Intensive Consciousness

Kant’s Theory of Inner Sense

Jonas Jervell Indregard

MA Thesis in Philosophy at IFIKK, HF
Supervisor: Camilla Serck-Hanssen

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Abstract

In this thesis, I present and defend an interpretation of Kant’s theory of inner sense. This theory is central to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but it has proven difficult to grasp. I suggest that inner sense provides us with a point of view, and that this point of view is constituted by the degree of clarity and distinctness of our representations.
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1. Introduction

James Van Cleve, in his book *Problems from Kant*, devotes a chapter to Kant’s theory of time. He concludes the chapter with a small section under the heading: “What did Kant really believe about time?”¹ His conclusion is that this is an open question, to which conflicting answers can, and seemingly must, be given.

In *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, Henry Allison’s book on the *Critique of Pure Reason*,² he approvingly quotes Paton as saying: “Kant’s doctrine of self-knowledge is the most obscure and difficult part of his philosophy.”³

What do these laments have in common? The fact that they are both directed toward the topic of this thesis: Kant’s theory of inner sense. Inner sense links time to self-knowledge, as the following passage shows: “Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state” (A33/B49). Our difficulties in understanding Kant’s views on time and self-knowledge can therefore be considered as symptoms of a more general problem: the lack of a coherent understanding of Kant’s theory of inner sense.

The aim of my thesis is to develop an interpretation this theory. Of course, the result will not amount to a complete explication of inner sense and its role in the critical philosophy, which is a task of a different scale. Rather, the more limited ambition is to present a framework within which such an explication would be possible, and in the course of this presentation to elucidate some central themes of the *Critique*. The thesis is structured along the following trajectory:

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² Citations from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, hereafter *Critique*, will be referenced directly after the quotes. The references follow the established convention; by giving the page numbers from the A edition of 1781, and the B edition from 1787. I use the Guyer & Wood translation from the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Particular sections of the *Critique* will be mentioned with capital letters, without quotation marks, e.g., the Refutation of Idealism, the B Deduction.

Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the main subject: The first part will exhibit what Kant has to say about inner sense. More specifically, it presents the different facts about inner sense that an interpretation must take into account. These different facts can be roughly separated into two groups. One group focuses on inner sense as opposed to outer sense, and the relevant facts are the asymmetries that Kant finds between these two senses. The other group focuses on inner sense as opposed to apperception, and the relevant facts concern the special role that inner sense has in providing us with knowledge of ourselves.

The next section will then analyze two existing interpretations: one given by Henry Allison, in *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, and a more recent interpretation by Markos Valaris, in his article “Inner Sense, Self-Affection & Temporal Consciousness.” Allison’s interpretation is premised upon distinguishing between two separate aspects of inner sense. However, I will conclude that this separation is untenable, and that a unified interpretation of inner sense must be sought. Valaris attempts to give such a unified account; inner sense provides us with an awareness of our “point of view,” a kind of mobile “vantage point” in space and time, from which we experience the world. My analysis will show that there are problems involved in making this proposal fit with what Kant says about space and time, and that it does not seem as if Kant claims that inner sense provides a vantage point located in space and time. But the important – and I believe correct – idea, which I will therefore adopt in my own interpretation, is to see inner sense as providing us with a point of view.

In the third part of this chapter I will argue that Kant in fact gives us a clue as to how we should understand this idea. In his critique of Leibniz, Kant suggests that Leibniz conceptualized the inner state of the monad through an analogy with our inner sense. And the inner state of the monad is a point of view, constituted by the distribution of clarity and distinctness of its representations. Thus my hypothesis is: The point of view provided by inner sense is the state of our representations, as clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct.

Chapter 3 will begin to develop this hypothesis. The first part is devoted to an explication of the notions of clarity and distinctness: What does it mean for a representation to be clear and distinct? Above all, this involves showing that Kant has a theory of clarity and distinctness in

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4 Markos Valaris, “Inner Sense, Self-Affection & Temporal Consciousness” (in *Philosopher’s Imprint* vol. 8, nr. 4 2008).
the first place. An important result of this investigation is to see that both clarity and distinctness come in *degrees*, and that they both concern the ability to differentiate a representation from others. Another result is a preliminary exploration of the complex relation between *aesthetic* clarity and *logical* clarity, i.e., the clarity of intuitions and the clarity of concepts. The distinction between intuitions and concepts is fundamental to Kant’s philosophy. However, the theory of clarity and distinctness, as it is developed in this section, concerns representations in general, whether concepts or intuitions, and will therefore serve as an entry point into the interrelation that must exist between them.

In the second part of the chapter I will proceed on the basis of the results of the previous section. The question is: In what sense is a degree of clarity, and especially logical clarity, *sensible*? This is obviously crucial insofar as we are looking for a theory of inner *sense*. The answer to this question is that the degree of clarity is a sensation, and corresponding to this sensation is what Kant calls the intensive magnitude of consciousness. This leads us to the realisation that as intensive magnitudes, the sensation of clarity and the degree of consciousness corresponding to it fall under Kant’s categories of quality.

Chapter 4 is an investigation of Kant’s concept of self-affection. Self-affection is closely related to inner sense: the manifold of inner sense can be determined only by affecting ourselves. In the first part of this chapter I explicate the concept of an “act of attention.” This act is the only explicit example of self-affection that Kant gives. I argue that it should be understood as a logical act that modifies the degree of clarity of our representation, by bringing a particular representation to clarity, thereby facilitating the act of judgment that is essential to Kant’s philosophy. But since the clarity of a representation is always a *degree*, judgments can never be completely safeguarded against error.

In the second part, I proceed to the concept of transcendental motion. In the *Critique*, Kant distinguishes between two different kinds of motion. Transcendental motion is “motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object)” (B155). I argue that this transcendental concept of motion should be understood as the sensible determination of inner sense, i.e., as bringing discriminations, and thereby degrees of clarity, into the indeterminate sensible given. This act is carried out under a sensible condition: the form of inner sense, time. The change of the degree of clarity is thereby continuous, in accordance with the intuition of time.
Chapter 5 has the overall task of explaining how inner sense, as explicated in my interpretation, relates to experience, both inner and outer. In the first part of the chapter I discuss the principle of intensive magnitude, which claims that all such magnitudes are continuous. As we have seen, the degrees of clarity are intensive magnitudes. I believe that this can help us with the problem of justifying the principle, a problem that has not been satisfactorily resolved in the secondary literature so far. What I will attempt to show is that the degree of consciousness, corresponding to the degree of clarity, is implicated in Kant’s proof for the principle of intensive magnitude. It is therefore a step towards showing the validity of the principle that we can, as the final part of this section demonstrates, show that the degree of clarity is a continuous magnitude.

In the next part, I proceed to look at sensations in general. It turns out that sensations in general – warmth, color, etc. – cannot without further ado be separated from their degree of clarity. This raises the question of how it is possible to determine an intensive magnitude separate from our degree of clarity. The answer to this question is that such a separation can only be effected through determining what corresponds to the sensation as a causal power. In the case of intensive magnitudes, this allows us to correlate changes in intensive magnitudes with changes in extensive magnitudes, as for instance changes in heat are measured by changes in the height of the column of mercury of a thermometer. The main point is that since intensive magnitudes can be objectively determined only by means of correlating them with extensive magnitudes, and extensive magnitudes are continuous, any objective intensive magnitude must thereby be continuous as well. If the degrees of clarity cover the subjective intensive magnitudes, then the preceding analysis have shown that both objective and subjective intensive magnitudes must be continuous; e.g., the principle of intensive magnitudes will have been justified.

In the final part, I sketch an analysis of the problem of inner experience. In the Refutation of Idealism, Kant aims to show that inner experience presupposes outer experience. I believe that our preceding investigation can help us understand why this is so: intensive magnitudes can be determined only by being correlated with extensive magnitudes, as causal powers. And this can only happen in space, according to Kant. If our subjective intensive magnitudes can be determined only on the basis of this objective determination, then inner experience necessarily requires outer experience.
As to the methodological aspect of the enquiry, the thesis is chiefly an attempt to work out what Kant meant. The close reading of Kant that follows is an attempt to tease out some of the specificities of Kant’s system: inner sense as opposed to outer sense; the categories of quality as opposed to the other category groups. This is based on the conviction that there is much of interest and importance to be learnt from carrying out such a project.

Kant’s critical philosophy, perhaps best known under the term “transcendental idealism,” was also considered by Kant himself as a “formal idealism” (B519n.). In *Kant’s Theory of Form*, Robert Pippin analyses Kant’s formalism, uncovering a slew of problems in the process, and concludes by saying that “many of those problems are consequences of Kant’s formal methodology itself, his attempt to specify a priori, formally, independently of any material or metaphysical commitments, the subjective structure of our experience of the world.” And he is of course not the only one to raise similar qualms about Kant’s theory; as Pippin points out, the movement of German idealism immediately following Kant himself can plausibly be viewed as a reaction against what was perceived as the rigid and excessive formalism of Kant’s version of idealism. However, I believe that the adjectives “rigid” and “excessive” can be pitted against each other: It is my contention that the architectonic extravagance of Kant’s system is precisely what allows for its suppleness, and that this apparent excess is therefore needed in order to support its claim to adequacy. The capacity of Kant’s philosophy can only be grasped through familiarity with the nooks and crannies of its formal architectonic structure.

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5 Robert Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

6 Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form*, 228.
2. From Inner Sense to the Monad

2.1 Inner Sense – an Introduction

The aim of this section is to introduce Kant's theory of inner sense. We will begin with a simple picture: a parallelism between inner sense and time, on the one hand, and outer sense and space, on the other. Had this picture been the entire story, a short and straightforward introduction would have sufficed. However, outer sense and inner sense are far from being completely symmetrical. In short, after presenting the simple, parallelistic picture, the remainder of the section will be devoted to giving a clear and comprehensive overview of the asymmetries between space and time as well as outer sense and inner sense. Here, I will not be concerned with answering the questions that come up (that is the task of the rest of the thesis), but simply with raising them. The aim is to present the full extent of the challenges that any interpretation of Kant’s theory of inner sense must face. This will be the backdrop for constructing an interpretation in the rest of the thesis, and also enable us to analyze two existing interpretations in the next section.

The basic distinction we start from, then, is that between inner and outer sense. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, inner sense is introduced by the following characteristic: “Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37). Outer sense, on the other hand, is said to present us with objects outside of us. A further characteristic of inner sense is its temporality: “Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state” (A33/B49). The form of outer sense, on the other hand, is space. Based upon this characterization, we can construct the following, “naïve” picture: everything that we take in through our outer senses (where “senses” are here taken to mean our familiar sensory modalities: sight, hearing, etc.) we experience as being in space. However, in addition to these senses, we are also immediately aware of ourselves; our mind, our thoughts and feelings, and so on. Thus, we say that we are aware of these things through “inner sense,” and further, it seems that we do not experience our mental states as being in space, but only in time.
So far, we have said nothing that is blatantly wrong with respect to how Kant sees inner and outer sense. We might, however, try to fill out our intuitive picture by an account of how they relate to one another. The obvious thing to say would be that there is some kind of mutual influence between inner and outer sense. What we see and hear influences what we think, and what we are thinking and feeling influences what we see and hear (directly through our focus, indirectly through our actions). But this mutual influence does not extend to a complete determination; what we think is not completely determined by our outer sensory input, and what we see and hear is not completely determined by our thoughts and feelings. In other words, inner and outer sense can be seen as two partially independent, but mutually influencing streams of sensory input.

This final gloss, however, is not faithful to Kant’s thought. For what he says demands not only several distinct levels but also different relations of complete dependence between the two senses (inner and outer) on the different levels. And it is this complicated web of relations that we must proceed to map.

### 2.1.1 Inner and Outer Asymmetries

There are three main levels where the asymmetry between outer and inner sense comes to the fore:

1) First of all, Kant consistently maintains that any sensible faculty is receptive to a manifold. The manifold of sensibility is the material which is given through the senses, i.e., through inner and outer sense. And it is at this level that we encounter the first asymmetry between inner and outer sense. In a passage Kant added to the B edition of the Transcendental Aesthetic (B66ff.), he tries to clarify his doctrine that we only cognize appearances, not things in themselves, by pointing to the fact that everything we experience in outer sense consists of mere relations; of place, motion, etc. He continues:

> It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. It is not merely that the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, but also the time in which we place these representations, (...) already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession (that which persists) (B67, italics mine).
In other words, the material of inner sense is the representations of outer sense, i.e., inner sense does not have its own manifold. Accordingly, the material for thinking is indeed completely determined by the material given through seeing, hearing, etc., according to Kant.

2) Intuitively, there is one flaw in the simple picture we outlined above. Namely, whereas it seems plausible to say of mental states that they are in time but not in space, it is clearly false to say of the objects outside us that they are in space but not in time. And indeed, Kant goes on to say:

All representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, (...) so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances (A34/B50-51). 

While this already points to an asymmetry, since everything is in time but only outer representations are in space, this is not the crucial asymmetry implied by the above quote. Rather, the main point of interest is the distinction between the immediacy of inner intuitions being in time, as contrasted with the mediacy of outer appearances being in time. One must therefore account for a difference in the way inner and outer representations are in time. More specifically, Kant says that time is the immediate condition of inner intuition and “thereby” the mediate condition of outer appearances. This clearly suggests that outer appearances are in time because inner intuitions are, however that is to be understood.

3) Thirdly, there is also an asymmetry between outer and inner experience. In the Refutation of Idealism (B274-279), Kant is concerned with refuting what he terms “problematic idealism” (B274), i.e., the Cartesian kind, which claims that our knowledge of ourselves is more certain than any knowledge of outer objects. Kant’s argument against this position will proceed by showing that “even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience” (B275). In other words, Kant reverses the asymmetry between outer and inner experience found in Descartes, and claims that any inner

7 In the quote, Kant refers to the inner intuition “of our souls.” But as we shall see, Kant is also clear that we do not have an intuition of “the soul itself, as an object” (A22/B37). There is a persistent ambiguity in Kant’s use of the concept of “soul,” owing, I believe, to a distinction between an invalid concept of soul – the soul as an object, i.e., as a substance – and a valid, “critical” concept of soul – the soul as an intensive magnitude. I explain this in chapter 3.2.
experience already presupposes outer experience. The possibility of inner experience is therefore completely dependent upon prior outer experience.

Thus, instead of the two partially independent, mutually influencing streams envisaged above, we have several relations of dependency that operate between inner and outer sense, on different levels.⁸

Now, I want to emphasize that at this point, there is not much we can say about exactly how these relations of dependency should be understood, and equally, it is unclear how they relate to each other. What we can perhaps perceive is a determinate direction (where we begin with “manifold,” go on to “time,” and end up with “experience”): since, for intuitions to be temporal, we presuppose a manifold; and for experience to be possible, our intuitions must be temporally determined. In any case, the asymmetries sketched here must be considered alongside the special features related to the informational content of inner sense, i.e., the connection between inner sense and the self.⁹

### 2.1.2 Inner Sense and the Self

As we have already seen, inner sense is the sensibility through which the mind “intuits itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37), and Kant even speaks of the “inner intuition (of our souls)” (A34/B50). But from the very beginning, Kant is quick to point out that this provides “no intuition of the soul itself, as an object” (A22/B37). This is another striking difference from outer sense, where the fact that you intuit outer objects seems to be accompanied by the fact

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⁸ Many recent commentators have been concerned with showing that Kant was in no sense a “phenomenalist.” (e.g., Graham Bird, *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 1965); Robert Pippin, *Kant’s Theory of Form* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), ch. 7; Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 38-42; Hoke Robinson, “The Priority of Inner Sense,” in *Kant Studien* 79, nr. 2 1998, 165-182) This debate involves some issues (like those related to the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction) that lie outside the scope of my thesis. The part of the debate that is pertinent to my concerns – like empirical knowledge, the Refutation of Idealism, etc. – is mostly brought up in sections 5.2-5.3. Note, however, that these sections presuppose the preceding chapters, in a way that obviates many of the lesser nuanced ways of posing the “phenomenalist or non-phenomenalist?” question with regard to Kant. For instance, we can already note that instead of attempting to determine the priority of either inner sense or outer sense (as e.g. Robinson, “The Priority of Inner Sense,” in which he actually argues for the priority of outer sense), we have delineated three different levels of dependency, where outer sense has “priority” on the first of them, inner sense on the second, and outer sense on the third.

⁹ All the asymmetries noted here might perhaps be conceived in terms of mediacy vs. immediacy. With time, this is clear from what we have already said above. But Kant also notes that the Refutation of Idealism proves “that outer experience is really immediate” and that “inner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer experience” (B277). Whether the outer manifold can be said to be immediate, whereas the inner manifold is only mediate, Kant does not say, but it seems a plausible way of phrasing the issue. In any case, this does not bring us much further as long as the meaning of the terms “mediate” and “immediate” is unclear.
that your outer intuitions are intuitions of outer, empirical objects. It is not exactly clear what it is that you do intuit in inner sense, and this lack of clarity is exacerbated when Kant says that the mind intuits “itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37, emphasis mine). For not much later, the disjunction becomes a conjunction, and he speaks of “the intuition of our self and our inner state” (A33/B49, emphasis mine). Unfortunately, Kant does not specify what he means by either “our self,” “our inner state,” or “inner intuition (of our souls),” except that it is not the soul itself, as an object. We might surmise that this problem is related to the fact that inner sense has no manifold of its own. Because of this, any intuition of our self or our inner state must be based solely on the material given in outer sense, i.e., the outer representations. The question is: how is this material able to become or provide intuitions of our self or our inner state rather than of outer objects? It appears that Kant attempts to answer this question by providing us with a theory of what must happen in order for inner intuitions to take place, namely, a theory of self-affection.

Kant’s first reference to self-affection is in the B edition of the Transcendental Aesthetic:

Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form (B67-68).

This account of self-affection, suggestive as it is, does not really bring us any closer to an understanding of what is going on in inner sense. Especially when Kant goes on to conclude from this that the subject only intuits itself as it appears to itself, and suggests that “any difficulty in this depends merely on the question of how a subject can internally intuit itself; yet this difficulty is common to every theory” (B68). The reader might beg to differ here; the difficulty does indeed seem specific to Kant, since the natural suggestion is that the subject intuits inner impressions of itself, but this would imply a specifically inner manifold, something Kant denies. In any case, there is only one other place in the Critique where Kant explicitly discusses self-affection: in the final sections of the B Deduction.
The structure and function of the Transcendental Deduction as such is too large a topic to enter into here. Our focus is inner sense, and the fact that in the B Deduction Kant relates inner sense to the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination.” But to explain this, we must first give a short account of what this transcendental synthesis of the imagination is, and what role it plays in the Deduction.

Imagination as such is, according to Kant, “the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition” (B151). Thus, the initial impression is that imagination is a faculty for imagining things other than those we actually perceive. In the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (hereafter Anthropology), Kant gives a fuller definition, by bringing in a distinction between two essentially different functions of the understanding:

The power of imagination (facultas imaginandi), as a faculty of intuition without the presence of the object, is either productive, that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object (exhibitio originaria), which thus precedes experience; or reproductive, a faculty of the derivative presentation of the object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously.

However, in the Anthropology it is not quite clear what Kant intends to show with this distinction. In the examples he later goes on to adduce, productive imagination is said to depend upon the senses, as much as reproductive imagination does, thus, “to a person who is born blind we cannot make any colors comprehensible.” The distinction between productive and reproductive might therefore seem to consist only in the distinction between imagining things as one actually perceived them in the past, and imagining new combinations based on what one has previously perceived. However, this does not make sense of the fact that Kant claims that productive imagination “precedes experience,” a claim he repeats in the Critique. There Kant distinguishes productive from reproductive imagination in the following manner: “I also occasionally call it the productive imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that thereby contributes nothing to

10 Specific themes from the B Deduction will be analyzed later in the thesis, more precisely the signification of the terms "attention" (in chapter 4.1) and "motion, as action of the subject" (in chapter 4.2).

11 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak 7:167; Anthropology, History, and Education, 278.

12 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak 7:168; Anthropology, History, and Education, 278.
the explanation of the possibility of cognition \textit{a priori}, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology” (B152). Essentially, what is going on is that the productive imagination is given a crucial role in the Deduction, whose aim is to show that the categories are valid \textit{a priori} of all objects of experience. This \textit{transcendental} role of the imagination, Kant writes,

can thus determine the form of sense \textit{a priori} in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility \textit{a priori}, and its synthesis of intuitions, \textbf{in accordance with the categories}, must be the transcendental synthesis of the \textbf{imagination}, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition that is possible for us (B152).

