Transforming Ethnic Nationalism

- the politics of ethno-nationalistic sentiments among the elite in Kosovo

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TRANSFORMING ETHNIC NATIONALISM
- The politics of ethno-nationalistic sentiments among the elite in Kosovo

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Foreword

The efforts of the international community in Kosovo are huge. There is, however, almost no scientific research undertaken by international professional academics looking at the effect of this engagement on culture and society. This is for me disappointing, as I believe the social sciences seldom have bigger potential impact on decision-making, as well as to provide international staff operating in the field, approximately 50,000 of them as of 2001, analysis and understanding of the complex setting in the context of international intervention, institution building, democratisation, implementation of self-government, and the difficult issues of reconciliation. I use the opportunity therefore, to urge international academic milieus to use Kosovo as a laboratory for studies on nationalism, nation-state, ethnicity and international intervention. This study is merely a beginning in this respect, and I hope to encourage other studies to continue the investigation.

The aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of how the elite in Kosovo maintain and transform ethno-nationalistic sentiments in a society in transition not only from a socialist one-party political system to democracy, but also from conflict to reconciliation. The methods used in this thesis are based upon the scientific discipline of modern Social Anthropology, where ethnographic description through the method of participant observation is fundamental. The field research carried out in order to collect and create data\(^1\) for the thesis took place mainly in Pristina from September to December 2000, and April to December 2001.

Because of its perspective and descriptive methods, I feel it is necessary here to warn about misuse of the content of the thesis. The political culture that is here described as nationalistic is not an Albanian phenomenon, but is part of a regional culture of politics found in South-East Europe and Europe in general; this analysis provides an understanding of this culture merely by using the Kosovo-Albanian elite as a case. The mobilisation of ethno-nationalistic sentiments in the region must be seen as inter-connected and in the perspective of mutual mobilisation in opposition to ‘the other’ - in the case of Kosovo-Albanians, in the opposition against Serbian nationalism. Any usage of the content of this thesis to undermine this fact and to credit or discredit one particular ethnic group is against the will and intention of the author and will be met accordingly.

\(^1\) It is problematic, I believe, to see the anthropologist as only collecting scientific data; data that is already out there somewhere, and not also taking part in creating them. We must acknowledge that some data, at least, are the result of a creative process, in which the Anthropologist as a person, is actively involved in creating the data. Therefore, the personal background of the Anthropologist is not entirely irrelevant for the analysis, alongside theoretical orientation.
I wish to thank all those in Kosovo that met me with openness and hospitality, and in particular the National and University Library, Institute of Albanology, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission (OSCE) in Kosovo, and all those colleagues and friends that made my life in Kosovo both interesting, challenging and socially meaningful. In particular, I want to thank the Selimi family for their friendship and help. I also want to thank my mentor Professor Thomas Hylland Eriksen who has guided me through the process and who has been an inspiring and enthusiastic adviser in this project.
Introduction

This thesis is an attempt to analysis how the elite in Kosovo maintain and transform ethno-nationalistic sentiments in a society in transition from conflict to democracy under UN administration.

The purpose of the thesis is to gain understanding of how the high culture in Kosovo maintain and transform ethno-nationalistic sentiments. It is believed that such fundamental understanding is a prerequisite for promoting policies that can counter-balance the regional ethno-nationalistic politics in South-Eastern Europe today. Kosovo is in this respect an excellent laboratory for such experiments in Social Anthropology, as it is under UN juridical and administrative control, making field work in a conflict society easier.

The problem of investigation is: What are the premises for a process in which the high culture in Kosovo de-emphasise ethno-nationalistic sentiments and enhance a multi-cultural society of tolerance and in respect of human rights values?

The analysis investigates the following hypotheses that is found to be crucial to the above problem:

1. Albanian high culture in Kosovo is currently in a process of diversification after a period where the Albanian ethnie has been mobilised and united as a result of Serbian state oppression, violence and threats of extinction.

2. There are changes in the civil society where a new high culture emerges partly as a response to international support and implementation of rule of law, as well as the re-establishment of Albanian trans-national communities.

3. This new high culture represents a group that the international elite for many reasons find easy to co-operate with, and the group is therefore developing a vital part of the new government and civil society; they provide vertical integration for ‘western’ ideas and the legitimacy of the international community.
4. The international community has a positive impact on the society as they display an example of successful multi-culturalism by being represented by most of the biggest nations of the world.

5. Territorial identity can be promoted as to counter-balance ethno-nationalistic sentiments.

These hypothesises will be tested by the use of participant observation as a method and address through ethnographical descriptions and analysis.

The thesis will rely much on Ernest Gellners (1983,1999) theory of nationalism, and his concept of the nation-state, high culture and modern nation formation; his theories is known for applying well on the German region and adjacent areas. In particular, the study will rely on Gellner’s theory regarding the role of high culture and education in maintaining national identity; this will be taken as a theoretical assumption.

Asafa Jalata argues that that the existing bodies of theories and literature on ethno-nationalism mainly reflects the views and interests of the colonising ethno-nations and their states at the cost of the dominated ethno-nations (Jalata 1993). There are certainly international political interests involved in Kosovo, and I am sure some will considered a study like this to pay tribute to one of them, somehow. For me, however, the ambition of this study is related to what George Marcus and Michael Fisher call “Anthropology as cultural critique” (Marcus & Fisher 1986), targeting groups of potential “conflict entrepreneurs” among political actors (Eide 1997) . I believe Social Anthropology and theories of ethnicity and nationalism can deconstruct the very basis for ethno-nationalistic politics. What is presented here is Political Anthropology, it applies anthropological methods on politics. The methods used are not normative, nor are the issues studied randomly selected.

The empirical basis for the investigation is ethnographical descriptions and analysis of the elite in Kosovo. This group is believed to have an institutional basis and the method of investigation focuses therefore on research institutions and the University of Pristina for data
on the intellectual elite, political parties for data on the political elite and the UN administrative structure and international NGO community for data on the International elite.

The investigation focuses on elite culture and perceptions of ethnic versus civic identity. It does not represent any ambiguity with regards to analysing the performance of the UN administration or the Albanian elite in the process of state formation and implementation of administrative policies. It must be said that this study has been made with very limited resources and does not represent a complete attempt at analysing vertical integration between the elite and the wider population and how political legitimacy is gained. The study was conducted for partial fulfilment of the Cand. Polit. degree at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo.

After describing the method used for the investigation (Chapter 2), Chapter 3 seeks to place Albanian culture and identity in Kosovo in a wider historical and sociological context. Chapter 4 identifies Albanian high culture in Kosovo and the emergence of what is called New High Culture. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 consists of ethnographical descriptions and analysis of the intellectual elite (Chapter 5), the political elite (Chapter 6) and the international elite (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 discusses ethnic nationalism versus a civic nationalism based on territorial identity and make conclusions based on the hypotheses set in the introducing chapter, based on the analyses done.
1. States, Nations and Nationalism

In studies of nations and nationalism, it has been normal to refer to Ernest Renan, for the first definition of a nation; “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of rememberances; the other is the actually consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common” (Renan 1994 [1882]). But Renan’s definition is not older than from 1882. What is common for the studies of nations before World War II, are their unanimous focus on language. Ludwig von Mises wrote in 1919 about nation as a ‘speech community’ and declared that “all national struggles are language struggles, that they are waged about language. What is specifically "national" lies in language” (Mises 2000:9-21 [1919]).

The term ‘nationalism’ hardly occurred in studies in the social sciences at all, until after the two world wars. Then, ‘nationalism’ became a concept that could help explain the mobilisation and the commitment of the people that lead to the war. Kedourie (1960), whom can be said to have started the modern study of nations and nationalism in the 1960s, sees nationalism as something evil that leaders of a country can use for their own political ambitions. The people are misled and almost brainwashed by misinformation and political campaigning. This conception prevails in many studies of nationalist conflicts, such as analysis of the recent Balkan wars (see Bowman 1994, Llobera 1994).

It is evident that the wars of the modern era, and the 20th century in particular, has been of a peculiar character, not seen earlier in history (Hobsbawm 1997). The possibility of these wars rests in modernism and industrialism. What is it that modernism has changed? The following are some elements of these changes:

1. The invention of the printing press that provides one-way communication with an almost indefinite number of people
2. Competition on a free labour and trade market
3. The uprooting of people from their kinship community and migration to cities
4. The creation of a trade and industrial elite and an educated middle class
5. Secularisation of religion and the end of divine legitimisation of political power
6. The role of the state in penetrating local knowledge structures and bring technical standardisation and cultural homogenisation

The elements are ordered somewhat in a chronological manner. The elements outlined above fits primarily the history of Western Europe, as communist regimes have sought to eliminate element 4 and 5. Modern studies of nations and nationalism often measure the strength of these elements and how they developed in that particular area. For example would Gellner (1983) focus on how education was spread, by migration to cities with educational institutions that fulfilled the need of the labour market and the creation of a literate high culture. Smith (1986) on the other hand, focus more on the perception of a finite death and the role of nationalism as a ‘surrogate’ religion in an urban society without kinship ties. Anderson (1991 [1983]) focus almost unanimously on the introduction of the printing press and its consequences. While Smith almost disregards element 6, Gellner and Anderson bases much of their theory on the role of the state in the creation of homogenous culture. Lately, others have started to look more closely at the technical role of the state however. James Scott (1998) have tried to see like a state and how state planners and organisers tend to standardise local knowledge structures in order to gain administrative control. In peripheries, like Kosovo, where state control has throughout history remained weak, the state often fails to bring homogenisation and standardisation. States are pushing for clear-cut identities; where they fail, identities may remain fluctuating and situational (see Duijzings 2000).

In the following, it is necessary to take a closer look at the concept of nations, state and nationalism, and how it relates to ethnicity; ethnic versus civic nationalism. It is also necessary to look into the problem of international intervention in ethno-nationalist conflicts.

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2 The nationalism that prevailed in these countries did therefore not have a middle class and trade elite. There was, however, the political elite throughout the communist party fulfilled the function of a literate middle class in this respect. For a comparison between European and an ‘Eastern’ (Middle East and Central Asian) concept of nation, see essay about “???” in Gellner 19??.
**When is a nation?**

During the 1980s and 90s there was a debate about the origin of nations; between those who saw nations as something constructed in modern times and those who understood nations as continuance of something ancient, based on the natural primordial diversity of humans. Most well known for the modernist approach has been Gellner and Anderson, while Smith is often referred to as following a primordial approach. The gap was maybe not as big as many perceived it to be. Smith’s focus is on elements of nationalism that seem to be based on something far older than modernism itself, but he does not disregard the massive changes brought by modernism. When reading later studies of nations and nationalism, it seems as the two approaches are somewhat complementary and that it is possible to use both approaches to shed light on the object of investigation; so will be done here. It might be argued though, that the focus of this investigation, the elite in Kosovo, favours analysis that follows the modernist approach because of its interest in the role of the high culture.

Most of the theoretical discourse has focused on Western-Europe. Kosovo and its immediate political-geographical context is Eastern Europe. Miroslav Hroch have developed a theoretical concept that is somewhat better adapted to the Eastern-Europe situation than other scholars. Hroch defines a nation like this:

"Now the 'nation is not, of course, an eternal category, but was the product of a long and complicated process of historical development in Europe. For our purposes, let us define it at the outset as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. Many of these ties could be mutually substituable - some playing a particularly important role in one nation-building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. But among them, three stand out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society." (Hroch 1996:79)
It is the intellectual and political elite, or ‘intelligentsia’, that present and represent the subjective reflection of the objective relationships in collective consciousness. It is the economic, political, cultural, religious, geographical and historical relationship of the citizens of the nation that is the basis for this subjective reflection.

The elite does however, present this relationship in certain ways, such as in a way that the group feels it has a ‘destiny’. This is part of what Smith calls ‘populism’ of the intelligentsia (Smith 1986:190), as it responds to a need in a modern society, where God and the infinite of death is no longer the core of organised society. But it also reflects the need of legitimisation of power by the state; as there is hardly any objective rational arguments for why a border, for example, should be exactly like it is, and the people that live close to it on each side should be treated so differently. Therefore, the elite will use the need for religious-like explanations in the population in order to legitimise power. It must be assumed that elite do so out of interest; first, because of its economic basis indirectly or directly in the state, either they are employed by state departments, employed by institutions funded by the state, or enjoy good premises for their businesses; second, because their symbolic capital of being the elite is based on the legitimate power of the state.

The civil society, which is a manifestation of the elite, bases itself on literacy, sciences and the purification of the national culture, what Gellner calls the mastery of ‘high culture’. In the modern society, where family associations are loose and there are few stable positions or even structures; what matters is “their incorporation and their mastery of high culture; I mean a literate codified culture which permits context-free communication. Their membership of such a community and their accept-ability in it, that is a nation” (Gellner 1983:??). The mastery of such culture and acceptability in it, becomes the most valuable possession a man has. A nation is therefore a legitimisation of state power over its territory, where its

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3 If the elite has an economic basis outside the state, such as in the market economy, it will tend to legitimise another type of power, if not the state exercise full control over the economy.
population finds pride in and has ambitions to actively participate in the civil society in order to gain more power and symbolic capital, within the framework of legitimate state power. If the elite fail to vertically integrate this pride and ambitions into the population, or at least acceptance for it, the exercise of state power will grow increasingly difficult, facing a problem of legitimacy. Therefore education becomes important. Education is the incorporation of the population into the strive for mastery of high culture and its acceptance for the fact that this competition should lead people to power and form an elite that represents the nation. As Gellner says:

> the maintenance of the kind of high culture, the kind of medium in which society operates, is politically precarious and expensive. It is linked to the state as a protector and usually the financier or at the very least the quality controller of the educational process which makes people members of this kind of culture (Gellner 1995).

The most prosperous nation would be when the population, by its strive to mastery of high culture, produce a high culture that penetrates the state and leads it to prosperity. If there is no coherence between state and high culture, and the state seems to exercise power in a way that contradicts the high culture; it will naturally evoke deep frustration in the population, as much as it would awake satisfactory emotions when the coherence proves to be effective. The civil society will thus be the medium of communicating such sentiments. For Gellner, this is a principle that keep the state or polity coherent with the culture of the population, refined by the elite as high culture. Nationalism is simply a principle that guards this balance and seek to make “culture and polity congruent” (Gellner 1983:43). Crucial for this development is that there is a homogenous culture in the population that makes vertical integration possible. It must be possible for an elite to represent and present a refined, pure, high cultural version of the nation that the population can identify themselves with, and considers to be reflect who they are. In order to help achieve this vertical integration, the state is actively engaged in promoting standardisation and homogenisation of culture.

