

ALL OUR VIDOVDANS

A Discourse Analysis of the RTS TV News Discourse on
the Celebration of *Vidovdan*



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Abstract

This thesis is based on a discourse analysis of four specific *Dnevniks*, the TV News programme with the highest ratings, broadcast by the Serbian National Broadcaster, RTS. The analysed reports focus on the discursive construction of the blending of national and religious identities in the representation of *Vidovdan*. *Vidovdan* is a national and religious holiday in Serbia that commemorates the day of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and in Serbian collective memory, it is connected to the Kosovo myth. A date of the *Vidovdan* celebration, 28 June, is considered to be “fateful day for Serbs” as many other important historical events also happened on that day.

Through the case study, this thesis aims to analyse TV News discourse as social action, the ideological function and power of media, and examine how this holiday is discursively constructed. Inspired by the blend of theories and methods of critical discourse analysts, mainly Teun van Dijk, Paul Chilton, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, and theories on collective memory, this work in particular highlights the discursive construction of the blend of politics and religion that has become quite prominent in post-socialist Serbia after the transitions in 2000.

Keywords: discourse, discourse analysis, *Vidovdan*, TV News discourse, *Dnevnik*, collective memory, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the blending of religion and politics.

The cover illustration is based on the image published in Serbian daily *Politika* (Politics) 28 June 2008:
<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Tema-nedelje/svi-nasi-vidovdani/Svi-nashi-Vidovdani.lt.html>. Here it is altered and adapted by Vladimir Isailović.

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Ovaj rad vama posvećujem!

General Notes

On toponyms:

In this thesis I have used *Kosovo* as the majority of authors use this toponym when referring to the area. The *Kosovo* name issue is addressed in this thesis.

I have used Serbian toponyms for *Gračanica*, *Priština*, *Kosovo Polje*, *Leposavić*, *Kosovska Mitrovica*, *Zvečan* simply because the analysed material that mentions these is in Serbian. I am aware of the Albanian variants: *Gračanicë/Gračanica*, *Prishtinë/Prishtina*, *Fushë Kosovë/Kosova*, *Leposaviq/Albaniku*, *Mitrovicë*, *Zveçan/Zveçani*.

On ethnonyms:

The terms *Kosovo Serbs* and *Kosovo Albanians* (or Serbs/Albanians + prepositional phrase "from Kosovo/in Kosovo") are used when referring to Serbs/Albanians *from* Kosovo. This is just to denote their specific place affiliation to Kosovo.

On translations:

All translations are the author's if not stated otherwise. The translated version of texts tried to follow the original as closely as possible in order to capture as much of the implied meaning of the original as possible. Only the analysed parts are translated. The transcription of all reports on *Vidovdan* in *Dnevnik* 2000-2011 is available in Appendix 2.

The term *narod*, 'people, nation, population' which is polysemic in Serbian, is left in Serbian (in italics) exactly to catch this polysemy.

Other notes on translation are given in the footnotes of the text.

On transcription:

All original video material is transcribed and included in Appendix 2. Because of the large amount of text, Appendix 2 is placed on the attached DVD alongside the original video material. The original spellings are preserved.

The DVD:

The analysed material consists of video clips that are to be found on the attached DVD, as Appendix 1.

The DVD includes all Appendixes:

- *Appendix 1:*
 - Complete episodes of *Dnevnik* broadcast on 28 June in the period from 2000 to 2011, organised in two folders: one for the material analysed in this thesis (2000, 2001, 2006 and 2011) and the other for the rest of the *Dnevniks* (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010);
 - An official installation programme for the VideoLan player (VCL) for Windows and Mac OS X, as many of the episodes are in this format. Installation for other operative programmes can be found here: <http://www.videolan.org/vlc/index.html>;
- *Appendix 2:* Transcribed *Dnevnik* reports on the Vidovdan celebration, 2000-2011
- *Appendix 3:* Table schematic representation of the key elements in the corpus, for the years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010: description and interpretation;

- *Appendix 4:*
 - *Zakon o državnim i drugim praznicima u [Socilistickoj] Republici Srbiji* (Law on State and Other Holidays in the [Socialist] Republic of Serbia), *Službeni glasnik SRS* 23 (1977), 13 (1990); *Službeni glasnik RS* 78 (1991), 55 (1996);
 - *Zakon o državnim praznicima Savezne Republike Jugoslavije* (Law on State Holidays in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), *Službeni list SRJ* 29 (1997), 63 (2002);
 - *Zakon o državnim i drugim praznicima u Republici Srbiji* (Law on State and Other Holidays in the Republic of Serbia), *Službeni glasnik RS* 43 (2001), 101 (2007), 92 (2011);

- *Appendix 5:* The epic poem *Propast carstva srpskog* (The Downfall of the Serbian Empire) in Serbian.

Abbreviations

CDA	Critical discourse analysis
DA	Discourse analysis
DEPOS	<i>Demokratski pokret Srbije</i> (Democratic Movement of Serbia)
DHSS	<i>Demohrišćanska stranka Srbije</i> (Christian Democratic Party of Serbia)
DOS	<i>Demokratska opozicija Srbije</i> (Democratic Opposition of Serbia)
DS	<i>Demokratska stranka</i> (Democratic Party)
DSS	<i>Demokratska stranka Srbije</i> (Democratic Party of Serbia)
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
GSS	<i>Građanski savez Srbije</i> (Civic Alliance of Serbia)
ICO	International Civilian Office
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
JSO	<i>Jedinica za specijalne operacije</i> (Special Operations Unit)
KiM	Kosovo i Metohija (Kosovo and Metohija)
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDH	<i>Nezavisna država Hrvatska</i> (Independent State of Croatia)
NS	<i>Nova Srbija</i> (New Serbia)
RLD	Red-Letter Days in Transition
RTS	<i>Radio Televizija Srbije</i> (Radio Television of Serbia)
SAP Kosovo	<i>Socijalistička autonomna pokrajina Kosovo</i> (Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo)
SFRJ	<i>Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija</i> (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
SNP 1389	<i>Srpski narodni pokret 1389</i>
SNS	<i>Srpska napredna stranka</i> (Serbian Progressive Party)
SPS	<i>Srpska pravoslavna crkva</i> (Serbian Orthodox Church)
SRJ	<i>Socijalistička partija Srbije</i> (Socialist Party of Serbia)
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

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*“Godišnjica Kosovske bitke biće
proslavljena čim se bitka
završi”.*

*‘The anniversary of the Kosovo
battle will be celebrated as
soon as the battle finishes’*

(Milovan Ilić Minimaks)

1 Introduction

1.1 The Research Problem

In the article “Vidovdan 2009” (2010), the Serbian anthropologist Ivan Čolović develops a theory on the uses of *Vidovdan* in Serbian public discourse in 2009 connected to the spheres of religion, politics and national identity. As he points out, *Vidovdan* and the Kosovo myth¹ that goes along with it plays the role of “secular religion” by going beyond the realm of Serbian Orthodoxy and by blending with the realm of politics and even the realm of Serbian national identity itself.

In my thesis, the conceptual blending² of politics and religion stands central. In contrast to Čolović’s work, I do not focus on the *reality* constructed from public discourses (media discourses, political addresses, interviews and the like). My work focuses on *possible* messages that one could have received by watching the news programme, *Dnevnik 2*,³ broadcast by the Serbian national television company, *Radio-televizija Srbije*, ‘Radio Television of Serbia’ (henceforth RTS) in reports on the marking of *Vidovdan*. As underlined in the work of several discourse analysts (Fairclough 1995; Kress and Leeuwen 2006; Van Dijk 1988), the meaning of discourse goes far beyond the denotative⁴ comprehension of the narrative (in my case, TV-reports on *Vidovdan*). That is why the *representation*⁵ of the *Vidovdan* celebration in RTS *Dnevnik* caught my attention. My focus is therefore on the messages that the editorial board of *Dnevnik* might have sent, within the presentation of the event they reported on, whether explicitly or implicitly. The whole process of the production of those messages as well as the process of receiving them, “unpacking”, realizing what they were all about and connecting them with existing background knowledge, is cognitive. Variations both in interpretation of the intended meanings, their implementation and the further mental processing of information on the part of the viewer,⁶ are therefore to be expected. Hence the need to underline that the view presented in this analysis depicts *possible* interpretations of the reports in question.

¹ The whole of Section 4 deals with the Kosovo myth. See the Section 4.1 on the content of the myth.

² See Section 4.2 for the theory of conceptual blending.

³ Lit. trans. ‘Journal’, meaning the daily evening TV News. More about *Dnevnik* can be found in Section 3.4.1.

⁴ I am not referring to the “literary meaning of the words” when I use the term “denotative” here. This term should be understood as meaning “the first level of the story, where understanding of a report is based on the formula: *X* had happened”.

⁵ See Section 2.2.2 for working definitions of terms like *discourse*.

⁶ See Section 2.2.2 for a note on the concept of the “model viewer” in this analysis.

I have decided to name these particular representations as the *staging of Vidovdan* (by the national television broadcaster, RTS). The term *staging*, borrowed from the linguist Karen Gammelgaard (2012: 237), differs slightly from the meaning ascribed to it in her text: the general impression around the event “based on [different] newspaper reportages, photos, and multimedia” – “[a composition of] celebratory components occurring on the same spot immediately before, during, and just after the [presidential] address”. In my definition, *staging* is determined by *Dnevnik*’s staff and relates to their *own* composition of the representation of the celebration; choice of place, event and social actors to report and focus on.

In Čolović’s article, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, he clearly points out some transition phases in Serbian politics, and argues that those changed the political interpretation and use of *Vidovdan*.⁷ They are not named in his text, by I shall name them here, simply to make following the text easier.

- 1) The *Vidovdan* of Milošević’s⁸ era – has two uses, both political, and both detached from its religious essence: a) Milošević’s administration used it as a part of their politics in relation to Kosovo and the strengthening of Serbian nationalism at the end of 80’s and through the 90’s. b) DEPOS⁹ used it as a strategy against Milošević to show that he did not own or have any exclusive right on this day and the Kosovo myth.
- 2) The *Vidovdan* of Đinđić’s¹⁰ era – “Đinđić and his government made an effort to speak of Kosovo and similar patriotic issues differently, in a more relaxed way, without the nationalist narrative, without calling for *Vidovdan* heroes and sanctities, trying to convert them to the language of argumentative political debate”¹¹ (Čolović 2010: 1). Čolović does not write about it, but it was in this period, that *Vidovdan* became a national holiday (July 2001), as well as being a church holiday.¹²

⁷ Čolović starts with Milošević’s regime (1989). However, *Vidovdan* has a longer history of use; see Section 4 for the history of *Vidovdan* celebrations.

⁸ Slobodan Milošević (1941-2006) was President of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and leader of *Socijalistička partija Srbije* (SPS), (Socialistic Party of Serbia).

⁹ *Demokratski pokret Srbije* (Democratic Movement of Serbia), a democratic coalition founded in 1992. It was one of the first organized alternatives to Milošević’s regime.

¹⁰ Zoran Đinđić (1952-2003) was the first Serbian Prime Minister after the overthrow of Milošević – from 2000 until his assassination in 2003. He was the prominent figure in Serbian politics during the 90’s as one of the opposition leaders, and the founder and leader of *Demokratska stranka* (DS), (Democratic Party).

¹¹ “[...] Đinđić i njegova vlada (2000-2003) trudili su se da o Kosovu i sličnim patriotskim pitanjima govore na drugi način, relaksirano, bez nacionalističkih naracija, bez zazivanja vidovdanskih junaka i svetinja, pokušavajući da ih ‘prevedu’ na jezik argumentativne političke rasprave”.

¹² See Section 4 on the religious and political history of *Vidovdan*.

- 3) The *Vidovdan* of Koštunica's¹³ era, when *Vidovdan* and the Kosovo myth are being reused in defining policies towards Kosovo. In this period, the blending of religious and political discourses is the strongest.
- 4) The *Vidovdan* of Tadić's¹⁴ era – Čolović claims that Tadić also uses *Vidovdan*, but that he, like Đinđić, *de-mythicizes* its narratives and avoids using it as a tool of Serbian nationalism. I think that, in parallel to the “pro-European” politics of Tadić, there still exists a set of nationalist *Vidovdan* policies, similar (if not the same) to the one of Koštunica's era.

The questions to be answered in this thesis are: *how is Vidovdan staged in RTS' TV News in relation to the classification above? How does television, through the news discourse on Vidovdan, shape public perception?; how are the social actors in the events represented discursively?; how are ideologies (or blends of ideologies) represented?; what kind of power relations do exist in the examined material?; how are social and group (personal) identities constructed?.* The already mentioned analysis of the *conceptual blend of religion and politics*, mirrored in the representations provided by the TV News discourse, can be considered as a one of the important “bi-products” of this analysis.

1.2 The State of the Art

It would be impossible to list all the literature written on Kosovo, as quite extensive research has been done on the subject and related to different subtopics. As this thesis has an interdisciplinary approach, a short list of the research done on similar subjects that has inspired my work is included, sorted thematically: the Kosovo myth and its realisations, the blending of national and religious identities, the discursive construction of identities (in relation to the former Yugoslavia) and the analysis of media discourses related to the ex-Yugoslavia.

In the book *The Road to War in Serbia* (2000), Olga Zirojević (2000) dedicated a chapter “Kosovo in Collective Memory” to a detailed analysis of the history and background of the Kosovo myth. By presenting the myth's essence, the sources of its creation in Serbian (and Montenegrin) national consciousness, the cult of the pagan god *Svetovit*, and the cultural and

¹³ Vojislav Koštunica (1944-) is Serbian politician and the leader of *Demokratska stranka Srbije* (DSS), (Democratic Party of Serbia). The “era” I refer to is the period he served as Prime Minister (2004-2008).

¹⁴ Boris Tadić (1958-) was the President of the Republic of Serbia until recently. He lost the election in May 2012, when Tomislav Nikolić, as a representative of and (now the former) leader of *Srpska napredna stranka* (SNS), (Serbian Progressive Party), became the President.

political uses of Kosovo myth's narrative, Zirojević covers most of the main aspects in the analysis of the Kosovo myth in relation to collective memory. Miodrag Popović takes a critical approach to the sources of the Kosovo myth in *Vidovdan i časni krst (Vidovdan and the Holy Cross)* (1989), where he compares the mythical and historical versions of the Battle of Kosovo and discusses the blending of the pagan and Christian elements in the Kosovo myth. *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide* (1999) interprets the Kosovo myth as “genocidal” in its essence. This book by Branimir Anzulović, though it contains a great amount of information on roots, the uses and reuses of Kosovo myth and especially its connection to the recent conflicts in the ex-Yugoslavia, “do[es] not distinguish sufficiently between the content and the instrumentalisation of the myth” (Bieber 2002: 98). Bieber, in the article “Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to present” (2002), follows the emergence and rise of the Kosovo myth, its political use until 1989 in the form of the myth of martyrdom, and explains how myth was used every time the conflict emerged in Kosovo, and how it was replaced by the myth of Jasenovac during the war in Bosnia. Since most of his article focuses on the reuse of myth in Milošević's Serbia, Bieber asks whether the view on the Kosovo myth is going to be changed by the democratic regime. An answer to Bieber's question is given in this thesis.

The blending of national and religious identity in the Serbian context has also been the subject of a number of scholar works. Though partly discussed in most of the works that deal with the Kosovo myth, the problematic of blended identity of Serbs receives particular attention in several works. Vjekoslav Perica dedicates a part of his book *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav State* (2002) to the political history of the Serbian Orthodox Church, highlighting its role in the processes of the rise and decline of several regimes, dealing with the complex relation between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state, but also with the discourse connection between the Church and nationalism, nationalistic parties and organisations. Another book that has a great focus on the blending of religious and national identity is Ger Duijzings' *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo* (2000). In an ethnographic study of ethnic groups in Kosovo, the author examines the religious dimension of these groups' ethnic identity in diverse contexts and in different arenas and analyses examples in which religion and rituals can be signs of division, but also of unification. Milorad Tomanić in a detailed account on the Serbian Orthodox Church's involvement in political matters, in the book *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj* (Serbian Church at war and wars within the Church) (2001) describes how the Serbian Church changed its political and ideological standpoints throughout

history (especially in the last decade of 20th century, but also before that) and influenced the perception of national identity coloured with a great amount of nationalism and war-approving politics. One of his main claims is that the Church has been more active in political than in theological matters.

Articles that use discourses as their primary material and analyse them from anthropological/historical/culture-historical perspectives were also of great importance for my work. In an article based on the anthropological approach to the vernacular discourses of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, Helena Zdravković (2005) analyses how everyday stories of both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo relate to their self-perception, the Others, and victimhood both in relation to history and collective memory. Ana Antić's article in the book *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe* (2005), through numerous public texts (history books, magazines, newspapers), classifies the uses of the Kosovo myth following Kolstø's typology in the same book that has also been used as a theoretical support to this thesis.

Intima javnosti (Intimacy of the public) (2008) has a few contributions that focus on the public discourse and especially on the discursive construction of the representation of the Self and the Other. In particular, one article, "Reorganizacija identifikacionog obrasca", focuses on the TV News discourse and "creation" of national identity in the text of two television stations: TV Ljubljana in Slovenia and TV Beograd in Serbia. Even though they approach the material by using some of the same methodological tools of CDA as I do in my thesis, Mihelj, Bajt i Pankov focus only on the verbal mode and almost completely ignore the image mode. In "The Battle of Kosovo: The Media's Recontextualization of the Serbian Nationalistic Discourses", (2007) Erjavec and Volčič analyse the mediated discourse of two of the most popular Serbian newspapers, *Blic* and *Večernje novosti* on the events of October 2006. In an analysis of what they call "the last media battle for Kosovo" and in the context of talks between Serbian and Albanian parties as well as the declaration of Montenegrin independence (May 2006), the authors follow the media reproduction of Serbian nationalism and distinctive religious discourse; their legitimisation strategies and representations of the Self and the Others in relation to the Kosovo issue.

Tatjana Felberg's PhD thesis *Brothers in Arms* (2008) has many meeting points with my thesis. In this work, the author analyses multimodal discourses of the front pages of the newspapers *Pobjeda* (Montenegro) and *Politika* (Serbia) and their discursive constructions of identities, relationships and representations of social actors (Đukanović and Milošević) in the

context of the NATO-bombing in 1999. As far as I know, this is the only extensive work¹⁵ done in relation to the former Yugoslavia that includes work on both the verbal and image mode of the multimodal discourse and which relates to the discursive construction of national identities, relationships and the representation of social actors.

Finally, contributions in *Transforming National Holidays: Identity Discourse in the West and South Slavic Countries* (2012), the product of the *Red Letter Days in Transition* research group at University of Oslo, which are the only work so far done on the discursive construction of national identity through the celebration of national holidays. My work is overlapping in many aspects with all of the mentioned literature. However, generally speaking, work on the critical analytical perspective on TV News multimodal discourse in Serbia (or in the former Yugoslavia) is under-explored.

The ideological power of the media is undeniable: *TV Dnevnik*, the news programme with the highest ratings in Serbia, also had a great ideological power in Milošević's Serbia and was termed as one of the pillars of Milošević's power. Because of this, the thesis goes, in the direction of filling the gap in research on the ideological work of *Dnevnik*, than can hopefully be generalised and applied to the ideological work of other TV News programmes. In addition, the subject of *Dnevnik*'s representation is *Vidovdan*, a national and religious holiday of great importance for Serbia that has, as the listed literature shows, a direct link to the most important Serbian myth, that of Kosovo. "The meaning of national holidays is created and negotiated through discourse" write Šarić and Gammelgaard (2012: 16) in the Introduction of our project's book *Transforming National Holidays: Identity Discourse in the West and South Slavic Countries*. Therefore my thesis is, alongside the project it is a part of, also a contribution to research on the discursive construction of national holidays.

1.3 An Outline of the Master Thesis' Structure

The paper is organized in six sections: introductory (1), theoretical (2), methodical (3), wide contextual/theoretical (4) analytical (5), and concluding (6) ones.

After the introduction to the subject and the presentation of the research problem, in Section 2 I deal with the choice of methodology, present the corpus I have used in the analysis and the key steps in the analytical process. In Section 3, I discuss the key theories that inspired

¹⁵ Besides some of Felberg's new work, including an article in *Transforming National Holidays: Identity Discourse in the West and South Slavic Countries* (2012), the book of the project group *Red-Letter Days in Transition*.

my research of the discourse, mainly approaches within Critical Discourse Analysis and theories on collective memory, as well as their mutual dialog.

The contextual perspective of *Vidovdan* is given in Section 4, first of all by describing what kind of role it had in the past, when was officially celebrated and secondly something about the “status” *Vidovdan* has today. I have tried to avoid giving a dry survey of the historical events, and attempted to present it through the prism of theories of conceptual blending and collective memory. In this way, this section should give the reader all the background information needed for the rest of the thesis, but also an idea what kind of role the Kosovo story plays in the public discourse in Serbia. In order to do this, I shall re-tell the story of the “original” *Vidovdan* (1389), present key-elements of the Kosovo myth, and discuss its use in Serbian popular public discourses, creating, in this way, the background information in the collective consciousness of the Serbs.

In the main part of this master thesis, a case study of RTS *Dnevnik*'s discourses in the period 2000-2011 should show the potential meanings expressed both in words and images. An overview of the key elements analysed is presented in the introductory part of Section 5 alongside a table overview with the contextual setting introduces each of the four analysed *Dnevniks* broadcast on 28 June 2000, 2001, 2006 and 2011.

At the end, concluding remarks and reflections around analysed years are presented in Section 6.

2 Critical Discourse Analysis: A Complete Package

Theories, (Methods), and the Interdisciplinary Approach

CDA Addresses Social Problems [...] Power Relations are Discursive [...] Discourse Constitutes Society and Culture [...] Discourse Does Ideological Work [...] Discourse is Historical [...] The Link Between Text and Society is Mediated [...] Discourse Analysis is Interpretative and Explanatory [...] Discourse is a Form of Social Action [...]. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 120-280)

2.1 Introduction (Blend of the Theoretical Approaches)

This thesis is a part of the project “Red-Letter Days in Transition” (RLD) conducted at the University of Oslo. As a result, the thesis overlaps with the project’s theme aiming to explain “how red-letter days in Central Europe and the Balkans have been constructed discursively in the period from 1985 to the present” (RLD research group 6 January 2010).¹⁶

When the word *discourse* is used, another term occurs: *discourse analysis* (DA). It might be confusing that in the social sciences *discourse analysis* is usually used to describe a specific *approach* to a discourse (usually understood as *text*), *method*, and at the same time, the *theoretical* background. This is particularly the case for scholars who conduct so-called *critical discourse analysis* (henceforth CDA). However, as described in *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (Jørgensen and Philips 2002: 4), when it comes to discourse analysis, “theory and method are linked together” and make “a whole package”. Van Dijk (2007), in contrast, states that “discourse analysis is NOT a method of research, but rather a (cross-) discipline” which also applies to CDA which is “[a]n academic movement of a group of socially and politically committed scholars, or, more individually, a socially critical attitude of doing discourse studies”.¹⁷

As a part of the previously mentioned project at the University of Oslo, this analysis deals with discursively constructed Calendric Public Rituals (*Vidovdan* in my case) and discusses changes in the discursive practices that follow or cause social changes. In this case, I am

¹⁶ <http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/red-letter/>, accessed 31 January 2011.

¹⁷ <http://www.discourses.org/resources/teachyourself/Unlearn%20misconceptions.html>, accessed 10 August 2011.

primarily interested in the representation of public rituals connected to celebration of *Vidovdan* in intertextual discourse provided by *Dnevnik*, but an analysis of the texts this intertextual representation consists of, stands equally central. Public rituals (official celebrations) in connection with national holidays have always been an important part of the confirmation of belonging to the national group which the holiday is a symbol of. In Yugoslavia, as a consequence of wars, some of the “new” nations were born in the 90’s. In the examined period 2000-2011, some more “new” nations were officially “created”, as new states appeared, also as a product of conflicts or consensual break up. All of them¹⁸ have seen the celebration of national holidays as an outstanding opportunity for “flagging the nation”.¹⁹ My assignment is both to analyse which discursive strategies social actors used in this process of “flagging the nation” but also to examine which strategies were used in the representation or social actors or in an intertextual relation to their discourses.

As it is important to underline that a blend of theories have inspired my research, this section presents some key theoretical points that have guided me while writing this thesis. In order to present them in a systematic way, I have, for the purposes of this presentation, divided them into three clusters: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), TV News and Collective Memory. This division is unnatural, though, as all these segments are theoretically, methodically as well as practically, woven together with each other, and could therefore be considered as a *blend* (see Section 4.2), a word which sums the interdisciplinarity of this thesis.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

In this section I shall present some of the key ideological axioms of CDA and how these can be read in my thesis. Some theoretical notes on the key terms in CDA and my use of those will also be addressed here.

2.2.1 CDA Axioms

Critical discourse analysis does not focus on theory-development only, but emphasizes the analysis of the empirical material (see Section 3 on methods). Different analysts might use

¹⁸ As a native speaker of Serbian, I have read/heard/seen the original texts of this “flagging”. Therefore this notion is primarily attached to Bosniak (the term Bosnian, regarding ethnicity, officially does not exist), Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Slovenian contexts. The Kosovo Albanian context is excluded, as I do not speak Albanian.

¹⁹ The term was coined by Billig (1995). See Section 2.4 for the short presentation of the concept.

different methods, but most of them do agree on some postulates, which CDA is primarily based on. The ones that constitute an important ideational basis for my analysis are presented in this section.

CDA Addresses Social Problems. In the introduction of this section I explained that CDA is more of a movement, a socially active force that addresses social problems in order to “develop critical awareness of the discursive strategies” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271), than a theory or method. While analysing *Dnevniks*, I have included an explanation of the different strategies that might have been used in *Dnevnik*’s “representation of the world, social relations between people and people’s social and personal identities” (Fairclough 1995: 17). A political recontextualisation of the Kosovo myth and the discursive construction of national identity through that myth are some of the social problems that are addressed in this thesis. In some of analysed sections, special attention is given to the discursive construction of the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and representation of political, cultural and social involvement of SPC especially in issues relating to Kosovo.

Discourse as a Social Practice. Among the first to create the notion of a discourse as a social practice is Austin in his *speech act* theory, which is based on the perception that a spoken sentence has performative action attached to it: “I hereby pronounce you husband and wife”. has not just informative value, but it implies a performative *action* that results in marriage between two people. In that sense, all discourses can be seen as a social interaction between the sender (the one who produces a discourse) and the recipient (the one who receives the meaning and potentially responds) that is realised in various cultural and social contexts. As social practices, discourses *constitute* social world including identities and relations (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 61). When looking at *Dnevnik*’s representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration, a viewer gets an *interpreted* version of reality, constructed by *Dnevnik*. Being as influential within Serbia’s information world as it is, especially due to high ratings, *Dnevnik* has had an important ideological function that creates an image of the “real” world for the most of its viewers. In that way, *Dnevnik* is shaping Serbian public opinion and it actively participates in Serbia’s social and political life.

Power Relations are Discursive and Discourse Does Ideological Work. Constructions of collective identities, and a particular representation of relations and the “real world”, represent

an articulation of an ideology. At the same time, the voice or point of view that is represented in that construction and the decisions behind that, reflect relations of power. In the same way, the creation of discourse, social practices and events arises from “the ideologically shaped relations of power and struggles over power” the relationship between society and discourse “is itself a factor securing power and hegemony” (Fairclough 1993: 135). In that sense, *Dnevnik* does ideological work since it delivers representations that also, as interpretations of discursive practices, provide a snapshot of power relations in Serbian society. At the same time, a discussion on power relations in media discourses is also implied through the question: who dictates that exact ideologically charged representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration? “Is mediatized political discourse the domination of the media over politicians, or exploitation of the media by politicians?” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 273).

Discourse is Constituted and Constitutive. The dialectical nature of the relationship between society and culture on one side and discourse on the other enables the process in which, in the broad social context, powerful structures in society construct a certain ideological discourse. At the same time every individual sentence of a discourse “function[s] ‘ideationally’ in representing reality and ‘interpersonally’ in constructing social relations and identities, as well as ‘textually’ in marking the parts of text into a coherent whole” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 275). When referring to the politics of *Dnevnik* in this thesis, I am actually referring to the power of reflection *Dnevnik* (and the social actors that are given the power “to speak”) has in, for example, constituting views on the perception of Serbian national identity as religious identity or the political function of the Serbian Orthodox Church. At the same time, *Dnevnik*’s discourse is constituted “in a form of action which is socially and historically situated and in dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social” (Jørgensen and Philips 2002: 62).

Discourse is historical. “Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking the context into consideration” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 276). The discourse-historical approach, one of the CDA approaches, is based on the “inclusion of layers of historical knowledge” (ibid: 277), which are comprehended as layers of context (see Section 2.2.2 in this thesis). Therefore the wider socio-political context is included ahead of every analysed year. Discourse relates in that way diachronically and synchronically to other discourses and (layers of) context.

2.2.2 Discourse, Text, and Context

The difficulties in defining the most frequently used word in this thesis, *discourse*, come from the fact that the word is often used with different meanings and rarely systematically defined and operationalized (Wodak 2008: 1). I also see defining the term *discourse* as a challenge as it is often used as a synonym for text, genre, a particular story or a point of view, every “text” assigned to a politician/person in general/institution (cf. in my thesis Đinđić’s discourse and Đinđić’s text, see Section 5.3). Discourses have often being analysed as written text, separated from other “discourses”, context or other modes (image, audio) that are the part of the same discourse.

In the context of this thesis, I define discourse, at the theoretical level, as any form of “language use seen in particular way, as a form of social practice” (Fairclough 1995: 2). So, the first postulate of CDA (See Section 2.2) is, at the same time, one of the definitions of my use of the term discourse: discourse is a form of social practice. The aspect “any form of language in use” is used primarily to avoid the identification with the text only, as it is done in British research (Wodak 2008: 5), and to underline the multimodality TV News discourse is based on. In that way, “language in use” might be interpreted as any sign, linguistic or otherwise, that has semantic potential. I am convinced that the production of signs, and signs *per se*, even though not expressed through text (facial expressions, road signs, *lieu de mémoire*, monuments), are connected to cognitive processes both in the process of sign making, and sign decoding. Taking that in consideration and having in mind the postulate that every mental process in the human mind is not impossible to separate from the language (Wertch 2002, Chilton 2004, Van Dijk 1988), I am, of necessity, forced to define discourse widely as any sign making and decoding of those in a form of social practice that happens in a certain context. Van Dijk defined discourse even more concisely as “text in context” (Van Dijk 1990: 164).

Thus discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se. [...] stretching the meaning of discourse from a genre to a register of style, from a building to a political programme. This causes and must cause confusion which leads to much criticism and many misunderstandings. (Wodak 2008: 1)

To illustrate two of the many possible uses of the term discourse, some authors (see Kolstø 2008: 27) see discourse as both “singled texts and as conglomerate of texts”. To make an obvious distinction, the second category is capitalized. I understand Kolstø’s *text* as being

defined extremely widely, as a specific and unique realization of a discourse. This limitation suits well the definition given by Jay Lemke (1995: 7ff.): “On each occasion when the particular meaning characteristic of these discourses [which he defines as widely as I did: social action of producing meaning in particular context] is being made, a specific text is produced”. That is why the word *text* is in this thesis closely related to genres and is used in the same specific realization of either the Discourse or the discourses. That is also a reason why this thesis contains phrases such as “*Dnevnik*’s / B92’s texts”, that underline the meaning: the particular image/audio/written verbal mode realization of a Discourse created by *Dnevnik* or B92. This meaning easily implies a complicated network of dialogs between similar realizations, texts, or discourses. In the similar way, I also use text in these or similar phrases: “in this year’s text”, “Koštunica’s/Đinđić’s text” where realizations of a discourse are even more (adverbially) determined as concrete realization of the discourse *Dnevnik* produced as made by XY or in the timeframe XY.

Three further remarks on these uses of *text* and *discourse* are needed. Firstly, I do not use the word *genre* even though I am well aware of the fact that the use of that term would bring some clarity in relation to my use of *discourse* in the text of this thesis. Therefore, phrases like “TV News discourse”, “conversational discourse” refer primarily to the conglomerate of discourses or their realizations (texts), that are defined primarily by stressing the process of their realization through a certain act (conversation) or genre (TV News).

In addition, and similar to Kolstø’s line quoted above, I use *Discourse* for a particular ideational realization (not practical realization, as text is), that is the thematic and philosophical concretization of discursive action. I therefore use *Vidovdan Discourse* to stress a thematic concretization of a discursive action that is, through the Public Ritual of *Vidovdan* celebration, interdiscursively connected to the Kosovo myth (see Section 4).

Thirdly, the concepts of *co-text* and *paratext* are also mentioned in this thesis. Out of practical reasons, I had to limit the material to be analysed in this thesis (see Section 3). I have therefore excluded an amount of *Dnevnik texts* that also recontextualize *Vidovdan Discourse*. These and other similar texts, are addressed as *co-texts*. *Paratext*, similar to Felberg’s (2008: 122ff.) use of the term, denotes the text *written* on the screen and can include *written* semantic macrostructures (headlines), but as well RTS’s and *Dnevnik*’s logo, and information on time. In contrast to Felberg, my perception of *paratext* does not include a notion of the *real Dnevnik*’s headlines, formed in the verbal (audio) mode as “news of the day”. These are termed as *macrostructures* (see Section 2.3.2).

Context is, besides discourse, a term which is also given different meanings, sometimes overlapping with discourse, and therefore difficult to define: sociological variables which can include age, class, sex and so on; pragmatics focused on the macro context of a communicative event: the communicative setting, speaker or listener. Some CDA analysts (cf. Van Dijk 1988, Chilton 2004) see context in cognitive terms (Wodak 2008: 13). Van Dijk's (1988: 23) perception of *context models* and their cognitive building relates closely to his theory on macrostructures. In a communicative setting, and considering every discourse as an ideological communication, we remember *macrostructures* selectively and in coordination with the chosen topics. A similar cognitive approach is also adopted in this thesis: "[...] the meaning of a text is not 'contained' in the text itself. Sense is made by readers or hearers, who link their knowledge and expectations stored in long- and short-term memory to the processing of the language input" (Chilton 2004: 154). This kind of context comprehension presupposes a generalization on the quality (which information) and the quantity (the amount of different information clusters) of the contextual information a *model viewer* might have, and as such the context is closely linked to concept of collective memory that introduces one specific way (Discourse) of remembering the past. It was a rational choice not to include a clear definition of a model viewer in this thesis. This choice can, in return, allow the readers to include or exclude themselves according to their own contextual background knowledge, ideologies and beliefs (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 279). At the same time, I adopt the concept of context presented by Wodak (2008: 12ff.) which includes an account of the following four levels:

1. the immediate, language or text internal co-text;
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
3. the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific *context of situation* [...];
4. the broader socio-political and historical contexts, to which the discursive practices are embedded in and related [...].

The last level is the one included in each analysis section just before the analysis (see Sections 5.2.2; 5.3.2; 5.4.2; 5.5.2). The first level of context is described alongside the analysis and the information about the co-texts included in sections where co-texts give important contextual information (e.g. Section 5.2.1). The second contextual level is also included in the analysis, especially in the parts where the dialog between two *texts* or *discourses* is obvious (e.g. Section 5.4). A specific *context of situation* is included both in Section 4 which includes information on the concept of *Vidovdan*, its celebration and conceptual blends of religious and national

identities and partly in Section 3 where we can find information on the importance of *Dnevnik* as a source of information and RTS's ideological and political history (which is also a part of the fourth contextual level).

2.3 TV News: Representations, Macrostructures and Intertextuality

Media discourse has certainly not been neglected as a subject of CDA analysis (see Van Dijk 1988, Fairclough 1995). On the contrary, a *mediated discourse* has been the occupation of CDA and DA analysts as they in particular aim to research the ideological function media has and especially which cultural/political elites (individuals?) have the power to influence media discourse or dictate its politics (Van Dijk 1988, Pankov, Mihelj and Bajt 2011, Fairclough 1995, Felberg 2008; 2012, Šarić 2012, Grimstad 2012). As mentioned in the section on power related to discourse, media has, theoretically, the power to form and shape the representation of the world, and relations between social actors and identities.

This ideological function of media is very important in modern societies. Phrases like *Media war*, *media manipulations* are just some that manifest the ideological use of the media. In Serbia, as in other countries in the ex-Yugoslavia, the media played an important role during the wars. Serbian national television, RTS, has had a history of manipulation, being used by Milošević's regime and was seen as one of the pillars of his power and influence, which is one of the reasons it was being bombed during the NATO-bombing in 1999 (see Section 3).

While Van Dijk's (1988) work on news discourse focuses on how cognitive information organisation (macrostructures, schemata, context models) shapes production, and especially the comprehension of the discourse, Fairclough's (1995) aim is to focus on the constitutive function of the discourse and describe how changes in language and social practices (discourse) results in changes in society. My work is based on a blend of these two ideas: I do think that *maybe political agenda of the news organisation influences Dnevnik viewers*. More explicitly, news is not "the news" before *Dnevnik* announces it. Moreover, of all of the news items, there are some that are presented as more *important* than others. These news items are the ones the audience is most likely to single out as well and remember. The ideological function of *Dnevnik's* use of macrostructures and the organisation of information in general is also important in the creation of long-term memory that, in this paper, overlaps with the concept of collective memory. In

addition, these specific news reports, thematically limited to the celebration of one of the most important Serbian national holidays, shape and reshape Serbian national identity:

When people speak and write about a specific theme of national holidays, they use discourse as a means to shape and reshape collective identity. Texts about national holidays do not merely contribute to building up knowledge and beliefs about the shared theme; they have important pragmatic aspects, too. (Šarić and Gammelgaard 2012: 22)

Fairclough's concept, however, is also interesting because the basis of this thesis conceptualizes the premise that social/political change (for example the change of President/government or political leaders that constitute that government) might also produce a change in the media/political discourse, or even more a change in the perception of national collective identity and collective memory.

TV News is a genre closely related to newspaper news discourse. As with newspaper news, TV News is a multimodal discourse, featuring audio and visual modes. The audio mode is transcribed in this thesis and analysed as a written mode, as is written text on the screen, being a part of the visual mode (see Section 3).

In TV News discourse, experts are sometimes invited to give an opinion while ordinary people are often included as the voice of *narod*. Generally, however, there is less space for personal comments and the reflections of the journalist than there is in newspaper articles. Fairclough (1995: 48) underlines that the production of news reportages (or documentaries) carries a certain degree of complexity, as having a "heavily embedded and layered character". This implies that a chain of people is involved in the production of news. Even though I do not know the exact working method of the *Dnevnik* crew, in this thesis I am taking for granted that there is a whole editorial board involved in the production of *Dnevnik*, and as a consequence there is the potential for interpreting their collective ideological influence on news formation.

If the ideological involvement of journalists and the editorial board in the interpretation of the news is not explicit, an analyst has to go beyond *visible* sources of that involvement and look at some other indicators. In this thesis, I have therefore been interested in particular in different representations strategies. Initially I shall list all of the important terms used in analysis and then briefly consider two terms whose concepts, put in use, can produce different manipulations of representation: the organization of information in connection to macrostructures and intertextuality, a basic feature of every news discourse.

2.3.1 Representations

In this thesis, one of the most important focuses is on representation: of social actors primarily, but also of relations between social actors and through them of identities and the “world”: the general socio-political situation.

Representations in this thesis relate both to the representations created through the advanced network of intertextuality and as well representations of the discourse world as seen “through the eyes” of social actors. In that way, in Section 5, the perspective of the analysis might change from *Dnevnik*’s representation to the discursive worlds of some of the participants, when we can see *their* representation of the social/political questions.

I have used the word *staging* as defined in the introduction, primarily for the first type of representations, as the term explicitly suggests *Dnevnik*’s active involvement in the representation. Some of the representation strategies can be *read* from the information structuring which will be addressed separately (Section 2.3.2) as well through power dominance condensed in the narrator-function in an intertextual discourse (Section 2.3.3).

In this section I shall briefly present a glossary of some of the main terms I have used while analysing different representation strategies. Some of those are also addressed in the Section 3 as a part of methodological approach to the text.

Strategies of Representation: Othering, Legitimation, Implicature. Analytics of discourse usually describe, identify and decompose *strategies* used by the language users wishing to accomplish a certain goal. There is no guarantee that a critical discourse analyst can reveal what is *meant* by a discourse or what the *intended* meaning really is. The intention of this work is primarily to *explain* the potential for realising a certain number of meanings, to discuss implied meanings and the discursively created power and ideological relations.

Strictly speaking, some strategies and persuasive methods are identified and “well-established” in CDA. Even though the content and the means of implementation of the strategy depend on the analysed material, some common features can be identified. Needless to say, there are no strict borders or definitions showing where one strategy “becomes” another or when a linguistic device is used to support one or the other. To illustrate and describe the use of the devices in CDA I am taking one example.

The context of the celebration in general is explained in Section 4: what is celebrated, when and where. So, in a way, this segment is taken out of context. If a speaker, during this festive occasion, addressed the present people by using specific references to faith, common

history, ancestry, or “common knowledge” about Christian Orthodoxy, one might, at the same time, be using (to name just a few of them): “Othering”, legitimisation/legitimation and banalization strategies. How? Let us look at this statement:

To je bila vera koja je držala naše pretke i u doba slobode i u doba ropstva i u doba borbi za slobodu. Bili su i ostali LJUDI,²⁰ kao što dolikuje našim precima. To će biti i ako i mi tako budemo postupali: Braniti se od neprijatelja, ali se braniti kao čovek. Nikada zločinom odgovarati na zločin. (Patriarch Pavle, *Dnevnik* 28 June 2004, 03:25)

That was the faith that kept our ancestors in times of freedom, slavery and in times of fighting for freedom. They were and remained HUMANS as it befits our ancestors. That will be the same if we act so: Defend against the enemy, but defend as a human being. Never to answer a crime with a crime.

First of all, the ones who identify themselves with the speaker, recognise the faith that was referred to as their *own*, acknowledge the “freedom, slavery and the times of fighting for freedom” *as a part of their own* historical past, and create a “we-group”. This group is also explicitly created by using the pronoun “we/our”, but also implicitly by classifying the “we-group” as a group with the same *ancestors* and *past*. Everyone identifying with a “we” group by *decoding* the used language, celebrating the same event, referring to the “known historical” times of slavery and freedom, automatically excludes all the possible “others” that do not identify with the speakers “we-group”.

In the very same example one can also identify legitimisation strategies: 1) the speaker is presenting himself as “one of ours”, one who knows “our” codes, 2) the speaker, being Patriarch Pavle, then head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, is also an insider who possesses the authority (therefore power) to identify and *define* “us” through the discourse. At the same time, he legitimises “our ancestors” who fought for freedom in a human way, “on the right side” and with the “right faith”.

The fragment is taken out of context, which is one of the basic elements for analysing the discourse. Taking the broader context into consideration, one needs to know the essence of the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, as well the historical argumentation that is used by the both parties in this context (Serbian and Albanian). A part of the broader context would then also include the history of the Battle of Kosovo and the myth presented in Section 4.

The “context of situation” (Wodak 2008: 12ff), as I define it in Section 2.2.2, includes the political/social situation around the Kosovo issue temporarily limited to a time parallel to the

²⁰ In the speech, the word was emphasized and is therefore spelled using capital letters.

celebration of *Vidovdan*. News, again, as a mixture of genres, requires that the previous part of the report, which is not a part of the quoted part of the speech, is also included in consideration (as co-text), as a part of the same discourse.

In the frame of CDA, words like strategies and techniques are being used to describe either what is achieved by using a specific devices or what linguistic means are used in order to implement the strategy. Likewise, in this theses strategies are defined and named for "what they do", (e.g. legitimise, make someone/something look like *the Other*, banalize/imply, misrepresent) and techniques for "how they do it" (e.g. the use of metaphors, analogies, passive/active voice, the use of lexemes with negative/positive connotation, use of pronouns, sentence order and information placement).

Implicature. Inexplicit meaning is a very common form of expressing meaning. It functions largely due to people's ability to *activate* long term knowledge and fill up the "gap" with the information that is not *said*, but is implied. As such, implicature has an important ideological function. Speakers do have a degree of choice in choosing words and phrases which can lead the listener to produce (understand) a particular meaning.

Example: "Ova zemlja pripada nama, kao istorijskom narodu na ovim prostorima, ali pripada i onima koji su s nama, mi to poštujemo", 'This land belongs to us, as historical *narod* on this area, but it also belongs to those who are with us, we respect that'. (Patriarch Irinej, *Dnevnik* 28 June 2010, 05:42)

The speaker chose not to include all the information explicitly, but most people familiar with all contextual levels would read the intended information as the anchor in the same *Dnevnik* did:

Patrijarh [...] poručio je da *albanski narod* ima neosporno pravo da postoji na *Kosovu i Metohiji*, ali da to pravo imaju i Srbi, kojima je Kosmet vekovna otadžbina. (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2010, 04:05)

The Patriarch gave a message that *Albanian narod* has undeniable right to exist in *Kosovo and Metohija*, but that *the Serbs* have that right also, since Kosmet has been their ancestral homeland.

According to Chilton (2004: 35ff) Grice distinguishes particularized from generalized implicatures. The generalized implicatures are based on logic that works universally and therefore theoretically could be applied in all languages (for example negation: X is Y. implies that X is not Z). Particularized implicatures are the ones that are important for this thesis. To

understand them, both particular contextual and some general background knowledge is necessary.

Spatial representations. Chilton (2004) presents a theory of *spatial representation* in relation to the cognitive understanding of discourse where all discursively constructed relations can be explained through *three spatial axes*: modality, time and place. They all start in the same, contextually determined, *deictic centre* (ibid.: 56) where the Self (I, we), truth, right, now and here are placed (see Figure 14 in Section 5.3.4).

The modal axis, the one that Chilton calls “the axis of reality and morality” (2004: 57) is the one of the three axis of the discourse world that is most used in this thesis, and then in the sense of *deontic*²¹ modality (“having to do with permission and obligation” (ibid.: 59)). I have used deontic modality to denote the Self’s “right” derived out of the Self’s perspective, knowledge and beliefs.

