

Decision Making and Advice Giving:
Differences in Construal Level and Responsibility.

Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye



Master of Philosophy in Psychology

Department of Psychology

University of Oslo

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Appendixes

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Abstract

Three experimental studies are reported, the first two of which explore differences in advisors' and decision makers' preferences, and differences in personal decisions in the near and the distant future. It was expected that preferences of advisors would be more similar to those of distant future decision makers than of near future decision makers. This prediction was supported. In Experiment 1, advisors (both pure advisors and decision makers for others) and distant future decision makers made more action choices than near future decision makers, thus only for low life-impact situations. In Experiment 2 advisors and distant future decision makers made more desirability choices than near future decision makers. These results indicate some similarities in representation of the decision problem due to a psychological distance to the event, which construal level theory could account for. Experiment 3 explores decision makers' and advisors' responsibility from the perspective of both decision makers and advisors. Responsibilities are explored both without knowledge of decision outcomes, and with two levels of outcome (moderately and severely negative). Decision makers are generally perceived as being much more responsible for a decision than advisors, both by the decision makers themselves and by the advisors. Advisors, on the other hand, perceived themselves as more responsible than did decision makers. Decision outcomes are found to have an impact on perception of responsibility. Decision makers perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of negative decision outcomes, while they perceived advisors' responsibility to decrease. Advisors, on the other hand, perceived their own responsibility to decrease with knowledge of moderate outcomes, and to increase with knowledge of severely negative outcomes.

The act of soliciting other people's opinions prior to making a decision is a common practice, both in private and professional life. A great deal of research has been conducted on how people make decisions for themselves (e.g., Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Although advice plays such a central part in real-life decision making, it has been given little consideration either in empirical studies or in theories of decision making until recently. Consequently, an integrative theory to understand the phenomenon of advice, as a whole is lacking (Yaniv, 2004b).

Yaniv emphasizes that advice is related to other and much older areas of psychology. Among these are attitude change (Jones & Harris, 1967), persuasion and small group processes (Kerr & Tindale, 2004), combinations of expert opinions, linear models of judgement (Armstrong, 2001), and models of information integration (Anderson, 1968).

Research on advice giving has found advice given to others to differ from decisions made for oneself (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006); it suggests that advisors weigh attributes differently than do personal decision makers, and that advisors are more prone to use decision-making norms (Stone & Allgaier, in press).

A major motivation for decision makers to take advice has been found to be the opportunity to share responsibility for a decision (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Promberger & Baron, 2006). To our knowledge, no further research on responsibility for advice givers and decision makers has been conducted within the advice tradition, and thus little knowledge exists in this domain.

The main purpose of the present research was twofold. The first purpose was to explore the difference between peoples' own preferences and the advice they give to others. The research reported above suggests that advice givers are more concerned with general norms, while personal decision makers consider more aspects of the decision problem. Construal Level Theory (CLT) (Trope & Liberman, 2003) suggests that people's preferences differ with psychological distance to an event, in that individuals tend to represent psychologically distant events by their essential, abstract and global features (high-level construal), whereas psychologically near events are represented by their peripheral, concrete, and local features (low-level construal). In line with this, Trope and Liberman found preferences to differ with temporal distance. We explored whether advice represents psychological distance from a decision problem (similarly to temporal distance) by comparing advice and distant future decisions.

The second purpose was to learn more about the perception of responsibility for a decision when advice was provided. No research has previously been conducted on this

subject. We explored perceived responsibility for both decision makers and advice givers as seen from the perspectives of both decision makers and advisors. Advisors' and decision makers' perceptions of responsibility were explored both with and without knowledge of negative decision outcomes (moderately and severely negative).

Previous Research on Advice: Decision Making and Advice Giving

The first article on advice was published by Brehmer and Hagafors in 1986. Recently, advice has received greater attention from researchers. Studies within this “advice tradition” differ with regard to perspective. The perspectives have been from either decision makers (advice takers) or advice givers, where undoubtedly the advice taking perspective has received the most research attention. Advice taking research has primarily emphasized research on decision makers utilizing or discounting advice, advisor and decision maker accuracy, and confidence. This line of research has found decision makers to be less likely to follow advice as much as they ought to, in order to improve the accuracy of their decisions (egocentric advice discounting, e.g., Yaniv, 2004b; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Further, decision makers have been found to improve decision accuracy by utilizing advice (e.g., Armstrong, 2001; Gardner & Berry, 1995; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 1997; Yaniv, 2004a; Yaniv & Milyavsky, in press). In addition, decision makers have been found to be more likely to follow advice when it comes from more confident decision makers (e.g., Phillips, 1999; Price and Stone, 2004; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005; and see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006, for an extensive literature review). Advice giving, on the other hand, has primarily emphasized the difference between advisors' recommendations and decision makers' choices (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & Allgaier, 2003; Fischhoff, 1992; Jonas and Frey, 2003; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Kray, 2000; Kray & Gonzales, 1999; Stone & Allgaier, in press).

The present study concerns the advice giving rather than advice taking. In the following, an introduction to research conducted on advice giving within the advice tradition, and an introduction to construal level theory (CLT) will be presented. Additionally, some of the CLT studies relevant for the present work will be presented. One first notes that although advisors also make decisions by deciding what advice to give, the term decision maker in this text refers to the actors who make decisions for themselves.

Advice giving: Self vs. Other Differences in Choice and Weighing of Dimensions

Research on advice giving suggests that advisors and personal decision makers weigh advantages and disadvantages of important decisions differently. According to Kray and Gonzales (1999), this difference might be caused by different decision strategies, where personal choices follow a trade-off strategy (several dimensions are considered) whereas advice giving follows a lexicographical strategy (one dimension is primary) (see Tversky, Sattah & Slovic, 1988).

Fischhoff (1992) observed differences in perceptions of strategies designed to reduce the risk of sexual assault. Advisors (men and experts on sexual assault) were found to emphasize the importance of personal safety and reduced risk, whereas the potential rape victims (women) were found to weigh the costs (e.g., limitation of freedom) of the advisors' prevention strategies in addition to the gains.

Similar results were found by Kray and Gonzalez (1999) when examining self-other differences in multi-attribute choices. They proposed that when people make decisions for themselves, they weigh attributes more uniformly than when giving advice. For example, Kray and Gonzalez (experiment 1) asked their participants to choose between two potential jobs, either for themselves or as advice for a friend. The two jobs differed in two dimensions: personal satisfaction and salary. Job A was better in terms of salary whereas job B provided more personal satisfaction, which is the most important dimension for most people. More participants in the advice-giving conditions favoured job A, while in the self-choice condition, participants chose jobs A and B more evenly. Kray and Gonzales further found that only the lower-valued dimension (salary) changed weight dependent on the perspective (self-choice vs. advice), which they interpreted as consistent with the suggested model that one dimension becomes primary in advice giving.

Note that the key element of Kray and Gonzales's (1999) framework is that advisors give more weight to the most important dimension (since importance of the lower-valued dimension decreases) when giving advice, and note that a shift takes place in the most prominent value (the most highly valued dimension does not change). They further suggest that the self-other difference emerges as a result of some aspect of the decision process itself, and not as a result of lack of advisor motivation. Advisors have been found to exhibit greater concern about the accuracy of their recommendations than personal decision makers, and to exert more task related effort (Jonas & Frey, 2003; Kray, 2000).

Norms and Advice

Kray and Gonzales (1999; Kray, 2000) emphasize that advisors tend to recommend options that most judges would prefer, whereas personal decision makers make choices consistent with their own perhaps idiosyncratic preferences. A similar argument is promoted by Stone and Allgaier (in press). Stone and Allgaier (also Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp & Allgaier, 2003) conducted a study using a social value analysis of self-other differences in decision making involving risk taking. Their results demonstrated that people made more risky decisions for others in domains where risk taking was valued. For example, in one of their experiments, participants had the option of choosing to introduce themselves to an attractive person at a party, or to stay with their friends. When providing advice, participants were much more likely to advise their friends to introduce themselves, whereas when deciding for themselves, participants were less likely to do so. It was actually regarded as inappropriate to make more risk-averse decisions for others than for oneself in situations where risk was positively valued (i.e., choosing for a single person not to introduce himself/herself). Interestingly, they found that participants made more risky decisions for others, even though they predicted that others would have made the same decisions as themselves (taking less risk). However, in areas where risk was not valued, people were found to make less risky decisions for others than for themselves, for example, in monetary gambling.

Stone and Allgaier (in press) define social values as “people’s perceptions of ...others’ value priorities” (p.11). Perceived group value may or may not correspond to the group’s actual value system. They argue that there is a decision-making norm for how to decide for others that results from people’s perceptions of whether risk is valued. This norm is stronger when deciding for others than for oneself, which may explain the differences in decisions that one makes for oneself versus those made for others. The argument of Stone and Allgaier is also similar to that of Teigen, Olsen, and Solås (2005), who conducted a series of studies designed to determine the factors that influence people’s choices of gifts and how these choices correspond to the preferences of the gift recipients. They found that gift buyers, in general, prefer more exclusive, high-quality items, whereas gift receivers preferred more useful gifts. Teigen et al. suggest that these results could be due to gift buyers’ greater concern with norms regarding gift exchange than that of recipients, and not to perceived differences between self and others. Stone and Allgaier point out that in both their study and that of Teigen et al., a similar picture emerges. Advisors are less concerned with identifying the unique desires of the person they are deciding for, and more concerned with following the proper decision making norm.

Personal decision making and providing advice to others, give different perspectives to a decision problem. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), different perspectives are most likely to result in a different framing of the decision problem. Tversky and Kahneman emphasize that a change in perspective often reverses the relative desirability of options. The frame a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by norms, habits and personal characteristics of the decision maker.

