Engaging with the Divine

A Cognitive Analysis of an Early Christian Apotropaic Papyrus

Nils Hallvard Korsvoll

Master’s Thesis
The Religious Roots of Europe
Faculty of Theology

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
August 2011
Engaging with the Divine
A Cognitive Analysis of an Early Christian Papyrus

Supervisor: Hugo Lundhaug

The Religious Roots of Europe
Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo
© Nils Hallvard Korsvoll

2011


Nils Hallvard Korsvoll

http://www.duo.uio.no/

Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

IV
Preface

This thesis completes two years in the new master’s programme The Religious Roots of Europe (RRE), launched by the Faculty of Theology here in Oslo together with its corresponding faculties in Aarhus, Bergen, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Lund. Being part of this programme’s first graduating class has been enlightening, challenging, encouraging, but most of all a privilege. I hope my work here meets with programme’s aim to combine multidisciplinary approaches with rigorous historical study.

A key help and guide this past year has been my supervisor Hugo Lundhaug. His expertise in cognitive theory and Egypt in Late Antiquity, his insightful comments and suggestions and his availability throughout the process have all been essential to driving this project forward.

I then want to thank my colleagues and friends Anna-Liisa Tolonen and Mattias Brand for reading through my work and providing helpful feedback.

Also, there is Kristine, Birte, Torkil and Marianne, who, through coffee, conversation and company, made the process of writing this thesis infinitively more enjoyable.

Finally, a big thanks to the whole of RRE for two amazing years. Our coordinator here in Oslo, Stig Frøyshov, the professors and instructors that have followed us through the programme and especially my wonderful, inspiring and simply lovely fellow students.
List of Content

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

2 P.Oslo. I V: The Papyrus and Its Contents ........................................................................... 3
   2.1 The Text ................................................................................................................................. 3
   2.1.1 ‘ΩΜΓ’ ................................................................................................................................. 6
   2.1.2 ‘Ωρ Ωρ φωρ φωρ’ ................................................................................................................ 7
   2.1.3 ‘Ιαώ, Σαβαώθ, Αδωναί, Έλωε’ ............................................................................................ 7
   2.1.4 ‘Σαλαμάν Ταρχ[ε]’ .............................................................................................................. 8
   2.1.5 ‘δένυσε, Σκορπίε Άρτεμίσιε’ ............................................................................................... 9
   2.1.6 ‘τιε’ .................................................................................................................................... 10
   2.1.7 ‘διαφύλαξαν / ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ / βασικοζύνης’ ............................................................... 10
   2.1.8 ‘δήγματος σκορπίου καὶ ὁφεως διὰ τὸ ὅνομα τοῦ ὑψίστου θεοῦ’ .................................... 11
   2.1.9 ‘ναίας μελι ζ’ όρουρο αααααα βανχωωχ μαριι ιι λ λαγ καρη’ ......................................... 12
   2.1.10 ‘Φύλαξαν, κύριε, αε τοῦ Δαιδ κατὰ σάρκα…’ ............................................................... 13
   2.1.11 ‘α†ω Ἄ†Ω ΙΧΘΥΣ’ .............................................................................................................. 15
   2.2 Background and Context ........................................................................................................ 16
      2.2.1 Voces Magicae .................................................................................................................... 16
      2.2.2 Divine Names .................................................................................................................... 17
      2.2.3 Vowel-strings ................................................................................................................... 19
      2.2.4 Liturgical Influence .......................................................................................................... 19
      2.2.5 The Wider Doctrinal Context .......................................................................................... 20
      2.2.6 Summarising Remarks: Christian, Non-Christian or Both? ............................................ 22

3 Magic: Definition, Debate and Discourse ..................................................................................... 25
   3.1 Substantive Definitions .......................................................................................................... 25
   3.2 Magic as Discourse .............................................................................................................. 27
   3.3 Magic as Ritual .................................................................................................................... 28

4 Methodology: Exploring Human Cognition .................................................................................. 31
   4.1.1 Some Basic Premises ......................................................................................................... 32
   4.2 Approach .............................................................................................................................. 35
      4.2.1 Lawson and McCauley and Structural Linguistics ............................................................. 37
      4.2.2 Blending Theory and Its Use in Ritual Studies ................................................................. 39

5 Lawson and McCauley’s Theory of Religious Ritual ................................................................. 41
List of Figures

Figure A: Photo of P.Oslo. I V ................................................................. 4
Figure B: Lawson and McCauley’s Basic Model of an Action Representation System .. 42
Figure C: An Example of CPS-agent Implication in Religious Ritual ...................... 44
Figure D: The First ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 1-6 ........................................ 49
Figure E: The Second ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 7-10 ...................................... 53
Figure F: The Eucharistic Elements as a Blend ......................................... 60
Figure G: Ritual as a Blend ..................................................................... 63
Figure H: The Catholic Eucharist as a Ritual Blend ....................................... 65
Figure I: δέννω ζε, Σκορπίε Ἀρτεμίσιε as a Blend ........................................ 68
Figure J: ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you Christ’ as a Blend ................................. 71
Figure K: The Enabling Acts of P.Oslo. I V ............................................... 74
Figure L: P.Oslo. I V as a Blend .................................................................. 75
1 Introduction

“Offenbar liegt hier der Fall vor, dass eine altbewährte heidnische Beschworungsformel durch einen christlichen Zusatz erweitert worden ist” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23). P.Oslo. I V contains ten lines including ‘magical’ invocations, known and unknown voces magicae, Hebrew divine names, a phrase expressing fairly detailed Christian doctrine and a doxology. It has been dated to the fourth- or fifth centuries (please see Appendix 1 for a photograph and transcription). The papyrus is not only remarkable for its “Mischung von Heidnischen und Christlichem” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23), but it is also important as an example of the vibrant and eclectic ritual practices in and around the Mediterranean basin in Late Antiquity (Smith 2003, 30-33). Allowing, then, both a glimpse into the era’s extensive ritual tradition and an impression of how early Christianity interacted with it, I have chosen P.Oslo. I V as a case study for my thesis, where I want to explore various ways and means of engaging with the divine in Late Antiquity. Rituals “are often viewed by the participants as evidence for religious assumptions, notably as the apparent confirmation of ontological assumptions” (Boyer 1994, 186), and I therefore propose to gain better understanding not just of the papyrus itself, but also of the worldview(s) that lay behind it, by analysing P.Oslo. I V.

Eitrem already published P.Oslo. I V in 1921 together with A. Fridrichsen, and the two present an enlightening introduction to the text, the times and the various religious and cultural traditions that are included there. However, while noting the presence of different and unexpected ritual elements, they do not explore the workings of the papyrus beyond classifying it as a continuation of ‘popular paganism’ as ‘popular Christianity’ (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 27). I wish to gain further understanding of how the ritual text works and what worldview(s) would accommodate such a papyrus. Therefore, I propose to employ the recent developments in ritual studies using cognitive theory. Cognitive studies, the investigation of how thoughts are formed, maintained and used, have for the last couple of decades become an important analytical tool in almost all fields within the Humanities. Not surprisingly, an approach that promises insights into the very workings of the human mind has met with an enthusiastic reception by some, if an equally adamant rejection by others. Basically, cognitive ritual theories propose to examine representations of religious phenomena, in their culturally dependent manifestations, according to basic principles of human cognition (Uro 2009, 230). They thus propose to circumvent difficult
phenomenological questions, like defining what ‘culture’ or ‘religion’ is. Rather, “[s]neaking up on symbolic-cultural systems by way of an analysis of their cognitive representations offers the advantage of studying minds rather than the systems themselves. Minds, in comparison to socio-cultural entities, are relatively accessible” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 183). Intrigued by these promises, I propose to take these cognitive scholars at their words and engage their theories in a new exploration of P.Oslo. I V, with a view to access the structural logic of the ritual text and the ‘symbolic-cultural system’ it worked within.

First, however, I will introduce P.Oslo. I V further in chapter 2, building on Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s article, but supplementing this with other research that has been done on this genre of papyri and ritual practice in Late Antiquity since 1921. I will first go through the text in detail, identifying and explaining the various ritual elements, and then proceed to discuss some key elements that arise in the presentation. Then, chapter 3 will present the major academic trends these past hundred years concerning the study of ritual, or ‘magic,’ in Late Antiquity. This will provide further context for P.Oslo. I V, as well as background information for the theoretical apparatus to be introduced in chapter 4. In this chapter, I introduce cognitive theory and its application to religious and ritual studies, as well as give a brief outline of the two theories that I will build my main analysis on. Chapter 5, then, uses Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley’s structural theory from Rethinking Religion (1990), and it opens with a more detailed introduction to the theory before I employ it to analyse P.Oslo. I V. In chapter 6 I will similarly first detail Jesper Sørensen’s exploration of ritual structure through blending theory (2007), before I apply his observations to P.Oslo. I V. Finally, in chapter 7 I summarise my findings and provide some thoughts as to what worldview(s) are reflected in the ritual text, and also give some suggestions as to what person(s) and contexts generated such a papyrus. In view of my analysis, comments on the cognitive theories will also be offered, alongside some notes on potential routes of expanding and improving both cognitive ritual studies and the study of ritual practice in Late Antiquity.
2 P.Oslo. I V: The Papyrus and Its Contents

Eitrem acquired the papyrus for the University of Oslo during one of his travels in Egypt, and it was first published by him in an article in 1921. He bought it from an antiques dealer operating from the Fayyum, but beyond this there is unfortunately little information as to its archaeological context. The papyrus is relatively small, 10cm by 16cm, and bears traces of being folded several times (Wessely 1974, 422). Eitrem praises it as “einen sehr erwünschten Zuwachs zu den christlichen Amuletten und Zauberformeln” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 3). In this first publication of the papyrus Eitrem dates it to the fourth century, based on the style of Uncial writing and the type of signs at the end of the ritual text, citing contemporary research saying the $\Delta\Theta\Omega$ and the $\Iota\Phi\Upsilon\Sigma$ gains common usage in the fourth century (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 3). However, comments on the publication pointed to parallels with later papyri, as well as the chronological uncertainties linked to early Christian symbols, arguing that the papyrus could well be from the fifth or even sixth century (Peterson 1923, 135). The criticism must have been noted by Eitrem, who in his new publication of the papyrus as part of the Papyri Osloenses dates it to the fourth or fifth century (Eitrem and Amundsen 1925, 21), and this dating has since been generally accepted. I will begin my investigation by simply going through the text on the papyrus and pointing out the different elements that are put into play here. Also, even though this papyrus is remarkably well preserved and the writing unusually regular and comprehensible, there are still some words that are difficult to decipher. Their possible readings will be listed here. Then, in order to more fully appreciate the various elements in the text, an exploration of their general tradition and context will follow.

2.1 The Text

After Eitrem, the papyrus has been published several times (Preisendanz 2001, 210-211, Wessely 1974, 422-423, Aland 1976, 428 and Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 49-50). A high-resolution photograph, along with a translation and bibliography, is available at the Oslo Papyrus Electronic System (OPES: http://opes.uio.no), or through the Advanced Papyrological Information System (APIS: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/projects/digital/apis/). I will include the photograph here, but there is also a larger version in Appendix 1.
As one may see here, the text has only minor lacunae and is written in a regular and clear, if not exactly beautiful, hand. Still, for convenience, I will include the transcript from Karl Preisendanz’ *Papyri Graecae Magicae (PGM)*, the second edition, here:

_XMG_

Ωρ Ωρ φωρ φωρ, Ιαώ, Σαβαώθ, Αδωναί, Ἐλωέ, Σαλαμάν Ταρχ[ει]ν
δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε τε’, διαφύλαξεν τὸν οἶκον τοῦτον
μετὰ τὸν ἐνοικοῦντος ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ, ἀπὸ βασκοσύνης
πάσης ἀερίων πνευμάτων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου ὀφθαλ[μο]ῦ
The translation, being the most recent published translation of the text into English, is based on the Preisendanz transcription and is by Marvin Meyer:

1  CH M G.
2  Hor Hor Phor Phor, Yao Sabaoth Adonai, Eloe, Salaman, Tarchei
3  I bind you, artemisian scorpion, 315 times. Preserve this house
4  With its occupants from all evil, from all bewitchment of spirits of the air and human (evil) eye
5  And terrible pain [and] sting of scorpion and snake, through the
6  Name of the highest god, Naias Meli, 7 (times) (?), XUROURO AAAAAAA
7  BAINCHOOCH MARIII III L ENAG KORE. Be on guard, O Lord, son of
8  David according to the flesh, the one born of the holy virgin
9  Mary, O holy one, highest god, from the holy spirit. Glory to you,
10  O heavenly king. Amen. (signs)

(Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 49-50)

The transcript varies slightly from the reading Eitrem presents (1921, 3), which for instance Charles Wessely relies on (1974, 422). I will point out these in the detailed discussion on the text and its elements. For now, even though it may be needless to say, I should mention that the word-separation, punctuation and accents in the transcription are not in the original text on the papyrus, which is written conventionally in scriptio continua. The Π is a tau-rho figure, a so-called staurogram. The only form of reading aid in the original are diaereses, or “¨”, which are used in Ἰαω (l. 2), ὤψιστον (l. 6), βαϊνχοων (l. 7) and νει (l. 7). Although, apparently not
very consistently since for instance νηστε (l. 9) does not have a diaeresis. The translation is quite uncontroversial, as a comparison with the other translations in Appendix 1 will show.

2.1.1 ‘ΧΜΓ’

The three-letter heading of the ritual text is a well-attested formula in early Christianity. Although its use does not seem to become widespread until the fourth century, at least not in Egypt (Choat 2006, 115), from then until the seventh century it occurs in a variety of contexts. ΧΜΓ occurs in letters and public documents, typically at the head like in P.Oslo. I V, in epitaphs, on amphorae and tiles (Llewelyn 1997, 156-157). Jan-Olof Tjäder argues that ΧΜΓ is even older, tying it to the Latin inscriptions VDN that are found in Rome from as early as the third century. He reads these as Virgine Dominus Natus, and since Greek is the original language of the church Tjäder infers that the formula must have come from Greek originally, hence the first use of ΧΜΓ must predate the Latin inscriptions from the third century (1970, 168). Either way, by the time of P.Oslo. I V sources indicate that the formula is well established and used in a variety of contexts. S. R. Llewelyn notes that ΧΜΓ mostly is linked to requests for divine help (1997, 156), ascribing it a primarily apotropaic function (1997, 166). This, a stock apotropaic formula, seems a very likely function, considering both its place in P. Oslo I V, and furthermore its use at the head of letters (Sarischouli 1995, 120) and lists of property (Sarischouli 1995, 155). Tjäder, on the other hand, thinks ΧΜΓ must originally have been a secret ‘catchword’ for Christians, although it may very well have developed into something else, like an apotropaic formula, later (1970, 169).

Although the function of ΧΜΓ is generally agreed upon, its meaning is contested. Most translations consider it an abbreviation of Χριστόν Μαριά γεννη, ‘Mary gives birth to Christ,’ although several other options, like Χριστός Μιχαήλ Γαβριήλ (‘Christ Michael Gabriel’) or χειρός μου γραφή (‘written by my hand’), have been suggested (Tjäder 1970, 148). Eitrem subscribed to the first translation, referring to several sources from the fourth and fifth centuries where the formula has been found spelled out (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 8). While such an appeal to the incarnation of Christ may fit well with an apotropaic function, Malcolm Choat points out that the implied christological stance is akin to an “encoded doctrinal formulation” (2006, 115). This is part of why G. H. R. Horsley argues for a different meaning. He finds it unlikely that such a doctrinal expression should gain a wide recognition in the dogmatically fluid situation of early Christianity (Horsley 1982, 179). As to the sources
where Χριστόν Μαρία γεννᾷ is spelled out, Horsley points out that these documents are relatively late and may be subsequent attempts to expand on a stock formula whose explicit meaning was unknown (1982, 178). Developing Horsley’s argument, Llewelyn remarks on the grammatical awkwardness of the phrase, using present tense and having Christ as the object, not the subject, of the phrase (1997, 158). He, instead, favours a numerical reading of ΧΜΓ (600+40+3=643), which is the same value as the summation of θεός βοηθός, ‘God Helper’, and hence symbolic of this (Llewelyn 1997). On his side, Horsley refuses to argue definitively for any solution, but ponders whether, with its widespread use in documents, the profane χειρός μου γραφή is the original meaning (1982, 180).

2.1.2 ‘Ὡρ Ὡρ φωρ φωρ’

This is a fairly common vox magica, or string of obscure, ritual utterances, and it is found to open many ritual texts (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 8). An identical use is found in P.Oxy. VIII 1152, P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3, ritual texts that also have many other parallels with P.Oslo. I V. For these papyri, which will be frequently referenced throughout this chapter, please see Appendix 2. Eitrem suggests that this is a play on the name of the Egyptian deity Horus (1921, 9), and Meyer supports this understanding of Ὡρ Ὡρ φωρ φωρ, saying they may be “permutations and verbal transformations based upon BOR and PHOR, and PHOR (or P-Hor) (...) taken as the name of the Egyptian god Horus” (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 43). Other scholars maintain that voces magicae like Ὡρ Ὡρ φωρ φωρ are “traditional forms of assonance and alliteration, creative wordplay such as one finds in children’s word-games, and, presumably, actual ecstatic glossolalia” (Frankfurter 1994, 199). A further introduction to voces magicae will come in section 2.2.1.

2.1.3 ‘Ἰαώ, Σαβαώθ, Ἀδωναί, Ἐλωέ’

These are Greek versions names for the Hebrew God. Ἰαώ is the Tetragrammaton, Σαβαώθ means ‘Lord of Hosts’, Ἀδωναί is ‘our Lords’ and Ἐλωέ is the generic word for ‘God’ in Hebrew. In Late Antiquity Judaism was reputed for its ancient wisdom and magical powers, so such strings of Hebrew divine names are common in ritual texts and on amulets from the time, and not only within Jewish or Christian contexts (Wessely 1974, 423). P.Oxy. VIII 1152, P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3 also have strings of Hebrew divine names in their opening line, as can be seen in Appendix 2. It is debated to what an extent the use of
these names in ritual texts represent a genuine Jewish influence, but most scholars consider these Hebrew divine names to have been stock divine powers in ritual texts in Late Antiquity (Swartz 2006, 699). This is indicated not only by their use in polytheistic contexts, but also by how the Hebrew divine names frequently are used as roots to form new *voces magicae* following principles and conventions from Greek ritual jargon (Bohak 2003, 71).

### 2.1.4 ‘Σαλαμάν Ταρχ[ει]’

Here, the reading of the papyrus is perhaps the most uncertain. Reading Σαλαμάν is easy, but then follows what may be an *iota* or a *tau*, then a gap, then a *rho*, with what may be a *diaeresis* over it, then a *chi* and finally an oblique line running down and to the left. This last is typically a sign of abbreviation (Gonis 2009, 172), and it appears from the papyrus that the writer here did indeed run out of space on the first line. The question is what word was abbreviated. The above solution is Preisendanz’ reading, which he gathers from looking at P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3, where the corresponding sections read Σαλαμα Ταρχει, Σαλαμαν Ταρχει and Σαλαμα ρθει, respectively (Preisendanz 2001, 154-155). Bernhard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt also support reading Ταρχει based on the parallels in these three papyri. They also propose that Σαλαμάν Ταρχ[ει] may be one word, not two, but they have no suggestion as to the meaning of such a composite word (Grenfell and Hunt 1924, 274).

In Eitrem’s first publication, he reads the section as Σαλαμαν I ρχ. He is not completely convinced of this, but suggests that the *iota* is short for Jesus, and that the abbreviation sign accompanies a reversed *chi-rho* for Christ (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 4). Evidence from other papyri and amulets show that the reversal or scrambling of names was a fairly common ritual practice, also within Christianity (Bonner 1950, 12). Moreover, Eitrem points to P.Oxy. VIII 1152 where the opening line of divine names is ended by Τεσσο [Χριστί (Preisendanz 2001, 214), which then has the same position in the text as the suggested I ρχ in P.Oslo. I V. Friedrich Preisigke supports drawing this parallel, although he reads the abbreviation as Τ[εσσ][Ο]δ σ[Χρι][ς[τέ], seeing the *rho* as an *upsilon* with an inexperienced abbreviation mark (1974, 69). All the same, Eitrem follows the former reading in his second publication of P.Oslo. I V and transcribes it as Σαλαμαν Ταρχ (Eitrem and Amundsen 1925, 21). Then, there is Wessely who reads the section as Σαλαμαν άρχ, taking άρχ as an abbreviation of άρχηγελε, ‘archangel’, while admitting his suggestion is supposition (1974, 422-423). Finally, in his review, Erik Peterson instead looks to P.Oxy. VII 1060, where ταχ [ταχ,
'quick quick', again a common exhortation to the powers addressed in ritual texts, is a potential parallel to this obscure word(s) (1923, 135).

As to the meaning of the first word, Σαλαμάν or Σαλαμάνς, scholars agree with Eitrem’s understanding that it is a corrupted version, or ‘Nebenform,’ of Σολομών, Solomon, reputed in Late Antiquity for his magical powers (1921, 10). It is the following, abbreviated word that is problematic. Mostly, abbreviation is used for common words, so that they are still intelligible to readers (Gonis 2009, 171). However, I have already found three possible words from the parallel papyri in Appendix 2. Ταξρεή, in its various forms, occurs in the most sources. However, its meaning is not known. Most scholars follow Preisendanz’ description of it as a ‘Zauberwort’ (2001, 210-211), being then one of several common, unidentifiable powers that ritual texts call upon. Appealing Jesus Christ, as suggest by the second reading, is of course always an option in a Christian ritual text. Still, there is always the risk of the Christian content elsewhere in the text causing scholars to see Christian elements where they are not. After all, there is from quite early on a well-established tradition of Christian abbreviations of Jesus Christ, the so-called nomina sacra (Hurtado 2006, 97), and this is not one of them. Moreover, nomina sacra are seldom found in ritual texts, here words like κύριος and θεός are typically spelled out in full (Hurtado 2006, 98). Lastly, reading it as ταχύ ταχύ is of course possible, but this means reading what appears a quite distinct rho as an alpha. Whereas the downward stroke may be the back of an alpha and not the stem of the rho, this is very unlike any of the other alphas on the papyrus.

2.1.5 ‘δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε’

This phrase is also used in P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3. “δέννω, ligo, offert la forme récente du verbe δέω; l’idée est celle-ci: le demon doit etre lié pour qu’on fasse usage dans la magie” (Wessely 1974, 423). This version of δέω, then, signifies that the speaker binds the demon to do his or her bidding, which is common in ritual in Late Antiquity. Many of the ritual texts in the Greek magical papyri are directed at taking control over ‘supernatural assistants,’ who are identified by name in the manner of a deity (Ciraolo 1995, 280). Eitrem has some thoughts on the background for Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε, noting that scorpions are potent figures in ritual and religiosity in Late Antiquity. He also points to the goddess Artemis’ role as protector of wild animals and her potential identification with the dark Hecate (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 12-13), but these links become more speculative. Wessely is content with
explaining the Artemisian demon as a mystical name, in keeping with the era’s ritual tradition (1974, 423).

