STRATEGIES OF ENGAGEMENT

A Study of U.S. National Security Strategies from the End of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism and their Implications for the Role of NATO

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Strategies of Engagement

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Ingrid Lundestad
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As the period of this study began, I personally was on the steps of entering the educational stage of my life. I was a 5 year-old when the Berlin Wall came down, and was introduced to a piece of the wall as a first-grader in 1991. At that time the Soviet Union disintegrated, me not knowing the historical dimensions of it beyond the fact that the map of Europe on the class room wall was now outdated. Later, I heard something terrible happened in Sarajevo as the 1990s moved on. I recall the NATO bombings of Kosovo. At 17, on my home TV set, I saw two planes crash into the World Trade Center. Clearly, I do not remember much, and definitely not in an academic manner. I had to re-live and re-think the period of my study through the thoughtful and instructive guidance of others, as well as the critical examination of primary material, interviews and literature. To make this possible, I have become indebted to numerous individuals and institutions. I would like to thank them all.

Firstly, I am utterly grateful to Professor Helge Pharo of the University of Oslo for supervising this project, and his persistent support and enthusiasm in doing so. Secondly, I want to thank the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies for providing me a special master scholarship and an including and inspiring work place during my last year of master studies. At the institute, I am thankful for the enlightening deliberations and advises of the fellows at the Center for Transatlantic Studies.

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In addition, I would very much like to thank Director Hope Harrison and the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University for their warm inclusion of me as a visiting scholar at the institute during my research stay in Washington, D.C. in September – October 2007. Having an established place to go to was very satisfying in the middle of a busy process of interviews.
and archive and library visits. I thank the Department of Archeology, Conservation and History at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies for funding the stay in Washington, and also the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies for additional sponsorship for my trip to Brussels in February 2008 to visit the NATO headquarters.

Furthermore, I truly appreciate all the help and assistance provided me in accessing information about the period of my study. Certainly this includes the numerous American politicians and academics who agreed to meet with me during my stay in Washington. A list of the relevant positions of the persons interviewed is included in the bibliography. Here, I would like to thank them all for the information provided: James Dobbins, Michèle Flournoy, James Goldgeier, Hope Harrison, Robert Hunter, Anthony Lake, Robert Litwak, Christian Ostermann, David Painter, Jeremy Rosner, Brent Scowcroft and Philip Zelikow. NATO’s Policy Planning Director, Jamie Shea, also deserves a great thank you for granting me an interview in Brussels, as do Anders Melheim of the Norwegian delegation to NATO. Another statement of appreciation to Professor Michael Cox of the London School of Economics and Political Science for urging me to go to Brussels, to Professor (and uncle) Geir Lundestad for suggesting people to interview in Washington, and to Professor Rolf Tamnes for linking me to the Norwegian delegation in NATO.

Also, I would like to say thank you to the staff members of the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, the Library of Congress and the American Embassy in Oslo for providing and assisting in accessing American policy documents. I want to state my appreciation of the libraries of the Norwegian Nobel Institute and the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies for their rich collections of relevant titles and service-minded staff. Another thank you to the G. H. W. Bush and W. J. Clinton presidential libraries for informing about their archival holdings, the Bush library for posting a requested document on its website, and both libraries for informing about the time impossibilities of accessing classified U.S. material through Freedom of Information Act requests in the two year time frame of this master program.

Last, but not least, my earnest thankfulness to my live-in boyfriend, family, friends and fellow students for supporting, motivating and inspiring me throughout this particularly special educational passage of my life.

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Ingrid Lundestad
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Alliance’s Strategic Concept</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>(Agreement on) Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>DNSA</td>
<td>Digital National Security Archive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>(United States) Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>FOIA</td>
<td>Freedom of Information Act</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations (academic discipline)</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, biological and chemical (weapons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (DNSA is the online database of this facility)</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (of the United States)</td>
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<td>PBS</td>
<td>Public Broadcasting Service</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>West European Union</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of mass destruction</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Project and its Relevance
With the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the context and challenges to the security strategies of the United States (U.S.) and the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) changed. Even so, a complete new understanding of post-Cold War strategies did not, and still has not, evolved. The ambiguity of the period is indicated in the very term of the phase, post-Cold War, simply negatively defined from what had been, and not from what was, and is, the present. Not until the War on Terrorism and Iraq did the security policies of the U.S. again seem focused, and NATO found itself in a new continent with the engagement in Afghanistan. In order to understand the evolution of U.S. strategies and the transformation of the role of NATO within them, and to comprehend the foundation for present security strategies, the research question of this project is:

How did U.S. national security strategies evolve from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism, and how did the role of NATO change within that strategy?

The argument emerging from this analysis asserts that U.S. national security strategies evolved as strategies of engagement. From relying on containment and deterrence to secure U.S. and NATO interests during the Cold War, strategies of engagement gradually came to constitute a new type of approach. In an intermediate phase, with a new primary position, and without an existential, monolithic threat, the three post-Cold War presidencies’ strategic deliberations were largely captured by a question of where and how to engage in the now more fragmented international security situation. The thesis further demonstrates how the evolution of such U.S. strategies of engagement gradually had implications for the widening role of NATO in the post-Cold War world. The alliance went from a territorially defensive organization towards a new role engaging “out of area”. Engagements were implemented firstly in the broader transatlantic area, and later in a more global sphere. In 2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer concluded that in the new international security situation, “[a] strategy of engagement, guided by our values, is the only feasible way to
approach global insecurity. As an Alliance with unique political and military assets, NATO is bound to play a major part in any such strategy”.1

In its broadest definition, engagement can simply be explained as the opposite of isolationism.2 Within this thesis, the term is applied as a term describing U.S. strategic decisions after the end of the Cold War, different from the previous strategies of containment and deterrence. It is possible to speak of economic engagement, political engagement and military engagement. Economic aspects are seen as outside of the scope of this thesis. In political terms, the engagement term refers to the forward diplomatic presence and international cooperation of the U.S.; engaging politically to ensure the U.S. position. But to form an understanding of U.S. strategic responses to threats in the post-Cold War world, the military aspects of engagements strategies are the essential focus of this thesis. As it is possible to point out that post-Cold War threats to the U.S. were increasingly handled through the planning and appliance of military engagement, the thesis gives emphasis to such military strategic responses. In this way, engagements are synonymous with foreign interventions, chiefly the use of military force. At the same time, the term allows for a more nuanced discussion of U.S. strategic policies, as it is possible to join such arguments with the political elements of engagement. In terms of NATO, the emphasis put on the military aspects of U.S. engagement strategies means that the practical role of NATO in “out of area” engagements is highlighted, at the expense of the more political features of U.S. engagement in Europe, as especially seen through NATO enlargement.

In order to consistently answer a relatively broad research question, the thesis applies a strict conceptual framework that operationalizes strategy into four categories of components. These include interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessment of strategic areas, allies and partners; as well as the strategic thinking and implementation made by the U.S. administrations, to combined provide an understanding of strategies. The theoretical foundation for such terms and framework will be elaborated below.

The actors considered in this thesis need to be reflected upon. This will also be done later in the introduction, but for now it is necessary to point out that the subject at study, as stated in the research question, is the United States. The NATO perspective is applied to give focus within the analysis, discussing the implications of the evolution of U.S. strategies for the role of NATO. Implicitly, this gives a geographical concentration on U.S. policies towards

the Eurasian landmass, with only limited inclusion of other areas when seen relevant to understand the formation of U.S. strategies.3

Regarding the time period covered, the research question demonstrates that this project is framed by the end of the Cold War at the one end, and the War on Terrorism at the other. Consequently, while providing background information on the Cold War, the project starts with the beginning of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, in January 1989, as the Cold War was ending. Then after covering the two Clinton terms, the thesis ends during the George W. Bush presidency, after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, and the NATO deployment in Afghanistan, tracing developments in the War on Terrorism through 2003.4

In attempting to merge post-Cold War developments into a unified understanding of U.S. national security strategies and NATO transformation within them, the project represents an effort by the author to join the “lumpers” among international historians. While “splitters” attempt to see the particularities and detail of different situations, the “lumper” constructs order within the diverse elements of history to produce a synthesis of understanding. John Lewis Gaddis is a leading international history advocate of such an approach. According to Gaddis, “there is a certain value in stepping back at times to try to take in the larger picture”.5 This marks a choice in the level of abstraction within this project. By focusing on tendencies in U.S. security strategies, the more specific details of policy making is not addressed. Rather, the synthesis accounts for policies at a more general, abstract level. Specific events are relevant as examples, but not studied thoroughly in themselves. While the “splitters” then are able to track the particular details of a specific decision,6 the “lumper” rather steps back to form a more abstract impression of broader processes. Even as the period is relatively contemporary, it is still possible to look at it with the historian’s distance, and identify the phase as a whole. The administrations themselves did not necessarily identify consistent strategies within the decisions they made and the policies they pursued. But the historian’s job, the “lumper”’s job, is to analyze and synthesize the broader aspects of security policies

3 Left out are more distinct areas and regions such as Oceania and the Americas (where the existence of the Monroe Doctrine in the latter case has made the area less relevant for studying broader U.S. strategies). Also more distinct conflicts, with their own dynamics and complexity, most especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are kept out of the analysis.
4 The title of the thesis and the research question uses the term War on Terrorism, without the War in Iraq specifically included, both for simplicity and to use a term valid for both the U.S. and NATO. Also, in American rhetoric, the War on Terrorism is used as a common expression for both engagements, even if Iraq did not have a link to terrorism.
6 The choice in focusing on overall strategy rather than specific policy processes is supported by the nature of available primary sources, see the section on primary sources and their applicability.
made, and identify an understanding of strategies within them. In this way, the project traces the overall tendencies found in the variety of the administrations’ individual decisions.

However, two assumptions provide the basis to question the desirability of performing such an analysis as the present one. The first, often the impression of political scientists, is that the literature on such a theme is massive in both depth and diversity. The other, particularly maintained by many historians, is that the theme is too recent in time and, implicitly, that a lack of primary information prevents scholars from making coherent studies of it. Contrasted and simplified, the first approach sees the theme at study as already thoroughly analyzed, while the other indicates that research can not be rightfully made until substantial time has passed. Although the assumptions are paradoxically opposite to one another, the following will show why both ideas are generally mistaken. A new approach combining a contemporary study with accessible historical material will provide new insight, and thus carry out the true mission of the contemporary historian. The two succeeding sections give an assessment of the existing field of research and an overview of relevant primary sources. Concerning the first assumption, the historiographical account shows that there are great opportunities for making new analyses, or syntheses, of U.S. security and NATO policies. As for the other, the discussion of sources demonstrates the applicability of contemporary sources to the study of post-Cold War history.

**Historiography and the Need for a New Synthesis**

The analysis of contemporary U.S. security strategies is in many ways a legacy of John Lewis Gaddis and his appraisal of U.S. security policies during the Cold War. The literature covering post-Cold War international relations and American security policies is vast. Put simply, we find four categories of literature dealing with the subject. These include studies of American foreign and security policies; literature on NATO; research done on American-European relations; as well as broader appraisals of the international system and international conflicts and relations during the period of this study. The two first categories are the most pertinent to this study, while the other two consider relations that are relevant for the study in its broader international context.

Firstly, the most relevant literature to this thesis is scholarly appraisals of post-Cold War American security policies and strategies. Still, even the *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* does not identify a new post-Cold War strategy, and in 2001, it implicitly names
the post-Cold War era, or transformative periods in general, as a “strategic pause”. Historian and journalist David Halberstam investigates the foreign policy decisions of the G. H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations, and concludes that the U.S. was “napping” in terms of strategic outlook before the September 11, 2001, attacks. Gaddis himself has not communicated an understanding of the period from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism either. In the 2005 epilogue of Strategies of Containment, the author investigates the remains of containment strategies in the post-Cold War international security environment, and only for the post-9/11 period identifies what he names a grand strategy of pre-emption. When speaking of the 1990s, Gaddis focuses on the lack of an adversary to the U.S., and what he from the perspective of the 9/11 attacks calls “the failure of strategic vision in Washington [that] lay in the inability of American leaders to look beyond their Cold War victory”.10

Among those that try to articulate an understanding of post-Cold War U.S. national security strategies, most appraisals apply varying ideas of hegemony, that the U.S. was guided by its global primacy, dominance, leadership position as well as ideas of American exceptionalism. Several of these accounts are theoretical in nature, and many are politically revisionist, in that they deliberately seek to influence policy, by either criticizing existing security policies or suggesting alternative strategies the U.S. should rather follow. Political scientists Barry Posen and Andrew Ross categorize four alternative U.S. strategies as: neo-isolationism; selective engagement; cooperative security; and primacy, and concludes that Clinton’s national security strategy by 1996/1997 was a strategy of selective but cooperative primacy. A related appraisal by political scientist Colin Dueck identifies four alternative U.S. strategies as strategic disengagement (neo-isolationism); balance of power; primacy; and liberal internationalism. In his analysis, the period 1992-2000 is seen as belonging within the

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9 Gaddis 2005: 383. It can also be questioned whether Gaddis’s suggested term of a strategy of pre-emption forms a complete new assessment of strategy, or if it is rather possible to view pre-emption as a military operational strategy to be applied within a more overall strategic outlook that he does not identify. Gaddis also states that such a strategy supplemented containment and deterrence, possibly supporting such a position, although not identifying a new post-Cold War strategy. John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press 2004): 86.
strategy of liberal internationalism and the post-9/11 strategies of the Bush administration as one of primacy. Political scientist Stephen Walt argues that the American position in the post-Cold War world and the foreign policies of all three presidencies are best understood under a label of primacy.

More empirically concerned studies include that of International Relations (IR) scholar P. Edward Haley. His discussion of the post-Cold War presidents’ security strategies concludes that there has been misdirection within U.S. post-Cold War policy, as the presidents have been following a strategy of dominance, or rather U.S. primacy, based upon the U.S. position in the world. Haley also suggests alternative strategies the U.S. should follow in the future. Zbiginev Brzezinski gives an assessment of how he thinks the three post-Cold War presidents performed in maintaining global leadership, even grading them on different aspects of such leadership. Trevor B. McCrisken argues that the U.S. belief in American exceptionalism has provided and continues to provide the framework for U.S. foreign policy making. Political scientist Christopher Layne places the entire period since 1940 within the concept of a U.S. strategy of extraregional hegemony, arguing that the U.S. attempted to establish its hegemony in Western Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Post-Cold War U.S. security policies are in this way, according to leading scholarly debate, in essence characterized by U.S. primacy. But while the concept of containment indicated how the U.S. responded to existing threats, i.e. containing the Soviet Union and communism, the idea of primacy does not indicate how the U.S. has acted in the post-Cold War world. Rather, primacy, or the dominant position of the U.S. in the world, can be seen as a fundamental purpose or objective of U.S. strategy. In this way, U.S. primacy can be understood as a foundation, an interest within U.S. strategy, but not as a concept describing

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the strategic thinking and implementation embedded in U.S. strategic responses to its interests and objectives, threat perceptions and assessment of strategic areas, allies and partners.

As presented, this thesis argues that such U.S. strategic responses in the post-Cold War world can be characterized as nuances of strategies of engagement. When investigating existing literature applying such an expression, different understandings of the term engagement are present. Often, it is applied as synonymous with diplomatic efforts, and contrastive to the use of force. Accordingly, Richard Haas and Meghan O’Sullivan understand engagement as “a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives”.19 G. John Ikenberry addresses the term with regard to other states’ responses to U.S. unipolar power, and also understands engagement as a strategy “building cooperative ties”.20 Another approach by historian Andrew Bacevich, presents an understanding of U.S. strategies not applying the term engagement, but rather a “strategy of openness”. Nonetheless, similar features are described, as he argues that the “Big idea guiding U.S. strategy is openness: the removal of barriers to the movement of goods, capital, people and ideas, thereby fostering an integrated international order conducive to American interests”.21 In such a way, Bacevich describes such processes that can also be understood as U.S. economic and political engagement, in supporting open markets and democratic values in the world, but under the term “openness”. By others, the term engagement has been applied with variations of its political or cooperative meaning in research done on U.S. engagement with specific countries of the world.22

To move on to the military aspects of engagement, others do understand the term within a broader strategic meaning focusing on the use of military force. Even so, the

literature is primarily theoretically concerned or politically revisionist, and not descriptive of the past. The theoretically founded literature on U.S. strategies has applied the term selective engagement. For instance, IR theorist Robert J. Art asserts that such selective engagement, among several other features, is a forward-defense strategy, seeing military power as a useful and fungible instrument of statecraft. Art gives a theoretical assessment of the elements of such a potential strategy, and goes on to argue that this is the best strategy for the U.S. Another understanding suggests that the different theoretical interpretations of primacy and selective engagement are just two different approaches to hegemony. While the theoretical literature discusses a similar term, it does not account for the content of this thesis; an understanding of the empirical evolution of U.S. strategies.

In terms of more empirically concerned literature, Walt in assessing the foreign policy record of Clinton, suggests that one of four main strategic goals of the administration was to remain militarily engaged in central regions such as Europe and Asia. But his appraisal does not cover the entire period of this study, nor does it argue that such a term as strategies of engagement embedded the other aspects of Clinton’s policies. A study on the transatlantic relationship after the 9/11 attacks, also writes about “terms of engagement”, how the U.S. cooperates with Europe, implying the above diplomatic meaning, in addition to a vaguely articulated variety, stating that the U.S. “engaged” in different conflicts, thus implicitly involving military engagement. But the author refers to the 1990s as a time when the U.S., and Europe, were strategically “out to lunch” and on “vacation”. In addition, he centers on dilemmas within the transatlantic relationship rather than articulating engagement as a concept that can be applied to understand the evolution of strategies and NATO’s role. Bacevich in his account of the “strategy of openness”, underlines that U.S. foreign policy

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26 Accordingly, the thesis acknowledges that the term is applied in a theoretical debate, but the thesis is not part of such a debate. It only applies a similar term to describe empirical developments. Another forward-looking account by Anthony Blinken argues that containment should be replaced by a comprehensive strategy of engagement, rather than the Bush administration’s strategy of pre-emption. But accordingly, Blinken does not understand the term as descriptive of the past. Anthony J. Blinken, “From Pre-Emption to Engagement”, *Survival* (vol. 45, no. 4, 2003).
29 Lindley-French 2002: 24-25. This is in line with the assessments made by for instance Halberstam and Gaddis, as presented above.
became increasingly militarized in the post-Cold War era. But still, he does not place such military engagement within his strategy of openness. In discussing military aspects of U.S. strategy, also Bacevich applies the interpretation of hegemony. In this way, it is necessary to move beyond the existing debate of primacy in U.S. post-Cold War strategy. Especially with regard to the military aspects of such a strategy, it is necessary to form an understanding of how the U.S. acted strategically, beyond the idea that the U.S. possessed a hegemonic position or was guided by its interests in primacy. In doing so, the term engagement can be applied, to form an integrated understanding of the empirical evolution of U.S. strategy in the post-Cold War world.

The second category of literature covers appraisals of NATO. Some of the literature focuses on the enlargement of NATO in terms of member countries. As this study concentrates on the evolution in the “out of area” role of NATO, how it functioned within U.S. strategies, literature covering the particular process of enlargement is not directly relevant, unless discussed as part of U.S. strategy. A Survival article by Gaddis discusses the 1999 NATO enlargement in such terms, and argues that it violated basic strategic principles and is a mistake, as it is only a partial enlargement. But consequently, he criticizes existing policy, and does not analyze the transformation of NATO’s role.

Appraisals that deal with the post-Cold War position of NATO includes political scientist Celeste Wallander, who discusses how the institutional assets of NATO formed the foundation for alliance adaptation after the end of the Cold War. Wallander explains NATO’s post-Cold War adaptation within a theory of institutional models, rather than focusing on the empirical evolution of NATO’s role. IR scholar Galia Press-Barnathan theoretically investigates the nature of relations within NATO in the light of U.S. hegemony, but accordingly does not center on the international role of NATO.

Contributions explicitly analyzing the role of NATO include a 1998 account by IR scholar David Yost. Yost accounts for NATO’s changed relationships with former adversaries and non-NATO members, and investigates a transformation in NATO’s role towards crisis.

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31 See Bacevich 2002: 218-223.
management and peace operations.\textsuperscript{36} NATO’s role in peace support operations has also been analyzed by others.\textsuperscript{37} In terms of a geographically broader role for NATO, political scientist Sten Rynning has accounted for allied encounters in the broader Middle East since 1949, but ignores the period from 1989-2001.\textsuperscript{38} Renée de Nevers accounts for NATO’s role in the War on Terrorism.\textsuperscript{39} These contributions accentuate different types of post-Cold War roles, but accordingly do not analyze the alliance’s overall role as it functioned within U.S. strategy.

Then concerning NATO’s overall strategic role, a recent report by the Danish Institute for International Studies addresses the possible global nature of NATO, discussing both global membership or partnership and a global strategy. Relevant to this thesis it formulates the strategy of the alliance as interventionist.\textsuperscript{40} Such an understanding of role is consistent with the military understanding of NATO’s role within a strategy of engagement. Even though the formulation used support the argument of this thesis, the report does not pursue the argument extensively, and does not focus on U.S. strategy. A recent article by Ellen Williams, investigates NATO’s role in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and assesses U.S. perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of acting through NATO.\textsuperscript{41} U.S. policies towards NATO are accordingly implicitly addressed within these cases, but the article does not discuss NATO within the overall U.S. strategic framework. In sum, the scholarly literature on post-Cold War NATO is manifold, but surprisingly, an account of the post-Cold War role of NATO seen within the evolution of U.S. strategy is missing.

Thirdly, a related, but broader category of literature is research on American-European relations. This category analyzes the transatlantic context, but has a broader focus than U.S. strategy and the role of NATO. Contributions are among others made by historian Geir Lundestad, addressing the U.S.-European relationship since 1945; former U.S. ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, reviewing the European security and defense policy (ESDP) in light of NATO; analyst Stanley Sloan, who in a chapter specifically addresses the post-Cold War military role of NATO, but without placing it within the evolution of U.S. strategy; as well as


\textsuperscript{38} Sten Rynning, ”NATO and the Broader Middle East, 1949-2007: The History and Lessons of Controversial Encounters”, \textit{The Journal of Strategic Studies} (vol. 30, no. 6, 2007).


\textsuperscript{40} Trine Flockhart and Kristian Søby Kristensen, ”NATO and Global Partnerships: To Be Global or Act Globally?”, \textit{DIIS Report} (no. 7, 2008).

an anthology with contributions from both sides of the Atlantic, evaluating different aspects of the transatlantic relationship and prospects for the future.  

Lastly, scholarly contributions on the international system as a whole and on different conflicts and events are relevant to the thesis within its broader international context. At the system level, the status of American unipolarity in the post-Cold War world has been the object of substantial scholarly enquiry. Such literature relates to the broader context of the international system after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. By confirming the U.S. position as unrivalled, the context of, and the major influence of, U.S. strategies to be investigated are assured. More specifically considering various conflicts during the 1990s, in light of U.S. policies, for example Robert DiPrizio reviews so-called humanitarian interventions by the G. H. W. Bush and Clinton presidencies.

The literature on U.S. strategies is fundamentally made by U.S. scholars, and are to a large extent either theoretically based or politically revisionist, attempting to outline future U.S. strategy. The literature on NATO and U.S.-European relations is generally more empirically concerned and has major contributions from both sides of the Atlantic. The last category with literature on the international system and international conflicts is manifold, and some examples of relevance have been outlined. In total, this historiographical account has identified the need for an understanding of U.S. strategies to be made on an empirical basis. Also, a non-American account of U.S. strategies can potentially to a larger extent avoid the political context, and rather aim to understand the evolution of past strategies, in stead of influencing policies for the future. Furthermore, the U.S. strategic context will elucidate the scholarly understanding of the transformation of NATO’s role, and thus add a central aspect to the existing, more alliance-oriented, accounts. Together, the project will provide an integration of the two first categories, within the context of the two following categories, the transatlantic dimension and the international or global dimension as a whole.

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Primary Sources and their Applicability

To supplement the international field of literature, the thesis is built on the analyses of primary material. In this way, new insight into the study of U.S. security and NATO policies in the post-Cold War period is based upon the traditional historian’s handwork – the critical examination of primary sources. The following account of sources will discuss the magnitude and relevance of the material available for the study.

First of all, the mandatory annual report of the President to Congress on the National Security Strategy of the United States, the NSS, is the foremost relevant primary source, and “an excellent starting point for [an] analysis of current United States strategy”. 45 The NSS report was introduced through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. It amended the National Security Act of 1947, and required that “[t]he President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States”. 46 During the period of this study, an NSS was submitted in 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002. 47 The primary purpose of the reports is to have the executive give Congress a clearly articulated basis for its foreign affairs budget decisions. It states the overall agenda of the President. 48 But important additional functions of the report are that it communicates the administration’s strategic visions to other

45 Dorff 2001a: 16.
constituencies, including foreign nations; a broader domestic audience; and internally, as it produces internal consensus and coordination within the executive through the process of making the report.\(^{49}\) This means that the report is the outcome of possible differences of substance on security issues within the bureaucracy. Accordingly, the document reflects the consensus arrived at, and to be followed, after different formulations have been drafted and discussed within the administration.

The NSSs are publicly available, even though they concern national strategic matters. Their public nature obviously makes the documents rhetorical, and controversial elements may be intentionally excluded. At the same time, as the reports are the foundation for Congressional decisions, statements need to reflect the administrations’ view of how the U.S. should act on security issues, even though formulations may be made in a rhetorical and selective manner. Secondly, as the reports have many indirect recipients outside of Congress, it is possible to identify statements intended for very different receivers. For instance, by affirming the administration’s appreciation of the work of U.S. soldiers, the document states its special consideration of the domestic audience, and by affirming a positive perception of international cooperation, foreign governments may be appeased. This is of course most likely the factual policy of the administrations, but also illustrates the stated challenge of the rhetorical nature of the reports. A third challenge when handling the document is that it is submitted under provisions of law. With requirements of when reports should be submitted, new administrations may not yet have a strategic approach to present or new reports by continuous administrations may only repeat the contents of previous issues. Still, the documents are the foremost available description of the full strategic assessments of each of the administrations. Particularly, the preface and introduction state the primary elements of U.S. strategies.\(^{50}\) In terms of NATO, the reports do not specifically address the transatlantic relationship, but the alliance, when mentioned, is seen within the broader context of U.S. strategy, as is the intention of this thesis. The NSS documents represent the central primary source of the project’s analysis, and are frequently referred to throughout the main chapters of the thesis.\(^{51}\)

But to ensure validity, readings of such documents are coupled with interpretations of other primary materials. Information provided through interviews and conversations with

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\(^{49}\) Snider and Nagl 2001: 128-131. Snider and Nagl also discuss the process in which the document was initiated.


\(^{51}\) Page numbers in these documents that are not automatically set in an electronic pdf version is referred to in terms of the pages’ numbers when on customary print. Concerning the last main chapter on the G. W. Bush presidency, alternative primary sources are applied to a greater extent than in previous chapter, to be able to address the period before the 2002 NSS was published, and particularly before the September 11, 2001, attacks.
representatives of the U.S. government and NATO are pertinent here. By means of interviews, assumptions or unclear elements about the theme at issue can be questioned, confirmed or modified. The interviews provide specific information on elements seen as central to the analysis. Also other institutions’ or researchers’ interviews or oral history roundtables, for instance made by the Brookings Institution, may add information, even if questions specific to this study have not been asked. To transcend the general methodological problems of possible bias or subjectivity in the interviewee’s statements, as well as possible lack or distortion of memory, the information provided needs to be evaluated critically. It is also necessary to remember that the more recent the events discussed, the more politically controversial it is for the interviewee to speak freely. These personal accounts need to be seen in relation to other primary material, and one person’s answers can be compared with another’s, to reasonably ensure the validity of the material.

Similarly, speech transcripts, policy papers and other types of accounts by actors involved, for instance biographies and articles, can supplement the analysis, as can information provided through relevant U.S. newspapers. These are written sources, but also here questions of reliability occur, and it is necessary to contextualize the document, and understand the selectivity in what is presented. Two important databases to public papers of the President and the Department of State are The American Presidency Project and the U.S. Department of State Dispatch. The Dispatch provides transcripts of major speeches and Congressional testimonies, and these have been systematically searched for relevant material.

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52 Interviews and conversations made with academics are rather a supplement to literature, as second hand material. For a broader discussion of the methodological aspects of interviews with political actors, see Anthony Seldon, “Elite Interviews”, in Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (eds.), The Contemporary History Handbook (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 1996).


55 News paper articles written at the time of events are considered primary sources, while articles commenting on the past are treated as secondary literature.


to this project. The *Presidency Project* has been useful to find specific remarks or statements made by the President.

In addition to the information directly stemming from the U.S. executive and its representatives, the analysis also benefits from additional documentation from Congressional sessions, some material available at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. and other online. As the thesis analyzes the policies of the administration, general Congress material is not relevant. But Congressional material becomes interesting when representatives of the administration deliver messages, testimonies, reports and other statements to Congress. The NSS reports are of course one example of such material, but other, and more specific, statements contain useful further information. The material here provided is also more extensive than the Congressional statements made available through the *Dispatch* magazine, which includes a selection of Congressional testimonies by Department of State officials. 58 As the NSSs discuss the overall security strategies of the U.S., this type of documentation, in addition to the other material stemming from actors involved discussed above, are especially useful concerning U.S. deliberations on the role of NATO. 59 When dealing with this kind of material, the domestic context, and the relationship between the government branches need to be taken into account. 60

As all the sources mentioned are public, the question of classified U.S. information remains. General declassification processes of material from the period is decades away, 61 but some information has been made available through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), an act opening for early declassification upon request. Processing FOIA requests are time consuming, so it is not possible to obtain material within the confined two years duration of a master project. 62 But information gained through other researchers’ FOIA requests are relevant to the extent that it deals with the field at study. Such material is available in print and in digital databases, at the National Security Archive (NSA) of the George Washington University; the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) subscription service; the electronic

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58 In addition to speeches and messages delivered outside of Congress.
59 According to Snider and Nagl (2001: 129), the administrations’ consider it better to depend on current, personal testimonies in Congress by administration officials, supported by President and cabinet-level media interventions, rather than the NSSs, to agitate the more specific contents of strategy.
61 Generally, declassified material is not made accessible until the passing of a substantial period of time. For instance, the latest volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the official documentary historical record of U.S. foreign policy, cover the Nixon and Ford administrations, 1969-1976. The general provision of declassification on the other hand, is that material should be declassified after 25 years. For more detail on declassification procedures and problems, see James David, “Progress and Problems in Declassifying U.S. Government Records”, *Journal of Government Information* (vol. 30, no. 4, 2004).
reading room of the Department of State; and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) FOIA reading room. The unpublished collection “The End of the Cold War” at the NSA has been manually investigated by the author. The DNSA, the Department of State and CIA FOIA reading rooms have been explored through systematic searches. Still, material declassified within the FOIA system is not truly effective for this study, as material related to national security is generally exempted. And if released, many documents are excised. The material that is available and applicable mostly covers the early period of this study.

A complete study of internal documents on this field needs to wait until regular declassification processes are completed, implying several decades of delay. But by including relevant material stemming from previously submitted FOIA requests, the thesis applies the most extensive set of sources available for any present analysis. When declassification has been completed, a detailed study of the formation of specific political decisions can be put under scholarly attention. But now, the declassified material supports the more general and public strategic documents and assessments in addressing the overall strategic outlook of the post-Cold War administrations. Furthermore, actual U.S. actions are taken into consideration within the analysis. These are of course at the overall level well known at the present point, without the access of classified material.