Construal Level Theory (CLT)

Trope and Liberman (2003) propose that individuals tend to represent psychologically distant events on a higher (more abstract) construal level, and psychological near events on a lower (more concrete) construal level. High-level construal can be described as more schematic with superordinate and decontextualized representations that extract the central feature of events, whereas low-level construal tends to include subordinate, contextual, and incidental features of events. Thus, low-level construal is richer and more detailed than high-level construal, which is more structured and parsimonious. Goals are central in CLT. Superordinate goals are most important for a high level of construal, while subordinate goals are central to a low level of construal. As pointed out by Trope and Liberman (2000), this idea bears some similarity to action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), which states that superordinate goals refer to “why action is performed” and subordinate goals refer to “how action is performed”. Consequently, any changes in the features of high-level construal produce major changes in the meaning of the event (goal relevant), whereas changes in low-level construal produce relatively minor changes in the meaning of the event (goal irrelevant). Moreover, the importance of values in CLT should be noted, or rather, that of the shift in values. CLT proposes that a shift in the most prominent value appears with psychological distance to an event.

Trope and Liberman (2003) propose that construal level underlies a broad range of evaluative and behavioural consequences of psychological distance to events. Although CLT proposes that psychological distance can be in the form of temporal (Trope & Liberman, 2003), spatial (Nussbaum, Liberman & Trope, 2006), hypothetical versus real events (Armor & Sackett, 2006), and social distance (Smith & Trope, 2006), the main body of research to date has been on temporal distance (e.g., Eyal, Liberman, Trope & Walther, 2004; Liberman & Trope, 1998, 2003; Liberman, Sagristano & Trope, 2002; Nussbaum, Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2003).

In this paper, we suggest that the difference between advisors and decision makers can also be conceptualized as a kind of psychological distance. People making immediate or near future decisions are, according to CLT, likely to represent the information at a low level of construal, in which they consider and value more of the contextual information, the low-level goals and the “how” aspects of the decision problem. People making distant future decisions, on the other hand are, according to CLT, more likely to represent information at a high level of construal, in which the “how” aspects are less valued and the superordinate goals, concerning the “why”, are more prominent. Similarly, in advice research, decision makers are found to value more dimensions of a decision problem, whereas advisors are found to give most value to the most important dimension. We suggest that decision makers and advisors have different perspectives to a decision problem, and, moreover, that more immediate or near future decision makers and distant-future decision makers have different perspectives on a decision problem. Consequently, preferences might differ when giving advice and when making decisions, but because both advisors and distant future decision makers are psychologically distant from a decision problem, such preferences might become more similar.

Note that we do not suggest that preferences will be identical, because several differences still exist between advisors and decision makers with temporal distance. One difference has to do with consequences. People who make decisions for distant future, are not faced with any immediate consequences, whereas people who make immediate or near-future decisions are most likely to be faced with more immediate consequences. Advisors, on the other hand, are in fact not faced with any direct consequences at all (only more indirectly, like blame), giving them a perspective that resembles, but is still not identical with distant future decision makers. Further, advisors do not have full access to the decision makers’ personal characteristics (e.g. individual likings and experience), and thus situational differences between advisors’ and distant future decision makers’ preferences might appear. Hence, we believe psychological distance to be even greater for advice giving than with distant future decision making.

Preference with Temporal Distance: Desirability vs. Feasibility

Liberman and Trope’s extensive research program on temporal construal has demonstrated how preference and prediction change in near versus distant future (Trope & Liberman, 2003). However, Liberman and Trope’s (1998) research on desirability and feasibility considerations is of particular interest for our present work and will be given particular

attention. Liberman and Trope have demonstrated how temporal distance increases the weight of desirability aspects and decreases the weight of feasibility aspects in preferences regarding future activities. Desirability is the value of an action's end state, a high-level aspect that refers to why the action should be taken, whereas feasibility is the ease or difficulty of reaching the end state, and is a low-level aspect that refers to how action is taken. In Liberman and Trope's study (experiment 2), a situation was described where a guest lecture was held at campus. Participants were asked to rate the importance of two reasons for attending the lecture: hearing an interesting lecture (desirability) and having the lecture held at a convenient time (feasibility). The importance of the interesting dimension (desirability) increased with temporal distance, whereas the importance of convenience (feasibility) decreased with temporal distance. Similar results were found when participants rated their preferences for a living room set. The importance of liking (desirability) the living room set increased with temporal distance, while the importance of having the living room set delivered (feasibility) decreased with temporal distance. However, the value of the desirability consideration remained high in both near and distant future decisions, regardless of whether feasibility was high (in near future) or low (in distant future). Liberman and Trope emphasize that this finding supports their suggestion that desirability considerations constitute a higher level of construal than do feasibility considerations.

Similar to desirability and feasibility considerations, pro (arguments in favour of taking action) considerations are generally found to be at a higher level of construal than con (arguments in favour of abstaining from action) considerations (Eyal et al., 2004). Pro considerations tend to be more salient in thinking about distant future activities than in near future activities. For example, in deciding whether to take a trip in the more distant future, the argument "visiting interesting places" (pro) would become more salient than the argument "long tiring journey" (con). Conversely, cons were found to be more salient in thinking about the relatively near future.

Responsibility and Advice

Although the domain of advice has recently received more research attention, surprisingly little research has been conducted on the division of responsibility and advice. Consequently, little knowledge exists on the perceived responsibility for a decision when advice is utilized. Promberger and Baron (2006) conducted a study on how likely people were to accept a medical recommendation when it came from a computer program rather than a physician.

They found participants more likely to follow a medical recommendation when it came from a physician rather than a computer program. However, more interestingly, the participants reported that they would feel less responsible for their decision if they followed the recommendation (especially the physician's recommendation) rather than if they did not. This is consistent with Harvey and Fischer's (1997) results indicating that sharing of responsibility was one reason for utilize advice.

LeBoeuf and Norton (2006) investigated how outcomes of events influenced perceived causes of events. They found a tendency for participants to match magnitude. A "big" negative outcome (e.g. the killing of Kennedy led to the death of 40 000 American soldiers in the Vietnam War) was matched with a "bigger" cause (e.g., the killing was due to a conspiracy). A "small" negative outcome (the killing of Kennedy did not make a difference to the outcome of the Vietnam War) was matched with a "smaller" cause (e.g., the killing was a result of a lone gunman). Similar matching also occurred with valence, where positive outcomes were matched with positive causes and negative outcomes were matched with negative causes. This observed difference in appraisal of causes on the basis of severity of consequences is interesting with regard to perceived responsibility of advice. Perhaps the perception of responsibility is not constant in magnitude, but varies with knowledge of consequences and also perhaps with severity of decision outcomes.

Present Research

We had two main agendas with the present work. Experiments 1 and 2 were primarily designed to explore the possibility that advice giving represents a psychological distance from a decision problem, in a similar manner as temporal distance (and is possibly even a larger distance). This could make construal level a plausible explanation for the observed self-other difference in decision making. Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that fewer action choices would be made for oneself in the near future, rather than for oneself in the distant future and when giving advice (also when making decisions for others). Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis that fewer desirability choices (options with a high value on desirability) would be made for oneself in the near future, rather than for oneself in the distant future and when giving advice. Additionally, feasibility considerations (the ease or difficulty of reaching the end state) were expected to be less important both when considering actions in the distant future, and when giving advice, compared to when deciding for oneself in the present or near future.

The second main agenda with the present work was to explore advisors' and decision makers' perceptions of responsibility for a decision. In experiment 1, advisors' perceptions of their own and decision makers' responsibility were explored. Experiment 3 was designed to explore advisor's and decision maker's responsibility, both from the perspective of advisors and decision makers (actors). Moreover, we explored whether knowledge of a negative decision outcome would have any impact on perceived responsibility, and in such case, whether level of negative (moderately and severely) outcome makes a difference. To our knowledge, the responsibility of both decision makers and advisors has never been studied before, so little empirical and theoretical knowledge exist in this domain.

Experiment 1

Many decision situations involve a choice between two options that could be called action versus inaction, respectively: To accept or to forego an offer, to speak up or to remain quiet, to get up or to remain in bed. Of these alternatives, the inaction option seems often to be the most convenient, at least in the sense that it requires the least amount of effort in the current situation. This has resulted in decision-making biases called "inaction bias", "omission bias" and sometimes "status quo bias" in the research literature (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Schweitzer, 1994, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)

The first goal of experiment 1 was to compare action and inaction choices for a decision maker who is deciding for himself/herself in the present (self near-future), compared to decisions in situations that may occur at a later point in time (self distant-future). Inaction follows more from a feasibility concern. We would thus expect more action choices in the distant than in the near future.

The second goal was to compare action or inaction choices made by a decision maker for himself or herself with advice given to others. In advising others, considerations associated with the current situation, immediate difficulties and inconveniences could be expected to play a less prominent role, leading to a less prominent inaction bias and more action choices. We explored two levels of advice, pure advice (where the final decision is made by the actor) and decisions made for others (where the advisor knows that the actor will follow his or her advice). Pure advisors are found to make balanced information search, whereas advisors as decision makers for others, are found to make more confirmatory (in support of preferred choice) information search, similar to personal decision makers (Jonas et

al. 2005). This suggests that the preference of for pure advisors might differ from the preferences of decision makers.

It follows that the advice people give to others should bear some similarity to the decisions they make for themselves in the distant future, or at least that the advice they give should be more similar to the decisions they make for themselves in the future, than the decisions they make for themselves in the here and now.

Additionally, we explored the advisors' perception of their own and decision makers responsibility for the decision. By asking participants to perform responsibility ratings on a percentage scale, we will gain information about their views on responsibility as a limited or unlimited quantity: is there a fixed quantity of 100% responsibility that has to be shared between those who contribute to the decision, or is there no upper limit for the total responsibility so the decision maker can be 100% responsible, with still some responsibility left for the advisor.

Further, we explored decision makers' awareness of what advice they were likely to receive from others, and whether any discrepancy existed between decision maker's expectancy and the actual advice that was provided. Finally, decision-difficulty was investigated. Decision-difficulty might be perceived differently when making action or inaction choices and when having psychological distance to the decision task.