The principle of congruence between politics and culture is a result of industrialism, where borders between states became more and more defined and definite as compared to the
agrarian society, were the borders were natural between civilisation and the wilderness. Gellner explain the development of nationalist doctrines by looking at the development of industrialisation. This seemed to be far more fruitful than earlier studies of nationalism, for example by Elie Kedourie, who claims the nationalist doctrine was an idea based on the philosophy of Kant brought forward by the new German middle class as an argument aiding their political cause. One of the problems with both Gellner and Kedourie has been to explain the reason why nationalism spread (Kedourie 1960). Kedourie describes nationalism as a German idea that spread to the rest of Europe because of social unrest and changes (Kedourie 1960), quite opposite to Anderson, who indicates its origin from when the legitimacy of the “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm” declined, starting with the English revolution in 1649 (Anderson 1991:7,21 [1983]). Gellner (1983) describe it as something that is a natural part of industrialisation and that the state institutions need in its development. Smith (1986) disregards them both and claim that the nationalist doctrine is founded on common cultures that existed long time before industrialisation started, which he calls “primitive nationalism” (such as the ancient Greek city-state). The earlier colonial states of Africa also proves that nationalism can come before literacy. In fact, the African de-colonisation proves that nationalism can be the drive behind spreading literacy and industrialisation (Smith 1986). Smiths emphasise is on the nation as a framework for self-realisation. People must identify themselves with the nation in order to gain freedom and self-realisation. This can not be done in any other nation, because the nation can only realise itself in its own state, just as its population, that has a distinct primordial character, can only realise themselves within the framework of their own nation-state. Loyalty is based on a national consciousness about the distinct national character. This explains why people are ready to sacrifice even their own lives for the nation.

There is not much agreement about when nations emerged. When investigating Norwegian nation-building at the time of separation from the union with Denmark in 1814, Kåre Lunden (1992) argue against Gellner and Anderson, who does not have much empirical material from before the middle of the 19th century. The Norwegian nation consciousness can be traced back
to the late 18th century. On the other hand, Kelly and Kaplan (2001) says; “scholarship that projects the nation-state back to the Enlightenment has occluded imperial history” (Kelly and Kaplan 2001:419). They see the World War II and decolonisation as a beginning, rather than an end; “the era of nation-states begins in 1945, an era of formal horizontal symmetries and nations imagined as communities, dominated in fact by American power and its exigencies of ‘self-determination’, ‘open doors’ and multilateral trade” (Kelly and Kaplan 2001:419). They claim that the studies of nations and nationalism that become so popular has its roots in the interests for ‘New Nations’ and states in the USA starting right after the World War II. A central argument is that the term ‘Nation-State’ does not appear in any encyclopaedias until the 1960s.

This shows that it is very difficult to point to a specific time in which nations became nations. The debate over nations and nationalism has evolved primarily around this question. Walker Connor (1984) has in this respect pointed out that historical events, such as those claimed to be forming a new nation, is easily dated; stages in a process is not. Most peasants in France had for example not much idea of their membership in a French nation not until the first world war. The fact is, that it is a delay, in some cases stretching into centuries, “between the appearance of national consciousness among sectors of the elite and its extension to the masses reminds us of the obvious but all-too-often ignored fact that nation-formation is a process, not an occurrence or event” (Connor 1984:158). A date when nations become nations is not very useful. We should therefore leave this debate of when nations occur, and continue focusing on the dynamics of the process and its content.

The discussion has revealed essential characteristics of modern nations. If these characteristics and criteria are applied on Kosovo, the conclusion would most probably be that Kosovo is a new nation, contrary to what most of the people of Kosovo claim themselves. A

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4 Lunden also argues that all cultural elements are constructed, such as marriage, but it may be very real for the people that adhere to it, and it does not cease to exist or lose its meaning just because it is constructed (Lunden 1992:34)

5 On this point the Kelly and Kaplan (2001) pointed to European scholars and their desire for undermining US influence and criticizing USA, while Jonathan Spencer who criticized them returned the argument that American anthropologists disregarded European studies on the issue – the exercise itself was a good example of how intellectual activity is rooted in nationalistic sentiments.
linguist in Pristina found the term ‘Kosovar’ in a British encyclopaedia and wonders polemically in an magazine article “What is ‘Kosovar’? Who are they?” (Kelmendi 2001). The term had seldom been used inside Kosovo, but it suddenly turned out to be a useful reference for international agencies who wanted to refer to the people of Kosovo without referring to any specific ethnicity. It was actually the State Department of the USA that first used the term during the war, which seem to be a good argument for Kelly and Kaplan’s theory. Still, we must make a distinction between our own definitions and concepts, and that of the respective national elite and people in which we study. For example is there no distinction between nation and ethnicity in Kosovo-Albanian public discourse. As one informant said “Kosovo is not so developed, the people do not see any difference between these two concepts yet” (ref). In the case of Kosovo, European and North-American influence is huge, and with time many ‘western’ perceptions will merge into the local cultural domain.

Another question is whether the UN protectorate is a state. Politcally, and according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, it is not. It is, however, an institution that enjoys full legislative powers within a clearly defined territory, and has state-like structures. Therefore we must regard it as a state for our analytical purposes. However, to say that Kosovo is a nation-state is problematic. Not because it does not act like a nation-state, but because its population yet do not define it as one.

If Kosovo is not a nation-state, but in our terms, a nation with “state-like structures”; can not the activity of building the state be called ‘nation-building’? As the current employees within the UN protectorate, which could be called ‘state-builders’, are foreigners working for the UN, OSCE or EU within a temporarily legislative framework, it is not necessarily a nation-state that is built. But as its goal is to build up self-governmental institutions with democratically elected politicians in assemblies with legislative power, it may very well be commonly referred to as ‘nation-building’ by future historians. Clifford Geertz describes ‘nation-building’ like this:

6 Following Kelly and Kaplan argument, it might be said that Geertz is an American anthropologist and that ‘Americans’ tend to refer to Kosovo and its administration as a nation-building project.
As the cultural apparatus of a traditional state – the detailed myths, the elaborate rituals, the high-wrought politesse – dissolves, as it has in the majority of the Third World states and doubtless will shortly in most of the rest, it comes to be replaced by a rather more abstract, rather more willed, and, in the formal sense of the term anyway, rather more reasoned set of notions concerning the nature and purpose of politics. Whether written down in a formal constitution, built into a new set of governmental institutions, or puffed up into a universal creed (or, as is not uncommon, all three), these notions, which I would call ideology in the proper sense of the term, play a similar role to the less-tutored, preideological ones they have succeeded. That is to say, they provide a guide for political activity; an image by which to grasp it, a theory by which to explain it, and a standard by which to judge it. This carrying forward into a more self-conscious, or anyway more explicit dimension, of what were once but established attitudes and received conventions is one of the central features of what we have come to call, half wistfully, half worriedly, “nation-building”. (Geertz 1973:339-340)

‘Nation-building’ seem to be nothing more than the revitalisation of a political framework declared through written documents or a constitution and new governmental institutions that present itself more rational, or at least differently, than earlier. The renewal of the state is vital. Thomas Hylland Eriksen argues that if the nation-state is ideologically successful, the identity of the population will “gradually grow compatible with the demands of the nation-state and support its growth (Eriksen 1991)”. If the UN protectorate succeeds with the self-governmental institutions, and it develops in congruence with the high culture, it is the vertical integration between the elite and its people that is critical. If the vertical integration is too weak, it will become an elitist rule. If the state is strong enough, it will be successful, and a process of nation-building will be nurtured.

In what Gellner calls “early nationalism”, where cultural homogeneity is not yet reached, the success of ‘nation-building’ is critical, and may easily fail. Ethnic minorities or other groups that communicate “distinctiveness in contexts where this distinctiveness is incompatible with requirements of the nation-state, notably those referring to formal equality and uniform practices” (Eriksen 1991), pose a serious problem. If the state fails to persuade its citizens that

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7 “Where nationalism fails to convince, the state may use violence or the threat of violence to prevent fission (that is, in the modern world, the potential formation of new nation-states on its former territory)” (Eriksen 1991).

8 Macedonia is currently in such a critical phase, 10 years after its independence from the Yugoslav Federation.
it represents the realization of (some of) their dreams and aspirations, then its power may appear illegitimate.

**Ethnicity and Ethnic Nationalism**

The term ‘ethnicity’ was first time used by David Riesman in 1953 and became in the 1960s popular in the social sciences, in the context of decolonisation of Africa (Guibernau & Rex 1997, Eriksen 1997). Since then, it has been an increasingly popular term for referring the of a particular type of social groups and its ‘ethnie’10. The process of globalisation and more and more contact between societies might have been the reason why the term ‘ethnicity’ is perceived as more adequate than the previously used ‘people’. Not many people live isolated without regular contact with other people anymore. ‘Ethnicity’ suggests that identity is something floating and dynamic that constitutes itself in relation to ‘others’. As Gregory Bateson has pointed out; there need to be more than one of something to create a difference. ‘We’ is only meaningful if there is a ‘they’ to compare with. Else it would be like the “sound of one hand clapping” (Bateson quoted in Eriksen 1993:1). This is fundamental for the concept of ethnicity, and has brought much attention to ‘ethnic boundaries’.

Fredrik Barth, who edited the volume *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* in 1969 (Barth 1969) contributed significantly to the understanding of this concept. Barth regards “ethnic identity as a feature of social organisation, rather than a nebulous expression of culture” (Barth 1994:12). Social organisation based on ethnicity regulates interaction between individuals; both within the ethnic group and between them. The ‘cultural stuff’ does not create boundaries, but is created, altered or erased as a function of it. (Barth 1994) Barth defined ethnicity as something which “classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background” (Barth 1969:13). Ethnicity is thereby the subjective identification of individuals in particular groups or categories of people.

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9 The term ‘ethnie’ is much older than ‘ethnicity’ and refers to an ancient Greek term.
10 Though it must be pointed out that the accuracy of the usage of the term seems to be lost in popular culture and media, where ethnic refers to minority groups that are potentially discriminated.
that makes it possible for actors to operate with a ‘us’ – ‘them’ dichotomy (Eriksen 1993:18,27).

One of the basic dynamics of this dichotomy, has been described by Evans-Pritchard in his famous study, that show how identity has a segmentary character among the Nuer in South-Sudan. The groups in opposition will unite (us) against a higher level opposition (them). Ethnic groups are created with a counterpart whom they distinct themselves from. For Albanians, the Serbs were an opposing ethnic group. As Serb oppression grew in the late 80’ies and reached a peak in 1993-94, students from the University of Pristina and the well respected academic Anton Cetta from the Institute of Albanology, launched a reconciliation program to stop the traditional blood feuds between families and clans. The argument was that Albanians had to unity against a bigger enemy, the Serbs. After only two years, they successfully concluded the last of the blood feuds in something that might be considered as a cultural revolution and with an astonishing effect on Albanian ethnic and national feeling of unity and strength (Clark 2000). Another point is that the multi-religious Albanian ethnic category has been perceived as non-religious or mono-religious in Kosovo. In order to avoid the religious divide between Muslim and Catholic Albanians, the civil resistance movement in Kosovo declared ‘Albanianism’ to be “our only religion”\textsuperscript{11}. The Albanian nation is really fragmented and religious fragmentation is perceived as a threat to unification in Kosovo (Dujizing 2000).

Identity is brought down level by level according to the scale a person is confronted with. Albanians stresses the Albanian in confrontation with Serbs, the ‘high culture’ of the Highlanders vs. the lowlanders, supporters of the Democratic Party vs. supporters of the Socialist Party, and clans vs. clans by over-communicating some statuses and under-communication others in certain situational contexts. People stress alliances and eliminate internal differences in one case and the opposite in another. One might say that there is a

\textsuperscript{11} People also converted to Catholism in order to show sympathies with the western world and Rome, rather to the eastern orthodox religious centres.
hierarchy of cultural idioms at work, where the Albanian ethno-national identity is at top, and trickles down all the way to family membership. As a majority of the population in Kosovo are peasants and live off their domestic produce in which each family household is a production unit and the organising principle of society, traditional ties, such as kinship, is a fundamental for the social organisation in rural areas.

One way of communicating differences, is through the usage of stereotypes. Ethnic, as well as other social categories are related to certain virtues or characteristics. The stereotype has a function of informing about the virtue of some groups as related to others. The stereotypes gives the individual easy criteria for classification that can be arranged in the social universe and provide a feeling of understanding of the society. They can also legitimize privileges and define boundaries.

For comparison, we can use an example of the social stigma of Sami ethnic identity in Norway, as described by Harald Eidheim (1969) in the late 60’ies. His fieldwork in the Finnmark region shows that coast Samis under-communicated their ethnic identity when interacting with ‘proper’ Norwegians because their identity was illegitime and was only communicated in close spheres (Eidheim 1969). Gerald Berreman have reflected on Eidheims term ‘stigmatisised ethnic identity’; “ethnic identity which ‘deeply discredits’ the individual” (Berreman 1971:12). He claims that nobody will accept a status which means “deprivation, denigration, subjugation, and exploitation - in short oppression” (Berreman 1971:12). Such status is “universally resented and struggled against” (Berreman 1971:12), because the privileges of others are visible and every human being have an empathic understanding of the fundamental similiarity between humans (Berreman 1971:12). In the 1990s, Kosovo-Albanians must have felt this discrimination strongly. Just as the Sami people, they would under-communicate their ‘Albanianess’ in interaction with Serbs, and speak Serbian\(^\text{12}\). After 1999, the table has turned, save in the Serbian enclaves; the Serbian language is discriminated

\(^{12}\) ‘Serbo-Croatian’, the official language of the Yugoslav Federation before the brake-up, is now of course non-existent, as it does no longer have a state to ensure its legitimacy and homogeneity. ‘Serbian’ and ‘Croatian’ is now two different languages, even though they are as similar (though increasingly different because of ‘nation-building’ on each sides) as Norwegian dialects would be.
and under-communicated\textsuperscript{13}. Albanians, not to mention Serbs themselves, are now extremely cautious to speak Serbian with anyone; even to acknowledge that they know the language. Rather, when the few Serb employees in OSCE and the UN spoke to Albanians in office premises, they preferred speaking English. Thereby they escape the linguistically Serb – Albanian domination and create a more neutral atmosphere of interaction.

As Edwin Ardener have pointed out, ethnic classification is a reflex of self-identification and identification of others is an important part of this self-identification (Ardener 1989:68). It is a self-imposed identification. As Barth says, “ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people” (Barth 1969:10). If the individual shall succeed in using its ethnic identity strategically, it is vital “how well the others, with whom one interacts and to whom one is compared, manage to perform, and what alternative identities and sets of standards are available to the individual” (Barth 1969:25). Barth then refers to Goffman’s over- and under-communication as mechanism of controlling an ‘impression management’ – playing on the right identity and status for the currently acting role depending on what is supposed to be achieved (Barth 1966:3, Goffman 1971). This opportunity to use ethnic identity strategically, is, as Eriksen rightly have argued, mot as much an available option in societies with nationalistic classification of a more digital kind (Eriksen 1993:67) – for example with regards to citizenship; either you are a citizen, or you are not. As Albanians make up the vast majority in the province of Kosovo, it was not a minority that was discredited, but a majority, which was governed by a Serbian minority. This was especially evident after the sacking of 90% of the total Albanian workforce in 1991 (Clark 2000). There were, however, only very limited possibilities for Albanians to escape their ethnic background in social interaction. For sure, there existed strategic opportunities in inter-ethnic interaction, but not for example in terms of using certain aspects of Albanian ethnic identity when wanting to achieve something from the government.

