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Out-Migration of Immigrants: Implications for Assimilation Analysis¹

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Abstract

The laborm arketbehavior of imm igrants is studied in relation to the propensity to outmigrate. U tilizing a large micro dataset for individuals in Norway, which enables identification of outmigrants, I find in line with other studies that attachment to the labor market influences positively on the propensity to stay in the host country. Among the individuals in the labor force I find that outmigrants originally from Non-OECD countries are negatively selected in terms of labormarket earnings, from the pool of Non-OECD immigrants. Among immigrants from OECD countries amore mixed picture arises, with the outmigrants drawn from both extremes of the earnings distribution. Further, I find some indications that immigrants in the upperpart of the earnings distribution for OECD immigrants are highly mobile and consequently stay only a very short time in the host country.

1. Introduction

In m igrant labor is an essential part of the labor force in m ostwestern countries. They are willing to undertake jobs in low-status occupations, and provide vital services as self-em ployed in small businesses, working long hours. For small countries especially, im migrants fill certain highly specialized positions in the laborm arket where the host country could not provide supply from its own labor force. Also, to some extent they act as a buffer in the laborm arket by providing a supply of labor in booms, and by a withdrawal from the laborm arket in downturns. On the other hand, immigrants are accused of over-utilizing the relatively generous welfare system found in most Western countries, to generate ethnic conflicts and to undermine the existing national culture.


Western governments have taken notice of the ongoing trend of declining and ageing native populations (United Nations, 2000), which could increase the pressure for allowing more immigrants into these countries. Also, the labormarket in certain regions, for instance within EU, are becoming more integrated, and the mobility of the work force is, in general, increasing. Moreover, as the EU expands eastwards more countries will experience the drastic decline in the overall costs of moving across borders. In sum, the discussion of immigration policy is on the forefront inmost western countries.


Any imm igration policy should be based on a base of know ledge as wide as possible. Crucial information in this respect is how immigrants conform to, or assimilate in the labormarket. Obviously, one very important aspect of the assimilation process is how long the immigrant stay in the host country. A teach point in time the immigrant can in principle choose whether to stay in the host country or not. If the immigrant choose to leave the host country, he/she could eithermigrate back to the source country (return migrate) or to another country (repeatmigration). To this end I denote both these events out-migration.

² On the other hand, the possible inclusion of new East-European m embers of EU has raised a huge debate on whether the new m ember should have free access to the European laborm arket. One suggestion is to define a transition period for the new m embers where the flow of immigrants are restricted.

³ There ignore the existence of contracts which lim its the stay in the host country, as well as the possibility of involuntary deportations. Dustmann (2000) provides an overview of the different types of migrants.

The number of immigrants who out-migrate from Western countries is substantial. Figure 1 presents the annual flows of foreign-born individuals in- and out of Norway for the period 1961-1999. The outflow as a share of inflow has a mean equal to 0.79 in the period. That is, for every 10 foreign-born individuals that move into Norway, roughly 8 individuals move out. Studies of questions related to immigration should therefore ideally include both immigration and out-migration, and the selection process implied by the large difference between gross- and net immigration.





Out-m igration is a topic which, due to insufficient and incomplete data, has mainly been studied from a theoretical point of view 5 However, information about return propensities

⁴ Source: Statistics N orw ay, Population Statistics.

 $^{^{5}}$ As far as I know, only Tysse and Keilm an (1998) have studied the out-m igration of imm igrants in Norway. However, they did not consider the correlation between earnings and out-m igration which is the main focus in the current study.

and know ledge of how the out-m igrants are characterized is essential forpolicy. For instance, if only a small percentage out-m igrate when the laborm arketworsen, the scope for using immigration as a buffer in the laborm arket becomes less attractive. Even worse, if the mostable leave the host country such a policy could result in a less able immigrant population. On the other hand, if those who do not succeed in the host country labor market leave, we are left with a gradually positively selected immigrant work force.

The earnings assim ilation studies typically utilize two orm one cross sectional data sets, w hich m akes it possible to identify assim ilation effects under strong assum ptions, a survey is provided in Borjas (1999). One of these assumptions is that the group of out-migrants is a random sample from the immigrant cohort under study. All logic and scattered empirical evidence contradicts that this is the case. If the out-m igrants are selective, in the sense that the distribution of earnings-determ ining characteristics differ from the distribution to those who stay, earnings assimilation estimates obtained from cross sectional data would be biased (henceforth denoted the out-migration bias). Very few attempts have been made in correcting the estim ates for possible out-m igration bias. How ever, recently a couple of studies have focused on this problem on U.S. data (Hu, 2000; Demombynes, 1999). Both studies rely on comparing estimates obtained on data from very different sources, and as such have come only part of the way in identifying the sign and strength of the bias. A lso, there are promising ongoing work on data from Denmark and Sweden (Husted et.al., 2000b; Edin et.al., 2001). These studies utilize data from a very long time frame. However, the sample sizes are rathersmall, and the availability of covariates are limited. The main conclusion in these studies, both on the U.S. data and the Nordic data, is that the out-m igrants are negatively selected in terms of earnings, from the group of imm igrants. This leads the authors to conclude that standards earnings assimilation estimates, obtained from repeated cross-sectionals in which out-migration is ignored, are upward biased.

This paper aim sat clarifying these issues using Norw egian data. The main advantage is that I observe the entire population of imm igrants at each point in time. This allows me to rather precisely characterize the different subgroups of the imm igrant population. The outmigrants are identified by sample attrition, which allows for an analysis of the propensity to outmigrate. The paper is organized a follows. In the next section I discuss what economic theory has to say about why individuals move across international borders. In section 3 I survey the available empirically related literature on out-migration, focusing on

those studies which analyse laborm arket earnings. In section 4 I present the data structure. Section 5 contains an analysis of how the out-migrants differ from those who stay. In section 6 I discuss how selective out-migration could influence on earnings assimilation estimates. Finally, in section 7 the results are summarized and interpreted.

2.Theory

In general, why do individuals move across borders? O riginating in Sjaastad (1962) the dom inating explanation has been hum an capital investment. By making an investment (forgone earnings, travel costs etc.) the migrants explores wage differentials and/or acquire skills not obtainable in the source country. The basic model, along with some common interpretations, are neatly summarized in Chiswick (1999). This model, in its most simple version, assumes perfect foresight, no unemployment, fixed wage rates in the source- and host country, and that the migration decision is ineversible (permanent migration). A risk neutral individual who maximizes lifetime income, and who lives infinitely, will migrate if the rate of return to migration, is greater than the real rate of interest cost in financial markets.

If all workers are identical we will typically end up with a corner solution, were either all orno one migrates. In reality both wages and costs will vary according to skill level.

Given that high skilled workers earn more than low skilled and that they are more efficient in the migration process in the sense that they face lower direct costs and that they spend less time on the migration process, they will have a higher rate of return of return to migration compared to low ability workers. The more the rate of return differs between high and low ability workers, the more selective would the migration be. Also, a key insight from this very simple model is that the larger are the direct migration costs, the lower is the propensity to migrate, but the greater is the propensity for a favorable (positive) selectivity in migration.

Within this framework an important determinant of the flow of immigrants is the ratio of wages for high skilled versus low skilled, in the source and host country. If for instance the ratio is higher for high skilled workers (as it would be if the wage distribution is more compressed in the source country compared to in the host country) this would further

increase the positive selectivity in m igration. If the opposite is true, that is if the ratio is lower for high skilled workers, this effect would work in the opposite direction and counteract the effects stem ming from higher efficiency and lower direct costs.

How ever, people move across borders also for other reasons than purely economical. One would expect that the mechanism outlined above would be less intense among those migrants who move across borders as refugees or due to family reunification etc. Also, more realistic, the information about the skill level would be asymmetric in the sense that the host country employer would not have full information about the skill level and productivity for the newly hired migrant. One simple assumption (Katz and Stark, 1987) is that the migrant on arrival is paid according to the average skill level among immigrants. Thus, the high skill workers would face a less favorable ratio of source country/host country wages at the outset, which would work in the direction of a less favorably selected migration.

To sum up, the model outlined above identifies wage differentials along with cost-and time efficiency as the main push factors (supply side) behind migratory behavior. As such, the model does not point to any particular mechanism for returning, besides from the obvious possibility that the wage differential could turn around over time in favor of the source country, or in principle of other countries, and induce the migrant to out-migrate. Still, the model serves as a useful reference in any discussion and analysis of labor migration.

What then motivates immigrants to out-migrate? Dustmann (1996b) provides some suggestions within an optimal life-cycle human capital model. In particular, it is rationalized why the migrant would out-migrate despite a higher wage in the host country compared to the source country, and the optimal duration in the host country is calculated. Three different motives are put forward: (i) accumulation of human capital; (ii) complementarities between consumption and the location for consumption; and (iii) differences in relative prices. It is shown that the optimal duration is not necessarily increasing in the wage level in the host country. More conventionally, the optimal duration is increasing in the planning horizon, and in the desired stock of savings at the end of the planning horizon.

What do the above mentioned theories imply for the laborm arket behavior of those who out migrate versus those who stay? Assuming that there is a wage premium associated with the initial move, the temporary migrant will typically, due to the limited horizon of the stay in the host country, supply more labor, save more of their income, and invest less in host country specific human capital. Also, to the extent that the human capital requirements in the labormarket varies across borders, short-term migrants would have less incentive to invest in host-country human capital, which could lead to a less favorable selective migration.

