From Syntheses to Ecstases:
Heidegger’s Appropriation of Kant

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Abstract

Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 1929) can be seen as an attempt to force on Kant Heidegger’s own doctrine of fundamental ontology as it was expounded through the analysis of human being insofar as it is unique, the so-called ‘Dasein’ of *Being and Time* (1927). ‘Fundamental ontology’ was Heidegger’s attempt to explicate the nature of being through the examination of Dasein’s relationship to its own temporality. Shortly after the publication of his book on Kant Heidegger renounced the possibility of gaining an ultimate understanding of being against the horizon of time. Since Heidegger himself abandoned the project of fundamental ontology, the object of the present investigation is not primarily an attempt to criticize Heidegger’s interpretation. Rather, I try to show that Heidegger’s analysis of the two core aspects of fundamental ontology, that I call ontological and intellectual finitude, constitutes a lasting acquisition for philosophy regardless of whether or not one chooses to adopt fundamental ontology. I argue that the conjunction of ontological and intellectual finitude grants a portrait of the philosopher as what Heidegger calls ‘authentic Dasein’, and thereby gives a valuable interpretation of the nature of philosophy itself as human activity.
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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. FROM TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS TO FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 A DOUBLE SHIFT WITHIN METAPHYSICS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 TRADITIONAL WESTERN METAPHYSICS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 DIRECT CRITICISM OF METHODOLOGY IN TRADITIONAL METAPHYSICS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 SUBDIVISIONS OF METAPHYSICS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO IN HUSSERL</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 THE TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT REVEALED IN FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FROM BEING-UNTO-DEATH TO INTELLECTUAL FINITUDE</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 ONTOLOGICAL AND INTELLECTUAL FINITUDE</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 FROM BEING TO MAN</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 DASEIN AND THE FORGETFULLNESS OF BEING</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 THE UNITY OF THE ECSTASES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 MAN’S INTELLECTUAL FINITUDE</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 FINITUDE IN THE KANTBUCH</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 HEIDEGGER’S THEORY OF OBJECTIFICATION</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 OBJECTIFICATION AND TRANSCENDENCE</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SYNTHESIS AND TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1 Transcendental Imagination in Kant’s Critique ........................................... 63
4.2 Theory of Knowledge and Possibility of Knowledge ....................................... 71
4.3 The Disagreement over Transcendence ........................................................... 73
4.4 Synthesis and Time .......................................................................................... 76
4.5 Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Kantian Concept of Synthesis ....................... 79
4.6 The Unity of the Three Syntheses ..................................................................... 82
4.7 Ecstasy and Transcendence ............................................................................ 93

5. Philosophy as Attention and Loneliness ............................................................ 96

References .............................................................................................................. 101
1. Introduction

When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search.¹

The early Heidegger considers the essence of human nature to be its temporality. More precisely, he sees man as defined by his relation to his own finitude. The revelation of man’s essential finitude (Endlichkeit) constitutes the central thesis of Heidegger’s unfinished magnum opus, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927). This analysis of the unique human mode of being, the so-called ‘Dasein’, constitutes what Heidegger calls a ‘fundamental ontology’²: a grounding of ontology. Since, according to Heidegger, general ontology precedes the regional ontologies of the respective empirical sciences, which in turn precede these sciences themselves, fundamental ontology forms the basis of human knowledge. ‘Human knowledge’ is here to be understood as both a subjective and objective genitive. Understanding what and how human beings know identifies with grasping human essence. This is because, for Heidegger, human being always extends beyond itself, into that which is known. Human beings are ‘being-there’ or ‘being-here’ (Da-sein); they always exist in a world, amongst other beings, and are not to be understood as entirely distinct from this world. Dasein is, however, differentiated from other beings in that ‘Being is an issue for it’³. The finitude Heidegger believes to be essential to Dasein regards its realization of and relationship to its own mortality. I will call Dasein’s relationship to its own mortality ‘ontological finitude’.

As an extension of his investigation into fundamental ontology, Heidegger published in 1929 the decisive⁴ account of his encounter with Kant, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik). As illustrated in the quote above, Heidegger

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¹ Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 292.

² Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1962), 34.

³ Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.

⁴ Although Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in the form of a course, forms a gentler introduction.
claimed to find ‘confirmation of the accuracy’ of his fundamental ontology in his reading of Kant. The finitude illuminated by Heidegger’s encounter with Kant takes a slightly different shape than that of ontological finitude. I have chosen to call it ‘intellectual’. These two kinds of finitude provide two complementary perspectives from which fundamental ontology can be studied.

Heidegger himself turned away from fundamental ontology not long after publishing his book on Kant, renouncing the idea of founding metaphysics explicitly on temporality. Before this turn he interpreted Kant as being of utmost importance to philosophy because of his (albeit aborted) insight into the essential temporality of man. The presupposition that the Critique constitutes an instauration of metaphysics is, for Heidegger, based on this insight that he perceives in Kant. If Kant was on the path leading to the elaboration of a fundamental ontology, then his project would harmonize with Heidegger’s. Fundamental ontology constitutes for Heidegger a phenomenological analysis of Dasein, of man insofar as being is an issue for him. Kant never explicitly conducted a similar analysis, but Heidegger believes he can show through his interpretation that this was in fact his initial intention. When Heidegger subsequently abandons temporality as the foundation of metaphysics, we can wonder if he thereby also abandons the validity of his interpretation of Kant. In that case seeking to refute it seems somewhat pointless.

Such an approach would take the shape of a criticism of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant as being primarily instrumental to his own project of demonstrating the fecundity of fundamental ontology, such as for instance Cassirer broached at the time. It seems to me that a more generally interesting continuation of the investigation is to examine what was gained as regards the study of man and philosophy by the contrast of intellectual finitude, as Heidegger gleans it from Kant, with the ontological finitude of Being and Time. The purpose of my investigation is therefore to compare and elucidate the relationship between ontological and intellectual finitude. I suggest that what Heidegger calls ‘authentic Dasein’ can be interpreted as a portrait of the philosopher, and that this portrait serves to elucidate the

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5 ‘Die Kehre’, Heidegger’s ’turn’, dates from the 1930s.

6 See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) appendix 2, ‘Davos Disputation Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger’.
nature of philosophy itself. Since the ‘nature of philosophy’ is fluid and pluralistic, conforming to the shape of its current interpreter, Heidegger’s vision of philosophy enriches the tradition. A comprehension of the core structures of ontological and intellectual finitude must be in place before one can argue for the lasting positive value of fundamental ontology. First order of business, however, is the justification for having chosen these two terms in the first place.

Since ‘ontological finitude’ refers to the results of the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time, it could be objected that a more fitting term would be ‘fundamental ontological finitude’. However, I believe that the intellectual finitude that Heidegger finds in Kant constitutes an aspect of fundamental ontology that must be conceptually distinguished from ontological finitude. Within traditional metaphysics, ‘intellectual finitude’ is understood as the lacuna attributed to our human intellect as derived intuition (intuitus derivativus), contrasting with the omniscient, creative, divine intellect of original intuition (intuitus originarius). Such an intellect creates the things it represents simply by intuiting them. This is the case of the Judeo-Christian god in the book of Genesis, for instance, and obviously not the case for human beings. According to Heidegger, this tendency to divide entities into two groups, into the one creative and the many created, pervades traditional metaphysics. Heidegger believes that Kant was the first to veer substantially away from this scheme in that he sought to ground metaphysics on human finitude, rather than on the eternal uncreated being.

Ontological and intellectual finitude must be distinguished from each other for several reasons to be further developed below. The immediate reason is that the respective projects of Kant and Heidegger are, ostensibly, far from identical. Kant’s central question in the Critique of Pure Reason is, ‘how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ Interpreting what ‘synthetic judgments a priori’ are forms a considerable part of Heidegger’s appropriation. For Kant, synthetic judgments a priori are concerned with the possibility of knowledge. For Heidegger, this is fundamentally a question regarding the nature of Dasein,

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7 Traditional metaphysics, for Heidegger, runs from Aristotle to Kant. The Latin designations date from the medieval Christian appropriation of Aristotle.

8 See for instance Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B145: ‘…as, say, a divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced…’
because it is only when we understand Dasein, the investigating subject, that that which it investigates can be known. It is for this reason that he refuses the idea of interpreting the *Critique* as a work of epistemology. Another way of looking at it is to consider that for Heidegger, the question of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori* is the question of the possibility of ontological knowledge – the knowledge of being. Since human being extends outside of itself, into that which Dasein knows, learning about how these things are known ultimately teaches us about Dasein, and vice versa.

My comparison of ontological with intellectual finitude centers around what I see as the parallel functions of the ecstases\(^9\) of ontological finitude and the syntheses\(^10\) of intellectual finitude. Regarding ontological finitude, I perceive Heidegger’s theory of the unity of the temporal ecstases to be its central tenet. ‘Ecstasis’ is to be taken in its strict etymological sense, *ekstasis* (from *ekshistémi*, ‘I displace’), rather than in its derived sense of ecstasy as a kind of religious or psychological rapture. There are three temporal ecstases to Dasein, altering the traditional scheme of future, present, and past. The latter constitutes for Heidegger the derived, vulgar\(^11\) understanding of time, and he seeks to replace it with three ecstases that yield, in concert, the original unity of time. The ecstasis of the future retains its name, but Heidegger imbues it with the significance of Dasein’s ownmost possibility – that of its future death. Since Dasein is defined in its temporality by its relationship to its death, the future enjoys a primacy over the two other ecstases.

The unity of the three temporal ecstases of ontological finitude finds complementary expression in the threefold synthesis (of apprehension, recognition and reproduction) that Kant holds (in the A-edition of the *Critique*) to be essential to knowledge.\(^12\) The comparison of the ecstases and syntheses permits a synoptic appraisal of the cores of ontological and intellectual finitude.

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\(^10\) Kant, *KrV*, A97.

\(^11\) Vulgär in German. The English translation of *Being and Time* has adopted ‘ordinary’, but ‘vulgar’ retains more of the idea of derivation.

\(^12\) Kant, *KrV*, A97.
The structure of the present investigation is thus as follows. In the chapter following this introduction I examine the passage from traditional metaphysics to Kant, in order to demonstrate the backdrop against which Heidegger’s conception of ontological finitude takes shape. This history is viewed largely from Heidegger’s perspective, since this is important to understanding what he meant his own metaphysics to contrast with. Special attention is given to the examination of the so-called transcendental subject and transcendental ego presented, respectively, by Kant and Husserl. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein is, in my opinion, best read against these two forerunners. In the third chapter I pass to the examination of the structures of ontological finitude, and then to intellectual finitude as I believe it is grounded in ontological finitude. In the fourth chapter I juxtapose the two in the comparison of the temporal ecstases with the syntheses of knowledge. Having thus explicated Heidegger’s interpretation in the light of the relationship between syntheses and ecstases, I proceed in the fifth chapter to analyze the positive gains I see resulting from the activity and method of the interpretation.
2. From Traditional Metaphysics to Fundamental Ontology

2.1 A double shift within metaphysics

Determining what ‘metaphysics’ means to Heidegger is no mean feat. This is not due to any avoidance of the matter on Heidegger’s part, the modern giant champion of being. By conventional definition and etymology, ontology is concerned with being. By heideggerian definition, philosophy is identified with metaphysics and fundamental ontology is the center of philosophy. Heidegger is everywhere and always concerned with metaphysics, but his paths are many and divergent. What concerns us here, however, is the relationship between his own conception of metaphysics and that of Kant, at a certain time in the development of Heidegger’s thought. In the years of 1927-1929, i.e. between the publication of Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger was occupied with the elaboration of his fundamental ontology. His reading of the Critique of Pure Reason was undoubtedly instrumental to this project. Heidegger has been criticized for his selective attention to certain parts of the work, and this is due to his motivation for finding justification for his own fundamental ontology in the thought of Kant. This selective focus, however, makes it easier to grasp something of Heidegger’s conception of metaphysics at a given time.

For Heidegger, finitude (Endlichkeit) is the center of fundamental ontology. Finitude can thus be said to constitute a sort of epicenter of metaphysics, and therefore of philosophy. Placing finitude at the center of ontology constitutes a radical break with what Heidegger calls ‘Western metaphysics’. This is not difficult to justify based on the historical view Heidegger offers of the metaphysical tradition he considers as inherited by Kant. As we will see, metaphysics from Aristotle and up through the scholastic tradition has been based on the unquestioned infinite being postulated prior to all other beings that have their essence in this

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13 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 8.

14 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 27.
first being. This is unacceptable to Heidegger, for whom this tendency springs from the traditional ‘onto-theological nature of metaphysics’. One cannot ground all beings on an uncritically posited original being from which all other beings flow, be that an aristotelian prime mover or a semitic god appropriated by religious philosophers that spouts creations ex nihilo. Ontology is in need of an entirely new grounding. This is where the *Critique of Pure Reason* enters the scene. According to Heidegger, Kant was responsible for a radical innovation in philosophy, attempting something hitherto unheard of in Western metaphysics.

Before Heidegger can begin his exposition of fundamental ontology as he maintains it is revealed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he must explain the nature of Kant’s pre-critical dogmatic slumber. In other words he must describe the metaphysics inherited by Kant, and therefore what metaphysics means to Kant. Roughly, under the influence of Christian tradition, Western metaphysics has since the days of Plato and Aristotle come to be the science of the supersensible. Besides ontology, there are three definite disciplines of metaphysics dealing with the spheres of the supersensible. As their Latin appellations indicate, these traditions are inherited from scholastic philosophy. Heidegger finds them inadequate because they spring from the traditional onto-theological conception of metaphysics. An important aspect of onto-theology in light of Heidegger’s analysis of the subjectivity of the subject is the position of man. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, Adam (‘man’ in Hebrew) was granted the rule of God’s earth, and man’s soul was promised eternal life. Within metaphysics, man’s unique status and the eternity of his soul transmuted into the understanding of man as an absolute subject.

Accordingly, the first shift I will examine in this chapter is the one Heidegger illustrates as occurring from somnambulant traditional Western metaphysics to Kant’s critical philosophy. The second is the shift from Kant to Heidegger concerning the perspective on metaphysics. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant has not met with unanimous consensus from his peers. Neither was Heidegger expecting this. His interpretation was in part a reaction against the

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16 As Heidegger quotes from Baumgarten, the traditional subdivisions of metaphysics are ‘ontologia, cosmologia, psychologia et theologia naturalis’ (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 3).

‘neo-Kantians’ he accused of interpreting Kant’s most important work in a one-sided manner, as a work of epistemology. This is all very well, but the common charge mentioned above as made against Heidegger, namely, that his reading of Kant is overly selective and instrumental, is not unfounded. His own thesis of fundamental ontology is revealed in the Critique, he maintains, to the reader who is prepared to understand Kant better than he understood himself. Such a way of dealing with a philosopher is done in the spirit of Kant, as Heidegger explains in the beginning of his interpretation\(^\text{18}\). This is an interesting idea, and difficult to falsify. It shows that Heidegger was expecting refutation.

Kant and Heidegger classify metaphysics into subdivisions, and although they overlap, their classifications are not identical. Heidegger’s appropriation is done in a subtle manner, often rephrasing ideas from Kant or others in his own idiosyncratic terminology. An example of this occurs early on in the interpretation, where Heidegger is presenting the formal classification of scholastic metaphysics and the place of rational psychology within it. This discipline is particularly interesting within the framework of a fundamental ontology, which is based on man. I will therefore examine this example towards the end of this chapter. It is a good place to begin the exploration of fundamental ontology, the basic structures of which will be elucidated in the following chapter.

2.2 Traditional western metaphysics

Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics both begin with a brief outline of the tradition of metaphysics inherited by Kant. In addition to providing the background for the comprehension of the systems of metaphysics Kant sought to guard against by means of the transcendental dialectic, this historical review is also crucial to understanding the background to Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology. The latter contrasts with the onto-theology that had come to dominate metaphysics under the potent influence of the Christian tradition. Since

\(^{18}\) Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 2. Heidegger here quotes Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KrV), B370/A314, where the latter refers to Plato, saying that it is ‘by no means unusual…to find that we understand [an author] better than he understood himself, in that he has not sufficiently determined his concept and therefore has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention’.
this historical introduction is important to understanding metaphysics as it figures in both
Kant and Heidegger I will examine the two versions of this beginning in some detail.

For a definition of metaphysics, Heidegger chooses two phrases by Baumgarten that are well
suited to his purposes. The first runs as follows: ‘Metaphysica est scientia prima cognitionis
humanae principia continens’.\(^{19}\) Heidegger then states: ‘Metaphysics is a science of the
principles of beings, not the principles of knowledge’. This apparent non sequitur is justified
by the second phrase: ‘Ad metaphysicam referentur ontologia, cosmologia, psychologia et
theologia naturalis’.\(^{20}\) In Heidegger’s appropriation of Baumgarten, metaphysics is equated
with ontology while epistemology is rendered redundant, at least as far as the realm of
metaphysics is concerned. Heidegger tells us that Kant held his lectures on metaphysics ‘in
accord with the compendium of Baumgarten’.\(^{21}\) Kant’s conception of metaphysics, then,
must accord more or less with Heidegger’s own.

Heidegger quotes the same pair of phrases in the first paragraph of *Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics*, where he relates essentially the same genealogy for Kant’s metaphysics. He
draws our attention to ‘a peculiar and at first a necessary ambiguity’ lurking in this concept
of ‘first principles’\(^{22}\). Heidegger traces this ambiguity back to the genesis of the term
‘metaphysics’ itself in the classification of Aristotle’s works. *Meta ta phusika* literally
designated the aristotelian treatises following those of the *Physics*. That the elusive subject of
metaphysics subsequently came to embrace questions and problems resembling those
broached by Aristotle in these treatises is not accidental, Heidegger explains. These treatises
were, in fact, difficult to classify other than in a formal manner. The *prôté philosophia* of
Aristotle is ‘both “knowledge of being as beings” (‘*on hé on’*) and also knowledge of the
most remarkable region of beings (*timiótaton genos*) out of which the being as a whole

Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 10). Translation: Metaphysics is the science containing the
first principles of human knowledge.

\(^{20}\) Baumgarten, A.G., 1743, paragraph 2 (quoted in Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason*,10). Translation: To metaphysics refer ontology, cosmology, psychology and natural
theology.


\(^{22}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 3.
(katholou) determines itself23. This ‘doubling’ of ontology did not begin with Aristotle, but rather has ‘prevailed since the beginnings of ancient philosophy.’24

After Aristotle, Heidegger maintains, the prevailing tendency is rather ignorance of the openness in which Plato and Aristotle left the problems of being25. Heidegger tells of two trends that have shaped metaphysics since the age of these Greeks. The consequence of this determination has been to ‘increasingly [hinder] the possibility that the original problematic can be taken up once again’26. One tendency is the monopolization of metaphysics by the Christian tradition, which essentially categorizes beings into the one uncreated and the many created, where man enjoys a special status as absolute subject insofar as he is his creator’s favorite child. It is this tradition that has resulted in the scholastic division cited from Baumgarten above. Rational cosmology was the study of the world created by God. Rational psychology was the study of the human soul as an entity susceptible to being saved by God. Rational theology concerned itself with the investigation of the nature of God by reason as opposed to revelation. This tripartite division is thus seen to be part and parcel of a Christian worldview.

The second tendency that has formed metaphysics since Aristotle ‘concerns its type of knowledge and its method’27. Metaphysics is considered to be the ‘queen of the sciences’ because its object is being in general. Befitting its rank, its method must be the one that is considered to be the most honorable. The most honorable method is that deployed by mathematics, because it is the most rigorous. Such rigor is an ‘appropriate ideal’ for metaphysics: ‘It is rational in the highest sense and a priori because it is independent of chance experiences, i.e., it is pure science of reason’28.

23 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5.
24 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5.
25 This is an echo of the exordium of Being and Time, where Heidegger laments the forgetfulness into which we have fallen since the times of Plato and Aristotle (Heidegger, Being and Time, 21).
26 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5.
27 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 6.
28 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 6.
Obviously dissatisfied with these two tendencies, Heidegger will launch a double criticism of the fallacies inherent in them as well as developing his own fundamental ontology, aided by Kant. Before examining the structures of this fundamental ontology as it takes shape in an interpretation of Kant’s most important work, it is helpful to examine more direct criticism of these two tendencies. The genesis of fundamental ontology is the result of the critical reactions they inspire in Heidegger.

2.3 Direct criticism of methodology in traditional metaphysics

The first charge Heidegger brings against traditional metaphysics is that it takes the form of an onto-theo-logy\(^{29}\). It perceives metaphysics as the enterprise of the thinking of the whole of being, as grounded upon an absolute, infinite being, a first cause, \textit{causa prima, causa sui, ultima ratio}.\(^{30}\) Heidegger shares his depreciative view of onto-theology with Husserl\(^{31}\). Concerning Kant, he famously refuted the ontological argument for God’s existence in the Transcendental Dialectic of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. Rational theology cannot demonstrate the existence of God, because being is not a real predicate\(^{32}\). We can believe in God, but not prove his existence in his absence. Since the idea of such a proof is misguided, we can learn nothing of the being that actually presents itself to our understanding from rational theology, or onto-theo-logy. In other words, no fruitful metaphysics can emerge when philosophy is relegated to the role of theology’s handmaiden. The fact that being presents itself to us is, rather, a consequence of our own unique position as regards the understanding of being. I will discuss this in more detail when examining the mechanics of objectification. For the moment, suffice it to say that the approach of fundamental ontology,

\(^{29}\) Heidegger, \textit{Identity and Difference}, 54.

