

# The Qing and Russia in Central Asia

## *A Comparative Study of Motives for Political Expansion*

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# Abstract

The Peoples Republic of China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, or eastern Central Asia, is an area that has recently seen large scale ethnic unrest, as the native Uygurs have protested violently against Chinese domination in the region. This thesis is a discussion of the background for why Xinjiang today is under Chinese rule. To and a half centuries ago, in 1755-59, the Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1911) conquered Xinjiang and incorporated it into their state, and this conquest contributed significantly to Xinjiang's present status as Chinese-ruled territory. In this thesis I discuss what motives might have driven this Central Asian expansion by the Qing. By employing a theoretical framework that focuses on five types of motives for state expansion, namely resources, commerce, overpopulation, security, and ideology, I examine the Qing annexation of Xinjiang comparatively with the Russian Empire's policies toward western Central Asia (the Central Asian segment that the Russians ended up expanding into, and which today is known as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and conclude that the Qing expansion was primarily the result of ideological motives. The reason was that the state which ruled Xinjiang at the time, the Junghar Khanate, had close relations with the Tibetan Buddhist establishment, which was an establishment that the Manchus depended on in order to keep their state intact. The Qing was therefore determined to conquer Xinjiang and eradicate its ideological adversary.



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## Note on Transliteration

Because this thesis contains maps from Yuri Bregel, *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*, vol. 9, Handbook of Oriental Studies: Section Eight: Central Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2003), I have tried to make all names and terms, from no matter what language, as consistent as possible with these maps. This means, for example, that I write “Junghar” instead of “Zunghar” or “Dzunghar” (and therefore “Jungharia” instead of “Zungharia or “Dzungharia”), “Qazaq” instead of “Kazakh,” “Qalmıq” instead of “Kalmyk,” “Tien-shan” instead of “Tianshan,” “Sır-Darya” instead of “Syr-Darya” or “Syr Darya,” “Altıshar” instead of “Altishahr,” and “Altay” instead of “Altai” (though I still write “Dalai Lama” instead of “Dalai-Lama”). As for names and terms that do not show on his maps, I have mostly followed Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), or Walter G. Moss, *A History of Russia*, vol. 1: To 1917 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997). For Chinese names and terms I employ the Pinyin system of transliteration.

I ought to inform that I have taken the somewhat unorthodox approach of altering names and terms in quotes so as to achieve consistency with the rest of the thesis. The changed name or term is then written with [brackets] around it. This is done because it makes the text more readable, and also because it does not force people to read several different transliterations of the same name or term.



# Maps


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Map 1. Central Asia Today




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Map 2. The Geography of Central Asia




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Map 3. Central Asia in the Seventeenth Century



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
Map 4. Central Asia in the Early Eighteenth Century



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Map 5. Central Asia in the Late Eighteenth Century



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# 1 Introduction: Framework, Definitions, and Sources

Central Asia is a part of the world which traditionally has received little attention in the Norwegian media. Although most Norwegians no doubt have a vague idea about where the region is situated, it seems fair to say that the Norwegian public usually has been unaware of what has been happening here.

This situation is now slowly changing, however, at least when it comes to the eastern part of Central Asia, which is the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region in the Peoples Republic of China (see Map 1).<sup>1</sup> As is suggested by the name, Xinjiang is home to the Uygurs, a Muslim people who constitutes one of the 56 minority peoples in China. In the last one or two decades, however, the Uygurs have become increasingly unhappy with Chinese rule and the escalating number of Han Chinese immigrants in Xinjiang, seeing the latter as threatening to their culture. As a consequence of this, many Uygurs have resorted to sometimes violent protests in order to voice their grievances. For example, four days before China was to arrange the Olympic Games in August of 2008, two individuals (whom the Chinese government claimed were Uygurs) attacked a police station in Kashghar, killing 16 policemen and wounding 16 others. About a year later, in the summer of 2009, violent protests erupted in the city of Urumchi (the capital of Xinjiang), when perhaps as many as 3000 Uygurs rose in revolt by showing their dismay against the Chinese, resulting in attacks on cars, buildings, and bystanders. Local Chinese citizens began to seek revenge against the Uygur protesters, and the city ended up becoming so chaotic and violent that large numbers of military forces had to be deployed in order to restore calm. In the course of all these events, probably hundreds of Uygurs lost their lives, and many more were arrested. Both the Kashghar attack and the Urumchi revolt received attention in the Norwegian media, and as a consequence of the latter Norwegian Uygurs also arranged a demonstration in Oslo.<sup>2</sup> Xinjiang, then, has in the course of the last year become more visible also in Norway.

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<sup>1</sup> I give a more thorough definition of Central Asia later in this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Jo Moen Bredeveien, *Opprøret kveles*, Dagsavisen AS, 09.07.2009, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article425313.ece> (accessed 07.10.2009); Jo Moen Bredeveien, *Sammenstøt også i Oslo*, Dagsavisen AS, 08.07.2009, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/article425105.ece> (accessed 06.10.2009); NTB, *Fakta om Xinjiang-regionen og uigurene*, Dagsavisen AS, 14.07.2009, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article426324.ece> (accessed 06.10.2009); NTB, *Kaos og sammenstøt i Xinjiangs hovedstad*, Dagsavisen AS, 07.07.2009, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article425027.ece> (accessed 07.10.2009); NTB, *Kina: - Angrep del av hellig krig*, Dagsavisen AS, 05.08.2008, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article362499.ece> (accessed 06.10.2009); Martin Skjæraasen, *Frykter mer*

As a consequence of this increased attention that Xinjiang has received, it is now timely to look at how and why the area ended up becoming a part of China in the first place. In fact, although the modern Chinese government claims that Xinjiang is an over 2000 year old part of the Chinese state,<sup>3</sup> it was the Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1911)<sup>4</sup> and its eighteenth century conquest and subsequent rule of Xinjiang that is the main reason why the region is controlled from Beijing today.<sup>5</sup> In 1690 the Manchus launched a war against the Junghar Khanate, the state that ruled Xinjiang from about 1680 until the Qing in 1755-59 invaded the region and annihilated it, and it is this expansion that is the main topic of this thesis. I will particularly focus on what *motivated* the Qing to take control over Xinjiang. Why did they need to expand into and take control over this territory? Why did they need to destroy the Junghar Khanate?

In view of the fact that Xinjiang and Central Asia has been such a peripheral topic in Norwegian discourse, however, I ought perhaps to explain how I came to be interested in this region in the first place. It was actually through my long-lasting interest in China, and especially the history of China, that I first came to be introduced to Central Asia. My passion for Chinese history was perhaps the main reason why I applied for the bachelor program “Asian and African Studies” at the University of Oslo in the autumn of 2004. After being accepted into the program I chose East Asia and China as my area of study, with a major in history and additional courses in Chinese language. I soon found out, however, that beyond the initial entry level courses in East Asian history, there were few others that dealt with the history of China. This was particularly the case among the more advanced bachelor courses. When given the opportunity to select my own topic for the final bachelor thesis, therefore, I realized that now was an opportunity for writing about a subject from Chinese history.

The problem was, however, to find out what subject I wanted to write about. The many preliminary suggestions that I sent to my supervisor Lars Harald Bøckmann spanned from as early as the Song period (960-1279) to as late as the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). After

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*vold*, Dagsavisen AS, 07.07.2009, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article424886.ece> (accessed 06.10.2009); Kristian Skårdalsmo, *Terrorangrep få dager før Kina-OL*, Dagsavisen AS, 04.08.2008, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article362355.ece> (accessed 06.10.2009); Amund Trellevik, *Kinas tikkende bombe*, Dagsavisen AS, 08.07.2009, <http://www.dagsavisen.no/utenriks/article425115.ece> (accessed 06.10.2009).

<sup>3</sup> James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 4.

<sup>4</sup> Although the Qing period is usually set to begin in 1644, when the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) in Beijing, it was in 1636 that the Qing was actually founded.

<sup>5</sup> James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, "Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, ed. S. Frederick Starr, Studies of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 48-62.

some time I decided to settle on the Qing period, and eventually wrote a thesis titled “Consolidation, Conquest, and Expansion under the Kangxi Emperor.”<sup>6</sup> Now, it was actually the Kangxi emperor (ruled 1662-1722) who was the Qing monarch that declared war on the Junghars in 1690, and even though he did not live long enough to see the conquest of Xinjiang carried through to the finish, it was nevertheless by studying for this thesis that I was given my first serious introduction to Xinjiang and the incorporation of this region into the Qing Empire.

The present thesis, then, is in one sense a chronological continuation of my bachelor thesis, in that it follows the Qing conquest all the way through to 1759, and also looks at how the region was controlled in the years after its conclusion. It also employs a wider geographical perspective, in that it compares the Qing conquest of Xinjiang with the Russian Empire and its relationship with the Qazaq nomads in the other (or western) branch of Central Asia. This western Central Asian region is the area of modern Kazakhstan (which was where the Qazaq nomads resided), in addition to those of modern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (see Map 1), and although the Russian Empire conquered all of these lands in 1822-84, it was the Qazaqs in Kazakhstan that experienced the most pressure from Russia in the eighteenth century (that is, in the same century as the Qing expansion into Xinjiang took place). It is therefore the Russian-Qazaq conflict that will be used as comparison partner for the Qing conflict with the Junghars. Since “the comparative approach serves the identification of problems and issues which would not be seen, or would be seen only with difficulty, without it”,<sup>7</sup> I believe that it is a potentially fruitful undertaking to compare these two “duels” to each other.

## 1.1 Motives for Political Expansion

My thesis, then, covers vast amounts of both time and space, and it is therefore important to have a theoretical framework guiding the narrative. First let me clarify two important concepts. By *motives* I mean *aims*, *goals*, or *objectives*. I want to know what the Qing *wanted* with Central Asia. *Why* did the Manchus sacrifice state resources to put this territory under their political control? It should become clear then, that I focus less on *means*, or on *how* the

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<sup>6</sup> Thomas O. Løvold, "Konsolidering, erobring og ekspansjon under Kangxi-keiseren" (Bachelor thesis, University of Oslo, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Jürgen Kocka, "The Uses of Comparative History," in *Societies Made Up of History*, ed. R. Björk and K. Molin (Akademityck AB, 1996), 199.

Qing *was able* to expand. Both aspects (motives and means) are of course crucial. Without appropriate means, the Manchus wouldn't have been able to expand into Central Asia at all, however much they would have liked to. When analyzing the causes for European overseas expansion in the fifteenth century, Carlo M. Cipolla identifies "the need to outflank the Muslim blockade and reach the Spice Islands"<sup>8</sup> as one of the objectives, but notes that this "was already felt in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries."<sup>9</sup> He also shows that there had in fact been earlier seafaring expeditions with this same goal in mind, but that these failed because "although there were 'motives', the necessary 'means' [that is, ships of good enough quality] were not available."<sup>10</sup> But it also works the other way around. In the first half of the fifteenth century, just before the Portuguese expansions began in earnest, the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) sent ships towards Southeast Asia, into the Indian Ocean and possibly as far afield as the East African coast. But the Ming eventually withdrew its fleets and destroyed them, and the seafaring expeditions came to an end. As J. R. S. Phillips eloquently put it, "the Chinese were far better equipped than Portugal or any other European nation to undertake a policy of overseas expansion...[but] they *chose* not to continue."<sup>11</sup> So, we may reverse Cipolla's statement and say that although there were "means," the necessary "motives" were not available. Therefore I would like to conclude that a search for *motives* for expansion can be just as significant as a search for *means*.

When talking about *expansion* I'm referring to *political expansion*, which basically means when a state or political entity (in this case the Qing Empire) extend their political or administrative control over territory previously not so. This should therefore not be confused with *economic expansion*, which is when an "economical world" or *Weltwirtschaft* expands and links new regions into its own system. This economical world is usually bigger than a single political entity and, according to Fernand Braudell, has greater abilities to expand.<sup>12</sup> True, should one think of the Qing as an economical world, it can certainly be said that it expanded into Central Asia much before 1755, as trade between the Junghar Khanate and the Qing developed much before the invasions of this year. But unlike Braudell, which is of the

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<sup>8</sup> Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion 1400-1700* (Yuma, KA: Sunflower University Press, 1985), 18.

<sup>9</sup> Cipolla, *Guns, Sails and Empires*, 18.

<sup>10</sup> Cipolla, *Guns, Sails and Empires*, 18-19, quote from 18.

<sup>11</sup> J. R. S. Phillips, *The Medieval Expansion of Europe*, Second ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), VIII, my emphasis.

<sup>12</sup> F. Braudel, "The Expansion of Europe and the 'Longue Durée'," in *Expansion and Reaction: Essays on European Expansion and Reaction in Asia and Africa*, ed. H. L. Wesseling, vol. 1, Comparative Studies in Overseas History (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1978), 20-22.

opinion that “political expansion does not last very long”,<sup>13</sup> I would like to emphasize that the Qing (and also the Russian) political expansion into Central Asia was an event of great long-term significance. Xinjiang, as we have seen, is today still a part of the Peoples Republic of China, the Qing Empire’s modern successor state, whereas Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became independent nation states only in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the direct successor to the Russian Empire. Thus I am of the opinion that political expansion certainly *can* last very long, and that a search for its *motives* therefore is important.

This thesis is therefore concerned with *motives for political expansion*. By drawing on literature concerned with perhaps the most studied expansion of all, namely that of Europe, I have tried to untangle the various motives that states might have for expanding their political borders, and have come to the conclusion that there are five main groups:

## Resources

Should a state expand into an area with the intention of extracting its resources, be it stone, wood, silver, gold, furs, or oil, it would fall under this category. As is clear enough, a “state that controls a given area is entitled to exploit the resources that are contained therein.”<sup>14</sup> An example of such a motivation may be found in the Russian expansion east across Siberia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in which the primary motive appears to have been the acquisition of furs from the various animals that lived in this area (see Chapter 2). Another resource is of course humans, and the most infamous example of this motive for expansion is perhaps when the Europeans expanded into Africa in order to get slaves for their plantations in America.<sup>15</sup>

## Commerce

A closely related motive is when a given territory and its peoples are seen as good targets for products produced in the expanding country. In general, the post-fifteenth century expansion

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<sup>13</sup> Braudel, "The Expansion of Europe," 21.

<sup>14</sup> Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, "Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 104.

<sup>15</sup> For good secondary accounts on this topic see Philip D. Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History*, Second ed., Studies in Comparative World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade, New Approaches to the Americas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

of European states overseas may often have been a result of this objective.<sup>16</sup> To give a more concrete example, when the French government proposed to conquer Algiers in the 1820s, they received backing from French merchants, “who saw an opportunity for procuring a new protected market.”<sup>17</sup> Also, when Russia in 1868-81 took control over Bukhara, Khiva, Qoqand, and the Turkmens in the Central Asia, one of their aims was “to gain markets for the products of Russia’s growing industry”.<sup>18</sup>

## Overpopulation

If a state experiences a rapid growth of its own population or already has too many people, it may find that the territory it controls is not sufficient to support them. Political expansion may therefore emerge as a solution to this problem, as new territory is added to the state. This territory can then be made into farmland worked by people from the expanding country (or also by indigenous peoples or slaves taken from other places), and surplus produce from this farmland can be sent back to the mother country to help support the population there. It has been argued that this “urgent search for land and food”<sup>19</sup> was precisely what started the expansion of Europe in the fifteenth century.<sup>20</sup>

## Security

If a state expands into new territory because it regards control of this land as vital to its own security, it falls under this category. A fairly recent example concerns the Soviet Union’s post-World War II expansion into Eastern Europe, in which state security apparently was the primary aim.<sup>21</sup> In earlier times, the Spaniards expanded up north along America’s western coast with the aim of safeguarding their galleons.<sup>22</sup> Also, when Napoleon in 1798 decided to conquer Egypt, he did so partly in order to increase the security of Frenchmen living in the region. As the general stated before the conquest took place, the contemporary Egyptian

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<sup>16</sup> Diehl and Goertz, "Territorial Changes," 104.

<sup>17</sup> J. C. Hurewitz, ed. *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, Second ed., vol. 1: European Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 242.

<sup>18</sup> Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 198-199, quote from 199.

<sup>19</sup> G. V. Scammell, *The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c. 1400-1715* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 52.

<sup>20</sup> This argument is put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, *Studies in Social Discontinuity* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 42-44. For a critique of this argument see Scammell, *The First Imperial Age*, 52-53.

<sup>21</sup> Diehl and Goertz, "Territorial Changes," 104.

<sup>22</sup> Scammell, *The First Imperial Age*, 67.



government “have engaged in open hostilities and most horrible cruelties against the French, whom they vex, pillage, and assassinate daily”.<sup>23</sup>

## Ideology

This category has to do with non-material motives. Religion (Christianity in the case of Europe) would be one of many important examples. For instance, when the Europeans initiated the eastern crusade in the eleventh century, Christianity no doubt played an important role in this event taking place. The reason is that Jerusalem for a long time had been one of the most important Christian pilgrimage sites, and that this century also saw the surfacing of “a reformed papacy with ambitions to exercise universal authority over Christians wherever they might be found [thus including the Christian pilgrims in Jerusalem] and which was conscious of a universal proselytizing mission.”<sup>24</sup>



But how is one to find out what motive(s) the Manchus had when expanding into Central Asia? To begin, it may be useful to look at how the emperor and his elites justified the expansion *in advance* of the actual event. But as has been noted, “*justifications... may or may not be indicative of underlying motives.*”<sup>25</sup> One must therefore also look at what policies were undertaken immediately *after* the expansion was concluded or brought to a halt. To give an example, if a European monarch expressed strong desires for a “civilizing mission,” for example to Christianize the indigenous peoples in the territory being expanded into, *ahead* of the actual conquest of this territory, and this was followed by extensive preaching among and conversion of the native peoples after the conquest was finished, one should be able to say that this was a fairly strong motive for political expansion into this territory. This is particularly the case if there were made little or no attempts at resource extraction, commercial expansion or immigration of Europeans in this same period. If, however, the immediate post-conquest period was followed by heavy immigration of Europeans, and the indigenous population were not made into Christians but were enslaved and put to work in

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<sup>23</sup> Hurewitz, ed. *The Middle East and North Africa*, 115-116, quote from 115. Hurewitz cites Napoleon I, *Correspondance de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>* (Paris: Plon, 1858-70), 4:52-53.

<sup>24</sup> Phillips, *The Medieval Expansion*, 243.

<sup>25</sup> Alexander B. Murphy, "Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 80, no. 4 (December 1990): 532.

newly opened mines or similar ventures, a “civilizing mission” can’t have been a very strong motive for the conquest. Instead, the dominant motives probably were to obtain resources and to find means of supporting excessive people back home. Therefore, what was said in advance and what was done immediately afterwards seems to be important guiding points for finding out what the strongest motive(s) were.

As I see it, however, at least two challenges are presented by this theoretical framework. First, while it may be convenient to treat the expansion of a particular state into a particular region as one single historical event, this expansion may be a process taking years, decades, or even centuries. For example, while the Russians started their Siberian invasion in 1581, it was not until 1649 (that is, over 65 years later) that they got to the Pacific Coast at the other end of the region (see Chapter 2). When it comes to such long-lasting expansions as this, it is not at all certain that the conquerors’ motives are the same at all times. If one thinks of European expansion as a whole, one can say that Christianity played a larger role in the early (meaning the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) and late (the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) period than in the middle period (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), which saw “the almost exclusive concentration of Europeans...on economic interest and a mercantilist view of competition”.<sup>26</sup> One must remember, therefore, that motives for expansion can change as time goes by.

Second, even though up to this point I have been talking about *the Qing Empire’s* motives for expansion into Central Asia, it is of course a fact that this empire, like any other political entity, is (or was) incapable of having any motives of its own. As Pamela Kyle Crossley writes, “the state does not believe.”<sup>27</sup> The individuals who constitutes the government of a particular state of course can have motives, but these may not all be similar to one another. When it comes to empires like the Qing, it is true, one may think that this is not that big of a problem, since empires usually have a single individual, an emperor or empress, who at least theoretically is located at the very top of the government. And the Qing emperors who combated the Junghars and annexed Xinjiang are in fact known for being powerful rulers, as they “made substantial personal efforts to secure intelligence, make decisions, and control the

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<sup>26</sup> Adam Watson, "European International Society and its Expansion," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 31.

<sup>27</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 225.

system of governance at their disposal.”<sup>28</sup> As Jonathan D. Spence reminds us, however, “Any emperor of China was...merely one individual, occupying a special position within his society but unable to comprehend all that society’s ramifications. Also, the actions and thoughts ascribed to him were often those of others, of relatives, courtiers, eunuchs, bureaucrats.”<sup>29</sup> It is important to remember, then, that even in an empire such as the Qing, government policies were shaped not just by one person but by many people, and that these people, in turn, were not necessarily always likeminded and therefore did not necessarily always have the same motives.

## 1.2 Defining Central Asia

Before I begin my narrative and start coping with the above challenges, however, I shall first endeavor to describe where exactly Central Asia is, in addition to outline the geographical characteristics of the region. This may not be as easy as it sounds, though, since nearly “every scholar defines the boundaries of the region differently.”<sup>30</sup> In addition, many different designations are being used, making it even more confusing. Peter C. Perdue uses the name “Central Eurasia,” and by this means the territory extending “from the Ukrainian steppes in the west to the shores of the Pacific in the east, from the southern edge of the Siberian forests to the Tibetan plateau.”<sup>31</sup>

Many also operate with the term “Inner Asia,” though the area attached to this name varies greatly. For Svat Soucek it refers to Kazakhstan, Xinjiang, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.<sup>32</sup> For Denis Sinor “it is that part of Eurasia which, at any given time, lay beyond the borders of the sedentary world.”<sup>33</sup> According to Perdue, the name is “conventionally defined as modern Mongolia (Inner and Outer), Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Tibet”.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Willard J. Peterson, "Introduction: New Order for the Old Order," in *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.

