A search for a beginning:
A study of the origin of genocide and politicide

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Summary

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This study is an investigation into the onset of genocide and politicide, crimes that have been responsible for the deaths of millions of civilians, and have affected the lives of countless people and communities (Rummel, 1994; Harff, 2003). This thesis is an inquiry into the genocide literature from a comparative and multidisciplinary perspective, and central is my research question; where is the beginning to genocide and politicide?

In an attempt to answer my query, I have created a thematic overview of common issues essential to the genocide field. A challenge of a comparative study of genocidal crimes is however the diversity associated with genocides and politicides, since similar crimes have been committed in different continents, by different types of regimes and perpetrated on different types of victims. Equally, each case seems to hold unique attributes such as a state’s history and leaders. Despite the differences however, comparative scholars seem to suggest that there are some structural and societal commonalities between many of the cases (Fein, 1993b; Harff, 2003; Rummel, 2005).

Central to this thesis is similarly the interdisciplinary perceptive. The assumption is that whilst each discipline is believed to introduce important and exclusive attributes to the study of genocide, some of the elements identified by, for instance, political scientists might similarly cohere with some of the factors introduced by social psychologists or criminologists. Accordingly, the first part of this thesis is a discussion of the structural and the succeeding
social risk factors common to genocide and politicide. Many of the attributes identified seem to be similarly prevalent in other countries that do not engage in genocidal crimes. In genocide however, a decision has been made to eliminate in whole or in part a group in society. The following chapter is an inquiry into the various motives held on state and individual level, and common societal mechanisms that can potentially influence genocidal participation and instigate genocide or politicide. Whilst the state is often ascribed the main responsibility for genocidal crimes, the perpetrator group often consists of a variety of agents and agencies. The third part is an enquiry into what lies behind the state label and the subsequent structure of the perpetrator group. The final chapter is an investigation into common mechanisms that might influence a group and the individual, to perpetrate genocide and to become a mass killer.

This thesis, in accordance with similar studies, seems to reflect the complexity associated with genocide and politicide, and the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach, that equally includes a criminological perspective.
Takk!

Denne avhandlingen hadde ikke blitt til om det ikke hadde vært for en uunnværlig støtte fra min gode veileder, mine gode medstudenter, min gode familie og mine gode venner.

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1 Introduction

Genocides and politicides have throughout the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st caused the death of millions of innocent women, children and men (Harff, 2003; Rummel, 1994). These large scale crimes, that are often associated with brutal violence and killings, do not only leave behind numerous casualties, they have similarly victimized millions of survivors and families. Consequently, entire communities are influenced and are often affected long after the end of an atrocity.

Genocide and politicide are crimes with intent (Alvarez, 2010; Rummel, 2005; Weiss-Wendt, 2010; Chirot and McCauley, 2006; Jamieson, 1999), subsequently behind any genocide lies a decision to eliminate in whole or in part a group in society. Why would anyone decide, to not only exclude, but kill members of a group in their own society? Why would police officers, soldiers and civilians partake and kill their own neighbours?

Genocide and politicide are often recognized to be complex crimes, which are reflected in the variety of cases and contexts. Similar crimes have, for instance, occurred in a range of states and cultures, and in every continent in the world (Harff, 2003). Genocide and politicide often involves a variety of agencies and the exact composition is dependent on the specific case. These agencies include state- and non-governmental organizations such as the military, the police force, paramilitary groups, and in some cases civilians. Relatedly, the genocidal process frequently comprises the state, the community and the individual. Subsequently, these crimes seem to acquire a variety of perspectives, which appears to have led many genocide scholars to argue for the necessity of a multidisciplinary approach (Savelsberg, 2010; Waller, 2007; Dutton, 2007 to name a few). Thus, “genocide is a complex and multifaceted type of crime, and no single theory and no single discipline can hope to provide a reasonably comprehensive and coherent understanding of the nature and dynamics of this phenomenon” (Alvarez, 2010:2).

Despite the severity, and the continuous threat genocide and politicide pose in many countries (Harff, 2003; Rummel, 1994), the criminological field seems strikingly absent in the genocide literature. The genocide field has, in contrast, generated a lot of interest from other disciplines such as political science, sociology, history, anthropology, law and social psychology, and has evolved substantially over the last 30 years (Fein, 1993a). From research that mainly focused on specific cases, particular the Holocaust, to more generalized theories
Comparative research mainly searches for common explanations, and primarily aims to detect and prevent future genocide and politicide (Hiebert, 2008). General theories are however, a recent development within the field and many questions seem to persist. This thesis is written in accordance with the new comparative research, and seeks common explanations for the beginning stages to genocide and politicide based on comparative, case specific and multidisciplinary genocide literature.

1.1 Criminology and genocide

Although criminologists seem to sporadically have shown an interested in the genocide field, such as scholars like Christie (1952), there has been limited focus on the subject despite the massive violence and large number of victims. Genocide and politicide seem, from a criminological perspective, to fall into the expanding category of frontier crimes that similarly include global perspectives such as violations of human rights, international criminal justice (Schabas, 2011), and global and transnational crimes, that include trafficking, terrorism and environmental crimes (Aas, 2007), to name a few. It seems that the criminological discipline has primarily focused on crimes within the western civilization, and often excluded global crimes such as genocide. To cite Morrison (2006:2); “criminology has confined itself to a supporting role for civilised space, a territorial imagination that excludes from view the uncivilised, the other, utilizing strategies that are imperially effective but domestically clean”. The need for a global criminology, and a focus on international and transnational crimes, seems however in an evolving world, to be more pertinent (Aas, 2007). Albeit, it poses new challenges to the field of criminology, and as questioned by Bowling (2011:375); “to what extent, if at all, is western criminology applicable to Latin America, Africa or Asia?”. Related to genocide and politicide, part of the answer might lay in the variety of perpetrators that similarly include Europeans and Americans. In other words, genocidal crimes are committed by perpetrators from all parts of the world, including from within the interests of western criminology.

During the last 15 years, genocide and politicide have received increased criminological attention from a variety of scholars, such as Alvarez (2010) and Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) and Alvarez (2010), attempt to incorporate criminological theories and empirical research in their respective studies on genocide. Alvarez (2010:2) for instance, aims to provide an overview of genocide that is centred on criminological and interdisciplinary literature, and attempts “to write about
genocide in a way that weaves in the criminological literature where appropriate in order to provide a richer and deeper understanding of genocide”. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) have conducted a critical collective frame analysis, which focuses mainly on the conflict in Darfur. The theoretical base of the study similarly relies on the works by other sociologists and criminologists, such as Jack Katz (1988; cited in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008). The main focus in their study is “on the dehumanizing racial motivations and intentions that explain how a government mobilizes and collaborates in the ideological dehumanization and criminal victimization of a racial group” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008:876). Whilst these scholars specifically focus on genocide, the majority of researchers from the criminological field seem to concentrate on generalized theories that incorporate genocide. For instance, Cohen (2001) mainly refers to atrocities in general, that includes collective violence, whereas Jamieson (1998) examines various armed conflicts and war. Maier-Katkin, Mears and Bernard (2009) concentrate on crimes against humanity, whilst Savelsberg (2010) seems to focus on human rights, which similarly includes genocide.

The necessity of criminological focus on genocide and politicide seems to be advocated by many criminological scholars with a human rights perspective (Woolford, 2006; Alvarez, 2010; Savelsberg, 2010; Jamieson, 1999; Maier-Katkin et al; 2009; Cohen, 2001 and, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008). Several arguments for a criminological focus on genocide centre on the sheer number of people involved that include a variety of perpetrators and the millions of people affected by these crimes. Genocide is also considered a criminal offence by a broad international community, which might be particularly relevant to criminology. Similarly, acts of violence and violation of human rights that frequently occur in genocidal crimes are instances of state crime and various criminal offences. Subsequently, these crimes involve, often gendered, criminal and violent actions perpetrated by individuals and by groups (Alvarez, 2010). Furthermore, genocidal crimes are often associated with increased social regulation and control, which often include acts of arbitrary punishment and executions by the state (Savelsberg, 2010). The preceding issues appear to be of criminological interest in other contexts, thus similar subjects found in genocide and politicide might be relevant to the discipline.

Criminologists have much to contribute to the genocide field. For instance, since the state is often involved in genocidal crimes, different criminological theories related to state crime, abuse of power and overt control to name a few, might aid state level discussions within the genocide field (Savelsberg, 2010). Similarly, research associated with punishment and
deterrents of for instance collective or organized crime, might provide an interesting perspective related to the retribution of genocidal crimes and viable preventative measures. Furthermore, criminologists possess important knowledge related to the criminal offences often committed within these crimes such as violence, sexual violence, rape and murder. Research associated with the subsequent social and individual mechanisms such as anomie, social control theory, stigmatization, learning theory, neutralization techniques, denial and theories of subcultures to name a few, might aid explain violent behaviour in genocidal crimes. Relatedly, criminological theories and empirical works on for instance victiminology and reconciliation, might aid explaining the possible effects on victims, survivors and the entire society after the event. Thus, “criminology, with its focus on various types of criminality and violence, has much to offer in terms of explaining the origins, dynamics, and facilitators of this particular form of collective violence” (Alvarez, 2010:2).

Genocide and politicide are however generally considered too complex to be explained merely within one field. Subsequently, a criminological approach might benefit from similarly adapting an interdisciplinary perspective. Particularly since, despite the limited focus from the criminological field, the genocide literature already consists of a large amount of research derived from a range of different fields such as psychology, law, political science and anthropology, which might equally be utilized by the criminological field. Relatedly, many criminologists, who hold a human rights perspective, maintain that a multidisciplinary approach is essential for a comprehensive inquiry into genocide and politicide. For instance, Alvarez’s (2010:2) analysis centers on an interdisciplinary approach that includes “many ideas, theories, examples, and issues that are derived from sociology, psychology, history, anthropology, political science, as well as criminology and criminal justice”. Savelsberg (2010:2) similarly acquires a multidisciplinary approach, and aims to “ask what concepts and explanations criminology can contribute and what it can learn from other fields”.

Consequently, the importance of criminological attention seems evident, particularly when referring to the relevant expertise acquired by criminologists that can aid our understanding of genocides and politicides.

1.2 Genocide and politicide: definition and classification

The definition of genocide seems to be a particularly important issue from a political and academic perspective. Politically, to define an incident of mass murder as a genocide, it has a major diplomatic consequence since international intervention is required if a genocide has
been identified (Waal, 2008). Whilst for academic purposes, “no other branch of history or field of inquiry centred on historical events is so dependent on a definition as genocide studies” (Lieberman, 2012:3), since the definition applied identifies the sample of genocide cases viable (Fein, 1993a; Harff, 2003; Waal, 2008).

The Lawyer Raphael Lemkin is often recognized to be the first person to name genocide and to introduce it as a legal term in the 1930s. Genocide became implemented by the UN and defined in the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide in article 2 in 1948

“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the groups conditions of life calculated to bring about its psychical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

As with most legal definitions, the “language is subject to various interpretations, and important controversies remain about the scope of the concept even within the framework of what is a concise and carefully worded definition”, and consequently there are many variations in the cases that are recognized as genocide (Schabas, 2010:123). For instance, only a few cases namely the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, the Bosnian genocide and by some the Cambodian case, appear to have been recognized as genocide by a broad international community. Although, Cambodia has established a criminal court and prosecuted several of the Khmer Rouge leaders for genocidal crimes, the Cambodian case is often recognized as politicide, or as a combination of genocide and politicide, rather than merely genocide since the victims were similarly selected based on political affiliations (Harff, 2003). Many more cases have however been identified by scholars that have applied or proposed an alternate genocide definition. From an academic perspective, a shared definition can be an influential tool to create a common outset for an intricate subject, and the more precise a definition is, it might provide a more accurate instrument for analytical purposes. However, to engage in a debate on terminology is outside the scope of this thesis, the aim is merely to signify the issues and present the preferred definition in this thesis.

There are however, some relevant aspects related to the legal definition of genocide that might be worth noticing, for instance, political groups were excluded from the UN definition.
According to scholars such as Iversen (2008), political groups were excluded from the final draft because of opposition from particularly Stalin’s USSR who vetoed the draft that included political groups, although according to Schabas (2010:133), the opposition was widespread. This resistance to the incorporation of political groups seems to be subjected as a perceived threat to state sovereignty, and a fear of possible international interference by certain states (Schabas, 2010; Iversen, 2008).

The subject of intent to destroy in whole or in part a specific group, is similarly important to the definition. For instance, intent might be difficult to prove, and to identify intent prior to or during genocide might be particularly challenging and thus reduces the possibility of quick intervention (Harff, 1992). As Lieberman (2012:8) notes

“The legal definition focuses on an end result: the destruction “in whole or in part” of particular groups, rather than on what genocide is in terms of causes and goals. Following this path, the field of genocide studies considered first and foremost final outcomes, rather than historical processes and conflicts. Unity comes only from the final product”.

Thereby, many victims might die before the international community intervenes.

There are several alternative academic definitions proposed by for instance Fein (1993b) and Kuper (1981) amongst others, however the definition that will be adopted in the interest of the objective of this thesis, namely Harff’s (2003) definition, incorporates both genocide and politicide. Harff (2003:58) suggests that

“Genocides and politicides are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents -or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities- that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups”

The cases are as previously illustrated dependent on the definition applied by the specific scholar, but since comparative studies are fairly new within the genocide field, only a few studies seem to provide a list of genocide cases (Fein, 1993a). Scherrer (2005) provides a comprehensive list of cases which includes both genocides and mass violence. This thesis
relies on the list provided by Harff (2003), which similarly has been applied by other scholars, such as Krain (1997). In Harff’s (2003) study, the sample of cases used for analytical purposes, is a modified and updated version of a comprehensive research effort published by Harff and Gurr (1988). The list includes 37 cases of genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and 2001 (cf. attachment 1). The condition for identifying a case was that an episode had lasted six months or more “on the ground that it takes time to plan and execute the destruction of a group. Thus, isolated massacres are excluded unless we see some continuity in the form of intermittent but repeated reprisals against such groups” (Harff, 1992:31). The year 1955 was chosen because

“most episodes in the late 1940s and early 1950s were continuations of prior conflicts, e.g., four cases in the USSR that followed through on Stalin’s wartime campaigns against disloyal national peoples and potential dissidents. As a consequence of decolonization, many new, conflict prone states entered the international system beginning in the 1950s, and as a practical matter, reliable data for most independent variables were sparse or nonexistent before then” (Harff, 2003:59).

1.3 Research question and outline

Genocides and politicides are horrific crimes committed by a collective that often comprises a large number of individual perpetrators. The number of people often involved in the genocidal machinery and the number of victims seem to be of such a scale that it is difficult to comprehend how these crimes can unfold without any interruption from the inside or the outside. Then, through a quest guided by questions related to the genocidal process, into a range of explanations and approaches found in the genocide literature, it led me to search for explanations to the origin of these crimes, and to my main research question namely,

Where is the beginning to genocide and politicide?

This study is an inquiry into the genocide literature from a comparative and multidisciplinary perspective. The main aim of the thesis is to provide a thematic overview of some of the issues essential to genocide. The relevant conditions have been divided into four main parts that intend to provide a coherent structure to the thesis.

Subsequently, the aim of the first part is to introduce common structural and societal pre-conditions in genocides and politicides. What are common structural pre-conditions and how
do they affect the society? The second part intends to illustrate common genocidal motives and how the in- and out- groups are created. What can the motives behind a decision to kill in whole or in part a group in society be? And why is a specific group selected and how do people come to view the same out-group as the enemy? The third part is an inquiry into the individual perpetrator and the structure of the perpetrator group. The perpetrator of genocides and politicides is often assumed to be the state, but who belongs to the state label? Who makes the decisions and who executes orders? The final part aims to discuss some of the possible processes that might influence society and people’s decisions to actively or passively participate in genocide and politicide. What are some of the processes that make people kill and continue to kill their own neighbours?
2 Methodology

This dissertation is a multidisciplinary literature study that is based on theoretical and empirical research relevant to genocide and politicide. I have chosen a literature study for several reasons, but primarily because my main interest lay with the perpetrators of genocidal crimes, subsequently it seemed that an inquiry into the genocide literature was an interesting and viable place to begin. By relying on various documents, it similarly allowed access to elements that would have been difficult or even impossible to obtain through other means (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005). Although, alternative empirical methods such as conducting interviews would be a very interesting approach, for practical reasons they were not ensued. Despite the limited criminological focus, genocidal crimes have generated a lot of interests in other fields, which have resulted in an extensive amount of studies related to the subject. Consequently, the existing genocidal material seemed to provide equal or possibly more information than what I would have obtained with other analytical methods.

There are however, ethical consideration that must be taken into account before embarking on the study of genocide and politicide. Ethical considerations are important because of the nature of the subject (Alver and Øyen, 1997), namely the severity of the crimes committed and the vast number of victims and people affected. The subject requires a respect related to the investigation into another country’s and a community’s grave experiences and possible attempts of reconciliation. Furthermore, inquiries into such sever crimes entail an appreciation of the potential effects related to recitations of the victims and the perpetrators personal statements and accounts of an event. In an attempt to protect the survivors, the few direct citations in this thesis have been taken from renowned studies that the author perceives to hold similar values. Relatedly, there are scholars who assume, that to explain criminal behaviour cohere with defending the perpetrators (Miller, et al. 1999). Although I appreciate this argument, I believe in line with scholars such as Zimbardo (2007) and Waller (2007), that the only way to prevent future atrocities is to gain as much knowledge and understanding on the subject as possible.

2.1 The process: choices and aspirations

The process, to what has now become a thesis related to genocide and politicide, began with a fascination for brutal crimes perpetrated by people often described as “ordinary” human beings by many scholars, such as Arendt (1964), Zimbardo (2007) and Waller (2007), but
often blamed on people deemed abnormal by the relevant authority. For instance, the torture scandal in the Abu Ghraib prison by American soldiers seemed to quickly be attributed to a few “bad apples” by the US military, whereas many professionals such as Zimbardo (2007) argued for the soldier’s normality, and that their abnormal behaviours were a result of conditions such as the situational context. Then, through further inquiry into scholars such as Zimbardo (2007), Waller (2007) and Dutton (2007), my interest shifted to the crimes of the collective, similarly often perpetrated by people considered normal, such as in collective lynchings and in military massacres like My Lai, and the rape of Nanking to name a few. After reading a variety of interesting academic literature that mainly focused on assorted aspects of crimes against humanity including genocide and politicide, the diversity of approaches and explanations related to the field became apparent, and inspired a broader and more comprehensive approach that would, for instance, include the perspective on state and societal level. For instance, theorists such as Cohen (2001) and Bauman (1989) inspired questions concerning the role and responsibility of the individual perpetrator in the context of broader social systems. Criminologists such as Alvarez (2010) and Savelsberg (2010), who incorporate a comprehensive and multidisciplinary method of analysis of the genocide and human rights field, further motivated the decision for a general approach. Then, succeeding the works of particularly the political scientists Harff (1992:2003) and Rummel (1994:2005), sociologist Fein (1993a:1993b), and the social psychologists Staub (2003) and Waller (2007), came the decision to attempt a multidisciplinary approach. These scholars similarly apply comparative methods of analysis in their academic works, emphasising some possible similarities between different atrocities. Subsequently, through an inquiry into the literature that seemed to portray a variety of complex approaches, it inspired an inquest into general comparative conditions in crimes against humanity from a multidisciplinary perspective.

It further seemed interesting to attempt to connect some of the factors that could cohere across the different fields where possible. For instance, to relate the motives held on state level with some of the incentives associated with societal level. And to describe relevant preconditions, such as the prevalence of autocratic regimes in genocides and politicides identified by political scientists (Harff, 2003; Rummel, 2005) and sociologists (Fein, 1993b), together with the authority oriented societies identified by social psychologists (Waller, 2007; Staub, 2003).

Then, after spending six months in Cape Town in South Africa through the University of Oslo’s exchange program, I came to appreciate the influence a society’s situation has on the
members of a community. Situational conditions such as poverty and insecurity, that are often associated with limited prospects, seem to influence the perceptions and the social patterns of the members in a community. The experience inspired a search for what conditions that might be prevalent in, for instance, a pre-genocidal society.

Consequently, through what was perceived as an overwhelmingly complex field, the initial aim that has resulted in the current structure of the thesis, was developed. The original aim was to organize common factors identified by a range of disciplines and scholars that might be prevalent in multiple crimes namely common pre-conditions, motives, objectives for targeting the selected group, the individual perpetrator, the transformation process, the international bystander effect and lack of outside interference. Then, through the influence of Maier-Katkin et al’s (2009) division of factors, that they perceived prevalent in crimes against humanity into six different yet interacting conditions, began the process that aimed to arrange the different elements. These factors that mainly constituted a selection of generalized questions, I perceived to be essential for my own perception of crimes against humanity, where placed in a structure that intended to provide a simplistic overview of the most common attributes in crimes against humanity. The main components, which include pre-conditions, genocidal motives, perpetrators and the genocidal transformation process, have interestingly remained relatively constant throughout the process, despite major reductions concerning the scope of the thesis.

2.2 Acquiring a direction: limitations and challenges

The final objective of this thesis is a result of many reductions, primarily related to the crimes included and the ambition of the analysis. The initial aim, that was to give the reader a comprehensive account of the broad topic of crimes against humanity, was first reduced to an inquiry into massacres, genocide and politicide. The project was still considered too broad however, and although I continue to see some similarities between massacres and genocidal crimes, and whilst the aim might persist to be a little ambitious, it has been reduced considerably, to merely include genocide and politicide. A more modest approach was further adapted, since a comprehensive account of such complex atrocities was perceived to be too great of a task, and essentially as social psychologist Waller (2007) suggests that “after all, our understanding of our fellow humans and ourselves, can never be complete”. The complexity of genocidal crimes are mirrored in the variety of perpetrators, the large numbers of victims, and the different genocidal processes that appear to have developed over time and
continue to progress throughout the atrocity. Subsequently, these crimes require different levels of understanding from, for instance, a state and individual perspective, and an insight into several different explanatory disciplines from political sciences, to psychology and criminology (Alvarez, 2010). Relatedly, because of the scale of the field of study, many of the elements that are involved in the process of these crimes are topics that have a substantial research field of their own. For instance, topics such as violence, rape, in- and out- groups, power crimes to name a few, have an extensive theoretical foundation that is only in the beginning stages of being related to genocides and politicides.

Consequently, in an effort to reduce the scope as well as preserve the essence of the thesis, the crimes that will be investigated are limited to genocide and politicide, and it is solely an investigation into the beginning of these atrocities and not the entire process. To focus primarily on the onset of these crimes served to reduce the scope substantially, and to centre the attention of the thesis. I have chosen to focus on both genocide and politicide, because despite the legal differences these crimes seem to have similar situational components, perpetrators and developmental patterns. The challenges associated with the selected crimes have been particularly related to the variations in the definition of genocide and the classification of the cases. The inconsistency however, inspired a need for identifying the definition employed in the general discussion, and an awareness of each scholars preferred definition.

Because of the described complexity often associated with genocide and politicide, and in line with relevant criminological literature (Alvarez, 2010; Savelsberg, 2010), an interdisciplinary inquiry into the genocide field was regarded as an appropriate approach to the subject. There are however, a number of challenges related to a multidisciplinary investigation, such as related to the application of terminology by the different fields. Savelsberg (2010:49) for instance, illustrates the differences between criminology and historians

“Criminological vocabulary differs substantially from that used by genocide scholars. While the latter discussed phenomena such as totalitarian and revolutionary regimes, war and social instability, racist and anti-Semitic ideologies, criminologists use concepts such as learning and culture, strain and anomie, social control and social disorganization. And yet, where one school of criminology addresses culture, for example, historians are concerned with specific cultural expressions such as anti-
Semitism; and where other criminologists discuss social disorganization or anomie, historians explore the role of crisis”.

Another challenge seems to be related to the different perspectives each discipline focuses on, and how these might correlate. Genocidal studies are however, merely in the beginning stages of being associated with inter-disciplinary perspectives, and to embark on a further discussion related to the challenges of multidisciplinary studies is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Another relevant precondition to this thesis is that, whilst research that focuses primarily on a specific genocide or politicide is equally as relevant to the study of the genocide field, I have chosen to investigate similarities and mainly focus on common attributes in several cases. As a consequence, this thesis might focus less on specific cases such as the Holocaust, than what for instance many within the field of criminology might be familiar with from studies by theorists such as Bauman (1989), who mainly focus on the Holocaust. To cite Lieberman (2012:14)

“Indeed the Holocaust is central to the field of genocide studies: Holocaust texts are core documents in the field of genocide studies, and the Holocaust was a core experience of modernity. However, it does not follow that research based on the Holocaust, or in the Holocaust and other such core cases, necessary provides the most useful guide for analyzing all other possible cases of genocide”

Consequently, because of the scope and the subsequent time limitation, the thesis includes regrettably less case examples counting the Holocaust than what was initially intended.

There are several challenges associated with a comparative literature study. For instance, within the genocide field there appears to be concerns related to the ability to associate genocide with similar crimes. For instance, there are scholars who argue that because of a case’s uniqueness as an historic event, the predispositions and leaders, it is not possible to compare it with other crimes. To cite Weiss-Wendt (2010:82); “the crime of genocide is developmental and can always be traced back to a particular set of circumstances unique to a specific time and place”. However, a case’s uniqueness does not necessarily exclude the possibility of certain similarities between other cases, and thus might have a comparative potential. Comparative studies might however, be vulnerable to “coding errors because of the sheer number of cases and the lack of specific expertise by the researcher(s) in most of the cases in the comparison” (Hiebert, 2008:337). Whilst “general explanations are difficult because of the diversity of situations and motives for genocide”, the pursuit for commonalities
nevertheless seems to continue (Fein 1993a:30). Focusing merely on commonalities similarly poses the risk of foregoing in-depth discussions that might be important explanatory elements. This is an unfortunate effect and regrettably there are discussions that have been surpassed within this thesis, but I believe that, as important in-depth studies of specific elements are, comparative research is equally as central to the study of genocide and politicide.

Relatedly, because of the extent of the genocide field and the aim of the thesis, there are regrettably many additional aspects that will not be discussed. This does not however imply that factors not included in this thesis are less relevant, but a selection had to be made due to space and time limitations. For instance, disputes related to criminology and the discipline’s place in the subsequent literature, have not been further discussed. Furthermore, Vetlesen (2005) and related perspectives from philosophy, and the subsequent discussion on evil and the application of the term, are unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, in depth discussions will regrettably not be further attempted in areas related to, definitions and the associated discussion on the classification of cases, questions concerning genocidal identification of intent, whether genocide is a modern crime, a crime’s uniqueness, the role of gender in genocide and politicide, and distinctions between war and genocidal crime, to name a few. Further central limitations, that were initially part of the thesis, are the attributes that were greatly influenced by the work of Cohen (2001) and Savelsberg (2010), namely the international community’s influence on genocidal crime and the bystander effect. Please note that because of the extensive literature, the presented list of limitations is not exclusive, there are other attributes that have not been included in this thesis.

2.3 Literature and theoretical framework

This thesis is a literature study, and central is the thematic structure of the main discussion. The selected approach might therefore be comparable with what Wiess (1994, cited in Thagaard, 2003) has termed ‘issue-focused analysis’, albeit the information is not extracted from interviews, but rather from literature. Issue-focused analysis centres on selected topics, and extracts parts that are considered relevant to a specific issue from an interview or a study. Categorization of the selected issues is central to this approach. Classification has subsequently been applied in this thesis through the labelling of the main issues such as, motives, pre-condition, and origins of the perpetrators. Issue-focused analyses have however, been criticized for potentially presenting an incomplete perspective, either assumed to be held by the associated source, or of the related topic. The risk seems to derive from the process
where an excerpt, which has been extracted from a study or interview, is placed in another context. The concern appears to be that the extract might be altered or has been made invalid by the process (Thagaard, 2003). This is a potential risk with this thesis, since the results of, for instance, an empirical study has possibly been divided and placed under the appropriate subject. Whilst the main aim is not to present an entire theoretical perspective, but merely indicate where different theories might potentially be relevant dependent on the topic, caution has been exerted to preserve the essence of the extracts.

The reliability of the selected literature is imperative to this thesis. To select the most reliable sources however, has in an overwhelming literature been a challenge, but the sources applied in the thesis aim to reflect accredited researchers, who contribute with innovative theoretical directions and/or empirical evidence. But before discussing the theoretical and empirical basis for this thesis, it might be pertinent to first introduce some general challenges related to reliable evidence in genocide and politicide studies, since reliable empirical evidence appears to be difficult for a variety of reasons. For instance, these types of atrocities are often not identified as genocide or politicide until after or during an event. Subsequently, majority of the research directly related to genocide and politicide often relies on victim and perpetrator reports, or various legal and narrative documents, they are all based on historical accounts. In other words, post-event research material is often the main source of analysis directly related to genocidal crimes. Victims and perpetrator accounts are however, often perceived to be unreliable. Since, people possess several mechanisms that can alter a person’s perception and memory of an episode, to protect the individual from traumatic events (Waller, 2007). While perpetrators might express post-event disbelief towards their own behaviour, and attribute their actions to other motives such as a dehumanization process. These accounts are however, often associated with attempts to explain and understand self- behaviour, rather than evidence for the actual psychological processes that might have influenced genocidal behaviour (Waller, 2007; Dutton, 2007). Relatedly, as apparent with all historical evidence, it is often subject to interpretation. This point seems to be particularly evident in genocides and politicides where historical reports might be coloured by political incentives. Similarly, the figures reporting mass deaths in genocidal crimes are often assumed to be highly political, and subsequently do not necessarily reflect the actual numbers (Scherrer 2005).

Other types of evidence often depend on related or comparable incidents, such as various combat situations and clinical experiments. Research that relies on clinical or alternate conflict situations might however differ from genocide and politicide related to important
aspects. For instance, studies that refer to military soldiers in combat situations have one specific difference from the genocide cases, namely the victims (Grossman, 1996). Alternate experiments that might attempt to recreate similar situations are however, often regarded as highly unethical. Subsequently, reliable evidence is a challenge in genocide and politicide research. The successive literature studies, that include Alvarez’s (2010), Savelsberg’s (2010), Waller’s (2007), and this thesis, similarly pose in general a potential risk of relying on literature that might hold innovative assumptions rather than being empirically based.