To supplement the analysis, official material from the transatlantic alliance provides insight into the evolution of NATO’s role within U.S. strategies. Also here, NATO actions constitute information for interpretation. When considering documents, NATO produced strategic documents, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (ASC), in 1991 and 1999, comparable to the NSSs. Other official NATO policy statements can add information, especially as no ASC has been published since G. W. Bush’s inauguration. The documents in themselves are not the object of scrutiny for this project, but they are useful to show how far the NATO

65 A future revised ASC document has been suggested among the allies. For the purpose of this thesis, to account for NATO’s perceptions during the G. W. Bush presidency, other NATO documents, from 2002 and 2006, are mentioned, as documentation of the final changes within NATO’s role. Even though the year of publication of the latter falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is mentioned as it refers to the changes within the period at study, notably the changes made after 9/11 and in the War on Terrorism. A European Security Strategy document was published in 2003. But as the document is made by another entity than is the focus of this thesis, the document is not applied in the analysis. NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration” (2002-11-21). Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm [online 2008-04-09]; NATO, “Comprehensive Political Guidance” (2006-11-29). Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm [online 2008-02-28]; European Union (EU), “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy” (2003-12-12). Available at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [online 2008-02-28].
member states have agreed to transform the role of the alliance.\textsuperscript{66} NATO documents, like U.S. material, need to be understood within their context and their public nature.

Combined, this review of primary sources has identified the magnitude of material available and its relevance to this study. The lack of substantial internal archival material is a present challenge, but with so much other primary material available, which is not only substantial in quantity, but also highly relevant for the core of this research, there are sufficient grounds for a new source-based synthesis, to add a new perspective to the historiography of the post-Cold War period. The public documents of the period specifically deal with security issues. With the new security situation, security policies were expressed more openly than during the period of Cold War rivalry. For instance, the NSS and ASC documents address strategy publicly, contrastive to previous Cold War secrecy.\textsuperscript{67} Also, when using critical reflection when working with the different contemporary sources, the historian attempts to transcend the methodological challenges of possible bias and subjectivity.

The Actors Involved – The U.S. and the Role of NATO

After assessing that it is both necessary and possible to write a thesis on U.S. national security strategies and their implications for the role of NATO, the question of how such an analysis is to be performed remains. The conceptual framework of the thesis is formed by the different components necessary to understand the concept of strategy, as will be discussed below. But firstly, the nature of the actors involved needs to be determined.

In an analysis of U.S. national security strategy the executive branch of government is the object of study. More precisely, the President, his National Security Advisor and Council (NSC) are involved, and at different levels, the Department of State and of Defense.\textsuperscript{68} At the same time that all these different persons and units are involved, the nation, the United States, is traditionally seen as a unitary actor in its international relations.\textsuperscript{69} But this unity has also been questioned. Two other models of decision-making highlight the diversity of government. The first alternative model understands policy formulations as an organizational process where policies are identified as outputs of large organizations functioning according to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Stanley Sloan, “The New NATO: Has It Outplayed its Role?”, lecture at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo (2008-02-25).
\item \textsuperscript{67} The NSS procedure was implemented during the late Cold War, but earlier statements of strategy were not as publicly available.
\item \textsuperscript{68} See Jordan et al 1999: 98-114. Here is also the influence of the CIA and the Office of Management and Budget discussed.
\item \textsuperscript{69} This implies that the state forms its policies according to a coherent and rational estimate of possible courses of action. Such a model can be characterized as the rational policy model of the rational, unitary decision-maker. See Graham Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, \textit{American Political Science Review: Quarterly Journal of American Political Science Association} (vol. 63, no. 3, 1969): 693-694.
\end{itemize}
standard patterns of behavior. The second alternative model sees decision-making within a bureaucratic politics paradigm, where the actor is a number of individual players having positions within the administration. And in addition to such different understandings of the nature of the executive, diplomatic relations are also understood as a two-level game, where the formation of foreign policy is not only an aspect of the international sphere, but also the domestic. In such a perspective, also Congress, and to some extent the American public, influence the formation of U.S. strategies.

Although the thesis does not aim to provide a theoretical understanding of decision-makers, it is necessary to be aware of the diversity within the actor under study. As stated above, the strategic decision-maker of the United States is in this thesis seen represented by several individuals and institutions, a diversity also supported by the two alternative models. But for simplicity, the singular terms the U.S. and the administration are also applied, implying unity. A pragmatic approach then sees diversity when necessary, but overall unity when possible. Firstly then, the thesis basically understands the formation of security strategies as coherent within the administration. But secondly, it accounts for variations and differences among the individuals of the administration when relevant for the formation of strategies. Otherwise, the consensus line within the administrations is considered as the administrations’ policies. And as for the domestic context of Congress and the domestic audience, these are not the subjects at study, and will only be mentioned if specifically influential as to the formation of strategies. Such a delimitation is necessary in order to perform the analysis within the number of pages allotted to the project.

The final actor concerned is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The organization is an inter-governmental structure even less unitary than a single state’s government. And as it is consensus-based, its policies reflect the “least common denominator” of all member states. But the aim of this thesis is not to account for NATO’s strategic post-Cold War development

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70 See Allison 1969: 698.
73 Interests groups, past policies and programs, lack of bureaucratic responsiveness, as well as the views of foreign governments may also influence the executive’s decision-making, see Jordan et al 1999: 116-121.
in itself, but rather to place such developments within the context of broader U.S. security strategies in the period. As such, the U.S. administration is the subject to be studied, and it is the influence of American strategies on NATO transformation that is seen as the implications of U.S. strategies to be discussed. As the security guarantor and the most powerful nation in the alliance, the influence of American security policies on NATO is extensive.

According to definition, an alliance is a confederation of nations by treaty to further the common interests of the members. In addition to such a general role, the specific nature of NATO is often described as: “a political-military alliance that combines the key political function of guiding members’ foreign and security policy and providing a forum for alliance consultation with the operational function of ensuring that members can train and develop the capabilities to cooperate militarily”. Accordingly, the alliance’s role is seen as a function of strategies. In addition, the alliance has a more delimited role in being a forum for consultation and operational coordination. With the influence of the United States on NATO strategies, the thesis then traces transformation within NATO’s role in the post-Cold period within the evolution of U.S. strategies.

**Strategy and its Components – A Conceptual Framework**

After identifying the subject at study, an understanding of strategy and a conceptual framework for the thesis needs to be outlined. The term “national security strategy” and its components will be addressed in the following, and they form the framework of the thesis.

The research question and the presentation of the U.S. National Security Strategy reports have introduced the term of national security strategy. The NSSs form a public statement of strategies, but an academic and empirical analysis that addresses the research question needs to go beyond the content of these documents in its assessment of strategies. In addition to such statements of strategic thinking, strategies mirror general ideas and perceptions of the administrations, its outlook, its policy implementation and actions. In the words of John Lewis Gaddis, “strategy” is “quite simply the process by which ends are related

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76 Nevers 2007: 36.

77 In this way the analysis centers on the practical functioning of NATO within U.S. strategies, i.e. what NATO does.

to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources”. In this way, many aspects are part of the same term. To make a constructive appraisal of strategy, the term needs to be operationalized.

Based on the work of political scientist and IR theorist Alexander George, Gaddis suggests that “there exist for presidential administrations certain ‘strategic’ or ‘geopolitical’ codes, assumptions about American interest in the world, potential threats to them, and feasible responses” that form strategies. With such an assessment in mind, Gaddis basically evaluates four different aspects of U.S. Cold War strategies. These are conceptions of interests, perceptions of threats to these interests, responses to interests and threats, and the justification of responses. Gaddis states that he does not want to use the categories obtrusively throughout his text. But within the scope of this thesis, categories are applied more explicitly, to focus the discussion of strategies. Gaddis’s concepts are adapted to fit with the research made in this thesis. It is necessary to add a dimension on U.S. views of the strategic importance of different areas, allies and partners to elucidate the strategic context of the NATO perspective. Also, Gaddis’s final aspect of justification, i.e. of the presentation of responses to the American public and Congress, is excluded. The reason is that it deals with the presentation of strategy to these actors, and not the formation of strategy within the executive, which is the subject of this study. Still, all the aspects of the above quote on strategic assumptions are included, in addition to the aspect on cooperation, applied to accentuate the NATO perspective. Also, the dimension of responses is renamed “strategic thinking and implementation”, in line with Gaddis’s actual treatment of this element. In sum, strategies are operationalized as: interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation. These operationalized components of U.S. national security strategy can be reformulated into four sub-questions to the overall research question presented earlier:

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80 Also, other terms than national security strategy are used on similar structures, such as grand strategy, security policy and foreign policy. In the thesis, national security strategy is primarily used, as this is the term used by the U.S. administrations in their appraisals of strategy. When grand strategy is applied, it is used synonymously, or in paraphrasing others applying that term in stead of national security strategies. As for policy, it accounts for more case specific decisions than strategies that include all the aspects mentioned in the above text. Security policies more explicitly deal with issues of war and peace, or issues dealing with the security of the state. Foreign policies on the other hand cover a wider array of policies, including security policies, but also such issues as international economy, etc.
82 Outline presented in footnote in Gaddis 2005: ix.
83 See the above paragraph on the actors of the thesis, which state that Congressional and public influence on the formation of strategy will only be mentioned when highly relevant to the actual formation of strategy within the executive.
- What interests and objectives did the U.S. have?
- What threats did the U.S. perceive against these interests and objectives?
- What areas did the U.S. view as strategically important areas, and how did it value allies and partners within these?
- How did the U.S. think about strategy, and how was it implemented?

These four questions, or the components of strategy, form the conceptual framework within which U.S. strategies and the role of NATO are to be discussed. The implications for the role of NATO are especially relevant when it comes to the last two components, where the first of the two addresses Europe and NATO’s position in U.S. strategy, and the last the actual role of NATO, as envisaged and performed within U.S. strategic thinking and implementation. Also, the categories of the conceptual framework implicitly provide some explanation of strategies, i.e. why strategies evolved as they did. Accordingly, strategies changed as a result of differences within U.S. interests and objectives; threat perceptions; the strategic importance of areas, allies and partners; as well as U.S. strategic thinking and implementation. But within the scope of this project, these explanatory aspects are subordinate to descriptive elements. Accordingly, the thesis’s research question asks how strategies developed, not why.84

Now, it is necessary to account for the content of each component; how each component will be treated within each following chapter. Firstly, U.S. interests and objectives are addressed.85 Generally, a nation’s national security interests and objectives are quite stable and continuous. The most fundamental objective of a state is found in its own survival; the maintenance of its sovereignty, territory and people.86 But for the sake of this thesis, more concrete U.S. security interests need to be discussed, to understand the foundation of strategy. Within such a study, interests are seen in political-military terms.87 This includes interests

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84 The “why” question is both important and interesting. But without firstly discussing the characteristics of a period, it is impossible to explain why features evolved. Also, a full explanatory approach needs to take in the particularities of each situation, the coincidences, structural aspects, individuals, etc. that formed each decision. Within this thesis, the limited, and implicitly rationalistic, explanation found in the conceptual framework only adds to the descriptive aspects, and does not form a full explanation of the formation of strategies.

85 Gaddis largely speaks of interests, and not objectives. They generally imply the same, namely what elements an administration view as favorable, but to be clear about the full spectrum of such aspects, both formulations are applied. Even if terms differ, this corresponds to Gaddis’s actual treatment of this component. Also necessary to be aware of, the concept of national interest is a fundamental part of political realism, see Michal G. Roskin, “National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy”, in Joseph H. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (2001): 13-15. Available at: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB362.pdf [online 2007-03-31].


87 This means that the thesis does not elaborate on for instance economic interests. If mentioned, it is only when specifically important to the formation of national security strategy. The U.S. interest in access to oil is in a
such as what position the U.S. sees an interest in having and obtaining; what values it sees beneficiary in the world; and what subjects U.S. interests are focused on. Also more indirect interests can be present, opposite to the more direct interests of the U.S., for instance the interests of allies or partners. By applying such a concrete conception of interests and objectives in the thesis, its clear basis for overall U.S. national security strategies are elucidated.

Secondly, perceptions of threats are treated. A state’s threat perceptions can comprise as different aspects as the threat posed by natural catastrophes to the threat of war. In the context of U.S. national security strategies, the thesis emphasizes political-military threats, or threats having implications in the form of strategic responses. To pose such a security threat, a subject needs to have both hostile intentions as well as the capabilities to realize these intentions. The strategic component of threats is modified with the word perception of threats, as it is the administrations’ views that are at focus, and not some objective estimate of what threats the U.S. counter in each period. It is the perceptions of threats that form the foundation of strategies, not the somehow objective nature of a situation or subject. By comparison, interests and objectives, as well as the other components of strategy, are by definition more subjective terms, implicitly referring to the administrations’ opinions. Threats can be perceived as having different intensities. For instance, a threat can be seen as existential, in other words threatening the very foundation of the state’s survival. Other types of threats include potential threats and indirect threats. Furthermore, threats can be posed by states or be asymmetrical, posed by non-state actors. Threat perceptions can be monolithic, threats being seen as interrelated or as one, or fragmented, thus posed by a variety of threats.

Thirdly, the component of U.S. assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners is evaluated. The terms are not as abstract as the others, and address what priority is given to different geographical areas, allies and partners within strategies. Fundamental to the special position. Access is in the economic interest of the U.S., at the same time that it is a resource with strategic-military dimensions. The thesis does not elaborate on oil as a foundation for U.S. national security strategy, but recognizes the stable U.S. interest in access to oil, especially important when considering relations with the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. An integrated study of oil and U.S. strategy is under construction by historian David Painter. A present point of reference is Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (London: Simon & Schuster 1991).

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88 Interview Flournoy 2007. A state possessing just one of those two aspects would not represent a threat.

89 Still, the administrations’ threat perceptions were also based on threat estimates, for instance by the CIA, and thus also reflected an external, perhaps more technically objective state of affairs, in addition to the priorities of the administration.

90 An ongoing theoretical discussion of threats also introduces the term “risk”. See for instance Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006). The thesis addresses different types of challenges to U.S. and allied security within the concept of threat perceptions, and includes the varying nature of threats within this term, as both risks and more traditional threats are perceived as dangers to somebody’s interests.
perspective on allies and partners is the more theoretically founded terms of multilateralism versus unilateralism. Within analyses of national security strategies, a strategy is unilateral if policies are formed by and responses made only by one state, here the United States. A more multilateral strategy would involve consultation with other nations in the formations of common strategies and the implementation of such responses. Generally, strategies are not simply multilateral or unilateral, but degrees of one or the other. Concerning the aspect of geographical areas of strategic importance, there is relative continuity, although focus on different regions within these areas may change more rapidly according to international events. In the thesis, this component will be covered by an estimate of the degree of multilateralism or unilateralism present in strategies, what geographical areas are valued, and allies and partners within them.

Lastly, the component of strategic thinking and implementation fulfills the analysis of U.S. national security strategies. This final element of the analysis, as the terms indicate, refers to the strategic argumentation made by the administrations, and an understanding of the implications of actions made. Accordingly, this component reviews the strategic ideas and actual actions; the responses to interests and objectives; perceptions of threats; and the assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners. The component of strategic thinking and implementation then integrates the previous components, and adds the means considered and actually used in U.S. national security strategies. Implied is a subordinate discussion of strategic thinking and implementation on the military instruments or operational aspects of strategies. This will be commented on, but the main aspect of this component is the higher level of overall strategic thinking and implementation.

Such a componential view of analyzing the different administrations’ strategy opens up for easily accessed comparison between the periods of time covered. Alexander George calls for systematic comparison, which can be made possible by such a componential outline. The components of strategy of the successive administrations’ can be contrasted or linked to one another. Through comparison, the historian may identify features not otherwise seen, describe or profile the individual periods, and acquire insight into the factual relationships between periods or the causes of change. Combined, a conclusive chapter may culminate into a synthesized understanding of the complete period at study. When contrasted with the strategic components of the Cold War, a more holistic understanding of the period

91 See Gaddis 2005: ix.
from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism can be outlined. By viewing strategies through the different components, the operationalized parts, the whole is elucidated.

Outline of Thesis
The main chapters of the thesis analyze the three successive post-Cold War American presidencies, and accordingly their approach to security interests and objectives; perception of threats; strategic areas, allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation. Hereunder, the implications of strategies for the role of NATO are addressed. One chapter cover the George Herbert Walker Bush administration from 1989-1993, the next chapter evaluates the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton from 1993-2001. This chapter is followed by another on the George Walker Bush administration from 2001-2003. Each chapter will commence with a brief outline of the key international events of the period in question. The U.S. responses to these events will be used to illustrate U.S. strategy. The concluding chapter synthesizes arguments, putting the different treatments of the components of strategy presented in each chapter together to make a complex whole of the entire period at study. Such an outline gives room for both inter-administrative comparison, as well as synthesis. But firstly, a chapter on the Cold War provides the point of departure; the historical context on which the post-Cold War period is based, and when seen together as a whole, compared with.

93 Implicitly, by dividing chapters by presidential periods, the main chapters contrast each administration. Another possible outline would be to use formative international events as the point of departure for the discussion. But as the subject at study is the strategic perceptions of the U.S. administrations, and as the formative international events of the end of the Cold War and the War on Terrorism form the frames of the period at study, the implemented outline serves the purpose of the analysis.
CHAPTER II

STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT AND DETERRENCE

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE COLD WAR AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF NATO

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. […] One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.1

Introduction
The Cold War represented both an ideological and a geopolitical rivalry. The above quote, from the speech announcing the U.S. Truman Doctrine, exemplified this. Ideological differences were underlined, at the same time as the geopolitical context was perceived as opening up for a possible Soviet influence in Greece and Turkey. The Cold War evolved after the end of World War II. Great power relations became fixed in tension between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and with them, their respective Western and Eastern bloc of supporter and satellite states.2 Within the Western bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was set up in 1949 between Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO, in 1955, The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and in 1982, Spain. In 1955, the Eastern bloc formally came together in the Warsaw Pact. While the so-called Iron Curtain divided Europe, other nations, primarily in the Third World, stayed non-aligned.

2 The word “bloc” is in used on both the Eastern and Western side of the Cold War, without prejudice as to the differences in uniformity within the two sides. Also, the terms “Western” and “Eastern” are applied, even though the terms are not completely geographically consistent. But they are used to identify the U.S. and the states that supported the American position in the Cold War, and the opposite side, the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and the states supporting communism.
In Europe, the Cold War remained cold, but in the Third World, U.S. or Soviet military intervention happened intermittently, most notably in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Generally, the Cold War was marked both by periods of tension and détente between the superpowers. Simplified, the first period of tension ended in 1962, with the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. From then on, a period of détente, of less tension between the Cold War rivals, reigned. Tensions rose again in what became known as the Second Cold War, from roughly 1979 onwards. Here, President Ronald Reagan increased U.S. military spending and the rhetorical confrontation with the adversary superpower. In the Soviet Union, defense spending served to erode the communist system, and Mikhail Gorbachev initiated internal reforms in the 1980s. The Cold War gradually came to an end, as the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991.3

With such a general history of the Cold War period, this chapter is to form a point of departure for the analysis of U.S. post-Cold War national security strategies and their implications for the role of NATO. To do so, the text emphasizes general or stable elements of U.S. Cold War strategies and NATO’s role. The chapter asserts, on the basis of central literature, that the period was marked by variations of U.S. strategies of containment and deterrence.4 NATO was an integral part of overall U.S. strategies. Its primary role was to be a territorially defensive alliance holding back the Soviet Union.

The chapter follows the same conceptual framework to be applied throughout the thesis, and addresses U.S. interests and objectives; perceptions of threats: assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners; as well as U.S. strategic thinking and implementation.

**Interests and Objectives**

U.S. interests and objectives during the Cold War were firstly concerned with containing the Soviet Union and communism. Interrelated with such an interest were favorable views of democracy and economic liberalism. Also, the U.S. administrations were interested in building alliances and support within a Western bloc. In view of that, the U.S. had an interest in providing Western leadership, and strengthening its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

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3 There is an extensive historiographical discussion concerning the Cold War, its origins, nature and end. Interpretations have been categorized as falling into an orthodox approach, seeing the Soviet Union as hostile to the West; a revisionist perspective, seeing the United States as the driving force of the Cold War; and a post-revisionist assessment, attempting to avoid the question of guilt, and balancing perspectives. After the end of the Cold War, elements of the orthodox side gained new force, most determinedly expressed in views of American “triumphalism”. The following chapter attempts to present, in a short and simple manner, a “neutral” approach. Accordingly, the author basically adheres to the post-revisionists. Another aspect necessary to point out is that this chapter covers the Cold War period up until the inauguration of President G. H. W. Bush in January 1989.

4 More precisely, the term containment refers to the more theoretically founded overall national security strategy, while deterrence indicates how it was fundamentally and practically seen implemented.
First and foremost, the central interest of the U.S. in the Cold War was to contain its adversary superpower, the Soviet Union. Such an interest was expressed both in terms of preventing Soviet domination in areas of central importance to the United States, and more widely, assumed that any further gains of Soviet domination would pose a threat to the interest of the United States. In a NATO perspective, the organization’s role in defending the territorial integrity of the Western European states against the Soviet Union supported this interest of the United States, and was shared among the allies.

Furthermore, the U.S. saw political and economic freedom around the world as favorable to its position. This was interrelated with the interest in containing the Soviet Union, now as an ideological dimension of containing communist ideology. Such an interest was expressed in denunciations of the system of the Eastern bloc. For instance, after the Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary in 1956, the U.S. argued in favor of pluralism and freedom. Also in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty democratic ideas were embraced.

The interest in containing the Soviet Union was in addition evident in the U.S. effort to build alliances and support for the Western bloc. The formation of regional defense arrangements underlined the interest in gaining support for the American position in the Cold War. NATO was the first and most central, but similar arrangements were formed in different regions of the world, for instance with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Likewise, U.S. attempts at gaining support among the so-called non-aligned nations outside the Western and Eastern bloc supported this general objective.

Through these relationships, the U.S. had an interest in strengthening its leadership within the Western and non-aligned world. In terms of NATO, the alliance supported the U.S. interest in institutionalizing American leadership in Europe. European integration was seen within the broader U.S. objectives of Western cooperation, as long as such cooperation also

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5 See Gaddis 2005: 89.
8 The observation that it was in the national security interests of the U.S. to build alliances and partnerships is not to say that relationships were not also formed as responses to allies’ interests, as they wanted U.S. guarantees. See also the “Empire” by Invitation thesis on U.S.-European relations. Lundestad 2003.
supported the transatlantic framework, and thus, the overall U.S. position in Europe.\(^9\) Through building alliances and winning supporters, the U.S. saw an interest in gaining position in the world vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This was particularly evident in areas central to the United States, but also more generally, within a more global perspective.

Combined, U.S. interests in the Cold War were centered on containing the Soviet Union; supporting ideas of political and economic freedom; and building alliances and support. Within these concerns, objectives of U.S. leadership and position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union crystallized.

**Perception of Threats**

As the section on interests and objectives has anticipated, U.S. and NATO Cold War strategies focused on the Soviet threat. Also, the People’s Republic of China was to some extent perceived as an interrelated threat. On the whole, communism was seen as hostile to the interests of the U.S.\(^10\)

U.S. Cold War threat perceptions were fundamentally centered on the Soviet Union. “The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], and from the nature of the Soviet system.”\(^11\) Soviet antipathies against the West were seen as a result of Soviet historical and ideological circumstances.\(^12\) Such perceived hostile intentions were coupled with major conventional and unconventional capabilities. Conventionally, the Red Army’s position in Eastern Europe and parts of East Asia, within striking distance of U.S. allies, was perceived threatening.\(^13\) And from 1949 onwards, the Soviet threat was coupled with unconventional capabilities, as the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb. In such a way, with perceived inherently hostile purposes, and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, the Soviet Union was seen to represent a direct and existential threat to the U.S. Such perceptions also formed the basis of NATO cohesion, countering a common threat.

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\(^10\) Threat perceptions stemming from the two world wars saw it to some extent also necessary to ensure that Germany did not reemerge as a threat. In such a perspective, Western influence in what became West Germany, and the country’s participation in European integration and NATO, formed the foundation for containing a possible German threat. Comparably, the U.S. also stayed committed to Japan.


\(^12\) See Gaddis (2005: 32) for more detail.

\(^13\) Gaddis 2005: 32.
After the takeover of Mao Zedong, and the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, also China was perceived a Cold War threat. With China, threat perceptions were less stable. In the early period from 1949, perceptions of China were consistently negative. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. attitudes became less negative, through what has been called an American-Chinese rapprochement. Still, the U.S. continued to view China as communist and undemocratic, consistent with original threat perceptions. From the first nuclear testing in 1964, the Chinese threat was also coupled with nuclear capabilities.

Consistently, communism in itself was perceived a threat. Seen within the discussion of communism as a monolithic or diverse threat, President Harry Truman feared that all communists got their orders from Moscow. The first proponent of U.S. containment strategies, George Kennan, on the other hand acknowledged possible tensions between the Kremlin leadership and the international communist movement. But the general U.S. perspective was that all communism represented a threat. The Soviet Union, China and other communist countries and movements were seen as threatening, while the existential threat of nuclear capabilities was confined to the Soviet Union and China. Communist parties within Western Europe were to some extent also seen as threatening to the stability of the West.

Simplified, the U.S. saw communism and the Soviet Union as an interrelated, monolithic and existential threat, even if diversity existed. Hereunder, China represented a threat, but in this case, threat perceptions were less consistent throughout the Cold War.

**Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners**

By building alliances and support focused against this communist threat, American strategies of containment and deterrence were inherently multilateral inside the Western bloc. Within this Cold War alliance structure, NATO and other regional defense arrangements were central. The Iron Curtain through Europe made the transatlantic relationship fundamental within U.S. strategies, and made it interlinked with the overall U.S. Cold War perspective in other strategically important areas as well.

During the Cold War, the strategies of containment and deterrence made U.S. policies predominantly multilateral, although its outreach was confined to the Western bloc. U.S.

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18 Gaddis 2005: 64.
strategies saw relations within the Western bloc as central to contain and deter the position of communism and the Soviet Union. In this way, multilateralism was inherent within the Western sphere. In a global realm, possible cooperation within the United Nations (UN) was mostly paralyzed as a consequence of the East-West rivalry, with the exception of the period when the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council as a response to the non-inclusion of Mao’s China.

Although cooperation was ascertained, different regions and relationships were prioritized differently. In general, it is possible to claim that the Cold War made all places strategically important, as all gains of communism could worsen the position of the U.S. Selectivity in where the U.S. had its vital interests was not easily decided, as it was difficult to draw demarcation lines in the world, singling out what countries it would defend against communism and which it would not. At the same time, the initial strategy formed by Kennan argued in favor of prioritized regions, and to put it simply, Western Europe and Japan had first priority. Europe was the initial theater of the Cold War, and was the location of the Iron Curtain. After the communist party gained power in China and the Korean War broke out, the Cold War and U.S. strategies of containment were also extended to Asia. In Western Europe and critical areas of Asia, the U.S. primarily built its regional defense arrangements, where NATO was the first, broadest and most sustained of the multilateral alliances set up.

Still, other areas than those of Western cooperation became the battlefield of U.S. Cold War strategies. Eastern Europe was recognized as an interest sphere of the Soviet Union. But the so-called Third World countries became battlegrounds of superpower

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22 Gaddis 2005: 29 and 40.
24 Phil Williams, "The United States’ Commitment to Western Europe: Strategic Ambiguity and Political Disintegration?", International Affairs (vol. 59, no. 2, 1983): 203.
25 While it has been suggested that the idea that American Cold War policies were Eurocentric is exaggerated, the preceding period to the time of my study, the 1980s were to a large extent focused on Europe. Interview Dobbins 2007.
rivalry, on the U.S. side most notably in the Korean and Vietnam War. But even if U.S. Cold War policies were implemented outside Europe, in these cases in Asia, but also in other continents such as Africa, operations were all seen within the same Cold War framework. As such, the focus on non-European areas did not diverge from the U.S.-European focus. NATO was an integral part of the overall Cold War outlook of the U.S., where NATO was one of several interlinked alliances in the Western bloc. NATO in this way had global relevance, as part of U.S. global strategy, while its practical role was confined to the territorial defense of its own region.

Even if the transatlantic allies were part of the same Cold War outlook, there existed instances of disagreement among the allies. Particularly, the Suez crisis in 1956 signified allied divergence. But even though the allies disagreed, and NATO experienced internal crises from time to time, U.S. policies were generally formed within the Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence. In this way, the general common objective of containing the Soviet threat produced overall coherence.

In sum, by being the location of the Iron Curtain, Europe was automatically central to global U.S. strategies. The U.S. had allies in and intervened in other areas as well. But the Cold War produced a U.S. framework where different regions became interlinked through its strategies of containment and deterrence. In this way, Europe and NATO was by position and nature of overriding interest to the U.S., within the U.S. strategic outlook based on multilateralism within the Western bloc. As such, the U.S. and allied Cold War framework contributed to allied coherence.

**Strategic Thinking and Implementation**

The preceding sections have pointed out that U.S. Cold War strategies were based on interests in containing and deterring the Soviet and communist threat. Strategic decisions were formed within a framework of alliances and supporters, which made policies inherently multilateral. Strategies of containment and deterrence developed and became implemented throughout the Cold War period, in which NATO functioned as a territorially defensive alliance.

The initial formulation of U.S. strategies of containment and deterrence was devised by George Kennan. In the so-called “Long Telegram” of 1946 and his “Mr. X” article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, Kennan outlined the strategy that by 1948 aimed to: restore the

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27 For a more detailed discussion of the application of U.S. Cold War strategies in the Suez Crisis, see Ingrid Lundestad, ”USA og Suez-krisa i 1956: Den kalde krigens betydning for amerikansk politikk” [”The U.S. and the 1956 Suez Crisis: The Importance of the Cold War for American Policies”], *Fortid*, (no. 4, 2007).

balance of power through the encouragement of self-confidence in the nations threatened by Soviet expansionism; reduce the Soviet Union’s ability to project influence beyond its borders through exploiting tensions between Moscow and the international communist movement; and to modify the Soviet concept of international relations, with an objective of forming a negotiated settlement of out-standing differences. These were basically the intended instruments of the strategy of containment and deterrence. The statement of the NSC-68 of 1950 called for a policy of containment that:

seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

Implemented, the initial Truman Doctrine of 1947 stated that the U.S. would support those threatened by Soviet subversion or expansion. The same year, the U.S. granted substantial economic support through the formulation of the Marshall Plan, designed to revive and integrate the economies of Western Europe. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaimed that the U.S. saw the spread of communism in the world as a possible domino effect expansion. The context was the idea that the presence of communism in one nation in Southeast Asia could spill over into communist expansion in other countries in the same region. The theory thus legitimized U.S. action to stop communist expansion, for instance in the Vietnam War.

The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, a reaction to the 1956 Suez Crisis, provided foundation for the transfer of military and economic aid to the Middle East, and guarantees against possible Soviet invasion or subversion in this region. Later, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, as a consequence of the troubles in the Vietnam War, declared that the U.S. could not undertake all responsibility for the defense of the “free world”. But even if this meant that restraints made U.S. strategies less committed to more peripheral allies and clients, it was less relevant for its transatlantic relations. Here, the American nuclear guarantee and troop presence stayed firm, and NATO’s primary relevance to the U.S. was affirmed.

