Color as Matter

Narratives of Race, Ethnicity, and the Deployment of Color

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Abstract

This paper has as its postulate that ‘race’, colors and appearances has been emptied of legitimate cultural content, and has been surpassed by a discourse of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ in regards to how we articulate differences across people. This postulate is worked against using a research question that states that ‘race/color’ in today’s public debate has become drained of legitimate cultural content, yet in the lives of people of mixed ethnic decent color acts as an ‘experience near’ concept that is given on the one hand positive value and on the other hand negative value. The goal is then to chart out some of the historical reasons why ‘race/color’ became illegitimate, and then try to show how in fact ‘race/color’ acts as a sort of ‘social subtext’ that is still in play in the lives of mixed ethnic individuals.

This is done by using a document analysis ranging from the UNESCO statement on ‘race’ as it was formulated in 1950 and 1951 as well was analyzing near contemporary documents from the Norwegian Justice Department and The Norwegian Language Council. This is an effort of doing a short ‘genealogical’ analysis of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in the sense that Foucault used the term ‘genealogy’. From here the paper moves on to contemporary interviews with individuals of mixed ethnic decent in order to chart out how and in which sites color and ‘racialized’ knowledge about ethnicity is played out. It is in this part that the paper looks at the everyday importance of color and ‘race’ as it is played out across various social fields.

The paper ends with a conclusion that is tentative, but which never the less makes the claim that ‘race’ to a certain degree and color and appearances matter in everyday discourse. Furthermore it is argued that in the documents analyzed, ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ is conflated to such a degree that several paradoxes are born out of the historical conflation between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. These paradoxes makes it hard to conclude that ‘race’ as such is dead, but it is also claimed that ‘race’ has transmuted; both as it appears in the documents analyzed, but also based on the ways it is used in the lives of the people interviewed. As such ‘race’ as it occurs in the material analyzed is better seen as being part of a process of ‘racialization’ which links ‘ethnicity’ to ‘race’ in such a manner that ‘ethnicity’ bespeaks a corporal dimension as well as a cultural.
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IX
Chapter One - Introduction

I am eighteen years old playing basketball with a friend of mine in the backyard of his apartment building, like we often used to do during spring and summer time. I miss a shot and the ball bounces away across the yard and lands near a middle aged lady who is sitting in her folding chair licking sun rays. I walk across to pick up the ball, but as I approach the ball and come closer to the woman she suddenly utters “This is so typical for people like you.” I am struck by the sentence and reply “What do you mean by people like you?” The return answer is neither new nor original yet it hit me: ”Foreigners”. I am perplexed, yet this has happened before and I have an ace up my sleeve; I am half Norwegian. My next move will surely be the winning move in this chess game of ethnic show and tell. I answer back with that certain confidence one gets when one thinks one has the correct answer; that answer that will set oneself free. I reply: ”As a matter of fact I am half Norwegian”. The day is won, I am Norwegian, with all that that implies. Yet battles over bodies are seldom won that easily, for the woman who I thought I had now corrected and who I thought I had beaten in this battle over my own ethnicity and belonging replies in what I can now only remember as a cold, almost analytical fashion: ”Well you are still only half”.

Years later I read Franz Fanon and his Black Skin, White Masks (Fanon, 2008) and it is here that I stumble upon thoughts and reflections that took me back to that day in the backyard and that lady and her words. In Fanon and especially his analysis of the lived experience of the black man, I found similar though not identical narratives. Fanon describes the meeting with the white gaze as an encounter wherein one’s own body schema gives way to the historical-racial schema; a schema that has been woven out of a thousand details, anecdotes and stories (Fanon,2008:91) which freezes the black man within the stereotypical views that exist in the world of him. Fanon states that in the white gaze the black man’s body is returned to him from the outside, from the white gaze and stereotypes that surrounds the black man. Fanon says: “The white gaze, the only valid one, is already dissecting me. I am fixed” (Fanon, 2008: 95, original italics). This way of being fixed is for Fanon an instance wherein the black person is “overdetermined from the outside. I am a slave not to the “idea” others have of me, but to my appearance” (Fanon, 2008:95). Thus the black man’s body is returned to him not fully as his own, but “spread-eagled, disjointed, redone” (Fanon, 2008: 93) by the stereotypes, anecdotes, and stories told about the black man; all of which are deployed through the epidermal, the skin, which signals all of this.
The encounter I had with that lady feels somehow connected to Fanon, my own answer of being half Norwegian was not good enough. I was still only half. What had triggered her to say this? What made her think that I was not Norwegian in the first place? Was it my appearance, my skin as Fanon would have said? In retrospect it felt like I was overdetermined from the outside and my body was dissected and given back to me in numerical partitions; I was still only half, not whole.

This narrative is of course the paramount example of such identity encounters, but what is more common is the meeting of new people who often ask the question of “Where are you from?” to which I have had various responses. I have said “Norway”, or “Norwegian”, yet often the follow up question has been: “No I mean, where are you really from?”

So what does this have to do with visible bodies, ethnicity and race? The interesting thing for me has been to reflect about this “really” in the question “where are you really from?” This ‘really’ is obviously not geographical since answers such as “Oslo” or “Norway” doesn’t seem to be enough, nor can it be because of language skills; I have no accent. Thus I came to the conclusion that this “really” is in fact a pointer towards my phenotypical appearance. Where are you really from is just as much about where did you get that dark hair, or that nose, or those eyes. These are the visible and corporal signs that this ‘really’ tries to uncover. In encountering this everyday issue I was struck by how important the body and its colors and shapes can be, but now a new issue arose: how to explain this importance of the body and color in a world wherein ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘religion’, and ‘values’ have usurped the older tropes of ‘race’, ‘biological incommensurability’ and ‘the inferiority of colored bodies’? How to account for the importance of skin color and bodies in a contemporary setting which seems to pride itself on being ‘post race’? In order to shed some light on the contemporary setting I had to formulate a research postulate that I could work with that was both embedded in the present but also in the past. The postulate that I landed on is that “race/color” in today’s public debate has become drained of legitimate cultural content, yet in the lives of people of mixed ethnic decent color acts as an ‘experience near’ concept that is given on the one hand positive value and on the other hand negative value. My goal then is to chart out some of the historical and rhetorical reasons in official documents as to why “race/color” became illegitimate, and then try to show how in fact “race/color” acts as a sort of ‘social subtext’ that is still in play in the lives of mixed ethnic individuals. My argument is that the ways in which ‘race’ and the corporal has become illegitimate and the subsequent rise of the ‘ethnicity’ and culture paradigms has lead to a conflation of ‘race/corporality’ and ‘ethnicity’ that can be called ‘racialization’.
Here ‘racialization’ should be seen a concept that refers to the phenotypical and corporal dimensions of ‘ethnicity’; as part of ‘ethnicization’ wherein when one speak of biological and/or somatic features (real or imaginary) one is thus speaking of a ‘racialization’ of ethnicity, a specific modality in which one talks about ‘ethnic bodies’ (Solomos and Murji, 2005:14). Racialization offers us a way of talking about visible ethnic bodies without validating the concept of ‘race’ in its biological mold, but is still able to take into account the power and influence of racial thinking (Solomos and Murji, 2005:16). As such what I want to show how the visible dimensions of ethnicity matter and that ‘race’ and bodies are often made into matter by a rhetoric that professes to not be ‘racial’ per se, but which never the less refers to people and concepts in highly ‘racialized’ terms.

Why ‘mixed race’?
A point that needs to be clarified is why the focus on mixed ethnic individuals? Could not this paper been written about other non-white minorities in Norway today? It no doubt could, and in fact it should, as little research have been conducted on such topics in Norway, but even less has been written about mixed ethnic individuals in Norway. Research on mixed ethnic individuals in Norway is very absent from the otherwise plethora of research on ethnic and cultural minorities in Norway. After an extensive literary search only two academic works on the subject in Norway appeared, one of which is a sociological master paper on identity development (Aiwerioba, 2007) and the other one is an article on mixed ethnic individuals performance in school (Hallvik, 2008). Thus one of the arguments for ‘why mixed ethnic’ is that this paper can be seen as a way of filling in an under researched area within ethnic and cultural studies in Norway\(^1\), or as it has called it in the early feminist or women studies; part of a ‘visibility project’ (Beauvoir, 2005, Hooks, 1984, Hooks, 1982, Gilligan, 1982, Wittig, 1986). This ‘visibility project’ becomes even clearer when one looks at how mixed ethnic individuals sometimes are conflated with other ethnic minorities in Norwegian academic research. For instance the otherwise well written book by Annick Prieur, *Balansekunstnere* (Prieur, 2004) uses informants who are of mixed ethnic decent, but this fact is never fully

\(^1\) A point in case is the new table from the Norwegian Statistic Bureau (SSB) which shows the total amount of mixed ‘ethnic’ individuals in Norway at present time. See [http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2011-04-28-05.html](http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2011-04-28-05.html) for the whole table. The SSB gives the figure of 213 486 to be the number of persons who are Norwegian born with one foreign parent. This means that in that total group one must assume that there also are a number of individuals who are mixed with other ‘white’ ethnic groups, thus this number is not a number which points to the total of mixed ethnic individuals who are ‘non-white’. Yet it is interesting that these individuals are placed in the group of so called ‘other immigration background’ [Annen innvandringsbakgrunn]. The total number in this group should warrant some research but as stated little have been done on this in Norway.
reflected upon or taken into consideration. The same can be found in Mette Anderson’s article on the relevance of the concept of the ‘Black Atlantic’ in Norway (Anderson, 2006); informants of mixed ethnic background are conflated with and looked upon as ‘just another minority story’ and seldom accorded a place of their own.

Hence the reason for choosing mixed ethnic individuals should be seen in this light; as expanding on current issues in ethnic and cultural studies in Norway, but also to embed it in a historical context that sees Norwegian research on these issues more often than not as unwilling or unable to engage with color and the corporal dimensions of ethnicity and “race” (Gullestad, 2002:152). But even though such a visibility project has both important epistemological as well as perhaps political implications there is also another reason for this and that has to do with more theoretical and analytical issues. The issue I want to, briefly, touch upon is how the concept of hybridity as a theoretical as well as an analytical term has gained such a vogue in newer cultural studies. Hybridity as an academic term and especially in the humanities has become something of the rage as far as cultural identity, praxis and globalization are concerned. Yet for all its productiveness, and at times obfuscating tendencies, on cultural praxis, identities and the ‘impurity’ of culture, the term has in its newer forms within academia almost exclusively focused on ‘cultural hybrids’ and as Dimple Godiwala claims the “biological hybrid remains ignored” (Godiwala in Kuortti and Nyman, 2007:74). I am not trying here to re-inscribe a biological essentialism that older academic writing on the ‘hybrid’ person often relied on; rather I would like to use this argument as a way of making apparent that mixed ethnic individuals seldom are accorded the place as necessarily a hybrid. In a longer quote from Godiwala she notes that

theories of cultural hybridity have turned all cosmopolitan subjects into hybrids on a macro level or global scale that which denies the real hybrids a subject space. What is required is a discursive space which is not just defined but also named for the biological, and perhaps, inevitably, cultural hybrid. The indeterminacy of the identity of

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the biological hybrid needs to be supplanted with an inscription of the ethnicity of a subject who is the *always-other*. Naming this subject ‘hybrid’ is to re-claim, as Rushdie put it, ‘the name […] given in scorn.’ (Godiwala in Kuortti and Nyman, 2007: 74, original italics)

I do take issue with Godiwala’s notion of ‘the real hybrid’ as this seems to make hybridity an issue of normativity and hierarchy which I would prefer to avoid, yet I think her arguments are useful for grounding this work on why we should focus on this group of people. The body should be re-inscribed into the language of hybridity, but not as an essentialized biologism; rather we should do this in an effort to nuance the term ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybridity’. This ‘turn to the body’ is also cultural as “the biological hybrid lives in a state of hybridization of cultures, language, and indeed, colour. The hybrid can be dark as the night or light as ice’ (Godiwala in Kuortti and Nyman, 2007: 75). The point is that by focusing on mixed ethnic individuals and how the racialization of their bodies influence their lives one can perhaps start to move away from a notion that all hybrids share the same subject position (Broeck in Kuortti and Nyman, 2007:51) just because they have been analytically conceptualized as hybrids.

Hybridity is also important as an historical discourse or concept; a short sweep of the cultural history of the term allows one to get a glimpse of a discourse that has both been vilified for its focus on ‘race mixing’ and the ‘bastard offspring’s’ of such race mixing⁴, but we should be careful in claiming that ‘race mixing’ and hybridity has historically been only molded in the negative. As cultural historian Peter Burke shows, hybridity does have a history that also focused on the positive. Especially in Latin America, Burke claims, has hybridity been a discourse of some valor; the Mexican Jose Vasconcelos, a former minister of Education celebrated hybridity in his work *The Cosmic Race*⁵ which presented the mestizo as the essence of the Mexican nation (Burke, 2009:4). The same can be said about the Brazilian case in which the sociologist Gilberto Freyre in 1933 in his work *Masters and Slaves* (Freyre, 1956, originaly published in 1933) defined the Brazilian identity as a mix especially between white, European culture and people and black, African people and cultures (Burke, 2009:4). The cultural history of hybridity as such contains a very broad and intricate history which cannot be recounted in its full range due to space considerations, but suffice to say that


⁵ See VASCONCELOS, J. 1979. *La raza cosmica*, Los Angeles, Cal., The University. For the original argument and version of *The Cosmic Race*
hybridity and especially “hybrid people” has long been the focus of much commentary and debate, both as a positive and as a negative pole.⁶

**Cultural History as History of the Present**

In writing a paper such as this there are several subtle and not so subtle acts of situating both oneself as an author, fledgling scholar and as a political being. It is not my concern here to define what cultural history is or isn’t⁷, rather it is to say something about how it is written and the disciplinary community it is connected to.

In writing about bodies, ‘race’ skin color and hair in a contemporary setting cultural history might seem far off, yet by supplementing the contemporary interviews with historical as well as near contemporary documents, the merger between cultural history and cultural studies is a necessary approach. More specifically it is connected to the work done on and about subject constitution through the body.⁸ As Mark Poster says cultural history might then be understood as the study of the construction of the subject, the extent to which and the mechanisms through which individuals are attached to identities, the role the process of self-constitution plays in the disruption or stabilization of political formations, and the relation of all of these processes to distinctions of gender, ethnicity and class (Poster, 1997:10, my italics).

So by looking at color, hair, and the corporal dimension of mixed ethnic individuals there is a hope that this might also shed light not only on the very materiality of the body but also how this materiality become matter that constitutes a specific self. My argument is that we cannot understand contemporary identifications of ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, or skin color without acknowledging how history has formed and reformed such concepts. The discursive battle over definitions, classifications and the power to name others and self is deeply connected to power and to historical processes which continue to shape how we act and identify today.

This thesis brings with it a postulate that claims that color and ‘race’ has lost much of its salience, at least in official discourses which has seen a turn from ‘race’ and skin to culture


and ‘ethnicity’. Yet it also claims that in the contemporary setting, in the lives of ordinary people, skin color and racialized versions of ethnicity is highly relevant. This vein of research does have a historical grounding, for instance Greer, Mignolo and Quilligan traces the emergence of ‘race’ and the classification system not to the nineteenth century, but places its emergence in the Renaissance and those early cross cultural encounters that took place in that era (Greer et al., 2007). The authors claim that they hope to locate a historical intersection of stereotypes, classifications, or what Foucault called “dividing practices” – practices of enormous ideological and practical consequence in forging, justifying, and maintaining early modern regimes of domination and exploitation, whose shifting combinations continue to shape how we think and act in the world we inhabit today (Greer et al., 2007:3).

But these dividing practices have varied from time to time and skin color was not always the dominant piece in the puzzle. Once again Greer et.al points towards the intersection between religion and bodies as a key site in which ‘race’ came to be articulated in the early modern period. The great divide in the early modern period of the Renaissance was religion and lineage, but it was this frame work that laid the basis for the secular and philosophical racialized divide of the nineteenth century. According to Walter Mignolo “what secular science and philosophy did in the nineteenth century was to translate and adapt the racial system put in place by theology in the sixteenth century” (Mignolo in Greer et al., 2007:312). Classifications of bodies belong to various temporal regimes of ‘dividing practices’, Mignolo identifies religion as key in this formation, skin color and biology came later only to be replaced, at least at a surface level, by concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ in the implementing a regime of dividing practices.

Yet it is a point that it is always a body or corporeal dimension to these dividing practices; be it a ‘pagan’ body, or ‘biological inferior body’ or a ‘culturally different’ body. Even though Mignolo points to the religious foundation of modern racism and race in that theology offered the tools to describing and classifying people as either being ‘in the right’ or ‘in the wrong’ (Mignolo in Greer et al., 2007:319), it is still a classification that writes itself upon the body of those classified as Elizabeth Grosz would say (Grosz, 1994). Skin color as ‘race’ might be historical contingent, and that other markers of ‘race’ have existed throughout history seems beyond doubt. Be it religion in the early modern period as Greer et.al shows (Greer et al., 2007), or even dietary prescriptions in the same period as Rebecca Earl shows (Earle, 2010), it all acted as part of a dividing regime.
But there is a problem with these innovative historical readings; for all their innovation and scholarly contribution to the expansion of our understanding of racial regimes and the construction of various dividing practices, we should also look at how terms are conflated and how ambiguous such dividing practices can be. This is particularly important in my own work wherein I look at how ambiguous the construction of ‘ethnicity’ has been at certain junctures and how in turn this ambiguity is played out and acted out in the contemporary setting in the lives of people today.

One such area wherein racial regimes are made, contested and classified are in the use and abuse of racialized stereotypes in the everyday lives of the persons interviewed. This is one of the sites that makes evident that skin color and racialized knowledge still is produced. Now the stereotyping of the racial Other within Europe has a long history within academic writing. Edward Said’s work on the stereotyping of the Orient and Arabic world has had an enormous impact on postcolonial scholarship (Said, 2004). But practices of stereotyping for instance Africans have a longer history than the nineteenth century; Earle et.al places this practice as emerging within the Renaissance in regards to African slaves who came to Europe (Earle and Lowe, 2005). In the Norwegian context, cultural historians Anne Eriksen and Olav Christensen traces in their work White Lies [Hvite Løgner] (Christensen and Eriksen, 1992) the emergence of black Africans as both a stereotype within Norway as well as the historical route that black Africans has had in Norway starting from the seventeenth century and the role of the house servant that served the rich to the everyday stereotypes and racist image making of the twentieth century. Newer work on stereotypical regimes of representations as Stuart Hall would have called it (Hall, 1997) would be Cora Alexa Døving’s book Integration. Theory and Empery [Intergrering. Teori og empiri] (Døving, 2009). Especially illuminating in this regards is Døving’s juxtaposing of anti-Semitic stereotypes and anti-Islamic stereotypes in regards to the Norwegian context.

Another site in which skin color and its meaning has been made evident in the Norwegian context is in connection to labeling and name calling. This has an impact on research such as this as it goes to the heart of how on one level there seems to be an insistence on the ‘post racial’ era in which ethnicity and culture are seen to be the dividing line between people. But what these discursive battles over naming and labeling shows is that skin color and bodies are contested sites in which the power to name others holds out the promise of belonging and placement within the Norwegian society. One such heated debate was the so called “Negro debate” [Neger debatten] wherein several social actors and commentators debated whether or not “Neger” [Negro] was a neutral word in Norwegian or if it was a
negative word in which history had made its irreducible claim to notoriety. One scholar who took this debate seriously was Marianne Gullestad (Gullestad, 2002) who made the claim that the problem with the debate was that it (i) underestimated the cross cultural connotations of the word “Neger” [Negro] and (ii) that it once again showed how the majority, white, population in Norway did not listen to the minority, non-white, population who felt offended by the term which in and of itself showed the power asymmetries that exists in Norwegian society when it comes to issues of naming and labeling. I will not go in depth into this matter, but I would like to point out that issues such as these show how bodies and skin color matter as discursive dividing practices; the link that I want to make between the above arguments and my own project is that it is history that has formed this route in which color and bodies come to matter and not just a contemporary issue.

In approaching the hypothesis regarding the turn from ‘race’ into ‘ethnicity’ one has to account for the material used. This paper circles around two types of empirical sources. The first one is an analysis of four official and institutional documents ranging from the 1950’s into 2006 wherein terms such as ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, color, and culture are constructed in such a way that we can see a turn away from the lived body towards a more abstract notion of ‘culture’. The second part of the hypothesis is analyzed by using interviews conducted with persons of mixed ethnic decent in Oslo during 2011. The empirical sources will be presented more thoroughly in respect to why they were chosen in the chapters wherein they are analyzed.

It is important to look at how ‘race’ vanishes in the rhetoric of the documents analyzed, but it is also in that instance that ‘race’ vanishes and ‘ethnicity’ emerges that ‘race’, by a sleight of hand, enters as a subtext. It is the task of this paper to try to show this sleight of hand as it manifests itself in the documents analyzed and then show how skin color and the importance of the body is much more present in the everyday lives of the people interviewed.

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9 This debate came to the fore in 2001 when the Norwegian Language Council became embroiled in a public debate whether or not ‘neger’ was a neutral word in the Norwegian language. It gained a lot of headlines and a torrent of responses. To see some of the responses and perspectives see for instance online article at NRK regarding a survey that said that “six out of ten Norwegians thinks it is ok to use the term ‘Neger’”; http://www.nrk.no/kultur-og-underholdning/1.3781150; other responses to this issue comes from anthropologist Marianna Gullestad in an online article in NRK’s P2 Akademiet; http://www.nrk.no/programmer/radio/p2_akademiet/2754550.html.
Chapter Two - Methodology, Epistemology and Ethics

Methodological concerns are connected to both theory and to the empirical material we intend to analyze, as such there are several issues that need to be addressed in this chapter such as what the empirical material worked with is, and how one intends to analyze it. As stated there are two main sources of material, interview transcriptions and official documents, as such there are two methodological approaches; interview analysis and text analysis.

When reflecting upon the interview and its epistemological value, we should perhaps first acknowledge that interview might instead of being written in the singular be written in the plural so that it becomes a matter of interviews instead. As such it is important from the outset to signal what kind of interview that is argued for here. The interview as it is used here leans on a postmodern foundation and as Thagaard points out, a postmodern take on the interview establishes that knowledge is dependent on the context in which it is formed making it hard to transfer knowledge claims to other situations (Thagaard, 2009:42). Since postmodern epistemology is heavily influenced by the subject’s sensitivity to context and language, the subject as discursively constituted, it naturally has consequences for the interview as a tool (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008:454). Thus, how the subject acts or paints a picture of reality within the context of the interview is less about how they ‘really’ are or how reality ‘really’ is and more about how they develop a form of subjectivity and representation of reality in relation to the local discursive context that the interview makes up (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008:454). But to follow such a ‘strong’ postmodern epistemology could lead to a view of the subject as nothing but a discursive and textual automaton that has little if no room for agency and reflection. Rather I would focus on the strengths of the postmodern interview; Alvesson and Skoldberg says one of the strengths of postmodern epistemology is plural interpretations. The two authors states that a postmodern epistemology allows for alternative representations of phenomena and a openness to plurality and variations in the stories that informants tell; a multiplicity of representations of the subject (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008:456). The focus on the value of the narrative, the historical, the local, the fragmented and the ambiguous within postmodern epistemology has a lot to offer within qualitative research, as do the claim that human knowledge is always irreducibly contradictorily and unstable (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008:458). What this further implies is that voices are in play in a postmodern interview; situated and local voices that speak and interpret from somewhere.
**Standpoint Theory, Situated Knowledge and the Qualitative Interview**

One of the most interesting things in applying a postmodern lens on the interview situation is the plurality of voices in the material gained from the interview. Thus in contrast to more traditional research ideals wherein one tries to limit the voices within the material, the postmodern approach tries to free up space for as many as possible (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2008:448). This is not to say that there is an unlimited presence of voices and realities in play within the interview context, rather it is to open up for plural interpretations of the material. But it is important to fuse the insights of plurality with that of locality. Each voice speaks from somewhere. Our own objectivity is influenced by our background and personality, and this in turn has implications for epistemology. To paraphrase Zackariasson; there are no neutral interviews, the researcher is always influenced by his or her own values and attitudes towards reality, just as he or she is always also influenced by the environment that he or she studies and the relations that are formed between people (Zackariasson in Gustavsson, 2005: 160). Perhaps the search for objectivity should instead start with the search for placement and perspectives? Donna Haraway makes the claim that objectivity is simply situated knowledges (Haraway in Harding, 2004: 86) and that;

The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another. Here is the promise of objectivity: a scientific knower seeks the subject position not of identity, but of objectivity; that is, partial connection (Haraway in Harding, 2004: 90, original italics).

Transferred to the qualitative interview as method we could suggest that Haraway’s view of the partial, the imperfect and unfinished nature of both knowledge and the knower does not foreclose knowledge to be gained from interviews, rather it opens up for a critical reflection that has to do with the limitations embedded in any knowledge that is produced. Objectivity is to a certain degree a realization that all connections are partial, that the knowledge gained from an interview will always be a partial representation of the world and of the informant. Stuart Hall states that

We all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always ‘in context’; positioned [...] Representation is possible only because enunciation is always produced within codes which have a history, a position within the discursive formations of a particular space and time. The displacement of the ‘centered’ discourses of the West entails putting in question its universalist

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10 This is of course closely linked to hermeneutics and interpretations of written texts but also text in its broadest sense of the term. For a good anthology of texts on hermeneutics see LÆGREID, S. & SKORGEN, T. 2006. *Hermeneutikk: en innføring*, Oslo, Spartacus.
character and its transcendental claims to speak for everyone, while being itself everywhere and nowhere. (Hall cited in Pels in Harding, 2004: 275, original italics).

To follow Hall here is to insist that an interview and the knowledge derived from it is spoken from somewhere and by someone and that this ‘speaking from’ is just as much about acknowledging that to speak from somewhere can and does imply some claim to truth, as well as implying that the truth spoken from that position is in fact limited by the very fact of speaking from a particular space and place. This applies to me as a scholar but also to the people I have talked to; we all speak from somewhere and it is this somewhere that should be accounted for as a way of being honest about my positioning as well as being epistemologically transparent. It is important to account for this in such a research project in that it points out both limitations and possibilities; location both foreclose too much of an generalization but it also opens up a deep understanding of that particular location in terms of time and space.

I do not want to argue that a postmodern take on qualitative interviews leads us into a relativism that tells us that anything goes. As Haraway declares:

The alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology. Relativism is a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally. The “equality” of positioning is a denial of responsibility and critical enquiry. Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; […] Relativism and totalization are both “god-tricks” promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully, common myths in rhetoric surrounding science. (Haraway in Harding, 2004: 89).

This point is crucial in arguing for the qualitative interview as an important tool in gaining new insights into the lives of others. This is also, as Esborg notes, a question about closeness and distance (Esborg in Gustavsson, 2005: 92); to reflexively engage with both theoretical frameworks, the word of the informants and our own position; to create, perhaps through

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11 An interesting point to observe from a theoretical and epistemological point is the contrasting view between stand point theory and psychoanalysis in the mold of the more Freudian vein. Stand point theory postulate that truth claims should be taken serious from the position of the speaker and thus has validation as truth as it is spoken. Yet if one follows the insights from Freud in his postulate that ‘humans are no longer masters of their own domain’ due to the mechanisms of the unconscious and the following repression of desires, emotions and memories, it becomes harder to take stand point theory at face value. In psychoanalysis it is the analysts’ job to resolve or help resolve the repressed emotion that leads to for instance neurosis, as such the spoken word of the patient cannot be taken at face value since it can always be symptomatic for the unconscious and repressed which the patient nevertheless has no control over. This clash between the agency embedded in stand point theory and the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ that is psychoanalysis is an interesting point which so far has not been looked into as a potential epistemological problem or at least as a theoretical “clash” to put it bluntly. For stand point theory see HARDING, S. 2004. The Feminist standpoint theory reader: intellectual and political controversies, New York, Routledge. For both Freud and Lacan see FREUD, S. 2006. Forelesninger til innføring i psykoanalyse, [Oslo], Bokklubben, FREUD, S. & HAUGHTON, H. 2003. The uncanny, New York, Penguin Books. And LACAN, J. 2006. Écrits: the first complete edition in English, New York, W.W. Norton.
partial connections, an interpretation that is both close to and far from one’s own position. As such ”through the interview the researcher tries to gain the other’s perspective through conversations and interactions […] The fieldwork then is a social project, wherein the researcher is dependent on the interaction of other people […]” (Esborg in Gustavsson, 2005:101, my translations). We can here use Haraway and say that the qualitative interview is a social interaction with other positions, with partial views of reality that comes to the fore within the interview and which in turn makes clear the views from somewhere and not a god-trick that claims to see from everywhere.

**Sample Composition, Criteria’s and Recruitment**

I have interviewed twelve persons of mixed ethnic background and conducted re-interviews with 4 of them in order to clear up, and add to the original interviews. The sample pool consists of four men and eight women and ranging from age 20 to 35\(^{12}\). All of the informants live in Oslo, as such they share a certain commonality as far as geographical location is concerned. In regards to the ethnic makeup of their parents they are diverse, but with one common characteristic; one of their parents are ethnic Norwegian, meaning in this context that they are also white. The other parents’ native country is diverse, stretching from Asia to Africa and to the Caribbean. What is of note is the fact that nine of the twelve persons interviewed come from backgrounds where they have grown up within a household that has had only one parent present. Furthermore, of the nine persons that have been raised within a single parent household, the parent raising them have been of ethnic Norwegian background. I have not gone in depth into this as it falls somewhat outside the frame of this paper, but I do acknowledge that this demographic fact regarding the people I have interviewed can and probably do influence such aspects as cultural competency, language skill, familiarity with parental culture and country, etc. all of which in turn influence cultural as well as ethnic subjectivities. Indeed this could be taken up as an area of further research.

In regards to how the informants were recruited I made use of a ‘snowball’ sampling method. Thagaard defines this sampling strategy as a strategy in which one contacts persons who have the desired qualifications and fall in under the sample criteria’s for the study at hand, and how in turn these individuals points towards others who fall in under this sample category (Thagaard, 2009: 56, Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 64). I reached out to my own network and in turn recruited individuals that were willing to partake in this interview study. This has

\(^{12}\) See Appendix for full list of informants
lead in my opinion to an easier recruitment process which in turn has shortened the time it would otherwise have taken to recruit individuals.

In choosing a snowball sampling strategy there are certain pitfalls that we must be aware of and reflect upon in connection to the material gained from the interviews. One pitfall in particular is striking in regards to my project and that is the risk of recruiting individuals that are all from within the same close circle of acquaintances (Thagaard, 2009:57) and thus result in a group of homogenous individuals which could influence the ways in which their narratives are told and the material gained from them. A way of countering this is as Thagaard says to operate with several ‘snowballs’ which are tide to different networks of people (Thagaard, 2009:57), and in such a way opening for a more heterogeneous sampling pool. The idea is that this in turn will generate several narratives that are perhaps contradictory or overlapping that in turn will give a more nuanced understanding of the research question that is posed (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:67). I have followed this advice and have tried to stretch my reach by going through friends of friends and by explicitly telling people I connected with during the sampling strategy to connect me with persons that they in turn knew I was not familiar with and that did not fall into the same network as me. I hope that I have managed to avoid any possibilities of interviewing people who would represent too similar environments and experiences.

