Philosophical Knowledge

An Investigation into Martin
Heidegger’s Method in Sein und Zeit

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Abstract

In this thesis I have two aims. Firstly, I will attempt to interpret Heidegger’s method in *Sein und Zeit* as a form of praxis. Secondly, I will try to show that philosophical knowledge for Heidegger is the same as the understanding know-how of the practical method. This is described as anticipatory resoluteness, which I understand as a know-how that creates a new praxis by revising the basic concepts of that praxis.

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δόξαη η᾽ ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι᾽ αὐτήν ἀγαπᾶσθαι: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, 1177b
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Chapter 1: Philosophical Knowledge

1.1 Knowing and Understanding – a Prelude

Many of the standard philosophical problems of the modern era, such as how we can have knowledge of other minds or how we can have knowledge of the outer world as such, are epistemic in nature and stem from taking the knowing subject (das erkennende Subjekt) as the starting point for philosophical reflection. According to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger as it is presented in his great early work Sein und Zeit, however, the basic relation between man and world cannot be described as a relation of knowing (Erkennen) between a subject and an object. For Heidegger, conceiving the subject as something inner or as having an inner sphere it has to leap out of to reach the outer world of objects which it can only know by holding on to them through ideas or representations (Vorstellungen), does not do justice to the true being of man.¹

Instead, man is described as Dasein, a term usually left untranslated in the English-speaking reception of his work, but which literally could be given as ‘there-being’. This description signifies for Heidegger more than a simple occurrence as the German term in colloquial speech connotes.² Dasein rather indicates that man is an entity³ which is there (da), situated in

¹ Martin Heidegger (2006). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, p. 60 §13. Henceforth I will cite this work in-  
² In addition Dasein could in normal parlance also have the meaning of ‘state’ or ‘life’ as in Ich bin mit meinem Dasein zufrieden, as well as ‘presence’, ‘being’ and ‘existence’. Though all the meanings mentioned here are thematically close, they still have connotations that Heidegger tries to avoid. This can be exemplified by Kant’s use of the term. For him Dasein is paired up with Nichtsein as one of the modal categories, with the meaning of existence. See: Immanuel Kant (1956). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, p. 118, A80/B106. Heidegger states that “Kant den Terminus ‘Dasein’ zur Bezeichnung der Seinsart gebraucht, die in der vorliegenden Untersuchung ‘Vorhandenheit’ genannt wird” (SZ, 203 §43a).  
³ Instead of rendering Heidegger’s term Seiende and its variations as ‘a being’ or in case of the plural: ‘beings’ I will follow the Macquarrie & Robinson translation and render it as ‘entity’ because of its immediate advantage of clarity. An example of the former usage can be found in Iain D. Thompson (2005). Heidegger on Ontotheology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, for example p. 9, 15, 56. In German the difference between Sein and Seiende is big enough as not to confuse, but the orthographical similarity between the English ‘being’ and ‘a being’ obfuscates more than needs be. It is none the less important to point out that with the pair ‘being’/‘entity’ one looses the link Heidegger frequently crafts between concepts when he wants to show kinship between them. Often this is done trough common prefixes or shared stems, here it is through
a world, and that this situatedness isn’t just an accidental part of its being, but perhaps its most central feature. Man is by Heidegger not to be characterized as in opposition to the world, instead, world is to such an extent seen as part of the make-up of Dasein’s being that the constitution of its being (Seinsverfassung) is referred to as being-in-the-world (In-der-Weltsein) (SZ, 53 §12).4

As being-in-the-world Dasein always already (je/immer schon) has an understanding of entities in the world and itself, it is always already somehow involved with the world. When I reach out my arms and type these words on my computer my activity harbours an understanding not only of the being of the equipment I use, such as the keyboard as something for typing and the computer as a word processor, but also of the aim of the activity, to write meaningful sentences, to compose textual structures, to complete difficult assignments, to be one who completes such assignments, and in the last instance to be a student. When enmeshed in practical dealings with the entities in the world one understands the being of those entities and in that understanding lies an understanding of our own being as well. Heidegger calls Dasein’s everyday use of equipment concern (Besorgen) and in this concernful activity Dasein doesn’t have to reach out from an inner sphere to capture the outside objects, rather it is “immer schon ‘draußen’ bei einem begegnenden Seienden der je schon entdeckten Welt” (SZ, 62 §13). Dasein is always already engaged with the world, it dwells there rather than being encapsulated in an inner cabinet (Gehäuse) of consciousness. In its dealings with the world Dasein always already has an understanding of it and stands in no need of asking whether the world exists or not, in its engagement it already presupposes that it does.

With such a move, replacing knowing with understanding of being as the basic ‘relation’5 between man and world, Heidegger’s philosophy rejects the central place accorded to the epistemological problematic which, concerned with the relation of knowing, attempts to answer the sceptical question: how can we be sure that we know? Instead he shifts to an

4 Expressions such as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), that-which-shows-itself-in-itself (das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende) and ahead-of-itself being-already-in-(the-world-) as being-alongside (Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei) all play a central role in Heidegger’s work. The hyphenated expressions are meant to convey that what are so described in essence are unities that must be understood as wholes and not composites of atomistic parts (SZ, 53 §12). The point of the hyphens in ‘being-in-the-world’, to take that as an example, is to highlight the distinction between this description from the traditional one of a subject and an object. The phenomenon in question is whole and not the sum of its parts.

5 I put relation in scare quotes here because understanding of being precisely isn’t a relation between two things, a subject and an object, but rather an involved engagement ‘in’ a world.
ontological problem field where being is given centre stage and the leading question concerns
the meaning of being (Sinn von Sein). From this vantage point he criticizes the traditional
account of knowing for not clarifying the ontological meaning of this phenomenon.
Throughout the tradition’s descriptions of knowing, Heidegger claims, “unterbleibt … die
Frage nach der Seinsart dieses erkennende Subjekts, dessen Seinsweise man doch ständig
unausgesprochen immer schon im Thema hat” (SZ, 60 §13). 6 What is the ontological meaning
of subject and object? What does it mean to be ‘inner’? How can knowing have or be in
possession of an object? The failure of the tradition to address these questions and thus
sidestep the ontological problem of knowing leads him to claim that the scandal of philosophy
isn’t, as Kant claimed, that the proof of the existence of outer objects hasn’t been given, but
rather that “solche Beweise immer wieder erwartet und versucht werden” (SZ, 205 §43a).
These proofs are attempts at solving problems that stem from inadequate (unterbestimmte)
descriptions resting on the unquestioned presuppositions (Voraussetzungen) of the tradition.
Such problems should therefore be cast aside from the centre of philosophical enquiry.
Needed isn’t a proof of the outer world’s existence, but an ontological description of man, i.e.,
a description of Dasein’s being, that bypasses such epistemological difficulties. The
ontological clarification (durchsichtigmachen) of man’s being is one of the main aims in Sein
und Zeit 7 and it is on the basis of a lack of such clarification that Heidegger rejects the
traditional conception of knowing both as a subject-object relation and as a relation to the
world that has a privileged position or a priority (Vorrang) over others.

1.2 Heidegger on Philosophical Knowledge

In Sein und Zeit knowing is thus dethroned from its previous position as the privileged
manner of access (Zugangsart) man has to the world. At the same time Heidegger doesn’t
remove knowing from his philosophy, he doesn’t reject the phenomenon as such. Taken
together these two observations point to the question of what place knowing is given in this
work. In fact knowing has a strong presence in the work, even if it doesn’t take centre stage. It
is characterised as the manner of access to entities in their presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit),

6 Regarding the subject-object relation Heidegger states that the tradition has “ihr ontologische Sinn im Dunkel gelassen”
(SZ, 59 §12).
7 It is not, however, the main aim, even though it may, due to the unfinished nature of the work appear to be so. The chief
objective is for Heidegger to awaken an understanding for the meaning of the question of the meaning of being (SZ, 1). He
intends to do this by way of an analysis of the being of Dasein, for then to go on tackling being itself. Only two of six
planned sections were finished leading to the impression that the work simply concerned itself with Dasein’s being.
that is, it has access to entities when they show themselves not as equipment for use, but as things with properties (Eigenschaften). Knowing is by Heidegger understood as “ein Seinsmodus des Daseins als In-der-Welt-sein” (SZ, 61 §13), and as such it is grounded in a practically involved understanding of the world. It thus becomes just one way, amongst many, of having access to entities. Because the philosophical tradition also has taken knowing or ‘knowing of the world’ (Welt-Erkennen) as the way of access that shows how entities really are, it also functions as a foil or point of contrast for Heidegger’s preferred manners of access to the world (SZ, 59-62 §13). But, knowing isn’t completely confined to the role of antagonist. Heidegger also seems to speak of his own undertaking as involving the most primordial knowing (ursprünglichsten Erkennens) and transcendental knowledge (transzendentale Erkenntnis) (SZ, 153 §32, 38 §7C). What should we make of these supposed self-descriptions? After removing knowing from its privileged position is he reinstating it as the way we have access to philosophical truths? Does Heidegger see his investigation resulting in the same sort of knowledge as that resulting from the grasping (erfassen) of objects in the relation of knowing? I think the answer is no. But if Heidegger himself pursues some kind of knowledge, what is the character of this knowledge if it isn’t the same as the traditional concept? This is the main question that I want to ask in this thesis: What does Heidegger’s conception of philosophical knowledge amount to in Sein und Zeit?

To answer this question I will commence with an investigation of Heidegger’s method. Why set out from this starting point? That philosophical knowledge is tied to some form of method is almost too trivial to point out. The English word method and its cognates in European languages stem from the Greek word methodos meaning ‘pursuit of knowledge’. Its components, the prefix meta- which expresses development and hodos which means way, suggests a directed path, a path leading towards knowledge. But I will try to show that Heidegger’s understanding of method involves a radical re-imagination of what philosophical knowledge is. In the tradition of epistemology philosophical knowledge can be seen as a reflection on knowledge. Exemplified it revolves around the questions of how we know, of what knowledge is, of what the requirements for ‘having’ knowledge are, and of the conditions of possibility for knowledge. In the reflection on knowledge the relation of knowing reflects itself back on itself, i.e., the reflection is nothing other than the utilization of the same gaze which captures or grasps entities to be able to grasp the grasping itself. For Heidegger however philosophical knowledge isn’t a theoretical grasping or holding on to of that which grasps as in epistemology; it is rather the practice of ontology conceived as
hermeneutical phenomenology, the activity of letting that which shows itself be seen. The two first chapters (2 & 3) will thus focus on painting a picture of Heidegger’s philosophy as a type of praxis where philosophical knowledge becomes the skilled practicing of the method itself. As Heidegger says in *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*: “Es geht nicht darum Philosophieren zu kennen, sondern philosophieren zu können.” My suggestion is therefore that we read Heidegger’s references to philosophical knowledge as a form of understanding know-how which questions the basic concepts that lead our philosophical investigation and in this manner revises both them and our praxis. The first step towards illustrating this will be taken in Chapter 2: *Method as Praxis*. Here I will give a reading of the introduction (§§1-8) where Heidegger gives the initial discussion of his method. In addition to presenting an overview of the methodological themes of the work and how Heidegger plans to proceed I will focus on the path of Heidegger’s thinking. This will be done in order to show that Heidegger’s method can be seen as a praxis because it stands in contrast to the pure theoretical gaze of knowing and it shares the same features as other practical understanding, without attempting to abstract from these. Chapter 2 will also briefly have brought to view the special relation between Heidegger’s method and its ‘object’, being. This relation will be given further elucidation in Chapter 3: *Method and Object*. By using the method-object relation as a parameter I will try to contrast Heidegger’s investigation against the instrumental view of method. This will be done with the aim of showing that philosophical knowledge for Heidegger can be characterized as anticipatory resoluteness, a know-how that creates a new praxis by revising the basic concepts of that praxis. I will argue that because the investigation, on the count of having a circular nature, has no natural result, the knowledge must be connected to the understanding know-how of the practical method. In the concluding Chapter 4: *Theoretical Correction* I will not attempt any summary, but instead, briefly investigate two problems connected to my interpretation. The first problem concerns the notion of praxis itself which the preceding chapters have overlooked. The second problem revolves around Heidegger’s ambivalence regarding whether philosophical knowledge after all is a knowing and not an understanding. I will find that a more proper name for praxis would be a unity of a specific disclosing-uncovering activity pertaining to the method. In addition, Heidegger’s intent regarding the end and final manner of access of the investigation must be regarded as uncertain, but what he did develop falls in line with the conclusion of the previous chapters.

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1.3 Methodological Considerations

Since this is a treatment of method and philosophical knowledge some brief words on the method and scope of the investigation and the knowledge it hopes to attain is called for. An initial explanation of how I got involved in the above explained problematic will perhaps shed some light on the methodological choices I have made. My engagement with *Sein und Zeit* started out with attempts to understand specific parts of the work, his conception of nature, his understanding of the ontology of presence-at-hand, and his analyses of equipment, breakdown and anxiety. But, looking at these parts out of context, standing alone, it was impossible to get a clear idea of them. Generally, it was hard to see what these analyses were supposed to reveal without a full understanding of the framework they were a part of. More specifically, it was unclear to me what standards his descriptions followed and how his descriptions were meant to be true; how could he ‘know’ what he was talking about? How could he ‘know’, for example, what anxiety revealed? These were the problems that led me towards investigating his method in the hope that this would make clear how these analyses were structured. Then it of course dawned on me that Heidegger doesn’t need to ‘know’ at all; he doesn’t need knowing to access the phenomena he is interested in. The questions I asked were epistemological in nature or stemmed from an epistemological starting point, but to understand what Heidegger does one has to leave the framework of epistemology and its emphasis on the relation of knowing and jump over to the framework of ontology. This is a leap of faith about which Richardson says: “To fail to make with him the initial leap into the circular structure of There-being is to render any sympathetic understanding impossible.”

The reason for this is that Heidegger, as we will see later, sets up a new standard for philosophical descriptions that breaks with the earlier conventions. Instead of measuring descriptions by how they correspond to the external world, ontological descriptions must show how the phenomenon in question is presented in Dasein’s self-understanding. This insight, which cannot lay claim to novelty, initially led me to frame my investigation as part methodological and part substantial; the latter part focusing on the above mentioned themes now enlightened on the background of an understanding of the method. But as the investigation into the methodological structure of Heidegger’s work grew, and as it became clearer to me that method was, if not the, then at least one of, the most central aspect of the work, and could not merely be understood with a view to the introduction, the work changed

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into entirely focusing on method. In order to do this, to properly investigate the problematic of
method and philosophical knowledge, an investigation into the whole of the work was
necessary. In a self-aware moment I might be prone to admit that the task undertaken here is
too grand to be completed in a thoroughly manner in so small a format. At the same time I
opine that Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be understood by looking at it in atomic parts,
rather it must be approached as a whole. To understand what Heidegger says one has to have
an idea of where the analyses is situated in the work, what methodological function it serves,
in short, a view of the whole. Given the large scope and the small space some central themes
have been given less attention than they deserved, others have been left out almost entirely.
Most notable of those is Heidegger’s conception of truth which has been omitted, except from
a brief discussion of it below, because my central argument is understandable without
recourse to it.

Instead, then, of following any tradition, instead of going via the commentary literature, I
have tried to thread my own path pursuing the above stated problems I had with regard to
understanding Heidegger’s text. My attitude towards the commentary literature has therefore
been eclectic. That is not to say that I haven’t learned from the commentators, but I have
chosen mainly to use them as guides for my own interpretation. Sein und Zeit has, of course,
had a remarkably rich reception history. To name only the most central it has had an
existentialist reception, for the most connected to Sartre, focusing on the themes of anxiety
and authenticity; it stands as a major inspiration for Gadamer’s development of philosophical
hermeneutics making use of Heidegger’s conception of understanding in his Wahrheit und
Methode; and it has been influential in the deconstructivist wave centred around Derrida
where Heideggerian themes of the presence-at-hand ontology and of destruction have been
key. Though we will encounter the terms authenticity, understanding and destruction centrally
placed in my interpretation, this does not rely on any of the aforementioned traditions. My
aim has been to understand Heidegger from out of himself, and I have therefore preferred to
go to the primary source itself. This is, I believe, the proper manner of doing phenomenology,
motivated by Heidegger’s appropriated motto zu dem Sachen selbst; which in this case is
Heidegger’s method. Another strain of interpreters has attempted to demonstrate the influence
Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Husserl and Kant has had on the work, or attempted to show how Sein
und Zeit stands in relation to his other works, whether they are contemporaneous or stem from
after what has been termed Heidegger’s turn (Kehre), in the 1930s, from a focus on Dasein’s
being towards a focus on being itself. Since I, in order not to make the task to unmanageable,
have chosen to focus almost exclusively on *Sein und Zeit* I will not provide a genesis of his concepts from out of his earlier work, nor will I attempt to take sides on the issue of Heidegger’s turn in thinking. The reliance on this work only is problematic because some of the key concepts it employs are not fully explained, most notably the formal indication. I have therefore, from time to time, made recourse to some other contemporary works of his to elucidate some points. With regard to Heidegger’s relation to his predecessors I have made no systematic attempt to show any connection, but, of course, such have been pointed out if thought eliminating to the context.

Richardson, as quoted above, is correct I think in observing that a requirement for a sympathetic understanding of Heidegger’s work is to follow him into the circular structure of the method set up by his formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence. This requirement raises the issue of whether to leap with Heidegger in order to understand him or stand ‘on the outside’ in order to criticize him. Granberg frames the same problem thus: “Since going along the way also demands having the right attitude, the question is if it is at all possible to get the necessary distance (or cool-headedness) for evaluating the results[.]” Her strategy is to provide a critical reading by laying “the basis for criticism” in “the relation between experience and description.” Similarly, Hubert Dreyfus seems to identify a critical reading of Heidegger with “trying to clarify Heidegger’s theses, checking them against the phenomena.” Checking the description against the experience or the theses against the phenomena amounts structurally to the same thing, it involves checking whether there is a correspondence in place between the two respective levels, if no correspondence can be found the description must thereby be rejected or refined. This ‘experimental’ approach, if we could call it that, to Heidegger’s work, is taken to a new level when there, in connection to the recent interest his work has gathered in the field of artificial intelligence, mainly spawned by Dreyfus’ work, have even been concrete attempts to empirically verify Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions. Dotov et. al. concludes their research paper stating that their

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10 The front line here goes between Richardson and Schürmann. The former originated the distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II where the first was concerned with Dasein’s being and the second with being as such. Schürmann however claims that Heidegger “explicitly denies a break in his thought and says that he never abandoned the intent of *Being and Time.*” Reiner Schürmann (2008). “Heidegger's Being and Time”. In Levine (Ed.), *On Heidegger's Being and Time.* London: Routledge, p. 58. It appears however that Richardson, in the 2003 edition of his work has back-tracked somewhat on his original distinction. He nonetheless still holds that “the distinction is, indeed, still a useful one, at least for heuristic purposes.” William J. Richardson (2003). *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. XXXVII.


study, which attempts to put Heidegger’s thoughts to empirical test, “offers evidence for the hypothesized transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand.”\(^\text{14}\) Such a fortunate outcome of an empirical experiment, though in itself alone not giving any final proof of the matter, might not have elicited much approval from Heidegger himself. For him phenomenological truth is a matter not of correspondence of any kind, but of letting the phenomena be seen in an uncovering (Entdeckung) of it as it shows itself from itself. Heidegger claims that “weil der logos ein Sehenlassen ist, deshalb kann es wahr oder falsch sein. Auch liegt alles daran, sich von einem konstruierten Wahrheitsbegriff im Sinne einer ‘Übereinstimmung’ freizuhalten” (SZ, 33 §7b). This uncovering of the phenomena is itself only possible on the basis of a disclosing (Erschließung) of being: “die Entdecktheit des innerweltlichen Seienden gründet vielmehr in der Erschlossenheit der Welt” (SZ, 220 §44b).

For Heidegger any understanding of the entities that surround us, be they equipment or things with properties, is called an uncovering. When I use a hammer to drive a nail through the wall I understand the hammer, I uncover it as a piece of equipment that is ‘in order to’ (Um-zu) hammer with, that stands in a relation to other equipment. This understanding however is only possible on the background of an understanding of the world which must not be understood as a totality of entities, but instead a structure of Dasein’s being. That is to say an understanding of entities is only possible on the background of an understanding of oneself. We bring this up because Heidegger identifies proper philosophical truth not only with descriptively uncovering, but with disclosing (“Phänomenologische Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein)” (SZ, 38 §7c)). As it turns out conceptualization as a descriptive uncovering of Dasein’s being cannot be done by any kind of self-understanding. It has to be done by an understanding that has disclosed Dasein’s whole being. Such an understanding is authentic and described by Heidegger as anticipatory resolute. Being resolute (entschlossen) is seen as an authentic modification of how Dasein in its everyday understanding is disclosed (erschlossen) (SZ, 297 §60). Indeed, Granberg is correct if she by ‘right attitude’ means that in order to do phenomenology one has to be authentic. Doing, however, is one thing, but does this mean that we as readers also have to be authentic in order to understand? Heidegger is unequivocal on the issue: “Das Verständnis der Phänomenologie liegt einzig im Ergreifen ihrer als Möglichkeit” (SZ, 38 §7c). At the end of Chapter 3 it will be shown that this amounts to questioning the basic concepts that stem from the tradition and that guide us in our philosophical praxis, thus changing both them and our praxis.

What then are our options? We could position us outside of Heidegger’s framework as Granberg and Dreyfus both do (though Granberg’ reading is considerably more suspicious). This however seems to me a wrong place to start. The reason is that it upholds the epistemological problem field and the detached observer’s role in a subject-object set up that Heidegger leaves. This does not mean that critique “becomes impossible” as Granberg claims. Of course one can criticize Heidegger from this position, but then one must show how the problem of the connection between the worldless subject and the outer object can be solved on an ontological level (SZ, 60 §13). One must show that the position one self occupies is ontologically sound. The other option is to go along with Heidegger. But can one be critical within the framework that Heidegger sets up? Doesn’t going with him also imply agreement? I think this need not be so. The proper way of criticizing Heidegger would be to evaluate and question his pre-conceptions, to out-Heidegger Heidegger so to speak. But in order to do this a real understanding of Heidegger has to be undertaken because a real critical engagement can only be done on the back of a real attempt of understanding. This critical engagement, however, will fall outside the scope of this thesis. To criticize Heidegger has not been my goal here; I rather view this thesis as a step towards being able to criticize. This means that I cannot be claiming to be doing phenomenology, if this is understood in the technical sense of creating a new praxis, and I can in Heidegger’s sense not lay claim to understanding it either. Does this mean that I don’t try to find out if Heidegger’s version of philosophical knowledge is correct or not? Yes, my aim is only to understand Heidegger’s method, something which means uncovering the standards against which his thinking measures itself. Only on the back of such a standard can there be an evaluation of correctness. Thus engraved in the self-understanding of this thesis is that it is a step towards doing phenomenology. The kind of result the investigation in this manner must see itself satisfied with is the showing of this standard and the methodological structure that surrounds it. In this way, at the same time as the scope of the undertaking is quite bold, trying to encapsulate the methodological movements of the whole work, the result is quite modest. I will not say that I have managed to capture Heidegger’s thinking regarding method in its entirety. Instead what I have attempted to show are some of the paths of his thinking, concerning that have seemed the most relevant for elucidating his views on knowledge and method.

Chapter 2: Method as Praxis

The main question of this thesis concerns philosophical knowledge and the form it takes in *Sein und Zeit*. I will start tackling this issue by performing an analysis of the introductory paragraphs (§§1-8) of the work, which will focus on Heidegger’s methodology. Apart from the fact that these paragraphs constitute the first part of the book, and therefore perhaps acts as a natural place to begin, why start out here? Firstly because it gives an introduction to Heidegger’s method and the key methodological problems he grapples with. Secondly, and more importantly for the thesis, however, is that it gives an opportunity to look at the practical aspect of Heidegger’s method. This is done in order to reach an interpretation, in Chapter 3, of philosophical knowledge itself as practical. To clarify the practical aspect we cannot however be satisfied with Heidegger’s statements only, we must also look at the investigation itself, that is, the path (*Weg*) that it follows. This path starts with the three prejudices of the tradition concerning being. In Chapter 2.1 I will show that Heidegger not only examines, but gives a deconstructive reading of these prejudices making them problematic, that is, he turns them into three problems concerning being. These three problems then form the basis for the next three chapters. Chapter 2.2 concerns the problem of the ontological difference and will show how Heidegger differentiates both being from entities and ontological investigations from ontic ones. In 2.3 I will show that what I call the problem of elucidation is countered by the introduction of phenomenology as the ‘letting be seen of that which shows itself’ and that this amounts to an establishment of a criterion for ontological descriptions. In the following Chapter 2.4 the problem of the conceptualization of being is the focus. Here I will examine the role that the destruction of the ontological tradition, the formal indication, and the utilization of border case modes of access play in conceptualizing being. Finally, in 2.5, based on the preceding analyses, I will argue that Heidegger’s method is practical because (1) it is a path, (2) it stands in contrast to the pure theoretical gaze of knowing and (3) it shares the same features as other practical manners of understanding without attempting to abstract from these.
In his late essay *Der Satz der Identität* Heidegger says: “Wenn das Denken, von einer Sache angesprochen, dieser nachgeht, kann es ihm geschehen, daß es sich unterwegs wandelt. Darum ist es ratsam, im folgenden auf den Weg zu achten, weniger auf den Inhalt.” Here we are looking at the path of thinking not only to catch a glimpse of the transition from dogma to problem, but also too see how the path conforms to the content of Heidegger’s descriptions.

2.1 Problem and Prejudice

The overall objective in *Sein und Zeit* is to retrieve the meaning of the question of the meaning of being. In §1 Heidegger undertakes to review three prejudices (*Vorurteile*) that have haunted the philosophical tradition’s understanding of being: (1) Being is the most universal concept, (2) being is indefinable and (3) being is self-evident. Together these three prejudices constitute a dogma in light of which the question of the meaning of being not only seems superfluous, the dogma also sanctions the neglect (*Versäumnis*) of the question. Accordingly the first task of Heidegger’s project is to soften up these prejudices so they can no longer stand in the way of the investigation. But this softening up is only enabled on the basis of certain attitudes which also must be retrieved. Heidegger’s reading is therefore designed to evoke an embarrassment (*Verlegenheit*) over not understanding being that will lead to the mood (*Stimmung*) of wondering (*thaumazein*) over the question of what being really is (SZ, 1; 172 §36). This strategy of evoking puzzlement is made use of repeatedly in SZ. But the question ‘was besagt ... ontologisch?’, which is a common trope, isn’t meant solely to lead to disarray; rather it is to provoke and provide clues for rethinking concepts whose ontological basis were thought obvious. What I aim to show is thus that Heidegger’s strategy of softening up the three prejudices results in them turning in to three problems concerning being. And in the subsequent parts I will show how these again are solved in the introduction on a methodological level.

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18 For further examples of this strategy see for instance: (SZ, 48 §10; 68 §15; 99 §21; 166 §34; 216 §44a) for Heidegger’s questioning of the ontological meaning of fulfil (*Vollziehen*), value (*Wert*), addition of values (*haften der Werte*), language (*Sprache*) and subsistence (*Bestand*) respectively.
The proponents of the first prejudice, concluding from the fact that being is incorporated in all understanding, holds that it must be the most universal concept. But not even this prejudice takes being to be a predicate or property like blueness, hardness, etc, or even, given from its applicability to everything, to be the most general of all properties. Aristotle and the scholastic ontology conceive of being as transcendence, as something beyond the realm of entities and the structure of genus and species in which they are ordered.\textsuperscript{19} Heidegger agrees with Aristotle in this regard, being is not a property locatable in a categorical schema, but at the same time he claims that Aristotle and the tradition that follows him haven’t shed light on the relationship this transcendence has with such a categorical structure. The failure of the tradition consists, therefore, in not having provided a clear unified account of being. Aristotle who came closest took the unity to be one of analogy, but he could not shed light on what such an analogy ontologically means. Heidegger therefore concludes by stating: “Wenn man demnach sagt: ‘Sein’ ist der allgemeinste Begriff, so kann das nicht heißen, er ist der klarste und aller weiteren Erörterungen unbedürftig” (SZ, 3 §1). And by that he indicates that the relationship between being and the categorical structure is problematic and stands in need of further clarification.

