the line, but maintain that the amount which my respondents received – comparable to what they would have received if spending the same amount of time working – was ethically justifiable. Second, and more important, was the fact that giving up sensitive information was not a prerequisite for receiving money. A study that targets people who by definition must give up sensitive information in order to qualify as part of the population (e.g. drug addicts, illegal immigrants etc.) would be more problematic. However, being Polish was the only prerequisite for participation in the present study, and thus receiving money. Respondents were given money up front, and told that they were not required to answer any questions. Payment was thus not directly tied to sensitive information.

By paying informants, researchers shape people’s expectations about participating in research, which in turn affects other researchers. Paying informants therefore concerns not just the relationship between researchers and respondents, but also the wider research community. Until recently, payment – though often used – was rarely mentioned in Norwegian research reports. This has recently changed, in part due to its mentioning in the first Polonia-report (Friberg & Tyldum 2007), which was picked up by the Norwegian Sociological Association and used as a basis for debate.14 As a result of this debate, the Norwegian Social Science Data Service held a seminar in 2009 about the practice of paying respondents, where I and several other Fafo researchers participated.15 A general consensus emerged regarding the need for more openness and the development of general guidelines. Such guidelines are now being discussed in several institutions.

14 See Jon Rogstad: Op-Ed Sosiolognytt 4/07, ”Problematiske praksis” Klassekampen 13.02.08, ”Betaling av informanter: Kan gi tvilsomme forskningsresultater” Forskerforum 02/08

15 http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/nsdnytt/09-1/7_betaling_av_informanter.html
5. Summary of articles

This dissertation is based on four articles. The first, a methodological contribution, is a short text, written in collaboration with Cindy Horst as a chapter for a forthcoming book about the use of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) in migration studies. Although the 2006 Polonia survey was among the first times RDS was applied to migrant populations, the chapter reviews experiences from several later studies, including the Polonia surveys. As lead author, I have contributed an estimated 75 to 80 percent of the text. I am the sole author of the other three articles and they have all been published in international peer-reviewed journals. In them, I address the issues of temporal adaptations, work-site inequality and labour-market exclusion, respectively. However, as the analyses in each article clearly show, these issues are closely intertwined.

Article I: RDS research and the structure of migrant populations

With Cindy Horst as a second author. This text has been accepted for publication as a chapter in a forthcoming book edited by Lisa Johnston and Guri Tyldum about the use of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) in migration research.

The piece addresses the appropriateness of RDS as a method for collecting survey data on migrant populations. What kind of problems do migration researchers encounter when using RDS to study migrant populations? What do researchers have to find out about the people they study before starting an RDS survey? How do these issues relate to the structure of social relationships within the target population? The analysis is based on empirical examples drawn from a number of recent RDS studies carried out within migration research. We argue that in many cases, migrant populations are well suited to RDS research because the structure of migrant populations quite often corresponds well to some of the basic assumptions on which RDS is based. However, not every migrant population is suitable for an RDS study. Sometimes, researchers have to redefine their target population for the sampling process to work; sometimes RDS is simply not suitable, given the research problem at hand. Therefore, when doing RDS studies it is of primary importance to know how social relationships within the target population are structured, not just for the sake of asking the right questions—as would be useful in any type of survey—but for the sake of designing and
conducting the sampling process itself. RDS researchers have to go into the field and engage with their data in a completely different way than ordinary survey research usually requires.

**Article II: The stages of migration. From going abroad to settling down: Post-accession Polish migrant workers in Norway**


This article discusses the temporal dynamics of labour migration from Poland to Norway since the 2004 EU enlargement. Based on analyses of register-based data and migrant surveys, I argue that there is a strong potential for a substantial proportion of these migrants to settle down permanently or at least long-term in Norway. Registry data show that about half of the Polish migrants who apply for residency are likely to remain after about four years. The majority of those who do return do so within the first two years. Employment sector has a strong impact on propensity to return: Nine out of ten agricultural workers had returned within four years, but this only applied to four out of ten workers in temporary staffing, construction and manufacturing. Analyses of survey data on Polish migrants in Oslo collected in 2006 and 2010 reveal that although the majority has quite open-ended plans for the future, significant changes in settlement patterns have occurred during this period. In 2006, the majority of Polish migrant workers in Oslo were male, living in workman’s sheds or communal housing with colleagues, commuting back and forth between work in Norway and their families they left behind in Poland. Only a small minority were living with spouses and family members in Oslo. In 2010, the situation was reversed. The female share of the population was significantly higher and the majority lived with their families in Oslo; only a small minority commuted between work and family.

Based on qualitative migration histories of Polish migrants in Norway and return migrants in Poland, the change that has taken place during this period is analyzed. With open borders, migrants’ decisions about settlement and return are shaped by their opportunities within segmented labour markets as well as their embeddedness in transnational families and social networks. Many go through a gradual process of settlement—often contrary to their original intentions. As temporary Polish migrants are primarily recruited to fill a permanent labour demand, migrants are constantly
offered new temporary assignments and rotation systems tend to break down as employers try to avoid the cost of retraining new workers. I argue that the migration process from departure to settlement happens in three stages, from initial temporary work abroad (usually with a set date for return), through open-ended transnational commuting, to permanent settlement. Migrants’ challenges and experiences differ considerably depending on which stage they are in. Although the migrant’s “dual frame of reference” is uncontested during the initial stage, the emotional strain of separation from families as well as frustrations over secondary status in the labour market often starts to take its toll during the transnational commuter stage. Depending on family circumstances, this often forces the decision to return home or bring their families and settle more permanently. Not every migrant goes through all three stages; migrants may return at any point in this process, but their reasons for doing so and the contexts in which they do so differ depending on their stage in the migration process.

Article III: Culture at work: Polish migrants in the ethnic division of labour on Norwegian construction sites


This article explores the relationship between organizational change and restructuring on Norwegian building sites and the cultural constructions of Polish migrants’ suitability for different kinds of work and how this relationship shapes employment opportunities and patterns of job mobility for migrant workers. I argue that following the large-scale labour migration from Poland to the Norwegian construction sector since 2004, new ethnic divisions of labour have been established between the usually native core workforces of construction firms and Polish migrant workers hired through a rapidly expanding market for temporary subcontracting and staffing agencies. Contrary to commonly held assumptions about the “stepping stone” function these flexible and low paid secondary jobs may have for migrant workers, survey data suggest that there is quite limited mobility from peripheral to standard employment. Even after several years working in Norway, only a small minority of workers manage to access permanent jobs within regular construction firms. The establishment and reproduction of this ethnic division of labour between the (usually) native in-house employees and the (usually) Polish externally affiliated temporary workers is analyzed through
qualitative interviews with Norwegian employers and Polish migrant workers. Polish migrants and their particular work culture are perceived by Norwegian employers as well-suited for work in the firms’ temporary external workforces. However, they are considered unfit for permanent positions unless they assimilate to a “Norwegian work culture”. According to Polish migrants (who usually hope to escape the pressure and insecurity of their “Polish job” by landing a “Norwegian job”) identical differences are described as properties related to different structural positions in the workplace. Nevertheless, Polish migrants will often actively conform to the stereotypical vision of “Polish work culture” in order to compete with each other and other groups of migrant workers for temporary assignments. As a result, ethnic segmentation and inequality in the workplace is reified and reproduced through the migrants’ own tactical use of the cultural capital available to them when negotiating conflicting expectations in different job segments.

Article IV: The guest-worker syndrome revisited? Migration and employment among Polish workers in Norway's capital


This article explores the evolvement of the Polish-Norwegian migration system from the 2004 EU accession to the economic downturn in the aftermath of the financial crisis and it discusses whether recent Polish labour migrants in Norway are likely to face long-term integration problems related to labour-market exclusion and marginalization. The analyses of the development over the first six years since accession suggest a conditional yes. On the basis of survey and qualitative data collected among Polish workers in Oslo, I show that (1) substantial numbers of initial temporary migrants have settled, owing to labour market, life-cycle- and family-related dynamics of the migratory process; (2) flexibilization and ethnic segmentation in migrant-labour-intensive industries have prevented migrants from accessing stable employment; and (3) in the aftermath of economic crisis and restructuring, migrant workers with weak ties to the labour market were pushed out of employment and had only partial access to unemployment benefits and other welfare state benefits. Although the international financial crisis only led to a mild and temporary economic setback in Norway, its effects upon immigrant employment may serve as an indication of possible scenarios in
an economic climate less favourable than that of the last decade. The analyses suggest that contrary to commonly held assumptions and despite significant differences, the experiences of the so-called guest-workers of the post-war era may be a relevant historical reference for understanding the fate of today’s free-moving Central and Eastern European workers.
6. Concluding analysis and discussion

In this concluding chapter I account for the main findings and how they relate to the research questions stated in the introduction and discuss some of the contributions to the general literature on East-West mobility and migration in Europe and the specific debate on the significance of labour migration for Norwegian society. I then provide a rough agenda for future research into the longer-term incorporation of Polish migrants in Norway.

