Development and Social Exclusion

The Case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Culture, Environment and Sustainability

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June 2007

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Dedicated to my father Oded Ben-Tov.
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Abstract

How does the discovery of the mausoleum of Herod the Great in the West Bank relate to Jewish Neo-Zionist territorial claims? What are the connections between agricultural farms and social exclusion? And why is it so difficult for Ka’adan, an Arab citizen of Israel, to purchase state owned land outside his own town?

In Israel, development schemes often contain a nationalistic overtone, marked by ethnic delineation and religious sentiments. This thesis, a cross-disciplinary socio-cultural and historical-geographical study, examines the role that religion, ethnicity and nationality play in the creation of “ethnoscapes” and “ethno-classes”. It is argued that the exclusive religious character of Israeli nationality poses a challenge to distributive justice and social sustainability. Focusing on the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, the relationship between nationality, demographic design and spatial domination is studied, revealing the interconnectedness of the politics of space, place, myth and identity.
Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to thank my supervisor Nina Witoszek. I would also like to thank the people in the Department of Man in the Desert, Jacob Blaustein Institute for Desert Research in Israel, who have made their research facilities available to me and were always ready to offer me help. I am grateful to Erika Rude for here proof reading. Special thanks to my father who helped me to establish primary contact with my informants and to my wife who bravely endured my endless attempts to speak about nationality.
List of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ILA</td>
<td>Israel Land Administration</td>
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<td>JNF</td>
<td>Jewish National Fund</td>
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<td>NCPB</td>
<td>The National Council for Planning and Building in Israel</td>
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<td>SD</td>
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1. Background

On January 13th 2007 a Jewish farmer shot to death an Arab-Bedouin who trespassed his property (Barshovski 2007:340). Looking at this incident from the perspective of the Jewish farmer, the trespassing occurred when the 25 years old Arab-Bedouin man crossed the border of his farm. From the Arab-Bedouin’s perspective, the trespassing took place when this border was first drawn. The focus of this thesis is on the issues of territorial and social boundaries. The objective is twofold: (a) to scrutinize the relationship between the Israeli state and its ethnic Arab-Bedouin minority, focusing on the ways spatial control and other means of domination are being legitimized by the hegemonic order; and (b) studying the impact that Israeli development policies have on the social equity of its Arab-Bedouin citizens.

Israel belongs to the category of “settler nations” similar to countries such as North America, French Algeria, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. Settler states are states where the hegemonic group has immigrated from abroad and rules over an indigenous population. Modern literature on encounters between white settlers and indigenous people is extensive (Hamdan 2005b; Hasson 1998; Howitt 2001; Kellerman 1996; Kimmerling 1999; Meir and Zivan 1998; Schnell 2004; Yiftachel 1998), to mention a few notable publications. Settlers’ encounters with the local people can take various forms, ranging from limited partnership to “ethnocide” and to genocide (Kellerman 1996). Often in history the power balance between the settlers and the indigenous population determined the nature of this encounter. In New Zealand, where the Maori were strong, there was some form of limited partnership (Howitt 2001). An “ethnocide” may occur where the state wishes to secure its national identity. For instance, in the nation building process of countries such as Canada, assimilation policies were used to “civilize” the native population, aiming to eliminate cultural differences and indigenous’ territorial claims. On the other hand, in Tasmania and in the Caribbeans a relatively weaker native community was subjected to genocide. During the first half of the nineteenth century the encounters that took place between white European fur hunters and the North American Great Plains
Indians were relatively peaceful, as both cultures borrowed and adopted cultural elements from each other. However, when the power relations changed as more white settlers arrived, the encounter gradually turned more violent (Meir and Zivan 1998:244). The encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab-Bedouins is somewhat similar to that of the encounter in America, in the sense of progressing from a peaceful encounter towards a more violent conflict.

The discussion of development policies and Arab-Bedouins’ social equity is closely associated with issues of settlement, which are pregnant with notions of security and demography. It is argued that these issues, which have a daily effect on the lives of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, are strongly influenced by the construction of Israeli national identity. To appreciate the connections between unsustainable development policies and national identity, narratives related to identity, security, pioneering and settlement are examined.

States have often used agricultural settlements in order to claim land and determine borders, for example, during the Ottoman period in Cyprus, during the nineteenth century agricultural colonies in Argentina, in the Canadian Prairies, and in the American frontier. Settlement activity can be regarded as a strategy of defining geopolitical boundaries between states, usually in an attempt to settle the minimum of people over a maximum of territory, (Hasson and Gossenfeld 1980), or as an activity designed to enlarge the territory of the state and form a cultural base for building the nation (Kimmerling 1999). The narratives relevant to settlement activity in Israel include: halutziut (“pioneering”), hafrachat hashmama (“making the desert bloom”), hityashvut (“settlement”), ge’ulat karka (“land redemption”) and kibush hashmama (“conquest of the desert”).

The Israeli political geographer Oren Yiftachel, who studied the socio-geographical consequences of the Israeli settler-politics, found that the encounter between settler societies and indigenous people creates two distinct developments. The first development is the rearrangement of society around “ethno-classes”, where the settler society forms the cultural, economic and political elite, while indigenous people
occupy lesser position in the socio-economic grid (Yiftachel 1998; 2003:24). The second development is the rise of ethnic opposition to the dominant outsider hegemonic power (Yiftachel 2003). For Yiftachel, territory is an essential element in the encounter between the state and the local people, being a mechanism which states use for gaining control over minority groups (Ibid:25). As a result of the rising resistance to the hegemonic power and its ethos, minorities often rediscover and even reinvent their communal identities, giving voice to counter narratives of their own. Before continuing, it will be useful to contextualize the encounter between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel/Palestine.

During four centuries of Turkish Ottoman rule, the Arab-Bedouin people in the Negev lived their lives according to their tribal traditions and nomadic life styles. Until 1948, the population of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev ranged between 65,000 and 90,000 people. However, after the *Naqba* (“disaster”), i.e. the War of Independence in 1948, 80-85% of the Negev Arab-Bedouins moved or were forced to move outside Israeli borders (Boteach 2006; Falah 1989; Goering 1979). Today, less than 10% of the remaining Arab-Bedouin people in Israel are able to maintain their traditional pastoral way of life and are ranked lowest in the socio-economic strata. This was the result of a number of factors: historically restricted access to economic, natural and social resources (Meir and Zivan 1998; Rosen-Zvi 2004), institutional discrimination (Adalah 2001), and a policy of spatial control (Falah 1985; Hamdan 2005b; Yiftachel 2003). The aggregated impact of the factors mentioned above led to the fact that the Arab-Bedouins living today in the Negev are among the poorest in Israel, occupy only 1.3% of their traditional ancestral territories and are in the midst of a conflict over land ownership with the Israeli state (Shagri-Bdarma 2006).

The encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab-Bedouins dates back to the beginning of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. The relationships between the Jews and the Arab-Bedouins began over 120 years ago, around the year 1880, when Jews from Poland began buying land and settling in Palestine (Aaronson 1983). The Jewish settlement activity expressed itself through two types of settlement: farmer’s frontier (the *Moshava* or “colony”) and labourer’s frontier (the Kibbutz and the *Moshav*
“collective settlements”) (Hasson 1998:121). The first phase of settlement (1880-1917) took place during the pre-state years under the Ottoman regime. This phase was peaceful as the Jewish socialist ideology of the Kibbutz met with Arab-Bedouin traditional hospitality (Meir and Zivan 1998:249). Influenced by the British romantization of Laurence of Arabia and ideas of the “noble savage”, the first settlers debated among themselves the extent to which they should adopt the Arab-Bedouin culture. However, as the encounter entered the post-independence phase, it became more violent, and its nature shifted from being local and personal to national and militaristic (Meir and Zivan 1998:257). The invasion of Israel by five Arab states in 1948 worsened the relations between Jews and the Arab-Bedouin community, especially in the Negev desert, where some Arab-Bedouins collaborated with the invading Egyptian armed forces (Peled 1992:434).

The Jewish Settlement in Palestine was supported by salient national narratives, such as aliya lakarka (“ascent to the Land of Israel”), halutziyut, and national heroic myths, such as the event of Tel-Hai (discussed below). These narratives and myths spoke of the redemption of the Fatherland, as well as the spiritual redemption of those Jews who settled in Palestine. During this period “the frontier” became a major Zionist icon, demonstrated in an Israeli popular song: “We shall build the land, our homeland” which was written by A. Levinston:

We shall build our country, our homeland because it is ours, ours, this land
We shall build our country, our homeland; it is the command of our blood, the command of generations
We shall build our country in the face of our adversaries; we shall build the country with the power of our will
The end to shameful slavery the fire of freedom is burning, the glorious shine of hope will stir our blood
Thirsty for freedom for independence we shall march without fear to liberate our people

(Quoted in Yiftachel 2000:738).
The image of the frontier was associated with the Zionist ethos of (re) building the nation through the “return” to the (home) land, cultivating the land, defending it and creating a new liberated society based on collective socialist ideals. The frontier symbolized a process of the national and spiritual revival of the Jews, a movement from the ghetto, the home of the money lender, to the frontier settlement, the home of the new “muscular” Jew, represented as a labourer and a warrior (Hasson 1998). The Zionists felt that the Jewish people had become detached from nature during their “exile” and hence they urged the European Jews to return to the historic homeland, the place of *initia gentis* (where the nation first arose) and to become closer to nature through agricultural labour (Gal 2007). The following song, written by Yoram Tehar-Lev in 1980 demonstrates the idea of the “new” Zionist Jew who claimed the land through his intimate knowledge of its secrets and walking and settling it.

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**Arise and walk through the land with a backpack and a stick. Surely you will find along the way the path of the good land.**

**The good land will embrace you; she will call you as if to a bed of love.**

**And groves of olive trees, the hidden spring still guard its dream, our ancient dream.**

**And red roofs on a hill and children on the path in that place we walked with a backpack and a stick.**

(Quoted in Yiftachel 2002:230).

The “new” Zionist Jew who redeemed the land through his physical strength was constructed in contrast to two “others”: the Diaspora Jews and the local Arabs (Ibid:228).

### 1.1.1 From Money to Sword

The Zionist transformation project was in effect a Westernization project as a form of self elevation. The Jewish settlers who immigrated to Israel from Europe imagined their new “self” based on the system of symbols, images and speeches that were used to mark them as inferior. The Jewish settlers who arrived from Europe carried with
them an inferiority complex: being marked not merely as being backward, but backward because being Oriental, Eastern, or Asian. Consequently, the new settlers in Palestine projected these stereotypic symbols to the general Arab population and to the Jews arriving from Arab countries\(^1\) (Khazoom 2003). The constitution of the settler’s mythical image is important for understanding the characteristics of the encounter between the Jewish farmers and the Arab-Bedouins within the context of the state’s development initiatives in the Negev, (e.g. the “Sharon Plan”) and for understanding the way in which this image has been used to legitimize land acquisition in Israel.

Development initiatives in Israel, such as the Sharon Plan (described below), often use rhetorics pregnant with national sentiments and resort to narratives expressing the national ethos. These rhetorics and narratives are linked to the Zionist ideology of building a home for the Jewish people in their assumed historical homeland—Zion/Palestine. For example, “making the desert bloom” is a narrative full of prominent connotations. The assumed ability of the Jews to develop the land resources to a higher level, as compared with the Arab-Bedouins’ “ineptitude” in the Negev, was used in the Zionist rhetoric to claim title over the land (George 1979:89). Levi Eshkol, who served as Israel’s third Prime Minister, was quoted in the Jerusalem Post, Feb. 1969 saying that: “it was only after the Zionist ‘made the desert bloom’ that they [the Arabs] became interested in taking it from us [the Jews]” (Jerusalem Post 1969).

The symbolic meaning folded into the encounter between Jews and Arab-Bedouins in the Negev is not only associated with a struggle over land resources between the local people and the developers, but also with an ideological conflict that concerns different national identities of the state and the Arab-Bedouins. On the one side there is the state’s attempt to sustain its national identity as Jewish, while on the other side

\(^1\) Due to the scope of this thesis it will not cover a major issue intimately linked to the Zionist project—the disparities within the Jewish Israeli Society in Israel, specifically between Ashkenazim (European Jews) and Mizrahim (North African Jews).
is the Arab-Bedouin struggle to assert its right for social, political and cultural self determination (Hasson 1998).

In contemporary Israel, the deep cleavages between the Jewish and the Arab-Bedouin communities are hardly a surprise, considering that Israel is a bi-national society with a Jewish majority constituting about 80% of the population and that most of its structural social basis is intact. Israel does not have a constitution, there is no separation between the state and the church, and there are some eighteen official laws discriminating Arabs (Svirski and Chason 2005). The disparities between the Jews and the Arabs are especially noticeable in the case of the Sharon Plan, a national development scheme initiated to address the “Bedouin problem” in the Negev. Within the context of the Sharon Plan, development is associated with the promotion of two main goals: (a) increasing the numbers of Jewish population in the Negev and (b) solving the Arab-Bedouin’s “illegal” acquisition of land by dislocating them into seven state-built semi-urban localities. These goals appear to be linked to the Zionist modernization and Westernization project in Israel, where control over the land is validated by “developing” it (George 1979). However, while studying the impact of the Sharon Plan on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, the claim that this development scheme is promoted in order to modernize them is contested in this thesis. Instead, it is suggested that the construction of national identity and the concept of citizenship play a more significant role in explaining the state’s policy of relocating the Arab-Bedouins. Accordingly, the Sharon Plan serves as a departure point for analyzing the challenges that unsustainable development poses to the social equity of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev.

The conflict in the Negev may be interpreted as a conflict over natural resources. However, what one sees depends upon one's subjective experience and position in relation to the issues surrounding this case. From the perspective of the Arab-Bedouins, the conflict is over “the right to culture” and the right to full participation in the social and economical everyday life. On the other hand, the state perceives the case as an issue of “protecting (Jewish) national land”. These two realities coexist and
they depend on one’s perception, the way light is either a particle or a wave. Before continuing, it would be useful to clarify the concept of social equity.

1.2 Development and Social Exclusion

Social equity means equal consideration of economic, environmental and social needs and includes the rights for food and shelter, safe drinking water, cultural and religious freedoms, political participation and access to health and education services. Accordingly, social equity requires intra-generational integrity, meaning equal distribution of environmental, economic and social resources (Howitt 2001; Parawer and Sarphus 2006:9). The concept of social equity emphasises the need to expand the circle of opportunities available to weak communities in an attempt to reverse the harming effects of social exclusion (MCSD 2000). Another distinguishing feature of social equity is the formulation of a community’s vision of the “good life” (Gabbay 2005). The concept of social equity is meant not only as a principle of inter-generational responsibility but also as an intra-generational integrity, implicating transparency, inclusiveness and equality in the distribution of natural resources among present communities (Gabbay 2005:13).

The concept of social equity is intimately linked to the paradigm of sustainable development (SD). The term “sustainable” comes from the Latin word “sustenere”, literally meaning “to uphold”. In its modern version, the term “sustainable” was first used in the German forest management (Ruu 2006:136). The United Nations Industrial Development Organization defines “sustainable development” as having three dimensions, which include environmental reliability, economic vitality and social equity (UNIDO 2006). Consequently, successful SD consists of the parallel consideration of all three factors.

Ever since sustainable development emerged as a development concept, non-governmental as well as governmental organizations have embraced it as the new development paradigm. Since the Brundtland Report (1987) and Agenda 21 (1992)
were published, there has been a growing awareness in the world for environmental problems and their possible solutions. It has also became clear that it is impossible to separate environmental issues from economical and social factors (ILA 2005). Sustainable development means different things to different people, but the most frequently quoted definition is taken from the World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the Brundtland Commission: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987:43). This quotation, which has been extensively used by academics, governments and NGOs for defining SD, emphasises the moral obligation that contemporary communities have towards future generations vis a vis the environment. This is to say that the sustainability of the environment is dependant on inter-generational equity, i.e. no natural resources should be consumed beyond their natural rate of recovery.

The debate about sustainable development often involves a discussion of people’s access to natural resources. This means that the interpretation of sustainability is relevant both to the relations between humans and the environment, as well as to the interrelations within human societies (Woodhouse 2000:162). Indeed, the Brundtland Report defines SD not only in environmental terms, but also as a social concept, specifically related to poverty reduction (Brundtland 1987:14). In the same vein, the General Assembly decided that poverty reduction is of primary concern to the implementation of Agenda 21. This decision was also reflected in the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, and in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (UNSD 2007). In conclusion: the issue of poverty reduction is a prime consideration for the SD paradigm.

The Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals address the various levels of human development, including halving by 2015 the number of people living under extreme poverty in the world (UNDP 2007). As with any formulation, defining poverty operationally is a complicated task. The World Bank is holding people whose income is less than 1 US dollars per day to be extremely poor
However, extreme poverty is not the only form of poverty. The United Nations Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific considers the most important aspects of poverty to be (a) health (b) education and (c) standard of living. “Poverty is (...) measured in terms of basic education, health care, nutrition, water, and sanitation, as well as income (...)” (UNESC 2007). Indeed, “Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends: above all it is a relation between people” (Alan 2000:20). According to this, poverty is not just having a low income; it is also a social status. Deepa Narayan finds poverty to be “the lack of material well-being, insecurity, social isolation, psychological distress, and lack of freedom of choice and action” (Narayan 2000:18). With relation to the above, poverty implies need, limited resources, low standard of living, lack of basic security and dependency (Banik 2006b:11).

Amartya Sen defines poverty as the failure to participate in human society and as a lack of choice, rather than just a matter of insufficient material living standards (Sen 1984). According to Sen’s Capability Approach, “an authentic development ethic shouldn’t be divorced from the hopes, expectations and aspirations of ordinary people” (Clark 2000:9). This means that development is understood as the enrichment of human lives in the sense of having the freedom to choose between different ways of living (Hewitt 2000:308). The failure to participate in human society takes different forms in different societies and is conceptualized by the term “social exclusion”.

The European Foundation defines social exclusion as “the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live” (European Foundation, Quoted in Alan 2000:14). The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination regards social exclusion as:

Any discrimination, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life (NCF 2006a:8).