The second prejudice, which takes being as indefinable, is an inference from the first one. Indeed if the only way of defining is to determine something according to its genus and species, a definition of being, since it transcends this structure, becomes impossible. Being can neither be deduced from higher concepts, its high generality prevents there from being any, nor can it on the count of its transcendence, which provides a gap between being and entities, be produced from lower concepts. Heidegger agrees with this and claims: “‘Sein’ kann in der Tat nicht als Seiendes begriffen werden” (SZ, 4 §2). His wording here is clever; the tradition’s focus on being as something not definable \textit{tout court} is transformed into being as not definable or conceptualizable as an entity. Heidegger is thereby only willing to conclude that “‘Sein’ ist nicht etwas wie Seiendes” (SZ, 4 §2). Thus the apparent

\textsuperscript{19} Aristotle reasons in this manner: “But it is not possible for either ‘unity’ or ‘being’ to be a genus of things; for each differentia of any genus must be and also be one, but it is impossible either for the species of genus or for that genus alone to be a predicate of the proper differentiae of the species.” Aristotle (1975). \textit{Aristotle's Metaphysics} (Apostle, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 45 B 3, 998b 22-5. For Aristotle to define a species is to supply the genus with a differentia. If I am to define ‘man’ I pick out the genus ‘animal’ and specify with the differentia ‘rational’. Man as a ‘rational animal’ is thus a species that falls under the genus of animal, and what sets it apart from the other animals is its rationality. The first clause of the quote implies that being will be a predicate of all differentia, because whatever you differentiate with will be something. In the last clause Aristotle claims that the predicate of the differentia of a species cannot be the genus. This means that a description of the differentiating property cannot be the genus because that would make the differentia fall under the genus as well. And this cannot be so. Man, for instance, cannot be differentiated by something else that falls under the genus of man. If being was a genus one would have to go outside being to define the species, but since being is supposed to be the highest genus this is impossible.
indefinability shouldn’t preclude us from trying to find another way of conceptualizing being. What is needed is an altogether new approach:

Seiendes als Seiendes nicht durch Rückführung auf ein anderes Seiendes in seiner Herkunft zu bestimmen, gleich als hätte Sein den Charakter eines möglichen Seienden. Sein als das Gefragte fordert daher eine eigene Aufweisungsart, die sich von der Entdeckung des Seienden wesenhaft unterscheidet. (SZ, 6 §2)

What this prejudice thus indicates is not that being is indefinable, but if we are to conceptualise being a rather different manner of doing so is required.

The third prejudice sees being as self-evident. Everybody understands what is meant with such statements as ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘the rock is heavy’ etc., something which would indicate that we have an insight into and for many purposes, indeed most, also are in possession of an adequate understanding of being. But for Heidegger this isn’t so much an insight as a riddle. He agrees that we already have an understanding of being, but this understanding is so opaque that it is more akin to a non-understanding because the meaning of being is for us obscured. This state of affairs “beweist die Grundsätzliche Notwendigkeit, die Frage nach dem Sinn von ‘Sein’ zu wiederholen” (SZ, 4 §1) in the light of which the understanding of being can be elucidated.

It is interesting that Heidegger doesn’t so much disagree with the prejudices of the tradition when it comes to being, as he seeks to change the perspective from which they are viewed. His main aim in this introductory analysis is not to annihilate the prejudices but to release them from the dogma that makes the investigation into being seem superfluous, and thus make us wonder what being ‘is’. The character of Heidegger’s approach thereby takes the form of a careful dismantling²⁰ of what blocks the investigation into being. His announced destruction of the transmitted ontological tradition, which the introductory chapters conform to, thereby shows itself as what they are billed: “Die Destruktion hat ebensowenig den negativen Sinn einer Abschüttelung der ontologischen Tradition. Sie soll umgekehrt diese in ihren positiven Möglichkeiten, und das besagt immer, in ihren Grenzen abstecken” (SZ, 22

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²⁰ The term dismantling is my translation of Heidegger’s Abbau (which also is the basis for Derrida’s term déconstruction). Heidegger doesn’t use the term in SZ, but it appears next to the term Destruktion in Grundprobleme with the same meaning. Martin Heidegger (1975). Gesamtausgabe Band 24: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, p. 31.
§6). The prejudices are to be dismantled in order to show their limits so that the possibility of going beyond them is accentuated.

Thus after this initial round of analysis we find that Heidegger shares a lot of the tradition’s views, with modifications however: being is transcendent with regard to entities, but the relationship between them must be clarified; it isn’t definable as an entity, but requires a different sort of conceptualization; and we already have an understanding of it, but this understanding must be elucidated. With Heidegger’s change of perspective these prejudices no longer stand in the way of asking the question of being, rather they “fordert dazu gerade auf” (SZ, 4 §1). Heidegger has in this manner, presumably, evoked a sense of embarrassment and wonderment by making the obvious (selbst-verständliche) problematic. The three prejudices are turned into three problems concerning (1) the relationship between being and entities, (2) the conceptualization of being and (3) the elucidation of being. By the end of §8, the last in the introduction, these problems will have been ‘solved’ methodologically, i.e., Heidegger will show how he plans to go about solving them.

2.2 First Problem – Ontological Difference

Beginning with the issue of the relationship between being and entities the first thing we can take notice of is Heidegger’s claim that: “Sein und seine Seinsstrukturen liegen über jedes Seiende und jede mögliche seiende Bestimmtheit eines Seienden hinaus. Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin” (SZ, 38 §7c). As we have mentioned this transcendence of being with regard to entities was already observed by the tradition which saw it as their task to explain the commonalities between entities and being. According to Heidegger’s interpretation Aristotle attempted to think the transcendental ‘universal’ in a unity with the manifold of the highest concepts and grasped this unity as one of analogy. The scholastics of the middle ages are claimed to have followed him in this regard as they “fäst den positiven Sinn des Bedeutens von ‘Sein’ als ‘analoges’ Bedeuten im Unterschied zum einsinnigen oder nur gleichnamigen” (SZ, 93 §20). Heidegger however flips the coin on Aristotle and the tradition on this point; opting against the attempt of finding a unity here at all he seeks instead to assert the radical difference between the transcending and the transcended, between being and entities.
Wir müssen den Unterschied zwischen Sein und Seiendem eindeutig vollziehen können, um
dergleichen wie Sein zum Thema der Untersuchung zu machen. Diese Unterscheidung ist keine
beliebige, sondern diejenige, durch die allererst das Thema der Ontologie und damit der Philosophie
selbst gewonnen wird. Sie ist eine die Ontologie allererst konstituierende. Wir bezeichnen sie als die
*ontologische Differenz*, d. h. als die Scheidung zwischen Sein und Seiendem.  

This quote is taken from a lecture held in the summer semester of 1927, right after the
publication of SZ. It is here the term ‘ontological difference’ first makes its appearance. But
even if it isn’t explicitly mentioned in the latter work the distinction is nevertheless made use
of not only in negative descriptions (such as: “Das Sein des Seienden ‘ist’ nicht selbst ein
Seiendes” (SZ, 6 §2)), but systematically throughout the work; it is indeed, as Heidegger in
the above quote claims, constitutive for ontological investigations. This is so because it limits
the reach of ontology to only concern itself with being and not just tell stories (*Geschichte
erzählen*) about entities (SZ, 6 §2). Such a move separates ontology as the science of being
from all other ontic investigations and sciences which concern themselves with entities. The
underlining of the ontological difference is nothing but a reaffirmation of the transcendent
character of being. As transcendent, being cannot be analyzable as a component or a property
(*Eigenschaft*) of entities, that would make it immanent. And since ontic investigation
according to Heidegger is the activity of analyzing entities in their properties it is an
undertaking which ontology needs to differentiate itself from. For Heidegger the latter is more
primordial (*ursprünglicher*) compared with the former. But what gives ontology this
privileged position? According to Heidegger the totality of entities can be divided up into
different regions (*Bezirken*) such as nature, history, life, language etc., each of them
susceptible for scientific investigation. This division is not to be seen as eternal or devoid of
context, they rather stem from the rough and naive determination of the subject area
performed by the “vorwissenschaftliche Erfahrung und Auslegung” of the scientists (SZ, 9
§3). The basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*), thus determined, then act as guides (*Leitfäden*) for
further investigations. If I want to describe natural objects, a requirement is that I have an
idea, however unclear, of what nature is (if I don’t have such an idea where should I begin to
look?). These investigations then bifurcate into positive science on the one hand, which
analyzes, describes and experiments with entities and their properties, and on the other, what
Heidegger calls the authentic movement (*eigentliche ‘Bewegung’*) of the sciences, i.e., the
revision of their basic concepts (SZ, 9 §3).  

Grondin points out that these concepts “sind aber

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21 Ibid., p. 22.
22 For more on authenticity and authentic science see Chapter 3.4.
selber nichts Seiendes, nichts Ontisches. Sie betreffen nämlich das Sein des jeweils behandelten Gebietes.” These revisions, since they are related to being, border on ontology, but when they are performed by the scientists they are done in a non-transparent (nicht dursichtigen) manner. I take this to mean that the scientists revise the basic concepts without being aware that this, i.e., changing what leads their understanding of their field, is what they are doing. Therefore Heidegger calls for a type of research that leaps ahead of the positive sciences and in a transparent manner actively revises and creates such concepts; and he refers to the work of Plato and Aristotle as proof of such research, which he calls “Ontologie im Weitesten Sinne” (SZ, 11 §3), being possible.

The basic concepts are what guides the research of the positive sciences, and without such guidance, be it transparent or not, the practice of science would not be possible. If the natural scientist had no understanding of the being of nature, then exploring it, describing it, experimenting with it etc. could not be done. A similar guide is also needed by the research connected to the each of the regional ontologies. Even if the construction and shaping of concepts are explicitly made to lead the positive sciences, up until now, this effort has been naive and non-transparent in a different manner: It hasn’t developed a clear sense of the meaning of being, that is, it hasn’t clarified what leads its investigation. The philosopher who, like Aristotle, attempts to describe the being of nature (φύσις) or the soul (ψυχή) must be led by an already present understanding of being. If not, how can he set out to describe what each subject matter ‘is’?

The question of being (Seinsfrage) – which it is Heidegger’s intent to develop – should therefore not be confused with neither of these two types of investigation. Rather it seeks to ascertain the conditions of possibility not only for the sciences as practical endeavours, but also for the regional ontologies which are prior to as well as provides the foundation for each of the ontic sciences (SZ, 11 §3). The path Heidegger sets upon is therefore a transcendental one. Ontology can play this role vis-a-vis ontic investigation because of the relation between being and entities. Being, even if it is transcendent, is always connected to entities (“Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden” (SZ, 9 §3)) and never just an abstract principle or divine substance floating freely beyond and without any relation to the

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24 The predominant understanding of being in the tradition is according to Heidegger, connected to time (Zeit), but not just any understanding of time, rather time as presence (Anwesenheit) or the present (Gegenwart) both terms indicating, according to the Macquarrie & Robinson translation, “presence of someone [or thing] at some place or on some occasion.” Martin Heidegger (1992). Being and Time (Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell, p. 47. Heidegger’s investigation of time is however something this thesis will only touch upon sporadically.
world of entities. But being isn’t merely transcendent, it is also transcendent, it is “das, was Seiende als Seiendes bestimmt, das, woraufhin Seiendes, mag es wie immer erörtert werden, je schon verstanden ist” (SZ, 6 §2). Being is that which makes entities understandable; it is, as an a priori, something prior (früher) that leads our interaction with the things we encounter in the world.25

This connection between being and understanding is so intimate that Heidegger even speaks of “der notwendige Zusammenhang von Sein und Verständnis” (SZ, 183 §39). Phrases such as these have undoubtedly been instrumental in leading philosophers like Hubert Dreyfus – whose pragmatic Wittgenstein-inspired interpretation has gained such traction that it has been called “the orthodox interpretation” in the Anglo-American academia26 – into interpreting being simply as the intelligibility of entities, i.e., that which makes entities understandable or intelligible. What makes Dreyfus’ reading pragmatic is foremost that he takes the “‘mindless’ everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility.”27 These skills are referred to as the background because it is a condition for something to be uncovered (entdeckt) as an entity, to be placed in the foreground so to speak, that something else has receded into the background. If one were to focus on how one understood one would miss the ‘what’ to be understood, the entity itself. The background conditions the foreground, but only as long as it remains in the background, as non-explicit: “Heidegger calls the non-explicit background that enables us to make sense of things ‘the understanding of being.’”28 For Dreyfus being is thus seen as the “background of everyday activity”29 which provides the intelligibility of entities. There are two problems with this interpretation. Firstly, it takes for granted that there isn’t a more primordial understanding than everyday coping, but as I shall show in Chapter 3.4 this can be found in the authentic understanding. Secondly, as Schürmann points out, if ‘understanding of being’ for Dreyfus is the same as being he appears to equivocate Dasein’s being, which has an understanding of being, with being tout court. But such an interpretation “does not operate with the understanding of the word ‘Being’ as Heidegger explicitly works out. ‘Being’ is not primarily man’s (Dasein’s) Being.”30 Heidegger’s aim in Sein und Zeit is after all to interpret the meaning of being and the analytic of Dasein which concern itself with Dasein’s being plays second fiddle to this aim.

28 Ibid., p. 4.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
Heidegger of course never gets to being proper due to the unfinished nature of the work. The way he planned to get there was by way of a fundamental ontology. This must be differentiated from a foundational ontology which seeks to ground all knowledge in an indubitable first principle such as Aristotle’s unmoved mover or Descartes’ *cogito*. Instead fundamental ontology is the attempt to elucidate Dasein’s being and use that as a springboard in order to reach being. Dasein is chosen for this purpose because it has three advantages contra other entities. It has first an ontic priority in that it is an entity which has existence as its being. This key term will be revisited, for now it suffices to say that it means that Dasein has an understanding of its own being. This leads to the second, ontological, priority because since it has an understanding of its own being it must also have an understanding of being as such. This differs from proper ontological understanding only in that it hasn’t been made explicit. And thirdly this understanding also leads to an ontic-ontological priority. Included in Dasein’s self-understanding (*Erschließung*) is an understanding (*Entdeckung*) of the being of other entities. For example my understanding of myself as a carpenter only manifests itself when I am involved in the skills connected to this role, using a hammer for instance. In this way my understanding of myself harbours an understanding of the being of the hammer as well. Dasein thus shows itself as the condition of possibility for all ontologies (SZ, 13 §4). For these reasons it is the analytic of Dasein that makes up the fundamental ontology. And in this manner it becomes apparent, as Richardson observes, that “The prelude to the question of Being is the question of There-being”.

But since it is only the being of Dasein that is worked out in the fragment of *Sein und Zeit* this thesis will also have its main focus on Dasein’s being and not on being as such.

To sum up, we can see that the problem of the relation between being and entities isn’t given a definite solution in the introduction. What we are given are preparatory remarks as to how they relate to each other in order to set the investigation on the right path. Ontology, because it attempts to grasp the conditions of possibility of other investigations must differentiate itself from these investigations if it’s going to be able to address being in a proper fashion. The connection between being and Dasein, the entity that understands being also means that a fundamental ontology must be sought in Dasein’s being.

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2.3 Second Problem – Elucidation of Being

Having thus given an indication of the fault line between being and entities, between ontological and ontic investigation, the next task is to sketch out how to go about clarifying the conditions of possibility the ontological investigation aims at. For that purpose he needs to address the next two problems regarding the conceptualization and the elucidation of being, let’s start with the latter. In the opening paragraphs Heidegger almost barrages the reader with passages referring to what we can call the dual nature of being, that being is both close and distant, that it is both something we understand and something we do not understand: “Daß wir je schon in einem Seinsverständnis leben und der Sinn von Sein zugleich in Dunkel gehüllt ist, beweist die grundsätzliche Notwendigkeit, die Frage nach dem Sinn von ‘Sein’ zu wiederholen” (SZ, 4 §1). “Das gesuchte im Fragen nach dem Sein ist kein völlig Unbekanntes, wenngleich zunächst ganz und gar Unfaßliches” (SZ, 6 §2). “Das Dasein ist zwar ontisch nicht nur nahe oder gar das nächste – wir sind es sogar je selbst. Trotzdem oder gerade deshalb ist es ontologisch das Fernste” (SZ, 15 §6). At some level being is apparent for us, but on another it is hidden. This isn’t just a description of a methodologically difficult situation, but a description of the nature of being itself (SZ, 16 §5). Being shows itself at the same time as it remains hidden, or more concretely as we have seen in the examples of the sciences, it leads our interaction with entities at the same time as we are blind to being led. This peculiarity in being is why Heidegger claims that: “Ontologie ist nur als Phänomenologie möglich” (SZ, 35 §7c).

According to Heidegger these two labels “charakterisieren die Philosophie selbst nach Gegenstand und Behandlungsart” (SZ, 38 §7c). That philosophy is ontology means, as we have seen, that its object of study is being; the phenomenological component shows ‘the how’ (das Wie) of the investigation. To illustrate what phenomenology is Heidegger performs an etymological analysis where he traces the meaning of each of the words two components, phenomenon and logos back to their Greek roots. Phenomenon is glossed as ‘that which shows itself in itself’ (das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende), whilst logos is ‘letting something be seen’ (Sehenlassen). The goal of phenomenological descriptions is to effectuate a movement

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32 To clear up any confusion, the second problem, the elucidation of being, is the same as I have earlier referred to with the numeral three, stemming from the third prejudice. The reason for this switch is exegetical. It makes more sense to present phenomenology as the elucidation of being, before hermeneutics, which is a specification of phenomenology, and will be the focus of the problem of conceptualization.
from concealment to unconcealment, bringing the hidden out in the open, letting it be seen.
What is to be laid bare is:

Offenbar solches, was sich zunächst und zumeist gerade nicht zeigt, was gegenüber dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, verborgen ist, aber zugleich etwas ist, was wesenshaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, gehört, so zwar, daß es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht. (SZ, 35 §7c)

But in order for something to be laid out in the open it must already at some level have shown itself. It must conform to Heidegger’s description of phenomena as “das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende” (SZ, 31 §7a). This forms a part of the critical aspect of Heidegger’s phenomenology. A common trope repeated throughout SZ is that phenomenological descriptions are supposed to follow Husserl’s maxim ‘to the things themselves!’ (zu den Sachen selbst!), and by that position itself

entgegen alle freischwebenden Konstruktionen, zufälligen Funden, entgegen der Überrnahme von nur scheinbar ausgewiesenen Begriffen, entgegen den Scheinfragen, die sich oft Generationen hindurch als ‘Probleme’ breitmacht. (SZ, 27-28 §7)

The maxim signifies for Heidegger more than empty bantering. He rather contends that for an ontological description to avoid being labelled as arbitrary or as a construction it must show that what it reveals in its description is something that already somehow is revealed. If this cannot be shown the description must be seen as an arbitrary construction. The entity which being is revealed to is Dasein. As we have seen being is what makes entities understandable, a connection Heidegger will make full use of. In its practical engagement Dasein always already has an understanding of its own being, which Heidegger names existence (Existenz), and in this self-understanding it already has an understanding of being. This pre-ontological understanding of being functions in Heidegger’s philosophy somewhat analogously to the way impressions functions in Hume’s thought as, what has been labelled, the criterion for the meaning of ideas. For Hume any idea that can not be found to originate in an empirical impression would be rejected as meaningless:

33 Contrariwise to my emphasis on the critical nature of this concept of phenomenology Grondin has claimed that Heidegger’s description of phenomenology as “Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst sehen lassen” (SZ 34 §7C) barely goes beyond the tautological (“gelangen ... kaum über Tautologisches hinaus”. Jean Grondin (2007). “Die Wiedererweckung der Seinsfrage” Klassiker Auslegen: Martin Heidegger - Sein und Zeit, p. 22). Instead he sees the real critical impetus of the work to lie in its hermeneutic nature. Indeed Grondin is right to point that there is a great critical potential in the hermeneutical aspect of the method moving as it does through the destruction of the self-evident prejudices of the everyday common sense towards describing the phenomena as they show themselves. But as I will show in Chapter 3.3 this description is far from tautological, rather it is quite informative both as a critical standard that keeps arbitrary constructions away and as guide for how being and its structures are to be described.
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but inquire from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it is impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute which may arise concerning their nature and reality.\(^{34}\)

While Hume doesn’t mention a criterion of meaning explicitly in the *Inquiry* it is clearly deducible from the quoted passage above that he is speaking of one. If there cannot be found an impression corresponding to the idea it must be concluded according to Hume that the idea is empty of meaning. Heidegger, on the other hand, does in fact explicitly mention such a criterion. When speaking of the possibility of Dasein’s authentic existence being whole he reasons:

Wie soll überhaupt die Eigentümlichkeit der Existenz bestimmt werden, wenn nicht im Hinblick auf eigentliches Existieren? Woher nehmen wir dafür das Kriterium? Offenbar muß das Dasein selbst in seinem Sein die Möglichkeit und Weise seiner eigentlichen Existenz vorgeben, wenn anders sie ihm weder ontisch aufgezwungen, noch ontologisch erfunden werden kann. (SZ, 234 §45)\(^{35}\)

If we in our descriptions are to avoid ontological fabrications and ontic imposition on the phenomena the phenomenologist must elucidate how the phenomena in question is presented (vorgeben) in Dasein’s being (in seinem Sein), i.e., in its self-understanding.\(^{36}\) It is by way of elucidating Dasein’s being that Heidegger will reach the possibility of a real ontology.

Even if there is a similarity between Hume and Heidegger here there are also great differences. Firstly, while for Hume his criterion is supposed to be valid for all ideas Heidegger only concerns himself with setting a criterion for ontological descriptions, i.e. descriptions of being and its structures. Secondly, there is a vast difference between the


\(^{35}\) For the same point see also §58 where Heidegger asks from where the criterion for the primordial meaning of guilt is to be taken. He responds by rhetorically posing the question if it can be found in the being of Dasein, asking if it “sofern es je faktisch existiert, auch schuldig ist?” (SZ, 281 §58).

\(^{36}\) With this criterion Heidegger can be seen to respond to the challenge put forth by Nietzsche in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* of how one can keep finding (finden) and inventing (erfinden) apart in the realm of the a priori. “Wie sind synthetische Urtheile a priori möglich? fragte sich Kant, - und was antwortete er eigentlich? Vermöge eines Vermögens … alle suchten nach ‘Vermögen’. Und was fand man nicht alles - in jener unschuldigen, reichen, noch jugendlichen Zeit des deutschen Geistes, in welche die Romantik, die boshafte Fee, hineinblies, hineinsang, damals, als man ‘finden’ und ‘erfinden’ noch nicht auseinander zu halten wüste!” Friedrich Nietzsche (1977b). "Jenseits von Gut und Böse". In Schlechta (Ed.), *Werke in drei Bänden*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 575 §11. For Heidegger the answer, as stated, lies in showing how Dasein already has an understanding of the a priori phenomena.
phenomena of self-understanding Heidegger wants to elucidate and Humean impressions. The latter are by their very nature apparent, as Hume states: “The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest of sensations.”\textsuperscript{37} The difference between them is expressed here as a difference in the degree of how apparent they show themselves. Phenomena in contrast are as we already have pointed out something which in addition to showing themselves also are concealed. Thirdly, for Hume the procedure of validating the meaning of ideas is a matter of checking for a correspondence between two appearing entities, the idea and the impression which the idea is a copy of. For Heidegger however, ontological descriptions don’t reach their truth by corresponding to something, but in uncovering that which is apparent but hidden (\textit{verborgen}), that which shows itself somehow, vaguely and distorted (\textit{verstellt}) or that which is forgotten (\textit{vergessen}) and must be retrieved (SZ, 35 §7c). And this is only done on the background of an authentic self-understanding.

Looking back we can see that the problem of elucidation has been addressed by conceiving ontology as phenomenology. As with the first problem we are not given a definitive description, only a preparatory one: “Wir exponieren nur den Vorbegriff der Phänomenologie” (SZ, 28 §7). But it is nonetheless sufficient in establishing both the general aim of the investigation, which is the letting-be-seen of that which shows itself, but is hidden, as well as establishing the criterion for ontological description: they cannot be arbitrary constructions but must be found in Dasein’s self-understanding.\textsuperscript{38}

2.4 Third Problem – Conceptualization of Being

Being, as the condition of possibility for our engagement with entities, are to be elucidated by way of disclosing how it is revealed for Dasein. As we have witnessed Heidegger calls this a letting-be-seen. A vital part of uncovering being in letting-it-be-seen is conceptualization. The understanding of being is to be determined (\textit{bestimmt}) and put to concept (\textit{Begriff}): “In der untersuchenden, d. h. Spezifisch theoretischen Frage soll das Gefragte bestimmt und zu Begriff gebracht werden” (SZ, 5 §2). And the goal of the work is “Die Gewinnung des Grundbegriffes ‘Sein’” (SZ, 39 §8). This puts us in the context of our last problem which the analysis of the prejudices made apparent. At the outset we saw that Heidegger claimed that

\textsuperscript{37} David Hume (1998). “An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding” Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, p. 496, Section II.

\textsuperscript{38} The relationship between these two aspects of Heidegger’s method will be further examined at the end of Chapter 3.3.
since being couldn’t be defined in the same way as an entity a different form of conceptualization was required for being (and, we might add, its structures), than for entities. How then should one conceptualize being? Heidegger briefly touches upon this in the introduction when he further determines the logos-character of phenomenology, the letting-be-seen, as interpretation (Auslegung) or more literally laying-out. Hermeneutics, which he calls “das Geschäft der Auslegung” (SZ, 37 §7c) thus become a key component of phenomenology. That Dasein already has an understanding of its own being means that it is already self-interpreting, but it is too easy to say that this self-understanding is what the philosopher is to conceptualize. Dasein’s self-interpretation isn’t just, like we have mentioned above, something which is revealed to itself, but at the same time remains hidden. In addition to this hiddenness at an implicit level, the investigation has to come to terms with Dasein’s tendency to cover itself up in the explicit interpretations it makes of itself:

Das Dasein hat nicht nur die Geneigtheit, an seine Welt, in der es ist, zu verfallen und reluzent aus ihr her sich auszulegen, Dasein verfällt in eins damit auch seiner mehr oder minder ausdrücklich ergriffenen Tradition. (SZ, 21 §6)

In its everyday (Alltägliche) dealings in practical matters Dasein doesn’t understand itself from out of itself, i.e., authentically (eigentlich), but falls (verfällt) into interpreting itself inauthentically (uneigentlich) – from out of the social-practical world it encounters. From this initial falling an ontological tradition has built itself involving the same misunderstanding. In the tradition Dasein is interpreted explicitly as a thing with properties (Eigenschaften) and not as having an own way of being. Dasein is thus doubly trapped: it has an inherent tendency to misunderstand itself, as well as being situated in a tradition that reinforces that misunderstanding. The result is a public understanding (Verständigkeit) which is vague, average and distorted.

How does Heidegger deal with this difficult hermeneutical situation? Not by naively utilizing “eines zufälligen, ‘unmittelbaren’ und unbedachten ‘Schauens’” (SZ, 37 §7c). The hermeneutically difficult situation demands a more complex treatment than a simple self-observation of a reflective act. Indeed, as we will see, it will demand recourse to other

39 My interpretation here of the priority of the personal fall before the fall of the tradition is based on this quote: “das Dasein sich selbst und das Sein überhaupt aus der ‘Welt’ her versteht und daß die so erwachsene Ontologie der Tradition verfällt...” (SZ, 21-2 §6). The ontology of the tradition grows out (erwächst) of Dasein’s understanding of itself from out of the world.

40 The implicit reference of this harsh treatment is to Husserl and his Wesenschauen. This type of beholding (Schauen) is not well though out (unbedacht) (the M&R translation “unreflective” is the complete opposite, if anything Husserl’s Schauen is
modes of access to the phenomena “weil die Erschließungsmöglichkeiten des Erkennens viel zu kurz tragen gegenüber dem ursprüngliche Erschließender Stimmungen (SZ, 134 §29).

Exact procedural descriptions are absent in the opening paragraphs, but enough brief hints are given to provide an outline of his strategy. For clarity I will illustrate his points with examples from the concrete analyses he makes later in the work. The task for the hermeneutically minded phenomenology is vast; a brief sketch such as this cannot give justice to its full complexity, only give an indication of its general characteristics. The core of the hermeneutic investigation revolves around three interlinked operations: (1) the destruction of the traditional ontology and public opinion, (2) the conceptuality of the formal indication (formale Anzeige), and (3) the utilization of border case modes of access (Zugangsarten) for conformation. Together they form the centre pieces of the circle-character of the hermeneutic investigation. To understand the conceptuality of Sein und Zeit we have to look at them in a unity.