\textsuperscript{13} Kosovo-Albanians has for the same reason always been bi-linguists, while few Serbs would have much knowledge of the Albanian language.
As we have seen, it is not possible to investigate these aspects of ethnicity without a theoretical concept of power relations. As we have seen, the individual uses accessible identities as a tool for particularistic interests. When all these individual interests are directed towards the same resources and these resources are limited, competition will arise and with it, power relations. Leo Despres (1975) has tried to integrate analysis of power relations with an analysis of interpersonal ethnicity in poly-ethnic Guyana. Despres focuses on three dimensions of ethnicity and ethnic group relations:

- first, that pertaining to the overall social system and the persistence of culturally different populations;
- second, the nature and character of organized ethnic group relations; and third, the role of ethnicity as it affects individual encounters within varying situational contexts (Despres 1975:89).

In the case of Guyana, the social system (macro level) was dominated by foreign interests. These relations influenced the possibilities of the individual in the situational context of competition for scarce resources (micro level). This is a theoretical supplement to Barth’s actor perspective and makes it possible to avoid to study the ‘opportunities of the slave’, as Talad Asad has pointed out in his critique to Barth. Barth has later incorporated macro level power relations as premises for action possibilities for the individual.

John Breuilly defines nationalism as “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments. A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions; a, there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; b, the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; c, the nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty” (Breuilly 1985:3). The term ‘nation’, used by Breuilly, seems to correspond to the when Smith uses ‘ethnie’. Breuilly’s definition can therefore be used to define nationalism that legitimise state power controlled by one ethnic group; ethnic nationalism. For the same reason is it a general perception that the Albanian term etnik (ethnic) means the same as komb (nation). It is evident that the civil resistance movement that started in 1990 had separatist aims. They demanded, through a referendum and a declaration of independence, separation from the Yugoslav federation and thereby Serb domination in
State institutions. The movement was therefore per se nationalistic, and because it was in the interest of one ethnic group that it promoted, its activity can be referred to as ethnic nationalism.

The ideal type of ethnic nationalism is then where the borders of the state and the ethnic boundary are the same. In many cases the state act as if these borders where the same, but they are not. Powerful ethnic minorities, and especially those who controls who exerts some sort of territorial control, pose a serious threat for states which is legitimised by the dominance of one particular ethnic group.

Smith is well known for stressing the ethnic origins of nationalism. He does not see nationalism as a purely modern phenomenon, but as based on an ‘ethnic core’ that has long historical roots (Smith 1986). Modernism brought more nostalgia for people’s ethnic past because of its uprooting of people for their communities and the decline of traditions and salvation religions. Nationalism, which bases itself on ethnicity, becomes

“a ‘surrogate’ religion which aims to overcome the sense of futility engendered by the removal of any vision of an existence after death, by linking individuals to persisting communities whose generations form indissoluble links in a chain of memories and identities” (Smith 1986:176).

Thus, the death of God in modern times, in Nietzsche’s sense, and with it, the possibility of a life after death, has inflicted a wound that nationalism provides healing for. Even though nationalism does not promise life after death, it provides the framework in which the individual can understand who they are;

“ethnic mythologies and symbolisms can restore the collective heritage and explain ‘who we are’ to ourselves and to other, by clearly demarcating what is authentically ‘ours’ from what is alien, in much the same way that traditional religions distinguished the sacred from the profane” (Smith 1986:202).

Not only does nationalism provide us with an explanation of who we are; it also outlines the nation situated in a historical timeline starting in the early times of origin and a golden age, to decline and future re-birth. It thereby also gives the individual and the ethnic community a framework of self-realisation. This framework is presented in national mythology. Smith has outlined a series of elements in national mythology or myth of ethnic origins and descent, such as a myth of origins in time and space, myth of ancestry, migration, liberation, the golden age, decline and rebirth. These elements
The basic identity code of the nation sets the pattern and direction of its destiny, but “humans and heroes alone can ‘realize’ it. That is why heroes are personalized, and why the golden age is an age of ‘heroes’. The ‘uses of history’ are the virtues of great men” (Smith 1986:192). The myths and symbols also provides what Smith calls ‘maps’ and ‘moralities’ (Smith 1986:202). They emphasise the boundaries of the ethnic group and the virtue of the ‘others’ and their location as opposed to the virtue of ‘us’, located in our territory. Monuments and landscapes are for example often objects of ethnic map-making and morality. The meaning of a monument of a national hero lies in his particular virtue and his unique context. The virtue “is peculiar to a specific group of descendants, the context is relevant only to a single community and its habitat. The hero is an examplar” (Smith 1986:196). He is an example of self-realisation within the framework of the nation and is of great inspiration for its people.

With Smiths theoretical explanation, it becomes easy to imagine that in times of crisis and ethnic mobilisation, the national mythology becomes the common denominator for all social activity. Nationalism presents itself in a Grand Story that intertwines with political and intellectual activity.

The central problem to the study of ethnic nationalism is integration. How can a society and its state integrate a population? Ethnic Nationalism in cases of separatist claims by minority groups is a true sign that such integration has failed. Throughout the social sciences, there has been consensus about the two most fundamental ways of integrating a population into the state; either by force or by coercion to an ideology. History has seen numerous combinations of the two. Ethnic nationalism is often met by military force because it threatens the very existence of a state. If minority groups remain loyal to the state and does not claim independence, it often gained increased rights and autonomy, such as is the example with Kosovo in the 1970s. In the 1970s however, the contact between Albanians in Kosovo and

14 As is often the case in the Balkans, even foreigners often find themselves entangled in the Grand Story when asserting the reasons for such conflicts.
15 Also the case with the Laps in Northern-Norway in the 1980s, who were granted a parliament with the powers to veto cases that were passed by the parliament in Oslo that violated their cultural integrity (see Eidheim 1969)
Albanians in Albania and Macedonia were almost null. There were several centres with high cultures, forming what Smith calls the ‘poly-centric’ type of nationalism; Tirana, Pristina and Tetovo. When the borders were opened in the beginning of the 1990s, the ‘ethnic high cultures’ in the Albanian dominated areas became more connected. This also gave opportunity to military alliances that transcended the boundaries of the nation-state, creating ultimate coercive powers (see Richmond 1994). The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is an example. KLA had financial and political support from trans-national Albanian communities in New York and Switzerland, training facilities and logistic support in Albania during the war and secure weapon storage in Macedonia after the war. This is the reason why KLA could fight Serbia, a state with major military capacity at a high technological level, but with jurisdiction only within its territory and without military alliances in the areas mentioned. It is evident that the problem of integration in states that faces a population with poly-centric nationalist activities is a regional one. But first of all, it is a problem of the state and its strategies of integration of its citizens.

Multi-Culturalism and Civic Nationalism

Many scholars claim that the nation-state is currently in crisis. The tighter international co-operation in economic affairs and new technology for transportation and information exchange, what is commonly referred to as a process of ‘globalisation’, creates powerful international corporations and organisations that create trans-national bonds between people. The nation-state is no longer the only guardian of meaning in social interaction and has got fierce competition with regards to provides people with a framework for self-realisation. Trans-national structures provide citizens with meaning through a constant and global flow of cultural elements, and the possibility of self-realisation through a diversity of trans-national ideologies and organisations. Homogenisation of the national culture is increasingly difficult in an environment were impulses from all the world’s cultures presents itself everywhere and in a diversity of forms at the local level. The nation-state is striving to control national ideology as an integrative structure, providing congruence between homogenous culture and the polity. It is in this context the recent revival of nationalism must be seen.
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the communist states are definitely a major event that enhanced nationalist ideologies, in particular in Eastern Europe. As Jacques Rupnik puts it; “The reawakening of nationalisms is connected to the interaction of three main causes; the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international system; the ideological vacuum after communism; the economy, caught between globalism and the decomposition / re-composition of systems” (Rupnik 1996:44). The world has seen numerous nation-formations since the 1960s, often initiated by states that “hold neither a monopoly of ‘meaning’ nor on violence, where the decomposition of their freshly acquired authority keeps pace with that of the economy, favouring the proliferation of parallel economic, financial, and communication circuits” (Rupnik 1996:46). The modernist perception of nation-states and its development as perceived by Gellner implies that the state has monopoly of meaning from its time of creation. In a post-modern world, however, the national high cultural elites are no longer the prime foci for the articulation of meaning in the life-world of the population it services. If the new nation-states of the 19th century today need increased administrative control and surveillance in order to homogenise culture and reforms in integrative politicise, to maintain congruence between culture and polity, the new states will need a tremendous ideological mobilisation in order to achieve the same effect; for example, one stimulated by opposition to neighbouring or ‘threatening’ states. Creating a homogenous culture and present a state as the framework for people’s self-realisation is an increasingly difficult task in the new age of globalisation. With a lack of an ideological community to base the integration between elite and people in a state, the monopoly of violence is crucial; the usage of state violence against certain groups is often the result.

In environments where the state does not provide a secure framework for economic activity and social life, structures based upon kinship, clan and ethnicity are often mobilised. It is therefore more accurate to call this process the reawakening of ethnicity, as nationalism, in this respect, is just a manifestation of ethnic mobilisation. The ethnic mobilisation is caused by the failure of the state in its strive for integration between the elite and the people, and failure to incorporate and commit its people to the governmental structures. In this context,
minority groups that are not well integrated, are the first that will seem to be contradicting the nation and is perceived as not to adhere to the ideology of the state; they therefore represent a threat to its existence.

The problem is not entirely restricted to new states and nation-formation. Ethnicity has become a vital structure in well developed states as well. Studies in the USA show that economic success often relies on ethnic networks (Rupnik 1996). ‘Balkanisation’ has become a widely used term in the USA referring to the process where political fractions and representations are created along ethnic lines (ref interview). The ideology of the ‘melting pot’ is now history. Ethnic groups are organised and politicised. Rex has called this process ‘pillarisation’ and used the example of the Netherlands, where the strategy of incorporation of minority groups focus on organising the groups and enable them to fight their cause within the political system (Rex). The French model has long been seen as the European ‘melting pot’ model, which focused on the citizen and its equal rights. It actively discouraged arguments or organisations that promoted the rights of one particular group. The civic perception of nationhood, where all citizens are equal to the state, is, however, loosing the battle. The French state is now making concessions to claims for particular rights for particular groups of citizens. As the nation-state looses the battle for civic nationhood, other regional structures, such as the European Union, are introducing a wider identity that might complement the loss of national citizenship ideology.

Theoretical concepts to deal with the new setting for nation-states has been developed, most notably the concept of ‘multi-culturalism’ advocated by Rex (1997) and the older concept of ‘plural societies’, as presented by Leo Kuper 1997 [1969)]. The concept of ‘multi-culturalism’ is based upon a division between the public domain, which is based on a single culture and governed by a single set of individual rights, and the private domain, which permits diversity between groups. The fundament of the concept rests on the assumption and ideology of equal opportunities among the citizens. The multi-cultural society must

“find a place for both diversity and equality of opportunity. Emphasise upon the first without allowing for the second could lead to segregationism, inequality and differential incorporation. Emphasise upon the second at the expense of the first could lead to an authoritarian form of assimilationism, which is both at odds with the ideal of a multicultural society” (Rex 1997:217-218).
Essential for the ideal is that all groups are equally incorporated and receives equal treatment in the public domain. Rex interprets society in term of conflict and class struggle. The “social order which we have is the result of social conflict. I see no reason why there should not be a similar process as that between majority and minority groups” (Rex 1997:218).

While this may fit historically in the North-Atlantic context, many other societies experience the two conflicts at the same time; both class struggle and that between minority and majority groups. Are we to assume that equal incorporation and opportunities between groups is possible in societies without the history of class struggle? I think not. The concept of ‘multi-culturalism’ presupposes a rule of law based on liberal values such as those in Northern America and Western Europe. Eriksen’s division between societies that originates from feudalism or colonialism, in which the Eastern European nationalisms has a dual origin, might be useful to see some of the historical rooted differences (Eriksen 1991). Before the concept of multi-culturalism can be introduced in Eastern European societies, major changes in the perception of state and governance, as well as in the culture of the public domain must come first. Kosovo can maybe be said to be an experiment in this regard. The UN administration emphasise equal incorporation of minority groups through political parties¹⁶, as well as through representation in municipal assemblies and the central provincial assembly. But is it legitimate to claim that such incorporation provides equal opportunities between the groups? The answer will easily be based on the perception of a society common for those advocating the concept of ‘plural society’, in which the concept of multi-culturalism is suppose to oppose; different groups have different degrees of political power (Kuper 1979 [1969]). This certainly seem to be the case in Kosovo, where newly elected democratic institutions are now operating; the groups have political power according to the size of their community and they do not have ambitions to represent any other groups.

For the public domain to be organised according to the ideology of equal opportunities, which is a precondition for multi-culturalism, the population must feel part of a community of

¹⁶ As the emphasise is that each minority should be represented by a political party, the perception of elections is that each minority community only votes for their respective parties.
equals. Incorporation following ethnic lines, as with social classes, does not create solidarity outside the group; rather, it contributes to a system of governance that can be polemically called ‘ethnocracy’; it supports political groupings and fractions in the government and public administration according to ethnicity, each with their agenda, focusing on the interests of a particular part of the population, not the society as a whole. The question is therefore; how does a culture of equal citizens and rights emerge?

First; there must be a civil society and a high culture that adopts this ideology of equal citizens and advocates it in the society. This can not be only done rationally, as sentiments towards the citizenship of a state is more emotional than rational. The civil society and high culture elite must advocate a national identity in which solidarity between the different groups is formulated in ways much similar to that of ethnic solidarity, only this time, super-ethnical. In order to do this, bonds between the groups must be stressed, such as the ones resting on the notion of common ancestry to a territory.

Second; a culture of equal citizens will only emerge when the whole population can identify themselves with the state and its ideology, values, norms, and praxis; which has to be proven as of ‘good governance’\(^\text{17}\). As soon as certain groups are perceived as not adhering to these identificatory elements, the group will cease to be considered part of the integrative structure and ideal of the state; the civic perception of the state and its service of the population will thus diminish. This often creates an evil circle, where failure by the elite and public administration to integrate the whole population will not create the required sentiments that allow them to be considered equal citizens, and the failure of the state is allowed to be ‘rationalised’ by arguments stressing the ‘primordial’ and inherent non-compliance of the group to the state and its ideological legacy\(^\text{18}\). The process that ends the evil circle, is often initiated by an international party or some gross domestic problems that do not only affect the

\(^{17}\) The term ‘good governance’ first appeared in the World Bank report by John ?, that showed that bilateral financial support to states without ‘good governance’ have significantly low effect. It is suggested instead, that such countries are first supported with institution building programmes. ‘Good governance’ is thus seen as an elementary fundament for further development.

\(^{18}\) This process is seen in Macedonia in 2001, where arguments about the inherent and primordial characters of Macedonian-Albanians and its non-compliance with the very idea of the Macedonian state is frequenting among ‘Macedonian-Macedonians’. These arguments sidelines the needed attention on state integrative policies.
minority groups, but also suffocates the dominant group. It can also be initiated over time with modernisation and increased penetration of state administration into people’s life-world. Personal identification, which individuals once had with the private domain and the local community, is thus transferred to the state, as outlined in the theory of multi-culturalism’ (Rex 1997:212).

The two arguments above are intertwined. As the state penetrates the private domain with ‘good governance’, it will quickly find a way to address its population as if it was one single group of people; simply because it needs it, and that this is part of the standardisation doctrine adopted by modern bureaucracy in order to achieve governance control. It is simply necessary to introduce arrangements that are most efficient within the territory of the state; to approach its citizens as constituting one single group of ‘clients’ is elementary. It reflects the way public administrations are ‘thinking like a state’ (see Scott 1998). As ‘good governance’ develops, people within that particular territory, that is, citizens equally eligible for the services of the state, will feel like citizens of the state, which enhances territorial identity.