<sup>29</sup> Jonathan D. Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," in *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 120.

<sup>30</sup> Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 19.

<sup>31</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 19.

<sup>32</sup> Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*.

<sup>33</sup> Denis Sinor, "Introduction: The Concept of Inner Asia," in *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, ed. Denis Sinor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16.

<sup>34</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, XIII.

The name that I use here, namely “Central Asia,” also has more than one definition. In *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia*, for example, we learn that Central Asia is the same as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan only.<sup>35</sup> In *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*, however, Yuri Bregel shows that Central Asia embraces not just these five states, but that it contains the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region as well. His definition of Central Asia is therefore the one that best fits my thesis. In this atlas, the areas of the first five states are collectively referred to as “Western Turkestan,” whereas the territory of present-day Xinjiang is referred to as “Eastern Turkestan.”<sup>36</sup> Because the name *Xinjiang* (which means “New Dominion”) was not used for this territory until after the Qing had annexed the Junghar Khanate (see Chapter 3), and because this thesis endeavors to compare the Qing and the Russian empires’ Central Asian policies, I will use the name “Eastern Turkestan,” not Xinjiang, for the rest of this thesis.<sup>37</sup>



Let us now examine Central Asia in a bit more detail. What are the essential geographical traits of the area? First, one must know that “Central Asia as a whole is characterized by an extreme continental climate, with high aridity that increases from north to south and from the mountains to the plains.”<sup>38</sup> This aridity has many causes, one of them being that the mountains in Central Asia prevents the monsoon winds from reaching the region, another being that its geographical location so far away from the ocean also prevents the Atlantic westerlies from having much effect. Central Asia, then, receives very little rainfall, meaning that its natural conditions are unsuited to the “normal” way of conducting agriculture.<sup>39</sup>

Second, the area can be “divided into three main natural regions: steppe, desert, and mountains.”<sup>40</sup> Below follows a brief description of each:

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<sup>35</sup> Rafis Abazov, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

<sup>36</sup> Yuri Bregel, *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*, vol. 9, Handbook of Oriental Studies: Section Eight: Central Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

<sup>37</sup> This is not an unproblematic choice, however. Since the name “Turkestan” is associated with modern Uyghur separatists and since it was also used by the two republics briefly existing in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 40s it is, therefore, a term full of political controversy. As James A. Millward states, it “only appears in China if carefully quarantined in quotation marks and attributed to Western colonialists or contemporary terrorists.” Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, IX-X, quote from X. As I have explained above, however, I have only academic reasons for adopting this term here, not a political agenda of any kind.

<sup>38</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

<sup>39</sup> S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 7, 14-15.

<sup>40</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

## Mountains

The mountains, we have already seen, are responsible for keeping the monsoons out of Central Asia. Furthermore, they also mark borders, both within the Central Asian region and between Central Asia and the rest of the world. The southern border of Central Asia, for example, is drawn by the Kopet-Dagh, Hindukush, and Kunlun mountains (this latter mountain range splits Eastern Turkestan and the Tibetan plateau), and the region's northeastern border is represented by the Altay Mountains (which divides Eastern Turkestan and Mongolia). The Tien-Shan Mountains separates the steppe and desert regions of Eastern Turkestan, whereas the Pamir-Alay Mountains splits Eastern Turkestan and Western Turkestan (see Map 2).<sup>41</sup>

## Steppe

After the mountains there are the steppes. This region of Central Asia, which is found south of the Siberian woodland and “north of the Aral Sea, the Sīr-Darya river, and the Tien-Shan mountains, is a part of the great steppe belt stretching across the Eurasian continent from Manchuria in the east to Hungary in the west.”<sup>42</sup> The Central Asian steppes can be broken up into three parts, namely the *Dasht-i Qipchaq* (“the Steppe of the Qipchaqs”) and *Semirech'e* (“Seven rivers”) in Western Turkestan, and *Jungharia* in Eastern Turkestan.<sup>43</sup>

As already mentioned, the lack of rain in Central Asia means that standard agriculture has been difficult to practice in this part of the world, and therefore also that its inhabitants have had to find other ways of getting by. As for the steppe region, this “other way” has been nomadic pastoralism. The pastoral nomads maintained herds of animals (camels, cattle, goats, horses, sheep, and/or yaks), and from these animals they obtained all the necessities of daily life. The nomads' herds required grass, however, and since they did not grow any grass themselves, they had to move their animals from place to place in the steppes looking for pastureland that they could feed on. The pastoral nomads, therefore, depended on favorable meteorological conditions, since drought or cold weather could incapacitate the pasturelands of the region, thereby leading to large numbers of animals starving to death.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, VII, 2; Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 5.

<sup>42</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

<sup>43</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

<sup>44</sup> Adshhead, *Central Asia*, 15-16; Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

The pastoral nomads, then, fought “a constant battle against a harsh environment and meteorological uncertainty”.<sup>45</sup> Despite these apparent drawbacks, however, they had an advantage in that they were both militarily powerful and highly mobile. These two assets enabled them to dominate the political and military landscape of Central Asia for several hundred years.<sup>46</sup> It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that when the Qing and Russian empires encroached on Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was the Central Asian nomads who became their main antagonists. The Qing Empire faced off with the Junghar nomads, who occupied (and also named) the Jungharia region.<sup>47</sup> The Russian Empire confronted the Qazaq nomads, who were in the Dasht-i Qïpchaq and Semirech’e regions<sup>48</sup> (these two confrontations will be explored further in Chapter 3).

## Desert

“South of the steppe belt lies the desert zone, which occupies the largest part of Central Asia and encompasses three major deserts, the Qara-qum, Qizil-qum, and Taqla-Makan,”<sup>49</sup> the last of which is in Eastern Turkestan. The Taqla-Makan Desert and the lands contiguous to it are often called the *Tarim Basin* or *Altïshar*. To the east of Altïshar (meaning east of the Baghrash Lake and the Quruq Mountains) is found the *Turfan Depression*, which consists of the Turfan oasis and its hinterlands (including the Hami oasis). In Western Turkestan, the major desert area is that flanked by the Amu-Darya and Sïr-Darya rivers, a region usually known as *Mavarannahr* or *Transoxiana* (“That which is beyond the [Amu or Oxus] River”).<sup>50</sup>

Similar to the steppe region, the desert region is also very much lacking in rainfall (the desert to an even larger degree than the steppe). In order to combat this dryness, however, the desert inhabitants used a different method than the steppe inhabitants; they practiced oasis agriculture, not nomadic pastoralism. By tapping water from rivers, constructing wells, and making use of *kariz* (aqueducts leading to subterranean water basins) and springs, the oasis agriculturalists could grow grain, cotton, melons, grapes, and other agricultural commodities, which in turn could support the clergy, craftsmen, officials, and traders also living in the oasis. Oasis agriculture made the desert region the economical powerhouse of Central Asia,

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<sup>45</sup> Adshead, *Central Asia*, 16.

<sup>46</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

<sup>47</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 33.

<sup>48</sup> Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, 195.

<sup>49</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2.

<sup>50</sup> Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2; Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 5-6; Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural History," 29-30.

but because it was the nomads who were (often) the strongest *military* power, and because these nomads also were in need of the products that the oasis produced, it was common for Mavarannahr, the Tarim Basin, and the Turfan Depression to be controlled by the nomads in Semirech'e and Jungharia.<sup>51</sup> The Junghars, for example, took charge of the Tarim Basin and the Turfan Depression in 1678-80, and this enabled them to enrich themselves on the resources of these two regions (see Chapter 3).

### 1.3 Sources

I have now defined the location and explored the geography of Central Asia, as well as established the theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis. But what kind of sources will it be based on?

It must unfortunately be admitted that I only draw on secondary literature here. Unlike other works of history, therefore, which usually employ archival sources and/or primary sources in published form, this thesis will only make use of articles and books written by other scholars. Why is this the case? The reason has to do with language skills. Were I to base this thesis on the study of primary sources, it would probably have required me to examine hundreds (if not thousands) of pages of Chinese, Manchu, and Russian documents, and perhaps also documents written in other languages. Having only a basic knowledge of Chinese, and no skills whatsoever in the rest of these languages, this would have been an impossible task to undertake.

Although I only use secondary literature, however, I still think that this thesis is a valid scholarly work. As Finn Fuglestad has stated, "To write from one [author only] is plagiarizing, to write from multiple [authors] is to conduct research."<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, although the two principal "duals" in this story (the Qing Empire versus Eastern Turkestan and the Russian Empire versus Western Turkestan) have both already been extensively explored, I have found no work that compares them directly as I have here.

When it comes to the secondary literature itself, it is not possible to review all of it in this chapter. Nevertheless, I will quickly go through the most central works. The single most important book used in my study is the already cited *China Marches West: The Qing*

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<sup>51</sup> Adshead, *Central Asia*, 20-22; Bregel, *An Historical Atlas*, 2; Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural History," 30-33.

<sup>52</sup> Finn Fuglestad, *Fra svartedauden til Wienerkongressen: Den vesterlandske kulturkretsens historie 1347-1815 i et globalt-sammenliknende perspektiv*, Second ed. (Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2004), 5.

*Conquest of Central Eurasia* written by Peter C. Perdue. It has been significant both as a reference and as an inspirational source (it was from here, for example, that I got the idea of comparing the Qing Empire with Russia). The works of the Xinjiang-specialist James A. Millward have also been invaluable, and particularly *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* and *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*. Pamela Kyle Crossley, too, has been frequently referred to, and then it has usually been from her *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* or her “Making Mongols,” which is a chapter found in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*. One must also not forget *The Cambridge History of China*, and especially *Part One: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800* (volume 9 in the series). When discussing the Russian Empire and the Qazaqs I have most often used *The Kazakhs*, written by Martha Brill Olcott and *Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800*, written by Michael Khodarkovsky.



## 2 Approaching Central Asia: The Qing, Russia, the Ming, and Siberia (1581-1689)

As explained in Chapter 1, the main aim of this thesis is to explore what motives were behind the Qing and Russian engagements with Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Before I proceed to this task, however, it is necessary to know the background of the two states in question. In this chapter I examine how the Qing and Russian empires came to be, and also trace the Qing expansion into China<sup>53</sup> and Taiwan (1644-83), in addition to the Russian expansion into Siberia<sup>54</sup> (1581-1689). Although neither China nor Siberia is in Central Asia, I believe that the Qing and Russian expansions into these two regions were necessary preconditions for the later confrontations with Central Asia, and that they therefore are highly relevant and need to be included in this thesis. Why did the Manchus expand into China? Did they seek resources, security, a commercial market, agricultural lands, or were there perhaps an ideological reason behind it? And what were the Russians looking for in Siberia?

At the end of this chapter I explore what happened when the Qing and Russian states collided on the Amur River in the latter half of the seventeenth century (1643-1689). As we shall see, the end result of this encounter was the Treaty of Nerchinsk, a Qing-Russian border treaty that was negotiated in 1689 at the Russian fort bearing the same name, and that was also the prelude to the first battle between the Qing and the Central Asian Junghars. The story of the Qing encounter with the Junghars, and also the Russian encounter with the Qazaqs, is then explored in the next chapter.

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<sup>53</sup> I define China as the lands of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). Under the succeeding Qing dynasty it was “reconfigured as eighteen provinces”, and became “the inner territory (the [*neidi*]), known as ‘China proper’ since the nineteenth century.” Peterson, “Introduction,” 7.

<sup>54</sup> I follow James Forsyth and define Siberia as the territory that “stretches for some 2,800 miles from the Urals to the shores of the Pacific Ocean...while in its most northerly, arctic latitudes, it extends for a further 950 miles eastward to the tip of Chuckchi-land...where the 50-mile-wide Bering Strait separates Asia from Alaska.” James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony, 1581-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6-7. The Arctic Ocean forms the northern border, whereas “nearly all of Siberia lies north of the fiftieth parallel of latitude,” which therefore serves as an approximate southern border marker. Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 7.

## 2.1 The Founding of the Qing Empire

The Qing Empire was established in 1636 by a man named Hong Taiji. It was a fusion of two political entities that existed in the early seventeenth century. The first and most important of these was the Latter Jin Khanate in the Northeast or Manchuria,<sup>55</sup> created by Hong Taiji's father Nurhaci (1559-1626) in 1616. Nurhaci began the construction of his state in 1583, when he initiated the military campaigns that eventually would incorporate the Manchu tribes (or Jurchen tribes before 1635)<sup>56</sup> in Manchuria into a single state structure. Many Mongols and Chinese were also brought in. In order to accomplish this feat Nurhaci founded the banners, an organization designed to redirect the tribal loyalties of the Manchus towards a single banner commander, which in turn served under Nurhaci. In 1615 the Eight Banners were founded, which "laid the basis for the multiethnic coalition that Nurhaci proclaimed as the Latter Jin empire in 1616."<sup>57</sup> In 1626 Nurhaci died, and his son Hong Taiji took over as Jin khan the following year. But Nurhaci didn't plan for Hong Taiji to rule all by himself. He supported a collective ruling system, and so Hong Taiji was joined by powerful Manchu nobles who were to govern the Jin state together with him.<sup>58</sup>

The second predecessor state of the Qing was the Mongolian Chahar Federation. This federation was after 1617 Nurhaci's and Hong Taiji's most powerful regional rival. Its leader in the seventeenth century was Ligdan Khan, who based his legitimacy on descent from Chinggis Khan in addition to patronage of Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>59</sup> Decent from Chinggis had ever since the last years of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) been an important part of the legitimacy of rulership in Mongolia, and had in the sixteenth century been mixed in with Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>60</sup>

For Hong Taiji to become supreme autocrat of Manchuria, therefore, he would have to shake off the Manchu nobles' power at home, in addition to destroy the Chahars. From when he became Jin khan in 1627 until 1636 he managed to accomplish both of these objectives. In

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<sup>55</sup> Manchuria is the region located to the north of the Great Wall, to the east of the Mongolian steppes, to the south of the Amur River, and to the west of Korea, the Sea of Japan, and the Tatar Strait. It is "a place where forest, steppe, and agricultural lands overlap." Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," in *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9-10, quote from 9.

<sup>56</sup> See Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 27.

<sup>57</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 110-111, quote from 110.

<sup>58</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 51-52.

<sup>59</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 210-212.

<sup>60</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Making Mongols," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China* ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 62-63.

order to take care of the nobles, one of the things Hong Taiji did was to import Ming-dynasty government institutions and laws into the Jin Khanate. This enabled him to build up a bureaucracy that was subservient only to him, and which in turn was used to assert his domination over the nobility.<sup>61</sup> Then, in 1633 the Chahar federation was destroyed by Hong Taiji's army, initiating "the remarkable process that between 1634 and 1636 ended both the Northern Yuan [the Chahar federation] and the Later Jin khanates, initiated the Qing empire that amalgamated both...[and] installed [Hong] Taiji himself as an emperor".<sup>62</sup>

## 2.2 China and Taiwan is Taken (1644-83)

8 years after Hong Taiji became Qing emperor, the first great period of Qing expansion commenced. In 1644 the Qing armies expanded south into China through the Great Wall. The Ming was in chaos, and Beijing had fallen to the rebel Li Zicheng. The Ming general Wu Sangui decided that it was best to find outside allies to help him fight Li, and so he struck a deal with the Qing. The Manchus were allowed entrance into China, after which they helped Wu defeat Li's army. The Manchus then moved into Beijing and put Hong Taiji's son Fulin on the throne there. Fulin is perhaps better known as the Shunzhi emperor (ruled 1643-61), and he succeeded his father as Qing monarch when the latter died suddenly in 1643. Following the Beijing takeover, the northern provinces were conquered by 1645. The southern areas proved more difficult to incorporate. Ming loyalists refused to give up their cause, and they were not thrown out of southern China until 1659. But after throwing out the Ming loyalists, the Qing government let south China fall under the control of three powerful generals, namely Wu Sangui (the same individual that sought Qing help against Li Zicheng), Geng Jingzhong and Shang Kexi. These generals began consolidating their own personal power until they eventually represented a fundamental challenge to the Qing state in the north. In 1674 Wu Sangui rebelled against the Qing, and he was later followed by Geng Jingzhong and Shang Zhixin (the son of Shang Kexi). Only after 7 years of brutal warfare (the Three Feudatories War, lasting from 1674 to 1681) were these territories brought under

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<sup>61</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 60-61.

<sup>62</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 212-213, 317, quote from 212-213.

Beijing's firm control. The southern expansion was brought to a close with the conquest of Taiwan in 1683.<sup>63</sup>

## 2.3 Motives for Expansion into China and Taiwan

What motivated this Qing expansion? In fact, both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji had long planned this conquest. Their motives were largely ideological, although concern with overpopulation in Manchuria was also present and, as we shall see, was an additional cause for expansion.

Let us first look at the ideological motives. One of the more detailed studies of the Qing conquest of China is Frederick Wakeman Jr.'s *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*. The main title of the book ("*The Great Enterprise*") refers to "a Confucian dynasty's effort to gain and hold the Mandate of Heaven by ruling the 'under-Heaven' (*tianxia*) of China".<sup>64</sup> The "Mandate of Heaven" is an ancient ruling ideology in China, going as far back as the Zhou dynasty (1045/40-256 B.C.). According to this ideological theory, a Chinese emperor's power as absolute sovereign was always dependent on heaven's backing. Should he rule tyrannically or behave badly, heaven would cease supporting him and give the Mandate to someone else, who thereafter had the opportunity to overthrow the present ruler.<sup>65</sup>

In the early seventeenth century Nurhaci started uttering the belief that he was going to take over the Mandate from the Ming. In 1612, 1614, 1615, and 1618 strange lights (which probably were northern lights)<sup>66</sup> showed in the skies over Manchuria. Nurhaci said this meant that the Ming's Mandate was moving in his direction. In 1616 Nurhaci promulgated a new khanate called Jin and started referring to himself as "Heavenly Mandated Khan of the Jin Country."<sup>67</sup> The name "Jin" referred back to the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1121-1234), an empire that 400 years earlier had ruled the northern part of China, Manchuria, Siberia, as well some Mongolian territories. Pamela Kyle Crossley, however, argues that Nurhaci in fact did not

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<sup>63</sup> For a more detailed narrative of these events, consult Jerry Dennerline, "The Shun-chih Reign," in *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 74-89, 92-101, 116-118; Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 136-147.

<sup>64</sup> Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 21n53.

<sup>65</sup> Irene Bloom, David S. Nivison, and Burton Watson, "Classical Sources of Chinese Tradition," in *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, vol. 1: *From Earliest Times to 1600*, Introduction to Asian Civilizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 27-28.

<sup>66</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 38n78.

<sup>67</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 37-38.

have a plan to attack the Ming in Beijing, but only to drive them out of Manchuria. As she states, “There is no contemporary evidence...to suggest that [Nurhaci] ever resolved to succeed the Ming in their own realm. The change of regime...was to occur in the Northeast, where Ming authority would give way to [Nurhaci’s] control.”<sup>68</sup> I believe, however, that Nurhaci in fact wanted to conquer China as well (though perhaps mainly the northern part, since this was what the previous Jin had controlled). In the early 1620s, for example, Nurhaci encountered a group of Chinese while he was out campaigning with his army. At the sight of Nurhaci’s forces, the Chinese fled, which in turn led Nurhaci to declare to them: “Come out of hiding and down from the mountains because even if you go inside the [Shanghai] Pass [i.e. into Ming territories]...my great army will enter the Pass in 1623-4.”<sup>69</sup> Also, in the process of expanding his state, Nurhaci frequently relocated his capital, and this was not always popular among his *belies* (or princes). Nurhaci, however, explained to them the necessity of looking “at the larger picture of establishing the great enterprise [i.e. establish rule in China].”<sup>70</sup> In spite of Crossley’s argument, then, I believe that Nurhaci in fact *wanted* to take (north) China and rid it of the Ming dynasty.

Nurhaci’s son and successor Hong Taiji picked up the thread where his father had left off. For example, “During the Jin raid upon [Beijing] in the summer of 1629...he traveled out to Fangshan and made sacrifice at the tombs of the Jin emperors Agūda [the original Jin’s ‘founding father’] and Shizong.”<sup>71</sup> Also, Hong Taiji’s motives were further clarified in 1636 when he created the Qing Empire. It has been argued that this particular name (*Qing*) was chosen because it had parallels to *Ming*. Additionally, the reign name that Hong Taiji adopted at this time (“Chongde”) was quite close to that of the contemporary Ming emperor (“Chongzhen”).<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, “By 1636 the [Qing] government [also] had counterpart versions of most of the Ming governmental functions in place”.<sup>73</sup> Chinese officials also increased in status, as Hong Taiji promoted many of them to influential positions in his government. These bureaucrats supported Hong Taiji’s quest for personal power and conquest. Sensing that the power of the Ming dynasty was weak, one of these officials memorialized to Hong Taiji: “This is the opportunity to enter...If the khan does not take the

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<sup>68</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 144-145, quote from 144.

<sup>69</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 37. Roth Li cites *Jiu Manzhou dang* (Taipei, 1969), 2:1089; Kanda Nobuo et al., *Mambun Rōtō* (Tokyo, 1955-63), 2:581-582. The Shanghai Pass had since 1389 been “the main route between China and Manchuria”. Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 11.

<sup>70</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 38-39, quote from 39. Roth Li cites *Da Qing Taizu Gao huangdi shilu*, rpt. as vol. 6 of *Qing shi ziliao, Kai guo shi liao* (2) (Taipei, 1969), Chapter 8, 17a-b.