The hermeneutical interpretation requires the character of destruction to break loose of the strangling hold of public opinion and ontological tradition by softening up the inherent prejudices they contain. It directs itself towards what is already interpreted explicitly and it reveals the shortcomings of these interpretations. In this manner it reveals clues as to how the investigation can continue by showing the possibilities inherent in the tradition. But how can such clues be relevant for the further investigation? “[Die Verdeckung] kann zur totalen werden, oder aber, was die Regel ist, das zuvor Entdeckte ist noch sichtbar, wenngleich nur

reflective) (1) because it doesn’t take account of the cover-up and the ensuing difficulty of the hermeneutic situation and (2) because it doesn’t question that priority of “eine schlicht vernehmende Reflexion auf das Ich von Akten” (SZ, 115 §25) when it comes to how phenomena are accessed.

Some of the themes here presented will, however, be addressed more thoroughly later in the thesis. A further treatment on access and perspective is given in Chapter 3.3 while the role of the formal indication will be revisited in Chapter 3.3-4.

Now, it might seem as if the destruction only is supposed (1) to be directed at the ontologies and (2) that it is only performed after Heidegger has been able to determine the meaning of the question of being. The design of the treatise certainly can give that impression by only connecting destruction with ontology explicitly (and not public opinion) and placing the complete emphasis of the second (never written) part of SZ on destruction (SZ, 39-40 §8). But if we take a second look at Heidegger’s description of destruction we see that what it specifies can be applied to other parts of the text as well and thus perform a function beyond that assigned to it in the uncompleted part two. Put succinctly the destruction aims at a loosening up (Auflockerung) of the tradition so that the concealments or prejudices can be dissolved (Abgelöst) in order for their positive possibilities to shine through (SZ, 22-3 §6). If we add that the destruction directs itself at today (“ihre Kritik trifft das ‘Heute’” (SZ, 22 §6)) with the assumption that the public opinion is affected by the traditional ontologies it becomes clear that something at least very like a destruction of public opinion is performed at various stages in the work. I might agree, somewhat, to a use of a creative licence when applying the term with this wider extension, but the function is at bottom the important part here, and it is the same in both instances. A further hint towards a connection between the destruction of the traditional ontologies and what I call the destruction of the public opinion is Heidegger’s characterization of the latter as having a quality of violence (Gewaltsamkeit) (SZ, 311 §63).
als Schein. Wie viel ‘Sein’” (SZ, 36 §7c). The relevance stem from Heidegger’s claim that every understanding, no matter how erratic, is an understanding; and every understanding is an understanding of being or its structure. Even a misunderstanding must in this way have a relation to the phenomena and have understood at least something. The investigation thus ‘starts’ at the level of common public utterances:

Alle ontologischen Untersuchungen von Phänomenen wie Schuld, Gewissen, Tod müssen in dem ansetzen, was die alltägliche Daseinsauslegung darüber ‘sagt’. In der verfallenden Seinsart des Daseins liegt zugleich, daß seine Auslegung zumeist uneigentlich ‘orientiert ist und das ‘Wesen’ nicht trifft, weil ihm die ursprünglich angemessene ontologische Fragestellung fremd bleibt. Aber in jedem Fehlsehen liegt mitenthüllt eine Anweisung auf die ursprüngliche ‘Idee’ des Phänomens. (SZ, 281 §58)

The phenomena of guilt, conscience and death are not the only ones that receive this treatment. In §13 Heidegger analyzes the normal (übliche) manner of interpreting man’s relation to the world: knowing-of-the-world (Welterkennen) as an anticipation of his treatment of being-in-the-world; In Heidegger’s analysis of truth “Die Analyse geht vom traditionellen Wahrheitsbegriff aus und versucht dessen ontologische Fundamente freizulegen ... Aus diesen Fundamenten her wird das ursprüngliche Phänomen der Wahrheit sichtbar” (SZ, 214 §44). Additionally we can mention the treatment in §73 of the “vulgäre Daseinsauslegung” of history as a way to find the right way into the primordial historicity (Gesichtlichkeit). These normal, vulgar, traditional cover-ups have at least three things in common in addition to being springboards for reaching the phenomena. Firstly the cover-ups don’t show the being character of the phenomena; their interpretation eschews mention of being altogether. Secondly, the cover-ups aren’t necessarily inventing things out of thin air, their interpretation hits concrete extant phenomena, they are however falsely taken to be all there is to say about them. Thirdly, the phenomena which the everyday interpretations focus on are all found to be made possible by the more primordial phenomena they cover up; they reveal themselves to be derived.

43 The sense of before (zuvor) in this quote must be taken as twofold corresponding to the two manners of falling. It means before as in ‘at an earlier time’ with regard to the tradition. Think here of the question of being and that it earlier was asked, but now forgotten. But it also means before in the sense of primordial (ursprünglich), it is somehow understood by each Dasein, but covered over. The most relevant example here is perhaps the nullity which anxiety reveals but is covered up by the falling into the world of shared common practices, rules and conventions.

44 There are many more however. As I already have pointed out, the analysis Heidegger performs in §1 is a destructive reading. So is his reading of Descartes in §§19-21 which ends with him pointing out several ontological aporiae that will be taken up again later. In addition, Heidegger’s etymological readings where he traces the meaning of words (phänomenon, logos, hermeneuein, cura, etc.) back to their supposed roots effectively does the same, it dissolves the meaning the word has in regular speech at the same time as it releases the words potential for a new/original understanding (SZ, §7, §42).
The reason for these cover-up interpretations to miss the primordial phenomena is not arbitrary or down to chance. Like the above quote mentions: they don’t have an ontological questioning that leads them. The ontological investigation, in the same way as the ontic sciences, has to have a directionality provided by a guide (Leitfaden). The ‘start’ of the analysis in the destruction of the already extant self-interpretations of public opinion and traditional ontologies therefore needs to be pre-empted by a guiding formal indication. Formal indications have a vital but underexplained role in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger only mentions them briefly, connecting them to the formal indication of existence. But even if he uses the term in the introduction, since he doesn’t describe how it works, neither there or later in the text, we will have to go outside Sein und Zeit for our information. The formal indications mark a different type of conceptuality than we find in traditional concepts. They are ‘formal’ because their content is not predetermined, but open for concretization, and they are ‘indications’ because they signal, point towards or give direction to the path of the investigation. The formal indications are what Heidegger calls constructions, they are conceptual projections that bring being and its structures into sight. In the phenomenological construction being shall “jeweils in einem freien Entwurf in den Blick gebracht werden.”

The type of projecting is thus different from the one which Heidegger claims form an implicit part of everything we understand (SZ, 145 §31) in that it is made explicitly and that it is a free projection, meaning it is made from out of one self (authentic). In addition Heidegger states that:

Der Bedeutungsgehalt dieser Begriffe meint und sagt nicht direkt das, worauf er sich bezieht, er gibt nur eine Anzeige, eine Hinweis darauf, daß der Verstehende von diesem

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45 Heidegger mentions formal indication in the following passages: (SZ, 114, 116-7 §25; 313, 315 §63). In the latter he also speaks of “Die formale Anzeige der Existenzidee” which is another term for the same function. Similar passages referring to the idea of existence can be found here: (SZ, 179, 232-3, 266, 302, 311-4).

46 The formal indication is first mentioned in §25: “Die Antwort auf die Frage, wer dieses Seiende (das Dasein) je ist, wurde scheinbar bei der formalen Anzeige der Grundbestimmtheiten des Daseins (vgl. §9) schon gegeben” (SZ, 114 §25). And it clearly claims that the formal indication of Dasein’s being was made already in §9. The relevant passage would be: “wir für das Sein dieses Seienden die Bezeichnung Existenz wählen” (SZ, 42 §9). This is strange, firstly, because in §9 he doesn’t mention what he is doing is formally indicating, and, secondly, because he already in the introduction names Dasein’s being as existence (SZ, 12 §4). In neither of these places does the terms ‘formal indication’ occur, but he does in §4 refer to existence as the “Idee einer solchen Seinsverfassung” (SZ, 13 §4), but that is in no way clear upon a first reading. No wonder then, perhaps, that interpreters such as Dreyfus in Being-in-the-World and Blattner in Temporal Idealism don’t mention formal indication at all. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991). Being-in-the-World. William D. Blattner (1999). Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Begriffszusammenhang aufgefordert ist, eine Verwandlung seiner selbst in das Dasein zu vollziehen.\textsuperscript{48}

As we can see the aim of such concepts isn’t to correspond to what they relate to, they rather seek to uncover, make visible and show (anzeigen). These concepts don’t refer to a ‘what’ because that would mean their content was directed at entities and thus be ontic. They rather attempt to show the ‘how’, and the manner they do so is by challenging the reader to effectuate a change in her self-understanding.\textsuperscript{49} A formal indication is therefore not equivocal to the theoretical concepts of the positive sciences but instead represent a certain being-with relation to one’s fellow man. As Granberg says: “Philosophical concepts cannot communicate their full content, but only indicate it … it is the philosophizing individual who is left the task of actualizing the concept and its content.”\textsuperscript{50}

Besides this existential component we can also note that formal indications are hallmarks of the hermeneutic approach. Initially the indications are ‘formal’ which means that they are unspecified and vague, and that they can even be misleading.\textsuperscript{51} But during the run of the investigation they will have worked themselves out towards something more ‘substantial’. For instance, the main formal indication of the work, existence, is more concretely laid out as care (\textit{Sorge}) the unity of the previously indicated existence with facticity (\textit{Faktizität}) and falling (\textit{Verfallen}) (SZ, 231 §45).\textsuperscript{52} But the formal indication cannot be a free-roaming projection of arbitrary ideas; instead it must base itself on clues revealed by the destructive analysis of Dasein’s self-interpretation. “Die Formale Anzeige der Existenzidee war geleitet von dem im Dasein selbst liegenden Seinsverständnis” (SZ, 313 §63). The relationship between the two operations of destruction and the formal indication thus become clear in their circular character. They both have a beginning in the other. The destruction cannot operate without the guidance of the formal indication and latter must take its clues from the destruction.

\textsuperscript{49} As we saw in Chapter 1.3 this change is from \textit{Erschlossenheit} to \textit{Entschlossenheit}.  
\textsuperscript{50} Anne Granberg (2004). \textit{Mood and Method - In Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit.}, p. 19.  
\textsuperscript{51} An example of such a misleading indication is the common understanding of the ‘I’: “Das ‘Ich’ darf nur verstanden werden im Sinne einer unverbindlichen \textit{formalen Anzeige} von etwas, das im jeweiligen phänomenalen Seinszusammenhang vielleicht sich als sein ‘Gegenteil’ enthüllt” (SZ, 116 §25). The ‘I’ only functions as an indication of something that in fact shows itself as its counterpart, the ‘I’ of the everyday understanding is revealed to be \textit{das Man}.  
\textsuperscript{52} Care is however only the formal whole of Dasein’s being. Later Heidegger will determine Dasein’s authentic wholeness more concretely as anticipatory resoluteness (\textit{vorlaufende Entschlossenheit}). From out of the formal indication, or ‘idea of existence’ as it is referred to here, a more concrete interpretation has been won: “die leitende Vor-sicht, die Idee der Existenz, hat durch die Klärung des eigensten Seinkönnens ihre Bestimmtheit gewonnen.” (SZ, 311 §63).
The strategy proposed so far to combat the hermeneutically difficult situation is a combination of using the possibilities of the tradition, revealed through the destructive reading, in order to project the structures of being. In one way this suffices in combating arbitrary constructions, because projections/constructions are based on the dis-closed self-understanding of Dasein, and not plucked from the sky. But it doesn’t suffice in showing that the projections point in the right direction; it doesn’t offer security in that the projection has revealed something which Dasein has already understood. These two operations are therefore not enough for a critical approach. In order to be critical of itself the hermeneutical interpretation must ask itself if the correct access to the relevant phenomena is reached. Since, as was remarked in Chapter 1.1, Heidegger dethrones knowing as the primary way we have access to both entities and world, it opens up for a plurality of modes of access to both ourselves, other entities and the structure of being. Concern (Besorgen) is the manner of access to equipment, knowing (Erkennen) is the mode of access to properties (Eigenschaften), whilst moods (Stimmungen) give access to oneself or “wie einem ist und wird” (SZ, 134 §29). Different modes of access reveal entities in different manners, and since they are also modes of being (SZ, 7 §2) they are ways of understanding entities; the common denominator for modes of access is understanding.

Now, as we have seen, it is an important part of phenomenology to allow phenomena to show themselves from out of themselves, that is why entities in the analysis “muß sich gleichfalls in der ihm zugehörigen Zugangsart zeigen” (SZ, 37 §7c). Most modes of access have an access to entities, but methodologically more important than these are perhaps the modes of access that reveal or indicate the structure of being more directly. They can act as confirmation of what has been indicated. For this Heidegger relies on border case experiences, modes of access which deviate from the way we interact with our surroundings proximally and for the most part. In Division One the two most important are the disturbance of the assignment (Störung der Verveisung) (SZ, §16) and anxiety (Angst) (SZ, §39-40). In practical coping with equipment break-downs can occur. A hammer may break; we forget our keys, etc. These disturbances hinder our normal usage of the equipment and prompt us into looking at the context of the usage. Our attention gets “die Weltmäßigkeit des Zuhandenen” (SZ, 74 §16) into sight. The complete phenomenon of world, however, doesn’t open itself through this mode of access. But the disturbance clearly is an access to the wholeness of the context of equipment (Zeugzusammenhang) and by that an aspect of the indicated world-phenomenon has been confirmed: if this wholeness intrudes the normal engagement with entities grinds to
a halt. Anxiety reaches further than the disturbance: “die Angst erschließt als Modus der Befindlichkeit allererst die Welt als Welt” (SZ, 187 §40). Anxiety doesn’t direct itself towards an entity like in fear; instead of appearing fearsome entities cease to have any significance. The importance of innerworldly entities and the context of coping they normally are revealed in recedes and the world as meaningless obtrude (aufdrängt) itself.\(^5\) Heidegger uses these phenomena of break-downs to show us that we already are familiar with the phenomenon of world which is an elaboration on the formal indication of existence. These phenomena, which the border case access modes reveal, are conditions of possibility for our practical engagement with things; they are something Dasein always already has an understanding of. Thus Heidegger’s description of them do not fall prey to the accusation of propounding a free-floating thesis.

These three operations (destruction, formal indication, and brake down mode of access) must not be seen as a step by step procedure. For a concrete example of how this process moves back and forth Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s being-towards-death is instructive (SZ, §45-53). The analysis starts with an initial projection of the direction of the investigation, it shall show the completeness of existentially (§45-6) before moving to a discussion of the mode of access with a view to the traditional manners of interpreting death which are destructed in the technical sense we have explained (§47-9). In §50 a preliminary sketch of the phenomena as being-towards-death is projected, in §51 a concrete analysis of the inauthentic mode of this phenomena is made before an additional interpretation is added (§52) that leads us towards the projection of the authentic being-towards-death (§53) which in the end is supposed to lead to the manner of access to the authenticity and totality of Dasein. And everything takes place within the scope of the guiding idea of the formal indication of existence as Dasein’s being. This, on the face of it, messy process is an acting-out of the hermeneutical circle, moving back and forth between whole and part, always moving forward and finding new clues. Progressing from the vague public self-interpretation towards a more primordial understanding this is thus the process meant to combat the double entrapment of falling and manage the “prägung der angemesseneten existenialen Begrifflichkeit” (SZ, 316 §63). Thus both the conceptuality and the process of getting there is very different from ontic investigations. Reaching the concept of being and its structures requires ‘starting out’ at the

\(^5\) We can note that to connect the two border case experiences and the common methodological function they have Heidegger uses the same word in different forms Aufdringlichkeit/aufdrängt to characterise the brake down of the coping-contextual meaning and the intrusion of the world. See: (SZ, 73-4 §16, 187, §40).
level of utterances and meanings (opinions). But this doesn’t mean going from the shadowy world of opinion up to a higher knowledge as in Plato’s allegory of the cave. Instead through a process of destruction and indication Heidegger finds his way down to a more primordial hidden understanding that must already somehow have been understood.

2.5 Method as Praxis

Briefly put, what we have seen so far was the overturning of the three prejudices concerning being into three problems. These were subsequently solved methodologically by introducing three methodological strategies outlining an approach which is ontological and phenomenological as well as hermeneutical. This succession might seem rather rigid, and indeed it is not the only factor operative in the introduction, but it does indeed illustrate a concrete path of Heidegger’s thinking. As stated before we haven’t given this illustration just to get an overview of Heidegger’s key methodological terms. By looking both at the path qua path and at its content we can also indicate the practical nature of Heidegger’s method.

This however might seem as a superfluous objective. Doesn’t the metaphor of threading a path automatically lend itself to being interpreted as an activity? In fact doesn’t the normal conception of method revolve around such notions as ‘procedure’, ‘application’, and ‘instrument’, all indicating types of practical activity? By pointing out the practical dimension of method aren’t we merely stating something “‘uninteressant’ und ‘selbsverständlich’” (SZ, 358 §69b)? Heidegger makes the observation that there is a clear practical aspect to both science and philosophy: “Die archäologische Ausgrabung, die der Interpretation de ‘Fundes’ vorausgeht, erheischt die gröbsten Hantierungen. Aber auch die ‘abstrakteste’ Ausarbeitung von Problemen und fixierung des Gewonnenen hantiert zum Beispiel mit Schreibzeug” (SZ, 358 §69b). But he calls this observation that a scientifically minded comportment also contains a practical aspect a triviality. This doesn’t however mean that it is valueless, it indicates rather that the relation between theory and praxis is ontologically unclear. What

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55 I have put ‘starting out’ and ‘at first’ in scare quotes here because they are related to one another in a circular fashion as I have described above. Schürmann holds contrary to this that “Heidegger rejects the path of the transcendental ego. Rather than starting from such a point of departure, he begins with everyday existence, with ‘factual life’”. Reiner Schürmann (2008). "Heidegger's Being and Time" On Heidegger's Being and Time, p.75. But as we have seen in order to reach ‘factual life’ one has to indicate it formally, so this cannot be the sole starting point.
other reasons then these trivial ones do we have for suggesting that Heidegger’s method is practical?

We can start by looking at the content of the path and by commenting on the ‘object’ of the investigation itself. What we have seen so far is that being is radically different from entities in that it is both transcendental and transcendent. As transcendental, being is that which makes entities understandable and as such it and its structures function as conditions of possibility for our engagement with entities and by extension for any practical engagement as well. As transcendent in relation to entities being cannot be analysed as a component or property of them. This is something the methodology has to take account of. Access to being cannot be expected to be gained by how entities are accessed by the ontic sciences, or by the traditional ontologies, like Descartes’, through the relation of knowing (SZ, 100 §21). Indeed if we approach being like the ontic sciences approaches entities we will make it into something which it is not, an entity with properties. The method therefore cannot utilize knowing in the way the tradition has used it as the preferred way to access all areas, rather it must start with the matter at hand. Heidegger’s motto Zu dem Sachen selbst!, which is borrowed from Husserl, means that we are not to try to grasp being by preconceived notions of how to approach it, we must consult the things themselves. But this doesn’t mean that we can simply approach the things themselves with the pretention of being able to meet them without prejudices or preconceptions whatsoever. We already have an understanding of being; in every utterance or action some understanding of being is already manifested. This isn’t seen as a drawback by Heidegger however, he sees it rather as an all-important possibility: That we already have an understanding of being is that which make the conceptualization of it possible. The method therefore has to take into account and work from out of the assumption that we are always already immersed in this understanding of being. The question isn’t how to get out or remove this pre-understanding but how to deal with it.

The method then has to view itself as situated amongst a flux of opinions and pre-understandings it has to come to terms with. As such Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology takes on a wholly different look than the purely theoretical attitude of seeing objects sub specie aeternitatis. Heidegger’s method doesn’t start out from an abstract spectator’s point of view, rather it is situated ‘there’ (Da) which means that it is already influenced by the present context, by the traditional manners of understanding and its own projections of the future. This situatedness and the prejudices and preconceptions it contains
isn’t something that can be removed in one swift blow, as Descartes wants to do by way of his method of doubt, in order for us to stand before truths untarnished by previous misconceptions. Nor should it be; the pre-understanding is a pre-requisite for ontological investigation. Heidegger’s method is thus trying to reach being from within the confines of the ‘there’. In fact the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy takes places immanent to the ‘there’. The transcendence of being as we have already seen isn’t a detached transcendence, being is always connected to entities. This means that being never transcends the ‘there’ of Dasein’s situation, it is never a free-floating construct. The spectator’s gaze however attempts to find a place from where to view objects which is totally abstracted from the situatedness of Dasein; that is to say it views ‘from nowhere’. The placeless (nowhere) and timeless (aeternitatis) gaze of traditional metaphysics (which still can be found in contemporary philosophy)\(^{56}\) is the polar opposite of the space-time situated ‘there’ of Dasein’s self-understanding which Heidegger confines his philosophy to. Phenomenology has to let things show themselves as they show themselves from out of themselves, and this cannot be done from constructed viewpoints, because their constructed nature changes the manner things appear. Instead what Heidegger favours is to find ways of access to being and its structure that could be unusual, such as anxiety, but nonetheless have revelatory functions. Heidegger’s method thus marks a stark contrast from the purely theoretical gaze and its abstract starting point, and as such a contrast it attains a practical flair.

This situatedness can be illustrated by the path we have seen Heidegger go through in the introduction. Here it becomes apparent not only that Heidegger is going to try to reach being and its structures from within, i.e., from the phenomenon of existence, Dasein’s self-understanding, but that the method as well is to be wrested from previous interpretations: Heidegger designs the main methodological concepts in his theory in response to his analysis of the inadequacies of the tradition. He is right from the start in the process of clarifying the hermeneutical situation. This means that we in the introduction should be able to identify as operative some of the hermeneutical strategies we have described. And indeed we do, the destruction and the formal indication can both be spotted. Heidegger starts out with a destructive reading of the tradition’s prejudices concerning being and turns them into

\(^{56}\) One prominent example of this is John Rawls who describes the original position behind a veil of ignorance (which individuals have to put themselves into in order to rank the acceptability of different conceptions of justice) in this manner: “Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view.” John Rawls (1999). *Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 514.
problems which directs the further path of the investigation. Based on this initial reading
Heidegger forms indicatory statements about being itself which work as guides for the road
ahead (such as that being is connected to entities, that it is transcendent and transcendental,
etc.). These statements cannot function as simple postulates – that would make Heidegger’s
philosophy dogmatic – they are formal indications, preparatory direction-giving hints, and
Heidegger speaks of them as such: “Mit der vorläufige Charachteristik des thematischen
Gegenstandes der Untersuchung (Sein des Seienden, bzw. Sinn des Seins überhaupt)” (SZ, 27
§7). Indicatory statements concerning being is not the only thing that is won from the
destructive encounter with the tradition. In addition the method itself is also worked out in a
preparatory fashion. What we have been given was “Die Erläuterung des Vorbegriffes des
Phänomenologie” (SZ, 38 §7c).57 Central in this regard is that through the process of
destruction and indication Heidegger has found what he calls the mode of access to being:
“Phänomenologie ist Zugangsart zu dem und die ausweisende Bestimmungsart dessen, was
Thema der Ontologie werden soll” (SZ, 35 §7c). Through the process of confronting its past
and indicating the future the method finds access points to being. This is a central model
which is repeated throughout in Sein und Zeit; we have already looked at it in 2.4 and we will
meet it again later. The last of the hermeneutical strategies, modes of access, is thus also to be
found in the introduction.

In this manner the method, just like any other type of understanding activity, is situated within
a context that involves standing in a relation with the past, the present and the future. This is
not meant in a trivial manner. For Heidegger the being of Dasein is interpreted as care (Sorge)
which is the structural unity of the three equiprimordial constituents existentiality, facticity
and falling. “Die Sorge charakterisiert nicht etwa nur Existenzialität, abgelöst von Faktizität
und Verfallen, sondern umgreift die Einheit dieser Seinsbestimmungen” (SZ, 193 §41). These
are descriptions that characterize all understanding including the understanding of the method.

Facticity illustrates that Dasein is thrown in the world. Dasein always already finds itself not
only in a specific time or place but as already having a self-understanding which not only is
influenced by the tradition, the latter also sets the limits (Grenzen) for its understanding (SZ,

57 But in this way Heidegger has already had to have some sort of understanding of the method before he made it explicit. Is
this a problem? No, this only conforms to the path of Heidegger’s movement from a vague to an explicit understanding. The
problem isn’t that we arrive at the scene with certain preconceptions; it is getting the right preconception of indication
correctly. “Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern in ihn der rechten Weise hineinzukommen” (SZ, 153
§32). The path that Heidegger takes is thus a circular reworking of earlier assumptions and understandings.
366 §69c). Only because Dasein is thrown into a particular context can it need something like the destruction to show the limits of the tradition’s and by that also its own understanding in order to challenge it. The destruction is the method’s way of understanding the past. That Dasein has existentiality as one of its core components means that it is self-interpreting. Understanding is a core feature of Dasein and the manner it understands is by way of projecting into possibilities. Only because Dasein already directs itself towards being can the formal indication guide the investigation towards being. The formal indication thus harbours the method’s understanding of the future. About falling Heidegger says: “Der Titel, der keine negative Bewertung ausdrückt, soll bedeuten: das Dasein ist zunächst und zumeist bei der besorgten ‘Welt’” (SZ, 175 §38). Falling epitomizes the fact that Dasein covers over its own being. And only because its own being is hidden does it need phenomenology to access it. Phenomenology as a manner of access is how the method understands the present. In addition, we can to this add the proper mood (Stimmung) of the method.58 At the beginning of this chapter we saw that in order to ask the question of being a certain attitude of wondering (thaumazein) was required. Heidegger differentiates this from curiosity: “Die Neugier hat nichts zu tun mit dem bewundernden Betrachten des Seienden, dem θαυμάζειν, ihr liegt nicht daran, durch Verwunderung in das Nichtverstehen gebracht zu werden, sondern sie besorgt ein Wissen, aber lediglich um gewußt zu haben” (SZ, 172 §36). Contrasted with curiosity which aims itself at knowing only to have known, in wondering Dasein is brought in front of a marvelling non-understanding about being itself which provokes it to ask the question of the meaning of being. The focus is not on taking up answers that lie readily available, but on the search, the quest of questioning itself. This wondering is thus the questioning method’s affected self-understanding.

If we thus look at the method as path it reveals itself as sharing the same attributes as any type of practical understanding. The method in this way looks like it springs out of a practical situatedness it doesn’t leave because it doesn’t abstract away from these features but utilize them. As Heidegger himself says: “Die Seinsfrage ist dann aber nichts anderes als die Radikalisierung einer zum Dasein selbst gehörigen wesenhaften Seinstendenz, des vorontologischen Seinsverständnisses.” (SZ, 15 §4). And because the method shares these attributes the whole of the work can be read as methodologically concerned. Dasein’s being is

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58 This place is not given to anxiety because the latter is a basic affectedness one can find in all Dasein. Granted, as we will see in Chapter 3.4, the method needs to be authentic, but that doesn’t mean being anxious, rather it means confronting ones anxiety.
also the being of the investigator/questioner. Thus any description of Dasein becomes potentially relevant to the method. As Heidegger himself says: “Genauer gesprochen, die phänomenologische Forschung ist die ausdrückliche Bemühung um die Methode der Ontologie.”

To summarize, the practical nature of the method is attested to not only from the fact that it is a path, but from two other sources as well. Firstly, in that it differs substantially from assuming a theoretical gaze which seeks to stare at its object from an unsituated position. And secondly, in that it is situated and does not abstract from the features which it shares with every type of practical understanding. The method then must be seen as a type of praxis.

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Chapter 3: Method and object

“Es geht nicht darum Philosophieren zu kennen, sondern philosophieren zu können.” 60

So far I have refrained from explicitly thematizing philosophical knowledge as such. What we have been looking at however was a path in Heidegger’s thinking that not only covered the basic methodological operations of the work, but also informed us about the practical nature of Heidegger’s philosophical method. We can however establish one more thing from out of the preceding chapter. In addition to showing us this practical nature of Heidegger’s investigation we can also observe that Heidegger’s method and its object (Gegenstand) share a peculiarly close relationship which we can distil down to four points.

