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## THE NEW RUSSIAN DIASPORA - AN IDENTITY OF ITS OWN?

Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic.

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### ABSTRACT

The collapse of the unitary Soviet state has plunged its former citizens into a profound identity crisis. Particularly hard hit are the twentyfive million Russians living in the non-Russian successor states. Formerly members of the dominant nationality of a multinational state they have been turned into a new Russian diaspora. Whether they in time should come to look upon themselves as Latvians (Ukrainians, Georgians, etc.) of Russian extraction or as Russians who happen to be living in Latvia, Ukraine, Georgia, etc. will clearly influence political relation both within and among the Soviet successor states.

Identity formation is a prolonged process and influenced by a number of factors. The authors attempts to outline a typology of possible identity trajectories of the Russian diaspora and discusses a number of influence factors which are deemed important to the identity formation. These factors work very differently in the various non-Russian successor states, and it is therefore no reason to believe that all Russians living outside the Russian Federation will develop the same identity. There is, however, good reason to expect that in the final outcome a very large number of them will develop an identity which sets them apart from the Russian core group.

## Introduction

Like any other identity, ethnic identity is a malleable quality (Keyes 1982; de Vos and Romanucci-Ross 1982). The speed, direction, depth, and extension of this change will depend upon a number of factors. These factors may be cultural, for instance exposure to new ethnic groups through migration, or result from changes in the economic structure of society (industrialization, etc.) (Gellner 1983).

Post-Soviet society is characterized by rapid and deep changes all across the board, political, economic, and cultural. The reified world of 'Soviet reality' (*sovetskaia deistvitel'nost'*) has collapsed as a deck of cards. This event affects most aspects of the identity of the former Soviet citizens - political, ideological, religious, ethnic, etc. This article will focus on two aspects of identity development, political and ethnic: which state and which ethnic culture will become the foci of identity? In order to keep these two identity axes terminologically apart, I will employ the terms 'loyalty' for the political axis and 'selfunderstanding' for the cultural axis. Both loyalty and selfunderstanding are intended as synonyms for identity.

The identity crisis affects the ethnic groups of the former USSR to different degrees. Two groups are hit particularly hard: politically, the Russians (as the former dominant nation of a defunct state), and culturally, the various diaspora groups, since the unitary Soviet state is today being replaced by nationalizing states in which they stick out as cultural anomalies. The twentyfive million Russians living outside the Russian Federation, 'the new Russian diaspora', straddle both these categories, and might be said to have received the blow of the post-Soviet identity crisis two-fold. This group is the subject of this article.

Due to their high numbers, their habitat in territories which in the Soviet system were deemed to be in some sense the 'property' of other major ethnic groups (the titular nations of the non-Russian Union republics), and the fact that

they were generally (if not necessarily correctly) associated with the central Union leadership and even seen as its collective agents, the Russians outside the RSFSR were central to any study of ethnic relations in the USSR. Many students of Soviet nationality problems were interested in how the presence of the Russians influenced the sentiments, attitudes, and behaviour of the non-Russians (Carrère d'Encausse 1979; Karklins 1986). The reverse relationship was less studied. In May 1978, however, Columbia University organized a colloquium on 'Ethnic Russia Today: Undergoing an Identity Crisis?' (Allworth 1980). Two of the participants dealt with the prospective identity development of the Russian diaspora.<sup>1</sup> Intriguingly, they reached almost opposite conclusions. William Boris Kory remarked that

in spite of being a minority group and despite great distances from the Russian heartland, the ethnic Russian migrants retain their language and ethnic identity.(...) The ethnic identity of the Russian population does not seem to diminish with the increased distance from the Russian heartland (Kory 1980, pp. 288, 290).

Matthews Pavlovich, on the other hand, suggested that the Russian diaspora was in the process of acquiring an identity of its own, different from the identity of the central Russians.

The wide demographic dispersion from the traditional core of Russia to the other Soviet union republics (...) has created two distinct Russian groups: the core and the periphery - conditions which will ultimately weaken Russian ethnic cohesion and probably alter the future of both groups. (...) The Russian settlers were ultimately forced to adapt to the environments and traditions dominant at their new place of residence, which further separated them from the core group (Pavlovich 1980, p. 294).

Pavlovich's hypothesis ran counter to the more common assumption that members of an ethnic group who come into close contact with neighbouring

groups develop an especially strong sense of attachment to their nation. According to a generally accepted theory, national identity is to a large degree acquired through a 'We-They' contrast. As the core group is less frequently confronted with 'them', it also has a less distinct identity as being 'us' (Allworth 1980, pp. 306-7). Raymond Pearson, for one, has unequivocally stated that "'border dwellers" are more sensitive about national identity and loyalty through day-to-day proximity to the state frontier, develop firmer commitments through awareness of the alternatives and are most subject to neuroses about territorial adjustments and therefore national security' (Pearson 1983, p. 20). Pearson goes one step beyond Kory by claiming that in the periphery national identity is not only not altered or loosened, but strengthened.

Whether for lack of empirical fuel or for lack of methodological clarity, the Western debate on the Russian diaspora identity in the late 1970s petered out, or rather: never really took off. Today, I believe, it is high time to resurrect it. After the breakup of the Soviet unitary state some of its methodological problems will be easier to come to terms with. As a new political map has been superimposed on the demographic map of the former Soviet Union, the line between the core and the diaspora has become drawn as with a scalpel. In the political sense at least it is now possible to claim that Russians living on one side of a state border belong to the core group, while their ethnic brethren a stone's throw away on the other side belong to the diaspora. Although this new political arrangement may not immediately be reflected on the mental level, it is reasonable to suspect that in the long run it will significantly affect the selfunderstanding of the people involved.

The new political map affects not only the methodology of the research, but also its urgency. In 1978 the distinction between a Russian core group and a diaspora group was a purely analytical tool in an academic discussion and concerned scholars only. Today, this is a question of immediate relevance for policy makers as well. If the diaspora Russians in, say, Latvia should come to see

themselves as 'Latvians of Russian extraction' this will affect the political discourse and political stability in the region quite differently than if they should consider themselves as 'Russians who happen to be living in Latvia' (Aasland 1994a).

In the 1970s and '80s some Western research was conducted on the topic of 'comparative diasporas' (Sheffer 1986). However, very few of its insights are applicable to the study of the Russian minority communities in the former Soviet republics since 'diasporas' in this research were defined as migrant communities far removed from their homelands rather than as stranded groups of contracted multinational states such as have been created in Eastern Europe in the twentieth century - the Hungarian, Serbian and Russian diasporas. John Armstrong explicitly excluded from his definition of diasporas groups that are not 'averse to political attachment to its great society' (Armstrong 1976, p. 395). Only very recently have post-imperial diasporas become an object of serious comparative and theoretical analysis. (Brubaker 1993a; Brubaker 1993b), but this research has so far not been primarily concerned with the identity aspect.