Dustmann (2000) contains an excellent discussion of these questions. The motives behind the move across borders are investigated from a theoretical point of view, and the implications for empirical analysis is discussed. The main point is that the length of the stay in the host country could affect earnings-influencing investment to a high degree, and hence empirical specifications which do not take this into account risk to obtain estimates that are biased. As investments in human capital in general may have strong impacts on the earnings profile, differences in assimilation rates between immigrant groups of different origins can be explained by different return probabilities. However, it is not clear how to approach this problem, even with full information on completed duration, as it is the unobserved intention which in principal determines the investments in general-and country specific human capital.

How ever, the extent of which the imm igrants behave rationally according to the factors outlined above could vary between groups of imm igrants. Iwould expect that both the motivation behind the initial migratory move as well as the geographical and cultural distance are important in this respect. Imm igrants who arrive as refugees and asylum seekers would be expected to behave less rational than pure laborm igrants. Also the less the geographical and cultural distance between the source and the host country, the more would we expect the imm igrant to respond to for instance changes in the wage structure and job opportunities.

3. A brief review of the literature

My review of the related empirical literature is threefold. Firstly, I discuss the existing literature on earnings assimilation. Secondly, I give a review of those studies who analyse out-migration in general, and which focus on to which extent the out-migrants are selected from the group of immigrants in the host country. Lastly, I discuss those contributions in the literature which explicitly have gone into the issue of how (selective) out-migration affects earnings assimilation estimates.

The empirical literature on how immigrants conform to the host country laborm arket is substantial, and although ${\tt m}$ ost of the focus has been on the U $\,{\tt S}$. laborm arket a num ber of studies have been undertaken for European countries, Canada and Australia as well. The typical modern study of earnings assimilation utilize two ormore cross sections, as in Borjas (1995), in order to separate cohort- and years-since-im m igration effects. Evidence for Norway is provided by Hayfron (1998) and Longva and Raaum (2001a). A quilar and Gustafson (1991) provides results for Sweden, while Husted et. al. (2000) studies Danish data. There are huge differences across nations when it comes to the history of im m igration, im m igration policy, and also in how an im m igrant, as well as earnings, are defined and m easured in the data sets. This, togetherw ith the variations of m ethods applied to cope with the assorted data deficiencies, makes a cross country comparison difficult. How ever, in most countries there seems to be a underlying declining earnings capacity of the most recent im migrant cohort over time, especially in the 80's. This justifies the use of two orm ore observations in time when measuring the effect of yearssince-m igration on earnings. Next, im m igrants starts out with an earnings disadvantage com pared to natives, but in prove their earnings over time. The speed atwhich this happens (the degree of assimilation) varies. For instance, Longva and Raaum (2001a) finds that im m ignants from Non-OECD countries im prove their earnings by about 6 percent relative to natives during their initial 10 years of residence in Norway.

Turning to the out-m igration studies, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) analyzes the return m igration of imm igrants in the U.S.Based on measures of the return migration flow by source country, data from the 1980 Census, and various aggregated data from the source countries, they find that imm igrants tend to return to rich countries and to countries not far away from U.S.A. Iso, the data gives some support to the hypothesis that return migration

tend to accentuate the selection originally characterizing the imm igrant flow . A similar study is conducted by R am os (1992) who finds that the migrants from Puerto R ico to the U.S. are negatively selected, both on observables and unobservables. Those who return from U.S. are, on the other hand, positively selected from the pool of Puerto R ican migrants in the U.S. These findings are interpreted as a support of a model where individuals from the lower part of the earnings distribution move from economies with the larger income inequality to economies with the less income inequality.

Within the European context, Dustmann (1996a) provides a simple empirical analysis of the determinants of the intended stay in the host-country among immigrants to Germany. Also, on a small sample of returned immigrants (after a stay in Germany) to Turkey, the out-migration decision is evaluated exante. He finds that the propensity to out-migrate increases with the age at entry, but declines with the number of years in the host country, holding age at entry constant. This latter effect is interpreted as a strong assimilation effect. However this could also be caused by selection if those who have the highest propensity to out-migrate do so after a short duration of stay.

Husted et.al. (2000b) studies out-migration on a comprehensive Danish data set. The main focus is on estimations of the probability among the stock of immigrants in 1986 of leaving Denmark in the subsequent nine years. Like Dustmann (1996a) they find a negative duration dependence in the sense that the probability of leaving is a decreasing function of the number of years the immigrant has resided in the host country. Further, the closer the immigrant has been attached to the labormarket, the lower the probability of leaving, which is interpreted as an indication of that the least successful out-migrate. On the other hand, registered unemployment works in the other direction, as those with a high number of months receiving unemployment benefits yield a low out-migration probability. Interestingly, the ratio between incomentomers of some work and gross income, interpreted by the authors as the ability to provide for oneself, enters negatively in the probit equation. This leads the authors to infer that the more able the immigrant are to provide for her/himself, the lower is the probability of out-migration.

 $^{^6}$ However, as the inhabitants of Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens, the relevance of this analysis in an international migration context could be questioned.

Borjas (1989) is the first study I am aw are off that explicitly focuses on the problem s, due to selective out-m igration, inherited in the standard approach to earnings assimilation estimation. A thand he has a small panel sample of scientist and engineers in the US, for the years 1972 and 1978. He finds that immigrants are more likely to leave the sample relative to natives (as expected), and that the probability is decreasing with the number of years since immigration, controlling for a number of other characteristics. Regarding earnings, it is shown that it is the least skilled (measured by weekly earnings) that disappear from the sample. Three separate estimations of the earnings assimilation model are undertaken, one for the full population, one for the subsample who stays in the sample, and one for the subsample who disappears from the sample. The results show that the stayers start out with a smaller wage differential compared to natives than movers.

Dustmann (1993) investigates how the earnings assimilation pattern depends on the intended duration of the stay (atamival) in the host country. On theoretical grounds he first argues that the amount of human capital investment undertaken by the immigrant depends negatively on the intended duration of the stay, implying a flatter earnings profile as the intended duration decreases. Secondly, the selectivity of the temporary immigrants depends crucially on the state of the laborm arket in the source country as well as in the host country, at the time of entry. Specifically, high unemploymentalong with low levels of unemployment benefits, in the source country relative to the host country, could give a negatively selected pool of immigrants in the host country. Data from Germany give some support to these hypotheses. However the sample is small, with no time dimension, hence different cohort effects in the pool of immigrants are implicitly assumed away. Dustmann (1999) tests the same hypothesis on data for language acquisition, a test that supports the theory.

There have been, and still are, huge controversies regarding the assim ilation of im m igrants in the U.S. laborm arket. Thus, one should not be surprised of the fact that the potential role of out-m igration has come into focus recently, in spite of the considerable difficulties in obtaining reliable data for this purpose. The studies that I am aware of are D em om bynes (1999), Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2000). The comm on approach is to compare earnings assimilation patterns obtained from standard repeated cross-sections and longitudinal data.

The source and approach in constructing the longitudinal data varies between the studies but they all face, to a varying degree though, data problems like censoring, eligibility etc. This is a common problem for the recent U.S. studies although it seems that Lubotsky (2000) goes a long way in clarifying the comparability problem, as well as taking this into account in the approach. Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2000) find that assimilation estimates based on the Censuses are biased upwards caused by negatively selected return migrants, in the sense that the out-migration flow is substantial and consisting of individuals who's potential earnings are below those who remain. Demombynes (1999) on the other hand finds indications of a more rapid earnings grow the in the 90's using the longitudinal data.

Lastly, a very interesting study is conducted by Edin et. al. (2001) on Swedish data. They observe a three percent sample of the population in each year 1970-97, and are able to distinguish between stayers and movers among the immigrant population by a simple sam ple attrition procedure. Within a cross-sectional fram ework they estimate earnings profiles for im m igrants by region of origin. They find no assim ilation effect for im m igrants from the Nordic countries and from the OECD region, these groups stay roughly 15-20 percent below the average native in income. Im m igrants from Non-OECD countries on the other hand enters the economy with a huge disadvantage in income, and experience only modest earnings assimilation, concentrated on the first five years of their stay. Next, the consequences of out-migration for the earnings assimilation estimates are investigated. They find that the least successful outmigrate. That is, within each group by region of origin, the group of out-m igrants could be characterized as those: (i) least attached to the laborm arket, m easured by w hether or not they are observed w ith zero earnings; and (ii) in the low expart of the earnings distribution, among those with positive earnings. Thus, by restricting the sam ple to those who remain in Sweden, they find that the assim ilation estim ates weakens compared to the benchmark analysis were bias from out-m ignation are not taken into account. The authors state quite strongly that this is the

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⁷ Dem om bynes (1999) uses merged CPS (Central Population Study) data for households, while Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2000) use Social Security data.

 $^{^{8}}$ Interestingly, Lubotsky (2000) also finds that m is classification in Census based studies of transient im m igrants as m ore recent arrivals than they actually were, leads to an overstatem ent of the declining earnings potential among successive im m igrant cohort in the U.S.

case. How ever, in the regressions they only adjust for age and gender, hence they do not take into account that other variables could vary between the groups. Moreover, the sample is quite small.