This is a difficult passage. What we can draw from it, at least, is that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination determines the sensibility (including inner sense), thereby providing us with possible objects of experience. In the following section, Kant returns to the problematic of inner sense, which he claims must have appeared as a “paradox” in the Aesthetic: that we intuit ourselves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, which means that “we would have to relate to ourselves passively” (B153). As we saw earlier, our problem was a different one; namely, how we could intuit ourselves at all. But if Kant’s explanation shows how it is that we intuit ourselves only as we appear, then that answers our question as well. His answer depends upon distinguishing \textit{inner sense} from \textit{apperception}. In the \textit{Anthropology}, he gives the following account of their difference: “Inner sense is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the human being \textit{does}, since this belongs to the faculty of thinking. Rather, it is a consciousness of what he \textit{undergoes}, in so far as he is affected by the play of his own thoughts.”\textsuperscript{13} The transcendental synthesis of the imagination has a different relation to inner sense than to apperception: it presupposes and accords with the unity of apperception; it is a presupposition of and determines inner sense. For it is this synthesis which “is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition” (B153). In other words, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination – that is a condition for the possibility of experience in general – is also responsible for self-affection.

\textsuperscript{13} Kant, \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View}, Ak 7:161; \textit{Anthropology, History, and Education}, 272.
As already mentioned, this is not the place to interpret these passages; that is a task for the entire remainder of the thesis. Below, I have formulated a list of “criteria,” i.e., statements Kant makes about inner sense, which can serve to guide us in our interpretation. Any plausible interpretation of inner sense should be able to account for most of these criteria.

1) Inner sense does not have its own manifold (B67).
2) Inner sense is determined by self-affection (B67-68, B153-154).
3) Inner sense, as distinguished from apperception, is a passive/receptive faculty, and its form of intuition is time (A33/B49, B153).
4) Time is the immediate condition of inner intuition, the mediate condition of outer appearances (A34/B50-51).
5) The intuitions of inner sense must tell us something about ourselves as we appear, about our “inner state” (A22/B37, A33/B49).
6) Inner experience presupposes outer experience.

Finally, we should also remark that if inner sense is intimately connected with the central issues of the Transcendental Deduction – as our quick introduction to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination above seemed to indicate – then a theory of inner sense will also be of importance for understanding Kant’s Critique at large.\(^{14}\)

Beginning with chapter 2.3, I will put forward an interpretation that I believe allows us to make sense of all the features of the Kantian doctrine of inner sense as I have presented it here. But before that, I will situate my view by presenting two competing interpretations: that of Henry Allison, in the revised edition of his book *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*; and a recent interpretation by Markos Valaris, in his article “Inner Sense, Self-Affection and Temporal Consciousness.”

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\(^{14}\) This central role of inner sense is also immediately apparent if one looks to the Schematism, where Kant expounds the role of transcendental schemata. Without entering into the difficult topic of just what these schemata are and how they function, it is in any case certain that they are indispensable in order to relate the categories to sensible objects. It is noteworthy, therefore, that such a schema is described as: “A transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general” (A142/B181).
2.2 Other Interpretations

2.2.1 Allison – A “Two-Aspect” Theory of Inner Sense

In my analysis of Allison, I will focus my attention on one particular feature of his rich discussion. This specific feature is chosen for two reasons: First of all, I believe that it is central to the understanding of Allison’s interpretation of inner sense. Second, and perhaps more important for the purpose of this thesis, it highlights what I believe is the most striking contrast between Allison’s account and my own, and thereby serves to draw attention to issues that will become relevant later.

Allison is keenly aware of the many asymmetries and difficulties concerning inner sense that I have already pointed out in the introduction. The overall strategy he adopts in his interpretation is, as I see it, to split the theory of inner sense in two; by distinguishing between two distinct aspects of inner sense. On the one hand, inner sense serves as “providing a merely subjective order of the succession of representations in empirical consciousness.”¹⁵ Viewed from this point of view, inner sense is integral to the possibility of experience in general, because its form, time, is the “a priori formal condition of all appearances in general” (A34/B50). On the other hand, it also has another, more specific function, namely: “as a sensory form of self-awareness, through which the mind intuits itself and its states. Inner sense, so construed, is contrasted not with outer sense but with apperception.”¹⁶ In other words, in its first aspect inner sense and its form serves as a condition of all appearances in general, whereas in its second aspect, inner sense and its form serves as a condition for intuiting oneself and one’s inner states.

As noted, inner sense is determined by self-affection. Allison suggests that, in parallel with the distinction between the two aspects of inner sense, we also need “a distinction between two senses of “self-affection”: one connected with the transcendental synthesis [of imagination] and serving as a condition of all experience, the other connected with the empirical synthesis of apprehension and serving as a condition of a specifically inner

¹⁵ Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 277.
¹⁶ Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 277.
experience.”\footnote{Allison, \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Idealism}, 283-284.} Whereas Allison never specifies how what I have called the two “aspects” of inner sense are related, he is more explicit concerning self-affection: They are two distinct kinds of self-affection, one transcendental and the other empirical.

To summarize, one can therefore say that Allison draws a distinction between the aspect that is relevant to experience in general, from the aspect that is relevant to specifically inner experience. I will not go into details concerning how Allison, on this basis, goes on to account for the criteria I listed above. For I do not believe that Kant distinguishes between two aspects of inner sense and, correspondingly, two kinds of self-affection. I have three reasons for this: First of all, I believe that it is possible to give a plausible unified interpretation of inner sense and self-affection. Secondly, I hope to have actually done so in this thesis. Third, I believe that it is necessary to give such a unified interpretation, because of textual evidence that speak, in my opinion decisively, against Allison’s dual account. I will point to some of these passages now, not as a refutation but at least to indicate that an alternative interpretation might be desirable, and to indicate what this alternative interpretation will aim to show.

The problem with distinguishing two aspects of inner sense and two kinds of self-affection is, as far as I can see, the lack of any indication on Kant’s part that he is in fact operating with Allison’s two distinct senses of each of these crucial concepts. To the contrary, he often seems to say things that go against such a differentiation. I will provide some examples of passages where there is at least a \textit{prima facie} resistance against a dual account of inner sense and self-affection:

1) Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state (A33/B49).

On Allison’s account, Kant is here referring to the second aspect of inner sense, as a “sensory form of self-awareness.” As we have seen, inner sense also provides the succession of representations in empirical consciousness in general. In the quoted passage, however, Kant writes as if he is talking about inner sense in general, that is, there is no hint that he is referring only to a specific, restricted part of inner sense (i.e., the second aspect). It would
therefore be desirable if one could show that the “intuition of our self and our inner state” is the succession of representations in empirical consciousness in general.

2) Apperception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as the inner sense that the former, rather, as the source of all combination, applies, prior to all sensible intuition of objects in general, to the manifold of intuitions in general, under the name of the categories; inner sense, on the contrary, contains the mere form of intuition, but without any combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis (B154).

Here, Kant contrasts inner sense with apperception. But the contrast seems to be based on the first kind of self-affection (the one connected with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination), rather than the second, specifically inner, kind of self-affection that should be the relevant one according to Allison. It would therefore be desirable if one could show how the self-affection connected with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination serves to distinguish inner sense from apperception.

3) In inner sense (...) the empirical consciousness can be raised up from 0 to any greater degree, so that the very same extensive magnitude of intuition (e.g., an illuminated surface) can excite as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other (less illuminated) surfaces taken together (A176/B217).

Since sensations are “subjective representations” (B207), we might expect them to be related to the intuition of “our self and our inner state” (A33/B49). Indeed, Kant says that: “Things like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject” (A29/B45). If this is correct, it should indicate that Kant is talking about the “self-awareness” aspect of inner sense. But on the other hand, the principle that he is attempting to prove is supposed to be valid a priori of perception in general. If so, then showing its validity only for the self-awareness aspect of inner sense is insufficient. It would therefore be desirable if one could show how the a priori validity of the principle can be established through an argument based upon sensations in empirical consciousness.

Before proceeding to my own interpretation, I will analyze a different attempt to construct a unified account of inner sense; that of Markos Valaris, in his article “Inner Sense, Self-Affection and Temporal Consciousness.”
2.2.2 Valaris – Perspectival Awareness

Valaris takes Allison’s account as his starting point, but argues that “there is only one kind of self-affection,” i.e., he refuses Allison’s distinction between two aspects of inner sense and two kinds of self-affection. His challenge, then, is to explain how this is compatible with the seemingly dual role of inner sense: in experience in general, but also in specifically inner experience.

This involves revaluating the contribution of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. On Valaris’ account, this same act of synthesis is responsible for determining both inner and outer sense. And both these determinations are needed in order for experience to be possible. The key idea in Valaris’ article is to emphasize the indispensability of perspective for our experience. Anything we can conceivably experience must be perceived from a certain point of view, a perspective on the world. According to Valaris, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination provides us with this perspectival outlook, and it does so by simultaneously determining inner and outer sense:

on the one hand, it synthesizes the manifold in a perspectival outer intuition whose content we can – at least, for the sake of the argument – express in the form ‘this F’, and on the other, it makes this content available to inner sense as a glimpse of the world from one’s current point of view.

In other words, outer sense provides the perspective, whereas inner sense gives an awareness of the perspective. Since we must be aware of the perspective we occupy in order to have experience, this explains the role of inner sense in experience in general. At the same time, we can thereby become aware of this specific inner “point of view” itself, which is required for inner experience.

While I find this to be an ingenious proposal for a unified account of inner sense, I do not think it solves all difficulties. First of all, I am not sure it can account convincingly for the connection between inner sense and time, on the one hand, and outer sense and space, on the other. For as Valaris admits, the “perspectival outer intuition” is both spatial and temporal,

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18 Markos Valaris, “Inner Sense, Self-Affection & Temporal Consciousness” (in Philosopher’s Imprint vol. 8, nr. 4 2008), 4.

and the perspectival awareness provided by inner sense is also both spatial and temporal. Though Valaris does present arguments that aim to connect inner sense to time and outer sense to space, he also admits that “the states of outer objects should have no reason to be any less immediately temporal than the states of the subject.” On the face of it, this contradicts criterion 4 listed above.

Moreover, Valaris claims that though inner sense provides us with a point of view, with “intuitions of itself as a spatiotemporally located subject of outer perceptions,” this does not mean that inner sense “provides the subject with intuitions of itself as a physical body; that, for Kant, is possible only through outer intuition.” In other words, inner sense provides us with our location, not through the location of our body, but instead as a “mere point of view.” However, I do not believe that Kant operates with the notion of a spatiotemporal location independently of the location of our body. At least in his metaphysics lectures, Kant seems precisely to deny that we can locate ourselves without locating our body in outer intuition. Kant is pointing out that as pure intelligence, i.e., apperception, I have no location. What he then goes on to say, it seems to me, is that it is only through the location of my body that I have a location in space and time: “As intelligence, I am at no location, for location is a relation of outer intuition, but as intelligence I am not an outer object which can be determined with respect to relation. My location in the world is thus determined by the location of my body in the world, for whatever is to appear and stand in outer relation must be a body.”

The main problem with Valaris’ interpretation, from my perspective, is that it attempts to cash out the notion of “perspectival awareness” in spatiotemporal terms. Thereby it has difficulty accounting for the asymmetries between space and time, and it must claim that

24 Kant, Metaphysik L1, Ak 28:225; Lectures on Metaphysics, 45, emphasis mine. Also, “Wherever my body is, there is my thinking I as well, for only through it can I know the position of my self. But I myself do not occupy any particular space in the body since I cannot be intuited according to the form of space.” (Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak 29:879; Lectures on Metaphysics, 248.)
inner sense provides us with a location in space and time independently of the location of our body. Nonetheless, I believe that the underlying idea is correct: My own unified interpretation of inner sense will also be based upon the idea of a “point of view.” I will, however, approach this idea from a different angle, dispensing with Valaris’ claim that the point of view is spatiotemporal. To see how this is possible, I want to draw attention to an example from the metaphysical tradition: one that, first of all, has a “point of view” without that point of view being defined in terms of a spatiotemporal location, and secondly, is already implicated in the argumentation of the *Critique*: the monad.

### 2.3 The Monadic Point of View

The Amphiboly (A260/B316ff.) is an appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, where Kant, among other things, launches his most thorough critique of Leibniz and his followers. In the course of this critique, he repeatedly refers to inner sense. In the first part of this section, I will argue that these references provide us with a clue to understanding the sense of “inner” relevant to Kant’s theory of inner sense: Kant claims that the inner state of the monad is analogous to the determination of our inner sense. The second part of this section will therefore look at the inner state of the monad, to find out what the analogy consists in, and where it breaks down.

#### 2.3.1 Inner Determinations

Let us first of all look at the relevant passages from the Amphiboly. There are three of them, and they all follow the same basic pattern. In them, Kant recounts Leibniz’ position, by describing the reasoning behind the latter’s postulation of monads, that is, simple mental substances. In the first of the relevant passages, he writes:

As object of the pure understanding, on the contrary, every substance must have inner determinations and forces that pertain to its inner reality. Yet what can I think of as inner accidents except for those which my inner sense offers me? – namely that which is either itself thinking or which is analogous to one. Thus because he represented them as *noumena*, taking away in thought everything that might signify outer relation, thus even composition, Leibniz made out of all substances, even the constituents of matter, simple subjects gifted with powers of representation, in a word, monads. (A265-266/B321-322)
I take it that there are three relevant steps in the reasoning Kant attributes to Leibniz. The first is that substances must have “inner determinations.” The second step is to say that we must therefore rule out all determinations that are based upon outer relations; this includes composition, and thereby everything in space. The third step is what interests us: Thus, we cannot think of any candidate for these inner determinations “except for those which my inner sense offers me” (A266/B321), and the substances must therefore have powers of representation.

We shall not analyze the first two steps here; suffice it to say that Kant agrees that the second step follows from the first, i.e., that everything in space ultimately consists of outer relations, but disagrees with the first step itself, i.e., that a substance must have inner determinations. This comes out clearly in the following passage: “A persistent appearance in space (impenetrable extension) contains mere relations and nothing absolutely internal, and nevertheless can be the primary substratum of all outer perception” (A284/B340).

As to the third step, Kant seems to be saying that it follows from the first and the second: If we believe that substances must have inner determinations, then we can find examples of such determinations only through our inner sense. In order for us to understand better what this means, I will quote what Kant says about this third step in the other passages from the Amphiboly:

we can therefore attribute to the substances no other inner state than that through which we internally determine our sense itself, namely the state of representations. This completes the monads (A274/B330).

since we are not acquainted with any absolutely inner determinations except through our inner sense, this substratum would be not only simple, but also (according to the analogy with our inner sense) determined through representations, i.e., all things would really be monads, or simple beings endowed with representations. (A283/B339-340)

What is at least clear from these passages is that Kant believes that Leibniz arrives at the inner state of the monads through something like an “analogy” with our inner sense. But I

25 What I will go on to say depends upon taking Kant’s statements in these passages to divulge something about his own theory of inner sense. It is therefore reasonable to ask: Have I adequately considered the context of Kant’s remarks in the Amphiboly; namely, that he is at various times, and sometimes simultaneously, expounding his opponent’s view, showing how that view might have been reached, and criticizing it? Admittedly, it is difficult to keep these different aspects of Kant’s discussion separate. But I find it evident that in the passages concerning inner sense, Kant is doing the second: he is
think that this analogy can be read in two different ways. The first reading would be to say
that what inner sense offers us are representations. Thus, Kant’s point is simply that if we are
acquainted with inner determinations through inner sense, this means that inner
determinations are representations.

But if we believe, as I suggested in the previous chapter, that inner sense might have
something to do with point of view, then a more interesting reading becomes possible. This
reading would interpret Kant’s reference to “the state of representations” (A274/B330) not as
the state of having representations, but rather as the state of these representations themselves.
This is because it is the state of representations in Leibniz’ monads that constitute its point of
view. In order to understand what this means, and whether it is a plausible reading of the
passages in question, we must ask: What does the point of view of a monad consist in?

2.3.2 Monads and the state of representations

As we can see from Kant’s description, the monad is a simple, immaterial substance.\(^\text{26}\)
Leibniz’ justification for postulating these substances are as follows:

I perceived that it is impossible to find the *principles of a true unity* in matter alone, or in what is only
passive, since everything in it is only a collection or aggregation of parts to infinity. Now, a multitude
can derive its reality only from *true unities*, which have some other origin and are considerably
different from [[mathematical]] points [[which are only the extremities and modifications of
extension,]] which all agree cannot make up the *continuum*. Therefore, in order to find these *real

reconstructing, from within his own point of view, how the Leibnizian is led to his metaphysical conclusions. Saying that
we discern the inner states of the monads according to the “analogy with our inner sense” is not a faithful rendering of
Leibniz; Leibniz himself would of course not consider sense, whether inner or outer, as a source of knowledge of the inner
states of the monads – the intellect is the only reliable source for such knowledge. It is rather a reconstruction of the
Leibnizian train of thought, an explanation from a Kantian (and thus presumably correct) point of view, of the reasoning by
which one might be led to a monadology. And it is precisely because the references to inner sense is *Kant’s own way of
making Leibniz’ reasoning understandable*, that I can use Kant’s references to inner sense in the Amphiboly as a clue in
figuring out what Kant’s theory of inner sense is.

\(^{26}\)The following segment does not aim to be a fully representative and updated picture of Leibniz’ thought. Whether there
even is such a thing as “Leibniz’ philosophy” is a vexed question among commentators, and any short summary like the one
I am about to give will inevitably be simplified. More to the point, a faithful rendition of Leibniz as we today can account
for his ideas would go against the purpose of this thesis. For it is the influence of Leibniz on Kant that is of interest here,
not what we, with the benefit of 200 years of scholarship and many important Leibnizian texts that have only become
publicly known and available after Kant’s time, can make of him. In fact, for our purposes it might perhaps have served just
as well to discuss the influential followers of Leibniz like Wolff and Baumgarten. The availability of texts and the fact that
Kant in the Amphiboly explicitly names Leibniz himself rather than his followers, justifies going to the primary texts of
Leibniz which we know Kant had access to.
entities I was forced to have recourse to a formal atom, since a material thing cannot be both material and, at the same time, perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity.27

In this quote, we recognize the second step of Kant’s summary above; since every material thing (i.e., thing in space) is always composed of parts, the substances (or “real entities” in Leibniz’ quote) cannot be material.

Why does he then think that monads must be thinking substances? Bennett suggests that Leibniz argues from the unity of the “I”:

When expounding the simplicity of substances, he conspicuously resorts to the first person singular. Evidently he found the simplicity of the soul to be especially obvious in his own case, and expected you to find it especially obvious in yours, and me in mine. This explains why he was irresistibly drawn to think that minds are monads.28

If this is right, then it is similar to the reasoning behind Kant’s principle of the unity of apperception, except Kant does not take apperception to be a substance. But when Kant, in the passage we quoted above, explains this third step that brings Leibniz to think of monads as “simple beings endowed with representations” (A283/B340), or as “determined through representations” (A283/B339-340), he intimated that it was inner sense rather than apperception that brought Leibniz to this conclusion.

I think this fact supports the second reading I proposed above. My suggestion is that whereas apperception could have brought Leibniz to believe that monads were “simple beings endowed with representations” (A283/B340), only inner sense could have brought him to believe that the monads were “determined through representations” (A283/B339-340, emphasis mine). Of course, Leibniz does not distinguish between these, since he does not distinguish between inner sense and apperception.29 But Kant does distinguish between them, and when he refers to inner sense when explicating Leibniz, it seems likely that this is

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29 See B153, where Kant accuses “the systems of psychology” of conflating inner sense and apperception. The systems of psychology Kant had in mind is most likely Leibniz-inspired systems like that of Baumgarten.
because he wants to emphasize not merely that monads have representations, but that they are determined through representations, they have a state of representations.

And in fact, as Kant would have been aware of, in Leibniz’ metaphysical system each monad represents the entire universe. He says that “everything conspires together,” and that “eyes as piercing as those of God could read the whole sequence of the universe in the smallest of substances.”\(^{30}\) This seems to lead to what Bennett calls the “collapse problem”: “to find a way for Leibniz to prevent the monads from being indistinguishable from one another and thus – by the identity of indiscernibles – collapsing into one.”\(^{31}\) Thus we realize that what Kant would call the “determination” of a monad’s inner state (Leibniz might instead say its “individuation”) cannot be the particular representations it has, for the simple reason that since every monad represents the entire universe, all monads have the same representations. What does distinguish one monad from another is the state of its representations, i.e., its point of view.