My present contribution to this debate will not be in the form of any large-scale sociological survey, but is much more modest. First, I will present a list of possible identities for the Russian diaspora. Second, I will consider some of the more important factors which might be expected to influence the formation and change of identity among diaspora Russians. Third, I will venture some conjectures about possible identity trajectories in the various regions of the former Soviet Union by applying the identity types and influence factors laid out in part I and part II. Finally, some material evidence in support of my hypotheses will be adduced. This evidence will be gleaned from opinion polls conducted by other researchers as well as from interviews of diaspora leaders which I have made myself.

There is of course no reason to believe that all members of 'the new Russian diaspora' will act and react in a uniform manner. On the contrary, the very term

'the Russian diaspora' may be highly problematic since the definite mode, singular, obfuscates the magnitude of the differences within the group. We should be on the look-out for varieties within the diaspora just as much as for patterns of regularities. Within the framework of an article the pictures of the various diaspora communities will inevitably be drawn with a broad brush. For more details and nuances I refer the reader to my book on the subject (Kolstoe 1995).

Any attempt to forecast the identity trajectories of the Russian diaspora in the various regions of the former Soviet Union will necessarily be somewhat speculative. Identity formation is a protracted process, spanning decades and generations. One should be very cautious about mechanical extrapolation of present day trends into the future. From other parts of the world we know that third generation immigrants often reject the cultural preferences of their parents and sometimes consciously attempt to recapture parts of their grandparents' identity (rediscover their 'roots'). Also, since man is not a socially programmable machine, many individual case stories will no doubt differ significantly from probability calculated outcomes.

## **II Identity types of post-imperial diasporas**

What, then, are the 'identity options'<sup>2</sup> open to the diaspora Russians (provided that they remain a diaspora, that is to say, that they are not reunited with the core group by migration or by the reestablishment of the unitary state)? Culturally, the Russian diaspora may be said to be confronted with the choice of three identities: identification with the dominant culture in the external homeland (= Russia); development of a new but still basically Russian selfunderstanding, and identification with the dominant culture in the state of residence (= the new nationalizing state). Politically, the options may be seen as fourfold: loyalty towards the historical boundaries of the Russian state up to and including attempts to resurrect it; loyalty towards the present and much reduced Russian

state, the Russian Federation; aspirations for the creation of a new nation-state; and finally loyalty towards the nationalizing state of residence. Hypothetically this gives us twelve positions. However, some of them are so unlikely to be found in real life that they may be discounted. The eight remaining positions plotted into the matrix below all reflect attitudes and identities which I have been met with among members of the Russian minority communities in the Soviet successor states.<sup>3</sup> While the above typology in a sense is tailored to the special situation of the Russian diaspora, I believe that in principle it is applicable to other post-imperial diaspora groups as well.

#### TABLE 1 IN HERE

The horizontal axis of the matrix describes a continuum of positions stretching from minimal change to the left towards complete cultural reidentification to the right. In addition to the three positions given numerous nuances and intermediate types are conceivable. The vertical axis, on the other hand, describes a more discontinuous set of choices. While also political loyalties may be vague and blurred, the individual will eventually have to make a choice between the political entities available to him as to which one he will pledge his allegiance. He may postpone the identity choice or hide behind a posture of 'dual loyalty' but he cannot ride two horses indefinitely. In a military conflict a soldier cannot fight on the side of two warring parties at the same time.

Another difference between political loyalty and cultural selfunderstanding concerns the speed of alteration. Political loyalties can change much faster than do cultural selfunderstandings. The radical changes leading up to the demise of the Soviet Union is a prime example of the fabulous speed political reorientations may acquire in exceptional situations.

In real life many diaspora Russians will probably find it hard to give a clearcut answer whenever they are asked to describe their cultural

selfunderstanding or their political loyalty. Their responses will often depend upon the context in which the question is posed. If the frame of reference is (the dominant culture in) the state of residence they might describe themselves as simply 'Russian'. However, if the context is (the dominant culture in) the external homeland they might tend to accentuate the peculiar traits which set them apart them from the Russian core group.

#### CULTURAL OPTION (A). IDENTIFYING CULTURALLY WITH THE EXTERNAL HOMELAND.

In the Soviet Union every person was ascribed a dual identity: political, as citizen of the Soviet Union, and ethnic, as member of a particular nationality (natsional'nost'). This duality was reflected in the internal passports where 'citizenship' and 'nationality' were recorded separately (Zaslavsky 1982). Thus, the Soviet citizens living outside their 'own' republic were not only allowed but also obliged to identify ethnically with the core group. Those Russian diasporians who fall under cultural option A in our matrix have internalized the official nationality ascribed to them.

(A1) Political loyalty towards historical boundaries: traditional Soviet. To be sure, the 'historical boundaries' of Russia have changed considerably over time, one of the distinguishing features of the Russian empire being the constant expansion of its territory (Kappeler 1992). For our purposes (A1) shall mean loyalty towards the Soviet state within the borders it possessed at the time of its dissolution. We are concerned with political loyalty in the territorial sense only, not in the ideological sense. This means that anti-Communist Russians who identify with and want to have restored the tsarist Russian empire also fall into this position.<sup>4</sup>

(A2) Irredentism. Russians in non-Russian Soviet successor states may accept the breakup of the Soviet Union as irreversible, but nonetheless fail to adopt an identity as citizens of the new nationalizing states. Instead of the USSR

their territorial focus of identity is 'Russia' in the narrow sense, the Russian Federation, which is regarded as a Russian nation-state. Russian 'diasporians' living in areas adjacent to Russia might demand border revisions in order to end up on the 'right' (= the Russian) side of the border.

(A3) Integrating national minority. The Russians may adopt a political identity as citizens of the successor states, but retain a cultural identity as Russians. This option could be labelled 'integrating minority'. Western Europe offers several examples of such groups: the Swedes in Finland, the Germans of Alsace, Danes in Northern Germany, Germans in Southern Denmark, etc. In this variant the diaspora Russians will tend to participate actively in the social and political system in the state of residence, using their 'voice' to fight for causes which may secure their continued existence as a distinct group.

#### CULTURAL OPTION (B). NEW RUSSIAN SELFUNDERSTANDING.

The Russian diasporians may retain an identity as Russians, but nonetheless see themselves as Russians of a special kind. Having lived for generations in a culturally alien environment they have adopted quite a few of the habits, customs, and ways of life prevalent in the region (Arutiunian and Drobizheva 1992; Susokolov 1992). Politically, this identity may go hand in hand with loyalty towards the external homeland; with a desire to gain a statehood of their own; as well as with loyalty towards the state of residence.