<sup>71</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 145-146.

<sup>72</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 63, 63n161.

<sup>73</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 61.

opportunity at once, there is no telling whether such a large country will continue to be weak.”<sup>74</sup> As Gertraude Roth Li notes, “Such advice demonstrated their support for the khan’s plan to conquer Ming.”<sup>75</sup> In sum, there is much evidence to support the argument that both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji had long-lasting ideological motives for expansion into China.

But what happened *after* the conquest? Does the Manchus’ post-conquest rule fit the argument that they were motivated by obtaining the Mandate of Heaven? It is important to know that although Nurhaci and Hong Taiji were responsible for the ideological formulations discussed above, neither of them ever ruled from Beijing. The post-conquest government’s most powerful figure was Dorgon, who was regent for the Shunzhi emperor until his death in 1650. How did Dorgon and his government rule China? Was it different from the Ming? Although it is true that the Qing government certainly wasn’t a Ming copy,<sup>76</sup> nevertheless increasing Chinese influence was the norm under Dorgon. He instituted the practice of having both Chinese and Manchus serving together in high government positions, and the Manchus were thrown out of the Six Boards. In other words, the “Chinese turn” that gained momentum under Hong Taiji continued with Dorgon. The post-Dorgon period saw two years of factional struggle until the Shunzhi emperor took charge of the state in 1653. Fulin too, increased the power of the Chinese at the expense of the Manchus, so much so that when he died in 1661 a group of Manchu nobles (Ebilun, Oboi, Soni, and Suksaha) with support from the Empress Dowager took over and started reversing this trend. Ming government institutions lost power and Chinese officials suffered persecutions.<sup>77</sup> But with the ascension of Fulin’s son Xuanye (the Kangxi emperor) in 1669, the Chinese course was again resumed. In his “Sacred Edict” (published in 1670) and subsequent promulgations, Kangxi spoke directly to the Han Chinese and justified his rule in the Confucian language they were familiar with.<sup>78</sup> The climax of Kangxi’s efforts to integrate the Han Chinese civilian elite came in 1679 with the grand *Boxue Hongru* examination, in which “the key inducement... was an opportunity for successful candidates to work on the compilation of the official history of the Ming.”<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 60-62, quote from 62, Roth Li's ellipsis. Roth Li cites *Jiu Manzhou dang*, 9:4141; *Jiu Manzhou dang: Tiancong jiu nian*, trans. Kanda Nobuo et al. (Tokyo, 1972), 1:54.

<sup>75</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 62.

<sup>76</sup> One of the most famous examples of this may be the Court of Colonial Affairs (*Lifanyuan*), designed specifically to take care of governmental matters in the north and west. It did not, however, have much influence on the governance of China proper. Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank, vol. 32, Harvard East Asian Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 72-75.

<sup>77</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 114-115.

<sup>78</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 115-116.

<sup>79</sup> Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 147-149, quote from 148.

I've argued above that the Manchus' motives for expansion into China was strongly ideological, that is, they believed that the Mandate of Heaven was about to be transferred to them. The expressions and actions of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji support this view, as does the post-conquest Qing governance of China proper. But were there other motives? Did the Manchus have other aims by expanding their state?

Overpopulation was also an important motive for expansion. The Manchu rulers realized from an early stage that Manchuria had limited natural resources. As more and more people (either voluntarily or involuntarily) came under Manchu control, the problem of feeding these people became an important topic of concern. It emerged as early as 1615, the same year as the formation of the Eight Banners, and lasted until 1644, when the Manchus expanded into north China and took Beijing. Although the Manchus previously had been able to survive on Manchuria's own resources, the increasing number of Chinese and Mongol subordinates following Nurhaci's successes made these resources inadequate. In 1615 Nurhaci realized that his grain supplies were insufficient for the population currently under his control.<sup>80</sup> As he said to his Manchu nobles that year: "Now we have captured so many Chinese and animals, how shall we feed them? Even our own people will die. Now during this breathing spell let us first take care of our people and secure all places, erect gates, till the fields, and fill the granaries."<sup>81</sup> But even after maximizing the agricultural output of his state, and despite getting additional grain supplies from raiding Korea and Liaodong (the area north of China and northwest of Korea),<sup>82</sup> the amount of food continued to be insufficient. In 1619 Nurhaci said to his Mongolian subjects that if they were to join him on campaign, they had to support themselves and also not rob the Jin population. It became increasingly clear that the Manchus had to take control over additional agricultural lands in order to find a more permanent solution to their food problems, and to this end Nurhaci in 1619 opted for expanding into Liaodong.<sup>83</sup> But Liaodong had a Chinese population of 1 million people, so that even though the Manchus after the conquest increased the total amount of farmland under their control their number of subjects increased as well.<sup>84</sup>

Subsequent unrest and revolts in Manchuria showed that the Manchus had not solved their logistical problems. Because the Manchus repeatedly found themselves without anything to

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<sup>80</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 117.

<sup>81</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 40. Roth Li cites *Jiu Manzhou dang*, 1:103; Kanda, *Mambun Rōtō*, 1:48.

<sup>82</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 57.

<sup>83</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 117-118; Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 41.

<sup>84</sup> Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 63.

eat, they attempted to get food from the Chinese agriculturalists. The Chinese resisted by trying to hide their grain. After suffering years of repression by Manchu superiors, a Chinese rebellion commenced in 1623 and again in 1625. Manchus were killed, buildings were ignited and grain was stolen from the granaries. Though order was restored without much difficulty, it was clear that the Manchus still had huge problems with their food supply.<sup>85</sup>

The situation was no better under Hong Taiji. Right after becoming Jin khan he sent a letter to the Korean king expressing his concerns: "If we alone had to live on the grain produced in our country...there would be enough. But you must have heard that the Mongol khan (Ligdan) is bad and that the Mongols have been coming over to us in an endless stream. These people need to be fed, yet there is not enough grain."<sup>86</sup> The price of grain this year (1627) increased to eight times that of 1623, apparently leading to robberies and instances of cannibalism.<sup>87</sup> The Manchus therefore pressed the Koreans, their neighbors in the southeast, to give them grain on an annual basis as tribute, or else they would invade the capital. This arrangement was clarified further in the Manchu-Korean treaty of 1637. But there were limits as to how much grain even Korea could provide. They had been invaded by Japan in 1592 and experienced domestic uprisings by the military in 1624. Korea therefore provided less grain than what was hoped for. In the year 1640, for example, Hong Taiji received only one tenth of what the Manchu-Korean treaty stipulated.<sup>88</sup> Not surprisingly, expansion southward into Ming territory was seen as a way of solving the problem. A Chinese official memorialized: "As soon as the [Shanghai] Pass is open, the eight cities inside China will inevitably be ours. Once the eight cities are taken, the great empire [the Ming] will follow, and how would we then have to worry again about our people going hungry?"<sup>89</sup>

Only in 1644 then, did the Manchus finally find a solution to their food supply problems. The majority of the Manchurian population was simply relocated south from Manchuria into China,<sup>90</sup> leaving Manchuria with very little people left. Only with the later Russian incursions into the northeast would the Qing rulers again direct their full attention towards this territory.<sup>91</sup> Also, one of the first things that the Manchus did after taking Beijing was to seize a large amount of farmland in northern China. These lands were previously owned by the

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<sup>85</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 118-119.

<sup>86</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 68-69. Roth Li cites *Jiu Manzhou dang*, 7:2717; Kanda, *Mambun Rōtō*, 4:111-112.

<sup>87</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 119.

<sup>88</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 53, 56, 70.

<sup>89</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 69. Roth Li cites Luo Zhenyu, comp., *Tiancong chao chen gong zouyi* (Peking, 1924), part I, 28a.

<sup>90</sup> Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 93.

<sup>91</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus*, *The Peoples of Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), 101-103.



Ming ruling house or by private individuals. Now they were to support the Banners and various high ranking Manchus.<sup>92</sup> It would take many decades before food problems or overpopulation was voiced as major concerns again.



In the preceding pages I've tried to show that ideological motives and a desire to find food for the ever increasing population in Manchuria should be highly emphasized when explaining the Qing expansion into China and Taiwan. From the early 1600s on, the upcoming Manchu leader Nurhaci expressed ambitions to overtake the Mandate of Heaven from the Ming dynasty. His son Hong Taiji followed in his footsteps and took it a step further by building a Ming-like government. After the Manchu conquest, the Qing rulers by and large tried to be accepted as heavenly mandated sovereigns by their new Chinese subjects.

But as Perdue rightly emphasizes, "From...[1615] until the conquest of Beijing, the urgent need for grain supplies became a major factor in the expansion of the state."<sup>93</sup> Nurhaci, Hong Taiji, and some of their government officials expressed their concerns about this, and rebellions in Manchuria also testify to this subsistence crisis. After taking China most of the Manchurian population was shipped south, and farmlands were appropriated to make sure that the Manchus had a solid base of support.

## 2.4 The Founding of the Russian Empire

The Russian Empire (or Muscovy before the eighteenth century)<sup>94</sup> started its ascension to power in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when Mongol control of Russia began to deteriorate. The Mongols, it is well known, stormed out of the Mongolian steppes in the beginning of the thirteenth century and managed to subjugate much of Eurasia. One of many states that fell before them was the Russian Kievan Rus (conquered in 1237-41). The huge Mongol Empire eventually split in four, and each branch was ruled by a descendant of their

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<sup>92</sup> Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221, 223.

<sup>93</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 117.

<sup>94</sup> As David Moon notes, "Muscovy is the name often given to the Russian state before the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725)." David Moon, "Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia's Frontiers, 1550-1897," *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 4 (December 1997): 859n1. Then, in 1721 Peter proclaimed that the Russian state had been transformed into an *imperii* (or empire). Perdue, *China Marches West*, 84.

first great leader, the famous Chinggis Khan (c.1162-1227). Among these successor polities were the Yuan dynasty in China, established by Chinggis' grandson Khubilai, and the Golden Horde in Russia, established by Chinggis' grandson Batu.<sup>95</sup>

Although the Golden Horde controlled Russia for about two centuries, their power weakened as time went by, and especially from the end of the fourteenth century. The main reason for the Golden Horde's decline was domestic fragmentation. Other states began to rise in the Horde's realm, and Muscovy was one of these states. In 1380 the Muscovite prince Dmitri Donskoi managed to defeat the Mongol Mamay's forces. Although formal independence from the Golden Horde was not yet achieved (it would have to wait until the next century), Muscovy had begun its rise to power.<sup>96</sup>

Under Ivan III (the Great, ruled 1462-1505) and Vasili III (ruled 1505-33) Muscovy annexed the other political entities in Russia (Novgorod, Pskov, Riazan, Rostov, Tver', Viatka, and Yaroslavl), and Ivan III has by historians in Russia been titled "the gatherer of the Russian lands."<sup>97</sup> Also, in 1481 Ivan terminated the tribute payments to the Golden Horde. The Horde later disintegrated, and other political groupings sprung up in its stead. These were the khanates of Astrakhan', the Crimea, and Kazan', in addition to the Noghays. Under Ivan IV (the Terrible, ruled 1533-84) Kazan' and Astrakhan' were incorporated into Muscovy.<sup>98</sup> As Walter G. Moss notes, these triumphs, occurring in 1552 and 1556 respectively, "paved the way for further eastward expansion [into Siberia] and the development of an increasingly multinational, multicultural empire."<sup>99</sup>

## 2.5 Russia Conquers Siberia (1581-1689)

Ivan the Terrible's victory over Kazan' in 1552 made the mineral-rich land of Perm available to Russian emigrants. A merchant called Gregory Stroganov was in 1558 allowed by Ivan to establish a tax- and customs-free enterprise here. The Sibir' Khanate, a political entity located just east of the Urals with its center in the vicinity of today's Tobol'sk, believed this to be

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<sup>95</sup> For a brief introduction to the thirteenth-century Mongolian conquest of Eurasia consult Ebrey, *Illustrated History of China*, 169-173. For an account of the Mongol conquest of Kievan Rus, consult Walter G. Moss, *A History of Russia*, vol. 1: To 1917 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 72-75.

<sup>96</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 74-78.

<sup>97</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 92-97.

<sup>98</sup> For a more thorough account of these events consult Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800*, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), Chapter 3.

<sup>99</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 137-139, quote from 138-139.

their land, however. As a consequence it was repeatedly raided by the Sibir' khan Kuchum's troops.<sup>100</sup> This led Gregory's nephew to recruit a Cossack named Ermak Timofeevich to serve as protector for his properties. This was an individual previously leading "a freebooting pirate's life plundering caravans and Tsarist officials along the Don and Volga rivers."<sup>101</sup> Ermak and his army headed for Siberia in 1581, and they attacked and conquered the Sibir' capital in 1582. Kuchum managed to escape, however, but he was never able to take back what he had lost. Although Ermak and the major share of his troops perished in 1585, Kuchum himself got killed in 1598.<sup>102</sup>

The Sibir' Khanate was the last major polity to stand in the way of the Russians in Siberia. After the death of Ermak in 1585, the Russian government began dispatching *voevody* (governors) and Russian troops into Kuchum's former territories. These *voevody* and their troops then started constructing Russian fortresses, helping to consolidate their position in this new region. Tiumen', the first of these forts, was established in 1586, then followed Tobol'sk in 1587 and Tara in 1594. Further east, Naryn was erected in 1596, Eniseisk was built in 1619 and Yakutsk was constructed in 1632. In 1649 the Russians stood on the shores of the Pacific Ocean.<sup>103</sup> The Russian's eastward march was helped forward by Siberia's many rivers and flat landscape, by smallpox and other diseases killing off a large part of the native population,<sup>104</sup> and by the absence of a major foreign competitor. The only power denying the Russians full access to Siberia was actually the Qing, when the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk resulted in Russia acknowledging Qing control of the area south from the Stanovoi Mountains down to the Amur River.<sup>105</sup> The process leading up to the materialization of this treaty will be discussed more fully in a later section of this chapter.

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<sup>100</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 28-30.

<sup>101</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 86.

<sup>102</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 30-31; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 86-87.

<sup>103</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 31, 33-34; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 84, 86-87.

<sup>104</sup> As James Forsyth reminds us, however, despite their relatively few numbers (which according to Walter G. Moss was about 200,000 at the start of the Russian expansion), and despite being vulnerable to Russian diseases, the native's resistance to Russian encroachments were at times severe and highly organized. Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 35-38, 45-46, 57-60, 64-66, 76-77, 79-83, 89-92, 95-98; Moss, *A History of Russia*, 182. It has nevertheless been played down in many historical accounts, and particularly those written by Soviet historians, since they like to portray this expansion as anything but a conquest, and instead put heavy focus on the "peaceful" settlement of Siberia by the Russians...[as contrasted to] the violent and destructive colonization of other parts of the world by West European countries, which resulted in the annihilation of whole peoples and their cultures". Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 109-111, quote from 110. Still, the native's resistance was not effective enough to stop the Russians from conquering Siberia.

<sup>105</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 182, 184-185.

## 2.6 Siberia and Russian Goals

What motivated this extraordinary expansion by the Russians? As we shall see, resources (furs and to a lesser extent minerals) were the almost exclusive motive for the Russians in this case. Other objectives played a very small role. This was therefore a very different expansion from the Qing conquest of China and Taiwan in which, as already discussed, ideology and overpopulation were the central factors.

The Sibir' khan Kuchum and his predecessor Ediger Taibugid both strove to be on good terms with Muscovy. Ediger made tribute payments to Ivan the Terrible, but this changed when Kuchum took over in 1563. His refusal to pay tribute did not mean open hostility to Muscovy, however, as he still strove to be on good terms with his western neighbor.<sup>106</sup> Conflict between Muscovy and Sibir' became serious only *after* Gregory Stroganov and other Russians began settling in Perm. Ivan the Terrible, which was the one who gave Gregory permission to move here, made it clear that his mission was to “fell trees and clear farming land, bring in peasants, and extract any mineral ‘salts’ which were found.”<sup>107</sup> Minerals induced Gregory Stroganov to erect a Russian settlement in Sibir' territory, and the Russian presence was what triggered Kuchum's raids, which in turn led to Ermak's conquest of Sibir' in 1582.<sup>108</sup> Security being the immediate aim behind the destruction of Sibir', it was nevertheless the hunt for minerals that started the Russian Siberian saga.

What pulled the Russians all the way to the Pacific coast, however, were not minerals but furs (or “soft gold”). The Russians had for a long time exported furs to Europe, the Ottoman Empire (before 1453 the Byzantine Empire) and Persia (after taking Kazan' and Astrakhan') in exchange for foreign products such as weapons, clothing, food, and other items.<sup>109</sup> These furs came from the many types of animals residing in Russia's northern forests and in Siberia.<sup>110</sup> Muscovy had made attempts at getting furs from Siberia even before the destruction of Sibir', by passing the Ural Mountains using a northeastern route. After Sibir' was taken, however, the Russians could now pursue “soft gold” directly from Siberia.<sup>111</sup> The native peoples residing here were not able to stop the Russian onslaught, though resistance nevertheless was substantial (see note 52). What happened was that “the natives were coerced into submission and then directly exploited as producers of wealth. Wherever the Muscovites

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<sup>106</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 86.

<sup>107</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 29.

<sup>108</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 29-30; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 86.

<sup>109</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 38, 40.

<sup>110</sup> Moon, "Peasant Migration," 873.

<sup>111</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 84, 86.

extended their territory in northern Eurasia they used armed force to exact regular tribute – *yasak* – from the natives, and this was the principal means of obtaining sable and other furs for the treasury.”<sup>112</sup> At the beginning of the seventeenth century, every native adult male had to pay 22 sable furs annually to the Russians. Half a century later the annual quota was reduced to 5, since there were so few of these animals left.<sup>113</sup> The Russian Siberian expansion halted only when they found out at there were no furs (or animals with furs) in the area being expanded into. Such was the case with the territory of the Chukchis in the northeastern branch of Siberia where, although these people were determined resisters to the Russian expansion in the beginning of the eighteenth century, the absence of sables in their lands probably was the chief reason for them not suffering a large Russian offensive until later in the eighteenth century. The same was true of the steppes south of western Siberia, in which the Russian advance also stopped because there were no furs to be found here.<sup>114</sup>

But was resources the only thing that the Russians sought? Unlike the Qing, at least, ideology and overpopulation was not central motives. Although there were Orthodox clergy in Russia which wanted to make converts out of the Siberian natives, since this also meant that they couldn't pay *yasak*, it was not favored by the government.<sup>115</sup> Also, though there certainly were peasants who moved into Siberia after it was “laid open” by Ermak, it was not on a very large scale. In 1678 only 1,32% of all Russian peasants lived in Siberia, and this had increased to only 3,04% in the beginning of the eighteenth century.<sup>116</sup> The Russian population (at least in and around Moscow) was actually declining at the very same time that the Siberian expansion began,<sup>117</sup> so it clearly wasn't a food hunt that the Russians were pursuing. The Russian peasants that moved into Siberia were to supply food for the local Russian establishment, not to send its surplus back westward to Moscow. But even making new farmland became secondary if it was pursued at the expense of *yasak*. In Yakutsk, a group of Siberian natives complained to Moscow of encroaching Russian peasants. The Muscovite authorities ordered that these peasants be stopped since the natives said they otherwise would be “unable to catch sufficient fur-bearing animals to pay their tribute (*yasak*).”<sup>118</sup> It was resources, therefore, that made the Russians expand into Siberia.

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<sup>112</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 41.

<sup>113</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 182.

<sup>114</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 37, 76, 81, 83.

<sup>115</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 185.

<sup>116</sup> Moon, "Peasant Migration," 864.

<sup>117</sup> Peter C. Perdue, "Military Mobilization in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century China, Russia, and Mongolia," *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 769.

<sup>118</sup> Moon, "Peasant Migration," 877, 883, quote from 883.

## 2.7 The Clash in Northern Manchuria (1643-1689)

I have discussed the Qing expansion into China and Taiwan and the Russian expansion into Siberia. In the midst of these conquests, however, the two empires eventually collided in the Amur region in northern Manchuria. As discussed above, the Russians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wanted furs and expanded into Siberia with this goal in mind. As a part of this process they entered the Amur region in 1643. The problem was that this territory was a (peripheral) part of the Qing Empire. After some 50 years of Qing-Russian clashes the two empires managed to agree on an inter-imperial border. The agreement was reached at the Russian fort of Nerchinsk in the summer of 1689.

Although certainly a part of the Qing Empire when the Russians entered in 1643, the Amur region was not the core of the pre-1644 Qing state. It was only under Hong Taiji that this territory was brought into the Qing realm.<sup>119</sup> But in 1644 the Qing expanded into China, and most of the Qing population and army moved out of Manchuria. It was precisely at this time that the Russians moved in.

Why did the Russians enter the Amur? Although furs were the overarching goal for the Russian expansion into Siberia, the Amur region was also seen as a source of food for the already established Siberian garrisons. Because the forests in Siberia couldn't produce enough food to fully support them, the Russian garrisons were unable to persist without additional food shipments sent from European Russia.<sup>120</sup> This was especially the case with the garrisons located in central and eastern Siberia. Although a sizable peasant community grew up in western Siberia, further eastward the climate became more hostile (most areas were frozen all year round) so that practicing agriculture became less feasible. Central and eastern Siberia was of course also farther away from European Russia, so that when at the end of the 1630s news spread of the favorable agricultural conditions prevailing in the Amur region to the south, this "could not but act as a magnet on the Russians."<sup>121</sup>

The Russian expedition that was the first to enter the Amur region set off in 1643, and its leader was Vasily Poyarkov. After plundering the local population for furs and people, he eventually withdrew back north to Yakutsk. Once there he "confirmed that the Amur valley

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<sup>119</sup> For two separate (although slightly diverging) accounts of this process see Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 194-196; Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 103-104.