This is what Smith calls the ‘ethnic model’, as opposed to the Western European territorial form of nation formation; the *ethnie* acquires a state that imposes a citizenship and rule of law in a territory (Smith 1986:144-149). The distinction between the two is based on Hans Kohn’s dichotomy ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ nationalism (Kohn 1946). The state has long historical roots in Western European countries, and has thus over time created homogeneous cultures, while in the east, most nations never had states and control over territory (see Gellner 19??). When the new eastern states acquired territory, they developed citizenship, rights, legal codes, political culture and social mobility that imposed a common culture based on the dominant *ethnie* and transformed it, into a modern nation. Territorial identity is thus created by the state, but is based on that specific *ethnie*.

Citizenship is regarded as the boundary that define the nation; the principle of inclusion and exclusion in the *ethnie* becomes coherent with the citizenship of the state, and is controlled by its bureaucratic structures. The *ethnie* originally acquired a state and territory; but the state has
created a modern bureaucracy and governance following the principle of citizenship, which has again created civic nationalistic sentiments. When citizens enjoy solidarity as equals to the state and its rule of law regardless of ethnicity, civic nationalism has developed, as a principle that keeps the common culture of citizens, referred to as a nation, congruent with the political culture of the state, which controls the execution of rule of law and the inclusion and exclusion of citizens. Citizenship is not coherent with membership in one specific ethnic group.

With good governance focusing on equal rights and opportunities, both the western and eastern model can lead to territorial identity and civic nationalism; but ethnic identity is a more vital part in national identity in the eastern context, simply because Western Europe has had persistent states for centuries that homogenised its cultures. Smith rightly acknowledges that “what distinguish nations from ethnie are, in some sense, ‘Western’ features and qualities“ (Smith 1986:144). In Eastern Europe, there has historically not been any congruence between nation and state, neither has the different ethnies, except the Hungarians and Austrians, controlled a territory. Rather, a few empires governed dozens of different subjugated nations and ethnic groups. The state has throughout the period of empires thus been superior to the ethnie, not been based upon its membership, solidarity and common culture. Ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Russia, Austria and Hungary, can therefore be interpreted as liberation from ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ rule, where the state and its territory must be created based upon the already existing and deeply rooted ethnie.

Michael Ignatieff has pointed out, when presenting the ideal of ‘benign nationalism’; the “mono-ethnic nation-state is now the exception, rather than the rule” (Ignatieff 1999). As trans-national labour market and global migration has given most nation-states today a diversity of ethnic minorities with even different primordial characters in its population, the civic type of nationalism is sought after globally and its ideal, together with ‘multiculturalism’, is being incorporated in legal codes and bureaucratic practice. Public
administrators that arrives in Kosovo to work for the UN administration is by no means an exception; what they build reflects their experience and background in their own countries; they implement the codes of rule coherent with territorial nation-states based upon law and citizenship. It is evident in this regard, that it is the administrators from Western-Europe and North America that are the architects of the building of the Kosovo governmental structures.

**International Intervention and the problem of interim governments**

In the post-cold world war, there has been a dramatic increase in international interventions, also military interventions, into states that are in crisis and can not provide security for its population. One serious challenge for those who advocate the right to intervene even with military force against the will of the respective states, is international law, which builds upon the sovereignty of the state. The intervention in Yugoslavia and other states has initiated a discussion about state sovereignty, which has been the ruling principle of international relations since 1648. The UN established in 1999 a commission in order to agree upon certain principles in which intervention should be regarded as legitimate. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) concluded in 2002 that the international community has a responsibility to protect people against serious human rights violations when the national authorities do not have the possibility or will to do so (ICISS 2002). State sovereignty is thus regarded as limited to compliance with human rights. The practice of ‘humanitarian’ intervention has received criticism for not being coherent, and that it happens in the interests of the intervening states. Naom Chomsky has been one of the prominent critics and argues that some conflicts are intentionally ignored, while other conflicts are intentionally escalated in the interests of the intervening western countries (Chomsky 1999). Chomsky refers to the ruling of the World Court, which ruled that US military activity in Nicaragua was unlawful and has been very critical about the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia and its compliance with international law (Chomsky 1999:152-153).
While the accounts on international relations and diplomacy in this respect are numerous, more detailed analysis about the impact of the intervention in a longer term is still scarce. David Chandler has made a great contribution in this respect, by analyzing the development of institutions in Bosnia four years after the 1995 Dayton peace agreement. Chandler calls the attempt by the international community to create democratic institutions and reconciliation in Bosnia for ‘faking democracy’ (Chandler 1999).

It is a problem with this type of criticism, that it has to base most of its analysis on critical journalism, and does so without much theoretical support. Chandler, Chomsky and others base most of their arguments on journalist articles and literature. This makes it possible to analyze recent events, but the analyses itself also tends to become journalistic and polemic in style and spirit. This leads Chandler also to criticize the UN administration in Kosovo in 1999, saying; “autonomy for Kosovo under the UN and NATO is increasingly looking no more democratic than life under the Yugoslav regime” (Chandler 1999:209). As with most journalists, Chandler does not realize the magnitude of the task of reshaping and rebuilding state institutions. The transition to self-governance involves a period without democratically elected government; that is a period in which the UN and certain selected individuals forms an interim government. This phase is not done in half-a-year, or even a year or two. The fact that Kosovo has a democratically elected government and both central assembly and municipal assemblies less than three years after the protectorate came into power must be seen as a remarkable success, and could only happen with the enormous resources put in by the international actors involved. The results of this engagements, is also the result of having developed what Janne Haaland Matlary calls the “human rights regime in Europe”, where the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a prime vehicle (Matlary 2002).

19 Many research institutes are involved in policy-oriented research on these topics; The Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo is a good example, having investigated many aspects of humanitarian forces (PRIO 1997) and the problems of state sovereignty with regards to humanitarian interventions (PRIO1999?).
In aftermath, it is evident that the period of interim government in Kosovo faced serious difficulties. These problems, which are intertwined with international intervention as such, must be seen as an abnormal interim period. Here are some of them:

People in general do not identify with the new international or internationally imposed leaders. The former elite is sidelined and made passive observers. They can only be re-activated by being included in civil society NGOs or take part in the election process (when finally organized).

1. Those of the elite taken into councils in the interim government are chosen by internationals as representatives of the people, but might very well turn out to not have much support in the population and made important by (accidentally) being selected.

2. An international elite emerges, consisting of a variety of internationals (mostly nomadic ‘mercenaries’) working for international NGO and GOs. They develop an elite culture and lifestyle with their own networks, with little contact with the general population.

3. The perceptions of the international elite with regards to explaining the conflict in the society promotes ‘ethnification’ of the society. The internationals in interim governments organize society according to the perceived ethnic boundaries; looking more like an ‘ethnocracy’ than democracy.

4. Internationals on high salary level creates a boom in certain businesses. The real estate market gets ‘twisted’; demands apartments and office space for international agencies that soars market prices; favorable urban areas are suddenly at the level of expensive big cities and global cosmopolitan centres in price. A whole new business sector arises for supplying the internationals with restaurants, apartments, luxury household articles, travels and office space. Creates successful ‘nouveau riches’ small business entrepreneurs.

5. The labor market gets ‘twisted’; people with knowledge of English, even without any other competence, earn 10-times a normal high-level salary by working for international agencies in positions of status and power; many of these are young students still living with their parents. These workers, who either adopts or already has
a ‘western’ lifestyle, constitute a new upper class contradicting the earlier class structure that legitimized itself by education, high culture and political power.

6. Illegal economical activity booms and gets impossible to control or even gain knowledge about without the functional legal institutions in place. This economy gets ‘settled’ and manage to ‘stay legal’ according to the progress of the new institutions and their increased economic control. Becomes an invisible force that plays its own game, also in politics. Represents a sustainable problem.

7. Political uncertainty easily lead to unrest and civil resistance. Especially in cases that relates to the interim status of the respective territory.

All these problems will cease to exist, or at least decrease, as the self-governance institutions runs with less international involvement and less international employees are needed. The first problem (1) has to do with vertical integration that will diminish a lot after elections are held and democratically elected officials are in power, which also will re-activate the former elite (2) and wipe out politicians without popular support (3). As international employees are fewer, the estate market will normalize (6). And as the self-governance institutions runs on their own budget, so will the salaries20 (7). Many of the new high culture of English-speaking young people, often with ‘western’ lifestyle becomes the new bureaucratic leadership in the governmental institutions and civil society (media and NGOs) in particular. The new entrepreneurs in the economic boom created by the consumption of international agencies, will either fall out of the competition, or expand into other more sustainable economic sectors, and thus contribute positively to the economy.

The illegal economic activity booms during the uncertainties during the setup of the interim government and is fought slowly over years as the governmental institutions gains control over the economy (8). Before these institutions are functional it is also impossible to really know the extent of the illegal economy. Because of the legal codes and lack of judiciary, it might not even be officially defined as illegal. It is object to a lot of speculations and myth-

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20 A report from Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) claims that the high international salary levels creates an inflationary effect on the society, see CMI 2002:47
making that undermines the interim government. Control of the black economy and whether the governmental institutions are functional enough to grow out of its ‘ethnocratic’ childhood (5), is the most crucial signs for whether the interim government has truly managed to form the basis for future good governance. Good governance needs a stabile political climate and therefore demands a solution to the final status dilemma (9). Special statuses, as promoted by Adam Roberts (Roberts 1999:102-3), is part of the transitional process of the interim government. The final status is often up to the international actors involved, as well as regional geo-political developments.

These are problems and general developments observed in Kosovo and Bosnia. Very little has been written about the above issues, maybe apart from the mythical black economy that now and then reveals itself, and the story of politicians. Attempts of analysis of the above problems are almost absent. Yet, they are important problems for any analysis of interventions and they give guidance to understanding the extent of the problem intervention and international interim governments creates. In the chapters ahead, many of these problems (2,4,5,7,9) will be looked into in detail.
2. Methodology and focus of enquiry

This is a study of the upper strata of social classes the provincial capitol of Kosovo, Pristina; the elite, that enjoys respect by the general population because of their educational, political and economic status; a status that find opposition in the notion of the less cultural sophisticated, commonly referred to as ‘farmers’ and ‘villagers’. This elite can be divided into four different social milieus. First, the intellectual elite, which is based at the University and research institutions and to some extend in media. Second; the political elite, organised in political parties. Third; what I have called the new high culture of trans-nationals and returning emigrants, located primarily in the NGO community and the media sector. Forth; the international elite, which is located in international governmental and non-governmental organisations.

![Diagram showing the degree of interaction between the four social milieus.](image)

The figure above indicates the degree of interaction between these four social milieus. Most notably, the political and intellectual elite are intertwined. Intellectuals are often, or becomes, politicians. There is sparse communication between the international elite and the intellectual elite. The international elite mainly communicate with the political leadership (top elite) and representatives of the new high culture. The new high culture plays a mediating role between the two local elites and the international elite.
In order to keep my scope of inquiry as tight as possible, a set of hypothesis were formulated in the introductory chapter. This has the purpose of keeping the empirical data in relation to a higher level of abstraction and thus avoiding a gap between the “theoretical frame of reference”, and the empirical level, as Pertti Pelto and Gretel Pelto warns about (Pelto & Pelto 1978:251-287). The hypothesises are central problems that will be the focus of the investigation, providing a conclusion at the end.

**Participant Observation**

The field research was conducted by the author in Kosovo; four months in 2000 and seven months in 2001. Apart from sporadic trips throughout Kosovo and across the border to Albania and Montenegro, the research has been conducted in the city of Pristina. Seven of these months have been spent as a contracted employee of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)\(^{21}\) and three of the months as an associate at a research institute.

It is important to be aware of my own personal background and experiences as a young Norwegian student and, sometimes, humanitarian worker. Cultural concepts that surprised me, might have been ignored by others, and vica versa, because of my particular background. The research can thus be seen as a process of inter-cultural meetings, in which my analysis derives from reflections regarding differences between the two cultures. This analysis is thus a result of a process where my own position and background has been constantly at play.

The roles that I had in the different social milieus varied. The intellectual and political elite were studied in the role and status as a ‘foreign student’. I was also an associate at a research institute that everyone knew and respected, as well as a friend of a family that was known in political circles. I used informants to get into contact with persons within the milieu that I only knew by name. Thus my network slowly expanded and I started to get a personal impression of the wider milieu and their interaction. Often I met persons that were central for

\(^{21}\) In the Department of Election Operations, on month at the Gjilan Regional Office and six months at Pristina HQ.
my research without knowing it there and then. In the beginning it seemed confusing with persons I could not relate to one another. But at the end of my field work I realised how small the elite is and to what extend they all know each other.

One key problem with the intellectual and political elite was language. Few among them spoke English. I had, unfortunately, a language barrier that was only slowly loosening its bonds on my interaction as I learned to speak the most basic Albanian myself. My knowledge of Albanian was mostly only good enough to be polite, get acquainted and sorting out practicalities, not for exchange of abstract information. I would often lose the meaning in the conversation and needed at least one in the company that knew English. The language barrier combined with the difficult access to politicians and the fact that they most often were under time-constraints, made my study of this milieu difficult. I admit that many senior international staff working in Kosovo know more about the political milieu than me. But my data about how politicians performed in public, like in public ceremonies, or in interaction between parties, like on political conferences, is rich. In such events I have had the role as an observer, as I had no active role in these arrangements.

The new high culture was studied both as a ‘student’ and an ‘international’, as well as a ‘youth’. This was the milieu I, as the person I am, go most easily access to. Their experiences and background were not all too far away from my own. I relaxed in their company. I mostly met them in cafes, concerts and bars. I also involved them more in the discussion of my research. Some of them had studied at foreign universities and were much more open to new perspectives. In this respect I might have had an impact on their perception of identity and politics as a discussion partner. It is difficult to take part in social interaction, especially with engaged and curious students, without contributing with your own background, experiences and thoughts. Most of them had lived abroad during the war or even the last decade, returning to Kosovo only recently, excited to contribute to re-building the society of their homeland. Thus, many of them were ready and open for anything new; some also for my very controversial perspectives.
The international elite and the OSCE was studied as ‘one of them’; I, the researcher, enjoyed the same status as my informants as an international employee. Therefore, formal interviews were only used on persons in higher positions, whom could not be reached through normal working relations. There was a period were I in this milieu lost the research role and “went native”. For more than a month I forgot all about the research project and was totally living in the life-world of my informants in this social milieu. Afterwards, I realised that this was fruitful, as I could more or less look at myself for gaining information about the milieu I was studying. Except for those I made interviews with, many of these informants knew I was writing a thesis, but did not know I would use my interaction with them as a basis for analysis. This is related to research ethics, which will be discussed below.