(B1 and B2) 'New Cossacks'. These identity positions are very similar to that of the Cossacks. The Cossacks are a Russian-speaking, ethno-social group which was formed in the ethnic borderland in the southern parts of the Russian empire in the 16th to the 19th centuries. Historically they represent a mixture of several ethnic groups, but culturally they have greatest affinity to the Russian ethnos. Nonetheless, they have developed a number of peculiar traditions as regards social organization, trades and crafts, idioms, etc. This is reflected in their selfunderstanding. They keenly feel that they are different from ordinary

Russians, although they may have difficulty explaining what this difference actually consists in.<sup>5</sup> A structurally similar identity is adopted by parts of the present-day Russian settlers in the Russian ethnic periphery.<sup>6</sup>

The Cossack concept of the Russian state is usually of the imperial kind and is identified with Tsarist Russia. However, some latter-day Cossacks, inside and outside Russia, are orienting themselves towards the new, modern Russian state as their focus of identity. The same seems to be the case with the 'new Cossacks'. Often they do not make any explicit distinction between the two Russian state concept which indeed may reflect their 'maximum' and 'minimum' programs, respectively.

(B3) The Dniester Syndrome. Russians with an identity of their own might also see the creation of a new, independent state as a natural corollary of their cultural distinctiveness. Recent years have seen at least two attempts to establish new national statelets involving diaspora Russians: the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR) and the Republic of Crimea. Both of them have an unsettled international status and somewhat unclear political aspirations. Political leaders of both insist that the Slavic population in the area, while having strong historical, cultural and emotional links to Russia, also has developed an identity of its own.<sup>7</sup>

The would-be new state on the eastern bank of Dniester broke away from the Moldovan Republic in September 1990 and in the summer of 1992 defended its secession in a limited war against Moldovan forces. With the backing of Russian army units stationed in the area DMR is today for all practical purposes a separate political unit, seeking international recognition and membership in the CIS (Kolstø et al 1993). Crimea, with a two thirds Russian population, was in 1991 granted status as an autonomous republic within the Republic of Ukraine but important segments of the political community on the peninsula strive for more. Many observers have been left with the impression that the endeavours to create an independent Republic of Crimea is more a means than an end, the end

being reunification with Russia (either in the larger, tsarist or the smaller, modern version). The many separatist movements of Crimea seem to have a much clearer idea as to which state they do **not** want to belong to (Ukraine) than as to what they want to put in its place.

(B4) 'Integrating new diaspora'. Importantly, a sense of cultural distinctiveness among the Russian diaspora does not have to be translated into political demands. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that diaspora Russians with a sense of being dissimilar to the Russian core group will more easily accept the post-Soviet political arrangement than will Russians with a self-understanding indistinguishable from the core group. The former will tend to develop an 'integrating new diaspora' identity.

#### CULTURAL OPTION (C). ADOPTION OF THE DOMINANT CULTURE OF THE NATIONALIZING STATE OF RESIDENCE.

(C3) Assimilation. In most cases adoption of the dominant culture of the state of residence will mean inculturization into the titular nationality, this is: assimilation. Usually change of mother tongue will be the most important ingredient in an assimilation process. Assimilated diasporians will not only learn the language of the titular nationality, but, within a generation or so, they will forget their former mother tongue.

To the extent that Russians will be assimilated into the titular group, they may continue to have a hazy memory of the distant origin of their forebears, but for all practical purposes they will shed their identity as being ethnic Russians. Their identity situation will be comparable to the situation of most European immigrant groups in the USA, whose only links to their cultural past may be a quaint surname and a dusted photo-collection somewhere in the attic. Most Russians in the United States, as well as in Western Europe, belong to this category.

## **II Factors influencing identity formation**

The identity choices of the diaspora Russians will be strongly influenced by a number of circumstances. Some of them affect the entire group within a given area, while some vary from individual to individual within the community. The most important of them, as I see it, are enumerated below. The list is offered not as a stringent set of independent variables, the specific weight of which can be measured statistically and from which the identity type of the different diaspora groups can be deduced. Rather it should be seen as a heuristic check list which we ought to have in the back of our mind when we turn to the empirical evidence.

(1) Geographic distance to Russia. If the external homeland is just across the border, the identity links between it and the diaspora are less likely to be severed than in the cases when it is far away. In the latter case it is more reasonable to expect that the local diaspora groups will develop an identity of its own or adopt the local culture.

(2) Cultural distance to the surrounding environment. I expect that in cases when the local culture is (perceived as) markedly different from Russian culture, rapprochement is less likely than when the two are (perceived as) varieties of the same basic type. Examples of the first kind would be the Central Asian (Turkic/Iranian, Muslim) cultures, while the most obvious examples of the latter are the Ukrainian and Belorussian (East Slav, mostly Orthodox) cultures.

(3) Numbers and compactness. The larger the Russian community is within a given area, the greater is the chance that it will hang on to a distinct identity. Small diaspora groups are 'endanger species'. However, if small groups are sufficiently compact, they might still be able to withstand assimilation. Conversely, if a diaspora group is scattered over vast areas and lives intermingled with other ethnic groups it will more easily adopt its basic characteristics, including language.

(4) Rootedness. It is reasonable to expect that the longer the Russians have lived in a given area, the more closely they identify with it. Newcomers will not feel the same degree of territorial attachment. Not only inhabitants of centuries-old Russian settlements may have a strong sense of rootedness, it can be felt also by third or second generation Russians.

(5) The absence/presence of burning issues other than the national one. The human mind does not seem able to be preoccupied with more than a limited number of concerns simultaneously, and the importance of the ethnic issue is relative to the importance of other issues. For instance, in periods of economic depression and abruptly falling standards of living socio-economic issues demand a lot of attention. Confronted with the struggle for the daily bread the members of ethnic minorities may not have time or capacity to fight for less pressing needs such as cultural rights. Instead, they might align themselves and identify with their work-mates, and as a result their class identity might be strengthened. However, if wealth and social positions in society are unevenly distributed among the various ethnic groups, and/or the economic policy of the state is deliberately geared towards an uneven distribution of wealth along ethnic lines, the ethnic issue will not only resurface but even be reinforced by economic factors (Horowitz 1985, pp. 20-1).

(6) Bilingualism/monolingualism. I expect Russians with no or scarce knowledge of the language of the titular nation in the country of residence to be more prone to hang on to a restitutionist or irredentist Russian identity, while bilinguals more easily will adapt to the dominant culture.

Proficiency in the titular language varies tremendously among the various Russian diaspora groups, from 0.8 per cent to thirtyseven per cent claiming fluency in 1989 census (See table 3). However, 'fluency' was poorly defined by the Soviet census authorities, and probably cover a wide variety of proficiency levels (Guboglo 1992; Kozlov and Kozlov 1994).