To sum up, a large empirical literature exists on how immigrants fare in the host-country laborm arket with regards to earnings. As a rule, these studies use the so called synthetic panel approach where two ormore cross sectional data sets are utilized in order to follow immigrant cohorts over time. In contrast, there exist only scattered empirical evidence on how out-migration influence the assimilation estimates. The common finding is that the out-migrants are negatively selected from the pool of immigrants, in the sense that their laborm arket earnings are less than for those who remain. Taken at face value this means that standard earnings assimilation estimates are upward biased. My study aims at adding to this recent literature.

4.Data

In two previous studies of the earnings assim ilation of Norwegian imm igrants we have utilized m icrodata with two observations in time, 1980 and 1990 (Longva and Reaum, 2001a; 2001b). The possible influence of selective outm igration was not specifically accounted for. Thus, it could be interesting in itself to apply these data, in order to get a validity check of our previous results. How ever, the 1980-90 time dimension is ham pered by a num ber of com plicating factors. Firstly, the m acroeconom ic situation was very different at the two points in time, with the aggregate unem ploymentalmost three times higher in 1990 as in 1980. Longva and Raaum (2001a) show that im migrantearnings are m uch m ore affected by high unem ploym ent com pared to natives, thus the com m on assum ption of equal period effects is hard to employ. Secondly, the characteristics of the im m igrant population changed dram atically, as the im m igration in the 1980's was dom inated by refugees, asylum seekers, and family reunification, while the immigration until the m id 1970's was dom inated by laborm igrants. Each of these factors are by them selves worth a study. The question of how out-migration influences the results, adds to the com plexity of the analysis. In addition, for those who leave the sample during the 80'ies, and thus under certain assum ptions could be characterized as out-m igrants, we do not observe when they arrived in Norway for the first time. This puts a limit on the use of this data set to investigate the precise effect of out-m igration on earnings assim ilation estim ates. Therefore, in addition to a characterization of m overs versus stayers, I resort to study the out-m igration decision only, by estimating the probability to out-m igrate. The set builds on information of all imm igrants and a random sample of natives in 1980 and 1992. Details on the underlying sampling procedure are documented in Appendix 1. The set is denoted the 1980 Sample.

The second data set available consists of all residents in N orw ay in 1993 and in 1997, with full information about arrival date and country of origin, 10 which enables a calculation of the length of the residence for all immigrants, including those who out-migrate. Hence, I can study the relationship between the propensity to out-migrate, earnings and years-since-migration. Moreover, I can undertake an explicit comparison of earnings assimilation estimates obtained from samples where we can include/exclude those who leave the sample due to out-migration. Details on the underlying sampling procedure are documented in Appendix 2. The set is denoted the 1993 Sample.

Imm igrant

I classify an individual as an imm igrant if he/she is born in a foreign country, with two foreign born parents. However, as explained in Appendix 1, I do not have available the country of origin for the out-migrants in the 1980 sample. For this group I therefore assume that the country of origin is equal to the observed citizenship. That is, naturalized immigrants that out-migrate are not captured by my definition of out-migrants. This would represent a problem for the interpretations of the results (or rather the applicability of the analysis) if this group: (i) systematically differ, in observed or unobserved characteristics, from the group of out-migrants without a Norwegian citizenship; and (ii) is large in numbers. Regarding the first point I have no definite opinion, however regarding the latter I would expect that the group in question is relatively small in size. It should be noted that in order to become a Norwegian citizen one must have been in the country for at least

⁹ In light of the discussion of the 1980-90 period, the reference to 1992 m ay seem strange. However, the 1990 sample utilized in Longva and Rauum (2001a, 2001b), is selected conditional of their presence in Norway two years later, in 1992. Thus, as residence in Norway is crucial for the classification of outmigrants, I find itmost appropriate to refer to 1992 in the presentation of this sample.

 $^{^{10}}$ This is part of the data set utilized in Barth et.al. (2000).

seven years. It is worth noting that a num ber of studies use only citizenship as the criterion for the classification of imm igrants, which yields an inferior sample as a number of foreign born individuals naturalize. As I have available both country of origin and citizenship for the majority of the sample in 1980, I amable to compare these two classification rules, see Appendix 1. Lastly, I divide each sample of immigrants into those who were born in a OECD country, and those born in a country outside the OECD. A atives constitutes the residual, i.e. those born in Norway or in a foreign country with at least one Norwegian born parent.

Out-migrant

Outm igrants are defined by a sam ple attrition procedure. That is, an individual in the 1980 sam ple is defined as an outm igrant if he/she is not present in 1992. Correspondingly in the 1993 sam ple, where the classification is done based on the residence in 1997. One possible source of bias is that I wrongly classify those who die between the two points of observation, as outmigrants. A simple correction could be done using the publicly available statistics of the mortality rate in Norway by age and gender. How ever, the main focus of this paper is on the correlation between the propensity to outmigrate and individual earnings, hence without any information about the correlation between mortality and earnings, I doubt whether such a correction would influence the main results. Also, it will be shown that the number of outmigrants are very large compared to the number of deaths at the present mortality rate. Hence, I have not prioritized such an adjustment.

Note that the different sam pling frame in the two data sets allows us to capture the outmigrants defined by two different lengths of stay. That is, if we capture outmigrants by sample attrition, we then select the group by a 12 and 4 years-of-stay-limit for the most

¹¹ For instance O ECD (2000) use citizenship to calculate the comparable share of imm igrants in all European O ECD countries.

¹² OECD (Nordic, with the exception of Norway, OECD-Europe as of 1990, North-America, Australia, New Zealand), Non-OECD (Eastern-Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin-America).

¹³ Thanks to Tore Schweder for pointing this out.

The annual average mortality rate is about 0.37 percent per 1999, SSB (2000). Interestingly, Schoeni (1997) reports some evidence of lowermortality among foreign-born in the U.S. compared to the U.S. born.

recent cohort in the 1980 and 1993 set respectively. However, the term length-of-stay must be used with caution, as the immigrants have spent a different numbers of years in Norway when I first observe them in 1980 and 1993. For instance, from the 1980 sample the subsample of out-migrants will consists of those in the k cohort of immigrants who spend between (1980-k) and (1993-k) years in Norway. Thus, for the different immigrant cohorts we capture the out-migrants at different stages of their stay. This is important to have inmind when interpreting the results.

Labor force participation

As I eventually would study laborm arket earnings, I find it appropriate to categorize each individual according to its laborm arket status. Most studies use a cutoff-point in earnings to select the sample (including Longva and Raaum, 2001a; 2001b). However, such a procedure is not ideal as the sample selection criteria is highly correlated with the dependent variable under study. The 1980 Census data includes information about hours of work which allows me to avoid the cutoff-point procedure. Thus, in the 1980 sample I define an individual as a member of the labor force if the individual: (i) reported that they worked 100 hours ormore during the Census year; and (ii) is registered with nonzero earnings. As we miss information about the actual number of hours worked in the 1993 data set we are forced to use an income criterion to assign the crucial labor force status. The annual threshold level is, set to approximately the average monthly earnings for full time workers.

Age, Student, Self-employed

In order to m inim ize the impact of the possible bias caused by the inability to distinguish between out-m igration and death, I have chosen to restrict the sample to those who are (or would have been) 64 years of age at the right endpoint in each sample. Hence, in the 1980 sample I select those aged 18-52, and in the 1993 sample I select those aged 18-60. Lastly, I throw out all students, as well as all registered as self-employed from the 1980 sample,

¹⁵ There ignore the possibility that the imm igrantmay out-migrate, and then immigrate again between the two points of observation.

Interestingly, the average annual earnings among the individuals categorized as not in labor force by m y selection rule are approximately equal to the cut-off point used in Longva and Raaum (2001a, 2001b), which is the average monthly earnings for full time workers.

which excludes about 7 percent of the natives, and 5 percent of the imm ignants. Unfortunately, I am not able to apply this selection criteria on the 1993 sample.

Given the complex data structure, and the large number of variables available, I face a number of difficult decisions regarding the empirical approach. The literature offers few guidelines in this respect. As discussed in section 3 the few studies which have been undertaken have designed the analysis according to specific structure of their data. In light of this I have chosen a rather broad empirical approach, focusing more on providing basic figures, rather than estimating heavily parameterized models. For instance, I have chosen not to undertake separate analyses for each gender as I am not convinced that a separate analysis is justified, given the other alternatives. For instance, a separate analysis by country of origin could potentially, from my point of view, provide as much insight.

Table 1 provides som e basic figures according to the chosen classifications. To simplify the exposition Idenote out-migrants as Movers and the residual as Stayers. For instance, 12 825 individuals from OECD countries are observed outside the labor force in 1980. Am ong these, 46 per centare notobserved in 1992 and thus classified as movers, and 69 percent are fem ales. While Non-OECD immigrants out-numbered the OECD imm igrants in the 1980 sample, it is opposite in the 1993 sample. This is due to the large inflow of Non-OECD imm igrants during the 1980's and underscores the importance of taking account of the region of origin distribution in the empirical analysis. O there is ewe risk to confound the findings with pure composition effects due to the dram atic shift in the population structure. Lastly, by any standard the sample sizes, are large which enables a rather detailed specification. 17 C om paring the sam ple sizes by labor force status w e observe that the overall labor force participation rate is clearly higher am ong natives com pared to the two groups of immigrants. This finding is in linewith Husted et.al. (2000a) which finds that that the unem ployment rate of immigrants in Denmark ismuch higher than for Danish born. The high share of imm igrants outside the labor force points to the importance of not neglecting this group.