Firstly, there is a close connection between being and understanding. Heidegger even speaks of “der notwendige Zusammenhang von Sein und Verständnis” (SZ, 183 §39). Being is that which make entities understandable in any practical engagement. Being structures how entities appear to us which means that it also structures the manner things appear for the philosophical investigator. When the investigator ‘directs’ himself at being it is being, or being understood as something (time), that make being understandable. This leads us to the second point: Being has already made itself understood, and the method thus finds itself situated. We always already have an understanding of being and this understanding always finds itself within the “Grenzen seiner Geworfenheit” (SZ, 366 §69c). The prejudices of the tradition limit the understanding. But note that the content of the prejudices are not part of the structure of being, they are ontic. The structure of falling which makes us fall prey to them however is ontological-existential, i.e. pertaining to the ontological structure of Dasein which has existence as its being. Thirdly, the method must come to terms with this situation (being as forgotten and thus hidden) through the destruction of that which is handed down by tradition. This is an operation which aims at unravelling the limits which have kept previous investigations from directing itself at being as a phenomenon. And finally, the method aims to conceptualize being and it structures. This is to do this by in a phenomenological manner.

60 Ibid., p. 1.
allowing it to appear ‘naturally’, as it were, without putting constraints on it. Being has to be allowed to show itself from out of itself.

From out of this a reflective structure appears. The method is to conceptualize what makes itself possible, it seeks to view its own structural, not genetic, genesis. It is about the “Durchsichtigmachen eines Seienden – des fragenden – in seinem Sein” (SZ, 7 §2). These observations testify to a relationship between Heidegger’s method and object which warrants a further investigation because it differs markedly from the way other methods interact with what it studies. Building on what we have seen as the practical nature of the method I will in this chapter use the close connection between the method and the object to elucidate an interpretation of philosophical knowledge as a practical knowledge. This will be done in the following manner. In Chapter 3.1 I will look at the instrumental view of method and its four constituent parts (predetermination, application, result and control) which I will use as a point of contrast to Heidegger’s method. In 3.2 we will look at the method’s manner of conceptualizing Dasein in order to contrast this with the instrumental view’s emphasis on result and control. We will find that instead of controlling the object of study by defining it in its actuality Heidegger’s aim is to lay it free in its character of possibility. We will also encounter a central problem that will preoccupy much of the subsequent discussion. Because Dasein in its everyday understanding doesn’t have a full understanding of its own being, i.e., of its wholeness, the investigation cannot be satisfied with only laying Dasein free in the mode of everydayness; it has to look for an ontic possibility that manifests an understanding of Dasein’s whole which can serve as a basis to determine Dasein’s being properly. The focus in Chapter 3.3 is on establishing that in contrast to the instrumental method’s character of being determined in advance, Heidegger’s method is rather worked out through the investigation in a circular manner where the object of the investigation, being and its structure, directs the investigation. We will also see that the quest for laying Dasein free in its possibility is also furthered with Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety, a phenomenon which reveals the freedom to project oneself into one’s own possibility and thereby wholly understand itself. Chapter 3.4 will look at why Heidegger’s method cannot be an application of rules in the same way as in the instrumental method because the ‘principles’ to be applied are the same that undergo determination. This will be showed by an examination of Heidegger’s term primordiality (Ursprünglichkeit) and the everyday understanding that covers it up (verdeckt es). Anticipatory resoluteness is Heidegger’s name for the most primordial understanding which I will identify with the creation of a new praxis. By
projecting into its own possibility of a new praxis, instead of appropriating possibilities from the tradition, Dasein, as resolute, tacitly acknowledges that the conventions of the tradition has no ultimate hold on it. This represents a whole understanding of Dasein’s finite being because unlike the everyday understanding it understands itself as fallen, as someone who has appropriated “zufällig sich andrängenden Möglichkeiten” (SZ, 264 §53). Anticipatory resoluteness, I will argue, is also a characterization of Heidegger’s formal indication; it as well sets up a new praxis by revising the standard for ontological description (as we saw in Chapter 2.3). What I will show is thus that anticipatory resoluteness shows both how Dasein is to be laid free in its ownmost possibility of being whole, as well as it clarifies the circular character of the method: In setting up the standard for ontological descriptions, thus creating a new praxis, the formal indication guides the investigation towards a determination of the investigator as anticipatory resolute. Finally, 3.5 will attempt to gather the threads and argue for the practical nature of Heidegger’s understanding of philosophical knowledge. The aim is to show that in comparison to the instrumental method Heidegger’s is different because philosophical knowledge can be seen not only to be tied to the practice of method, but being this praxis. I will argue that because the investigation, on the count of its circular nature, has no natural result, knowledge must be connected to the understanding know-how of the method. This understanding is the one we found in anticipatory resoluteness, a know-how that creates a new praxis by revising the basic concepts of that praxis.

One of the most interesting passages with regard to the relation between method and object can be found in §7 where Heidegger is giving an initial characterization of phenomenology:

Der Ausdruck ‘Phänomenologie’ bedeutet primär einen Methodenbegriff. Er charakterisiert nicht das sachhaltige Was der Gegenstände der philosophischen Forschung, sondern das Wie dieser. Je echter ein Methodenbegriff sich auswirkt und je umfassender er den grundsätzlichen Duktus einer Wissenschaft bestimmt, um so ursprünglicher ist er in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Sachen selbst verwurzelt, um so weiter entfernt er sich von dem, was wir einen technischen Handgriff nennen, deren es auch in den theoretischen Disziplinen viele gibt. (SZ, 27 §7)

Heidegger is here speaking directly of the relation between his method and the object of the study. He appears to draw a line with no clear demarcation positioning technical handling and examination (Auseinandersetzung) of the things themselves at opposite far ends. The more the concept of method strays toward the latter and roots itself in the things themselves the more primordial it is. In this section I want to examine the meaning behind these claims in greater
detail utilizing the preceding analysis in Chapter 2 as a background. What does it mean that Heidegger distances himself from utilizing a technical view of method? How can a method be rooted in the things themselves? And what does the relationship between method and object amount to in view of such an examination? Following this line of questioning we will arrive at Heidegger’s practical understanding not only of method but at his practical conception of philosophical knowledge as well.

3.1 Instrumental View of Method

With regard to the first question, the claim is reiterated in Grundprobleme: “Wissenschaftliche Methode ist nie eine Technik. Sobald sie das wird, ist sie von ihrem eigenen Wesen abgefallen.” But neither there nor in Sein und Zeit does Heidegger give us a further explicit explanation of what technology means. The term comes to a stronger prominence in Heidegger’s later writings. In Die Frage nach der Technik, Heidegger starts out from what he labels the normal instrumental conception of technology as a means to an end and a human activity. From there on he precedes (in a similar manner to how we have seen the destruction operate in SZ) to develop a concept of technology which is connected to revealing (Entbergen). “Die Technik ist also nicht bloß ein Mittel. Die Technik ist eine Weise des Entbergens.” Technology is a way of revealing entities (Heidegger especially focuses on nature) in a manner that in its modern incarnation make them appear not as mere objects, but as something which can be exploited. It is what makes entities appear as resources from which we can order (bestellen), or arrange (stellen) as we like, exemplified by how the river becomes a source of water power, or how the tract of land becomes a coal deposit (Note the similarity here between technology as a way of revealing and being; both make entities understandable). The important aspect of living in a technological age is thus not the still correct (richtige) observation that we use a lot of technologically advanced instruments, but that the way entities are revealed to us not only show them as exploitable resources, but also that this revealing “vertreibt jede andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung.”

61 Ibid., p. 29.
63 Ibid., p. 27.
What relation to this elaborated view of technology do the aforementioned quotes from *Sein und Zeit* and *Grundprobleme* have? Is Heidegger alluding to this, the revealing, sense of *Technik*? I believe the answer is no. The focus of this notion of technology is a feature of his later works, technology as a way of revealing is not thematized in the period around *Sein und Zeit* and the quotes reflect this. They speak of technical handling and ‘eine Technik’, indicating with the reference to human action and the use of the indefinite article that, if anything, they are closer to the instrumental understanding of technology.

What are we then to make of these remarks? To suggest that Heidegger is contrasting his method against the instrumental view of method as it is briefly sketched in *Die Frage Nach der Technik* is perhaps far-fetched. But the connection between the technical and the instrumental need not be spurious. I will suggest that it can give us a hint as to what Heidegger contrasts with his *Auseinandersetzung*. Both the technical and the instrumental center around the concept of means. Now the standard or what I will call the narrow view of the instrumental method is that it is a means to an end, that the method as a ‘mere’ instrument is subservient to its output or result. But, it can be analyzed into further components. If the method is to lead to a result it has to be applied to an object or a field of research, and for it to be applied it has to be chosen in advance. Thus you get a sequence, first you choose a method, or you already approach a thematic with a method at-hand, then you apply that method, and the application is done in order to get a result. To this we can add a fourth, that the result is some form of control. This completes the outline of what I term the broad view of the instrumental method as a four-part ordered sequence. This is not meant as a suggestion of a definitive definition of what an instrumental view of method is or should be, instead it is not more than a starting point to investigate the relation between method and object in Heidegger’s work. Before looking at how and what aspects of this view Heidegger distances himself from I would like to run through a more detailed description of this sequence with the help of illustration from the works of Descartes to show that the view is not as implausible as not to be held.

Let us start with the first part of the sequence, the method as pre-determined. What does it mean that before the application of the method it is already decided upon? First of all it means that the method has the character of an assumed completeness. Like any tool it is ready to be put to use and does not need to be changed in view of the things it encounters. So instead of the object directing the method, the possibility forms itself of the method directing the object.
For an example of this we can look to Descartes’ *Discourse on the Method* where he outlines his method as consisting of a set of four principles for conducting reason which can summarized as follows: The principles of: 1) Doubt, never accept anything as true that cannot clearly be recognized to be so; 2) Atomism, divide up the object to be explained in as many parts as possible; 3) Sequence, start with the smallest and easiest and work through towards the more complex; 4) Comprehensiveness, nothing shall be omitted. These principles are made in advance; the “Method prescribes” them as he puts it, without regard to neither what is supposed to be studied nor indeed a critical evaluation of the manner of access to the phenomena (SZ, 96 §21). For Descartes this can most clearly be seen in connection with his methodological principle of atomism. It is a huge presupposition to think that all phenomena lend themselves to be explainable through being broken down and built up again by atomistic components. The principle thus stands in danger of either radically altering holistic phenomena, or omitting their existence altogether (thus contradicting the principle of comprehensiveness). In the same way as a black and white camera makes the world look a colourless two-dimensional place without movement a pre-determined method comes with its own settings which can alter its object. A further point to be made connected to the completeness of the method is that it doesn’t incorporate a reflective stance. If it is assumed to be complete there is no need for it to be re-evaluated or specified during the investigation itself. The instrumental method thus doesn’t look back, it isn’t circular; its goal isn’t to improve upon itself during the investigation because it doesn’t incorporate itself into what it studies. It positions itself outside of what it is to capture. The subject of method and the object it studies are removed from each other to the point where the method harbours an indifference towards the object.

After deciding upon a method the next step concerns its application. The manner of application requires adherence to the principles the method spells out. Application thus becomes a sort of rule-following. This need not be as specific as following a recipe or a user’s manual, it might even leave space open for a fair amount of improvisation and creativity, but this normally confines itself within the space opened up by the method. Think here of Descartes application of the principle of doubt in his *Meditations*. When the method

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65 Ibid., p. 94.
66 René Descartes (1996). *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of The University of Cambridge. Consider for instance what Cottingham says in the introduction to this work: “the Doubt has to be methodological. A refusal to take things for granted that might be doubtful is part of Descartes’ general intellectual method,
becomes a form of rule-following it might even be said that the rules form an authoritative procedure. The closeness to the object is removed because instead of relating itself to the object it studies, the method relates itself to the rules.

The third point concerns the method’s character as a means. As a means it has its telos outside of itself in the result of its application: knowledge. “I have formed a Method, by whose assistance it appears to me I have the means of gradually increasing my knowledge”, Descartes claims and his method is to lead us towards the accumulation of knowledge and indeed the secure foundation of both philosophy and the sciences. In this manner it has a clear directedness, it is to segue forward toward capturing the object. That the method is an instrument and not an end in itself has like Aristotle observed the following consequence: “And when there is an end beyond the action, the product is by nature better than the activity.” The method is subservient to what it produces, knowledge.

The fourth point is that the result which the instrumental method aims for is a type of control or power over the object. One might say that this need not be the case; the aim of the pursuit is often stated to be such noble things as truth or knowledge in themselves. But no matter the intent truth and knowledge can even if not outright be connected to control. The control manifests itself in two ways first as an intellectual control where the object is defined. What before was loose and fluid, out of control so to speak, has been caged in, held fast in representation and defined. The aspect of them that is captured is “das immerwährend Bleibende” (SZ, 96 §21), that which is left after going through all its variations and mutations. Definition is intellectual control over a constructed object. And because of this intellectual control it is possible to gain practical control or power over it. This idea is most famously connected to Bacon who claimed that “Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced.” But it is present in Descartes as well speaking as he does of applying science with the aim to “thus render ourselves the

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which he had introduced in his earlier work The Discourse on the Method; the Doubt is an extreme application of that idea, conditioned by the circumstances of the special project, the radical search for certainty.” Ibid., p. xii.


69 Note that today’s conception of the scientific method where, following Popper, it has become common to separate between context of discovery and context of justification. According to Popper one can stumble upon a discovery in a variety of ways without using a method therefore there cannot be a method we can apply and expect knowledge to come out, but what we can have a method of is how we justify our theories. But here as well the notion of the method as a means prevails as it is subordinated to the result of the justification.

70 Francis Bacon (1960). The New Organon. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, p. 39. The more famous phrasing ‘knowledge is power’ is not to be found in his writings.
masters and possessors of nature.” The method catches its object, abstracts it from its context and turns it into something predictable, manageable and controllable. Knowledge as power implies knowledge as control.

One decides upon a method, the method is then applied, the application leads to a result, and the result is knowledge and power. This is the broad view of the instrumental method. Having given it a brief sketch what is the prevalent relation between the object and the method? That the method is decided upon and in advance means that it is taken to be complete and therefore in no need re-evaluation. Further there is an indifference to the object in that it isn’t consulted or allowed to direct the method. Secondly, when the method turns into application of rules, a distance towards the object itself ensues. Thirdly, the instrumental character of the method means it is subordinated to the result, knowledge. And fourthly the object as defined is not recognizable as what it was. It has lost the lively colour of movement, of chaos and change. It is theoretically captured in order to physically be controlled. Summarized the relationship the instrumental method has towards its object is this: The object is looked over, not consulted, kept at a distance, captured, caged and changed. The object is subordinated the method which in turn is subordinated the result, which is power over the object.

3.2 Control of the Object

In this exposition of the instrumental method we have obtained a basis for a comparison with Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology. We can start this work of contrasting by looking at the last part of the sequence we have illustrated. It concerned how the knowledge which the instrumental method aims at is a type of control over the object. As we saw this control manifests itself in two ways. First, as an intellectual control where the object is abstracted from its fluid and changing nature in order to be caged in, held fast in representation and defined. And because of this intellectual control the second aspect becomes possible: the practical control over the now predictable, manipulative object. In order to look at what attitude Heidegger’s method has towards its object when it comes to the issue of control I will start with Dasein itself and Heidegger’s attempt to define its being. Central in this regard will be how Heidegger’s focus on how-ness and its connection to possibility.

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Dasein, which can be translated to being-there, is a being; a being amongst other entities like stones, dogs, molecules and so forth. It is not just any being however: “Das Seiende, dessen Analyse zur Aufgabe steht, sind wir je selbst” (SZ, 41 §9). Dasein is the being each of us are, thus Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s being is an analysis of man’s being. Heidegger gives Dasein two introductory characteristics that separate it from all other entities and which Heidegger uses as a starting point for his analysis:

1) The essence of Dasein lies in its existence
2) Dasein is in each case mine.

To elucidate the strategy Heidegger uses to define Dasein’s being we can begin with the first characteristic. Normally when one tries to define something one states what that something is; if one is to define a specific thing, this chair, for instance, one designates it according to its differentiating property, trait or function, which, in this example could be ‘the only chair made by me’; a property that sets it apart from all other chairs and indeed from all other entities. If one is to define chairs in general one seeks to find a property common to all chairs which characterize it especially, which could be ‘thing one sits on’ or ‘sitting-equipment’. Defining something is thus to find what a thing is by assigning it a property that, after purpose, is specific or general.

The same has been the case with definitions of man; as a general concept one finds the property common to all instances. Aristotle to name one, gives man as zoon logon echnon (usually translated as ‘the rational animal’), Descartes as res cogitans (the thinking thing). In both cases man is defined by a property, thinking or rationality. Heidegger however goes against the grain of most of the tradition of western philosophy when he seeks to find the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of man, not in a property or a what-ness, but in its how-ness.² Heidegger puts ‘essence’ in scare quotes to denote the uncommon use of essence in that it doesn’t lie in a property.

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Seeking the essence of man in its how-ness is to seek it in how it is, that is, in its ‘way of being’ (Weise zu Sein) (SZ, 42 §9); and Dasein’s ‘way of being’ is by Heidegger called existence. But, from this it is still unclear what how-ness is in contrast to what-ness. We can start clarifying this by seeing how these three terms are related. How-ness and ‘way of being’ is the same concept, existence however is only Dasein’s ‘way of being’ and Dasein isn’t the only being that has a ‘way of being’. Equipment (Zeug), for instance, has readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) as its ‘way of being’ whilst properties (Eigenschaften), has presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) as its how-ness.

Let’s try to characterize how-ness by looking at existence. We get a hint of what existence is when Heidegger says that Dasein is a being for which its being is an issue for it: “Das Sein ist es, darum es diesem Seienden je selbst geht” (SZ, 42 §9). So what characterizes Dasein’s ‘way of being’ is that it has a relation to itself, more specifically to its own being. But this self-relating is a characteristic of existence and not a description of how-ness as such. Equipment, for instance, have a how-ness that cannot be given such a self-relating description simply because it cannot relate to itself. So how-ness isn’t necessarily a self-relation, but if we further characterize what kind of relation existence is, we can get a better grasp of it. Heidegger says that: “Das Dasein bestimmt sich als Seiendes je aus einer Möglichkeit, die es ist und d. h. zugleich in seinem Sein irgendwie versteht” (SZ, 43 §9). What we recognize here is the second of Heidegger’s characteristics; the ‘way of being’ of Dasein always has the character of being mine. We also see that this self-relating of Dasein’s existence an addition to being a relation to itself, is described as a relation to its own possibility. The fact that what Dasein relates itself toward is always its own possibility implies that Dasein, i.e. the how of Dasein’s existence, is its own possibility. Heidegger thus seeks the essence of man beyond what we may call actuality and places it instead in the realm of relating towards possibility. This gives us a good idea of what how-ness is, but there is more.

In addition this relation isn’t any kind of relation, but an understanding relation, what we may call comportment (Verhalten). The essence of man, according to Heidegger, consequently lies, not in any determinate property, but in how it understands its own possibilities to be. We must however be cautious with such language, the characterization is not as contentless as it may appear, Heidegger doesn’t’ mean any kind of self-relating understanding. My essence does not lie in the fact that I sometimes dream about becoming a pro-footballer, walking on the moon, marrying a model or any such waiting-for (Erwarten) or thinking-of (Denken an) type
Indeed the understanding meant here must be differentiated from all instances of what one calls conscious acts such as subjective experience (*Erlebnisse*), objective experiences (*Erfahrung*) or theoretical knowing (*Erkennen*).

We get closer if we think of this understanding to lie in a more implicit goal-oriented self-relation as I might have towards my possibilities of being ‘a good parent’, ‘an honourable person’ ‘an intellectual’ or other such understandings of my real possibilities I implicitly might have. But this is too content specific (one could also follow Heidegger and call it too ontic in that they as individual instances of understanding are entities; in contrast stands the ontological which is concerned with being or the structures common to all these instances of understanding). What is meant by Dasein determining itself as a being from a possibility that it is, is that it understands itself from its possibility to be itself or not to be itself:

> Das Dasein versteht sich selbst immer aus seiner Existenz, einer Möglichkeit seiner selbst, es selbst oder nicht es selbst zu sein. Diese Möglichkeiten hat das Dasein entweder selbst gewählt oder es ist in sie hineingeraten oder je schon darin aufgewachsen. (SZ, 12 §4)

This choice is one Dasein already has made; Dasein always already understands itself from a way to be, whether it is from out of itself, that is authentic, or taken from others, that is inauthentic.

Existence is thus a relation of understanding towards one’s own possibility of being itself. Two aspects of this are important to clarify what defining something according to its how-ness means. Firstly, how-ness has to do with understanding relations or comportments, when looking for how-ness one looks for how it is understood. Secondly, this understanding always has a time character. The move of interpreting Dasein’s essence as its how-ness is novel in that it brings the character of time to the fore. When one defines something as a what, one tries to capture it in its timeless eternal character. Instead of capturing the existence of Dasein Heidegger speaks of the laying free (*Freilegung*) of Dasein’s being (SZ, 37 §7C). By seeking man’s essence in its existence, that is, in its how-ness, Heidegger’s aim is to open up a time aspect in respect to defining. In contrast to the static what-ness, existence as a relation to its own possibility, that is, to its future, is already in its most formal character a relation where
time is central. Thus studying something in its how-ness is ultimately studying how it shows itself in the time-character of understanding.

To further our investigation let us look at how Heidegger goes about defining other entities as well. The analytic of Dasein attempts to give an analysis of the ‘way of being’ of Dasein, its existence, or self-understanding. The first and major part of this analysis consists of analysing Dasein in its everydayness. The analytic of Dasein shall “das Seiende in dem zeigen, wie es zunächst und zumeist ist, in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit” (SZ, 16 §5). In the average everyday Dasein shows itself in its understanding relationship with other things, with other people and with itself. The analysis of everydayness thus tries, on the one hand, to grasp Dasein by looking at the self-understanding possibility manifest in its interaction with other entities. Dasein’s understanding relation to other entities is described, in Chapter 3 of SZ, in terms of Dasein’s concerned coping (umsichtige Besorgen) with equipment, and in Chapter 4 considerate soliciting (rücksichtige Fürsorge) describes its relation to other people.

On the other hand it also involves the defining, or more properly, laying free of the being of equipment and Dasein-with (Mitdasein) which means grasping them in their how-character of possibility. With respect to equipment Heidegger finds this firstly in the function of ‘in order to ...’ (Um-zu), i.e. that the equipment always is for something and has the possibility of being used (SZ, 68 §15). Secondly he find it in involvement (Bewandtnis) (SZ, 84 §18). This characterization refers to that when one uses equipment one is involved not only with the equipment at hand, but also with other equipment and ultimately one self as well. When hammering one is involved with the work (the house), the material (wood) and the future user of the work (Dasein).

This strategy equally applies for other Dasein, Dasein-with. In everyday interaction Dasein-with, as, is called das Man. But in face this designation also covers Dasein itself because in the everyday understanding it is indistinguishable from the others. Dasein has a tendency to do what one does, to appropriate possibilities, that is social roles and the conventional norms and practical rules that follow them, from others. A social role or a for-the-sake-of-which

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73 In English das Man is often rendered as ‘the one’ (Dreyfus) or ‘the they’ (Macquarrie & Robinson). I nonetheless prefer to keep the German partly out of habit, but mostly because these translations carry unfortunate significances. ‘The they’ implies a severance between Dasein and das Man while the original term easily allows Dasein to be included. ‘The one’, even though it is a more direct translation, it can also mean the one as in ‘the one and only’ which is as far away as ‘one’ can get from the intended meaning.
(worumwillen) are inseparable from conventional norms and practical rules that follow them. This is made clear in §18: “Das Worumwillen bedeutet ein Um-zu, dieses ein Dazu, dieses ... Diese Bezüge sind unter sich selbst als ursprüngliche Ganzheit verklammert” (SZ, 87 §18). This quote shows how the understanding itself refers (verweist) itself from its social role towards tasks, skills, goals and products etc. Heidegger calls this referring be-deuten which means that the understanding interpretatively projects (deutet) the significance (Bedeutung) of the tasks and goals on the basis of Dasein’s possibility-to-be. And together they form a unity.

Heidegger’s manner of conceptualizing, the laying free of the entities means showing the character of possibility of the entity. The structure that makes up this possibility is the being of the entity. When it comes to the properties or equipment the structure that is to be captured is categorical, while it for Dasein it is called existential (SZ, 88 §18).

What we have seen then is that the manner of definition Heidegger chooses is easily contrasted with the attempts to control the object we saw with respect to the instrumental method. Instead of capturing entities in their actuality the aim of Heidegger’s concepts is to lay them free in their possibility. With respect to equipment the laying free is no condition for physical control comparable to the way the definition of the object is a condition for manipulation within the scope of the instrumental method. Equipment is rather laid free in their how-character as they already are being used and understood.

When it comes to Dasein (and by extension Dasein-with) the issue is a bit different. The aim here is also a laying free of a how-ness which for Dasein is its manner of understandingly projecting itself into possibilities-to-be. But in the case of Dasein a problem arises. In the everyday understanding Dasein projects itself into possibilities that does not stem from itself, but are fallen into and appropriated. In the everyday coping Dasein does not understand itself ontically from out of itself, nor does it have an ontologically clear, i.e., transparent, understanding of itself. But the aim of the analysis as we already have noted is to make Dasein transparent for itself in its being (SZ, 7 §2). Transparency means making one’s self-understanding clear in its being, i.e. ontologically, but it can only be done on the basis of an ontic understanding of Dasein’s being as a whole. As das Man, however, one understands oneself as another, one appropriates roles and the conventions and rules connected to them from others. Just describing how Dasein shows itself in the everyday understanding will therefore be inadequate. What is needed is to show Dasein in a possibility where it is ontically
‘transparent’. If such a possibility is not found it means that the whole investigation is a non-sequitur. How can the investigation succeed in making Dasein transparent if this ontic projection is not possible? What Heidegger’s strategy of countering this problem ultimately amounts to is two things. Firstly, to show on an ontological level that Dasein has a freedom to project into its own possibility of ‘transparency’, and secondly to show how this possibility can be projected into. The first will be shown in the phenomena of anxiety and being-unto-death, the former of which will be looked into in Chapter 3.3, and the second in the phenomena of anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), which will be addressed in Chapter 3.4. These two aspects together with the issue of circularity, which we only briefly have touched upon, will be central when we go forward contrasting the other parts of the instrumental method with Heidegger’s method. These issues notwithstanding it is clear that the prospect of physical control based on these ‘definitions’ thus vanishes. That the focus on controlling the object disappears means that the role knowledge plays within Heidegger’s framework is decidedly different as well. Instead of knowledge being conceived as one type of control leading to another it is connected to laying free. But the role knowledge plays is still awaiting further determination pending on the following analysis of anxiety, resoluteness and circularity.

3.3 Direction and Things Themselves

Let’s quickly look back at the first part of the instrumental view of method which concerned the fact that before application the method is pre-determined. The central characteristic we came across was that in advance the method is assumed to be completed. Firstly, this involves a state where the method directs the object into certain positions thus altering it, and, secondly, that during the investigation there is no room for re-evaluation or looking-back. Overall this step in the sequence marks an indifference to the object it studies. We have already seen that Heidegger’s method differs markedly from the instrumental one when it comes to the issue of control, and we will see that with regard to issues just mentioned the case is no different.

I will start by arguing that because the method is subject to a circular re-evaluation it cannot be complete at the outset. Further I will claim that because the method is to build itself from out of the things themselves it can’t be indifferent to its object. These two claims however
leave unspecified their relation to each other. What is the connection between the circular character of the method and the things themselves? I will subsequently look into this relation by investigating how methods direct their objects. First by looking at Heidegger’s criticism of how a method which prioritizes knowing directs its object, and then by showing how Heidegger’s method cannot avoid directing its object, but that it does so itself whilst being led by the things themselves. Finally by using the concrete example of anxiety I will show how the manner of access determines itself from out of the things themselves, and we will in addition see how the freedom to project oneself into one’s own possibility is revealed in this phenomenon.