I have relied on the works of criminologists such as Alvarez (2010) and Savelsberg (2010), who contribute to a general understanding of the genocide field from a criminological perspective. Alvarez (2010) for instance, has conducted an interdisciplinary literature study, which focuses on three different levels of analysis namely the state level, the organizational level and the individual level, and assumes that “by looking at genocide at these different levels of analysis, a more complete picture of genocide emerges, one which recognizes the importance of the context for dictating criminal behaviour” (Alvarez, 2010:4). The literature seems to be primarily based on similar theoretical works and empirical studies applied in this thesis, such as Bauman (1989), Fein (1993b), and Rummel (1994), that will be further discussed successively. Alvarez (2010) has particularly contributed to the genocide research field with an interrelated level approach employed in his literature analysis, which seems, in line with the objective, to provide a more complete perspective of genocide and politicide.

Savelsberg (2010) has similarly conducted a multidisciplinary literature study, although focusing on human rights in general. Through an inquiry into various human rights violations, Savelsberg (2010:2) seeks to explore the historical variations through questions such as “when and how did atrocities become defined as crimes, and what types of control responses emerged”, the circumstance around criminal behaviour particularly related to genocide, and finally how, and if, violations to human rights can be overcome. Although, research related to law and international criminal court studies constitute a large part of the literature, the empirical and theoretical studies applied in the discussion of criminal behaviour seem to be based on similar literature found in Alvarez’s (2010) analysis. Savelsberg’s (2010) analysis contributes with a direct approach to how criminological research might relate to issues often associated with genocide and politicide.

Alvarez (2010) and Savelsberg (2010) seem to refer to other criminological theories, that are similarly presented in the thesis, such as social control theory, anomie, Cohen’s (2001)...
theory of denial, Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization theory, and Agnew’s (1992) strain theory.

I have also made several references to the research conducted by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) on the conflict in Darfur, and particularly to their emphasis on the influence of dehumanization in the conflict. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) performed an empirical study based on historical narratives, and the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) conducted by the US Department of State that included interviews with 1,136 Darfur refugees in Chad. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008:883) have reportedly “cross-checked and supplemented the ADS data by reading and coding the extensive narratives recorded in the interviews”. It is however, a little unclear on what bases the historical narratives have been selected. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s (2008) analysis is one of few empirical studies conducted within the genocide field from a criminological perspective, and provides therefore an important contribution.

Because of the limited focus that is currently predominant in the criminological field however, majority of the selected literature relies on other disciplines particularly on political science, sociology and psychology. For instance, political scientists such as Rummel (1994) and Harff (2003), have both made significant contributions particularly related to political issues signified in comprehensive comparative studies that, “seek to determine the explanatory variables that can assist in identifying the genocide- prone societies of the present, and insolating positive and constructive features that may inoculate societies against genocide and other crimes against humanity” (Jones, 2006:307).

Harff (2003) for instance, has in addition to conducting a comprehensive comparative analysis, developed an alternative definition to genocide that includes both genocide and politicide (c.f. chapter 1.2), and contributed to a longstanding research effort to produce an extensive list of genocide and politicide cases (Harff and Gurr, 1988). The comparative analysis involves 37 cases of genocide and politicide, identified by Harff and Gurr (1988). Harff (2003) tested the correlation between six different components associated with genocidal risk, namely prior genocide, political upheaval, minority elite, exclusionary ideology, type of regime, and trade openness. The result suggests that the six factors have a 74 % accuracy in identifying genocide and politicide from other conflicts, which have been identified in the State Failure Task Force Report (2000).

Rummel (1994) has similarly conducted an extensive comparative analysis, which mainly aims to investigate the role of a state regime and power, and the occurrence of various
atrocities. Rummel (1994) seems to base his analysis on an extensive amount of sources that include various human rights reports, historical documents, and surveys. Although, other types of crimes against humanity, or what Rummel (1994) has termed Democide, that is the killing by a government, that include genocide, politicide, mass murder, massacre and terror, are included in the main analysis. Rummel (1994) focuses exclusively on genocide in a chapter published in Scherrer’s (2005) introductory book on genocide and mass violence.

Sociologists, such as Fein (1993a) and Bauman (1989), have similarly been used throughout the thesis. Fein (1993a; 1993b) has contributed to the comparative genocide research through empirical studies and through analysis of the genocide literature. Fein (1993a) has for instance, proposed several widely cited typologies that aims to categorize various genocide. Furthermore, Fein (1993b) has conducted an influential comparative study that investigated various pre-conditions to genocide and other state massacres such as ethnic discrimination, regime type, and the prevalence of war and prior genocide. The empirical data applied in Fein’s (1993b:84) study is a compilation of cases “based on examination of the consensus among independent investigators; these include Kuper (1981), Harff and Gurr (1988) and Chalk and Jonassohn (1990)”, that occurred in Asia, Africa and the Mid-East between 1945 and 1988.

Bauman (1989) has, through his prominent theory on the relationship between modern bureaucratic structures and genocide, similarly become an influential scholar within the genocide field. Whilst Bauman (1989) has received criticism for his methodology, he remains an important scholar for many because of his innovative theory that accentuated the relationship between social structure and behaviour.

Social psychologists, such as Waller (2007), Zimbardo (2007) and Milgram (2005), seem to similarly influence the genocide field, to cite Jones (2006:261); “the more prominent analysts of genocide are psychologist and psychiatrics”. Waller (2007) for instance, investigates why “ordinary” people would commit brutal crimes such as often reported in genocides. Through a variety of theoretical and empirical studies Waller (2007) proposes a theory that aims to explain individual behaviour in genocide and mass killing. The ultimate influence is believed to be evolution whilst three proximate influences work in an interactive fashion to influence behaviour, namely a) “Cultural Construction of Worldview”, b) “Psychological Construct of the ‘other’”, c) “Social Construction of Cruelty” (Waller, 2007:138). Waller (2007) appears to base his literature on a range of studies that include
genocidal scholars such as Browning (1992), and empirical studies by for instance Grossman (1996), Tajfel (1978), Zimbardo (2007) and Milgram (2005) to name a few.

Other influential psychologists are for instance Zimbardo (2007) and Milgram (2005), who similarly have contributed with theoretical and influential empirical studies related to behaviour often found in genocidal crimes. Milgram (2005) for instance, has conducted several experiments related to obedience to authority, which seem to imply how easily people can be influenced by an authority figure. Whilst Zimbardo’s (2007) famous mock prison experiment, seems to suggest that people are influenced by the situation, even if the subjects are aware that the conditions are fabricated. Zimbardo (2007) and Milgram (2005) are often associated with situationalism. Their studies have been described further in chapter 3.4. Whilst both these scholars have conducted influential studies that continue to be relevant, their studies have been widely criticized for their methodology and for ethical reasons. Similar experiments would, for instance, not necessarily be allowed today. Their studies remain prominent however, because of their innovative influence on the field.

The presented scholars seem to be widely accredited for their works, for instance Rummel (1994), Harff (2003), Fein (1993a) and Staub (2003) have all been mentioned in Totten and Jacobs’s (2002) book Pioneers of Genocide Studies. And similarly to scholars such as Zimbardo (2007), Waller (2007), Milgram (2005) and Bauman (1989), they are frequently cited in, for instance the Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies edited by Bloxham and Moses (2010), the Encyclopaedia of Genocide edited by Charny (1999), and other introductory books by scholars such as Jones (2006). Please note that the presented scholars are not an exclusive list, and alternate scholars, that similarly are considered influential to the genocide field such as Staub (2003), Grossman (1996) and Kuper (1981), will be introduced throughout in the thesis.
3 An introduction: the origin of genocide and politicide

Genocides and politicides have caused the deaths of millions of people (Harff, 2003). The last century has been filled with reports of people brutally killing their own neighbours, and even family members in an attempt to exterminate in whole or in part a group in their own society. How have members of a society come to perceive a group as an enemy, that should not only be excluded from society, but eliminated? Where does it all start? What is the beginning to genocides and politicides?

Genocide and politicide are often associated with complexity and contradictions. The intricacy is, for instance, mirrored in the variety of genocides and politicides that range from well-known cases, such as the Holocaust, the genocide in Rwanda and in Bosnia, to less known cases such as in El Salvador, Guatemala and Algeria (Harff, 2003). These genocides and politicides are committed in different continents, by different regimes and perpetrated on different victims. Despite the range of cases, comparative studies seem to suggest that there are some commonalities between many of the genocides and politicides (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993b; Rummel, 2005). Before embarking on the study of genocide and politicide however, there are some important differences in the conditions related to the study of genocide, and certain prerequisites and assumptions that have been made in this thesis, that might be pertinent to quickly introduce.

For instance, since the selection of cases is dependent on the definition of genocide that similarly is contingent upon the particular scholar there might be differences in the classification of genocide and politicide. Subsequently, please note that throughout this thesis when referring to a specific study or article the definition and classification of cases that the relevant scholar has applied might be different to those employed by others. In other discussions Harff’s (2003) definition and list of genocide and politicide will be used as a reference (c.f. attachment 1). Harff’s (2003:58) definition includes both genocide and politicide, and is

“The promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group”.

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This thesis is a literature study, and is based on the assumption that an integrated multidisciplinary approach is imperative for the study of genocide and politicide. Each discipline is believed to introduce important elements that can contribute to a further comprehension of a very complex subject. Although while some of the factors recognized by a field might be an exclusive attribute from that discipline, it is believed that some of the elements identified by for instance, political scientists might similarly cohere with some of factors introduced by for instance, social psychologists or criminologists. Another central assumption is that there are elements such as a state’s history and specific components that are unique to every genocide and politicide but there are some conditions that can be recognized across many cases. It is an important pre-requisite to this thesis because comparative research constitutes a large part of the basis for the discussion and the structure.

The genocide field is regrettably too vast to give a comprehensive theoretical and empirical overview, consequently the main aim is merely to discuss some of the main conditions associated with the contextual risk factors, and common conditions associated with the beginning to the societal and individual genocidal process. The limitations to the thesis unfortunately entail that factors equally important to those that will be further discussed might not be included, this however does not imply that other elements are less relevant. For instance, the international community might be an important factor in genocide and politicide, related to such as intervention and retribution, but is regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, the structure mainly categorises the genocide literature thematically, subsequently the relevant theories and genocide cases might be divided and described separately under the relevant subject. This structure however means that if a scholar has examined multiple factors, every component might not be included or they might be considered separately. For a full overview of the studies please refer to the original article.

The main discussion has been thematically structured and divided into four parts, guided by pertinent questions related to genocide and politicide. The first part, for instance, introduces some of the structural and social risk factors in genocidal crimes. What are some of the preconditions to genocide and politicides? And is the society affected by some of these conditions? The second part is a discussion of the various motives that can instigate a desire for genocide and politicide, and how the target group is selected. Why would some regimes decide to eliminate a group in society? And do all the genocidal perpetrators hold the same incentives? How do the genocide objectives correlate with the selection of the target group? The third part is an enquiry into the perpetrator group. What hides under the state label? What
kind of people are the perpetrators? The fourth part is an investigation into the social and individual transformation into a mass killer. What are some of the mechanisms that make people, often brutally, kill other people part of their own society?
3.1 Structural and social risk factors

Genocides and politicides are generally recognized to be organized and pre-planned (Alvarez, 2010; Rummel, 2005; Weiss-Wendt, 2010; Chirot and McCauley, 2006; Jamieson, 1999), and consequently “do not develop overnight and without warning” (Harff, 1992:31), then what does a pre-genocidal society look like? What are some of the preconditions to genocide and politicide?

Comparative research seems to suggest that there are some structural and societal similarities between many of the different genocide and politicide for instance, many cases seem to have had similar types of regime and had experienced state failure simultaneously or prior to the atrocity (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993b; Rummel, 2005). The succeeding discussion will focus on some of the common risk factors in genocide and politicide and the connection between the structural risk factors identified by a variety of political scientists, criminologists and sociologists, and the societal risk factors recognized by different social psychologists. The main assumption in this chapter is that the structural conditions such as regime types, and political upheavals, would affect the society. Therefore, if some of the research conducted on the societal risk factors is connected with the relevant structural conditions it might aid the discussion related to societal incentives for genocidal participation. The structural and social risk factors that will be discussed are a selection of factors based on the results of various comparative studies (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993; Rummel, 1994; Staub, 2003), that seem to have been widely used by other theorists when examining risks related to genocide and politicide (Alvarez, 2010; Jones, 2006).

Subsequently, the following chapter will attempt to introduce some of the structural risks associated with genocide and politicide, such as regime types, political upheavals, fragmented societies and economic dependencies that will be related to some of the societal risk factors that might cohere with the structural risks such as authority orientation, obedience to authority, and possible effects of exposure to violence. But before investigating some of the current theories on structural and social risk factors in genocidal crimes, an essential question arises; who is ultimately responsible for these crimes? Who are the perpetrators?

The main perpetrator of genocide and politicide is frequently perceived, by a variety of researchers from political scientists (Harff, 2003; Rummel 2005), to sociologists (Fein, 1993a) and criminologists (Alvarez, 2010; Savelsberg, 2010), to be the state. Although, many scholars similarly seem to argue for the necessity of popular support, they often recognize the
state as the primary perpetrator. To cite Fein (1993b:98), the “control over the state machine is critical and that the absence of limits on the controllers is a precondition for its commission”. Relatedly, the result of a comprehensive comparative study conducted by Harff (2003) suggests that out of the 37 possible cases classified as genocide and politicide between 1955 and 2001, all were perpetrated by the governing authority of the state.

There are however some theorists, such as Gerlach (2006), that argue that genocides and politicides derive from violent societies, and that the state is not the sole perpetrator since these types of crime require a certain level of societal support. Furthermore, other scholars argue that to only refer to the state as the perpetrator might be in some instances misleading because the highest official authority is not always the main perpetrator, such as in the genocide in Rwanda (Weiss-Wendt, 2010). Then again as Alvarez (2010:30) suggests

“States are not always monolithic entity that operates uniformly and systematically… Genocide is planned by both formal and informal agents of a state, and any particular example may involve only element or fractions of a government rather than the entire political apparatus”.

These agents can for instance be non-governmental security forces, paramilitary and rebellious groups. Relatedly, Rummel’s (2005:65) definition of government namely “any ruling authority, including that of a guerrilla group, a quasi-state a soviet, a terrorist organization, or an occupation authority” might be particularly suitable when discussing genocide because it emphasizes that it is any group currently in possession of state power. The perpetrators might derive from different positions dependent on the genocide and politicide but the group is often recognized to be superior to their targets, for instance the perpetrators are often in possession of arms, military equipment and other resources whereas the victims are often primarily defenceless civilians.

It might be important to note that the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide in 1948 article 2 does not imply that the state is the only potential perpetrator. Interestingly, the General Assembly (2005) of the UN emphasises in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, that the primary responsibility of preventing genocide lies with the state, allowing other types of non-governmental organizations to be viable perpetrators. Another implication with a generalization of the perpetrator to the state is that the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutes individuals and not the entire state (Rummel, 2005). Furthermore the state
machinery consists of many people with different positions, incentives and authority. This implication with be further discussed in chapter 3.3.

Subsequently, the primary perpetrator of genocide and politicide is frequently assumed to be the authority that at the time of the atrocity is in possession of state power, but what are some of the most common structural and social conditions related to the main perpetrator?

3.1.1 Regime and its effect on society

Many forms of governmental regimes appear to have been perpetrators of genocidal crimes for instance the totalitarian communist regime in Cambodia, the authoritarian regime in Uganda and the democratic regime in Sri Lanka (Harff, 2003). But are there some political systems that pose a higher risk of genocide and politicide?

First, before presenting some of the studies investigating risks related to the different regimes, it might be useful to have a short introduction into how the various governments are commonly classified. It is recognized that the classification practices of regimes is a disputed subject but regrettably an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. It seems however that many theorists that have focused their research on genocide and politicide such as Rummel (1994) and Fein (1993b) have based their classification of regimes on the Polity 2 codebook developed by Gurr, Jaggers and Moore (1990 cited in Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). The Polity 3 codebook by Jaggers and Gurr (1995:469) that was used by Harff (2003) was successfully retrieved, which is an updated version of the Polity 2 codebook that comprising “annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy for 161 states spanning the years from 1946 through 1994”. Jaggers and Gurr (1995:471) consider a state to be democratic if it scores high on the following “the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the level of constraints on the chief executive”, whereas authoritarian regimes would be identified if it “sharply restrict or suppress political participation; their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite; and once in office the executive exercises power with few or no institutional constraints”.

In continuation, Harff (2003:61) conducted a comparative study of genocides and politicides where the main objective was “to identify general conditions under which governments, and rival authorities in internal wars, choose such a strategy”, that is to destroy in whole or in part a collective. One inquiry was “whether failed states with partial democracies have been less likely than autocratic regimes to commit geno-/politicides since
The result suggests that “failures in states with autocratic regimes were three and a half times more likely to lead to geno-/politicides than failures in democratic regimes” (Harff, 2003:66). Fein (1993b:79) similarly conducted a comparative study of genocide with the objective to review “theoretical expectations and examines the empirical relation between genocides (and other state massacres) and indices of ethnic discrimination, polity form, and war among states in Asia, Africa and the Mid-East from 1948 to 1988”. Fein (1993b) similarly found that the most likely regime to perpetrate genocide is a totalitarian government. Relatedly, Rummel (1994; 1995) has conducted several studies based on a comprehensive data set that include human rights reports, specialized studies and surveys that suggest a similar effect. Rummel (1994:1) proposes that “power kills and absolute power kills absolutely”, which suggests that totalitarian regimes are more likely to engage in genocide and the stronger a democracy is, the less likely it is that atrocities will take place. Even in genocide where the perpetrators have been democratically elected, the government has often in the shadow of a war acted characteristically like a totalitarian regime with increased power and control over their society such as in Nazi Germany (Rummel, 1994).

Contrary to Rummel’s (1995) findings, Krain (1997:342) performed an empirical study investigating various hypothesis of the onset of genocidal crime, and found a non-significant result for a power concentration that is “the degree to which power resides in the institutions of government”. Krain (1997) argues that there are other more prevalent conditions that can better predict these atrocities and power alone cannot be the sole cause, however he acknowledges that he cannot reject the power thesis completely since power is a necessary prerequisite because without it, there would be no crime.

There appears to be an on-going debate between scholars who belong to the “democratic peace” school, who suggest that democratic states are less likely to engage in conflicts (Rummel, 1995; Jones, 2006; Harff, 2003; Hegre et. al., 2001), and those that suggest democracies are as violent but do not engage in atrocities as openly as other types of regimes (Mann, 2005). Rummel (2005) and Harff (2003) argue that the least likely regime to engage in genocidal crime is a full-democratic state, since a democratic regime has more control mechanisms, such as independent organizations that function as watchdogs, to prevent the government to engage in covert atrocities. Sociologist Mann (2005) argues that Rummel (1994) and others who assume democracies as safe havens from this type of atrocity ignore other mass murders such as the dropping of the atomic bombs by the USA. Relatedly, the killings of indigenous people that have occurred within all forms of regimes such as in
democracies like Australia and USA. Further arguments for democratic states as perpetrators of mass murders, are the killings in other countries rather than in their own (Jones, 2006; Mann, 2005). According to Jamieson and McEvoy (2005) states often use techniques of “othering” victims that allows for people to torture and kill outside of their own state boarders. States often create Special Forces that perform missions that are often exempt from the same rules as regular military. For instance, US Special Forces have been reported to train other paramilitary groups and death squads to use torture and to kill prospective enemies. Democratic states have also been involved, both as active and passive participants in genocidal crimes in other countries such as France’s involvement in the Rwandan genocide (Fein, 1993a). France initially got involved to preserve the French speaking post-colonies as counterinfluence to the English speaking countries. France helped train and financed the Hutus militia to protect themselves initially against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) namely Rwandan exiles that attempted a military invasion in 1990 (Jones, 2006). Relatedly, Jaggers and Gurr (1995:477) seem to notice a connection between attempts of democratization and the genocides in Burundi and Rwanda, and suggest that

“It must be recognized that political mass murder in Burundi in 1993 and genocide in Rwanda in 1994 were both preceded by internationally-brokered efforts to democratize regimes through power-sharing agreements between Hutus and Tutsis. In each case the group whose position was threatened by democratization (Hutus in Rwanda, Tutsis in Burundi) resorted to massive retaliatory violence against communal rivals.”

Nevertheless, “the general proposition that democracies do not annihilate groups defined to be within their polity – i.e., part of the body political and moral universe of obligation- has not been contradicted” (Fein, 1993b:84). To cite Weitz (2003:56) “the notion that liberal regimes never engage in genocide can only be sustained if one completely isolates the domestic practices, of liberal Western states from their international activities”. There are however different degrees of democracy and Fein (1993b:92) points out that “one state with a mixed experience of military rule and episodic elections -Pakistan- perpetrated genocide after free elections”. The results of both Fein (1993b) and Harff (2003) comparative studies nonetheless suggest that from their sample of genocide cases, not one of the perpetrators were ruled by a fully democratic regime.
One of the main arguments appears to be that democratic regimes have more control agencies that function as watchdogs within their own state boarder, this however might also apply to the international community. For instance, human rights organizations might operate as international regulators and a country with several global associations through political and independent organizations might be more likely to conform to international legislation. Interestingly, Harff (2003:67) tested the effects of international political and economic interdependency of a country and found that economic dependency decreases the risk of genocidal crime, but the initial result of political interdependency however showed limited effect. Additional tests were conducted on political connections based on the assumption that “the greater a country’s international political connections, the more likely it is to accept help in managing conflict and the more susceptible it is to pressures to minimize human rights violations” (Harff, 2003:68). However, the result does not support the hypothesis which might “suggest that minority elites are less likely to have dense networks of political ties with other countries, and thus are more free to commit human rights violations, but the direction of causality is uncertain” (Harff, 2003:68). Harff (2003:70) suggests that the positive effect of economic rather than political interdependence might be because “the international will to act is more important than political linkages in preventing escalation to geno-/politicide”. Autocratic regimes appear to pose the highest risks of becoming a perpetrator of genocide and politicide within their own state boarder, but what effect do these forms of regimes have on a society? And can a specific culture increase the likelihood of a society’s genocide support and participation?

Social psychology researchers, such as Staub (2000) and Waller (2007), suggest that to make sustainable social interactions in a society even possible, a certain level of respect for authority and hierarchy based systems is necessary. Human beings appear to create hierarchical systems to minimize aggression and unnecessary fighting, and it seems that all cultures to some extent acknowledge a hierarchy where people’s social and economic status are valued. However, certain cultures appear to rely more on their leader and according to Waller (2007:179) “in most cases of genocide and mass killing, the culture has been characterized by a strong authority orientation”. Authority orientation refers to “a cultural model that orders the social world and relates to people according to their position and power in hierarchies” (Waller, 2007:179). Waller (2007) suggests that this effect is often mirrored in the family culture in these societies. Pre-genocide societies such as in Germany, Rwanda and Cambodia appear to have had cultures built on hierarchical values that promote respect and
obedience to authority. For instance, according to Staub (2003), Germany has a long history of value discipline, respect and obedience to authority in their social and family culture. Obedience and respect was highly regarded and enforced within the school system, at work and within the family dynamics (Staub, 2003). Subsequently, people with a strong authority orientation that are accustomed to being guided, will when faced with a difficult situation be more prone to rely on their leader and “less likely to oppose the actions of leaders and the group, including harmful acts toward a victim group” (Staub, 2000:370). Consequently, they might “be more likely to obey direct orders for violence” (Staub, 2000:370). Interestingly, Blass (1991:405) reviewed various empirical studies and argue that

“What three out of four of these studies suggest is that beliefs about ceding versus retaining personal control seem to be salient and predisposing factors in obedience to authority. The evidence, in this regard, is clearest with religious variables, that is, variables centered around the belief that one's life is under divine control”

The study on religion conducted by Bock and Warren (1972), analysed in Blass’s (1991) study, suggests a correlation between subjects that score high on religious beliefs and accepting commands from authority. According to Waller (2007), this connection might occur since religion often provides specific guidelines for social and individual conduct that could re-enforce the importance of the authority by passing the decision on to how to live one’s own life to the authority. Religion “for many, offers the most explicit answer to the meaning of life and, in doing so, tremendously influences cultural models of authority orientation” (Waller, 2007:181). Authority orientation might therefore be further enhanced in societies where religion is dominant.

This does not however imply that an innate respect for authority can solely explain genocidal behaviour since there are many societies that recognize these values that do not engage in genocide or politicide. These factors could however as part of several contributing factors influence the perpetrators readiness to participate. It is difficult to believe that a totalitarian or authoritarian regime would not influence a society, but does it necessarily suggest that other cultures less authority oriented are less likely to engage in genocidal behaviour, if culture specific methods are used to engage people?

To make a short summary, the empirical evidence from comparative studies such as Fein (1993b), Harff (2003) and Rummel (1994) suggests that democratic regimes are the least likely to engage in genocide, whereas a strong correlation was found in all three studies
between genocidal crime and totalitarian regimes. There might be a correlation between autocratic regimes and societies that value obedience and respect for authority, which seems to increase the risk of people obeying violent orders (Staub, 2003; Waller, 2007). But as Krain (1997) so rightly points out, that to identify which regimes that increase the risk of genocide and politicide is important, it does not aid in determining the onset of genocidal crimes during a regime's duration in power.

3.1.2 Political upheaval and societal changes

The majority of genocides and politicides seem to have been committed by the state, or the agency currently in control of the state. The question that follows is therefore under what conditions does the government most often perpetrate genocide and politicide?

The Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) (2012a:1) writes that “genocide may occur in times of peace, where groups are intentionally subject to long term policies affecting their ability to exist as an identity group as well as in the context of both intra-state and inter-state conflicts”. However, various researches seem to suggest that genocidal crimes rarely occur during peace time. For instance, the result of Fein’s (1993b:95) comparative research suggests that “the use of genocide and state-sponsored or tolerated massacres is virtually restricted to warring state; there is but one case of a non-warring state engage in state-sanction massacres (Equatorial Guinea)”. Similarly, Harff (2003) has used the list of structural conditions associated with a conflict provided in the State Failure Task Force Report (2000) to compare the genocide cases identified in her study to what she termed political upheaval, that is

“An abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries, or defeat in international war. Types of political upheaval include defeat in international war, revolutions, anticolonial rebellions, separatist wars, coups, and regime transitions that result in the ascendency of political elites who embrace extremist ideologies” (Harff, 2003:62).

Harff (2003) found that 36 out of 37 genocide and politicide in the last part of the twentieth century occurred within or following political upheaval. The exception was the Syrian incident of the Muslim Brotherhood who was targeted because of their opposition to the regime that is more reminiscent of a massacre, but because of its length and certain attributes
it was defined as comparable with a revolutionary war (Harff, 2003). Interestingly this is not the same exception that was found by Fein (1993b), and the Syrian incident is included in Fein’s (1993b) list of cases.

The trigger factors identified by the OSAPG (2012b) as an analysis framework to detect genocide seem to reflect recognition of political instabilities as potential risk situations. Some of the factors identified are

“Upcoming elections; change of Government outside of an electoral or constitutionally sanctioned process; Instances where the military is deployed internally to act against civilians; Commencement of armed hostilities; Natural disasters that may stress state capacity and strengthen active opposition groups; Increases in opposition capacity, which may be perceived as a threat and prompt pre-emptive action, or rapidly declining opposition capacity which may invite rapid action to eliminate problem groups” (OSAPG, 2012b:4).

There appears to be an increase in the support for the correlation between political upheaval and genocide amongst genocide scholars (Krains, 1997; Rummel, 2005; Alvarez, 2010; Jones, 2006; Hiebert 2008; Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993b). Some theorist such as sociologist Shaw (2003) even suggests that genocide is in fact a form of war that targets civilians rather than military. Then, what are some of the most common political upheavals associated with genocides, and what are some of the risks related to these conditions?

Harff (2003) investigated risk related to the magnitude of violent conflicts and prior genocides. The result of the first risk factor suggests that

“The greater the magnitude of previous internal wars and regime crises, summed over the preceding 15 years, the more likely that a new state failure will lead to geno-/politicide. When the magnitude of past upheaval was divided between high and low, in high-magnitude cases the risks of geno-/politicide were nearly two times greater” (Harff, 2003:66).

Repeat genocide and politicides were counted within the timeframe of the study 1955-2001 and considered separate events when they occurred four or more years after the last event ended. The results suggest that
“The risks of new episodes were more than three times greater when state failures occurred in countries that had prior geno-/politicides. The effects of magnitude of political upheaval were weaker than those of prior genocide—it appears that habituation to genocide adds more to the risks of future genocide than the magnitude of internal war and adverse regime change per se” (Harff, 2003:66).

The results support the effect found by Fein (1993b) that suggests a high correlation (73% of the cases) between increased risk and prior genocides.

There are many examples of genocide and politicide exciding civil and international war (Jones, 2006), for instance the genocide in Rwanda excided the civil war in the country, the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust occurred during the First and Second World War respectively (Alvarez, 2010). Krain (1997) conducted a comparison study based on the data set similar to Harff (1992) that investigated the onset of genocides and politicides. The result suggests that the most prominent predictor was civil war. International war was not as significant, however combined or preceding a civil war, the risk increased significantly even more than either one on its own. Similarly Fein’s (1993b) results support an increase in risk related to civil war compared to other political upheavals. War can also affect the risk of conflict in the neighbouring countries. For instance, masses of refugees fleeing from war can destabilize the countries admitting the refugees (Fein 1993b; Jones, 2006; Alvarez, 2010), such as during the Rwandan genocide the population fled to their neighbour country Zaire (now The Democratic Republic of Congo) which eventually caused a new war in the region (UNHCR, 2000).

Krain (1997) also investigated the risk of decolonization and found only a minor effect on the occurrence of genocidal crime and only after 4-5 years. Krain (1997) theorizes that the result of the analysis could suggest that decolonization has a slower progression, and subsequently the opening in power structure is prolonged. This effect could be a result of the authority’s hesitation and an immediate lack of funding following the event of decolonization. The risk associated with decolonization seems however to increase significantly combined with civil war (Krain, 1997).