For example, social exclusion may occur when changes in land tenure are made, causing people to lose their homes and forcing them to resettle on less fertile land, with insufficient access to resources such as social infrastructures or even drinking water. Social exclusion is thus a concept that relates to the mechanisms and institutions that marginalize people.

Different societies have different means for excluding the “other” and for preventing him or her from having access to social, cultural and natural resources. Deprivation and social exclusion have appeared in many shapes and forms, whether as the Jati Caste systems in India, former Apartheid in South Africa or slavery system in the US, or marginalization of Aboriginal people in Australia. History is crowded with examples of social exclusion; whether it is the lack of women’s voting rights in Bhutan, the expulsion of all Asians from Uganda under Idi Amin, or the official race categorization against ethnic Chinese and Indians under the “Malay Supremacy” policy in Malaysia. While social exclusion in Israel takes many forms, the discussion in this thesis is limited to the exclusion of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev, associated with the various mechanisms of spatial and symbolic domination.

1.2.1 Social Exclusion and the Geography of Poverty

Land has always been an important resource in the lives of the Arab-Bedouins, especially since their social structure and internal hierarchy is set according to the size of the tribal territory. Traditionally, the main resources of the Arab-Bedouins are land, while other resources such as education and employment are almost non-existing. Land resources consist of strong social factors and are an important part of the Arab-Bedouin’s identity and cultural heritage. Therefore, losing access to traditional territories threatens their ability to sustain their culture, social structures and communal identities (Abu-Ras 2006; ILA 2005).
Within this context, the state’s policy to resettle the Arab-Bedouins in semi-urban localities promoted by the Sharon Plan is challenging Arab-Bedouin’s cultural, social and economic integrity. Among the 160,000 Arab-Bedouins currently living in the Negev desert some 80,000 live in seven state townships, while the remaining Arab-Bedouins, who refuse to relocate, still reside in about 45 unrecognized villages, regarded as illegal by the government (Havatzelet 2006:4). The social conditions in the state townships are often less than adequate. For example, a lack of proper public transportation restricts the access of the Arab-Bedouin population to labour markets, higher education institutions and social services (NCF 2006a:19). In the unrecognized villages Arab-Bedouins are denied almost all state services, including connection to water, electricity and sewage grids (Saporta and Yonah 2002:99).

The Jewish National Fund is a semi-governmental organization responsible for developing and managing land resources in Israel. The Jewish National Fund attends to issues concerning settlement and demography and is playing a key role in Arab-Bedouin’s access to land resources. The Jewish National Fund is committed to the settlement of Jewish people in Israel. Together with the Israeli Land Administration the combined landholding power of these bodies prevents Arab citizens from buying, leasing or using over 75% of the land in the country (Yiftachel 1998:10).

In contemporary Israel, Jewish ethnicity is a precondition for the membership in the political community, a reality that excludes non-Jewish ethnicities. A telling example of social exclusion of the Arabs in Israel is their exemption from military service. Considering that many social and economic benefits in Israel are associated with military service, not being able to take part in military service has a negative impact on their lives (Wollf 2004). Furthermore, Israel’s national identity has an excluding effect on the non–Jewish citizens of the state. The state is not defined as the state of all its citizens, but as the state of the Jewish people, regardless of where they hold their citizenship. Consequentially, through semi-governmental organizations such as the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the state effectively marginalizes the non-Jewish minorities.
1.3 Objectives and Rationale

The objective of this thesis is to explore the consequences of Israeli development policy on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev and to examine the ways in which these policies are legitimized. The thesis draws attention to the interconnectedness of demography policies as exemplified in the Sharon Plan, as well as discusses the role of spatial control, settlement activity, and Israeli national identity. While exploring how national development policies in Israel impact the social equity of the Arab-Bedouin minority, this thesis explores the ways in which the construction of national identity and national myths in Israel is utilized by the hegemonic order, i.e. white, middle-class males, to legitimize the dispossession of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. Examining these issues will enhance the understanding of the issues surrounding the case and will help to generalize beyond the specific context of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev to other cases within and outside Israel. This thesis will also attempt to shed light on the mobilizing power of nationalism and its relevance to the problems of development.

1.3.1 The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter one opens by drafting the scholarly and the geographical context of the thesis. It presents the main issues discussed in the thesis, including a preliminary review of theory and a section about methodology. Chapter two expands the discussion of the theory, delving into theories of nationalism in an attempt to find a model that could offer some insight into the case of Israeli nationalism. This chapter discusses the nature and origins of nationalism and concludes with the examination of the historical ethno-symbolic approach. Chapter three, which pertains to the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the role of land resources in the culture of the Arab-Bedouins and reviews the development of land tenure in Palestine/Israel. The second section describes the challenges development policies such as the Sharon Plan and the Wine Road Project pose to the social equity of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. Chapters four
and five are the discussion chapters. Chapter four is designed to explain the state’s development policies in the Negev. Firstly, it examines and contests the argument that the state’s policies can be understood as attempts to bring modernization to the Arab-Bedouin townships. Secondly, it links development policies to the issues of ethnicity and demography, articulating the connections between demography, settlement, security and national identity. Thirdly, it discusses how national myths are used to legitimize state’s policies within the context of land allocation and settlement activity. Chapter five continues the discussion of the Israeli national identity, exploring the challenges that Israeli polity poses to Arab-Bedouins’ social equity. While undertaking this task, the chapter untangles the construction of nationality and citizenship in Israel. Chapter six brings to a close the main issues touched upon in this thesis, and discusses post-nationalist and neo-nationalist sentiments in Israel and their relevance to national identity and spatial control.

1.4 Introduction to Theory

The discussion of the encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab-Bedouins in Israel/Palestine grows from the tension that exists between settler states and the “local” ethnic minorities over their physical and imagined spaces. This is why national and ethnic group identities are central to the discussion of conflicts, especially in the light of recent conflicts in places such as Eastern Europe, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Angola. Conflicts between ethnic groups in the Middle East are also frequent, including ethnic groups such as Druze, Kurds, Armenians, as well as Jews and Arabs. The theoretical perspective applied to deal with the issues of group identities is the “historical ethno-symbolist” approach, formulated by Anthony D. Smith in the discursive debate about the nature and origins of nationalism (Smith 1983, 1986, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2007). The main argument of the historical ethno-
symbolist approach is that national identities are socially constructed by myth, memories, values, symbols traditions and “sacred texts”\textsuperscript{2} (Smith 1999:9).

The historical ethno-symbolic approach proves to be relevant to the case at hand, since it provides a model for explaining the ways in which communities regulate their interests through mythical symbols of territory, ethnicity and landscape. At the core of this approach lie myths of “golden age”, ethnic descent and myths of “ethnic sacredness”. These narratives explain the prevalence and re-emergence of nationalism and national identity in the modern era (Conversi 2007:22).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{2} For example, the connections between sacred texts and the formation of modern nations may be found in the recovery of the German \textit{Nibelungenlied}. Another example is the recovery of Karelian ballades and their correlation in the Finnish \textit{Kelevala}, edited by Elias Lønnrot in 1835 (Smith 2007).
1.5 Methods

This thesis studies the mechanisms of spatial control, their consequences and the narratives used to maintain them, employed by the Israeli state to control the Arab-Bedouins. While undertaking this task a strategy of particularization is adopted, moving from the meta level where abstract issues of national iconography are discussed to the micro level, examining the more particular issues concerning the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. At the micro level, etic questions are progressively transformed into emic issues. In the process of narrowing down from abstract to particular levels, the study becomes progressively more focused, beginning with key issues identified prior to arriving to the field and tackling new themes stemming from the new information.

The research activity includes a field work and the study of secondary materials such as text books, articles, NGO’s publications, press releases, state statistics, archival records, films and maps. The chief method for collecting data in the field consisted in semi-constructed and open ended depth-interviews. During the time spent in the field, a variety of primary and secondary sources were used to gather and generate data, such as qualitative interviews, personal observations, physical trace evidence, conferences, the press and the media, spontaneous conversations with locals and daily trips to key locations in the studied area. A voice recorder was used to register the collected data.

Issues relevant to the case study have often been perceived differently by governments, NGOs, academics and private people. This is why representatives from these different groups were included in the interviews. Purposeful sampling was used to select the informants, supplemented with “snow ball” sampling to locate informants from the Arab-Bedouin community.
The informants who were interviewed include NGOs such as Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Bimkom-Planners for Planning Rights, the Council for the Unrecognized Arab-Bedouin Villages in the Negev, Physicians for Humans Rights and The Society of Nature Protection. The official sources include a manager in an Arab-Bedouin city council and an executive in the Ramat Negev Regional Council. In addition, three Arab-Bedouins from the Azazme tribe and three Jewish local farmers were interviewed. I have also spoken with two Jewish academics, including an historian from the University of Haifa and an anthropologist from Ben-Gurion University in the Negev. These informants, both from the Arab-Bedouin and the Jewish sectors, were chosen due to their professional, private or academic acquaintance with the issues concerning the case study.

The Arab-Bedouins as well as the Jewish farmers who were interviewed were selected according to their geographic proximity to “spatially stressed” areas. The latter are localities where the expansion of an Arab-Bedouin village is frustrated by a variation of spatial mechanisms. The parameters used to identify these locations include distance from mining sites, nature and national reservations, planted areas, military zones, industrial areas and chemical dumpsters. The spatially stressed areas were selected using data retrieved from the Geospatial Information System (GIS), a computer program systemized to store, share, analyze and manage geographic data. The data was used to generate a map in Photoshop which helped to determine key locations for exploration. The Arab-Bedouin informants who were interviewed are members of the Azazme tribe which has been long involved in land disputes with the Israeli state. These informants included a social worker, a member of a school board, a local leader and an activist.

During the field work, trigulation was used to ensure the collection of valid and reliable data. Trigulation was exercised by cross examining the source and quality of the data gathered, through interchangeably using interviews, direct observations, 

3 See Table 1 for a complete list of the informants.
document review and “member checking”, allowing the informants to read and comment on the content of the interviews conducted with them.

In the process of gathering and analysing the data, qualitative and interpretative methods were used; an interpretative approach to the politics of nationalism and historical analysis were adopted to examine the impact that Israel’s development policies have had on the lives of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. Since the phenomena explored involve strong emotions which are hard to measure empirically, the emphasis was on qualitative methods. In addition, a reliable account of the various meanings of the case has required studying the different actors in their natural settings and recovering meanings of texts and speeches in the intentions of their authors.

1.5.1 Choosing the case study

Spending time in the field proved essential for gaining rigorous understanding and personal familiarization with the political, physical and cultural aspects surrounding the relations between national identity, development policies and social equity in the Negev. The decision to study the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev has been justified by this case’s potential to shed light on the broader nature of decision making in Israel and on the connections between development and ethnicity.

Beyond the local circumstances of the Negev region, the case of the Arab-Bedouins is a prism through which the relations between the state of Israel and its variety of ethnical minorities may be examined. The case was thus chosen not for being unique, but for being typical and exemplary, and hence capable of offering an insight into the historical, cultural and ethical characteristics of the relations between the Israeli state and its ethnical minorities. In short, the study is designed to optimize the understanding of the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev in order to enable a (future) comparison with other similar cases of internal colonization within the context of ethnic-democratic states and their relations with their ethnic minorities.
Focusing on a single case study for only 6 weeks was far from an ideal research situation. However, resources such as the length of study, time and finances did not allow for a lengthy exploration of the case. With all these limitations, the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev proves to be highly emblematic of the relations between demography, development and ethnicity in Israel.

1.5.2 Setbacks

“Knowledge filters” such as the author’s gender and social status had an impact both on the quality of the interviews and on access to informants. Being white, middle-class academic Israeli, unavoidably influenced the informants’ attitudes and responses during the interviews. In addition, being a male prevented interviewing Arab-Bedouin females, as the social code of this community forbids such interaction. Another factor influencing the access to and the sampling of informants was the fact that during the week days many young Arab-Bedouin men work in the cities. This meant that the informants who were interviewed consisted of mostly older men.
2. In Search of a Theory

2.1 “In the Desert there is neither God nor Government”

While addressing the issues of land conflicts and internal colonization, a question arises: How does one group of people legitimize the deprivation and exclusion of another? In answering this question, one may use a variety of possible theories emerging from fields such as Cultural Studies, Economics and Marxism.

One mode of explanation emerges from the field of Cultural Studies, explained by Avinoam Meir in “As Nomadism Ends” (Meir 1997). Meir argues that the imposed restrictions on pastoral societies who live within industrial states stem from the struggle between the desert and the town, an eternal tension between settlers and nomads that derives from the different social structures of these societies. According to this argument, the modern state operates in a way that can be described as “centripetal circles”, meaning, attempting to centralize power, while the social structure of pastoral societies is formulated around the principle of “centrifugal circles”, resisting the centralized power of the state by expressing loyalty to customary law (Meir 1997; Meir and Zivan 1998). In the Arab-Bedouin case, the popular idiom “in the desert there is neither God nor government” expresses the traditional Arab-Bedouin resistance to external powers (17.12.06, Interview in Rahat). This resistance demonstrates why the different regimes in the area have repeatedly tried to control and limit the Arab-Bedouins’ access to land (Goering 1979). A different mode of legitimizing the spatial control is expressed in the following quote:

We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat in industry, services, construction and agriculture (...). This will be a revolution, and it may be [achieved] within two generations (Moshe Dayan, quoted in HRA 2003:3).
Reading the quote, one may be drawn to the conclusion that the conflict between the state and the local people is a result of the government’s attempt to incorporate pastoralists into the labour market (Rosen-Zvi 2004). However, both the cultural and the economic explanations fail to address the more essentially relevant issues of the construction of social boundaries and of national group identities.

In recent decades, the struggle over land resources in Palestine has taken a nationalist form, as both Arabs and Jews became increasingly territorial (Yiftachel 2002). The concept of national group identity, which has received considerable amount of attention in political science, social studies and international relations, is essential when one seeks an understanding of how domestic violence, colonization and spatial control are being justified by the hegemonic order, allowing it to restrict minorities’ access to the common good (be it water, food, or land). Accordingly, in order to find out how issues of group identity can shed light on the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, this chapter delves into theories of national identity, i.e., nationalism. It should be noted that, while nationalism is a research area divided between many specialized disciplines such as history, political science, sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, psychology and geography, (Gellner 2006:40) and encompasses an extensive amount of academic materials, the literature reviewed in this chapter covers only the most relevant theoreticians and does not pretend to be a comprehensive study of nationalism.

One question central to the discussion of nationalism is whether it is an ancient phenomenon, or whether it is a modern development. This question, which is central to the discussion of nationalism and ethnicity, is especially pertinent when considering the encounter between the Zionist nation building project and the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. The dilemma needed to be unravelled is whether development in Israel is instrumental for the revalidation of Zionist ideology, or whether Zionism, understood as a socio-political movement, is instrumental for social and economic development. To put in a different way, in order to decode the rhetorics and practices linked with governmental development policies in the Negev, it is important to know whether the mobilizing force behind state policies in Israel is economic growth, or
whether this force is rooted in the domain of national identity. If the Zionist national movement is a modern development generated to fulfil the needs of an industrial society, than one may conclude that in the Zionist case nationalism is instrumental to development. On the other hand, if one concurs that the modern phenomenon of Zionism is rooted in ancient ethnic identity, one can well argue that development is used in the Israeli case to enforce and reinforce the Zionist ideology.

2.2 How old is the Nation?

There is no disagreement that nationalism has been ‘around’ (…) at the very least for two centuries. Long enough, one might think, for it to be readily understood. But it is hard to think of any political phenomenon which remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus (Anderson, quoted in Yiftachel 2002:243).

Nationalism is a field marked with conflicting ideas, over which there is little agreement among scholars. For instance, in the 1950’s Elie Kedourie understood nationalism as “a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century”, while in the 1970’s he shifted his perspective claiming that nationalism is based on mythical ideas of the nation as an ethnic community (Gellner 2006:19). This demonstrates the disagreement expressed in the literature about the way the nationalist processes work. It is especially hard to find agreement on the questions whether nationalism has an ethnic core (i.e., “do nations have a navel?”) and whether nations came before or after nationalism. It seems like the only issue most theoreticians agree on is that nationalism is a social or political movement born in Western Europe and in America between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Smith 1999:115). The issue of national identity received wide attention in the literature and has been problematized by leading theoreticians in the field of nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson (1992), John Armstrong (1982), Ernest Gellner (1998), Eric Hobsbawn (1996) and Anthony D. Smith (1986) to name but a
few. The question of the origins of nationalism is an issue that has been contested by these scholars, and which can, once scrutinized, provide a model for understanding how societies manage their interest, especially with relation to ethnic conflicts, whether they occur in the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa or in the Middle East. The issue of nationalism is problematic in the sense that it is highly political; even today, it easily creates conflicts, whether it is between Tamils and Sinhalese or Serbs and Bosnians (Smith 1986). Following Conversi (2007), the approaches to the origins of nations and nationalism are divided here into two schools: primordialism and modernism. The following poem, written by Rudyard Kipling, may be used as an introduction to the discussion of primordialism.

Our hearts where they rocked our cradle
Our love where we spent our toil
And our faith, and our hope, and our honour
We pledge to our native soil
GOD gave all men all earth to love
But since our hearts are small
Ordained for each one spot should prove beloved over all
(Rudyard Kipling 1865-1936).

Kipling’s poem expresses the primordialist notion that the nation is a universal phenomenon, as “real” as the human body and as “natural” as the gravity force and that it is linked with spiritual and emotional bonds to a demarcated “beloved over all” territory. The primordialist view, which is the most “archaic” among the different approaches to nationalism, contends that the world consists of organic nations and that nationalism is based on ethnicity which functions as an extension of kinship, and therefore can be traced back to ancient human history (Smith 1986:12). In that sense, Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations” can be seen as an example of modern primordialism, where different civilizations are engaged in cultural struggles (Allen and Eade 2000:500). Accordingly, the role of nationalism is to wake nations to
rediscover their forgotten national self-consciousness and to achieve territorial independency (Smith 2000:146). Steven Grosby suggests that “primordialism” refers to the “significance of vitality which men attribute to and is constitutive to, both nativity and structures of nativity”, including kinship and most significantly territory (Quoted in Conversi 2007:15). The primordialist school contends that ethnic affiliations are given rather than chosen, defining ethnic groups as “super families” related to each other by birth. An extreme form of primordialism adopts a socio-biological perspective, asserting that nations are constructed of people sharing the same genetic material. This suggests that people sharing similar cultural attributes are descendants of the same ancestor and that myths of common origin actually match biological similarities (Smith 2000:148). Related to the stance described above is the idea that primordialism is a universal phenomena, and that nations and ethnicity are a-historic. This means that under the primordialist view nations have always existed, carrying through time the unchanging identity of the nation as part of the natural order of things.

Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian social anthropologist who studied the issue of group identity found nationalism to be a cultural phenomenon, where manipulation of cultural differences creates real territorial and social boundaries (Ritzer and Smart 2001:477). Following Barth, a theory for explaining nations and ethnicity was suggested by John Armstrong in “Nations before Nationalism” (Armstrong 1982). Armstrong’s analysis of medieval Middle Eastern European civilizations and ethnic identities suggests that “The key to the significance of the phenomena of ethnic identification is persistence rather than genesis of particular patterns” (Armstrong 1982:4, emphasis is mine). Armstrong’s analysis implies that ethnicity is maintained by cultural and social boundaries, rather than common ancestry. This position was further developed by the modernist school.

The modernist approach is the most widely held theory among contemporary theories of nationalism, contending that nationalism cannot emerge outside modernity (in whatever form the later is defined) (Conversi 2007:18). In his book “Imagined
Communities” Benedict Anderson (1936- ) exemplifies the role that bureaucracy and modernization take in the process of shaping nation states, while attributing an imagined element of old age to the national community (Anderson 1992). Anderson argues that an essential element in the construction of a nation is its existence as an “imagined community” which shares a common history (the “what” of the nation), long before it reaches a territorial realization (the “where” of the nation) (Ibid). “Imagined communities”, which are considered by Anderson to answer the economic and psychological needs of modern societies, are explained as products of secular modern capitalism. Anderson associates nationality with the decline of religion, the disappearance of Latin as a spoken language, and with the rise of printed press: conditions which made it possible for the elites to spread national ideas in an attempt to mobilize people (Ibid). Similarly, Bernhard Giesen finds nationalism to be a “doctrine codified by elites who sought to mobilize the masses or in other cases, sought to provide a system of legitimization for a political order” (Quoted in Ritzer and Smart 2001:476). The question of national “invention” or “continuity” has been lengthily debated by three leading theoreticians in the arena of nationalism: Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith.

Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) developed a theory based on a functionalist analysis of the relationship between economy, culture and politics in the age of industrialism (Gellner 1998). According to Gellner’s theory, nationalism is a product of modernity, rising as an answer to modern industrial societies’ need of communal homogeneity (Gellner 2006:43). Gellner argued that “nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities (…)” (Ibid:7) and, “nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism rather than, as you might expect, the other way around” (Ibid:54). Following Gellner’s perspective, it may be concluded that it is the political or cultural will of men that conveniently creates the notion of the nation and that nations are culturally constructed products which have roots neither in ancient times nor in real ethnic pasts.

By postulating that “nationalism is not awakening of nations to self-conscioussness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1964:168), Gellner rejected the
primordialist idea that the world is made of natural nations and that nationalism is a movement which concerns the revival of national self-consciousness. Gellner’s stance is echoed in Erick Hobsbawm’s (1917- ) theory of “political nationalism”, claiming that nationalism is a political tool in the hands of the hegemonic social elites. The elites, Hobsbawm argues, invented national traditions in order to mobilize the masses to form nation states. National traditions are often found in historiographical texts, which include fancy as well as fact, for instance, in ancient Israel (the Jewish Bible), in sixth century Sri Lanka (the Mahavasama), eighth century Japan (the Nibon Shoki), eleventh century medieval France (the Song of Roland) and Geoffrey’s twelfth century (History of the Kings of Britain) (Grosby 2007). As a consequence, by “creating traditions”, the elites were able to maintain their social status and economic superiority (Hobsbawm 1996:7). For Hobsbawm, the nation, ethnicity, national symbols and myths, traditions and nationalist sentiments “rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate (…)” (Smith 1999:165) and were “selected, written, pictured popularised and institutionalised by those whose function is to do so” (Hobsbawm 1996:13). In other words, nationalists assembled symbols, myths, languages and historical fictions of different origins, communicating them through the media to create an “imagined community”, the kind that Anderson describes. In summary, in the vein of Fredrik Barth who thought national group identity to be a matter of establishing territorial and conceptual boundaries, thinkers like Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm, who belong to the modernist school, resist the primordialist argument that nations have an ancient “natural” ethnical core. Instead, they find nationalism to be a cultural artefact of the industrial era.

Trying to apply the modernist approach on the Israeli case, seeking an understanding of the nature of Israeli nationalism, one is immediately faced with pending difficulties. Hobsbawm and Gellner’s instrumental approach to modernism professes that nationalism emerged as a response to the new psychological and social needs of industrial societies, as people moved from rural areas into the cities (Gellner 1998). Reading the Zionist project of building a home for the Jews in Israel/Palestine through this modernist eye-glass, Zionism may be understood to be formulated
around the need to adjust to the age of industrialism and its new conditions. However, this approach does not explain the Zionist “diaspora nationalism” which did not wish to transform peasants into proletariat, but the other way round, attempting to transfer the urban Jewish European merchants and small free traders into peasants and farmers (Gellner 2006). Therefore, the answer to the question whether Zionism is instrumental for development or the other way around has to be searched for elsewhere.

2.3 The Historical Ethno-Symbolist Alternative

A different critique of Gellner’s modernist mode of understanding nationalism was offered by Anthony D. Smith, who formed the “historic ethno-symbolist” approach. Smith argues that Gellner’s attempt to explain nationalism as a force rising to realize modern need in social homogeneity is in fact a functionalist fallacy and “overly deterministic”. Smith insists that events do not “happen” simply because of an historical “need” (Smith 2000). In contradiction to Gellner, Smith argues that industrialization is not a prerequisite for nationalism, considering cases such as Finland, Serbia, Ireland, Mexico or Japan, where national awakening was not linked to industrialism nor to capitalism (Conversi 2007:19). Smith conceives nationalism to be the expression of people’s will to maintain their identity “by drawing on the cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities and categories (…) (Smith 1999:18). Smith’s theory of the historical ethno–symbolism builds on the debate between modernist and primordialists of how to explain nationalism, whether as a modern phenomena with roots in industrialization, capitalism, democratization and bureaucracy, or as a natural phenomenon with roots in distant past. Consider for example Hobsbawm’s account of the Zionist call to settle Jews in the Land of Israel:
It is entirely illegitimate to identify the Jewish links with the ancestral land of Israel, the merit derives from pilgrimages there, or the hope to return there when the Messiah comes- as he so obviously had not come in the view of the Jews- with the desire to gather all Jews into a modern territorial state situated on the ancient Holy Land (Quoted in Smith 1999:222).

In his book “Chosen Peoples” (2003) Smith refers to the concept of ethnic cores, which he terms *ethnie*, where he argues that these existed in pre-modern times and can be linked to the origins of many contemporary nations (Smith 2003). In line with Smith approach, agreeing with Hobsbawm argument means downplaying eighteen centuries of historic spiritual link between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, as expressed in prayers and rituals⁴.

While looking to conceptualize the formation of nations and nationalism, modernist scholars such as Anderson, Barth, Gellner and Hobsbawm explain nationalism as a modern phenomenon born in Western Europe and America in the late 18th century. These modernist scholars have understood nationalism to be a response to the needs of modern societies in homogeneity, supporting capitalism, bureaucracy and industrial growth, thus holding that nationalism creates nations and not the other way around. Balancing the modernist approach with the primordialist perspective Smith suggests the historic ethno-symbolist approach, a synthetic model balancing the influences of ethnic past with the importance of modernism (Smith 1999). Smith writes:

> New states, often top-heavy and fragile, are anxious to establish their ‘national’ credentials, especially when they lack any semblance of common

⁴ For example, such a tradition is demonstrated in the breaking of a glass during a Jewish wedding ceremony, a symbolic act meant to mark the spiritual connection of Jews to Zion (Jerusalem) and to express the hope of rebuilding there the Temple. Another demonstration of the sense of Jewish unity and spiritual link to the Land of Israel is expressed in the Jewish holiday Passover, where Jews repeated the same Hebrew ancient text, praying to reach Jerusalem in the following year (Rubinstein 1967).
ethnicity (...) without myth and memories nations are just people bounded in political space (Smith 1986:2).

To conceptualize and contextualize Smith’s synthetic model, it is useful to take a moment to look at the formation of Israeli society. Israeli society could be regarded as an imagined community, consisted by at least seven diverse cultural-ethnic groups, among them Ashkenazim (European), Mizrahim (North African), Russian and Ethiopian Jews, who are living together with Muslim, Christian and Arab-Druze (Kimmerling 1983). What make the aggregated human components of the young state into a nation are myths, symbols, canonic texts, songs and collective social memories of shared ancestors. For example, in Israel, Arab and Jews assume to share a common origin, colloquially referring to each other as cousins, believing to be the siblings of the two brothers E’sav (Esau) and Jaakov (Jacob) respectively, the forefathers of the two nations (Kimmerling 1999). Similarly, the Jews colloquially refer to each other as brothers and sisters, as expressed in the common phrase “kol Israel Ahim” (“all Israel is brothers and sisters”), assuming to share the same forefather Avram/Abraham (“High Father”).

A critique of Smith’s ideas is offered by Oren Yiftachel, who argues that nationalism should not be readily understood as a force acting like a glue in homogenizing distinct societies, or as a force that moves to merge the state and the nation, but as a force that acts to maintain “the tension between etno-national belonging and formal citizenship (...)” (Yiftachel 2002:222) consequently separating the identity of the state from the identity of the nation. According to Yiftachel’s analysis, nationalism in the Israeli case should be understood as an excluding force rather than a merging force as argued by Smith.

5 Ashkenazim are Jews from European or North American Origin. Mizrahim (also Sephardim) are Jews from North African or Middle Eastern origin who settled in countries like Iraq and Yemen after being deported from Spain in 1492.
Re-examining the Israeli case adopting Yiftachel’s perspective, one comes to realize that while nationalism is perceived as a homogenizing force by scholars like Gellner and Smith, it can also be an isolating and excluding force. Used by the hegemonic order to secure the separating of state from nation, ethnic minorities are effectively marginalized, since, although they may be citizens, they are not part of the nation.

2.3.1 Summary

From the historical ethno-symbolic standpoint, Zionism may be regarded as a modern manifestation of a primordial Jewish claim over the Holy Land. Accordingly, the Zionist ideology is seen not just as a contemporary phenomenon which was born in order to answer the changing life circumstances of modernism, but also as an expression of ancient Jewish ethnical territorialism. Considering the relations between Zionism and “development”, one may argue that development has both an inherent and instrumental values. On the one hand, development initiatives in Israel are used to implement the Zionist ideology, i.e. maintaining the Jewish nature of the Israeli state. On the other hand, developers and policy makers are using Zionist idioms to legitimize and de-politicize their decisions.

Trying to find an answer to the question posed in the beginning of the chapter, i.e., what is the nature and origins of nationalism, ethnicity and national identities, this chapter has surveyed some of the leading theories in the study of nationalism. After delving into issues regarding the origins and nature of nationalism and its mobilizing potential, the most relevant approaches to the case study were marked, e.g., Smith’s historical ethno-symbolist approach and Yiftachel’s critical account of the ethnocratic state. Putting together these approaches, a joint approach to nationalism emerges. This approach fuses both the homogenizing force of nationalism in forming an imagined community that is based on a socially constructed “ethnic” basis (the “what” of the nation which builds on values, social meanings, traditions, sacred texts, symbols etc.), and the excluding force of nationalism, which is used to establish
ethnic control of the landscape and causing the marginalization of “other” ethnic minorities from having access to the common good.
3. The Case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev

Poor people appear both as the objects of pity and humanitarian aid, as well as a threat to the social order (Alan 2000). Often, those who are especially burdened with poverty and diseases are the targets of racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination (Niezen 2003:134). While social exclusion and domination take many forms, this chapter aims at describing the influence of Israeli development policies and demographic design on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. Shading light on this issue, this chapter focuses on the various mechanisms of spatial control and how they constitute social exclusion. The main mechanisms associated with the dispossession of the Arab-Bedouins include (a) the deprivation of state services (b) house demolitions (c) destruction of crops and (d) construction of “isolated farms”.

The discussion of poverty, social exclusion and the dispossession of the Arab-Bedouins in Israel is associated with issues of land ownership and land entitlement. While current land policies fail to deal with the growing demand for land, pastoralists are losing control over their traditional areas (Forni 2006:1). Similar to other peoples in the world, Arab-Bedouin’s social equity is influenced by their ability to claim title over traditional tribal territories.

Land is a key asset for both the rural and urban poor. Access to land and the ability to use it productively are essential for poor people world wide. Arguably, sustainable land policies are indispensable for the implementation of sustainable development. In some countries the state continues to own large areas of land, causing people who live in these areas to be vulnerable to threats of eviction (Deininger 2003). In Africa for example, the majority of land is handled under customary tenure, which until recently was not recognized by the state, effectively causing it to remain outside the official legal system. Land scarcity and high population growth, combined with a history of discrimination and unequal access to resources, may lead to struggles for land. The tension between territory and people and its implications for the rights of land is
amply revealed in examples such as the aftermath of the population transfer between Turkey and Greece in the 1920’s, and in pre-independent Ireland where legal restrictions prevented Catholics from owning land (Goertz and Diehl 1991). Recent examples from East and West Africa, show that failure to end land conflicts at an early stage, especially if these conflicts involve people with different ethnic backgrounds, can lead to negative consequences (UNDESA 2007).

In the case of the Arab-Bedouins, land has always been an important resource. Land ownership is associated with the integrity of Arab-Bedouin’s social structure. For instance, the social hierarchy between different tribes is set according to the size of the tribe’s dirah (tribal claim for traditional right of passage) (Abu-Ras 2006; Forni 2006). This means that a tribe’s access to traditional territories is essential for maintaining group identity. Before 1948, approximately 90% of the Arab-Bedouin in the Negev earned their living from a mixture of agriculture and pastoralism. Even today, after the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev have gone through a process of sedentarization, the main resource they possess and prize is land. While other resources such as education or formal employment hardly exist, land plays an important role in the Arab-Bedouin’s identity and is thus relevant for the managing of its social equity (ILA 2005:34). For example, it is a common practice for the Arab-Bedouins to live with their extended families. As a result, they require areas of land large enough to support two to three generations. In this perspective, losing access to traditional territories pose a real challenge for their ability to sustain their culture, social structures and economies.

3.1 Managing the Land or Managing the People? Land Tenure in Palestine

The word Bedouin derives from the word bedu (‘‘desert dweller’’) and is applied to Arab ethnic minorities of semi-nomadic groups traditionally inhabiting the desert belt of the Arabian Desert, Sahara, Sinai and the Negev (Meir 1997). The Arab-Bedouin
language is an Arabic dialect and their religion is Islam. The Arab-Bedouins in Israel are ethnically distinct from the Jewish majority, socially distinct from the Arab minority and politically distinct from the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories (RCUV 2007). The population of the Arab-Bedouins in Israel counts 530,000 people (8% of the Israeli population), out of which 160,000 live in the Negev (ILA 2006; Parawer and Sarphus 2006:8). The Arab-Bedouin population suffers poverty, high infant mortality rates, shortage in skilled professions and high crime rates. Approximately 40% of Arab-Bedouin children leave school before graduating and about half the population in the Negev live in Israel’s poorest towns (NCF 2006a).

Examining the origins of property and land rights, as well as their evolution over time is central for appreciating how Arab-Bedouin’s poverty and social exclusion are influenced by access to land. Accordingly, the historical background of the development of land tenure in the region is analyzed.

3.1.1 Land of Plenty or Plenty of Land?

Arab-Bedouin presence in the Negev desert (Naqab in Arabic) began in the 14th century when Arab-Bedouins began migrating to the region from the Arabian Peninsula (Meir 1997). In 1517, the Negev came under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire the Arab-Bedouins were, for the most part, the sole residents of the Negev, counting around 90,000 people and holding about two million dunams (Rubinstein 1967:111). At the time, the land was divided according to the ‘urf: a system of Arab-Bedouin customary land tenure, where land was transferred through inheritance without any written records (Abu-Ras 2006; Forni 2006; Symon 2002). Land tenure, defined by the World Bank as “social conventions that regulate the distribution of the benefits that accrue from specific use of a certain piece of land” (Deininger 2003:22), was categorized into four classes by the Ottoman Empire: Mulk (private), Miri (state), Waaqf (public or religious trust) and Mawat (property of the sultan) (Abu-Ras 2006:2; Forni 2006:1). In 1839, the Sultan Mahmud the Second
enacted the “Tabu Law” as part of the Tanzimat Fermani ("reorganization") modernization program, whose intention was to centralize power against landlords and to improve the quality of uncultivated wasteland, granting land ownership to those cultivating it (Creasy 1878). During the Tabu Law most of the Negev, which was classified as Mawat land, was defined as “dead” uncultivated land (Abu-Ras 2006:4; Yiftachel 2003:32). According to the new law, certificate of ownership was granted to Arab-Bedouins who cultivated Mawat land, re-categorizing it as Miri (state owned land that could be cultivated for a single fee) (Abu-Ras 2006). In order for the ownership to be granted the names of land owners had to be formally recorded (Goering 1979:6). However, the Arab-Bedouins chose not to do so, wishing to avoid land-taxation to the Ottomans and military service in their army (Abu-Ras 2006). Consequently, many Arab-Bedouins were left with no official papers to prove ownership of their land.