In many of the new nationalizing states the language laws and the requirements for proficiency in the native language is the main issue in the confrontations between the titular nation and the minorities. In most cases when the distinction between speakers and non-speakers of the state language is very much stressed in the political debate this will reinforce the contrast between the indigenous population and the outsiders.

(7) The identity development of other ethnic minorities. Many members of the non-Russian diaspora groups are linguistically russified. In the post-Soviet discourse the term 'russified' is frequently used in a derogatory sense, signifying lack of ethnic identity. Russified non-Russians, however, can be seen as a group in the process of changing their ethnic identity. While people sharing a common language don't per se constitute an ethnic group, they may over time be transformed into one. If we think of ethnic groups as groups sharing common cultural traits and common interests, the Russified non-Russians on the one hand and the Russian diaspora group on the other in a given area may in time coalesce into a common group, a distinct 'Russian-speaking post-Soviet diaspora'. (If this really takes place, a more elegant appellation will no doubt be found for it.)

(8) Endogamy/exogamy. In the Soviet Union children in ethnically mixed families were the only persons confronted with an identity choice. When they reached the age of sixteen they had to choose the nationality of one of the parents. ('mixed' or 'new' identity was not an option.) When either the mother or the father was a member of the titular nationality in the republic of residence, the children tended to choose his or her nationality (Kozlov 1982, pp. 216-18; Karklins 1986, p. 154-5). For instance, the offspring of a mixed Latvian-Russian couple living in Russia usually chose a Russian identity, in Latvia, a Latvian one. (Some other factors also played a certain role, such as the sex of the Latvian vs. the Russian parent.) Such marriages, then, favoured the assimilation of the persons involved into the titular nation. It is every reason to believe that this will continue to be the case also in post-Soviet societies.

In the Soviet Union marriages between Russians and members of the titular nationality in the non-Russian republics was the most common kind of interethnic marriages (Komarova 1980, p. 33). In 1989, they amounted to 11.8 per cent of all interethnic marriages in Central Asia, 24 per cent in Kazakhstan, 22.9 per cent in Moldova, thirtytwo per cent in the Baltics, 25.1 to 53.7 per cent in Transcaucasia and 57 per cent and 74.7 per cent in the East Slavic republics (Pain 1992). Rogers Brubaker finds it problematic to subsume Russians in such crosscultural families under the common denominator 'Russian', plain and simple (Brubaker 1993a).

A large number of mixed marriages were also concluded between Russian diasporians and members of other diaspora groups. When a Russian in a non-Russian republic married a Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Jew, a frequent occurrence, their children usually chose the Russian nationality (Susokolov 1992, pp. 191-216). Under post-Soviet realities a high percentage of such marriages in a Soviet successor state will promote the development of a common 'Russophone' or 'new Russian' identity.

Exogamy frequency is clearly linked to factor (1): cultural distance. The shorter this distance, the greater the number of mixed marriages. Also, if the cultural distance to the dominant culture is very large, this may lead to greater amalgamation among kindred national minorities in the state (Horowitz 1985, p. 40). In addition, large ethnic groups are usually more relaxed on the issue of ethnically mixed marriages than are smaller ones.

(9) The presence of elites among the local Russians. I expect that diaspora groups with weak elite structures will be less able to articulate common interests and sustain a common identity than are groups possessing elites able to take leadership roles in the ethnic community.<sup>8</sup> Elite formation is usually linked to levels of modernization and urbanization. Compared to most other post-Soviet nationalities Russians have high levels of formal education and with the exception of the Jews, the Russians are also the most urbanized post-Soviet

people. If this is true in general, it is even more so in the case of diaspora Russians. The great bulk of them live in large cities, sometimes constituting a majority or near-majority (Lewis et al 1976). However, while the Russian diaspora communities do have numerically strong intellectual elites, the professional structure of the contemporary Russian diaspora intelligentsia is heavily tilted towards technology and the exact sciences. Engineers are often less concerned with the maintenance of ethnic culture than are members of the cultural intelligentsia.

(10) The policy of the nationalizing state. State authorities in the nationalizing states have a number of policy options vis-a-vis the national minorities in general and towards the Russian group in particular, ranging from attempts at deliberate extinction of the minorities (genocide, expulsion, or forced assimilation), via minority protection, to apartheid (deliberate perpetuation of insurmountable differences among the ethnic groups). One would perhaps assume that the paramount concern of any state authority is to secure the political loyalty of all members of the community towards the state. In other words, they should be expected to focus their attention on the vertical axis of our matrix. The cultural selfunderstanding of the residents would have been of little importance, were it not for the fact that these two dimensions of identity are regularly seen as being intimately linked to each other. The loyalty of cultural minorities is not taken for granted in the same way as the loyalty of the dominant group is.

The identity trajectory of a given minority group may of course develop quite differently from the direction in which the state authorities want to push it. For instance a heavy-handed assimilation policy may produce a backlash of political disloyalty and restitutionist sentiment.

(11) The policy of the external homeland towards the diaspora. The policy options of the Russian Federation range from total disinterestedness via insistence on minority rights for the Russians in the 'near abroad' to military intervention for their protection. Total disinterestedness will make the diaspora

less inclined to choose the external homeland as the focus of their identity. Conversely, if Russia acts as if the diaspora Russians were still 'citizens of Russia', a large number of diaspora Russians will continue to see themselves under this caption (A2).

(12) The attitudes of the Russians in the Russian Federation. Ethnic cohesion is of course a two-way street, demanding active involvement of both parties, the core group and the diaspora. If the Russians in the Russian Federation show a large degree of indifference to the plight of their ethnic brethren outside Russia, the diaspora is more likely to develop an identity of their own. On the other hand, frequent visits of Russian nationalist agitators in the region may reinforce the feeling a shared destiny.

The Moscow-based Congress of Russian Communities, which serves as one of the main conduits between the Russian public and Russian diaspora organizations, propagates activist and restitutionist attitudes (Declaration 1994). The Russian public, however, seems to be divided over the issue. In a 1991 poll 39.5 per cent believed that Russia should act as guarantor of the rights of Russians in the near abroad, while 22.3 per cent felt that those who live on the territory of other republics should solve their own problems (Rossiiskaia gazeta 24 October 1991).

(13) Migratory currents. A replenishment of the Russian diaspora communities by fresh immigrants coming from Russia will contribute to the sustenance of strong cultural and political links to Russia and to the Russian core group. If the migratory currents are reversed and large numbers of Russians begin to leave, this will stimulate integration among those who stay behind, for two reasons. The emigrants will usually be the ones who are least willing or able to adapt, and secondly, after their departure the remaining diaspora community will become smaller (Susokolov 1992).

However, limited and large-scale out-migration will affect the structure of the diaspora communities differently. Well-educated elites will more easily find new

jobs elsewhere than will people with little formal education. Medium size pull-factor migration therefore will tend to create diaspora groups with many Indians and few chieftains, less able to sustain a distinct identity.<sup>9</sup> Large-scale push-factor migration which takes on the character of mass flight, on the other hand, will leave behind a socially more diversified diaspora community.