Revolution is similarly considered a risk factor in genocides and politicides. For instance prior to the Cambodian politicide, the Khmer Rouge party had begun a communist revolution. Pol Pot became the leader of the Khmer Rouge party in 1963, with more radical and nationalistic political views than the previous leader. Through its peasant directed policies, that focused its attention on the social injustices and the poverty the country suffered from,
the support for the communist party grew. The Vietnam War had spread to Cambodia along with a civil war that broke out in 1967 where Khmer Rouge fought against government forces (Stensrud, 2008). The regime led by Prince Sihanouk was overthrown by the Americans in 1970 and replaced with Lon Nol Sihanouk’s former ally (Jones, 2006). Sihanouk’s were forced to join his former opponent Pol Pot in the fight against Lon Nol’s regime. Sihanouk was popular amongst the population that might have profited the Khmer Rouge. The most significant event however in the political upheaval, that is often associated as the major cause of Pol Pot’s widespread support, and that influenced the outcome of the war, was the bombing by the US. The bombing caused millions of civilians dead and produced widespread fear amongst Cambodians. After the American army withdrew from Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge managed to take the power from the Lon Nol regime in 1975 (Stensrud, 2008). The politicide and genocide in Cambodia lasted from 1975-1979 (Harff, 2003). However, as Kissi (2006) suggests, revolution might have excited the Cambodian politicide but not all revolutions trigger mass murders. In line with this argument, not all wars become genocides and politicides, but they constitute a risk factor, and combined with other factors have the potential to develop into genocides and politicides (Chirot and McCauley, 2006). Various researches seem to suggest that wars, revolutions, refugees, and political conflicts increase the risk of genocide and politicide, but how do these situations affect the onset of genocide?

Some theorists, such as Chirot and McCauley (2006), propose that war and other types of conflicts provide the opportunity to engage in genocidal behaviour. The genocidal intent is either suggested to have developed because of the opportunity, or the opportunity allows for the execution of genocidal policies (Hiebert 2008). Krain (1997), for instance, argues that political upheaval causes structural changes to the power, which can provide the opportunity to commit genocidal crimes. State authority continuously oppresses their opposition, but when internal structural changes occur, the government perceives itself as exposed. The necessity to eliminate the opponent becomes more apparent and elimination becomes the most viable solution. Similarly, Harff (2003) suggests that the effect of the magnitude of a violent conflict is a result of the authority’s increased use of force combined with an opportunity presented by the chaos of the situation to exterminate any possible rivals.

Various theorists suggest that political upheaval provide a mask that conceals the execution and provides the tools to exterminate the target group (Rummel, 2005; Fein, 1993b; Markusen and Kopf, 1995; Alvarez, 2010; Jones, 2006). Extreme situations such as wars and revolutions allow the state to be exempt from ordinary rules of engagement, and to take
excessive measures to defend their own citizens. Society allows for more invasive control in the name of self-protection (Alvarez, 2010). These methods of protection can be means of a stricter control of the media and conventional methods of information, exemptions to established laws and it can provide an opportunity to enforce new legislation. These exemptions might be necessary, but can also be exploited for genocidal purposes. For instance, in the aftermath of the WWI and prior to the Holocaust, the Nazi regime made radical changes to the laws and made the Jewish people into lawless citizens (Alvarez, 2010). Resources are made available with minimal inquiries into its usage which allows the state to easily redirect military forces in favour of genocidal aims. Other situational risks are that the target group is made increasingly vulnerable because of isolation (Markusen and Kopf, 1995). Genocide and politicide then seem to predominantly occur during or in the aftermath of political upheaval, but how does political upheaval affect the society?

War and armed conflicts greatly affect the society, and in particular the civilian population, that often experience a threat for their lives and their way of living (Alvarez, 2010). Staub (2003) argues that people in war and other violent conflicts are affected by both difficult life conditions and by deprivation of basic primary needs. The situational conditions such as hunger, famine and poverty (i.e. living conditions) that are often prevalent during war, effects the biological needs but also people’s psychological primary needs appear to be effected, “this include the needs for security, for a positive identity, for effectiveness and control over important events in one’s life, for positive connections to other people, and for a meaningful understanding of the world or comprehension of reality” (Staub, 2003:293). Subsequently, people then often react to both psychological and biological needs that can work as powerful instigators for a reaction for instance, “the inability to protect oneself and one’s family and the inability to control the circumstances of one’s life greatly threatens security” and can prompt a reaction to the perceived cause (Staub, 2003:294). The situational conditions during a war can cause an experience of powerlessness and feelings of uncertainty of how to respond to a frightening and chaotic situation.

“People usually do not know how to deal with the material deprivation, chaos, and social disorganization these conditions create. They do not join together to deal with them effectively. Instead, the life problems in society give rise to psychological and social processes that turn subgroups of society against each other. Individuals, feeling
helpless on their own, turn to their group for identity and connection. They scapegoat some other groups” (Staub, 1999:182).

The mechanisms that scapegoat, create us- and them- groups, and devaluate the victims are often important factors in the genocidal process and will be further discussed in chapter 3.2 and 3.4.

Various social psychologists seem to suggest that societies that have been exposed to war and its violent effects are also more predisposed to further acts of violence (Waller, 2007; Dutton, 2007; Staub, 2003). The assumption appears to be that through exposure to violence, the perceptions of violent behaviour and subsequently the associated norms become altered through processes that normalize violence into acceptable behaviour. To cite Staub (1999:83)

“Great violence, and certainly group violence, usually evolves over time. Individuals and groups change as a result of their own actions. Acts that harm others, without restraining forces, bring about changes in perpetrators, other members of the group, and the whole system that makes further and more harmful acts probable. In the course of this evolution, the personality of individuals, social norms, institutions, and culture change in ways that make further and greater violence easier and more likely”.

Research on communities where violence has become a common attribute, appears to similarly suggest that exposure to violence increases the risk of aggressive behaviour (Dutton, 2007). Furthermore, studies conducted on children that have been exposed to violence at home, seem to suggest that these children have a significantly higher risk of becoming violent themselves, have a lower threshold in using violence, and are more likely to interpret messages more aggressively then children not exposed to violent behaviour (Bartol, 2002).

Relatedly, while norms aid society to distinguish between rights from wrong, norms are not necessarily constant entities, and can through persistence and situational conditions be changed rather quickly. As a result, through exposure to violence, the perception of violence as unacceptable behaviour is changed into a behaviour that is now seen as acceptable, and in some situations welcomed and “eventually, killing the victims becomes the right thing to do” (Dutton 2007:109). Subsequently, when an action is deemed normal, personal responsibility seems to be diffused by the normality of the behaviour since everyone is doing it. Furthermore, whilst violent behaviour becomes the norm, the target group is similarly excluded from the moral universe. The out-group is no longer recognized as part of the moral
society, and it is therefore not perceived as a crime to violate the victim group (Staub, 1999; 2000).

Rosen (2005) argues that a strategy to normalize violence in society was intentionally enforced by the state power in Sierra Leone. The politics validated the use of violence and incorporated it into the norms and perceptions in society.

“The seeds of civil war were sown in the pre-war peacetime politics that mobilized large numbers of children and youth in the years following Sierra Leone’s independence in 1961 and turned them into political thugs. Youth violence was encoded into the normative structure of everyday political completion in Sierra Leone. Its legitimization opened the door to unrestrained bloodshed” (Rosen, 2005:59).

Rosen (2005:79) further suggests that “pre-war political violence was the training ground for warfare. Marauding bands of youth first learned in peacetime that they could kill and maim civilians with impunity and that the rule of law was a club for bludgeoning political enemies”. This normalization of violence occurred through the forceful implementation of obedience to authority, habituation to killings and unrestricted actions with no moral or legal consequences (Rosen, 2005).

Criminologists, such as Alvarez (2010:39) and Savelsberg (2010), argue for what could seem to be a contradiction to the changing of norms namely for a state of anomie, adopted from Durkheim’s original anomie theory on a state of normlessness. Anomie is according to Morrison (2001:10) “a state of ethical normlessness or deregulation, pertaining either to an individual or a society. This lack of normative regulation leaves individuals without adequate ethical guidance as to their conduct and undercuts social integration”. Anomie would occur during a conflict when rapid change in societal structure occurs and when the established conventions change, anything is possible.

“In this kind of situation the limits of the possible are unknown and old animosities and long-standing prejudice can be acted upon. Violence and criminality no longer seem out of bounds since all the rules are off. Genocidal actions are facilitated by this state of anomie since many of the traditional moral and social norms around community, neighbours, violence and persecution are greatly diminished” (Alvarez, 2010:39).
It is however a little unclear what evidence supports these claims in a genocidal context. For instance, do no norms instigate genocidal behaviour? Relatedly, if there are no norms that restrict or assume that killing people is undesirable, would it necessarily increase the likelihood of perpetrators namely the men, women and children that are found to participate in genocides and politicides, randomly kill people?

Furthermore, war and other conflicts also often involve most parts of society, since majority of the adult population would already participate in the war machinery. Relatedly, Jones (2006) argues that since states at war already have majority of their population involved in different war related roles, the distinction between illegal and legal behaviour might diminish.

Persistent violent behaviour increases the risk of an elevation of the situation (Staub, 1999), which can explain some of the mechanisms that make political upheaval into a genocide or politicide. However, there are numerous violent societies that do not result in genocide or politicide, and there are societies that are not to the same extent predisposed to violence that do engage in genocidal behaviour. Furthermore, there are incidents of genocides that occur in peacetime, but does the variety of structural conditions necessarily eliminate the effects of war on genocide and politicide? For instance, could it be several processes that influenced pre-genocidal societies and that other mechanisms would affect a society’s readiness to participate in genocide at peacetime?

The results of various studies seem to suggest that the most common situational risk factors posing a high risk of genocide, is civil war and prior genocide (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993b). The magnitude of a conflict would significantly influence the risk, but the factor associated with the highest risk of genocide and politicide is a combination of several political upheavals, such as international war and civil war. These conflicts appear to provide the opportunity to engage in genocide and often provide the legitimacy for states to make exceptions to ordinary laws to protect their citizens. Why some political upheaval leads to genocide and politicides and others do not, seems to still be unclear (Harff, 2003).

On a societal level, war and violent conflicts often affect people’s biological and psychological needs, that prompt a readiness to react and produce psychological mechanisms that motivate a creation of in- and out- groups because of a need for connection with peers and an alienation of others. Studies on exposure to violence seem to suggest that violent behaviour fosters more violence that can again escalate. This effect could be reflected in the results of Harff (2003) and Fein (1993b) studies, that there is a higher risk of genocidal crimes
if the state had experienced a previous genocide or politicide. Societies that experience conflict appear to be accustomed to violence through an often gradual exposure to violence, which changes the norms in society to except and even welcome violent behaviour (Staub, 2003). Then, if a conflict influences division, i.e. the creation of in- and out- groups, would divided societies pose a higher risk of genocide and politicide?

3.1.3 Divided societies and economic development

Fragmentations in society are often recognized as a prerequisite in ethnic and civil conflicts (Harff, 2003). However, is prior division a precondition in genocide and politicide? Are divided societies more prone to genocide?

Societies are already divided, from more segregated to loosely divided societies by socioeconomic status, religion, health and so forth, and these divisions are often intertwined (Staub, 2000). It is suggested that more segregated societies, especially by religion and ethnic division, are at more risk of experiencing conflicts between groups (Dutton 2007; Harff 2003) that effect the onset of a genocidal process (Staub, 2000). For instance, Kuper (1981) argues that societies that are subjected to clear divisions combined with other inequalities, such as economic differences that are attributed to the outsider group, are at higher risk of engaging in genocidal crimes. The social structure re-enforces the segregation which enables crimes perpetrated against a specific group. However, the results of various empirical studies seem to not support a significant connection between prior segregation or discrimination and genocide. For instance, Fein (1991, cited in Fein 1993b) performed a study on states and political discrimination in genocides and massacres between 1960 and 1988 and found no significant correlation between societal division and genocide. Relatedly, Harff (2003) found in her comparative study that in 24 out of the 37 cases, ethnic conflict were a pre-condition and tested several hypotheses on the correlation between risk of genocides and politicides and ethnic divisions. For instance whether the risk of genocidal crime increases if a society possesses a potent ethnic and religious division, demonstrate discriminatory behaviour towards a specific group and the ethnic diversity within the authority group. The results suggest however only one significant correlation which is the “risks of geno-/politicide were two and a half times more likely in countries where the political elite was based mainly or entirely on an ethnic minority” (Harff, 2003:67). Similarly, the results of a correlation analysis between different situational components and the onset of 35 incidents of genocides and politicides between 1945 and 1982, conducted by Krain (1997), suggest a non-significant
correlation between societal fragmentation and onset of genocide and politicide. Fein (1993b) however proposes that there is a possible parallel between rebellion groups and discrimination. The hypothesis was that states that oppress specific groups in society increase the likelihood that the oppressed become a rebellion group. The result supports the assumption, which suggests that this form of discrimination aids rebellious groups evolve, which often resort to genocidal crimes.

Furthermore, Harff (2003:64) tested the effect of economic development in genocidal countries, since many genocides and politicides have occurred in poorer countries. Infant mortality rate was used in the analysis to measure a country’s economic development since child deaths might better reflect a series of social and material living conditions, than a country’s Gross Domestic Product. The result suggests that “low development is a generic risk factor for civil conflict and regime instability”, but do not necessarily effect the risk of genocide and politicide (Harff, 2003:69). Relatedly, as previously mentioned, international economic dependencies substantially decreased the risk of genocidal crime. Harff (2003:67) found that “countries with low trade openness had two and a half times greater odds of having state failures culminate in geno-/politicide”, furthermore high economic dependency lowers the risk of state failure in general, and genocide and politicide. Consequently, countries with low economic development might be less likely to be economically interdependent, which might further reduce the chance of international preventative initiatives and intervention.

Not all societies that experience genocide have a previous history of fragmentation and not all divided societies will endure a genocide (Harff, 2003; Kuper, 1981), however supporters of the societal division thesis only suggest that societal fragmentation creates the potential for genocidal behaviour (Heibert, 2008). Nevertheless, there seems to be a weak consensus of what this correlation entails, and little evidence to support that division in itself is a significant risk factor (Fein, 1993b; Harff, 2003; Krain, 1997). Discrimination might be a significant factor in the onset of a civil war and ethnic conflict, but because of the substantial number of fragmented societies that does not result in genocide or politicide to cite Harff (2003:70) “once ethnic and other civil wars have begun, discrimination does not help explain which of them are likely to lead to geno-/ politicide”. Similarly, economic development might affect the initiation of civil war, but the effect on genocide and politicide is uncertain whereas “the effects of economic interdependence are both global and specific to the risks of geno-/politicide” (Harff, 2003:69).
3.1.4 Summary

Presented here are some of the risk factors associated with genocide and politicide. Various conditions seem to have an effect on these atrocities but the general assumption appears to be that one factor alone cannot explain these complex crimes. Furthermore, the presence of a factor does not necessarily help predict the onset of a genocide or politicide.

The primary perpetrator of genocide and politicide is often perceived to be the head of state at the time of the atrocity, and the regime that poses the highest risk within their own state border are autocratic types of government (Rummel, 2005; Fein 1993b; Harff, 2003). However not all totalitarian regimes commit genocide, and identifying the regime posing the highest risk does not help determining the onset of genocide during a regime’s period in power (Krain, 1997). Similarly, many of the factors discussed in this chapter might be a precondition to genocide and politicide, but they do not necessarily aid to explain the inception of a genocidal crime. For instance, ethnical division and low economic development, might affect state failure in general, but how or if they affect the onset of genocidal crime is unclear (Harff, 2003). Situational conditions such as prior genocide, political upheaval and the magnitude of the prior conflict appears to pose a high risk of genocidal crime (Fein, 1993b; Harff, 2003). The political upheaval that poses the highest risk of genocide and politicide is often found to be civil war, and the risk is further increased if a combination of conditions occurs, such as civil war combined with international war or decolonization. The correlation between the risk of genocide and political upheaval appears to be that the conflict provides an opportunity to commit the atrocity, and in the chaos of war, genocide can be carried out largely undetected. But similar to other risk factors, it is difficult to predict which civil wars or revolutions that will evolve into a genocide or politicide. Interestingly, when each attribute is connected to other causal factors, it might improve the predictability of the onset of genocide. For instance Harff (2003:70) proposes six causal factors that “jointly differentiate with 74% accuracy the 35 serious civil conflicts since 1955 that led to episodes of genocide and politicide from 91 others that did not have genocidal consequences”. These causal factors include

“The extent of political upheaval and the occurrence of prior-/ politicides. The probability of mass murder is highest under autocratic regimes and is most likely to be set in motion by elites who advocate an exclusionary ideology, or represent an ethnic minority, or both. International economic interdependencies sharply reduce the
chances that internal war and regime instability will have genocidal consequences” (Harff, 2003:70).

The various structural conditions present prior to, or during a genocide and politicide, would similarly affect the society in a variety of ways. For instance, people in societies ruled by a totalitarian regime appear to often be accustomed to following orders and to not question authority. Exposure to war seems to similarly create fear and insecurities amongst the residents and various studies appears to suggest that exposure to violence might even change how people perceive violent behaviour. The assumption seems to be that violent behaviour generates more violence that through repetition becomes normalized that subsequently might alter the norms in society to perceive violence as acceptable and possibly as desired behaviour (Staub, 2003).

Lastly, to make a short summary, the state that poses the highest risk of genocide and politicide, is a state that is ruled by an autocratic regime, is a fragmented society with low economic development, have low international economic interdependency, have experienced a prior genocide, and prior to or at the time of the atrocity is involved in a combination of violent civil and international war. The structural conditions would presumably affect the society, which would influence people’s readiness to participate in a genocide or politicide. There are however many examples of states that have experienced similar structural and social conditions that do not engage in genocide or politicide (Harff, 2003). So why would some regimes decide to kill in whole or in part a group in their own society? And how is the target group selected?
3.2 Genocide incentives and selection of the target group

Behind any genocide and politicide, a decision has been made to attempt to kill in whole or in part a group that often mainly consists of innocent civilians. Why would a regime decide to eliminate a group in their own society? And why is that specific group selected? Subsequently, what is the correlation between genocidal objectives and the selection of the target group?

The study of motives in genocidal crimes is often approached from various perspectives by the different disciplines. For instance, political scientists and criminologists such as Rummel (1994) and Alvarez (2010) appear to investigate the overall motives held on state level. Whereas social psychologists such as Staub (2003), Waller (2007) and Dutton (2007) often approach the subject from a societal and group perspective, often focusing on the situational strain and group dynamics relevant in the process of acquiring an out-group, while other scholars investigate individual incentives such as social status and economic related motives (Singer, 2005; Brett and Specht, 2004). The variety of approaches seems to reflect a complexity related to genocidal objectives, but the range of incentives also generate some interesting questions namely, how can we understand the political motives in connection to the incentives held on a societal level? And how have the different motives resulted in a desire to target the same group?

But first, a short introduction into some differences that concern the research on the subject. It appears that some of the research on genocidal objectives is related to two different, but often interlinked subjects, namely the study of motives and typology. It seems however often difficult to differentiate between the two, since they seems often to be interlinked and in some cases appear inseparable. For instance, Chalk and Jonassohn (1990:29) propose four typologies that “classifies genocides according to their motive”. There are however various elements that can be considered bases for a typology other than motives such as type of victims, societies, perpetrators, accusations and types of groups (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990). Some scholars even seem to use different bases for their typology. For instance, Kuper (1981 cited in Harff and Gurr, 1981:361) proposes four main typologies namely a) “genocide against indigenous people”, b) “Genocide against hostage or scapegoat”, c) “Genocide following decolonization of a two-tier structure of domination” and d) “Genocide during struggles of power or autonomy by ethnic/racial/religious groups”. It seems that the first two typologies use the target group as a reference for classifying genocide, whereas the last two types of genocide are identified by structural conditions. Furthermore, certain classifications
seem to be comparable despite differences in primary focus. For instance, Fein (1993a) proposes developmental genocide that is, genocide committed against indigenous peoples often for economic exploitation, whereas Rummel (2005) proposes economic gain as primary motive often perpetrated on indigenous peoples. Despite some of the differences between typology and motives, it appears to be difficult however to exclude one from the other.

This chapter will first introduce some of the main incentives ascribed to different genocides and politicides based on a selection of scholars that have specifically proposed generalized motives and typologies (Fein, 1993a; Harff and Gurr, 1988; Kuper, 1981; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Rummel, 2005). The motives behind genocide (and politicide) are often many and intertwined (Rummel, 2005), and to determine the exact incentive for genocide might be difficult and in some cases not even possible (Harff and Gurr, 1988). Nevertheless, despite the blend of incentives often found in genocidal crimes, there seems to be a primary motive that can be identified from the mixture (Rummel, 2005). Since some of the most cited researches on typologies of genocide seem to propose similar classifications and incentives for genocide with some variations in terminology, this chapter will be divided based on different motives and comparable typologies rather than by scholar.

The genocidal objectives that will be further discussed have been selected based on comparison studies conducted by Fein (1993a) and Harff and Gurr (1988). Fein (1993a) compares the typology of genocide proposed by several researchers (c.f. attachment 2). Kuper (1981), Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) and Fein (1993) for instance have all proposed four comparable typologies. Harff and Gurr (1988) compared the typology proposed by Fein (1993a) and Kuper (1981), that seem to support this connection between the classifications of the different types of genocide. There are certain inconsistencies however between some scholars such as the contradiction noted by Fein (1993a) related to the six typologies proposed by Harff and Gurr (1988). There will be researchers that have proposed other motivations or types of genocides not discussed in this paper. This is not to say that alternative motives are not relevant, but because of limited space, the aim of this part is to discuss the most common motives recognized by a variety of researchers, alternate incentives have therefore been excluded. Many scholars seem however to reference either one of the researchers cited in Fein’s (1993a) comparison. For instance criminologist Alvarez (2010) uses Fein’s (1993a) original four typologies in his discussion of motives, whereas the sociologist and psychologist Chirot and McCauley (2006) apply Chalk and Jonassohn’s (1990) typology. Other scholars
such as Rummel (2005) have proposed independently five motives, but also similar to the previous incentives.

Subsequently, the motives that will be further discussed are in sequential order developmental genocides and economic incentives, retributive and despotic genocides, and lastly ideological genocides. Keep in mind that there are some disagreements regarding the classification of the cases that might be even more disputed because of the differences in typology. The next part aims to introduce some common collective reactions to threat and situational strain, and the subsequent incentives often held in society. For instance, when exposed to threats and uncertainties, people frequently turn to their in-group for protection whilst searching for a scapegoat to blame for the situation (Staub, 2003). The discussion will be followed by an introduction into how society might come to perceive the target group as an enemy. The last part is related to the individual that often hold alternate independent incentives that do not necessarily reflect those on state or society level. For instance, individual incentives might be more driven by immediate profit and personal gains, such as promises of farms and influential positions after the end of a genocide or politicide (Alvarez, 2010). But first what are some of the most common motivations for a state to eliminate a group of people primarily within their own state boarders?

3.2.1 Developmental genocide and economic incentives

One of Fein’s (1993a) four typologies, in line with Kuper’s (1981), is developmental genocide that is genocide against indigenous people often for economic gain. To cite Harff and Gurr’s (1988:361) comparison:

“Fein's developmental genocides, like Kuper's genocides against indigenous peoples, are ones in which the victims are likely to be a tribal people, not integrated with the majority. Often economically exploited, they offer little resistance to "progress" and are perceived as standing in the way of further development. Their humanity is often devalued, and killing these people is legitimized in the name of development and modernization”.

Fein (1993a:86) suggests that out of the 17 cases reviewed in her study, “the annihilation of the Ache in Paraguay is the only developmental genocide of indigenous people”. The 17 cases applied by Fein (1993a:86) are “those cases after 1945 in which there was the greatest

Rummel (2005) focuses primarily on the economic motive and similarly exemplify the killings by colonial powers of the indigenous people as economic exploitation. States can secure economic profits by eliminating groups that have previously controlled the resources such as the targeting of indigenous people (Rummel, 2005), and also particularly in old colonial states where the colonial powers aimed to secure their economic interests using genocidal tactics, such as the Italian gas attacks in Ethiopia, or the destruction of crops and fields to deliberately cause hunger and death such as by the German colonizers in Tanzania and against the Herero people (Schaller, 2010). Similarly Chalk and Jonassohn (1990:29) focus on the economic aspect as one of four primary motives that is “to acquire economic wealth”.

In most conflict situations the authority of a state want to secure economic and other interests that will benefit the state (Alvarez, 2010). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) conducted a study on the conflict in the Darfur region and suggests that resources have even a regional effect within the conflict area. The results of the study suggest that the greatest victimization were in the areas that were the richest on resources. Relatedly, there are many examples of internal wars that have transpired from economic interests that have led to genocide or politicide. This is particularly evident on the African continent, where post-colonial states that are rich on natural resources become victims of violent conflicts (Solinge, 2008), that can result in politicide, such as in Angola and The Democratic Republic of Congo (Harff, 2003). The Belgian Congo has become infamous for its massacring and torturing of the Congolese population for economic exploitation (Schaller, 2010). The possibility for profit is often a strong motive for the state, but also for other business. Private organizations for instance, often work together with the state to secure common economic interest (Alvarez, 2010). An example of collaboration between the state and non-state actors are the funding of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone by the trading of diamonds. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) funded the war with diamonds which continued even after the UN Security Council banned any trading of diamonds with Sierra Leone (Solinge, 2008). According to the report from the Sierra Leone Expert Panel established by the UN (UNESC, 2000) the diamonds were exported to the neighbouring countries involving the Liberian government and Guinean military officers, and the weapons were illegally imported from Eastern Europe primarily by Lebanese business men.
3.2.2 Retributive and despotic genocides

Fein (1993a:86) suggests that retributive genocide is “in which the perpetrators retaliated to a real or perceived threat by the victim to the structure of domination”. Fein (1993a:86) classifies 11 out of the 17 cases as retributive, and suggests that it is the most common type of genocide. According to Harff (2003:61)

“Retributive geno-politicides are strategies forged during and in the immediate aftermath of civil wars. Some occur during a protracted internal war- whether ethnic or revolutionary or both- when one party, usually the government, systematically seeks to destroy its opponent’s support base”.

Such as in Angola, where the National Union of the Independence of Angola (UNITA) and government forces systematically attempted to destroy the opposition (Harff, 2003). Harff (2003:61) further suggests that “some retributive episodes occur after a rebel challenge has been militarily defeated. In Indonesia in 1965-66, for example, a coup attempt supposedly inspired by communists led to countrywide massacres of party members and other civilians”.

Similarly, Rummel (2005) proposes one of the main motives is “to destroy a group that is perceived as a threat to the ruling power” and suggest that this was the incentive for the genocide in Pakistan in 1970, Ukraine in 1931 and Rwanda in 1994. Comparable typologies have been suggested by Kuper (1981) and Chalk and Jonassohn (1990).

Genocidal governments that want to secure their political control, often repress all groups that are seen as an opponent to the power (Krain, 1997). In Uganda for instance, Idi Amin’s regime, systematically murdered all possible opposition from elites to civilians (McDoom, 2010).

“Idi Amin presided over a highly authoritarian regime that used violence to maintain control of the state and to repress its civilian population. Following his military coup bringing him to power in 1971, Amin purged the various security institutions of individuals seen as favourable to his ousted predecessor, Milton Obote. His new state security apparatus institutionalized violence as the basis of authority. Influential elites and ordinary civilians alike were imprisoned, tortured, and murdered, sometimes for their perceived opposition to Amin but sometimes arbitrarily. In addition, between 1977 and 1978, Amin authorized death squads to target ethnic Achili and Langi elites in response to sabotage activities by Obote agents. Between 1978 and 1979,
conspiracies and mutinies to topple Amin resulted in further purges. Amin’s policies resulted in the estimated killing of between 50,000 and 300,000 civilians” (McDoom, 2010:564).

Furthermore, Rummel (2005:75) proposes another responsive incentive, a motive that is

“Deeply emotional and involves the destruction of those who are hated, despised, or conversely are envied or resented. The genocide of Jews throughout history and in particular the Holocaust was fundamentally an act of religious and ethnic hatred mixed with envy and resentment over their disproportionate economic and professional achievements. Similarly with the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey, 1915-18, where Armenians enjoyed wealth and professional status far beyond their numbers, but also were hated as Christians in a Moslem society.”

Interestingly, Rummel (2005) classifies the Holocaust here rather than as an ideological genocide, he does emphasise that motivations are most often intertwined, but it is noteworthy that he does not mention the Holocaust when describing ideological motivations. Fein (1993a) similarly suggests that emotions such as wounded pride and resentment towards the target group facilitate the desire to exclude the group from society. Other emotions such as revenge for perceived injustices towards the in-group can become the prime motive for the perpetrator group (Chirot and McCauley 2006; Jones, 2006; Rummel, 2005). For instance, in Rwanda the Tutsis had been favoured by the Belgian colonial powers. This perceived injustice by the Hutus might have been used to fuel the conflict with messages that the Tutsis had received unfair advantage in the past (Schaller, 2010).

Fein (1993) proposes a third motive, namely despotic genocides that are, to cite Harff and Gurr (1988:362),

“Typical in "new" states, among peoples sharing little or no common history or traditions. Kuper asserts that existing tribal/ethnic divisions were encouraged and exploited by the former colonizers. Upon independence the "strong man" from the leading tribe exerts his will on unwilling minorities, often using strong measures to pre-empt oppositional moves.”

According to Fein (1993a:86) there are a few cases where the target group poses no threat that can be classified as despotic genocide, that is “the Soviet Union and Uganda (but were the
latter broken down into periods there might also be retributive genocides”). Fein (1993a) considers the genocide in Uganda from 1972-1985, whereas the example above describe the period from 1972-1979 under the rule of Idi Amin, who was forcibly removed in 1979.

3.2.3 Ideological genocides

Ideology is a complex subject because of its diversity and broad definition. Alvarez (2010:58) for instance suggests that “all genocides are ideological because all social life is ideological”. Alvarez (2010:58) argues that society’s culture and ideology are inevitably linked, “Every culture makes sense of the world through various shared symbols and ideas that give meaning and purpose to life…. culture, then, is a part of all social life and ideology is therefore an inescapable part of all culture. This is the nexus where ideology connects with genocide, because genocide requires a framework of beliefs that provides purpose and meaning for the destruction of a population”.

However, there might be some concerns when applying ideology to explain all societal processes in genocides, because ideology in its broad sense encompasses many different processes that might be similar studied separately. For instance, Alvarez (2010) introduces conditions such as dehumanization and scapegoating as forms of ideology, while these elements might be equally explained as psychological mechanism that can be intentionally produced or can be a reaction to conditions in the genocidal process. Ideology is also in the context of genocide and politicide often associated with specific and often exclusionary belief systems such as Nazism and Communism, rather than general belief systems that every culture possesses. If applied to the genocidal process a clear distinction might be important in the interest of separating exclusionary ideologies and the general societal mechanisms that occur in most genocidal societies. My intentions are not to become caught in a discussion of definition, but merely to emphasise the differences in its use. For the purpose of this chapter, to discuss various motivations for genocidal crimes, exclusionary ideologies to use Harff’s (2003) terminology, will primarily be discussed whereas ideology in its broader sense that includes discussions on how new sets of beliefs and ideas are implemented in society will be further discussed in chapter 3.4.