The central research questions

This dissertation has been guided by the question: How have Polish migrant workers adapted to and become incorporated into Norwegian society in terms of migration decisions and employment conditions after the EU enlargement in 2004? I have sought to answer this through an exploration of three sub-questions.

In a context of free movement, would Polish labour migrants in Norway settle down or return to Poland, and how do they adapt and make decisions regarding length of stay, settlement and return migration? The analysis in article II shows that although many return, many others go through a gradual process of settlement, often despite their original intentions. This process is conceptualized as three stages of migration. Migrants may choose to return at any point, but their reasons for doing so and the conditions under which they return differ depending on which stage they are in. Their freedom of movement as EU citizens does provide an opportunity to extend the open-ended phase of migration for much longer than in the past. However, there are gradual processes of settlement which are shaped by family life and social networks on the one hand and by opportunity structures in the labour market on the other. I argue that a substantial proportion of the migrant workers most likely will, often despite their original intentions, end up permanently settled in Norway, because they are recruited to satisfy a permanent need for labour (as is the case in most migrant-intensive industries) and because over time, family life and social obligations place considerable constraints on transnational and circular adaptations.

How have Polish migrants become incorporated into the Norwegian labour market, and what opportunities do they have to improve their situation over time? The analyses show that the incorporation of migrant workers is shaped by the specific dynamics within the sectors and segments of the labour markets where they find employment. For example, Polish women who find employment within the new
growing market for informal domestic services, typically find themselves in a precarious situation completely outside the regulated labour market, marked by very low pay, severe underemployment, and arbitrary working conditions in which they depend on a personalized relationship with their employers and remain without access to basic social rights in Norway. However, for some of these women – having a more varied background from Poland in terms of class, education and work experience than the men – this type of employment can be a stepping stone into other more stable and rewarding types of work in Norway, including working in public health care, kindergartens, trade or hospitality. It may be too early to tell how many will move on from informal domestic services to regular employment in other sectors, but the analyses suggest that as long as they are able to learn the Norwegian language there are several opportunities for Polish women, particularly within traditional female occupations in the public sector. Polish men working in the construction industry most often enter the formal part of the Norwegian labour market and are thus usually better off from the start. For the men, however, construction work in temporary staffing agencies, in Polish subcontractor firms or other types of temporary employment, which above all are characterized by precariousness in the form of financial instability and weak autonomy compared to the kind of jobs held by native workers in the same vocations, does not work to the same extent as a stepping stone into regular employment for the vast majority and new forms of more permanent inequality and stratification have arisen between native and migrant workers. The analyses indicate that in addition to the ample scope for low-wage competition provided by the relatively high Norwegian wages, these new forms of inequality have been shaped by a close interrelationship of several factors. The primary ones are the differentiation between different channels of mobility (mobility of labour and services); shortcomings and loopholes in the Norwegian system of labour-market regulation (such as low collective-agreement coverage rates and liberal regulations on temporary staffing) which in the face of cross-border mobility have facilitated the establishment of parallel niche markets partly outside the regular labour market; organizational changes and flexibilization in firms and sectors, giving rise to new hierarchies between in-house employees and a growing class of externally affiliated temporary staff; and finally, cultural constructions of “otherness” and employers’ notions of suitability and worker skills that have laid the ground for categorical and stereotyped employment practices—practices which in turn create barriers towards accessing regular employment for many migrant workers. This final point is elaborated in article III,
which explores the close relationship between structural inequality between migrants and natives on Norwegian construction sites on the one hand, and the social construction of ethnic group characteristics, typically framed as different “cultures of work”, on the other. This article also emphasizes how tactical adaptations among Polish migrant workers contribute to reproducing these stereotypes. It may be that over time, Polish construction workers—at least those who decide to stay—will be able to overcome these barriers and access more stable employment as they learn Norwegian language and cultural codes. However, the analyses do indicate that those working in linguistically segregated work organizations based on Polish work teams and bilingual foremen and translators, which are common within the construction sector, show slower language acquisition than those working in other sectors. This leaves them particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in labour demand within those specific niches of the labour market where language proficiency is not a prerequisite.

Are Polish migrant workers likely to remain employed or risk exclusion from the labour market over time, similar to earlier waves of labour migrants from outside Europe? Only a few years after Polish migrant workers started arriving in significant numbers, it is obviously too early to give any conclusive answer to this, but article IV presents some indications of possible mechanisms of labour-market exclusion. Most important, it shows that atypical and precarious employment increased the risk of unemployment during labour-market uncertainty and lower demand after the international financial crisis. Combined with the gradual process of settlement and access to social rights, the establishment of new precarious and substandard niche immigrant employment segments and the barriers migrants face when trying to access more stable employment, the analyses suggest that future Polish labour migrants may risk facing more traditional “integration problems” related to labour market exclusion, short employment careers and welfare dependency. Most migrants had not yet had time to accumulate unemployment benefit rights in Norway and thus did not see any point in registering with authorities when they lost their jobs, so unemployment figures among migrant workers during this period were even higher than reported. It remains to be seen whether this development is a foreshadowing of more permanent exclusion or just a development towards a periodical socialisation of risks in volatile labour markets.
Contributions to the literature on East-West mobility and migration in Europe

Studying a new and so far largely unexplored phenomenon, with potentially far reaching consequences, this dissertation’s most important contribution to the literature has been to empirically describe and document new patterns of migration, employment and incorporation of Polish migrants in Norway in the wake of the EU enlargement. Furthermore, the use of Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) to collect data on free-moving labour migrants is in many ways a methodological innovation. RDS had until recently been used primarily within epidemiological research on HIV and AIDS risk groups, and in 2006, we were among the first to employ it within migration research\(^\text{16}\). The two consecutive successful surveys among Polish migrants in Oslo have shown that RDS can be a useful tool in migration research in cases where ordinary random sampling may not be a viable method. Article I in this dissertation provides the reasons RDS is well suited for migration research; the methodology chapter in this Foundation provides an empirical validation of the results, showing that the estimates accurately match what can be expected based on administrative data.

Regarding the more general discussions of migration in Europe, I highlight two other contributions: the sociological and general academic discussion about the nature and conditions of migration, mobility and transnationalism between East and West in today’s Europe; and the discussion provided by this dissertation, the more economically oriented discussions on the consequences of migration within Europe for host countries.

Much of the sociological research on post-accession migration, especially migration to the United Kingdom, has focussed on circular patterns of mobility and the transnational practices of migrants, demonstrating how readily the lives of migrants cross international borders in Europe (Burrell 2009, Ryan et al. 2009). Some scholars have emphasized the fluidity and temporariness of transnational East-West migration to the extent that they have argued that labour mobility within the enlarged EU should be conceptualized as something qualitatively different from past labour migrations (Favell 2008a, Engebersen et al. 2010). The findings presented in this thesis do not

\(^{16}\) My colleague Guri Tyldum at Fafo deserves the greatest credit for developing the RDS methodology in the first Polonia survey in 2006.
contradict this empirical description. Indeed, much of the migration from Poland to Norway is temporary in nature and Polish migrants in Norway commonly engage in extensive transnational practices, such as commuting between work in Norway and family life in Poland, sending remittances home, and trying to reap the benefits of Norway’s high wages and Poland’s low costs. Even those who settle more permanently often retain strong links to their home communities using web-based communication and cheap airfares to stay in touch with friends and family. However and perhaps precisely because the high Norwegian costs encourage so many to engage in extensive transnational practices such as commuting between work in Norway and families in Poland, the empirical analysis draws particular attention to the limits and constraints of these kinds of engagements: how the strain of separation from families, the pain of not seeing their children on a regular basis, the conflicting expectations of colleagues, friends employers and family members, and the frustration of living neither here nor there takes its toll on the migrants over time. The analysis highlights how the frustrations and limitations of transnational living are shaped by their temporal perspective on migration (because it's all right for a while, but not indefinitely) and on the other hand, how these limitations contribute to changing their temporal perspectives (because at some point, it forces many to make a decision). So to the larger question of whether free mobility within the enlarged EU with its possibilities for circular and transnational adaptations outside the control of border controls and state immigration policies is qualitatively different than past migration and whether the forces which propelled so many former temporary labour migrants to become settled in the host countries are no longer in operation, my answer is a tentative no. Instead, I argue that the difference from past labour migrations is one of degree, not of kind. Even though state policies and strict border controls no longer compel people to settle within the confines of any single nation state, there are plenty of other forces that do, such as labour-market attachments, the acquisition of social welfare rights, and life-cycle related processes within families and social networks.