\(^{30}\) Heidegger, \textit{Identity and Difference}, 60.

\(^{31}\) For both Husserl and Heidegger, ‘one cannot explain the being of worldly being by another being of the same kind but of a superior level, which would be God’ (Jacques Rivelaygue, \textit{Lecons de métaphysique allemande} (Paris: Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1993), 360. My translation).

\(^{32}\) Kant, \textit{KrV}, A598/B626: ‘Anything one likes can serve as a \textbf{logical predicate}, even the subject can be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from every content. But the \textbf{determination} is a predicate, which goes beyond the concept and subject and enlarges it…Being is obviously not a real predicate…’
in placing finitude at its center, is more or less diametrically opposed to the traditional onto-
theology, centered around an infinite being.

Concerning the methodological rigor demanded of metaphysics, Heidegger considers this to
be grounded on a fallacy. He explains his views succinctly on the matter in the lecture
entitled What Is Metaphysics?  

The fields of the sciences lie far apart. Their methodologies are fundamentally different…No one methodology
is superior to another. Mathematical knowledge is no stricter than philological or historical knowledge. It has
merely the characteristic of ‘exactness’, which is not to be identified with strictness. To demand exactitude of
history would be to offend against the idea of the kind of strictness that pertains to the humanistic sciences.

For Heidegger, mathematical methodology is unsuited to the ‘humanistic sciences’, and a
fortiori to the shaping of ontology. Heidegger concedes, however, a certain role to
‘mathematical natural science’ in giving an ‘indication of this fundamental connection
between ontic experience and ontological knowledge’, but

its function for the laying of the ground for metaphysics exhausts itself therein, for the reference to this
conditional connection is not yet the solution to the problem. It is rather only a statement of the direction in
which it, to be understood in its more fundamental universality, must first be sought.

In question here, obviously, is Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology, and not ontology in
general. Since Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is a reaction to the fallacies of traditional
metaphysics, however, his warning against the inappropriate adoption of mathematical
methodology is applicable to ontology in general, as we can see from the first quote.
Heidegger does not recur to mathematical methodology during the course of his Kant-
interpretation beyond this brief mention in the second paragraph.

Heidegger’s position in regard to the traditional schema of Western metaphysics is thus a
critical one. His own fundamental ontology, however, is not identical with Kant’s critical
project; rather, his reading of Kant is instrumental to his own project. As mentioned above,
Kant and Heidegger do not subdivide metaphysics in exactly the same way. More precisely,

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33 Heidegger’s inaugural lecture upon assuming Husserl’s professoral chair in Freiburg, 1929.


35 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 7.
Heidegger does not adopt Kant’s classification of metaphysics, but appropriates it to fit his own framework of fundamental ontology.

We have seen that fundamental ontology emerged as a reaction to traditional metaphysics. The forgetfulness into which being has fallen through the noxious influence of this tradition was the great negative impulse that gave rise to the work. The main positive influence, however, is Kant. Although Heidegger effects a destruction of preceding metaphysics, he does not wish to disregard all previous philosophy and recommence in cartesian fashion. This is especially true of his relationship with Kant. In the choice of his main partner in the new battle of giants over being, in the enterprise of fundamental ontology, Heidegger indicates that Kant’s principal merit in his most important work lies in the effort to ground metaphysics independently of the two concerns sketched above. There are parts of Kant’s metaphysics that Heidegger takes a particular interest in as pertaining to his own fundamental ontology. This concerns Kant’s views on the position of man as regards the questions of metaphysics. For now we will look at what Heidegger says about the different subdivisions of metaphysics used by Kant in his critique of traditional metaphysics and the positive laying of the foundation for future metaphysics.

### 2.4 Subdivisions of metaphysics

In accord with tradition, Heidegger divides traditional metaphysics into *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*. The first is the question of being qua being (*on hé on*), the second embraces the tripartite division of natural cosmology, psychology and theology stemming from scholastic philosophy.

*Metaphysica generalis* is more fundamental than *metaphysica specialis*. A general ontology, a theory of being qua being, precedes the regional ontologies dealing with particular kinds of being, which in turn precede the elaboration of the sciences that are built on them. Fundamental ontology, as befits the name, is for Heidegger the original foundation of all other ontologies.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the question of general metaphysics is dealt with in the Transcendental Analytic. In the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique* Kant is involved primarily in the critique of the knowledge of the objects investigated in special metaphysics.
Here Kant examines the classical fallacies into which the questing human philosopher is driven by his natural metaphysical inclination. This leads to the ‘transcendental illusion’ that reason is naturally and inevitably susceptible to. He explains these fallacies in accordance with the traditional schema provided by Baumgarten, subdividing *metaphysica specialis* into enquiries concerning the world as totality (cosmology), the soul (psychology), and God (theology). He begins with the examination of the paralogisms of the soul, proceeds with the antinomies of pure reason resulting from enquiries into cosmology, and examines at last the ideal of pure reason. In the context of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, the section dealing with paralogisms is especially interesting as regards the essence of the transcendental subject. Heidegger, Husserl and Kant have divergent conceptions of the transcendental subject. I will discuss this further below in connection with Heidegger’s characteristic rephrasing of the object of rational psychology.

For the moment, let us concentrate on the natural human inclination to metaphysics resulting in the transcendental illusion. According to Kant, this illusion is ‘natural and unavoidable’. As human beings we cannot help postulating the existence of metaphysical entities. Understanding metaphysics as a natural human disposition touches on the question of the transcendental subject. Heidegger was dissatisfied with what he perceived as the primarily logical and negative manner in which Kant and Husserl dealt with this center of cognition/consciousness. To understand his criticism and the fundamental ontology that resulted from the appropriation of the transcendental subject into his understanding of man as Dasein, I will first consider Kant’s transcendental subject as it transpires from a reading of the transcendental deduction of the categories, and of the beginning of the section on paralogisms, both from the B-edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I will then examine what Husserl has to say about the phenomenological reduction in his first *Cartesian Meditation*. Heidegger’s Dasein comprises the transcendental subject, but is primarily a factical entity, in stark contrast with the transcendental subject as it appears, respectively, as a purely logical function as the subject of Kant’s transcendental apperception, and as negative non-being following Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.

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36 *Kant, KrV*, B354/A298.

37 *Kant, KrV*, B354/A298.
2.5 Kant’s transcendental subject

First a preliminary apology. The transcendental deduction of the categories is given much less attention than it deserves here, and I will only focus on a little part insofar as it illuminates the transcendental subject. Briefly, the transcendental deduction of the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that the legitimate field of the application of the categories of the understanding is the representations of intuition. Prior to the transcendental deduction, Kant has established that the categories are intellectual and characterized by their spontaneity. This is opposed to the receptive character of sensibility. Despite the ostensible heterogeneity of the intellectual and sensible faculties, Kant shows in the transcendental deduction that the only way to form an object is through the application of the categories of the understanding to the diversity supplied by the sense data (das Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen) acquired through the two pure intuitions of space and time. Without the interaction of these two sources, we would not have cognition. The deduction is therefore ‘transcendental’ – it concerns the possibility of cognition. The term ‘deduction’ is used because Kant considers his approach to be analogous to legal procedure: he wishes to ‘establish the entitlement or the legal claim’ – the quid juris of the subsumption of objects under the categories. Kant does not mention a ‘transcendental subject’ in this section; he describes, amongst the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge, the function of transcendental apperception. It is necessary to read the section on the paralogisms in the Transcendental Dialectic in conjunction with the deduction in order to gain an understanding of what Kant can be interpreted as perceiving to host transcendental apperception.

§16 of the transcendental deduction of the categories deals with the original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception. In this section, Kant lays the emphasis on cognition in understanding consciousness:

Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one.

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38 Kant, KrV, A84-A130 and B116-B169.


40 Kant, *KrV*, B131-B136.
The unity of consciousness conditions the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in cognition. In other words, it is the unity of consciousness that accords unity to experience. Transcendental apperception is the ‘I think’ that must be able to accompany all representations. This is reminiscent of Descartes’ first principle on which he intended to build all his subsequent philosophy, but transcendental apperception is fundamentally different from the cartesian cogito. Transcendental apperception is not a metaphysical cornerstone whose attributes can be enumerated. It is a logical function, necessary in the sense that it conditions the possibility of experience. To understand the necessity of the function of transcendental apperception we must look at the previous paragraph.

§15 is the first paragraph of the B-edition of the transcendental deduction of the categories. Its heading is: ‘On the possibility of a combination in general’. The connection (Verbindung, conjunctio) in question in this first, introductory paragraph to the transcendental deduction is best understood not as the connection between the intellectual categories and sensible intuition, but rather the unity of the diversity of the manifold. Sensible intuition, though it brings this diversity to our understanding, cannot in itself create unity in the intuitions it receives. Therefore, there must be a faculty different from sensibility that ensures the formation of the object. Kant states the following concerning this faculty: ‘it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and…one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility…’. There must be a spontaneous understanding at work in the forming of an object because sensibility is receptive and cannot on its own create cognitive unity from diversity through synthesis. Kant proceeds to claim that any connection whatsoever must therefore come from the understanding, be this a connection between concepts or of the diversity of intuition.

This connecting act of the understanding is now revealed to be a central concept to both Kant and Heidegger’s (Kant-inspired) theories of objectification, namely synthesis. An act of the understanding (Verstandeshandlung), can, in effect, be generally designated as

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41 Kant, KrV, B133.
42 Kant, KrV, B131.
43 Kant, KrV, B130.
synthesis[,] in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in the
object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination is
the only one that is not given through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of
its self-activity.\footnote{Kant, \textit{KrV}, B130.}

The connection of the manifold executed by the understanding, and therefore the formation
of an object, cannot be done in the object itself, but must be accomplished in the subject.
Since we know that we have experience, we must presuppose this subject as a logical
function.

The transcendental deduction, inhering as it does in the Transcendental Analytic, is not
concerned with the subject hosting transcendental apperception. To understand Kant’s views
on the matter of this subject we must skip to the section on paralogisms in the
Transcendental Dialectic. The Transcendental Dialectic, which forms the second major part
of the \textit{Critique}, is concerned with the critique of special metaphysics. The section on
paralogisms is devoted to the critique of rational psychology, i.e., of traditional and,
according to Kant, erroneous conceptions of the soul. The term ‘logical paralogism’ itself is
defined as ‘the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, whatever its content may otherwise
be’.\footnote{Kant, \textit{KrV}, A341/B399.} This definition is taken from the first edition of the paralogisms; in the remainder of
this section I will concentrate on the B-edition. Kant here tackles again the proposition of ‘I
think’. The ‘I’ of this ‘I think’ ‘can always be considered as subject’ insofar as it is that
which cognizes. Considering the ‘I’ to be a subject constitutes ‘an apodictic and even an
\textbf{identical proposition}\footnote{Kant, \textit{KrV}, B407.}. The problems arise when we attempt to say something more of it;
e.g. that it is a simple substance subsisting through time. Qualifying the ‘I’ as subject ‘does
not signify that I as \textbf{object} am for myself a self-\textbf{subsisting being} or \textbf{substance}\footnote{Kant, \textit{KrV}, B407.}, because
such a statement would be a synthetic proposition, i.e., relying in part on empirical intuition.
This contrasts with the understanding of the ‘I’ as singular, because this conception of the ‘I’
as a ‘logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking, and is consequently an
analytic proposition\(^48\). It is a mistake to consider the thinking I as a substance, because the concept of substance is always tied to intuition, which is not under consideration here.

Concerning this ‘I’ of ‘I think’, which I designate as the transcendental subject, Kant wishes to guard it against hasty dialectical paralogisms and rather affirm the only thing that can be affirmed of it, namely that it plays an essential role in knowledge. The term ‘transcendental’ was explained in the introduction to the transcendental logic as referring to the possibility of cognition, and not to the objects of this knowledge\(^49\). The transcendental subject is therefore one of the requirements that make knowledge of objects possible – indeed, a requirement for making objects themselves possible. Postulating the necessity of the transcendental subject, Kant has shown that it plays a purely logical role in the account of justification offered in the transcendental deduction of the categories. Nothing else can be said of it, and it has nothing to do with a postulation of a soullike entity. The ‘soul’ is a question for dialectic, while transcendental apperception is a question for analytic.

I will now turn to Husserl, whose transcendental ego as it is revealed in the first *Cartesian Meditation* also served as an important incentive to Heidegger’s formation of ‘Dasein’ as a merging of the knowing transcendental subject and lived human experience.

### 2.6 The transcendental ego in Husserl

As I read Kant, the transcendental subject behind transcendental apperception is a logical function of which nothing beyond its necessary role in the experience of objects can be affirmed. Husserl takes this one step further, defining the transcendental ego negatively as non-being. That which apprehends being is itself non-being. For Husserl it is vital to distinguish between man as an object studied by psychology and man as the subject of cognition, the consciousness of beings.

\(^{48}\) Kant, *KrV*, B407.

\(^{49}\) ‘…not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori). Hence…only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can nevertheless be related a priori to objects of experience call be called transcendental.’ Kant, *KrV*, A56/B80-B81.
Husserl treats of the possibility of an apodictic foundation of philosophy, and by extension of the rational sciences, in the *Cartesian Meditations*. As the title indicates, the precursor of the effort is Descartes and his demolishing of all previous philosophy, undertaken in order to rebuild it on unalloyed first principles. The aim that shall ‘continually motivate the course of [Husserl’s] meditations’ is that of ‘grounding science absolutely’. Husserl lauds the ‘regress to the philosophizing ego…as subject of [Descartes’] pure *cogitationes*’. So far we cannot distinguish any important difference between Husserl’s Descartes-inspired transcendental ego and Kant’s transcendental subject. Despite the fact that the ‘pure *cogitationes*’ of Descartes are not what Kant had in mind when he was seeking the possibility of unity in sensible diversity, no content has been attributed to this philosophizing ego to differentiate it from the logical transcendental subject.

According to Husserl, Descartes’ *Meditations* constitute a ‘radical turn: from naïve Objectivism to transcendental subjectivism’. This, of course, is reminiscent of Heidegger’s characterization of Kant’s radical efforts within metaphysics. The rational sciences were to receive a ‘grounding’ through the investigations in the *Meditations*. This talk of ‘grounding’ is also a concern of Heidegger’s, but here we hit on an obvious and important difference in Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant and Husserl’s reference to Descartes: the primary merit of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is in laying out a fundamental ontology, which then grounds all other ontology. The *Critique* is not a work of epistemology for Heidegger, and is not primarily concerned with laying the ground for the rational sciences (although a fundamental ontology also does this, enjoying a primacy over ontology, which enjoys a primacy over regional ontologies, which in turn precede the sciences they ground).

§7 of the first *Cartesian Meditation* is entitled ‘The evidence for the factual existence of the world not apodictic; its inclusion in the Cartesian overthrow’. Although our experience of the world seems at first glance to be indubitable, we cannot reject the possibility that we are prey to a sensory illusion or a protracted dream (or victims of Descartes’ malignant genius). The ‘being of the world’ is therefore an inappropriate starting point for an apodictic grounding of philosophy:

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The evidence of world-experience would, at all events, need to be criticized with regard to its validity and range, before it could be used for the purposes of a radical grounding of science, and... therefore we must not take the evidence to be, without question, immediately apodictic\textsuperscript{52}.

Husserl rejects here what Heidegger would call being-in-the-world (\textit{In-der-Welt-sein}), as being able to provide an apodictic grounding of philosophy. As we will see, Heidegger cannot accept this exclusion of facticity in the question of grounding.

Husserl concludes this paragraph by asking what would transpire if the world were not the ‘absolutely first basis for judgments’, if ‘a being that is intrinsically prior to the world were the already presupposed basis for the existence of the world’. The following paragraph is entitled ‘The ego cogito as transcendental subjectivity’. Now that Husserl has rejected ‘not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world’ as something that ‘is for me’, it is henceforth to be considered only as a ‘phenomenon of being’. Despite this new awareness, the philosophizing ego goes on experiencing the world as before. The difference is that the philosopher can ‘(no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in experiencing the world – though that believing too is still there and grasped by my noticing regard’. This movement of relinquishing all existential positions as regards an objective world constitutes the phenomenological epoché, the ‘parenthesizing’ of the Objective world’, or the ‘transcendental-phenomenological reduction’. The latter consists not in a loss, explains Husserl, because by his effort the philosopher gains himself as pure (understood as transcendental) ego by putting himself above believing anything about this objective world.

Thus the being of the pure ego and his \textit{cogitationes}, as a being that is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being of the world – the world of which I always speak, the one of which I \textit{can} speak. Natural being is a realm whose existential status [\textit{Seinsgeltung}] is secondary; it continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being\textsuperscript{53}.

Heidegger would say that it is the other way around. Human beings are defined primarily by their historicality and facticity, by their being-in-the-world. The transcendental subject that Husserl posits as antecedent to the experienced world deploys such a role with regard to cognition, while for Heidegger man is primarily characterized as a place of pre-ontological

\textsuperscript{55} Husserl, \textit{Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology},4.

\textsuperscript{52} Husserl, \textit{Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology},17-18.

\textsuperscript{53} Husserl, \textit{Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology},21.
understanding, and not as possessor of a sophisticated philosophical understanding that precedes his facticity. It is our essence as primarily Da-sein (in the world) that permits us to ask the question of being.

For Husserl, however, the two entities of man as transcendental ego and man as a factical being are to be kept strictly apart. The last paragraph of the first Cartesian Meditation is devoted to this distinction, which he draws between the transcendental ego and the psychological ego. The psychological ego is the individual, in this case the philosopher, insofar as he is a being of the world and can thus be studied by empirical sciences such as anthropology, biology and psychology. Though the philosopher can be both, they are to be kept conceptually separated by the phenomenological epoché. The transcendental ego is a pure ego of cognition, who is defined negatively as non-being. The psychological ego, on the other hand, is a being amongst other beings. In Heidegger’s terminology, the psychological ego forms an object of study for ontic knowledge. He would not agree with Husserl’s scission here between the two domains of study. For Heidegger, ontological knowledge precedes ontic knowledge, and the latter depends on the former. Anthropology, for instance, depends on the fundamental ontology that analyzes man as a finite being. The scission for Heidegger is between ontological and ontic knowledge (the ontological difference), not between the psychological and transcendental ego.

In summary, we have seen that Heidegger rejects Husserl’s doctrine of the transcendental ego as separate from the psychological ego present in the world. This is a rejection of a limited definition of a part of man as a purely cognizing subject. Concerning Kant, Heidegger reacts to the lack of content affirmed of the transcendental subject. This dissatisfaction serves as an indispensable incentive in the forming of his fundamental ontology. Heidegger does not discard the transcendental subject, but he seeks to define it positively. As we will see, he will do this essentially by defining man as a finite being. We return now to Kant.

§11, entitled The psychological and the transcendental Ego. The transcendency of the world.
2.7 The transcendental subject revealed in fundamental ontology

The criticism of rational psychology that Kant executes by his exposition of the paralogisms regarding the metaphysically posited ‘soul’ is contrasted with the postulation of the logical, transcendental subject that executes the original-synthetic unity of apperception described in §16 of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. As we have seen, the soul is the object of rational psychology in traditional metaphysics, as well as for Kant himself. In the context of his exposition of the metaphysics inherited by Kant as the science of the supersensible, Heidegger enumerates the soul among the objects not accessible to experience: ‘…then those beings within the world which are central for all questioning, i.e., humans and particularly that in them which is not experienceable; what lies beyond death, the immortality of the soul; the soul as such and its freedom’.

An important shift in focus has occurred. In traditional metaphysics, according to Heidegger, the focus on man was on the immortality of his soul. Although Heidegger mentions this as a moment of particular importance, man is first characterized as ‘those beings within the world which are central to all questioning’. Man is here defined not by the particular status he holds in divine creation by virtue of being endowed with an immortal soul, but by his central relationship to the questioning (of all other beings).

While Heidegger is ostensibly expounding on the domains of traditional metaphysics, we are with this formulation plunged into the center of Heidegger’s own fundamental ontology. Man is central to the metaphysics defended by Heidegger in the sense that ontology must build on fundamental ontology. In stating that human beings are characterized by being central to all questioning, Heidegger defends his own claim that beings can only be revealed through the ‘comportment’ (*Verhaltnis*) of the human subject.

This human subject, Dasein, is defined in its essence by its finitude, or by its mortality. In this respect it is diametrically opposed to the Christian conception of man’s essence as consisting of his immortal soul. Dasein is also different from Kant’s logical transcendental subject, and from Husserl’s negatively defined transcendental ego. The examination of the

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structures of fundamental ontology in the next chapter will serve to elucidate the unique position of Dasein as regards what can be known of being. Fundamental ontology will be examined from two linked perspectives: that of human (fundamental) ontological finitude in the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time,* and that of intellectual finitude, as I have chosen to call the finitude that seems to stand with one foot in epistemology and one foot in ontology in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant.
3. From Being-Un unto-Death to Intellectual Finitude

3.1 Ontological and intellectual finitude

In the previous chapter I gave a preliminary negative definition of fundamental ontology by sketching a certain contrast with the traditional concept of metaphysics. According to Heidegger’s account, traditional Western metaphysics postulates an infinite being and is as such concerned with (among other matters) the immortality of the soul, a doctrine that naturally flows from the postulation of the infinite being. Fundamental ontology, on the other hand, is centered around the primary thesis of finitude (Endlichkeit).