First of all, it is clear that this point of view is not spatiotemporal. “Leibniz does not think that monads are literally at distances from one another, because he assigns all spatiality to the level of ‘well-founded appearance’ or to the even less basic level of the ‘ideal’. So a monad’s point of view is not a point in space.”\(^{32}\) Instead, the point of view is constituted by a qualitative feature of the representations: whether they are clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct. As humans, we have some clear and distinct representations, but most of them we are not even conscious of at all, they are what Leibniz calls tiny perceptions [petites perceptions], since “at every moment there is an infinity of perceptions in us, but without apperception and without reflection.”\(^{33}\) And every individual monad has its own unique distribution of clarity and distinctness among its representations: “While all monads perceive the whole universe, and thus in a sense agree in terms of the content of their perceptions,

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\(^{31}\) Bennett, *Learning from Six Philosophers*, vol. 1, 277.

\(^{32}\) Bennett, *Learning from Six Philosophers*, vol. 1, 278.

\(^{33}\) Leibniz, *New Essays*; in *Modern Philosophy – an Anthology of Primary Sources*, 377. As we shall see, Kant expresses a similar view in his *Anthropology*, e.g., Ak 7:135.
they necessarily differ in terms of their point of view; that is, they differ in terms of the distribution of clarity and distinctness over their perceptual states.”

Now, if we turn our attention back toward the Amphiboly, we recall that Kant claimed: “we can therefore attribute to the substances no other inner state than that through which we internally determine our sense itself, namely the state of representations” (A274/B330). What I have suggested is that the “inner state” that Kant has in mind, the one Leibniz attributes to his monads, is a point of view, a “distribution of clarity and distinctness over their perceptual states.” If this is correct, and Leibniz gets this by considering our inner sense, then we must also draw a conclusion about what it means to “internally determine our sense,” i.e., what a determination of inner sense is. I suggest the following: A determination of inner sense is a determination of the qualitative state of our representations; as clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct. The distribution of these states over the different representations constitutes the point of view of the monad, and it also constitutes the point of view provided by the determination of our inner sense. Thus, when Kant says that inner sense provides us with intuitions of “our inner state” (A33/B49), he does not mean merely the state of having representations, but more significantly, he means the state of these representations, i.e., their state of clarity or obscurity, distinctness or indistinctness.

This connection between inner sense and the clarity and distinctness of representations is, as far as I am aware of, a novel hypothesis. I have therefore decided on the following procedure, which will be executed in chapter 3:

In 3.1, I will explicate what is meant by “clarity” and “distinctness.” Part of the motivation for the section is to show that clarity and distinctness are interesting, and important, Kantian notions in the first place. The reason that this is an important task is that it is not at all obvious on the surface. In fact, judging by the commentators I am aware of, it is something that will be met with almost unanimous disagreement. Perhaps the main reason is that Kant’s references to the notions of clarity and distinctness in the Critique are nearly always dismissive. Indeed, one of his points against the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition seems to be precisely that while these concepts were thought to be important, this alleged importance is

34 Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (New York: Routledge, 2005), 72.
in fact completely wrong-headed. In other words, my goal in this section is to show that appearances are misleading, and that Kant’s point, as often when it comes to his rationalist predecessors, the German *Schulphilosophen*, is not to dismiss the entire tradition and all it stood for, but rather to profoundly transform the tradition and its concomitant framework of concepts from the inside. In explicating Kant’s theory of clarity and distinctness, two things will become apparent: First of all, that Kant believes clarity and distinctness to be a matter of degree, moreover, this degree corresponds to a degree of consciousness. Secondly, that there is a complicated relation between *aesthetic* and *logical* clarity and distinctness, i.e., between the clarity of intuitions and the clarity of concepts. I will begin to approach this relation in this section, but will have to return to it in later chapters, e.g., 3.3 and 4.1.

In 3.2, I will investigate the status of the degree of clarity and distinctness of representations. As we have seen, Kant rejects the first step that leads Leibniz to his monads and their inner state – namely, he rejects that substances must have absolutely inner determinations. And in fact, Kant does not see the degree of clarity and distinctness of our representations as the determination of our self or “soul,” considered as a simple, mental substance. I will argue that the reason the degree of clarity is a determination of inner sense is because Kant considers the degree of clarity to be a sensation. As such, it is what Kant calls an intensive magnitude. And corresponding to this sensation is, according to Kant, the *intensive magnitude of consciousness*. What this means is that we should see the notions of clarity and distinctness in light of the categories of quality, and their principle of intensive magnitude, and correspondingly, we must also reconsider the categories of quality and their principle in light of the notion of the clarity and distinctness of representations.

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35 This distinction between intuitions and concepts lies at the very heart of Kant’s critical philosophy. In short, intuitions are singular representations, they relate immediately to a single object, and they are “grounded on the receptivity of impressions” (A68/B93). Concepts, on the other hand, are general representations, they relate only mediately to objects, through being applied to or “subsuming” the objects of intuitions, and they are “grounded on the spontaneity of thinking” (A68/B93).
3. Clarity and Consciousness

3.1 Kant’s Theory of Clarity and Distinctness

The task of this chapter is, as mentioned, to explicate the notions of clarity and distinctness in Kant, and to defend their role within his philosophy. It seems appropriate, however, to begin by displaying the passages where Kant is often thought to have denounced any important role for these concepts in the critical project.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant takes the rationalist philosophy to task in the following manner:

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\text{The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has therefore directed all investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions to an entirely unjust point of view in considering the distinction between sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental, and does not concern merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its origin and content, so that through sensibility we do not cognize the constitution of things in themselves merely indistinctly, but rather not at all (A44/B61-62).}
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And, just before this passage: “The difference between an indistinct and a distinct representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content” (A43/B60-61). As is apparent from these statements, Kant’s overriding concern is the distinction between sensibility and understanding, on the one hand, and the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, on the other. And neither of these distinctions have anything to do with the clarity and distinctness of representations, which is relegated to a “merely logical” role. This kind of relegation is symptomatic for the way in which Kant refers to clarity and distinctness throughout the Critique. In a similar fashion, in the Amphiboly we find that the “logical reflection” as well as the “logical topics” of traditional logic must be amended by the prior execution of a transcendental reflection, and a transcendental topic. And it is the transcendental reflection which is a proper part of the critical philosophy.

Moreover, the dismissal of clarity and distinctness as important notions seems to be rooted in the most fundamental differences between the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy and Kant’s own: A theory which sees sensibility and understanding as two inner modes of cognizing the things in themselves, with sensibility being the confused mode and understanding the clear
and distinct one (i.e., the Leibnizian-Wolffian theory), will place great importance on the distinct/indistinct distinction. A theory in which sensibility and understanding are two radically separate sources of representations, both of which are, because we are dependent upon outer affection, limited to appearances when providing cognition (the Kantian one), will have a completely different emphasis. But does this mean that there is no work left to be done by the distinction between the distinct and the indistinct, the clear and the obscure?

First of all, we note what Kant does not say. And he does not actually claim that these distinctions are mistaken, that they have no application at all. Rather, they are “merely logical.” According to Kant, the Leibnizians characterize the distinction between sensibility and intellect as “merely logical,” whereas Kant himself characterizes the difference between distinct and indistinct representations as “merely logical.” It seems that what Kant intends by this is something like “merely a difference of degree,” rather than a difference of kind. Now it should be clear that even if Kant wants to emphasize the differences of kind (between sensibility and understanding, for instance), this does not mean that he denies the existence of differences of degree. And if we look at his logic lectures, we can confirm that Kant does indeed have a specific conception of clarity and distinctness. So what does Kant say about them? In the Jäsche Logic, he characterizes the difference between clear and obscure representations thus: “If I am conscious of the representation, it is clear, if I am not conscious of it, obscure.”\footnote{Kant, Jäsche Logic, Ak 9:33; Lectures on Logic, 545.} A similar view is proposed in the Anthropology; interestingly, Kant’s remarks there are directed against Locke, which places him very close indeed to the context of Leibniz and his New Essays.\footnote{Leibniz’ New Essays on the Understanding is a book-length study and critique of Locke’s Essays Concerning Human Understanding, where Leibniz proposed his notion of “tiny perceptions” against Locke’s view that we could not have representations of which we are not conscious. Leibniz’ book was translated into German in 1765, and thus available to Kant at the time of his writing the Critique. In the context of the interpretation of inner sense proposed in this thesis, Kant’s Leibnizian critique of Locke is of particular interest; for it is plausible to believe (see e.g., Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 234-240) that Locke’s theory of inner sense was an inspiration for Kant’s own.} And Kant, like Leibniz, affirms against Locke that

We can still be indirectly conscious of having a representation, even if we are not directly conscious of it. – Such representations are then called obscure; the others are clear, and when their clarity also
extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection, they are then called *distinct representations*, whether of thought or intuition.\textsuperscript{38}

As we can see, here Kant also outlines the difference between clarity, on the one hand, and distinctness, on the other. However, before we proceed to that, one other question needs to be asked, namely, what is the precise definition of clarity? In the quote from the *Jäsche Logic*, Kant says that the representations of which we are not conscious, are obscure. In the *Anthropology*, he says that we are *indirectly* conscious of obscure representations. We might think that these expressions are somehow equivalent. In any case, they seem to be contradicted by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant notes that: “Clarity is not, as the logicians say, the consciousness of a representation” (B414n.). It is rather, he claims, the consciousness of a *difference* between the representation and others. Similarly, in the *Anthropology*, he states: “Consciousness of one’s representations that suffices for the *distinction* of one object from another is *clarity*.\textsuperscript{39} I believe we can distinguish three definitions of clarity from the different texts, which I will list by the progressively increasing strength of the requirements, where each definition adds an additional requirement to the previous: 1) In the *Logic*, a representation is clear if we are conscious of it. 2) In the *Anthropology*, we must also be able to *distinguish* the representation from another. 3) In the *Critique*, we must in addition be *conscious of the difference* by which we distinguish the representation from another. It is reasonable to take the final view as constituting Kant’s considered opinion, since it is given in the *Critique* and since it explicitly addresses each of the other two conceptions, stating their inadequacy. Thus, he says that: “Clarity is not, *as the logicians say*, the consciousness of a representation” (B414n., emphasis mine), against the view proposed in the *Logic*. And later in the footnote: “To be sure, if this consciousness suffices for a distinction, but not for a consciousness of the difference, then the representation must still be called obscure” (B415n.), which directly addresses and goes

\textsuperscript{38} Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Ak 7:135; *Anthropology, History and Education*, 246. That the role of these obscure representations is not wholly dissimilar to that of Leibniz *petites perceptions*, can be glimpsed from Kant’s following remarks: “The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, *obscure* representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense. Clear representations, on the other hand, contain only infinitely few points of this field which lie open to consciousness; so that as it were only a few places on the vast map of our mind are illuminated.” Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Ak 7:135; *Anthropology, History and Education*, 247.

\textsuperscript{39} Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Ak 7:137-138; *Anthropology, History and Education*, 248.
against the view proposed in the *Anthropology*. We should therefore understand the critical criteria for clarity to include *consciousness, distinction, and consciousness of difference*.

In the following paragraphs I will develop and defend the following claims: 1) The critical view of clarity implies that clarity is a matter of *degrees*. 2) The distinction between clarity and distinctness thereby becomes a difference in degree, not a difference in kind. 3) From this we will conclude that both clarity and distinctness are specifications corresponding to a scale of *degrees of consciousness* (similarly to how warmth is a specification on the scale of temperature). This implies that the representations we are *indirectly* conscious of (the obscure representations) are also characterized by a degree of consciousness (comparable to how there are also *cold*, i.e. not-warm, representations, with a varying degree of coldness).

### 3.1.1 Clarity

In the B414-415 footnote, Kant gives examples of representations that are not clear, though we are conscious of them. The examples are representations that would qualify for clarity on the view suggested in the *Anthropology*, but not for the stricter definition expounded in the *Critique*, i.e., representations where a distinction can be made, but without a consciousness of the difference involved. One of the examples concern the concepts “right” and “equity.” The point Kant is making seems to be the following: We differentiate between “right” and “equity,” so that we sometimes use the one concept, sometimes the other. And not merely in a random manner, rather we judge “right” to be more appropriate in some contexts, “equity” in others. But though we differentiate between them in this way, we are not able to say exactly why we do so, we are not able to say what the difference is that causes the concepts to have different appropriate usages. In other words, we can make a *distinction* between these concepts, but we have no *consciousness of the difference* between them. “A consciousness of

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[^40]: It should be emphasized that the following attempt to work out a theory of clarity and distinctness draws on the three sources mentioned above: the *Critique*, the *Anthropology*, and the *Logic*. As already noted, these sources differ in their treatment of the terms. For the purposes of the present investigation, I have thought it best to follow the line suggested by the *Critique*, and modify the theory according to it. A more complex and nuanced account could – and should – perhaps be given, drawing on the vast range of material concerning clarity and distinctness that can be found, for instance, throughout Kant’s lectures. This, however, would demand a thesis of its own; the following account suffices for our purposes.
the difference” in the context of the footnote must mean, I believe, that one can clearly represent the difference. 41

What is important to notice here is that it does not seem possible to say that the concept of “right” is obscure, period. For it is essential to Kant’s example that the concept compared to “right” is “equity” rather than, for instance, “chair.” It is undeniable that we are conscious of differences between the concepts “right” and “chair,” i.e., only one of them is the concept of a material object. In this respect, then, the concept of “right” must be considered clear. And this point, I think, generalizes. For something to be clear, then, we must have some mark (Merkmal) 42 that can be either affirmed or negated of it; otherwise there is no way of being conscious of a difference between it and anything else. But beyond that, everything becomes a question of degree. That is to say, in comparison to a specific representation, the question of clarity is either-or (i.e., “right” is clear when compared to “chair,” obscure when compared to “equity”); but the representation as such (e.g., the concept of “right”) has a degree of clarity, as measured by considering how many other concepts it is clear when compared with.

The same point holds, I would argue, when considering intuitions rather than concepts (in other words, when it is aesthetic rather than logical clarity that is considered). Kant’s other example in the B414-415 footnote is of this kind: It refers to “a musician who, when improvising, hits many notes at the same time” (B415n.). The point seems to be that even though the musician does not have a clear representation of each of the notes that he is playing, he is nonetheless conscious of each of them – otherwise, it would not be explainable that all the notes fit together in harmony. In other words, though he can distinguish between the particular combination that he plays and a slightly different one, he might be unable to

41 Presumably, Kant’s requirement of a “consciousness of the difference” does not mean that he requires an actual conscious thought of the difference at that exact moment for the representations to be clear. It seems highly unlikely that Kant believes that I only have a clear representation of a chair at those moments when I consciously think something like “what differentiates this chair from its surroundings is the mark ‘x’” (I have hardly ever thought something like that; I like to believe that I have had clear representations of chairs). It must, I believe, rather be the capacity for thinking such a thought at that moment which makes the representation clear. And to have that capacity, I argue, one must be able to clearly represent the difference; if not, one would not be able to have a thought which put forward this difference in a concept.

42 A technical term in Kant, meaning “characteristic,” “property,” or “feature.” The definition of a concept is given by listing its marks, these marks together make up the intension of a concept (i.e., what is in a concept), as opposed to its extension, which is made up of the sub-concepts and objects that are subsumed under a concept (i.e., what is under a concept).
specify the combination clearly, as would be required for writing the composition down, for example.

Similarly to the conceptual example, it is important here that the comparison is between the particular combination of notes that he plays and a slightly different combination of notes. For the comparison might instead be between the specific combination of notes and tapping a rhythm with your feet. Surely, in that case the musician would not only notice that there was a difference, but would also be capable of specifying what the difference was, i.e., he would be conscious of the difference. Though the exact combination of notes might elude him, the specification of them as, say, notes on a piano, rather than the tapping of feet, should be clear enough. So, like in the conceptual example, while in comparison to a specific representation, the question of clarity is either-or (i.e., a particular note in a combination of notes is clear when compared to the tapping of feet, obscure when compared to a slightly different note); but the representation as such (i.e., the particular note) has a degree of clarity, measured by the amount of other sounds it is clear when compared with.43

3.1.2 Clarity and Distinctness

What is, then, the difference between clarity and distinctness? In the Jäsche Logic, Kant says: “All clear representations, to which alone logical rules can be applied, can now be distinguished in regard to distinctness or indistinctness. If we are conscious of the whole representation, but not of the manifold that is contained in it, then the representation is indistinct.”44 In the Anthropology, as we have seen, he also begins from clear representations, and says: “When their clarity also extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection, they are then called distinct representations.”45 In the

43 In my modified examples here, I have contrasted the representations (the concept “right,” a specific note) with clear representations (“chair,” the tap of a foot) rather than other obscure representations (the concept “equity,” a slightly different note). This might seem to distort the logic of Kant’s examples. However, my point could also be made using other obscure representations as contrasts. For the crux is merely that though “right” and the specific note are obscure representations, they can nonetheless be recognized and specified to some extent, i.e., we are conscious that the one is a note, the other an abstract concept. And this implies ipso facto that we are conscious of the difference between them and some other obscure representations, i.e., those that we are conscious of not being notes or abstract concepts, respectively. E.g.; if we were improvising a tune on the piano while at the same time talking about right and equity.

44 Kant, Jäsche Logic, Ak 9:34; Lectures on Logic, 545.

45 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak 7:135; Anthropology, History and Education, 246.
Critique, however, there is no explicit definition of the notion of distinctness. As far as I can see, the revised definition of clarity in the Critique ensures that the concepts “clarity” and “distinctness” are mutually entailing in a way that correlates the degree of clarity with the degree of distinctness. From the definitions of clarity given in the Logic and the Anthropology, the difference is more significant, because what made a representation clear did not seem to have much to do with its distinctness or indistinctness. When it comes to the definition given in the Critique, however, this is no longer the case. For what does it mean to be conscious of the difference between a representation and another? For Kant, it can only mean that we are conscious of a mark that is present in one of the representations compared and absent in the other. That is to say, only by being conscious of a mark (like “material object”) that is a part of the intension of the concept “chair” but not of the concept “right” can these concepts be clear when compared to one another. But this means that the partial representation “material object” must be clearly noted in the concept “chair,” and the negation must be clearly noted in the concept “right.” In other words, the degree of clarity presupposes and is strongly correlated with the degree of distinctness, because the degree of distinctness determines the amount of differences that can be consciously noted.

But is there not a regress problem here? If the clarity of a representation presupposes the clarity of one of its partial representations, then the clarity of the partial representation also presupposes the clarity of one of its partial representations, and so on. Thus the conclusion seems to follow that if anything is to be clear, then we must regress through the partial representations contained in the concepts’ intension, that is, in the direction of increasingly abstract concepts, until we arrive at “being” or “nothing,” the most general concepts. And here we can go no further; we find no partial representation bringing these concepts to clarity. How, then, can any concept be clear? Fortunately, there is in fact another source of difference than the one we have been relying on so far. As Kant points out in the Amphiboly, there is the possibility of numerical difference without conceptual difference, based upon different location in space. Basically, once we can localize a being in space, and subsume the intuition of this being under the concept, the individuating character of the spatial

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46 To this, we should note that in the Schematism, Kant says: “Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time)” (A143/B182). I will say more about clarity as related to the category of reality in the next chapter, 3.2.
intuition will provide the needed clarity. In other words, the *extension* of a concept is ultimately what makes us able to differentiate it from other concepts. What this suggests, then, is that clear concepts ultimately depend upon clear intuitions, and the subsumption of the objects of these intuitions under the concepts in question. For once an intuition has been consciously subsumed under one concept and not under another, the consciousness of difference needed for clarity is provided. The reasoning provided here gives us a grasp of Kant’s oft-repeated assertion that concepts are in some sense empty, they have no sense or meaning, if they do not apply to intuitions. Ultimately, it is only by distinguishing concepts based on their application to objects (this object is a chair rather than a table) that the concepts have meaning.47

3.1.3 Clarity, Distinctness and Consciousness

Now, we need to give an account of the relation between the concepts of clarity and distinctness (which, as we have seen, become entangled in each other in the *Critique*) and consciousness. Consciousness is obviously implicated in these concepts; clarity means a *consciousness* of the difference and so on. Nonetheless, we cannot presume that consciousness can be accounted for in terms of clarity and distinctness. For while clarity implies distinctness, and vice versa, consciousness seems *prima facie* to imply neither clarity nor distinctness. *Obscure* representations, that are neither clear nor distinct, nonetheless have a degree of consciousness. “A certain degree of consciousness, which, however, is not sufficient for memory, must be met with even in some obscure representations” (B414n.). Before we try to account for this, let us look at what Kant says about obscure representations.

As previously mentioned, Kant affirms the existence of obscure representations in the *Anthropology*. And the reason he gives is this:

> When I am conscious of seeing a human being far away from me in a meadow, even though I am not conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth, etc., I properly *conclude* that this thing is a human being. For if I wanted to maintain that I do not at all have the representation of him in my intuition because I am not conscious of perceiving these parts of his head (and so also the remaining parts of this human...