Ideological genocide is a type of genocide that is primarily driven by an exclusionary ideology. Researchers such as Kuper (1981), Fein (1993a), Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) all
recognize ideological genocide as a typology and that certain types of ideology poses a risk of genocide. For instance the results of Harff’s (2003) comparative study suggest that the risk of genocide increases when elites possess exclusionary ideologies such as in Cambodia and Baha’is in Iran.

There are different ideological directions, but most of these ideological motives seem to refer to a utopian vision that promotes a new and better society (Alvarez, 2010). The target group is often believed to pollute society and since the state often perceives it as a necessity to cleanse society from all other values and customs that the authority does not possess, the target group become an entity that must be eliminated (Chirot and McCauley, 2006). Interestingly, Rummel (2005:75) distinguishes between ideology in its self which he terms as “the pursuit of an ideological transformation of society”, such as communist societies “where those resisting or perceived to be enemies of the ideology are murdered” and a purification of society which he describes as “purification, or the attempt to eliminate from society perceived alien beliefs, cultures, practices, and ethnic groups”. Rummel (2005) uses Mao and Stalin, the genocide in Serbia Bosnia-Herzegovina and Myanmar (Murmese) as examples for purification. In support of purification ideologies, Kiernan (2005) suggests that there are similarities between the Holocaust, Armenian and Cambodian politicide particularly in their ideological aspiration of race and religious segregation. Kiernan (2005:77) argues that racism “was a key component of the ideology of each regime” often in combination with religion since “although all three regimes was atheistic, each particularly targeted religious minority (Christians, Jews and Muslims)”.

The politicide in Cambodia is often classified as a primary ideological genocide where the Khmer Rouge aimed to create a peasant utopia, targeting various groups belonging to other social classes and ethnical groups, in particular the Cham Muslims (Kiernan, 2005). The Khmer Rouge wanted to destroy everything old to create a new and better society. Everything was to be ruined, all that was foreign, even modern medicine, because it was believed to be polluted by the western society and everything related to tradition and religion such as books, music and instruments. To create a peasant utopia the cities was emptied to be able to control the masses better and destroy the urban culture. Schools and hospitals were emptied and large collective farms were established (Stensrud, 2008).

Bauman (1989) similarly argues that the motive behind genocide is primarily ideological. The act of genocide is perceived as only a means to an end, “the end itself is a grand vision of
a better, and radically different, society” (Bauman, 1989:91). The assumption appears to be that modern society always wants to improve to obtain a professed ideal society

“Modern culture is a garden culture. It defines itself as the design for an ideal life and a perfect arrangement of human conditions. It constructs its own identity out of distrust of nature. In fact, it defines itself and nature, and the distinctions between them, through its endemic distrust of spontaneity and its longing for a better, and necessarily artificial, order ” (Bauman, 1989:92).

According to Bauman (1989:92), modern society is like a garden, and the design of the “garden defines its weeds” and the gardener’s job is to pick out the weeds.

“All visions of society-as-garden define parts of the social habitat as human weeds. Like all other weeds, they must be segregated, contained, prevented from spreading, removed and kept outside social boundaries; if all these means proved insufficient, they must be killed” (Bauman, 1989:92).

However, Bauman’s (1989) notion of the garden state appears oversimplified, particularly when assuming that societal polluting is the only viable motive of a state to eliminate a group in society.

Goldhagen (1996:9) relatedly proposes in his much debated book “Hitler’s willing executioners” that

“Germans’ antisemitic beliefs about Jews were the central causal agent of the Holocaust. They were the central causal agent not only of Hitler’s decision to annihilate European Jewry (which is accepted by many) but also of the perpetrators’ willingness to kill and to brutalize Jews. The conclusion of this book is that anti-Semitism moved many thousands of “ordinary” Germans and would have moved millions more, had they been appropriately positioned- to slaughter Jews. Not economic hardship, not the coercive means of a totalitarian state, not social psychological pressure, not invariable psychological propensities, but ideas about Jews that were pervasive in Germany, and had been for decades, induced ordinary Germans to kill unarmed, defenceless Jewish men, women, and children by the thousands, systematically and without pity.”
Goldhagen (1996) has received wide criticisms for his categorical and exclusionary arguments for an eliminationist ideology as the sole cause for the Holocaust (Waller 2007). For instance, Waller (2007) suggests that it is difficult to find this extensive anti-Semitism in the German society. To the contrary, Jews had become a part of society and possessed influential positions in the German society. Furthermore anti-Semitism appears to not have been more prevalent in the German society than in other European countries (Kruger, 1999). Evidence from the Nazi Party’s political campaign suggests that the focus of the election was current issues, such as the economic crises and that the anti-Semitic values were periphery in the beginning stages and only after winning the election in 1930 did it become a more visible topic (Brustein, 1996 in Waller, 2007). As Waller (2007:45) suggests that “for Germans, as for most of us, their political affiliation was based on self-interest”.

Furthermore, Goldhagen (1996) appears to make a generalization when portraying cultures as a unified entity with common reaction and beliefs. Alvarez (2010) similarly seems to suggest that the entire society needs to support the ideology, since societal participation is dependent on people’s believes in the ideology. However, it is important to recognize that there are individual differences in accepting ideologies, and as Waller (2007:173) suggests that “individuals vary substantially in their motivation to embrace certain cultural models: a model that is highly relevant for some may be regarded with only passing indifference by others”. Goldhagen’s (1996) main argument is the uniqueness of the anti-Semitic ideology of the German culture and the German population’s relationship with the Jews. Scholar have therefore questioned how Goldhagen (1996) explains why people from other countries such as Romanians and Croats would participate in the killings, and why millions of non-Jews would be killed. Waller (2007) argues that because of the high prevalence of genocide and politicide the uniqueness thesis of the German culture cannot account for the Holocaust. Goldhagen (1996) also seems to portray a society where everyone is an active participant, holding conscious resentment where as other researchers seem to suggests that the majority in the society was mostly ignorant and unconcerned for the Jews (Waller, 2007). Waller (2007) suggests that there is some support for ideological influence in genocidal crimes, and a culture does share common belief systems and influence the individual behaviour, but it cannot explain everything since behaviour appears to be more complex than a result of ideological beliefs.
Goldhagen (1996) might have attributed too much significance to anti-Semitism’s role in Germany, however he might have touched on a relevant subject; that is of the importance of culture specific ideology. As Semelin (2003:196) suggests that

“Ideologies rarely have a profound impact on the masses, especially when they have foreign origins; unless their language can be radically transformed and adapted to the local culture. It is therefore the reinterpretation, or even the fabrication, of myths about the history of the country that allows for the ideological “transplanting” into local culture”.

Waller (2007:188) similarly proposes that

“Ideology is often complemented by myths and symbols that also perpetuate and legitimate cultural models of social dominance. In many ways, it is the myths and symbols that translate, or repackage, ideological beliefs into an accessible, and oft-repeated, narrative or vision that gives meaning to the masses.”

A further discussion of culture specific propaganda promoting exclusionary ideologies will follow in chapter 3.4.

Ideology has received widespread interest amongst scholars, however it is important to emphasise that genocides classified as primarily ideological, only constitute a small part of genocides according to researchers such as Fein (1993a) and Harff (2003). This is not to say that they do not constitute a significant portion of victims of genocides and politicides (Rummel, 1994). Nevertheless, retributive motives are according to Fein (1993a) in most genocides and politicides the primary motive. Furthermore as Fein (1993a:88) suggests “whether ideologies define the search for enemies or whether they are post-hoc justifications for retributive massacre of collectivises which threaten the ruling elite may be debated”.

3.2.4 Societal motives and in- and out-group processes

A society consists of individual people who belong to different groups, that possess different attributes and psychological advantages (Waller, 2007), and the incentives for genocidal participation might be very different for the elite, the soldiers, and the active and passive participants in a society. What then might influence support for genocidal incentives on societal level?
Since the majority of genocide and politicide occur during a political upheaval that is during a war, power struggle, revolution and so forth, the conditions that people live under are often charged with insecurities and suffering (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993a; Rummel, 1994). Furthermore many societies that experience genocide and politicide also already live in poverty, due to the state’s low economic development (Harff, 2003). These situational conditions combined could make a society vulnerable.

Many of the situational and psychological conditions people are affected by under normal circumstances would also be evident in stressed situations, such as normal in- and out-group mechanisms (Waller, 2007). Furthermore, certain attributes will also be enhanced under pressure such as suspicion of others, prejudice and xenophobia that is “especially potent when a threat is identified” (Dutton, 2007:111). Many of these individual psychological processes and mechanisms that occur within the perpetrator group will be further discussed in chapter 3.4. But what are some of the reactions on a societal level to situational stressors, such as hunger and insecurity?

Many psychologists, such as Staub (2003) and Waller (2007), and criminologists such as Alvarez (2010) propose that a common societal reaction to a stressed situation is to find a scapegoat. Scapegoating is according to Murji (2001:255) “to cast blame or guilt on to an innocent person, group or object”. Why do we search for a scapegoat? And what is it that a scapegoat provides?

According to Staub (2003) when people perceive to be threatened and basic human needs are not provided for, people begin to search for a scapegoat. The scapegoat appears to serve various functions

“It serves the need for a positive identity by diminishing one’s own and one’s group’s responsibility for life problems, including the inability at times to provide food and shelter for oneself and one’s family. It serves the need for comprehension of reality by providing an understanding of the reasons for life problems. It serves the needs for security, comprehension, as well as effectiveness and control by pointing to a way of dealing with life problems (which is to ‘deal’ with its cause, the scapegoat). It is a means of creating connection, as members of the group join in scapegoating and in taking action against the scapegoat” (Staub, 2003:55).

Appointing a scapegoat allows for assigning the responsibility to someone else, and it provides a reason for why the individual is in a difficult situation. The scapegoat thereby
allows the individual to retrieve a sense of control, and by representing a common enemy the scapegoat can also bring people together and strengthen social bonds (Staub, 2003). These mechanisms appear to support the impression that the target group is often not the cause of the societal strain, merely a convenient group to blame. This often occurs when “the cause of our frustration is too intimidating or vague to confront directly. In those cases, we may redirect, or displace, our hostility to convenient target groups- that is scapegoats” (Waller, 2007:218). For instance, in Rwanda the Belgians became the rulers of the colony after Germany’s defeat in World War 1 and quickly favoured the Tutsis who were taller and lighter skinned than the Hutus. The Tutsi favouritism might have been a result of a common perception by the colonizers that “the mark of civilization was grafted on physiognomic differences, with the generally taller, supposedly more refined Tutsis destined to rule, and shorter, allegedly less refined Hutus to serve” (Jones, 2006:235), but also it “reflected the Tutsis’ minority status- it is often easier for colonizers to secure the allegiance of a minority, which recognizes that its survival may depend on bonds with the imperial authority” (Jones, 2006:234). The Belgians segregated Tutsis and Hutus, and provided the Tutsis with precedence in areas of the schools, churches and so forth (Jones, 2006). The segregation and favouritism was subsequently not created by the Tutsis, but the Hutus nevertheless target the Tutsis, rather than the Belgian colonial power that was responsible for the suppression of the Hutus. The assumption that the Hutus targeted the Tutsis because of an inability to target Belgians, might however be a simplistic explanation of the conflict between the Tutsis and Hutus. The conflict between the two ethnicities Hutus and Tutsis has, for instance, been prevalent across the entire region, and whilst the Tutsis were targeted in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the Hutus were the targets in the genocide in Burundi in 1993-1994 (Harff, 2003).

Then, as Staub (2003) amongst others (Alvarez, 2010; Dutton, 2007), suggests that scapegoating is a common reaction to difficult situations and many communities begin to search for a scapegoat for the problems in society, but does this mean that it is the society as a collective that selects the target in genocides and politicides? If it is not only the society, then what or who decides which group that will become the target?

Before investigating common propositions for how the out groups are selected, what are the effects of the normal process of dividing people into in and out groups? And why do people often perceive the out-group negatively?
Waller (2007:174) suggests that “assigning people to in-groups and out-groups have four important effects: assumed similarity, out-group homogeneity, accentuation, and in-group bias”. The first effect is that people perceive their own group members to be more alike than members of other groups. People recognize and emphasise the attributes that are considered similar, “even when we are randomly, or arbitrarily, assigned to a group, we assume that other in-group members are especially similar to us on a surprisingly wide range of thoughts, feelings and behaviours” (Waller, 2007:174).

The second effect is the “out-group homogeneity effect” that is “our tendency to see members of the out-group as all alike” (Waller, 2007:174). This mechanism seems to refer to people’s inclination, when recognizing a trait in one or a few members of the out-group, to attribute the same characteristic to all members of that group. This effect can also be prevalent when searching for a scapegoat, where the beliefs and actions of a few individuals belonging to a vulnerable group are simplified and made into characteristics for that specific group. The entire group is then made potentially threatening and “as the perception of threat spreads to encompass the entire group, all members, even children, come to be viewed as probable future enemies and, hence, as threatening” (Dutton, 2007:111).

Then, to cite Waller (2007:175)

“We amplify our assumed similarity of in-group members and homogeneity of out-group members by drawing ever starker lines between “us” and “them”. We draw these lines by exaggerating the differences between our group and the out-group. This exaggeration of out-group differentness, termed the accentuation effect, leaves us biased towards information that enhances the differences between social categories and less attentive to information about similarities between members of different social categories”.

This division can be further exaggerated intentionally by elites through mechanisms such as propaganda that will accentuate and often exaggerate blame or anxieties towards the out-group. Differences can for instance be emphasised through means of official identification such as in Rwanda where the inhabitants had to wear Hutu and Tutsi cards (Dutton, 2007). The identity cards were introduced by the Belgian colonial powers

“Defining every Rwandan as either Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa- the last of these a Pygmy ethnicity, constituting around 2 percent of the population. The institution of these identity cards was perpetuated by the post-colonial government, and in 1994 proved a
key genocidal facilitator. At the thousands of roadblocks established across the country, carrying a Tutsi identity card meant a death sentence” (Jones, 2006:236).

The last effect proposed by Waller (2007:175) is the in-group bias that is

“We generally like people we think are similar to us and dislike those we perceive as different. Thus the mere act of dividing people into groups inevitably sets up a bias in favour of the in-group and against the out-group. We evaluate in-group members more positively, credit them more for their successes, hold them less accountable for their failures or negative actions, reward them more, expect more favourable treatments from them, and find them more persuasive than out-group members. Such in-group favouritism has been demonstrated across a wide range of groups, ages, contexts, and tasks”.

There are several psychological experiments conducted on how easily people feel a connection to a group. For instance, Tajfel (1978) conducted various experiments on group dynamics where participants were divided into different groups based on trivial criteria observed by the participants, such as by tossing a coin. The groups were to compete in different tasks set up by the researcher. Tajfel (1978) found that the participants showed a significant in-group bias, and thought that their own group were smarter, faster, better and so forth even though they knew they were randomly selected to their group and that knowledge regarding the other group could not be observed appropriately. In a response to Tajfel’s (1978) experiments, Waller (2007:176) asserts that

“Before these experiments, most social psychologists assumed that social exclusion was the result of existing prejudice and hostility that developed over time in the course of active intergroup relations. Social exclusion produced by mere categorization into separate groups, in the absence of any previous history of intergroup contact or conflict, simply did not fit our understanding of intergroup behaviour.”

This is possibly an important attribute to the field of genocide, such as in the study of recruitment to paramilitary groups, since it seems to demonstrate how easy people can feel an attachment to a group they have no prior connection to. Similarly, it might be relevant when considering the limited results of studies on prior ethnical division, since division in itself
would produce almost momentary in-group favouritism, and prior segregation might not be a necessary component when creating a target group.

Waller (2007:176) emphasises that “though in-group favouritism need not be always mirrored by a negative bias against the out-group, the sequence does often follow”. Staub (1999) for instance suggests that devaluation is a result of these segregation mechanisms into in- and out- groups. Devaluation, or the negative bias, towards the out-group often occurs when the out-group is perceived as threatening. For instance, the devaluation of the Jews in Germany and the Tutsis in Rwanda, might have occurred because of a perceived threat against the in-groups generated by attributes such as the success that the Jews often enjoyed, and the unfair favouritism of the Tutsis in Rwanda by the Belgians. Similarly Mummendey and Wenzel (1999:159) assume that “when the out-group’s difference is evaluated negatively, perhaps as a challenge or threat to the in-group’s opinions and attributes and hence to the in-group itself, the out-group should experience devaluation and discrimination”.

It seems that people instinctively favour their own group (Waller, 2007), but then who belongs to our in-group? A society would presumably consist of a many different groups divided by different attributes such as ethnicity, skills, employment, interests and so forth. These groups even appear flexible in the sense that people can belong to many different groups a day, dependent on the situation and definition of the group.

Dutton (2007) and Waller (2007) refer to Tajfel and Turner (1986 in Dutton, 2007:141) who proposed “We are what we are because they are not what we are”. However, if what we are, is determined by what they are not, how do we determine which attributes are important when distinguishing between them and us? If the in-group is created based on common grounds, it is important to take into account that each of the groups have other familiarities between them that have to be ignored for an “in-group” to develop. For instance, prior to the Belgians rule in Rwanda, the Tutsis and Hutus were not perceived as distinct ethnicities in that sense, because the differentiation between the two was primarily based on societal status. The Tutsis were generally the owners of land and livestock, and the Hutus were the workforce for the Tutsis. This boundary was however fluctuating, so that the Hutus could earn Tutsi status. Rwanda was not without violence prior to colonization, but there is no evidence of a targeting of either ethnicity. Tutsis and Hutus shared the same schools, churches and even inter-marriages occurred (Jones, 2006). Consequently, many of the Tutsis and Hutus would have belonged to some of the same groups in society. Is it therefore possible that in genocides and politicides we are what we are because they are what they are? That the in-group is
defined by who belongs to the “out-group” and that the perpetrator group becomes clearly defined as a result of finding a scapegoat for the societal strain. Even when the scapegoats have a long history in society, it seems that the in-group is often everyone that does not belong to the out-group. For instance during the Holocaust, the in-group would be everyone that was not Jewish.

The primary motive and the situational strain that affect the society could therefore have an influence on who belongs to the in-group and who becomes the scapegoat. For instance, if the primary motive is economic advantages or to use the typology proposed by Fein (1993a), such as developmental genocides that often have a clear target group, namely the group that stands in the way of economic gain. In these genocides the genocidal motivation primarily held by the elites, presumably provide the society with a scapegoat that can be blamed for the situation the society is in. However, whilst a genocide might be classified as having economic gain as its primary motive, it does not necessary suggest that this is the main objective presented to or perceived by the society prior to or during a genocide. The elites often need the support from society to execute genocide, and to gain support the society has to be able to justify the elimination of an out-group. Motives such as economic gain for the state is not necessarily enough for such a support, but a scapegoat that can be blamed for and explain the difficult situation people find themselves in, keep in mind that the majority of genocide and politicide occur during a political upheaval, might contribute to societal support. Interestingly, Staub (1999:184) suggests that “when a group has experienced great suffering, especially due to persecution and violence at the hand of others, and is therefore deeply wounded, it is more likely to respond to a renewed threat with violence”. Society will perceive their response to be in self-defence. Their primary motivation is therefore self-protection rather than perceived as an attack on innocent victims (Staub, 1998b in Staub, 2000).

The society might search for a scapegoat because of the effects of the political upheaval and the elites could provide the scapegoat that stands in the way of the primary motive, that is incentives such as economic gain, elimination of possible threats to the power or a threat to an ideal society. The threat posed by the scapegoat could also be constructed by the elites. For instance Dutton (2007:111) suggests that threats can be fabricated

“While in some cases, realistic historical conflict provides the germ for the out-group threat (Armenia, Rwanda, Bosnia), in others (like Cambodia) it is completely manufactured on ideological grounds. It is possible that when clearly defined out-groups do not exist, they have to be invented. Out-group can be viewed as a kind of
lightning rod for the collective frustration and rage that builds at a societal level fuelled by accumulated frustration and directed by rhetoric. ”

Furthermore, Alvarez (2010:69) suggests that

“Political, military, and/or religious leaders may also seek to deflect responsibility away from themselves and their policies and may therefore try to scapegoat a group as being to blame. One of the best examples of this involves the Nazi depiction of the Jews as being responsible for Germany’s defeat in the First World War”.

It is also possible that the selection of an out-group is more dependent on a cultures history when the out-group is not defined by the elites. It could appear that when societal mechanisms are the primary reason for the selection of a scapegoat, these processes would have occurred long before genocide progressed. In the genocides and politicides where the target group have been the outcast of society for a long time, the decision to eliminate the group might be fairly recent and not necessarily connected to the creation of the scapegoat. Therefore the arguments for a societal selection of the out-group might be more significant when looking at the history of a society, but when a conflict situation evolves into a genocide, it is not necessarily the society as a collective that define the target of the genocide per se, but that the elites merely hold or use the group that the society already has made into outcasts.

It is essential to a society that its inhabitants feel a connection and commitment to their community, but these same mechanisms can easily be transformed into hostility towards unfamiliar others, in particular when a threat is identified (Waller, 2007). As Dutton (2007:111) suggests “perceived threat (real or concocted) inspires the requisite social polarization, initial avoidance, and eventual hostility”. Scapegoating seems to serve various functions and appear to be a means to protect oneself. People “scapegoat another group for life problems, which protects their identity, strengthens connections within the group, and provides a psychologically useful (even if false) understanding of events” and because they have experienced suffering and violence, they will respond more violently than others because the situational factors influence their behaviour and trigger basic human instincts (Staub 2000:370). There are however societal and individual differences in the psychological responses to a strain, and variations in the degrees of distrust in a society such as the difference between mere suspicion of the unknown as opposed to distrust that provoke a reaction towards the out-group (Waller, 2007). It is not necessary that genocide and politicide
would occur in the society that experience the most distrust or are the most prejudice, since these mechanisms cannot explain genocidal crime alone. Nevertheless they might contribute to society’s readiness to participate in genocides and politicides.

### 3.2.5 Individual motives

The presented motivations might define or classify the overall genocide and might describe some of the incentives frequently found on societal level however, within all genocides and politicides regardless of their main objective individuals often have other independent reasons for genocidal participation.

Singer (2005) for instance proposes three basic motivations for soldier participation namely material gain, social incentives, and threats of psychical retributions. Material incentives appear to be common in many genocide and politicide. Perpetrators such as military and militia soldiers are often promised material incentives such as money and farms that have been taken from the victims and are divided amongst the perpetrators after a killing mission (Brett & Specht, 2004). For instance, in Rwanda there were reports of militia soldiers who looted the houses of their Tutsis victims (Dutton, 2007). Furthermore, other soldiers might be promised social incentives such as a higher status in society or a desired governmental positions and so forth (Dutton, 2007). There is some evidence that indicates opportunistic motives such as immediate economic profits, particularly in genocides and politicides that have had an unusual amount of populous participation, such as in Cambodia and Rwanda (Alvarez, 2010). Similarly, real and perceived threats of physical retributions to both the perpetrator and or their family might influence genocidal perpetrators (Singer, 2005).

However, as for the majority of the perpetrators, both civilians and soldiers, the objectives for genocidal participation appear to be many and intertwined. There might however be additional factors or mechanisms that influence behaviour other than self-serving motivations. For instance, reasons such as lack of alternate opportunities and strong social forces such as group conformity and peer pressure might similarly influence individual behaviour. Subsequently, as chapter 3.3 and 3.4 might illustrate, individual motivations are far more complex than the self-serving objectives identified here.

### 3.2.6 Summary

The complexity of genocide and politicide seems apparent when discussing the motives behind these crimes. To cite Alvarez (2010:74)
“Any one participant may be operating on the basis of multiple motivations, some reinforcing and strengthening each other, other potentially working against each other so that the individual may feel conflicted about their participation. Just as genocide is itself a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, so too do the perpetrators exhibit a wide range of motivation and goals. They also assist the destructive processes of genocide within a wide range of social, organizational, and political contexts. Any explanation as to the motivations and mechanisms of participation must therefore recognize this diversity and approach the phenomenon of genocidal participation on a number of different levels and contexts”

There appears to be a variety of possible intertwined motives in genocide and politicide (Rummel, 1994). For instance, the state’s incentives and the motives held on societal level are not necessarily the same in a specific genocide, but the objectives appear to nevertheless interact whereas the individual could similarly hold independent self-serving incentives. Furthermore, the motives that derive from both political and psychological forces (Dutton, 2007) appear to be connected to the selection of the target group.

In a simplified summary, the main incentives frequently held on state level appear to be retributive, economic and ideological (Fein, 1993a; Rummel, 2005). Retributive genocide, to use Fein’s (1993a) terminology, is the reaction to a perceived or a real threat. These genocides are often an attempt to destroy the opposition to the power. This is according to Fein (1993a) and Harff (2003) the most common type of genocide. Rummel (2005) proposes a separate emotional motive that is a reaction to those that are hated and resented in society. The target group in these genocides appears to be the group that the state perceives to be threatening, but this does not necessarily imply that that the target group poses an actual threat. This could be related to the target group that similarly fall under Rummel’s (2005) emotional motives, and to society’s process of scapegoating. Several social and psychological mechanisms occur that separate a group that becomes the scapegoat in society. These social processes often occur because of a reaction to a threat, to pose blame on a group to retrieve a sense of control, and to strengthen social bonds within the in-group (Waller, 2007). In most genocide and politicides however, it appears that the elites either perceive the group already made into outcasts by the society as the threat, or make the group posing a threat to the power into a scapegoat so that the society will hold the same enemy as the elites. Since the out-group is perceived as a threat it could be viewed as a reasonable solution to eliminate the target group
to protect the society. The incentive for societal participation is then often perceived to be self-defence to a threat, rather than as an attack (Staub, 2003).

Economic incentives (Rummel, 2005) and what Fein’s (1993a) termed developmental genocide, often target indigenous people primarily for economic exploitation. The target group in these genocides appear to be selected primarily because they are perceived to be in the way of economic growth. Economic objective, are similarly also often held by individuals who perceive a possibility for immediate economic profits, or enhanced social status (Singer, 2005), and also private organizations that seize the opportunity for economic advantages by cooperating with, and providing the state with illegal arms and so forth (Alvarez, 2010). However, it is not necessarily a correlation between the state’s and the individual’s economic objective in a specific genocide or politicide.

Lastly, ideological genocides are those genocides that primarily are identified by exclusionary visions, frequently attempting to improve society through excessive means (Alvarez, 2010). The outcast in society, that is either segregated by the community or by the authority, can be viewed as the group polluting society and must therefore be eliminated.

It seems that the first main genocidal objectives; developmental, retributive and responsive motives appear to be related to a reaction to the target group by the perpetrators. The perpetrator group seems to react to the target group as a perceived threat, an economic liability or hindrance to future financial gain or an act of revenge for prior injustices perceived to be committed by the target group. Whereas ideological motives seem to concern a belief in a renewed society free from undesirable elements. However where does this desire derive from? The other three objectives seem to derive from aspirations or emotional responses that are comparable to other situations and human reactions, for instance people’s desire for economic gain and human reactions to defeat. The unusual element appears to be that the solution to these factors is not only to exclude the target group from society, such as during apartheid in South Africa, but finding it necessity to kill the entire group (Harff, 2003). There is often more than one motive behind genocide and politicide (Rummel, 2005; Chirot and McCauley 2006), and it is somewhat understandable that states would use exclusionary ideologies as tools to accomplish a means to an end, but what states use exclusionary ideology as an actual prime motive? Is it possible that the genocides and politicide that are fuelled by an exclusionary ideology are more dependent on the leader of the perpetrator group?
3.3 Group structure and the individual perpetrator

The perpetrator of genocide and politicide is as previously discussed often recognized to be the state (Rummel, 1994: Alvarez, 2010: Savelsberg, 2010: Fein, 1993b: Harff, 2003), but who belongs to the state label? For instance, could it be assumed that everyone involved in the state machinery would participate in the decision making process to eliminate and kill a group in society? And if there are people that participate with less or no influence on the decision to commit genocide, does it make them less responsible for their genocidal behaviour, or less of a genocidal perpetrator?

Goldhagen (2009) and Rummel (1994) for instance, emphasise that these broad labels such as ‘state’ and ‘regime’ aids distancing the perpetrator to a theoretical entity. To cite Rummel (1994:8)

“Saying that a state or regime is a murderer is a convenient personification of an abstraction. Regimes are in reality people with the power to command a whole society. It is these people that have committed the kilo-and megamurders of our century, and we must not hide their identity under the abstraction of ‘state,’ ‘regime’, ‘government’ or ‘communist’ ”.

A generalization of the perpetrator group can in many situations be sufficient, but not necessarily when investigating the perpetrator group and the individual perpetrator. So who are the genocidal perpetrators? And what is the structure of the perpetrator group?

According to many studies, the perpetrator group appears to be a flexible entity that consists of a variety of people in different positions. The group appears flexible in the sense that it can consist of a variety of agents and agency compositions dependent on the different genocides and politicides. Paramilitary groups for instance hold a very important role in some genocides, such as the Interahamwe in Rwandan genocide, whereas in the politicide in Iraq (1963-1975), the government’s army were the primary forces (Harff, 2003). At other times it might even be difficult to determine the different actors present in a genocide or politicide, to cite Jones (2006:313) “with a mosaic of local and outside forces, apportioning responsibility for genocide and other atrocities- and bringing effective pressure to bear on perpetrators- are tasks even more daunting than usual”. Nevertheless,

“The most common and direct perpetrators of genocide are usually the military forces and the law enforcement agencies that already exist in a society. They are large and
capable organizations that are trained and equipped for violence and are expressly created to serve the state, members often being required to swear an oath to that effect” (Alvarez, 2010:75).