2.1.6 ‘τιε’

In the first publication Eitrem reads this as ττε and proposes it an abbreviation for ‘Tartarian’, being an epitaph to the Artemisian scorpion (Eitrem and Friderichsen 1921, 4). However, all later publications read the letters as τιε with a line over them. Such a superlinear stroke is typically used in ancient Greek when the letters signify numerals. This is mostly done in documents, but Christians early took to using numerals in literary texts, instead of the traditional convention of spelling out the numbers (Millard 2000, 70). The value of τιε is 315 (300+10+5), and when the parallel between P.Oslo. I V and P.Oxy. XVI 2061 was discovered, where the number is spelled out as τριακόσια δεκάπεντε, Eitrem, Preisendanz and Wessely all read it as the number 315. In their translations, Eitrem (Eitrem and Amundsen 1925, 21) and Preisendanz (2001, 210-211) both understand this to mean that the demon is bound 315 times. Ritual repetition is found not only in P.Oslo. I V, but also, in various forms, in P.Oxy. VII 1060, P.Rain. 3 and P.Oxy. XVI 2061, and ritual theory holds it as a strong sign setting ritual activity aside from regular activity (Smith 1992, 111). Wessely, in his publication, suggests it is a mystical, numerical epitaph of the demon (1974, 423). Finally, a superlinear stroke may also indicate an abbreviation (Gonis 2009, 171), and, perhaps unaware of the parallel in P.Oxy. XVI 2061, both Preisigke (1974, 69) and Ulrich Wilcken (1924, 113) suggest that τιε’ stands for τι(μιωτατε), ‘the most honoured.’ Whether this is meant to refer back to the Artemisian scorpion, or forward as the subject of διαφυλαξον, they do not address.

2.1.7 ‘διαφυλαξον / ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ / βασκοζύνης’

The following lines in the ritual text are quite straightforward, I only have some remarks on the words that are used. Διαφυλαξον, ‘protect’ strengthened with the preposition δια-, is typical in ritual contexts, found both in the Great Magical Papyrus of Paris and on several amulets (Eitrem and Friderichsen 1921, 6), as well as in Psalm 90, which is often cited in ritual texts and amulets (Eitrem and Friderichsen 1921, 25). Also the phrase ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ, ’from all evil,’ is a phrase frequently found in amulets (Bonner 1950, 46). Choat notes that the term Βασκοζύνης, ’witchcraft,’ while popular in non-Christian papyri, was long thought to have
been avoided by Christians due to its pagan associations, but he finds it in several Christian
documents from Late Antiquity (2006, 98-99).

2.1.8 'δήγματος σκορπίου καὶ άφεως διά τò άνομα τού ύψιστου θεοù'

Snakes and scorpions frequently brought up in ritual contexts as symbols of dark forces,
throughout Egypt’s history (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 11). For instance, the demon being
pierced on the generic horse-rider amulets from early Christianity is often snake-like (Bonner
1950, 209). P.Oslo. I V asking for protection against the bites of scorpions and snakes,
δήγματος σκορπίου καὶ άφεως, then, is also very common in the pan-Mediterranean ritual
tradition. διά τò άνομα may refer to reverence for God’s name found in Christian Scripture
(Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 24), or also to the healing and consecrative powers of Christ’s
name in early Christian traditions (Weltin 1960, 83). Or, it may be an expression of the
general ritual emphasis on divine names in Late Antiquity (Graf 1991, 190). While τοù
ύψιστου θεοù in line 6 could refer to the Christian God, it was also much used in non-
Christian monotheistic traditions (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23). Choat finds that by the
fourth century, most references to τοù ύψιστου θεοù are indeed Christian, but cautions that the

It is not obvious from the text to what verb the phrase διά τò άνομα... refers. Meyer and
Wessely translate it as belonging to διαφύλαξεν in line 3, but it may also belong to the earlier
dέννοι or point forward to φύλαξεν in line 7. This is obscured by the unintelligible words or
phrases in lines 6 and 7, typically taken to be different voces magicae for lack of a better
interpretation. If the phrase belongs to διαφύλαξεν, the Artemisian scorpion is expected to
work ‘through the name of the highest god,’ which has implications for who both this
Artemisian scorpion and also the highest god were seen to be. In the second case, the appeal
to the name of the highest god simply strengthens the user(s)’ ritual binding of the Artemisian
scorpion. Finally, in the third case this phrase refers to the following appeal to κύριε for
protection. In this case, it would function as the opening of a second section of the ritual text,
with the unidentified voces magicae in lines 6 and 7 as introductory powerful names like the
Ἰάω Σαβαὼθ...–phrase in line 1. Unfortunately, there are no reading aids in the text to help
decide between the options, and this section is furthermore not paralleled in any of the papyri
Appendix 2 which could have given a clue about how to read it.
As it is difficult to identify separate words in this section, it has been interpreted as another instance of *voces magicae*. Meyer suggests that a reading could be *ναῖας μελὶ*, 'sweet Naiad,' and that the ζ is a numeral, 7 (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 360). As such, it could be a sevenfold appeal to a naiad, as a ritual force. The use of ζ in ritual texts to amplify the elements with the significant number seven is known from other sources (Faraone and Kotansky 1988, 260). I have not found a parallel or precedent for ξυρουρο. It appears to be a ritual play on assonance, as described by Frankfurter (1994, 199), but I cannot suggest any meaning beyond this. Strings of vowels, like αααααα and potentially ηηηηηη in the next line, are also common in ritual texts and amulets (Faraone and Kotansky 1988, 265). Frankfurter argues that the Greek vowels developed a special role in ‘magic’ in Late Antiquity, eventually being powerful in their own right (1994, 200), and Patricia Cox Miller looks to neopythagorean authors with the conclusion that “the vowels of the alphabet designate that point at which the human and divine worlds intersect” (1986, 484). The significance and implications of the ritual use of vowels will be discussed further in section 2.2.3.

*βαϊνχωσωχ* is, finally, a common name in ritual texts. Although used in various ways, it is thought to be “the name of one of the Triple-powered gods: often part of the χρξ-βαξχ formula (…) usually a proper name, either of a god or of the magician himself (…) and commonly explained as Egyptian in origin (‘Souls of darkness’)” (Jackson 1989, 70). Its potency is underlined by the sum of the letters when read as numerals, which is the magically significant 3663 (2+1+10+50+600+800+800+800+600) (Wessely 1974, 423). The name is sometimes linked to *Balsames*, another divine name that often occurs together with Ἰαώ Σαβαώθ (Bousset 1979, 224). The words following *βαϊνχωσωχ* are again difficult to identify. Preisendanz, as seen, here reads μαριι τι λ, while Eitrem originally saw the rho as an iota since the loop of the rho has disappeared. However, the stroke more resembles the stem of a rho then an iota. Then, there is a lacuna, with traces of iotas, and following this what has been read as the second stroke of a lambda. The iotas are understood as another vowel-string (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 14), but the rest is unidentified. Gideon Bohak, in his discussion of *voces magicae*, describes the practice in rituals from Late Antiquity of constructing Hebrew angel names by simply adding –el to the end of any word (2003, 72). This could be the case here, *Mariel*, with a string of iotas included in it. For the remaining
eight letters, the first four are difficult, but the last four are generally read as κόρη, although its context here is unclear. Several goddesses are referred to as κόρη, ‘girl,’ in ritual texts (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15), especially the daughter of Demeter often had this appellation (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 360). However, there is no thematic indication or support for why Persephone should be included in this ritual text.

2.1.10 ‘Φύλαξον, κύριε, οἱ τοῦ Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα…’

The last three lines of P.Oslo. I V are clear and intelligible. Here begins the more explicitly Christian section of the text, and the shift appears so distinct that A. Fridrichsen thinks the last section must be copied from early liturgy (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 28). It is unclear whether φύλαξον here is meant to be transitive, with an implied reference back to the house and all its occupants, or whether it is a more abstract appeal to the Lord. φυλάσσω has a wide range of commonly used nuances and may here have either of the two meanings. Meyer’s translation above reads it more abstractly, ‘be on guard,’ while Wessely translates it as more transitive with “Gardez” (1974, 422-423). Whatever form, the appeal is address to κύριε, whom the subsequent lines identify as Christ. Christ being the οἱ τοῦ Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, ‘son of David according to the flesh,’ is found in Romans 1:3, and the phrase is also found on other amulets (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15). Using fragments from Scripture in amulets was quite common, with certain sections, like Psalm 90 or the Our Father, being especially popular (La’da and Papathomas 2004, 94).

The verb τεχθεῖς, from τίκτοι, means bear, beget, bring forth (Lampe 1961). As a description of Christ’s conception and birth, it appears in Matthew 2:2 in the mouths of the three Magi, hence it does have New Testament precedent, yet it seems the word did not figure as a loaded term in the christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries. According to Lampe’s entry on it, it occurs in a range of Christian works from the fourth century onwards (Lampe 1961). Moving on, Mary’s virginity, τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου Μαρίας, is a common topic in Christianity, early as contemporary, but Fridrichsen points out that addressing Mary as ἁγίας occurs relatively late (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 30). Still, although the title becomes more common in the fifth century (Graef 1964, 105), both Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 295 – 373) and the historian Socrates (b. 380) cite a creed from the ‘Dedication Council’ that includes “τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου” (Kelly 1972, 272).
That Christ was born ἐκ τῆς [ἡγίας] παρθένου Μαρίας (...) ἐξ ἡγίου πνεύματος is included in, if not using the exact same words as in P.Oslo. I V, the expanded version of the Nicene Creed, which was attributed to the Council of Constantinople of 381 and made the common creed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Kelly 1972, 296-297). Even the anti-Chalcedonian communities, which were dominant in Egypt, rallied around this creed. They only objected to the Chalcedonian interpretations of it (Grillmeier 1996, 72). Hence, from the fourth century onwards, it is very likely this phrase had a prominent part in official church liturgy and may therefore reflect influences from this on the text of P.Oslo. I V. Moreover, later texts on church doctrine and heretics refer to this phrase from the Nicene Creed on the incarnation as one of the keys to Orthodoxy (Kelly 1972, 334), indicating that the phrase retained both its doctrinal and its popular relevance in the following centuries, even as the christological debates were calming down.

Still, Christ’s birth ‘from the Virgin Mary and the Holy Spirit’ is referred to in several texts already by Origen (c. 185 – 254), J. N. D. Kelly assuming he is citing an article of faith then in use in Alexandria (1972, 93). Variations on this are very much a part of the debates leading up to the Council of Constantinople in 381 (Kelly 1972, 293-297), although there here are several variations that omit the Holy Spirit. Still, this shows that the content of lines 8-9 in P.Oslo. I V occurs as early as the third century and was common enough to be part of debates on the Christian creed already by the middle of the fourth century. Finally, in line 8, there is ἅγηε, ὑςηζηε ζεέ which need not be a Christian appellation, as seen in section 2.1.8. The phrase appears to be an address back to κύρε in line 7. Fridrichsen ponders whether its insertion here, in line 9, is the writer simply employing a stock, ritual element, or whether it means to emphasise Christ’s divinity in a christological context, but he does not conclude on this (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 30).

Notably, it seems the entire section is addressed to Christ. Eitrem points out that none of the conventional doxological epitaphs for God the Creator are present (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15), and even though appellations like κύρε (l. 7) and οὐράνιε βασιλέε (l. 10) typically brings God the Father into mind, there is evidence for an extensive use of these also in reference to Christ. In Clement of Alexandria’s (c. 150 – c. 215) The Instructor there is a hymn to Christ where he is addressed as βασιλεύς (Hurtado 2003, 610), and Wessely notes instances in papyri containing fragments of liturgies or prayers where Christ is called both
κύριε and βασιλέως (1974, 424-450). In one of the creeds that came out of the ‘Dedication Council’ at Ephesus in 341 Christ is called “βασιλέα ἐκ βασιλέως” (Kelly 1972, 268-269), so this epitaph must have had a general appeal by the fourth century. Larry W. Hurtado argues that Christ from very early on in Christianity assumed a leading role in devotional practice, that in fact in “some forms of early ‘popular’ Christianity, Jesus almost seems to have eclipsed ‘the Father’” (2003, 3). And, with the strong traditions for healing and miracles linked to Christ in early Christianity (Aune 1980, 1523), a focus on Christ in a ritual text like P. Oslo. I V seems reasonable.

2.1.11 ‘α†σ Α†Ω ΙΧΘΥΣ’

The text closes with an ἀκήλ and various signs, presumably to make the ritual text more efficacious (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 15). In Late Antiquity, symbols took on an important role in rituals, sometimes even being addressed as powerful agents in and of themselves (Frankfurter 1994, 210). The symbols used at the end here are, like the ΧΜΙΓ at the beginning, quite standard. The ΑΩ is from Revelations 1:8, 21:6 and 22:13, referring again to Christ, and the symbol is quickly taken up by the Christian tradition, for instance by Clement of Alexandria (Forstner 1977, 34). In the excavations of the Roman catacombs, ΑΩ has been found in contexts as early as the second- or third century. Initially as a symbol on its own, but by the fourth century in combination with other Christian symbols (Forstner 1977, 35), such as the cross with which it is found here.

The staurogram, †, the ligature of TP, is first found in manuscripts as part of the word STAUROS, ‘cross,’ as an abbreviation of –TAURO-. Hurtado argues that this ligature with time also came to be appreciated as a visual reminder of the crucified Christ, with the tau as cross and the loop of the rho as a human head (2006, 147). The staurogram as an independent symbol occurs first in the fourth century, when it is found both in manuscripts and on amulets, which is also the century when the cross is taken up as an important Christian topic both in art and literature (Dinkler-von Schubert 1995, 35-37). Precedence for seeing the cross as a Christian symbol referring to Christ is found in the Pauline epistles (Dinkler-von Schubert 1995, 29), and many have noted its, and the staurogram’s in particular, extensive use in ritual contexts (Black 1970, 325). Having a cross between Α and Ω, as seen here in P.Oslo. I V, is also found a variety of ritual contexts (Forstner 1977, 35). Finally, there is the fish, or ΙΧΘΥΣ. This famously stands for ‘Jesus Christ, Son of God, Saviour,’ but it is uncertain whether the
symbol came from the phrase or vice versa (Cross 1966, 506). Both as the shape of a fish and as an abbreviation, the symbol is found in sources dating back to the second century, but it gained more widespread use in the fourth and fifth centuries (Cross 1966, 506). Dorothea Forstner notes that the ΙΧΘΥΣ is found in a range of contexts, on tombstones, gems and amulets and at doors, and she argues that this, combined with a number of instances where letters are missing or shuffled, shows that it was significant as a symbol in itself and not necessarily by the meaning of the phrase it stands for (1977, 43). Common to all these symbols at the end of P.Oslo. I V, then, is that they all refer to Christ and that they have been used in ritual contexts from quite early on.

2.2 Background and Context

Until now, I have gone through the text of P.Oslo. I V word by word, element by element, to provide some basic information as to what it is, what it means and where it comes from. Several important ritual traditions in Late Antiquity came up in the discussion, and the following section is to further introduce the most important of these. First, more information on voces magicae, on the ritual use of divine names and on the significance and ritual use of vowel-strings will be presented. Then, I will discuss early Christian liturgy, its formats and potential links to the P.Oslo. I V, followed by observations on the doctrinal climate of the times in its potential reflection in P.Oslo. I V.

2.2.1 Voces Magicae

So-called voces magicae have a long history in the rituals of the ancient Mediterranean. Sometimes referred to as Ephesia grammata, “mythic letters allegedly incised on the famous cult statue of Artemis of Ephesus,” they were used in apotropaic rituals and copied onto amulets, most likely without the ancient writers knowing their meaning (Kotansky 1991, 111). “Their use in the Greek magical papyri certainly suggests their use in incantation and chant, but the earliest reference to Ephesia grammata describes them as carried in ‘sewn pouches,’ implying that they held power in written form” (Frankfurter 1994, 195). In his commentary on a later collection of Coptic ritual texts owned by the University of Michigan, Paul Mirecki observes that the recipes were meant to be recited or “copied onto papyrus amulets” (1994, 453). Now, whether spoken or written, the origins and meanings of most voces magicae are clouded in mystery. In the sources themselves, some ritual experts say the
words they are using are Hebrew, Aramaic or Egyptian, but then others “claim that some words are written in ‘baboonish’ or in ‘bird-glyphics’” (Bohak 2003, 78). Some modern scholars will search for the origins of a *vox magica* in ancient Egyptian (Thissen 1991) or Near Eastern languages (Graf 1991, 191), and occasionally they find a likely root, while other scholars suggest “the author simply let his own imagination run riot in an orgy of (...) glossolalia, for the names are impervious to analysis along any lines whatever” (Jackson 1989, 69). Bohak further notes that even if some *voces magicae* may have had an original meaning, this is likely to have been lost as they were misspelled and reinvented as stock ritual elements (2003, 79).

Also the function of *voces magicae* is not quite clear. As some exotic spirits and divinities can be identified in these phrases, the general idea has been that they represent divine powers of some sort, that the ritual text then calls upon (Graf 1991, 192). Roy Kotansky supports this opinion, holding that *voces magicae* must be understood as apotropaic names “in the widest sense of the word” (1991, 116) and Fritz Graf contends that “it forms part of the *invocatio* as another name of the divinity invoked” (1991, 191). An interesting point here is introduced by Graf’s reference to PGM VII.756-94 and PGM VII.668-85, which both end in *voces magicae* followed by an instruction to ‘add the usual’ (1991, 203-205). This instruction could on the one hand mean that *voces magicae* indeed are random inventions the writer came up with on the spot. On the other hand, however, there is a degree of consistency and repetition in *voces magicae* throughout the ritual sources from Late Antiquity, strongly suggesting that the writer will not have been at complete liberty. Several *voces* occur with regularity across centuries, like *Salamaxa* and *Abrasax* (Bonner 1950, 49), and they may be part of a conventional combination with other divine names, for instance how *Abrasax* is often found in connection with *Iaò* (Bonner 1950, 29). Also, they are sometimes part of a longer assonance formula, like *βαϊνγρων* in the *χυξ-βαχρχ* formula (Jackson 1989, 70). It appears more likely, then, that *voces magicae* form a strong tradition within pan-Mediterranean ritual practice, rather than improvised nonsense. Or, at the very least, that these improvisations followed certain traditions and conventions.

### 2.2.2 Divine Names

As the *voces magicae*, there are also other divine names in P.Oslo. I V that appeal to divine powers, such as *Iaò*, *Σαβταοθ*, etc. The plethora of such names are considered to be partially
due to the tradition of God’s name being ineffable and only partially revealed, known both from Mediterranean polytheistic religions, but also from Jewish, Christian and later Muslim tradition (Bovon 2001, 268). Also, the use of Hebrew names for God, as in line 1 here, was a widespread ritual practice to claim ritual power from the ancient and exotic Jewish religion (Bohak 2003, 71). Howard M. Jackson observes the extensive practice of, to create this exotic effect, making common Greek or Latin words appear Semitic by adding endings such as –oth or –el (Jackson 1989, 77). The idea of the powerful name was also seized upon by early Christianity, for instance in the Apocalypse of John where apotropaic and protective uses of God’s name occur (Aune 1980, 1555). Later, church fathers like Origen and Athanasius of Alexandria write about the efficacy of Christ’s name, and the invocation of names, typically the Trinitarian formula, soon became linked to sacraments like baptism and the Eucharist (Weltin 1960, 80-83). Hence, even if the deities called upon in P.Oslo. I V originate and were used outside of Christianity, their use and importance within a ‘popular’ Christian setting is not improbable, since a tradition for powerful divine names also existed within authoritative Christianity.

Of further interest regarding divine names is Graf’s observation that “[i]t is not peculiar to magical prayers that the invocation contains a long list of epicleses and conflates scores of divinities and that the pars epica is rather short” (1991, 190). Also in his search for Jewish influence in ritual text from Late Antiquity, Bohak concludes that although divine names were commonly appropriated, there are almost no instances where passages or elements from Jewish liturgy are adopted (2003, 73). Also many of the examples in Wessely’s survey of Christian amulets refer extensively to Christ, Mary and angels (1974, 399-423), showing that also in several Christian ritual texts there is an emphasis on including powerful agents. These observations are important for my investigation, as they indicate a determining principle in the at first perplexing combination of religio-cultural elements in the many ritual texts from Late Antiquity. They indicate that this genre of ritual primarily takes up and employs Jewish and Christian divine powers out of context, and that this therefore rarely means an inclusion of Jewish or Christian practice or doctrine. Hence, the presence and use of divine names in P.Oslo I V shows that also its user(s) will have ascribed to the common ritual practice of focusing on powerful agents, a pan-Mediterranean tradition that importantly also manifests itself in the works of early Christian writers when they extol the awesome properties of Christ’s name (Weltin 1960, 80-83).
2.2.3 Vowel-strings

It is perhaps difficult to specify the development of the ritual importance of the Greek vowels, typically shown as strings of vowels and often of a significant amount and rendered in a special formation (Faraone and Kotansky, 1988). Patricia Cox Miller has drawn on neopythagorean texts to understand the ritual importance of vowels, and according to her study they were appreciated as imperfect, human attempts at recording or mimicking the divine language of the cosmos or deities (1986, 482). She further remarks that many ancient writers linked the order and sequence of the alphabet with the cosmic order (1986, 495). Frankfurter notes how the ritual use of vowels seems to have increased with the regularisation of the alphabet, which facilitated a fixture of speech that allowed for a heightened vocality in ritual texts, transcending language (1994, 202). Proper rendition was always of prime importance in both Greek and Egyptian ritual traditions, and as vowels allowed the sacred names to be pronounced with increased precision vowels became increasingly important in the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition (Frankfurter 1994, 203). In the Greek magical papyri, vowels then also appear free from words, often in strings, like in P.Oslo. I V, or in special formations (Frankfurter 1994, 199). They here also occur in strings or formations in groups of ritually significant amounts, such as three or seven (Faraone and Kotansky 1988, 262). Not only a part of Orphic ritual practice and Pythagorean philosophy, these ideas are also found in some early Christian writers, like Clement of Alexandria, presenting vowels as divine, cosmological expressions (Frankfurter 1994, 201).

2.2.4 Liturgical Influence

From line 7 onwards, P.Oslo. I V includes references to the New Testament and implies certain doctrinal positions. Fridrichsen suggests that this section must be borrowed from public liturgy, and substantiates his claim by quoting Justin Martyr’s (c. 103 – c. 165) Dialogue, where he describes how christological formulae are used for ‘magical’ purposes (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 28). Remembering how lines 7-10 are addressed to Christ, Fridrichsen continues by arguing that baptismal rites, as early as the second century, included a form of christological doxology (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 28). Presumably he here refers to the Apostolic Tradition, where the eucharistic rite following the baptism has a thanksgiving which partly addresses Christ (Jasper and Cuming 1980, 22). These early doxologies, then, agrees with the emphasis on Christ in P.Oslo. I V. In addition, Gregory Dix
proposes that the original thanksgiving in the *Anaphora of Addai and Mari* was addressed to Christ, and not the Father (2005, 185). Hurtado has already pointed to how Christ was a very strong figure in early worship, and Geoffrey Wainwright supports this in holding that Christ is likely to have been central to the earliest liturgies (1980, 47). According to these observations, then, the focus and topics in the latter section of P.Oslo. I V may very well have come from public liturgy.

There are, however, no direct parallels in the surviving liturgies from Egypt in the fourth and fifth centuries. In what manuscript sources there are, the doxologies are typically addressed either to the Father or to the Trinity (Johnson 1995, 14). When indeed Christ is mentioned, it is in relation to the Father, for instance as ‘the only-begotten’ (Jasper and Cuming 1980, 38-62), and not in and of himself like in P.Oslo. I V. Another possibility is of course that the lines were taken from popular hymns. Hurtado argues that hymnody will have been one of the central aspects of early Christian worship, and one where Christ was especially dominant (2003, 609). But again very little of this material has survived and does not really offer any concrete parallels (Wainwright 1980, 53-54). Still, as I pointed out in section 2.1.10, several literary sources place phrases and terms akin to those in lines 7-10 of P.Oslo. I V as parts of early creeds. Not only may ἐθῆ ἡγίας [ἀγίας] παρθένου Μαρίας (...) ἐξ ἀγίου πνεύματος have been used in an article of faith in Alexandria in the third century (Kelly 1972, 93), the phrase, in various forms, continues to appear in the different creeds circulating in the fourth century, not to mention in the final Nicene Creed that was settled at Chalcedon in 451 (Kelly 1972, 293-297). This, to me, outweighs the absence of any parallel in the few and fragmented liturgical manuscripts from fourth and fifth century Egypt, and leads me to believe that the Christian phrases in P.Oslo. I V may very well derive from public liturgical practices, at least in inspiration and topicality if not *in verbatim*.