47 Mathematical concepts present a special case; an attempt to account for them on the basis of the interpretation given here is worthwhile, but would take us outside the central topic of the thesis. But the conclusion that I have stated here seems to hold for them as well: they depend upon application to objects in order to have meaning.
being), then I would also not be able to say that I see a human being, since the representation of the whole (of the head or of the human being) is composed of these partial ideas.  

By reiterating the sentiment expressed here, the conclusion seems to follow that the parts of the eye, nose, mouth, etc., the parts of those parts, and so on, are also obscurely represented. And so on to infinity? I see no way of avoiding that conclusion. While this might initially seem to give rise to a problem of infinite divisibility, I believe that it actually fits the discussion of this topic in the Second Antinomy. The antinomy consists in the fact that we can prove matter to be both infinitely divisible and consist of smallest parts; these proofs seem to contradict each other. In the solution to the Antinomy, Kant affirms that all the infinitely many parts of the intuition are contained in the whole, but then says: “Though all the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division is not contained in it; this division consists only in the progressive decomposition, or in the regress itself, which first makes the series actual” (A524/B552). It seems plausible, then, to identify the infinitely many obscure partial representations with the parts that are not yet divided.

So it seems that we have an indeterminately large amount of obscure representations: the parts, parts of parts, parts of parts of parts, etc., of the clear intuitions we have. How are these obscure representations related to consciousness? In the Anthropology Kant proposes the view that we might be indirectly conscious of our obscure representations, whereas we are directly conscious of the clear ones. As we have seen, the revised definition of the Critique classifies more representations as obscure than the Anthropology does. Still, it might adhere to the same distinction between direct and indirect consciousness. However, we have also suggested that in the Critique, it is all a question of degree. For as I have tried to show, the clarity of representations becomes a matter of degree, and by implication (if what is obscure is conceived of as what is not-clear), so does the obscurity of representations. To be concise: To the degree that a representation is not clear, it is obscure. Perhaps this means that the distinction between what we are directly vs. what we are indirectly conscious of also becomes a difference in degree. Another possibility is that we can still make sense of the direct/indirect distinction on the following basis: We can determine something either positively or negatively, i.e., by determining what it is or what it is not; Kant distinguishes

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48 Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Ak 7:135; *Anthropology, History and Education*, 246.
between *affirmative* and *negative* judgments (A70/B95). Something that we are directly conscious of might be something we are capable of determining affirmatively, whereas something we are indirectly conscious of might be something we are only capable of determining negatively. Whether this proposal is plausible is difficult to discern.

In any case, one question must be considered before we can evaluate the relation between clarity and consciousness: Can a *completely* obscure representation still be accompanied by varying degrees of consciousness? First, we need to be clear about what a completely obscure representation would be. According to what we have already said, complete obscurity would imply that the representation is not clear in comparison to *anything*. This should mean that we cannot give any positive or negative judgment about the marks or partial representations contained in the representation in question. This is of course not the case for the eyes, nose, mouth, etc., of Kant’s example. We are, for instance, conscious of the difference between the representation of the nose and the representation of, say, a strong flashlight turned toward the observer; i.e., we can clearly judge that what we presume to be the nose is not a flashlight, because we are conscious of a difference between the representation of the nose and the representation of the flashlight (a difference in the intensity of light, presumably). I think, however, that this line of argument can be expanded so as to show that *no* intuitive representation is completely obscure. For spatiotemporal representations that we do not clearly distinguish from their surroundings – say, the minute sounds that each drop of water makes when it is moving toward the shore, as per Leibniz’ famous example of tiny perceptions – are at least clear in the sense that we are conscious of the difference between them and *huge* perceptions. That is to say, compared to the noise of a gigantic explosion, the minute sound of the drop of water is indeed clear, because we are conscious of the difference between the minute sound and the huge blast (a difference in sound level). Of course, this does not prevent representations from getting *increasingly* obscure. We know that our representation of whatever lies on the other side of the Milky Way is not a light source strong enough to be as visible as our Sun from here on Earth; this does not amount to what we would call a “clear” representation in any normal sense of that word.

The main point here is that *everything adds up to what we perceive*: there is thus no intuitive representation that is *completely* obscure to us, because there is always a way in which that representation could have been different to such an extent that what we perceive would be
different (in a way we were conscious of). And insofar as we have seen concepts to be ultimately reliant upon intuitions for their clarity, and moreover that all concepts arise only through sensory experience (though not necessarily from sensory experience), the same should hold for conceptual representations.

From this I conclude as follows: If the interpretation given so far is largely correct, the degree of consciousness, degree of clarity, and degree of distinctness all seem to be strictly correlated. Hence, I will from now on mostly refer to these degrees as “degrees of clarity,” and summarize what we have so far in the following proposition: the magnitude of consciousness corresponds to the degree of clarity of representations. What this means is that I take the degree of clarity/distinctness/consciousness over the sum total distribution of representations present in the mind to correspond to the magnitude of consciousness.

The possibility of developing, as I have done above, a theory of clarity and distinctness within Kant’s framework, does not yet tell us whether there is any use or demand for such a theory in the critical philosophy. However, I believe that this can easily be affirmed: for instance by looking at Charles Parsons’ article on “Infinity and Kant’s Conception of the ‘Possibility of Experience’,” which points to a possible problem in Kant’s theory of the infinity of time and space. The problem centres on the issue of infinite divisibility. If space and time, as forms of intuition, are infinitely divisible, does this imply that any intuition has an infinite amount of information? And when Kant says that “as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity” (A99), does this mean that we only apprehend simple parts in instants, and through a succession of these “build up” the manifold of intuition? In attempting a solution to these quandaries, Parsons says that “we have to make a distinction which Kant does not explicitly make and which has some consequences which I am not sure that Kant would have accepted.” And this distinction is that between what is taken in explicitly and what is only taken in implicitly. Making such a distinction answers the questions posed above by saying that our intuition has a potentially infinite amount of information (but most of it is implicit), and that the simple parts are the absolute unity of explicitly given impressions (which nonetheless contain implicitly given


50 Parsons, Mathematics in Philosophy, 101.
parts). Parsons goes on to equate this distinction with that between the “figure” and “ground” of Gestalt psychology. As we have seen, he also takes it to be the case that such a distinction is not present in Kant, and perhaps is even something that Kant would not have accepted. As I will proceed to show, however, the reason Kant does not have or accept such a distinction is that he already has similar but better and more widely applicable tools: Precisely the notion of the degree of clarity and distinctness of representations.

First of all, Parsons’ distinction does not amount to a full explanation of why Kant characterizes a representation as “absolute unity” when contained within one moment; the spatial unity of a representation in which one can distinguish no explicit parts seems to be relative. That is, insofar as Parsons ascribes the unity to the spatial representation, this unity can only be relative. But as I will expound further in chapter 3.2, the degree of clarity of representations, on the other hand, must be taken as sensations, with an intensive magnitude. And what is distinctive about intensive, as opposed to extensive, magnitudes, is that they are indeed absolute unities in the sense that they are not composed of parts outside one another (partes extra partes). Instead, they have a degree. In his late metaphysics lectures, Kant explicitly phrases the contrast between extensive and intensive magnitude as that between magnitude of the unity versus magnitude of the plurality:

One determines the degree better this way: magnitude of the unity, i.e., the representation of an object, insofar as I think its magnitude (quantity <quantitatem>) as unity, provides the degree of the magnitude. Thus the magnitude is given here not as plurality, but rather as unity and distinguishes itself precisely from extensive magnitude.51

And Kant is moreover clear that sensation is apprehended in a moment: “Apprehension, merely by means of sensation, fills only an instant” (A167/B209). It is therefore natural to assume that the absolute unities contained in one moment must be sensations. But as we have seen, this does not mean that they do not have a magnitude, i.e., the “magnitude of the unity.”

Secondly, while “figure” and “ground” are sensible, spatial determinations, clarity and distinctness apply to all representations, sensible and conceptual alike. As we have already

seen, Kant allows for both aesthetical and logical clarity. But in contrast to the usual treatment of these terms among commentators, the interpretation proposed here can at the same time affirm that there must be some connection between aesthetic and logical clarity. And there are good reasons for seeing this as an advantage. In general, it seems hard to deny that since experience requires a combination of intuitions and concepts, this must also imply some relation between the clarity exhibited by intuitions and the clarity of concepts. And a consideration of the role that the concepts of reflection play in the formation of empirical concepts should make this even more obvious. The comparison of empirical intuitions with a view toward forming empirical concepts, performed by means of the concepts of reflection, imply that the relations falling under the concepts of reflection (identity or difference, conflict or agreement, etc.) are relations that are consciously apprehended in the empirical intuitions themselves. In other words, for a concept involving a certain set of predicates to be formed, empirical intuitions more or less clearly exhibiting those sets of predicates as aesthetic features must be presupposed. We have already seen that the interpretation given here is germane to these considerations; one connection between the clarity of concepts and the clarity of intuitions has already been exposed, namely, the fact that the clarity of concepts ultimately depend upon the clarity of intuitions.

In chapter 3.3, I will expand further on this idea of a relation between aesthetic and logical clarity, by interpreting the “act of attention” as an act which enables us to bring aesthetic clarity to concepts. But before this, I will in the next chapter develop further the idea that the degree of clarity of our representations is an intensive magnitude.

3.2 The Intensive Magnitude of Consciousness

Chapter 2 presented the initial case for thinking that a determination of inner sense might be a determination of the degree of clarity of representations. In 3.1, we have now seen how Kant’s theory of clarity and distinctness works, and we have also begun to see its connection to consciousness. But whereas we can perhaps see why the degree of clarity of a

52 As a general rule, holding for real concepts (i.e., concepts involved in cognition), of course. Arbitrarily invented concepts, or fictuous ones, must be allowed for, but these in no way undermine the picture sketched above as a general prerequisite for the possibility of empirical concept formation.
representation is *inner*, it is more problematic to understand why it is a determination of inner *sense*; what does the representation of the concept of “right” have to do with sensibility? In the present section, I will attempt to resolve this difficulty by showing how the degree of clarity and distinctness must be, and is, subsumed under the category of *reality*. It is for this reason that the degree of clarity of representations constitutes an *intensive magnitude*, corresponding to the intensive magnitude of consciousness.

The three categories of quality (reality, negation, and limitation), when applied to our sensible conditions *a priori* (i.e., as so-called schematized categories), give rise to a principle. This principle is presented and defended in the Anticipations of Perception, and goes as follows: “In all appearances the real, which is an object of the sensation, has *intensive magnitude*, i.e., a degree” (B207). In 5.2 we will return to discuss this principle in detail; for now, it suffices to emphasize the contrast between on the one hand, the categories of quality that give rise to the principle of *intensive* magnitude, and on the other hand, the categories of quantity that give rise to the principle of *extensive* magnitude. An extensive magnitude is an aggregate of parts, whereas an intensive magnitude is a coalition of degrees.

In other words, an intensive magnitude is not constituted of mutually external parts. As Kant says, in an intensive magnitude “the magnitude is given here not as plurality, but rather as unity and distinguishes itself precisely from extensive magnitude.”

It therefore comes as something of a surprise when Kant, in the Transcendental Dialectic, consistently relates the categories of quality to the question of *parts and wholes*. And indeed, Kant himself remarks, toward the end of the A paralogisms, after summarizing the “sophistical doctrine of the soul,” i.e., the claims of rational psychology that he has criticized: “How the simple here once again corresponds to the category of reality, I cannot yet show, but rather it will be proved in the following chapter, on the occasion of another use by reason of the very same concept” (A404). Thus, we can clearly expect an explanation for this correspondence to appear in the “following chapter,” that is to say, in the Antinomies. What we find is the following:

> Reality in space, i.e., *matter*, is likewise something conditioned, whose inner conditions are its parts, and the parts of those parts are the remote conditions, so that there occurs here a regressive synthesis,

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whose absolute totality reason demands; and that cannot occur otherwise than through a complete division, in which the reality of matter either disappears into nothing or else into that which is no longer matter, namely the simple (A413/B440).

Now in the context of a general explanation for the correspondence of the simple to the category of reality, the argument Kant gives here suffers from at least one fatal flaw. Namely, that it is explicitly limited to reality in space. It is difficult to believe that Kant would have considered an argument about reality in space to be an explanation for how to deal with reality in the Paralogisms, where it is the soul, as an object of inner sense, that is in question. Nonetheless, that is what we find.\(^{54}\) It should be remarked that there is no similar reference to a general explanation for the correspondence of the category of reality with the simple in the B Paralogisms, perhaps suggesting that Kant himself saw its inadequacy. But that just leaves us where we were, with no explanation for this strange correspondence.

We can, however, perhaps unearth a connection between talk of parts and wholes and the categories of quality. This connection has to go through the topic of our previous section, namely, clear and distinct representations. Witness, for instance, a passage where Kant discusses an indistinct representation:

> We glimpse a country house in the distance. If we are conscious that the intuited object is a house, then we must necessarily have a representation of the various parts of this house, the windows, doors, etc. For if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either. But we are not conscious of this representation of the manifold of its parts, and our representation of the object indicated is thus itself an indistinct representation.\(^{55}\)

Whereas the parts of the house themselves are *extensive* magnitudes, the degree of clarity of these parts, and thereby the degree of clarity of the representation of the house, is an *intensive* magnitude.\(^{56}\) In other words, the part-whole relation can be connected to the

\(^{54}\) In fact, even for reality in space, the explanation given seems to rely on an empirical statement, associated with the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, namely, that matter is the moveable in space. In that work, Kant will indeed show that reality in space is conditioned by the reality of its parts, and so on. But this should not be assumed in the *Critique*. Whether this is a problem for the argument of the second Antinomy is a question I cannot pursue here.

\(^{55}\) Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, Ak 9:34; *Lectures on Logic*, 545.

\(^{56}\) In line with the revision of the concept of clarity envisioned in the B413-414 footnote, we should say that we are conscious of the parts of the house, but not a consciousness of the difference between these parts and others. For if the fact that the house is an indistinct representation means that the partial representations contained in it are not clear, this then implies that we are not conscious of the difference between these partial representations and others.
categories of quality through the degree of consciousness accompanying the representation of the wholes and parts. The key to understanding why wholes and parts are suddenly the focus of the Dialectic is thus to see that the potential “division” Kant discusses in the Second Antinomy is, as we already hinted at above, a division which can only be conceptualized in terms of the potential distinctness of representations, the potential distinctness of its parts, etc. Because “division” can be seen as distinctness, and distinctness is a measure of the intensive degree of consciousness, there is a connection between Kant’s discussion of the categories of quality in the Analytic and that in the Dialectic. But again, this can only be properly understood once the essential role played by the intensive magnitude of consciousness is grasped.

And that is what we must proceed to next. For in the B Paralogisms, the plot thickens. As of yet, we have seen only a somewhat strange displacement in what corresponds to the category of reality in the object. This changes when we encounter a new section written for the B Paralogisms, seemingly just a detour from the main objective of the Paralogisms, that is, the disclosure of the four paralogistic inferences associated with the groups of categories: the “Refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the persistence of the soul” (B413-418).

A short version of Mendelssohn’s proof (as Kant presents it) is something like the following: Given that the soul exists, there is no way in which it could disappear. Because it is simple, it cannot disintegrate, because it has no parts to split into. This seems clear, if one allows (as Kant does) that it is simple. Moreover, because of the properties of time, it cannot vanish. This is due to the fact that no amount of time is the smallest: If the soul was to vanish it would have to be there one moment, and gone the next. But this is impossible, there is no such thing as the “next” moment, just as there is no such thing as the “next” real number after 1. What Kant does is point to another way in which the soul could disappear: through elanguescence, i.e., through the gradual diminishing of its intensive magnitude down to nothing. An intensive magnitude is indicative of the fact that the category of reality is being applied. Kant says the following:

Even if we allow the soul this simple nature (...), and hence no extensive magnitude, one nevertheless cannot deny to it, any more than to any other existence, an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, indeed to everything in general that constitutes its existence, which might diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees (B414).
In other words, Kant affirms that like everything that exists, the soul must have an intensive magnitude.

First of all, I want to emphasize that this cannot be the unschematized category of reality, for the simple reason that ascribing to the soul an intensive magnitude means subsuming it under the schema of the categories of quality, i.e., the principle of intensive magnitude. From the unschematized category of reality one does not get so much as a hint that anything should have an intensive magnitude. Determining something as having an intensive magnitude just is subsuming it under the schematized categories of quality, just as determining something as having an extensive magnitude just is subsuming it under the schematized categories of quantity. As we have seen, Kant denies that the soul has an extensive magnitude, and thus he does not subsume it under the schematized categories of quantity. It is equally clear, however, that Kant affirms that the soul has an intensive magnitude, and thus he does subsume it under the schematized categories of quality.

The major obstacle to an understanding of this claim is to grasp exactly what Kant intends to designate by the term “soul.” It is clear that it cannot be understood as an object, i.e., as substance, as this would go against the entire gist of the Paralogisms. It seems equally clear, however, that the “soul” in question here cannot be a merely logical subject, to which any of the categories can be applicable only in a transcendental sense. For as we have seen, it is the schematized version of the category of reality that is validly applied to the soul. What, then, does “soul” refer to in this context? Fortunately, we have already encountered this problem in the thesis: In our discussion of inner sense, we noted that inner sense provides “inner intuitions (of our souls)” (A34/B50). The question back then was what exactly inner sense could possibly tell us about ourselves, or our souls, since we could not intuit the soul itself, as an object. But now it seems that we can answer this question quite precisely: what inner sense can tell us about the soul is that it has an intensive magnitude. And this also clarifies the ambiguity concerning whether we intuit “ourselves” or our “inner state.” For “state” is merely another word for having certain properties at a certain time, and positive properties are exactly what is schematized under the category of reality. What this means is

57 For the distinction between a "transcendental" and an "empirical" application of the categories, see the section on Phenomena and Noumena in the *Critique*, esp. A246/B303.
that we only know “ourselves,” i.e., our “souls,” through our “state,” i.e., the intensive magnitude of consciousness. In other words, within Kant’s critical system, the terms “ourselves as we appear,” “the soul” (when not understood as object/substance) and “our inner state” all refer to the same thing: the intensive magnitude of consciousness.

I would therefore argue that the Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof confirms the analysis presented in this thesis so far. For it is not a coincidence that when Kant appends a footnote to his point about the intensive magnitude of the soul, this footnote is the one that we have already analyzed in some detail in 3.1, i.e., the footnote about clear and obscure representations. The connection is quite striking, as these last three sentences bring out nicely:

A representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a consciousness of the difference between it and others. To be sure, if this consciousness suffices for a distinction, but not for a consciousness of the difference, then the representation must still be called obscure. So there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its vanishing (B415n., italics mine).

If it is correct to categorize obscure representations as those that have a low degree of clarity, the quote clearly seems to imply that the intensive magnitude of consciousness (of our souls) corresponds to the degree of clarity of our representations. In the Metaphysik Vigilantius from 1794-95, Kant distinguishes between the extensive magnitude of a thought in time (its duration) and the intensive magnitude (reality) of a “clear head”: “So a thought has, e.g., quantity as intuition in time, but a clear head has reality on account of the subjective sensations of its representations.”

Kant’s reference to a “clear” head reinforces the interpretation presented here: the intensive magnitude of consciousness corresponds to the degree of clarity (the “subjective sensations”) of its representations.

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58 Kant, Metaphysik Vigilantius, Ak 29:999; Lectures on Metaphysics, 467.

59 It would be desirable to work out how apperception fits into the account given here: 1) as a representation (what can we say about the “I” of apperception in respect to its clarity/obscurity?); and 2) in relation to reality (how can Kant say that “apperception is something real” (B419)?). But apperception in Kant is such a vast and difficult topic that such a working out would require a thesis of its own. All I can provide here, for the curious reader, is a few admittedly sketchy suggestions as to the lines along which such a working out could proceed:

With regard to the first issue, the “I” of apperception is said to be simple. E.g.: “The simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept” (A345-346/B404). Based on the account of clarity and distinctness given here, one must therefore question whether the “I” can be clear, since there seems to be no basis for a consciousness of the difference between the “I” and any other representation. This seems, strangely enough, to imply that this particular representation (of the “I”) has no degree of
I should already here emphasize that in addition to being a new theory of inner sense, the interpretation given also gainsays a quite widespread assumption about intensive magnitudes: that they are inescapably connected to the categories of relation. Such a view is exemplified by Daniel Warren, in *Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature* (see especially ch. 1), who claims that intensive magnitudes are causal powers. But it is difficult, to say the least, to see how the degree of clarity of a representation could be a causal power. It seems to me, then, that Warren’s view can be upheld only as long as one disregards or denies that consciousness has an intensive magnitude, or at least denies that this intensive magnitude is measured by the degree of clarity or obscurity of representations. The claim that consciousness has causal power is of course not philosophically unheard of clarity, i.e., no degree of consciousness. This may perhaps reflect the fact that the “I” is said to be “a mere consciousness” rather than to have a degree of consciousness.

