Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: A Comparative Study

By

Håkon Lunde Saxi

Master Thesis in History
Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History
University of Oslo
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Acknowledgements

When I first began researching the topic of this study in the fall of 2006, I was baffled to discover that two countries that I thought were surely like as twins were anything but with regard to defence policy. It was therefore with a growing enthusiasm to discover the origin of this puzzling difference that I emerged myself in the study of Norwegian and Danish defence policy. It has been a stimulating two years, separated by the year I spent in London gaining my MSc in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Since I first began writing, developments in Afghanistan have further highlighted the different willingness of Norway and Denmark to engage in warfighting. While the thesis is in contemporary history, there is presently little to indicate that its underlying conclusions have in any way become passé.

In the course of writing my thesis I have become indebted to a number of individuals and institutions, to whom I would like to offer my gratitude. Any mistakes or omissions in the thesis are of course entirely my own. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Rolf Tamnes, Director of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), who first suggested the topic to me. With his authoritative command of Norwegian history and defence issues he could always provide advice as to the most important areas to look at, and yet he was never dismissive and was always ready to enter an open discussion when I presented my ideas. I am also deeply grateful to IFS for providing me with a special master scholarship, as well as an office and a stimulating working environment for my final months working on the thesis. Special thanks are due to PhD candidate Ingrid Lundestad and Editor Anne Therese Klingstedt for providing excellent technical advice.

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# Contents

Acknowledgements i  
List of abbreviations v  

## Introduction  Danish Peace Enforcers and Norwegian Peacekeepers? 1  
  The Research Question 4  
  The Four Factors Explaining the Difference 5  
  Sources 9  
  Types of International Military Operations 11  
  Outline of the Thesis 12  

## Section I  Demonstrating Divergence: How Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy Has Differed Since the end of the Cold War 13  

### Chapter 1  The Long Lines of Danish and Norwegian Defence 14  
  Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy Until 1949 14  
  Norway and Denmark During the Cold War 20  
  The Armed Forces During the Cold War 23  
  Conclusion: Norway the Good, Optimistic Ally; Denmark the Bad Defeatist? 28  

### Chapter 2  Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Aftermath of the Cold War 29  
  Reforming the Armed Forces After the Cold War 1990–1994 29  
  SHIRBRIG and the Baltic States 41  
  Defence Reforms in the Post-Bosnian War Era 1995–2001 44  
  Conclusion: At First Divergence, Then Convergence at the Start of the 21st Century? 49  

### Chapter 3  Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11 50  
  Defence reforms 2002–2008 55  
  Conclusions: Divergence Persisted Into the 21st Century 63
List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>Allied Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTAP</td>
<td>Allied Forces Baltic Approaches</td>
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<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion</td>
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<td>BALTNET</td>
<td>Baltic Air Traffic Control Network</td>
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<td>BAOR</td>
<td>British Army of the Rhine</td>
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<td>BFO</td>
<td>Befalets Fellesorganisasjon</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Co-operation</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Centralforeningen for stampersonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Danish International Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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EU European Union
FIST Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HJK Hærens jegerkommando
(The Norwegian Army Special Operations Forces)
HKKF Hærens Konstabel- og Korporalforening
IFOR Implementation Force
IR International Relations
IRF Immediate Reaction Forces
KFOR Kosovo Force
LANDJUT Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland
MBT Main Battle Tank
MDF Main Defence Forces
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MoD Ministry of Defence
MTB Missile Torpedo Boat
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NOF</td>
<td>Norges Offisersforbund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORDCAPS</td>
<td>Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support</td>
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<td>NORDSAMFN</td>
<td>Nordic cooperation group for military UN matters</td>
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<td>NORPOL</td>
<td>Nordic-Polish Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>Rådgivnings- og analysegruppe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Advisory and Analysis Group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagment</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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INTRODUCTION

DANISH PEACE ENFORCERS AND NORWEGIAN PEACEKEEPERS?

Norway and Denmark are two countries with a great many similarities. The two states share a common Scandinavian language and culture, very similar democratic political systems, a generous welfare state, and even membership in the same military alliance. For many non-Scandinavians the two states may appear almost politically and socially indistinguishable. However, even very similar countries can sometimes develop marked differences in particular sectors of society. This dissertation will argue that defence policy represents one such marked difference. After the Cold War Norway was reluctant to get involved in international military operations, and initially did so only with low-risk support units. Denmark however wholeheartedly embraced expeditionary employment of its armed forces, and Danish units were frequently among the few western forces to take part in actual combat.

Images can provide a powerful insight into similarities and differences. Two selected images from Norwegian and Danish post-Cold War military operations may in this case serve to illustrate difference. Our first image is from the city of Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the time is April 1994. Danish Leopard 1 main battle tanks (MBTs) engage in a regular battle with Bosnian Serb forces, possibly killing as many as 150 Bosnian Serbs. If the Danes need medical aid, Norwegians medics stand ready to assist, if they need medical evacuation Norwegian helicopters are available to fly them out, if they need logistical support the Norwegians can provide it. The Norwegians provided support, but unlike the Danes they did not fight. The Danes did battle; the Norwegians were “in the rear, with the gear”.

Our second image is from Afghanistan in August 2006. Danish soldiers in lightly armoured vehicles drive to the tiny village of Musa Qala in southern Afghanistan to relieve a platoon of British paratroopers. Over the next 36 days the Danish soldiers endured over 70 Taliban attacks, killing at least 25 enemy combatants, until they were again relieved by British troops. The encampment they held was nicknamed "The Alamo", due to it being

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1 For a well written and entertaining first-hand account of the specific engagement, as well as the Danish experience "on the ground" in Bosnia, see the book written by the officer in command of the Danish tank squadron Lars R. Møller, Operation Bøllebank: Soldater i kamp (Copenhagen: Høst & Søns Forlag, 2001).

totally isolated and surrounded on all sides by hostile fighters. The Norwegians were also in Afghanistan, this time also with combat troops. The Norwegian units in Afghanistan were trained, organised and equipped to fight, even bringing heavily armed and well-armoured CV9030N infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) with them. Seemingly the Norwegians were now ready to fight alongside the Danes. But they did not engage in the fighting. The reason was simple: the regular Norwegian soldiers were not in Musa Quala, but in Maymana and Mazar-e-Sharif. Both are in the north, far from where the Danes were battling the Taliban insurgents.

These two simple images, taken twelve years apart, illustrate a basic difference between Danish and Norwegian defence policy in the post Cold-War era. While the Danes have been ready and able to fight alongside (mostly) British and American troops in places far from Denmark, Norwegian troops have been more reluctant both to go and especially to fight.

Why is this? Is it because the Norwegian Armed Forces were still busy "defending" their homeland against a looming threat from the east? If so, was this a rational response to Norway’s geopolitical position, or was it due to cultural baggage which slowed down reforms? And were the Danes now simply freed from having to worry about any conventional military threat to their territory, and therefore now enjoyed the "luxury" of using their military selectively in conflicts far away from Denmark proper?

The Norwegian political scientist Ståle Ulriksen has a cultural explanation for Norwegian aversion. He argues that Norwegian reluctance to use its armed forces abroad was due to the Norwegian "defence tradition", which understood the role of the Armed Forces to be defence of the territory and nation of Norway. The Armed Forces were therefore less thought of as a foreign policy tool, and when Norwegian soldiers did go abroad, they were less willing to sacrifice life and limb for what were at best "secondary tasks", at worst a costly distraction from their "real" task. Not until 2001 did Norway move towards making

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3 The Danish light reconnaissance squadron was hailed as "the heroes of Musa Qual" by the Danish political scientist Jens Ringsmose. Jens Ringsmose, "Heltene fra Musa Qala," Nyhedsavisen, 6 June 2007. The Danish unit numbered approximately 140 troops. For a short review of the battle of Musa Qual see Thomas Donnelly and Gary J. Schmitt, "Musa Qala: Adapting to the Realities of Modern Counterinsurgency," Small Wars Journal (2008). For a detailed first-hand account of the events before, during, and after the battle of Musa Qala, see the book written by the officer in command of the Danish light reconnaissance squadron Lars Ulslev Johannesen, De danske tigre: Med livet som indsats i Afghanistan (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008).


5 The Danish scholar Henning Sørensen terms this "selective security". His argument is that, because there is no clear enemy or threat to Danish security, security policy is increasingly driven by national preferences. Henning Sørensen, "Denmark: From Obligation to Option," in The Postmodern Military, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Se also ———, "Den selektive soldat," CS Bladet 38, no. 2 (March 2008): 9-10.

6 The main publication putting forward this argument is the book by Ståle Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar? (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 2002). Ulriksen, together with Iver
operations outside of Norwegian territory one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, making for what Ulriksen terms a "paradigmatic shift" in Norwegian defence policy.\(^7\)

Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børresen has a geopolitical, not cultural, explanation for Norway’s greater reluctance to participate in distant military endeavours. His argument is that the end of the Cold War had changed little about Norway’s main geopolitical challenge: the shared border with Russia. The Norwegian Armed Forces main role therefore remained relatively unchanged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. To maintain a constant military presence in the High North continued to be the focus of the military, in order to demonstrate Norwegian willingness and capacity to control its own territory and resources. Whereas Ulriksen argues that the armed forces were insufficiently oriented towards international operations in the 1990s, Børresen argues that in the new millennium too much attention was given to projecting military force to places far removed from Norwegian territory.\(^8\)

Both the cultural and the geopolitical explanation have their counterparts in the Danish academic debate. The Danish international relations scholar Bertel Heurlin sees geopolitics as being decisive for Denmark’s path to expeditionary defence. Because Denmark no longer faced any direct threat after the Cold War, but was now surrounded by friends and allies on all sides, it became necessary for Denmark to use its armed forces actively as a foreign policy tool. Doing so enabled Denmark to retain influence with its allies and especially with the sole remaining superpower. Military "activism" became a way to avoid marginalisation in a

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\(^7\) Ståle Ulriksen, "Brydningstid - paradigmeskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001–2005)," in Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag, ed. Bertel Heurlin (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007). Ulriksen is supported by the Norwegian Chief of Defence General Sverre Diesen, who also sees this transition as a "paradigmatic shift". Unlike Ulriksen, however, Diesen sees Norway as having kept up relatively favourably in the process of change in the post-Cold War era compared to other NATO countries. Sverre Diesen, "Mot et allianseintegritert forsvar," in Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar?, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary og Øyvind Østerud (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag AS, 2005).

unipolar world. In order to generate maximum political benefits from its military contributions, Denmark has structured its armed forces so as to be able to respond rapidly, be projected globally, and be able to fight alongside high-tech American troops (“first in-first out capacity”).

The cultural explanation for Norwegian reluctance to participate in international military operations also has its counterpart in Denmark, fronted by the Danish political scientist Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. He sees Denmark as having experienced a shift from a deterministic “what’s the use of it” attitude towards the armed forces during the Cold War, to one of increasing militarization of its foreign policy under the term "activism" in the post-Cold War era. Unlike Heurlin, Rasmussen argues that there was nothing inherently necessary about Denmark’s decision, following the disappearance of the threat from the east, to make use of its newfound strategic opportunity to project military force abroad. Rather, a new consensus was reached amongst Danish politicians, civil servants, officers and academics about what could be accomplished by using the Danish military. This was the decisive factor. This new consensus was so radically different from the old, and so unquestioned across the political spectrum, that one can talk about the emergence of a new strategic culture in Denmark.

The Research Question

The objective of this dissertation is to answer the question how and why Norway and Denmark’s defence policies diverged after the Cold War. The time period is chosen because the end of the Cold War heralded a radical change in the foreign and security policies of both countries, but interestingly to very different degrees. At first, in Section I, I will present a comparative historical narrative detailing what happened, laying the foundation for the subsequent discussion in Section II of why it happened. While it will have its main emphasis


11 This argument is put forward in Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ”’What’s the Use of It?’: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 40, no. 1 (2005).
on the period after the Cold War, it will also provide an overview of the pre-1990 defence polices of the two countries, in order to allow space for historical comparison. Particular focus will be put on how Norway and Denmark differed markedly when it came to participating in international military operations after the Cold War. The time period covered by the dissertation is from 1990 until 2008, the starting date being a compromise since the exact end of the Cold War is disputed,\textsuperscript{12} and the end date being as close to the present day as can reasonably be studied in contemporary history. Because the full implications of close-to-present-day events are harder to gauge, the thesis will put more emphasis on the earlier rather than later part of the study.

After presenting this chronological narrative in Section I, I will then in Section II approach the question of \textit{why} they were so different. Rather than doing this chronologically, I will instead approach the question thematically, dedicating one chapter to each of the four factors I consider crucial for understanding the divergence. The factors have been adapted and developed from a number of different academic studies, and ultimately the thesis will provide a synthesis, demonstrating the necessary inclusion of and mutual dependence of all four factors. While no categorisation is perfect, as they inevitably simplify complex historical processes and are susceptible to accusations of arbitrariness, the analytical clarity and insight gained from this historical simplification nevertheless outweighs the loss of empirical focus and detail.

\textbf{The Four Factors Explaining the Difference}

Initially a \textit{cultural} and a \textit{geopolitical} explanation for divergence were suggested. There are however two main problems with restricting oneself to only the abovementioned analytical poles. Firstly, culture operates at many different levels in society. Organisations can exhibit a particular culture, affecting which tasks are considered important, appropriate, and natural for that organisation, somewhat independently from the grander societal norms in which they are embedded.\textsuperscript{13} To account for this, culture will be subdivided into the grander \textit{strategic culture} and the narrower, organisation-focused \textit{military culture}. Secondly, one problem with the above positions is that they are inherently \textit{structural} accounts that pay insufficient mind to

\textsuperscript{12} The usually suggested dates for the end of the Cold War are 1989 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall) or 1991 (the breakup of the Soviet Union), but other dates have also been suggested. See Vladislav M. Zubok, "Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of 'The Turn'," in \textit{Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory}, ed. Odd Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 344-348.

\textsuperscript{13} Edgard H. Schein has studied culture at the level of organisations, and argues convincingly that culture plays a great role at this level of analysis. Edgar H. Schein, \textit{Organizational Culture and Leadership}, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).
human agency.\textsuperscript{14} This represents an ontological problem, because as Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski note "[a]ll collectivities are ultimately reducible to individuals".\textsuperscript{15} In order to incorporate agency, I will therefore introduce the concept of leadership. All of these four factors, geopolitics, strategic culture, military culture, and leadership, will in turn be outlined below. It is important to note however that ultimately these categories must be seen as just an analytical tool, rather than a true reflection of reality. I particularly agree with the holistic approach of Colin Gray, who argues that one cannot separate strategic behaviour from cultural behaviour.\textsuperscript{16} What Gray is saying is very commonsensical: culture matters, it inserts itself into every aspect of human behaviour and you cannot therefore separate e.g. collective/individual strategic behaviour or culture, as truly independent variables. Nevertheless, as analytical tools these categories provide useful counterpoints, bringing forth the "big picture" from the tyranny of details.\textsuperscript{17}

What exactly, then, is meant by the term geopolitics? One definition holds that geopolitics is commonly thought to be "about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power."\textsuperscript{18} Three different levels of geopolitics can be identified: local, regional and global, with each having its own "code" which may or may not conflict with the other levels.\textsuperscript{19} A central point in the literature dealing with Denmark and Norway is that the end of the Cold War had enormous effects on the global and regional distribution of power, but for Norway it had a more modest impact on local power dynamics. Due to its continued proximity to Russia, and the geo-economics potential for conflict over Norway’s rich maritime resources, Norway remained wary of engaging in

\textsuperscript{14} For a theoretical account of the agent-structure debate in IR, see Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer, 1987). Also, see ———, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 4 Structure, agency, and culture.


\textsuperscript{17} In International Relations (IR) terminology the culture vs. strategic behaviour debate can be seen as a constructivist/post-structuralists position on the one hand, debating with a classical-realist/neoliberal on the other.


post-Cold War euphoria. I will argue that this difference has proved a vital necessary enabler for divergence in Norway and Denmark, but in and of itself an insufficient explanation for it.

While geopolitics as a term is not unambiguous, culture is perhaps an even more contentious term. I will use Peter Wilson’s relatively short and clear definition, identifying culture as "the values, norms, and assumptions that guide human action". When applying culture to a nation’s foreign, security, and defence policy, one often speaks of that nation’s strategic culture. Jack Snyder offers the most authoritative definition, identifying it as:

[T]he sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to […] strategy.

Studying strategic culture in particular allows one to say something about a society’s "perception of risk, goals, and the relative willingness to use force". I will focus in particular upon the latter point, because I will argue that there has been a significant difference between Denmark and Norway with regard to the willingness to use force as part of their foreign policy, and that this has been a key reason why their defence policies diverged in the post-Cold War era.

However, while strategic culture operates at the level of the national community, military culture is a narrower term. Because this dissertation deals with a particular sub-sector of society, i.e. defence, the prerogative of a particular organisation (the armed forces), in both units of study, it makes sense to analytically examine whether particular cultural traits in the armed forces of Norway and Denmark have influenced the divergence in defence policy after the Cold War. Like culture generally, military cultures cannot be changed overnight, but

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22 The academic literatures on national ways of warfare and strategic culture stretches back to Liddell Hart and Jack Snyder respectively, and have recently gained a number of new adherents. For one overview, see Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 123-130. For a very thorough account of military theory, its theoreticians and its application, adopting a national focus, see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
change will rather involve the incremental amalgam of old and new practices. Consequentially, having a culture more adapted to face the new challenges of the post-Cold War world, such as the requirements of expeditionary operations, will facilitate the transition to these new tasks. I will argue that Denmark and Norway have had military cultures that have differed in their adaptability to tackle the new type of international military operations in the post-Cold War era. Therefore different military cultures will be singled out as a source of explanation.

Finally, leadership seeks to incorporate agency into the story. Theo Farrell has argued that a process of radical norm transplantation can be driven by individual, elite "norm entrepreneurs" in the centre of the decision-making apparatus, who by their actions are able to "communicate and push through new ideas". Similarly, at the organisational level, Edgard H. Schein argues that leaders can bring in "new beliefs, values, and assumptions" that they can sometimes successfully impose as shared experiences if their ideas succeed in solving the group’s problems. On this note, the Danish International Relations scholar Peter Viggo Jakobsen has been making the case for bringing back agency, in the form of "heroic leadership", when it comes to understanding Denmark’s post-Cold War military activism. Jakobsen draws inspiration from those who seek to "rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them." As I will demonstrate, drawing on Farrell’s, Schein’s, and Jakobsen’s arguments, bringing individual agency "back in" can help tremendously in understanding why two so seemingly similar units as Denmark and Norway developed such profound sectoral differences after the Cold War.

Embracing the above four key factors allows me to cover several levels of analysis, from the individual (agent) level to the sub-societal and finally to the material and macro-societal level (structure). Section II will outline in greater detail the order in which the factors will be discussed, as well as how they interact with one another.

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28 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 225.
Sources

Both Norway and Denmark are open and transparent societies where the government is required to have their security and defence policies overseen and occasionally approved by directly elected parliamentary assemblies. Most documents pertaining to security and defence are thereafter made publicly available, and deployments of military forces abroad usually involve parliamentary debates outlining the reasons and size of the deployment.\(^{31}\)

In Norway, the most important documents pertaining to defence have been the *Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces* enacted every four years. In the period dealt with in this dissertation, there were five such plans (1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2002, 2003–2008, 2009–2012). When larger revisions of defence policy have been envisaged, a Defence Commission or Defence Policy Committee has been convened. The committee has produced findings that have been used as the basis for future long-term plans. A Defence Commission presented its findings in 1992, while a Defence Policy Committees did so in 2000 and 2007. All of these were preceded by a Defence Study providing the military advice of the Chief of Defence.

In Denmark, the key documents in defence policy have not been parliamentary documents *per se*, but extra-parliamentary *Defence Agreements* reached between most of the Danish political parties. Five such Defence Agreements were signed in the period covered (1989–1991/2, 1993–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009). As in Norway, Denmark also periodically convened Defence Commissions to present a report when larger revisions of defence policy were envisaged. Two such commissions delivered their findings, in 1989 and 1998 respectively, and a smaller defence policy working group presented its findings in 2003.

Besides government documents, newspapers provide another vital source of information, not least to account for the involvement in operations abroad of the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War. Many of the politicians, officers and academics involved in formulating and analysing the defence policies of the countries in question have also used newspapers as a vehicle for expressing their views.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\) In Denmark, parliamentary approval is required by law for all deployments of Danish soldiers abroad. In Norway, it is a well established custom to consult parliament prior to any deployment of soldiers, and the government will usually follow the outcome of the consultation. However, in that there does not need to be a public debate or parliamentary decision, Norway appears somewhat less open with regard to its security and defence policy than Denmark. Marc Houben, *International Crisis Management: The approach of European states* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 85, 108-110.

\(^{32}\) Newspaper articles written about current events at the time of the events in question are considered primary source material, whereas articles commenting on events in retrospective are considered secondary sources. For more concerning using newspapers as sources, see Chandrika Kaul, “The press,” in *The Contemporary History Handbook*, ed. Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton, and Anthony Seldon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
Apart from official government document and newspaper articles, I have also been in the fortunate position that many of the policymakers and military persons who have been involved in the key events of Danish and Norwegian defence policy over the last two decades have written and held speeches on the subject. Some have even written biographies that have proved invaluable in order to discern their views and motives, as well as, albeit to a lesser extent, providing accounts of factual events.\(^{33}\)

Similarly, and deserving special mention, is the large body of literature that has been published detailing the experience of Norwegian and Danish soldiers in military operations over the last two decades. While these must be treated with some care, as they tend to be factually less accurate than other primary sources, they provide an excellent source of material for examining military culture.\(^{34}\)

Finally, in order to improve my understanding and supplement these written sources, I have also conducted a few interviews. This has been done mainly to try and grasp more firmly the "moods" and "atmosphere" of events not always accessible from the documents, as well as to ascertain the perceived relative importance of certain documents over others.\(^{35}\)

While government documents, newspapers and academic publications together make it relatively easy to pin down the specifics of what happened, when, where and how, the really tricky issue, as always in historical accounts, has been the more analytical question of why. Providing explanation for the events detailed has been the major issue, indeed the very research question, for this dissertation. In particular, providing comparable mental histories, as part of the two different levels of cultural explanation, has proved challenging.\(^{36}\) The explanation can only partially be found in the narration of the events themselves. Here I have drawn on the plentiful academic literature concerning Danish and Norwegian foreign, security and defence policy. Since this is a study of contemporary history, it should be noted that many of the academics writing about this topic are drawn from the social sciences. While I am fortunate that a relative rich body of literature exists on most of the above topics, the available


\(^{34}\) For a discussion of the utility of military memoirs, see Yuval Noah Harari, "Military Memoirs: A Historical Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era," War in History 14, no. 3 (2007): 289-309.


\(^{36}\) For a brief outline of the historiography of mental histories, as it originated in France with the Annales School, see Roger Chartier, "Histoire des mentalités," in The Columbia History of Twentieth-century French Thought, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 54-59.
research is somewhat more limited when it comes to the more specialised subjects of the culture and mentality of the Norwegian and Danish Armed Forces and societal strategic cultures. I hope that this work will contribute to the ongoing research efforts in this field.

Types of International Military Operations

A brief mention is necessary of the different types of military operations that the Norwegian and Danish Armed Forces have been taking part in since the end of the Cold War. Apart from preparing for their wartime territorial defence tasks, as well as undertaking their peacetime tasks such as sovereignty and surveillance missions, international military operations have been the main activity of the these armed forces. These fall broadly into four categories.

Firstly, there are the so-called traditional peacekeeping operations of the type undertaken regularly during the Cold War. Here one seeks to monitor compliance with ceasefires, and in some cases physically insert the peacekeepers between the former belligerents. This is based on a "holy trinity" of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force. Secondly, there are the so-called managing transition operations. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, these take place after a conflict has ended, and seek to implement a peace accord freely entered into by the parties involved. Both traditional peacekeeping and managed transitions fall under Chapter VI of the UN charter. Thirdly, so-called Chapter VI and-a-half missions are conducted internally in states to try to promote peace and stability, often under circumstances where consent is at least periodically withdrawn by the warring parties. These operations therefore require forces that more combat-capable, in order to protect themselves and solve their missions. Fourthly, peace enforcement or a Chapter VII mission involves using force against one or more of the warring parties in order to impose a settlement and restore peace and security. Since this can by its very nature involve high-intensity warfare, this requires the highest level of combat-cabillities from the participating forces.\(^{37}\) Note that while the military requirements of the different missions are here framed in UN Charter terms, they need not be led or even sanctioned by any global or regional organisation. So-called

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coalitions of the willing or even individual countries can also perform them without any legal authorisation from the UN, NATO or regional bodies.\textsuperscript{38}

In Scandinavia the preferred term for all of the above tasks is either peacekeeping operations or international military operations, terms that have a benign ring in Scandinavian. The term expeditionary operations, often favoured in the UK and US, has not been common until very recently. However, since most international military operations in which Denmark and Norway have participated have taken place a long way from their territory, calling them expeditionary operations is not inappropriate. Finally, NATO employs a third term, Peace Support Operations (PSO),\textsuperscript{39} encapsulating all of the above categories. In this dissertation I will use the terms PSO, expeditionary and international military operations more or less interchangeably.

**Outline of the Thesis**

As mentioned, Section I is organised in historical narrative form. Chapter 1 gives a brief historical introduction to Norwegian and Danish security and defence policy since the Napoleonic wars and until the end of the Cold War (1807-1989/91). The object is to provide a point of departure, as well as to contextualise the following chapters and draw the reader’s attention to important similarities and differences. Chapter 2 and 3 then gives an empirical outline of Norwegian and Danish defence reforms since the end of the Cold War, as well as military operations and engagements abroad. The chapter points out the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the post-Cold War era, both in defence posture and in military engagements abroad. In Section II this divergence is explained using the four categories outlined above: geopolitics, leadership, military culture, and strategic culture. Each factor is dealt with in a separate Chapter (4–7). The chapters demonstrate the importance of each factor individually, but also how they interact with one another. Finally, the conclusion provides a synthesis demonstrating how it all fits together.


\textsuperscript{39} NATO defines PSOs as “An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations.” NATO Standardization Agency, *AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)* (Brussels: NATO, 2008), 2-P-3.
The defence dilemmas faced by Norway and Denmark have borne many similarities, both being small states in the northern part of Europe. They spent the First World War and inter-war years neutral, the Second World War under German occupation, and the Cold War years as members of the Western Alliance. However, after the Cold War the defence policies of Norway and Denmark parted company. Denmark quickly came to embrace its Armed Forces as a foreign policy tool in the post-Cold War era, employing it frequently in combat operations abroad. Meanwhile, Norway was more hesitant to utilize military instruments abroad, and remained reluctant to participate in combat operations, preferring the safer and less glamorous job of providing combat support or combat service support.

Section I gives a narrative presentation of modern Danish and Norwegian security and defence history, with its main emphasis on the period of study in the dissertation, 1990–2008. This section will provide the empirical background to answer the first part of the research question, how Norway and Denmark’s defence policies diverged after the Cold War.

Chapter 1 will provide the background for the following chapters by examining the long lines of the countries’ defence policies, including the different responses to German occupation during World War Two and the threat from the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Thereafter, Chapter 2 will look at the first decade following the Cold War, in which Norway and Denmark responded militarily very differently to the changes in the international political system, the Gulf War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Finally, Chapter 3 will look at the responses to the developments after 9/11, and how the differences in defence policy grew even more pronounced. These narrative chapters will in turn lay the foundation for Section II, which will thematically account for the differences we observe in post-Cold War defence policy.
CHAPTER 1

THE LONG LINES OF DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE

Norway and Denmark were both traditionally neutral states, until the German occupation during World War Two demonstrated the fallacy of this policy. They therefore became founding members of NATO in 1949, and as front-line members of the Atlantic Alliance their defence strategies and structures became very similar. Both developed balanced conscripted, mobilization-based forces designed to contain territorial invasion until allied reinforcement could arrive. They shared a limited exposure to warfighting during this "long peace", the most common deployments of their armed forces abroad being classical peacekeeping missions.

This chapter will chart the long lines of Danish and Norwegian defence policies, demonstrating how their different historical experience placed them within the same alliance, and made them embrace very similar modes of military organisations. It will, however, also demonstrate that there existed some important differences between them, which, during the Cold War, made Norway a more committed member of the Atlantic Alliance than Denmark, but which in the post-Cold War world would help to make Denmark a more avant-garde NATO country than Norway.

Danish and Norwegian Defence Policy Until 1949

Since the end of the Great Nordic War in 1720 until joining NATO in 1949, Danish foreign policy had been to avoid getting entangled in conflicts between Europe’s great powers. The involuntary involvement in the Napoleonic wars 1807–1814 constituted the first disastrous failure of this policy. The second was the second Schleswig War, in which the multi-lingual Oldenburg state became reduced to a homogenous image of modern Denmark. The third was the Second World War, in which Denmark experienced the trauma of being de facto occupied by Germany 1940–1943 and de jure 1943–1945.

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Perhaps the most influential experience for Danish defence policy was the 1864 debacle. The defeat left the country with a traumatic feeling of hopelessness, similar to the one experienced fifty years previously, when defeat in the Napoleonic wars forced Denmark to hand over Norway to Sweden. Symptomatic of this attitude was the statement made by the Liberal Member of Parliament Viggo Hørup in March 1883, when he argued against the government’s defence policy with the words "what’s the use of it". The memory of the defeat of 1864 is still kept alive in Denmark today, e.g. through the museum erected at Dybbøl and the recreations of the battle of Dybbøl held there by the members of the Danish Armed Forces. The Danish historian Knud J.V. Jespersen finds that the Danish defeat in 1864 "gave birth to the peculiarly Danish image of Denmark as Lilliput, with a small and insignificant role to play, and which could do best by turning its back on the world".

This small-state mentality was to prove particularly prevalent in defence policy. While the Danish state initially remained eager to reclaim the lost territories, the defeat of France in 1871 and the unification of Germany left this goal unattainable. This left Denmark as a linguistically and culturally homogenous entity, and it is in this sense that the Danish historian Uffe Østergård argues that 1864 created modern Denmark. A referendum in 1920, stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, returned northern Schleswig to Denmark. This gave Denmark probably the most accurate border it could hope for with Germany in terms of the language and disposition of the population.

Following its defeat, Danish defence policy became increasingly conditioned by the constant fear of antagonising its giant neighbour in the south. In the interwar period there was a political consensus that Denmark could not defend itself against a German attack, and there was a persistent debate whether Denmark should even attempt to offer any kind of organised resistance. The Social Democratic Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning clearly answered in the negative when he declared in his new year’s speech in January 1940 that "our country is

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4 “Hvad skal det nytte?” Quoted in Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, *Dansk Udenrigspolitiks Historie. Bind 3: Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814-1914* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2003), 404. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.
prepared to guard our neutrality, but warfare in any real sense is not an option”.