The finitude in question is that of man. Heidegger often stresses the importance of avoiding a misunderstanding here. Man in himself is not the center of interest; the question revolves around being. For this reason fundamental ontology is not to be confused with anthropology, as he emphasizes on the first page of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: ‘[Fundamental Ontology] remains fundamentally different from all anthropology and from the philosophical’\(^\text{56}\). This is a strong and curious affirmation. Being and Time is an analysis of Dasein. Dasein is human existence, a situation distinct from that of all other living and inanimate beings. In that respect, Heidegger must have good arguments if he wishes to persuade us that this analysis is fundamentally distinct from and prior to the study of man. The question of whether or not his disavowal of philosophical anthropology as regards his own work is justified will have to wait until we have examined the results of the analysis of Dasein, or of fundamental ontology.

In this chapter I will therefore explain basic structures of fundamental ontology. Considering the central tenet of fundamental ontology to be that of human finitude, I will divide my investigation into two parts. The first will concern itself with what I shall call man’s

\(^{56}\) Heidegger, Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics,1. In the original : ‘Sie bleibt von aller Anthropologie, auch der philosophischen, grundsätzlich unterschieden’ (Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 6th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kostermann GmbH, 1998). The English translation carries a slight risk of misunderstanding - fundamental ontology is not fundamentally different from all things philosophical.
ontological finitude, and the second with man’s intellectual finitude. The former will base itself on the central importance of being-unto-death (Sein zum Tode) as the culmination of the analysis of Dasein in the second division of the completed first part of Being and Time. Concerning man’s intellectual finitude I will examine with particular attention the phenomenon of objectification as it reveals itself in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The problem of objectification is the same problem Kant poses himself in the transcendental deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, how the intellect forms an object out of the manifold presented by experience – in other words, how an object is possible. In Heidegger’s terms, the ‘sense and task’ of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories consist in ‘the exhibition of the original self-forming of the essential unity of ontological knowledge’. Heidegger examines this, amongst other places, in §16 of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. To describe the phenomenon he uses the term Gegenstehen-lassen von, (or Entgegenstehenlassen) rendered in English as ‘letting-stand-against of’. This heavy but apt formulation comprises the conception Heidegger has of transcendence as the act of a finite intellect permitting an object to take shape.

The order of examination of the two kinds of finitude (ontological and intellectual) does not spring from a chronological motive, i.e., that Heidegger wrote Being and Time before devoting himself more explicitly to Kant. Rather, ontological and intellectual finitude seem to be inseparable in the same manner that ontological and ontic knowledge seem to be inseparable. Ontological knowledge (of being qua being, Sein) precedes and conditions ontic knowledge (of particular beings, Seiende). The contrast between these two constitutes what Heidegger calls the ‘ontological difference’ between the ontological and the ontic. In the same way that the ontological level precedes the ontic, the fact of man’s mortality, his ontological finitude, seems to precede his intellectual finitude. Whether or not man’s mortality can be said to condition his intellectual finitude is less certain, because this is not stated explicitly by Heidegger. This incertitude stands opposed to the relationship between ontological and ontic knowledge in the sense that Heidegger often explicitly affirms the primacy of the former over the latter.

57 Heidegger., Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics, 46.
58 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics, 49.
The concepts of ‘ontological’ and ‘intellectual’ finitude cannot, however, be divided in the sense that one could say that Heidegger deals with ontological finitude in *Being and Time* and with intellectual finitude in the two books on Kant. Apart from the fact that these two aspects of the fundamental human characteristic of finitude are inseparable as mentioned above, we must take into account the general difficulty of separating epistemology from ontology. Epistemology deals with knowledge and ontology with things that are. However, epistemology deals with the knowledge of *things*. The dichotomy epistemology-ontology poses particular problems within the framework of Heidegger’s thinking. This is obvious from the polemic tone of his Kant-interpretation, where he shows himself eager to separate himself from what he disparages as the ‘neo-kantian’ tendency of interpreting Kant’s first *Critique* as a work of epistemology. In that connection he makes some strong assertions about Kant’s aims that seem difficult to justify. His term ‘ontological knowledge’ would seem by its second component to render impossible an absolute exclusion of epistemology from its concerns. I will tackle this problem in the next chapter, which examines the relationship between epistemology and ontology through the examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of transcendental imagination and the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition in the *Critique*.

### 3.2 From being to man

Heidegger distinguishes between ontology, the study of being qua being, and fundamental ontology, which in *Being and Time* takes the form of an analysis of Dasein. In light of its contents, the title seems odd. How did we pass from being in general to man, a particular being? Heidegger is careful to stress that man is not the true goal of the investigation, which is his justification for separating his fundamental ontology from a philosophical anthropology. The title of *Being and Time*, however, seems to promise a work of ontology, rather than of fundamental ontology.

As is indicated on the first page of the work, it is the second term of the couple, namely time, that dissolves the confusion. Heidegger first appeals to Plato for vindication in his wish to

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59 The other is *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. 
reinstate the ‘gigantomachia peri tés ousias’, the giant fight over being. Plato was conscious of the aporia always threatening those that dared to pose the question of being. Since his time we have fallen into forgetfulness and ignorance even of our perplexity. It is time to ask the question again, Heidegger says, and gives an indication of the intimate relationship he perceives as existing between being and time:

Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.

At this point in the investigation into being, time is the only ‘horizon’ in light of which we can hope to gain any understanding whatsoever of being. In other words Heidegger will have to examine time in order to understand something of being.

The necessary focus on time is the reason why the investigation into being takes the form of a fundamental ontology. Heidegger will reveal that man has a unique relationship with time by reason of his mortality. This could also seem odd, since biology teaches us that all living things eventually die. Fundamental ontology, however, precedes biology, as biology is an ontic science, and the ontological precedes the ontic. The essence of man is not his particular being as a mammal, but his unique potential as a mortal being in a way that only human beings can be mortal. The relationship between being and time is best illuminated by the relationship between human being and time.

To understand this it is necessary to explain the basic structures constituting the Daseinsanalytik of Being and Time — in other words, it is necessary to explain the nature of Dasein insofar as it is defined in its deepest nature as Vorlaufen, as being-unto-death. The purpose of the following sections is not, however, to provide an exhaustive account of the scheme of existentials making up the analysis of Dasein. The purpose is to enable a comparison of ontological finitude with intellectual finitude. For this reason the focus on

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60 Heidegger, Being and Time, 21.
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 19.
62 Heidegger, Being and Time, §10.
63 The existentials are the ‘categories’ Heidegger uses in his analysis of Dasein. Calling it ‘existential’ means that it is ontological, not ontic.
Heidegger’s idiosyncratic terminology will be selective, though, I believe, thorough enough to yield an understanding of Dasein insofar as it is temporal in its deepest nature. The explanation of the unity of the ecstases at the end will enable an understanding of the parallel function Heidegger takes Kant’s three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition to hold in his account of intellectual finitude. It should be kept in mind that the idea of unity is central to the accounts of both the three ecstases and the three syntheses. The unity in question is that of temporality, which, according to Heidegger, forms the foundation of Dasein. It is because temporality is shown to constitute the unity of both the ecstases and the syntheses that I believe it is essential to understand their affinity in order to make sense of the relationship between ontological and intellectual finitude.

3.3 Dasein and the forgetfulness of being

The forgetfulness of being that Heidegger sought to remedy against in his double effort of negative destruction and positive analysis (of Dasein) was, on the one hand, due to an old philosophers’ prejudice that can be traced to Aristotle. In his *Categories*, Aristotle defines ‘substance’ as ‘that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse’\(^{64}\). Furtive substance, then, does not inhere in individual beings (*Seiende*). The idea of a substance as something not inhering in individuals that display only attributes of this original substance leads to the birth of certain prejudices regarding the nature of being, which, according to Heidegger, have obstructed the philosophical understanding of being since.\(^{65}\) In the care of Western philosophers bearing the burden of Aristotle’s ontology, the question of being has come to be seen as a primarily theoretical problem, an object studied by a subject entirely distinct from it, where the object is substance and the subject is the philosopher. As Heidegger phrases it, “‘Being’ acquires the meaning of ‘‘Reality’’. Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being.”\(^{66}\) The post-

\(^{64}\) Aristotle, *Categories*, 2a1.

\(^{65}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §1. The resulting prejudices are three. ‘Being’ is perceived as the most general of concepts, as indefinable, and as self-explanatory, as we all know what we mean when we say that ‘the sky is blue’ (Heidegger’s example).

\(^{66}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 245.
aristotelian tradition considers being as something that is ‘present-at-hand’ (Vorhanden), as presenting itself to the investigating subject. Human being, within this paradigm, is itself viewed as a real (as a thing, res) being present-at-hand (real Vorhanden). The view of objects presenting themselves for study at hand mirrors the artificial scission between subject and object that Heidegger perceives as resulting from these ancient prejudices regarding substance.

In fact there are several mistakes operating here that cut Heidegger’s work out for him. One is the idea that human beings primarily deal with objects they encounter as something that is ‘present-at-hand’. Dasein’s most common (what he calls alltägliche, everyday) attitude towards the things it encounters in the world is, rather, pre-theoretical, regarding things in relation to their applicability as tools in the mode Heidegger calls the ‘pre-ontological understanding of being’ (vorontologische Seinsverständnis). Dasein primarily grasps things as being ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden), as being at our disposition for use. Another important mistake is the indiscriminate categorizing of our own existence in the inventory of beings ‘present-to-hand’. Being and Time seeks a remedy to these mistakes, destroying traditional metaphysics based on substance and a first creator that analyzes beings as ‘present-to-hand’, and building in its place an analysis of Dasein that expounds the singular being that is the human insofar as it is the only being for whom being is an issue.

‘Dasein’, on the one hand denoting simply ‘existence’ in German, is customarily considered to be an untranslatable term of Being and Time, for the simple reason that Heidegger imbues it with his entire theory of fundamental ontology. ‘Da-sein’ translates literally as ‘there-be’ or ‘here-be’ – being-there. Dasein is thus first and foremost characterized as that which is there, at a certain place in a certain time. It is in a world – Dasein is Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), always thrown into a world. This contrasts with the situation of those who are to human beings biological cousins but ontological aliens, namely non-human animals, who are ‘poor in world’, possessing only an environment, or about-world (Umwelt). Their mode

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67 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 201.
68 Heidegger, Being and Time, 35.
69 Heidegger, Being and Time, 79.
of being is termed ‘life’. Inanimate beings, material things, have ‘no world’ whatsoever, and they are ‘extant’, which is to be distinguished from human existence.

Human being is characterized by its historicality and its facticity. In placing man in a fixed spatio-temporal context, Heidegger underscores at the same time man’s finitude. As we saw in chapter one, this contrasts with the traditional metaphysical conception of man as being animated by an eternal soul. When Heidegger says that his ‘Dasein’ has no corresponding term in Cassirer’s philosophy, he is giving an indication of the unique conception he takes himself to hold of man as a factical entity that makes transcendence possible. Dasein’s unique position amongst beings as always being in a world indicates that Dasein always has its being outside of itself, in the beings it encounters. Husserl’s transcendental ego was defined negatively as non-being that cognizes beings. While Heidegger also maintains the uniqueness of human cognition, he seeks to give a positive definition of the cognizing being. The terms of apodicticity are reversed. It is because man is a factical being that he has experience, that he can know things, it is his facticity that enables the formation of objects. It is not the preexisting evidence of the fact that there are objects that forces us to postulate the necessity of a transcendental, logical subject, as is the case for Kant.

Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of beings as it encounters them in the world as tools is distinct from ontological, theoretical understanding of beings. The inauthentic (uneigentliche) mode of existence is an inauthentic relationship to our own original being. As Heidegger will explain later in the treatise, the forgetfulness in question is of our own finitude, of our own temporality as always being rooted in the future (Zukunft), our coming, certain death. It is only through the authentic mode of being, reached through ‘resoluteness’ (Entschlossenheit) that we can have an original understanding of time, and thus of the meaning of our own being. Before explaining the passage to an authentic mode of being

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71 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 14.

72 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 14.

73 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 181.

74 I will explain this more thoroughly in the account of objectification and transcendence, having chosen to describe Dasein’s transcendence and ontological creativity under the heading of ‘intellectual finitude’. Here it is the ontological finitude that interests us, our relationship to our own death.
through resoluteness, Heidegger analyzes the structures of Dasein in its mode of ‘everydayness’ (Alltäglichkeit)\(^\text{75}\) as encountering beings to-hand in the impersonal manifestation of das Man\(^\text{76}\). The closest everyday English equivalent to this expression is probably ‘you’ (‘one’ has fallen into disuse), employed in conventional wisdom like ‘When you look for a job, you have to remember to be careful about...’ Das Man is everyman and no man, an impersonal identity formed by the context of history and culture the individual is born into, and into which the individual escapes as a way of avoiding confrontation with its own mortality. Heidegger specifies further:

Accordingly Dasein’s ‘average everydayness’ can be defined as ‘Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others’.\(^\text{77}\)

The ‘potentiality-for-Being’ (Seinkönnen) of the last line refers to the possibility of Dasein’s impossibility, that of its own death. Consequently, this possibility always defines Dasein, even when Dasein is not in the authentic mode of understanding its own mortality. I will return to this below in the examination of the authentic mode of Vorlaufen.

The earlier sections\(^\text{78}\) of Being and Time concentrate more on the analysis of the everyday than on the authentic mode of Vorlaufen. Here Heidegger opposes his modes of Dasein’s apprehension of things as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand to the traditional subject-studying-substance scheme. The question of Dasein’s relationship to things, be that inauthentic or authentic, finds fuller expression in Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Critique, in the discussion of objectification and transcendental imagination. Heidegger reveals that it is man’s finitude that is responsible for objectification, for the forming of an object. The object springs from finitude, from the efforts of a finite intellect. It would seem that unless man has an authentic relationship to his own finitude, his own death, he will not understand the nature of the object, because he will not realize in what sense it can be said to spring from his own nature. This, of course, is in line with Kant’s copernican revolution. I

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\(^{75}\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 150.

\(^{76}\) Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 126. The English translation has opted for ‘they’ as the translation of Das Man, but I prefer ‘you’ for the purpose of illustration. In the translation, ‘you’ might be impractical, however.

\(^{77}\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 225.

\(^{78}\) Roughly, up to and including § 38.
will return to this below in the discussion of objectification. Since I will argue that there is a relationship of a parallel nature between the ecstases of ontological authenticity and the syntheses as Heidegger interprets them, and that they are the expression of the same unity, we will now examine Dasein in its mode of authentic understanding of original time, the unity of which manifests itself through the ecstases. This contrasts with the everyday mode of being of Das Man and the forgetfulness of being.

3.4 The unity of the ecstases

The moment of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) separating inauthenticity from authenticity occurs through the experience of anxiety. Anxiety (Angst) is the most authentic of attunements (Befindlichkeiten). In this state Dasein perceives the world as empty, and the anxiety experienced has no apparent object. It is the experience of nothing (das Nichts). This nothing can be compared to the nothing (non-being) that is necessary in the process of objectification. In both cases, the nothing is not a nihil absolutum, but rather an essential step on the path to new understanding. In the case of objectification, this preliminary nothing is that which creates space for the something that is the object of knowledge, formed by the conjoint efforts of the intuition, the understanding and transcendental imagination. In the case of anxiety as analyzed in Being and Time, this nothingness is the silence (Verschwiegenheit) from the ‘chat’ (Gerede) characterizing das Man in everyday existence. In this silence Dasein hears and heeds the call of conscience (Ruf des Gewissens) exhorting it to authentic resoluteness.

Throughout his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger seeks to seize the unity of being of Dasein, what he calls the ‘whole existential constitution of Dasein’. This desire for a structural

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79 Heidegger, Being and Time, §40. Dasein is always ‘gestimmt’, always characterized by its ‘attunement’.

80 See Heidegger, Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics, 49. I will discuss this section further below.

81 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics, 49.

82 Heidegger, Being and Time, 343.

83 Heidegger, Being and Time, 224.
unity ties in with Heidegger’s refusal of the traditional scission between subject and object in the perception of man’s dealing with and study of objects in the world. Insofar as Dasein is always thrown into a world, man’s being cannot be separated from this world, and our being is always a being by or with other beings (Mit-sein in the case of other Daseins). The unity of the existentials is assured by the structure of care (Sorge), both in inauthentic and authentic existence. Care is temporal in nature. Heidegger defines the structure of care as ‘ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world)’ as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)\(^84\) (Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in (der Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden). As Heidegger says, this ‘formulation of the structure of care’ with its words ‘before’ (vor) and ‘already’ (schon) demonstrates ‘the temporal meaning of existentiality and facticity’\(^85\). He also says, quite simply, that ‘care is Being-towards-death’\(^86\). In other words, it is temporal and always oriented back from the future, so to speak.

In inauthentic understanding, the structure of care manifests itself in our consideration of things as ready-to-hand, as things we are next to (bei) and with (mit), in the case of other Daseins. In authentic understanding, however, Dasein has gained an authentic understanding of its own temporality, and the original structure of care has shown itself in its true guise, as we can see in the first part of the definition given above. It is temporality that ensures the totality of care, and thus of the structures of the existentials of Dasein. The being ahead of oneself (Sich-vorweg) is grounded, not surprisingly, in the future, or to-come\(^87\). The German word Zukunft describes the future as something to-come, whereas the English term does not immediately reveal this meaning. It is after the resolution, after Dasein has heard the call of conscience, that the ecstases reveal themselves as the three original structures of temporality, and Heidegger can contrast original time as revealed through these ecstases with the vulgar conception of time that derives from it, and that manifests itself in the traditional concept of time as a succession of counted instants\(^88\). In the comparison of original with derived time, it

\(^84\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 237.

\(^85\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 376.

\(^86\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 378.

\(^87\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 373.

\(^88\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 475.
is important to remember the guiding principle of unity that is made possible by the primacy of the first ecstatic of the future. The analysis of the ecstases has a parallel structure to the analysis Heidegger conducts of Kant’s three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. As we will see from Heidegger’s analysis of the role of transcendental imagination in Kant’s *Critique*, these ‘three syntheses’ are in fact three modes of the same synthesis, and their unity is made possible by the primacy of the synthesis of recognition. For this reason, Heidegger has this third synthesis correspond to the ecstatic of the future. The distinction Heidegger draws between original and vulgar understanding of time is, I argue, central to understanding why Heidegger insisted both on Kant’s importance as instigating a revolution within metaphysics, and as not being able to follow it through. From a reading of Heidegger’s conception of original and vulgar time and a study of Kant’s three syntheses in the A-edition, it would seem that Kant had one foot in the traditional, vulgar understanding of time, and the other in the understanding of original time. This will be explained in connection with the syntheses, after intellectual finitude as it manifests itself through transcendence and objectification has been accounted for.

According to Heidegger, the derived concept of time can be traced, perhaps not unsurprisingly, to Aristotle. The aristotelian definition of time has become the norm in the sense that ‘ever since Aristotle all discussions of the concept of time have clung *in principle* to the Aristotelian definitions’. This definition is succinctly articulated in Aristotle’s *Physics*, 219b1 sq: ‘For time is just this – number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’(…)Time, then, is what is counted…’. As Heidegger explains in §81 of *Being and Time*, which deals with the ‘genesis of the ordinary concept of time’, time, understood inauthentically, is a succession of ‘nows’, it is the succession of instants counted by the hands of the clock. This is because, in inauthentic understanding, we deal with things in the mode of concern (*Besorgen*). Dasein counts the ‘nows’ in which it encounters these things, and around this now there is a ‘no-longer-now’ and ‘not-yet-now’. The present is thus a ‘now-time’ (*Jetzt-Zeit*). The mode of concern, in Dasein’s state of being fallen into a world,

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90 Aristotle, *Physics* (*Aristotle’s Collected Works*).

naturally meets the tools we use and reflects over this use without reflecting over time itself, and as long as it does this it misses the authentic understanding of original time. The ordinary understanding of time, whose principle was formulated by Aristotle, becomes in Heidegger’s ‘existential-ontological’ translation, ‘a sequence of “nows” which are constantly present-at-hand’, simultaneously passing away and coming along. Time is understood as a succession, as a ‘flowing stream’ of ‘“nows”’. As we shall see below in connection with Kant’s three syntheses permitting knowledge, such a flow of nows figures prominently.

The flow of nows is without end, in the sense that the concept of ‘now’ presupposes the not-yet-now, and the no-longer-now. Time is thus perceived to be endless. Das Man does not die, because it is not personal enough to be able to die, it is not ‘mine’. It is only through ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) that death can be ‘authentically understood’. Through the efforts of vulgar time original time is absconded. It is only when Dasein assumes its authentic mode that time can be uncovered as original.

The mode through which original time is hidden is through the process naturally occurring in vulgar time that Heidegger calls the levelling off of world-time. The endless succession of nows is a levelling of the ecstases that characterize the unity of original time. When original time becomes revealed, these three ecstases are shown to replace the orientation around the succession of nows with their unity springing out of the primary ecstasis of the future (Zukunft). We are now in a position to see how these three ecstases provide the unity of original time and thus constitute the conceptual center of the whole analysis of Dasein, mirroring the nature of Dasein as a fundamentally temporal being, defined by its relationship to its own end.

Heidegger introduces the term ‘ekstatikon’ in §65, entitled ‘Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care’. Here Heidegger explains that temporality, through the structure of care, pervades the being of Dasein, whether Dasein be in its authentic or inauthentic mode. It is

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92 Heidegger, Being and Time, 473.
93 Heidegger, Being and Time, 474.
94 Heidegger, Being and Time, 477.
95 Heidegger, Being and Time, 474.
the Vorlaufen, the constant orientation from the future, that determines Dasein in its being, that makes Dasein ‘authentically futural’\(^96\) (eigentlich zukünftig), a being defined by the future, by the to-come.