¹⁷ For instance, Dustmann (1993) observe a total of 1064 imm ignants while Dustmann (1996a) apply a sample of 6901. Edin (2001) observe a 3 percent sample each year from 1970 to 1990, which adds up to 15574 imm ignants. The sample size in Husted et.al. (2000b) is not reported.

Table 1. Sam ple sizes, share movers and share fem ales.

	1980 Sam ple				e	
Country of origin ^a	Size	M overs (share)	Fem ales (share)	Size	M overs (share)	Fem ales (share)
Not in the labor force						
N orw ay	23 145	.00.	.82	90 120	.02	54
OECD	12 825	.46	.69	14 196	30	.54
Non-OECD	5 155	26	.63	33 951	14	.51
In the labor force						
N orw ay	95 470	.00.	.44	340 893	.01	.48
OECD	28 244	25	.46	33 963	10	.50
Non-OECD	11 412	12	29	37 460	.05	36

^a Fornon-residents 1992, in the 1980 sample, the country of origin is based on the citizenship.

Turning to the extent of out-m ignation we observe, as expected, that only a very small fraction, 1-2 per cent, of the native sam ple leave the sam ple between 1993 and 1997. The finding of zero attrition in the native sam ple between 1980 and 1992 is due to the construction of the data set, as explained in Appendix 1. The out-m ignation behavior for the imm ignants, as represented by the share of movers, could be summarized as follows:

(i) in the 1980 sample the share of out-mignants among those outside the labor force is about the double compared to the share among those within. In the 1993 sample the share is roughly three times as high for those outside compared to those within; (ii) the share of out-mignants is roughly the double among OECD immignants compared to among Non-OECD immignants; and (iii) the share in the 1980 sample is higher than in the 1993 sample. That the overall propensity to leave the sample is higher in the 1980-92 sample compared to in the 1993 sample could easily be explained by the difference in the time span between the two observations over time used to identify the out-mignants. While I

define those who disappear from the sample during the following 12 years in the 1980 sample, the corresponding numbers of years is 4 in the 1993 sample.

A lithough the large share of out-m igrants among the OECD imm igrants could in principle be caused by some kind of composition effect, it should not be controversial to state that OECD imm igrant cross the borders more frequently than the Non-OECD imm igrants. One common explanation could be found in the imm igration laws which allows in principle unrestricted movement within the Nordic countries and the EU, another in the small cultural distance between Norway and many western countries. More puzzling, a larger percentage of the individuals outside the labor force out-migrate compared to the individuals in the labor force. Taken at face value, this could be interpreted as an early indication that those who do not succeed in the labormarket leave. This finding is in line with Edin et. al. (2001). However, there are several objections to such an interpretation. First, people may come for other reasons than labor, for instance to take education, due to family unification, or as refugees. Second, my measure of earnings is not necessarily a good measure for success in the labormarket.

Regarding the gender distribution I find that fem ales are over-represented outside the labor force in the early sample (1980), while the distribution is more equal in 1993. This is partly due to an overall increase in the labor force participation among fem ales, and partly due to the severe worsening in the labor market between these two points in time, which affected a number of the employed males. It should also be noted that the share of females is low among the Non-OECD immigrants compared to OECD immigrants and natives. Also (not shown), the tendency to outmigrate is much stronger among mencompared to women. We know that mentypically are the main breadwinners in the family, and hence would be over-represented among short term labor migrants, while women on the other hand are over-represented among the family-reunification migrants.

As remarked upon earlier in this section I observe the imm igrant cohorts at different stages of their stay. This motivates a look at the share of movers for each arrival cohort. Table 2 provides an overview for the 1993 sample, using 5-year cohorts, by labor force status. For instance, among the imm igrants born in an OECD country, not in the labor force in 1993, who arrived before 1965, 5 percent (first row, first column) are not observed in 1997 and thus classified as movers. It seems like the longer the imm igrant has been in Norway as of

1993 the less chance for outm igration during the next four years. This can be interpreted as a cohort effect, a years-since-im m igration effect, or a combination. In the first case the increasing share of out-migrants as the arrival time get closer to 1993 is due to inherent differences between the arrival cohorts, with the early cohort characterized by a low out-migration propensity, and the more recent cohort characterized by a higher out-migration propensity. In the latter case the pattern is interpreted as a declining out-migration propensity as the length of the stay increases, which is what we will observe if the arrival cohorts consists of a mix of short-term and long-term in migrants. The pattern for OECD immigrants is very strong. While only five percent of the remaining immigrants from the pre 1964 arrival cohort outside the labor force out-migrated during 1994-97, the corresponding number is almost sixty percent for the most recent cohort. The pattern for those in the labor force is also clear, especially from the 1980-84 cohort on.

Table 2. Share movers, by arrival cohort, 1993 sample.

	Not in the	labor force 1993	In the lab	or force 1993	
Cohort	OECD	Non-OECD	OECD	Non-OECD	
A rrived pre.1965	.05	.07	.02	.03	
A mived 1965-69	80.	11	.03	.03	
A mived 1970-74	14	10	.04	.03	
A mived 1975-79	21	.09	.05	.03	
A mived 1980-84	26	11	.08	.04	
A mived 1985-89	39	14	13	.06	
A rrived 1990-92	59	18	34	10	

 $^{^{18}}$ This process could be illustrated within a simple form all framework modeling the stock and outflow of immigrant cohort over time.

5.Movers versus Stayers

The empirical analysis will proceed as follows. I start out with some basic descriptive statistics followed by a simple multivariate analysis of the earnings differential between movers and stayers. As the main focus is on earnings, this part of the analysis is undertaken on the subsample of labor force participants. Next I provide an analysis of the discrete choice of whether to out-migrate or not.

Descriptive statistics

Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for those in the labor force by out-m igration status, separately for the two samples. First, looking at the earnings statistics, we observe that natives on average earned less than the imm igrants with the exception of the group of Non-OECD imm igrants in 1993. This somew hat peculiar observation was also found in Longva and Raaum (2001b), but was to some degree explained by a different age- and gender structure in the samples. Nevertheless, with the mentioned exception, these simple figures paint a fairly positive picture of immigrant laborm arket behavior. Taken at face value, and by using earnings as a measure of the immigrants contribution to the economy (Borjas, 1999), the high mean earnings provide some indications of a positive contribution to the economy from immigrants participating in the labor force. 19

Turning to the earnings differential between movers and stayers we observe that the mean annual earnings among 0 ECD movers are well above the corresponding statistics for stayers. However, the reported percentiles show that the earnings distribution among the movers is skewed to the extremes, with the 90 percentile roughly twice as large as the corresponding figure for the stayers, and with the 10 percentile below that of the stayers. Thus it seems like 0 ECD movers consist of a number of high-earnings individuals, mixed with movers which have annual earnings clearly below that of the stayers. The earnings distribution among the Non-OECD movers is more in line with the stayers, at least in the upperpart of the earnings distribution. However, both the median and the 10 percentile are clearly below that of movers, in both samples. Thus it seems like

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¹⁹ Of course, such a statement is build on a number of strong assumptions and premises, which I will not go into in this paper (Borjas, 1999). However, from my point of view it is striking that we observe a positive earnings gap for large groups of immigrants in Norway.

Table 3.M eans, individuals in the labor force.

		OE	CD	Non-C	DECD
V ariable	N atives	Stayers	M overs	Stayers	M overs
1980 Sample					
Earnings ^a , m ean	153	169	261	163	171
Earnings ^a , 90 percentile	248	273	523	247	255
Earnings ^a , 50 percentile	154	162	152	161	151
Earnings ^a , 10 percentile	49	52	44	70	57
Log Earnings	11.74	11.81	11.89	11.86	11.79
Fem ales, share	0.44	0.49	0.37	0.30	0.20
Age, in years	33.85	37.67	31 34	33.71	32 32
Education, in years	10.33	11.43	11.85	11.15	10.98
Education m issing, share	0.01	0.14	0.22	0.35	0.46
Y ears since imm igration	-	11.35	-	7.67	-
<u>1993 Sample</u>					
Earnings ^a , mean	164	190	258	130	141
Earnings ^a , 90 percentile	271	317	527	226	245
Earnings ^a , 50 percentile	160	175	174	124	97
Earnings ^a , 10 percentile	46	64	49	33	25
Log Earnings	11.81	11.96	12.03	11.55	11.42
Fem ales, share	0.48	0.51	0.44	0.37	0.30
Age, in years	37 23	41.74	36.81	34.98	34 29
Education, in years	11.58	12.57	12 95	11.43	12.35
Education m issing, share	0.01	0.43	0.79	0.52	0.55
Y ears since im m igration	-	15.87	7.20	10.01	7.58

^aThousand 1990 NOK

 $^{^{\}mathrm{b}}\!\mathrm{A}\,\mathrm{m}$ ong those w ith registered educational attainm ent

the movers on average are drawn from the low expart of the earnings distribution among the Non-OECD im m ignants.