Now, if one takes a quick look at the table of contents of *Sein und Zeit* one could get the impression that Heidegger’s method like the instrumental one also was pre-determined. Heidegger states his problems, describes the method and from §9 he starts applying it onwards. This observation can however only be called superficially correct. It is correct in the sense that Heidegger does indeed start the work with some considerations on method, but for him the first two steps of the sequence we have drawn up for the instrumental view (first find a method, then apply) are conflated. In contrast to the instrumental view Heidegger’s method isn’t complete at the beginning; instead it is only given as a sketch which is meant to be further elaborated on. “Die Sinnfixierung von ‘Methode’ ist in formal anzeigender Bedeutung (z. B. ‘Weg’) offenzuhalten für eigentliche konkrete Bestimmungen.” As we saw in Chapter 2.5 Heidegger already at the outset have a preconception of the method. Some of these methodological preconceptions are then made explicit as hermeneutical phenomenology. And this process of further determination of the method is continued also after the introduction. Consider for instance §31 on understanding only to name the most relevant. The paragraph is not only a clarification of an existential, but also a specification of the investigator and his method which deals with interpretation. The description of the method thereby shows a circular characteristic similar to the description of Dasein itself:

> Die Analyse des Daseins ist aber nicht nur unvollständig, sondern zunächst auch vorläufig. … Die Freilegung des Horizontes für die ursprünglichste Seinsauslegung soll sie vielmehr vorbereiten. Ist dieser erst gewonnen, dann verlangt die vorbereitende Analytik des Daseins ihre Wiederholung auf der höheren und eigentlichen ontologischen Basis. (SZ, 17 §5)

In the same manner as the interpretation of Dasein is subject to repetition (Wiederholung) the same holds for the method. The method since it itself is a way of being of Dasein is through the clarification of Dasein’s being also going through a clarification of itself. This is of course no accident, as we mentioned in Chapter 2.5 we are to find the being of the entity that asks the question of being: “Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage besagt demnach: Durchsichtigmachen eines Seienden – des fragenden – in seinem Sein” (SZ, 7 §2). That the method only is given a sketch in the introduction is then of course because the being of the investigator isn’t worked through. We can not stipulate how the investigation should go on if we do not have a clear understanding of the one who is investigating. And so in the absence of stipulation formal indication will do. Because of this re-evaluation and further elaboration Heidegger’s method is not pre-determined but continually improved upon in hermeneutically circular fashion.

To jump forward, what about the further point of indifference to what is studied? In Grundprobleme Heidegger says “Die Methode der Ontologie, d. h der Philosophie überhaupt, ist insofern ausgezeichnet, als sie mit keiner Methode irgendeiner anderen Wissenschaft, die alle als positive Wissenschaften vom Seienden handeln, etwas gemein hat.” What then is the difference between Heidegger’s method and other methods? As we have said earlier, for Heidegger the main focus of the method is not entities, but being. It is thus very specific in taking account of the subject matter; it cannot be a study of other things. It takes what it studies into consideration, unlike Descartes for whom all objects can be studied with the same general method: “And not having restricted this Method to any particular matter, I promised myself to apply it as usefully to the difficulties of other sciences”. For Descartes the method is universal, potentially applicable to all objects and realms of investigation whilst for Heidegger the method (Behandlungsart) is to be appropriate to the object of study (Gegenstand). But if this was all there was to Heidegger’s insight it is if course nothing new, but can find its traces all the way back to Aristotle who in De Anima claimed that “if there is not some single common method for the investigation of particulars, then putting our inquiry into practice becomes still more difficult. For we will have to grasp in each case what the method of inquiry is to be.” But it is one thing for the method to be appropriate to the object, another to claim that “the method should spring from the matter to

be investigated itself”,78 as Granberg puts it. And indeed Heidegger does seem to go further than Aristotle in this regard:

Es soll überhaupt nicht der Aufgabe einer vorgegebenen Disziplin genügt werden, sondern umgekehrt: aus den sachlichen Notwendigkeiten bestimmter Fragen und der aus den ‘Sachen selbst’ geforderten Behandlungsart kann sich allenfalls eine Disziplin ausbilden. (SZ, 27 §7)

This quote makes visible two clear options. One can either approach the phenomena with a pre-conceived notion of how to analyze them, or the method can be made to spring out the nature of the things themselves. This difference between taking over from the tradition and following the things themselves is a central theme. Heidegger undoubtedly steers his method towards the second option which means that it clearly cannot be indifferent to its object of study. But what does it mean that the method springs out of the things themselves?

We have so far seen that the circular self-elaborating character of Heidegger’s method means that it cannot be complete at the beginning of the investigation. This is corroborated with the observation that the method cannot be indifferent to the things themselves, but must be elaborated from them. If the method must be elaborated then it clearly isn’t determined in advance. There thus seems to be a connection between the things themselves and the circular character of the method that might help us to identify what is meant when Heidegger talks about how the method springs out of the encounter with the things themselves. But what does this link consist in? We can get the answer to this question if we observe that the method shall be wrested from the things themselves also means that the object directs the method and not the other way around. Our investigation therefore turns towards the issue of direction.

In 3.1, in connection with the first part of the instrumental view, it was mentioned that one way the method can direct its object is via principles such as Descartes principle of atomism. But there is another way an investigation can be directing however, and uncovering this and its role is a prerequisite for understanding how Heidegger aims at elaborating the method out of the object. In the following I will start with examining Heidegger’s criticism of the priority of knowing in the tradition of ontology with the aim of clarifying its way of directing objects. I will subsequently look at how Heidegger aims at distancing himself from the tradition

before an examination of his analysis of anxiety will serve as an illustration of how he proceeds.

As we saw in Chapter 1.1 Heidegger rejects the epistemological set-up of a detached subject standing before reality as a world of objects; instead man as Dasein is being-in-the-world. He thus differentiates his ontology, focused on being and the understanding of being from epistemology, centred on a knowing subject. Central in this regard is that Heidegger dethrones knowing (Erkennen); in his philosophy it no longer has a privileged position or a priority (Vorrang). Let us investigate this character of priority a bit further by looking at §§12-13. Here Heidegger’s concern is to give a preliminary sketch of being-in-the-world. He claims that this phenomenon always already is understood by concern (Besorgen). The same phenomenon is however overlooked by the ontological tradition. It is overlooked because in order to ‘know’ being-in-the-world, “dann nimmt das in solcher Aufgabe ausdrückliche Erkennen gerade sich selbst – als Welterkennen zur exemplarischen Beziehung der ‘Seele’ zur Welt” (SZ, 58-9 §12). The priority knowing has in the tradition is thus one of manner of access (Zugangsart) to the ‘world’. The ‘world’ it has access to however is the totality of entities, and not the world of social-practical relations. But where does this priority stem from? Heidegger notes that during the description of this way of being “unterbleibt aber durchgängig die Frage nach der Seinsart dieses erkennenden Subjekts” (SZ, 60 §13). This lack of questioning points to something significant, there is no need to ask about the way of being of the knowing subject because it is taken as something self-evident (Selbstverständlich). The knowing subject forms of course half of the well-known subject-object relation, a relation which in the tradition “muß vorausgesetzt werden” (SZ, 59 §12). Knowing then is given the position of priority for no other reason than being an obvious and evident starting point for a subject to grasp its corresponding object. Being-in-the-world thus becomes “ontologisch unzugänglich” based on taking the subject-object relation as self-evident.

In his investigation of the ontological assumptions of Descartes in §§19-21 Heidegger goes a step further. Not only does he criticize Descartes for taking the priority of knowing as self-evident, he also seeks to show why it has that character. We recollect from Chapter 2.2 that, for Heidegger, investigations, be they ontic or ontological, have to have some guiding idea (Leitfaden) directing them towards what they are looking for. Every investigation somehow anticipates its object. The part of Heidegger’s reading of Descartes which we are interested
concern firstly where he shows what guiding idea is leading Descartes’ conception of world
and secondly to show how this guiding idea effects the choice of access to this phenomenon.
Heidegger notes that extension constitutes the being of innerworldly entities which Descartes
substitute for world. Further he observes that extension can fulfil this role because it is the
only thing left through all changes, the only thing that lingers after it has gone through all
variations and mutations. Based on this Heidegger claims that for Descartes it holds that:
“Eigentlich ist das immerwährend Bleibende” (SZ, 96 §21). The being of the entity is thus by
Descartes determined as extension based on the leading idea of being as constant presence-at-
hand (ständige Vorhandenheit). This is an idea Descartes has taken over from the tradition, it
is the idea of being as substantiality. Substantiality is however not accessible in and for itself
(an ihr selbst für sich) but only through attributes of entities. And these attributes are captured
by knowing: “Der einzige und echte Zugang zu diesem Seienden ist das Erkennen, die
intellectio, und zwar im Sinne der mathematisch-physikalischen Erkenntnis” (SZ, 95 §21).
And when being is understood as presence-at-hand choosing knowing which has access to the
presence-at-hand is self-evident. But Descartes doesn’t even need to choose because: “Unter
der ungebrochenen Vorherrschaft der traditionellen Ontologie ist über die echte Erfassungsart
des eigentlichen Seienden im vornehin entschieden” (SZ, 96 §21). The manner of access is
already chosen by the tradition. And in this way “kommt für Descartes die Erörterung der
möglichen Zugänge zum innerweltlich Seienden unter die Herrschaft einer Seinsidee, die an
einer bestimmten Region dieses Seienden selbst abgelesen ist” (SZ, 97 §21).

Let us summarize our findings. Firstly the priority (Vorrang) of knowing is a priority of one
way of being over others in terms of manner of access to being and entities. Secondly, this
priority makes being and world inaccessible for the tradition, all knowing has access to are
present-at-hand entities. This means that the method’s preferred manner of access directs the
object and not the other way around. Thirdly, this priority is something which is presupposed
(vorausgesetzt) and has the character of being self-evident. Fourthly, the obviousness of the
priority stems from a guiding idea of being as presence-at-hand. It is thus ultimately the
guiding idea of being as presence-at-hand that leads the ontological investigations to prefer
knowing and thus pass over being and world as phenomena and rather direct itself at entities.
This isn’t an idea that is taken from an examination of the things themselves, but something
which is passed down by the tradition as a prejudice.
Now for Heidegger, as we have seen it is important not to let the method direct the object, but let the things show themselves from out of themselves. Can he avoid letting the method direct the object? Summarized his strategy consists in formally indicating Dasein’s being as existence in order to open up a plurality of access points to being. This isn’t self-explanatory so we have to do some exposition. As we saw in Chapter 2.2 for Heidegger every investigation has to be led by a guiding idea. The ontic scientist is led by an idea or basic concept of nature, life or history without which he could not be directed at the entities his aim it was to study. Similarly the investigator of regional ontologies who shapes and constructs the concepts is also directed by an idea of being: The idea of being of time as presence (Anwesenheit), ‘that which is’ is thus that which enduringly remains, the constant presence-at-hand. In fact this directing anticipation is fundamental in any understanding. For Heidegger we understand by projecting into possibilities. What kind of possibilities are we projecting into? Not abstract ones, but possibilities to be (Sein-können) for the sake of which (worumwillen) Dasein is. They could be called roles, but, as I have pointed out before, it has to be understood that they come ‘equipped’ with a set of practical rules and social conventions. In fact these roles are indistinguishable from the rules and conventions because when meeting other people we don’t meet them in their abstract roles, but “wir treffen sie ‘bei der Arbeit’” (SZ, 120 §26). Projecting into a possibility means projecting into a manner of coping with things and behaving in front of other Dasein: “Das Worumwillen bedeutet ein Um-zu, dieses ein Dazu, dieses ein ...” (SZ, 87 §18). In concerned coping with equipment for instance Dasein doesn’t first detect a property of an entity before deciding it might be suitable for something. Rather equipment is already understood as such on the background of the context of equipment it is situated in. And this context is given its significance (bedeutet) by projecting into a possibility. The point is, in the use of the equipment we anticipate it by projecting into the possibility of using it, we are always already directing.79

What this means is that the investigation can’t get beyond the fact that it will be directing the object anyway because that is the manner of human understanding. But that is not to say that it is all the same what kind of guiding idea there is. The important point is whether these ideas stem from an examination of the things themselves or not. And we can now see what this

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79 Heidegger analyses this pre-understanding as fore-having (Vorhabe) which means that that which is understood is zueignet appropriated or lit. made one’s own; fore-sight (Vorsicht), which means that the understanding has to have an insight to the purpose (worauf) of the object: and fore-conception (Vorgriff) which means that even the nont-thematically understood is prepared conceptually in the use-understanding. (SZ, 150 §32). Compare: Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991). Being-in-the-World, p. 199.
actually means. As we saw in the case of Descartes he is led by an idea of being that is taken from a specific region of innerworldly entities, the present-at-hand (SZ, 97 §21). The problem isn’t this guiding idea itself, it can legitimately be used in scientific investigations of the present-at-hand. The problem is the transference of the being of the present-at-hand over to the different region of the being of Dasein. This could be called a categorical mistake, but that implies a confusion of two categories, in this case it is a confusion of categories (designating the being innerworldly) and existentials (designating Dasein’s being) (SZ, 44 §9). The problem then isn’t so much that such guiding ideas are handed down by the tradition. Rather it gets problematic first because the idea of being doesn’t stem from an examination of the things themselves, Dasein’s being and its structure, but is taken from the wrong source. And secondly because of the dogma that hinders the questioning of this displacement.

Heidegger’s formal indication is also a guiding idea, but it stems from an understanding of the things themselves: “Die formale Anzeige der Existenzidee war geleitet von dem im Dasein selbst liegenden Seinseverständnis” (SZ, 313 §63). With this the connection between the things themselves and the circularity of the method also becomes apparent. The formal indication is to be led by a guiding idea of Dasein’s understanding of being. And Dasein’s understanding of being is itself circular in the sense that in the anticipation we presuppose what we are going to find. The circularity of the method (which is a praxis of Dasein) stems from the things themselves (the circular understanding manifest in Dasein’s praxis).

But the formal indication is not the only methodological feature of Heidegger’s investigation that has to engage with the things themselves. The same holds for the vital methodological tool of manner of access to the things themselves. When Heidegger challenges the primacy of knowing by formally indicating Dasein’s being as existence he opens up the possibility that being can be accessible through other ways of being (Seinsarten). This does not mean however that Heidegger puts understanding of being on the same pedestal which previously was occupied by knowing. This is so because understanding of being does not confine itself to one way of being. When Dasein is indicated as existence it becomes clear that it disposes over a plurality of ways of being which each have different types of access to and thus also understanding of entities and being. Existence as being-in-the-world means always already

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80 This identification within the context of the analytic of Dasein of the things themselves as Dasein’s being and its structure means that Heidegger’s term must be differentiated from Kant’s thing in itself. Dasein’s being is a phenomenon in the Heideggerian sense of showing itself from out of itself to Dasein, while the Kantian thing is precisely that which does not show itself.

81 Chapter 3.3 will deal to a greater extent with the importance for Heidegger of the difference between taking over from the tradition and braking away from it. The manner the formal indication brakes away will turn out to be authentic.
having understood the world, its entities, itself and being through a variety of modes of access. As human entities we are open to the world and how it shows itself. We are open to other humans, equipment, properties and to oneself. Dasein is always open to its self, for example through always finding itself attuned (stimmt) as lonely, happy, bored, angry, disgusted, playful, anxious etc. Common for all these ways of access is that they involve an understanding of being or of entities. Being open means being illuminated or cleared: “Es ist ‘erleuchtet’, besagt: an ihm selbst als In-der-Welt-sein gelichtet, nicht durch ein anderes Seiendes, sondern so, daß es selbst die Lichtung ist” (SZ, 133 §28). Every way of being has its sight (Sicht), its manner of seeing or standing in the light of being. For Heidegger the method of philosophy should not only take this into account, but utilize its potential. Within the context of the formal indication of existence phenomenology becomes a manner of study which does not operate with one access point, but which rather seeks to find them and to show them. And when we grasp this point we can see why the method cannot be decided upon fully in advance. The manner of directing is thus another than for the instrumental method. The formal indication directs the investigation towards existence, but it is itself guided by die Sachen selbst, Dasein’s understanding of being. The formal indication directs the investigation, but it does not direct the specific ways we have access to being; that has to be elaborated during the run of the investigation.

Let us try to illustrate this latter point and by that further characterize Heidegger’s method as one that has to be worked out from the things themselves with the concrete example of anxiety. We choose anxiety for this purpose because this phenomenon also holds the key to illustrating how Heidegger aims to show that Dasein has a freedom to project into its own possibility of ‘transparency’. What we are illustrating is phenomenology in the way Heidegger describes it as: “Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen” (SZ, 34 §7C). What this amounts to is the activity of finding ways of access to being and its structures and showing what they reveal. Both aspects will receive equal attention in the following.

82 The centrality of the conception of phenomenology as a manner of finding access points can be witness through the following passages: In the introduction Heidegger speaks of how Dasein “muß sich gleichfalls in der ihm genuin zugehörigen Zugangsart zeigen” (SZ, 37 §7C). And also that the analysis stands before the “ontologischen Aufgabe, dieses Seiende in seiner phänomenal nächsten Seinsart nicht nur nicht zu verfehlen, sondern in positiver Charakteristik zugänglich zu machen” (SZ, 44 §9). In addition whilst looking back on the accomplishments of the preceding investigations Heidegger observes that: “Die vorbereitende Analyse hat eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Phänomenen zugänglich gemacht, die bei aller Konzentration auf die fundernde Strukturganzheit der Sorge dem phänomenologischen Blick nicht entschwinden darf” (SZ, 334 §67). What the investigation has brought forth has been making phenomena accessible. In addition Division One of SZ can be read as the attempt to gain access to care as the formal whole of Dasein’s being, whilst the analysis of death, conscience, and
The analysis of anxiety comes up in context of Heidegger’s desire to reach the structural wholeness of Dasein’s being at the end of Division One. This wholeness must be attested to somehow by Dasein in an understanding manner. Thus he has to look for ways of being in which Dasein already has an access to this wholeness. “Zugänglich wird uns das Sein des Daseins ... in einem vollen Durchblick durch dieses Ganze auf ein ursprünglich einheitliches Phänomen” (SZ, 181 §39). Taking over the tradition’s preferred manner of access, knowing, cannot be the answer because it only has access to properties and the only wholeness it sees is the totality of such properties. Heidegger claims that Dasein’s wholeness is “nicht zu erreichen durch ein Zusammenbauen der Elemente” and the reason for this is that “Dieses bedürfte eines Bauplans” (SZ, 181 §39). Heidegger’s reasoning here is the same as when he criticizes the ontologically dubious attempt at constructing equipment as a totality of properties:

Und bedarf diese Rekonstruktion des zunächst ‘abgehäuteten’ Gebrauchsdinges nicht immer schon des vorgängigen, positiven Blicks auf das Phänomen, dessen Ganzheit in der Rekonstruktion wieder hergestellt werden soll? Wenn dessen eigenste Seinsverfassung zuvor aber nicht angemessen expliziert ist, baut dann die Rekonstruktion nicht ohne Bauplan? (SZ, 99 §21)

Within the ontology of the present-at-hand, because it passes over the phenomenon of world, as we saw in the process described above, the only recourse it has for explaining how we understand complex phenomena such as equipment or Dasein’s wholeness is by the use of present-at-hand properties. On this view to understand equipment we have to construct it from out of the present-at-hand nature-thing by adding to it functions/values (Werte) that is not to be found in the object itself. Imagine first observing an entity, a hammer, with the properties of extension, hardness, colour etc. then adding the function property of ‘good for hammering’ et voilà the hammer as equipment is constructed. This picture causes two problems. Firstly, by adding another present-at-hand property we still don’t get closer to the relevance which characterizes equipment. Properties are according to Heidegger uncovered by abstracting them from their use context. Adding more properties does not make objects

anticipatory resoluteness in Division Two can be seen as an attempt to find the manner of access to Dasein as a temporal whole.

83 The modern discussion of whether such properties as colour or hardness are primary (in the object) or secondary (stemming from human interaction) is not vital to Heidegger’s argument because there is an agreement in this tradition that function-properties such as ‘good for X’ clearly are secondary.

relevant for use because this requires an equipment context complete with reference to other equipment, the aim of the use as well as the user. Secondly, Heidegger calls this construction a reconstruction because he claims it presupposes a prior understanding of the wholeness. For how can the function ‘good for hammering’ be picked out? From out of the object? That would mean that the value-property was to be found independently of humans, which is implausible. And if not this, then the only other possibility would be that it was picked out from a prior understanding of the wholeness. But since this ontology only sees wholeness as a totality of entities, meaning that there are no other types of wholeness, the reconstruction builds without a plan. It tries to construct something without having recourse to what is relevant for this construction. And the same is the case with the wholeness of Dasein. The elements detected by the knowing gaze would need to be constructed into a whole, but for that we need a plan which again requires a direct understanding of the wholeness, but if we have the latter (as it turns out we have) there is no need for the former.

Heidegger also briefly evaluates and finds lacking the everyday (objective) experience (Erfahren) as well as the immanent perception of (subjective) experiences (Erlebnisse). And remember that this evaluation is done within the framework of the formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence. Something which means that what we are looking for is ultimately an understanding of Dasein’s own being existence. Everyday experiences do not meet the requirement because it is only directed at Dasein as an innerworldly entity and not at its own being, its possibility-to-be. The perception of experiences likewise fails because it lacks “ein ontologisch zureichender Leitfaden” (SZ, 181 §39), which is a way of saying that what this self-perception directs itself at (experience) is not existence, not its possibility-to-be.

Instead it is Heidegger’s contention (Behauptung) that anxiety can perform this methodological function as the manner of access to Dasein’s being because it is the widest and most primordial manner of disclosure of Dasein’s own being. Dreyfus calls anxiety

85 Granberg does not remember this in her analysis of Heidegger’s conception of death: “The experience of the death of the Other is not really analyzed as a basic and primordial experience, but simply bypassed in an offhand manner.” Anne Granberg (2004). Mood and Method - In Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, p. 150. Heidegger’s reasoning is directed against showing that the experience of the death of the other does not represent a possibility-to-be for Dasein and it is on this account, not any other, that it is rejected. As he clearly states: “Die Frage steht nach dem ontologischen Sinn des Sterbens des Sterbenden als einer Seinsmöglichkeit seines Seins” (SZ, 239 §47). I bring this up because the case is analogue to the rejection of experience as a manner of access to anxiety.

86 This I believe is the passage where Heidegger most clearly differentiates conscious thematic understanding from an understanding of Dasein’s being: “Der Entwurfcharakter des Verstehens besagt ferner, daß dieses das, woraufhin es entwirft, die Möglichkeiten, selbst nicht thematisch erfährt. Solches Erfassen benimmt dem Entworfenen gerade seinen Möglichkeitscharakter, zieht es herab zu einem gegebenen, gemeinten Bestand, während der Entwurf im Werfen die Möglichkeit als Möglichkeit sich vorwirft und als solche sein läßt” (SZ, 145 §31).
“Heidegger’s existential equivalent of Husserl’s transcendental reduction.” 87 I think Dreyfus is wrong in this equivocation. This becomes apparent if we look at Husserl’s description of his own term: “The fundamental phenomenological method of transcendental epoché, because it leads back to this realm [the phenomenal-subjective realm] is called transcendental-phenomenological reduction.” 88 For Husserl this methodological tool reduces the area we as philosophers are interested in to the structure of consciousness. It’s a delimitation of the subject matter. For Heidegger anxiety is one of the ways we have access to the being of Dasein. It functions both as an access point and, as we saw in Chapter 2.4, as a way of confirming the initial formal indication. 89 For Husserl however the access involves “looking at and describing the particular transcendentally reduced cogito”. 90 The transcendental-phenomenological reflection is a ‘looking at’ manner of access to properties that directs itself at the already delimited realm of the reduced cogito. Reduction and reflection are therefore separate in Husserl and their Heideggerian correlates, I would suggest, would be formal indication and ‘access through relevant understanding of being’ respectively. The formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence is what directs the investigation towards its object and thus also roughly delimits it to concentrate on Dasein’s self-understanding instead of human consciousness as Husserl’s reduction points towards. And the manner of access to existence is not through a knowing or perceptive (wahrnehmende) reflection, but through the relevant understanding of being, such as anxiety. But, and this is important, the manner of access is not decided upon in advance but found via the process, we have looked at, of examining manner’s of access.

Dreyfus, then, is wrong when saying anxiety serve the same function as the transcendental reduction because the latter is a way of directing while anxiety is a manner of access. 91 But Dreyfus is right in saying that anxiety reveals something different than what is revealed for Husserl. As he says the transcendental ego is revealed as: “the absolute source of all intelligibility, while anxiety reveals Dasein as dependent upon a public set of significances that it did not produce.” 92 Heidegger does not speak of anxiety as in normal parlance where it

89 In neither of these roles is it alone, resolute anticipation functions in much the same way as a manner of access to Dasein’s temporal wholeness, and as a way of attesting to the formal indications validity.
91 Note that when Husserl’s reduction directs towards consciousness and not possibilities-to-be it to, like Descartes has to be led by an understanding of being as presence-at-hand.
92 Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991). Being-in-the-World, p. 177. I have here modified the context of the quote so that it agrees with my earlier statement that it is the reflection that reveals, not the reduction.
often is confused with fear. Instead he calls it a basic affectedness (*Grundbefindlichkeit*), i.e. it is part of every Dasein. That in the face of which Dasein is anxious of (*das Wovor der Angst*) is not innerworldly entities (equipment, other Dasein) like in fear, rather these appear as unimportant. No concrete possibility involving public significations (i.e. provided by das Man) appears as worth projecting itself into. Instead what Dasein is anxious of is “die Möglichkeit von Zuhandenem überhaupt, das heißt die Welt selbst” (SZ, 187 §40). What it is anxious of is the possibility itself (which compared to the concreteness of a ready-to-hand entities is a nothing (*Nichts*)), and the possibility of the ready-to-hand is Dasein’s own being, being-in-the-world. Neither is Dasein anxious about (*ängstet sich um*) concrete possibilities-to-be (social roles with its codified practical skills and social conventions) because the world of public significations that Dasein has to project itself into appears as insignificant. Instead then of being thrown into the world of public significations as it normally finds itself, anxiety cuts Dasein off from the world and throws it back upon itself thereby individualizing it as a nothing that “als verstehendes wesenhaft auf Möglichkeiten sich entwirft” (SZ, 187 §40). That which is revealed for Dasein as that which it is anxious about is its own possibility-for-being-in-the-world. Without leaping into possibilities Dasein is only a possibility-to-be (*Möglichsein*), i.e. a nothing (*Nichts*). This possibility to project itself is *unheimlich*, a word which carries two central meanings for Heidegger. Firstly it literally means ‘not being at home’ (*Nicht-zuhause-sein*) as such it is a description of Dasein’s being as always projecting itself away from itself (home) towards its possibility. This ‘not being at home’ is also, and this is the second meaning, ‘uncanny’. This is so because as a possibility to be projecting, Dasein stands free to project itself into a possibility that is its own and is not taken from das Man. Freedom then for Heidegger means being free to project oneself into its own possibility. But this choice is such an uncanny freedom that it is something from which Dasein flees (*flieht*). “Die verfallende Flucht in das Zuhause der Öffentlichkeit ist Flucht vor dem Unzuhause” (SZ, 189 §40). Instead of projecting itself into its own possibilities everyday Dasein flies into projecting itself into possibilities provided by the public sphere of das Man. This falling covers over that which is revealed to Dasein in anxiety: That the social conventions and practical significations that make up the world are nothing but conventions and rules which

93 This can be seen not only by the fact that it is called a basic affectedness, but also because Heidegger claims that “Die Abkehr des Verfallens gründet vielmehr in der Angst” (SZ, 186 §40). And falling (*Verfallen*) is something that every Dasein in everydayness pertain to.