The interviews themselves were conducted in public places such as cafes or at the University of Oslo during the period of May 2011 until November 2011. The location of the interviews made it is easier for the informants to be accessible for an interview as well as it made the talk more informal and loose. During the interview phase it became clear that of the twelve people interviewed four of them developed very long and deep narratives of the topics at hand and as such became what one could call ‘key informants’. This was also one of the reasons that when I decided to re-interview some of the informants. I went back to those informants that had yielded the longest and most in depth narratives. As such some of the informants interviewed are not cited at all or directly due to the fact that the key informants gave narratives that were very similar to those given by other informants. In choosing this way of doing the write up I have taken a conscious decision in prioritizing deep narratives which have yielded great depth, but I am aware of the danger of over prioritizing some informants over others. These decisions are hard to make and in fact constitutes an interesting field of study in itself; why do we chose to prioritize these particular informants and stories? How conscious are we of our choices? And what kinds of knowledge are produces and omitted in such a process? These are interesting points but I have had to make a choice and
the choice fell on prioritizing deep narratives, perhaps following the notion of ‘thick descriptions’ akin to Clifford Geertz (Geertz, 1983) wherein the focus lies not on a wide quantitative field, but rather and rich qualitative depth.

**Researching Others, Researching the Self: conducting research within one’s own culture**

Being of mixed ethnic heritage myself, conducting research with informants that are of a similar background is both an interesting and challenging task. At times it has been dominated by narratives that have felt close to home while at other times I have encountered narratives that feel strange and alien. A question that does crop up in this regard pertains to closeness and distance; to objectivity and blindness. To conduct research within a field where the informants are close to oneself has been an issue of much debate. Thagaard refers to several studies wherein gender has played a crucial role in facilitating a closeness that has been important for the study at hand (Thagaard, 2009:82), but if gender commonality can facilitate this kind of closeness can the same be said of ethnicity and race? As Yasmin Gunaratnam states: “Discussions about racial and/or ethnic matching, and related concerns about the effects of racialized commonality and differences in interracial qualitative interviews, occupy a central position in the methodological literature on interracial interviewing” (Gunaratnam, 2003:82)\(^\text{13}\). The questions raised is whether or not one should strive for ethnic and/or racial ‘matching’ between researcher and the informant so as to best understand the experience of the interviewee. Those that see ethnic ‘matching’ as the best strategy in interracial interviews sees it as the best solution to the ‘problem’ of gaining access to the experiences and perspectives of minoritized research participants (Gunaratnam, 2003:83) as well as promoting an reduction of intersubjective distance between the interviewer and the research participant (Gunaratnam, 2003:83). On the other hand, others have raised the question that even though ethnic matching might be seen as a form of ‘methodological capital’ (Gunaratnam, 2003:83), it still might not fully be able to take into account the power asymmetries that are embedded within a research interview of this kind (Gunaratnam, 2003:83). It is still the researcher who interprets the interviews collected, it is also the I as researcher who more or less sets the agenda in that even though I for instance have used a thematic interview guide which follow a fluid structure wherein the informants

\(^{13}\) Interestingly enough, or perhaps rather telling is the fact that ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ commonality as part of a debate on methodological concerns in regards to qualitative interviews seems absent from the literature in Norway. Gender, age and class all seem to be mentioned yet ethnicity and ‘race’ as part of this debate is if not totally lacking, then at least very well hidden.
can break free to associated over other themes and questions, it is still I who have laid the ground for departure in regards to what we talk about.

In regards to these statements it is crucial to take both approaches into account; in conducting my interviews I have both experienced that it has been useful to have an ethnic commonality, but it has not annihilated the power asymmetries that are found within the interview setting. At the same time there is always the possibility that whatever commonality that was formed during my interviews were not based simply on me being of mixed ethnic decent, rather there could have been a multitude of factors that facilitated a good report. Gender, age, geographical location or just the sheer luck of finding common ground might have facilitated this. Pettersen in a rather different setting states that: “Whether or not the informant defines the researcher as “one of them” or as “one of the others”, has a large influence on what sort of information we as researchers gains access to” (Pettersen in Gustavsson, 2005:196, my translations). If we follow Pettersen in this argumentation then it seems that an ethnic commonality might facilitate an easier report, one in which the information gained reflects a more ‘emic’ perspective than it would have if the informant had not seen the researcher as closer to or similar to the respondent. But once again there is not a clear understanding if the people interviewed has seen me in this way, even though I have felt that at times there have been moments of ethnic commonality in as much as statements such as “you know what it is like to be mixed”, or “don’t you think that is the way people look at us?” have been made by the informants. I would like to exemplify this with an outtake from one of my interviews wherein Stine, a female informant gives just such an example of what could be called ethnic commonality. The comment was raised without me explicitly asking and it appeared in a context wherein we talked about the importance of color and who can ask what about whom. The narrative goes like this:

Stine: [...] If for instance you had been white and were to write this paper would I have been as open as I have been? Had I answered just as truthfully or would I had been more hostile and given you answers that were not that reflective?

In the above Stine clearly reflects upon the notion of commonality and how she would have reacted to me as a person and interviewer had I been ‘white’ It is perhaps not an explicit acknowledgement of mixed ethnic commonality, yet I take it to be a way of expressing that she herself feels that me being ‘non-white’ did facilitate some sort of report that made her answers differently and possibly more extensive and illuminating than had I for instance been white. I am skeptical in taking this to its extreme end, wherein commonality can be distilled
down to just one factor, be it gender, age or ethnicity, yet I do think it has had an impact upon my research.

This is well captured by Avtar Brah in her views on diasporic and border positionality as she links this to the understanding of differences:

diasporic or border positionality does not in itself assure a vantage point of privileged insight into and understanding of relations or power, although it does create a space in which experiential mediations may intersect in ways that render such understandings more readily accessible (Brah cited in Gunaratnam, 2003:96).

This is a position that I think is a viable one; one that resonates with my own research experience during these interviews. It was perhaps easier for me to gain access to the informants experiences due to my own similar but not identical experiences; perhaps these moments of commonality made some insights easier to relate to and reflect upon. Gunaratnam follows up on this notion of lived experience and claims that:

What Brah suggests is that lived experiences of ‘race’ and ethnicity […] may create ‘spaces’ or possibilities, for people […] from minoritized groups to use our own constructions of ‘experience’ to develop insights into the connections between social location, power and difference (Gunaratnam, 2003:96).

This position takes account of both placement, and commonality but also shows that there is no guarantee that commonality is achieved, rather there is a possibility that this might happen. It is my hope that this has occurred and that it has had a positive effect on this research, even if only for some of the time.

**Document Analysis: History, Genealogy, and Discourse**

In addition to analyzing interviews, I have also analyzed documents. This addition to my project came later on in the process as I eventually realized that interviews alone could not tell the whole story that I wanted to look at. History and textual discourse had to be implemented in such a way that it could engage at a level which was official and the same time also embedded in a historical context which sees the rise of ‘ethnicity’ and the demise, at least at a surface level, of ‘race’. In doing this I have been strongly influenced by discourse theory, as such much of what I will be elaborating on in the chapter on theory will be valid in approaching these documents. There is an inevitable slip here because discourse theory can be a method as well as a theory (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999, Wetherell et al., 2001), but due to space consideration and the risk of repeating what will be stated in the chapter on theory I will not be engaging in a re-citing of the ways discourse operates. But suffice to say
that in analyzing these documents I approach them as fragments of discourses; bits and pieces that can be said to be part of a greater discourse in regards to ‘race’, and ‘ethnicity’. It is also important to note that I view the content within these documents very much in line with how Foucault viewed statements, as the smallest building blocks of discourse (Mills, 2004: 55). A statement must be seen as a function of existence that enables groups of signs to exist (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003: 11) which in turn can be linked to how this, the smallest unit of the discursive structure, brings forth phenomenon through enunciation (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003: 11). So by reading and “deciphering these traces, this manner of reading documents ‘makes it possible to snatch past discourse from its inertia and, for a moment to rediscover something of its lost vitality’” (Foucault in Tate, 2005: 37). It is an effort to see what kind of internal logic is there as a foundation for understanding the transformation from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ and see what these statements do in order to form these terms.

Inspired by Michel Foucault and his genealogical reading of the various ways in which we have been made into modern subjects (Foucault, 1979, 1985, 1986, Foucault, 1984) I want to engage in a close reading of these documents as part of a genealogy of the ways in which ‘race’ has transformed into ‘ethnicity’, and see how color, ‘race’ and the visible body has been made more opaque throughout the documents that I have analyzed. I do not mean that what I am doing here demonstrates a full and exhaustive genealogical reading of this phenomenon, rather

Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of broken things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes (Foucault in Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003: 20).

The analyst “should attempt to draw the different and multifaceted branches of a genealogical tree [...] To trace the origin of a social phenomenon [in this case ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and the colored body] does not imply the establishment of the birth of the phenomenon, but the tracing of its line of decent”(Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:20, my interpolations). As such the methodological reading of these documents consist of a close reading that tries to chart out some of the ways in which the body goes from being ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’; from being pure biology to being cultural.

It is a reading that “seeks the surfaces of events, small details, minor shifts and subtle contours” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:106) of a discourse that goes from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ and which in the interviews of those I have talked to can be seen as traces of history. This
reading of history is not a reading that wants to understand the past in term of the present, nor see in the past the origin of the present, rather it begins with the problematization of an issue that one is confronted with today and then starts to chart out its contingent historical and political emergence (Howarth, 2000:72-73). The issue that I want to confront in these documents is a reading that poses the problem of how did ‘race’ become ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ and how did this have a bearing on the body as a marker of visual difference. After that one can turn to the interviews and see how these issues are manifested in the everyday lives of the people I have talked to. The ‘history of the present’ as genealogy might be called starts with a diagnosis of the current situation; there is in that sense an unequivocal and unabashed contemporary orientation (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:119) to the project of genealogy. This seems like a good fit for a paper that draws from both historical perspectives as well as contemporary perspectives in cultural studies.

By reading these documents as part of a genealogical project it highlights how such terms as ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and how we today see them are deeply connected to history. “Genealogy accepts the fact that we are nothing but our history” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 122), which is precisely the aim; to see how bodies are in fact made in history and by history while it at the same time is history that often offers us new ways of being. One of the issues that I am confronted with in my reading of these documents as well as the interviews is how the body acts as a surface which ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ writes itself upon. As Foucault states the

Body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of decent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body (Foucault in Kapoby and Szeman, 2011:344).

These insights will be further elaborated in the analysis of the interviews that I have done when I draw upon Butler and her terms of performativity and the materialization of bodies through history. The important aspect is that genealogy in this regards offers a way of seeing how the body is inscribed as ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, ‘cultural’, etc. all in an effort to describe and to invest it with meaning. A meaning that, goes from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ in the official discourse; a discourse that makes the racial much more cultural, while it in the contemporary setting, in the lived lives of those interviewed, the corporal in its racial guise is very much there.
A Short Note on Transcriptions and Translations

I have recorded the interviews that I base my contemporary analysis on and then I transcribed the interviews. The total length of transcribed interviews is close to hundred and fifty pages and the total length of audio material is close to sixteen hours. I have chosen to approach these interviews in a manner that I hope is open and accessible without losing too much of the informants voice. I have transcribed the interviews in such a fashion that it is following standard norms for written language. I have avoided using phonetics and conventions taken from Conversation Analysis and I have instead opted for an approach that is perhaps further from a verbal form and closer to what we would call a written standard. This entails that I have transcribed the interviews with standard written markers such as comas, punctuation marks, capitalization, etc. This might remove the ‘naturalness’ of the interviews, yet I think that this will make them more accessible and open. Since written language might be said to be an idealization of what spoken language is, with its long and at times broken up content it is perhaps true that this way of doing my transcriptions might lessen the informants voice. I have chosen to write this paper in English, yet all my interviews have been done in Norwegian. This too might pose a problem as far as epistemic validity is concerned; after all, all translations lose something in that very act of being translated. This also applies to my document analysis which I have also translated from their original Norwegian language into English; once again this poses some questions on the epistemological problems embedded in all translations and as such it is important to take notice of these choices.

Ethics and Interviews

Ethical considerations are of immense importance in regards to how we conduct qualitative research, and in particular when we are dealing with interviews. The partial closeness that I have advocated in the above, in regards to both epistemology and in researching within and upon people that are of similar background, also plays a role in the ethical dilemmas that can present themselves during these interviews. Partial closeness is still closeness and as such the information the researcher gains through interviews might at times be of such a nature that the researcher cannot use it without breaking the ethical and moral bonds that the researcher has to the informants (Aukrust in Gustavsson, 2005: 220). This makes it paramount for the researcher to reflect upon the interaction between him/herself and the informant and make sure that the contact that is established is conducted in an ethical fashion (Thagaard, 2009:85). This means that it is the researcher’s duty to insure that not only
the interview and meeting with the informant is conducted along ethical lines, but also to ensure that the material gained from this meeting is handled in an ethical fashion; in this case that involves masking the informant’s identity when writing the paper.

I masked my informants by substituting their names as well as their age and the countries from where their parents came from in an effort to make them as anonymous as possible without losing too much data in regards to the questions asked. This was done in such a fashion that it would be hard to trace the original identity of the informant to the persona in the text. It is also important that the interview itself is formed in such a fashion that it maintains the integrity of the informant, their motivations as well as their self respect (Thagaard, 2009: 110). Confidentiality is a key principle when it comes to presenting the finished analysis (Thagaard, 2009:27) both as a professional hallmark, but more importantly as an ethical responsibility we have towards the Other. This also meant that I had to submit my research project for approval with the NSD [Norsk Samfunnsfaglig Datatjeneste] which is responsible for approving research projects that deal with personal information and the handling of such in research projects. The project was cleared as it was deemed that it followed the ethical guide lines that the NSD has put forth thus giving the green light to go ahead and start the project.

There is also the issue of the power relations that are embedded within these kinds of interviews. The researcher can potentially distort and transform the material gained from these kinds of interviews in such a fashion that the informants’ voice disappears completely. In such instances it is important to be aware of the potential ‘symbolic violence’ as Bourdieu points to (Thagaard., 2009:212). It is of course a fine line between maintaining good theoretical rigor and that of ‘epistemic violence’ and recreating hegemonic ‘regimes of truths’. It should imply that the persons interviewed should be clearly present in the text as a ‘voice’ and not just as a bi-product of the researchers own views on the topic at hand.

Social research should always strive to at least minimize the ways in which the researcher conduct violent analysis of the material gained from others and always keep in mind the ethics of the Other. Citing Shirley Ann Tate and her work, Tate states that to

14 A peculiar note to make in regards to the NSD and how they define sensitive personal information is that they too, much like the documents that will be analyzed later, use ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ side by side as part of what they deem to be sensitive personal information. The terms ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic background’ is deemed to be of sensitive nature; this in and of itself is not my main target here, rather it is the fact that even the NSD seems to be unable to severe the link to ‘race’ as a concept and is still used in official parlance. See NSD on sensitive information: https://trygg.nsd.uib.no/personvern/forsk_stud/begreper.html
take account of empowerment ‘the researched’ must not be reproduced in ways which re-inscribe inequality. This means that the research report must attend to the micro-political processes involved in the research and, questions of difference must be dealt with in the design, conduct, write-up and dissemination of the research study (Tate, 2005:18).

To empower the informants means that they must be allowed to speak up and be able to correct and disagree with the researcher. Conducting such research means to use interactive methods, taking account of the subjects’ own agenda and feelings, and to give feedback and share knowledge with the individuals being interviewed (Jaworski and Coupland, 2006:143).

This has meant in this project that the informants have had the option to withdraw anytime during the work phase, from interview to the finished result which they have had the option of reading. It is of course difficult to work within a theoretical framework, and not let it distort or transform the material gained from the interviews; after all the transformation starts from that moment when I start transcribing the audio files recorded during the interview. It is no longer the informants’ voices that are found on my paper, rather it is transcriptions of voices, that now is transformed into a written text. Since a general ethical principle is that the informant shall not be injuriously implemented within the research, a nuanced theoretical understanding can on the one hand include the informants’ voice and on the other give room for an understanding that is relevant in an academic setting; it is a way of lessening power asymmetry and epistemic violence.
Chapter Three - Theory

In order to analyze my sources I will use the work on discourse as it is formulated in the works of Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1979, Foucault, 1993, Foucault, 1989, Foucault, 1984), Ernesto Laclau (Laclau, 1994, Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) and the work of Judith Butler on gender subjectivities (Butler, 1993, Butler, 2004, Butler, 1999). The main argument for choosing a discursive focus is that much of the analytical weight is put on analyzing texts either in the form of documents such as the UNESCO declaration on “race”, but also in order to analyze the contemporary interviews in their transcribed form. This is a way of analyzing the social world as a ‘textual world’ much in line with what has often been deemed to be the ‘linguistic turn’ within the humanities and social sciences.

Discourse theory in the mold I have chosen to work with leans heavily on how the world is socially constructed through language and the epistemological claims we make about the world and the objects that inhabit it rather than being a ontological given structure (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:21). This implies that the knowledge produced about ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ is not contingent upon a prior reality that is there, accessible and open to us, but rather that discourse seeks to produce reality rather than report on an existing one (Butler, 1997:33). This is so because within discourse theory epistemology slips onto and into ontology; what we know about the world is forming that very world that we seek to discover. This has implications for many things, and in this paper it means that how we see ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ has as much to do with the rhetoric and language that we talk about it as it has to do with the very bodies or subjects that we describe as either ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’.

Discourse: Power, Knowledge and the Formation of Objects/Subjects

I want to signal the key factors established by Foucault in his discursive writings that I intend to use which are (i) the role of the statement within discourse and its link to creating subjects/objects within discourse ,(ii) the link between power and knowledge within discourse, and (iii) the polyvalent nature of discourse.

The statement in Foucault can be read as the smallest unit within a broader discourse which brings forth phenomenon through enunciation (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:11). Statements are those small parts of discourse that has the power to create both ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’; that is a statement creates an object not as an ‘object out there’, but rather creates discursive objects constructed, classified and identified by the statement itself (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:11). In this context this seems to open up for the possibility of analyzing
documents which pertain to the ‘creation’ of for instance ‘race’ or ‘ethnic Norwegian’ as an object within discourse; it is how documents produce ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ as discursive objects that makes them appear as statements of discourse. The statement creates subjects when it “creates subject positions that can be signed over to individuals, that is, if the statement creates discursive spaces from which something can be stated” (ibid.). Foucault did claim that the statement is not a speech act, but later made it clear that the statement as such can be seen as somewhat similar to what J.L Austin (Austin, 1975) and Searle (Searle, 1979) formulated as speech acts (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:46). This point will be especially important in looking to how ‘ethnicity’ and in particular color and bodies are part of a performative doing later on in regards to Butler’s theory and how the people I have interviewed can be seen as engaging in various speech acts that all can be seen as statements in the way that they create subject positions from where to speak and move.

The statements that Foucault analyses are special; they are not everyday speech acts, but rather those statements that are categorized as truth claims; or more precisely, as “those linguistic performances in which subjects are empowered to make serious truth claims because of their training, institutional location and mode of discourse” (Howarth, 2000:55). This is the starting ground for looking at the documents that are analyzed as this would mean that we can see how the ‘truth’ about ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and the body is created based on the statements made about these objects. But this does seem to pose a problem for my other empirical sources, my contemporary interviews. Are the speech acts of the people I have spoken to infused with the same truth claims that Foucault was interested in? Probably not, but it is possible with a reversal here. If such statements are grounded in the authority to ‘be in the true’ as Foucault might have said, then what the people I have spoken to represents is the authority to speak ‘in the true’ about their lives and their subject positions, but not outside discourse. This is due to the construction of the ‘role’ of the ‘informant’; for the informant’s words to be ‘in the truth’ so to speak, it is only due to the fact that what they say is still inside discourse. Truth then is:

Of the world; it is produced there by virtue of multiple constraints […] Each society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true […] the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth: the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault cited in Mills, 2004: 18).

One such ‘regime of truth’ must be seen as the construction of the ‘informant’ as a social character which is sanctioned to ‘speak the truth’ about the topic at hand within academic and
scientific texts such as this. In fact the enterprise of conducting an interview can be seen as a particularly technique within the social sciences and humanities in producing and sanctioning certain ‘truths’ about various topics. As such the construction of ‘the informant’ is just as much about producing subject positions which are made to be ‘in the true’ so to speak. Even though this view of the sanctioning of truth production might seem to devoid those I have spoken to of agency, it is still my contention that this does not take away the fact that the ‘truth’ that is spoken of in these interview is in fact still ‘in the truth’. This is so due to the fact that no one is outside discourse; ‘the informant’ as a constructed source of scientific data is still a source even though it is discursive.

Another point is that analysis of statements is one that “avoids all interpretations: it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were ‘really’ saying, in spite of themselves, the unspoken element that they contain…; but, on the contrary, it questions them as to their mode of existence” (Foucault cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:51). The question asked is; why this and only this statement at this particular time and place? How did this statement come to be? Regarding the paper at hand one way of thinking about the statements as such is to ask why did the Justice Department make these particular statements regarding the change from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’; what facilitated this move and no other?

The second useful aspect of Foucault is the way that he sees discourse as infused with a deep connection between power and knowledge. Power is everywhere “because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1984:93). Power is also productive; it produces actions at every turn. These insights are useful for the task at hand in that it shows how ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ bodies are constituted in the play between the knowledge about them and the power to speak about them. It is interesting to see how power is not only located in the official documents analyzed, but that power is also enacted on an everyday level of those interviewed which means that we can see how knowledge claims about for instance ‘ethnic Norwegian’; is tied up to the power to define this subject position. Power is not held but instead must be seen as something which is exercised (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:192). An example of this is of course how the UNESCO statement on ‘the race question’ can be seen as an instance where power and knowledge are exercised in order to constitute a discourse. But it can also be seen at the everyday level in which the people interviewed exercise power through racial
stereotypes, ways of talking and in fact ‘doing’ ethnicity. This is an instance wherein power is productive. As John Frow states

If power is no longer thought simply as a negative and repressive force but as the condition of production of all speech, and if power is conceived as polar rather than monolithic, as an asymmetrical dispersion, then all utterances will be potentially splintered, formally open to contradictory uses (Frow cited in Mills, 2004:20).

This points to the third item on my list which is the ‘polyvalence of discourse’ (Foucault, 1984:100) and the potential for plural meanings within discourse. Since power is productive and formative it has implications for how we behave, think and conceptualize objects in the world. It produces ways of behaving as well as foreclosing ways of behaving (Mills, 2004:20) based on what is perceived as ‘proper’ behavior and in fact thought. This has bearings on how the people interviewed can act and can be seen to act according to various discourses that deal with ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’. The same can be said about the documents analyzed; to ‘establish a regime of truth’ forecloses certain ways of describing that truth as well as enabling ways of speaking about that ‘truth’. That means looking at how ‘race’ is spoken about in such a manner that it enable ‘ethnicity’ to arrive, or how ‘ethnic Norwegian’ is described and thus establishes certain frames of references on how we can talk about this object.

Foucault also speaks about the ‘tactical polyvalence of discourse’ (Foucault, 1984:100). For Foucault there is not a matter of a dominant or subordinate discourse on for instance ‘race’ or on ‘ethnicity’. Rather he states that “we must not imagine a world of discourses divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies” (Foucault, 1984:100). To give an example, ‘race’ might now in Norway be regarded as a debunked and ‘irrational’ discourse, it nevertheless can arise within other discourses; elements of older or refuted discourses might be seen within for instance the discourse on ‘ethnicity’. In fact this is part of the nature of discourse;

discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy (Foucault, 1984:102).

This is perhaps one of the most crucial elements in the analysis of the turn from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’, and in attempting to chart out how racialized understandings of ethnicity at an everyday level contain several often contradictory beliefs or statements about ‘ethnicity’,
‘race’ and skin color. It is also useful to see how the people interviewed often use labels that could be seen as embedded in a racial discourse while at the same time refute racialist discourse. Much of this theoretical perspective could have been supplemented by using either Julia Kristeva’s notion of ‘intertextuality’ wherein various discourses are connected and play of each other, or even more so in Bakhtin’s notion of the ‘dialogic’ and ‘polyphonic’ nature of language (Gunn, 2006:65, Bachtin and Mørch, 2003). For Bakhtin, language is by nature social and always in connection to prior utterances and must always respond to those prior utterances in order to calculate responses to that utterance (Gunn, 2006:66). It is also worth keeping in mind that much like Foucault, Bakhtin also differentiates between ‘official’ language and ‘unofficial’ language. ‘Official language’ is often seen, similar to Foucault, as monological and as an imposing force that wants to force its meaning as ‘truth’ while the opposite, ‘unofficial’ language, is more dialogical in nature (Gunn, 2006:66). So why focus on Foucault? There are several reasons, but my main argument for this is that Foucault has as his strength the focus on the deep coupling between discourse and language on the one hand and on the other hand the coupling between power/knowledge. This way one can focus on the various ways in which even ‘tyrannical’ discourses can offer room to move and be productive for those agents that are embedded in such discourses.

**Ernesto Laclau and Discourse**

For Laclau the ‘polyvalence of discourse’ lies in ‘the openness of the social’ which in turn is a consequence of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity (Howarth, 2000:102). To fully understand this, we must take one step back and see how Laclau views the structure of discourse and how signs within discourse are always embattled sites within the social. For Laclau, discourse starts with what he calls an ‘articulatory practice’, that is the construction of nodal points which are partially fixed within discourse (Howarth, 2000:102). Hence discourse is the structured totality of various ‘articulatory practices’ within a domain (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:36). A discourse in Laclau’s sense can then be seen as a fish net with its knots, all of which are connected. These knots are in turn partially fixed meanings which are established through these articulatory practices. All discourses tries, through the battle over hegemonic meaning, to establish ‘nodal points’ which can be seen as a privileged sign which other signs establish their meaning around (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:37). The discourse is established as a totality in that hegemonic meaning tries to exclude other possible meanings in relation to these nodal points; the establishment of a discourse is thus also the establishment on the limits
of what certain signs can mean (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:37). This is reminiscent of Foucault and how he saw how power and knowledge foreclose and enable certain meanings to be deducted from a discourse. But since discourses are interlinked and overflowing with meaning the closure of meaning within discourse is impossible as the field of discursitivity (inter discursive links) offers other possible meanings to slip into the discourse (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:37) This can be seen in the material wherein ‘race’ as an established outside of the discourse on ‘ethnicity’ glides in and onto ‘ethnicity’. It is important in the analysis of the documents on ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ to see how one tries to freeze the sliding of the signifier; how for instance UNESCO tries to establish a closure of discourse by making the concept of ‘race’ an unequivocal concept (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:38). Much like the polyvocal nature of discourse that Foucault operates with, so too does the discourse of Laclau offer a multitude of possible meanings to come to the fore. Since all signs never can be finally arrested in their meaning due to the surplus of meaning within the total field of discourses, discourses themselves are never totally stable. This is closely connected to how Laclau reads the relationship between ‘signifiers’ and ‘signified’. In Laclau’s discourse the opposite; or rather the other side of the nodal point which has achieved partial closing of meaning is the floating signifier. This is when the sign and what it signifies has been torn apart from one another and implies that the signifiers influence that which they signify (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:53). The discursive battle is therefore over which signifiers are tide to which signified (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:53). It displays how new meaning can glide across or down into for instance the sign ‘Norwegian’ and come to signify something new. This is a key point in this analysis as well; even though ‘white’ often comes to stand for ‘Norwegian’, the people interviewed often engage in ways of stating that while white equals ‘Norwegian’ they too are ‘Norwegian’ albeit under a new sign which signify across various discourses such as ‘Norwegian’, ‘black’ or ‘immigrant’. This is also the reason, as I will show later on, for the continual semantic slippage of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as it is an example of how difficult it is to freeze the signification of bodies as they emerge within various discourses.
Performativity, Materialization and the ‘Doing’ of the Body

I want to use Butler’s theory on performativity and materialization not only as an account of the performative nature of ‘ethnicity’ or the body, but to account for how, in the everyday lives of the interview subjects, color and bodies are made to ‘speak’ or ‘do’ in such a way that ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ is blurred.

For Butler the gendered body is produced discursively, and it is this discursive production of the gendered body that allows her to view gender as a series of performative acts. Gender is an act in the sense that ‘doing’ gender involves ‘sustained social performances’ which involve repetition of socially established meanings, which in turn makes gender attributes and acts the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification (Jagger, 2008: 27). Quoting literary scholar Gill Jagger:

[...] gender acts are what constitutes embodied beings as gendered subjects in keeping with the norms of compulsory heterosexuality. They involve an on-going process of continual repetition (‘sustained social performances’) through which individual subjects do (act out) their gender, in a ‘stylized repetition of acts. This ‘stylized’ repetition of acts involves bodily movements and gestures (corporal styles) that are socially approved and politically regulated in keeping with a cultural field of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality” (Jagger, 2008:27).

At this early juncture we might be compelled to ask the question: if gender can be viewed as a performative act can the same be said about race and ethnicity? Is there also a ‘nationalnormative’ ideal that operates upon and through bodies so as to regulate what is considered a ‘Norwegian’ person? In regards to this project we can link this to how the informants interviewed view this national normative body of the Norwegian. Butler herself has acknowledged the need and possibility of utilizing a performative perspective on the modalities of race and ethnicity, though she herself has not done so explicitly.15 As Sara Salih states “Butler insists that they [gender and sexuality] do not precede race and that normative heterosexuality is not the only regulatory regime operating in the production of the body” (Butler and Salih, 2004: 139) and in turn that “to talk in terms of ‘racializing norms’ is to suggest that race, like gender, sex and sexuality, is constructed rather than natural, the effect of discourses and interpellations which performatively constitutes subjects as ‘raced’” (Butler and Salih, 2004:142). Hence performativity is a ‘doing’ that is worked through and upon both gender, race and ethnicity.

One of the most important things in producing bodies within discourse is “the

understanding of performativity not as the act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler, 1993:2). This is important as it points to the fact that we should not take performativity to be an ‘acting’ that is totally free and that enables the subject to construct his or her own racialized position, rather it is the repeated acts within the normative discourse of what counts at any given time as a gender or racially intelligible subject that in turn makes us into recognizable subjects. There is good cause here to shortly note that while Butler might have formulated a theory on the performativity of gender and of the subject, such ways of theorizing the subject has been done before and especially by Erving Goffman in his book *The presentation of self in everyday life* (Goffman, 1971). Space considerations foreclose a deep analysis of the various differences between Goffman and Butler, but suffice to say that the choice of Butler is better aligned with the poststructural perspective as a whole in this paper, as well as the difference between Goffman and Butler on how much agency we have as social actors. While Goffman can be read as proponent of an active and willing agent, Butler focuses on the more restrictive nature of performativity. Hence there has been a tendency to differentiate between performance (Goffman) as more of an active and willing ‘doing’ while performativity (Butler) has often been seen as more restrictive and discursive in nature, making the ‘agent’ not an agent, but in the extreme, a textual puppet.

Furthermore this process of performativity is linked to how Butler views the site of the body and its materiality. Bodies as matter should according to Butler be seen as “a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” (Butler, 1993: 9, original italics). Hence to become a recognizable racial subject is always also an historical process that regulates what is at any given time the normative ideal. The very fabric of the corporal body should then be seen as a historical sedimentation of norms that in turn animates the various ways in which we can ‘act’ out as gendered and racial subjects. A longer quote from Butler will hopefully serve as a way of making this point clearer as she states that

“Crucially, then, construction is neither a single act nor a causal process initiated by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed effects. Construction not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of this reiteration. As a sedimented effect of a reiterative or ritual practice, sex acquires its naturalized effect, and, yet, it is also by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as the constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes or exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed by the repetitive labor of that norm” (Butler, 1993: 10, original italics).
Linked to this analysis we can start to see here how the construction of a ‘ethnic’ body is also contingent with how the ‘raced’ body has been perceived; how color and bodies have accumulated meaning through history. Even though for instance the UNESCO statement that will be analyzed replaces the term ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’, Butler’s notion of the materiality and materialization of the body as a process in time makes such an “easy” shift problematic. For if the very body is constructed through time and in language it seems difficult to “just” replace ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’ when the very body these two terms refer to has a much longer history.