Method

Participants

Participants were 241 students attending an introductory class in psychology at the University of Oslo (176 women and 61 men, 4 did not indicate gender), with mean age of 22.9 years. They were randomly allocated to four different conditions by receiving different versions of the same basic questionnaire.

Materials

All participants received a questionnaire describing three personal decision making scenarios, where the decision maker had a choice between two options, an action alternative and a status quo alternative. The situations differed in importance, with the first situation as a situation with lower life stakes (life impact) than the last two, where decisions could have momentous consequences.

Vacation scenario. In the first scenario, the decision maker is a student who is offered a cheap and tempting vacation to the south in the middle of the semester (interfering with the course work). Should the offer be accepted or rejected?

Abortion scenario. In the second scenario, the student discovers that she (for male participants: his partner) is pregnant. The pregnancy is unplanned and a baby will seriously interfere with study progression. The options were to seek abortion or not.

Job offer scenario. In the third scenario, the decision maker receives an unexpected attractive job offer and is confronted with the choice of leaving school and to accept the offer or to reject the offer and continue her or his studies towards graduation (for a detailed description of the scenarios, see Appendix A).

Participants in *Condition 1* (self, near-future) were asked to imagine themselves as actors and the situation as happening in the near future.

In *Condition 2* (self, distant-future), participants were asked to imagine that the situations could arise at some point in future.

In the last two conditions, participants were asked to give advice to somebody else (same age and sex). In *Condition 3* (other-decide) the actor was described as undecided and could be expected to rely on your advice, whereas in *Condition 4* (other-advice) the actor felt free to follow the advice, or not.

After choosing one option, participants were asked for each of the scenario (1) to rate how difficult they found the choice, on a five-point scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult); and (2) to produce any number of reasons in favour of or against their decision (open question).

Finally, participants in the Self conditions (1 and 2) were asked to rate on a five-point scale from 1 (certainly not) to 5 (certainly), how likely they would be to seek advice from others in each situation, and to mark which advice they would expect to receive.

Participants in the advice conditions (3 and 4) were, instead, asked two questions about responsibility. How responsible would they (as advisors) be for the decisions, if the actor chose to follow their advice, and how responsible would the actors be? Both questions were answered by circling a number on percent scales from 0 (not at all responsible) to 100% responsible.

Results

Action Preferences

Participants were presented with three scenarios, where they were given the choice between committing an action (go on vacation, choose abortion, and accept a job offer), or decline to act. Figure 1 shows that action choices were least frequent in Condition 1, where the decision had to take place in the near future, and most frequent in Condition 4 (pure advice), with the other two conditions in between. A one-way ANOVA confirms that the mean numbers of action choices in the four conditions are significantly different, $F(3, 218) = 4.627, p = .004$. Thus, advices were, as predicted, generally more action oriented than decisions, in particular decisions concerning oneself in the immediate future.




Figure 1. Mean number of action choices for self and other in three scenarios. Experiment 1.

A closer look at the separate scenarios (as displayed in Table 1) shows that this pattern was particularly conspicuous in the vacation scenario. Only 38% would accept the vacation offer if it was presented to them today, whereas more than 72% would accept it if it was offered to them under similar conditions next year. They would also recommend the vacation offer to another student. The conditions differed much less in the abortion and in the job offer scenarios. These are high life-impact situations (Beisswanger et al., 2003), which might be decided according to guidelines of conduct that apply equally to self and others.

Table 1. *Preference for actions (percentages of participants) in four conditions, Experiment 1. Expected advice in parentheses (Conditions 1 and 2 only)*

Scenario	Condition 1 Self Near-future (n=69)	Condition 2 Self Distant-future (n=58)	Condition 3 Other-decides (n=59)	Condition 4 Other-advice (n=55)
Vacation	38.2 (72.1)	72.4 (78.9)	73.7	83.6
Abortion	55.9 (64.5)	54.4 (66.7)	54.9	57.7
Job offer	50.0 (42.9)	58.6 (52.8)	53.6	60.8
Total	48.0 (59.8)	61.8 (66.1)	60.7	67.4

Expected action advice in the two self choice conditions was similar to advice actually given (mean percentages of action choices = 63.0 vs. 64.1 for predicted advice and actual advice), showing that personal decision makers predict advices quite well. When examining the results for each scenario, differences in pattern of results emerge among situations (see table 1), mostly following the same pattern as action choices among conditions, with clearest results in the vacation scenario.

Decision difficulty

Difficulty ratings showed that the participants found deciding for others to be more difficult than advising others, with mean difficulty scores of 3.34 and 2.86 respectively; $t(102)= 3.07$, $p=.003$. They also felt that personal decisions for next year were more difficult than decisions for the near future, with mean difficulty scores of 3.32 vs. 2.89 respectively; $t(122)= 2.69$, $p=.008$. More interestingly, participants who made action choices felt that the decision had been more difficult than those who decided to abstain from action. This applied to all personal decisions, both in the near and in the distant future. As a consequence, participants who made none or only one action choice had an easier time than those who made two or three action choices, with mean difficulty ratings 2.83 vs. 3.26; $t(121)= 2.62$, $p=.010$. Making decisions for others followed the same pattern, with mean difficulty ratings 2.98 vs. 3.48; $t(49)= 2.01$, $p=.051$. However, action choices were not perceived more difficult when giving pure advice ($M= 2.64$ vs. 2.92; $t(46)= 1.13$, *ns.*)

Personal decision makers are more likely to seek advice in the distant future than in the near future, with mean likelihood ratings 3.94 vs. 3.48; $t(119)= 2.80$, $p=.006$.

Responsibility

Advisors responsibility ratings revealed, not very surprisingly, a substantial difference in perceived responsibility for decision maker and advisor, with mean responsibility ratings of 90.7% for decision makers and 34.5% for advisors. However, it is worth noticing that advisors were perceived to have more responsibility in the other-decide condition than in the other-advice condition (see Table 2); $t(101)=2.28, p=.025$. This indicates that advisor was perceived more responsible when being in a position of deciding for someone else, but still perceived to be much less responsible than the actor. Further, it is worth noticing that participants differed in how they divided responsibility between actor and advisor. Most participants (55.8%) perceived the actor to have a total responsibility of 100%, but additionally perceived advisor to have some responsibility, thereby exceeding 100% responsibility in total. More than one fourth of the participants (26.9%) regarded actor to have less than 100% responsibility, but still giving advisor enough responsibility to exceed 100% in total. Only a minor proportion of the participants were particular about not exceeding a total of 100% responsibility, 3.8% regarded actor fully responsible and advisor not responsible at all, while 13.5% perceived actor less than fully responsible and additionally giving some responsibility to advisor.

Table 2. *Mean responsibility for decisions in Conditions 3 and 4. Experiment 1.*

Scenarios	Condition 3: Advisor decides		Condition 4: Pure advice	
	Actor (n=55)	Advisor (n=54)	Actor (n=49)	Advisor (n=49)
Vacation	87.0	40.9	89.6	32.1
Abortion	92.1	39.8	96.2	31.3
Job offer	87.9	35.2	91.1	27.4
Total	89.0	38.6	92.3	30.3

Pro and Con arguments

Participants produced marginally fewer pro arguments in Condition 1 compared to the other conditions. The clearest difference was observed in the vacation scenario. In Condition 1 (self, near future), 41.8% pro vacation arguments were generated (near future) against 51.5% in Condition 2, 64.6% in Condition 3 (other-decide), and 67.2% in condition 4 (other-advice).

When comparing Condition 1 and the more distant decision-making conditions (60.7%), a significant difference in generated pro arguments was observed, $t(212) = 4.07, p < .001$.

Discussion

These results demonstrate, in line with our predictions, that action choices were less prominent in near future decision making and more prominent in the distant future and both of the advice conditions. This suggests that the more “feasible option of inaction”, is more likely to appear when people are making near future decisions, whereas when people are making decisions in the future, making decisions for others, or when giving advice, the more “desirable option of action” is more likely to appear.

There was, however, a difference between high and low life-impact situations. In the vacation situation (low life-impact), marked differences appeared in action choices between the near future condition and the other conditions, whereas hardly any noticeable differences were observed between conditions in the abortion scenario (high life-impact). A similar pattern of results was obtained by Beisswanger et.al. (2003). In a series of studies on self-other difference in risk taking, they demonstrated how low life-impact situations produce self-other differences when risk was valued, whereas high life-impact produce no differences. Importantly, these results suggest that action choices seem to follow a similar pattern both when making personal decisions in distant future and when providing advice (deciding for others and giving pure advice). Additionally, a similar pattern of choices are made when having a distance (both temporal and advice) to a decision problem both for high life-impact situations (no difference in any of the conditions) and low-impact situations (choices differs systematically when having distance to a decision task). We believe the present data support our proposition that advice givers and decision makers represent the decision problem in a similar manner.

Interestingly, the current results suggest that advisors do perceive themselves responsible for the decision, and even more responsible when making decisions for others than when giving pure advice. Although advisors perceive themselves responsible for the decision, decision makers were perceived far most responsible for the decision. However, individual differences in perception were observed, and the present data suggests that decision makers can not generally rely on advisors to take any responsibility away from the decision makers. More questions arose from the results, like what about decision makers perception of their own and advisors responsibility? What about perception of responsibility with

knowledge of a decision outcome? These questions will be investigated more closely in Experiment 3.

Experiment 2

Experiment 2 was designed to compare more directly predictions from two research traditions. Research within the CLT tradition has demonstrated that people have different preferences in the near and the far future (Trope & Liberman, 2003), whereas the advice tradition has demonstrated a difference between personal preferences and preferences when making recommendations to others (e.g. Beisswanger et al., 2003; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; Stone & Allgaier, in press).