**Research in Conflict Societies**

The political and intellectual elite, in particular the political, had a clear picture of what was the topic of my study and how the study would look like. I mostly did not get to tell them more than that I would write about Kosovo in recent times. I realised that they, as familiar with academic papers and research, saw me as a continuation of a political scientific tradition, a ‘normal science’ in the conflict-ridden province, in which history and the human rights violations following political events were the prime focus. It was hard to convince them otherwise. Thus I was informed a lot about these topics and gained knowledge into the ‘normal science’ of what could be called ‘oppression’ studies within the political paradigm of civil resistance and war. It gained my purpose and made me well positioned for studying institutionalised production of knowledge and its distribution. Informing these people that I would not follow this doctrine created anger and suspicion, and I therefore resented doing this, apart from to the few informants that were open enough for it and who had a background that made it possible for them to understand such my analytical concept. For my own security and the possibility of making this research at all, I refrained from trying to make most informants in this milieu understand the real scope of my investigation. Many times I felt bad and hypocritical about this. I was assumed to be patriotic towards the ‘Albanian question’, but I had little or no ambitions to support a nationalistic political programme in this respect. Therefore I was constantly nervous for being ‘caught’ and that people assessed me rightly.
also felt that I did not give anything in return for their help; I did not share articles or published materials, nor did I take actively part in discussions with my own point of view. I only asked questions, now and then, in between the politeness. All I had to offer was the ‘friendship’ of a foreign student. I was probably perceived as an exotic stranger; the first foreign student ever (from symbolical ‘Europe’ and rich Scandinavia) who wanted to study at their university in the “backward” and war-torn province of Kosovo. And thus I was received according to the traditional hospitableness, in which I had to adhere to the role of the grateful client.

It is in general difficult to distinguish who gave information and when they did and in what context. As a researcher I often felt that it was more or less irrelevant who the informant were, as much of the information gained was of a structural character, a common knowledge shared by the whole city; just not the views of one individual. Even though some key informants gave me invaluable information and access to information, knowledge was not gained by a single interview or even hours of discussion, but by weeks of reflection based upon all the bits and pieces of information gathered, combined with a theoretical framework. In this way, data was created by me, the researcher, not gathered from individuals as apples can be picked from a tree. None of the informants, maybe except for two or three of them, had much knowledge about the theoretical framework I used to create data, on the basis of the information they gave away. The informants shall therefore not feel that they portrayed the society to me as I do. I am solemnly responsible for my own description.

Because of the sensitivity of the material and the tense political situation in Kosovo, I have refrained from naming any informants, except when they have made public statements in media or in interviews where they clearly intended to do so. Names of institutions are also avoided, even though a reader from Pristina will probably recognise it in the text.

**Events Analysis**
Ted Lewellen has written an introductory book about Political Anthropology (Lewellen 1992) without mentioning nationalism. Nation-formation is briefly mentioned while discussing
modernisation theories, but without reference to Gellner and Anderson, or any other theorists of nationalism. This does not mean that there are not many other case studies that focus on the subject. My impression is, however, that the overwhelming literature on nationalism is not primarily based on systematic case studies, in particular not those based on field work and participant observation. For example is Gellner’s empirical fundament is very vague, and do not rest on any field work; neither do Anderson, who rather analyse literature and could be said to follow the discipline of the ‘history of ideas’, or ‘intellectual history’, more than Anthropology in methods. Smith has numerous comparative empirical examples to support his theories, but these do not rest upon any case studies with ‘thick’ anthropological descriptions and analysis based on field work. I find it therefore necessary to outline how this will be done in this study.

Most cases that are referred to as ‘nationalistic’ refers to either single expressions by persons or institutions, or a concerted expression orchestrated in a specific event, in which nationalist symbols and verbal references to such symbols are used. Symbols are, I believe, the only way in which nationalist expressions can be perpetuated by material means. Thus, nationalist symbols are central to the analysis of events that expressed nationalist sentiments. The analysis of such events are twofold; first, the analysis of the event and its context, how it is organised and structured. Second; how the symbols of nationalist meaning is used and the analysis of what it refers to in the context it is used.

The context of nationalist events is that it is made on the background of mobilising political support for and by an elite. The event thus has a wider context, which we can call the ‘political field’, while the ‘political arena’ refers to the public stage that the event creates. In the analysis, the description of the ‘political field’ is necessary to understand the arena created.

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22 This dichotomy is discussed in Lewellen (1992:101). Anthropological literature does not provide a clear definition on the dichotomy.
by the event. Another central dichotomy is that between active and passive participants. As one of the key aspect of modern ceremonies is that it has more passive participants than active; such events always have a ‘stage’, or a place where the attention of the passive participants are focused. This is elaborated by Anderson, who sees the start of printed media, as a first step towards modern nationalism, making it possible for the political elite to communicate with a far wider audience (Anderson 1991 [1983]). Jean Baudrillard has also reflected upon this one-way communication, in which the masses are merely recipients like an audience on a theatre. Baudrillard says the masses not only absorbs, but ‘implode’ also the very meaning of what was communicated (Baudrillard 1991). The masses are a medium stronger than all mass mediums; they absorbs even the medium. Playing with the famous quote from McLuhan, Baudrillard says “Mass(age) is the message” (Baudrillard 1991:38). All systems of representation are undermined by the silent implosion of the masses (Baudrillard 1991:45). Even though Baudrillard is extreme in his arguments, his perspective points at the fact that the masses, or the passive participants in our context, can only ‘implode’ the message that is being sent to them, for example in events like those of our concern. Thus the message is transformed, and is experienced by the passive participants as meaning something else than what the political elite that organises it meant it to be. There is however, indicators to whether the passive participants experienced the event as meaningful or not. This can be interpreted by the describing the crowd and its movement, as well as comments and discussions in aftermath. It can also be measured in public polls and elections, where certain politicians increases their popularity.

Time is essential for the event as such. What happens ‘on stage’ does not happen by accident; it is organised according to a time schedule, where the order is not insignificant. The proportions of the ‘ingrediences’ in the set-up indicate the priorities given to the different elements. Both the time-related structure and the structural setting of the event is essential for the analysis.
The symbols that are being presented in events like these need both to be interpreted as they appear and are presented on the political arena, and in a wider comparative and historical perspective. Even though Victor Turner analyse traditional rituals among the Ndembu in Zambia, where there are fewer participants and none of them are passive, he has suggested a model to use for analysing symbols in rituals which can be partly applicable on nationalist events. The political arena corresponds to what Turner calls ‘field setting’ (Turner 1967:26). There are three classes of data to analyse symbols in a ‘field setting’; external form and observable characteristics, interpretations offered by specialists and laymen, and significant contexts largely worked out by the anthropologists (Turner 1967:20). The first and the last of them, reflects the twofold approach set-up above. The interpretations being offered by specialists corresponds to political commentaries in media and discussions of intellectuals after events.

Turner classifies descriptive data into three categories; condensation, or many things and actions are represented in a single formation (1), a dominant symbol that is a unification of disparate data (2), and polarisation of meaning (3) (Turner 1967:28). Tuner uses Edward Sapir to distinguish ‘referential symbols’ from condensed symbols (1), in which includes “oral speech, writing, national flags, flag signalling, and other organizations of symbols which are agreed upon as economical devices for purposes of reference” (Turner 1967:29). It is cognitive and refers to “known facts” and builds on formal elaboration. The condensation symbol, on the other hand, is saturated with emotional quality and strikes deep into the roots of the unconscious (Turner 1967:29). Our theoretical discussion has shown that national symbols of the “referential” type is equally ‘saturated’ with emotion, and is not at all object to any formal or rational ‘elaboration’. Turner uses ‘the milk tree’ as an example, a tree used in a rites de passage for young girls symbolising breast milk and the fertility that production of breast milk represent. One of his informants refers to the British flag over the administrative
headquarters and says; “Mudyi [the milk tree] is our flag” (Turner 1967:21-23). Like the informant, I see no difference between the two. We shall consider also ‘referential’, or national symbols, as ‘condensational’, and our analysis should focus on their emotional character and multitude of meanings.

Turner also stresses that there is often a dominant symbol (2), which refers to “values that are regarded as ends in themselves” (Turner 1967:20). ‘The milk tree’ is an example. For our purposes, a national flag might be a dominant symbol on the political arena. The polarisation of meaning (3) is the last category, where there are two distinguishable ‘poles of meaning’ in the symbol; one referring to the moral and social order of society, the ‘ideological pole’, while the other refers to the related elements that arise desires and feelings, named the ‘sensory pole’ (Turner 1967:28). It is not evident how this last dichotomy can be applied on a political arena. There is obviously an ideological meaning in national symbols and the way they are used, but do these meanings have related elements that oppose them in an emotional manner? It is true that state symbols and symbols of representation often use animals, for example the falcon, the eagle or the lion, which conveys particular virtues that enjoys emotional attraction, but it is doubtful that this relates well to what Turner meant.

We have, however, now described a twofold approach to analyse events where nationalist sentiments are conveyed; first by looking at the structure and its context, then by analyse the symbols in use, in which there often a dominant one, and they all have multiple meanings. Intellectuals and commentaries should also be listened to, when analysing how the masses responded to the events.
3. Kosovo between Myth and Reality

It has often been noted that the Balkans have more history than the people itself can bear. As Smith has pointed out, the *ethnie* and its elite tends to lean on history in times of conflict. The elite legitimises its *ethnie* by its historical roots, and in times when it is threatened and mobilised, these roots are the focus of intellectual activity. As people themselves use history to explain the conflicts, international intellectuals, as well as humanitarian workers, are also lead to history in order to explain the violence. For an outsider, the conflicts and wars on the Balkans have been presented as ‘ancient hatreds’ that flared up as soon as the oppression of the military empires of the Ottomans, and later, Tito’s Yugoslavia fell. The myth of ‘ancient hatreds’ describes the Balkan areas as a damned area squeezed in between civilizations, with an ethnic composition that is a constant basis for conflicts. The myth helps to explain the shocking violence that erupted in the prosperous 20th century Europe, as well as the often failing involvement of the international community, when trying to resolve it. Apart from this comfort, it has little explanatory value. It has nothing to offer as a basis for research, other than as a myth often exploited for political purposes. The myth of the ‘ancient hatreds’ in the Balkans should rather be seen as an example of how powerful myths can be, and what makes them prosperous to the extent in which they can be taken as an established and verified truth in everyday reflections about a topic, as well as literature of the social and philosophical sciences.

This chapter introduces Kosovo as a place, its culture, administration and people throughout history until the recent self-government under UN protectorate. Then, the political and legendary myths of Kosovo will be explored, in the light of nationalist ‘grand stories’. It will end with the burning political issues of today and what is at stake for the population of Kosovo and its administrators.
Kosovo in the periphery of empires

Kosovo has historically been, and still is, located in the periphery of empires. Kosovo has been on the outskirts of the Eastern Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Yugoslav federation. It is located at a frontier between the Western European Protestant and Catholic Christian cultural system, that of the Eastern European Orthodox Christian and that of the Turkish-Ottoman and Middle Eastern Muslim cultural system. Historically, the core of these cultural systems has been language and religion. The Christian Latin and the Muslim Arabic was not only part of a religion; it was the single system in which the ontological reality was possible to apprehend. For Benedict Anderson, the cultural systems of ‘truth-languages’ that offered privileged access to ontological truths, and the organisation of society evolving around high centres of monarchs who ruled by divine legitimacy, represents a political reality fundamentally different from the modern nation-states (Anderson 1991:36 [1983])\(^{23}\). In the periphery of such cultural systems, where central state control has, through centuries, been minimal.

For the Christian centralised states, the ‘Muslim threat’ has been felt since the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the division between the Orthodox and Protestant or Catholic Christian states has been extensive, in particular during the Cold War. As the world conflict lines was in general thought to be ideological in the Cold War area, the conflict lines after 1989 is perceived more and more according to wider blocks enjoying certain ethnic and cultural common uniqueness and solidarity. This is no doubt connected to the development of economic regions, as part of the process of globalisation. This leads Huntington to claim in 1993 that the next major war will be a war between civilisations and that the areas in between ‘civilisations’ will provide constant insecurity and see numerous ethnic conflicts (Huntington 1996). The belt between the Christian and Muslim areas stretches from Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia through the trans-Caucasian area to Tsjetchnia. Ger Duijzings, who are among the few anthropologists that has studied the politics of identity and religion in Kosovo, calls it the “crisis arch between the Adriatic sea and Sea of Azov” (Dujizings 2000:??). He claims that

\(^{23}\) The introduction of print capitalism was one of the major events that ceased the importance of these cultural systems, and thus paved the way for a conception of the modern nation-state (Anderson [1983] 1991:36).
the people of these areas accepts and create a wide range of identities on the basis of the chaotic cultural impulses around them. This is allowed to happen because of their position in the periphery of the empires and states that administrate them. The penetration of a state administration and its homogenisation of culture is very low, and thus there is no force that hinders the variety of identity to develop.

All the three major religions are represented in Kosovo; Muslim Albanians make up the majority of the population, while orthodox Serbs are located predominantly in the North. There is a small Catholic minority among the Kosovo-Albanians. But it also comprises minorities that are compositions of the two Christian religions, such as the Gorani and Bosniacs, as well as other ethnic groups; Roma, Egyptians and Ashkalja.

There has been a lot of politically-motivated research on the origin of the Albanians in Kosovo. Noel Malcolm traces Kosovo-Albanians to the ancient ‘Illyrian Dardanians’, who must have been living in Kosovo since at least the 6th century (Malcolm 1998:22-40). Slav tribes invaded the territory of modern Kosovo in 547-48 under Justinian. The Albanians were only a minority in medieval Kosovo (Malcolm 1998:57), but it is certain that the groups were in contact in the 9th century the latest (Malcolm 1998: 30). The orthodox monasteries built in the 13th century in Western Kosovo bear witness of Slav orthodox domination in Kosovo; a power that ceased when Prince Lazar lost the battle of Kosovo to the Ottomans in 1389. The Ottomans brought an end to the medieval Serbian rule in 1459 (Malcolm 1998:92). The Ottoman empire gained control over Kosovo some years after the battle of Kosovo Polje in 138924, and slowly imposed Islam as dominant religion. There are indications of immigration of Albanians to Kosovo in the 16th century, but they were not in majority in Kosovo before the ‘great migration’ of Serbs following the failed Austrian invasion of Kosovo in 1689-90 (Malcolm 1998:139).

24 The famous battle of Kosovo Polje was actually a ‘draw’; nobody won and both armies, the Ottoman army and the alliance of kings from the Albanian, Montenegrin and Serbian area withdrew after heavy casualties. A new battle took place seven years later, in which the Ottomans won and gained control over the area (ref.)
The social organisation and economy for the population in this area has not changed substantially until the modernisation under Yugoslavia in the 20th century. The social organisation was, and still is, based upon kinship; the household and family is a production unit, and the extended families and clans were vital economic units and allies. Monetary economy has probably, for the majority of the population, been non-existent until the last century. Before the Ottoman empire, society were organised according to clans following traditional laws, Kanun, that varied from region to region.

Kosovo in the Ottoman and Yugoslav empire

The Ottomans included Kosovo into their administrative system, in which newly acquired territory was organised in vilayets; an administrative unit comprising two sub-levels; the ‘sancaks’ and ‘kazas’, whom the commune Mayor reported to (Malcolm 1998:191). The Prizren vilayet was created in 1868, and became the most Albanian-dominant of the three vilayets comprising Kosovo (Malcolm (1998:191f).