Intelligible Subjects, Abjects and Performativity

A key point in Butler’s theory on performativity is that the ways in which we acts or ‘do’ our gendered and ‘racial’ being is contingent upon a normative ideal that establishes who counts as ‘insiders’ and who counts as ‘outsiders’; or rather who is made culturally intelligible so that their bodies so to speak “matters” and that those who do not live up to or conform to a normative ideal are made into abjects. Thus “normativity marks out a social realm inhabited by both relatively successfully gendered subjects and the abjected, excluded or penalized bodies of those who define the limits of the norm by falling outside it” (Loxley, 2007: 121). This is useful as it points out the ways in which we can analyze how for instance documents establishes ‘who is Norwegian’ or how the informants interviewed establishes a center, a norm and its outside in relation to ‘Norwegian’, ‘white’, ‘ethnic Norwegian’, etc.

In regards to the paper’s line of questioning we must ask here whether or not the normative ideal of who are recognized as ethnic and culturally Norwegian also produces its abject outside, and whether or not the national normative also contains a corporal dimension such as skin color, hair texture, etc. Butler points to this when she states that “[T]his exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet “subjects”, but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” (Butler, 1993:3). Once again we can ask if to be a Norwegian subject also follows this logic; that the ways in which we performativly constitutes ourselves as ‘Norwegian subjects’ also produces in the same fashion those that are regarded as not yet fully ‘Norwegian subjects’?
Interpellation, Performativity and Speech Act

Performativity is as said a way of looking at identity as a ‘doing’, and as a reiteration of norms that in turn can be said to be

so many “styles of the flesh”. These styles all never fully self-styled, for styles have a history and those histories condition and limit the possibilities. Consider gender, for instance, as a corporal style, an “act” as it were, which is both intentional and performative, where “performative” suggests a dramatic and contingent construction of meaning (Butler, 1999:177).

The discourse on what counts as a intelligible subject already precede the subject itself, thus it is the historical contingent discourse that offers the (narrow) set of options available to us in ‘doing’ our subjectivities. Butler here uses, among other theories, Althusser’s term of ‘interpellation’ and combines it with the speech act theory of J. L. Austin and its reformulation done by Derrida.

According to Althusser, the subject is produced through a process that is called ‘interpellation’, in which she or he is ‘hailed’ or addressed by a powerful ideology, and in responding to that ‘hailing’ the subject takes on the identity of the ‘you’ thus hailed (Loxley, 2007:130). Butler in turn plays on this by stating that all such ‘interpellations’ functions on the basis of prior social conventions. This is the reason why interpellation works in the first place; why we respond to these sorts of ‘calls’. As Moya Lloyd claims, interpellation in Butler’s account works through other practices, and institutions – ‘bureaucratic forms, the census, adoption papers, employment applications’, and so on. The reason for all of this is that interpellation, like illocutionary speech, is based on convention. It has a ritual form that precedes and exceeds it (Lloyd, 2007: 117).

For instance when a baby is born the descriptive utterance, ‘It’s a girl!’ is both a description of the apparent sex of the baby, but at the same time also an interpellation that functions as ‘hailing’ the subject into a prior culturally intelligible subject position. This interpellation is also related to the continual reiteration of gender norms that the individual then comes to follow; i.e. the ‘girling’ of the subject by for instance giving it dolls, dressing it up in clothing that is culturally coded as ‘feminine’, etc. This ‘girling’ of the subject is linked to the ways in which we ‘talk into being’ our subject positions, or rather how we are talked into being. “Being called a name is also one of the conditions by which a subject is constituted in language; indeed, it is one of the examples Althusser supplies for an understanding of “interpellation”’ (Butler, 1997:2). As Butler states this ‘girling’
of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout the various intervals of time to reinforce or contest this naturalized effect. The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm (Butler in Salih, 2002:77).

In regards to the task at hand, there is good cause to ask how people are ‘interpellated’ as either ‘Norwegian’, ‘white’, black’, or ‘non-Norwegian’ in the interviews conducted. Furthermore it is well worth to ask how skin color and the visible body is part of such interpelations; how color, as social ‘subtext’, functions as a founding interpellation. We can also pose the question of interpellation to the documents I have analyzed; who is ‘hailed’ into various subject positions and by what means does this process proceed? Regarding the documents from Norway, either the Norwegian Language Council’s wording of ‘who is Norwegian’ or the Justice Departments draft on new wording in regards to immigration laws one can ask who is being hailed into a position of ‘ethnic Norwegian’ and why?

Salih argues, “[w]hile no one usually declares “It’s black/white!” when a child is born, presumably Butler would argue that this particular performative utterance could just as well operate in the context of race” (Butler and Salih, 2004:142). The point is that performativity functions also at the level of speech and not only as corporal gestures. We are being ‘hailed’ into positions by what seem to be neutral descriptions, yet what Butler shows us is that these descriptions can in fact constitute what they describe. Thus to be ‘hailed’ into a subject position that is ‘Norwegian’ could be seen as part of the process in which we as persons finds spaces of belonging. It is also important to note that the visible body is key in understanding how ‘descriptive’ statements also constitute what it describes. The body that is being described is often also constituted by that description and this has implications for the ways in which we are ‘racialized’ as subjects. Even though there seems to be an effort in many of the documents analyzed to sever the link between the body as “pure” biology and replace it with ‘culture’ or ‘ethnicity’, what Butler points to is that complicated process of living in a body, or with a body, that has been constituted by and through history.
Chapter Four – From Race to Ethnicity: The Purification of a Discourse.

“[W]hen the term ‘race’ is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term ‘race’ altogether and speak of ethnic groups.”¹⁶

The quote is taken from the UNESCO statement on race from 1950 wherein the scientific validity of race was to be drafted in an effort to initiate a “programme of disseminating scientific facts designed to remove what is generally known as racial prejudice” (UNESCO cited in Hazard, 2011:176). I want to take this sentence as a starting point and from here undertake a discourse analysis of the ways in which ‘race’ became illegitimate, at least at a surface level, and then see how ethnicity became the legitimate ‘heir’ to race. It is an effort at making an analysis of how ‘race’ and implicitly, the body, became a ‘sub text’ embedded within ethnicity in a genealogical sense.

Before embarking on this, I want to give a short account of the texts that I intend to use. I will start by looking at the 1950 and 1951 statements on ‘race’ that was formulated by UNESCO. From here I will move forward and look at how the relationship between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ is talked about in newer Norwegian documents. I will look at how the Justice Department formulated the change from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ as they were about to implement a new law on ‘Ethnic discrimination’ which was formulated in 2002 and how it was formulated in the law on immigration formulated in 2010. I will also look at how the Norwegian Language Council [Norsk Språk Råd] defined the use of ‘ethnic Norwegian’ and ‘Norwegian’ in its response to the Ombudsman on Equality and Discrimination policy which had made a request to the Language Council in 2006 to clarify what the Language Council meant by these terms.

The first reason for choosing these texts is that they represent some form of ‘discursive authority’; the UNESCO statement represents a form of discursive power that is connected to how it is embedded in an institution and in its connection to scientific ‘truth’ production (Foucault, 1993) concerning what ‘race’ is and what it isn’t. The Norwegian Justice Departments’ reformulation of ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ also represent the authority to change discourse; it is deeply tied to what Foucault might have called ‘the juridico discursive’ authority of for instance prison (Foucault, 1979) in that it formulates an official ‘reading’ of

‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’, which following Foucault is not so much a ‘reading’ but a construction of both terms. The last text from the Norwegian Language Council represents what I would call a ‘social linguistic authority’ in that it governs the ‘official’ language use of terms and terminology. Once again this is closely connected to the two others in that the documents are in the business of making ‘regimes of truths’ (Stuart Hall in Wetherell et al., 2001: 76).

‘Regimes of truth’ are those statements which are made by authorized people and accepted by society as a whole and which are then distinguished from false statements by a range of different practices (Mills, 2003:74). When these documents comment upon and debate what ‘race’ is or what ‘ethnic Norwegian’ is we should keep in mind that this is not so much a description, but rather a constative speech act within discourse. Statements create objects within discourse (Mills, 2003:74.) much more than they just describe them, or rather it is the process of ‘description’ that is also the moment of ‘construction’. The authority of the describer also constitutes the ‘truth’ that is being established, and that is exactly what these documents have in common; they all construct ‘race’, and ‘ethnicity’ based on some form of authority.

I do not want to make a historical line that causally explains, or ‘shows’, how ‘race’ vanished and ethnicity emerged, the scope of such an endeavor is too big for a paper such as this. Rather I want to make the claim that there is an ‘intertexual’ relationship stretching from the UNESCO statement and into the other texts. The UNESCO statement has had a huge impact on historical research on the history of ‘race’ as well as being perceived as being politically important in order to battle racism and overturn the philosophical underpinnings of European colonialism and the Jim Crow laws in the US (Hazard, 2011:174). Several scholars point to the statements as a defining moment in the abolishment of ‘race’, as it had been perceived earlier (Lavik, 1998, Berg and Kristiansen, 2010, Gullestad, 2002). As such it has had an enormous impact on how the UN has formulated its tenets on the equality of humans and its views on racism and discrimination. One of the clearest intertextual connections is between the UNESCO statements and how the Norwegian anti discrimination law sees the term ‘ethnicity’. The anti discrimination law explicitly marks out how the term ‘ethnicity’ has a juridical anchoring within the racial discrimination tenets of the UN, thus establishing a transnational authority and at the same time an intertextual connection.17

17 See the Justice Department’s use of the term and how it supports itself on the UN definition of ‘ethnicity’, especially point 3.4: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ad/dok/nouer/2002/nouer-2002-12/5.html?id=145423
UNESCO's Turn From ‘Race’ to ‘Ethnicity’

The background for the UNESCO statement on ‘the race question’ cannot be explained without acknowledging the historical backdrop of World War Two, and its atrocities, connected to both the Holocaust, and the ways in which eugenics were conducted during the war (Gullestad, 2002:143, Lavik, 1998:18). As renowned scholars, Omi and Winant notes, the ethnicity paradigm that came during the period between 1930 and 1965 can in academic settings be seen as a progressive/liberal “common sense” approach to race that challenged the biologistic and implicitly racist paradigms that had dominated before (Omi and Winant, 1994:14) making the UNESCO statement a cornerstone in this paradigm.

The second thing to consider is the members of the committee that drafted and wrote the statement. Among those who wrote the original statement were several prominent anthropologists such as Claude Levi Strauss, Ashley Montagu and the prominent biologist and director of UNESCO Julian Huxley, all of whom had written extensively on ‘race’, culture and ethnicity.\(^\text{18}\) Montagu is often seen as being an important figure in the forming of the statement (Lavik, 1998:18, Hazard, 2011). As a student of Franz Boas, often seen as the leading anti-racist anthropologist of his day (Hazard, 2011:177), Montagu was vehemently opposed to the term ‘race’ as he had made very clear in an article from 1942 which later was published as the book *Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race* (1945). Even though both Montagu and Boas can be seen as precursors for a discourse that tried to sever the link between ‘race’ as it was written about during their age,

recent critical assessments have concluded that despite an insistence on severing a determinitive link between “race” and cultural development, and arguing vehemently against the inferiority of “lower races”, Boasian anthropology affirmed the existence of biological “races” while ultimately contributing to the social prominence of a racialized culturalist discourse in the second half of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century(Hazard, 2011:175).

But is this conflation between culture, ‘race’, and ethnicity played out in the UNESCO statement itself, and how does this relate to the question of the interconnection between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’?

It is clear that the statement is leaning heavily towards the severing of the link between biological aspects and cultural aspects of human behavior. As Lavik points out, a clear example of this is how the link between intelligence and ‘race’ is debunked in the statement in

an effort to sever the link between human behavior, intellect and cultural and social
development (Lavik, 1998:19). Another interesting point in regards to the above question but
also to the issue concerning mixed ethnic individuals that will be dealt with later, the
statement goes on to claim in its point 13 that “no convincing evidence has been adduced that
race mixture of itself produces biologically bad effects” (UNESCO, 1969:33). But it is also
here that ‘race’ and ‘ethnic group’ becomes conflated and used interchangeable when it states
that “one of the chief processes of race formation and race extinction or absorption is by
means of hybridization between races or ethnic groups” (UNESCO, 1969:33). Strangely
enough a statement meant to do away with the term ‘race’ continues to use it; even more
troublesome is the fact that ‘races’ can in fact be ‘extinct’, ‘absorbed’ and ‘formed’. These
formulations point to the confusing and strange paradox which implies that even though the
statement means to do away with race it nevertheless re-inscribes it in the form that it seems
that race does in fact exist since it can be absorbed, exterminated and formed.

The strongest point against race as the foundation of human differences is made under
point 14 in the statement that claims that “The biological fact of race and the myth of ‘race’
should be distinguished. For all practical social purposes ‘race’ is not so much a biological
phenomena as a social myth” (UNESCO, 1969:33). This, along with point 6 of the statement19,
which stated that race should be dropped in favor of ethnicity was the points that sparked the
most controversy (Hazard, 2011:179), which is not too strange considering that the two points
seem to be connected. But is the transformation from the ‘social myth’ of “race” into ethnicity
so easily handled?

Even though point 6 marks out that race should be substituted with ethnicity since
there is often a misuse of the term ‘race’ in terms of how it establishes ‘biology as destiny’,
point 7 in the statement seems to contradict this very statement when it claims that “at the
present time most anthropologists agree on classifying the greater part of present-day
mankind into three major divisions as follows: (a) the Mongoloid division; (b) the Negroid
division; and (c) the Caucasoid division” (UNESCO, 1969:31). While the statement claims to
do away with ‘race’ it still utilizes the “centuries-old tripartite division of humanity into
Yellow, Black, and White” (Hazard, 2011:182). Strangely enough, these markers are highly
visible in the sense that they denote ‘colors’ and not culture. Regardless, this confusing
purging of race continues in point 8 of the statement wherein it goes on to claim that “Many

19 The most significant part of this point reads as follows: “Because serious errors of this kind are habitually
committed when the term ‘race’ is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races
to drop the term ‘race’ altogether and speak of ethnic groups” UNESCO 1969. Four Statements on the Race
sub-groups or ethnic groups within these divisions have been described” (UNESCO, 1969:32). At this juncture, the question arises, whether or not ethnicity is in fact made into a sub category of race? Are ethnic group’s just subgroups of the three major divisions of mankind, which incidentally happens to correspond with very corporal markers?

The conflation of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ creates a hybrid between not only ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ per se, but also between two taxonomies and perhaps even two epistemologies. The ‘translation’ of ‘race’ into ‘ethnicity’ creates a mixture between new types of beings, hybrids; the ‘purification’ of ‘race’ from ‘ethnicity’ creates what appears to be two entirely distinct ontological zones (Latour, 1993:10). Thus in the UNESCO document the rhetorical shift from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ is compromised by very confusing conflation between the very terms that it seeks to separate from each other. By recourse to science in the guise of genetics, physical anthropology and cultural anthropology ‘race’ is remolded, but this remolding seems incomplete.

The turn away from ‘biology as destiny’ or from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ was in the statement underlined by a ‘culturization’ of the body or rather the perceived differences between various ‘races’. This turn towards culture and ‘race as ethnicity’ is explained by well by Omi and Winant when they state that

in contrast to biologically oriented approaches, the ethnicity-based paradigm was an insurgent theory which suggested that race was a social category. […] Ethnicity itself was understood as the result of a group formation process based on culture and decent. “Culture” in this formulation included such diverse factors as religion, language, “customs”, nationality, and political identification. “Decent” involved hereditary and a sense of group origins, thus suggesting that ethnicity was socially “primordial”, if not biologically given, in character (Omi and Winant, 1994:15).

These ideas are communicated in several of the points in the Statement; for instance point 9 which dealt with the question of mental characteristics across ethnic groups ends with the dictum of Confucius which proclaims that “Men’s natures are alike; it is their habits that carry them apart” (UNESCO, 1969:32). The dictum seems to indicate that all men have the same biology while it is culture, their habits which is the difference. Later on, in point 15, the statement states that:

Historical and sociological studies support the view that genetic differences are not of importance in determining the social and cultural differences between different groups of homo sapiens, and that the social and cultural changes in different groups have, in the main, been independent of changes in inborn constitution (UNESCO, 1969: 34).
It is not the point here to re-inscribe a biological essentialism that states that all is biology and that ethnic differences are in fact ‘racial’; to do so would be counter to so much of the thinking within this paper. Rather it is to show how the body as such is made cultural, it is an effort to chart out how ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ becomes, in much the same way as ‘race’, markers of difference. Seeing as the Statement was produced by some of its time, most anti-racial anthropologist such as Montagu and Levi Strauss, this seems hardly surprising. A great deal of their writings was heavily influenced by Franz Boas, one of the most influential anthropologists in the twentieth century (Malik, 1996:150). Boas was an ardent proponent of the ‘culturalist’ paradigm on human differences and his most ardent attack on classical race thinking came in the form of his book The Mind of Primitive Man (1963: originally published in 1911). In it he sought to refute the hierarchy of races and the superiority of the ‘white race’, and secondly he solidified the notion of culture as the prime locus of differences between various ‘races’, in place of biology. But as Malik observes, the work of Boas can be seen as somewhat ambiguous; Boas most certainly was a key figure in deconstructing ‘race’ and the supremacy of the ‘white race’, yet the concept of culture that he helped develop can be seen to have rearticulated the themes of racial theory in a different guise (Malik, 1996:151). That is one of the points here; the body as such is now being signified not by a ‘racialist’ grammar, but instead by a ‘culturalist’ grammar which never the less articulates differences. Of course these ‘corporal grammars’ are as noted in the Introduction historically contingent; ‘race’ as noted has not always been the ruling grammar, and other ‘grammars of differences’ have been dominant. For instance in the Early Modern period and the cultural encounters therein had various grammars of difference such as pious/heretic body (Greer et al., 2007), and the dichotomy of civilized/savage bodies (Gaudio, 2008). The point is to quickly note that ‘grammars of difference’ has not always been articulated along the axis of color or ‘race’ and as such the turn away from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity/culture’ should not be seen as either a teleological evolution going form ‘wrong’ to ‘right’, nor as ‘natural’ in an evolutionary vein. Rather it is a transformation that seems to be informed by normative, and political injunctions that changes in co-operation with politics of morality, scientific discourses on human nature as well as the politics of liberation and the abolishment of racism and colonialism.

Boas, Levi Strauss and Montagu were part of a ‘turn towards culture’ in dealing with ‘the race’ question. In line with the statement, Levi Strauss observed that biologically humanity is singular while it expresses itself culturally in its differences (Malik, 1996:164). It is culture that is the defining difference between and across people, not ‘race’, but it is
interesting to hear Levi Strauss in dealing with the similarities between ‘race’ and ‘culture’. Strauss goes on to state that

Cultural barriers are almost of the same nature as biological barriers; the cultural barriers prefigure the biological barriers all the more as all cultures leave their mark on the human body: through styles of costume, hair and ornament, through physical mutilation, and through gestures, they mimic differences comparable to those that exist between races and by favoring certain physical types, they stabilise and even spread them (Strauss cited in Malik, 1996:165).

Prefiguring Judith Butler and Elisabeth Grosz’ point about the materialization and performativity of the body (Butler, 1993, Grosz, 1994, Butler, 1999), Strauss seems to be pointing to the complex interweaving of ‘culture’ and ‘biology’. But in regards to the UNESCO Statement it is pertinent to ask, under what register is the corporal body now written under? Supremacist theory on race claimed that it was the innate mental and biological traits of the various ‘races’ that determined cultural form and progress, hence difference is purely biological. But for Strauss and for the statement it is culture which is the articulator of differences. Culture precedes biology, and not as the ‘racialists’ claimed, biology as preceding culture. Once again it is more a question of what the body signifies, and not so much about the validity of the argument on ‘race’ versus ‘culture’. The problematic conflation in the Statement though does make for some troublesome connotations in that ‘race’ never fully leaves the vicinity of ‘culture’ for instance in the use of the three major ‘races’.

Point 14 is striking, after proclaiming that race is a social ‘myth’, the document goes on to make a very political statement when it claims that “The biological differences between ethnic groups should be disregarded from the standpoint of social acceptance and social action. The unity of mankind from both the biological and social viewpoints is the main thing. To recognize this and to act accordingly is the first requirement of modern man”(UNESCO, 1969:33, my italics). Now it is not my place to comment upon whether or not what seems to be a heavily normative injunction should be included in what is argued for is a scientific document²⁰; after all I do find the project of ending racial prejudice and racism very much a goal to be sought out.

²⁰This point was the one point that in fact sparked such a heavy controversy that the 1950 statement had to be re-drafted and issues anew in 1951 wherein this point was left out. Other amendments and outtakes were also made in the 1951 statement which left less room for normative injunctions. Furthermore, the 1951 statement was less insistent on the ‘fiction’ of ‘race’ and seems to have moderated itself in its language which in and of itself is worth a study. For the 1951 statement see ibid. For a good overview on some of the differences and reasons for this shift between 1950 and 1951 see HAZARD, A. Q. 2011. A Racialized Deconstruction? Ashley Montagu and the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race. Transforming Anthropology, 19, 174-186.
By claiming that these new points on the race question are ‘modern’ one implicitly also bracket of the old way of understanding race as ‘non-modern’, but as we have seen, the conflation within several points of the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ compromises this very division. It is a hallmark of the valuation of ‘modern’ versus ‘non-modern’ rhetoric which posits that modern is truer, better able to explain and describe the world as ‘it is’ than its predecessors. “All the ideas of yesteryear, one after the other, became inept or approximate. To paraphrase Latour; simply applying the modern Constitution was enough to create, by contrast, a ‘yesteryear’ absolutely different from today (Latour, 1993:35). Modernity and ‘the modern’ are concepts which in the West are seen as ‘better’ or ‘more accurate’ in regards to science and the idea of ‘scientific progress’. And in connection to the UNESCO statement, it is deeply connected to a social role that Zygmunt Bauman identifies as distinctly modern – the expert or specialist intellectual who can make claims on the basis of “superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better access than the non-intellectual part of society” (Bauman cited in Bauman and Briggs, 2003:127). The role of the ‘expert’ in the construction of ‘ethnic group’ instead of ‘race’ is highly important as it is often seen as the responsibility of such experts to sort out the kernels of science from the chaff of ideology (Latour, 1993:35).

It is a wholly modern construction of ‘truth’ that is being made in this document. It is the conflation between expert knowledge which is backed up by the power ‘to be in the truth’ since they are sanctioned by the discourse on who can speak on what subjects. In this instance the UNESCO statement can perhaps be seen as a “serious speech act” which indicates that it contains the “necessary validation procedures, community of experts and so on” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:48). It is a serious speech act in that it tries to do something with words (Austin, 1975) which in turn will produce something ‘in the world’; a performatif if we will, that is meant to establish what is ‘true’ and what is not. At the same time it is important to note that if we see this as a performatif statement, then it must also be seen in connection to its materiality; its materiality lies in the fact that it is grounded in specific places, institutions, and other statements (Schaanning, 1997:196). It is not an ‘immaterial’ act; the statement is in this context grounded in the materiality of the office of UNESCO, its material resources, the scholars who produced it and their authority as knowledge producers, and it is grounded in prior material statements on ‘the race question’.

We are once again back in that zone wherein power and knowledge meets; where ‘truths’ are produced by the sanctioning of certain comments, statements, scientific treaties on
human nature and indeed what ‘reality’ really is. But this discourse on ‘ethnicity’ contra ‘race’ is compromised.

The supposedly ‘pure’ form of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as ontological phenomena is compromised by the epistemological work of purification by hybridizing relationships (Bauman and Briggs, 2003:5). And the split between ‘modern’ understandings of ‘ethnicity’ as opposed to ‘race’ as ‘non-modern’ is made problematic by the constant shuttling between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. As Hazard claims, the UNESCO document at times “biologized “ethnic groups”” (Hazard, 2011:181) thus making the distinction between ‘race’ and ‘ethnic groups’ highly problematic. One way of understanding the temporal distinction that the document highlights is by recourse to the background that it was set in. By distancing themselves from prior understandings of ‘race’ they also at the same time distanced themselves from the atrocities of World War Two. The paradox here is that modernity itself is often described as being the very thing that fuels its own horrors, guilt and subsequent actions. One telling example of this is Zygmunt Bauman’s seminal work Modernity and the Holocaust (1989). Is it a characteristic of modernity that it feeds on its own atrocities and in the following recovery from those atrocities there is a proliferation of terms, discourses, statements and comments which all produces ways of describing, understanding and recovering from the very horrors it produced in the first place? One of these strategies is to temporally distance oneself from that which represents a different ‘mentality’, which we then describe as invalid (Larsen, 2009:283). But as seen in the UNESCO statement, the invalidation of ‘race’ is compromised by the very inability to ‘translate’ or communicate visible differences between people.

The problematic oscillation between ‘race’, biology, and ‘ethnicity’ and culture makes the temporal distance smaller. It is the paradox of the purification attempt; instead of creating distinct categories it creates hybrids or at least a much clouded understanding of the two terms within one and the same document. Bruno Latour claims this is because the “modern Constitution allows the expanded proliferation of the hybrids whose existence, whose very possibility, it [the modern Constitution] denies” (Latour, 1993:34, my interpolation). The distinction that is formed between ‘race’ as ‘non-modern’ and ‘non-scientific’, and ‘ethnicity’ as ‘modern’ allows for, two operations to happen. The first one (i) the creation of what seems at the surface to be two distinct phenomena; and (ii) it creates a distance to the past and its understanding of ‘race’, thus establishing both what is true, and whose understanding of ‘race’ is in fact ‘modern’. Latour follows up with more insights on the construction of hybrids, and the purification of discourse when he states that the “price the moderns paid for this freedom was that they remained unable to conceptualize themselves in continuity with the premoderns.
They had to think of themselves as absolutely different” (Latour, 1993: 39). There seems in this case to be a valid reason, at least from the perspective of those who wrote the document, to distance themselves from prior understanding of ‘race’ seen as it must be against the backdrop of World War Two and the increased pressure on solving ‘the race question’.

But this was not just a political massage nor just a way of distancing oneself from the horrors of World War Two; after all many of these experts had a long history of writing against ‘race’ as a social phenomenon. The interesting point is rather to see how such an important document, both of its age, and how it has influenced today’s debate, contained within itself so many internal contradictions. Contradictions that forms an image of a discourse wherein the authors of the statement had not “quite worked out how a new way of describing biological difference, outside of merely removing one term and inconsistently inserting another” (Hazard, 2011:181). Even though the statement tries to separate, or rather: construct, two distinct phenomena, it still can’t seem to grasp the corporal dimension of visible differences within the language available. In effect the 1950 Statement did not function as a moment of closure for ‘race’, rather it ushered in an era of old and new debates about the use of ‘race’ as an analytical category in science (Hazard, 2011:174). One of the reasons that it did not serve as the moment of closure was that it had trouble overcoming the visible body as an object of analysis; its conflation of terms lead to the hybrid understanding of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ that made the category of ‘race’ not obsolete as they would have hoped, but rather made it into an object that was part of a racialized understanding of ethnicity.

Norwegian Juridico Discursive Readings of ‘Race’ and ‘Ethnicity’

We can now move onto the contemporary setting and to Norway; more specifically I want to look at how ‘race’ was removed or rather substituted by ‘ethnicity’ in the Justice Departments draft on the wording of the new law on ethnic discrimination that was published in 2002. The draft on the wording within the law against ethnic discrimination has also had implications on other laws and their wording in regards to ‘ethnicity’. The new draft of the so

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21 This is made even more evident when one takes into account that the whole statement had to be re-drafted after massive pressure in regards to what many took to be a highly political statement. A new statement was released in 1951 just one year later, but as noted with several amendments and a considerable moderation on the ‘race question’. For a better view on this see HAZARD, A. Q. 2011. A Racialized Deconstruction? Ashley Montagu and the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race. Transforming Anthropology, 19, 174-186. And for both statements in full see UNESCO 1969. Four Statements on the Race Question. Paris.

22 See the Justice Department’s own web page for full information regarding the draft of the law and its full juridical implications; http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ad/dok/nouer/2002/nou-2002-12.html?id=145418
called “Immigrant Law” [Utlendingsloven] was also subject to such a re-phrasing form ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’. As such the juridico discursive implications for such a re-phrasing can be seen as very significant in terms of its field of impact within the legal definitions.

With regards to the law against ethnic discrimination and its wording the intertextual ‘bridge’ between the draft and the UNESCO Statement are made explicitly clear in the law’s draft. It states that “The term ethnicity is most developed in the social sciences and has also a juridical anchoring in amongst for instance the UN” (my translations). What is striking here is that the authority to change the wording comes not only from the UN, but also from a reference to the social sciences. Authority to go from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ is in the above firmly embedded in both the ‘juridico discursive’ (Foucault, 1984) institution of international law, but also by recourse to science. Power here is deeply connected to knowledge as Foucault has formulated it (Foucault, 1979, Foucault, 1984). It rests on the premise that certain actors are able to ‘know the truth’ about in this case ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and are then as Foucault would have said; ‘in the true’. As Foucault states “It is always possible one could speak the truth in a void; one would only be in the true, however, if one obeyed the rules of some discursive ‘police’ which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke” (Foucault cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:48). The authority to go from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ is in a way as much about who states what, on what grounds and from what place actors states it from. By leaning on the established UNESCO and UN understanding of ‘ethnicity’ the Justice Department are drawing upon a historical reservoir which makes them ‘in the true’. It is a reactivating of the sort of ‘discursive police’ that Foucault talks about, or perhaps in slightly less polemical words; an intertextual link that is established and played on. The draft functions in a double fashion in this regards; it produces these kinds of ‘truths’ as both a comment to the law that it is meant to revise and to comment upon the UNESCO statement as well as furthering the authority of the social sciences. In this fashion such documents solidifies each others claim to truth; the comment, in this case the draft itself, is solidified by reference to prior authorities on such issues and in turn this also solidifies the text which it draws upon by making the UNESCO statement come to life again as an authority.

Contrary to the UNESCO statements which does not define ethnicity explicitly, except as we have seen as a possible sub-group under race, the Justice Department defines ethnicity

23 See full details on “Prop. 141, L” and the changes that were recommended in its wording on the Justice Departments web page: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/republ/prop/2010-2011/prop-141-l-20102011.html?id=649670
24 See section 3.4 in how the new wording of the law against ethnic discrimination should be changed; http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/republ/prop/2010-2011/prop-141-l-20102011/3.html?id=649678
as follows: “Ethnic identity is attached to such variables as culture- and identity, like “race”, skin color, decent, religion, etc., but does in addition to this connote the relations between different groups and identities” (my translations). This definition of ethnicity seems to coincide with newer forms of relational ethnicity thinking such as Fredrick Barth’s (Barth, 1994), Gerd Baumann (Baumann, 1999) and Thomas Hylland Eriksen (Eriksen, 2002). Yet it also conflates ethnicity with ‘race’, as a variable within ethnicity alongside other variables. Later on in the definition it is stated that “‘nationality’ or “national origin” will in certain cases be included in the term ethnicity” (my translations). Semantically, ethnicity becomes latched onto other terms which in effect make the discourse on ethnicity very cloudy. The discursive signifying chain establishes here that several ‘signs’ can in fact connote ‘ethnicity’.