To this end, two scenarios were selected from Liberman and Trope's (1998) study on desirability and feasibility considerations. In addition to repeating their design, the same scenarios were given to a group of "advisors". The prediction is that advisors make choices more similar to the far future decision makers than to the near future decision makers. In a similar way, two scenarios were selected from the research literature on advice giving (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; Stone & Allgaier, in press), where people have been found to make different choices for others than for themselves. By presenting two scenarios from CLT tradition and two scenarios from the advice tradition in the same design, we expect to find a difference between advisors choices and decision makers choices, and in addition, a difference between the choices people make for themselves in the near and the far future. Again, the prediction is that the difference in choices between advisors and far future decision makers is smaller than the difference in choices between advisors and near future decision makers.

In addition, we ask what reasons people consider important when making choices for themselves and when giving advice. Such reasons can either reflect more immediate, practical considerations ("feasibility"), or more general goals ("desirability"), as suggested by the CLT. For each decision, 2 or 3 relevant considerations were selected and classified as feasibility or desirability reasons. Again, we predict that advisors will be less concerned with feasibility aspects compared to the decision makers, especially when the decisions concern events in the present or in the near future.

Finally, we explored confidence levels. Overconfidence has often been found in research conducted on confidence in judgment and decision making literature (e.g., Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic & Ross, 1990). Little research has explicitly investigated confidence in

advice literature, but findings in construal research indicate more confidence when predicting distant future outcome rather than near future outcome (Nussbaum, Liberman & Trope, 2006). Perhaps confidence in choices will be more pronounced when participants give advice, and be more similar to confidence in own decisions in far future than in near future. However, confidence in choice tasks (as used in the present study) might differ from confidence in judgment tasks. Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo and Barlas (1999) suggest that overconfidence is more likely in judgment than in choice tasks, hence, making it difficult to predict a particular pattern of result in the present study.

Method

Participants

Participants were 226 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Oslo (171 women and 51 men, 4 did not indicate gender), with mean age of 23.2 years. They were randomly allocated to three different conditions by receiving three different versions of the same basic questionnaire.

Materials

All participants received a questionnaire describing four decision-making scenarios. Of these the first two from the temporal construal research (Trope & Liberman, 1998, study 3) and the remaining two from the advice-giving research. Scenario 3 was adapted from a study of Kray and Gonzalez (1999) and scenario 4 was adapted from Stone and Allgaier (in press, a similar scenario also used in Beisswanger et al., 2003).

As in study 1, participants were asked to choose one of two options.

Lecture scenario. In the first scenario, the decision maker is a student who is recommended by the teacher to attend a lecture held by a guest lecturer at an inconvenient time. Should the lecture be attended (desirability) or not (feasibility)?

Sofa scenario. In the second scenario, the decision maker is moving into a new apartment and is in need of a sofa. The decision maker is offered a second hand sofa from a friend. The design is not perfect, but the giver offers to deliver the sofa. Should the offer be accepted (feasibility) or rejected (desirability)?

Job scenario. In the third scenario, the decision maker has just finished school, and is offered two different jobs. One job is in accordance with his or her education and with a high salary. In the other job, the education is irrelevant and the salary is low, but the job is more

fulfilling and in line with the decision maker's interests. Which job offer should be chosen, the well paid one and the one educated for (lower valued dimension) or the one interested in (more highly valued dimension)?

Party scenario. In the fourth scenario, the decision maker spots an attractive person at a party, and has to decide whether to introduce oneself (risky option) or just stay with friends (safe option)? (For a detailed description of the scenarios, see Appendix B).

Participants in *Condition 1* (self, near-future) were asked to imagine themselves as actors and the situation as happening in the near future. In *Condition 2* (self, distant- future), participants were also asked to imagine themselves as actors, but the situations were described to happen at some point in the future. In *Condition 3* (other-advice), the participants were imagining themselves as advisors and asked to give advice to another person (of the same age and sex) facing the same choices.

After each scenario, participants were asked to rate, on scales from 1 (totally unimportant) to 10 (very important), the importance of selected feasibility (F) and desirability (D) considerations. The attributes to be rated were:

Lecture scenario: Importance of Thematic relevance (D), Convenient time (F)

Sofa scenario: Importance of Attractive design (D), Free delivery (F)

Job offer: Salary (F), Importance of Work satisfaction (D), Convenient commuting (F)

Party scenario: Importance of Making a try (D), Risk rejection (F), Stick to friends(F).

After the importance-ratings, participants were asked to choose between the two options, where one can be regarded as ideally more desirable (on a higher construal level), and the other as more feasible or convenient from a practical point of view. Finally, participants were asked to rate, on scales ranging from 1(totally uncertain) to 10 (very certain), how confident they were in having made the best choice.

Results

Desirability vs. Feasibility Preferences

Each decision contained a choice between one more ideally desirable and one more feasible and "safe" option. Choices of the desirable option received a score of 1 and the feasible option, a score of 0. Aggregated scores for each participant were computed by adding the

scores from each of the 4 scenarios. Thus, a score of 4 indicated that the participant always chose the ideally desirable option. Figure 2 shows that desirability choices were least frequent in Condition 1, where the decision had to take place in near future, and most frequent in Condition 3 (advice), with Condition 2 (distant future) in between. A one-way ANOVA confirms that the mean numbers of desirability choices are significantly different in the three conditions, $F(2,223)= 27.58, p< .001$.




Figure 2. Mean number of desirable choices for self and others in four situations. Experiment 2.

A closer look at the separate scenarios (displayed in Table 3) shows the same pattern. When examining differences in choices in Condition 1 and 3 (near future decisions vs. advice to others), more desirability choices appeared in both the job and party scenarios from the advice tradition, replicating the results of both Kray and Gonzalez (1999) and Stone and Allgaier (2006; also Beisswanger et al.,2003). This was confirmed by Chi-square tests: job, $\chi^2(1, N= 154)= 3.13, p= .049$; party, $\chi^2(1, N=151)=33.60, p< .001$. Additionally, more desirability choices were made in the lecture scenario from the CLT tradition, $\chi^2(1, N=153)=20.06, p< .001$. However, different results appeared in the sofa scenario from the other scenarios. Participants in the advice condition made more feasibility than desirability choices, producing an opposite pattern of results compared to the other scenarios, $\chi^2(1, N=150)= 8.68, p= .003$.

An increase in desirability choices was also apparent with temporal distance (see Table 3), but when analysing these differences separately for each scenario, none of them reached a significant level. Thus, Liberman and Trope’s (1998) results of more desirability choices with temporal distance in the lecture and sofa scenario were replicated, but without

reaching significance. Posts hoc tests (Tukey) show, however, that the sumscores for near and distant future, reported in Figure 2, are significantly different at the $p < .001$ level.

Table 3.

Percentages of participants choosing the most “desirable” option. Experiment 2.

Scenario	Condition 1 Actor near-future (n = 75)	Condition 2 Actor distant-future (n=72)	Condition 3 Advice (n=79)
Lecture	49.3	59.7	83.5
Sofa	34.7	45.8	21.5
Job	73.3	80.6	86.1
Party	49.3	59.7	98.7
Total	51.7	61.5	72.5

Certainty ratings

Participants seemed to be quite confident in their choices, regardless of making near or distant future decisions or if advising others. Summing up all situations, quite similar certainty scores were obtained, with means of respectively 6.75 and 6.82 for personal decisions in near and distant future, and 6.93 for advice giving. However, participants were more certain when more desirability choices (2-4) were made, rather than few desirability choices (0-1), with mean certainty ratings of 6.95 (more desirability choices) and 6.17 (few desirability choices), $t(223) = 3.51, p < .001$.

Desirability and Feasibility Considerations

As in the research design of Liberman and Trope (1998), participants rated the importance of desirability and feasibility considerations. However, in the present study participants scored feasibility and desirability considerations in scenarios from both CLT and advice tradition. Desirability scores (4 variables) and feasibility scores (6 variables) for all 4 scenarios were summed up and means computed (see table 4).

Table 4.

Mean importance ratings of desirability vs. feasibility considerations (four scenarios). Experiment 2

Considerations	Condition 1 Self near-future (n=75)	Condition 2 Self distant-future (n=72)	Condition 3 Other advice (n=79)
Desirable	7.38	7.62	7.63
Feasible	6.37	6.21	5.19

Note. Mean feasibility scores are computed from all six feasibility attributes.

Similar to Liberman and Trope (1998), we first conducted a Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X Distance (self near vs. self distant future) mixed ANOVA with consideration as within-subjects variable and temporal distance as between-subjects variable. Additionally, we conducted the same analysis with Self vs. Advice (Condition 1 vs. Condition 2) as the between subjects variable.

The first analysis replicated one main effect in Liberman and Trope's results, demonstrating (see Table 4) that desirability considerations were perceived more important than feasibility considerations both in near and distant future, $F(1, 144)=108.29, p < .001$. However, little difference in preference was observed between near and distant future conditions, thus no main effect of distance was obtained, $F(1, 144)=.097, ns$. Even though pattern of results indicated that desirability considerations marginally increased and feasibility considerations decreased with temporal distance, the interaction effect, which was obtained by Liberman and Trope, was not significant in the present study, $F(1,144)=2.70, ns$.

More interestingly, the analysis of Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X Distance (self near distance vs. other-advice) mixed ANOVA, revealed similar results to Liberman and Trope's observations in near and distant future (see Table 4). The analysis confirm that desirability considerations were perceived more important than feasibility considerations, both in the near future and in the advice condition, $F(1, 151)=205.82, p < .001$, similarly as observed with temporal distance. Further, feasibility considerations were scored more important in the near future condition than in the advice condition, $F(1, 151)=9.06, p=.003$. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated a Consideration x Distance interaction, $F(1, 151)=34.87, p < .001$. This confirm the pattern shown in Table 4, where desirability considerations marginally were scored more important in the advice condition, while feasibility considerations were scored less important in the advice condition.