Stauning effectively ruled out persistent Danish resistance to a foreign invasion. When the German invasion came on 9th April 1940 (at 04.15) the Danish government decided already by 06.00 the same day to order the cessation of resistance. The Danish government chose to cooperate with Germany, and until 28th – 29th August 1943 the government continued to function as an independent government in Denmark despite the German presence. When the German Wehrmacht moved to neutralise the Danish Armed Forces on the 29th August 1943, the death of 23 Danish soldiers in fact made this day a bloodier one for Denmark than 9th April 1940.

Unlike Denmark, for Norway 1814 was not "one of the lowest points in modern […] history” but rather a celebrated triumph for liberalism and nationalism. The subsequent dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905 was a similar success for Norway, involving few embarrassing concessions except the demolition of a few fortresses along the Swedish border. While evaluation of the relative strength of Norwegian Armed Forces in 1905 varies, the prevalent "1905-myth" persisting afterwards was that "a strong defence" proved decisive in allowing for the peaceful dissolution of the union.

When Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905, it, like Denmark, sought to remain outside of international entanglements. The new state wanted to focus its attention on consolidating its independence. Perhaps due to the absence of other threats, a possible conflict with Sweden remained dimensioning for Norwegian defence effort in the years following the dissolution of the union. New fortifications were erected to replace those disassembled after 1905. While Norway remained publicly neutral during the period 1905–1940, there was an implicit understanding in Norway that Great Britain had a strong interest in ensuring that no other power gained control over Norwegian territory. Though seldom articulated, it was

11 Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State, 33.
13 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar? , 105-106. This view is still common among contemporary historical studies of the dissolution of the union. A recent historical investigation to the role of the army in 1905 concludes that the Norwegian armed forces would have been defeated in 1905, but that their strength was such that it would have been very costly for Sweden to make Norway remain in the union by force. Vigar Aabrek, Landforsvaret 1905: Tilbakeblikk etter 100 år (Oslo: InfoMediaHuset AS, 2005), 154-155.
15 Rolf Rasch-Engh, Forsvar og forsvarssyn før og etter 1905: Fiendebleide og befestningsutbygging etter Karlstadforliket (Kvam: Silver Fox forlag, 2005), Chapter IX and X.
assumed in Norway that Great Britain would ultimately come to Norway’s aid should a threat materialise.\textsuperscript{16} It was thought to be in Britain’s interest that no other power gained control of the Norwegian coastline, and that the Royal Navy’s power was such that no great power would be able to seize the country while simultaneously fighting the UK. Until 1940 Norwegian politicians were therefore in a position to "have their cake and eat it too",\textsuperscript{17} enjoying the protection of a great power, while being able to indulge in neutralism and a moralistic criticism of great power politics.

In contrast to Denmark, two months of organised resistance followed the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, but British naval power was trumped by German airpower and resistance ultimately proved futile.\textsuperscript{18} The Norwegian Government and Armed Forces continued the war from exile, as did a number of Norwegians in the resistance in occupied Norway. When the government and military returned in May 1945, it was with their honour intact.\textsuperscript{19}

Since the Napoleonic Wars Norway and Denmark had very different military experience. Denmark had suffered defeat in 1814 and 1864, and a humiliating lack of organised resistance by official organs of the state to the 1940–1945 occupation. Norway, on the other hand, saw 1814 not as a defeat but as the joyous start of independence. 1905 proved that the Armed Forces, when supported by the population, could deter a potential enemy. Finally, the campaign in Norway in April–June 1940 seemed to demonstrate that the country was indeed defensible, as long as military assistance was prepared in advanced rather than

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\item Because Denmark had not taken an active part in the allied war efforts, about 2,500 Danes were allowed to volunteer for the British army in 1945. The Danish government felt it had a dept to repay Great Britain, and hoped by this to save some of the nation’s lost honour. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Fra Palestina til Afghanistan - danske soldater i international tjeneste 1945-2005," in \textit{Hvor som helst i det britiske verdensrige: Danske frivillige i britisk tjeneste 1945-48}, ed. Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Rasmus Mariager (Copenhagen: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, 2006), 6-7.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
improvised at the last minute.\textsuperscript{20} Norway hence emerged from the period 1905–1945 with a positive view of what the country’s defence forces could achieve when provided with the necessary resources and allied assistance. This positive legacy from 1905 and 1940 formed the basis for the continuation of what Ståle Ulriksen defines as the "Norwegian defence tradition".\textsuperscript{21} This was the belief in the validity of having large, conscripted armed forces with close (often local) ties to the territory and nation, but little emphasis on acting as a foreign policy tool of the state.

Denmark did not share Norway’s optimistic evaluation of what could be achieved with military means. Due to its exposed geographical location, but also due to Danish historical experience, Danish defence preparations through the Cold War had a very symbolic character.\textsuperscript{22} The lesson of 1864 and 1940 seemed to be that there was little Denmark could do to resist a continental invader, and therefore spending money on the military was a waste of resources better spent elsewhere.\textsuperscript{23} There was a sense that "Denmark’s fate would be decided by others irrespective of what she did".\textsuperscript{24} This was not necessarily very explicitly stated, but can be described as an "unspoken assumption" among Danish politicians.\textsuperscript{25} Danish policy has been described as a "passing buck" or "free riding" strategy by Bertel Heurlin.\textsuperscript{26} It was more important for Denmark that its defence forces were considered "credible" by its own allies, who would ultimately protect it from a foreign invader, than by the expected enemy.\textsuperscript{27} The Danish historian Nikolaj Petersen argues that "[Danish] defence efforts tended to be symbolic; enough to qualify for the NATO guarantee, but not to put up a meaningful deterrent".\textsuperscript{28} In this sense the defeatist attitude from the 1864 to 1940 period still persisted in Denmark through the Cold War, as the ability to defend oneself by independent means was considered negligible by the political class.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{21} Ulriksen, \textit{Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militemakt eller folkeforsvar?}
\textsuperscript{22} Bertel Heurlin sees this as the logical resources of being a small state with limited resources caught in an exposed geographical location of great importance to the superpowers. Heurlin, \textit{Riget, magten og militæret: Dansk forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitik under forsvarskommissionerne af 1988 og af 1997}, 221-228.
\textsuperscript{24} Pharo, "Scandinavia," 203.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Nikolaj Petersen, "The Dilemas of Alliance: Denmark's Fifty Years with NATO," in \textit{A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years (Volume 3)}, ed. Gustav Schmidt (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 281.
\textsuperscript{29} Jens Ringsmose, \textit{Danmarks NATO-omdømme: Fra Prügelkanb til duks} (Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, November 2007), 24-25.
Despite their different military experience, both Norway and Denmark arrived at somewhat similar conclusions about their security and defence policy after the Second World War. Both countries negotiated with Sweden for a possible Scandinavian defence union, but came to the conclusion that such an agreement could not provide the security guaranties and preferential arms deliveries they needed. Norway therefore chose to pursue membership in the Atlantic alliance, followed shortly afterwards by Denmark, and both countries became original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. After having experienced the failure of neutrality in the German attack in April 1940, both concluded that their security would henceforth rest upon a combination of their national defence effort and assistance by the Western Great Powers. In this their paths diverged markedly from their Nordic neighbours, Finland and Sweden.

Joining an alliance represented a sharp break with neutrality for both Norway and Denmark. However, there was nevertheless a stronger sense of foreign policy continuity about the path taken after World War Two in Norway than in Denmark. For Denmark, the break with neutrality and pragmatic accommodation towards Germany was something which changed the conditions of Danish security policy completely. More so than Norway, Danish NATO membership was therefore "half-heartedly" from the start and Denmark was sometimes described, perhaps somewhat unfairly, as the "weakest link" in NATO. Norwegian security policy in the period 1905–1940 had been implicitly tied to the idea of British support for Norwegian independence. The Norwegian historian Olav Riste therefore argues that it is possible to see NATO membership in 1949 not as a vital "turning point" for Norway, but rather also as a codification of the existing national security strategy which was

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33 Petersen, "The Dilemas of Alliance: Denmark's Fifty Years with NATO," 277.

"to ‘nail the Anglo-Saxon powers’ to their presumed responsibility for the security of the area." There was therefore a stronger feeling of continuity in the security and defence policy of Norway than in Denmark after 1945, a factor that may explain the greater enthusiasm for NATO membership in Norway.

Norway and Denmark During the Cold War

Both Norway and Denmark occupied geopolitical positions of great importance in the emerging Cold War. Norway’s long Atlantic coast had great strategic importance for the western powers, as did Denmark’s location by the exit from the Baltic Sea, and its possession of Greenland. Throughout the Cold War both Norway and Denmark were to pursue a balancing act between "the two parameters of ‘integration’ and ‘screening’" in the Western Alliance, e.g. by rejecting allied bases and nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. In this way Norway and Denmark were said to play their part in maintaining a particular "Nordic balance" which ensured that the Nordic countries remained an area of relative low tension during much of the Cold War. By regulating access by their alliance partners to their territory, and especially the United States, Denmark and Norway were also able to exert influence upon their much larger allies.

During the Cold War both countries were part of NATO’s Northern European Command, which also included Schleswig-Holstein and a part of northern Germany. An isolated Warsaw Pact attack on Norway or Denmark was considered unlikely, at least since the late 1960s, but in the event of a general conflict with NATO, there were several reasons

why the Warsaw Pact might want to take control of Danish and Norwegian territory. Such control of Denmark, as well as Southern Norway, would give the Soviet Baltic Fleet the ability to exit the Baltic Sea and operate jointly with the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would give Soviet naval forces in the North Sea access to bases and repair facilities in the Baltic. Denmark would also be an important flank against NATO’s central region, and possibly provide airbases for attacks against NATO naval forces and targets in the British Isles. The Warsaw Pact held considerable forces trained in amphibious operations in the Baltic, and the Soviet Baltic Fleet appeared designed to achieve control with the Baltic and its exit. 2–3 Warsaw Pact divisions in the German Democratic Republic could also be used against Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland.

Northern Norway was strategically important due to its location between the USA and the Soviet Union, and due to its proximity to the Soviet naval bases on the Kola Peninsula. There was considerable advantage for the Soviet Union in gaining control over Northern Norway. It would provide better protection of its Kola bases, resupply points for its Northern Fleet operating in the Atlantic and airbases to support its fleet further west with land-based aircraft. The Soviet Union had considerable forces in the Leningrad Military District, as well as sufficient forces in place on the Kola Peninsula to carry out a surprise attack against parts of Norwegian territory. In case of war, the Norwegian Armed Forces would mostly have operated on their home territory, whereas Danish forces as part of the German led-multinational corps LANDJUT would also have been employed in defence of Schleswig-Holstein. Even Norway’s contribution to NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) would have broken away from the force and returned to national waters in case of a crisis or war at home. Hence while both Norway and Denmark were

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40 There was some concern in Norway that a limited attack was a possibility, especially in the 1960s. Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie 1940–1970: Alliert i krig og fred, 40-46.
43 Except for peacekeeping operations, as well as the brief period 1951–1953 when the combat brigade in Germany was planned to be part of the allied defence of the central front, there existed no plans to use Norwegian forces outside Norwegian territory during the Cold War. Olav Breidlid and Ernst Olav Bjørkevik, De norske styrker i Tyskland 1947-1953: Fra okkupasjon til forsvar av tysk jord, 2 ed. (Oslo: Elanders Forlag, 1997), 219-228. Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tannes, Allianseforsvar i endring: 1970–2000, 85. S.C. Volden, Danske hærordninger efter 2. Verdenskrig i nationalt og international perspektiv (Karup: Hærens Operative Kommando, 2007), 65-67.
44 While it was never stated publicly, this was an unspoken condition for participation in the force. Jacob Børresen et al., Fregatter i storm og stille: Marinens «_langskip» 1960-2007 (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2007), 165-166. It should be noted however that STANAVFORLANT was conceived of within NATO as more of a
"security importers", Danish forces would also have been employed in forward defence positions on German territory whereas the Norwegian Armed Forces were solely charged with fighting on and in defence of Norwegian territory.

Since the late 1960's both countries suffered form a discrepancy between the agreed defence budget and the prescribed force structure of the armed forces. The size of the defence budget was insufficient to modernise the force structure, due to most of the funding being tied to personnel expenditure. This was a legacy of the early Cold War period, when much of the infrastructure and weapons acquisitions costs had been financed by the US and NATO. For instance, Norway only had to cover 60 percent of its defence expenditure during the period 1950–1965. Neither country was able to resolve this problem during the Cold War.

Norway and Denmark also had very similar experience with military operations beyond their own territories during the Cold War. Both countries maintained a combat brigade in Germany in the early Cold War period, first as part of the occupying forces and but later as contributions to allied defence efforts. The Norwegian brigade remained from 1947–1953, whereas the Danish brigade was stationed in Germany from 1947 until 1958. Both the Norwegian and the Danish brigade maintained close cooperation with the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), even if their operational role and command-and-control relationship remained vague.

But while contributing to allied defence in Germany, neither Denmark nor Norway would support efforts to take NATO out of its core area, nor give the organisation new tasks. For the duration of the Cold War, both Norway and Denmark remained vocal advocates for limiting NATO to its collective defence mission in the Euro-Atlantic area, and both countries

politician tool for signalling alliance unity and solidarity than as a real combat force.


49 Breidlid and Bjørkevik, *De norske styrker i Tyskland 1947-1953: Fra okkupasjon til forsvar av tysk jord*, 556-560. In fact, Helge Ø. Pharo finds that despite greater political hesitation about joining the Atlantic Alliance, the Danish military was working closer with the British in Germany by 1947-8 than the Norwegians were. Pharo, "Scandinavia," 203.
opposed enlarging the Atlantic alliance to include new members. Rather than going "out of area" with NATO, Norway and Denmark, together with non-aligned Sweden and Finland, pioneered UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, introducing what Peter Viggo Jakobsen calls "the Nordic Model of peacekeeping". The Nordic states provided about 25 percent of the personnel serving as peacekeepers during the Cold War period, about 125,000 troops in total. These missions can almost all be classified as classic peacekeeping missions, involving only the use of force in self-defence. The one notable exception to this rule was the Norwegian and Danish participation in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in during period 1960 until 1964.

Both Norway and Denmark took on a number of long-running peacekeeping missions. Jointly they provided a battalion (DANOR) for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Gaza 1957–1967. Separately Norway provided an infantry battalion (NORBATT), as well as initially a medical and a maintenance company plus a helicopter detachment, for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 1978 until 1998, and Denmark provided an infantry battalion for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from 1964 until 1994.

The Armed Forces During the Cold War

If we compare the state of Norway’s and Denmark’s armed forces at the very end of the Cold War, we come to the conclusion that they were very similar but with a few interesting differences. Both had peacetime structures designed as training establishments, producing soldiers who after the end of their service joined the reserve formations making up the bulk of the armed forces. Since 1973 Denmark had supplemented the conscripted units by employing some formations composed of enlisted soldiers. In the peacetime establishment Norway and

55 Volden, Danske hærdninger efter 2. Verdenskrig i nationalt og international perspektiv, 36.
Denmark had about the same number of active troops. Conscripts made up about 2/3 of the active Norwegian forces but only 1/3 of the active Danish troops.\(^{57}\)

**Table 1: Conscripts From a Youth Cohort of 18 in 1970/71 – 1998**

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conscripts</td>
<td>27,850 (90%)</td>
<td>28,250 (88%)</td>
<td>21,800 (64%)</td>
<td>22,700 (84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From cohort</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conscripts</td>
<td>24,400 (57%)</td>
<td>10,550 (27%)</td>
<td>9,215 (24%)</td>
<td>7,900 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From cohort</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
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As shown in Table 1, conscription was far more universal in Norway than in Denmark. Another major difference between the countries was in the size and composition of their forces. Norway could mobilize almost three times the number of reserves that Denmark could, despite Denmark having a larger population than Norway. Conversely, the Danish Army was considerably more mechanized than the Norwegian Army, having twice the number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Meanwhile, the Norwegian Navy was significantly larger than the Danish, having three times as many submarines and almost twice as many major surface combatants. Finally, the two countries’ air forces were quite evenly matched in terms of the number and quality of combat aircraft available.\(^{58}\)

The differences in the structure of the two countries’ armed forces can to some extend be explained by their different geography. Norway’s land area covers 324,000 km\(^2\) while Denmark only covers 43,000 km\(^2\).\(^{59}\) As the Norwegian government frequently pointed out during the Cold War, with limited resources the Norwegian Armed Forces had to defend a

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\(^{58}\) Ibid.

\(^{59}\) This only includes the continental parts of Denmark and Norway. The Norwegian islands of Svalbard and Jan Mayen are not included, nor are the dependencies of Bouvet Island and Peter I Island. For Denmark the incorporated areas of Greenland and the Faeroe islands are also not counted. "Denmark," in *The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 17* (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 1993), 227. "Norway," in *The New Encyclopædia Britannica, Volume 24* (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc, 1993), 1082.
land area equal to the combined territory of Denmark, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. The 1974 Defence Commission noted that Norway’s economic and population base was modest in comparison with the territory the country needed to defend. Cold War era security analysts considered the defence of such a huge territory to be an "unenviable task". As expressed by the Inspector-General of the Norwegian Army in 1992, the choice of a militia system was logical because the army "defend an area three times the size of England, with a population barely half that of London". Under such circumstances only total utilization of available manpower was deemed sufficient.

In addition to being much larger than Denmark, Norway also had very different terrain. As stated in one Cold War era textbook on military defence in the Nordic states, while Denmark had an "open landscape […] favourable for air landing and mechanized troops", Norway possesses an excellent defensive terrain due to "a nearly tree-less alpine landscape descending into the sea". This rugged landscape was said to be particularly suitable for light infantry. In order to exploit this favourable defensive terrain most of the high-end Norwegian forces were concentrated in the mountainous county of Troms, with only a small "trip-wire" force deployed nearer the Russian border. Norway also had a considerably longer coastline than Denmark (25,148 km to 7314 km), and from the late 1970’s claimed partially disputed maritime economic zones of approximately 2 million km², six times the area of continental Norway. All this would seem to offer good military reasons for Norway’s larger wartime forces, less mechanized army and larger navy.

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65 Ibid., 34.
68 While Denmark also had Greenland and the Faeroe Islands in the Atlantic, which their Navy patrolled, there was no attempt from Denmark to pretend that these dependencies could in fact be defended. Klaus Carsten Pedersen, "Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy," in The Nordic Countries and the European
There were, however, also important political reasons for the high number of conscripts. In order to construct a national and unifying military that would conscript nearly all able-bodied men, the Norwegian Armed Forces chose a defensive military strategy designed around quantity not quality. Ståle Ulriksen goes as far as to claim that Norway had a military structure "constructed for nation-building – not warfare". Critical shortage of equipment meant that only 2–3 of the army’s 13 mobilization brigades were adequately equipped at the end of the Cold War, and their training standards left much to be desired. The need to equip and train such a large reserve force meant that even the few standing forces were never equipped with modern weaponry. Some of the same points could however be applied to the Danish mobilization units. The higher number of males conscripted gave the Norwegian military a more important role as a "nation-building" institution than the Danish Armed Force, but it did not necessarily increase its combat value proportionally.

Nevertheless, the Norwegian political establishment seemed to have had more faith in the value of their military forces than did the Danish political class. It was the mantra of the Norwegian political leadership that the Armed Forces had to be prepared to defend the country until allied reinforcements could arrive. No similar mantra existed in Denmark, where few policymakers seemed to envisage that the Danish military would be able to defend


Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?, 228. Jørgen Berggrav similarly argue that a defensive strategy was chosen because it was the one conscription was most suitable to produce. Jørgen Berggrav, "Forsvarets rolle i norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk etter 1949," in Finsk og Norsk forsvar: Alltid for samme formål - alltid med ulik kurs?, ed. Arne Olav Brundtland (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1996), 79.


Henning Sørensen argues that since the 1970s, the Danish armed forces had been conscripting too few able-bodied men too fulfil the task of nation building. Henning Sørensen, "Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments," Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 316. See also Perti Joenniemi, "Farewell to Conscription? The Case of Denmark," in The Changing Face of European Conscription, ed. Perti Joenniemi (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006).

the country that long.\textsuperscript{77} The Danish Chiefs of Defences were also systematically less optimistic than their Norwegian counterparts.\textsuperscript{78}

It is telling that in international relations lingo the term "Denmarkization" came to refer to a country seen as free-riding on the efforts of others in a military alliance.\textsuperscript{79} The US had hoped that Norway could serve as a model for Denmark, which was said to be lacking in alliance solidarity.\textsuperscript{80} In fact, the Norwegian government itself sometimes criticised its southern neighbour for its lack of alliance loyalty and effort.\textsuperscript{81} In the early Cold War, Norwegian officials spoke of a "Danish problem", and sought to bolster Danish moral while bargaining to increase Danish defence efforts.\textsuperscript{82} Despite these efforts, Norway consistently spent more on defence than Denmark throughout the Cold War, both in relative and absolute terms. Denmark was normally the lowest spender amongst the NATO countries in percentage of GDP.\textsuperscript{83} In the 1985–1989 period defence spending in Norway was almost 3 percent of GDP, whereas in Denmark it was closer to 2.2 percent.\textsuperscript{84} In 1990 Denmark spent $2.2 billion compared to Norway's $3.4 billion on defence,\textsuperscript{85} and Norway was able to allocate a much larger share of its defence expenditure on investments in new equipment and infrastructure than Denmark was.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{77} Defending the country during the Cold War meant being capable of holding the invading Warsaw Pact forces off until allied reinforcements could arrive. It was believed in Norway that the Norwegian forces should and could be capable of doing this, unlike in Denmark. Arne Olav Brundtland, "Nordiske aspekter ved norsk sikkerhetspolitikk," in Norsk utenrikspolitikk, ed. Johan Jurgen Holst and Daniel Heradstveit (Oslo: Tano, 1985), 126. This was again not a formal policy difference, but one that was mostly unspoken.


\textsuperscript{81} Erich Hauser, "Enough Deterrence to Deter?," in NATO's Defence of the North, ed. Eric Grove, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 1 (London: Brassey’s, 1989), 96.


\textsuperscript{84} NATO Defence Policy and Planning Division, "NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence," (Brussels: NATO, 9 June 2005), Table 3: Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product, 7.


\textsuperscript{86} NATO Defence Policy and Planning Division, "NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence," Table 5: Distribution of total defence expenditures by category, 9.
Conclusion: Norway the Good, Optimistic Ally; Denmark the Bad Defeatist?

As shown above, many observers of Danish defence policy view the low mobilisation of personnel and resources for the Danish Armed Force in the Cold War as an indication that Denmark’s armed forces were thought of as being more or less symbolic. As pointed out by Helge Pharo, this was never explicitly stated in government publications or statements during the Cold War, but nevertheless existed as an "unspoken assumption". Bertel Heurlin finds a similar unspoken determinism in Danish defence policy at the end of the Cold War. This negative and dismissive view of the utility of the military meant the Danish Armed Forces were a low priority during the Cold War. It is perhaps indicative of this defeatism that the controversial right-wing politician Mogens Glistrup was able to obtain 12 percent of the Danish vote in 1973 after he suggested replacing the Danish Armed Forces with a telephone answering machine proclaiming Denmark’s surrender in Russian. In contrast, the Norwegian Armed Forces were able to mobilise more personnel and received more resources. A strong and credible national defence was held to be of great importance by Norwegian policymakers. Put very polemically, we can say that in the context of the Cold War, Denmark was the "bad boy" of the NATO class, whereas Norway was considered a "good boy" by comparison.

This was to change in the post-Cold War period, when the willingness and ability to participate in international military operations abroad became the new measuring stick for NATO member states. Whereas Norway had been a more enthusiastic member of the "old" alliance than its southern neighbour, Denmark would become a much more active proponent of the "new" NATO. While Norway had led Denmark into the Atlantic alliance in 1949, after 1990 Denmark would take the lead whereas Norway would lag behind.

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91 Ringsmose, Danmarks NATO-omdømme: Fra Prügelkanb til dukks. Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie 1940–1970: Alliert i krig og fred, 226. Like most NATO countries, Norway was also frequently subjected to criticism for its supposedly inadequate contributions to allied defence, however not to the extend Denmark was.
CHAPTER 2

DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR

In the aftermath of the Cold War both the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces underwent radical change. From being manpower intensive territorial defence forces intended to fight World War III, they became smaller, more capital intensive forces capable of expeditionary operations. In this new post-Cold War world PSOs in distant theatres of operations became a major day-to-day preoccupation for Danish and Norwegian soldiers. This change was not easy or uncontroversial in either country, but nevertheless it was carried out at very different speeds in the two entities. While Denmark began the transition to expeditionary defence as early as the beginning of the 1990s, Norway did not follow suit until a decade later.

This chapter charts the transformation of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces in the first decade after the Cold War, and by doing so it illustrates how these two traditionally similar units proceeded to reform their militaries at such different speeds, and employ them in such very different ways.

Reforming the Armed Forces After the Cold War 1990–1994

Both Norway and Denmark established defence commissions at the end-stage of the Cold War, who recommended broadly speaking very similar things. The Danish commission was appointed in July 1988 in order to assess what changes, if any, were required in the organisation of the Danish defence forces in peace as well as in war.¹ Submitting its findings in December 1989, the commission sketched out a "best case" and "worst case" scenario, depending upon whether the ongoing negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) were concluded successfully. The enactment of these treaties was seen as very beneficial for the Western Alliance in general, and for the defensibility of Denmark in particular. The former scenario was considered much more likely than the latter.² The commission did not envisage any

¹ Forsvarskommissionen af 1988, Forsvaret i 90'erne, 8.
² Ibid., 132-136.
radical changes in the role assigned to the Danish military, but moved to rationalise the Danish Armed Forces.

Most noticeable in operational terms was the recommendation to scrap the F-35 Draken aircraft and concentrate upon the F-16. As agreed previously in the March 1989 Defence Agreement, the Navy was to rationalise by concentrating its activities, and by scrapping the two elderly Peder Skram-class frigates, 6 Søløven-class missile torpedo boats (MTBs), and several coastguard and minesweeper ships. The Army was the least affected service. It was to draft more conscripts than previously, increasing its peacetime size somewhat. Costs were to be cut by concentrating the army’s regiments in fewer locations, which triggered heavy protests from the areas affected by base closures. Altogether the 1988 Defence Commission represented a rationalisation of the Danish defence establishment, but hardly any radical departure from the past in terms of mission and organisation. Due to uncertainties about international developments, decisions were effectively postponed.

In Norway, a Defence Commission was also assigned to chart the way forward. The commission was appointed in January 1990, and submitted its findings in March 1992. Despite the Norwegian Defence Commission delivering its findings over two years after the Danish commission, it contained the same wary conservatism. Considering the enormous changes that had taken place in Europe during these two years, this was remarkable, especially considering that evaluating the implication of the new developments in "Eastern Europe and East/West relations" for Norwegian defence was an important part of the commission’s mandate. The commission chose to increase the focus on the defence of Northern Norway, due to the improved security for Southern Norway caused by the changes in Eastern Europe. Instability in and conflict with Russia were seen as the main security

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3 Ibid., 205-240.
6 Forsvarskommissionen af 1988, Forsvaret i 90'erne, 140-141.
7 Volden, Danske hærordninger efter 2. Verdenskrig i nationalt og international perspektiv, 79.
challenges. The planned wartime Army was to be reduced from 13 to 6 brigades and from 28 to 17 independent battalions, the reduced land forces being more heavily mechanized than before. The Navy was cut from 36 to 22 MTBs and 29 to 13 coastal artillery fortresses. The Air Force was still to retain its present size of about 80 fighter aircrafts.

Altogether the Norwegian defence commission suggested, like its Danish counterpart, moving cautiously into the future. While rationalising the Armed Forces to make more room for investments in new equipment, neither of them heralded any radical changes in the organisation and mission of the Armed Forces. But about the same time as this cautious Norwegian defence commission was delivering its findings, a new course was already being charted for the Danish Armed Forces.

In November 1991 NATO’s heads of state and government had enacted a new Strategic Concept for the alliance. It envisaged a new conventional force structure for member states, dividing their force on the one hand into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), which would be mobile and flexible, and on the other hand into more traditional in-place Main Defence Forces (MDF). While both Norway and Denmark responded positively to the new NATO Strategic Concept, Denmark was to go much further towards contributing to the alliance reaction forces than Norway.

The reorientation towards expeditionary defence in Denmark began with the November 1992 Defence Agreement for 1993–1994. This defence agreement differed from the ones negotiated during the Cold War, as it was based on the absence of a defined military threat. The risk of an invasion of Danish territory was considered close to zero. It prompted a shift of emphasis away from territorial defence towards international operations, most noticeably by moving to establish a Danish International Brigade (DIB) of 4,500 soldiers. The idea of setting up brigade-sized forces for international operations had been present in the Danish defence discourse for at least a few years, most noticeably being proposed by the Danish military unions, Centralforeningen for stampersonel (CS) and Hærens Konstabel- og Forsvarkommisjonen av 1990, NOU 1992: 12. Forsvarkommisjonen av 1990, 119-121.

Ibid., 194-197. Despite the downsizing of the army, the Norwegian Chief of Defence estimated that his available funds would not be sufficient to raise the quality of the armed forces to the level desirable. ———, NOU 1992: 12. Forsvarkommisjonen av 1990, 163.


Korporalforening (HKKF) in September 1990. The defence minister’s Advisory and Analysis Group (RAG), mentioned a brigade-sized unit for NATO’s RRF as one possible contribution, and in October the RAG submitted a report which was to become the basis for the November 1992 Defence Agreement setting up the DIB.

Parallel with the creation of the DIB, Denmark also introduced the obligation for non-conscripted members of the Armed Forces to serve in military operations abroad. From January 1994, all Danish regular military personal (and some civilians) had to indicate whether they wanted to limit their international service to only the traditional missions, making henceforth nearly all regular members of the Danish Armed Forces eligible for deployment in international operations. A similar law allowing the Norwegian government to order officers to participate in international operations was passed by the Norwegian Parliament in February 1996, but it only came into effect from January 1999. The law only applied for officers entering the Armed Forces from January 1999, and was only to apply when sufficient volunteers were lacking. This arrangement proved transitory, as in March 2004 new legislation extended the duty to participate in international military operations to all regular serving members in the Norwegian Armed Forces. This was almost exactly 10 years after Denmark had introduced the same principle.

The DIB was to be able to participate in "conflict-preventing, peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian and other similar operations on a mandate from the UN or the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)." In this capacity, it replaced

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the earlier Danish commitment from 1964 to maintain a permanent Danish military force available for use by the United Nations. Until the DIBs establishment Danish peacekeeping had been organised "ad-hoc" and "outside the normal Army structure", just like in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The DIB would also be available as a rapid-reaction brigade for NATO, and from 1995 it was to contribute to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) by potentially being deployed as part of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division. The brigade would be structured as a Danish armoured infantry brigade, with about 20 percent regular personnel and 80 percent being former conscripts who had signed a three year readiness contract with the Armed Forces. Reaction time was 7 days for the headquarters elements, and 14 days for the brigade as a whole. The brigade would enable Denmark to maintain 1,500 soldiers continuously in international military operations abroad. The Danish Navy would have one corvette, one submarine and two mine clearing vessels as NATO IRF and RRF contributions, the Air Force one F-16 squadron and a HAWK surface-to-air squadron.