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30 NSC-68 1950: (VI)(A).
34 Palmowski 2004: 195.
Carter doctrine in 1980 announced that the U.S. would use any means necessary to prevent Soviet control in the Persian Gulf.\(^{37}\) The 1984 Reagan Doctrine aimed at turning nationalistic forces in the Third World, and eventually also Eastern Europe, against the Soviet Union.\(^{38}\) These doctrines and policies sought to contain communist expansion and deter Soviet aggression. In such a way, the negotiations with the Soviet Union, intended by Kennan, generally did not become the focus of strategy. Rather, the process of containment became the central focus.\(^{39}\)

U.S. strategies were actively pursued throughout the Cold War, but at the same time containment and deterrence are by definition defensive terms. The U.S. administrations perceived that they responded to what happened in the international sphere.\(^{40}\) Such defensive arguments were for instance made about the Truman doctrine, accordingly supposed to protect against Soviet expansion.\(^{41}\) But even if the U.S. did not confront the Soviet Union militarily, strategies of containment and deterrence did not prevent the U.S. from intervening militarily in the Third World. In accordance with containment and deterrence, this was perceived as rolling back the provocations of the Soviet Union. But in a post-revisionist view, both sides escalated the conflict as seen by the other, and implemented policies to limit the influence of the adversary.\(^{42}\) According to Kennan, the United States should not interfere in other nations’ internal affairs, unless evidence suggested that U.S. national interests were sufficiently at stake, and that the U.S. possessed and afforded the means to do so.\(^{43}\) But as the expansion of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union was seen directly threatening to the U.S., interventions were seen as legitimate.\(^{44}\) In this way, the strategies of containment and deterrence were directed towards the Soviet Union and communism, but also became implemented through military interventions in the Third World, within the same framework of Cold War strategies.\(^{45}\)

Militarily, U.S. Cold War strategies relied on both conventional and unconventional weapons, and embedded attitudes towards the use of military force. As part of the strategies of containment and deterrence, the U.S. sought qualitative superiority in military technology.

\(^{37}\) Gaddis 2005: 344.  
\(^{38}\) Gaddis 2005: 369. U.S. Cold War doctrines by J. F. Kennedy and L. B. Johnson are excluded from the presentation, as they referred to communism in Latin America, outside the realm of this thesis.  
\(^{39}\) Gaddis 2005: 81.  
\(^{40}\) See note by Gaddis 2005: viii.  
\(^{41}\) Scott 2001: 80.  
\(^{42}\) Contrastively, the American perceptions of purely defensive strategies were thus much in line with the so-called orthodox approach.  
\(^{43}\) Gaddis 2005: 30.  
\(^{44}\) See also the above presentation of the domino theory and its rationale for the Vietnam War.  
\(^{45}\) Also see the section of strategic areas, allies and partners of how different regions were prioritized, its note on the theoretical discussion of U.S. universalism and particularism, and the Cold War framework of strategies.
to achieve and maintain an advantage over the Soviet Union. This was particularly present in the unconventional arms race. But also conventionally, the U.S. implemented its strategies with troop deployments in critical areas. Also the military interventions mentioned were executed through conventional means. But the role of unconventional weapons was important as it built a balance of terror with the Soviet Union. During the Eisenhower presidency, U.S. and allied strategy came to rely heavily on U.S. nuclear capabilities, to deter, and if necessary, resist conventional aggression in Western Europe. The initial Reagan approach emphasized defense spending as the means to contain the Soviet Union. When it came to the use of military force, the Vietnam War had special influence on U.S. policies. In line with the Nixon Doctrine, the Vietnam experience made the U.S. wary of unfocused appliance of U.S. military force. Such an attitude was also consistent with Kennan’s initial statement of U.S. Cold War strategies; that the U.S. should not intervene unless clear national interests were threatened, and resources to do so were present and applicable. U.S. strategies relied on military means, not only through actual deployment and appliance to contain the Soviet position, but also through the deterrence represented by their very existence.

In addition to these military aspects of the Cold War, U.S. strategies of containment and deterrence were also rhetorical. This reflected the ideological nature of the Cold War, in addition to the geopolitical aspects outlined. According to Kennan, the Cold War was primarily psychological, and U.S. strategies therefore had to focus on psychological aspects. In this way, arguments made within the framework of U.S. strategies of containment and deterrence were also part of a propaganda war between the two superpowers. For example, The NSC-68 condemned the Kremlin in harsh wording. The quote at the beginning of the chapter expresses U.S. criticism of the Soviet system. Reagan also applied hardened rhetoric, as the Soviet Union in 1983 was denounced as the “focus of evil in the modern world”. The psychological nature of the Cold War was also manifest within periods of lesser tension between the superpowers. For instance, Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw

47 The presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe will be elaborated on below.
48 Gaddis 2005: 162-166. Gaddis states that the primary reason for relying on nuclear capabilities was the intent to reduce defense spending, and compensate for manpower deficiencies. In addition, U.S. ground forces based in Western Europe were maintained to contribute to containing the Soviet Union, as well as to ensure the Europeans of the American transatlantic commitment.
49 See Kennan’s argument in the above paragraph on military interventions in the Cold War.
50 See Gaddis 2005: 35.
51 NSC-68 1950.
détente as part and parcel of the long series of attempts to contain the power and influence of the Soviet Union through pressure and inducements to change Soviet perceptions. But still, harsh language was not applied to the same extent as during periods of major East-West confrontation.

The role of NATO within U.S. Cold War strategies was the territorial defense of its member states within allied strategies to contain and deter the Soviet position in Europe. In addition, in line with the general definition of the alliance presented in the introduction, NATO performed as a forum for consultation on security issues for the member states. NATO relied on a system of collective defense, where Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided guarantees for allied support in case a member of the alliance was attacked. The clause was formed within international law, seeing individual or collective self-defense as an inherent right of nations as explicitly stated in the UN Charter, article 51. Although the alliance was mutual, it centered on the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe. In practice, this came to rely on the stated U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression, as discussed above. With Europe’s reliance on U.S. security guarantees, it was more or less inevitable that U.S. security strategies also became NATO’s strategies.

Initially, NATO centered on building European defense, and was not intended as the foundation for a permanent stationing of U.S. ground troops in Western Europe. But both the U.S. and Europe came to rely on permanent U.S. bases within Western Europe. This was particularly important in Germany, where what became the FRG was home to the majority of U.S. troops. These contained the Soviet Union, but also influenced the foundation of German rearmament, within NATO structures and the context of European integration. In this way, the alliance, in addition to containing the Soviet position, anchored U.S. security in Europe, and formed a structure that would also prevent Germany from reappearing as a

54 Even though the fact that NATO was created during the period of this study makes it hard to speak of implications for the role of NATO of U.S. strategies - as it presupposes that the alliance is already present - the chapter title applies this term, to be consistent with the succeeding chapters on the post-Cold War period. Even so, as NATO was created early in the Cold War, it is possible to place its role within U.S. Cold War strategies.
55 NATO 1949: article 5; Ryan 2003: 64.
57 Scott 2001: 80.
60 See for instance Lundestad 2003: 71.
possible threat.\textsuperscript{61} But the Soviet threat was the most important factor for the close cooperation between the U.S. and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{62}

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the alliance was also enlarged to include new members, and thus broadened the base of support and the area of the transatlantic defense arrangement. Still, the inclusion of Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain did not change the role of the alliance and the transatlantic perception of common security. In this way, the primary role of NATO in the Cold War was the territorial defense of its member states, especially containing and deterring the Soviet Union in Western Europe. NATO functioned as a central element of U.S. global security strategies. As the above section also illustrated, NATO had global relevance as the most central of several alliances within the Western bloc. The practical role of NATO however, was confined to the territory of its member states.

To sum up, George Kennan formed the initial strategic thinking that U.S. Cold War presidents came to rely on and adjust throughout the Cold War. U.S. strategies were implemented in both geopolitical and ideological terms, and were the foundation for U.S. interventions in the Third World. Also the reliance on military power, both conventional and particularly unconventional, was central to U.S. strategies. In a NATO perspective, the alliance formed an organization defending the member states against outside aggression.

\textbf{Conclusions}

All together, the Cold War was characterized by a geopolitical and ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. strategies were formed as containment and deterrence, based on U.S. interests in containing the Soviet and communist threat. These strategies were inherently multilateral, relying on regional defense arrangements and supporters within a Western bloc. NATO was central to U.S. Cold War strategies. It deterred aggression in the transatlantic territory and was part of the overall common transatlantic intention of containing the position of the Soviet Union. U.S. strategies embedded a globally coherent outlook, based on the Soviet threat, shared among the allies.

\textsuperscript{61} The alliance’s first secretary general, Lord Ismay, famously stated that NATO was formed to: “keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in”. Ismay quoted in Lundestad 2003: 7-8.

\textsuperscript{62} Lundestad 2003: 8.
“The collapse of the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe means that the Cold War is over, its core issue resolved. […] In the emerging post-Cold War world, international relations promise to be more complicated, more volatile and less predictable.”

Introduction
When George Herbert Walker Bush was inaugurated in January 1989, the power of the Soviet adversary was being drained away. The Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989. In 1990, Germany re-unified within the framework of NATO membership. The Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, and the U.S. remained the only superpower. As the above quote indicates, these changes gave way to a new strategic environment. In the post-Cold War context, the 1990-1991 Gulf War, responding to the regional conflict of Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait, represented the primary event. But also internal conflicts in Africa and Europe confronted the Bush administration. In Somalia, the administration provided support for food supplies from 1992 onwards. Yugoslavia started to disintegrate in 1991. But the administration stayed out of the rising tensions occurring as the Serbs tried to hold back on Bosnian independence.

The Bush administration’s policies were influenced by Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence, as they had been the major national security strategy for the last four decades. This meant that the U.S. remained skeptical as to the intentions of the Soviet Union and other potential great power rivals. But the administration gradually recognized the major shifts taking place in the international system, and tried to initiate elements of a new strategy. The phrase “the new world order” indicated that the administration saw prospects for U.S. engagement in a new era, even though confined to traditional state-to-state international

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relations. With limited time and continuing Cold War elements, only the Gulf War substantially implemented elements of a fledgling new engagement strategy of the U.S. In terms of NATO, American strategic tensions between an established and new security concept, contributed to allied coherence on its original foundation, at the same time that the organization saw prospects and planned for a new broader post-Cold War role. In terms of implementation, NATO was not an integral part of U.S. engagements in the “new world order”, and accordingly, the practical role of NATO changed little during the course of the Bush presidency.

The following chapter discusses the evolution of U.S. security strategy in the changing international security environment from 1989 to 1993, and their implications for the role of NATO. In line with the conceptual framework already implemented in the chapter on the Cold War, the discussion covers American interests and objectives; perception of threats; approach to strategic areas, allies and partners; in addition to the strategic thinking and implementation of the Bush administration.

**Interests and Objectives**

As explained in the introduction, a nation’s security interests and objectives relate to the maintenance of its sovereignty, territory and people. For the United States under the first Bush presidency, this was stated as “an understanding of our basic interests and objectives, [...] that even in a new era [includes] the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure”. More concretely, the administration perceived U.S. interests and objectives in the sustained containment of the Soviet and emerging Russian state; the broadening influence of American values; a U.S. role of international and transatlantic leadership; as well as the maintenance of the new supreme position of the U.S.

When Bush was inaugurated the Cold War was still the prime strategic concern forming American interests and objectives. Accordingly, American and NATO’s relations with the Soviet Union were at the center of attention. United States interest in this case dealt firstly with limiting Soviet and communist influence in the world, and secondly, to ultimately win the Cold War through the termination of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. During the Bush presidency this was formulated as an intention to make the Soviets “take positive steps, such as reducing their conventional forces, permitting self-determination for all Eastern Europe […], [and] achieving lasting political pluralism and respect for human

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rights”. American interests in Soviet reforms that would lead the Soviet Union towards “multiparty democracy, national self-determination and market economic reform”, as well as a reduced role of ideology in Soviet foreign relations, might also make cooperation between the two superpower adversaries more likely, the Bush NSS of 1991 stated. But the administration remained skeptical of the Soviet and new Russian state throughout its presidency, as antagonism lingered on through the period of Soviet decline and the establishment of the successor states.

Related to, but also independent of the American interest in limiting the influence of communism, the Bush administration saw a general interest in promoting ideas of political and economic freedom around the world. As a relatively stable aspect of American national objectives, the administration affirmed that American interests were “best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure”. The objective was “[a] stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions [would] flourish”. Also, emphasis put on trade negotiations indicated a general interest in promoting the basic ideas of the post-World War II American economic system. Tendencies of systemic change in the world, as the global influence of the communist system was lessened, also made the broadening influence of the American system seem more attainable.

The administration saw a continuous U.S. interest in maintaining U.S. international leadership. As the Cold War was ending, the administration thought it necessary to commit and engage internationally based on a fear of a recurrence of problems analogous to those of the interwar years. At the end of the presidency, this was stated as the need to stay engaged to prevent “the emergence either of a new global threat or a vacuum in a region critical to our interests”. In this perspective, it was decisive that the United States seized international

4 NSS 1991: 5.
5 The chapter elaborates on U.S. Soviet policies at more length in the sections on perception of threats and strategic thinking and implementation.
6 NSS 1991: 5.
7 NSS 1991: 4-5.
leadership to avoid international crises and conflicts. Accordingly, the administration rejected a return to American isolationism, as practiced in the interwar years.\textsuperscript{11}

The interest in leadership also represented a U.S. commitment to providing transatlantic leadership. Bush felt that “the United States bears a disproportionate responsibility for peace in Europe and an obligation to lead NATO”.\textsuperscript{12} The administration thought that it should “[s]upport Western Europe’s historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community”.\textsuperscript{13} The administration was in this way positive to security initiatives within Europe. This would potentially ease the burden on the U.S. in providing for European security.\textsuperscript{14} At the same time, the administration underlined the necessity of such security arrangements to be linked to the transatlantic community, to avoid initiatives that might promote rivaling policies to those of the United States and potentially challenge its leading position in Europe.

Even though the burdens of providing international security could be shared in the post-Cold War world, the U.S. saw an interest in having an unrivalled global position.

Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United States remains the only state with true global strength, reach and influence in every dimension – political, economic and military. In these circumstances, our natural desire to share burdens more equitably with our newly-strong friends does not relieve us of our own responsibilities.\textsuperscript{15}

Accordingly, the emerging international system of unipolarity, with the U.S. as the sole superpower, was seen beneficial to American security interests. This interest in global U.S. supremacy was determinedly expressed among factions of the Bush administration, in what was seen as the necessity to prevent more actively the emergence of rivals to such a position. In 1992, The New York Times referred to drafts of a new post-Cold War strategy in the Department of Defense (DoD), a report supervised by Paul D. Wolfowitz, at the time Pentagon’s Under Secretary for Policy.\textsuperscript{16} The draft has now been declassified with excised parts.\textsuperscript{17} According to the DoD faction, the United States “must sufficiently account for the

\textsuperscript{12} Bush in Bush and Scowcroft 1998: 60.
\textsuperscript{13} NSS 1991: 4.
\textsuperscript{14} See also Steven Hurst, The Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration: In Search of a New World Order (London: Cassell 1999): 210; Halberstam 2003: 86.
\textsuperscript{15} NSS 1991: 2.
\textsuperscript{17} See the National Security Archive (NSA), ”Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival’: The Making of the Cheney Regional Defense Strategy” (2008-02-29). Available at:
interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order”.  

Also in terms of the transatlantic dimension, the report specifically called for the preservation of NATO to make sure no rivals developed in Europe, especially as Germany now was reunified. American transatlantic leadership through NATO could then specifically ensure a sustained American position in Europe. Controversial aspects of the report were disputed, but the overall primary position of the U.S. in the world, as the power of the Soviet Union was retreating, was seen favorable by the whole administration. This was also consistent with the U.S. interest in “winning” the Cold War.

In sum, American interests reflected elements of Cold War thinking, as the administration saw continuous interests in containing the Soviet Union and preventing other potential rivals from challenging the U.S. At the same time, the administration asserted that in the “new world order”, the U.S. had interests in remaining engaged and providing international and transatlantic leadership. European security initiatives could shoulder more of the burden for maintaining European security. But the overall supreme position of the U.S. in the post-Cold War world, both in transatlantic and international affairs, was affirmed as a general objective of the U.S.

Perception of Threats

Interests and objectives were coupled with perceptions of threats. The maintained interest in containing the Soviet Union and upholding the primary position of the U.S. meant that fears of the Soviet Union and of potential future challenges to the U.S. were present within the administration. Separately, a threat to U.S. leadership and position in the “new world order” was more concretely posed by the Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait. In addition to this regional conflict, internal crises in Somalia and in the Balkans represented threats the administration needed to respond to.

During the first half of the Bush presidency, the Soviet Union was still perceived as a preeminent threat, even with Gorbachev’s opening reforms. Soviet initiatives were viewed with skepticism, and as a threat to the United States and its international reputation. For example the U.S. looked upon the Soviet call for nuclear force reductions in Europe as its “propaganda efforts”, and the administration feared it was losing what it called the “public


Tyler 1992-03-08: 1.

Haley 2006: 43-44.
relations war” with its adversary superpower.\textsuperscript{20} Also, when Gorbachev announced the Soviet intention of non-interference in the Eastern bloc, i.e. a retreat from the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Bush administration saw potential problems with Soviet policies. By criticizing other elements of the Soviet leader’s speech that indicated that socialism might still outlive the fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Eastern Europe,\textsuperscript{21} the Bush administration upheld an ambivalent approach to the intentions of the Soviet Union. In addition, the military capabilities of the Soviet Union were still perceived as a major threat to the U.S. and its allies: “The Soviet Union remains the only state possessing the physical military capability to destroy American society with a single, cataclysmic attack and, in spite of severe economic strains, the modernization of Soviet strategic forces continues virtually across the board”, the administration uttered in 1991.\textsuperscript{22} In this way, elements of Cold War antagonism lingered on through a period of lessening tensions.

Gradually, the Bush team considered that the Soviet threat and the state’s military capabilities were becoming more of a potential risk, rather than the imminent threat it had been perceived as in the Cold War. In 1991, the administration further stated that “the Soviet Union is far more inwardly focused as it wrestles with its internal crises” and that “a return to the same superpower adversary we have faced for over 40 years is unlikely”.\textsuperscript{23} The NATO heads of state in 1991 agreed that the “threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed”\textsuperscript{24}. Indicatively, American and European perceptions were ambivalently optimistic, but also too cautious to view the Soviet threat as finally terminated. According to the U.S., “elements of the U.S.-Soviet relationship will remain competitive, and there is always the danger that confrontations will re-emerge.”\textsuperscript{25} To ensure a positive evolution within areas of former confrontation,\textsuperscript{26} the administration, by the end of the Bush presidency, saw economic and political reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as its number one foreign policy priority.\textsuperscript{27}

As the administration was hesitant about ascertaining the future of the Soviet or Russian threat, the uncertainty regarding what other threats would evolve, was greater.

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\textsuperscript{22} NSS 1991: 1.
\textsuperscript{23} NSS 1991: 1.
\textsuperscript{24} ASC 1991: paragraph 7.
\textsuperscript{25} NSS 1991: 6.
\textsuperscript{27} NSS 1993: 6. This was also in line with the administration’s interest in broadening the influence of democratic values.
\end{flushright}
Elements of an extended concept of threats were put forward by the administration, dubbed “new kinds of security issues”. These included threats against the fiscal strength of the American economy, illegal drugs, environmental depredations (although explicitly related to Saddam Hussein) and human migrations. But these threats to American security were only listed, and not elaborated on at length, an indication that they were the least important to the strategic formulations of the administration, and that threat perceptions on a state-to-state basis lingered throughout the presidency.

Within the range of such threats, and as introduced in the section on interests and objectives, the administration, particularly DoD feared that other major powers would evolve after the fall of the Cold War bipolar structure. Such potential threats to U.S. supremacy were thought to be represented by any power dominating the territory of the former Soviet Union, Europe, East Asia, the Middle East or Southwest Asia. Perceptions of the emerging Russian state have been outlined above. Elsewhere, re-united Germany and China were perceived as potential threats. For NATO, the most dramatic scenario was of course U.S. fears of rivals in Western Europe. The administration had supported the development that lead to the re-unification of Germany. But the administration underlined the need for anchoring the new state in both the European Community (EC) and NATO. In consequence, it may be possible to talk of an American strategy that contained Europe through integration in the transatlantic dimension. Regarding the EC itself, the U.S. approved of European initiatives within the security and defense field, and was positive to such developments as long as European arrangements were secured within the transatlantic framework. Independent European security initiatives, such as plans to strengthen and expand the West European Union (WEU), were viewed critically. Especially the DoD saw initiatives outside NATO as threatening the position of the U.S., and thought that arrangements that implied a “Europe only”, would undermine NATO unity.
As regards China, the administration was uncertain of the progress of the reform process, especially keeping in mind the suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrators in spring 1989, which Bush thought “seriously damaged [the American Chinese relationship’s] hard-won gains”.\textsuperscript{36} In this way, policies reflected the diverse U.S.-Chinese relationship of the Cold War. More generally though, the potential Chinese challenge was commented on in the NSS of 1991, which stated that China posed a “complex challenge”, but that “[c]hange is inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure”.\textsuperscript{37} As opposed to the Wolfowitz team’s deliberations on the Chinese threat to American supremacy, this also took into account the actual interaction with China, especially in economic terms, that made policies similar to the American Soviet containment policies less realistic to implement, a modification that had been present since the Cold War \textit{rapprochement}.

The overall threat perceptions of the Department of Defense was re-evaluated, and a new “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy” was published in January 1993. Here, the general intentions of “preclud[ing] any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests” were upheld, but the conceivable concrete threats to this objective were thought less imminent than in the 1992 draft.\textsuperscript{38} In this way, the emergence of great power threats to the U.S. was merely potential. Partly, such fears were in line with general Cold War sentiments, meaning that Pentagon now was looking for a possible new direct, monolithic threat to the United States.\textsuperscript{39} At the same time, these threats were not fully part of the Cold War monolithic threat perspective, as the evolution of such threats could also potentially be formed outside the Cold War framework of communist threats.

Other more limited, but more concrete threats to American interests were firstly represented by the Iraqi aggression and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. In 1989, the United States had perceived, along the lines of the Carter Doctrine, that “[a]ccess to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U.S. national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own”.\textsuperscript{40} Accordingly, the U.S. saw its national

\textsuperscript{37} NSS 1991: 10.
\textsuperscript{39} Interview Scowcroft 2007.
\textsuperscript{40} The White House, ”National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf”, to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,
interests threatened by the 1990 Iraqi invasion. Within the administration’s ideas of a “new world order”, and under UN mandate of supporting Kuwaiti self-defense, the Bush administration moved to counter the moves by Saddam Hussein. More generally, the Bush administration feared what they called “the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities”. Before leaving office, the administration asserted that in the post-Cold War era “global security is threatened by regional instabilities that we may have to confront”. This meant that regional crises had evolved into centrally perceived threats for the administration, as part of a fledging new strategic outlook separate from the Cold War.

In addition to such regional conflicts, the Bush administration faced internal crises and conflicts that more indirectly represented threats to the U.S. and its allies. One example was the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Here, Bush gave U.S. troops a limited mandate of securing food transportations to the Somali people at a specific time, while further missions were considered the responsibility of UN peacekeeping forces. This indicated that the crisis was recognized as a threat in the post-Cold War world. Nonetheless, as the UN was identified as the proper organization for handling the crisis, the administration did not perceive the crisis a direct threat to the U.S., one that the U.S. needed to substantially engage in.

Also, the internal instabilities as the state of Yugoslavia broke up after the end of the Cold War posed a similar challenge to the U.S., and especially because of the proximity, also to its European allies. NATO in 1991 endorsed that:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe [sic]. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.


42 NSS 1991: 2.

43 NSS 1993: 1.


Thus, the allies felt that internal or regional instabilities and conflicts were relevant to their own security as the Soviet threat was retreating. By underlining the possible spill-over effects of such instabilities into broader European stability, the Balkan conflict was perceived as an indirect threat. As the conflict in the Balkans arose as the state of Yugoslavia broke up, it was also an internal conflict, rather than the state-to-state conflict seen in the Gulf War. The fact that the U.S. did not consider the conflict in Yugoslavia a direct threat to U.S. interest is supported by Steven Hurst. Hurst also underlines the administration’s insistence on having the European’s handle the conflict, as it was a conflict within Europe. But members of the administration after leaving office admitted that the possibility of European action in Yugoslavia was an excuse for American inaction, and did not mean that the U.S. could not have engaged if it wanted to. According to NSC staffer Philip Zelikow: “There was not much confusion in the government about whether we had a vital interest to defend the Balkans. There was a consensus on the top of the government […] that we did not”. As the administration did not respond to the Balkan conflict, and only to a limited degree took steps towards the Somalia crisis, the administration did not substantially include internal conflicts into its fledgling new strategic outlook.

In sum, American threat perceptions included remains from the Cold War and fledgling elements of new post-Cold War threats. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat had been perceived monolithically, and Cold War antagonism lingered on during the first half of the Bush presidency. But new threats, such as potential new great power threats; regional conflicts; and internal crises, were fragmented from one another. Principally, this meant that the U.S. administration did not perceive new threats within an interconnected framework as in the Cold War. Also, the conflicts arising were perceived as of different importance to the U.S., as they did not all relate to the same, monolithically perceived Soviet and communist threat.

The observation of post-Cold War threats being fragmented from one another has also been made in a preface by David Halberstam. For Halberstam, it is a simple descriptive term. But within the discussion of this thesis, such fragmentation of U.S. threat perceptions can be built on to form an understanding of U.S. post-Cold War perceptions of strategic areas, allies and partners, as well as help place NATO’s role in overall U.S. strategy.

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49 Halberstam 2003: 2.
Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners

With the inherently multilateral outlook of U.S. Cold War strategies, continuous elements made for a consistent interest in the West-European countries on a traditional basis. At the same time, the termination of the Warsaw Pact meant that Eastern European countries were now released from Soviet dominance. And new challenges around the world, separate from the Cold War, opened up to both regional partnerships and broader multilateralism through ad hoc coalitions and the UN, implying a fragmentation from the system of alliances within U.S. Cold War strategy.

Generally, the Bush administration viewed international cooperation as a basis for foreign policy. The NSS of 1990 reflected this attitude unambiguously: “Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. […]. [To attempt to ‘go it alone’] would alter our way of life and national institutions and would jeopardize the very values we are seeking to protect.”50 But U.S. strategy is not stated as multilateral by strict principle, but only by choice and if suitable. The NSS reports state that the U.S. should act on its interests and objectives “whenever possible in concert with its allies”.51 This might be taken in defense of acting unilaterally if thought necessary, although preferably multilaterally. Still, the interests of international partners would be taken into account, as the strategies called for American decisions to be made on “terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies” and that the United States should “deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies”.52 In addition, the administration declared that the American commitment to a strategy of alliances would endure beyond the perception of a common Soviet threat,53 and accordingly declared more firmly an intent or more general interest in supporting, and having the support of, allies.54

The interest in having allied support firstly relates to the American approach to its Cold War founded transatlantic relationship, and the position of Europe in American strategic thinking going into a new era. The continued American interest in diminishing Soviet, communist and Russian influence, and skepticism regarding Soviet/Russian intentions, at a time when the power of the Kremlin was reduced, proved that remains of a conventional Cold War interest and threat perspective facilitated continued NATO cohesion. But with the break-up of the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, the original foundation for such cohesion was retreating. The Bush

50 NSS 1990: 15.
51 For instance NSS 1990: 2; NSS 1991: 3.
52 NSS 1990: 2; NSS 1991: 3.
53 NSS 1990: 1.
54 For more on Bush’s inclination to multilateralism, see for instance Hurst 1999: 11.
administration admitted that the reduced intensity of the Soviet threat would have implications for the allies’ security concerns and ultimately the alliance’s strategy. The NSS of 1991 commented on this, as “differences among allies are likely to become more evident as the traditional concern for security that first brought them together diminishes in intensity”, and that, “a key issue is how America’s role of alliance leader – and indeed our alliances themselves – will be affected, especially in Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat.” In this perspective, the administration saw challenges to a continued transatlantic relationship emerging with the Soviet threat reduced. None the less, the administration still believed in maintaining the American position in Europe, and thought that the U.S. shared moral values with its allies, values that could be built on to continue the transatlantic relationship.

The administration assessed that “[w]hile Europe remains a central strategic arena, the Gulf Crisis reminded us how much our interests can be affected in other regions as well”. Implicitly, while Europe and NATO remained central within the European dimension, the administration perceived that the U.S. had global interests that did not automatically include European interests in the same way as seen during the Cold War. The notion that Europe could take a greater share of the responsibility for securing Europe, also meant that American engagements might not include Europe, as illustrated by the lack of action by the Bush administration regarding the rising tensions after the break-up of Yugoslavia.

American relations with Eastern Europe might change once the Cold War rivalry ended. Specifically, German re-unification within NATO structures was seen as pertinent, and as enhancing the stability of Europe. National Security Advisor Scowcroft underlined that it was important that the re-unified Germany did not become a neutral state. But even as re-unification broadened the base of cooperation, the necessity of preventing German neutrality also underlined the presence of Cold War bloc thinking. The administration’s perception of

57 NSS 1991: 1-2. These common values were stated as the principles of “democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. ASC 1991: paragraph 15.
60 Interview Scowcroft 2007. Internally, it was stated that it was important to “avoid creating the image of winners and losers in the unification process”, and that unification was not “a loss for the Soviet Union”. U.S. mission NATO, “Secretary Baker’s May 3 NAC [North Atlantic Council] Intervention” (1990-05-00a), declassified 1997-05-29. Available at Department of State FOIA Reading Room (FOIA state): http://foia.state.gov/documents/FOIA Docs/000053E3.pdf [online 2008-04-05].
61 Furthermore, the history of Germany in the two world wars had highlighted the perceived need for integrating FRG into Western structures of cooperation in the Cold War.
the necessity for transition in Eastern Europe also indicated that sentiments based on the Cold War experience persisted.

To ensure such transition, the administration saw the possibility of building greater partnerships with Central and Eastern Europe. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was seen as an instrument that would facilitate expanding American security interests eastwards. The NSS of 1991 called for the CSCE to “bring about reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free”.62 In 1993, the administration stated CSCE before NATO in addressing institutions to confront new challenges, and underlined the Conference’s new role.63 NATO also declared that it was interested in building partnerships and friendships in Eastern Europe.64 A North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with former adversaries was set up in December 1991.

Parts of the Bush administration also saw prospects for including Eastern European states in European economic and political cooperation,65 facilitating the gradual inclusion of Eastern Europe into Western cooperation, possibly even into NATO, and as a result expand the American strategic areas eastwards.66 American economic assistance to the newly independent states in the East of Europe would ease the progress of American influence in previously Soviet controlled areas. But it has also been argued that the U.S. economic response to the liberation of Eastern European was meager, and it did not in any way reach post-World War II Marshall Plan proportion.67 This indicates that the U.S. was only partially expanding American interest areas eastwards in Europe. The administration thought that the probability of formalizing a geographically broadened area of Western influence, at a moment when Eastern Europe was only just loosening its ties with its former Soviet suzerain, was hardly likely.68 The administration informally opened up for dialogue and limited cooperation eastwards,69 but did not engage in any formal relationships equaling the relationship the U.S. had with Western Europe.