In order to see if a similar pattern of results emerged in scenarios from CLT and advice tradition, as predicted, separate Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X Distance (near future vs. advice) ANOVAs were performed for each of the scenarios. The analysis of considerations in Condition 1 and 3 revealed significant interactions in both of the scenarios from the advice tradition (job and party), and one from CLT (lecture): lecture, $F(1,152)=5.22, p=.024$; job, $F(1,152)=6.72, p=.002$; party, $F(1,151)=28.25, p<.001$. The exception was the sofa scenario, which might need to be seen in connection with results of choices. Similar as for the advice Condition, separate Consideration (feasibility vs. desirability) X Distance (near future vs. advice) ANOVAs were conducted for each scenarios to test temporal distance. However, only the sofa scenario reached a significant interaction $F(1,145)=10.38, p=.002$, replicating the result of Liberman and Trope (1998). Although only marginally significant, the result from the job scenario is worth mentioning, coming from the self-other tradition, $F(1,145)=2.58, p=.079$.

Discussion

As predicted, more desirability choices were made in the advice condition than in the personal condition, and more desirability choices were made in the distant future condition rather than in the near future condition. Similar pattern of results were obtained in scenarios from both the CLT and advice tradition. We believe this indicates that some similarities in representation of the decision problem take place when giving advice and when making temporal distant decisions, supporting our proposal that advice giving represents a psychological distance to a decision problem, as for temporal distance. Moreover, the observed differences in preference are more conspicuous in the advice condition, therein more desirability choices are made and feasibility considerations are least valued in the advice condition. This could indicate that the psychological distance is greater when giving advice than when making temporal distant decisions. These results are consistent with CLT, which suggest that feasibility considerations are less valued with psychological distance, and that the superordinate value (desirability) is superordinate regardless of distance

However, participants' preferences in the sofa scenario differed in the advice condition. Less desirability choices were made and feasibility considerations were more valued compared with the other scenarios. Actually, advisors' chose to accept the sofa more often than near future decision makers, thus advisors preferences were more similar to personal preferences in the near future rather than preferences in the distant future. This suggest that even though psychological distance, in form of distant future decision making or

advice giving, seem to result in similar preferences in many situations, this is not the case in all situations. After all, decision makers and advisors are different persons, with their own personal taste.

Experiment 3

The second main agenda with the present work was to explore the advisor's and the decision maker's responsibility for the decision. Surprisingly little research within this area has been conducted before, thus little knowledge has been acquired on advice and responsibility. Results from experiment 1 demonstrated that although advisors perceive decision maker most responsible, advisor does take some responsibility for the decision, which suggest that advice utilization might be useful if decision makers seek to share responsibility (Harvey and Fischer, 1997). Moreover, perhaps the decision maker's feeling of less responsibility when following advice, which was suggested by Promberger & Baron (2006), might be legitimate. Still the decision makers' responsibility remained very high, suggesting that "shared" responsibility does not mean reduced responsibility. However, participants in experiment 1 were only asked about their own responsibility as advisors (in Conditions 3 and 4), thus the research design of experiment 1 did not reveal any information of decision maker's perception of responsibility.

The primary objectives for experiment 3 were dual. The first objective was to explore how advisor's and decision maker's responsibility was perceived, both from the perspective of the decision maker (actor) and the advice giver. We expected decision makers to be perceived far the most responsible, both by decision makers and advisors. Additionally, we also found it likely that advisor was perceived to have some responsibility for the decision.

The second objective of experiment 3 was to explore perceived responsibility and consequences. The research of LeBoeuf and Norton (2006) demonstrate how consequences influence the perception causes. Participants in their study perceived big negative outcomes to have "big" negative causes, whereas small negative outcomes were due to "small" negative causes. We sought to ascertain whether perception of responsibility was constant or if the perception varies with knowledge of a negative decision outcome, and further, whether responsibility varies with regard to the outcome being moderate or severe. We could imagine different outcomes of this study. From LeBoeuf and Norton's observations, participants in the role of both advisors and decision makers would be expected to perceive responsibility to increase with knowledge of negative outcome, and even more so with knowledge of severe

outcome. However, attribution research (Snyder & Higgins, 1988) has shown that people often ascribe their own success to internal personal factors, such as ability, and their failures to external situational causes, such as bad luck. According to this “self-serving bias”, one might expect decision makers to perceive advisors responsibility as particularly high following a negative outcome, a result which might be more pronounced when negative outcome is severe. We would also expect people as advisors to blame the decision makers and not themselves.

To sum up, we had three main questions: Did actors and advisors agree upon how much responsibility each of them had? Were there any differences in perceived responsibility when negative consequences were known rather than unknown? Finally, were there any differences in perceived responsibility with regard to the level of outcome severity?

Method

Participants

Participants were 245 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Oslo (173 women and 68 men, 4 did not indicate gender), with mean age of 23.3 years. They were randomly allocated to six different conditions by receiving six different versions of the same basic questionnaire.

Materials

All participants received a questionnaire describing four decision making scenarios, but unlike both in study 1 and 2, the scenarios in this study presented a decision that had already been taken. Consequently, no choices were to be made by the participants. In all four scenarios, the decision maker received an advice from a trusted friend before making the decision, which then was made according to the advice.

Book scenario. The first scenario described a situation where a student had to make a choice between reading superficially both books on the curriculum for an exam or take a chance and study just one of them more thoroughly. Time was limited, and the decision maker was advised by a fellow student (who had already persuaded some other students) to concentrate on one book and skip the other.

Drunk-driving scenario. In the second scenario, the decision maker was at a party. As the party members did not make it to the bus, the decision maker was persuaded to drive, even after having drunk alcohol.

Co-author scenario. In the third scenario, a choice had to be made whether the decision maker should become a co-author on a research article. The decision maker was persuaded to be listed as a co-author, despite having made only a minor contribution to the article

Employment scenario. In the fourth scenario, the participant was a student representative on a university board. An employment decision had to be made between two candidates (one young and promising and one more experienced) for a position as a professor at the university. The decision maker was advised to choose the promising one (for a detailed description of the scenarios, see Appendix C).

Altogether 6 conditions were employed in this study, forming a 2 x 3 design with actor/advisor as one factor and three levels of outcome information as the other factor.

In *Condition 1-3*, participants were asked to imagine themselves as actors, being the personal decision makers who receive advice (advice-takers) from a trusted friend.

In *Condition 4-6*, participants were instead asked to place themselves in the role of advisors, providing the advice upon which the personal decision makers based their decisions upon (advice-givers).

The conditions also differed in information about consequences. In Conditions 1 (advice-taker, no outcome) and 4 (advice-giver, no outcome), no outcome information was provided. In Conditions 2 (advice-taker, moderately negative) and 5 (advice-giver, moderately negative), moderately negative consequences were disclosed:

Book scenario. The decision maker received a question from the book that was skipped and did less well on the exam than his/her potential, but was still allowed to proceed with the studies.

Driving scenario. The decision maker was stopped in a police control and received a ticket for drunk driving.

Co-author scenario. It was disclosed that the main researcher had cheated and the article was based on fabricated data. However, the decision maker being just a co-author, received little negative publicity.

Employment scenario. The chosen candidate proved not to be a successful teacher, and one would think that other candidate would have been a better choice.

In Conditions 3 (advice-taker, negative) and 6 (advice-giver, negative), the decisions led to more severe consequences.

Book scenario. The decision maker failed the exam and was not allowed to proceed with the studies.

Drunk-driving scenario. The decision maker was stopped in a police control and was convicted for drunk driving (having to serve time in jail).

Co-author scenario. The decision maker, being a co-author received a lot of negative attention. Difficulties arose both in private life and also interfering with her academic career.

Employment scenario. The chosen candidate proved to be a disaster. Everyone agreed that it would have been much better to have chosen the other candidate.

After being presented with each scenario, participants were asked to rate how much responsibility they regarded the advisor to have for the decision, and also how much responsibility they regarded the personal decision maker to have for the decision. In scenario 1 and 2, the responsibility of the other students (or partygoers) was also rated. All responsibility ratings were done by circling a number on a percentage scale from 0 (not responsible at all) to 100% (completely responsible).

Results

Participants were presented for four scenarios. Decision makers' (actors) scores of respectively advisor's and decision maker's responsibility, and advisors' scores of respectively advisor's and decision maker's responsibility, were averaged over 4 scenarios. Table 5 shows the total mean responsibility ratings for both the decision maker and the advisor, as made by decision makers (self as decision maker) and advisors (self as advisor). The total scores demonstrate clearly a main effect of decision makers responsibility. Both decision makers themselves and advisors perceived the decision maker as much more responsible than the advisors. In the following, the responsibility of actor (decision maker) and advisor will be discussed separately.

Table 5. *Mean ratings of perceived responsibility averaged over 4 scenarios. Experiment 3.*

Decision-outcome	Conditions 1-3 Self as decision maker (actor)			Conditions 4-6 Self as advisor		
	Self-Actor	Other-Advisor	n	Other-Actor	Self-Advisor	n
Unknown	82.5	30.3	53	88.1	37.9	54
Known	89.7	22.1	70	87.6	30.9	65
- Moderately negative	90.5	25.3	31	87.4	27.6	35
- Severely negative	88.8	19.6	39	87.4	35.1	30
Total	86.5	25.7		87.8	34.2	

Decision makers' Responsibility as Perceived by Decision Makers and Advisors

The perception of decision makers' responsibility did not appear to differ much across conditions (see table 5). The decision makers' responsibility scores are in the high end of the scale, both when scored by decision makers themselves and by advisors, the small differences observed between the conditions might be due to a ceiling effect. However, interestingly, a 2 (Perspective: decision maker vs. advisor) x 2 (Outcome knowledge: unknown vs. known) ANOVA, with decision maker's responsibility as dependent variable, demonstrate a Perspective x Outcome knowledge interaction, $F(1, 242) = 4.60, p = .033$. This interaction indicate that decision makers perceive their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of decision outcome, which was confirmed by a one-way ANOVA $F(1,122) = 8.13, p = .005$. While advisors, on the other hand, only perceive their own responsibility to marginally decrease, $F(1,119) = .12, ns$.