<sup>120</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 87. By "European Russia" is meant the Russian Empire located to the west of the Urals. The Russian Empire to the east of the Urals is usually called "Asiatic Russia."

<sup>121</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 100-101, 103-104, quote from 103.

could be a source of grain for the Tsar's soldiers in Eastern Siberia."<sup>122</sup> As he said, "The warriors of the Sovereign will not go hungry in this land."<sup>123</sup> The next big Russian incursion came in 1650, and the leader this time was Erofei Pavlovich Khabarov. The Qing, who at this time was busy expanding into China, sent troops to kick Khabarov out, but they were unable to accomplish their objective. Nevertheless, because they eventually learned why the Russians expanded into the Amur, the native grain-producing Jurchens and Daur were relocated away from the invaders by the Manchus. In 1658 the Qing armies were successful in expelling the Russians, as Onufry Stepanov, who continued the Russian Amur expansion after Khabarov, was killed after a Qing fleet hunted him down.<sup>124</sup>

The Qing, however, was still not satisfied with the situation in northern Manchuria. A Manchurian governor wrote to the smallpox-stricken Shunzhi emperor in 1661 that "The migration to China of the Eight Banners, in combination with restrictions on immigration from China, had left Manchuria underpopulated, its cities falling into ruins, its field untended, [and] its perimeters without adequate defenses."<sup>125</sup> In short, "the entire region was vulnerable to conquest by Russians or Mongols."<sup>126</sup>

His warnings turned out to be well placed, as the Russians soon reentered the Amur region. The intruders this time were Cossacks fleeing from the oppression of the Siberian military governors or *voevody*. Siberia had always been vulnerable to Cossack rebellions, and from the 1650s onward several such rebellions took place. Because the Amur's wealth at this point was well known in Siberia, many of the rebellious Cossacks decided to flee there. In 1665, one such group entered the Amur and settled in Albazin (a town that in 1650 was fortified by Khabarov<sup>127</sup> but apparently taken over and later abandoned by the native Daur after his departure in 1652). Thereafter they started collecting tribute from the local natives. This tribute they sent to Moscow, who because of this forgave them their crimes. In 1684 Albazin "became officially part of the Russian Empire."<sup>128</sup>

It was precisely at this time that the Qing expansion into China and Taiwan was completed, and so the Manchus could now redirect their attention and military forces from rebellious generals in southern China towards Russian intruders in northern Manchuria. The Russians

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<sup>122</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 104.

<sup>123</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 87. Perdue cites George V. Lantzeff and Richard Pierce, *Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), 159.

<sup>124</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 104-105.

<sup>125</sup> Crossley, *The Manchus*, 102-103, quote from 103.

<sup>126</sup> Crossley, *The Manchus*, 103.

<sup>127</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 87.

<sup>128</sup> Forsyth, *The Peoples of Siberia*, 106-107, quote from 107.

came under attack by Qing forces in 1685, and Albazin was captured by the Manchus. The Russians would not let themselves be expelled, however, and by the next year they had reentered the Amur and Albazin. The Manchus continued to attack, but the Russians would not back down. Both the Russians and the Qing then opted for finding a more peaceful way of solving this long-lasting dispute.<sup>129</sup>

The Qing-Russian talks took place in July 1689 at the Russian fort of Nerchinsk. After fierce negotiations a border was agreed upon. The Russians were to hand over Albazin, but would in turn be allowed to sell Siberian furs in Beijing, thus opening up an additional “soft gold” market. As Perdue writes, “food shortages in Siberia drew the Russian state to the Amur, but the primary importance of the fur trade led them to give it back to the Chinese [or Qing].”<sup>130</sup> For the Qing in turn, having Russia as their northern neighbor was also beneficial. The natives and other peoples in this region were now forced to become either Qing or Russian subjects, increasing Qing (and also Russian) control in this fluid and ambiguous borderland. Perhaps most important of all, the Russians were forbidden to offer any kind of help to the Junghar Khanate in Eastern Turkestan,<sup>131</sup> who by the late seventeenth century had become a serious Qing rival, and who from this point onward until the Qing annexation of Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59 drove Qing expansion first into Mongolia and Hami, then Tibet, Turfan, and Kokonor, and last into Central Asia. These expansions are discussed in the next chapter.

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<sup>129</sup> Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 150-152.

<sup>130</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 88.

<sup>131</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 161-173.



### **3 Drama in Central Asia: The Qing, Russia, the Junghars, and the Qazaqs (1690-1820)**

We have now arrived at the main chapter of this thesis, which is where I discuss the Qing, Russia and their respective actions towards Central Asia in the eighteenth century. This period's central event is the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan in the years 1755-59. Before the Qing conquest Eastern Turkestan was home to the Junghar Khanate, and an examination of the relationship between the Qing and the Junghars is therefore necessary for understanding the events of 1755-59. We shall see that the war between the Qing and the Junghars, which started in 1690, led the Qing to expand into Mongolia, Hami, Tibet, Turfan and Kokonor before they took Eastern Turkestan itself in the middle of the eighteenth century. These earlier conquests are in my thesis therefore treated as a part of the Eastern Turkestan expansion (Hami and Turfan *is* in fact a part of Eastern Turkestan). What goals did the Qing have with the destruction of the Junghar Khanate? How does the relationship between the Qing and the Junghars compare with the contemporary Russian relationship with Western Turkestan and the Qazaq nomads residing here? It is important to know that the Russians didn't incorporate Western Turkestan into their empire in this period, although their influence there increased considerably (actual Russian expansion into Western Turkestan occurred only in the nineteenth century and will therefore not be discussed in this thesis). Perhaps the eighteenth century Russians abstained from expanding because they viewed the Qazaqs differently than the Qing viewed the Junghars?

#### **3.1 The Founding of the Junghar Khanate**

I will first examine the origins of the Junghar Khanate. The Junghars were a part of the Oyrat federation, a rubric applied to a group of Mongolian tribes that originally lived on the western side of Lake Balkhash<sup>132</sup> in modern Kazakhstan. In the beginning of the seventeenth century the Oyrats consisted of the Derbets, Khoshots and Torghuts in addition to the Junghars. In 1635 Batur Khun-tayiji (ruled 1635-53) took over as Junghar leader and it was under him that

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<sup>132</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 80-81n10.

the Junghars began to rise above the other Oyrat tribes and start the construction of the Junghar Khanate centered in Jungharia.<sup>133</sup>

Like his Russian and Manchu counterparts, Batur Khun-tayiji faced many challenges in his quest for power. One of his many problems was the inadequacy of the Oyrats' domestic resources. Like other state building nomads, Batur Khun-tayiji "had to rely on resources from outside, extracting wealth through trade, tribute, or plunder."<sup>134</sup> Russia became a major Oyrat trading partner, and at Tobol'sk in Siberia "the [Junghars] exchanged their horses, cattle, sheepskins, and furs for handicrafts made of cloth, leather, silk, silver, walrus ivory, and metal."<sup>135</sup>

Batur Khun-tayiji's other major problem was that he was not directly related to Chinggis Khan. This made him unfit to the title of Junghar Khan, and he was therefore not able to conduct a proper unification of the Oyrat groups and put an end to the long tradition of inter-Oyrat conflicts. In 1625-35 two Oyrat tribes had actually left Jungharia, the Khoshots traveling to Kokonor and the Torghuts emigrating to the Volga, and Batur Khun-tayiji was not able to make them come back.<sup>136</sup> As we shall see, these two groups of Oyrats would later play significant roles in the drama of Qing and Russian state expansion.

In 1653 Batur Khun-tayiji passed away, and this led to further Oyrat fragmentation. Batur Khun-tayiji had nine sons, and among them Sengge became his successor, but he was killed in 1670 by his own brothers. Another of Batur Khun-tayiji's sons, Galdan (ruled 1670-97), who were at a lamasery in Tibet when Sengge died, traveled back to the Oyrats to assume leadership. He "became the great unifying leader the [Oyrat] Mongols needed".<sup>137</sup> To increase the amount of resources under his control, Galdan and his Oyrat forces in 1678-80 expanded into the oasis towns in the Tarim and Turfan regions (see Map 3). These territories supplied the Oyrats with agricultural produce, manpower, mercantile products, minerals and various advanced technologies.<sup>138</sup> For example, the Junghars shipped many Turks from the Tarim Basin north to Ili to be farmers (these Turks came to be called Taranchi).<sup>139</sup> When it came to the problem of Chinggis Khan and ancestral connections to him, Galdan received help from the Dalai Lama. In 1678 the Tibetan leader "bestowed upon Galdan the title 'Boshugtu Khan', khan by divine grace, essentially licensing Galdan to use the khanal title despite his lack of

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<sup>133</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 102-105.

<sup>134</sup> Perdue, "Military Mobilization," 763.

<sup>135</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 106-107, quote from 106.

<sup>136</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 101-105.

<sup>137</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 108-109, quote from 109.

<sup>138</sup> Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural History," 50-51.

<sup>139</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 351.

Chinggisid ancestry.”<sup>140</sup> By 1680, then, Galdan stood at the head of the powerful Junghar Khanate covering the entire region of Eastern Turkestan.

## 3.2 The Junghars and the Qing Conquest of Eastern Turkestan (1690-1759)

Let us pause briefly and look at the state of affairs in the beginning of the 1680s. The Qing Empire was now about to finish its southward expansion into China and Taiwan, and Galdan and his Junghars had established a strong state in Eastern Turkestan. To the northeast of the Junghars, however, the Khalkha Mongols in the north of Mongolia<sup>141</sup> were in the midst of a civil war, as the two Khalkha “wings” battled each other. With the help of Qing and Tibetan mediation, in 1686 the Khalkhas eventually gave up their fighting. Inter-Khalkha hostilities soon resurfaced, however. In 1687 the Tüsiyetü Khan (who was part of the “eastern wing”) attacked the Jasaktu Khan (who was part of the “western wing”) and killed him. A brother of Galdan, Dorjizhabu, who had fought for the Jasaktu Khan also died. This led to a direct Junghar attack on the Khalkhas in 1688, resulting in the Khalkha tribes fleeing both north to the Russians and south to the Qing. Other Khalkhas surrendered to the Junghars. In 1690 Galdan attacked again, but this time the Qing took offensive action. With the help of the previous year’s Nerchinsk treaty (see Chapter 2), the Russians had been persuaded to stay out of Junghar affairs. The Qing sent its forces into Mongolia, and they met the Junghar army at Ulan Butong. The Qing beat the Junghars, although Galdan was able to flee. In his absence, however, in 1691 the Qing emperor Kangxi (ruled 1662-1722) fully incorporated the various Khalkha Mongols into his state. Galdan and his Junghars, however, were still at large, but the war against them had been initiated.<sup>142</sup>

The next Qing-Junghar battle came about in 1696, much further out in Mongolia at Jao Modo. Galdan was again moving into Khalkha territories, and Kangxi mobilized his forces to meet him. Galdan was defeated, and he lost most of his army.<sup>143</sup> The next year, in 1697, Galdan died. Kangxi was satisfied and proclaimed: “Now Galdan is dead, and his followers

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<sup>140</sup> Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 90 (quote); Perdue, *China Marches West*, 104.

<sup>141</sup> Roth Li, “State Building before 1644,” 56.

<sup>142</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 144-161, 174-180.

<sup>143</sup> Perdue, “Military Mobilization,” 764-766.

have come back to our allegiance. My great task is done.”<sup>144</sup> Although Galdan certainly had died, Kangxi was wrong about the Junghars as a whole, as they certainly did not “come back to Qing allegiance” at this time. Still, the conflicts with Galdan led to the incorporation of Hami into the Qing state. In 1697, after the Junghars lost the confrontation at Jao Modo but before Galdan’s death, Hami’s ruler ‘Abdu-llāh took custody of Galdan’s son, whom he subsequently sent to the Qing capital. Later, after Galdan had passed away, ‘Abdu-llāh captured and transferred to the Qing another of Galdan’s sons. In 1698 “The Kangxi emperor [therefore] showed his appreciation by endorsing ‘Abdu-llāh’s rule and bringing Hami firmly into the empire.”<sup>145</sup> Another piece of territory had been brought under Beijing’s control.

So far the Qing war against the Junghars had led to the Khalkha Mongols and Hami being brought inside the Qing borders. The Junghars themselves, however, remained alive and well in Eastern Turkestan. A nephew of Galdan called Tsewang Rabdan (ruled 1697-1727) replaced his uncle as leader of the khanate, although it seems that he did not inherit the “Boshugtu Khan”-title that Galdan had used. Still, “He had obtained from the Dalai Lama the title of Erdeni Zoriqtu [Khun-tayiji] in 1694.”<sup>146</sup> As James Millward frankly put it, “The Tibetan connection was critical to the growth and legitimacy of the [Junghar] state.”<sup>147</sup> And it was precisely in Tibet that the next big confrontation between the Qing and the Junghars would occur.

For the first eighteen years of his reign, Tsewang Rabdan maintained peace with the Qing but had hostile relations with the Qazaqs and the Russians. It was not until 1715 that he confronted the Manchus. This year he attacked Hami, but the Hami ruler supported by Qing troops forced him to pull back.<sup>148</sup> Two years later, however, Tsewang Rabdan’s “cousin Chereng Dondub achieved the astonishing feat of marching an army through the [Kunlun] mountains and seizing control of Tibet.” (see Map 4)<sup>149</sup> Tibet was certainly not part of the Qing Empire at this time, but the man in charge in Lhasa (a Khoshot Mongol called Lazang Khan) had been supported by Kangxi when he conquered the country in 1705. We have seen earlier that the Junghars, and Galdan especially, had made good use of his “Tibetan connection,” and a Qing supporter in charge in Lhasa was therefore bad news for Tsewang

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<sup>144</sup> Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 154-156, quote from 155. Spence cites Okada Hidehiro, *Kōkitei no tegami* (Tokyo, 1979).

<sup>145</sup> L. J. Newby, "The Begg of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 61, no. 2 (1998): 286.

<sup>146</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 209-210, quote from 210.

<sup>147</sup> Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 90.

<sup>148</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 209-212, 229.

<sup>149</sup> Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 160.

Rabdan. Also, Lazang Khan was unpopular among many Tibetan lamas, who wanted Tsewang Rabdan to overthrow him.<sup>150</sup> But the Junghar invasion in 1717 led Kangxi to react, and in 1720 the Tibetan capital was taken by the Qing. “With the support of both Tibetans and the Kokonor Mongols the [Qing]...successfully established its own claimant as the Seventh Dalai Lama. After the main armies...had withdrawn, the emperor ordered a strong garrison force left in Lhasa, thus inaugurating the period of direct [Qing] intervention in Tibetan life and politics.”<sup>151</sup>

Qing expansion did not stop there, however. In the beginning of the 1720s, Turfan and Kokonor were conquered as well. Like the previous expansions into Mongolia, Hami and Tibet, the conquests of Turfan and Kokonor were an outcome of the conflicts between the Qing and the Junghars. As noted, Tsewang Rabdan attacked Hami unsuccessfully in 1715, but this attack was meant as a diversion for his forthcoming conquest of Lhasa. Nevertheless, Kangxi started planning for a counterattack westward from Hami. After many delays because of problems with the logistics, in 1717 the Qing forces finally moved, but because they learned of Tsewang Rabdan’s plans to take Lhasa the expansion was brought to a halt. Nevertheless, after Lhasa was secured in 1720 the westward expansion from Hami was resumed. This led to Turfan, the large oasis laying to the west of Hami, falling into Qing hands the same year.<sup>152</sup> Then it was Kokonor that became the center of attention.

The dominant ethnic group in Kokonor was the Khoshot Mongols. These were the same Khoshots that had fled from Batur Khun-tayiji and the Junghars into Kokonor in the seventeenth century. From their new homeland in Kokonor they had been able to secure the role as military protectors of the Tibetan government in Lhasa. The Qing’s occupation of Lhasa in 1720, however, put an end to that tradition. This resulted in discontent and civil war breaking out in Kokonor. The new Qing emperor Yongzheng (ruled 1723-35) more than anything feared a Junghar intervention in this civil war, and that the Kokonor Mongols and the Junghars would join in an anti-Qing alliance. But Tsewang Rabdan at this time was occupied with the Qazaqs and the Russians, so the intervention never came. The Qing, however, did intervene. In 1723 Qing forces invaded Kokonor and subdued the Khoshots, and from then on Kokonor was Qing territory.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 228-229.

<sup>151</sup> Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 160.

<sup>152</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 229-232.

<sup>153</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 227, 243-247.

In 1723 the Qing and the Junghars had been at war for more than three decades, although as we have seen the major events can be narrowed down to the periods 1690-98 (when Kangxi turned hostile on Galdan and the Khalkha Mongols and Hami were incorporated into the Qing) and 1715-23 (when Kangxi and Yongzheng fought against Tsewang Rabdan and took Tibet, Turfan and Kokonor). But even after these Qing expansions, Eastern Turkestan itself was unincorporated. The Junghar Khanate still existed. In 1726, however, Yongzheng wanted to do something about that, as he now started preparing to expand into Eastern Turkestan as well. "In 1727 the [Qing] concluded the Treaty of Khiakta with Russia, settling the border between Siberia and Mongolia."<sup>154</sup> When the Qing had negotiated with the Russians in 1689, the Siberian-Mongolian border had been left unsettled because the Khalkhas at this time were still not Qing subjects. But as we have seen, in 1691 the Khalkhas were brought under the Qing umbrella, so that this question could now be laid to rest. Potential Russian cooperation with the Junghars had once again been eliminated, and the Qing could now continue with their expansions. In 1731 Turfan was repeatedly raided by the Junghars, and Yongzheng ordered the expansion to commence.<sup>155</sup> Still, "Despite a total expenditure of almost 130 million taels, the forces assembled by [Yongzheng] were almost wiped out in 1731. A minor victory in 1732 allowed the [Qing] the opportunity to call a truce with the [Junghars] without a complete loss of face."<sup>156</sup>

The Qing-Junghar truce was formalized in 1739 when the next Qing emperor Qianlong (ruled 1736-95) and the Junghar khan Galdan Tseren (ruled 1727-45) stabilized the relationship between their two states. As with the Russians, the Junghars could trade with the Qing on a regular basis, and a border between the two states was drawn. The Qing-Junghar trade expanded greatly in the years that followed, and it was maintained until 1754, the year before Qing forces invaded Eastern Turkestan and put a permanent end to the Junghar Khanate.<sup>157</sup> As it turned out, Galdan Tseren's reign was to be the last stable ruling period for the Junghars. After he died in 1745 the khanate disintegrated, as internal fighting broke out. Amursana and Dawaci eventually emerged as the two main contenders for power, but after Dawaci won against Amursana, the latter in 1754 fled eastward and asked Qianlong to intervene. Qing forces together with Amursana then headed for Jungharia, which they took

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<sup>154</sup> Madeleine Zelin, "The Yung-cheng Reign," in *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 227.

<sup>155</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 169, 250, 252-253.

<sup>156</sup> Zelin, "The Yung-cheng Reign," 227. Only 2000 out of a total of 50 000 Qing soldiers survived the battle. Perdue, "Military Mobilization," 767.

<sup>157</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 256-265.

without much effort in 1755. Most of the Qing forces eventually withdrew. Amursana then declared that he was to be the new Junghar khan and killed the Qing troops that were left. In 1756 Qianlong therefore had to organize a second campaign into Jungharia, and this time he showed no mercy. Every Junghar was to be killed, the only exception being the old, women and children. These were to be converted into slaves. As if this was not enough, the Junghars also suffered a smallpox outbreak at this time, and many of them fled from Jungharia to Russia and elsewhere. The result of these events was that Jungharia, which formerly had housed around 1 million people, became practically empty of human inhabitants. The Qing also sent its armies south from Jungharia into Altishar in 1758, and by 1759 they had conquered all of the oasis cities laying here. Thus the entire region of Eastern Turkestan was annexed by the Qing (see Map 5).<sup>158</sup> Nine years after these events had transpired (1768), the new Qing territories were rechristened “Xinjiang” (“New Dominion”),<sup>159</sup> which is the name that it is known by today.



I have now described the Qing war against the Junghars, which lasted from 1690 until the Qing finally conquered the Junghar state itself in the middle of the eighteenth century. But why did the Qing need to destroy the Junghars and conquer Eastern Turkestan? What were their concrete motives?

### 3.3 The Junghars as a Military Threat

This may seem like a naive question to ask. Since the Qing and the Junghars conducted warfare for so many years, didn't the Qing need to eliminate its foe? Wasn't security the most important aim? By this rationale the Junghar Khanate was a military threat, and the Qing answered this threat by destroying it. This may indeed be the most frequently encountered explanation for the conquest, and especially if the Qing Empire is viewed as the last in a long line of “Chinese” dynasties, and the Junghars in turn is seen as the last of the many nomadic groups that existed to the north and west of China. After all, one of the first theorems

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<sup>158</sup> Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 94-96; Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural History," 53-54.