The temporality that defines human being must be distinguished from the traditional tripartite division of time into future (Zukunft), past (Vergangenheit) and present (Gegenwart). Original temporality is characterized by the ‘primordial unity of the structure of care’\(^97\). The ‘ahead of itself’ of care is grounded in the future. It is this future, of always being ahead of oneself, that makes it possible for Dasein to be such that ‘its potentiality-for-Being is an issue’\(^98\) for it. However, it is only because Dasein has already been (gewesen) that it can, in the manner of the future, return back to itself (zurück-komm[en]), and vice versa. The unity of temporality makes for this interdependence between the having-been and the to-come. As regards the present, it is ‘awake[ned]’ by the future\(^99\). It is the ‘third item which is constitutive for care – the Being-alongside which falls’\(^100\). The Gegenwärtigen (meaning both ‘the present’ and ‘presented’ in German) is tied to the phenomenon of objectification – it regards the beings we encounter. In the inauthentic ‘fallenness’, that which is present is grounded in that which is to hand and at hand. In the mode of original time, however, the present is ‘included in the future and in having been’\(^101\).

These three concepts of future, having-been and present ‘show the phenomenal characteristics of the ‘towards-oneself’, the ‘back-to’ and the ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered-by’\(^102\) (Auf-sich-zu, Zurück auf, Begegnenlassens-von). It is this zu, auf and bei that ‘make temporality manifest as the ekstatikon pure and simple.’\(^103\) Future, having-been

\(^{96}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 373.

\(^{97}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 375.

\(^{98}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 375.


\(^{100}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 376.

\(^{101}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 376.


\(^{103}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 377.
and present are the three ecstases of temporality, their unity being the unity of original time, replacing the ‘vulgar’ interpretations of past, present and future as the succession of nows. Heidegger defines temporality, in connection with the ekstatikon, as follows: ‘Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself’. Time is not a ‘thing’, it is not at hand, temporality temporalizes (Zeit zeitigt). The definition here of temporality as that which is outside of itself ties in well with Heidegger’s conception of transcendence, which defines human nature. Dasein is transcendent in that it has its being extends outside of itself, into the beings it encounters. This, again, mirrors Heidegger’s disapproval of the scission subject/object of traditional metaphysics, the isolation of Dasein from the beings studied, and the isolation of the eternal, uncreated creator from all that is created. In defining temporality as being outside of itself (a meaning of the word ek-stasis), Heidegger makes temporality conceptually compatible with Dasein’s nature, affirming again that, insofar as it is transcendent, Dasein’s innermost being is temporal.

In this definition of the ecstases, temporality has been shown to share a central affinity with transcendence. I have investigated the ecstases within the framework of ontological finitude, while choosing to investigate transcendence in connection with ‘intellectual finitude’. In the investigation of the relationship between ontological and intellectual finitude, it seemed prudent to see the kantian syntheses in light of the heideggerian ecstases, rather than the other way around. Despite the fact that Heidegger was influenced by Kant in the shaping of his analysis of Dasein, it is obvious that his reading of the section on syntheses seeks to force his own theory of temporality onto Kant’s doctrine. In other words, it is better to come to Heidegger’s interpretation of the syntheses armed with knowledge of the significance of temporality in the analysis of Dasein.

The elements of Being and Time that have been discussed in this section do not provide an exhausting explanation of that work. However, the terminology that must be presupposed in order to understand the ‘intellectual finitude’ I believe Heidegger was determined to trace in the Transcendental Analytic of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason should now be adequately exposed. We turn, therefore, to intellectual finitude.

104 Heidegger, Being and Time, 377.
3.5 Man’s intellectual finitude

In the analysis of Dasein expounded in *Being and Time*, Heidegger reveals human finitude to rest ultimately on human factual mortality, and Dasein’s essence to be the innermost possibility of its own death, being-unto-death (*Sein zum Tode*). In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, the perspective on finitude is different. I have chosen to call the finitude under investigation in the latter work ‘intellectual finitude’, the examination of the works and ways of the finite intellect. Intellectual finitude, one could imagine, means simply the inherent limits of man’s knowledge. However, ‘intellectual finitude’ is not, for Heidegger, primarily a question for epistemology. Here again we are in fact dealing with ontology.

In the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger is engaged in single combat with another philosopher. *Being and Time* touches on a plethora of philosophers and ideas, and is intended amongst other things as a destruction of traditional metaphysics. Its main concern is the exposition of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Despite the influences of the philosophers Heidegger was so well-versed in, fundamental ontology constitutes in name and concept a new idea of his own with which he intends to revolutionize metaphysics. In the *Kantbuch*, however, fundamental ontology is examined from a new perspective, or rather an older one: fundamental ontology as it takes the form of a celebrated critique of pure reason.

It seems safe to hazard that Kant’s magnum opus is concerned with how we can know. What makes Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s intention divergent from those he dubs the neo-Kantians is that the question of the knowledge of objects is for Heidegger primarily ontological, and not epistemological. In the ‘knowledge of objects’, it is ‘objects’ and not ‘knowledge’ that constitutes the primary term.

As we saw in chapter one, it is the transcendental deduction of the categories that deals with the formation of objects in Kant’s *Critique*. The chapter on schematism that follows it shows how this is actually done. Accordingly, Heidegger is especially interested in the

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106 Kant, *KrV*, B176/A137-B187/A147.
transcendental deduction, and above all in the schematism. He believes that this little chapter constitutes in fact the conceptual center (Kernstück\textsuperscript{107}) of the work.

The importance Heidegger accords to the chapter on schematism illustrates the prime position of ontology as opposed to epistemology. Heidegger is asking how an object at all is possible. This is a question for ontology. Only a factual human being can cause an object to stand forth. This is despite, or rather because, the human intellect is not ontically creative. If we accept that the function of transcendental imagination as it is revealed in the schematism plays a pivotal role in the formation of objects, it becomes easier to see how Heidegger can interpret the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} as primarily a work of fundamental ontology.

In order to explain how this process of objectification works in Heidegger, I will first give a general overview of what he says about finitude in connection with Kant’s work in \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}. This means explaining how Heidegger is brought to the conclusion that transcendental imagination constitutes the center of the work. I will then examine in detail an aspect of finitude, namely his theory of objectification as revealed in §16 of this work. These two efforts of exegesis will constitute a defense of Heidegger’s unique interpretation, and also lay the ground for the examination of elements of contention in the relationship between epistemology and ontology, which will be further examined in the following chapter through the analysis of the role of transcendental imagination in the three kantian synthesizes. This function, which Heidegger takes to lie at the heart of both the \textit{Critique} and man’s innermost being, serves thus to illuminate the intricate relationship between ontological and intellectual finitude.

### 3.6 Finitude in the \textit{Kantbuch}

Heidegger first mentions ‘finitude’ in §4, entitled ‘The Essence of Knowledge’. This paragraph appears in the second part of the work, entitled ‘Carrying Out the Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics’, underneath the subsection A, 1 : ‘The Essential Characteristics of the Field of Origin’. This ‘origin’ gives an indication of Heidegger’s method. His task is that

\textsuperscript{107} Heidegger, \textit{Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik}, 89.
of the ‘essential determination of ontological knowledge through elucidation of its origin in the seed which makes it possible’\textsuperscript{108}. The following §5 is devoted to finitude, entitled ‘The Essence of the Finitude of Knowledge’. Finitude is thus accorded an essential importance in the mapping of knowledge. According to Heidegger, Kant presupposes the ‘essential characteristics of the field of origin’ in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. Finitude is assumed, and is therefore not a matter for discussion. His own interpretation, therefore, must not ‘overlook the previously worked-out function of these ‘assumptions’. He then proceeds to summarize them thus:

\begin{quote}
The ground for the source [\textit{Quellgrund}] for laying the ground for metaphysics is human pure reason, so that it is precisely the humanness of reason, i.e., its finitude, which will be essential for the core of this problemati of ground-laying...This finitude of reason, however, in no way consists only or primarily in the fact that human knowing demonstrates many sorts of deficiencies such as instability, imprecision and [the potential for making] errors. Rather, this finitude lies in the essential structure of knowledge itself.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

In this passage we learn of the central importance of finitude in the laying of the ground of metaphysics, and of its nature as inherent to human reason. Heidegger’s insistence in the second sentence that this finitude is not to be understood as a simple intellectual shortcoming is reminiscent of his analysis of the dichotomy of authenticity / inauthenticity in \textit{Being and Time}. We always stand in a relationship to our own death, whether authentic or inauthentic, because our essence is that of a mortal being.

Finitude, then, is the primary characteristic of human knowledge. After affirming this, Heidegger goes on to assert the importance of understanding that ‘knowing is primarily intuiting’ if one wishes to understand the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. He draws our attention to a quote he thinks is unduly neglected considering its importance, namely : ‘In whatever manner and by whatever means a knowing [\textit{eine Erkenntnis}] may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it relates itself immediately to them, and upon which all thought as a means is directed’\textsuperscript{110}. According to Heidegger, this means that the primacy must be given to intuition, rather than to thinking, in the description of human knowledge. ‘From this it at once becomes clear that the new interpretation of knowledge as judging (thinking) violates

\textsuperscript{108} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics},14.

\textsuperscript{109} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{110} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A19, B33, quoted in Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 15.
the decisive sense of the Kantian problem.’ Not only is intuition more authentic than
thinking, but ‘all thinking is merely in the service of intuition’\textsuperscript{111}. Kant separates intuition
\textit{(Empfindung, sensatio)} from thinking / knowing \textit{(Erkenntnis, cognitio)} in their divergent
ways of relating themselves to objects. Intuition enjoys a more intimate relationship with the
object than thinking does, because it ‘relates immediately to the object and is single; the
latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things can have in
common’\textsuperscript{112}.

Intuition and thinking share a common origin in representation: ‘If thinking is to be
essentially relative to intuition, however, then both intuition and thinking must have a certain
inherent relationship that allows their unification’\textsuperscript{113}. Representation here is taken in the
‘broad, formal sense’ and means one thing standing for another (‘indicates, announces,
presents another’). The relationship between representation, intuition and thinking is thus
classified by the assertion that ‘[t]he knowing representing is either intuition or concept’.
According to Heidegger, the first sentence quoted from the \textit{Critique} above (from A19/B33)
indicates that ‘knowing is a thinking intuiting’\textsuperscript{114}. Kant states that ‘[each of these two
{intuition and thinking}] is indeed representation, but is not yet knowledge’\textsuperscript{115}. The two
fundamental sources of knowledge are, for Kant, understanding and intuition, and on its own
neither can produce knowledge\textsuperscript{116}. As we shall see, Heidegger will a few paragraphs later
challenge the supremacy of this couple of functions serving human knowledge, positing that
they spring out of a common root, the third source of the imagination. Here he claims that to
draw the conclusion of the equal importance of these two sources is mistaken – knowing is
not primarily judgment. Rather, ‘we must maintain that intuition constitutes the authentic
essence \textit{[eigentliche Wesen]} of knowledge’. According the authentic essence of knowledge to
intuition here can be compared to his qualification of transcendental imagination as original

\textsuperscript{111} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 15.

\textsuperscript{112} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 16, quoting Kant, \textit{KrV}, A320, B376f.

\textsuperscript{113} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 15.

\textsuperscript{114} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 16.

\textsuperscript{115} Kant, \textit{Über die Fortschritte}, 312, quoted in Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 16.

\textsuperscript{116} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A51/B75.
(ursprünglich), as we will see below. It is a part of his effort to persuade the reader that Kant displaced the emphasis away from the understanding and towards the imagination in his mapping of the mechanics of human knowledge.

As Heidegger has already asserted that finitude constitutes the essence of human knowledge, we can then see that the intuition in question must be finite. It is ‘only with this interpretation of knowledge’ that it becomes ‘possible to grasp what is essential in this interpretation of knowledge, namely, the finitude of knowledge’\(^{117}\). In other words this interpretation suits Heidegger well in his interpretation of the *Critique* as fundamental ontology.

In effect, the prime focus on intuition here serves to justify Heidegger’s ontological reading of the *Critique*. His concern is not only with how an object presents itself to our knowing of it, but how we in a certain way can be said to create the object that we know. To explain the particular nature of this creation Heidegger contrasts our finite intellect with the mode of creation inherent in the nature of a hypothetical infinite intellect, once again beginning by tackling his subject negatively.

An infinite intellect is an intellect possessed of original intuition (*intuitus originarius*), which means it is ontically creative. It ‘first brings this [intuited] being into its Being, helps it to its coming-into-being (*origo*)\(^{118}\). It cannot think a thing without at the same time creating it, because it is itself infinite and comprises everything. *Intuitus originarius*, which Heidegger qualifies as ‘infinite divine knowledge’\(^{119}\) would not be absolute if it depended on an exterior entity that provided what becomes known to it. This means that an infinite intellect is incapable of having an object. An object (*ob-jectus*) is something that is thrown forth and as such is exterior to the subject. The absolute subject cannot stand against something that contrasts with itself. At the end of this preliminary negative sketch of finite knowledge, Heidegger guards against a possible misunderstanding.

\(^{117}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 16.

\(^{118}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 16.

\(^{119}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 16.
The essential difference between these kinds of knowledge lies...primarily in intuiting itself, since properly speaking even knowing is intuition. The finitude of human knowledge must first of all be sought in the finitude of its own intuition.\(^{120}\)

The ‘mark of finitude’, however, is thinking, because an infinite intuition does not need this mediate connection to the thing intuited. It ‘simply [sees] through it in advance’. I will give a more thorough account of objectification below in the explanation of §16, where Heidegger gives a positive account of the conceptual creation particular to the finite Dasein in letting something become an object. As §5 begins by stating, finite intuition is not creative. However, a certain mode of creation is particular to it, as Heidegger will explain in connection with his interpretation of transcendental imagination.

This following §5 is devoted to ‘The Essence of the Finitude of Knowledge’. Heidegger here defines our finite intuition as an \textit{intuitus derivativus}. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, it differs from the originary intuition in that it does not create the things that give themselves to its thought. It must receive them from something outside itself. Kant distinguishes the receptivity of intuition (\textit{Rezeptivität der Vorstellungsfähigkeit (Sinnlichkeit)} from the spontaneity of thinking. In §24 of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, the spontaneity in question is that of the productive imagination.\(^{121}\) Heidegger emphasizes that it is finite intuition, and not intuition in general, that is characterized as receptivity. Our intuition takes the form of receptivity because we are finite. This is in line with the analysis of Dasein in \textit{Being and Time}. Dasein is being-in-the-world. The tools of which we have a pre-ontological understanding by using them are already present in this world; they did not come from us.

Continuing in this vein, Heidegger goes on to claim that Kant was the first philosopher to propose an ontological theory of sensibility, as opposed to a sensualist account. It is in the nature of receptivity that it must be affected by what it intuits. We must therefore have senses to intuit with.

Because our Dasein is finite – existing in the midst of beings that already are, being to which it has been delivered over – therefore it must necessarily take this already-existing being in stride, that is to say, it must offer it the possibility of announcing itself.\(^{122}\)

\(^{120}\) Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, 17.

\(^{121}\) Kant, \textit{KrV}, B150-B152.

\(^{122}\) Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 18.
This is one of those ‘assumptions’ Heidegger claims lie between the lines of the *Critique*. Although Kant says it is in the nature of that which is receptive that it is affected by other beings, he does not say that we must have senses because we are finite. It is not a far stretch by Heidegger from the first to the second, but the interpretation is, again, germane to his own conception of Dasein as being-with, being-in-the-world. As he claimed in the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*, we are always existing amidst other beings. As will be explained more thoroughly below, our unique position amongst these other beings is revealed through the positive account of the objectification accomplished by our finitude.

The finitude in question here is clearly intellectual, pertaining to our knowledge. At the same time it is ontological, because it concerns being. Ultimately it concerns the being of Dasein itself, because Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of the ontic beings it encounters in its world is comprised in its pre-ontological understanding of its own being. Dasein is characterized by its transcendence, by the extension of its being outside of itself: the mark of finitude. It would be more exact to call the finitude pertaining to the nature of Dasein a fundamental-ontological finitude. To distinguish it from ontological finitude, however, by intellectual finitude I mean here that which specifically concerns Dasein’s knowledge of beings other than its own. It explains how Dasein knows things by permitting them to present themselves as objects to Dasein’s receptivity. In effect, Heidegger states a little later in this paragraph:

> The finitude of knowledge has been characterized hitherto as intuition that takes things in stride and that is therefore thinking. This clarification of finitude took place with reference to the structure of knowing. By virtue of the fundamental significance which finitude has for the problematic of the laying of the ground for metaphysics, the essence of finite knowledge should come to be illuminated from still another side, namely, with a view toward what is knowable in such knowledge.  

Since the analysis of finitude has hitherto concerned ‘the structure of knowing’, it can be said to have a strong epistemological component. What has been investigated is the human potential for knowing insofar as its intuition is finite. At the same time, Heidegger’s main concern is revealed in the last sentence. That which is ‘knowable in such knowledge’ is objects that are permitted to appear through this finitude. Understanding how beings come to appear will serve to illuminate Dasein in a way that an epistemological analysis will not. The

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ultimate question here belongs to the domain of ontology. This is revealed in Heidegger’s theory of objectification, which we will now examine.

### 3.7 Heidegger’s theory of objectification

Objectification\(^\text{124}\) (Vergegenständlichung) is the account of how an object is formed, and therefore how this object is possible. This ‘being formed’ does not, in Heidegger, mean that it is created by the derived, finite intellect that intuits it, but that this finite intellect enables it to appear. In his examination of Kant’s account of objectification, Heidegger is most interested in what is said in the transcendental deduction of the categories and in the short chapter on the schematism. As mentioned above, Kant demonstrates in the transcendental deduction that the intellectual categories have as their only domain of application the manifold provided by the senses and unified by the originary synthetic unity of transcendental apperception. In the following chapter on the schematism, he shows how this is actually done through the application of the schemas. Heidegger perceives the chapter on schematism to be indispensable for this reason: it reveals the original (ursprüngliche) conditions of possibility for objectification. The most authentic function involved in the process of objectification is transcendental imagination, and not the understanding, nor intuition, which have their common origin in the source of imagination.

The problem of objectification is discussed not only in the context of Kant’s own theory of objectification, but in many of Heidegger’s works, not least in *Being and Time*. *Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein* is intimately concerned with how Dasein through the structures of its being reveals (or discloses) other beings – in other words, how it forms objects. This reflects why the analysis of Dasein founds other ontologies. It is through understanding the nature of Dasein that we can understand the nature of other beings insofar as they appear. Conversely, it is through understanding the world that Dasein is in and the beings it encounters there that

\(^{124}\) In the French translation, de Wahelhens et Biemel have opted for the translation of ‘objectification’ for Entgegenstehen, as this term brings to mind objicere. The German points back to this etymological denotation. See *Kant et le problème de la métaphysique* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1953, translation by Alphonse de Waelhens and Walter Biemel), 129. ‘Objectification’ is also the term adopted by Emad, P. and Maly, K. in the English translation of *Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Richard Taft’s translation, more literal translations of Entgegenstehenlassen and its variations are employed: letting-stand-against-of, etc.
we can understand Dasein, both in the first, pre-ontological way and later through ontological and ontic knowledge. Transcendence, our nature as finite beings, makes possible our understanding of other beings, while the understanding of these beings makes possible our understanding of ourselves. This is not a circle without a beginning, however, because Dasein is always thrown into a world and as such always has pre-ontological understanding, which constitutes the starting point for the more advanced form of understanding (ontological knowledge) accessed through authenticity and objectification.

The problem of objectification cannot be isolated from the understanding of Heidegger’s investigation of Dasein and finitude in this period, and an exhaustive analysis of the place and importance of objectification in these works will not be conducted here. I will rather focus on objectification in those of its aspects that seem to best illuminate the problem of intellectual finitude. I will not examine objectification as it is analyzed throughout Being in Time as an essential ability of Dasein. Rather, I will focus on his theory as he reveals it through his discussion of Kant.

Heidegger’s understanding of objectification is, as is often the case with his concepts, already indicated in his choice of vocabulary. A Gegen-stand is something that stands against something else. The finite, derived intellect (intuitus derivativus) is a subject knowing an object that is already given. As we saw above, Heidegger illuminates this ability to have an object of our finite intellect by comparing it with a hypothetical infinite intellect devoid of this ability, since it does not need to think. Thinking is the mediate access to the object, while intuition is the immediate.