However, a 2 x 2 ANOVA on decision maker's responsibility with knowledge of a moderate and severe decision outcome, demonstrate that level of outcome knowledge (moderately or severely negative) neither had impact on decision maker's perception of responsibility, nor on advisor's perception of responsibility.

Advisors' Responsibility as Perceived by Decision Makers and Advisors

Means of advisor responsibility displayed in Table 5, show that advisors perceive themselves more responsible for the decision than they were perceived by decision makers. Further, a

somewhat different pattern of responsibility scores are displayed across levels of decision-outcome.

A two-way ANOVA was performed, with Perspective (advisor vs. actor) x Outcome-knowledge (unknown vs. known) as independent variables, and advisor responsibility as dependent variable. The analysis confirm that advisors perceive themselves more responsible with knowledge of outcome than they are perceived by decision makers, $F(1, 241)= 9.42, p=.002$. Additionally, advisors and decision makers perceive advisor less responsible with knowledge of outcome rather than when having no knowledge, with means of respectively 26.5 and 34.1, $F(1,241)= 8.75, p=.003$. However, no perspective x outcome-knowledge interaction was demonstrated, $F(1, 241)= .066, ns$.

Additionally, perceived advisor's responsibility with knowledge of level of negative outcome was examined. A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with Perspective (advisor vs. actor) x Level of severity (moderate vs. severe) as independent variables and advisor responsibility as dependent variable. Again, the analysis confirmed that advisors perceived their own responsibility to exceed the decision maker's perception of responsibility, $F(1,133)= 6.71, p=.011$. No main effect of level of negative outcome was demonstrated, $F(1,133)= .42, ns$. However, a Perspective x Level of severity interaction was confirmed, $F(1,133)= 4.19, p=.043$. As visualized in Table 5, this interaction indicate that advisors perceive themselves more responsible with knowledge of a severe decision outcome, while decision makers, on the other hand, perceive advisor even less responsible with knowledge of severe decision outcome.

The Responsibility of a Group as Perceived by Decision Makers and Advisors

Two scenarios contained, in addition to decision maker and advisor, a group of others who sided with the advisor in recommending one of the options (driving after drinking in the Driving scenario, and focusing on one book in the Book scenario). These groups were also perceived to have some responsibility. In fact, they were perceived as somewhat more responsible than advisors. This was confirmed by a 2 x 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with Perspective (actor vs. advisor) x Level (unknown vs. moderate vs. severe) x Target (group vs. advisor). Perspective and Level were between-group variables and Target was within-group variable. A main effect of Target was demonstrated, $F(1, 236)= 14.30, p<.001$, confirming that the groups present were perceived more responsible than advisors (with means of respectively 37.8 and 32.9). Moreover, a main effect of Perspective was demonstrated between-groups, $F(1, 236) = 21.37, p<.001$, confirming that the decision

maker (self as actor) gave less responsibility to the other group than given by advisor (with means of respectively 27.8 and 43). Neither Level nor any interactions were demonstrated to differ significantly.

Individual Difference in Perception of Responsibility

Similarly to observations in study 1, participants seemed to employ different decision rules when rating responsibility. Approximately 40% of the participants were very particular in not exceeding a total of 100% responsibility (14% perceived actor all responsible while actor not at all responsible), whereas 55% produced ratings that added up to more than 100%. A few participants (5%) gave a total of less than 100%. However, the tendency of using these rules varied with perspective (actor or advisor). Twenty percent of actors against only 8% of advisors perceived actor as totally responsible (100%) and advisor not at all responsible.

Discussion

These results suggest that knowledge of outcome seem to have effect on perception of responsibility, as predicted from LeBeouf and Norton's (2006) observations of magnitude matching of cause and consequences. However, differences were observed between decision maker's perception and advisor's perception of responsibility with knowledge of consequences. While decision makers and advisors agreed upon the total amount of responsibility that lay upon the decision maker, they disagreed upon the responsibility that lay upon the advisor, but not in the direction predicted by the self-serving bias (Snyder & Higgins, 1988). Rather, with knowledge of a negative outcome, decision makers perceived their own responsibility to increase while they perceived the advisor's responsibility to decrease. Further, decision makers perceived advisors to have less responsibility than advisors perceived themselves to have. With knowledge of a moderately negative outcome, advisors perceived their own responsibility to be less than with no knowledge of outcome, however, with knowledge of a severely negative outcome, the advisors perceived their own responsibility to be increased (back to the level with no outcome knowledge).

Promberger and Baron (2006) suggest that decision makers feel less responsible after taking advice. In the present study, differences in responsibility were observed across conditions. However, decision makers' responsibility remained very high, both when perceived by decision makers' themselves and by advisors'. This indicates that although some responsibility is given to advisors in addition to decision makers, shared responsibility does not necessarily mean reduced responsibility. Further, individual differences in perception of

responsibility were observed. A substantial part of the participants perceived decision makers fully responsible regardless of the situation, and participants in the role of decision makers even more so than advisors. Hence, decision makers does not seem to regard advice as a mean to share responsibility on a general basis, as proposed by Harvey and Fischer (1997).

General Discussion

Difference in Perspective and Difference in Preference: Experiment 1 and 2

In two experiments, it was found that the advices people give to others differ systematically from the decisions they make for themselves. This difference seems, as anticipated, to be smaller between advice giving situations and personal decisions with temporal distance. Consistent with our main prediction, results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants recommended more action choices when giving advice, and they made more action choices for themselves in distant future rather than in near future, although only for low-impact situations. Results from Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants made more desirability choices in three out of four situations when giving advice, and also that more desirability choices were made in distant future than in near future. Moreover, participants were found to value feasibility considerations less important in three out of four situations when giving advice. Desirability considerations were more valued than feasibility considerations in all conditions.

These results suggest that people who give advice and make distant future decisions, represent decision problems differently than people who make more immediate decisions. It appears to be some similarities between giving advice and making distant future decisions, which perhaps could be counted for by construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2003). The differences in people's preferences when providing advice and when making distant future decisions, might be due to a psychological distance from the decision situation.

Positive and Negative Consequences

The observed tendency of making more action and desirable choices when having a psychological distance to the decision problem, might be due to less focus on the negative prospects of a decision outcome. Beisswanger et al. (2003) found that people deciding for themselves were particular focused on negative reasons rather than on positive ones, while

people advising others were less focused on possible negative decision outcomes. Eyal et al. (2004) found people to consider more pro argument when thinking about distant future activities than near future activities.

Tory Higgins (e.g. Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 2000a; Higgins, 2000b; Higgins, 2002; Molden & Higgins, 2005) promote a motivation theory, in which people have a promotion or a prevention focus. The promotion focus is concerned with advancement, growth and accomplishment, whereas prevention focus is concerned with security, safety and responsibility. A promotion focus might be more prevalent when people have a distance to a decision task, either in form of temporal or advice giving, in which one is more concerned with the positive aspects like attaining possible gains. Prevention focus, on the other hand, might be more prevalent in near future decision making, in which primary focus is more likely in order to avoid negative outcome, thus a more cautious consideration of both positive and negative aspects of the situation is needed. Consequently, advisors and far future decision makers might be more inclined to make approach choices, whereas immediate decision makers might be more prone to abstain from them.

This is in line with Tversky and Kahneman's (1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) prospect theory, where two phases are distinguished in the choice process, an initial phase, in which acts, outcomes and contingencies are edited or framed, and a subsequent phase of evaluation. Evaluation of prospects differs with different framing of the decision problem. They propose that people evaluate acts in terms of a minimal account (which includes only the direct consequences of the act) or a more inclusive account (more aspects are considered). When people have the perspective of advisors or as distant future decision makers, they might be more likely to evaluate a decision option in a minimal account, mainly considering the core features (possible gains). When people have the perspective of near future decision makers, on the other hand, they might be more inclined to evaluate the acts in a more inclusive account, considering more of the negative aspects in addition to the positive ones (possible losses). As pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman, when one is considering more aspects of a decision situation, the concurrent balance in a possible decision outcome might be negative.

This has some similarities to both CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2003) and the "change in the weighting of dimensions" framework forwarded by Kray and Gonzales (1999), in which both suggests that more aspects of a decision situation are valued when personal decisions are made (in the near future), whereas the most important aspects are given most value in the distant future (CLT), or when giving advice. However, Kray and Gonzale's framework propose that advisors consider the same amount of information as personal decision makers,

but they give more weight to the most important attribute. CLT, on the other hand, suggest that when people have psychological distance from a decision task, information is represented in such way that the most important dimensions are more available.

Weighting of Dimensions Framework and CLT – Is It the Same?

Liberman and Trope (1998) found desirability considerations (the value of an actions end state) to be superordinate to feasibility considerations (practical considerations), both in near and distant future, whereas feasibility considerations were considered less important with temporal distance. Similarly, Kray and Gonzalez (1999) found the most highly valued dimension to stay most important, both when making personal choices and when giving advice, whereas the lower valued dimension were given less weight when providing advice. However, Kray and Gonzales found the most highly valued dimension not to change weight across conditions and argue that this provide support for their proposal that a difference in weighting (of lower valued dimension), rather than a shift in value, is the reason for the observed difference in preferences. Liberman and Trope, on the other hand, found people to value desirability considerations more important in the distant future, in addition to giving less value to feasibility considerations, which they argue provide support for their proposition that a shift in value takes place. In Experiment 2, results demonstrate that participants regarded the feasible aspects less important when providing advice and also when making distant future decisions, whereas they regarded the desirable aspects marginally more important both when making distant future decisions and when giving advice. These results suggest that there are some similarities in how the different aspects are valued, both when comparing advice vs. self-choice conditions and when comparing near vs. distant future conditions. However, we recognize that further research need to be done in order to disentangle whether reasons for the observed differences in preferences are due to a shift in value with different perspective, or difference in weighting of value.