As for the more economically oriented discussions on the consequences of migration within Europe for host countries, economists who have studied the impact of post-2004 labour migration usually emphasize the benefits from labour migration in terms of increased productivity and tax revenue. Any negative effects on wages and employment have according to a number of studies been described as being small or negligible (although some studies suggest that certain groups of low-skilled workers, particularly other migrants, may suffer displacement and wage depression to
some extent) (EU-commission 2008, Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009, Barel et al. 2010). It should be noted that these studies are marked by certain methodological problems of measurement: poor data quality, high level of aggregation, and difficulties in accounting for cyclical effects\(^{17}\). A more important shortcoming, however, is their theoretical and at least implicit assumption that the impact of migration occurs instantaneously and affects labour markets uniformly. The more in-depth contextual sociological approach adopted in this thesis shows that the consequences of large-scale labour migration are more likely to unfold through slow, long-term and sequential processes of adjustment which affect different sub-segments of labour markets and society in highly different ways and so are quite difficult to measure on an aggregate level.

There is no doubt that labour migration from Poland has brought substantial economic gains for Norwegian society by providing cheap and flexible labour in a period of high economic growth: increased tax revenues and reduced inflation with little burden on public spending (see for example NOU 2012:2). In a period of economic expansion, migrant workers have complemented, not competed with native workers, who primarily have felt the consequences of labour immigration in lower costs and higher productivity. Nor is there any doubt that large numbers of Poles have had the opportunity to improve their own economic situation and quality of life through work in Norway; this has been a positive experience for the vast majority of them. The fact that so many have decided to stay is an obvious testament to that. In many ways, the migration, employment, and settlement of so many Polish migrant workers in Norway represent an immigration success story. Despite its considerable volume, it has not led to any major conflicts (except legal disputes over wage and working condition regulations)\(^{18}\), and the migrants have received a relatively warm welcome from the native population (at least compared to non-European immigrants). I realize that my analyses could be accused of focussing too much on the problems of labour migration and ignoring the positive. There are likely several difficult-to-measure positive effects of labour

\(^{17}\) In studies that (for example) compare the development in wages and employment in sectors and areas that experience differing levels of migration, there is often a tendency for the developments which causes migration in the first place, such as rising wages and labour shortages in certain sectors, to be confounded with its potential impacts.

migration that I have not dealt with in this thesis, such as the increased collective creativity and productivity arising from intercultural exchange, collaboration and competition, the intrinsic value of increased cultural diversity and the influx of people to many rural areas throughout Norway threatened by depopulation. So far, I have only mentioned the consequences for Norwegian society. Although outside the focus of this dissertation, sending areas in Poland are obviously affected by migration, including positive effects like inflow of remittances, reduced unemployment and rising wages as a result of increasing labour shortages.

Nevertheless, the analyses do suggest that structural changes in the labour market in response to the increased access to cheap and flexible workers have produced effects that in the long run may prove problematic for the Norwegian social model based on equality, redistribution and universal welfare, as well as for the migrants themselves. Most important is a trend towards increasing inequality between native and migrant workers and the establishment of new precarious segments in the labour market. There is no doubt that the existing Norwegian system of labour market regulation based on voluntary collective agreements with relatively low coverage rates—despite comprehensive policy measures and reforms designed to combat social dumping—have been unable to counter this development (for an in-depth evaluation of Norwegian anti-dumping policies, see Eldring et al. 2011). Furthermore, the analysis suggest (although it is far too early to conclude in this matter) that in the long run, the restructuring and flexibilization of the lower rungs of the labour market which has been made possible by this new access to workers from poorer countries may translate into pressure upon the welfare system. So far, labour immigration from Poland has come during a period of sustained high economic growth in Norway. The brief economic uncertainty following the international economic and financial crisis in 2008, which resulted in immediate—and at least temporary—labour market exclusion for a significant share of the Polish migrant workers, provided only a glimpse of what may happen in a more serious economic downturn. According to this analysis, this potential pressure upon the welfare system will not so much be a direct consequence of labour immigration itself but rather a consequence of institutional inability to regulate and uphold standards in the labour market under conditions of free mobility.
Class, welfare and migration in a global economy

For more than 40 years, Norwegian sociologist Ottar Brox has argued against labour immigration from a national class perspective (see for example Brox 1970). Simply put, he argues that structural labour shortages have been a prerequisite for the development of equality and welfare in Norway, and that labour import only works to weaken the bargaining power of the working class. In 2005, he published Labour immigration: rescue or destruction for the welfare state (author’s translation). In this book, as elsewhere, he argues that when employers no longer have to attract native workers to perform low-skilled work but can turn to workers in poor countries whose alternative options are far worse, these jobs turn into “immigrant-jobs”: harsh, insecure and low-paid jobs that natives shun and immigrants try to escape from. If living conditions provided by work in these labour markets sink below the level provided by welfare state benefits, welfare benefit levels must be cut to maintain “incentives to work”. Hence, labour migration may lead to the downfall of the Norwegian welfare state as we know it. When I started working on this thesis, I thought that this line of argument was too simplistic and that his analysis did not account for labour migration also generating increased productivity and demand nor for new forms of labour market regulation (such as generalisation of collective agreements and stricter statutory enforcement of labour laws) mitigating such negative effects. To some extent I still believe this. For example, my own and others’ research has shown that policies regulating working conditions do matter (Alsos and Eldring 2008, Friberg 2010, Eldring et al 2011). Since many of the new labour migrants bring their families and settle down in Norway, their presence also generates a demand for services and labour which counter the “supply-shock” effect of their presence in the labour market. And in some export-oriented sectors, such as the ship-yards industry on the Norwegian west coast, there is no doubt that labour migration has contributed to increased production capacity and competitiveness in a way that has benefited many communities19. Nevertheless, I now have to admit that my empirical findings support Brox’s claims to quite some

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19 Another question, one outside the scope of this dissertation, is what would have happened if Norwegian ship-yards did not have access to cheap Polish and Rumanian workers? Very likely, production would have been moved to Poland and Rumania—a situation which might have been preferable for many of the Polish and Rumanian workers now working in the Norwegian west coast ship-yards and beneficial to the economy of those countries.
degree: In the wake of increasing labour migration, we do find increasing labour-market inequality and precariousness that, in turn, might very well generate pressure on welfare in the future.

In a 2012 paper, Brox suggests that there is a connection between the apparent need to import labour and Norway’s educational policy, which is geared towards providing secondary and higher education to an ever increasing share of the population and towards reduction of inequality through social mobility in the educational system. In my view, this connection is perhaps most clearly illustrated by comparing two different Norwegian policy documents. A recent white paper on educational policy (see St.meld. nr. 44 (2008–2009)) argues strongly for the need to provide Norwegian youth with secondary or higher education, or they will risk becoming redundant in the knowledge-intensive economy which no longer has any need for low-skilled manual labour. At the same time, a white paper on labour immigration (see St.meld. nr. 18 (2007–2008)) insists that in the future, Norway will face labour shortages in low-skilled sectors of the economy and these sectors will have to recruit foreign workers to satisfy labour demand. This obviously sound like a paradox, but in a transnational or global class perspective, it does make sense.

If class locations are defined by the unequal distribution of rights and powers over the means of production or the appropriation of the outcome of production\(^{20}\), Norwegian citizens, including those usually defined as working class, are in today’s global economy all located in the relatively privileged end of the class spectrum. This is not only because of their skills and education (which are important means of production in a knowledge-based economy), but also through the shared ownership of one of the world’s biggest investment funds (the so-called Oil-Fund), through redistributional rights embedded in the welfare state and collective arrangements in the labour market, which all provide Norwegian citizens with considerable rights regarding the appropriation of the outcome of (global) production. Citizens of poorer nations typically find themselves in a less-privileged class position in the global division of labour, irrespective of their position within their own countries.