In December 1993 the Danish Parliament passed a new Defence Act stating explicitly that there was now no direct military threat to Danish existence, integrity, and sovereignty. The new act committed the Armed Forces to participate in "conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace making [and] humanitarian missions" without any geographical limitations, as well as "crisis management and defence within NATO's area". The law marked a shift towards a

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23 Ibid.
25 NATO had November 1991 decided upon a new Strategic Concept for the alliance. Among other things it divided member states force into three categories with various levels of readiness: Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF), Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) and Main Defence Forces (MDF). The North Atlantic Council, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council " (8 November 1991).
26 Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 178-180. It should be noted that both Danish and British officers seriously questioned whether the DIB would have been able to meet the response time of the ARRC, and if they would have been able to work effectively as part of the unit. Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, 98. Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and Doctrines, 157. The goal of having 20/80 regular vs. readiness contract personnel was never meet. The real figure was about 30/70. Søren Nørby, Det danske forsvar: Opgaver, udstyr og mandskab i det nye årtusind (Copenhagen: Aschehoug Dansk Forlag, 2006), 16.
27 Nørby, Det danske forsvar: Opgaver, udstyr og mandskab i det nye årtusind, 16.
29 Forsvarskommissionen af 1997, "Lov Nr. 909 af 8. december 1993 om forsvarets formål, opgaver og organisation m.v.," in Fremtidens forsvar: Bilagsbinder 2 (Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 1998), 1-6. Petersen, "Adapting to change: Danish Security Policy after the Cold War," 102. A report from the foreign ministry the same year had already concluded that Denmark faced new challenges and opportunities, and that these would be less military in character and more political, economic, social, environmental, religious and ethnic. Udenrigsministeriet, Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik - Dansk udenrigspolitik på vej mod år 2000 (Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet, June 1993), III.
much wider definition of security, and towards viewing the Danish Armed Forces as a useful foreign policy tool rather than an instrument of last resort, intended solely to ensure national survival.\textsuperscript{31}

Despite the massive changes that had taken place in the years 1989–1991, Norway did not, like Denmark, move to shift focus from invasion defence towards participating in international operations. The findings of the Norwegian 1990 Defence Commission were not substantially revised after its publication, as the 1988 Defence Commission was in Denmark. When the Norwegian government passed its new Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 1994–1998 in January 1993, it based it almost entirely upon the 1990 Defence Commission’s findings.\textsuperscript{32} While talking about substantial change in regional and global politics, the Norwegian government expressed its view that the objectives of Norway’s security policy remained unchanged. Norway remained a neighbour to one of the largest military concentrations in the world, and therefore the defence of Northern Norway should remain the dimensioning task of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{33} The changes made in the size and organisation of the Armed Forces where almost entirely due to lack of resources to sustain the Cold War structure, rather than any desire to orientate the military towards new tasks.\textsuperscript{34}

In the early 1990s the army introduced a new concept, manoeuvre warfare doctrine, but this did not create any wish within the organisation to reduce the overall size or number of wartime brigades. Rather, a greater differentiation of the quality of the army’s brigades was planned in order to make them capable of performing their assigned role within the new concept. The central problem of the army’s doctrine remained how to fight a numerically superior enemy invading Norwegian territory.\textsuperscript{35} Through the early and mid 1990s a number of revisions were made in favour of emphasising the importance of having the Armed Forces contribute to international operations, but overall the changes in the structure of the armed were of a relatively minor and incremental nature.\textsuperscript{36} Norway decided to contribute to NATO’s

\textsuperscript{31} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen: Dansk forsvars-politik fra Murens fald til Kosovo}, 180-182.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 8-14.
\textsuperscript{34} Ulriksen, \textit{Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?}, 264-265. Already in the 1970s the 1974 Defence Commission had cautioned that failure to increase defence spending would result in the inability to modernise the armed forces, but this had not been realised. Forsvarskommisjonen av 1974, \textit{NOU 1978: 9}.
\textsuperscript{36} Neumann and Ulriksen, "Norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiikk," 101-103.
IRF with an infantry battalion, an F-16 squadron, a frigate and two mine clearing vessels. In addition, the number of troops available for UN operations was increased from 1,300 to 2,000. Unlike the DIB, the Norwegian UN readiness forces were only trained, organised and equipped to be suitable for classical peacekeeping, not warfighting.


The development of the Danish and Norwegian force posture after the Cold War cannot be understood in isolation from developments in international relations in the 1990s. The broad changes taking place in the world, especially the winding down of the East-West confrontation, opened the way for a wave of UN interventions around the world. These were to be very different from the traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping missions, in which the Scandinavian countries had participated from the start. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, as well as the unravelling of Yugoslavia starting in June 1991, offered Norway and Denmark the opportunity to reorient their armed forces towards what was for them a new practice in international relations, that of using their armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. Ultimately, only Denmark took this turn wholeheartedly, while Norway hesitantly followed up the rear.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Denmark and Norway came under pressure to contribute to the UN coalition being amassed in the region. The most direct military contribution the two countries would consider at this time was towards upholding Security Council resolution 665, which called upon UN member states to uphold the embargo against Iraq. A day after the request was made by the Security Council the Danish government conferred with members of the opposition and quickly decided to contribute a *Nils Juel* class corvette to enforce the embargo, the *KDM Olfert Fischer*. The Danes conferred with their

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40 While the UN charter did not make any specific mention of these "traditional" peacekeeping missions, they were generally assumed to fall under Chapter VI of the UN charter. The institution itself was a product of the inertia in the Security Council produced by the Cold War, which made it impossible for the UN to function according to the intentions of the Charter. James Mayall, "Introduction," in *United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004*, ed. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 6-11. Norway and Denmark provided a joint battalion (DANNOR) for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai in 1956. Skogrand, *Norsk Forsvarshistorie 1940–1970: Alliert i krig og fred*, 233-234.
Norwegian counterparts, who were less enthusiastic about the prospect of participating in the Gulf embargo.\textsuperscript{42} The Norwegian government was left in the position of having to respond to the Danish initiative, and the Danes now requested that Norway either provide a navy vessel or a supply ship for the Danish corvette. Norway decided to contribute a Coast Guard vessel, \textit{KV Andenes}, as a supply and support ship to the Danish corvette.\textsuperscript{43} Norway also contributed a medical company (NORMEDCOY) from the Norwegian UN-reaction force to the Gulf coalition.\textsuperscript{44}

The Danish contribution was minor, but important in principle. It was the first time that an armed unit from the country had been sent "out-of-area" outside a UN peacekeeping context.\textsuperscript{45} The Norwegian contribution was less groundbreaking. The Norwegian government made a conscious decision not to send combat units, just support units and humanitarian and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{46} This followed the established Norwegian pattern of contributing support units to UN coalitions, such as a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH) in the Korean War.\textsuperscript{47}

Both Norway and Denmark were to become involved in enforcing the UN arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia through NATO’s standing naval forces. From June 1992 NATO, together with the Western European Union (WEU), began to enforce the arms embargo.\textsuperscript{48} A Norwegian frigate was present in the Adriatic in the autumn of 1992 (\textit{KNM Bergen}), the autumn of 1993 (\textit{KNM Narvik}) and in two periods in 1994 and 1995 (\textit{KNM Narvik}).\textsuperscript{49} Denmark participated with a corvette, initially the \textit{KDM Niels Juel} in June 1993, replaced by the \textit{KDM Peter Tordenskiold} in August 1993 and later the \textit{KDM Oliver Fischer} in 1994.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{45} Petersen, "Adapting to change: Danish Security Policy after the Cold War," 108. If one ignores the criteria of the deployment being a non-UN peacekeeping operation, the some would argue that the deployment of 132 Danish soldiers to Namibia in 1989 was in fact the start of Danish military activism. Lars R. Møller, \textit{Det danske Pearl Harbor: Forsvaret på randen af sammenbrud} (Copenhagen: Informations Forlag, 2008), 55-56.
\textsuperscript{48} Ettore Greco, \textit{The Evolving Partnership Between the United Nations and NATO: Lessons From the Yugoslav Experience} (1997), 3.2.1 Naval Embargo.
While naval deployment was handled through NATO, the ground forces in Yugoslavia were initially a more traditional UN Chapter VI peacekeeping force. In February 1992 the UN Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in order to "create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis". Denmark received a UN request to contribute to UNPROFOR in March 1992, and decided to contribute a reinforced battalion with five manoeuvre companies and a support company, a total of some 940 soldiers. Norway contributed a transport control unit of about 100 troops, 30 civilian police, a few military observers and some military police (143 persons in total).

Both Norway and Denmark contributed to the Nordic Battalion (NORDBAT) in Macedonia, established in March 1993, but the Norwegians made by far the largest contributions. Norway sent a manoeuvre company and parts of the joint staff company (218 troops total). The Danish contribution was limited to the commander of UNPROFOR’s Macedonian Command, Brigade General F. Særmark-Thomsen, six staff officers and a UN observer. The deployment in Macedonia was relatively uneventful, and the Norwegian contribution was scaled down to about 30 men from August 1994.

(oversigt): Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om dansk deltagelse i den internationale maritime embargo mod det tidligere Jugoslavien.,” (12 April 1994).


53 Rasmussen, For fredens skyld, 15-18. The decision to participate was taken by the government, although later inquiries revealed that according to the Danish constitution UN peacekeeping missions need parliamentary approval. Hækkerup, Pæ skansen: Dansk forsvarsbevægelse fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 103.

54 Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tannes, Allianseforsvar i endring: 1970–2000, 203. Norway also had a staff company as part of UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from December 1992 until March 1994, varying in size from 77 to 140 soldiers. Gjeseth, Hæren i omvending 1990–2008, 158-159. While the forces were not a combat unit, as in Bosnia the personnel nevertheless experienced very challenging situations. See e.g. the story of one Norwegian soldier serving in UNOSOM I and II in Haakon Bull-Hansen, I krig for fred: 12 personlige fortellinger fra Koreakrigen til Afghanistan (Oslo: Kagge Forlag AS, 2008), 191-210. For a general overview of the challenges facing western forces in Somalia in the early 1990s, see Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, "Humanitarians or Warriors? Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,” in Motivating soldiers : morale or mutiny, ed. Peter Karsten (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1998).


56 Rasmussen, For fredens skyld, 21-22. For a detailed and first-hand account of the Danish experience in Macedonia, see the book by Finn Særmark-Thomsen, Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv (Copenhagen: Eget Forlag, 2008), 81-126.

Things were considerably less peaceful for the Danish units in Croatia and Bosnia. In April 1993 it was decided to reinforce the Danish contingent with UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia. The Danish Parliament voted to despatch additional sanitation, armoured transport, heavy mortars and anti-tank rockets, all in order to improve the forces’ security and their ability to perform the mission. The decision meant that the Danish forces in the theatre became more robust, and yet more robustness was to come. In August 1993 the Danish Parliament voted to despatch an armoured squadron to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be part of NORDBAT II. Possessing 10 Leopard 1 MBTs, this represented the first time in history that tanks where deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force. This force was to be involved in the heaviest fighting any Nordic military unit had seen since the Second World War. In a single engagement on 29th of April 1994 Danish tanks fired 72 main-gun tank rounds in anger, reputedly killing as many as 150 members of the Bosnian Serbian Army in the engagement. This operation was widely reported in the international press, and contributed to changing the international perception of the Danish Armed Forces. Whereas previously Denmark was thought of as the "peace-loving, foot-dragging footnote country", it now gained a more martial reputation.

The Norwegian contribution on the ground in Bosnia was less robust: a medical company and a helicopter detachment (NORAIR). In June 1994 it was decided to send a Norwegian logistical battalion to Bosnia, which was in place in theatre about three months later. It was the Norwegian government’s policy to restrict Norwegian participation in peacemaking operations only to support units, such as engineers, maintenance, logistics or 58 59 60 61 62

58 The difference in security environment is startling when one compares the yearbooks from Bosnia and Macedonia. For Bosnia see Anders Person, Nordbat 2 i Bosnien 1993–94 (Stockholm: Stellan Ståls Tryckerier AB, 1994). For Macedonia, the last yearbook from UNPREDEP gives an overview of the Nordic UN presence in FYMOR since 1993. Björn Carlsson and Adam Folcker, The Last of the Nordic Peacekeepers (Karlsborg: UNPREDEP, 1999).

59 Forsvarsministeren (Hans Hækkerup), "1992-93 - B 79 (oversigt): Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om at øge sikkerheden hos det danske personel ved FN's fredsbekræftende styrke i det forhenværende Jugoslavien (UNPROFOR) samt udvide det danske bidrag til UNPROFOR's.," (1 April 1993). Se also Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 103. The decision did not prevent the Danish forces in Croatia from being vulnerable however. Two Danish soldiers were killed and eight wounded 10 August 1995 when the Croatian army attacked the breakaway Republic of Krajina. Lyng et al., Ved forenede kræfter: Forsvarets øverste militære ledelse, Forsvarschefsemdet og forsvarets udvikling 1950–2000, 231.

60 Rasmussen, For fredens skyld, 6-7.

61 Møller, Operation Bollebank: Soldater i kamp, 276-299. In a subsequent engagement another 20 tank rounds where fired, and two Bosnian Serb tanks and an anti-tank gun were possibly destroyed. ———, Operation Bollebank: Soldater i kamp, 368-373. See also the then Senior Sergeant Erik Kirk’s account of the battle in Ole Luk Sørensen, Kasper Støgaard, and Kjeld G.H. Hillingsø, Udsendinge for fred: Danske soldater i internationale konflikter (Copenhagen: Documentas, 2006), 124-131.


medical units. First and foremost the Norwegians wanted to avoid peace enforcement and concentrate on traditional UN peacekeeping tasks, where Norway was thought to have certain comparative advantages.65

In December 1995 the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced UNPROFOR in Bosnia. IFOR numbered 60,000 troops, and was much more strongly equipped both in weaponry and rules of engagement (ROE) than UNPROFOR.66 Both Norway and Denmark agreed to have their UNPROFOR forces "switch hats" and become part of IFOR. The forces became part of a joint Nordic-Polish (NORPOL) Brigade. Denmark contributed a manoeuvre battalion with one mechanized and one armoured company, numbering approximately 800 troops in total.67 Norway contributed a supply battalion and a medical company, totalling 921 troops.68 With the change from IFOR to Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 1996 came an important change in Norway’s participation in a PSO. For the first time, combat units were to be deployed in a peace enforcement operation.69 The Norwegian government decided to contribute a mechanized infantry battalion and an independent mechanized infantry company (Telemark Kompani). The battalion was in place by February 1997. By sending combat units it was hoped that the forces would be more visible, and hence give more political influence.70 Less visibly, Norwegian Special Operations Forces were deployed in the Balkans from 1996 onwards. This represented a new, robust capability, as well as one of the first deployments of standing, combat ready army units in international operations.71

In March 1997 Italy offered to lead a multinational intervention force to stabilize Albania, know as operation Alba.72 Denmark participated in the operation with a light reconnaissance squadron (59 soldiers) integrated into a French infantry regiment. This participation was possible because the Danish unit was a standing, volunteer unit with light

65 Ibid., 143.
69 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, 147.
72 The operation was authorised by the UN Security council. United Nations Security Council, "RESOLUTION 1101 (1997)," (28 March 1997).
equipment, which made it possible to deploy it rapidly.\textsuperscript{73} The cooperation with the French worked well, and this experience contributed to the decision to work with the French again in Kosovo two years later.\textsuperscript{74} Norway chose not to participate in the \textit{ad hoc} coalition in Albania, and in any case had few standing-high readiness units suitable for such a deployment.

In February 1998 an armed insurgency broke out in Kosovo, a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Western diplomacy failed to defuse the conflict, which by early 1999 had become an outright civil war.\textsuperscript{75} On 24 March 1999 NATO aircraft started attacking targets in the FRY. The object of the bombing campaign was, according to most European leaders, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused by a vicious campaign of persecution by FRY military and paramilitary forces against the Kosovar Albanian population.\textsuperscript{76} Both Denmark and Norway contributed combat aircrafts to the air campaign. Denmark contributed four operational F-16s, plus two reserve aircrafts, and the Danish aircraft were employed in both air-to-air and air-to-ground role.\textsuperscript{77} Norway made a similar contribution, and operated together with the Danish Air Force from the Grazzanise base in Italy. However, it did not prove possible to use the Norwegian F-16s in an air-to-ground role. Norway therefore avoided the more controversial role of attacking ground targets.\textsuperscript{78} There were signs of increasing Norwegian "robustness" in 1999. The Norwegian Army Special Operations Forces, \textit{Hærens jegerkommando} (HJK), were among the first units to enter Pristina as part of a British Special Forces unit.\textsuperscript{79}

Both Norway and Denmark thereafter chose to make a battalion-sized contribution to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which moved into the province after the Yugoslavian force had agreed to withdraw. It proved challenging for Denmark to contribute a battalion to KFOR (approximately 875 soldiers) while simultaneously having a battalion in SFOR, and the size of the Danish battalion in Kosovo had to be reduced to about 500 soldiers in February

\textsuperscript{74} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo}, 125-128.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 85-98. US President Clinton interpreted the objective of the air campaign somewhat wider, including to "to seriously damage the Serbian military’s capacity" and to prevent NATO from being discredited. President Clinton: "Address to the Nation", Washington, DC, 24 March 1999 in Marc Weller, \textit{The Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities}, International Documents and Analysis, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Documents and Analysis Publishing, 1999), 498-499.
\textsuperscript{77} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo}, 130-131.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 225. The Norwegian Journalist Tom Bakkeli characterises this as the "international breakthrough" of the Norwegian Special Forces. The Norwegian SOF unit was requested specially by the senior British commander in Kosovo, General Michael Jackson. Tom Bakkeli, \textit{Norges hemmelige krigere: Kommandosoldater i kamp mot terror} (Oslo: Kagge Forlag AS, 2007), 220-238.
2001.\textsuperscript{80} Norway contributed a reinforced mechanized battalion (approximately 1200 soldiers), but experienced problems getting the unit ready despite winding down the deployment in Bosnia at the same time.\textsuperscript{81} The decision to deploy was taken on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of June 1999, but the battalion was not fully deployed in Kosovo until the 12\textsuperscript{th} of October 1999.\textsuperscript{82} The Norwegian deployment hence took nearly four months. While it was not a secret that Norway had never been able to fulfil NATO's IRF reaction-time requirement, which was readily admitted by the government already before the Kosovo deployment, four months was considered far too long a reaction time.\textsuperscript{83} Denmark also struggled with the reaction-time requirement, and it took eight weeks to deploy the Danish DIB battalion in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{84} In particular, Denmark had problems with personnel on readiness contracts that refused to go when called up for service.\textsuperscript{85} Both in Denmark and in Norway, the performance of the armed forces during the Kosovo War thus strengthened the argument that more regular, standing units with contracted personnel were needed if the military was to be capable of rapidly responding to this kind of crisis.

**SHIRBRIG and the Baltic States**

The Balkans were not the only area in which the Danes were pushing to use their military as a foreign policy tool. Denmark also took the lead, along with Canada and the Netherlands, in developing high-readiness forces for the UN. In January 1995 Denmark announced that it would establish a working group to develop a Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). The brigade would consist of 4,000–5,000

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\textsuperscript{84} Both Norway and Denmark could defend themselves by arguing that as Kosovo was not a NATO Article 5 mission, the reaction time requirements of IRF and RRF NATO force categories did not apply. Henning-A.Frantzen, "NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991-1999: Policies and Doctrines. A Study of NATO and Britain, Canada, and Denmark" (Ph.D in War Studies, King's College, University of London, March 2003), 201. Thought the DIB was assigned to the ARRC, which led the operation in Kosovo, the DIB did not come under its operational command for this mission. Thomas-Durell Young, *Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997), 31-33.

\textsuperscript{85} Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?*, 98.
troops, and have a reaction time of 15–30 days. By 1999 11 countries had chosen to participate, and the brigade was declared available to the UN from January 2000. While Norway was a signatory country, it was the Danish minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup who had been the most active promoter of SHIRBRIG. The Danes where initially told that Norway had trouble in meeting the expected reaction time. While the Norwegian Foreign Ministry enthusiastically wanted to make a contribution, the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces viewed the initiative as being incompatible with Norway’s role in the alliance and military posture. The Norwegian contribution to the SHIRBRIG force pool was limited to a helicopter detachment, whereas Denmark contributed part of the brigade headquarters, a reconnaissance squadron and a military police company.

The issue of the Baltic countries provides another good example of Danish assertiveness and Norwegian carefulness. Denmark had long taken an interest in the independence of the Baltic states, and, after World War One, a Danish volunteer unit had fought in Estonia and Latvia against the Bolsheviks. Towards the end of the Cold War Denmark had been an early and outspoken supporter of the Baltic movement for independence, and continued to take a leading role after independence, whereas Norway chose to be more careful in its support. Danish politicians kept in close personal contact with the leaders of the independence movement in the Baltic countries, and Denmark provided significant material and moral aid to the movement. After independence, Denmark took the lead on military cooperation with the newly independent states, while Norway chose

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87 Hækkerup, *På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo*, 89.
88 Joachim Koops and Johannes Varwick, *Ten Years of SHIRBRIG: Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany*, GPPi Research Paper Series No. 11 (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2008), 9-10.
91 The unit was know as the Danish-Baltic Auxiliary Corps, and numbered about 200 volunteers. Niels Jensen, *For Dannebrogs Ære: Danske frivillige i Estland og Letlands frihedskamp 1919* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1998).
to keep a lower profile.\textsuperscript{95} Because of this military activism, and due to Russian sensitivity about a US presence in the Baltic, Denmark often acted as Washington’s go-between in relations with the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{96} On several occasions the US praised Danish military cooperation with the Baltic states, such as taking the lead on setting up the Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT), while also crediting Norway for leading the establishment of the Baltic air traffic control network (BALTNET).\textsuperscript{97}

Through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), Denmark and Norway pursued a policy of supporting the build-up of the armed forces of the Baltic countries. Denmark led the way by integrating platoon-sized units from their armed forces into its own battalions in the former Yugoslavia from 1994.\textsuperscript{98} From February 1997 individual Baltic countries took turns deploying a company as part of the Danish battalion in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{99} Norway also worked to strengthen the armed forces of the Baltic states, and in 1996 an Estonian company served with the Norwegian battalion in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{100}

Providing weapons to the Baltic states proved a more controversial step, as most states maintained an almost "unofficial arms embargo" to avoid provoking Moscow.\textsuperscript{101} Denmark again preceded Norway by moving to donate surplus artillery and anti-aircraft artillery in 1999.\textsuperscript{102} Norway followed in 2000 by donating light anti-tank weapons to Estonia, but refused to donate surplus Leopard 1 tanks because the Norwegian army did not want to be burdened helping the Estonians to maintain them.\textsuperscript{103}


\textsuperscript{98} Hans Hækkerup, "An open NATO." NATO Review No. 6, Vol. 44 (November 1996).

\textsuperscript{99} Henning Sørensen, "Danish Senior Officers' Experiences from IFOR/SFOR," in Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters; A Comparative Study Based on Experiences in Bosnia, ed. Jean Callaghan and Mathias Schönborn (Münster: LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, 2004), 111.


\textsuperscript{101} Kristina Spohr Readman, Germany and The Baltic Problem After the Cold War: The Development of a New Ostpolitik 1989–2000 (New York: Routledge, 2004), 168. The exception was BALTBAT, which received donated weapons from several states.

\textsuperscript{102} Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 70.

\textsuperscript{103} Gjeseth, Hæren i omvelting 1990–2008, 170. In 2001 Latvia and Lithuania did receive six Storm Class fast patrol boats, with at least part of their weapon mounts. Forsvarsdepartementet (Norwegian Ministry of Defence), Norwegian defence-related cooperation with the Baltic states (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet (Norwegian Ministry of Defence), 2002).
While Norway initially kept a low profile with regard to military cooperation and diplomatic support for the Baltic States and only gradually followed Denmark’s lead, the Danes were early and substantial in their support. The former Lithuanian Minister of Defence Linas Linkevicius considers it "virtually impossible to overestimate the historic role of Denmark [in] developing the Lithuanian Armed Forces". The Danes themselves also seemed to view themselves as the Baltic states’ "best friend". Indeed the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen described the Baltic states as a Danish "sphere of influence" in the 1990s.

**Defence Reforms in the Post-Bosnian War Era 1995–2001**

A new Danish Defence Agreement for the period 1995–1999 was signed in December 1995. The agreement further rationalised the structure of the Navy and Air Force by cutting the number of bases, and reduced the number of Army brigades from four to three. The Army’s wartime strength was reduced to 58,000 troops. The DIB received priority for new equipment, including approximately 50 used Leopard 2 MBTs and 20 wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs). Procurement priority was clearly allocated to the DIB, and, by 1999, five of eight investment programs were directed towards the brigade. The number of internationally deployable land units remained unchanged from the prior 1993–1994 Defence Agreement, but the Navy increased its contribution in the form of a submarine and a STANDARD FLEX 300 minesweeper, and the Air Force through a HAWK surface-to-air missile squadron. Most importantly, the agreement stipulated that a new Defence Commission was to be convened in 1997 and deliver its findings by 1998. The commission’s findings were to form the basis for the next Danish Defence Agreement after 1999.

The Danish defence commission of 1997 consisted, like its predecessors, of politicians, officers and experts from the ministries and academia. It submitted its findings in...
November 1998. It confirmed the general changes that had taken place since the defence commission of 1988 submitted its findings. The threat of a massive invasion from the east had been replaced by more diffuse risks, and the Armed Forces had gone from serving only as a "reactive and deterring security guaranty to also being an active and confidence-building instrument in [Danish] security policy".

While Denmark was rapidly reforming its armed forces towards expeditionary operations, and showing more will to use them for combat than Norway, Denmark also demonstrated greater affinity for the "new NATO" than did Norway. In April 1999 NATO again revised its Strategic Concept, moving further towards enlargement and taking the organisation "out of area", thereby giving it a more proactive role besides its classic collective defence mission. Denmark had since the early 1990s favoured of such an "entrepreneurial" role, having NATO take on missions on behalf of the UN and the CSCE. Denmark therefore supported the American effort to take NATO "out of area" at the Washington summit in 1999, as well as to enlarge NATO membership. In particular, Denmark continued to purport its longstanding argument that the Baltic states had to receive the same treatment as the other Central and Eastern European countries. Unlike Denmark, Norway remained sceptical. Norway maintained a more cautious attitude towards NATO enlargement during the 1990s, initially suggesting the PfP as an alternative. Norwegian scepticism towards both enlargement and the new tasks were kept in check, partially for tactical reasons, such as the fear of being viewed as the last "Cold Warrior" within the alliance.

The Danish Defence Agreement 2000–2004, agreed upon in May 1999, was based on the conclusions drawn from the 1997 defence commission. It sought to shift the emphasis in the Armed Forces further from a mobilization-based territorial defence towards crisis

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112 Ibid., 17.
management. The Army’s contribution to NATO’s IRF was increased from a platoon-sized light Reconnaissance unit to a company-sized unit, and the DIB was given an integrated helicopter unit. The Navy’s contribution to NATO was reduced, due to the overall reduction in platforms. The Air Force added radars and a logistical unit to its existing contribution of one F-16 squadron and a HAWK surface-to-air battery. The Danish Home Guard was assigned more territorial defence tasks, in order to allow the other branches of the Armed Forces to focus more on international operations. All in all the change in the Danish force posture was not such a radical one, because the Armed Forces had already begun orienting themselves towards international operations before the engagement in the Balkans. As such, the Defence Agreement 1995–1999, the 1997 Defence Commission, and the Defence Agreement 2000–2004 merely continued along the path already taken in November 1992 through the Defence Agreement for 1993–1994.

Norway, on the other hand, was to experience a radical shift around the turn of the millennium. That this would happen was not initially apparent, however. Despite the engagement in the Balkans, the Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 1999–2002 proposed by the government in February 1998 did not envisage radical changes to the Armed Forces. While stating on the one hand that "there is no military threat to Norway today", the government still expressed its concern that security developments were plagued by "uncertainty". The Armed Forces were still seen as needing to be dimensioned towards meeting a possible invasion of Norwegian territory.

There were critical shortages of certain types of equipment in the Norwegian Armed Forces around the end of the 1990s. This was especially the case for the Army, where many units merely existed on paper. The Chief of Defence therefore expressed his concern that the Armed Forces were not receiving the resources needed to maintain the structure laid down in the long-term plan for 1999–2002. In November 1998 he commissioned a defence study which would become the first high-level radical proposal for restructuring the Norwegian Armed Forces. It proposed moving from a total defence structure designed to ensure

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120 Ibid., Bilag 1.
121 Ulf Scheibye, "Fremtidens hjemmeværn," Militært Tidsskrift 129, no. 3 (June 2000): 260-266.
123 Ibid.
national survival, a scenario now seen as passé, towards an armed force designed for more relevant scenarios requiring better and more responsive units. The later required the ability to deploy rapidly - both nationally and internationally.\textsuperscript{126}

In June 1999, immediately following the Kosovo War, the government presented a white paper entitled "Adjustment of the Armed Forces to Participation in International Operations".\textsuperscript{127} It created the Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces (FIST), which would be available for international operations. Norway now abolished the separation between NATO IRF and UN standby forces, a distinction Denmark had already abolished in creating the DIB in November 1992.\textsuperscript{128} FIST would consist of units from the Army, Navy and Air Force, totalling approximately 3,500 soldiers. The Army’s contribution to the High Readiness Forces (FIST-H) would be one mechanized battalion for rapid-reaction, and one battalion equivalent of follow-on forces. For the first time the Army planned to deploy tanks and artillery in military operations outside Norway. The Navy would contribute a frigate, a submarine, a minesweeping vessel, a command-and-control vessel, four missile patrol boats and a platoon of combat divers. The Air Force would contribute an F-16 squadron, four transport helicopters, a NASAMS equipped air-defence unit, two C-130 transport aircraft and a P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. In addition some unspecified Special Forces, intelligence and medical personnel would be available.\textsuperscript{129} Significantly the reform brought the Norwegian land units available for international operations close to the level and capabilities that Denmark had had since the decision to create the DIB in 1992. However, this was still only a modification of the existing structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not a wholesale reform. However, such a reform did indeed soon follow.