The different agencies, the military and the police force, appear to primarily operate under state control together with non-state agents like paramilitary groups (Dutton, 2007: Weiss-Wendt, 2010). Paramilitary groups “often referred to as militias, these organizations are created in order to engage in acts of collective violence” (Alvarez, 2010:78). The state appears to often “deliberately use them as proxies to obfuscate the decision making process and thus to shift responsibility for the crimes committed” (Weiss-Wendt 2010:81). Militias vary in size and seem looser in organizational structure than police and military organizations that are often based on hierarchical systems. Militia groups do not necessarily have formal roles, but there seems to be certain informal positions such as the role of a leader that they appear to rely strongly on. Paramilitary groups appear to have “more fluid and dynamic social arrangements than traditional military and police forces. In sociological terms, militia groups tend to rely on the authority of leadership, while the military and police tend to rely on the authority of position” (Alvarez, 2010:79). Paramilitary groups such as the Arkan’s Tigers in the Bosnian genocide and the Interahamwe in Rwanda and “most recently, militias known collectively as the Janjaweed have been implicated in the genocidal violence in the Darfur region of Sudan” (Alvarez, 2010:78), often

“Operate in a nebulous area between the two extremes of pure military and pure mercenary. Members of militia groups often believe in the cause in which they serve, be it that of a greater Serbia or Hutu-dominated Rwanda, but also feel no compunction about exploiting the situation for personal gain” (Alvarez, 2010:80).

It might however be relevant to note that the issue of militia groups seems to be more complex than presented here since the role of paramilitary groups in many societies appears to be fairly ambivalent as they often represent both a form of security and insecurity. For instance, a militia that might threaten certain groups in a country may “simultaneously protect the communities they view themselves as representing” and “sometimes also contribute to upholding law and order in their local communities, operating under the command of traditional authorities such as village or tribal elders” (Møller, 2009:29).
Consequently, the perpetrator group seems to consist of a variety of interconnected agencies, but who makes the decision to commit genocide or politicide? And who obeys orders and execute the mass murder?

To cite Weiss-Wendt (2010:81) “the painstaking reconstruction of the chain of command, where possible, inevitably points to the upper echelons of power as the original source of mass violence”. The leaders of the perpetrator groups then are equally as diverse as for instance the political upheavals. These people are leaders of revolutions, military coups and civil war. Subsequently they can be leaders of the state, the opposition, the military regime and paramilitary groups. The focus of the first part of this chapter lies with the leaders that hold the primary responsibility (Dutton, 2007), frequently the head of totalitarian regimes or revolutionary leaders (Harff and Gurr, 1988). Please note that the question of definition is also relevant here, since whether a leader is described as revolutionary or not might dependent on the implementation of terminology. The second part of this chapter focuses on the front line killers, namely the police officers, the soldiers, the members of militias and the civilians who participate, presumably merely obeying orders with no or limited direct influence on the decision making. Because of the diversity in the agencies involved in genocide and politicide, the final part of this chapter has been roughly divided into three parts based on the degree of the perpetrators assumed prior training. This structure aims to identify some common outsets related to prior familiarity with violent behaviour and combat training. Successively, the first part introduces the military soldiers and the police officers, the second part discusses the soldiers recruited to militia groups, and lastly the active and passive civilians with presumably limited or no prior genocidal training. But first, who are the decision makers in genocides and politicides?

3.3.1 The leaders

The leaders of the perpetrator group are responsible for the deaths of millions of people (Rummel, 1994) and are often referred to as the “authority” or the “elites”, but who belongs to these labels? Who are the leaders of genocides and politicides?

The structure of the authority group in genocides and politicides appears to be flexible and often difficult to determine similarly to the perpetrator group. According to Dutton (2007) however, the authority group can in general often be divided into those that make the decisions, namely the leaders and those that are often referred to as the vanguards, that is a small group of supporters, often admires of the leaders, that serves as high protectors of the
cause. Vanguards are often perceived to be important to the genocidal machinery because they make sure that the perpetrators comply with orders and are often the messengers and executioners of the control mechanisms that the leaders wish to implement (Dutton, 2007). Subsequently, the leaders presumably direct and make the strategic decisions in a genocide or politicide, but to identify some attributes common to leaders in genocide and politicide appears however to be difficult. It seems that the research on this topic are studies primarily attributed to a specific leader, particularly leaders such as Hitler, Pol Pot and Idi Amin, but there seems to be little comparative research. This might be due to a combination of factors such as insufficient cases, the accuracy of information obtained, difficulties with testing the results (Conteh-Morgan, 2004), and in certain cases it might be difficult if it is even possible to identify the leader of a genocide or politicide (Weiss-Wendt, 2010). Relatedly, as Hiebert (2008:311) argues “the role of individual elites in a particular genocide may be highly idiosyncratic and, therefore, not comparable to those of other elites in other cases”. Nevertheless, there seems to be some attributes that are frequently used to describe leaders of genocide and politicide such as extreme paranoia, and they often obtain more extreme and radical perceptions than their own group (Dutton, 2007). Relatedly, despite the limited comparative research, other studies that focus specifically on different leadership styles might aid the study of the correlation between leaders, leadership style and the decision making process. For instance, according to McDoom (2010:560), many leaders of military regimes often experienced distrust and lack of societal support, whereas many revolutionary leaders initially appear to be associated with a more charismatic leadership style (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Nevertheless, it seems that the leaders of genocides and politicides often are perceived as unique, but then is a specific leader essential to the development of a particular genocidal crime?

Goldhagen (2009) argues that the leader is the critical element in genocide and politicide, and that the specificity of a leader is the primary instigator of genocidal crime. The differences between societies that are divided by ethnicity and hatred that result in genocide and politicide and those that do not, is the leaders desire to eliminate the target group such as Hitler in the Holocaust and Talât in Armenian genocide. For instance, the ethical conflict in Rwanda “produced mass murder only when the Hutu leaders decided it should” (Goldhagen, 2009:76). Similarly, Dutton (2007) and Staub (2003) argue that the leaders of the group hold a very important role in genocides and politicide referring to the assumption that most of the major cases in history have had a strong dominant leader. For instance, Saloth Sar often
referred to as Pol Pot, was the leader of the politicide in Cambodia and responsible for one of the most brutal mass murders in our times, killing numerous civilians in the period of the Khmer Rouge rule between 1975 and 1979. The estimate of casualties varies from 1 900 000 to 3 500 000 people killed (Harff, 2003), that count for almost half of the Cambodian population that are tallied to approximately 7 million in 1970 (Rummel, 1994). Pol Pot studied at the University in Paris, where he reportedly became interested in communism and upon his return to Cambodia he joined the Khmer Rouge and later became the leader (Jones, 2006). Idi Amin was another brutal leader that is responsible for the politicide and genocide in Uganda, killing between 50 000 to 400 000 people (Harff, 2003). Idi Amin appeared to enjoy “little natural legitimacy”, and is said to rule with brutality, repression and employed indiscriminately killing to spread fear among the civilians to stay in power (McDoom, 2010:557). Contrary to Pol Pot, Idi Amin had little formal education, and is believed to have remained illiterate until his death (Kavanagh, 2009). Both Idi Amin and Pol Pot are frequently described as suffering from paranoia that led to the massive killings. For instance, Pol Pot seems to have “believed that he was surrounded by enemies of the revolution”, suspicious of everyone and killed those that might be in opposition to the opinions fronted in the revolution (Dutton 2007:33).

Although a specific leader might hold an important position in the genocidal process, it might be difficult to prove a particular leaders influence on genocide, since it is impossible to determine if it would have still occurred without the leader (Heibert, 2008). The different leaders would nevertheless be affected by factors that would instigate a decision to eliminate a group in society, subsequently what might affect a leader’s decision making process? What are some of the reasons for the destructive policies?

Like most people leaders of genocide and politicides are presumably affected by biological, psychological and social experiences that influence their behaviours in adulthood. Conteh-Morgan (2004:149) focuses primarily on revolutionary leaders and political violence, but similar conditions might be relevant to other type of leaders, and emphasizes the effect of personal childhood and adolescent experiences on their leadership style

“Many theories of leadership stress the varied biological, psychological, and social forces that affect the child and adolescent as the source of political leadership. These early influence, which produce and shape the impulse for revolutionary leadership in an individual, are especially sharpened by parental attitudes and behaviour, peer
pressure and relations, type of schooling, and youthful attitudes toward leaders and leadership positions”.

It appears that “some of the major leaders analyzed by psychobiographers either had an intense positive attachment to one parent and intense negative attachment to the other, or an intensely traumatic, or negative youthful experience” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004:151). For instance, Hitler reportedly loved his mother, but had a very difficult relationship with his father. His father is often described as an uncaring man who beat and tormented his own family. The dispute between Hitler and his father particularly over Hitler’s choice of profession and ambition of becoming an artist continued until his father’s death. Hitler’s traumatic childhood and “guilt feelings, anxieties, deviant behaviours, and extreme rage at perceived injustice may have shaped Germany’s destiny and seriously affected its political and military future” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004:142).

The leaders of genocide and politicide are often in forefront encouraging collective violence. This behaviour is often interpreted as an incentive for support and to maintain power, but as Staub (1999) argues the leader would similarly be affected by factors such as prior victimization and social conditions, as the rest of society that might prompt a desire for retribution or a reaction. “Leaders are also members of their groups and are affected by instigating conditions and culture. Their own basic needs are frustrated; they and their families have unhealed wounds” (Staub 1999:184). Leaders might therefore also encourage a reaction because they themselves have suffered similar conditions and might have experienced personal loss. Relatedly, many revolutionary leaders appear to be driven by a sense of justice and a common personal motivation appears to be a perception of “justice/injustice and an accompanying attempt to rectify wrongs” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004:143). Staub (2000) further argues that since the majority of a society, including the leader, often share and are affected by similar situational conditions, the leaders and followers often possess an interdependent group dynamic. This dynamic allows for a leader who hold vindictive or violent intentions in society, because of a collectives willingness to respond to a perceived injustice or threat.

“The followers' readiness opens the way for destructive leader-ship. At times, destructive leaders may be trying to respond to the needs of the group in ways that the culture has prepared both leaders and group members to respond. In a sense, then, the group and leaders are joined” (Staub 2000:372).
To make a short summary, similar to other people, leaders of atrocities are affected by their experiences and many appear to have had a traumatic or difficult childhood. It appears that the perceptions and decisions made by genocidal leaders furthermore are affected by threats primarily directed at the leader, but also the psychological and social conditions experienced by society. However, there are many people that have similar experiences that do not become leaders of genocidal crimes, and it seems unlikely that a specific leader can explain all the mechanisms that make many people in a society kill a group in whole or in part. To cite Chirot and McCauley (2006:60); “although simple cost-benefit analysis can explain some leadership behaviour inciting genocide, there is much left unexplained”. Furthermore, it is somewhat unclear who belongs to the authority group, for instance the leaders of the police force or the paramilitary groups might be included when referring to the authority, but would they have an impact on the decision to commit genocide or politicide? Defining and separating the different participants in genocidal crimes might be a challenge, but it seems to be important particularly when attempting to comprehend common mechanisms in the transformation process, and some of the various roles in the genocide apparatus.

3.3.2 The front line killers

When hearing about genocide and politicide we are often presented with the masses of casualties and the brutality often found in these crimes. Consequently, the extreme behaviour namely the killings, sexual violence, rapes, mutilations and cannibalism is often what is associated with genocide and politicide. Then, who are the perpetrators that execute these brutal crimes?

An initial assumption might be that the perpetrators of such violent crimes must be different from the rest of society. As a result, many researchers from different disciplines have searched for various personality traits, socioeconomic and environmental predispositions that might explain how people can commit such crimes. It appears to be little evidence however, to support the assumption that the perpetrators are a specific type of people (Waller, 2007; Dutton, 2007; Zimbardo, 2007).

Social psychologists have for instance studied the prevalence of psychiatric disorders and personality traits, and have applied a variety of analytical methods on clinical participants, and perpetrators of military massacres, genocides and politicides post-event. The results predominantly suggest that commonly presumed disorders and personality characteristics such as Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), sadistic personality traits and authoritarian
personality traits are no more prevalent amongst perpetrators of atrocities than in the rest of society (Waller, 2007). The prevalence of APD is between 3-5% in the general population, and it is suggested to be a little less in for instance military organizations that apply a strict recruitment process that seek to exclude people with psychiatric disorders (Waller, 2007). Similar results have been obtained in several research experiments on sadistic traits, that suggest an estimate of between 5-10% of the perpetrators in atrocities that would possess sadistic traits and finds pleasure in harming others (Dutton, 2007). Interestingly, research investigating the prevalence of authoritarian personality suggests that there can be some evidence that there are certain “Authoritarian sleepers” that will awaken in trigger situations but people with an authoritarian personality are often leaders, not rank and file officers (Waller, 2007). Nevertheless, as Waller (2007) suggests, there are not enough people with APD, authoritarian or sadistic traits to explain the behaviour found in most genocides and politicides. However, “a common pattern of behaviour does not mean that they also shared a common underlying personality”, or that common personality traits shared by perpetrators necessarily are unique to these types of people (Waller, 2007:90).

Subsequently, a variety of studies appear to demonstrate the diversity of people involved in genocide and politicide. For instance, there seems to be no common personality traits, family backgrounds, socioeconomic status, specific gender or criminal history that can be generalized to all perpetrators of genocide and politicide (Zimbardo, 2007; Waller, 2007; Dutton, 2007). But to cite Waller (2007:127)

“Emphasizing that ordinary people commit extraordinary evil does not preclude the possibility that certain types of individuals may be more likely than others to engage in destructive obedience. Nor does it deny that there are evil people. Rather, it simply affirms the uncomfortable reality, based on the historical and social psychological evidence, of our capacity for inhumanity towards each other”

The ordinary perpetrators are individuals similar found in the normal distribution of people in the general society, with all their differences (Waller, 2007). Then who are these ordinary people at the front line killing innocent civilians?

Since the military force often is involved in genocidal crimes, one part of the front line killers appears to be people that are soldiers by profession. The trained soldiers have often chosen the military as a career path, and have enlisted before the atrocity and not because of the genocide or politicide (Alvarez, 2010). These soldiers are often extensively trained in armed
combat and taught to handle different war situations. They are specially trained to kill and follow orders, not to ask question and not to question authority (Alvarez, 2010). Lankford (2009:389) suggests that the basic training in the American military is often “designed to promote an aggressive military subculture and produce a tight-knit, obedient workforce that will carry out violence on command”. Furthermore, these soldiers have strategically been exposed to violence and trained for violent responses such as “during basic training, the military’s recruits are systematically desensitized, which makes it easier for them to act violently in ways they would have previously found extremely difficult” (Lankford, 2009:390). This type of training appears to make the soldiers accustomed to violence and as a result might make them more predisposed to genocidal behaviour. However, it is important to remember that there might be differences in the training of enlisted soldiers around the world. There appears to be examples of the American army training other countries military and militias, however soldiers enlisted in the US might have a different training than the soldiers in for instance Rwanda. Furthermore, there are strict requirements for the soldiers to enlist in the US army, and the recruitment process is a set of hard physical and psychological tests that might not be equal to that of another military organization (Waller, 2007). The police force are similarly trained in combat training, possibly not as aggressively as military soldiers, but police officers are trained to handle difficult situations and to use violence if deemed necessary.

Then there are the perpetrators that have been recruited primarily for the purpose of committing collective violence including genocide and politicide (Alvarez, 2010). It seems as if most of the people are recruited primarily to militia groups. Militia groups appear to have been created for a variety for reasons, for instance a paramilitary group might have been created for genocide purposes or for other types of collective violence, and then used by the state as part of a genocide strategy (Weiss-Wendt, 2010). In many genocide and politicide the state often either encourages or even creates the paramilitary group. For instance, in Rwanda the Hutu President Habyarimana created the Interahamwe in 1992, by training young men from his political party in militia activities (Alvarez, 2010). Then how and what type of people are recruited to militia groups?

The recruited soldiers are often young men from poverty with limited future prospects. These men are commonly unemployed, with little education and with limited means to provide for a potential family. They often perceive themselves as outsiders and are equally seen as outcasts and often stigmatized by the rest of society (Dutton, 2007). Goffmans’ theory
of stigmatization might be relevant to the perception of these young men as outcasts. Stigma is “the process in which a person’s identity and behaviour is discredited and tainted” (Alvarez, 2010:32). According to Muncie (2001:292)

“Stigma is derived less from a particular attribute (stigmata) and more through a social process in which particular attributes are discredited at particular times and in particular places. It is described as a discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity. The normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives.”

Stigma is interactive, which means that an attribute can in some situations be seen as an asset, whereas in others it is perceived as a weakness or a flaw. For instance aggressive behaviour might be considered a menace by society, whereas in a social context that value violent behaviour it could be respected (Muncie, 2001). The stigmatization of the young men appears to often be taken advantage of and emphasized by the authority or the militia group, to segregate and exclude the individual from the rest of the society so that the young men have limited or no alternatives then to join the paramilitary group (Alvarez, 2010).

Relatively, Alvarez (2010) uses social control theory when explaining parts of the recruitment process. Social control theory is “a sociological approach to understating the causes of conformity that focus on the ability of society and its institutions to restrain human behaviour” (Rankin and Kern, 2001:207). The main argument is that crime or deviant behaviour is more likely when a person has weak emotional and institutional bonds to society. “Criminality, in other words, is partially dependent upon how embedded a person is within their community” (Alvarez, 2010:91). Paramilitary groups, such as the Arkan Tigers in the Bosnian genocide and the Interahamwe in the Rwandan genocide, might contribute to support for a social theory since they recruited mainly unemployed members of soccer fan clubs, namely young men that generally had limited ties to their families and often lack an attachment to public institutions such as schools or workplaces (Alvarez, 2010).

The militia then offers the often unemployed, stigmatized and secluded young men “a mission and a sense of purpose” through activities and a sense of group solidarity (Alvarez, 2010:90). Furthermore, the recruited soldiers are also often exposed to treats and or offered material and social incentives to join the militia (Singer, 2005). For instance the authorities in Rwanda

“Offered tangible incentives to participants. They delivered food, drink, and other intoxicants, parts of military uniforms, and small payments in cash to hungry, jobless
young men. They encouraged cultivators to pillage farm animals, crops, and such building materials as doors, windows, and roofs. Even more important in this land-hungry society, they promised cultivators the fields left vacant by Tutsi victims” (Dutton, 2007:106).

Many of the soldiers recruited to paramilitary groups are often trained similarly to military soldiers that frequently involve a form of boot camp

“The experience is specifically intended to be hard, brutal, and degrading because it is intended to turn civilians into soldiers who are able to engage in violence on command. After recruits are broken down both psychologically and physically, they are built back up into soldiers, a process that involves instilling a sense of loyalty, pride, and obedience. In sum, basic training is designed to provide new soldiers with the mechanical skills of violence and to socialize them into a value system that supports fierceness, aggression, and solidarity with their comrades” (Alvarez, 2010:89).

These soldiers are often trained using extreme and unconventional methods such as water boarding, often intended to make the soldiers feel they have accomplished a particularly demanding task, and it gives the impression that they are part of something unique and superior (Alvarez, 2010). This perception of being a part of an elite unite strengthens the attachment to their peers and to the militia (Dutton, 2007).

“In Rwanda, the Interahamwe militia engaged in mass rallies with alcohol, speeches, marching, and drill maneuvers to train and instill the appropriate attitudes and behaviours. This militia also utilized three-week indoctrination sessions at a training camp where recruits were taught how to use machetes on human shaped dummies, throw grenades and burn homes” (Alvarez, 2010:90).

The training period often varies however and many of the recruited soldiers only receive limited training. For many of the perpetrators the task at hand might not necessarily require extensive training since most of the targets in genocide and politicides are vulnerable and defenceless men, women and children. Relatedly, according to Alvarez (2010), the authority might intentionally only recruit certain soldiers to increase the number participating in the
genocide since the targets are mainly civilians and there is great power in merely the number of perpetrators.

In many violent conflicts there are also children participating in genocides and politicides (Singer, 2005). Child soldiers appear to hold an important role in many paramilitary groups. For instance, the child soldiers in Sierra Leone are assumed to play a large part in the distribution of fear

“The bloody and notorious role of child soldiers in the rural and urban killing fields is emblematic of the brutal character of the war. Armed children and youth spread unspeakable fear throughout Sierra Leone. They were responsible for thousands of murders, mutilations, and rapes, and for torture, forced labour and sexual slavery” (Rosen, 2005:58)

Child soldiers are a challenge in many conflict areas including countries that have experienced genocide or politicide such as Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau and so forth (Children and Armed Conflict, 2012).

According to the UN and UNICEF a child soldier is

“Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.” (UNICEF, 1997:13)

There are however many disputes related to the legal age for soldiers participating in wars. The age of 18 might be contested by different countries and it is “by no means clear that all persons under age eighteen are or even should be deemed children” (Rosen, 2005:3). For instance, in many African countries a child is considered a man after a ritual often performed at the age of 14 (Wessells, 1997). Militias are similarly often reluctant to exclude children and are often not concerned with the rights of the child. This appears however to be a political issue and particularly criminologist might recognize similar arguments in the discussions of
the legal age for criminal responsibility, where some countries incarcerate children as young as ten such as in England (Goldson and Murcie, 2006).

The children are often victims of similar types of recruitment procedures like that of older youths, but many of the children have also been kidnapped (Singer, 2005). The report by Machel (1996), that drew international attention to the children in armed conflicts, suggests that paramilitary groups and other organizations, such as police forces, drove around in the streets picking up youths. As a result the children working in the street selling goods were at particular risk. However schools and orphanages were also targeted. “In Ethiopia, armed militias would surround a public area such as a marketplace, order every male to sit down, and then force into a truck anyone deemed “eligible” (Wessells, 1997:35).

The children recruited often belong to the same risk group as the other recruits, and they are frequently from poverty, many live in the streets and some are refugees. They often get involved with militia type of groups for similar reasons to that of the others (Singer, 2005), but “it is misleading, however, to consider this voluntary. While young people may appear to choose military service, the choice is not exercised freely. They may be driven by any of several forces, including cultural, social, economic or political pressures” (Machel, 1996:12). For instance some children might join for economic reasons or protection but also

“Hunger and poverty may drive parents to offer their children for service. In some cases, armies pay a minor soldier's wages directly to the family. Child participation may be difficult to distinguish as in some cases whole families move with armed groups. Children themselves may volunteer if they believe that this is the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing or medical attention. Some case studies tell of parents who encourage their daughters to become soldiers if their marriage prospects are poor” (Machel, 1996:12).

Singer (2005) suggests that a normalization of violence and the situational components can drive children into military for a sense of control. Many children might feel powerless in their everyday life because of violent situations, poverty and limited or no access to schooling and anything that will give them a sense of control and protect them, they will happily accept. Desperate and hungry children are easy to take advantage of (Singer, 2005).

Militia groups often apply various techniques when training the children that appear to combine initiation rituals that use fear and humiliation, whilst isolating the children from the rest of society. These rituals often create a special bond to the militia that makes it difficult for
children and youths to separate from the group (Singer, 2005). Refusal to cooperate might cause severe consequences, such as in Uganda the Lord’s Resistance Army would mutilate people in sadistic rituals involving cutting off the lips and ears with machetes of those that opposed the militia (Wessells, 1997). Initiation rituals might use acts of sadism to trigger fear and humiliation, for instance in Rwanda sexual abuse, mutilations and rape were often means to desensitize children. Exposure to violent behaviour would also increase the likelihood of the children applying the same methods to other people (Singer, 2005). Methods that would separate the children from society often consist of rituals where the child must prove their allegiance for instance

“In Sierra Leone, the kidnapping of children and youth, the permanent tattooing of child soldiers with the mark of the RUF, the reports of gruesome rites in which children were forced to publicly murder family and community members to ensure their alienation from them show the trademark violence of a slave regime” (Rosen, 2005:59).

Similarly in Rwanda, children from Hutu and Tutsi parents often had to prove their loyalty by killing the members of their Tutsi family (Briggs, 2005). The initiation rituals combined with the separation from society would encourage increased dependency to the leaders and develop a strong sense of loyalty to the militia that would become the child’s primary group (Singer, 2005). The leaders of the militia would frequently provide the children and youths with alcohol and drugs so that the children would fearless attack the opposition (Machel, 1996). The drugs provided are often amphetamines and tranquilizers such as used in Burma (Myanmar) and Sri Lanka (Wessells, 1997).

Children are used in various roles, but often as informants and messengers (Machel, 1996). For instance in Rwanda the primary role was to identify Tutsis in hiding (Briggs, 2005). But children are also used for killing, plundering and looting houses, housework and for sexual exploitation. Girls, for instance, often become a “soldiers’ wives” (Machel, 1996).

There appear to be an overwhelming correlation between men and responsibility of genocide and politicide (Waller, 2007). However is this evidence that women cannot be as violent as men?

It appears that some of the earlier theories argue that women do not have the capacity to commit such brutal crimes, often referencing the passive participation of women namely the supporting role.
“Past analysis of women in military and paramilitary actions have depicted them as “designated non-combatants” by emphasizing their complicity in supporting husbands, sons, and brothers: working in factories making weapons of destruction; nurturing and sustaining men through ancillary support units; defending the “home front”; profiting from the plunder and confiscation of victims’ property and goods; or standing silently by as witnesses to the atrocities committed in their lands or on foreign shores ” (Waller, 2007:265).

However, current studies seem to suggest that “women simply have not been given equal opportunity to perpetrate violence. When given the opportunity, this argument maintains, women can certainly evidence the same level of brutality as male perpetrators” (Waller, 2007:265). Increasing evidence appears to suggest that female perpetrators in various roles in the genocide machinery are capable of killing victims that reflect the same brutality practiced by certain men (Jamieson, 1999; Jones, 2006; Adler et al., 2007). For instance, there are evidence of women torturing victims with similar sadistic methods as men in the Holocaust and Cambodia (Waller, 2007). In Rwanda the former national minister, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, became the first woman in 2011 to be found guilty with genocide and sentenced to life imprisonment. Nyiramasuhuko “was found guilty by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwandan (ICTR) of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity (extermination, rape and persecution) and several serious violations of the Geneva conventions” (UN news centre, 2011). Nyuramasuhuko reportedly encouraged sexual violence before killings and employed systematic use of rape (Adler et al., 2007).

It appears however that gender stereotypes depicting women as mother figures and caretakers generate unbelief in women’s ability to commit such crimes. Even when presented with evidence of women’s brutality people tend to attribute the actions to a disorder or something abnormal (Waller, 2007).

“The challenge, then, is to transcend our gender expectations that women are basically innocent by nature, so that their acts of cruelty are viewed as deviant and abnormal, and instead approach their perpetration of extraordinary evil the same way we have that of men – as ordinary people influenced by cultural, psychological, and social constructions. Only when we stop stereotyping women to the point of assuming female perpetrators to be extraordinary can we began to unpack the intriguing role that gender plays in binding factors of the group” (Waller, 2007:269)
Majority of the front line killers appears to be those that are part of the military, police force or militia, however “the attempted destruction of a population also often relies upon many ordinary citizens working within different state agencies and private businesses” (Alvarez, 2010:92). In some of the genocides there are an unusual high number of active civilian participation, for instance in the Rwandan and the Cambodian genocide (Robins and Jones, 2009:5). In the Rwandan genocide “in the interests of ‘national security,’” civilians were called upon to murder Tutsi non-combatants, who were characterized as enemy collaborators and as a threat to national security” (Adler et al., 2007:225). “Administrative officials ordered local people to establish barrier to catch Tutsi trying to flee and to organize search patrols to discover those trying to hide” (Dutton, 2007:105), others picketed up their machetes and begun to kill their neighbours without any previous training (Briggs, 2005).

Adler et al. (2007) conducted a study on female participation in the Rwandan genocide, and performed post event interviews with 10 civilian female perpetrators that acquired “rank and file” positions during the genocide.

“The results of this study reveal that for women, the decision to participate in the Rwandan Genocide was motivated by a complex interaction between background environmental themes that had been in play for years and contemporary experiential pressures that gathered momentum in or around April 1994” (Adler et al., 2007:224).

The participants described a peaceful coexistence with the Tutsis prior to the genocide. Despite some changes of the perception of female roles in the 1970’s, the “gender roles for women emphasized hard work without complaint, homemaking, rearing and disciplining children, faithfulness to partners, and (for women with farms or gardens) making a success of subsistence agriculture” (Adler et al., 2007:216). Then there were an immediate change in attitudes after the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed, and hostility towards the Tutsis increased rapidly.

“The downing of Habyarimana’s plane had the immediate effect of increasing the militarization of the entire country, a move pre-planned by the Hutu Power militants months earlier. Militarization was framed as critical to “national security” and encompassed not only the armed forces but also large proportion of Rwanda civil society” (Adler et al., 2007:217).
Adler et al. (2007:222) divided the female participants into two main groups, namely the active and passive perpetrators. The majority of the female participants appears to belong to the passive group, “while remaining within traditional gender norms with respect to spouse, home, and family, these women nevertheless lent support to the eliminationist Hutu Power agenda by egging on attack groups, informing on concealed victims, and pillaging property from the dead” (Adler et al., 2007:222). Then there were a small group that actively participated in the killing of the Tutsis. The participants expressed four reasons for why they participated in the genocide, that is “(1) a disaster mentality; (2) fear of the new social order; (3) confusion or ambivalence about events on the ground; and (4) consonance and dissonance with gender roles” (Adler et al., 2007:214). After the president was killed many women felt frightened, panicky and hopeless. Some experienced outrage and wanted to seek revenge for the killing of their president. Others reportedly feared the Hutus that killed the Tutsis, and perceived the environment as uncertain and confusing. “The majority describe confusion regarding what to think, how to feel, and whom to believe about the unfolding genocide” (Adler et al., 2007:220). Nevertheless, “while many women attribute their involvement in the 1994 genocide to spontaneous or poorly considered behaviour, some participated deliberately and with conviction” (Adler et al., 2007:221).

3.3.3 Summary

As this chapter might illustrate, a generalization of the state as the primary perpetrator could in some incidents be an under-communication of the diversity of people that often belong under the “state” label. The perpetrator group consists of different formal and informal agencies, each holding a hierarchy of leaders and rank and file officers that possess different roles in the genocidal machinery. Furthermore, a clear definition of the perpetrator group and their function might be very difficult to establish particularly prior to a genocide or politicide, since a situation might transform into a genocide rather quickly and leaders might be appointed ad hoc. Adler et al.’s (2007:218) description of the genocide in Rwanda reflects the complexity of the subject.

“After early April 2004, governance in Rwanda devolved to a complex network of government, military, and Interahamwe extremists working in loose affiliation, as well as individually, at national, regional, and local levels. During the genocide, ad hoc leaders in all social strata mobilized citizens to denounce, rob, and kill targeted Tutsi
and Hutu victims—by planning and importing weapons from abroad, by assassinating formal leaders who would not cooperate with the Hutu Power agenda, by commanding the Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe militias to attack and kill unarmed civilians, by disseminating misinformation about the RPF and Tutsi civilians at the national and local levels, and by bribing and coercing average civilians to participate in the mayhem”.