Reading Images with the Grammar of Visual Design. Most scholars (cf. Đorđilović 2006, Felberg 2008; 2012, Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006; 2001) that analyse multimodal discourses focus largely on the text and image modes. In that sense, the term *multimodality* in my primarily material has a slightly different meaning. My primarily multimodal text has three, instead of “just” two modes: (video) image, verbal (text), verbal (audio) mode. From practical reasons, most of the third mode is (as explained in Section 3) transcribed to verbal (text) mode and the video dimension of the image is “cut down” to plain image mode in most cases.

This in return made it possible for me to use the tools by “grammarians of visual design”, even though I am aware that some film editing theories might have suited my material better. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 41) relate this theory to a hierarchy of signs, presented in an image through up-down, left-right relations, perspective (behind-ahead), angles, information distribution and salience. This is very applicable and open for interpretation when the image is created for a specific purpose (a presidential campaign, a commercial, an artistic image...). However, some of those spatial relations might be misinterpreted in the case of film footage. If a cameraman films from the top of a building down to a crowd, this does not necessarily mean that desired effect is to “look down on” the crowd, but perhaps simply that she/he could not find better place for filming on the ground. Sometimes, though, the obvious effect of editing is visible. In that way, some of the spatial organisational notions Kress and Van Leeuwen refer to

²¹ Chilton (2004: 59) also mentions *epistemic modality* that “has to do with degrees of certainty”, and *negation*.

are going to be commented on where I find them as a product of an editing process. I am also using these tools in commenting on the effect the image *might produce* in the viewer, even though I could not know if the strategy was employed deliberately or not.

Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 45ff.) use the term representation in phrases *narrative* and *conceptual representations*. I am applying simplified version of their theory on the “reading the images” and then especially in relation to these representations:

When participants are connected by a vector, they are represented as *doing* something to or for each other. [...] we will call such vectorial patterns *narrative* [...] and contrast them to *conceptual* patterns. [...] narrative patterns serve to present unfolding actions and events, processes of change, transitory spatial arrangements. (ibid.: 59)

[...] conceptual, representing participants in terms of their more generalised and more or less stable and timeless essence, in terms of class, or structure or meaning. (ibid.: 79)

Conceptual representations can represent a *classificational process*, where the represented actors are connected to each other via a relation that is based on taxonomy; *analytical process*, which shows just one actor who does not relate to others, called a *Carrier*, which can possess a number of *Possessive Attributes*; or *symbolic processes*, where the identity of the *Carrier* is defined through *Symbolic Attributes* (ibid. 79ff.).

I have also used Kress and Van Leeuwen’s (2006: 175ff.) notion on the distribution of information (see Figure 1) value from left to right, where the right side of an image is presented as the “new” information and “seems to be the side of the key information”. For information values in relation to bottom to top, Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 186) say: “If, in a visual composition, some of the constituent elements are placed in the upper part and other, different elements in the lower part [...] then what has been placed on the top is presented as Ideal, and [...] [what is] at the bottom is put forward as the Real”.

Figure 1 graphically presents the information value as presented in an image.




Figure 1 The distribution of information value in an image (modification of Fig 6.18 by Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 201))

When representing participant’s interpersonal relations, Kress and Van Leeuwen use different terms to define aspects which might be relevant for the construction of interpersonal relations, with regard to, for example, angle, gaze or social distance. The realisations and their potential meaning that have been important for this thesis are:




Figure 2 The aspects important in interpersonal relations and their realizations (Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 148))

The described interpretation of images as based on Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) has, as explained, limited potential when it comes to the video mode. When the transition from one film shot to another was important, I have therefore applied Van Leeuwen (2005: 219ff.) notion on *information linking*. “The term linking is used to extend the concept beyond language and relate

it to the way items of information are linked in hypertext” (ibid. 280). The sequences of multimodal discourse in this thesis are linked in different ways. I have not discussed all of the linking, but in the analysis of one year in particular (see Section 5.3.5), information linking was in particular analysed as related to Pudovkin’s film theory on montage (see Van Leeuwen 2005: 227f. and Section 5.3.5). The text I was analysing is linear, that is, the video material follows, at least seemingly, a chronological pattern. The interpretation in this thesis is therefore limited to the sequence of linking determined by temporal linearity.

2.3.2 Semantic Macrostructures

The already introduced term *macrostructures* is based on Van Dijk’s (1988) conception of the same term. Van Dijk’s theory is derived from a socio-cognitive understanding of news text as thematically organised in cognitive structures that shape the production and comprehension of news. In his study on the news discourse of racism and how news shape the perception of it, by using a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods, he discovered that the overall schemata of the text, as well as structuring information in thematic clusters, helped in spreading racism. In one of the analysed years in this paper (see Section 5.5.3) I turn to the analysis of macrostructures. TV News discourse has the privilege of having a kind of double macrostructure: audio and the one written on the screen. As I analysed macrostructures and as I read Van Dijk’s work on news discourse, I realized the ideological function of the lines popularly called “news of the day”. The structuring of news reports, and more importantly singling out one of the segments of that report, “helps” the reader understand what the important information is. Following Van Dijk’s theory, these lines, macrostructures otherwise known as topics are those most likely to be remembered and stored first in the serial (personal) and then in the long-term memory of the viewer. Van Dijk (1988: 23) suggests that the historical dimension of the discourse also plays an important role in this cognitive process: context has a crucial role in determination what form the structured news is going to remain within the long-term memory of viewers and more importantly, how. Personal knowledge, experiences, beliefs and interests are all catalysts in the process of the comprehension of the meaning and the possible intended meaning.

2.3.3 Intertextuality

In the representation of social actors and events, which is the main function of news discourse, the “representing discourse” (news story) creates a link with the “represented discourse” (the

event's story) through a network of voices, which are an important variable that can change the perception of the representation (Fairclough 1995: 81).

Multivocality, through the news' polyphony, is perhaps the perfect parameter of a news reporter's (or editorial board's) objectivity. *Dnevnik* decides if these voices are going to be silenced (omitted), paraphrased, or quoted indirectly or directly. Fairclough (2003: 49) lists four ways of reporting:

- Direct reporting
Quotation, purportedly the actual words used, in quotation marks, with a reporting clause (e.g. She said: 'He'll be there by now').
- Indirect reporting
Summary, the content of what was said or written, not the actual words used, no quotation marks, with a reporting clause (e.g. She said he'd be there by then). Shifts in the tense (he'll becomes 'he'd') and deixis ('now' becomes 'then') of direct reports.
- Free indirect reporting
Intermediate between direct and indirect – it has some of the tense and deixis shifts typical of indirect speech, but without a reporting clause. It is mainly significant in literary language (e.g. Mary gazed out of the window. *He would be there by now*. She smiled to herself.).
- Narrative report of speech act
Reports the sort of speech act without reporting its content (e.g. She made a prediction).

The TV News discourse allows for one more subtype, that of direct speech. I have named it "live direct speech". The discussed multidimensionality of the image and verbal modes allows for the division of the direct speech voice into two dimensions: both live and directly quoted. In essence the two are both forms of quotation, but in the live quotation there is no explicit mediator to inform and direct the receiver. In the case of live direct speech, the audio and image mode "help" the viewer to match the voice to its sender. The mediator's voice (the reporter or editorial board) is still there: though silently, that voice selects and emphasises some sequences, omits others and makes the transmission of the social actor's voice possible in the first place.

In my material all four types of reporting Fairclough refers to are evident, alongside live direct speech as an extra category. Instead of Fairclough's, I have used names given in standard grammar books: live direct speech, direct speech, paraphrase, and narrative report of a speech act.

Firstly, by underlining the camera's reputation for "unerring eyes" and the power of the moving image as a "means of communication for establishing seemingly authentic impression of realities", that Alexander Pollak (2008: 79) drew attention to in his analysis of documentaries

using CDA, this analysis builds on the perspective that the live quoted voices seem more natural and real and therefore more legitimate. Related to that, each of the live quoted voices in the represented discourse is “more responsible” for its own utterances than the voices that are paraphrased, rather than quoted, or which use indirect speech.

One of the features of the indirect speech is that although it is expected to be accurate about the propositional context of what is said, it is ambivalent about the actual words that were used – it may simply reproduce them, or it may transform and translate them into discourses which fit more easily with the reporter’s voice. (Fairclough 1995: 81)

This leads to the second point: due to this “voice-in-voice representation”, social actors are discursively constructed through their own voices, through the reporter’s voice that paraphrases, cites directly and indirectly, edits and omits, but also through the voices of other social actors.

2.4 Collective Memory

A case study of mediated discourse on the *Vidovdan* celebration in this thesis has inspired me to choose a theoretical approach that will both look at the representation of social actors, but also of their texts, and at the same time give an image of both the specific realisation of the re-enactment of the Kosovo myth, through commemorative speeches on the occasion, and the construction of new interpretations of the *Vidovdan* Discourse.

National holidays, which *Vidovdan* became in 2001, have a specific relationship to the past they are celebrating. “As symbols of a collective’s past” (Šarić and Gammelgård 2012: 11) national holidays represent a yearly recycling of collective memory through a network of discourses and other “meaning making activities [...] [as] concerts, laying wreaths, planting trees, presenting medals and singing national anthems (that often also rest on discourse)” (ibid.)

Human reality, as well as past, is reconstructed in cognitive process and by employing long-term memory devices and language, which is the basis of every cognitive process (Chilton 2004). Discourse provides, therefore, an important dimension in constructing collective memory.

A short overview of research on the term collective memory and my definition of the term is listed first. In the second part, I give a short explanation of the relationships between collective memory and myth/history and collective memory and discourse.

The Definition. Since many scholars of social sciences and humanities have dealt with memory in the social context, many terms other than “collective memory” have emerged to denote the same process: “social memory” (Connerton 2009), “cultural memory” (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995), “popular memory”, used by a group of English historians in the 80’s (Eriksen 1995: 14), “the social production of memory” (ibid.: 15), “kollektivtradisjon” (ibid.: 14), “collected memory” (Young 1993: xi) or just memory (Anderson 2002 and Smith 2008). The term was coined by the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1992) to denote any memory that the members of one social group share.

Even though these scientists deal with roughly the same problem – to find out how groups remember, all of them use different terms, have a specific approach, or a particular relationship they chose to focus on. The historian of culture, Anne Eriksen (1999) focuses on the borders between the past, history, memory and myth, deals with cases of mythification of the past and history and the “historification” of the past and myth and explores sources of collective memory as well as ways of transmitting it. While James E. Young examines “collected memor[ies]...gathered into common memorial spaces and assigned common meaning” (1993: xi) through memorial and monument culture dedicated to the victims of the Holocaust, Paul Connerton (2009) tries to explain bodily manifestations of collective (social in his interpretation) memory.

As a product of a research group from England, the “Popular Memory Group”, the term “social production of memory” is used to describe all production of a memory in the context of a society, but also relations between different competing forces within a society that have the power to impose a dominant way of remembering the past (Kverndokk 2007: 33).

Ernest Renan in his work *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation* (cited in Esborg 2008: 20) defined the nation as a social group with two elements, “[...] one is in the past, the other is in the present”. Paul Connerton in his book *How societies remember* (2009) sees collective memory as a synthesis of the past and the present pointing out that memory and the knowledge generations inherit about the past, influence that group’s understanding of the present: “Concerning social memory in particular, we may note that images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order” (1989: 3).

Besides the already mentioned “competing memories”, the essence of the “the social production of memory”-theory, the same phrase, in my definition, represents an umbrella term for different kinds of collective memories: “In this [way of understanding the collective

memory] they [Popular Memory Group] want to include all those ways of building an understanding of the past that are present in our society” (Eriksen 1999: 14).²²

I have chosen to define collective memory using the terms of the Popular Memory Group, because their conception of “competing narratives” in my interpretation includes several important premises that are important for this thesis:

- 1) Collective memory is often constructed as a narrative (discourse) about a collective past;
- 2) Collective memory is constructed through competing narratives, and therefore has the potential to change and different interpretations;
- 3) The use of collective memory has an ideological function;
- 4) The way a society remembers is discursively constructed by powerful elites.

Collective memory, history and myth. Anne Eriksen discusses the relationship between collective memory, history and myth in relation to the Norwegian perception of the history of World War II. She takes the view that “[i]n total, the war history refers not only what actually had happened in five years, it [the history] is in itself an expression of a very extensive cultural interpretation process, where much of the population has taken part” (1995: 13).²³

This, a kind of dialectic understanding of history, singles out an important point in relation to collective memory: history can be influenced by collective memory and myths; it can be changed, shaped and reshaped.

Section 4 takes exactly this notion into account. A historic event, the Battle of Kosovo, has “gone through” many discursive constructions over time, to be *recontextualised* in a form of myth through epic poetry and the Serbian Orthodox Church’s own interpretation of the *Vidovdan* Discourse. The power of the Serbian Orthodox Church as a social actor has exactly determined the course of the development of the *Vidovdan* Discourse towards having an ideological background promoting the Christian faith.

After taking this “form”, the mythical essence of the *Vidovdan* Discourse has been discursively recontextualised many times, almost always in relation to the discursive construction of national (collective) identity. An interesting example of the recontextualisation of the *Vidovdan* Discourse, is Ivan Meštrović’s sculpture, the *Vidovdan* Temple. Meštrović, a Croatian artist, was, through an artistic installation, trying to recontextualise the *Vidovdan* Discourse by discursively constructing another nation – Yugoslavian:

²² “I dette vil [de] inkludere alle de måter å bygge opp en forståelse av fortiden på som finnes i vårt samfunn.”

²³ “Samlet refererer krigshistorien ikke bare hva som rent faktisk hendte gjennom fem år, den er i seg selv uttrykk for en svært omfattende kulturell fortolkningsprosess, der store deler av befolkning har tatt del.”

At the opening of his exhibition in London on 24 June 1915 Ivan Meštrović stressed that all Yugoslavs have their Kosovo – in addition to the Serbs, the Croatian Kosovo is the place where Croatian peoples' king Petar Svačić was killed by the soldiers of the Hungarian King Koloman, while the Bosnian Kosovo is the place where Turks killed King Tvrtko Kotromanić and conquered Bosnia. (Trgovčević, n.d.)²⁴

The celebrations of *Vidovdan* have also been an ideal opportunity of constructing national identity and “flagging the nation”.²⁵ As Billig (1995: 95) pointed out, a nation would die out “[if not] put to daily use”. By sharing the memory of the same history, members of one “imagined community”²⁶ also share commemorative holidays whose celebration puts the nation or the memory of a nation, into daily use.

This and many other perceptions of collective memory in connection to the Kosovo myth, in both its mythical and historical perspectives, bear many layers of symbolic meaning. Some of those meanings are determined through the ideological functions of the Kosovo myth, or more specifically, the role this myth might have in modern Serbian society.

Ana Antic (2005: 191ff.), according to Pål Kolstø's classification (ibid.: 1ff.) in *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, gives an overview of these layers of interpretation of the *Vidovdan* Discourse as a *myth of antiquity*, an *antemurale myth*, a *sui generis myth* and a *myth of martyrdom*. Vjekoslav Perica (2002) includes also a *myth of the sacred centre* (a Jerusalem myth).

Although all of these have been realised in *Dnevnik's* representation of *Vidovdan* celebrations (in co-texts to the analysed material as well, see examples) two of the ideological presentations of the *Vidovdan* Discourse have been of particular importance for the analysed material: the *myth of martyrdom* and the *myth of the sacred centre* (the Jerusalem myth):

- *antemurale* (interpreted as a “wall of protection”): “St. Vitus's Day 1389 was a day of eternal significance and that is, more for Europe than for Serbia”. (Ratko Marković, *Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 03:58);²⁷

²⁴ http://www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/sanu/KOS_MIT.html, accessed 4 February 2010.

²⁵ The phrase “flagging the nation” is borrowed from and relates to Billig's concept of “banal nationalism” that implies that we are “constantly reminded that ‘we’ live in nations: ‘our’ identity is continually being flagged” (Billig 1995: 93).

²⁶ Benedict Anderson (2002) defines a nation as a community which is “imagined” because people live as a part of and in this community, sharing one collective identity without being aware of each others existence, or as Line Esborg (2008: 21) paraphrases it: “The nation is like a deep horizontal comradeship, a “we” even though “we” do not know each other”. ‘Nasjonen lignes med et dypt horisontalt kameratskap, et “vi” til tross for at “vi” ikke kjenner hverandre’.

²⁷ “Vidovdan 1389. godine je dan večnog značaja i to više za Evropu, nego za Srbiju.”

- *myth of antiquity* (interpreted as proof of Serbian *eternal* existence in Kosovo): “[...]Serbs, who have had Kosmet as their fatherland for centuries”. (Patriarch Irinej, *Dnevnik* 28 June 2010, 05:42),²⁸
- *sui generis myth* (interpreted with the claim “we were there first”): realized in the name issue (see Section 5.2.3).

In the end, the discursive nature of this collective memory is more than obvious in the Kosovo conflict, where competing narratives, which include elements of the above-mentioned myths, seem to play an important role in *proving* that Kosovo is Serbian (or Albanian). *Cuius fabula eius regio!*²⁹

Collective memory and discourse. As I underlined in the previous section of the text, collective memory is in this thesis considered to be discursively constructed. All the segments of collective memory (history, myth, ideological functions) are language constructions that are manifested through discourse in a specific context. Therefore this segment includes a short exploration of the connection between collective memory and mediated discourse.

In all the ways already described, a specific story about an event stored in the minds of every member of a community, is often “refreshed” by the state, media, history textbooks or museums (Nora, cited in Zerubavel 2003: 316). As Esborg (2008: 23) notices, the celebration of national holidays shows “how the national identity is produced in the areas that are not usually seen as political [...] in thousands of homes, in the company of family members, friends and colleagues”.

This interpretation, accepted in my thesis as well, suggests that the *narrative*, which is a product of collective memory, is being *retold* and therefore mediated especially through Public Calendric Rituals. The mediators in that process, “groups in power, control or impose the content of social memories, and ‘invented’ memories serve their current purposes” (Šarić and Gammelgaard 2012: 24).

The discussion in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3 on the ideological power of the media in constructing public opinion is completely applicable to the use, recycling and changing of collective memory. But, as also pointed out, the media’s own conception is also discursively constructed by powerful elites. It seems also that the story of power relations goes in circles: “Elites who have access to mass media, and who thereby control the production and

²⁸ “Srbi, kojima je Kosmet vekovna otadžbina.”

²⁹ Whose story, his realm. Alluding to the Latin proverb: “Cuius regio, eius religio” (Whose realm, his religion).

reproduction, creation, and recreation of narratives, acquire more power (van Dijk 2005)” (ibid.).

Following this argument, *Dnevnik* could in its discourse, contribute to not just creating a certain perception of the Kosovo myth, but also a perception of its ideological use as well, through a positive or negative representation of social actors that give that perception.

Vidovdan, as the day when the Kosovo myth experiences its annual revival, when the conflicts in Kosovo become somehow more vivid and the Serbs as victims more visible, when the Kosovo myth shows its political face all over again, is also the day when the Serbian Orthodox Church, via the *Vidovdan* Discourse finds its way into the political life of Serbia:

Vidovdan is one of those holidays – when the Serbian Orthodox Church has an opportunity to inform the nation about its view of the current political situation, when – as our ancestors said – it [the Church] points out the problems that stand in the way of development and give guidelines for further action. (Čolović 29 June 2007)³⁰

³⁰ “Vidovdan je jedan od onih praznika koji su za Srpsku pravoslavnu crkvu prilika da narodu saopšti svoje viđenje aktuelnih političkih prilika, da – kako su govorili naši stari – ukaže na probleme koji stoje na putu razvoja i da smernice za dalju akciju”.

3 The Methodological Frame

3.1 Introduction

Methods in scientific research are meant to reveal the procedure one used while conducting the research. Since the choice of research methods depends on the research question, the approach chosen in this analysis has to be understood in relation to the study's object: the TV representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration in the period 2000-2011.

A research method on discourse in relation to TV journalism can be either *qualitative* or *quantitative* or a combination of the two. If a researcher chooses to focus on finding the answer to the question “*how many* newscast there are, *how many* news reports that are dealing with the particular subject there are, *how many* [...]”³¹ (Waldahl, Andersen, Rønning 2002: 42), the research method is quantitative. Wodak (2008: 2) has explained that, due to the both cultural and linguistic turns in social sciences, qualitative analysis has become more suitable than quantitative for conducting research. As this thesis aims to answer a *how* question, the choice of the method fell on qualitative, a discourse analytical method. Critical discourse analysis that has influenced my work, bases its theory on the dialectical relationship between society and the discourse: society changes the discourse, but any change in discourse causes changes in society as well.

I am quite aware of the fact that I discuss the changes in use of *Vidovdan* Discourse that occurred on the basis of political and social changes in Serbia. Since discourse both constitutes and is constituted by society, it remains an open question if the discourse changes caused changes in society. In order to do so, it would be desirable to, besides doing an analysis of the material, invest some time in qualitative fieldwork that might have provided a perspective on how the same, analysed discourse might have changed Serbian society. Since I live and work in Norway, this aim was not practically achievable for me, knowing that the fieldwork should ideally last a few months in order to provide some meaningful data. On the other hand, I have made shorter trips to Serbia on a couple of occasions for the purposes of collecting material, primary and secondary sources, and still do have contact with people living in Serbia, including my family. For parts of the analysed period, until I came to Norway in 2005, I was “living that discourse”.

³¹ “[H]vor mange nyhetssendinger som finnes, hvor mange nyhetsinnslag der er om ulike emner, hvor mange [...]”

Implementing Van Dijk's notions on CDA and DA (see Section 2.1), I base my methodological approach in this thesis on a blend of several theories and methods. The *interdisciplinary* side of this research is mainly presented in the theoretical approach, which is a blend of culture-historical, historical, and critical discourse-analytical perspectives on media studies. In my quest to answer the research question, I had to juggle these perspectives, using them as tools in connection to my research.

CDA as a method, which inspired me in my research, is fascinating because of the extreme variation of strategies used and philosophical/theoretical approaches that are, first of all, dependent on the analysed material. This means that no one can copy the methodological approach of a scholar developing a CDA. None of the scholars that define their research as CDA is following the same research path, but most of them base their research on a similar theoretical (maybe more explicit: philosophical) understanding of CDA. Globally, critical discourse analysts have the same philosophical understanding of discourse as a social action, but in practice CDA-analysts implement tools that are adjusted to the analysed text.

Different schools were developed within CDA, based on different interpretations of the same philosophical basis. These schools might differ in the use of strategies but they keep both characteristics of a critical research and special aspects (postulates) of CDA (see Section 2.2.1). Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258-284) define and describe the work of seven schools that follow the theoretical mainlines of CDA. Both theoretically and methodically, my work is based on a combination of four of these: social semiotics (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006; Pollak 2008), sociocultural change and change in discourse (Fairclough 1995), socio-cognitive studies (van Dijk 1988; partly Chilton and Schäffner 1997: 206-230; Chilton 2004) and the discourse-historical method (Wodak 2008; Wodak et al. 2009). As all of these schools have useful segments to offer in decomposing a TV News discourse, their combined version, used in this thesis, will hopefully provide the tools for a fruitful analysis of *Dnevnik's* representation of *Vidovdan* celebrations. In the theoretical part of this thesis (2.2.1 and 2.2.2) the main theoretical principles CDA is based on are explained. In the same part I explain why those principles are considered to be important in the analysis of TV news material.

3.2 Methodological Approach in Conducting the Analysis

While conducting this research, I carried out following analytical steps:

1. Formulating the research question (see Section 1.1);
2. Collection of material (both newspaper articles and video material);
3. Limitation of corpus (video material) (see Appendix 1);
4. Narrowing the corpus to segments dealing with the *Vidovdan* celebration;
5. Transcription of the video material (see Appendix 2);
6. Table schematic representation of the key elements in the corpus: description and interpretation (see Appendix 3 and Tables 3; 4; 5; 6);
7. Narrowing the corpus to the segments dealing with the *Vidovdan* celebration in Gračanica and on Gazimestan;
8. Narrowing of corpus to the four selected years: 2000, 2001, 2006, and 2011. For a general explanation on the principles of selection see Section 1.1;
9. Describing the context;
10. The selection of representative parts of image mode material and "freezing" images;
11. The final phase of the research represents the analysis of the multimodal text selected in the previous steps (Section 5).

3.3 Researcher's position

On one hand, as a native speaker of Serbian and a resident in Serbia until recently, I have an understanding of the Serbian discourse at quite a deep level that has made it possible for me to spot some of the implications, intertextualities and implemented linguistic strategies. At the same time, I am, as the theory I am using in this work explains, also the product of Serbian society: as I was born and raised there. I am therefore aware that this thesis, a Discourse itself, is founded on intertextuality and necessarily implements some subjective views. My text becomes, in that way, by no means different to the text I am analysing. But, being aware of that is a move toward a critical research agenda. In the context of discourse analysis, though, this kind of involvement is usually understood as positive:

Because analysts are often part of the culture under study, they share many of the taken-for-granted, common-sense understandings expressed in the material. The difficulty is that it is precisely the common-sense understandings that are to be investigated: analysis focuses on how some statements are accepted as true or ‘naturalized’, and others are not. (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 21)

3.4 The Corpus

Originally, and according to the research questions, I decided to focus on the media representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration based on newspaper articles. In the early phase of this work, the main focus was the gathering of newspaper material. During this phase, a change occurred and the focus changed to the TV News material, primarily that of the national television RTS – *Radio-televizija Srbije* (Serbian Radio and Television) and its news programme *Dnevnik 2*.³² The archive of the earlier collected material (newspaper articles from 27, 28, 29 June from the dailies *Politika* (Politics), *Borba* (The Battle), *Glas javnosti* (Voice of public), *Novosti* (The News), *Danas* (Today), as well as TV and internet material of B92) has since been used either as material for comparison or as material for collecting contextual information.

The corpus used in this analysis represent twelve *Dnevniks*, each broadcasted on the 28 June of a specific year at 19.30.

3.4.1 Dnevnik and RTS

The concept of *Dnevnik* is familiar to the rest of the world. In the former Yugoslavia (SFRJ and SRJ) *Dnevnik* was also the central news programme, broadcast on the First channel, and most of the former Yugoslav republics kept the same name for their main news programmes.³³ In Serbia, *Dnevnik* is broadcast on the first channel of the national television broadcaster, RTS1, and sums up the most important national and international news of the day. Structurally, *Dnevnik* is a

³² *Dnevnik 1* is broadcasted earlier in the day. *Dnevnik 2* is the central news programme, so when one usually refers to *Dnevnik*, one means *Dnevnik 2*. In this text, *Dnevnik 2* will always be referred to as just *Dnevnik*.

³³ Bosnia and Herzegovina: <http://www.bhrt.ba/lat/default.wbsp?p=35&n=1589>;

Montenegro: <http://rtcg.me/program/programska-sema/rtv-stanice.html>;

Croatia: <http://raspored.hrt.hr/?raspored=1&datum=2012-03-11>;

Macedonia: <http://www.mtv.com.mk/MK/programa/ponedelnik.aspx>. Slovenia is the only exception – the central informative show is named *Zrcalo tedna* (the Mirror of the Day):

http://www.rtvsl.si/spored/modload.php?&c_mod=rtvodddaje&op=web&func=read&c_id=22081. All websites accessed 11 March 2012.

Kosovo and Vojvodina use non Slavic languages as well, and have a similar concept broadcast at 19.30, though in Albanian and Hungarian respectively: *Lajmet* (News): <http://www.rtklive.com/new/rtk/> and *Híradó* (Signal):

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoL-H2p824c>, accessed 3 November 2012.

collage composed of several different genres: interviews, filmed and edited video material, reports and analysis from experts and live broadcasting from the studio. RTS *Dnevnik* is advertised as the most popular news program in Serbia,³⁴ aired strategically, as in most of the countries with the same concept, at 19.30. With variations, it lasts usually 30 minutes.

Partial information on ratings is available online,³⁵ but it was generally difficult to find official information on ratings for the whole analysed period (2000-2011)³⁶ or comparative ratings. RTS published ratings a few times, and based on the source AGB Nielsen, “Drugi Dnevnik svih pet decenija je najgledanija informativna emisija u zemlji”. ‘*Dnevnik 2* is for all five decades the news programme with the highest rating in the country’. (RTS 13 November 2008).³⁷ Radović (2010: 2)³⁸ has, for the purpose of her master thesis, quoted unpublished research done by Senić (2009) and on the basis of the data delivered by AGB Nielsen, stating that *Dnevnik* “has the highest ratings among the ten most popular news programs in the country for the period 2003-2009 (with exception of 2008)”.

One of the postulates in this thesis and a theoretical axiom is that (media) discourses are not just a part of social action: media discourses also actively influence social action. TV, being the most commonly used information source nowadays, creates and shapes views, defines our standpoints and modifies our perception about the subject in question. In that sense, the ratings and trust in *Dnevnik* as the most reliable news programme is quite important in the postulate that

³⁴ “Dnevnik: Najgledanija informativna emisija u Srbiji. U 19.30 na Prvom i Satelitskom programu RTS-a i u 21.00 na našem internet portalu”. ‘*Dnevnik*: the most popular informative program in Serbia. 19.30 on the First [RTS1] and Satellite RTS program and 21.00 on our internet portal’.

<http://www.rts.rs/page/tv/sr/series/20/RTS+1/35/Dnevnik.html>, accessed 11 March 2012.

³⁵ Mainly for 2011/12. A list of publications on research about ratings available for period 2007-2012. Weekly ratings show separate numbers for each TV programme (cf.

<http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/CIPA/story/265/Vesti/1201188/Sedmični+pregled+gledanosti+televizije.html>,

accessed 3 November 2012). Quarterly ratings are based on numbers for the whole of RTS1 in comparison to other TV stations in Serbia (cf.

<http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/CIPA/story/171/Istraživanje/1189232/Izveštaji+o+gledanosti+TV+programa.html>,

accessed 3 November 2012). Yearly ratings (for 2011 only) show both (see

<http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/CIPA/story/171/Istraživanje/12163/Izveštaji+o+gledanosti+TV+programa.html>,

accessed 3 November 2012).

³⁶ AGB Nielsen has been conducting research for RTS. These data are partially available online on the site of RTS (2007-2012). I have tried to contact RTS on several occasions: 31 January 2011 (e-mail), 3 March 2011 (telephone), 2 August 2011 (e-mail), 27 September 2011 (e-mail), and then again 3 November 2012, via RTS’ offer: *Pitajte generalnog direktora RTS-a*, ‘Ask RTS’ director’:

<http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/javniservis/story/283/Pitajte+RTS/1146878/Pitajte+generalnog+direktora+RTS-a.html>,

none of these were answered. On 31 October 2011 I sent an e-mail to *Istraživanje i izdavaštvo RTS*, (Research and publishing RTS). I got an answer 1 November 2011 that “the independent provider AGB Nielsen delivers data on ratings”. After contacting AGB Nielsen (1 November 2011, telephone), I got the response that the research is done for the needs of RTS that *owns* this data. I got an offer to buy this data, which I choose not to do.

³⁷ <http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/sr/javniservis/RTS+50/story/251/I+dan/27308/Najbolje+od+RTS-a.html>, accessed 4 November 2012.

³⁸ http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/743, accessed 1 November 2011.

Dnevnik and the way it presents information creates, influences and changes society, as well as influencing the creation of background information and their audience's perception of the world.

During the 90's RTS, with the nickname *TV Bastilja* (TV Bastion), was stamped as Milošević's "third foundation of power" (in addition to the control he had over financial institutions and the police) (Ramet 2006: 498) and was completely controlled by the regime, picturing Serbs as "always and everywhere innocent victims" (ibid.). There is no doubt that RTS during the 90's was biased. In 1999, during the Kosovo war, RTS was "intentionally bombed [... and this] was part of a planned attack aimed at disrupting and degrading the C3 (Command, Control and Communications) network" (Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY n.d.).³⁹ A story of RTS as a Milošević instrument for "controlling the masses" was mentioned and discussed in several scholarly publications (Mihelj, Bajt and Pankov 2008: 98-125; Gordy 1999; Ramet 2006: 497-499). RTS's covering of the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 has also earned scholar's attention (Hammond and Herman 2000; Goff and Trionfi 1999). The most obvious characteristic of *RTS*'s language during the bombing was an "us/them" binary opposition (a list of some is available in Goff and Trionfi 1999: 534-536) that is also present in the only sample of *Dnevnik* from the Milošević's era included in my material, 2000.

It is up for discussion to what degree the politics of manipulation of information by the state-owned RTS channel and the influence "from above" has changed over the years (see Amis 2006⁴⁰ and Amis 2005⁴¹), but RTS did go through a couple of reformation processes which included a EU sponsored training programme, conducted by the BBC World Service Trust (2008: 12). Officially, during the first decade after the change of Milošević's regime, RTS worked on developing a modern and unbiased TV station that "[n]eguj[e] vrednosti demokratskog društva, oslobođen uticaja političke pristrasnosti, [...] doprinosi boljem kvalitetu života svakog pojedinca i društva u celini", 'cherish[es] the values of a democratic society, free from influence of political bias, [...] contributes to a better life quality of individuals and society as a whole' (RTS, n.d.).⁴² The democratic tendencies of *New RTS* are reflected in two main slogans: "Radio-televizija Srbije, Vaše pravo da znate sve", 'Radio Television Serbia, your right to know everything' and "Gledaj. Slušaj. Misli", 'Watch. Listen. Think'. In 2011, RTS officially apologized to the peoples of Serbia's neighbouring countries who, during the 90's in the

³⁹ Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Part B, iii, 71 and 72,

http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf, accessed 29 February 2012.

⁴⁰ <http://www.globalpolitician.com/21546-yugoslavia-kosovo>, accessed 10 February 2012.

⁴¹ <http://www.globalpolitician.com/2619-yugoslavia>, accessed 10 February 2012.

⁴² <http://www.rts.rs/page/rts/ci.html>, accessed 13 December 2011.

programming of RTS “had been subject to insults, slander and content to match today's legal definition of hate speech”. (Upravni odbor RTS-a 2011).⁴³

And still, there is no doubt that RTS and its news programme did distance from and change the political background that it had during the 90's and while supporting Milošević's regime. But, as this thesis aims to investigate 1) Is RTS really treating all peoples, all classes and religions in Serbia equally? and 2) Is RTS as democratic and free from influence from the politics of the ruling regime(s) as it claims to be?

3.4.2 Preparation of the Material for the Analysis

In order to analyse the material in the most effective way, I prepared it by selecting the reports about *Vidovdan* from the rest of *Dnevnik* and *writing them down*. The transcribed version of these reports is included in the Appendix 2 (on the DVD).

Audio: At this stage, my initial audio-visual (multimodal) discourse lost one dimension. Due to the limitation of this thesis, and the choice rather to focus on several different periods than to include audio elements in detail, comments on pronunciation especially, intonation or some other phonetic features of the analysed texts are excluded. The dimension of the audio is commented on to that extent that all spoken material is distinguished from written on the screen (paratext). One other element of audio material is also of importance: the possibility of multidimensional intertextuality (see Section 5.4).

Visual: This dimension plays an important role in my analysis. Based partly on the theoretical and methodological principles of social semiotics, I analyse the video material in segments, *as if they were pictures*. Essentially, I “froze” some parts I consider important or representative using the *print screen* and *transcribed* parts of them both by including their description (what I saw) in the overview table (see Tables 3; 4; 5; 6; and Appendix 3) and in Appendix 2 as a part of the transcribed audio material. There where the motion, the linking between images or transition from one image to another, was an important element of the analysis, a notion on that is also included. Otherwise, on the theory behind the analysis of images, see Section 2. The original material, with complete *Dnevnik* programmes is included on a DVD at the end of this thesis (Appendix 1).

⁴³ <http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2011/05/23/1379756/Programska%20izjava%20UO%20RTS.pdf>, accessed 24 May 2011.

4 “All our *Vidovdans*”;⁴⁴ the Historical Overview

For, in Kosovo, history is not really about the past, but about the future.

In other words, he who holds the past holds the future. (Judah 2000: 2)

One of the things that I have learned while working on this thesis is the amount of events that happened on 28 June throughout Yugoslav history. Working on this thesis proved that history, its versions (myths derived from it), and collective memory derived from the two, play an extremely important role in the mind of the Serbs. Telling the story behind the holiday named *Vidovdan* helps, therefore, in understanding the analysis (Section 5). Besides that, CDA places a great focus on the context in which every discourse develops. In Section 2.2.2 I dealt with some working definitions of key terms used in this paper. As pointed out there, the line between context and discourse is difficult to define. Interplay between *discourses* on different levels (intertextuality) and *context* are extremely important in conducting a critical discourse analysis. If a Discourse is one specific way of understanding reality, the Kosovo myth, as understood and realised in Serbian reality, is *the* Discourse actualized in the analysed material. This section is, therefore, a direct introduction to the analysis and the most important part in understanding it.

Celebrating *Vidovdan*, one commemorates, first of all, the Battle of Kosovo, but other things, as well. Since the time of the battle in 1339, other significant events happening on the same date have enriched previous knowledge of and the importance of *Vidovdan* in Serbia. Sherman (1996: 186) sees commemoration as “the *practice* of representation that enacts and gives social substance to the discourse of collective memory”. Celebration of *Vidovdan* is indeed the representation of recycled collective memory and of the “original” *story* about the Kosovo battle. Every *Vidovdan* celebration is based therefore, on the replayed *Vidovdan story* adjusted to other contemporary stories. Simply said, in order to keep the memory of the Kosovo battle and *Vidovdan* alive, whatever the motivation for that might be, one needs to *tell* and *re-tell* to the people why *Vidovdan* is so important and why it is being celebrated. That *story*, in its many shapes and forms, is the *Vidovdan* Discourse.

⁴⁴ The title is borrowed from the daily *Politika* (Politics) - “Svi naši Vidovdani” (Matović 29 June 2008). Available online at <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Tema-nedelje/svi-nasi-vidovdani/Svi-nashi-Vidovdani.sr.html>, accessed 25 May 2011.

To start with, in Section 4.1 I present the Kosovo myth and its parallels to the myth of Christ. The Serbian Orthodox Church might be using the “Christianisation” of the Kosovo myth in order to popularise the faith or adjust it to Serbian conditions. By making *one of the most important Serbian stories* more Christian, on the other hand, the Serbian Orthodox Church might be defining the national identity as close as possible to the religious. In this section, the source(s) of this myth are presented as well as the historical vs. the mythical presentation of the Kosovo battle.

Section 4.2 has a main goal to list the important, firstly political, events that have happened on *Vidovdan*, accidentally or not. Myths and truths in these stories about the Kosovo battle have shaped Serbian national identity and influenced Serbian politics towards Kosovo. Van Dijk (2001) and Chilton (2004) single out long-term knowledge as one of the most important factors in understanding a discourse.

[T]he analysis of the organization and the application of knowledge and beliefs in memory becomes just as important as the description of the role of discourse structures during comprehension processes. It was shown that the knowledge must be efficiently organized in special clusters, so-called *scripts*,⁴⁵ which contain all we know in our culture about a specific stereotypical type of episode. (Van Dijk 1988: 13-14)

“Background information”, “scripts”, “scenarios”, “schemata” are the names used by different CDA analysts, for the knowledge learned (either consciously or not) and stored in a long-term memory. “Background information” “frames” any new information and allows one to *read/hear/see* and understand a new discourse in a certain way (Chilton 2004: 51). When learning a language, we learn words and their meanings, as well as meanings of word combinations. During that process we also “fill out” meanings with a specific set of *stories* or *knowledge* that, governed by the rules of language economy, allow us to be understood without needing to verbalize all components of some contextualized meaning. Hence, it is important to bear in mind that one and the same event can be interpreted using different and at times competing frames. In practice, one might call *Vidovdan: sveti srpski dan*, ‘holy Serbian day,’ (Marković, *Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 03:00) or claim that that is the day when “Srbima [se] malo kad događalo nešto lepo,” ‘hardly anything good ever happened to the Serbs’ (Matović, *Politika* 29 June 2008). Obviously the two speakers have focused on different information in their frames. The first one focuses on the interpretation of the battle of Kosovo as a Christian *victory*,

⁴⁵ Italics are mine.

and the second one on *all the other* aspects of *Vidovdan* (the assassination in Sarajevo, the break between Tito and Stalin, Milošević's speech in 1989, and the military aspect of the battle in 1389) that were interpreted as *defeats*. The information that follows in this Section presents the different frames needed to understand the reports on *Vidovdan*.

In this section I implement the theory of the social production of memory on the creation of the Kosovo myth and show how this myth, through the years might have been recycled. As shown in the example above, how one interprets the meaning of a word is influenced by one's knowledge, beliefs, feelings, cultural predispositions, and political orientation (just to mention a couple of influences). What I also try to do in this section is to peel off the layers of meanings that have been stored in the word *Vidovdan*. I do that by representing the following "conceptual blends" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) *Vidovdan* is made of 1) the blending of "the Christian" and "the pagan", 2) blending of "the religious" and "the political", 3) The blending of religious and national identity.

4.1 Heavenly People and Sacred Serbian Land – the Kosovo Myth

The story usually referred to as the Kosovo myth stands centrally in the Serbian collective memory. Interestingly enough, this story (myth) is more like a series of religious, national and political myths.

The popular meaning of the word "myth" is "a false story", even though the word comes from the Greek *mythos*, meaning just 'a story', and has acquired, the meaning "a sacred story" as defined by religious and cultural historians. These kind of stories "must be [true] for the believer, because such stories reveal something of great importance about the meaning of human life and about the universe in which we live and die" (Kessler 2006: 71). It is, therefore, of crucial understanding that it is not important if the myth elements are true or false, hence – mythical or historical, but that they do explain "the universe we live and die in", taking that "we" are the Serbs and their "universe", Serbia.

Some use the word "legend" (see for example Roudometof 2005; Zirojević 2000) instead of "myth". This is somehow more accurate, since the story these words refer to, depicts the historical Battle of Kosovo in 1389. By using the word "legend" one does not exclude "the

historical” part of the story, but just sets up two bulks: the made up (mythical) story about the Kosovo battle (elements of that story are the subject of this section) and the historical one.⁴⁶

Table 1 presents the overview of historical and mythical elements of the event that is so deeply rooted in the Serbian collective memory: the Kosovo battle. The Kosovo battle and the myth of the glorious choice of the heavenly kingdom, alongside all the other interpretations of the Kosovo myth, have developed in need of definition of “Serbdom” and Serbian. The (re-)use of this myth has been “popular” whenever there was the need for defining “Serbian”, be it the Serbian national revival during the nineteenth century, or nationalist politics of the 90’s. This “mutation” of the Kosovo myth, the myth of heavenly Serbia and of Serbs as special, heavenly people, connected to God directly,⁴⁷ through the Lazar’s choice, has become the dominant Serbian myth, according to cultural anthropologist Branimir Anzulović (1999: 4). As such, the Kosovo myth, looking at the way it has been used in public spheres, represents the founding myth of the *srpstvo*, ‘Serbdom’. As the myth with eschatological theme, it is often taken to mark the beginning of the “dark age” in Serbian history, which is used as the main argument for the alleged decline in Serbian culture.⁴⁸

Key points of the Kosovo myth (see the Table 1) are the Serbian loss of independence, as, after the battle, a “five hundred years long night” and “slavery” began for the Serbs; the mythical hero Miloš Obilić,⁴⁹ claimed to have killed Ottoman Sultan Murat I; the mythical choice of “heavenly” rather than “earthly kingdom” by prince Lazar, who led the army in the Kosovo battle; and the mythical betrayal of Vuk Branković,⁵⁰ a Serbian nobleman. The combined version of the presented mythical elements and the interpretation of those resulted in a presentation of the Serbian army as a bulwark of Christianity. The self-proclaimed victim role, comprehended as the result of great loss of Serbian independence and suffering of the nation, is almost literally taken from the myth of Christ. The borderlines of the myth and the history are blurry, as some of the Serbian history books present history emphasising mentioned mythical

⁴⁶ I shall use the word “myth”, as that is the one most common in the literature about the Kosovo battle and its use in the public discourses.

⁴⁷ However, worth noting is that this seems not to be an exclusively Serbian phenomenon: “For Dostoyevsky, Christ is a Russian, for Kazantzakis, the Creator is personification of the Greek *romiosini*”. (Mylonas 2003: 60).

⁴⁸ The phrase “Turci su nas unazadili...” ‘The Turks have downgraded us...’ is quite common to see on different forums or in comments to Internet articles, no matter whether one talks about the current political situation or the Serbian Middle Ages. See for example “HybridCultures” comment on: http://www.youtube.com/all_comments?v=7xrXRWWHqqI, accessed 18 November 2011.

⁴⁹ This name is the one which is commonly referred to when mentioning this person, although in some sources also known as Miloš Kobilić, or as Albanian version Di Lellio and Elsie (2009), Milosh Kopiliq.

⁵⁰ Vuk Branković is Obilić’s antipode in the Serbian folklore. He is a historical person, the son in law of prince Lazar. Supposedly, he betrayed Lazar in the Kosovo battle by retreating. In the Serbian collective memory, this betrayal marked Branković as one of the negative figures in Serbian history.

elements. Political scientist Ana Antić (2005: 191-222) wrote an article analysing the mythical perceptions included in Serbian public and history writings. According to Antić, Serbian history books regarding the Kosovo battle and medieval Serbia are full of “historically problematic approaches” (ibid 192). Antić alludes on the implied deliberate sacrifice of the Serbian warriors to ensure the subsistence of the whole Christianity in historical textbooks (ibid).

In the current history curriculum, the part on medieval Serbia and the battle of Kosovo is taught in the sixth grade of primary and the second grade of high school. Both history books elaborate on the “Kosovo legend” and how it was created, stating openly that:

In the minds of the generations to come, the Battle of Kosovo was taken as a landmark event to mark the downfall of the empire. In the line with this, Prince Lazar appears in the legend with the title of tsar. The loss of the state had to be explained and justified. (Bubalo and Bečanović 2008: 201).