The flows of Russian outmigration to the non-Russian regions of the USSR peaked in the late 1950s and were reversed in the 1970s. Declining birthrates among Russians meant that they no longer had any population surplus to export. At the same time, the need for qualified Russian labour in the non-Russian republics was steadily diminishing as the titular nationalities in the non-Russian republics caught up in the modernization process. The Baltic states represented an exception to this pattern. Large-scale Russian migration to this region continued in spite of the high modernizational level of the Balts (Anderson and Silver 1989).

After 1991 immigration of Russian to the Soviet Successor states has continued to go down, partly as a result of migration quotas introduced by the new state authorities. At the same time outmigration has increased, reaching e.g. fiftyone thousands in Latvia in 1992 and fortyseven thousands in Kyrgyzstan in first six months of the same year, (all ethnic groups) (Bungs 1993; Slavianskie vesti [Bishkek] 1992 no. 16).

### **III Probable identity developments, region-wise.**

TABLE 2 TO 4 IN HERE

**The Baltics.** The Russian communities in the Baltic states are generally characterized by high shares of the total population and low degrees of rootedness. While there were sizable Russian minorities in the interwar Baltic states, particularly in Latvia, most present-day Baltic Russians nevertheless are post-war immigrants. They comprise as much as thirty per cent and thirtyfour per

cent of the total population of Estonia and Latvia, respectively. Together with other Slavs and Russified former Soviet citizens they make up hefty thirty-nine per cent and forty-eight per cent. In some districts in the eastern parts of the countries they account for ninety-ninetysix per cent (Estonia) and sixty per cent (Latvia) of the total population. Russia is just across the border. In combination, these factors favour the retention of a traditional Russian identity and continued strong links to the external homeland. To the degree that the various Russian-speaking groups converge the outcome will be a common 'new identity'.

Compared to other Russian diaspora groups in the former Soviet Union the Baltic-Russian communities have a pronounced proletarian profile. Industrial workers predominate and also most of the intelligentsia is engaged in material production. While workers certainly also may become political leaders, one would expect this social structure to complicate the articulation of common goals and the upkeep of traditional Russian values. Nevertheless, Baltic Russians have formed a larger number of organizations to cultivate and express their interests than have Russians in most other areas.

Balts often claim that a cultural chasm separates them from the Russian immigrants to their republics while the Russians tend to emphasize the important common elements in Baltic and Russian cultures (Europeanness, Christian religion, high degrees of modernization, etc.) (Lieven 1993, pp. 185-7). The Baltics is probably the only region in the former Soviet Union where many local Russians are apt to see the indigenous civilization as equal or even superior to their own (Abyzov 1992; Gudkov 1993). Their intense appreciation of the high Baltic standard of living also gives them a strong incentive to emulate the 'Baltic way of life'. A 'Balticization' of Russian settlers in the area was in fact detected already in the 1970s (Kazlas 1977, p. 241). Many of them claim that they are more hard-working and punctual than Russians at home, and attribute these traits to the healthy influence of the Protestant work ethic of the titular nationalities. As a result of new, strict Baltic migration policies in-migration of new arrivals from

Russia has practically stopped. These factors should, in contrast to the ones discussed above, favour a development towards the bottom of the identity matrix.

Political authorities in Estonia and Latvia have little trust in the loyalty of the local Russians. They have expressed fears that the bifurcation of their societies will be perpetuated indefinitely unless harsh pressure is applied upon the Russians to integrate. Estonia and Latvia are the only post-Soviet states which have not granted the resident Russian population of post-war immigrants status as original citizens (Kolstø 1993b). This has created strong reactions in the Russian communities as well as in Russia. Probably more than any other factor the Latvian and Estonian citizenship legislation has contributed to the hardening of attitudes on the diaspora question in Russia, among policy makers as well as in the public (Kolstoe 1995). Baltic legislative practices, touted as a means to secure accelerated integration of the Russians into society, may well have the opposite effect, and push parts of the Russians towards non-cooperation and non-adaptation.

In Lithuania, the situation is different. The Russians are fewer (less than ten per cent) and their proficiency in the titular language is higher than in any other former Soviet republic (thirtyseven per cent). The country does not have a common border with mainland Russia.<sup>10</sup> Generally speaking, members of the dominant nationality do not perceive the Russians as a threat to their cultural survival or political independence. All post-war immigrants have been granted automatic citizenship. The pull towards socio-political integration and perhaps even towards acculturation seems to be fairly strong.

There is an abundance of material on the identity formation of Baltic Russians, both statements of Baltic Russian diaspora leaders and opinion surveys. Most indicate a tendency both towards the establishment of distinct Baltic-Russian cultures and a certain resilience of traditional Soviet attitudes.

Natalia Kasatkina, cochairwoman of the Russian Cultural Centre in Lithuania, describes the Russians in her country as a 'subethnos with its own

destiny' (Kasatkina 1994, p. 112). The leader of the Latvian Society for Russian Culture, Iurii Abyzov, on the other hand, strongly emphasizes the pro-imperial, pro-Soviet sentiments among Russians in his country. Having overheard bragging statements like 'I came here as a boy, riding on the top of a tank', he concludes gloomily: 'In general we should remember that an empire always draws to its outlying areas far from its best human material.' (Abyzov 1992) Statements like this one are rare among Russian diaspora spokesmen and it seems to reflect the bifurcation between an old, prewar community of Latvian Russians, whom Abyzov represents, and the large groups of postwar immigrants.

In a pioneering study in 1992 Aadne Aasland was struck by the strong diversity of Latvian Russian identities. While many Russians were well integrated into Latvian society, 'imperial identity is quite widespread among certain sub-groups of the Russian population' (Aasland 1994a; Aasland 1994b, p. 81). In a survey of Russian opinions in Estonia in 1993 the pollsters also here found attitudes which they interpreted as 'empire-mindedness': thirtyseven per cent of the Russian respondents said they felt bereft of a homeland after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Kirch and Kirch 1995, p. 48). The Estonian researchers nevertheless detected a slow but perceptible identity change among Estonian Russians towards an embryonic Estonian-Russian local identity. They saw the typical Estonian-Russian self-perception as ambiguous: Russians in Estonia feel some resonance with Russians in Russia, but at the same time they recognize in the Russian core group certain characteristic traits from which they wish to dissociate themselves (A. Kirch 1994, p. 41; Vetik 1994; Vetik 1995).