\(^{20}\)This definition is compatible with both a Marxist and a Weberian concept of class. See Olin Wright (1999, 2009).
Shortages of labour are not simply a matter an insufficient number of people (after all, even China face labour shortages), but an insufficient number of the right kind of people. In the high-end spectrum of the labour market such shortages may be related to specialist skills which very few people possess and which take a long time to develop. In Norway, one may think of American or British Oil drillers in the 1960s and 1970s or Indian IT specialists from the late 1990s and onwards. In the bottom end, labour shortages arise due to shortages of people with a sufficiently disadvantaged class position that they are willing to perform work that does not provide much status or financial rewards. A capitalist economy like Norway’s needs a working class, but as people become more entitled, they also become less attractive in the bottom end of the labour market. This means that policies aimed at eradicating inequality among its citizens through education and upward social mobility generate a need to import a new working class from poorer countries. This apparently makes policy efforts to combat social inequality into somewhat of a Sisyphean task, whereby upwardly mobile working class citizens are instantly replaced by more impoverished foreigners (who in addition to an underprivileged class position also risk facing discrimination and linguistic/cultural barriers). Natives not able to compete in the educational system but too entitled to seek out low-status “immigrant work” may thus become more likely to live off welfare. This is of course also the case for immigrants who are already settled.\(^{21}\) According to Brox’s argument, policy makers eager to reduce inequality would have more luck trying to raise the status and conditions within low-skilled manual work, rather than trying to educate people out of occupations and positions that are obviously necessary for the functioning of society. The question is to what extent this is possible to achieve through regulation and collective action (i.e., tighter statutory regulations in vulnerable sectors of the labour market and recruitment and mobilisation on behalf of labour unions), and to what extent it depends on structural labour shortages (induced by immigration restrictions) (as Brox argues). Resolving this question is, however, beyond the scope of my study.

\(^{21}\) According to analyses from SSB, non-European immigrants have higher levels of family income than Central and Eastern European labour immigrants in Norway (NOU 2011:7).
**Trajectories of long term incorporation: an agenda for future research**

Increasing class differences between natives and immigrants are obviously problematic in a social model based on equality and redistribution. They are, however, less so if they are temporary, meaning that immigrants (or at least their children) have the opportunity to improve their economic situation and assimilate into the existing class structure over time. Although for several decades the concept of *assimilation* had quite a negative ring in the ears of most immigration scholars, it has recently enjoyed a vigorous rehabilitation in the United States. In their seminal book *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (2003), Richard Alba and Victor Nee discarded the old ideological baggage of ethnocentrism and naive images of the melting pot associated with the one-directional, straight-line model of assimilation prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. They by incorporate insights from the new institutionalism in sociology stressing how immigrant incorporation is shaped by both host-society institutions and the social capital within migrant networks and by the ways in which social and ethnic boundaries tend to blur over time or shift entirely thereby redefining not just the minority culture but also mainstream society and the relationship between them. Supported by works by Waldinger (2007), Waldinger and Feliciano (2004) and Kasinitz et al. (2004, 2008), they argue that even though immigrants arrive at the bottom of American society and face discrimination and hardship, the forces which led American immigrants a century ago—or at least their descendants—to slowly be absorbed into the mainstream culture will also propel the descendants of today’s immigrants into upward social mobility in which they enjoy jobs and lifestyles that match those of the native majority, thereby becoming part of and thus remaking the mainstream American culture of the future. This process is partly promoted by the development and diffusion of what Neckerman et al. (1999) call “minority cultures of mobility”: ways in which new minorities collectively learn how to overcome barriers and promote upward mobility within mainstream institutions.

This optimistic view is contrasted by the works of Alejandro Portes and colleagues who developed the concept of *segmented assimilation* (Portes and Zhou 1993, Portes and Rumbaut 2001). They propose that immigrants do indeed assimilate into American society but that they assimilate into different segments of the existing class structure and that today’s polarized labour markets and class cleavages constitute insurmountable hurdles to social mobility for at least some immigrant groups. They argue that although some immigrant groups may move into middle-class status, others
stagnate in the marginal working class and still others face the risk of downward mobility into a permanent “rainbow underclass”; the path depends on the human capital the migrants arrive with, the context of their reception including the level of racism and discrimination they are met with, and the social capital and resources available within their particular ethnic communities. They also argue that for immigrants with low levels of human capital in particular, the road to success lies not in full acculturation into American society but in keeping it at an arm’s length, using the social capital available within their own ethnic communities through a process of “selective acculturation”.

This unresolved debate is primarily concerned with the long-term incorporation of the children of immigrants. Nevertheless, it may still have some theoretical relevance for first-generation immigrants (such as post-2004 Polish labour migrants to Norway) in terms of a typology of different possible trajectories of adaptation and in terms of identifying the causal forces which may push them in different directions. Luthra and Waldinger (2010) use the recent assimilation debate to outline three different long-term outcomes in the labour market. As proposed by the segmented assimilation approach, some might experience lasting inequality relative to the native-born population, through a process of stagnant assimilation (maintaining and reproducing the low status, marginal labour market position of the initial immigrants) or even downward assimilation (unemployment, welfare dependency and/or crime). At the other end of the spectrum is the process of diminishing inequality between those of immigrant background and the native majority through the upward mobility into the economic mainstream proposed by the neo-assimilation approach. Finally they outlines a third possibility, which is suggested by both Portes’ segmented assimilation approach of and Alba and Nee’s neo-assimilation approach: The pluralist alternative, first proposed by Glazer and Moynihan (1963) and extensively developed within the literature on ethnic enclaves (Portes and Bach 1985, Portes and Jensen 1989) and ethnic niches (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2001), suggests that distinctive ethnic social structures and ethnic concentration in the labour market may persist, even as immigrants and their children move forward into better economic positions. Like the neo-assimilation approach, the pluralist alternative forecasts upward social mobility but not through dispersion into an ethnically undifferentiated mainstream. Instead, ethnic minorities may achieve upward mobility into better jobs through continued reliance on ethnic social capital and labour-market concentration in certain niches of the economy.
Although Luthra and Waldinger explicitly applies this typology to Mexican labour migrants and their children in the United States, it may also be relevant for understanding the mobility paths of Polish labour migrants in Norway: They may experience upward mobility—from unstable low paid peripheral jobs in Polish niche markets into better paid, more stable and more diverse sectors and types of employment; they may experience stagnant or downward mobility—by becoming trapped in unstable peripheral employment or by being excluded from employment altogether and pushed into unemployment and/or welfare dependency; or they may opt for the pluralist alternative—economic mobility within Polish niches of the economy, for example through self-employment or entrepreneurship in typically Polish dominated sectors such as construction or domestic services. All three alternatives may be combined with and influenced by different forms of transnational engagements. Tracing the long-term patterns of economic incorporation, social mobility and home country engagements of today’s labour immigrants and comparing them to the patterns found among other groups of immigrants should be an important task for future research.

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22 Preliminary analyses of administrative income data conducted by Bernt Bratsberg and Oddbjørn Raaum, following the initial cohorts of post-2004 Polish labour migrants from 2006 to 2009, do suggest income stagnation for Polish men relative to a comparison group of native born men stratified by age. While the comparison group experienced income growth of 26 %, Polish men only increased their earnings by 18 %, leaving a wage gap of 49% four years after arrival. Polish women on the other hand, although starting from a much lower income level at arrival, experienced a slightly sharper income growth than the native comparison group, leaving a wage gap of 31% four years after arrival. (Bratsberg, Dolvik and Raaum, *Inntektsutvikling for arbeidsinmigranter*. Dagens Næringsliv 19.07.2012),
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The articles
THE ‘GUEST-WORKER SYNDROME’ REVISITED?

Migration and employment among Polish workers in Oslo

Abstract
This paper discusses whether recent Polish labour migrants in Norway are likely to face long-term integration problems related to labour market exclusion and welfare dependency. The analyses of the development over the first six years since European Union accession suggest a conditional yes. On the basis of survey and qualitative data collected among Polish workers in Oslo, I show that (1) substantial numbers of initial temporary migrants have settled down, owing to life-cycle- and family-related dynamics of the migratory process; (2) flexibilisation and ethnic segmentation in migrant-labour-intensive industries have prevented migrants from accessing stable employment; and (3) migrant workers with weak ties to the labour market are particularly at risk of being pushed out of employment in times of economic uncertainty and restructuring. These workers have, however, so far had quite limited access to unemployment benefits and other welfare state benefits. The analyses suggest that, despite some significant differences, the experiences of the so-called guest-workers of the post-war era may be a relevant historical reference for understanding the situation of today’s free-moving Central and Eastern European workers.