<sup>159</sup> Marwyn S. Samuels, "Kung Tzu-Chen's New Sinkiang," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 66, no. 3 (1976): 418.

encountered by the beginner student of Chinese history is that China (or more concretely the many dynasties that through history existed in the north of China<sup>160</sup>) had repeated unfriendly encounters with the nomads from Mongolia and Central Asia. This was the grand clash between the agricultural world of China and the pastoral world of the steppes. One of the earliest and most famous confrontations is perhaps that between the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) and the Xiongnu nomadic confederation. A few centuries later the Tang dynasty (618-906) would battle with the Türks.<sup>161</sup> The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) also struggled with the nomads, as the Mongols proved themselves quite capable of raiding the Ming frontier and north China. More than once they attacked Beijing, and in 1449 the Ming emperor Zhengtong was even abducted by the Mongols.<sup>162</sup> Thus we may read that since the Qing managed to permanently conquer the nomads, they terminated “2,000 years of defence [sic] problems.”<sup>163</sup>

And it is true that both the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors made references to past events when discussing the Junghars and Eastern Turkestan. After the Qing and the Junghars had fought at Jao Modo in 1696, Kangxi’s historians wrote that “Now the deserts are permanently cleared, and the border is secure. This is an achievement rarely seen in history books. The Han could not do this to the Xiongnu, Tang could not do this to the [Türks].”<sup>164</sup> In 1730 the Yongzheng emperor, as part of his famous text *Dayi Juemilu* (“Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion”), a compilation created in response to the discovery of anti-Manchu views expressed by a Hunanese teacher named Zeng Jing, justified Manchu rule on the grounds that they, unlike the Han and the Tang, had managed to incorporate all the peoples in the northwest into the polity. As is noted by Perdue, this was before the 1731 defeat of the Qing by the Junghars, so that he could say with some conviction that the Junghars also were (or soon would be) brought into the Qing.<sup>165</sup> In the Qianlong reign, “After the initial victory over [Dawaci] in 1755...the Qianlong emperor ordered the compilation of three major geographic works on the new Qing territories, including large-scale maps, a large gazetteer

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<sup>160</sup> As is noted by James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, “Though much cultural and institutional continuity links the states ruling in northern China from the second century BCE to the present, to refer to them universally as “China” is a gross simplification.” Millward and Perdue, “Political and Cultural History,” 28-29.

<sup>161</sup> Both of these encounters are discussed in Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 17-25, 30-39.

<sup>162</sup> The Ming’s struggle against the Mongols is discussed in Perdue, *China Marches West*, 52-66.

<sup>163</sup> Ebrey, *Illustrated History of China*, 227.

<sup>164</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 190. Perdue cites Zhang Yushu comp., *Qinzheng Pingding Shuomo Fanglue* (Chronicle of the Emperor’s Personal Expeditions to Pacify the Northwest Frontier) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian, 1708), *juan* 25 KX 35/5 *guiyou*.

<sup>165</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 470-474.



and a glossary of names.”<sup>166</sup> In the last two of these works, one of the most important aims was to link the Eastern Turkestan now under Qing control with the Eastern Turkestan of Han and Tang times. Both of them put heavy emphasis on showing how this region was like under the Han, Tang and other eras.<sup>167</sup> Finally, in 1792 Qianlong “began to style himself ‘Old Man of the Ten Complete Victories’ (*Shi Quan Lao Ren*), after an essay in which he boldly declared he had surpassed, in ‘Ten Complete Military Victories’ (*Shi Quan Wu Gong*), the far-reaching westward expansions of the great Han... and Tang... empires.”<sup>168</sup> It would seem that there is good reason for including the Qing-Junghar conflict in the “China versus the nomads”-tradition, at least if based on the expressions of the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors outlined above.

But it is important to emphasize that there are many differences between the Qing conquest of Eastern Turkestan and the situation under earlier dynasties. In Han times, the Xiongnu nomads entered northern China, that is, the Han Empire itself, repeatedly in order to raid and acquire supplies.<sup>169</sup> For the Tang as well, the Türks at several times attacked and penetrated the Tang borders. Their “incursions into the area around the capital [Chang’an] became so serious that late in 624 the city itself had to be placed under martial law.”<sup>170</sup> The Ming, as described above, experienced Mongol incursions into their empire, resulting in attacks on Beijing and other misfortunes. In short, the nomad adversaries of the Han, Tang and Ming were a real and serious military threat. With the Qing and the Junghars it was different. Kangxi’s first battle with the Junghars in 1690 was instigated not by Junghar raids on Qing borders, but by Galdan moving into *Mongolia*. Even though Immanuel C. Y. Hsü once wrote that Galdan in 1690 “apparently...[had] the intention of taking [Beijing]”,<sup>171</sup> Perdue argues that Galdan had no plans to attack the Qing capital at this time. When Galdan turned hostile on the Khalkhas in 1688, Galdan’s nephew Tsewang Rabdan (the same individual that would take over as Junghar leader after Galdan’s death in 1697) rebelled against and greatly

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<sup>166</sup> James A. Millward, “‘Coming onto the Map’: ‘Western Regions’ Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang,” *Late Imperial China* 20, no. 2 (December 1999): 69.

<sup>167</sup> James A. Millward discusses these projects in addition to similar works produced by private individuals in Millward, “‘Coming onto the Map,’” 77-82.

<sup>168</sup> Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Commemorating War in Eighteenth-Century China,” *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 869.

<sup>169</sup> John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History*, Enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 61.

<sup>170</sup> Howard J. Wechsler, “The Founding of the T’ang Dynasty: Kao-tsu,” in *Sui and T’ang China, 589-906, Part I*, ed. Denis Twitchett, vol. 3, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 181-182, quote from 181.

<sup>171</sup> Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, “The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense Vs. Frontier Defense,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 25 (1964-1965): 221-222, quote from 222.

weakened his uncle. At the same time as Galdan fought in Mongolia, Tsewang Rabdan assaulted Hami, meaning that Galdan now faced enemies on two fronts. His army began to starve, and so the second march into Mongolia in 1690 was motivated not by conquering Beijing but by finding food and supplies to help keep his army alive. The Junghars in fact told the Qing that their expedition was directed at the Khalkhas only, and that they had no plans of advancing into Qing lands. To Kangxi, therefore, “Galdan’s forces had been reduced from a serious military threat to a starving remnant band deserving of pity.”<sup>172</sup> Despite this understanding of the situation by Kangxi, however, he chose to attack Galdan anyway. Similarly, even though after 1715 the Junghars and the Qing fought at Hami and Turfan, and the Qing invaded Tibet and Kokonor for fear of Junghar influence in these areas, it remains a fact that the Junghars never assaulted the Qing heartland itself in this period. In fact, Hami and Turfan had once been a part of the Junghar Khanate, so that the conflicts in these oases could be seen more as the Junghars trying to push back the encroaching Qing than the Qing trying to defend itself against the Junghars. Also, Yongzheng’s defeat by the Junghars in 1731 occurred after he had sent Qing forces to invade Jungharia, not because the Junghars invaded the Qing. Perhaps most importantly, during the 15 years of peaceful relations from 1739 to 1754, there was great potential for the two states to work out a new relationship based on coexistence, as they regularly traded with each other and a Qing-Junghar border had come into existence. But as Perdue notes, “at the first sign of division among the [Junghars], the [Qing] rulers were ready to embrace the military option and return to their primary goal of eliminating the [Junghar] state”.<sup>173</sup> Clearly then, there was something more than the Junghars just being a military threat to the Qing. I will now look at what ideological motives the Qing might have had with their expansion into Eastern Turkestan.

### **3.4 The Junghars as Targets of a “Civilizing Mission”**

As discussed in the introduction, an urge to “civilize” the indigenous peoples of the area brought into the polity is one type of ideological motive for state expansion. If the expanding state’s dominant ideology or religion (Christianity, Islam, Marxism, Nazism etc.) preaches that it is a good thing if other foreign peoples are converted and incorporated into the mother

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<sup>172</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 151-153, quote from 151.

<sup>173</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 269-270.

country, then we can say that to “civilize” is a potential motive for political expansion. For the European states this was often the case, with Christianity being the dominant ideology or religion (see Chapter 1). For imperial China Confucianism played much of the same role as Christianity did in Europe. The ancient Chinese term *jiaohua*, which William T. Rowe translates as “instructing and transforming or, more simply, ‘civilizing’”,<sup>174</sup> was a well known phrase for the Qing elite, and perhaps even more important, in the Chinese political tradition “performing this function effectively was both a political imperative and the most reliable index of good governance.”<sup>175</sup> The potential targets for this “transformation” included people both inside and at the edges of China. In short, a well-functioning Chinese imperial government was expected to civilize the peoples in and around the empire and make them follow Confucian rules of right and wrong.<sup>176</sup>

And there are indeed instances of the Qing Empire striving to civilize parts of the polity in the eighteenth century, for example in the Guizhou and Yunnan provinces in the southwest. Although the southwest had come under Qing control after the Three Feudatories War ended in 1681 (see Chapter 2), the area was at first not governed in the same way as the other Chinese provinces. The system that was used was the indigenous headman (or *tusi*) system (a system that the previous Ming also had used), which meant that the native peoples living here were governed by headmen (usually, but not always of indigenous origin) that owed allegiance to the empire but existed outside of the Chinese bureaucracy. The headmen’s posts were hereditary and they were not rotated around the empire as the other officials were. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the Qing initiated a procedure known as *gaitu guiliu* (by Kent Smith translated as “replacing native chieftains with regular officials”),<sup>177</sup> which meant that these territories from then on were to be governed the same way as the other Chinese provinces and that the native peoples were to adopt the Han Chinese Confucian culture. The Yongzheng emperor especially was a champion of this drive, and in 1728 the Qing governor-general Ortai started conducting military expeditions in the southwest in order to eliminate the power of the *tusi* chiefs. Around the same time substantial amounts of Confucian schools were erected (according to Rowe, since the sixteenth century the “efforts at

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<sup>174</sup> William T. Rowe, *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 406.

<sup>175</sup> Rowe, *Saving the World*, 406.

<sup>176</sup> Rowe, *Saving the World*, 406-407.

<sup>177</sup> Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 119. Hostetler cites Kent C. Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China: Aspects of Ortai’s Governor-Generalship, 1726-1731” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1970), 42.

incorporation of the [southwest] region by Chinese had featured the establishment of [these] Chinese language Confucian schools as one of their most basic components”),<sup>178</sup> and particularly in Yunnan in the 1730s, when the famous official Chen Hongmou served as provincial treasurer in this region. Chen assumed his post in 1733, and when leaving office in 1738 he left behind almost 700 Confucian schools, the greater share of which he himself had established.<sup>179</sup>

Chen Hongmou once wrote that “In the task of governance, the mission of *jiaohua* assumes first priority”,<sup>180</sup> and his efforts at erecting the Confucian schools in Yunnan testifies to the validity of this statement. It is highly significant then, that this same Chen Hongmou *disapproved* of the annexation of Eastern Turkestan in the 1750s. Right before the first Qing campaign into Jungharia in 1755, Chen Hongmou was governor of first Shaanxi and later Gansu province. These two provinces, laying near the front with Eastern Turkestan, were the areas responsible for supplying the armies that were to be used against the Junghars. A few months before the planned assault, Chen Hongmou wrote to the Qianlong emperor that instead of expanding into Eastern Turkestan it would be better “to devote our energies to strengthening ties of commercial interdependence between [Junghar] and Han so as to ensure peace and prosperity for both peoples.”<sup>181</sup> In other words, he wanted to continue with the policy conducted after the Qing-Junghar truce of 1739. And Chen Hongmou was not the only Chinese official that protested against the expansion into Eastern Turkestan. After Amursana became Junghar khan in 1755, the Shaanxi-Gansu governor-general Liu Tongxun wrote that it would be best to pull out from Jungharia and instead erect defenses at Hami, which should be considered as the westernmost border of the empire in Eastern Turkestan. As he wrote, “The inner and outer boundaries must be demarcated”.<sup>182</sup> In short, Chen Hongmou and Liu Tongxun both disagreed with the emperor on Eastern Turkestan policy. Furthermore, when in 1757 Qianlong was touring south China, Jiangnan officials too voiced their dissatisfaction with the campaigns, as did Chinese *jinshi* students in 1760, who thought that the Eastern Turkestan conquest “was a cover for the expansion of despotic power, and that the military

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<sup>178</sup> Rowe, *Saving the World*, 418.

<sup>179</sup> Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 114-121; Rowe, *Saving the World*, 417-419.

<sup>180</sup> Rowe, *Saving the World*, 407. Rowe cites Chen Hongmou, *Peiyuan tang oucun gao*, 15:15.

<sup>181</sup> Rowe, *Saving the World*, 246-247, quote from 246.

<sup>182</sup> James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 38. This is a second-hand quote, but since I have only been able to access *Beyond the Pass* through Google Book Search (were only a select number of pages are displayed), I have not been able to find out Millward's source for this quote.

colonies planned for the region were simply a coercive device to abuse human labor.”<sup>183</sup> It seems then, that *jiaohua* was not a very strong motive for the conquest of Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59. This is further clarified if we examine how Eastern Turkestan was governed after the conquest was completed.

The Qing government in Eastern Turkestan was an intricate and many-layered one, and a thorough description is not possible here.<sup>184</sup> I will simply emphasize that the Qing did not strive to “civilize” or “transform” the native population after the conquest. The Qing regime consisted of an overarching military establishment with three types of civilian administrations (the *beg-*, *jasak-*, and *junxian* systems) located under it. As for the military establishment, the main Qing base was in New Qulja in the Ili region.<sup>185</sup> The Eastern Turkestan military governor (the highest-ranked official in the entire region) together with the largest part of the army was stationed here. A military lieutenant-governor stationed in Urumchi had personal command over a smaller Qing force and assisted the military governor, and military councilors resided in Chuguchak, New Qulja and Kashghar (see Map 5).<sup>186</sup>

The *beg* system was used for governing the sedentary Muslim Turks residing in Altīshar and Ili. As previously noted, the Junghars had moved large numbers of Turkic farmers from Altīshar to Ili in order to increase their state’s agricultural output, and the Qing did the same thing when they took over. The *begs* had originally been influential Turkic noblemen, but under the Qing they were converted into nonhereditary officials serving the imperial government. Even though this meant that the administration in Altīshar was greatly systematized and bureaucratized compared to what it had been earlier,<sup>187</sup> the *begs* were still to remain Turkish. No steps were taken toward Chinese cultural assimilation.<sup>188</sup> This was also the case for the rest of the Turks in Eastern Turkestan, as “the Qing maintained relations with

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<sup>183</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 39-40; Alexander Woodside, “The Ch’ien-lung Reign,” in *Part One: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 245 (quote).

<sup>184</sup> For more in-depth accounts consult Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” in *Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part I*, ed. John K. Fairbank, vol. 10, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 58-90; Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 97-108; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 338-357.

<sup>185</sup> This name needs to be specified further. As Fletcher points out, there were two “Quljas” in Jungharia at this time: “Old Qulja,” which existed before the Qing takeover and was then just called “Qulja”, and “New Qulja,” which was built by the Qing in the beginning of the 1760s to be the new government center. Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” 58.

<sup>186</sup> Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” 58-60; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 338-340.

<sup>187</sup> James A. Millward and L. J. Newby, “The Qing and Islam on the Western Frontier,” in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 117-119.

<sup>188</sup> Newby, “The Begs of Xinjiang,” 295-296.

the *'ulama*, or Islamic learned community, who handled certain judiciary tasks involving *shari'ah* law, which pertained in local matters.”<sup>189</sup>

For Eastern Turkestan's nomadic population, the Qing employed hereditary officials called *jasaks*. This system was already in use among the Qing's nomadic subjects in Mongolia and Kokonor. Hami and Turfan also used the *jasak* system, separating them from the oases in Altishar (were, as noted above, the *beg* system prevailed). Overall the *jasaks* were quite autonomous, but they still “served at the pleasure of the Qing government and could be replaced.”<sup>190</sup> When it came to religion, among the Mongolian nomads in Eastern Turkestan (as well as Mongols residing elsewhere in the empire) it was Tibetan Buddhism that was promoted. Buddhist institutions in Jungharia received donations from the Manchus, and Tibetan Buddhism was central to the everyday culture of this region.<sup>191</sup>

The last of the civilian systems used was the *junxian* (or Chinese civilian) system. Unlike in Yunnan and Guizhou, however, in which the goal was to implement this system for the entire provinces (the *gaitu guiliu* policy), in Eastern Turkestan it was used only where Chinese immigrants settled. This meant that it was only in Ili and in the eastern part of Eastern Turkestan (more precisely in Urumchi, Khitai, Barkul, Hami, and Turfan plus some additional territories) that this system was practiced.<sup>192</sup> As I have emphasized above, other populations and areas in Eastern Turkestan were governed differently, and the Qing allowed and even promoted other distinct ideologies for these populations. The Confucian schools, so prominent a sign of the *jiaohua* policy conducted in the southwest, were largely absent in Eastern Turkestan. Curiously, in 1769 a Manchu general named Wenfu suggested that Qianlong should integrate Eastern Turkestan into the Confucian education system, including erecting such Confucian schools.<sup>193</sup> But I have not come upon any evidence of this policy being implemented in the region, at least not for any of the non-Chinese populations. In fact, in 1765 Qianlong declared that top officials in Ili were to speak in Manchu only, not Chinese.<sup>194</sup> To conclude, an urge to “civilize” the populations in Eastern Turkestan can't have been a prominent motive for the Qing expansion into this region.

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<sup>189</sup> Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 93n24, 100-101, quote from 101.

<sup>190</sup> Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 100.

<sup>191</sup> Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," 62.

<sup>192</sup> Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 101; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 339-340.

<sup>193</sup> Woodside, "The Ch'ien-lung Reign," 237-238.

<sup>194</sup> Woodside, "The Ch'ien-lung Reign," 279.

### 3.5 The Junghars as an Ideological Threat

If the Junghars were not a direct military threat to the Qing, and the Manchus likewise had no need for civilizing Eastern Turkestan's native population, then why did they conquer it? To find a plausible answer to this question it is necessary to look a bit more closely at the details surrounding the creation of the Qing state in 1636, and to examine the Manchu-Mongol relationship in the decades prior to and following this important event.

As discussed earlier, Nurhaci, the father of the first Qing emperor Hong Taiji, started building the Manchu state at the end of the sixteenth century (see Chapter 2). The Mongols were close neighbors of the Manchus during these years, and the Mongols were to become crucial Manchu allies. First, on a strategic level, they became an important component of the Manchu army and an essential supplier of horses and livestock for the Manchus' military expeditions. As early as 1619 Nurhaci wanted to recruit neighboring Mongols to march with him against his enemies.<sup>195</sup> When Kangxi fought against Wu Sangui and the other Qing generals in 1674-81 (the Three Feudatories War), the Chahar Mongols (who were incorporated into the Qing when Hong Taiji defeated their leader Ligdan Khan in 1633) greatly aided the Qing military effort. After the Khalkhas were incorporated in 1691, they were to become important horse- and livestock suppliers for the Qing war against the Junghars. Also, when Yongzheng's army was annihilated by the Junghars in 1731, Khalkha warriors engaged the Junghar army and forced them to pull back to Eastern Turkestan, greatly relieving the Qing emperor.<sup>196</sup> Second, on a cultural level, the Mongols supplied the Manchus with a more "sophisticated" culture, most importantly in the realm of language. Before 1599 Nurhaci and the other Manchus used Mongolian as their written medium, and when Nurhaci this year ordered that a Manchu written language be created, it was to be based on the Mongolian script. And it was most likely from the Mongolian language that the Manchus adopted their early political ideology and vocabulary. For example, like the Mongols, the Manchus looked on the many polities and peoples in East Asia as fundamentally equal (thus differing from the Chinese), and like the Mongols, the Manchus saw the state as made up of two spheres; one religious and one secular. It was also from the Mongols, not from China, that the Manchus took their early concept of emperor (*khan* in Mongolian, *han* in Manchu).

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<sup>195</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 31.

<sup>196</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 138, 183, 254-255, 276-277.

Furthermore, Manchu officials and princes were supplied Mongolian titles by Nurhaci, and Mongolian terms were applied in the spheres of law and taxation.<sup>197</sup>

But how were these Mongols incorporated into the Qing? We saw in the previous chapter that the Qing state was a fusion of two rather distinct polities, the first being the Jin Khanate of Nurhaci and the second being the Chahar federation of Ligdan Khan. From Nurhaci Hong Taiji took over the role as Manchu leader, and from Ligdan Khan (after Hong Taiji defeated him in 1633) he inherited a distinct tradition of rulership that enabled him to rule the Mongols. As described earlier, this tradition preached that in order to lead the Mongolian people one would have to be a descendant of Chinggis Khan in addition to be a patron of Tibetan Buddhism. While descent from Chinggis had been a fundamental requirement for Mongolian rulers since late in the Yuan dynasty, ties to Tibetan Buddhism became important only in the sixteenth century. A pivotal event occurred in 1576, when the then dominant Mongolian leader Altan Khan (ruled 1543-83) issued an invitation to the Tibetan Buddhist elder Songnam Gyamtso to come to Mongolia. Once there Altan Khan announced that Songnam Gyamtso was a *Dalai Lama* (“universal teacher”). From this time onward Tibetan Buddhism became increasingly important for the Mongols.<sup>198</sup> In fact, in “the late sixteenth century, some chiefs of the eastern Mongol tribes had turned their residences into centers of religious and literary activities with ties to the religious authorities in Tibet.”<sup>199</sup> Ligdan Khan himself “sponsored a spectacular program of building monasteries, schools for the study and translation of religious works and publishing shops to reprint both Yuan-period texts and newly imported ones.”<sup>200</sup> More specifically he was also a patron of the Tibetan Mahākāla cult which, it was said, enabled the patron to connect his mind or consciousness to the famous khans of previous times. He could also claim to be a *chakravartin* (a “wheel-turning king”) by worshipping to Mahākāla. In short, from the end of the sixteenth century onward, and particularly in the beginning of the seventeenth century under Ligdan Khan, the ideological bonds between the Mongolian tribes and the Tibetan Buddhist establishment became very strong.<sup>201</sup> One can say that it was a distinct “political universe”<sup>202</sup> of its own.