Further, the movers are younger than the stayers, especially among the OECD immigrants. At face value the movers are more educated than the stayers among OECD immigrants, and less educated among Non-OECD immigrants. However, Imiss information on educational attainment for a large share of the immigrant groups, especially for the Non-OECD movers where Imiss information for nearly half of the group. This fact hints at that we should be careful in using educational attainment as a regressor later on. Lastly, we note that the average OECD immigrants has spent less time in Norway compared to the average Non-OECD immigrant. From the 1993 sample we observe that the movers, as expected, have spent less time in Norway compared to the stayers.

M ultivariate analysis

This exercise is motivated by the different distributions of socioeconom ic variables by out-migration status, and by country of origin, as shown in Table 3. Specifically Iwould like to investigate whether the presented raw earnings differentials by country of origin, as well as by out-migration status, could be explained by differences in the distribution of marital status, gender, age and education. I estimate the following model by ordinary least squares, separately for each sample (1980 and 1993):

$$y_{i} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}I_{i} + \alpha_{2}I_{i} * OUT_{i} + X_{i}\beta + \varepsilon_{i}$$

$$\tag{1}$$

where y_i denotes the natural logarithm of annual earnings for individual i, I is a dum my variable for im m igrant status, OUT is a dum my variable which takes the value 1 if the individual is classified as a mover, 0 otherwise. X is a vector of sosioeconomic variables, and α_0 , α_1 , α_2 and β are unknown parameters. By the specification in (1) we restrict the variables in X to have the same impacton log earnings, independent of region of origin, which is a highly questionable assumption in light of the presumable very different underlying return to observable variables, for instance educational attainment. However, for the case of simplicity I stick to this restriction. Also, note that in light of the earnings

distributions presented in Table 3, the use of a logarithm ic transform ation of the dependent variable is not unproblem atic.²⁰

Table 4 provides estim ates of the imm igrant dumm ies and the interaction terms, obtained by estimations of (1) on individuals in the labor force, in 1980 and 1993 respectively. These estimates are approximations of the group specific mean earnings, relative to natives. The controls included are indicated in the bottom of the table. For instance, in 1980, from column 5, we observe from the first row that the average stayer from an OECD country earned 2.6 percentmore than natives, controlling for the differences in the distribution of gender, age and marital status. The second row is accordingly interpreted as the earnings differential between OECD stayers and movers, evaluated at the means (in the 1980 sample) of the above mentioned socioeconom ic variables.

From the 1980 sam plewe observe from column (1) and (2) that the earnings advantage for the group of imm ignants from Non-OECD countries disappear once we control for some basic individual characteristics. The earnings differentials in column (3) are identical to those that result from a comparison of the mean log earnings presented in Table 3.

Controlling forgender we find that immigrants from OECD countries earn more than immigrants from Non-OECD countries, both among stayers and movers. Column (6) presents the differentials after controlling for the full set of variables. We observe that we end upwith a structure similar to what we found by comparing the raw means, namely that the movers earn more (less) in 1980 than the stayers among the OECD (Non-OECD) immigrants. The results for the 1993 sample show that much of the earnings advantage of OECD immigrants overnatives could be explained by socioeconomic characteristics.

Further, by controlling for the full set of variables, the other differentials, as observed in column (3), become stronger. For instance, while the average Non-OECD mover earned 13 per cent less than the average Non-OECD stayer, this differential increases to 188 per centafter controlling for gender, age, marital status and education.

The widely used log transform ation of earnings in the literature is normally justified by two factors: (i) the distribution of earnings is positively skewed such that the distribution of log earnings is closer to the normal distribution; (ii) the transformation simplifies the interpretations of the estimated coefficients from the regressions. Regarding (i) no such regularity is observed in the subsets of stayers and movers, judging from Table 3. In spite of this I have undertaken the transformation as this greatly simplifies the interpretation of the estimates.

Table 4. Estim ates of the im m igrant dum m y and interaction w ith out-m igration status, individuals in the labor force.

V ariable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<u>1980 Sample</u>						
OECD	.090 (.005)	.057 (.004)	.070 (.006)	109 (.005)	.026 (.005)	032 (.005)
OECD*OUT			.081 (.010)	800 (e00.)	119 (.009)	114 (.009)
Non-OECD	108 (.007)	017 (.006)	.116 (.008)	.020 (.007)	005 (.007)	034 (.007)
Non-OECD*OUT			073 (.022)	-145 (.015)	-102 (.019)	095 (.018)
1993 Sample						
OECD	.161 (.004)	.048 (.003)	154 (.004)	165 (.004)	.035 (.004)	002 (.004)
OECD*OUT			.074 (.013)	.049 (.012)	125 (.011)	148 (.011)
Non-OECD	-266 (.004)	-337 (.003)	-259 (.004)	-301 (.004)	-328 (.003)	-317 (.004)
Non-OECD*OUT			-130 (016)	-155 (016)	-169 (.014)	-188 (.014)
Controls						
gender		X		X	X	X
age		X			X	X
m arital status		X			X	X
education						X

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. G ender is entered as a dum m y for fem ale. A ge is entered as a fourth-order polynom ial. M arital status is entered as a dum m y form arried and a dum m y for previously m arried.

Education is entered as the num berof years for those w ith registered education, and a dum m y for education m issing. The complete table of the results is available from the author.

To sum marize, much of the observed difference in average earnings between natives and OECD immigrants as well between natives and Non-OECD immigrants in 1980 can be explained by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. My earlier observations with regards to the earnings differentials by region of origin, and by out-migration status, are upheld.

The decision to out-migrate

In order to more precisely characterize how movers differ from stayers I undertake a probit analysis, in line with H usted et.al. (2000b) and D ustmann (1996a). Formally, the decision to out-migrate is modeled as a binary choice of whether to stay or not, with the probability of not staying given by:

$$Pr(out-m igrate) = \Phi (Z\gamma)$$
 (2)

where Z is a vector of variables, influencing the out-m igration decision, γ is an unknown vector of parameters, and Φ is the standard normal distribution function. (2) is estimated separately for 0 ECD and N on-0 ECD immigrants, Table 5 gives the results for the 1980 sample. For simplicity I present only the result with the full set of variables included, as a stepwise introduction of the variables did not provide any major new insights. If a variable enters positively in the table it has a positive effect on the probability to out-migrate. In order to simplify the interpretations I have calculated the marginal effect, M E , for variable j given by:

$$M E_{j} = \phi (\overline{Z} \hat{\gamma}) \hat{\gamma}_{j}$$
 (3)

where ϕ is the normal density function, interpreted as the change in out-migration propensity of a small change in variable j, calculated at sample means.

A ge enters negatively for 0 ECD im m igrants, with a marginal effect of minus 12 percent. That is, the older the im migrant is, the lower is the probability of out-migration during 1981-92, and being 10 years older reduces the probability of out-migration by 12 percent. One interpretation is that older im migrants have spental argernum ber of years in the host country and thus are more established compared to younger im migrants. Also, the group of 0 ECD out-migrants could be dominated by young, highly mobile, labormigrants. This

Table 5. Probit analysis of the propensity to leave Norway 1981-92, by region of origin.

		OECD		N	on-O ECD	
Variable, 1980	Est.	Stdev.	ΜE	Est.	Stdev.	ΜE
Intercept	1.417	.065	.420	-1 283	118	-239
Age	041	.001	012	001	.002	.000
Fem ale	-329	.018	098	-212	.038	040
M amied	-510	.023	-151	-237	.041	044
Previously married	-407	.036	-121	-273	.080.	051
N everm arried	ref.	-	-	-	-	-
Education, years	.001	.003	.000	002	.007	.000
Education, missing	227	.045	.067	152	.079	.028
Nordic	ref.	-	-	-	-	-
Western-Europe	-232	.020	069	-	-	-
North-America	<i>4</i> 70	.027	140	-	-	-
Eastern-Europe	-	-	-	ref.	-	-
A sia	-	-	-	330	.046	.061
A frica	-	-	-	321	.060	.060
South/ M iddle Am .	-	-	-	324	.070	.060
Earnings, 1 quartile ^a	081	.025	024	211	.045	.039
Earnings, 2 quartileª	-270	.026	080	.032	.047	.006
Earnings, 3 quartile ^a	-308	.026	091	062	.049	012
Earnings, 4 quartile ^a	ref.	-	_	ref.	-	-
Log-likelihood	-13548.2			-3975.6		
Number of observations	28 244			11 412		
Number of out-migrants	7 105			1 338		

Notes.M E=M arginal effects, calculated at sample means. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the individual is not residence in Norway in 1992 (out-migrant), 0 otherwise.

^a Quartiles defined by the gender specific earnings distribution for the group under study

is supported by the observation that the effect of age on the propensity to out-m igrate am ong Non-OECD im m igrants, which to a less degree are laborm igrants, is statistically insignificant. Being a fem ale, m arried or divorced, have a strong negative effect on the probability to out-m igrate, especially am ong OECD-im m igrants. While education in years has no effect on the out-m igration probability, the effect of not having reported the educational attainment in the 1980 Census, has a strong positive effect on the propensity, especially for OECD im m igrants. Interestingly, being born in North-America yields a 14 percentage points larger out-m igration probability compared to the reference category (Nordic), and as much as 21 percentage points more than Western-Europe. In light of the large geographical distance between North-America and Norway I suspect that these im migrants are mostly high-earnings, short-term, laborm igrants working in sectors say, the oil industry. We do not find such large and marked differences among the Non-OECD im migrants.