The leaders of genocide and politicide are frequently assumed to be very influential and even essential to the development of a genocidal crime (Goldhagen, 2009; Staub, 2003; Dutton, 2007). There appears to be some challenges related to a comparison, and some scholars argue that it would not be possible because of the uniqueness of each conflict and leader (Hiebert, 2008). Nevertheless, the process that results in a decision that genocide or politicide is the appropriate resolution, seems to be dependent on similar attributes that influence the decision making process of ordinary people such as psychological, social and environmental conditions (Staub, 2003).

The diversity related to agencies is similarly reflected in the diversity of the front line killers. The genocidal killers are the career soldiers, police officers, militia soldiers, child soldiers and civilians that all belong to the in-group. There appears to be individual variations related to prior experiences, combat training, exposure to violence, the recruitment process to name a few. Relatedly, at present it appears to be no specific personality traits that all perpetrators exhibit or any exclusive social and environmental predispositions. Subsequently, the perpetrators are people from every part of society and under the “right” situation majority of people would presumably participate in genocidal crimes, but some people appear to be more prone to join than others (Waller, 2007). It might however be more hopeful that “ordinary people” commit genocide rather than monsters that we cannot comprehend (Dutton, 2007; Waller, 2007).

When the perpetrator group is broken down to the individual perpetrator, the subject becomes far more complicated. It seems that for many of the young men, women and children, recruitment to paramilitary groups may be the only hope of survival, and to cite Rosen’s (2005:60) expressive description of the situation for many child soldiers in Sierra Leone, “they were abused, exploited, and murdered just as they abused, exploited, and murdered others”.

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3.4 The individual and collective transformation into mass murderers

The last century has been filled with numerous accounts of human brutality from violent murderers described by the survivors of the Rwandan genocide to pictures of the gas chambers killing thousands in Nazi Germany. Narratives of genocide and politicide appear so extreme in hindsight that it seems incomprehensible that a society might even willingly participate in these crimes. Then how have many people in a pre-genocidal society come to support a solution that promotes genocide or politicide? And how can a husband, a wife or even a child become transformed into a mass murderer?

The complexity of the genocide field is reflected in the variety of theories and perspectives that attempt to explain why these large scale crimes occur, from the different disciplines such as political science to social psychology, to the many divergences found in a variety of the explanations. For instance, on the one hand there are scholars that argue for the importance of societal support and participation in genocidal crimes, but on the other hand there are those scholars that claim that genocides and politicides are committed only by a small group of people, such as by paramilitary groups (Lieberman, 2012).

As previously discussed, the research on genocide appear to primarily assume a top-down perspective that focuses on the state as the main perpetrator. However, it should be noted that there are some researchers that argue for, a bottom-up approach (Gerlach, 2006), or a combination of a top-down and bottom-up perspective to explain genocide (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008). A discussion of the relationship between the state and the members of a society’s influence on the development of a genocidal crime is an interesting and relevant discussion, but it is regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis because of time limitations.

Whilst genocide research frequently embrace the powerful state thesis such as scholars like Rummel (2005), Harff (2003) and Fein (1993a), at the same time as Lieberman (2012:11) notes “researchers have also scrutinized the role of ordinary people in committing and carrying out genocide, and supporting or profiting from it” such as theorists like Waller (2007) Zimbardo (2007) and Staub (2003). There appears to be, to make a very simplistic distinction, two different levels of primary focus, namely the state level and the level of the front line killers. Since these approaches appear to adopt a top-down approach, the focus of the research on the transformation process seems to centralize around the various components that might influence a person’s perception and ultimately their behaviour. The different theoretical approaches appear to increasingly adopt a multi-factor model, rather than one-
factor explanations. Furthermore there appears to be a growth in scholars that apply a multi-factor approach that seeks to combine explanations that focus on both the state, and the executioners such as the criminologists Alvarez (2010) and Savelsberg (2010).

The theoretical field of genocide and politicide is regrettably too vast to give a comprehensive introduction in this thesis, consequently the aim is merely to introduce a selection of the theoretical approaches, and common factors frequently argued to be necessary components in the altering process of an individual and subsequently to the development of a genocide and/or politicide. This chapter has been divided into five parts, where the objective of the first part is to introduce some of the theoretical models often used as framework to the factors that might affect behaviour. The theoretical approaches that will be discussed have been selected in an attempt to emphasize some of the different approaches and highlight some of the disagreements found in the genocide literature concerning the individual transformation process. The succeeding four parts are merely intended to introduce some of the most common factors identified by a variety of scholars as influential to the genocidal process, and to tie some of the previously discussed pre-conditions to the transformation process. Subsequently, the ensuing part focuses on the state level and the means available to the authority that might influence the perceptions in society, whereas the next three parts focus on factors that influence the front line killers in sequential order, the effects of group dynamics on behaviour, how the perception of the target group might influence behaviour, and lastly the mechanisms that might affect the actual execution of the genocidal killings.

Please note that a full overview of the theories and the factors is regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis, this does not however imply that other theories or factors not included in this thesis are less relevant. For instance, the bystander effect that refers to the often passive spectator’s inability to intervene is unfortunately not further discussed (Cohen, 2001: Staub, 2003). Then, what are some of the main theoretical approaches?

### 3.4.1 Theoretical approaches

Previously, genocide theories frequently focused on the pathology of the individuals involved, labelling the perpetrators as evil and categorizing their behaviour as beyond human capability. Then, Arendt (1964) in her famous analysis of the Adolf Eichmann trial, made what was to become a very influential observation to the genocide field namely that of “the banality of evil”. Eichmann, one of the major organizers of the Holocaust responsible for the death of millions, argued that he followed orders and perceived himself as a law-abiding citizen “he
did his duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law” (Arendt, 1964:135). Arendt (1964:276) argues that it would have been more comfortable to view him as a monster, but “the trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.” The attention than seemed to gradually shift from the focus on pathology towards explanations that genocide occurs because of ordinary factors that are arranged in an extra ordinary way. To cite Bauman (1989:94) “only the combination of factors is unusual and rare, not the factors that are combined. Separately, each factor is common and normal”. But before exploring what some of these “ordinary” factors might be, it might be useful to investigate some of the theoretical contexts they might be placed in.

From a social psychological perspective, some of the main disagreements appear to be between dispositional, situational and interactionist models. Dispositional theorists lay “emphasis on factors specific to the psychology of an individual” (Roth, 2010:199). Related to genocidal studies are dispositional approaches those that search for personality traits, environmental predispositions, and personal experiences and so forth to explain genocidal behaviour. There is, as previously discussed, little evidence to support a merely dispositional explanation to genocide and politicide primarily because of the variety of people that participate in genocidal crimes.

Situational theorists take “the persons immediate context – the ‘situation’ in which one find oneself- as a highly reliable predictor of behaviour” (Roth, 2010:199).

“The emphasis on situation implies that social stability (the following of certain standards of behaviour) should be understood as a function of the ‘normative stability’ of the contexts in which a person happens to be. Changes in normative expectations change behaviour. More generally, the paradigm teaches how people have a powerful tendency to conform to stated or implied norms in social and institutional contexts” (Roth, 2010:199).

Zimbardo (2007:445) is frequently associated with situationalism, and defines the primary components that influence behaviour namely the Person, the System and the Situation as the following
“The Person is an actor on the stage of life whose behavioural freedom is informed by his or her makeup—genetic, biological, physical, and psychological. The Situation is the behavioural context that has the power, through its reward and normative functions, to give meaning and identity to the actor’s roles and status. The System consist of the agents and agencies whose ideology, value, and power create situations and dictate the roles and expectations for approved behaviours of actors within its spheres of influence”.

Zimbardo (2007) relies mainly on his famous Stanford prison study where ‘normal’ college students were randomly selected to the role of either prisoner or prison guards, in a realistic simulated prison setting. Zimbardo himself played the role of the prison director. The study had to be terminated before schedule because of the negative development of the study. Interestingly, the decision to end the experiment was only initiated when a person outside of the study observed what was unfolding. The guards and the prisoners quickly became accustomed to their roles, and their behaviour simulated realistic scenarios often reported from various real prisons, where some of the guards

“Soon came to abuse their newfound power by behaving sadistically-demeaning, degrading, and hurting the ‘prisoners’ day in and night out... Other guards played their role in tough, demanding ways that were not particularly abusive, but they showed little sympathy for the plight of the suffering inmates. A few guards, who could be classified as ‘good guards,’ resisted the temptation of power and were at times considerate of the prisoners’ condition, doing little things like giving one an apple another a cigarette, and so on” (Zimbardo, 2007:207).

The prisoners similarly assumed different roles and quickly became passive, resigned or oppositional to the guards. The majority reported they became distressed by the continued bullying, surveillance and mistreatment by the guards, and the prisoners quickly rebelled. Some of the prisoners wanted to quit but where asked to continue, however not far into the experiment one of the prisoners had a breakdown and experienced transient emotional distress. The primary argument is that since the students participated was as “normal, average, and healthy as possible and had no prior history of antisocial behaviour, crime or violence” the situational components influenced the participants behaviour (Zimbardo, 2007:206). Zimbardo (2007:210) describes a “transformation of character’- of good people suddenly becoming perpetrators of evil as guards or pathologically passive victims as prisoners in
response to situational forces acting on them”. Zimbardo (2007) argues that people obtain various roles in different situations such as illustrated by the Stanford prison experiment. It remains however a little unclear how people acquire their specific roles, for instance why a specific person acquired the role of the “sadistic” guard rather than the “good” guard. Could this be dependent on dispositional attributes?

Another scholar that frequently is associated with situationalism is Asch (1956:1), who similarly argues for the importance of the situation and conducted a study on group conformity where the design of the study

“Generated a disagreement between a single person and a group concerning a simple and clear matter of fact in the immediate environment. Further, the group that disagreed with the individual judged the facts in question wrongly, while the individual could not but judge the facts correctly. Finally, the judgments were stated publicly; the single individual was always called upon to announce his judgment just after a group of equals had stated a wrong judgment.”

The task could be such as determining the difference in length between two lines, where one line was significantly longer than the other. The group would then state that the shorter of the two lines was the longest. The results suggest that many people chose to conform and agree with the rest of the group despite knowing that it was the wrong answer. The effect however decreased when one other person announced the answer similar to that of the participant (Asch, 1956).

Milgram (2005) relatedly conducted several experiments in the early 1960’s on obedience to authority. The participants were invited to what was believed to be a memory and learning experiment in a psychology laboratory. The study consisted of one participant that was assigned to the role of the “teacher”, that were to administer shock to the “learner”, that the participant was made to believe was similarly just another participant, but in reality was an actor playing the role. The participant was placed in front of a large generator that the participant was made to believe could administer electric shock that ranged from 15- 450 volts, each of the 30 switches increased the electric shock by 15 volts. The numbers were reinforced by verbal descriptions “which ranged from SLIGHT SHOCK TO DANGER – SEVERE SHOCK”, the last switches was marked with XXX (Milgram, 2005:5).The participant was directed to administer shock with increasing volts when the learner would answer a question incorrectly.
“The point of the experiment is to see how far a person will proceed in a concrete and measurable situation in which he is ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim. At what point will the subject refuse to obey the experimenter?” (Milgram, 2005:5).

The actor had been instructed to react with increasing discomfort when set values were reached from subtle grunts to verbal protests such as “Experimenter, get me out of here! I won’t be in the experiment anymore! I refuse to go on!”, to violent screaming and finally when reached maximum volt, with silence (Milgram, 2005:25). “Each time the subject hesitates to administer a shock, the experimenter orders him to continue” (Milgram, 2005:6). Milgram (2005) conducted various experiments that varied between variables such as the participants distance to the victim. Four main conditions were used. In condition one and two the victim was placed in another room, but in experiment one the victim only made non-verbal feedback whereas in experiment two the victim voiced verbal protests. In experiment 3 the victim was placed in the same room administrating visual and voice feedback. Experiment 4 was similar to the last but the victim would only receive shock when his hand rested on a shock plate. The participant had to physically hold the victims hand after administer shock levels of 150 volt. Each experiment had 40 different participants both men and women from different professions. The results suggest in the first experiment 65% of the subject administered over 450 volt, in the second experiment 62.5 %, in the third experiment 40 % and the fourth experiment 30 % administered maximum voltage to the victims. Milgram (2005) has received a variety of critics primarily aimed at the method such as whether a generalization of laboratory studies is possible, and questions concerning the participant’s perception of the study’s authenticity, but also the selection process of the participants particularly concerning the wage of 5 dollars that were paid at the end of the study. Furthermore, potential violations of ethical consideration that concern the deception of the study’s objective and possible latent reactions to the experiment itself. Milgram (2005) argues that through follow up questionnaires, few of the participants report negative feelings towards the experiment and few perceived it as a fraud. Nevertheless, despite criticism Milgram (2005) has received widespread support and the experiments continue to be regarded as influential.

The presented scholars Zimbardo (2007), Milgram (2005) and Asch (1956) are widely cited by a variety of genocide researchers such as Alvarez (2010) and Bauman (1989) for their contributions. The factors that these scholars argue to impact a person’s behaviour are
generated by the situation the individual is in. To cite Roth (2010:205); “the core point demonstrated by these experiments concerns the power of the ‘conformity effect’- the amazing willingness of people to simply assimilate the norms of the situations in which they find themselves”.

Scholars that rely mainly on situational explanations have been criticized for moving the focus of pathology merely away from the individual and into the situation. However, Roth (2010:209) argues that there is nothing pathological about the situations presented by either Milgram (2005) or Zimbardo (2007); “the ‘pathology’ consists in the thoughtless investment people make in roles handed them by an accident of fate”. Furthermore, situational approaches have been accused of taking away individual responsibility because of the argument that individual behaviour is guided by the situation and not dispositional factors. This argument seems to touch on several aspects, for instance can an explanatory approach be deemed unfit solely because it might be considered ‘unpopular’? Is an explanation on individual behaviour less accurate because it does not suit the current perceptions held by many societies on justice and responsibility? And does a situational approach really remove responsibility from the individual?

Another important question arises, do people really blindly participate in genocide and policiide without any personal choice? According to Roth (2010:209) the “situations do not necessitate behaviours. But the tendency to conform makes this freedom to choose moot. A type of herd mentality effectively trumps any actual ability to behave otherwise”. Then how do situationalists explain that there are people that act differently than the rest of the group in various situations? Zimbardo (2007) and Milgram (2005) appear to acknowledge that some people react differently to the situational components, but why this is, appear to be somewhat unclear. To account for the variations in individual responses, Newman and Bakina (2009) argue for interactionism. That is

“Stable dispositions and situational influences combine to elicit behavior in complicated ways, and have the potential to transform each other. How an individual reacts to a situation will depend on who that individual is. Furthermore, the way an individual will express his or her traits (and the attitudes, beliefs, and capacities that underlie them) will depend on the situation. Finally, the very nature of ‘situations’ depends on the people who encounter them, who are in turn shaped by those situations” (Newman and Bakina, 2009:259)
Newman and Bakina (2009:259) further argue that the relationship between dispositions and situations is complex and does not affect behaviour straightforward, moreover various personality traits can “express themselves in some situations and not others”. However, when and what type of traits that are relevant, and when the situation and when the dispositional attributes are significant, appears to be diffuse (Roth, 2010).

The influence of structural components proposed by for instance Zimbardo (2007) on behaviour, has similarly been promoted by scholars from other fields such as Bauman (1989) and Harff (1992). Bauman (1989) argues from a sociological perspective that the mechanism for committing genocide is the modern bureaucracy. The modern bureaucracy creates the necessary distance to the victims, diffusion of personal responsibility, and dehumanization of the victims for populous participation. The system, namely the modern bureaucracy is what creates the necessary factors, such as distance to the victim, which enables people to become mass murderers. Bauman’s (1989) bureaucratic argument has however received criticism relating oversimplification and lack of transferability to other regime types and societies (Brandal et al., 2008; Vetlesen, 2005). Other critics related to the distance and dehumanization argument of the bureaucratic model will be discussed later in this chapter. Regardless, the bureaucratic system thesis appears to gain support from for instance Harff (1992:98), who points to the magnitude of certain atrocities and suggests “regardless of the political form, bureaucratically developed structures are the best equipped to execute a genocide on the scale and in the manner of the holocaust”.

A variety of multi-factor theorists argue for the influence of collective perceptions, ideologies, norms and values on behaviour. There are however some discrepancies between the positions or the context that the various factors belong. For instance according to Zimbardo (2007:226), these factors are central components that are part of what he terms as the System “the programs, policies, and standard operating procedures that are developed to support an ideology become an essential component of the System. The System’s procedures are considered reasonable and appropriate as the ideology comes to be accepted as sacred”.

Bauman (1989) has similarly proposed a multi-factor model, but it appears that ideology and the bureaucratic system are perceived as correlating but independent factors. That is when ideologies of purification of society for an ideal world, combined with a totalitarian regime’s control over the bureaucracy, it becomes a lethal mix that causes genocide. To use Bauman’s (1989:93) terminology “when the modernist dream is embraced by an absolute power able to
monopolize modern vehicles of rational action, and when that power attains freedom from effective social control, genocide follows”.

The definition of ideology is equally relevant here, since as previously mentioned ideology can refer to a specific, often exclusive ideology such as communism, or ideology in the sense of shared beliefs in a culture (Weiss-Wendt, 2010; Alvarez, 2010). However, genocide and politicide that has as an overall ideological motive are according to the research conducted by Harff (2003) and Fein (1993a) relatively rare. Whereas alterations or exaggerations of shared belief systems or ideologies appear to be an important element in the genocidal process (Staub, 2003; Waller, 2007; Alvarez, 2010; Kiernan, 2005). Ideology in this sense appears to be similar to terminologies such as shared belief systems or what Waller (2007) has termed worldview. A shared worldview includes “presuppositions, intentions, meanings, rules, norms, values, principles, practices, and activities through which people live their lives” (Waller, 2007:171).

Relatedly, Alvarez (2010:50) argues that “states do not maintain their control of a society solely through the use of force and coercion, but also because citizens have adopted ideas and values that support the status quo”, since it is “much more efficient and effective to get people to do something willingly because they have come to believe in its necessity and rightness”. This occurs, according to Alvarez (2010:50), through hegemony that is “an ideological tool that is fostered and encouraged by the state in order to maintain citizens’ sense of the state legitimacy”. Alvarez (2010:50) proposes that “hegemony is best understood as power” and refer to Foucault’s notion of power that “power does not just act upon people, but through them as well”. The importance of societal adoption of common beliefs is similarly argued by Staub (2000:370)

“As part of the process leading to violence, the group usually creates or adopts an ideology, a vision of ideal social arrangements. This offers hope of a better future, provides a new comprehension of reality and connection to other people, and offers the potential for effective action”

Societies construction of worldview is according to Waller (2007) one of several important factors, including situational influences, that contribute to genocidal behaviour. Waller (2007) has proposed a multi-factor model that emphasize an ultimate influence, namely human instinct derived from evolution such as the basic need for food, and three proximate influences that is the immediate influences on behaviour in collective violence. The three
proximate influences are the cultural construction of worldview, psychology construction of the “other” and the social construction of cruelty

“The cultural construction of worldview examines the influence of cultural models-related to collectivistic values, authority orientation, and social dominance-that are widely shared by the members of the perpetrator group. The psychology construction of the “other” analyses how victims of genocide and mass killing become simply the “objects” of perpetrators’ actions through the processes of us-them thinking, moral disengagement, and blaming the victims. Finally, the social construction of cruelty explores the influence of professional socialization, group identification, and the binding factors of the group in creating an immediate social context in which perpetrators initiate, sustain and cope with their cruelty” (Waller, 2007:139).

Other researchers have proposed stage based explanations to attempt a structural understanding of the genocidal process. For instance, Stanton (1998) proposes eight stages in genocide. These stages are not necessarily sequential and may overlap but they do strengthen each factor’s effect, they are the following: 1) classification, namely the ability to classify a group into a category such as by race or religion 2) symbolization, that is the naming of the category such as Jews or Tutsi 3) dehumanization, refers to the process that people are perceived as less than human that allows for killing with impunity 4) organization, genocide is not necessary planned in detail but it is deliberate and organized 5) polarization, that is the further division in society that drive the groups apart 6) preparation, namely the enforcement of segregation plans, such as removal from land, deportations and so forth 7) extermination, namely the killing of the target group and 8) denial, refer to the perpetrators denial of the event that often follows a genocide. There are other theorists that argue for a similar stage approach, such as Scherrer (2005), who proposes eleven stages that are mainly based on Stanton’s (1998) eight stages. Feierstein (2012:23) has similarly developed a stage model that consists of six stages

“Beginning at the moment that a group of individuals with an autonomous social identity is negatively constructed as ‘Other’, and continuing until its symbolic extermination in the minds of the survivors, which may happen after the physical acts of extermination themselves, and rob the survivors of the possibility of being subjects ‘for themselves’.”
Similarly, the stages often overlap and do not necessarily occur in chronological order. The six stages proposed by Feierstein (2012) are as follows: 1) stigmatization: the negative otherness, refer to the process where the state stigmatize a group in society that create “us” and “them” groups 2) harassment, namely the physical stage that introduce physical violence 3) isolation, the process of differentiating the out-group and removing the groups ties with society 4) policies of systematic weakening, refer to the strategies that reduce the out-group both physically and psychologically for instance, food deprivation, abuse, and humiliation 5) extermination, namely the systematic killings of the target group 6) symbolic enactment, refer to the process of symbolic change of the genocidal society.

It is however unclear related to both these stage explanations, what type of evidence they are based on. Although Feierstein (2012) uses the Holocaust to emphasize the arguments, it is unclear if it is based on any empirical evidence. The difficulty with these models appears to be a simplification of events, and the question remains whether these stage models might be equally valuable in the process of prevention rather than in the discussion of the unfolding of a genocide and politicide. Then, what are some of the most common factors identified by a variety of genocide scholars that might influence a society to engage in genocidal behaviour?

### 3.4.2 The authority and means to alter perceptions

As previously discussed, many scholars argue that in majority of the genocide and politicides the state holds the primarily responsibility (Alvarez, 2010; Harff, 2003), then to quickly recap what are some of the main objectives?

The motives often held by the authority are frequently found to be economic, retributive/responsive and/or ideological (Rummel, 2005; Fein, 1993a; Harff, 2003). As a result, the target group is frequently the group that is in the way of economic growth, or is perceived to pose a threat to the power, or those that are perceived to pollute an ideal society. The most common motive appears to be retributive or responsive. Subsequently, the target group is often those that are perceived to pose a threat to the power. The atrocity is led by a leader frequently described as increasingly paranoid, who might perceive genocide as the only solution (Fein, 1993a; Harff, 2003). Then, how is the objective to commit genocide or politicide accomplished?

Many scholars such as Alvarez (2010), Waller (2007) and Staub (2003) to name a few, argue that for a state to accomplish such large scale crimes, the authority often needs popular support from their citizens. Various processes might occur for a state to achieve popular
support, but a common perspective is that different psychological and situational mechanisms can influence people to willingly execute violent orders for instance, through belief systems and ideologies (Zimbardo, 2007; Waller, 2007; Staub, 2003; Alvarez, 2010). Therefore, societal support through changes to the values, norms and beliefs systems in society appears to be important in the genocidal process, but how can the authority alter the beliefs held by the majority in society?

The target group must be separated or further segregated from the in-group. A division might be accomplished through various means, but the out-group must be made different or the difference must be exaggerated if the target group is already the outcast in society (Dutton, 2007). Autocratic states have often unlimited control over state regulated agencies, and have the opportunity to make alterations that might further alienate the target group such as through changes to legislation. To make the target group into lawless citizens could possibly emphasize a difference and further distance the group (Alvarez, 2010). Similarly, reduced or limited access to political and other positions in society would enhance the separation (Harff, 1992). The authority can also physically remove the group from society or increase the practice of control, such as through means of incarceration and even through arbitrary killings (Harff, 1992). These measures might be easier accepted by the society if the state is in what Harff (1992) and Alvarez (2010) propose as states of exceptions, such as during a civil war or conflict where the means that was designed to protect the population during a nations emergency is used to further alienate the target group (Harff, 1992). These measures might enhance the power of the state, and allow for the use of violence against the society and violate human rights “yet, the actions of that state still have the appearance of legality and legitimacy even though they are truly acting in a kind of legal void” (Alvarez, 2010:35).

It appears that legitimacy is an important aspect in the process of accepting a belief or an ideology (Waller, 2007; Staub, 2003; Alvarez, 2010). An ideology can be legitimized in different ways, for instance through a professionalization of information (Alvarez, 2010), and through the use of cultural specific prejudice (Waller, 2007). For instance, legitimacy can be established through the use of myths and symbols that already exist in society (Waller, 2007). This would emphasise the target group already demonized in society. This does not mean however that the out-group is necessarily the primary scapegoat in the society, but the beliefs might emphasise some of the prejudice that is associated with that specific group. Furthermore, from an individual perspective, people seem to want to confirm their own world
view and have several mechanisms that process new information in systems that validate existing beliefs. Because we process new information into already existing categories, new information is altered to fit into the existing representations (Zimbardo, 2007; Waller, 2007). Additionally, the ideology is often directed at and made appealing specifically to that particular society. For instance, many genocidal states often present themselves as “protectors of peasant life against rural rivals”. Such mantras might be more appreciated by societies that consist of many uneducated, illiterate rural workers (Kiernan 2005:88). Relatedly, in Kiernan’s (2005:77) comparison study of the Holocaust, the Cambodian politicide and the Armenian genocide, “all three regimes idealized their ethnic peasantry as the true national class, the ethnic soil from which the new state grew”.

According to Alvarez (2010), the state possesses a natural authenticity, thereby if genocide would be ordered by the authority, it would automatically receive a sense of legitimacy. However, as previously suggested, the perception of which agencies that represent security are often blurred and fluctuating. For instance, whilst a militia group might be associated with a threat in some areas in others they might serve as a means for protection. Similarly, state agencies might protect certain areas whereas in others pose a threat. This uncertainty appears to be further reinforced by an increasingly complex security sector that seems pertinent in, for instance many African countries where the security sector has experienced a growth in both private and state security agencies. Furthermore it appears to be an increase in outsourcing and the collaboration between formal and informal agencies, often cumulating a confusion in establishing which agents who pose a threat and which contribute to security (Møller, 2009).

The state is however in possession of various techniques to legitimate a genocidal message. For instance, the authority often uses professionals to validate the information provided by the state, “lawyers, doctors, and scientists for example, often justify genocide in ways that relate to their specific occupations and skills” (Alvarez, 2010:52). Educated and trained professionals are often already established as trustworthy people in society, and by professionalising the communication it creates a more believable message. For instance, by providing scientific support for allegations might add a sense of authenticity to the information. Furthermore, the information is often culturally designed using local linguistics and local references to increase legitimacy (Zimbardo, 2007).

Communication of the genocidal belief and ideology appears to be essential to the genocidal process. Genocidal ideologies can be communicated through symbolic actions by the state such as segregation, overt execution of control, and changes to legislation, but also through
propaganda that is distributed through various media such as the radio, magazines, newspapers and television. Propaganda is used to generate hate and fear and is a means to create a distance between the in- and out-group, to dehumanize the target group and to emphasize their less-worthiness. The perception of the target group is subsequently changed through mechanisms encourage by propaganda (Dutton, 2007).

“The communication of ideology through hate propaganda is central to the development of “burning hate”. Such propaganda functions to negate the intimacy toward the targeted entity, generate passion, and generate commitment to false beliefs through the implantation of false presuppositions” (Waller, 2007:187).

Zimbardo (2007) argues that propaganda works on the unconscious mind, working its way slowly and changes the norms. It changes the perception of others through images and words that create the outsiders, and the changes in language are used to disguise the true purpose. Through isolation and monopoly of media the only information available are demonizing other people. The “information is controlled and reality is reshaped” (Dutton, 2007:103). The main message is strong enough to alter previous beliefs and people are made to believe they are doing the right thing by killing other human beings. The actions are transformed unconsciously to do a good deed that is, “the killing of a human being has become transformed in consciousness to the cleansing of an infection. Our human capacity for symbolic reasoning, perhaps the essence of our humanity, enables these transformations in consciousness” (Dutton, 2007:109). The target group are often associated with vermin or viruses and “must be exterminated before they multiply” (Dutton, 2007:103). This idea that the target group is like an infection that is spreading appears to be common for instance “the Nazi propaganda apparatus produced films showing lice and hordes of rats; Jews were described in these terms and associated with visual images of pestilence” (Dutton, 2007:103). Interestingly, although in certain genocide cases the intent of exterminating a target group from society might have been concealed, there are cases were the perpetrators made no attempts to hide the genocidal aim such as in Cambodia (Harff, 1992).

In the Rwandan genocide, propaganda was similarly widely used, to cite Schabas (2000:144); “the road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech”. Majority of the population was illiterate, but propaganda was spread through magazines, television and radio that used pictures, illustrations and speech. This occurred several years before the genocide, but intensified prior to the killing of the president, “in months leading up to the genocide,
violent sexual imagery depicting both males and females abounded in the iconography of Hutu extremist literature, while actual sexual violence against Tutsi women occurred with increasing frequency” (Taylor, 2009:128). Interestingly, the president “Habyarimana’s death was predicted four months in advance” by a variety of magazines (Taylor, 2009:127). “The official radio station, Radio Rwanda, had always been a loyal organ of the regime” and in December 1990 the educated extremist Ferdinand Nahimana took control of the station and “used the radio to shamelessly manipulate public opinion, experimenting with techniques that were to become part of the Interahamwe arsenal during the 1994 genocide” (Schabas, 2000:146). In April 1993 the Radio-telewion Libre des mille Collines (RTLM) was introduced and announced increasing messages of hate and extremist views. The RTLM coordinated the killing during the genocide and fuelled the hatred towards the Tutsis. The infamous “Hutu Ten Commandments” was repeated in various media and described

“The Tutsi as "thirsty for blood and power, seeking to impose their hegemony over Rwanda by rifle and cannon." Tutsi were accused of using their two favourite weapons, "money and Tutsi women". Kangura warned that "every Hutu must know that Tutsi women, wherever they are, work for their own ethnic group. Consequently, a Hutu who marries or lives with a Tutsi woman, or who hires her as his secretary or assistant, was a traitor, every Hutu should know that Tutsis are dishonest in business, and seek only the supremacy of their ethnic group” (Schabas, 2000:145).