In July 1999 a Defence Policy Committee had been appointed by the government, submitting its findings in June 2000.\textsuperscript{130} It was presented at the same time as the Defence Study 2000, but did not propose cutting the overall size of the Armed Forces quite as radically as suggested by the Chief of Defence. In February 2001, the Norwegian government presented the new Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005, which based itself upon the findings of the previous Defence Study 2000 and the 2000 Defence

\textsuperscript{127} St.meld. nr. 38 (1998–99) Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner.
\textsuperscript{129} Forsvarsministeren (Hans Hækkerup), "B1 - Forslag til folketingsbeslutning om etablering af en dansk international brigade," 218.
\textsuperscript{130} St.meld. nr. 38 (1998–99) Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner, 49.
}\textsuperscript{NOU 2000: 20 Et nytt forsvar, (Oslo: Statens forvaltningsstjeneste, 29 June 2000).}
Policy Committee.\textsuperscript{131} It stated categorically that the Armed Forces were in "crisis" and that in their present form they were "not up to solving the tasks of the future".\textsuperscript{132} According to the Minister of Defence, Bjørn Tore Godal, this was a much more provocative formulation than what one would normally find in a government document.\textsuperscript{133} Specifically, the problems Norway had experienced providing relevant rapid-reaction forces to NATO operations were mentioned to exemplify the problem. Despite being given considerable resources and possessing highly qualified personnel, the Armed Forces in its present form were not able to deliver the capabilities required by the government.\textsuperscript{134} The Armed Forces were now to develop more mobile and flexible forces with shorter reaction time, available for use both nationally and in PSO.\textsuperscript{135}

Lacking a parliamentary majority, the government needed to negotiate with the opposition. This resulted in a modified plan being passed by Parliament. The Defence Policy Committee had proposed increasing the number of brigades retained from two to three, and questioned the proposal to phase out the Navy’s existing MTBs and not acquire the new Skjold class.\textsuperscript{136} Picking up on these suggestions, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence then recommended keeping some coastal artillery installations in mothball rather than discarding them completely, retaining 14 Hauk class MTBs and acquiring 6 new Skjold class vessels, and also maintaining the Home Guard at its present strength of 83,000 troops.\textsuperscript{137} In the end Parliament decided to maintain a larger Army and Navy than originally envisaged by the government, and the Home Guard retained its present size.\textsuperscript{138} The Army was cut from six to three brigades, one standing (Brig N) and one reserve brigade (Brig 5) as part of the 6\textsuperscript{th} division in Northern Norway. An independent reserve brigade was kept in Trondheim (Brig 12), of which the FIST-H units became an administrative part.\textsuperscript{139} Despite these alterations, the main suggestions from the Chief of Defence and his staff were retained and implemented.

One example of this increasing focus away from a static in-place organisation towards more mobility was that the Norwegian Navy now abandoned a territorial organisation in

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{133}Bjørn Tore Godal, Utsikter (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), 55.
\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{136}NOU 2000: 20 Et nyttt forsvar, 82-83.
favour of a functional and radically centralised structure.\textsuperscript{140} Another novelty receiving widespread attention was the introduction of an Army battalion employing enlisted soldiers on 3-year contracts rather than conscripts.\textsuperscript{141} This "new" Telemark Battalion was much more robust and capable than its predecessor, and could realistically be expected to participate in operations across the full range of military operations, including high-intensity operations, with a relatively short reaction time.\textsuperscript{142} An attempt was made amongst the parties in Parliament to emulate the Danish tradition of broad, long-term defence agreements. This had been the recommendation of the 2000 Defence Policy Committee.\textsuperscript{143} However, it proved impossible to reach any such broad-based settlement.\textsuperscript{144}

**Conclusion: At First Divergence, Then Convergence at the Start of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century?**

As the 20\textsuperscript{th} century came to a close, Norway had now emulated Denmark in taking a substantial step towards replacing its Cold War era invasion defence structure with a smaller, more deployable force. Something resembling a Norwegian brigade was now available for rapid deployment abroad, with forces so robust as to be realistically expected to take part in high-intensity warfare. Can one then reasonably talk about convergence between Danish and Norwegian defence policy during the period 2000–2001? Indeed the capabilities available for deployments abroad in the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces now resembled each other markedly with the establishment of the FIST, particularly in qualitative terms. The Norwegian forces were now as robust and capable of high-intensity operations as their Danish counterparts. Furthermore, Norwegian participation with air and land combat forces in the Kosovo war represented a milestone in Norwegian willingness to conduct actual warfare. The beginning of the new millennium thus marked a point in time at which Norway "caught up" with Denmark in terms of capabilities and willingness to fight. However, this convergence was to prove short-lived.

\textsuperscript{143} *NOU 2000: 20 Et nytt forsvar*, 114-115.
CHAPTER 3

DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11

The first decade of the new millennium saw Norwegian and Danish soldiers being sent to warzones in some unlikely places, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially relative parity existed between the amount of forces the two countries sent and their assigned missions in the theatre of operations, further indicating that convergence had taken place in the early years of the 2000s. However, in 2003 Denmark took part in the Iraq war as a belligerent state, while Norway chose to participate in only a very limited way, technically as a non-belligerent. Then in 2004 Denmark undertook a radical transformation of its Armed Forces, turning them into a mostly professional expeditionary corps. This was followed in 2006 by a Danish decision to send combat forces to the war in southern Afghanistan, where Norway again chose not to participate.

This chapter describes Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the post-9/11 era, and demonstrates how the two states remained very different in the new millennium with regard to focusing their armed forces towards expeditionary operations, as well as their willingness to participate in warfighting alongside their allies.


Following the 11th of September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, both Norway and Denmark moved to make immediate and very similar contributions to the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In January 2002, a Danish Special Forces unit (Task Group FERRET) numbering approximately 100 Special Forces operatives and support personnel was despatched to Afghanistan, remaining in theatre until June. An unspecified but probably equal number of Norwegian Special Forces soldiers (Task Group NORSOF) was also in place by January 2002, and like their Danish colleagues remained there until June. Among other tasks, the Danish and Norwegian Special Forces

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1 Forsvarsministeren, Årlig Redegørelse 2002 (Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 2003), 27. The soldiers were reputedly drawn from both the Army (Jægerkorpset) and the Navy (Frømandskorpset) Special Forces units. Leigh Neville, Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, Elite (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 31.
participated in Operation Anaconda in March 2002. Both states also sent support personnel such as mineclearers, and a joint Danish-Norwegian-Dutch C-130 transport aircraft detachment was also in Afghanistan from March until September 2002.

On Washington’s request, Denmark and Norway together with the Netherlands despatched six F-16 combat aircraft each to Kyrgyzstan in October. Their role was to provide combat air support (CAS) to coalition forces in Afghanistan. During their tour of duty, aircraft from both Denmark and Norway dropped live ammunition in support of friendly forces. For Norway the 27th of January 2002 therefore became an historic date. While Danish forces had seen combat before, including dropping bombs in Kosovo, for Norway this was supposedly the first official rounds fired at an enemy since 1945.

Unlike in the Balkans, where the Danes had always been quicker to send robust ground forces than the Norwegians, in Afghanistan it would initially be the other way around. In December 2003 Norway sent a company from the Telemark Battalion to Kabul, as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). From July 2004 Norway also assumed responsibility for being the lead-nation in one of ISAFs multi-national battlegroups. In 2006 the Norwegian manoeuvre company moved from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan, where they were to provide the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for Northern Afghanistan. Norway already had a military presence outside Kabul at this time. In September 2005 the Norwegian Armed Forces assumed responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Maymana from the United Kingdom.

While the Norwegians provided robust ground forces in Afghanistan, the Danes initially made only limited contributions. The Danish forces varied between 50 and 140
soldiers in 2003 and 2004, all in various support functions. In 2005, additional smaller Danish contributions were made to the German PRT in Feyzabad, the Swedish PRT in Mazar-e Sharif and the Lithuanian PRT in Chaghcharan. In this initial "PRT-phase" the Danish soldiers were more involved in rebuilding efforts than combat operations. Not until autumn 2006 did any significant Danish ground forces arrive in Afghanistan, in the form of the light reconnaissance squadron from Bornholm, an artillery locating radar team, and a Civilian-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) unit. All these new forces were deployed in the south of Afghanistan, in support of the British PRT and ISAF’s regional headquarters in Kandahar. The total number of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006 rose to approximately 390.

The reason why Denmark delayed so long in sending more forces to Afghanistan was not any greater reluctance to go, but simply that the Danish Army was overstretched. Unlike Norway, Denmark had chosen to join the American led "coalition of the willing" in Iraq. Danish participation in the multinational invasion of Iraq was argued to be necessary in order to help remove a threat to peace and security in the region. The initial contribution had been the submarine DKM Sælen, the corvette DKM Olfert Fischer, and a medical detachment. In May 2003, the Danish Parliament also voted to contribute to the stabilisation forces in Iraq. The force was to be part of the British-led division in southern Iraq. The initial contribution consisted of a battalion with a reconnaissance squadron, a mechanized infantry detachment, military police and a CIMIC unit (approximately 380 soldiers). A Latvian mechanized infantry unit was attached to the battalion. By October it had proved necessary to reinforce the battalion with more military police, a full mechanized infantry company, and some engineers.

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10 For a detailed account of Danish involvement in the PRTs in northern Afghanistan, see Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Umulig mission? Danmark i Afghanistan og Irak (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008), 105-157.
12 Denmark was a signatory of the January 2003 "letter of eight" in which Denmark, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Hungary expressed their support for US policy on Iraq. Anders Fogh Rasmussen et al., "Europe and America must stand united," The Times 30 January 2003.
14 Forsvarsministeren, Årlig Redegørelse 2003, 28-29. For a detailed account of the participation of the DKM Sælen, see Søren Nørby, SÆLENS deployering til Middelhavet og den Persiske Golf (Copenhagen: Marinens Bibliotek, 2007).
16 Volden, Danske hærordninger efter 2. Verdenskrig i nationalt og international perspektiv, 123.
This increased the size of the force to more than 500 soldiers. The Danish forces engaged in heavy urban warfare with Iraqi insurgents. Parallel to the military engagement, Danish civilian authorities were involved at many levels within the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), especially as co-ordinators for the CPA in the Basra region in Southern Iraq, and by training police officers for the new Iraqi police force.

Norway did not consider itself part of the coalition forces in Iraq. The government decided to send military forces to Iraq only after the Security Council in May 2003 asked member states to assist in stabilising Iraq. An engineer company (approximately 136 soldiers), initially from the Telemark Battalion, was sent to the theatre in July 2003 and was stationed close to Basra in southern Iraq. The unit was placed under British command. The company remained in Iraq until July 2004, when it was withdrawn. Only a few Norwegian staff officers remained in Iraq, as well as a few Norwegian NATO instructors for the Iraqi Army. The Norwegian battalion in Kosovo was similarly wound down in July 2004 in order to focus the Armed Forces resources on Afghanistan.

Due to the challenge of being engaged in three geographically separate regions (Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan), while only being dimensioned for two, the Danish Army had become overstretched. This overcommitment of the Danish Armed Forces has been described as a small state version of imperial overstretch. Not until its engagement in Iraq was wound down, ending in August 2007, were the Danish Armed Forces able to project considerable

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17 Forsvarsministeren, Årlig Redegørelse 2003, 28-32.
18 One ambush of a Danish unit took place in the Iraqi town of Al Hartha, 14th May 2007. The Danish mechanized infantry company, including a Lithuanian platoon, and the light reconnaissance company engaged in several hours of urban combat alongside British forces. One Danish soldier was killed, and several wounded in the engagement. Michael Bjerre, Jesper Larsen, and Karl Erik Stougaard, Blindt ind i Basra: Danmark og Irakkriigen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008), 215-231.
forces to Afghanistan. Once disentangled from Iraq, the Danish Armed Forces became heavily involved in Afghanistan. In May 2007 it was decided to send a Danish battalion to make up a part of the British Task Force Helmand, while reducing or winding down the participation in the PRTs in the north. The number of Danish soldiers deployed in Afghanistan was estimated to rise to approximately 640. The engagement also soon took on a qualitatively new nature. In October 2007, the Danish government decided to send an armoured platoon to Afghanistan, making Denmark one of the few countries to deploy tanks in the theatre. In June 2008 a detachment of four Fennec reconnaissance/observation helicopters were also ordered to Helmand province.

The Danish engagement in Afghanistan came later than the Norwegian one, but it was of a very different nature. Firstly, and unlike most nations contributing troops to ISAF, Denmark placed no national caveats on its deployed troops. Secondly, immediately after ISAF took over responsibility from the American OEF in southern Afghanistan, Danish troops became involved in continuous combat in the region. The first major encounter was in August 2006, when the Danish light reconnaissance squadron endured 36 days of heavy combat defending the village of Musa Qala against the Taliban. An estimated 25 enemy combatants were killed during the siege, and several Danish soldiers were wounded. The light reconnaissance squadron continued to engage regularly with the Taliban thereafter. The unit employed their light weapons, mortars, 84mm recoilless rifles and coalition close air support (CAS) during Operation Medusa and Sarwe in September 2006. But while the Danes participated willingly, the Norwegian government actively resisted calls by NATO allies to allow for deployment of its forces in southern Afghanistan.
Two years later Danish forces engaging in fire fights with the Taliban had become more or less routine. On the 5th of January 2008 Danish tanks were once again engaged in combat, for the first time since Bosnia in 1994. This time Danish tanks fired 20 rounds from their main guns in the battle.\textsuperscript{34} In October 2008 the Danish battalion in Helmand engaged in another major operation, in which speculative reports claimed that 30 to 50 Taliban insurgents may have been killed.\textsuperscript{35}

The most dramatic incident for the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan occurred on the 7th of February 2006, when the Norwegian PRT in Maymana came under attack. Six Norwegian soldiers were injured, and approximately four Afghans killed.\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps the engagement most resembling regular combat occurred in early November 2007, when Norwegian soldiers from the QRF engaged insurgents with small arms, heavy weapons and air support.\textsuperscript{37} This was the first time the CV9030N IFVs were used in combat, and the first time Norwegian ground forces called in coalition CAS.\textsuperscript{38} Nevertheless, for Norwegian combat forces in the north the service in Afghanistan was much less hazardous than for the Danes in the south, and direct combat with the enemy was the exception rather than the norm. Danish and Norwegian casualties reflected this. By March 2008 Denmark had lost 15 soldiers in Afghanistan, most of them as a result of direct combat with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{39} By comparison, Norway had lost 3 soldiers due to enemy actions as of November 2008.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Defence reforms 2002–2008}

While SHIRBRIG, as we have seen previously, was a Danish project in which Norway more reluctantly followed, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) was different. It was established in 1997 in order to facilitate Nordic cooperation in PSOs, replacing the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN matters


\textsuperscript{35} The Danish armoured platoon was operating together with a Danish mechanized infantry detachment in support of British company. For a detailed account of the encounter, see Christian Reinhold, ”Kampvognene for alvor i ilden,” (Copenhagen: Forsvarskommandoen, 14 January 2008).

\textsuperscript{36} Mari Åsland, ”- Danske soldater drepte opptil femt i Taliban-opprørere,” \textit{Aftenposten} 26 October 2008.


\textsuperscript{40} Randi Ellingsen, ”Hedret de falne i Afghanistan,” (Oslo: Forsvarsnett 16 November 2008).
In 2003 it was agreed to set up a NORDCAPS force catalogue with the purpose of providing a Nordic multinational brigade for UN, OSCE, NATO, and UN operations. Norway and Denmark both offered their available international deployable forces for NORDCAPS, Denmark the DIB and Norway the FIST. While the Danish Army contribution was more "robust" than the Norwegian one, including armour and self-propelled artillery, the Norwegian Air Force and Navy contributed considerably more than their Danish counterparts, e.g. 12 F-16 fighters and a frigate. The force catalogue was never employed, and was eventually declared obsolete in May 2006 due to functional overlap with other multilateral force pools. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the change in Norwegian capability and willingness to use military forces abroad. While SHIBRIG was initiated at a time at which Denmark had just experienced the success of its new "militarised" foreign policy in the Balkans, Norway’s armed forces at that time remained focused on the defence of Norwegian territory. When the NORDCAPS brigade pool was established, Norway now had considerable more forces to offer due to establishment of the FIST in June 1999, and the implementation of the new Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005.

However, just as Norway was starting on the path towards creating an expeditionary unit almost similar in robustness and size to the DIB, Denmark moved further away from territorial defence and towards making international operations the sine qua non of the Danish Armed Forces. The new Danish Defence Agreement for the period 2005–2009 took the step fully away from invasion defence. Since the radical shift occurred in November 1992, with the decision to create the DIB, the Danish Armed Forces had remained in principle unchanged. While increasing resources and attention had been given to units intended for international operations in the following two defence agreements, the old Cold War structure of long term conscription and static mobilisation defence forces remained in existence. The

41 Being set up while SHIRBRIG was still under development, the Danish minister of defence Hækkerup was initially concerned that NORDCAPS would effectively sabotage SHIRBRIG. Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarsøkonomi fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 59-61. This Danish scepticism of NORDCAPS seems to have persisted, and the NORDCAPS brigade was seen as a competitor to capabilities existing within NATO and SHIRBRIG. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Still Punching Above Their Weight? Nordic Cooperation in Peace Operations after the Cold War," in Peace Support Operations: Nordic Perspectives, ed. Eli Stamnes (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 10-13.
43 For a detailed list of forces offered in the NORCAPS force catalogue, see ———, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, Table 8.1 NORDCAPS force pool (2004).
2004 Defence Agreement did away with this legacy force structure. It replaced it with a two-pillar structure: a professional expeditionary force and a total defence force.\textsuperscript{46}

The agreement was not preceded by another defence commission, but rather a smaller working group chaired by the diplomat Hans Henrik Bruun. The group presented its report in August 2003. It reiterated the findings of the 1997 Defence Commission, that there was no direct territorial threat to Denmark. The practical conclusions of this went much further than previous studies however. The group concluded that the remaining territorial defence capacity in the Danish Armed Forces was no longer needed, nor was there any need to retain a base from which to regenerate such a force.\textsuperscript{47} The group noted that a small state such as Denmark had limited ability to sustain a sizable force in PSOs abroad. In order to make more effective and visible contributions, the group recommended that Denmark move to specialise in delivering rapidly deployable initial-entry forces, capable of taking part in high-intensity warfighting operations alongside allied forces. Denmark was to be ready and able to contribute to NATO, UN and multilateral coalitions of the willing and capable.\textsuperscript{48}

Signed in June 2004, the new Defence Agreement aimed to do two things: firstly, to increase the ability to deploy military forces internationally and secondly to increase the ability of the Armed Forces to combat terrorism and its effects.\textsuperscript{49} The agreement drew inspiration from the new US national security strategy from June 2002, as well as the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security in January 2003.\textsuperscript{50} The existing inactive mobilisation forces were scrapped, and support functions were now only to be dimensioned by the military’s operational units. The Army was reduced to the Danish Division with two mechanized infantry brigades, doing away with two brigades and five territorial defence battalions. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade would be a standing brigade with mostly regular serving personnel, available for NATO on high readiness. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade would consist of personnel on reaction-contracts, as well as soldiers receiving basic training.\textsuperscript{51} The Navy would receive three new patrol vessels (really frigates), most likely to be named the Ivar Huitfeldt class, and


\textsuperscript{47} Udenrigsministeriet, De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik (Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet, August 2003), 37. One of the group’s main innovations, implemented in the defence agreement, was a strong focus on specific capabilities (“capabilities-based approach”). For an in depth look at this, presented by a member of the working group, see Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “Kapacitetsspecialisering,” Militært Tidsskrift 133, no. 1 (April 2004): 60-68.

\textsuperscript{48} Udenrigsministeriet, De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik, 28-36.

\textsuperscript{49} Forsvarsministeriet, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2005–2009 (Copenhagen: Forsvarsministeriet, 10 June 2004), 1.

\textsuperscript{50} Udenrigsministeriet, De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik, 24.

two flexible support ships of the *Absalon* class. These ships would primarily be intended for participation in international military operations far away from Denmark.\(^52\) This was a marked improvement, because most of the existing Cold War era materiel in the Navy had been intended solely for operations in the Baltic and the North Sea.\(^53\) The Danish Air Force also aspired to become an "expeditionary air force", phasing out elements intended primarily to defend Danish airspace in favour of deployable capabilities seen as relevant for international military operations.\(^54\)

In the new defence agreement Denmark’s submarines were scrapped, as were the ground-based air defence composed of DeHawk missiles.\(^55\) By slaughtering the "sacred cows" of the mobilization forces and two whole weapon categories, it was possible for the Danish Armed Forces to develop credible deployable capabilities with the limited resources available.\(^56\) Conscription was reduced to four months, and trained personnel who did not enlist in the regular forces would spend three years as mobilisation personnel in a new total-defence force of 12,000 lightly-armed troops.\(^57\) This new total-defence force would be employed, along with the police and the Home Guard, according to a total-defence concept.\(^58\)

A key task would be to defend society against the threat of international terrorism. After the implementation of the agreement, the Danish Armed Forces would have standing forces capable of rapidly responding to international crises, as well as to constantly maintain approximately 2,000 troops in international military operations (1,500 from the Army, 500 from the Navy and Air Force).\(^59\) This doubling in the number of deployable troops would come at no extra cost to the Danish taxpayer, since the defence budget remained effectively fixed.\(^60\)


\(^{54}\) Nørby, *Det danske forsvar: Opgaver, udstyr og anskafte i det nye årtusind*, 179-181.

\(^{55}\) Forsvarsministeriet, *Af tale om forsvarets orden* 2005–2009, 8-12. The government did not originally propose to scrap the submarines, but his was the result of the negotiation with the other parties. The government also wanted a total defence force of 15,000 rather than 12,000, which meant that more conscripts would have to receive the basic four months service. Unlike in Norway, in Denmark negotiation with parliament led to a smaller defence structure rather than a large one. ———, *En verden i forandring - et forsvar i forandring: Regeringens forsvarsopløg 2005-2009* (Copenhagen: Schultz Grafisk, 2004), 3-7.

\(^{56}\) Stefan Thorbjørnsen, "Fra ”grønthøster” til ”slagting af hellige köer”," *Militært Tidsskrift* 133, no. 4 (December 2004): 755-768.


In March 2004 the Norwegian government presented its Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces for the period 2005–2008.\(^{61}\) Coming only three months prior to the new Danish defence agreement, it showed how much Norwegian defence planning had changed since the Kosovo War. The new long term plan envisaged a Norwegian defence force looking remarkably similar to the Danish Armed Forces. In October 2004 the Ministry of Defence (MoD) also published its first "Strategic Concept for the Armed Forces",\(^{62}\) intended to address what the MoD viewed as the decoupling of foreign- and security policy from defence policy after the Cold War.\(^{63}\) But while the goals and assigned tasks of the defence forces in both countries were now almost identical, a study conducted by the Norwegian MoD found that the Norwegian Armed Forces chose to retain greater focus on purely national tasks.\(^{64}\)

Like the Danish defence agreement three months later, the new Norwegian long-term plan at least theoretically did away with the distinction between units envisaged for national defence and units intended for international operations. All units in the Armed Forces were now in principle available for operations outside national territory.\(^{65}\) In practice this would be less the case in Norway than in Denmark however, because of the decision to retain long-term conscription. In Denmark, nearly all units in the standing 1\(^{st}\) Brigade would be manned by volunteers. The 2\(^{nd}\) Brigade would be mostly manned by conscripts who had volunteered for longer service, or personnel on readiness contracts. Only the units performing the basic four month training of the conscripts would be unavailable for international deployments. The 1\(^{st}\) Brigade would be available to respond rapidly to international crises, while the 2\(^{nd}\) Brigade would maintain the Danish Army’s long-term commitments abroad.

In Norway only the Telemark Battalion within the Brigade North would be a standing unit composed of volunteers. The other deployable units within the brigade would consist of personnel on readiness contracts. The entire brigade would be available for deployment internationally, the first time that Norway had aimed to produce a brigade-sized expeditionary

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\(^{64}\) Forsvarsdepartementet, Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet, 31 January 2005), 4.

\(^{65}\) There were some exceptions, such as the Border Guard battalion in Kirkenes as well as the Royal Guard battalion in Oslo. These units would however act as recruitment pools for the deployable forces. Forsvarsjefen, Forsvarsjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003 (Oslo: Forsvarets overkommando, 2003), 10.
However, the Norwegian brigade would have a considerably longer reaction time than the Danish brigade. The Chief of the Danish Army Operational Command emphasised how the 1st Brigade, along with augmentations from the Danish Division, was to have a "first in – first out" capacity "in the full range of missions". The implicit mission was to deploy and fight alongside US and UK initial entry forces in high-intensity operations. Such ambitious tasks were not foreseen for the Norwegian brigade, which was more likely to be deployed as a rotating brigade in an ongoing operation, due to its long preparation time.

The Norwegian Navy was to be primarily tasked with solving national maritime tasks, but was also to have a capacity for contributing to international military operations. Participation in and possibly the leadership of STANAVFORLANT were particularly mentioned. The Navy was to receive new high quality equipment. The major decision, made in May 1999, was to acquire at least 5 new frigates. They were to replace the ageing 1960-era Oslo class. The new 5300 ton Fridtjof Nansen class frigates and the Skjold class MTB were generally considered to be technologically impressive warships. The Fridtjof Nansen class frigates alone were the most expensive acquisition ever made by the Norwegian Armed Forces. While the Danes were investing in capabilities designed primarily for expeditionary operations, particularly in the Army, the Norwegians allocated more resources towards the Navy, which retained most of its focus on handling national tasks.

As the February 2001 Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005 had led to a "paradigm change" for the Norwegian Army, Navy and Air Force, the March 2004 Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces did the same for the Home Guard. Both in Norway and Denmark the respective 2004 defence plans transformed the Home Guard into a

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67 Forsvarsdepartementet, Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar, 10. The Chief of Defence estimated 180 days' preparation time for deployment outside Norwegian territory. Forsvarsjefen, Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003, 15. By comparison the DIB was supposed to be deployable within 14 days. Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 179. This only applied to NATO article 5 missions, and it was doubtful whether the DIB could have managed such a rapid deployment successfully. Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and Doctrines, 157.
69 Forsvarsdepartementet, Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar, 27.
74 Forsvarsdepartementet, Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar, 63.
75 See Ulriksen, "Brydningstid - paradigmekspent i det norske forsvar (2001–2005)." The current (as of 2008) Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen also use the term "paradigm change" to describe the new shape and tasks of the armed forces. Diesen, "Mot et allianseintegrert forsvar."
force designed for assisting the police and civilian authorities e.g. with combating terrorism. Both created a prioritised reaction force within their guard, of 5,000 and 3,000 soldiers respectively. This force would be able to react rapidly, and receive better training and equipment than their regular Home Guard units. In Norway an additional 20,000 strong reinforcement force would make up a mobile component of the guard. Another 25,000 would be available for securing vital infrastructure. A 33,000 strong reserve would exist, which would be equipped with uniforms, but not receive training or assigned weapons. In Denmark the 50,000 strong guard was divided into an active and a passive component. In order to take part in an active unit one had to perform at least 24 hours of service every year. Only those committing themselves to perform this service would be issued weapons. About 23,000 members of the guard were active as of December 2007. The Danish Home Guard remained more specialised than the Norwegian one, having for example a dedicated Police Home Guard (Politihjemmeværnet) tasked with providing assistance to the civilian police.

In February 2004, as part of the Headline Goals process to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), the United Kingdom, France and Germany agreed to establish battalion-sized EU battlegroups available for rapid reaction. In November 2004, Norway declared together with Sweden and Finland that it would contribute to building a Nordic multinational EU battlegroup, the Nordic Battlegroup. The Norwegian contribution would consist of about 200 soldiers, serving in support functions such as medical service, logistics and strategic lift. Due to the Danish reservations against the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Denmark did not participate in the battlegroup. However, the 2004 Defence Agreement did state that the structure of the Danish Armed Forces would be such that an immediate entry into ESDP would be possible following a lifting of the Danish reservation.
This nevertheless represented a departure from earlier practice for Nordic multinational forces, when Denmark had normally taken the lead. While Denmark had led the way in SHIBRIG in the 1990s, and both Norway and Denmark had made relatively equal contributions to the 2003 NORDCAPS force catalogue, now only Norway participated while Denmark was opting out. The self-imposed Danish restrictions thus allowed Norway to be a more active player in an important new multinational military cooperation than Denmark, changing the earlier trend from the mid 1990s with Danish activism and Norwegian reluctance. Since the EU summit in Nice in December 2000 approved the ESDP relations with contributing third countries, Norway had in fact been more integrated into the ESDP than Denmark, despite not being a member of the EU.  

In January 2005 a new law regulating the personnel in the Norwegian Armed Forces came into effect, creating a new class of professional non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the military. The law was based upon the findings of a group chaired by Commander Arne Røksund. When introducing the new law, the Norwegian government argued that the Armed Forces had suffered from a surplus of older officers, combined with a lack of qualified younger officers and NCOs to command lower-level units, which made reforming the personnel structure of the military necessary. Norway therefore effectively chose to embrace the Danish model of employing professional NCOs, explicitly modelling its new NCO corps on the Danish system.

In January 2008 a new Defence Study was presented by the Norwegian Chief of Defence, aiming towards further professionalisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces. It recommended slashing the MTBs, reducing the Home Guard to 30,000 troops and converting two conscript battalions to a volunteer battalion. The Defence Policy Committee, which submitted its findings in October 2007, agreed with most of the military recommendations. It

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89 Forsvarsdepartementet, Ot.prp.nr.60 (2003-2004) Om lov om personell i Forsvaret (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet, 2004), 11-17.
92 Ibid., 7-8.
did however support retaining one conscripted manoeuvre battalion while adding the one professional battalion, and it also wanted a Home Guard numbering 40,000.\(^{93}\)

In March 2008 the Norwegian government presented its new Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces for the period 2009–2012, based on the Defence Policy Committee recommendations.\(^{94}\) It chose to make only relatively modest changes to the overall structure of the Armed Forces, but rationalised it by reducing the number of bases and units somewhat. There was an increased focus on responsiveness, to be accomplished by increasing the number of regular contracted soldiers and soldiers on reaction-contracts. However, the most controversial proposal put forward by the Chief of Defence, to replace the two conscript-based manoeuvre battalions in Brigade North with an all-volunteer battalion, was rejected by the government. The 6 Skjold class MTBs were retained, and the Home Guard was given an authorised strength of 45,000.\(^{95}\) Norway therefore did not choose to move as radically towards an all-volunteer force as Denmark did. While rejecting further professionalisation of the Army, as in Denmark four years previously, the Norwegian authorities did follow Denmark in moving towards a new total-defence concept, aimed amongst other things at combating terrorism.\(^{96}\)

**Conclusions: Divergence Persisted Into the 21st Century**

In the introduction I used two images taken twelve years apart to illustrate a difference in the deployments and tasks undertaken by the Norwegian and Danish Armed Forces in the post Cold-War era. Chapter 2 and 3 have further fleshed out this difference. While the Danes undertook combat missions in dangerous places, the Norwegians initially only took on support roles. When Norway changed its policy, and began contributing combat formations towards the end of the 1990s, these were still deployed in safer places and therefore not employed in direct combat.

\(^{93}\) NOU 2007:15 Et styrket forsvar, (Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning, 31 October 2007), 58-60.