Regarding the inclusion of earnings in the probitione possibility is to enter-earnings or log earnings directly, like Edin et. al. (2001). However, the descriptive statistics in Table 3 indicate that the earnings distribution among the out-migrants is not trivial, especially for OECD—immigrants. Thus I have chosen to include a set of dummies indicating the position (in one of the four quartiles) in the group—and gender specific earnings distribution. For OECD immigrants I find a strong positive effect of being in the highest earnings quartile (reference category). Thus, controlling for a number of other variables, the earlier observation of OECD out-migrants being partly drawn from the upper part of the earnings distribution, still holds. This is in contrast to the unanimously negative association between earnings and the propensity to out-migrants the picture is roughly the same as observed in the raw data, with a larger out-migration probability for those in the low expart of the earnings distribution.

For instance, a fem ale OECD -im m igrant is assigned a quartile based on the earning distribution for all fem ale OECD -im m igrants in the sample. I have also experimented with the position in the gender specific earnings distribution of natives. This gave similar, but somewhat weaker effects. As my aim is to say something about how the out-migrants are selected from the group of immigrants, I stick to the original specification.

As the 1993 sample contains inform ation about the time of arrival, I can study the interesting relationship between the decision to out-migrate, earnings and years since immigration. For the case of simplicity I have chosen to include years-since-immigration as a quadratic. Further, in order to investigate the correlation between the length of the stay and earnings I include interaction terms between years-since-immigration and the position in the earnings distribution, represented as a dummy forwhether or not the individual is positioned in upperhalf of the distribution (3'rd and 4'th quartile). Table 6 gives the results.

In contrast to the findings in the 1980 sample of a strong positive correlation between age and the out-m igration probability for OECD imm igrants, we observe that age enters with a small positive marginal effect in the 1993 probit. One interpretation of this finding is that young laborm igrants are more responsive than older laborm igrants to imbalances in the laborm arket, in their out-migration behavior. So when the aggregate unemployment rate decreased sharply from 1993 to 1997, the young immigrants stayed put to a larger degree than between 1980 and 1992 when the unemployment rate almost tripled in size. We note that the difference in out-migration probability between the two genders, as well as the variation in the probability by marital status, are negligible compared to what I find from the 1980 probit. This could be due to the inclusion of the years-since-migration variables in the 1993 probit.

I find only small positive effects from originating in Asia, Africa, and South, Middle America compared to Eastern-Europe. Thus, it seem like the pool of Non-OECD immigrant, as of 1993, are more equal in terms of out-migration behavior than in 1980. The structure for the OECD immigrants in this respect is roughly the same as for 1980.

²² I have experimented with a number of different specifications, including variants which impose few restrictions on the relationship between the propensity to out-migrate and years since immigration. None of these gave any different insight into the relationship under study.

Table 6. Probit analysis of the propensity to leave Norway 1994-97, by region of origin.

		OECD		Non-OECD			
V ariable, 1993	Est.	Stdev.	ΜE	Est.	Stdev.	ΜE	
Intercept	-277	104	0369	-2.087	104	-1969	
Age	.009	.002	.0012	.011	.002	.0010	
Fem ale	055	.021	0073	-112	.024	0106	
M arried	-215	.026	0286	-115	.028	0108	
Previously m arried	-132	.037	0176	-143	.044	0135	
Nevermannied	ref.	-	-	ref.	-	-	
Education, years	.000	.006	.0000	.073	.006	.0069	
Education, missing	122	.087	.0163	. 752	.078	.0710	
Nordic	ref.	-	-	-	-	-	
Western-Europe	033	.023	0045	-	-	-	
North-America	125	.037	.0167	-	-	-	
Eastern-Europe	-	-	-	ref.	-	-	
A sia	-	-	-	.118	.035	.0112	
A frica	-	-	-	256	.042	.0241	
South/MiddleAm.	-	-	-	218	.046	.0206	
Earnings, 1 quartile*	-354	.050	0473	-160	.069	0151	
Earnings, 2 quartile*	-539	.051	0719	-290	.071	0274	
Earnings, 3 quartile*	-283	.030	0378	-195	.036	0184	
Earnings, 4 quartile*	ref.	_	-	ref.	-	-	
YSM	-111	.006	0148	070	.009	0066	
YSM ² /10	.021	.002	.0028	.018	.004	.0017	
YSM *Q.3/4	047	.009	0062	043	.013	0041	
$YSM^{2}/10*Q.3/4$.013	.003	.0017	.008	.005	.000	
Log-likelihood	-9 277.0			-7 328 1			
Number of observations	33 963			37 460			
Number of out-migrants	3 402			1 964			

Notes.M E=M arginal effects, calculated at sample means. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the individual is not residence in Norway in 1997 (out-migrant), 0 otherwise.

 $^{^{\}rm a}\,\mathrm{Q}\,\mathrm{uartiles}\,\mathrm{defined}\,\mathrm{by}$ the gender specific earnings distribution for the group under study


In order to facilitate the interpretation of the earnings and years-since-imm igration coefficients I have calculated the out-m igration probability by years-since-imm igration separately for each earnings quartile, presented in Figure 2. For instance, the predicted probability of out-m igration during 1994-97 for a OECD imm igrant, who arrived in 1992 (YSM = 1), located in the 2'nd quartile in 1993 (dotted line with triangles), is 25 percent.


A very clearpattern is found for the OECD in m igrants with the out-m igration probability decreasing in YSM, at a decreasing rate. And the probability is highest for being positioned in the upper quartile in 1993, followed by the 3'rd quartile. However, the differences diminish over time, among those OECD immigrants who arrived as early as 1973 (YSM = 20) I find very small differences in the out-migration probability by the position in the 1993 earning distribution. These findings could be interpreted in a number of ways. One interpretation is that the probability to out-migrate is a decreasing function of the number of years in the host country. This is the one made by Husted et.al. (2000b). However, since both the current study and Husted et.al. only observe the full sample at one point in time we risk confounding years-since-immigration effects and cohort effects. As discussed in relation to Table 2, if older cohorts of OECD -immigrants have a lower overall propensity to out-migrate than more recent cohorts, this would show up as a negative correlation between YSM and the propensity to out-migrate.

Turning to the Non-OECD imm igrants in the low erpanel of Figure 2 I find much weaker effects of both years-since-imm igration and the position in the earnings distribution.²³
However, we find some indications of the same structure, with the more recent imm igrants over-represented among the out-migrants.


²³ Note that the scale of the vertical axis is different in the two panels.

Figure 2. Predicted out-m igration probabilities by years-since-m igration and earnings quartile, 1993 Sample, individuals in the labor force.





Non-OECD imm igrants



6. Eamings Assim ilation

I have found some clear indications of non-random out-migration among immigrants in Norway. In this section I will discuss how this could influence estimates of earnings assimilation.

First of all I need to clarify the concept of earnings assimilation and how out-migrants fit within this fiam ework. In the literature earnings assimilation is associated with how the immigrant is integrated into the labormarket after arrival, measured relative to a reference group. Borjas (1999) argues strongly that natives is the relevant comparison group in this respect. Further, the term assimilation is closely connected to the long-run labormarket behavior of permanent immigrants i.e. those who remain in the host country. This seems also to be the understanding of those studies, referred to insection 3, that have gone into the issue of out-migration. Most the studies have embarked upon the task simply by comparing estimates obtained from repeated cross sections (standard approach) with estimates obtained from longitudinal data. The estimates obtained from the latter source are viewed as the correctories, and hence the difference in the estimates is interpreted as the mistake, or bias, due to not taking account of out-migration. In the following discussion I will adopt this view.

How out-migration influences earnings assimilation estimates depends on the structure of the data used. Ignore for the moment the possibility of cohort effects, that is I assume that the earnings potential do not vary across cohorts. Without selective out-migration unbiased estimates of the earnings assimilation could be obtained from a single cross-section, ignoring other disturbance factors such as measurement errors in the variables. A ssume that out-migration from the immigrant cohorts occurs with a constant rate (for instance, 5 percent of the remaining individuals in the cohort out-migrates each year). With observations from only one point in time (a single cross section), the older cohorts would then consist of a smaller share of the initial pool than more recent cohorts. In other words, due to the longer length of the stay in the host country, the older cohorts would be more drained by out-migration than the more recent cohorts. If the out-migrants are negatively (positively) selected from the immigrant cohort, in the sense that those who leave have a lower (higher) earnings potential than those who remain, this will show up as

a spurious positive correlation between years since imm igration and earnings. Hence we are facing a positive (negative) out-m igration bias.

M ost recent studies find a declining cohort quality, in the sense that more recent cohort have a low erearnings potential than older ones (Borjas, 1999). Within the present framework this effect works in the same direction (on the estimates) as negatively selected out-migration. Thus, in the case that we have available only a single cross-section the existence of negatively selected out-migration would re-enforce the positive bias caused by declining cohort quality. In the case that the out-migrants are positively selected, the negative out-migration bias would counteract the positive cohort bias.