In 1917, the region fell under the British Mandate (1921-1948). In 1921, the British Mandate government issued the Mawat Land Ordinance Law, encouraging Arab-Bedouins to register their land. According to the new law the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev were given a period of two months to register their land. Those who registered were given a certificate of ownership, although many Arab-Bedouins chose not to register it. The British Mawat Land Ordinance Law contradicted the Ottoman Tabu Law, stating that anyone who cultivated wasteland would obtain no title to the land and could be prosecuted for trespassing (Shehadeh 1982:88), setting the ground for further marginalization of the Arab-Bedouins.

3.1.2 Development as Demographic Hygiene

After 27 years of British rule the Israeli state was founded and so in 1948, the Arab-Bedouins became Israeli citizens. The Israeli state did not recognize Arab-Bedouin traditional land ownership and ruled that Arab-Bedouins who did not registered their land under the Ottoman Empire or the British Mandate, were denied legal ownership
of their lands (Abu-Ras 2006:3). As a result, much of the land previously held by the Arab-Bedouins was transferred to the hands of the Israeli state (NCF 2006a).

After the Independence War/Naqba between the Israeli Defence Force and the neighbouring Arab countries in 1948, some 79,000 out of 90,000 Arab-Bedouins living in the Negev fled or were expelled from the country. Under the directions of Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, the 11,000 Arab-Bedouins remaining in Israel were uprooted from their current land and transferred to the north-eastern part of the Negev. This area was a restricted zone called the Siyag (“enclosure”), characterized by low rainfall and poor soil quality (Boteach 2006; George 1979; Gordon 2006). (See Figure 1, “Area of Research”).

Figure 1.

Area of Research.

Source: Israel’s Ministry of the Interior, the spatial information was used to create the map, using Geospatial Information System (GIS).
Continuing the discussion of the historical development of land tenure, in 1950, Israel passed the “Absentees Property Law” allowing the state to expropriate land belonging to Arabs no longer residing in Israel. Furthermore, in 1953, the state enacted Israel’s Land Acquisition Law, defining the criteria for annexing land to be either land that was not cultivated before 1952, or land that was required for national needs, such as military use. Since the Arab-Bedouins had been dislocated into the Siyag prior to this date, they lost their land even when possessing proof of ownership (NCF 2006a:10).

During the 1950s and the 1960s, the Arab-Bedouins, like the rest of the Arab-Palestinians in Israel, lived under tight military control (Boteach 2006; Goering 1979). During this period, most of the Arab-Bedouins’ land was confiscated by the government (Hamdan 2005b; Rosen-Zvi 2004). Furthermore, in the 1970s, about 50% of the Arab-Bedouin population was pressured by the government to move into designated semi-urban townships, designed and built by the government in the northern part of the Negev desert (Gordon 2006). Those refusing to relocate into the townships remained scattered in rural locations in the Negev. Today, the rural locations, which are considered illegal by the government, are inhabited by more than 80,000 Arab-Bedouins (Parawer and Sarphus 2006:8).

3.2 “Judaization” of the Negev

Land, being the primary factor of production, has been a major component of religious, economic, political and social aspects of human life. In the history of modern colonialism, states have often used frontier settlements as a strategy to expand national territories. For instance, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries Germany attempted to “Germanize” Prussia’s Poland by purchasing Polish farm land and resettling it with ethnic Germans. Although the newly settled farms were allowed to be sold, they were prohibited from being resold to Poles (Goertz and Diehl 1991).

In Israel, ever since the state was founded, the Negev region has been the centre of governmental attempts to settle it with ethnic Jews. The Negev, it is said, is where
GOD first spoke to Abraham, and where monotheism began. The area stretches over 13,230 square kilometres, constituting two thirds of Israel’s territory, and is the home of about ten percent of Israel’s population. During its first years, the Israeli state was under-populated. In this period, an undeveloped area was perceived as an “enemy” to be conquered (Chertok 1999). In fact, the Hebrew word Shmama (“wilderness”) is a synonym of backwardness (Borel et al. 2003). Indeed, the national challenge was to conquer the wilderness, manifested through erecting new settlements. With David Ben Gurion as Prime Minister (1948-1953; 1955-1963), the Negev grew in importance as new settlements and industries were built. In 1884, Ben Gurion claimed that,

The people of Israel will be tested in the Negev (…) only by settling and developing the Negev can Israel, as a modern, independent and freedom seeking nation, rise to the challenges that history puts before us (…) All of us, veterans and new immigrants, young and old, men and women, should see the Negev as their place and their future and turn southwards (Quoted in Yiftachel 2003:29).

In line with Ben-Gurion’s vision of settling the Negev, the National Water Carrier was built, subsequently increasing the Jewish agricultural settlements and population in the area. From 1950 to 1963, the population of the Negev grew from less than half a percent of the state’s population to six and a half percent, as almost two hundred thousand Jews settled there (Chertok 1999). In the 1950’s and 1960’s new settlements were built in the Negev by the government in order to receive the new wave of Jewish immigrants from Middle Eastern and North African countries. However, after the Six Days War in 1967, the status of the Negev declined, as new frontiers opened in the Sinai Peninsula. In the 1990’s there was another increase in population, as Russians and Ethiopians immigrants were directed to the Negev by the government (Meir 1997). In 2003, another attempt to draw Jewish settlers to the Negev was initiated by Mr. Ariel Sharon, serving as the Prime Minister at that time.
3.3 Sharon Plan

“It is no longer resources that limit decisions; it is decisions that limit resources”
(Alvin Toffler 1928-).

In an attempt to develop the Negev and increase its population, the Sharon administration issued a regional development initiative called the “Sharon Plan”. This plan, a five year development program, sets forth a budget of 265 million US dollars for the promotion of national goals in the Negev. The plan announced that its goals were “to change and to improve the situation of the Bedouin population” in the Negev (Hamdan 2005b:3). The main aspects of the plan included (a) settling ownership claims with the Arab-Bedouins (b) completing the development of the existing seven state-built Arab-Bedouin towns in the Negev and (c) planning seven new towns to be settled by the Arab-Bedouins, currently residing in the illegal villages (Bishara and Rosenberg 2004).

After witnessing the refusal by 80,000 Arab-Bedouins to move into the seven existing townships, the state initiated a “strong hand” policy, forcing relocation. The Minister of Industry and Trade, at the time Mr. Ehud Olmert, who was responsible for implementing the Sharon Plan, was quoted commenting that, “we are talking about evacuating the Bedouins [from their rural localities into the towns], however, I assume they will absolutely oppose this plan” (Bishara and Rosenberg 2004:9). According to the plan, the Israeli Land Administration (ILA) announced that it “will act to fully implement the rule of law by enforcing the state’s rights for land, including taking actions against trespassers” (Bishara and Rosenberg 2004:10). These actions include a variety of mechanisms; the first mechanism is the development of a legal framework designated to claim ownership over the disputed territories, currently occupied by Arab-Bedouins. The second mechanism is the demolition of houses considered to be built illegally by the Arab-Bedouins. The third mechanism is the development of isolated farms, a form of settlement where a single family leases
agricultural land from the state. In the following section the consequences of the state’s policy to urbanize the Arab-Bedouins are examined.

3.4 Arab-Bedouin’s Social Equity

Social equity means the equal consideration of economic, environmental and social needs and includes the rights of food and shelter, clean drinking water, cultural and religious freedom, political participation and access to health and education services (Parawer and Sarphus 2006).

Cities have long been the symbols of civilizations. Adam Smith described urban cities as “engines of national economic growth” (Alan 2000). In social terms, urban centres have been characterized as attracting a variety of people, encouraging new forms of individual interaction (Beall 2000:425). According to David Harvey, urbanism can also be understood as a spatial expression of social relations based on power (Harvey 1988). Pryer and Crook defined urban centres in contrast to rural areas, claiming that deteriorated urban infrastructure and services are responsible for poverty and health problems (Pryer and Crook 1988). Similarly, Howsam and Carter stated that a lack of access to services, such as clean water and sanitation, is both the cause and the symptom of poverty in low income urban localities (Howsam and Carter 1996). Furthermore, Jo Beal has noted that life in underprivileged cities is characterized by “poor living conditions, such as appalling overcrowding, contaminated water, poor or absent sanitation, lack of services and the constant threat of (...) industrial pollution, mean that the urban poor are exposed to severe environmental health risks” (Beall 2000:432). Indeed, contaminated water, lack of proper sanitation and poor hygiene are major factors in causing death (Almi 2006). Accordingly, safe, secure and adequately serviced housing is crucial for people living in cities (Beall 2000:436).
3.4.1 Life in the Suburban Ghettos

As previously mentioned, half of the 160,000 Arab-Bedouins living in the Negev currently reside in allocated townships, planned and built in the 1960s and the 1970s to accommodate Arab-Bedouins who were uprooted from their rural localities. There are seven towns, all located in the Siyag area: Hura, Kseifa, Laqia, Arara, Rahat, Segev-Shalom and Tel Sheva. While these semi-urban centres were intended to accommodate the Arab-Bedouins with basic services and were subsidized by the government, they were planned without considering Arab-Bedouin culture and social structures. Consequently, the towns became “pockets of deprivation, unemployment, dependency, crime and social tension” (NCF 2006a:18). The towns suffer from a variety of disadvantages, including shortage of banks, post offices, public libraries and places of entertainment. As Mr. Salem Abu-Medigham, the manager of the Negev branch of the Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel explained,

There are no public libraries, not even in the high school. In the area where I live now, there is no telephone connection. I pay my taxes like everybody else in this country and I am entitled to the same services from the state as everybody else. There is no public transportation to Rahat. The closest bus gets only to the gate of the town. There is only one bank and one post office for 45,000 thousands people, and the town is overpopulated (...) (02.12.06, Interview in Rahat).

Indeed, the towns are overpopulated, a situation causing social tension which is intensified by the fact that different tribes, traditionally occupying different territories in the Negev, were relocated to the same towns and sometimes even to the same neighbourhoods. The state townships positioned the Arab-Bedouins in social and economic isolation, described by Israeli activists as “suburban ghettos”. The policy of

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6 See Table 2, “Population in the Arab-Bedouin Towns”.

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resettling them in the state towns is generally perceived by the Arab-Bedouins as unsustainable, as one Arab-Bedouin stated:

To have the Bedouins move into those townships, or to centralize them in a new village, is tantamount to passing a death sentence on a long tradition and a way of life (Goering 1979:19).

Dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs has emerged in the form of “reversed nomadism”, where Arab-Bedouin families leave their houses in the townships and return to more traditional pattern of life in the Negev. Although such instances are few in number, they demonstrate the difficult living conditions in the townships (Falah 1989).

The state’s official reason for relocating the Arab-Bedouins was to promote modernization and enable the provision of basic services in the towns (Rosen-Zvi 2004). However, social equity in the townships is inadequate, as social and economic conditions are seriously lacking. In order to appreciate the challenges that spatial and development policies in the Negev pose to Arab-Bedouin’s social equity, the situation in the unrecognized settlements is examined.

3.4.2 The Unrecognized Arab-Bedouin Villages in the Negev

“Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country” (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21).

In a rapidly developing world, the area of the Negev where this study took place is a relatively underdeveloped region. Today, half the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev reside outside the state townships in about 45 rural localities. The unrecognized Arab-Bedouin settlements, referred to by the authorities as the “Bedouin Pzura” (“dispersion”), are deprived of most state services, such as connection to water, sewage, electricity and road grids (ILA 2005:1). In 1965, the state enacted the Planning and Construction Law, redefining the land within the borders of the Siyag (the area the Arab-Bedouins were confined to during the Israeli military rule between 42
1949 and 1966 and the area where the seven townships are confined to) as agricultural lands (Svirski and Chason 2005). According to Israeli law, it is illegal to build houses on land designated for agriculture, consequently retroactively making the existing houses (outside the townships) illegal. Additionally, as the settlements were considered to be illegal by the government, the villagers had no local authority where they could apply for changing the status of their lands. The illegal houses in the unrecognized settlements involve all structures built outside the boundaries of the village’s blueprint. All Arab-Bedouin villages refused recognition by the state lack a blueprint, resulting in every new house being built there automatically becoming illegal (Falah 1991:80). In 1981, the policy of denying the villages access to the national water and electricity infrastructures was enforced by issuing an amendment to the Planning and Construction Law (1965), making it illegal for the electricity and water companies to connect unrecognized Arab-Bedouin’s houses to the national nets (NCF 2006a).

Attempting to force the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev to dislocate from their rural localities into the seven state planned urban centres, the state has used a series of mechanisms hoping to force sedentarization over the Arab-Bedouins. These mechanisms include denying state services in the “illegal” villages, house demolitions of the so called illegal structures, destroying Arab-Bedouin crops, and promoting the building of Jewish isolated farms.

In 1976, the Green Patrol was created to fight the so called “Bedouin infiltration into state lands” (Adalah 2006a). During its first three years, Arab-Bedouin’s goat herds were reduced from 220,000 to 80,000. In 1950, the state enacted the Plant Protection Law, also known as The Black Goat Law, prohibiting the Arab-Bedouins to graze their herds on state land without a specific permission from the Ministry of Agriculture (Adalah 2006a). As an Arab-Bedouin man whose entire goat herd was confiscated by the authorities in 1983 testified:

The people from the Green Patrol took all my goats. The black goats are forbidden. They issued the Black Goat Law so we won’t be able to use the hair
of the goat for making the tents. This is a big damage for us. Now the tent is made out of plastic and needs to be replaced all the time. To make a tent from goat hair was the honour of the Bedouin. The young people don’t know how we used to live in the past. This is the worst damage in the world. They touched our honour, [dishonoured] our traditions, on top of ruining our livelihoods (Edler 2006).

3.4.3 House Demolition

“No one should be arbitrarily deprived of his property” (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17).

The main mechanism used by the state to forward the transition of the Arab-Bedouins from the rural areas into the townships has been house demolitions. The Planning and Construction Law (1965) gave the authorities i.e., Israeli Land Administration (ILA), the legal right to demolish illegal houses erected in the unrecognized villages (Bishara and Rosenberg 2004). An Arab-Bedouin man whose house was demolished by the ILA described the event:

During the last Holocaust day, the inspectors and police officers arrived to the area [of the El Ukbi living space, near H’ura] to deliver demolition warrants before demolishing the houses. While the police officers were working, the horn [signalling two minutes in the memory of the victims of the Holocaust] was sound, so they stopped their work, holding their clubs in their hands, and stood still for two minutes, after which they continued their work. It was a terrible day (Sober 2006).

In an article from 1979, a house demolition was described:

Shots were fired in the air to scare them out of their houses, smoke bombs were thrown and panic was created among their women and children. The Bedouins were not allowed to remove personal possessions from the dwellings
(...) clothing and jewellery were trucked away and dumped at a nearby Bedouin cemetery. Dozens of families were left homeless (Goering 1979:17).

Between 2002 and 2007, more than 500 houses, private businesses, livestock dens and tents have been destroyed by the government in the unrecognized villages (Forum 2007). The current situation is becoming increasingly tense as Arab-Bedouins are unable to obtain building permits. Consequently, when construction takes place it is done without the appropriate permits, subjecting it to demolition. One Arab-Bedouin female exclaimed, “nothing like this has ever happened before, we have lived here for 300 hundred years and now they come and kick us out. I am going to stay even if I have to die here” (Edler 2006).

A different tactic used by the state to push the Arab-Bedouins into the towns was the destruction of agricultural fields using toxic chemicals. In 2002, the government ordered the spraying of herbicides on the fields of Arab-Bedouin farmers, accusing them of cultivating state land. According to the British Mawat Land Ordinance Law enacted in 1921 by the British Mandate, cultivating Mawat (state) land is considered to be a criminal offence. As a result, the state initiated a policy of aerial spraying of Arab-Bedouins’ crops using “Round Up”, a toxic substance designed to destroy weeds. As one Arab-Bedouin woman, who lives in an unrecognized village in the Negev testified,

The state has poisoned the crops using airplanes. They probably used a strong substance because we got sick. At first, we thought it was an Iraqi chemical strike. When the airplanes came I was terrified. I was alone with the kids and I was very scared. I did not know what to do. I thought it was a chemical [terror] attack. Only later I found out that it was the state, trying to destroy our crops (...) we have nothing here. Do you see? They destroy everything. Why? (Edler 2006).

Since 2002, the state has sprayed more than 28,000 dunams of wheat, barley and vegetables, in twelve unrecognized villages (NCF 2006a). In April 2007, after Adalah
Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel petitioned to the High Court against the state actions, the spraying stopped. However, the destruction of crops continues, not through spraying, but by tilling the soil just before the crops are ready for harvest.

3.4.4 The Right to Health

“Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection” (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25).

In the unrecognized villages there are no dentists, no optometrists, no mental health specialists and no health education (Almi 2003). Only about ten out of forty-five villages have health clinics and only six villages have Mother and Child clinics. Mrs. Amal Elsana Alhjooj, the director of the Arab-Jewish Centre for Equality, Empowerment and Cooperation noted that,

Because of the lack of health services in the unrecognized villages, women suffer from the poorest health. [Because of] the lack of transportation and the inaccessibility of health services it is mostly women who are denied their right to health services (…). Pregnant women often give birth on the way to the hospital since the ambulances don’t reach homes that don’t have paved roads leading to them (…) (Adalah 2005).

In the mother and child clinics that do exist, the absence of electricity causes the services provided there to be insufficient, being incapable of keeping vaccinations refrigerated (Almi 2003). Meanwhile, infant mortality in the villages is more than triple compared to the Jewish community in the Negev7. In a report published by the state regarding infant mortality in Israel (2006), the large gap between the Jewish and the Arab-Bedouin populations was explained to be caused by the Arab-Bedouin’s

7 See Table 3, “Infant Mortality”.

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“high rate of consanguineous marriage, (…), religious prohibitions against abortion, even in medically recommended cases, as well as socio economic differences” (NCF 2006a). The state’s report ignores both the numbers and the equality of the infrastructures in the villages, such as access to clean drinking water and garbage disposal.