The object of commentary in this law is not simply ‘culture’ or ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’, it must inevitably also point back to the ‘object in the back’ so to speak which is a body. This might be recognized as what Laclau and Mouffe states is an ‘articulatory practice’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) wherein social actors tries to construct a nodal point which partially fixes meaning. But this signifying meaning is only partial due to the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity (Howarth, 2000:102). The meaning of ethnicity is the nodal point which discourse tries to fix; its meaning must be defined, commented upon and also made relational to other concepts. At the same time it chains together several signs in that very process of fixing meaning. In the above ‘ethnicity’ stands for ‘race’, ‘religion’, ‘decent’, ‘skin color’, and ‘nationality’ in some cases. Thus, the definition of ethnicity is highly volatile; its meaning is hard to make clear. The body, as background can, in the definition of ‘ethnicity’ above, signify so much more than just ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’.

In both the draft on the law against ethnic discrimination and the “Immigrant Law” it is stated that the committee which were to draft and advice the Justice Department on the wording would advice the Justice Department to change the terminology from ‘race’ to ethnicity due to the fact that race as a term can give unfortunate associations within the Norwegian language, hence it should be substituted by ethnicity. The committee as such points to a how ‘race’ as a term is not neutral; it has certain connotations sticking to it which makes it a term that should be avoided. I take this to be an instance in which the history of the

26 See point 3.1 in the recommendations on the change in the wording of the law; http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/regpubl/prop/2010-2011/prop-141-1-20102011/3/1.html?id=649679
term ‘race’ exposes itself; but this history is not simply a history of how it has been used, in what contexts, and for what purpose;

it is the way such histories are installed and arrested in and by that name. The name has, thus, a historicity, what might be understood as the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name: the sedimentation of its usages as they have become part of the very name, a sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives the name its force (Butler, 1997:36).

If seen in this light it is not so much ‘race’ as a neutral description that must be omitted, but it is ‘race’ as a sedimentation of history that must be expunged from the discourse on difference. ‘Race’ is in the draft avoided; the committee states that “the committee will avoid entirely the term ‘race’ in its own assessments, descriptions and recommendations in this draft”27 It then goes on to define ‘race’ in the following manner: “Race terminology builds on biological, inheritable markers of recognition, on theories that do not have any viable scientific ground or content; “the races” was both before and just after the last world war, often grounded on strongly subjective criteria, divided on the basis of supposedly connections between outer markers and inner qualities. The term is highly charged” 28 (my translations). In this instance the Justice Department handles language not only as descriptive, but as historically contingent, it is not seen as divorced from society at large or history, but it is acknowledged that history does in fact constitute the usage of language. History is formative of language and the way we conceptualize the world around us. It is also telling that the Justice Department here draws on the authority of scientific knowledge in order to legitimize its own stand on this, very much in line with how Foucault would have seen the deep coupling between scientific knowledge and power to set the agenda on what is ‘true’. The irony here is that they point towards biological, inheritable markers of recognition as a mark of ‘race’, but this is also one of the terms that is introduced into the term ‘ethnicity’ as they use it when they as seen count skin color to be one of the aspects that is important in dealing with ethnicity. Just like the UNESCO Statement, the conflation between color, bodies, race, and ethnicity haunts this document as well it seems.

It is the historicity of ‘race’ as a biological ontology that is marked as the defining discursive reason for the substitution of ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’. ‘Race’ as social ontology is not mentioned in this part and only later on is the social side of ‘race’ made evident, but only

27 See point 3.4 in the draft on the law against ethnic discrimination; http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ad/dok/nouer/2002/nou-2002-12/5.html?id=145423
28 See point 3.4 in the draft on the law against ethnic discrimination; http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ad/dok/nouer/2002/nou-2002-12/5.html?id=145423
by association with ‘racism’. The draft goes on to say that “The term “racism” does on the contrary [in opposition to race] express something real. […] Racism is a phenomenon that can be observed scientifically and concrete, and it will be applied as usual in this paper. It is in precisely this respect that the committee considers the term "race" to be applicable” 29 (my translations and my interpolations). ‘Race’ it seems, is only a social ontology when it is articulated in connection with discrimination and racism. But as I hope to show later on ‘race’ or at least very racialized ‘doing’ of ethnicity is at an everyday level expressed not only in connection to racists encounters, but in very mundane settings. In this ‘juridico discursive’ understanding, race as a sign can not signify without racism it seems, yet strangely enough it is still an element within ‘ethnicity’ as it is defined further up. ‘Race’ as such does not exist, but becomes the by-product of ‘racism’. It states that ‘racism’ can, contrary to ‘race’, be observed scientifically and concrete, but the question arise: is racism so easily observed? What is a racist statement in today’s climate?

Marianne Gullestad notices how racism as a phenomena is, and perhaps always was, a highly syncretic social phenomena that was interdiscursive (Gullestad, 2002:148). Furthermore she claims that in today’s climate, culture has more often than not replaced ‘race’ in racist rhetoric on incommensurable differences (Gullestad, 2002:149), often termed ‘new racism’ within academic literature. Racism then, in Gullestads view, can come to include people who are regarded as visibly different and people who are not regarded as visibly different, but whose culture and religion is seen as alien (Gullestad,2002:149). Seen in the light of the UNESCO statement and the anthropological turn away from biology as the determining factor of human development, potential and worth and towards a more ‘culturalist’ understanding it is no wonder that ‘racism’ as such also inevitably had to become perceived as encompassing ‘culture’ as well. But the ‘new racism’ is not as new as many would have it, in fact many scholars 30 have pointed out that the conflation between biological notions of supremacy and cultural elements were linked much earlier than the rise of the ‘new racism’ paradigm. David Theo Goldberg states that linguists in the nineteenth century often turned on the dictum that it is ‘the language that makes the man’ (Goldberg, 1993:71), which turn on a notion of a “strictly linguistic differentiation of racial groupings” (Goldberg, 1993:70). Following this argument it is not always easy to know what a racist speech act is or

29 See point 3.4 in the draft on the law against ethnic discrimination; http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ad/dok/nouer/2002/nou-2002-12/5.html?id=145423
act can encompass to be. And in today’s climate with its backlash against so called ‘political correctness’ it seems that nothing is racism, only free speech; yet following the above logic everything has the potential to ‘be’ racist speech acts; ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and linguistic competence. I won’t follow this thread too long, only to note that not only does it seem that ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are difficult concepts, but so too is ‘racism’.

Linguistic Authority, Definitions and Conflations

The last document that I want to analyze is a web document published by the Norwegian Language Council [Norsk Språkråd] in connection to a longer debate that raged in 2006 on the subject of ‘what is a Norwegian?’ The debate flourished in the media after the Language Council had published an article in the paper “Ny Tid” on the question of ‘what is an ethnic Norwegian’. The response that I will analyze does in fact have an interdiscursive relationship with the ‘juridico discursive’ field that I traced out in the above. The article is based on an email response from the Language Council to the Department on Equality and Discrimination in regards to the question on what the Language Council meant by the term ‘ethnic Norwegian’.

On the issue of charting out what the Language Council means by ethnic Norwegian, they state that they take the dictionary definition as their starting point. In doing so they come up with this as their starting point:”The dictionary explains “Norwegian” as “a person from Norway”. On “ethnic” the dictionary states this:” that which is special for a race or a people” On ethnicity it states that this word means “cultural and geographical background for a people, ethnic background” (my translations). There are several analytical points here; first of all it is interesting to see that the Language Council uses a descriptive approach; they are in the apparent business of just describing the terms, not explaining them or setting them in their social relations in the world. As such the description seems to be divorced from society at large.

Second of all the conflations of ‘race’ and ethnicity is still in play, the cultural aspect is highlighted as well as geographical location, all of which connote belonging. A further

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31 For a few examples on how it was debated see online versions of Aftenposten, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Hva-er-en-nordmann-6433886.html, http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kommentatorer/aamaas/Negeren-og-nordmannen-6604592.html
32 For the entire article see the online version http://www.nyttid.no/arkiv/artikler/20061026/norsk_norskere_nordmann/
33 See the entire response by the Language Council; http://www.sprakrad.no/nb-NO/Toppmeny/Aktuelt/Likestillingsombudet/Svar/
34 See http://www.sprakrad.no/nb-NO/Toppmeny/Aktuelt/Likestillingsombudet/Svar/
statement from the language council will clarify this when they state that “What can be drawn out from the dictionary as a conclusion about “ethnic Norwegian” is that it is attached to the cultural and geographic location of people “from Norway” and to that which is taken to be special to Norwegians as “a people”” (my translations). The Language Council does operate with “that which is special to Norwegians as a people”. There is thus ‘something’ essential that does in fact differentiate Norwegians from others and its source is cultural and geographical, not ‘racial’. Yet as seen the notion of ‘a people’ is further up conflated into ‘race’. This is of course commented upon by the Language Council as it states that this conflation should be downplayed as its reference in the dictionary most likely points to how the situation is in other parts of the world where race can in fact be part of what people take to be ethnic differences between people. I want to draw a parallel here to the UNESCO statement and how I analyzed it in regards to the splitting between a modern understanding of ‘ethnicity’ and a ‘non-modern’ understanding of ‘race’. The split that the Language Council here does is to implicitly say that ‘we’ do not have race, while ‘others’ do have it. ‘We’ have moved on and are in possession of a language that is ‘race free’. ‘Race’ and ‘racism’ can in this sense be seen as illegitimate concepts that does not belong to ‘us’ and our age, just like many other semantic concepts such as slavery, honor killings and genital mutilation (Larsen, 2009:283). This is not to say that the cultural and national conditions on ‘race’ between for instance Norway, USA and the UK are different, which they most certainly are, but it is to trace a logical assumption which purposes that ‘we’ do not have ‘race’ today.

The idea that ‘race’ is something that is ‘other’ to Norway is also an act which gives even more ontological weight to ethnicity, yet if there is some hold to my short genealogical analysis of the semantic history of ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ it is once again an act wherein the Modern Constitution that Latour talks about have managed to ‘hide’ the hybridization between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’; the modern Constitution renders the work of mediation that assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable, unrepresentable (Latour, 1993:34). But I would argue that it is documents like these that in fact can show the traces of such a hybridization process; the Language Council seems to do much of the same work of discursive ‘purification’ as the Justice Department does, it conflates and obscures signs, they postulate that ‘race’ is outside Norwegian language, but in the same breath it insert ‘decent’, ‘people’, and ‘ethnicity’ making for a semantic cluster which seems hard to resolve. Much like

35 See http://www.sprakrad.no/nb-NO/Toppmeny/Aktuelt/Likestillingsombudet/Svar/ under “Hva er en etnisk nordmann”
36 See http://www.sprakrad.no/nb-NO/Toppmeny/Aktuelt/Likestillingsombudet/Svar/ under “Hva er en etnisk nordmann”
Montagu and Levi Strauss and the other authors of the UNESCO statement, the Language Council has a hard time ‘exporting’ away the body; ‘race’ might be ‘exported’ onto other nations and cultures, but the body is still retained in such language as ‘decent’ and ‘the people’. To paraphrase Latour, the power of ‘modern’ notions of the difference between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ does not lie so much in their success in severing the connection between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’, but rather in its ability to create and maintain more hybrids and extend its scale (Latour, 1993: 109) so that new terms arise and are grafted onto/into a new grammar, which contains older social grammar.

Linking Latour to Foucault one can place the proliferation of new hybrid meanings of ‘race’ or rather the raced body to be connected to the role that ‘commentary’ plays in the historical constitution and maintenance of discourse. Those discourses that we comment upon and is commented upon by others are the discourses which we consider to have validity and worth (Mills, 2004:67). These comments are those “which give rise to a certain number of new speech acts which take them up, transform them or speak of them, in short, those discourses which over and above their formulation, are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again” (Foucault cited in Mills, 2004:67). The role of such ‘comments’ as the one the Language Council gives it that it further solidify and make ‘real’ or ‘true’ the notion of what an ‘ethnic Norwegian’ is. It establishes its authority by its institutional legitimacy, its expert knowledge about Norwegian language, its reference to lexical meaning of ‘ethnicity’, ‘Norwegian’, etc. as though it is outside power relations. It is ‘in the true’ so to speak, or at least professes to be so. The more comments, the truer the statement, and if Latour’s claims are anything to go by then the numbers of new hybrids that modernity spawns the more comments must be added in order to show that these are in fact not hybrids, but ‘pure’ so as to maintain the illusion of “pure” forms, one of which we now can establish should be ‘ethnicity’.

Commentary serves to ensure that certain texts are always in circulation (Mills, 2004:69), but more importantly it also ensures that certain ways of understanding certain

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I would like to point out that this link between Latour and Foucault might at first seem problematic in as much as for Foucault history and knowledge produced in history is bracketed by discourse which in turn is formed by the episteme in which it is formed. It is the episteme which sets the boundary for what kind of knowledge that is produced as well as what can be thought and in turn called ‘truth’. Foucault operates with three epistemes which all produce various thought regimes based on the historical context which they are embedded in. And herein lies the problem with my juxtaposing of Foucault and Latour; for Latour such a strict bracketing of history and knowledge production is seen as deeply problematic. Latour’s thesis of “we have never been modern” makes Foucault’s strict division of epistemes problematic, but I think we can allow for some form of synthesis in regards to the analysis above. I am indebted to John Ødemark for pointing this out to me. For a concise look at how Foucault and Latour can be used in coupling, see SCHAANNING, E. 1997. *Vitenskap som skapt viten: Foucault og historisk praksis*, Oslo, Spartacus forl.
objects are in circulation, it keeps certain modes of understanding alive. A couple of such modes of understanding that is kept alive in these documents are ‘who is ethnic Norwegian’, ‘what is ethnicity’, and ‘what is race’. This is how commentary in Foucault’s understanding of the term adds to the project at hand; it shows how ‘race’ is transformed and commented upon in such a fashion that ‘ethnicity’ becomes the center of attention and of discursive truths.

It also ensures that the body is always talked about, even though there are few references to ‘the body’, there nevertheless is an implicit notion of the corporal in the ways in which ‘skin color’, ‘ancestry’ and ‘race’ is in play in these comments. This silence of the body is less the absolute limit of discourse, but more like an element that functions alongside the thing said, with them and in relation to them (Foucault, 1984:24). Nowhere is the color of the ‘ethnic Norwegian’ mentioned, which is fortunate for that would exclude a large number of subjects which all ‘belong’ to Norway, yet there is a body there; ‘race’ and ‘people’ are factors that point to the body politic. The silence of the body is still not completely resolved since these terms must nevertheless refer back to subjects.

The last part of the Language Council document that I want to comment upon is taken from the last part of the document that pertained to the connection between the terms ‘ethnic Norwegian’ and ‘ancestry’ or ‘decent’. The Language Council notices that the connection between ‘decent’ or ‘ancestry’ and ‘ethnic Norwegian’ in its dictionary definition might be read as they say ‘in a racist light’38, but they go on to clarify that the wording of ‘ancestry’ is meant to highlight that this points to where ones parents and grandparents are born which traditionally has been a determining factor for the cultural and geographical attachment to Norway. But it is in fact this focus on decent that at the same time also re-inscribes a certain corporality into ethnicity. This understanding of cultural and national attachment seems very similar to the concept of jus sanguinis, or as Gullestad formulates it, the principle of decent wherein it is the ‘blood bond’ between people that counts most in regards to national belonging (Gullestad, 2002:22). But what is ‘blood bond’ other than a metaphor for belonging? Does this not also point back to an understanding of a body? Ancestry or decent has traditionally been seen as important markers of social belonging, but it seems that it also has something to do with a certain morphology; a corporal dimension to decent and ‘who you look like’. We must consider how the body is re-inscribed into the language of ‘decent’ or jus sanguinis. Gullestad has an interesting point in this regards when she points to the terms

38 See http://www.sprakrad.no/nb-NO/Toppmeny/Aktuelt/Likestillingsombudet/Svar/ under the heading “Er det en bestemt innvandringshistorisk bakgrunn...?”
‘second generation immigrant’ as a token of this ‘blood bond’ thinking (Gullestad, 2002:27). She states that “the category of second generation immigrant has as its underlying notion that it is kinship and decent that is important rather than citizenship” (Gullestad, 2002:27, original italics, my translations). It is as if the line of decent never stops; we can ask ourselves when and if we ever come out of this circle of generations, when is the ‘blood bond’ broken and when do we become ‘first generation Norwegians’? This becomes even more connected to visible bodies when as Gullestad states that the term ‘second generation immigrant’ becomes linked to the now debunked category of ‘non-Western’ (Gullestad, 2002:27). The Language Councils focus on decent in connection to the category of ‘ethnic Norwegian’ can be read as a re-inscription of a body by recourse to the principle of jus sanguinis which is after all about genealogy and corporal decent as much as it is about abstract notions of citizenship. There is a certain idea of primordial ties and kinship to Norway that is established, but kinship as ‘Norwegian’ is foreclosed to those who are ‘second generation immigrants’; they are not primordially seen as tied to Norway even though they have been born here. Ideas of primordialism I would argue for can not be divorced from decent, genealogy and on that basis; bodies.

This discursive production of ‘Norwegian’ as tied to decent and the subsequent marking of ‘second generation immigrants’ can be seen as an instance in which the discourse on who counts as ‘Norwegian’ both produces its inside and its outside in one and the same instance. To paraphrase Judith Butler we can here state that ‘Norwegian’ is produced in relationship to its Other, ‘second generation immigrants’, and that the mechanisms of this production follows a logic of expulsion; ‘second generation immigrants’ are expelled from ‘Norwegian’ in such a way that it excludes certain bodies to be counted as Norwegian (Butler, 2006:182). Furthermore, it creates a set of Others through exclusions from an ‘inner world’ of recognizable ‘Norwegians’ who belong to Norway, while it places ‘second generation immigrants’ in a zone of an ‘outer world’ that works as the boundary between ‘Norwegian’ and ‘non-Norwegian’ (Butler, 2006:182). The Language Council then, and subsequent statements like it, functions at a dual level; it interpolates or ‘hails’ subjects into an inside/outside dichotomy and it at the same time contributes to the idea of who belongs to Norway.

The Invention of Ethnicity, the Conflation of Race, and the Rise of Culture

By looking at these documents the case has been made that the body as a ‘racial’ or ethnic signifier has gone from a biological determined referent towards a more culturally
defined entity. But that the body nevertheless is still seen in traces such as the referral to ‘The
Three Major Races’ in the UNESCO statement, or in the lexical definition of ethnicity that
still plays on the link between ‘race’ and ‘people’ in order to establish what ‘ethnicity’ is. As
such there are a few points that need to be made; one of which is the ‘invention of ethnicity’. Much have been said about the ‘invention’ of cultural phenomena such as ‘traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), or the ‘imagination of nations’ (Anderson, 2006). In fact the ‘invention’ of the human body in its various shapes and the understanding of it has also been postulated in respect to masculinity (Mosse, 1996, Taylor, 2000), gendered bodies (Butler, 1993), and ethnicity (Sollors, 1989). As Sollors states the naming of ethnicity as an ‘invention’ signals an interpretation that is modern and postmodern in context (Sollors, 1989: xiii), yet what is puzzling is the fact that “by and large, studies tend less to set out to explore its construction than to take it for granted as a relatively fixed, or at least, a known and self-evident category” (Sollors, 1989:xiii.). Ethnic groups seem to be always already in existence and imagined to be natural, real, eternal and stable (Solors, 1989: xiv), yet by looking at how the semantic conflation between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ we see that the content of ‘ethnicity’ is much more about discursive strategies and construction than it is about ‘eternal cultural differences’ and not as self-evident as it seems.

In its efforts to distance itself from racial thinking, ethnicity and culture became ways of mitigating the political connotations of racial difference as it was molded in its ‘biology as destiny’ form and would thus allow scientists to study social distinctions in a neutral and value-free fashion (Malik, 1996:174). But as have been shown in the analysis of the documents that have been used, this mitigation is made problematic by the constant conflation and gliding of meaning in terms of what ‘ethnicity’ exactly is. Upon such close scrutiny a belief in a deep divide between race and ethnicity that justifies a dualistic procedure runs against the problem that the distinction between ethnicity and race is simply not a distinction between culture and nature (Sollors, 1996:xxxiv). From the outset ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ had a and has a, deep semantic link that makes clear distinctions such as the one that for instance the Justice Department tries to impose difficult to do. One of the reasons for this is that both ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ tries to capture visible and corporal differences that somehow must be accounted for. Herein lies the problem for the ‘culturalists’, but also the ‘racialists’; the body is hard to capture in language, no matter what language that is. ‘Race’ as ‘biological determining’ for cultural prowess is a fallacy, but ‘ethnicity’ as only cultural is just as much an invention that tries to do away with a body that nevertheless is already always cultural.
I want to point out that in looking at ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in these documents I am not saying that they are synonymous, rather I am in agreement with David Theo Goldberg when he states “conceptually, that race is not just simply or straightforwardly a form of ethnicity, though neither is it reducible solely to claims of biology” (Goldberg, 1993:77). Rather, race sometimes is made to assume ethnic connotations, which provides one possible explanation of the meaning of ‘race’, thus race sometimes takes on signification in terms of ethnicity (Goldberg, 1993:78). But it is also the other way around; ethnicity in the above documents takes on ‘racial’ meaning, it inevitably refers back to a corporal object that both these concepts tries to describe. This is as seen a highly complicated process in which terms are conflated, entwined, purified and made hybrid. To use a metaphor applied by David Huddart in an attempt to explain hybrid identity we can claim that the turn from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ and the process it involved can be seen as a palimpsest. Palimpsest as Huddart notes “are overwritten, heavily annotated manuscripts, on which earlier writing is still visible underneath newer writing” (Huddart, 2006:107). But it is not enough to state that ‘ethnicity’ wrote itself upon ‘race’; there is another level, a bottom if you will and that is the body. This is the genealogical aspect of such an analysis; that is sees how terms writes itself upon bodies, makes them intelligible within discourse and makes bodies ‘racial’ in one era, and ‘ethnic’ in another.

It is also an effort in seeing how these documents tries to construct univocal notions of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’; this is done by following ‘the rules of discourse’ as seen in Foucault. One tries to limit who can say what; one separates the meaningless speech from the meaningful only to condemn the meaningless as just that; meaningless (Schaanning, 1997:198). Furthermore one tries to separate true from false by a process of purification; one tries to make univocal a very polyvocal discourse by trying to close of all disturbing elements which might point to the polyvocal nature of discourse (Schaanning, 1997:198). This is done by either commentary, give the discourse an identity by ‘signing it’ with an ‘authorship’, or by holding it by the reins by some discursive police who is tasked to make sure that the discourse does not run rampant (Schaanning, 1997:198). Now in the above both commentaries are seen as in the instance of the Justice Departments commentary upon the UNESCO statement, and in the Language Councils comments upon dictionary definitions. Furthermore the authority to make such statements is made by a recourse to ‘authorship’ in the sense that all of these documents write from a position of power; the ‘authors’ in these documents speak from a position of power.

A cautionary note on the invention of ethnicity as it is seen in these documents are in
order for it will allow for a deeper contextualization of the ways in which ethnicity came to replace race. The usages of ‘invention’ is not meant to point to a conspiratorial interpretation of a set of manipulative “authors” of ‘ethnicity’ who single handedly made ethnicity out of racial beings (Sollors, 1989:xi). The historical context of both the UNESCO statement and the other documents are important in this respect. When the UNESCO statement was formulated it had cause to do so scientifically with the empirical evidence it had available to them at the time, but we must also see it as a reaction to much of the political climate at the time in regards to the ‘race question’. The turn towards ‘ethnicity’ as opposed to ‘race’ is influenced by a combination of factors that not necessarily add up to a ‘willing manipulator’; rather it is a result of political, scientific, and moral ways of seeing visible differences. The turn to ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ can on one level be seen as a result of a long anthropological tradition that wanted to focus on and explain differences in terms of ‘culture’ instead of ‘race’ in the vein of Franz Boas (Boas, 1938, Boas, 1940), Levi Strauss (Lévi-Strauss, 1952), and Montagu (Montagu, 1945). But the ghost of racism must also be accounted for when we are dealing with these texts.

Both the UNESCO document and the contemporary Norwegian documents are confronted by the discomfort of racism. All of them labor under an ‘episteme’ to speak with Foucault that when dealing with ‘race’ or the visible body, must confront the ghost of racism both in its contemporary form but equally the history of racism. The fear of being labeled racist can be, as Gullestad points to, one of the tendencies why there has been a proliferation of terms that instead of making the discourse on ‘race’ and ‘racism’ clearer has made it more complex (Gullestad, 2002:143). It is possible that new ways of describing ‘race’ in another grammar is about this fear of racism, especially in the newer Norwegian documents we might suspect that the weight of history makes descriptions more prolific. Stuart Hall once said that ethnicity and race play hide and seek with each other (Sollors, 1996xxxv) and the constant sliding, conflation and confusions regarding these two terms in the above documents points towards this.

Another important aspect is the turn towards a ‘culturalist’ explanation on ‘differences’, but as we have seen this turn towards the cultural in these documents has not erased the body per se, but has either made it a ‘national’ body, an ‘ethnic’ body, a ‘cultural’ body, a ‘linguistic’ body or even at times a ‘religious’ body. This turn towards the cultural was made before the UNESCO statement in the work of many prominent anthropologists, but it was perhaps made more explicit in the post World War Two setting of the UNESCO statement. In all of the documents analyzed ‘culture’ is made out to stand in the foreground,
yet the corporal or bodily dimensions never totally left and continue to haunt what we would have to call a ‘pure culturalist’ view. As seen in for instance Levi-Strauss it is culture which is defining for human beings and not ‘biology as destiny’, yet in such a view we can speculate that the ‘biology is destiny’ could easily be replaced by ‘culture is destiny’. Race as the UNESCO statement claimed is a social myth (UNESCO, 1969), yet ‘ethnicity’ can just as easily become a social myth in that it makes not biology destiny, but culture. Gerd Baumann claims that race is a “fallacious nineteenth-century fiction” and the term ethnicity “in its presumed biological sense is its late-twentieth-century photocopy” (Baumann, 1999:20). Biological essentialism can come to be replaced by cultural essentialism, which nevertheless seems to point back to colors and bodies.

The fact that culture and how it is linked to ethnicity has come to replace ‘race’ in these documents should not be seen as the death of racialized thinking. The so called ‘new racism’ for instance re-codes more often than not ‘race’ with ‘culture’ making no explicit recourse to biological superiority, but instead insists on the incommensurability of cultures (Goldberg, 1993:73). For instance, the rhetoric of decent which the Norwegian Language Council elaborates can be seen as an instance of racialized rationalization wherein the rhetoric of decent, claims of common origin, kinship and belonging comes to stand for a discourse which codes ‘race’ as ‘national belonging’ or ‘ethnic groups’ (Goldberg, 1993:78). Rhetoric of decent and ancestry is seen as ‘culture’, yet it plays on many of the terms that indicates biology and the body. What better way to understand the never ending spiral of so-called ‘second generation immigrants’ then by a racialized understanding of belonging. Always trapped in the act of generating a new generation within Norway, yet never as ‘Norwegians’, always in the act of generating a ‘second’, a ‘third’, or possibly a ‘fourth’ generation of ‘immigrants’. The focus on second generation immigrants is a focus on genealogy, it is a focus on bodies that generate not a new Norwegian typology, but just a new immigrant. The demise of race as explicitly mentioned in these documents and the turn towards ‘ethnicity’ and culture is made problematic by the constant conflation of terms, as such it is perhaps not correct to say that ‘race’ or color has been emptied of cultural meaning and content; rather the body, color, and its racialized connotations have moved.
Chapter Five – Discourses of Race and Ethnicity: A Difficult Deployment of Color.

“[…] when I think about ethnicity I think about a small cultural community, that people have some kind of cultural coherence, something that makes them being seen as a sort of group. […] whether it is language or history or something else that ties them together, that one can define them as a group” – Mike, 26, Norwegian and Ivory Coast decent

This outtake is taken from my re-interview with Mike wherein I asked him to tell me what he thought about the term ethnicity. In the above ethnicity is conceptualized along fairly familiar lines to that of many modern scholars where ethnicity is about ‘the cultural stuff’ within ethnic groups as well as the borders between ethnic groups (Eriksen, 2002, Smith, 2009, Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, Barth, 1995) be they languages, history, traditions, religion and values. Mike’s narrative is very close to what anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen works with as a definition of ethnicity when he states that ethnicity “refers to aspects of relationships between groups which considers themselves, and are regards by others, as being culturally distinctive” (Eriksen in Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:28). Both Mike’s emic view on ethnicity and Eriksens etic view on ethnicity points towards the cultural aspects of boundary erections and how ethnicity is something that can be ascribed onto one self by others and at the same time something that one proclaims for oneself. Later on in the interview this view is complicated in ways that makes the academic, etic understanding of ethnicity troublesome. Mike went on to tell the following when I asked him about his own ethnicity in regards to this definition that he had laid out:

Mike: well it is not that easy for me since I am mixed; partly Norwegian and partly West African. It becomes a bit difficult to place me culturally […] I guess I am more Norwegian since I am born here and grew up here, but I guess calling myself ethnic Norwegian is also wrong. I am per definition not within that category.”
Tony: why do you not fall into that category?
Mike: I am not sure. It seems that ethnic Norwegian, you automatically think a bit in color codes […] you must have a white background, that’s what I at least think about when I think about ethnic Norwegian.

Color enters into how ethnicity is seen and experienced in Mike’s claim that there is a certain automatic in linking ethnicity to color. Ethnicity is thus not only ‘the cultural stuff” within ethnic groups nor is it only about the barriers that are erected between ethnic groups to differentiate themselves from one another as the seminal work of Fredrick Barth shows (Barth, 1994). The emic conceptualization of ethnicity is here not only tied up to culture, language, and other non corporal concepts; it is also tied into bodies and color, concepts that in our newer history have been tied to definitions of race. The definitions of ethnicity as it has
been analyzed in the documents lean on an understanding of ethnicity which is mainly culturalist, but as already stated this too is to underplay the importance of the body. In everyday discourse such as this we see that ‘ethnicity’ as a signifier within discourse comes to signify not just culture, but also a corporal dimension. As such there is a notion of ‘racialization’ at play in such narratives. In fact a bit later on Mike goes on to say the following:

Tony: [...] you talked a bit about this earlier but do you feel that ethnicity also reflects appearances?
Mike: Yes most certainly, I feel that even though it might not be totally legitimate to say so, that perhaps this goes more into race teaching. Yet it is not totally that either, it is something about the visible that is tied up with the term ethnicity.

In the above Mike deploys color through the fact that he links appearances to a visible register that is key to ethnicity. Color is thus coded and deployed as a key part of ethnicity.

The next narrative is taken from my re-interview with Thomas, a 35 year old man whose parents are from Norway (white) and from Tanzania (black).

Tony: [...] what do you associate with the terms ethnic or ethnicity, do you have a relationship at all to these terms?
Thomas: yes or it is something that I think about when I read the paper, I never discuss ethnicity
Tony: ok
Thomas: I never use the term at all, it is more in the papers that I read about it as a subject.
Tony: so is it a term you feel that is out there and not in your everyday experience?
Thomas: yes rather like that, if you for instance discuss or read about criminality and other things of that nature, that’s when I use it.

Compared to Mike’s emic understanding of ethnicity Thomas’ understanding seems to imply not an emic understanding, but a conceptualization of ethnicity as etic; as an experience-distant concept (Geertz, 1983:60); something he reads about in the papers and which is not explicitly in his everyday experience. It is only a bit later in the interview that color and race enters as emic concepts in regards to ethnicity. Thomas said the following when I asked him about his understanding of the term ‘ethnic Norwegian’:

Thomas: Ethnic Norwegian, well then you are a white Norwegian person with two Norwegian parents [...] Ethnicity for me is both culture and race.