With regard to the second issue, we must be careful to denote precisely what we mean by “apperception.” The principle of synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., the principle that is encapsulated by Kant’s famous pronouncement “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations” (B131), is not a principle which demands clear self-consciousness. As one can gather from the quote, the principle states the necessary possibility of clear self-consciousness (i.e., the necessary possibility of the “I think”), rather than itself being a principle of clear self-consciousness. Thus Kant says that all my representations must “belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such)” (B132). The “as such” I take to mean that we need not be aware that they are mine, i.e., they need not be clearly represented as mine. To be represented as mine, I take it, is to actually be accompanied by the “I think,” that is, by clear self-consciousness. When it comes to the “I think” itself, as clear self-consciousness, the category of reality seems relevant. For Kant claims that this “I think,” as a given proposition, is empirical. E.g.: “the empirical but in regard to all kinds of intuition indeterminate proposition “I think”” (B421); “The “I think” is, as has already been said, an empirical proposition, and contains within itself the proposition “I exist”” (B422n.); and “The I think expresses the act of determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given” (B157n.). And there are several clues which link this empirical nature of the “I think” to reality: Kant says that the “I think” expresses the indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception (hence it proves that sensation, which consequently belongs to sensibility, grounds this existential proposition) (B422-423n.). If the indeterminate empirical intuition is indeed a perception then we would expect it to be covered by the Anticipations of Perception, where the principle for the categories of quality is said to hold for all perceptions. And when Kant goes on to specify, he indeed says: “An indeterminate perception here signifies only something real, which was given” (B423n., emphasis mine). Judging by this, it would seem that the “I think” is empirical in the sense that the schematized category of reality is applied to it. Now the problem is of course how to square this with Kant’s distinction between inner sense and apperception. The “I think” is related to apperception rather than inner sense, since he says about it: “The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required” (B157n.). It is obvious from the context that inner sense is what can provide the required “self-intuition.” But if the point of inner sense is, as I have argued, to give us the intensive magnitude of consciousness, but the “I think” already has an intensive magnitude, then what is the difference? First of all, as I have already pointed out, one cannot simply identify the “I think” with apperception tout court, rather, the synthetic unity of apperception is the necessity of the possibility of the “I think.” I would suggest that the “I think” expresses the analytical unity of apperception, rather than the synthetic unity (for this distinction, see B133-134. Longuenesse also reads the “I think” as the analytic unity of apperception, see Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 67). The distinction between the synthetic unity of apperception and inner sense should therefore be unthreatened. Nevertheless, the “I think” must also be distinguished from inner sense. My best suggestion is that whereas the “I think” indeed seems to have an intensive magnitude, this intensive magnitude can be determined only through inner sense. In other words, the “thinking” that is predicated of the “I” indeed has an intensive magnitude, but this intensive magnitude is determined only by the self-affectation of inner sense providing the empirical content of the thought. In fact, in light of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism it turns out that not only does this kind of determination require inner sense, but it also presupposes outer experience. I say more about this in chapters 4.2-4.4.

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(Kant’s attitude toward this claim is far from simple), but the claim that the degree of consciousness met with in a representation, i.e., its degree of clarity or obscurity, is a causal power, hardly seems plausible.\(^\text{61}\)

Being clear about this distinction between intensive magnitudes and causal powers seem to me to have the side benefit of allowing us to avoid a conflation: namely, between the category of reality and the modal category of existence (actuality). When applied to our sensible conditions, the modal category claims actuality \([\text{Wirklichkeit}]\) for that which accords with the formal conditions of experience and is connected with the material condition of experience, i.e., sensation. This connection to the material conditions of experience, Kant states, is made by means of the analogies of experience, i.e., by the categories of relation (see A225/B272). Now all “sensible” realities, that is, reality as that which “corresponds to the sensation” (A168/B209), are intensive magnitudes. Now since these realities already correspond to sensation, then if they are all causal powers as well, they are obviously connected by means of the second and third analogy of experience, and thus they must be actual. But if this follows from the principle of intensive magnitude itself, then there is no need for a separate principle of actuality. Warren in fact emphasizes the difference between the category of actuality and the category of reality (see p. 3), but what he fails to do, as far as I can see, is to consider whether there can be any difference between the \textit{schematized} versions of these categories on his account. When Warren states that these categories are different because we can represent concepts as having positive properties (realities) without claiming that the concepts are actually instantiated (in an existing object), he seems to be comparing the “intellectual” category of reality with the “sensible” category of actuality; it is not surprising that these are different.\(^\text{62}\) What should be in question is whether reality \textit{as that which corresponds to sensation} can be distinguished from actuality. It is not clear to me that Warren’s account is able to make that distinction. My interpretation avoids this problem by claiming that \textit{not} all realities are causal powers.

\(^{61}\) I am of course not denying that \textit{some} intensive magnitudes are causal powers, only disputing that they \textit{all} are.

\(^{62}\) The distinction between “intellectual” and “sensible” categories is Warren’s, see Warren, \textit{Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature}, 2. It is the same distinction as that made between “schematized” vs. “unschematized” categories, or categories as applied to objects vs. categories as mere forms of thought. I use these distinctions synonymously.
But my view also conflicts with those less radical views that stop short of postulating intensive magnitudes *tout court* as causal powers, while nonetheless affirming some indispensable connection with the categories of relation. For instance, in Longuenesse’s interpretation of the Principles, she writes: “Finally, if the category of reality reflects, not sensation *simpliciter*, but sensation *related to an object*, or the matter of appearance as “that which corresponds to sensation,” the category of reality (*Realität*) cannot be considered apart from the categories of relation”\(^63\) And, after referring to the mathematical/dynamical distinction, she continues:

He [Kant] has stressed that the former have to do with the constitution of our (pure or empirical) intuitions, while the latter alone have to do with the existence of the objects represented in our intuitions. But in the proof of the Anticipations of Perception he relates “the real of sensation” to “something existing in space or time” ([Longuenesse’s] emphasis)\(^64\)

But it must now be pointed out that Kant has a concept of existence *distinct* from the categorial one, as explicitly noted in the B Paralogisms in connection with the “I think” that we have already discussed. Kant here says about the “I think”: “It expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception (…), but it precedes the experience that is to determine the object of perception through the category in regard to time; and here existence is not yet a category” (B422-423n.). It seems clear that in this case at least, perception implies existence of a non-categorial kind, precisely because it is not yet determined “through the category in regard to time,” i.e., through the categories of relation, as “rules of general time-determination” (A177-178/B220). Now insofar as we take the Anticipations to guarantee *that* empirical realities, “the real of appearance,” has an intensive magnitude, without determining anything about what the intensive magnitude must be, we would expect the situation there to be similar to that of the B422-423 footnote. And indeed, the footnote has many textual parallels to the Anticipations: he is concerned with the perception of an “indetereminately given object” (B423n.), similar to the “object in general” (B207) of the Anticipations. Both contain references to “sensation,” and the reference to “object[s] of perception” (B207, B423n.) in both cases makes the parallel even clearer. Accordingly, there are reasonable grounds for subsuming the reference to “existing” in the Anticipations to the notion of

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\(^63\) *Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 302.

\(^64\) *Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 302.
existence given in the B422-423 footnote, as an indeterminate sense of existence, prior to the
determination of the “way of existing” (B410) which can only be made by way of the
dynamical categories, specifically the categories of relation. And it is precisely this non-
categorial concept of existence, which is correlated with reality instead of actuality, that
allows Kant to avoid the conflation between actuality and reality. It should also be noted, in
this regard, that in Longuenesse’s quote Kant says “existing in space or time” (my
emphasis), thus explicitly referring to the fact that while everything that exists does so in
time, not everything is in space. Consciousness, while certainly existing, does not exist in
space.

As I hope that the current chapter has showed, it is indeed necessary, pace Longuenesse, to
consider the category of reality independently of the categories of relation. Indeed, on the
interpretation given here, the parallels invoked above are natural, since Kant has been, in the
B Paralogisms, trying to convey that consciousness must necessarily have an intensive
magnitude. The fact that intensive magnitudes in general should have the same kind of
existence as the intensive magnitude of consciousness is therefore no big surprise.\(^{65}\)

What are the results of our investigation so far? The main achievement is the outlines of a
new interpretation of inner sense: Whereas outer sense is what provides us with the material,
that is to say, the representations themselves, inner sense is what gives us the state of the
representations. And this state is a degree of clarity, which, as a sum total over all our
representations, constitutes our “inner state”: the intensive magnitude of consciousness.

By means of this result, we have also already begun developing the second main topic of the
thesis; namely, the categories of quality and the concomitant principle of intensive

\(^{65}\) It would be worthwhile to reinvestigate the relation between reality and actuality, and in general the relation between the
categories of quality and those of modality, on the basis of the reappraisal of inner sense that I have set out here. As I have
tried to show, the intensive magnitude of consciousness seems to present us, through inner sense, with a clear case of
something that has reality but not (categorical) existence. But I believe the account given here might also shed some light
on the Postulate of possibility, and specifically the paragraph (A222-223/B269-270) where Kant discusses the status of
“entirely new concepts of substances, of forces, and of interactions from the material that perception offers us”
(A222/B269). For it is noticeable that these concepts pertain to each of the categories of relation (substance, causality,
community), and the examples of new concepts Kant gives are all constructed by giving inner sense a role that it is not, in
our present experience, able to fulfil (for example the thought of “a faculty of our mind to stand in a community of thoughts
with other men” (A222/B270), which seems to be constructed by applying the result of the Third Analogy to the content of
inner sense). This is one of the clear examples of passages where a better understanding of the specificities inherent to each
of Kant’s forms (of intuition and of thought) is needed in order to grasp Kant’s meaning. But constructing a framework for
making these connections intelligible would constitute a major undertaking, and cannot be attempted here.
magnitude. As we have seen, the interpretation of inner sense given here provides meaning and content to Kant’s clear distinction between intensive magnitudes (realities) and causal powers, as well as the modal category of actuality. This is in fact an important preliminary result, since much of the commentary on the categories of quality and their principle has, as exemplified above, proceeded exactly by denying that they can be explicited independently of the dynamical categories.

I have, as of yet, not said much about self-affection. Since the idea of self-affection seems to be central to Kant’s discussion of inner sense, it is an appropriate test of my interpretation whether it can provide a plausible and coherent explication of self-affection, as it is presented in the *Critique*. The next two chapters, 4.1 and 4.2, will deal with this topic. First I will address the meaning of the concept of an “act of attention.”
4. Self-Affection

4.1 Attention

In dealing with Kant’s theory of self-affection, the concept of attention is often brought to the foreground. The reason for this is that the act of attention is used as an example – as a matter of fact, the only explicit example – of self-affection in the B Deduction. In a footnote appended to §24, where Kant introduces self-affection in the B Deduction, he says as follows:

I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this. In such acts the understanding always determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination that it thinks, to the inner intuition that corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is commonly affected by this means, everyone will be able to perceive in himself. (B156-157n.)

Since I have now presented the outlines of my own interpretation of inner sense, attention seems a suitable test case by which to measure my suggestion against others in the literature. The examples that I will draw on explicitly are those of Allison, and a more recent interpretation forwarded by Dyck, in his article “Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction.” To anticipate the results of this chapter, I believe that the account of attention given by my interpretation compares favourably to the others; more specifically, I will argue that my interpretation fits better with: (1) our intuitive or phenomenological notion of what attention is; (2) what Kant says about attention in his other works; and (3) what Kant says about attention in the B156-157 footnote. I will go through these points in order. But first of all, let us quickly summarize the interpretations of attention given by Allison and Dyck. Allison’s view is, as we have seen, premised upon the distinction between two kinds of self-affection. Attention constitutes the second act of self-affection, which Allison sees as providing for specifically inner experience. In attending to a representation, we re-conceptualize it as an object, and thereby

grasp this representation as belonging to us: “In attending to its representations, the mind makes them into objects perceived.” Thus, attention is separated from and presupposes the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Dyck’s interpretation, in sharp contrast to Allison’s, actually identifies attention with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. He claims that Kant “is directly identifying the act of attention with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination,” and that “it is through the act of attention that the subject affects itself.” As different as these two interpretations are, they agree on one thing: They both put the act of attention at the centre of an understanding of self-affection and self-knowledge. In other words, both identify attention with self-affection, and differ only in the position that they jointly give to these two notions.

Let us now proceed to the points raised earlier.

(1): How would a phenomenological description of what we consider as acts of attention look like? First, let us consider how the other interpretations cohere with our everyday view of attention. Take the following sentence: “Pay attention to the road.” It would be strange (and potentially dangerous) to take this to mean, as Allison’s interpretation would suggest, that you should re-conceptualize your representation of the road as a subjective object, in order to see this representation as belonging to you. But Dyck’s interpretation fares no better; it would suggest that the imperative sentence simply means to synthesize the representation of the road into a spatiotemporal part of your experience, something you can hardly avoid doing as long as the road is in your visual field. Similarly, paying attention to a sound would,
on Dyck’s proposal, be something you can only avoid by *not actually hearing* the sound in question – hearing it is already paying attention to it, on his account.

Now, before evaluating these objections one may ask: Is it not reasonable to think that Kant, in the B Deduction footnote, is pointing to something different from our intuitive notion? That he is rather making a transcendental point about a function of attention that must be seen as grounding our ordinary, empirical acts of attention, and therefore that our intuitive, phenomenological notion of what attention is cannot be used as an argument? In my view, there are several reasons for thinking that this is erroneous, and that he is indeed talking about the ordinary concept of attention. First of all, we should try to avoid attributing any more obscurity to Kant than necessary. Kant was perfectly capable of adding “transcendental” whenever a word should be taken in a different significance than the ordinary, i.e., transcendental imagination, transcendental subject, motion considered transcendentally, transcendental matter, etc. There is no hint of this when it comes to attention, either in the footnote or anywhere else.

Secondly, taking Kant to be referring to some kind of “transcendental attention” contradicts what seems on the face of it to be the main point of the footnote. For in the footnote, he is pointing to our everyday experiences of acts of attention as giving an example of self-affection; if he was talking about some esoteric, transcendental notion of attention it would make no sense to say that “I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this,” and further, “how much the mind is commonly affected by this means, everyone will be able to perceive in himself” (B156-157n.).

Finally, I believe that my own interpretation of inner sense allows us to understand attention in a way that coheres well with our intuitive notion, as well as with what Kant says in other passages, as we shall see. For as I have previously expounded, inner sense gives the degree of clarity of our representations. Self-affection, insofar as it is what determines inner sense, coheres with our intuitive notion.

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71 Arthur Melnick suggests that “attention” should be glossed as “keeping attention inwards,” and that what we perceive by such acts are our own receptive states, understood as the bodily functions by which we receive outer impressions (focusing with our eyes, tilting our head, etc.), in Arthur Melnick, *Kant’s Theory of the Self* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 112-114. This is perhaps most similar to Allison’s proposal, but has the additional problem of suggesting that inner sense informs us of our spatial, bodily states. It is also difficult to see how to square it with Kant’s assertion that “*every* act of attention can give us an example” (B156n., emphasis mine).
should therefore relate to this. My interpretation thus suggests that if attention is an example of self-affection, this is because it modifies the degrees of clarity of our representations. And indeed, the intuitive notion of “paying attention to the road” has to do with the degree of clarity of the representation of the road: it is something like “continually making and keeping the representation of the road a clear and distinct one.” If the intuitive notion is to be taken into account, then, it appears that the interpretation given here has a definite advantage.

(2): This appearance is strengthened when one considers the passages from outside the *Critique* where Kant explicitly discusses attention. In his metaphysics lectures, Kant says the following: “Abstraction is the actualization of attention, whereby only a single representation is made clear and all the remaining are obscured. Attention does not stop with abstraction, but rather it is only directed from one or several objects to one, and all the remaining representations obscured and the one clear.”\(^\text{72}\) As is clear from the quote, Kant himself connects attention to a modification of the degree of clarity of representations. But moreover, I will argue, the quote also suggests that attention is not (or at least not solely) an aspect of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. The acts of abstraction that attention is intimately related to here\(^\text{73}\) are according to Kant of a piece with acts of comparison and reflection as the three basic *logical* acts, that is to say, they are kinds of *intellectual* synthesis rather than figurative synthesis. They are acts for generating and refining concepts rather than intuitions. An example from the *Jäsche Logic* brings this point out nicely: “Abstraction is only the negative condition under which universal representations [concepts] can be generated, the positive condition is comparison and reflection. For no concept comes to be through abstraction; abstraction only perfects it and encloses it in its determinate limits.”\(^\text{74}\) This is equally troublesome for Allison and Dyck, since they both assign attention as a function of the imagination rather than the understanding. Of course, from what has been

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\(^{72}\) Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, Ak 29:878; *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 248. Interestingly, especially in connection with the discussion of “existence” in the previous section, the chapter of the *Metaphysik Mrongovius* this quote is taken from contains statements about many of the topics we have already discussed (e.g., our knowledge, *pace* Locke, of having obscure representations; positioning ourselves, *pace* Valaris, only on the basis of the position of our body; intelligence as opposed to soul as a sensible subject, etc.), and the chapter is called “On the Existence of the Soul.”

\(^{73}\) For additional evidence that Kant connects these two concepts, see *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*, Ak 24:753-754; *Lectures on Logic*, 487.

\(^{74}\) Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, §6, Ak 9:95; *Lectures on Logic*, 593.
said so far it cannot be ruled out that attention has a dual signification, one logical and the other sensible.

(3): If we look closely at the footnote from the *Critique*, however, this is not what Kant seems to suggest. What he says, rather, is that “in such acts the understanding always determines the inner sense” (B157n., emphasis mine). And lest we believe that this is a reference to the “effect of the understanding on sensibility” (B152), which is associated with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, Kant adds that inner sense is determined according to the combination that understanding thinks “in the synthesis of the understanding” (B157n.), in other words, in the intellectual synthesis. And it should not in itself be that hard to agree that paying attention to something is in many cases a consciously decided act, whereas the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, insofar as it is the synthesis through which the fact that the categories hold of all possible experience is grounded, is not something we consciously decide to apply. Nonetheless, there has obviously been a real difficulty in taking this passage literally, presumably because it seems to brazenly cross Kant’s receptivity/spontaneity divide. In any case, I believe that there is a case to be made for taking Kant at his word here. Indeed, Kant’s point seems to be that it is more obvious that we are affected by ourselves through intellectual synthesis than through figurative synthesis. How can we understand this?

Let me suggest, then, that Kant’s intention might have been something like the following: To justify the claim that self-affection is the ground of every possible experience we can have of ourselves, he needs to show that the understanding’s “first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition” (B152) is a self-affection. In other words, what he wants to dispute is the following picture: It is granted that we are receptive creatures that depend on outer affection. Once this material has arrived, however, in our active apprehension of this material, we intuit ourselves as we are, and not merely as we appear. According to Locke, for example, inner sense is reflective; sensibility takes the form of a mirror. In other words, there is no mediation, but rather, our acts of thought are immediately and directly sensed – i.e., there is no distinction between inner sense and apperception. Similarly, the monads are not “creative intellects” in the sense that they themselves create what they perceive (God being the exception to this, of course). But their apperception is still also a direct apprehension of the content of their states, and therefore, inner sense and apperception are conflated. When Kant describes the problem in terms of understanding how
it could be that “we would have to relate to ourselves passively” (B153), the passivity implies more than simply a receptivity that imposes no conditions of its own, but instead directly receives what the mind actively thinks. If this were the case, there would be no sense in speaking of “passivity,” since the apprehension of its own activity might just as well be seen as an aspect of the activity. In other words, there is a reason Kant does not distinguish explicitly between the “intuiting” and the “intuition,” whereas he does make a point of distinguishing between inner sense and apperception. And the reason is that even though for intuition one can indeed distinguish between the active (act of intuiting) and passive (the intuition as product, as mental content) aspect, no vital difference is thereby pinpointed. The intuition that you intuit has no further conditions beyond the conditions for intuiting the intuition. When it comes to inner sense and apperception, however, things are different. Inner sense provides a further condition for intuiting apperception, beyond what is necessary for apperception itself.