As the Ottoman Empire was superseded by the Western European industrial states based on development of superior technology and trade monopolies, its territories were shrinking. At the Berlin conference in 1878, many of former Ottoman territories were in the hands of western powers (Malcolm 1998:201). The prosperous Austrian-Hungarian Empire expanded its control south wards following the weakened Ottoman control. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 gave away the Nis area to Serbia, but Kosovo remained under Ottoman control. There was an attempt by the Prizren elite to influence the conference and the Ottoman government to consider the ‘Albanian question’; the ‘League of Prizren’ was founded, based upon around one hundred clan leaders throughout Kosovo. They demanded a single vilayet, Albanian-speaking officials, elected local councils of Muslims and Christians and an elected assembly for the whole vilayet, and Albanian-language schools (Malcolm 1998:223). Even though the ‘League of Prizren’ did not achieve anything concrete, it brought together the Albanians, both Muslims and Christians, in a period of deterioration of Muslim and Christian relations,
reflecting the bigger political picture of the Christian Austrian Empire fighting against the Muslim Ottoman Empire.

The Albanian state was acknowledged at the conference of Ambassadors in London 1912-1913, where it was sought to include the Prizren region of Kosovo; the Austrian-Hungarian representatives proposed it to include all the Albanian areas. (Malcolm 1998:256), but this was denied by Russia and Serbia. The outcome of the conference was not implemented before after the first world war. At the end of the war, allied forces, including Serbian, occupied Kosovo. The new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Montenegro got international recognition for including Kosovo into its territory. Thus Kosovo was part of the new kingdom until the second world war, where the partisan movement and its leader Tito won, and founded the Yugoslav federation. The partisan movement was also active in Kosovo, with both Serbs and Albanians sabotaging the Italian and German military who controlled Kosovo in between 1941 and 194525.

Tito emphasised that Yugoslavia was a state which united many nations, and that the ‘national question’ was part of its fundament. However, the careful balance of political power of Yugoslavia was designed suspicious of Albanian nationalist revival; Walker Connor points out in his study about Marxist-Leninist strategy on national questions that

> although there were more Albanians (…) within Yugoslavia than there were Montenegrins, these people were granted only an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia and not their own republic, apparently on the ground that a people who form part of a larger nation beyond the Yugoslavian borders could aspire only to the official status of a nationality, rather than to the higher status of nation (Connor 1986:223).

Already in 1958, the Albanian state leader Enver Hoxha demanded in a very diplomatic speech that the Yugoslav government granted the Albanians in Kosovo the rights as a national minority (Connor 1986:577). As nationalism flared up in the late 1970 throughout Yugoslavia and communism as a uniting ideology seem to loose ground, in favour of the fragmenting force of ethnic nationalism, politicians started to work for the interests of their own ethnic group, rather than the federation as a whole. The same communist party, which in 1928 had called for an independent and united Albania, and later, in 1934, called for the expulsion of

25 A huge statue of an Albanian partisan guerrilla leader is still located on the hill over-looking Mitrovica, shaped as a sitting place for an eagle.
Serbs in Kosovo, cracked down on Albanian claims for a republic of Kosovo during the 1981 demonstrations and civil unrest. The communist party reacted with a statement saying that “the establishment of a republic of Kosovo in Yugoslavia would in essence mean the downfall of Yugoslavia” (Connor 1986:500). The claims were clearly seen as secessionist and aspire to lead to unification with Albania. In 1982, Hoxha claimed that Albania was not a state of three million people, but a nation of six million, referring to the Albanian population in Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo (Connor 1986:577). Throughout Yugoslavia, the Kosovo unrest frequented public media. By 1983 the press was filled with nationalist outbursts from all parts of the federation; Bosnians, Croats, Serbs and Slovenes. In Serbia, the resentment against Albanian secessionist claims flared openly as Serbs started to leave Kosovo under Albanian pressure. It is in this environment in which the then unknown deputy leader of the Socialist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, comes at rescue for the Serbian nation; at Kosovo-Polje, in commemoration of the 1389 battle, he held his famous speech in which the words “nobody is allowed to touch you” hit the heart of the Serbian nationalist sentiments, marking the start of a much more aggressive policy towards civil unrest in Kosovo. Less than three years later, President Milosevic pushes for the removal of the autonomy of the province through a majority vote in its assembly, which created the enormous demonstrations of 1990-91, first initiated by the mine workers, who walked from Trepca to Pristina to protest. The demonstrations were violently cracked down on by the police. The political climate in Yugoslavia at the end of 1989 and 1990 was that of complete political fragmentation following nationalities and their respective territories and centres. The war was in the air.

The fundament for Marxist theory is the solidarity of workers, united in the cause of creating a more just distribution of wealth in society. Because workers represent most people in world, it is essentially international. Just as nationalist doctrines are essentially particularistic; promoting the interest of one particular group of people. The two doctrines represent therefore two conflicting interests. This conflict was inherent in the Yugoslav federation from the time it was established; but in the 1950s, socialist ideology was stronger than nationalism, at least in Eastern Europe. It was not the internal conflict between nationalities alone that lead to the break-up; not only was the fall of the socialist regimes of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet
Union a devastating blow for the communist ideology, it left Yugoslavia short-cut of extensive funding, coming from both sides of the ‘Iron curtain’; the federation kept its foreign policy independent from the bigger powers, playing a leading role in the non-alignment alliance, in a time when the rest of Europe was totally committed to the dual polarity of the Cold War. Thus, as soon as the different power centres in Yugoslavia, which held power by representing the major nationalities, realised that the whole idea of the federation fell apart, together with the whole international socialist bloc, they became fully engaged with gaining control over as much resources as possible.

The Civil Resistance Movement and the Parallel System

The 1990 “constitution of tanks”, as Kosovo-Albanians later named it, which removed the autonomy of the province, triggered a political mobilisation involving most Albanian grown-ups in Kosovo. Shortly after the shutdown of the assembly and the first wave of demonstration and civil unrest, Kosovo-Albanian politicians and leaders assembled in Kamenica and declared the Republic of Kosovo, independent not only from Serbia, but the whole federation. A parliament in exile was formed. They called for international recognition for the secession and UN protection and intervention. In this turmoil, the Democratic League (LDK) was founded. Mehmet Kraja was one of the founders of LDK and describes it like this; “we did not know what we were doing. But we had to do something, so we wrote a letter supporting the declaration of independence and said we would form a party” (Kraja 2001, Kraja 1995:163-172). Two weeks later, LDK had more than 100.000 members (Clark 2000). LDK encouraged other political parties to be established, in order to not be “looked upon as the only responsible in the eyes of the serbs” (Kraja interview). A number of political parties and civil society NGOs were established, but LDK became the biggest and lead the civil resistance movement in years to come. LDK was the first political party established apart from the communist party (LCK) and literally took all Albanian members from it (Kraja 1995) as well as much of its party structure in Kosovo (Pula 2001). The parliament in exile founded ministries for defence, finance, education and health. The ‘paralell system’ became institutionalised throughout Kosovo, at the unofficial consent of the Serbian provincial
administration, which after the sackings of most Albanian employees in 1991 was run completely by Serbs (Clark 2000).

The Newspaper ‘Bujdar’ became the media voice of the civil resistance movement and was their only daily newspaper between 1990 and 1994, when the weekly Koha Ditore started to print on a daily basis. During these four years, the civil resistance movement was completely unified politically. The introduction of Koha Ditore as a daily newspaper in 1994 marks the end of this unity, when fractions within the movement started to establish their own organisations with their own political standpoint. From then on, the media sector grew increasingly diverse. In late 2000 there were at least 6 daily newspapers and a large number of magazines.

The NGO’s and political parties that was formed in these years, was founded in or in relation to very few institutions. The Institute of Albanology and the University of Pristina was a central focal point for the civil resistance. The Institute of Albanology, founded already in the 1950s\(^{26}\) has hosted respected intellectual figures that maintained and spread knowledge about the Albanian cultural heritage in Kosovo. All the founders of the LDK where either working at the Institute of Albanology or associated to it. It has produced leading political figures like Anton Cetta, Rexhep Qosja and Ibrahim Rugova. The institute produced academic texts about Albanian history, folklore, ethnology, ‘epicology’ and linguistics; scientific legitimate material on the ancient Albanian roots in Kosovo which formed the fundament of the arguments legitimising the movement. Most of the people involved in organising the civil resistance were students or former students that had moved into Pristina to get education at the only University in Kosovo.

Shqelzen Maliqi claims that the LDK actually was “based on the strength, convictions, and ideas of the people of Hill of the Brave” (Maliqi 1998:70), Kodra e Trimave in Albanian, in the outskirts of Pristina. The village is well known for its cultural conservatism, defending old

\(^{26}\) I find it puzzling that the Yugoslav government authorised the opening of a research institute solemnly dedicated to the issue of Albanian studies, in particular in the 1950s, when Albanian minority rights were slim.
Albanian cultural values and folk culture. This was the spirit of the movement, and it also had an effect on the rural areas. Students organised in the Youth Parliament and the Students Union initiated in co-operation with the well known Anton Cetta a reconciliation programme throughout Kosovo, where all blood feuds were ended under the argument that Albanians needed to be united in the fight for independence. The establishment of the Christian-Democratic party also indicates ‘western’ sentiments in the movement. Many converted to Catholicism in order to show that Kosovo-Albanians did not constitute a ‘threat of Islam’. It also wanted to signal anti-communist ideology, opposing the communist Albania, as the movement was alleged to be organised by Albanian secret service and had unification with Albania as goal.

The institutions that were central to the civil resistance movement in the beginning of the 1990s were all located few blocks apart in downtown Pristina. The TV and Radio Building, the Rjilinda Publishing house and the University buildings are all located in central Pristina, many of them being visual landmarks of the city. They are all within walking distance from each other. If we map the flow of knowledge between these institutions, we get an illustration like the one under.

Due to expansion, and demand for more office space after the war ended, downtown Pristina has turned into a hub of NGO’s more or less part of the civil society. This makes the illustration a gross simplification for the current situation, but the pattern is still intact.
Researchers at the University, publishes their work in various forms printed media, all printed by the Riljinda publishing house. In the case it is done in newspapers and magazines, they are all (except Koha Ditore) located on the upper floors of the Riljinda building, and this is where they edit and discuss the text before sending it down for printing. The newspapers are distributed all over Kosovo, while the books are mostly sold either at the Riljinda bookshop on the ground floor, the bookshop at the Institute of Albanology, or another bookshop on the Mother Theresa Street. Used books are sold from stands on the same street. The TV and radio building relies on subjects at the University for interviews and information.

There has evidently been a power struggle within the LDK as soon as it got political power. All the founders, except the leader, Ibrahim Rugova, left the party one by one. Mehmet Kraja went in exile in Albania and did not return until after the war. Ibrahim Berisha started working for the Bota Sot newspaper. Milazim Krasniqi started the PQLK party and wrote for Kosova Sot newspaper. Idriz Ajeti is pensioned but still active at the Academy of Science and Arts. The founders of the LDK are currently well respected intellectual figures in the public sphere. They continue their writing, four of them in the four main newspapers in Kosovo. All the major daily newspapers had in 2000 at least one respected intellectual figure that symbolise the start of the civil resistance, as the founders of LDK and others. These persons are authorities in matters within the political life in Kosovo and provides intellectual and symbolic capital to the newspapers.

The first period of the civil resistance movement was essentially non-violent. The strategy was non-violent resistance and boycott of the ‘illegitimate’ Serbian state structures. People started acting ‘as if’ Kosovo was an independent republic (Clark 2000). The operating parallel system aroused satisfaction and pride; it made income from taxation and paid salaries to doctors and teachers supplying them with medicines and Albanian textbooks. As the police violence against demonstrations reached new heights in 1992, the president of the exile government and LDK, Ibrahim Rugova announced not to organise demonstration anymore (Clark 2000). A more subtle form of civil resistance emerged: everyone made noise with pots and metal boxes at a certain time of the day for example (ref). But the political situation was
stalemate and the parliament in exile could not agree to negotiate about retrieval of the autonomy as it now had declared itself independent as a republic. When Shkelzen Maliqi, one of the few that is perceived as ‘truly independent’ intellectuals in Kosovo, suggested to look upon the political goal of total independence from Yugoslavia as a process with many part-goals; but he was met with fury and disgust. How could the ‘Republic of Kosova’ negotiate over autonomy with a republic of which claim to administer Kosovo it did not recognise? It was a complete political stalemate with two ethnic communities and their political leaders living in more ‘separate worlds’ than ever before (Maliqi 1998). As the state violence topped in 1993-94, the parallel system started falling apart.

In 1996 people felt that the achievements of the exile government were close to zero and that their leadership had not been successful at gaining international support. Hopes for UN intervention faded away together with the difficulties and many failures of the UN in Bosnia. Kosovo had seldom made it to the international headlines, overshadowed with the horrors of the Croatian and Bosnian wars. This the approximate time when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) enters the political scene as an organisation fighting for the same goals as the civil resistance movement and the exile government, but by violent means. The KLA is frequently referred to as a rural organisation initiated by farmers in the Drenica region. This is a result of all the attention the first martyrs of KLA got, as well as an internal power struggle which left the founders of the organisation unknown. Further investigation reveals however, that KLA was a branch of the Ministry of Defence established by the exile government (Peci & Demjaha 2001). As KLA grew stronger, and its leadership gained control over its finance and supply lines, it cut its ties to the exile government. As the organisations produced martyrs in the successful violent struggle for independence, the old intellectuals and politicians that founded the exile government were perceived as those that chose a failing strategy, that of non-violence. The guerrilla warfare escalated the conflict and led to international attention and finally intervention. But as Clark (2000) and others has pointed out; the first phase of non-violence resistance was a precondition for the later escalation to violent means of resistance. Without the perceived failure of the non-violent strategy, the KLA would never have gained support; neither in the Albanian population, nor internationally (Clark 2000). The
combination of the two, proved to be very successful; one part attacked military and police targets following guerrilla tactics and often gained temporarily control over a cluster of villages, while the non-violent and political legitimate part used an extensive international network of diplomatic ties throughout Europe and North America to gather support by systematically documenting and informing about human rights violations by the Serbian and federal police, military and paramilitary forces. This combination proved to be very effective and put a lot of pressure on European and American politicians; it was like if the whole world had their eyes on Kosovo telling the international community that something had to be done.

International Intervention and the UN administration

NATO, led by the American and British military, started attacking military and infrastructural targets in the Yugoslavian federation by aerial force on 24th of March 1999. Serbs all around the world were in shock; the ‘western powers’ were bombing their nation, “again!”, many would say. The symbolic effect of being at war with the “world’s most powerful military alliance” was huge. The media broadcasted powerful images of civilian casualties that created furore in the Serbian public opinion, resenting both the West and the Albanian terrorists. The Serbian opposition movement, that just a year earlier had mobilised hundred thousands on the streets of Belgrade, were now overshadowed and sidelined by the reaction in which Serbs were targeted and stigmatised more or less like the Jews in Europe in the 1930s; how is it possible to advocate democracy, western values and commitment to international co-operation, when the countries that represents this system seeks to destroy you?. It is in this environment that the Serbian police let paramilitaries operate freely in Kosovo, ignoring their gross human rights violations on the Albanian population (ICG 2000d). There was also a concerted attempt of forcing most of the Albanian population to leave Kosovo in which the police participated. As many as 800.000 Albanians, which is approximately half of the

27 Human rights violations were in particular documented by the Centre for the Defence of Human Rights and made public on the international media scene by the media agency of the LDK, Kosova Information Centre (KIC), though its mailing lists that contained all international news agencies and national as well as many local media in most Western-European countries.