It is interesting to note the conflation of culture and race into ethnicity as it marks out an experience-near understanding of ethnicity. The discourse on ‘ethnicity’ as it is lived here becomes conflated with ‘culture and ‘race’. ‘Ethnicity’ as a signifier becomes a ‘floating signifier’ which is fought over and filled with at times various meaning content (Winther
Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:39). Ethnicity sometimes seems to take on the signification of race both through ordinary folk usage as in this example, and at times also in the prevailing paradigm of social sciences (Goldberg, 1993:78). This is clear from the problematic conflation in for instance the UNESCO statement and in the Language Council’s definition of ‘what is an ethnic Norwegian’. Kenan Malik citing Malcom Chapman, states that “in many ways, “ethnicity” is “race” after an attempt to take biology out” (Malik, 1996:176). Furthermore Malik also observes the words of Sandra Wallman who states that “Once it is clear that ethnic relations follow on the social construction of difference, phenotype falls into place as one element in the repertoire of ethnic boundary markers” (Malik, 1996: 176 original italics). Hylland Eriksen also states that ‘race’ as such might not have an ‘objective’ existence as earlier typologies professed, but that race may assume sociological important due to the value we place in the idea of ‘race’ (Eriksen in Hutchinson and Smith,1996:29).

If this is so then the comments from Thomas seems to be well in line with a view that sees ethnicity as much more than ‘just’ cultural aspects of identity and boundary making. Color is deployed as part of the differentiation between and across ethnic groups. Seminal works such as Fredrick Barth’s work on boundary markers (Barth, 1994) between ethnic groups are of much use in dealing with questions of ethnicity, but it fails to account for the historicity embedded in the construction of corporal and embodied borders that mark out ethnic groups. If as Butler argues, bodies matter due to their historical sedimentations (Butler, 1993) and the meanings given to bodies throughout history then the body as a cultural construct must be implemented in theories on ethnicity and how ethnic borders are drawn. Barth’s now classical sentence of how it is “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth in Sollors, 1996:300, original italics) is made problematic or at least needs some amendment if one is in agreement with Butler that the body as such must be seen as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface (Butler, 1993:xviii). Following this we could conceive the body and skin to be already culturally inscribed as symbolic and filled with meaning. In fact this notion of the connection between body and culture is as Kenan Malik observes something that Levi-Strauss already formulated in the 1950’s (Malik, 1996:165). Strauss saw the connection between the body and culture as one in which it was culture that formed the very body of individuals as opposed to the racialists who saw culture as being formed by ‘race’ or biology (Malik, 1996:165.). But contrary to Strauss, Butler and to a degree Foucault, views this process as taking place in history, as a process which is not just a result of the present culture but a sedimentation of norms which forms the body (Butler, 1993,
Foucault, 1979). The very matter of our bodies is already always cultural. If this is so then what happens to the perspective that Barth holds; when the very matter of our bodies become cultural, when the ethnic boundary is not various praxis forms or customs but skin and color? Boundary markers and its effect on the maintenance of ethnic fault lines seem to be drawn at the skin; bodies are in effect also borders, thus we should perhaps not only focus on various customs and other praxis forms when we are looking at ethnic borders.

As stated earlier much of the focus on ethnicity in today’s social debates and scholarship has been about the ‘cultural stuff’, and especially in the post 9/11 world the focus on religion, cultural differences and ‘the war of values’ has been highly visible. This has as Marianne Gullestad argued for, led to a view that sees race replaced by culture and ethnicity (Gullestad, 2002:149); where before race had been seen as the defining aspect of incommensurable differences now a discourse on culture and values has taken over. But this is perhaps an overstatement on behalf of Gullestad; one in which history is seen as a line with a clear distinction between a ‘racial’ era and one of ‘culture’. As seen in the UNESCO document the conflation between ‘culture’ and ‘race’ is not always clear and following scholars who have looked to history, this divide between an era of ‘race’ and one of ‘culture’ is not so clear cut as cultural notions of race has been with us a long time (Young, 1995, Goldberg, 1993, Malik, 1996). Even though race may not have had or has as much hold within the discourse on social differences in Norway as it does in for instance the US it still seems evident that color and bodies still matters by the narratives above. Foucault’s notion of the ‘tactical polyvalence of discourse’ (Foucault, 1984:100) can be utilized as a way of accounting for these observations. Discourse is not divided into clear lines wherein knowledge claims are strictly divided and clinically sealed off from one another, but rather that discursive elements are tactically deployed across and between domains (Foucault, 1984:100). These elements can be concepts such as ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘culture’; all of which are tactically deployed as elements of the discourse on differences. Discourse is never ‘pure’; ethnicity as a social discourse in the narratives above is not only about culture, but also about bodies. The discourse on ethnicity in the narratives above can be seen as a hybrid discourse that has been purified at one level of racial elements, yet still contains pockets of archaic racialized knowledge.
“Race is something that belongs to the past, doesn’t it?”

Tony: Is it legitimate to talk about race today?
Mike: No I don’t think it is legitimate to talk about race today. At least not in Norway, I know that the term has a different meaning in for instance USA, that it involves much more cultural aspects there, but in Norway it is much more about the outer appearances and the physical that matters and it is hard to define people after what kind of hair style they have or forehead, nose, lips and stuff so I don’t think it is legitimate to talk about race today. One almost right away starts to rank people according to race. – Mike, 26, Norwegian and Ivory Coast decent.

Tony: do you feel that it is legitimate to talk about race today then?
Mariana: well, we always try to talk about cultural groups and ethnic belonging, but you know race is such a loaded word, or rather it has been a word that has been loaded from earlier times; it is a bit of a scary word, people don’t dare to say that one belongs to a certain race you know?  – Mariama, 28, Norwegian and Nigerian decent.

In both these narratives the persons I have talked to show an understanding of the historicity of the term race; both Thomas and Mariana related race to the past and its connotations to the history it has. They both establish that race is something that is if not taboo, then at least heavily connotated with the historical usage of it. Race it seems is conceptualized as an archaic term while ethnicity and cultural groups as Mariana states are modern and accepted terms. In the two narratives above a certain postmodern notion of distance is applied; race it seems is not part of the legitimate discourse on human differences. Race is illegitimate as a discourse; it is not part of us today, at least not in the sense that its historical usage would have it. As such a break is formed in the discourse; one between race of yesterday and that of ethnicity and culture of today. It creates what Bruno Latour has claimed to be the hallmark of modern discourses; ‘hybridizations’ and ‘purifications’ (Latour, 1993). The hybridization and purification of discourse play key roles in the structuring of social relations (Bauman and Briggs, 2003:7) in that it makes pre-modern, modern and postmodern discourses linked; it fuses, translates and masks the interlinking of race and ethnicity and culture. Yet it also at the same time claims to be totally modern; as Latour states: “the modern Constitution allows the expanded proliferation of the hybrids whose existence, whose very possibility, it denies” (Latour, 1993: 34, original italics). Thus in distancing itself from prior understanding of race, ethnicity makes the claim that it is totally cut off from race; its meaning is taken to be modern. Ethnicity does away with objective, biological distinctions and instead introduces subjective, cultural differences (Malik, 1996:175). Race might have been reduced to an illegitimate discourse, but its usurper, ethnicity, still has a corporal dimension that makes ethnicity a hybrid of the modern Constitution.
Many of the same elements that one finds in the documents can be seen in the narratives above; a recourse to race as archaic, an understanding of race as illegitimate and not as a part of Norway, but rather of other nations and cultures. I would postulate that this points towards once again an interdicursive link in which ‘race’ has been disseminated as illegitimate, and as a relic of the past. The link between official knowledge and an everyday discourse on ‘race’ is here very much in line with each other. The need to distance oneself from ‘race’ is at the same time a need to distance oneself from the negative stigma contained within the history of ‘race’, as such we cannot underestimate the effect on history when we deal with ‘race’ or other themes that border on these issues. The historicity and how people use history when dealing with race has a profound effect on what ‘race’ is.

I want to follow up and use some other narratives which deal with similar topics and which can be analyzed along similar lines. Once again the narratives come from Mike and Mariana; how they viewed race and history.

Tony: Do you feel that race is something that belongs to the past then?
Mike: Yes I sort of do, because of the negative connotations, I feel we have moved one step forward; we don’t need to speak about the size of the nose or just skin color, and whether you have curly hair or brown eyes. Or rather I feel like that but there is also a certain color aspect when one is talking about ethnicity.
Tony: [...] so it is kind of an older understanding within ethnicity then, is that what you mean?
Mike: Yeah right? It is there for a reason, there is a lot of history in all of this, and I think it has somehow snuck in there. But it doesn’t have to always be a bad thing. It is an aspect of ethnicity. And it is no doubt that there is color within ethnicity I think. Race is shapes and color [...] – Mike, 26, Norwegian and Ivory Coast decent.

Mariana: [...] but once again I have to say that it isn’t a word [race] that I would actually use so that I don’t feel that I have a particular relationship to that word except when you ask me about it now.[...]
Tony: so do you think that the reason we don’t use it [race] today is due to the past then?
Mariana: Yes I do think so, I have never thought about using it, not that it is so wrong, but it is something that I feel is a bit negatively connoted.
Tony: so if I understand you correctly; do you think that race has been drained with meaning?
Mariana: Well it isn’t drained with meaning, it has always had a meaning, for instance in the past we divided people into races and placed them in a hierarchy. I feel it lies more with that era than now; now we work towards an equality of all people[...] there is still a certain hierarchy; in the Norwegian society but also in the Nigerian. When I am in Nigeria then I am often treated differently by other Nigerians as someone how is better in relation to themselves because I am European and it has very much a colonial feel to it. Because I have lighter skin than them hence I am better off than them; it sort of hangs on then, we are sort of slow.
– Mariana, 28, Norwegian and Nigerian decent.

Both these excerpts are rather long but I feel it is valid to recount them in their full length as they both show very well how translation, purification and the rhetoric of history works when it comes to how race is inserted into ethnicity and how the body and its color still remains with us today even though a lot of political as well as academic discourse has indeed proclaimed that we live in a post racial era. Mike clearly points towards this when he explicitly states in the beginning of his narrative that race is something that belongs to the
past, yet later he inserts color and the body within his understanding of ethnicity that in a way sutures the discourse on ethnicity and race together. Culture cannot stand alone as the defining aspect of ethnicity; as Mike points to, history and the deep connections that ethnicity has to race must also be accounted for when we deal with how people utilize ethnicity in their everyday lives. This is not to say that ethnicity is synonymous to race, nor that race is solely biological and a concept of the past (Goldberg, 1993:77), rather it is to say that the discourse on ethnicity is at times racialized. Werner Sollors proclaims that the differences between ‘race’ and ethnicity is at times better seen as differences of degree instead of kind (Sollors, 1996:xxxv), and leaning on David Theo Goldberg’s words, this is so because “the assignation of significance to ‘physical’ criteria is in itself the result of a ‘cultural’ choice that has been made differently in different countries and times” (Goldberg in Sollors, 1996:xxxiii). This perspective was in fact also held, perhaps not surprisingly, by Claude Levi Strauss as he stated that “Far from having to ask whether culture is or is not a function of race, we are discovering that race – or what is generally meant by the term – is one function among others of culture” (Levi Strauss cited in Peck and Daniel, 1996: 249). As argued for earlier, Strauss’ view is that ‘race’ is a cultural concept which is established by culture and not the other way around, making race, and in turn the body, already culturally inscribed.

The above argument supports Butler and her notion of the already cultural body; inscribed in history and subject to discourse. Ethnicity as a modern category still points back to a body even though it often proclaims to move along lines that are more about ‘culture’. The modern understanding then of ethnicity fails to account for how the body is already cultural. This is because the discourse on race never fully left ethnicity; race was in Latour’s sense of the split between modern and pre-modern, separated from ethnicity by recourse to the belief that ‘ethnicity’ is more neutral, more ‘real’ and more modern and scientific than race ever was. This point has already been established in my analysis of the documents, yet the narratives that these informants tell also point to similar rhetoric; a recourse to ‘race’ as being part of an archaic discourse that has run its course. But this split is not as total as it appears if we look at how these informants also state that race has not fully left our modern understanding.

Mariana and Mike gives credence to this as they reflexively claim that ethnicity is not synonymous to race yet acknowledges that color and racialized knowledge is embedded in ethnicity due to its historicity. Mariana’s narrative is particularly telling in its cross cultural narration. She proclaims that race is on one level a relic of the past that we in our modern world has left in our efforts towards the equality of all people, yet she also acknowledges the
discourse that is there both in Norway but also in Nigeria when she points to a politics of shading; to be fair skinned is to be better off. Even though Norwegian research seems at times to imagine itself as outside of post colonial narratives, stories such as the one Mariana tells are powerful reminders that we cannot afford to disregard cross cultural narratives that brings specific colonial and post colonial racialized knowledge with them. Such narratives of inferiority and skin color complex have been crucial to colonial and post colonial research (Fanon, 2008, Tate, 2007), yet in Norway very little, if any research exist on the intersection between bodies, skin color and beauty norms. It seems that these areas of research are omitted more due to the imagined ‘outsider’ position that Norway has in terms of the colonial enterprises than it has to do with the fact that such narratives exists in the post colonial Norway of today. With increased immigration and a multitude of colored bodies and post colonial stories circulating in Norway today it seems well worth to look more closely at such narratives as the one Mariana told.

In regards to the split between the ‘archaic’ notion of race and the more modern understanding of ethnicity her telling ending is almost an echo of Latour’s main thesis; we have never been modern (Latour, 1993) or as Mariana says; we are slow in our liberation from racialized thinking.

In the above narratives I would claim that the hybrid production of racialized knowledge is produced exactly in that instance wherein we try to purify ethnicity from its racial guise; it is in that moment when we use history to distance ourselves from the past understanding of race that we also makes ethnicity into a hybrid. By recourse to the past as the home of ‘race’ the above narratives does exactly what Latour means make for the temporal split between modern and pre-modern; it is this sorting of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ into modern or non-modern concepts (Latour, 1993:76). Yet as we have seen the split is not complete; color is deployed at that instance when past understandings of race meet the contemporary understanding of ethnicity.

**Race: Subtext/Graft Onto/Into Ethnicity**

Color as it is deployed in these narratives makes it evident that racialized knowledge about such terms as ethnicity and cultural group is highly present in the everyday lives of these individuals. If these interviews are anything to go by then it is clear that color might work as a ‘social subtext’ that runs through, with and within terms such as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘cultural groups’. I want to start out by looking at an excerpt from my interview with Thomas.
The outtake is from my re-interview with him and it contains part of our discussion about how various terms often in fact point towards color without explicitly talking about either color or race.

*Thomas:* [...] people are interested in skin color. Yet color is also something that people are a bit careful about when it comes to talking about it, one often instead prefer to talk about regions, non-western for instance.

*Toni:* do you feel that such terms also reflect some kind of appearance?

*Thomas:* Yes most definitely.

*Toni:* what do you mean by that?

*Thomas:* well I think that when one wants to discuss race then one does everything possible to avoid using the term race, one instead moves into other terms. One prefers to say African rather than black; I think one tries to use a lot of different terms in order to circle in on race without using the term or other terms such as black, Negro, and such. – Thomas, 35, Norwegian and Tanzania decent.

The above narrative is very interesting in several respects; first of all it shows how translation and discursive purification works. Race and skin color is under communicated yet it is present through other terms that connote, in Thomas’ view, the very same thing that they try to avoid. As Berg and Kristiansen says in a similar setting, terms such as ethnic, non-Western, foreigner, and immigrant often point in the Norwegian context to visible differences between white and non-white people (Berg and Kristiansen, 2010:228). The two also claim that ‘race’ is a gliding signifier that in certain official settings and documents glides across into new domains and terms such that it masks itself as not being about visible differences, yet still acts as a signifier that points to visible differences that is closely tied to color (Berg and Kristiansen, 2010: 234-243). This also seems to be the experience that Thomas has; we avoid direct confrontations with color and especially the term race, yet the new linguistic homes that color and race slides into still points to the corporal. Since the official discourse on ethnicity in Norway is dominated by a purging of racialized signification such terms as ‘non-Western’ and ‘immigrant’ becomes loaded with corporal meaning which in turn is a way of translating and making hybrid the discourse on ethnicity. The colored body often acts as a floating signifier within various discourses; terms like non-Western, visible minority, etc. all fight over which meaning content to fill the visible body with (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:39). The ways in which the colored body is articulated in these terms show how full closure of the signifying chain is difficult to achieve; the signifying chain going from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ and other terms such as ‘non-Western’ and ‘visible minority’ shows the problem that the body represent to representation and language; the potential for ambiguity within this floating signifier is due to the prior discursive elements that it builds upon while it at the same time articulates something new (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:39). Put otherwise:
ethnicity and other ‘modern’ terms that signify the non-white body both draws from a prior
discourse on race, while it at the same time casts it in a new form that makes it into something
which is separate from ‘race’ as it was cast in prior discourses.

I want to draw this insight a bit further and connect it to how bodies are viewed in this
shift in discourse. If discourse and discursive shifts are not only textual, but also corporal then
these shifts from ‘race’ to ‘ethnic’, ‘non-Western’, or ‘immigrant’ also influence those very
bodies that these terms describes, in fact this description is not descriptive, but formative.
Social narratives such as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘racial’ “create their characters and plots through the
textualization of the body’s contours and organic outlines” (Grosz, 1994:119) meaning that
when we talk about ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’ we also write these terms upon certain bodies. To
paraphrase Elizabeth Grosz, this “intextuation of bodies” means that bodies are also
transformed when the discourse about ‘race’ for instance changes into one on ‘ethnicity’. The
discursive apparatus of regimes of social fiction or knowledge such as the prior discourse on
‘race’ or the current discourse on ‘culture/ethnicity’ either “corrects”, updates, or makes more
“truthful” certain ways of describing and explaining who we are as ethnic or racial beings
(Grosz, 1994:119). Put in blunt terms; the way the informants and indeed the documents
describe either ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and subsequently who belongs into each of these categories
also forms the knowledge/fictions about these concepts, and also about bodies and people.

Perhaps Michel Foucault would have said that the Norwegian inhibition in talking
about race and indeed skin color forces race and skin as social signifiers to graft themselves
onto and into other terms such as ethnicity and non-Western by way of their semantic
polyvocality and thus acts as discursive elements that perhaps look different, yet circulate
within several strategies (Foucault, 1984:102) that all aim at talking about race and color
without ever really naming them explicitly. Race and color in Thomas’ view seems to be
replaced by other terms that never the less are connoted as visible differences (Berg and
Kristiansen, 2010:249) and thus the explicit mentioning of color becomes absent, yet still
there; a sort of social subtext that runs within other terms. I would like to draw a parallel to
Foucault and his work on the history of sexuality; to the ways in which the discourse on ‘race’
and ‘ethnicity’ as a discursive device might have certain similarities to those that Foucault
found in regards to sexuality and his take on ‘the Repressive Hypothesis’ (Foucault, 1984:15-
51). Foucault states that there has been a shift in the discourse on sexuality that had bearings
on how certain statements in regards to sexuality were made and how they took shape, “new
rules of propriety screened out some words: there was a policing of statements. A control over
enunciations as well: where and when it was not possible to talk about such things [sex]
became much more strictly defined; in which circumstances, among which speakers, and
within which social relationships” (Foucault, 1984:18). This transformation on how we spoke
about sex had bearings on how we viewed sex and sexuality, but this new transformation did
not lead to a silencing of sexuality according to Foucault; it lead to a proliferation of new and
various discourses. The multiplications of discourses concerning sex in the field exercise of
power itself: an institutional excitement to speak about it, to hear it spoken about and to cause
it (sex) to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail (Foucault,
1984:18).

The parallel I want to draw is this: could it be that the shift from a discourse on race
and racial differences in pre World War Two Europe which later shifted into a discourse on
color and the colorful community of the identity politics of the late 1970’s and 80’s which in
turn seems to be replaced by today’s discourse on cultural differences is following a similar
discursive pattern that sexuality has been doing? Has the repression of race and color lead to a
proliferation of other terms that never the less all seek in some similar fashion to demarcate
colors and bodies so as to highlight differences? Marianne Gullestad claims that certain
theories seems to have replaced culture with race in an effort to explain differences
(Gullestad, 2002:149) and Berg and Kristiansen cites renowned scholars John Solomos and
Les Back when they say that

One of the most important features of the contemporary situation is that manifestations of race are coded in a
language that aims to circumvent accusations of racism […] In the case of contemporary racist discourses, for
example, race is often coded in terms of “differences” and “culture” (Solomos and Back in Berg and Kristiansen,

Could it be that the incitement to not talk explicitly about race or colors has in fact lead to an
even greater incitement to name color in other terms? Is Thomas’ narrative just such an
example on the deployment of color wherein, as he says one ‘tries to use a lot of different
terms in order to circle in on race without using the term or other terms such as black, Negro,
and such”? Thomas in his narrative seems to be pointing to a problem with the deployment of
color and race in particular; the silence that surrounds it. The silence that surround race
explicitly and color implicitly is key in understanding how race and color is grafted into/onto
the discourse on ethnicity. Foucault goes on to say that silence itself:

The things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers
– is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, that an
element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies.
There is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say […] There is not one
but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses (Foucault, 1984:27).

Following Foucault and Thomas’ narrative we could postulate that it is perhaps the silence of colors and the ban on race that makes colors implicitly embedded into ethnicity. The silence surrounding ‘race’ and at times color and bodies makes color opaque and less evident, yet when we read these narratives we see that color matters; it is deployed through actions and words, and it is not outside discourse but rather intrinsic to it. It is productive as it produces actions and new concepts; ethnicity as a term would never have arisen in its popular vogue in Norway had it not been for the various discursive purifications that occurred in the wake of the demise of ‘race’.

Another example on race and color as deployed through such a social subtext is from my interview with Mike. We talked about how certain terms becomes loaded with visible and corporal meaning and Mike made the following comment which is highly relevant for this analysis when he stated that:

Mike: [...] non-Western immigrant, well when you hear that you wouldn’t immediately think about a Canadian or an American, white Americans, but one rather think about groups of people who are easily recognizable in regards to skin color within the Norwegian society. And more often than not this seems to be connected to crime in the media and a lot of other negative stuff. – Mike, 26, Norway and the Ivory Coast decent.

In the above a lot of the same mechanisms that Thomas describes come into play; the gliding of racialized meaning, and the deployment of color not through race per se but through other terms that still points towards the body. This is very much in line with the research that Berg and Kristiansen did on how racial meaning in official Norwegian documents is made opaque and under communicated (Berg and Kristiansen, 2010). Since discourse, following Foucault, is always plural in nature it is evident that the hybridization that Latour talks about works in a fashion that allows terms to be exported and imported from one domain into another thus transforming the discourse on for instance color from one that would be loaded with negative connotations (such as ‘race’) into what is seen and taken to be a more neutral and value free discourse (such as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘non-Western’).

Strangely enough, or perhaps very much in line with the ways discourse transmutes and changes, the term ‘non-Western’, which was dominant in describing cultural and national groups in Norway has in fact been discarded by the National Statistic Bureau in their statistics due to the negative connotations that the term has gotten over the years. Here we see

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39 For the full article on how and why ‘non-Western’ where discarded see SSB web article: http://www.ssb.no/ssp/utg/200804/15/
how the historicity of a name or a term becomes sedimented through usage; how meaning becomes internal to a word and gives it its force (Butler, 1997:36). Based on the insights from Butler this is also why the translation of color into for instance ‘ethnicity’ or ‘non-Western’ works; its historicity makes its hidden meaning evident to us. Color is deployed through an act of ventriloquism wherein the signifying value of the term color, glides across various terms in such a way that in our culture we still connote such “colorless” words as ‘non-Western’ and ‘ethnic’ with color. Such deployment of color in the name of “colorless” terms is an example of how the production of hybrid discourses takes shape. As Bauman and Briggs says discursive hybridity often makes certain words such as “crime”, “drugs” and “welfare mothers” stand for race (Bauman and Briggs, 2003:7) and this seems evident in Mike’s narrative experiences as well when he points to the way he views the term ‘non-Western’. It becomes a hybrid that bespeaks several things and not just what the National Statistics Bureau would like it to mean. It becomes crime and immigration problems; it is a national concern and political rhetoric, and in this setting it becomes colors and bodies.

The body as such represent a particular problem for discourse in that it must be held within a linguistic term which means that how the colored body is represented and how the machinery of representation and régimes for representing racialized bodies within a culture play a constative role and not just a descriptive, secondary role (Stuart Hall in Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:113). Even though many terms that circulate within discourse do not explicitly talk about color or bodies in racialized ways, narratives such as the ones that have been shown above point to the ways in which many of them at an everyday level still connotes a visible body that is often non-white and coded as non-Norwegian.

I want to end on that note by turning to an outtake from my re-interview with Mike who himself had taken a masters degree within the social sciences here in Norway.

Mike: in academia one is very careful, as one is in the general public debate, in talking about colors and ethnicity. One usually talks in terms of cultural aspects and one notices this very well when one is writing a paper; I have to write it in a certain fashion that is legitimate within academia because one is afraid to offend someone. You can sort of be arrested on what you write. I would talk much looser about ethnicity in my day to day conversations than I did at the university [...] 

Tony: so what you are saying is that in your opinion the public debate and academia has a much more...

Mike: ...colorless term for ethnicity.

Tony: while at an everyday level, when you speak with your friends, do you feel that color is much more out there?

Mike: It is much more out there. It is much easier to talk about color at that level. You do not fear that sense of being arrested; “oh no, now you are attaching properties to them that they do not have!” Really, reality is a bit different from what one writes about in a paper at university, one has to adapt to the one you are writing to. I think one is a bit careful about attaching a color aspect to ethnicity both in academia and in the public debate. – Mike, 26, Norwegian and Ivory Coast decent.
Mike’s narrative is a good window into some of the points made earlier; it shows how color is deployed differently depending in the social site it arises in, forming a divide between “official” discourse and “ unofficial”. It also shows how the point made by Foucault seems to be valid when it comes to who can speak of what and on what grounds; which types of discourse is valid where and among who (Foucault, 1984:27) on color seems in this narrative to be formed along the fault line of the everyday deployment of color and that of the deployment of color in more public social sites. This Mike claims, makes color silent within one site and more present at the everyday level; thus the rules of discourse forms how one reports on ‘reality’ which in Mike’s view is in fact split. I take this to represent how the discursive elements that Foucault talks about could be made “empirical” in the sense that color exists at both levels, yet that color as a discursive element can come into play in various strategies (Foucault, 1984:100) and social sites. Color matters in this narrative at several levels yet it is interesting, and perhaps even a bit troublesome that Mike connects the inability or inhibition to talk about color as a way of censorship, at least within the public sphere.

If this is so could this point to the compliancy of silence within discourse? Which “grammar” gives us the best grip on the lives of people like Mike; is it the grammar of color deployed within public debates and institutions or is it the everyday language used by people like Mike? I am not trying to give an answer here as that would include, at least implicitly a moral judgment upon which discourse is the right one, but what we can establish from this is that color is deployed differently and it means different things depending on the social site from which it emerges.

**Normative Ideals and Hegemonic Whiteness**

In order to see how the category of ‘ethnic Norwegian’ relates across both the documents that I have analyzed and with the people I have talked to, I want to turn to how the people I talked to see this category. The goal is to see how ‘ethnic Norwegian’ is seen in regards to color and then see how this is different from or similar to the definitions that for instance the Justice Department and the Norwegian Language Council operates with.

I want to start out by reproducing a few outtakes from various interviews that all concern what the informants viewed as a proper Norwegian body when it came to color and the corporal.

*Tony: What kind of image do you have of the Norwegian? What does he look like?*

*Mike: I think that the Norwegian has white skin at least and his hair color is not that important. He has at least white skin. He has in a way the cultural codes that say that you are Norwegian. The traditional; knows*
how to ski and stuff, the outdoors. Traditions on Christmas Eve. It is in a way the standard form for a Norwegian. It has of course become acceptable to do other things but appearance vise then the Norwegian is white. – Mike, 26 years old, Norwegian and Ivory Coast decent.

Thomas: I have always felt Norwegian and been accepted as such, but still; you don’t look Norwegian, you do not look ethnically Norwegian and you become very aware of that.
Tony: so how does a Norwegian look?
Thomas: White plain and simply. Or you can tell the difference between an Eastern European and one from Norway and Scandinavia. – Thomas, 35 years, Norwegian and Tanzanian decent.

Tony: what is a Norwegian appearance in your opinion?
Mary: Norwegian appearance that’s, well that’s blonde hair and blue eyes. That’s the image I have in my head when I think about that, but I know that it really is not that because I too have a Norwegian appearance but nobody thinks about that. – Mary, 25 years, Norwegian and St. Martian decent.

In the first quote from Mike the emphasis is on skin color. He explicitly connotes Norwegian with white skin color, but he also links cultural ‘codes’ and ‘traditions’ with the color white. The connotations of color is thus not only corporeal but becomes cultural. Certain signs such as ‘skiing’ and ‘the outdoors’ becomes semantically ‘white washed’ and linked to white skin color in Mike’s narrative. This is a signifying chain wherein ‘Norwegian’ as a sign glides across several other cultural signs and as such the connotations for the sign ‘Norwegian’ become connected to for instance skiing. Much like the definitions given by the Language Council and for that matter, UNESCO, Mike’s narrative gives credence to the idea that there is a ‘culturalist’ notion of ethnicity that is in play and not a ‘racialist’ discourse. Yet his conflation with skin color and cultural aspects such as skiing makes for a conflation and mixture of bodies and culture. Skiing comes to signify ‘white’ and vice versa; cultural acts connotes not only ‘values’, ‘belonging’ and ‘the Norwegian’, but also connotes certain bodies.

Mike’s acknowledgement that there is a certain plurality in this regards can be analytically read as an instance wherein the connection between the sign ‘Norwegian’ and other cultural signs have been loosened; talking with Ernesto Laclau we could say that the signifier and signified are not irrefutably tied to each other (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:53) and what we instead are seeing is how the signifiers are indeed floating signifiers (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:53.). But the connotations between the sign ‘Norwegian’ and ‘white’ is still maintained in Mike’s narrative making it an instance where discursive closure is temporarily achieved (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:38). This crystallization of the connection between ‘Norwegian’ and ‘white’ could be interpreted as the making of a ‘nodal point’ wherein discursive meaning is frozen and wherein the gliding of the sign’s meaning is halted in such a way that other possible connotations are made impossible (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:37). We can here see how discourse solidifies meaning and thus creates cultural
essentialism; rather than saying that it is biology that is the driving force of culture as in the old discourse on ‘race’ we here sees how culture becomes the force that drives bodies. But since cultural practices seem to point back to certain bodies in these narratives the tie between bodies and culture is still intact making cultural essentialism also implicated in the process of making certain bodies stand for certain cultures.

Even though the ‘field of discursivity’ as Laclau would have called it (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:37) or as Foucault would have said, ‘the polyvalence of discourse’ (Foucault, 1984), has a reservoir of discursive meanings that are tied to the history of the sign or use of the sign in other discourses, it never the less is often ignored in an effort to create a hegemonic meaning within a specific discourse (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999:37). This insight can be linked to Stuart Hall’s notion of ‘preferred meaning’. Preferred meanings rely upon ‘common-sense’ or ‘taken-for-grantedness’ and reflects the dominant cultural order which imposes its classification of the social and cultural and political world (Procter, 2004:68). Seen in this light, what the informants here express is a notion of ‘white’ as linked to ‘Norwegian’ in a common sense or taken for granted attitude. This taken for granted attitude is not formed through a unilateral process, but rather is the making of a battle over signifying value (Procter, 2004:69), which is contested and always in transformation (Procter, 2004:69). But this must be seen as a historical endeavor as well; ‘white’ and ‘Norwegian’ is made into signs through a historical process which on the one side seems on an official level to have moved towards ‘only culture’, while in these narratives the relationship between color and culture is more ambiguous.