94 This actually amounts to the same as saying that Dasein is being-in-the-world. If one takes away the world of significance one is left with nothing, there isn’t a detached subject to be found.
means they can be broken and has no real hold or real attachment to Dasein because it has the possibility of freely projecting itself from out of itself.\textsuperscript{95}

What we can see Heidegger doing in his analysis of anxiety is that he lets the showing which is hidden be seen. He shows (he describes in words), the showing (that being-in-the-world as a wholeness is a nothing and stands free to project itself from out itself) which is hidden (Dasein flees from anxiety by covering this nullity by taking up the shared significations of das Man). The role of the interpreter in relation to anxiety is described like this: “die Interpretation ... vollzieht nur die Explikation dessen, was das Dasein selbst ontisch erschließt” (SZ, 185 §40). When Heidegger talks about anxiety he doesn’t talk about it as an experience (\textit{Erlebnis}) we have to undergo or put ourselves into. Nor does he ask us to imagine (\textit{vorstellen}) how it is to be anxious. He is showing us how the phenomenon shows itself by describing it and in this way making the unthematically understood thematically understood. But how does the investigator follow the trace of what anxiety reveals? At this point the sceptical question of ‘how do we know anything about such a realm?’ might also pop up. But from the preceding we can appreciate that this is an unnecessary question; we don’t have to know it, we can have access to it through other means because knowing isn’t the only mode of access we have. But the first question remains unanswered: Anxiety is the manner of access to Dasein’s wholeness, but what is the manner of access to anxiety? Heidegger further characterizes his investigation as “interpretierenden Mit- und Nachgehen innerhalb eines befindlichen Verstehens zum Sein des Daseins vorzudringen” and that the investigation shall “schrittweise zum Phänomen der Angst vorzudringen” (SZ, 185 §40). In order to go with (\textit{mitzugehen}) the phenomenon to reveal what it reveals we have to follow (\textit{nachzugehen}) it by proceeding step by step. If we had to put ourselves into anxiety (if such a thing were even possible given that for Heidegger moods are not something that can be changed by will), because it involves not projecting into possibilities it is a position from where one cannot do any work, authentic or inauthentic. So what characterizes this step by step procedure? Firstly, anxiety is projected as that which reveals Dasein’s wholeness; it only has the status of a contention (\textit{Behauptung}) at first. Then Heidegger notes the common error of equivocating anxiety and fear in the common sense understanding. Thus orienting himself from the one

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{95} What is revealed in anxiety is also what is drawn up (\textit{vorgezeichnet}) ontologically concerning being-unto-death. Heidegger describes the connection thusly: “Die Geworfenheit in den Tod enthüllt sich ihm ursprünglicher und eindringlicher in der Befindlichkeit der Angst. Die Angst vor dem Tode ist Angst ‘vor’ dem eigenten, unbezüglichen und unüberholbaren Seinkönnen” (SZ, 251 §50). The difference between anxiety and being-unto-death is that the former accentuates the thrownness of death (“Die Angst ... wirft das Dasein zurück, worum es sich ängstet, sein eigentliches In-der-Welt-sein-können” (SZ, 187 §40), while the latter focuses on it as a possibility, a projection.}
side from out of the projection of anxiety, and from the other from the destruction of the common opinion, Heidegger is able to gain access to what anxiety reveals, contrasting step by step how anxiety differs from fear. The manner of access to anxiety is thus the contemplative understanding we already have sketched in Chapter 2.3-5 which conforms with Heidegger’s statement that “Phänomenologie ist Zugangsort zu dem und die ausweisende Bestimmungsart dessen, was Thema der Ontologie werden soll” (SZ, 35 §7C).

The picture of phenomenology that emerges from this analysis is one consisting of two steps. Firstly, it is a deliberative process about finding which manner of access reveals the phenomenon we are interested in (as we saw Heidegger evaluates the features of knowing, experience or self-perception before anxiety). Secondly, it is an attempt through the use the understanding, i.e. of projection and destruction, to gain access to and show what the phenomenon itself shows. Phenomenology is a manner of making us explicitly see that which we already are seeing implicitly. Thus in contradistinction to the instrumental view of method, Heidegger’s method is always in negotiation with its object trying to find a manner of access (i.e. the method is trying to determine itself) in order to let the object show itself from out of itself and thus avoid determining how the object shows itself in advance by accessing it in the wrong way. These two steps, of course, are located within the projection of the formal indication which directs the investigation towards being, but not towards any the specific way we have access to being. And as we have seen this is a projection that also is led by the things themselves. Heidegger’s method is a hermeneutically circular investigation rooted in the things themselves that at the outset is not complete but has to determine itself.

Based on this were does our investigation of the role of philosophical knowledge stand? We have, I believe, found two aspects that have furthered our inquiry. The first concern knowledge as a description. In Chapter 3.2 we saw that the type of knowledge aimed at was not a traditional definition of a ‘what’. Instead the aim was to describe Dasein in its how, i.e. to lay it free. The problem however was that this could not simply be a mere description of how Dasein shows itself in the everyday. From the analysis of anxiety it becomes clear why this is so. In the everyday understanding Dasein flees from its ownmost possibility to project itself from out of itself. Instead it understands itself from out of possibilities it falls into. What it flees from is the realization that it has the freedom to project itself from out of itself. By describing this freedom Heidegger has gotten one step closer to a description of Dasein as having a full ‘transparent’ understanding of itself, i.e. laying it free in its ownmost possibility-
to-be. But we still need to see more than just ‘that’ it has this possibility, we need to see how such a projection is made. The second thing we have found concern the path towards this description. Recall what we have looked at with respect to circularity. The character of the circularity of any understanding lies in that it anticipates the object when grasping it in its possibility. This circular character is not something the method shies away from, rather it utilizes it. The circularity is part of the things themselves, the structures of Dasein’s self-understanding, which the formal indication is led by. Describing means formally indicating and as we have seen the formal indication has to move in a circular manner from the formal towards the concrete. In the next chapter I will try to show how these two aspects of knowledge interacts in the concept of anticipatory resoluteness.\textsuperscript{96}

3.4 Application and Authenticity

When we looked at the application aspect of the instrumental method we saw that application of principles decided upon in advance becomes a rule-following process. Instead of engaging the object of study directly the method has the consequence of not being in contact with the object, of distancing itself from it. What I will try to show is that Heidegger’s method in contrast to the instrumental method cannot consist in a simple application of rules. The reason for this lies in the contrast Heidegger draws up between primordial (\textit{ursprünglich}) understanding and the covered up understanding of \textit{das Man}.\textsuperscript{97} While primordial understanding is what the phenomenological analysis aims at (we will see why later), common sense is a privative understanding plagued by self-evidentness as well as adherence to conventions and rules. I will start out by analysing Dreyfus’ conception of this difference which I will find faulty because it is not aware that also the use-understanding is a covered up understanding and therefore cannot be the most primordial. This role is instead given to anticipatory resoluteness which I will identify with the creation of a new praxis. I will first attempt a more general explanation of this phenomenon before showing how it characterizes the formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence.

\textsuperscript{96} ‘Anticipatory’ in anticipatory resoluteness must not be confused with the more general character of anticipation or being ahead of itself (\textit{sich-vorweg-sein}). The latter is a character of all understanding while the former is only connected to an ontic possibility of Dasein.

\textsuperscript{97} The term \textit{Selbst-verständlichkeit} must also be seen as closely linked with common sense.
To understand the difference between the two let us begin with an exposition of Dreyfus’ analysis of this topic from his influential *Being-in-the-world*. According to Dreyfus Heidegger operates with a sliding scale of intelligibility differentiated in three phases into what he calls primordial, positive and privative understanding.98 The primordial is identified with the use of equipment and he cites this quote: “je zugreifender es [das Hammer] gebraucht wird, um so ursprünglicher wird das Verhältnis zu ihm” (SZ, 69 §15), to back up his claim. The more we stop merely watching the hammer and start using it the more primordial is our understanding of it. Further, the positive understanding is connected to talk about equipment that one is familiar, but with which one does not have any/much experience handling. Dreyfus mentions scalpels, jet planes and wheelchairs as examples. Finally the privative understanding revolves around covering up the more primordial understanding. In distinction to the prior two modes, the privative understanding according to Dreyfus is not a helpful communicative tool. What was once disclosed, opened by an understanding praxis is covered-over. It is the “structure of language” that allows the cover-up because terms gets passed on from familiar users to ones that are unfamiliar. Idle talk (Gerede) according to Dreyfus “closes off genuine and even average understanding.”99

The picture of intelligibility that Dreyfus paints is one centred on familiarity and charts the difference in understanding between the familiar user, the average observer, and the curious onlooker. Let us try to illustrate this with an example that charts the difference between the understanding of a string theory scientist, a science journalist reporting on string theory and a casual observer. If one where to compare the familiar understanding the scientist has of the concept of this theory with the privative and the positive understanding of it one would easily find that they are different. My ‘privative’ knowledge of the area limits itself to speaking about strings as sub-atomic phenomena without having a clear image of what they are other than that I think they ‘look’ like other strings. The journalist might be able to explain to me aspects of the theory and what it explains, but as he isn’t a skilled practitioner of science he is also reliant on the scientist who uses the terms in a clear and technical sense, for his facts.

The view Dreyfus describes seems a plausible one of how intelligibility diminishes as it is dispersed. But is it Heidegger’s view? Three considerations will show that Dreyfus’ interpretation doesn’t match Heidegger’s descriptions. Firstly, consider something that

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99 Ibid., p. 231.
Dreyfus himself notes, that the average understanding also tends towards the same banality that characterizes the privative understanding: “Yet, this second hand understanding introduces a generality that tends towards banality.”\(^{100}\) If the positive understanding shows a banality, how is it different from the privative one? This brings us to the second point. Dreyfus cites a passage that describes the privative understanding as “aggravated to complete groundlessness” (*Bodenlosigkeit*).\(^{101}\) But consider what Heidegger says just after the passage cited by Dreyfus: “Die Bodenlosigkeit des Geredes versperrt ihm nicht den Eingang in die Öffentlichkeit, sondern begünstigt ihn. Das Gerede ist die Möglichkeit alles zu verstehen ohne vorgängige Zueignung der Sache” (SZ, 169 §35). We can from this quote observe that groundlessness is identified with idle talk. But in addition it is said about idle talk that it makes understanding without closeness to the thing itself possible. The supposed privative understanding thus has a positive characteristic. Moving forward to the third point we can stay with the concept of groundlessness and ask: In what sense is the understanding groundless? The answer can be found if one observes that the quotes that Dreyfus cites about the positive and the privative understanding reveal that both of them are severed from the primordial understanding.\(^{102}\) Being groundless means simply being severed from the primordial understanding. The positive and privative understandings share this feature. If one adds all of this up it becomes apparent that what Dreyfus tries to describe as two distinct phenomena, the positive and privative understanding, for Heidegger amounts to the same, idle talk. In the relevant passage, in §35, there is no attempt made at describing two distinct phenomena, only one.

If this is so what is then the difference between the primordial and the covered-up understanding? If we take what is left of Dreyfus’ view we can suggest that the difference is between the primordial using and the positive-privative talking. In our example that would translate into the difference between the directly familiar user and the only indirectly familiar (to various degrees) journalist and layman. This, however, cannot be the correct interpretation because for Heidegger also the use of equipment can be a cover up; “das Besorgen” is also “verloren in das Man” (SZ, 189 §40). The reason Dreyfus’ account gets confused is that it omits the fact that Heidegger in Division Two makes accessible an understanding which is

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\(^{100}\) Ibid., p. 231.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 231. The passage he cites is in SZ, 168 § 35.

\(^{102}\) Here is the relevant part of the quote that, for Dreyfus, illustrates the positive understanding: “even if the hearer does not bring himself into such a kind of being towards what the telling is about as to have a primordial understanding of it.” And for the privative one: “it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner.” Ibid., p. 230-1.
more primordial than the use-understanding we have been looking at.  

Because of this he doesn’t see that even if the ordinary use intelligibility is called primordial it is covering-up a more primordial understanding by codifying the latter into social roles and conventions and practical rules.  

This convention and rule based understanding is what Dasein falls into in its everyday understanding. “Mit der Verlorenheit in das Man ist über das nächste faktische Seinkönnen des Daseins – die Aufgaben, Regeln, Maßstäbe, die Dringlichkeit und Reichweite des besorgend-fürsorgenden In-der-Welt-seins – je schon entschieden” (SZ, 268 §54). As das Man the rules and conventions of practical-social (besorgende-fürsorgende) engagement in the world is something that Dasein already is thrown into, they are already decided upon. In its everyday engagement with entities Dasein uses equipment as one uses equipment and Dasein follows the social conventions as everyone else.

Das Man-selbst, worumwillen das Dasein Alltäglich ist, artikuliert den Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit. Die Welt des Daseins gibt das begegnende Seiende auf eine Bewandtnisganzheit frei, die dem Man vertraut ist, und in den Grenzen, die mit der Durchschnittlichkeit des Man festgelegt sind. (SZ, 129 §27)

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103 This is something he attests to in a later essay. See: Hubert L. Dreyfus (2000). "Could anything be more intelligible than everyday intelligibility? Reinterpreting division I of Being and Time in the light of division II”. In Faulkner (Ed.), Appropriating Heidegger. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of The University of Cambridge, p. 156.

104 These rules and conventions need not be thematic or explicit, but rather cover such ground as ‘a way of handling a hammer’ or ‘a hammer is for hammering nails’, some of these rules are picked up by observation, some by instruction, the important is that they are taken from das Man. They way I use the term rules (Regeln) must therefore not be confused with Dreyfus’ usage of the same word. For him rules are connected to computers which “programmed as physical symbol systems, that is, using rules and features, do not have skills”. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991). Being-in-the-World, p. 117. My usage of the term ‘rule’ covers the same ground as Dreyfus ‘skill’. I have however chosen to keep in line with the German term Regel. But Dreyfus distinction is important. There is a difference between practical rules (skills) handed down in social contexts and formalization of these rules. These rules or ‘relations’ which Heidegger also calls them “widerstreben ihrem phänomenalen Gehalt nach jeder matematischen Funktionalisierung” (SZ, 88 §18). What is lost in the functionalization or formalization is the way these rules are connected to each other in referential whole (Verweisungszusammenhang).

105 Heidegger here uses a vocabulary with a highly specific meaning. A short explanation is due. All these terms show up in Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s coping with equipment in §§15-18. A single piece of equipment is according to Heidegger never encountered, because essential to equipment is that is it something ‘in order to ...’ (Um-zu) which means it refers beyond itself (SZ, 68 §15). The hammer is ‘in order to’ put nails in the wall which again is ‘in order to’ build a house which as the product (Werk) has the character ‘towards-which’ (Wozu) which again refers to the materials (woraus) and the users (Benutzer). Such a gathering of references is called a referential context (Verweisungszusammenhang). Involvement (Bewandnis) is the characterization of the being of equipment. It shows that by means of (mit) equipment we can be involved with (bei) something (SZ, 84 §18). For example by means of hammering Dasein is involved with the nail, or the house, or in the last instance itself, that ‘for the sake of which’ (Worumwillen) it hammers. That is to say, the activity of tool use is self-reflective, when Dasein hammer it has an understanding of it self. The ‘for the sake of which’ is not a need, but a possibility to be (Seinkönnen) for Dasein. Letting-be-involved (Bewendenlassen) is not a characteristic of equipment, but of Dasein and means that it lets equipment be involved, which make it a condition of possibility for equipment to show up as such. Since letting-be-involve means first having a goal (wobei) it has the inverted structure of ‘with ... by means of...’ (bei... mit...) (SZ, 85-6 §18). Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) is the totality of relations of significations (Bedeutens). What it describes is how the understanding itself refers (verweist) itself from its ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ towards tasks and products etc. This process is called be-deuten which means that the understanding interpretatively projects (deutet) the significance (Bedeutung) of the tasks and goals on the basis of Dasein’s possibility-to-be. “Das Worumwillen bedeutet ein Um-zu, dieses ein Dazu, dieses ein Wobei...” (SZ, 87 §18).

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That the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ of everyday Dasein is das Man means that the possibilities-to-be Dasein has are provided by das Man and do no stem from Dasein itself. It is on the basis of such possibilities that Dasein refers itself into the referential context with its tasks and goals. That das Man articulates the referential context of equipment usage means that the manner of usage is based on the possibilities of das Man, and the further consequence is that everyday Dasein uses equipment in a way where the tasks and goals, falls within the limits of the average conventional and rule-based understanding. As for social conventions Heidegger claims: “Wir genießen und vergnügen uns, wie man genießt; wir lesen, sehen und urteilen über Literatur und Kunst, wie man sieht und urteilt” (SZ, 126 §27). In short, being with others is characterized by adhering to social norms and standards. Even the skilled scientist finds himself within a framework of assumptions, norms etc. in a manner which Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* describes as normal science. For Kuhn normal science is puzzle solving set within a paradigm which provides “rules” and give “commitments” to a set of problems and established practises such as “the ways in which accepted instruments may legitimately be involved” for solving these problems.\(^{106}\)

To summarize: “Das Dasein ist im Aufgehen der besorgten Welt, das heißt zugleich im Mitsein zu den Anderen, nicht es selbst” (SZ, 125 §26). The manner of coping with equipment and being with others is something which Dasein has taken over or fallen into. In everyday understanding Dasein is, because of its convention and rule understanding, indistinguishable from the others to a degree that Dasein itself is called das Man. Instead then of just focusing on familiarity as a difference between a primordial understanding and its counterpart, as Dreyfus’ interpretation does, one has to see that the difference lies between a primordial understanding and one where rules and conventions cover this understanding up.

But our mission is still incomplete because we haven’t seen what this primordial understanding is. What does it take to overcome the cover up of conventions and rules and reach a primordial understanding? In order to do this, Heidegger claims, Dasein has to face that for which it is anxious, i.e. it has to face itself. This facing up to ones own possibility to be is called anticipatory resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*). It is described by Heidegger as an ontic understanding possibility (SZ, 312 §63) of Dasein\(^{107}\) that attests to its


\(^{107}\) Meaning that it is an individual understanding not to be found in every Dasein, as Heidegger says that it “möglich sein mag, aber doch nicht für jeden verbindlich zu sein braucht” (SZ, 312 §63).
wholeness and its authenticity. Anticipatory resoluteness is unfortunately not a name that automatically reveals what kind of understanding Heidegger has in mind. Some exposition of this and its connected terms is therefore needed. It should be noted that I am only giving an interpreted summary of a much larger discussion.

When Heidegger first mentions resoluteness he describes it thusly: “das verschwiegene, angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste Schuldig-sein – nennen wir die Entschlossenheit” (SZ, 297 §60). Let us look closer at each of the parts which describe resoluteness. That the projection is reticent (verschweigende) means that “Sie entzieht dem verständigen Gerede des Man das Wort” (SZ, 296 §60). Something which implies that instead of following the idle talk of das Man, Dasein refuses to pass it on. With respect to being-guilty Heidegger says that Dasein “aus der Verlorenheit in das Man sich zu ihm selbst zurückholen soll, das heißt schuldig ist” (SZ, 287 §58). Guilt is connected, therefore, to not having brought itself back from falling into the possibilities of das Man. Projecting oneself (Sichentwerfen) upon its own being-guilty should therefore mean taking responsibility for falling into the lostness of das Man by projecting into its own possibility. The last component of resoluteness, being prepared for anxiety (angstbereit), means to face that which is revealed by this phenomenon and not flee from it. We have already seen that that which is revealed by anxiety is Dasein as an individual being-in-the-world void of any significance, a nullity that has the possibility to project itself from out of itself. The resoluteness that is prepared for anxiety thus understands that the social conventions and practical significations that make up the world are nothing but conventions and rules. This means that they can be broken and has no real hold or real attachment to Dasein because it can project itself into its own possibility.

Resolute Dasein does not, however, deduce this before subsequently acting upon it. Heidegger is not speaking of a thematic grasping of a fact. It is a realisation that is already taking action: “Als Entschlossenes handelt das Dasein schon” (SZ, 300 §60). But in what way is it acting? Is it acting counter to social norms and rules? Is being part of a counter-culture what resoluteness is about? The answer is no, because as Heidegger says: “wir ziehen uns aber auch vom ‘großen Haufen’ zurück, wie man sich zurückzieht” (SZ, 127 §27). Also the act of non-conformity pertains to the inauthentic mode of das Man.

Facing one’s nullity means more than discovering in anxiety that the rules and conventions one falls into are just that, rules and conventions. It also means projecting oneself based on
this revelation. For Heidegger understanding is projecting oneself into possibilities. But the possibility which the resolute projection directs itself towards can not be given a concrete description. “Wozu soll es sich entschließen? Die Antwort vermag nur der Entschluß zu geben” (SZ, 298 §60). But if we look closer at the component of anticipation we can observe that even if Heidegger does not give the content he does give an outline of the form of what this primordial understanding projects itself towards. Anticipation is Heidegger’s shorthand for anticipation of Dasein’s ownmost possibility of death. Dasein presses into this possibility, not by taking its own life, but anticipatory, in projecting itself into it, meaning “sich verstehen in dem Sein-können, das sich im Entwurf enthüllt” (SZ, 263). Projecting itself into its ownmost possibility allows Dasein to avoid being lost in arbitrary possibilities which is imposed on Dasein from the outside. “Das vorlaufende Freiwerden für den eigenen Tod befreit von der Verlorenheit in die zufällig sich andrängende Möglichkeiten” (SZ, 264 §53). These arbitrary possibilities are the same as those revealed by anxiety; the social-practical conventions and rules that Dasein falls into. What the anticipatory resoluteness does, then, is to allow Dasein to project itself into a possibility that is uniquely its own, something which means projecting itself into a possibility which is not derived from the outside, such as the social roles and their conventions and rules of das Man are. Further Heidegger says that:

Frei für die eigenen, vom Ende her bestimmten, das heißt als endliche verstandenen Möglichkeiten, bannt das Dasein die Gefahr, aus seinem endlichen Existenzverständnis her die es überholenden Existenzmöglichkeiten der Anderen zu verkennen oder aber sie mißdeuten auf die eigene zurückzuzwingen – um sich so der eigensten faktischen Existenz zu begeben. (SZ, 264 §53)

When Dasein understandingly projects itself into its finite possibilities it avoids the danger of misunderstanding the existence possibilities of others for its own. The difference between the primordial understanding and the understanding that pervades das Man is that while the latter is a rule and convention-based understanding which pervades das Man is that while the latter is a rule and convention-based understanding which Dasein falls into, the former is an

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108 We can here take note of Heidegger ontologically appropriating another existentiell claim from Kierkegaard: “Men er det at blive subjektiv Opgaven, saa er for det enkelte Subjekt det at tænke Døden ikke saaden Noget overhodet, men en Handling, thi netop deri ligger Subjektivitetsens Udvikling, at han andende gennemarbeider sig selv i sin Tænken over sin egen Existents.” Søren Kierkegaard (2002). Afsluttende videnskabelig Efterskrift. København: Gad, 156. Anticipatory resoluteness like the ‘subjective task’ here referred to revolve around a correct pre-understanding of death as key to acting authentically (eigenlichgentlig). Heidegger’s attitude to the Danish thinker seem to me to most aptly be described in a passage where, whilst presumably referring to thinkers like Kierkegaard, he asks himself “ob diese Auslegungen ebenso ursprünglich existenzial durchgeführt wurden, wie sie vielleicht existenziell ursprünglich waren” (SZ, 16 §5). The verdict is simply that even if Kierkegaard’s analyses were primordial and serve as excellent work that Heidegger readily imitates they do not fulfil the requirements of his own ontological science. The appropriation is thus not a theft, but a making place of these insights within an ontological problem field. The same sentiment is expressed with regard to Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety, the problem of existence and the moment of vision (der Augenblick) which despite Heidegger’s frequent appropriation is the only three times he gives Kierkegaard credit (SZ, 190 §40; 235 §45; 338 §68a).
authentic (eigentliche) understanding from its own (eigene) self. The easy way to say all this would be that the difference lies between falling into conventions and rules and creating new forms of praxis. For Heidegger the concept of death as in being-unto-death (Sein-zum-tode) then carries two connotations. In the sense of dying away it is described by anxiety not as a dying away from the world as a totality of entities, but from the world of social roles, conventions and rules Dasein has fallen into. But it also has a sense of rebirth or creation, the anticipatory resoluteness is the creation of a new praxis.\(^\text{109}\)

\[\text{Diese eigentliche Erschlossenheit modifiziert aber dann gleichursprünglich die in ihr fundierte Entdecktheit der ‘Welt’ und die erschlossenheit des Mitdaseins der Anderen. Die zuhandene ‘Welt’ wird nicht ‘inhaltlich’ eine andere, der Kreis der Anderen wird nicht ausgewechselt. (SZ, 297-8 §60)}\]

What the resolute projection modifies is not the content of the world of entities or the people it deals with, what changes is the manner these are uncovered and disclosed. It is the understanding of the equipment and other Dasein that changes. This is not a random change from one convention to another, but a change into a new understanding praxis.

We can illustrate this by elaborating on the example of the scientist above. A scientist whose projection conformed to anticipatory resoluteness would be a scientist who as prepared for anxiety would face the discovery that rules and conventions he operates within are just conventions and do not represent ultimate truths, which means he is free to project himself into his own possibilities; who as reticence would not pass the conventions along; who as a projection would accept his being-guilty and take responsibility for falling into the tradition by projecting himself into his own possibility instead of those provided by the tradition; and in this manner he would be anticipating his ownmost possibility of death, i.e., he would be projecting into his ownmost possibility of new praxis that is different from the tradition. The difference is similar to the difference between practicing science within a paradigm and

\(^\text{109}\) The model for this construction is not Kierkegaard, but Nietzsche. Anxiety is Heidegger’s version of Nietzsche’s death of God while anticipatory resoluteness corresponds to the creation of new values. God’s death does of course not mean the death of an actual God (that would make no sense firstly because if one believes in such it goes against the very conception of God as eternal and omnipotent and secondly because Nietzsche was an atheist) but death of God as a symbol of absolute authority giving meaning to our lives and praxises: “Was taten wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne loskettelten? Wohin bewegt sie sich nun? Wohin bewegen wir uns? Fort von allen Sonnen? Stürzen wir nicht fortwährend? Und rückwärts, seitwärts, vervärts, nach allen Seiten?” When the sun (God) is cut off from the earth (social praxis) there is noting that gives any direction any more, nothing the leads us towards ‘this’ instead of ‘that’ and this is what is revealed in anxiety as well. Further in the same passage Nietzsche asks: “Ich nicht die Größe dieser Tat zu groß für uns? Müssen wir nicht selber zu Götern werden, um nur ihrer würdig zu erscheinen?” Killing God is tantamount to realizing that he is dead, to be worthy of such a deed one needs to become Gods, that is create new values. As we have seen Heidegger’s concept of facing anxiety revolves around the same. Friedrich Nietzsche (1977a). “Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft” Werke in drei Bänden, p. 127 §125.
creating that paradigm. Between adhering to a set of conventions and problem fields and creating those problems fields and the accepted ways of behaving within them (standards, conventions, rules).\textsuperscript{110} Within this context of science Heidegger himself describes the same movement thusly: “Die eigentliche ‘Bewegung’ der Wissenschaften spielt sich ab in der mehr oder minder radikalen und ihr seelbst nicht durchsichtigen Revision der Grundbegriffe” (SZ, 9 §3). The authentic movement of the sciences is the revision of its basic concepts. As we have witnessed in Chapter 2.2 these concepts are what leads the investigation of entities; if one changes these, the investigation, i.e., the praxis, changes.

This interpretation is not uncontroversial so I will briefly consider some objections and alternative interpretations. One could argue that it in the change from authentic to inauthentic it is only Dasein’s perspective on itself that changes not any correlated praxis. This, I believe, is Richardson’s view. First it must be made clear that he differentiates between two types of authenticity. The existential authenticity, being- unto-death, is seen as the condition of possibility for the existentiell authenticity which is to supplement a lack (\textit{Mangel}) in the former by attesting to it (SZ, 260 §52). I believe he is correct in this, so far I have only been tracking the existentiell understanding and it is with regard to this that our interpretations clash. About the existentiell authenticity Richards claims that: “The achievement of authenticity for There-being is not, of course, a suppression of its finitude. On the contrary. It simply consists in accepting its self for what it is: a drive-towards-Being that is constitutionally limited.”\textsuperscript{111} Authenticity on this view amounts to Dasein accepting the finite nature of its human understanding. This conception is insufficient for two reasons. Firstly because he seems to think that this acceptance involves that one is “willing to accept the disposition corresponding to such a comprehension, sc. anxiety”.\textsuperscript{112} But as we have seen anticipatory resoluteness means facing what anxiety reveals, not lingering in it. This has to be so because resolute Dasein projects while this is not possible in anxiety because all possibilities have lost their relevance. As Heidegger says: “Auch der Entsclüß bleibt auf das Man und seine Welt angewiesen” (SZ, 299 §60).\textsuperscript{113} Perhaps our interpretation is harsh,

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\textsuperscript{110} And this doesn’t have to be within science. It could just as easily be a description of any type of activity where someone steps beyond the conventions and creates new ways of doing things. To have an authentic understanding would be the same as to be a game changer, a genius a paradigm creator.

\textsuperscript{111} William J. Richardson (2003). \textit{Through Phenomenology to Thought}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 83.