Keywords
Labour migration • settlement • segmentation • unemployment • social protection

1 Introduction
Triggered by the Eastward enlargements of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007 and powered by a booming demand for labour in many sectors, Norway has in recent years become a magnet for Central and Eastern European (CEE) labour migrants, and in particular Polish workers, who in some industries could expect to earn up to five times more in Norway than back home. Between May 2004 and November 2011, more than 140,000 Polish migrants were registered by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. If we add workers from the Baltic states and Romania and the unknown but significant numbers of posted and undocumented workers who arrived without being registered, more than 200,000 labour migrants from the new EU member states had entered Norway by 2012. With less than 5,000,000 inhabitants and a workforce of about 2,500,000, this makes Norway one of the top destinations for migrants from the new member states in relative terms. It also makes Polish immigrants the largest immigrant group in Norway, with a ten-fold increase in the settled immigrant population from 7,000 in 2003 to more than 70,000 in 2012. The majority have come to work within construction, manufacturing, agriculture and low-skilled services, with a profound impact on the labour market in these sectors.

Facing an ageing population, labour migration from new EU member states has largely been welcomed as a much-needed contribution to the domestic labour force in Norway. Despite ongoing concern for and comprehensive policy initiatives against “social dumping”, labour migration has largely been considered a win–win phenomenon, whereby employers get access to cheap and flexible labour, the government can expand its economic scope of action without the fear of inflation, while migrants from the new EU member states can supplement their homeland earnings with income from work in the West – income that may be low by destination country standards but highly rewarding in a transnational context (St.meld. nr. 18 (2007–2008), NOU 2012: 2). In a context where immigration from outside Europe has become an increasingly contested issue in Norwegian politics, the relatively warm welcome which the Polish immigration has been met with has been related to at least two factors. First of all, the majority of Polish labour migrants were not expected to settle down. Instead, it has often been argued that temporary and circular migration from new EU member states could satisfy the need for foreign labour without the problems traditionally associated with integration. This view is also reflected in the European academic literature on post accession East–West migration. Much of this...
literature highlights the very different institutional and legal contexts of migration within the European area compared to migration from outside the EU, and have resulted in a series of new concepts which aim to conceptualise these new fluid and transient patterns of mobility. These include “income-seeking travel” (Morawska 2001), “fluid” or “incomplete” migration (Jaźwińska & Okólski 2001), “lasting temporariness” (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2005), “regional free movers” (Favell 2008) and “liquid migration” (Engbersen et al. 2010). Second, empirical studies from Norway and elsewhere suggest that these new migrants so far have not experienced any of the traditional economic integration problems often associated with non-European immigration. CEE migrants generally display high rates of employment and make low demands on welfare state benefits. Several Norwegian studies show that labour migration has contributed to increased numerical flexibility and reduced labour costs in a period marked by severe labour shortages in several sectors (Delvik et al. 2006; Andersen et al. 2009), and to reducing “bottlenecks” in regional labour demand (Reed et al. 2011). Similarly, European economic research on the consequences of post-enlargement migration has generally concluded that it has had a positive impact on receiving economies, with “little, if any, impact on wages and employment and no negative impact on welfare systems” (Kahanec & Zimmermann 2010: 30). The fear of “welfare tourism” – a main argument in most western European countries for applying transitional restrictions in the first years after enlargement – has generally been found to be groundless; CEE migrants have come for work, not benefits (ibid.; see also European Commission 2008; Kahanec & Zimmermann 2009, 2010). CEE migrants’ perceived ethnic and cultural proximity to native Norwegians compared to non-Europeans should also not be underestimated as an explanation for their relative positive reception.

There are, however, at least four good reasons to look beyond these immediate outcomes and try to explore processes that are at work today which may point towards possible different outcomes in the future. First of all, it could be argued that the significance of institutional differences between European free movement and state regulated immigration from outside the EU are somewhat exaggerated, and that state policies are not the only – or even the most important – factors shaping the adaptation and incorporation of migrants. Equally important are the structural processes in the labour market and economy that shape employment patterns and material relations and the social processes that shape settlement and community formation in migrant groups. Second, recent developments reflected in official statistics (such as rapidly increasing numbers of workers who register themselves as “settled” in Norway rather than on “temporary stay” and the changing gender composition of the migrant population) as well as a number of empirical studies in Norway and elsewhere have questioned the initial assumption that CEE labour migrants are only temporary migrants and not likely to settle down for the longer term (Grabowska-Lusińska & Okólski 2006; Friberg & Eldring 2011; Friberg, 2012a). Third, much existing economic research about the impact of CEE labour migration is methodologically flawed by an implicit assumption that this impact occurs instantaneously and affects labour markets uniformly, while, in reality, it is more likely to unfold through slow, long-term and sequential processes of adjustment that affect different sub-segments of labour markets and society in highly different ways (Arnholtz & Hansen 2011). Fourth, while the immediate post accession years were characterised by an economic boom, the recent financial and economic crisis has – even though Norway was among the least affected countries in Europe – provided a glimpse of how the migratory dynamic may play out under less favourable economic conditions.

As a historical reference and basis for developing an analytical framework for understanding today’s labour migrants I will use the experiences of the so-called post-war guest-workers. Before turning to the empirical investigation of Polish migrants in Oslo, I will present a brief historical account of this earlier wave of labour migration to Western Europe in general and to Norway in particular. In post-1945 Europe, temporary labour recruitment systems – the German Gastarbeiter programme (1955–73) being the most famous – played a major role in labour market policies in a period of sustained industrial growth and persistent need for labour. The idea behind these programmes was to import labour but not people: workers from less-developed countries were recruited for limited periods, their rights in the host countries were restricted and family reunion and settlement were minimised. Migrants were expected to accept relatively poor wages and conditions, to make little demand on social infrastructure, to avoid getting involved in labour struggles and to return home after definite periods of work. By the 1980s, however, the guest-worker programmes had largely been abandoned. Stephen Castles (1986) describes the failure of the programmes: The increased labour market segmentation in the wake of migration led to a constant need for migrant labour in certain industries. As temporary workers were recruited to meet a permanent labour demand, the rotation system inevitably broke down. The social and life-cycle-related dynamics of the migratory process gradually led to settlement and community formation as single workers grew older and established families and households. Over time, migrant workers were integrated into welfare systems, and liberal democratic states found themselves incapable of expelling large numbers of workers. It soon became clear that official policies of differential exclusion, the immigrant workers’ subordinate position in the lower segments of the labour market and barriers to occupational mobility and improvement gave rise to social marginalisation rather than return migration. As the 1973 oil crisis marked the end of Europe’s long industrial boom, followed by economic restructuring and decimation of jobs in traditional industrial employment, many labour migrants were excluded from the labour market and formed disadvantaged minorities, often with high levels of welfare dependency.

Castles describes the explicit guest-worker policies that many European countries adopted in the post-war era but similar patterns have been found in Norway, where such policies were not applied. From the late 1960s, Norway received substantial numbers of spontaneous labour migrants from Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco, who initially came for temporary work and who were predominantly hired as low-skilled manual labourers in industrial manufacturing. Contrary to policy-makers’ expectations and the original intentions of the workers themselves, most of them settled down and brought their families after the 1975 immigration stop (Brochmann & Kjelldstad 2008). Studying the life-cycle employment profiles of these labour migrants, Bratsberg, Raanum and Reed (2010) showed that, during the first years after arrival, almost all the migrants worked and their employment rate even exceeded that of natives. Yet, about ten years after their arrival, immigrant employment showed a sharp and steady decline. By 2000, the employment rate of the studied immigrant cohort was down to 50 per cent, as opposed to 87 per cent in the native comparison group. According to the authors, the decline was explained partly by the migrants’ over-representation in jobs associated with short employment careers (the three Ds – dirty, difficult and dangerous), partly by their particular vulnerability to economic restructuring, with high probability of exit from employment during downturns, and partly by disincentives embedded in the social security system that contribute to poor life-cycle
employment performance, especially among immigrants with many dependent family members (Bratsberg et al. 2010). Although they apply very different methodologies and theoretical perspectives, the general process described both by Castles and by Bratsberg et al. includes the following three interconnected elements: (1) the recruitment and subordinate incorporation of "temporary" labour migrants; (2) settlement and community formation as a result of the social dynamic of the migratory process; and (3) vulnerability to unemployment and welfare dependency after periods of economic crisis and restructuring.2

In the following, I will refer to the combination of these three processes as the "guest-worker syndrome".4 With a view to assessing this syndrome’s relevance for understanding possible outcomes of the Polish–Norwegian migratory system, each of the following three elements will be put under scrutiny:

1) whether Polish migrants are likely to settle down like the post-war guest-workers or whether their migration patterns are more likely to be temporary and transient;
2) whether today’s Polish labour migrants are subject to any form of subordinate incorporation in the labour market similar to that of their post-war counterparts;
3) whether Polish migrants are vulnerable to labour market exclusion in times of crisis and restructuring.