Decision Quality

Although we have found participants systematically to make more action choices and more desirable choices, both with temporal distance and when giving advice, it is important to note that we did not study decision quality. Different perspectives on a decision problem are found to promote different preferences, but no knowledge is obtained on which perspective that might increase the likelihood of making the most optimal decisions.

One perspective is not likely to be superior to others in making the best decisions in all situations. Rather, one perspective is likely to promote more correct decisions in some situations, while other perspectives are likely to promote better decisions in other situations. In the vacation scenario (experiment 1), advisors and far future decision makers (next year) were more inclined to choose to go on vacation in the middle of the semester than decision makers with little temporal distance (this year). It is possible that near future decision makers, in fact, made a better decision in order to do well on the forthcoming exam. Advisors and far future decision makers might have failed to consider the contextual considerations of how long it takes to prepare on each topic relevant for the exam, hence making a planning fallacy (Buehler & Ross, 1994). In the party scenario, on the other hand, it is possible that the advisors made the best choice of taking the risk of introducing oneself, because the downside of the decision was only temporarily (humiliation of being turned down). Only one participant advised the decision maker not to introduce him or herself, which demonstrates that advisors very much agreed upon making this choice, whereas only half of the immediate decision makers chose to introduce themselves.

Implications

However, some implications do arise in using CLT as a general explanation for differences observed with psychological distance. The current results demonstrate that situational differences might occur in advisor preference and personal preference in the future. Same pattern of preference was observed for both advice givers and far future decision makers in all scenarios, except in the sofa scenario (experiment 2). Although the recipient of the sofa was not very fond of the design, advisors recommended acceptance of the sofa more often than personal decision makers (both with and without temporal distance). Personal decision makers, on the other hand, were more likely to reject the sofa in the distant future than in the near future (Trope and Liberman, 1998).

Braithwaite and Scott (1991, as cited in Rohan, 2000) emphasise that personal value-priorities have to do with the desired, or what people want, rather than with the desirable, or what people ought to do. This suggests that there are situations where the desired and the “desirable”, the more normatively correct thing to do, are not the same. The sofa scenario differed from the other scenarios in that the desired option (an attractive sofa) was tied to personal taste, and as we know, personal taste differs among different people. Advisors do probably not relate to others’ personal tastes in a similar way as people relate to their own taste with temporal distance. Most likely are other people’s tastes less available for the

advisors, while practical considerations, on the other hand, like the hassle of moving a sofa, are more available. Moreover, the sofa is offered to the decision maker for free, perhaps the advisor is following some norm where “one ought to accept a perfectly good sofa when offered to you”, and especially in the case of a young student with little money available. Besides, the advisor is not the one having to live with the unwanted sofa.

Limitations and Future Directions for Advice Giving as Psychological Distance

The present approach has some limitations. The scenarios were hypothetical, but on the positive side, there are reasons to believe that the differences in psychological distance would have an even stronger influence on responses in real-live situations, especially in the personal decision making conditions (near and distant future).

We did not study decision quality, and hence cannot tell which choices that would have been the best for the decision maker. Although advisor’s and decision maker’s accuracy has received some attention in the advice taking research (e.g., Gardner & Berry, 1995; Snizek, Schrah & Dalal, 2004; Yaniv, 1997, 2004a), these studies have used judgment tasks rather than choice tasks, thus making comparisons difficult. However, in our Experiment 3, we have studied decisions and advices with negative outcome, which consequently proved to be poor decisions and advices.

Responsibility for Decision: Perceived by Advisor and Decision Maker

The second main agenda with the present work was to explore the domain of responsibility. Decision makers’ and advisors’ responsibility was explored, as seen from the perspectives of both decision makers and advisors. Additionally, perceived responsibility was explored with and without knowledge of decision outcome.

Results from both experiment 1 and 3 suggest that advisors take some responsibility for the decision made. However, results from experiment 3 suggests that there are discrepancies between advisors’ and decision makers’ perception of their own and the other’s responsibility. Although results suggest that decision makers and advisors agreed upon the decision maker’s responsibility (close to full responsibility), they disagreed upon the responsibility that lay upon the advisors’. Advisors perceived themselves to have more responsibility than the decision makers perceived them to have. Interestingly, decision makers perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of a negative outcome, whereas they perceived advisors responsibility to decrease. Advisors, on the other hand, perceived

themselves just as responsible with no knowledge of outcome as with knowledge of a severe outcome, and further, they did not perceive decision makers responsibility to differ with knowledge of outcome.

As predicted from LeBoeuf and Norton's (2006) results of causality, the actors perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of a negative outcome, and also advisors perceived their own responsibility to increase with knowledge of a severely negative outcome (but not exceeding their responsibility level with no knowledge of outcome). To our knowledge, no previous research has been performed on perception or responsibility for decisions following advice taking. Hence, we have no ready explanation for the obtained differences in perceived responsibility, and can only offer speculations about why some of the results occur.

LeBoeuf and Norton found the outcome-cause matching to be prevalent, and suggests that the "resemblances criterion" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, cited in LeBoeuf & Norton, 2006) might account for the observed matching. Presumably, a matching between magnitude of outcome and responsibility might take place. A similarity heuristic (Kahneman & Frederick, 2003) might be used when making responsibility-judgments, in which knowledge of increased magnitude of consequences might promote a similar increase in perceived responsibility.

Additionally, suggestions can be that the awareness of a negative outcome might cause the situation to become more vivid for the decision maker, in which more of the detailed, contextual aspects of the situation become more prominent, for example the fact that the decision maker has to face the consequences alone. Advisors are not faced with the consequences to the same extent as decision makers, advisors responsibility is limited to being blamed for providing poor advice. This awareness might also explain why decision makers actually perceives advisor to have less responsibility when having knowledge of the negative consequences. Knowledge of negative consequences might in fact promote a more realistic perception of responsibility for decision makers. Advisors' perception of responsibility, on the other hand, does not to change accordingly to decision makers, which might indicate that the whole situation is more abstract to them. Advisors might even be following a decision making norm. They might feel that taking some responsibility is the right thing to do, since they actually made a contribution to the outcome in form of giving the advice.

However, individual differences in perception of responsibility were observed, making general explanations less likely valid.

Limitations, Implications and Future Directions for Perceived Responsibility

The present approach to investigate the responsibility of the advisor and decision maker has certain limitations. First, our design does not allow any conclusions to be drawn on whether decision makers are perceived less responsible when taking advice. We have no measures on perceived responsibility for the decision maker when no advice is taken. Although many participants did not perceive the decision maker to be fully responsible, we can only assume that the reason for this observed reduction in responsibility (from 100% when fully responsible) is caused by the decision maker's utilization of advice. Second, the participants were young students. It is possible that samples from different populations might perceive responsibility differently. Moreover, it is plausible that cultural differences might appear in the perception of responsibility. Third, the scenarios were hypothetical. There are reasons to believe that responsibility might be perceived differently in real-life situations, when decision makers will have to live with the consequences of their decisions, and advisors with their conscience.

The domain of responsibility is largely unexplored, and several interesting avenues of research could be followed in order to understand this phenomenon more completely. For example, we found a negative decision outcome to have an impact on decision makers' perception of responsibility, but we have no knowledge of the impact of positive decision outcomes.

Further, descriptive research show how people focus on decision outcome when evaluating the quality of a decision (Keren & Bruin, 2003). Responsibility for advisors' and decision makers' would be interesting to explore from the perspective of outside observers. The Outside observers are not accountable for any outcome, and would perhaps be more inclined to perceive the responsibility of both advisors and decision makers in wisdom of hindsight.

Moreover, perhaps perceived responsibility differs with regard to expert level of advisors and decision makers respectively. Promberger and Baron (2006) found participants to feel less responsible for their decision after taking medical advice from doctors. Research within the advice taking division of the advice tradition, has found decision makers more likely to utilize advice from experts (e.g., Harvey & Fisher, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Yaniv, 2004b; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), to trust advice from experts more (e.g., Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005), and to be more confident when receiving advice from experts (eg., Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). Perhaps perception of advisors' and decision makers' responsibility differs with regard to the relative level of

expertise of an advisor. For example, an advisor is perhaps perceived more responsible in cases like; a professor giving advice to a student, or a doctor giving advice to a patient, or a senior employee giving advice to a junior employee, rather than if the advisor is purely a friend with no more knowledge than the decision maker.

Conclusion

This work demonstrates that advisors preferences bear some similarity to personal distant future preferences. Thus, it is plausible that advice represents a psychological distance to the decision problem, similar as with temporal distance. CLT predicts that psychological distance to an event makes central features of the event more prominent and most value is given to superordinate goals, which offers a plausible explanation for advisors' and distant future decision makers' tendency to choose the more desirable options. However, advisors are found to make choices according to norms more than decision makers (eg., Stone & Allgaier, in press) There are situations where the desired and the desirable are not the same, hence where advisors and decision makers might make different choices due to the fact that they are different persons.

The present work gives a contribution to knowledge of advisors' and decision makers' perception of responsibility for decisions. This could be a good starting point for further studies to obtain a more extensive understanding of the demonstrated phenomena. Phenomena such as: (1) the self-other differences in the responsibility of advisors; (2) the effects of outcome knowledge on perceived responsibility; and (3) whether responsibility can be shared without being reduced.

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Beslutningstaking og rådgivning

Dette spørreskjema er utarbeidet som en del av et forskningsprosjekt om rådgivning og beslutningstaking, som pågår ved Psykologisk institutt. Prosjektet inngår som en del av masteravhandling for Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye, under veiledning av Karl Halvor Teigen. Alle besvarelser er anonyme og vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. En kort rapport om undersøkelsen vil foreligge senere i semesteret, og kan fås ved å sende mail etter 1.november til ghnordby@student.sv.uio.no.

Bakgrunnsopplysninger:

Kjønn (sett ring rundt)

K M

Alder

..... år

Studium/yrke

.....

Hvor lenge har du studert?