\textsuperscript{113} One could also see this as an objection to my interpretation. The resolute Dasein cannot be creating a new praxis because it finds itself within the reach of the understanding of das Man. But, this quote, I think merely refers to that even if resolute Dasein creates a new praxis; it is still surrounded by other forms of praxis which it did not create. Or perhaps better, since creating a praxis means setting it up, not upholding it, it is only natural that once the praxis is set up one is back in an inauthentic mode.
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Richardson’s phrasing could be seen as ambiguous (‘corresponding’ is imprecise at best) as to the issue whether anxiety is synchronous with the understanding; he does after all claim that Dasein “is not delivered from the referential dependence upon beings but only enjoys a transparency to itself in its situation.”114 But this only leads to the second problem. Richardson is careful in noting that Dasein ‘only’ is transparent and that it ‘simply’ accepts its finitude. He is particular in his wording about emphasising that there is nothing else then this change of perspective that is going on. But accepting ones finitude means projecting, and projecting is always into possibilities-to-be, i.e. into that for-the-sake-of-which Dasein is. And as we have seen these comes with a package of standards for social-practical behaviour. There are no abstract perspectives separated from social conventions and practical rules. A change in what guides the projection also changes the praxis. Truly accepting ones finitude consist in the realisation that the social conventions and practical rules are conventional, and as said before this realization is not thematic, but acting, and the only possible action that would manifest this realization is setting up the standards for a new praxis.

Let us try to make this latter point a bit clearer: As resolute Dasein projects into its own possibility, this is an understanding of Dasein’s wholeness. How can that be so? This is so because Dasein’s wholeness is its finitude (Endlichkeit). What kind of finitude is this? Even though human beings are both spatially and temporally finite in extension this is not the type Heidegger refers to. Nor is it meant the epistemic finitude of our cognitive powers that Kant illustrates in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft when he says we cannot know the thing in itself (Ding an sich), only the object construed by our understanding. Finitude, for Heidegger, is on an ontological level. Being finite means not being fully present; Dasein’s finitude means that there is a negativity in its being. This character of not being fully present, or negativity, is what is made apparent in anxiety. As we have seen, in anxiety Dasein is unheimlich, i.e., it is always projecting itself away from itself (home) towards its possibility. It isn’t present (home), but projecting away, thus leaving a nothing. Projecting always means projecting into future possibilities, which again means having an understanding of time. Not being fully present means being temporal. If Dasein’s being was infinite presence there would be no need for projecting, everything would be understood. But, to understand Dasein needs to project, it always already finds itself as projected and what it finds itself projecting into is the possibilities of das Man. From this can be seen the characters that make up Dasein’s finite

being: (1) existence as being-ahead-of-itself (Sich-worweg-sein) in projecting; (2) thrownness as always already finding itself (schon-sein-in) projecting; and (3) falling as being alongside (Sein-bei) entities by projecting into the possibilities of das Man. Vital here is the aspect of falling. In the everyday, Dasein does not implicitly view itself as falling into “zufällige sich andrängende Möglichkeiten” (SZ, 264 §53), rather the possibilities appear natural and grounded. But a projection that does implicitly understand this is the one who creates a new praxis, by projecting into its own possibilities instead of appropriating the possibilities from das Man. By projecting into its own possibility it is implicitly saying that the possibilities provided for don’t have ultimate legitimacy, that they are merely conventional. An anticipatory resolute projection stands free “für die eigensten, vom Ende her bestimmten, das heißt als endliche verstandenen Möglichkeiten” (SZ, 264 §53). This is a finite understanding because it has an understanding of Dasein’s whole as finite.

A second interpretation I distance myself from is Gethmann’s who claims that “Das Begriffspaar ‘Eigentlichkeit /Uneigentlichkeit’ ... bezeichnet zwei methodische Stufen in der Explikation der Subjektivität, der Analytik des Daseins.” Clearly the methodological function of these concepts is important. As we already have sketched out (see end of Chapter 3.2) they serve a key purpose in laying free Dasein. But there are two reasons for this description not being sufficient. Firstly, authenticity can only have a methodological function because it refers to a real phenomenon, this I am sure Gethmann would agree on. Secondly, if it was a phenomenon that only was relevant in a methodological context there would be no need for claiming that the content of what resolute Dasein projects could not be determined.

The proper meaning of primordial, instead of identifying it with use-meaning as Dreyfus did, can then be found if we examine the German word itself. Ursprünglich, which is the adjective form Heidegger uses to describe understanding, directly translated means ‘springing from’ and it is commonly used in the expression Ursprung des Flusses ‘where the river springs from’. To underline this metaphor Heidegger also refers to primordial understanding as a source (Quelle) (SZ, 21 §6). What Heidegger means by primordial understanding is thus something akin to where intelligibility originally springs out or flows from. And as is

116 Heidegger, when he discusses the concept explicitly in §45, connects primordiality with wholeness and authenticity. Does this contradict my interpretation? No, it does not. First off all because he explicitly connects primordiality with creating. In the traditional understanding, the primordial is covered over, it “verlegt den Zugang zu den ursprünglichen ‘Quellen’, daraus die überlieferten Kategorien und Begriffe z. T. in echter Weise geschöpft wurden” (SZ, 21 §6). What the tradition covers is
apparent from the preceding discussion this is not ordinary use. But as we have seen Heidegger also calls use-understanding primordial, Dreyfus is correct in observing this. I would propose to read the term as a relative one. The primordiality of the use-intelligibility is only in relation to the intelligibility of the present-at-hand: The intelligibility of the latter springs out of the former because it is a derived form. Also the use-intelligibility has a source and this is the anticipatory resoluteness. The resolute projection creates forms of praxis which get codified into conventions and rules via the process of falling. When Heidegger says that: “Die Öffentlichkeit verdunkelt alles und gibt das so verdeckte als das Bekannte und jedem Zugängliche aus” (SZ, 127 §27), he means that the primordial creative understanding has been made accessible for everyone by codifying it into familiar rules. Everyday use is a levelled re-enactment of an earlier engagement with the primordial praxis-creating phenomena.

Where then is the relevance of this when it comes to Heidegger’s method? This can be seen if we draw a parallel between the history of downfall from a primordial understanding to a privative one and Heidegger’s description of the history of ontology. While in its inception ontology was focused on the question of being this question has now become forgotten and covered over. We are living in oblivion to being (Seinsvergessenheit). The ontological discussion of being is removed from the real phenomena of being and has its focus rather on the being of an innerworldly entity the present-at-hand. At the beginning of the history of philosophy, however, the question of being, and the creation of concepts to come to terms with this question, was very much alive with Plato and Aristotle. “Sie [die Frage] hat das Forschen von Plato und Aristoteles in Atem gehalten, um freilich auch von da an zu verstummern – als thematische Frage wirklicher Untersuchung” (SZ, 2 §1). The subsequent development is touched upon in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes where he says: “Das römische Denken übernimmt die griechischen Wörter ohne die entsprechende gleichursprüngliche Erfahrung dessen, was sie sagen, ohne das griechische Wort. Die Bodenlosigkeit des abenländischen Denkens beginnt mit diesem übersetzen.”117 With the translation of the Greek concepts into Latin we can see the same movement as we saw in

the primordial understanding that has created (geschöpft) the concepts and categories. Secondly, that Heidegger identifies the primordial understanding with wholeness and authenticity does not preclude that it also can be identified by being the source of intelligibility. As I have attempted to show, an authentic understanding creates a new praxis because it has an understanding of the whole of Dasein. This authentic understanding of Dasein’s whole creates a new intelligibility; that Heidegger identifies primordiality with an authentic understanding of Dasein’s whole should then only underscore my interpretation.

connection to idle talk. When the word gets used without the primordial understanding it
looses its primordial meaning. Thus instead of being ‘subject’ to questioning, ontological
terms such as substance, subject, and object are taken as being self-evident in their meaning:

Die Hierbei zu Herrschaft zu kommende Tradition macht zunächst und zumeist das, was sie
‘übergibt’, so wenig zugänglich, daß sie es vielmehr verdeckt. Sie überantwortet das
Überkommene der Selbstverständlichkeit und verlegt den Zugang zu den ursprünglichen
‘Quellen’, daraus die überlieferten Kategorien und Begriffe z. T. in echter Weise geschöpft
wurden. (SZ, 21 §6)

From what was once the primordial questioning of being all we have left is the dogma with
the character if self-evidentness which regulates the philosophical investigations. So the
situation for Heidegger is that he is surrounded by a philosophical understanding that is
passing on a self-evident dogma that blocks the primordial understanding of the things
themselves. Instead of asking the question of being the dogma in effect leads to the
perpetuation of a self-evident idea of being. When we examined Heidegger’s analysis of
Descartes, in Chapter 3.3, we saw that this idea was being as presence-at-hand. Directed by
the idea of presence-at-hand man’s being is found as a present-at-hand subject standing before
a present-at-hand object. This connection is also seen as so self-evident that the subject-object
relation is taken as an automatic starting point. Notice here two things. Firstly, that the
guiding idea forms a standard or measure for the investigation. Only if the subject’s being
conforms to the idea of being as presence-at-hand can it be accepted. Secondly, there seems to
be an apparent circularity in this set-up. The tradition ‘presupposes’ the presence-at-hand only
to find it later in man’s being.

Now within the modern enterprise of epistemology the subject as self-evident is
‘presupposed’, and with this as a starting point one tries to explain how it interacts with the
world of objects that surrounds it. The problem of this interpretation of man’s being is,
according to Heidegger, not the apparent circularity, but that it presupposes to little: “Nicht zu
viel, sondern zu wenig wird für die Ontologie des Daseins ‘vorausgesetzt’, wenn man von
einem weltlosen Ich ‘ausgeht’, um ihm dann ein Objekt und eine ontologisch grundlose
Beziehung zu diesem zu verschaffen” (SZ, 315-6 §63). Since this interpretation sees the
subject-object relation within the horizon of this guiding idea of being, i.e. as two present-at-

According to this interpretation then, that would mean that Descartes on Heidegger’s reading neither is reticent because he
passes the conventional self-evident understanding along nor prepared for anxiety because he projects into possibilities that
already are present in das Man.
hand entities, it doesn’t posses resources enough to solve the different versions of the same epistemological problem of the connection between the inner and the outer world (SZ, 60 §13). And because it is located within the confines of the aforementioned dogma it cannot see that the epistemological problem surfaces because of a lack of ontological questioning and therefore also an insufficient ontological description of both the relation and what it relates. This insufficiency stems from the fact that the idea which directs these investigations has been worked out from a region of innerworldly entities and not the things themselves, Dasein’s self-understanding.

What is required for an ontologically adequate description is an idea of man’s being which can direct the investigation and which is worked out from the things themselves and not transferred from another region of entities. What is this idea and where can it be found? The thing itself in question is Dasein’s being, what is needed is thus something that can direct the investigation towards this. Is there something that already is directing itself towards Dasein’s being? There is, and it is Dasein itself which always already has an understanding that is directed at itself; it is understanding itself by projecting into possibilities. Dasein already has an ontic understanding of its own being, but at the outset of the investigation it has no ontological clarity of what this being is. And when Dasein already has understood its own being “vermag dann die ontologische Interpretation anderes als ontisches Möglichkeiten (Weise des Seinkönnens) zugrundezulegen und diese auf ihre ontologische Möglichkeit zu entwerfen?” (SZ, 312 §63).

But what kind of ontic understanding can project us towards Dasein’s being? For it cannot be any kind of ontic projection. If the projection stem from the common sense of das Man and its realm of self-evident truths it will not suffice, but only continue the perpetuation of the dogma that block ontological investigations. The projection then cannot pass on the self-evident dogmas of the tradition. Instead it must realize that the dogma does not represent the truth and that it is possible to project oneself into other possibilities. The projection we are looking for must in this manner be both reticent and prepared for anxiety.

In addition this realization cannot be an ontological one, that would make the undertaking superfluous, in fact the realization cannot be a conscious experience or ‘a clear thought’ because those are not relations to Dasein’s own possibility-to-be (SZ, 145 §31). Rather it must already be projecting into a possibility that differs from the tradition and therefore can be said
to be uniquely its own. And doing so would include an acceptance of that one is ultimately responsible for falling into the tradition. The projection must then add the requirements of being an anticipatory projection upon its own being-guilty.

An ontic projection that confirms to all these requirements is the already aforementioned formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence. The formal indication is anticipatory resoluteness because it is a projection that, without ontological transparency (SZ, 313 §63), brakes with the tradition by revising its basic concepts and thus establishes a new praxis. The formal indication is an ontically ‘transparent’ projection, i.e., it has a full understanding of Dasein, that through the investigation will be concretely determined.

And if we are right about our interpretation of anticipatory resoluteness as the creation of a new form of praxis, the formal indication should also show sign of this, and it does. To make this apparent we have to go to §63. At this point the formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence has been de-formalized by finding Dasein’s authentic wholeness in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness (which we have described above). The analysis is by Heidegger given the characteristic of violence (Gewaltsamkeit) because it brakes with the everyday interpretation’s tendency to cover (Verdeckungstendenz) up Dasein’s primordiality. After noting this Heidegger subsequently asks what guides his interpretation: “Aber gibt es hierfür nicht je eine eigene Leitung und Regelung?” (SZ, 312 §63). The answer must be ‘no’ if he by that means guides and rules that can be picked up and applied; that would mean the same as appropriating an earlier dogmatic praxis. But why does he even ask? He asks because with the violent projection the interpretation bypasses all earlier rules, standards and conventions. The interpretation can’t be measured from out of the old standards precisely because it brakes away from them. But the investigation does have something which structures it and guides it, but that is not rules, conventions or other self-evident principles taken from everyday understanding. Heidegger asks “Wo sind de Wegweiser für die Entwurfsrichtung, damit sie überhaupt auf das Sein treffe?” (SZ, 312 §63). The guide is of course the formal indication.

It must also be added that even if the revision is a break with the tradition, it does not represent any creatio ex nihilo; it rather consists in a retrieval of possibilities “aus dem Erbe, das sie als geworfene übernimmt” (SZ, 383 §74). For Heidegger the revision of the basic concepts can only be done on the background of the destruction of the philosophical tradition. Remember, as we saw in Chapter 2.1, that the initial methodological description was made on the background of retrieving the possibilities in the tradition by a destructive reading. So even if anticipatory resoluteness is an ownmost projection it is still situated historically: “Die eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit versteht die Geschichte als die ‘Wiederkehr’ des Möglichen und weiß darum, daß die Möglichkeit nur wierkehr, wenn die Existenz schicksalhaft-augenblicklich für sie in der entschlossenen Wiederholungen offen ist” (SZ, 391-2 §75). And it must be so because if not, then the revision of the basic concept would only translate into an individual changing his praxis.

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And it sets up a standard of validity for the investigation. We have already encountered this, in Chapter 2.3 as the criteria for ontological description where we said that if we in our descriptions are to avoid ontological fabrications and ontic imposition on the phenomena the phenomenologist must elucidate how the phenomenon in question is presented in Dasein’s being i.e. in its self-understanding:

Woher nimmt sie [die Interpretation] den Leitfaden, wenn nicht aus einer ‘vorausgesetzten’ Idee von Existenz überhaupt? Wodurch regelten sich die Schritte der Analyse der uneigentlichen Alltäglichkeit, es sei den durch den angesetzten Existenzbegriff? ... Ist nich schon alles, wenngleich dämmerig, erhellt durch das Licht der ‘vorausgesetzten’ Existenzidee? (SZ, 313 §63)

The formal indication is anticipatory resoluteness because it sets up a new praxis through creating a new standard of validity that gives direction to the investigation. But, if this is correct doesn’t this mean that what guides the investigation towards the authentic and whole Dasein must itself be a projection of anticipatory resoluteness. This ‘insight’ forms the basis for the circular argument (Zirkeleinwand) against Heidegger’s undertaking: “die Idee der Existenz und des Seins überhaupt wird ‘vorausgesetzt’ und ‘darnach’ das Dasein interpretiert, um daraus die Idee des Seins zu gewinnen” (SZ, 314 §63). Heidegger brushes this objection away in three steps. Firstly, by saying that the circle is a character of the understanding one cannot avoid and therefore is apparent in other ontologies as well. The difference between Heidegger’s ontology and the subject-object ontology is not that only the former ‘presupposes’, they both do, but that the latter can’t adequately show how man interacts with his world. Secondly, Heidegger observes that the objection can only be valid if the procedure is seen as a deduction, but his investigation is not engaged in deductively proving but in letting being be seen. Thirdly, by claiming that it is through the “ausbildende Interpretation das Auszulegende gerade erst selbst zu Wort kommen last” (SZ, 314-5 §63). It is the only way of letting being speak.

At last we can see how this relates to the issue of application. In the case of normal everyday coping with equipment, Dasein has always already fallen into a set of standards for practical-social behaviour. More specifically, the role, the for-the-sake-of-which Dasein is, is taken from das Man. A carpenter doesn’t need to invent the role of carpenter; he falls into it as a possibility already developed. In normal everyday coping Dasein follows the standards that comes with the role it takes up (Dasein could also break them, but that would only confirm
that they were led by these standards). There is a correct way of holding a hammer; there is a correct way of hammering. In this sense one can speak of a praxis as the manifestation of the application of such standards. The standards manifest themselves through the praxis of them, even a faulty praxis such as erroneous hand-writing is led by the same standard as the correct one, just not in a successful way.

When it comes to the instrumental method, which is also a praxis, the case is no different; the same application of standards can be found here. We can also observe that the standards are appropriated. Take the example of how the instrumental method figures in Descartes’ work. The methodological principles are established in advance and do not change under the investigation. The reason for this is that they are viewed as present-at-hand, as something that remains the same through-out, their ‘eternal’ character has already been found. As we have seen it is the guiding idea of presence-at-hand that plays a role in determining these principles and this idea is taken over from the tradition in an analogue way to how we saw for everyday praxeses.

In both the everyday understanding and the instrumental method the primordial understanding has been covered up. Two aspects of this cover up deserve special attention. Firstly, the standards which are taken over appear anchored, whilst in reality they are only conventions and can be changed. That Dasein has the possibility to project itself from itself, to challenge the standards of das Man instead of appropriating them, is what is revealed in anxiety. But, as Heidegger says: “Die Angst bringt nur die Stimmung eines möglichen Entschlusses” (SZ, 344 §68b). So he needs another phenomenon to show how this projection is made. This is described as anticipatory resoluteness where a new praxis is created by a revision of the basic concepts of that praxis. In the special case of Heidegger’s method this revision involves breaking loose from the ontology of the presence-of-hand by way formally indicating Dasein’s being as existence; a move which sets up a standard of the validity for ontological descriptions. So, instead of applying rules that stem from das Man or the tradition, the resolute Dasein creates them.

Does this mean that Heidegger bypasses the equivalent of the application part of the instrumental method? As we have seen, the formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence does provide a standard to follow, but it is a different kind of standard. This leads us to the second aspect of the cover-up understanding, within das Man the standards are rigid, they
don’t change. Application in this sense means following a standard that is already determined. In distinction to this, the guiding idea of Heidegger’s method is itself not fully determined, but it is in the process of determination, going from the formal to the concrete. In this way there can never be a pure application of pre-determined rules because the guiding rule-giving idea is not concretely determined. The relationship between principle and application is a circular one where the application changes the principle, not randomly, but towards a concrete determination.

From this we can take up the thread, from the end of Chapter 3.3, concerning knowledge, and see how the laying free of Dasein in its transparency is connected to the circularity of the path towards this description. As we saw the description of Dasein was not supposed to capture Dasein in its properties, but lay it free in its way of being, in its possibility-to-be. But to lay it free transparently could not be done only on the basis of showing how Dasein is in the mode of everydayness. As das Man Dasein does not have an understanding of itself as fallen into social-practical conventions. Instead it understands itself from the possibilities provided by das Man, and thus its self-understanding does not reveal any understanding of the fact that these possibilities are conventional, man-made and can be changed. Put succinctly, it does not have a full understanding of itself. As we saw in Chapter 3.3, in anxiety it is revealed *that* Dasein can project itself into its own possibility; and with the description of anticipatory resoluteness Heidegger has described *how* this can be done. Anticipatory resoluteness is a projection that has a full understanding of Dasein’s being, i.e., an understanding of its whole being, because it sets up a new standard and thus implicitly understands that the conventions it has fallen into are just conventions.

In order to describe this possibility Heidegger has had to formally indicate Dasein’s being as existence. He has had to set a new standard for ontological descriptions, because the paradigm of the presence-at-hand ontology would only have directed him towards the present-at-hand properties of Dasein and not its possibilities-to-be. This means that the ontic condition for an ontological description is that the understanding of the describer is anticipatory resolute. Or as Heidegger says it: “Die existenziale Analytik ... ist letztlich existenziell d. h. ontisch verwurzelt” (SZ, 13 §4). The phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness is a description of the investigator himself. This brings the circular character of the investigation to the fore; the description is a description of that which describes. The investigation goes in a circular fashion from an ontic ‘transparency’ (a full self-understanding that *is not* explicitly described)
towards an ontological transparency (a full self-understanding which is explicitly described).\textsuperscript{120}

But we would have misunderstood the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness if we claim, as we have done so far, that it only sets up a standard. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, because only revising the concept will not represent an improvement vis-à-vis the ontology of presence-at-hand. To avoid being free-floating constructs the revisions can only be made with a view to the things themselves. In Chapter 3.3 we saw that both the formal indication and the search for a manner of access were led by the things themselves in order to further determine Dasein’s being. The standard must have something that leads it. Secondly, setting up a standard can not be understood as an abstract act. The standard of the praxis cannot be separated from that praxis; it only is as part of the praxis. The resolute investigator is already acting and is already letting the standard guide him towards a continuing determination of its own standard. The formal indication can be seen as the setting of the standard and the search for a manner of access is that which further determines it. The investigation is thus a continued reworking of the basic concept we are witnessing when we see the formal indication become deformalized. The investigator is being guided by an idea that is changing by being determined. For Heidegger the investigator is essentially a questioner (\textit{Fragende}) that questions the self-evident characterizations provided by the public opinion and the tradition in order to determine the structure of its own being. What the questioner is making transparent is the being of the questioner: “Nur wenn das philosophisch-forschende Fragen selbst als Seinsmöglichkeit des je existierenden Daseins existenziell ergriffen ist, besteht die Möglichkeit einer Erschließung der Existenzialität der Existenz” (SZ, 13 §4). It is only by making the understanding of the questioner who continually revises the basic concepts that we reach the possibility of a determination of Dasein’s being because the questioner represents a praxis that have an understanding of the whole of Dasein. In the following chapter we will see what the implications of this are for Heidegger’s view of philosophical knowledge.

\textsuperscript{120} Beware that Heidegger, by letting this character of possibility be shown, has not made Dasein ontologically transparent. That requires a further determination of what makes this understanding possible that Heidegger will find by looking closer at the time-aspect of this understanding.
3.5 The Result

What we have found so far, as we anticipated from out of the quotes where Heidegger distanced his philosophy from a technical handling, was that the investigation’s ‘attitude’ towards the object it studies is radically different from the instrumental method. In Chapter 3.2 we saw that Heidegger’s manner of defining Dasein’s being was not to capture it in its actual properties in order to control it, but to lay it free in its possibility-to-be. Chapter 3.3 showed that Heidegger’s method was not determined in advance but rather worked out through the investigation in a circular manner where the object of the investigation, being and its structures, directed the investigation. And in Chapter 3.4 we looked at why Heidegger’s method cannot be an application of rules in the same way as in the instrumental method because the principles to be applied are the same that undergo determination. For Heidegger phenomenology becomes the activity of finding the method in order to further determine an answer it already has. This marks a stark contrast contra the instrumental view of the method which, as both determined in advance and based on rule-application, leads to a result of control. If the method, in addition to having a fundamentally circular structure, does not aim for a type of control over its object, what then is the character of the result of the investigation? During the last two chapters we also further specified what laying free in its possibility-to-be means. Because Dasein, since it appropriates the roles, conventions and rules of das Man without seeing them as merely conventional and man-made, doesn’t have a full understanding of its own being, the investigation has to look for an ontic possibility that manifests Dasein’s understanding of its own self in order to be able to characterize the ontological conditions for this understanding. Heidegger calls this understanding anticipatory resoluteness which is a projection into a new praxis by continually reworking the standard that guides this praxis in light of the things themselves. That anticipatory resoluteness also characterizes the understanding of the investigator reveals more clearly the circular relationship between the description and the path towards the description. But so far we have not explicitly drawn out the consequences of this for Heidegger’s view of philosophical knowledge.

Now, if we look back to chapter 3.1 we saw that the obtaining a result, knowledge, forms a central part of the instrumental view of the method. There the method is seen as a means to acquiring a result. The method itself is subservient to providing an outcome. What I will try to
show is that in contradistinction to this Heidegger’s method does not function as a means, rather it must be seen as part of the end. We have finally come to the point where we can show that philosophical knowledge is not a theoretical holding of an object, but a practical activity. The picture of knowledge that emerges is one of a continuing questioning of being.

If one asks about a result in the context of *Sein und Zeit* the most obvious point to make is that the work does not provide one because it was never finished. Originally planned as a two-part work consisting each of three divisions, only the two first divisions were published, the third never reached the public’s eye. Heidegger never got to the point where he could elaborate time as the meaning of being as was the plan, the work ends after showing how temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is the meaning of Dasein’s being, and the ensuing discussion of the ramifications of this for historicity and the normal understanding of time. But one should not simply, based on this, take the lack of result due to the unfinished state of the work for a lack of intended result.

Heidegger does talk of results repeatedly underways in the investigation. In certain instances he does stop and reflect, for example, on: “Die ontologisch relevante Ergebnis der vorstehender Analyse” (SZ, 126 §27). But what does such talk reveal? What is here meant by result (*Ergebnis*)? More revealing than the aforementioned passage as to the meaning of result comes perhaps from §45 where, at the threshold of Division Two, Heidegger looks back on what has been brought forth in the preceding analysis. The title of the paragraph reads: “Das Ergebnis der vorbereitenden Fundamentalanalyse des Daseins und die Aufgabe einer ursprünglichen existenzialen Interpretation dieses Seienden” (SZ, 231 §45). The obvious thing to point out is that the result which has been achieved is only preparatory (*vorbereitende*), and not final in any way. We have briefly touched upon this preparatory character repeatedly in this thesis, lastly in Chapter 3.3 where we saw it in connection with the circular character of the method. The descriptions of Dasein’s being, the existentials, are not complete until the end of the investigation: “Erst wenn die Grundstrukturen des Daseins in expliziter Orientierung am Seinsproblem selbst zureichend herausgearbeitet sind, wird der bisherige Gewinn der Daseinsanalytik seine existenziale Rechtfertigung erhalten” (SZ, 16 §5).

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121 In a footnote at the very beginning of *Grundprobleme* Heidegger does however mention that this work is the “Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnitts des I. Teiles von ‘Sein und Zeit’.” Something which would indicate that he indeed worked on a draft (why else would Heidegger call this version be new?) that never was published. Martin Heidegger (1975). *Gesamtausgabe Band 24: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 1. Grondin corroborates this as he speaks of the “anscheinend sofort verbrannten 3. Teil”. Jean Grondin (2007). *Die Wiedererweckung der Seinsfrage* Klassiker Auslegen: Martin Heidegger - Sein und Zeit, 17.
Only when the problem of being as such has been addressed can the existential structure that has been found be legitimized.

In this manner, even if the character of the investigation is circular, it doesn’t mean that it is only ‘going in circle’ as in going nowhere; it has a clear sense of direction, as Gethmann points out: “Vielmehr erfolgt der methodische Fortgang in einer Art Spiralbewegung.” The investigation shall, from the formal and vague, spirally centre in on the concrete. Heidegger first formally indicates Dasein’s being as existence. Then he analyses the everyday understanding to further determine the meaning of Dasein’s being as care. This is used as a starting point to analyze the authentic resolute Dasein and thereby achieve the further determination of Dasein’s being as temporality. In this process the formal indication of Dasein’s being of existence comes to a more concrete form as care and temporality through a process of more primordial interpretations. Finally the notion of temporality is itself supposed to lead to a determination of time as the meaning of being, a step Heidegger never gets to complete, but that would have given the earlier results their full justification.

Heidegger is aware, however, that this circular and preparatory nature of the investigation is something that lends itself to being questioned as to whether there in fact can be found an ultimate ending point:

> Jede Untersuchung in diesem Felde, wo ‘die Sache selbst tief eingehüllt ist’, wird sich von einer Überschätzung ihrer Ergebnisse freihalten. Denn solches Fragen zwingt sich ständig selbst vor die Möglichkeit der Erschließung eines noch ursprünglicheren universalen Horizontes, daraus die Antwort auf die Frage: was heißt ‘Sein’? geschöpft werden könnte. (SZ, 26-7 §6)

From this passage it seems as if Heidegger faces the consequences of the circular character of the method; the possibility can always remain for discovering more primordial horizons of interpretations. But, bar the possibility of a more primordial horizon, the method already has an anticipation of the end. When it comes to Dasein’s being this is anticipated in the formal indication of existence, but Heidegger’s investigation aims for more than the meaning of Dasein’s being, it also has the intention of conceptualising the meaning of being itself. And this is of course, already in the short preface, also given a formal indication: “Die interpretation der Zeit als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seinsverständnisses

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The meaning of being is from the beginning indicated as time.