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<sup>197</sup> See David M. Farquhar, "The Origins of the Manchus' Mongolian Policy," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank, vol. 32, Harvard East Asian Series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

<sup>198</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 62-63.

<sup>199</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 64. It is common to divide the many Mongol groups that existed at this time into an eastern and a western part, of which the western contains the Oyrats, whereas the eastern refers to the Khalkhas, Chahars, and others.

<sup>200</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 63.

<sup>201</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 63; Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 212.

<sup>202</sup> This term I borrowed from Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 205.



When Hong Taiji eliminated Ligdan in 1633, he took over the leading role (or placed himself at the center of) this political universe. First, surprisingly enough, he was fortunate in that he himself actually was of Chinggisid decent. Hong Taiji's mother, Monggo-gege, who had married Nurhaci as part of diplomatic activity between him and a federation called Yehe in 1588, was a Chinggisid. Also, with the demise of Ligdan, Hong Taiji took from him a sacred Chinggis seal.<sup>203</sup> Second, Hong Taiji began establishing closer ties with the Tibetan religious establishment. Those Mahākāla teachers that had previously given Ligdan the Chinggis consciousness arrived in Mukden (the contemporary Qing capital) to perform the same ceremony on Hong Taiji.<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, in 1637 the Dalai Lama visited Mukden, and in 1638 Hong Taiji finished building a Yellow Temple in which to store a Yuan-period Buddhist statue, also previously owned by Ligdan. In addition to this, two years later the Manchu sovereign "received a letter from the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in which the two religious leaders recognized him as a bodhisattva and called him 'Mañjuśrī-Great Emperor.'"<sup>205</sup> Since "Chinggis [Khan] as a spirit... still ruled over all Mongols",<sup>206</sup> all Mongols were now in theory to become Hong Taiji's subjects.

As a step in this direction, from 1636 to 1638 Hong Taiji created the Mongol Eight Banners. As noted earlier, Nurhaci had built an Eight Banner organization in 1615. These banners consisted of both Manchus, Chinese and Mongols. Now, in 1636, the Chahar Mongols had been brought into the Manchu polity, and Hong Taiji had become a Mongolian khan in addition to Manchu ruler and an up-and-coming Chinese emperor. The Chahar Mongols, together with previously incorporated Mongolian peoples, were therefore given a separate Eight Banner institution (the Chinese followed suit in 1642, when the Chinese Martial Eight Banners were created).<sup>207</sup> In addition to this, the Manchus began to intermarry with the Mongol nobility. This policy had been practiced by Nurhaci as well, and Hong Taiji developed it further. It was additionally expanded after the Manchus took China, and particularly under the Qianlong emperor and his successor the Jiaqing emperor (ruled 1796-1820). As Perdue notes, this policy was very different from the previous *heqin* ("peace and kinship") policy practiced by the Han and the Tang, in which Chinese emperors gave Han women to nomad chiefs in order to stop nomadic attacks. The Manchu-Mongol bonds were

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<sup>203</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 154, 211-212.

<sup>204</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 66.

<sup>205</sup> Roth Li, "State Building before 1644," 65.

<sup>206</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 311.

<sup>207</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 69.

much closer than that.<sup>208</sup> In fact, “Mongol noblemen of the Eight Banner lineages were present for even the most carefully guarded shamanic rituals of the Qing imperial lineage, and they were represented on all military councils, campaigns, and history projects.”<sup>209</sup> They “were as essential to the integrity of the empire as were the Manchu Eight Banner elites.”<sup>210</sup> The Qing state, in short, was as much a Mongolian polity as it was a Manchu or Chinese.

It is against this background that we have to understand the Qing expansion into Central Asia. The Junghars were, after all, also Mongols. First of all, they spoke and wrote in Mongolian. Even though their language (both the spoken and the written) was slightly different from the one used by the Mongols to the east, it was close enough for outsiders to consider them as dialects.<sup>211</sup> Also, the Oyrats firmly believed that their khan ought to be of Chinggisid descent. As noted, since Batur Khun-tayiji was not a Chinggisid, he was unable to give himself the Khan title. In fact, in the fifteenth century, the non-Chinggisid Oyrat leader Esen (the one who abducted the Ming Zhengtong emperor) did just this, and he suffered death as a result.<sup>212</sup> Finally, as we have seen, the Junghars were also closely integrated with Tibet. The Junghar unifier Galdan stayed at a lamasery in Tibet prior to his return to Jungharia in the 1670s, and it was the Dalai Lama that helped him become Junghar Khan when he named him “Boshugtu Khan” in 1678. The Junghar Khanate was, in short, part of the same “political universe” that the Manchus entered in 1636.

This makes the Qing urge to conquer the Junghars more understandable in at least two respects. First, we can understand the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan based on the following logic: From 1636 on, the Qing emperor became a Chinggisid spirit who were to rule the Mongols. The Junghars were Mongols. They therefore had to be ruled by or incorporated into the Qing state. If seen this way, the Qing had purely ideological motives for their expansion into Eastern Turkestan. It would explain why many of the Qing’s Chinese officials (even those stationed in Gansu near the Qing-Junghar frontline, such as Chen Hongmou and Liu Tongxun) did not want the expansion to take place. After all, these Chinese officials probably did not see the Qing state as a Mongolian state.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Fairbank and Goldman, *China: A New History*, 61; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 124-125.

<sup>209</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 72.

<sup>210</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 71-72.

<sup>211</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 64.

<sup>212</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 59.

<sup>213</sup> It was, at least, by posing as a Chinese monarch, not a Mongolian khan, that Kangxi had been able to bring the Chinese elite into Qing service in the seventeenth century. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 224; Spence, "The K'ang-hsi Reign," 147-149.

Further support for this perspective is found in the Qianlong emperor's writings concerning the Torghut tribe of Oyrats and their emigration from the Volga to Jungharia in 1771. To recapitulate, the Torghuts were one of two Oyrat groups (the other was the Khoshots) who emigrated from Jungharia in the first decades of the seventeenth century. Whereas the Khoshots went to Kokonor and ended up as Qing subjects in 1723 (this is described earlier in this chapter), the Torghuts moved toward the Volga and eventually ended up under Russian domination (under the Russians the Torghuts were called Qalmıqs).<sup>214</sup> "By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, they grew restive again under Russian taxes and military call-ups, and faced increasing conflicts with Russian and Ukrainian settlers colonizing the Don and Volga areas."<sup>215</sup> They therefore decided to emigrate back to Jungharia, since they had found out that pasturelands were available in this region after the Junghar Khanate, in addition to most of the Junghars themselves, were no longer there. In 1771, after a long and hard journey, they were accepted by Qianlong as new imperial subjects.<sup>216</sup> Qianlong was very happy to receive the Torghuts, and wrote that "With this, all the Mongol lineages are ministers (*chen*) of the Great Qing",<sup>217</sup> and that "of all the Mongolian tribes there are none who are not the Great Qing's subjects."<sup>218</sup> It seems that the Qing rulers (or at least Qianlong), saw the Mongols as a people that ought to be ruled by the Manchus. But "pure" ideological goals alone may not be sufficient to fully explain the Qing expansions. While acknowledging the importance of the ideological motives discussed above, I believe it is also essential to recognize the potential *ideological threat* that the Junghar Khanate represented. As already discussed, the Manchus depended highly upon the Mongols (that is, the eastern Mongols incorporated in the seventeenth century) not just in a cultural sense (their language and ideology) but also in a very material sense (as soldiers and suppliers). The Qing emperors also knew that they needed to control Mongolia in order to keep the Russians at bay.<sup>219</sup> The Junghars, by being so close to the Manchu and Mongol world while at the same time being independent,<sup>220</sup> could appeal to the Qing Mongols in a way that made them

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<sup>214</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 293-294.

<sup>215</sup> James A. Millward, "Qing Inner Asian Empire and the Return of the Torghuts," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James A. Millward, Ruth W. Dunnell, Mark C. Elliott, and Philippe Forêt (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 91.

<sup>216</sup> Millward, "Qing Inner Asian Empire," 91-92; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 294-297.

<sup>217</sup> Millward, "Qing Inner Asian Empire," 92-93, quote from 93. Millward cites "Tu-er-hu-te quan bu guishun ji," reprinted in Qi Jingzhi, *Waiba miao beiwen zhuyi* (Annotated Translations of the Steles of the Outer Temples) (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 1985), 60-62.

<sup>218</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 298. Perdue cites Berthold Laufer and Otto Franke, *Epigraphisches Denkmäler aus China* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1914), 1:plate 63.

<sup>219</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 321.

<sup>220</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 269.

extremely dangerous. The Junghars were not Chinggis descendants and therefore could not compete with the Manchus in that arena, but other options were available. For example, when the Kangxi emperor fought the Three Feudatories War, we saw that the Chahar Mongols helped the Qing achieve victory. But Wu Sangui had actually contacted the Dalai Lama himself (the lands that he controlled in the south neighbored Tibet). These contacts, even though ultimately of no major consequence, led to the Dalai Lama not being very supportive of Qing attacks against Wu Sangui. Because of this “the Qing court experienced some difficulty in persuading its [Chahar] subjects and Khalkha allies to aid in the Qing side of the war.”<sup>221</sup> If, for example, Tsewang Rabdan had been able to install a Junghar-friendly Tibetan government in Lhasa after he invaded the city in 1717, then the Dalai Lama could have persuaded the Qing Mongols not to fight for the Manchus, but perhaps even join the Junghars instead. Had this occurred, the Qing state would have been in an extremely dire situation. The Qing army would have become weaker, while the Junghar army would have become stronger. Also, horses (who were “always crucial for the survival of an empire and accounted for a very significant part of the budget”)<sup>222</sup> and livestock would have been more difficult to acquire. In 1731 the Junghars actually pursued a strategy somewhat resembling the above example. Right after the Junghar khan Galdan Tseren defeated Yongzheng’s army that year, the following letter was sent to the Khalkha Mongols:

*We are of one religion, and dwell in one place, and have lived very well alongside each other.... Considering that you are the heirs of Chinggis [Khan], and not wanting you to be the subjects of anyone else, I have spoken with the Emperor of China about restoring Khalkha and [Kokonor] as they were before. But now the emperor of China wants to organize us, too, like Khalkha and [Kokonor], into banners and sumuns [companies], and grant us titles, wherefore I am going to oppose him by force of arms. If all goes well, I shall restore Khalkha and [Kokonor]. May it soon succeed! Move over to the [Altay], and dwell together with us in friendship as before. If war comes, we can face it together, and not be defeated by any man.*<sup>223</sup>

This strategy did not succeed in making all Khalkhas join the Junghar camp. As noted, it was actually Khalkha forces that made the Junghars retreat to Eastern Turkestan. Among other Khalkhas and Mongol groups, however, “the document—or, more precisely, the logic and

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<sup>221</sup> Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 329 (quote); Perdue, *China Marches West*, 138.

<sup>222</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 354.

<sup>223</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 75, Crossley's ellipsis. Crossley cites Charles R. Bawden, *Modern History of Mongolia* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 114.

sentiment it captured—continued to stir insurrectionist talk and action”.<sup>224</sup> As Crossley concludes, “The Qing court fought Galdan [Tseren] not only on the military front but the ideological front as well.”<sup>225</sup> As I have argued in this chapter, it may even be that it was the ideological front that was the most significant.

### 3.6 Other Motives

As discussed above, I believe that the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan and the conquest of the Junghar Khanate must be understood as the Manchus striving to eliminate an ideological threat to their state. While acknowledging that this was the primary Qing aim, could there have been other (albeit more secondary) motives as well? I will now discuss commerce, resources and overpopulation as potential motives for the Qing expansion into Eastern Turkestan.

As for commerce and resources, I believe that these were not fundamental Qing motives, though there certainly are evidence of commercial development and extraction of resources in the post-conquest period. The Qing government itself was actually involved in commercial ventures, which “included official trade of textiles for [Qazaq] livestock; agricultural reclamation; traditional Central Asian as well as new forms of taxation; garrison commissaries; and such measures as manipulation of exchange rates, renting out of government property, and investment of government funds with private merchants.”<sup>226</sup> Also, from 1762 Chinese merchant immigration was promoted. Some of these were even financially supported by the government.<sup>227</sup> In addition to this, the Qing dug up copper, gold, jade, lead, sulfur, nitre, and iron from Eastern Turkestan.<sup>228</sup>

All of these economical undertakings, however, were initiated with the aim of making Eastern Turkestan self-sufficient, not with the aim of making the Qing state richer.<sup>229</sup> In fact,

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<sup>224</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 76.

<sup>225</sup> Crossley, "Making Mongols," 76.

<sup>226</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 44. As for taxes, the major share of these were those levied on Chinese merchant trade. Also, livestock dealings were taxed as well. Joanna Waley-Cohen, review of *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 59, no. 2 (1999): 650.

<sup>227</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 116.

<sup>228</sup> Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," 72-73; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 356.

<sup>229</sup> Beatrice Bartlett, review of *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): 500; Linda Benson, review of *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*, *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 5 (1999): 1647; Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 44-45; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 336.

even with these economical enterprises in operation, the Eastern Turkestan administration could not operate on locally extracted resources alone. The Qing therefore had to spend thousands of extra silver taels annually in order to keep the government running. In 1795, for example, Eastern Turkestan received 845,000 taels from Beijing. As the nineteenth century unfolded expenses increased even more, since the Qing, in response to escalating regional conflicts, therefore needed to station more soldiers there. By the end of the 1840s, therefore, over 4 million taels were sent every year to Eastern Turkestan.<sup>230</sup> The important point is that the Qing chose to “pay the bill.” This shows that commerce and resources was not what the Qing sought most at this time.

But what about overpopulation? This motive might sound more probable than the previous two, in so far as we know that the Qing period as a whole saw a great increase in the Chinese population. Accurate data is hard to come by, however, since population surveys were always conducted with the aim of finding out how many potential taxpayers, soldiers, or laborers there were in a given place, not with the aim of recording the population for its own sake. And since the population figures of a particular administrative region in part was used to calculate how much taxes this region owed the central authorities, not only the civilian population but also local officials had an interest in underreporting to the central government.<sup>231</sup>

Despite this practice, however, it seems safe to say that the Qing population was somewhere around 150 million by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and that this had grown to a little over 300 million by end of the same century.<sup>232</sup> This is highly significant indeed, but for our purposes we need to find out how serious a problem population pressure was in the period *before* Eastern Turkestan was conquered in 1759. When did overpopulation become a concern to the Qing?

A probable answer to this question is the second decade of the eighteenth century, since the Qing “from that point on gave strenuous attention to crafting a multifaceted set of activist policies to manage food supply.”<sup>233</sup> As we have seen, the Qing state had earlier had serious problems with feeding its people in Manchuria. They found a temporary solution in 1644, but now the problem had caught up with them again. From after Qianlong took power in 1736, the challenge became even greater, and particularly in the early period of his rule. In the

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<sup>230</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 58-61.

<sup>231</sup> Fairbank and Goldman, *China: A New History*, 167-168.

<sup>232</sup> William T. Rowe, "Social Stability and Social Change," in *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 474-475.

<sup>233</sup> Rowe, "Social Stability," 479.

1740s, for instance, the Qing population appears to have increased by as much as 45%.<sup>234</sup> It seems then, that overpopulation was a problem for the Qing even before they expanded into Eastern Turkestan in the 1750s.

Despite this, however, I still do not believe that overpopulation was what made the Qing conquer Eastern Turkestan. First of all, we have to remember that the Qing began battling with the Junghars in 1690, that is, two decades before the problem first surfaced. Second, if we look at what happened after 1759 we find that there were not *that* many Chinese farmers that went to Eastern Turkestan, at least not if we compare the numbers to the total population of the empire. When the nineteenth century began, the region was home to roughly 155 000 Chinese farmers,<sup>235</sup> and we saw above that the contemporary Qing population was slightly over 300 million individuals. The Chinese peasant immigrants in Eastern Turkestan, therefore, were only about 0.05% of the entire Qing population. This is certainly not much, especially if one considers that Eastern Turkestan's surface area was 1,646,800 square kilometers, thus exceeding the territory of modern France by more than three times.<sup>236</sup> Although Qianlong in 1760 in fact *had* suggested that Eastern Turkestan (more particularly Urumchi and Pijan) could help the overfilled Chinese provinces by functioning as an emigrant destination for the populations in these regions,<sup>237</sup> this was, as we have seen, in the same period as he experienced criticism from officials and students who thought that the expansion should never have taken place. Qianlong's recommendations should therefore be seen as an attempt at pleasing his domestic adversaries.<sup>238</sup> Actually, while at this time it was the Jiangnan region that was "the most populous and most densely populated area of the empire",<sup>239</sup> it was, as we have seen, precisely from Jiangnan that some of Qianlong's critics came. And it remains a fact that the largest part of the 155,000 peasant immigrants came not from Jiangnan, but from Gansu and Shaanxi in northwestern China.<sup>240</sup> The Qing's main aim, it seems, was to use the Chinese farmers in Eastern Turkestan as grain suppliers for their own military forces in the region, in part because it was very expensive to transport grain from interior China to Eastern Turkestan.<sup>241</sup> In short, their role was to be similar to that performed by the Russian peasants moving to Siberia in the seventeenth century (see Chapter 2). This

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<sup>234</sup> Rowe, "Social Stability," 475.

<sup>235</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 51; Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 104.

<sup>236</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 21.

<sup>237</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 51.

<sup>238</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 39-41; Woodside, "The Ch'ien-lung Reign," 245-246.

<sup>239</sup> Rowe, "Social Stability," 476.

<sup>240</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 51; Millward and Perdue, "Political and Cultural History," 59.

<sup>241</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 51-52.

role, it ought to be noted, they played very successfully, as Eastern Turkestan's military establishment was well provided with grain in the post-conquest decades.<sup>242</sup>



The Qing's Eastern Turkestan expansion was, as we have seen, a process that lasted for almost 70 years, from 1690 until the final conquest in 1759, and the chief reason for its occurrence was the Qing's insistence on annihilating the Junghar Khanate, a Mongolian political entity that was located in Eastern Turkestan. I have argued that the Junghar Khanate was not just a military rival of the Qing, but that it also was an ideological rival, and that we need to understand the Qing's determined expansion with this last point in mind.

While the Qing warred with the Junghars, however, the Russians too began to increase their presence in Central Asia. As discussed in Chapter 2, Muscovy conquered Kazan', Astrakhan' and Sibir' in the second half of the sixteenth century. This led to them encountering a new people in the steppes to the south. This was the Qazaqs,<sup>243</sup> and I will now examine the founding and development of the Qazaq Khanate.

### **3.7 The Founding of the Qazaq Khanate in Western Turkestan**

The Qazaq Khanate, like the Russian state of Muscovy, rose to prominence simultaneously with the gradual crumbling of the Mongolian Golden Horde. We saw in the previous chapter that when the Golden Horde was destroyed, many new states and groups (the Noghays, Kazan', the Crimea and Astrakhan') sprang from its ruins. While this happened, however, in Western Turkestan yet another state was created, namely the Özbek Khanate. After its creation in 1420, it developed into the most powerful polity in the area. Nevertheless, around 1465 the Özbek royal Janibek together with his brother Kirai split with the Özbek khan Abu'l-Khayr and built a new khanate centered on the Betpak-Dala Desert. In the following years its population increased to more than one million inhabitants, most of whom were Turkic nomads. Some of these came from the Dasht-i Qïpchaq, others came from the Özbek Khanate (at this time centered on the Mavarannahr region), and still others were natives of the

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<sup>242</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 52.

<sup>243</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 146-149.



Betpak-Dala environs. There were also a few Mongol nomads coming from the Altay area (see Map 2). All of these groups eventually adopted the name “Qazaq.”<sup>244</sup>

The Qazaqs were officially a Muslim people. Both Janibek and Kirai were Muslims, and this identity was acknowledged by the Islamic world. Despite this, however, they had much weaker ties to the religion than many other peoples in the area. They did not even have an official Islamic establishment (the steppe had no mosques or madrasahs, and the Islamic taxes on livestock and grain were not collected), and although Islam had existed in the Dasht-i Qipchaq since 1043, the Qazaqs’ religion was also, and continued to be, characterized by pre-Islamic practices such as worship to ancestors.<sup>245</sup>

In the two centuries that followed its creation, the Qazaq polity expanded a great deal, including southward towards Tashkent and the cities lying along the Sīr-Darya. One of these cities, Turkestan (Yasy), became the Qazaq capital, and “by the last quarter of the seventeenth century they controlled most of present-day Kazakhstan.”<sup>246</sup> But the Qazaqs had powerful and often hostile neighbors. In the seventeenth century, the two most important were the Ashtarkhanid dynasty to the south, centered on Bukhara, and the Junghar Khanate which, as we have seen, at this time rose to power in Eastern Turkestan (see Map 3). It was the latter of these two neighbors that caused the most trouble. In 1643 Batur Khun-tayiji led an invasion into southern Kazakhstan, as did Galdan in 1681-85. Tsewang Rabdan attacked the Qazaqs in 1698-99 and in 1716 and 1718.<sup>247</sup> The most serious Junghar attack, however, came in 1723. This year’s onslaught made the Qazaqs “flee west across the [Sīr-Darya] River. There, at what they considered a safe distance, they were taken completely by surprise when the [Oyrats] overran them later that year. Having lost the towns of Tashkent, [Turkestan], and Sayram and having found no safe haven from the [Oyrat] raids, the [Qazaqs] fled in panic farther west, approaching Khiva, Bukhara, and [Samarqand].”<sup>248</sup> The Qazaqs, in short, were not capable of holding the Junghars at bay on their own. They therefore began searching for an external ally that could aid them against their Mongol adversary. The best candidate for this role seemed to be the Russians to the north, and in 1687 Tauke (ruled 1680-1718) therefore dispatched his

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<sup>244</sup> Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Studies of Nationalities in the USSR (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 3-4, 7-10.