We have also seen that there were some marked differences in priority given to international versus purely national tasks in the armed forces of the two countries. Again, a snapshot image taken twelve years apart can illustrate this. In 1994 Denmark worked to establish the DIB, a mechanized infantry brigade available for deployments outside Denmark. This brigade would be available for NATO, the UN and the CSCE, and would be able to participate in the full range of military missions, including high-intensity warfare. At the same time Norway established its IRF battalion, a lightly mechanized battalion intended primarily for NATO operations, but possibly also the CSCE. A separate infantry battalion existed for UN operations, intended only for traditional peacekeeping. In 2006, twelve years later, the Norwegian UN battalion had merged with the IRF battalion and become the Telemark Battalion, a mechanized battalion staffed with professional soldiers. Meanwhile, Denmark had now established an all-volunteer mechanized brigade, the 1st Brigade, which would compliment the successor to the DIB, the 2nd Brigade.

The picture presented is of course oversimplified, as it does not reflect the totality of the resources made available for deployments abroad. Nevertheless, it does reflect a broad trend: when Norway was capable of rapidly deploying a battalion abroad, Denmark was capable of sending a brigade. When Norway created one all-volunteer battalion, Denmark created a brigade. Denmark consistently stayed one level above Norway in terms of its capabilities as well as its willingness to participate in dangerous, high-intensive warfare missions far from native soil. While differences had narrowed somewhat after the Norwegian defence reforms in 1999 and 2001, they nevertheless grew again once Denmark moved to abolish territorial defence and long-term conscription altogether in 2004. The countries also went separate ways when Denmark decided to participate in the Iraq War in 2003 and to send combat forces to southern Afghanistan in 2006. Thus in the 21st Century an inversion had taken place. During the Cold War Atlanticism had been stronger in Norway than in Denmark, and it was the former country that had led the latter into NATO. In the 21st Century the tables had turned. Denmark and the United States now criticised Norway for its supposedly inadequate effort in Afghanistan.

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97 The air and sea units available for international military operations abroad were much more similar in both countries.
SECTION II

UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENCE: WHY DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY DIFFERED AFTER THE COLD WAR

The preceding section charted the development in Danish and Norwegian defence policy from approximately 1990 until 2008. While the two nation’s armed forces forces shared similar missions and force postures around about 1990, a decade later these missions and postures had become very different indeed. Anthony Forester, in his 2006 study of armed forces and society in Europe, concludes that, in the 21st century, the armed forces of Denmark and Norway parted ways, and now belonged in his view to different categories. While Norway retained a Territorial Defence model, the type of armed forces both countries had possessed during the Cold War, Denmark had transformed its military into a Late Modern force.¹

Table 2: Different Typologies of Armed Forces

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<tr>
<th>Territorial Defence Model</th>
<th>Late Modern Model</th>
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<td>Have generally been willing to engage in peacekeeping tasks only to a very limited degree, with still less enthusiasm for high intensity peacemaking and war-fighting operations, and relatively few resources have therefore been allocated to the development of a rapidly deployable forces.</td>
<td>[Has a] dual mission providing what might be termed a &quot;residual Territorial Defence function&quot;, but in parallel a commitment to provide a significant contribution as a proportion of overall sizes to international peacekeeping.</td>
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Forester also concluded that Denmark had moved towards a war-fighting focused conceptualisation of peacekeeping which included high-intensity warfare, and was more willing to make use of force without a Security Council mandate, when circumstances required action (the so-called "post-Westphalia" position).²

It is important to reiterate once more that we are talking about a difference of degree. While the reorientation towards international operations has been higher in the Danish Armed Forces than in the Norwegian, the latter have nevertheless undergone one of the greatest

² Ibid., 217, 205.
public-sector reforms in modern Norwegian history.\(^3\) Also, while it is true that Danes have shown a higher willingness to take part in high-intensity combat than the Norwegians, the picture changes if we compare the Danish Armed Forces with their US or UK counterparts.\(^4\)

Finally, while the Danish military has been more positive towards an all-volunteer force than the Norwegian Armed Forces, Norway and Denmark nevertheless remain two of the few NATO countries to retain conscription at all.\(^5\) Thus one should not overemphasise the differences between Norway and Denmark compared to other countries.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, there are substantial differences, which need to be accounted for. Why did Denmark give much more attention and resources to international military operations than Norway, and why were the Danes much more willing to engage in combat operations in risky areas of the world? Section II will examine one by one the four main factors identified as driving this early and persistent reform and employment of the Danish Armed Forces towards expeditionary missions, and will also explain why the Norwegian military only did so at a more measured pace. When viewed together, these factors provide the answer to the second part of the research question, *why Norway and Denmark’s defence policies diverged after the Cold War.*

Initially, Chapter 4 will address Norway and Denmark’s different geopolitical environments after the Cold War. Denmark’s newfound strategic security was a key underlying reason why reorientation towards expeditionary defence was possible in Denmark, but less so in Norway. This factor is dealt with first because it represents a necessary condition for Denmark’s path towards expeditionary defence, and a constraint on Norway’s ability to do the same.

Thereafter, Chapter 5 will look at individual leadership as the instigator of change in Denmark. That the reorientation started so early in Denmark, and was carried out with such determination, cannot be understood without examining the individual decision makers who pushed through this change in Denmark. These leaders broke with tradition and succeeded in

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5 Of the 19 "old" member of NATO, only Germany, Greece, Turkey, Norway and Denmark still retained conscription by 2008, and of the 10 "new" members only Estonia still had conscription. Forster, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe*, 163-164.
building stable political support for the new policy of military activism which proved enduring. The absence of similarly driven reformers in Norway until 2000–2001 was an important reason for the country’s much slower pace of change. Norwegian leaders were also less able to build broad political support for making tough choices and setting priorities. This continued to hamper the ability to make effective military contributions abroad.

Chapter 6 will look at military culture, a factor which was an important facilitator for change in Denmark but which served as a hindrance in Norway. The reformist leaders in Denmark were aided by a Danish Armed Forces culture which welcomed and supported internationalisation. The Danish military also had a personnel structure making it easier to adapt the organisation to the new paradigm of projecting military force abroad. In Norway the Armed Forces fought internationalisation, and had a personnel structure making them less suitable for more demanding and dangerous missions abroad.

Finally, Chapter 7 will study the different strategic cultures in Norway and Denmark. After the Cold War Danish elites and society grew to believe that the use of force was occasionally necessary and effective. This consensus gradually emerged from the successful post-Cold War use of the Danish military abroad, and in turn resulted in more frequent employment of the Danish Armed Forces in warfighting-situations abroad. Norwegian elites were however reluctant to even talk about warfighting. Norwegians did not see military means as the answer, nor did they feel equally threatened by distant phenomena such as terrorism. They also continued to view the Armed Forces’ traditional defence and nation building tasks at home as being important.
CHAPTER 4

DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS

Norway has access to rich natural resources in vast ocean areas, and borders on to a great power in the north. These two factors largely define [Norway’s] regional dimension.¹ The 2004 Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces

With its newly gained and unique level of security in relation to traditional conventional threats, Denmark in the 1990s developed an interest in preserving the global and especially regional framework for this security.² The 2003 Bruun report on Danish defence policy

A key factor causing the divergence in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War was their different geopolitical situations. Even with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Norway was left with two geopolitical problems which precluded a radical and immediate reorientation towards expeditionary operations: the shared border with Russia and the huge and partially disputed maritime economic zones. Denmark, however, faced neither a lingering territorial threat, nor the same need to exercise authority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones. Consequentially, these two geopolitical differences between Norway and Denmark allowed for the rapid transformation of the Danish Armed Forces and its employment abroad, while forcing Norway to remain focused upon national issues even in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter accounts for the different geopolitical calculations made by Norwegian and Danish policymakers after the Cold War, and in particular its impact on defence reform and weapons procurement. It argues that their different geopolitical situations allowed for the rapid Danish reorientation towards international deployments, while Norway’s different security environment did not allow for a similar rapid and radical change of priorities.

The Security Environment of the 1990s

The insight that the disappearance of a territorial threat opens up a space for reorienting the armed forces is hardly unique to Denmark. Karl W. Haltiner, in his study of the decline of mass armies in Europe, finds that countries closely integrated into multilateral security

¹ Forsvarsdepartementet, Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret, 42. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.
² Udenrigsministeriet, De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik, 19.
institutions, and facing no territorial threat, have reoriented their armed forces more towards standing, volunteer forces intended for expeditionary operations. In this Denmark and Norway seem to be no exceptions. The Danish academic Bertel Heurlin finds that, for all the Nordic states, geographical proximity to Russia provides a major source of explanation for the degree of change away from territorial defence after the Cold War. Norway, Sweden and Finland all shared proximity to, and therefore continued to feel uneasy about, its giant neighbour in the east. Denmark, however, was suddenly surrounded by friendly states to its east acting as a buffer against Russia.

By the early 1990s local Danish and German air and sea forces were able to counter all likely threats in Denmark’s vicinity. The Danish Army was consequentially left with only a very limited operational role on Danish territory. A number of official acts and inquiries coming directly on the eve of the Cold War recognised the new security situation facing Denmark, and moved official Danish policy towards a more comprehensive view of security. Denmark’s relocation from the frontlines to the backwater of the alliance thus made it possible to reorient the Armed Forces, and especially the Army, towards crises management away from Denmark proper. Thus from an early point in the post-Cold War era the disappearance of a concrete threat to Danish territory enabled the reorientation of Danish defence policy towards combating "chaos" on the fringes of the international system. Denmark could now move from being a security importer preparing to fight a concrete threat to its territory, to being a security exporter willing to combat diffuse threats both regionally and globally.

Heurlin argues that since Denmark was "[f]aced with an international environment without any possible conventional military threats, the only usable choice for the Danish military was in international operations." The Armed Forces were also transformed into a foreign policy instrument in order to retain influence in the new NATO, and especially

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with the sole superpower. As the Danish journalist Jørgen Dragsdahl expresses it: "[the armed forces] are to be visible and harvest good-will in Washington". Heurlin thus sees the shift towards expeditionary operations as a result of Denmark’s altered geopolitical position.

Indeed the Danish relationship with the American superpower has been central in 21st century Danish security policy. Per Stig Møller, the foreign minister of Denmark since 2001, emphasised the tremendous benefits Denmark reaped from the close bilateral ties that it enjoyed with the US. This close relationship was seen as giving Denmark a say on the major international issues of the day. When announcing Denmark’s intention of joining the American coalition in the Gulf in 2003, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that supporting the United States would always be in Denmark’s interests. Denmark’s "opt-out" from ESDP in 1992–93 served to make the country all the more dependent upon NATO and its relationship with the United States.

The Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen further argues that with German unification Denmark faced the unpleasant scenario of being placed in Germany’s shadow once more. The EU served as a way of preventing this, by tying Germany into a European political structure from which it could be controlled. However, without full integration in the EU, due to the opt-out on defence, a strong and well-functioning NATO would have to serve as the Danish instrument for tying Germany down effectively. This dependence therefore made Danish military activism within the alliance crucial for Danish security.

Henning Sørensen, unlike Heurlin and Mouritzen, sees the transformation as less of a necessity and rather more of a luxury. Sørensen argues that the increased sense of security after the Cold War allowed Denmark to move towards selective security, allowing the state to employ its armed forces to deal with problems that did not directly constitute an existential threat to Denmark. The structure of the Armed Forces came to reflect this selective security environment, offering soldiers a number of different options depending upon what kind of service they would like to provide to the state and society, rather than universal conscription.

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12 Interview with Per Stig Møller in Kvist and Skipper, Udenrigsminister: Seks politiske portrætter, 420-426.
13 Bjerre, Larsen, and Stougaard, Blindt ind i Basra: Danmark og Irakkrigen, 78.
14 Pedersen, "Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy," 48. The Norwegian political scientist Pernille Rieker in fact sees Denmark’s status as a "footnote" country in NATO as having been replaced by a similar status in the EU. The two organisations effectively switched places in terms of priority in Danish foreign policy. Rieker, "Europeanisation of Nordic security: The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States", 186-187.
designed to defend the survival of the nation. However, whether they see the new Danish Armed Forces as a necessity or a matter of choice and "luxury", both Heurlin and Sørensen agree that Denmark’s changed geopolitical circumstances represented the key factor driving the change in mission and organisation of the Armed Forces.

But while Danish officers and politicians in the early 1990s asked publicly "where is the front?", and looked for new tasks for the Armed Forces, there was little such existential soul-searching within the Norwegian officer corps and political leadership. As the Norwegian historian Olav Riste points out, due to its next-door neighbour, "Norway had good reasons for seeing that the end of the Cold War was not ‘the end of History’". The massive military presence in the Leningrad Military District did not disappear overnight, nor did the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula with it strategic nuclear missile submarines. Russian democracy was seen as unstable, and Russia still had an unsolved territorial dispute with Norway. There remained a long-term uncertainty due to neighbouring Russia, and Riste attributes the relative stability of Norwegian defence spending after the end of the Cold War to this uncertainty.

Even if Russia slashed its military spending to a "normal" European level, there would still exist a huge local military disparity between Norway and Russia. The Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes similarly finds that the Norwegian government felt that certain "geostrategic" factors still persisted after the Cold War. Norway was still located "within the Russian great power sphere of influence", and the great natural resources located in the partially disputed northern areas were seen as a potential source of conflict with Moscow. Norwegian security and defence policy therefore exhibited greater continuity in the post-Cold War era than in most other NATO countries, at least prior to the eastern enlargement.

It therefore remained the guiding principle for Norwegian defence planning throughout the 1990s that a military invasion of Northern Norway still remained a possibility.

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16 Sørensen, “Denmark: From Obligation to Option.” ——, "Danish Senior Officers' Experiences from IFOR/SFOR," 84-85. See also ———., "Den selektive soldat," 9-10.
18 Riste, Norway's Foreign Relations - A History, 277.
19 Ibid., 277-278.
Norwegian intelligence saw the high north as having increased its strategic importance for Russia, and viewed the Russian forces in the region as sufficient to launching an isolated attack upon Northern Norway.\(^{25}\) There remained uncertainty in Norway about how stable Russian was in the 1990s, due to the economic troubles and political instability plaguing the country.\(^{26}\) The Armed Forces also need to maintain air and sea power capable of conducting surveillance and exercise authority and sovereignty in the Norwegian maritime economic zones, a mission with increased importance as Norway began to develop its oil and gas resources further north.

The Norwegian view of the importance of geopolitical continuity was shared by prominent politicians in Denmark. That geopolitics played an important role for the divergence in defence policy is certainly the impression of the former Danish Minister of Defence, Hans Hækkerup. He explains the continuation of Norway’s territorial defence posture by arguing that “having Russia as a neighbour rather than the Soviet Union does not make much of a difference”.\(^{27}\) Hækkerup argues that Denmark had a much stronger feeling of suddenly being in a very different geopolitical situation, and that this facilitated the move from invasion defence towards an expeditionary defence posture. Danish activism in the defence field was made possible by its new geopolitical circumstances.\(^{28}\) In particular, Poland’s transformation from foe to friend drove this change in threat perception. Hækkerup argues that Poland’s accession to NATO was supported so enthusiastically by Denmark because it "would change Denmark’s geographical placement decisively".\(^{29}\)

Like Hækkerup, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen also sees Danish assertiveness as being partially driven by its new geopolitical circumstances. Especially Danish policy towards the Baltic states towards the end of the Cold War and after is seen by Ellemann-Jensen as having been about exploiting the possibility for action which suddenly opened up, further facilitated by Denmark’s dual membership in both NATO and the EU.\(^{30}\) Danish outspokenness on the Baltic issue can hence at least partially be explained by its strategic distance from Moscow.\(^{31}\) By way of contrast, Norway did not have such vital interests in the Baltic region as Denmark,
being more concerned about the Barents Sea. Furthermore, Norway’s shared border with Russia made it wary of engaging itself in opposition to Russian interests. Clive Archer describes Norway’s policy as having been "Russia first", which was also the case for Sweden and Finland. Only Denmark gave priority to the relationship with the Baltic states. Thus while Denmark during the Cold War could hardly be defended, the post-Cold War world left Denmark safely at a distance from "the realities of great power politics".

While the shared border with Russia continued to dominate Norwegian security and defence policy, Norway’s huge maritime economic zones also tied down a great deal of Norway’s military resources. The enlargement between 1977 and 1980 of the maritime economic zones to 200 nautical miles had given Norway approximately 2 million km² of oceanic territory. This huge area had to be managed, under conditions where the legal rights of Norwegian authorities to do so were constantly being challenged. The Norwegian Coast Guard, Navy and Air Force were all involved in day-to-day surveillance activities in these areas, ready to exercise Norwegian authority and sovereignty. The discovery of large quantities of petroleum in the North Sea in 1969 had also given Norway new responsibilities, and by the 1990s Norway had become the world’s second largest producer of oil, and Europe’s second largest source of natural gas. While the direct defence implications were modest, being mainly the responsibility of the Special Forces, the growing importance of Norway’s energy resources was frequently invoked as a reason why the country needed to maintain air and sea forces capable of maintaining situation awareness and exercising authority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones.

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34 Tamnes, "Norsk forsvarsaktiviteter i dag og i morgon," 64.
36 With the exception of the Border Guard unit on the Russian border, the Army only had a limited role in these respects. Svein Vigeland Rottem, Geir Hønneland, and Leif Christian Jensen, Småstat og energistormakt: Norges sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i nord, Nordområdepolitikk III (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2008), 32-47.
Defence Reform in the 21st Century

Differences in their respective geopolitical situations seem to offer several convincing reasons for Norwegian continuity and Danish change in defence policy after the Cold War. The question then becomes, if proximity to Russia and oceanic jurisdiction were the key reasons for the continuity of the territorial defence posture of the Norwegian Armed Forces, why then did Norway choose to reform its military in the early 21st century? Did geopolitics diminish in importance around the turn of the millennium? I argue that geopolitics still played a prominent role, but that circumstances had changed since the early 1990s.

Firstly, Norway experienced a similar problem to Denmark: diminishing allied interest in its territory. As one Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed the attitude in Washington, "the problem with Norway is that there is no problem with Norway". Like Denmark, Norway was no longer able to maintain a relationship with the United States based simply upon American interests in Norway’s strategic location. Providing Norwegian forces for US-led multilateral military operations, mostly within NATO, consequentially became a new way of maintaining friendly relations with the now sole superpower. By doing so, Norway hoped to maintain NATO, and by association the American security guaranty which made up the cornerstone of the alliance. It became a common argument among the political leadership that if Norway expected to receive allied assistance when needed, the country had to contribute to the alliance in turn. It is indicative that when the new long term plan, initially unveiled in 2001, began to be implemented, it was warmly welcomed by top NATO officials.

However, even as Norway reformed its armed forces towards meeting NATO’s requirement for a more modern and expeditionary-capable force, this was always done with a

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40 Italics original. Jonas Gahr Støre, Å gjøre en forskjell: Refleksjoner fra en norsk utenriksminister (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008), 141.
43 To keep Norwegian forces interoperable with allied forces was another key objective for participating international military operations, as interoperability would be a key requirement for successful allied military operations on Norwegian soil. Nina Græger, "Norsk forsvarsdiskurs 1990-2005: Internasjonaliseringen av Forsvaret" (PhD Thesis, University of Oslo, 2007), 77-80.
view towards keeping NATO’s classic collective defence role relevant.\textsuperscript{45} When legitimising sending Norwegian troops to Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre emphasised that due to Norway’s "location, geography and resources" it needed the alliance.\textsuperscript{46}

Secondly, the nature of the threat from the east had changed after the Cold War. Specifically, Norway’s strategic environment had changed due to the deterioration of the Russian military, and due to the advancements made in military technology.\textsuperscript{47} The Norwegian shift away from conscripted reserve units and towards more regular contracted units in 2001 was therefore in some respect driven by the realisation that Russia continued to be a potential threat, but that scenarios involving Russia had changed from the threat of a massive Russian military invasion to more limited scenarios.

That the Russian conventional forces had decreased tremendously in size and capabilities in the decade after the Cold War, including on the Kola Peninsula, was something of which the Norwegian authorities were keenly aware.\textsuperscript{48} Qualitative reforms in the Russian Armed Forces meant that Russia was also expected to develop more limited means of accomplishing their military objectives, such as stand-off guided munitions, rather than having to carry out a full-scale conventional ground invasion.\textsuperscript{49} In the Norwegian defence establishment the large, mobilization-based, relatively static invasion defence army therefore came to be seen as increasingly unsuitable to face the most likely scenarios involving Russian forces. A massive invasion designed to take control of most of Norway now seemed very implausible. Rather, limited Russian military operations against Norway were more likely, designed to achieve limited aims. Under these circumstances better and more mobile units, with shorter reaction time, would be required to win in this type of limited warfare scenario.\textsuperscript{50} Crises-management now replaced invasion-defence tasks for the Norwegian military units in Northern Norway.\textsuperscript{51} The seriousness of these new tasks were underlined by the fact that the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{46} Maria Reinertsen, "I krig for freden," \textit{Morgenbladet} 16 February 2007.
\textsuperscript{47} Changing threats to national security and new military technologies are two of the factors driving military change suggested by Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff. Farrell and Terriff, "The Sources of Military Change," 10-17.
\end{footnotesize}
use of force in or near Norway could in fact be said to have increased after the Cold War, because such limited use of force would not necessarily lead to any automatic escalation. Under these circumstances, quality and response time became more important for the Norwegian Armed Forces than quantity and endurance.

Thirdly, and finally, the Norwegian maritime economic zones increased in importance in the new century. This was due to the abundant food resources, as well as the future potential as an energy region and as a maritime transport hub across Eurasia through the Northeast Passage. By 2008 the Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen considered strategic competition concerning access to these resources to be the most likely source of conflict in the region. This confrontation would most likely take the form of a tactical confrontation involving mainly air and sea forces, and possibly short-term air- or sea-launched raids with limited land forces against valuable military and economic targets.

The types of units needed for these new tasks were mobile and flexible forces, available all year, with short reaction time and the ability to work alongside units from allied countries. In short, they would be nearly identical to the types of units needed to participate in international operations abroad. The Coastal Artillery provided was a good example. Because technology had made fixed coastal artillery vulnerable, the Coastal Artillery was in 1998 converted to smaller, more agile, high-technological, mobile forces. The new Coastal Ranger Command (Kystfegerkommando), established in 2001, was gradually converted from one intended to train conscripts, to a standing, volunteer force. In the fall of 2005 the unit was active with four Combat Boat 90s on an exercise with British and Dutch marines off the coast of Senegal, and also had a Reconnaissance squad in Afghanistan, while maintaining

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their readiness for contingencies in Norway.\textsuperscript{58} Thus the new organisation proved equally employable on Norwegian territory as well as on the global arena.

Similar to the Coastal Artillery, the Norwegian Army had through the 1990s remained bound to their static defence concept behind the Lyngen-line, only really capable of tactical mobility in the mountainous Troms County. Such limited tactical mobility was now no longer sufficient, because the Army would have to be rapidly strategically deployable and be capable of winning in limited scenarios. The threat of vertical envelopment created by an increasingly air-mobile Russian military further made the old, relatively static defensive concept unsuitable for modern conditions.\textsuperscript{59} The new, smaller Army had increased availability, responsiveness, mobility, firepower and protection, and at least parts of it would in principle be equally capable of deploying to win a limited tactical engagement in Northern Afghanistan as in Northern Norway.\textsuperscript{60}

Even as the Norwegian Armed Forces became remarkably similar to the Danish military after 2001, the motives for the Norwegian reforms were nevertheless different. The restructuring towards a smaller number of volunteer units was not justified solely or even primarily by the requirements of PSOs in distant theatres, but rather by the need for military forces available for \textit{national} contingencies requiring the capacity for rapid reaction.\textsuperscript{61}

The importance of the High North was however not a constant size, but fluctuated during the 1990s and 2000s. From 2005 the new Red-Green government became increasingly committed, at least rhetorically, to conducting an active High North policy.\textsuperscript{62} Increasing the presence of the Armed Forces was part of this policy, and the High North can therefore be said to have experienced a renaissance in Norwegian security and defence policy towards the end of the period examined here, after having decreased markedly in importance following


\textsuperscript{59} Tormod Heier, "Forsvaret etter den kalde krigen: En militærpolitisk analyse av invasjonsforsvaret og verneplikten" (Hovedoppgave, University of Oslo, 1999), 44-48. Also, the focus on static territorial defence forces made the Norwegian army much less capable when it came contributing forces for PSOs alongside its allies. Heier, "Forsvaret etter den kalde krigen: En militærpolitisk analyse av invasjonsforsvaret og verneplikten", 55-59.


\textsuperscript{61} Forsvarssjefen, \textit{Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport}, 8.

the end of the Cold War. As expressed by the State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence: "Many of the geopolitical factors we used to think of as obsolete are once again relevant." While careful to emphasise that there was no new Cold War, Norwegian policymakers remained aware of Russia’s military resurgence and the growing geopolitical and energy importance of the High North.

**Procuring Weapons for Going Abroad or Staying at Home?**

The continued territorial focus in Norway and comparatively expeditionary focus in Denmark is clearly shown in weapon procurement decisions taken in the early 21st century. When the Norwegian government made the decision to acquire the F-35 to replace the F-16 in the autumn of 2008, the primary importance of the new aircraft were said to be its role in national crises management, surveillance and ability to enforce national sovereignty. Indeed the main competitor to the F-35, the JAS Gripen, was considered adequate for NATO missions abroad, but was ultimately rejected because it failed the requirements for national tasks. In contrast, in a study conducted by the Danish Institute for Military Studies, the main criterion for a future Danish aircraft was held to be the ability to contribute to international military missions abroad, with a national capacity for homeland defence ("air policing") being listed only as a second criterion.

The five new Fridtjof Nansen class frigates which began to be phased into Norwegian service during 2006 offers another case in point. Not having been requested by NATO, the need to acquire the frigates was primarily legitimised by references to national priorities in national waters. Strengthening the capacity for crisis management in Norwegian waters was considered their most important operations task by the government. Similarly, the Skjold

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class MTBs were also not legitimised by their capacity for force-projection abroad, being optimised for anti-invasion operations in coastal areas.\(^{71}\) Norway also continued to maintain a strong Coast Guard, numbering 15 vessels in 2008, whose main task was exercising Norwegian sovereignty and authority in its northern waters.\(^{72}\) The Coast Guard was equipped with new vessels, acquiring five small *Nornen* class patrol ships in 2006–2007, and three new *Barentshav* class vessels displacing 4000 tons were being constructed in 2008.\(^{73}\) Northern and maritime dimensions hence took on a relatively greater importance in post-Cold War Norwegian defence policy, leading to greater prioritising of the Navy at the expense of the traditionally dominant Army.\(^{74}\) The service mainly concerned with operations abroad therefore diminished compared with one focusing mainly on national tasks.

The Danish on their part reduced the size of their navy more rapidly than the Norwegians after the Cold War, and concentrated their new acquisitions around larger platforms suitable for operations outside the Danish Navy’s traditional Baltic theatre of operations. This indicates the increased priority assigned in Denmark to PSOs and NATO standing naval forces away from national waters.\(^{75}\) While patrolling the Danish economic zones around Greenland and the Faeroe Islands continued to be an important national task, this would now be the sole responsibility of the *Thetis*, *Agdleq*, and *Knud Rasmussen* class arctic patrol ships.\(^{76}\) Force projection and sea-to-land operations were the priority within the new Danish Navy. The new 6,300 tons *Absalon* class had the ability to carry up to 200 extra soldiers in addition to is 100 regular crewmembers, had a roll-on-roll off platform which could accommodate even the heavy 62 ton Leopard II MBT, and was equipped with a 127mm cannon that could provide naval fire support up to 100 km inland.\(^{77}\) The Danish Navy’s ambition was to "create a fleet that can do on water what Danish soldiers are doing on land", meaning to contribute to international military operations far away from Denmark proper.\(^{78}\) The Danish Navy can in some respects be said to have returned to the days of the 18th and 19th century, when Danish ships-of-the-line displayed the Danish flag and protected Danish ships

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\(^{77}\) Nørby, *Det danske forsvar: Opgaver, udstyr og mandskab i det nye årtusind*, 124-130.

in distant waters. For example, the *DKM Absalon* in August 2008 assumed command of the Combined Task Force 150, the international naval force conducting anti-terrorism operations, as well as protecting shipping from terrorist and pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa.

**Conclusion: Geopolitics, the Necessary but Insufficient Factor**

While Denmark has since the end of the Cold War transformed its armed forces into a professional expeditionary corps, safe in the knowledge that no conventional military threat to Danish territory exists, Norway has not enjoyed the same feeling of safety and security. Due to its uncertainty vis-à-vis its great power neighbour in the northeast, and its need to exercise authority and sovereignty within its huge maritime economic areas, Norway has retained a stronger territorial focus in its defence forces, even as its armed force has moved away from mobilization forces towards more standing, responsive, volunteer units. This is one important reason why Norway has had fewer capabilities available for deployment abroad, despite spending much more on its armed forces than Denmark.

But while geopolitical differences provide an important and indeed necessary condition for the divergence in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the post-Cold War era, they fail to provide a sufficient explanation for the differences. The enhanced security environment only gave Denmark the opportunity to reorient its Armed Forces towards expeditionary operations, but it does not explain why this opportunity was seized so early and so decisively. Also, Norway’s move away from invasion defence came rather late. The new geopolitical situation had been apparent for some time before the defence reform of 2001.

Because geopolitics alone only provides part of the answer, in the following three chapters we will therefore examine in turn the role of the individual leaders and the cultural factors that decided the shape of Danish and Norwegian defence policies after the Cold War.

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CHAPTER 5

DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP

If the Alliance were to falter, we [the Norwegians] would be among the last ones to leave the sinking ship.¹
Johan Jørgen Holst, Norwegian Minister of Defence

When the Cold War was over, the work began to restore Denmark’s ruined credibility as an ally and partner in international cooperation.²
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs

A central reason for the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the post-Cold War era was the different desires of key policymakers for change. The key decision makers as well as the broader political elite in Norway were generally hesitant about making great changes to defence policy before the turn of the century, while in Denmark key decision makers actively sought to create a new political consensus for new policies. These leaders sought to remake Danish defence policy so that the Armed Forces would act as instruments for Danish interests and values abroad, and especially to ensure that Denmark was seen as being in the vanguard of the Atlantic community. In this endeavour they greatly succeeded.

This chapter will highlight the importance of individuals with fresh ideas and new projects. This is a factor that has all too frequently been dismissed in the literature on post-Cold War Nordic defence policy, often in favour of more "objective" material factors, such as geopolitics.