This anticipation clearly contrasts with what we have described as the instrumental method. One could claim that since, for Heidegger, the result is already presupposed then the method cannot be said to be a means to attain it. But this argument doesn’t seem to be correct. Think of the way that having a guiding idea of a house before we build it doesn’t make the building process non-instrumental to the house. In fact, because of the role of anticipation, this example of house building is somewhat similar to the way Heidegger’s investigation proceeds. First the end is given formally (plan or idea of a house), then one finds the appropriate means (hammer, nails, wood), which are applied (constructing) to achieve the concrete end (the actual house). This anticipation is found in every understanding; in light of this and the way we, in Chapter 3.3, saw how investigations in general are directed it also becomes clear that the instrumental method as we have sketched it in Chapter 3.1 is seriously flawed. It also has to have some anticipation of what the result it is going to be, some leading idea of the being of the entity (and thus also of being) that guides it if it is going to work. For it to comply with Heidegger’s conception of how the understanding works it has to be amended. The same schema can be set up for it as for the house building: First the end is given formally (being of an entity as presence-at-hand), then one finds the appropriate means (knowing, and the principles for conducting it), which are applied (used to access entities) to achieve the concrete end (the concrete determination of the entity in its presence-at-hand).

But there are some crucial differences between the instrumental house building and the instrumental method on the one side and Heidegger’s method on the other. For the builder, if he isn’t the first one (the creator), he has a set of practices that the idea of house building already conveys. He doesn’t need to ponder what equipment or materials to use: “Im Werk liegt zugleich die Verweisung auf ‘Materialen’” (SZ, 70 §15). And this isn’t something the builder has discovered by himself; rather it is appropriated from das Man (SZ, 129 §27). The

123 The role anticipation plays in Heidegger’s philosophy can be seen as an alternative to Socrates’ answer to Meno’s paradox: “How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?” Plato (1997). "Meno". In Cooper (Ed.), Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, p. 880, 80d. Socrates suggested answer is built on the premise of the immortal soul: “if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present – that is, what you do not recollect.” Ibid., p. 886, 86b. Because our soul is immortal and has learned infinitely it already knows what we are searching for, we only have to recollect it. That we can learn something new is conditioned on the infinity character of our soul. For Heidegger, by contrast, it is the finitude of human understanding that make us project into possibilities and anticipate the object.
same is the case for the instrumental method; the guiding idea (presence-at-hand) comes
together with a manner of access to the entity (knowing). As we saw in the case of Descartes
this is already decided upon: “Unter der ungebrochenen Vorherrschaft der traditionellen
Ontologie ist über die echte Erfassungsart des eigentlichen Seienden im vornehin
entschieden” (SZ, 96 §21).124

There are three differences here compared to Heidegger. Firstly the guiding idea is not
appropriated from the tradition, but created in the formal indication of Dasein’s being as
existence. Secondly, the means of the method are not self-evident, but have to be worked out,
as we saw in Chapter 3.3, through a process of deliberation. The guiding idea does not specify
a manner of access in the same way as the ontology of presence-at-hand does with respect to
knowing, but it does direct towards Dasein’s understanding of being. Thirdly, there is a
feedback in the application of the method; the manner of access is supposed to lead us to a
further determination of the guiding idea of the investigation.

The most important of these differences, in this context, is the last one, because it reveals
another type of circularity than the anticipation. It isn’t the circular character understood as
the anticipation of the object that is the main difference between the instrumental method and
Heidegger’ method when it comes to the issue of result; the anticipation is a staple of all
understanding. Instead it is the circularity of the path of the guiding concept that provides the
difference. In the instrumental method, even if there is an anticipation of the end in the
guiding concept, there is a linear development from the guiding idea via the means toward the
end result. In Heidegger’s method however the application of the method does not lead to an
external result, but to a specification of the guiding idea. The method does not lead to a result
that is different from itself. The result is nothing but the improvement of the method. The
method then seizes to function as a means to an end and can therefore not be seen as
subordinate to the end either.

This connection between the means and the end can also be seen by looking at what in my
mind seems to be the central description Heidegger gives of what the result of the
investigation means:

124 The difference here between the house building and the instrumental method is that the guiding idea of the former is more
concrete (a house), but it nonetheless carries with it an idea of the being of the entity (the house as equipment, that it is
something in order to (Um-zu) live in) and with this also an idea of the being as well.
Weil das Sein je nur aus dem Hinblick auf Zeit faßbar wird, kann die Antwort auf die Seinsfrage nicht in einem isolierten und blinden Satz liegen. Die Antwort ist nicht begriffen im Nachsagen dessen, was sie satzmäßig aussagt, zumal wenn sie als freischwebendes Resultat für eine bloße Kenntnisnahme eines von der bisherigen Behandlungsart vielleicht abweichenden ‘Standpunktes’ weitergereicht wird. … Die Antwort gibt ihrem eigensten Sinne nach eine Anweisung für die konkrete ontologische Forschung, innerhalb des freigelegten Horizontes mit dem untersuchenden Fragen zu beginnen – und sie gibt nur das. (SZ, 19 §5)

This passage reveals several interesting bits of information worth elaborating. Heidegger starts with a claim whose meaning, on the face of it, is not self-evident. He says that the answer to the question of the meaning of being cannot lie in an isolated sentence because being is only grasped with respect to time. What would that sentence be? It would of course be ‘time is the meaning of being’. As we can see this is not a lucid definition unless we get a clarification that specifies the meaning of the terms ‘being’, ‘time’ and ‘meaning’ itself. But that we have to go outside of the sentence to understand it holds for every sentence. Heidegger seems to be saying something different. He is not merely making the holistic claim that the answer cannot be understood in isolation; he is saying that this is so because being is only grasped with respect to time. For Heidegger, understanding of being also means having an understanding of time. This can clearly be seen, to use an example we have fresh in mind, in the function of anticipation. When building a house we already have an anticipation of the future house we are building; understanding as projecting is an understanding of the future. But this alone does not explain Heidegger’s reasoning in the above quote; he is here speaking not of a general understanding (verstehen), but of grasping (fassen). In order to understand his claim we must recall that we in Chapter 3.2 saw that defining being (or Dasein’s being) is connected to time. Defining Dasein’s being meant laying it free in its possibility and this opened up a different time-aspect with regard to defining. Laying it free in its possibility does not mean that we are aiming for a definition of the actual property of an entity understood as that which is left through all variations and mutations, that which always remains, the eternal aspect of the entity (SZ, 92 §19). Instead, defining being means to lay it free in its future possibility. For Heidegger there is a difference between defining entities in their eternally present actuality and being in its future possibility. That being is only graspable with respect

125 More correct, perhaps would be to say that Temporality is indicated as the meaning of being. (SZ, 19 §5) But Heidegger never clarifies what the difference between time (Zeit) and temporality (Temporality). There is however a clear difference between Temporality and Zeitlichkeit, something the Macquarrie & Robinson translation confuses by translating both as ‘temporality’. The former is the meaning of being, the latter the meaning of Dasein’s being.
to time should more specifically say that it is only graspable if we understood it, not as something present-at-hand, but as a possibility. As we saw the answer to the question of being is already indicated: ‘time is the meaning of being’. If we see this answer as a description of an entity we would have misunderstood it. The only way of understanding it as being and not as an entity is to understand it as a possibility. How can this be done? We have to let the answer function as a possibility we can project into, where it guides us towards further investigations. “Das Verständnis der Phänomenologie liegt einzig im Ergreifen ihrer als Möglichkeit” (SZ, 38 §7c). This holds not only for the start of the investigation, but throughout. If we, on the path from ontic ‘transparency’ towards ontological transparency, understand the preparatory findings as present-at-hand properties instead of as revisions of the basic concept that guides the investigation (existence – care – temporality) we will effectively have stopped the investigation. What is needed to understand being is not a theoretical holding on to, a knowing, of properties, but projecting into a possibility-to-be in a such a manner that “die Antwort auf die Seinsfrage zur Leitfadenanweisung für die Forschung wird” (SZ, 19 §5).126 Thereby it also becomes understandable that Heidegger, in the quoted passage, further says that the answer is misunderstood if it is taken as a standpoint divorced from the method (Behandlungsart). If we understand the answer theoretically as divorced from the method we are not letting it guide us. Instead the result has to be seen in connection with the method. As we have remarked, the method and the result are intertwined; they stand in a circular relationship towards each other. The application of the method leads to a determination of that which leads the investigation. When the end result, then, has no value standing alone the method cannot be a mere means. The same point about circularity is brought up in last point of the quoted passage. It concerns the very end of the investigation, but Heidegger doesn’t here speak of a final end point. Instead he says that the answer will only give impetus to further questioning. When we don’t have a final end point the investigation cannot be seen as having a static means-end relation, instead the relation between them is circular. So even if Heidegger’s method anticipates the end, this doesn’t mean the method will ever reach an end conceived of as final.

Therefore, when the investigation doesn’t end in any grasping of a fact or a sentence, when there is only the investigation conceived of as a circular undertaking, then if one can speak of

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126 Heidegger is in this quote referring to the answer as concretely determined and saying that this should lead the further investigation. But he might as well have said this about the formal indication that lies in the formal answer at the start of the investigation.
knowledge at all it must be connected to the understanding of the method. And Heidegger does in fact call this ‘knowledge’: “Dieses ‘Wissen’ aber ist kein Entdeckthaben einer Tatsache, sondern das Sichhalten in einer existenziellen Möglichkeit” (SZ, 336 §68a). As we repeatedly have mentioned this existentiell possibility which we project into cannot be any kind of possibility. In the everyday Dasein is trapped in the ontically insufficient understanding of das Man and the ontologically insufficient interpretations of the tradition. In order to brake out of these Dasein has to be anticipatory resolute. Anticipatory resoluteness means taking on the role of questioner; where this is meant in the specific sense of revising the foundation for one’s own praxis by questioning it, and thus create a new praxis. Knowledge, then, for Heidegger, amounts to projecting as anticipatory resolute. As Heidegger says in the Grundprobleme: “Es geht nicht darum Philosophieren zu kennen, sondern philosophieren zu können.”127

The point is not to get more ‘facts’ to know, but to change how one acts; to go from taking the roles, conventions and rules as set into questioning them. This is not done by stating (nachsagen) that we are going to question, by thinking it (andenken), or by experiencing it, but by projecting into the possibility of questioning. This can be also be seen from Heidegger’s intended relation towards his reader: In §26 Heidegger describes two border case possible ways one can comport oneself to others, one can either leap in (einspringen) for the other or leap ahead (vorausspringen) of the other. The former involves taking over that which is to be done (was zu besorgen ist) so that the other is left with a finished product or without anything to do. The second possibility concerns, not a taking over, but a giving back, and what is given is no thing, but the possibility of the other’s existential freedom: “Diese Fürsorge, die wesentlich die eigentliche Sorge – das heißt die Existenz des Anderen betrifft und nicht ein Was, das er besorgt, verhilft dem Anderen dazu, in seiner Sorge sich durchsichtig und für sie frei zu werden” (SZ, 122 §26). Here Heidegger describes a type of soliciting that is aimed at the other’s existence, i.e. the other’s self-understanding. What kind of relation could this be? I think this passage can be read as a programmatic statement of the aim of the work with respect to its relationship with the reader. As we have seen Heidegger wants to make Dasein transparent (durchsichtig) for itself. This means to elucidate, or make explicit, an understanding of Dasein’s being as a wholeness that Dasein already has implicitly. But from this passage it becomes evident that even if an ontologically transparent account of

Dasein’s being was given, it would not be enough to make the other Dasein transparent, it could only help (*verhelfen*) the other to make itself transparent.¹²⁸ To achieve transparency therefore it is not enough to merely know a concept and recite an ontological description as a fact like any other. As Granberg says: “it is the philosophizing individual who is left the task of actualizing the concept and its content.”¹²⁹ Better, perhaps, than this Aristotelian phrasing is to say that Dasein has to ontically fulfil (*vollziehen*) the content of the description. The avoidance of an Aristotelian terminology in this instance is important because an actualization for Aristotle is always of a latent potential, (the tree is the actualization of the seeds potential for growth) whilst for Heidegger the fulfilment consists in going beyond the actual entity by projecting into a possibility.¹³⁰

In this way Heidegger’s conceptuality must be seen as related to Søren Kierkegaard’s indirect communication (*Indirekte Meddelelse*). For Kierkegaard one does not become a true Christian and exist authentically by being in possession of a certain type of knowledge (“at faae paa et enkelt Punkt maaske Noget at vide”¹³¹), the matter is rather one of gaining a special relation with oneself in front of God. It is the ‘how’ of this self-relation that is important, not the specific ‘what’ one either does or knows. The task then for the author who wishes to inform the public of how one can exist authentically is to lead the attention away from the pursuit of the ‘what’ of knowledge and towards the ‘how’ of the individual’s self-relation. For both Kierkegaard and Heidegger philosophical communication does not revolve around giving the readers more to know (about entities), but in shifting the focus of what is communicated from the ‘what’ to the ‘how.’¹³²

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¹²⁸ This role of a helping solicitude is later described as the other’s ‘conscience’ (*Gewissen*): “Das entschlossene Dasein kann zum ‘Gewissen’ der Anderen werden. Aus dem eigentlichen Selbstsein der Entschlossenheit entspringt allererst das eigentliche Miteinander” (SZ, 298 §60). Heidegger uses scare quotes to indicate the difference from conscience as a calling (*Ruf*) from Dasein itself. (SZ, 275 §57).


¹³⁰ Heidegger’s prioritization of the possible in relation to the actual (“Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit” (SZ, 38 §7c)) is related to his critique of the ontology of the present-at-hand for which eternal presence (which harbours no potential, but is fully actual) is the meaning of being.


¹³² The different strategies for not ‘providing knowledge’ are also worth a short review. Kierkegaard utilizes both irony as well as a wide repertoire of pseudonyms in order not to stand up as an authority figure for the reader and in this manner accentuate that existence is the concern of the individual, and cannot be taken over or ‘solved’ for you, as it were, by someone else. In contrast such textual trickery is absent in *SZ* which makes it more conservative in style. But at the same time, the preparatory (*vorbereitende*) and provisional (*vorläufige*) nature of the analysis makes it hard to base ‘one’s knowledge’ on this work. Further, for Kierkegaard “bliver det at kunne meddele tilsidst den Kunst at kunne fratage eller fremarre. ... Naar en Mand har faaet Munden saa fuld af Mad, at han af den Grund ikke kan komme til at spise, og det maa ende med han døer af Sult, bestaaer saa det at meddele ham Spise i at stoppe Munden endnu fuldere, eller ikke snarere i at see at faae lidt bort, for at han kan komme til at spise? Og saaledes ogsaa, naar en Mand er meget vidende, medens hans Viden ingen eller saa godt som ingen Betydning har for ham, bestaaer det ikke snarere i at fratage ham Noget?” *Ibid.*, p. 251. For Kierkegaard indirect communication is a manner of taking knowledge away from the other. This lack of knowledge will invite the other to see that he cannot base his salvation on knowledge due to its doubtability; it does not suffice to create a
What we are seeing here is a shift from a conception of philosophical knowledge as a theoretical holding on to, as in the ontic sciences, towards an understanding of it as a possibility, a *sein-können*. Philosophical knowledge is the willingness to question the foundational presuppositions of the tradition which we find ourselves part of. It is an investigative questioning that at the beginning has the answer to what it is looking for; it only needs to find the way to determine the method to reach a concrete determination of this. This might seem strange but as Schürmann have noted “to raise any question, is to look for some determinateness of that with which we are already familiar.” Philosophical knowledge then involves clarifying a transparency we already have.

It is an investigative praxis where instead of being indifferent towards the object, the object is rather an issue (*darum es geht*) for the investigator. Instead of a distance between towards the object, it is rather that which is closest ontically and which is to be brought ontologically closer. Instead of capturing the object it is about laying it free in its possibility. Instead of theoretically understanding the object, it has to be understood practically. The method thus is not inferior to the result, they must be seen as standing in a circular relationship with one another. There seems to be no end because there is always further questioning to be done. In fact the most important ‘end’ lies in the beginning, in starting with the right anticipation, in getting into the circle in the right way. “Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondern in ihm nach der rechten Weise hineinzukommen” (SZ, 153 §32). To enter the circle in the right way is to start the philosophical praxis of questioning.

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stable ground from where to make decisions. A decision therefore requires an unsupported leap of faith over 70,000 fathoms of water. An interesting parallel is where Heidegger lets it be seen what is revealed in anxiety, that norms, rules and conventions are contingent, not a secure ground to base one’s actions on. This revelation can either be fled from, meaning that one appropriate these conventions as if they were grounded, or faced, that is accepting the implications of the contingency of these praxises. The difference between the two is that for Kierkegaard the focus is on thematic knowledge, while for Heidegger with his ontological focus even the practical and social know-how lacks the security of a foundational grounding.

Chapter 4: Theoretical correction

To recapitulate, in Chapter 2 I argued that since Heidegger’s method is a path, that it stands in contrast to the pure theoretical gaze of knowing, and that it shares the same features as other practical understanding without attempting to abstract from these features, then Heidegger’s method must be practical. In Chapter 3 I argued that because Heidegger’s method only anticipates its end, instead of ending in any grasping of a fact, which only leaves the circular investigation, then, if one can speak of knowledge at all it must be connected to the understanding of the method, which can be characterized as continued questioning, a revision of the basic concepts.

By following these two paths in Heidegger’s thinking what we have found is not an exhaustive interpretation, but an interpretation that has managed to show, I hope, what it means for the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit to philosophise. Most importantly I think is that we have been able, not only to uncover that the formal indication of Dasein’s being as existence sets up a standard for ontological descriptions, but also to see that setting up a standard, as the creation of a new praxis is what philosophy is about. This opens up a range of questions, such as: ‘what is the relationship between Heidegger’s standard and the things themselves?’, ‘is there a standard for the standard?’ or ‘what unexamined ontological baggage does this standard carry with itself?’ Responding to the call of those questions would be to practice phenomenology, the groundwork for which we have attempted to lay in this thesis. We cannot, however, upon reaching these conclusions rest on our laurels. The reason is that the conclusions suffer from being based on unexamined presuppositions that don’t exactly fit with some of Heidegger’s descriptions. The rest of the thesis will be spent addressing the following two problems. With regard to the interpretation of Heidegger’s method as a praxis we haven’t investigated thoroughly the relation between praxis and theory as they appear explicitly in Sein und Zeit. What we have done is to interpret praxis as action, and theory as the anti-thesis of that without examining the content of these terms, or what they mean for Heidegger, for whom the use of the term action (Handeln) “legt ... das daseinsontologische Mißverständnis nahe, als sei die Entschlossenheit ein besonderes Verhalten des praktischen Vermögens gegenüber einem theoretischen” (SZ, 300 §60). When it comes to the interpretation of Heidegger’s knowledge as practical it rests on the presupposition that there is
no end point in Heidegger’s investigation. But, there are passages in Heidegger’s work that seem to indicate that he indeed envisioned an end result, and even that there was meant to be a transition from a hermeneutical understanding to a knowing. In the following I will attempt to address these issues.

As we saw with regard to the interpretation of Heidegger’s method as a praxis we have been working from out of a pre-conception of praxis as an activity. This is problematic not only because we haven’t clarified earlier what we meant by this, but also because Heidegger explicitly identifies praxis not with action per se, but with production (“besorgenden Umgang (προσευμα)” (SZ, 68 §15)). Further, in Chapter 2.4 we casually quoted Heidegger saying: “In der untersuchenden, d. h. Spezifisch theoretischen Frage soll das Gefragte bestimmt und zu Begriff gebracht werden” (SZ, 5 §2). And indeed Heidegger repeatedly refers to his investigation as theoretical.¹³⁴ Does this mean that we have to throw away our findings so far? I think not, rather they need to be refined with regard to the understanding of praxis and theory that Heidegger develops. What, then, is the relation between the practical and the theoretical in Sein und Zeit? In order to find that out let us start with orienting ourselves from out of Aristotle’s view for whom Heidegger can be seen to modify.

In the sixth chapter of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle describes five virtues of thought: craft (téchné), scientific knowledge (epistémé), intelligence (phrónésis), wisdom (sophía), and understanding (noûs).¹³⁵ Each of these has a corresponding activity. The activity of téchné is poïésis, the production of an art of a craft different from itself; for phrónésis the activity is praxis, or action; when it comes to sophía which is “both scientific knowledge and understanding”¹³⁶ the activity is called theoría, or universal knowledge. The difference between these three can be seen on the basis of two central distinctions. Firstly, while téchné and praxis are concerned with contingent objects, sophía is only concerned with what is necessary. Secondly while téchné is an activity with an end that is different from itself, for praxis and sophía the end lies in the activity itself. Praxis then, on Aristotle’s view, is an activity concerned with contingent objects where the end lies in the action itself. It seems to fit pretty good with what we have described as Heidegger’s method. But as we have seen

¹³⁴ Heidegger repeats this claim on several occasions: “Wenn wir daher den Titel Ontologie für das explizite theoretische Fragen nach dem Sein des Seienden vorbehalten” (SZ, 12 §4). “Jedes ontische Verstehen hat seine wenn auch nur vor-ontologische, das heißt nicht theoretisch-thematisch begriffenen ‘Einschlässe’” (SZ, 312 §63).
¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 22, 1141b.
Heidegger identifies praxis with concerned coping. In concerned coping one interacts with entities as ready-to-hand equipment. This is a purposeful activity that is centred on producing: “das Werk, das jeweilig herzustellende, ist das primär Besorgte” (SZ, 69-70 §15). What Heidegger calls praxis thus has a clear connection with Aristotle’s *poiēsis*, it has its end outside itself. Further, Heidegger’s use of the term theory is primarily connected to the relation of knowing of the present-at-hand properties of entities. The relation between them we have already looked at. Seeing things as present-at-hand is a derived mode of the everyday use-understanding; entities only show up as present-at-hand normal usage grinds to a halt, when the equipment becomes conspicuous, obtrusive or obstinate (SZ, 73-4 §16). But even if theory is a derived form it is nonetheless wrong to see them as separate. Heidegger says that: “wie der Praxis ihre spezifische Sicht (‘Theorie’) eignet, so ist die theoretische Forschung nicht ohne ihre eigene Praxis” (SZ, 358 §69b). Theory for Heidegger differs from Aristotle’s term by not being separated from the activity of production. Heidegger then, in the same manner as he with the term being-in-the-world seeks to circumvent the subject-object dichotomy also seeks to undermine the opposition between theory and praxis. But is there an ersatz term that functions analogously with being-in-the-world when it comes to the theory-praxis divide? It turns out it is Heidegger’s correlative term to Aristotle’s praxis. Now, both knowing (theory) and concern (praxis) uncover entities, as presence-at-hand properties and ready-to-hand equipment respectively. These do not belong in different spheres, firstly, because knowing is derived from concern, and, secondly, because they both manifest themselves together. It can also be added that they belong to opposite sides on a scale with intermediate levels between them (the unready-to-hand can be seen as such (SZ, 73 §16)). But, as we saw in the introduction, an uncovering of entities is only made possible on the background of a disclosing of oneself, this is what unifies the scale. This disclosing of oneself is as Hanley points out, just like Aristotle’s *praxis* an “activity that aims at an end non-distinct from itself.”

In light of this, what then is philosophical knowledge? Anticipatory resoluteness as an authentic disclosing is a self-relation, but this cannot be the only thing, it has to be an uncovering as well because these two always go together. The question then is if this uncovering is theoretical or practical (*poiēsis*) or somewhere in between. Since every praxis

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137 In her *Being and God* Hanley suggests finite transcendence as the Heideggerian correlate, not disclosing, but the terms describe more or less the same thing, finite transcendence laying more wight on the issue of time. Catriona Hanley (2000), *Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 165.
has its theory and vise versa, my suggestion is that we can find both. The theory aspect would be found in the specific sight of the method its fore-sight (vor-sicht), the method’s manner of anticipating as a formal indication (SZ, 232 §45). The corresponding połésis is the making of descriptions. Describing as laying free can be seen as a making of descriptions whose end is to be “der Gewissen der Anderen” (SZ 298 §60) showing how authenticity is possible. Does this mean that the description is the end of the activity? No, the descriptions are the traces of philosophical thought, not the end result. The production is here only possible on the background of a previos self-understanding. In this manner I think we can say that the achievement up until this chapter were only in need of a correction. What we were tracking with the notion of praxis earlier was in reality that which could be called a unity of a specific disclosing-uncovering activity pertaining to the method.

With regard to the second problem we can start by noting Schürmann’s claim to the effect that there is an anti-hermeneutical touch to Heidegger’s philosophy: “The task of ‘determination’ is to lead us from understanding (pre-understanding) to knowing.” And he bases this on a reading of the following passage: “Wir wissen nicht, was ‘Sein’ besagt. Aber schon wenn wir fragen: ‘was ist ‘Sein’?’ halten wir uns in einem Verständnis des ‘ist’” (SZ, 5 §2). Schürmann notes an opposition between knowing and understanding, where the latter is supposed to lead to the former. He states that this anti-hermeneutical aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy is a residue of metaphysics in his thinking, and that this shows that Sein und Zeit hasn’t been able to “disentangle itself from metaphysics.” In light of a lacking explanation for what this means I take it to concern that if Heidegger goes from understanding to knowing he is leaving the situated understanding for an abstracted perspective. But does this in fact mean that Heidegger aims for an end result where we are supposed to thematically hold on to the object in a manner similar to the other sciences after all? This is what I will examine in the following, and I will start by looking at Heidegger’s claim that phenomenology is “die Wissenschaft vom Sein des Seienden” (SZ, 37 §7c). Does this mean that Heidegger ultimately prioritizes knowing? As it turns out, to be scientific is connected to showing “alles, was über sie [die Gegenstände] zur Erörterung steht” (SZ, 35 §7c), and not to any specific manner of access. This should also be apparent from our discussion of access in Chapter 3.3 where the focus for Heidegger was on finding a manner of access which showed an understanding of being. A further indication contra Schürmann’s interpretation we have already encountered in

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139 Ibid., p. 67.
Chapter 2.1: “Sein als das Gefragte fordert daher eine eigene Aufweisungsart, die sich von der Entdeckung des Seienden wesenhaft unterscheidet” (SZ, 6 §2). Being and entities demand different ways of being shown. To the same effect, only more to the point Heidegger also says that: “Dies phänomenologische Auslegen ist demnach kein Erkennen seiernder Beschaffenheiten des Seienden, sondern ein Bestimmen der Struktur seines Seins” (SZ, 67 §15). Another set of quotes reveal that Heidegger does speak about some kind of knowing connected to his method. We mentioned “transzendentale Erkenntnis” and “ürsprungliche Erkennens” (SZ, 38 7c, 153 §32) already in the introduction. Basically, there are two ways of looking at these quotes. One could take them as we have done up until now as a reference to hermeneutical understanding, that it refers to the understanding connected to the method. But there is nothing intrinsic to them that exclude them from being viewed as evidence of a metaphysical strain left in Heidegger’s thinking. The most relevant passage, however, lies hidden in a footnote on page 363: “ob gar philosophische Erkenntnis auf ein Gegenwärtigen zielt, bleibe hier noch unentschieden” (SZ, 363 §69b). Making present (Gegenwärtigen) is a term Heidegger uses to characterize the present-at-hand. As is apparent, the issue, as far as Heidegger is concerned, is not decided. And in light of the unfinished nature of the work it would be a matter of speculation as to what road he might have taken. We must conclude with Dreyfus that Heidegger seems to be uncertain as to whether there is a final horizon to his investigation or not, whether the investigation continues on in a hermeneutical circle or whether it reaches an end and thereby changes character. Nevertheless, I think it stands above all doubt that what Heidegger actually develops in Sein und Zeit is the hermeneutical understanding as a way of accessing being. In light of this, then, it is clear that the most prevalent view of the work is the one we have sketched.

By addressing these problems we have refined rather than changed our previous findings. Instead of calling Heidegger’s method a praxis it must rather be seen as a unity of a specific disclosing-uncovering activity pertaining to the method. In addition, Heidegger’s intent regarding the end and final manner of access of the investigation must be regarded as uncertain, but what he did develop falls in line with our previous conclusions.

Bibliography