In a major study in 1993 encompassing all three Baltic countries, Richard Rose and William Maley found that fifty per cent of all Russian respondents most often identified with their city/locality while only twenty-nine per cent listed 'Russian' as their first identity choice. In contrast, only twenty-two per cent of the Balts put city/locality above nationality in their hierarchy of identities. Sixty-nine per cent of all Baltic Russians felt that they had a 'great deal' or 'some' in

common with the titular nationality. The corresponding figures for Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians were only twentyfour to twentynine (Rose and Maley 1994, pp. 51-5).

**Belarus.** Russians in Belarus number more than one million (thirteen per cent of the total). In addition, 1.5 million Belorussians in Belarus are linguistically Russified. Belorussian national identity is very young and brittle, a product of the twentieth century. The prestige of the Belarusian language is surprisingly low even among Belarusians. In a 1992 survey in Eastern Belarus more than sixty per cent claimed that they more or less regularly heard disrespectful remarks about the Belarusian language uttered by ethnic Belarusians (Zlotnikov 1993, p. 39).

The educational level among Russians in the republic is well above the average Belarusian level (Clem 1990). Belorussians are strongly attracted to the larger and more consolidated Russian culture. Evidence of this is the May 1995 referendum which showed strong support for the introduction of Russian as a second state language, and for greater integration with Russia.

Neither the Russian language nor Russian ethnic identity is under threat in Belarus. Russia is adjacent, and to be a Russian in Belarus is almost like being a Russian 'at home', in Russia proper (Grigor'eva and Martynova 1994). This will reinforce the retention of strong identity links to Russia both politically and culturally, mostly in the shape of 'traditional Soviet'. Indeed, the major Russian language daily in Minsk is still called 'Soviet Belarussia', and functions as a strong conveyor of restitutionist sentiment.

**Ukraine.** The Russian population in Ukraine makes up as much as eleven millions and is the largest Russian diaspora group by far. The Russian settlements are often centuries-old, and geographical distance to Russia is short, particularly in the Eastern part of the country, where a majority of the Russians are living. A separate Russian identity is therefore anchored in both high

numbers, a high degree of rootedness, and geographical proximity to the external homeland.

At the same time, the cultural distance to the Ukrainian environment is very short. Until recently the affinity between the Russian and the Ukrainian cultures worked in favour of the former: many Ukrainians in the Ukraine (not to mention in the Soviet Ukrainian diaspora) adopted Russian as their mother tongue. Today, under new political realities, this tendency is likely to be reversed: many Russified Ukrainians will rediscover their cultural roots. In addition, in independent Ukraine a large number of Russians will no doubt learn the state language. This will not demand much of an effort, and will increase their chances for social advancement. Assimilation might take place among some Russians who live scattered in heavily Ukrainian-populated areas as has also occurred in the past (Chizhikova 1968, pp. 22-5).<sup>11</sup>

To many Russians in Russia proper the idea of an independent Ukrainian state is completely outlandish (Brzezinski 1994). To them Ukraine is an old Russian province inhabited by people who are 'practically' Russians. The Russian population in Ukraine, however, has indicated that it thinks differently. In December 1991, a very large percentage of them voted for Ukrainian independence (Vydrin 1992). Apparently, many supported this idea in the expectation of a swift Ukrainian Wirtschaftswunder which has so far not materialized. The economic hardships in the country might take on ethnic overtones, driving segments of the Russian group towards the Dniester syndrome or irredentism. In Crimea, where both legal, historical, and demographic arguments for unification with Russia can be marshalled, irredentist sentiments are running high.

A 1992 survey of three Ukrainian cities, Lviv, Kiev and Simferopol, showed that eighty-nine and eighty-eight per cent of the Russian inhabitants in Lviv and Kiev wanted to be a citizen of the Ukrainian state (in Simferopol in the Crimea support for Ukrainian statehood was radically lower; only twenty-seven per cent).

At the same time, more than forty per cent of the Russians interviewed also would prefer it if the Soviet Union still existed (Bremmer 1994b). This adds up to almost 130 per cent support for incompatible alternatives, indicating rather unsettled or muddled political loyalties.

Along the cultural axis, Russians in Ukraine tend to feel both attached to and removed from the Russian core group.<sup>12</sup> As pointed out by Andrei Malgin at the Simferopol Regional museum, this ambivalence is shared also by other Russian groups in the periphery of the Russian ethnographical space, such as the Sibirians, and may be interpreted as a case of general Russian regionalism.<sup>13</sup> N.M. Lebedeva asks but does not answer the question: 'is Russians in Ukraine a diaspora or a part of the Russian people?' (Lebedeva 1994). The answer is clearly: 'both', since few Russians in Ukraine see any contradiction between those two identities.

**Moldova.** The distance between Russian and Moldovan cultures is shorter than the Russian-Baltic distance, but longer than Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Belorussian ones. Moldovans and Russians share the same religion, Orthodoxy, but speak very different languages. All permanent residents of Moldova have been granted original citizenship, but many Russians nevertheless feel that they are not accepted as part of the body politic on a par with ethnic Moldovans (Lukyanchikova 1994).

In the first years after independence Moldova used the language of ethnic rather than civic nation-building to a larger degree than most other Soviet successor states in official state documents (Kolstø, 1993b; Kolstoe 1995). Also the prospect of Romanian-Moldovan state unification made the half a million Russians uneasy. At the present time unification is clearly not in vogue among ethnic Moldovans but it remains an issue by virtue of the demographic and linguistic realities.

Geographically, Russians in Moldova are further removed from Russia than are any other Russian diaspora group in the European part of the former Soviet

Union. This factor adds to their feeling of vulnerability. These circumstances are likely to produce an identity development towards the centre or lower left corner of our matrix. Indicatively, 'the Dniester syndrome' derives its name from developments in Moldova. After the Dniester war in 1992, however, official rhetoric in Chisinau was changed from ethnic towards civic nation-building. If this new departure is followed through it might stimulate the formation of integrated minority mentalities.

In interviews with the author in 1992 in Chisinau and Tiraspol leading Russian spokesmen of different political convictions all agreed that Russians in Moldova had developed an identity of their own.<sup>14</sup> State Secretary of the Dniester Moldovan Republic, Valerii Litskai, defined the local Russian culture as a 'homestead culture' (using the English expression), and likened it to the frontier mentality of the American Mid-West.

An opinion poll conducted in 1992 showed that approximately half of all Moldovan Russians (fiftythree per cent) regarded themselves as different from Russians in Russia (Stepanova 1992). At the same time, in another survey conducted in the same year one quarter of the Russian respondents gave answers which were interpreted by the pollsters as 'a nostalgia for the Soviet Union' (Danii and Gontsa 1992).

Moldova is one of the few Soviet successor states where Russians do not constitute the largest minority, this being the Ukrainians. Due to Moldova's proximity to Ukraine and the policy of the Moldovan government, which favours reopening of Ukrainians schools and cultural facilities, the chances that Russians and other Slavs in Moldova will coalesce into a common Russian-speaking group are relatively small.