2 Data and methods

The analyses are based on a comparison of two surveys collected among Polish migrants in Oslo in 2006 and 2010, as well as qualitative interviews with Polish migrants in Oslo and return migrants in Poland. Transnational free-moving labour migrants are an elusive population for quantitative survey research. Some may only stay for short periods of time, some may not live in registered housing and many are not registered as residents because they are only planning to stay temporarily or not even in the tax registers if they are working in the informal economy. Ordinary random sampling based on public registers will therefore produce biased samples and low response rates. This is why, in the autumn and winter of 2006, Fao, in collaboration with researchers from the Centre for Migration Research in Warsaw, conducted a pilot study using respondent-driven sampling (RDS) to study Polish migrant workers. RDS was first developed by Douglas Heckathorn (1997) and later refined by Heckathorn and associates (Salganik & Heckathorn 2004; Heckathorn 2007; Weinert & Heckathorn 2008; Volz & Heckathorn 2008) in order to study hidden and hard-to-reach populations by combining elements of “snowball sampling” (getting individuals to recruit people they know who, in turn, recruit individuals they know and so on) with economic incentives for participation and recruiting.5

It also uses statistical software to produce estimates that adjust for network effects in the sampling procedure, such as the recruitment patterns of people with different characteristics and the network size of each respondent. The method has been shown to produce statistically unbiased estimates for populations where no sampling frame exists (ibid.). The 2006 survey proved successful and was repeated in early 2010, following the same procedures and using a slightly improved questionnaire. Both samples consist of Polish migrants staying in the Oslo area, and each time more than 500 people were interviewed. In both surveys, interviews were conducted face to face by a team of Polish-speaking interviewers. Respondents were asked a wide range of questions about their situation in Poland before emigration, their migration histories, their labour market situation and social integration in Norway. The following analysis will describe developments and changes in patterns of labour market positions, settlement and unemployment by comparing the results from the two surveys. The analysis will also draw on forty qualitative interviews with Polish migrants that were collected in 2008 and 2009 and on a set of eight case studies in firms employing Polish migrants. The qualitative material will be used for processes tracing and explaining the observed patterns in the quantitative material.

3 Are Polish migrants likely to settle down in Norway?

>When I first came to Norway, I just thought that it would be nice to work, make some money and go back to Poland after a while. I wasn’t sure how long I would stay, but month by month, year by year, I have lived here – for 2 years now. […] Lately I’ve started thinking that I just might stay. (Polish construction worker, 32, interviewed in Oslo in 2009.)

Regulated by principles of free movement of labour and services and assisted by cheap airline flights and Internet-based communications, CEE migrants are indeed free to take up employment in any destination in the EEA without severing their ties to their homelands or communities and can go back home without fear of losing residence rights. This enables them to exploit the benefits of relatively high wages in destination countries and low living costs at home, allowing them to lead significant parts of their lives both at home and abroad, in a way that was hardly possible for post-war guest-workers who faced completely different obstacles to their transnational engagements in terms of geographical distance, political borders and expensive and slow means of communication. Such circular or transnational mobility is particularly rewarding given the exceptionally high cost level in Norway compared to Poland. As we shall see, however, dynamics related to life-cycle-, family- and social-network-driven processes of settlement and community formation may still provide a powerful dynamic in favour of more enduring settlement. The comparison of survey results from 2006 and 2010 presented in table 1 gives us a glimpse of this dynamic in this early stage of the migratory experience. When the first survey was conducted, in 2006, the proportion of Polish migrants in Oslo was indeed highly transient and unsettled and consisted largely of recently arrived male workers who had left their families back home to work temporarily abroad, commuting back and forth between work in Norway and their families in Poland. Many of them had quite open-ended plans for the future but most of them expected to return to Poland at some point.

When the survey was replicated only three and a half years later, the Polish community in the Norwegian capital had undergone significant changes. The proportion of women in the population had increased from 26 per cent to 36 per cent, as a result of family migration. While almost all men reported that they had migrated for economic reasons, roughly half the women reported that they had come in order to join their spouses. In 2006, most respondents reported that their spouses were living in Poland. In 2010, the situation was reversed: most of the non-single respondents now reported that their spouses were living in Norway. Similarly, the situation had changed dramatically in terms of housing and living arrangements. In 2006, the majority reported that they lived with colleagues and friends in temporary shared housing. In 2010, the majority were residing together with
their families. These results show that in less than four years there had been a considerable shift in the Polish migrant community in Oslo: from consisting of a transient and unsettled population mostly made up of male workers to a far more settled immigrant community consisting of men, women and families.

What had happened in the period between the two surveys? First of all, permanent and long-term migrants tend to accumulate in the immigrant populations of the destination countries, while temporary, short-term migrants do not. This inevitably leads to changes in the total composition even if migration patterns or intentions do not. But changes in the migrant population are also related to changes in the situation of individual migrants and families. According to the qualitative study, migrants usually perceive going to work abroad as a strategy for building better lives for themselves and their families in Poland, and at the time of arrival, few migrants have any intention of settling down in Norway. Nevertheless, many end up overstaying their initial return dates and gradually become more settled. Two main reasons can be identified: first of all, Norwegian employers in construction, industrial manufacturing, cleaning, etc. are generally recruiting temporary workers to meet a permanent labour demand. As employers try to avoid the cost of retraining new employees and as workers are constantly offered new temporary assignments, the circular pattern of migration tends to break down. Second, as migrants often miscalculate the cost of living abroad and thereby the time needed to reach their target earnings, families back home often become dependent on income remittances. As initial plans of swift return dwindle, many migrants suffer under the strain of living neither here nor there – separated from their families and friends in Poland and marginalised in Norwegian labour markets and communities. Without the prospect of immediate reunion, their living apart from their families becomes increasingly frustrating and puts transnational relationships under considerable stress. While some migrants eventually return to Poland in order to reunite their families, many opt for reuniting with their families in Norway, especially if their wives can find work in Norway. As more Polish women gain a foothold in parts of the Norwegian labour market, jobs become increasingly accessible to other Polish women through informal networks of relatives, friends and acquaintances. As increasing numbers of settled families are able to provide increasingly varied social, practical and emotional support to other families, reducing the risk and increasing the reward for others contemplating this option, settlement and community formation takes on the character of a cumulative self-perpetuating process.

4 Are Polish migrants subject to subordinate incorporation in the labour market?

You have a staff of people who know the machines, the technical stuff, etc. That’s the ‘core’ […] Those are the real assets of the firm and you need a group of people you really can trust. On top of that, you hire people from the temp agencies and subcontractors to be helpers, to do the manual labour or to do specific tasks. That’s the outer circle, that’s where you find the Poles. (Manager, medium-sized construction firm in Oslo.)

Unlike classical guest-workers, Polish workers in Norway are not subject to any differential legal treatment. Their access to the Norwegian labour market is regulated by free movement of labour within the EU/EEA internal market that guarantees equal treatment and access. Once the transitional period allowing member states to postpone free movement ran out in May 2009, individual member states could not apply any form of discriminatory policy or restriction on the social and settlement rights of CEE workers. As CEE workers are not racially distinguishable from the native populations, they are supposedly less likely to face labour market discrimination and prejudice than non-European migrants are, at least in the long run. Nevertheless, Polish migrants tend to find themselves in a very different position in the labour market than most native workers. First of all, the labour market for Polish migrants is confined to relatively low-skilled work in a few sectors and highly segregated by gender. In Oslo, nine out of ten Polish men are employed in the construction industry, while more than two-thirds of the women work as cleaners (although, as we shall see, women have recently to some extent accessed more varied occupations). The small residual category “other sectors” consists primarily of men who work in transport, storage and industrial manufacturing and of women who work in health care, child-care and hotels. Second, most Polish migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family status</th>
<th>2006 (n = 510)</th>
<th>2010 (n = 501)</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not have spouses</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses living in Poland</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses living in Norway</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing arrangements in Norway</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living alone</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with friends/colleagues/others</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with spouses/family members</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>+32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are not offered what is usually considered to be regular employment. The regulated Norwegian labour market is characterised by a strict separation between standard and atypical forms of employment, and permanent employment within firms is considered to be the norm (Nesheim 2002). Both surveys indicate that those Polish migrant workers who are permanently employed on legal terms by Norwegian firms tend to enjoy working conditions quite similar to those of their native colleagues (although they rarely get paid in keeping with skills and experience obtained in Poland). However, very few Polish migrants manage to access this kind of employment. When the first survey was conducted in 2006, only 15 per cent of the Polish construction workers, 3 per cent of the cleaners and 20 per cent of those employed in other industries were permanently employed on legal terms by Norwegian companies.