### 2.2.5 The Wider Doctrinal Context

I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s fourth or fifth century dating of P.Oslo. I V is primarily based on the script, and how dating papyri from orthography is notoriously vague and disputed (Hurtado 2003, 16). Now, there is some evidence whose contextual relevance to P.Oslo. I V seems beyond dispute: The parallel ritual texts provided in Appendix 2, especially P.Oxy. XVI 2061-3, P.Oxy. VII 1060 and P.Oxy. VIII 1152. Notably, these are all dated later than P.Oslo. I V, most to the sixth century. Would
it then not seem more likely that P.Oslo. I V also comes from the fifth or sixth centuries, as its parallels does? Possibly, but again this is difficult to assert. Importantly, there are no more specific details on the dating of these parallels in Appendix 2 than there is on the dating of P.Oslo. I V. This indicates that Preisendanz (2001) and Grenfell and Hunt (1910, 1911 and 1924) base their dating on the same uncertain criteria of orthography as Eitrem and Fridrichsen do. Hence, linking P.Oslo. I V to these papyri does not really provide a stronger argument for a date of provenance.

If it is difficult to date P.Oslo. I V from script and parallels, maybe it is possible to contextualise it according to the doctrinal stances its Christian content suggests? By the fourth or fifth centuries Christianity had developed more elaborate doctrines that carried consequences as to the form and expression of one’s faith, and arguments about Christ, first regarding his relation to the Father and later concerning his nature, repeatedly drove the Christian world to traumatic and divisive conflict. Although the theological debates were generally conducted in the upper echelons of society, accounts do suggest that the controversies also found resonance among the common folk (Grillmeier 1996, 37). Susan K. Roll, in her investigation into the origins of the Christmas celebration, proposes that its ascendancy in the fourth century is at least partially linked to the christological developments, being almost an ‘incarnation feast’ in support of the Nicene Creed (1995, 219). Similarly, examining Coptic hymnody from the fifth century, Aloys Grillmeier notes the permeation of anti-Chalcedonian doctrinal formulations in the daily life of the Coptic church (1996, 253).

As the questions of doctrine thus appear to have influenced ritual developments in several other areas of Christian devotion, can traces of them be found also in P.Oslo. I V?

Following κόρινθος in line 7 is ‘son of David according to the flesh,’ from Paul’s letter to the Romans 1:3. While this initially is a reflection of Christianity’s heritage from the Old Testament, this debate was largely settled by the Council of Nicaea in 325 (Kelly 1960, 280). Here, the emphasis is more likely to be on Christ as a son κατὰ σάρκα, and Christ’s incarnation is also the key concern in ὁ τεθήκες ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου Μαρίας, ἀγιε, ὑψιστε θεοῦ, ἐξ ἀγίου πνεύματος. Here, one must also remember the ΧΜΓ at the head of the papyrus, which section 2.1.1 showed is generally believed to mean ‘Mary gives birth to Christ.’ In section 2.1.10 I mentioned how the formula of Christ’s incarnation through the Virgin and the Holy Spirit occurs as early as the third century, but the topic and phrase gained much wider
currency with the christological controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries. Christ’s incarnation is an important question in Egypt both in the teachings of heretics like Apollinarius in the 370s (Kelly 1960, 291) and church authorities like the patriarch Cyril of Alexandria (c. 376 – 444). He came to establish orthodox doctrine on this question, in his answer to Nestorius’ (c. 386 – c. 451) refusal to call Mary *Theotokos*. Cyril holds that Christ, the Logos, is eternal, and in the incarnation became embodied in one unified nature, and that Mary therefore is *Theotokos* (Kelly 1960, 319-322). By the parallels between Cyril of Alexandria’s contributions to the debate, and their adoption as proper doctrine at the Council of Ephesus in 431 (Graef 1960, 105), it is tempting to place P.Oslo. I V within the context of this debate. Also P.Oslo. I V’s equation of Christ with God the Father, implied by ‘heavenly king’ in line 10, is more appropriate with the consolidation Mary as *Theotokos*.

However, even if Cyril’s christology was accepted at Ephesus, the question remained prominent and disputed, and it took a key role again in the conflicts and controversies preceding and following the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Grillmeier 1996, 72). In a catechism ascribed to Shenoute (348-451/466), which Grillmeier takes as an expression of ‘popular’ Egyptian Christianity at the middle of the fifth century (1996, 180), Shenoute still feels he must defend Mary’s status as holy virgin and *Theotokos* (1996, 194). Also a fraction of a later anaphora, ascribed to Severus of Antioch (465-518), found in the *Great Euchologion* of the White Monastery, includes that Christ assumed flesh “by the Holy Spirit in the holy theotokos Mary” (qtd in Grillmeier 1996, 250). Hence, it appears that this question remained current in Egypt also after the fourth century, and P.Oslo. I V may then just as well have originated from this period of consolidation and spread of Egyptian Christianity. Based on this, and also the later dating, however uncertain, of the parallel papyri in Appendix 2, I believe a later date, sometime in the fifth century, is more likely than Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s original dating to the fourth. Yet, this is still a tentative conclusion and it would be problematic to claim any specific contextual situation based on it.

2.2.6 Summarising Remarks: Christian, Non-Christian or Both?

With this information, should P.Oslo. I V be considered as a two-part text where a Christian section (l. 7-10) is added onto a more generic ritual text (l. 1-7), like Eitrem and Fridrichsen hypothesise (1921, 23)? On the one hand, the first section makes no explicit Christian references, with the notable exception of ΞΜΓ at the head of the papyrus. Instead, it employs
a wide range of ritual elements known from the general, pan-Mediterranean ritual traditions of Late Antiquity, like *voces magicae*, divine names and vowel-strings. Moreover, P.Oxy. XVI 2061-63 are almost exact parallels to P.Oslo. I V, only without the ‘Christian’ section and thereby further suggest that lines 7-10 are an expansion of an established, non-Christian ritual tradition. Yet, at the beginning of P.Oxy. XVI 2063 there are four crosses. Granted, Forstner notes that crosses are used as ritual symbols also in non-Christian contexts (1977, 38), so they need not signify a Christian expression. Still, there is also P.Oxy. VIII 1152, which has a similar, simple ritual form and includes explicit Christian references. Also other ritual texts, like P.Oxy. VI 924 and P.Rain. 3 (please see Appendix 2), have both strong Christian references and an extensive use of non-Christian ritual elements. All in all, then, it seems that a clear distinction according to what is Christian and non-Christian is not possible in this genre of ritual texts.

Of course, P.Oslo. I V may be an example of a firmly established ritual tradition that continued to be in use, both Christian and non-Christian, into the sixth century. For those who found it relevant, Christ and his angels were called upon, while for others powers like *Ἰαώ* and *Βαῖγχοιοιχ* were more relevant. In such a case, the second part can be considered an addition, but then not an unusual or alien addition since such elaborations on ritual appear to have been well established in Late Antiquity. In a fluid ritual tradition, what one may read as *Ταξεη* another may read as *Ἱεζα Χριστε*. In their presentation of early Christian Greek and Coptic papyri, Meyer, Smith and Kelsey hold that “they demonstrate that Christianity can take the form of a folk religion with a syncretistic interest in making use of ritual power for all sorts of practical purposes” (1994, 7). Also Frankfurter, from observations on early Christian Egypt, argues that local or domestic Christianity easily appropriated and developed earlier, non-Christian ritual practices (1998). This being a very likely, but also somewhat perplexing, conclusion, I will use cognitive ritual theories to explore precisely how such a combination of traditions and elements work.

Also, there is another interesting observation to note. Examining the prayers and ritual texts grouped as Christian by Preisendanz, they seem to divide themselves into two ‘genres.’ There is one genre that typically calls upon holy names and uses symbols (for example P.Rain. 3 or P.Oxy. VIII 1152, please see Appendix 2), while the other has more elaborate formulae, often supported by narrative and citations (for example P.Oxy. VIII 1151 or P.719 SIP, please see
Appendix 2). This division into two genres is not so much according to theology or doctrine, but rather according to ritual format. While the first calls on powers, the second seeks to effectuate their request by significant stories parallel to the situation or the desired result, so-called historiolae (Frankfurter 1995). P.Oslo. I V clearly tends towards the former, even if it may also contain inspiration from the latter genre. Perhaps, then, the key here is ritual structure rather than religious belonging? Ritual structure being what Lawson and McCauley, and to great extent also Sørensen, address, also this question will be taken up in my analysis.
3 Magic: Definition, Debate and Discourse

First, however, I will attempt an overview of debates and developments in the study of ‘magic,’ from its beginnings in nineteenth-century anthropology to the more varied approaches that are part of the discussion on Late Antiquity today. Although not exhaustive, the chapter aims to present the major formative contributions to the debate, which are mainly found in anthropology, history and religious studies.

3.1 Substantive Definitions

I will begin with James Frazer, who initiated the modern academic study of ‘magic’ with his *The Golden Bough: A Study on Magic and Religion* in 1890. Here, he defines ‘magic’ in opposition to religion, in that a magician constrains, coerces and forces the divine, while a religious person prays, supplicates and adores the divine (Graf 1991, 188). Frazer further holds that societies progress from primitive magic, through organised religion and ending in a scientific society, presenting a positivist conception of religious development (Betz 1991, 245). He adopted most of his understanding of magic as ‘pre-scientific’ from a contemporary anthropologist, Edward Tylor, who saw ‘magic’ as a flawed understanding of cause and effect, centred on the principle of analogy: “[F]irst, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and second, that things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on each other at a distance” (Tylor, qtd in Collins 2008, 14). Together, Frazer and Tylor represent the first anthropological inquiries into the nature of ‘magic,’ inquiries that have later been discredited by many scholars as expressions of nineteenth-century universalist positivism and racist ideas of evolution (Janowitz 2001, 4).

Indeed, it did not take long before their ideas were modified. First was French philosopher and ethnographer Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who in his *How Natives Think* from 1910 maintains that societies are not irrational: A ‘magical’ explanation of a phenomenon is also causal, and thereby rational, only the explanation has a different footing than scientific knowledge (Collins 2008, 7). This assertion is supported by the famous study of the Azande by Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, first published as *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande* in 1937, who observed that the ‘magic’ of the Azande was culturally specific, and that ‘magical’
explanations worked alongside scientific causal explanations (Collins 2008, 13). Simultaneously with Lévy-Bruhl, another understanding of ‘magic’ developed with Émile Durkheim and further developed by Marcel Mauss, one that accommodated the cultural specificity of ‘magic.’ They, somewhat simplistically put, argue that ‘magic’ should be defined as an activity of an individual to attain individual goals while religion is communal and aims at the collective good (Thomassen 1999, 56), hereby introducing a social criteria for the understanding of ‘magic.’ Referring to Roman sources, Peter Brown and Ramsay MacMullen in the 1970s and 1980s linked these ideas to Antiquity by arguing ‘magic’ was not so much about illicit activities, but rather about social divisions founded on principles of propriety and social order (Phillips 1991, 269-270). Also David E. Aune, in his oft-cited article on early Christian ‘magic,’ defines it as socially deviant religious activity (1980, 1516).

These, and other, contributions did certainly add nuance to the definitions first presented by Frazer and Tylor. Still, they maintain Frazer’s dualist opposition of ‘magic’ to religion/science, the traditional understanding of ‘magic’ that is being increasingly criticised as subjective and prejudiced. In this dualist conception religion/science quickly becomes the category for one’s own belief/culture, while ‘magic’ is the category for everything else. Randall Styers writes that “definitions of magic formulated over the past few centuries contributed to the construction of ideas about modernity by acting as a foil for the conceptualisation of distinctly modern concepts such as science, religion, and rationality” (qtd in Stratton 2007, 4). Yet, the separation of ‘magic’ and religion/science still holds much currency in non-academic understandings of ‘magic,’ and there are also a number of contemporary scholars that wish to hold on to it as an interpretative tool. William J. Goode first launched this idea, suggesting that ‘magic’ and religion be treated as two ends of a continuum (Schäfer 1997, 20), while Jens Braarvig holds that dichotomies are an entrenched element of academic epistemological tools and therefore necessary also in the study of ‘magic’ (1999, 27). Answering the charge of subjectivity, Henk S. Versnel in his seminal article from 1990 asserts that all knowledge contains an etic imposition, and continues that ‘magic’ then is best identified “as it is generally perceived by the ‘common sense’ in our culture (…) instrumentality, manipulativity, mechanicalness, non-personality, coercion, concrete and generally individual goals, and so on (…) when enough of these features are present in a given phenomenon it is magic” (Versnel, qtd in Harari 2005, 111).
Elements from these dualist and positivist concepts and categorisations also form part of the theoretical foundations for many of the cognitive approaches to ritual (Czachesz 2010, 2). For instance, Sørensen derives several of his principles for ritual efficacy from Frazer’s work (2007, 95). Other scholars working on the cognitive science of religion tend to rely heavily ideas on evolution, often taking it as an “analogy for cultural transmission” (Uro 2010, 3). Many, including Sørensen, argue that ‘magic’ must be accepted as a viable academic category, since it “identifies a genuine recurrent pattern of thought and behaviour” (Pyysiäinen 2004, 96). However, most add to this that it does not mean that ‘magic’ is entirely separate from religion, but rather that it is a special aspect of religion (Pyysiäinen 2004, 111). Sørensen even adding that ‘magical agency’ is part of why religious rituals are appreciated as efficacious (2007, 5). Hence, they do not maintain the dualist idea of ‘magic’ versus religion.

### 3.2 Magic as Discourse

In an attempt to then avoid giving a substantive definition of ‘magic,’ which has been the basic aim, but also the basic problem, for the anthropological and sociological studies referred to above, several scholars of Late Antiquity have turned to discourse analysis. Not only is this an emic approach honouring the historian’s call *ad fontes*, many have also recently questioned “the usefulness of applying theories of magic, which were derived from the observation of small-scale tribes, [to ancient magical texts] which were produced in a cosmopolitan urban setting” (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 4). Daniel Ogden (2008), Gideon Bohak (2008), Kimberly Stratton (2007), Matthew Dickie (2001), Ann Jeffers (1996) and Susan R. Garrett (1989) are a few of those who have analysed magic in Late Antiquity as a part of social discourse, holding that its role in discourse is the only aspect of ancient magic accessible to current scholars. While not giving a substantive opinion on what ‘magic’ in Late Antiquity was, discourse analysis offers access at least to what role ‘magic’ played in peoples lives (Ogden 2008, 2). Interestingly, most conclude that ‘magic’ is a means of ‘Othering’ in ancient discourse, much like it has in the modernist theories of ‘magic’ presented in section 3.1.

The studies all agree that throughout the ancient source material ‘magic’ is never used self-referentially, but is always ascribed to another group or person, and often in a highly polemical fashion (Janowitz 2001, 1). In the Greek literature four words are used when referring to a magician; μάγος, γόης, ἐπωδός and φαρμακεύς (Dickie 2001, 13). Unfortunately,
the terms appear to be used interchangeably, thereby making it difficult to draw any conclusions from their etymology and context (Dickie 2001, 15). Still, μάγος, the Greek word for Persian priests, does illustrate the tendency in ancient literature to see ‘magic’ as something foreign. Another prevalent feature in Greco-Roman literature is the female magician, especially the ‘hag-witch’ that has prevailed in popular culture as the stereotype for a witch until today. In Late Antiquity, then women, like foreigners, were marginalized group and a potential ‘Other’ (Ogden 2008, 45).

Placing ‘magic’ at the fringes of society continues even into Christian times, with church fathers such as John Chrysostom warning against old women and Jews who heal (Dickie 2001, 305). Many scholars, then, argue that ‘magic’ is an ancient tool of ‘Othering,’ saying that ‘my miracle is your magic.’ Yuval Harari observes this in all the Mediterranean religious traditions (2005, 105). For instance, in ancient Jewish conceptions of ‘magic’ “it is not the nature of the action itself, but the conformity of the action (or actor) to, or deviation from, the values of Israelite society (...) that determines whether it is characterized as magical” (Ricks 1995, 131). Also in Christianity, “[b]eginning with this account of Simon from the Acts of the Apostles, magic functions (...) as the discourse of alterity par excellence” (Stratton 2007, 107). But, of course, P.Oslo. I V, together with many other Greek papyri, challenges precisely this conception, as it seemingly freely includes deities and elements from a range of religious traditions. Hence, while the literary sources from the time describe a quite polemical discourse concerning ‘magic,’ here I will have to follow other theoretical approaches to further understand the papyrus.

3.3 Magic as Ritual

Another trend in the study of ‘magic’ is to approach and define it as ritual. “For any culture I am familiar with, we can trade places between the corpus of materials conventionally labelled ‘magical’ and corpora designated by other generic terms (e.g., healing, divining, execrative) with no cognitive loss” (Smith 1995, 16). Also Marvin Meyer, Richard Smith and Neal Kelsey maintain that ”the more closely these texts are read, the harder it is to maintain any distinction between piety and sorcery” (1994, 2). As a part of this effort to excise the field of old prejudice and presumptions, Fritz Graf compares prayers in the Greek magical papyri to non-magical prayers and finds nothing principally different (1991, 194). As another example,
there are many who have pointed to “intriguing points of resemblance between the miracle accounts in the canonical Gospels and ancient magical traditions” (Garrett 1989, 19). However, linking ‘magic’ to ritual studies also opens the subject to the extensive theoretical developments within ritual studies these past decades. For instance, there is the functionalist branch that has developed from Durkheim and Mauss’ sociological approach and seeks to interpret ritual through its social function (Uro 2009, 225). The classical themes explored with a functionalist approach are social cohesion and shared experience, but ritual theory has also gone further, for example with Susan Stewart looking at the reasons for and consequences of miniaturisation of ritual (Smith 1995, 27) or Jonathan Z. Smith’s exploration of sacred space in Late Antiquity (1995, 22).

Then, there are symbolist approaches to ritual. Fundamental to these is Bronislaw Malinowski’s study of the Trobriand Islanders from 1915, the first study of ritual and magic based on original fieldwork. Malinowski reads their ritual system as communicative acts: “He thought that it was the product of social institutionalisation of types of spontaneous body and tongue response to strong outbreaks of feeling or desire (...) to externalise the emotions of the one who acts towards the object of his action” (Harari 2005, 101-102). In current scholarship, the idea of ritual as communication has developed along two lines. The one emphasises cultural semiotics and concerns itself with the interpretation of ritual symbols, while the other, building on linguistic theory, searches for the universal ‘grammar’ of ritual (Uro 2009, 228). On the one hand, then, there are scholars who explore ‘magic’ as symbolic acts, like Michael D. Swartz who writes ‘magic’ is “a form of semiotic exchange – that is, a mutual conveyance of codes” (2005, 235) and Naomi Janowitz: “Rituals are highly structured uses of signs that have complex relationships with the contexts of use. That is, they can ‘do things’ to the world around them based on socially conceived models of efficacy” (Janowitz 2002, xviii).

On the other hand, examples of investigations seeking a universal structure in magic include anthropologist Stanley Tambiah, who asserts that “[m]agic does not aim at causal reasoning at all; its key element is a claim to power. (...) On this view magic may appear Other but is in fact familiar, being at bottom persuasive re-definition” (qtd in Gordon 1999, 239), and Marcel Sigrist who places a very instrumental emphasis on his understanding of magic: ”Instead of going out into the world and creating the tool to change things [like the scientist], he [the magician] does the opposite. With the specialized tool, or power he is endowed with, he
reduces and reads the world according to his specific skill, and is therefore also able to obtain results” (Sigrist 2005, 307). Thus, they see ‘magic’ as human behaviour following a universal structure, even though the structure is employed using culturally determined and defined elements. Cognitive studies have a similar approach to religion and ritual, wishing to study how the phenomena are appreciated by the human mind. “[C]ognitive scholars are interested in cross-culturally recurrent patterns in religious thought and practice seeking to explain these regularities in terms of the architecture of the human mind” (Uro 2009, 230). Building models from these recurrent patterns, cognitive theories then offer an interpretative framework for assessing the various cultural phenomena and religious elements that occur in P. Oslo. I V.
4 Methodology: Exploring Human Cognition

Since Thomas E. Lawson and Robert N. McCauley’s *Rethinking Religion* (1990), cognitive theories have been a growing part of the study of religious ritual (Uro 2010, 2). As a part of this flourish, cognitive studies have also been introduced into the study of ‘magic’/ritual, for instance by Illka Pyysiäinen’s *Magic, Miracles and Religion* (2004), Harvey Whitehouse’s *Modes of Religiosity* (2004a) and Jesper Sørensen’s *A Cognitive Theory of Magic* (2007), together with Lawson and McCauley’s own work (1990/2002). Whitehouse and Luther H. Martin in 2004 edited a compilation of essays exploring the impact of cognitive studies on history of religion (Whitehouse and Martin 2004), while a symposium held at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in August-September 2005 addressed various aspects of religious life in Late Antiquity through cognitive theories (Luomanen et al, 2007). Taking part in these larger discussions, Martin (2003/04 and 2007), Kimmo Ketola (2007), István Czachesz (2010) and Risto Uro (2010) examine specifically ‘magical’/ritual practices in Late Antiquity, as I propose to do by analysing P.Oslo. I V. Still, the growing number of cognitive approaches to religious phenomena and ritual is of course not in itself a guarantee for its quality and use.

Another recurrent critique of cognitive approaches is that while they purport to describe physiological processes, most have little evidence from neuroscience or psychological experiments, relying instead on analogies to linguistics and anthropological data (Engberg-Pedersen 2007, 304). The answers to this charge tend to fall into two groups, one pointing to some experiments being done but admitting the need for further research (Whitehouse 2004a, 41), while others emphasise “that models are only heuristic tools that have no ontological reality. They only help find new questions and frameworks which may – or may not – prove to be helpful in understanding” (Luomanen, Pyysiäinen and Uro 2007, 19). Now, there is a growing amount of empirical research, both neurological (Pearson 2002, 87-91 and Czachesz 2007, 77-78) and in the form of psychological experiments (Whitehouse 2004a, 40, Mithen 1996, 14 and Boyer 2001, 87), which works towards confirming different aspects of these cognitive theories. Still, I find the answer of the second group the more appealing, at least until more empirical support can be found for the neurological case. As heuristic models for cognition, cognitive approaches need not claim empirical knowledge about the physiological
conception and functioning of the brain, but use psychological and anthropological data to build interpretative models for how cognition can be seen to work. The theories, then, admit to not providing substantive knowledge, but hold that “[a]cknowledging the universal underlying mechanics of thought may, however, enable us to analyse the intellectual products and patterns of thought of peoples and cultures far removed from our own with an adequate degree of methodological clarity” (Lundhaug 2010, 64).