**Transcaucasia.** The three Transcaucasian republics have experienced very little demographic penetration of Russians, in 1989, Russian shares of the total population varied between one and six per cent. Due to their small numbers many

Russians in Transcaucasia have learnt the local language (fluency percentages of twentythree in Georgia and thirtythree in Armenia in 1989).

Protracted ethnic warfare in the region has induced scores of Russians to leave. Hence, the already very small Russian communities are further diminished. There is every reason to believe that those who stay behind are those best integrated into society. The evidence also indicates that Russian old-timers in Transcaucasia have a feeling of being rather dissimilar to Ciscaucasian

Russians. In 1994 a prominent Russian Georgian writer described himself as  
 a third generation inhabitant of Tbilisi with a mediocre command of Georgian. At the same time, I speak Russian with a distinct Georgian pronunciation. I am raised in the traditions of Russian culture and have no intention of betraying them, but at the same time my customs and habits are Georgian. (...) In a certain sense, I am a typical Georgian Russian (Osinskii 1994).

While this self-description fits the integrating new diaspora type, others see the 'typical Georgian Russian' as more or less assimilated: one source describes him and her as 'not quite a Russian, or not even a Russian at all' (Mikeladze 1993). A further development towards integration and even some assimilation may be expected.

**Central Asia.** Central Asia is the post-Soviet region furthest removed from Russia, geographically as well as culturally. To an extreme degree the Russians and other Europeans have been clustered in the cities, particularly in the capitals. Marriages between the Russians and indigenous groups are statistically negligible, of 134 Russians interviewed in Tashkent in 1992, Jürgen Nowak found only one person with an Uzbek parent (0.7 per cent) (Nowak 1994, p. 46). On the other hand, marriages among the various European diaspora groups are very frequent. Central Asian Russians usually make no distinctions among themselves and other Europeans in the area, but indiscriminately lump everyone together as 'Russians'.<sup>15</sup>

Only a tiny fraction of the Europeans (between one and five per cent) are fluent in the native languages. Two distinct cultural communities, Asian and European, have been living side by side. In the opinion of one well-informed observer, pro-Soviet nostalgia is more widespread among Russophones in Central Asia than among inhabitants of the Russian Federation (Rotar 1993). However, they seem to wail the disappearance of the unitary state more than the political ideology it was shrouded in.

Russians in Central Asia are mostly engaged in production and construction, as engineers, managers, and workers. On the average, their educational level is well above that of the indigenous groups (Ostapenko and Susokolov 1992). They have been granted automatic citizenship in their state of residence (in Turkmenistan, even the right to obtain dual Turkmenistani-Russian citizenship). Nevertheless, most of them feel politically marginalized. Social and political advancement in these societies largely rest with the old tribe- and clan-structures from which the Europeans are excluded. Also in industrial management and research, previously bastions of the Europeans, the top jobs are gradually being taken over by the locals. For social support and social values the Russians have relied heavily on the Soviet state structures which have now vanished.

The already strong feeling of vulnerability among Central Asian Russians has been further enhanced by the occasional flare-ups of ethnic conflicts which have visited several countries in the region. In Tajikistan a full-scale civil war among various Tajik clans erupted in 1992-93. These conflicts have rarely if ever involved the Russians directly, but they fear that the violence at any time might spread and encompass them as well. For these reasons the streams of Russians leaving the region have been wide. These have to a very little degree been offset by the arrival of new groups. The question of how many will remain when the outmigration tapers off has been a matter of much controversy (Perevedentsev 1993; Dunlop 1994). If the most alarmist prognoses come true, only a fraction will be left by the year 2010. Those who do will most likely be the ones who are

best integrated into the new states. Should many Russians be persuaded to stay, a wider variety of more Russia-oriented identity types may be retained.

Most Russians in Central Asia clearly feel different from mainland Russians (Brusina 1992, p. 84). They see themselves as less given to drinking, more hardworking, and more disciplined.<sup>16</sup> The cultural selfunderstanding of most of them is leaning towards (B) 'new Russian'. This factor to some extent keeps back migration, and has also prompted a certain amount of remigration. Central Asian Russians complain that in Russia they are not receiving any cordial homecoming as ethnic brethren. As expressed by the leader of the 'Slavic Diaspora' organization of southern Kyrgyzstan, V. Uleev:

Many have already returned, at a considerable economic loss. It is indeed very difficult to adapt to new circumstances when you have a radically different mentality. More often than not those who think that they have arrived in their historical homeland, find that they are regarded as aliens (Uleev 1993).

**Kazakhstan.** The vast Kazakhstani state (the size of Western Europe) stretches deep into Siberia and the southern Ural mountains. The entire northern tier of the country is predominantly inhabited by Russians and Russified Europeans who are usually engaged in either mining, engineering or agriculture. Their towns are hardly distinguishable from similar settlements across the border in Russia, neither is the cultural selfunderstanding of the local Russians. Russians in Kazakhstan are less versed in the titular language of their state of residence than their conationals in any other Soviet successor state (0.85 per cent fluency in 1989).

From the 1930s through the 1970s Russians made up the largest ethnic group in Kazakhstan. Today, some six million Russians live in Kazakhstan, making up almost thirtyeight per cent of the total population, the largest percentage of any Soviet successor state outside Russia. By dint of their numbers, rootedness, and generally high educational levels the Russians in Kazakhstan should be

guaranteed a future in Kazakhstani society for a long time to come. They are less given to flight than are Europeans further south, and Kazakhstani state authorities are expressly striving towards civic rather than ethnic nation-building. However, civic nation-building in a society with so disparate population elements as in Kazakhstan is extremely hard going, even with the best of will, and some observers have doubts about the earnestness of the Kazakhstani endeavours (Bremmer 1994a; Rotar 1994). As in the other Asian republics political authority largely flows through clan channels, and ethnic Kazakhs are increasingly filling the top notches in government and administration (Giller and Shatskikh 1993). A state program to promote the knowledge of Kazakh is fiercely resisted by Russians in the north, and tension between the two major ethnic groups seems to be mounting. Irredentism remains an identity option in the northern provinces.

In southern Kazakhstan the Russians are fewer in number and more cut off from mainland Russia. This leads us to assume that Russian identity formation in northern and southern Kazakhstan will follow very different trajectories. In the north it will remain basically geared towards Russia, politically as well as culturally, while the south will see some outmigration and a growing willingness to adopt and integrate (but not assimilate) among those who choose to stay.<sup>17</sup>

### **Concluding remarks.**

On the political loyalty axis there has been considerable movement in the Russian diaspora community over the last couple of years. Around 1990-91 a significant part of the Russians in several Soviet republics - ranging from perhaps a third to a half - in plebiscites and elections signalled a willingness to transfer their political allegiance to their state of residence. However, when the euphoria of de-imperialization faded away and the harsh realities of economic depression set in the pendulum changed its direction once more. Although few hard facts are available, the evidence indicates a certain strengthening of nostalgia for the

Soviet past in many regions and also for identification with the contemporary Russian Federation.