Denmark: The Coming of the "Dynamic Duo"
The Danish academic Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that while a "zero-threat environment"³ which "moved Denmark from the frontline to the backwater"⁴ was indeed a requirement for the rapid Danish transition to expeditionary defence, it also required dynamic leadership to build political consensus and public support for it. To send Danish combat troops abroad was

² Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Fodføl: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2004), 291. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.
³ Jakobsen, "The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold War: A New Model in the Making?,” 117.
⁴ ________, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making? , 92.
in no way a "natural" choice, and it broke decisively with past practice in Denmark. Jakobsen especially identifies two successful defence policy entrepreneurs, the Liberal Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Social Democratic Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, whom he describes as the "dynamic duo" of Danish defence policy in the early post-Cold War years.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen served as Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1982 until 1993. He was deeply dissatisfied with what he perceived as Denmark’s wholly inadequate support to its allies during the Cold War, which he described as virtual appeasement of the Soviet Union. Ellemann-Jensen felt ashamed by the role that Denmark had played in NATO as a "footnote-country". The new policy term introduced by him in 1989, "active internationalism", was meant to remedy Denmark’s established reputation as a "wimp-state" ("pusling-land"). Denmark was now to become a reliable and predictable ally, which stood by its friends. This was particularly important in relations with the United States. This change of policy was enabled by the restoration of consensus in Danish politics, which took place following the election of 1988, and the close cooperation between Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup.

Ellemann-Jensen saw the 1990/91 Gulf War as an opportunity to rebuild Denmark’s reputation as a reliable ally, and to move the frontier of what was considered possible with respect to the employment of the Danish military. Ellemann-Jensen therefore actively sought to change Denmark’s foreign policy approach by sending the KDM Olfert Fischer to the Gulf in 1990. In this he was supported by the future Minister of Defence Hækkerup, who was then a member of the Defence Committee in the Danish Parliament and defence policy spokesman for the Social Democrats. Despatching the KDM Olfert Fischer to the Gulf was the closest to actual participation in the US coalition that Danish domestic politics would allow, and it only proved possible due to close cooperation between Ellemann-Jensen, Vice-Admiral Hans Garde who was then Chief of Defence Staff (Chefen for Forsvarsstaben), and Hans Hækkerup.

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5 Jakobsen, "Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the Cold War," 41-42.
6 Ibid., Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, 93-94.
7 See his book on this topic, Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfeil: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig.
9 Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfeil: Da Danmark svigtede under Den Kolde Krig, 291-292.
10 Interview with Ellemann-Jensen in Kvist and Skipper, Udenrigsminister: Seks politiske portrætter, 183.
11 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, 93-94.
To Ellemann-Jensen the Gulf War marked a watershed in that Denmark, unlike in the past, did not let its allies down this time.\textsuperscript{13} Hans Hækkerup also viewed sending a warship to the Gulf in 1990 as important in order to change the Danish attitude towards the application of military force.\textsuperscript{14} Like Ellemann-Jensen, Hækkerup had been very uncomfortable with Denmark’s footnote-policy, but like the Liberal foreign minister he legitimised staying on despite the policy because his resignation would not have changed it.\textsuperscript{15} Upon becoming Minister of Defence in January 1993 Hækkerup continued the policy of employing the Armed Forces proactively abroad, most noticeably in the Balkans. Hækkerup stood his ground and pushed for the deployment of the Danish tank squadron to Bosnia, despite the scepticism of the UN. As a result, unlike the Dutch, who deployed to the safe area of Srebrenica without their heavy-weapons, the Danes came heavily armed to their zone in Tuzla. The result was disaster and humiliation for the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica, and comparative success for the joint Swedish-Danish-Norwegian battalion in Tuzla.\textsuperscript{16}

Hækkerup also took a strong interest in the organisation of the DIB, which he regarded as "the Jewel in the Crown" of the November 1992 Defence Agreement.\textsuperscript{17} Hækkerup himself described the DIB as his "pet project".\textsuperscript{18} His enthusiasm for the brigade was such that its first commander, the then brigadier general Finn Særmark-Thomsen, was initially concerned about undue interference from the minister.\textsuperscript{19} This strong political patronage was an important reason why the DIB received a clear procurement priority with the Danish Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{20} SHIRBRIG experienced similar personal patronage by Hækkerup. His fear that his personal prestige project would fail if not used was the main reason why SHIRBRIG was deployed to Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000.\textsuperscript{21} If the UN called and SHIRBRIG did not respond, Hækkerup

\textsuperscript{94-98. On the request of Ellemann-Jensen, the Danish businessman Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller put his considerable merchant fleet at the disposal of the US, free of charge. This was however not “official” Danish aid to the coalition. Ellemann-Jensen, \textit{Vejen, jeg valgte: Ti Mands Minde-foredrag på Vartov}, 212.}
\textsuperscript{13} Ellemann-Jensen, \textit{Din egen dag er kort: Oplevelser og indtryk}, 239.
\textsuperscript{14} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen: Dansk forsvars politik fra Murens fald til Kosovo}, 97-98.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 140-142.
\textsuperscript{17} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen: Dansk forsvars politik fra Murens fald til Kosovo}, 178.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{19} Særmark-Thomsen, \textit{Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv}, 136.
\textsuperscript{21} Jakobsen, \textit{Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?}, 95-96. Hækkerup again worked together with SHIRBRIG’s first commander, brigadier general Finn Særmark-Thomsen, to find employment for the brigade. Særmark-Thomsen remarks on Hækkerups very active involvement in the setting up of the brigade, and subsequent personal involvement in its activities. Særmark-Thomsen, \textit{Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv}, 184-199.
feared it would fall apart. As he puts it, "a soufflé rises only once".22 The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) therefore became a brief return to "traditional" non-robust UN peacekeeping for Denmark.23

The Liberal politician Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who served as Prime Minister from 2001 until 2009, continued taking the "dynamic duo" project a step further from the 1990s. This demonstrates both that their dynamic leadership had been a success, but also shows the emergence of a new leader daring to challenged domestic constraints and past practice. The need to make a break with the embarrassing past and reinvent Denmark as a good and assertive ally which "punched above its weight" was an important mantra for Rasmussen. A new chapter in this break with the past came when he decided on Danish participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.24 The logic of Denmark having a "debt of honour" to its allies thus still played a part when Denmark joined the US/UK coalition.25 Rasmussen viewed past Danish foreign policy as having been "to hide behind others and follow a passive adaptation-policy".26

Rasmussen therefore successfully took up the rhetoric of Ellemann-Jensen in the early 1990s and, to a lesser extent, Hækkerup up until 2000. They all sought to make a clear break with the Danish attitude during the Cold War of being a "reluctant ally"27 with "neutralist tendencies"28 and to remake the country into America’s "best ally".29 Perhaps most remarkable was the fact that they managed to build broad cross-party political support for the new policy, which endured for two decades almost without cracks. Only with regard to participation in the Iraq War did the consensus actually break down, but this was quickly restored when the Social Democrats supported the presence of Danish troops to stabilize the country.30 However, it should be noted that unlike the previous experience in the Gulf and the

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22 Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarsøkonomi fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 90.
23 See e.g. Sørensen, Søgaard, and Hillingsø, Udsendige for fred: Danske soldater i internationale konflikter, 144-173. The emphasis on deploying SHIRBRIG as a whole brigade has been toned down after Hækkerup was replaced as Minister of Defence. See e.g. Søren Gade, "SHIRBRIG - en status," Militært Tidsskrift 134, no. 3 (September 2005): 305-310.
28 Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State, 119.
29 Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarsøkonomi fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 40.
Balkans, participation in Iraq has subsequently been seen as less successful.\textsuperscript{31} Hans-Henrik Holm argues that Danish activism in fact declined in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{32}

While an early desire for change in Denmark was a decisive reason for the rapid change of Danish defence policy, another cause of its continued success has been an ability to make difficult choices about priorities. In this the senior leadership of the Danish Armed Forces also played a crucial role, and particularly so with the milestone 2004 Defence Agreement. While the August 2003 Bruun report was given little media attention,\textsuperscript{33} the so-called K-note ("Capacity Memorandum") from the Danish Defence Command received a lot of attention. Presented publicly in September 2003 by Chief of Defence General Jesper Helsø, this was the first time that the Armed Forces themselves had taken a leading role in the political debate about defence reform.\textsuperscript{34} The K-note effectively sidelined those who opposed abolishing the remnants of territorial defence, and speeded up the road towards a new defence agreement. With the K-note the Armed Forces themselves led the way towards expeditionary defence.\textsuperscript{35} They made sure that the tools in the military toolbox "would be of an expeditionary nature".\textsuperscript{36}

This prioritising of expeditionary capabilities was aided by a political leadership who dared to cut entire military capabilities. Minister of Defence Søren Gade presided over the 2004 Defence Agreement which disbanded the Navy’s submarines, the Air Force’s ground-to-air missiles and the Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).\textsuperscript{37} Denmark’s low


\textsuperscript{33} Udenrigsministeriet, \textit{De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarspolitik}.

\textsuperscript{34} Although the note itself was confidential, its content was made widely known by General Helsø’s presentations on the internet and statements to the media. Heurlin, "The New Danish Model: Limited Conscription and Deployable Professionals," 165.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{———}, "Det nye danske forsvar: Denationaliser, militarisering og demokratisering," 101-103. The Danish Film Institute and the Danish Broadcasting Corporation in April 2004 released a documentary about the K-note, as part of a series on entitled "Pictures of Power". It highlights how the senior officers in the Danish armed forces worked actively to shape the next defence agreement towards more expeditionary capabilities and away from territorial defence. Dola Bonfils, "Magtens Billeder: K-notatet," Magtens billede (Denmark: 21 April 2004).


defence spending left a choice between starving the military or transformation, and the civilian and military leadership boldly chose the latter.\(^{38}\)

**Norway in the 1990s: In the Mire of Complacency**

In Norway no similar political entrepreneurship as in Denmark was forthcoming after the Cold War. The political leadership mostly supported the status quo as far as the Armed Forces were concerned, and if anything there was a general lack of political interest in military affairs.\(^{39}\) The Conservative Minister of Defence from October 1989 until November 1990 Per Ditlev-Simonsen cautioned that "tampering" with the Armed Forces was undesirable at this point in time.\(^{40}\) In this he was supported by his Chief of Defence, Admiral Torolf Rein, who called for prudence and no dramatic changes to the mission or shape of the Armed Forces.\(^{41}\) The 1990 Defence Commission, chaired by the former Conservative Prime Minister Kåre Willoch, did argue that the Armed Forces should be prepared to participate in peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the UN or the CSCE.\(^{42}\) Overall however the recommendations given by the commission in 1992 were very conservative considering that the same year Denmark moved to establish the DIB.\(^{43}\) Generally, the Norwegian government seemed more comfortable to continue focusing on traditional peacekeeping.\(^{44}\)

In his vision for Norway’s security policy in the 1990s, the well known academic and Labour politician Johan Jørgen Holst, who served as Minister of Defence 1986–1989 and 1990–1993, made no concrete mention of future Norwegian participation in international military operations.\(^{45}\) This was despite the fact that he was an enthusiastic and energetic participant in the process of reshaping NATO for the post-Cold War era.\(^{46}\) Holst supported the

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\(^{38}\) Heurlin, "The New Danish Model: Limited Conscription and Deployable Professionals," 165-166.


\(^{43}\) Ibid. Forsvarsministeriet, *Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1993–1994*. In retrospect, Willoch sees the commission’s focus on Russia as having been correct, give the circumstance. He is mostly critical abut parliaments lacking ability to allocate the necessary funds to finance the commissions recommended structure for the armed forces. Kåre Willoch, "Forsvarskommisjonen av 1990 - ti år etter," in *Forsvaret i en ny tid*, ed. Tønne Huitfeldt (Oslo: Oslo Militære Samfund, 2000).


idea of NATO being available to implement enforcement missions in the interest of regional order, provided that a mandate was given by the UN and the CSCE.\textsuperscript{47} This implied that the Norwegian IRF force could also be used for such missions. However, when Parliament discussed the governments’ proposal to create the IRF battalion in June 1993, little discussion was sparked off by the proposal. It seemed that few politicians really thought the unit would be utilized for warfighting abroad.\textsuperscript{48} The only politicians interested in debating the proposal came from the Socialist Lefts Party, which traditionally opposed anything involving NATO.\textsuperscript{49} The IRF battalion represented the only real innovation in the structure of the Armed Forces towards making them more capable of deploying abroad, as the Navy and Air Force already possessed units capable of embarking on IRF missions.\textsuperscript{50} Nevertheless Ståle Ulriksen argues that even this relatively limited force bore the mark of being more symbolic than real.\textsuperscript{51}

There was a feeling in Norway that things had changed less radically by the events of 1989/1991 than in Denmark, hence preserving NATOs historic role remained essential. Thus the government spent much time and energy salvaging what could be salvaged of existing equipment prepositioning programs, NATO headquarters and dedicated allied reinforcements.\textsuperscript{52} Less energy was spent on reforming the Armed Forces, whose main task was still invasion defence. Leif Mevik, who served as Norway’s NATO ambassador during the period 1992–1998, experienced how Norway was increasingly seen as out of touch with what other NATO countries viewed as the defence and security challenges of the day.\textsuperscript{53} This criticism was sometimes voiced publicly by NATO officials.\textsuperscript{54} As the 1990s passed, Norway became more and more a "special case" in an alliance increasingly oriented towards other

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\textsuperscript{48} Tor Aagaard Borgersen, "Forsvaret i skuddlinjen: En analyse av debatten rundt opprettelsen og iverksettelsen av Telemark bataljon" (MA Thesis, University of Oslo, 1998), 55-61. Establishing the IRF battalion was proposed by the government in \textit{St.prp. nr. 83 (1992–93) Visse organisasjonsendringer m.v. i Forsvaret}, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{49} The Socialist Left Party (SV) had its roots in a movement opposing Norwegian NATO membership. The party consistently opposed moves to orient the armed forces towards expeditionary operations, wanting to keep the military focused on purely national tasks. Græger, "Norsk forsvarsdiskurs 1990-2005: Internasjonaliseringen av Forsvaret", 65-68.


\textsuperscript{51} Ulriksen, \textit{Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?}, 238.


\textsuperscript{53} Other NATO ambassadors would discreetly start studying their papers, or gaze elsewhere, when Norwegian NATO representatives sought to discuss the security of the High North. Mevik, \textit{Det nye NATO: en personlig beretning}, 98-101.

\textsuperscript{54} Gunnar Johnsen, "NATO er bare mellomfornøyd med Norge," \textit{Aftenposten Morgen} 1 February 2001.
tasks than collective defence.\textsuperscript{55} Norwegian foreign ministers and ministers of defence continued to focus upon the relevance of Article 5, the High North and Russia.\textsuperscript{56} While always careful to emphasise the new comprehensive security challenges, this commitment was much stronger in rhetoric than in reality.

The Labour politician Jørgen Kosmo served as Minister of Defence from 1993 until 1997. He was thus the main player involved in implementing the Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces for the period 1994–1998, as well as developing the following plan for the period 1999–2002. Together with his Chief of Defence, General Arne Solli, Kosmo adopted a cautious approach towards implementing the long-term plan. Under Kosmo and Solli plans to downsize the Armed Forces further were halted, and personnel expenditure again took up a growing size of the budget, at the expense of planned equipment acquisitions.\textsuperscript{57} When planning for the 1999–2002 period began, Kosmo mainly wanted to examine the economic feasibility of a continued invasion defence structure. Any major changes to the organisation of the Armed Forces or the present system of conscription were ruled out \textit{prima facie}.\textsuperscript{58} Under Kosmo and his successors, the Christian Democrat Dag Jostein Fjærvoll (1997–1999), "uncertainty" became a watchword legitimising continuity in defence policy.\textsuperscript{59} Fjærvoll could see "no responsible alternative" to continuing with a conscripted, mobilization-based total defence force.\textsuperscript{60}

That there were few calls from prominent politicians for a radical reorientation of Norwegian defence policy in the 1990s can in part be attributed to the fact that few votes were to be gained, but many could be lost over the issue.\textsuperscript{61} By one calculation, in 1992 almost 9 percent of the working population of Northern Norway was \textit{directly} employed by the Armed Forces.

\textsuperscript{55} Rolf Tamnes, "The Strategic Importance of the High North during the Cold War," in \textit{A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years (Volume 3)}, ed. Gustav Schmidt (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 274.
\textsuperscript{60} Fjærøvoll, "Forsvarets utfordringer inn i år 2000," 13.
\textsuperscript{61} Heier, "Forsvarets utvikling etter den kalde krigen- den vanskelige veien," 21-22.
Forces, and 15 percent if counting indirect effects. In some Northern Norwegian municipalities direct military employment exceeded 40 percent.\(^{62}\) The Norwegian Armed Forces had therefore become an important source of employment in these relatively rural areas, a factor complicating any attempts to rationalise and reform the Armed Forces. The "municipality-military complex" which had emerged during the Cold War, consisting of local base commanders, municipality and country politicians, and local businessmen, proved effective at squashing attempts to rationalise the number of bases.\(^{63}\) The drawn out political decision-making process required to enact change left ample opportunity for local communities to mobilise effectively against reforms they considered undesirable, such as those involving base closures.\(^{64}\) Furthermore, maintaining settlements in rural communities in Northern Norway had itself become "securitised"\(^{65}\) during the Cold War, making it legitimate to argue that having many spread-out bases was a security gain in itself.\(^{66}\) Many defence policy decisions were in fact taken with rural settlement policy in mind from the outset.\(^{67}\)

**Norway After 2000: Taking the Turn Away From Invasion Defence**

Around the turn of the new millennium, Norway reached a "turning point" in its defence policy. Several key political and military leaders now became convinced that the Norwegian Armed Forces were in a crisis, and that radical reforms were needed. The reasons for this change of mind came about for two reasons: resource imbalance and task imbalance. Firstly, due to shrinking budgets, failure to cut costs and inaccurate planning costs, the Armed Forces were held to be unable to invest sufficient funds in force modernisation and training. Secondly, even if adequate funding had been provided, the structure of the Armed Forces was such that it would still be incapable of delivering the kind of relevant military power demanded by the political leadership. In Norwegian defence policy documents these factors were collectively referred to as the "dual imbalance".\(^{68}\)


\(^{65}\) Securitization is said to take place when an issue "is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures". Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Wæver, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 23-24.


\(^{67}\) Berggrav, "Forsvarets rolle i norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk etter 1949," 79.

\(^{68}\) This definition of "dual imbalance" draws on the "official" definition presented by the government in *St.prp. nr. 45 (2000–2001) Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002-2005*, 6.
The first imbalance was said to be making the Armed Forces into a "technical museum" because of lack of funding for new equipment.\textsuperscript{69} Planned equipment acquisitions were being postponed regularly.\textsuperscript{70} The latter imbalance had been bluntly demonstrated by the Kosovo War. When the Norwegian units arrived in Kosovo three months after KFOR had already deployed there, its British commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson was supposed to have asked sarcastically asked "what took you so long? Have you been walking?"\textsuperscript{71} Clearly the slow responsiveness of the Army was an embarrassment to the Norwegian political leadership.\textsuperscript{72} Members of the foreign policy elite seem to have mistakenly believed that the Armed Forces were in fact capable of rapid reaction.\textsuperscript{73} While the Danish leadership experienced the same unpleasant surprise, the Danish Armed Forces nevertheless performed better than their Norwegian counterparts.\textsuperscript{74} The political consensus in Norway after the Kosovo War was that Norway needed more capabilities, with higher quality and shorter response time.\textsuperscript{75}

Much of the intellectual and ideological impetus for the reforms came from within the Armed Forces themselves,\textsuperscript{76} the key figure being the future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen. Since early in his career he had been an advocate for a standing military with a high-number of service members on contracts.\textsuperscript{77} After the Cold War he continued to argue that this new age required higher quality and more standing forces with shorter reaction time.\textsuperscript{78} Diesen was convinced that the role of the military had fundamentally changed in the new age, and that the Norwegian Armed Forces had to keep up with the times.\textsuperscript{79} He argued that the old invasion


\textsuperscript{72} The one exception was the Norwegian Special Forces. Due to their early entry into Pristina, one author claims that Prime Minister Bondevik could in fact inform President Clinton that Norwegian forces had entered Kosovo before American troops had. Anders Nilsen and Are Løset, Fallskjermjegere: Arven fra Kompani Linge (Oslo: Kagge Forlag, 2008), 133.

\textsuperscript{73} Henrik Thune and Ståle Ulriksen, Norway as an Allied Activist - Prestige and Penance through Peace (NUPI Paper No. 637) (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 23.

\textsuperscript{74} See Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 135-137.


\textsuperscript{76} Both Godal and his successor Devold credit the top military leadership with initiating the reform. Godal, Utsikter, 67-69. Kristin Krohn Devold, Nyttårsforedraget 2005: Vilje til å endre, evne til å forsøre (Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet, 2005), 3-4.

\textsuperscript{77} Interview with Ole Rønning, the former Chief of the Norwegian Military Academy. Leif Inge Skagemo, "Den nakne kadett," Forsvarets Forum, no. 4 (April 2009).

\textsuperscript{78} Sverre Diesen, "Høren i fremtiden - kvalitet eller kvantitet?," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 161, no. 6 (1991): 9-23.

defence force was neither appropriate nor affordable anymore.\textsuperscript{80} The Armed Forces were now to become a standing, more-volunteer, capital-intensive, power-political instrument for the state, adapted for limited rather than total war.\textsuperscript{81}

In November 1998 Diesen was given responsibility for drawing up Defence Study 2000.\textsuperscript{82} While the triggering reason for this study was financial,\textsuperscript{83} it soon became a vehicle for updating the Armed Forces to a new international and technological reality.\textsuperscript{84} The study was closely coordinated with the work of the Defence Policy Committee, whose support provided extra weight.\textsuperscript{85} His leading role in drawing up Defence Study 2000 therefore made Diesen the chief ideological architect for the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{86}

The reforms were carried out under the leadership of two reform-driven ministers of defence. First, the plans for a new defence were drawn up during the tenure of the Labour politician Bjørn Tore Godal, who served as the Norwegian Minister of Defence in the vital period 2000–2001. This was the period when the radical new Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces for the period 2002–2005 was being developed. Thereafter, with the change of government in October 2001, the Conservative Kristin Krohn Devold served as Minister of Defence for the entirety of its implementation period.

Godal argued that the threat of a full-scale invasion was now long gone, and that any new threat would take at least 10–15 years to re-emerge.\textsuperscript{87} New multi-dimensional \textit{challenges} were replacing yesterday’s \textit{threats}.\textsuperscript{88} However, as he saw it, the Armed Forces were still adapted to yesterday’s scenarios. Norway needed military instruments that could rapidly be utilized along with other instruments, both in the High North and if necessary "out of area" alongside allies.\textsuperscript{89} The present invasion defence structure was no longer economically


\textsuperscript{81} Diesen, "Mot et allianseintegrert forsvar," 167-171. See also the book by Diesen on military strategy, outlining his thinking in more detail. Sverre Diesen, \textit{Militær strategi: En innføring i maktens logikk} (Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 1998).

\textsuperscript{82} Ulriksen, "Brydningstid - paradigmeskiftet i det norske forsvar (2001–2005)," 164.


sustainable, but more importantly it was no longer needed nor suitable to face the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. Territorial defence tasks could now mostly be transferred to the Home Guard. The responses to the proposals were fierce. Godal compares the effect of the long-term plan on many groups in Norway to a "sleeping beauty" being awakened not by a prince, but by a monster who told the people of a reality they did not want to hear. However, by providing political leadership and acting as a public spokesman for the reforms, Godal played a decisive role in ensuring that most of the ideas for a "new defence" were in the end adopted, despite widespread opposition. Implementation of the reforms were, however, to be the responsibility of Godals successor, Kristin Krohn Devold. She proved to have an equal zeal to that of her predecessor for adapting the Armed Forces to new tasks.

It was during Devold’s period as Minister of Defence that the Norwegian Armed Forces first began to be employed actively in combat operations abroad. Within a month of assuming office, she had offered substantial Norwegian forces for the US lead War of Terror. Within two month of assuming her post, Norwegian Special Forces were involved in combat operations in Afghanistan, something that was noticed and appreciated by the US. Devold wanted the Armed Forces to have shorter response time and the capability to solve more complex missions. She especially wanted more "deployable forces", declaring in the American press that "we want to be relevant".

Devold became an active exponent of developing niche capacities for use abroad alongside larger allies, her stated strategy being to "identify what you are good at, and concentrate on it" because "that way you can play with the big boys even if you are small."

91 Ibid.: 12.
93 Godal, Utsikter, 54-56.
94 "A New Defence" was the title of the report delivered by the Defence Policy Committee appointed in July 1999. NOU 2000: 20 Et nytt forsvar.
97 Bakkeli, Norges hemmelige krigere: Kommandosoldater i kamp mot terror, 50-128.
100 ——, "What Europe wants from NATO?," Speech at the NATO/GMFUS Conference, Brussels (3 October 2002).
102 Ibid.
Her enthusiasm for military transformation and the use of Norway’s Armed Forces abroad made her quite popular with Norway’s NATO allies, enough to make her a serious candidate for the post of General Secretary of NATO.103

However, Godal and Devold were less successful at building broad, cross-party political support to set clear defence policy priorities. Unlike in Denmark, Parliament was unwilling to sanction an expeditionary concept which emphasising "first in, first out" capacity at the expense of sustainability, but was equally unwilling to accept the technical obsolescence of the Norwegian forces. It ended up in a requirement that the Norwegian Armed Forces "had to be both modern and large, and should underscore NATO as well as UN related operations."104 Parliament also refused to cut whole military capacities, insisting for instance on acquiring and retaining the *Skjold* class MTBs despite repeated military studies recommending that these be cut.105 Great reluctance was also shown to trimming base and support structure as much as was advised by the Armed Forces.106 The Norwegian MoD identified the greater political ambivalence reigning in Norway about setting priorities as the key reason why the Danes were able to get seemingly the same range of deployable capabilities from their armed forces, despite a much lower defence budget.107

**Conclusion: Leadership Determined When the "Turn" Was Taken**

In a way Uffe Ellemann-Jensen played the part of the forerunner in Danish defence policy; he advocated the new policy to come even before the security environment enabling it had fully materialised. His ambitious "active internationalism" in the Gulf and towards the Baltic states came, thus, slightly ahead of their time. Hans Hækkerup worked to consolidate the embryonic new practices begun by Ellemann-Jensen and himself by despatching the Danish Armed Forces to cut their teeth in Croatia and Bosnia in the early to mid 1990s. By this point the beneficial post-Cold War security environment which Denmark enjoyed had been realised, but Hækkerup’s determination to see the Armed Forces play a decisive part in risky operations in the Balkans drove a change that was in no way predetermined by the country’s...

107 Forsvarsdepartementet, *Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar*, 59-61, 74-75.
new strategic situation. The rallying cry of breaking with the past continued into the new century, with Anders Fogh Rasmussen assuming the same rhetoric as Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup when Denmark went to war in Iraq. Thus early, decisive and successful leadership was a vital factor in driving Denmark’s rapid transformation from "weakest link" into one of NATO’s most willing members when it came to warfighting. The Armed Forces senior leadership then completed the final transformation towards expeditionary operations by introducing the K-note in late 2003.

In Norway no ambitious leader with a program for radical change came to the forefront after the Cold War. However, the structure introduced by the 1992 Defence Commission was neither economically sustainable nor military appropriate for the security environment facing Norway in the late 1990s. The failure of political leadership to enact timely reforms therefore made the 1990s a "lost decade" in Norwegian defence policy. That little was done to downsize and restructure the Armed Forces resulted in a feeling of crises in 2000, when the Armed Forces proved inappropriately organised and much too expensive.

At this point two political leaders did come forward in Norway, and they were willing both to propose and carry through massive reorganisation. Godal’s program of reform was, however, drawn up by ambitious reformers within the Armed Forces themselves, chief of these being Brigadier Sverre Diesen. They were subsequently enacted by the energetic DeVold, who worked successfully to change the reputation Norway had acquired in the 1990s of being out of sync with its allies.

In summary, when we regard the overall effect of leadership in the two countries, what conclusions can be drawn? Decisive political leadership in Denmark, driven by a strong cross-party desire for change, was a key reason for early and persistent reform of and active use of the Danish Armed Forces. In Norway comfortable complacency and hesitation about the direction to take contributed to maintaining the status quo in the 1990s. Thus leadership proved very important in causing the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War.

CHAPTER 6

DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF MILITARY CULTURE

*During the Cold War we used to joke that everything would be O.K., because it was all just a joke [...] When we started receiving the first fallen Danish soldiers from international operations [...] the joke was over.*¹

Col. Lars R. Møller

*Many of my colleagues say they joined the military to defend Norway, and not to embark on foreign adventures.*²

Gen. Sverre Diesen

One important reason for the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy since the end of the Cold War was the countries’ different military cultures. While the Danish Armed Forces quickly became a willing and capable foreign policy tool, the Norwegian military was neither as capable of performing the new expeditionary missions, nor as willing to do so. The reasons were threefold. *Firstly*, the Danish military became involved in combat operations abroad much sooner after the Cold War, and thus changed its internal priorities towards expeditionary warfighting more quickly than the Norwegian Armed Forces. *Secondly*, the Danish Armed Forces had traditionally depended less on conscripts than their Norwegian counterparts, and because standing, volunteered units were more easily employable for warfighting abroad, they thus had a personnel structure more suitable for expeditionary missions. *Thirdly*, the Danish Armed Forces had a stronger tradition of performing missions outside the borders of Denmark proper. In Norway, however, the traditional mission of the Armed Forces was more tied to the *territory* of Norway. The Norwegian Armed Forces therefore resisted the state’s attempt to task them with a growing number of new and demanding missions abroad, while the Danish Armed Forces quickly accepted and supported the new expeditionary missions.

This chapter will highlight the significance of different organisational cultures within the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces, and argue that while the former acted as a catalyst, the latter was an inhibitor in determining the speed at which the two organisations became willing and capable of performing the new post-Cold War missions.