After emphasizing in §5 (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics) that the focus of his present investigation is that of finite knowledge, Heidegger proceeds to analyze some terms Kant uses in connection with the knowledge of objects. In the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique, Kant distinguishes between an object (Gegenstand), the thing in itself (Ding an sich), and appearance (Erscheinung). These concepts, Heidegger claims, are rendered intelligible only if one always keeps in mind the finitude of human knowledge. The term ‘appearance’, for Heidegger, indicates the way the finite intellect permits an object to stand

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125 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics, 23.
forth. ‘[T]he knowable must show itself from itself’\textsuperscript{126} because it exists independently from and prior to the finite intellect that intuits it. Heidegger ties appearance to being in itself here, explaining that the fact that the being appears as an object shows that the entity it appears to is a finite intellect. ‘More precisely stated: only for finite knowledge is there anything at all like an object. It alone is delivered over to the being which already is’\textsuperscript{127}. This is interesting in the light of Kant’s self-claimed ‘copernican revolution’ that postulated that objects are best understood as conforming to the preexisting structures of our intellect and not the other way around\textsuperscript{128}. Here Heidegger refers again to the hypothetical infinite intuition, which would allow the being in itself (the thing in itself in kantian terms) to stand forth. To apprehend an appearance is to have an object, and to conform to this object insofar as it is apprehended. The act of conforming would be a dependency on the object, which is why an infinite intuition cannot have an object. Heidegger insists on the true significance of Kant’s copernican revolution, which he claims is subject to frequent misunderstanding. For Kant objects must conform to our intellect. For Heidegger, we must conform to things in themselves in that we are dependent on them in the sense that they exist before we apprehend them. However, it is our intellect that makes of them an object by letting an appearance stand forth, and our intellect does this because it is finite. Objectification is a positive, unique ability of Dasein. It is in this sense the copernican revolution is understood by Heidegger: the finitude of our intellect is what enables us to have objects. Heidegger expresses this in the oft-repeated dictum that ontological knowledge precedes ontic knowledge. It is transcendence that permits this ontological knowledge that makes objects appear. In turn, this ontological knowledge that permits us to have objects conditions our knowledge of the objects as ontic entities. The importance of transcendence to objectification is indicated in §16 of \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, to which we now turn.

\textsuperscript{126} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 20.

\textsuperscript{127} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics}, 20.

\textsuperscript{128} Kant, \textit{KrV}, Bxvi.
3.8 Objectification and transcendence

§16 is entitled ‘The Elucidation of the Transcendence of Finite Reason as Basic Intention of the Transcendental Deduction’\(^{129}\). Since this paragraph deals with objectification, we understand that objectification is closely tied to transcendence. In order to understand what transcendence means in this context I will examine what transcendence means to Heidegger in general.

According to Malpas and Crowell in their introduction to *Transcendental Heidegger*, transcendence is in Heidegger most frequently linked to the adjectival form ‘transcendental’ as it is tied to Kant. At the same time Heidegger stands closer to Husserl’s interpretation of transcendence as being of central importance to Kant’s critical enterprise than Kant himself.\(^{130}\) As mentioned in chapter one, Kant describes the transcendental as that which pertains to the possibility of knowledge, and not the objects of knowledge themselves\(^{131}\). For Heidegger the question of transcendence is also a question of the possibility of knowledge, but his emphasis is more explicitly on the objects that are known. At the same time Heidegger maintains that his own interpretation of finitude as central to transcendence must be correct if the transcendental deduction is to be intelligible.

Heidegger first mentions transcendence in §3 after quoting the passage from the *Critique* referenced in the previous paragraph, qualifying it as ‘the stepping-over…of pure reason to the being, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object’. In §8 he offers a curious juxtaposition of his own project of fundamental ontology with Kant’s critical enterprise:

> What is at issue is the essential possibility of ontological synthesis. When unfolded, the question reads: How can finite human Dasein pass beyond (transcend) the being in advance when this being is not only something it did not create itself, but something at which it must be directed in order to exist as Dasein?\(^{132}\)

\(^{129}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 47.


\(^{131}\) Kant, *KrV*, A56/B80.

Dasein was described in *Being and Time* as being-in-the-world. While the essence of man is his finitude, his being-unto-death, he is primarily characterized as a practical being involved with things. Dasein necessarily exists in a world. In this passage Heidegger proceeds to explain that the problem of the transcendental can also be explicated through the analysis of the ‘innermost essence’ of the ‘finite being that we shall call human being’. In this way he ties his interpretation of Kant’s critique to the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*. Kant puts forth a critique of reason, of knowledge, and to Heidegger such a critique takes the form of a fundamental ontology, as he states in the first sentence of his interpretation. In tying objectification to the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger offers a plausible justification for his interpretation of the *Critique* as a work of ontology (fundamental ontology). The central idea in the passage quoted above is finitude. Kant is concerned with how human beings can have knowledge of objects, but finitude does not stand so explicitly on center stage as it does in Heidegger.

Heidegger justifies the central importance of transcendence to objectification in §16, which we will now examine more closely. In demonstrating the link between these two terms, Heidegger begins by returning to the ‘knowable’ discussed in §5. This focus on the being that is ontologically known, however, cannot be separated from the focus on the subject which ontologically knows. Previously (e.g. in §5 on the ‘Essence of the Finitude of Knowledge’) Heidegger has indicated that it is necessary to understand the structure of the finite intellect in order to understand how these objects stand forth. For this reason it is useful to keep in mind the results of the analysis of Dasein while reading Heidegger’s account of transcendence and objectification.

As Heidegger described in *Being and Time*, Dasein is characterized by its pre-ontological understanding. Although we move, in our common mode of the everyday (Alltäglichkeit) in the forgetfulness of being (Seinsvergessenheit), we always have a certain understanding of being, because Dasein is in its essence a relation to being. In order for us to have an object, however, the ‘knowable’ must be able to present itself; it must exist prior to our knowledge of it, since our intuition is not ontically creative, but receptive. Heidegger is here considering the structure of being (Seinsverfassung) of the being that is to be known – which means that

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133 Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 1.
we are dealing with ontological knowledge. This ontological knowledge is ‘here...always pre-ontological’\textsuperscript{134}. This pre-ontological knowledge conditions the possibility of the finite intellect to have an object\textsuperscript{135}. The fact that we are dealing with conditions of possibility of knowledge shows why the possibility for objectification is transcendence. This transcendence must be a part of fundamental ontology, as the structure of Dasein is what must be ultimately understood if the possibility of objectification is to be understood. Although Heidegger begins by discussing the structure of the known being, what is ultimately at stake here is the structure of Dasein. It is because what is of primary interest is not knowledge but ontological structure that the question of objectification is a question for ontology.

This pre-ontological knowledge of the finite intellect constitutes an ‘original turning toward’ that is characteristic of the comportment of all finite beings that turn towards beings susceptible of giving themselves to be known. This ‘basic faculty [Grundvermögen] of [holding] oneself in advance in such a play-space [Spielraum], to form it originally’ is transcendence\textsuperscript{136}. This is not yet objectification, but the condition for its possibility. This possibility for ontological knowledge has its foundation (gründet) in the pure synthesis, which must therefore be examined in order to ‘unveil’ the ‘innermost essence of the finitude of reason’\textsuperscript{137}. The synthesis in question is the ontological synthesis of transcendental imagination, which Heidegger has described in §14. I will examine this synthesis in the next chapter. Transcendental imagination, as stated above, constitutes for Heidegger the common source of both understanding and intuition, and is therefore more original than both. This is why he accords the ontological synthesis an essential role in the unveiling of the finitude of reason.

\textsuperscript{134} Heidegger, Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics, 47.

\textsuperscript{135} In the translator’s note to the French translation at the beginning of §16, mention is made that the act of objectification in question here is prior to the act of objectification as it is understood by epistemology. See Kant et le problème de la métaphysique, 129.

\textsuperscript{136} Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 48.

\textsuperscript{137} Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 48.
The rest of the paragraph is devoted to the explication of the role of understanding. Understanding and intuition are the two fundamental sources of knowledge according to Kant. Of the two, Heidegger has accorded the primacy to intuition, and relegated the subordinated role to thinking. This was accomplished through the comparison with an infinite intuition, which has no need for thinking, having already an immediate relationship to that which is intuited, creating it by intuiting it. Now Heidegger looks closer at this auxiliary role thinking appears to play in relation to intuition, and searches for its contribution in making possible the structure of transcendence.

Heidegger has established that our knowledge must be receptive, insofar as it is finite. The possibility of the reception of being is, as he mentioned in the beginning of the paragraph, that the known beings offer themselves up to be known. Heidegger then asks, ‘what is that we, from out of ourselves, allow to stand-against?’ It cannot be a being, it must be a non-being (ein Nichts). Since our intuition is not ontically creative, it is not in our own power to make objects susceptible of offering themselves up. We must turn to this nothing in order to open ourselves to the non-nothing (nicht-Nichts) of beings, which can then reveal themselves. Heidegger emphasizes that the nothing in question is not a nihil absolutum, but an opened space permitting the manifestation of beings. It is an essential part of the structure of objectification.

This nothing is reminiscent of the moment of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) that Dasein can reach through the experience of anxiety. The feeling (Befindlichkeit) of anxiety has no object; it perceives a void, a nothing. It would seem that this is a wholly negative experience, but it is in fact the only way to reach the authentic mode of existence. The nothing often plays a pivotal role in processes of realization in Heidegger. The nothing is essential to the disclosure of being through objectification, and to the achievement of the authentic mode of existence for Dasein.

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138 Kant, KrV, A50/B74 and A294/B350. But as mentioned, Heidegger believes these two sources to spring from the imagination. The imagination would then be the most original source. This is supported by certain passages in the Critique. See for instance A15/B29.

139 The article What Is Metaphysics? is also concerned with the nothing (das Nichts).
Concerning objectification, the central question is how this orientation (Zuwendung-zu) towards the object in general is possible. Kant was the first to ask this general ontological question in a ‘decisive’ manner in the transcendental deduction. Quoting the A-edition of the transcendental deduction, Heidegger shows that objectification reveals something that ‘opposes’ itself to our knowledge. This mode of opposition is specific to being. It reveals a constraint (the ‘necessity’ Kant mentions), which in its turn is responsible for a ‘concordance’ into which all that is encountered is forced. This concordance constitutes a unity, a

representing of a representative, unifying unity...a consciousness in the sense of the representing of unity. The letting-stand against...is hence the ‘primal concept’ [Urbegriff], and, to the extent that the conceptual representing comes to be assigned to the understanding, the primal activity of the understanding.

For Kant, the understanding is the faculty of rules. It contains, according to Heidegger, a ‘multitude of ways of unification’. It is here the understanding reveals itself as the very faculty of objectification. Before receiving the manifold first received by the intuition, it has imposed the rules to which this manifold must accord. For this reason it would seem that the understanding should be accorded a more original importance than the intuition. Heidegger reminds us that it is the finitude of reason that supports the problem of the possibility of metaphysics.

In fact, there is no paradox. In revealing itself as the faculty of objectification, the understanding shows itself as the true mark of finitude. This is because objectification is in itself the act of a finite being. Since understanding is the supreme faculty within finitude, it is effectively subordinated to intuition. As far as it is pure understanding, it will be subordinated to pure intuition, and will remain the master of empirical intuition. It is superior to empirical intuition because it is the faculty of rules, and the manifold received by the intuition must conform to these rules, in accord with Kant’s copernican revolution. This pure

\[140\] Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 49.

\[141\] Kant, *KrV*, A104.

\[142\] Kant, *KrV*, A104.

\[143\] Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 50.

\[144\] Kant, *KrV*, A126.
intuition also betrays its finite essence. Heidegger concludes the paragraph by saying that it is only ‘their essential structural unity [that] immerses pure intuition and pure thinking in their full finitude’\(^\text{145}\). This finitude will reveal itself as transcendence. The ‘elucidation of transcendence’ that he is seeking will be revealed through the analysis of the function of the imagination.

Heidegger has shown in this paragraph in what way the understanding can be said to be the mark of finitude, insofar as it constitutes the faculty of objectification. Concerning man’s intellectual finitude, Heidegger has postulated that the understanding plays a role of prime importance. At the same time it remains subordinated to intuition. This is comparable to the relationship between attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) and cognition examined in the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*. The sentence ‘Dasein ist gestimmt’ expresses the prime importance of mood in Dasein and opposes itself to the primacy granted to cognition by the expression of the cartesian cogito. The pre-ontological knowledge of beings that Dasein has because it is its nature to stand in relationship to beings is tied rather to attunement than to cognition.

In his analysis of intellectual finitude in this paragraph, however, Heidegger has placed the emphasis on the understanding. But perhaps we cannot understand understanding without first understanding the root it shares with intuition: transcendental imagination. Heidegger believes that transcendental imagination constitutes the central piece (*Kernstück*) of Kant’s *Critique*. Since he considers the *Critique* to be a work of fundamental ontology, it follows that transcendental imagination is the center of man, and the center of finitude. To understand the essence of transcendence, then, we must next examine transcendental imagination, which is intimately tied to objectification.

The analysis of objectification has been a positive account of the finite intellect, the illustration of a talent particular to knowing Dasein, of something it can do that an infinite intellect does not. It is its finitude that enables objectification. Objectification, therefore, is an important step in Heidegger’s efforts towards a definition of man through his fundamental ontology. In order to have an object, there must be some form of conceptual creativity. The

\(^{145}\) Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 51.
nature of this non-ontic creation becomes clear through the analysis of the role played by
transcendental imagination.

From the preceding examination of objectification, it transpires that the demarcation line
between ontological and intellectual finitude is not clear. It seems more in line with
Heidegger’s thinking to state that man’s factual finitude (his mortality) precedes his
intellectual finitude, as the essence of man is his relationship with death. In this chapter I
have examined his opposition between a finite and an infinite intuition. Although ontological
finitude would seem more essential to man than intellectual finitude, it is not thereby
immediately obvious that man has a finite intuition because he is factically mortal.

Heidegger is not interested in hypothetical discussions of human immortality and whether or
not this would entail for us an absolute, ontically creative intuition that comprises everything
within itself. The analysis of the infinite intuition is only interesting insofar as it illuminates
what we are not. Also, Heidegger does not discuss whether or not this hypothetical infinite
intuition is immortal or not. An ontically creative absolute intellect obviously has a lot in
common with the traditional uncreated Judeo-Christian god who has created everything and
who is also deathless. The immortality of this being is not broached by Heidegger, however,
because it is uninteresting in the negative function it is meant to serve.

Therefore, we have as of yet not resolved the question of the nature of the relationship
between ontological and intellectual finitude. We have seen that our intellectual finitude is
rendered evident by the essential structure of our knowledge of things, for instance in our
relationship to things in objectifying them. In our knowledge of things we stand in an
ontological relationship to the things known. This is Heidegger’s view, as we know, that we
are dealing with ontology and not epistemology. The role of transcendental imagination is
especially illuminating of the relationship between ontological and intellectual finitude, as
Heidegger’s entire interpretation turns upon it. For Heidegger, we will see, transcendental
imagination is in its nature temporal. Time is the only available horizon for any
understanding of being whatsoever, as we know from Being and Time. Since objectification
is accomplished by the temporal function of transcendental imagination, our knowledge of
objects must be intimately tied up with our understanding of being, and therefore with being
itself, since time is at the center of both. The term ‘synthesis’ is essential to Heidegger’s
interpretation, as this synthesis is the center of man. The relationship between synthesis and
transcendental imagination must now be explored, in order to elucidate what Heidegger perceives to be the subjectivity of the subject.
4. Synthesis and Transcendental Imagination

Early in his interpretation of Kant\textsuperscript{146}, Heidegger makes the following assertion: ‘The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with a ‘theory of knowledge’ [*Erkenntnistheorie*].’ He moderates his affirmation in the next sentence, stating that if it were to be called a theory of knowledge, then it is a theory of ontological and not ontic knowledge. Epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*) is traditionally the domain of ontic knowledge, which is why it would be entirely mistaken to interpret the *Critique* as epistemology. Although Heidegger seems to qualify his initial strong statement, he remarks that even understanding the *Critique* as a critique of ontological knowledge would be a mistaken approach. With this interpretation as our guide we would not [encounter] what is essential, namely, that ontology as *Metaphysica generalis*, i.e., as the basic part [*Grundstück*] of metaphysics as a whole, is grounded [*begründet*], and here for the first time it is seen for what it is. With the problem of transcendence, a ‘theory of knowledge’ is not set in place of metaphysics, but rather the inner possibility of ontology is questioned.\textsuperscript{147}

I won’t attempt to justify that the *Critique* has ‘nothing to do’ with epistemology. However, if Heidegger can be charitably interpreted as saying rather that for him Kant’s *Critique* has nothing (or very little) to do with epistemology, then the statement becomes easier to understand. Heidegger makes no secret of the fact that he wishes to understand Kant better than he understood himself, and in a practical sense this means that he wishes to nourish a seed sown but neglected by Kant. This is transcendental imagination and its prime importance to understanding the temporality at the center of human being and knowledge, transcendental imagination as the common source of both the understanding and intuition in Kant’s system. Heidegger’s attention to a certain aspect of the *Critique* leads to his neglect of other aspects, but this is because Heidegger is not involved in a disinterested, historical exegesis. He is searching for examples of fundamental ontology as it has surfaced before his own time, intimations of the finitude of being perceived by other philosophers germane to his own research.

\textsuperscript{146} Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 11.

\textsuperscript{147} Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem Of Metaphysics*, 11.
In other words, although it can be difficult to separate epistemology from ontology when dealing with Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, it seems indisputable that Heidegger’s own concern is with ontology, both in what he explicitly says he is interested in and in the object of his research: *die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*. In the previous chapter I compared ontological finitude as it is described in the analysis of Dasein with intellectual finitude as it is described through the interpretation of Kant, and especially in the account of objectification. At the center of both is time, in the sense that the limit of human time, finitude, is the center of human being and the center of the possibility of cognition.

The center (*Kernstück*) of Kant’s *Critique* is, according to Heidegger, the short chapter on the schematism. We can guess that this central importance accorded to the schematism has to do with time. It is there Kant comes closest to understanding how objectification is truly made possible, according to Heidegger. The schematism of transcendental imagination is the pure synthesis without which synthetic judgments *a priori* would be impossible. As the common source of intuition and understanding it is more original than these two offshoots.

Heidegger’s novel interpretation of the role of transcendental imagination is the crux of his claim that the *Critique* is best read as first and foremost a work of fundamental ontology. He claims that the common source of understanding and intuition, which are the two sources of knowledge in human beings, is fundamentally temporal. Previously, in *Being and Time*, he has claimed that the only possible understanding of being is to be gained against the horizon of time. In making transcendental imagination the center of knowing, as Heidegger claims Kant does, Kant would then seem to agree that temporality is the center of human knowing. This, of course, presupposes that one agrees with Heidegger on the central importance and the temporal nature of transcendental imagination.

Even if we grant that transcendental imagination is the central function of the acquisition of human knowledge, however, it does not automatically follow that temporality is the essence of human existence. This is the heideggerian thesis of *Being and Time* that Heidegger seems eager to foist on the *Critique*. These questions regard the delimitation between ontology and epistemology that Heidegger is grappling with throughout his interpretation. They stand and fall upon transcendental imagination and whether or not it is tied primarily to our knowledge, or rather more fundamentally, to our innermost being.
My investigation of the meaning of transcendental imagination in Heidegger’s interpretation will proceed from two perspectives. The first is Kant’s own exposition of transcendental imagination, primarily in the transcendental deduction of the categories and in the schematism, followed by Heidegger’s views on Kant’s express explanation of the concept. The second perspective is that given in Heidegger’s radical appropriation of the threefold synthesis enabling objectification. Heidegger’s perspective seeks to show that the inner logic of Kant’s system should compel him to conclude as Heidegger himself did, i.e., that the inner nature of man is temporality, and transcendental imagination must be the source of understanding and intuition. The former perspective, on the other hand, is more of an attempt to justify his interpretation by commenting on Kant’s characterizations of transcendental imagination.

4.1 Transcendental imagination in Kant’s *Critique*

Before attempting to understand Heidegger’s points of concord and disaccord with Kant’s theory of transcendental imagination, I shall first give an explanation of this concept as it figures in Kant’s own *Critique*. It is only through an understanding of what transcendental imagination can be that the importance Heidegger accords to the synthesis in the elucidation of the subjectivity of the subject becomes apparent. A careful reading is in order, because Kant employs a number of expressions regarding transcendental imagination, and there is a specific sense Heidegger is interested in – a specific synthesis he is hunting among the shapes the imagination takes for Kant, and the syntheses Kant supplies to accompany them. Kant’s exposition of the imagination is not isolated from the exposition of the other elements in his system, always aiming to show how synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible. Transcendental imagination is a necessary part of the explanation, but Kant does not facilitate the comprehension of the nature of this faculty. He differentiates between productive (transcendental) imagination and empirical/reproductive imagination, and the functions of the imagination that are the figurative and the intellectual syntheses.\(^\text{148}\)

\(^\text{148}\) This section on the transcendental imagination in Kant’s *Critique* draws on an earlier paper of mine for a course on the *Critique of Pure Reason* at the University of Oslo, written in May 2007, entitled ‘Er den transcendentale innbildingskraften en egen evne?’ (Is the Transcendental Imagination a Separate Faculty?) In this paper I suggest that the postulation of the transcendental imagination is necessitated by the inner logic of
Kant does not use the exact expression ‘transcendental imagination’ in the Analytic of the *Critique*. He discusses ‘the transcendental act of the imagination’¹⁴⁹, ‘the transcendental synthesis of the imagination’¹⁵⁰ and ‘the transcendental product of the imagination’¹⁵¹. His choice of vocabulary shows that if transcendental imagination is a separate faculty, it is first and foremost intertwined with the function it fulfills or the product it produces, which defends the use of the expression ‘transcendental imagination’ in the sense of ‘the imagination insofar as it is transcendental’, despite the fact that Kant does not himself use this expression. As we will see, transcendental imagination is in Kant’s text defined in connection with this act/function/product.

Imagination is introduced in relation to Kant’s definition of synthesis in the transcendental deduction of the categories¹⁵², where synthesis is defined ‘in the most general sense’ as ‘the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition’. A synthesis is further characterized as ‘pure’ if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time)*. This synthesis ‘in general’ is ‘the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious’.¹⁵³ As we can see, the imagination is defined as a part of another definition, namely that of the synthesis, the primary subject of the sentence.¹⁵⁴

Kant’s system, and that this explains why Kant is reluctant to describe it in detail. The heterogeneity of understanding and sensibility necessitate a mediator endowed with the characteristics of both, and an entity called ‘the transcendental imagination’, as Kant enumerates its characteristics, satisfies these requirements, and is therefore an essential component in making synthetic judgments a priori possible.