63 NSS 1993: 2 and 7.
65 Haley 2006: 44.
69 According to Philip Zelikow, the administration wanted to “bring the Central and Eastern Europeans into the house, but have them come knock on the back door, not the front door”, meaning that by creating liaison missions, the East European states would become familiar with the alliance, opening up options for the future, in Zelikow’s view. Interview Zelikow 2007. See also Philip Zelikow, “New Concert of Europe”, Survival (vol. 34, no. 2, 1992): 22-23.
But other areas were seen interesting to the administration too. The memoir of Bush and Scowcroft focuses on the collapse of the Soviet Union, German re-unification, the protests in Tiananmen Square and the Gulf War.\(^70\) This thematic or geographic focus should be read as an indication of what the administration viewed as strategically important events, and areas of importance for their policy formulation. Consequently, other partners, institutions and associations were included in the Bush administration’s strategic approach, in addition to the transatlantic dimension.

As in the Cold War, Asia was seen as strategically important to the Bush administration. The administration saw it as necessary to uphold partnerships in Asia in a changing security environment.\(^71\) Especially with regard to Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, the administration feared and wanted to prevent a transformation of policies in the region that would go from viewing the Soviet Union as a threat to becoming more of a partner.\(^72\) In such a perspective, remains of the Cold War pattern of thinking of alliances as confronting the Soviet Union were still present in a time of transformation.

Even so, the “new world order” concept made different regions important on a more individual basis, rather than through the generic Cold War framework. For instance, in the NSS of 1991 the administration quoted King Fahd of Saudi Arabia when elaborating on the international commitments of the United States.\(^73\) Seemingly, this statement had no specific relationship with the preceding Cold War approach to alliances, but rather embedded elements of a new appraisal of allied relationships, inspired by the Gulf War. President Bush in this way commented that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was “wholly unrelated to the earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship”.\(^74\) The U.S. saw it as necessary to sustain sound ties with central countries in Europe and Asia, allies and partners stemming from the period since 1945, as this was perceived “crucial to regional and even global stability.”\(^75\) But as the Soviet threat diminished, and elements of a fledgling new strategy was articulated, allies in Asia were not automatically interlinked with the transatlantic dimension in the same

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\(^70\) Bush and Scowcroft 1998.
\(^73\) NSS 1991: 2.
way that it had been during the Cold War. This meant that allies and partners were still considered important to the U.S., but now though a more fragmented, rather than generic approach.

In terms of the strategic importance of areas outside the Eurasian landmass, a continent such as Africa had been the locality of superpower rivalry in the Cold War. But as the Cold War was retreating, the administration came to view Sub-Saharan Africa as of reduced military significance.\footnote{The White House, “National Security Review 30: American Policy toward Africa in the 1990s”, memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the Agency for International Development and the Director of the United States Information Agency (1992-06-15), confidential, unclassified 2000-09-07. Available at DNSA: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/PR/01800/all.pdf [online 2007-06-01].} The reason was thought to be the new international realities after the Gulf War, and the lessened influence of socialist ideologies in this region,\footnote{The White House 1992-06-15, DNSA.} which underlined elements of a new post-Cold War approach to different geographical areas, where the decline of global communism meant that all areas was not perceived as of automatic strategic interest to the U.S. Indicatively, the Somalia engagement at the end of the Bush presidency was perceived as a humanitarian effort, and not as a matter of war and peace.

On a global scale, the decline of the Cold War meant that the “new world order” might also include large multilateral coalitions, resembling ad hoc assemblies as in the Gulf War. The DoD draft of 1992 asserted that: “Like [the Gulf War] coalition, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished”.\footnote{Department of Defense 1992-02-29: 5, NSA.} Cooperation in this case was broad and included former adversaries, i.e. the Soviet Union, a remarkable break with the Cold War alliance structure. Still, such cooperation did not make all contributing countries in the coalition permanent allies or partners to the U.S. Overall, UN missions were limited to humanitarian engagements during the Bush presidency, and the coalition assembled in the Gulf War did not repeat itself.\footnote{David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs”, in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), \textit{Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World} (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997): 4-5.} This implied that the U.S. approach to cooperation did not become fully global, but that new patterns of international cooperation were present.

Put together, more or less the same regions of the world were considered of primary strategic interest to the United States immediately after, as during, the Cold War. Elements of Cold War thinking provided for continuity in American approaches to its allies and partners. Particularly Western Europe, and to a limited degree also Eastern Europe, as well as Asia.
were perceived important. Still, as new strategic thinking appeared within the administration, the overall Cold War structure of alliances started to fragment. The administration perceived that the retreat of Cold War rivalry meant that areas more peripheral to the U.S. would not necessarily be as interesting as before. In this way, U.S. strategic interests in different regions of the world were increasingly made on the region’s individual merit, and not as part of the complete global outlook of the U.S.

David Lake and Patrick Morgan have edited a book discussing the increasingly regional nature of the international environment after the end of the Cold War, exploring the theoretical and tentative nature of such a system. For the sake of this thesis, such an observation of regionalism supports the argument of fragmented threat perceptions, which imply a more fragmented U.S. outlook when it came to strategic areas, allies and partners. In such a way, by seeing threats and areas increasingly fragmented from one another, the U.S. preoccupation with regions other than Europe, as in the Gulf War, was not automatically part of the overall security concept that included the transatlantic allies. With the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, events in Europe affected U.S. interests there, but it did not necessarily affect the global strategic outlook of the U.S. Thus, the transatlantic relationship seemed to decline in global relevance in the new era, while NATO was continued into the post-Cold War American security strategies, along with, but more or less separate from other regional partners of the United States.

**Strategic Thinking and Implementation**

In relation to these interests, perception of threats, and assessment of strategic areas, allies and partners, the administration formed a strategic outlook on global security and appraisals of the role of NATO in it. During the Bush presidency, the Cold War strategy of containment and deterrence was to some extent upheld through policies aimed at limiting the influence of the Cold War adversary. This made for a continuation of elements of NATO’s Cold War role. Gradually, the idea of a “new world order” also formed elements of a new U.S. strategic outlook in the post-Cold War world. Even though such a strategic idea was only to a limited degree implemented, it embedded elements of a fledgling strategy of engagement, on a state-to-state basis. For NATO, there existed parallel deliberations on a new role.

Overall, the Bush administration’s strategic thinking and implementation reflected a cautious approach to a strategic environment that was rapidly changing. Concretely, in terms

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81 See also section on strategic areas, allies and partners in chapter IV.
of strategies towards the Soviet and emerging Russian state, this meant that the strategy of containment and deterrence, practiced in various forms during the Cold War, now was transformed to try to fit the new realities of Soviet perestroika and glasnost. Bush and his foreign policy team supported the hard line policies of its Reagan predecessors, and saw the 1980s arms race as the reason for Soviet demise.\textsuperscript{82} Even though Gorbachev’s “new thinking” by an objective stance had eased the Soviet threat, the actual reaction to steps taken by the Kremlin embodied great skepticism, and American responses to the Soviets resembled to a substantial degree Cold War reaction patterns.

A practical example of such a variation and transformation of the strategies of containment and deterrence was American attempts at gaining the initiative on force reductions, to make the West win what was thought of as the “propaganda war”, and make sure that reductions on the European continent were made to the strategic advantage of the U.S. and NATO. National Security Advisor Scowcroft initiated plans to withdraw both Soviet and U.S. ground forces in Central Europe. The intended result was to reduce the presence of Soviet forces in this area, and also improve the balance in favor of the West, as NATO without its U.S. troops was thought better off than the Warsaw pact without Soviet troops.\textsuperscript{83} Such a continuation and adaptation of Cold War strategies had a potentially conserving effect in terms of NATO, as the sustained East-West strategic framework meant that the alliance might be cohered on its traditional foundation.

On the other hand, there was also divergence between the allies on how to implement policies towards the Soviet Union. For example, when it came to the U.S. position on having conventional force reductions precede potential nuclear reductions, the position of the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was opposed to that of the U.S. and Britain.\textsuperscript{84} While the Americans saw the nuclear balance in Europe as favorable to the Western allies, and supportive of the primary interests of the U.S., Kohl wanted to reduce the alliance’s dependency on a nuclear strategy. Still, disagreement within the alliance on the implementation of strategy did not necessarily depart from Cold War alliance realities.

\textsuperscript{83} Scowcroft in Bush and Scowcroft 1998: 43. The CIA also reported on the prospects for war between East and West in Europe, in light of force reductions. Director of Central Intelligence, “Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces” (1989-09-00). Available at CIA FOIA Reading Room [online 2008-04-05].
\textsuperscript{84} Scowcroft in Bush and Scowcroft 1998: 58.
The administration and NATO proceeded with the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), where they initiated cuts of 5-10 percent for the transatlantic community, and over 50 per cent of the Warsaw Pact totals, to equalize the forces of the alliances. As the Warsaw Pact agreed to the proposal, and even suggested deeper cuts, the Bush administration was criticized for having maintained too much of a Cold War approach to the Soviet Union and for being on the defensive, rather than the intended offensive. In sum, this was thought of as a manifestation of an alliance that lacked a new strategic vision.

But the administration also stated that its strategic outlook needed to move “beyond containment”. The administration indicated that the U.S. would seek to integrate the Soviet Union, and would be committed to match the Soviet moves towards greater openness. In this way, the administration attempted to cooperate with the former adversary, as in the examples of the Gulf War and the cooperation seen in Europe through CSCE and NACC. Such political engagement across the former lines of the Iron Curtain implied the fledgling appearance of new strategic elements. At the same time, skepticism lingered on, and threat perceptions of the Soviet and Russian state remained present in parallel to such new features. In this way, the strategy of the Bush presidency towards its former adversary became more of a new variety of the strategies of containment and deterrence, than a true strategy “beyond containment”.

This meant that the Cold War role of NATO to some degree persisted. At a London summit in 1990, the NATO members joined hands in agreeing to carry the organization beyond the fall of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, although such a new strategic concept would perhaps not have a focal point equivalent to the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union. While acknowledging the need for transformation, the Cold War foundation of the alliance was still visible. The Bush administration was apparently interested in revising NATO’s mission for two reasons. Firstly, it was necessary to revise the alliance mandate to convince the American people that it was still in United States national interests to continue sizeable expenditures and military deployment in Europe. And secondly, it was thought relevant to “demonstrate to Moscow that the alliance was no longer the menace they had preached to their people for forty years”. In this way, both stated motivations were compatible with a transformed Cold War approach; the first as NATO would continue to

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87 For instance NSS 1990: v and 9.
89 NATO 1990-07-06.
provide a framework for U.S. deployments in Europe; and the second, that NATO, although adapting, remained somewhat skeptical of Soviet perceptions of the West. Bush would lead the alliance, and the prime concern of the Bush administration, as well as of the allies, was to preserve the American link to European security. 91 Furthermore, in the actual declaration of a new post-Cold War NATO strategy, the NATO members still feared “the fact that the conventional forces [of the Soviet Union] and its large nuclear arsenal [is] comparably only with that of the United States.” They thought that “[t]hese capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved”. 92 Indicatively, the allies still perceived a need for American security guaranties against the reformed Soviet Union, and they remained skeptical with regard to Soviet intentions and potentials. In this way, the continuation of elements of the East-West framework had as consequence that the alliance’s founding role could be sustained.

But as the superpower rivalry was diminishing, and new types of threats appeared on the administration’s agenda, new strategic elements also formed within the administration. The concept of the “new world order” was publicly presented by President Bush on September 11, 1990. 93 Ideas included multilateral decision making, the stated possibilities of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and a bolstering of the UN, made possible by the end of the Cold War and its decades of a divided Security Council. 94 American objectives for such an order were intended to contribute to international security and stability after the fall of the bipolar structure of the Cold War.

As central aspects of the administration’s strategy, the 1991 NSS outlined strategic deterrence; forward presence in key areas; crisis response; and retaining the national capacity to reconstitute forces if needed. 95 Here, deterrence and the need to maintain capacity to reconstitute forces, continued to underlie Bush’s variation of previous strategies of countering a clear adversary as in the Cold War. The retained forward presence in critical areas was also based on the U.S. stationing of troops in the Cold War. But it also meant that the administration emphasized forward engagement in military terms, as well as the political maintenance of allies and partners, as part of strategies for the future. And especially, as the

administration came to recognize the presence of regional conflicts as “the predominant military threat we will face in the future”, the need to respond to appearing crises meant that the administration saw military engagement as a strategic response to new threats. Such perceived new elements of strategy were fundamentally linked to the Gulf War experience, and thus also mirrored aspects from the idea of conflict resolution in a “new world order”.

By the time the administration was leaving office in January 1993, the NSS stated that the administration formed policies through “a strategy of engagement and leadership”. In this way, the administration suggested a label in some ways similar to the argument made here about the administration; that the Bush team at the end of its presidency included possible new responses into its strategic outlook. Simultaneously, the administration continued to see deterrence as the point of departure for its strategy. But the administration opened up for engagement in the form of crisis response if deterrence failed. In such cases, if military engagement was to be implemented, the response was to be dependent “on the interests at stake, our commitments to the nations involved, the level of sophistication of the threat, and on the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces”.

While such strategic thinking might have opened up for U.S. and allied engagements as response to humanitarian crises, the administration was wary of such a development. Especially the DoD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell rejected potential strategies that “had a humanitarian role that might be poorly thought out, too open-ended and might somehow draw the country into an unwanted combat commitment”. This was consistent with general mission guidelines known as the Powell Doctrine, that implied engagement only upon threats to vital American national interests, where a clear-cut exit strategy was to be in place before engaging, and the operation itself was to be performed efficiently, taking advantage of massive American military power. The doctrine also reflected the Vietnam experience, which explained the military’s reluctance to force commitments. The Vietnam experience also influenced the administration in the decision not to topple the Iraqi regime in the Gulf War, and thus deterred the administration from engaging in what was perceived as possibly a long and bloody civil war. Interrelated, the fear of casualties in the post-Cold War era was increasing subsequently to extensive media coverage.

98 Halberstam 2003: 38.
100 McCrisken 2003: 151.
Accordingly, American engagements in the “new world order” did not substantially include internal conflicts and crises. Such indirect threats to U.S. security did not come within the confines of the Powell Doctrine’s emphasis on threats to vital U.S. interests. The Somalia engagement was by the Bush administration perceived as purely providing humanitarian aid, and not as an engagement aiming at conflict resolution. Bush commented that the escalation of the engagement under Clinton, which led to the American defeat and loss of life and equipment, was a mistake, a so-called “mission creep”.102 Closer to the transatlantic dimension, in the former Yugoslavia, the administration also chose not to engage. Secretary of State Baker pronounced it as: “We don’t have a dog in that fight”.103 The internal perception was that “[s]tarting with the President himself, there was no support at the top of any [government] agency for using force in Yugoslavia.104 The Bush administration did not see it likely that the U.S. should get involved.105

In this way, only the Gulf crisis substantially conformed to the ideas presented in the “new world order”, and in the planning for crisis response as seen in the NSSs. Consequently, the administration’s prospects for military engagement were confined to state-to-state regional conflicts. The (non-)responses to new threats represented by internal conflicts and crises showed that the administration did not implement a fully new concept of national security strategy engaging against all new types of threats. According to Scowcroft,

the new world order was intended as a framework for dealing with international conflicts. It was not seen as a completely new and comprehensive strategy. To the administration, it did not seem necessary to develop a new strategy as the Cold War threat dissolved. The new world order was rather a framework for dealing with state-to-state conflicts, through the UN Security Council, as the Cold War deadlock in the UN was overcome.106

According to Andrew J. Bacevich, the Bush administration “made little effort even to try [to articulate a new rationale for U.S. strategy]”.107 Others have pointed out that Bush was uncomfortable with “the vision thing”.108 Contrastively, Earl Ravenal states that the Bush administration instituted real and far reaching changes to U.S. national security; that the “new world order” represented a new strategy of collective security, transcending Cold War

102 Bush 1999: 580. When it came to rising instabilities in the American “back-yard”, the Bush administration disregarded sufferings in Haiti.102
103 James Baker quoted in Halberstam 2003: 46.
105 Interview Scowcroft 2007.
106 Interview Scowcroft 2007.
107 Bacevich 2002: 63. With some modification, Bacevich also states that some ideas of globalization, and his concept of openness, were embedded in the administration’s outlook, although not articulated by the administration in strategic terms. Bacevich 2002: 72-73.
strategies. The argument presented here asserts that the strategies of the Bush administration included variations of previous strategies, at the same time that fledgling elements of engaging against new types of threats were present. The persistent skepticism when it came to the Soviet and Russian state, and the limited response to internal crises meant that the strategy of the administration was not fully worked out, and did not represent an all-out new strategy of collective security, as in Ravenal’s term. Some ideas of containment were still present, deterrence continued to be a basis of strategy, but fledgling elements of a strategy of engagement were visible.

In terms of NATO, the Bush administration’s focus on the Soviet Union and Russia, as well as the integration of re-unified Germany into allied structures and the maintenance of the American role of international and transatlantic leadership, implied that the organization had cohesive prospects based on its Cold War role, as commented above. At the same time Bush also wanted to expand the role of NATO. The administration believed that the U.S. and its allies needed to reflect on how they should respond to a new security agenda within the framework of the moral and political values they asserted they continued to share. “NATO confined to its traditional role – defense against a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe […] was precisely what we did not want”. Bush deemed that NATO “will be guaranteeing against instability, […] [i]ts role will be different, [and] [t]he organization must be flexible”.

The NATO strategic concept of 1991, while discussing the remains of the Soviet threat, had also commented on broader threats to NATO’s security, as seen in the section on the perceptions of threats. Hence, the transatlantic allies declared a general intention to broaden its traditional outlook in countering new threats to their national security, especially the prospects for regional instability in Europe. Furthermore, the ASC stated that it needed to be aware of the global context, and that:

The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass

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109 Earl C. Ravenal, “The Bush Administration’s Defense Policy: Transcending the Cold War”, in Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (eds.), From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002). He also recognizes that there was an engagement component to such a strategy, but overall identifies it as a strategy of collective security.


destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.114

This implied that the alliance also recognized possible new threats from outside Europe, but that the basis for such concern was how this would affect the territorial security of the NATO member states.

Before the completion of the ASC, Secretary of State Baker also elaborated on NATO’s post-Cold War role:

NATO will continue to play an important role in ensuring strategic stability and predictability in Europe – West and East – but NATO must also evolve to assume new missions. As a political alliance, NATO offers a cohesive structure that can help address old and new European animosities and fears – outside and inside NATO. As a security alliance among 16 like-minded democracies, NATO should consider how it might facilitate collective action against non-traditional threats – such as proliferation and regional conflicts. As a political and a security alliance, NATO can assist in the verification of arms control and security agreements to the benefit of all Europeans.115

In retrospect, this seems like a more determined and broad statement of a new NATO role, made as early as February 1990. The statement opened up for possible allied action, in countering proliferation and regional conflicts. While the alliance recognized such possible threats to the alliance, Baker also dealt with allied responses, how NATO should consider how it could possibly act in new missions. Still, around the same time, President Bush spoke of priorities for the future NATO role in more moderate terms. He underlined NATO’s political role; conventional arms control; negotiations on nuclear weapons in an East-West dimension; and a strengthening of the CSCE.116 Baker also later commented on NATO in such terms, underlining the alliance’s present and future role as a traditional military alliance and as a forum for political consultation on Europe.117 NATO revisions being on the drawing board, U.S. ambassador to NATO Taft internally proposed that the U.S. approach should be flexible, “less with the goal of a single grand strategy paper than a series of conclusions and milestones towards the ‘new’ strategy NATO is evolving”.118

114 ASC 1991: paragraph 11.
In terms of the possible implementation of a new role, the above discussion has argued that the Gulf War represented the only substantial implementation of fledgling new U.S. strategies. Concerning NATO, the position of Philip Zelikow, serving at the NSC in 1989-1991, is that it is possible to argue that the Gulf War had implications for the future role of NATO, as a beginning of the “out of area” discussion, even though it was improvised in practical terms, and implemented by a U.S. led ad hoc coalition. As members of the alliance engaged against new types of threats in the Persian Gulf, it influenced their security outlook, and could potentially result in a new approach also within NATO.\(^\text{119}\) In line with such a perspective, the ASC also commented on the Gulf War, and how it affected the security of the southern periphery of Europe.

On the other hand, fledgling new engagement strategies of the U.S. were implemented through other forums than NATO. The Gulf War was implemented through a U.S.-led ad hoc coalition under UN mandate. While the individual contributions of NATO member countries were underlined by the administration, the actual organization was not the active player in the engagement.\(^\text{120}\) NATO was not developed as an adequate organization for such a mission.\(^\text{121}\) NATO was thus at the overall level separate from the U.S. military engagement in a new era. NATO did function as a forum of consultation between the allies, and provided support to Turkey, as a neighboring state to the region. This implied that the alliance recognized a new conflict different from the Cold War, but that it did not alter the practical role of the alliance. It still centered on defending the territory of its member states, in this case Turkey, and continued to provide a consultative forum for its member states on security issues.


The European states felt that their roles had been marginalized next to the Americans in the Gulf War. Scowcroft stated that the implementation of policies through the UN in the Gulf War implied a reduced practical importance of NATO at the time. In this way, NATO’s role seemed partially fragmented from the new U.S. strategic elements represented by the Gulf War engagement, as new strategic responses were formed outside the Cold War structure of alliances.

In terms of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, NATO could potentially have obtained a new engagement role here. But the Bush administration’s reluctance to engage implied that the possible role for NATO in countering conflicts in Europe did not become realized during the Bush presidency. Also in this conflict, the allies could consult through NATO. But actual policies to counter the crisis were formed elsewhere, with the Europeans and the UN. Consequently, NATO, starting in 1992, backed the UN mission. In internal documents the Bush administration stated that it wanted the UN to have the leading role in the conflict, and that NATO was only to consider how it should support the UN. In this way, the Bush administration considered that “NATO's infrastructure, resources, and operational experience are well suited to support peace-keeping efforts that may be sanctioned by CSCE or the United Nations in the future” in Europe. Still, peacekeeping was not specifically seen as related to NATO’s role, but rather within a broader CSCE or UN perspective. U.S. and allied policies towards the former Yugoslavia did not implement a new role for NATO, but made the allies deliberate on how new threats affected the security of the alliance, and more principally or theoretically review how it could participate and engage in handling post-Cold War challenges to the alliance.

NATO’s practical role in the period was fundamentally built on its Cold war foundation. Brent Scowcroft in retrospect has concluded that NATO was still seen within its Cold War role during the Bush presidency. But the administration also asserted that it

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123 Interview Scowcroft 2007.
125 For detail see Frantzen 2005: 66.
128 Interview Scowcroft 2007.
wanted the alliance to transform. In principle, the allies recognized the existence of new types of threats the alliance might have to deal with, vaguely opening for broader assignments than its previous concentration on deterring state-to-state aggression towards its territory. But as the U.S. implemented fledgling engagement strategies in the Gulf War, it did not substantially include NATO. In addition, NATO did not obtain a role in handling the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For the future, the allies had agreed to commence transformation, in which engagements to respond to new conflicts was one possible way ahead. But the exact content of a future role remained on the drawing board.

**Conclusions**

The Bush administration’s strategies reflected the maintenance of previous skepticism towards the Cold War adversary, at the same time that the administration identified the need for responding to a new threat of regional conflict through military engagement, representing fledgling elements of a new U.S. strategy. The tensions between old and new security conceptions underlined the administration’s fundamental inclination to ensuring stability in a time of major international transformation, all happening within the four year period of its presidency. Instability in areas geographically close to the transatlantic community seemed to represent a new potential threat for the U.S. and the NATO alliance. But the U.S. only substantially engaged against the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, and chose to stay out of broader missions in for instance Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the administration’s engagement strategy was implemented in a fledgling manner, as seen within a regional state-to-state perspective.

NATO followed the course of the American strategy, as its traditional position was sustained to some degree, while it also opened up for a new broader role. As the Gulf War was fought through a multilateral ad hoc collation, NATO did not have an integral role in the elements representing the Bush administration’s fledgling post-Cold War strategy, but did so in the strategic elements that represented continuity from the Cold War past. Consequently, the practical role of NATO beyond the Cold War was limited to its political aspects and the continued defense of the member states’ territory. Nonetheless, the Bush administration’s strategic deliberations provided a foundation for a new post-Cold War American strategy and NATO role, in what would become the succeeding Clinton presidency’s restrained strategy of engagement, and a NATO “out of area”.

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CHAPTER IV

A RESTRAINED STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF NATO

“[W]e have an unprecedented opportunity to make our nation safer and more prosperous. [...] At the same time, the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity.”¹

Introduction
During the period of the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton, from January 1993 to January 2001, the United States was confronted with a broad set of post-Cold War transformations and challenges. The above quote underlines the novelty and complexity of these concerns, at a time where the U.S. was in an unrivalled superpower position. The internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia escalated. In 1995, NATO, acting on behalf of the UN, intervened in the Bosnia crisis. In 1999, NATO forces intervened in Kosovo. NATO also started an enlargement process from 1994 onwards. The alliance was expanded eastwards, as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic formally became members in 1999. The transatlantic community also set up a Partnership for Peace program in 1994 with the former members of the Warsaw Pact, including Russia, as well as Sweden and Finland. The U.S. was also confronted by security issues in other regions than Europe. The Somalia mission was inherited from the former administration, and the U.S. withdrew in 1994. A massive ethnic conflict in Rwanda continued without international interference. The U.S. was also concerned with nations as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, so-called rogue states, especially in terms of possible proliferation on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Lastly, limited instances of international terrorism hit U.S. targets during the 1990s.

The previous chapter argued that the G. H. W. Bush administration partly retained in a Cold War perspective, but that elements of an engagement strategy in a state-to-state regional conflict did form a fledgling new outlook. Still, NATO was not an integrated part of the Gulf War mission, and NATO’s practical role to a large extent remained based on its Cold War

foundation. The present chapter, with the broad and multiple challenges outlined above, argues that a post-Cold War U.S. strategy became more clearly fleshed out and implemented during the subsequent eight years of the Clinton presidency. Firstly, what can be characterized as restrained strategies of engagement were seen in the responses to the internal crises in Somalia and the Balkans. Also the Partnership and enlargement processes indicated that the administration politically engaged eastwards in Europe. U.S. strategy was also added with planning and limited implementation of military engagement towards rogue states and WMD proliferation. The U.S. remained interested in the transatlantic alliance within Europe. But as threats were perceived fragmented from one another, the transatlantic framework was in practice separated from U.S. strategy when it came to challenges outside the broader transatlantic area. NATO obtained a new role in engagements “out of area” through the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. The new role did not extend beyond Europe, although it is possible to spot elements of more global thinking at the end of the Clinton presidency.

In accordance with the conceptual framework of the thesis, the following sections address U.S. interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessments of strategic areas, allies and partners; in addition to the strategic thinking and implementation of the Clinton presidency.

**Interests and Objectives**

Overall, the Clinton presidency identified three key national security interests. These were stated as the objectives of enhancing U.S. security; ensuring economic strength; and promoting democracy abroad. Concretely, these objectives became expressed as interests in upholding the American power and leadership position in both transatlantic and global affairs. Interlinked, the administration’s had a more indirect interest in preventing the escalation of internal conflicts. Combined, these interests supported the gradual evolution of restrained engagement strategies.

The campaign and beginning of the Clinton presidency underlined a domestic focus on the national economy, which became the initial priority of the administration. By contrast, G. H. W. Bush’s political focus had been on the international sphere, on the end of the Cold War, the future of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, and domestic issues had not extensively influenced the formation of national security policies. But at this point, domestic issues were foremost on the American public’s mind. With the Cold War resolved, Americans expected a

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U.S. focus and resources to be directed more inwards. The stagnant economy with a large federal budget and foreign trade deficit caused more traditional security issues to drop on the political agenda. The United States no longer faced a monolithic threat such as that of the communist Soviet Union. This did not mean that U.S. national security became irrelevant to the administration or was ignored. Rather, the post-Cold War international climate, combined with pressing domestic issues, made for a, strategically speaking, less urgent context. Still, the administration acknowledged the interdependence between its interests in its economic position and its broader strategic position, as well as the interconnection between domestic and international issues:

[Our strategy] is premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies are disappearing – that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.4

Consequently, in the international sphere, the administration saw it as of U.S. national interest to promote open economies.5 Also the encouragement of democratic ideas was seen as a national security interest. In addition to enhancing the possibilities of international cooperation, both in trade and political arrangements, broadening such values was seen as likely to make the world safer.6 Interests in market economy and democracy represented a “constant” in American foreign policies, also prominent during the Cold War and the previous Bush presidency. For the Clinton administration, these values and ideas were considered to be of special strategic importance. Nonetheless, the intention to promote democracy and market economy was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. The administration intended and wanted to broaden its influence, but did not do so entirely globally and would not employ any means to do so. Such values and interests were promoted by cooperation and diplomacy, and were not to be forced on anyone. Democracy and market economy were not seen as issues of war and peace. Rather, they were perceived as basic objectives generally preferable to U.S. and allied safety, but in practice subordinated when faced with international emergencies that put other interests at stake.

In practical matters, the interest in promoting such values were especially linked to the areas opened to liberal influence by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the

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4 NSS 1995: i.
5 An economic focus in the NSS reports indicated that both national and international economic issues were seen more integrated with security issues in the post-Cold War international situation. For a more theoretical discussion of the wider nature of the foreign policy agenda since the 1980s, see Mark Webber and Michael Smith, Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Essex, United Kingdom: Pearson Education 2002): 9-28. The thesis acknowledges the interconnectedness between economic aspects and security policies, but highlight political-military aspects, particularly decisions on the use of force.
Soviet Union. Here, the administration underlined democracy as the way to ensure a “Europe whole and free”. According to political scientist James Goldgeier, reform in Russia was President Clinton’s primary national security objective. Through the Partnership for Peace agreement also signed by Russia, the NATO allies thus partly integrated the former adversary of the Cold War into cooperative arrangements. In this way, promoting democratic and economic cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe underlined the allied interest in making sure the former rivalry would not recur. Rhetorically, such objectives were anchored in a general idea of the positive aspects of promoting democracy and economic liberalization. According to second term Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, enlargement was in the strategic interest of the U.S. as it would make the U.S. safer by increasing the area in Europe where wars did not happen; the prospects for NATO membership would give aspiring members an incentive to ensure its democratic progress; and thirdly, that it would make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive. Implicitly, an integration of areas formerly hostile to the U.S. would also increase the American geopolitical leverage and leadership position in the region.

Accordingly, these interests were related to a general interest in ensuring that the U.S. maintained the lead across the Atlantic and in the formation of Europe’s future development. The administration assured that “[t]he strong leadership role that the United States plays [in Europe] continues to promote and protect the vital national security interests of the United States”. The importance of U.S. transatlantic leadership was also important when it came to the evolution within Western Europe. The evolution of EU military capabilities was viewed favorably, although Clinton stressed that such capabilities would be integrated with the U.S. through the transatlantic alliance.

While broadening Western ideas and leadership to the whole of Europe, the administration saw U.S. interests in providing more global leadership too. As Bush, so also Clinton based this commitment to a fear of returning to equivalent problems of the interwar years of American isolationism. “The Cold War may be over, but the need for American

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7 Interview Lake 2007.
8 Goldgeier 1999: 160. See also the following section on threat perceptions concerning Russia.
11 Interview Lake 2007.
12 NSS 1995: iii.
leadership abroad remains as strong as ever.” American leadership was seen as conducive to make the U.S. “safer and more prosperous – by deterring aggression, fostering the resolution of conflicts, opening foreign markets, strengthening democracies, and tackling global problems. Without our leadership and engagement, threats would multiply and our opportunities would narrow.”

The Clinton administration also recognized the primary global position of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era, and wanted to uphold that position. With the Cold War definitely over, the administration from the onset asserted that “[w]e stand as the world’s preeminent power”. Later, it declared that the U.S. “must always retain our diplomatic, technological, industrial and military capabilities” to defend its global interests. Accordingly, the administration saw a general interest in upholding a unipolar, or unrivalled, position. Included in such an appraisal was the assessment of the diplomatic, economic and military power of the United States.