Such a prospect is appealing, as cultural investigations and assessment of historical material are notoriously difficult because of scholars’ removal in time and space from the subject matter. Cultural-semiotic approaches argue for contextual analysis, but this is difficult when the contextual information from the period is rather fragmented. For instance, when Janowitz examines ‘magic’ in Late Antiquity, she turns to neoplatonic thoughts on theurgy and ritual efficacy to explain the ritual traditions of Late Antiquity (2002). As theurgics are the only surviving developed theory of ritual efficacy from Late Antiquity, this is valid approach and a good study. Yet, there is no guarantee that all forms of ritual in the period was conceived of according to this particular philosophical tradition. Instead, cognitive theories promise to circumvent this problem by taking the human mind itself as its interpretative key. This position does not discount the role and importance of cultural and religious context, but merely acknowledges that it in this case is difficult to reach and may therefore be fruitfully approached by studying their manifestation in cognitive representation. “Even if the structures in question are substantially social in origin, it does not follow that participants in ritual systems will not have some organized system of cognitive representations of the ritual acts in question” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 81). Concerning P.Oslo. I V, I have already shown in chapter 2 how complex it is. This is why I would like to attempt a cognitive analysis of it, and see whether this can lead to a further understanding both of the papyrus itself and also the context it worked within.

4.1.1 Some Basic Premises

However, before going into further detail and presenting the specific theories I will use, I should first present a few premises for how I will proceed in my analysis. Section 4.1.1.a introduces a general point concerning cognitive studies of religion, while I in sections 4.1.1.b and 4.1.1.c present certain more specific observations on how a ritual text like P.Oslo. I V should be understood and approached.
4.1.1.a The Mind Treats Religious Phenomena Like Other Phenomena

A fundamental assumption for the use of cognitive theory in the study of religion is that the human mind processes religious phenomena the same way it processes other, ‘profane,’ phenomena: “I argue that belief in gods comes about through the same mental process as any other beliefs, using the same tools” (Barrett 2004, 21). For this point see also McCauley and Lawson 1990/2002, Boyer 1994/2001, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Atran 2002, Pyysiäinen 2004/2009 and Tremlin 2006. They argue that the religious or ritual nature of an event or phenomenon is not determined by the cognitive framework that assesses it, but rather by the inputs to the framework (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 87). This assertion is based on references to various studies on human cognition and psychology that point towards “the existence of a general mental operation” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 37). Justin Barrett details how the mind forms beliefs in the same way it takes in any form of information and forms knowledge from this, in an interplay between reflective and nonreflective cognitive processes, and cites several cognitive and anthropological studies for support (2004, 16-19). This premise has yet to become a consensus in the study of religion, with other scholars arguing that religious phenomena are dealt with in special cognitive processes (Polkinghorne 2001, 2400 and Pearson 2002, 96-97). However, it allows cognitive students of religion to employ the results of cognitive studies of other phenomena, providing both a wide array of methodological tools and instructive parallels.

4.1.1.b Speech-Act Theory

Another basic premise for my study comes from speech-act theory. Speech-act theory was launched by J. L. Austin in a series of lectures in 1955, and, while Austin was not directly concerned with ritual, this theoretical field is increasingly being adopted by ritual scholars (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 51). Austin challenged the view that language is only representational, a manner of communicating occurrences in ‘real life’ by using words as symbols for these, by pointing to several common instances where utterances do not describe but are ‘performative.’ For instance, when a priest declares someone husband and wife he does not describe them as such, he makes them as such (Austin 1971, 6). Austin continues in his lectures to explore and classify various forms of performative language, and further specifies performative speech-acts as ‘illocutionary acts’, writing that they “act in saying something” (1971, 99). John R. Searle develops the theory in further exploring the nature and workings of illocutionary acts, and holds that speech-acts are linguistic behaviour governed
by formal rules (1969, 198), and an analogy can be made here to the formal rules established by religious tradition (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 57). Building on this analogy, scholars conceive of ritual utterances as “special kinds of speech-acts, believed to establish or create a desired state of affairs” (Sørensen 2007, 68). Hence, the theory offers an understanding of ritual utterances beyond their referential function, providing an analytical means for appreciating how things like prayers or spells are thought effective. In P.Oslo I V’s case, I should add that even if ‘utterance’ typically brings vocal action to mind, “also acts of writing are included” (Verschueren 1980, 3). Lawson and McCauley also assert that “[a]fter all, written language is neither less observable nor less linguistic than speech. Although it is derivative in fact, there is no principled distinction at stake here” (1990, 71).

I will, then, analyse the text on P.Oslo I V as a speech-act, a ritual utterance. As such, it is not simply the written record of or the idealised representation of a ritual act, but a ritual act in and of itself. I noted in section 2.2.1 that Late Antiquity had an established tradition for ritual texts that were powerful in and of themselves, although Frankfurter, in discussing the conceptual consequences of performing ‘magic’ in writing, does not venture upon a more elaborate explanation of this (1994). Further support for interpreting the text as a ritual utterance is in the fact that the papyrus contains no description of any ritual act(s) to be performed alongside it. While physical, nonverbal acts may have accompanied the use of this ritual text, the papyrus itself contains only the speech-act. Then, there is Smith’s argument that ritual texts in Late Antiquity are displaced and miniaturised rituals, being parts of the turn towards more private religious expression (1995, 26). All this, then, points towards treating P.Oslo I V as a ritual utterance, and I will do so in my analysis.

4.1.1.c The Location of the Cognitive Processes

The subject of cognitive studies is, simply, the processes of human cognition. However, as I use these theories on ritual representation, am I addressing the cognitive processes of the author/ritual expert of the ritual, or in the reader/participant? From the theories themselves, there is no clear answer. Hugo Lundhaug points out that Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner never specify exactly with whom the cognitive processes they describe occur (2007, 39), and continues by quoting Tim Rohrer’s assertion that “what counts as a blending space from the author’s perspective should be regarded as an input space from the perspective of the reader (qtd in 2007, 40).
Although P.Oslo. I V certainly was composed and written down by someone, it is impossible to know whether it was written and/or blessed by a priest or ritual expert, or if it was simply written out by anyone able to do so, as Kim Haines-Eitzen suggests was the case with religious texts in Late Antiquity (2000, 7). Was it constructed on the spot from memory, or was it copied out of a collection of ritual texts, like Hans-Dieter Betz proposes was the use of the Greek magical papyri (1992, xlvi), or perhaps both? The parallel papyri in Appendix 2 and discussed in chapter 3 certainly suggests that P.Oslo. I V was part of a textual tradition, but the nature of its transmission and formation is still unknown, both in general and in this specific case. Only one thing is reasonably certain, by the mere existence of P.Oslo. I V, and that is that it most probably had one or more users, which may be treated as the readers/participants in cognitive analysis. Hence, as the thesis progresses, it is the cognitive representations on the part of the ritual’s participants that will be studied, and in this case the participants of the ritual are the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V.

4.2 Approach

Cognitive studies of religion tend to either work towards creating empirically verifiable theories or attempt to apply them (Pyysiäinen 2009, viii). The most extensive of these two directions is the theoretical branch. Here, the work is mostly centered on cognitive representation and appreciation of gods or supernatural beings (Boyer 1994/2001, Atran 2002, Barrett 2004, Pyysiäinen 2004/2009 and Tremlin 2006), religious transmission (Whitehouse 2000/2004a, McCauley and Lawson 2002) and, the subject that I will address here, the intuitive structure of religious ritual (Lawson and McCauley 1990, Sweetser 2000 and Sørensen 2007). These ritual theories posit that the cognitive representation of ritual has an intuitive structure that determines how rituals are appreciated and then in turn how they are formed. Following these theories, I hope to explore further for instance how the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V may ‘bind’ the ‘Artemisian scorpion’ (l. 3), and how this can occur on the very same papyrus where Christ is called upon. Wishing to analyse the intuitive structure and workings of the ritual text, I will employ first Lawson and McCauley’s structural approach (1990) and then Sørensen’s development of blending theory in relation to ritual (2007).
There is, by now, also a fair number of studies that apply cognitive theory to specific cultures or religions. Whitehouse (2000) and Emma Cohen (2007) use cognitive theories in anthropological studies, while Steven J. Mithen (1996) and James L. Pearson (2002) use them in the study of pre-historical religion. Martin (2007) and Uro (2007) both use Whitehouse’s modal theory of religious transmission to explore early Christian ritual, while others have applied Lawson and McCauley’s structural theory to religions in Late Antiquity (Martin 2003/04, Gragg 2004, Ketola 2007 and Uro 2010). Lundhaug (2007/2010) and Vernon K. Robbins (2007) use blending theory to analyse early Christian texts, and Czachesz even combines several of the theoretical approaches, including Sørensen’s work, when he seeks to explain early Christian miracles (2010). However, common to all these studies is that they in their analysis address either a corpus of texts or an entire ritual and/or religious tradition. The only other historical application of cognitive ritual theory to a specific case that I have found is Theodore Vial’s (2004a) analysis of a conflict in the Reformed Church in Zurich between 1864 and 1868 on how to baptise. Yet, while being a case study, in other respects this is of course quite distant in topic and time frame from what I will do here. Hence, this thesis is something of a new project. Not only do I address a specific case study, I also analyse an original example of ritual practice in Late Antiquity, as opposed to literary renditions where one would need to include considerations on authorial intent and manuscript transmission.

I noted in section 3.1 how many cognitive scholars argue for rehabilitating ‘magic’ as an analytical category, and how Frazerian observations and categories are still used in several cognitive approaches to ritual, despite the extensive criticism both positions have undergone. However, these scholars also assert that there is no dualist separation between religion and ‘magic,’ rather that ‘magic’ is a part, to varying extents, of religion, and especially religious ritual (Sørensen 2007, 5). This modification that ‘magic’ is no opposite to religion, but rather a part of it, seems to me to open their position to the arguments I presented in section 3.3, namely that ‘magic’ has no substantive difference from ritual practice and should therefore be treated and studied as such. Therefore, especially since this study is more concerned with applying the theory than a theoretical discussion, I propose to still employ these cognitive ritual theories, while disagreeing with their rehabilitation of ‘magic’ as an analytical category and approaching ‘magic’ in general, and P.Oslo. I V in particular, as ritual.
Finally, a recurring challenge for several historical studies using cognitive theory is exemplified by, but not exclusive to, Ketola’s study (2007). While he builds a strong theoretical framework for the cognitive aspects his study, the historical material he applies this to he finds in one or two standard histories of Second Temple Judaism, without engaging in any form of source criticism or notable appreciation for the nature of historical research. He admits from the outset that history is not his field (Ketola 2007, 96), but this acknowledgement does not solve the problem. I wish to avoid such a pitfall in my study by opening with a philological exploration of P.Oslo. I V in chapter 2, and consistently referring to this chapter as I apply the cognitive theories in chapters 5 and 6.

4.2.1 Lawson and McCauley and Structural Linguistics

Chapter 2 has already traced the possible meanings and implications of the elements in P.Oslo. I V according to extant philological research. But, how do the elements function in the ritual text and what worldview and ontological assumptions do they suggest? What roles, specifically, do the Artemisian scorpion and Christ have in the ritual, and what type of interaction between humans, the user(s), and such supernatural beings does P.Oslo. I V allow? Lawson and McCauley presents cognitive criteria for assessing the various deities and elements included in P.Oslo. I V, and I will use these to break the ritual text down into its functional parts and provide observations on the nature and tradition of the ritual. As a part of this discussion, I will also touch upon the main points from the cognitive research on gods/supernatural beings, which I referred to earlier in this chapter.

Lawson and McCauley propose to “specify a set of universal principles of religious ritual for assessing the products of this [the religious ritual] action representation system” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 84). Remembering the premise explained in section 4.1.1.a, their theory rests on the basic analogy of seeing the cognitive representation of an action as the formulation of a sentence. Just like a sentence consists of 1) a subject and 2) a verb, and potentially 3) an object, an action consists, or is cognitively represented as consisting, of 1) an agent, 2) an action and potentially 3) an object of this action (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 92). These are the basic structural entities of what Lawson and McCauley call an ‘action representation system,’ ARS, a model for how human cognition intuitively represents an action. As ritual is a religious action, this applies also to it (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 57). From this simple analogy, Lawson and McCauley borrow theories of cognitive representation from structural
linguistics to map the cognitive representation of ritual. They admit to extensive criticism of such a ‘cross-discipline’ application from linguistics by the likes of Dan Sperber and Noam Chomsky, but hold that the two phenomena nevertheless share enough traits to justify their attempt to use linguistic theory to develop models for representing ritual action (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 75). I will use such a model, then, to analyse the ritual utterance(s) in P.Oslo. I V. Thus, I will not only be able to explore the role and function of the ritual powers in P.Oslo. I V, but also further examine the meaning and implications of the ritual terms δέννω and (δια-)φυλάσσω.

For rituals, Lawson and McCauley posit that the ARS is always tripartite, having an agent, action and object. Hence, a ritual act is different from prayer, which they take to include only an agent and an action (1990, 125). They distinguish the two saying that ritual brings about change, whereas prayer have no such certainty and thus no direct object/result (McCauley and Lawson 2002, 15). To me, this smacks of the Frazerian definitions I presented in section 3.1, and I find it problematic. However, this point will arise when dealing with the more Christian lines in P.Oslo. I V, so I will save a thorough discussion of the relation between ritual and prayer for my analysis of these lines in section 5.2.2.

Moving on, Lawson and McCauley also point to ARS constraints beyond structure. Noam Chomsky’s famous example for this, the sentence ‘curious green ideas sleep furiously,’ is linguistically correct, but still nonsensical (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 105). Like a sentence, an ARS is intuitively judged, and hence constrained, by the ‘available conceptual schemes’ (ACS) (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 89). As the content of Chomsky’s sentence violates the ACS of the English language, where ideas do not sleep nor is sleep ever furious, so also will human cognition reject as false any ARSs that go against its ACS. For instance, if a man is seen to walk on water, this is a false ARS according to the ACS related to human behaviour, and the event will either be rejected as false or explained through another ACS, in this case a religious one. When it comes to rituals, these are religious actions and will therefore also be judged according to religious ACS (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 84). Hence, by examining what action constraints are at play in the ritual actions in P.Oslo. I V through Lawson and McCauley’s ARS-model, I hope to infer the relevant ACS. Thus, I hope to learn about the worldview and ontological assumptions of the user(s).
4.2.2 Blending Theory and Its Use in Ritual Studies

In their introduction to the Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysäininen and Risto Uro propose that conceptual blending is an apt tool for bridging cognitive theory with practical case studies (2007, 15). And indeed, whereas Lawson and McCauley’s theory is adept at identifying the role and function that cognitive processes ascribe to the various elements in P.Oslo. I V, it leaves something to be desired as to the interaction between these elements. For this, I will turn to the theory of conceptual integration developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, which they call ‘conceptual blending’ or ‘blending theory,’ and Sørensen’s later application of their theoretical work to ‘magic’ rituals.

Building on George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s ‘conceptual metaphor theory,’ Fauconnier and Turner argue that the processes by which the mind forms ideas or concepts can be modelled in much the same way as Lakoff and Johnson model metaphors. Basically, “[c]onceptual metaphors are employed as powerful cognitive tools enabling the readers or listeners to think about abstract (...) concepts in terms of more concrete and familiar concepts and imagery” (Lundhaug 2010, 27). This eases cognition and frees up cognitive capacity. For instance, dealing with the passing of time through the movement of a clock’s hands over its dial is much simpler than dealing with time as the abstract notion it really is (Hutchins 2005, 1571). “Conceptual integration, which we also call conceptual blending, is another basic mental operation, highly imaginative but crucial to even the simplest kinds of thought” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 18). Thinking of death as a form of sleep is a common example of an abstract and unexperienced phenomenon being conceptualised through a familiar phenomenon (Lundhaug 2010, 26). Conceptual blending, then, is a process where two established ‘mental spaces,’ or ideas/concepts, are joined, and through the dynamics of this process they emerge as a new mental space or idea/concept, a ‘blended space’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 43).

Fauconnier and Turner first introduced the theory in 1993, and they have later been “heartened to discover that, coming from another angle and with very different kinds of data, several ‘creativity theorists’ were insisting on the existence of a general mental operation (...) whose result is to bring together elements of different domains” (2002, 37). Not only employed by the historical studies of religious texts mentioned in section 4.2, blending theory has also become an important tool in the fields of cognitive linguistics and literary theory.
(Lundhaug 2010, 29-30, note 34). Criticising the use of blending theory in historical studies, Czachesz argues that “it is often difficult to anchor the ’blends’ in empirical evidence” (2010, 3). Other scholars express a general scepticism towards the theory, maintaining that blending theory is too general, too ambitious and lacks empirical support (Coulson and Oakley 2000, 192-193). Now, there are supporting results from some experimental research in neuroscience and psychology (Grady 2000, 336-339), but most importantly the majority of applications of blending theory do not claim to directly describe the neurological processes involved in cognition, but rather to present an explanatory model of these (Gibbs Jr. 2000, 349). To repeat Luomanen, Pyysiäinen and Uro’s assertion, the “models are only heuristic tools” (2007, 19).

The first attempt at exploring ritual structure using blending theory is by Eve Sweetser. She conceptualises ritual through speech-act theory and then explores the ritual utterances as conceptual blends (2000). Sweetser argues that rituals are non-linguistic performative utterances; just like a minister weds a couple by declaring them husband and wife, some ritual experts inflict pain by acting upon a wax doll (2000, 306). Just like the declaration of marriage, the harming of the doll is performative. The process of how actions in one space (the doll) may cause changes in another space (the victim), she continues, is best modelled as a conceptual blend, as it shows how different spaces are joined together, forming a blended space. The blended space, then, is performative, and this performativity makes the ritual efficacious (Sweetser 2000, 310). For my study, however, I will use Sørensen’s introduction to ‘magic’ from 2007. While sharing the fundamental aspects of his approach with Sweetser, his work proceeds further than she is able to in her article. Sørensen relates this basic process of joining different spaces to principles of ritual efficacy he collects from anthropological observations, and proceeds to detail how these principles guide the interaction between the spaces (Sørensen 2007, 44). Analysing, then, P. Oslo. I V as a conceptual integration network, with Sørensen’s observations on special ritual network interaction, I shall be able to explore more closely how the elements in the ritual text combine and how this combination is appreciated as efficacious by the user(s).
5 Lawson and McCauley’s Theory of Religious Ritual

P.Oslo. I V certainly indicates a society were emerging Christianity lived alongside and functioned with traditional, non-Christian practices and ideas. In this chapter, I will employ Lawson and McCauley’s theory of ritual structure to try to reach beyond the confusing diversity of P.Oslo. I V and see more specifically what purpose the various elements are serving in the ritual text, and by what criteria they are found appropriate for it. Chapter 4 already briefly introduced Lawson and McCauley’s application of cognitive theory to the study of religious ritual, which aims to explore the “participants’ religious ritual competence, i.e., a theory of their tacit knowledge about their religious ritual systems” (McCauley and Lawson 2002, ix). This means exploring people’s intuitive learning from living and participating in ritual tradition, and not their appraisal according to theological criteria (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 3). For Lawson and McCauley’s full argument and theory, their own works Rethinking Ritual and Bringing Ritual to Mind are certainly the most complete and instructive. Nevertheless, a minor elaboration on their theory must be undertaken here before it can be applied to P.Oslo I V, together with the aforementioned introduction of cognitive studies dealing with gods and supernatural beings.

5.1 The Theory

I mentioned in chapter 4 that Lawson and McCauley’s theory is derived from structural linguistics and how the basic analogy for this comparison is seeing a (ritual) action as a sentence (1990, 84). I also outlined how these structural principles are constrained by the ‘available conceptual system,’ the ACS, in which the (ritual) action takes place and is judged according to. For instance, ‘a man lifts a ton of rock,’ while possible according to the structural principles of agent, action and object, it is an inappropriate action as it contradicts common experience about human strength. If a phenomenon is completely unconnected with an individual’s representation of reality, the ACS, it will be rejected (Pyysiäinen 2004, 85). These principles Lawson and McCauley combine in an ‘action representation system,’ ARS, to model how an action is intuitively appreciated. Their theory is often criticised for oversimplifying difficult and complex topics like ‘culture’ and ‘ritual’ (Jablonski 1998, 272), and for an opportunistic and poorly founded borrowing from linguistic structural theory.
In response, McCauley and Lawson admit that their theory is somewhat ‘informal,’ but maintain that it, “like any scientific theory, will gain credibility to the extent that it is able to stand up to independent texts with materials it was not originally designed to explain” (2002, 5). My analysis here will be such a test.

5.1.1 ‘Action Representation Systems’

To illustrate how these principles work together in an ARS, Lawson and McCauley create a graphic model whose main features will be rendered here (please see figure B). It shows how the ACS provide input to the ARS and how this then together forms the cognitive representation of an action. Constraints to the ARS are included as ‘quality’ and ‘property.’

Figure B: Lawson and McCauley’s Basic Model of an Action Representation System

Returning to the example of the man and his rock, the man must conform to the ACS criteria for an agent, for instance being a human and not a chair, and he must have the necessary properties for the action, like two strong arms. The action complex must involve contact between the man and the rock, and ‘lifting’ implies, as a property, a direction from low to high. Finally, the rock must have the quality of being hard and compact, but in this case it is its property of weighing a ton that makes the ARS inappropriate. Yet, an ARS may include several ‘enabling’ ARSs that represent foregoing actions which make the ARS intuitively acceptable. Here, the ARS can be made appropriate through adding the quality ‘using a crane’ to the action complex. This includes earlier action(s) to the ARS, where a mechanical crane is
built and made available to the man so that he may lift the heavy rock. Lawson and McCauley call this ‘action conditioning,’ the detailing the enabling properties of preceding actions and events (1990, 98).

5.1.2 Ritual as an ARS

Now that the basic outline of how humans cognitively represent an action in an ARS has been presented, next is to apply this model to ritual action. In their application, Lawson and McCauley posit two premises that especially define ritual action. 1) “Participants perform rituals in order to bring about changes in the religious world” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 125). This point is related to the discussion on ritual versus prayer that I mentioned in section 4.2.1, and which I will return to in section 5.2.2. 2) The input to the ARS is primarily provided by religious conceptual scheme(s), albeit, Lawson and McCauley add, its assessment is strengthened if it also complies with logical constraints from other conceptual schemes (1990, 89). Essential to religious conceptual schemes, then, are ‘culturally postulated superhuman agents,’ CPS-agents (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 87). For P. Oslo I V, obvious CPS-agents are the divine names and voces magicae that the text calls upon, but most importantly the Artemisian scorpion and Christ. These are agents that the ritual text ascribes superhuman qualities, and whom I in chapter 2, although to a varying extent, established in the cultural or religious traditions of Late Antiquity. More will come on CPS-agents in section 5.1.2.a. Returning to Lawson and McCauley’s theory, they then posit CPS-agents as the ultimate explanatory cause for religious systems or ACSs. Consequently, the key criterion for the appropriateness of a ritual is the implication, somewhere in the ARS, of a CPS-agent (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 112).

McCauley and Lawson note that their premise that belief in CPS-agents are the defining feature of a religious conceptual system has been controversial (2002, 8). Czachesz, for instance, points to various ancient ‘spells’ that do not have a reference to supernatural agents (Czachesz 2010, 11). However, most cognitive scholars also argue for this premise (Martin 2003/04, Whitehouse 2004a, Tremlin 2006, Pyysiäinen 2009). Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter 4, a large part of cognitive studies of religion are centred precisely around gods or supernatural beings, since these are taken to be the defining feature of religion as a cultural conceptual system (Mithen 1996, Atran 2002, Boyer 2001, Barrett 2004, Tremlin 2006 and Pyysiäinen 2009). Interesting as a discussion on this question would have been, I have not the
space for it here. Moreover, it is also not as pressing, since P.Oslo. I V clearly does include CPS-agents, like the Artemisian scorpion and Christ. Thus, it is ritual type that agrees with Lawson and McCauley’s premise, regardless of this premise’s universal truth value.