The prime factor negatively effecting the residents of the villages is the lack of clean drinking water, causing a range of water carried diseases, such as pneumonia and diarrhoea (Adalah 2006b; Almi 2006). As most villages are not connected to the national water system, some Arab-Bedouins are left with the option of collecting water from water-outlets and storing it in non-sterile containers. A resident in the unrecognized village of El Hiran explains:

> The situation in the village is very difficult; we are suffering a huge lack of water. We are recycling water, for example, first we use the water for washing, and then we use them again in the toilet. The water is not clean so we have to boil them before drinking. We bring the water from a distance, several kilometres away (Adalah 2005).

The hospitalization rates of Arab-Bedouin children with water carried infectious diseases are three times higher compared to Jewish children living in the Negev (HRA 2003:16). During the hot summer months, the shortage of safe drinking water results in dehydration (Almi 2006). As presented in the Table of Water Consumption, the annual consumption of a Jewish resident in Omer (Jewish town) is seven times higher than that of an Arab-Bedouin residing in an unrecognized village.

Another factor associated with the lack of state services in the unrecognized villages is the absence of waste management. As a result, waste accumulates outside the dwelling areas, attracting pests such as mosquitoes, flies, wasps, snakes, rats and cockroaches. In dealing with the waste problem, residents of the unrecognized

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8 See Table 4, “Water Consumption”.

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villages often choose to burn their garbage, releasing toxic gases into the air, contributing to the prevalence of respiratory diseases (Almi 2003).

In 1976, Ramat Hovav, a national hazardous waste treatment site was constructed fifteen kilometres south of the city Beer-Sheva, encompassing nineteen agro and petrochemical factories and a toxic waste incinerator pesticide. In 2004, the Ministry of Health published the findings of an epidemiological study, stating that cancer and mortality rates are 65% higher within twenty kilometres radius of the Ramat Hovav industrial zone, which is spread across 8,000 dunams of land. The unrecognized village of Wadi El Na’am, where 4,500 Arab-Bedouins of the Azazme tribe reside, is located within five hundred meters of the Ramat Hovav site. The Ramat Hovav industrial zone, which spreads foul smells, causes respiratory problems among children in the village (Almi 2003). Protesting against the state policy, an Arab-Bedouin activist bitterly noted that,

Only in one instance shall the Arab-Bedouins get their full and equal rights in the Jewish state. Only if miraculously we stop occupying, needing or using any land. Then we shall receive what we truly deserve- the right of breathing (Quoted in Yiftachel 2003:33).

Similarly, an Arab-Bedouin man living in Wadi El Na’am after being asked about the health situation in the villages commented that,

Almost every woman and child is suffering from breathing problems. Four people from my family are suffering from asthma and others are suffering from eye problems. And from the smells we are suffering all the time. If there will be an accident [in Ramat Hovav], there is nothing that can protect us. You can’t isolate a tent against toxic gases (Shezaf 1998).

High voltage electricity lines are stretched above Wadi El Na’am, yet the village is not connected to electricity; the village is also located close to the national water carrier site, yet it is not connected to the water line. Furthermore, an oil storage site,
the Israeli electric company, and a military firing zone engulf the village, effectively restricting its development.

3.5 Spatial Violence and the Enemy Within

As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the main objectives of the Negev development scheme called the “Sharon Plan” are to increase the population of the Jewish sector in the Negev, while transferring the Arab-Bedouin population living in the “illegal” villages into the seven state townships. So far, we have mentioned house demolitions, crop destruction, and denial of state services as the main strategies taken by the state to fulfill its goals. However, the state has one more “weapon” in its arsenal: the isolated farms. Isolated farms are a form of settlement where a single family lives on a large area of land. Currently, there are 59 farms in the Negev, spread across 81,000 dunams (NCF 2006b). Out of these 59 farms, 13 are built as part of the Wine Road Project, a development program initiated by the regional council Ramat Negev.

On March 2004, the Wine Road Project was approved by the National Council for Planning and Building in Israel (NCPB). The plan is to build a total of 30 isolated farms in the Negev. The Wine Road Project is promoted as a tourist attraction in the northern parts of the Israeli desert between Beer-Sheva and Mitspe Ramon, offering local wines (hence the name Wine Road), home made cheese, lodging and access to scenic and historic sites. In its decision, the NCPB declared that its primal interest is to attract more people to live in the Negev, by developing tourist attractions that will also give the Negev an economic boost. According to the manager of the tourist department in the regional council Ramat Negev, who is also responsible for the promotion of the Wine Road Project, the goal of the development scheme is to draw Jewish population:

The main aim [of the project] is to increase the numbers of Jewish settlers in the Negev. This is the approach decided by the state, which we try to
implement on the local level. The isolated farms are a way to draw internal tourism and eventually new people into the area (7.12.06, interview in Ramat Negev).

Increasing the numbers of Jewish population in the Negev is one aspect of the Wine Road Plan. Another aspect is using the farms to protect “state land” from being taken by the Arab-Bedouins, referred to by Mr. Ariel Sharon as “alien elements” (Hamdan 2005a). The policy of protecting national land from alien elements, i.e., non-Jews, is implemented through internal spatial control and ethnic demographic design. The Wine Road Plan was initiated by the state to assert restrictions over the development of Arab-Bedouin settlements in the Negev and is supported by the state’s policy to relocate the Arab-Bedouins into the state built townships (Hamdan 2005b:1; NCF 2006b).

At a meeting between Mr. Ariel Sharon who was the Minister of National Infrastructure at the time, and the Agriculture Minister, it was agreed that isolated farms should be promoted as a means for safeguarding state lands (Hamdan 2005a). Allocating hundreds and sometime thousands of dunams to the Jewish farmers strategically located around Arab-Bedouin settlements implies that the isolated farms function as barriers, restricting the expansion of Arab-Bedouin villages. The Minister of Strategic Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman explained the strategy behind the isolated farms: “we are talking about single individuals, who will guard extensive land areas. This is most effective (…)” (Hamdan 2005b). Indeed, the farms are effectively restricting the development of the Arab-Bedouin settlements, dominating the space with fences, barbed wires, guard dogs and electrical gates. The farms, presented as tourist attractions, are supposed to be accessible for the public. However, free access to the area under the control of the isolated farms is denied, as most of these farms are surrounded with fences.

Consider for example the case of the Arab-Bedouin village Beer Hadaj, which suffers a shortage in space. The area of the settlement is 6,550 dunams, home to some 5000 residents from the Azazme tribe, located on road number 222, 23 km south-west of
Beer-Sheva. In 2004, the village, which until then was the largest illegal village in the Negev, was recognized by the government. The village was relocated to its present location after being uprooted by the government twice, once in 1944 and a second time in 1974, both times for reasons of national security and “development needs”. Despite the fact that the village was officially recognized by the authorities, it still does not receive state services, such as connection to the national water system. In contrast, the isolated farms, although inhabited only by a single family, receive state services such as water and electricity. In addition, the Jewish farmers receive financial help from the state for fencing the farms. Furthermore, Beer Hadaj is encircled by a nature reserve (Mashabim Sands), a restricted military zone, three Jewish settlements (Ashalim, Retamim and Revivim) and eight isolated farms (Kalinger, Zohar, Shalbi, Rota, Dankner, Glinka, Shchafim and Matnat Midbar) (see, Figure 2 “Detailed Map of Research Area”). As a result, the spatial development of the village is restricted. As mentioned earlier, the Arab-Bedouins often live together with their extended families. Lack of land reserves for building more residential units often means that families have to move from the village, or stay and suffer overpopulation.

In summary, the isolated farms have three functions: (a) increasing the Jewish population in the Negev, (b) restricting the spatial development of the Arab-Bedouin villages and (c) causing the Arab-Bedouins to relocate into the state townships (Abu-Ras 2006; Adalah 2006b; NCF 2006b). Included in the state’s attempts to control the space, reserving it for the exclusive use of the Jewish population, the state has initiated the construction of isolated farms: a form of settlement sought to answer the need of protecting national (Jewish) lands from being occupied by non-Jews.
Figure 2.

**Detailed Map of Research Area.**

Source: Israel’s Ministry of the Interior, the spatial information was used to create the map, using Geospatial Information System (GIS).

### 3.5.1 Summary

The years of governmental neglect has resulted in a series of third-world niches in the midst of an affluent society, creating feelings of bitterness, anger and frustration among the Arab-Bedouins living in the state towns and in the unrecognized villages. While the state’s reasoning for dislocating the Arab-Bedouins into designated
townships was to create conditions that would enable the provision of basic state services, in fact, the reason was to concentrate them, preventing them from cultivating and claiming ownership of the land that was expropriated. This was done in order to ensure that the Jewish project of settling the Negev under the salient ethos of halutziut ("pioneering") could be executed unchallenged (Abu-Sa'ad 1998; Yiftachel 2003). In order to achieve its aim, the state has used a variety of legal, economic, and spatial mechanisms to enforce the sedentarization of the Arab-Bedouin population.

Implementing its policy to force the sedentarization of the Arab-Bedouin population and to compel them to dislocate into the state townships, the Israeli state has controlled and restricted access to traditional resources, denied basic state services in the unrecognized villages, demolished houses, destroyed agricultural fields and promoted the building of isolated Jewish farms. As shown above, these various mechanisms of spatial domination had fundamental consequences on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. Facing the state attempts of dislocating them, the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev have adopted a strategy of sumud ("steadfastness"), resisting the state by hanging on to the land, trying to maintain normality under the circumstances. As the mayor of an Arab town stated in 1983:

> Israel has taken our land, surrounded us with Jewish settlements, and made us feel like strangers in our homeland (...). The Jews do not realize, however, that we are here to stay, that we are here to struggle for our rights and that we will not give up our identity as Palestinians Arabs and our rights as Israelis (...). the more they take from us, the more we fight (Quoted in Yiftachel 2000:747).

The Arab-Bedouin form of resistance, the sumud, is expressed in a poem by Tawfiq Ziyad, “We Are Staying Here”:

> Here, on your chest,
> Here, like a fence,
> Here, in your throat
Like a piece of glass, like a sabar

And in your eyes

Like a storm from the fire

We are staying here

(Tawfiq Ziyad 1978, quoted in Yiftachel 2002).

Sabar is a cactus, adopted as a Zionist national symbol.
4. Mindscapes and Landscapes

Trying to explain the relations between the Israeli state and its Arab-Bedouin ethnic minority, one is faced with a major difficulty: the official documents of Israel’s policy toward its Arab-Bedouin citizens are limited. One official document dealing with the state’s policy toward the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev is “The Bedouins in the Negev, Policy, Setbacks and Recommendations”, a report presented by Israel National Security Council to the Six Convention for National Security in 2006. In the report it is stated that,

(…) if the government was able to evacuate 8,000 settlers who were living in legal settlements [Gaza Strip], it can in no doubt evacuate thousands of Arab-Bedouin who live in illegal settlements10 (Translated from Hebrew, Parawer and Sarphus 2006:2).

It would be reasonable to ask, why does the state wish to settle Jews in the Negev while at the same time evacuating 80,000 Arab-Bedouins living in the so called illegal settlements? The first step in answering this question is presenting the authority’s official narrative for its demographic policy. The official story is one of a benevolent state, a state looking to improve the life of its Arab-Bedouin citizens. Israeli officials claim that the reason for dislocating the Arab-Bedouins from their current semi-agrarian locations into designated urban localities is to “develop” the Arab-Bedouins. In this perspective, development is considered by the government to be inherently “good” and is closely associated with modernization and Westernization.

10 The Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories are considered legal by the Israeli government, but in fact are standing in violation to international law.
4.1 Development as Westernization

Israel has some similarities with Australia, where the legal status of the Aboriginals was based on the notion that the Australian state originated from the settlement of a terra nullius (“empty land”). In Israel, Zionists considered Palestine as an “empty” and desolated land. Erets Israel, or the Land of Israel, was perceived as a terra nullius, waiting to be redeemed by its true Jewish owners, after years of being neglected. Consider for example the description provided by the Israeli geographer Ben Arieh, in 1987,  

It is important to stress that in the dispersed country whole areas were empty of population, (...), the image of emptiness and abandonment was amplified by the poverty of peasants, commerce, craft and transportation (...). They all seemed to be backward and frozen in time (...). In 1882, when the first Zionist pioneers arrived, the first signs of change had already begun to appear (Schnell 2004:569).

The “emptiness” of the land of Palestine is perpetuated in Zionist literature and rhetorics, expressed in the infamous Zionist idiom: “a land with no people for people with no land”. The notion of the emptiness of the land was contrasted with the Zionist goal to modernize it. In Zionist mythology, the “old” “uninhabited” landscape represented the shmama (“wilderness”). At the same time, the new Zionist landscape was associated with progress and modernity (Azaryahu and Golan 2004:499). From the Zionist perspective, progress is understood as modernization and development is understood as following the footsteps of the West (George 1979).

The idea of equating development with modernization and Westernization can be tracked back to the nineteenth century, where economic, social and political systems originated in Western Europe and North America have spread to South America, Asia, and Africa (Alan 2000:30). In colonial times, it was assumed that poverty may be contained by urbanization, which transfers low-productive subsistence agriculture to more productive modern industry (Wratten 1995).
The Zionist nation building project, aspiring to be seen as fundamentally Western with some Oriental features and not as fundamentally Oriental (Khazoom 2003), promoted the transformation of the pre-Zionist landscape into a strictly Jewish landscape, i.e., an “ethnoscape”. An ethnoscape, as defined by Smith, is where “landscape, (...) becomes an intrinsic element in a community’s myth of origins and shared memories” (Smith 1999:150). The Zionist project involved transforming the landscape from an underdeveloped and “primitive” state into a more modern Hebrew landscape. This transformation was practiced through renaming places, assigning Hebrew, often Biblical names to places already carrying names in Arabic. At the same time, Arab names were erased from Israeli official maps. Indeed, “within the realm of national identity, the landscape of the ‘other’ simply does not exist” (Newman 2001:241).

This transformation of the landscape into an ethnoscape is echoed in the Zionist ideology of hafrachat hashmama (“making the desert bloom”) and ge’ulat karka (“land redemption”) (Goering 1979:12). The vision of “making the desert bloom” created national symbols and iconography around the landscape. A few of these mythical symbols celebrated a Jewish technological superiority in agricultural farming. For example, the water-tower is a prominent repeated motif in Zionist iconography, constituting a primal element of settlement landscape and a signifier of the modernization of the country (Azaryahu and Golan 2004). The Zionist supposed superiority in farming the land stood in contrast to the local Palestinian population, whose ability to cultivate the desert soil was doubted (George 1979). The alleged superiority of the settlers to exploit the natural resources was understood by the Zionists as a moral legitimization to assert control over these resources (Ibid).

11 The word Hebrew is dissimilar to the word Jewish. Hebrew denoted a social class and the “ethnicity” of the ancient Israelites. Jewish is a religion, used by the Zionists in modern times to mark the boundaries of the nation, creating a symbolic gap between “ethnic” Jews and other minorities, such as the Arab-Bedouins.
The argument that lifestyle can be used as a tool to legitimize control over resources dates back to Weber. The Zionist doctrine, which was influenced by Western secular dogmas, was propelled by the idea that “a civilized man (…) could cultivate the land because it meant something to him; on it, he accomplished, he built. For an uncivilized people, land was either farmed badly, (…), or it was left to rot” (Edward Said, quoted in Hasson 1998:118).

Indeed, Israeli officials claim that the government’s policy towards the Arab-Bedouins is to “encourage and assist them to the full turning from a nomadic or semi-nomadic life to a permanent settlement (…)” (Goering 1979:8). According to the state’s official narrative, the raison d’être for dislocating the Arab-Bedouins from their villages into the state built semi-urban townships is to benefit them both socially and economically and to provide the residents of the townships with modern life conditions. In the first page of the report written by Israel National Security Council in 2006, it is stated that,

The illegal settlements of the Arab-Bedouins prevent the urbanization and modernization of this society, prevent the state from providing them with adequate services and create a state of poverty that perpetuates itself (Translated from Hebrew, Parawer and Sarphus 2006:4).

As shown above, the state legitimizes its policy to uproot the Arab-Bedouins through equating social and economic development with modernization. Israel, a developed Western country, perceives the sedentarization of the Arab-Bedouins from a Western perspective. Accordingly, the state views their urbanization as positive. According to this logic, encouraging nomads to curtail their wanderings means helping them to advance their living standards and influencing them to settle down in urban centres, is equal to assisting them to become more “civilized” (Goering 1979). In this respective, by attempting to relocate the Arab-Bedouins into the townships, Israel is seeing itself as fulfilling a missionary role, bearing a kind of a “white man’s burden”.

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Nonetheless, having examined the life conditions in the townships, one has no choice but to doubt the sincerity of the states’ proclamation to “modernize” the Arab-Bedouins. As discussed in the previous chapter, the life conditions of the Arab-Bedouins in the townships are so abysmal that some Arab-Bedouins have chosen to leave behind their urban homes and move back into their traditional tents. Therefore, in order to understand why the government desires to relocate the Arab-Bedouin population while increasing the Jewish population, one has to look for answers elsewhere.

4.1.1 Development as Lebensraum and the “Demographic Demon”

*The Negev land is reserved for the Jewish citizens (...). We must expel Arabs and take their place (...) and if we have to use force, then we have force at our disposal- not in order to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and deport them, but in order to guarantee our own right to settle in those places* (David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, in a letter to his son, 5 October 1937, quoted in HRA 2003:8).

Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the compartmentalization of the world into nation states has formulated nations around territorial navels (Gross 1948). Indeed, the national identity of the “Jewish nation” is pregnant with sentiments of territorial demarcations. Demography, or the study of the relations between human populations and space, is tied up with the territorial discourse in Israel, where the basic consensus is that a Jewish state means Jewish majority (Newman 2001). Accordingly, areas densely inhabited by non-Jews (e.g., Arab-Bedouins) are perceived as a threat to (Jewish) national security. Mrs. Hana Hamdan, a legal attorney in Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has noted that “the [Israeli] state must stop seeing the Arab-Bedouins as a threat to security. Till today, [with a bitter smile], every time an Arab-Bedouin gives birth, it alarms the Israeli interior ministry and the Israeli foreign minister (...)” (Adalah 2005).
In view of that, the state’s desire to evacuate the Arab-Bedouins from their rural localities and replace them with Jews is arguably linked to the fear of becoming outnumbered (Rouhana 1997). This fear, which is publicly referred to in Israel as “the demographic demon” or “the Arab problem”, is used by the state to legitimize its policy, forcing the dislocation of the Arab-Bedouins. Consider for example the words of Mr. Ariel Sharon, prior to his term as the Prime Minister: “In the Negev, we are facing a serious problem, about 1.3 million dunams of state land are not in our hands but in the hands of the Bedouin community” (Translated from Hebrew, Abu-Ras 2006:1). The reason why Sharon finds the fact that 9.8% of the Negev land is populated by Arab-Bedouins to be a problem, besides the fact that they are non-Jewish, is linked to the notion that Arab-Bedouins’ loyalty to the Jewish state is only partial (Merom 1999; Rouhana 1997).