28 For a critical analysis of how the media covered the crisis, see Hammond & Herman 2000.
population, fled Kosovo to neighbouring Albania and Macedonia, and some to Montenegro (ICG 2000d). The Serbian military had spent the last months preparing for bombing raids and did not suffer much casualties or loss of equipment, in particular in Kosovo, as NATO never managed to destroy the anti-air weaponry of the federal forces and thus chose to bomb only from high altitudes. The attack went on for 52 days before the President of Yugoslavia finally agreed to sign a peace agreement that meant the withdrawal of federal police and military forces and temporarily handing over the jurisdiction of the province to the international forces. The UN then passed a Security Council resolution, UNSCR 1244, that provided legal grounds for the protectorate (UNSCR 1999).

The first six months period of the UN administration, called the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was marked by failure to build up an adequate organisation fast enough. It had not the necessary means to impose rule of law and security for the people and the refugees that were returning. The NATO Kosovo Multi-National Task Force (KFOR) had up to 50.000 troops spread throughout the province, which effectively secured the province against any possible international threat, but could not do much against internal crime, because of the lack of a juridical system. Local administrative structures were taken over by local ‘warlords’, leaders of the local branch of KLA, when Yugoslav authorities withdrew. The leader of the KLA declared himself Prime Minister and formed a government that was illegal in the eyes of the UN, but which they nevertheless had to co-operate with on a legal basis. Not until the approval and implementation of the Joint Interim Administration Council (JIAC) in January 2000, which legitimised the establishment of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) out of the to-be disbanded KLA, did UN have complete control over the local government institutions. The key problem that persisted to be an essential obstacle that had to be overcome before elections and self-government institutions could be set up, was an effective and impartial judiciary and police force. The international police force was built up slowly and never reached it initial necessary estimate of 7000 police officers; it also proved to be inefficient when dealing with the local population because of the language and cultural barrier. Thus the police school in the town of Vushtri, north of Pristina, was established, and started producing local officers by the

29 For a detailed analysis of NATO’s military campaign, see Daalder & O’Hanlon 2002.
end of 2000. This was a turning point. In 2001, the local police force, Kosovo Police Service (KPS), numbered 1400 officers, working together with international officers all over Kosovo, except in the northern part of Mitrovica city. At the same time did the judiciary system finally start operating and the supreme court of Kosovo was opened. The delay in getting the judiciary system operating was the fact that the province did not have a single set of laws; the judiciary still have to make up laws as they go along, combining the Yugoslav laws before 1989 in combination with the many resolutions passed by the UN administration (see ICG 2000b). The SRSG approved a constitutional framework in spring 2001, which described the layout of the self-governmental system to be implemented. According to the framework, elections were to be held and form assemblies in the 32 municipalities and a provincial assembly in Pristina, in which the result distributed 100 of the 120 seats, while the last 20 seats were set aside for minority representation. The provincial assembly should then form a government with a mandate that was restricted within the Constitutional Framework and the UNSCR 1244, as interpreted by the UN administration. The municipal assemblies were operating in the first part of 2001, without Serb representation because the Kosovo-Serbs collectively boycotted the elections. The Provincial Assembly was operating in December 2001, and formed a government not before three months later. The assembly agreed upon a coalition government, in which LDK would hold the presidency and PDK the prime minister post. The AAK got two minister posts, and the Serbian party ‘Povratak’ was offered the Minister for Agriculture post. Thus, all the four parties that had substantial support in the elections, together form the government.

**Albanian Ethnic Identity in Kosovo**

There are certain common perceptions of what ‘the Albanian’ is. These perceptions explain the uniqueness and particularities of the *ethnie*. These are elements Albanians often refer to when presenting themselves to strangers. These are cultural concepts that all Albanians would recognize as at the core of their cultural and ethnic heritage. Even though many would

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30 A report from International Crisis Group (ICG) criticise the new judiciary for being corrupt and lacking quality of personnel (ICG 2007).
31 For a glimpse of the negative reaction in Kosovo-Albanian civil society that the Constitutional Framework has received, see KACI 2001.
acknowledge that the accounts of Albanian cultural heritage are idealised and historical, and do not anymore reflect the lives of people, it is still part of the ethnic sentiments shared by most Albanians today. These sentiments provide a basis for solidarity among members of the group.

The house constitutes a national symbol that penetrates all Albanian cultural idioms. In many ways, we can say that the house "is good to think" when analysing Albanian society. 'House' in Albanian is 'Shtepi' or 'shpi', also meaning 'household' (Doja:200:22). Because the community of the clan did not give protection for the individual, each person had to provide for his own family’s security and prosperity. Thus the house and the family became the nucleus of society (Gashi 1997:115). This is reflected in the construction of the house that is designed for defensive functions. Especially the ‘kulla’ type of house, built by landowners and wealthy families.

A two-meter high stone wall surrounds the house and its garden. The house is also made of stone and the walls are thick. There are no windows on the first floor and on the second there are just small peaking holes. The roof is made of wood. Little light comes in the windows and inside it is rather dark. But the defensive advantage of the construction is obvious and favoured. In a region where a strong state has historically not existed, the household had to rely on its own defensive capabilities. This also concerns socio-economic matters. That is one of the reasons why the ethnographical famous, now diminishing phenomenon of the Zadruga household32, which can consist of more than 100 members can be found in the Albanian mountain areas (Durham 1909, Backer 1979).

The strength of the family was equal to its manpower. A powerful family with influence in its village and the clan would be a family with many men. Therefore, the birth of men is a specially greeted occasion connected with many symbolic rituals. Albert Doja (2000) has recently explored these rites in a structural anthropological perspective. He shows how the birth of a man is celebrated and how the upbringing of men is bound with a series of rites de

32 ‘Zadruga’ is the Serbian term for the extended family household, which has become the ethnographical reference term, first described by Edith Durham in 1909 (Durham 1909).
passage that the girls are excluded from. Girls are simply not that important, as they are going to be married to another man’s family. For the family, the most important contribution a woman can make, is to give birth to a man. Subsequently, her status in the family is ascribed according to the number of children she has given birth to. Sterile women and their families are therefore confronted with a crisis. There are many rituals that have the supposed effect of increasing a woman’s fertility (Doja 2000).

Historically, there has been no inns or cafes in Albanian villages. There were no public buildings of any kind. All societal matters was discussed and decided upon in family’s houses, as those described above. Every aspect of life took place in and around the house (Gashi 1997). Therefore the house have a tremendous importance in Albanian culture and society. Not even great empires would interfere in an Albanian family house. Because Albanians have never been very religious, their house was a sort of sacred place (Gashi 1997). The basic construction of a public sphere like described in the Western European countries simply did not exist. As Richard Sennett (1976) has pointed out; the public sphere need physically constructed areas, public spaces, in order to create a civil society. In the western sense of the term, this has not existed in the Albanian rural areas. The clan was the only social organisation that reached outside the family boundaries.

Every family has an authority among its men. That person, who is chosen by the household is traditionally called zoteri i shtepise, the ‘master of the house’. According to Susanne Wiik, who conducted fieldwork among women in Tirana, where they called this person kryefamiljar, ‘head of the family’ (Wiik 1999:93). He has the responsibility for the family’s economy. Zoteri i shtepise is the family’s contact point to the outside world concerning economical, practical and societal matters. He would have contact with the state authorities and decides in which matters the women of the household can participate outside the house. The zoteri i shtepise have the main responsibility for the honour of the family and the honour of its women. When a guest is present, he will be the one to address, and he talked for the whole family. The rest of the household are obliged to show their respect to the zoteri i shtepise in everyday life and especially when guests are present. This is formalised through a
series of symbolic actions, such as when serving food or talking. He will be served the food and coffee first and the women will be silent in general when he is present (Wiik 1999). Respect and power is interrelated; by showing respect, the power and authority of an individual is confirmed.

Among the women there will also be one of authority, called zonja e shtepise (Wiik 1999:93-95). This responsibility is enrolling between the elder women. The upbringing of the children and house work is her organising responsibility. She is however, under the authority of the zoteri i shtepise, because descend is traced through the male patrilineal line and she is not considered part of the lineage.

The sons of the family enjoy more freedom than their sisters. They are more outside the house participating in social activities, while their sisters get more and more duties in their homes as they grow older. They are supposed to be silent and dutiful, while the opposite is expected from the boys, who shall be noisy and independent (Wiik 1999:99). It is not expected anything from the son regarding duties at home. However, the bonds between brothers and sisters are strong. A girl can rely on support from her brother(s) her whole life. This is evident in sociological studies, where the brother is referred to as the one women go to in case of crisis (USAID/ORT 1998). And after her fathers death, women move to their brother if they divorce or their husband dies.

While the man is expected to live in his family house his whole life, the women are to be married to another family. The women that are married into a family are called the nuse of the family. The nuse is ranged lowest in the hierarchy of the family (Wiik 1993:101). Urban women are therefore privileged because their family is usually not far away, while women in rural areas often have to move long distances, and thus enjoys less support from their families.

A fis, extended family or ‘clan’, is the patrilineal lineage that connects families by blood. People of the same fis are supposed to descend from the same male ancestor. The leader of the fis is called bajraktari. ‘Bajrak’ mean banner in Turkish. ‘Bajraktari’ is therefore the leader of
the fis and its banner. This leadership was actually imposed by the Ottoman administration in the 17th century (Malcolm 1998:16). The fises are mixed geographically, in particularly in Kosovo, where the household has been the production unit. In Northern Albania, the fis has been a single production unit with territorial control, and was a therefore much stronger institution (Malcolm 1998:15-16). Still, place-names often refer to a particular fis. People say that the different fises are dominant in different areas.

It is said that Albanians originally descend from three brothers who created families that is the forefathers of all the fises. All Kosovo-Albanians, even though urban people would not like to admit it, can find out whether they are of the Krasniqi, Gashi, Thaci, Shala, Sopi or Berisha fis. Old stories about the fises conveys stereotypes and peculiar characters of the members of the respective fis. One story is about how a Krasniqi and a Gashi enters a room with nice carpets and a weapon on the wall; the Krasniqi walks in instinctively takes the weapon, because the Krasniqis are know for being brave fighters, while the Gashi went inside and sat on the carpet well dressed and with style, because the Gashis are known as gentlemen. Another story is about the building of a church, in which the Thaci brought planks, because they are known for their solidarity, while the Sopi brought 99 planks in stead of 100, as they are known for being stupid, or “in lack of a plank” as they say; nje derrase eksik. Shala men killed a person even though they swore not to and are known as betrayers, braking their bese, word of honour; ka pre ne bese. The Berisha used a maize as a scrub, because they are known as being unhygienic. When marrying, some combination of fises are better than others, for example the Thaci and Gashi.

Women that are married into a family are considered a part of the family, but not the fis. She is still part of the fis of her father (Wiik 1999). This means that the women still can claim protection by her brothers if she is not treated properly. The honour of the women is related to her fis. Members of a fis claim that they have a common ancestor. Through exchange of brides, two fises can form an alliance. This does not necessarily prevent the clans from

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33 It has been very difficult to collect these stories in Pristina, as urban people under-communicate the presence of these traditional structures. The stories I obtained comes from two old women around the age of 80, one of them I spoke to myself, the other was conveyed by an informant, who asked her grandmother.
conflict. This is a topic that repeats itself in epic songs, where the women get caught in a very
difficult situation as a wife in a family which clan is in conflict with her own fis (Wiik
1999:48).

Often the fis will populate a geographical area such as a valley (Durham 1909). A conflict
between two fis can thus involve a whole region. A fis will become in conflict with another
fis when a woman is ill treated or a the honour of a woman is disgraced. This will mobilise the
fis of that woman. The woman can not incur in blood feuds, but the men of her family and fis
will incur for her (Gjecov & Fox 1989:38).

Ethnography from the Mediterranean region in general shows that honour is a strong cultural
idiom. This is true also for the Albanians. The Albanian term bese can be translated as
‘honour’, and is often a part of the culture that Albanians are proud of, and refers to often.
When accepting a ‘guest’ for example, an Albanian have given his besa, his honour, in taking
care of the guest, and is, according to traditional law even entitled to revenge the guest if he is
killed by others. Bese is connected to respect (respekt), which again is related to a persons
social power and the acknowledgement of that power. To openly show disrespect of a person
means to dishonour the person and his or her family. This often leads to a sustainable conflict
in which the two persons and their families never speak to each others again and avoid all
social contact with each others. Albanians in general are therefore very careful about talking
to and about other persons. If you ask for opinions about another person you are most
probably presented with neutral answers. Sociological surveys also shows that people are very
concerned about what other people think of them, and that they easily feel miserable if
someone should be disappointed of their performance (ORT/USAID 1998)\textsuperscript{34}. The essence of
Albanian traditional law is about securing people’s honour. If someone is dishonoured, the
law suggests ways of compensation and re-establishing the honour of the person and the
family (see Gjecov & Fox 1989 [1913]).

\textsuperscript{34} This is in particular true in Albania, and relates to the communist regime in which criticism or discussion
about political issues was dangerous.
The *Kanuni i Leke Dukagjinit*, The code of Leke Dukagjinit, is a 600 years old customary law for the Albanian highlands first written down by Shtjefen Gjecov (1874-1929). The *Kanun* organises the society in a way which gives each person responsibility for his own family (Gashi 1997). The *Kanun* has been used as a system for administering justice in an area of Northern Albania, which historically has remained isolated from central governance. This is the context in which we have to understand the *Kanun* and why it is so deeply rooted in the society.

During the socialist government in Northern Albania, efforts were made to decrease the influence of the *Kanun*. With the collapse of communism in 1991 and the subsequent lack of nation-wide law and order, the *Kanun* has re-appeared and strengthen its position as the governing law of the northern areas in particular. Its re-appearance indicates that it is not merely an old functional law regulating system in an area without a functional juridical system; it is also used to legitimise political and economical crime and murders. A recent reports from International Crisis Group states that:

"Today, revenge killings in the name of the Kanun have taken on threatening proportions. A recent survey on the Kanun by the Independent Social Studies Centre, Eureka, expressed concern that many killers were using the rules of the Kanun as a cover to commit ordinary crime. According to the Eureka statistics, over 50 per cent of teenagers polled said that they respected the rules of the Kanun and would be willing to take revenge in the name of the Kanun. The report also highlights the fact that thousands of male children are being locked inside their homes because of the fear of revenge (females are exempt from revenge killings). In one sense it could be argued that northern Albanians are resorting to the Kanun in order to fill the law and order vacuum. (...) In most cases, however, it is not the traditional rules of the Kanun that are being applied but rather a self-selected interpretation. In fact it is a means of settling accounts amongst gangs of traffickers, smugglers, and other criminal elements who, in the absence of official law and order, can use the fear, respect and moral justification associated with the Kanun to terrorise local people into a code of silence" (International Crisis Group 2000b).