¹⁴⁹ Kant, *KrV*, B154.
¹⁵⁰ Kant, *KrV*, B151.
¹⁵¹ Kant, *KrV*, A142/B181.
¹⁵² Kant, *KrV*, A78/B103.
¹⁵³ Kant, *KrV*, A77-A78/B103.
¹⁵⁴ The entire definition runs as follows: ‘Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to *concepts* is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.’ Kant, *KrV*, A78/B103.
There are several items of moment here. Since the imagination is ascribed to the ‘soul’, it is tied primarily neither to the understanding nor to sensibility, the two sources of knowledge. The characterization of the imagination as a ‘blind’ and ‘seldom conscious’ function pertaining to the ‘soul’ can indicate a difficulty in obtaining an epistemological grasp of it. One can understand the allure this holds for Heidegger – Kant presents the imagination as a mysterious faculty belonging to the soul, which Heidegger would explain as constituting the center of the subjectivity of the subject. Kant is unable to define this faculty in a more precise manner, Heidegger would say, because he failed to understand that the subjectivity of the subject as temporality was revealed in the central position of transcendental imagination. Kant also describes the imagination as an ‘indispensable function’. In other words, the imagination is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. Heidegger equates the human possibility of knowledge with essence. Within his interpretation, therefore, the imagination would seem to play a central role to the being of man. However, this does not yet show us how the synthesis of transcendental imagination can be said to constitute this essence – or quintessence, as the imagination is far from being the only necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge. Such an interpretation cannot be gotten from Kant alone, but must wait for Heidegger’s interpretation.

It is also worth noting that Kant only offers a preliminary explanation of the imagination here (‘as we shall subsequently see’). The attributive adjective ‘transcendental’ does not accompany the imagination here, and neither does it accompany the synthesis, because it is the ‘Synthesis in general’ that is subject to definition. It becomes evident later in the text, in paragraph 24, that the figurative synthesis, or synthesis speciosa, must be distinguished from the intellectual synthesis, synthesis intellectualis. This will be explained in more detail below.

Since the imagination is defined for the first time within the frame of another definition, it can be useful to go back a few lines and take a closer look at the synthesis, which in turn is defined by the help of ‘imagination’. It is in fact the synthesis which is being postulated as a condition for the possibility of experience, but it, again, is dependent on the imagination as the faculty by which it is accomplished. This explains why ‘imagination’ constitutes a part of

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155 Kant, KrV, A51/B75.
the definition of ‘synthesis’. In what degree the imagination constitutes a necessary condition for the possibility of experience depends, therefore, on whether or not the synthesis does. Kant explains here\(^{156}\) that the manifold presented by sensibility must be synthesized before the spontaneity of thought can be applied to it. The synthesis is that which puts ‘different representations together with each other and comprehend[s] their manifoldness in one cognition.’\(^{157}\) This means that the synthesis ‘alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition.’\(^{158}\)

This statement can be taken as a first defense of Heidegger’s claim regarding the primary importance of the synthesis, and transcendental imagination, in the primacy of our knowledge, and thus of our being. At the same time, the understanding also plays an important role here, as we see by the final sentence in the preliminary definition of the synthesis given above. As Kant remarks in A78/B104, there are three necessary conditions that must be fulfilled in order for us to have knowledge: the manifold of pure intuition, the synthesis of the imagination, and the representation of the synthetic unity, which is supplied by the concepts of the understanding. In other words, these three conditions cannot be reduced to each other, which both supports and goes against Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination as original in relationship to sensibility and understanding. It concords with Heidegger’s consideration of transcendental imagination as a third, necessary source of knowledge, but it does not show how understanding and sensibility spring from the imagination.

Paragraph 24 of the B-edition of the *Critique* is entitled ‘On the application of the categories to objects of the senses in general’.\(^{159}\) In this paragraph we are introduced to a particular synthesis – the figurative synthesis. It is through this synthesis that the application of the categories obtain an objective validity. The *synthesis speciosa* is distinguished from the

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156 Kant, *KrV*, A77/B102.

157 Kant, *KrV*, A77/B103.

158 Kant, *KrV*, A78/B103.

159 Kant, *KrV*, B150.
synthesis intellectualis in that only the former is assigned to the imagination, and this is the key element separating the two. Kant gives here a definition of the imagination as such, saying that it is ‘the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition’\textsuperscript{160}. This entails, as he explains in the following sentence, that the imagination must be ascribed to sensibility, as all intuition (Anschauung) is sensible. However, the synthesis of the imagination is spontaneity, he goes on to say, which determines rather than being determinable, as is the case of sensibility.\textsuperscript{161} We see here an indication of what will be explained later in the chapter on the schematism; namely, that the imagination unites characteristics pertaining respectively to the spontaneous understanding and the receptive sensibility. Heidegger, of course, would explain this hybrid nature of the imagination to derive from its primacy as the source of the two others. Of note in this definition of transcendental imagination is also Kant’s characterization of the imagination as a separate faculty (Vermögen). The synthesis connected with this faculty, the synthesis speciosa, as well as the synthesis intellectualis, are characterized as ‘transcendental’ in Kant’s sense of the term because they make knowledge possible.\textsuperscript{162}

So far Kant has indicated that the figurative synthesis of transcendental imagination is necessary for the pronouncement of synthetic judgments \textit{a priori} in virtue of its hybrid nature as both spontaneous and receptive. He has not yet shown \textit{how} this is accomplished, which is the task of the schematism. When Heidegger claims that this chapter constitutes the heart of the \textit{Critique} he is indicating that transcendental imagination constitutes the heart of Kant’s system of knowledge. This permits Heidegger to draw a link to what he himself saw as man’s essence, namely, temporality – the possibility of one’s own death, as expounded in the analysis of Dasein in \textit{Being and Time}.

Considering the schematism as the heart of the \textit{Critique} yields an inkling of an answer to the question regarding the possibility of synthetic judgments \textit{a priori}. The goal of the chapter on schematism, following the transcendental deduction in order of exposition, is to explain how it is possible for objects of sensibility to be subsumed under the categories of the

\textsuperscript{160} Kant, \textit{KrV}, B151.

\textsuperscript{161} Kant, \textit{KrV}, B151-B152.

\textsuperscript{162} Kant, \textit{KrV}, B151.
understanding when these two sources are ‘entirely unhomogeneous’ (ganz ungleichartig).\textsuperscript{163} The difficulty of synthetic judgments a priori is traced to the heterogeneity of the components permitting them – the different natures of understanding and sensibility. As we now know, the resolution of the difficulties is supplied by transcendental imagination. Since without this mediator the two other sources could not supply us with knowledge, Heidegger perceives this chapter, concerned with the modus operandi of transcendental imagination, to be essential.

The synthesis speciosa is rechristened ‘schema’ in the schematism. The schema is the ‘transcendental product of the imagination’.\textsuperscript{164} Regarding the exact nature of the schema, Kant does not provide a straightforward definition in the section on schematism. Rather cryptically he defines the schematism itself as ‘a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty’. Thereupon he modifies his reticence:

We can say only this much: the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that they designate.\textsuperscript{165}

As we see here, Kant is careful to distinguish ‘image’ (Bild) from the schema. In English as in German, the word ‘image’ shares etymological roots with ‘imagination’ (Bild, Einbildungskraft), which is not the case for ‘schema’. The ‘image’ is here assigned to the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, whereas the schema belongs to ‘pure imagination’ – transcendental imagination. To illustrate the difference between ‘image’ and ‘schema’ Kant employs a number of examples, including our representations of ‘a triangle’\textsuperscript{166} and ‘a dog’\textsuperscript{167}. To take the example of a triangle, Kant argues that it would be logically and psychologically impossible for us to have a single ‘image’ of a triangle that

\textsuperscript{163} Kant, KrV, A137/B176.

\textsuperscript{164} Kant, KrV, A142/B181.

\textsuperscript{165} Kant, KrV, B180/A141-B181/A142.

\textsuperscript{166} Kant, KrV, A140/B180.

\textsuperscript{167} Kant, KrV, A141/B180.
could account for the size and shape of all possible triangles. The schema, on the other hand, is not a static image, but a dynamic rule for constructing all possible triangles, thus enabling us to apprehend the different triangles we encounter. This ‘rule for the determination of our intuition’ is applied ‘in accordance with a certain general concept.’

The chapter on the schematism reveals that the imagination is transcendental insofar as it has a transcendental function. This function is revealed by its transcendental product: the schema. The perspective here has been on transcendental imagination, rather than on the synthesis it is responsible for, the synthesis that makes knowledge possible.

According to Heidegger, Kant reveals in this section the ‘inner temporal character’ of transcendental imagination. This is revealed through the syntheses, Heidegger claims, which will be examined below. The discussion of the transcendental deduction and the schematism has revealed that the imagination is an ‘intermediate faculty between sensibility and imagination’, or the synthesis speciosa, as we saw above, called the schema in the schematism, that enables the subsumption of representations under the categories. Heidegger takes this one step further, claiming that this mediating function of the imagination indicates that it is in fact the common root of understanding and intuition that Kant has called unknown. It is, unsurprisingly, the imagination that forms transcendence that is called transcendental imagination.

This imagination is that which enables us to have an object, though this is only explicitly stated in connection with the syntheses and will be examined further below.

§27 of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics deals with ‘the transcendental power of imagination as root of both stems’ (these two stems being understanding and sensibility). Heidegger begins by reminding us that calling faculties transcendental equates with explaining them insofar as they enable transcendence, i.e., that they make knowledge of objects possible. Insofar as imagination is transcendental, it is not just a mediator between

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168 Kant, KrV, A141/B180.
169 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 120.
170 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 90.
171 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 91.
sensibility and understanding, but a necessary condition in its own right, and not reducible to these two other conditions. Heidegger quotes Kant where he cites three sources of knowledge, namely, sensibility, imagination and apperception\textsuperscript{172}, which, we remember, seems to contradict Kant saying elsewhere\textsuperscript{173} that understanding and sensibility grant us knowledge, and that they are mutually dependent in our cognition of objects. It is sensibility, imagination and apperception that are represented in the three syntheses discussed in the A-edition. Heidegger thus inquires into the apparent contradiction of these sources of knowledge. He questions Kant’s choice of metaphor in calling our two sources of knowledge ‘stems’ (\textit{Stämme})\textsuperscript{174}, claiming that, lurking out of sight, is a root from which shoot these two stems, and that this subterranean faculty is transcendental imagination. The structure of the \textit{Critique} itself, ostensibly, serves as mirror to the hegemony of the two sources. The Transcendental Aesthetic deals with sensibility, and the Transcendental Logic with understanding. Transcendental imagination, though it should seem to belong with intuition, is ‘homeless’ (\textit{heimatlos})\textsuperscript{175}, first cropping up, and unceremoniously, lacking proper introduction, in the Transcendental Logic. It is Heidegger’s ‘interpretation of the ground-laying’\textsuperscript{176} that reveals the core importance of this root – the third unifying faculty necessary to knowledge. In order to reveal how transcendental imagination is this root, Heidegger must inquire into the dynamic of possibilities revealed by this faculty. This rejoins the problematic of \textit{Being and Time}, insofar as Dasein is in its deepest nature a possibility.

Before we can tackle the full significance of transcendental imagination for Heidegger, it is necessary to investigate the synthesis in general and the unity of the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition in particular. The essential role of transcendental imagination as original time and the center of Kant’s ‘laying of the foundation’, as Heidegger construes the \textit{Critique}, is rendered manifest by Heidegger’s interpretation of the unity of these three syntheses. Before we can reveal the true significance of transcendental

\textsuperscript{172} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A94.

\textsuperscript{173} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A51/B75.

\textsuperscript{174} Kant, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, 94.

\textsuperscript{175} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics}, 93.

\textsuperscript{176} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, 94.
imagination, therefore, we must take an even closer look at the concept ‘synthesis’. This means, also, bringing into the light some of Heidegger’s core disagreements with Kant, showing the originality (or violence) of his interpretation. This is because Heidegger’s interpretation of the syntheses fits suspiciously well with his own doctrine of the ecstases in *Being and Time*. In order to gain a certain overview of the role synthesis comes to play in Heidegger’s interpretation and how transcendental imagination is revealed through their investigation as being original time, I will start with giving a short overview of a point of contention Heidegger saw himself as having with Kant.

### 4.2 Theory of knowledge and possibility of knowledge

What for Kant seems to be a possibility of knowledge examined within the framework of the theory of knowledge becomes, in Heidegger’s appropriation, a theory of human essence. An epistemological interpretation of the intent of the question ‘how are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?’ would concentrate on how we gain knowledge through these judgments, and on the evaluation of the knowledge thus acquired in terms of its validity and veracity. Heidegger refuses this interpretation and instead builds his entire interpretation around the term ‘possibility’ (*possibilitas*) in the phrase, asserting that it coincides with the essence (*essentia*) he has claimed for his own concept of Dasein. The ‘basic inquiry’ of Kant’s *Critique* concerns the ‘ground of the possibility of ontological knowledge’\(^{177}\). This question of ontological knowledge, the knowledge of being, is for Heidegger conditioned by and intertwined with the knowledge of the essence of Dasein. Human being, as we learn from the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*, is a possibility. In *Being and Time*, Dasein’s innermost possibility is the possibility of its own impossibility. Dasein is therefore finite and in its deepest essence temporal. As we saw above, this temporality can manifest itself in one of two modes. The first is the inauthentic mode of derived time, the traditional concept of time, which is a seemingly endless succession of nows in which we deal with things that are to hand with care (*Sorge*). This care is temporal in nature. Time is counted and perceived as the succession of nows. The authentic mode, being-onto-death (*Sein zum Tode*), is characterized by its orientation towards the future (*Vorlaufen*). Common to both of these modes is their

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\(^{177}\) Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 35.
grounding in original time (temporality, Zeitlichkeit). Dasein in the authentic mode of Vorlaufen zum Tode has an original understanding of time, whereas the traditional and more common concept of time is a derived time of the original time.

In Being and Time the inauthentic and authentic modes of temporality were explored insofar as they were central to explaining the nature of Dasein. As we shall see below Heidegger makes some of Kant’s concepts coincide with his own. This tendency of the interpretation is most pronounced in Heidegger’s appropriation of the three syntheses discussed in the A-edition of the Critique and their connection with the original synthetic unity of transcendental apperception. Heidegger stresses this connection because he believes that Kant here came close to an understanding of the ‘subjectivity of the subject’ itself as temporality, which would harmonize with his own conception of temporality at the center of Dasein. At the same time Heidegger recognizes that Kant’s explicit concern in the Critique is not identical with his own and admits to the ‘violence’ of his interpretation. His reading of Kant takes shape from out of the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time, and as regards the temporality of the subject, he cites his paragraphs §61ff, and §78ff.

It was only on the basis of that investigation that the possibility arose for me to understand what Kant is actually seeking, respectively must seek. Only from out of that [investigation] can we grasp the unity of receptivity and spontaneity, of time and the transcendental apperception, as a possible problem.

In other words, it is only with the results of Being and Time in mind that it is possible to understand where Kant was headed, before he failed to follow through. In order to understand these correspondences, we must explain Heidegger’s appropriation of certain core concepts: primarily the syntheses and transcendental apperception. In fact it is possible to understand why transcendental imagination must play the role it does if Heidegger’s premises are correct, through the explication of these premises.

In Heidegger’s interpretation of the syntheses as they are made manifest through the activity of transcendental apperception by means of the schematism of transcendental imagination, the holistic character of his reading of Kant is especially obvious. Kant was a great systematician, while Heidegger was suspicious of systems insofar as they were closed,

178 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 253.

179 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 267.
preferring ‘paths’. At the same time he has sympathy for the holistic aspect of Kant’s architeconic. Heidegger is seeking to explain an essence, which is reflected in the structure of his interpretation as circular. The interconnectedness of the elements is common to Kant’s system of pure reason and to Heidegger’s explication of the existential structure of Dasein. When examining Heidegger’s structures it is important to keep in mind the focus on essence that drives his interpretation. The essence in question is the temporality of Dasein, and this is what Heidegger is always trying to explain. When he makes Kant’s project of the investigation into the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori coincide with his own project of fundamental ontology, it is by making Dasein’s possibility the center of his research. His criticism concerns Kant’s oscillations away from the ‘true problematic’ of the investigation of the possibility that is Dasein’s own.

In order to arrive at the core of Heidegger’s argument, the role played by temporality in his own fundamental ontology as it is made manifest in Kant’s system, it is necessary to explain how the problematic of temporality reveals itself through the terms Heidegger wishes to explicate. In the previous chapter I focused on transcendence and objectification as these were central to understanding human knowledge of being. Finitude was shown to be the essence of transcendence, which is what makes objectification possible. I will here focus on the meaning of synthesis and transcendental apperception. Through this effort it will be made obvious why transcendental imagination must, according to Heidegger, be the center of human being, and the chapter on the schematism the center of the Critique. A useful place to start in the gradual approach of the core of temporality is with Heidegger’s disagreement with Kant over the quaestio juris-premise of the transcendental deduction of the categories, the section preceding that on schematism. This ‘mistake’ constitutes for Heidegger Kant’s misconstrual of transcendence. This is where Kant went wrong, and where Heidegger’s interpretation must become violent in order to make Kant say what he should have said – i.e., what Heidegger would have preferred him to say.

4.3 The disagreement over transcendence

The transcendental deduction of the categories derives its name from the allegory of juridical procedure. Kant is here concerned with demonstrating the objective validity of his categories. This is the quid juris dealt with by the deduction, and this procedure contrasts with the quid
facti – the fact of our having the categories. The deduction was one of the parts of the Critique subjected to massive re-organization between the A and the B-edition. The most common interpretation of the reason for the changes indicates the criticism offered by Garve and Federer, who voiced concern for what they felt was the predominance of the subjective aspect of the deduction over the objective. The subjective aspect is concerned with transcendental imagination as mediator between the intuition and the understanding. According to Kant’s critics, this focus represented the risk of a lapse into psychology. Heidegger concedes to this interpretation that Kant oscillates between psychology and logic, dissatisfied with both, and doesn’t see the possibility of a phenomenological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject. However, Heidegger thinks there is a deeper reason for Kant’s relative neglect of transcendental imagination in the B-edition, and attributes it to his reluctance to accomplish the radical break with traditional metaphysics that he had inadvertently begun in the first edition.

According to Heidegger, the question of the objective validity of the categories is inessential; it takes care of itself through the subjective deduction. Demonstrating the objective validity of the categories simply means showing that the intellectual categories are applied to objects. For Heidegger it is enough to explicate the subjectivity of the subject in order to show how an object is formed. This is because the subjectivity of the subject is synonymous with Dasein’s transcendent nature. As transcendence, Dasein necessarily has its being outside of itself, in the heideggerian (or husserlian) world it is thrown into. Since Dasein has a finite intuition, as discussed above, it necessarily forms objects on the basis of things it receives from outside of itself. This means that Dasein is ontologically, not ontically, creative.

Heidegger’s criticism does not, however, restrict itself to claiming that the objective deduction is redundant. The charge cuts deeper than superfluity and concerns the role Kant

180 Jurists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter between the questions about what is lawful (quid juris) and that which concerns the fact (quid facti), and since they demand proof of both, they call the first, that which is to establish the entitlement or the legal claim, the deduction. Kant, KrV, B116/A84.

181 See for example Rivelaygue, Lecons de métaphysique allemande, 471.

182 See Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 283. Heidegger is here discussing the transcendental imagination and describes it as ontologically creative.
accords to judgments. According to Heidegger, Kant contradicts himself in claiming that we pass judgments on objects, because it is only by the ontological creation of our finite intellect that there are objects at all. Once again, this does not mean that beings do not exist outside of our intellect, but rather the opposite: it is because these beings are already given to us that we can make them into objects for our intellect. In claiming that we pass judgments on objects, that these beings are objects before we judge them as such, Kant seems to forget his earlier and fundamental postulation of the interdependence of intuition and understanding that states that ‘thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’\(^\text{183}\).

Heidegger’s claim that Kant misconstrues the nature of transcendence is one of the most important differences between the two that Heidegger brings to light in his interpretation. What he perceives as Kant’s failed theory of objectification is responsible for the mistaken explication of the subjectivity of the subject, the path Kant began on but failed to follow through to the conclusion Heidegger himself had reached concerning the temporal essence of Dasein. This combination of auspicious beginning and subsequent perdition explains why Heidegger can claim on the one hand that Kant ‘never attempted to offer a fundamental ontology of Dasein and did not realize the tasks and methodical peculiarity of such an ontology’\(^\text{184}\), and on the other hand ‘[interpret the Critique] as a laying of the ground for metaphysics and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology’\(^\text{185}\).

In order to gain a better understanding of Heidegger’s accusation regarding Kant’s misconstrual of transcendence it is therefore necessary to examine what he himself meant by the temporality of the subject within Kant’s system. For Heidegger, Kant came close to a correct interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject in his postulation of the relationship between the three syntheses and transcendental apperception. For Heidegger the most important characteristic of the three syntheses is their temporality, and he makes them correspond to his own three temporal ecstases of the subject. These three syntheses play a more prominent role in the A-edition of the deduction, along with the linked function of

\(^{183}\) Kant, KrV, A51/B75.

\(^{184}\) Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 214.