<sup>245</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 18-20.

<sup>246</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 8-10, quote from 10.

<sup>247</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier*, 147-148; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 25-26; Perdue, *China Marches West*, 210.

<sup>248</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier*, 150.

first ambassador to Peter I and Ivan V (co-tsars 1682-96) and asked that the Russians help the Qazaqs prevail against the Junghars.<sup>249</sup>

### 3.8 The Qazaqs Submits to Russia (1690-1740)

A Qazaq request for Muscovite military assistance was actually not an unprecedented event. In the late sixteenth century, when the Russians and the Qazaqs had their first diplomatic exchanges, the Qazaqs were driven by the hope of acquiring Russian military support. But the Russians put a high price on their aid. They demanded among other things that the Qazaqs maintain a hostile relationship with the Sibir' Khanate to their north (which at this time was at war with Muscovy) and with Bukhara to their south. The Qazaqs also needed to capture the Sibir' khan Kuchum who, as noted, in 1582 fled from the Russians when Ermak Timofeevich took over his capital. These terms were not accepted by the Qazaqs, and formal Russian-Qazaq contact was subsequently cut.<sup>250</sup>

For most of the seventeenth century, when the Qazaqs were pressured by the Ashtarkhanids and the Junghars, the Russians had no formal exchanges with their neighbors to the south. During these years “they were preoccupied with the Siberian fur trade, and so the [Qazaq] Steppe was of relatively little importance.”<sup>251</sup> Nevertheless, as the century closed, several factors helped make the Russians more attentive to what was happening in Central Asia. First, as described in Chapter 2, when the Muscovites established themselves in Siberia there developed Russian forts there, and at the end of the century these forts had come so close to the Qazaqs that the latter attacked them. Also, the Russians at this time came to depend on Qazaq support with regard to their commerce with Bukhara.<sup>252</sup> The Russians had actually traded with Bukhara before this time as well, but at the end of the seventeenth- and beginning of the eighteenth century, because of a general growth in the economy of Russia, the Russians wanted to strengthen their commercial links not only with Central Asia, but with India and Persia as well.<sup>253</sup> On the Russian side the Bukharan commerce had usually been operated from Astrakhan' and Kazan', but because the Torghuts (the Oyrat tribe briefly encountered in the Qing part of this chapter) arrived and blocked these trading routes,

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<sup>249</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 150; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 29-30.

<sup>250</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 147; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 29.

<sup>251</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 28-29, quote from 28.

<sup>252</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 148.

<sup>253</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 29-30.

Astrakhan' and Kazan' were eventually superseded by Tara and Tobol'sk,<sup>254</sup> and in order to get to Bukhara from there the Russians needed to travel across Qazaq-dominated territories (see Map 3). This made the trade difficult to maintain, as the Qazaqs sometimes attacked the caravans in order to obtain its commodities and people. Also, the escalating Qazaq-Junghar conflict did not make the commercial opportunities any better for the Russians.<sup>255</sup> In fact, by the late 1720s they understood "that without some form of outside assistance the [Qazaq] steppe would be entirely overrun by the aggressive [Qalmıqs] [or Junghars], thus threatening not only Russian [commercial] expansion but Russia's position in southern Siberia as well."<sup>256</sup> This made the Russians more willing to ally themselves with the Qazaqs than what had previously been the case. It also made them build a series of forts to serve as a defensive line against the steppes. The first fort, Omsk, was finished in 1717, then followed Semipalatinsk in 1718 and Ust'-Kamenogorsk in 1720. Orenburg, originally built in 1737 and later moved slightly westward (the first Orenburg fort was renamed Orsk), became the capital of the region (see Map 4).<sup>257</sup> The Russians eventually built so many forts that the Qazaqs became anxious, since the pastureland at their disposal decreased as a consequence of this policy.<sup>258</sup>

To summarize, we have seen that the Russian Empire and the Qazaq Khanate, after their brief and unsuccessful contacts in the late sixteenth century, developed stronger incentives towards allying with each other in the late seventeenth century. The Qazaqs wanted Russian military assistance in order to keep the Junghars in check, whereas the Russians wanted the Qazaqs to stop assaulting their forts and caravans. In the 1720s the Russians also came to realize that if they did not help the Qazaqs hold back the Junghars, the latter could eventually threaten their own imperial enterprise in Siberia and Central Asia. In short, the stage was now set for a new chapter in Russian-Qazaq relations.

Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to take a quick look at the Qazaqs' political organization in this period. Rather than having one single powerful khan as their leader, the Qazaqs were split up into three separate "hordes", namely the Senior (also called "Great" or "Greater") Horde, Middle Horde and Junior (also called "Small" or "Lesser") Horde (see Map 4). These three hordes were created in the sixteenth century, but they were not always independent political units. Powerful Qazaq khans such as Haq Nazar (ruled 1538-

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<sup>254</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 148.

<sup>255</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 29-30.

<sup>256</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 25-27, 31, quote from 26.

<sup>257</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 26-27, 30, 32-33.

<sup>258</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 167-168, 172.

80) and Tauke were able to control all of the three hordes because of their personal military capabilities. After Tauke died in 1718, however, no other Qazaq khan appears to have been capable of doing so. At this time, therefore, “the khan of each horde assumed the powers of sovereign ruler in his own territory, including the right to negotiate treaties with foreign powers”,<sup>259</sup> and the Russians now saw the Qazaqs as organized into three separate states.<sup>260</sup> These three polities were found in Semirech’e (the Senior Horde), central Kazakhstan (the Middle Horde), and western Kazakhstan (the Junior Horde).<sup>261</sup> In the eighteenth century, the Russians dealt primarily with the Junior and Middle Qazaq hordes. The Senior Horde resided to the south and east of the two other hordes, and they established contact with the Russians only in the nineteenth century.<sup>262</sup>

The first of the three Qazaq hordes to submit to Russia was the Junior Horde. Its “proximity to the Russian frontier and the example of the military and material benefits that other neighboring peoples, such as the [Qalmıqs] and Bashkirs, derived from their ties with Russia prompted the khan of the [Junior] Horde, [Abu’l-Khayr], to approach the Russian authorities. His first offer of a military alliance with Russia in 1718 was not immediately welcomed”,<sup>263</sup> however. The Russians, as noted, only changed their minds after the Junghar offensives against the Qazaqs in the 1720s. When Abu’l-Khayr in 1730 asked the Russian empress Anna (ruled 1730-40) to be allowed to become a Russian citizen, therefore, his request was accepted, and in 1731 Abu’l-Khayr swore an oath promising to be a subject of Russia. In the years that followed, the Middle Horde leaders Semeke (in 1732), and Abu’l Muhammad and Ablai (in 1740), also promised to be loyal Russian citizens.<sup>264</sup> By 1740, then, the Junior and Middle Qazaq hordes had apparently been successfully brought into the Russian Empire. In fact, “the traditional historiography regards 1731 as the year when the [Qazaqs] became Russian subjects.”<sup>265</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 11.

<sup>260</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 10-13.

<sup>261</sup> Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, 195.

<sup>262</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 152; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 71-73.

<sup>263</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 152.

<sup>264</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 26-27, 31, 39-40.

<sup>265</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 152.

### 3.9 Russia and the Qazaq Hordes in the Eighteenth Century (1740-1820)

This assertion, however, is not accurate, since the Qazaqs, and even the Russians themselves, did not see the former as being a genuine part of the Russian polity. From Abu'l-Khayr's, Semeke's, Abu'l Muhammad's, and Ablai's point of view, the oaths they swore to Russia were first and foremost "designed to bolster...[their own] positions in intertribal wars."<sup>266</sup> Neither were they looked on as permanent treaties. In 1733, only one year after his submission to Russia, Semeke (ruled 1718-33) launched an attack on the Bashkirs, "Russian subjects with whom he had sworn to live in peace."<sup>267</sup> When these same Bashkirs shortly thereafter revolted against the Russians, Abu'l-Khayr (ruled 1718-48) allied himself with them and attacked Orenburg.<sup>268</sup> Also, after the Qing expanded into Eastern Turkestan in the 1750s, Ablai (ruled 1733-81) established connections with the Manchus and submitted to them as well, and when in 1773 the Cossack Pugachev organized a huge rebellion against the Russian Empire (according to Khodarkovsky this uprising was so big that it "would send shock waves across Russia and Europe"<sup>269</sup>) the Junior Horde khan Nur Ali (ruled 1748-86), who was the successor of Abu'l-Khayr, allied himself with Pugachev in the first year of the rebellion.<sup>270</sup> Clearly, the Qazaq chieftains did not see themselves as true subjects of Russia at this time.

More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that the Russians by and large agreed with them, since they neither by administrative nor military means managed to gain full control of Kazakhstan at this time (it was actually only in 1822-84 that the Russians genuinely conquered Western Turkestan.)<sup>271</sup>

It should be said, however, that the Russians had *some* influence over the Qazaqs also in the eighteenth century. For example, in the course of this period they gave themselves the right to decide who was to be khan of the two hordes. Traditionally the Qazaqs themselves had elected or approved their khans,<sup>272</sup> but the Russians now began to extend their influence over this process. For example, when Abu'l-Khayr died in 1748, it was the Russians who insisted that his son Nur Ali become the new Junior Horde khan, despite the fact that many

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<sup>266</sup> Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, 196.

<sup>267</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 40.

<sup>268</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 33.

<sup>269</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 172.

<sup>270</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 37-38, 41-42.

<sup>271</sup> Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, 195-199.

<sup>272</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 13-14.

Qazaqs had their allegiance elsewhere.<sup>273</sup> Furthermore, when Nur Ali passed away in 1790 and yet another khan had to be elected, his brother Er Ali (which was the candidate favored by Russia) was chosen after the Russians “dispatched to the election site a sizable contingent of regular and irregular...troops armed with artillery.”<sup>274</sup>

The situation was similar in the Middle Horde, since after Semeke died in 1733, it was the Russians who gave the title of khan to his successor Abu'l Muhammad.<sup>275</sup> Furthermore, when Abu'l Muhammad eventually also died and his title was passed on to Ablai (whose initial coronation happened without Russian interference), the latter came into a quarrel with Catherine II (ruled 1762-95), who “claimed that since Semeke’s oath of fealty in 1732 the dignity of khan rested with St. Petersburg and not with the [Qazaqs] themselves.”<sup>276</sup>

Despite this limited meddling in Qazaq politics, however, a fully fledged conquest, such as happened in Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59, clearly *did not happen* in Western Turkestan. At the end of the century Russian maps still depicted the imperial border as running “north of the Ural and Mias rivers just south of Orsk and Troitsk over Omsk and thence along the [Irtish] River to the [Altay] mountains”,<sup>277</sup> and Qazaq traders doing business in Orenburg and elsewhere were taxed as foreigners (see Map 5).<sup>278</sup>

### 3.10 Similarities and Differences between Russia and the Qing

It was in the eighteenth century, then, that Russia and the Qing for the first time diverged from each other in their engagement with Central Asia, since up to this point they had followed roughly the same pattern. In the first place, it was the expansions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that made their states come into direct conflict with the Central Asian peoples. The Manchus constructed a state in Manchuria, conquered the Chahar Mongols and expanded south to take control of China by defeating and replacing the Ming dynasty. Then, in 1690, conflict broke out between the Qing and the Junghars in Mongolia. The Russians, in turn, took control over the Golden Horde successors Kazan’ and Astrakhan’,

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<sup>273</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 166-167; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 34-35.

<sup>274</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 177, 180-181, quote from 180.

<sup>275</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 164; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 40.

<sup>276</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 43.

<sup>277</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 32.

<sup>278</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 32.

and subsequently marched east across the Ural Mountains through Siberia. Then, in the late seventeenth century, the Qazaqs launched their first attacks on the Russian forts in this region.

After these initial confrontations there followed a turbulent half century, especially so for the Qing, the Junghars and the Qazaqs. As seen above, the Qing and the Junghars engaged in many battles in this period, as did the Junghars and the Qazaqs. The Russians and the Qazaqs did not have as hostile a relationship as the Qing and the Junghars, but as noted, the Qazaqs did attack Russia's Siberian forts as well as their trading caravans traveling in the steppes. They also launched an attack on the Torghuts (who were subjects of Russia) in 1726.<sup>279</sup>

Following this period of turbulence both the Qing and the Russians managed to build a more formal relationship with the states in Central Asia. The Qing emperor Qianlong and the Junghar khan Galdan Tseren came to terms with each other in 1739, as did the Russians and the Qazaqs in 1731-40. But here the similarities stop. For where the Qing a few years later used the first occurrence of disorder in the Junghar camp as an opportunity to expand into their territory and destroy their state, the Russians lingered on in Siberia and did *not* expand, at least not in the eighteenth century. This was despite the fact that the Russians knew that the Qazaq hordes were not very centralized political entities. Ivan Kirilov, the founder of Orenburg and a representative of Anna, in 1734 wrote of the Qazaqs that they “have a Khan in name only, for he has no power over them, for affirming himself in his khanic rule or for turning his subjects away from the [*khun-tayiji*] (leader) over to Russian power.”<sup>280</sup> It is true that the Russians *spoke* of the Qazaqs (that is, those belonging to the Junior and Middle hordes) as their subjects after 1740,<sup>281</sup> but so did the Qing of the Junghars after 1739,<sup>282</sup> almost twenty years before the actual expansion took place. From 1759 onward, however, the Qing could more legitimately claim that the peoples in Eastern Turkestan were their subjects, since they now had their own administration in place there. As we have seen, however, this was not the case for the Russians in Western Turkestan.

Why didn't the Russians conquer the Qazaqs in the eighteenth century, like the Qing did with the Junghars? It is not easy (perhaps impossible) to answer this question in full. I believe, however, that it is possible to increase our understanding of this question by focusing on Qing and Russians *motives* in Central Asia. Previously I argued that the Qing conquered the

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<sup>279</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 150.

<sup>280</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 31-32, quote from 32. Olcott cites S.E. Tolybekov, *Kochevoe obshchestvo Kazakhov v XVII-nachale XX v* (Alma-Ata, 1971), 367.

<sup>281</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 162-163, 169.

<sup>282</sup> According to Perdue, “they were referred to as being part of the ‘interior’ (*neidi*)”, which I take as evidence of them being thought of as Qing subjects. Perdue, *China Marches West*, 269.

Junghars because the former perceived the latter as an ideological threat. Since both of them capitalized heavily on Tibetan Buddhism and at the same time were military adversaries, the relationship between the two became particularly problematic. This is the reason, I believe, that the Qing did not hesitate when given a chance to expand into Junghar territory. It follows, then, that the Russians and the Qazaqs did not have the same kind of relationship as the Qing and the Junghars had. In fact, although the Russians and the Qazaqs can be said to have been military adversaries, they nevertheless were not coreligionists; the Russians were Orthodox Christians whereas the Qazaqs, as we have seen, were Muslims. I will now examine how Russia adopted Orthodox Christianity.

### 3.11 Russia and its Ideological Heritage

Christianity came to Russia (or Kievan Rus as it was known then) in the late tenth century. At this time Vladimir, the leading prince in Kievan Rus, converted, and he subsequently insisted that the rest of the country follow in his footsteps. “From the beginning, the princes, with the cooperation of early churchmen, made use of the new faith to underscore the sanctity of princely power.”<sup>283</sup> It was the Byzantine form of Christianity that served as the most significant model for Kievan Rus, and after the famous 1054 split between the pope in Rome and the patriarch in Constantinople, “Rus Christianity was part of the Orthodox world.”<sup>284</sup>

As we saw in Chapter 2, Kievan Rus was destroyed by the Mongols in the early thirteenth century, but this did not mean the destruction of Rus Christianity. The Mongols actually showed a remarkable degree of tolerance for it, as they even permitted the founding of a bishopric in the Golden Horde capital Saray. Rus Christianity was therefore able to survive the Mongol period, and when Muscovy in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries emerged as the dominant Russian hegemon, the Muscovite rulers too capitalized on Orthodox Christianity in order to increase their own power.<sup>285</sup> This was particularly the case after Ivan the Terrible became tsar of Muscovy in 1547. Ivan was actually the first ruler in Russia to receive this designation. The leader of the coronation ceremony was none other than Metropolitan Makari, the head of the Orthodox establishment in Russia, and the Orthodox Church now began preaching that the sovereign of Moscow “was the legitimate successor to

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<sup>283</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 14, 44-45, quote from 14.

<sup>284</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 45-47, quote from 46.

<sup>285</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 70, 119.



the former lands of Kievan Rus<sup>286</sup> and that he was “the last great Christian monarch.”<sup>287</sup> Later in the century, after Ivan’s death, the patriarch in Constantinople declared to Fedor (ruled 1584-98) that “Your great Russian Tsardom, the third Rome, surpasses all in piety; you alone in all the universe are referred to as the Christian Tsar.”<sup>288</sup>

This strengthened Christian identity also showed itself in the interactions between Muscovy and the successors of the Golden Horde who, as we shall see, were all Muslim polities. Nevertheless, in his analysis of Muscovy’s capture of Kazan’, Perdue claims that religion played a subordinate role. He believes that the relationship between Muscovy and Kazan’ was characterized by pragmatism and cooperation before 1552, and that the former conquered the latter because Kazan’ disintegrated from the inside. Among the inhabitants of Kazan’ there were some who favored Muscovite interference and some who resisted it. In short, “There never was a united Turkic-Muslim front against Orthodox Moscow.”<sup>289</sup> Khodarkovsky, on the other hand, argues that “the ideological divide between Moscow and the Muslim world...[became] more pronounced [after 1547], and [that] the issues...[were] articulated more frequently in terms of the religious differences.”<sup>290</sup> It certainly is true that Ivan IV received support from the Orthodox Church when he defeated Kazan’ in 1552. Metropolitan Makari himself was highly enthusiastic, and Ivan subsequently rewarded his supporter by building a cathedral in Kazan’, by giving the city its own archbishop and by trying to convert its population to Christianity. “He also granted monasteries and churches land within the city and beyond.”<sup>291</sup> Perdue claims that the issue of religious conflict was emphasized only at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, when Orthodox clerics tried to put in place a justification for the previous annexation.<sup>292</sup> Ivan’s policies immediately after the Kazan’ takeover would seem to contradict this argument, though.

It is true, however, that the majority of Muslims in Russia continued (and were allowed) to practice their religion as before. In the Russian view, as long as the Muslims did not resist the empire, it was not necessary to carry out an inquisition.<sup>293</sup> Ivan IV outlined the reason for this

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<sup>286</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 135, 208, quote from 208.

<sup>287</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 208.

<sup>288</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 208. This is a second-hand quote, but Moss does not provide a direct reference for it in his book.

<sup>289</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 79-81, quote from 80.

<sup>290</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 103.

<sup>291</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 137.

<sup>292</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 81-82.

<sup>293</sup> Vladimir Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," in *Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven, vol. II, *The Cambridge History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 204.

approach in a letter that he sent to the Noghay chief Ismail in 1563. It had earlier been revealed that seven Astrakhan' nobles had worked in secret with Kazy (another Noghay chief) and the Crimean Khanate, both of whom were enemies of Muscovy, and Ismail protested to Ivan that these nobles were allowed to stay in Astrakhan'. Ivan wrote to Ismail:

*We cannot remove them because [when] we took [Astrakhan'] and appointed our governors there, we gave our word to the [Astrakhan'] nobles that they would be protected. And we are the Christian sovereign, and they are Muslims. If we remove them and keep them away from [Astrakhan'], the [Astrakhan'] people might run away, and in the foreign lands some would say that we did not keep our word, that the two faiths could not live in peace, and that the Christian sovereign was destroying the Muslims. And it is written in our Christian books that it is not allowed to convert to our faith by force; people should have whichever faith they wish. And then God will decide in the future whose faith is right and whose is not; a man cannot judge this. And in our lands there are many people of the Muslim faith who are in our service, and they live in accordance with their law.*<sup>294</sup>

As Khodarkovsky notes, Ivan probably wrote this letter “With one eye on the Ottoman sultan and another on the rapidly growing number of Muslims in his own domain”,<sup>295</sup> and we can see that his concern for a pan-Islamic alliance against Muscovy was definitely present. In fact, Ivan knew that Süleyman I, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, just a few years earlier had tried to forge such an alliance. Around 1550, not long before Ivan's seizure of Kazan', the Muscovite leader was told that Süleyman had contacted Ismail and suggested that his Noghays join forces with Astrakhan', the Crimea and Kazan' against Russia. As Süleyman wrote, “we are all Muslims and we should all stand united against Moscow”.<sup>296</sup> Ismail told Ivan that he had declined the request, however, and in 1551 Muscovy was able to install a khan of their own liking in Kazan'. The proposed alliance, in short, did not materialize at this time.<sup>297</sup>

Besides these fears of a hostile Muslim alliance, however, the letter reveals something else about the Russian tsar: He still looked on himself *solely* as a Christian ruler. Despite the fact that Russia now had many Muslim subjects, Ivan IV did *not* become a Muslim monarch. In

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<sup>294</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 114-115, quote from 114, the first bracket is Khodarkovsky's. Khodarkovsky cites *Prodolzhenie drevnei rossiiskoi vivliofiki (PDRV)* (St. Petersburg: Imper. Akademiia Nauk, 1786-1801); repr., *Slavic Printings and Reprintings 251*, ed. C. H. van Schooneveld (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 10:318-319.