More indirectly, the administration saw an interest in preventing the escalation of internal conflicts. With regard to the conflict in the Balkans, Clinton in 1994 stated that:

We have an interest in showing that NATO, history's greatest military alliance, remains a credible force for peace in post-Cold War Europe. We have an interest in stemming the destabilizing flows of refugees that this horrible conflict is creating. And we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia. These interests do not justify unilateral American intervention in the crisis, but they do justify the involvement of America and exercise of our leadership.

This meant that an internal conflict in itself did not necessarily directly involve the interests of the U.S., which would make unilateral action seem necessary to the administration. But as such a conflict had implications for the stability of regions important to the U.S.; the NATO alliance; and the credibility of the position and leadership of the U.S., U.S. interests were indirectly involved. In this way, the overall U.S. interest in a leadership position implied that it was an indirect interest of the U.S. to handle internal conflicts that were seen as having a substantial affect on such a position.

In sum, the administration saw an interest in including broader parts of the world into democratic and market economic systems, especially with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. The administration intended to maintain the primary American position and

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13 NSS 1995: iii.
14 NSS 1997: 5. Here, engagement refers to the rejection of isolationism.
16 NSS 1997: 5.
17 NSS 1995: ii.
leadership in both transatlantic and world affairs. Based on the interests in maintaining the U.S. position and leadership, preventing the escalation of internal conflicts became an indirect interest of the Clinton administrations. Together, these interests indicated an overall interest in staying engaged in international relations, and formed a foundation for gradually implementing a strategy of restrained engagement.

Perception of Threats

In terms of threat perceptions, the administration saw no monolithic or existential threat. The Russian threat was no longer considered urgent. A new and more diverse, fragmented threat perspective manifested itself on the U.S. security agenda, related to the more complex strategic environment of the post-Cold War world. Such threats included internal conflicts around the globe, but also more transnational threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. Also, so-called rogue states posed potential threats to the U.S. But neither these, nor any great power, were in the position to rival the dominant position of the United States.

The first Bush administration had observed the changing nature of the former superpower and did to some extent cooperate with its former adversary, while skepticism remained. As the Clinton administration took office a little more than a year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both the time and attitudes in the administration facilitated a changed perception of the Russian threat. As stated in the introduction, intentions and capabilities combined represent what is considered a threat to a country’s national interests. With Russia, the capabilities to pose a threat were available to a degree. The concerns about Russia’s capabilities dealt both with the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal, its ability to control the nuclear material, and some conventional military power. But more importantly, the administration did not view Russian intentions as inherently hostile to the interests of the U.S. and its allies. The ideological underpinnings that had seemed to make Russian capabilities an existential threat to the West, was perceived as gone. The changed perception of Russian intentions also caused the administration to state that “[T]he threat of a war among great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation both have receded dramatically”. As long as the political and economical liberalization processes set in motion would continue,

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19 Interview Flournoy 2007.
21 For instance expressed in NSS 1995: i.
Russia was no longer perceived a threat.\(^{23}\) The national security strategies of the United States thus perceived Russia as an arena where democratic and economic transition was seen as favorable.\(^{24}\) Cooperation and integration into Western institutions would thus be one way of making sure that Russian intentions would not once again turn hostile to the U.S. and its allies. For NATO, the disappearance of its main \textit{raison d’être} would of course have great implications, leading towards an entirely post-Cold War founded role, to be discussed fully in this chapter’s section on strategic thinking and implementation.

In a new security perspective, the Clinton NSSs recognized ethnic conflicts as a first new challenge that confronted the U.S. as the Cold War threat was gone.\(^{25}\) Internal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, first with regard to Bosnia and later Kosovo, as well as the crises in Somalia and Rwanda, represented post-Cold War challenges to the administration. Generally, such conflicts were perceived as indirect threats, as they produced fears of greater destabilization of regions, especially when involving areas important to the U.S., and more widely, the possibly perceived reduced leadership role of the United States. Accordingly, “[u]nchecked regional or civil conflicts risk escalation with broadening consequences; threaten the credibility of the United States, its allies, and major international instances as guarantors of world order; and confront decision[-]makers with horrendous and morally intolerable humanitarian abuses”.\(^{26}\) The ethnic and humanitarian crises in Africa, where the U.S. had fewer obligations, were perceived as less threatening to U.S. interests. In terms of NATO threat perceptions, internal conflicts within Europe appeared gradually threatening to the alliance. By the completion of the 1999 ASC, instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area, including possible regional crises at the periphery of the alliance, were seen as central risks.\(^{27}\)

As part of the more fragmented post-Cold War security picture, also transnational threats became more visible to the U.S. Bush had mentioned such threats, but throughout the 1990s and with Clinton, such threats became more prominent. Still, they were not the only threats the administrations perceived, and thus constituted just part of the fragmented threat perceptions relevant to the formation of national security strategies. These types of threats were diverse in themselves, and included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

\(^{23}\) Interview Flournoy 2007.
\(^{24}\) For instance in NSS 1994: 23.
\(^{25}\) See for instance NSS 1994: i.
\(^{27}\) ASC 1999: paragraph 20.
environmental degradation, terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{28} WMD proliferation and increasing levels of international terrorism were the most significant of these threats during the Clinton presidency.

The proliferation of WMDs was a fundamental concern of the administration. Proliferation had been perceived as threatening to the U.S. ever since the U.S. itself gained such capabilities. But in the post-Cold War world, WMDs became part of the more fragmented threat perceptions of the U.S. This contrasted with the threat’s assumed nature during the Cold War. During the period of East-West rivalry, the WMD threat had been part of the monolithically perceived Cold War threat perspective. Now, the threat transcended into a more transnational threat, fragmented by the different types of actors possibly possessing or acquiring WMD capability.

Linked to the former East-West conflict was the administration’s fear that other former Soviet Republics than Russia would possess nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the administration was interested in “denuclearizing” these republics, most notably Ukraine. In addition, and linked to a clear-cut post-Cold War security agenda, proliferation was a potential threat seen as represented by the possible acquisition of WMDs by new and more unstable actors. This included the fear both of terrorists acquiring WMDs and the so-called rogue states.\textsuperscript{29} In such a way, the WMD threat had become more fragmented, linked to the more unbalanced or unpredictable state of international relations in the post-Cold War world. In terms of NATO, the administration briefly initiated a review of NATO’s role concerning the WMD threat at the 1994 NATO Summit.\textsuperscript{30} But for the transatlantic community, the WMD threat was here primarily part of the alliance relationship with Russia and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{31}

By the end of the Clinton presidency, a somewhat broadened and more global perception of

\textsuperscript{28} NSS 1996: 1.

\textsuperscript{29} The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in 1994 explicitly related such potential threats to North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Office of Naval Intelligence, “Director of Naval Intelligence Posture Statement” (1994): 2-3. Non-classified. Available at DNSA: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/EP/00336/all.pdf [online 2008-03-11]. In the NSS of 2000, the administration also underlined Russia’s possible role in such rogue state WMD acquisition, wanting to control the possible leakage of Soviet WMD material and expertise to these states. NSS 2000: 7.


the WMD threat had tentatively been adopted by NATO on U.S. initiative. The NATO ASC of 1999 in this way stated that “the proliferation of NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern”, and explicitly confined these threats to states in the NATO periphery and in other regions, as well as the potential acquisition of non-state actors.

Both as linked to the fear of WMD proliferation and in itself, international terrorism was included in the American security agenda during the Clinton years. There had been limited terrorist attacks on U.S. interests before. The Bush administration had recognized terrorism as a threat, but no clear and prioritized assessment of such a threat seemed to exist. During the Clinton presidency, limited terrorist attacks did hit U.S. targets, as the World Trade Center was the scene of a bomb attack in 1993, U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia were hit by bombs in 1995 and 1996, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were targeted in 1998, and the destroyer USS Cole was attacked in 2000. The administration did review such instances, made political assessments of the terrorist threat, and was increasingly alarmed by the phenomenon as these occurrences took place. But as the U.S. did not see such threats as existential, and dealt with such challenges primarily through law enforcement, international terrorism did not evolve as a central threat concern to U.S. security during the Clinton years. Overall, NATO was not part of U.S. counter-terrorism procedures. Terrorism was in the 1999 ASC listed as a risk that could affect the interests of the alliance, but was not seen as a great threat to allied security.

Rogue states represented another threat to the U.S. as the administration perceived it. Earlier, the term had been applied to regimes that committed crimes against their own citizens under the protection of their national sovereignty. In the 1990s, the expression was rather linked to the external behavior of states, especially related to potential pursuits of WMD

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33 ASC 1999: paragraph 22. See also the last section on strategic thinking and implementation.


capability and use of terrorism as an instrument. Consequently, these threats were still state-
to-state threats to the U.S., but at the same time related to transnational and unconventional
threats, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.
Especially, Iraq, Iran and North Korea were considered within this category of threats.
Military planning was dominated by such threat perceptions. Consequently, the threat was
perceived as a central and direct threat to the U.S. The administration feared the possibility
for regional aggression as a result of external action on the part of these states. Although
rhetorically the term rogue states may have resembled Cold War discourses of an “evil Soviet
empire”, both the small size and capabilities of these countries prevented them from posing
major existential threats to the U.S., equivalent to the former Soviet Union. The 1999 ASC
did not apply the term rogue states, but more vaguely talked about the risks of “regional crises
at the periphery of the Alliance”, and that “some states, including on NATO’s periphery and
in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and their means of
delivery”.

While both the administration and the alliance monitored possible changes in great
power threats, such traditional state-to-state-threats were not as evident. As the Clinton
administration asserted that it saw its present unrivalled position and global leadership as
preferable, it would see other great powers emerging as threatening to U.S. interests, just as
parts of the preceding Bush administration had been more explicit about it. There were fears
in the House of Representatives that China soon would emerge as a major military power.
And the economic growth of Japan caused several to argue that Japan would develop into a
new dominant power. But during its presidency, the administration asserted that it possessed
an unrivalled position. As stated in the introductory quote of this chapter, and based on its
military capabilities and economic possibilities, the administration thus perceived that “we
have an unprecedented opportunity to make our nation safer and more prosperous”.

39 Litwak 2000: 52. The definition according to external behavior took root in the 1980s. The described internal
behavior was now mostly discussed as ethnic conflicts, humanitarian disasters, i.e. internal conflicts.
40 For instance, CIA estimates on Iraq in 1993 assumed that Saddam Hussein’s foreign policy goals included
WMD programs. Director of Central Intelligence, “Prospects for Iraq: Saddam and Beyond” (1993-12-00),
secret, declassified 2005-04-00. Available at CIA FOIA Reading Room [online 2008-04-05].
41 Interview Litwak 2007. Military planning will be further discussed in the section on strategic thinking and
implementation.
43 ASC 1999: paragraphs 20 and 22.
44 Floyd D. Spence [Chairman of House National Security Committee], “Press Release: Administration China
45 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House 1987) was a point of
departure.
46 NSS 1997: 1.
The fact that the U.S. was in such a dominant position, without any superpower rival, contributed to make security issues seem less urgent. At the same time, the administration had to deal with the more limited threats that did arise. As such, key dangers were thought represented by “those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression and threats to the stability of states”.\textsuperscript{47} Compared with the Cold War, these threats were fragmented, and largely indirect and potential, different from the monolithic and existential threat the Soviet Union had been perceived as. The main challenges the Clinton administration had to deal with were the ethnic tensions in the Balkans, the crises in Somalia and Rwanda, rogue states, the proliferation of mass destruction and international terrorism. The strategy of the Clinton administration was formed as it responded to these threats, as will be discussed below, and was based upon its overall interests in ensuring its secure and leading position in the world.

**Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners**

Accordingly, the Clinton administration to a greater extent than its predecessor faced the broader complexity in approaching security issues in the post-Cold War world. The Clinton team made central policy formulations concerning Europe, particularly when it came to enlarging and transforming the role of NATO. The above section has outlined the broad threat perceptions of the administration, including new types of threats fragmented from the transatlantic dimension. NATO was still central to the U.S. within the broader transatlantic area. But the Clinton administration’s focus on separate issues caused partial fragmentation with the transatlantic aspect, with regard to U.S. strategy in other regions than Europe. The section discusses the administration’s general view on international cooperation, as well as the perceived relevance and cooperative aspects of different areas in the world.

Although at first inwardly focused on the domestic economy, the administration was also determined to stay engaged and take the lead in international affairs. In this approach cooperation and multilateralism were key components. The Clinton team broadened the transatlantic alliance, both in terms of member states, and the geographical outreach of the organization. It also formalized the interaction with other regions, especially when it came to economic cooperation, for instance through the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the participation in establishing the World Trade Organization. Regarding security issues in a global framework, the U.S. under Clinton’s leadership contributed in missions under UN

\textsuperscript{47} NSS 1994: 10.
mandate, as in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. International cooperation on issues of interest to the United States was thus seen as important. At the same time the administration asserted that while it acted multilaterally if possible, it would act unilaterally if seen necessary. Accordingly, the administration stated that: “[We must] be willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community”. Implicitly, the administration perceived cooperation as beneficiary to the U.S. in order to share responsibilities and burdens, while at the same time it was desirable to retain control over which interests were to be acted upon. Such an approach to multilateralism made NATO interesting to the U.S., as responsibilities and burdens could be shared between allies, at the same time that the Americans had great influence on the formation of policies and missions within the alliance. According to IR scholar Robert Litwak, acting through NATO was among other things a fiscal necessity in conflicts that did not threaten direct American interests. Seen together, cooperation represented a way of promoting U.S. interests, as American interests and values could be generalized to express widely shared interests and values. More specifically, cooperation would make it less costly, both in political and economic terms, to counter threats against such interests.

Cooperation was then linked to the continued U.S. commitment to the transatlantic alliance and Europe. The administration in one NSS stated that its first strategic priority was to “foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe. When Europe is stable and at peace, America is more secure. When Europe prospers, so does America.” As such, the Cold War and G. H. W. Bush’s focus on European relations continued under Clinton’s leadership. The administrations’ national security team had mainly been brought up during the Cold War, and appreciated the interconnected relationship between the U.S. and Europe, and the relevance of NATO. In the 1960s, a young Bill Clinton had participated in and organized a Conference on the Atlantic Community, and he acknowledged the importance of NATO to European

48 It is also interesting to point out that the Haiti engagement was mandated by the UN, even though the U.S. generally claims its undisputed influence in the region, referring the Monroe Doctrine.
49 For instance in NSS 1996: 14 and 17.
51 Concerning the Bosnia engagement, engaging through the UN (and by 1995 principally NATO) was seen adequate as the crisis was not perceived as immediately threatening to the security of the U.S. Bill Clinton, “Renewing the Momentum toward Peace in Bosnia”, opening statement at a news conference (1994-04-20), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 5, no. 17, 1994). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no17.html [online 2008-04-07].
52 Litwak 2000: 32.
53 NSS 1997: 2.
54 Interview Lake 2007.
security in the Cold War. For the administration, NATO was considered an instrument that would provide for continued American leadership and involvement in European affairs. The integrated military structure of NATO was seen as an asset, and the U.S. wanted to stay engaged in Europe.

The U.S. engagement in Europe also represented an interest in Central and Eastern Europe. The administration commented on U.S. interests here as “[a]reas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union”. The Iron Curtain had fallen during the first year of the Bush administration, and Bush had from 1991/1992 in a limited manner cooperated with former adversaries, in actual policies by agreeing on the Gulf War, but also through consultations in the NACC. One year into the Clinton presidency, the administration started to approach Central and Eastern Europe with a more formal intent of turning them westwards. The Partnership for Peace and the decision to enlarge NATO mainly stemmed from U.S. initiatives at the January 1994 NATO summit. While NATO also had enlarged during the Cold War, the administration recognized that the 1999 enlargement would “cross the line it was created to defend and overcome”. With such a change in East-West cooperative structures, cooperation with Russia was seen strategically important, as the administration also had included the former adversary of the U.S. into the Partnership for Peace program. Russia was also included in the G-7 cooperation between central Western powers, which in 1997 became the G-8. The less threatening view of Russia, presented earlier on, opened up to increased cooperation. Expansion of the alliance and broader partnership were seen opportune, making cooperation within the whole of Europe strategically important to the U.S.

Secondly, besides focusing policies on cooperation in the broader area of Europe, Asia was also important during the Clinton presidency. The national security strategies underlined the importance of enhancing relations “across the Pacific as well as across the Atlantic”.

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56 Interview Hunter 2007. Underlining the relevance of Europe, the European Bureau of the Department of State produced more than half of the policy documents in the Department, and Albright and Clinton spent half their time on European issues, an indication of a preoccupation with European affairs, at least in the second term (Interview Dobbins 2007). In addition, the importance of people is shown, as the productivity of Richard Holbrooke, serving as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, contributed to making Europe continuously relevant (Interview Goldgeier 2007).
59 Albright 1998-02-24, U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Although the re-unification of Germany within NATO structures during the Bush presidency had also crossed such a line, but then simply confined to the German state.
60 NSS 1997: 2.
With Clinton’s economic focus, relations with Asia were seen particularly important. Although security issues became more diverse, and might include economic relations in the post-Cold War world, such issues were still not as urgent as those of war and peace, and not as relevant to understanding the decisions on national strategy. But when it came to more clear-cut security relations, other regional partners than Europe were also considered important to the Clinton administration. According to Michèle Flournoy, serving at the Department of Defense, the administration pursued multiple areas simultaneously. In addition to NATO, the Clinton administration maintained non-European alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea and South East Asia, and bilateral relationships in the Middle East. Also ad hoc partnerships supplemented such cooperative structures. For example, the NSS of 1996 underlined the importance of regional allies in countering possible Iraqi threats of aggression towards Kuwait in 1994. Combined, the administration stated that “many of our security objectives are best achieved – or can only be achieved – through our alliances and other formal security structures, or as a leader of an ad hoc coalition formed around a specific objective”.

In this way, such ad hoc coalitions were seen as a supplement to the alliance structure, and not as an alternative, as the later Bush administration would come to do.

As outlined in the sections on threats, threat perceptions in rogue states, WMD proliferation and international terrorism also made for a strategic focus on Asia. The military planning for major regional wars were primarily perceived to rely on directly affected regional partners. Still, Secretary of State Albright in 1998 argued that weapons of mass destruction potentially could be a “unifying threat” in terms of NATO. But the WMD and terrorist threats were only vaguely included in allied threat perceptions in 1999, and the U.S. implemented policies on such issues outside of NATO. In this way, the administration largely focused on other strategic relationships than NATO when concerned with issues located outside of Europe. This had also been the primary case with Bush’s Gulf War, then with partial participation of European allies. By maintaining allies and partners in Asia, the Clinton administration continued to underline cooperation in central areas, but as threats here were largely fragmented from the transatlantic dimension, these relationships were not interlinked with other allies in the same way as during the Cold War.

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61 Interview Goldgeier 2007.
62 Interview Flournoy 2007.
63 NSS 1996: 17. This also mirrored the ad hoc cooperation in the Gulf War during the Bush presidency.
64 NSS 1998: 2.
65 Interview Flournoy 2007.
In addition to the critically perceived regions of Europe and Asia, the administration did engage more globally. This was for instance evident with regard to the involvement in Somalia. But actual policy implementation indicated that such areas were not as strategically important to the U.S., as the administration withdrew from Somalia and stayed out of Rwanda. The administration’s appraisal of Africa also had in mind that it was not part of any alliance or partner structure. Consequently, the administration had to review whether a certain situation was interesting on a more ad hoc basis. As commented upon in the previous chapter, the disappearance of East-West rivalry then implied that conflicts here did not seem to affect U.S. interests in the same way as if threatened by communism. Also, in Somalia, the U.S. acted through the UN. While acting under UN leadership showed a general multilateral approach of the administration, at least up until it withdrew, it also indicated that the conflict in the region was not directly important or vital to the US. In such cases, the U.S. was inclined to have greater control of missions than what was possible through a UN mission.

To sum up, the first National Security Advisor to the Clinton administration, Anthony Lake highlighted that “in an increasingly complex world, it was not possible or desirable to have only one strategic focus”. Barely seen during the Bush administration, new patterns of cooperation more determinedly appeared during the Clinton presidency. Russia formally evolved as a partner through the Partnership for Peace, and NATO enlarged to include three new member states. Broader cooperation in other areas was also evident, especially in Asia. But fragmented threat perceptions meant that the framework for understanding strategic areas, allies and partners was different from the Cold War. The administration’s post-Cold War outlook meant that Europe and NATO were still interesting to the U.S., but more as a region in itself, and not automatically part of strategic considerations in other parts of the world. At the same time, relations in Europe remained critical to the U.S., in addition to U.S. relations in Asia. Other areas were included in U.S. strategic conceptions, but the administration’s outlook centered on what was seen as the geopolitically crucial Eurasian continent. Such an approach indicated continuity regarding which areas were seen the most strategically important, and where formal cooperation in terms of alliances and partnerships was seen most

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70 Interview Lake 2007.
relevant. The difference was that the strategic outlook now was largely fragmented, as opposed to the more inherently integral nature of U.S. Cold War strategies.

**Strategic Thinking and Implementation**

According to previous sections, Clinton’s strategy was based on a general interest in broadening the influence of American values, and ensuring the power and leadership position of the U.S. in the world. The two administrations were confronted with internal conflicts, and dealt with more potential threats posed by rogue states, nuclear proliferation and limited instances of international terrorism. The administration had a global, while fragmented outlook, particularly concerned with Europe and Asia. In such a situation, the Clinton presidency formed its national security strategies and NATO policies.

Frequently, the administration was accused of lacking a national security strategy or grand strategy. Critics stated that it did not have a clearly defined security concept as in the Cold War. As seen in the introductory historiographical account, this is for instance the approach taken by Halberstam and Gaddis. Political scientist Christopher Layne argues that the end of the Cold War rightfully made room for broader foreign policy concerns than those of grand national security strategy, as the United States faced no imminent threat. On the other hand, while an articulated concept equivalent to containment and deterrence was not present, the strategic foundation of the administrations can nonetheless be identified in the strategic thinking and responses implemented in the diverse and fragmented security situation. In such a way, the general ideas formulated and the policies formed reflect what can be named the Clinton administrations’ strategy. Returning to Gaddis’ initial understanding of strategy, this is confirmed, as strategies are seen to mirror the assumptions of interests, threats and feasible responses. Referring Goldgeier, the administration initially concentrated on domestic affairs, was uncomfortable with the use of force, was lacking policies on Bosnia, and had little knowledge of or interest in NATO. But general strategic schemes were gradually formed. Combined with responses to international events, the strategic thinking the administration outlined can together be interpreted as its strategy of restrained engagements.

Focusing on military aspects, engagement strategies were formed and implemented towards internal ethnic conflicts. Planning and scenarios of military engagement towards rogue states and their possible WMD proliferation also existed in parallel. In political terms,

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72 See the introductory chapter on strategy and its components – a conceptual framework.
73 Goldgeier 1999: 19.
the integration of former adversaries in Europe represented a type of political engagement replacing former containment in Eastern Europe.

The first Clinton administration’s conception of American engagement was vaguely introduced by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in a 1993 address, but developed into a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement published in 1994, 1995 and 1996.\(^{74}\) Here, the administration asserted that its outlook was based on U.S. leadership, enlargement and the broader role of NATO in the post-Cold War world. Implicitly, the administration referred to engagement in its broadest sense, rejecting American isolationism.\(^{75}\) Engagement was seen as a general interest of the U.S., working through the enlargement of ideas and influence. In this way, the formulation “strategy of enlargement” was applied as an initial term for the Clinton presidency’s national security strategy, as its alternative to Cold War containment strategies.\(^{76}\) Later, the administration produced strategic documents based on the same content under the headings of A National Security Strategy for a New Century in 1997, 1998 and 1999, and For a Global Age in 2000.\(^{77}\) Even though the approach to strategy was fundamentally the same, the title was changed. According to political scientist Robert H. Dorff, the change was primarily made to avoid connotations of a neo-imperialist approach.\(^{78}\) In the reports of the second administration, engagement is underlined more explicitly. In 1997, 1998 and 1999 engagement as a strategy is stated. In the 2000 document, the term strategy of engagement is used specifically. Here engagement is summarized as:

The elements of engagement – adapting alliances; encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries; encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development; preventing conflict; countering potential regional aggressors; confronting new threats; and steering international peace and stability operations – define the Nation’s blueprint for a strategy of engagement.\(^{79}\)

Accordingly, the administration applied a broad conception of engagement. In responses to threats, military aspects are underlined as preventing, countering and confronting threats, and in terms of interests in for instance democratization, and alliances, a more political understanding of the term is also evident.


\(^{76}\) See Lake 1993-09-27.

\(^{77}\) NSS 1998; NSS 1999; NSS 2000.

\(^{78}\) Dorff 2001a: 18.

\(^{79}\) NSS 2000: 8.
Then on the non-emergency level, the Clinton administration, in emphasizing its ideas of promoting democracy, as well as economic liberalization, politically engaged in Eastern Europe. Partnership for Peace, and partial NATO enlargement was the implemented results of this process. For NATO this meant that the organization in terms of member states would enlarge. Still, this was a gradual process, made in a restrained manner, as only Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were invited to join the alliance by 1999. By these approaches, the U.S. widened the territorial area of the alliance.

The 1990s was seen as a preferable time to implement NATO enlargement eastwards, based on the argument of reinforcing democracy in the region.\(^8^0\) In this way, NATO enlargement represented a U.S. political engagement in the region that potentially would be favorable to the U.S. if U.S.-Russian relations were to worsen. Interconnected, the implementation of Partnership for Peace supported the U.S. interest in ensuring a democratic and stable situation also within broader areas formerly hostile to the West. Making Russia a partner in the partnership for Peace was intended to ensure the continuation of positive trends in Russian politics.\(^8^1\) The Bush administration had upheld elements of the containment strategies with regard to Russia, and only in a fledgling manner cooperated with the former adversary. President Clinton declared that: “The threat to us now is not of advancing armies so much as of creeping instability. The best strategy against this threat is to integrate the former communist states into our fabric of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation”.\(^8^2\) Consequently, enlargement and partnership would ensure a broadened influence of values seen favorable to the U.S., which removed the need for containing Russia. As political engagement with former adversaries in the East meant that U.S. and NATO confrontation with former adversaries would be less plausible, it formed a foundation for the U.S. in taking on a new strategy, implementing engagement in more military terms, and NATO to form a new role engaging “out of area”.

Such a strategy was based on diverse elements. Engagements were made in accordance with U.S. interests; an attitude of hesitant interventionism, especially related to so-called “humanitarian” interventions, and implied a role for NATO acting “out of area”.

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\(^8^0\) Interview Lake 2007.

\(^8^1\) Interview Flournoy 2007. If positive trends would not endure, the administration stated that NATO would remain a centerpiece of the collective defense of Europe, and ensure stability among the non-allied states that would remain partners. See Strobe Talbott [Deputy Secretary of State-designate], “Intensifying U.S. Support for Russian Reform”, statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (1994-01-31), *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* (vol. 5, no. 5, 1994). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1994/html/Dispatchv5no05.html [online 2008-04-07].

Also, the strategy reflected a use of military power relying on the use of air force, as well as a perceived need of being able to fight at least two major regional wars simultaneously, which was related to limited military engagements towards rogue states.

Accordingly, the Clinton administration’s approach to military engagement emphasized that the administration needed to prioritize when to engage. One NSS commented on this as: “[w]e must be selective in the use of our capabilities, and the choices we make always must be guided by advancing our objectives of a more secure, prosperous and free America”. Engagements were made first and foremost when “vital or survival interests” were at stake, and secondly selected on the basis of areas that affect U.S. national interests, such as “areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies”. The administration saw its strategy as global, for instance in promoting democracy and economic liberalization, and had a fragmented perspective on threats, meaning that policies still could not be pinned in just one direction. On the other hand, the administration’s reluctance to make full engagements and its hesitant approach to international events caused the implemented engagement strategy to be more restrained. Indicatively, U.S. engagement strategies were centered on the more strategically defined Eurasian continent. For instance, the ethnic conflict in Rwanda was not perceived as a threat the U.S. should counter. The administration engaged when seen necessary and preferable, in accordance with U.S. interests, and indirectly, those of its allies.

The Bosnia and Kosovo engagements implemented such a strategy towards the indirect threats of internal conflicts. The description of Clinton’s engagement strategies as restrained is also here fitting, as engagements were made after initial hesitation. The preceding Bush administration had avoided military engagement in the Balkans, and Clinton initially continued along the lines of his predecessor. The Clinton team had campaigned

84 NSS 1994: 10. In referring to possible refugee flows, the administration referred to conflicts in areas that potentially could generate flows of refugees into the U.S. or its allies, meaning that in such cases, the U.S. would have an indirect interest at stake.
86 In the early phase of the Clinton presidency, the administration did not perceive that the U.S. had a strategic stake in Bosnia and would not commit forces. Accordingly, also for the early Clinton administration, the
arguing that Bush’s policies in the former Yugoslavia were too weak. When in office, the Clinton administration took a step back on this issue, and a consistent strategy was not implemented. According to National Security Advisor Lake, the administration was evaluating how the U.S. should respond to the conflict. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1993 said that the U.S. was prepared to join the UN and NATO to enforce a solution in Bosnia, if necessary with U.S. military participation, and that the Bosnia conflict provided a test for the U.S. post-Cold War role in Europe and the world. Still, the UN track remained. By 1994-1995, events had escalated, and the administration got a firmer grip of what policies to pursue. But by 1995, the administration engaged in Bosnia, thus forming the contours of a restrained strategy of engagement. When it came to Kosovo, the administration’s implementation followed much from the previous conflict. Although here, the UN track was not followed at first, and engaging through NATO then became implemented after a shorter process than what had been the case with regard to Bosnia.

As regards the U.S. strategy towards threats from rogue states and potential WMD proliferation planning for restrained engagement was evident. International terrorism, on the other hand, was not as dominant in the formation of the Clinton administration’s strategies, as the threat was not perceived as central at the time. Returning to rogue states and their possible WMD proliferation, these perceived threats influenced the strategic planning of the administration, especially in military terms. Central to such preparation was the perception of the need to be able to fight two major regional wars at the same time. Such planning was evident from the administration’s onset in 1993, where the Department of Defense characterized its approach towards both these threats and internal conflicts as a strategy of engagement, partnership and prevention. As the presidency moved on, such an approach became underpinned by experiences with rogue states and what was perceived as the possibility of two simultaneous conflicts with North Korea and Iraq in 1994. The administration perceived the possibility of military conflict with such countries, which

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87 Interview Rosner 2007.
88 Interview Lake 2007.
90 Interview Litwak 2007.
91 See Department of Defense 1993-10-00, DNSA.
indicated that the threat was perceived as direct and necessary to deter and defeat should aggression occur.93

In this way it is possible to point out how this indicated contours of an engagement strategy towards such threats. By planning for, and seeing the possibility of military engagement as the response to possible rogue state threats, this meant that the administration had an implicitly broader strategy of engagement than if only seen with regard to internal conflicts. Accordingly, its strategic response of military engagement could potentially also apply to the rogue state threat. In terms of implementation, such military responses were seen with regard to several intermittent instances of the use of air force power towards Iraq.94 According to Robert Litwak, the U.S. primarily perceived rogue states within a containment framework.95 He asserts that future U.S. strategy towards such states potentially could comprise an engagement component, in terms of diplomatic or political engagement.96 He is right to point out that the U.S. contained the position of these states in international relations. But as there does not exist an empirical understanding of engagement strategies in military terms, planning and limited implementation of military engagements are not articulated within his appraisal of the possible engagement component. In this way, the contours of military engagement strategies seen during the Clinton administration can supplement Litwak’s analysis, and also provide an understanding of responses to such threats that were reinforced by the more offensive military engagement by the younger Bush administration. In addition, it accentuates that such military engagement was not only confined to internal conflicts as in the Balkans.