The same happens in Thomas’ narrative; there is a link between whiteness and Norwegianess. But what is striking here is how he in turn deploy color in such a fashion that he also breaks down the category of white into a plural. It is telling that he makes a difference between Norwegian and Eastern European. Both are considered white, yet there is a visible difference that keeps them apart as well. From an academic point of view research on ethnicity in Norway has more often than not focused exclusively on so called ‘ethnic minorities’\(^{40}\), and visibility and the corporal has seldom been theoretizised or analyzed in

regards to the majority population in Norway. Seldom has the majority population been taken into consideration as part of a ‘visible ethnic group’ (Gullestad, 2002). More often than not it is the minority population that is made visible and thus also racialized. ‘Race’ is something ‘they’ have and in turn, color is something ‘they’ poses. This can be seen in the document analyzed from the Norwegian Language Council wherein ‘race’ as it appears in the dictionaries are said to relate to circumstances outside Norway and to cultures that in fact ‘have race’.

Thomas’ narrative is interesting in so far as whiteness is made into a plural, a racialization of both Norwegians and Eastern Europeans. This point to an important issue raised by Richard Dyer in his seminal book on whiteness, White (1997) wherein he offers compelling historical arguments for how whiteness can be seen as a coalition which in turn makes possible the notion of some being whiter than others (Dyer, 1997:19). In Thomas’ narrative there is no explicit reference to whiteness in this fashion, but it is at least an implicit understanding that one can differentiate between Norwegian (white) bodies and Eastern European (white) bodies.

Dyer makes the case that whiteness should be seen as historically contingent in as much as some groups of people that we today might consider white were in fact in the past considered non-whites; the case being the Irish and the Jewish population in regards to both the US context and the UK (Dyer, 1997:51-58). A case in point is the English priest Charles Kingsley’s observations after his first trip to Ireland during the 19th century: “I am haunted by the human chimpanzees I saw along that hundred miles of horrible country […] But to see white chimpanzees is dreadful; if they were black, one would not feel it so much, but their skins, except where tanned by exposure, are as white as ours” (Kingsley cited in Loomba, 2005:93). The same differentiation has been done in Norway as well in the past in regards to the Sami population, and the kven population. In his book, Kortskaller og langskaller, anthropologist Jon Røyne Kyllingstad points out how physical anthropology in Norway in the beginning of the 20th century in fact maintained such differentiations of white people based on what we now call ‘ethnic’ fault lines. The Sami and kven where in many works within this
discipline viewed as belonging to another race (Kyllingstad, 2004: 56, 98, ). This differentiation shows that whiteness as such is also historically and culturally contingent.

In all of the three narratives taken from my interviews whiteness is made to ‘speak’ or matters as a way of visualizing what a ‘Norwegian’ looks like. It is a way of talking that deploys color and makes certain bodies stand for ‘Norwegian’ and often also to stand for ‘Norwegian culture’, or at least certain aspects of Norwegian culture. Already at this juncture there seems to be a difference between ‘official discourse’ as it is played out in the documents analyzed and the micro level of the informants; skin is made to matter in the construction of ‘ethnic Norwegian’ on a level that is much more explicit than in the official documents. Even though in the official documents ‘decent’ or ‘ancestry’ seems to at least implicitly implicate certain bodies, there is a much more explicit demonstration of color in these narratives.

I want to look at some more narratives in order to show how whiteness is seen from an emic point of view as being ‘hegemonic’ or normatively white as a ‘experience near’ concept (Geertz, 1983) that in fact deploys color and links it to Norwegian ethnicity and makes whiteness visible.

Tony: How then does a real Norwegian look like in your head?
Obi: No, well, I have to say that I see a person that has white skin, that’s really it, that he has white skin. [...] – Obi, 31, Norwegian and Kenyan decent.

Tony: But what is this white? That’s interesting; what is this white and do you feel yourself that Norwegian equals white?
Stine: I try to avoid thinking like that but I can’t totally do it. I used to talk about ethnic Norwegians when I meant whites [...] but then I thought ‘damn it! I am an ethnic Norwegian!’”, but I am brown, when does one become an ethnic Norwegian? Does one become ethnic Norwegian faster when one is white, and I think you do that, or rather nobody questions you if you have a white American dad and a white Norwegian mother, then you get labeled ethnic Norwegian. [...] The dark is very new in Norway, so perhaps one has a hard time not to conflate Norwegian with white. But that’s also because Norway is so good at, for instance in commercials to illustrate that the Norwegian is white; a sort of norm. But I can’t liberate myself from that, no, white equals Norwegian. – Stine, 30, Indian and Norwegian decent.

It is of interest to note how I myself phrase the question in this interview. The outtake is from a part of the interview that concerned itself with how Obi viewed himself against what he came to talk about as ‘real’ Norwegians. In hindsight one can say that how both me and Obi approached this issue can be seen as cultural ‘silent knowledge’ (Thorbjørnsrud in Gustavsson, 2005:41) that me and him both share as part of our similar background and geographical location. A ‘real’ Norwegian can be seen here as a mental construct that we both shared an understanding of what was, a concept that is part of our mutual mentality or as Peter Burke perhaps would have said: schemata (Burke, 1997:177). ‘Real’ Norwegian as part of schemata is interesting not only as a recurrent theme, but as Burke says as part of the
structuring of thought (Burke, 1997:177). Thus the structuring of thought in this instance, and might one add, the narratives above, all structure ‘real Norwegian’ as white. It is perhaps an instance wherein Hall’s idea of the ‘preferred meaning’ of ‘Norwegian’ comes to the fore in my own understanding of the term or as a ‘common sense’ understanding.

Common sense as I use it here can be seen as the ways in which my own view on ‘Norwegian’ reflects a discursive construction more than a reality. Common sense is made up by of that which seems obviously true and enjoys consensus or near consensus (Alcoff, 2006:185). But despite its felt naturalness, common sense is “culturally constituted – not as false consciousness is, by imposition from above, but by the sediment of past historical beliefs and practices of a given society or culture” (Alcoff, 2006:185). In this insight from philosopher Linda Martin Alcoff, we see that ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ common sense meets the historicity of Butler and the discursive notions of Foucault wherein such common sense is not “the imposition of ideology, but as part of the backdrop of practical consciousness, circulating, as Foucault would say, from the bottom up as well as from the top down. Racial knowledge exists at the site of common sense” (Alcoff, 2006: 185). Hence the notion of the ‘real Norwegian’ as white should be taken serious, not as a factual reality, but as a description and symptom of a broader discursive construction that influence everyday beliefs which tells us that color still matters even in a world where culture, religion, and values are portrayed as being the defining aspects of human differences. In Obi’s narrative it is skin, in Mary’s it’s the iconicity of blond and blue eyes which structure discursive experiences; Norwegian is deployed as ‘white’. The most important issue is to show that ‘Norwegian’ is in fact a category that is subject to a process of ‘racialization’; it points back to a body and not only to ‘culture’, or the body as culture. Stine’s narrative is interesting on several levels in regards to the deployment of color. Her problematization of the term ethnic Norwegian starts out with her own insistence that she is an ethnic Norwegian, but then she draws on her own visible body as ‘brown’ and starts to reflect on the very process of becoming an ethnic Norwegian. Stine states that one becomes ‘faster’ ethnic Norwegian if one is mixed white/white and that ‘nobody questions’ you as to what ethnicity you have. I take this as an instance that whiteness ‘masks’ ethnicity and that whiteness and ‘Norwegianness’ is constructed as the unmarked, homogenous, and normative (Gullestad, 2002:164). This is in line with what Dyer observes in regards to the Western tradition as a whole. Building on David Lloyd 42, Dyer remarks that non-white subjects are “particular, marked, raced, whereas the white man has attained the

position of being without properties, unmarked, universal, just human” (Dyer, 1997:38). The opposite to this marking of the particular is the white body which is as David Lloyd observed, closely connected to the idea of the ‘Subject without properties’ an unmarked subject that is universal; Lloyd observes that this subject becomes more and more connected to white Europeans during the nineteenth-century (Lloyd inPeck and Daniel, 1996:256). Now in terms of marking and visibility this is closely linked to notions of how we describe ethnic Others. This is especially so in today’s climate in Norway wherein according to Gullestad, the term ‘immigrant’ [innvandrer] has become more often than not connoted as one with ‘dark skin’ [mørk hud] (Gullestad, 2002:159); meaning that there is ‘marking’ of an allegedly non-racial term linking it to a colored body making the colored person marked. We could here use in brief, the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ as it is formulated by Simone de Beauvoir (Beauvoir, 2005) and claim that Norwegians as ‘white’ has transcended the visibility of non-whites; they are left unmarked in most settings and are thus free to establish themselves as part of an invisible majority while ‘visible minorities’ are immanent to their bodies and colors. The transcendal properties of the Subject without properties is what makes it seem invisible; ethnic Norwegians are as far as I have come across seldom been accrued the space of an immanent colored, ethnic group.

As such ‘Norwegian’ becomes in the public debate ‘invisible’ and lacks the visible connotations that other ethnic groups have. Yet by looking at narratives such as these, we can see that ‘ethnic Norwegians’ are highly visible in the everyday narratives of these individuals. It is not only about ‘culture’ or ‘values’; at an everyday level, discourse surrounding ‘Norwegian’ is premised upon a very visual strategy that deploys color in both explicit and implicit ways. It is perhaps a paradox that a lot of research on whiteness has seen whiteness as ‘invisible’, yet what these narratives shows is that the category ‘Norwegian’ and ‘ethnic Norwegian’ are highly racialized in everyday discourse making it visible and corporal.

43 Now an interesting point to juxtapose this line of arguing for ‘racial/ethnic’ visibility discourse is to set it against the dichotomy of ‘immanence/transcendence’ that Simone de Beauvoir operates with in her work The Second Sex. Here women are seen as being placed in a state of immanence that renders women more bound to their cultural roles as providers, home keepers, etc. while men are seen as inhabiting the space of transcendence wherein men are nurtured by culture to be active, assertive and inhabit social space in such a way that they occupy more space and are seen as being those who ‘can do’ while women are those that ‘can not do’. For the full argument see BEAUVOIR, S. D. 2005. Det annet kjønn, [Oslo], Bokklubben.
**Bodies, stylization and performativity**

To look into how color/bodies matter at an everyday level as part of my research postulate, I want to use Butler’s notion of performativity in an effort to juxtapose how color still matters in the everyday lives of the people I have talked in contrast to the documents analyzed which tries implicitly I would argue for, to remove color and race at a certain level.

Color matters as a ‘doing’ of bodies; these doings can be seen as performative or as Judith Butler sometimes labels them; “styles of the flesh”. These styles are never fully self-styled, for styles have a history, and those histories condition and limit the possibilities (Butler, 1999:177). These ‘styles of the flesh’ are all historical sedimentations or as Butler calls it; ‘materialization’ (Butler, 1993). Hence bodies and hair are in Butler’s view “a *process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter*” (Butler, 1993: 9, original italics). The term materialization encapsulates the idea that the body is a temporal process repeatedly taking place in language that is itself material (Salih, 2002:81). Hence these narratives must also be seen as sediments of historical discourses regarding what counts as Norwegian, white, black, non-Norwegian, etc. These historical sediments on what counts as a ‘Norwegian’ or as a non-Norwegian subject are in turn formed by normative or ‘mythical’ ideals of the very concept of the ‘Norwegian’. The materiality of the body is formed and sustained through and as a materialization of regulatory norms (Butler, 1993: 15). Furthermore the materialization of norms “requires those identificatory processes by which norms are assumed or appropriated, and these identifications precede and enable the formation of a subject, but are not, strictly speaking, performed by the a subject” (Butler, 1993:15). The excerpt that I want to start with is from a narrative delivered by Thomas. The part transcribed below was part of a discussion we had regarding how he had viewed his body image and whether or not he had been happy with his appearances up throughout the years.

*Tony:* [...] growing up as you say you did in a relatively homogenous community, was it at any time a period where you were less content with your appearances? I remember for instance that I wanted straight hair and to be able to style it in certain ways. Have you ever experienced something akin to that?

*Thomas:* Yes, or like, there are times where I wish that I could have a hair style like other people. There have been times like that. When I was younger there were periods, but not like I was unsatisfied, I feel that maybe I was happy with the fact that I could stick out, that I was visible. And that I have been pleased with. I got a lot of nice feedback when I had such and such hair styles, but I do have had certain things that I would have wanted to be able to do. For example make a hair style that was on style during a certain period, but on the other side, I have always been happy with, I was always very fond of attention when I was younger so when we were a group of people I always felt that I was being recognized.

*Tony:* have you ever then stylized yourself with for instance an afro or a high top like one had in the 90’s, a style that other ethnic Norwegians could not do?

*Thomas:* I have had an afro. On my driver’s license I have that. - Thomas, 35, Norwegian and Tanzanian decent.
Let me first of all point out something of methodological concern. In the above narrative my own voice as an interviewer comes to the fore, in fact in hindsight it perhaps comes too much to the fore, yet what I find interesting is the way Thomas responds. Even though I am perhaps too visible in this narrative Thomas seems to be able to freely engage with me and as such I hope that this is more an instance wherein commonality was achieved more than me functioning as a ventriloquist.

Second of all, the above quote speaks to how the deployment of color as it is acted out across the body is about the intersection between labor and self confidence, but a labor that is also racialized. It shows how to stylize oneself is invested with social meaning that in turn influences both confidence and skills in establishing oneself as a culturally intelligible individual. A lot of this cultural meaning is invested in this quotation in the hair style and matter. As the cultural critique Kobena Mercer notes in regards to the matter of hair and how it is a constant signifier of the self he notes that hair is organic matter produced by physiological processes, human hair seems to be a natural aspect of the body. Yet hair is never a straightforward biological fact, because it is almost always groomed, prepared, cut concealed and generally worked upon by human hands. Such practices socialize hair, making it the medium of significant statements about self and society and the code of value that binds them, or do not [...] hair is constantly processed by cultural practices which [...] invest it with meaning and value (Mercer in Tate, 2009: 44).

I would like to link this back to the aforementioned ‘styles of the flesh’ as Butler calls it and claim that the performativity of the above quote lies among other things in the ways in which hair is worked and sculpted by the informants in ways that both inspire confidence and which the informants himself sees as an positive attribute of his body image, one which makes possible a certain stylization of the self. But this stylization is in turn invested with racial meaning that is at the intersection between a corporal body and a cultural schema. It interacts with discourses on ethnicity and grafts itself onto this discourse; stylization and the corporal is deeply connected to the ways in which bodies are culturally coded through history.

The next excerpt is from an interview with John who is of Norwegian and Ghanaian decent. The narrative is taken from a part of the interview that was concerned with his take on what made him remember that he had a father from Ghana and that he himself was not ethnic Norwegian.

Tony: is it the color of your skin that reminds you that you are not fully Norwegian?
John: yes but not very often, but yes, but more often than not it is my hair. Usually I wear it with a hair band or dreads but the times when I, for instance yesterday had to comb it out into an afro I just thought for a moment” shit! I can do that”, it was like I had discovered a super power that had just been laying there. I can
Once again I want to emphasis the creative potential that goes into the labor of hair and the performativity of hair styling. Hair labor in this excerpt is as in the prior one connected to difference, the joy of being able to have a particular hair style and about being reminded of one’s ethnic background. It is also connected to cultural knowledge about how to care for and style that particular hair type; it is part of the everyday deployment of bodies which I would say is a part of the ‘practice of everyday’ (Certeau, 1984). Hair style and the deployment of color through hair is once again marked as a marker of difference and as a racial signifier with the label ‘afro’ that in turn points towards a performativity of blackness or at least a non-Norwegian identification practice. Hair then, functions as a key ethnic signifier because, compared to bodily shape or facial features, it can be changed more easily by cultural practices such as straightening (Mercer, 1994:103), combs, gels, coloring, etc. All of these objects makes such performatives acts deeply connected to material objects; performativity in this sense can be linked to a vast network of objects that all contribute to a deployment of color much akin to Bruno Latour’s understanding of actor-networks (Latour, 1999) which points to how material objects as part of the deployment of color are folded into and onto bodies such that performativity is also materiality (Damsholt et al., 2009:25). Ethnicity and ‘race’ as it is inscribed in culture cannot be understood without also looking at material culture; this is something that for instance Levi Strauss understood when he stated that culture forms the very body of man, or as seen in the work of Kobena Mercer on black hair aesthetics (Mercer, 1994). The body as such is not an organic totality which is capable of the wholesale expression of ethnic or ‘racial’ subjectivity; it is an assemblage of heterogeneous elements and materials (Grosz, 1994:120). All of these elements points to the relevance of color and, if not ‘race’ then racialized ethnic bodies; hair coloring, hair straightening products, bleaching industries across the globe and photo retouching of black models and commercial actors all points to a highly racial industry and economy which never the less relies on material objects in its conflation of bodies and culture.

A short survey of online as well as printed magazines that cater to this very racial economy of beauty are Ebony (http://www.ebony.com/), Essence (http://www.essence.com/), Jet (http://www.jetmag.com/). These are the most prominent African American magazines dealing with this beauty economy but the globalization of racial beauty is also prominent in magazines such as ALO magazine which caters to Middle Eastern audience (http://www.alomagazine.com/), Audrey for Asian women (http://audreymagazine.com/), and Latina, which offers styling advice and lifestyle advice to the women of Latin American background (http://www.latina.com/). This is of course a limited example of such magazines, and taking into consideration the huge influx of diasporic

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There are a lot of things that goes into forming the ethnic body. It is a very racial labor of the self that is inscribed onto and into the body which in turn is tied up to material objects that all constitutes a racialized economy of beauty which would be impossible to ‘do’ without material objects and the network they are embedded in.

Another narrative that implies hair as a way of deploying color comes from Mike. The narrative is taken from a discussion regarding how he had felt and was feeling regarding his own appearance in connection to racial and ethnic norms of beauty and body.

Mike: I would of course have wanted to be twenty centimeters taller and with a lot more muscles and all that, but that is not that important. But I have straightened my hair and put highlights into it. All that stuff!

A point in particular that I would like to highlight here is Mike’s engagement with hair straightening and highlights. There has been a long history of seeing the straightening of African hair as a sign of self hatred and as a racial minority complex (see for instance Banks, 2000, Rooks, 1996, Tate, 2009), yet I want to focus on the hybrid complexity of such styles of the flesh and argue, alongside Tate that straight hair is not about being ‘fake’ or ‘wanting to be white’; rather it is about a stylization which points to the hair as Black apart from any signification from the racial body which it occupies (Tate, 2009:47). This can be seen as a way of being engaging in an act of subjectivation as Michel Foucault might have called it (see for instance Foucault and Rabinow, 1997 on the subject of subjectivation). As the Danish professor of Politics and Philosophy, Andersen states, the mode of subjectivation is a “mode of transformation – it invokes the passively receiving and subjected so that s/he may cross the line from subjection to subjectivation, thereby making her/himself actively sovereign in her/his own self-creation” (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003: 24, original italics). Transformation is about going from one state to another; from one form to another and can thus be linked to the concept of translation.

In the act of transforming one’s body one is at the same time translating it. When narratives such as these points to the various ways of ‘doing’ and deploying color and bodies it is also about translating skin and bodies into a new register. The body must graft itself onto/into an already established discourse on what a Norwegian/non-Norwegian looks like in people who live across the world there is a diverse array of such ‘ethnic’ beauty magazines that influence ‘racial’ beauty norms.

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45 My own clumsy formulation of this seems ironic considering the thematic at hand; what an overt generalization, yet it somehow also seems fitting. ‘African hair’ works as a heuristic device, yet what is African hair? Once again the body and its colors are hard to represent in a clear and nuanced way, and it becomes even harder once political tendencies creep in and power relations are accounted for. It seems that the body often is trapped within language and the history we have imbued such words and bodies with.
order to be made intelligible. This closely reminds us of the concept of bricolage employed by Claude Levi-Strauss which creates a very corporal ‘third space’ as Homi Bhabha would have said. This ‘third space’ displaces the histories that constitutes it, and sets up new structures of authority (Huddart, 2006:126) meaning that ‘the afro’, or the ‘hair straightening’ is not about the inscription of either ‘African’ (whatever that may be), or ‘Norwegian’ (once again, whatever that might be), but rather a new body whose ‘sign’ might come to signify new meaning as time goes by. This is not to disregard the power of connotations; after all much of my arguments builds on the fact that within ‘hybridity’ there is in fact degrees of essentialism as Tate claims (Tate, 2005). As such hybridity is perhaps much more a living process than a permanent state; one in which at times essentialism is taken up and used only to be re-invented as a bricolage or as a ‘third space’.

This ‘third space’ is about a very corporal inscription that signals various social meanings; this inscription is done by using as stated several “writing tools” such as combs, hair straightening products, and other material objects. These writing tools provide what Elizabeth Grosz states are various inks that produce different degrees of permanence, and they create textual traces that are capable of being written over, retraced, redefined, written in contradictory ways, creating out of the body text a palimpsest, a historical chronicle of prior and later traces, some of which have been effaced, others of which have been emphasized, producing the body as a text which is as complicated and indeterminate as any literary manuscript (Grosz, 1994:117).

This way of thinking about the body in this setting highlights the fact that what bodies are ‘Norwegian’ and what bodies are ‘non-Norwegian’ is a question of history and of the ways in which discourse forms bodies. Transforming a body by manipulating it is a way of creating new Norwegian bodies, it is an effort of writing new styles of the flesh as Butler would have said into the grammar of who constitutes a Norwegian person. It is a way of making the body matter or into to matter by ‘writing upon it’ either by way of hair straightening products, hair coloring, the stylization of hair into for instance an afro, or other such embodied practices. These ways of styling oneself are connected to how Grosz views the body as an inscriptions surface, but more to the point in this paper, it is a way of understanding that color and appearances still matter, is corporal matter, and is transformed into cultural matter in one and the same sleight of hand. The afro hair of for instance John is at the same time both nature in that it is organic matter, yet it is also cultural in its signifying value and the way it is stylized. It is also connected to the degrees of permanence that Grosz talks about; hair styles have their own permanence as a ‘racial’ inscription tool, as do skin bleaching and hair straightening. All
of which points to how various cultural ‘engraving tools’ write upon the body to produce ‘racial/ethnic’ connotations and meanings which have various temporal permanence.

All of those I have talked to see themselves as Norwegian, but not looking as Norwegians. The issue here is “the performative nature of differential identities: the regulation and negotiation of those spaces that are continually, contingently, ‘opening out’, remaking boundaries, exposing the limits of any claim to a singular or autonomous sign of differences” (Bhabha, 2004:313, original italics). Hence a deployment of hair for instance should not be seen as a case of differences as being either the One or the Other, but rather as something in between (Bhabha, 2004:313), a Norwegianness that is being made by translating for instance the semiotic sign of the afro or the use of hair straightening into not just Norwegian or non-Norwegian, but a hybrid. As Bhabha says: “Translation is the performative nature of cultural communication” (Bhabha, 2004: 326) and this should not just be taken to include art, language, or traditions and customs; it should be taken to include those practices which we do onto and with our bodies. The performative translation of cultural translation is neatly captured in the narratives above; what better way to explain the proliferation and wide distribution of corn rows, dreads, afros, mullets and other hair styles that has spread across the globe? Is this not the deployment of bodies and colors? Shapes and forms? Nowadays such narratives as the ones delivered above can be heard spanning our modern world; dreadlocks can be seen in Tokyo and Berlin, Rastafarian aesthetics are found across a wide array of cultures and no longer bound to just one geographical location.

Now such narratives of style and bodies does not only belong to our modern time; Karen Kupperman in her article Presentments of Civility notes that English elites in the colonial setting of North America during the seventeenth-century adopted and utilized Native American styles of presentments in such a way that it in fact caused some contemporary commentators to worry that such utilization of Native Americans styles and presentments could lead to a fall from grace (Kupperman, 1997:225-226). As such ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ styles and presentments have a longer history of traveling and meeting than just the ‘Age of Multiculturalism’; such styles have often been part of a performative economy of beauty and style which transforms various cultural spaces which has a longer history than just our contemporary era.

But can such styles be divorced from bodies and only be seen as cultural? Are they not placed at that zone in which the natural (the body) meets the cultural (combs, styles, fashion)? Is this not an argument that makes problematic a clear distinction between nature versus
culture and more to the point: is it not an argument that makes problematic an understanding of ethnicity as only cultural and which is divorced from a very racialized body?

Narratives such as Mike’s show how the deployment of color and bodies can act as cultural translations; it brings ‘newness’ into the world. “The foreign element [in this case hair styles] destroys the original’s structure of reference and sense of communication as well not simply by negating it but by negotiating the disjunction in which successive cultural temporalities are preserved in the work of history and at the same time cancelled” (Bhabha, 2004: 326, my interpolations.). Thus new corporal elements and styles are grafted onto and into people’s sense of national belonging and community; elements that are foreign to dominant discourse on what counts as Norwegian are added to the discourse by deploying one’s body and color making for a hybrid translation of Norwegianness.

It is about the translation of skin and hair, a bricolage of corporal signs that eventually is translated into a new ‘BlackNorwegian’ sign. A sign where

Black practices of stylization today seem to exude confidence in their enthusiasm for quoting and combining elements from any source-black or white, past or present-into new configurations of cultural expression. Post-liberated hairstyling thus emphasizes a “cut’n’mix” approach to aesthetic invention (Mercer, 1994:125).

**Gender, Exotica and Stereotypes**

One field in which the informants that I have talked to elaborated on how color and bodies came to matter was in relationship the opposite sex, and in regards to the use and abuse of stereotypes. In order to firmly establish that bodies and color matters in ways that makes ethnicity much more racialized than perhaps the documents I have analyzed pertain to, I want to focus on these aspects of the narratives collected during my interviews. This way of looking at the importance of skin color and appearances is not without importance when it comes to other questions in regards to integration and multiculturalism, as Cora Alexa Døving states regimes of stereotypical representations has a profound impact on the terms in which we can conduct integration and what results this will have (Døving, 2009:128). I will leave those questions for another time, but I want to start by looking to Judith Butler and her work on the intersections between race/gender.

Butler states that her description of the regulatory ideal concerning gender is also and always a racial industry, indeed it is the reiterated practice of racializing interpellations (Butler, 1993: 18). Thus sexual and racial differences are not autonomous or discrete axes of power (Salih, 2002: 93). Butler asks then: “How is race lived in the modality of sexuality? How is gender lived in the modality of race?” (Butler, 1993: 117). In looking at gender/race
as a totality one sees that gender differences does not precede race or class in the constitution of the subject, thus we can talk about racializing norms as well as gendered norms, hence the subject is also produced by racially informed conceptions of ‘race’ (Salih, 2002: 94). This is an important point as it points towards how the importance of color is at times also connected to gender; color as it is deployed in these narratives are not genderless. I want to start out by looking at a narrative taken from the interview I had with Mike. We enter the narrative as we talk about his experiences with ‘playing’ on his looks and connect this with stereotypical images of black men.

\[\text{Mike: Sometimes, just to have some fun then you sort of exaggerate ones ethnicity, and suddenly shout out to people "hey hey! You have to calm down! You can’t say that, can’t you see that I am from another country?" just to make people nervous, it’s mostly for fun. Come to think about it I do it very often. And I also incorporate the positive stereotypes.}
\]
\[\text{Tony: for instance?}
\]
\[\text{Mike: that I am well endowed and that I run a lot faster and that I am stronger and that I can dance much better than everybody else.}
\]

The deployment of color that Mike here engages with is upheld by his utilization of highly gendered racial stereotypes, a stereotype that plays on an idea of a black essence, an arrested and fixed form. As Bhabha claims in regards to the stereotype: “The stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation” (Bhabha, 2004: 107). In order to reverse the racial power relations that are embedded in the ideas that black men are well endowed, more physically gifted and have an innate sense of rhythm, Mike here uses them in a way that are meant to ‘put people off’ and make them nervous. Gendered stereotypes of the ‘Black Other’ has a long history and is a common occurrence in the regimes of signifying practices in the West (Hall, 1997). Mike’s usage of the stereotypes of the ‘Black Other’ is a very corporal doing; the play on the physical prowess of black men as faster is one thing that Mike plays on but also the play on how well endowed black men are is something that has hold in our culture. Døving notes that the sexual undertones of stereotypes of Jews and Muslims have a common cultural history (Døving, 2009:143), but might we add here, the body of non-white Others are also projected as a site of sexualization.

In Bhabha’s reading of Franz Fanon the stereotype is a highly visible form of representation. It is what Fanon calls ‘the epidermal schema’ (Fanon, 2008). Skin as the key signifier of cultural and racial difference in the stereotype is the most visible of fetishes, recognized as ‘common knowledge’ in a range of cultural, political and historical discourses which in turn plays a very public part in the racial drama that is enacted on an everyday level.
(Bhabha, 2004: 112). Skin becomes in a way ‘culture’; it is a signal of cultural competency and of essence. Skin is premised between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, but its connection to culture is in our era a result not just of racial thinking, but of the turn towards ‘culture’ as the signal of difference. As already stated, many scholars claim that we are witnessing a turn towards culture as a way of marking incommensurable differences and racism without utilizing racist grammar. This is partly why skin and color works so well in connection to stereotypes; it is highly visible and can easily change its area of effect. Before it signaled inherited weakness or inferiority, now in the “new” culturalist era it signals ‘culture’ and ethnicity, it signals if you can dance, ‘have soul’, or if you are ‘Norwegian’. We can link this way of thinking about the body and skin color to Elizabeth Grosz and how she views the body. As mentioned earlier Grosz views the body as an inscription surface where society writes with various tools upon the body in order to make it intelligible. I would claim that one such tool are stereotypes and how they form bodies and behavior. The body becomes a text and is fictionalized and positioned within myths and belief systems that form culture’s social narratives and self-representations (Grosz, 1994:119). Stereotypes and the uses of them are not only linguistic expressions, but becomes ways of acting out social narratives that are taken to be ‘common knowledge’ in the Gramcian sense of the term; even though stereotypes are fictions their social value lies with the way it plays on taken for granted attitudes within our culture. More importantly, this point alludes to the fact that contrary to many ‘post-racial’ or perhaps ‘post-corporal’ understandings of differences, bodies still matters and are made to matter in the ways stereotypes are used and abused.

We can see this very clearly in Mike’s narrative wherein he claims that he does engage with such stereotypes in order to ‘act’ or exaggerate his own ethnicity. This is well put as the stereotype is exactly that: an arrested and fixed image of, in this case, an exaggerated black man. Another narrative that shows the intersection between gender and the deployment of color comes from a narrative taken from an interview with Stine, who is of Norwegian and Indian decent. The excerpt is taken from a part of the interview that dealt with how she had experienced her own mixed ethnic background in relationship to the other sex and how this influenced her view on her own ethnic background.

Tony: So what do you feel about that? What do you think around that topic?
Stine: It, it is mostly tiresome, and it is like I said, it’s something about the fact that they think it is so original that they say what they say. And especially the part about being exotic, it often comes when they are meaning to give you a compliment or trying to pick you up in a way, trying to get some sort of relationship with you; that’s when it often comes to the fore, and it just works so terribly badly! [...] in those situations one does not want to measure up to those demands, about being exotic, that’s when I just become extra vulgar, and burp
and drink, and just become so much the opposite. Not to prove to oneself or them, but because one becomes so annoyed by being called exotic because I can’t identify with being something exotic. What is it to be exotic anyway? When I think about it I think about hula hula dancers in skirts who dance. And speaking of dancing, I really enjoy dancing and then you get like, “yes you just have it in you” and that’s that.

Tony: do you get comments like that a lot?