¹ Møller, *Det danske Pearl Harbor: Forsvaret på randen af sammenbrud*, 57. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.
² Brzezinski, “Who’s Afraid of Norway?.”
Diverging Experience in the 1990s

In proportion to its population, Denmark was to contribute more troops than any other nation to the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia, and those forces were involved in the most intense combat engagements Danish forces had experienced since the Second World War.\(^3\) Between 1992 and 1997 over one third of all Danish Army officers and nearly half of all NCOs had done service in Bosnia.\(^4\) This war-like experience which the Danish soldiers faced in the Balkans in 1992–1995 contributed to changing the Danish Armed Forces self-understanding. When Danish officers came face-to-face with the harsh new reality of PSOs in the post-Cold War era, so different from the "beach party" days in Cyprus, even older officers came to experience a change of their world view.\(^5\) Henning-A. Frantzen argues that the experience in the Balkans led the Danish Armed Forces to adopt a "robust"\(^6\) approach to PSO, a "'warfighting first' doctrine".\(^7\) Generally the Armed Forces came to accept their new role as a foreign policy instrument within this warfighting focused framework, whereas previously, peacekeeping duty had been a side-show and a bad career move for officers.\(^8\)

While these deployments, as it were, continued the Danish tradition of participation in UN peacekeeping operation, the risk involved and the very robust nature of the Danish contribution were something new.\(^9\) The consequences of makings a mistake abroad were no longer merely a bungled exercise in West-Germany, but would literally result in Danish soldiers returning in coffins.\(^10\) Consequently, the requirements of international military operations quickly grew in importance with respect to determining force structure and procurement priorities of the Armed Forces, eventually supplanting all other considerations.\(^11\)

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\(^3\) Sørensen, "Denmark: From Obligation to Option," 125.
\(^4\) Between April 1992 and December 1997, 35 percent of all Army officers, 44 percent of NCOs, and 7-10 percent of all conscripts were deployed in Bosnia. For the Navy and the Air Force the participation rate was much lower, being 10, 12 and 13 percent for the Navy and 7, 6, and 3 percent for the Air Force. ———, "Danish Senior Officers' Experiences from IFOR/SFOR," 86.
\(^5\) Møller, *Det danske Pearl Harbor: Forsvaret på randen af sammenbrud*, 56. Peacekeeping duty in Cyprus was described by one Danish officer as having been "boring" and without significant challenges. Særmark-Thomsen, *Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv*, 38.
\(^6\) Note that while the lines between "robust" peacekeeping and peace enforcement can appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the two. While "robust" peacekeeping involves the use of force at tactical level, peace enforcement also includes the use of force at strategic level. UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 19.
\(^8\) Ibid., 167, 176. In his study of Danish officers serving in Bosnia in the late 1990s, Henning Sørensen found that they were positive towards the mission, viewed it as important for their military skills and future career, and looked at their own role as being "professional soldiers" more than "humanitarians". Sørensen, "Danish Senior Officers' Experiences from IFOR/SFOR," 91-97.
The "hot" combat-exposed parts of the organisation started dominating the military, at the expense of the "cold" peacetime establishment.12

How the Danish approach to PSOs was changed by the experience in the Balkans can be illustrated by how differently they organised their camps and military units in Croatia and Bosnia. In Croatia the camps had been located on the demarcation line, and been designed more for convenience than defensibility. In contrast, the camps built in Bosnia were established well away from the buffer zone and built-up areas, with clear fields of fire around the base. The organisation of the battalion sent to Bosnia was also more robust, being organised into regular manoeuvre companies rather than observation teams. This was due to experience from the Croatian deployment of small observation posts teams being too vulnerable to intimidation or being taken hostage by the warring parties.13

While they were assigned to perform PSO mission, Danish officers argued that little special PSO training or doctrine was needed, because the ability to solve PSO missions were based on the ability to fight.14 The commander of the Danish battalion in the NORPOL brigade argued that the Danish battalion was better prepared for the mission because it was organised like a regular Danish mechanised infantry battalion. The other battalions in the brigade, including the Norwegian battalion, were specially equipped, trained and organised for PSOs. Because the Danish battalion was more robust and prepared for warfighting, its commander claimed it would be better able to solve the full range of tasks to which it could be assigned in Bosnia.15 Similarly, the Danish commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast (MCN-NE) emphasised that the most important ability of the corps was its warfighting ability, upon which all other tasks relied, even thought its most probable mission was low-intensity PSOs.16

The Norwegian contingents to the Balkans in the period 1992–1995 were primarily involved in support functions, and did not, therefore, gain first-hand experience of engaging in regular platoon and company size combat engagement as did the Danes. While serving in support functions in Bosnia by no means meant serving in the rear, the Norwegian units in

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12 "Hot" conditions apply "when the heat is on, when one has to perform in critical, difficult, dangerous, violent, ambiguous, and hence stressful circumstances". Very different logics apply in the "hot" and "cold" parts of the military organisation. Soeters, Winslow, and Wibull, "Military Culture," 247.
15 Ibid.: 84-85.
theatre did not have combat as their assigned role.\textsuperscript{17} While the Norwegian forces experienced the same \textit{quantitative} shift that their Danish counterparts did when it came to deploying abroad, they did not to the same degree experience the same \textit{qualitative} shift in terms of the types of missions they were asked to perform.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, due to the different size and role of the Norwegian forces serving in international operations, the embedding of new practises did not take place to the degree in the Norwegian Armed Forces as the Danish military. The view within the Norwegian Armed Forces continued to be that international operations were "an unwelcome diversion of personnel and resources, rather than an opportunity to gain valuable experiences".\textsuperscript{19}

During the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia, attitudes in the Norwegian military began to change. Norwegian officers serving in SFOR in Bosnia in 1996–1997 began to sense a shift in the attitude of the Armed Forces towards a more positive view of participating in international operations.\textsuperscript{20} High ranking officers spoke out in favour of revising the existing practice of only sending support units. The commander of the Norwegian contingent in the NORPOL brigade, Colonel Kjell Grandhagen, argued firstly that Norway did not enjoy any "comparative advantage" when it came to logistics and medical services. Problems with recruiting such personnel rather meant that only sending such units was becoming a "comparative disadvantage".\textsuperscript{21} Secondly, Grandhagen felt that the types of contributions that Norway was making did not provide merit in the Atlantic alliance. As a consequence of this, Grandhagen argued that Norway should send manoeuvre units to Bosnia.\textsuperscript{22} The Colonel also argued in favour of more robust units, capable of forcing their will upon uncooperative parties in the area of operations.\textsuperscript{23} Other officers argued for making more

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Especially personnel assigned to tasks that meant being mobile in Bosnia, such as medical units, experienced a reality on the ground very different from the traditional peacekeeping missions which the Norwegian government had in mind. Gjeseth, \textit{Hæren i omveltning 1990–2008}, 144. For one first-hand account of the kind of challenges faced by soldiers serving in the Norwegian transport company in Bosnia-Herzegovina see Bull-Hansen, \textit{I krig for fred: 12 personlige fortellinger fra Koreakrigen til Afghanistan}, 213-234.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Torunn Laugen Haaland, "Den norske militære profesjonsidentitet: Kriger, hjemlandsforsvarer og statsansatt tjenestemann," in \textit{Krigerkultur i en fredsnasjon}, ed. Håkan Edström, Nils Terje Lunde, and Janne Haaland Matlary (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2009), 48-52.
\item \textsuperscript{19}———, "Small Forces with a Global Outreach: Role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War" (PhD Thesis, University of Oslo, 2008), 166.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.: 19.
\end{itemize}
use of Norwegian Special Forces in robust PSOs abroad, including as initial entry forces and for direct action missions.\textsuperscript{24}

The trickle in favour of changing the priorities of the Armed Forces became a flood after the Kosovo War, with officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mood returning from abroad with vocal calls for change.\textsuperscript{25} The officers who returned from both actual and virtual combat operations abroad returned with new ideas about how the Norwegian Armed Forces should be structured, organised, trained and equipped. They challenged those officers whose world view remained fixed on the peace-time training establishment that the Norwegian Armed Forces had been during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{26} In Lebanon and Bosnia in the 1990s Norwegian Army units had only been trained and organised for peacekeeping. After Kosovo there was a new emphasis on capacity for high-intensity warfighting being the benchmark for all other activities.\textsuperscript{27} The transition that happened in Denmark in the early 1990s, of the “hot” parts of the organisation challenging the "cold" peacetime establishment, now also took place in Norway.

The early Danish emphasis on robustness in peacekeeping was well ahead of its time. It was fully in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report submitted to the UN General Assembly in August 2000, which emphasised the need for bigger, better equipped forces capable of offering a credible deterrent.\textsuperscript{28} While sending well-equipped forces with robust rules of engagements became a norm in UN peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report, this had already become the norm for Denmark by the mid 1990s.\textsuperscript{29}

SHIRBRIG, the Danish UN prestige project, was initially an exception to the Danish emphasis on robustness. It was constructed as a more traditional, infantry-based peacekeeping brigade. However, in June 2004, the Danish government and most of the opposition parties agreed in the Danish Defence Agreement for the period 2005–2009 that Denmark would work

\textsuperscript{25} Mood implored his political superiors and fellow officers "let us not do this again". Mood, ”Erfaringer fra KOFOR I.”
\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Major General Robert Mood January 2009 and Major General Per Arne Five February 2009.
towards enabling SHIRBRIG to deploy as a more robust brigade in the future, capable of executing Chapter VII missions of the UN Charter.³⁰ 

In contrast to the Danish emphasis on robust, warfighting-capable units, the Norwegian UN readiness force remained structured around lightly equipped infantry until their merger with the Norwegian NATO IRF units in 1999. The Norwegian unit was only capable of classic, consent-based peacekeeping missions, as opposed to the new muscular Chapter VI and-a-half "strategic peacekeeping" which became common in the 1990s.³¹ The supposedly warfighting-capable IRF battalion was itself proven to have been inadequately robust when required to deploy to Kosovo in 1999. When the battalion was initially established, it consisted of an infantry company equipped with wheeled lightly armoured vehicles and two infantry companies mounted in unarmoured tracked all-terrain vehicles. Considering that the forces were in principle intended for high-intensity warfare, the battalion seemed inadequately equipped in terms of protection and firepower.³²

**Personnel Policy: Top-Heavy "People’s Defence" or Slim "Professional" Force**

While not sharing the Danish Armed Forces quick and positive experience with robust peacekeeping in the Balkans, there were also more deep-seated reasons why the Norwegian military was a less manageable foreign policy instrument than the Danish Armed Forces. The Norwegian approach to international military operations in the post-Cold War era represents what Peter Viggo Jakobsen has called "an interesting combination of civilian activism and military food-dragging".³³ This implies that the Norwegian military was a less-than-willing instrument, even for those Norwegian politicians who did have a desire to employ the Armed Forces abroad.

Bjørn Tore Godal describes the confrontation over the 2002–2005 Long Term Defence Plan as a "collision between two different views on what the tasks of the Armed Forces were".³⁴ A large group of "surplus" officers of colonel and lieutenant colonel rank, in alliance with retired senior officers and so called "friends of the Armed Forces" made up the traditionalists and the reactionaries opposing the reforms. This group was, according to

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³¹ In classical peacekeeping the parties themselves would invite the UN presence, defining the strategic role that peacekeepers are to play. In "strategic peacekeeping" external powers take the strategic initiative and insert a force to limit the effect of a conflict, altering the strategic environment. See Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 3 (1997).
Godal, still thinking in terms of yesterday’s security challenges. Godal sees an important reason for this strong opposition to reform in the Norwegian military lying in it being a very top-heavy force. Despite being much smaller than the Swedish military, the Norwegian Armed Forces had twice as many admirals and generals. In 2002 Norway had three times as many officers at lieutenant colonel/commander level as Denmark did (9 percent of all military personnel in Norway, compared to 3 percent in Denmark). In Denmark three-fourths of the Armed Forces were either enlisted soldiers or sergeants. In Norway the corresponding number was about one-fourth.

If the Norwegian armed force was to become capable of carrying out sustained military operations abroad, it had to be streamlined with more young, low-level “trigger-pullers” and fewer old, high-ranking desk officers. One key motive given by the leader of the working-group who proposed to re-introduce a professional NCO corps after the reform in 2001 was to address this problem. Naturally, the officers being made obsolete would be inclined to resist this process. Indeed, the new law was opposed by two of the three military unions, Befalets Fellesorganisasjon (BFO) and Norges Offisersforbund (NOF). A more profound question was, however, at stake in the reform. The reformists wanted to reduce the number of “surplus” traditionalist officers. While a voluntary separation package offered by the Norwegian government had slimmed the ranks of the Armed Forces, it was feared that if nothing was done to change the existing system for educating officers, a new group of “surplus” older senior officers would be produced. These officers would re-entrench themselves and again make reforming the Armed Forces difficult.

Another aspect of the NCO reform was the question of egalitarianism in the Armed Forces. The representatives of the military unions argued that the (re)introduction of a

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35 Ibid., 65-78.
36 Ibid.
37 Forsvarsdepartementet, *Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar*, 54.
38 “Figur 5.14 Personellstrukturen i Danmark og Norge (2002)” in Ibid., 53. The Swedish armed forces exhibited some of the same features as the Norwegian armed forces, being located somewhere in between Norway and Denmark. Karl Ydén, “Kriget” och karriärsystemet: Försvarmaktens organiseringe i fred (Gothenburg: Bokförlaget BAS, 2008), 82-85.
41 Røksund, “Befalsordningen,” 12-14. Although there were fewer high-ranking officers in the Danish armed forces, the problem of them being too old to be employed in operations also existed in Denmark. An informal estimate was that 60 percent of the Danish officers were unemployed in the deployable forces, due to their age. Clemmesen, ”De danske væbnede styrker i fremtiden - en skitse fra sidelinien,” 293-296.
professional NCO-corps would introduce an elitist class system into the Armed Forces. The new system was claimed to be a violation of "Norwegian values". Norway had maintained a professional NCO corps until 1927, when a unified officer/NCO corps was formed. An important reason for the abolition of the division between the officer and the NCO corps had been to secure equal access to education and do away with outdated social divides. As a consequence of this reform not only did Norway have a more top-heavy military hierarchy than Denmark, but it also systematically had less experienced leaders at lower level.

Norway had stood out within the Atlantic alliance during the Cold War for lacking specialised leaders at the squad and section level, and this absence was frequently commented on by Norway’s allies. In most alliance countries, e.g. Denmark, this was where the technical expertise in low-level tactics and weapons would lie. Critics would have it that the Norwegian system was designed to be egalitarian and to serve nation-building purposes, at the expense of military effectiveness. With increasing military involvement abroad in the 1990s, resulting in increased risk for members of the Armed Forces, senior Norwegian officers and public intellectuals became vocal spokesmen for revising the system and introducing professional NCOs. Eventually the new system was introduced in January 2005, modelled on the Danish system, giving Norway a military personnel system somewhat similar to the Danish one.

There was however another key personnel difference making the Danish Armed Forces much more capable of expeditionary operations than its Norwegian counterparts;
namely the much stronger tradition for employing contracted enlisted soldiers. In 2002 46 percent of all Danish active regular soldiers were volunteer enlisted soldiers, compared to 9 percent in Norway. Meanwhile, in Denmark 25 percent of the total number of active soldiers were conscripts, whereas the corresponding number in Norway was 57 percent. The high number of conscripts in Norway represented an obstacle to projecting military force abroad. In the early UNEF and ONUC missions the ordering of conscripts abroad had been practiced in Norway, but since UNIFIL this had ceased completely. Because ordering conscripts abroad was considered impossible in both countries by the post-Cold War era, having more volunteer enlisted soldiers gave Denmark an advantage when it came to making contributions to NATO and UN PSOs.

Employing volunteer soldiers had been much more common during the Cold War in Denmark than in Norway, and the idea of an all-volunteer force had in fact enjoyed significant political support. It is interesting that, unlike in Norway, the Home Guard in Denmark had always been a voluntary organisation. While initially conceived as a voluntary force in Norway as well, concerns about recruitment and calls for a proper “people’s defence” (folkeforsvar) resulted in the introduction of conscription for the Home Guard.

50 In Danish and Norwegian debates these are commonly referred to as "professional soldiers". For a discussion of "professional" armed forces, see Patrick Mileham, "Professional Armed Forces: Concepts and Practices," in Defence Management in Uncertain Times ed. Teri McConville and Richard Holmes (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
51 By “regular” it is meant that the unit is an active, standing force rather than an inactive, reserve unit. The latter can in turn be based either upon conscripts or contracted soldiers who can be called up for future service. "Figur 5.14 Personellstrukturen i Danmark og Norge (2002)" in Forsvarsdepartementet, Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvar, 53.
54 NATO political leaders have expressed their preference for all-volunteer forces, arguing that volunteer forces will be more able to provide modern expeditionary capabilities that their conscripted counterparts. Cindy Williams, "From Conscripts to Volunteers: The Transition to All-Volunteer Forces in NATO Countries," in Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities: A Systemic Comparison of Professional and Conscript Forces, ed. Kristina Spohr Readman (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004), 79-80. In particular large reserve forces, such as Norway possessed in abundance at the end of the Cold War, have been criticised for being unable to produce deployable forces. Christopher N. Donnelly, "The Impact of New Security Threats on the Generation of Reserves," in Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities: A Systemic Comparison of Professional and Conscript Forces, ed. Kristina Spohr Readman (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2004).
55 The Danish and Norwegian Home Guards, established in 1948 and 1946 respectively, were established under similar circumstances and for similar reasons. The former was however a voluntary organisation, while the later was based on conscription. Lyng et al., Ved forenede kræfter: Forsvarets øverste militære ledelse, Forsvarschefsembetet og forsvarets udvikling 1950–2000, 68-70. Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie 1940–1970: Alliert i krig og fred, 278-280. Hansen, Doktrineutvikling i Heimevernet, 57-60.
important than the principle of relying on volunteers or conscripting soldiers was the issue of whether to employ regular, standing forces on contract ("professional soldiers"). The 1973 Danish Defence Agreement had introduced a mixture of units manned by contracted enlisted soldiers (konstabler) alongside conscripted units, and the Social Democratic Party had been in favour of an all-volunteer, standing military from the early 1970s until the late 1980s. The military unions (CS and HKKF) also supported more widespread professionalisation. In September 1990 they proposed reducing the Army to two brigades manned by regular contracted soldiers, reserving conscripts for 7 local defence battalions and the Royal Guard battalion. Mobilization based units were to be cut to a minimum.

In Norway a much weaker tradition existed for employing volunteer enlisted soldiers. Proposals to recruit a large number of volunteer enlisted soldiers (grenaderer) during the Cold War always met strong opposition. Consequently this group was restricted to just a few specialists with certain technical skills for the duration of the East-West confrontation. The Norwegian Army never had more than approximately 250 contracted enlisted soldiers during this period. This did not change markedly with the establishment of the IRF-battalion in 1993, as there continued to be a deep ambivalence about "elite" units within the ranks of the Armed Forces as well as in the Norwegian political elite. The traditionally prioritised Border Guard and Royal Guard battalions were given priority over the new battalion when conscripts were scarce, demonstrating that units with strictly national tasks were still held to have higher priority. This scepticism about elite units can arguably be traced back to the strong Norwegian emphasis on egalitarianism.

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58 CS and HKKF, *Et forsvar, der er brug for*, 88-104.
60 Haaland, "Small Forces with a Global Outreach: Role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War", 155.
61 Ibid. The Border Guard and Royal Guard battalion have traditionally required a higher level medical ranking than regular units, and preferred to take conscripts who had especially volunteered for these units. Trygve Andersen, *Finnmark landforsvar 1944–1994* (Alta: Finnmark landforsvar, 1994), 80-81.
62 Ulriksen, *Den norske forsvarsstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?*, 200-204.
63 Anne Eriksen, *Det var noe annet under krigen*: 2. verdenskrig i norsk kollektivtradisjon (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1995), 163-164. The argument about conscription was often tied to Norwegian geography, which was said to be particularly suitable for a well-motivated, infantry-based citizens' army. Tore Asmund Stubberud, *Allmenn verneplikt - konflikt mellom ideal og praksis: Den norske vernepliktssordningen i idéhistorisk perspektiv*, Forsvarsstudier 2/2005 (Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2005), 122.
Resistance against all-volunteer units in Norway persisted beyond the reorientation of the Armed Forces after 2001. When the Chief of Defence proposed replacing two conscripted battalions with a volunteer battalion in 2008, the military unions lobbied for a larger Army, with four conscripted and only the one already existing all-volunteer battalion. In Denmark there was hence a stronger tradition for advocating a smaller military, employing contracted soldiers, to which Norway really had no equivalent. Furthermore, this tradition persisted even into the new millennium, continuing to affect the force posture of the Norwegian Armed Forces away from employing more contracted units.

**Different Responses to Internationalisation**

While the debates about the personnel structure of the Armed Forces were important, being linked to the Armed Forces ability to participate in international military operations, a more direct debate dealt with the issue of whether such participation was an obligation or a choice for serving members of the military. It is interesting to note that while the Danish military unions argued for greater international orientation of the Danish Armed Forces, the Norwegian military unions did exactly the opposite. This is all the more interesting because, during the Cold War, the Armed Forces in both countries had shared a negative attitude towards their one major source of military deployments abroad: peacekeeping.

This attitude changed relatively rapidly in Denmark after the Cold War. This was partly driven by the positive experience of carrying out robust peacekeeping in the Balkans, as outlined above. However, there were also some deeper reasons. First of all, the conceptual leap of employing the Armed Forces outside national territory was smaller in Denmark than in Norway. Unlike the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Danish military had been charged during the Cold War with defending not only their own territory, but they would also have been employed in a forward-defence role in parts of Germany as well. To do this they had been tightly integrated with German land, air and sea forces through LANDJUT and BALTAP. Because the Danish PSO doctrine came to emphasise robustness and the capacity for warfighting over and above classic peacekeeping and the missions were initially in the Balkans, the new international tasks could be seen as a continuation of the old NATO tasks of

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65 Volden, Danske hærordninger efter 2. Verdenskrig i nationalt og international perspektiv, 65-68.
defending the near abroad as an extension of defending Denmark. By 1993–94 high-ranking members of the Danish officer corps were no longer being taught the defence of Danish territory, but were instead learning conflict resolution, crises management and the conduct of joint operations without reference to any particular geographical area. Examples were taken from all over the world.

The shift towards projecting forces outside national territory hence came as less of a revolution in Denmark than in Norway, where the Armed Forces had solely been tasked with defending Norwegian territory in case of a general war. However, the mental shift required was probably even greater than this would suggest. Norwegian national-romanticism has historically been particularly tied to Norwegian landscapes and geography, and historical accounts tended to reflect this by mainly focusing on events that took place within the borders of the realm. Norwegian military history had therefore traditionally ignored historical accounts of military operations outside Norwegian territory. The objective had been to present the Armed Forces primarily as an institution tied to the territory and nation of Norway, so as better to be able to function as a nation building institution. Hence Norwegian officers saw it less natural, even in historical terms, to do warfighting abroad than their Danish counterparts.

The difference in mentalities can be seen in the different responses to increasing internationalisation within the armed forces of the two countries. There seemed to have been little grass root resistance to further internationalisation within the Danish Armed Forces. Indeed the military unions themselves created the momentum towards setting up the DIB by in September 1990 proposing to create a reserve brigade manned by volunteer soldiers for operations outside Denmark. When service in international operations finally became

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66 From 1993 the Danish staff college became more geared towards training for crisis management in the Caucasus, the Balkans and in the Baltic Sea than towards territorial defence of Denmark itself. There was not seen to be any conflict between this new tasks and “proper warfighting” because the doctrine emphasised that the capacity for high-intensity warfare allowed one also to perform equally well at lower levels of violence. Henning-A. Frantzen, “NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and Doctrines. A Study of NATO and Britain, Canada, and Denmark” (Ph.D in War Studies, King’s College, University of London, March 2003), 219-226.


71 The brigade was however to be considerably less robust than the DIB. It was to have no tanks, and be intended primary for traditional peacekeeping missions. CS and HKKF, Et forsvar, der er brug for, 92. Clemmesen, ”3.
obligatory from January 1994, only five percent of the serving members of the Armed Forces chose to reserve themselves against this. Vice-Admiral Hans Garde, the Chief of Defence Staff, interpreted this low number of reservations as meaning that there was widespread support for the new international tasks that Danish Armed Forces were becoming involved in.

In contrast, when in 1995 the Norwegian government proposed making participation in international military missions obligatory, this caused widespread debate and controversy. It was particularly controversial within the ranks of the Armed Forces, evoking strong opposition from the ranks of the largest military unions (BFO and NOF). Major General (ret.) Werner Christie led the charge against the government. A soldier’s duty was to protect home and fatherland against those who would threaten its liberty, and Christie did not believe that peace enforcement missions in distant conflict zones bore any relation to this objective. Christie also opposed the move to make service abroad more rewarding for officers’ careers. Being ordered to fight in distant conflicts would according to Christie reduce Norwegian soldiers to the level of mercenaries. The resulting law, passed in February 1996, only came into effect in January 1999, and would only apply to officers entering the Armed Forces from that date. This proved only a transitory measure however, and a genuine universal obligation to serve abroad was finally introduced in March 2004. By then military obstructionism had delayed the introduction of this legislation for a full decade after it had been introduced in Denmark.

The Norwegian academic and politician Espen Barth Eide, as well as Ulriksen, argue that this resistance to ordering soldiers to go abroad was due to a narrow view of the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not least within the institution itself. To change their
established views and ways of doing things was a "painful process" for most of the Norwegian officer corps, as well as for the "traditionalist" defence policy community.

The obligation to serve abroad is an example of military foot dragging; the awarding of medals for doing so is another. As a result of the engagement in the Balkans, the Danish Armed Forces quickly felt the need to reward those distinguishing themselves in the line of duty. Consequentially, in 1996 the Armed Forces introduced a medal for bravery in combat, as well as a separate medal for those wounded in the line of duty. In Norway a generic medal for participating in international operations was finally introduced in 2000, but only in 2005 was one introduced for soldiers who had died or been wounded in combat. By 2008 the question of whether or not to award a medal for bravery in combat still remained hotly contested in Norway, over a decade after the first such post-World War Two medal was awarded in Denmark.

When Norwegian defence policy did take the proverbial leap towards expeditionary defence, with the new long-term plans introduced in 2001 and 2004, the reforms were still subjected to the same fierce criticism from the older members of the officer corps. Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børressen was the most articulate and persistent critic. He expressed his discontent with how the reforms lessening emphasis on conscription severed the ties between the nation and the military, and weakened Norway’s ability to control and defend its own territory independently of its allies. Quality should not replace quantity to the degree now occurring, and interoperability with allies and the ability to deploy outside Norway should not be a necessary goal for all parts of the Armed Forces. Børressen quickly became the...
bannerman for critics of the reforms. The ideological architect of the reforms, the future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, had to face up to criticism that the Armed Forces had lost all legitimacy now that it’s raison d’être was no longer defence of the nation’s territory.

However, these rearguard actions against the reforms were inevitably doomed due to natural causes. As the polemic journalist Aslak Nore puts it, this was a generational cleavage. The debate was resolved as the older Cold War generation naturally declined, and new officers now needed a successful record of participating in international military operations in order to advance their careers. These younger officers felt that being obliged to serve abroad constituted a natural part of their chosen profession. The remaining proponents of territorial rather than an alliance integrated defence were successfully branded as "dinosaurs" by the reformists, and therefore lost much of their influence. A series of interviews conducted with members of the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2006 show that the majority now supported the new long-term term plan implemented in the 2002–2005 period. Most respondents felt that the new mobile, alliance integrated force structure was more suitable for this day and age than the old mobilization-based territorial defence force.

Consequently, it seems that a shift in attitudes towards international military operations away from Norwegian territory had in fact taken place around the end of the 1990s. Members of the Armed Forces had become less convinced that there was an inherent conflict between defending Norwegian territory and participating in military operations abroad. This was particularly the case in the Army, traditionally the most sceptical service of the Armed Forces. The shift from participating in UN to NATO led operations also helped, because attitudes in the Armed Forces were much more positive towards NATO missions.

In her study of role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War, Torunn Laugen Haaland found that Norwegian soldiers had primarily considered themselves

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89 Nore, Gud er norsk: Soldatene fra fredsnasjonen, 212-216. A turnover of a large portion of the members of a community is one way identified by Theo Farrell for how norm change can take place. Farrell, "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army," 84.
93 Brekke and Knutsen, Politiske rammebetingelser for norsk deltagelse i internasjonale militære operasjoner 30-31.
"homeland defenders" and "state employees" at the end of the Cold War. A decade latter involvement in challenging military operations abroad had revitalised a certain "warrior role" in the institution, making the Armed Forces both more able and willing to participate in dangerous military operations abroad. By the time the second Norwegian battalion was rotated into Kosovo, warfighting skills and robustness had become the focus of the units deployed in theatre. Less emphasis was now put on special peacekeeping training, equipment and organisation.

The "new model army" deployed to Afghanistan in the new century was even more remarkably different from the army of the early 1990s. Career patterns had changed such that now it was considered very beneficial, even necessary, to have experience from international operations in order to advance in a military career. This "new army" considered the Cold War era conscript army as its "anti-thesis". The Cold War era officers had an understanding of "duty" and "honour" tied to fighting and possibly dying in direct defence of the nation. The post-Cold War generation of officers and soldiers had developed pride in their professionalism and "a kind of warrior ethos" unknown in the old army. Its members viewed the Cold War force as having been "rigid, passive, a slow organisation with desk officers without combat experience".

The Armed Forces sought to strengthen this new expeditionary ethos. In 2004 the Army published a new historical work emphasising that the Norwegian military had a long history of participating in missions far abroad, explicitly to foster the development of an expeditionary culture. The new message was that operations abroad strengthened rather

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94 Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach: Role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War”, 244-257.
95 Rolf-Petter Larsen, Norske soldater i Kosovo - erfaringer "rett fra levra" (Oslo: Sypress forlag, 2006), 247-261. In fact, the participating soldiers were critical of the lack of police-related training prior to deployment. Ole Asbjørn Solberg, "Peacekeeping warriors: a longitudinal study of Norwegian peacekeepers in Kosovo" (PhD Thesis, University of Bergen, 2007), 41-43. The same was the case with the Danish military units deployed in Kosovo, where warfighting had also been prioritised during training. Claus Kold, Krigen er slut - konfliktener fortsetter (Copenhagen: Frydenlund, 2006), 414-444.
96 Græger and Leira, "Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: From a Local to a Global Perspective," 61-62.
100 Ibid., 112.
than weakened the defence of Norway, and that officers doing well abroad were now being hand-picked for the top jobs at home.\textsuperscript{102}

**Conclusion: Military Culture; a Facilitator in Denmark and a Hindrance in Norway**

Like many other Western military forces, both the Danish and the Norwegian armed forces had been mostly homebound "unblooded" armies after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{103} This changed with the end of the Cold War, as both countries became involved in a new type of PSOs around the world. Both the Norwegian and the Danish military gradually came to rediscover some of their warrior roots after the Cold War, embracing more of what Christopher Coker has called "The Warrior Ethos".\textsuperscript{104} The Danish experience in the Gulf and especially in the Balkans however meant that this transition was much more rapid and complete in the Danish Armed Forces, leading to radical changes at tactical and operational level in the employment of Danish forces abroad.\textsuperscript{105} The Norwegian reluctance to commit combat forces to the two theatres meant that the post-Cold War mentality took longer to penetrate the military ranks in Norway.

An important reason for this was that the Danish military culture was more positive towards professionalisation and internationalisation in the first place. The Norwegian Armed Forces were more sceptical of employing contracted soldiers and NCOs, and remaining strongly wedded to the twin concepts of universal conscription and the defence of Norwegian territory. Hence Danish military culture facilitated the rapid transition towards expeditionary operations, whereas the culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces served to slow down the process and keep the organisation focused upon its old Cold War tasks of territorial defence and traditional, non-robust UN peacekeeping.


\textsuperscript{103} Lars Nyholm, "On the social organisation of western armed forces after the Cold War: a return to warrior ethics?," *Militært Tidsskrift* 126, no. 4 (October 1997): 396.