.....år

Nedenfor er det beskrevet tre ulike situasjoner der du må ta en beslutning på kort varsel. Prøv og lev deg inn i hver beslutningssituasjon så godt du kan, med de fordeler og ulemper som disse situasjonene innebærer for deg.

Situasjon 1

Det er midt i semesteret og du er i full gang med studiene. En god venn tilbyr deg senere i dag å bli med på en ferietur i en uke til varmere strøk, med garantert sol og sommer. Vennen din har gode kontakter i reiselivsbransjen slik at du får turen svært billig. Du må bestemme deg raskt for om skal ta imot tilbudet, for reisen er allerede til neste uke.

Tror du at du vil velge å reise? (Kryss av)

Reise

Ikke reise

Hvor vanskelig synes du beslutningen var?

Veldig lett

Veldig vanskelig

Hvor sannsynlig er det at du ville søkt råd hos andre?

Helt sikkert ikke

Helt sikkert

Sett at du valgte å spørre en studievenn om råd, hvilket råd tror du ville vært mest sannsynlig å få?

Reise

Ikke reise

Hvilke grunner (for og imot) vurderte du når du tenkte på om du skulle reise eller ikke?

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

Situasjon 2

Tenk deg at du i dag oppdager at du (eller din kjæreste) er gravid. Du blir veldig overrasket da dette ikke er noe du har planlagt at skal skje nå. Du har nylig blitt kjæreste med din partner og det er fortsatt flere år igjen før du er ferdig med studiene dine. Du vet at du har mulighet til å velge abort. Dersom du (eller din kjæreste) ikke tar abort, vil livet ditt bli svært endret siden du kommer til å ha et barn innen dette studieåret er over.

Tror du at du vil velge abort? (Kryss av)

Abort

Ikke abort

Hvor vanskelig synes du beslutningen var?

Veldig lett

Veldig vanskelig

Hvor sannsynlig er det at du ville søkt råd hos andre?

Helt sikkert ikke

Helt sikkert

Sett at du valgte å spørre en studievenn om råd, hvilket råd tror du ville vært mest sannsynlig å få?

Abort

Ikke abort

Hvilke grunner (for og imot) vurderte du når du tenkte på om du (eller din kjæreste) skulle velge abort?

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

Situasjon 3

Tenk deg at du har gjennomført tre år av et studieforløp som vil vare i fem år til sammen. Det er viktig å gjøre det bra på studiet, for det vil være konkurranse om jobbene etter at dere er ferdig utdannet. Du har jobbet hardt i disse tre årene og gjort det brukbart, men du gjorde det dårlig på siste eksamen. Du begynner å bli usikker på om dette er den rette utdannelsen for deg. Da kommer et overraskende og fristende tilbud om en god jobb innenfor et helt annet felt, der lønnen er god og det er gode fremtidsutsikter.

Vil du slutte studiene og ta imot tilbudet? (Kryss av)

Ta imot tilbudet

Ikke ta imot tilbudet

Hvor vanskelig synes du beslutningen var?

Veldig lett

Veldig vanskelig

Hvor sannsynlig er det at du ville søkt råd hos andre?

Helt sikkert ikke

Helt sikkert

Sett at du valgte å spørre en studievenn om råd, hvilket råd tror du ville vært mest sannsynlig å få?

Ta imot tilbudet

Ikke ta imot tilbudet

Hvilke grunner (for og imot) vurderte du når du tenkte på om du skulle ta imot jobbtilbudet?

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-

Råd og beslutninger

Dette spørreskjema er utarbeidet som en del av et forskningsprosjekt om rådgivning og beslutningstaking, som pågår ved Psykologisk institutt. Prosjektet inngår som en del av masteravhandling for Gro Hege Haraldsen Nordbye, under veiledning av Karl Halvor Teigen. Alle besvarelser er anonyme og vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. En kort rapport om undersøkelsen vil foreligge senere i semesteret. Eventuelle spørsmål kan rettes til ghnordby@student.sv.uio.no.

Bakgrunnsopplysninger:

Kjønn (sett ring rundt)	K	M
Alder	år
Hvor lenge har du studert?	år
Har du vært med på en lignende studie før? (sett ring rundt svaret)	Ja	Nei

Du vil i dette spørreskjemaet få presentert 4 ulike situasjoner der du må ta stilling til noen spørsmål. Tenk deg at dette er situasjoner som du står overfor i dag. Sett deg godt inn i situasjonene og svar så godt du kan ut fra hvordan situasjonene er beskrevet og den personen du selv er.

Situasjon 1.

Du er på psykologisk institutt og får vite at en gjesteforelesning vil bli avholdt i dag. Du blir anbefalt av en lærer å gå på denne forelesningen, og du tror at forelesningen både kan være interessant og nyttig for fremtidig arbeid.

Hvor viktig er det for deg at:

forelesningen er faglig relevant? (sett ring rundt svaret)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(Helt uviktig) (veldig viktig)

forelesningen holdes på et praktisk tidspunkt? (sett ring rundt svaret)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(helt uviktig) (veldig viktig)

Det viser seg at forelesningen avholdes kl 18.00, noe som betyr at du må tilbake til instituttet etter middag. Tror du at du vil velge å gå på forelesningen? (kryss av)

Gå på forelesning
Ikke gå på forelesning

Hvor sikker er du på at dette er det riktige valget? (sett ring rundt svaret)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(helt usikker) (helt sikker)

Situasjon 1

Du er med i en kollokviegruppe hvor dere diskuterer hvordan dere skal legge opp lesing, fritid og ekstrajobbing de siste månedene før eksamen. Harald, som også er med i gruppen, forteller at han har tenkt å konsentrere seg om kun den ene av bøkene på pensumlisten. Dette oppfattes som dristig, men Harald hevder at de to oppgavene på eksamen sjelden kommer fra samme bok. De andre lar seg overtale og nå ivrer de for at du skal gjøre det samme.

Du er avhengig av god karakter, da du gjerne vil videre på studiet, men du innser at du ikke rekker å lese begge bøkene grundig dersom du også skal få tid til litt jobb og sosialt liv. Du er svært usikker og spør en venn om råd. Du blir anbefalt å følge kollokviegruppen og satse på å lese en bok grundig. Etter å ha fått rådet ender det med at du følger Harald og resten av kollokviegruppen og leser bare en av bøkene grundig.

I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for at du valgte å satse på bare en bok?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

I hvilken grad er du ansvarlig for at du valgte å satse på bare en bok? (ring rundt svaret)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

I hvilken grad er kollokviegruppen ansvarlig for at du valgte å satse på bare en bok?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

Situasjon 2

Du og fire andre venner prater og drikker vin en fredagskveld. Etter hvert ønsker dere en tur på byen, men lar dere overtale av vertinnen til å bli litt lenger. Da dere endelig skal reise, viser det seg at siste buss allerede har gått. Taxi vil bli dyrt med mye venting. Siden du har med bil, ønsker vennene dine at du kjører og argumenterer med at du er så godt som edru.

Du føler deg i stand til å kjøre, men er redd konsekvensene for å bli tatt eller utsatt for uhell siden du mest sannsynlig befinner deg over promillegrensen. Du er svært usikker og ringer en venn for å spørre om råd. Du beskriver situasjonen og får til råd at det burde være greit å kjøre i dette aktuelle tilfellet, tatt i betraktning at det ville være det mest praktiske og risikoen for at noe skjer er svært liten. Du følger rådet og kjører til tross for at du har drukket alkohol.

I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for at du valgte å kjøre bil etter å ha drukket alkohol? (ring rundt svaret)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

I hvilken grad er du selv ansvarlig for at du valgte å kjøre bil etter å ha drukket alkohol?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

I hvilken grad er de andre festdeltakerne ansvarlig for at du valgte å kjøre bil etter å ha drukket alkohol?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

Situasjon 3

En profilert forsker har skrevet en artikkel på basis av en studie. Du får tilbud om å bli medforfatter av artikkelen, som vil bli forsøkt godkjent i et prestisjetungt tidsskrift. Du har hatt en svært liten rolle i denne prosessen og er veldig usikker på om du skal ta imot tilbudet. Du søker råd hos en studievenn du har tillit til. Hun mener at dette er en gylden sjanse for deg som du ikke må la gå fra deg.

Du følger rådet og blir medforfatter, selv om du ikke ville ha tatt denne beslutningen på egenhånd. Artikkelen blir godkjent i tidsskriftet, og du blir glad av å se ditt eget navn stå der.

I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for at du valgte å bli medforfatter?
(ring rundt svaret)

0 % 10 % 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100 %
(ikke ansvarlig i det hele tatt) (fullstendig ansvarlig)

I hvilken grad er du selv ansvarlig for at du valgte å bli medforfatter?

0 % 10 % 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100 %
(ikke ansvarlig i det hele tatt) (fullstendig ansvarlig)

Situasjon 4

Du sitter som studentrepresentant i styret ved instituttet og dere vurderer to kandidater, henholdsvis Vik og Vang, for et nytt professorat. Vik har hatt mange verv ved universitetet, han har også lang erfaring fra undervisning men har gjort lite spennende forskning. Vang er yngre og har mindre erfaring med undervisning og administrasjon. Til gjengjeld har han publisert noen svært interessante arbeider.

I styret er det delte meninger om hvem som bør velges. Instituttstyreren og representanten for de administrative går inn for Vik som har mer erfaring. De to vitenskapelig ansatte synes man bør satse på Vang, som har gjort mer spennende forskning. Din stemme, som studentrepresentant, vil bli avgjørende.

Du er veldig usikker på hvem du skal velge. Før avstemningen tar du kontakt med en venn som du anser som en klok person. Du gir en balansert fremstilling om alle sidene ved saken og ber om råd. Vennen din råder deg til slutt å stemme på Vang. Du følger rådet.

I hvilken grad er rådgiver ansvarlig for du valgte å stemme på Vang? (ring rundt svaret)

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)

I hvilken grad er du selv ansvarlig for at du valgte å stemme på Vang?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(Ikke ansvarlig overhodet) (Fullstendig ansvarlig)