Stine: Yes very often, maybe that’s because I am not the worst dancer, but that’s because girls dance a lot, I am often taken to be from Latin America and not from [Norway], they just say that I have it in me; even my family can say that. It is meant to be a compliment, so ok I have a rhythm in my body, but it is not because I am half Indian, I don’t even know if they are known for their great sense of rhythm, but it is because one is dark, and because of that then I am taken to be so much better at moving to music.

The above excerpt is long, but contains several points that are connected to the thematic at hand. First of all it is interesting to see that just like Mike’s narrative, Stine’s narrative also shows how power relations are turned around by reacting and activating a response to stereotypes; in this excerpt the interpolation into a subject position that is labeled ‘exotic’ get’s a subversive response in Stine’s refusal to enter that discursive position and instead ‘becomes’ the antithesis of exotic as she herself claims. Second of all it is interesting to see how the modality of ethnicity is linked in the excerpt to ‘racialization’ through a stereotypical view that black people are innately better dancers than white people. But Stine, contrary to Mike, does not engage in a deployment of color that plays on this stereotype, rather she questions the essentialist notion that this implies. I do want to draw attention to the use of ‘hula hula’ dancer as a trope that stands for ‘exotica’. Even though Stine opposes her own interpellation as exotic she still is not outside a discourse that furnishes her with images of who and what is exotic.

It is the everyday power struggles over stereotypes and how to resist the normative idea that black people are innately better dancers than white people which is also the site which both constraints and agency are found in these interactional practices wherein both the micro and macro conjoin (Tate, 2005: 32).This brings me back to Butler and her idea that the normative frame work that we all have to navigate both foreclose and make possible various forms of subject positions and ways of being (Butler, 1993, Butler, 1997). This comes very well to the fore in Stine’s narrative when she states that “in those situations one does not want to measure up to those demands, about being exotic, that’s when I just become extra vulgar, and burp and drink, and just become so much the opposite.” This is an excellent example of the ways in which individuals refuses to become ‘hailed’ into a subject position that they find offensive or restrictive. Instead of being interpelated into a position that is considered ‘exotic’, Stine subverts and resists this interpellation by a performative script that is the opposite of the call to the exotic. Salih states that
we have to respond to the policeman’s call otherwise we would have no subject status, but the subject status we necessarily embrace constitutes what Butler (borrowing from Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak) calls ‘an enabling violation’. The subject or ‘I’ who opposes its construction draws from that construction and derives agency by being implicated in the very power structures it seeks to oppose. Subjects are always implicated in the relations of power, but since they are also enable by them, they are not merely subordinated to the law (Salih, 2002: 79).

Relating this to Stine’s narrative we can claim that the very ‘hailing’ of her into a position of the ‘exotic’ is also what enables her to resist, to subvert and to performatively engage with a new subject position that is nevertheless part and parcel of the power structures that are embedded in gender/race structures.

In both Mike and Stine’s narratives the stereotype of the dancing prowess of ‘non-white’ individuals represents an arrested form of knowledge about the Other; yet their response to this is different. Mike uses it actively by playing on it, while Stine subverts it. Both though, are if we follow Butler, enabled by the very stereotype. In both Stine and Mike’s case they are utilized along gendered and racial axes so as to create counter-knowledge’s and strategies for resistance and contestation (Huddart, 2006:55) that allow for a form of agency that nevertheless is contained within the very discourse that it opposes.

To continue this foray into the narratives of exotica and stereotypes I would like to add an excerpt taken from Thomas’ and his interview. We talked at length about his view on gender relations seen through his mixed ethnic lenses and in the excerpt below we can see how gender intersect with race/ethnicity to form an intersectional dynamic for analysis.

Tony: Do you ever get the sense that other people view you as exotic? In particular when it comes to the opposite sex?
Thomas: Yes that’s a pretty good point right there, because I often feel, and in particular among certain women, that there is an expectation that you have to be exotic because of the way you look, or because you are dark. But often I feel that some of them can become very disappointed because I am not as exotic as I look. That is a feeling I get a lot.

Tony: How does that feel? [...] What do you think about that?
Thomas: I am not sure what I should think about that. I usually don’t give it too much notice. I usually distance myself from it and find it a bit comic. I think they expect a guy who is more African when it comes to culture and how I act, when maybe in reality I am a bit more like a boring Norwegian and then they are a bit disappointed and don’t get what they expect.

Even though Thomas here seems to find this ‘exotification’ somewhat comic he later on states that it has often worked to his advantaged when it comes to getting in contact with women.

Tony: but do you think that this has been a positive entrance gate in getting in to contact with the opposite sex?
Thomas: yes, I would say so yes. I think it is a bit like either or. I do think that it has been easier, it has always been like that I guess, so yes it has been pretty ok really.
In the above segment Thomas is reflexively engaging with a discourse of the ‘exotic black man’ and uses it to his advantage. Even though his narrative is also filled with the realization that he sometimes does not measure up to the stereotypical exotic African man, he still claims that it has been a positive entrance gate when it comes to women.

Hence the deployment of color, skin and visibility are crucial in understanding how cultural ‘schemata’s’ instill stereotypical ideas about as Bhabha claims: “color as the cultural/political sign of inferiority or degeneracy, skin as its natural ‘identity’” (Bhabha, 2004: 114). Skin becomes the site which “is seen to hold the ‘truth’ of the subject’s identity (like a ‘kernel’) as well as functioning as the scene of the subject’s memory and history” (Ahmed in Bell, 1999:99). Skin and color must also be understood against or with perception and the visible. The perceptual practices which are involved in the racialization of various bodies is to high degree tacit, almost hidden from view making them almost immune to critical reflections (Alcoff, 2006:188), but in the above the informants seem to do just that; reflect upon the use and value of stereotypes. But it still seems fair to state that skin as a sign of the ‘authentic’, ‘your essence’, ‘your ethnic belonging and identity’ is key in the formation of stereotypes and the importance of bodies; as part of a view that sees ‘skin as genealogy’.

A note to make of this in regards to my own project is the use of a genealogical approach to both the documents and to the interviews. It is perhaps ironic that the word ‘genealogy’ within this paper exists on two levels, as a methodological aspect in the vein of Foucault, and as it is used in the wording of ‘second generation immigrants’. But I want to push this even further; I want to see this coupling as also a coupling that has to do with bodies and ancestry in the sense that both genealogy as a method and as a way of understanding belonging focuses on a paradoxical splitting; on the one hand genealogy as a method avoids the search of depth, instead it focuses on surfaces of events, small details and minor shifts and contours (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:106). But it can, as in the Language Council statement, stand for origin, for depth and for historical connection to Norway. Now the paradox of all of this, is that at an everyday level ‘genealogy’, as it is visually connotated, is often draw at the skin; skin is seen as a pointer to an imaginary or real ‘homeland’. As such ‘genealogy’ in its everyday use is closer in fact I would argue, to Foucault’s abstract notion of it as a method. In its everyday usage, ‘genealogy’ as the interpretation of skin surfaces, works much in the same fashion as genealogy in the sense that Foucault describes it when he states that “depth is resituated as an absolutely superficial secret” (Foucault cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:107). This ‘genealogy of skin’ at an everyday level is connected to for instance stereotypes and other labeling strategies that never the less writes a story of where we come
from and who we are. It is the interpretation of the skin as genealogy that is key in understanding the importance of skin and belonging through ancestry. These interpretations points to the strange paradox that the more we interpret skin as genealogy, the more we find not the fixed nature of belonging, but only other interpretations; these interpretations have been created and imposed by other people, and not by the nature of belonging (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). Now we are closing in on the point made by Fanon on the ‘racial schema’ which is formed out of a thousand anecdotes and stories made about the black man, but never by the black man (Fanon, 2008). As such genealogy operates at various levels in this text; as a method, as a concept that tells something about ancestral belonging and community through historical connections, yet it must also be read in a material fashion as seen in the usage of clothing (national/folk costumes), the upholding of ‘traditional’ practices (such as folk dance, singing and art), or in its newer guise, in genetic testing for ancestral placement, and finally, in its visual, everyday level; in the reading of the skin.

Skin can in this regards be read as a paradoxical space; it is our outer most layer, the surface of the human body. But in regards to stereotypical ideas it functions at the same time as a sign of our interiority; of our identity, cultural belonging and in fact history. Skin functions in this sense like the postmodern saying: the only meaning is surface meaning. In deploying stereotypes depth is skin deep, and color matters as a way of pointing to this skin deep meaning. It points to notions of belonging as well as to notions of essence, taken together, it creates an essentialist notion of ‘ethnicity’ which revolves around the three prong strategy of (i) that skin tells us where we are from in the genealogical sense of decent and corporality (certain bodies ‘belong’ certain places); (ii) that said skin color also is an indication of inner qualities and character; of values and mentalities that points more often than not to a politics of incommensurable differences; and finally (iii) this leads to a notion that conflates skin color/appearance with an essentialist idea that claims that certain bodies belong/comes originally from certain places and that this ‘coming from/belonging to’ also dictates the content of character and values. This is of course a gross fiction that misses some crucial insights; for instance the people interviewed have all grown up in Norway and born here, hence ‘genealogically’ speaking there is no ‘origin’ except for Norway; there is no return to a homeland.

The equation looks very similar to older tropes of biologically deterministic racial ideology in that it takes cultural practices such as dancing or the sexual prowess of black men and makes it into a norm. It makes cultural what once was taken to be biological and tries to arrest the notion of who we are and what we can be by insisting on the primacy of skin color
as determining cultural belonging. Nuances and variations are made opaque and diversity is conflated; stereotypes are often a mechanism that reduces human variety into notions of essentialisms (Døving, 2009:150). Once again color matters; it is made into matter and it would seem that even though ‘race’ as such has vanished, racialized versions of ethnicity still matters due to skin color and appearances. Døving in her work on stereotypes in Norway in regards to Jews and Muslims rightly places an emphasis on the ways in which stereotypes freezes and foreclose certain avenues of actions, and belonging (Døving, 2009:150), and I am also in agreement with her when she states that stereotypes are deeply connected to ways of discrimination and exclusion and that stereotypes are at its core about power relations which more often than not is about the majority’s power to define others (Døving, 2009:150). Yet I think that the examples above also show that power relations can be turned around by reciting highly negative stereotypes in new ways. I also think that the above narratives shows that even though a ‘violent interpellation’ can be hurtful, i.e. by a negative stereotype, it never the less creates a space from where one can speak back. It is a way of occupying a space that was meant to be negative, but which the informants at times take up as that space wherein one can speak back even though it is from a space that is deeply connected to negative usage.

All of the three narratives presented in the above show that they nevertheless produce strategies, counter-knowledge and resistance to a discourse of the exotic black person. Stereotypes that deal with the exotic, black person could then as Bhabha points to be seen as much more complex and ambiguous.

Stereotyping is not the setting up of a false image which becomes the scapegoat of discriminatory practices. It is a much more ambivalent text of projection and introjections, metaphoric and metonymic strategies, displacement, over-determination, guilt, aggressivity; the masking and splitting of ‘official’ and phantasmatic knowldges to construct the positionalities and oppositionalitis of racist discourse (Bhabha, 2004:117)

In the above narratives gender, stereotypes and racialized ‘common’ knowledge of ethnicity are all connected to each other which inform, foreclose and enable the individuals to use stereotypes, whether or not they are seen as a positive or a negative. Furthermore, it is a paradox that it is the very discourse on ‘black’ or ‘exotic’ that in fact enables both the positive usage of stereotypes and the negative. This makes as Bhabha says the deployments of stereotypes a highly ambivalent text wherein both constraints and possibilities opens up in an everyday deployment of color.
‘Where are you really from?’

Maria: [...] many people ask where I am from and people are very curious about where you are from and they seem often want to ask me about that, they often try to ask in a certain manner like “where are you really from?” You can just see that they are dying to ask you that question.

Tony: what do you think about that?
Maria: I think that it is...I have to laugh a bit; at the same time you want to annoy them a bit.
Tony: why do you want to do that?
Maria: it is probably because I have experienced it so many times before that you are sort of fed up with it. And then you sort of think that “I won’t give him the satisfaction”; I want to see him struggle a bit.
Tony: so you feel as though you sort of put him in his place?
Maria: yes and then you sort of laugh inside yourself.

Tony: do you feel that it is your appearance that defines these encounters?
Maria: yes no doubt. – Maria, 28, Korean and Norwegian decent.

The above narrative points to some interesting points in regards to how belonging, appearances and ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ intersect at an everyday level wherein color still matters. Maria points out that encounters such as these have become tiresome and that she is ‘kind of fed up’ with it. We can link this to Minelle Mahtani who states that ‘mixed race’ persons who resists the occupation of a single ethnic space in what can be called ‘hyphenated circumlocutions’ also make the process of self definition lengthy and exhausting often requiring a whole geography and history of explanation (Mahtani, 2002a: 79). Following this it might be logical to propose that certain ways of subverting ethno-racial labeling is also a product of a long history of exhausting and often very personal story-telling about one’s heritage, family composition and family history. To subvert and not divulge one’s cultural and ethnic affiliations might be seen as a coping mechanism that resist the insistence of today’s society to label oneself as either this or that; to subvert racialized identity thinking at the everyday level. Once again the microphysics of power that Foucault identified (Foucault, 1979) can be seen as operating within deployments of color; bodies must be made knowable and the space which they occupy must be delineated. The “where are you really from?” question imposes itself as a ‘strategy’ in the framework of de Certeau as a question that is panoptic in its task of transforming “ foreign forces into objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and “include” them within its scope of vision” (Certeau, 1984:36). But to subvert the microphysics of power within racialized discourse in the way that Maria does is to tactically reverse the strategic deployment of such a question; it is to refuse the call of identification which lies implicit in such a question.

I want to explore this narrative in connection to how Jin Haritaworn has explored similar everyday encounters of identity interrogations (Haritaworn, 2009). Haritaworn view everyday encounters such as this as an encounter wherein some are entitled to gaze at and
categories others, and treat their perceived differences as a trigger for their voyeuristic forays into their bodies, minds and families (Haritaworn, 2009: 118) and that encounters such as the one Maria mentions should not be seen as ‘a normal reaction to abnormal bodies’ but rather should be linked to a legacy of colonial archives of knowledge (Haritaworn, 2009:116). I am to a certain degree in agreement here in as much as everyday encounters such as these might not be overtly racist or even discriminatory; but they nevertheless re-inscribe notions of racial and ethnic boundaries which in turn trigger specific ways of thinking about belonging within a cultural and national space. Yet these types of encounters are not only about being gazed at and about being pigeonholed; rather as Maria shows it is also about the reversal of power relations, about her ‘holding out’ and ‘not giving him the satisfaction’. Remarks such as these shows that encounters of the type ‘where are you really from?’ also has the ability to create new meanings of race during social interaction and sometimes even forcing those with whom they interact to rethink assumptions and shift their understandings (ibid:122). These encounters are what Haritaworn (Haritaworn, 2009) and Teresa Kay Williams (Williams in Root, 1996) has called the What are you? encounter. For both of these two authors this encounter can at times be seen as “a transgressive space of empowerment and contestation which bears the potential to ‘expand […] racial boundaries’, ‘subvert the racial system’ and expose ‘race [as] a process’” (Haritaworn, 2009: 122). In the above Maria is perhaps not explicitly subverting the racial system but in her holding out on the information about ‘where she really is from’ she at least undermines clear notions of ethnic identity thinking. It can be seen as a way of breaking up a narrative that insists upon a clear placement of every(body) wherein non-white bodies must be made knowable and labeled.

Another narrative that I want to draw on is taken from my conversation with Stine who is a woman of Norwegian and Indian decent. It is very telling in regards to my above points on the subversive potential in such everyday encounters of identity thinking.

Stine: I have to say that I have been very conscious about showing that I am Norwegian; let’s say at least the last five years or so. [...] when people see me they often bring up the question of “where are you from?” and then I say Norway, then they just ask in turn “no where are you really from?” and then I answer Halden. I try to do like an attitude on that, but it doesn’t make any sense to give an attitude like that since I already know what they want. And I understand why they are asking, they are curious, they are interested and as I become older I am more understanding as to why they wonder because I too wonder when I meet people who are dark.

Tony: And yet one has this attitude that one wishes to underline the Norwegianess?
Stine: yes I do, I think I had a real need to do that, because like I said earlier, I used to be so afraid to be identified with the multicultural, or with a multicultural background.
Tony: can you remember why that was so scary?
Stine: I am not sure, I guess it is because they are being looked a bit down upon in our society and that I didn’t want to be a part of that[…] and it is that thing about when somebody asks you that question they also question who you are or doubt who you are and that is very frustrating.
In the above we see that several dimension of the discourse on belonging, color and culture conflated into these ‘where are you from?’ encounters. In the beginning Stine does what Maria also did in her narrative; she resist the interrogation into her heritage by stating that she is simply from Norway and when this is not enough she once again resists by recourse to a particular geographical location within Norway, Halden. She acknowledges the fact that the whole process is tiresome as it is an encounter she has met several times before and thus she already knows what they are after. She implicitly links this encounter to color when she states that she herself is curious as to where people who are ‘black’ come are from. I take this to be an interesting point in as much as it shows that Stine might subvert ethno-racial discourses in her own way she is nevertheless also part of a discourse that connects skin color to location and culture.

Another point is Stine’s ending. The phrase: ‘and it is that thing about when somebody asks you that question; they also question who you are or doubt who you are and that is very frustrating’ is interesting in this exploration of whether or not color still matters. The phrase can be connected to how bodies get read; how they are culturally code and in turn made as Butler would say: culturally intelligible. By refusing Stine’s first answer of the ‘hailing’ into a cultural identity position the person asking at the same time also invokes an idea of what a Norwegian person looks like. By posing another question ‘no, where are you really from?’ the person asking is second guessing and in turn doubting the first answer that was given. But where is this ‘really from’? Why is it that the first answer is not accepted as a valid identification? I would claim that this ‘really from’ is the skin; color and texture must be coded and made knowable. This process of ‘knowing the Other’ is linked to Fanon’s ‘epidermal schema’ or as Butler states: a racial way of “seeing” that is also a way of “reading” (Butler and Salih, 2004: 210). It is a specific cultural-historical way of ‘coding’ and ‘knowing’ Others; it is a way of seeing others that in turn also “reads” certain bodies as belonging to certain cultures, nations, and ethnicities. In relating this to Stine’s narrative it is possible to say that Stine’s body is not seen and in turn read as fitting the “historico-racial schema” (Butler and Salih, 2004:210.) of who counts as a culturally intelligible Norwegian body thus her first answer is not coded as valid and must be followed up by a ‘no, where are you really from?’. This is an important indicator that identity thinking is at its most persistent in everyday encounters such as these. Color still matters within our culture today; bodies matter as markers of ethnicity in a way that must be accounted for by recourse to a body and not to ‘culture’ as abstract phenomenon or as the defining difference. Even though ‘race as biology’ has vanished or transformed, the body as it is found in these narratives still matter as
a way of marking who you are or rather what you are. The discourse one here can get a glimpse of is connected to the fact that by implying that Stine is not really from Norway she is Other to Norway. Once again we can see this as an instance wherein the discourse on what a ‘Norwegian’ looks like makes for an assumed normative appearance; it creates an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, but this duality is to a large degree produced in relationship to the body; to colors and to appearances.

This can be linked to as I have already mentioned Fanon and his epidermal schema, but also to what William coins, ‘the racial compass’. In her view it is when the ‘racial compass’ fail that the ‘what are you?’ and ‘where are you really from’ question arise (Williams in Root, 1996: 203). This is so, following Butler, because the “visual field is not neutral to the question of race; it is itself a racial formation, an episteme, hegemonic and forceful” (Butler and Salih, 2004: 207). It is a culturally constituted act of perception that informs us of who is “truly Norwegian”. This is, following Merleau-Ponty, because “Perception is, not presumed true, but defined as access to truth” (Merleau-Ponty cited in Alcoff, 2006:188). It is this act of perception and coding of skin that often makes us “see” the character and emotional subjectivities of others (Alcoff, 2006:188) based on the assumption that skin as surface layer gives us access to the “truth” about non-white people in regards to who is ‘Norwegian’ or not. Yet the mechanisms of these acts of perceiving are themselves not seen as just that; culturally and historically contingent and not ontologically true (ibid). This in turn is linked back to what we already have pointed out is ‘common sense’ in the sense that Gramsci used it. It is “just there”; a habitual way of perceiving others.46

The visual field is also about knowledge, with ways of ‘knowing’ the Other based on the coding of for instance skin color. It works as a heuristic device in regards to identity thinking. But this field is not devoid of history, since the constitution of our bodies takes place in time and through materialization (Butler, 1993) the visual field is informed by history and the narratives that follows the narration of the nation space (Bhabha, 2004:199-244). Bodies whose ‘narratives’ falls outside history, or at least has a shorter history, are then subject to the interrogation of identity. Skin functions in the ‘where are you really from’ encounter as a passport; it is must be inspected by a visual gaze for authentification. It is here that clear notions of ‘race/body’, ethnicity, nation, and culture becomes entangled.

I would like to qualify this further by stating that even though the visual field is not a neutral field, it should be remembered that the way it is structured varies from social site to

46 See MERLEAU-PONTY, M. 2002. Phenomenology of perception, London, Routledge. For the concept of habitual perception and analysis of the ways in which we perceive the world
The visual field in Norway should be seen as different from the visual fields in the US or UK due to its historicity. In regards to the ‘where are you really from’ encounter there are a few narratives that show how people of mixed ethnic decent also draw on language that is at time very racial and which points to the thesis raised that color and bodies still matter at an everyday level. The first two narratives that I want to use are taken from Mike and John’s interviews.

Mike: On all public forms I write that I am Norwegian, and if people who I do not know asks where I am from I answer that I am Norwegian and add that I have a father that is non-Norwegian because most people can see that I am not white. But if I am with friends for instance who I have grown up with who isn’t Norwegian then it happens that I define myself as African or as a mulato or something else like that. It really depends on the circumstances. The reason why I do that is really because it is a way of fitting in. And the same when I call myself Norwegian, it has to do with how I feel belonging to that particular group I am with at that particular time. – Mike, 26 years old, Norwegian and Ivory Coast heritage

John: It is just that, well I have become, and always known that I am half Norwegian and half Ghanaian. It has always been said to me that this is what I am, thus this is what I am. – John, 29 years old, of Norwegian and Ghanaian decent

In the top one, from Mike, we can see that he varies in his ways of labeling himself according to context. In meeting with the public domain his strategy is to adhere to a definition of ‘Norwegianess’ while when he is with close friends his way of defining himself shifts according to the new context. As he himself states these flexible praxis’s of identification allows him to gain a sense of belonging within the specific context that he finds himself in. Belonging is also linguistic; it is a way of speaking oneself into a community. By naming himself either ‘Norwegian’, ‘African’, or ‘mullato’ Mike names himself and thus is also given a certain possibility of social existence (Butler, 1997: 2) that hinges on what has already been mentioned as the various ways in which subjects are seen through the ‘historico-racial discourse’ and in turn how they then are coded. The reason why this is so is because all names or utterances of the sort ‘Norwegian’, ‘African’ and ‘mullato’ has as Butler states, a historicity:

The name has, thus, a historicity, what might be understood as the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the contemporary meaning of a name: the sedimentation of its usages as they have become part of the very name, a sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives the name its force (Butler, 1997:36).

If one agrees to this then what one might see in Mike’s narrative is a flexible, yet historical determined use of various ethno-racial positions; each identification is a sedimentation of prior usage. Belonging is to occupy a name, a position that was already there within discourse, prior to you or in this case Mike, stepping into that name, be that ‘Norwegian’,
‘African’ or ‘mullato’. We can here use this interview, and interviews similar to it, as a way of seeing how these excerpts functions as statements that creates subject positions; it works as a statement because the use of such terms as ‘mullato’ or ‘African’ creates a position from where to speak and act that was already there. It creates a subject position that can be signed over to individuals, that is, the statement creates a discursive space from which something can be stated (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:11). But this is also linked to Butler and the performative; for this subject position of ‘mulatto’ is not entirely similar to that of other such positions, it is the small differences in the performative doing of this subject position that creates new ways of inhabiting this space (Butler, 1999). As such the subject creating potential of such statements that Mike here engages with works due to the fact that it reactualises [in Butler’s terms: historicity] and extends [the subversive potential of the performative] other statements (Åkerstrøm Andersen, 2003:12, my interpolations). This in turn influences how we can navigate within that social position; it forecloses and enables various ‘styles of the flesh’ as mentioned earlier. The historicity in a name points back in this case to bodies that have occupied that name in the past which in turn has bearings on how we can take on that name. Following this line of argumentation makes the switch from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ harder than just switching between these two terms. The UNESCO statement tries this as well as the Justice Departments draft as I have analyzed it, but the problem here is that words have a history. A history that refers back to certain bodies; this makes it harder to “just” replace one term with another and hope that the history that words such as ‘negro’, ‘mulatto’ or ‘nigger’ has internal to them will vanish along with them.

I want to return to John’s phrase one last time in order to elaborate a bit more on the connection between ‘interpellation’ and ‘becoming’. In John’s narrative there is a clear distinction between ‘whole’ and ‘part’; of being ‘completely’ and being ‘half’. As Jin Haritaworn found in her research, people of mixed ethnic decent often used narratives of ‘stock’ and ‘blood’ in an effort to strategically identify themselves (Haritaworn, 2009: 119), thus challenging the often perceived ‘death of eugenicist and genetic’ narratives of ‘race’ (Haritaworn, 2009:119) in contemporary society. Invoking ideas about blood-count such as ‘half’ can be seen as a way of reproducing and re-inscribing both whiteness and ‘monoraciality’ as a norm from which ‘multiracial’ bodies deviate (Haritaworn, 2009: 120). But contrary to perhaps the skepticism of both Haritaworn and Suki Ali (Ali, 2003) who both were struck to a certain extent by these “problematic undertones” that “invoked essentialist, even racist, identity labels” (Haritaworn, 2009: 119) I, in following Butler want to attack this from a standpoint that instead sees these labels as subversive at times and as ‘linguistic
homes’ that “can function as a series of multiple identifications that come into play in different situations” (Mahtani, 2002b: 487). This can clearly be related to the first narrative in which Mike uses various identifications in a variety of situations. In his narrative even such overt generalizations such as ‘African’ becomes a ‘home’ and facilitates belonging; in fact even the notorious term ‘mulato’ becomes a source of cultural belonging in a given context. ‘Mulato’ as a derogatory term is in Mike’s narrative taken up as a linguistic home. Butler states that “injurious names have a history, one that is invoked and reconsolidated at the moment of utterance, but not explicitly told. This is not simply a history of how they have been used, in what contexts, and for what purposes; it is the way such histories are installed and arrested in and by the name” (Butler, 1997:36). But there is a specific historicity that must be accounted for in order to utilize Butler here; Mike’s usage of ‘mulato’ does not only point towards the negative connotations that are imbedded into that word. His usage of the term is not necessarily the taking up of only the negative connotations that have sedimented themselves within that name throughout history, rather it is a performative re-inscription of a negative word.

Contrary to for instance the US or the UK, mulatto as a term does not have the same historicity in Norway as it does in the two other settings. This is a sign of the opacity of racial discourses in Norway; they are there yet they act as a subtext that does not speak in the same colonial tongue as for instance in the US. The past intersects here with the present and allows for what in other cultures would be deemed a highly racist term to be used as a ‘linguistic home’ which in turn enables a hybrid identification. This is an instance wherein we can see a specific form of Norwegian hybrid emerging; one that is premised upon the historicity of various racialized terms and which in turn becomes material upon the body of individuals as they use such terms as ‘mulatto’. Instead of seeing ‘mulato’ as a word that binds us with the power of past usage, of arresting movement (Butler, 1997:36) of those that take it up, we must distinguish between the various historical and cultural connotations embedded in a name. ‘Mulato’ in Mike’s case is bound to a Norwegian history, which we must also say is transnational, but the specific Norwegian discourse makes it a label that Mike can take up without any explicit hesitation.

This narrative also shows the points made very early on about Latour’s notion about the hybridization of modern and pre-modern understandings. Discourses that we think are behind us comes creeping back in; racial knowledge about blood quantum, stock and decent all comes creeping back in at times which makes the discourse on ethnicity and the mixing of ethnicity a hybrid discourse (Bauman and Briggs, 2003) or once again; a polyvalent discourse.
‘Fully Norwegian’ seems to have as its basis in this narrative a visual component, skin is the surface we return to in order to delineate a subject position. Color and ‘phenotype’ plays a role in this delineation of space around the subject, thus the discourse on ‘fully Norwegian’ contains within itself a biological component. Ania Loomba in her *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (Loomba, 2005) re-presents a table from W.B. Stevenson’s *Narrative of Twenty Years Residence in South America* which was published in 1825, charting out twenty three “mixtures of the different castes, under their common or distinguishing names” as Stevenson remarks (ibid:103). Today we would never have divided mixed ethnic individuals under such rubrics as “Mulato – 5/8 White, 3/8 Negro - [color] Tawny” (Loomba, 2005: 104), we would most likely have deemed that highly racist. Yet ‘mulato’ still stands, it still points back to a body, and the “partitioning” of one’s ethnic background can still be heard along the lines of “I am half Norwegian and half Nigerian”, or “ I am a quarter Norwegian, a quarter English and half Japanese”. But we must ask ourselves if this is as peculiar as I am now making out to be. Can it not be that language itself forces us to identify in this fashion? Do we innately gravitate towards thinking in wholes and thus are forced to identify in parts? This is outside the scope of this paper but in relating these problems to the question at hand it does seem that language is both corporal and historical. Stevenson’s table is not with us today in precisely the same form that it had in 1825, but the language that these informants use can perhaps be seen as a genealogical line that still contains traces of discourses of ‘blood quantum’, ‘purity/whole’, and other terms that in other contexts would be seen as obsolete or very improper.

In many of the narratives that have been recited in this chapter the tension between self definition and the definition given by others have been clear or at least an underlying principle. To be named by others then is often a traumatic event, one that often precedes our wills but one that never the less brings us into a linguistic life (Butler, 1997:35) which I also take to be linked to a ‘cultural life’; a life that marks out who is Norwegian and who is ‘not’. For Butler to be given a name is a “founding subordination”, one that is repeated in social life (Butler, 1997:35), and “because I have been called something, I have entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes” (Butler, 1997:35). Discourse gave me a ‘name’ yet its use and future application can be disrupted by my own mimicry of that very term; by my own performative usage of that term that is given me by others I can also re-create it. This is perhaps best seen in Mike’s narrative and his usage of the term ‘mulato’. In connection to all of the above narratives we can say that we are not just born Norwegian, but must be called
Norwegian; we must be given the proper label in order to ‘be’ Norwegian or become one. But perhaps racialized interpellations and performativity is just as much about what we are not called; about the lack of recognition as a ‘fully’ or ‘complete’ Norwegian. I would like to quote from Butler in this regard.

The subject is constituted (interpellated) in language through a selective process in which the terms of legible and intelligible subjecthood are regulated. The subject is called a name, but “who” the subject is depend as much on the names that he or she is never called: the possibilities for linguistic life are both inaugurated and foreclosed through the name (Butler, 1997:41).

I want to end by showing a quote from one of the people I talked to, Obi, who gave me a glimpse into how labels of language intersect with the body to create powerful ways of seeing oneself. Obi went on to give the following statement: ‘they view you as a foreigner and then you become a foreigner. Then you start behaving accordingly. And that can have something to say [...] had everybody treated me as if I was completely Norwegian then maybe I had though right away that I was completely Norwegian’ Is this a powerful reminder of both the interpellative force of being called a ‘foreigner’ as well as the force of not being called a ‘Norwegian’? How do we internalize a sense of belonging to a community when we are continually interpolated as belonging to an outside? The paradox here is that internalization of a sense of belonging works through the skin it seems and through the words we are called and not called. It seems to place Obi in that zone of ‘almost the same, but not quite’ as Homi Bhabha would have said (Bhabha, 2004:122), or as we now perhaps dare to say; almost the same but not white. The above quote from Obi can be seen as a site in which to be ‘hailed’ into a subject position of ‘Norwegian’ is supported by the silence of not being called a ‘Norwegian’. To be almost Norwegian is premised on being in that zone that is outside the normative of what a Norwegian looks like or is taken to be.