\(^{185}\) Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 1.
transcendental imagination. Kant was still on the right path here according to Heidegger, and we will therefore move from disaccord to accord in the next step of the elucidation of Heidegger’s appropriation, which will focus on the syntheses and transcendental apperception.

4.4 Synthesis and time

The *Critique* sets out to investigate the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*. Heidegger calls attention to Kant’s assertion that the synthesis is that ‘on account of which the whole critique is actually undertaken’\(^\text{186}\). Insofar as Heidegger holds the syntheses to be temporal in nature and to be closely tied to transcendental apperception, this is an example of what Heidegger perceives as a core agreement between himself and Kant. For Heidegger, this synthesis is the expression of a possibility and a temporal process. However, synthesis does not have one simple meaning, neither in Kant’s transcendental philosophy nor in Heidegger’s appropriation. I will not here give an exhaustive enumeration of the ways in which the term synthesis is used in the *Critique*, but rather channel the main focus on the three syntheses that can be seen to correspond with the three ecstases in the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*. It is important to gain a precise understanding of why this usage of the term synthesis is central to the understanding of the kantian critical enterprise viewed through Heidegger’s eyes. Heidegger explains that affirming that the synthesis forms the essence of finite knowledge tells us nothing ‘as long as the expression synthesis is allowed to remain in ambiguous indeterminacy’\(^\text{187}\).

The synthesis Heidegger is after is the ontological synthesis that makes knowledge possible,\(^\text{188}\) and this points back to the investigation into the subjectivity of the subject. As we have seen, ‘the investigation into the subjectivity of the subject’ is another expression for fundamental ontology. The investigation of the synthesis *a priori*, or the pure synthesis, is for

\(^{186}\) Kant, *KrV*, A14/B28.


\(^{188}\) This is also, Heidegger tells us, the goal of the transcendental deduction: it ‘has as its task to show the inner possibility for the essential unity of ontological synthesis’ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 121.
Heidegger an investigation into the creative possibility of Dasein. The reason for this is that, in accord with Kant’s system, he holds ‘pure’ and ‘a priori’ to mean that which precedes the reception of the manifold. The manifold is given to us insofar as we are finite beings. However, if knowledge is only rendered possible on the basis of certain a priori conditions of possibility, then this must mean that it must ‘be grounded in a knowing of the Being of beings prior to all receiving’\textsuperscript{189}. Since we, as finite beings, do not create the beings we intuit, the question arises as to how we are able to have a knowledge of being prior to the knowledge of individual beings. This is the question of the ontological synthesis for Heidegger, and it explains why he identifies the ‘grounding of metaphysics’ with ‘the projection of the inner possibility of a priori synthesis’\textsuperscript{190}.

Heidegger explains that ‘synthesis’ must be understood in a certain way, as three modes of the same synthesis, not three separate syntheses.\textsuperscript{191} This is in line with Kant’s own presentation of the three modes of the synthesis in the A-edition of the \textit{Critique}\textsuperscript{192}, which is, as mentioned before, Heidegger’s preferred edition. As mentioned above, these can be seen to correspond to the three ecstases constituting the unity of temporality.

The perspective of the syntheses offers a complementary view to the explication of objectification and transcendence. It is through transcendence that objectification is made possible. Transcendence is the essence of Dasein in that it characterizes a being having its being outside of itself. This is the mark of a finite being, and also expresses itself in our dependence on thinking for having knowledge of beings, as I discussed in connection with objectification. This finitude which shows itself through transcendence is also made manifest through the characterization of our innermost nature as temporal. In understanding beings we are dependent upon the three syntheses whose unity is in transcendental apperception. Amongst these three Heidegger accords a primacy to the synthesis of recognition over the other two. He claims to find grounds for doing this in Kant; in any case it concords well with

\textsuperscript{189} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, 25.

\textsuperscript{190} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, 25.

\textsuperscript{191} Heidegger, \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}, 122.

\textsuperscript{192} ‘This is now the ground of a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily found in all cognition…’ Kant, \textit{KrV}, A97.
the primacy granted to the ecstasis of the future in original time as this is explicated in *Being and Time*.

Kant’s proximity to the solution Heidegger believed to be correct, and at the same time his distance from it, receives perhaps its most telling revelation in the tension Heidegger makes visible between original time and derived time. Heidegger believes that both of these manifest themselves in Kant’s work. Insofar as Kant is most firmly attached to the traditional concept of time that has reigned supreme since Aristotle, he has misconstrued the subjectivity of the subject, failing to realize that it is grounded above all in its relationship to the future. At the same time this traditional concept of time is not to be depreciated; it is the form of time that Dasein most commonly encounters in its state of fallenness, in its state of being in the world. It would not be possible for Dasein to access the authentic mode of time as original time, as being-unto-death, without being first in the inauthentic mode of derived time. We can therefore draw a correspondence between traditional time and the inauthentic mode of fallenness. Heidegger explains the nature of this derived time in §81 of *Being and Time*. However, Kant also had an inkling of original time, which manifests itself in the role he granted transcendental imagination in the A-edition of the *Critique*. He had a certain understanding of the primary role of the productive synthesis of transcendental imagination in regard to the other two. Granting the primacy to this synthesis shows that he had an idea about the future as the primary ecstasy. Such an understanding of original time as the true horizon upon which Dasein is to be understood leads Heidegger to identify the pure synthesis of recognition with the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception. The temporality at the core of Dasein is for Heidegger to be found in transcendental imagination. Kant failed to see that his concept of transcendental apperception had its center in transcendental imagination. Determining the subjectivity of the subject reveals itself to be a question of showing how the temporality constituting the essence of Dasein is grounded in original time.

According to Heidegger, then, it is on the basis of original time that we can ultimately understand the essence of Dasein. Although Dasein most commonly understands time in its

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193 Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 232. See also *Being and Time*, 473.

194 Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 278.
derived mode, this mode could not exist without original time, which is obvious from the choice of the term ‘derived’. This also shows why Heidegger considers Kant to be so important. The original time Heidegger struggles to resuscitate from the forgetfulness it has been historically cast into, the forgetfulness it is its nature to fall into, is partially unearthed in Kant’s initial insight into transcendental imagination. It is therefore all the more urgent to rescue Kant’s insight from Kant’s mistakes.

In order to arrive at an understanding of what this original temporality is and how it reveals itself in Kant’s system, I will now give an overview of the ways in which Heidegger focuses his interpretation on synthoses insofar as they elucidate the nature of Dasein as temporality. The main focus will be on the three synthoses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition.

4.5 Heidegger’s interpretation of the kantian concept of synthesis

Heidegger introduces the term ‘synthesis’ in §3 of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, where he identifies it with ontological knowledge, thereby making Kant say that ontological knowledge constitutes that ‘on account of which the whole critique is actually undertaken’.¹⁹⁵ As we saw above, this is because the *Critique* is engaged in the investigation into the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*. It is not Heidegger’s fault that it is difficult to gain a firm grip on the meaning of this synthesis, because synthesis designates a number of ‘ways of unification and has an ominous ambiguity’.¹⁹⁶ Heidegger contrasts synthesis with ‘syn dosis’, the ‘onefold [Einigkeit] which is especially peculiar to space and time’. In his interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique*, Heidegger characterizes synthesis as ‘the spontaneous unification which is accomplished by understanding’.¹⁹⁷ At the same time ‘syn dosis and synthesis must obviously be unified’,

¹⁹⁵ Kant, *KrV*, A14/B28.


without it being immediately obvious how this unification will be brought about, ‘in the whole of knowledge which is a unification of intuition and thinking’.  

Every judgment, even analytic judgments, are synthetic in the sense that they connect a subject and a predicate. The subject and predicate are bound together by the ‘is’ of the copula. In addition to this primary characterization of all judgments consisting of a predicate describing a subject, synthetic judgments are synthetic also in a second sense: ‘insofar as the legitimacy of the ‘connection’ (synthesis) of the representation is ‘brought forth’ (synthesis) from the being itself with which the judgment is concerned – in other words, making ontological knowledge possible. Dasein must relate itself to beings. It must do so on the basis of something that it does not draw from the being itself, on the basis of an *a priori* faculty. A certain kind of ontological creativity is demanded on the part of Dasein, and the nature of this creativity is explained through the nature of the syntheses.

As we saw in our discussion of objectification, the act of judging is dependent on the intuition. Thought is subordinated to the intuition, but both are necessary for us to make an object of the beings that are given to us. The union of thought and intuition forms a synthesis by which ‘thinking is mediately related to the object’. This makes for a ‘thinking intuition’. This synthesis ‘accomplishes the making-evident of the encountered being as object’. Heidegger calls this the ‘veritative synthesis’.

Heidegger then proceeds to differentiate the predicative from the apophantic synthesis, which are both englobed in the veritative synthesis. The predicative synthesis represents ‘the unifying unity of concepts in their character as predicates’. The apophantic synthesis, from the Greek *apóphansis* (judgment), is easy to confuse with the predicative synthesis, and Heidegger is careful to contrast them. The apophantic synthesis links the subject and

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predicate in ‘that unifying in which judging presents itself’. It is concentrated on the act of
decision, on saying that something ‘is’ something, the linking of subject and predicate by
means of the copula. The predicative synthesis does not refer to the act of judging a predicate
as belonging to a subject, but to the unity of the predicates themselves.

Containing the predicative and the apophantic syntheses, the veritative synthesis constitutes a
‘structural unity of syntheses’204. Heidegger then says that the veritative synthesis ‘in general
constitutes the essence of finite knowledge’205. A brief reminder of Heidegger’s famous
conception of truth is here in order. He is not content with the traditional concept of truth as
*adequatio intellectus et rei*, or the correspondence (*correspondentia, convenientia*) of the
object with the judgment pronounced upon it. This theory, which Heidegger traces back to
Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna206, is derived from a more fundamental theory
of truth as disclosure. The Greek word for truth, *alétheia*, serves Heidegger’s purposes of
excavation of the foundation. The constituent privative alpha indicates that ‘truth’ was
originally a negative concept, meaning that which is un-hidden, un-forgotten207. This
attention to something hidden and forgotten is, of course, reminiscent of the case of being. It
is the meaning of being that Heidegger wants to save from forgetfulness. The meaning of the
question of being has this ‘disclosure’ in common with truth. *Truth rightfully has a
primordial connection with Being*.208 For that reason it enters into the problematic of
fundamental ontology. In fact, there is no truth where Dasein is not. For Aristotle, the place
of truth was in the pronounced judgment, in the correspondence between fact and statement.
Heidegger takes this further. He does not refute the correspondence theory, but believes it to
repose on the deeper foundation of Dasein’s inherent ability to uncover being. ‘Dasein is in

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207 *Lethe* was the river of forgetfulness in Greek mythology; the Greek word *lethe* means forgetfulness or
concealment.
208 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 256.
the truth’, which means that ‘the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution’²⁰⁹.

Heidegger’s conception of truth as intimately related to Dasein’s ability to uncover the meaning of being is therefore of central importance to fundamental ontology, and I have only given a very brief account of it here. With regard to the veritative synthesis it is important to remember that Heidegger also calls this the revelatory (wahr-(offenbar-)machende, veritative) synthesis, thereby underlining the characteristic of disclosure also here²¹⁰, i.e. in the investigation of intellectual finitude. Objectification through synthesis is the work of Dasein, in the same way that the knowledge of truth through disclosure in the analysis of ontological finitude in Being and Time is crucial to understanding the unique nature of Dasein as that which asks the question of being (as disclosure). From this we can see that the synthesis in general renders visible an important connection between ontological and intellectual finitude.

In order to approach an understanding of the nature of this connection, the last and central piece of the puzzle must be examined: the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition as they are, according to Heidegger, accomplished through the deployment of transcendental imagination.

### 4.6 The unity of the three syntheses

For Heidegger, Kant’s misconstrual of transcendence is tied to his failure to follow through with the analysis of transcendental imagination as the center of the possibility of ontological knowledge. If Heidegger had his way, the quaestio juris, concerning the objective validity of the deduction, would be replaced by a complete phenomenological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject. At the same time he claims that Kant was not entirely ignorant of the importance of the subjectivity of the subject for understanding ontological knowledge, which explains the unchanged version of the chapter on schematism, which, as we have seen,

²⁰⁹ Heidegger, Being and Time, 263.

²¹⁰ Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 29.
concerns the role of transcendental imagination in making synthetic judgments a priori possible.

As we saw in connection with the exposition of transcendental imagination as it figures in Kant’s *Critique*, transcendental imagination was defined alongside, or subordinated, to the synthesis. The intuition, the imagination and the understanding are all three necessary in order for us to have cognition. The imagination synthesizes the manifold that is first provided by the intuition, and finally, this pure synthesis is given unity by the concepts of the understanding. It is only through this last contribution by the understanding that cognition is ‘first [provided] in the proper sense’.

This three-part process can be juxtaposed with Heidegger’s interpretation of the three synthses of apprehension (through intuition), reproduction (through imagination) and recognition (by means of transcendental apperception). Contrary to what one might first expect, it is not the second of these that is granted the primacy over the other two. This is because the imagination in question, that of reproduction, is not the same faculty as transcendental imagination. It is rather transcendental apperception, the unity, according to Kant, of the ‘I think’, that accords unity to the synthses, and that therefore corresponds to Heidegger’s ecstasis of the future. In this way he harmonizes his interpretation of intellectual finitude as Kant intended it with his own ontological finitude centered on temporality.

In §13 of the *Critique*, entitled ‘On the principles of a transcendental deduction in general’, Kant claims that there are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, imagination, and apperception. On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; 2) the synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception.

According to Heidegger, Kant was on the right track when he wrote that the unity of the synthesis was achieved through original apperception. This shows that the synthesis is

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211 Confer Kant, *KrV*, B103.

212 Kant, *KrV*, B103-B104/A78-A79.

213 Kant, *KrV*, B127/A94.
somehow intimately connected to original apperception. As the synthesis is, according to Heidegger, inherently temporal, this means that Kant was onto the temporal nature of transcendental apperception, and therefore of the temporality of the subject, which is in line with Heidegger’s conception of Dasein. Furthermore, it seems to contradict Kant’s claim that human knowledge has only two fundamental sources, the understanding and intuition. Heidegger justifies his interpretation of the original role of transcendental imagination by remarking that Kant equally noted the possibility of an unknown origin common to these two sources\(^\text{214}\).

Kant explains the nature of the threefold synthesis in the second section of the A-edition of the transcendental deduction\(^\text{215}\). Heidegger generally prefers this first edition, because the ‘psychological’ elements, and thence the imagination, were played down in the second. This passage does not figure in the B-edition. The threefold synthesis mentioned here is ‘necessarily found in all cognition’ and consists of ‘the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept.’\(^\text{216}\) In other words, representation, imagination and concept are all necessary to knowledge.

The three elements of pure knowledge are pure intuition, imagination and understanding. The ostensible reason for there being also three syntheses is that these correspond to the three functions. Heidegger questions this assumption and suggests that the deeper reason for this correspondence lies in the parallel to the three modes of time\(^\text{217}\), by which he means his three ecstases of present, having-been and future. In claiming that transcendental imagination is that which grants unity to the threefold synthesis and is thus synonymous with transcendental apperception he does not support himself on the interpretation he has already conducted on transcendental imagination as the common source of the understanding and intuition. He chooses rather to take the path of demonstrating the ‘intrinsic temporal character of the three

\(^{214}\) Kant, KrV, A15/B29.

\(^{215}\) Kant, KrV, A99-A110.

\(^{216}\) Kant, KrV, A97.

\(^{217}\) Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, §33.
modes of synthesis’. What is most important in his interpretation here is what he takes to be
the essential interconnection of the three modes, though he seems to acknowledge that this is
not always borne up by Kant’s text.218 His three temporal ecstatics, as we saw above, are
unified and tied together in original time, the future-oriented being-unto-death (Sein zum
Tode). Here Heidegger will argue that transcendental imagination holds the corresponding
role, and that therefore the synthesis of recognition is in fact a function oriented towards the
future. For this reason he stresses that apprehension, reproduction and recognition are not
three separate syntheses, but rather modes of the same pure synthesis.219 Each of these three
modes of synthesis has an empirical and pure mode, and Heidegger is most interested in the
‘pure’ modes, which reveal Kant’s understanding of time.

The first synthesis is that of ‘apprehension in the intuition’.220 Before embarking on the
explanation of this first synthesis, Kant remarks that our representations, whether of internal
or external genesis,

always belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition
of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations.
This is a general remark on which one must ground everything that follows.221

Not surprisingly, Heidegger likes this remark. He will show through his interpretation that it
is this temporal nature that necessitates the primacy of transcendental apperception. It is not
immediately obvious why the primacy of apperception should follow the temporal nature of
inner sense through the reading of Kant’s text, but we will see further below why Heidegger
interprets him thus. For Heidegger, ‘the time-character of this synthesis…makes everything
uniformly submissive in advance’.222 He is referring here to the pure synthesis, and not the
empirical.

218 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, §33.
219 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, §33.
220 Kant, KrV, A99-A100.
221 Kant, KrV, A99.
222 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 122.
We always receive a manifold of impressions through the intuition, Kant explains, but it would not be presented as a manifold if the mind failed to separate time in units that follow each other. In order for us to have the unity of the intuition, the manifold must first be sifted through and thereafter ‘summarized’. This is what Kant calls the synthesis of the apprehension. He tells us in the final paragraph that the pure synthesis of apprehension must also be accomplished a priori, as regards the non-empirical representations. It is the pure synthesis that enables us to have knowledge of time and space a priori through sensibility in its ‘original receptivity’.

In his interpretation of this first synthesis, Heidegger emphasizes, first of all, what Kant says about the units of time. As Heidegger rephrases it (thereby harmonizing Kant’s words with his own regarding vulgar time), ‘in distinguishing time, our mind must already be saying constantly and in advance ‘now and now and now’ in order to be able to encounter ‘now this’ and ‘now that’…’ Intuition, Heidegger says, is ‘just a representation of the manifold’ and therefore ‘in itself ‘synthetic’…it takes up ‘exactly’ the offer of the impression of each look (image)’. Here, Heidegger subtly introduces the word ‘image’ and thereby, a few lines later, transcendental imagination. He quotes the Critique from a little later in the A-edition of the transcendental deduction, where Kant says ‘It is thus an active faculty in us for the synthesis of this manifold which we call imagination, and its immediate action on perceptions I call apprehension’. Therefore, Heidegger states, the synthesis of apprehension must spring from transcendental imagination. Since this first synthesis is ‘time-forming’ insofar as it yields the succession of nows, and since it is grounded in transcendental imagination, the latter must be ‘time-forming’ and possess a ‘pure temporal character’. Insofar as this is the case, this transcendental power of imagination, Heidegger says, cannot be the same imagination as that which is discussed in the following section,

223 Kant, KrV, A99.

224 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 123.

225 Kant, KrV, 123.

226 Kant, KrV, A120, quoted in Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 123.

227 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 123.
which deals with the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. We will now examine this second synthesis.

As the word ‘reproduction’ might imply, the second synthesis is concerned with what has come before, what Heidegger calls *Gewesenheit*, having-been. It would be impossible for us to form the synthesis of apprehension of that which presents itself to us if we did not perceive certain regularities in that which we have perceived before. Therefore, the mind (*Gemüt*) must retain the memory of the representations that have preceded the current one. If representations did not repeat themselves in certain configurations, we would not be able to think of these things in conjunction, and the ‘empirical imagination…would remain a dead and for us unknown faculty hidden in the inner mind’\(^\text{228}\). This synthesis of the imagination must also be pure, constituting a condition for the possibility of knowledge – in other words the imagination must have a ‘pure transcendental synthesis’\(^\text{229}\). Since this transcendental synthesis of the imagination is a condition for the possibility of knowledge, it is ‘inextricably bound up with the synthesis of the reproduction’\(^\text{230}\). Since they are so tightly bound together, and the synthesis of apprehension is the ‘transcendental ground of the possibility of all cognition whatsoever’, the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs with the transcendental acts of the mind, which leads Kant to call this faculty the ‘transcendental faculty of the imagination’\(^\text{231}\).

This could seem to refute Heidegger’s theory, which distinguishes transcendental imagination from this second synthesis and rather assigns it to the third synthesis, that of recognition in a concept\(^\text{232}\). However, as he said above, he does not take the imagination

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\(^{228}\) Kant, *KrV*, A100.

\(^{229}\) Kant, *KrV*, A101.

\(^{230}\) Kant, *KrV*, A102.

\(^{231}\) Kant, *KrV*, A102.

\(^{232}\) In a footnote to his explanation of this second synthesis (*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 124), Heidegger remarks on the potential trouble arising from Kant assigning the reproductive imagination to the transcendental acts of the mind. ‘Reproductive’ is generally equated with ‘empirical’ by Kant, when he distinguishes the different ‘modes’ of the imagination. The sentence would then become ‘meaningless’. Heidegger cites Riehl, *Korrekturen zu Kant*, *Kantstudien* vol. V [1901], who proposes substituting ‘productive’ for ‘reproductive’. In Heidegger’s interpretation, however, this correction would ‘remove in general the sense that Kant wants to express with the sentence, for it should indeed show directly that the
under consideration here to be transcendental imagination. Although this does not have to mean that Heidegger is accusing Kant of getting mixed up in his own concepts, it does seem that Heidegger is pushing hard here in order to make his interpretation of the scheme of syntheses match that of his own ecstases. He lays the emphasis on the character of the synthesis of reproduction to be that of *Gewesenheit*, having-been, which, as we remember, was the name of the ecstasis corresponding to the vulgar concept of the past. Again, this ‘pure power of imagination with regard to this pure synthesis’ must be ‘time-forming’, it ‘opens up in general the horizon of the possible attending-to, the having-been-ness, and so it ‘forms’ this ‘after’ as such’. As we saw in connection with the ecstases, the unity of the having-been, present and future is such that the present is only a present because of the having-been, and vice versa. This ties in well with the nature of the two syntheses being inextricably bound together, in Kant’s words. For Heidegger, these two syntheses are thus shown to spring from the transcendental power of imagination in that they are inextricably linked and inherently temporal. More precisely, the transcendental power of imagination ‘must be grasped as that which functions synthetically and in itself ‘inseparably’ as the faculty of ‘synthesis in general’ according to both of these modes.