In construction, 85 per cent had some sort of temporary and atypical employment arrangement, and belonged to what we may call the peripheral “outer circle” of the work-force in the sense that they were not permanently employed in the companies for which they worked. Some had temporary contracts, many were hired through temporary staffing agencies, some were posted workers hired through transnational Polish subcontracting firms and a few were self-employed casual labourers. Those who were employed on legal terms – meaning that they had written contracts and paid tax from their income – were usually paid according to legally mandatory minimum wages (which are about two-thirds of the industry average) set through the extension of national collective agreements. In addition to being relatively low paid, these kinds of labour intensive temporary and casual jobs, which are generally shunned by natives, provide very little financial and job security, since employers do not have any financial obligation to the workers between temporary assignments and the workers can be laid off at short notice. Many, however, had what we may call informal employment – meaning that they did not have written contracts and did not pay tax from their income. In addition to the lack of employment protection, these workers are usually paid below-minimum wages and they typically work under exploitative conditions. Typically employed by small Norwegian or Polish firms or operating as self-employed casual labourers and usually found in the market for private renovation and building services or at the bottom of long chains of subcontractors on construction sites, these workers do not have access to any social rights in Norway. Of the cleaners, most of whom were female, the majority were in fact employed in the informal economy. These were usually found within the domestic services market that expanded rapidly after the EU-enlargement. In addition to low wages and the banning of access to social protection, severe under-employment was also common among cleaners, with fierce competition for assignments. Among those employed outside these primary Polish immigrant niches (“other sectors”), the pattern of employment was quite similar to that of those in the construction industry (although one must make allowances for a very small n).

When the second survey was conducted, in 2010, there were several reasons to expect that many migrants would have found their way into more stable forms of employment, with better working conditions and more protection against fluctuations in demand. With more time to adapt and to acquire basic language skills, they might have become less dependent on middlemen and go-betweens and many might have obtained work experience in Norway and gone through the initial trial periods often required prior to the landing of regular employment. Employers could be expected to have grown more accustomed to Polish workers, and extensive policy initiatives had been launched in order to combat exploitative working conditions and promote decent work, narrowing the scope for low-wage competition (Alsos & Eldring 2008).

To some extent, the results could confirm this hypothesis. Among the relatively few but increasing numbers of Polish workers employed outside the two main “Polish” niche sectors of construction and cleaning, roughly half were permanently employed by Norwegian firms in 2010, in comparison to only 20 per cent in 2006. Furthermore, illegal employment was substantially reduced in this group. Among cleaners, illegal work was still common but quite a few had moved from informal domestic services to work in regular cleaning firms operating on the formal market. In other words, there were indications of a certain trend towards formalisation of employment relations among cleaners and towards standardisation of employment among those outside cleaning and construction. However, in the construction industry – by far the largest employer of Polish migrants in Norway – very little had changed. Less than one in five were permanently employed in Norwegian firms, illegal work was just as common as in 2006 and atypical and temporary employment of different kinds (mainly work commissioned by temporary staffing agencies and Polish transnational subcontractors) was still the most common form of employment. Looking at the relationship between length of stay in Norway and jobs position, confirms a pattern of little or no upward mobility even for those settling down for longer periods of time. Among those who had worked in Norway for more than four years (n = 131), only 22 per cent reported having permanent legal jobs in Norwegian firms. Furthermore, and despite substantial policy efforts to combat social dumping, indicators of exploitative working conditions seemed to be just as prevalent in 2010 as they are.

Table 2. Sectors and terms of employment in 2006 and 2010 compared. Per cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms of employment:</th>
<th>Construction work</th>
<th>Cleaning</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006 (n = 289)</td>
<td>2010 (n = 292)</td>
<td>2006 (n = 108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent legal jobs in Norwegian companies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary and atypical legal employment</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(posted subcontractors, agency work, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal employment (have no written contract and do not pay tax)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

had been in 2006. Ninety-five per cent of the Polish construction workers in Oslo had hourly wages below the industry average and one in five workers earned less than the legal minimum wage for unskilled workers without prior experience (despite the fact that most of them had relevant skills and work experience). One-third of the construction workers reported that they had experienced not getting paid for their work and two-thirds had worked overtime without receiving overtime payment. One-third of construction workers and two-thirds of cleaners expected to get no paid leave if they became sick, one-third of workers in all sectors expected to lose their jobs or face serious problems if they talked to labour inspectors, and one-fifth of workers expected to lose their jobs or face serious problems if they became sick. The results regarding these indicators of precarious and exploitative working conditions were largely the same in 2010 as they were in 2006.

So how do we explain these different patterns of mobility and in particular the apparent lack of mobility and improvement in the construction sector? The survey material gives some indications. For example, contrary to most cleaners and workers in other sectors, most Polish construction workers reported that they only worked alongside other Poles and that at work they spoke only Polish, a testament to work organisations in the construction industry strictly separated along lines of language and nationality. This is probably the reason why construction workers report to have significantly lower language skills than other workers, even when controlling for length of stay. The qualitative study among employers and migrants within the construction industry confirm a trend towards stricter separation of the work-force into clearly distinguishable segments based on nationality. Employers typically stated that Polish workers were the best suited to the kinds of jobs found in the firms’ temporary external work-forces, while Norwegian workers were the best suited to jobs within the firms. Notions of the two groups’ having different and incompatible “work cultures” were commonly used by employers as a reason not to offer Poles permanent jobs. Polish migrants, on the other hand, insisted that they met with completely different expectations at work than their native co-workers, and even though most of them hoped to access what they referred to as regular “Norwegian jobs” they feared sanctions and termination of employment if they did not conform to the “Polish” style of work, which included working hard at low rates (Fritberg, 2012b). The combination of qualitative and quantitative evidence clearly indicates that the large-scale recruitment of Polish labour in the construction industry – combined with structural changes in employment relations, including extensive use of temporary staffing and other forms of atypical and informal employment – has led to a clear-cut ethnic division of labour, with different expectations and different conditions for native and migrant workers. Recruitment practices appear to be informed by stereotypical notions about the suitability of different groups for different kinds of work. This amounts to a major hurdle for occupational mobility, which appear to be much easier for Polish workers employed in industries where the use of migrant labour is less institutionalised.

5 Are Polish migrants vulnerable to labour market exclusion in times of crisis and restructuring?

After I was laid off, our company continued to bring in new people from Poland. It’s not logical. People are sitting at home, getting paid by NAV [Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration] and the company do what they please. I guess it’s more cost effective though, because the new people work for lower rates. […] Maybe this is how they can make it through the crisis. (Unemployed Polish construction worker, interviewed in 2009.)

Migrant-labour-intensive sectors all over Europe were severely affected by the financial and economic crisis that struck in 2008. Although Norway was among the European countries least affected, some sectors, such as construction and industrial manufacturing, which had been expanding rapidly in the boom leading up to the crisis and were highly sensitive to changes in credit markets and international demand, failed to escape its consequences (NOU 2011: 1). According to a nationwide survey conducted in 2009 among employers in these industries, the most common way to meet reduced labour demand was to cut the use of hired labour from temporary staffing agencies and subcontractors while protecting the firms’ regular employees (Andersen et al. 2009). These particular segments of the labour market in these industries were exactly where the majority of the Polish migrants worked. Usually not permanently employed, they could easily be laid off or simply run out of assignments as the market for labour-intensive subcontracting collapsed.