Even though both of the books claim that Branković was unjustly accused of betrayal, and “admit” (in the sentence above) that Prince Lazar’s figure has been mythicized, some of the historically problematic elements are still to be found in the historical textbooks in use. For instance, both of the textbooks assure us (without any doubt) that Miloš Obilić, a Serbian knight, was the hero that killed Murat I, the leader of the Ottoman army in the Kosovo battle. This fact was never historically confirmed and is still a matter of discussion in historian circles (Popović 1976; Judah 2009: 32). As shown in Table 1, according to the historical sources, the troops fighting under the leadership of Prince Lazar were not exclusively Serbian (with the help of some Bosnian troops) as claimed in Serbian history textbooks. On the contrary, historians claim that the army opposing the Ottomans was more a kind of union of Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians and Romanians (Kolstø 2005: 24; Judah 2008: 20, 2009: 31). Neither of the books mentions the role of the Church in creating the myth and the promoting of the myth during and from the 19th century onward.

The history textbooks are just a small (but important) contribution to the collective memory universe of the Kosovo battle. These texts are what Serbian children accept as “doubtless sources”. Alongside with films, books, epic poetry, speeches, media stories (including the ones on the *Vidovdan* celebration) these texts intertextualize the Kosovo myth story and they do have an active part in creating the *frames* (see Chilton 2004: 51). The role of individual frames⁵¹ that every person might have when *Vidovdan* or Kosovo is mentioned is not

⁵¹ All personal experiences, thoughts, dialogues and such like that one connects with the particular mention of Kosovo battle, *Vidovdan* or Kosovo always make a part of the background information (frame).

of significance in this thesis, though the acknowledgement of their existence is important. The assumed *collective frame* that Maurice Halbwachs named *collective memory* is the discursive and social construction of the dominant group in the society (1992).⁵²

Table 1 The overview of the history and the myth on the Battle of Kosovo

History	Myth ⁵³
1) The army that probably consisted of Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians and Romanians, led by Serbian Prince (<i>knez</i>) Lazar fought against the Ottoman army led by Sultan Murat I on the Kosovo field in 1389 (Kolstø 2005: 24; Judah 2008: 20, 2009: 31).	1) The Serbian army fought the Ottoman army on Kosovo field 1389. The night before the battle, <i>Tsar</i> Lazar got the choice: heavenly or the earthly kingdom. He chose heavenly, and the whole army took holy communion from Orthodox priests.
2) Under the battle, Vuk Branković, Lazar's son in law, retreated, but he fought loyally in the Christian army (Anzulović 1999: 184).	2) Vuk Branković betrays Lazar, and Serbs lose the battle.
3) The Ottoman Sultan was murdered during the battle by a knight. Neither the name nor the origin of the knight are confirmed by the historians (Popović 1976; Judah 2009: 32).	3) Serbian knight Miloš Obilić kills Murat I, as to fulfil the promise he gave under the Prince Lazar's dinner, and confirms that he is not a traitor, as accused by Branković.
4) The first news of the battle was that the Christian army had won the battle as both Lazar and Murat were killed under the battle, but it was later described by historians as a military defeat as Murat's son Bayazit took over after the Murat's death and finished the battle. (Emmert 1990: 61; Anzulović 1999: 12)	4) The Serbs have lost the battle, as chosen by Lazar and got the heavenly kingdom instead. The best knights have died in order to be a part of that kingdom: the knight who killed Murat – Miloš Obilić, Toplica Milan (not known in history), Kosančić Ivan (not known in history), nine Jugovića and Jug Bogdan.
5) The battle was not really that important, as the Serbs really fell under the Ottomans some seventy years later. In historical sense, the battle at Marica (1371) was more important for the Balkans than this one (Ramet 1996: 358; Anzulović 1999: 12; Antić in <i>Večernje novosti</i> 27 June 2009).	5) The battle is extremely important in Serbian history as the Serbs were, after that day, under the Ottoman Sultan.
6) The <i>millet</i> system, which functioned as a kind of pre-modern religious pluralism, allowed the existence of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This kind of religious freedom was rather advanced for other countries in the middle ages (Anzulović 1999: 25; Mønnesland 2006: 95f.).	6) A “five hundred-years-long-night” begins after the battle. The Ottomans, primitive Muslims, have stopped and downgraded the Serbian rich medieval culture.

⁵² See also the theoretical introduction to the term *collective memory* in Section 2.4 and the discussion about competing memories later in this text.

⁵³ The summary of the mythical elements presented in this table is made on the basis of Anzulović 1999; Duijzings 2000; Judah 2008, 2009; Mertus 1999; Popović 1976; Zirojević 2000, epic poetry, folk songs, film *Boj na Kosovu* (The Kosovo Battle) (Šotra 1989) and such like those I was in contact with while living in Serbia.

What is striking is that the military defeat of the Kosovo battle and the myth, born from the story about the battle, was given such a huge place in the collective memory of the Serbs. On the other hand, as Roudometof (2002: 10) pointed out, the peoples in the Balkans all celebrate “an uprising, revolution, battle, or other military victory (or defeat)”. The last one, being the case of the Kosovo battle, is the event that has either got importance as a trauma for the nation; as the result of “sacralisation” of the Serbian national identity by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the 19th century or a mixture of both. The role the Serbian Orthodox Church had in “freezing” the 28 June 1389 as a day of biblical importance is mentioned in the Section 4.2.

Branimir Anzulović (1999: 12) implies that, in military terms, the Serbs lost the battle. He argues that the function of the mythical version of the Kosovo battle that occurred in the Serbian collective memory, and especially in its foremost transfer tool: epic poetry, “was to transform alleged military defeat into moral victory”. In doing so, the great national trauma of downfall of the Serbian “empire” would be annulled, even though Sabrina Ramet (1996: 358) argues that Ottoman conquest actually occurred not as the result of battle, but first seventy years later, with the fall of Smederevo. The story of the defeat, and the “moral victory” that goes with it, as a consequence of Lazar’s choice, has remarkable parallels with the story of Christ’s suffering: Lazar, Christ-like figure, devoted to God; Bayazit, Pontius Pilate’s figure that authorised Lazar’s decapitation; the Judas-like figure, the eternal betrayer,⁵⁴ embodied in Vuk Branković; the “Last supper” of the Lazar and his military leaders and even the *Kosovka devojka*⁵⁵ (Kosovo Maiden), whose parallel in the myth of Christ might be Mary Magdalene.

The moral that the Church, in this case, promotes is closely connected with the Christian comprehension of the suffering and the victim-role that stand, as will be shown in the analysis in Section 5, central in the discursive representation of Kosovo during the marking of the Kosovo battle day – *Vidovdan*.

The main source of the myth was folk poetry that had lived its own life until the 19th century, when the awaking of nationalism produced the need for the myth to be written down and used actively as an element in national awaking: “Just as Serbia’s medieval kings were

⁵⁴ Unjustly accused for betrayal (Anzulović 1999: 184 n.5), Branković still remains the synonym for word “traitor”, sometimes equally used as *Judas*. See, for example, text titled *Brankovići* (lit. Brankoviés, *Traitors, Judases*) for the illustration of the word’s use: <http://www.naslovi.net/2008-12-16/kurir/brankovici/960721> (Kurir 16 December 2008, naslovi.net), accessed 18 November 2011.

⁵⁵ A title of an epic poem with a central figure with the same name. *Kosovka devojka* (Kosovo Maiden) does not have a personal name, she should symbolise all the maidens who were left behind in sorrow for their fiancés after the Battle of Kosovo. See the translation of the poem into English here: <http://home.earthlink.net/~markdlew/SerbEpic/maiden.htm>, accessed 1 December 2011.

preserved in paint, stories of a heroic past were preserved in song. Many concerned Lazar, and some may have been the medieval version of propaganda” (Judah 2008:21). The epic poetry is in Serbian literature thematically (and chronologically) named and systematized into cycles. Three of seven are determined in relation to the Kosovo battle: *prekosovski* (before Kosovo battle), *kosovski* (about the Kosovo battle) and *pokosovski* (after the Kosovo battle).

The role of the Church should not though be neglected in the process of “making” collective memory, as I will explain in Section 4.2.1. The Serbian epic folk poem that has been singled out as the main source of the myth (see for example Anzulović 1999: 11f., Duijzings 2000:185) is *Propast carstva srpskog*⁵⁶ (The Downfall of the Serbian Empire)⁵⁷ where the famous choice had been given to Lazar:

“Care Lazo, čestito koleno,
Kome ćeš se privoleti carstvu?
Ili voliš carstvu nebeskome,
Ili voliš carstvu zemaljskome?”

“O, Tsar Lazar, Prince of the righteous lineage,
which of the two kingdoms will you embrace?
Would you rather choose a heavenly kingdom,
Or have instead an earthly kingdom here?”

As Norwegian historian of culture, Anne Eriksen (1999: 13), writes, folk tradition gathers not just historical background information, which should be an objective *mimesis* of the past events,⁵⁸ but as well all the other sources of collective memory, written and unwritten. In this way, one can draw a parallel between how the Serbian “imagined community”, remembered, made, adopted and re-adopted the Kosovo myth and the history of the World War II Eriksen refers to. “All together, the war history [World War II] refers not just to what actually happened during five years, it [the history] is itself an expression of a very extensive cultural interpretation process, in which large parts of the population have taken part”⁵⁹ (Eriksen 1995: 13).

⁵⁶ This epic folk poem is a part of the *kosovski* cycle.

⁵⁷ The translation to English is from Duijzings (2000: 185-186). See Appendix 5 for the whole poem in Serbian.

⁵⁸ Eriksen brings in discussion on the position history writing has, concluding that it could not be a plain mirror of the past events, since ”historien skapes i nåtiden, den er et kulturprodukt oppstått i en bestemt kontekst” (1999: 13).

⁵⁹ “Samlet refererer krigshistorien ikke bare hva som rent faktisk hendte gjennom fem år, den er i seg selv uttrykk for en svært omfattende kulturell fortolkningsprosess, der store deler av befolkning har tatt del.”

4.2 Religious and Political History of *Vidovdan* – the History of Blending

Without analysing in the detail the theory of conceptual blending,⁶⁰ as comprehended by Fauconnier and Turner (2002), I introduce the term and its use in the beginning of this section. To start with, conceptual blending is one of basic mental processes, that allows us to blend two different concepts and produce a new, blended version that has segments of both start concepts, but possesses as well some new characteristics (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 18).

Basically, all blends work in the similar way and are a part of everyday cognitive processes of which humans are not even aware. Fauconnier and Turner dedicated their book “The Way We Think” to explain this phenomenon. They discuss in detail different types of blends on many examples. Their theory bases on the premise that the human mind performs blends unconsciously in a process that bases on imagination (ibid.). One of the examples they use is the *New York Times*’ story “Ghosts of Predators Past”. The story tells the scientist proposition to the question why American pronghorn is faster than any of its modern predators. The scientists think that this animal is so fast because it is “chased by the ghosts of predators past”. This explanation came as a result of the study “showing that even when predators have been gone for hundreds of years, their pray may not have forgotten them” (*New York Times* 24 December 1996, cited in Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 115). Fauconnier and Turner (ibid.: 116) claim that human mind realizes, without any explanation, that there are no real ghosts who chase pronghorn and even more, that there is no talk about one specific pronghorn, but more of the whole species. They claim that we understand that, 1) *caused* by the speed of predators in the past, ancestors of today’s pronghorn had to adapt to the conditions and increase the speed while moving and 2) that this “information” is genetically transferred to pronghorn of today (ibid.).

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) suggest that this understanding is only possible thanks to the process of conceptual blending (they also call it “conceptual integration (network)”). This specific type of blending they call “mirror networks” because of the mirroring of *input mental spaces* first into a *generic mental space* and then into *blended mental space* (ibid.: 40-50). A term *input space* denotes concepts that are being blended, in this case scenario: input space 1 > pronghorn’s ancestors’ being chased by their predators and input space 2 > pronghorn of today

⁶⁰ This theory is slightly simplified and adjusted in order to serve needs of his thesis.

being chased by its predators. These input spaces share the generic space, which includes both pronghorn and the action of being chased. Two input spaces are being mirrored in the blended space as our mind allows us to “run” the story of the ancestors’ chasing parallel to the one of today and “place” today’s pronghorn into the ancestors’ world (even though we know that this is not realistic). This kind of blend is usually presented with the diagram (Figure 3) bellow.⁶¹




Figure 3 Graphical presentation of conceptual blend, mirror network (adapted from Fauconnier and Turner (2002))

As shown in the example above, blending occurs in concrete realizations as sentences or phrases where we clearly see or can guess what the input spaces are. Even though Fauconnier and Turner’s analysis always deals with concrete examples, I argue that many of the blends occur as a project of collective memory process that can compress blended inputs into one and single term. Analysing reports on *Vidovdan*, I realised that some of the basic concepts in Serbian society blend on several different levels. To start with, *Vidovdan* is one of those blends. As the background information supplied in the rest of this Section shows, *Vidovdan* “carries” several blends. Inputs in the case of *Vidovdan* on the first level are pagan and Christian faith. As the Section 4.2.1 shows, *Vidovdan* as a holiday dedicated to a pagan deity is blended with the input space No. 2 – *Vidovdan* as a Christian celebration. More specifically, we cannot see the blend the term *Vidovdan* consists of, unless we have the background information, the knowledge of all different inputs (pagan, Christian, national, political) in this blend. The blending in the *Vidovdan*

⁶¹ Fauconnier and Turner do not present this exact case in their diagrams. This one I have made using the existing one (2002: 46) as a model in the simplified version.

case (or more precisely, in the whole sphere of religious and national identities) is realized in the concrete, discursively created blends. These concrete realizations in the *Vidovdan* Discourse make the blend visible.

More generally, when it comes to blend in case of *Vidovdan*, one has to look back into the history of the holiday in order to detect and separate inputs that are blended. For example, *Vidovdan*'s history reveals that there is, on one side, a pagan deity, *sveti Vid*, and celebration dedicated to it, and on the other side, a Christian holiday introduced in the 19th century. Without having this *frame*, it is not possible to acknowledge the blend. At the same time, while most of the Fauconnier and Turner's cases show a complete process of blending, my analysis shows that the blend exists, but both input spaces are well preserved in the blend. But, even if the input spaces can somehow be decomposed and acknowledged, they do not exist as independent concepts anymore. The only thing that is left is the *version* of *Vidovdan* that we know of, with elements of all described input sources. That is why my use of the term "blend" is not entirely in accordance with Fauconnier and Turner's definition.

The second segment, the blend of the national and religious spheres is even more complex. Now, the first input space is an already blended version of pagan and Christian *Vidovdan*. The second input is the conceptualisation of national identity. *Vidovdan* as a religious holiday becomes a national as well. The *Vidovdan* discourse played an important part in this process. Those who were members of the Serbian Orthodox Church celebrated *Vidovdan* as a religious holiday. But at one point, it was decided, and even proclaimed by law in 2001 that *Vidovdan* was a national holiday, as well. In this process *Vidovdan* is discursively *made* to be a national holiday without stopping being a religious holiday. This second stage of blending has been inspired by many historical events. One of the most referred to is the speech of President Milošević delivered in connection to political riots in Kosovo in 1989. Milošević then used the occasion to emphasize the importance of the Kosovo battle and *Vidovdan* in his speech. Milošević, for instance, focuses in this speech on the pagan-heroic and national input spaces of the blend even though, formally, *Vidovdan* was then still "just" a religious holiday. He almost totally singles out those aspects by focusing on the "najveća bitka onoga vremena", 'the greatest *battle* of that time', "Srbija [je] povratila svoju državu i svoje dostojanstvo da bi tako proslavila istorijski događaj [...] koji je imao veliki istorijski i simbolički značaj za njenu budućnost". 'Serbia who [...] got back its *state* and *dignity* so that it [*Serbia*] could celebrate a *historic* event [...] that had a great *historical* and *symbolical* importance for its [*Serbia's*] future' (Milošević 1989). The words that are singled out belong to the national and heroic discourse and are,

therefore, still a blend. *Vidovdan* was in this speech made to be secular. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 4.2.3 give the frames necessary to understand the blend of pagan/heroic and Christian inputs and at last the blend of those with national identity. The last two blends is the ones of the most importance for my analysis.

4.2.1 The Blending of Christian and Pagan

Etymology of word *Vidovdan* might be two-fold: coming from the name of the pagan Slavic god *Svetovid* (or *Vid*), the god of war, or the Sicilian Christian saint from third century, St. Vitus⁶² (Zirojević 2000: 199). According to Olga Zirojević (ibid.), the first accounts of celebration of this date were connected to the pagan god. These celebrations included rituals that had to do with fortune-telling and such like. This practice is connected to the meaning of the word *vid*, ‘sight,’ often connected to the possibility to ‘see,’ *videti*, the future (ibid.). Zirojević argues that this might be due to the homonymic relation between the names of ancient god *Vid* and Christian Saint *Vid* (in Serbian, St. Vitus is usually referred to as *sveti Vit* or *sveti Vid*), i.e. one ancient cult was replaced with another. The replacement of pagan gods with Christian saints is not an unknown phenomenon in Serbian history of religion.⁶³

Serbian literature historian, Miodrag Popović, shows in his case study *Vidovdan i časni krst* (*Vidovdan* and the Holy Cross) that the mixture of pagan and Christian elements is more than obvious in the whole cycle of Serbian epic poems about the Kosovo battle (1976: 90). According to Popović’s analysis, in Serbian epic poems of the Kosovo cycle, faith in the pagan Slavic god White Vid (*Beli Vid*) is equally strongly present as the myth of Christ and Christian ethics. This blending of two conceptually different elements (pagan and Christian) can be, according to Popović (ibid.: 87-93), viewed in the poem *Kneževa večera* (The Prince’s Supper). This poem is strikingly similar to the story of the Last Supper of Christ, but at the same time, blended with the pagan elements. Popović argues that the folk storyteller⁶⁴ acknowledges the existence of the pagan god *Vid* in the line: “Sjutra jeste lijep Vidov-danak, viđećemo u Polju Kosovu ko je vjera, a ko li je nevjera!” ‘Tomorrow is nice Vid’s Day, we shall see in the

⁶² This is usually the name used in translation of *Vidovdan*, ‘St. Vitus Day’. I have, however, decided to keep the original name in this thesis.

⁶³ The concept of *krsna slava*, ‘the feast of the family’s patron saint’, introduced by St. Sava (Serbian prince from the 12th century that became Christian monk and the first archbishop of autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church) in the Middle Ages, to make the transition to Christianity easier (Episkop Hrizostom 1997), is one of the examples of that kind of replacement.

⁶⁴ *Narodni pripovedač* (singular), phrase often used to give the name to the collective national subject (nameless, without personal face) who created, and orally transferred folk poetry during the centuries until the 19th century when the folk poetry was written down by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and published.

Kosovo field who is faithful and who is unfaithful'. At the same time, this line presents Miloš's⁶⁵ announcement of his death as the death for the Christian cause. However, Popović also argues, that words *vjera* and *nevjera* are not supposed to determine the faithfulness to Christianity, but to be synonyms to pagan ideal of bravery. "[T]he verse 'Who is faithful and who is unfaithful' means who is a hero, in which way each is going to present himself in the critical situation on the battlefield"⁶⁶ (ibid.: 88).

Anzulović (1999: 13) agrees that elements of pagan and Christian are blended in the Kosovo myth:

On one hand, it [Kosovo myth] praises Prince Lazar, the leader of the Serbian army at Kosovo, for choosing the heavenly kingdom, even at the cost of defeat and slavery. On the other hand, the most admired hero of the Kosovo cycle – Miloš Obilić – is guided by a pagan-heroic rather than Christian ethic.

This blending of pagan-heroic and Christian discourse has not at all vanished from the public discourse during the years, as my analysis is showing. The dominant side in this blend, though, might be the Serbian Orthodox Church's interpretation of the Kosovo myth moral as the Christian moral, with the victimisation of the nation as its main narrative. On the other side, the pagan/heroic elements might also (and they usually do) show up as a integral part of rhetoric in connection with national identity and nationalism. Since the blend I am most interested in is the one where one input source is the sphere of religious identity and the other, the sphere of national identity and politics, pagan/heroic input is commented only if an integral part (pre-blended blend) of either religious or national input.

After all, the pagan elements did not completely disappear from the cult of *Vidovdan*, even though the holiday is marked as Christian and from 2001 as Serbian (national) as well. These elements are still very strongly rooted in the name of the holiday, *Vidov-dan*, 'the day of Vid' (Popović 1976: 121). Interestingly enough, the popular translation of this name into English is exclusively connected to the Christian (Roman Catholic and Orthodox) saint, St. Vitus (St. Vitus Day).

⁶⁵ Miloš Obilić, a Serbian mythical hero, claimed to have killed Ottoman Murat I.

⁶⁶ "[S]tih 'Ko je vjera, ko li je nevjera' znači ko je junak, ko će se kako pokazati u kritičnoj situaciji na bojnopolju."

4.2.2 The Blending of Religion and Politics

The history of the *Vidovdan* celebration, as a Christian holiday, is of a newer date. It was first in the 19th century, 1892, that it was introduced as a church holiday dedicated to St. Lazar⁶⁷ and the Kosovo battle (Popović 1976: 122).

The Serbian state, after being under the Ottomans for more than four centuries, was recognised at the congress of Berlin in 1878, and by the time of the 500th anniversary of the Kosovo battle, Kosovo was still a part of the Ottoman Empire (Judah 2008: 23). In that period Kosovo became the main preoccupation of Serbian politics (Duijzings 2000: 190). It was crucial to turn back to Kosovo, to connect its medieval history with the contemporary situation and express the claim to Kosovo. Similarly to the 19th century's political preoccupation with Kosovo, at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, Kosovo's past, as shown in my analysis, became the centre of legitimation claims in discussion about who has the right to "keep" Kosovo.

Apart from Serbian politicians, the Serbian Orthodox Church also played an important role in the process of "turning back to Kosovo". The autonomous Serbian Orthodox Church gained again its autocephalous status just a year after Serbia's independence, 1878 (Duijzings 2000: 177). In the same period, Orthodoxy was, by constitution, recognised as the official state religion and "all state and national holidays were celebrated with church ritual" (Ramet 1988: 233). This fusion of the State and the Church made it possible for the Church to create and maintain an important political role in the Serbian society at the beginning of the 20th century. The blending of the Church and the State did not come suddenly, as the Church was building this role throughout the whole 19th century (Duijzings 2000: 177). According to Jean-Arnault Déries, the 500th commemoration of the Kosovo battle in 1889 played an important role in the process of the new state's reconciliation with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) (Cited in Judah 2008: 23). From that celebration, SPC started with making "Kosovo 'a mystical space', a symbol of resistance to secularization and modernization" (ibid.).

The blending of Church and State did not result in a completely new product, a form of theocratic state, with Church having all political power. It was more, as Branimir Anzulović put it (1999: 4), secularisation of the church, and at the same time, deification (I would add – and mystification) of State and the nation.

⁶⁷ Serbian Prince Lazar, who was the commander in chief of Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian, Romanian forces against the Ottomans in the battle on Kosovo Polje in 1389 was canonized and is celebrated under the name St. Lazar by the Serbian Orthodox Church and its believers.

Miodrag Popović is not quite convinced that the Church on its own played a crucial role in revitalisation of the Kosovo myth in the 19th century. He explains that the national awakening, and its foremost representatives, writers from the era of Romanticism, also tried to bring back to life the stories of the glorious national past (1976: 94). The main difference, he thinks, is that those writers were promoting *narodni duh*, ‘*narodni spirit*’, which included the promotion of pagan cults and folk traditions. The official Church, *Karlovačka mitropolija* (Metropolitanate of Karlovci), at the time quite loyal to the authorities of Austria-Hungary, was trying as hard as possible to distance itself from the folk traditions that would strengthen the building of the national identity (1976: 122).

From then on, the blend of pagan and Christian that exists in the Kosovo story, started to blend with the political and national. The *Vidovdan* of 20th century is primarily characterized by its political use, starting already with the Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in 1914, which was the cause for the outbreak of the World War I. Table 2 presents historically crucial events that, accidentally or not, happened on *Vidovdan*, 28 June.

Table 2 All our *Vidovdans*

Year	Events
1389	Battle of Kosovo took place.
1876	Serbs declared the war on Turkey that was to lead to Serbia’s independence.
1914	Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and his wife Sophie are assassinated in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, the <i>casus belli</i> of World War I.
1919	The Treaty of Versailles is signed in Paris, formally ending World War I.
1921	King Alexander I proclaimed the new constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, known thereafter as the <i>Vidovdan</i> Constitution.
1948	The Cominform circulates the “Resolution on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia”; Yugoslavia is expelled from the Communist bloc.
1950	Highway <i>Bratstvo i jedinstvo</i> (Brotherhood and unity) was opened for traffic.
1960	University in Novi Sad established.
1989	The 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević delivers the Gazimestan speech at the site of the historic battle, which is later interpreted as foreshadowing the Yugoslav wars.
1990	Adopted amendments to the Constitution of Croatia by which Serbs were no longer a

	constituent people in Croatia.
1992	<i>Vidovdanski sabor</i> (Vidovdan assembly) – <i>DEPOS</i> ⁶⁸ rally in Belgrade.
2001	Slobodan Milošević deported to International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia to stand trial.
2006	Montenegro was announced as the 192 nd member state of the United Nations.
2008	The inaugural meeting of the Community Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija.

For the purpose of this work, it is therefore important to consider and understand the bond that exists between the state (politics) and religion (Serbian Orthodox Church). Even though I have to see them as two separate domains in Serbian society, as they formally are, it is impossible to analyse the celebration of *Vidovdan* as both a national and a religious holiday, without recognising the shared (blended) side of those domains.

The political role of the Church and the formal involvement of the state in Church matters has varied over the years, and had a huge down turn in the era of communist Yugoslavia. During this period, according to Pedro Ramet (1988: 232), the Church was often accused of Greater Serbian nationalism and chauvinism. Serbian Orthodox Church has used these accusations in creating a self-image of a suffering church and oppositional relation to the state.

Even in the period of communist rule in Yugoslavia (1945-1989⁶⁹), the discourses of the sphere of politics and religion have not completely “unblended”. Or at least, the State was not publicly interested in the “church business”,⁷⁰ as long as it was not political. The Church still might have been interested in national and state questions, but tried not to disagree or in any other way conflict the authorities (Tomanić 2001: 13). In those years, the Church was barely seen in public, except during big celebrations. *Pravoslavlje* (Orthodoxy), a newspaper of the Serbian Patriarchate, was preoccupied with the Bible and religion only (ibid). With Tito’s death, this soon changed, and the Church “got back” on the political scene. “The bishops dealt with political, military and many other topics and the Bible was to be mentioned only

⁶⁸ *Demokratski pokret Srbije* (Democratic Movement of Serbia) is the first oppositional coalition to Milošević’s regime founded in 1992. The coalition was formed by *Srpski pokret obnove* (Serbian Renewal Movement), *Demokratska stranka Srbije* (Democratic Party of Serbia), *Srpska liberarna stranka* (Serbian Liberal Party), and *Nova demokratija* (New Democracy).

⁶⁹ Whether Milošević’s rule can also be described as communist is not of importance for this division. 1989 is chosen as the “last year of communist rule” since it marks a new era in Serbian politics.

⁷⁰ The Yugoslav state was not as negative towards religion as Albanian and Russian communisms were. After the Constitution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1974, art. 174, religion was free to be practiced as long as it was not (mis)used in political purposes: “Protivustavna je zloupotreba vere i verske delatnosti u političke svrhe.”

occasionally”,⁷¹ writes Tomanić (2001: 14). An especially interesting example was an article about Tito’s death, published on the front page of *Pravoslavlje*. In that text, the Serbian Orthodox Church stated that “[i]n the past forty years there were also disagreements between the Church and the state, but, ‘for which we do not blame the thoughts and acts of this exceptional man’”⁷² (*Pravoslavlje* 15 May 1980, cited in Kupres 2006: 6).

It was, though, in the 80’s and the 90’s that the Church defined its status as anti-communistic and spread the rhetoric that accused communism of having the most devastating effect on Serbs and Serbian national interests (Kupres 2006: 7). As Serbian nationalism began to grow, during the 80’s, it was the Orthodox religion that stood out as “typically Serbian”. The Church promoted religious identity as the purest version of national (Serbian) identity.

Might it be that the Kosovo myth is exactly the element that made the blend of the two identities? The Serbian national myth based on the Battle of Kosovo occurred right after the battle in the Serbian folk poetry. Srđan Šljukić (2009: 135) thinks that these stories (the Kosovo myth) were the element that kept the existence of the national identity alive under the Ottomans, besides the Serbian Orthodox Church, which enjoyed certain freedoms because of the Ottoman way of ruling, quite liberal for the medieval state. This is why, Šljukić concludes, the Kosovo myth was and still is interwoven with religion.

The blending of national and religious identity was very strong during the 90’s onwards. The Church’s involvement in politics in the same period was, though, shifting in strength. In my analysis, I am decomposing the balance of the powers between Church and State through the *Vidovdan* discourse. This will hopefully show how this blend of Church involvement in political matters worked discursively in the period 2000-2011.

During the Milošević regime, as Tomanić (2001) explains in the book *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj* (Serbian Church in War and Wars in It), the Church was sometimes divided when it came to political support. The Church showed support to Milošević and “the Serbian opposition” in turns. Tomanić gives examples of the Church’s active involvement in the political life of Serbia during the last decade of 20th century. He claims that again in the 90’s, the Church was more active in political than in theological matters.

⁷¹ “Episkopi će se baviti političkim, vojnim i mnogim drugim temama, a Sveto pismo će tek uzgred biti pominjano.”

⁷² “U proteklih 40 godina je bilo i nesporazuma između Crkve i države, ali ‘za koje mi ne držimo da im je izvoriste bilo u mislima i postupcima ovog retkog čoveka’.”

4.2.3 The Blending of Religious/National Identity and Politics

The history of *Vidovdan* is a complicated mixture. To start with, blending of religious and political spheres during *Vidovdan*'s celebration has varied in its grade and nature throughout history, as shown in the previous section. In this section I will attempt to explain another aspect of the *Vidovdan* blend, i.e. I will show that it is completely impossible to detach the essence of *Vidovdan* (both in relation to religion and politics) from the formation and maintenance of the Serbian national identity. Finally, the blends in *Vidovdan* are complicated because of the unfinished blending process that still allows the discursive reuse of one of the input sources in particular. *Vidovdan*, primarily a religious holiday (until 2001 when it was made national as well), has been discursively presented more as Serbian (national) during the years of Milošević's rule, starting with his speech in 1989 (e.g. Section 5.2). On the other hand, the discursive construction of *Vidovdan* has been changed in the years after Milošević's rule (2001 – nowadays) to represent a more homogenised blend of the Serbian (national identity) that equals the Orthodox (religious identity).

As Table 2 shows, already in the 19th century, *Vidovdan* served as a fuel for national awaking and in the process of liberation from Ottoman rule. "The political" side of *Vidovdan* was quite often blended with "the national" side of it, and more than once, again blended with the pagan-heroic and Christian moral.

It is highly controversial whether Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, intentionally came to Sarajevo to conduct a military inspection exactly on this day. At the time, as explained, *Vidovdan* was one of the most important Serbian national holidays. It is quite definite, though, that Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb who assassinated the Archduke and his wife in Sarajevo, was "outrage[d] that Franz Ferdinand was visiting Sarajevo on St. Vitus Day, *Vidovdan*, the Kosovo anniversary" (Judah 2009: 64). Even more, Tim Judah (2009: 64) who cites the parts of Princip's interrogation after the assassination, claims that Princip was recycling the collective memory of the Kosovo battle and literally re-enacting the Kosovo myth. According to Judah (ibid.), Princip compared himself with Obilić, the foremost hero of the Kosovo myth and its pagan-heroic symbolism.

The strongly charged political symbolism in *Vidovdan* is certainly derived from Serbs' emotional attachment to the Kosovo myth both through their religious and national identity. Yet again in 1948, under Communism, with the famous break up between Stalin and Tito, exactly on

the 28 June, *Vidovdan* kept its emotional appeal as the event “cut into the minds and hearts of all us Serbs” (Đilas 1985: 201 cited in Duijzings 2000: 192).

Finally, one needs to ask the following question: How are the inputs of religious and national blended discursively in the *Vidovdan* celebrations I am analysing? How is this blend used politically? And, in addition, do some of the Serbian politicians in the examined period prefer to mystify the political rhetoric with the use of the Kosovo myth and the religious-national blend? For some politicians (Milošević, for example) the use of the Kosovo myth excludes religious elements. During the celebration in 1989, SPC expressed dissatisfaction that Milošević did not take a part in liturgical celebration of *Vidovdan* (Tomanić 2001: 19). Others, (e.g. President Tadić, or even more the assassinated ex Prime Minister Đinđić), were not focusing on the Kosovo myth at all, and tried to demystify it. Vojislav Koštunica, again, blends strongly religious and national elements of the Kosovo myth.

In this thesis, identity is simply defined, using Duijzings’ (2000: 18) way of thinking, as “link between the individual and specific category of group and people”, because it underlines a personal *feeling of belonging* to a specific group, no matter which category is taken as the primary source of that feeling (regional, national, religious...). This definition slides easily in Anderson’s definition of nations as “imagined communities” where the feeling of belonging bases on imaginary implied *sameness*. Ivo Banac (1984: 107) has noticed that the sameness in which the Serbs were expressing and building their national identity was in many cases connected to Serbian Orthodox Christianity. Vjekoslav Perica explains in the example of Serbian and Croatian national identity that the religious identity was the one that defined national identity. Due to many shared characteristics which are usually used as the markers of national identity, the religion overtook the role of the differentiator between the national identities in Yugoslavia:

Serbia and Croatia involve two culturally similar peoples that also share much common history and territory, such that, although religious nationalism is only part of the nationalist endeavour, religion highlights ethnic and national boundaries. (Perica 2005: 131)

The shortest definition of the blend made up of the Serbian Orthodox and the Serbian national identity is given by Mylonas (2003: 23). In his perception of the relation between the religious and national identity in Serbia, he sees the Serbian Orthodoxy as the “sacralisation of the Serbian national identity”.

5 RTS *Dnevnik*'s Representations on *Vidovdan* Celebrations

*Even today, 611 years after the Battle of Kosovo, it is confirmed that Serbdom can not be imagined without Kosmet.*⁷³ (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 22:32)

*How can Serbia be and remain Serbia without Kosovo? That is a body without a head! That is a body without a heart and soul!*⁷⁴ (*Patriarch Irinej, Dnevnik* 28 June 2011, 15:00)

In the analysis part of this research, I shall present a case study. The analysis follows the ways in which the most influential TV News program in Serbia, RTS *Dnevnik*, discursively constructs and represents participants in the *Vidovdan* celebration, the Kosovo myth, as well as religious and national identity, and the blending of the two.

In this analysis, terms will be used as defined in Sections 2 and 3. Methods and theories of CDA and the approaches of cultural historians to collective memory, presented in Section 2, provide the tools for my research. I am also interested to see if the politics of RTS might have influenced the *staging* of events using the semiotic resources of image and the verbal mode, editing and using different levels of intertextualization.

In the Section 5.1, an explanation of the tables presenting keywords, -participants and events, which sketch the main focuses RTS had in *Dnevnik*'s representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration, is given.

Sections 5.2; 5.3; 5.4; and 5.5 give specific, in-depth analysis of the particular years that I have chosen as the basis of this thesis: 2000, 2001, 2006, and 2011. These years are selected to follow the discourses of four periods in Serbian politics as introduced in Section 1.1: those of Milošević, Đinđić, Koštunica, and Tadić.

5.1 An Overview

The tables at the beginning of each section (and in Appendix 3) hold condensed information on reports about *Vidovdan* delivered by RTS *Dnevniks* on the 28 June in the examined period. The goal is to give an overview that allows the reader to follow the rest of the analysis. The columns are roughly based on Fairclough's (1995: 91) dimensions of discourse analysis: description,

⁷³ “[I] danas [se] posle 611 godina od kosovske bitke potvrđuje da se srpstvo ne može zamisliti bez Kosmeta.”

⁷⁴ “Kako može Srbija bez Kosova ostati i biti Srbija? [...] To je telo bez glave! To je telo bez srca i duše!”

interpretation and explanation. The first five columns represent a “description of the material” (Fairclough 1995). The descriptions do not include any substantial “interpretation”, as I tried just to note the things that I have seen and heard in these reports, after transcribing them (see Appendix 2). The last column, however, represents the pre-analytic understanding of the text and matches Fairclough’s *interpretation* stage in discourse analysis (ibid.): here, I have tried to note implicatures/associations/impressions. Some of those thoughts are elaborated on later in the *explanation* part of this thesis, the analysis.

The first column is reserved for the year, and the numbers beside it are meant to mark different reports in the same *Dnevnik* (28 June, the same year). I have gathered not just reports on the “central” marking of *Vidovdan* but also on any other gathering of people (rally), speech, cultural manifestation, religious service, announcement and the like that in any sense represented the actualization of the *Vidovdan* Discourse. Some of the contributions are marked with some extra numbers (e.g. 2000 (2.1)), to indicate that the report, as a thematically identical whole, had different contributions that work as co-texts to the analysed text. This analysis focuses on the reports on central celebrations. What is “traditionally”⁷⁵ considered to be a central celebration is the liturgical ritual at the Gračanica monastery,⁷⁶ the requiem on Gazimestan⁷⁷ and the cultural programme in Gračanica monastery later during the same day. The second column lists the participants in the event; either the ones that were “actively” involved – live directly quoted, directly quoted, indirectly quoted or paraphrased in the report, or just mentioned as being present. The third column lists the locations where the events have taken place. The fourth column cites the *semiotic macrostructures* (Van Dijk 1988; see Section 2.3.2) of *Dnevnik* in question. In the way I implemented Van Dijk’s theory about semantic macrostructures in the TV News discourse, these show up as *vesti dana*, ‘the news of the day’. Hence not all of the reports have semiotic macrostructure, but rather those that *Dnevnik*’s editorial board singled out as “important” news. The sixth column presents shots taken from the visual mode in the *Dnevnik*’s TV News discourse. The video material in its whole is to be found in Appendix 1.

⁷⁵ In *Dnevnik*’s representation. See the overview in the tables and compare the places of celebration.

⁷⁶ A Serbian medieval monastery in Kosovo, near the capital of Kosovo, Priština. The monastery is placed in the town (and municipality) of the same name (Albanian: Graçanicë, Gračanica).

⁷⁷ A monument near *Kosovo polje* (The Field of Blackbirds; Albanian: Fushë Kosovë/Kosova), the original site of The Battle of Kosovo.

5.2 The Vidovdan of Milošević's Era, 2000

Serbia triumphed morally again.

*In the same way she was a bulwark to the world's Ottoman Empire in 1389,
she was also a bulwark to the world's NATO empire in 1999.*

(Marković, Dnevnik 28 June 2000, 03:58)⁷⁸

5.2.1 Introduction

The report on the *Vidovdan* celebration in Kosovo in 2000 consists of five contributions: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 (see Figure 4 and the Table 3). Report 2.1 is the one that focuses on the part of celebration that is traditionally called “the central celebration”, placed in Gračanica/Gazimestan. The other texts (1. and 3.) are not analysed here, but are important since they, alongside 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, function as *co-texts*. *Vidovdan* Discourse is actualized in them as well. All together, reports that had *Vidovdan* as a main or side theme and in which *Vidovdan* Discourse was recontextualised, constituted approximately twelve minutes of a 55 minutes long *Dnevnik*.

The video text analysed in this section is approximately one minute long. The co-texts, though not part of the original scope of this thesis since they thematically cover “celebrations” arranged in places other than Gazimestan and Gračanica, are in dialog with the analysed text by creating discourse worlds with a recognizable representation of the Other that transfers to all the mentioned texts.

The representation of the Other as well as a positive representation of the Self, mainly by using lexical devices, is the main argument of this part of analysis.




Figure 4 A schematic presentation of discourse on *Vidovdan* in 2000, text and co-texts

⁷⁸ “Srbija je ponovo moralno triumfovala. Kao što je 1389. godine bila bedem svetskoj otomanskoj imperiji, ona je tako 1999. godine bila bedem svetskoj NATO-vskoj imperiji.”

Table 3 Year 2000

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructure	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2000 (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Deputy Prime Minister, Prof. Dr. Ratko Marković, (live direct speech, paraphrase) - Dean of the University (image) - University staff (image) 	- Novi Sad	(1 st news): “Special Envoy of the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ratko Marković, gave the University of Novi Sad an order, with which President Milošević honoured this institution, on the occasion of forty years of its existence.”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Of the ceremony - The order - The speaker - Video-beam: the name and the title of the speaker 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Battle of Kosovo analogies - NATO bombing - 40 years of existence - Serbia: an <i>antemurale</i> myth -pagan/heroic discourse
2000 (2.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Srećko Mitrović, Vice President of the Municipal Assembly of Priština (paraphrase) - Delegations (Actor, image) - Patriarch Pavle (Actor, image) 	- “Kosmet” (Priština, Gračanica)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Municipal Assembly in Priština (Gračanica) - Gračanica Monastery - Gazimestan: “delegations” - “<i>Vidovdan</i> Poet Communion” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Kosovo as part of Serbia - Blend of religion and pagan-heroic - Heroism
2000 (2.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dragan Jablanović, President of the Municipal Assembly Leposavić (live direct speech, paraphrase) 	- “Kosmet” (Leposavić)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The monument - The names of the dead - The speakers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NATO bombing - Kosovo - Othering - Positive/negative face - Pagan heroic discourse
2000 (2.3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delegation of South Banat district (Actor, paraphrase) - Members of the Yugoslav Committee for the cooperation 	- “Kosmet” (Kosovska Mitrovica)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delegations, - UN tank and UN military forces in the background - Talks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNMIK - Cooperation between districts – (Suffering of the Serbian people) - Victimisation discourse

	with The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Actor) - Zdravko Trajković, Head of the Kosovska Mitrovica District(Actor)				
2000 (2.4)	- Ivana Žigon, Nebojša Kudačina (intertextual live direct speech) - Nada Momirović (manager of Mona fashion house), (live direct speech) - Velimir Matanović, manager of the Cultural Centre in Kosovska Mitrovica (live direct speech)	“Kosmet” (Kosovska Mitrovica)		- Show, - Dresses inspired by “Serbian medieval tradition” - Ivana Žigon, - Velimir Matanović and Nada Momirović	- Fashion show (elements of “Serbian medieval tradition”) - NATO bombing - Expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo
2000 (2.5)	- Branimir Đokić, RTS’ Folk Orchestra (live direct speech)	- “Kosmet” (Zvečan)		- People dancing <i>kolo</i> , the ‘ring dance’	- Concert - Victim role
2000 (3)	- SRS (Serbian Radical Party) (direct speech)	- Belgrade (from the studio)		- Text on the screen	- Warning to Serbian people to keep away from Serbian traitors (mentioned by name) and NATO forces

5.2.2 Context

Since the context, as defined in Section 2.2.2, represents the global political, cultural and historical situation the discourse is a part of, elements of the global context which are important for understanding the analysis are presented at the beginning of the analysis of each individual year. However, it is impossible to present all the aspects of the context which might have influenced the discourse in question.

A great number of scholars have been writing about the situation in the former Yugoslavia, focusing on the years of wars (1991-1995 and 1998-1999) and the ones following Milošević’s fall (see Mønnesland 2006, Popov 2000, Ramet 2006, Sliber and Little 1996). Most of them are used in this thesis as supporting literature.

There are several ways of presenting the context of the Kosovo conflict. Or rather several starting points. Starting points in themselves are discussion material when it comes to Kosovo. Both sides involved in the conflict (Kosovo Albanian and Serbian) have used them as legitimization claims in validation of their national existence on the territory of Kosovo. What follows is therefore a quite simplified version of historical events before 2000.

In SFRJ⁷⁹ Kosovo and Metohija⁸⁰ had the status of autonomous province (hence the full name *Socijalistička autonomna pokrajna Kosovo* (SAP Kosovo) (Socialist Autonomous Province Kosovo)). In the Serbian Constitution of 1974,⁸¹ both provinces within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, received increased autonomy (cf. Constitution of SR Serbia, SAP Vojvodina, SAP Kosovo 1974: 131-132⁸²). At the time, Yugoslavia had six nations, and “the rest” were considered to be nationalities. Kosovo got greater autonomy as a part of Serbia, greater rights and “quasi-republic” status (Mertus 1999: 18-19). However, “[a]s a mere “nationality”, Kosovo Albanians did not have the right to their own republic. The heart of the political tensions in Kosovo rested in this denial of republic status” (ibid.: 19). This resulted in escalated tension between Albanians and Serbs during the 80’s. Twice, first in 1987 and then again in 1989, Slobodan Milošević was stepping out in public as the figure who would solve the “Kosovo issue”. In 1989, amendments to the Serbian Constitution greatly reduced the autonomy which the provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) had received in 1974, which resulted in the great abuse of the Albanians’ human rights (Budding 29 May, 2002: 61). In the same year, on the occasion of the *Vidovdan* celebration, Milošević gave a speech, later described as the trigger for the wars in Yugoslavia (Silber and Little 1996: 72; Mertus 1999: 185; Judah 2008: 67). The wars during the 90’s and rising nationalism in Serbia of course had an impact on the Kosovo issue as well, but the context of the wars in other ex-Yugoslav states is not considered here, as it lies outside the scope of this thesis.

The most important contextual aspect for analysis of the first year (2000) is the bombing in 1999. In the period from 24 March until 10 June 1999, NATO bombed the Federal Republic

⁷⁹ *Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija* (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, SFRY), in literature referred to as “former Yugoslavia”, or “ex-Yugoslavia”, dissolved with the wars in the 90’s.

⁸⁰ The official name of Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. In the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, however, only *Kosovo* is used (cf. Constitution of SR Serbia, SAP Vojvodina, SAP Kosovo 1974 and Constitution of SFRY 1974). The word *Metohija* means ‘church estate’. See Section 5.2.3 for the discussion about the use of *Metohija* in the name. Kosovo Albanians use *Kosova*/Kosovë. The most common name used in scholar publications in English is *Kosovo*.