Heidegger has now designated the first two syntheses as corresponding to his own ecstases of present and having-been. As he says in the last paragraph of the section dealing with the second synthesis, it is necessary for the third synthesis, that of recognition, to somehow form the future, if his theory of the ‘threefold-unified whole’ is to be correct. This last leg of the appropriation of the syntheses promises to be more of a stretch than the others. As might be expected, it is also the most important part of the interpretation of the syntheses, and holds the key to the understanding of the importance of transcendental imagination in Heidegger’s theory.

productive, i.e., here the pure power of imagination, is purely reproductive in that it makes possible reproduction in general’. Heidegger therefore proposes the substitution of ‘pure reproductive synthesis’.

233 Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 125.

234 Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 125.

235 Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 125.
The final synthesis is that of recognition in the concepts. The difficulty presented at the outset, as regarding Heidegger’s interpretation, is of the ostensibly atemporal nature of the ‘I think’ of transcendental apperception, which is here in question. The ‘I think’ that must be able to accompany all my representations is supposed to stand outside of time. Before examining Heidegger’s attempt at resolution of this apparent conflict between Kant’s views and his own, we will look at how Kant himself describes this third synthesis.

As Heidegger remarks, the exposition of the third synthesis is better developed than the two previous ones. It begins by noting that there would be no use in having the second synthesis of reproduction at our disposal if we lacked the consciousness that grants unity to our representations – that is, that I know that it is I that has had these representations. ‘Without consciousness, concepts and consequently cognition of concepts is completely impossible’\(^{236}\). At this point in his exposition, it suddenly becomes necessary for Kant to specify what he means by ‘object of representation’. Earlier, Kant reminds us, he has said that representations are not to be confused with objects. However, one talks about an object corresponding to our cognition. Here he tells us that this object must be thought of as something ‘overall=X’, because we cannot, on the one hand, perceive anything else than our representations, and on the other hand, we cannot without cognition postulate something as corresponding to our cognition\(^{237}\). The unity of our representations demands ‘something necessary’ from this unknown object X, because our various representations must share regularities between them. Kant goes on to repeat that, since all we are dealing with is the manifold of our representations, this X is nothing (nichts). Such a nothing for Heidegger, we remember, is not an absolute nothing (nihil absolutum), but the nothing that allows something to stand forth, the object in the case of intellectual finitude (as is here the case with Kant) and the nothing resulting from our experience of anxiety that makes space for the resoluteness and authentic understanding of Dasein’s self, in the case of ontological finitude. It is worth noting that this ‘nothing’ of the unknown object is mentioned in connection with the third synthesis, which Heidegger conceives as corresponding to the ecstasis of the future. It is in connection with transcendental apperception that assures the unity of consciousness

\(^{236}\) Kant, *KrV*, A104.

\(^{237}\) Kant, *KrV*, A104.
and therefore the unity of representations that it is necessary to clarify what is meant by ‘object’, because it is finally this unity that makes this object possible.

Since this object X is for us a ‘nothing’, the unity in question is a ‘formal unity’, not empirical, because it is not yet dealing with concrete representations. It is necessitated by this unknown object and is ‘the formal unity of consciousness’. We ‘cognize the object when we have effected a synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition’\textsuperscript{238}. The possibility of cognizing an object also demands what Kant calls ‘the unity of the rule’, which presupposes a rule according to which the intuition is represented in the function of synthesis. The object X is a ‘unity’ made necessary by the object, and this unity is the ‘formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.’\textsuperscript{239} The rest of the section is devoted to the further explication of transcendental apperception, which is Kant’s name for the ‘formal unity of consciousness’. At this point in the text he has not yet introduced the term. He first mentions the ‘unity of apperception’ as that which is made possible by the unity of the rule.\textsuperscript{240} The concept that assures unity is grounded in a transcendental condition, as is the case with ‘every necessity’\textsuperscript{241}. This ‘original and transcendental condition’ is transcendental apperception.\textsuperscript{242} There is an empirical and pure apperception, and it is the pure apperception that presupposes the empirical one. The latter is called inner sense, which, as we remember, is time. However, it is only pure apperception that can make possible that which must be thought by necessity, unalloyed by empirical elements. ‘All cognition presupposes (erfordert) a concept’\textsuperscript{243}, which stems from pure transcendental apperception.

Transcendental apperception, we have seen, has an ‘original and necessary consciousness of the identity of itself [which] is at the same time the consciousness of an equally necessary synthetic unity of all representations according to concepts…which also therefore decides an

\textsuperscript{238} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A105.

\textsuperscript{239} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A105.

\textsuperscript{240} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A105.

\textsuperscript{241} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A106.

\textsuperscript{242} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A106.

\textsuperscript{243} Kant, \textit{KrV}, A106.
object for their intuition, i.e., a concept of something by which they are necessarily associated.\textsuperscript{244} Consciousness of the unity of our own consciousness, transcendental apperception, is that which enables us to have an object. In Heidegger’s interpretation of transcendence this is turned around somewhat: it is through knowing other beings that we know ourselves. Before turning to Heidegger’s interpretation of this last synthesis, the concluding sentence of the section must be noted. Kant remarks that it is the ‘necessary unity of the apperception that first makes possible any cognition’\textsuperscript{245}.

In other words, this synthesis, examined last, reveals itself to be the first, as Heidegger justly remarks.\textsuperscript{246} A more difficult problem that imposes itself on the desired results of his interpretation is, as mentioned above, the question Heidegger evokes at the outset of his interpretation of this section as the true ‘time-forming’ synthesis of transcendental imagination (through transcendental apperception). How can ‘the I of pure apperception...have a temporal character when Kant opposes in the sharpest terms the ‘I think’ in particular and reason in general to all time-relations’?\textsuperscript{247} As we saw above in chapter one, Kant’s logical transcendental subject stands outside of time. Heidegger’s own Dasein, we know, is not only in time but defined in its deepest nature by time. If Kant was onto the real truth of the matter regarding human nature as essentially finite, then there must be a temporal nature hiding itself deep in the core of transcendental apperception, insofar as this is the ultimate condition for our knowledge. In order to show that this must necessarily be the case, Heidegger proceeds by interpreting this section in the following manner.

The unity of the two preceding syntheses, that of apprehension and reproduction, must be effected in a certain ‘place’. This place cannot be created after the ‘perception and recollection’ of these two syntheses, because it presupposes them. These syntheses must therefore be ‘already oriented in advance toward the being as something which has presence in sameness’. This synthesis of concepts is ‘the holding of the being before us’\textsuperscript{248}, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{244} Kant, KrV, A108.
  \item\textsuperscript{245} Kant, KrV, A110.
  \item\textsuperscript{246} Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 127.
  \item\textsuperscript{247} Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 126.
  \item\textsuperscript{248} Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 127.
\end{itemize}
horizon that is held open and that enables us to have objects. It is pure transcendental apperception that does this, insofar as it is dealing with the unknown object X that precedes our cognition of individual, empirical objects. Heidegger praises Kant’s choice of designation for this synthesis – that it is a ‘reconnoitering’. The first synthesis grounds the other two and is in advance of them. The pure synthesis of recognition ‘explores the horizon of being-able-to-hold-something-before-us [Vorhaltbarkeit] in general. As pure, its exploring is the original forming of this preliminary attaching [Vorhaften], i.e., the future.’ 249 At this point Heidegger feels he has established this third synthesis as the future insofar as it is the synthesis of ‘pre-paration’ (Vor-bildung), and that he has also shown its primacy in respect to the other two syntheses insofar as it is originally time-forming. Although he acknowledges that this does not at any point spring directly from Kant’s text, 250 he claims that the task of proving the inner time-character of the transcendental power of imagination, which was undecided, has been accomplished. If the transcendental power of imagination, as the pure, forming faculty, in itself forms time – i.e., allows time to spring forth – then we cannot avoid the thesis stated above: the transcendental imagination is original time. 251

Transcendental imagination is thus, in Heidegger’s interpretation, original time. In Being and Time original time was contrasted with vulgar time insofar as original time always forms its unity from the ecstasis of the future, while vulgar time is an endless succession of nows. In calling transcendental imagination original time in this context, Heidegger is referring to its characteristic of being the source of time. It might seem somewhat sudden that he suddenly begins to speak of transcendental imagination here, but this is because, as we remember, Heidegger sees transcendental imagination as that which grants unity to the three syntheses as original time. A further result of his interpretation of the third synthesis is that the universal character of pure sensibility, i.e., of time…now has likewise been revealed. Consequently, the transcendental power of imagination is able to support and form the original unity and wholeness of the specific finitude of the human subject, which has been asserted to be pure, sensible reason. 252

249 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 127.

250 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 128.

251 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 128.

252 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 128.
On the one hand, Heidegger points out, Kant seems to say that ‘pure sensibility (time) and pure reason remain heterogeneous’, but on the other hand, he also says that ‘time apart from the subject is nothing’. Here Kant only evokes the negative aspect of time, as being nothing outside of the subject. However, in the transcendental deduction of the categories and the schematism, Kant has shown that ‘time takes part essentially in the innermost essential structure of transcendence’, and for Heidegger, transcendence ‘determine[s] the Being-as-self [Selbstsein] of the finite self’.

4.7 Ecstasis and transcendence

Transcendence, for Heidegger, defines the finite being in its essence and enables the formation of the object through the ontological creativity that is proper to it. Through his analysis of transcendental imagination, first as it he reads it in Kant’s Critique, essentially in the first edition, and then through his interpretation of transcendental imagination as original time appearing in the synthesis of recognition, Heidegger shows how the Critique can be read as supporting his own view of the essential finitude and temporality of the nature of the cognizing subject, or Dasein, in his own terms. He has made his own three ecstases of present, having-been and future coincide with the three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition, respectively.

According to Heidegger, it is the third synthesis of recognition that is original time, in the sense that it is the origin of the pure succession of nows. This, however, is not identical with his conception of original time in Being and Time, examined here in the second chapter. Original time in his analysis of Dasein is revealed as Dasein’s own innermost possibility, Vorlaufen towards the future. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the fact that Heidegger is here interpreting the role of the syntheses of the Critique, and believes that for Kant, ‘the selfhood of the self is not understood in terms of the full temporal extension of Dasein’. The germ for understanding original time as such, as the unity of the ecstases, lies in the

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253 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 128, the latter quote from Kant, KrV, A35/B51.

254 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 128.

255 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 268.
importance granted to transcendental apperception as opposed to the other two syntheses, but Kant did not take the full step. Kant remains embedded in the vulgar, traditional understanding of time, but Heidegger believes there was enough of a beginning of comprehension of original time in the syntheses that he can compare them to his own ecstases of Dasein.

Following the comparison of the syntheses with the ecstases I am now in a position to return to the problem of the relationship of ontological and intellectual finitude that has guided this investigation. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s syntheses is obviously accomplished in view of establishing the Critique as fundamental ontology, as a forerunner to his own analysis of Dasein as temporality. For this reason his doctrine of the ecstases, and therefore ontological finitude, conditions his interpretation of intellectual finitude. If we enter into Heidegger’s logic, it would seem that ontological finitude can be said to precede intellectual finitude. This can be understood by examining the relationship of transcendence and ecstasis.

Taking our clue from etymology, we can say that ‘ecstasis’ and ‘transcendence’ both deal with a departing beyond boundaries, a going beyond oneself. While transcendence defines Dasein’s inner being insofar as Dasein’s true being is in the objects it forms through ontological creativity, Dasein’s innermost possibility – and therefore its inner being – is defined as the unity of the ecstases as it is expressed in the ecstasis of the future. In the ontological finitude of the analysis of Dasein, Dasein is always ahead of itself, always in a relationship to the possibility of its own impossibility. In transcendence, Dasein is always in a sense outside of itself, in the world it is thrown into.

For Heidegger there is no epistemology without ontology. Fundamental ontology grounds ontology, which grounds regional ontologies. The term ‘ecstasis’ does not figure in Kant, and it deals with our ontological finitude. The term ‘transcendence’, on the other hand, figures in Kant’s use of ‘transcendental’ as that which deals with our possibility for having knowledge, and is thus a concept discussed in connection with intellectual finitude. Insofar as this possibility is for Heidegger Dasein’s finite essence, transcendence figures in the structures of both ontological and intellectual finitude. Dasein’s essence is a possibility. The third ecstasis is, in this sense, transcendence. The priority that must be granted to ontological finitude and ecstases over intellectual finitude and transcendence, then, is not grounded in a scission of the two, but rather in the primacy of fundamental ontology over epistemology for Heidegger.
Consequently, this priority does not express a causal relationship between ontological and intellectual finitude, which Heidegger does not discuss in his interpretation.\textsuperscript{256} It rather suggests that transcendence and ecstasis both mirror the finitude of Dasein and express its essence as being outside of itself. At the same time, as I suggested in the discussion of the analysis of Dasein, it would seem that, as regarding our own understanding of ourselves, the priority must be granted to ontological finitude for another reason. If it is because our nature is essentially finite that we can have objects, then it is only through an authentic understanding of ourselves as finite, of our ownmost possibility, that we can understand how our transcendence causes objects to stand forth for us.

The heideggerian concepts of transcendence and ecstasis open for questions regarding the nature of philosophy itself and what philosophy means to human beings, and thereby the nature of man as such. The relationship between transcendence and ecstasis will serve to open an appraisal of what can considered to be won for philosophy through Heidegger’s analysis of ontological and intellectual finitude.

\textsuperscript{256} A possible reason for this is that such a postulation would surpass even his standards of charitable interpretation.
5. Philosophy as Attention and Loneliness

Throughout my investigation of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant, I have often remarked that Heidegger’s interpretation forces Kant in the direction of his own fundamental ontology. If someone is seeking to understand Kant, even to understand Kant better than he understood himself, being ‘for Kant against Kantianism’\(^\text{257}\), then Heidegger should not be studied as a source to the exclusion of others. Having now examined core principles of Heidegger’s interpretation, it is time to ask what has been gained for philosophy from Heidegger’s ontological and intellectual finitude, even after Heidegger himself abandoned his perspective on the fecundity of the union of time and being shortly after the publication of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

As Frede suggests in her article ‘The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project’, the motivation for Heidegger’s abandonment of fundamental ontology in the 1930s could be that such a metaphysical ‘foundational enterprise’, seeking to establish ‘an ultimate basis of all things’\(^\text{258}\) promises perhaps no greater guarantee of success than that of previous projects within metaphysics. Perhaps the desire to build all philosophy on Dasein ends in a dogma no better than the ones that have been presented before, and the most positive results for philosophy stem from the negative endeavors of critical projects. Heidegger strove to imbue Kant’s *Critique* with his own positive value, but it is perhaps its original negative value that is the most enduring. The question is, what can be learned from this stage of Heidegger’s investigation of the meaning of being, even if we do not adopt his fundamental ontology?

Heidegger himself set out from the criticism of onto-theology and the scission subject/object embedded in the traditional conception of metaphysics. He ended up with his own concepts of transcendence and temporal ecstasy as human essence. The unique human relationship to truth stands in relation to the concepts of transcendence and ecstasy in that it is insofar as we are the only being whose innermost possibility is its own finitude that there is truth where

\(^{257}\) Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 190.

Dasein is – that it is Dasein that uncovers truth. This is perhaps more of a poetic truth than a philosophical doctrine robust enough to stand up to argument. William Butler Yeats wrote in his later years that ‘man can embody truth but he cannot know it’. Heidegger would perhaps sympathize with this phrase, both before and after his turn away from fundamental ontology. Before abandoning fundamental ontology he might have said that even though truth is uncovered where Dasein is, Dasein does not know this, being most of the time ignorant of its own true nature. Without wishing to pronounce the victory of poetry over philosophy in Plato’s ancient quarrel on the basis of the evolution of Heidegger’s thought, it can, at the end of this investigation into fundamental ontology, be useful to remind ourselves what Heidegger considered the nature of philosophy to be. There are perhaps as many definitions of philosophy as there are philosophers, and Heidegger evokes quite a few of his own in connection with his fundamental ontology. As was mentioned in the first chapter, he identifies philosophy with metaphysics and metaphysics with ontology in connection with his interpretation on Kant. That is not, however, his only definition of philosophy. One of the most interesting of his definitions occurs, I believe, in the beginning of his 1929-1930 course on the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. The first two chapters deal with the essence of philosophy as it stands in relation to Dasein’s essence. Finitude, therefore, plays a central role. It is interesting that Heidegger supports his case with quotes from Novalis, Plato and Heraclitus – a poet and two (arguably) poetically minded philosophers.

In the quest for the essence of philosophy, the search of the domains of the empirical sciences, art, religion and history do not yield a discipline of adequate affinity to permit comparison. If it cannot be understood from out of these, how then are we to access it?

The negative result is this: philosophy does not permit itself to be grasped or determined by way of detours or as something other than itself. Philosophy itself – what do we know of it, what and how is it? It itself is only whenever we are philosophizing. Philosophy is philosophizing.\(^{259}\)

Philosophy is a human activity. Philosophy is ‘an ultimate pronouncement and interlocution on the part of man and constantly permeates him in his entirety’\(^{260}\). Defining philosophy must therefore be seen in connection with the question ‘what is man?’ We know now something of Heidegger’s interpretation of man’s innermost essence at this time: Dasein is


transcendence, ecstasis. If man is full of philosophy, then our mortality must be stamped all over with philosophy. The ancient dictum stating that to philosophize is to learn to die is well read against Socrates’ famous declaration in his speech of defense, ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’261. The consolation of philosophy is that it enables us to greet our inevitable death with dignity, in the meantime making life worth living. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein possesses the original relation to its own death. It does not seem that it is the socratic ethical value of philosophy that he is here acknowledging. He seems to be saying that it is because we are finite that we philosophize. We know from Diotima’s counsel to Socrates in the Symposium that lovers do not possess their coveted objects; philosophers are not wise, but thirsting for wisdom. For this reason, says Heidegger, ‘God does not philosophize’262. We know that this God would not have an object, either, since it is the transcendence of Dasein’s finite nature that permits the formation of objects. In fact, it would seem that philosophy, transcendence and ecstasis are intertwined in an intriguing way. Philosophy is ‘the turbulence into which man is spun, so as in this way alone to comprehend Dasein without delusion’263. The analysis of Dasein reveals that Dasein comprehends its own nature without delusion when it grasps its own finitude, its own mortality. It seems that authentic Dasein is the activity of philosophizing. Such a definition of philosophy is, in Heidegger’s terms, a world away from the conception of philosophy as the most noble of contemplative theoretical activities in detachment from the studied objects.

In authentic Dasein, we remember, the individual has a relationship to its own death as Vorlaufen, and is no longer protected by the ignorance of das Man. For this reason authentic finitude is characterized by solitude.264 Heidegger quotes a definition of philosophy by Novalis, which states that ‘Philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere.’265 This urge drives philosophers because ‘we who philosophize are not at home


This poetic and ‘romantic’ view of the philosopher concentrates on the subject rather than on the object. In the same way that fundamental ontology must be distinguished from anthropology, the consideration of philosophy through the philosopher is not a non-philosophical psychologization, but another example of Heidegger’s insistence that understanding of the object passes through understanding of the subject. The homesickness of the philosopher is the disquiet experienced by finitude, as being a tension between ourselves and our coming death – our ownmost possibility.

Aristotle referred to Anaxagoras as the first sober Greek. While the idea of the philosopher’s loneliness as that of the only sober man in a crowd of intoxicated fellows could seem attractive to Heidegger, he finds in Plato an image better suited as allegory to the difference between *das Man* and authentic Dasein.

Plato says in one of his major dialogues that the difference between the philosophizing human being and the one who is not philosophizing is the difference between being awake (*upar*) and sleeping (*onar*). The non-philosophizing human being, including the scientific human being, does indeed exist, but he or she is asleep...

Like the ecstasis of the future, philosophy is seen to be both distinct from the world and as encompassing everything in it. It could seem puzzling that the philosopher is separated from others in virtue of the activity of philosophizing, and at the same time is, as authentic Dasein, always in a world. In fact, ‘Philosophy is something primordial that stands on its own, yet for this very reason it is not something isolated. Rather, as something extreme and primary, it is already comprehensive of everything…’

In this conception resides an understanding of philosophy that must not be forgotten. Heidegger speaks of an ancient idea, as he says he demonstrates by his sympathy with the

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268 Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 6. Heidegger does not explicitly say this in the passage, but it is not difficult to interpret him thus in conjunction with his explanations of finitude in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.


examples from Antiquity and later. In the same way that philosophy is both loneliness and the whole, Heidegger’s thoughts are not foreign to the tradition he sought to add to and criticize by his doctrine of fundamental ontology. He refines the tradition with a perspective on philosophy as pilgrimage, rather than as contemplation.

Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 23. He also mentions Hegel’s understanding of philosophy as the ’inverted world’, mentioned to ’name a philosopher of the modern era’. Heidegger’s thoughts are not foreign to tradition, despite his unique formulations.
References