The timing of the crisis was important in terms of migrants’ eligibility for unemployment benefits. First of all, the transitional regulations had restricted the migrants’ access to social benefits during their first year of residence. When the regulations were revoked, in May 2009, Polish migrants were equally eligible to claim unemployment benefit if they lost their jobs, and four and a half years after enlargement, many of them had stayed long enough to earn benefits. Until 2008, the unemployment level of settled Polish immigrants – just like that of the general population – was less than 2 per cent. In the wake of the crisis, registered unemployment in the general population did not change very much, but among settled Polish immigrants it soared. In Oslo, 15.4 per cent of the settled Polish labour migrants were unemployed at the time of the survey. Survey results, however, indicated that the real unemployment was much higher than the registered unemployment. Many who had lost their jobs were still not eligible to receive unemployment benefits – either because they had not earned enough or because they had worked in the informal economy. These workers had little incentive to register. While the proportion of respondents who reported that they received unemployment benefit concurred with official unemployment figures, the proportion of Polish migrant workers who reported that they were without paid employment at the time of the survey was about 30 per cent, twice as high as official numbers and a ten-fold increase since 2006.

Unemployment affected different parts of the migrant population in different ways. Not surprisingly, construction workers were more severely affected than those working in other sectors. Long-term stayers and the more recent arrivals were almost equally at risk of losing their jobs but those who had lived in Norway for more than two years had significantly better chances of accessing unemployment benefits. Most importantly, the results showed that compared to those with regular employment, atypical and casual employment substantially increases the risk of labour market exclusion. At the same time, atypical and casual employment reduces access to social protection in the form of unemployment benefits. Those in standard employment appear to be less at risk of becoming unemployed but have greater chances of gaining access to benefit if they do. The results show that flexibilisation and casualisation of labour relations not only affect working conditions but also influence the distribution of risk related to labour market exclusion and access to social protection.
Furthermore, the survey showed that unemployment does not necessarily lead to return migration. In general, those who had lost their jobs in Norway reported that they would rather stay and look for work than return to Poland or move to other countries where the crisis was much deeper. Qualitative evidence indicates that many workers alternate between working in for example temporary staffing agencies and periodically claiming unemployment benefits between assignments. Unemployed migrants were generally no less inclined to think that they would stay in Norway than those who were employed. The survey provides little information about how those unemployed migrant workers who do not receive benefits support themselves in Norway. However, qualitative data suggests that survival strategies include spending savings and getting support from family and friends, help from charities and the occasional odd job.

The crisis led to a short dip in in-migration, but by 2010 the number of new entries from Poland was even higher than before the crisis. High levels of in-migration from Poland combined with persistent levels of unemployment among resident Polish migrants may suggest that employers prefer fresh recruits straight from Poland over unemployed settled workers. This is supported by some of the qualitative interviews with migrants (as illustrated by the quotation above). Interviews with employers suggest that some perceive recent migrants as being less “spoiled”, and being willing to work harder for less, compared to those who have settled down with their families and have access to social rights in Norway. Downsizing and lay-offs in the wake of the crisis may thus have provided opportunities to renew the work-force with fresh and cheaper workers as the labour demand recovered.

6 Discussion

Labour migration from the new EU member states has brought substantial economic gains not just for the migrants but also for Norwegian society, by providing much-needed labour in a period of high economic growth, while placing only modest burdens on public spending. In the introduction to this paper, I nonetheless asked whether Polish labour migrants in Norway in the longer run might face traditional integration problems related to labour market exclusion and welfare dependency, and whether the experiences of the so-called guest-workers of the post-war era could be relevant for understanding the fate of today’s free-moving CEE workers. These experiences were summed up in three interrelated processes referred to as the “guest-worker syndrome”, consisting of: (1) the recruitment and subordinate incorporation of “temporary” labour migrants; (2) settlement and community formation as a result of the social dynamic of the migratory process; and (3) vulnerability to unemployment and welfare dependency after periods of economic crisis and restructuring. The presented analysis suggests a conditional yes to this question. Despite obvious institutional differences, there are several features of today’s Polish-Norwegian migration system which parallel those of historical guest-worker migrations. Although Polish migrants do display extensive patterns of circular and transnational migration, the two surveys document a trend towards more long-term settlement. It remains too see how many will eventually stay for good, but at this point it is reasonable to assume that a significant part of the migrant population will do so. Just as in the case of the post-war guest-workers, this process is driven by labour market-, life-cycle, family- and network-related processes within the migration system. At the same time, extensive restructuring of immigrant-intensive labour markets has led to the establishment of peripheral immigrant niches in the labour market, where, unlike in the otherwise highly regulated Norwegian labour market, atypical or informal employment is the norm. The analyses suggest that such employment has not been a stepping-stone into the regular labour market but instead represents a more enduring form of ethnic segmentation. As most Polish workers are confined to temporary, atypical, and precarious employment, they are disproportionately vulnerable to fluctuations in labour demand, with high risk of unemployment in times of crisis and restructuring. So far Polish migrants have only had limited access to social protection, but this may change with increasing length of stay. However, the historical guest-workers were largely employed in the kind of traditional manufacturing that was gradually outsourced to low-cost countries in the wake of economic restructuring. Today’s labour migrants on the other hand are mostly drawn to construction,

## Table 3. Employment status and access to unemployment benefit among Polish workers in Oslo, 2010. Job seekers who never had a job in Norway are excluded from the analysis. Per cent, n = 410

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed, without benefit</th>
<th>Unemployed, with benefit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sectors (incl. cleaning)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than two years</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than two years</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of employment in current/last job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent legal employment</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atypical or casual employment</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

along-term decimation of the kind of jobs that labour migrants perform, similar to what happened in the 1970s, therefore seems unlikely. But the precarious nature of employment in migrant-labour-intensive segments of the labour market is a new and distinct phenomenon, and the establishment of such new precarious job segments within the context of a generous universal welfare state – exemplified by the rapid growth in temporary staffing and the rise of an informal labour market in the shadow economy – may have some problematic side-effects in the long run. The present study can only give a rough indication of some possible outcomes. For one, it is reasonable to assume that hard physical labour, low wages, limited employment protection, fluctuating demand and few prospects of occupational mobility, combined with generous state benefits, may, in the long run, among some of the new migrant workers, lead to relatively short employment careers and possible welfare dependency. Alternatively, deteriorating labour standards may translate into downward pressure on welfare benefits as governments attempt to maintain incentives to work. Similar concerns about the long-term employment prospects of labour migrants and the viability of a generous universal welfare state in the face of increasing labour migration and low wage competition have recently been raised in the 2011 Norwegian government report on welfare and immigration (NOU 2011: 7). A related concern is that the interplay between generous state benefits and restructuring of manpower strategies in the lower rungs of migrant-intensive industries may generate a dynamic where employers gain access to a permanent fluid reservoir of temporary workers accepting precarious and short-term employment, while the welfare state meets the cost of its availability and reproduction in periods of low demand. Such a development would imply that the risks generated by labour market flexibilisation and increasing precariousness in the labour market, may quickly translate into public costs.

So far, however, the same weak integration into the labour market that puts Polish labour migrants disproportionately at risk of becoming unemployed in the first place also prevents many of them from accessing social protection in the form of public benefits. This suggests that within these new, flexible, casualised, migrant-intensive labour markets, parts of the mobile work-force are at risk of falling outside not only the labour market but also the protection of the welfare state. Both concerns appear to be causally linked to flexibilisation and precariousness in immigrant intensive parts of the labour market.

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Notes
2. In fact, anti-immigration activists often portray “hard working” and “christian” Polish immigrants as a positive contrast to “undesirable” non-Europeans (see for example: http://www.minervanett.no/2011/03/31/polakker-for-like-tii-a-bli-tatt-alvorig/)
3. Bratsberg et al. also invoke disincentives to re-entry provided by generous welfare benefits for families with many children as an important explanation for labour market exclusion of minority groups with high birth rates. These are, however, not relevant for Polish migrants, since Poland has a lower birth rate than Norway.
4. I use the term syndrome as referring to a combination of phenomena seen in association, or “concurrency of symptoms” from the Greek word συνδρομή (sundromē) (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dsundromh%2F).
5. For an ethical discussion of the practice of paying respondents, see Tyldum (2011).
6. The “exception that proves this rule” is the agricultural sector, which, in Norway, generates only short-term seasonal demand for labour. Registry data based on temporary residence permits granted under the transitional regime shows that, unlike those working in other sectors, very few agricultural workers can be found in the registers after some years (Friberg, 2012a).
7. Agriculture and certain sectors of industrial manufacturing are also major employers of Polish migrants but these industries are located elsewhere in the country and thus are not a part of our sample.
8. It should be noted that our survey has a bias towards stayers, since returnees are not part of the sample population. For example, workers who (1) had families in Poland, (2) had lost their jobs and (3) had no access to benefits in Norway appeared to be severely under-represented in the survey, indicating that many of them had already left.

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