<sup>295</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 114.

<sup>296</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 105. Khodarkovsky cites *PDRV*, 8:263-267.

<sup>297</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 105.

fact, although the Russian state by and large allowed its non-Orthodox peoples to continue their religious practices, it is a fact that “conversion to Christianity was always encouraged”,<sup>298</sup> at least in the case of the Muslims. For example, Peter I (ruled 1682-1725) proclaimed that Orthodox converts were exempt from paying taxes for three years, did not have to serve in the military, and were exempt from labor in government factories. In 1713 it was declared that any Muslim noble living in the provinces of Kazan’ or Azov who did not become Christians would lose his lands and the Orthodox serfs working on them. In 1731 and the years that followed, the Russians converted around 8000 Muslims in the provinces of Nizhnii Novgorod and Kazan’. In 1740-44, 418 of Kazan’s 536 mosques were destroyed by the Orthodox, and in 1742 the building of new ones was banned.<sup>299</sup>

In short, from the time of Kievan Rus until after the Qazaqs became “subjects” of Russia in 1731-40, it was Orthodox Christianity that was the sole official religion in the empire. Although the Russian state had incorporated many Muslims in the course of these centuries, it had nevertheless not incorporated Islamic ideology.<sup>300</sup> The only religious establishment that really mattered for the tsar, then, was the Orthodox one. Furthermore, this was an establishment that the Russian government managed to bring under firm imperial control. The highest figure in Rus Christianity had usually been the patriarch in Constantinople, and back in the days of Kievan Rus it was he who decided who was to be the metropolitan of Kiev, the top local cleric. After Muscovy’s entrance on the scene, however, Constantinople gradually lost control over its coreligionists in Russia. First, as early as 1325 Moscow became the new

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<sup>298</sup> Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," 204.

<sup>299</sup> Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," 204-205.

<sup>300</sup> This changed slightly in the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, when Catherine II was in charge of the empire. In the course of her reign Russia annexed territories in Poland, Lithuania, the Crimea, Caucasus, and Transcaucasia. These territories were home to a large number of Muslims, and by taking control over these lands, the Russian Empire’s Muslim population became even larger than what it had previously been. Catherine II therefore decided to grant legal status to the Islamic religion, permitted mosque-building in the entire empire, created an official publishing house for printing Islamic texts, and even established an imperial Islamic hierarchy. This latter organization was called the Orenburg Assembly or (unofficially) the Orenburg Muftiate. “Based on both shari’a and imperial laws, the Orenburg Assembly worked as a kind of Muslim Supreme Court and issued legal decisions (*fatwas*) in matters of marriage and divorce, inheritance, burial, as well as appointments of imams and mosque building.” Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," 205-208, quote from 207-208. Under Catherine II Islam therefore became an officially endorsed religion in Russia. As regards Central Asia and the Qazaqs, however, this upgrading of Islam to an official religion came several decades *after* these nomads’ first submission to the empire (and over two centuries after the initiation of the Muscovite tsardom). Furthermore, it “was a central element of steppe frontier policy only before the tsars came to fully control the region” in the nineteenth century, since they at this time began looking “to [Qazaq] customary law (*adat*) and the clan elders who administered it to perform many of the same tasks that they had elsewhere assigned the shari’a and Muslim clerics.” Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 193-195, quotes from 193, 195. Islam was therefore not the kind of fundamental building block in the Russian Empire the way that, say, Tibetan Buddhism was in the Qing Empire. Catherine II’s intention was actually to use “Islam as a ‘bait to catch a fish with’, in order to attach Muslim borderlands to Russia.” Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," 207.

residence of the metropolitan. Then, in 1448, the Russians for the first time appointed their own metropolitan independent of Constantinople.<sup>301</sup> Finally, in 1589 they got their own patriarch as well, and although “the touchy question of the relative powers of tsar and patriarch [still] remained”,<sup>302</sup> this was a contest that would be won by the tsar. To take a few examples, in 1649 the state “forbade sermons to offend the honor of any boyar [noble] or official, created a Monastery Bureau...to oversee litigation against church people, and confiscated church lands located in the cities.”<sup>303</sup> In 1764, Catherine II (ruled 1762-96) would annex the remaining church lands as well.<sup>304</sup>

### 3.12 Russian Goals in Western Turkestan

The Russian Empire, then, did not follow “the Qing incorporative religious policy”.<sup>305</sup> Whereas the Manchus tried to co-opt Tibetan Buddhism after obtaining Mongol Buddhist subjects, the Russians stuck to their original Orthodox Christianity and did *not* try to co-opt Islam after obtaining Muslim subjects. While it is difficult to say which of these two strategies was the most advantageous, the Qing had one clear disadvantage as compared to the Russians: By making themselves so dependent upon a religious authority located so far away from their own realm (the Dalai Lama in Lhasa), they put themselves in a difficult situation. This was particularly the case when it turned out that the powerful Junghars too used Lhasa as a religious resource. The Russians, however, faced a less complicated situation. When they and the Qazaqs ran into each other at the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian government already dominated the Orthodox Church, which was the only church of any significance to them, and which was a church that the Muslim Qazaqs did not aspire to take over. The Qazaqs in Western Turkestan, then, could not in any possible way threaten the Russians the way that the Junghars threatened the Qing.

What, then, did the Russians hope to achieve in Central Asia? The Russians actually had the same goal in this region as they had in Siberia: They wanted to get rich. The man who founded Orenburg, Ivan Kirilov, meant that Central Asia could be to the Russians what America was to the Iberians. Whereas Spain and Portugal extracted resources from overseas,

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<sup>301</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 45, 83, 90.

<sup>302</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 208.

<sup>303</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 208.

<sup>304</sup> Moss, *A History of Russia*, 312.

<sup>305</sup> Perdue, *China Marches West*, 83.

Russia would be able to get salt, lead, valuable stones, silver, gold, and additional metals from Central Asia. “Kirilov drew a grandiose picture of caravans from Khiva, Bukhara, and India bringing exotic goods, and Bukharan, Indian, Armenian, and even European merchants coming to trade in Orenburg.”<sup>306</sup>

Unlike in Siberia, then, where the Russians extracted animal furs directly from the native inhabitants, in Central Asia they were to obtain the items they needed by commercial means. Kirilov actually recommended that the Russians simply conquer Central Asia,<sup>307</sup> but as we have seen above, this did not happen in the eighteenth century. Although Anna most likely gave the idea some thought, security for Siberia and commerce with Asia were what the Russians prioritized most at this time, and the arrangement with the Qazaqs was advantageous in both respects. In fact, even before Orenburg was finished in 1737, “[Kirilov], led by [Qazaq] guides, established a Russian caravan trade with Khiva, Bukhara, and Tashkent.”<sup>308</sup>

It is no wonder, then, that the Qazaqs did not share the fate of the Junghars in the eighteenth century. The profit-seeking Russians had other aims in Central Asia than had the Qing. The Qing was willing to sacrifice lots of resources in order to conquer the Junghars. The conquests themselves cost millions of taels,<sup>309</sup> and as we have seen, the Manchus’ administration in Eastern Turkestan was also very expensive to run. But all of these expenses were justified because the Junghars were looked on as a threat to the very core of the empire.

The Russians, however, did not see things the same way. Since the Qazaqs did not threaten their ideological establishment and since their main aim in Central Asia was commerce, the Russians were less willing to conquer the Qazaqs. A complete incorporation of the Qazaq steppe would have been expensive, just as it was to the Qing, and the Russians knew this and therefore hesitated to do it.<sup>310</sup> If they could continue with their commercial activities in Central Asia without conquering the Qazaqs, this was a cheaper and therefore better method for the Russians. I believe this is the main reason why the Russians, unlike the Qing, did not expand into Central Asia in the eighteenth century.

When Russia finally *did* annex the Qazaqs and the rest of Western Turkestan in the nineteenth century (more precisely in 1822-84), it was in an environment that differed much

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<sup>306</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 156, 158, quote from 158.

<sup>307</sup> Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 156.

<sup>308</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 28, 30-32, quote from 32.

<sup>309</sup> According to Perdue, Yongzheng used 50-60 millions on his Junghar campaigns, whereas Qianlong used 17 millions. Perdue, *China Marches West*, 257, 287. I have not found the exact number for Kangxi. When it comes to Yongzheng, however, Madeleine Zelin claims that this emperor used close to 130 million taels on the Eastern Turkestan-campaign alone (see an earlier quote in this chapter).

<sup>310</sup> Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 51.

from the eighteenth-century world. Russia was now emerging as an industrial power, and it began competing with other European states for colonies, influence, and prestige.<sup>311</sup> While it would have been very interesting to see exactly what motives were behind these expansions as well, they nevertheless occur outside of the chronological framework of this thesis, and I will therefore not explore these events further here.

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<sup>311</sup> See Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Chapter 3; Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, Chapter 15.

## 4 Conclusion: The Qing, the Junghars, and Tibetan Buddhism

In this thesis I have tried to find out what the Qing Empire hoped to achieve by annexing Eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth century. What motives guided this conquest? As we have seen, prior to the Qing expansion it was the Junghar Khanate that held sway in Eastern Turkestan. Did the Qing expand because the Junghars was a strong military power that needed to be eliminated, or were they eager to initiate a “civilizing mission” in Central Asia? Perhaps they thought that Eastern Turkestan’s territories could help them with the heavily increasing population in China, or that it would be a good recipient for Qing commerce? Maybe they desired to get hold of its resources?

The Qing Empire that conquered Eastern Turkestan was built in the early seventeenth century in Manchuria, and the two men responsible for this feat were Nurhaci and Hong Taiji. Nurhaci began his unification of the Manchus in 1583, and Hong Taiji (the successor of Nurhaci) initiated the Manchu Qing Empire in 1636. Before the Qing began to interact with Central Asia, however, they first conquered China. In 1644 they launched their armies against the Ming dynasty, and 39 years later, in 1683, China and Taiwan was in the hands of the Manchus.

In my view, this expansion was the product of two motives, the first being ideological and the second having to do with overpopulation. As for the ideological motive, the Manchus had a desire to conquer the Ming dynasty and overtake its “Mandate of Heaven.” The Chinese had for several thousand years thought that their rulers required the support of heaven in order to stay in power, and that this support depended on him (or her) being a just and morally upright sovereign. But if a ruler converted to evil ways, his Mandate would be removed and put in the hands of a different person, so that the evil ruler might someday be replaced. The Manchus thought that heaven had selected *them* to be the new rulers of China.

What they also thought, however, was that the Ming conquest would terminate a critical Manchu problem, which was that their state had a larger number of subjects than Manchuria was able to support. The Northeast was simply not rich enough for the Qing population. This was a problem that the Manchus knew they had, and which indeed was solved after they took China and Taiwan in 1644-83.

There were other challenges waiting for the Manchus, however. Two centuries earlier, in Russia, the old Mongolian polity known as the Golden Horde had begun to fall apart, and

from its aches would rise a number of states, one of which was the Russian state of Muscovy. In 1581, two years before the Manchus initiated their political project in the Northeast, the Muscovites traversed the Ural Mountains and began their expansion into Siberia. By the 1640s they had gotten as far as the Pacific Ocean.

This expansion by the Russians, although chronologically very close to the Manchu conquest of China, was nevertheless very different as far as motives are concerned. The Russians had no ideological reasons for taking Siberia, nor any troubles with their food stores in Russia. They took Siberia because it had resources, most significantly furs, which the Russians wanted to get their hands on. When they later expanded from Siberia into Manchuria, however, they were in fact looking for food as well, though this was to go to its existing establishment in Siberia, not to its subjects in the Russian homeland.

As the Russians drifted into the Northeast, however, they triggered Qing alarms. The Manchus were now in the midst of their China campaign, but they nevertheless tried to expel the Russians in the far north of their realm. It was not until the 1680s, however, after the Manchu hold on China and Taiwan had been consolidated, that a solution was worked out with Russia. The Qing and Russian states produced an agreement in 1689, called the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which divided the Qing and Russian realms in this region. The Russians left Manchuria, but could in return sell furs in China. Since furs was the very reason for their presence in Siberia, this was an acceptable compromise for Russia.

In the meantime, however, another state had emerged on the scene, and this was a Central Asian state. In the course of the seventeenth century the Junghar nomads had built a polity in Eastern Turkestan, and by 1680 the whole of this region was under their control. In 1688 this Junghar Khanate, led by Galdan, sent its forces eastward against Mongolia and the Khalkha Mongols. On this occasion the Qing did not respond, but after settling their issues with the Russians in 1689 (whom because of this treaty also had to promise not to aid the Junghars), the Qing was freer to do as it pleased. When the Junghars invaded again in 1690, therefore, the Qing attacked and defeated them.

It would take many decades, however, before the Qing actually defeated the Junghar state itself. Although they beat them in Mongolia in 1690 and later in 1696, and although Galdan perished in 1697, the Qing did not move into Central Asia until 1755-59. By 1759, however, they had destroyed the Junghars and in the process brought Eastern Turkestan into the Qing. What were the Manchus' motives?



In view of the many battles that the Qing and the Junghars engaged in, one would initially think that this was about security. The Junghars were destroyed because their armies threatened the Manchus. But because the Junghars had actually not invaded China itself, and because the last one and a half decades of Qing-Junghar intercourse (1739-54) was quite peaceful, I believe that this explanation is not good enough.

It is also unlikely that a “civilizing mission” was the motive, since the post-1759 years does not show much evidence of the local population being “transformed” or “civilized.” They imported Chinese government institutions into Eastern Turkestan, it is true, but this was only in a limited area, and in any case was only to govern the Chinese who immigrated to the region. The natives had their own government establishments, which was different from the Chinese one.

But perhaps it was these Chinese immigrants that were the cause of the conquest? Was overpopulation again one of the primary motives, as it had been when the Manchus took charge of China? The Qing population had in fact grown enormously during the eighteenth century, but because so few Chinese actually left China for Eastern Turkestan at this time (155 000 souls out of a population of 300 million Chinese lived in the region in 1800), I do not think that overpopulation was an important motive.

But could it be that the Manchus wanted the same as the Russians in Siberia, namely resources? As we saw previously, the Russians took Siberia because of the furs that it contained. Eastern Turkestan had resources as well, and the Qing obtained gold, iron, silver, and other commodities after the conquest. But because these resources were extracted with the goal of paying for the local Qing establishment, which in any case continued to rely on payments from China in order to stay afloat, I do not think that resources was why the Manchus annexed Eastern Turkestan either. The same is the case with commerce.

The reason they did expand into Eastern Turkestan, I believe, had to do with the Junghar Mongols, and the fact that they not only threatened the Qing in a military way, but also in an ideological way. In fact, the Qing and the Junghars were both closely associated with and critically dependent upon the *same* ideological source, which was the Tibetan Buddhist establishment in Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism was important for the Manchus because it helped them keep the Mongols (not the Junghar Mongols in Eastern Turkestan, but the Mongols in Mongolia and Manchuria) loyal to their state. Furthermore, because these Mongols also were an inalienable part of the Qing ruling core (perhaps as inalienable as the Manchus themselves), maintaining Mongolian loyalty towards the Qing was of utmost importance.

As for the Junghars, Tibetan Buddhism was important because it had helped grant political legitimacy to its leaders, first and foremost Galdan but also Tsewang Rabdan (the successor of Galdan). Galdan had in fact been in Tibet himself, and had it not been for the Dalai Lama titling him “Khan by Divine Grace,” he could probably not have called himself “khan” at all (all of these titleholders had to be in the family of Chinggis Khan, something that Galdan was not).

The Qing and the Junghars, then, were both military and ideological competitors at the same time. For example, if the Junghars in some way could have managed to make the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan establishment disapprove of the Qing as a Buddhist state, they could have hurt the Manchus badly without actually having done any physical action, and had they followed this up with a military attack, the Manchus would have been in a difficult position. I believe this is why the Manchus were so resolute in destroying the Junghars.

I also think that this argument is strengthened by looking at what Russia did with the Qazaqs in Western Turkestan. As we shall see, the Russian state’s experience with this area was in *some* ways similar to the Qing experience with Eastern Turkestan. As the Qing had first taken China and thereafter (in 1690) come in conflict with the Junghars, so the Russians had first taken Siberia and thereafter (at the close of the seventeenth century) come in conflict with the Qazaqs. As the Qing and the Junghars experienced several hostile engagements for the next 30-40 years, so the Russians and the Qazaqs did the same. But *unlike* the Qing, which conquered Eastern Turkestan in 1755-59, the Russians *did not* conquer Western Turkestan in the eighteenth century. They were content with the lands that they controlled in Siberia, built defensive structures along the Central Asian border, and although certainly increasing their influence in Western Turkestan, they did not conquer it. Why so?

I believe the reason is that unlike the Qing and the Junghars, the Russians and the Qazaqs *did not* capitalize on the same ideological source. The Qazaq Khanate had from the beginning been a Muslim state (though their pre-Islamic culture was still showing through), whereas the Russian state had from the beginning been an Orthodox Christian state. The Russians and the Qazaqs, in short, were not ideological rivals. I believe that had the same been the case with the Qing and the Junghars, the Qing would probably not have conquered Eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth century either.

## Appendix: Rulers and Reigns<sup>312</sup>

### Manchu Rulers to 1820<sup>313</sup>

Chinese Reign Name	Personal Name	Reign Period
Tianming	Nurhaci	1616-26
Tiancong	Hong Taiji	1627-35 (as Latter Jin khan)
Chongde	Hong Taiji	1636-43 (as Qing emperor)
Shunzhi	Fulin	1644-61
Kangxi	Xuanye	1662-1722
Yongzheng	Yinzhen	1723-35
Qianlong	Hongli	1736-95
Jiaqing	Yongyan	1796-1820

### Junghar Rulers<sup>314</sup>

Name	Reign Period
Khara Khula	?-1635
Batur Khun-tayiji	1635-53
Sengge	1664-70
Galdan	1671-97
Tsewang Rabdan	1697-1727
Galdan Tseren	1727-45
Tsewang Dorji Namjal	1746-50
Lama Darja	1750-53
Dawaci	1753-55
Amursana	1755-57

### Russian Rulers to 1820<sup>315</sup>

#### (The Romanov dynasty from 1613)

Name	Reign Period
Dmitri Donskoi	1359-89
Vasili I	1389-1425
Vasili II (the Blind)	1425-62
Ivan III (the Great)	1462-1505
Vasili III	1505-33
Ivan IV (the Terrible)	1533-84
Fedor	1584-98
Boris Godunov	1598-1605
Fedor II	1605
Pseudo Dmitri I	1605-06
Vasili Shuisky	1606-10

<sup>312</sup> This name is taken from a similar (though not identical) appendix from Perdue, *China Marches West*, 569.

<sup>313</sup> Based on Perdue, *China Marches West*, 569; Willard J. Peterson, ed. *Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, vol. 9, *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), XXV.

<sup>314</sup> Based on Perdue, *China Marches West*, 569.

<sup>315</sup> Based on Moss, *A History of Russia*, 568-569.

***(The Romanov dynasty)***

Mikhail Romanov	1613-45
Alexei	1645-76
Fedor III	1676-82
Ivan V	1682-96 (co-tsar)
Peter I	1682-1725
Catherine I	1725-27
Peter II	1727-30
Anna	1730-40
Ivan VI	1740-41
Elisabeth	1741-61
Peter III	1761-62
Catherine II	1762-96
Paul I	1796-1801
Alexander I	1801-25

**Qazaq Rulers to 1820<sup>316</sup>**

**(The Junior and Middle hordes from 1718, and the Bukei Horde from 1801)**

Name	Reign Period
Janibek	1465-80
Buyunduk	1480-1511 <sup>317</sup>
Qasim	1511-23
Mamush	1523
Tahir	1523-33
Buidashe/Ahmed/Tugun	1533-38
Haq Nazar	1538-80
Shigai	1580-82
Taulkel	1586-98
Esim	1598-1628
Jangir	1628-80
Tauke	1680-1718

***(The Junior Horde)***

Abu'l-Khayr	1718-48 <sup>318</sup>
Nur Ali	1748-86
Er Ali	1791-94
Ishim	1795-97
Ayshuak	1797-1805
Jhan-Tore	1805-09

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<sup>316</sup> Based on Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 4, 8, 10-11, 13-14, 24-26, 31, 34-35, 39-44, 46-53, 61-62. When the first and/or last year of a reign is not specifically stated and it has not been possible to precisely calculate it from the text, I have provided what I believe to be the most plausible year, and these years are written in *italics*.

<sup>317</sup> It is possible, however, that Kirai (the brother of Janibek) also ruled for a few years in this period. As Olcott states, "The official Soviet history of Kazakhstan considers Janibek the first [Qazaq] khan, holding that, upon Janibek's death in 1480, Kirai's son Buyunduk... was elected his successor. Other sources maintain that Kirai was the first *elected* khan, ruling until his death in 1488, when he was succeeded by Buyunduk." Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 8.

<sup>318</sup> On page 26, Olcott states that Abu'l-Khayr's rule ended in 1749, but on page 34 she writes that he was killed in 1748. Since she also states that Nur Ali (Abu'l-Khayr's successor) took over the latter's office in 1748, I've therefore set 1748 as the last year of Abu'l-Khayr's rule. Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 26, 34-35.

Shir Ghazi	1812-24
<b><i>(The Middle Horde)</i></b>	
Semeke	1718-33
Abu'l Muhammad	1733-71 (co-ruler)
Ablai	1733-81
Vali	1781-1817
Bukei	1816-18 (co-ruler 1816-17)
<b><i>(The Bukei Horde)</i></b>	
Bukei	1801-23
Jangir	1817-45 (co-ruler 1817-23)

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