To be called a name brings us into a cultural-linguistic life that makes us into ‘culturally intelligible’ subjects. Bodies’ makes representations in language problematic in that discourse often points back to a body even through the terms in which the signifying process tries to avoid this return to the body. We have seen this in the usage of various terms throughout this analysis; ‘non-Western’, ‘ethnic Norwegian’, visible minority’, all of which according to these narratives try to circle in on a certain body while at the same time struggling to avoid for ‘race’ or ‘racism’.
Chapter Six – Without Guarantees and Only Paradoxes to Offer: Instead of a Conclusion 47

Instead of drawing a definitive conclusion I would rather recap some of the main points of the paper and connect them to the postulate raised in the Introduction, not in an effort of concluding but of presenting a case that has no teleology, no guarantees and only paradoxes to offer.

The first issue that I want to recap in regards to the postulate posed is the notion of color and ‘race’ as ‘experience near’ concepts in the lives of the informants. The postulate stated that these two concepts were to some degree emic, meaning that they were meaningful to those I have interviewed. After the analysis it seems that ‘race’ is perhaps not emic or experience near to them, but that color and the ethnicity in a racialized form is experience near does seem to be accurate. In the postulate I conceptualized the division of color and ‘race’ as emic concepts based on a dichotomy that said that on the one hand color acted as a positive and on the other hand that it acted as a negative. This total split though seems now at the end to be somewhat misleading when we take in what has been analyzed. Telling examples of the ambiguous nature of color and its valuation seems to come to the fore in the various ways in which the informants related to stereotypes. The informants oscillates between using stereotypes in a myriad of ways, but these are not formulated in only negative or only positive ways. As Homi Bhabha proclaims, the study of stereotypes should shift its focus from the ready recognition of stereotypical images as either positive or negative, rather its focus should lie on the process of subjectification made possible through stereotypical discourse (Bhabha, 2004:95). This view on the performative nature of stereotypes seems much more in line with what the informants describe; it shows how stereotypes opens up ways of behaving and acting that is not just demeaning or negative. Yet at the same time we can also see how it, the interpelation of a subject position that is stereotypical in nature, also is seen at times as highly repressive. The force of this ambiguous usage of stereotypes lies in the re-citing of the normative discourse as Butler would have said (Butler, 2006). Stereotypes can be seen as discursive elements that are able to form subject positions from where one can

47 This headline owes much of its wits to Stuart Hall’s article HALL, S. 1986. The Problem of Ideology-Marxism without Guarantees. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 10, 28-44. And to Joan Scott’s work SCOTT, J. W. 1996. Only paradoxes to offer: French feminists and the rights of man, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Both of whom formulate extremely interesting questions regarding, in Hall’s case, the problematic notion of a Marxism that must have a guarantee in its theoretical and historical grounding and in Scott’s case the paradoxes that presents themselves in regards to the battle for voting, citizenship and universal suffrage in regards to women.
speak; in this regards it acts as a certain type of statement in the vein that Foucault described it in his *The Archeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 2002). It ‘signs over’ a prior subject position to an individual who then can occupy this space delineated by the prior historical construction of the stereotype, but at the same time the ‘doing’ of the stereotype offers some space to move due the performative aspect of discourse. As such stereotypes can be seen as part of a ‘racialization’ *process*, as part of a machinery that fuses racial thinking with ideas about ‘ethnicity’ in such a fashion that bodies and color comes to matter.

Bhabha claims that the idea that stereotypes often are read as concepts that secures, at any one time, a secure point of identification, misses the point that at other times and places, the same stereotype may be read in a contradictory way, or indeed be misread (Bhabha, 2004:100). This is very similar to the point Butler makes on the subversion of norms and I would argue that this can empirically be seen in the narratives that the informants tell. This social site show that color acts as an ‘emic’ concept that is lived in the lives of the people interviewed; the stereotypes and exotica used in the narratives are indeed empirical sources for looking into how color still matters, but its splitting is highly ambiguous. As Fanon says, one is assailed by the stereotype, “the corporal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema. […] It was no longer a question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person […] I was not given one, but two, three places” (Fanon cited in Bhabha, 2004:115). It is this splitting within the use of stereotypes that also frees up space for those who occupy the ‘racial epidermal schema’; it is this plural space that makes for a process wherein multiple beliefs also come to the fore. Of what Freud called ‘the articulation of multiple belief’; a “form of knowledge that allows for the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official [stereotypes holds no truths], and one secret [stereotypes are still utilized], one archaic [skin color matters in our culture ], and one progressive [skin color matters not, all is culture], one that allows for a myth of origin [stereotypes and skin color are my origin], the other that articulates difference and division [I am black and still Norwegian]”(Bhabha, 2004:115, my interpolations). It is this theoretical perspective that gives a more nuanced view of my own postulate; there are no guarantees that stereotypes will work as either just positive or just negative. The split between these two poles collapse in the narratives of the informants and form a metanarrative that points to a more complex use of skin color and bodies than I first hinted at.

In this regards there are a few areas of future research that can be teased out. For one we can ask ourselves how and on what grounds do we at times occupy highly negative stereotypes, why and under what circumstances do we take up and ‘live in’ negative
Research on racial stereotypes could with good effect turn towards issues regarding why for instance words like ‘nigger’, ‘coon’, ‘mulato’, or ‘half cast’ are at times occupied as linguistic homes; how come people at times take up these social positions and what kind of social space is offered within these stereotypes. Another historical dimension of such research could be to chart out how racial stereotypes have evolved, been co-opted, reused and made legitimate both in Norway and at large.

The second point that I want to recap is how I have analyzed some of the historical reasons and some of the ‘official’ logical assumptions found in these documents for how ‘race’ and color became to some extent illegitimate both in a broader sense within the West and more particularly in Norway. I have done this through the analysis of documents that each represent some sort of discursive authority in regards to question of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and to a certain degree bodies and skin color. One of the chief reasons for the debunking of ‘race’ must be seen as the UNESCO statement (UNESCO, 1969) on the race question as analyzed earlier. But the historical backdrop for it is just as important as the statement itself. World War Two and its long shadow must be taken into account when one read the statement as well as the pressure that had gained momentum through the Civil Rights movement in the USA (Hazard, 2011). The historicity embedded within the concept of ‘race’ as analyzed within this paper shows that the concept itself is deeply connected to the history of racism and colonialism. But this is also one aspect which makes ‘race’ problematic within the documents analyzed; the fear of racism or the ghost of the past forces new concepts to be generated in order to account for the visible body.

One of the most important rhetorical elements within the discourse on ‘race’ as it is formulated in all of the documents is the truth production of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ versus ‘race’. One of the historical reasons for the turn away from ‘race’ is the way it was made problematic as a scientific truth. Both the UNESCO document and the Norwegian documents depend heavily on the scientific validation of ‘ethnicity’ and on the invalidation of ‘race’ with the same scientific language. It is un-scientific to talk about ‘race’ while ‘ethnicity’ is scientific. As such scientific regimes of truths are established as a means of distinguishing what is legitimate and what is not. But what this implies is that my own postulate needs some revision here at the end; it means that historically ‘race’ did not become a totally illegitimate concept, it became a hybrid that was on the one hand illegitimate within a scientific discourse, but on the other hand it often became conflated with ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’ and other terms in such a fashion that it is sometimes hard to tell wherein one starts and the other begins. This is as Baumann and Briggs states an instance wherein concepts that are seen as “pure” are in fact
hybrids; that these concepts are made to seem “pure” by way of a discursive process of purification (Bauman and Briggs, 2003:5). Much has already been said about this process in the analysis of the documents, but here at the end there are a few implications for my postulate that I want to rise.

One goal that was stipulated in the research question was to chart out some historical reasons why ‘race/color’ became illegitimate, and on that account I think I have lifted a few of them from their inertia. To mention some of them; the ghost of racism, colonialism, and the Second World War; the rhetoric of scientific validity that was writ large upon the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’; the split between the ‘modern’ grammar of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’ as the driving force behind human development and the ‘pre-modern’ and archaic notion of ‘race as biological destiny’; and the turn towards culture as a master trope within the discourse on human differences. Herein lays some paradoxes; for if ‘race’ truly did vanish, how come we still labor under ‘racism’? How can we today speak of ‘racism’ without ‘race’? The law against discrimination proclaims that ‘race’ as ontology can only exist as we have seen, in connection to ‘racism’, yet epistemologically this appears as somewhat of a paradox. How can we have two concepts, race and ethnicity, whose very existence seem to foreclose the others existence? ‘Race’ is as analyzed a much more illegitimate concept than ethnicity, this seems evident enough, but as stated the paradox of the continual co-existence of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ seems strange. At least if we take serious the efforts in doing away with race as the UNESCO statement does as well as the Justice Departments law draft.

Areas of future research within the Norwegian context would in this case be to look at what is a racist statement in today’s climate? How has racism evolved and reacted against the notion of ‘political correctness”? When do we recognize a racist speech act and why do we call it a racist speech act? What is the relationship to racism and other discriminatory regimes such as ‘islamophobia’, and other non-racial forms of discriminations? What is the qualitative difference between ‘racism’ and these regimes? The historical dimension to this vein of research would be to chart out how racism has evolved, been co-opted and made legitimate through other processes of discursive purification. What has constituted a racist act in the past and what constitutes it now? These issues could shed important light on how we relate to other ‘ethnic/racial’ groups and also to point out more precisely what racism is.

Some of those paradoxes are once again connected to the process of discursive hybridization and to the polyvocality of discourse as formulated by Foucault in his *History of Sexuality Volume One* (Foucault, 1984). ‘Race’ as such became and perhaps already always
was as several scholars’ notes, a syncretic concept; this is one of the reasons that ‘race’ dies so hard, its semantic field of operations has historically been so varied that the ways in which it at times is conflated with other terms makes it hard to erase. One of my main arguments running through this paper is in fact that it is perhaps not ‘race’ as a concepts that dies hard, but rather that it is visible differences that is hard to account for in a language that often becomes trapped within a historicity that is both highly politicized, moralizing and normative. It is this connection to the visible body that makes ‘race’ problematic in that visible differences must be accounted for. It is the body as an inscription surface (Grosz, 1994, Foucault in Kaposy and Szeman, 2011) that is inscribed by concepts such as ‘race’, ‘ethnic’, ‘non-Western’, etc. which makes the body that concept that is translated into a ‘racial grammar’ or a ‘cultural grammar’ or a ‘ethnic grammar’. The ways in which ‘race’ became illegitimate is then closely connected to new ways of inscribing the visible body in a new grammar; with the rise of ‘ethnicity’ and the culturalist view that for instance Montague, Boas and Levi Strauss stood for the visible body became written into a new grammar that never the less contained some elements of a racialist grammar. As such the body can now be seen as a palimpsest; the body is that surface that is written upon over and over again, but this cultural writing process is also taking place in time as Butler so keenly notes.

This writing process can now be linked to how I established ‘racialization’ as a result of all these conflagations and semantic shifts; the racailized understanding of ethnicity that we see in both documents and in the narratives of the people I have interviewed points to both racialization as a concept, but also as a process. A process that takes corporal notions of difference and places cultural value in them, making ethnicity also about bodies and color, as such racialization as a process can be seen to encompass how we give cultural meaning to appearances (Berg et al.,2010:227). Perhaps the very term ‘racialization’ as it figures is academic literature is in fact a product of the very process that I have tried to chart out by using Latour and Foucault.

Can racialization as an analytical term be seen as the inevitable reconciliation attempt between a ‘race’ paradigm that is illegitimate, and an ‘ethnicity’ paradigm that focused too little on the corporal dimension of ethnic bodies? I would argue that this might be so; that ‘racialization’ as a concept is a hybrid concept that points to a process which pertains to ways

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in which we invest the body and color in its ‘ethnic’ guise with ‘racial’ meaning. It is the analytical equal to the concept alluded to earlier from Freud; ‘the articulation of multiple believes’; to embrace two contradictory beliefs while still being able to function and work with both. We can now put this paradox within the formulation quoted earlier and state that this articulation of multiple believes might look like this: ‘racialization’ functions as a “form of knowledge that allows for the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official [‘ethnicity’ is what counts], and one secret [‘race’ is still utilized], one archaic [racial knowledge still circulates ], and one progressive [ethnicity is the future, all is culture], one that allows for a myth of origin [‘race’ and bodies means origin], the other that articulates difference and division [ethnicity is multiple and movable]”(Bhabha, 2004:115, my interpolations). The outcome of this is that ‘race’ is still taboo, but ‘ethnicity’ must also be accounted for in the corporal hence the fusion of ‘race/ethnicity’ into ‘racialization’; an analytical way of resolving the paradoxes, and hold on to several belief systems at once.

Now this leads to a process of cultural writing or coding; what Butler calls materialization, a process that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of a boundary, of fixity and that surface we call matter (Butler, 1993:xviii). The way discourses such as the ones in the documents analyzed form how we look at bodies is in fact this production of boundaries and fixity. The way in which ‘ethnicity’ as a discursive device lays itself upon the matter of the body is what produces the boundary between an ‘ethnic’ body and a ‘racial’ body. It is the process of materialization that makes us ‘believe’ in the fixity of ‘ethnicity’ and the boundary between ‘race’ and ‘ethnic’. It makes ‘racialization’ part and parcel of materialization; ‘racialization’ is a process that takes place in time and in language that informs praxis. This process is exactly why my own postulate needs an amendment; ‘race’ did not become altogether obsolete, rather it transmuted and transformed itself due to the new “grammatical rules” that were used to encode various bodies and cultures.

This socio-cultural writing process that Butler calls materialization, that Elizabeth Grosz calls inscriptions (Grosz, 1994) and which Foucault following Nietzsche (Foucault inKaposy and Szeman, 2011) called genealogy is also that process which makes it impossible to guarantee that ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic’ as it functions today will be that safe haven that we think of it today in order to describe visible differences. We have seen this briefly in the retreat that the SSB (Norwegian Bureau of Statistics) did in regards to the terms ‘non-Western’ versus ‘Western’ immigrants; we have seen this in the allegedly demise of ‘race’ in favor of ‘ethnic groups’ in the UNESCO statement. All of these historical battles over which grammar to use in order to make bodies intelligible must remind us that ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethnicity’
should not be seen as a safe ontology. The call of Werner Sollors to look into the ‘construction of ethnicity’ (Sollors, 1989) is one such act of being aware of how we describe both visible differences and cultures according to the historical regimes of truth that we have available to us. It is to state that ‘ethnicity’ could potentially follow ‘race’ in that the ways in which we write upon bodies have no guarantees.

Now the last part of the postulate that I want to connect to this ending is also the ending of the postulate which pertained to how ‘race/color’ was seen to act as a sort of social subtext running through the lives of those I have interviewed.

As I have already mentioned the (ab)uses of stereotypes and exotica seems like a clear case in which color is still in play in the lives of the people interviewed, but there are other aspects as well that warrant a closer look. ‘Race’ as it is deployed in the interviews is clearly still connected to a negative image and grammar which shows a reflexivity in regards to the use of history and how we as social beings use history as a way of navigating through and with concepts. It shows how the informants are engaging with the historicity of such concepts as ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ which points to the importance of looking at the use of history and historicity in contemporary society. In this regard race is not an emic concept that is in everyday use or belong to those concepts that can be said to be ‘experience near’. Color and appearances on the other hand does seem to act as something that is experience near in the everyday lives of the informants.

It also shows that ‘race’ is not dead; the end of ‘race’ as such is not as total as we would like it to be. Color and ‘race’ is used in these interviews in such a way that they are not solely connected to ‘racism’; ‘race’ and color are deployed in much more mundane ways. Seen in this light the effort put forward by the Justice Department in order to de-couple race from everyday usage and only leave it as a social reality in relationship to encounters of racism seems problematic when we take into account the everyday use of ‘race’ and color. The same goes for the UNESCO statement which relied on an understanding that “race is a social myth” (UNESCO, 1969) and a myth that should be abolished by the introduction of ‘ethnic groups’ instead of ‘races’. But ‘race as social myth’ should still be seen as a powerful heuristic device when we look at how we use color and notions of racialized ethnicity; if a myth is but a fiction, then what we should judge these social myths on is not their mythical origin, but more the real life consequences that such myths establishes.

Color and ‘race’ acts as social subtext in both the documents analyzed and in the interviews that have been conducted in the sense that ‘race’ is both under communicated, yet often conflated; it is still in use, but not in a sense that is equal to older notions of racial
superiority. Rather, it is often used to differentiate between ‘modern’ and progressive and between ‘pre-modern’ or ‘old fashioned’ views on human differences. It is introduced both in the documents and in the interviews as something which has gone by, or something that we should distance ourselves from. But ‘race’ as subtext is articulated differently within these two levels of discourse; in the documents ‘race’ is more often than not also grafted onto other terms in an effort to abolish it; semantically it glides onto other terms. In the interviews this gliding is much more ambivalent, ‘race’ and particularly the value of skin color and racialized ethnicity, is played much more out in the open.

There is a note to make of all of this and that is the difference between ‘race’ and color or bodies. ‘Race’ is a concept that belongs to a class of concepts that in our days has become illegitimate in the sense that its historicity has made it a sort of conceptual taboo. It belongs to a mentality that we often would like to think is foreign and obsolete and one we do not want to recognize (Larsen, 2009:283). In this regards what the documents, and at time the informants engage with could be seen as a sort of ‘allochron’ strategy akin to the one Johannes Fabian describes in his Time and The Other (Fabian, 1983). As seen ‘race’ is not as foreign or obsolete as for instance the documents wants them to be, but they never the less try to distance themselves from ‘race’ as such.

One reason that can account for this distancing urge which then forces race at times to become a social subtext, at least within the documents analyzed, is how ‘race’ and ‘racism’ often seem to trigger notions of moral panic (Larsen, 2009:283). Earlier we have analyzed how part of the reason why ‘race’ has become a subtext is due to a two prong tactic; (i) how the taboo and subsequent silencing of discourse makes it hard to talk directly about it, but (ii) that this silence of ‘race’ makes for a new proliferation of other terms that must be made up and used in order to describe visible bodies in our society. This was as noted earlier a reformulation of Michel Foucault’s argument of the ‘Repressive Hypothesis’ in regards to sexuality in the Victorian Age wherein censorship of certain sexualities, acts and behaviors were not silenced as many would like to believe, but instead lead to an increase in the ways in which society described, made intelligible and made use of sexuality (Foucault, 1984:15-51).

The point here is that the moral panic of ‘race’ seen in the wake of World War Two, racial atrocities in the USA, the Apartheid and others, must be resolved and one of the ways in which we resolve this is to re-invent the grammar of the visible body. The ways new terms

49 For a somewhat similar argument in regards to the concept of homosexuality within the US army see BUTLER, J. 1997. Excitable speech: a politics of the performative, New York, Routledge. With emphasis on chapter 3 Contagious Word: Paranoia and “Homosexuality” in the Military
enter into the discourse on visible differences is a way of building a bridge over those taboos that cause moral panics in the first place (Larsen, 2009:285). Herein enters the bodies of the informants, for whereas ‘race’ as a concept must be made clear, debated, used, misused and tried erased, the bodies of the informants are there in a very real and material way. It is, to speak with several phenomenologist’s; the irreducibility of the lived body.\textsuperscript{50} The difference between ‘race’ and color/bodies is that ‘race’ as subtext can be hidden, conflated, and used in a slight of hand fashion in documents, but the colored body of the informants must always be accounted for in social encounters. Even though ‘race’ and skin color might, with all its goodwill, have been tried eradicated, the lived body must still confront the historicity of the colored body in our society today (Fanon, 2008, Butler and Salih, 2004). ‘Race’ has changed; it has become one of those concepts within the Norwegian society that is “illegitimate”, but it is far from dead. It has transformed and transmuted and has become conflated with a host of other terms. It does act as a subtext within the documents analyzed, but in a very different form than from that of the informants. In the lived world of the informants ‘race’ and the usage of skin color and racialized ethnicity, color, bodies and hair all comes to matter by way of both performative speech acts, but also by the very ‘doing’ of the body. It is played upon, and with; it is resisted, denied and enjoyed; it creates space to move and minutes later close down ways to claim belonging and community.

In the end much of what has been argued for in the preceding chapters seems to be issues which are hard to resolve or to conclude upon; this is not an act of nihilism nor relativism, but rather an incitement to say that a lot of issues pertaining to ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and how we view related issues should be viewed as paradoxical and without guarantees.

To finish of such an endeavor should be done not by concluding, but by wonder and further questions. I would like to end by quoting Franz Fanon but at the same time insert some of myself into his, when Fanon so brilliantly ends his book \textit{Black Skin, White Masks} by stating:

“O my \textit{body}, always make me a man who questions!”(Fanon, 2008:206, my italics).

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Appendix

Content:

- Interview guide and re-interview guide
- List of informants
- Information about the project to informants
**Interview guides:**

**Original Interview guide: informant formulated questions**

**Del 1: Selvdefinisjon/ eget syn på etnisitet og 'blandethet**

- Kan du si noe om hvordan du ser på din bakgrunn? Hvordan ser du på å være blendet/halvt?
- Hva vil det si å være blendet for deg?

**Del 2: Familie og familiens syn slik individet opplever det**

- Hvordan opplever du at din egen familie/nære venner/kone/kjæresete ser på deg? Ser de på deg som norsk? Blandet?
- Kan du si noe om hvorfor du tror de oppfatter deg slik de gjør?
- Hva føler du er holdningen til det å være blendet blant dine nærmeste venner/familie? Er det noen holdninger som stikker seg ut?

**Del 3: Andre sin oppfattelse av individet**

- Hvordan føler du at andre mennesker som ikke nødvendigvis er i nær forbindelse opplever deg og din etnisitet?
- Kan du fortelle litt om hva du opplever at andre mennesker legger merke til når de møter deg for første gang? For eksempel når du møter folk i sosiale sammenkomster, ny jobb, etc.?
- Når du da har begynt å bli kjent med nye mennesker er det da noe du føler de ofte spør om eller lurer på ang deg og etnisk bakgrunn?
- Er det noen ting du føler er mer positivt eller negativt når det gjelder ditt møte med nye mennesker og hvordan de oppfatter deg og din etnisitet?

**Del 4: Oppvekst**

- Kan du fortelle litt om hvordan du har opplevd det å være blendet oppgjennom oppveksten? Føler du at det er en forskjell på hvordan du ser på deg selv nå og hvordan du har sett på deg selv?
- Hva er det i så fall som er forskjellen føler du?
Hvis du har opplevd at det er en forskjell kan du si om du føler at de er positive eller negative?

Hva tror du grunnen til at du har forandret holdning eller syn på det å være blandet?

Har du hatt mange venner opp igjennom oppveksten som har flerkulturell bakgrunn eller har det vært mest av etnisk norsk bakgrunn?

Tror du at dette har hatt noen betydning for hvordan du ser på din etnisitet og kulturelle bakgrunn?

Del 5: Kulturell kompetanse

• Hvis vi ser på kultur, føler du spesiell tilhørighet til en eller flere kulturer?

• Forventer andre at du skal kunne fortelle noe om din ”ikke-norske” kultur?

• Har du i løpet av livet ditt eller nå følt at du burde kunne mer om dine ”kulturelle røtter”? For eksempel språk, eller tradisjoner?

• Føler du noen gang en følelse av tap eller at du ikke kan nok om dine kulturelle røtter? Har du noen eksempler på dette?

• Føler du at det er viktig å vise din kulturelle bakgrunn? Er dette noe som du tenker på?

Del 6: Møte med det offentlige

• Når du da er ute i det offentlige hvordan føler du at du blir sett på når det gjelder etnisitet? Hva tror du grunnen er til at du blir sett på slik?

• Er det noen episoder i løpet av livet ditt der du har blitt veldig bevist på det å være blandet i for eksempel skole situasjoner, jobb, militær, etc.?

• Tenker du at man kan være både norsk og samtidig tilhøre en annen etnisk bakgrunn? Eller er dette vanskelig? Hvorfor det?

Del 7: Passering/å bli tatt for en annen

• Har det noen gang skjedd at andre mennesker har trodd at du var av en annen etnisk bakgrunn enn den du selv føler du tilhører? Hvordan var dette?

• Kan du fortelle litt om hva som skjedde og hvordan det utviklet seg?
- Skjer dette ofte? Føler du at det skjedde oftere før eller nå? Føler du at det er en forskjell på hvordan du reagerer på det nå enn før når du var yngre?

- Hvorfor tror du at dette skjer? Det å bli tatt for å tilhøre en annen etnis gruppe? Føler du at det er noen spesielle grunner til det?

- Har du noen gang selv da spilt med når folk tror at du er fra enn annen etnis bakgrunn enn den du selv føler du tilhører? Hvordan ser du på dette? Hvordan skjer dette?

- Kan du fortelle om det er noen sosiale settinger eller ganger der du mer aktivt fremhever den 'norske' siden av deg og motsatt, er det noen settinger der du heller velger å fremheve din andre bakgrunn?

- Har det noen gang skjedd at du har "spilt" på det at du har en blandet bakgrunn?

- I møte med det annet kjønn, for eksempel ute på byen, i jobb, etc. har du noen opplevelser der du har følt at du har blitt sjekket opp eller lagt an på pga. din etniske bakgrunn eller utseende? Hvordan føles/syn på dette?

**Del 8: Syn på egen kropp og farge**

- Har du opplevd at fargen din/ditt utseende har blitt kommentert negativt eller positivt?

- Hva føler du da at mennesker som møter deg først legger merke til ved ditt utseende og kropp? Er det noe spesielt?

- Føler du selv da at du har ett "norsk" utseende? Hva for deg er ett "norsk" utseende?

- Sånn opp igjennom oppveksten er det noen ord og uttrykk som du har fått høre mye når det gjelder hvordan du ser ut? For eksempel mulatt, svarting, brun, etc.?

- Hvordan har slike ord og uttrykk føltes?

- Når du var yngre var det noen ganger at du følte at du heller skulle sett annerledes ut? Hvis så, hvordan?

- Hva med nå da? Er du fornøyd med slik du ser ut?

**Del 9: Sted/Rom**

- Når du vokste opp var det steder der du følte deg mer hjemme enn andre steder? Kan du si litt om det?

- Føler du at det finnes steder der etnisitet og utseende betyr mer enn andre steder? Er det steder der dette betyr mindre?
• I nabolaget der du vokste opp hvordan så folk på deg der? Var det mer eller mindre fokus på etnisitet og utseende der du vokste opp?

• Nå når du er eldre hvor føler du deg mest hjemme? Er det steder der du føler deg mer komfortabel?

• Føler du eller har du opplevd at folk ser på deg annerledes når du er ute og reiser? Er det en forskjell på hvordan folk ser på deg utenfor Oslo? Utenfor Norge? Hva føler du er forskjellen?

**Del 10: Eget syn på andre som er blandet**

• Hvordan ser du selv på andre som er blandet eller halvt?

• Føler du at du og andre som er blandet har noe tilfelles? Er det noe du mener at dere deler av opplevelser? Hva da i så fall?

**Del 11: Informantens egen refleksjon**

• Hvordan føler du intervjuet gikk? Var det noe du ikke likte eller syntes du det var en ok opplevelse?

• Er det noe du trenger klarhet i?

• Føler du at dette temaet er viktig eller er det ikke så viktig?

• Er det noe du vil legge til nå på slutten?

**Re-interview guide**

**Etnisitets begrepet:**

• Hva legger du i begrepet etnisk eller etnisitet? Er dette noe du har ett forhold til?

• Hva slags etnisitet har du?

• Hva legger du i begrepet etnisk nordmann? Har du ett forhold til dette? Hva betyr det for deg?

• Hva føler du at det betyr i det offentlige?

• Føler du at man har ett godt begrep for den etnisiteten du har? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?
• Handler etnisitet om hva slags utseende du har?
• Føler du selv at etniske nordmenn har en farge/utseende?

Farge:
• Føler du at hudfarge er tabu i den offentlige debatten?
• Hvordan føler du at hudfarge og kropp blir omtalt i det offentlige?
• Om hvem er det farge blir brukt? Føler du at etniske nordmenn blir omtalt med en farge?
• Hvis farge er tabu hvor er det tabu å snakke om det? Og hvorfor tror du det er tabu?
• Føler du at det er tabu for alle å snakke om? Er det forskjell på om hvite snakker om farge og om fargede snakker om det?
• Er Norge ett "fargerikt" land føler du?
• Er Oslo det?
• Har dette med farge og Norge å gjøre noe med historien til Norge? Jeg tenker da på om du føler at historien har noe å si for om farge er legitimt å snakke om i Norge i dag?
• Når jeg spør om for eksempel "det offentlige" hva forstår du selv med dette? Er det skole, media, politikk?

Rase begrepet:
• Hva legger du i begrepet rase?
• Er det legitimt å snakke om rase i dag? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?
• Hva er forskjellen mener du på begrepet rase og etnisitet?
• Har du noe forhold til denne forskjellen?
• Føler du at det er en forskjell på den offentlige holdningen til rase og den holdningen du har til rase?
• Er rase noe som tilhører fortiden?
• Handler rase om hva slags utseende du har?
List of informants

- John, 29 years old man from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Ghana
- Mary, 25 years old woman from Oslo, mother from St. Martin and father from Norway
- Linda, 30 years old woman from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Gambia
- Obi, 31 year old man from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Kenya
- Mona, 30 year old woman from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Egypt
- Mike, 26 year old man from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from the Ivory Coast
- Thomas, 35 year old man from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Tanzania
- Maria Yano, 27 year old woman form Oslo, mother from Korea and father from Norway
- Stine, 30 year old woman from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from India
- Mariama, 28 years old from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Nigeria
- Ruth, 28 years old woman from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Nigeria
- Anna, 29 years old woman from Oslo, mother from Norway and father from Morocco
Information letter to the informants in regards to the project

Mitt navn er Tony Sandset og skriver masteroppgave i Kulturhistorie. Jeg trenger i den forbindelse individer som kunne tenke seg og la seg intervjuer ang. mitt tema.

Jeg skriver om hvordan det oppleves å være av blandet etnisk opprinnelse, dvs. personer som har en av sine foreldre fra Norge og den andre fra ett ikke-europeisk land. Dette er ett felt som er forsket lite på i norsk sammenheng.


Intervjuene vil bli brukt i min master oppgave, men du vil bli anonymisert slik at man ikke kan gjenkjenne deg som person. Du vil også få muligheten til å lese oppgaven når den er ferdig slik at du kan evt. Komme med innspill/innvendinger til hvordan intervjuet blir brukt. Materialet og prosjektet som helhet har blitt godkjent av NSD (Norsk Samfunnsvitenskaplige Datatjeneste) som sørger for at prosjektet følger regler for personvern slik at de som stiller opp vil kunne føle seg trygg på at all materiale som blir samlet inn via båndopptaker vil bli behandlet på en trygg måte.

All lydmateriale vil bli lagret sikkert slik at man sørger for at det ikke kommer ut til uvedkommende. Hvis du vil trekke deg fra prosjektet så vil all materiale med deg på bli slettet og ikke brukt i oppgaven. Du kan også trekke deg når som helst i løpet av prosjektets gang.

Hvis man har lyst til å delta eller har spørsmål så ta kontakt på tlf. 90144187 eller via epost: tjsandse@student.ikos.uio.no