Now, to implicate a CPS-agent in an ARS will often require several earlier, ‘enabling’ rituals. Far from all rituals involve the direct participation of a CPS-agent, but implicates the CPS-agent via the ritual expert or a sacred item. An example is perhaps the best way to illustrate this, and also the other aspects of Lawson and McCauley’s structural theory. For this, a dismissal in a Lutheran service will be analysed, with apologies for the lack of theological detail and subtlety (please see figure C).

**Figure C: An Example of CPS-agent Implication in Religious Ritual**

Here, the action complex of the ARS is the blessing, while the minister is the agent and the congregation the object. 1) By blessing the congregation, the minister changes their state in the religious world to being blessed. 2) Then, according the religious conceptual scheme, in this case Lutheran, the ARS is judged appropriate through two preceding action conditioning rituals; a) the minister is ordained by the Church, b) who in turn is instituted by Jesus Christ,
the CPS-agent. Thus complying with the two premises for ritual action, the blessing is an intuitively acceptable ARS.

The model also shows certain ACS constraints, featured in the places for ‘property’ and ‘quality.’ For instance, the action of saying the blessing does require the formal form of a liturgical formula, and should in most cases be accompanied with the sign of the cross. These are aspects of the action complex that are required for it to be judged appropriate by the ACS-criteria. I will not go through and explain all the properties and qualities of a Lutheran dismissal, but to further illustrate this point they are included in the model in figure C. These ACS-constraints on the ARS hint at the ontological assumptions of the ritual participants. Identifying the constraints for P.Oslo. I V will help indicate the user(s)’ worldview and ontological assumptions as to ritual efficacy.

Moving on, Lawson and McCauley, by applying their theory to a range of rituals know from anthropological studies, for instance a Vedic Agnyadhana ritual, Catholics blessing themselves using holy water and a Zulu ingestion of a love potion (1990, 104-121), argue that they can also deduce certain universal, structural principles that indicate the centrality of a ritual within its religious tradition. 1) The ‘principle of superhuman agency’ states that when the CPS-agent is implicated as or with the agent in the ARS, the ritual in question will be more central to the religious tradition than if the CPS-agent is implicated as or with the action complex or the object in the ARS (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 125). 2) The ‘principle of superhuman immediacy’ holds that “the fewer enabling actions to which appeal must be made in order to implicate a superhuman agent, the more fundamental [central] the ritual is to the religious system in question” (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 125).

Now, ‘centrality,’ according to Lawson and McCauley, is the participant(s)’ intuitive assessment of a ritual in its religious ACS, and it is typically related to the degree of CPS-agent involvement in a ritual and how constitutive it is the religious conceptual scheme (1990, 126-127). Admittedly, a participant’s intuitive appreciation of a ritual is a quite vague notion, but Lawson and McCauley demonstrate their principles through various examples, for instance that “the parishioner’s blessing is less important to the Catholic system than is Jesus’ institution of the church” (1990, 126). In the latter case, the superhuman agent is both 1) active and 2) more closely implicated in the ritual, and is therefore appreciated as more
‘central’ and constitutive to the Catholic conceptual scheme. There is even some empirical support for this claim, from an experiment on a group of Christian believers that suggests the ‘principle of supernatural agency’ does affect their intuitive appreciation of ritual efficacy (Whitehouse 2004a, 39).

5.1.2.a ‘Culturally Postulated Superhuman Agents’

As Lawson and McCauley see CPS-agents as the defining feature of religion and consequently ritual, I want to here briefly present the basic observations that cognitive studies of religion are making about gods or supernatural beings. This field of study typically follows an evolutionary approach to cognitive development, developing its arguments on the growing discipline of evolutionary and developmental psychology (Mithen 1996, Atran 2002, Boyer 2001, Barrett 2004, Tremlin 2006 and Pyysiäinen 2009), and McCauley and Lawson frequently refer to their results (2002, 24). The basic argument is that human cognitive tools are, through evolution, wired to detect agency (Barrett 2004, 4). Hence, when no ‘natural’ agency can be found for a seemingly intentional or purposeful occurrence “the most straightforward manner is in identifying some ambiguous thing, such as a wispy form, as an intentional agent – a ghost or spirit” (Barrett 2004, 33). Moreover, Barrett adds, this inbred search for intent even leads people to “overestimate the connection between factors” (Barrett 2004, 51), linking events and stories together that need not necessarily be linked. This tendency will typically enforce religio-cultural ideas, as these provide established explanatory patterns of agency and intention into which people may fit their experience (Lundhaug 2007, 35). An example would be breaking a mirror and then experience a string of misfortunes the next day. Czachesz calls this ‘confirmation bias’ (2010, 34), and Emily Pronin et al have conducted an empirical study that observes such confirmation bias (2006).

However, Boyer points out that there appears to be certain criteria for what makes some supernatural agents, or other religious phenomena for that matter, more appealing and acceptable to human cognition than others (2001, 148). Stewart Guthrie argues that to the human mind a human is the standard agent and uses this to explain what he calls an ‘anthropomorphic’ bent in human religiosity (Tremlin 2006, 100), and Boyer points to psychological research in support of this (2001, 89). Boyer deduces another criteria for successful supernatural agents, namely that they should be ‘minimally counterintuitive concepts,’ MCIs. These he describes as meeting “most of the assumptions that describers and
categorizers generate – thus being easy to understand, remember, and believe – but as violating just enough of these assumptions to be attention demanding” (Barrett 2004, 22). For instance, the Christian God is popularly conceived of as an older man, a wise father-figure, but then violating these conceptual structures by being, for instance, omnipresent. Finally, to be successful, MCIs also need to have inferential potential, they must be relevant for people’s lives (Whitehouse 2004a, 54). Barrett, in an argument echoed by Boyer (2001, 202) and Tremlin (2006, 111), holds that supernatural agents typically have access to privileged information, being either all-knowing, all-seeing or something to that effect, by which they “hold the potential to be both powerful allies and dangerous enemies” to humans, for whom the collection and used of strategic information has become an evolutionary niche (2004, 49). These are, then, cognitive criteria for CPS-agents, and I will have to see, in my analysis, to what extent and in what way(s) the Artemisian scorpion, Christ and the other CPS-agents in P.Oslo. I V comply with these criteria.

5.2 Its Application to P.Oslo I V

There are three main verbs, or ‘action complexes’ to use Lawson and McCauley’s terminology, in P.Oslo. I V, and consequently three ARSs to explore: 1) δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε, ‘I bind you, Artemisian scorpion,’ 2) διαφύλαξον τον οίκον τοῦτον..., ‘protect this house...,’ and 3) φύλαξον, κύριε, ‘be on guard, Lord.’ (Concerning this last ARS, it was noted in section 2.1.10 that the verb may be transitive or intransitive, but from its context here it seems most likely that it operates with ‘this house with all its occupants’ in lines 3-4 as its implied object.) However, according to Austin’s classification of performative speech-acts, ARSs 2 and 3 do no qualify as being performative. According to him, typical performative speech-acts are in the first person active indicative, like 1) δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε, or at least “reducible, or expandible, or analysable into a form with a verb in the first person singular present indicative active (grammatical)” (Austin 1971, 61-62). Being imperatives, the two other ARSs must be expanded somewhat to be in the first person active indicative, and this expansion has consequences for the application of Lawson and McCauley’s model.

5.2.0 ‘Illocutionary Acts’ and ‘Propositional Acts’

Austin writes that imperatives automatically imply an ‘operative’ word like ‘I order/demand/appeal.’ For instance, in saying ‘be quiet!’, there is an implicit ‘I ask/order you
to be quiet’ (Austin 1971, 59). Thus, the imperative acquires illocutionary force through the implied operative word ‘ask/order.’ It is, then, this operative ‘ask/order’ that is performative and may in certain contexts be a ritual act, not the imperative. ‘Be quiet’ is what Searle terms a ‘propositional act;’ the action that the illocutionary act proposes to achieve (1969, 29). It is “a proposition bearing upon a future act of the hearer” (Recanati 2007, 49). Hence, what I suggested is two separate ARSs here, numbers 1 and 2, are in fact the illocutionary and propositional acts of one performative utterance: ‘I bind [illocutionary act] you, Artemisian scorpion (…) (to) protect [propositional act] this house…’ Finally, number 3, φύλαξον, κύριε, is also a propositional act, and therefore not a complete performative utterance. However, following Austin’s assertion that there is an implicit operative verb to every imperative, I will analyse the performative speech-act that is implied by the imperative φύλαξον. Thus, the second performative utterance in P.Oslo. I V is something like; ‘I ask/order/appeal to [illocutionary act] you, Lord, to protect [propositional act]….‘ and I will proceed to analyse this as an ARS as well. The delineation between these two distinct performative utterances, notably, agrees with Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s identification of a pagan and a Christian section in P.Oslo. I V (please see section 2.2.6).

However, having established the two illocutionary acts of P.Oslo. I V, I need to also place the two propositional acts; 2) διαφύλαξον τὸν οἶκον τοῦτον..., and 3) φύλαξον. As Lawson and McCauley’s theory explores ritual acts, these non-performative propositional acts cannot be analysed in their own ARS-models. Rather, they must be included in the ARS-models of the two illocutionary acts. I have already quoted Francois Recanati on propositional acts, saying that these bear “upon a future act of the hearer” (2007, 49). The hearers here, of course, are the objects of the illocutionary acts, the Artemisian scorpion and the Lord. Hence, the propositional acts in P.Oslo. I V are the proposed future acts of the Artemisian scorpion and the Lord, in response to the ritual. Consequently, for the illocutionary ARS to be intuitively acceptable, the Artemisian scorpion and the Lord must be considered capable, by the user(s) of the ritual text, of performing these proposed acts. If the Lord is unable to protect the house and its inhabitants, then calling upon him to do so would be futile. Hence, the propositional acts reflect an intuitive object property in the respective ARSs, namely that the object is able to perform this act. Thus, the propositional acts have already established one common object property for both the ARSs in P.Oslo. I V.
5.2.1 δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Άρτεμίσιε

Starting with the first performative ARS, its basic structure is quite simple (please see figure D). There is the agent (‘I’), the action complex (‘bind’) and the object (‘Artemisian scorpion’). The agent is referred to by the first person singular form of δέννω. As mentioned in section 4.1.1.c, the initial agent could have been a priest or ritual expert, but from the information available the ritual agent must be considered the user(s) of the ritual text.

Figure D: The First ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 1-6

Yet, what property must the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V have to qualify as the ritual agent? As presented in the model, the key requirement for someone to qualify as the user(s) of the papyrus is their association with the papyrus. It has been noted in the opening of chapter 3 that P.Oslo. I V bears traces of being folded, which could mean that it was carried around by its user or that it was tucked away somewhere special. Both practices are well known from the Mediterranean since the Roman Imperial period, especially among Jews and Christians (Ogden 2008, 131). The papyrus may, of course, have been taken out to be read when it was felt needed, but, as I mentioned in section 2.2.1, such papyri were also thought to be powerful
simply by their presence/existence (Frankfurter 1994, 195). It is difficult to know whether the permanence given to a performative utterance by writing it down signified some sort of continual repetition or permanent expression. Alternatively, it could have functioned as a substitute for the original ritual expert, potentially the writer of P.Oslo. I V, which Sørensen suggests is one of the purposes of ritual (2007, 183). Either way, the one fairly certain thing here is that possession of or association with the papyrus identifies its user(s), qualifying the possessor(s) as the ritual text’s ‘I.’

Another quality of the ritual agent may be signalled by the divine names and *voces magicae* in line 2. Several scholars argue that the purpose of *voces magicae* is to signal the divine knowledge of the ritual expert (Graf 1991, 192). Hence, the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V could be further qualified by their knowledge of the divine names and *voces magicae* in line 2, which is demonstrated by the listing of these divine names and *voces magicae* in the ritual text. I have suggested this possibility as an enabling act in stippled lines in figure D, but the figure also shows that I consider it more likely that the *voces magicae* and divine names are linked to the action complex. My reason for this is the propositional act, the imperative to protect the house and all its occupants. As the utterance is geared towards this goal, it seems more likely that the enabling acts are also linked to the action complex ‘bind,’ as this drives the utterance towards the propositional act. However, I realise that this observation is not conclusive, and that the divine names and *voces magicae* may in fact take on both these roles in the intuitive appreciation of P.Oslo. I V, simultaneously qualifying the agent and the action complex.

Moving on, then, to the action complex, this is δέλνω, ‘I bind.’ ‘To bind’ is a common ritual term in Late Antiquity for taking control of spirits and demons, which developed from the classical term for binding, δέω (Wessely 1974, 423). In P.Oslo. I V, the preceding and following mentions of and/or calling upon divine names, *voces magicae*, and the probable ritual repetition 315 times, are introduced to lend authority to and hence enable the action complex. According to the user(s) intuition about ritual action, then, he/she/they may bind the Artemisian scorpion by virtue of calling upon these powers. This enabling act is represented in the model in figure D by a second ARS, and its position discussed in the previous paragraph. As the model shows, the CPS-agents are here implicated through the presence of their names, by them being called upon. The implicit agent quality, then, is that the deities are powerful, and the action quality is the presence of their names, while the action property is
their being mentioned and/or known. Bovon has already noted how pan-Mediterranean ritual traditions in Late Antiquity set great store by the ritual power of divine names (2001, 268), and chapter 2 also concludes that P.Oslo. I V appears to be of a ritual ‘genre’ where the extensive mention of deities and spirits is a defining trait.

At last, there is the object of the ARS, the Artemisian scorpion. According to the propositional act, as established in section 5.2.0, the Artemisian scorpion is an intuitively appropriate object because of its power to deal with the threats listed in lines 4-5. This power may been seen to either 1) be a natural quality of the Artemisian scorpion as a CPS-agent, or to 2) be transferred to it from ‘the highest god’ in line 6. The uncertainty here originates with the ambiguity of the διὰ τὸ ὄνομα...-phrase starting at the end of line 5, which I pointed out in section 2.1.8. 1) If it refers to δέλλσ, then ‘the name of the highest god’ is simply another powerful agent conditioning the action complex, as it is seen in brackets in figure D. 2) Yet, if it refers to διάφηλαξαν it instead conditions the object of the ritual, the Artemisian scorpion. Hence, the Artemisian scorpion may have been considered a sufficiently powerful CPS-agent in its own right to follow up on the ritual, or it may have been a minor CPS-agent whose power is conditioned here by ‘the highest god,’ a possibility I have indicated on the right hand side of figure D in stippled lines. I established in section 2.1.5 that very little is known about this Artemisian scorpion, and also the ‘highest god,’ the former being obscure and the latter generic. It is therefore difficult to know which of the two possibilities are correct.

While gaining a further appreciation for how the ritual utterance functions, there is not an abundant amount of new information here on the worldview and ontological assumptions of the user(s). The dominating feature seems to be the use and transfer of power. Various ritual tools are employed to attract or assume power, which in turn is used to dominate others. This theme extends to the elaborate hierarchy presented in this ARS, with the Artemisian scorpion being controlled, potentially also empowered, by other, more powerful CPS-agents. I mentioned in section 5.1.2.a how cognitively successful supernatural beings often have human-like traits, and this divine hierarchy will have mirrored the user(s)’ experience of human social hierarchies. Furthermore, within this human-like hierarchy, the Artemisian scorpion, with a name that hints at savagery and beasts, may well be considered something of an MCI, even if Artemis is frequently associated with animals in ancient sources (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 12). Finally, the very existence of this papyrus shows that the divine
hierarchy also includes, or is at least accessible to, humans, as they may call upon and manipulate these powers through ritual. Hence, as both powerful and accessible, the CPS-agents have great inferential potential for the user(s).

Such hierarchy and supernatural plurality, according to Lawson and McCauley, indicates a fluid ritual system: “Rituals which involve relatively unimportant gods or mere substitutes for gods (of higher status) are far more likely to undergo variation and more likely to be co-opted by the culture at large” (1990, 135). This squares well enough with what is known of the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition in Late Antiquity, but may Lawson and McCauley’s principles of superhuman agency and of superhuman immediacy say anything more about P.Oslo. I V? In this ARS, the CPS-agents are passive, even though they are implicated both in the action complex and the object. Following the principle of superhuman agency, then, the ritual should not have been very central to the religious tradition. When it comes to the principle of superhuman immediacy, the analysis relies on the property and nature of the Artemisian scorpion, which I was unable to establish earlier. 1) If the Artemisian scorpion is an independently powerful CPS-agent, the ARS must be considered rather central to the religious tradition since the CPS-agent is implicated immediately as the ritual object. If this is correct, then it contradicts the above observation following the principle of superhuman agency, which holds that the ARS is not central. 2) However, if the Artemisian scorpion is conditioned by “the highest god,” the principle of superhuman immediacy agrees that this ARS is not central to the religious tradition. This ambiguous analysis, combined with the fact that CPS-agents here are implicated in more than one place in the ARS, both as object and in the action complex, perhaps shows that Lawson and McCauley’s criterion of a CPS-agent as the ultimate explanatory cause for a ritual ARS (1990, 124) requires some revision.

5.2.2 ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you, Lord’

Then, there is the second performative ARS, which is not uttered explicitly, but which is implied in the imperative φύλαξον. Before starting the analysis, however, there is the question of where the first performative ARS ends and this one begins. The uncertain reading of lines 6 and 7 makes it impossible to establish a dividing line between the two. Section 2.1.8 explained the ambivalence regarding the position of διὰ τὸ δνομα in lines 5-6, how it may refer back to the first ARS or instead open the second one. The latter case would include all the voces magicae of lines 6-7 as action conditioning to this ARS, which would give it a form
similar to the first ARS, opening with an appeal to divine powers. This is also the case if διὰ τὸ δόνομα... refers back to the first ARS, as the phrase then finishes the first ARS, while the voces magicae in lines 6-7 open the second ARS. If the second ARS opens by such a string of voces magicae and divine names, this also parallels the first ARS opening with Ὡξ Ὡξ θσξ, Ἰαν, Σαβανζ...’ Of course, seeing such a parallel form to the two ARSs is appealing, and quite possible, but it must be remembered that it is a current interpretation and academic study is prone to find system and order where there may not be any. Hence, I will present the voces magicae in lines 6-7 and/or διὰ τὸ δόνομα in brackets in the model, and not consider their position there certain.

Beginning the analysis, then, the ritual agent is the same for this ARS as for the previous one; the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V. Again, they are qualified as ritual agents by possession of or association with the papyrus. Also concerning the ARS object, this ARS mirrors the previous one in that the object is a CPS-agent. The ritual’s object is κόριος, but the description following in lines 7-9 identifies him as Christ.

**Figure E: The Second ARS of P.Oslo. I V, lines 7-10**

If I then apply the cognitive criteria for a successful CPS-agent from section 5.1.2.a, it is quickly clear that Christ qualifies on all counts. By his very incarnation, Christ conforms to any intuitive notions that agents should be human-like. Moreover, the christological details in
lines 8-9 on his heritage make him an MCI par excellence, being both man and god, born but not conceived in the flesh. Finally, Christ’s inferential potential is also, like the Artemisian scorpion, demonstrated by his accessibility through this ritual text and his apotropaic power. Hence, so far this ARS parallels the previous one, with the user(s) as ritual agent and Christ as the CPS-agent ritual object. The only distinction is that there is no hint of a potential enabling hierarchy of CPS-agents, like there is with the Artemisian scorpion and the ‘highest god’ in the first ARS. Here there is only Christ.

However, there is a further difference in that Christ is given an explicit object property, in addition to the implied object property of having power to protect which he shares with the Artemisian scorpion. The descriptions of his heritage, ἴηὲ Ῥατὶδ (...) ἐκ ἀγίου πνεύματος, are of course what identify him as Christ, but they can also have been appreciated as object properties that qualify him as an intuitively acceptable object to the ARS. Now, these properties are almost precisely the phrases discussed previously in section 2.2.5 as doctrinal indications related to christology. While I concluded there that these descriptions are too general to place within a certain school of thought or doctrinal position, they are still precise enough to suggest a more than superficial influence from the church. Hence, it seems Christ is not included in this ARS merely as a powerful CPS-agent, which many scholars argue is the case when Christian or Jewish deities appear in ritual texts in Late Antiquity (Betz 1991, 254). Rather, Christ’s participation here appears to be judged appropriate according to these teachings from official church doctrine, which shows that these were part of the user(s) ACS.

In fact, these doctrinal indications could also be interpreted as a demonstration of the user(s) orthodoxy. However, placing the rules and assessments of doctrine in Lawson and McCauley’s model is difficult. According to their theory, doctrine should constrain the ARS as a part of the ACS (Lawson and McCauley 1990, 89). But what the phrases here are meant as an explicit demonstration of true faith on the part of the user(s)? This ambiguity concerning the display of doctrine is problematic. Granted, Lawson and McCauley underline that they are not analysing ritual according to theological criteria (1990, 77), and Vial argues that in a competence-approach, as this is, “ritual is judged primarily in terms of orthopraxy, not orthodoxy” (2004a, 11). Nevertheless, in the factious fourth or fifth century Christian Egypt, it is likely that the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V will have had some appreciation of doctrine as a concept and the conflicts related to it. The display of orthodoxy in P.Oslo. I V, then, could
just as well be an agent quality, not an object quality. Hence, I here face a problem similar to
the question of the enabling act in the first ARS, having a quality but no clear idea of where it
should go in the ARS. It could work in either position, or it could have served both purposes.
While Lawson and McCauley’s premise of CPS-agency being the ultimate explanatory cause
for ritual efficacy is helpful in outlining a basic ritual structure, it appears its ability to
appreciate and place displays of correct faith and doctrine is more limited.

A final difference with the first ARS concerns the action complex. As I discussed in section
5.2.0, its existence, and also its form, is implied from φύλαξον. Yet, an imperative may
represent everything from requests to strict commands. In the section heading here, and also
in figure E, I use ‘ask/order/appeal to,’ but it may just as well have included ‘beg,’ ‘implore,’
‘pray’ or ‘request.’ The only hints about how this imperative should be understood come from
contrasting it to the imperative in the first ARS. There, the sense of command is underlined by
having δέννεω as the operative word and by φύλαξον being strengthened by δια-. Here, with no
strict operative word nor a typical ritual prefix, the imperative appears less commanding.

Having a less coercive language, and expressing distinctly Christian doctrines, should this
ARS then be considered a prayer? Kimberly Bowes notes that authorities like Tertullian,
Hippolutys and Origen promoted prayer as the basic form of private ritual (2005, 193), and its
permeation of Christian society makes it a likely influential practice for other rituals.
Moreover, private prayer is thought to have been inspired by and developed from liturgical
practices (Stewart 2008, 744), and I have already described P.Oslo. I V’s strong parallels to
liturgy in section 2.2.4. More specifically, the ARS, and the entire ritual text, ends with Δόξα
σοι, οὐρανίω βασιλεία, and doxologies, which are common in the New Testament letters and in
liturgy, were also “a standard feature of individual prayer” (Stewart 2008, 755). Agnes
Cunningham further notes how a theology of praying in memory of Christ developed (1985,
31), a mnemonic attitude that may be reflected in τιε το κέν Λευθ (...), εκ αγίου πνεύματος, and
Wessely’s compilation of early Christian liturgical and prayer papyri (1974, 424-450) also
suggests that the narrative of Christ’s life permeated this genre. In addition, his collection also
shows how prayers often included symbols (Wessely 1974, 439-441) like those found at the
end of P.Oslo. I V.

Here, Lawson and McCauley substantive distinction between prayer and ritual, which I
mentioned in section 4.2.1, makes itself felt. Lawson and McCauley consider prayer different
from ritual and therefore not a suitable subject for their theory. Yet, prayer can mean many things, also in the early Christian tradition (Severus 1972, 1254). While the likes of John Chrysostom, Cassiodorus and John Damascene define prayer as ‘petition’ (Cunningham 1985, 17), “[b]oth Jesus and Paul taught that prayer is efficacious” (Stewart 2008, 749). To distinguish between prayer and ritual, McCauley and Lawson argue that prayer is different because it does not directly “bring about some change in the religious world” (2002, 13).