⁸¹ The constitution was adopted at the federal level, but also at the level of each republic.

⁸² *Ustav SR Srbije, Ustav SAP Vojvodine, Ustav SAP Kosova, Službeni list Savezne Federativne Republike Jugoslavije*, 1974, art. 291-296, p. 131-132. Available online: <http://scc.digital.nb.rs/view/RA-ustav-1974&p=066&e=t&w=980&h=600>, accessed 1 April 2012.

of Yugoslavia.⁸³ The “Kosovo war” usually refers to both this operation and a conflict between Serbian forces and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo in 1998 (Judah 2008: 75). The unsuccessful involvement of the international community as mediators in this conflict resulted in an unsigned mutual peace agreement in Rambouillet. Judah (2008: 87) argues that in the political context of the war in Bosnia, and especially Srebrenica,⁸⁴ Western leaders were keen to take action to make sure that Srebrenica would not happen again. However, opinion in scholar circles is still divided as to whether the NATO-bombing was in accordance with international law. The bombing led to the signing of Security Council Resolution 1244. By Resolution 1244, the Yugoslav army and Serbian police were to withdraw from Kosovo and jurisdiction in Kosovo was passed to a UN mission - UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo).

5.2.3 They – “Terrorists” and We – “Martyrs and Patriots”

The report on the celebration at Gazimestan and Gračanica is done with a voice over of a reporter (talking over the phone).

As opposed to the other years analysed in this thesis, the actualization of *Vidovdan* Discourse in 2000 formally puts a great focus on the secularization of the celebration.

RTS’s involvement in the secular *staging* of *Vidovdan* can be noticed in the choice of the material and social actors presented. These representations, the further analysis shows, are essentially different from the other analysed celebrations. First of all, the report on the traditional *Vidovdan* celebration in Gračanica and on Gazimestan is minimized to include only a couple of pictures covered with the reporter’s voice-over. The “alternative”, secular celebration of *Vidovdan* is given a more prominent place and discursively connected to the NATO-bombing. The celebration of *Vidovdan* is not singled out in the “news of the day” and first appears after the 20th minute of *Dnevnik*’s broadcast. As the analysis shows, it seems that the main theme of all the reports is the NATO-bombing linked to the *Vidovdan* celebration through *Vidovdan* Discourse.

The report starts with a “secular” celebration, featuring “svečana sednica grada Prištine koja je posvećena obeležavanju Vidovdana u Gračanici”, ‘festive session of the Priština city [council] dedicated to *marking Vidovdan* in Gračanica’ (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 22:32). In 2000,

⁸³ *Savezna Republika Jugoslavija* (SRJ), consisting of Serbia (with Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro. After the other Yugoslav republics declared independence and the war began, the former Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) broke up and Serbia and Montenegro made a “new state” under the name *SRJ*.

⁸⁴ A town in Bosnia and Herzegovina, site of the 1995-massacre*(see footnote 124 in this thesis) during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Vidovdan was still just a religious holiday, but the religious celebration is mentioned in just one sentence at the very end of the report.



Figure 5 The session of Priština city council, 2000

The news opens with this picture of a secular, but also political representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration. Along with the opening line, both the picture and text, place the information about the secular celebration at the top of *Dnevnik*'s news structure in this report in accordance with “relevance structuring”, after “the important-information-comes-first principle” (Van Dijk 1988: 11).

The reporter informs the viewer that the national anthem is played (the video is showing the present *men*⁸⁵ standing up, to show respect to the anthem, see Figure 5) which gives the holiday a very secular feeling, making it recognisable as being close to a state-holiday. It is not only the fact that the information about the anthem is “tuned” that underlines the secularity of this celebration; the anthem also, as one of the national symbols, “flags the nation”. These “natural ties” that bind people together, connected to the national anthem, are described Benedict Anderson (2002: 145) as a “physical realisation of the imagined communities”: “At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses and the same melody. The image: unisonance”.

The blending of the religious and national dimensions of *Vidovdan* Discourse shows up in the first sentence of the report: “Na svečanoj sednici grada Prištine koja je posvećena obeležavanju Vidovdana u Gračanici najpre je odata pošta kosovskim mučenicima i svim rodoljubima koji su dali živote u odbrani slobode”. ‘On the festive session of the Priština city council dedicated to marking of *Vidovdan* in Gračanica, respects were first paid to the *Kosovo*

⁸⁵ *Dnevnik*'s representation is not gender biased here – there were obviously no women present. On the other hand, this fact reveals another interesting issue which is not analysed here: the possible gender bias in Serbian politics and society in general (see Čičkarić and Kolin-Parun 2010 who discuss exactly this topic).

martyrs and all *patriots* who gave their lives while defending freedom”. (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 22:32). By using the word *kosovski mučenici*, ‘Kosovo’s martyrs’, a phrase highly coloured the Orthodox Christian interpretation of the *Vidovdan* Discourse, the reporter blends this interpretation with phrase that evokes national emotions ‘all *patriots* that gave their lives while defending the freedom’. The word *rodoljubi* is translated with ‘patriots’, even though Serbian has another word, with the same etymological root as ‘patriots’: *patriote*. *Rodoljub* (in the text plural, *rodoljubi*) is a compound of two words of Slavic origin, *rod* ‘lineage, kind’ and *ljub*, from *ljubiti*, with an archaic meaning ‘to love’. These two words in compound give the literal meaning ‘the one who loves his/hers (own) kind’. Meaning analysis shows that the semantic potential of the word *rodoljub* is wider than the one of the word *patriota*, even though the two are often listed as synonyms. These two construals get their meaning from the contextual situation. *Rodoljub* is the one who, in contrary to *patriota* who “just” loves his/hers *patris* (Greek) ‘fatherland’ loves the whole [Serbian] *rod*, i.e. nation.

The sentence reveals one more important thing: the implied positive Self-representation. The discourse world the reporter is creating places both patriots and martyrs in its constructed deictic centre. By employing a condensed version of *historical analogy* (see Chilton 2004: 149) by which the “martyrs” from the Battle of Kosovo were placed in the same group with the patriots from the Kosovo war (1998/99), the reporter creates a positive representation of both. The positive meaning of the “Kosovo martyrs”, stored not just in the Christian interpretation of the Kosovo myth, but also in a kind of blending that exists in the collective memory between the mythical representation of the “Kosovo version” of the Christian moral and the heroism of Lazar’s soldiers (see Section 4) is mapped on the *patriots* in the same sentence.

The positive Self-representation can be used in parallel to the negative representation of the Others (an Othering strategy), but can also exist separately from the negative representation of the Others in a process called *legitimation*. At the same time, the legitimation strategy does not have to be based on polarisations and explicit mentions of “the Others”, but “the Others’ identity” is equally being defined through the definition of the “We-group”. As Kolstø (2009: 2) explains “[T]he selfunderstanding of identity of a group is always constructed upon the boundary separating it from other groups. Stories about the ‘Others’ are, therefore, always also stories about ourselves.” I would suggest that the opposite is also true.

The most glorified sacrifice a patriot can make for his/her country is to die for its freedom. A claim that freedom is what they fought for gives a “positive face”⁸⁶ to the Serbs and legitimises the actions of the Yugoslav army, the Serbian police and the regime behind them. The question of which freedom is referred to remains unanswered. Whether the reporter refers to the Kosovo war (1998/99) is, read from the context and co-text, almost certain. Do the other “wars for Serbian freedom” also count? Apparently, the answer is given in the construction: “[...] and *all* patriots who gave their lives while defending the freedom”. The interesting note to this sentence is that the *patriots* are not determined by their place affiliation to Kosovo in this construction as directly as *martyrs* are, but more to the wider definition of the action of *defending freedom*.

All the other reports (co-texts) on the “celebration” of *Vidovdan* have as a main theme the bravery of the patriots and their sacrifice for freedom. These texts are more explicit, as “freedom” implies the defense of the country during the bombing. Compare:

U Leposaviću je danas, u prisustvu rodbine poginulih i građana ove opštine na severu Kosmeta, otkriveno spomen obeležje devetnaestorici pripadnika Vojske Jugoslavije i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova koji su svoje mlade živote dali za slobodu u otporu zlikovačkoj NATO agresiji i u borbi sa šiptarskim teroristima. (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 23:30)

In Leposavić a monument was revealed today, in the presence of relatives of *the ones who died* and citizens of this municipality in northern *Kosmet*, dedicated to the nineteen members of the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Internal Affairs who *gave their young lives for freedom* in resistance to the *evil* NATO *aggression* and while fighting *Šiptar terrorists*.

The language used in this sentence reveals the binary opposition We (good) – the Others (bad) that was typical for the media language during and after the Kosovo war (Goff and Trionfi 1999: 534-536), not just in Yugoslav, but in Western “Kosovo war discourse” as well (cf. Chilton’s analysis of Clinton’s speech 2004: 54-55; 137-153; Hammond and Herman 2000). “We” are: young soldiers, heroes, fighting for freedom. They are: evil and aggressive (NATO) and terrorists (Kosovo Albanians).

The group of Kosovo Albanians was classified by the choice of wording by using the adjective *šiptarski* in addition to already deontic negative *teroristi*. Ethnonym *Šiptar* (pl. *Šiptari*) is a version of the Albanian *shqiptar*, translated with ‘Albanian’. In SFRJ there was a tradition

⁸⁶ Chilton (2004: 46) uses this metaphor to describe a strategy of legitimisation. The techniques used in this process might vary, but the most common, as in this example, is to use positive words in self-representation.

of calling Kosovo Albanians *Šiptars*, with the argument that “they [Kosovo Albanians] also call themselves the same” (Ćirilov, *Blic komentar* 29 April 2009).⁸⁷ On the initiative of Kosovo Albanians, in 1968, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia agreed to change the term *Šiptar* into more neutral *Albanian*, since the former “Albanians considered pejorative, but which had hitherto been standard vocabulary in official as well as unofficial business” (Ramet 2006: 295).

In the next sentence, *Dnevnik*'s reporter paraphrases the Vice President of the Municipal Assembly of Priština, Srećko Mitrović. The message of his speech is paraphrased as the most important message of the event: “i danas posle 611 godina od kosovske bitke potvrđuje [se] da se srpstvo ne može zamisliti bez Kosmet-a”, ‘even today, 611 years after the Kosovo battle, it [is] confirmed that *Serbdom* can not be imagined without Kosmet’ (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 22:32). This historical analogy implicitly sees the definitions of national identity (*Serbdom*) as directly depending on Kosovo. Kosovo is, according to Mitrović, a part of who Serbs are. This perception, which has been kept by many until recent times (see Sections 5.4; 5.5), is based on the understanding that Kosovo represents a sacred Serbian centre, an essence of being Serbian.

Furthermore, the toponym Kosmet is used. Kosmet, an acronym for Kosovo and Metohija from the 1940s and 1950s (Banac 1984: 205), never used by Kosovo Albanians (Judah 2008: 30) or its longer version *Kosovo i Metohija* (KiM) was one of the characteristic features of the *Dnevnik* text in general, during the analysed period. My material shows that *Dnevnik* almost exclusively uses KiM over the whole period of time (2000-2011) with the use of just “Kosovo” only if the whole phrase is introduced earlier in the text (see Appendix 2).

Mertus (1999: 286) claims that even in the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the Slavs were calling this territory *Kosovo i Metohija*, while Kosovo Albanians have always used the toponym *Kosova* or *Kosovë*. The word *Kosovo* is considered to come from the phrase *Kosovo polje*, ‘the field of blackbirds’. The second word in the phrase, *Metohija*, ‘church or monastic lands’ is equally problematic as the word *Kosovo*, from the Serbian word *kos*, ‘blackbird’: “If the root of Kosovo’s name is Slavic, then that would seem to contradict the Albanian argument that they lived here before the Serbs [...]” (Judah 2008:31). In addition, “‘Metohija’ links its [Kosovo’s] past (and thus present) to that of the Serbian Orthodox Church” (ibid). The name dispute was active during communist rule as well and one of the things to be changed with the 1974 Constitution was the name of the province, from the Serbian name *Kosovo i Metohija* to *Kosovo* only, which was a symbolic victory for Kosovo Albanians (Mertus 1999: 202, 291).

⁸⁷ <http://www.blic.rs/Komentar/Sa-rukama-u-dzepovima/153134/Albanac-ili-Siptar>, accessed 15 July 2012.

The new Constitution of 1990, which basically stripped Kosovo of autonomy, enthroned the “old” name: *Kosovo i Metohija*.

The “name issue”, and especially the medieval tradition that reads from *Metohija*, could have a say in arguments about “who was there first”, the core of the *myth of antiquitas*, which, according to Pål Kolstø (2005: 21-22) is one of the main arguments in discussions about Kosovo.

The absence of the central church ritual (liturgy) in Gračanica and requiem on Gazimestan in the almost ten minutes long report on *Vidovdan* in Kosovo is an obvious *staging* strategy in the secularization and nationalization of *Vidovdan* in 2000. Only two sentences were dedicated to this event. Only one of them was focussed on the religious marking of the holiday:

Delegacije jugoslovenskog komiteta Skupštine opštine Priština, Socijalističke partije Srbije i srpske nacionalne skupštine, položile su cveće i odale poštu kosovskim junacima na Gazimestanu. Njegova svetost Patrijarh Pavle, ovom prilikom, služio je liturgiju. (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 22:29)

Delegations of the Yugoslav Committee of the Municipal Assembly of Pristina, of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian National Assembly, laid down flowers and paid their respects to the Kosovo heroes on Gazimestan. His holiness Patriarch Pavle, served the liturgy on this occasion.

The main actors in the event of celebration on Gazimestan are *delegacije*, ‘delegations’. This information can be “read” out of two structural choices of the reporter: 1) The relationship between sentences – “The general principle is that important information must come first. This may affect [...] also the ordering of the sentences in paragraphs describing an episode” (Dijk 1988: 16), 2) The adverbial phrase *ovom prilikom*, ‘on this occasion’, places the action performed by the Patriarch as subordinate to the actions of the delegations. *Vidovdan*, at the time being just religious holiday is *made* secular by using the old, communist-like practice of the laying the flowers by delegations with names consisting of long nominal phrases. The strategy of legitimisation is present here as well, as those who laid down the flowers were not just people, but the “institutions” behind them as well.

Tomanić (2001: 19) states that the liturgical ritual in Gračanica, followed by the requiem on Gazimestan, was practiced in the years right after the bombing. In contrast to 1989, the number of people present was drastically changed. Beside the Patriarch, a couple of bishops and a few people, all of them under the protection of UN forces, Gazimestan was empty (*ibid.*).



Figure 6 A secular celebration of *Vidovdan* at Gazimestan, 2000

The image mode depicts exactly this, but the reporter does not mention or comment on the number of people present (see Figure 6). This image shows another point, in accordance with a text that *stages* the secularization of the event. *Delegacije*, in the “front row” almost completely overshadow the monk “far back”. The medium shot places the ‘delegations’ closer to the viewer, creating in that way a “friendly” relationship, while the same choice of taking the shot from this angle, represents the monk with a long shot, creating an impersonal distance.

While the delegations are represented facing the camera, the other gathered people are represented from an angle showing their back to the viewer and towards the Gazimestan monument (see Figure 7). While that can imply a certain detachment in relation to the viewer, the same position can show a devotion to the monument (and all it represents).



Figure 7 In front of Gazimestan monument, *Vidovdan* 2000

Two of the others represented in the same shot are members of the UNMIK and KFOR, the armed forces that entered Kosovo in 1999. In the verbal mode, UNMIK and KFOR troops are not mentioned at all, and in all the other shots UNMIK and KFOR are not visible either. In this

one (see Figure 7), as the only ones facing the viewer, the image gives a possible representation of dangerous people that signal a demand with their eye-vectors pointed at the viewer.

From this position, the camera takes a few more shots by lifting the frame bottom-up and following the lines of the monument (Figure 8):



Figure 8 The Gazimestan monument, camera move bottom-up, *Vidovdan 2000*

Kress and Van Leeuwen's theory (2006: 186ff.) about the arrangement of information in image corners, suggests that the upper part of an image has the potential of realizing the meaning interpreted as Ideal, while the information on the bottom of the page "remains" the Real. If we look at all the shots of the camera move from the bottom-up as one semantic whole (as in the Kress and Van Leeuwen theory an image would be), a viewer gets first the angle view straight ahead which changes to a bottom-up perspective. This perspective can create a feeling of inferiority within a viewer. At the same time, the viewer's eye-level perspective (which catches the actors in the first shot) places all the actors in the realm of Real, while the shots to come represent the monument as Ideal.⁸⁸ Transferred to the specific situation, a potential implication of this image is that the soldiers, alongside the gathered people, representing the Real, and stand as opposite to the realm of Ideal/Divine, the realm of the "heavenly kingdom".

5.2.4 Conclusion: The *Vidovdan* of Milošević's Era, 2000

The "*Vidovdan* of Milošević's era" does not feature Milošević, at least not as the one in 1989 did, when he was the main actor of the celebration. But, the representation of this year's *Vidovdan* celebration does leave traces of Milošević's politics in relation to the media.

⁸⁸ All the terms used as description tools in analysing images are borrowed from Kress and Van Leeuwen and used as described in Section 2.3.1.

Some of the features, including the distinctive use of the ethnonym *Šiptar* to present Kosovo Albanians in a negative manner, were a part of representations that had been implied during the whole decade of Milošević's rule. Another strategy, used extensively during and after the Kosovo war, was the discursive construction of two polarities where the Other (NATO, Kosovo Albanians) was explicitly marked as distinctively negative, which was a feature that was part of the RTS's media politics at the time, as which was also discussed by various authors writing on the subject.

In the end, a negative representation of "our enemies" as well as an explicit "positive face" representation of the Serbs, realized in the blend of the religious and national identity, served, in a setting of *staged* secularized representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration, as a legitimization strategy in order to justify both the claim to Kosovo and the politics that led to the Kosovo war.

5.3 The *Vidovdan* of Đinđić's Era, 2001

“Znate li da je danas Vidovdan?”
‘Do you know that today is Vidovdan?’
(Milošević, in *Glas javnosti*
(Voice of the Public), 30 June 2001)

5.3.1 Introduction

After more than a decade of Milošević's rule and a very “folklorised” political discourse (Čolović 2002), a change in the political regime might have brought a change in political discourse as well.

In this section, I analyse *Dnevnik*'s news discourse on the celebration of *Vidovdan* in Gračanica and Gazimestan and especially related to the different role and change in the amount of focus the *Vidovdan* Discourse has got.

Firstly, after introducing the basic contextual notes for the analysed period, I present one important co-text to the ones analysed in this thesis. The co-text in question is Đinđić's public address, which is very important for the context of this thesis as probably the one text that most explicitly disconnects the bond with the *Vidovdan* Discourse that was, at different levels, used and reused in Serbian politics.

After that, through the discursive world of the verbal mode, I analyse the possible revival of the *Vidovdan* Discourse in the form of the myth of victimisation, and how the Serbs in Kosovo are represented through the complex image of Others by *Dnevnik*.

Finally, the discursive world of the image mode is analysed, where, besides the theory on vectors of Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006), Van Leeuwen's (2005) theory on *linking* is explored in combination with Pudovkin's film editing theory as recontextualised in Van Leeuwen's work in order to analyse the representation of the international community and the Serbs.

Table 4 Year 2001

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructure	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2001a	- “Temporary displaced people” from Kosovo (images, paraphrase) - Jovica Stanković, President of the Association of Displaced Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija (live direct speech)	Kraljevo–Kosovska Mitrovica		- People take bread and salt (with making the cross sign) - Demonstrations - Banners; - Ring dance (“as they said, we came to share our troubles, but also to mark the most important holiday for Serbs from KiM: <i>Vidovdan</i>)	- Victimization of Serbs - Demonstrations - Displaced people from Kosovo
2001b	- Patriarch Pavle, Bishops Artemije and Atanasije Jefić (paraphrased)	- Gračanica/ - Gazimestan		- Gračanica - Gazimestan: UNMIK police with weapons, barbed wire around the monument	- Victimization of Serbs - Military forces with weapons - Serbs – not safe

5.3.2 Context

From the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2000 to the one a year later, Serbia went through the socio-political transformation which came in most countries in “East Europe” with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The democratic opposition in Serbia took over power after more than a decade of Milošević’s rule. In this single year, the political picture changed dramatically.

As a result of the end of bombing in 1999, the UNMIK and KFOR troops entered Kosovo and the Serbian police withdrew. Directly or indirectly, this led to a complete change to the status of the Kosovo Serbs. The immediate post-war reaction was the burning of Serbian (and other non-Albanian) houses, attacks on Orthodox churches and kidnapping and murder of non-Albanians (Judah 2008: 91). At the beginning of 21st century, Serbia and Kosovo (then both a part of SRJ) were alienated from Europe, exhausted economically and physically from a decade of wars culminating in the Kosovo war and NATO-bombing. Many Serbs decided to leave their homes in Kosovo as the international troops entered (Ramet 2006: 541-543).

In these circumstances, the Serbian opposition gathered their forces once again⁸⁹ in connection to the presidential elections in SRJ scheduled for the 24 September 2000. Serbian cities were covered with the posters featuring the fist, symbol of *Otpor!*⁹⁰ (Resistance!), and the slogan “Gotov je!” ‘He [Milošević] is finished’. “People [were] beginning to draw the conclusion that there [was] no future with Milošević”. (Pešić, cited in Ramet 2006: 517).

On the eve of the presidential elections, Serbia had no freedom of speech, journalists were killed,⁹¹ neutral and oppositional TV and radio stations closed, while the national television channels, cherished the “media darkness”.⁹² The usual reports on national television ignored the student and oppositional protests and focused on demonizing the NATO troops and the “international community”, alongside the Albanians from Kosovo (see Section 5.2.3).

Just before the presidential elections at the federal level (SRJ, Serbia (with two provinces) and Montenegro), Milošević’s government had to “adjust” the Constitution, to make sure that Serbian voters could outvote the Montenegrin ones, which resulted in Đukanović’s⁹³ declaration that his republic would boycott the elections (Ramet 2006: 520). *Demokratska opozicija Srbije* (Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS) decided to run with Vojislav Koštunica, a constitutional lawyer and the leader of *Demokratska stranka Srbije* (Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS) against Slobodan Milošević, who was representing his own party – *Socijalistička partija Srbije* (Socialistic Party of Serbia, SPS).

As the voting was finished, the two sides published different results. In order to win the elections, Koštunica needed more than fifty percent of the votes, otherwise a run-off was required. After DOS’ calculations, Koštunica gained more than fifty percent, but the SPS numbers claimed that this was not the case and the second round of the elections was scheduled for 8 October (Judah 2009:343). DOS did not want to accept the run-off election, declared victory and Koštunica a new elected President, accused the government of fraud and announced a general strike to bring down the government (Ramet 2006: 521).

⁸⁹ The opposition did that twice more during the 90s. The coalition DEPOS, *Demokratski pokret Srbije* (Democratic Movement of Serbia) was formed in 1992 before the Parliament elections; coalition *Zajedno* (Together) was born in 1996.

⁹⁰ A civic youth non-party organization, formed by Belgrade University students in 1998 as a reaction to repressive laws against Universities and the Public Information Act (Collin 2001: 153).

⁹¹ According to Veran Matić, editor-in-chief of Radio B92, by 2000, 26 employees of TV, radio and print media were killed (Ramet 2006: 519). One of the most referred to is the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija (1999), a journalist and owner of *Dnevni telegraf* (Daily Telegraph), *Nedeljni telegraf* (Weekly Telegraph) and *Evropljanin* (The European). All of these were closed before his death, as their publishing policy clashed with the new Information Act (1998).

⁹² The phrase *medijski mrak*, ‘media darkness’, was often used as a metaphor for the state that freedom of speech in Serbia was in. In particular, this phrase aimed to depict the selective information politics of the government media.

⁹³ Milo Đukanović, the President of the Republic of Montenegro at the time.

The strike spread fast and on 5 October reached its peak: the crowd, estimated to be hundreds of thousands, spread over the whole capital of Serbia, led by *Otpor!* and the DOS-leaders⁹⁴. *Savezna skupština* (the Federal Parliament) and National Television, RTS were some of the “targets” of the gathered people. As one of the main symbols of Milošević’s regime, both were, almost ritually, re-conquered. Once RTS was “conquered”, the TV program of the “New RTS” began its broadcast. The newly elected president, Vojislav Koštunica, addressed the public and Milošević was forced to resign (BBC News 6 October 2000).⁹⁵ Milošević was arrested on 1 April 2001. On *Vidovdan* the same year, the Yugoslav authorities handed over the now ex-Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milošević, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia⁹⁶ (ICTY). Milošević’s delivery to The Hague was one of the points of contention between the new elected Yugoslav president, Vojislav Koštunica, and the new Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić (Ramet 2006: 527). As my *Dnevnik* material also shows, Đinđić publicly justified the decision to hand Milošević over to the war crime tribunal in The Hague. Koštunica, on the other hand, for the first time publicly, expresses opposition the Đinđić’s government decision, naming this move a coup d’état (Janić 2011).⁹⁷

On his way to the helicopter that would take him to The Hague, Milošević allegedly said: “Znate li da je danas Vidovdan?” ‘Do you know that today is *Vidovdan*?’ (*Glas javnosti*, 30 June 2001).

5.3.3 The *Vidovdan* of Đinđić’s Era: Withdrawal from the *Vidovdan* Discourse?

As can be seen in Table 4, in comparison to all the other years analysed in this thesis, the text on the *Vidovdan* celebration on *Dnevnik* on 28 June 2001 has the shortest duration. This year’s celebration evidently got less attention as a short report starts after 31 minutes of the programme and lasts for approximately 1min and 15 seconds. Generally, the mythologisation of the text is avoided.

⁹⁴ DOS consisted of 18 oppositional parties. The biggest among them were DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia, leader: Vojislav Koštunica), DS (Democratic Party, leader: Zoran Đinđić), GSS (Civic Alliance of Serbia, leader: Vesna Pešić), DHSS (Christian Democratic Party of Serbia, leader: Vladan Batić), and NS (New Serbia, leader: Velimir Ilić).

⁹⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/959077.stm>, accessed 10 September 2012.

⁹⁶ A United Nations court of law, established in 1993 with its seat in The Hague. This court deals with war crimes that took place during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. (ICTY, <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY>, accessed 10 July 2012).

⁹⁷ <http://www.e-novine.com/feljton/45657-Deo-ire-zloinake-organizacije.html>, accessed 15 July 2012.

Reports on Milošević's delivery to the ICTY stands central in RTS *Dnevnik* of 2001. The Serbian Prime Minister at the time, Zoran Đinđić, held a press conference, which was broadcasted in its entirety on RTS *Dnevnik* on 28 June 2001. On the same day, though not as a part of the *Dnevnik* broadcast, Đinđić addressed the public (cited in *Dokument*⁹⁸ 27 June 2012, 07:33). In this address Đinđić demythologises *Vidovdan* Discourse. What he literary did is that he destroyed the blend based on the Christian mythologisation of *Vidovdan* Discourse and Serbian national identity (see Section 4.2 for the roots and manifestations of this blend). Đinđić does that explicitly by employing the words “ideali zemaljske Srbije”, ‘ideals of the earthly Serbia’, as opposed to those of “nebeska Srbija”, ‘heavenly Serbia’. These “ideals of the heavenly Serbia” are closely connected to Prince Lazar's choice (see Section 4.1) of the “heavenly kingdom” and the Serbian Orthodox Church's interpretation of the Kosovo myth. Moreover, Đinđić makes sure that the phrase “ideals of the heavenly Serbia” gets an extremely negative connotation. SPC, the nationalist right wing in Serbian politics (first of all, Koštunica, but Drašković as well) and Milošević administration,⁹⁹ had used this phrase and its variations as a “political myth” that, in various senses, glorifies the Serbian nation (Čolović cited in *Most* 2009). Now, Đinđić turns the same phrase into a synonym for “12 years of wars, disasters and destruction”:

Poštovani građani Srbije, pre ravno 12 godina, na isti ovaj dan, na jedan od najvećih srpskih praznika, Vidovdan, Slobodan Milošević je pozvao naš narod da ostvaruje ono što je on nazvao idealima nebeske Srbije. To je dovelo do 12 godina ratova, katastrofe i propadanja naše zemlje. Vlada Republike Srbije se danas obavezala da sprovodi ideale zemaljske Srbije.

Dear citizens of Serbia, exactly 12 years ago, on this same day, on one of the greatest Serbian holidays, *Vidovdan*, Slobodan Milošević called on our people to realize what he called the ideals of the heavenly Serbia. This led to 12 years of wars, disasters and destruction of our country. The Serbian Government pledges today to uphold the ideals of earthly Serbia. (Đinđić cited in *Dokument* 27 June 2012, 07:33)

Đinđić still names *Vidovdan* as “one of the greatest Serbian holidays”. In that sense, he determines *Vidovdan* as a blend of the religious, as it was still just a religious holiday in June 2001,¹⁰⁰ and the national. The demythologisation of the *Vidovdan* Discourse in Đinđić's address

⁹⁸ “Mit o Vidovdanu”, *Dokument*, 27 June 2012, http://media.rtv.rs/sr_lat/dokument/2750, accessed 17 July 2012.

⁹⁹ As explained in Section 4.2, “heavenly Serbia” is the very core of the *Vidovdan* Discourse. Shapes and uses of *Vidovdan* Discourse in the texts of RTS, as well as RTS' representations of *Vidovdan* Discourse as used by social actors, are the research assignments of this thesis. See Section 1.2. for a list of other authors that also wrote about the uses of *Vidovdan* Discourse. See also Antić (2005: 191-222), Bieber (2002), Erjavec and Volčič (2007).

¹⁰⁰ It was first declared as a state holiday by the Law on State Holidays in July 2001.

to the public, cited above, is based, therefore, not on ignoring the Kosovo issue or the importance of *Vidovdan* in Serbian collective memory, but on placing that issue in the realm of politics and not blending it with the Kosovo myth. Florian Bieber (2002: 107), expressed hope that “the end of Milošević era [...] hold[s] out some promise that the Kosovo myth might be removed from the political sphere and restored to the realm of cultural heritage”. This short analysis of the main points in Đinđić’s text shows that the change in use of *Vidovdan* Discourse travels towards placing the Kosovo myth in “the realm of cultural heritage”.

5.3.4 The Discourse World of the 2001 Celebration, Verbal Mode

The report on the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2001 starts at 31:26 from the beginning of *Dnevnik* with anchor’s announcement of the marking of *Vidovdan* in Gračanica monastery. The very obvious difference in staging of this year and the event in 2000 is that the liturgy in Gračanica monastery got not just more attention this year, but also a central place in the report on the *Vidovdan* celebration, mainly through the visual mode (see Figures 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13):




Figure 9 Gračanica monastery, 2001



Figure 10 Patriarch Pavle serves the liturgy, 2001



Figure 11 Patriarch Pavle, Bishop Artemije, Bishop Atanasije Jeftić, and priests of the Raška-Prizren diocese serve the liturgy, 2001



Figure 12 People gathered in the Gračanica churchyard during the liturgy, 2001



Figure 13 Patriarch Pavle during the liturgy in Gračanica, 2001

Uz velike mere obezbeđenja od strane brojnih pripadnika KFOR-a i UN policije, Vidovdan je ponovo i u većem broju okupio Srbe u Gračanici i na Gazimestanu. Jutros je u dvorištu manastira Gračanica, pred nešto više od hiljadu vernika, liturgiju povodom Sv. Vida, služio Njegova svetost patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle.

With high security measures provided by numerous members of KFOR troops and the UN police, *Vidovdan* has again gathered numerous Serbs in Gračanica and Gazimestan. This morning His Holiness Serbian Patriarch Pavle served the liturgy on the occasion of St. Vitus, in the courtyard of the Gračanica monastery, in front of more than a thousand believers. (*Dnevnik*, 28 June 2001, 31:39)

On the one hand, the reporter breaks the connection with the *Vidovdan* Discourse by connecting the event only with the Christian martyr from the 4th century, St. Vitus: “Liturgiju povodom Svetog Vida”, ‘Liturgy [served] on the occasion of the St. Vitus’. In the book *Srpske slave i praznici* (Serbian feasts and holidays) (Bojić 2009: 65) *Vidovdan* is described primarily as “pomen na dan srpske pogibije na Kosovu 1389. godine”, ‘commemoration of the day of Serbian death in Kosovo in 1389’. In *Crkveni kalendar* (the Church Calendar) for 2012, 28 June is marked with “St. Prophet Amos” written in black and “St. Martyr Prince Lazar and all St. Serbian martyrs – *Vidovdan*”, written in red letters (Sveti Arhijerejski Sinod Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve 2012: 13). None of them even mentions that St. Vitus is celebrated on 28 June.

On the other hand, the report presents Serbs in Kosovo as powerless, depended on UNMIK’s and KFOR’s protection. The historical context (see Section 5.3.2) shows that the political and social position of the Serbs in Kosovo has changed after 1999 (Judah 2008: 98, Ramet 2006: 538, 542, Buckley and Cumming: 38) meaning that many felt unsafe living in Kosovo. In his article “Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to the present”, Bieber (2002: 107) expresses a concern that the unsolved Kosovo issue, even with the change of regime in 2000 and Milošević’s handing over to the ICTY, might be a source of a new reuse of *Vidovdan* Discourse in representations of Serb

suffering. Ramet (2007; 2006: 537-552, see also Zdravković 2005) explains that both parties (Serbian and Albanian) have, in the period after the change of the regime in Serbia, presented themselves as victims. *Dnevnik*'s report from 2001 represents Serbs as victims, which is, to a certain degree an accurate picture of the real condition according to the history sources cited above. What *Dnevnik* also does, on the other hand, is avoid presenting any particular conflict episode which might have created an unsafe environment for the Serbs in Kosovo. It is more the *state* of constant doubtful safety for the Serbs in Kosovo that is the main representation theme in the report of 2001.

The reporter, functioning as the narrator, changed role in comparison to the one in 2000. This led to a changed perception and representation of the “we”- and “the other”-groups. While the reporter in 2000 identified herself with the group determined by the collective “we”: “prošlodigošnja agresija na našu zemlju”, ‘last year’s aggression on *our* country’ (*Dnevnik*, 28 June 2000, 03:58), the reporter in 2001 describes the event of celebration as an omniscient narrator. The authoritativeness of this role is even more emphasized by the absence of the reporter’s image, and his presence is marked only with the voiceover narration.

With this kind of representation from the reporter in the role of omniscient narrator, the “we” perspective does not really exist in the text from 2001. “Such deictic positioning also detaches the newsreaders and journalists from the events they are reporting, establishes them as external observers, and necessitates the adoption of third-person narration and external focalization” (Mihelj, Bajt, Pankov 2008: 65). In that case, from the reporter’s perspective, all the actors in the reported event, Kosovo Serbs, KFOR and UN soldiers, the Church officials, are represented as the Other. This Other, though, is not the same as the one in the representation of social actors in 2000.

As described in the first part of the analysis, the Other in 2000 is constructed through the negative representation of Kosovo Albanians and the “international community” (see Section 5.2.3). The “international community” in the text of 2000 was described as the “blind and obedient executor of the dark orders of America” (Jablanović in *Dnevnik* 28. June 2000, 24:17) and NATO’s politics as “dirty” and “evil aggression” (Jablanović, *Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 23:30). The Other in the representation from 2001 is neither negative nor really that far from the possible deictic centre of the narrator. Moreover that Other is parted in two: Kosovo Serbs and the “international community” (KFOR and UN troops). Kosovo Serbs, as a part of the Other, are defined as victims through (the slightly more remote) Other of the international troops: “Uz

velike mere obezbeđenja od strane brojnih pripadnika KFOR-a¹⁰¹ i UN policije” (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2001, 31:39), ‘With high security measures provided by the numerous members of KFOR troops and UN police’, “pod pratnjom, ‘do zuba naoružanih’ vojnika” (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2001, 32:25), ‘escorted by soldiers armed to the teeth’. The international community that in the discourse of 2000 represented the negative Other, now has a positive Other connotation and a protector role. The negative Other, which is making Serbs feeling unsafe and therefore in the need of protection, is not explicitly mentioned.

Fairclough (1995: 77) underlines that one of the exceptional features of news discourse is ability to blend in different levels of intertextuality and therefore representations made in a multivocal discourse. In that sense, the reporter’s voice, a narrator, is partly lost or blended into another voice in the proposition: “Pred portom manastira Gračanica, patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle je poželeo mir i *slobodan život* žiteljima Kosmeta, a *prognanima* da se što pre vrate svojim domovima”, ‘In *Gračanica*’s churchyard, the Serbian Patriarch Pavle wished peace and *free/liberated life* to Kosovo’s citizens, and to *those who were driven away* to return to their homes as soon as possible’. By naming the voice (source) the utterance is ascribed to, and paraphrasing (we are expected to believe) the exact content of the part of Patriarch’s speech, the representation of the Serbs in Kosovo as victims, implied through the use of the nominal adjective *prognani*, ‘driven away’ is assigned to Patriarch Pavle, not the narrator himself. Furthermore, it is left open to interpretation whether the meaning of the polysemic adjective *slobodan*, alludes to the wishes for the future life in peace and *free* life or to the experience-based utterance depicting the Serbs as captured and in need of being *liberated*.

The substantivized adjective “prognani”, ‘the driven away’ is of particular importance since it creates a kind of intervocal agreement between the narrator’s general representation of Serbs in Kosovo as victims (see also Section 5.3.5) and the Patriarch’s own (and that of the Serbian Orthodox Church for that matter) perception and representation of the same social actor. This adjective also acknowledges the existence of the unnamed negative Other that *drives* the Serbs *away*.

Strictly speaking, legally the term *prognani* or *prognana lica* was reserved for the “citizens of the Republic of Serbian Krajina who were [...] after the action *Oluja*, under pressure, driven away to the territory of the Republic of Serbia. By adoption of the amendments

¹⁰¹ The Kosovo Force, or KFOR, are the NATO-led troops that entered the territory of Kosovo in 1999 as a peace keeping mission (see article on NATO’s role in Kosovo http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm, accessed 10 July 2012). See also Section 5.2.2 where the context of KFOR’s entering Kosovo is described.

to the Law on Refugees,¹⁰² the term ‘*prognana lica*’ is no longer in use”. (Petar Anđić, pers.comm.).¹⁰³ For citizens of Kosovo, the term *interno raseljena lica*, ‘temporarily displaced people’ has been in use “quite a long time” (ibid.) though not defined in the Law on Refugees. According to the Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, people who left Kosovo to live in Serbia are, per definition, not refugees and are displaced *within the territory of the same state* (ibid.).

A portrait of Serbs in Kosovo as unsafe is implied though a new image of the international community. Following Van Dijk’s (1988) “macrostructure theory” in the news discourse, the most important information is always placed at the beginning of the text. The first sentence that should sum up the report places the information about the international troop’s protection above the information about the *Vidovdan* celebration. The rather neutral name used of the KFOR and UN troops, *pripadnik* ‘member’, *vojniki* ‘soldier’, in combination with the positive function they have got: to provide *obezbeđenje* ‘security’, places these actors closer to the deictic center (See Figure 14). The “international community” is not exactly the same as the subject placed in deictic centre, but it is near, and because of the protector role, outside of scope of the implied “negative Other”. The Scheme below spatially describes the change in representation of the Self and the Other in the texts of 2000 and 2001, using Chilton’s (2004) graphic presentation of discourse worlds and deictic centre.

¹⁰² *Zakon o izbeglicama*, 2010, *Službeni glasnik RS*, br. 30, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0Byj7SkMd-KbYODdlNDczMmEtYWRiMy00NTJmLWE3MjctODQzZjJmMWQ5ODNj/edit?hl=en_US, accessed 20 September 2012.

¹⁰³ Petar Anđić, representing Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, e-mail message to author, 27 July 2012.




Figure 14 A schematic spatial presentation of representations in *Dnevnik* in 2000 and 2001

The discursive world that the reporter is creating as an “observer” has its own deictic centre where the “inner Other” becomes a “new Self”. This Self is crucially different in the representations in 2000 and 2001. In 2000, that “we” who celebrates *Vidovdan*, the text shows, includes Serbs from the whole of Serbia (with Kosovo explicitly included): “Širom Srbije svečano se obeležava Vidovdan. Evo kako je bilo na Kosmetu”, ‘*Vidovdan* is ceremonially marked throughout Serbia. This is how it was in Kosmet’ (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2000, 22:27). The Self in 2001 represents solely Serbs from Kosovo: “više stotina Srba iz Gračanice, okolnih sela i ostalih srpskih enklava sa Kosmeta [...] uputila [se] do Gazimestana” ‘hundreds of Serbs from Gračanica, near-by villages and the other Serbian enclaves in Kosmet [...] headed towards Gazimestan’. (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2001, 31:40).

Moreover, the identity of those who “have gathered in Gračanica and Gazimestan” to celebrate *Vidovdan* is determined through a blend of the religious and the national. “Vidovdan je ponovo i većem broju okupio Srbe u Gračanici i na Gazimestanu”, ‘*Vidovdan* has again gathered a large number of Serbs in Gračanica and Gazimestan’ leads to the next phrases “Jutros

je u dvorištu manastira Gračanica, pred nešto više od hiljadu *vernika* [...]" "This morning, in front of more than a thousand believers, in Gračanica monastery [...]" (ibid.) explicitly equating the national determination *the Serbs* and the religious determination of the *believers*.

5.3.5 The Discourse World of the 2001 Celebration, Visual Mode

The video story of this report follows the reporter's narrative: the picture takes the viewer first to Gračanica monastery, with shots from the liturgy, then down the road towards Gazimestan and then finally to the site of the battle, the Gazimestan monument. The visual representation of social actors focuses on the representation of the "inner Others", primarily the international troops. As in the verbal representation, the "new Self" and a part of the inner Other, Kosovo Serbs, is entirely defined through the visually implied action(s) of the international soldiers. The visual mode organizes the story in the same way the verbal mode does. Firstly, the viewer gets almost uninterrupted video camerawork of the liturgical celebration with a shift towards more dynamic transitions between images in the part presenting the requiem at Gazimestan.

As noted in Section 2.3.1, it can be difficult to prove which parts, if any, of the uninterrupted video image are staged or manipulated and, if so, in which way. We can only speak of the possible reach in the semiotic potential of each of the shots, and their composition into a meaningful whole.

The first part of the video mode is based on a semi-documentary style which is stressed by the authenticity of the audio mode. Even though the audio mode is not analysed in detail in this thesis, this particular voice-over with a recognisable sound "over the phone", confirms the documentary style, placing the reporter "on the spot" in the function of eyewitness.

The second part of the video mode is slightly more staged in that sense that the impression of the live film footage is broken by the fast changing sequences of images seemingly arranged almost exclusively to create the picture of the Serbian need for protection in Kosovo.

The positive image of the international community is not implied in the visual mode. The "muted" image "talks" about the danger, describes the setting of the conflict, even giving an implied war setting, since a tank occupies the central place in the image (see Figure 15).



Figure 15 On the way to Gazimestan, under KFOR and UNMIK protection, 2001

In Section 2.3.1 I dealt with the shortcomings of the theory of the “grammar of visual design”, as presented by Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006), as related to video footage. On the other hand, most of the video material in this thesis is analysed through “frozen images”. Therefore, parts of this theory/method are used in order to investigate the potential semantics of the images. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006: 59) speak of two essential types of representation: narrative and conceptual (see Section 2.3.1), the first one being where the participants are, through vectors, represented as “doing something or for each other”.

Even though, as I understood the use of this term, the vectors exist in images with two or more actors to explain who is “doing something” and to whom (what is usually in verbal discourse described using the transitive verb), I find it useful to deal with the same term even in cases when the other actor is not present in the image. The other actor, in my opinion, and as the images below might indicate, is implied or more precisely, taken from the verbal mode of the text. Van Leeuwen (2005: 219-247) calls this “borrowing” or extending the meaning of the image through the text – “linking”. “Formerly the image illustrated the text (made it clearer); today the text loads the image, burdening it with culture, a moral, an imagination. Formerly, there was reduction from text to image, today, there is amplification from one to the other” (Barthes cited in Van Leeuwen 2005: 230).

The “information links” (see Section 2.3.1), the meaningful relationships between each of the shots (or image elements), semantic wholes in a verbal text or the relation between shots and verbal text, are “often seen as having value in themselves, again in terms ‘the more information, the better’” (ibid.: 219).

Of the film theories Van Leeuwen deals with (2005: 228f.) the most relevant for the next few shots is the one of Pudovkin. For instance, the barbed wire in the picture below is important as a symbol of danger, and the feeling of being trapped. The decision to focus on the barbed

wire (Figure 16) and then unfocus and film through it and focus on the international soldiers through the wire (Figure 17) gives away the intention to create an impression of being trapped and feeling unsafe.

By using the *relational montage*, as Pudovkin calls the linking of the material not directly connected to the narrative (both visual and verbal) to the narrative itself, one brings in additional semiotic devices for interpreting the story. In this particular case, the barbed wire, not directly connected to the story (the celebration of *Vidovdan*) is introduced in the first shot and then, *through* the barbed wire, the story has continued. The barbed wire *linked* the two shoots by using a *similarity* montage: “where an abstract concept is introduced into the consciousness of the spectator without the use of a title” (Pudovkin cited in Van Leeuwen 2005: 228). The symbolic meaning of the barbed wire gives an interpretation to the soldier image which follows immediately. Or more precisely, it puts them in the role of the protector Subject, in accordance with the verbal mode.



Figure 16 The barbed wire (zoomed in), 2001



Figure 17 Through the barbed wire: UNMIK and KFOR soldiers, 2001

As the sequence of soldier images is changing before the viewers' eyes, the viewer has to find the other part of the information, the answer to the question of who is being protected, from the verbal part of the text. This information binds the verbal and visual representation into one: "više stotina Srba iz Gračanice, okolnih sela i ostalih srpskih enklava sa Kosmeta [se] pod pratnjom "do zuba naoružanih" vojnika, uputila do Gazimestana", 'hundreds of Serbs from Gračanica, near-by villages and the other Serbian enclaves in Kosmet headed towards Gazimestan escorted by the soldiers who were "armed to the teeth"'.