Purely humanitarian operations and peacekeeping missions were perceived less attractive to engage in. Such strategic appraisals were built on the administration experiences in Somalia. While first being engaged in Somalia, the administration withdrew as the intervention had escalated from merely food support under Bush to a clearer military operation resulting in American losses during Clinton’s first year. The Presidential Decision Directive 25 outlined the administration’s views on the use of force in such conflicts, and also pointed to more general implications for the administration’s views on the use of force, its criteria for engagement.97 It was particularly important that the administration declared its

94 G. H. W. Bush also made such a hit on Iraq just before leaving office. See Litwak 2000: 129.  
95 See Litwak 2000.  
97 Interview Flournoy 2007.
refusal to relinquish command of American troops to foreign control. The Somalia engagement had been carried out under UN leadership, and the administration ended up skeptical to relinquishing control.

At the same time, the administration declared that it wanted to avoid long term commitments in crises that the U.S. intervened in. Referring to the Somalia and Rwanda conflicts, Clinton stated in the preface of the NSS 1995 that:

[O]ver the longer run, our interests were served by turning these operations over to multilateral peacekeeping forces once the immediate humanitarian crisis was addressed. No outside force can create a stable and legitimate domestic order for another society – that work can only be accomplished by the society itself.

In other words, the administration saw no U.S. or global interest in staying engaged. The quote shows both reluctance to commit in the long run based on practical U.S. interests as well as a more general argument that devastated countries need to build their futures on their own, supported by multilateral institutions, and not through occupation. This means that the Clinton engagement strategy was restrained; that the administration would thoroughly consider any future engagement before actually engaging, and that the administration would deal with threats, but preferably not be part of a long term stability or peacekeeping mission.

The administration’s perspective on the use of military force further illustrates the restrained feature of its engagement strategy. “We therefore will send troops abroad only when our interests and values are sufficiently at stake. When we do so, it will be with clear objectives to which we are firmly committed and which – when combat is likely – we have the means to achieve decisively”. This indicates that the U.S., although developing engagement strategies, continued to be influenced by elements of the Powell Doctrine. Influenced by the Somalia engagement, air, and not ground, force was the preferred military means of engagement. This was seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in the limited retaliations

100 NSS 1995: ii. See also NSS 1995: 12-13. After the Kosovo intervention, the administration also asserted that it would not make precedent for intervention in other instances; each decision on the use of force was to be made “on a case-by-case basis after weighing a host of factors”. Madeleine Albright, “After Kosovo: Building a Lasting Peace”, remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations (1999-06-28), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (July 1999). Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/publications/dispatch/July1999.pdf [online 2008-04-10].
101 Also Michèle Flournay recognized the continued influence of the Powell Doctrine on the administration’s general perspectives on the use of military force. Interview Flournoy 2007. Jeffrey Record discusses the maintenance of elements from the Powell doctrine in relations with the 1999 NSS, in Jeffrey Records, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Military Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press 2002): 31-32.
102 Interview Shea 2008.
against Iraq. To a large extent, the use of air power indicated that as the threats countered were largely indirect and potential, they did not justify large troop deployments.

Accordingly, the administration feared American casualties as a result of military engagement. The existence of modern live mass communication, sometimes referred to as the CNN factor, exacerbated such fears. The broadcasting of the U.S. losses in Somalia had built restraint in the administration. For example, the decision not to deploy U.S. ground forces in Kosovo was influenced by the Somalia experience. In light of that, the administration saw it particularly important that it had domestic support, with Congress and the public, before applying military force. But also the perceived lack of urgency in the post-Cold War strategic environment caused the administration to have a restrained approach to its engagement strategy. Still, the administration did use military force in multiple instances and in broader missions than its predecessor. But this deployment of force was seen as a last resort and restrained engagements became the strategy implemented.

Generally, the strategic environment of the Clinton presidency was quite different from that of Cold War. The unrivalled strategic position offered the U.S. an enormous freedom of action. This is characteristic of the entire period at study, but became fully apparent and completely relevant to the position of the U.S. during the Clinton presidency. At the same time, the absence of a monolithic threat or rival made for a fragmented feature of strategy, indicated in the engagement strategies formed towards internal conflicts and those formed towards especially rogue states.

Bacevich characterizes Clinton’s strategy as a one of openness; McCrisken emphasizes the administration’s own term a policy of enlargement; and Haley interprets Clinton’s policies as non-interventionist, relying on democratization through globalization. While the broadened political engagement of the U.S. and its values can be described within such terms, the military aspects of a Clinton’s security policies do not fit into such categories. The term strategies of engagement on the other hand, can account for such political features as the administration’s political (or economic) engagement, while at the same time integrating an understanding of Clinton’s use of military force. Antony Lake stated that the Balkan engagements were not specifically linked to expansion, but were conceptually linked. Strategies of engagement can accordingly be seen as accounting for the full spectrum of the

103 Such a factor was referred to in for instance NSS 1995: ii-iii.
104 Interview Dobbins 2007.
105 See NSS 1997: 6-7 and 12.
106 Walt 2000: 64; Haley 2006: 5.
administration’s policies. But the assessment has emphasized the military responses to post-Cold War threats, in order to form an understanding of what has merely been analyzed and perceived on an ad hoc basis.

For NATO to fit into such an American strategy of engagements, it turned from the basic territorial defense of its member countries to engage in conflict resolution “out of area” in the Balkans. In line with such an evolution, the administration stated that it did not see NATO within the concept of containment. NATO military engagements were confined to the broader Euro-Atlantic area, and consequently, U.S. engagement strategy towards rogue states and WMD proliferation stayed fundamentally fragmented from the transatlantic dimension.

The “out of area” debate was initiated from the American side, famously coined by Republican Senator Richard Lugar’s term “out of area or out of business”, presented in an August 1993 remark at the Department of State. On the part of the administration’s side, the early and mid 1990s were seen as a transition period for NATO. As the security situation in Europe was changing, the U.S. was interested in forming a new role of the alliance. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in September 1993 vaguely called on the NATO member states to update the post-Cold War role of NATO. The decision was made to continue American investments in NATO, built on the assessment that NATO had been successful in the Cold War past, and that it was a multilateral organization that was led by the U.S.. Accordingly, the first Clinton NSS of 1994 supported limited NATO operations “out of area”. The administration remarked after the 1994 NATO summit that the allies had decided it needed adapt its military capacities to be able to “carry out new missions and conduct what used to be called out-of-area operations”.

In practical terms, such an “out of area” role developed parallel to the gradually escalating crisis in the Balkans. The Clinton administration recognized that the Bush administration had perceived the Europeans and the UN as responsible for handling the

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111 Interview Lake 2007.
113 Interview Hunter 2007.
115 This referred to the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces. Oxman 1994-02-01, U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Oxman also underlined that all key decisions stemmed from U.S. initiatives.
conflict. At its initial onset, the new administration continued to emphasize that the Europeans should play the leading role. At that point, NATO was involved in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) missions in the former Yugoslavia. The NATO UNPROFOR operations were very limited in scope, both in terms of troop numbers and the nature of the involvement, “reflect[ing] those of a peacekeeping mission, even though there was no peace to keep”.

According to Goldgeier, there did not exist an initial plan of how NATO’s role would be, but events in the Balkans made the administration act as circumstances evolved. At the same time, the above has shown that a more general American debate on the future role existed in parallel to, or was accelerated by, the practical evolution of NATO’s role. As the U.S. decided that it would engage more determinedly in the crisis, NATO was seen the proper instrument, especially as the U.S. would have more control in a NATO operation, than in a UN engagement. The result was that NATO gradually moved from its Cold War territorially defensive character into its post-Cold War transformation to engage in missions “out of area”, implemented through the 1995 NATO engagement. The Clinton team saw Bosnia as a situation that could “confirm NATO’s central role in post-Cold War Europe”.

According to a central NATO staffer, the debate on what to do about the break up of Yugoslavia since 1992 had laid out the foundation for NATO’s future role, in terms of political consultation and its different practical capabilities. Bush had seen conflict resolution as a possible, but not ensured, way ahead for NATO. But with the escalation of the Balkan conflict, the closely related American deliberations on NATO’s role, and the U.S. decision to engage militarily, NATO became transformed to act in “out of area” engagements.

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116 Interview Rosner 2007. Anthony Lake pointed out that as the U.S. in 1991 not chose to intervene directly in Bosnia through NATO, and the UN was leading the mission, it made NATO retaliation the last resort. Lake 1994-11-30, U.S. Department of State Dispatch.

117 See Warren Christopher, ”NATO and US Foreign Policy”, excerpts from the intervention at the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (1993-02-26), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 4, no. 9, 1993). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no09.html [online 2008-04-05]. In line with such a more vague initial approach, also statements on NATO in terms of a peacekeeping role in support of the UN or CSCE was discussed within NATO, as commenced during the Bush presidency. See White House, “President Meets with NATO Secretary General”, statement by the White House Press Secretary (1993-03-02), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 4, no. 10, 1993). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no10.html [online 2008-04-05].


119 Interview Goldgeier 2007.

120 Interview Dobbins 2007. NATO was accordingly from 1993 seen the right instrument for U.S. engagement if the U.S. should decide to engage, see also Stephen A. Oxman [Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs], “Status of the Bosnian Peace Negotiation”, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1993-10-05), U.S. Department of State Dispatch (vol. 4, no. 42, 1993). Available at: http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no42.html [online 2008-04-05].


122 Interview Shea 2008.
As the Russians were partners in the Bosnia engagement, implying that as political engagement integrated former adversaries, military engagement could evolve as a new strategy to both the U.S. and NATO. In the late 1990s, the Kosovo intervention could be built upon the experiences gained and the role developed in the Bosnia engagement.\(^{123}\) The “out of area” engagement role could also here be applied, even outside the UN framework and with initial opposition by Russia.

At the same time, the American reluctance to make long term commitments, outlined above, in the form of stability or peacekeeping missions, had implications for the role of the alliance in such missions. Initially, the U.S. had seen the UN primarily relevant to perform such missions. At the same time, parallel to the Bosnia crisis, the administration came to see it more relevant for NATO to perform missions of crisis management and peacekeeping.\(^{124}\) In this way allied burden sharing would ease the need for the U.S. committing troops and resources itself, relevant to the Balkans engagements.

Firstly, NATO from 1993 supported UN peace engagement in Bosnia.\(^{125}\) The same year, the administration in a general approach, but still somewhat vaguely, suggested that it might be necessary for the alliance to assume a European peacekeeping role in the post-Cold War reality.\(^{126}\) After the 1995 American brokered Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO became responsible for the Implementation Force (IFOR).\(^{127}\) From December 1996 NATO led the international stabilization force (SFOR) to maintain a peaceful environment in Bosnia. After the initial Kosovo engagement, NATO was given responsibility for the peacekeeping Kosovo force (KFOR) from March 1999. In this way, NATO, and primarily European troop

\(^{123}\) Also confirmed by at the time spokesman of NATO and NATO Deputy Director of Information and Press, Jamie Shea. Interview Shea 2008.


\(^{125}\) See John Kriendler [NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs; Director, Political Directorate], "NATO's Changing Role Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping", *NATO Review* (vol. 41, no. 3, 1993).


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contingents, facilitated for peacekeeping and stability after the initial intervention. This implied that while the Americans were central in the decision to engage, and in the principal military implementation, the Europeans within NATO had relatively larger responsibility for post-conflict peacekeeping engagement. Such an implementation was consistent with Clinton’s disinclination to long-term U.S. commitment after initial military engagement, as well as general U.S. insistence on allied burden-sharing.

The beginning of a more global outlook and role for NATO also appeared during the Clinton presidency. But compared with the initial engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo, it was not as crisis-driven. More globally, the U.S. had been concerned with threats primarily located in Asia, separate from the transatlantic dimension, in what has been described as fragmentation in the above section on strategic areas, allies and partners. The second term of the Clinton presidency also commenced with an understanding of NATO as the anchor of U.S. engagement in Europe, while at the same time outlining that more global threats, such as rogue states and terrorism, were common dangers for the alliance. U.S. initiatives within these areas to some extent spilled over into the agenda of the alliance. Still, this was more vaguely implemented in the 1999 ASC, but nonetheless was perceived by the Clinton administration as at least a partial adaptation of U.S. strategic concerns.

Towards the end of the presidency, it was underlined that rogue states with WMD capabilities was as much a threat to the allies as was the threat of military invasion in the Cold War. In the alliance strategic concept (ASC) of 1999, the allies saw WMD proliferation and terrorism as concerns and risks, while not stating them as explicit threats. Such an inclusion partially expanded NATO’s perceptions of threats, towards including more fragmented and global types of threats. This was commented on by the administration as: “The strategic concept adopted this year was evolutionary, not revolutionary. […] we updated our assessment of threat, and adapted our philosophy of the capabilities and strategies needed

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to meet them.”\textsuperscript{131} NATO stated that the alliance had to take account of the global context, and recognized the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as a serious concern.\textsuperscript{132}

On the other hand, such threats were not articulated in a specifically global manner, and remained as more potential concerns of the alliance. President Clinton reported to Congress on the 1999 ASC, pointing out that the proliferation of WMDs represented a real threat to allied populations, territory and military forces.\textsuperscript{133} More particularly, he linked these threats to developments in South Asia, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, and consequently well beyond the transatlantic area. Clinton also applied the term rogue states. But the allies had not applied the rogue states term, and particular countries threatening the alliance had not been recognized by NATO. In this way, the allies had not applied as specific an outlook as had the U.S. The heading of Clinton’s reports also characterized such threats to NATO as potential. Concerning terrorism, the equivalent was observable.\textsuperscript{134}

This implied that while thinking of global concerns, the alliance did not obtain a role outside the broader Euro-Atlantic area during the Clinton presidency, and in countering such broader potential threats.\textsuperscript{135} The administration had asserted before the completion of the ASC, that it did not intend to make a “global NATO”.\textsuperscript{136} James Dobbins in retrospect commented in this manner on the outreach of NATO in terms of rogue states during the Clinton administration:

\begin{quote}
Clinton’s approach to rogue states did not see NATO as a likely instrument in a short time frame. Of course there was Serbia, if it was to be considered a rogue state. If Libya had been a problem the administration needed to deal with, NATO might have been relevant, but not on Iran, North Korea, etc.\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

Dobbins among other positions served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on the Balkans, and was the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} Slocombe 1999-10-28, Congress.
\item \textsuperscript{132} ASC 1999: paragraphs 22 and 24. See also Robert P. Grant, “Sustaining the U.S. Commitment to NATO”, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), \textit{A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years} (New York: Palgrave 2001 [volume 2]): 53-55.
\item \textsuperscript{134} See ASC 1999: paragraph 24; Clinton 2000-01-31: 4, Congress.
\item \textsuperscript{135} According to Jamie Shea, “as seen in the Balkan case, the evolution of NATO in the post-Cold War period was mainly crises-driven” (Interview Shea 2008). In light of such a statement, it is possible to point out that as the global threats of rogue states, terrorism and WMD proliferation did not produce imminent crises, it contributed to the fact that NATO did not obtain as specific an approach to such threats, in addition to the fact that they were located outside the broader Euro-Atlantic area.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Albright 1998-05-28, \textit{U.S. Department of State Dispatch}. The European and Atlantic nature of NATO, as opposed to global, was also underlined after the Kosovo engagement. Albright 1999-06-28, \textit{U.S. Department of State Dispatch}.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Interview Dobbins 2007.
\end{itemize}
administration’s special envoy to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and later the special envoy of the G. W. Bush administration to Afghanistan. According to his statement, the Clinton administration’s strategy did not include NATO in more global engagements outside the broader Euro-Atlantic area, within the short time frame at least. He speculated that Libya might have become a case for NATO. But as that was not an issue, and Libya could have been seen as closer to the Euro-Atlantic zone, NATO still did not engage outside its broader area. In such a perspective, NATO recognized new and broader threats to the alliance, but it did not obtain a role in countering them. The U.S. ambassador to NATO up to 1998, commented in 1999 that: “At least for the near future, agreement between the allies to act in the Middle East will almost certainly be limited to so-called coalitions of the willing”. 138 And as the conflict in the Balkans was seen as an internal conflict, and the definition of a rogue state derived from its international affairs, NATO did not militarily engage towards broader threats than internal conflicts during the Clinton presidency. The administration stated that it saw NATO as a possible institution to deal with for instance WMD proliferation. 139 But deliberations on a broader role did not manifest itself into actual strategic implementation.

Statements by the administration vaguely opened for broader concerns of the alliance. NATO documents gained an increasingly global focus, but actual engagement was limited to “out of area” engagements in the extended Euro-Atlantic area. A participant assessment of NATO perceived the alliance as crisis driven. 140 In other words, the alliance in practical terms acted reactively, engaged against actual crises in the Balkans, but did not in fact counter what was considered merely potential threats. Nonetheless, such a broadening of security concerns, as well as the actual engagements in the Balkans, came to form a background to build on for the more globally implemented strategies seen in Clinton’s aftermath. 141 Accordingly, similar to the state of affairs at the end of the Bush presidency, broader thinking of the alliance’s role in the post-Cold War world existed, but would only be implemented by the administration’s successor. Within the Clinton presidency then, the alliance’s role transformed in line with the restrained evolution of U.S. engagement strategies in the Balkans, implementing a role engaging “out of area” in the broader transatlantic area. But more globally, while indications of broadened NATO threat perceptions, U.S. engagement strategy was fundamentally formed fragmented from the transatlantic dimension.

139 See Albright 1998-12-08, U.S. Department of State Dispatch.
140 Interview Shea 2008.
141 Jamie Shea stated that the application of NATO in Afghanistan could not have been made without the Balkan experiences. Interview Shea 2008.
Conclusions

The Clinton administration’s strategy of engagement represented a fully fledged new strategy of the administration, although policies were formed in relation to specific events, and within a diverse and complex strategic environment. Compared with the previous Bush administration, the new Clinton administration initially continued along some of the lines of its predecessors, especially as the administration did not seriously respond to the internal conflict in Bosnia until 1995. But the elements of an engagement strategy seen in the Bush Gulf War became more prominent in the Clinton presidency. With an escalation of the Somalia engagement, and the engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo, a military engagement strategy was implemented. Such engagements deepened into internal affairs, as opposed to the more specifically state-to-state regional outlook of Bush. Still, engagements were made with restraints, and did not include the Rwanda conflict. In response to the threat of rogue states and to some extent WMD proliferation, military engagement was indicated and planned for, but implemented only to a limited degree. Nonetheless it marked a departure from previous containment and deterrence strategies. The political engagement with former objects of Cold War containment also underlined the new approach of the administration, and implicitly contributed to the freedom of action underpinning the implementation of forward military engagement.

While strategies of engagement became implemented in the U.S. strategic approach, NATO formed a new role, from being a territorially defensive organization to engaging “out of area”. Such a role was firstly implemented in the Bosnia operation, and the Kosovo engagement was later added. More global threat concerns, of rogue states, WMD proliferation and international terrorism became evident to the alliance by the end of the Clinton presidency. But in terms of actual strategy, U.S. engagements in these cases were primarily seen fragmented from the transatlantic alliance. In this way, the NATO role “out of area” was confined to the broader transatlantic area. NATO in reality did not obtain a global role.
“It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.”

Introduction

During the presidency of George Walker Bush, the September 11, 2001, attacks by the terrorist network Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were the most influential events forming American policies. As the quote indicates, it manifested a pro-active and offensive U.S. policy towards new threats. The NATO allies for the first time in history invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic treaty, a statement that the attack represented an aggression against them all. The Bush administration engaged in a new War on Terrorism, militarily fought in Afghanistan. In 2003, the U.S. went to war in Iraq, and NATO got responsibility for the Afghanistan engagement. The alliance continued the enlargement process set in motion during the previous presidential period, formally implemented through the 2004 inclusion of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The following chapter analyzes the national security strategies of the U.S. and their implications for NATO during the presidency of G. W. Bush, from the inauguration in January 2001 to 2003. The chapter argues that the appointment of the new administration made U.S. strategy turn more U.S. focused. In terms of U.S. strategic assessments, this meant that the administration contended that American strategy should be made in line with direct U.S. interests. Bush’s initial claim of the U.S. as a “humble nation” rhetorically illustrated such an approach. After the September 11 attacks, the administration engaged in a massive
War on Terrorism. The Iraqi War introduced preventive strike as an instrument in Bush’s strategy. In this way, the administration moved towards a U.S. focused strategy of offensive engagement. In such a way, the strategic response, military engagement, represented a continuum from previous post-Cold War administrations. But under Bush, such a strategic approach was changed from a reactive nature, responding to conflicts, to pro-actively counter a perceived threat such as Iraq. By centering on threats in the Middle East, and performing more unilaterally than its predecessors, NATO initially appeared less strategically important to the administration. As U.S. threat perceptions became more focused after the 9/11 attacks, it did not provide an equally cohesive foundation for NATO’s role as the Cold War threat. NATO gradually broadened its role outside Europe through the global “out of area” operation in Afghanistan, but did not support the war in Iraq.

In line with previous chapters, U.S. interests and objectives; perception of threats; strategic areas allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation will be discussed in this chapter on the G. W. Bush administration. In this way, it completes the analysis of U.S. post-Cold War strategies of engagement, and the evolution of the role of NATO within them.

**Interests and Objectives**

The Bush administration’s perceptions of U.S. interests and objectives were in line with its broader, more U.S. focused policies and strategy. Interests centered on homeland security. The administration, as previous ones, identified the promotion of democracy as an objective favorable to the security of the U.S., especially determinedly expressed in the post-9/11 state of affairs. Related to such an objective, the administration also saw an interest in reducing the influence of Islamic extremism. Finally, U.S. global primacy was perceived as an underlying propitious premise.

First of all, both before and increasingly after September 11, 2001, the administration defined U.S. security interests more directly than its predecessor did, ultimately expressed in a preoccupation with homeland security. Generally, this meant that ensuring the security of the U.S. state and its citizens was the administration’s number one objective. Naturally, such vital interests would be prioritized by any administration. But the new Bush administration declared a reduced interest in more indirect interests, as it argued that the Clinton administration had pursued too broad an agenda, and that the new Republican administration

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3 The administration applied the term “pre-emptive strike”, but as such a strike was implemented without the presence of a direct, immediate and specific threat, there is general understanding that the term “preventive strike” describes the means applied by the administration. See for instance Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *War and the American Presidency* (New York: Norton & Company 2005): 23. For the administration’s perception, see NSS 2002: 15.
would refocus U.S. national interests and pursue key priorities. After September 11, 2001, direct homeland security was underlined as the central interest of the administration. Having experienced an attack on the U.S, the 2002 NSS stated that: “Defending our Nation against its enemies it’s the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government”. Such perceptions illustrated more directly perceived U.S. focused interests and objectives.

But that did not mean that the administration was isolationist, and that it did not place U.S. interests and objectives within a more global realm. The interest in homeland security was seen as connected with other U.S. interests in a global context.

Accordingly, also the Bush administration saw American interests in promoting democracy in the international sphere. “American values are universal”, the to-become national security advisor of the president, Condoleezza Rice, argued during the 2000 presidential election campaign. President Bush in January 2001 stated that: “America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom”. The 2002 NSS underlined such values under the slogan of “champion aspirations for human dignity”. U.S. interests in open economies were also discussed in the 2002 NSS. Through the War on Terrorism and Iraq, the interest in democratic regime change seemed more at focus than the economical aspects of promoting American values. In addition, by applying military means to promote such change, the interest in democracy appeared more central to the administration than it did to its predecessors, by making it part of decisions on war and peace. At the same time, such a determined promotion of American values was connected with other U.S. interests as well. Accordingly, and similar to previous U.S. administrations, the Bush administration also cooperated with many undemocratic countries. As Rice put it, “it is simply not possible to ignore and isolate other powerful states that do not

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5 This was for instance expressed in the administration' proposal to launch a new department, the Department of Homeland Security. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the primary mission of the Department was stated as: “a) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; b) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; [and] c) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States […]”.Congress, "Public Law 107-296: An Act to Establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes” (2002): 8. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf [online 2008-01-18]. See also NSS 2002: 6.

6 NSS 2002: iv.

7 Rice 2000: 49.


9 NSS 2002: 3-4.

share these values”.11 In this way, while the instruments applied in promoting democratic regimes became more powerful or extreme with Bush, the administration did not engage in an unconditional crusade towards promoting worldwide democratic systems of government.

Subsequently, the administration’s objective of reducing or eliminating the influence of Islamic extremism represented the flip side of its interest in promoting democracy. The interest in diminishing rivaling attitudes had been visible before the 9/11 attacks.12 But similar to the U.S. interest in promoting democratic values, such an interest was perceived immensely more central in the War on Terrorism. Bush stated that: “We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threat from terrorists and tyrants”.13 The administration consequently saw an interest in countering the influence of radical movements and regimes connected to the stable U.S. interest in promoting democratic values.

Beneath the directly perceived interest in the security of the U.S., in promoting of democratic systems of government, and implicitly reducing the influence of Islamic extremism, the administration favored an American position of global primacy. Ideologically, the stable promotion of American values underlined the interest in ensuring the American position. More concretely, President Bush stated that: “[w]e will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite challenge”.14 The NSS 2002 declared that: “The United States possesses unprecedented – and unequaled – strength and influence in the world”; and that “[o]ur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States”.15 In this way, the administration saw the unrivalled and dominant U.S. position in the world as an overall interest of the U.S. Also, the quotes underlined the quite military or physical perception of such favorable U.S. primacy.

11 Rice 2000: 49.
12 For instance, the CIA had informed that “Islamic militancy is expanding, and the worldwide pool of potential recruits for terrorist networks is growing. In central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, Islamic terrorist organizations are trying to attract new recruits, including under the banner of anti-Americanism.” George J. Tenet, “DCI’s Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World”, statement by Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2001-02-07). Available at: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2001/UNCLASWWHT_02072001.html [online 2007-12-10]. The terrorist threat is discussed explicitly in the following section on threat perceptions.
15 NSS 2002: 1 and 30.
With regard to the transatlantic dimension, the administration perceived an “interest in shaping the European defense identity – welcoming a greater European military capability as long as it is within the context of NATO”. The administration accordingly was skeptical of single-European initiatives in the security field, as previous administrations had been before it. Consequently, the administration maintained the American interest in NATO as a favorable structure for Europe. U.S. influence was institutionalized through the alliance, and ensured the primary position of the U.S. in the region. At the same time, while interested in keeping European security and defense policies within an American consensus, the administration did not necessarily view such cooperation as central to the implementation of U.S. strategy, as will be elaborated on in the section on strategic areas, allies and partners.

Related to such an interest in the unrivaled position of the U.S. and the American influence in Europe, Bush’s predecessors had articulated an interest in U.S. international leadership. The G. W. Bush administration stated that it would lead in the international mission to ensure “freedom’s triumph” against its enemies. It also stated that it would use the “full influence of the United States, and work closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate”. In this way, the Bush administration also underlined that it would take the lead in its War on Terrorism. But implicitly, the quotes focused on the “influence” of the U.S., “that it would make clear” in the world, and that it was the mission, as the administration defined it, that it would lead. Accordingly, the position of the U.S., which provided such influence, seemed to be articulated more determinedly than the predecessors’, at least rhetorical, focus on international leadership. The Bush administration’s interest in global primacy tended to be more an interest in dominating, less than leading, international relations.

Summing up, the Bush administration’s interests and objectives focused on the more directly articulated security interests of the U.S. or its homeland security. In addition, the promotion of democratic values, and subsequent the reduction of the influence of Islamic extremism, was an objective of the administration. Overall, the U.S. interest in its primary position in the world and transatlantic relations was underlined. These interests and objectives would seem more urgently threatened in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and thus were to provide a foundation for a more pro-active, or offensive, strategic outlook.

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17 NSS 2002: vi.
Perception of Threats

In view of that, the intensity felt in U.S. threat perceptions increased severely by the 9/11 events, as international terrorism became the overall dominant threat as perceived by the administration. In addition, the threat of the proliferation of WMDs and rogue states was seen as more acute than potential. These threats had been previously identified, but with the attack on American ground, the vulnerability felt deepened such threat perceptions. In addition, the fear of possibly emerging major powers was a continuous feature in U.S. threat perceptions, even tough less visible on the post-9/11 U.S. agenda.

With the Al Qaeda attacks, international terrorism came to forefront of U.S. threat perceptions. While post-Cold War threats had not been perceived as so urgent and directly threatening as the Cold War Soviet threat, the administration now countered a possibly new and equivalent threat. The remarkable swiftness of the attack and it being the first attack on U.S. territory since Pearl Harbor, and this time within two of the major cities of the U.S. mainland, the threat was seen as extraordinary. The terrorist attack produced a new dominant threat perception posed by a non-state extremist movement. Although the administration perceived it as a new dominant threat, there were apparent differences from the Cold War threat. It was an asymmetrical threat, as Al Qaeda was not a state actor the U.S. could retaliate against. At the same time, the threat became coupled with state threats, as failed or rogue states sponsoring or hiding terrorists were seen as jointly responsible. The lack of economic development and functioning political institutions were seen as a foundation for having terrorists harboring within their borders, for instance as the administration came to see it in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{19} The possibility of a terrorist or rogue state acquisition of WMDs was also underlined.\textsuperscript{20}

In terms of the terrorist threat being existential or not, the 2002 NSS did not refer to such a term. On occasion the term was nonetheless applied by representatives of the administration.\textsuperscript{21} From an objective stance, seeing existential threats as threats being able to overthrow the complete existence a nation, as in the Cold War age of adversary nuclear capabilities, the attacks did not pose such a threat. But in line with the administration’s perceptions, arguing that terrorism, rogues states and WMD capability were interrelated, threat perceptions, to the later observer, coalesced in the American perceptions of the War on Terrorism.

\textsuperscript{19} NSS 2002: v.
\textsuperscript{20} The threat of rogue states and the proliferation of WMDs will be elaborated on below.
Even though international terrorism became the single most important perceived threat in the post September 11, 2001 world, international terrorism was recognized as a pending threat to the U.S. also before the attacks. In a February 7, 2001, statement by the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, transnational threats, and the threat of international terrorism was seen as a first priority, as “[f]or me, the highest priority must invariably be on those things that threaten the lives of Americans or the physical security of the United States”. Hereunder, Osama bin Laden and the global Al Qaeda network were seen as “the most immediate and serious threat”. Such a threat perception was in line with the administration’s more U.S. focused and home centered interest perceptions also visible before the September 11 attacks. Also in the pre 9/11-history of the U.S., had rogue states been perceived as a threat related to its interconnection with WMD acquisition and possibly terrorism. But differently, with the 9/11 attack, such threat scenarios were perceived more acute than solely potential.

In this way, the threat of rogue states was seen as partially interlinked with the terrorist threat, at the same time that it represented an individual and to some degree continuous feature of U.S. threat perceptions. While Clinton had been concerned with rogue states, the Bush administration now saw such countries as even more threatening, and threatening in a way that demanded more pro-active action. The administration contained members who viewed rogue states as intolerable from early on, while others reached such a position in the wake of 9/11. Iraq was then the most important rogue state threat. From an early stage, such a threat perception, specified to Iraq, was evident in a letter sent to then President Clinton in 1998. The letter was signed by among others Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, who were to become Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first term Bush presidency, and called for U.S. military intervention to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Such a threat perception then posed the question of the intentions of the Iraqi regime vis-à-vis U.S. and what capabilities it would be able to mount. The administration post 9/11 tried to indicate a connection between the terrorist threat and Iraq, stating that Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda cooperated. By that, the administration feared that the regime had intentions of collaborating with terrorists to pursue plans hostile to the U.S.