The most common data structure in analysis of earnings assimilation is repeated cross sections. Here, immigrant cohorts are followed over time, and the cohort bias is avoided. In the absence of selective out-migration, and provided that period effects do not affect the relative earnings of immigrants (Longva and Raaum, 2001b), unbiased estimates of earnings assimilation could be obtained. The selectivity of the out-migrants works in the same direction (on the estimates) as in the case of a single cross section. As time goes by a negatively (positively) selected out-migration will work in the direction of amore (less) able immigrant cohort in terms of earnings.

A sm entioned above, most of the studies of the out-migration bias have chosen a comparative approach, where estimates from longitudinal data are compared to those from a single cross section or from repeated cross sections. In light of the data structure available in the current study, a natural approach is to estimate the earnings assimilation with and without the out-migrants included. In principle this enables a direct identification of the out-migration bias. I have undertaken three attempts which could be summarized as follows:

(i) 1980 Sam ple: As I only observe the time of arrival (and hence are able to calculate the years-since-m igration) for the stayers, the estimation was undertaken as a standard two-step Heckman procedure: step 1: estimation of the probability to out-migrate as a function of gender and age; step 2: estimation of years-since-immigration effects on earnings both with and without the predicted probability to out-migrate from step 1 included. However, this exercise gave no interpretable results. Specifically, the selection term had only a

negligible effect on the earnings assimilation estimates, in spite of the differences between stayers and movers, as documented in section 5.

(ii) 1993 Sam ple: As discussed, the variable years-since-imm igration is observed both for stayers and mover. Hence, straight forward estimations of years-since-imm igration effects were undertaken with and without the mover included. However, the exclusion of the movers did not alter the predicted assimilation profile.

(iii) 1993 Sam ple, m erged with earnings inform ation for 1997: In order to check whether cohort effects could be the culprit for the missing effects in attempt (i) and (ii), Iutilized earnings information for 1997, and created a set with two observations in time. A lthough the expected declining cohort effect was identified for Non-OECD immigrants, the estimates of the effect of years-since-immigration only changed marginally when excluding those from the 1993 sample who out-migrated during 1994-97. Appendix 2 provides the details regarding data and Appendix 3 provides the specification and the results.

A number of explanations for these seem ingly negative findings could be put forward. Firstly, the movers are out-numbered by the stayers in the regressions based on the 1993 sample. When excluding 10 percent of the 0 ECD immigrants and only 5 percent of the Non-0 ECD it should probably be of no surprise that the estimates changes only marginally, in spite of the marked pattern from the probit analysis presented in section 5. The reason for the low number of out-migrants is due to the rather short period of time (fours years) as well as the fact that we observe the individuals at only two points in time. Secondly, regarding the attemptof correcting the estimates by a basic sample selection model on the 1980 sample, the specification of the selection equation (step 1) is critical. In principle one should include at least one variable which affects the out-migration decision, but not earnings. Such exclusionary restrictions were not found, and the identification was implicitly based on functional form only. Thirdly, as shown in Table 5 the earnings distribution among the movers is not trivial, especially for the movers originally from 0 ECD countries. In this light the usual log transformation of the dependent variable, undertaken in all three attempts, is questionable.

 24 Thus, most of the out-migration may already have taken place for the older cohorts.

7.Sum m ary and Discussion

The outflow of foreign born individuals from Norway, as well as from otherW estern countries, is substantial. However, our know ledge of the composition of this flow, and how the different groups of out-migrants are characterized, is sparse. This study utilizes two comprehensive microdata sets for immigrants in Norway with the aim of studying the relationship between labormarket earnings and out-migration.

Firstly, I find that the probability of out-m ignation is much smaller for im m ignants from less developed countries than from more developed countries, which is in line with what others have found. A lso, I find indications of out-m igration being associated with short residence in Norway. Secondly, I find that labor force attachment is positively correlated with the propensity to stay. This is in line with the finding in Edin et. al. (2001) on Swedish data, as well as in Husted et.al. (2000b) on Danish data. A policy implication is that the relatively generous welfare state in Norway do not necessarily retain groups of im m igrants prone to receive welfare benefits. A mong the im m igrants from Non-OECD countries in the labor force it seems like the least successful, in terms of laborm arket earnings, out m igrate. For the OECD -im m igrants a m one m ixed picture arises w ith a tendency of the out-m ignants either placed very high in the group specific earnings distribution, or below the median. Further, I find some clear indications that the high earnings group stays only a short period in Norway. The finding of a rather large pool of high earnings individuals among the out-migrants from OECD countries, is as far as I know not found in other studies. For instance, Edin et. al. (2001) report that all groups of out-migrants earn less, on average, than those who stay. As discussed, this group could be associated with sectors like the oil-industry, known for high compensation. The large share of out-m igrants am ong individuals from North-Am erica strengthens this hypothesis.

These findings have several important implications for studies of earnings assimilation. Firstly, as immigrants from Western countries stay on average only a short period in the host country, the relevance of undertaking studies on how they assimilate in the labor market could be questioned. Moreover, those studies that are notable to distinguish between countries of origin, due to limitation in data etc., should be very careful when interpreting the results, especially results regarding the earnings at arrival. However, I am notable to find any dramatic change in the assimilation profiles by excluding those who

return. This could, as discussed in the previous section, be caused by a num berof factors and further investigations into this rather complex issue remains to be done. In spite of these findings the results contained in this study can be related to previous studies of earnings assimilation for Norwegian immigrants. For instance, the finding of a rather large pool of high earnings, short-term, OECD -immigrants fits well with the finding in Longva and Raaum (2001a) of an increasing earnings potential for the most recent cohort of immigrant in the period under study.

A lithough the two sam ples utilized in this study differ with respect to the composition of source countries among the immigrants, as well as a in the time span used to identify the out-migrants, some of the findings are remarkable similar. For instance, the earnings distribution for OECD out-migrants are very similar in 1980 and 1993, in spite of the huge difference in the aggregate economic situation at the two points in time. This strengthens the robustness of the result.

Further research on the out-m igrants based on N orw egian m icrodata should, from my point of view, focus on obtaining reliable data from more than one point in time. By observing the out-m igration from the imm igrant cohorts over time, one could more precisely pinpoint the nature of out-m igration, as well as exploring its consequences for earnings assimilation studies more accurately. A nother important topic is the labor market behavior of those outside the labor force. A central questions in this respect is to which degree these individuals have income from other sources. Lastly, the reason for immigration and out-migration should be investigated. When such information becomes available, one could test more precisely the different theories of the underlying motivations for the migratory move, which are highly relevant from a policy perspective.

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Appendix 1:1980 Sam ple

Alldata used is provided by Statistics Norway.

Source, 1980: Norwegian Population and Housing Census 1980 (a full census).

Source, 1992: Demographic file. A register based file containing demographic information (place of residence, country of origin, time of arrivaletc.) for the full Population in Norway as of 1992.

An individual is assigned a unique identification number, which is the same across time (1980 and 1992). As both samples covers the entire population at the given point in time, it is possible to construct a comprehensive panel data set. However, in this analysis we will only utilize the panel dimension in order to identify whether or not a given individual from the 1980 file is present in Norway 12 years later. For simplicity we denote this as the 1980 Sample.

Ideally, we would select all im m igrants in 1980, defined by country of origin, along with random sample of natives, defined as a residual. Next we would construct a dichotom ous variable indicating whether or not the individual left the sample between 1980 and 1992, not being registered as dead, and thus could be characterized as a later out m igrant or not, as seen from 1980.

However, such a procedure are not directly attainable, for three reasons: (i) we only observe country of origin for those present in 1992, for those present only in 1980 we observe citizenship only; (ii) we do not know whether sample attrition is caused by outmigration or by death; (iii) from 1980 to 1992 it is only possible to identify those natives who were present in the 1990 Census (which did not cover the entire population).

Hence, if we want the set of stayers (not out-migrants) and movers (out-migrants) to be based on the same source when it comes to the assignment of source country, we are forced to use citizenship in 1980, which yields a subsample of the group of immigrants defined by country of origin. Also, we risk that a share of those characterized as out-migrants did in fact leave the sample due to death. Lastly, it is not possible to select a random sample of natives in 1980 independent of their presence 12 years later.

In spite of these limitations we head on with the following sampling procedure:

Immigrants: (i) All foreign born individuals with two foreign born parents, residents in Norway, in 1992, present in the 1980 Census, of age 18-52 in 1980; (ii) Residents in Norway in 1980, present in the 1980 Census, of age 18-52 in 1980, with a foreign citizenship, not present in 1992.

Native comparison group: A random 8 percent sample of natives in 1992, defined as residents in Norway, notborn outside Norway with two foreign born parents, present in the 1980 Census, of age 18-52 in 1980.

Thus, compared to the optimal immigrant sample, were all immigrants are selected on the basis of country of origin, we miss out those immigrants who had a Norwegian citizenship in 1980, and left the sample within 1992. However, as we would expect that the propensity to leave the sample due to out-migration is small among the naturalized immigrants, this group is probably limited in size. In the native comparison group we miss all those who left the sample from 1980 to 1992 (compared to the optimal sample). Again, as the out-migration rate among natives is small this should not represent a problem for the analysis.