This is why the question which looms the largest is: how is the mind passive in perceiving what seems to be its most passive aspect, namely intuition? Intuiting seems to be something the mind immediately perceives itself as doing. It is therefore in transcendental imagination, where apperception is involved, but seemingly without requiring any extra condition to be perceived, that the question of self-affection is most pressing. If we consider this in light of the qualia debate, things become considerably clearer. Kant’s point, then, is that even our sensory impressions, even those qualia that seem to be immediately and unmistakeably given as the content of our minds, are the result of self-affection, and therefore only show ourselves as we appear. When we return to consider sensation later in this thesis (chapter 5.2), we can perhaps evaluate this suggestion more precisely.

In any case, it seems clear that the interpretation proposed in this thesis is better suited to accommodate what Kant says in the footnote than those of Allison and Dyck. For none of their interpretations seem equipped to account for a connection between intellectual syntheses and inner sense. If, on the other hand, we interpret inner sense on the basis of

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75 Two of the three sense of “intuition” – more precisely, the “mental content” sense and the “act” sense – that Allison distinguishes at Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 82.

76 Or, more precisely: Because inner sense provides a further condition, what is intuited is not apperception “in itself,” but merely its sensible effects.
Kant’s doctrine of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, then we are already committed to claiming that there is a connection between intellectual representations (a concept) and intensive magnitude (the degree of clarity of the concept); and thereby also between logical acts (like the logical act of attention) and inner sense (the logical act of attention modifies the degree of clarity of representations). But how, exactly, should we understand attention as a “synthesis of the understanding”? 

Insofar as an act of attention succeeds in making one representation sufficiently clear, the result is that this representation can be reflected in a concept, by means of judgment. For example, an act of attention can result in the following (overt or tacit) judgments: “Oh, it is a horse,” or “A rock is blocking the way.” This, I suggest, is what Kant means when he says that the “synthesis of the understanding” determines the inner intuition. For by bringing the representation to clarity one is able to reflect the representation in a concept, and thereby the inner intuition is conceptually determined.

This does not apply only to perceptual judgments, but equally to conceptual judgments. In other words, attention “determines inner sense” when it modifies the logical clarity of our representations, just as much as when it modifies the aesthetic clarity. Any analytic judgment, for instance, requires the ability to clearly represent what is analytically contained in the concept. In the Blomberg Logic of the early 1770s, Kant notes that: “All distinguishing of the true from the false involves the cognition of inner sense[,] i.e., I must be and become conscious what really lies in my concept, and what I think.” Kant clearly seems to suggest here that analytic judgments (insofar as “what really lies in my concept” is normally a reference to what is analytically contained in the concept) depend upon the “cognition of inner sense.” In other words, both aesthetic and conceptual representations have their degree of clarity through inner sense, but a determination of these representations, i.e., a judgment having a truth value, can only be obtained through an act of attention whereby one attempts to bring clarity to the representations and determine them in judgments. And this is also where the possibility of error arises. Kant continues: “Inner sense is often dull, and its horizon shrouded in fog, and it does not give us enough help. Meanwhile, though, inner sense also belongs to sensibility, but without it the understanding cannot judge, so the

77 Kant, Blomberg Logic, Ak 24:87; Lectures on Logic, 66.
understanding must judge with the help of sensibility[;] and just this connection and mixing together of the understanding with sensibility is the source of all errors, namely, the effects of the understanding are taken for effects of sensibility."78 When making a judgment, you must base this judgment upon representations with a degree of clarity, whether aesthetic or logical (Aesthetic: paying attention to the aesthetic features of the figure in the field, I form the judgment “It is a horse.” Logical: paying attention to what lies in the concept “matter,” I form the judgment “Matter is lifeless”), but this judgment can always turn out to have been mistaken (Aesthetic: on approaching, you see that it is actually two men wearing a horse costume. Logical: on closer investigation, the empirical concept of matter does not analytically contain “lifelessness”79). Kant describes this by saying that “we take merely subjective grounds to be objective,” meaning that we take the subjective representation, as it is accompanied by a degree of clarity, to be objective.

In other words, the possibility of error arises because we have a point of view, as disclosed in inner sense, and we sometimes mistakenly judge our own subjective point of view to correspond to the objective features of the world. My interpretation, which takes this subjective point of view to be the degree of clarity of our representations, allows us to understand how error in analytic as well as synthetic judgments can arise from taking these subjective grounds (the representations with the degree of clarity we are able to give them) to be objective (the true features of the objects or concepts).

I have already begun referencing the “further condition” that inner sense imposes. But it is now time to re-introduce the form that this condition takes, i.e., that the form of inner sense is time. It remains to be seen how well the interpretation proposed here can combine the two following claims: 1) that time is the form of inner sense, and 2) that the degree of clarity of representations is the determination of inner sense. As is well known, monads are not

78 Kant, Blomberg Logic, Ak 24:87; Lectures on Logic, 66.

79 This should not be taken to indicate an argument against Kant’s proclamations concerning the conceptual impossibility of hylozoism (e.g., in the Critique of the Power of Judgment). The point is merely that analytic judgments can be mistaken, and when they are, it is because the concepts they involve are not completely clear to us. Empirical concepts can, according to Kant, never be completely defined, i.e., never become completely clear and distinct: “One makes use of certain marks only as long as they are sufficient for making distinctions; new observations, however, take some away and add some, and therefore the concept never remains within secure boundaries” (A728/B756). The point is that, as far as I understand, Kant might be wrong about the impossibility of “living matter.”

80 Kant, Jäsche Logic, Ak 9:54; Lectures on Logic, 561.
primarily in time. It is therefore imperative, insofar as we have played up the similarity between the Kantian inner sense and the inner state of the monad, to explain how time, as an essential component of cognition and an unavoidable form of intuition, enters the picture. In the following section, we will investigate the relationship between time and inner sense, through the concept, propounded in the B Deduction, of \textit{transcendental motion}.

\section*{4.2 Consciousness in Motion}

So far, I have tried to present a novel interpretation of the dependence of the inner manifold on the outer manifold – what this means, and how it can tell us anything about ourselves. To review, the inner manifold consists in the degree of consciousness of the outer representations (or concepts that ultimately depend upon these outer representations). And the reason this potentially tells us something about ourselves is that it is not a simple reflection of the outer content, but the degree of consciousness is precisely the degree to which our consciousness actively apprehends the outer content.

What we have not yet clarified, however, is how this inner sense is connected to \textit{time}. Time is, as we have seen, the form of inner sense, and it is therefore incumbent upon an interpretation of inner sense to explain how this is so and what it means. In the present case, that means answering the following questions: How is the clarity and distinctness of representations connected to time? What is the connection between the degree of consciousness, and the “time in which we place these representations” (B67)? In the remainder of this chapter I will interpret this connection, by looking at the concept of \textit{motion} in Kant, and more specifically, as it is presented in the B Deduction, where Kant distinguishes between two kinds of motion. What I will attempt is to explain how one of these kinds of motion, motion as action of the subject or “\textit{description} of a space” (B155n.), can be understood precisely as a way of understanding the connection between time and degree of consciousness. This will then constitute the first part of the full explanation of the role of time in the part of Kant’s framework interpreted here. The rest of the story, elucidating the meaning of Kant’s claim that time is the immediate condition of inner intuitions, the mediate condition of outer appearances, will be given in the following chapters of the thesis.
Let me first of all situate the remarks about motion in the context of the B Deduction, and then present two opposing interpretations of the specific concept of motion relevant in the Deduction – what I will term *transcendental motion*.

This motion is, by Kant, also referred to as “motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object)” (B155). Implied by this is a distinction between two kinds of motion, and in a footnote Kant expands on this:

Motion of an **object** in space does not belong in a pure science, thus also not in geometry; for that something is movable cannot be cognized *a priori* but only through experience. But motion, as **description** of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer imagination in general through productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental philosophy. (B155n.)

A reasonable assumption, on the basis of this footnote, is that Kant distinguishes between the kind of motion relevant to empirical science – the kind which comes to the fore in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* – from the purely critical concept relevant to the Deduction and to transcendental philosophy. However, since this distinction has been downplayed, prominently by Michael Friedman in *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, we should look more into the details. Specifically, Friedman seems to identify or at least bring closely together the motion “as **description** of a space” with the kind of motion described in the first chapter of the *Metaphysical Foundations*, namely, phoronomical motion, i.e., the motion of a mathematical point. As support for this interpretation, Friedman adduces the following passage from the Phoronomy chapter:

In phoronomy, since I am acquainted with matter through no other property but its movability, and may thus consider it only as a point, motion can only be considered as the **describing of a space** – in such a way, however, that I attend not solely, as in geometry, to the space described, but also to the time in which, and thus to the speed with which, a point describes the space.

As we can see, the phrase “description of a space” occurs both in the Deduction and the Phoronomy, and can therefore be seen to point in favour of Friedman’s hypothesis. However,

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82 See, e.g., Friedman, *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, 40; 77n.; 131; 201; 332-334.

there is other textual evidence that weighs against it: For one thing, in the B155 footnote Kant specifies that movability is an empirical notion, pertaining to the motion of objects rather than the motion of the subject relevant to the Deduction. Since Kant in the Phoronomy explicitly states that we are acquainted with matter “through no other property but its movability,” this indicates that the Phoronomy deals with empirical matter, and therefore not with transcendental philosophy proper. And indeed, the reference to the motion of “matter” should in itself be enough to conclude that he sees this as the motion of an object rather than motion, as action of a subject. On a more general note, it is also clear that Kant wants to keep separate the purely a priori investigations of the Critique from the pure part of natural science presented in the Metaphysical Foundations; i.e. keep the transcendental philosophy of the Critique distinct from the metaphysics of corporeal nature of the Metaphysical Foundations. Only after emphasizing this distinction does Kant go on to introduce the guiding concept of the foundation of natural science: “The basic determination of something that is to be an object of the outer senses had to be motion, because only thereby can these senses be affected.” There are many signs, therefore, that we would be conflating things Kant wants to keep separate if we identified motion, as action of the subject, with phoronomical motion. And of course, the fact that both are referred to as “the description of a space” does not by itself tell us that they should be identified – presumably, the motion of an object (a mathematical point) and motion, as action of the subject, can both be descriptions of space without being the same description. There is, however, another underlying issue that I believe motivates Friedman’s interpretation. Namely, insofar as change is dealt with in the Analogies of the Critique and its real possibility therefore proscribed a priori, how can movability be considered as empirical? These two concepts seem as if they should be on exactly the same footing, enjoy the same status. However, on this point I am in agreement with Walker that motion that is in fact empirical whereas change, as such, is not. Quite simply, change (even in space) does not a priori imply motion. The fact

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84 See Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Ak 4:469-470 for these distinctions.

85 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Ak 4:476; Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, 191.

86 That this motivates Friedman’s account can be clearly seen, I believe, in the passages where he takes Kant’s example of the drawing of a line at B291-292 (where Kant deals with alteration and motion, as alteration in space) as additional proof of the equation of transcendental motion with phoronomical motion.

that our senses can only be affected by moving forces should not be considered \textit{a priori}, any more than our particular sensory modalities (sight, hearing, etc.) should. And this is because change can also be change in \textit{quality}, or change in \textit{intensity}, and such changes could, if our sensory organs were different, have affected us directly.\footnote{Action at a distance should not, after all, be a problem here, since Kant is already committed, in the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations}, to Newtonian action at a distance.}

This point also indicates my disagreement with a different reading of transcendental motion, that of Jens Saugstad, in his article “Kant on Action and Knowledge.”\footnote{Jens Saugstand, “Kant on Action and Knowledge (in Kant Studien 83, nr. 4 1992), 381-398.} On his externalist reading, the motion specified in the Deduction is an action of the subject simply because it is the overt action of an agent. The “overtness” of this action, the part that makes Saugstad’s proposal externalist, is the reference to “actions essentially involving the movement of the limbs.”\footnote{Saugstad, “Kant on Action and Knowledge,” 384.} But while it is true that this kind of motion, as opposed to that of other objects in space, “is part of an action performed by a human agent,”\footnote{Saugstad, “Kant on Action and Knowledge,” 385.} the problem is that it is exactly this part – the external, bodily part – that Kant would assign to the \textit{a posteriori} “motion of an \textbf{object} in space.” And for good reason, if the movability of objects in general can only be empirically ascertained. For his case against \textit{a priori} movable bodies \textit{in general} should then also count as a case against \textit{a priori} movable bodies in the case of our own human body.

This is not to deny that the empirical actions exemplifying what Kant is here talking about – drawing a line, etc. – are more often than not overt actions of an agent. The importance of the use of diagrams in Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, for example, should certainly not be underestimated. The point is rather that the part of this exemplification that Kant denotes under the term “motion, as \textbf{description} of a space” (B155n.) is \textit{not} the part of it concerned with the motion of the limbs, even if those limbs belong to a human agent.\footnote{Saugstad seems to note this point when he says that “the fingers, points, etc. used in the exhibition of the synthetic \textit{a priori} judgment do not have the status of objects. Of course, this is not to deny that they are objects, for certainly we can, and do, determine their properties in empirical judgments. My point concerns their role and status in the exhibition: the synthetic \textit{a priori} judgment is not \textit{about} these self-produced representations, but is exhibited \textit{by means} of them.” (Saugstad, “Kant on Action and Knowledge,” 392.) But this seems to me uncomfortably close to the role \textit{matter} plays in the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations}. More specifically, in spite of his criticism of Friedman, the role Saugstad assigns to the body of an agent seems close to that assigned by Kant to spatial matter in the Phoronomy: we disregard the actual, empirical objects involved, and thereby focus solely on universal conditions (phoronomical rules in the case of the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations}).}
present an interpretation here that involves an “internalization” of transcendental motion, while nonetheless making it perfectly obvious that such a motion is a presupposition of every possible human experience. To anticipate, I view transcendental motion and the fact that our representations always have a degree of clarity as mutually entailing each other. Since having a degree of clarity and distinctness seems like an undeniable fact about Kantian representations, I hope that this can serve to demystify transcendental motion all the while resisting an externalist interpretation, whether in terms of the motion of a point or in terms of the overt action of an agent.

So, if we distinguish the transcendental motion from every kind of motion of an object, even that of a mathematical point (as in Friedman) or that of the limbs of a human agent (as in Saugstad), what are we left with? The clue Kant gives us is the notion of the “description of a space.” This kind of description is then also identified with self-affection. I believe that the generic term “description” is in fact better suitable to conveying Kant’s meaning than the specific examples that he goes on to illustrate his point with. For in general, a description involves specifying what one is describing, that is to say, finding distinctions or determinations that can pick out what is described from the “background.” In terms of the vocabulary used in this thesis, to describe something means to provide its representation with a degree of clarity. And as I’ve said earlier (in chapter 3.1), there must be a connection between aesthetic clarity and logical clarity: If we are to form an empirical concept, our empirical intuition must already contain, as aesthetic features, the distinguishing marks of the concept. And the role of “motion, as an action of the subject” is to describe the sensible by making pre-conceptual distinctions in what is given as an indeterminate whole of intuition.

We can note, first of all, that this motion is necessary for experience: Without sensible distinctions we cannot even identify objects. But moreover, it is equally obvious that our

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93 Konstantin Pollok emphasizes the need for differentiation between the transcendental, geometrical, and empirical concepts of motion, and presents a thorough discussion of the recent literature, especially in relation to the Metaphysical Foundations, in his article, “Kant’s Critical Concepts of Motion,” (Journal of the History of Philosophy 44, nr. 4 2006), 559-575. However, beyond assigning it to the figurative synthesis he does not explicate the concept of transcendental motion as such.
human understanding is incapable of reaching the level of clarity Leibniz affirms of God; that is, completely clear and distinct representations. One could even claim that for Kant, such completeness is impossible for any creature with space and time as forms of intuition – since it would amount to a complete division, of the kind Kant proves to be impossible in the Second Antinomy.

We thus see that the two options considered here end up as no understanding, in the first case, and the impossible infinite understanding, in the other. In between those extremes we find ourselves: as finite understandings with the capacity for transcendental motion. In other words, to describe a space means to determine the manifold of that space with a certain degree of clarity and distinctness, by describing some of its properties. This process of description is ongoing and finite, meaning that the idea of a total, complete description is not actually attainable. That is to say that we know this description as successive, i.e., as constrained by the form of intuition known as time. The distinction between what is described (in space) and the describing (in time) can then be cashed out in terms of the distinction between the outer representation and the degree of consciousness attached to that representation. Thus, when Kant says:

> Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action in accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense, first produces the concept of succession (B155).

He is saying that if we focus on the describing we find that what is determined are successive states, each of which constitute a specific, and limited (not infinite) degree of consciousness. This image, and its connection with the categories of quality, is reflected by a passage in the *Metaphysik Vigilantius*: “Limitation, i.e., the representation of a thing, whose being is affected by its non-being, therefore whose concept contains a being and non-being connected. E.g., light is reality; darkness is negation; shadow is limitation, for it is a darkness which is bounded by light. So also cognition - ignorance - limited knowledge.”\(^94\) In other words, what holds for consciousness in general (that it always has a limited degree of reality), is here said to hold also for the more specific mental state of cognition; it is part of

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\(^{94}\) Kant, *Metaphysik Vigilantius*, Ak 29-998; *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 466.
the human condition to have a limited knowledge, a degree. This condition should be seen as part of what Kant is referring to by calling inner sense a “limiting condition” (B159).

We should at this point be able to dispense with some of the common criticisms directed at Kant’s theory of the determination of inner sense. For in his examples, Kant seems to suggest that we can only ever intuit something by a continuous motion through all its parts. But it seems like a basic phenomenological fact that we sometimes take things in “at a glance.” If we can, for instance, perceive a line simply by a glance, does this not contradict Kant’s statement that we have to *draw* the line in order to think it? Perhaps this objection highlights the inadequacy of Kant’s examples.95 From the interpretation given here, it should be clear that Kant should *not* be taken as relying upon a view in which a figure must be apprehended by starting from its first point and moving continuously through each subsequent point in linear fashion, thereby supporting the transcendental synthesis of the imagination upon a rather unconvincing internal analogy to drawing. Rather, what happens is that we go through a continuous motion in going from no perception of a line to a clear perception of a line. This motion will only in special cases be something similar to “drawing” the line from one end to the other. Unfortunately, Kant uses an example which diverts our attention to the extensive magnitude when his point is really about intensive magnitude; his real point does not concern the spatial line (Kant himself points out that we should “abstract from this manifold in space” and “attend solely to the action”), but rather the self-affection involved in making a sensible distinction, in the form of a line. This self-affection results in the generation of an intensive magnitude (a degree of clarity) rather than an extensive magnitude (a line). According to Kant, we are not building intuitions from “sensory atoms,” but rather introducing distinctions into an indeterminate whole of intuition. The process involved in the motion, as action of a subject, is therefore a “drawing” in the following sense: “But it [the sensation] is understood as a magnitude whereby the parts are not cognized previously in order to determine the magnitude, rather they must be cognized as unity, and the parts *drawn out from the unity.*”96 And since the time in which this process takes place is continuous, the change in the degree of clarity of any representation must also be continuous (or more

95 One does well, I believe, to heed Kant’s remarks about the inevitable inadequacy of examples in the Schematism. And this is especially so in the Deduction, where the level of abstraction is perhaps at its highest.

precisely put, we can never ascertain a discontinuous leap from a degree of clarity to another, since this would amount to claiming that the degree changed from one moment to the next, but since time is continuous there is no such thing as a “next” moment.\(^{97}\)

\(^{97}\) The argument presented in the current section can be seen as building upon the interpretation of Béatrice Longuenesse in her *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. In her book, which is an interpretation of the *Analytic of the Critique*, the concept of *conatus* holds a central position. For example, she sees the figurative synthesis as a result of this *conatus*: “To borrow a term from Spinoza and Leibniz, one might speak of an actual *conatus*, a continual effort, to shape the representation of what affects us in order to exercise our judgment (…) The actualization of the *conatus* is the “action of the understanding on sensibility,” namely the *synthesis speciosa*, the figurative synthesis carried out by the imagination.” (Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 208.) And it is precisely this “continual effort,” I would claim, that we know through the resulting determination of inner sense as the intensive magnitude of consciousness. The intuition of ourselves in inner sense is therefore the intuition of the degree of our *conatus*. 
5. Inner Sense and Intensity

5.1 Intensive Magnitudes

In the previous discussion of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, we noted that Kant’s conclusion was: “So there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its vanishing” (B415n.). But the question we must now ask ourselves is: why are there infinitely many degrees? This question can be generalized as a problem that has puzzled all commentators trying to make sense of Kant’s principle of intensive magnitude: How can Kant prove a priori that every sensation, and every reality corresponding to it, is an intensive, continuous magnitude? Why is it not possible that at least some sensations are either there or not there, or that their magnitude change in discrete jumps, or even that a sensation could simply be there without admitting of any quantitative change at all?98 In the next paragraph I will give an outline of the problem, pointing to the reasons it has proven so difficult to solve.