The staging of the international troops' image as "security – makers" is also evident in Figure 18. The interpretation of vectors in this image brings out the same point. The machine gun, even while pointing down, symbolises power. The actor holding the machine gun (and the power), holds an instrument for making the other participants, seen in the background, safe. The real vector, though, I would suggest, is not the machine gun, but a pointed finger that provides balance between the control over the power and the readiness to use the instrument of power in protecting the others in the image. The image is taken from an angle from which both soldiers' heads are "cut off". Faceless soldiers become depersonalised, which underlines even more the focus on the action: to provide security, not the subject or the object of the action. The image taken from the bottom-up could also suggest that the power lies with the soldiers represented in the image. At the same time, the social distance is quite narrow which can be interpreted with a kind of personal relationship that might otherwise be read from the verb "to protect".



Figure 18 Armed soldiers at Gazimestan, 2001

5.3.6 Conclusion: The *Vidovdan* of Đinđić's Era, 2001

After using different techniques in exploring the meaning potential of *Dnevnik*'s news text on *Vidovdan* in 2001, any conclusion would have to underline the global tendency towards distancing from the *Vidovdan* Discourse.

Đinđić has, in one of the most explicit example in this thesis, broken the relationship between his political utterances and the poetics of *Vidovdan*.

In a way, a slight detachment can be followed in the *Dnevnik*'s text as well, mostly through the use of various "objective newsmaker" techniques: allowing the narrator to keep the role of the omniscient narrator and through creating a discourse with no Self and an inner Other instead.

On the other hand, the implicit definition of Kosovo Serbs as victims, even bearing in mind that the power balance changed totally with the change of regime in Serbia, indicates that one of the main narratives of the *Vidovdan* Discourse, the myth of martyrdom, still persists.

5.4 Vidovdan of Koštunica's Era, 2006



(Corax, *Danas* 29 June 2007)

5.4.1 Introduction

The perspective that the reporter (or the editorial board) can give with the use of different kinds of intertextuality is discussed in Section 2.3.3. In some cases (cf. the reporter's perspective in Section 5.3) the editorial board of *Dnevnik* decides whether certain social actors are going to be given "voices", be allowed to speak, to what degree and *how*.

Representation through intertextuality is one of the key elements in the analysis of *Dnevnik's* text of 2006. See Figure 19 for the schematic presentation of "news' polyphony" in *Dnevnik's* representation of *Vidovdan* celebration in 2006.

In Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4, I primarily analyse the discursive construction of social actors through *Dnevnik's* voice (both that of the anchor and the reporter), while the final part of this analysis, Section 5.4.5 considers the discursive worlds of the represented discourses and their connection to collective memory.




Figure 19 News' Polyphony: A graphic representation of the voice distribution and intertextuality in *Dnevnik's* text, 28 June 2006

Table 5 Year 2006

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructure	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2006 (1)	- Koštunica (live direct speech, direct speech, paraphrased) - Patriarch Pavle (paraphrased) - Bishops Artemije (paraphrased)	Gračanica / Gazimestan	(1 st news) “We want historically fair solution for Kosovo and Metohija. Kosovo has always been and forever shall be a part of Serbia”, said Prime Minister Koštunica in Gračanica on the <i>Vidovdan</i> celebration.	- Koštunica on Kosovo - The Gračanica Monastery - Liturgy - Koštunica’s speech - Koštunica shakes hands with people - <i>Mother of nine Jugovičs</i> medal - <i>A mother of “Southern Serbian province”</i>	- The victimization of Serbs - The sacralization of The Patriarch - Myth of antiquity, victimhood-Jerusalem - Implied public support for the Prime Minister
2006 (2)	- Members of the Kosovo Police Service (paraphrased) - The “Self-determination” movement (image) - Emrush Xhemajli (talked about)	- South part of Kosovska Mitrovica - The border at Merdare		- Picture of the arrest	- Negative representation of Kosovo Albanians - De-legitimisation of Kosovo Albanians – even the Kosovo Parliament member was one of them
2006 (3)	- People in the church (image, talked about) - Families of the abducted and the ones that have disappeared (image, talked about)	- Belgrade (Church of St. Marko)		- Liturgy	- Victimization - Speculation with numbers - Legitimation (by implementing numbers)

5.4.2 Context

Even though Milošević was arrested and delivered to the ICTY, Serbia still had a list of political, economical and cultural issues that the state had inherited from Milošević. Serbia had to deal with the unresolved Kosovo issue; the question of the independence of Montenegro; organised crime; pressure from the ICTY for the delivery of war criminals, principally Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić; general economic and political chaos; all of these were part of Milošević’s legacy.

On top of all these issues they had to deal with, the new Serbian Prime Minister, Đinđić, and the new Yugoslav President, Koštunica, fought “a cold war [because they] disagreed on all of these questions” (Judah 2009: 348).

One of the challenges Đinđić’s government was faced with was the organized crime that flourished in Serbia even after the 5 October overthrow. According to Čedomir Jovanović, organized crime was well integrated into and controlled by “the top of the federal administration”, meaning Koštunica, people close to him and some other DSS members¹⁰⁴ (cited in Judah 2009: 351). These criminal groups, claimed to be associated with the Zemun gang and the Special Operations Unit (JSO), were involved in various criminal operations in Serbia at the time, including assassinations and murder attempts that had political background, both during and after Milošević (*Insajder*, “Zavera ćutanja”, 12 March 2012). Members of these groups were also involved in Đinđić’s assassination on 12 March 2003.

The Montenegrin independence issue began to unfold quite quickly: as early as 14 March 2002, on the intervention of Javier Solana, the High Representative of the European Union, the formal state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased to exist and a new, looser union was born, being Serbia and Montenegro (Ramet 2005: 528). Both units in the new union were on the way to European integration and wanted EU-membership. Of all the political differences and disagreements Serbia and Montenegro were occupied with at the time, the EU-question seemed to be the most important one: “Many Montenegrins thought that their development and European integration were being held back by issues which concerned Serbia, above all relations with ICTY and the fate of Kosovo” (Judah 2009: 354). Montenegro declared its independence from Serbia on 3 June 2006 after a referendum that showed that a majority in Montenegro did not want union with Serbia. On 28 June, *Vidovdan*, 2006, Montenegro was admitted as the 192nd member of the United Nations (UN) (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2006, 13:50).

In the period from the previously analysed *Vidovdan*, of 2001, to the one in 2006, Serbia and Montenegro as union and Serbia as a republic, went through a couple of intensive rounds of elections on all levels. Boris Tadić¹⁰⁵ was elected President of the Republic of Serbia in 2004 in elections held on 27 June 2004, and remained in the post until April 2012. Koštunica, on the

¹⁰⁴ One of the popular TV shows on the television B92, *Insajder* (Insider) tried, on a couple of occasions and related to different subjects, to confirm and document this claim. See *Atentat* (The Assassination), http://www.b92.net/video/video.php?nav_category=906&nav_id=513514, *Zavera ćutanja* (Conspiracy of silence), http://www.b92.net/video/video.php?nav_category=906&nav_id=591063 or *Patriotska pljačka* (Patriotic Robbery), http://www.b92.net/video/video.php?nav_category=906&nav_id=645824, accessed 5 September 2012

¹⁰⁵ Tadić was a member of DS, *Demokratska stranka* (Democratic Party) from its foundation in 1990. He was the party’s vice president until 2004 when he, a year after Đinđić’s death, succeeded him as a president of DS. He still holds this position even though he stepped down as Republic President in April 2012.

other hand, with the looser union between Serbia and Montenegro and the end of DOS-era, was forced to seek another position and from March 2004 until February 2007 was to preside “as Serbian prime minister, over uneasy coalition government which included G17 Plus but not the DS” (Judah 2009: 351) and then again from 2007 to 2008 in coalition with DS.

The situation in Kosovo went through major changes as well. The most well-known are the *martovski događaji* (March events) in 2004 and the beginning of talks between the Serbian government and Kosovo Albanian representatives. Initiated by the shooting of a Serbian teenager and the drowning of Albanian children in mid-March, the “March events” usually refer to “an unexpected spasm of violence, rioting, and pogroms” (Judah 2008: 108) where a large numbers of Kosovo Serbs were driven out of Kosovo and Orthodox Churches and Serbian houses were burned (BBC 28 April 2004).¹⁰⁶ After the events in March 2004¹⁰⁷ it was quite clear that the Serbian and Albanian side needed to talk and find a solution about Kosovo. Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish President got an assignment to oversee the talks between the two parties (2006 in Vienna). These talks, would lead 14 months later to the creation of a plan popularly referred to as the “Ahtisaari Plan” made by Ahtisaari and his team (Judah 2008: 111).

Slobodan Milošević, the ex-Yugoslav (SRJ) President died on the 11 March 2006 in his cell in Scheveningen, the Hague (B92, 11 March 2006).¹⁰⁸

5.4.3 The Representation of Social Actors I: Koštunica

According to UNMIK’s contact for public information, Neeraj Singh, Vojislav Koštunica came to Kosovo on a *private* visit and for *religious* reasons on the occasion of the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2006 (Singh cited on B92, 26 June 2006).¹⁰⁹ *Dnevnik*’s report does not signal in any of the sentences that Koštunica’s visit should be seen as private. Quite the opposite, every time Koštunica’s name is mentioned in this year’s report about *Vidovdan*, the viewer is reminded¹¹⁰ of his political function: *premijer Koštunica*, “Prime Minister Koštunica”, *srpski premijer* “Serbian Prime Minister”, or even more, just *premijer* implying Koštunica. This

¹⁰⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3667839.stm>, accessed 20 October 2012.

¹⁰⁷ The chronology of events can be found here: <http://www.b92.net/specijal/kosovo2004/> B92 *Specijal*, accessed 5 October 2012.

¹⁰⁸ http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=03&dd=11&nav_category=64&nav_id=191255, accessed 5 October 2012.

¹⁰⁹ http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=06&dd=26&nav_category=11&nav_id=202591, accessed 5 October 2012.

¹¹⁰ B92’s text about the same event proves that it is possible to write about Koštunica’s “2006 *Vidovdan* visit” to Kosovo without referring to the political function to the visit. In this text Koštunica’s title is used a lot lesser and the dispute about official vs. private visit is also addressed. See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=06&dd=28&nav_category=11&nav_id=202843, accessed 5 October 2012.

“move” can be seen as legitimisation strategy, with repetition as its linguistic technique. In the context of talks between Serbia and Kosovo, scheduled for the same year, and the future planned Athisaari’s solution for Kosovo, which was to be considered as the beginning of a process of Kosovo becoming independent (Judah 2008: 111-116), the UNMIK’s voice that insisted on Koštunica being just himself, not the state he is representing, is omitted. This omission caused a direct blend of politics and religion in *Dnevnik*’s report: the viewer sees the meeting of the Church and the State joined together in a religiously grounded celebration.¹¹¹

That is how Koštunica, a “legitimate insider”, gets to speak “in the name of” Serbia when he says: “Kosovo je bilo i zauvek će biti deo Srbije”. ‘Kosovo has been and shall forever be a part of Serbia’. For Koštunica, as a believer and a citizen of Serbia, this utterance might be considered a personal opinion. On the other hand, when Koštunica, as Prime Minister, utters the same sentence, it becomes somehow a powerful, almost, performative, political statement.

This statement is foregrounded in several ways: it is singled out as “the news of the day” (macrostructure), and quoted as direct speech; then repeated and paraphrased in the anchor’s introduction to the report to be finally uttered in a live quote by Koštunica himself. The power, given to Koštunica by *Dnevnik*, is also indicated through a “God’s messenger” – representation of Koštunica in both verbal and image modes: “Srpski premijer, Vojislav Koštunica, po podne je stigao u Gračanicu s porukom da je Kosovo uvek bilo i de će uvek biti deo Srbije”. ‘Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica, this afternoon came to Gračanica with the message that Kosovo always was and shall always be a part of Serbia’ (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2006, 01:38). The combination of the clause “stigao [...] s porukom”, ‘came [...] with a message’ and the expressed certainty through reusing the almost exact wording of Koštunica (adverb “uvek”, ‘always’ in combination with the past and future tense) gives an impression that “the message” about “Kosovo being Serbian” is not something Koštunica said and delivered himself, but was, almost, an act of divine intervention. Moreover, who is the intended receiver of the message Koštunica delivers?

In comparison with the whole speech¹¹² (see Koštunica 2008: 48-49) the parts that *Dnevnik* recontextualized are less connected to the *Vidovdan* Discourse. Direct analogies and words from the *Vidovdan* Discourse used in the speech are avoided by *Dnevnik*. All of the

¹¹¹ “Vidovdan – spomen na Kosovsku bitku se praznuje i obeležava radno”, ‘Vidovdan – memory of the Battle of Kosovo is celebrated and marked as a working day’ states the Law on Holidays in the Republic of Serbia passed in 2001 (*Službeni glasnik RS*, 43/2001. Revised in 2007 and 2011: *Službeni glasnik RS*, 101/2007, 92/2011). That means that, from 2001, *Vidovdan*, the religious holiday, became a national holiday as well. This law recognizes that official blend of religious and state (in this case, “state” implies “national”) identity in the *Vidovdan* celebration.

¹¹² Also available online: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SrpskaInformativnaMreza/message/40742>, accessed 5 October 2012.

following phrases used in the speech do have either an implied or direct connection to the *Vidovdan* Discourse, but are not used in the *Dnevnik*'s recontextualisation of Koštunica's speech: "*najpresudniji dan naše istorije*", '*the most fateful day of our history*'; "*Gračanica pamti Lazara i Miloša*", '*Gračanica remembers Lazar and Miloš*'; "*Gračanica svedoči o tome ko smo mi, kako smo nastali, šta je bio Vidovdan, kako se rađala Srbija*", '*Gračanica testifies about who we are, how we [Serbs] became to be, what Vidovdan was, how Serbia was being born*'; "*Kosovo je, dobro znate, u našem narodu druga reč za pravdu, za pravo i slobodu*", '*Kosovo, you know that well, in our narod, is another word for justice, law and freedom*'; "*Gračanica nas ne samo podseća, Gračanica nas i uči*", '*Gračanica not only reminds us, Gračanica also teaches us*'. In examples above, and especially in the words highlighted, by using the myth of antiquity (see Section 2.4) and especially by alluding to Christian Orthodox values, while equating those with the Lazar's and Miloš's morality, Koštunica actively uses historical analogies to appeal to the collective memory of the Serbs in order to legitimise Serbia's claim to Kosovo.

It is quite difficult to draw any conclusions from the video material of Koštunica's visit to Gračanica. As explained in Section 2.3.1, in these cases it is hard to predict whether the angle of filming was deliberately chosen or the only one possible, and to make any statements on the represented social actor's eye contact, for example, since this position is changing from shot to shot. What can be noticed, however, is that the video-shots that introduce Koštunica to the text are "long-distanced", zoomed out. Social distance, represented by the long shot, suggests impersonal distance (Felberg 2008: 50). At the same time, while *Dnevnik* might be using "impersonal distance" to "introduce" Koštunica to the viewers, it is also likely that the long shot perspective sets the verbal text into a context. Since the video shows that the crowd (of both the present people and journalists) follows Koštunica from the entrance to the monastery building, a comparison can be made between this and the image of the leader that leads his "flock" (see Figure 20 and 21).



Figure 20 Koštunica's arrival in Gračanica, 2006: a part of *Dnevnik*'s macrostructure with a recognizable framing



Figure 21 Koštunica at Gračanica, 2006: “Srpskog premijera, Vojislava Koštunicu, u manastirskoj porti dočekali su vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije i sveštenstvo”. ‘Bishop Artemije and the priests of Raška-Prizren parish welcomed Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Koštunica’.

On the other hand, if we analyse these shots as they are, we can conclude that the first image has an *objective perspective*, since its main object recognizable to the audience as the Prime Minister, stands in the central part of the image and directly in front of the viewers (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006: 130), since they produce the image most natural to the human eye, which is one looking at the object straight ahead. The naturalization in this image might therefore have the effect of introducing Koštunica to the story. It is perhaps strange, though, that the most salient figure in the image is a bodyguard, who is closest to the camera (and therefore the viewer as well). However, as the image semantics works in a similar way to the ones in verbal mode of a discourse, the background information allows the viewer to recognize the “main actor” in the story, single him/her out and give him/her a greater information value.

An oblique “upside-down” angle to the other image, shows not just Koštunica, but the two priests as well who, by the way they are clothed (and again by activating the background information) are thus, alongside Koštunica, made the most important actors represented in the image. From the angle the shot is taken, we can conclude a certain “detachment”, like the presented actors are not “from our world” and, out of the “upside-down” perspective, we can “read” that the power is given to the viewer (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006: 136). Once again, the blend of Church and the State, expressed in the verbal mode as well, can be seen in the image: two priests, with a look that triggers the symbolic representation of the Church, placed on the each of the sides of Koštunica, the symbol of the State, constitute with their bodies a *frame* of the part of the image with the most important information.

One of the pictures is “frozen” by *Dnevnik*’s crew and shown in the background behind the anchor while he talked about “Koštunica – the messenger”:



Figure 22 The frozen image of Koštunica’s visit (also zoomed) in the background of anchor, 2006

According to Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) there are two types of representations: narrative and conceptual. The former one was used to tell a story through “vectors” in the *Vidovdan* representation in 2001. The later “represent participants in terms of their class, structure and meaning – in terms of their generalized and more or less stable and timeless essence’ (2006: 59). Of the three possible types of conceptual representations Kress and Van Leeuwen give (classificational, analytical and symbolical), this image shows (Figure 22), in combination with verbal mode, a symbolic representation of a leader: he is walking proudly – with the chest pushed forward and his arm symbolizing movement; looking “towards the horizon, in a visionary manner” (Felberg 2008: 150). On the other hand, if a picture is to be interpreted in such a way that Koštunica symbolizes the state and Bishop Artemije (on Koštunica’s left side) the SPC, the conclusion would be that the state is more powerfully represented, as Koštunica takes more than half of the picture and is more dominant. The verbal text mode confirms this hypothesis: Koštunica got more attention and is the only one to speak “live”.

The intention to present Koštunica with a “positive face” (Chilton 2004), as a “good Prime Minister” is also seen through the report’s sudden narrative turn to *vox populi*: “Poseta Gračanici za premijera je bila prilika i da razgovara sa građanima južne srpske pokrajine”, ‘The visit to Gračanica was an opportunity for the Prime Minister to have a conversation with the citizens of the southern Serbian province’. It seems that the main aim of the inserted conversation Koštunica is having with the anonymous male “citizens of the southern Serbian province” is to naturalize the discourse/text:

- *Anoniman1*: Mislite malo na nas!
- *Koštica*: Mislim, kako da ne mislim!
- *Anoniman1*: I treba (dok se rukuje s Koštunicom)!
- *Anoniman2*: Svaka čas' [sic], svaka čas' [sic]!
- *Anoniman3*: Hvala što ste nas posetili!

- *Anonymous1*: Think little bit of us!
- *Koštica*: I do think, of course!
- *Anonymous1*: That's the way it should be (while handshaking with Koštunica)
- *Anonymous2*: Well don'[sic]!
- *Anonymous3*: Thank you for visiting us!

(Dnevnik 28 June 2006, 04:07)

Even though there is a certain amount of guesswork regarding the ideological function of a conversationalized text (as above), Fairclough still thinks that the ideological function can be hidden. If “the ideological function of conversation is to naturalize the terms in which reality is represented” (Flower, cited in Fairclough 1995: 13) Fairclough asks whether the conversationalized text represents a real shift in power or is merely a “strategy on the part of those with power to more effectively recruit people as audiences and manipulate them socially and politically”.

5.4.4 The Representation of Social Actors II: The Saints and the People

Besides Koštunica, the only one who got “his own voice”, there are two more social actors who were represented in this year’s text through indirect speech and paraphrases: Patriarch Pavle and Bishop Artemije.

As seen in Figure 19 the narrator’s (reporter’s) discourse world has a dialog with two more texts: the Patriarch’s and the Bishop’s speeches. Therefore these two are presented in Figure 19 as an almost integral part of the reporter’s voice.

The representation of Patriarch Pavle comes to the viewer through the paraphrased voice of Bishop Artemije. An image of a saint is discursively constructed through the performative action of expressing gratitude to the Patriarch who “i pored bolesti stigao u Gračanicu i pokazao kako treba da se borimo za Kosovo i Metohiju”, “despite illness came to Gračanica and showed how we should fight for Kosovo and Metohija”. The represented martyr-like figure is even more underlined when the reporter notifies: “Patrijarh se pomolio Bogu za spasenje srpskog naroda, ali i za naše neprijatelje, kako bi i oni spoznali istinu”, ‘The Patriarch prayed to God for the salvation of the Serbian *narod*, but also for our enemies so that they can find the truth as well’.

The reporter’s voice represents the Patriarch in the same way the Bishop Artemije does. By using narrative report of the speech act, reporter is referring to the performative verb “pomoliti se” as something exclusively reserved for the Patriarch, and considering that all those

gathered, who were attending the service were possibly praying, the reporter interprets the Patriarch's act of praying as something with a higher value, as if the Patriarch has some direct link to God. When naming the Other, the enemies, *Dnevnik* takes sides: the Other is *our* enemy. At the same time, the reporter places the Other on the side of the deontic wrong as *they* do not know the truth (in a Biblical sense). Again, the Patriarch gets to play the role of Jesus, the son of God, who utters: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34).

Besides the representation of the "ordinary people" who got to shake the Prime Minister's hand in the Gračanica's church yard, *Dnevnik* focuses on one more person: the winner of the prize: *Majka devet Jugovića* (the Mother of Nine Jugovićs). Analysis of *Dnevnik*'s representation of the winner of this prize, asks for a slight micro-contextual explanation. The Mother of Nine Jugovićs is a character in an epic poem *Smrt majke Jugovića* (The Death of the Mother of the Jugovićs). This rather unusual epic poem focuses on the "clan's matriarch" rather than having the "martial and male focus [that is present] in the majority of epic songs" (Wachtel 1998: 35). In short, it narrates a story about the sorrow of the (unnamed) mother of Jugović¹¹³ who has lost all of her sons and the husband in the Battle of Kosovo, but have never showed her grief until she died from sorrow. The Mother of the Jugovićs represents the womanly ideal with two of the most cherished characteristics of the national romanticism of the 19th century: she is a *mother* who gives birth to nine children, all of them males, future warriors, and she is a *patriot* for "scarifying" her children, despite her grief. As a part of *Kosovski ciklus* (see Section 4.1), this poem has also had a great influence on creating the collective memory in relation to Kosovo.

The prize *Majka devet Jugovića* is one of the prizes traditionally given to the women from Kosovo that gave birth to five or more children (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2006). This prize is mentioned in *Dnevnik* only two times during the examined period: 2007, when it was given to "*Serbian families with several children*" and in 2006.

In the representation of the prize and its winners in 2006, *Dnevnik* focuses on the same values the Mother of the Jugović's has, motherhood and patriotism: "Tradicionalno, *majkama Kosova i Metohije* koje su rodile više od petoro dece, uručene su medalje 'Majke devet Jugovića'", "Traditionally, the mothers of Kosovo and Metohija who gave birth to more than five children, were awarded the medal "Mothers of Nine Jugovićs". Their primary function "of being a mother" has been used in *Dnevnik*'s representation to literary make all of them "Mothers of Nine Jugovićs".

¹¹³ Mythical characters in Serbian epic poetry, allegedly brothers of Milica, Lazar's wife.

By using a special framing¹¹⁴ technique known in journalism as “human interest story”, which “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue or problem” (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000: 3) RTS focuses on one of the “mothers”:




Figure 23 A “Mother of the Nine Jugovići” Diploma in the hands of the story’s heroine, 2006



Figure 24 The ultimate Serbian mother, one of the winners of the prize “The Mother of the Nine Jugovići”, 2006



Figure 25 Zoom in on the child, focus on “motherhood”, 2006

“She” could be any of the *mothers* that have received this medal. *Dnevnik* states that 224 mothers from “the *southern Serbian province* have *earned* this acknowledgement” in 2006. The image of the medallion recontextualizes the *Vidovdan* Discourse in relation to Serbian epic poetry on several levels: the diploma (see Figure 23) is graphically framed with the ornament on top that shows the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Saint Sava; the name of the prize is directly connected to a character from the epic poetry; and the person who got the medal gave birth to nine children, just as the Mother of the Jugovići did.

¹¹⁴ Earlier in the thesis I introduced the term “framing” in the context of background information. Here, framing relates to the news frames as “conceptual tools which media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information” (Neuman et al. 1992: 60).

The human interest story strategy is not used in the verbal mode in *Dnevnik* on 28 June 2006, but exclusively in the video mode to “personalize the news, dramatize or ‘emotionalize’ the news, in order to capture and retain audience interest” (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000: 4).

The first of the four images above (Figure 23) gives our heroine a name. The document is in focus, but the hands that hold that piece of paper and the medal, introduce a lady in the shots to come (Figure 24). She “does not speak” even though the position of her body and the look on her face give the impression that she is being interviewed. The focus on “her” and the zoom in on the child’s face (Figure 25) represent one personal, emotional story, but I think that the symbolical intention was to represent the ultimate *Serbian mother*: zooming in on her child, focusing on “motherhood”.

5.4.5 Collective Memory

In Section 2.4 about the theory of collective memory, I explained that collective memory in relation to Kosovo, as an interplay of history and myth, plays an important role in the understanding of the political situation and arguments in relation to Kosovo, in the analysed period of 2000-2011. When Koštunica directly states: “Kosovo *has always been* [...] a part of Serbia”, he makes an historical analogy to past times when *Kosovo was a part of Serbia*. In historical reality, with a very literal understanding of the phrase “being part of Serbia”, Kosovo (or parts of it) were mainly a part of the Nemanja-dynasty Serbia of the Middle Ages (Hupchick 2001: kart 17; Stavrianos 2001:27). After being a part of the Ottoman Empire (after the fall of Smederevo in 1459) it was only in 1830 that Serbia got any kind of autonomy inside the Ottoman Empire (Stavrianos 2001: 239, 244). Serbia was later to be acknowledged as a state after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, but Kosovo still remained under Ottoman rule (Stavrianos 201: 260, 408). It was after the Balkan wars that Kosovo was integrated into the Serbian state and was a part of it, with what was considered by Serbia to be full autonomy, and it remained part of Serbia, except during the occupation of Serbia in the First and Second World Wars, until international troops entered Kosovo in 1999¹¹⁵ (Mønnesland 2006: 153, 188).

In that sense, Koštunica is deeply relying on collective memory and the mythical perception of Kosovo’s past in making this historical analogy. Furthermore, Gračanica, being an important historical and religious site and the place of annual reenactment of the Kosovo myth through the *Vidovdan* celebration, a perfect example of *liuex de memoire*, becomes literarily and

¹¹⁵ See Section 4.2.2 for the contextual situation of this event.

figuratively the deictic center, connected not just to the moral virtues of the Kosovo warriors, but “objective” *truth, right and righteousness*:

Sa ovog mesta, na Vidovdan, iz Gračanice, prilika je da objavimo svetu šta Srbija hoće. Srbija hoće pravdu, pravo i mir. Narod koji hoće pravdu, pravo i mir, hoće da razgovara, hoće da se dogovori, hoće kompromis, hoće istorijski pravična rešenja.

From this place, on Vidovdan, from Gračanica, it is an opportunity to declare to the world what Serbia wants. Serbia wants justice, law¹¹⁶ and peace. *Narod* who wants justice, law and peace, who wants to talk, wants to make an agreement, wants compromise, wants historically righteousness solutions. (Koštunica cited in *Dnevnik*, 28 June 2006, 03:11)

In the Section 2.4 a typology based on Kolstø's (2005) in relation to the interpretation of the Kosovo myth (*Vidovdan* Discourse) is introduced. Of elements of that typology, the most usual realisation in the analysed material is through the *myth of antiquity* and the *myth of martyrdom* that usually goes hand in hand with the *myth of the sacred centre* (the Jerusalem myth).

Bishop Artemije uses the Kosovo myth as the myth of antiquity as Koštunica does as well, but he blends it with the myth of the sacred centre. The metaphor he uses, *srpski Jerusalem*, ‘Serbian Jerusalem’, builds on the complex metonymical and the relation of historical analogies. The target domain “Jerusalem” builds on the metonymy: the name of one city is used to denote the concept of the sacred centre of the Jews, with all the intertextual meanings of Eternal Persecution and Eternal Return. Before conceptualizing the source domain, *Kosmet*, as a target domain (Jerusalem), Artemije introduces an historical analogy that intertextually explains or instructs the listener as to how to map the meaning onto the target domain: “[Kosovo] *ostane* ono što je *oduvek* bilo: kulturna i duhovna *kolevka*”, ‘[it] *remains* what it [Kosovo] *always has been*: a cultural and spiritual *cradle*’. What Artemije is saying is that Kosovo has a long history of being a cultural and sacred centre for the Serbs, *as* Jerusalem has been for Jews.

The use of metaphors has always been important in the political life of Serbia and Montenegro (Felberg 2008: 36). Artemije is first of all addressing one of the most important, political issues at the time, directly blending religion and politics through highly poetical, metaphorical language. “Politicians”, argues Čolović (2002: 149), and I would add, church

¹¹⁶ Word *pravo* can, in my view, translate here with ‘law’, ‘right’ or even ‘righteousness’. I chose ‘law’ to underline the “legality” Koštunica refers to (from other contexts by pointing back to legal documents, primarily Resolution 1244) and because, the other options, ‘right’ and ‘righteousness’, are somehow integrated into the first word “justice”.

leaders in Serbia as well, “poeticise their discourse, which is one of the procedures of creating what Adorno calls ‘the jargon of authenticity’. In that way, speaking politically becomes the same as speaking poetically”.

5.4.6 Conclusion: *Vidovdan* of Koštunica’s Era, 2006

Koštunica is the only one of the four leaders that I singled out in this analysis who takes part directly in the *Vidovdan* celebration. At the same time, this analysis has showed that Koštunica not only actively takes part in the celebration, he, by doing that, blends the religious and politics spheres in the most performative way.

This analysis has also showed that Koštunica relies on the *Vidovdan* Discourse and Serbian collective memory when he addresses the Kosovo issue. The Church hierarchy, primarily Bishop Artemije, who, using more poetic language, blends religious and national interests, does the same.

RTS represented Koštunica as a legitimate patriotic leader, and thereby *Dnevnik* gives the impression of supporting his way of discursively constructing political reality based on the myths of antiquity and in relation to the *Vidovdan* Discourse. This *Dnevnik*’s representation of the *Vidovdan* celebration implements a complicated network of intertextuality, by employing paraphrasing, indirect, direct and live direct speech. The degree of intertextuality and the way each of the actors has been allowed to speak and how much, what they have been allowed to say, as well as the inserted unexpected conversation between Koštunica and Kosovo’s *vox populi* demonstrates *Dnevnik*’s way of legitimising and giving a “positive face” to Koštunica, the Serbian Prime Minister of the time.

5.5 Vidovdan of Tadić's Era, 2011



(Somborac, Blic strip, 29 June 2011)¹¹⁷

5.5.1 Introduction

Taking into consideration the developments described in the context part of this analysis (see Section 5.5.2), and especially the fact that Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2011 took one huge turn in comparison to the ones analysed up to now: the celebrations are not just planned for Gračanica and Gazimestan, but organized in Kruševac¹¹⁸ and Niš as well. *Dnevnik*'s report focuses on and delivers just the story of the celebration in Gračanica and Gazimestan.

In this part of the analysis, the same elements, followed in the analysis of the *Dnevnik* of 2006 will be discussed. I mainly focus on the representation of social actors and strategies used in their representations: “positive vs. negative face” created using different legitimisation strategies. The special accent in this matter will be on the representation of Serbs as unjustly treated by the Kosovo police.

At the same time, one special strategy, that achieved visibly less attention in the analysis of the 2000, 2001 and 2006, will be discussed: implications and omissions, their form and mutual relations as well as their possible effects. This segment is interesting to investigate, especially in the comparative analysis of two (conflicting) texts. As the news concept is based on the power to decide what is new and what the news is, what should be included or deliberately excluded, the comparison between the two sources could stress the elements that are “promoted” by one and neglected by the other. To make this analysis more complete, I have therefore, based the comparative story on the B92 representation of the same event. The text of B92 is not analysed here and is used to provide context for the analysis of *Dnevnik*'s text.

The first part of the analysis deals also with the phenomenon of macrostructures and three modes macrostructures have in a TV News discourse. In the second part special attention is

¹¹⁷ <http://www.blic.rs/Strip/1166/Marko-Somborac>, accessed 27 October 2012.

¹¹⁸ Kruševac is a city located in the central part of Serbia. The city is closely connected to the *Vidovdan* Discourse as it was founded by Prince Lazar, the main actor of The Battle of Kosovo.

given to the parts of Irinej’s speech in connection with the *Vidovdan* Discourse and its relation to Serbian collective memory. A short analysis at the very end is dedicated to the phenomena we met in the analysis of *Dnevnik* of 2006: conversational discourse.

To avoid misunderstandings, the headline of this section does not allude to Tadić’s involvement with *Vidovdan* Discourse. The headline is connected to the timeline presented in the introduction (Section 1.1). This roughly gives four dominant political options in Serbia over the analysed period, and with that kind of division, for dominant political leaders whose involvement/detachment from the *Vidovdan* Discourse and *Vidovdan* celebration I have tried to follow. When it comes to the representation of a dominant political figure in *Dnevnik*’s text and in relation to *Vidovdan*, there are three possible solutions if the representation is inaccurate/deficient: the person/political option/political standpoints are 1) implied, not explicit 2) omitted (they are active in reality, though not presented in reports) 3) not included, since they have not been engaged in *Vidovdan* celebration.

The latter is true of Tadić in relation to *Dnevnik*’s text on *Vidovdan*. But, the silence is also a discursive action.

Table 6 Year 2011

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructure	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ Impressions
2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Patriarch Irinej (live direct speech, paraphrased) - The injured and the arrested (topic) - The Kosovo police (Agent, paraphrase) - Passers-by (live direct speech) 	Gazimestan / Gračanica	(5 th news) “Unfortunately, everyday reality” “After marking of <i>Vidovdan</i> on Gazimestan, two persons injured and one arrested”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monument on the Gazimestan with the flag of Prince Lazar over it - Kosovo police - Gračanica liturgy - Gazimestan’s crowd 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Victimization - Jerusalem myth - Legitimation (of ours)-de-legitimation (of them) - “Kosovo is Serbian”?

5.5.2 Context

The context of the previous analysed year (see Section 5.4.2) announced talks planned for the autumn of 2006 between the Serbian and the Albanian parties under the arbitrage of the Special

Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari. In March 2007, *Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement*,¹¹⁹ popularly referred to as the Ahtisaari Plan, which dealt with the future status of Kosovo, was submitted to the UN's Security Council.

The Ahtisaari Plan opened room for the encouragement of Kosovo's independence, though not explicitly (Judah 2008: 113). At the same time, "the core of the plan was decentralization, understood as code for Serbian autonomy, given that the north and the Serbian enclaves were de facto run by, or at least heavily influenced by Serbia" (ibid.).

Even though Ahtisaari, a Nobel Peace Prize winner for 2008,¹²⁰ did not mention the word *independence* in the body of the plan, the covering report mentions "supervised independence" (ibid.) which, among other things connected to the plan, resulted in the Russian *veto* on the plan at UN's Security Council (Judah 2009: 358). The plan's solution in the form of implied Kosovo's independence also resulted in international speculations on security situation in Kosovo and fears of possible violent riots in the other regions with independence issues: Abkhazia and South Ossetia in relation to Georgia; Tibet's and Taiwan's (Republic of China) relationship to the People's Republic of China; The Basque Country *vis-a-vis* Spain; and Quebec in relation to Canada (ibid. 2008: 134).

Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008 but had in advance to agree to accept EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission) and ICO's (International Civilian Office) intervention, to wait with declaration of independence until Serbian elections for the President of the Republic has passed, to implement the Ahtisaari Plan and at the same time confirm that Resolution 1244 remained the only valid one, as no other resolution had been passed to replace it (Judah 2008: 142). At approximately the same time EULEX for Kosovo was approved by the UN Security Council as a mission which "support[s] Kosovo on its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area".¹²¹ With a raising number of countries recognising Kosovo as an independent republic, Serbia relied on Russia to block Kosovo's membership of the UN in the same way it vetoed the Ahtisaari plan (Judah 2008: 141). Russia's support, especially on the Kosovo issue, increased Russia's popularity among some.¹²²

¹¹⁹ http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf, accessed 9 October 2012.

¹²⁰ http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2008/press.html, accessed 9 October 2012.

¹²¹ EULEX-Kosovo, www.eulex-kosovo.eu, accessed 9 October 2012.

¹²² Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) with its leader, Tomislav Nikolić, and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and Koštunica were very explicit on favoring relations with Russia in international politics. See for example <http://www.naslovi.net/2011-09-23/vesti-online/kostunica-srbija-ne-moze-bez-rusije/2829499>, accessed 15 October 2012 and <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/342072/Nikolic-za-rusku-televiziju-Jedino-Srbiju-volim-vise-od-Rusije>, accessed 15 October 2012.

Just a couple of days before Kosovo's declaration of independence, in a run-off elections, the Serbs confirmed they wanted Boris Tadić as President for a second term, when he barely won against Tomislav Nikolić, a candidate of *Srpska radikalna stranka* (Serbian Radical Party, SRS). Tomislav Nikolić, who was at that time representing SRS in the name of party's president, Vojislav Šešelj, who was arrested and sent to ICTY, later left SRS to start his own party *Srpska napredna stranka* (Serbian Progressive Party).

The European question began to unfold positively for Serbia when the Bosnian Serb leader, the former President of Republika Srpska and accused war criminal Radovan Karadžić, was found in Belgrade and delivered to ICTY 21 July 2008 (BBC 22 July 2008).¹²³ Cooperation with ICTY, which is one of the preconditions of Serbia's entering the EU, also resulted in finding and delivering the second most-wanted Bosnian Serb: the former military leader and war fugitive, Ratko Mladić, accused of, among other things, the Srebrenica massacre¹²⁴ (ICTY, Case Information Sheet).¹²⁵ Mladić was delivered to ICTY right before the analysed *Vidovdan* celebration in 2011: 26 May 2011. This provoked a nationalist reaction by many (see Figures 27 and 28).

The European Commission has concluded on several occasions that most of the preconditions for Serbia to enter the EU have been fulfilled: moving towards the stabilization of market economy, the implementation of human rights and the protection of minorities has begun, cooperation with ICTY has reached a satisfactory level and in relation to Kosovo, "Serbia has agreed to and participated in a process of dialogue with Kosovo to facilitate the lives of the people which has led to several agreements (free movement of persons and goods, civil registry and cadastre) and Serbia has taken initial steps for implementation". (*European Commission* 2011: 11-12).¹²⁶

5.5.3 Victims and Aggressors

The importance of topics in general as a summary of the text is discussed earlier (see Section 2.3.2). Topics, in the case of TV News realised as a short overview at the beginning and in the end of *Dnevnik*, "news of the day", have the important social function as well. "Vesti dana",

¹²³ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7518543.stm>, accessed 15 October 2012.

¹²⁴ In literature on the former Yugoslavia, *massacre* is often used in connection to Srebrenica (see Ramet 2006). The term use in the case of Srebrenica is still an issue. ICTY defined "Srebrenica" as both genocide and massacre, see http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/jit_srebrenica_en.pdf (especially the headline "Srebrenica Was an Act of Genocide"), accessed 15 October 2012.

¹²⁵ See http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf about the information on Mladić case.

¹²⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/sr_rapport_2012_en.pdf, accessed 17 October 2012.

‘News of the day’, does not just sum up the event, it also gives a certain interpretation of the event and more importantly, it makes the prioritisation of “important” news easier: “language users are unable to memorize and manage all meaning details of a discourse, and hence mentally organize these meanings by global meanings or topics” (Van Dijk 2001: 102). Meaning organized in these topic clusters, “macrostructures” as Van Dijk called them (1988), as a summary of the story to appear in the longer version in the report, is, in the case of *Dnevnik*, imposed on the viewer.

How the macrostructures are organized depends on the main point *Dnevnik* wants to underline. The “privilege” of the macrostructure is that it guides the viewer as to how to interpret the text to come later on in the report. In this case, macrostructures in *Dnevnik* are staged by *Dnevnik*’s editors. In *Dnevnik*’s “news of the day,” the macrostructures are double. Since the TV news discourse is multimodal, the visual, written, secondary macrostructure can often underline, modify or colour the primary macrostructure that appears in the voiceover. At the same time, the picture that accompanies these two macrostructures, gives a third macrostructural dimension.

Dnevnik’s *Vidovdan* macrostructure in 2011 also has these three modes: 1) audio: “Posle obeležavanja Vidovdana na Gazimestanu, dve osobe povredene i jedna privedena”, ‘After marking of *Vidovdan* on Gazimestan, two persons injured and one arrested’, 2) visual modification of the audio macrostructure (written mode): “Nažalost, svakodneviца”. ‘Unfortunately, everyday reality’ and 3) video mode: as in these two images:



Figure 26 Video mode of *Dnevnik*’s semantics macrostructures (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2011, 00:55)

“Vesti dana”, ‘News of the day’ should have the same double function as the headlines in the newspapers, they are “supposed to inform and attract the reader” (Felberg 2008: 120). Felberg

also points out that the headlines, as paratexts,¹²⁷ are “shown to anticipate and influence the reception of the actual text” (ibid.). The main difference between newspaper headlines and TV News macrostructures is that newspapers usually have different levels in headlining. *Dnevnik*'s macrostructure is not levelled: the above mentioned written and visual modes have modal and subordinate function.

After informing the viewers that the result of *Vidovdan* celebration on Gazimestan was two injured and one arrested person in a factual passive sentence that functions as the main macrostructure (audio mode), *Dnevnik* changes the mode¹²⁸ with the subordinate, written, macrostructure that classifies the “injured and arrested” as victims. This is done by the use of the sentence adverbial *nažalost*, ‘unfortunately’ in combination with the noun *svakodnevica* (Figure 26). “Svakodnevica” originally means ‘everyday event’, but I translated it as “everyday reality” to underline the negative representation of the implicated continuous action of injuring and arresting, by implication, *innocent* people that celebrate *Vidovdan* by an unnamed perpetrator.

The main macrostructure has an elliptical passive voice, consisting just of the passive participle (injured, arrested). Passive constructions in general are used when the speaker wants to avoid naming the agent and focus on the action *done* to the recipient which in turn, if the action is negative, can produce an image of a victim.

The third macrostructure mode, visual, modifies the main macrostructure in the way that it “fills up” the empty agent space with some implied subjects: the Kosovo police officers (see Figure 26 above). In this context, in a macrostructure, a viewer first gets an image of the people celebrating *Vidovdan*, and connects that image with the injured and arrested *on a daily basis* (“unfortunately, daily reality”) by the Kosovo police.

The same implication continues when the anchor announces the report:

Na obeležavanju Vidovdana na Kosovu i Metohiji – dva incidenta. Dve osobe lakše su povređene kada su kamenovana dva autobusa kojima su se građani vraćali sa Gazimestana. Kosovska policija privela je muškarce srpske nacionalnosti zbog, kako kažu, vandalskog ponašanja.

¹²⁷ Paratext in the context of *Dnevnik* are, besides audio part of “vesti dana”, all the other elements written on the screen. These include name of the reporter, *Dnevnik*'s and RTS' logo, the inscription “©Radio-televizija Srbije, www.rts.rs”, the logo of TV Most that shows that the video footage is not RTS footage as well as the “timer” integrated in *Dnevnik*'s logo. All of those elements do influence the viewer's perception of the news, but will not be analysed here.

¹²⁸ “Mode” here refers to the modality, not the modes of the multimodal text.

On the *Vidovdan* celebration on Kosovo and Metohija two incidents. Two persons were slightly injured when two buses, which the citizens used to get back from the Gazimestan, were stoned. Kosovo Police arrested males of Serbian nationality because of, as they say, vandal behavior. (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2011, 14:00)

In the announcement of the report, the anchor opens a deontic space by making two clusters. In the first one, she places “građani”, ‘citizens’; “dve lakše povređene osobe”, ‘two slightly injured people’ and “muškarce Srpske nacionalnosti” ‘males of Serbian nationality’ while in the other one there are implied agent back the passive voice “su kamenovana”, ‘are stoned’ and “Kosovska policija”, ‘the Kosovo police’.

The passive voice used in the second sentence is made, as in the macrostructure, from passive participle. Passive constructions with passive participle “might hint that the agent is someone in a high place, with authority” (Felberg 2008: 100n74). In these cases, it might be that the use of the passive construction places the responsibility on the collective Other. The intended agent can only be derived by reasoning by using contextual and background knowledge. Taking into consideration the global historical context, the implied collective Other are Kosovo Albanians. The discursive mechanisms used here are based on the premise that “the meaning is constructed by human minds on the basis of language_{I/u} using language_L, together with massive amounts of ‘background’ knowledge” (Chilton 2004: 61) and is often referred to as implicatures, presumptions (Chilton 2004) or just implication. Who have actually stoned the bus of “citizens” is left to viewer’s imagination, but avoiding to name explicitly the agent also releases *Dnevnik* from the responsibility of blaming: it is not *said* that Kosovo Albanians have done it, just implied.

Chilton (2004: 35) mentions Grice’s division into particular and generalized implicatures (see Section 2.3.1). The negative representation of Kosovo Albanians, not just on RTS, but elsewhere in Serbian press,¹²⁹ has made this implicature particular as the specific background information is needed for its understanding, but also deontic, as, because of the image created in the Serbian media, it is *always* implied that Kosovo Albanians are “the negative face”.