Through aggressive propaganda the perceptions in society might be changed in favour of genocidal beliefs and ideologies. Through visual and verbal means, the target group is moved further from the in-group’s moral universe that might make it easier to disregard their human and legal rights. Several processes appear to be instigated through an aggressive alienation of a group in society, how do some of these processes affect the group and the individual? Furthermore, does supporting a belief necessarily suggest that people would act upon it? Then, what influences people’s behaviour?

3.4.3 Behaviour and in-group dynamics

The perpetrators in genocide and politicide consist of a diverse group of people. As illustrated in chapter 3.3 the perpetrators, namely the military and paramilitary soldiers, the police officers, the active and passive civilians and so forth, come from a variety of backgrounds. The complexity is however that the differences is not confined to psychological or
environmental predispositions, but there are also variations in the perpetrators level of training, attachment to their in-group, and so forth. Despite the variety however, many individuals appear to behave very similarly when placed in the same situation. Then how is this effect explained? What are some of the most common factors that might influence a person to participate in genocidal behaviour?

As previously discussed there are different theories that attempt to explain individual behaviour, for instance situationalist such as Zimbardo (2007) attributes the main influence to the situation, whereas Alvarez (2010) appears to suggest that there are a variety of factors that influence individual behaviour. According to Alvarez (2010:105), genocidal participation

“Is contingent upon many different elements that interact, influence, and guide our behaviours in many multifaceted ways. These include a person’s history and life experiences, temperament and character, belief system, career and job, friends, neighbours, family members, and community. All of which interact in conscious and unconscious ways to help produce behaviour. The dynamic is even more complicated when it involves stressful and conflict situations. Danger, fear, and stress affect people in many different ways and two individuals faced with the same circumstances may well react and act in completely different ways”

The aim is as previously stated not to compare the different theories, but it might however be valuable to note that despite some fundamental differences in the explanations, the scholars nevertheless identify many of the same factors that might influence individual behaviour. Furthermore, many scholars such as social psychologists frequently refer to the perpetrator group as one in-group. As previously suggested however, that might be in some instances misleading, since the in-group in genocide and politicide might consist of many different agencies with separate hierarchies, values, incentives and backgrounds. For instance, it might be particularly relevant to research on genocides and politicides, since these crimes frequently include a variety of independent but interlinked agencies, whether there are any differences in the group mechanisms when refereeing to the immediate group, namely the militia group or the police force, or the entire in-group that consist of all the active and passive participants. Similarly it might be important to note that the different scholars often refer to specific groups of people, for instance Grossman (1996) refers mainly to military soldiers whereas Browning’s (1992) analysis revolves around mainly middle aged men drafted into the Order Police during the Holocaust. Furthermore, Waller (2007) often uses experiments conducted
on military soldiers or adults to emphasise the main arguments on how “ordinary” people become perpetrators of genocide, but in many of the genocide and politicide were paramilitary groups are common child soldiers are an important part of the killing force, and are the psychological mechanisms the same for child soldiers and the older perpetrators? (Hiebert, 2008). But first, to make a brief recap, what are some of the situational conditions frequently present prior to or during a genocidal crime and what are common individual responses to these situations?

The situational components that are common in genocide and politicide are various political upheavals. Various studies appear to suggest that civil war is the most common preconditions followed by other conflicts and state changes such as international wars, revolutions and decolonization (Harff, 2003). Additionally, genocidal countries often experience economic hardship and societal divisions. Furthermore are the possible effects of the political upheaval such as increased hunger, poverty, insecurity and so forth. Various researchers then argue that these situational components would affect the individual and the social dynamics in society (Alvarez, 2010; Staub, 2003; Waller, 2007). For instance, from a criminological perspective Alvarez (2010) and Savelsberg (2010) reference Agnew’s (1992:74) strain theory, which proposes that strain may be caused by three different components that would increase the likelihood of a criminal response that is “(1) the actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively valued goals, (2) the actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli, and (3) the actual or anticipated presentation of negative stimuli”. To cite Alvarez (2010:38) “The strain from any and/or all of these sources can result in feelings of frustration, anger, and a desire to lash out violently at perceived sources of this strain”. Emotional responses to difficult situations are similarly emphasized by a variety of scholars, although frequently highlighting different responses such as fear, humiliation, pride, need of control, flight or fight mechanisms and so forth (Zimbardo, 2007; Dutton, 2007; Alvarez, 2010; Chirot and McCauley, 2006).

Additionally, human beings are group animals and when people experience a difficult situation they tend to turn to their in-group (Waller, 2007; Dutton, 2007; Staub, 2003). As previously discussed in chapter 3.2, this turn towards the in-group occurs for several reasons such as for security, support and information, but how does the in-group influence the individual?
The group might influence an individual in a number of ways, such as people’s perceptions, values and behaviour. Beliefs and ultimately behaviour can be altered through normal group mechanisms such as peer pressure, obedience to authority and mere group identification. For instance, people’s tendency to conform to their group (Asch, 1956) and to authority (Milgram, 2005) has been demonstrated in several experiments that is argued to reveal that people can defy their own sense of right and prior beliefs in favour of the groups.

As discussed in chapter 3.1, many of the societies involved in genocide and politicide appear to have a strong respect for authority (Waller, 2003; Staub, 2003). To show respect for authority is not in general a problem, but according to Staub (2003) a strong respect for authority might make people more likely to obey orders and less likely to oppose immoral orders. Similarly, in many of the organizations that often participate in genocide and politicide such as the military and police force, respect for authority is an important part of how the agencies operates. According to Grossman (1996:144) who refers to a military context, obedience to authority appears to be influenced by several factors such as the legitimacy of the leader, prior respect for the authority and intensity of the authority figure’s demands and the leader’s proximity. It is however unclear whether variations in the factors, such as respect for authority, produces mere reluctance to for instance killing or affects the actual performance. Additionally, in genocides and politicides the authority often verbally or silently threatens with sanction if people don’t comply with orders. Individuals are often too afraid to be disobedient since to challenge the authority is often considered of too great of a risk. There are stories of people that oppose the authority alone and endure great loss either by sanctions or death (Zimbardo, 2007). For instance, after the Rwandan genocide there have been many reports of Hutus that saved the life of many Tutsis, but “paid for their kindness with their lives” (African Rights, 1995:1024). Interestingly,

“Among a wide range of Tutsis, there was a consensus that uneducated farmers were far more helpful and courageous than, in the words of one women, those “who sat in offices and understood the politics at hand”. Some administrators and educated people, did of course, protect Tutsis where they could, and on account of their very prominence, many of these were among the first victims of the killers” (African Rights, 1995:1024)
Relatedly, the bystander effect frequently refers to a passive onlooker’s often inability to intervene, while it might further encourage negative beliefs or behaviour a bystander could also have a positive impact on a situation if the spectator do interfere, such as by publicly opposing the authority (Cohen, 2001: Staub, 2003). However, to oppose as a passive or active perpetrator to one’s own in-group is very difficult, particularly if the person do not receive any support from the other members (Zimbardo, 2007).

According to Waller (2007), mere attachment to a group might even influence behaviour. “Group identification- an emotional attachment to a group- is a potent influence on an individual’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviours” (Waller 2007:243). Furthermore, “at the extreme, group identification may be mobilized into collective violence or a genocidal imperative as it is used to forge in-group solidarity and undermine the normal inhibitions against killing out-group strangers” (Waller 2007:243). These mechanisms appear to be facilitated by the authority and applied in the normal training of for instance military and paramilitary soldiers to enhance group bonds. Recruited soldiers and other trained perpetrators are often subject to extensive training and rituals designed to strengthen group connections. This appears to be important for several reasons, for instance Grossman’s (1996) analysis, that is mainly based on interviews with veteran soldiers that have served in a variety of conflicts such as in the Vietnam War, appears to suggest that soldiers fight for their fellow comrades rather than for the main goal of the conflict or other incentives.

“Among men who are bonded together so intensely, there is a powerful process of peer pressure in which the individual cares so deeply about his comrades and what they think about him that he would rather die than let them down” (Grossman, 1996:150).

Furthermore, according to Grossman (1996) there are soldiers that appear unable to kill in combat, but the likelihood of failure to kill will decrease if a soldier has developed bonds to his group and fight with that particular group. “In general, the more members in the group, the more psychologically bonded the group, and the more the group is in close proximity, the more powerful the enabling can be”, that of killing another human being (Grossman, 1996:153).

The perception of reality might similarly be influenced by the group. Initially, many individuals appear to possess similar opinions, values and morals to the rest of the group. These similarities could occur through direct and indirect influences by other members and
through exposure to shared social and environmental conditions. Interestingly, individual beliefs often become more extreme in a group. Groups might exaggerate opinions through situational components that might work as an amplifier such as through isolation (Waller, 2007). In genocide and politicide, the situational conditions are often affected by perceptions of danger and deprivations of basic needs that might produce feelings of fear and insecurity. Through conditions such as group isolation, frequently experienced by various agencies such as paramilitary groups, these perceptions might be exaggerated. In other words, if an individual experience fear in a group and particularly combined with situational conditions that would prevent exposure to other possible responses, the feeling of fear might be amplified and subsequently experienced much stronger than if the person was alone. Furthermore, people’s perception of reality might also change in favour of the group (Zimbardo, 2007). People frequently come to believe what the majority believes to be true. Keep in mind that people also search for their in-group to gain information.

Waller (2007) suggests that as a result of group forces, people are easily influenced and seem to lose their sense of self in groups. Interestingly, a person can have certain beliefs and morals in a group and different alone. Furthermore in some cases the person might remain independent in their minds, but not in their actions (Waller, 2007). According to Zimbardo (2007), people possess a self-bias mechanism that makes people believe they are independent despite behaving very similar to their group. “Most of us construct self-enhancing, self-serving, egocentric biases that make us feel special- never ordinary, and certainly “above average” (Zimbardo, 2007: 261). These self-biases protect us from unwanted critiques, they protect us from failure, make us blame others rather than taking responsibility for our own mistakes and make us take accountability for our own success.

“Yet these biases can be maladaptive as well by blinding us to our similarity to others and distancing us from the reality that people just like us behave badly in certain toxic situations. Such biases also mean that we don’t take basic precautions to avoid the undesired consequences of our behaviour, assuming it won’t happen to us. So we take sexual risks, driving risks, gambling risks, health risks, and more. In the extreme version of these biases, most people believe that they are less vulnerable to these self-serving biases than other people, even after being taught about them” (Zimbardo, 2007:261)
Similarly, the informal investigation conducted by Milgram (2005) before his famous experiment on obedience to authority, indicated that no one believed that they would have gone up to the highest level of voltage. We do not believe we would make the same decisions as those people that clearly made the wrong decision before us. Regardless, both history and clinical experiments suggest that we will make the same mistakes over again. Zimbardo (2007:262) proposes “that only by acknowledging our own vulnerability” can we resist social forces that we believe we are immune to. Group influences are less easy to detect and as a result might be more difficult to disobey than direct orders from the authority (Zimbardo, 2007).

Then, through peer pressure and respect to authority we often conform to the behaviour of the group. The group can affect how people perceive reality and often amplify the opinions held by the individual. Furthermore, the individual can behave similarly to their group whilst they perceive themselves as independent. Conformity is nevertheless essential to our instinct as group animals and is re-enforced by our social structures. It might be imperative however to recognize that whilst group members are affected by peer pressure, people similarly aspire for social approval (Zimbardo, 2007). People’s desire to belong to a group also creates a fear of being left outside and fears of rejection that might make people want to conform to the needs and behaviour of the group, which again make room for peer pressure. There is no peer pressure unless the individual wants the group to want the individual, that is to site Zimbardo (2007:259) “there is no peer-pressure power without that push from self-pressure for Them to want You”. This parallel effect might aid our understanding of the complex bonds that are often experienced by members of paramilitary groups. When a youth or child has been isolated from the rest of society, the militia becomes the in-group. The member will be exposed to ordinary group forces that might change a person’s beliefs and behaviour and might trigger mechanisms such as our human desire to belong.

Individual perceptions are then influenced by normal group mechanisms that in pre-genocidal societies are frequently fuelled by state propaganda, but what kind of perceptions of the target group would increase the likelihood of genocidal and politicidal behaviour?

3.4.4 Behaviour and the perception of the target group: distance and dehumanization

The perception of the target group appears to be an important attribute in the process of altering individual views and eventually behaviour against the out-group. As previously
discussed in chapter 3.2, when people experience strain, they often begin to search for someone who can be blamed for the difficult situations, namely a scapegoat. This social process of scapegoating often occurs because of a reaction to a threat, the collective appears to pose blame on a group to retrieve a sense of control and strengthens social bonds within the in-group (Staub, 2003; Waller, 2007). In most genocide and politicides, it appears that the elites either perceive the group already made into outcasts by the society as the threat, or makes the group posing a threat to the power into a scapegoat so that the society will hold the same enemy as the elites (Staub, 2003). Since the out-group is perceived as a threat it could be viewed as a reasonable solution to eliminate the target group to protect the society. The incentive for societal participation is then often perceived to be self-defence to a threat rather than as an attack (Staub, 2003), but as previously discussed there are many reasons for participating in genocides and politicides (Rummel, 2005).

It appears however to be important to create a distance between the in-group and the target group. Distance is however an ambiguous term (Vetlesen, 2005), and the focus on distance can refer to the physical distance to the victim but “distance is not simply a physical construct; it is a moral and psychological construct as well” (Waller, 2007:197). According to Grossman (1996:97) there “is a direct relationship between empathic and physical proximity of the victim, and the resultant difficulty and trauma of the kill”. The physical distance appears to be an important factor and is increasingly relevant in relation to the development of new technology, that allows soldiers to physically be in another country whilst killing the target on the battleground with bombs and other military equipment. Grossman (1996:107) boldly states that he has not heard of any soldier in combat that has refused to kill at a maximum distance “a range at which the killer is unable to perceive his individual victims without using some of the mechanical assistance” or any reports of soldier trauma (Grossman 1996:107). The effect of distance is scaled in various levels, but it seems that when it is difficult to establish the exact killer of the victim the soldier is more likely to kill, “there were so many other guys firing, you can never be sure it was you. You shoot, you see a guy fall, and anyone could have been the one that hit him” (Grossman, 1996:110). Seeing the victim is often associated with emotional responses of regret and pain that frequently cause soldier trauma. Interestingly, the distance also seems to have an impact in face-to-face killings related to for instance the choice of weaponry such as a sword or a bayonet, which might be more preferred than a small knife. Relatedly, killing a person front to front appears to be more difficult than killing a person from the back. This is argued to be because the psychical and
emotional responses from the victim are hidden from the perpetrator (Grossman, 1996). It is however important to note that Grossman (1996) is referring to soldiers in combat, that is trained soldiers mainly killing other soldiers. It might be a relevant distinction because soldiers that program the drop of a bomb at a physical distance from the target, might experience and acknowledge that some of the casualties also include some civilians. But the primary aim is not to kill innocent women and children, the question however remains would these same soldiers kill with indifference or show no reluctance to execute orders if they were told to bomb a school full of children?

Interestingly, already in the early 1950’s criminologist Christie (1952) conducted an analysis on the relationship between the prison guards and the prisoners in a German concentration camp in the north of Norway between 1942 and 1943. The results suggested an effect of the prison guard’s emotional proximity to the prisoners. The prisoners appear to be mainly hostages and political prisoners transferred from Yugoslavia by the Germans. The prison guards were mainly Norwegians, that were similarly the focus of the analysis, but also consisted of German officers and soldiers. The conditions in the concentration camp were perceived to be particularly hard with reports of hunger, torture and killings with an estimate of as high as 69% death rate of the original prison population. The results suggest that the prison guards that perceived the prisoners as substantially different to themselves and described them negatively or with indifference appear to be those that frequently perpetrated torture or killings whereas the guards who would relate to the prisoners situation were rarely found to engage in torture or demeaning behaviour.

Bauman (1989) similarly argues for the important effect of distance to the victim for both the executioners and the civilians who participated in the Holocaust, and suggests that the distance is enabled through the modern bureaucracy. The bureaucracy creates a distance in the sense that most people only do a small part in the killing process such as filing papers or organizing the transport, which makes it difficult to perceive the entire genocidal picture. The bureaucracy becomes a means to hide the killings that many people in society are a part of, “violence has been taken out of sight, rather than forced out of existence” (Bauman, 1989:97). Additionally, it is frequently argued that one of the main reasons bar efficiency for why Nazi Germany came to use gas chambers rather than face-to-face killings, was to create a further distance from the perpetrators to the victims. According to Bauman (1989:98) the “use of violence is most efficient and cost-effective when the means are subjected to solely instrumental-rational criteria, and thus dissociated from moral evaluation of the ends”, but can
a theoretical model primarily based on the presence of a bureaucracy be generalized to other societies than Nazi Germany? Can the social structures prior to and during the Rwanda genocide and the Cambodia politicide be described as bureaucratic societies? (Vetlesen, 2005; Brandal et al., 2008). Furthermore, theories that rely on modern technology as the primary means to kill, might have difficulties with generalizing their arguments to conflicts that rely on simpler weaponry such as machetes that were the primary choice of weapon in Rwanda or attempt to explain the face to face killings in the Holocaust.

There appears to be however important differences in the focus of the distance theme, for instance Grossman (1996) refers to soldiers in combat situations and how soldiers that are ordered to kill frequently show reluctance to killing other soldiers when the opponent is at close range. Whereas Bauman (1989) focuses primarily on civilians not trained to kill, that as part of a genocide machinery that kill innocent victims. Christie (1952) on the other hand, refers to prison guards not in combat, where the emotional proximity to the victim appears to prevent unnecessary abuse. An in depth discussion of these differences would be very interesting, but it is unfortunately not possible due to time limitation.

A factor that is frequently considered as an important influence in the transformation process is dehumanization (Alvarez, 2010; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989; Zimbardo, 2007; Waller, 2007). “Dehumanization refers to a process of identifying others as being not only different, but also less than human” (Alvarez, 2010:66). This process is often emphasised by propaganda that further alienates the target group by using stigmatizing language such as animalistic descriptions to refer to the target group. For instance the Tutsis were often referred to as ‘cockroaches’ in the Rwandan genocide and ‘lice’ was often applied to the Jews in the Holocaust.

Kelman and Hamilton (1989) suggest that dehumanization is a twofold process where both the individual’s identity and their societal ties are removed. Subsequently the target group is excluded from society’s moral universe, “in so far as they are dehumanized, the usual principles of morality no longer apply to them” (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:19). Accordingly, “face to face killing is enabled when the victims have been through a lethal rite of passage in which they have already died a social death in the eyes of the perpetrators” (Waller, 2007:197).

According to Hagen and Rymond-Richmond (2008) dehumanization played a central role in the Darfur conflict. Hagan and Richmond’s (2008:876) analysis is based on a large quantity of documents that include
“Historical material to establish the ideological link in Darfur between the Sudanese state and the targeting of three black African groups: the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit. We then analyse the historically unprecedented U.S. State Department’s Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) data on racial dehumanization and violence collected during the Darfur genocide. We use these data to document the combined role of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces in the incitement of racial epithets to collectively dehumanize and victimize black African groups. Finally, we use narrative from the ADS interviews to document the organized leadership and integration of Janjaweed with Sudanese forces in perpetrating genocide”

The main hypothesis was that “racial targeting was the socially constructed and critically contingent mechanisms that mediated the influence of population” in the Darfur region (Hagan and Richmond, 2008:879). The result suggests that dehumanizing racial language was more common in areas associated with increased victimization.

“We found compelling evidence that collective processes of racial motivation and intent influenced the severity of victimization across settlements, above and beyond this influence at the individual level, and that this collective frame mediated the concentration of attacks on densely settled areas and particular African groups” (Hagan and Richmond, 2008:895).

Dehumanization is similarly perceived to be important in Nazi Germany. The dehumanization process of the Jews is often argued to have begun centuries before the Holocaust, to cite Waller (2007:207)

“The historical stigmatization and exclusion of the Jews meant that the traditions, habits, images, and vocabularies for extreme dehumanization were already well established. The century-old image of the vile and diabolical Jew was woven into the fabric of German, and European, culture. The deluge of racist and anti-Semitic propaganda ribboning throughout German society during the rise of Nazism was thus profoundly effective in placing, and keeping, the Jews entirely outside the realm of moral obligation for perpetrators”.

Many scholars appear to share this perception of the dehumanization process in Germany (Alvarez, 2010), but how do arguments of a fundamental dehumanization process correlate
with the explanations that many Jews where an integrated part of the German society before the Holocaust? Even Waller (2007:44) states in a couple of chapters prior to the section on dehumanization that “for a very long time, Germany was thought to be a peculiarly hospitable and secure place for Jews”, emphasising their high positions in society and their legal rights that were not changed until the Nazi party came to power and removed them.

There appears to be other inconstancies, or what might possibly be mere simplified explanations of the dehumanization process. For instance Grossman (1996) suggests that there are various other forms of distance than physical distance such as moral, social and cultural distances that all aid in the process of denying the humanity of the victim, but he further explains how many soldiers are reluctant to kill up close

“As men draw this near it becomes extremely difficult to deny their humanity. Looking in a man’s face, seeing his eyes and his fear, eliminate denial. At this range the interpersonal nature of the killing has shifted. Instead of shooting at a uniform and killing a generalized enemy, now the killer must shoot at a person and kill a specific individual. Most simply cannot or will not do it” (Grossman, 1996:119)

Then is dehumanization only effective at a distance? If it is, then how are the face-to-face killings explained?

Furthermore, some scholars such as Alvarez (2007) and Waller (2007) seem to emphasise the significance of, and the relationship between propaganda, dehumanization and killing whilst similarly focusing on soldiers that are reluctant or refuse to kill. However, dehumanization is rarely discussed in relation to perpetrators that refuse to kill. Dehumanization is frequently presented as a necessary part of how perpetrators are able to kill their victims, but if propaganda and dehumanization are essential components, why is not every person in a genocidal society all murderers? Who is this propaganda actually working on? Is the difference between those perpetrators who refuse to kill their inability to dehumanize their victim?

Waller (2007) refers, as a final comment on dehumanization, to Milgram’s (2005) study where the participants administered electric shock to what most of the participants described as a likable person, thereby not perceiving the victim as an enemy or not human, but Waller (2007) argues that if the participants would have dehumanized the victim, the procedure of shocking the victim would have been done with more ease. This however does not change the fact that as many as 65 % electrocuted a person they liked. Waller (2007) argues that
dehumanization is not a necessary component to demonstrate obedience to authority, but then what evidence is there that dehumanization is a necessary component in killing?

Empirical evidence is a challenge in genocide and politicide for a variety of reasons. For instance, in many of the cases it is only classified as genocide after the event and to recreate a situation similar to genocide and politicide in a clinical study poses many challenges, but mainly it would be highly unethical. Subsequently, the majority of the empirical research appears to rely on official documents, interviews with survivors and perpetrators after the event and studies on various effects that could be associated and assumed to be relevant in genocide and politicide, such as studies on other types of collective violence.

Some theorists, who argue for a dehumanization process, reference interviews with perpetrators who often report a disbelief in their own behaviour, frequently stating that they perceived the target as nothing more than animals. Self-reports are however often very unreliable since human beings have several defence mechanisms that allow us to repress and isolate uncomfortable events in our life. This is particularly important after traumatic events, but it could also be used to repress negative actions that subsequently would affect a person’s memory of a specific situation and that might produce an altered or even false account of an event (Waller, 2007). Furthermore, there are many psychological experiments that suggest human memory can be substantially altered through different unconscious mechanism that can make people even falsely accuse people without realizing it (Waller, 2007).

Relatedly, if the soldiers dehumanize the victims, specifically did not see them as humans, how are the sadistic crimes committed in mass killings understood? For instance can the numerous accounts of perpetrator brutality in genocides and politicides, such as soldiers that force sons to rape their mothers in front of their fathers be explained by dehumanization? Dutton (2007:124) argues that perpetrators’ account of self-behaviour is very unreliable and that perpetrators frequently report perceiving the target as an animal “may be the perpetrators’ way of trying to make sense of their own brutality”, but it does not explain their behaviour. According to Dutton (2007), for the perpetrators to understand that actions such as rape and sexual dismemberment are humiliating they must have a “theory of mind”, i.e. understand that the victims feel humiliation.

“The raping of family members in front of their family suggests that a knowledge of a human social taboo against family sex is part of the consciousness of the military rapist. Its function is sadistic- to generate a human emotion of humiliation in the victim and her family” (Dutton, 2007:129)
If the perpetrators can understand that what they are doing is seen as degrading, they cannot perceive the victims as animals or in any other way not human. Interestingly, whilst Dutton (2007) argues against dehumanization in brutal face-to-face killings, he suggests that dehumanization does occur in more efficient killings, the reason for this difference appears however to be somewhat unclear.

The status of the target group is through propaganda reduced to less worthy than the in-group. They are made into people that are not even worth being a part of the society, but is it a process of dehumanization that occurs? Is it not enough to reduce a status of a person below the rest of the group, rather than that people actually have to believe they are animals?

In many cases there is also an inclination to blame the victim. This occurs both in the sense that there is a perception that the target group must have done something to deserve being victimized, but there is also an attribution of responsibility, namely that it is their own fault to be in this situation. This effect appears to also be common in everyday life were for instance some people blame the poor for being poor (Waller, 2007).

“Social psychology has a rich history in studying our ways of finding explanation. This history shows that, in general, we tend to grant ourselves the benefit of the doubt in explaining our own behaviour but are much harsher in explaining other people’s behaviour’s” (Waller, 2007:212)

According to Waller (2007:213), people show a strong “cognitive tendency to search for ways to blame individuals for their own victimization”. This might be correlated with our beliefs in a just world. Research on people’s perceptions on whether the world is just, supports this notion that the victims are responsible for their own misfortunes because the world is perceived as a just place, “we know that bad things do happen to good people. To a large degree, it is not a just world. But we cherish our illusion of a world that is fair and just” (Waller, 2007:213). Furthermore Staub (2003:326) suggests that in stressed situations this effect might be elevated, “under difficult life conditions, concern about the self also diminishes concern about others’ suffering”.

Then, through state directed propaganda, normal in-group mechanisms and negative perceptions of the out-group, the individual can alter their beliefs against a target group in favour of the collective, but what are some of the mechanisms that make people physically capable of killing?
3.4.5 Genocidal behaviour and mass killings

Pre-genocidal and politicidal societies are subjected to normal group forces that can alter a person’s beliefs and behaviour. The collective appears to adopt a belief or an ideology presented by the state that through various mechanisms can alienate the target group and alter the perception of reality. The out-group might be perceived as threatening and seen as an element standing in the way of a better life than the insecurity and poverty that the society might experience. As a result, many people in the society might recognize that the only viable solution is to remove the group from the society. These perceptions might not be held by everyone, considering the variety of the agents and agencies involved in these crimes, but the majority of society would nevertheless experience the strain that the collective would have been exposed to. As illustrated in chapter 3.1, many societies prior to and during a genocide and politicide would experience violence that might originate from another conflict such as from a civil war. Staub (2003) and Waller (2007) argue that through exposure to violence, many of the pre-genocidal societies have experienced, violent behaviour might become normalized and an integrated part in everyday life. The perception of violent behaviour is altered into acceptable conduct. Various scholars appear to support the argument that violence becomes normalized and norms change because of exposure to violence (Savelsberg, 2010; Waller, 2007; Staub, 2003). However, regardless of whether it is a process of normalization to violence that occurs, it might be useful to keep in mind that violence is common in many pre-genocidal societies, and exposure to violence appears to increase the likelihood of people reacting with violence (Staub, 2003). Then, what are some of the mechanisms that occur in the individual process of enabiling to kill a target? And are there any individual differences?

Gradual exposure to violence is frequently argued to influence the process of killing (Waller, 2007). Small steps that might begin with passive participation and become intensified with more active behaviour, such as physical reprimands that further escalate into murder. The argument appears to be that because of minor incremental steps, the individual has smaller hurdles to overcome and since each step might appear insignificant, it prevents people from seeing the progression in behaviour that they might have refused to do if asked directly and thereby the likelihood of participating in violent behaviour increases. There appears to be evidence to support this claim from various cases such as torture and other physical reprimand studies, but there are also evidence of people who engage in brutal mass killings from the beginning, that could suggest that other effects are equally influential in the killing process.
Perpetrators seem to have an initial reluctance to kill, but when the killing spree begins it quickly escalate and frequently become extreme (Zimbardo, 2007). The physical instigation of a killing episode seems to begin with the firing of one soldier, that is quickly followed by the rest of the group. For instance in Rwanda it was reported that a soldier initiated a killing spree by killing a child and then it rapidly escalated into a massacre (Dutton, 2007).

Mechanisms such as routinization and desensitization towards violence are frequently argued as influential factors in the transformation process. For instance, research on torture appears to suggest that an action becomes a routine and after a while, people seem to stop asking questions regarding their behaviour, if they ever did ask them (Dutton, 2007).

“The deed has been done a few times, it becomes easier to do it again, as the killers become desensitized. Once the first hurdle has been passed, and men have killed a few helpless victims, it is not so difficult to turn them into mass butchers” (Chirot and McCauley, 2006:53).

Furthermore, as Kelman and Hamilton (1989:17) emphasise “once they have taken the initial step, they are in a new psychological and social situation in which the pressure to continue is powerful”. Routinization fulfils two main roles, namely that when an action is repeated “it reduces the necessity to make decisions, thus minimizing the occasions in which moral questions may arise” further “it makes it easier to avoid the implications of the action, since the actor focus on the details of the job rather than on its meaning” (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:18). Kelman and Hamilton (1989) argue that the last effect is more relevant to those perpetrators not directly involved in the combat situation, thus appear to support Bauman’s (1989) emphasis on the importance of the organization.

Accordingly, desensitization effects the perpetrators perceptions of the action itself and the effect on the target. To cite Waller (2007:45); “most problematic is the fact that desensitization to violence gradually extinguishes inhibitions among many perpetrators, blunting their sensitivity to the suffering of their victims.”

Dutton (2007:104) argues that the form of killing in many totalitarian regimes can be perceived as efficient and unemotional, this is often reflected in the language describing the act of killing such as the Khmer Rouge used “sweep out” and “discard”.
“The genocide in these states is ‘dispassionate,’ systematic, efficient, and controlled. It is directed toward target groups who were clearly politically selected. The Nazi genocide of the Jews represents an example; although it began with mass shootings, it progressed to the Final Solution using technology: trains and gas chambers, crematoria, and hugely repressive control. In Rwanda, extremist militias (called Interahamwe) initiated the killing spree. Later on, when the genocide reached an apex, other Hutus became killers as well. Surreptitiously taken films of the Rwanda killing show an apparently dispassionate slashing of people, much in the manner one would cut corn or long grass (and just as the killers described it- the cutting)” (Dutton, 2007:104).