Israel was born in war and since World War Two has been involved in more wars than any other country (Rouhana 1997). In a reality where some Arab countries define the destruction of the Zionist state as the Arab strategic objective and occasionally discuss the extermination of the Jewish citizens of Israel, Israeli-Arabs are perceived as a potential danger to national security (Merom 1999). The latter is a major concern in Israel, forming the base of Jewish consensus (Ibid). Indeed, Israel’s public discourse is laden with symbols, images, stories, songs and myths that elevate the importance of defending the country. As with religion, security issues in Israel raise questions of myth-building (Rouhana 1997). In conclusion, the reason for the state’s demographic policies is rooted in security issues which are deeply associated with issues of national identity. In order to shed light on the interconnectedness of Israel’s national identity, demographic policies and spatial control, the historical ethno-symbolic approach is adopted, scrutinizing how myths serve to mobilize public opinion and to legitimize state’s policies.
4.2 National Narratives and Settlement

*Love of the motherland is acquired through knowledge (…) Geography, which is the study of landscapes, not only teaches us landscape perspective but also the understanding of its historical development and its present status, and mainly the connection of people to their surroundings* (Quoted in Schnell 2004: 566).

This section attends to the question: how does one group legitimize the social dispossession and marginalization of another group? And more specifically, what are the mechanisms used by the Israeli state to legitimize spatial control and the discrimination of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev? In the process of answering these questions, the historical ethno-symbolist approach is adopted. This approach will help to shed light on the pervasiveness of national identity and social imagination over time and its re-emergence in modernity. Specifically, this section focuses on Jewish national narratives, and on the way these narratives have been utilized by the Zionist ideology to secure its policies of land acquisition and demographic design in Israel/Palestine.

According to the historical ethno-symbolic approach, collective national identity, space, place and territory are mutually interconnected. “Place” is the concrete expression of man’s dwelling in the world and his identity depends on his belonging to places (Schulz 1980:46). As a result, certain symbols, such as territory, are pivotal to the existence of identity, including national identity (Smith 1999). From the historical ethno-symbolic point of view, societies have a universal geographical significance. In other words, once symbolic systems are absorbed into the social memory of a society, territorial demarcations can resonant over considerable periods of time with large political and social consequences (German 2007:122). For example, during the German national revival, the Teutenburger Walad, the place where the ancient Germanic hero Arminius, prince of the Cherusci discovered his “blood loyalty” and defeated three Roman legions, was rediscovered and celebrated.
in the form of a monumental commemoration (Schama 1996:87). But it was not just
German history that was imagined in the first decades of the sixteenth century but
also German geography, as simultaneously with the re-discovery of Arminius, came
the mapping of the heimat, the German homeland (Schama 1996:95). Another
example is Greece, where Hellenistic sites were reinvented as elements of modern
Greek national identity (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998). Similarly, many civilizations
bear witness to territorial attachment over long periods of time, for example, the
English vill, the Arab Watan and the Hebrew Nachala. For instance, the Jerusalem Ge
Ben Hinnom (“Valley of Hinnom”, or “The Valley of Death”), where the fires that
were originally designed to burn criminals and garbage, were later transformed into
the flames of Hell (Grosby 2007).

Arguably, national identity plays an important role in the formation of space and
territory, specifically in frontier regions (Yiftachel 1996:6). Space involves not only
the traditional geographical notions of fixed territories and boundaries, but also
symbolic and abstract notions of place, at local, national and global levels (Schnell
2001). National identity demarcates directions for territorialism and provides
symbols, legends and myths, used in the construction of space and place. Accordingly, national narratives shape the managing of space and place, while at the
same time, space and place re-enforce national identity (Kellerman 1996).

The literature on nationalism often emphasizes the function of national myths in
reinforcing solidarity among the members of society. As discussed earlier, national
narratives and social myths, which are often codified by the social elites, consolidate
National myths are often used to laden places with social memories of national
contents, transforming these places into a key aspect in the cultural geography of
nationalism (Zerubavel 1991). Indeed, as Azrayahu and Kellerman note, “the
symbolic loading of a place with historical myth amounts to the invention of
tradition” (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998:10). According to Barthes, myth is a type
of speech used by the hegemony to form social memory and to sustain the existing
hierarchy by depoliticizing it, passing it from the realm of history to the realm of
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“Nature”, where it appears to be axiomatic and unchallengeable (Barthes 1993:48). For instance, Bede’s eighth century Ecclesiastical History of the English People and Georgy’s sixth century History of the Franks, were used later in history by the hegemonic power to utilize collective memory and enhance group cohesion, weaving together historical facts and fiction as part of the creation of these modern nation states (Grosby 2007). As a consequence, the elites were able to consolidate and legitimate their authority (Grosby 2007; Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998). In conclusion, myth may serve to “advocate a certain course of action or to justify acceptance of an existing state of affairs” (Kellerman 1996:364). This means that national narratives such as the myths of frontier settlement and pioneering may serve to legitimize the hegemonic social order and validate decisions of power holders in issues such as development policies and demographic design.

4.3 Zionism and its Myths

Zionism makes an interesting example of how tradition may act as a glue in forming cultural and political collective out of many culturally different groups of people. The Zionist ideology drew legitimization both from the history of the Jews as reflected by the Bible and from a bond to the homeland, Erets Israel (“the Land of Israel”). The Zionist movement strived to solve the “Jewish problem”, i.e., anti-Semitism and pogroms in Europe, through building a home for the Jewish people in their historic Fatherland. The land of Israel/Palestine was chosen out of ideological and religious reasons based on narratives such as the return to the (home) land from a forced exile of 2000 years, as mentioned in the Israeli national hymn (Kimmerling 1999:341). The modern national trend of the return to the Land of Israel persistently transformed the Exodus story to an ethno-symbol (Gal 2007:223); in contrast to the Egyptian beit avadim (“house of slaves”), later compared by Zionist socialists to capitalism, the Zionist ideal was that of rural labourers living in freedom. Hence, the Biblical story of the exodus of the Hebrew people was used by the Zionists to create public support in the building of Kibbutzim in Palestine (Ibid). Similarly, The Zionists adopted
Jewish agricultural holidays, e.g., *Shavu’ot* (Pentecost) and *Tu Bi Shvat*, using them to promote and validate the Zionist ideology.

In ancient times, the Jewish holiday *Shavu’ot* celebrated the first fruits and the harvest. After the destruction of the Second Temple, the ancient agricultural festival was transformed into the anniversary of the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai. Later in history the Zionists chose to emphasize the agricultural side of the festival, giving it nationalist and social meanings.

The Jewish holiday *Tu Bi Shvat* is a ceremony of planting trees which dates back to the Second Temple era. In its Zionist version, the ceremony came to celebrate the Zionist ideology of *ge’ulat karka* (“land redemption”) and *kibush hashmama* (“conquest of the desert”) (Gal 2007), meaning, transferring the land from Palestinian to Jewish hands. The Zionists propagated the saying of the sages: “if the Messiah comes when you are planting a tree, first finish planting and only then go to receive him”. Among the national narratives used by the Zionist to support the national project of building a Jewish nation-state in Israel, especially salient were the myths of *halutziut* (“pioneering”) and *hityashvut* (“settlement”). These settlement myths have had a far reaching impact on the justification of state’s policies in issues of land management and demography, e.g., building development towns for the Jews in the Negev frontier, building *mitspim* (“communal settlements”) in the Galilee area and restricting the development of Arab-Bedouin settlements.

### 4.3.1 Settlement Myth

Settlement myth is a certain type of geographical myth, assigning subjective meanings to places: “one of the most important roles that landscape plays in the social process is ideological, supporting a set of ideas and values, unquestioning assumptions about the way a society is, or should be organized” (Quoted in Kellerman 1996:366).

As noted by F.J. Turner in “The Frontier in American History”, national collective identities are often formed and reinforced by territorial expansionism and frontier
settlements (Turner 1962). Settlement activity creates conceptions of space “as a frontier and as an element in the process of nation building” (Kellerman 1996:364). In fact, some of Israel’s basic values have focused on the concept of frontier settlement. In Israeli popular culture, the boundary was described as a wall separating good from evil and “us” from “them”. Simultaneously, the enemy was metaphorically described as a vulture, while the locus of the “good” was described as “out-post like settlements, peopled by labourers and warriors” (Hasson 1998:126).

The Israeli nation-building project of establishing a national-territorial identity in the Land of Israel/Palestine was based on Jewish traditions, mythical texts and narratives, intimately linked to settlement in the frontier (Schnell 2001). Settlement frontiers are the regions in which settlement take place at the boarders of the settled regions, or at the national borders (Kellerman 1996:363). The Israeli national myth created the idealization of border settlements and mobilized public support in settlement activity (Hasson 1998:128). The national narratives and iconography of Israeli society abound in landscape representations and are formed around the nations’ frontiers, creating a “geographical myth”. Geographical myth was defined by Entrikin who argued that “in mythical thought necessary conditions link events and their locations (...) Places and their contents are seen as wholes“ (Quoted in Kellerman 1996:363). These geographical myths can be categorized as myths relating to sites, e.g., the affair of Tel-Hai and myth related to settlement forms, e.g., isolated farms (Kellerman 1996). These national myths, which mystify past events, fuse history and landscape and define “sacred history” in terms of symbolic places (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998). The tale of Tel-Hai is particularly laden with symbolic meanings of pioneering, self sacrifice and defending the homeland.

4.3.2 “Hail to the Glorious Dead”. National Narrative: the Myth of Tel-Hai

Go, stranger, tell the Spartans that here, obedient to their laws, [they] lie (...).
Having died, they are not dead; for their valour, by the glory which it brings,
raises them from above out of the house of Hades (Simonides, quoted in Smith 2003:219).

The sacrificial virtue of heroes, willing to die for their countries and fellow men is a main principle of the nationalist thought (Smith 2003:42). For example, heroes and heroines like Wilhelm Tell, Joan of Arc, Moses, David, Leonidas, Arminius, Alexander, Arthur, Wallace, or Saladin have all been cherished by nationalists, demonstrating the role heroes and patriots have in mobilizing the masses (Smith 2003:41).

In pre-Israel Palestine, the resistance of Arab countries to the Zionist enterprise tied the issue of Jewish settlement to that of security (Kellerman 1996), demonstrated in the following account of the affair of Tel-Hai. On March 1920, a battle between Arabs and Jews took place at the Jewish settlement of Tel-Hai in northern Israel, claiming the life of eight Jewish settlers (Zerubavel 1991). Among the dead was Joseph Trumpeldor, a veteran of the Tsarist army who had lost an arm in a battle. The memory of this “local hero”, who was an active Zionist and a well-known figure, is still pervasive in Israeli social memory. Trumpeldor was portrayed according to the image of the haluts (“pioneer”), a worker and a warrior who “with one hand held the plough and with the other held his weapon12”. The image of the haluts as a fighting-labourer draws legitimization from the Biblical description of the Jewish people who built the Second Temple around 520 BC. The Zionists drew inspiration from Nehemiah’s phrase: ‘with one of his hands each laboured in the work, and with the other hand he held a weapon’ (Gal 2007:225). The Tel-Hai affair and Trumpeldor’s alleged last words “it is good to die for our country” were elevated by the Zionists to a national myth and were used to propagate settlement activity and pioneering in Palestine. As both a place and a myth, Tel-Hai became a symbol which was used to

12 Since Trumpeldor had only one arm, he was portrayed as holding both a plough and a gun in one hand.
promote the settling, working and defending of the Land of Israel (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998).

In summary, the symbolic meaning of the Tel-Hai national myth, which emphasized personal sacrifice and agricultural work, was closely associated with issues of security. As one Jewish farmer in the Negev noted, “during the days I work outside, tending to the livestock. At night I sleep in a small room which I built inside the den, keeping my rifle close to me so I could guard against theft” (Barshovski 2007). Currently, the farmer is under arrest for man slaughter after shooting an Arab-Bedouin who earlier this year (2007) trespassed the farm (Ibid). Although settlements in the peripheries were considered by the public as a continuation of the Tel-Hai tradition, settlers were not supposed to actively fight (Kellerman 1996). Instead, agricultural activity was extended to the boarder, fusing agriculture and security.

As Kretzmer notes, “security of the state is synonymous with security of the Jewish collective and that is often seen as promoting Jewish national goals” (Quoted in Rouhana 1997:58). Accordingly, policies that are perceived as beneficial to non-Jews in Israel may also be perceived as not serving the national interest, or even as threatening national security. If Israel was defined as the state of all its citizens, positive development of Arab-Bedouin social equity might have been perceived as beneficial for the general national interest (Rouhana 1997:58). As it is, national identity in Israel is used to legitimize the state’s spatial policies and demographic control in the Negev. Hence, the construction of citizenship and nationality in Israel deserve some more attention.
5. Demos or Ethnos? Nationality and Citizenship in Israel

In February 1995, Ka’adan, an Israeli Arab citizen petitioned to the Israeli High Court against being discriminated by the Israeli Land Administration; in his appeal to the court, Ka’adan claimed that he was refused to lease land from the ILA since he was not an ethnic Jew. Twelve years earlier, Ka’adan had tried to move his family out of the run-down overcrowded Arab town Baqa into a small Jewish village built on Israeli state land in order to improve his family’s standard of living. In 2000, the President of the High Court, Mr. Aharon Barak, ruled that the ILA had acted illegally by refusing to lease land to Ka’adan. The *Jura* Ka’adan won. However, up to this date he still has not been able to purchase the land.

Mr. Aharon Barak, known as a champion of civil rights, noted this case (known as the Ka’adan case) to be the most strenuous of his legal career (Ash 2004). The fact that the President of the High Court found it difficult to protect the civil right of an Arab citizen for having an equal access to state land is a living testimony of the problematic nature of the relations between the state and its Arab ethnic minorities as well as to the challenges of civil rights in the Jewish state. In order to understand how the construction of Israeli national identity causes the marginalization of the Arab-Bedouin community, this chapter untangles the construction of nationality and citizenship in Israel.

Before delving into the issue of Israeli national identity, it should be noted that the relationship between the state and the Arab-Bedouins is distinct from issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Firstly, Israeli Arab citizens do not have interaction with the Palestinian people and its leadership, as their social, economic and political daily lives is restricted to Israel proper. Secondly, Israeli Arab citizen’s collective experience is different from the experience of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation or under the Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Thirdly,
they are not represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the Palestinian polity (Rouhana 1997).

The issues of national identity and citizenship are linked to the concept of democracy. According to the Oxford English Dictionary democracy is defined as a form of government in which “the people have a voice in the exercise of power”. The word “democracy” was coined in ancient Greece, originating from the Greek words *demos* (people) and *kratia* (rule) literally meaning “the rule of the people” (Oxford 2007). Joseph Schumpeter explains democracy as a system for “arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Banik 2006a:57). Democracy is often regarded as requiring a minimum of conditions including a) liberty and equality among the members of the *demos*, b) a territory, c) elected governmental bodies and d) regulated competition between political parties (Rouhana 1997:35; Yiftachel 2000:732).

The three most common types of democratic political regimes are liberal, republican and ethnic democracies. These models are distinct from each other *vis a vis* government accountability, fair elections, civil rights and associational autonomy (Potter 2000:365). In countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the liberal model of democracy means that all individuals have equal rights, such as the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion13 (Wollf 2004:6). In addition, citizens in liberal democracies have the right to form political parties and interest groups (Potter 2000:367). In liberal democracies, the elected representatives are usually moderated by a constitution that protects the rights of individuals. In addition, constraints are placed against the will of the majority in order to protect the rights of the minorities. Republican democracy is a system that replaces inherent rule with citizenship, for example in countries such as Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and

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13 Although liberal democracy tries to be neutral it is not unbiased. For example, a Muslim women in France asked to remove her headscarf while in school might consider the state regulation to be an act of cultural imperialism.
Malaysia, where collective identities are recognized by the state. In this model the collective rights of one group can lead to another’s marginalization (Wollf 2004:7).

The third model of democracy is an ethnic democracy. The latter is a “specific expression of nationalism that exists in contested territories where a dominant ethnos gains political control and uses the state apparatuses to ethnicize the territory and society in question” (Yiftachel 2000:730). The word “ethnos” corresponds with the Latin word natio translated into “birth” (Oxford 2007). The ethno, which is a competing concept of the demos, is defined as “a historically formed community of people characterized by common, relatively stable cultural features, certain distinctive cultural traits, and the consciousness of their unity as distinguished from other similar communities” (Allen and Eade 2000:495).

Nationalism in ethnic democracies, or “ethnocraties” fuses three forces: (a) internal colonization of space through settling activity, (b) separating nationality and citizenship and (c) creating “ethno-classes” stratification by using “development” to marginalize group foreign to the hegemonic ethnic group (Yiftachel 2000:730). Accordingly, it is membership in the ethnos that enables participation in the public life and grants access to the common good. National movements within ethnocraties often move to exclude rather than merge parts of society, practiced in countries such as Japan, Estonia, Sri Lanka and in Second World War Germany (Yiftachel 2002:220). For example, in Japan, the Burakumin people have been historically excluded by the dominant ethnic group (Wollf 2004:9). In Estonia, all people with Estonian descent are regarded as citizens, while most Russians, even after two generations of living in the country, are not entitled to citizenship. In Sri Lanka, over two million Tamils having resided in the country for generations are denied citizenship since they are marked as ethnically different from the Sinhalese ethnos (Yiftachel 2000:731). In Nazi Germany, the myth of common origin corresponded with state structures. Adolph Hitler could therefore claim that the state is the living organism of the nation and most Germans could understand what he meant, although they might have disagreed with him (Allen and Eade 2000:488).
According to Fredrik Barth and Anthony Smith, ethnicity is understood as an aspect of social relations linked to the maintenance of real and imagined boundaries. An ethnic community is defined by Smith as a “named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites” (Smith 1986:13). Going back to the debate between primordialists and modernists regarding the nature of nations and ethnicity, it is useful to remember that Smith agrees with the modernist approach, which does not accept the primordialism of nations. However, unlike the modernists who find the distant past to be irrelevant for understanding nationalism, Smith contends that there is a need to “inquire into the genealogy of nations”. He argues that “(...) any study of the “roots” of nations must study the culture of that nation” (Smith 1986:7) and that “the ancient past explains the national present” (Smith 1983:10).