The other Other is named: the Kosovo police. The action of the Kosovo police, arresting, as well as the action of the unnamed Other, injuring by stoning, are labelled as *incidents*. The meaning of this word in Serbian, as in English, according to dictionary is primarily “an event”. However, this word is more common to use in the negative meaning of the word, “an unpleasant

¹²⁹ This statement is made on the basis of personal experience as well as articles that dealt with the representation of Kosovo Albanians in Serbian media (see for example Erjavec and Volčič 2007)

event” and is therefore more marked than a neutral version “dogadaj,” ‘event.’ The anchor places the Kosovo police action into deontic “wrong” by marking it as *incident*, but as well, by de-legitimising arrests made by the Kosovo police. The anchor does that by employing the clause “kako kažu,” ‘as they say.’ This clause directly casts doubt on the “vandal behaviour of the male Serbs”. The report to come after the announcement does not show anything that would prove wrong this doubt about “vandal behaviour” and does not mention the “incidents” at all.

B92¹³⁰ showed a story¹³¹ that RTS omitted. On Gazimestan, during the speech of Aleksandar Karađorđević¹³² the mass was shouting “Ratko Mladić”, “Tadiću, spasi Srbiju i ubij se!”, ‘Tadić, save Serbia and kill yourself!’¹³³ and “Srbija-Rusija, ne treba nam Unija”, ‘Serbia-Russia, we don’t need [European] Union’.

The video of B92 showed also pictures of the young males with different symbols considered to be nationalistic: *šajkača* with cockade,¹³⁴ flags of *Srpski narodni pokret 1389* (Serbian *narodni* movement 1389), a nationalistic organization with the aim of making a greater Serbia,¹³⁵ flags of *Obraz* movement (literary ‘cheek’, here metaphoric: ‘honor’),¹³⁶ posters and T-shirts with Ratko Mladić in an old Bosnian Serb uniform (see Figures 27 and 28).

¹³⁰ B92 has always been seen as an antipode to RTS. With a long tradition of oppositional radio programming during the Milošević era, B92 transformed into a TV station as well after Milošević’s downfall.

¹³¹ http://www.b92.net/video/videos.php?nav_category=905&yvyy=2011&mm=06&dd=28&nav_id=521969, accessed 20 October 2012.

¹³² Usually referred to as “heir to the throne”, as he is the first in the royal line to be monarch if Serbia was a monarchy.

¹³³ This motto is retextualized from the motto used in the 90’s: “Spasi Srbiju i ubij se, Slobodane, Slobodane!”, ‘Save Serbia and kill yourself, Slobodane, Slobodane [Milošević]!’.

¹³⁴ A Serbian national cap, which is, especially with characteristic cockade featuring Serbian coat of arms, the double-headed eagle, considered to be nationalistic feature, used a lot both by military and paramilitary Serbian forces in the wars in ex-Yugoslavia.

¹³⁵ “Oslobođenje i ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja u jednu srpsku državu (pod pojmom srpskih zemalja podrazumevamo: celokupnu teritoriju današnje Republike Srbije sa njenim pokrajinama Kosovom i Metohijom kao i Vojvodinom, Republike Crne Gore, Republike Makedonije, Republike Srpske i Federacije BiH, kao i prostor okupirane RSK s teritorijalnim proširenjima i severni deo Republike Albanije”, ‘Liberation and unification of all Serbian lands in one Serbian state (by the “Serbian lands” we mean: the entire territory of present-day Republic of Serbia with its provinces of Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina, Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Macedonia, *Republika Srpska* and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as occupied territory of *Republic of Serbian Krajina* [Croatia] with territorial expansions and the northern part of the Republic of Albania.’ (*SNP 1389*, 30 August 2010, http://www.snp1389.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=264&Itemid=85, accessed 5 October 2012).

¹³⁶ A Right-wing, neo-Nazi movement in Serbia. Officially identified as a Clerico-Fascist movement because of its violent activism and theologically inspired racism and nationalism (B92, 10 December 2005, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yvyy=2005&mm=12&dd=10&nav_id=182260, accessed 4 October 2012).



Figure 27 Shots from the B92 report on the *Vidovdan* celebration in Gazimestan, 2011 (part 1):
 1) Flag of Serbian *narodni* movement 1389 with the verse from the epic song *Boj na Mišaru* (the Battle on Mišar): “Srbija se umiriti’ ne može!”, ‘Serbia can not be settled.’ 2) Young males with the Serbian flag, one of them wearing *šajkača* with cockade 3) Wearing T-shirts with an image of Ratko Mladić, a Bosnian Serb war criminal



Figure 28 Shots from the B92 report on the *Vidovdan* celebration in Gazimestan, 2011 (part 2):
 The first two images are from the same B92 report on the *Vidovdan* celebration, the last one is from news report from B92 web-site: 1) Flag of *Obraz* as a background of Aleksandar Karadžević’s speech. 2) Posters of Ratko Mladić. 3) A group of *Red Star* or *Partizan* football supporters, with essential accessories for football matches: torches and “Serbian” three fingers

The RTS report’s omission of the representation of provocative behaviour by the gathered nationalist groups is not an implicature. For all those who know the history of the behaviour of *Crvena zvezda* (Red Star) and *Partizan* football supporters and the actions of *Obraz* and *SNP 1389*, seeing the image of their behaviour and hearing their shouting on the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2011 as presented by B92, it would be difficult to claim, as firmly as RTS does, that the arrests were *allegedly* provoked by *vandalism*. RTS’ images from the Gazimestan celebration, in contradiction to those of B92, speak of a calm crowd:



Figure 29 RTS' representation of participants in the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2011: 1) The crowd with flags.



Figure 30 RTS' representation of participants in the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2011: 2) The Gazimestan monument covered with the flag, featuring an icon of St. Knez Lazar



Figure 31 RTS' representation of participants in the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2011: 3) The crowd in front of the Gazimestan monument.

The first image (Figure 29), filmed from a slight distance and from above, features participants of the celebration with their backs turned. As the image represents it, it seems like the crowd is going away. The depersonalization achieved by a “faceless image”, can also achieve the effect of a conceptual representation of the group as calm and nonviolent. Aside from the detachment realized by taking the shoot from the back, the possible aggressiveness of the image of a crowd of people going *toward* the camera is avoided by taking the shoot of a crowd going *away* from the camera. The other two images are (Figures 30 and 31), equally, omitting the presentation of a violent or engaged crowd. Both of them make the monument a more salient part of the picture, taking all the focus from the crowd. The first one (Figure 30) does this by giving the shoot from the angle which make it possible to see the whole monument on Gazimestan with a “handful” people, looking quite small in comparison to the monument. Lazar’s figure that covers one whole part of the monument, bigger and more salient than the crowd in the bottom, we can therefore interpret as the Ideal/Divine (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006: 186-193). In this

analytical conceptual representation (see Section 2.3.1) of the image on the flag, Lazar (the Carrier) is primarily defined through the symbolic representation of the head he is holding in his hands (the Possessive Attribute). This is the intertextual link that joins this representation of Lazar and the Kosovo myth (see Section 4.1). Thereby, this shot contains multiple intertextual connotations: the flag in itself is a representation of Lazar according to the mythical essence of the *Vidovdan* Discourse; the flag *attached to* the Gazimestan monument, intensifies the Possessive Attribute (the monument as a *lieux de memoire*); both are then set in the context of the *Vidovdan* celebration and presented in a long shot that catches the monument (with the flag) in its whole.

This gives the impression of Lazar standing among and in the centre of the crowd, reminding viewers of the moral of the *Vidovdan* Discourse: the choice of the heavenly kingdom. The composition of this shot, makes it possible to place the two main symbols represented on the two different sides of vertical axis, according to Kress and Van Leeuwen's "Ideal and Real" information value (ibid): we can see people's bodies at the bottom of the shot as Real, and even more as the Earthly Kingdom, while Lazar, standing up and "touching the sky" belongs to Ideal and Heavenly Kingdom.

For something to be ideal means that it is presented as the idealized or generalized essence of the information, hence also as its, ostensibly, most salient part. The Real is then opposed to this in that it presents more specific information (e.g. details), more "down-to-earth" information [...] or more practical information. (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2006: 186-187)

At the same time, the camera angle makes it possible to interpret the position of Lazar's head as both looking at and "guarding" his crowd. The third image (Figure 31), as a close-up continuation of the previous shot, still keeps the attention on the monument in the upper left corner, which is more salient as the symbol that is immediately identifiable, according to Kress and Van Leeuwen theory on the value of the placement of visual information (2006: 197).

5.5.4 "Serbia Without Kosovo: That Is a Body Without a Head! That Is a Body Without Heart and Soul"

The report on *Vidovdan* starts approximately 14 minutes after *Dnevnik* starts. The main focus of the report is the blend of religious and national identity, and the main actor is Patriarch Irinej.

As noticed in previous section, *Dnevnik* neglected to report on the Gazimestan event with Aleksandar Karađorđević's speech and his reaction to the nationalist behavior of the people

present. The main story *Dnevnik* did focus on was the liturgical celebration of *Vidovdan* in Gračanica monastery. The only voice viewers get to hear in this year's report is Irinej's.

In the reporter's paraphrase of parts of Irinej's speech, they show a detachment from Irinej's own discourse world, especially the deictic center of collective "we". Irinej's "*moramo da učinimo sve da ono [Kosovo] bude i ostane naše srpsko, kao što je to bilo kroz istoriju*", 'we have to do everything for it [Kosovo] to be/become *our* Serbian, as it was throughout the history', was transformed into "[...] *da se mora učiniti sve da ono [Kosovo] bude i ostane srpsko, kao što je to bilo kroz istoriju*", 'it has to be done everything for it [Kosovo] be/become and remain Serbian, in the same way it was that throughout the history' (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2011, 14:00). Following the impersonal *se*-construction, implying "hidden" agency, the responsibility of *doing everything for Kosovo to be Serbian* becomes collective.

Unlike the "popular" use of the imperfective version of the verb 'to be' in the present "*je*" in the sentence: "Kosovo *je* srpsko!", 'Kosovo *is* Serbian!' Irinej's choice of sentence construction is a little bit different. Mediated through the reporter's voice, Irinej said: "treba da učinimo sve da Kosovo bude i ostane srpsko", 'we should do everything for Kosovo to be and remain Serbian'. The first part of Irinej's sentence, an impersonalised modal clause, *treba da učinimo sve* conditions the use of the *da+bude* construction (from the perfective stem of the verb *biti*, 'to be'). The implied uncertainty of that modal clause, as well as the semantic temporal space of the perfective present that signalise future or relative future (Klajn 2006: 154), suggests that the construction *da+bude* has the semantic potential to imply the meaning "to become" in Irinej's sentence.

The Patriarch blends religion and politics when he asks the rhetorical question: "Kako može Srbija bez Kosova ostati i biti Srbija? To je telo bez glave! To je telo bez srca i duše!", 'How can Serbia without Kosovo remain and be Serbia? That is a body without a head! That is a body without heart and soul!'. The metaphor he uses represents Kosovo as the vital part, the head, of the whole, the body. Moreover, Irinej, first metaphorically compares Kosovo with a "rational" body part to transfer the comparison to spiritual and vital "organs": the heart and the soul. The metaphorical play in these sentences works as a kind of analogy. The Patriarch makes an analogy between the dependence of the body on its vital organs: the brain (head) and the heart, and the existence of Serbia that is questionable without Kosovo. Again, in his speech on the importance of Kosovo to Serbia, Irinej relies on the historical analogy planted in the Serbian collective memory, which is based on the continuity of Kosovo's existence exclusively as a part of the same (Serbian) organism. The metaphor of Kosovo as a vital organ goes hand in hand

with the Serbian Orthodox Church's efforts to preserve "the memory of the Serbian state with Kosovo as its major sacred center. Kosovo is the central myth and symbol of Serbian Orthodoxy" (Perica 2002: 7). According to Perica (ibid.: 228, 229), the myth of Serbian martyrdom and Serbian glory, which he names the Jerusalem myth, is a myth constructed by the SPC and some leading intellectuals and realized through the myth of sacred centers: the sites of Serbian martyrdom, Kosovo and its "Jasenovac extension"¹³⁷ being the most notable and the most important ones.

Irinej's Discourse is completely fused with the Jerusalem myth, or the myth of martyrdom (Kolstø 2005). As Perica notices (2002: 228), the Balkan version of the Jerusalem myth, is a myth of Lost Jerusalem and "Eternal Return": "Kako možemo ostaviti zemlju, osvećenu suzama pokajničkim i molitvama svetih ugodnika Božijih počevši od najsvetijih Nemanjića pa sve do dana današnjega. Nikako to ne možemo učiniti!", 'How can we leave the land, blessed with the tears of the penitents and prayers of the holy chosen by God starting from the most holy Nemanjić to today's day. We can most certainly not do that!'.

The 'sacred Serbian land', "sveta srpska zemlja" as Kosovo has often been called by SPC officials is literally being constructed as "sacred" in the Patriarch's speech. Through historical analogy, Irinej firstly points back to the antiquity of Serbian possession of Kosovo (from the Nemanjić period, in the Middle Ages) and at the same time he uses the same analogy to connect Kosovo with the Serbian dynasty that has created the Serbian version of Orthodoxy: *svetosavlje*,¹³⁸ with the ultimate model of orthodox saints even to our times. The blend of the religious and national identity is exactly implied in this fused version of distinct Serbian "martyr" fates. Moreover, the same blend is realized through the discursive revival of the cult of Serbian ethnic saints, rather than making a comparison with the pan-Christian myths of martyrdom.

¹³⁷ Perica thinks that the Serbian Orthodox Church bases a lot of its nationalist politics on Kosovo and the Jasenovac myth. In his opinion, these two myths have the same essence of the sacred centre, but the Jasenovac myth, as it appeared after the World War II, represent an extension of the Kosovo myth. Jasenovac was a concentration camp established in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during World War II.

¹³⁸ The compound is formed by the words *sveti Sava*, 'Saint Sava', and derived with the suffix *-lje* modelled after *pravoslavlje*, 'Orthodoxy.' Saint Sava, a prince and monk, and a son of Stefan Nemanja, the founder of Nemanjić dynasty in Serbia, is a founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church (in 1219). Nikolaj Velimirović, has explored the ideology of *svetosavlje* as "Serbian form of Orthodoxy founded by sveti Sava" (Nedeljković 2007: 41n33). A blend between national identity and religion (as well as politics) is evident in this term, as it terms "Pravoslavno hrišćanstvo srbskog [*sic*] stila i iskustva", 'Orthodox Christianity of Serbian style and experience.' (www.svetosavlje.org, accessed 20 January 2010). On this specific blend, see Falina 2007, http://www.timeandspace.lviv.ua/files/library/Falina_SZRKG_101.pdf, accessed 15 September 2009.

It was noted before that it is difficult to analyse the video material using the techniques as social distance, attitude and modality Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) use in their “reading of images”. Both comments on the social distance and attitude might simply be the product of the position of the cameraman, not staged in order to produce a certain effect. However, the angles the video is taken from, even if not intended, can have an effect on a viewer. Therefore for this, as well as for all the analysed images in this thesis, it is better to talk about the image’s potential regarding element placement along horizontal and vertical axes, in relation to social distances and modality in order to constitute meaning, rather than talking about the meaning *given* by the image’s construction.



Figure 32 Sequence of images of Patriarch Irinej, the first one from the liturgy and then from the speech (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2011, 15:00)

Irinej is filmed from a very close distance both during the liturgy and during the speech (see Figure 32). The close-up, and frontal angle, represents the Patriarch as somebody known to the

viewer. The Patriarch is engaging while speaking, as he moves his body and looks from the right to the center and then left. This and the fact that he is not speaking to, but rather over, the camera, might modify the viewer's perception of the Patriarch's image as of somebody who is attentive and speaking to everyone. His central position in the frame can imply legitimisation and that he is a figure of authority. That is in overall agreement with the place the Patriarch was given in the verbal mode as well. The important element in these pictures is the sign of cross (Possessive Attribute) the Patriarch (Carrier) holds. Through the movement of his hands when holding the cross, the attention of the viewer is driven to that hand. In that way, the cross can symbolize the Patriarch's function, but also the power the Patriarch has. The other participants in the picture have also turned their eyes to the Patriarch, or otherwise focus on the centre of the picture which perhaps symbolises trust and respect.

5.5.5 Vox Populi

In this *Dnevnik* as well, two passersby have been represented. A young man and a woman, represent the voice of the people.

- *Mladić:*

Identitet našeg naroda je sačuvan tom bitkom. I sav taj mit... kosovska legenda je... znači za naš narod!

- *Žena:*

Za sve generacije: pamćenje koje treba da imamo i pronosimo sa generacije na generaciju!

- *A young man:*

Identity of our *narod* is kept with that battle. And that whole myth... Kosovo legend is...it means for our *narod!*

- *A woman:*

For all generations: memory that we need to have and transfer from generation to generation!

The effects of the conversation implemented in the news discourse have been discussed earlier in Section 5.4.3. The same effect, legitimisation, is expected from the conversation with persons the reporter met "on the spot". We do not hear the question and we can conclude that the question is not important. The element Ivan Čolović calls "naturalization/folklorisation of the national" (2002: 58) makes it possible for viewers to identify themselves with randomly picked members of their "imagined community" that get to speak in front of a population.

Fairclough (1995: 186) agrees that the voice of ordinary people is a major political voice. Ordinary people's opinions on important political and social issues have become important, especially in the democratization of the media. As discussed earlier, it is a huge question whether these extracts of "popular reaction" are a real attempt to hear the public opinion, or just

a makeover. When it comes to the specific example above, none of what is said is new, dramatic or in contradiction to the overall picture *Dnevnik* gave in the report. However it should be noticed that the conversational colloquial use of language is avoided, even though we see from the camera frame that the conversation was between the reporter and the “interviewee” (Figure 33). Both of interviewees appear as experts and try to sound like ones. The young man, for example uses the phrase “the identity of our *narod*” to start with, but after a period of confusion, he continues in a more colloquial manner: “Kosovo legend is important for our *narod*”. The reporter on the other hand, totally ignored this little confusing moment and kept nodding as if he hears a statement he entirely agrees with.




Figure 33 *Dnevnik*’s *vox populi* on the importance of *Vidovdan*, from 2011 (*Dnevnik* 28 June 2011, 15:00)

5.5.6 Conclusion: The *Vidovdan* of Tadić’s Era, 2011

As noted at the beginning of this section, Tadić’s voice is silent in the *Vidovdan* Discourse of 2011. But, as I suggested in the introductory part of this theses, parallel to the silent voices of one part of the Serbian political and social public in relation to *Vidovdan* celebration, there exists another voice which still nourishes the traditional nationalist use of the *Vidovdan* Discourse in relation to Kosovo.

This analysis have shown that the SPC with its leaders, and especially the Patriarch whom we have “heard” in this analysis, do discursively re-enact the mythical representation of the Kosovo issue and blend it with current political and national questions. The myth of Jerusalem, as the myth of the sacred centre, stands central in the Church’s discursive explanation of the current political situation in Kosovo. The underlying element of the Jerusalem myth, a myth of martyrdom, underpins central representation of the position of the local Serbs.

This very same interpretation, victimisation, is also present implicitly in *Dnevnik*'s own interpretation of the circumstances *Vidovdan* is celebrated in. The placing of collective blame on, as is implicitly understood, Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo police, by failing to present the whole picture of provocative Serbian nationalism, is also to be understood as a kind of reuse of the myth of martyrdom. This, as we have seen, is not done explicitly, but the passive constructions "that allows the speaker to make no overt reference to an agent" (Chilton 2004: 134) were accompanied by images, that in combination with the collective memory of who "the bad guys" are, helped the viewer to identify both the imaginary victim, and the imaginary perpetrator.

6 Concluding Remarks

The *Vidovdan* Discourse is so strongly rooted in the Serbian collective memory that it is used actively in the public discourses (religious, political and in their media representations) every year in the examined period. Variations in use do exist, depending on the year and the contextual situation. Political transitions in the period 2000-2011 do influence the discursive construction of *Vidovdan* and its representation in the media, though *Dnevnik*'s editorial board does not always follow the direct lines of those transitions.

TV News as a specific genre of media discourse is interesting to follow, in particular because of having a structure that seemingly represents a complete *mimesis* of reality and calls on direct adoption of the presented information. RTS *Dnevnik* is no exception here. As one of the most watched and trusted news programme in Serbia, *Dnevnik* creates a certain view of the world that is, as with all other discourses, ideologically motivated. Judging by the material I have analysed in this thesis, *Dnevnik* plays an important role in the annual reproduction of national identity and the recontextualization of the *Vidovdan* Discourse through RTS representation of the Vidovdan celebration.

The main focus in this thesis was on *Dnevnik*'s representation of the ritual celebration of *Vidovdan* at Gračanica and Gazimestan, and through that celebration, the representation of social actors, Serbian national and religious identity, and the blend of the two identities in relation to Others alongside the representation of the current political situation in relation to Kosovo. I decided to follow *Dnevnik*'s Discourse in the period 2000-2011, and to focus on 2000, 2001, 2006 and 2011 which I initially named after four dominant political figures: Milošević, Đinđić, Koštunica and Tadić.

Inspired by the work done by Critical Discourse Analysts, my research design is also based on an interdisciplinarity approach that blends theories on the ideological functions of discourse that are realised through a number of linguistic strategies, as well as on theories of collective memory and conceptual blending.

I am very much aware of the fact that generalisations cannot be made only on the basis of these four analysed *Dnevnik*'s, and in order to map conclusions on the whole period (other days in the year, other years), a comparative analysis with a larger corpus would be desirable. I am therefore presenting four different components concluding remarks, where the two main deictic perspectives that are followed in the analysis are also present: the one of *Dnevnik* and where

Dnevnik allowed the other perspective to come through, the perspective of the represented social actors.

The Vidovdan of Milošević's era, 2000. The discursive construction of the *Vidovdan* celebration in 2000 is in dialog with the NATO-bombing Discourse. The binary oppositions in representations of the Self and the Others serve in establishing legitimatisation in connection to Kosovo politics. The polarisation is primarily realised through lexical devices where the Self is defined through the blend of religious and national identities as “patriots” and “martyrs” while the Other (Kosovo Albanian and the “international community”) was represented as “evil” and “terrorists”. Besides creating an overall impression that the perspective of *Dnevnik* (the deictic centre) is the same as the one held by the represented social actors and “official politics”, *Dnevnik* has also staged the celebration in order to make it “look” secular. The question remains: Why was a secularised celebration of *Vidovdan*, thematically completely substituted by the NATO-bombing Discourse, important as the representation of *Vidovdan* which in 2000 was a purely religious event? This secularisation of the religious *Vidovdan* could illustrate a general tendency in Milošević's Serbia towards representing Serbian national identity as based on the national-heroic interpretation of *Vidovdan* Discourse. The conception of *Homo Serbicus* was, therefore, in Milošević's era based on the secular interpretation of the ultimate Serbian myth stored in the collective memory.

The Vidovdan of Đinđić's era, 2001. The break with the *Vidovdan* Discourse is one of the most obvious conclusions in relation to this year's representation. From *Dnevnik's* deictic centre, a detachment is realised through the objectification of the discourse, presented mainly through two strategies: 1) the change to the “we” perspective of the narrator (*Dnevnik*) and 2) a cognitive shift in focus from the main actors of the *Vidovdan* Discourse (Lazar, Miloš) to St. Vitus. The description of the context has provided information on the changed power relations in Kosovo after the entry of UN and KFOR troops, and especially the changes in status for Kosovo Serbs. Even though the contextual picture of “unsafe” Kosovo Serbs might overlap with *Dnevnik's* representation, the question remains whether the representation of the “unsafe Serbs” during the celebration might have been staged with the intention of changing the negative image of the international community created through a decade of RTS's media manipulation during the Milošević's era and replace it with the *protector* image of the “international community”.

When looking at the whole analysed period, a unique withdrawal from the *Vidovdan* Discourse is made only by Đinđić, who most explicitly destroys the “moral” of the *Vidovdan* Discourse by acknowledging that the rhetoric of the “heavenly Serbia” was used as a cover for wars and raging nationalism.

The Vidovdan of Koštunica’s era. The involvement of *Dnevnik* in staging and promoting the blend of religion and politics as well as religious and national identity is most obvious in the representation of the 2006 celebration. In the context of “creating” a new Serbian nation, as the last Yugoslav unit, Serbia and Montenegro, ceased to exist, Koštunica is represented as the leader of the *narod*. In a strategy aimed at the naturalization of the discourse and the representation of Koštunica as the leader, a new technique is employed: a conversationalized discourse.

By relying ideologically on Serbian collective memory and especially, on the myth of martyrdom, this *Dnevnik* also gives an idealized image of Orthodox Church leaders, especially of Patriarch Pavle. In addition, *Dnevnik* used images of ordinary people to present exemplary *Serbdom*. In order to do so, *Dnevnik* employs a really short *personal interest story* through the images of the “perfect” Serbian mother. This image is also supported verbally by relation to the Mother of the Jugovics, a character from Serbian epic poetry, who is, in *Vidovdan* Discourse, the prototype of the Serbian mother.

Koštunica, already represented as a leader by *Dnevnik*, uses rhetoric, which, by employing historical analogies based on the arguments of the *myth of antiquity*, lays the groundwork for the legitimization of his claim: “Kosovo has always been and shall always be a part of Serbia”.

The Vidovdan of Tadić’s era. The last analysed *Vidovdan* celebration is based on two representations. The first one is the representation of the Serbs who came to celebration. A brief comparative analysis with the B92 report on the same issue, reveals that the Serbs were, by omissions and implicatures, deliberately represented as victims and the Kosovo Police and Kosovo Albanians as aggressors. The second representation is the one of the Serbian Orthodox Church that has, in this report, been given a more prominent place than in all the other analysed years. The discursive world of one of the represented actors, Patriarch Irinej, is based on the politicization of the *Vidovdan* Discourse and use of poetic and metaphoric language and the language of historical analogies, to support Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.

In article mentioned in the Section 1.1 of this thesis, Ivan Čolović presents a claim that *Vidovdan* Discourse is being used by many, and even, maybe especially, in the “new Serbia” after the 5 October-overthrow. This claim can be supported through the analysed material, though some changes, diversity and frequency in use, determined by the contextual transitions, do exist: Milošević is not explicitly represented, but the traces of his and the secularized version of *Vidovdan* Discourse are the signs of his *presence*; Đinđić most explicitly breaks the connection with the political use of the same discourse; Koštunica brings the discourse into politics again, while Tadić remains silent. However, being silent is also a statement.

The conclusion after analysing the reports on the *Vidovdan* celebration is that some of the actors, for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church, are being “favoured”, certainly in the two last analysed celebrations. This is related to the nature of the holiday that has, as seen in the Section 4, always been closely related to the Serbian Orthodox Church. But, it does not stop us from asking why the SPC is represented as an active and legal political “advisor” on all questions related to Kosovo and why SPC’s unifying Serbian national identity and Orthodox Christian (religious) identity is also highlighted by *Dnevnik*.

One more *Vidovdan* passed while I was writing this thesis. This time it featured a new government that introduced a new political figure, Tomislav Nikolić. The media had already started to speculate on “the importance of *Vidovdan*” when Nikolić gave a mandate to form the government and the role of Prime Minister to Dačić (the leader of SPS, the party founded by Milošević). This happened exactly on *Vidovdan*.

The case study presented in this thesis has shown that the blend of politics and religion has become quite prominent in Serbia after the transition in 2000, as it has in some others post-socialistic states. And the question that we still, 12 years after that transition, may ask is: Is *Vidovdan* ever going to lose its political essence?

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Appendix

1. Appendix 1: Complete episodes of *Dnevnik* broadcast on 28 June in the period from 2000 to 2011

See attached DVD.

2. Appendix 2: Transcribed *Dnevnik* reports on the Vidovdan celebration, 2000-2011

1. *RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2000.*

(*vesti dana, prva vest*)

(00:33) *Spiker Jasmina Veselinović (slika sa događaja, naslov: "Obeležen jubilej")*: Specijalni izaslanik predsednika Jugoslavije, Slobodana Miloševića, potpredsednik Vlade Srbije, Ratko Marković, uručio orden Novosadskom univerzitetu, kojim je predsednik Milošević odlikovao tu visokoškolsku ustanovu, povodom četrdeset godina postojanja.

(02:03) *Spiker Jasmina Veselinović*: Specijalni izaslanik predsednika Jugoslavije, Slobodana Miloševića, potpredsednik Vlade Srbije, Ratko Marković, uručio orden Novosadskom univerzitetu, kojim je predsednik Milošević odlikovao tu visokoškolsku ustanovu, povodom četiri decenije postojanja.

Prilog br. 1 (02.19) (*slika sa svečane akademije u Novom Sadu*) *Reporter Mirela Mitrić*: Pod pokroviteljstvom predsednika Republike, Slobodana Miloševića, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu svečano je obeležio jubilej četrdeset godina rada. Naglašavajući činjenicu da je Univerzitet učinio ovaj grad jednim od predvodnika naše univerzitetske nastave i nauke, lični izaslanik predsednika Miloševića, profesor doktor Ratko Marković, uručio je Novosadskom univerzitetu orden «Vuk Karadžić», kao simbol nacionalnog pregalaštva i rezultata koje je ova visokoškolska ustanova ostvarila u svojoj četvoro-decenijskoj tradiciji (*slika uručivanja ordena*). Podsećajući da je Vidovdan, uistinu, bio dan srpske pobede, profesor

doktor Ratko Marković je rekao da se istorijski poklopilo da taj dan bude i dan pobeđe akademizma i ideje Univerziteta u Srbiji.

(slika: govornik Marković; na video bimu: Lični izaslanik predsednika SR Jugoslavije, Slobodana Miloševića, prof. dr Ratko Marković, potpredsednik Vlade Republike Srbije)

(03:00) *Ratko Marković*: Ima puno simbolike u tome da je Univerzitet u Novom Sadu nastao na sveti srpski dan, Vidovdan. Vidovdan 1389. godine je dan večnog značaja i to više za Evropu, nego za Srbiju. Tada je to bio sukob hrišćanskog i otomanskog sveta. Primitivna azijska bujica krenula je da stihijom ljudstva i oružja pokori prosvećenu i po mnogo čemu naivnu Evropu, koja je živela u arkadijskoj veri da su prosvećenost i znanje najmoćnije oružje. Srbija je tada bila na braniku prosvećenosti i znanja. U poplavi zahteva 60-tih i 70-tih godina, da mnogi gradovi, a pritom kulturne zabiti, postanu univerzitetska sedišta, potez s osnivanjem Univerziteta u Novom Sadu bio je knez lazarovski.

Reporter *Mirela Mitrić*: Osvrćući se na vreme prošlogošnje agresije na našu zemlju, izaslanik predsednika Miloševića je naglasio:

(03:58) *Ratko Marković*: Novi Sad je 1999. godine ponovio Gazimestan 1389. Srbija je ponovo moralno triumfovala. Kao što je 1389. godine bila bedem svetskoj otomanskoj imperiji, ona je tako 1999. godine bila bedem svetskoj NATO-vskoj imperiji. I zato nije ni malo čudno što je Srbija počela baš iz Novog Sada da se obnavlja i da fizički i duhovno raste. Zemlje se ne mere prema fizičkom prostranstvu i brojnosti ljudstva, nego prema srcu koje imaju. Srbija je 1999. godine imala ono isto srce koje je imala 1389. godine. O tome će najbolje svedočiti Novi Sad.

Reporter *Mirela Mitrić*: U znak zahvalnosti za prihvatanje pokroviteljstva obeležavanja jubileja i stvaranja uslova za razvoj i afirmaciju Novosadskog univerziteta, predsedniku Srbije, Slobodanu Miloševiću dodeljena povelja sa zlatnom plaketom, a priznanje i zahvalnice za uspešnu saradnju, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu dodelio je istaknutim pojedincima i institucijama (u nastavku priloga nema pomene Vidovdana).

(22:27) *Spiker Jasnina Veselinović*: Širom Srbije svečano se obeležava Vidovdan. Evo kako je bilo na Kosmetu.

Prilog br. 2 Prvi deo (22:32) *(slika sa sednice u Gračanici, samo muškarci)* Reporter *Borivoje Uskoković (preko telefona)*: Na svečanoj sednici grada Prištine koja je posvećena obeležavanju Vidovdana u Gračanici najpre je odata pošta kosovskim mučenicima i svim rodoljubima koji su dali živote u odbrani slobode. Nakon intoniranja državne himne,

odbornicima i brojnim gostima, Srećko Mitrović, potpredsednik Skupštine opštine Priština, rekao je da se i danas posle 611 godina od Kosovske bitke potvrđuje da se srpstvo ne može zamisliti bez Kosmeta.

(slika: *Gazimestan sa nekolicinom političkih predstavnika i jako malo građana*) Delegacije jugoslovenskog komiteta Skupštine opštine Pristina, Socijalističke partije Srbije i srpske nacionalne skupštine, položile su cveće i odale poštu kosovskim junacima na Gazimestanu. Njegova svetost Patrijarh Pavle, ovom prilikom, služio je liturgiju.

(slika: *Gračanica, «Vidovdansko pesničko pričešće 2000»*) Inače, u okviru manifestacije «Vidovdansko pesničko pričešće 2000», sinoć su u Gračanici pred više hiljada okupljenih Srba, 32 pesnika i književnika iz cele zemlje, govorila [sic] svoje stihove i zapise. (slika: *povelja sa likom Kneginje Milice(?) i tekstom:*

*Видовданско песничко причешће
додељује грачаничку повељу
песнику
Миодрагу Трипковићу
Грачаница, на Видовдан 2000. год.)*

Drugi deo (23:30) (slika otkrivanja spomenika) reporter Ljiljana Janković: U Leposaviću je danas, u prisustvu rodbine poginulih i građana ove opštine na severu Kosmeta, otkriveno spomen obeležje devetnaestorici pripadnika Vojske Jugoslavije i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova koji su svoje mlade živote dali za slobodu u otporu zlikovačkoj NATO agresiji i u borbi sa šiptarskim teroristima. obraćajući se prisutnima, predsetnik Skupštine opštine Leposavić, Dragan Jablanović, rekao je da ovo spomen obeležje simbolizuje hrabrost, prkos i patriotizam palih junaka otadžbine koji je i svetli putokaz generacijama koje dolaze. Ono je i opomena svim slobodoljubivim državama i narodima u svetu da se zločin koji je počinjen nad srpskim narodom nikada i nigde više ne ponovi. «Brutalno bombardovanje je prestalo, ali se agresija na našu zemlju, rukovođena prljavom politikom Sjedinjenih država, nastavlja», istakao je Jablanović i dodao:

(24:17) *Dragan Jablanović:* Niti će Srbija i Jugoslavija biti stavljene pod okupatorsku čizmu niti će Međunarodna zajednica trajno biti slepi i poslušni izvršilac mračnih naloga Amerike. Srbija i Jugoslavija se ne mogu pokoriti. (slika prisutnih, neki plaču)

reporter Ljiljana Janković: Poštu svojim stradalim saborcima odao je i Radiša Balović, učesnik rata 98/99 godine koji je rekao: (slika spomen ploče sa imenima poginulih)

(24:39) *Radiša Balović*:...oni su sve imali, ali čini mi se da će ostati bez išta [sic] na Kosovu, jer Kosovo neće biti Albanija. (*Aplauz*)

reporter Ljiljana Janković: Na spomen obeležje rodoljubima leposavičkog kraja vence su položile delegacije građana ove opštine, mladih i udruženja boraca rata 1991-1999. godine.

Treći deo (25:05) (slika delegacije, tenk sa UN vojnicima u pozadini) reporter Ljiljana Janković: Delegacija južno banatskog okruga koji je predvodio predsednik okružnog odbora SPS-a ovog regiona, Radimir Popović, boravila je danas u Kosovskoj Mitrovici. U razgovoru sa članovima Jugoslovenskog komiteta za saradnju sa misijom Ujedinjenih nacija na Kosovu i Metohiji, načelnikom kosovsko-mitrovačkog okruga, Zdravkom Trajkovićem i predstavnicima lokalne samouprave, gosti iz Vojvodine istakli su da su u ovaj grad došli kako bi se, u neposrednom kontaktu s ljudima, iznašle mogućnosti za uspostavljanje plodnije saradnje dva okruga, pre svega u oblasti privrede, ali i obrazovanja, zdravstva i kulture. Želja im je bila i da na Vidovdan, veliki praznik srpskog naroda, budu na Kosmetu gde se Srbi stoički bore za opstanak na svojim ognjištima.

Četvrti deo (25:46) (slika ljudi kako ulaze u zgradu fakulteta) Reporter Miloš Milatović: Sinoć je u srpskom delu Kosovske Mitrovice u fakultetskom amfiteatru održana revija modne kuće «Mona» iz Beograda sa kolekcijom METOS, inspirisanom srednjovekovnom tradicijom pravoslavlja koja se negovala u manastirima Kosova i Metohije. Drugi deo revije predstavljao je inspiraciju koja potiče iz tradicije srpskog naroda, tačnije, folklornog nasleđa, čija je osnovna karakteristika bogatstvo boja. Naravno, o ovoj izuzetnoj modnoj reviji, uz učešće dva vrsna dramska umetnika, Ivanom Žigon i Nebojšom Kudačinom, moglo bi se još dosta pohvala reći (*slika modene revije pa glumaca i programa*).

(26:32) *Ivana Žigon*:

«Mora da su čule belosvetske bande
da imamo [sic] zlatna srca
pa ih vade
da ih presade u sopstvene grudi
ne bi li i oni tako bili ljudi.

Ali uzalud, uzalud ćete linčovati

najgostoljubiviji narod na planeti

(zbog čega ćete goreti u paklu)

jer Ljudsko Srce

čudo nad čudima

neće da se primi u vašim grudima!» (Prkosna pesma, Dobrica Erić, 1993) (*aplauz*)

(27:19) *Nada Momirović*, direktor Modne kuće «Mona» iz Beograda: Mi smo, eto, mislili da ulepšamo deo života ovom narodu, ali ja mislim da su oni nama, nama iz Beograda, ulepšali. Oni su nama pokazali kako treba živeti kako treba boriti se i kako treba opstajati.

(27:33) *Velimir Matanović*, direktor Kulturnog centra Kosovske Mitrovice: Večeras je bilo veličanstveno, večeras je ovde, kao i uvek, bila Srbija, večeras je ovde bila srpska duhovnost. Ovo što je bilo večeras to je bilo do sada neviđeno. Ja sam oduševljen.

(27:44) *Ivana Žigon*, glumica: Velika je čast biti ovde i govoriti za ove prekrasne ljude i za ovu prekrasnu decu, to je sve što mogu da kažem (*deca aplaudiraju*).

Anonimni: Želeo bih da oni koji su ovde, ostanu i oni koji su otišli da se vrate. Mislim da je vreme da se vrate svi. Na svoje. Sa budemo svoji na svome.

Peti deo (28:05) (*slika: kolo se igra, mnogo ljudi, muzika*) *Reporter Ljiljana Janković*: U organizaciji podkomiteta za kulturu Jugoslovenskog komiteta za saradnju sa UMNIK-om u Zvečanu je, u okviru vidovdanskih svečanosti, održan koncert pod nazivom «Pesma nas je održala». Narodni orkestar RTS-a, pod upravom Branimira Đokića, i vokalni solisti PGP-RTS-a u Zvečanu su boravili nakon posvete Kosovskoj Mirovici, Leposaviću, Štrpcu i Gračanici.

(28:30) *Branimir Đokić*, šef narodnog orkestra RTS-a: Oduševljen sam jer vidim u njihovim očima i dušama snagu za borbu, za ostanak na svojoj zemlji, na svom ognjištu. To je nešto divno videti, i ... svaki moj dolazak ovde... ja se vratim u Beograd sa još više patriotske energije i i i tog naboja, koji je teško objasniti nekome ko to ne doživi i ne dođe međ' svoj narod na Kosovo.

Prilog br. 3 (40:07) (*glas čita saopštenje, slika: logo SRS i slika Beograda. Tekst: Saopštenje Srpske radikalne stranke*): Srpska radikalna stranka ukazuje da srpski narod, u svim srpskim zemljama, suočen sa opasnošću fizičkog uništenja, vodi grčevitu borbu za slobodu koju mu, već deset godina ugrožavaju Amerikanci sa svojim zapadnim pomagačima. Srpska

radikalna stranka, danas, na Vidovdan, na dan junačke pogibije srpskih ratnika za slobodu i čast otadžbine, upozorava vaskoliko srpstvo da, u trenutku kada je opstanak srpskog naroda doveden u pitanje, u Srbiji postoje i takve snage kojima su poniznost i servilnost ka neprijateljima, preči od slobode i dostojanstva sopstvenog naroda. Negirajući i sprečavajući svaki otpor srpskim neprijateljima, američke sluge iz Saveza za promene i Srpskog pokreta obnove, bespogovorno ispunjavaju sve želje i zamisli okupatora. Takvi izrodi srpskog naroda, na sva usta, veličaju, navodno, mirovnu misiju NATO-a, gluvi i slepi za muke i patnje naroda kojem samo poreklom pripadaju. Koaliciona vlada, Vuk Drašković, Bernard Kušner, Artemije Radosavljević, Hašim Tači, treba do kraja da sprovede u delo zločinački plan američke administracije i pokuša da zapečati sudbinu srpskog stanovništva na Kosovu i Metohiji. Srpski radikali su uvereni da će Srbi, kao i mnogo puta kroz istoriju, i iz ovog istorijskog iskušenja izaći kao pobednici, ističe se u saopštenju Srpske radikalne stranke.

2. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2001.

(vesti dana, prva vest)

(00:36) *Spiker Dragana Vasiljević*: Biši jugoslovenski predsednik, Slobodan Milošević, predat je organima haškog tribunala, izjavio je potparol potpredsedništva Vlade Srbije. Pre nepun čas, u Beogradu je završena sednica republičke Vlade. Naša ekipa se vratila i imamo izjavu premijera Vlade Srbije, gospodina Zorana Đinđića.

(00:59) (slika iz Vlade, konferencija za štampu, Zoran Đinđić govori u vezi sa izručenjem, ne pominje se Vidovdan).

(30:10) *Spiker Dragana Vasiljević*:

Iz Kraljeva je, jutros, u vidovdanskom protestnom maršu, krenulo 15 autobusa sa privremeno raseljenim licima. Protest zbog postupka UMNİK-a i KFOR-a, završen je u severnom delu Kosovske Mitrovice.

Prilog br. 1 (30:24) (slika: Prисutni uzimaju hleb i so. Demonstracije. Transparent «Nema izbora na Kosmetu bez 1300 kidnapovanih...»)

Reporter Bojana Delibašić: Vidovdanski praznik okupio je u severnoj Kosovskoj Mitrovici oko 1000 Srba sa Kosova i Metohije koji su privremeno raseljeni po gradovima i selima centralne Srbije. Na ulazu u grad, dočekali su ih meštani, nakon čega su se zajedno uputili ka Ibarskom mostu, gde je, na samo nekoliko metara od mosta, održan zajednički protestni miting raseljenih i prognanih Srba i porodica kidanpovanih. Zahtevi jednih i drugih bili su isti: okupljeni su skandirali: «Hoćemo da se vratimo kući!», «Vratite otete!» i «Bez ispunjenja ovih zakona nećemo izaći na jesenjske kosovske izbore!».

Jovica Stanković, predsednik Udruženja raseljenih Srba sa Kosova i Metohije:

Mi znamo da danas vape svi manastiri, sve crkve, za povratak naših, jer bez nas su im kandila ugašena i mi na tom putu nećemo da stanemo, bićemo uporni i istrajni.

Reporter Bojana Delibašić: Upriličen je i prigodan, kulturno-umetnički program, jer kako rekoše: “Okupili smo se danas da zajedno podelimo tugu i probleme, ali da obeležimo najveći i najznačajniji praznik za sve Srbe sa Kosova i Metohije: Vidovdan».

(31:27) *Spiker Dragana Vasiljević*: Obeležavanje Vidovdana u manastiru Gračanici započelo je svetom arhijerejskom liturgijom koju je jutros služio patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle.

Prilog br. 2 (31:39) (slika iz Gračanice, sa liturgije) *Reporter Žarko Joksimović* (preko telefona): Uz velike mere obezbeđenja od strane brojnih pripadnika KFOR-a i UN policije, Vidovdan je ponovo i većem broju okupio Srbe u Gračanici i na Gazimestanu. Jutros je u dvorištu manastira Gračanica, pred nešto više od hiljadu vernika, liturgiju povodom sv. Vida, služio Njegova svetost patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle.

Činodejstvovali su vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije, vladika Atanasije Jeftić, monaštvo i sveštenstvo raško-prizrenske eparhije. Pred portom manastira Gračanica, patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle je pozeleo mir i slobodan život žiteljima Kosmeta, a prognanima da se što pre vrate svojim domovima. Potom se više stotina Srba iz Gračanice, okolnih sela i ostalih srpskih enklava sa Kosmeta, pod pratnjom, “do zuba naoružanih” vojnika uputila do Gazimestana. (slika Gazimestana, vojnika sa puskama, bodljikava žica oko spomenika) Pred spomenikom srpskim junacima, služen je parastos knezu Lazaru i ostalim vitezovima palim u Kosovskom boju pre 612 godina.

Nakon parastosa, na spomenik su položeni vencii.

3. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2002.

(Vesti dana):

(00:51) 3. vest (*slika protesta; tekst: "Opozicija traži izbore"*) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović*: Srpska opozicija protestuje na Vidovdan.

(01:12) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović*: Dobro veče. Ovo je drugi Dnevnik 2002. godine na Vidovdan u kome ćete saznati kako danas izgledaju Srbija i svet.

(06:06) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović (slika: spiker, u pozadini ikona sa knezom Lazarom)*: Današnji praznik, Vidovdan, Srpska pravoslavna crkva posvećuje velikomučeniku knezu Lazaru i svim svetim srpskim velikomučenicima. U hramovima su služene sv. liturgije, a potom i pomen knezu Lazaru i svima koji su od Kosova do danas pali u odbrani svoje zemlje i otadžbine.