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22 Tenet 2001, Congress.
24 See for example Anders G. Romarheim, “Definitions of Strategic Political Communication”, paper 689 by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005: 19. See also NSS 2002: 14 in terms of rogue states perceived as sponsoring terrorism.
The diffusion of the term War on Terrorism and the War in Iraq also underlines such a rhetorical interconnection, while in reality it was a “separate war in Iraq”. The Bush administration also referred to the rogue states threat as the “axis of evil”, linking North Korea and Iran to the Iraqi threat. The rhetoric on rogue states in this way had hardened as compared to that of the administration’s predecessors. Rogue states were among other things classified as states that “hate the United States and everything for which it stands”. Broadly, the rhetoric of the perspective of the threat of terrorism and rogue states bore a resemblance to Cold War views of the “evil Soviet empire” in a post-9/11 security environment that was perceived more directly threatening than the preceding post-Cold War period. Accordingly, Bush would “rid the world of evil”. In this perspective, a more offensive strategy was seen to be applicable.

Next, the U.S. administration continued fear the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which was seen both related to the rogue state and terrorist threat, as well as to the proliferation engineered by other powers. The threat of WMD acquisition by nations hostile to the U.S. was visible before the September 11 attacks. President Bush stated that: “[w]e will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors”. While such a perspective had been present also during the Clinton presidency, the urgency and interconnectedness between threats in the post 9/11 situation made such a threat appear more acute to the administration. The 2002 NSS compared the threat of rogue states and terrorism to the Cold War Soviet threat, underlining that the greater likelihood that they would use WMDs made the present security situation more complex and dangerous than in the Cold War balance of terror. Also the controversial Colin Powell presentation to the UN Security Council before the War on Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was capable of acquiring WMD capability underlined the perceived urgency concerning these threats.

Followed by such U.S. threat perceptions of international terrorism, rogue states and the proliferation of WMDs, NATO threat perceptions were to some degree altered. WMD proliferation, international terrorism and states that potentially could produce regional crises had been vaguely included into NATO threat perceptions at the end of the Clinton presidency.

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27 Bush quoted in NSS 2002: 5.
The September 11, 2001 attacks and the following activation of Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, then caused NATO threat perceptions to broaden beyond the more limited “out of area” approach pursued during the Clinton presidency. But while terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs gradually came into the center of allied threat perceptions, the NATO allies did not agree on the Iraqi threat before the 2003 U.S. intervention. As such, allied threat perceptions did not follow American perspectives fully. As was the case of terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, allied perceptions were lagging behind American initiatives, and were not fully as determined and offensive as those of the U.S.

At the same time that relatively new and more transnational threats became increasingly dominant on the U.S. agenda, and eventually also to some degree to NATO allies, more traditional threat concerns were also visible. As the administration saw an interest in American global primacy, the possibilities of the emergence of other great powers was a continuous concern of the administration. According to Rice it was necessary to build American power, and especially military power, and focus on U.S. relations with other powerful states. Also the previous post-Cold War administrations had seen new emerging powers as a potential threat to the dominant position of the U.S. Linked to the continuity in the people holding positions in the administration, such perceptions might echo the DoD draft of 1992, discussed in the chapter on the G. H. W. Bush administration.

The CIA indicated that Russia under President Putin was trying to restore aspects of the Soviet past, “status as a great power, strong central authority, and a stable and predictable society […] and] may be resurrecting the Soviet-era zero-sum approach to foreign policy”. In the wake of 9/11, the administration asserted that it did not see NATO and Russia as adversaries, and rather emphasized the cooperative aspects of the relationship. The 2002 NSS consequently commented that Russia was “in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror”. Thus there were fears that Russian relations would become more hostile to the U.S. pre-9/11, but in the War on Terrorism, in the short term, cooperation eased possible tensions. Generally, the administration, as previous ones, wanted to promote democracy and economic openness in both China and Russia as that was seen as “the best foundations for domestic stability and

31 Rice 2000.
32 Tenet 2001, Congress.
34 NSS 2002: v.
international order.” Concerning China, CIA asserted in early 2001 that the country’s “drive for recognition as a Great Power is one of the toughest challenges we face. Beijing’s goal of becoming a key world player and especially more powerful in East Asia has come sharply into focus.” For the administration, there existed a fear of the emergence of new great powers, but it did not see any present-day great power threat to the U.S. or the transatlantic alliance, thus looking to resurrect a more traditional foundation of the transatlantic security community in great power deterrence. While the Bush administration actively wanted to uphold the American dominant position in the world, and wanted to make sure that the military power of the U.S. ensured it, at that point emerging great powers were not imminent.

In sum, the administration’s more U.S. focused policies and the reactions to the 9/11 attacks meant that indirect threats were not central on the administration’s agenda. The threat perception of international terrorism and rogue states in the War on Terrorism and Iraq became dominant. The threat of the proliferation of WMDs was seen interconnected with these types of threats. In this way, American threat perceptions seemed to become more focused in the post-9/11 world. Threats were now largely located in Asia, or especially the Middle East. Threats previously identified as merely potential, were perceived as more acute. A new dominant threat perspective was outlined, and central threats were argued to be interlinked with one another, mirroring a new focus partly equivalent to Cold War monolithic threat perceptions. In addition, the administration’s interest in U.S. primacy meant that emerging powers represented a potential threat, outside the agenda set by the 9/11 attacks. NATO became influenced by reinforced U.S. threat perceptions, especially in terms of allied support to the U.S. in acknowledging the terrorist threat. But the opposition to Iraq also meant that many European allies did not perceive this threat as severe that preventive action was demanded, as the administration did. In light of that, NATO threat perceptions did not necessarily perceive threats as interlinked with one another as the Bush administration largely argued.

Strategic Areas, Allies and Partners
The strengthened threat perceptions of terrorism, rogue states and WMDs meant that the Bush administration’s strategic focus in the War on Terrorism was primarily on the Middle East. By forming strategies largely on its own, supported by ad hoc coalitions of the willing in the initial Afghanistan and the Iraq engagements, the Cold War founded system of alliances was

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35 NSS 2002: v.
36 Tenet 2001, Congress.
not an integral part of the new strategic focus of the U.S. Cooperation through NATO was affirmed by the administration, and NATO continued the enlargement processes in Eastern Europe, although the practical importance of the alliance in overall U.S. strategy seemed to depend on an evolution of a global, flexible role.

This means that the administration’s more directly perceived interests and threats produced an inclination towards unilateralism, and that policies were only pragmatically multilateral, if possible to combine with more unrestrained American interests. The 2002 NSS stated that the administration would “implement its strategies by organizing coalitions – as broad as possible – of states able and willing”. In such a way the administration said it would cooperate with willing and able states. But with the limitation of such cooperation to implementation, deliberations on what strategic responses to make was indicatively seen as confined to the Americans themselves, implying that consultation was not an integral part of the administration’s view of international cooperation. According to an NSC staffer, also concerning missile defense, the Bush administration did not consult allies, it informed. When criticized for lack of consultation with NATO allies concerning perceived threats, the administration asserted that it did spend much time talking with the Europeans. But in doing so, it also said that it was explaining to the Europeans what the administration’s policies were. Consequently, and as seen in the post 9/11 situation, if NATO or other organizations would be capable of doing what the U.S. wanted, and had instruments to do so, such cooperative structures might be relevant to the administration. Referring to the introductory definition of multilateralism as interrelated with consultation, the administration’s strategic approach then seemed more unilateral than its predecessors.

Such a pragmatic approach to international cooperation gave room for the so-called coalitions of the willing, ad hoc coalitions to support what the U.S. more or less planned on its own. The administration stated that it was committed to lasting institutions and alliances, but admitted that it saw coalitions of the willing as an augmentation of these permanent relationships. In practice, such coalitions became not an augmentation, but rather an alternative to allied contributions and UN mandate, when it came to the implementation of the

37 NSS 2002: 25.
38 Indicatively, the administration if not acting “alone”, would “strive to enlist the support of the international community”[Italics put by author]. NSS 2002: 6.
39 Interview Harrison 2007.
40 Jones 2002-03-13: 17, Congress.
41 At the same time, the strategic climate in Washington after 9/11 might have contributed to such unilateralism among other administrations too. A U.S. representative stated that a Democratic administration would perhaps also have acted unilaterally after the September 11 attacks. Interview Dobbins 2007.
42 NSS 2002: vi.
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. Compared with the first Bush administration’s Gulf War, and the perceptions within the DoD at that time, the perceived applicability of ad hoc coalitions were similar. At the same time, the Gulf War had been fought under UN mandate, and consultation through for instance NATO had been underlined. Consequently, while ad hoc coalitions of the willing had been present earlier on, the administration’s military engagements after 9/11 was fundamentally based on ad hoc support to initial U.S. planning. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s assertion that “the mission will define the coalition – not the other way around”, thus indicated that permanent institutions and alliances, committed multilateralism, were not emphasized or integral in the administration’s global War on Terrorism.

In terms of strategic areas, strengthened perceptions of threats located in the Middle East meant that the administration’s focus on this region became highlighted. This means that with the inauguration of George W. Bush, Europe implicitly came to decline on the American agenda, relative to the Middle East. Especially the neo-conservatives in U.S. politics were disinterested in Europe before 9/11. According to neo-conservative views, present among representatives of the administration, NATO could no longer be seen as an unambiguously useful asset of the United States. After the September 11 attacks, with dominating threats located outside Europe, and what was seen as a European unwillingness and inability to build military capacities, Europe seemed less interesting in this view. Possible allied cooperation in the initial war against Afghanistan accordingly seemed more constraining than enabling to the administration. With Rumsfeld’s emphasis on willing coalitions, the U.S. should act according to its case, with whoever supported what the administration decided. Also emphasis put on the assistance of regional allies indicated that the permanent Western alliance did not necessarily seem fruitful to the administration’s implementation of the War on Terrorism.

The basic consultative feature of NATO’s role was also less relevant as the administration formed strategic responses on its own.

On the other hand, the administration, as previous ones, recognized NATO as a central defense organization. The NSS stated that NATO was one of the “strongest and most able international institutions in the world”, which “has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security”. But as the Bush administration was relatively less interested in international organizations and multilateralism, such an interest was to some extent less firm than with Bush’s predecessors. In such a way, the administration went on to announce that “[t]he alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions”. In this way, the practical importance of NATO was linked to it being flexible within U.S. strategies in the War on Terrorism, and that it needed to be able to act in a global sphere. In 2003, the alliance obtained the responsibility for the Afghan stability mission.

The administration supported continued eastward NATO enlargement, thus following up on the political engagement of the Clinton administration in the region. As for the Iraqi war, where “old” allies in Western Europe had opposed the U.S., Eastern European allies were substantially more positive. Also the support of Russia in the War on Terrorism indicated cooperative features in the east of Europe. Referring to the chapter on the Clinton period, the preoccupation with Europe existed parallel with other foci, as part of a more fragmented security environment. The continuation of NATO enlargement meant that the alliance remained central within U.S. strategy in Europe, as it had been with Clinton. But with the Bush administration’s highlighted focus on the Middle East, in stead of more equally centering on different regions at the same time, such a political development within Europe was not as essential to overall U.S. strategy as before. Rather, the allies’ ability to assure flexible and global support in another region seemed to be the foundation of which NATO might continue to be relevant to the U.S.

Beyond the increased focus on the Middle East, and the decreased centrality of Europe, other areas were of interest to the administration. The administration continued to perceive other areas in Asia as important to U.S. interests. Principally this meant that the administration upheld bilateral relationships in Asia, and that the administration maintained an eye on the developments in China. Elsewhere, for instance in Africa, the administration saw fewer direct interests of the United States. Here, the administration stated that: “Africa’s size and diversity requires a security strategy that focuses on bilateral engagement and builds

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47 NSS 2002: 25.
48 NSS 2002: 25.
49 See NATO 2002-11-21: paragraph 2.
50 With some exceptions, most notably the United Kingdom.
51 Interview Flournoy 2007.
coalitions of the willing”. Even if previous U.S. administrations had not centered on building permanent partnerships in Africa, the statement indicated that the administration saw ad hoc cooperation as most fitting also in this less strategically important continent.

Compared with the Cold War, where the transatlantic alliance had been an integral part of the complete U.S. strategic picture, the new and formative War on Terrorism did not include NATO or Europe as self-evidently central players. Within Europe, enlargement indicated that NATO was still perceived as a relevant organization. But the overall focus of the administration was to counter threats in the Middle East, which were perceived reinforced in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In doing so, the U.S. made decisions by itself, and only more pragmatically cooperated through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. In this way, NATO needed to be flexible and global to become part of overall U.S. strategies. As the NATO allies would partly broaden its role in countering non-European threats, the fragmentation between NATO’s role and global U.S. strategies seen after the Cold War was in some ways reduced as NATO engaged outside the broader Euro-Atlantic area. But the U.S. inclination to unilateralism, and European opposition to the War in Iraq, meant that allied coherence on these completely “out of area” engagements was not integral; that the new U.S. focus in the War on Terrorism did not make post-Cold War fragmentation gone.

**Strategic Thinking and Implementation**

When turning towards the strategic thinking and implementation of the administration, the task is then to understand how the direct and U.S. centered interests of the administration; the preoccupation with threats in the Middle East; and the more pragmatic and less consultative view on cooperation, became part of a strategy ultimately leading towards offensive engagement in the post-9/11 environment.

An appraisal of U.S. security strategy before the September 11 attacks must largely be based in the administration’s strategic thinking and planning, and not actual strategic implementation. The reason is that the administration did not substantially engage in these eight months, at least when applying a military understanding of the term. Accordingly, in addition to the administration’s wordings, the appraisal must try to take hold of what the absence of engagements may indicate, beyond the state of international affairs at the time. The administration argued that it should not apply American force unless clear U.S. interests were at stake, criticizing the Clinton administration for having had too broad an agenda.  

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52 NSS 2002: 11.
53 See section on interests and objectives.
Indicatively, the administration’s strategy appeared more focused on the U.S., with a declining interest in so-called humanitarian interventions, and emphasis put on attaining a national missile defense. This implied that engagements were not ruled out, but just that they would be made more selectively, when seen to be in the direct interest of the U.S. The change produced by the September 11 attacks underlined such an interpretation, as a clear threat to U.S. security then made the administration call for offensive engagement in the new War on Terrorism.

But to return to the pre-9/11 situation; Bush had campaigned arguing that the U.S. should be a “humble nation”. In his outline of such a term, the principle for engagement and the possible use of American force would be guided by a question of “what's in the best interest of the United States? What's in the best interest of our people? When it comes to foreign policy, that will be my guiding question. Is it in our nation's interests?”54 By saying that clearer U.S. interests would be the guide to decisions on engagement, the administration formed more selectively U.S. focused policies. In this way, an evaluation of U.S. interests in different scenarios, conflicts and wars would form the basis for a strategy of engagement. As discussed in the section on interests and objectives, other administrations would of course also refer to U.S. national interests before engaging. But Bush wanted to distinguish himself from previous approaches, by emphasizing that he would only engage according to more narrowly defined interests, and implicitly only if confronted with more direct threats to the U.S.

As engagements would be selected according to more directly perceived U.S. interests, peacekeeping missions were not regarded as the appropriate use of American force. Accordingly, the administration’s approach has been characterized as an attitude implying that: “Any so-called humanitarian interventions would be driven by security concerns, not humanitarian impulses.”55 Simultaneously, Bush agreed that the Clinton administration’s decision to intervene in the Balkans was right, but preferred that the Europeans would handle the continued need for peacekeeping.56 Bush stated that: “I hope our European friends become the peacekeepers in Bosnia and in the Balkans. I hope that they put the troops on the ground, so that we can withdraw our troops and focus our military on fighting and winning war”.57 In this way, if U.S. security interests were directly threatened, the U.S. would engage, while broader missions did not seem interesting to the administration.

54 Bush in PBS 2000-10-12.
56 Bush in PBS 2000-10-12.
57 Bush in PBS 2000-10-12.
The administration’s pre-9/11 concern with acquiring a national missile defense also underlined this evolution of a more U.S. focused strategy. According to a participant in the transition from Clinton to Bush, the Bush administration’s preoccupation with missile defense represented the immediately greatest divergence from Clinton’s security interests.58 For the Bush administration, the interest in obtaining a national missile defense, and leaving the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, underlined the more direct or narrower perspective to national security than was the case with its predecessor,59 in the administration’s pre-9/11 history. It also implied that rogue states and the possible proliferation of WMDs were seen as potential threats to the U.S. At the same time, missile defense had been discussed during the 1960s, 1980s and briefly during the Clinton presidency.60 But the new Bush administration was substantially more enthusiastic about it.61 The Clinton administration had decided in 1999 to defer such a deployment.62 In terms of transatlantic relations, European skepticism of a U.S. national missile defense, and the lack of consultation with the NATO allies,63 highlighted more unilateral U.S. policies, as the Bush administration pursued and wanted to obtain a missile defense regardless of support. Also, the possible existence of a missile shield would give the administration increased freedom of action, as threats would become less relevant.64 Consequently, such a defensive measure could implicitly and potentially also have offensive implications, as it could make it possible to prepare for offensive strategies without fearing retaliation.

The administration pre-9/11 implicitly asserted that it saw military engagement as central to its strategy. More as an afterthought to the use of military force, Rice stated that “[s]ometimes though, competent diplomacy in the beginning can prevent the need for military force later”.65 At the inaugural ceremony, Bush stated that “we will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength”.66 In this way, the administration even if not engaging anywhere before the September 11 attacks, nonetheless articulated a strategic reliance on military engagement.

58 Interview Harrison 2007.
59 See section on interests and objectives.
60 Philip H. Gordon, ”Bush, Missile Defense and the Transatlantic Alliance”, Survival (vol. 43, no. 1, 2001). See Gordon for a broader discussion of Bush’s policies on national missile defense, its background, and implications for NATO.
61 Interview Harrison 2007.
62 Gordon 2001: 17. See also Offner (2007: 36-37) for the Clinton administration’s approach to missile defense and the ABM treaty.
63 Gordon 2001: 22. See also section on strategic areas, allies and partners.
64 Of course, such a shield would not be able to prevent terrorist attacks as seen on September 11, 2001.
Such initial strategic thinking, emphasizing that engagements should be made when U.S. interests were directly threatened, was put into practice by the 9/11 attacks. The impact of the attack on the U.S. meant that the administration’s threat perceptions were deeply reinforced. The administration was confronted by a new dominant threat that it perceived necessary to confront determinedly. Accordingly, the 2002 NSS stated that: “In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”

The report outlined that “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects our national interests”. Compared with the Clinton NSSs, such a statement did not refer to engagement explicitly. Still, as internationalism was underlined as the basis of strategy, it meant that isolationism was rejected, as its predecessors had done. In addition, the previously stated path of action meant that a more specific engagement strategy was to be offensively and pro-actively pursued. Also, while G. H. W. Bush and Clinton had emphasized the international features of such a strategy, the specific reference to “internationalism that reflects our national interests” underlined the U.S. focused nature of the G. W. Bush strategy of offensive engagement.

The new nature of U.S. engagement strategy can also be identified through the explicit rejection of Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence. With the newly perceived threats, the administration concluded that such strategies were inapplicable.

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. […] To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

In this way, military engagement against Afghanistan, the state where the Al Qaeda network and Osama bin Laden had been given refuge, was seen as the proper response to the stateless terrorist threat. In terms of the argued interconnectedness between terrorism and rogue states, as well as what was perceived as the probable WMD capability of such states, more offensive engagement strategies were seen to be the only applicable response, and preventive action was implemented to defeat the Iraqi threat.

One participant in drafting the 2002 NSS, Philip Zelikow, stated that:

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67 NSS 2002: v.
68 NSS 2002: 1.
69 Although the NSS 2002 rejects the applicability of containment and deterrence, John Lewis Gaddis claims that the Bush doctrine did not reject it, but that it supplemented it with what he sees as a strategy of pre-emption. Gaddis 2004: 86.
70 NSS 2002: 15.
71 See footnote three of this chapter for the discussion of pre-emptive versus preventive strike.
The possibility of attacking Iraq was never discussed, at least in my presence, in connection with that document. The discussion of preemptive action was instead dominated by reflections on the 9/11 experience and lessons learned about the failure to deal adequately with the problem of al Qaeda and Afghanistan before the United States was attacked. Also some of the participants in drafting remembered the precedent of the Iraq war in 1991, where there was great concern about preventing the completion of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, a program the UN later discovered to be much more elaborate than the United States had realized before that war began. In other words, the context for this aspect of the 2002 NSS was reflection on past experience, not consideration of any specific future enemy.72

In this way, Zelikow argues that the inclusion of preventive strike into the 2002 document was not a result of a prior decision to intervene in Iraq. But key members of the administration, before gaining office, and while in it, had a more offensive strategic approach. Ideas presented in the DoD draft from 1992, as discussed in the chapter on the first Bush administration, indicated a need for actively preventing the emergence of rivals, implying a more pro-active attitude. During the 1990s, some of the same people had called for action, including military measures, to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.73 The people representing such possible continuity from the DoD draft of 1992 and the younger Bush administration were most importantly Paul Wolfowitz and “Scooter” Libby. From among signatories of the 1998 letter and as members of the new administration both Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld are found. Also, the top DoD 1992 draft responsible and the 2002 vice president was Richard Cheney. According to a close observer, some representatives of the G. W. Bush administration, such as Wolfowitz, may have had an agenda to have the U.S. use massive military force against Iraq before the September 11 attacks. Cheney, on the other hand, did not call for more offensive policies until after 9/11.74 Then, Iraq was argued and intended as part of the War on Terrorism. The shock produced by the terrorist attacks helped Wolfowitz and his agenda.75

Countering Iraq had also been part of Clinton’s rogue state policies, although the administration largely treated the rogue state and WMD threat as potential, and did not perceive it an imminent threat it needed to strike preventively. According to a participant in drafting a 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report, the Bush administration had also been interested in pre-emption even before September 11, 2001, but it was then focused on proliferation, and not terrorism and regime change.76 While it is possible that the entire administration did not have a fully offensive agenda to remove Saddam Hussein from power before the 2002 NSS; at least some members of the G. W. Bush administration favored more massive and offensive

72 Interview Zelikow 2007.
73 See section on perception of threats.
74 Interview Scowcroft 2007.
75 Interview Scowcroft 2007.
76 Interview Flournoy 2007.
deployments, even before the September 11 attacks and the following War on Terrorism. And the document itself, opening for preventive strike, laid grounds for its implementation.

Accordingly, while engagement strategies had been planned and to a limited degree been deployed against rogue states and possible proliferation during the 1990s, after 9/11 determined engagement strategies were implemented against international terrorism and these threats. Threats were now seen more imminent than potential. This was especially evident when it came to international terrorism, as the Afghan engagement was implemented as a direct result of the September 11 attacks. With regard to Iraq, the urgency of security issues in the War on Terrorism also spilled over on to the administration’s perceptions of the Iraq threat. According to James Dobbins, the administration’s envoy to Afghanistan after 9/11, the initial easy military success in Afghanistan gave rise to confidence and optimism towards what was achievable when it came to Iraq. The toppling of Saddam Hussein thus seemed feasible, and more so than in 1991, even though the U.S. then had a larger army deployed and was supported by a larger coalition. Accordingly, the war on Iraq thus seemed worthwhile after 9/11.77 According to Robert Litwak, the vulnerability produced by 9/11 paved the way for using preventive means.78

The implementation of strategies in the War on Terrorism and Iraq also meant that engagements were implemented as regime change.79 While the Gulf War had left Saddam Hussein in power, both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Iraqi regime were overthrown through the U.S. interventions. Clinton had planned for military engagement should threats in the Middle East become real rather than potential, for instance in the form of a regional crisis. But still, this did not indicate that the administration would militarily intervene to ensure regime change. In terms of internal conflicts, the Clinton administration’s engagement in the Balkans had removed Milosevic from power. At the same time, this kind of regime change was implemented in a conflict where the administration engaged to stop an internal ethnic conflict, and the administration had asserted that the U.S. itself could not create a stable and legitimate domestic order for any society. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, regime change through military engagement was applied as the administration’s response to what initially were the transnational threat of terrorism and the perceived WMD capability of Iraq. The presumption that Iraq possessed WMD capability was later judged

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77 Interview Dobbins 2007.
78 Interview Litwak 2007.
79 Regime change in the wake of the September 11 attacks has been studied by Litwak 2007. The paragraph also discusses previous policies with regard to regime change. Such a discussion is made here and not in the previous chapters, as it is the most relevant when studying the Bush period. But to nuance the development, Bush’s policies are discussed with reference to his predecessors.
incorrect. Instead of confronting the threat of terrorism and possible WMD capability, the toppling of the regime itself was the goal, and not simply conflict resolution as in the Gulf War. Such regime change had not been part of previous post-Cold War administration’s approach to these threats, and it meant that the Bush administration’s engagements were made more deeply.

In line with the evolution of a more U.S. focused and offensive engagement strategy during the Bush presidency, operational strategy changed accordingly. The Rumsfeld Doctrine, named after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, outlined the military plans for being able to make small interventions “everywhere”. The Afghanistan engagement was, according to an observer, “supposed to be an example of Rumsfeld’s theories that small amounts of special forces and airpower could combine to do what large Army units had been called on to do in the past”. 80 This fundamentally contrasted with the Powell Doctrine of the late Cold War, influencing G. H. W. Bush and to some degree Clinton. According to such a doctrine, U.S. military operations would only be made after thorough consideration, and if implemented, was to be made with large troop deployments. The Rumsfeld doctrine then underlined the expeditionary nature of engagements as seen by the G. W. Bush administration. By underlining the efficiency of which engagements could be made, pro-active action might have seemed more applicable. More similar to its predecessors, such an operational approach was also supported by an initial reluctance to perform in long term stability missions. In terms of using the U.S. military to stabilization and peacekeeping engagements, there was a common disinclination to have the U.S. commit to these types of mission during the early Bush presidency. Such an assessment was shared among Rumsfeld, the Pentagon and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. 81

Also noteworthy, the U.S. focused and offensive engagement strategy was not perceived as restrained by international norms and law, as the administration interfered in internal affairs. During the 2000 presidential campaigning, it was argued that “[it is not] isolationist to suggest that the United States has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose” 82 Even as this referred to international treaties and agreements, underlining U.S. unilateralism, the later Iraqi engagement was also made without UN consent. While also the Clinton and NATO Kosovo engagement was made outside the decisions of the UN Security Council, this engagement was tacitly approved after the operation. But the engagement promoting regime

80 Clarke 2004: 278.
81 Interview Shea 2008.
82 Rice 2000: 48-49.
change in Iraq rather meant that the U.S. intervened in Iraqi internal affairs without a threat to international peace and stability being recognized by the international community.

As a consequence of gradually deepening military engagement strategies, the U.S. became more concerned about internal problems. But by doing so, long term engagements became a post-intervention feature of U.S. engagements. While the Rumsfeld Doctrine indicated that minor engagements could be made everywhere according to U.S. interests, the strategy implemented inevitably led to the U.S. and its partners ending up in a more long-term engagement to stabilize and keep the peace after the initial combat engagement.83 This correlated with the gradually increasing interference in internal affairs, as the target of Bush’s engagements was the regime itself. Contrastively, the Gulf War, majorly based on the Powell doctrine, was deemed over as soon as the violation of international borders, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, was over.

Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in assessing the historical record of the Bush administration asserts that Bush made a revolutionary change in U.S. strategy.84 But Schlesinger’s point of reference does not take the evolution within U.S. strategic responses in the 1990s thoroughly into account, and he thus sees Bush as swiftly overturning the long established strategy of containment and deterrence. But as the thesis has shown in the chapters on previous post-Cold War administrations, the post-Cold War strategic responses of the U.S. were increasingly marked by military engagements rather than containment and deterrence. This implies that there was continuity in the basic strategic response of the U.S., even with Bush’s implementation of strategy. But the difference from its predecessors was that Bush’s strategic thinking and implementation was made more unilaterally and pro-actively, to even include preventive strike as part of such an engagement strategy, rather than responding to appearing conflicts. With new fragmented threat concerns in the post-Cold War period, deterrence strategies had been considered gradually less applicable. With suicide bombers and so-called rogue regimes, the state-to-state deterrence of Cold War vintage was declared unusable. The gradually appearing post-Cold War strategy of the United States was offensively implemented in Bush’s War on Terrorism.

The reinforced threat perceptions and offensive application of engagement strategy had great implications for the role and outreach of NATO during the Bush presidency. The geographically limited out of area role of NATO during the Clinton presidency turned more global. The alliance came to broaden its perception of threats, particularly as a consequence of

83 But such recognition of the need for stabilization and long-term engagement of U.S. troops was not fully acknowledged until after 2003, and accordingly will not be treated within this study.
the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. War on Terrorism. But U.S. unilateralism and coalitions of the will ing also undermined such a role for NATO immediately after the September 11 attacks. Divergence on Iraq meant that NATO did not obtain a role here, and consequently indicated that allied coherence on the new engagements strategies of the U.S. were not equal to the agreed containment role of the Cold War.

The ASC of 1999 had stated that terrorism and WMD proliferation concerned the alliance. Still, NATO’s role remained within the broader Euro-Atlantic area. With the September 11, attacks on the U.S., such threat perceptions were asserted more determinedly by the NATO allies, parallel with the reinforced U.S. threat perceptions. This was evident in the 2001 Article 5 implementation, and the decision to have the alliance take over the responsibility of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) engagement in Afghanistan in 2003. The decision to invoke article 5 was taken jointly by the allies, after a Canadian initiative.\(^85\) In this way, the broadened outlook of the organization did not stem from distinct American pleas. Still, the U.S. during the Clinton presidency had also emphasized to NATO that threats outside Europe were looming, making a foundation for the article 5 implementation, beyond the fact that the U.S. had been hit by terrorists. But the terrorist attacks strengthened U.S. threat perceptions, and made responses that implemented shifts in the role and outreach of NATO. The Bush administration underlined that the alliance post-9/11 needed to prepare for “a full range of threats”, including terrorism and WMD.\(^86\)

From a fundamentally defensive stance in the Cold War, through restrained engagements “out of area” during the Clinton presidency, NATO developed a more global approach, and with the implementation of the Afghanistan engagement, acted in a complete new region, far outside its transatlantic base. To keep NATO relevant, the allies of the U.S. saw it necessary to get involved in the War on Terrorism.\(^87\) The post-9/11 support to the U.S. manifested its more global strategic outreach:

> The present outreach of NATO has been a significant extension of NATO’s outreach, which would have been hard to imagine before 9/11, and is still controversial, especially among Europeans. Another shift has also taken place, in the levels of violence and its intensity.\(^88\)

At the same time, NATO’s engagement role during the 1990s provided a foundation that more global engagements could be based upon. In such a way, the Balkans engagement was a

\(^{85}\) Interview Hunter 2007.
\(^{87}\) Interview Hunter 2007.
\(^{88}\) Interview Dobbins 2007.
pre-condition for the application of a wider engagement role after September 11, 2001.\textsuperscript{89} The deployment of NATO in Afghanistan then implied that the alliance had broadened its role into the global realm, engaging fully “out of area”.