\textsuperscript{105} The operational level is "the level at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained, to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronize actions, within theatres or areas of operations". The tactical "is the level at which formations, units and individuals ultimately confront an opponent or situation". UK Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine*, 3 ed. (Shrivenham: Forms and Publications Section, The development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, August 2008), page 2-7.
Chapter 7

DANISH AND NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

The successful Danish military participation in the Gulf and in the Balkans served finally to rid the country of the defeatist "what’s the use of it" attitude which had persisted since 1864.¹

- Hans Hækkerup, Danish Minister of Defence

Peace and justice provide the safest shield for lands and peoples, and the people that make peace their purpose will thereby have gained an honourable place in the history of the world.²

-Halvdan Koht, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs

The final factor driving the divergence between Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War was the countries’ different strategic cultures. Denmark’s experience with successfully utilizing force abroad drove a reconfiguration of its relationships with its armed forces, and made it reappraised the utility and morality of utilizing force. Norway, on the other hand, did not undergo the same change and therefore retained a more traditional Nordic position on sovereignty and the use of force. Also, unlike in Denmark, the Norwegian Armed Forces continued to have the important strategic tasks at home of defending the country and building the nation. Denmark also developed a threat perception different to Norway’s, viewing new and distant threats as national security challenges. In Norway however the employment of the Armed Forces abroad was more often legitimised by referring to humanitarian rather than national security issues. Altogether, the different views in Norway and Denmark on the desirability and possibility of utilizing force meant that Denmark made much more frequent use of it than Norway did in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter will demonstrate the significance of different strategic cultures in Norway and Denmark after the Cold War, with special emphasis on cultural effect on force employment, threat perception and view of international law. It argues their different strategic cultures represented the reason why Norwegian and Danish defence policies continued to diverge moving into the 21st century.

¹ Hækkerup, På skansen: Dansk forsvars politik fra Murens fald til Kosovo, 9. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.
² Halvdan Koht was a renowned Norwegian historian who served as Foreign Minister 1935–1941. Quoted in Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations - A History, 254.
Denmark: Reinventing Itself as a Strategic Actor

The successful entrepreneurship by members of the Danish political class, made possible by a benign security environment, and aided by a military both able and willing to do warfighting abroad, all served to produce a change in Danish strategic culture. It changed fundamentally the conception of what was "normal" and "routine" in Danish defence policy. Having Danish soldiers participate in high-risk combat operations far from home certainly would certainly not have been "normal" just a few years previously. Now it became "an axiom that hardly anyone questioned." Once policymakers, officers and the public became accustomed to using the Armed Forces successfully as instruments of Danish foreign policy, and the military came to view this activity as its main raison d'être, the activity became self-reinforcing. Hans-Henrik Holm finds the changing Danish conception of the use of armed force to have emerged from a gradually changing practice:

The Minister of Defense at the time, Mr. Hans Hækkerup, fundamentally changed the traditional Danish approach to the role of the armed forces in Danish foreign policy. They were seen as a prospective tool that could be used to support a policy of active internationalism.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen agrees with Holm:

The deployment of Olfert Fischer to the Gulf got the snowball rolling and the subsequent (from a Danish perspective) successful deployments in Croatia and Bosnia created an avalanche that changed the Danes’ understanding of their appropriate role in the world.

Far from being seen as useless and purely symbolic anymore, in the 1990s the Danes came to regard their armed forces as a useful tool for achieving security. The military-diplomatic policy towards the Baltic countries provides another example of a change having taken place in the Danish strategic culture since the end of the Cold War. Christian Hoppe, a section head

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4 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, 94.
5 Holm, "Danish foreign policy activism: the rise and the decline," 13.
6 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?, 94.
in the Danish Foreign Ministry, argued that Danish policy towards the Baltic states in the post-Cold War era demonstrates that Denmark had put the 1864 defeatism behind it. The old Danish attitude would have been to think that a small state like Denmark could have no influence on developments. Now the view in Denmark was that Danish activism towards the Baltic states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, had an impact.  

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen argues that what made this change in Danish defence policy possible was the new consensus which was built between Danish "Scandinavian cosmopolitanism" and "defencism". Adherents of the former ideology had traditionally been active supporters of the UN and sceptical to NATO and the Armed Forces. Supporters of the latter tradition had been enthusiastic about NATO membership and a strong defence, but less interested in what they viewed as an altruistic foreign policy by the cosmopolitanists. These two traditions now increasingly agreed on the need to use the Danish Armed Forces to combat "indirect threats" to peace and stability in Europe and beyond. This political consensus was instrumental in first setting up the DIB, and thereafter for choosing to give the highest priority to capabilities which were internationally deployable, such as the DIB in the Army, tactical transport helicopters for the Air Force and flexible support ships for the Navy. This clear priority given to internationally deployable capabilities by the Danish political and military leadership was combined with willingness to make use of the new expeditionary force to engage in high-risk combat operations. As expressed by Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "activism means that Denmark had begun to think of armed interventions as a natural part of its foreign policy and organize its defence accordingly." Whether military force was useful or not was now no longer a matter of debate. The Armed Forces had become a self-evident part of the foreign policy toolkit.

Sten Rynning sees the Danish relationship with its armed forces as being reminiscent of the mid 19th century, when Denmark was willing to employ force to achieve its aims in its relationship with its German neighbour states. Denmark now again sought to become a strategic actor. The development of an expeditionary intervention force was intended to secure Danish influence in NATO and with the US, as well as to further a law-governed satisfaction of strategic aims.

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10 Rasmussen, "What's the Use of It'?: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force," 77.
11 Clemmensen, "De danske væbnede styrker i fremtiden - en skitse fra sidelinien," 267.
12 Rasmussen, "'What's the Use of It?' : Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force," 82.
13 Ibid.
liberal world order from which Denmark would benefit. Poul Villaume claims that what emerged was something akin to a "great power" mentality in Denmark, driven forth by military activism and close alignment to the United States. Anders Wivel in turn argue that the Danish world view in the post-Cold War period moved at least somewhat towards that of the US, in seeing security and a liberal world order as requiring the position and use of military force.

Norway: A Humanitarian Superpower

In Norway few norm-entrepreneurs came forward to deliberatively change what was considered "natural" or "appropriate", as did Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup in Denmark. Less assertive use of Norwegian military forces after the Cold War meant that the new paradigm of using the Armed Forces as a foreign policy tool took longer to develop, and when it did, it did not penetrate as deeply into the Norwegian collective mindset. Norway consequently found it much harder to adapt to the new international PSO environment, where use of force beyond self-defence became more common. This new paradigm was seen to run counter to the traditional Norwegian emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution and mediation.

The Norwegian political scientist Halvard Leira argues that Norwegian foreign policy culture since the late 19th century has been influenced by a strong emphasis on the peaceful nature of Norway and its people. This powerful "peace discourse" in the foreign policy realm meant that defence issues were seen as being separate from foreign policy, as the defence discourse lacked an international dimension. This necessitated the portrayal of Norwegian military engagements abroad as inherently humanitarian, and as a continuation of this peace tradition. For a Norwegian politician to challenge the established traditions by advocating a

14 Rynning, "Denmark as a Strategic Actor? Danish Security Policy after September 11."
17 The phrase is common in Norwegian discourse ("humanitær stormakt"). As an example, it was used by Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal to describe Norway's involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Quoted in Nils Morten Ugaard, "Godal liker ikke å true med vapen," Aftenposten Morgen 19 February 1994.
18 Jakobsen, "Stealing the Show: Peace Operations and Danish Defence Transformation after the Cold War," 42.
more proactive use of Norwegian military forces would involve taking considerable political risk.21 There was therefore a poor match between the new paradigm of employing military force as part of wider foreign policy and domestic Norwegian practices.22 In 1990 it was considered "unnatural"23 to contribute combat forces to the Gulf War, and there was said to be "nothing in our historical tradition"24 which suggested Norway should contribute. As we have seen, this Norwegian reluctance to send combat troops to PSOs did not change until SFOR in 1997. Denmark, while also exhibiting much of the same discourse, had a stronger tradition for thinking strategically about employing military force as part of its foreign policy, and its peace tradition was less missionary than its Norwegian counterpart.25

Torunn Laugen Haaland claims that in the early 1990s, while wanting to demonstrate Norway’s solidarity with its allies, the Norwegian political class did not want to be associated too closely with military endeavours. The solution was to emphasise "non-military" parts of the Armed Forces activities abroad, portraying Norwegian soldiers as military humanitarians.26 This patterned continued in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, even as the Norwegian military contribution changed towards robust combat forces. Norwegian politicians still continued to emphasise the non-military and humanitarian aspects of the Armed Forces activities abroad, downplaying and even trying to camouflage by clever rhetorical ploys the military aspects of the activities of the Armed Forces abroad.27 Kjell Magne Bondevik, the Norwegian Prime Minister during the 1999 Kosovo War, was accused of trivialising Norway’s military involvement by describing it as "limited military operations".28 It is also revealing to read the account of the Norwegian Foreign Minister 2000–2001, Thorbjørn Jagland. While recognising that NATO’s Article 5 had been invoked,

21 Leira, "«Hele vort Folk er naturlige og fødte Fredsvener». Norsk fredstenkning fram til 1906," 180.
22 Jeffrey Checkel argue that the degree of "cultural match" between global norms and domestic practices is a key factor in determining the degree of diffusion of the former. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (March 1999): 86.
26 Haaland, "Small Forces with a Global Outreach: Role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War", 83-85.
he still praised the toppling of the Taliban as a "humanitarian intervention", and made no mention of Norwegian military participation. This fits Marc Houbens finding that Norwegian participations in international military operations were mostly justified with references to international obligations and humanitarian concerns, and far less so with reference to material national interests. Noting this, Karsten Friis argues:

[T]hat Norwegians have to kill and die on another continent to secure national strategic security appears to have been difficult to state publicly for the government. The humanitarian version is safer and less controversial.

The resulting difference between rhetoric and reality was great, leading to something akin to cognitive dissonance.

Talking About War, Risk-Perception and Sovereignty
The Danish government and prominent member of the public did not have the same inhibitions as their Norwegian counterparts when it came to talking publicly about utilizing military means. Prominent members of the Danish political class repeatedly stated publicly that the country was at war and that Denmark was being defender in Iraq and Afghanistan. These public statements became so common in Denmark in the 21st century that Jacobsen claims that "nobody [in Denmark] raises an eyebrow" when a politician made a claim that Denmark was being defended in the Iraqi desert or the mountains of Afghanistan.

Risk perception in Denmark related to more distant and non-classical threats, such as terrorism, have differed to Norway's. In newspaper articles legitimising their respective military engagements abroad, the first reason listed by the Norwegian Minister of Defence was humanitarian and developmental, while her Danish counterpart immediately drew attention to Denmark’s security. The central-right government that came to power in

30 Ibid., 8-21. The decision to send Norwegian troops was taken in principle by the outgoing Stoltenberg government. Bakkeli, Norges hemmelige krigere: Kommandosoldater i kamp mot terror, 50-52.
November 2001 rhetorically aligned itself closely with the US and the "War on Terror", arguing that Denmark was a belligerent in a global war on terrorism that had both an offensive and a defensive side. The US concept of "Homeland Security" was warmly embraced in Denmark, this now being the main task of Danish forces on Danish soil. Meanwhile the government claimed to be pursuing an "offensive foreign policy", listing its involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples.

The Danish government also seemed to have grown more willing than its Norwegian counterpart to condone the idea of engaging in war without necessarily needing to obtain a UN Security Council mandate. The 2003 Iraq War was a case in point, marking a break with past practice in Danish foreign policy. While the initial Danish decision to join the US-led "coalition of the willing" can to some extent be attributed to the election of the Fogh Rasmussen government in 2001, there was nevertheless little opposition to it in Danish society, and after the invasion the Social Democratic opposition supported the Danish presence in Iraq.

Norway, however, remained insistent on the primacy of international law. This clearly placed Denmark squarely in the "post-Westphalia" group of countries, as Anthony Forester argues, while Norway remained more tied to Westphalian norms as far as

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41 Knudsen, "Denmark and the War against Iraq: Losing Sight of Internationalism?".
43 Frantzen, Clemmesen, and Friis, Danmarks krigshistorie 2: 1814–2008, 365-367. Danish participation in the offensive war against Iraq received relatively little attention in the Danish media. Much more attention was given to the US/UK forces than the Danish units in the coalition. Danish participation in the war seems to have moved into a sphere of consensus, meeting with little public opposition. Nete Nørgaard Kristensen and Mark Ørsten, "Danske mediers dækning af Irak-krigen 2003 - i tal og store træk," in Krigen i medierne, medierne i krig, ed. Nete Nørgaard Kristensen and Mark Ørsten (Frederiksberg: Forlaget Samfundslitteratur, 2006), 49-50.
44 Bondevik, Et liv i spenning, 563-573. Ole Berthelsen, En frelser, en prest og en satan: USA, Norge og Irakkrigen (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2005), 88-103. It is nevertheless interesting to note that, as in Denmark, the Norwegian military presence in Iraq was not criticised extensively in the media, despite confusion about the Norwegian forces relationship with the Coalition forces in Iraq. Rune Ottosen, "Velgjørere eller skadegjørere? Irak-dekningen i norske medier," in Krigen i medierne, medierne i krig, ed. Nete Nørgaard Kristensen and Mark Ørsten (Frederiksberg: Forlaget Samfundslitteratur, 2006), 270-272.
the use of military force was concerned. Overall Norway remained committed to a more traditional Nordic position regarding sovereignty and the use of force, whereas Denmark has reappraised the utility and morality of utilizing force.

Thus, even as Norway’s military contribution gradually changed from support to robust combat units, Norway remained much more reluctant to commit its forces to actual combat operations than Denmark. The effectiveness of the Danish contribution in the 1990s was also reinforced because Denmark tended to concentrate its deployments in fewer locations, whereas Norway tended to participate in a larger number of missions. Denmark also favoured NATO PSO missions earlier, whereas Norway continued to spread its priorities between the UN and NATO until the late 1990s. The net result was that, despite still being among the lowest spenders in NATO on defence, Denmark managed to achieve a solid reputation among its allies after the Cold War. In comparison, Norway lost at least some of the more favourable status it had enjoyed in the alliance compared to Denmark.

**Lingering Strategic Rationale for the Armed Forces**

Differences in perception regarding the desirability to use force and adhere to Westphalian norms of sovereignty constituted important strategic differences between Norway and Denmark. However there was also another set of reasons. Namely, there was a difference in the strategic rationale for maintaining armed forces at all. It may seem paradoxical that the Danish scepticism about the usefulness of military force during the Cold War, characterised by a "deterministic" and "what’s the use of it" attitude, would transform into such a period of military activism in the post-Cold War era. In fact, however, it is precisely this lack of functions for Danish defence during the Cold War that allowed for such a rapid transition towards an expeditionary defence after 1990. With the primary function of providing a symbolic defence now obsolete, and influence in the Atlantic alliance now increasingly being

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51 Rasmussen, "’What's the Use of It?': Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force," 67.
based on how much capabilities a country provided for international operations, conditions were ripe for a rapid change in Denmark. There were simply few inherent functions in the Armed Forces that remaining once providing a symbolic resistance to a Warsaw Pact invasion of Denmark suddenly became irrelevant.

In Norway the role of the Armed Forces had been more diverse than in Denmark. Consequently, the calls for change were fewer and less successful. While the end of the Cold War acted as an external shock changing the traditional way in which most Western states organised and utilized their armed forces, neither Norwegian politicians nor the Armed Forces were sufficiently shocked by the end of the Cold War to call for radical changes.

Firstly, unlike in Denmark, the Norwegian Armed Forces were not seen as merely being capable of providing a symbolic defence of the nation, but were viewed as actually capable of defending the country. Secondly, the Norwegian military continued to be seen as an institution that should serve as homogenising vehicle for the young men of the nation. Already during the 19th century the Norwegian Armed Forces had become closely tied to civilian society through voluntary organisations and broad parliamentary oversight. Conscription in Norway was said to serve as a socialising and educational institution, gluing the nation together. For the duration of the Cold War there was little conflict between society’s desire to see as many young males as possible undergo conscription, and the functional requirements of the Armed Forces. In order to secure the territory of the state, virtually the entire nation would need to be mobilized in some capacity. With the end of the Cold War, however, social desirability and military functionality increasingly parted ways. Despite this there was little immediate debate about national service. Conscription had become institutionalised and tied to national myths to a degree where it was difficult to

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52 Ringsmose, Danmarks NATO-omdømme: Fra Prügelkanb til duk, 7.
53 Græger and Leira, "Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II: From a Local to a Global Perspective,” 54.
54 Brundtland, "Nordiske aspekter ved norsk sikkerhetspolitikk," 126.
55 Sørensen, "Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments,” 316. Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?, 253-266.
56 Tom Kristiansen, "Grunntrekk i norsk militærhistorie til Atlanterhavspakten," in Finsk og norsk forsvaret: Alltid for samme formål - alltid med ulik kurs?, ed. Arne Olav Brundtland (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1996). After World War Two these ties continued. New civil organisations were established to strengthen the ties between Norwegian society and the armed forces, such as the People and Defence organisation established in 1951. Paul Engstad, Fra kald krig til fredsbrygging: Med Folk og Forsvar gjennom 50 år (Oslo: Folk og Forsvar, 2000), 85-119. The organisations most important function has been to build a positive attitude in the population towards the armed forces (forsvarsviljen). Johannessen, Admiral Folke Hauger Johannessen’s erindringer, 1948–1973, 157.
Any attempt to reform the system was faced with strong emotional reactions. This made Norway different from Denmark, where the traditional attachment to conscription was weaker, and hence the system of long-term conscription was easier to reform.

**Conclusion: Strategic Culture, a Significant Cause of Divergence**

The formative experiences in the 1990s established a new Danish culture for employing military force, including when there were doubtful international legal allowances for it. The country came to see the use of force as an acceptable and effective tool to utilize as part of its general foreign policy. Denmark also developed a different evaluation of the necessity of employing force, because distant threats such as terrorism, rogue states and the proliferation of WMDs were held to be threats to Danish national security. Furthermore, the disappearance of the one primary strategic function of the Danish Armed Forces after the Cold War meant that reorientation was easier to achieve.

On the other hand, Norwegian strategic culture remained more tied to its pre-1989 norms of consent and non-use of force except in self-defence. Norway also retained a stronger attachment to Westphalian norms and international legal principles, and did not develop an equal feeling of being endangered by distant threats. Rather, humanitarian and idealistic motives were often given for Norway’s military engagement abroad, and efforts were made to make them appear as pacific as possible. The Armed Forces were also still expected to defend the country and build the nation, giving them strategic tasks beyond expeditionary defence.

It thus seems clear that part of the difference between Norwegian and Danish defence policy can be traced back to a difference in strategic culture developing during the two decades following the end of the Cold War. This explains why the differences persisted into the 21st century, after Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup had left politics and the Norwegian Armed Forces had become more willing and capable of projecting military force beyond national territory.

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60 Heier, "Forsvarets utvikling etter den kalde krigen- den vanskelige veien," 22.

CONCLUSION

*Denmark was quicker to embrace operations going beyond traditional peacekeeping, it was quicker to give priority to peace operations in its defence planning, and it was the only one to give its military forces pride of place in its foreign policy.*

Peter Viggo Jakobsen

When studying the post-Cold War security and defence policies of Norway and Denmark, one is struck by how much of an inversion they seem of the pattern established during the more than four decades they were both engaged in the Cold War. After the Second World War Denmark was a "reluctant ally" within the western camp, and throughout the Cold War it retained an image as the "weakest link" in the alliance. Norway, on the other hand, was held to be a "not so reluctant ally", and was considered one of "the most cooperative countries within the Alliance" by the Americans.

A little over a decade after the end of the Cold War things had changed radically. Denmark had "adjusted significantly" after the Cold War considering its "Cold War policy of an almost pacifist nature". Denmark was now described by one academic as the "impeccable ally". Meanwhile, Norway had by the end of the 1990s become a "special case" in NATO and was in danger of becoming "the last cold warrior" in the alliance. The reason for this inversion was the new measuring stick within the alliance: capacity and willingness to participate in expeditionary military operations, preferably with combat troops in high-risk areas.

This chapter draws together the preceding two sections and especially seeks to correlate the different factors handled in Section II. It then attempts to present a few hypotheses about the future, drawing on recent developments in Danish and Norwegian defence policy. Finally, it offers a few reflections on viable prospects for future research on the topic, and how the thesis fits into a new form of history-writing relatively unknown in

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3. Agger and Michelsen, "How strong was the “weakest link”? Danish security policy reconsidered."
7. Ringsmose and Rynning, "The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO, and the Uncertain Future of Top Tier Membership."
8. Tamnes, "The Strategic Importance of the High North during the Cold War," 274.
Scandinavia, building bridges between, on the one hand, a technical military literature, and on
the other hand, and a more accessible foreign policy history.

Geopolitics, Leadership, Military and Strategic Culture
As we have seen, the reasons why Norway and Denmark parted ways in their willingness and
ability to do expeditionary warfighting in the post-Cold War era can be divided into four main
categories:

Table 3: Overview of Factors Determining Change or Continuity in Norwegian
and Danish Defence Policy after the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
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<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>- “Lingering threat” from Russia and need to exercise sovereignty/authority in maritime areas. Therefore territorially focused</td>
<td>- No military threat to Danish territory after the Cold War. Could therefore refocus the Armed Forces on combating distant/diffuse risks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>- Political and bureaucratic desire for continuity</td>
<td>- Political and bureaucratic desire for change</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Successful example of political and bureaucratic inertia</td>
<td>- Successful case of political and bureaucratic entrepreneurship</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Ambivalent leaders unwilling to identify clear priorities</td>
<td>- Willingness to make tough choices and prioritise</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lacked professional soldiers and NCOs</td>
<td>- Tradition for employing professional soldiers/NCOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Opposition to operations outside of Norwegian territory</td>
<td>- Stronger support for expeditionary operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Culture</td>
<td>- Political consensus persisted which emphasised traditional role of the Norwegian armed forces</td>
<td>- New political consensus emerged which viewed the Armed Forces as useful and employable foreign policy tool</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use of the Armed Forces abroad seen as much as humanitarian as national security issue</td>
<td>- Use of armed force against distant new threats seen as necessary and vital for national security</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Old Cold War functions to defend the state and build the nations still relevant</td>
<td>- Cold War symbolic defence functions of the military obsolete in the new era</td>
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The different factors played different part in different periods.

Marked differences in Geopolitical environment remained a persistent factor throughout the period covered. For Denmark, geopolitical concerns decreased even more in
relevance throughout the period, as Denmark’s feeling of security was amplified by Poland’s NATO membership in 1999. Thus Danish freedom to "go global" in combating distant and diffuse threats grew over the years, and the necessity of doing so, if Denmark was to avoid being marginalised, increased. For Norway, the geopolitical environment changed to a lesser extent. The combination of the decline of the Russian military, new advances in military technology, and the drastically reduced probability of a Russian desire to occupy Norwegian territory, all served to make the invasion defence forces obsolete by the turn of the century. However, the Norwegian government remained concerned about the possible application of limited force in the High North. In addition, the economic importance of the High North was growing. This increased the need to maintain a presence in the region, to exercise sovereignty and authority, and to have the necessary capacity for managing a limited crisis.

The appearance of decisive leadership was a transitory phenomenon occurring in Denmark in the 1990s. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup, working closely with military counterparts such as Hans Garde, managed to realise their common project of breaking-down well-established Danish domestic constraints on employing military force abroad. Their success, part skill and part luck, meant that a new domestic consensus was created in which it was now viewed as normal and even desirable for Danish soldiers to be located on the frontlines in distant wars. Bjørn Tore Godal and Kristin Krohn Devold, acting as the political agents for military reformers such as Sverre Diesen, played a somewhat lesser role in Norway. They managed to overcome domestic opposition to scrapping the Cold War era invasion defence force, introducing a more modern and employable structure. They did not, however, manage to do more than soften domestic constraints on engaging in combat operations abroad, which still remained controversial. They also did not successfully manage to set political priorities for the Armed Forces, by closing redundant bases and cutting excess capacities.

Like leadership, military culture was primarily an issue in the 1990s, when conservative older officers in Norway fought against reducing the size of the armed forces, re-introducing a NCO corps and being obliged to serve in international military operations abroad. With the military reforms after 2001, and the deployment in combat operations in Yugoslavia in 1999 and Afghanistan since 2002, the Norwegian Armed Forces came to abandon their former absolute attachment to a large conscripted force and territorial defence. Thus the sharp differences in military culture were a transitory phenomenon, although the Danish armed forces still employed more professional soldiers and remained more focused on high-intensity, expeditionary warfighting than their Norwegian counterparts.
But while differences in military culture declined in the 2000s, the degree of divergence in *strategic culture* between the two nations grew consistently throughout the 1990–2008 period. During the Cold War Denmark and Norway had shared a common Nordic outlook regarding the use of force, sovereignty, and international institutions. In the post-Cold War world, Norway retained much more of these classic Nordic positions than Denmark. The latter now reinvented itself as a strategic actor feeling it occasionally necessary to employ military means against the dangers of this world, whether or not this was condoned by international institutions. Denmark thus reinvented a new strategic role for its Armed Forces, as expeditionary warriors foremost and homeland security providers as a secondary new task. In Norway, however, the Armed Forces’ strategic tasks remained tied to a more classic role of defending the state and its territory, while conscriptions’ role as a nation-building instrument remained a much more powerful part of the popular image of the armed forces.

**The Present and the Future**

Both Norway and Denmark are set to continue their present level of international deployments, though the latter is showing the strain of doing so. While Denmark remains set to maintain its focus on deploying combat forces under the NATO or US/UK umbrella, Norway recently decided to once more send out support forces under UN command.

The 2008 Danish Defence Commission, chaired by Hans Hækkerup, presented its findings in March 2009. It recommended broadly to continue the present line in Danish defence policy.\(^{10}\) While not everyone agreed, the criticism has mostly been limited to questioning whether the report was innovative enough.\(^{11}\) Thus no upheaval in Danish defence policy seems forthcoming in the short term. The recent appointment of the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO’s next General Secretary also seems to confirm Denmark’s status as a "top dog" in NATO circles, giving Denmark some room for complacency.\(^{12}\)

Denmark has until now been relatively unfettered by its Arctic positions Greenland and the Faeroe Islands. However, it is conceivable that the melting of the polar ice, and the consequent possibility of exploiting the resources and maritime transport routes of the Arctic,

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\(^{11}\) Poul Aarøe Pedersen, "Forsvarskommissionen turde ikke udfordre vanetænkningen," *Politiken* 31 March 2009.

\(^{12}\) The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre was, however, also mentioned as a possible candidate if Rasmussen was rejected. Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Backs Dane for NATO Post Amid Turkey's Objections," *The New York Times* 23 March 2009.
will convince Denmark to follow Norway’s lead and reorient resources towards maintaining a
greater military "footprint" in the area.\textsuperscript{13}

At the moment, however, the most likely reason for Denmark to reduce its
international deployment of forces would be either the great strain on personnel and
equipment, or a popular backlash against the mounting casualties. Retention of personnel is
perhaps the most serious problem, seeing as how the Danish Armed Forces are now short of
2,300 soldiers at the start of 2009.\textsuperscript{14} The strain on equipment has also been substantial, as the
increasing Danish deployment tempo has not resulted in any comparable increase in defence
spending. Though differences have narrowed somewhat, Norway spent more than Denmark
on defence in the entire 1990–2007 period,\textsuperscript{15} and also invested a much higher percentage of
its defence budgets in new equipment.\textsuperscript{16} As it is unlikely that Denmark will increase its
defence expenditure, it is likely to either scale back on its commitments, or cut boldly in
capacities in order to focus upon the remaining ones. If history is any guide, the latter is by far
the most likely.

The recent Norwegian Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces for the period 2009–
2012, presented in March 2008, did not present any upheavals on the Norwegian side. It
broadly maintained the presence force structure of the Norwegian military, rationalising it
somewhat. Overall the Norwegian Armed Forces remain occupied with their dual mission, a
national, territorial one and an alliance integrated one abroad.\textsuperscript{17} The High North has received
increased attention, and the budget for 2009 allocated more funds to increase slightly the
Navy’s and Air Force’s presence in the region, as well as increase the Army’s readiness
somewhat.\textsuperscript{18} Linked to Norway’s growing concern about a resurgent Russia and the growing
importance of the High North is the government’s attempt to bring NATO "back in area". This is argued to be necessary in order to strengthen the organisation’s legitimacy, which in
turn will strengthen support for "out of area" missions.\textsuperscript{19}

There seems to be little prospect of the present Red-Green government changing the
established pattern of providing combat troops only to relatively safe locations. In

\textsuperscript{13} See e.g. NTB, "- Et kapplø i Arktis," \textit{Dagens Næringsliv} 27 August 2007.
\textsuperscript{15} NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” (Brussels:
NATO, 19 February 2009), Table 1: Defence expenditures of NRC countries, Table 3: Defence expenditures as
% of gross domestic product, 4, 6.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., Table 5: Distribution of total defence expenditures by category, 8. In the 1990-2004 period Norway’s
expenditure on equipment averaged 24 percent, while Denmark’s averaged 15 percent.
\textsuperscript{17} St.prp. nr. 48 (2007–2008) Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier.
Afghanistan the government calls for an approach with less emphasis on the military.\textsuperscript{20} The Norwegian decision to send a field hospital for the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is also reminiscent of the pre-1997 policy of providing support forces,\textsuperscript{21} but it is however unlikely that this will become a regular phenomenon.\textsuperscript{22} Norway seems for the moment to continue focusing more on rotating troops for stability operations, than for participation in high-intensity combat as initial entry forces.

**Final Remarks**

This thesis has hopefully provided a detailed comparative analysis of Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War, a field in which the differences between these very similar countries have been so remarkable as to inspire frequent comments in the media, popular culture, as well as academic and military studies. It is, however, by no means a comprehensive study, dealing as it does with nearly 20 years of history and several different aspects of security and defence policy. Firstly, perhaps one of the most unexpected findings I made, upon which no dedicated literature has to my knowledge ever been written, is the substantial differences between the personnel structure and traditions in Norway and Denmark. In many ways the Danish Armed Forces more resemble the German or British system than the Norwegian one. There is certainly a comparative article begging to be written on this subject alone, if only military researchers were to raise their gaze from their own particular country of study. Secondly, little has been done comparatively on Scandinavia within the strategic culture literature. Norway and Denmark, due to their many similarities and yet defence sector differences, would surely make an excellent case for an updated historical study of "same but different" foreign policy cultures, drawing on recent developments in the field of strategic culture. Finally, and most importantly, relatively little has been written in the cross-sectional field between military and foreign policy history in Scandinavia. Military history tends to be narrow and specialised, and more general political and foreign policy history tends to ignore military issues. While this may have its natural explanation in the "long peace" during the Cold War, the "militarization"\textsuperscript{23} of Scandinavian foreign policy over the last two decades has surely opened up a space for this type of history. Hopefully, this study provides one of many new contributions to this genre.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 92.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Bengt Holmen 2009.
\textsuperscript{23} Note that the word militarization is used here in a neutral analytical, and not a derogatory sense.
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(Meeting at United Nations Headquarter, New York, 19\textsuperscript{th} February 2009)
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