It appears somewhat difficult to understand the argument for purely effective and dispassionate killings with so many graphic descriptions of the brutality of mutilations and sexual violence in genocides such as in Rwanda, but he further poses an interesting question: Why kill with such a brutality?

Sexual violence and rape in genocide and politicide appears to occur both as independent crimes and as part of a military strategy. But when these crimes do not occur as part of a military strategy, why do they happen when the genocidal aim is extermination of the target group?

According to Grossman (1996:137), there appears to be a link between killing and sex in combat situations

“The concept of sex as a process of domination and defeat is closely related to the lust for rape and the trauma associated with the rape victim. Thrusting the sexual appendage (the penis) deep into the body of the victim can be perversely linked to thrusting the killing appendage (a bayonet or knife) deep into the body of the victim”

“Rape in military situations seems to fulfill an ultimate expression of sexualized power and its presumed pathological extension-sadism”, sexual opportunity and wish to humiliate (Dutton 2007:129). The inconsistency is however, that in many of these conflicts the perpetrators behave normally before and after the event so a mere pathological explanation might not be sufficient to explain the brutality that frequently occur in genocide and politicide (Dutton, 2007).
Other violent acts such as mutilations, cannibalism and the taking of trophies have been reported in a variety of cases. For instance in Sierra Leone “the RUF became infamous for maiming and killing by chopping off the arms, breasts, hands, legs, tongues, and heads of their victims” (Rosen, 2005:60), this type of dismemberment have been observed in many genocide and politicides, such as in Rwanda. Hatzfeld (2006) has conducted interviews with Tutsi survivors that describe the occurrence of brutal violence and dismemberment in Rwanda for instance, a 17 year-old girl who survived the genocide watched her own mother’s mutilation and subsequent killing.

“One day the interahamwe unearthed Mama beneath the papyrus. She stood up; she offered them money to kill her with a single machete blow. They stripped her to take the money knotted up in her pagne. They chopped both her arms off first, then her legs. Mama was murmuring, “Saint Cécile, Saint Cécile,” but she didn’t beg for mercy” (Hatzfeld, 2006:23).

Her mother died three days after the attack.

Cannibalism and the taking of trophies such as trophy necklaces made out of fingers from the victims are according to Dutton (2007) often rooted in myths and supernatural beliefs that are assumed to give extra strength in combat. For instance in Cambodia “cannibalism had become a common practice during the civil war, as the Cambodians believed (as do some African tribes in The Congo and Burundi and the Japanese Army) that eating an enemy’s liver gave them more physical strength” (Dutton, 2007:32). A further discussion of the psychological mechanisms that might help our understanding of why such brutal behaviour occurs, is regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis. But, how do people cope with killing and their often brutal behaviour?

Alvarez (2010) argues for the relevance of Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization theory as one method of preparing a perpetrator to engage in genocidal behaviour, that it is through a continuing process of neutralization that occur prior to and during rather than after the event. Sykes and Matza’s (1957) theory is primarily directed at delinquents, but increasingly applied to a variety of criminal behaviour. There are five different forms of neutralizations techniques that aim to deny or deflect responsibility from the perpetrator namely the 1) denial of responsibility, 2) denial of injury 3) denial of the victim 4) condemnation of the condemners and 5) appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Cohen (2001:77) proposes two additional accounts to the five neutralization techniques namely “denial of knowledge-
Perpetrators profess not to know what they or others around them did-and at the end, moral indifference: the absence of even token appeals to conventional morality-no neutralization because there is nothing to neutralize”. Cohen (2001) poses an interesting question, is it possible that individuals that are at a physical distance from the killings, such as described in Bauman’s (1989) bureaucratic model, not to know anything of what is going on? The answer according to Cohen (2001) lies in the conscious and unconscious denial, activated by a variety of cognitive mechanisms. Denial is however perceived to be only partial there is some information that always gets through.

Perpetrators’ perception of self-responsibility is frequently argued to be subjected to a sense of diffusion. Different factors are assumed to create a diffusion of responsibility that is instigated by different conditions, such as merely being part of a group i.e. a notion of “everyone is doing it” and a segmentation of tasks that is, a perception of only playing a small part, but not actually committing a crime. Interestingly, in military type of organizations it appears to be a general perception that the group is the killer rather than the individual (Grossman, 1996). Furthermore

“When people act alone, it is obvious who made the decisions and who is to blame. In large and complex groups, however, responsibility can sometimes be divided up into such small parts and pieces that no one seems to be to blame” (Waller, 2007:247).

The effect of the organization in the diffusion of responsibility appears to be recognized by a variety of scholars, to cite Waller (2007:248)

“In an organization committed to the sanctioning of inhumanity, no one person feels the pressure to say that such actions are wrong. There is a routinization of bureaucratic subroutines in which responsibility for evil is divided among members of the group. This makes it possible for many perpetrators to claim a specious personal exception- ‘I, personally, did not kill anybody’- for their involvement in genocide and mass killing”

Furthermore, when the killing task is segmented and divided between various perpetrators it “in addition to making the killing process more efficient and effective, allows perpetrators to reduce their identification with the consequences of their actions” (Waller, 2007:248). A similar argument is made by Bauman (1989), where the bureaucratic structure allows each individual to focus solely on their own task, and since many perpetrators not directly execute
orders to kill, there is a diffusion of who is actually responsible for the killings. As previously discussed however, there are cases where the killings can hardly be identified by routinization or segmentation of the killing tasks such as in the genocides in Rwanda and in Bosnia (Waller, 2007). The differences in the preparations to mass killings might similarly support the assumption that there are different mechanisms that influence the transformation process.

Other scholars refer to a rationalization process (Dutton, 2007). Many perpetrators seem to rationalize their behaviour during and/or post event. Rationalization seems to occur in a variety of ways, for instance, a policeman in the Reserve Battalion 101 in Poland rationalized the killing of a child by focusing on the death of the mother, “I reasoned with myself that after all without its mother the child could not live any longer” (Browning 1992:73). Other seems to rationalize genocidal behaviour through a reasoning that if they did not kill, someone else would (Dutton, 2007). The research on rationalization processes appears to derive mainly from perpetrator self-reports, but also from studies on people who execute the death penalty in USA (Dutton, 2007).

Other common coping mechanisms are for instance substance abuse. In many genocide and politicide from the Holocaust to Rwanda, various substances such as drugs and alcohol have been widely consumed during and after killings. The previous arguments seem to apply various mechanisms to make an individual kill in genocide and politicides, but are there no individual differences? Does no one refuse to kill?

Alvarez (2010) argues that the human species because of evolution and adaptations is innately violent and that every human being holds the potential to engage in violent behaviour. However, since social structure is dependent on cooperation and solidarity, many people are taught to oppose violence. Whether violence is innate or learnt are an on-going debate and not the aim of this discussion, but as previously illustrated many perpetrators show an initial opposition to killing that can be overcome, but there are some evidence that suggest some individuals continue to refuse to kill.

Interestingly, Browning (1992:1) conducted an analysis of testimonies and interrogations of the Police Battalion 101 stationed in Poland during the Holocaust. The analysis revealed a remarkable offer made by a commander before a massacre and an interesting response from the soldiers. Battalion 101 consisted of “middle-aged family men of working- and lower-middle-class background” (Browning, 1992:1). Major Wilhelm Trapp was the commander of the battalion in a state ordered massacre in Józefów. The order was to kill 1800 Jews in Józefów where most of the victims were women, children, and elderly. Trapp addressed his
battalion and “after explaining the battalion’s murderous assignment, he made his extraordinary offer: any of the older men who did not feel up to the task that lay before them could step out” (Browning, 1992:57). Interestingly, only 10-12 men out of approximately 500 decided to take the offer to hand in their weapons. The assignments were brutal, and consisted of face to face killings, killing infants and children, and hunting down and killing Jews in the nearby woods. Major Trapp, reportedly made several complaints about the task, and some of the soldiers asked to be excused from duty after the killing had commenced. The requests were met, and the soldiers were relocated to other tasks. Browning (1992:57) argues that the low number that accepted the initial offer to not partake in the killings was due to the suddenness of the offer and that many did not fully comprehend the task at hand. However, estimate of only 10-20 % of the men chose not to participate in the killings and the most common response was to not openly resist, but to just not fire. However, these numbers are based on the memories and perceptions of the perpetrators that might influence the reliability of the results.

Relatedly, Grossman (1996:33) poses two very interesting questions related to soldier refusal to kill in combat

“If a soldier would not kill in combat, when it was his duty and responsibility to do so, would he let that be common knowledge? And if the majority of soldiers two hundred years ago did not fulfil their duties on the battlefield, would we have known?”

Grossman (1996) argues that there are myths and glorifications often associated with war and killing that appears to be continuously reinforced by for instance the media and films. However, interviews with veterans suggest that soldiers frequently are unable to kill in combat, but feel reluctant to admit their inability to kill. Additionally, revelations of soldier’s unwillingness to kill in combat might be difficult to accept particularly for the military but “there can be no doubt that this resistance to killing one’s fellow man is there and that it exists as a result of a powerful combination of instinctive, rational, environmental, hereditary, cultural, and social factors” (Grossman, 1996:33).

Consequently, there appears to be different reactions to killing in genocide and politicides. Zimbardo (2007) for instance, has identified three different perpetrator groups from the Stanford prison experiment that can frequently be found in a variety of other conflicts, such as the Nazi SS doctors involved in the death camps at Auschwitz. There are those who kill without complaint and just follow orders, those that overkill and are sadistic, and the soldiers
that refused or show an unwillingness to kill. There are a variety of psychological theories on the differences in behaviour (Dutton, 2007), but regrettably due to limitations a further discussion is not possible.

### 3.4.6 Summary

Different explanatory models of a culture’s transformation process into a genocidal society seem to focus mainly on the factors that influence the individual’s and group’s perceptions and ultimately behaviour. The difficulty is, as similarly found in many of the previous chapters, related to the many variations in the cases and perpetrators, and consequently there are many exceptions to the factors proposed. This variety however, does not necessarily exclude one factor or the other, but might suggest that there are several mechanisms that might influence genocidal participation.

The aim of the first part has been to introduce some of the contexts that different scholars place the different influential factors, for instance Zimbardo (2007) assumes that the structure produce the situations that generate the factors that influence behaviour, where factors such as ideology is part of the structure, whereas Bauman (1989) appears to argue that the bureaucracy structure interact with independent factors such as ideology to create a lethal mix that might result in genocide. Furthermore other scholars, such as Waller (2007) assumes one ultimate and three proximate primary conditions that constitute and structure the various factors that influence individual participation in violent behaviour, but there are also scholars who adopt explanations placing the factors in various interacting stages (Stanton, 1998; Feierstein, 2012). Regardless, although the extent and the position of each factor might vary, many scholars appear to recognize similar influential factors (Zimbardo, 2007; Bauman, 1989; Alvarez, 2010; Waller, 2007).

Various scholars argue that to execute a genocide or politicide the state needs popular support (Alvarez, 2010). This might be achieved through alteration or exaggerations of perceptions that can be accomplished by the collective’s physical and emotional separation from the target group. Through means such as changes to legislation, excessive use of power, and aggressive culture specific communication, that rely on state legitimacy and the validity of the propaganda, the target group become alienated from society and beyond moral universe (Staub, 2003; Zimbardo, 2007).

The difficult situational conditions frequently caused by the effects of political upheaval instigate a human tendency to turn to the in-group. People’s primary group have the ability to
alter people’s beliefs and behaviour through influences such as group conformity (Asch, 1956) and obedience to authority (Milgram, 2005). Group bonds can frequently predict behaviour and can even increase the likelihood of killing in combat (Grossman, 1996). Group dynamics appear to rather easily influence the individual’s perceptions and behaviour, whilst simultaneously people seem to possess self-bias mechanisms that makes them believe they are independent, unique and not allegesable to do the same mistakes as other before them. People often appear to believe they make self-determining decisions and behave independently from their group, although the individual might have altered their beliefs and behaviour in favour of the groups (Zimbardo, 2007).

The perpetrators’ perception of the target group appears to be important in the enabling the process of killing. The perpetrator often needs to create a physical and emotional distance to the victim to be able to kill and prevent post trauma stress symptoms (Grossman, 1996). Other mechanisms to alienate the target group is proposed to be through a dehumanization process that allows the perpetrators to perceive the target as less than human, assumed to make it easier to kill and a sense of blaming the victims for their own victimization (Waller, 2007).

Many perpetrators frequently demonstrate an initial reluctance to kill, but once the first hesitation is overcome, the killing process can quickly escalate. The physical initiation of a killing spree is often triggered by a single soldier that begins to fire, quickly followed by fellow combatants (Dutton, 2007). Different perpetrators appear to be able to kill through a gradual exposure to violence, but there is evidence of perpetrators that quickly adapt to killing. Other mechanisms frequently proposed to influence the ability to kill are routinization and desensitization to the victim and genocidal behaviour. Coping mechanisms might be various neutralization mechanisms, different forms of denial, a diffusion of responsibility, rationalization mechanisms and also consumption of substances such as alcohol and drugs (Cohen, 2001; Alvarez, 2010; Waller, 2007). There appears to be various types of perpetrators, that can according to Zimbardo (2007) be divided into three groups namely the sadistic perpetrator, the follower and those perpetrators that are reluctant or refuse to kill (Zimbardo, 2007). Interestingly, there are some researches who suggest that there might be a larger number of soldiers that refuse to kill in combat than previously believed (Grossman, 1996).
4 Concluding reflections

The main aim in this thesis has been to investigate some common theories on the onset of genocide and politicide. The theoretical and empirical genocide field appear to suggest a complex subject with many similarities across cases, but also many inconsistencies. Before making some concluding reflections, a brief summary of the previous chapters might be pertinent. What does a pre-genocidal society commonly look like?

Pre-genocidal and politicidal societies frequently experience a form of political upheaval (Harff, 2003). The severity of the conflict is often excessive, and civil war is a common component. The risk of genocidal crimes seem to increase when there is a combination of political upheavals such as civil war concurrent with, international war, decolonization or revolutions (Krain, 1997). Pre-genocidal cultures are often described as divided, by for instance ethnicity or political affiliations, and frequently experience low economic development. Furthermore, these societies have often experienced a prior genocide or politicide (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993b). Consequently, the members of a pre-genocidal society are often exposed to, or participate in, the violence prompted by a conflict. The community would similarly experience the consequences of war, and the effect of low economic development such as hunger, poverty, famine and insecurity. These conditions might affect the individual’s primary needs and instigate several defence mechanisms (Staub, 2003). Furthermore, exposure to violent behaviour is frequently associated with violent responses. Subsequently, an increase in the use of violence might influence people’s perception of violent behaviour. An action might for instance be judged differently if it is deemed normal. Frequent exposure to violence might therefore affect, and even alter, the norms previously held by many people in a society (Staub, 2003; Dutton, 2007; Waller, 2007). Other theorists argue for anomie, namely a state of normlessness, where the chaos of a conflict creates a perception that there are no norms to direct individual behaviour, and thereby produce an impression that everything is allowed (Alvarez, 2010; Savelsberg, 2010). Pre-genocidal and politicidal societies nevertheless, seem to experience situational components that are common in other societies. In other words, the situational compositions are often not unique to pre-genocidal societies, other communities experience similar situations and do not engage in genocide.

Whilst the responsibility of genocide is often assigned to the state, the perpetrator group consists of a variety of government and non-state agencies with different affiliations to the state. The exact combination appears however, to be dependent on the atrocity, but the
agencies often involved are, for instance, the military, the police, paramilitary groups and also civilians. Then, what are common factors that might influence the state, society and the individual in the genocidal process?

The primary perpetrator of genocide and politicide is frequently the authority currently in possession of the power at the time of the atrocity, and the government that pose the highest risk of perpetrating genocidal crimes are autocratic regimes (Harff, 2003; Rummel, 1994; Fein, 1993b). Genocide and politicide are, subsequently, planned by the state, often holding many and intertwined motives that might be difficult to separate from each other (Rummel, 2005). The most common incentives appear to be economic, retributive and ideological objectives. Genocide and politicide seem however, to frequently be a response to a perceived threat or an injustice (Harff, 2003; Fein, 1993a). The target group is subsequently the group that is perceived to pose a threat, or stand in the way of economic development or an ideal society. Then, in the shade of a political upheaval, the opportunity to eliminate the targeted group prevails. Genocide and politicide are argued to be either pre-planned or organized during this window of opportunity that the disruption or conflict presents (Chirot and McCauley, 2006). Different political upheavals often cause for the authority to react and protect their inhabitants. As a consequence through a pretence of protection, the state could with more ease re-organize the necessary means, and re-direct military and police forces for genocidal and politicidal aims. Similarly, the state could involve civilians by initiating mass recruitment to state- and non-governmental agencies, such as paramilitary groups (Alvarez, 2010). Then, through means of aggressive propaganda and symbolic actions, such as changes to legislation, arbitrary incarcerations and killings, the state could exhibit the target group and further alienate the group from society.

From a societal perspective, in many pre-genocidal communities, the strain experienced through the various consequences of conflicts and insecurities, would induce people’s tendency to seek their in-group and subsequently the leaders of their group for protection, solidarity and information. To comprehend and obtain control over the situation, the community often appoints an out-group or takes on a scapegoat provided by the state. To retrieve a sense of control in an often erratic environment, the scapegoat has been attributed the responsibility for the situation. Subsequently, the out-group becomes a target within reach to deal with society’s problems. These perceptions are then presumably reinforced by the state, through means such as symbolic acts and culture-specific propaganda. Influential symbolic acts might include recruitments and kidnappings, and the subsequent training of
young men and children, to various agencies such as militia groups. Furthermore, pre-geno-
cidal societies are frequently described as authority oriented cultures, which presumably
affect people’s dependency and obedience to authority (Waller, 2007). This affect seemingly
makes people vulnerable to obeying orders, and less likely to disobey violent orders (Staub,
2003). Albeit from a civilian perspective, obedience to authority might affect passive
participation, and a general support from society. It is assumed that many civilians, such as
the wives and families of the front line killers, often support the genocidal aims and
subsequently obtain the role of passive participants, who aid the genocidal process in alternate
ways. However, it should be noted that there are various degrees of societal participations,
and certain genocides and politicides presumably hold a higher active and passive civilian
participation than others.

The front line killers commonly consist of soldiers, police officers, and civilians. The
combination of the perpetrators is, similar to the agencies, dependent on the specific atrocity.
Genocidal participation appears to be a result of interconnected self-serving incentives, such
as status or economic objectives and fear of retributive measures, and group influences.
Strong in-group forces, such as group conformity and peer pressure, are often assumed to
affect genocidal behaviour. Furthermore, the front line killers would be affected by the
societal pre-conditions, which might produce emotional responses similar to other members
of the community, such as fear and perceived insecurity. The complexity related to explaining
genocidal behaviour is reflected in the diversity of the individual’s dispositional attributes,
origin and prior training. For instance, perpetrators might become front line killers through
recruitment, by profession, by force or voluntarily. Subsequently, a perpetrator’s prior
training varies greatly. Whilst, military and certain militia soldiers might have gone through
an extensive training process that aims to desensitize and create strong bonds to the in-group,
others have received limited or no prior training. Despite the variety however, many
genocidal perpetrators seem to behave very similarly and engage in violent behaviour
(Zimbardo, 2007). Although, whether a perpetrator actually kills or avoids killing in genocide
and politicide might be difficult to prove (Grossman, 1996).

The current presentation, in a simplified summary, describes some of the processes that
might occur during a genocidal process. It might however, be relevant to keep in mind that
whilst it seems to be many similarities amongst cases, one factor that is prevalent in one crime
may not be in another (Lieberman, 2012). Similarly, identifying factors common in genocide
and politicide does not necessary aid to predict the onset of a crime (Krain, 1997; Harff,
(2003), and a pertinent factor present in several genocides and politicide might not necessarily indicate that it is a triggering factor in all of the cases.

The research on genocide and politicide mirrors a diverse field that contains many similarities, but also many challenges and conflicting perspectives. A major challenge related to these crimes is, for instance, that whilst comparative genocide research seems to suggest that there are certain common attributes in many cases, there are often one or more exceptions. It might be that the exception is related to a culture-specific attribute to that particular society, and that the exception is a unique part of a certain person or collective, but it seems unlikely that all inconsistencies can be attributed to specificity. Subsequently, a comprehensive theory of genocide has to incorporate the many exceptions and inconsistencies. For instance, many genocidal crimes appear to evolve gradually, but there are similar crimes that seem to have progressed rather quickly, where people rapidly mobilize and leaders are appointed ad hoc (Dutton, 2007). Similar diversity is mirrored in the individual enabling process of killing, and whilst certain front line killers have received extensive training, others have limited or no prior training (Waller, 2007). Subsequently, how does a quick genocidal transformation cohere with arguments of a more longstanding process that include the necessity of enduring mechanisms such routinization and gradual exposure?

Similarly, there appear to be some inconsistencies within certain perspectives. For instance, ideology is often assumed to hold an important role in genocidal behaviour, and is frequently presented by scholars such as Goldhagen (1996) and Bauman (1989), as a widely accepted system of belief in genocidal societies. But, what is the relationship between the argument that assumes ideology as a necessity for genocidal participation, and the organizational argument that suggests people participate because of a social structure that allow people to merely focus on their own task, whilst having no or limited knowledge of the genocidal process? Bauman (1989) for instance, argues that the motive behind genocide is an ideological goal of a new and improved society, and genocide is merely a means to an end. The necessary factors for genocidal participation are ideology, and the modern bureaucracy that allows distance and subsequently provides an incomplete picture of the crime. But, why do people need to be convinced of a genocidal ideology, if they do not perceive or comprehend the genocidal process that occurs in their own society? Furthermore, it is a little unclear how a widespread ideology can be a fundamental factor for genocidal participation for everyone involved in genocide and politicide. For instance, what is the relationship between a widespread ideology and the individuals who refuse to kill? Relatedly, if a perpetrator
convinced of the righteousness of an ideology, and has similarly been subjected to the powerful social forces previously described, that have altered the norms so that violence is acceptable and the victims have been dehumanized, why do some people hesitate to follow orders? It seems that a further inquiry into why some people do not participate might be an interesting and relevant succeeding step.

Relatedly, a further query into the impact individuals might have on a group might similarly be very interesting and pertinent to a further study of genocide. Whilst situational theories that attribute genocidal behaviour to situational components, seem to currently hold prevalence particularly within the social psychology field, dispositional attributes are often argued to have limited influence on genocidal participation, because of the variety of perpetrators in genocide and politicide (Waller, 2007; Staub, 2003). But does the lack of a general attribute, necessarily discount the influence of people with, for instance, sadistic personality traits or anti personality disorder on genocidal behaviour? For instance, research on group mechanisms seems to suggest that, since people are influenced by their peers and often adapts their behaviour according to their group, the in-group holds an important role in individual genocidal participation. Would it then not matter what type of people was in the in-group? For instance, would it necessary have to be more than a few people with APD or sadistic traits within the in-group, to influence other members within the group, particularly in these extreme situations? Similarly, what if the leader of the group possesses these attributes?

Although, there are issues that remain ambiguous within genocide and politicide, the research within the field provides important and interesting reflections related to genocidal participation. A further inquiry into the preceding reflections, and the many issues that regrettably have been left unexplored in this thesis, such as the interactive approach that incorporates dispositional and situational conditions, the distance thesis, perpetrators that refuse to kill, and the complexity perceived by the individual in a situation, would be very interesting in a future analysis.

To conclude, this dissertation aspires to contribute to the genocide research with a thematic structure of common attributes associated with the onset of genocide and politicide. This analysis seems to mirror the difficulty often associated with detecting the beginning of a genocide and politicide, and subsequently reflects an important and continuous need for caution and awareness related to the potential risk of genocide and politicide. Whilst pressing issues such as climate change, sea level rise and drought to name a few, might increase the risks of future conflicts (Alvarez, 2010), the beginning stages to a genocide or politicide...
might be difficult to recognize, and subsequently challenging to prevent. For instance, in the chaos of a political upheaval and the associated psychological reactions, and through ambiguous social forces, it might be difficult to identify the onset of a perception that supports a genocidal aim. Particularly, since common attributes associated with genocidal crimes are often culture specific such as the strain, the beliefs, the myths and the out-group (Waller 2007), and combined with psychological mechanisms such as our human tendency to not perceive our own vulnerability (Zimbardo 2007), similar processes that leads to genocidal crimes might, as a result, be difficult to detect. What would, for instance, the western world allow in the name of democracy?

The structure of this thesis and the succeeding inquiry into the societal and the individual mechanisms in the genocidal process might similarly be relevant to for instance, intervention and prevention strategies that centre on the individual and the collective. There are great challenges however, associated with international intervention strategies that regrettably have not been discussed in this thesis, but it is an important component within the genocide field. The genocide in Rwanda, for instance, has become a symbol of how the UN and the international community failed to intervene and to prevent one of the most brutal genocide in the 20th century (Alvarez, 2010).

Whilst the intentions of this thesis has not been to discuss or attribute responsibility in genocide and politicide, the presented analysis might however, through an illustration of the complexity associated with the genocidal process, generate questions related to the attribution of responsibility in genocidal crimes. For instance, the relationship between the state, the society and the individual perpetrator, and the succeeding social and psychological processes, might pose questions related to a perpetrators’ often assumed rational choice, and the relationship between collective and individual accountability. Similarly, questions associated with accountability, and the subsequent punishment of genocidal perpetrators are important issues to the International Criminal Court (Savelsberg, 2010), and the Tribunals established to prosecute perpetrators of genocide in for instance the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Alvarez, 2010). Furthermore, aspects that relate to questions of accountability might also be relevant to other global criminological perspectives such as international law, and similar crimes processed in the International Criminal Court (Savelsberg, 2011).

In conclusion, this dissertation, in accordance with similar studies, seems to reflect the complexity associated with genocide and politicide, and signifies the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach, that equally includes a criminological perspective. Whilst research
on specific genocides provides details that comparative research cannot, it seems to be equally important to investigate genocide in a broader perspective. The presented discussion seems however, to only begin to illustrate some of the relevant developments in genocide and politicide, and many questions related to the genocide process continue to be, by the current genocide literature and this thesis, left unexplained. The increasing criminological attention hopefully inspires a further inquiry into these severe crimes, that continue to pose a threat in many countries.
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Scientists.


Word Count: 49 670
Attachments

Attachment 1: List of Genocides and Politicides from 1955 to 2001 from Harff (2003:60)

Attachment 2: Typologies of genocide compared from Fein (1993a:87)
### TABLE 1: List of Genocides and Politicides from 1955 to 2001 from Harff (2003:60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Dates</th>
<th>Nature of Episode</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, 10/56–3/72</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>400,000–600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam, 1/65–4/75</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>400,000–500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, 3/59–12/59</td>
<td>Genocide and politicide</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, 6/63–3/75</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>30,000–60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, 7/62–12/62</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>9,000–30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, 12/63–6/64</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>12,000–20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-K, 2/64–1/65</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>1,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, 10/65–12/73</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, 11/65–7/66</td>
<td>Genocide and politicide</td>
<td>500,000–1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, 5/66–3/75</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>400,000–850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala, 7/78–12/96</td>
<td>Politicide and genocide</td>
<td>60,000–200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan, 3/71–12/71</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>1,000,000–3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda, 2/72–4/79</td>
<td>Politicide and genocide</td>
<td>50,000–400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, 9/72–6/76</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan, 2/73–7/77</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>5,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile, 9/73–12/76</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>5,000–10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, 11/75–2001</td>
<td>Politicide by UNITA and government forces</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, 4/75–1/79</td>
<td>Politicide and genocide</td>
<td>1,900,000–3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, 12/75–7/92</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>100,000–200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 3/76–12/80</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>9,000–20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia, 7/76–12/79</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-K, 3/77–12/79</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>3,000–4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, 4/78–4/92</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma, 1/78–12/78</td>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El. Salvador, 1/80–12/89</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>40,000–60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda, 12/80–1/86</td>
<td>Politicide and genocide</td>
<td>200,000–500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria, 4/81–2/82</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>5,000–30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, 6/81–12/92</td>
<td>Politicide and genocide</td>
<td>10,000–20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, 9/83–present</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, 3/88–6/91</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia, 5/88–1/91</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>15,000–50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, 1988</td>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>5,000–20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka, 9/89–190</td>
<td>Politicide</td>
<td>13,000–30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia, 5/92–11/95</td>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, 10/93–5/94</td>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, 4/94–7/94</td>
<td>Genocide</td>
<td>500,000–1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia, 12/98–7/99</td>
<td>Politicide with communal victims</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This list of episodes was compiled in a long-term research effort (see Harff 1992), has been updated and modified for the State Failure Task Force, and is posted on the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management Web platform, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mscr/stfail. The list and analysis reported here exclude a few episodes identified in previous studies, for example, in Angola in 1961–62 (because it was then a colony), in Equatorial Guinea in 1969–79 (the country was below the 500,000 population threshold used in the State Failure analyses), in Paraguay against the Ache Indians in 1962–72, and in Nigeria against Ibos living in the North in 1966 (in the latter two cases the government was not complicit in killings carried out by private groups). Estimates of victims are invariably imprecise and often vary widely among scholars, journalists, human rights observers, and spokesmen for the victimized groups. Some of the figures are little more than guesses. If a detailed and reliable study is available, a single figure is used. A single figure is also used when several sources offer similar estimates. When different estimates are reported and there is no basis for choosing among them, a range is shown.
### Attachment 2: Typologies of genocide compared from Fein (1993a:87)

**Table 1**

Typologies of genocide compared, 1975-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>I (Holocaust; Armenian gen.)</th>
<th>II (East Pak. '71, Burundi '70)</th>
<th>III (Paraguay, Brazil '70)</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examples in ()</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Dadrian (1975)</td>
<td>Optimal</td>
<td>Retributive</td>
<td>Utilitarian</td>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kuper (1981)</td>
<td>Against hostage or scapegoat groups</td>
<td>following decoloniz. Of a two-tier system of domination</td>
<td>against indigenous peoples</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990)</td>
<td>To implement a belief, ideology or theory</td>
<td>To eliminate a real or potential threat</td>
<td>To acquire economic wealth</td>
<td>To spread terror among real or potential enemies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*******************************************

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genocides:</th>
<th>Politicides:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


***** Represents discontinuity between theorists above and below line.