This newest trend, no more than the previous support for independence, should be automatically extrapolated into the future. It goes without saying that the political identity of the Russian diaspora in the next century will be completely dependent upon the political realities prevailing then. Should the CIS collapse and the new states develop quite independently of each other, this will confront the Russians with quite another situation than if CIS should prove a durable and viable political structure. Also, if relations among the Soviet successor states should evolve into some kind of neo-imperial arrangement, this will increase the likelihood of the 'traditional Soviet' and 'new Cossacks' options among Russians outside Russia. And last but not least: internal developments in Russia - towards prosperity or economic collapse, and towards democracy, anarchy or dictatorship - will determine the gravitational strength which this state can exert upon the Russian diaspora.

Cultural selfunderstandings change much more slowly than do political convictions. However, a tendency of Russian periphery communities to be influenced by their immediate ethnographical environment is much older than the debacle of the Soviet Union. More than hundred years ago, in 1878, the leading Muslim intellectual in the Russian Empire, Ismail bey Gasprinskii, remarked that

the assimilationist ability of the Russians is obviously very weak. We see very few cases of Russified non-Russians,<sup>18</sup> but quite a few examples of Russians who to some degree have submitted to the influence of the surrounding non-Russians. They adopt their language - - without, of course abandoning their own -- as well as some customs, popular beliefs and dresses (Gasprinskii 1993, p. 38).

110 years later, in 1988, (that is, before the break-up of the Soviet Union), a Russian intellectual in Estonia asserted that

Russians today is a peculiar national entity, an unprecedented historical experiment. On the one hand, a huge part of the people is living in a practically monoethnic territory. On the other hand, millions are dispersed on the territories of other republics. (...)

For all practical purposes Russians in each republic constitute a particular ethnos with its own specific needs, cultural ballast and literature, frequently also with its own dialectical fragments (Portnikov 1988).

This assessment was seconded by a well-informed Russian anthropologist, A.Susokolov, in 1992. As a scholar, Susokolov was inclined to use somewhat more cautious expressions:

Even if the regional "republican" groups of Russians so far have not coalesced into independent sub-ethnoses, intense interethnic interaction, combined with a reduction of in-migration from the outside, can in the course of two to three generations lead to such an outcome (Susokolov 1992, p. 215).

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There is every reason to believe that the tendency towards a split in the Russian ethnos, between a diaspora and a core group, will be strengthened under the new political realities after the collapse of the unitary state (Laitin 1994). Of the eight identity options discussed in this article the four on the axis of 'new cultural self-understanding' are in the opinion of this author likely to be strengthened most. In many areas this development will be boosted by the convergence of Russians and other Russophone diasporas into one group. The creation of new Russian diasporas as separate cultural entities is not a matter of dissociation from the Russian core group only but also of association with other groups. However, in some places, such as in Moldova, this tendency will probably be off-set by ethnic revivals among the Russified non-Russian diasporas.

There is no reason to believe that the final outcome of the identity formation of the Russian communities in the Soviet successor states will be the creation of one, single diaspora identity. Not only the cohesion within the Russian ethnos at large - between the core and the periphery - is being weakened. This is true also of the cohesion within the diaspora itself. The social, political, economic, and cultural conditions under which the diaspora is living differ greatly. Rather than one diaspora identity we should expect the formation of several new identity types.

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## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> The authors used the English word 'dispersion', rather than the Greek 'diaspora', but in the same sense as diaspora is used in this paper.

<sup>2</sup> The nouns 'option' and 'choice' may be somewhat misleading, insofar as they imply a voluntary and conscious process which cannot be assumed. They will, however, be employed throughout the chapter. Whenever this is done, they should be understood in a metaphorical sense as synonymous with 'adoption'.

<sup>3</sup> The matrix is revised from an earlier version used in my earlier article (Kolstø 1993a). The terms 'nationalizing state' and 'external homeland' are taken from Rogers Brubaker (1993b).

<sup>4</sup> For convenience's sake we may regard the Soviet Union and the Russian tsarist empire as coextensive.

<sup>5</sup> Some Cossacks will claim that they are a 'sub-ethnos' under the Russian nation, while others maintain that they constitute a separate nation. Finally, some Cossacks define themselves not in ethnic, but in social terms, describing themselves as a *soslovie*, or estate. Author's conversations with Cossacks in Tiraspol and Kuban, September 1992.

<sup>6</sup> This is true also of residents of remote areas of the Russian Federation such as the Sibirians.

<sup>7</sup> Author's interviews with Valerii Litskai, State Secretary of DMR, Tiraspol, and with Crimean nationalist politicians Iurii Meshkov, Anatolii Los' and Vladimir Terekhov in Simferopol, September 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Not everyone will agree to this. John Armstrong (1976) thinks that proletarian diasporas lacking elites, in contrast to mobilized diaspora possessing elites, will tend to become progressively more distinct culturally and in physical appearance from the dominant ethnic group.

<sup>9</sup> Author's conversation with Vladimir Steshenko, Nationalities director in the Latvian government until 1993, since then a Russian diaspora activist and journalist, in Riga, May 1992.

<sup>10</sup> Lithuania does border on the Kaliningrad enclave, but this fact does not seem to be of great import to Lithuanian Russians.

<sup>11</sup> Already in 1989 the only sizable group of Russian diasporians who had abandoned Russian as their mother tongue consisted of linguistically Ukrainified Russians in Ukraine (some 180 thousands).

<sup>12</sup> Author's interviews in Simferopol, September 1992 and Donetsk, September 1994, with, *inter alia*, the leader of the Republican Movement of Crimea, Iurii Meshkov, and the leader of the Intermovement of Donetsk, Dmitrii Kornilov.

<sup>13</sup> Author's interviews in Simferopol, September 1992.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with General Director of the Nationalities Department in the Moldovan Government, Victor Grebensicov; cochairman of the Russian cultural centre, Ivan Belopotapov; and State Secretary of the Dniester Moldovan Republic, Valerii Litskai, in Chisinau and Tiraspol, September 1992.

<sup>15</sup> The category of 'Russian' in Central Asia is very much linked to the Russian language. An indication of this is that even Russian-speaking Koreans, who were deported to the region in the 1930s, are often included in the European group! See Vasil'eva 1991.

<sup>16</sup> Author's interviews in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, May 1993.

<sup>17</sup> Author's interview with Mr. Podushkin, leader of the Slavic cultural centre, Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan, May 1993.

<sup>18</sup> For 'non-Russian' Gasprinskii used the word *inorodtsy*, which usually designated people of nomadic and/or Muslim origin.