Returning, then to the comparison of the action complexes in P.Oslo. I V, this criterion in fact does point to a difference between the two ARSs. While the illocutionary force of ‘bind’ acts directly upon the Artemisian scorpion, the implicit illocutionary act in the second ARS is not direct. The second ARS certainly works for the same results, as described in the propositional acts, as the first, but it does not achieve a direct result in the religious world, like ‘bind’ does. In fact, this demonstrates one of Austin and Searle’s further classification of performatives, creating one group of ‘perlocutionary acts,’ which are illocutionary acts that bring about “effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence” (Holdcroft 1994, 350). In my discussion, then, this distinction would mean that ritual acts are perlocutionary while prayers are illocutionary. And in this case, ‘bind’ clearly has perlocutionary force while ‘ask/order/appeal to’ does not.

However, I would say that the ARS model in figure E shows that the utterances of P.Oslo. I V cannot be so easily categorised. It shows how Christ is implicated as a CPS-agent not just as the object, but also through the Christian symbols on the papyrus that serve as action conditioning. The symbols refer to Christ, and thus call on his power to enable the action complex, much like the voces magicae and divine names functioned in the first ARS. Firstly, this enabling action creates an ARS structure that essentially parallels that in the first ARS, with the CPS-agent implicated both as object and through enabling action conditioning. Secondly, the enabling action shows CPS-agency being used to facilitate the appeal or prayer, to help catch the attention if you will, of the ARS object in the religious world, indicating some sort of direct impact on the religious world. Hence, the action complex appears to have features that Lawson and McCauley ascribe to both prayer and ritual. While the illocutionary act itself does not have perlocutionary force, its ARS-structure and the enabling actions suggest a stronger, more direct link to ‘the religious world.’ Finally, the appearance of both utterances on the same papyrus, and in a continuous text, shows an undeniable association between the two, further suggesting that a categorical distinction between the two utterances
is problematic. I already remarked on my misgivings towards introducing a substantive definition separating ritual and prayer in section 4.2.1, and for the reasons given here I will continue to consider the two performative utterances of a similar genre. Still, the difference that one action complex is perlocutionary and the other illocutionary is an important observation, and I will take this with me in the further analysis of the ritual text.

5.3 Summarising Observations and Remarks

In this chapter I set out to detect any intuitive principles for the cognitive representation of the composite and highly varied ritual text of P.Oslo. I V. At first glance, the intuitive structures of the two ARSs appear to be almost parallel. Divine powers are called upon, the action complex enabled through to appeal to (other) divine powers in the form of voces magicae, divine names or ritual symbols, to protect the user(s) of the papyrus. However, upon closer inspection it was found that not only does the second ARS, the ‘Christian one,’ have additional object properties with a distinct doctrinal flavour, also the action complex of this ARS is different from the first. While ‘bind’ has perlocutionary force, the appeal in the second ARS does not bring about a direct change in the religious world and can therefore be classified as a prayer. Still, the presence of enabling acts complicates this conclusion, as it gives this ARS a similar ritual structure to the first ARS. According to Lawson and McCauley’s principle of superhuman agency, this structure, where the CPS-agency is involved with the ritual object and the action complex, indicates that the ritual will not have been a central feature of religious tradition. Yet, their principle of superhuman immediacy, as both the Artemisian scorpion and Christ are included directly as ritual objects in P.Oslo. I V, suggests that the ritual will have been more central to the religious tradition. Concerning this point, the potential enabling action to invest the Artemisian scorpion with CPS-agency is important, as it would be another distinction between the two ARSs. If the Artemisian scorpion is indeed empowered by the ‘highest god,’ this suggests, by the principle of superhuman immediacy, that the second ARS is more central to its religious tradition than the ritual act represented in the first ARS.

In short, P.Oslo. I V still presents a rather confusing combination of different principles and ritual actions. In certain respects, the second ARS should not even be considered as a ritual, yet in other respects the two ARSs appear remarkably similar. To me, then, P.Oslo. I V
appears to be a case where Christ and Christian material has been taken into an established ritual practice, known from the other ritual texts in Appendix 2. Yet, importantly, the second ARS still follows Christian ontological assumptions. For instance, it has an illocutionary, or prayer-like, action complex and in that there is no plurality of deities, which compares well with a Christian ACS. Hence, the Christian material, if fitted into a ‘generic’ ritual tradition in Late Antiquity, is not doctrinally altered and its impact is more significant than simply the incorporation of another deity. As such, the situation does not appear altogether too different from Fridrichsen’s assessment of the ritual text eighty years ago, “dass man die heidnischen Zauberworte mit einem den christlichen Kreisen entlehnten Element bereichert hätte” (Eitrem and Fridrichsen 1921, 23).

Yet, as I have pointed out throughout the analysis, there are certain aspects of the intuitive representation of P.Oslo. I V that Lawson and McCauley’s theory does not seem to capture and are therefore left unaddressed. First, both ARSs have CPS-agency implicated both as object and in the action complex, providing conflicting results when I try to apply Lawson and McCauley’s principles of superhuman agency and immediacy. Second, the potential use and appreciation of doctrine in ritual practice is difficult to address explicitly through the ARS-model. Related to this is the question of locating qualifying elements in the model. For ARS 1 I observed how the enabling act may qualify either the action complex or the agent, or possibly both, while νιὲ τοῦ Δαυῑδ (...) ἐξ ἀγίου πνεύματος in ARS 2 may be either an object quality or, as a signal of orthodoxy, an agent quality. Or, again, both. Such flexibility was difficult to include in Lawson and McCauley’s model. The most important remaining question, however, is how P.Oslo. I V can combine both a generic, pan-Mediterranean ritual structure with content that is distinctly Christian? How are these two supposedly different worldviews made to work together? I hope to shed some light on these questions in the next chapter, by applying blending theory to P.Oslo. I V.
6 Conceptual Blending in P.Oslo. I V

As I mentioned, blending theory was initially developed by Fauconnier and Turner and has already been employed in various cognitive studies of religion, also to a certain extent in a historical perspective. In this chapter, I will first present the basic framework of their theory, and then introduce Sørensen’s application of blending theory to the study of ritual. In turn, his conclusions and typologies will be used to analyse P.Oslo. I V, with a view to understand how the different elements in the ritual text combine in the human cognition and how all this relates to the relevant ACS, or what Sørensen calls ‘cultural conceptual systems.’ From observing these relations, I hope to address the questions raised on the previous page, and to also make other inferences regarding the worldview and ontological assumptions of the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V. Finally, blending theory also allows me to, in the end, include both of P.Oslo. I V’s performative utterances in one model, reflecting and assessing the key fact that they occur together on one papyrus and in a continuous text.

6.1 Blending Theory

In section 4.2.2, I explained a little about the background of Fauconnier and Turner’s blending theory. Its fundamental purpose is to explore how different mental spaces are joined to create a new ‘blended space,’ through what they call a ‘conceptual integration network.’ This, Fauconnier and Turner maintain, is a “basic mental operation, highly imaginative but crucial even to the simplest kinds of thought” (2002, 18). A basic network consists of two input spaces that, through matching and/or counterpart connections, combine to form a new, blended space (Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 182). The connections also result in a ‘generic space,’ which holds the common traits of the two input spaces. All four spaces working together, a blend affects the entire network and influences go back and forth between the spaces that make up the blend (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 47). Somewhat abstract in theory, a conceptual integration network is perhaps best explained through an example.

For studies of religion, the most commonly example for conceptual blending is the Catholic Eucharist (please see figure F). Here, the two mental spaces, the two ‘input spaces,’ are 1) bread and wine and 2) the body and blood of Christ. In the generic space, their common properties are established being a) solid and b) fluid and red. The concepts from the input
spaces are then projected into the blended space, thereby making the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ (Lundhaug 2010, 32).

Figure F: The Eucharistic Elements as a Blend

(Lundhaug 2010, 418)

Separately, the content of the two input spaces have nothing to do with each other, but in this conceptual integration network they are blended to form the Host. This example is a simple, four-space blend, but there may very well be more than two input spaces in a conceptual integration network, and there may also be intermediate blends that function as inputs into new blends or conceptual integration networks (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 279).

Now, Fauconnier and Turner call the connections between the spaces ‘vital relations,’ and list fifteen main types: change, identity, time, space, cause-effect, part-whole, representation, role, analogy, disanalogy, property, similarity, category, intentionality and uniqueness (2002, 101). For instance, the wine and the blood in the Eucharist are linked through similarity, analogy and property, being fluid and red. These relations, then, are the foundation for linking the two, or more, mental spaces together. As the list shows, some of these vital relations can still be quite abstract, or, as the example illustrates, there may be several possible relations at play. In addition to being guided by different types of relations, the blending process is constrained by certain ‘optimality principles,’ conditions under which the blend works most efficiently. Fauconnier and Turner argue that these generally push to 1) compress what is diffuse, 2) obtain global insight, 3) strengthen vital relations and 4) go from many to one (2002, 312).
Thus, optimality principles work towards producing a blend that is easy for human cognition to fathom and process. Fauconnier and Turner observe that they commonly result in compressing the blend to human scale (2002, 312). As an example, when the Christian God is conceptualised as Father or King, he is brought down to a human scale (Lundhaug 2010, 36). This 1) compresses what is diffuse and 2) increases insight, as a human figure is easier to comprehend and deal with than the abstract nature of an almighty God. However, there is also a principle in conceptual integration that opposes compression; the ‘topology principle.’ ‘Topology’ is the existing conceptual frame(s) from the input spaces, and important topological features will work to resist change brought on by compression (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 328). The Christian God might be brought down to human scale as Father or King, but rarely as chair or fork. The latter options are difficult, since God is very strongly identified as an acting and leading agent, which compares well enough with cultural ideas concerning kings and fathers, but not so much chairs or forks. Certainly exceptions exist, but generally such violations of initial role/identity or category are not acceptable to the topology of the concept God. Together, then, the principles of compression and topology create the dynamic that guides how a blend’s conceptual integration. This dynamic between compression and topology, and their effect on the vital relations, is part of what I will try to find in P.Oslo. I V.

There are different types of conceptual integration networks. In some networks, the input spaces share the same conceptual frames, while in others the elements from the one input space will be accommodated into the conceptual frame of the other input space (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 120-129). However, conceptual integration may also produce “a relation in the blend where there was none in either the inputs or the connections between them” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 319). In fact, an important feature of blending theory is precisely this capacity to map such ‘emergent structures,’ a “structure that is not copied from the inputs” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 49). For instance, from the blend for the eucharistic elements emerges a structure that relates flesh to bread and blood to wine. This relation is not part of either input space, but becomes so in the blended space and thence rise as an emergent structure. Fauconnier and Turner call these networks ‘complex blends’ and maintain that such ‘clashes’ between input frames can be “highly creative” (2002, 131). The eucharistic blend, for example, enables believers to consume the body and blood of Christ, and thus creates a
concept that can be further elaborated on. For instance, it may be expanded as an affirmation of being part of the Church, or as a unification with Christ, or as absorbing the Holy Spirit. “[T]he blend may be elaborated upon in ways that are in principle limitless” (Lundhaug 2010, 33), which means that such blends have a fair degree of potential for influencing cultural and religious development.

Fauconnier and Turner maintain that their theory presents an apparatus for ‘unpacking’ blends, revealing their inputs and inner workings, much in the same way as Lawson and McCauley’s model helped reveal P.Oslo. I V’s structure in chapter 5: “Unpacking is often facilitated by disintegrations and incongruities in the blended space. (…) at first we recognize a space with incongruities and that those incongruities prompt us to take the space as a blend and look for its inputs” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 332-333). With P.Oslo. I V, the obvious incongruity is the combination of Christian and non-Christian ritual practices in one papyrus. However, also the differences and similarities of the two performative utterances that I found in chapter 5, making them simultaneously not quite the same but also not quite different, is also something of an incongruity, leading me to think that blending must be going on in P.Oslo. I V. Czachesz is sceptical towards such applications of blending theory in historical studies, saying “the creativity of the interpreter (rather than formal rules) plays an important role in establishing the ‘mental spaces’ involved in the blend” (2010, 3). Answering this genre of criticism, Lundhaug argues that this is a condition that all historical studies suffer, as the historical context that could have indicated the forms and rules for the relevant mental spaces is generally lost (2010, 55). “Even the most positivistic historians recognize (…) that they will never attain certainty about the past” (Martin 2004, 12). In fact, Lundhaug continues, it is precisely this situation that makes blending theory a desirable tool for historical study, since it compensates for the contextual void by a strong and clear analytical framework (2010, 64).

6.2 Blending Theory and Ritual

Commenting on Sweetser’s application of blending theory to ritual, Fauconnier and Turner congratulate themselves that it “suggests that this fundamental and elaborate human activity [ritual], unparalleled in the animal world, makes use of the operation of conceptual blending as its basic instrument of imaginative invention” (2000, 295). Here, then, I will proceed relate
blending theory to the study of ritual, through Sørensen’s comprehensive study of ‘magic.’ This will form the methodological foundation for my analysis of P.Oslo. I V in section 6.3.

Like Sweetser, referenced in section 4.2.2, Sørensen’s basic purpose in using blending theory is to explain how rituals are intuitively appreciated as efficacious. How are, to use P.Oslo. I V as an example, the words and phrases on this papyrus believed to have any consequence for the life and well-being of ‘this house with all its occupants’ (l. 3-4)? Similar to how Sweetser uses the idea of performativity from speech-act theory, Sørensen explains how such words and phrases can have an impact on ‘the house with all its occupants’ by modelling ritual as a blend. “At a general level, religious and magical rituals involve a blended space consisting of elements projected from input spaces themselves created by elements from two general domains – ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ – and structured by a ritual frame” (Sørensen 2007, 63).

**Figure G: Ritual as a Blend**

Sørensen proceeds to offer a more specific definition of ‘sacred’ and ‘profane,’ essentially distinguishing between what is intuitively assessed according to supernatural/religious criteria and what is appreciated according to normal/natural criteria, the definition of these criteria being both cultural and intuitive (2007, 63-64). In Lawson and McCauley’s terminology, these are different ACSs. Moving on, a ritual takes place when the actions from the one
domain, the profane, are allowed to influence the other, the sacred domain (Sørensen 2007, 64). Joining of these two distinctly different domains produces a complex blend, which creates a highly creative emergent structure “that is not copied from the inputs” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 49), namely the ability of the user(s) of P.Oslo. I V to affect CPS-agents like the Artemisian scorpion and Christ. So, Sørensen’s basic explanation of ritual efficacy is modelling it as a complex blend, where the emergent structure in the blended space allows the elements in the profane space to affect those in the sacred space.

In the generic space, Sørensen places three main types of ritual agency; agent-based agency, action-based agency and object-based agency, which he deduces from various anthropological studies (2007, 73). As figure G shows, he also includes other types of ritual agency, but these three are the major forms of ritual agency (Sørensen 2007, 65). Not derivation of Lawson and McCauley’s tripartite ARS-structure, as the names might lead one to believe, the categories are generic types of how supernatural agency is implicated into a ritual. For instance, the Artemisian scorpion in P.Oslo. I V, as it is a CPS-agent, brings agent-based agency into the ritual, even if it is the object of the ARS.

Now, concerning the relations between the input spaces, Sørensen does not rely on Fauconnier and Turner’s fifteen vital relations. Instead, he again turns to anthropology, more specifically to Frazer’s two types of ‘magical’ action; ‘Contagion,’ where supernatural agency is transferred through contact, and ‘similarity,’ where supernatural agency is transferred by, well, similarity (Sørensen 2007, 95). These categories, Sørensen continues, have not only been Frazer’s most enduring and useful legacy to anthropology (2007, 95), they have also more recently been confirmed by psychological experiments, for instance by Rozin and Nemeroff (2007, 95-96). Sørensen introduces the categories into blending theory using Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of semiotics. Peirce states that a phenomenon, in the form of its ‘sign,’ is appreciated by the interplay between three properties of the sign; icon, likeness or appearance, index, factual connection and symbol, its formal/cultural meaning. Sørensen equates the first two to similarity and contagion, respectively, and uses this analogy to explore the cognitive processing of ritual (2007, 44). An indexical relation describes what Frazer would call contagion, as the relation is founded on some form of contact, while an iconic relation is based on similarity.
I will pause briefly here to make a theoretical observation. Sørensen makes no attempt to relate his Peircian types of connection to Fauconnier and Turner’s vital relations, but I believe there is a possible correlation between the two approaches. An iconic relation includes types like analogy, similarity and property, while an indexical relation describes types like identity, part-whole, representation and role. From the many examples given by Sørensen it does seem that iconic and indexical principles are good ways of; 1) compressing what is diffuse, 2) obtaining global insight, 3) strengthening vital relations and 4) going from many to one (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 312). Elsewhere, Fauconnier and Turner argue that many blends and compressed relations eventually form part of the ‘cultural system’ (2002, 321). Concerning ritual, then, could similarity and contagion be culturally cemented compressed vital relations, made relevant in a ritual setting? As I mentioned, Sørensen does not suggest this, but it would align his and Fauconnier and Turner’s works on blend connections.

Returning to the main argument, I will present Sørensen’s interpretation of the Catholic Eucharist as an illustration of what I have explained, and also to show how his observations expand on the Eucharist-blend in figure F.

*Figure H: The Catholic Eucharist as a Ritual Blend*

Agent-based agency is implicated into the blend from ‘Christ/apostle,’ who is indexically linked to the person performing the ritual by the latter’s ordination and role, thus forming the ritual agent ‘priest.’ Also, there is action-based agency here, as the ‘mythic actions,’ here the
last supper, are iconically linked to the eucharistic actions, thereby forming ritually efficacious actions in the ritual space. The generic space, then, mirrors the two input spaces by the concepts ‘agent’ and ‘action,’ two of the three typical generic forms of ascribing ritual agency to the blend. All together, the blend produces an ‘emergent structure’ where the priest acquires superhuman agency and may distribute the body and blood of Christ, thereby acting back on the sacred domain. In fact, such an analysis may be precisely the refinement of Lawson and McCauley’s model that was called for in section 5.3, having room for multiple types of ritual agency in and ritual and thus allowing a more nuanced appreciation of the interaction between the ritual performance and CPS-agency in the ‘sacred space.’

Sørensen proceeds to argue that it is the indexical and/or iconic, and not the symbolic, properties that determine what is projected into the blended space and thus guides ritual development (2007, 68). For instance, “[s]pells and magical formulas are a certain type of speech-act almost devoid of direct reference and communicative effect, equivalent to ritual action with its lack of direct instrumental effect” (Sørensen 2007, 87). Of course, the ritual emphasis on index and icon does not mean that the individual elements in a ritual do not have a strong symbolic meaning in the general culture. In fact, this may be precisely why they are included in the ritual. Yet, as part of a ritual, the symbolic meaning of the elements subsides and they instead function according their indexical and iconic properties (Sørensen 2007, 146). As it turns out, that representations of efficacious rituals highlight the iconic and indexical properties of the elements used, and decrease their symbolic meaning, is Sørensen’s main conclusion (2007, 178). However, he adds, working against this tendency is the human/cultural need to organise and interpret phenomena symbolically, resulting in a dynamic process where one tendency emphasises indexical/iconic properties and the other symbolic properties (Sørensen 2007, 180). Sørensen sees this dynamic as the driving force in religious innovation. First, the emphasis on iconic and indexical features in ritual opens for new contexts and/or alignments, while in turn these new ritual alignments, which then have become incongruous to their former symbolic interpretation, provoke a new symbolic interpretation (2007, 180). For example, the similarity between wine and bread and blood and body presents a strong enough iconic relation to establish the Host as the body and blood of Christ in the Catholic Eucharist, but after the Reformation this coupling was no longer acceptable to Protestants as their doctrine emphasise symbolic properties in ritual.
Not everyone agrees with Sørensen’s emphasis on indexical and iconic properties. Czachesz argues that frequently performed rituals will be subject to a ‘tedium effect’ unless they are supported by “thematically arousing details” (2011, 9-10), which means a strong symbolic interpretation. Also Whitehouse holds that the symbolic interpretation of ritual is a key element in its transmission (2004a, 56). But this need for ‘thematically arousing details’ is perhaps precisely what Sørensen means when he writes about the human need for also a symbolic interpretation. The difference then would be that while Czachesz understand this need as a conservative force emphasising symbolic properties, Sørensen sees this as part of an innovative dynamic. Another comment on Sørensen’s work is that he bases his observations on a fairly limited empirical background, mainly using Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the Trobriand Islanders and the Azande, respectively, and certain rites in the Catholic mass (Yelle 2008, 528 and Bever 2008, 271). As the presentation above shows, Sørensen’s entire theory of ‘magic’ is built on a somewhat unprecedented combination of theoretical frameworks, taken from as disparate fields as cognitive science, anthropology and semiotics. Drawing upon such different fields and approaches may very easily meet with scepticism, perhaps justifiably so. However, here, as I noted earlier, my assessment of his theory will be through application, and Sørensen’s approach indeed produces some insights.

6.3 Blending in P.Oslo. I V

My discussion in section 5.2.0 already established that P.Oslo. I V contains two performative acts, and the analysis here will consequently, as the analysis in chapter 5, first look at both acts separately. Modelling them as blends, I will explore their network and continue by examining how the ritual space is formed as an emergent structure and elaborated on as such. Finally, in section 6.4 I will model and discuss how the two performative acts figure together, as they appear on the same papyrus and in a continuous text.

6.3.1 ‘δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε’ as a Blend

Beginning with the profane input space, the ritual action is the utterance δέννω σε, Σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιε. I indicate it as an utterance in figure I by placing the words in inverted commas (please see figure I). As established already in chapter 5, the ritual agent is the user(s) or ‘I.’ The model here shows that the user(s) is projected into the ritual/blended space only from the profane space, with no related event or being in the sacred space. Again, this was also
observed in the previous chapter, which showed that the CPS-agents in this ARS, and hence
its ritual agency, are implicated in the action complex and the object. As no ritual agency is
linked to the user(s), they are not connected to a counterpart in the sacred space.

However, the action complex is connected to a counterpart. I have discussed how this
utterance is perlocutionary, meaning that the action complex has a direct effect on its object.
As this object is the Artemisian scorpion, a CPS-agent and thus in the sacred space, the action
complex in the profane space must have a counterpart in the sacred space. I feel further
justified in placing ‘being controlled’ as a counterpart in the sacred space by the observation
in section 2.1.5 that δέννω is a common ritual term for taking control over supernatural beings
in Late Antiquity, and also by the analysis in section 5.2.1 indicating a divine hierarchy and
that the Artemisian scorpion’s position in this hierarchy is not leading.

Figure 1: δέννω σε, Σκορπίς Αρτέμις as a Blend.

The utterance ‘bind’ in the profane space is then iconically linked to ‘being controlled’ in the
sacred space. The type of ritual agency thus implicated is action-based agency, as reflected in
the generic space, based on the conceptual similarity between controlling and binding. This
model illustrates how the utterance is illocutionary, being an action, but also perlocutionary,
since the action complex has a counterpart in and directly affects the sacred space.
Proceeding to the ritual’s object, then, the Artemisian scorpion is a CPS-agent that originates from the sacred domain. It is implicated in the blend through the utterance of its name in the profane space. Remembering Peirce’s definition that indexes are ‘factual connections,’ a name is a typical indexical relation. The ritual importance of names in Late Antiquity has already been noted both in sections 2.2.2 and 5.2.1, and its use here connects the Artemisian scorpion with the profane space. Here, the relevant type of ritual agency mirrored in the generic space is agent-based agency. I have already elaborated some on the concept and importance of agency and CPS-agents in chapter 5. As an agent, the Artemisian scorpion is intuitively appreciated as acting and intentional. Furthermore, as section 5.2.1 showed, it is qualified as an appropriate object by the propositional act, being thought capable of protecting the house and its occupants. I first thought to place the utterance of the propositional act as part of the profane space, and have it projected into the ritual/blended space from there, but soon realised that, not being performative, it has no place in the blend. After all, it describes a future event, a proposition, and is therefore not a part of this ritual frame. Instead, it should be considered an indication of the Artemisian scorpion’s agent properties.