According to modernist thinkers such as Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm, ethnicity is not a “real” phenomenon existing independently of human concepts. Instead, they argue that ethnicity is an “invented” idea, invoked by social elites to accomplish political agendas. Considering this issue from a pragmatic position, whether ethnicity is “natural” or not, is irrelevant. Although ethnicity may be socially constructed, it has tangible effects e.g., legitimizing a certain development policy. Accordingly, a critical examination of the mechanisms used by the hegemony to legitimize the marginalization of other groups requires an analysis of the cultural foundations of a given “nation”. In doing so, one should take into account the obvious paradox that although ethnicity is not “real” it does have actual consequences, functioning like a placebo. In line with the approach offered by Barth and Smith, the rest of this chapter focuses on the way ethnic boundaries and national identity are constructed and maintained in Israel.
5.1 The Dynamics of Ethnic Policies in Israel; Jewish and Democratic?

-Who are you?

-I am an Israeli.

-No, what nationality?

-I am an Israeli.

-But also the Arab is an Israeli.

-I am an Israeli in my identity, not just in my citizenship.

-But are you a Jew?

-Of course, I just told you that I am an Israeli.


Israel is a country where even simple issues often have the tendency of becoming complicated. Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this is the inherent difficulties of terminology and the many senses in which conceptual categories such as “nationality”, “citizenship” and “religion” are used. Indeed, Israel is distinctive with relation to a variety of issues, e.g., the mixture of individual and collective rights, the role of religion in policy and most importantly, the lack of conformity between citizenship and nationality (Wollf 2004:3). The nature of the Israeli state is linked to its socio-historical context of being formed as a society of settlers/immigrants. Currently, the country is still absorbing immigrants and is engaged in settlement activity both within and outside its international borders (Kimmerling 1999). The literature regarding the Israeli political system is vast. During the last decades scholars like Amnon Rubinshtein (1967), Baruch Kimmerling (1999), Ben Wolff (2004), Ishak Saporta &Yosi Yonah (2002), Nadim Rouhana (1997), Oren Yiftachel,
(2000), Sami Smooha and Yoav Peled (1992) have been engaged in describing the Israeli polity, struggling to label its democratic characteristics. The scholarly debate of the nature of the Israeli democracy is marked with contradictions, either describing Israel as a shameful apartheid state or as a full liberal democracy; either as the exclusive state of the Jewish people or as the state of all its citizens (Glaser 2003). Although the question whether Israel is a democracy or not is interesting, the aim of this chapter is not to solve this analytical debate. Keeping in mind that the concept of democracy is distinct from theories of democracy (Banik 2006a:58), meaning, the definition of democracy is separated from the question whether democracy is “good”, this chapter focuses on the challenges that the construction of Israeli democracy, nationality and citizenship pose to the wellbeing of the Arab-Bedouin citizens of the state.

Most Israeli and Western scholars regard Israel as a democracy. Democracy enjoys a wide consensus in Israel in the sense that it is taken for granted as “well known and requiring no proof” (Rouhana 1997:35). For example, the Basic Law on human dignity and freedom passed in 1992, states that the purpose of this law is to “protect human dignity and freedom, in order to lay down the ethical value of the state of Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state” 14 (Rouhana 1997:35, emphasis is mine).

In contemporary Western countries, it is citizenship rather than ethnicity or religion that indicates belonging to the demos (Don-Yehiya 1998:273). This means that the state does not identify itself with any ethnic or religion groups of citizens. In Israel, however, the state is committed to the Jewish people, despite the fact that parts of its citizens are not Jewish. Noam Chomsky explains the tension between the “Jewishness” of the state and its commitment to liberal democratic values:

The Zionist dream is to construct a state which is as Jewish as England is English and France is French. At the same time, this state is to be a democracy

14 In Israel, which does not have a constitution, the various Basic Laws are the foundations of a future constitution.
on the Western model. Evidently, these goals are incompatible. Citizens of
France are French, but citizens of the Jewish state may be non-Jews (…). To
the extent that Israel is a Jewish state it can not be a democratic state (Quoted
in Adalah 2001:8).

Yoav Peled argues that the Israeli political system is defined by two types of
citizenship: republican for the Jews and liberal for the Arabs (Peled 1992:432). This
means that while the Arabs formally enjoy civil rights as individuals, the Jews enjoy
communal rights in addition to the individual rights recognized to the Arabs. But what
Peled obviously forgets is that in a republic democracy it is the minority’s group
rights that are secured against the tyranny of the majority and not the group rights of
the majority.

Contrary to Peled, scholars such as Yiftachel (1998) and Rouhana (1997) describe
Israel as an ethnocracy, where citizenship laws are based on the principle of jus
sanguinis (“blood relations”) and not jus soli (“territory”) and where ethnic identity is
the primary factor in granting citizenship status (and certain civil rights). The most
telling example of Israel’s commitment towards the Jewish citizens of the state is The
Law of Return, which was enacted in 1950, granting any Jew the right to settle in
Israel, acquiring full citizenship automatically upon arrival (Rubinstein 1967:435).
While this right is granted to Jews, the Law of Shielding the Deprivation of the Right
of Return, passed by the Knesset in 2001, denies the Palestinians the right to return to
Israel (Adalah 2001:11). It should, however, be remembered that at the time when the
Law of Return was enacted, many of the Jews arriving in Israel where either refugees
of the Holocaust or immigrants from Muslim countries where Jews faced racial
intolerance (Yiftachel 2002:228).

In the Israeli Declaration of Independence, signed by the State Council on 14th of May
1948, it was announced that the Land of Israel,

was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and
political identity was shaped. Here they first attained statehood, created
cultural values of national and universal significance and gave the Bible to the world (…) by virtue of our natural and historic right we hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel (Israel’s Declaration of Independence 1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Indeed, following the war of 1948 Israel was founded not only as a Jewish state but as the state of the Jews, regardless where they held their citizenship (Gover 1992). In 1992, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) ratified two basic laws declaring the state of Israel to be both Jewish and democratic. Similarly, the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency Law proclaimed that “the state of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates are open, in accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate to it” (Rouhana 1997:32). Manifesting the above proclamation, Edward Said noted that, “Israel is now not only the only state in the world that is not the state of its citizens but of the whole Jewish people wherever they may be” (Rosen-Zvi 2002:3). Israel’s strong commitment to the Jewish people is expressed in various laws, rules, regulations and practices. The following examples suffice in illustrating the exclusive Jewish identity of the Israeli state.

In 1985, the state adopted the amendment to the Basic Law, denying any party whose actions or beliefs negate the existence of the state of Israel as the state of the Jews the right to participate in the elections to the government (Peled 1992:438). As a consequence, participation in government elections by a party that wishes to challenge the Jewish nature of the state could be denied, even if it wishes to do so through a parliamentary process (Rouhana 1997).

The Flag and the Emblem Law enacted in 1949, reflects the government’s decision that the flag and emblem of Israel should be a combination of Zionist and Jewish religious imagery (Adalah 2001). The Israeli flag is also the flag of the Zionist movement and is demonstrating two Jewish historic and religious symbols- the Talit (praying shawl), represented by two horizontal blue strips and magen david (the Shield of David), a Jewish symbol several hundred years old (Gal 2007:226). Moreover, the menorah (the seven branched candelabrum) had served for centuries as
a Jewish symbol in synagogues and eventually was adopted as the symbol of the state of Israel (Gal 2007:226).

The public holidays in Israel are all Jewish-centred. The Israeli Independence Day, for instance, celebrates the victory of the Israeli Defence Force over the neighbouring Arab countries but also symbolizes for the Arab citizens the defeat of the Palestinian National Movement as well as the fragmentation of Palestine and the Palestinian people (Rouhana 1997:33). The text of the national hymn *hatikva* (“Hope”) is highly particularistic and has no meaning for the non-Jewish citizens of the state (Adalah 2001:47). As one Arab-Bedouin man noted, “the melody of the national hymn is nice, but I am unable to identify myself with its lyrics” (02.12.06, Interview in Rahat). *hatikva*, which expresses the yearning of the Jewish people for Zion, is also the hymn of the Zionist movement:

As long as in the heart, within,  
a Jewish soul still yearns,  
and towards the end of the East  
an eye still watches toward Zion

Our hope is not yet lost,  
the hope of two thousand years,  
to be a free nation in our own land,  
the land of Zion- Jerusalem

(Naftali Herz Imber 1878, translation from Hebrew).

As discussed earlier, Jewish national and personal redemption is linked to the ethos of *ge’ulat karka* (“land redemption”). As those from whom the land is to be “redeemed”, the Arabs can not participate in this process (Peled 1992:435). As an Arab-Bedouin man noted:

I can not transform myself, even for a moment, into a ‘pioneer’, a ‘settler’ or a ‘Zionist’ (…). Equality should not be claimed on the grounds that ‘I am a Zionist’ but on the grounds that I am also a human being, or at least on the ground that I am also a citizen or resident of the state (Quoted in Saporta and Yonah 2002:103).
In the Jewish state, Arab citizens are usually exempted from military service. Mandatory for most Jews but denied to Israeli Arabs, the military service functions as a gate-keeper causing socio-economic segregation between the Arabs and the Jews (Peled 1992:436). This exemption is not grounded in any law, but is still widely practiced, with the exception of Arab-Druze and Arab-Bedouins who are normally allowed military service. Since many social and economic benefits are linked to the military service, the Arab citizen’s ability to attend the common good is restricted, e.g. access to special low interest loans, partial exemptions from fees in state-run courses, preferences in public employment, educational loans and on campus housing (Adalah 2001; Wolff 2004).

In 1948, Israel declared a “state of emergency”, which is still maintained today. Israel’s permanent state of emergency enables it to re-enforce regulations that the British Mandate used against the Palestinians and the Jews in Palestine previous to 194815 (Rouhana 1997:58).

Another example of the unequal distribution of civil rights can be found in the development and allocation of land resources by the Jewish National Fund. The JNF was founded in 1901, in order to pursue the project of nation building in the Land of Israel (Bishara et al. 2006). After Israel reached statehood, it transferred about two million dunams of land to the JNF so that the land could be developed to benefit the Jews (Rouhana 1997). In 1952, the state enacted the World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency in Israel Law, granting several Zionist organizations, among them the JNF, the right to act in Israel as semi-governmental agencies. As a result, more than 20 percent of the land in Israel is owned by the JNF.

According to the JNF’s official statements, its objectives are “purchasing, acquiring by lease or exchange, receiving by leas or any other way, lands, forests (...) for the

15 The League of Nations “mandate” was used to govern areas of colonial rule in the Middle East, where parts of the Ottoman Empire were divided between Britain and France (Bernstein 2000). The term British Mandate refers to Palestine between the years 1920-1948, a time period in which the British Empire governed the area (Rozen-Zvi 2002).
purpose of settling Jews on the said lands (…)” (Adalah 2001:32, emphasised in the
original text). This means that the JNF is committed to develop the land only for the
benefit of the Jewish people, insisting that its devotion is not given to the general
public in Israel, but to the Jewish ethnos alone (Bishara and Hamdan 2006). For
instance, while hundreds of settlements were built for the use of Jewish citizens, not
one rural settlement was built for the Arab population. In addition, according to JNF’s
policy, land is not to be sold to non-Jews (Rouhana 1997:53). The nationalist aspects
of the JNF, which originated from the Zionist interpretation of the biblical text, “the
land shall not be sold forever for the land is Mine” (Leviticus 15:23), prevent Arab-
Bedouins access to approximately 20 percent of the country’s land (Rouhana 1997).

Ironically, the state of Israel is defined under the principals of “freedom, justice and
peace as envisaged by the Prophets of Israel; [and] it will ensure complete equality of
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex
(…)” (Israel’s Declaration of Independence 1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
However, the definition of Israel as a Jewish state recognizes only one people, one
history and one national memory. It excludes the Arab citizens by generating
oppressive policies against them. In defining itself as the state of the Jewish people,
Israel denied itself developing an inclusive Israeli national identity that encompasses
all citizens. In fact, there is no “Israeli nationality”; it is either Jewish or Arab
(Rouhana 1997). Consequently, this reality construes sentiments of frustration and
isolation among the Israeli-Arab minorities (Adalah 2001), that is best expressed in
the poem “Identity Card”, by Mahmoud Darwish:

Write down!
I am an Arab
and my identity card number is fifty thousand
I have eight children
and the ninth will come after the summer
will you be angry?
Write down!
I am an Arab
employed with fellow workers at a quarry
I have eight children
I get them bread
garments and books
from the rocks…
I do not supplicate charity at your doors
nor do I belittle myself at the footsteps of your chamber
so will you be angry?

Write down!
I am an Arab
I have a name without a title
patient in a country
where people are enraged
my roots
were entrenched before the birth of time
and before the opening of the eras
before the pines, and the olive trees
and before the grass grew

My father… descends from the family of the plough
not from a privileged class
and my grandfather… was a farmer
neither well-bred, nor well-born!
taught me the pride of the sun
before teaching me how to read
and my house is like a watchman's hut
made of branches and cane
are you satisfied with my status?
I have a name without a title!

Write down!
I am an Arab
you have stolen the orchards of my ancestors
and the land which I cultivated
along with my children
and you left nothing for us
except for these rocks…
so will the State take them
as it has been said?!

Therefore!
write down on the top of the first page:
I do not hate people
nor do I encroach
but if I become hungry
the usurper's flesh will be my food
beware…
beware…
of my hunger
and my anger!

(Mahmoud Darwish 1964).

Israel’s official definition as a Jewish state is clearly more than semantics. Access to the common good and distribution of civil and human rights are granted in accordance with ethnic belonging rather than citizenship (Kimmerling 1999:340). The ethnically prejudiced distribution of resources is revealed through the interconnectedness of land allocation and belonging to the Jewish *ethnos*. It is generally accepted that in ethnocracies, or countries governed by unstable democracies, disparities in the distribution of wealth demonstrate human right’s abuses, in the form of state sanctions towards a section of its’ citizens (Niezen 2003:56). The situation where people’s access to resources is denied based on ethnic reasons, is discriminatory and contradicts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1, where it is stated that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (…)” (UNGA 1948:1). The UN International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 articulate the rights of peoples to control resources, self determination, practice of subsistence and cultural development (ICESCR 1966). As mentioned earlier, both the Israeli Land Administration, e.g. the Ka’adan case and the Jewish National Fund violate these rights, through practicing an unequal development and distribution of land resources, in addition to denying the Arabs citizens the right to equal opportunities.

5.1.1 **Summary**

*Are we eventually going to set up a theocracy? No! Belief holds us together, science makes us free. We are not going to allow our rabbis even to think about theocratic ideas. We are going to know how to restrict them to their synagogues just as we are going to retain our army within their bases (...) and should people of other creed or other nationality come to live among us we are going to guarantee them honourable protection and equal rights. We have*
learned tolerance in Europe (Dr. Herzl, a Viennese Jewish Journalist and the founder of the Zionist movement, in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" from 1896, quoted in Rubinstein 1967:108).

A common practice among members of social groups, inside and outside of Israel, is to base their sense of collective identities on the perceptions of the difference between “us” and “them” (Merom 1999). For instance, in the seventeenth century the British elite regarded itself to be exceptionally rational and scientific compared to other “nations” (Greenfeld 1992). According to Greenfeld, national identity was in effect identical with citizenship and since “a nation existed only insofar as its members kept the social compact, could be in principle acquired or abandoned of one’s free will” (Ibid). This however, is not the case in Israel of 2007, as membership in the nation and national identity are separated from the concept of citizenship.

If democracy stands for equal membership in the demos, and equal membership in the demos is realized through civil and human rights equally distributed in all parts of society, then it follows that the manner by which Israel defines itself poses a threat to liberal values. A liberal democracy that emphasizes an inclusive and civil national identity, can secure a more equal distribution of resources. It lifts a barrier against social exclusion of ethnic minorities, allowing full access to the common good on the basis of citizenship, not on the basis of being a member of a certain ethnic group (Saporta and Yonah 2002).

The human world is not just a cultural assemblage but it is also a political stage, where large segments of the human population owe their allegiance not just to the state but also to an “indigenous nation”. The latter is often subjected to tight spatial control for no other reason than for occupying the same space simultaneously with another nation. As we observed, there is an inherent duality in the way Israel recognizes civil rights to its citizens, granting some rights on the basis of ethnic belonging, while simultaneously providing a democratic framework based on liberal individualism. Interestingly, this duality is also inherent to the Zionist movement. Zionism grew as a secular and emancipatory movement which was influenced by
European liberalism (Kimmerling 1983). While it presented itself as an anti-colonial liberation movement, it evolved as a colonial project, attempting to maximize landholding in Israel/Palestine, advancing the undemocratic project of “Judaizing” the country16 (Yiftachel 2000:736; Yiftachel 2002:226).