Prilog br. 1 (06:24) *Reporter Biljana Radonja: (slike iz crkve, sa bogoslužjenja)* Postoje različita predanja o Vidovdanu. U crkvenim knjigama je zapisano da je današnji dan dobio ime po svetom mučeniku Vidu, mladom Sicilijancu postradalom za Hrista u 4. veku. Po Vuku Karadžiću, međutim, Vidovdan potiče još iz staroslovenskog mnogoboštva kada je bog Vid bio vrhovni bog Srba, bog svetlosti i junaštva. U srpskom crkvenom kalendaru, 28. jun upisan je crvenim slovom tek posle 1389. godine i vezan je za Kosovski boj. Tragedija Kosovske bitke odredila je tada sudbinu srpskog naroda, a pokolenjima ostavila u nasleđe reči kneza Lazara: «Zemljsko je za malena carstvo, a nebesko uvek i do veka». Uzvišena tragika heroizma vođe srpske vojske na Kosovu (*slika ikone «sv. velikomučenik Lazar»*), kneza Lazara, u narodnom predanju podignuta je na nivo kulta, iznad istorijske realnosti, koji je sačuvan i danas.

Prilog br. 2 (07:17): *Reporter Gordana Mladenović (slika litije i nošenja srebrnog kivotu kneza Lazara; kivot nose pripadnici Vojske Jugoslavije; mesto: Kruševac)*: Po održanom pomenu, svečana litija ispratila je mošti do Lazarevog grada. Kivot u koji su položene mošti sv. Lazara biće od danas izložene u severnoj pevnici crkve Lazarice i dostupan vernicima na celivanje i poklonjenje.

(07:30) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović*: Povodom Vidovdana, patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle, služio je liturgiju u manastiru Gračanica na Kosovu, a zatim na Gazimestanu, u pratnji KFOR-a – pomen srpskim ratnicima poginulim u Kosovskom boju.

Prilog br. 3 (07:45) (*preko tlf.; slika sa Kosova, sa Gazimestana*) *Reporter*: Nakon liturgije, patrijarh Pavle je na Gazimestanu, poprištu Kosovske bitke, služio parastos sv. Knezu Lazaru i ostalim kosovskim junacima (*slika sa parastosa; princ Karađorđević i princeza Katarina u prvom planu*). Iako se strahovalo, skup na Gazimestanu protekao je bez problema, naravno, uz jako obezbeđenja vojnika KFOR-a. Međutim, treba reći da pripadnici međunarodnih snaga nisu obezbedili pratnju iz srpskih sredina do Gazimestana (*slike sa Gazimestana – izgleda kao da ima više vojnika nego posetioca, slike vojnika, tenkova*), tako da je mnogima koji su hteli, bilo onemogućeno da odu na Gazimestan i odaju poštu i poklone se senima kosovskih ratnika.

Prilog br. 4 (08:17) (*slika iz Gračanice, dodela nagrada*) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović (iz studija, slika iz Gračanice)*: Akademik Dragoslav Mihajlović dobitnik je priznanja «Zlatni krst kneza Lazara» na «Vidovdanaskom pesničkom

pričešću» koje je održano u Gračanici. U porti manastira, svoje stihove govorilo je 30-tak pesnika iz Srbije, Crne Gore, Republike Srpske i Rusije.

(08:35) Akademik *Dragoslav Mihajlović*: ...ono što rade da bi se kasnije kajali i popravljali nego da bi ga u budućnosti upotrebili kao nevažan uvod u dokazivanje da su bili u pravu. Ako si žrtva, moraš se, u životu, snaći sa svojim zlotvorom.

(09:05) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović*: Vidovdanski sabor koji organizuju Srpski pokret obnove, Narodna demokratska stranka i Socijaldemokratija, zakazan je za 19 časova na platou ispred Savezne skupštine. Tamo je naš reporter, Danica Kostić.

Danice, da li je miting počeo?

Prilog br. 5 (09:19) *Reporter Danica Kostić*: Vidovdanski sabor počeo je na platou ispred Savezne skupštine himnom «Bože pravde» i kako je najavljeno, velikom broju učesnika prvo će se obratiti predstavnicima Srba sa Kosmeta. Zatim će govoriti lideri stranaka koji su organizovali miting. Najpre, Slobodan Vuksanović iz Narodne demokratske stranke, zatim Vuk Obradović iz Socijaldemokratije i, na kraju, Vuk Drašković, lider Srpskog pokreta obnove. On će pročitati i saborsku deklaraciju koja sadrži ultimaturnu predstavnicima vlasti Srbije, da do 15. septembra raspišu izbore na svim nivoima ili da se suče sa blokadom puteva po Srbiji. Posle čitanja deklaracije, učesnici sabora će krenuti u šetnju beogradskim ulicama. Inače, na mitingu učestvuju i predstavnici Otpora iz Požarevca i članovi nezavisnog sindikata policije, čiji predstavnici pomažu i obezbeđenje mitinga. Redari na mitingu su, inače, povećani. Njihov broj je negde oko 500, jer kako je Slobodan Vuksanović rekao, njihov cilj nije da ruše grad, već samo da sruše vlast.

(10:32) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović*: I to je bila Danica Kostić sa Vidovdanskog sabora, a skup pod nazivom «Protiv Haga, za izbore» u organizaciji SPS-a, počeo je u šest sati na Trgu republike.

Prilog br. 6 (10:43) *Reporter Nataša Mihajlović*: Sloboda za Slobodana Miloševića i izbori na svim nivoima zahtevi su učesnika mitinga na Trgu republike, mitinga Socijalističke partije Srbije, kome su se pridružili (*slika: mahom stariji ljudi; slike transparenata, zastava, slika Radovana Karadžića, Ratka Mladića, Slobodana Miloševića, SPS zastava*) i Demokratska socijalistička partija Milorada Vučelića i Partija demokratske levice, Aleksandra Vulina, koji su se juče, kolektivno učlanili u Socijalističku partiju Srbije. Miting na Trgu republike počeo je sa 30tak minuta zakašnjenja (*slika: Bata Živojinović među ljudima*), okupljenima je saopšteno da miting kasni, jer je policija zaustavila autobuse sa učesnicima, prisatalicama Socijalističke partije Srbije. Na samom početku, okupljeni su skandirajući: «Slobo, Slobo», pozdravili Mirka Marjanovića koji je okupljenima preneo pozdrav predsednika Socijalističke partije Srbije (*slika: zastave sa Če Gevarom*). «Živela Srbija!», «Živeo Slobodan Milošević!», «Želimo život u slobodnoj Srbiji!» samo su neke od parola okupljenih na ovom skupu.

(33:13) *Spiker Aneta Mihajlović*: I to je bio drugi Dnevnik Televizije Beograd na Vidovdan. Hvala vam na pažnji i poverenju! Prijatno veče!

4. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2003.

(Vesti dana):

(00:23) *Spiker Miran Đevenica (samo glas, slika sa Gazmestana, natpis na ekranu: Vidovdan 2003):* «Srpski narod živi na Kosmetu, ne da bi otimao (slika Gazimestana i kraljevske porodice, drže sveće) tuđe i ne da bi svoju veru nametao drugome, već zato što želi da odbrani svoje, poručio je patrijarh Pavle na Gazimestanu».

(01:26) *Spiker Miran Đevenica (u studiju):* Poštovani gledaoci, dobro večer. Ovo je Dnevnik 2 Televizije Beograd. U srpskom crkvenom kalendaru, 28. jun upisan je crvenim slovom tek posle Kosovskog boja, 1389 godine. Tragedija Kosovske bitke odredila je tada sudbinu srpskog naroda, a heroizam kneza Laraza u narodnom predanju podignut je na nivo kulta i iznad istorijske realnosti.

Prilog br. 1 (01:48) *Reporter Biljana Radonja (slika iz Gračanice):* Danas 614 godina kasnije u slavu kosovskim junacima, patrijarh Pavle služio je svetu arhijerejsku liturgiju u manastiru Gračanici i parastos na Gazimestanu. U svojoj besedi, patrijarh Pavle je podsetio da srpski narod živi na Kosmetu ne da bi ne da bi otimao tuđe, ne da bi svoju veru nametao drugome, već zato što želi da odbrani svoje. (slika Gazimestana, "Kneževa kletva" na spomeniku) Na Gazimestanu odajemo poštu starim i novim srpskim žrtvama na Kosovu i Metohiji, ljudima koji su stradali samo zato što su Srbi i pravoslavne vere, rekao je prestolonaslednik Aleksandar Karađorđević i podsetio da Srbi u pokrajini žive u getu, da povratka prognanih nema, da su mnoge svetinje porušene. On je pozvao Međunarodnu zajednicu da udvostruči napore i učini mnogo više za bezbednost i vladavinu ljudskih prava na Kosovu i Metohiji. Parastosom na Gazimestanu završeno je ovogodišnje obeležavanje Vidovdana koje je pored predsednika Koordinacionog centra, Nebojše Čovića, okupilo poslanike koalicije "Povratak", i ostale srpske političare sa Kosova i Metohije. Okupilo se i oko hiljadu vernika, što je nekoliko puta više nego u godinama posle NATO bombardovanja, ali mnogo manje u odnosu na 1989. godinu, kada je, po tadašnjim procenama, na Gazimestanu bilo oko 1 000 000 ljudi (slika govora Slobodana Miloševića sa Gazimestana) i kada je Slobodan Milošević održao govor koji je, kako se smatra, bio inicijalna kapisla za raspad SFRJ.

(vesti dana):

(11:16) *Spiker Miran Đevenica (samo glas, slika sa Gazmestana, natpis na ekranu: Vidovdan 2003):* «Srpski narod živi na Kosmetu, ne da bi otimao (slika Gazimestana i kraljevske porodice, drže sveće) tuđe i ne da bi svoju veru nametao drugome, već zato što želi da odbrani svoje», poručio je patrijarh Pavle na Gazimestanu.

(vesti dana):

(27:10) *Spiker Miran Đevenica (samo glas, slika sa Gazmestana, natpis na ekranu: Vidovdan 2003):* «Srpski narod živi na Kosmetu, ne da bi otimao (slika Gazimestana i kraljevske porodice, drže sveće) tuđe i ne da bi svoju veru nametao drugome, već zato što želi da odbrani svoje», poručio je patrijarh Pavle na Gazimestanu.

5. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2004.

(vesti dana, peta vest):

(01:10) *Spiker Milica Nedić*: Na Vidovdan, praznik srpske države i crkve, patrijarh Pavle služio parastos na Gazimestanu (*slika spomenika na Gazimestanu*), a liturgiju u manastiru Gračanici (*slika Gračanice*).

(22:53) *Spiker Milica Nedić* (iz studija, sa video slikom iz Saborne crkve u Beogradu, sa bogoslužnja): Danas je Vidovdan, jedan od najznačajnijih datuma srpske države i crkve. (*Slika: Boris Tadić, novoizabrani predsednik Srbije, «celiva ikonu» u Sabornoj crkvi u Beogradu*). Novoizabrani predsednik, Boris Tadić, prisustvoao je jutros liturgiji u Sabornoj crkvi u Beogradu.

(23:10) *Spiker Milica Nedić* (iz studija, iza nje slika Gračanice): A patrijarh srpski Pavle služio je na Gazimestanu parastos kosovskim junacima koji su na današnji dan 1389. poginuli u borbi s Turcima. Jutros je, u manastiru Gračanica (*slika patrijarha sa Gazimestana*), srpski patrijarh služio svečanu, vidovdansku liturgiju.

Prilog br. 1 (23:25) *Reporter Žarko Joksimovic*: Više od hiljadu Srba iz kosmetskih enklava i ove godine nešto brojniji gosti iz Srbije i Crne Gore, okupili su se danas u podne na Gazimestanu, gde je, povodom Vidovdana, održan pomen stradalim srpskim borcima za slobodu. Obraćajući se prisutnim [sic], kraj spomenika na Gazimestanu, patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle, podsetio je na primer svetog cara Lazara i one koje sa njim postradaše, kao nauk da se sloboda brani, između ostalog, i svešću da je potrebna svima. (*slika sa parastosa na Gazimestanu*) (23:57) (*slika iz Gračanice*) Njegova svetost patrijarh srpski služio je jutros pred manastirskom Gračanica, svečanu liturgiju u prisustvu mnogobrojnih vernika, koji su do Gračanice stigli uz pratnju vojnika KFOR-a. Sinoć su pred portom zadužbine kralja Milutina, na završnoj manifestaciji «Vidovdansko pesničko pričešće», dodeljene književne nagrade. «Zlatni krst kneza Lazara» je ove godine pripao Danilu Nikoliću (*slika*), «Gračanička povelja» – Dragomiru Kostiću (*slika*), «Kondir Kosovke devojke» – Ljubici Miletić (*slika*), a «Pero despota Stefana Lazarevića» – mladom pesniku iz Novog Sada, Branimiru Bojeviću.

6. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2005.

(vesti dana, prva vest):

(01:10) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija glas, preko ekrana video patrijarha na Gazimestanu):* Patrijarh Pavle na Vidovdan služio parastos na Gazimestanu. Praznik obeležen u celoj zemlji.

(02:27) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija, iza spikera slika patrijarha sa Gazimestanu):* Srpska pravoslavna crkva i njeni vernici obeležavaju Vidovdan, praznik posvećen svetom velikomučeniku knezu Lazaru i velikomučenicima koji su se, na današnji dan 1389. godine, suprotstavili turskim osvajačima. Srbi sa Kosova i Metohije obeležili su praznik u Gračanici i na Gazimestanu.

Prilog br. 1 (02:49) *Reporter Zoran Babović (video-slika sa Gazimestana):* Povodom Vidovdana, jednog od najznačajnijih datuma u istoriji našeg naroda, Njegova svetost, patrijarh srpski gospodin Pavle, služio je pred spomenikom kosovskim junacima na Gazimestanu parastos knezu Lazaru i svim palim za veru i otadžbinu (*u kadru patrijarh, Vuk Drašković iza njega*). U obraćanju prisutnima nakon parastosa, patrijarh Pavle je, između ostalog, istakao: «Knez Lazar i naši sveti položili su svoje živote ne idući da otimaju tuđe nego svoje da brane, ne da kome nameću svoju veru, nego svoju da brane, a to je ono što je kroz vekove činilo da ovaj dan bude u svesti i srcima celog našeg naroda»

(03:25) *Patrijarh Pavle:* To je bila vera koja je držala naše pretke i u doba slobode i u doba ropstva i u doba borbi za slobodu. Bili su i ostali LJUDI (*naglašeno*), kao što dolikuje našim precima. To će biti i ako i mi tako budemo postupali: Braniti se od neprijatelja, ali se braniti kao čovek. Nikada zločinom odgovarati na zločin.

(03:58) *Reporter Zoran Babović:* Patrijarh Pavle je pre parastosa na Gazimestanu u porti manastira Gračanica služio svečanu vidovdansku liturgiju uz sasluženje sveštenstva raško-prizrenske eparhije. Liturgiji u manastiru Gračanica i parastosu na Gazimestanu, pored nekoliko stotina kosovsko-metohijskih Srba (*slika sa lica mesta sa vojnicima KFOR-a među prisutnima*), prisustvovali su i ministar spoljnih poslova državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora, Vuk Drašković (*svi se krste na snimku*), Dragan Kojadinović, ministar za kulturu u Vladi Srbije i prestavnici Koordinacionog centra za Kosovo i Metohiju.

Prilog br. 2 (04:27) *Spiker Milica Nedić (u studiju):* Parastos svima koji su kidnapovani pa ubijeni na Kosovu i Metohiji u Sabornoj crkvi u Beogradu služio je starešina Saborne crkve, Petar Lukić, uz sasluženje sveštenstva. Otac Lukić je naglasio da je to parastos svim Srbima koji su ubijeni od Kosovske bitke 1389 do ove, jednako nepravedne koja se danas vodi na Kosovu i Metohiji. Otac Lukić je još rekao da je nezadovoljan što je, i na današnji dan, Saborna crkva polu-prazna.

Prilog br. 3 (04:59) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija)* Pristalice Socijalističke partije Srbije okupili su se na Trgu republike u Beogradu na mitingu podrške predsedniku stranke Slobodanu Miloševiću. Milošević je na Vidovdan, pre četiri godine izručen haškom tribunalu. Potpredsednik Socijalističke partije Srbije, Milorad Vučelić, rekao je da je miting podrška Slobodanu Miloševiću, ali i znak spremnosti da se SPS, bori za pravdu, slobodu i istinu. (*slika: veliki broj starijih ljudi skandira: «Slobo, Slobo...»*)

(24:28) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija)*: Decenijama unazat, Kruševljanjin Vlastimir Đuza Stojiljković je za glumačke bravure dobijao mnogobrojna priznanja. Danas, na Vidovdan, posle šezdeset godina umetničkog rada, od svog grada dobio je posebno priznanje: «Vidovdansku plaketu» za izuzetan doprinos afirmaciji kruševačke kulture.

Prilog br. 4 (24:47) *Reporter Ljiljana Raičević*: Glumačku karijeru započeo je pre šest decenija u kruševačkom teatru. Sedamdesetih godina popularnost stekao ulogom Rodoljuba Petrovića Rođe u kulturnoj seriji «Pozorište u kući». Na daskama koje život znače ostvario je 130 dramskih likova. Naravno, ovog barda srpskog glumišta tokom šezdesetogodišnjeg scenskog trajanja nisu zaobišle ni nagrade: «Sterijina», «Dobričin prsten» i mnoge druge. Ova poslednja, Vidovdanska, grada u kome je rođen ipak je nešto posebno.

(25:21) *Glumac Vlastimir-Đuza Stojiljković*: Ovo je meni nekako najdraže zato što ono što čovek ponese iz svog mesta to traje i dalje i ima da zahvali, ako uspe u životu, u mnogo čemu, baš da zahvali gradu iz kojega je potekao.

(25:37) *Reporter Ljiljana Raičević*: I ako je zvanično penzioner već čitavu deceniju, Vlastimir Đuza Stojiljković, stalno je angažovan u Ateljeu 212, te njegov dar, osobeni stil i šarm burnim aplauzima i dalje nagrađuje pozorišna publika.

((29:19)«Bjelo dugme» na hipodromu!)

(*vesti dana, prva vest*):

(31:10) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija glas, preko ekrana video patrijarha na Gazimestanu)*: Patrijarh Pavle na Vidovdan služio parastos na Gazimestanu. Praznik obeležen u celoj zemlji.

7. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2006.

(vesti dana, prva vest):

(00:41) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (iz studija, video-slika Koštunica na Kosovu, Gračanica):* «Hoćemo istorijski pravično rešenje za Kosovo i Metohiju. Kosovo je bilo i zauvek će biti deo Srbije», rekao premijer Koštunica u Gračanici, na proslavi Vidovdana.

(00:52) «Srbija se protivi nezavisnosti Kosova,» poručio i predsednik Tadić iz Skoplja.

(1:48) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (slika Koštunice u pozadini):* U Gračanici je danas tradicionalno proslavljen Vidovdan i obeležena 617. godina od Kosovskog boja. Svetu arhijerejsku liturgiju u manastiru je služio patrijarh srpski Pavle. Služen je i parastos palim srpskim junacima na Gazimestanu. Srpski premijer, Vojislav Koštunica, po podne je stigao u Gračanicu s porukom da je Kosovo uvek bilo i de će uvek biti deo Srbije.

Prilog br. 1 (02:11) *Reporter Ruža Jeremić (slika sa liturgije u Gračanici):* Patrijarh Pavle služio je liturgiju sa vladikama raško-prizrenskim i lipjlanskim Artemijem i Teodosijem. Obraćajući se vernicima i građanima, vladika Artemije posebno se zahvalio patrijarhu, jer je, kako je rekao, i pored bolesti stigao u Gračanicu i pokazao kako treba da se borimo za Kosovo i Metohiju. Vladika raško-prizrenski ocenio je da Kosmet treba da ostane ono što je bilo u prošlosti, naša duhovna i kulturna koevka, srpski Jerusalim (*video i zvuk sa dela liturgije*). Patrijarh se pomolio bogu za spasenje srpskog naroda, ali i za naše neprijatelje, kako bi i oni spoznali istinu.

(02:47) Srpskog premijera, Vojislava Koštunicu, u manastirskoj porti dočekali su vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije i sveštenstvo. Čestitajući Vidovdan okupljenima, Koštunica je rekao da nema boljeg mesta za obeležavanje tog praznika od Gračanice, ona najbolje svedoči o tome ko smo bili, kako smo nastali i kako se radala Srbija, rekao je premijer, ukazujući na to da senima naših predaka ne bi mogli da se poklonimo bez vojne zaštite.

(03:11) *Premijer Srbije Vojislav Koštunica:* Sa ovog mesta, na Vidovdan, iz Gračanice, prilika je da objavimo svetu šta Srbija hoće. Srbija hoće pravdu, pravo i mir. Narod koji hoće pravdu, pravo i mir, hoće da razgovara, hoće da se dogovori, hoće kompromis, hoće istorijski pravična rešenja.

(03:43) *Reporter Ruža Jeremić:* Premijer je uveren da nikad niko nije bio više u pravu od Srbije u raspravama koje se vode o budućem statusu Kosova.

(03:48) *Premijer Srbije Vojislav Koštunica:* Da ponovimo ono što svaki Srbin mora da zna: Kosovo je UVEK (*naglašeno*) bilo i zauvek će biti deo SRBIJE (*naglašeno*)! (*usklici, «Bravo»*)

(04:02) *Reporter Ruža Jeremić:* Poseta Gračanici za premijera je bila prilika i da razgovara sa građanima južne srpske pokrajne.

(04:07) *Anoniman 1:* Mislite malo na nas!

(04:08) *Premijer Srbije, Vojislav Koštunica:* Mislim, kako da ne mislim!

(04:09) *Anoniman 1:* I treba, treba! (*dok se rukuje s Koštunicom*)

(04:12) *Anoniman 2:* Svaka čas', svaka čas'!

(04:13) *Anoniman 3:* Hvala što ste nas posetili!

(04:16) *Reporter Ruža Jeremić (slika «Ordena majke devet Jugovića» i diploma sa tekstom: «Eparhija Raškoprizrenska dodeljuje Orden majke devet Jugovića*

Srpskoj majci G-đi Peri Miladinović iz Podkomlja [sic] koja je rodila i odgajila devetoro dece...»): Tradicionalno, majkama Kosova i Metohije koje su rodile više od petoro dece, uručene su medalje «Majke devet Jugovića».

(04: 24) *Reporter Ruža Jeremić (na licu mesta, ispred Gračanice):* Dugo su danas deljena priznanja majkama iz južne srpske pokrajne, jer je ovo priznanje zaslužio njih čak 224. Inače, u Gračanicu je danas došlo mnogo građana iz cele Srbije. To se videlo prema registarskim oznakama na automobilima. Iz Gračanice, za Dnevnik Javnog servisa Srbije, Ruža Jeremić.

Prilog br. 2 (4:46) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (iz studija; video snimak u pozadini: hapšenje):* Pripadnici kosovske policijske službe uhapsili su u južnom delu Kosovske Mitrovice i na administrativnom prelazu kod Merdara 116 aktivista pokreta «Samoopredeljenje» zbog blokade administrativnog prelaza između Kosova i Srbije. Oni su protestovali zbog dolaska premijera Koštunice. Među uhapšenima je i predsednik Narodnog pokreta Kosova i poslanik kosovske skupštine, Emruš Đemajli (Emrush Xhemajli).

Prilog br. 3 (5:10) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić:* U crkvi sv. Marka u Beogradu služena je liturgija i održan pomen srpskim žrtvama na Kosovu i Metohiji. *(slika sa liturgije)* Na liturgiji su prisustvovale porodice otetih i nestalih na Kosmetu. U udruženju nestalih i kidnapovanih traga se za 650 osoba. Do sada su ponadeni i sahranjeni ostaci 179 ubijenih.

(vesti dana, prva vest):

(37:34) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (iz studija, video-slika Koštunica na Kosovu):* «Hoćemo istorijski pravično rešenje za Kosovo i Metohiju. Kosovo je bilo i zauvek će biti deo Srbije», rekao premijer Koštunica u Gračanici, na proslavi Vidovdana.

8. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2007.

(vesti dana, prva vest):

(00:41) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija, video snimak, najpre Gračanice, a onda policije koja hapsi):* Više od hiljadu Srba na proslavi Vidovdana na Gazimestanu. Jake policijske snage kontrolisale skup i uhapsile dve osobe.

(01:07, *treća vest*): Premijer Koštunica izjavio da je u toku novi, srpsko - američki «Boj na Kosovu». «Mi smo prijatelji Srbije!» odgovara ambasador Majkl Polt (Michael Polt), a iz vlade poručuju da se prijateljima ne otima teritorija.

(01:44) *Spiker Milica Nedić (u studiju, slika iza nje: Gazimestan sa ljudima)* Centralna proslava Vidovdana u Gračanici i na Gazimestanu prošla je mirno uz izuzetno jake mere obezbeđenja. Pripadnici međunarodnih i kosovskih snaga bezbednosti kontrolisali su sve koji su dolazili u skladu sa najavom da neće dozvoliti da prođe iko naoružan ili u uniformi.

Srpska pravoslavna crkva i srpski narod slave Vidovdan, verski praznik i uspomenu na kosovski boj 1389. godine.

Prilog br. 1 (02:10) *Reporter Zoran Babović (slika Gazimestana u daljini i vozilom teretnim KFOR-a u krupnom planu, pa spomenik na Gazimestanu sa zastavama):* Povodom Vidovdana, jednog od najznačajnijih datuma u istoriji srpskog naroda, pred spomenikom na Gazimestanu, poprištu Kosovske bitke, održan je parastos kosovskim junacima i svim stradalim za veru i otadžbinu. Parastos su služili izaslanik Njegove svetosti patrijarha Pavla, mitropolit crnogorsko-prmorski Amfilohije, vladika raško-prizrenske Artemije i episkop lipljanski Teodosije uz sasluženje sveštenstva raško-prizrenske eparhije (*slika sa Gazimestana i sveštenstva koji služe*). Pred oko hiljadu kosovsko-metohijskih Srba, bogoslužnju u slavu Vidovdana i kosmetskih junaka, prisustvovali su i ministri u Vladi Srbije za Kosovo i Metohiju Slobodan Samardžić i ministar vera Radomir Naumov, kao i princ Aleksandar Karađorđević sa suprugom Katarinom. U obraćanju prisutnim, nakon parastosa, mitropolit Amfilohije je izrazio nadu da će 618. godina Vidovdana biti razrešenje kosovskog haosa.

(03:06) *Mitropolit Amfilohije:* Ovde, dakle, na ovom mjestu, sabirali smo se, učili se da budemo istinski i pravi ljudi i pravi narod. Učili se kako treba se žrtvovati za pravdu, za istinu, za dobro, za ljudsko dostojanstvo.

(03:27) *Reporter Zoran Babović (slika naroda sa zastavama, kosovske policije i pretresa autobusa):* Recimo i to da su pripadnici kosovske policije više od sat vremena maltretirali oko trista učesnika vidovdanskog marša, prilikom njihovog dolaska na Gazimestan, zbog nošenja, kako su rekli, majci sa provokativnim natpisima i znamenja Republike Srbije. (*slika: jedan od prisutnih ima majcu sa natpisom «Srbija» i grbom, drugi ima dres srpske reprezentacije*)

(03:41) *Reporter Zoran Babović:* Jeste nešto okrivljeni, šta je problem?

(03:43) *Anonimni 1 (ima majcu sa grbom i natpisom "Srbija"):* Traže majce, a sad ih svako nosi...[nerazumljivo]

(03:50) *Reporter Zoran Babović:* Šta im je sporno?

(03:51) *Anonimni 2: Majca (Ima majcu sa grbom i natpisom «Srbija»)*

(03:52) *Reporter Zoran Babović:* Šta ovde ima sporno?

(03:54) *Anonimni 2: Ne znam ja, stvarno.*

(03:55) *Reporter Zoran Babović:* Znamenje Srbije, jel?

(03:56) *Anonimni 2: Ne znam.*

(03:58) *Reporter Zoran Babović:* A šta su ti rekli?

(04:00) *Anonimni 2*: Da izađemo samo napolje.

(04:02) *Reporter Zoran Babović (policajcu)*: A šta je sporno sa dečkom, da li možemo da znamo?

(04:03) *Policajac*: Van, van (*pokazuje da se odmakne van određene linije*)

(04:07) *Spiker Milica Nedić (u studiju)*: Na Kosovu u Zvečanu je naša kolegnica Snežana Milošević. Snežana, tokom čitavog dana dobijali smo informacije o jakim merama obezbeđenja. Kako je to izgledalo?

Prilog br. 2 (04:17) *Reporter Snežana Milošević (slika obe)*: Da, pripadnici KFOR-a, UMNİK policije, i kosovske policijske službe od ranog jutra kontrolisali su i pretresali one koji su pristizali na svim prilaznim punktovima u blizini Gračanice i Gazimestanu.

(04:33) (*sa slikom sa lica mesta*) Kosovska policijska služba oduzela je sve majce koje su, po njima, navodno, imale oznake rasformirane jedinice za specijalne operacije, takozvane “Garde cara Lazara” (*slika majce “Garde cara Lazara” sa natpisom: “Terorizam je bolset, pozovite doktora JCO” i vuk sa crvenom beretkom na karti Kosova*). Ima i informacija da su dve osobe privedene od kojih je jedna identifikovana kao Dejan Ivković iz Beograda, o čemu, uprkos nastrojanjima, nismo uspeli da dobijemo potvrdu.

(04:53) *Reporter Snežana Milošević*: Ministar za Kosovo i Metohiju, Slobodan Samardžić, protestovao je što svima koji su to hteli, nije omogućeno da dođu na Kosmet. Samardžić se, na kraju svoje posete Kosmetu osvrnuo i na diplomatsku aktivnost Srbije i buduće rešenje statusa Kosmeta, naglasivši da sada situacija mora da se smiri kako bi dve strane našle kompromisno rešenje.

(05:15) *Slobodan Samardžić, ministar za Kosovo i Metohiju: (slika iz Pres centra Gračanica)*: ...jako rizično, to je poznato iz naše novije istorije, pa i iz naše davnije istorije, tako da mislimo da ima osnova, ima prostora da ruska strana ubedi američku da se mora pristupiti na mnogo osetljiviji način toj stvari i da će posle toga biti otvoren jedan proces koji će biti normalan.

(05:47) *Reporter Snežana Milošević*: Na kraju valja istaći da je današnji dan na Kosmetu ipak protekao mirno. U Kosovskoj Mitrovici, svečanom akademijom, obeležen je i dan prištinskog univerziteta (*slika: hor na bini, iznad natpis: Vidovdan dan prištinskog univerziteta*), na kojoj su najboljim studentima dodeljene diplome, a profesorima “Vidovdanaska priznanja”.

(06:03) *Reporter Snežana Milošević*: Vidovdanske svečanosti završene su dodelom nagrada «Majka devet Jugovića», srpskim porodicama sa više dece.

(06:14) *Spiker Milica Nedić (u studiju)*: Premijer Srbije, Vojislav Koštunica, ocenio je da se, pred očima celog sveta, odvija novi, sada srpsko-američki Kosovski boj. Komentarišući njegove reči, američki ambasador u Beogradu, Majkl Polt, poručio je da između Sjedinjenih američkih država i Srbije, iako se ne slažu o pitanju budućeg statusa Kosova i Metohije, nema neprijateljstva.

Prilog br. 3 (06:35) *Reporter Tatjana Ćitić (slika odsečak iz novina, Politika Online: Koštunica: Kosovski boj između sile i prava (<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/t32816.lt.html>) Koštunica i tekst: Sve dok u Ustavu Srbije piše da je Kosovo njena teritorija, Kosovo ne može biti nezavisno. I tu sila ništa ne pomaže, poručuje predsednik Vlade Srbije.)*: U intervjuu Politici, premijer Koštunica objašnjava da je u srpsko-američkom boju, na jednoj strani, autoritet velike svetske sile, a na drugoj Srbija, koja ističe argument prava i da je ključno pitanje da li je u novom boju jača sila ili pravo. Sve dok u Ustavu Srbije piše da je Kosovo njena teritorija, ono ne može biti

nezavisno. I tu sila ništa ne pomaže, poručuje premijer. Reagujući na Koštuničinu izjavu da se u ovom trenutku odvija srpsko-američki kosovski boj, ambasador Majkl Polt poručuje da nema sukoba, nema boja, nema gneva između naše dve zemlje. Postoji neslaganje o nekim pitanjima, ali se zato slažemo oko hiljadu drugih.

(07:11) *Majkl Polt, američki ambasador (slika ambasadora sa konferencije za štampu):* Za svaki boj potrebne su dve strane, a u ovom slučaju postoji samo jedna. Mi smo vaši prijatelji, a ne vaši neprijatelji.

(07:20) *Reporter Tatjana Ćitić:* Na izjavu američkog ambasadora odmah je reagovao savetnik premijera Srbije za medije, Srđan Đurić (*slika iz kabineta Đurića*). On poručuje da se o prijateljskim odnosima Srbije i Sjedinjenih američkih država može govoriti samo ako administracija u Vašingtonu odustane od podrške nezavisnosti Kosova i Metohije, odnosno od svog nacrtu rezolucije u Savetu bezbednosti po kojoj Kosovo dobija nezavisnost. Đurić komentariše da bi ambasador Polt trebalo da zna da se prijateljima ne otima teritorija i da stvaranje nove albanske države na teritoriji Srbije pod pokroviteljstvom Amerike ne može biti zalag prijateljstva.

(vesti dana, prva vest):

(37:56) *Spiker Milica Nedić (iz studija, video snimak, najpre Gračanice, a onda policije koja hapsi):* Više od hiljadu Srba na proslavi Vidovdana na Gazimestanu. Jake policijske snage kontrolisale skup i uhapsile dve osobe.

(38:26, *treća vest*): Premijer Koštunica izjavio da je u toku novi, srpsko-američki «Boj na Kosovu». «Mi smo prijatelji Srbije!» odgovara ambasador Majkl Polt (Michael Polt), a iz Vlade poručuju da se prijateljima ne otima teritorija.

9. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2008.

(vesti dana):

(00:42, *druga vest*): *Spiker Vladimir Jelić*: U Srbiji i rasejanju obeležen Vidovdan. Na Gazimestanu služen pomen kosovskim žrtvama od 1389 do danas.

(00:51, *treća vest*): Srbi s Kosmeta osnovali skupštinu sa sedištem u severnoj Mitrovici.

(01:02, *peta vest*) Pre 60 godina proglašenja rezolucija Informbiroa posle koje su počele najzloglasnije čistke u istoriji Jugoslavije.

(08:33) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić*: (*u studiju*) Danas je Vidovdan, verski praznik koji se posebno obeležava jer su se na taj dan 1389. godine Srbi, u Kosovskom boju, branili od invazije Turaka. I ove godine nekoliko hiljada Srba okupilo se na poprištu bitke, na Gazimestanu, na parastosu poginulim srpskim ratnicima. Prisustvovali su i brojni državni zvaničnici i crkveni velikodostojnici. Čitav događaj obezbeđivale su pojačane snage kosovske policije, UNMIK-a i KFOR-a.

Prilog br. 1 (08:58) *Reporter Milan Mihajlović*: (*slika, spomenik na Gazimestanu sa koga se viori srpska zastava*) Na Gazimestanu gde su se 1389. sukobile srpska i turska vojska i srpski narod osvedočio svoj slobodarski duh, okupilo se oko dve hiljade onih koji Kosmet smatraju srpskom kolevkom, a Vidovdan jednim od najznačajnijih datuma u srpskoj istoriji. Parastos palim srpskim junacima, služili su izaslanik Njegove svetosti patrijarha Pavla, mitropolit crnogorsko-primorski Amfilohije, vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije i vikarni episkop lipjlanski Teodosije.

(09:27) *vladika Artemije* (*slika sa Gazimestana, vladika Artemije*): Zato smo ovde danas sabrani, da tu istinu i tu veru našu posvedočimo i potvrdimo. Neka mi dao bog da kroz sva buduća vremena i sve vekove Kosovo bude ono što je bilo i u prošlosti, a to je srce Srbije i duša našega naroda.

(09:49) *Reporter Milan Mihajlović* (*slika iz Gračanice*): Svete liturgije povodom Vidovdana služene su u svim pravoslavnim hramovima na Kosmetu, a u manastiru Gračanica, njoj je prisustvovalo blizu hiljadu vernika. U oči Vidovdana, u porti ovog manastira, dodelom prestižnih pesničkih priznanja spuštenu je zavesa na najznačajniju kulturnu manifestaciju na Kosovu i Metohiji, «Vidovdansko pesničko pričešće». «Zlatni krst kneza Lazara» uručen je književniku Milovanu Danojliću. Vidovdanskim svečanostima na Kosmetu prisustvovali su ministar za Kosovo i Metohiju, Slobodan Samardžić i ministar vera, Radomir Naumov. Inače, prilaze Gračanici i Gazimestanu obezbeđivale su jake snage KFOR-a, UNMIK i kosovske policije, a svi oni koji su imali majce sa natpisom «Kosovo je Srbija», po nalogu kosovske policijske službe, morali su da ih skinu, kako bi im se dozvolio ulazak na Gazimestan. Drugih incidenata nije bilo (*slika sa Gazimestana, policije, vozila, ljudi, zastava sa gazimestanskog spomenika*).

Prilog br. 2 (10:40) *Reporter Milan Mihajlović*: Na severu Kosmeta, svečanom akademijom, obeležen je 28. jun, dan prištinskog univerziteta sa sedištem u Kosovskoj Mitrovici kojoj su prisustvovali i ministar prosvete, dr Zoran Lončar i mitropolit crnogorsko-primorski Amfilohije. Ova, visoko obrazovna institucija bogatija je za 18 doktora nauka i novu univerzitetsku bitlioteku (*slika sa svečane akademije povodom proslave*).

(11:03) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Parastos stradalima na Kosovu i Metohiji služen je i u beogradskoj crkvi sv. Marka (*slika crkve sv. Marka*). Parastos je organizovalo Udruženje porodica kidnapovanih i nestalih na Kosovu i Metohiji. Molitvu za žrtve svih ratova i stradanja u južnoj srpskoj pokrajini održali su sveštenici crkve sv. Marka.

(11:20) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: A u severnoj Kosovskoj Mitrovici osnovana je Skupština Zajednice opština Kosova i Metohije. Delegati novoizabrane Skupštine, jednoglasno su odbacili nezavisnost i Ustav Kosova.

Prilog br. 3 (11:31) *Reporter Ljiljana Janković (slika sa Skupštine)*: Novoizabrana Skupština Zajednice opština autonomne pokrajine Kosovo i Metohija je multietnička i predstavljaće sve građane koji priznaju Srbiju kao svoju državu, rekao je ministar za Kosmet, Slobodan Samardžić. On je istakao da će ta skupština biti posrednik između lokalnih samouprava i institucija Srbije u Beogradu.

(11:50) *Slobodan Samardžić, ministar za Kosovo i Metohiju*: ...poruka, za Beograd, razume se, a ja dolazim, još uvek iz institucija Vlade Srbije, to je poruka za sve učesnike u međunarodnoj zajednici. Ona mora biti kratka i jasna: Srbija ima svoju pokrajinu, ona ima svoje nadležnosti, ona ima svoje institucije. Sve ostalo je politički život južne Srbije. (*aplauz*).

(12:13) *Reporter Ljiljana Janković*: Skupština će imati 45 delegata iz 26 opština. Dva mesta rezervisana su za Bošnjake i Rome. Za predsednika je izabran član Srpske radikalne stranke i predsednik Skupštine grada Prištine, Radovan Ničić. Od četiri, danas su izabrana dva potpredsednika: Marko Jakšić i Srđan Nikolić.

(12:30) *Marko Jakšić*: Mislim da ova skupština treba da bude najveća brana za stvaranje još jedne albanske države ovde na ovom prostoru. Mislim da ona treba da trasira put državi Srbiji na ovom prostoru ovde i mislim da će u narednom periodu ova skupština biti sve i savez cele Srbije, a čini mi se, i celokupnog srpstva.

Reporter Ljiljana Janković: Sednici nisu prisustvovali predstavnici Demokratske stranke i G17+.

(12:57) *Goran Bogdanović, predsednik PO DS za KiM*: Naš principijelni stav je da čekamo formiranje nove Vlade i da nova Vlada zauzme stav o toj skupštini. Naravno, mi nemamo ništa protiv takve skupštine, ali želimo da nova Vlada zauzme potpuno jasan stav, jer ne želimo na bilo koji način da otežamo dalju borbu za očuvanje Kosova i Metohije budućoj Vladi.

(13:15) *Reporter Ljiljana Janković*: Novoformirana skupština neće imati zakonodavnu izvršnu vlast, ali će predstavljati političku snagu koja će pomagati Srbima na Kosmetu u prevazilaženju nagomilanih problema.

(13:25) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Potparol UNMIK-a, Aleksandar Ivanko izjavio je da Skupština Zajednica opština Kosova i Metohije, koja je konstituisana u severnom delu Kosovske Mitrovice, neće pomoći srpskom narodu na Kosovu. Srbi bi trebalo da se okrenu i saraduju sa kosovskim vlastima i međunarodnim organizacijama koje su prisutne na Kosovu, rekao je Ivanko i ponovio da u UNMIK-u ne smatraju da je formiranje skupštine ozbiljana stvar jer to telo nema operativnu ulogu.

(21:03) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Knjiga nekadašnjeg predsednika Srbije i Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, Slobodana Miloševića, «Prilog istoriji dvadesetog veka» u kojoj su prikazani njegovi odabrani govori iz perioda od 1989. do 2000. godine, promovisana je u Tanjugovom međunarodnom press centru.

Prilog br. 4 (21:21) *Reporter Ivana Miljković (slika sa promocije)*: Pre promocije knjige, prikazan je govor Slobodana Miloševića sa Gazimestana, na Vidovdan 1989. godine, koji su, neki od prisutnih dočekali sa suzama.

Nekadašnji ministar inostranih poslova, Vladislav Jovanović, rekao je da je ta zbirka govora najbolji dokaz da Milošević nije bio onakav kakvim su ga predstavili domaći i strani mediji, već da je bio čovek mira, odan svojoj zemlji i spreman da sva pitanja jugoslovenske krize rešava na demokratski i legalan način. Istoričar Slavenko Terzić naglasio je da će vreme koje dolazi dati objektivnu ocenu o političkom delu Slobodana Miloševića (*slika knjige sa Miloševićem na koricama*).

(21:55) *Istoričar Slavenko Terzić*: Tek će doći vreme kada se budu otvorili strani i domaći arhivi, kada se budu otvorili arhivi stranih i domaćih službi, privatna prepiska, onda će istina izaći na videlo. To će dati, uveren sam, pozitivniju i objektivniju ocenu od ostrašćenih i propagandnih sudova njegovih savremenika, naročito njegovih protivnika.

(22:19) *Reporter Ivana Miljković*: O knjizi su govorili i profesor ustavnog prava Ratko Marković i ekonomista Oskar Kovač. Promociji knjige prisustvovali su i predsednica Skupštine Srbije, Slavica Đukić-Dejanović, funkcioneri SPS-a Milutin Mrkonjić i Aleksandar Antić i druge javne ličnosti.

(22:36) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Na današnji dan, pre 60 godina, u Bukureštu, na kraju zasedanja Informbiroa, objavljena je rezolucija kojom je jugoslovensko partijsko i državno rukovodstvo, predvođeno Josipom Brozom Titom, optuženo za nacionalističku i anti-sovjetsku politiku. Pod Staljinovim pritiskom, istočnoevropske partije optužile su jugoslovenske komuniste za skretanje sa socialističkog kursa i da pripremaju obnovu kapitalizma. Rukovodstvo KPJ odgovorilo je na optužbe, ali raskol između Beograda i Moskve izazvao je surove podele među jugoslovenskim komunistima. Najstrašnija i decenijska tajna bio je Goli otok.

Prilog br. 5 (23:15) *reporter Predrag Šarac*: prilog o Golom otoku (ne toliko relevantno)

(26:20) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Sa blagoslovom svetog sinoda Srpske pravoslavne crkve, muzička proukcija Radio-televizije Srbije i festival duhovne muzike «Horovi među freskama» organizovali su veliki vidovdanski koncert. Za nekoliko minuta počeo koncert hora RTS-a u hramu Svetog Save na Vračaru. A tamo je kolegnica Marina Nikolić. Marina, ako me čuješ, da li je taj koncert osim obeležavanja Vidovdana ima još neki povod?

Prilog br. 5 (26:42) *Reporter Marina Nikolić*: Naravno! Moram prvo da kažem da muzička produkcija Radio-televizije Srbije tradicionalno organizuje vidovdanske koncerte, mada su do sada, uglavnom, na njima učestvovali članovi ansambla, narodnog ansambla naše kuće. Međutim, ovom prilikom, hor Radio-televizije Srbije izvešće srpske i ruske duhovne pesme, muziku, da bi se, da bi ljudi koji dolaze ovde, a videćete verovatno i sliku, ostvarili neke dobrovoljne priloge za dovršetak izgradnje Hrama, koju je, kao što je poznato, otpočeo da se gradi pre dugih sedam, više od sedam decenija. Biće na programu kompozicije Stevana Hristića, Sergeja Rahmanjinova, Dmitrija Bortnjanskog (Bortniansky Dmitri), a dirigovaće jedan od najpoznatijih ruskih horskih dirigenata maestro Tevelin. Inače, kao što čujete, naš hor, koga smo juče snimili na probi sjajno se pripremio za ovaj nastup i publika koja je zaista, već u velikom broju ispunila ovaj ogroman prostor hrama Svetog Save, svakako će učiniti da se približi ovom, kraj izgradnje da se približi, da se to što pre ipak nekako dovede onako u red kako je i zamišljeno. Naravno, proradiće i ona tanana duhovna uzvišena žica koja uvek postoji u našem srpskom genetskom kodu, već vekovima, naročito kada se izvodi muzika koju upravo čujete i vidite u izvođenju našeg hora. Naravno, svi oni koji su na Vračaru, u blizini, još uvek imaju vremena da stignu. Kao što sam rekla, ulaz je slobodan, a oni koji nemaju priliku

da učestvuju u ovom izvanrednom događaju uživo, moćiće da ga prate posredstvom Radio-televizije Srbije u direktnom prenosu koji počinje za nekoliko minuta, dakle tačno u 20 časova, na našem drugom programu. Vlado? (28:41) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Marina, hvala ti na informacijama i na ovom uključenju. Evo, poštovani gledaoci čuli smo kolegicu Marinu Nikolić iz hrama Svetog Save.