But while the alliance broadened its role in the wake of 9/11, unilateral implementation, and only pragmatic cooperation with willing states, had caused traditional alliances and partnerships to reduce in practical relevance.\textsuperscript{90} Even with the NATO engagement in Afghanistan, it has been pointed out that NATO largely plays a supportive role in the War on Terrorism, and that its role in Afghanistan has been secondary to that of the U.S.\textsuperscript{91} Also, the U.S. was skeptical of European caveats within the operation, which implied that the administration did not see NATO as efficient and flexible enough.\textsuperscript{92} In terms of an implementation of a new role in countering WMDs and rogue states, the alliance did not engage in the American War on Iraq, and consequently did not agree with the U.S. strategic response of preventive strike. The NATO allies agreed that both terrorism and WMDs posed threats to the alliance. They did not agree, however, on how to respond, thus their ideas on the implementation of strategy, were not always consistent. In addition, as some allies to a larger extent than the U.S. continued to view these threats as potential rather than imminent,\textsuperscript{93} the alliance did not agree to fully implement common strategies towards such threats.

But the Afghanistan mission nonetheless implemented a more global role for the alliance. By taking over the ISAF mission, NATO lead the forces trying to achieve stability in Afghanistan. According to a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the NATO engagement in Afghanistan was made to ensure that NATO stayed relevant and to compensate for the lack of support on Iraq.\textsuperscript{94} By doing so, a new role for NATO in post-combat operations within U.S. engagement strategies had broadened. The peacekeeping and stability role of the alliance had been seen in the Balkans during the Clinton presidency. But with Afghanistan, NATO obtained formal responsibility for such a stability engagement in a global context and in a mission with higher intensity, as stated in the above quote.

\textsuperscript{89} Interview Shea 2008.
\textsuperscript{90} See section on strategic areas, allies and partners.
\textsuperscript{91} Nevers 2007. For the specific role concerning peacekeeping and stability, see below.
\textsuperscript{92} For a more present time and specific discussion of NATO’s role and the mission in Afghanistan see Ingrid Lundestad, “Europas reservasjoner en ‘ulempe for NATO’” [“European Caveats a ‘Disadvantage to NATO’”], Dagbladet Magasinet på nett (2007-12-21). Available at: http://www.dagbladet.no/magasinet/2007/12/19/521704.html [online 2008-01-10].
\textsuperscript{93} Interview Shea 2008. While the allies supported the Afghanistan engagement, own responses to smaller terrorist attacks also differed from the military engagement approach of the U.S. After the context of terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, European counter-terrorism measures were seen within domestic law enforcement and international crime, more similar to Clinton’s initial approach
\textsuperscript{94} Interview Hunter 2007.
Different from the peacekeeping role of NATO in the Balkans, the alliance took over responsibility for the long term stability mission of an engagement made by the U.S. and not NATO itself. But somewhat similar to the stability engagement in the Balkans, this meant that the European allies became more central in the engagement after the U.S. had led the initial combat engagement. This implied that the stability role of the alliance continued to support the post-conflict needs of initial U.S. engagements. But different from the Balkans engagement, the U.S. continued to lead the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan, while NATO initially focused more on peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{95} According to Jamie Shea, serving as NATO Director of Information and Press and subsequently as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations during the early Bush presidency, there was a tendency among some Americans to think that NATO could do what the U.S. did not want to do itself.\textsuperscript{96} This reflected the U.S. reluctance to involve itself in such stability missions at the time, although that attitude changed later after the 9/11 attacks.

The NSS 2002 asserted that if NATO would succeed in transforming the alliance within the frames of U.S. strategies, “the reward will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the case during the Cold War”.\textsuperscript{97} NATO did recognize broader threats to its security, and obtained a more global role by engaging in Afghanistan. But the initial U.S. engagement did not rely on alliance structures in its implementation, and the Iraqi engagement was not supported by NATO. Consequently, NATO’s role was not as fully flexible as to completely fit within Bush’s engagement strategies. In such a way, while U.S. strategies coalesced in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and NATO performed on a different continent, the alliance did not seem to have an equally central position within global U.S. strategies as it had during the Cold War.

Conclusions

A strategy of offensive engagement became the strategic approach of the Bush administration. In this way, the administration continued to see engagements as the post-Cold War strategic response of the U.S. The new variety of such a strategy was firstly seen in the U.S. centered focus of the administration, and consequently, in the disregard for broader engagements, although restraints were also visible during the Clinton presidency. With the reinforced threat perceptions formed by the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S., Bush’s engagement strategy obtained a more offensive, or pro-active feature, as the administration included

\textsuperscript{95} Interview Shea 2008.
\textsuperscript{96} Interview Shea 2008.
\textsuperscript{97} NSS 2002: 26.
preventive strike as a means of strategy. The administration engaged in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The new focus within the administration’s War on Terrorism meant that the threat perceptions and global strategies of the U.S. were no longer implemented in the same perceptibly fragmented security environment. But the unilateral formation of engagement strategies, and the application of so-called coalitions of the willing, meant that such a new focus did not inherently rely on structures of alliances, as had been the case in the Cold War. In sum, military engagement remained the strategic response of the U.S. in countering threats, but Bush’s variation of such a strategy was more unilateral, offensive, and centered on direct threats seen as located in the Middle East.

Parallel to such an evolution post-9/11, also NATO’s role developed. By the implementation of Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks, NATO’s more global threat perceptions were fully confirmed. And the NATO responsibility for the Afghanistan engagement from 2003 onwards implemented a practical engagement role of the alliance outside the alliance’s Euro-Atlantic area. This marked an extension from the more limited “out of area” role pursued during the Clinton presidency, into a more global realm. But central NATO members opposed the U.S. Iraqi engagement, and the administration did not perceive NATO as flexible enough to fit into U.S. strategic implementation. Accordingly, Bush’s formative frame in the War on Terrorism did not produce allied coherence in the same way Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence did.
“The full story will require us to transcend the parts and concentrate on the whole; this will require unprecedented linguistic ability, insight and imagination. It is a formidable challenge.”

**Adding Parts into a Whole – Seeing Order in Diversity**

After characterizing the three post-Cold War presidencies’ national security strategies, and the evolution of NATO’s role within these, the concluding chapter aims to synthesize arguments into a coherent understanding. U.S. historian Melvyn Leffler requests such a holistic approach in the above quote, related to making a Cold War synthesis. To add up parts into a larger whole is now as relevant to post-Cold War interpretations.

By summing up the thesis through the conceptual framework used, it is possible to identify the key interests and objectives; perception of threats; assessment of strategic areas, allies and partners; and strategic thinking and implementation of the administrations. Such an overview of periods and components of strategies is possible to present in a simplified table, as seen on the following page. For comparison, the outlined overview includes U.S. Cold War strategies. When read vertically, the table gives a basic account of the different periods’ assessment of each of the components of strategy, as treated in each chapter. When read horizontally, the table gives an overview of each of the conceptual components of U.S. strategies throughout the periods covered. In this way, by applying the same conceptual framework used in each chapter, the conclusion will integrate the three administrations’ policies into a combined account. When also seen next to U.S. Cold War strategies, a synthesis of the period at study is possible to identify through an idea of U.S. strategies of engagement. In this way, parts are brought together in a synthesized whole.

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1 Leffler 2000: 58. The quote indicates that a historical synthesis, while being based on the empirical parts of history, also needs to be constructed through abstract understanding and creativity.
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The conclusion argues that the interpretation of strategies of engagement contain the central aspects of U.S. strategies during the period of this study. Contrastive to the Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence, the post-Cold War strategic environment made the question of when and how to engage internationally the key feature of strategy. Interests in engaging largely stemmed from U.S. interests and objectives in sustaining its new supreme and leading position. New post-Cold War threats were largely indirect or potential which made the previous strategies less applicable, and the question of when and how to engage more relevant. Concerning the third component or part of strategy, the U.S. framework of interpreting security strategies within changed from the global Cold War framework where multilateralism was integral, to a more fragmented strategic outlook. By engaging out of area,
NATO transformed to account for new threats in an extended transatlantic area. In parallel, broader U.S. threat perceptions made NATO fragmented from U.S. engagement strategy beyond Europe during the 1990s. In the War on Terrorism, U.S. engagements again became more focused. While NATO broadened its engagements into non-European continents in support of U.S. strategy, the new strategic focus of the U.S. was not as cohesive as the one of the Cold War.

**Interests and Objectives**

With different variations, the above table indicates that there existed stable U.S. interests in being an undisputed power in the world, and nuances in objectives of performing global leadership. Consequently, U.S. strategic interests and objectives in international leadership and position embedded ideas of American primacy. The primacy term has been extensively pursued by scholars, as seen in the introductory historiography. According to such views, the U.S. strategy was one of primacy. In reviewing the post-Cold War U.S. presidencies, also this thesis has pointed out that the U.S. saw an interest in upholding its unipolar position and providing international leadership in doing so. But as different from other approaches, the thesis has treated such a position as an objective of the U.S. strategy, but not one that describes the actual strategic decisions made. Consequently, as the Soviet Union disintegrated, the U.S. administrations saw an interest in upholding the new position of the U.S. In doing so, both G. H. W. Bush and Clinton emphasized the interest in providing leadership. With G. W. Bush, American objectives of leadership were somewhat overshadowed by a more physical or military understanding of U.S. primacy. Contrastive to the Cold War, in the post-Cold War era, the primary position of the U.S. could be pursued without the restraints posed by the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, and thus through new strategies of engagement.

Such an interest in the unrivalled position of the U.S. also meant that the post-Cold War administrations continued to promote American values abroad. Nonetheless, such promotion was promoted with varying means, from political (and economical) engagement, to military engagement during the G. W. Bush presidency. In the Cold War, the promotion of American values had been an ideological dimension of the superpower rivalry. In the post-Cold War period, such values could be promoted without consideration of the Soviet Union, and accordingly the U.S. could engage in doing so.

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2 See also the historiography presented in chapter 1.
Likewise, stated objectives of minimizing the influence of threats supported the general interest in having a superior and leading position. In addition, minimizing threats, and upholding a superior position, were seen to secure the basic and straightforward interest in protecting U.S. territory and citizens. As is demonstrated by the table, interest in containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War; continuing such interests towards the Soviet Union and Russia and possibly emerging powers during the G. H. W. Bush presidency; interest in preventing the escalation of internal crises during the Clinton presidency; as well as the interest in diminishing the influence of Islamic extremism during the G. W. Bush presidency, all supported the general security of the U.S.

Lastly, the table identifies that the alliance continued to institutionalize American power in Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the G. H. W. Bush administration saw continuous interest in the transatlantic relationship. Clinton also expanded the relationship eastwards. The G. W. Bush administration was relatively less interested in permanent institutions, but the administration saw an interest in making the transatlantic relationship more flexible, and further enlarged into Eastern Europe. In this way, the U.S., as in the Cold War, recognized a strategic interest in having a leading position in transatlantic affairs. Combined, U.S. interests in the period reflected an intention to engage in international affairs.

Perception of Threats
Consistent with table 1, threats were seen to change more than interests as the Cold War ended. Seen together, there was a change from the monolithic perception of communism and the Soviet Union, to new, fragmented threats, until threats again were seen as focused in the War on Terrorism. The new nature of threats contributed to new strategic responses, as strategies of containment and deterrence became seen as inapplicable to counter these threats.

At the height of the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath, threat perceptions were concentrated on the Soviet Union. By being monolithic, the whole strategic outlook of the administration and the foundation of the transatlantic alliance centered on this threat. In addition to the ideological and geopolitical fear of the Soviet Union, the nuclear capabilities of the adversary superpower made it represent an existential threat to the U.S. and NATO. Also China was with varying degrees of intensity seen as an interrelated threat. The first Bush administration continued to focus on the possibly hostile intentions of the Soviet Union and Russia, and maintained a fear of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Fears of other possibly emerging

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3 Such an observation of relative stability in interest perceptions is also consistent with the theoretical assessment of national security interests, as presented in chapter I.
powers, especially fears within the DoD, was interrelated with the existing threat perspective. At the same time, it was also related to new elements of engagement strategies. As these threats were potential, engagement was possible, as there were no direct balancing of the U.S., as seen in the Cold War. Rather, engagement could support the long term interest in sustaining the interests in a U.S. primary position, and thus indirectly minimize potential emerging powers’ possible influence.

Rather than being monolithic, new threat perceptions were fragmented from one another, and can be placed within two broad categories of threat perceptions that gradually appeared to the U.S. administrations: the indirect threat of regional and internal conflicts, and the potential threat of so-called rogue states, the proliferation of WMD capability and initial fears of international terrorism.

The first new category of threat perceptions, internal and regional conflicts, appeared in a state-to-state manner during the first Bush presidency, with the Gulf War. With Clinton, internal crises were included as indirect threats to the U.S., particularly in the Balkan cases. These crises affected the broader interests of the U.S. in international leadership, and as such, its preponderant position in the world, as well as transatlantic affairs. As this category of threats was of such a kind that it could not be contained or deterred, the central question of threat handling appeared to be the question of when and how to engage.

The second category of threats also contributed to the formation of engagement strategies by the respective U.S. administrations. In these cases, the concerns evolved more gradually than the more crisis-driven policies towards regional and internal conflicts. This largely came from the threats’ principal nature of being potential, rather than immediately present, during the intermediate period. As Table 1 states, rogue states, the proliferation of WMDs and international terrorism appeared as perceivably central threats during the Clinton presidency, and became more so in the G. W. Bush era. In the new, broader, threat perspective of the post-Cold War, the threat of WMD proliferation had more fragmented and transnational characteristics – particularly related to so-called rogue states and possibly also, international terrorism – than being interrelated with the monolithic communist threat. In terms of NATO, this second category of U.S. threat perceptions was fragmented from the transatlantic dimension in the intermediate phase.

Still, the Gulf War had shown that the Iraqi regime had intentions of creating a nuclear program, and in this way such threat perceptions also existed earlier on, as Iraq also is listed as a threat during the first Bush period in the table. But as the Bush administration perceived the crisis as an issue of state-to-state aggression, engagement policies were here formed on the crisis’s basis as a regional conflict, namely fitting in the first category of threats. Accordingly, threat perceptions of Iraq as a rogue state and possible nuclear power were not the foundation of G. H. W. Bush engagement. Rather, rogue states and a fragmented fear of WMD proliferation became more openly expressed in the late 1990s.
This second category of post-Cold War threats became more central and imminent, rather than potential, to the U.S. during the first year of the G. W. Bush presidency. With the 9/11 attacks, international terrorism came to be perceived as a new direct threat to the U.S, and rogue states and their WMD capability were articulated as interrelated threats. U.S. threat perceptions to a greater extent converged and centered on these types of threats, in a new focus perceived equivalent to the Cold War. But in stead of containment, military engagement was the strategy pursued to minimize threats. Deterrence strategies were seen inapplicable to counter non-state actors and rogue regimes.

**Strategic areas, allies and partners**

As table 1 states, the U.S. Cold War approach centered on regional defense arrangements, in which NATO had a special position. The existence of the Iron Curtain demonstrated that Europe was central within the strategic picture of the Cold War. Parallel military operations in the Third World were part of the same framework of bloc thinking. Hence, U.S. Cold War strategies were broadly framed within the same structure that NATO was founded on. As the Cold War ended, a gradual fragmentation of U.S. strategic outlook coincided with the preservation and transformation of NATO in the broader transatlantic area.

Firstly, the G. H. W. Bush administration still saw Europe and NATO as central to U.S. strategy. But limited engagement in conflicts beyond Europe anticipated fledgling fragmentation in U.S. security outlook, where NATO did not have a function. The overall Cold War framework of analyzing strategic areas, allies and partners within started falling apart. At the same time, traditional U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Russia showed elements of continuity, also with regard to Europe and NATO. But with Clinton, the more fragmented outlook became manifest. As such, Europe represented one central arena for U.S. strategy, while other regions were approached separately from the transatlantic dimension. For instance, U.S. policies towards rogue states were outside NATO’s strategic perspective. In parallel, the Clinton administration broadened and transformed its European relations. U.S. strategic influence moved eastwards, through NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace. NATO engagements in the Balkans also broadened the transatlantic outlook. But NATO was not concerned with more global challenges, at least not in terms of practical engagement during the Clinton presidency. Compared with U.S. Cold War operations in the Third world, broader post-Cold War engagements by the U.S. did not stem from the same strategic framework that NATO belonged to.
With G. W. Bush, and especially the War on Terrorism, the administration moved towards a new U.S. framework in terms of strategic areas, allies and partners. An increasing disinterest in Europe, and preoccupation with the Middle East underlined divergence, unless the NATO strategic outlook changed in accordance with U.S. priorities. As the September 11 attacks did lead NATO to deal with more global threat concerns, transatlantic security outlook looked potentially convergent. But with U.S. unilateral engagement, with local partners and coalitions of the willing as supplement, NATO initially did not have a central position within the new strategic framework bring formed. But the organization adopted U.S. strategic perceptions, and in terms of engagements, eventually became deployed in Afghanistan. NATO in this way partly converged with U.S. engagement strategies in a more global sphere. At the same time, the U.S. questioned the enthusiasm and substance of NATO support in the Afghan mission. Disagreement between traditional European allies and the U.S. concerning Iraq, further highlighted that the new strategic outlook of the U.S. was not as unifying as the one of the Cold War.

With reference to trends of multilateralism and unilateralism, there was an evolution aligned with the development of a new strategic outlook. In the Cold War, multilateralism in the form of allies and partners within the Western camp was inherent in the framework of containment and deterrence. Even though there existed disagreement among allies, there was fundamental cohesion on their common strategy of containing the Soviet Union. In post-Cold War policies and engagements, the same stable picture was not present. With a fragmented strategic environment, U.S. policies were not as stable in terms of international cooperation, allies and partners. And with the War on Terrorism, initial cooperation was formed unilaterally or with coalitions of the willing. In this way, diverse types of engagements produced fragmentation in terms of international cooperation as well. From the inherent multilateralism in the Cold War, global policies were not as fixed as before with regard to cooperation. In stead of having a stable Western bloc, U.S. cooperation in the post-Cold War world relied on varying institutions. In the War on Terrorism, U.S. focused policies, and unilateral implementation, meant institutionalized multilateralism dropped on the U.S. agenda.

In terms of strategic areas, and hereunder present allies and partners, there was a continued focus on the Eurasian landmass from the Cold War to its aftermath. But while Europe and NATO remained central to the U.S. within a transatlantic dimension, other more global security issues separate from a NATO perspective formed a fragmented U.S. security outlook. Eventually, U.S. engagement in the War on Terrorism, particularly centered in the
Middle East, produced a new strategic framework for the G. W. Bush administration. Within this security outlook, NATO and Europe were not as inherently relevant to the U.S. as in the Cold War perspective, or in the more limited out of area engagements of the 1990s, even as NATO adopted policies in line with new U.S. strategies.

**Strategic Thinking and Implementation**

Compared with the Cold War, where Kennan outlined a strategic thinking of containment that would be adapted and applied in different variations throughout the period, the post-Cold War period did not have an equivalently articulated foundation of strategy within the U.S. executive. It has been pointed out that such a lack of overall strategic concept was perhaps desirable in an implicitly intermediate period.\(^5\) As the National Security Advisor to the first Bush administration put it, “it did not seem important to develop a new strategic concept when the administration did not counter any new direct threats”.\(^6\) As the period from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism appeared unfocused to the administrations, they had to deal with the conflicts, crises and threats as they occurred. With such a strategic environment, the lack of an overall defined concept guiding U.S. strategy meant that policies could be pursued flexibly according to each situation the administrations encountered.

Nonetheless, the administrations were determined to remain engaged; to ensure its position, and counter the fragmented threats that did arise. The thesis has accordingly attempted to form an understanding of the imperatives of the actual strategic responses made, the strategic decisions taken, from the “lumper”’s perspective and with some time’s distance. The study has taken in, supplemented and amended previous literature into its integrated study. Combined, a synthesis of U.S. strategies has been presented. In doing so, an extensive set of primary sources has been investigated, to form as valid conclusions as possible without the full access of internal classified U.S. material.

The table presented above states that Cold War strategies were characterized by containment and deterrence. This meant that the foremost strategic approach of the U.S. was related to containing the position of communism and the Soviet Union in the world, and deterring possible aggression or hostility towards the Western bloc. As the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself disintegrated in 1991, containing and deterring the former superpower became more and more obsolete. New strategic responses started to evolve. With the U.S. military engagement in the Gulf, a fledgling new strategic outlook, different from

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\(^6\) Interview Scowcroft 2007.
previous Cold War strategies, was implemented. With the Clinton administration, even as strategic decisions were made in a restrained manner, and often as responses to crises appearing, the policies made came to represent different variations of strategies of engagement. With regard to the former Cold War adversary, the administration politically engaged with Russia and Eastern Europe through the Partnership for Peace and partial NATO enlargement. In this way, former rivals were integrated, rather than contained. But returning to the more military aspects of U.S. engagement strategies, the Clinton administration engaged in internal conflicts, and planned and to a limited degree implemented such strategic responses with regard to the rogue state threat. G. W. Bush initially criticized the development of broad U.S. engagements during the 1990s. But with the 9/11 attacks, also Bush implemented military engagement as the response to post-Cold War threats. In the War on Terrorism, such engagement was implemented against the terrorist threat located to Afghanistan. In 2003, the administration’s strategy was implemented more offensively, as the U.S. preventively went to war in Iraq.

Through these post-Cold War responses, the engagement strategy widened in its application. Engagements gradually became an all-inclusive strategic response, moving from a more traditional type of conflict, to internal conflicts, to end up confronting more transnational and unconventional threats.7

While engagements widened in terms of appliance, they also deepened in terms of substance. Firstly, G. H. W. Bush’s Gulf War engagement merely confronted Iraqi aggression in a state-to-state conflict. With Clinton’s engagement in the Balkans, the administration’s engagement strategy confronted the internal situation in the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in the fall of Milosevic’s regime. With Bush’s engagements, regime change became the focus of engagement, as engagements were made to remove the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from power. Consequently, also international rules of non-intervention were challenged by the deepening application of U.S. engagements.8

7 Without stating that policies pursued by former administrations directly caused later evolution in strategy, it is possible to identify widening application of such a strategy, while at the same time acknowledging the particularities present within each administration and each decision to engage. Particularities made for different approaches, but former engagements generally formed a foundation and experiences that later policies could rely on. A distinct exception is the Somalia engagement which caused profound psychological restraints and fears of future engagement, especially in terms of areas distant to the U.S. and possible “mission creep”.

8 The concerned legal debate concerns the basic nature of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, versus the right to (collective) self defense and the UN Security Council’s mandate to identify threats to international peace and security, and proper responses, as defined in the UN Charter. A discussion of the implications for the international norm of non-intervention of the Clinton and G. W. Bush military engagements is available in Hege Kristin Ulvin, The United States and the Norm of Non-Intervention: US Argumentation for the Use of Force from Clinton to Bush, Master Thesis in Political Science (University of Oslo: 2006).
The operational strategies the U.S. relied on changed in parallel to the widened application of strategies. G. H. W. Bush maintained the Powell Doctrine, which demanded a clear foundation for military engagement, and if engaging, operations should be made with major deployments. Moving deeper into the 1990s, the Clinton administration’s wider, but still restrained engagements indicated a partial movement. The administration still hesitated before engaging, looking for a decisive foundation, at the same time that military operations multiplied, and were conducted more in terms of technology and efficiency. As new threats were largely indirect or potential, the strategy had to take into account the reduced level of legitimizing factors for troop commitment. Accordingly, the administration to a large degree relied on the use of air force power. During the presidency of G. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s doctrine manifested a fulfilled change from the Powell Doctrine. In the initial Afghan and Iraq cases, military engagements were made offensively, and on the assumption that efficiency and technology was more important than massive troop commitment. Seen together, such a development formed a foundation for the widened application of strategies of engagement.

Furthermore, as engagements also deepened, and confronted the internal situations in states, interventions became increasingly also long term engagements within the states confronted. This was partly contradictory to the evolution in operational doctrines, moving towards expeditionary missions, as discussed above. In the Balkans, engagements had produced a need for continued peacekeeping and stability operations. The Afghanistan and Iraq engagements became more time, money and personnel consuming than the administration intended, and consequently also these engagements became long-term commitments, with higher levels of intensity and violence than in the Balkans. While engagements were ruled by doctrines that relied on being operationally and technically more efficient, the deepened application of strategies towards intervening in internal situations meant that commitment needed to last even after the initial target of interventions had been confronted.

As commented on in chapter II, the terms containment and deterrence are implicitly defensive terms, perceived as responding to the Soviet and communist threat. Contrastively, the term engagement implies a more forward strategy, as it is the U.S. who engages in the world. Even so, the administrations when militarily engaging did so on the basis of its interest, and perceived that they responded to threats confronting them. In such cases, engaging to project interests appears more offensive than engaging to respond to threats. Bacevich has argued that to “categorize any strategy as either defensive or offensive is to
This way, chapter II pointed out that also Cold War strategies were actively pursued. In terms of engagement, the strategy also appeared in variations of defensive and offensive character. The Gulf War engagement was for instance seen as collectively defending Kuwait. In the other end, G. W. Bush’s Iraq war has been characterized as offensive, as the administration applied preventive strike. But as stated, also in the Cold War the U.S. intervened in other countries. Nonetheless, interventions in the Cold War and in the post-Cold War world were part of two different strategic approaches. In this way, even as both strategies relied on the use of U.S. military force, interventions in the Cold War were made as part of the overall strategy in containing the Soviet Union and communism. Contrastively, in the post-Cold War world, interventions were part of engagement strategies, as the new U.S. strategic response to new, fragmented threats.

Lastly, the implementation of post-Cold War U.S. strategies indicated selectivity in engagement. In the Cold War, the use of military force was of course made in accordance with the overall U.S. strategic approach. But as the U.S. was confronted with a monolithic superpower threat, there was a tendency to refer to all gains of communism as threats to the U.S. Accordingly, strategies seemed less selective. With no overall threat in the post-Cold War period, the U.S. strategy needed to depend on the specific interests of the U.S. as it was confronted with minor, fragmented threats. In other words, the strategies of engagement meant that the U.S. had to select when and where to engage. The criteria of selectivity, of when and how to engage, was to a large extent founded on the administrations’ assessment of the strategic components. This meant nuances between the administrations in assessing what engagements were possible or desirable to make, including a review of what areas were strategically important to engage in; appraisals of what implications the situation in question had for allies or partners; what seriousness of threat the situation represented; possible consequences for the U.S. objective of holding a primary and leadership position in the world; as well as the more clear-cut, direct U.S. interest in homeland security.


In this way, the first Bush administration’s engagements were shaped by its traditional state-to-state outlook. An example of non-intervention is thus represented by the conflict arising when Yugoslavia broke up. The Clinton team implemented engagement strategies in a restrained, but still broader base. But the Rwanda case indicates selectivity. For the last Bush administration, engagement came to rely on a U.S. centered approach, selecting engagements on their more direct importance to the United States. Of course, as all administrations decided on where and how to engage along the lines of its interests, threat perceptions and assessment of strategic areas, allies and partners, selectivity represented a fully American perspective. In this way, all strategies of engagements were U.S. focused. But as G. W. Bush saw U.S. interests in overall stability, selecting engagements were made on more international grounds. And with the Clinton administration, the recognition of broader, more fragmented and indirect, threats contributed to a wider base of its engagement strategy, than was the case with the more internally based focus of the G. W. Bush administration.
Concerning NATO, the evolution of U.S. strategies of engagement was followed by a gradual formation of NATO’s role. During the G. H. W. Bush period NATO did not transform substantially. Remains of Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence produced allied coherence on its traditionally territorially defensive foundation. Fledgling U.S. engagement approaches were made outside the transatlantic dimension. Nonetheless, the presidency embedded deliberations on what the future role of the alliance would be, outlining possible courses for the future. During the Clinton presidency, NATO gradually transformed to fit into post-Cold War engagement strategies. Through the two Balkan engagements, NATO implemented a fully new engagement role. As parallel U.S. planning and limited implementation towards other threats remained outside the transatlantic dimension, NATO was separated from other theaters of U.S. engagements. At the same time, both the administration, and to some extent NATO, opened up for broader threat assessments that would influence NATO’s role in the future. With G. W. Bush, strategies of engagement came to particularly center on the Middle East. As a response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., global threat perceptions became more concrete to NATO. From acting limited out of area in the Balkans, the alliance from 2003 onwards became deployed in Afghanistan. Still, the Bush administration had not seen NATO as relevant in the initial phase of engagement, and the consensus driven organization was inapplicable in the U.S. Iraqi engagement. Accordingly, NATO’s engagement role was not equally integral to the new U.S. outlook, as its Cold War role that by origin was part of the global U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union.

Combined with the long term aspects of engagements, NATO’s role also adopted post-engagement needs, as these escalated. U.S. post-Cold War security strategies step by step made ground for a process of turning NATO more flexible and deployable, as seen fitted to deal with the diverse, complex and more distant threats of the post-Soviet era. As the U.S. strategic framework broadened, NATO engagement outside its own region became a result, as the alliance adopted a new more global engagement role to remain central in a new era.

**Final Remarks**

The thesis has covered the period from the end of the Cold War to the War on Terrorism and Iraq; but what about the potential future presence of U.S. engagement strategies? As investigated, U.S. responses to post-Cold War threats were largely made as military engagements. With the inclusion of preventive strike, the engagement strategy seems to be at its most intense. Nonetheless, strategies of engagement appear to have a foundation for being maintained by succeeding American administrations, as the U.S. continues to hold a primary
position in the world, and accordingly faces threats that do not equal its power. Contrary, in a long term perspective, the potential re-emergence of great power rivals to the U.S. would imply that strategies of containment and deterrence could be rejuvenated. But as the basic underpinnings of the engagement strategy seem to be present at least in the short to middle term future, elements of an engagement strategy seem likely to remain. As the Afghanistan and Iraq engagements have become difficult, costly and long-term operations, future engagements will presumably be planned and made more cautiously and restrained.

In terms of NATO’s role, its engagement role principally depends on the outcome of the Afghanistan engagement and ultimately allied coherence in such a new and broad role of the alliance globally “out of area”. If an elongation of post-Cold war trends were to become manifest, NATO seems to move towards a truly global, expeditionary feature in U.S. strategies of engagements, unless the U.S. reverses its strategies, or the transatlantic allies were to reject such a substantial change of the alliance’s original approach.

While the thesis has provided a description of the evolution of U.S. strategies and NATO’s role within these, there are other, some more specific and explanatory, research approaches that may be investigated within the same strategic understanding. While emphasizing the evolution of military engagement strategies, the thesis has pointed out that the U.S., particularly the Clinton administration, also politically engaged with former adversaries. In light of this description, further research can accentuate and explain the potential correlation between the U.S.-Russian relationship and broader U.S. strategies.11 Also the economic aspects of U.S. engagement strategies can be addressed, as a possible new approach to U.S. policies within a period of economic globalization. And in terms of NATO, a clear account of U.S. intentions of forming a new role may be a future subject at research, meaning not the implications of strategies as has here been covered, but rather the motivation behind U.S. ideas for NATO’s gradually widened role in the post-Cold War world. How much was premeditated and how much was crisis-driven? As the descriptive features addressed in this thesis are more easily accessed through public sources, more explanatory studies would clearly benefit from accessed internal material. Nonetheless, the thesis has outlined a general description of U.S. post-Cold War strategies that can be scrutinized within other or more specific realms than what has been possible to address within this project.

11 Michael McFaul sees “realistic engagement” as a preferable U.S. strategy for the future in terms of U.S.-Russian relations, but what is here indicated, is an empirical investigation of the political aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship within the strategic outlook here identified as strategies of engagement. McFaul 2001.
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