Table A 1 provides an overview of the classification structure by citizenship and country of origin in 1980. For instance among the individuals with a citizenship from an OECD country, 41.3 percent were not present in 1992, and thus classified as movers. The corresponding number among the Non-OECD immigrants is 20.0 percent. Also, 35.3 percent of those born in an OECD country have a Norwegian citizenship as of 1980. Note that among the stayers roughly thirty-five percent of those born in an OECD country were Norwegian citizens in 1980. The corresponding share among those born in a Non-OECD country is roughly twenty percent. Thus, by using citizenship rather than country of origin as the basis for the immigrant-native categorization (as done in a number of studies) one excludes a substantial share of the immigrant population, or more precisely, a substantial share of immigrants is wrongly classified as natives.

Table A 1 G roup sizes, 1980 sam ple.ª

	Stayers, by country of birth				
Citizenship 1980	N orw ay	OECD	Non-OECD	M overs	Total
Norwegian	118 324	9 900	3 181	0	131 405
	(901)	(7.5)	(2.4)	(0.0)	(100.0)
	(99.8)	(35.3)	(22.9)	(0.0)	
OECD	286	18 060	185	13 048	31 579
	(0,9)	(572)	(0.6)	(413)	(100.0)
	(0.2)	(64.5)	(13)	(83.1)	
Non-OECD	5	61	10 548	2 653	13 267
NONOHOD					
	(0.0)	(0.5)	(79.5)	(20.0)	(100.0)
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(75.8)	(16.9)	
Total	118 615	28 021	13 914	15 701	176 251
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	

 $^{^{\}rm a}\,{\rm R}\,{\rm ow}$ -percentages in second row , column -percentages in third row .

Appendix 2:1993 Sam ple

A lldata used is provided by Statistics Norway. We have available annual register files for the full population in Norway from the period 1993-97 containing demographic variables, and information on income from work and self-employment from tax-records.

The data handling process is undertaken in the following steps:

- (i) The files are m erged by a unique individual identification number, resulting in m in im um one, and maximum 5, data records per individual (one per calendar year the individual is present in Norway).
- (ii) Any inconsistencies between the yearly records regarding date of arrival (first time) and country of origin, are resolved by assigning the most current observation to each individual.

(iii) Two populations are defined:

- A . $\underline{\text{Im}}\,\underline{\text{m}}\,\underline{\text{igrants}}$: Individuals for which at least one yearly record identifies the individual as born abroad with two foreign-born parents.
- B. $\underline{\text{N atives}}$: Individuals for which all yearly records identify the individual as born in Norway.
- (iv) The set of yearly records are reduced to one record per individual in the sample, that is every person belonging to one of the groups specified in (iii) and with at least one yearly record from the sample period 1993-97.
- (v) We regard an individual as present in entire calendar year 1993 if we have an observation (record) for the individual in 1993 and 1994. As the sample will later be conditioned on at least one years of residence in Norway, those who immigrate during 1993 will be thrown out.

- (vi) A coordingly we regard an individual as present in the entire calendar year 1997 if: (a) we have an observation for the individual in 1996; and (b) we have an observation for the individual in 1997, and the individual is not reported with an out-migration date in 1997.
- (vii) Lastly, based on the presence in 1993 and 1997 I assign each individual in one of the four following groups:
 - 1. <u>Stayers</u>: present in 1993 and 1997. (natives: 97.7%, imm igr.: 57.7%)
 - 2.M overs: present in 1993, not present in 1997. (natives: 1.4 %, im m igr.: 8.9 %)
 - 3. New comers: not present in 1993, present in 1997. (natives: 0.5%, imm igr.: 18.6%)
 - 4. Residual: not in 1-3. (natives: 0.5%, im m igrants: 14.9%)

The distribution within each population group (natives, imm ignants) is given in the parentheses. The large share of imm ignants in the residual group are mainly made up from the inflow of individuals to Norway during 1993 and 1997.

- (viii) For the 1993 Sam ple I exclude the new comers and the residual from the sam ple.
- (ix) For the analysis presented in Appendix 3 I exclude the residual only.

Appendix 3: Earnings Assim ilation Estimates

This Appendix provides an analysis of earnings assimilation with and without the inclusion of out-migrants, on a data set with two observations in time.

The standard approach in the literature starts outwith the specification of an earnings function where log income of individual intime tis given by:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y E A R_t + \alpha_2 IM M_i + X_{i,t} \beta + \gamma g (A_{i,t}) + \delta f (Y S M_{i,t}) + C_i \lambda + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
(A1)

where YEAR is a dummy for the year the observation is taken from , IM M is a dummy variable for imm ignant, X is a vector of other explanatory variables like gender and m arital status, A is the age and YSM denotes years since imm ignation (set to 0 for natives). C is a vector of cohort-dumm ies (set to 0 for natives). In the estimations I have specified the age function g(.) as a fourth-order polynomial, and the year-since-migration function f(.) as a set of dummies, representing varying length of residence.

(A 1) follows roughly the standard approach in the literature, how ever the specification in poses several assum ptions on the data which must be commented on. First, I in pose that the effect of age (which approximates experience) on log earnings as well as the characteristics included in X, are equal for natives and immigrants, as well as constant over time. Second, the period effect is common for natives and immigrants. As Longva and Raaum (2001b) show, this is not unproblematic. As the macroeconomic environment was different at the two points in time 26 there are reasons to believe that this could influence on the results. Thirdly, the assimilation effect works through the year-sincem ignation variables only, and not through changes in the return to observable variables due to the restriction that these are constant over time. All these restrictions could principle be dealtwith by introducing further interaction terms. However, in order to make the analysis as simple as possible, I have not pursued this path. 27

 $^{^{25}}$ The chosen specification is based on experim entation with different lengths etc. in order to capture the most interesting variation between years-since-migration and earnings with a minimum number of dummies.

 $^{^{26}}$ In 1993 the unem ployment rate was 5.1 percent, compared to 3.1 percent in 1997, source: SSB .

 $^{^{27}}$ I have experim ented with different, more complex, specifications of the earnings equation. These gave, from my point of view, no further insights into the questions under study.

As described in Appendix 2, the data set can be divided in three parts: stayers, movers and new comers. By stacking the full set by year of observation, I obtain a sample that resembles the one Iwould have gotten if Iwere to take two independent cross-sections, one in 1993 and one in 1997. I denote this set All. The subset of stayers yields a sample where a substantial share of the immigrants who would out migrate at one point in time, are excluded. I denote this set Stayers only.

The earnings equation (A1) are estim ated separately on Alland Stayers only. Table A2 brings some selected estimates. First, from the estimated years-since-migration dummies for OECD immigrants, column 1, I find no systematic pattern. If anything, the estimates indicate some sort of negative assimilation, as the effect of the years-since-migration goes from statistically insignificant different from zero (2-3, 4-5, 6-7 years dummies) to negative (8-9 years dummy). At first glance, the estimated coefficients in column 2 are indifferent from those presented in column 1. Note how ever that the 2-3 YSM dummy is negative when estimated on Stayers only. This fits well with my observation in section 5 that short-term immigrants from OECD countries earns well above the average. Turning to the Non-OECD immigrants, I find a clear pattern of earnings assimilation as the predicted earnings increases steadily with years since immigration. How ever, the differences between the two columns (3&4) are small. Given the standard errors they are by all means statistically indistinguishable.

In addition to this exam ination of the assim ilation profile itself, a simple comparison with natives could be undertaken. However, this is not a prioritized task here, see Longva and Raaum (2001a, 2001b) for such an exercise.

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²⁸ In the set utilized in this analysis I restrict the sample to those with at least two years of residence in Norway.

²⁹ In fact, the sam ple of stayers as defined in section 4, excludes im m igrants who out-m igrate atdifferent stages of their host-country laborm arket career. For instance, among those who arrived in 1985, we exclude those who out-m igrate with between 7 and 10 years of residence.

Table A 2 Regression results, 1993-97 data.

_	OECD		Non-OECD	
	All	Stayers only	All	Stayers only
Years in Norway				
2-3	.0169	0497	-3336	-3643
	(.0169)	(.0207)	(.0278)	(.0290)
4-5	.0101	0268	-2670	-2513
	(.0173)	(.0186)	(.0275)	(.0277)
6-7	0245	0291	-1640	-1539
	(.0173)	(.0178)	(.0274)	(.0275)
8-9	0382	0494	-1286	-1238
	(.0164)	(.0167)	(.0272)	(.0273)
10-14	0290	0317	0518	0492
	(.0132)	(.0133)	(.0264)	(.0265)
15-30	0244	0249	0367	0344
	(.0099)	(.0099)	(.0252)	(.0253)
30+	ref.	æf.	ref.	ref.
Period of arrival				
1985-95	0384	0204	-2117	-1939
	(.0139)	(.0207)	(.0216)	(.0218)
1975-84	0500	0427	-1375	-1209
	(.0094)	(.0094)	(.0200)	(.0203)
1965-74	0361	0315	-1457	-1318
	(.0085)	(.0800.)	(.0201)	(.0203)
1964	ref.	ref.	æf.	ref.
N atives	686 057	680 556	686 057	680 556
Im m igrants	69 356	59 897	85 774	75 632
R-just.	291	293	292	293

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. O ther variables included: D um m y for 1997, Im m igrant, R egion of origin, 4-order polynom ial in age, gender, m arital status, education in years. The complete results are available from the author