One of the distinctions made at the very beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic is that between the matter of appearance and the form of appearance. Kant describes the distinction as follows: “I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance” (A20/B34). He proceeds to claim that “the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori” (A20/B34). As is well known, the focus of Kant’s investigation is a type of judgment hitherto unknown to philosophers, but which Kant will bring to the centre stage, namely the synthetic a priori judgment: “The real problem of pure reason is now contained in the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” (B19) Since the matter of appearance can only be given to us a posteriori, we might draw the

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98 The categories of quality have received little attention, compared to the other category groups. To the best of my knowledge, the only book exclusively dedicated to them is Anneliese Maier, Kants Qualitätskategorien (Berlin: Metzner, 1930). Among those who have struggled with the problem outlined above we can count Warren, Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature, 15-16; Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 314-316; Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 172-176; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 202-205.
conclusion that we will not be occupied with it in the following, and that we will not be able to judge synthetically *a priori* concerning it. For instance, in the “Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories,” Kant states that representation and object relate only “Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible *a priori*. And this is the case with appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation” (A92/B125). Thus, such a conclusion seems to be borne out, until we reach the Schematism of the Analytic. At that point, the matter of appearance returns, and surprisingly, here Kant seems to allow for synthetic *a priori* judgments about it after all. He introduces the topic with the following comment: “Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time)” (A143/B182). This is the first surprising statement: we have a pure concept of the understanding of that which corresponds to sensation, that is, the matter of appearance. By saying that this concept indicates a being (in time), Kant is already proceeding to the schema of this pure concept, “which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general” (A142/B181). This time-determination is, then, in the case of reality, the indication of a being in time. Accordingly, negation indicates a non-being in time. So far, it seems that what we have is not an *a priori* discursive *determination* per se of the matter of appearance, but only an *indication* of its presence or absence. However, we might consider it the second surprising statement when Kant proceeds to argue that “every sensation has a degree or magnitude, through which it can more or less fill the same time, i.e., the inner sense in regard to the same representation of an object” (A143/B182). And it turns out that it is this specification which defines the schema of the pure concept of reality: “The schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform generation of that quantity in time, as one descends in time from the sensation that has a certain degree to its disappearance or gradually ascends from negation to its magnitude” (A143/B183). So rather than just a conceptual indication of the matter of appearance, Kant claims that we can actually have a

99 Similarly to what might initially be drawn from the description of the material support of the “I think” as “something real, which was given” (B423), as we have previously noted.
synthetic a priori knowledge of this matter: by knowing that it has a quantity, i.e., a degree.\footnote{What exactly are these intensive magnitudes? Kant understandably never provides anything like a list. Nonetheless, we can get an impression by collecting some of the examples he gives: “Impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.” (A21/B35); “the sensations of colors, sounds and warmth” (B44); “the pleasant taste of a wine” (A28); “a degree of reality with regard to all its [the soul’s] faculties, indeed to everything in general that constitutes its existence” (B414); “pain, consciousness in general” (Prolegomena, Ak 4:309n.; Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, 102); “the parts of the speed are not external to one another like the parts of the space, and if the former is to be considered as a quantity, then the concept of its quantity, since this is intensive, must be constructed in a different way from that of the extensive quantity of space” (Metaphysical Foundations, Ak 4:493-494; Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, 206). To this list we must also add the basic forces of attraction and repulsion that Kant expounds in the Metaphysical Foundations.}

Kant’s proof of the principle of the Anticipations of Perception goes as follows:

Now from the empirical consciousness to the pure consciousness a gradual alteration is possible, where the real in the former entirely disappears, and a merely formal (\textit{a priori}) consciousness of the manifold in space and time remains; thus there is also possible a synthesis of the generation of the magnitude of a sensation from its beginning, the pure intuition $= 0$, to any arbitrary magnitude (B208).

There are several difficult questions that need to be asked concerning the current passage. First of all: What is the relation between the \textit{consciousness} Kant talks about in the proof, the \textit{sensation}, which is what Kant concludes can be generated, and the \textit{object of the sensation}, which is what Kant’s claim in the headline of the Anticipations concerns? If it is granted that a sensation can be subject to a gradual alteration, does this necessarily imply that the real in the object, corresponding to that sensation, is also thus alterable?\footnote{This is the problem Longuenesse points to in \textit{Kant and the Capacity to Judge}, 314-316.} A related problem concerns the use of the concept of “alteration” Kant makes in the quoted passage. How are we to square Kant’s reference to a “gradual alteration” with his statement a few pages later, where he says that “the causality of an alteration in general (…) lie[s] entirely beyond the boundaries of a transcendental philosophy” (B213)? A clarification of this view can be found a few pages earlier: “If one regards this reality as cause (whether of the sensation or of another reality in appearance, e.g., an alteration), then one calls the degree of reality as cause a “moment,” (...) But I touch on this here only in passing, for at present I am not yet dealing with causality” (A168-169/B210). Here, alteration seems to rely on reality as cause, to which we would then be justified in applying the principle of the law of causality of the Second Analogy: “All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (B232). It is clear from Kant’s exposition, however, that he does not want to bring
alteration in the sense of causality into his discussion at this point. So the question remains: what kind of alteration is the “gradual alteration” of the Anticipations?

Even disregarding these problems, it is not easy to see how the quoted passage is supposed to constitute a proof for the intensive magnitude of the matter of appearance. Is this claim really buttressed by postulating that a gradual alteration from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness is possible? We have to reject an “intuitive” interpretation of the passage in question: It is sometimes suggested that we can imagine going from complete silence, for instance, gradually up to any specific level of sound, or in the opposite direction, going down from the heard level of sound towards complete silence. Such empirical examples, however, can be met with equally empirical counterexamples. One case in point is heat. How are we to imagine this process when it comes to heat? As a gradual diminishment of heat, approaching absolute zero? Thought as a felt sensation, this would soon enough tip over to the increase of cold, rather than a gradual alteration towards less and less heat.

If such a psychological reading of the proof is unavailable, it seems, however, no easier to find a proper transcendental interpretation. Could this kind of “gradual alteration” be seen as a condition of possible experience? It is difficult to envisage how, and the problem of intensive magnitude seems to provide one of the clearest cases of the problematic “formalism” which, as we noted in the introduction, Pippin finds in Kant: Because of his “dualism” of form and matter Kant struggles to account for their interrelation, and where he attempts to do so, like in the Anticipations, which promise to give us an a priori principle concerning what is strictly speaking empirical, his attempts are far from convincing.

Longuenesse proposes that we can at least represent sensation, and the real which corresponds to it, as being a continuous magnitude. Her reason for suggesting this is as follows:

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102 For instance: “Thus my experiencing a sound may begin with silence, which is followed by the gradual increase of the sound’s volume such that my awareness of it progresses from a vague sense of some sound being made to an awareness of increased volume and of certain aspects of the character of the sound: brilliance, shrillness, etc. (…) Clearly, then, sensation (and intensive magnitude) admits of degree, continuous from no intensity up to higher degrees of intensity.” (C. Thomas Powell, *Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 119.) Interestingly, this example clearly exhibits the interdependence of outer sensations, such as sound, and sensation as degree of clarity, as the “awareness” that progresses from a low degree of clarity (“a vague sense of some sound”) to a higher degree of clarity (“an awareness of (…) certain aspects of the character of the sound”). I say more about this in chapter 4.3.
Although no sensation is successively synthesized, every sensation can at least be reflected, as the quale that it is, under the concept of a unit, by comparison with which its absence is nothing: zero. Both this reality = one, and this negation = zero, are posited in time. But between zero and one, and between one and zero, an infinite number of intermediate quantitative determinations can be posited.\footnote{Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 313.}

As far as I can tell, however, one could still ask why we are entitled to conceive of a sensation as reflected under the concept of unit, in the quantitative sense connected to the principle of extensive magnitude, in the first place? And in any case, the problem remains that even if we can represent sensations, and the real, as continuous magnitudes, it still does not follow that they are continuous magnitudes. Anneliese Maier proposes that Kant actually considered the ground of the proof of the Anticipations to be a third form of intuition, in addition to space and time. Similarly, some have suggested that this third form must be “another time,” the outlines of which can be found in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, and that can ground the principle of intensive magnitude.\footnote{“This “other time,” which can be said to be what is used to reflect upon the first measure of time, is what I am calling an intensive form of time, since, by means of it, one can measure the degree to which what is apprehended in extensive time takes up time. In other words, this form is what makes possible the intuition of intensive magnitudes” (Melissa Zinkin, “Intensive Magnitudes and the Normativity of Taste,” in Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, ed. Rebecca Kukla (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 149.)} As intriguing as such a theory might be, I cannot see it as anything but a last resort, since Kant never explicitly mentions any forms of intuition other than that of inner sense and outer sense, i.e., time and space. Another possible path – enjoining the categories of quality with those of relation\footnote{As we have seen, Warren chooses this option. This is also the gist of Longuenesse’s tentative suggestion for a solution to the problem of why realities are continuous magnitudes. See Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 315-316.} – is closed to us, on the basis of the arguments presented in 3.2. But I believe that the interpretation presented so far enables us to conceive of a new solution to this vexed problem. And it is to this possible solution I will now turn.

We will have to approach the problem of the continuity of intensive magnitudes in steps. To introduce the necessary caveat, the interpretation given here accounts for three different kinds of intensive magnitude: 1) aesthetic clarity, 2) logical clarity, and 3) sensations that relate to objects, and the realities corresponding to them. I thus leave out the “relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is
designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.” I will begin by first accounting for the intensive magnitude of consciousness, i.e., aesthetic clarity and logical clarity. These magnitudes can, I will argue, be shown to be continuous. But the crucial part of my argument is the following: I believe that it is only by reflecting on what the magnitude of consciousness can and cannot provide on its own that we can understand how to give an argument for the continuity of our point 3) above, that is, sensations that relate to objects, and the realities corresponding to them. But first, I will in the following paragraph begin by displaying the central role that consciousness has in the proofs of the Anticipations.

Because of our previous analysis, we are well positioned to explain what other commentators have mainly passed over in silence; namely, the many references to consciousness in the text of the Anticipations. As we have seen, the proof at B208 refers to “empirical consciousness,” “pure consciousness,” and “formal (a priori) consciousness.” And towards the end of the Anticipations, Kant returns to offer another attempt at an explanation of how the proof works, because, as he says,

> some reservation is aroused about the fact that the understanding can anticipate a synthetic proposition of the sort which that concerning the degree of everything real in appearance is (...) and it is therefore a question not unworthy of solution, how the understanding can assert something synthetic a priori about appearances, and indeed anticipate them in that which is really merely empirical, namely what pertains to sensation (A175/B217).

From this passage we can surmise that Kant is not unaware of the issue we pointed to above, namely, the apparent contradiction involved with having an a priori principle for what is, according to his own theory, strictly a posteriori. His attempt to explain should therefore be of great interest. He proceeds to, first of all, make it clear that the quality of sensation is

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106 Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §1, Ak 5:204. An attempt to account for the relation between the intensive magnitude of consciousness, understood as the sum total degree of clarity of its representations, and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, would require a study of its own. Such a study would have to account in detail for if and how the interpretation given in this thesis could be brought to bear upon the third *Critique*.

107 The one commentator I am aware of who has emphasized the importance of this connection is Deleuze, who dedicates some fascinating but cryptic paragraphs in one of his lectures on Kant to the Anticipations. This thesis owes its title to one of the passages in this lecture: “There will be a complementarity between the function of the caesura which intensive consciousness plays in time and the empty linear form that time takes on.” (Gilles Deleuze, “Kant,” *Cours Vincennes* 21/03/1978, available at http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=67&groupe=Kant&langue=2)
strictly empirical and cannot be anticipated. Afterwards comes what we must take to be his argument:

But the real, which corresponds to sensations in general, in opposition to negation = 0, only represents something whose concept in itself contains a being, and does not signify anything except the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general. In inner sense, namely, the empirical consciousness can be raised from 0 up to any greater degree, so that the very same extensive magnitude of intuition (e.g. an illuminated surface) can excite as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other (less illuminated) surfaces taken together (A175-176/B217, emphasis mine).

Rather than focusing on the photometrical example Kant provides, I believe that the real clue lies in the emphasized sentence, namely, in the “synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general.” What kind of synthesis is this? My suggestion is that it inevitably involves the transcendental motion that we discussed in the previous chapter. This would explain the puzzling reference to “gradual alteration” (B208) that we noted earlier; the alteration in question is the “motion, as action of the subject” (B155n.). This interpretation also gives us at least an initial grasp on how the real that corresponds to sensations signify this synthesis of empirical consciousness. For as we have seen, it is this synthesis, transcendental motion, that determines inner sense to the degree of clarity with which any of our representations must be accompanied. In other words, the intensive magnitude of consciousness, at least, certainly signifies the “synthesis in an empirical consciousness.”¹⁰⁸ In light of this, I must interpret Kant’s reference to “pure consciousness” and “a merely formal (a priori) consciousness” (B208) somewhat differently from what is normally assumed. This pure consciousness cannot be a consciousness of purely mathematical structures of time and space a priori, since these would undoubtedly be accompanied by a degree of clarity. While this might at first seem to be a problem, I believe that it actually fits with what Kant is saying about the pure consciousness in the Anticipations. For the full sentence about formal consciousness goes as

¹⁰⁸ Warren seems to take this synthesis to refer to something like a sui generis representational capacity: “if we presuppose (as Kant does) fundamental representational capacities for diminishing or augmenting the intensities of sensations, this ‘construction’ allows us to order sensations and their corresponding realities as greater or lesser, according to their positions in the time sequence.” (Warren, Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature, 18.) While it must be admitted that Kant seems to argue in this way, it is nonetheless unacceptable on philosophical grounds. We have no “capacity” to represent the diminishing of warmth down to absolute zero, nor the capacity to represent the diminishing of gravity down to zero. Warren tries to avoid this problem by making it clear that he is not talking about psychological possibility but rather something akin to mathematical possibility, but since we have no form of intuition grounding this “intensive capacity,” similar to pure space and time for mathematics, this suggestion is unconvincing (though Warren criticizes Maier’s proposal of a “third form of intuition,” his own suggestion here seems to presuppose something like such a third form).
follows: “Now from the empirical consciousness to the pure consciousness a gradual alteration is possible, where the real in the former entirely disappears, and a merely formal (a priori) consciousness of the manifold in space and time remains” (B208). Admittedly, Kant is rather obscure here. But by equating the pure consciousness with the “consciousness of the manifold in space and time,” it can be argued that Kant is not equating it with a consciousness of any combination of this manifold, i.e., no synthesis. We should not, after all, forget that Kant considered sensation to be a presupposition for the “I think,” as the B422-423 footnote shows. Without re-entering the discussion of apperception, I can at least say that this would be my reading of “pure consciousness”: Not pure synthetic (mathematical) consciousness of spatiotemporal structures, but rather a pure consciousness of the manifold we are affected with, prior to any spontaneity and therefore prior to any synthesis. Not pure thought, but pure sense.

If I am correct, and the “synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general” (A176/B217) can be understood in terms of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, we can begin by accounting for the continuity of this particular intensive magnitude. First, let us consider aesthetic clarity, i.e., the degree of clarity of spatiotemporal representations. It is in fact not too difficult to realize that this magnitude must be continuous. Since space and time, as the form of these intuitions, are continuous, the aesthetic clarity of our representations will be able to be continuously diminished or augmented. The conscious differences I am able to perceive between my spatiotemporal representations will always lie on a continuum of ever more precise or ever less precise distinctions between the spatiotemporal regions involved. So in this case, at least, the intensive magnitude is continuous for the same reason that extensive magnitudes are continuous; because of the continuity of space and time.

As for logical clarity, that is, the degree of clarity of our conceptual representations, they must also be represented as continuous. Here we draw on Kant’s discussion in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, where he specifies the positive use of reason within theoretical philosophy. He there presents three subjectively necessary regulative principles:

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109 See §15 of the B Deduction for the important distinctions between the manifold, the combination of the manifold, and the unity of the manifold.
Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: 1. by a principle of **sameness of kind** in the manifold under higher genera, 2. by a principle of **variety** of what is same in kind under lower species; and in order to complete the systematic unity it adds 3. still another law of the **affinity** of all concepts, which offers a continuous transition from every species to every other through a graduated increase of varieties. We can call these principles of the **homogeneity**, **specification** and **continuity** of forms (A657-658/B685-686).

Together, these three principles forms a “systematic unity” (A658/B686). Fortunately, it is not necessary for our present purposes to enter into the much-debated status of these principles. For what we are after is the status of our conceptual **representations**, rather than the objects these representations subsume, and when it comes to these representations the adduced principles of reason are undoubtedly valid (this is what constitutes their subjective necessity).\(^{110}\) In other words, the principle of continuity of forms guarantees the continuity of the logical clarity of representations.\(^{111}\)

We have taken the first step towards explicating the ground for the principle of intensive magnitude. But we must now face the real problem, namely, the question of sensation in general. The degree of clarity of representations seem to be a very special kind of sensation, and one may wonder if anything like the strategy adopted here for accounting for the continuity of this sensation can be given for sensations in general. The degree of clarity of your representations is one thing, but how do you show that the sensation of, e.g., warmth, is a continuous magnitude? To investigate this problem we must first look more closely into what a sensation is.

\(^{110}\) This validity for the concepts of the understanding, as opposed to validity for the objects of experience, is expounded for instance in the following passage: “Thus the idea of reason is an analogue of a schema for sensibility, but with this difference, that the application of concepts of the understanding to the schema of reason is not likewise a cognition of the object itself (as in the application of the categories to their sensible schemata), but only a rule or principle of the systematic unity of all use of the understanding” (A665/B693). Their validity as “subjective principles” (A666/B694) can therefore be extended to the subjective representation of the degree of consciousness accompanying all concepts, but not to the objects these concepts subsume.

\(^{111}\) In the *Jäsche Logic*, Kant explicates the conditions of the “form of a system” as follows: “The distinctness of cognitions and their combination in a systematic whole depends on the distinctness of concepts both in regard to what is contained in them and in respect of what is contained under them.” (Kant, *Jäsche Logic*, §98, Ak 9:140; *Lectures on Logic*, 631). As we can see, the idea of reason embodied in the form of a system is the complete distinctness of concepts. This can, of course, only be a regulative principle, since complete distinctness is unattainable, as we saw in 4.2.
5.2 Causality and Sensation

In the Anticipations, Kant says the following about sensation: “Since sensation in itself is not an objective representation, and in it neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be encountered, it has, to be sure, no extensive magnitude, but yet it still has a magnitude” (B208). Earlier he describes it as “sensation, as merely subjective representation, by which one can only be conscious that the subject is affected, and which one relates to an object in general” (B207). What seems clear is that sensations are subjective representations, in which one is conscious that the subject is affected. As a side note, we see that the interpretation of inner sense I have given here is at an advantage in explaining why we call the determination of inner sense self-affection. If sensation is a representation “by which one can only be conscious that the subject is affected” (B207), then it seems that affection should involve sensation. Insofar as my account explicitly connects the self-affection of inner sense to a special kind of sensation, namely the degree of clarity of the representations, calling it self-affection seems perfectly appropriate. Kant’s first mention of sensation, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, seems to accord with what we have already said: “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation” (A19-20/B34). However, here Kant is talking about the effect of an object on us, i.e., Kant’s phrasing seems to imply that the sensation is the effect of an object, considered as cause. Insofar as thinking of the object as cause might be problematic when we are considering self-affection (where the object is the soul), we have to investigate just what relation causality has to sensation.

Fortunately, this problem overlaps with the problem we have already faced, namely: We can provide a justification (as I did in the previous chapter) for why the inner sensation of the degree of clarity is a continuous magnitude. But how is it possible to provide a similar justification for those sensations that are the direct effects of outer objects? It seems, thus,

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112 The interpretation given here is thus directly opposed to Collins’, who writes: “Kant says that the mind must affect itself in order that its representations be material for inner intuition. He also speaks of inner perception of the elements of the manifold of outer sense. However, if such talk were to be meaningful, if it could be taken literally, there would have to be another range of sensations generated when the mind affects itself. There is not. Kant gives no indication that he expects sensations beyond those connected with outer sensibility, that is, with the senses.” (Arthur W. Collins, Possible Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 113-114). Collins contends that the issue of sensation is where the parallelism between outer sense and inner sense breaks down; I, on my part, find that sensation is one of the important points where there indeed is a parallel (between outer affection and self-affection).
that it is the sensations involved directly in causality for which an account of their continuity is still lacking.