(44:19, *druga vest*): *Spiker Vladimir Jelić*: U Srbiji i rasejanju obeležen Vidovdan. Na Gazimestanu služen pomen kosovskim žrtvama od 1389 do danas.

(44:26, *treća vest*): Srbi s Kosmeta osnovali skupštinu sa sedištem u severnoj Mitrovici.

(44:39, *peta vest*) Pre 60 godina proglašena rezolucija Informbiroa posle koje su počele najzloglasnije čistke u istoriji Jugoslavije.

10. RTS, Dnevnik, 28.06.2009.

(vesti dana):

(00:42, prva vest) Spiker Maja Žeželj: Srbija ne odustaje od Kosova i Metohije, poručeno na Vidovdan sa Gazimestana. (slika spomenika na Gazimestanu sa ljudima i zastavama, pa srpska zastava u krupnom planu).

Parastosi kosovskim žrtvama služeni u hramovima širom zemlje. (slika iz Gračanice)

(01:36) Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju): (slika iza nje: slika Kosovskog boja, prema Politici (<http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Kultura/Albanci-prisvojili-i-Milosha-Obilica.lt.html>), freska Obilića iz manastira Hilandar; i na njoj godine 1389 (gornji levi ugao, 1914. donji levi ugao, 1921 gornji desni ugao, 1948. donji desni ugao ; u centru 28.jun))

Srbija obeležava Vidovdan, nacionalni i verski praznik. Većina najznačajnijih događaja u srpskoj istoriji desila se upravo 28.juna. Pored Kosovskog boja, 1389.godine, sarajevski atentat 1914. i versajski mirovni sporazum pet godina kasnije. 28.juna 1921. godine donet je Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, a na današnji dan 1948. godine, na sastanku u Bukureštu, Komunistička partija Jugsoslavije isključena je iz Informbiroa. Na današnji dan sećamo se stradanja srpske vojske koja je pre 620 godina na Kosovu branila svoje zemlje i hrišćansku Evropu od otomanske imperije.

Liturgije su služene širom zemlje.

U manastiru Gračanici (slika iz Gračanice) služili su izaslanik patrijarha Pavla, mitropolit crnogorsko-primorski Amfilohije i episkopi Artemije, Filaret i Teodosije, a u crkvi svetog kneza Lazara na Zvezdari, vikarni episkop, patrijara Pavla, Atanasije hvostanski. Parastos za sve postradale na Kosovu i Metohiji od Kosovskog boja do danas, služen je i u beogradskoj crkvi svetog Marka (snimak iz crkve sv. Marka).

(02:48) Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju): (slika, Gazimestan, spomenik, nova zastava freska sa likom Larzara i natpis: "Volimo Srbiju" (na ćirilici)): Više hiljada Srba prisustvovalo je pomenu na Gazimestanu. Srbija će se boriti za očuvanje Kosova i Metohije svim diplomatskim i pravnim sredstvima. Ta borba je teška, ali od nje se ne odustaje, jer je to jedini način da se reše problemi i nađe kompromis. To je zajednička poruka građana, crkvenih velikodostojnika i državnih zvaničnika.

Prilog br. 1 (03:07) Reporter Ljiljana Janković: (slika Gazimestan, ogroman poster (zastava), freska Kneza Lazara, ljudi): Ovogodišnji Vidovdan okupio je na Gazimestanu najveći broj ljudi od dolaska međunarodne misije na Kosovo i Metohiju. Molitvenom sećanju na cara Lazara, kosovske vitezove i slavne pretke, prisustvovalo je više hiljada Srba s Kosmeta, iz centralne Srbije, Republike Srpske, Crne Gore i dijaspora.

(03:26) Anonimni 1 (iz Republike Srpske): Pa Vidovdan je za nas Srbe iz Republike Srpske svetinja. I zato smo došli našim prijateljima iz Kosovske Mitrovice još u petak. Juče smo obišli Pečku patrijaršiju, Visoke Dečane, danas smo ovdje na Gazimestanu da poručimo svima i da se svi Srbi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, u celom svijetu založe da ovo ostane srpsko.

(03:47) Anonimni 2 (iz Nemačke): I Kosovo je srpsko i ne može biti nikada drugačije.

(03:50) Anonimni 3 (iz Australije): Uvek je lepo kada ovoliko dođe Srba na jedno mesto, na sveto mesto, ovako.

(03:55) *Anonimni 4 (Crna Gora)*: Doš'o sam danas sa velikom tugom. Al' ipak, kad dodjem ovde, ipak me ozari neka radost, valjda zbog trajanja, i valjda što duboko verujem da moj narod treba da traje, treba da stremi budućnosti, ali nikada da ne zaboravi šta je vekovima iza toga bilo.

(04:14) *Rajko Petrov Nogo, pesnik (slučajni prolaznik)*: Ništa još definitivno nije izgubljeno, a neće biti izgubljeno sve dok ne počnemo da se pozdravljamo «Doviđenja, do godine u Prizrenu».

(04:27) *Reporter Ljiljana Janković*: Parastos kosovskim junacima služili su najviši velikodostojnici Srpske pravoslavne crkve (*slika sa Gazimestana sa parastosa*).

(04:34) *Vladika raško-prizrenski Artemije*: Kosovo je bilo, jeste i biće, srce Srbije, (*masa: Tako je!*) kao što je bilo i pre šest stotina i dvadeset godina.

(04:48) *Reporter Ljiljana Janković (slika: ministri i državni predstavnici do spomenika na Gazimestanu, u pozadini crkveni barjak (ne vidi se svetac na barjaku))* Skupu su prisustvovali republički ministri: kulture, Nebojša Bradić, vera, Bogoljub Šijaković i za Kosovo i Metohiju, Goran Bogdanović, kao i princ Karađorđević sa suprugom. (*slika spomenika sa ogromnom zastavom sa četiri «S» i dva vojika u uglu snimka*) Incidenata nije bilo. O bezbednosti učesnika brinuo je veliki broj pripadnika KPS-a i KFOR-a.

(05:08) *Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju)*: (*slika, Milošević, slika sa govora na Gazimestanu, juoslovenska zastava iza njega*): A pre 20 godina sa Gazimestana, Slobodan Milošević poručio je da smo ponovo u bitkama i pred bitkama, one nisu oružane, mada, kako rekao, ni takve nisu isključene. Taj govor, haško tužilaštvo podnelo je kao dokaz o njegovim ratnim namerama. Milošević, koji je na današnji dan 2001. i izručen Hagu, na suđenju je potvrdio da stoji iza svake izvorene reči na Gazimestanu.

Prilog br. 2 (05:34) *Reporter Dragan Stanojević: (slika Gazimestan 1989)* Na Vidovdan 1989. godine, 5000 autobusa, 50 redovnih i vanrednih vozova i nekoliko desetina hiljada automobila, na jedan skup došao je do tada nezapamćen broj ljudi. Različite su procene koliko ih je bilo. Kreću se od 700 000 do dva miliona. U prvom redu, pored rukovodstva Srbije, sedeli su i predsednik predsedništva SFRJ, Janes Drnovšek, predsednik Savezne Vlade, Ante Marković, predstavnici tadašnjih jugoslovenskih republika, Jugoslovenske narodne armije, patrijarh German, predstavnici diplomatskog kora. Istorijski govor tadašnjeg predsednika Predsedništva Srbije [sic], različito se tumači.

(06:16) *Slobodan Milošević*: Šest vekova kasnije, danas, opet smo u bitkama i pred bitkama. One nisu oružane, mada i takve još nisu isključene. Ali bez obzira kakve da su (*aplauz i ovacije*) one bitke se ne mogu dobiti bez odlučnosti, hrabrosti i požrtvovanosti. Bez tih dobrih osobina koje su onda davno bile prisutne na polju Kosovu, naša glavna bitka danas odnosi se na ostvarenje ekonomskog, političkog, kulturnog i uopšte društvenog prosperiteta (*more ljudi aplaudra*).

(06:58) *Borisav Jović, potpredsednik Predsedništva SFRJ (iz Medija Centra Beograd, ne direktno, snimak)*: Uzima se često neka Miloševićeva rečenica o nekoj ratnoj nameri i tako dalje, koja je izvučena iz konteksta i apsolutno u tom trenutku nije se to imalo u vidu, po mom mišljenju. Čovek je govorio o vekovnoj borbi srpskoga naroda za opstanak, uključujući i oružanu i svaku drugu borbu koja je bila potrebna, koja je bila neophodna da bi se opstalo.

(07:25) *Reporter Dragan Stanojević (slika mase na Gazimestanu 1989)*: Sociolog Milan Nikolić kaže da je Milošević shvatio trenutak, da Jugoslavija neće opstati, da on ne može da zameni Tita i da mi je proslava na Gazimestanu odlična prilika da naglasi svoju ulogu nacionalnog lidera.

(07:37) *Milan Nikolić*: On se tim govorom, na neki način spremao i davao naznake kuda će se ići. I tražio da svi stanu iza njega jer je govorio jako mnogo o jedinstvu. Znači, pripremao se da povede jednu bitku za, kako on pretpostavlja, za srpski nacionalni interes, ali se veoma žestoko prevario u mnogo čemu.

(08:04) *Reporter Dragan Stanojević*: Skoro 13 godina kasnije, govor na Gazimestanu haško tužilaštvo podnosi kao dokazni materijal.

(08:09) *Džefri Najs, haški tužilac (slika, Hag)*: Znači oružana bitka, oružana borba nije bila isključena, čak i u tom momentu.

(08:17) *Slobodan Milošević (slika iz Haga, 14.02.2002)*: Neću da citiram ceo govor, ali sam ga citirao u delovima da se vidi koliko je zlonamerno izvučen citat, jer upravo kažem da nam predstoji glavna bitka za ekonomski, socijalni, kulturni prosperitet i tako dalje. A oni to, videli ste kako su upotrebili. Šta dokazujete citiranjem jedne rečenice iz mog govora na Gazimestanu koji je bio, mogu da Vam kažem, jedan veoma dobar govor, rekao bih odličan govor, i kome zaista nema šta da se zameri? Ni danas ne bih u njemu promenio u njemu ni jednu reč!

(09:00) *Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju) (slika, Boris Tadić)*: Predsednik Srbije Boris Tadić smatra da nije loše podsetiti se kako je učešće u raznim manifestacijama na kojima se obeležavaju važni datumi naše istorije, često bilo kontra-produktivno. U intrevjuu u Novostima, predsednik Tadić naglašava da Srbiji i Srbima «niko ne može oduzeti Vidovdan», ali da nikada više ne treba da ga proslavljamo kao pre 20 godina. Zbog pogrešne i neodgovorne politike usledili su blokada, sankcije, ratovi, pogibije i pljačka građana. Povrh svega, bivamo bombardovani, a upravo Kosovo, kojeg su im bila puna usta, postaje protektorat, podseća predsednik Srbije. *(slika Tadića iz Novosti sa tekstem:*

Niko nam ne može oduzeti Vidovdan

To trenutno nije u planu. Inače, nije loše podsetiti se kako je učešće u raznim manifestacijama na kojima se obeležavaju važni datuminaše istorije često bilo kontraproduktivno. Na proslavi 600.godina Kosovske bitke, 1989, učestvovalo je milion ljudi. Deset godina kasnie bio sam na Gazimestanu samo sa nekoliko vladika i tridesetak Srba. Ovo govorim zato što prilikom obležavanja istorijskih datuma moramo da vodimo računa kakve će biti posledice naših reči i postupaka. To ne važi samo za Vidovdan već i za sve ostale istorijske događaje. Niko Srbiji i Srbima ne može da oduzme Vidovdan.)

(09:38) *Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju) (slika, karta Kosova i Metohije, iznad se vidi natpis Srbija, govori se o razlicitim reakcijama i misljenjima o statusu Kosova, razlicitih stranka i sl.)*

(10:20) *Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju)*: U Srpskom pokretu obnove koji danas slavi slavu, ukazuju na neophodnost nastavljanja borbe za evropske vrednosti i ekonomski oporavak Srbije. Predsednik DSS-a, Vojislav Koštunica, saopštava da je Vidovdan praznik kada srpski narod potvrđuje spremnost i rešenost da odbrani legitimne državne, nacionalne i ekonomske interese. Srbima na Kosovu i Metohiji, na Vidovdan, potred DSS, Srpska napredna stranka, i Srpska radikalna stranka porucuju da ne bi trebalo da učestvuju na novembarskim lokalnim izborima u pokrajni. *(slika, karta Srbije sa Kosovom iza spikera)*

(33:30) *Spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju):* Tradicionalno na Vidovdan oko 1000 motorciklista stiglo je večeras u Kosovsku Mitrovicu, gde će biti održan rok koncert. Karavan je iz Beograda krenuo jutros, a usput su mu se pridružili motorciklisti iz Crne Gore i Bosne i Hercegovine. *(slika motorciklista).*

(vesti dana):

(40:27, *prva vest*) *Spiker Maja Žeželj:* Srbija ne odustaje od Kosova i Metohije, poručeno na Vidovdan sa Gazimestana. *(slika spomenik na Gazimestanu sa gomilom ljudi i zastavama, pa srpska zastava u krupnom planu).* Parastosi kosovskim žrtvama služeni u hramovima širom zemlje. *(slika iz Gračanice)*

11. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2010.

(vesti dana):

(00:55, *treća vest*) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić*: Srpska pravoslavna crkva i srpski narod obeležavaju danas Vidovdan; U Kruševcu u toku vidovdanski miting opozicije.

(04:05) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić*: Na veliki verski i nacionalni praznik, Vidovdan, patrijarh srpski Irinej poručio je u Gračanici da se nada da će za Kosovo i Metohiju biti nađeno rešenje koje će zadovoljiti obe strane: i srpsku i albansku. Patrijarh, koji je na Gazimestanu služio parastos palima u Kosovskom boju poručio je da albanski narod ima neosporno pravo da postoji na Kosovu i Metohiji, ali da to pravo imaju i Srbi, kojima je Kosmet vekovna otadžbina.

Prilog br. 1 (04:30) *Reporter Zoran Babović (slika sa Gazimestana)*: Povodom Vidovdana, jednog og najznačajnijih datuma u istoriji srpskog naroda, pred spomenikom na Gazimestanu, poprištu Kosovske bitke, održan je parastos kosovskim junacima is svim stradalim za veru i otadžbinu. Parastos na Gazimestanu služili su Njegova svetost patrijarh srpski Irinej, administrator raško-prizrenske eparhije, miropolit crnogorsko-primorski Amfilohije i vladike Atanasije i Teodosije, uz sasluženje sveštenstva raško-prizrenske eparhije. Pored više od deset hiljada kosovsko-metohijskih Srba iz centralne Srbije, Republike Srpske, Crne Gore, ali i dijaspore, bogoslužnju u čast i slavu Vidovdana i kosovskih junaka prisustvovali su ministri u Vladi Srbije za Kosovo i Metohiju, Goran Bogdanović, i ministar vera, Bogoljub Šijakovic, kao i ambassador Rusije u Beogradu, Aleksandar Komuzin.

(05:15) *Anonimni 1*: Došli smo da podržimo srpski narod na Kosovo [sic].

(05:17) *Anonimni 2*: Znači da mi i dalje postojimo ovde.

(05:20) *Anonimni 3*: Za mene se ovde prelama naša prošlost, sadašnjost, a najverovatnije i budućnost, ukoliko uspemo da opstanemo i zadržimo se na ovim svetim našim prostorima.

(05:31) *Reporter Zoran Babovic*: Parsatosu na Gazimestanu prethodila je svečana vidovdanska liturgija u manastiru Gračanica, a bogoslužjenja su održana i u ostalim hramovima Srpske pravoslavne crkve na Kosovu i Metohiji.

(05:42) *Irinej*: Ova zemlja pripada nama, kao istorijskom narodu na ovim prostorima, ali pripada i onima koji su s nama, mi to poštujemo, mi se nadamo da će se naći takvo rešenje, da će obe strane biti zadovoljene.

(06:05) *Reporter Zoran Babovic*: Putne pravce ka Gazimestanu i Gračanici obezbeđivali su jake snage KFOR-a EULEX i kosovske policije, a osim manjih provokacija od strane, uglavnom mlađjih Albanaca, nije bilo drugih incidenata.

(06:20) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Lider Srpskog pokreta obnove, Vuk Drašković, poručio je da su evroatlanske integracije jedini put oporavka Srbije i građana. Samo taj put vodi do demokratski uređene Srbije, do ravnomernog razvoja regija i opština, do priliva stranih investicija, novih radnih mesta i dobrih zarada, do ozdravljenja morala i stvarnog razvlašćivanja svih parazitskih centara moći i kriminalnih kartela, izjavio je Drašković na slavi stranke u Novom Sadu (*slika: Drašković i Tadić na bini na slavi SPO-a*). Slavi SPO-a prisustvovao je i predsednik Srbije i lider Demokratske stranke, Boris Tadić, koji je poručio da je Vidovdan slava srpskog identiteta, ali je naglasio da će Srbi, u buduće, morati da nadograđuju svoj integritet, tako što će više da rade i pokažu više discipline i prilježnosti.

(07:02) *Boris Tadić*: Nije vreme za velike govore, već za velika dela, i tu se Vuk Drašković i ja slažemo da treba angažovati sve državne i nacionalne potencijale kako bi se ostvarila ta velika dela, a najveći od njih jeste kako približiti Srbiju i konačno uvrstiti u familiju nacija, država koje jesu u Evropskoj Uniji. To je naše poslanje, to je naša uloga i to je naš politički san i politički cilj.

(07:36) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Sada idemo u Kruševac gde je održana centralna manifestacija povodom obeležavanja Vidovdana, nacionalnog i verskog praznika i 621. godišnjice Kosovskog boja. Tamo je kolegnica Ljiljana Raičević. Ljiljo, kako su Kruševljani obeležili Vidovdan, koji je ujedno i dan grada?

Prilog br. 2 (07:52) *Reporter Ljiljana Raičević*: Pa, u Kruševcu se Vidovdan praznuje tradicioinalno u skladu sa duhovnim i svetovnim običajima. Kao i pre više od šest vekova u dvorskoj crkvi kneza Lazara služena je sveta arhijerejska liturgija. Kraj spomenika kosovskim junacima održan je pomen stradalima. Uz sve državne i vojne počasti, predstavnici Vlade, Vojske Srbije, kao i gosti iz zemlje i inostranstva položili su vence. Vlado?

(08:20) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Ljiljo, u Kruševcu se održava i miting opozicije. Reci nam koje su osnovne poruke?

(08:25) *Reporter Ljiljana Raičević*: Pa kao što je najavljeno i kao što su, između ostalog, i prvi govornici rekli, cilj današnjeg skupa ali i svih drugih aktivnosti opozicije, jeste smena aktuelne vlasti i raspisivanje vanrednih parlamentarnih izbora.

(slika mitinga, reportaža o mitingu: zastave komunističke?, srpske zastave, Obilic? Nikolic na transparentima)

(08:43) *Reporter Ljiljana Raičević*: Prilikom obraćanja okupljenim članovima, simpatizerima i ostalim građanima rečeno je da ovaj miting treba da pokaže snagu srpske opozicije i volju prisutnih da se prevaziđu razlike zarad postavljenog cilja. Aleksandar Vučić, potpredsednik SNS-a, između ostalog je rekao:

(09:00) *Aleksandar Vučić*: Naš je posao, dragi prijatelji, da u narednom periodu pokažemo da smo alternativa režimu. Da pokažemo da možemo ozbiljnije, odgovornije i bolje od njih. Da pokažemo da možemo da se izborimo protiv korupcije i kriminala. Da pokažemo da u Srbiji ne sme da bude selektivne pravde.

(09:28) *Reporter Ljiljana Raičević*: Da kažemo i da miting i (dalje traje?) traje traje [sic]. Ovaj skup počeo je sa 30 minuta zakašnjenja. Do sada su govorili lideri Srpske napredne stranke, zatim Nove Srbije, Pokreta socijalista i Demokratske stranke Srbije. Upravo sada govori Tomislav Nikolić. No, o svom ovom dešavanju u Kruševcu u našim sledećim informativnim emisijama. Vlado?

(09:50) *Spiker Vladimir Jelić (u studiju)*: Upravo tako, Ljiljo, hvala ti na uključenju i hvala na informacijama.

12. RTS Dnevnik, 28.06.2011.

<http://www.rts.rs/page/tv/sr/story/20/RTS+1/916120/Dnevnik.html>

(vesti dana):

(00:00, *peta vest*) *spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju) (slika Gazimestana sa zastavom kneza Lazra preko spomenika; Naslov na ekranu: Nažalost, svakodnevica):* Posle obeležavanja Vidovdana na Gazimestanu, dve osobe povređene i jedna privedena.

(14:00) *spiker Maja Žeželj (u studiju) (slika Gazimestana iza spikera):* Centralne manifestacije povodom 622 godine od Kosovskog boja održane su u Kruševcu, Nišu, Gračanici i Gazimestanu. Na obeležavanju Vidovdana na Kosovu i Metohiji – dva incidenta. Dve osobe lakše su povređene kada su kamenovana dva autobusa kojima su se građani vraćali sa Gazimestana. Kosovska policija privela je muškarce srpske nacionalnosti zbog, kako kažu, vandalskog ponašanja.

Prilog br. 1 (14:00) *Reporter Sanja Ljubisavljević (slika iz Gračanice, sa liturgije):* Jutarnju liturgiju i parastos služio je patrijarh Irinej. Iz Gračanice je poručio da je Kosovo i Metohija blagoslovena zemlja, koja ima mesta za sve ljude dobre volje, ističući da se mora učiniti sve da ono bude i ostane srpsko, kao što je to bilo kroz istoriju.

(15:00) *Irinej:* Kako možemo ostaviti zemlju, osvećenu suzama pokajničkim i molitvama svetih ugodnika božijih počevši od najsvetijih Nemanjića pa sve do dana današnjega. Nikako to ne možemo učiniti! Kako može Srbija bez Kosova ostati i biti Srbija? To je glava...bez te... to je telo bez glave! To je telo bez srca i duše!

(15:00) *Reporter Sanja Ljubisavljević:* Vidovdanskoj liturgiji u manastiru Gračanici prisustvovali su vernici iz svih krajeva Srbije, kao i iz Crne Gore, Republike Srpske i Makedonije.

(15:00) *Anonimni 1:* Identitet našeg naroda je sačuvan tom bitkom. I sav taj mit... kosovska legenda je... znači za naš narod!

(15:00) *Anonimni 2:* Za sve generacije: pamćenje koje treba da imamo i pronosimo sa generacije na generaciju!

(16:00) *Reporter Sanja Ljubisavljević (slika sa Gazimestana):* Obeležavanje praznika završeno je na Gazimestanu, parastosom srpskim junacima palim u Kosovskom boju 1389 godine.

Appendix 3: Table schematic representation of the key elements in the corpus, for the years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010: description and interpretation

Table 7 Year 2002

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2002 (1)	- Reporter			- Liturgy in a church - Icon of Prince Lazar	- The Kosovo myth - <i>Vidovdan</i> - The Serbian Orthodox Church
2002 (2)	- Relics of St. Lazar - The Yugoslav Army	Kruševac, Lazarica		- Religious procession - Reliquary - The Yugoslav Army	- St. Lazar
2002 (3)	- Patriarch Pavle - KFOR	Gračanica/ mostly Gazimestan		- Gazimestan: Prince and Princess Karadorđević - Soldiers, tanks, more than just “regular” visitors	- Protection of Serbs - Not adequate protection of Serbs - The need for the protection of Serbs
2002 (4)	Academic Dragoslav Mihajlović	Gračanica		- Award in front of Gračanica monastery - Dragoslav Mihajlović	- “Golden cross of Saint Lazar” - Victimization of Serbs
2002 (5)	- Slobodan Vuksanović - Vuk Obradović - Vuk Drašković	Belgrade, in front of the Federal Assembly	“Serbian opposition protests on <i>Vidovdan</i> ”	- Reporter; in the background a lot of people in front of the Federal Assembly	- Demonstrations against the government
2002 (6)	- Milorad Vučelić - Aleksandar Vulin - Mirko Marjanović - Bata Živojinović	Belgrade, <i>Republic Square</i>		- Gathered people, mostly elderly - Holding pictures of Mladić, Karadžić, Milošević, <i>SPS</i> flags, Che Guevara	- The elderly - Support for Slobodan Milošević - The police mistreat them

Table 8 Year 2003

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2003	- Patriarch Pavle, - Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević, - Nebojša Čović. - Coalition "Return"	Gazimestan / Gračanica	(1 st news) "Serbian people live in <i>KOSMET</i> , not to grab something that belongs to others or to impose their religion on others, but because they want to defend what they own,' said Patriarch Pavle in Gazimestan."	- Monument at Gazimestan - <i>Kneževa kletva</i> (Prince's Curse) on the monument - The people gathered there	- Serbs as victims in Kosovo - "Serbs were (through the centuries) killed because they were Serbs and Orthodox"

Table 9 Year 2004

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2004	- Patriarch Pavle - Boris Tadić	Belgrade/ Gračanica, Gazimestan	(5 th news) "On <i>Vidovdan</i> , a holiday of the Serbian state and church, Patriarch Pavle served the requiem at Gazimestan and the liturgy in Gračanica monastery."	- Picture of new elected President Tadić as he "kisses the icon" in the church - Patriarch at Gazimestan and in Gračanica	- Tadić: for the first time in this context - Lazar, the example of a freedom fighter

Table 10 Year 2005

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2005 (1)	- Patriarch Pavle - Vuk Drašković - Dragan Kojadinović	Gazimestan/ Gračanica	(1 st news) "Patriarch Pavle served on <i>Vidovdan</i> requiem at Gazimestan. The holiday was marked in the whole country."	- Gazimestan -The Patriarch, Vuk Drašković - The gathered people - KFOR soldiers in-between - Those politicians present "crossing themselves"	- Victimization and sacralization of the Serbs – in connection to glorious ancestors
2005 (2)	- Father Petar Lukić	Belgrade/ <i>Saborna crkva</i>		- In the studio	- Victimization of Serbs - Disappointment
2005 (3)	- SPS - Milorad Vučelić - Slobodan Milošević	Belgrade / Republic Square		- From the studio: voice - Elderly people	- Support for Milošević - The Hague - Fight for justice, freedom, truth
2005 (4)	-Vlastimir Đuza Stojiljković	Kruševac		- From the plays he was acted in - Dialogue with the actor Stojiljković	- Kruševac, the old Serbian capital - "Vidovdan plaque"

Table 11 Year 2007

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2007 (1)	- Amfilohije, - Artemije - Teodosije - Slobodan Samardžić - Radomir Naumov - Aleksandar and Katarina Karadorđević - Members of The Kosovo Police Service	Gazimestan	(1 st news) "More than a thousand Serbs at the <i>Vidovdan celebration</i> at Gazimestan. Strict police force controlled the rally and arrested two people."	- Gazimestan with the KFOR tank close-up - Monument with flags - Priests serve the requiem - Search of the bus with people headed to Gazimestan - T-shirts with the inscription "Serbia" and Serbian coat of arms - Jerseys of the	- Demonization of the Kosovo police - Victimization of Serbs - Moral right on the Serbian side

				Serbian national football team	
2007 (2)	- Members of KFOR, UNMIK police and the Kosovo Police - Slobodan Samardžić	(Kosovo) Zvečan/ Gračanica		- KFOR, UNMIK of Kosovo Police search the buses - The T-shirt of the “Tsar Lazar’s Guard” - Samardžić in the press centre in Gračanica - Anniversary of the University in Pristina	- Victimization of Serbs
2007 (3)	- Vojislav Koštunica - Michael Polt - Srđan Đurić	Belgrade	(3 rd news): “Prime Minister Koštunica declared that a new Battle of Kosovo is happening, ‘We are friends of Serbia,’ answers ambassador Michael Polt, and from the Government they say that one doesn’t steal territory from a friend.”	- Koštunica’s declaration from the newspapers. The headline “A Battle of Kosovo between power and justice.” - Michael Polt from the press-conference - From the cabinet of the Prime Minister’s advisor, Đurić	- Antemurale myth - Truthfulness and the moral of the Serbian side

Table 12 Year 2008

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2008 (1)	- Amfilohije - Artemije - Teodosije	Gazimestan / Gračanica	(2 nd news) "In Serbia and in the diaspora <i>Vidovdan</i> was marked. At Gazimestan a requiem for the Kosovo victims from 1389 to today was served."	- Monument at Gazimestan with the Serbian flag - Bishop Artemije - Gračanica monastery - Police, Gazimestan, flag on the monument	- Jerusalem myth - Victimization - Antiquity myth - Kosovo is Serbia.
2008 (2)	- Zoran Lončar - Amfilohije	Kosovska Mitrovica		- Ceremony dedicated to the marking of the anniversary	- Idea of prosperity
2008 (3)	- Association of Families of Kidnapped and Missing Persons in Kosovo and Metohija	- Church St. Marko (Belgrade)		- Church St. Marko - Requiem	- Victimization - Kosovo is Serbia
2008 (4)	- Slobodan Samardžić - Marko Jakšić - Goran Bogdanović - Alexander Ivanko	North Kosovska Mitrovica	(3 rd news) "Serbs form KOSMET established an Assembly based in north Mitrovica"	- Assembly - Speakers - Goran Bogdanović (DS) in his office	- Victimization - Othering - Revolt - Quasi multi-ethnicity
2008 (5)	- Vladislav Jovanović - Slavenko Terzić - Ratko Marković - Oskar Kovač	Belgrade		- Promotion - Book close-up with Milošević on the front page	- Legitimization and positive representation of Milošević
2008 (6)	- RTS Choir	Belgrade (St. Sava Church)		- Reporter in St. Sava church with the choir sound in the background	- Implied Russian-Serbian orthodox relationship - Sacralization of Serbs

Table 13 Year 2009

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2009 (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Metropolitan Amfilohije - Bishops Artemije, Teodosije, Atanasije hvostanski - Minister of Religions, Bogoljub Šijaković - Minister of culture, Nebojša Bradić - Minister fro KiM, Goran Bogdanović - Prince Karadorđević with wife 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gazimestan/ Gračanica/ all over Serbia/ Church St. Marko 	<p>(1st news) “Serbia doesn’t give up Kosovo and Metohija, is the message from Gazimestan on <i>Vidovdan</i>.”</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gračanica - Studio: the picture behind the host of <i>Dnevnik</i>’s: The Battle of Kosovo and years on it (28.june in the centre): 1389 – upper left, 1914 bottom left, 1921 – upper right, 1948 – bottom right corner. - Gračanica - Church St. Marko - Gazimestan: monument, new poster-flag: Prince Lazar (fresco) over the monument; “We love Serbia” (Cyrillic, beside the monument), requiem - Flag: four “S”, two KFOR soldiers in the corner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Blending of church and state issues - The importance of 28.june -Suffering of Serbian people - Myth of antiquity, antemurale, Jerusalem, exodus of Serbian people - Kosovo is Serbia - Victimization of Serbs (in need of protection)
2009 (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Slobodan Milošević - Borisav Jović - Milan Nikolić - Geoffrey Nice - Boris Tadić 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gazimestan 1989 - Belgrade (Media canter) - The Hague (2002) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Studio, behind the host: Milošević’s picture with the Yugoslav flag behind him - Gazimestan (1989) - Borisav Jović (Media centre) - Office of sociologist Nikolić - The Hague, trial of Milošević (2002) - From the newspapers <i>Novosti</i> (The News): Tadić and the text “Nobody can take <i>Vidovdan</i> away from us” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pro-European Serbia - Aware of the Kosovo myth, its use and effects in the long-run

2009 (3)	- <i>SPO</i> - <i>DSS</i> , Vojislav Koštunica - <i>SNS</i> - <i>SRS</i>	In studio		- Studio, the host and behind: a map of Kosovo (as a part of Serbia)	- Two main currents in Serbian political scene: Pro- European and nationalistic
2009 (4)	- Motorcyclists form all over Serbia, Montenegro and Herzegovina	- Form Belgrade to Kosovska Mitrovica		- Studio - Picture of the motorcyclists	

Table 14 Year 2010

Description					Interpretation
Year	Participants	Place	Semantic Macrostructures	Video shots, motifs	Implicatures/ associations/ impressions
2010 (1)	- Patriarch Irinej - Metropolitan Amfilohije - Bishops Atanasije and Teodosije - Minister of Religions, Bogoljub Šijaković - Minister for KiM, Goran Bogdanović - Russian Ambassador in Serbia, Alexandr Konuzin (Александр Конузин)	Gazimestan/ Gračanica	(3 rd news) “The Serbian Orthodox church and Serbian people mark <i>Vidovdan</i> today...”	- Gazimestan - Anonymous people interviewed	- Antiquity myth - Manipulation of numbers? - Kosovo is Serbia - Othering: provocation from Albanians
2010 (2)	- Vuk Drašković - <i>SPO</i> - Boris Tadić	Novi Sad		- Drašković and Tadić on the stage – <i>slava SPO</i>	- the “EU branch” of Serbian politics
2010 (3)	- Government representatives - Army representatives - Guests from Serbia and abroad	Kruševac		- Dialog between the host from the studio and the reporter	
2010 (4)	- Aleksandar Vučić, <i>SNS</i> - Tomislav Nikolić	Kruševac	(3 rd news) “...In Kruševac, in progress, a Serbian opposition rally.”	- Rally: communist flags, Serbian flags, picture of Obilić, Nikolić	- No direct connection to <i>Vidovdan</i>

Appendix 4 Laws on State and Other Holidays

ZAKON

O DRŽAVNIM I DRUGIM PRAZNICIMA U REPUBLICI SRBIJI

("Sl. glasnik SRS", br. 23/77 i 13/90 i "Sl. glasnik RS", br. 78/91 i 55/96)

Član 1

Državni praznici Republike Srbije su Sedmi jul - dan ustanka u Srbiji 1941. godine i Dvadeset osmi mart - dan Republike Srbije kada je uspostavljen državno-pravni suverenitet.

Sedmi jul - dan ustanka u Srbiji 1941. godine praznuje se na dan 7. jula, a Dvadeset osmi mart - dan Republike Srbije kada je uspostavljen državno-pravni suverenitet praznuje se na dan 28. marta.

Član 2

Na dane državnih praznika iz člana 1 ovog zakona ne rade državni i drugi organi, preduzeća, ustanove i druga pravna lica i radnje.

Državni i drugi organi, preduzeća, ustanove i druga pravna lica i radnje dužni su da obezbede neprekidno vršenje delatnosti odnosno usluga i na dane državnih praznika iz člana 1 ovog zakona ako bi u slučaju prekida vršenja delatnosti odnosno usluga nastale teške posledice za društvenu zajednicu i građane.

Opština određuje organe i organizacije koji su, u smislu stava 2 ovog člana, dužni da obezbede neprekidno vršenje delatnosti odnosno usluga i na dane državnih praznika iz člana 1 ovog zakona.

Preduzeća i ustanove čija priroda delatnosti, odnosno tehnologija procesa rada zahteva neprekidan rad, mogu da rade i na dane državnih praznika iz člana 1 ovog zakona, ukoliko to svojim opštim aktom predvide.

Član 2a

(Brisan)

Član 2b

U školama Republike Srbije praznuje se 27. januar - Dan Svetog Save.

Način obeležavanja ovog praznika uređuje se propisima u oblasti obrazovanja.

Član 3

Stupanjem na snagu ovog zakona prestaje da važi Zakon o ustanovljenju narodnog praznika za proslavu ustanka u Srbiji ("Službeni glasnik NR Srbije" br. 18/45).

Član 4

Ovaj se zakon primenjuje, na osnovu član 300 stav 1 tačka 1 Ustava Socijalističke Republike Srbije, na celoj teritoriji Republike.

Član 5

Ovaj zakon stupa na snagu osmog dana od dana objavljivanja u "Službenom glasniku Republike Srbije".

ZAKON
O DRŽAVNIM PRAZNICIMA SAVEZNE REPUBLIKE
JUGOSLAVIJE

("Sl. list SRJ", br. 29/97 i 63/2002)

Član 1

Praznici Savezne Republike Jugoslavije jesu: Nova godina, Dan Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, Praznik rada i Dan pobeđe.

Član 2

Nova godina praznuje se 1. i 2. januara, Dan Savezne Republike Jugoslavije - 27. aprila, Praznik rada - 1. i 2. maja i Dan pobeđe 9. maja.

Ako jedan od datuma iz stava 1 ovog člana, osim 9. maja, padne u nedelju, ne radi se prvog narednog radnog dana.

Član 3

U dane praznika Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, osim Dana pobeđe, ne rade državni organi, preduzeća i drugi oblici organizovanja za obavljanje delatnosti ili usluga.

Državni organi, preduzeća i drugi oblici organizovanja za obavljanje delatnosti ili usluga dužni su da, u skladu sa zakonom i propisima donesenim na osnovu zakona, obezbede neprekidno obavljanje delatnosti, odnosno usluga i u dane praznika Savezne Republike Jugoslavije ako bi zbog prekida delatnosti, odnosno usluga nastale štetne posledice za građane i državu.

Preduzeća i drugi oblici organizovanja za obavljanje delatnosti, odnosno usluga čija priroda delatnosti, odnosno tehnologija procesa rada zahteva neprekidan rad, mogu da rade i u dane praznika Savezne Republike Jugoslavije.

Član 4

Danom stupanja na snagu ovog zakona prestaje da važi Zakon o praznicima Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije ("Službeni list SFRJ", br. 6/73).

Član 5

Ovaj zakon stupa na snagu osmog dana od dana objavljivanja u "Službenom listu SRJ".

ZAKON

O DRŽAVNIM I DRUGIM PRAZNICIMA U REPUBLICI SRBIJI

("Sl. glasnik RS", br. 43/2001, 101/2007 i 92/2011)

Član 1

Državni praznik Republike Srbije jeste Sretenje - Dan državnosti Srbije, spomen na dan kada je na zboru u Orašcu 1804. godine dignut Prvi srpski ustanak i dan kada je u Kragujevcu 1835. godine izdan i zakletvom potvrđen prvi Ustav Knjaževstva Srbije.

Sretenje - Dan državnosti Srbije praznuje se 15. i 16. februara.

Član 1a

Državni praznici Republike Srbije jesu i Nova godina, Praznik rada, Dan pobjede i Dan primirja u Prvom svetskom ratu.

Nova godina praznuje se 1. i 2. januara, Praznik rada - 1. i 2. maja, Dan pobjede 9. maja, a Dan primirja u Prvom svetskom ratu 11. novembra.

Član 2

U Republici Srbiji praznuju se verski praznici:

- 1) prvi dan Božića (7. januar);
- 2) Vaskršnji praznici počev od Velikog petka zaključno sa drugim danom Vaskrsa.

Član 3

U dane državnih i verskih praznika koji se praznuju u Republici Srbiji ne rade državni i drugi organi, privredna društva i drugi oblici organizovanja za obavljanje delatnosti ili usluga, osim na Dan pobjede koji se praznuje radno.

Državni i drugi organi, privredna društva i drugi oblici organizovanja za obavljanje delatnosti ili usluga dužni su da, u skladu sa zakonom i propisima donesenim na osnovu zakona, obezbede neprekidno obavljanje delatnosti, odnosno usluga i u dane državnih i verskih praznika koji se praznuju u Republici Srbiji ako bi zbog prekida obavljanja delatnosti, odnosno usluga nastale štetne posledice za građane i državu.

Privredna društva i drugi oblici organizovanja za obavljanje delatnosti ili usluga čija priroda delatnosti, odnosno tehnologija procesa rada zahteva neprekidan rad, mogu da rade i u dane državnih i verskih praznika koji se praznuju u Republici Srbiji.

Član 3a

Ako jedan od datuma kada se praznuju državni praznici Republike Srbije padne u nedelju, ne radi se prvog narednog radnog dana.

Član 4

Zaposleni imaju pravo da ne rade u dane sledećih verskih praznika, i to:

- 1) pravoslavci - na prvi dan krsne slave;
- 2) katolici i pripadnici drugih hrišćanskih verskih zajednica - na prvi dan Božića i u dane Uskršnjih praznika počev od Velikog petka zaključno sa drugim danom Uskrsa, prema njihovom kalendaru;
- 3) pripadnici islamske zajednice - na prvi dan Ramazanskog bajrama i prvi dan Kurbanškog bajrama;
- 4) pripadnici jevrejske zajednice - na prvi dan Jom Kipura.

Član 5

U Republici Srbiji se praznuje i obeležava radno Sveti Sava - Dan duhovnosti, Vidovdan - spomen na Kosovsku bitku, Dan sećanja na žrtve holokausta, genocida i drugih žrtava fašizma u Drugom svetskom ratu i Dan sećanja na srpske žrtve u Drugom svetskom ratu - spomen na 21. oktobar 1941. godine i krvavu jesen 1941. godine kada su nemačke okupacione snage izvršile masovni ratni zločin nad civilima u Kragujevcu i širom Srbije.

Sveti Sava praznuje se 27. januara, Dan sećanja na žrtve holokausta, genocida i drugih žrtava fašizma u Drugom svetskom ratu - 22. aprila, Vidovdan 28. juna, Dan sećanja na srpske žrtve u Drugom svetskom ratu - 21. oktobra.

Član 6

Danom stupanja na snagu ovog zakona prestaju da važe:

- 1) Zakon o državnim i drugim praznicima u Republici Srbiji ("Službeni glasnik SRS", br. 23/77 i 13/90 i "Službeni glasnik RS", br. 78/91 i 55/96),
- 2) član 60. Zakona o radnim odnosima ("Službeni glasnik RS", br. 55/96 i 28/2001).

Član 7

Ovaj zakon stupa na snagu osmog dana od dana objavljivanja u "Službenom glasniku Republike Srbije".

Samostalni članovi Zakona o izmenama i dopunama Zakona o državnim i drugim praznicima u Republici Srbiji

(*"Sl. glasnik RS", br. 101/2007*)

Član 4

Prestaje da važi Zakon o državnim praznicima Savezne Republike Jugoslavije ("Službeni list SRJ", br. 29/97 i 63/02).

Član 5

Ovaj zakon stupa na snagu osmog dana od dana objavljivanja u "Službenom glasniku Republike Srbije".

Appendix 5 The epic poem Propast carstva srpskog (The Downfall of the Serbian Empire) in Serbian

1. Propast carstva srpskog (The Downfall of the Serbian Empire)

*Poletio soko tica siva
Od Svetinje od Jerusalima,
I on nosi ticu lastavicu.
To ne bio soko tica siva,
Veće bio svetitelj Ilija;
On ne nosi tice lastavice,
Veće knjigu od Bogorodice,
Odnese je caru na Kosovo,
Spušta knjigu caru na koleno,
Sama knjiga caru besedila:*

*Care Lazo, čestito koleno!
Kome ćeš se privoleti carstvu?
Ili voliš carstvu nebeskome,
Ili voliš carstvu zemaljskome?
Ako voliš carstvu zemaljskome,
Sedlaj konje, priteži kolane,
Vitezovi sablje pripasujte,
Pa u Turke juriš učinite,
Sva će Turska izginuti vojska;
Ako l' voliš carstvu nebeskome,
A ti sakroj na Kosovu crkvu,
Ne vodi joj temelj od mermera,
Već od čiste svile i skerleta,
Pa pričesti i naredi vojsku;
Sva će tvoja izginuti vojska,
Ti ćeš, kneže, šnjome poginuti.
A kad care saslušao reči,
Misli care misli svakojake:
Mili Bože, što ću i kako ću?
Kome ću se privoleti carstvu?
Da ili ću carstvu nebeskome?
Da ili ću carstvu zemaljskome?
Ako ću se privoleti carstvu,*

*Privoleti carstvu zemaljskome,
Zemaljsko je za maleno carstvo,
A nebesko u vek i do veka.
Car volede carstvu nebeskome,
A nego li carstvu zemaljskome,
Pa sakroji na Kosovu crkvu,
Ne vodi joj temelj od mermera,
Već od čiste svile i skerleta,
Pa doziva Srpskog patrijara
I dvanaest veliki vladika,
Te pričesti i naredi vojsku.
Istom kneže naredio vojsku,
Na Kosovo udariše Turci.
Mače vojsku Bogdan Juže stari
S devet sina devet Jugovića,
Kako devet sivi sokolova,
U svakog je devet iljad' vojske,
A u Juga dvanaest iljada,
Pa se biše i sekoše s Turci:
Sedam paša biše i ubiše,
Kad osmoga biti započеше,
Al' pogibe Bogdan Juže stari,
I izgibe devet Jugovića,
Kako devet sivi sokolova,
I njiova sva izgibe vojska.
Makoš' vojsku tri Mrnjavčevića:
Ban Uglješa i vojvoda Gojko
I sa njima Vukašine kralje,
U svakoga triest iljad' vojske,
Pa se biše i sekoše s Turci:
Osam paša biše i ubiše,
Devetoga biti započеше,
Pogiboše dva Mrnjavčevića,
Ban Uglješa i vojvoda Gojko,
Vukašin je grdni rana dop'o,
Njega Turci s konjma pregaziše;
I njiova sva izgibe vojska.
Mače vojsku Erceže Stepane,
U Ercega mloga silna vojska,
Mloga vojska, šezdeset iljada,*

*Te se biše i sekoše s Turci:
Devet paša biše i ubiše,
Desetoga biti započеше,
Al' pogibe Erceže Stepane,
I njegova sva izgibe vojska.
Mače vojsku Srpski knez Lazare,
U Laze je silni Srbalj bio,
Sedamdeset i sedam iljada,
Pa razgone po Kosovu Turke,
Ne dadu se ni gledati Turkom,
Da kamo li bojak biti s Turci;
Tad' bi Laza nadvladao Turke,
Bog ubio Vuka Brankovića!
On izdade tasta na Kosovu;
Tada Lazu nadvladaše Turci,
I pogibe Srpski knez Lazare,
I njegova sva izgibe vojska,
Sedamdeset i sedam iljada;
Sve je sveto i čestito bilo
I milome Bogu pristupačno.*