All this is then projected into the ritual or blended space, which produces the emergent structure wherein the user(s), as ritual agent, can exert power over the Artemisian scorpion. I noted already in chapter 5 that this ARS indicates a worldview in which people may, through ritual, engage with and even control CPS-agents. Here, the emergent structure in the blended space, establishing links and relations that are not originally present in the input spaces, demonstrates how this is possible. The conceptual integration network shows how P.Oslo. I V joins the user(s) and the Artemisian scorpion through the ritual text, making the utterance ritually efficacious. Then, by being used, a blend is ‘elaborated upon’ (Lundhaug 2010, 33). As this blend is worked in human cognition, it confirms the validity of the user(s) as ritual agent, and by extension, or ‘elaboration,’ humans’ validity as ritual participants in general. The cultural presence and impact of this type of ritual blend is confirmed by the several parallel ritual texts in Appendix 2.

The analysis so far has dealt with principles of ritual efficacy, which Sørensen has found from both cognitive theories and anthropology, and how these work together in P.Oslo. I V. Now I will turn to Fauconnier and Turner’s ‘topology principle,’ to examine what aspects of the profane and sacred domains that are too strong to be affected by the blending in this utterance.
Lawson and McCauley’s theory has already established the basic topology of the profane space; the ARS. Their argument in section 5.1 detailed how an intuitively acceptable action, and by extension also a ritual action, representation needs an agent, an action complex and an object. Consequently, the profane space must include these three elements and they must be projected into the ritual/blended space, as shown in figure I. More interesting, however, for my study is the topology of the sacred space. This is, after all, what holds the user(s)’ culturally postulated worldviews and ontological assumptions. Yet, here I cannot offer much more information. Chapter 5 already concluded that power and domination are important principles in the ontological assumptions of this ritual utterance. My analysis in figure I simply confirms these observations, showing that humans may acquire power over CPS-agents in the sacred space, through both agent- and action-based agency.

6.3.2 ‘I Ask/Order/Appeal to you Lord’ as a Blend

Moving on, I proceed to the second performative act, which, as detailed in section 5.2.0, is implied by the imperative φύλαξον. This ritual utterance shares some traits with the first, but there are also differences between the two. Some of the differences are such that Lawson and McCauley would class it as a prayer, and not a ritual, but than I found other traits that are more ritual-like. Using blending theory, I hope to, in addition to the general analysis, be able to explore this question further. Now, Sørensen does not place a strict dividing line between different genres of religious activity, holding that all religious practice includes, to varying extents, some form of ritual agency (2007, 5). Still, he acknowledges various types of religious activity, by how ritual agency is implicated into the blend from the sacred space and this may help to further comprehend how this implicit performative act works.

Starting, there is the profane space where the only recorded utterance is ‘Lord,’ the ritual object. However, based on Lawson and McCauley’s principle for action representation, I know that an intuitively acceptable action also needs an agent and an action complex. In section 5.2.2 I argued why I hold the agent to be the user(s) and the action complex to be ‘ask/order/appeal to,’ so I will simply adopt this here. Suffice it to remind that while the imperative φύλαξον may imply a wide variety of illocutionary acts, a comparison with the first performative act suggested that this is a much milder imperative. All together, then, the implicit utterance in the profane space is ‘I ask/order/appeal to you Lord,’ and this is what I will analyse (please see figure J).
Like in the first performative act, the ritual agent here is the user(s). As in the first performative act, he/she/they are projected from the profane space without a counterpart in the sacred space. However, differently from the first performative act, here also the action complex stands without a direct connection to the sacred space. Figure J thus demonstrates the difference between the perlocutionary force of ‘bind,’ which by causing an immediate change in its audience (the Artemisian scorpion) establishes a direct connection with the sacred space, and the illocutionary force of ask/order/appeal. These, or any other of the potential operative words in the second utterance, are performative only as actions and not as actions that somehow changes the audience. Modelling the utterance as a blend, then, demonstrates the difference between the illocutionary and perlocutionary force, suggesting that the there indeed is a structural difference between a prayer and a ritual.

Returning to this question later, I move on to the ritual object. The title ‘Lord’ is uttered in the profane space, and then the description of his heritage and attributes in lines 8-9 quickly identifies as Christ. Christ is then the sacred space counterpart of ‘Lord,’ and is of course a CPS-agent. This is an indexical relation, analogous to the connection between the name of the Artemisian scorpion and the CPS-agent itself in the first performative act. The generic space
here contains agent-based agency, as Christ is a CPS-agent and his implication into the blend provides it with agent-based agency. Again like the Artemisian scorpion, as an agent Christ holds intuitive properties like agency and intentionality, as well as the special property of being capable of effectuating the propositional act. For the same reasons as above, the propositional act here can also not be included in the ritual blend.

All three elements are projected into the ritual/blended space to form an emergent structure. First of all, the ritual/blended space brings the user(s) and Christ together into one action structure, thereby becoming efficacious. This does not necessarily prove much about the nature of this performative act, as a prayer, also according to Christian tradition, is considered efficacious (Stewart 2008, 749). Irrespective of the act’s nature, the emergent structure establishes the user(s), as ritual agent, with at least the ability to reach the sacred space. In fact, by the use and elaboration of this, the utterance here may very possibly be related to the wider Christian tradition for prayer and a belief in such efficacy can thus cement itself in the early Christian worldview in Late Antiquity. It is, after all, well known from a range of studies that Christ was considered a powerful apotropaic agent, and that he was popular as such (Hurtado 2003, 618, note 167).

Here, I rather think the key lies in the action complex, having illocutionary, but perlocutionary, force. Being only illocutionary, this action complex shows a situation where Christ in the sacred space is not a CPS-agent to be controlled or gained authority over. This can be understood as the topology of the Christian sacred space, allowing no other deities. In fact, seeking out the topology principles of the sacred space here, these appear to have a lot in common with Christian teaching. First, Christ is not controlled or coerced by anyone. Second, Christ (of course extended to the Trinity) is the only active element in the sacred space; there is no other hierarchy or divine action indicated. In addition to this, the blend here also has one less connection between the profane and the sacred space. Again, this would compare well with a Christian idea of prayer as something less direct, less compulsory than a ritual, if still efficacious. This, then, appears to be a perfect example of what Fauconnier and Turner writes, namely that a blend develops in the dynamic between 1) the compressing tendencies of the emergent structure and 2) the topology principles, which here is 1) ritual efficacy and 2) Christian dogma on Christ and divinity.
6.4 Summarising Observations and Remarks

I closed chapter 5 by pointing out three main questions that my analysis there had raised, but which I had been unable to address using Lawson and McCauley’s theory. The first question concerned Lawson and McCauley’s somewhat unilateral tracing of supernatural agency to an original CPS-agent, and, as I previewed in section 6.2, the analysis in section 6.3.1 shows how Sørensen use of blending theory, which implicates CPS-agency via one or more connections between the profane and sacred spaces in a ritual blend, facilitates multiple avenues of divine or ritual agency into a ritual. The second problem was assessing the intuitive role of signallng doctrine, which presented itself in the analysis of the second ARS. Here, it turns out, Sørensen’s theory can be of little assistance. As in Lawson and McCauley’s theory, questions of faith and doctrine are posited as constraining forces originating from the conceptual domains. They are then part of the vital topology of the input spaces, but any other, more explicit function doctrinal signalling may have had is difficult to incorporate into Sørensen’s blending framework.

Another aspect which Sørensen’s theory of ritual blending does not include, but which Lawson and McCauley’s theory is able to capture, is enabling acts and action conditioning. In both utterances, the action complex is enabled, or at the very least strengthened, by action conditioning. For the first performative act, this is the divine names and voces magicae in line 2, while the second performative act is enabled by the string of symbols ‘α†ω Ω Α†Ω ΙΦΘΥΣ’ in line 10. Being unable to include these in the model, there is no possibility to assess the ritual according to the principles of superhuman agency and superhuman immediacy, as this would be based on observing the proximity of the CPS-agent to the ritual through the number of enabling acts. So, while representing ritual as a blend allows for greater detail in analysing the ritual action itself, Sørensen does not offer any specific framework to address the centrality or performance frequency of a ritual.

Of course, it is possible to model the enabling acts as separate, independent blends, and then take these as implicit parts of the main blends in figures I and J. While loosing some precision, this approach does open for the possibility, which I found lacking in section 5.2.1, that the enabling act works upon more than one of the ritual elements. These would be very simple blends (please see figure K). The sign, be it a divine name or a symbol, in the profane space has an indexical relation to the CPS-agents the name/symbol refers to, providing the
blend with agent-based agency. In fact, this is exactly how the Artemisian scorpion is implicated into the ritual in figure I. I include Christ as the sacred space counterpart in the enabling act of the second performative act, since section 2.1.11 established that ‘α†σΑ†ΩΙΦΘΥΣ’ are symbols referring explicitly to Christ.

**Figure K: The Enabling Acts of P.Oslo. I V**

While not having very elaborate networks, modelling these two enabling acts as blends further illustrates their similarity. As I argued in section 5.2.2, the enabling acts of the two utterances are so similar that it is difficult to categorise the one as substantively different from the other. Both the structure and the type of ritual agency is identical, the only difference is in the religious content.

Finally, the third and largest question left from chapter 5 is how P.Oslo. I V as a whole, but also the second ARS more specifically, may display such different traits. Some are typical for the ‘generic’ ritual tradition in Late Antiquity, while others appear distinctly Christian. To a certain extent, my analysis in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 has addressed this. However, to further facilitate this discussion I propose to combine the two performative acts of P.Oslo. I V together in one blending model (please see figure L). On the one hand, the performative acts are similar, with the basic representation structure agent – action complex – object in the profane space, and this important topology is projected into the ritual/blended space. Second, ritual agency is in both cases ascribed to the blend by the implication of a CPS-agent, from the sacred space, as the ritual object. On the other hand, the action complex in the second performative act is only illocutionary, not perlocutionary like ‘bind’ in the first, meaning 1) that the user(s) here may not effect a direct change in the sacred space and 2) that there is one
less connection between the sacred and the profane spaces. Regarding the first point, the sacred space was found to have different topology principles, generally more in line with Christian teachings on the divine and divine agency. In addition to this model, there are the enabling acts in figure K, whose analysis in the previous paragraph show to be near-identical in structure. Hence, as I concluded in section 6.3.2, the ritual text appears to work in a dynamic between the compressing tendencies of the ritual’s emergent structure and the restraining topology from the Christian sacred domain.

Another purpose of placing the two performative acts together in one model is to reflect that they appear together on one papyrus and in a continuous text. This is an important fact I fear
is easily forgotten in the separation of the text into two performative acts. I was initially hesitant to use the two performative acts as input spaces for a new blended space, which represents all of P.Oslo. I V. As the model shows, this new blend is quite weak, in that it rather reflects commonalities between the two performative acts, than a blending of the two input spaces. As such, the Artemisian scorpion and Christ are not blended into a new deity, but aligned as CPS-agents. Also the action complexes are projected into the blended space with a very general common denominator; ‘interacts.’ Thus, one could argue that there is no blending taking place between the two performative acts.

However, then there is the fact of them being together in a continuous text on the one papyrus, something which does relate the two acts. It also underlines their structural similarity, which may consequently provoke an iconic relation between the two spaces, thereby starting off a new conceptual integration network. Hence, I choose to project the two performative acts into a blended space for all of P.Oslo. I V, even if it is a weak blended space that includes the very broad terms ‘interacts’ and ‘deities.’ Clearly, a great deal of nuance is lost here, nuance which I have found to be very important in the understanding of, and also distinguishing between, the two performative acts. Yet, I think the weakness of this over-arching blend is a good model for P.Oslo. I V, reflecting that there are also several aspects that the two performative acts do not share. The sacred space of the second act still adheres to Christian ideas of the divine, and its action complex has no counterpart in the sacred space, as opposed to the first blend. The difference found in the foregoing analysis is still present and must have an impact also on P.Oslo. I V as one blended space. All in all, then, I think the weak blended space reflects both how the two utterances’ common ritual structure pulls toward blending, and how important topology principles from the input spaces work to constrain the degree of blending.

There are, however, some questions that arise with this blend. Can I really place Christ and the Artemisian scorpion together, on the same level, as ‘deities’? In fourth, and at least fifth century Egypt, one would think most people very well appreciated the difference between the two CPS-agents, irrespective of their faith, and my analysis in the foregoing paragraphs has demonstrated that they are even treated differently within P.Oslo. I V itself. Fauconnier and Turner note that blends may be internally contradictory in certain respects, in order to preserve the running of the entire network (2002, 85). Here, the alignment of Christ with the
Artemisian scorpion may be an example of this, a case where the CPS-agents are joined in a network aimed at ritual efficacy and therefore downplaying their differences. This falls in line with Sørensen’s point that it is indexical and iconic interpretations, not symbolic ones, that guide ritual development (2007, 175). And when these interpretations dominate, a ritual like P.Oslo. I V, combining Christian ritual practice with other ritual traditions, is possible. After all, it is these clashes between different organising frames that provoke rich cultural blends (Lundhaug 2007, 33). However, Sørensen also notes that these new cultural blends will need to be symbolically reinterpreted in a manner that satisfies the common religious domain. If not, the ritual will be either rejected or renovated (Sørensen 2007, 187-189). It is tempting, then, to see P.Oslo. I V as an instance of combining Christian and non-Christian ritual forces, but then in a manner that would never be accepted in official Christianity.
7 Conclusion

As my work draws to a close, I will begin by bringing together the observations and results from my analysis and propose a scenario for the making of P.Oslo. I V, followed by a short comment, on the cognitive theories I have used. Then, I will proceed to make a brief attempt at locating P.Oslo. I V in a wider context, looking first at cognitive approaches to religious transmission and then at historical studies of ritual practice in Egypt in Late Antiquity. Finally, I will close by pointing to possible future research that may help the understanding of both early Christianity and of ritual practices in Late Antiquity.

7.1 Concluding Summary and Observations

In the first of the three main chapters of this thesis, I presented P.Oslo. I V and the main outlines of the philological work that has been done on it specifically, and more generally on the contents of the ritual text. It established, in line with Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s first publication of the papyrus (1921), that the text combines elements from both Christian and non-Christian ritual practice in Late Antiquity. Summarising my observations in section 2.2.6, I outlined two possible ways of understanding P.Oslo. I V. One possibility is that P.Oslo. I V was an instance of a well-established ritual practice, known from the parallel texts in Appendix 2, adopted and elaborated upon within a Christian context. The similarity with liturgical prayer of lines 7-10, and its doctrinally significant content, certainly suggests so. The second possibility is that the ritual text should be approached in terms of ‘genre.’ Looking at papyrological evidence from the era, there appears to have been two main ‘types’ of ritual texts, one which “conflates scores of divinities” (Graf 1991, 190) and another that keeps a narrative structure (Frankfurter 1995). P.Oslo. I V tends towards to former. This emphasis on genre, instead of religion, falls in line with several studies arguing that even if ritual texts contain Jewish and/or Christian elements, “they unashamedly lacked a full comprehension or appreciation of the inner integrity of the cults whose material they appropriated” (Betz 1991, 254, see also Bohak 2003, 73 and Kee 1989, 128). However, in both possibilities, Christian and non-Christian ritual elements are combined to form P.Oslo. I V. Yet, based on chapter 2 I was unable to say anything more about the nature and motivation of their combination, and this is why I turned to cognitive ritual theory.
The analysis in chapter 5 produced a somewhat puzzling result. On the one hand, the structure of the Christian and the non-Christian performative act is quite similar, suggesting the Christian elements were simply employed as ritually powerful elements and thus supporting an assessment of rituals in Late Antiquity according to genre. On the other hand, the action complexes of the two performative acts are different, which then indicates that the Christian part did keep its integrity and thereby implies a situation where religious tradition is important. The results from my analysis in chapter 6 confirm this situation. While the intuitive ritual structure of the two performative acts is similar, their action complexes, and also the appreciation of the their respective sacred spaces, are different. By combining the two performative acts in one blend in figure L, I try to catch how these differences and similarities may function together in one ritual text. Section 6.4 then concludes that ritual text appears to work in a dynamic between 1) the compressing tendencies of the ritual’s emergent structure and 2) the restraining topology from the Christian sacred domain. I refer to Fauconnier and Turner’s note that blends may have internal contradictions between certain elements to preserve the running of the entire network (2002, 85). In P.Oslo. I V, then, the contradiction between the Christian and the generic, pan-Mediterranean material is downplayed by the ritual structure, but this is not strong enough to remove the differences in topology between the Christian and the non-Christian sacred domains.

Although I have been analysing the user(s)’ appreciation of P.Oslo. I V, as the text’s audience and not its author, I would still like to hazard an hypothesis regarding the formation of P.Oslo. I V. I propose its creator wanted to elaborate the ritual act in lines 1-6 with Christian material. She or he then did this by duplicating the ritual structure, creating another performative act in lines 7-10. I already discussed the possibility of the two acts having parallel structures in section 5.2.2, opening with an appeal to higher powers before moving on to the performative utterances. Most ritual studies agree that proper form and structure is important in ritual (Sørensen 2007, 175, MacMullen 2009, 101), and following this principle the creator of P.Oslo. I V would have wanted to expand the Christian material in a proper and correct format. This is easily achieved by paralleling the performative act in lines 1-6, which the other papyri in Appendix 2 show was a popular ritual form. The only difference, according to structural criteria, is that the content of lines 7-10 is Christian, following Christian teaching on divinity and quite possibly borrowed from liturgical practice or prayer-traditions. Well, almost. If the voces magicae in lines 6-7 are introductory appeals to the second performative
act, then it is not completely Christian. But then again, the first performative act is headed by the Christian \( \Phi M \), so the lines drawn between the two utterances and their religious tradition cannot be too sharp. As, indeed, the cognitive analysis in chapters 5 and 6 suggests.

This scenario, with a ritual structure duplicated from the generic pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition, but built onto a ritual phrase that is Christian in content and doctrine, mirrors Lawson and McCauley’s prediction that “the more rituals and personally active superhuman agents that a religion possesses [here, the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition], the firmer is its basis for accommodating competing cognitive models [here, Christian belief]” (1990, 164). This opens for rituals like P.Oslo. I V, where the structural forces from the one tradition operates together with topology principles from the other. It furthermore helps to explain the contradicting observations on the ritual’s ‘centrality’ in chapter 5. As the object of the second ARS, Christ is qualified according to properties from the Christian domain or ACS, whereas his role as enabling agent for the action complex follows the generic, pan-Mediterranean ideas on ritual efficacy. Thus, Christ answers to two sets of ACSs; 1) the Christian religious tradition as ritual object and 2) the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition as enabling agent. With such a mixed situation, it is reasonable that Lawson and McCauley’s principles contradict.

### 7.1.1 Observations and Comments on the Cognitive Theories Used

I opened this thesis by quoting Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s conclusion about P.Oslo. I V, saying that “Offenbar liegt hier der Fall vor, dass eine altbewährte heidnische Beschworungsformel durch einen christlichen Zusatz erweitert worden ist” (1921, 23). After some fifty pages of cognitive theory and analysis, I have arrived at a conclusion, in section 7.1, that essentially says the same. However, in reaching this conclusion I have made some observations as to the hows and whys of P.Oslo. I V, thereby complementing Eitrem and Fridrichsen’s understanding of the ritual text. The cognitive analysis has shown that P.Oslo. I V includes two performative acts, and it detailed how this structure makes the utterances be intuitively appreciated as ritually efficacious. Moreover, the structure of the two acts was found to be almost identical, which helps explain how two different religious traditions may fit together in one text. However, the cognitive analysis also detected differences between the two performative acts, notably in their action complexes and in their ACSs or sacred domains. Finally, placing the two acts together in section 6.4, I was able to illustrate how P.Oslo. I V is built around a dynamic between the Christian and the generic, pan-Mediterranean religious
traditions. Thus, my analysis has provided some further observations on how P.Oslo. I V works and the worldview(s) that lie behind it, as I set out to do.

In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I already mention the many challenges to cognitive theory in religious and ritual studies, ranging from accusations of reductionism and opportunistic borrowing of theoretical frameworks, to calls for better empirical evidence or disagreement over premises. In response, cognitive scholars underline their field’s young age and argue successful applications will validate the theories (McCauley and Lawson 2002, 5). My application here has indeed provided some interesting observations on P.Oslo. I V, but there were also aspects of the ritual text that my analysis was unable to address. Lawson and McCauley’s theory was seen to be somewhat limited in its unilateral implication of CPS-agency, while Sørensen’s blending did not initially include preceding or preparatory acts. I tried to amend this point by modelling the enabling acts as separate blends in figure K, but I would have preferred to be able to include everything in the ritual text in one model. Then another question arose, and for this I did not find any answer. I was unable to address the role and function of signalling doctrine both in chapter 5 and chapter 6. This theoretical lapse when it comes to doctrine can be a consequence of the general reliance on anthropological studies of foreign, ‘pre-modern’ societies in cognitive ritual studies. While the cognitive scholars all make supporting references to Christian rituals, examples of which I have included in my presentation of their theories, typically “the language gets more vague, the use of terms looser” (Vial 2004b, 154) when they analyse these. At this observation, I cannot help but to return to Meyer, Smith and Kelsey in section 3.3, who ask for the relevance of ritual theories “derived from the observation of small-scale tribes, to the texts in this volume [ritual papyri], which were produced in a cosmopolitan urban setting” (1994, 4).

7.2 Possible Contexts

A part of my aim for this thesis has been to study P.Oslo. I V in and of itself, without relying on interpretative cues from a context that is largely unknown. While there is historical material on several groups of Christians and non-Christians in Egypt in Late Antiquity, locating P.Oslo. I V within any one of these contexts is difficult. However, having completed my analysis, I will make a short attempt at contextualising my observations and conclusions. First, I will briefly introduce the fourth branch of cognitive ritual studies, dealing with
religious transmission, and assess how these theories reflect on P.Oslo. I V and its context. Then, I shall compare my results to other historical work on religion and ritual practice in Egypt in Late Antiquity.

7.2.1 Cognitive Theories of Religious Transmission

Cognitive theory on religious transmission has developed in a discussion between Whitehouse (2000/2004a) and McCauley and Lawson (2002). From his studies religious groups in Melanesia, Whitehouse launched a theory saying that religions tend towards two opposite modes of religiosity (2000/2004a), which manifest themselves in different ritual experiences and how these trigger human memory (2004a, 64). Thence, he classifies ritual according to two attractor-points, two opposing modes of religiosity; a ‘doctrinal mode’ that relies on rituals with low emotional arousal but a high performance frequency, and an ‘imagistic mode’ whose rituals typically have high emotional arousal but lower frequency. The doctrinal mode results in the formation of a religious hierarchy to ensure the content and correct repetition of the rituals, which by their low emotional arousal are subject to a ‘tedium effect,’ while imagistic, infrequent rituals favour smaller, more exclusive groups centred on the memory of rituals of high emotional arousal (Whitehouse 2004a, 65-74). While agreeing with Whitehouse’s use of cognitive memory-studies, McCauley and Lawson argue that the degree of emotional arousal in a ritual, and consequently its memorability, does not originate with the frequency of ritual performance, but rather with the ritual’s form (2002, 113). High emotional arousal, they argue, occurs in rituals where the CPS-agent acts as ritual agent, whether directly or through enabling acts, while high frequency rituals are typically those where the CPS-agent is implicated either in the action complex or the ritual object (McCauley and Lawson 2002, 118). They continue to argue that due to the ‘tedium effect,’ religious traditions will evolve towards special agent rituals, but add that the most successful religions have a balance of both ritual forms (McCauley and Lawson 2002, 181).