But first of all, we have to complicate our notion of sensation, since it must be admitted that what we have distinguished as inner sensation (the intensive magnitude of consciousness) and outer sensations (the effects of outer objects, i.e., sensations of color, warmth, sound, etc.) in fact cannot be completely separated. Phenomenologically speaking, we know that there is some relation between the intensive magnitude of consciousness and the perceived intensive magnitude of other sensations. The most obvious example is being unconscious: we presume that losing consciousness means losing (or at least strongly diminishing the intensive magnitude of) our outer sensations. It is moreover quite plausible to say that by acts of attention, we can augment or diminish the intensive magnitude of sensations (by changing focus, for instance). Kant, however, seems to go further: “A representation that is clear on the whole but not in respect of the parts is an indistinct representation. E.g. Blue and yellow make green, but with the green color we are not always conscious of these parts that lie within it[;] so too with concepts.”\(^{113}\) As we can see, the green color is here thought as a sensation as opposed to as a concept, and we must therefore conclude that Kant considers the sensation of green, insofar as one is not conscious of the blue and yellow that make it, to be an indistinct sensation.

And this is not a pre-critical idea, but one that recurs in the critical writings: In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant in two places (§14 and §51) discusses the theory of Euler: “That the colors are vibrations (pulsus) of the air immediately following one another, just as tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sound.”\(^{114}\) Kant’s question is whether some humans, at least, can be aware of this as a factor in their aesthetic judgment. After adducing evidence that this might be so, Kant says that if one takes this into account, “then one may see oneself as compelled to regard the sensations of both not as mere sensory impressions, but as the effect of a judging of the form in the play of many sensations.”\(^{115}\) In other words, the sensations (of colors and sounds) themselves must be seen as the effect of many

\(^{113}\) Kant, *The Vienna Logic*, Ak 28:841; *Lectures on Logic*, 296.

\(^{114}\) Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §14, Ak 5:224.

\(^{115}\) Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §51, Ak 5:325.
sensations. In fact, the picture Kant gives us of sensations is quite complex. For he also seems to assert that sensations can be “mere sensory impressions,” by which, in the case of colors and sounds at least, he seems to mean “the effect of these vibrations on the elastic parts of our body.” The implication of this is that not only the intensity but also the quality of sensations are affected by the intensive magnitude of our consciousness, e.g., the quality “color” is a result of our inability to distinctly perceive the vibrations of the air. In any case, it is obvious that Kant does not see sensations as simple qualia in the sense that modern philosophy might be inclined to do. The degree of clarity of our representations is the reason we see a simple green qualia instead of its blue and yellow parts, and the reason we see light as a simple sensory impression instead of the “play of many sensations,” as vibrations of the air. It should already be clear from our discussion of the intensive magnitude of consciousness that sensations are not in every sense, at least, without parts. But in the sensations we have considered here, it is not really clear whether they have parts, and if so, in what sense.

What this also means, however, is that we must refine the question we posed above. As we remember, our previous question was: What could possibly justify claiming that sensations resulting from being affected by objects (i.e., those that are not a degree of clarity of representations) are continuous magnitudes? But as we have now seen, a sensation might be caused by an outer object, but the sensation itself nevertheless has a degree of clarity (i.e., the sensation of green is an indistinct sensation of green and blue, and in the last instance perhaps the obscure representation of a play of many sensations, caused by vibrations in the air), and this necessitates a preliminary question: how can we first separate out that in the sensation which corresponds to an objective reality, to a feature of the object, rather than being a subjective “perspectival effect” caused by the degree of clarity of the representation? The real question, then, is this: how is it possible to objectively determine an intensive magnitude? And to this question, Kant, at least in his Reflexions, has a clear answer. He says that “one cannot say that warmth consists of warmnesses, one thus does not


117 For, as Kant says: “things like color, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject” (A29/B45).
determine its magnitude in accordance with the parts that it contains, but rather in accordance with the effects that it produces, e.g., that it causes a body to expand.\textsuperscript{118}

Here we find our discussion returning back to causality: A sensation can be determined to correspond to a feature of the object \textit{if} the sensation is found to be an \textit{effect} of this object upon our sensory organs. What I will propose is the following: In general, for the reality corresponding to sensation to be an objective feature it must be causal power.\textsuperscript{119} Moreover, the objective reality of the intensive magnitude is determined by the \textit{results} of this causality, i.e., by the “effects that it produces.” Intensive magnitudes, when they are causal powers, can be determined because they can then produce determinate effects, which is to say, they can produce determinate changes \textit{in extensive magnitudes}. In Kant’s example, the intensive magnitude of warmth can be determined in accordance with the expansion it causes in a body of mercury, i.e., by means of a thermometer. As Warren points out: “According to Kant, the part-whole structure characteristic of quantity is not to be found in an intensive magnitude, but rather in its consequences.”\textsuperscript{120} Thus, in the \textit{Metaphysik Volckmann}, Kant explains that: “The illuminating power of a wax light is intensively greater than that of a tallow light, for, with the first we would be able to read at a distance of 2 feet, but with the latter only at a distance of 1 foot.”\textsuperscript{121} My own interpretation adds two crucial points to this: first, that this only holds for the intensive magnitudes of objects; second, that this fact, in conjunction with the proof of the continuity of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, is what grounds Kant’s principle of intensive magnitude.\textsuperscript{122}

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\item \textsuperscript{118} Kant, R 5663, Ak 18:322; \textit{Notes and Fragments}, 291.
\item \textsuperscript{119} The account of intensive magnitudes as causal powers given here is strongly indebted to, while also in a sense being an inversion of, that given by Warren, in \textit{Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature}, ch. 1. Warren begins by assuming that sensations and their corresponding realities must be continuous magnitudes, goes on to exhibit the synthesis which allows for this continuity, and then finally shows that in order to be magnitudes “in the full sense,” i.e., additive, they must be thought of as causal powers. My approach proceeds by showing that sensations, in order to determine objective realities corresponding to them, must be thought of as corresponding to causal powers and this implies that they (both the sensations and the corresponding realities) must be continuous magnitudes. Of course, my account is only possible because I have already accounted for the role of \textit{non-objective} realities, and their continuity.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Warren, \textit{Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature}, 30.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Kant, \textit{Metaphysik Volckmann}, Ak 28:424-425; quoted from Warren, \textit{Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of Nature}, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Hegel, in the \textit{Science of Logic}, will claim that intensive and extensive magnitude are, in essence, identical: “Extensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same determinateness of quantum; they are only distinguished by the one having amount within itself and the other having amount outside itself.” (G. W. F. Hegel, \textit{Science of Logic} (London:
Through determination of causal power, we are also able to determine realities that only indirectly “correspond” to our sensations; for instance, magnetic matter: “Thus we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of attracted iron filings, although an immediate perception of this matter is impossible for us given the constitution of our organs” (A226/B273). In other words, the magnetic matter has no perceivable causal effect upon our sensory organs (Kant refers to the “crude” of our senses), but we determine its reality through the causal effects that it has on other bodies (iron).

An advantage of this interpretation is that it also provides a plausible account of one of the most problematic criteria for a theory of inner sense: the asymmetry of the immediacy/mediacy of time. As we remember, neither Allison nor Valaris gave a fully convincing account of this asymmetry. However, if we determine the objective features corresponding to our sensations by means of determining causal relations, thereby determining the intensive magnitudes as causal powers, this should also explain why time is the immediate condition of our inner intuitions, and the mediate condition of outer appearances. Our inner intuitions are immediately encountered in relations of succession. Now causality, and the categories of relation generally, are schematized as “rule[s] of time-determination” for “the relation of perceptions among themselves to all time” (A145/B184). But the categories of relation are also said to deal with the “existence of appearances” (A178/B221). And this dual significance of the principles given in the Analogies of Experience – they give rules for the connection of perceptions; and they concern the existence of appearances – is the key to understanding why outer appearances are mediately temporal.

Routledge, 1969), §481. He goes on to give examples of this identity; one of them is the one we have considered here: “Again, heat has a degree; this degree, whether it be the tenth, twentieth and so on, is a simple sensation, something subjective. But this degree is equally present as an extensive magnitude, as the expansion of a fluid, of mercury in a thermometer, of air, of sound and so on. A higher degree of temperature expresses itself as a longer column of mercury, or as a narrower sound cylinder; it heats a larger space in the same way as a lower degree heats a smaller space.” (Hegel, Science of Logic, §489). But most interestingly, he then proceeds to §492, a “Remark 2: The determination of degree as applied by Kant to the soul,” i.e., a comment on the passage from the Refutation of Mendelssohn we have already considered. Hegel agrees says, against Kant, that with regard to the soul: “Its intensity is wholly different from that of intensive quantum; indeed, its intensity is such that in it the form of merely immediate being and all its categories are sublated. What should have been admitted was the elimination not only of the category of extensive quantum but that of quantum altogether.” (Hegel, Science of Logic, §492.) I affirm, to the contrary, that the case of consciousness is precisely where the identity of extensive and intensive magnitude breaks down, because consciousness is only determinable as an intensive magnitude.
What happens is that the immediately temporal, successive, inner perceptions give rise to the cognition of objective causal powers by determining the existence of objects in time, objects having the objective realities to which the sensations correspond. Only by reference to outer objects persisting in time and having causal powers can we determine intensive magnitudes, and the immediately temporal and indeterminately intensive inner intuitions therefore give rise to mediately temporal and determinately intensive outer objects of experience.\footnote{Without entering into the difficult discussion regarding Kant’s distinction between “judgments of perception” and “judgments of experience” in the Prolegomena, it seems plausible that the present point could be couched in terms amenable to that distinction. However, this would also mean, as section 5.3 will indicate, that judgments of perception in general presupposes judgments of experience in general. For an interesting and challenging account of the distinction, see Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, ch. 7.} This is a crucial point: The temporality of our perceptions is immediate, as we have seen in section 4.2 on transcendental motion. On the basis of (i.e., mediated through) these subjective perceptions, we are able to affirm the existence of appearances, as objects, by connecting the perceptions according to rules. And these rules are rules for determining objective time-relations: “Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. We can therefore never determine from this alone whether this manifold, as object of experience, is simultaneous or successive”\footnote{A182/B225, emphasis mine.}.

It is not so strange, therefore, that Kant distinguishes “mathematical” from “dynamical” principles: “In the application of the pure concepts of understanding to possible experience the use of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical: for it pertains partly merely to the intuition, partly to the existence of an appearance in general”\footnote{A160/B199.} (A160/B199). We can recognize the distinction between intuition and the existence of an appearance from the passage concerning time, where time is said to be: “the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances”\footnote{A34/B50-51, emphasis mine.} (A34/B50-51, emphasis mine).

This account might seem to invite the following conclusion: that what we experience are primarily inner perceptions, and only mediately outer, empirical objects. However, such a conclusion would be premature. For we must remember that there are two distinct cases of an asymmetry with regard to mediacy and immediacy: the asymmetry with regard to time should be kept separate from the asymmetry with regard to experience. In terms of the
asymmetries between inner and outer sense we listed in 2.1.1, we have now accounted for all but the last of them. That is to say, we have explained how the inner manifold is dependent upon the outer manifold, and how the outer temporality is dependent upon the inner temporality, but we have not yet said anything about how inner experience is dependent upon outer experience. To this final task we now turn.

5.3 Inner Experience

What, exactly, is inner experience? In his interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism, which bases its argument on such inner experience, Allison distinguishes between two possible readings of what inner experience involves: “One, which we shall term a “thick” conception of empirical self-knowledge, takes the premise to be that the self has some knowledge of its past mental states,”\(^\text{124}\) meaning that the self has knowledge of its own history, i.e., through veridical memory. He continues:

> The alternative reading of the premise in question opts for a relatively “thin” conception of empirical self-knowledge. Rather than assuming that a consciousness of one’s existence as determined in time includes a knowledge of one’s past and, therefore, involves a reliance on memory, it limits this knowledge to the contents of one’s current mental state.\(^\text{125}\)

The way Allison frames the alternatives, the choice is thus between a diachronic knowledge of one’s past, and a synchronic knowledge of one’s act of recollecting of the past (whether veridical or not). In any case, the knowledge involved is the knowledge of one’s mental states, either historically or just in the present.

The definition of inner experience is important for the Refutation of Idealism because it needs to fulfil two criteria: on the one hand, it must be something that his Cartesian opponent accepts, so as not to beg the question. On the other hand, it must be something that will, together with the other premises, lead to the desired conclusion: that inner experience presupposes outer experience. The problem with the “thick” reading is that a Cartesian philosopher may not accept a premise based upon knowledge of one’s past mental history

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\(^{124}\) Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 289.

\(^{125}\) Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 290.
(since the evil demon might have distorted all your memory, or simply created a totally false one). The “thin” reading fares much better; note that it still requires, however, a conscious memory of a past mental state (however false that memory might be). Allison exemplifies the virtue of the “thin” conception by imagining someone who has just been created by an evil demon, with false memories and beliefs about his past existence; in this case, the “thin” conception still works. In any case, the interpretation of inner sense that I have given in this thesis has also proposed a new interpretation of what an “inner state” is (the degree of clarity of representations), and thus might also give us a new conception of inner experience. My suggested reading for what “inner experience” in the argument of the Refutation of Idealism consists in is thus: being conscious of any determinate inner intuition. Now clearly this premise is something the Cartesian opponent would not object to; indeed, it seems to go straight to the first step taken after the “I am thinking” has been established: clear and distinct ideas. In other words: what is known when I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time is simply any synchronic consciousness of something determinate. Against this interpretation, on may ask: How can this be consistent with Kant’s insistence that I am “conscious of my existence as determined in time” (B275, emphasis mine)? Is this not clearly a reference to diachronicity? To this question I would answer that my argument assumes that Kant refers to a determinate filling of time, i.e., a determinate degree of a determinate reality at a moment in time. I take Kant’s point to be that a determinate filling of time, i.e., determinate mental content, requires and therefore presupposes a reference to the causal time-determination of things existing outside of and (empirically) independently of us, in space. In other words: If, for instance, the “I think,” and thus the indeterminate perception grounding it (B422-423n.), is to be determined, then this determination must happen in time. But this presupposes a determination in space. For the possibility of determining this indeterminate perception depends upon a causal time-determination, and

126 What about, e.g., a case of total amnesia? If it is possible that such a case can involve no memories of past mental states, would it not then be possible for such a subject to have inner experience (of what he/she is sensing at that present moment) without outer experience?

127 Longuenesse points out the necessity of the categories of relation for determining the sensible matter, here with reference to limitation and community, the third category of quality and relation, respectively: “Now the logical form of disjunctive judgment and the universal community of substances are nothing other than the determination of what remained indeterminate in the infinite judgment and the spatiotemporal totum realitatis providing it with its sensible matter. (...) the reflection of a dynamical relation of reciprocal causality is the relation by means of which the intuitively given reciprocal limitation of realities in space and time can be determined, quantitatively and qualitatively. (Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 387.)
any such causal determination relies upon (as shown in the First Analogy) a reference to a permanent substance, and this permanency can only be found in space. This reading should allow us to counter Longuenesse’s problem concerning the Refutation. After presenting her reading of it, she asserts that: “the most his new Refutation of Idealism seems to be establishing is that in my consciousness there is a necessary distinction between objects of inner sense and objects of outer sense, and the latter are just as immediately present as the former, indeed are a condition for the determinate consciousness of the former.” In other words, whereas Kant arguably succeeds in arguing for “the existence of a thing outside me, and not just of my representation of the existence of a thing outside me,” Longuenesse argues that this is still valid only within consciousness. On the basis of the interpretation given in this thesis, however, we can see that this must be mistaken. For it is exactly by reference to what is distinct from consciousness, and its intensive magnitude, that it is possible to determine any intensive magnitude. That is, the entire procedure is aimed at distinguishing the “effect” consciousness and its degree of clarity has on sensation from the effects of the objective realities that correspond to its sensations.

Still, the question might be asked: if this is the case, then does it even make sense to talk about inner experience? If experience is only possible as experience of causal powers and causal relations, how can we conclude that inner experience presupposes outer experience? Should we not rather say that outer experience is the only experience possible for us? If inner experience is possible for Kant, as far as I can see, then it has to be indirect and mediated through outer experience in a strong sense. For the intensive magnitude of consciousness can only be determined indirectly by measuring it against already determined outer experience. For example, the fact that we experience the world in colors tells us something about ourselves – on the condition that we know the causal processes involved, and are therefore able to see indirectly how our mental powers contribute to the representation that we perceive. Similarly, by knowing that the causal impressions remain fairly constant we can get an idea of how much an act of attention contributes to the degree of clarity of a specific representation, and thus obtain some information concerning the intensive magnitude of our


129 Longuenesse, “Kant versus Descartes,” 29.
mental powers. In other words, it is only by first knowing something about what the world is like that we have any chance of determining our particular point of view with regard to it. Knowledge of your own body is of course essential to such an experiential process, because we need to know the capabilities of our sensory organs in order to understand the contribution our own mental powers make to the state of our representations.

I do not intend to say that the question of the temporal order of our mental states is irrelevant to an interpretation of Kant on inner experience. But I do believe that this issue must at least be considered concomitant with the question of determining our mental content in the first place, which is what I have discussed here. It seems to me that this determining is the crucial factor with respect to inner experience and the Refutation of Idealism.
6. Conclusion

The most fundamental move, the key idea, of the present thesis has been to connect the determination of inner sense with the degree of clarity of our representations. The bulk of the thesis has therefore been dedicated to displaying and arguing for its plausibility and explanatory power. To take stock of the interpretation, let us therefore list the main results that point in its favour, as they have been brought up in the course of the investigation:

First of all, Kant refers to inner sense as the source of inspiration for the inner state of Leibniz’ monads. The inner state of the monads is most felicitously described as a point of view, constituted by the distribution of clarity and distinctness over their representations. This suggests that the same should be the case for inner sense. And in fact, we already found that a unified interpretation of inner sense could promisingly begin from the idea of a point of view, though this point of view should not be a spatial location. The distribution of clarity and distinctness over our representations fulfil these requirements: it constitutes a non-spatial point of view.

As section 3.1 has shown, Kant has a theory of the clarity and distinctness of representations. Despite first appearances, one cannot doubt that they are included within his critical framework, and constitute an important background for his philosophy. This is of course a prerequisite for my interpretation of inner sense. But given this, it also seems legitimate to ask: How would we be given these qualitative features of our representations if not through our inner sense?

In 3.2, I suggested that my reading is supported by the footnote where Kant explicitly connects the intensive magnitude of consciousness with the clarity of representations. Since the intensive magnitude of consciousness seems to qualify as an “intuition of our self and our inner state” (A33/B49), it must be given through inner sense. This implies that the intensive magnitude of consciousness is what corresponds to the sensation of a degree of clarity.

Furthermore, Kant points to “attention” as an example of self-affection, which implies that an act of attention determines inner sense. It is plausible, both from an intuitive and from an exegetical point of view, to conceive of attention as a modification of the degree of clarity of representations.
More generally, I have attempted to use these results in outlining a unified interpretation of inner sense. The grounding idea is that inner sense is a condition of experience, because experience requires the action of describing what affects us from outside. It is necessary to perceive distinctions – without the ability to perceive distinctions one can hardly even be said to be alive. This basic ability to describe by making distinctions in what we are given was identified as transcendental motion. On this basis our inner point of view on the world is constituted: As the distribution of degrees of clarity of our representations, the differentiations we are able to perceive in the world. But experience as we know it is only possible through judgment, and this judgment must involve a reference to objective states, states of objects existing in space. The analysis of causality and experience given in the final sections of the thesis aimed to sketch how this can be conceived. The immediately temporal sensible discriminations determined through transcendental motion are not yet determined by concepts: they do not figure as a part of our knowledge. The determination by means of concepts aims to extract the objective feature of our immediate perceptions through causal judgments. And it is only on the basis of such an extraction that one can estimate the subjective contribution, and thereby attain inner experience.

As I mentioned in the introduction, the thesis is not a complete explication of the role of inner sense in Kant’s philosophy, or in the Critique for that matter. My aim was to present a framework which could make this explication possible: Toward this aim, I have attempted to show, or at least indicate, how my interpretation can account for all six criteria listed in 2.1.2. Yet it is quite obvious that there is more to be said concerning each of them. To return to the very beginning of the thesis, it must be admitted that we have not yet passed beyond the state of affairs recounted by Van Cleve and Allison: the full nature of Kant’s theories of time and self-knowledge remains obscure. Nevertheless, I hope to have helped bring some of the resources inherent in Kant’s system out of obscurity and into the open. If the suggested framework is not completely off the mark, then further investigation should prove fruitful.
References