The reason why Israel’s status as a democracy is such a contested concept is that the association of ethnicity with national identity has become ingrained into the Jewish nature of the state (Kimmerling 1999). The state symbolic system is strictly Jewish: Israel calendar, days and sites of commemoration, heroes, flag, emblem, national anthem, names of places and ceremonies are all Jewish. Since Israel’s character as Jewish is defined in exclusive ethno-religious terms, Jewish ownership of the state defeats equal citizenship as the state’s raison d’être (Wollf 2004). Consequently, by devoting itself to benefit Jews rather than its citizens the state creates a gap between nationality/ethnicity and citizenship (Meir and Zivan 1998; Rosen-Zvi 2002). The identity card carried by every adult in Israel includes the rubric: “nationality”. Under this rubric the word “Jew” appears for Israeli Jews and the word “Arab” appears for the Arab citizens (Rouhana 1997:220). Thus, erecting an imaginary as well as a real boundary between the concepts of nationality and citizenship, re-formulating “Jewishness” not just as a religion but also as a nationality. Defining the state as Jewish enables the state to create separated Jewish and Arab ethnoscapes based on notions of ethnicity and nationality (Bishara and Hamdan 2006). For example, as discussed above, non-Jews are unable to lease or buy land from the Jewish National Fund, whose policy of land allocation is based on ethnical attachments.

In conclusion, the construction of the state’s identity as inherently Jewish disallows equal membership in Israeli society to citizens not belonging to the Jewish hegemonic ethnos. From the perspective of the Arab citizens, the notion that Israel is the state of the Jews regardless of their citizenship, but not necessarily the state of its Arab

16 The Zionist movement presented itself as anti-colonial, attempting to “liberate” the homeland from the British (Yiftachel 2002).
citizens demeans their status and isolates them both psychologically, emotionally, socially and economically. Israel “grants” its Arab citizens some equality in access to resources as a show of generosity, a kind of noblesse oblige (Rouhana 1997). But some equality actually means no equality. To put in the words of an Arab-Bedouin man from the town of Rahat: “my dream is that my children and grandchildren, Arab citizens of Israel, could feel that they belong to the state as part of the society, with full rights, without feeling like a fifth weal and without feeling like they are the enemy (…)” (Edler 2006).
6. Conclusions

The consequence of an Israeli national identity being formulated according to ethnic boundaries and strictly defined within the paradigm of a Jewish *ethnos*, is that non-Jewish minorities are perceived by the Jewish majority as potential enemies (Merom 1999; Rouhana 1997). This perception has enabled the state to attribute the inequality and discrimination of the Arabs to “security issues” and to legitimate unequal distribution of resources and civil rights, e.g. through land policies and land management (Rouhana 1997). The result, one may argue, is that after 59 years of distributive injustice, Israeli society is stratified along the lines of ethnicity, having created ethno-classes. Since national identity and territorial demarcation were crucial for the Zionist project in terms of nation building, ethnic boundaries were laden with images of spatial representation, creating ethnically segregated spaces of Jews and Arabs and in the process depriving Arab-Bedouins and other ethnic minorities of their land.

The Zionist ethos is still potent in Israel’s political culture. Any attempt by non-Jews to protest against the exclusive nature of the Jewish state is perceived by the state as a demonstration of disloyalty and consequently, as a threat to national security. As mentioned earlier, these notions are used to legitimize discriminatory policies. In the Zionist project of territorializing Jewish national identity, myths and narratives of frontier settlement, e.g. the myth of Tel-Hai and the “redemption of the land”, were associated with security issues, further contributing to the legitimization of spatial policies of land allocation. As we have seen, these spatial policies include mechanisms such as the establishment of isolated farms, land acquisition, the appropriation of Arab-Bedouin land and policies of demographic control.

During the Zionist settlement project, which gave rise to development schemes such as the Sharon Plan and the Wine Road Project, Arab-Bedouin private and collective assets were split, annexed and eroded, resulting in unsustainable life conditions. As discussed in the first chapter, a successful implementation of sustainable development
must be based on three chief pillars: environmental reliability, economic vitality and social equity (Brundtland 1987). The case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev clearly demonstrates that failing to attend to all three aspects of the sustainable development paradigm, can only result in a humanitarian and environmental crisis. The Arab-Bedouins currently living in the townships may have a higher income than 50 years ago when they lived in tents, and perhaps today more Arab-Bedouins are officially employed than before. However, economic growth alone cannot secure human flourishing. In fact, a sustainable increase in welfare can be achieved without economic growth, as the case of Kerala clearly shows\(^\text{17}\) (Banik 2006a:100). Similarly, taking the environment into consideration on the one hand, but neglecting the social factor on the other, is not truly sustainable. This is why adding a few green spots on the map under the salient ethos of “making the desert bloom” cannot be sustainable, as long as transparency, inclusiveness and equality in the distribution of natural and social resources among all citizens of the state is satisfied.

During previous discussions it has been clarified that the rise of nationalism in modern times, although very often had its roots in ancient times, is understood to be a mechanism used by the social elites to fuse state and nation, creating modern nation-states, e.g., France and Germany. Indeed, the Zionist national revival movement, seeking to build a home for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel, utilized popular traditions, symbols and myths to form the national collective out of the many culturally distinct Jewish communities in the Diaspora. For example, the tradition of celebrating \textit{pesah} was utilized to revalidate the socialist agenda of the kibbutzim. However, the Zionist movement did not follow the European pattern of bridging the gap between the nation and the state. Instead, similar to states such as Serbia, Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Malaysia, it created an ethnic democracy, or an “ethnocracy”, where the state identifies itself with a specific ethnic segment of its

\(^{17}\) The Kerala case shows that low level economies are able to significantly improve human social equity. In Kerala, an increase in life expectancy, a decrease in child mortality, 100 percent literacy and sustainable population reduction were achieved without a significant increase in income.
citizens, keeping the tension between ethno-national belonging and formal citizenship, allowing the marginalization of non-ethnics.

In a sense, states have always been at a disadvantage when it comes to earning the loyalty of their citizens (Niezen 2003). In Israel, the situation where the state imposes social, legal, symbolic and spatial boundaries between the majority Jewish ethnos, and other non-Jewish ethnic minorities, can be seen as a counterproductive policy, as it alienates a group of citizens from identifying with the state, risking that in the course of seeking national identity this group will pursue self-determination (Yiftachel 1996). In other words, where spatial control and other means of domination are used by the state to economically and socially exclude minority groups, the latter will often seek to break away from the state, consequently, threatening the state’s territorial domination (Newman 2001).

Indeed, if Israel sticks to its present policy as an ethnic democracy, maintaining a status quo of inequality between ethno-classes, the Arab-Bedouins and other ethnic minorities might decide to resort to international organizations, to get their rights recognized (See for example, “The Arab Bedouins of the Naqeb-Negev Desert in Israel, Shadow Report”, a report submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), submitted by the Negev Coexistence Forum in 2006; NCF 2006a). Therefore, in order to counter any separationist tendencies of minority groups, if not for other reasons such as securing distributive justice and human dignity, Israel should promote group cohesion by drafting a constitution that guarantees the recognition of rights on the basis of civil citizenship.

6.1 Nationalism, Nationality and Citizenship, Final Comments

-Excuse me for prying, but I’d like to ask you, are you Jewish or Arab?

-I am an Arab-Jew.
- You are funny.

- No, I am quite serious.

- Arab-Jew? I have never heard of that.

- It is quite simple: just the way you say you are an American Jew. Here, try to say “European Jews”.

- European Jews.

- Now, say “Arab-Jews”.

- You can’t compare, European Jews is something else.

- How come?

- Because “Jew” just doesn’t go with “Arab”. It just doesn’t go. It doesn’t even sound right.

- It depends on your ear.

- Look, I have nothing against the Arabs. I even have friends who are Arabs, but how can you say an “Arab Jew” when all the Arabs want is to destroy the Jews?

- And how can you say “European Jews” when the Europeans have already destroyed the Jews?

(Quoted in Ducker 2006:1).

In recent years, the processes of globalization have ostensibly brought with them the “end of nationalism”. According to this view, traditional forms of boundaries become less meaningful, as information, finances and migrant workers cross the boundaries that no longer acts as a barrier (Newman 2001). The increasing flow of technologies, information, services, goods and people across state boundaries is often thought of as eroding the importance of old national sentiments. This period, in which these
processes are occurring, is described as “the age of global systems and post
governmental structures”, portrayed by Habermas as “the age of post-national
identity” (Ben-Ami 2000). As the world moves towards becoming a “global village”,
notions of the diminishing role of nationalism are expressed. Consider for example
the words of Eric Hobsbawm: “nations and nationalism will be present in this history,
but in subordinate, and often rather minor roles” (Quoted in Smith 2003:1). To be
sure, uncertainty about the future of nation-states and expectations of their decline are
“as old as nation-states themselves” (Niezen 2003:197). These notions, however, are
only one side of the bigger picture, as they neglect to attach weight to recent
processes of re-territorialization and spatial re-configurations, brought by the revival
of neo-nationalist movements, in places like Ayodhya, Kosovo and Jerusalem. In
Spain, for example, properties of territory and the role of ancestral homelands have
been re-invoked by Basque nationalists (Ben-Ami 2000; Smith 1999). Indeed, in this
“borderless world”, where forty new state boundaries had been created since 1989,
the control over a specific stretch of land remains closely related to notions of
national identity (Newman 2001).

In Israel, both post-nationalist and neo-nationalist ideas have been on the rise (Wollf
2004). Israeli neo-nationalist ideology, i.e., neo-Zionism, is being reinforced by
religious affiliations to places of worship, invoked in rhetorics of divine promises and
sacred territories (Smith 2003). By contrast, post-nationalist ideas, i.e., post-Zionism,
advocate the waning of Zionism as the primal factor of national identity, refocusing
the debate around the idea of the civil state, where the state is committed to the
interests of all its citizens (Rouhana 1997; Schnell 2004).

Neo-Zionist ideas relate to the ancient Israelites who “settled the Promised Land, the
sites of battle, the resting place of the Arc of the Covenant, the place of the Temple,
the sites of miracles and the tombs of rabbis” (Smith 1999:152). Through embedding
these places with sacred meanings, the neo-Zionists are defining the extent of their
claims over territory. For the neo-Zionists, manifested by settlers in the West Bank
and the Occupied Territories, territory remains the main tenet of their culturally
constructed national and ethnic identities (Ben-Ami 2000). According to the settlers
of *yehuda ve shomron* (“Judea and Samaria”), living in the heart of the ancient Hebrew kingdom is supposed to hasten the appearance of the Messiah (Schnell 2004). A telling example is an article that was published in the Israeli online newspaper Y-Net on May 2007. The article reveals that the last burial place of Herod the Great (74 BC – ca. 4 BC) was found in *gush etzion* (“Block of the tree”), a cluster of Israeli settlements in the northern Judea region of the West Bank. The article describes the archaeological discovery and notes that, “finding the last burial place of Herod the Great, (...), is another proof of the strong links of *gush etzion* to the history of the Jewish people and to Jerusalem” (Translated from Hebrew, Shoval 2007). To be sure, by weaving notions of historical continuity into the ‘meaning’ of the archaeological burial site, Jewish settlers are able to revalidate the claim that *gush etzion* is a Jewish territory where Jews have the right and the obligation to settle. It then follows that, if a territory is the “promised land”, than it must be owned. If a piece of land is “redeemed” by its historic true owners, liberated in some miraculous victory of few over many, it can not be negotiated. And if a certain community is defining itself as the “chosen people”, it follows according to the neo-Zionist logic, that other people are less worthy (Newman 2001).

Post-Zionists on the other hand (represented by a small group of Israeli academics), seek to transform the Israeli ethnic state into a civil state, moving away from the ethnocratic model towards a liberal democracy (Schnell 2004). Unlike the political model of ethnic democracies where there is an official distinction between nationality and citizenship, e.g., Arab-Israeli, in the civil state, at least officially, nationality is similar to citizenship. This means that in order to shrink the gap between nationality and citizenship, national identity must be broadly defined to include all citizens of the state and be formed on the basis of geographical delineations. In other words, to transform Israel from an ethnic democracy into a liberal democracy, national identity must be defined according to territory, as in, say, France, and not according to ethnic relations, as in Sri Lanka or Greece (Rouhana 1997).

In transforming Israel to the state of all its citizens, its exclusive Jewish nature has to be compromised in favour of a civil, secular national identity, with symbols such as
the national hymn, national emblem and the national flag transformed to accommodate the different ethnic groups. By defining itself as the state of the Jews, Israel failed to develop a national identity that represents the entire civil population, including Jews, Arab-Bedouins and other ethnic minorities. By creating an inclusive Israeli national identity, contested spaces may be reconfigured as shared places, no longer finding it necessary to practise spatial segregation and demographic control to support a sense of a national “self”.

At this point, one may argue that symbolic landscapes and places should be demystified, redeemed from the various myths and national narratives embedded in them by those who had the interest to do so (Hasson and Gossenfeld 1980). As part of the process of creating a new Israeli national identity, the political and social meanings of sacred places and holy landscapes need to be re-opened for an honest public debate, reclaiming the meanings of these places back from the domain of “Nature” into the domain of history. Once the process of demystification has begun, history can be re-valued. For example, Zionist Kibbutzim may be viewed as a “social experiment set up by unemployed, seemingly confused persons, who had no connection whatsoever with the goals of national salvation and spiritual redemption” (Hasson 1998). Only then could graves be seen as the last resting place of human beings and not as places of national significance; only then could battle sites be seen as a demonstration of the horror of wars, not as places celebrating the glorious sacrifice of people’s lives in the name of national destiny.

It is therefore suggested that symbolic places of Zionist history be deconstructed and reconstructed, first, stripped of their old chauvinistic meanings, and then laden with new symbolic meanings that celebrate coexistence. Such a process will discharge the landscape of its current nationalistic dimensions, turning it back from an ethnoscape into a landscape, where citizens are able to live peacefully in spatial and symbolic coexistence. Following Shlomo Hasson (1998), I would like to conclude with a monologue between a man and a boy, standing on the shoreline of the Mediterranean Sea:
- In What Language are you speaking, uncle?

- In Arabic.

- With whom?

- With the fish.

- Do the fish understand only Arabic?

- Yes, the old fish, the ones that where here when the Arabs were.

- And the young fish, do they understand Hebrew?

- They understand Hebrew, Arabic, and all Languages. The seas are wide and flow together. They have no borders and have room enough for all fish.

- Wow.

(Quoted in Hasson 1998:137).
7. Appendix

7.1 Glossary

Aliya lakarka (Hebrew): Ascent to the land (of Israel).

Ashkenazi (Hebrew): European Jew.

Bedu (Arabic): Desert dweller.


Dirah (Arabic): An area over which a tribal group claims traditional ownership, or right of access.

Dunam (Turkish): 1 dunam is 1000 square meters, or a quarter of an acre.

Erets Israel (Hebrew): Land of Israel.

Ge Ben Hinnom (Hebrew): Literally means “valley of death”. The name refers to a location in Jerusalem.

Ge’ulat karka (Hebrew): Land redemption.


Hafrachat hashmama (Hebrew): “Making the desert bloom”.

Haluts (Hebrew): A pioneer.

Halutziut (Hebrew): Pioneering.

Hatikva (Hebrew): Literally means “hope”, Israeli national hymn.
Hityashvut (Hebrew): The process of Jewish settlement.

Jus sanguinis (Latin): “Right of blood”, a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual born to a parent who is a national or citizen of the state.

Jus soli (Latin): “Right of soil”, a right by which nationality or citizenship can be recognized to any individual born in the territory of the related state.

kibush hashmama (Hebrew): Conquest of the desert.

Kibbutz (Hebrew): A settlement with collective organization of labour and housing, with equal sharing of production and consumption.

Kol Israel Ahim (Hebrew): Literally means “all Israel are brothers and sisters”.

Magen David (Hebrew): The Shield of David.

Mawat (Turkish): Unclaimed “dead” land.

Menorah (Hebrew): the seven branched candelabrum used in the Temple in Jerusalem.

Mirit (Turkish): State land.

Mitspe (Hebrew): Communal settlements.

Mizrahim (Hebrew): Jews from North African or Middle Eastern origin.

Moshav, Moshava (Hebrew): Agricultural cooperative settlement based on the equality of its members to cultivate an equal share of land.

Nachala (Hebrew): Jewish traditional demarcation of territory.

Negev/Naqab (Hebrew/Arabic): Desert area in southern Israel.

Pzura (Hebrew): “Dispersion”. refers to Arab-Bedouin’s unrecognized villages in the Negev.
Shavu’ot (Hebrew): Pentecost, a Jewish holiday, one of the three Biblical pilgrimage festivals.

Sheikh (Arabic): Leader of clannish or religious order.

Shmama (Hebrew): Literally means “Wilderness”.

Siyag (Hebrew): An area in the Negev, into which most of the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev were moved during the 1950s.

Sumu’d (Arabic): Steadfastness.

Tanzimat Fermani (Turkish): Literally means “reorganization”, a period of reformation in the Ottoman Empire which began in 1839.

Talit (Hebrew): Jewish praying shawl.

Tabu (Turkish): Ottoman land tenure law, enacted in 1858.

Terra nullius (Latin): “No mans land”, meaning “empty land”.

Tu BiShvat (Hebrew): A Jewish holiday celebrating trees.

‘Urf (Arabic): Islamic customary law.

Vill (English): A tract of land of rural community.

Yehuda ve shomron (Hebrew): Judea and Samaria.

Watan (Arab): Arab traditional territory.
7.2 List of Tables
### Table 1.

**Informants.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bimkom- Planners for Planning Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physicians for Humans Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council for the Unrecognized Arab-Bedouin Villages in the Negev</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Society of Nature Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Arab-Bedouin manager in local city council</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism manager in Ramat Negev Regional Council, responsible for the promotion of the Wine Road Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab-Bedouins</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Social worker in Abu Basma- the Regional Council of the unrecognized villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>An Arab-Bedouin activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A member of the parent’s board in a school in Beer Hadaj- an Arab-Bedouin unrecognized village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A local leader from Abde- an Arab-Bedouin unrecognized village</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jewish Farms</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Havarim farm</td>
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<td>Nahal Boker farm</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, an Anthropologist</td>
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<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
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</table>
Table 2.

Population in the Arab-Bedouin Towns.

![Bar chart showing population in thousands for Tel Sheva, Rahat, Lakia, Segev-Shalom, Aroar, Kseifa, and Hura.]

Table 3.

Infant Mortality per 1000 Live Birth in the Negev.

Table 4.


8. References


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