Both theories of religious transmission have already been applied to a number of historical cases. Some see great explanatory potential in them (Beck 2004, Gragg 2004, Leopold 2004, Ketola 2007, Martin 2003/04&2007 and Uro 2007), while others question the distinction of their attractor points (Clark 2004, Wiebe 2004) and the applicability to more complex historical situations (Vial 2004b). Concerning Late Antiquity, Douglas L. Gragg argues that traditional Roman religion relied on high frequency, low emotional arousal rituals, which
made it subject to the tedium effect and thus explains the rise of mystery religions in the high-
and late empire (2004). Martin continues this argument by outlining how Christianity initially
held many imagistic traits, but then developed, from the Pauline tradition, a growing doctrinal
tendency (2007, 48-49). Anita Maria Leopold agrees with this scenario (2004, 109), and then
both she (Leopold 2004, 117) and Uro (2007, 129) position different ‘gnostic’ groups as
imagistic reactions to the growing doctrinal importance in early Christianity. But then, fitting
P.Oslo. I V into this scenario may present more of a challenge to the theories than these
previous applications have foreseen. None of these address small, private ritual in Late
Antiquity. Criticising the modal theory, Vial notes how apotropaic practices at the time of the
Reformation, which without hierarchical control and being performed in local milieus one
would expect to be imagistic, “on a second glance (…) seem to fit most of the criteria of the
doctrinal mode” being repeatable, widespread and frequently sanctioned by the local clergy
(2004b, 152).

Assessing P.Oslo. I V directly is, again, difficult due to the lack of contextual information.
The papyrus may have been taken out and read repeatedly, or it may have been hidden on the
user(s)’ person or somewhere else significant. It is equally impossible to say whether the
user(s) experienced the ritual text as emotionally arousing or not. Intuitively, I would be
inclined to link the many symbols and *voices magicae* in P.Oslo. I V to an imagistic mode, but
Vial has already pointed out that the instinctive equation of the imagistic mode with the use of
imagery does not square with the modal theory and is rather based on prejudice (2004b, 153).
Hence, there is no information regarding P.Oslo. I V that is of use to Whitehouse’s modal
theory. However, the ritual form of P.Oslo. I V is known, so I can apply McCauley and
Lawson’s theory of form. According to this, with the CPS-agent being implicated with the
action complex and the ritual object, P.Oslo. I V is a doctrinal ritual, meaning it has a high
performance frequency and low emotional arousal. Still, this is difficult to support through
other evidence. Moreover, McCauley and Lawson underline that not all rituals arrange
themselves according to their two attractor points, some rituals will have low frequency and
low emotional arousal and therefore need “cultural mechanisms for supporting memory”
(2002, 191). Jan Assmann has pointed out how writing is an important such ‘cultural
mechanism’ (2006, 8), and as a ritual text perhaps P.Oslo. I V is such a ritual? Of course, it
such an atypical form of ritual, but with the large amount of surviving examples of rituals
similar to P.Oslo. I V (Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994), far exceeding the few rendered in
Appendix 2, the ritual form appears to have been common. I would then rather agree with Vial’s comment that such apotropaic practices challenge these transmission theories, or at least beg further development. In fact, Whitehouse acknowledges Vial’s observation, yet does not propose to answer it (2004b, 222).

Finally, I should include Sørensen’s ideas on religious transmission. Although careful not to give ritual any primacy in religious development, he does argue that ‘magic’ “plays both a conservative and an innovative role in the development of cultural systems” (Sørensen 2007, 180). “[M]agical actions and representations are often deeply embedded in cultural systems and function as a ‘conservative’ force that supports already existing explanatory event-frames and systematised theologies” (Sørensen 2007, 176). Yet, as I mentioned briefly in section 6.2.2, Sørensen then adds that this symbolic understanding of ritual elements will eventually be undermined, and indexical and iconic relations will dominate the interpretation. Consequently, one may have a ritual like P.Oslo. I V, where common ritual structure and relations unite two different theologies on one papyrus. Thus, this ritual can be said to innovate the pan-Mediterranean ritual tradition by including something like a Christian prayer or liturgical phrase. I already referred to early Christian assertions that prayer is efficacious (Stewart 2008, 749), and P.Oslo. I V may have been an expression of this idea, understood via the older traditions of ritual efficacy. Thus, one could even argue that P.Oslo. I V is wholly a Christian ritual text, using older structure to express a belief in the efficacy of appealing to the divine. Then, with time, such ritual efficacy requires a new symbolic understanding, as Sørensen notes (2007, 181), and other, Christian structural expressions of ritual efficacy are produced.

7.2.2 Ritual Traditions and Early Christianity in Egypt

I noted already in section 3.2 how discourses in Late Antiquity, both Christian and non-Christian, placed ‘magic’ at the fringes of society and generally included it in some processes of ‘Othering.’ However, the efficacy of the ritual practices were never questioned (Collins 2008, 1). According to Smith, the era saw a general trend in religious behaviour, displacing religion from public temples and sacrifice to private devotion, and amongst the private devotional practices written rituals were a large category (1995, 22-27). In what has long been the standard work on early Christian ‘magic,’ Aune asserts that “[m]agic appears to be as universal a feature of religion as deviant behavior is of human societies” (1980, 1516), and
observes that early Christian literature, the Gospels included, could have functioned to sanction Christian ‘magic,’ especially through the name of Christ (1980, 1546). This, of course, became an important invocation in the development of the baptismal and eucharistic sacraments (Weltin 1960, 83). Somewhat later, Augustine describes ‘magic’ as communication with demons (Graf 2002, 96), and Caesarius, John Chrysostom and Athanasius all warn against using amulets and phylacteries, even if they refer to Christian scripture or are addressed to God (Dickie 2001, 281-283). However, in addition to the stereotypical ritual experts known also from non-Christian sources, their sermons also warn against the ‘magical’ ministrations of Christian clergy (Dickie 2001, 273). In a more specifically Egyptian setting, a well-known anecdote about Shenoute describes his condemnation of another monk who gave a fox’s claw to a sick official, and surviving letters to the monk Paphnutius ask for help in health, temptations, protection and other concerns (Brakke 2009, 4).

While the historiographical sources from early Christianity do an effective work in distancing the religion from such common ritual practices, recent scholarship agrees that the situation must have been more nuanced (Choat 2006, 126). In early monastic literature, David Brakke finds many indications that monks, at least some, functioned as local ritual experts. “The picture of the monk as the impresario of the demonic placed him among other figures in Egyptian society who likewise offered themselves as specialists in dealing with the divine or demonic powers – specifically, pagan priests and pagan or Christian ‘magicians,’ groups that in this period overlapped” (Brakke 2006, 227), with several stories of monks performing ritual services (Brakke 2006, 228). Moreover, in their interaction with the traditional priests there are not only stories of competition, but also of conversions (Brakke 2009, 9). These conversions may have caused the traditional priests’ ritual knowledge and competence to enter Egyptian Christianity (Brakke 2006, 227). These tales also make Frankfurter suggest a ‘demographic continuity’ from the Egyptian priestly class to the monastic communities, but he acknowledges there is no concrete evidence for this (1997, 129).

Still, Frankfurter has developed an extensive argument for seeing a continuity from traditional Egyptian religious practice to local Christian ritual experts. First he points to the large amount of surviving ritual texts in Coptic from the fifth through tenth centuries, Coptic being, he adds, a language that originated from and thrived in Egypt’s monasteries (Frankfurter 1997,
Then, Frankfurter places these ritual texts in a long line of texts of ritual expertise, with roots back to the temples of the New Kingdom (1997, 116). He proceeds to argue that religion in Roman Egypt functioned in local temple-village systems, centred on fertility, healing and safety (Frankfurter 1998, 7), and that, concurring with Smith’s hypothesis, in Late Antiquity this religious system was displaced from the temples to more private settings and itinerant religious experts (Frankfurter 1998, 30). This, then, was the system that Christianity went into competition with and addressed, partially, by taking up the same functions (Frankfurter 1998, 197). Robin Lane Fox (1986) and Ramsay MacMullen (1984) are two more controversial scholars arguing that Christianity spread through taking over the cultural niches of traditional religion, rather than displacing it. In Egypt, then, and for these ritual practices, Frankfurter holds that one should not think in terms of global religious systems like Christianity, but rather of local systems centred on practical concerns like health and safety. “Local religion is personified in a variety of ritual experts, individuals in whom the community invests some degree of authority over ritual bricolage, intimacy with spirits, or efficacious technologies like writing” (Frankfurter 2005, 275).

To me, this seems a very likely context for the production and use of P.Oslo. I V. My cognitive analysis of the ritual structure shows a combination of principles both from traditional ritual practice and from new, Christian teachings. Frankfurter refers to a similar process in the continued use, from pharaonic to Christian times, of amulets with a horse-rider spearing a demon: “[T]hus religion in its most basic and most traditional aspects, in its devotion to everyday safety and conservative allegiance to the image of divine victory, also continues by reasserting itself in ever new idioms and legends” (1998, 1-2). If P.Oslo. I V was produced by local, christianised ritual experts, who may even have been monks, it seems reasonable that it should have both its traditional form and elements from the new religion. This concept of local, contextualised religion would also explain why the ritual was found to be not very central to Christianity. Even though the ritual text includes distinctly Christian teachings, proposing a more than superficial knowledge of doctrine, the ritual structure is still alien to Christianity when manifest as global religious system. Instead, P.Oslo. I V will have been a local expression of Christian faith. Sorensen’s argument on religious development supports this, as it is precisely in such a local, pragmatic ritual setting that the indexical and iconic properties of religious elements will rise to the fore. Through these, P.Oslo. I V may unite the conservative force of the ritual structure with the new content and worldview of
Christianity. Together, these demonstrate a common appreciation for ritual efficacy and use, but a also a divine world, a sacred domain if you will, that is changing.

7.3 Suggestions for Further Research

As all cognitive studies seem to do, I shall also join the general call for more work in this field. Although I have pointed to an increasing number of empirical studies and different applications of cognitive theories, there are still too few. Despite the relative success of the present application of cognitive theory to P.Oslo. I V, Lawson and McCauley’s analogies to structural linguistics continue to be founded perhaps more in pragmatics than academic argument, and Sørensen’s expansion of blending theory is done with a fairly random assortment of theoretical loans. Hence, further work, both on theory and application, would be welcome. A more specific point that was raised in my study is the question of doctrine and where this features in the cognitive representation of ritual. I found that neither Lawson and McCauley nor Sørensen captured this aspect in their models, which seems to underline Meyer, Smith and Kelsey’s criticism of ritual theories that rely too much on anthropological observations of small-scale tribes (1994, 4). Hence, I think it is necessary to further explore cognitive theories within religious traditions with better known, if not stronger, doctrines, as for instance Vial (2004a) does. Connected to this is also the question of distinguishing between ritual and prayer, or perhaps more specifically between illocutionary and perlocutionary force in performative utterances. Although there are works like Sweetser’s (2000), who looks at speech-act theory and its relation to ritual, a stronger theoretical base here would be of great help. Even if Smith thinks the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary force is merely a continuation of the preconceived duality between religion and ‘magic’ (2002, 90).

Another development for this type of research would be to expand the source material. Having P.Oslo. I V as a case study has allowed me to proceed in great detail, precisely the point of having a case study, but now our appreciation of the period and the subject would clearly benefit from extending the study to more examples of ritual texts from Late Antiquity. The close parallels to P.Oslo. I V listed in Appendix 2 are but a few of the large number of published ritual papyri, many of which include equally fascinating combinations and uses of different religious traditions. Hopefully, the conclusions arrived at here can be of help in
analysing also these other ritual texts. Another interesting aspect, which I also did not have time or space to go into in this study, is the materiality of the papyrus and its significance as an object. I did touch upon the question of having a performative utterance written down, what the significance of such vocal permanence would have been, in section 5.2.1, but very briefly. In cultural studies, there is an expanding field of research looking at the cultural participation of objects in actor-network-theory, led by scholars like Bruno Latour and Theodore Schatzki (Reckwitz 2002). Within religious studies, Marianne Schleicher has begun to explore the relation between Scripture, primarily in Judaism, and the material manifestations of the texts (2008, 50-51), and anthropologist Edwin Hutchins has presented an article incorporating materiality into blending theory, seeing objects as potential ‘material anchors’ and as such possible input spaces in a conceptual blend (2005). Including such approaches in the study of ritual papyri, taking into account their role not only as text but also as an artifact, I think will provide further interesting insights into ritual practice and ideas in Late Antiquity and early Christianity.
Bibliography


MacMullen, Ramsay. 1984. Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


Appendix 1

**P.Oslo. I V.**
Oslo Papyrus Electronical System (OPES): [http://ub-fmserver.uio.no/viewRecord.php?recid=44](http://ub-fmserver.uio.no/viewRecord.php?recid=44)
XMΓ.

Ὡρ Ὡρ φωρ φωρ, Ἰαώ, Σαβαώθ, Αδωναί, Ἐλωέ, Σαλαμάν Ταρχ[ei]
dέννω σε, Σκορπίε Άρτεμίσιε τιε΄, διαφύλαξον τὸν οἶκον τοῦτον
μετὰ τὸν ἐνοικούντον ἀπὸ παντὸς κακοῦ, ἀπὸ βασκοσύνης
πάσης ἀερίνων πνευμάτων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου ὄφθαλμον,
καὶ πόνου δεινοῦ [καὶ] δήγματος σκορπίου καὶ ὄφεως διὰ τὸ
όνομα τοῦ ὕψιστον θεοῦ ναίας μελὶς ζή νηοςρυρο ααααααααααααααα
βαϊνχωικόι μαριν υ λ ἡναγ κορη. Φύλαξον, κύριε, υἱὲ τοῦ
Δαβίδ κατὰ σάρκα, ὁ τεχθεὶς ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου
Μαρίας, ἄγιε, ὑψίστε θεὲ, ἐξ ἄγιου πνεύματος. Δόξα σοι,
oὐράνιε βασιλεῦ. ἀμήν. ᾧ ἁ Ω Π ΧΘΥΣ

(Preisendanz 2001, 210-211)

1 CH M G.
2 Hor Hor Phor Phor, Yao Sabaoth Adonai, Eloë, Salaman, Tarchei
3 I bind you, artemisian scorpion, 315 times. Preserve this house
4 With its occupants from all evil, from all bewitchment of spirits of the
   air and human (evil) eye
5 And terrible pain [and] sting of scorpion and snake, through the
6 Name of the highest god, Naias Meli, 7 (times) (?), XUROURO
   AAAAAAA
7 BAINCHOOOCH MARIII III L ENAG KORE. Be on guard, O Lord,
   son of
8 David according to the flesh, the one born of the holy virgin
9 Mary, O holy one, highest god, from the holy spirit. Glory to you,
10 O heavenly king. Amen. (signs)

(Meyer, Smith and Kelsey 1994, 49-50)
Appendix 2

P.Oxy. VIII 1152
4.2 x 6.1 cm, 5th/6th century.

Ὡ ΧΩ θσξ / Ἑισεί / Ἀδσλαί / Ἰάσ / Βαὼθ Μιχαήλ / Χριστὲ βοήθητι ἡμῖν /
καὶ τοῦτο οίκῳ α / μήν


(Preisendanz 2001, 214)

Photo: Advanced Papyrological Information System (APIS)
http://wwwapp.cc.columbia.edu/ldpd/apis/item?mode=item&key=pts.apis.8

P.Oxy. VII 1060
9.2 x 6.3 cm, 6th century.

† Τὴν θύραν, τὴν Ἀφροδίτην
φροδίτην
ροδίτην
οδίτην
δίτην
τὴν
ην
ν[π]

Ὡ ΧΩ / φωρ φωρ, Τάω Σαβαώθ, Άδονέ / δένο σε, σκορπεῖ Ἀρτερήσει / ἀπάλλαξον τὸν οίκον

(Preisendanz 2001, 209-210)

P.Oxy. XVI 2061
5,3 x 5,3 cm, 5th century.

Οξ Οξ θνξ θνξ Σαβ[α]ώζ, / Αδνλέ, Σαιακα, Ταξ / ρεη, Αβξα[ζ]αξ. δέννω σὲ, / σκορπίε Αρτεμίσιαξ, / τριακόσια δεκάπεν / τε. Παχων πεντεκαι / δεκάτη.....


(Preisendanz 2001, 154)

P.Oxy. XVI 2062
9,8 x 10,2 cm, 6th century.

Ὡξ ᩐξ / φορ φορ / Ιάω, / Αδοναει, / Σαβαώθ, / Σαλαμαν, Ταρχχει. / δέννω σαι, / σκορπίε / Αρτεμίσου, 1η´.


(Preisendanz 2001, 155)
P.Oxy. XVI 2063

7.7 x 5.2 cm, 6th century.


(++, ++ zw) Adônai, (zw)! Ich binde dich, artemisischer Skorpion. Am vierten Phamenôth (zw).

(Preisendanz 2001, 155)
P. Rain. 3
4,8 x 11,7 cm.

Ἱεσοῦς, Ἰησοῦς, Ἰησοῦς, ΑΩ, Ἀδωναί, Ἐλωνάι, Ἐλωὲ

εεεεεε εηηηηηη ιιιιιι 000000

(Z Charaktere)
o o a a αώρα

θ η ι ο α Ἔ λ ω σ α ι

ο ρ ρ ρ α π ω χ . . . η ι α ι α ι Α ι ώ ι

(Preisendanz 2001, 219)

P. Oxy. VI 924
9 x 7,6 cm, 4th century.

Ἡ μὴν φθλάξης καὶ συντή/ρήξης Αρίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπιθημερ/νοῦ φρικός καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καθημε/ρινοῦ φρικός καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λεπτοῦ / πυρε[τοῦ τοῦ τῆς κορυ/φής. ταῦτα εὐ[μενό]ς
[π]ρά[ξ]εις ὅλως κατὰ τὸ θέλημα / σου πρῶτον καὶ κατὰ τὴν πίε/τιν αὐτῆς, ὅτι δοῦλη ἐστίν /
tοῦ θ(ε)οῦ τοῦ ζώντος, καὶ ἵνα / τὸ δύναμά σου ἦ διὰ παντὸς / δεδοξαμέν[ον. /

dύναμ]ίς / α Ἰ(ησο)ῦ πατὴρ, νιός, μήτηρ Χ(ριστο)ύ o

η v

ι πν(εύμ)α Α Ω ἁγιον ω

Ἀβρασάξ

Bewahre und schütze Aria vor dem Schüttelfrost, der einen Tag währt, und vor dem Schüttelfrost bei Tag und vor dem Schüttelfrost bei Nacht und vor der durchdringenden Fieberhitze [des Kopfes]. Das tu mir in Gnaden voll und ganz, einmal nach deinem Willen,
und dann nach ihrem (der Trägerin) Glauben, weil sie Dienerin ist des lebendigen Gottes, und auf dass dein Namen immerdar gepriesen sei. [Wunderkraft] Iēsu Christi, Vater, Sohn, Mutter, heiliger Geist, A Ō, Abrasax.

(Preisendanz 2001, 212)
P.Oxy. VIII 1151

23,4 x 4,4 cm, 5th century.


(Preisendanz 2001, 212-213)

P.Rain. 5

13,4 x 19,6 cm, 6th/7th century.

Διὰ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς] καὶ υἱ[οῦ, τοῦ ἄγι[ον [πνεύματος καὶ] τῆς δεσποινῆς ἡμῶν, / τῆς παναγίας θεοτόκου καὶ ἀειπαθένου Μαρίας καὶ ἁγιασμοῦ / καὶ προδορίου Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστ[ό][υ], καὶ τοῦ ἄγιον καὶ θεολόγου / Ἰωάννου τοῦ εὐαγγελιστῆς, καὶ τῶν ἄγιων πατέρων / ἁμαρτόλων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἁγίων. ἐξορκίζω πᾶν δήμα τοῦ / διαβολοῦ θηρίων τῶν / ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κατά τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος / ἡμῶν Ἡσυχοῦ Χριστοῦ διὰ τοῦ ἐλαίου / τοῦ / ἑρωῦ βαπτισ[ιμοῦ, εἰ] τὴν τόπου τοῦ / τῶν ὄντων ἔθηκα, ἣν / σταθήτη ἐπὶ τὰς ἐθηκάς, ἤ / ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν / καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλήν / ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν βολβ[α]να, ἄλλα / σταθήτη, ἐφ᾽ ὧν τὸν ὄνομα (ἐθηκάς), καὶ ἄπονος μείνῃ / ὁ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸ πανάγιον καὶ / ἐντιμὸν ὄνομα τοῦ παντοκράτορος θεοῦ καὶ / Ἡσυχοῦ Χριστοῦ, τοῦ ὦ νοοῦ ...

(Preisendanz 2001, 219-220)

"Bitte des Dichters von Aphroditê"

49,6 x 28,5 cm

[Χρ(ιστός). ἐξορκίζω] σε, κ(ύρι)e, π[ανταγων[έω], [α]γνωστός[τε],
ἀπερμογόνητε, / 7 B.] στεφανά ὁμοίου παντεπότης σὺ καὶ Εἰώς, Σαβαώ, Βρινθαώ, ἔχε με
υίόν, / παρα[φυλαξάνξ με ἀπὸ παντός πονηροῦ πν(εύμ)ματος καὶ ὑπόταξόν μοι πᾶν / πν(εύμ)α
δαιμονίων φθειροποιοῦντον ἀκαθάρτων, ἐπίγα, ὑπόγα, / ἐνυδρα καὶ χερσαία, καὶ πᾶσα(ν)
σκιά(ν) σκιά(ν). Χρ(ιστός).

[Christus! Ich beschwöre] dich, Herr, Allherrscher, Ersterzeuger, Selbsterzeuger, ohne Samen Erzeuger, [Lücke], Allseher zugleich (bist) du und Iaô, Sabaô, Brinthaô, nimm mich als Sohn, bewahr mich vor jeglichem bösen Geist und unterwirf mir jeglichen Geist Verderben schaffender, unreiner Dämonen, die auf der Erde, under der Erdem die des Wassers und Festlandes, und jedes Gespenst. Christus!

(Preisendanz 2001, 221-222)

P.719 SIP

25 x 5,5 cm, 4th or 5th century.

† Χ [.]ερ. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν. καὶ θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος. βίβλος
γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, / υἱὸν Δαυείτ, υἱὸν Ἀβραὰμ. καθὼς εἶπεν Ὑσαίας ὁ προφήτης.
[ἀρχὴ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, / υἱὸν θεοῦ, υἱὸν Ἀβραὰμ. ἐπειδὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς
ἐπεχείρησαν ἀνταξάσθαι διήγησιν περὶ τῶν / πεπληροφορημένον ἐν ἡμῖν πραγμάτων. ὁ
κατοίκων [ἐν βοηθείᾳ τοῦ Ὑψίστου καὶ τὰ ἔξης. πάτερ ἡμῶν, ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς,
ἀγιασθήτο τῷ ὅνομα σου καὶ τὰ ἔξης]. ὁ δόξα πατρός καὶ υἱῶ / καὶ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι νῦν καὶ
ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. ἀμήν. Χ[(ριστός)]. † † †

(Preisendanz 2001, 227-228)