The *Kanun* is being used to compensate for a weak and corrupt judicial system, but it is also a fact that for too long now it has become the accepted truth that Northern Albania is beyond the rule of law, that the government has no jurisdiction there, and that the north must rely on its own customary law to provide justice for its citizens. Blood vendettas are particularly rife in and around the town of Shkodra, where gangs routinely collect ‘gjoba’, protection money, from bars and shops, which if not paid will result in the automatic killing of its owner (International Crisis Group 2000b). The vast majority of contemporary feuds, however, are the result of disputes over land and water rights. The International Crisis Group concludes that
The reintroduction of the Kanun into the lives of the communities of northern Albania must be seen as a serious challenge to the state. Today paperback copies of the Kanun are widely available in Albania, Kosovo and Western Macedonia, and the fact that new translations and interpretations of the Kanun are appearing must be viewed with real concern” (International Crisis Group 2000b).

It is difficult for a western person to look upon the current praxis of the Kanun without moral condemnation. In Kosovo however, the civil resistance movement reconciled most of the blood feuds, and it is no longer a big issue.

Legends, Myths and Martyrs

One of central historical dispute connected to ‘the Albanian question’ is whether the Albanians descends from the ancient Illyrians or not. The Illyrians inhabited the area referred to as ‘Illyria’, which covers today’s Albania, Kosovo, part of Montenegro, Greece, Macedonia as well as parts of Serbia itself. The term ‘Albanian’ first appears in historical records in 1043 (Malcolm 1998:28). Malcolm suggests that it derives from ‘Alb’, which was “the indo-european word for a type of mountainous terrain” (Malcolm 1998:28). Whether these people are the descendants of the ancient Illyrians is the transition period which has been subject to a lot of political motivated historical research. The Slavs came into the area in the 6th century. By tracing their origins to Illyrians, the most ancient people, Albanians can make claim that they inhabited the territory first. This, however, is not recognised by Serbs in general and the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts in Belgrade in particular, who claim that Albanians are ‘Albanianized Serbs’, or Serbs that converted to Islam during Ottoman reign; the old orthodox monasteries from the 13th century bearing witness of this. However, Illyria remains a vital myth for Albanians of a legendary land of forefather:, where their civilisation started.

The greatest myth of them all, is the battle of Kosovo, at the Kosovo-Polje plain in 1389. The battle is a historical event that marks a turning point; the start of the time of empires. For Serbia it also symbolise where the European allies met the ‘Muslim threat’; it thus symbolised the outskirts of Christian European civilisation, or ‘cultural system’. It was at the same place Milosevic mobilised massive political support in his famous speech at the commemoration of the legendary battle in 1987, marking a start of extreme nationalism in Yugoslavia. The speech was a defence of Christian Serb territorial rights. Albanians were, however, part of the
alliance of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, that fought the Ottoman forces. At the time of the battle, they were still Christians; after hundreds of years of Muslim Ottoman rule, they were perceived as the very threat their forefathers fought against.

The most prominent Albanian legend is Gorg Kastrioti Skenderbeg, that fought against the advancing Ottoman forces from 1443 until his death in 1468. Even though he finally lost his life in the battle, and the Albanian areas were overtaken by the Ottomans, Skenderbeg held off Ottoman forces from advancing further into Europe. The Vatican was very pleased with his contribution against the ‘Muslim threat’. A statue of Skenderbeg was erected in the Vatican, in his honour. In the 1981, the Albanian President Hoxha erected a huge Skenderbeg statue in an old small village called Kruje, North-West of Tirana, that is now a national symbol. An exact copy of this statue was erected in the centre of Pristina in 2001. The legend of Skenderbeg is presented in school textbooks and all literature about the history of Albanians. The legend was revoked and mobilised during the civil resistance movement, as Skenderbeg represents the historical roots of Albanian resistance against empires.

There is a saying about Skenderbeg’s flag bearer who was killed; the flag (flamur) became red by blood, but an eagle came and picked it up to prevent it from falling to the ground. Thus the flag is red with a black eagle. The flags used in these times were flags of the extended family, fis, symbolising under which traditional legal code and clan dominance the party or area belonged to. Each valley had its clan, flag and legal code, Kanun. ‘Flag-bearer’, flaumurtar is common name on for example sports-clubs, while Flamur is also common as forename on young Kosovo-Albanians today. This bear witness to the pride of which Kosovo-Albanians hold to the flag, symbolises civil resistance against empires.

Historical and legendary myths are highly political. The myths are constructed to tell who the Kosovo-Albanians are, as opposed to the Serbs. The myths are maintained and transformed through written media, and used in political discourse and education curriculum. Nexhmedin

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35 At that time, all Albanians were Catholics. The rule of the Ottoman Empire introduced Islam, that slowly converted most of the population.
Spahiu (1999) has shown how the myths are reflected in the historical curriculum in both Serb and Albanian educational system. He describes how some historical events are emphasised while others are liberally forgotten, under-communicated or simply lied about. He argues that the Kosovo-Albanian myths where created as a reaction on the Serbian mythology and that its fundamentals was copied (Spahiu 1999:37). Many aspects of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo resembles Serbian nationalism, which supports the credibility of this theory; in fact, the nationalist ideology throughout the region seems to be interconnected in these ways.

The KLA guerrilla has produced a lot of martyrs and heroes throughout the conflict. The most prominent and first, many would say, is Adem Jashari. The Jashari family in Prekaz in the Drenica valley, was all killed in March 1998; all except one younger member who miraculously survived. Adem Jashari himself became a martyr and symbolised fierce and determined armed resistance (see Tahiri 1999). Jashari was a peasant like most people in Kosovo. He became a person that in particular the rural people could identify themselves with. He soon was referred to as hero i popullit, hero of the people, and the remains of his family’s house in the small village of Prekaz have now become a ‘national museum’.

Perceptions of Ethnicity, Nation and State

One student, who had recently been educated in the difference between Ethnicity, Nation, State and Nationalism told me about a conversation he had with an elder intellectual. The elder said that ethnicity and nation is the same. The student then said; well there are some differences, and the elder then responded; “Oh, it is not much difference. It is the same thing, really”. The language also indicates that no distinction is being made between the two concepts. Ethnicity is translated as ‘etnik’. Nationalism is translated as ‘nacionalizmit’ or ‘patriotizem’. Often the term ‘bashkimi etnik’ is used instead, meaning “ethnic unity” or ethnic ‘togetherness’ and refers to ‘Shqiperia Etnik’, which means the area where Albanians are in demographical majority (Albania, Southern Montenegro, Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Northern Greece (Chameria), the area of the ancient Illyria. ‘Shqiperia’ is Albania and a ‘Shqiptar’, an Albanian, means a person who speaks ‘Shqip’, Albanian (Shqipe). The national symbol is the ‘shqipe’, the eagle (Shqiponje -f), and is symbolically connected to bravery,
cleverness and strength. The nation, ‘komb’, is thus not only perceived as comprising the Albanian state, but the ethnic unity of Albanians in the area of the ancient Illyria. This notion has been internationally recognised as a political ambition of creating a “Greater Albania” and must be interpreted in the regional political and historical context of Greater Serbia, the Bulgarian empire, the Austrian-Hungarian empire and the Ottoman empire. The 1990s and the start of the new millennium have shown important changes in the perception of the concept of “one nation, one state, one people” that reached its height in the politics of the region in the 1970ies, fostering many of the radical actors on the political arena today36. The ambition of Greater Albania is politically dead and absent among the political elite in Kosovo (Naegele 2002).

On the Boundaries of the Albanian Ethnic Category

When Fredrik Barth set out to understand the meaning of ethnicity, he found it fruitful to go to the very boundaries of the ethnic category itself; to study the “ethnic boundaries that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 1969:15). This boundary is defined by the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, and identifies the “criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclusion” (Barth 1969:15). In the following, the focus will be the boundaries of the Albanian ethnic category and its relation to other ethnic groups.

Ethnic identity and culture in general is not equally distributed. As Duijzings (2000) has shown, this is particular true in Kosovo, where there is much movement across ethnic boundaries. Cultural classification can even create anomalies – individuals who does not seem to fit in anywhere. Ardener (1989) claims that some categories are even made up and could be considered as empty ‘hollow categories’ that does not refer to any existing population (Ardener 1989:70). On the other side, there are categories which, according to Gellner (1983) are entropy-resistant - for example if some people had blue skin color. The individual cannot

36 Central actors and initiators of the KLA, NLA and UCPMB guerrilla belong to this category, many of them who are active also in legitimate political life in Kosovo and Macedonia today (ICG, Lulzim Peci)
escape such a category and have subsequently less opportunities to use over- and under-communication strategies in social situations in order to achieve certain desirable goals. Gellner believes that this poses a particular problem for industrial societies as identity cannot be equally distributed in the society. They are a hindrance for the cultural homogeneity of the nation-state and will therefore be subject to nationalistic sentiments (Gellner 1983:64-69). As blue skin colour truly does not exist however, there is always a matter of consideration by the actors in interaction, whether a category should apply in that particular social setting.

Jonathan Okamura, by building on Mitchell, describes the distinction between social setting and situation as follows:

the structural features of the setting provide the overall framework of social relations, while at the level of the situation concern is on the different courses of action actors may then pursue according to their understanding of their personal circumstances within this framework (Okamura 1981:453).

By focusing on the situational aspect, Okamura has developed the term ‘situational ethnicity’ to refer to both the structural and cognitive aspect of ethnicity in a social situation (Okamura 1981:452f). The structural dimension of situational ethnicity makes up the framework of possible choices of the individual, while the cognitive dimension is the actor’s subjective perception of the situation and how s/he chooses to make ethnicity relevant in that particular situation (Okamura 1981:454). This leads us to several questions, among others: how entropy-resistant is the Albanian ethnic category in Kosovo? What strategies does the minorities use in relation to the majority group? What does the international community do to create social settings where ethnicity is more irrelevant? It is easy to see that these questions are vital to the problem of how to increase ethnic tolerance in Kosovo.

One key concept when investigating the assimilation and participation of minority groups is that of the majority group’s monopoly over legitimate statuses and institutions. In Fredrik Barth’s words:

The general feature of all minority situations lies in the organisation of activities and interaction: In the total social system, all sectors of activity are organised by statuses open to members of the majority group, while the status system of the minority has only relevance to relations within the minority and only
Albanians in Kosovo have lived under Serb domination and institutional discrimination. The resistance to such domination made the life of the Serbian population difficult. Emigration of the Serbian population indicates this. As friction between the groups grew in the 1980s, there was a net emigration of between 80,000 to 100,000 Kosovo-Serbs to Serbia in the period 1961 to 1981, reducing its total number to 236,000, and further to 215,000 in 1991 (Malcolm 1998: 330). After the NATO bombing many more Kosovo-Serbs fled the province in order to escape retaliation. The 1,25 million electorate in the 2002 elections produced only 30,000 votes for the Serbian ‘Coalition Return’ party (OSCE 2001), indicating a Serbian electorate inside Kosovo of approx. 65,000. Out of this number, it is possible to estimate the current Serbian population a little over 100,000.

As Kosovo is under UN protectorate, Albanians dominate legitimate institutions, and are gradually taking over the positions in public administration currently held by international staff. Whereas Serbian language was something Albanians had to learn in order to participate in legitimate FRY institutions, it is now the Albanian language which gives basis for legitimate action. Currently, Serbs therefore often interact with Albanians in English rather than Serbian, shielding themselves behind the notion that they are internationals. Other ethnic groups that speak Serbian related languages experience more difficulty with achieving acceptance by the Albanian majority, e.g. the Muslim Slav Ethnic Groups (Gorani, Bosniac and Torbesh).

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37 This is my own calculation based on a 65% turn-out of the 30,000 voters for the Serbian party. Registered voters for the Out-of-Kosovo programme (150,000) is of course, not included.
38 This is also what is normally estimated in Kosovo public media.
39 The language of the dominant group becomes a language the minorities tend to learn – some serbs in Gjilan spoke Albanian, which made it possible for them to be more accepted by friends and colleagues. It is also interesting to note, that Serbian has not always been the dominant language in Kosovo – in the nineteenth century it was bi- or multi-lingualism was more widespread among Serbs, who was then the weaker group (Duijzings 2000:34, Roux 1992:205)
A key criteria for access and acceptance by the Albanian majority is that the group suffered under Serbian state discrimination and supported the civil resistance against it. The Roma people are an example of groups that Albanians in general perceive not to have met this criteria. When 90% of the Albanian workforce was sacked during 1991, Romas often took their places (Clark 2000). Most of the Romas speak Serbian related languages and are perceived as having deliberately co-operated with Serbs during the struggle with personal benefit. Immediately after the war therefore, Albanian groups burned down whole Roma suburbs, as was the case along the southern side of the Iber river in Mitrovica. Some groups within the Roma people in Kosovo do, however, speak Albanian. Right after the war, when revenge attacks against Romas became known, one group stood out claiming to be a separate ethnic group of Roma origin, but that considered themselves to be Albanian. They spoke Albanian and called themselves ‘Ashkalija’.

In moderate political circles the Ashkalija have achieved acceptance. Representatives of the Ashkalija were for example invited as observers at a LDK political rally in Malisheve outside Gjilan, where the leaders of LDK announced that the Ashkalija suffered just like Albanians and were equally entitled to live and prosper in the new liberated Kosova40. Some weeks later, however, four members of the Ashkalija groups were found murdered41. Their strive for acceptance by the Albanian majority is by no means over. They have chosen the difficult path of achieving acceptance as a minority, rather than being assimilated into the Albanian category. Following Barth (1969:17) and his organisational requirements for an ethnic distinction to emerge in an area; their first ambition is therefore to become subject to categorisation in exclusive and imperative status categories. As the newspaper writes about the Ashkalija and people refer to them as Ashkalija, or ‘Hashkalli’, they have been quite successful at this point. Secondly, they must achieve acceptance for that standards applied to them should be different from that applied to the others, and especially the Romas and Serbs. The second goal is, as we have seen, only partially met. Where these two principals are

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40 This relies on my own observations at the event in October 2000.
41 This relies on my own observation in public media in Kosovo, December 2000.
fulfilled, interaction will, according to Barth, be channelled and standardised, and boundaries
that maintain and generates ethnic diversity in a greater social system will emerge (Barth
1969:17f). As long as there is consensus about criteria for inclusion and exclusion, these
ethnic boundaries will be maintain despite inter-ethnic contact and dependence.

By Albanians, Ashkalija are not considered Albanian, but Albanian-speaking Romas. Ashkalija political leaders though, try to promote their group as Albanians. They named the Political Party aiming to represent the Ashkali population as Ashkali Albanian Democratic Party (PDASHK). One of these leaders was also part in the formation of the association for ‘Egyptians’ before the war, another ethnic group that emerged in 1991\(^{42}\) (Duijzings 2000). Both are recognised by the UNMIK administration and have organisations that aims at representing them and defend their interests. Albanians in general are well aware of the categories, but tend to consider them all as Romas. Ashkalija are, however, often mentioned by Albanians to be culturally ‘higher’ or ‘better’ than Romas in general. There are several stories and evidence of individuals that have changed their identity between the three, just like the above mentioned political leader. The criteria for inclusion and exclusion in these three groups; Roma, Egyptian and Ashkalija, is therefore not yet clear. This gives the category more dynamics and provides individuals with more options and strategies. It also makes the situation more complex. The logic behind this might be found in the fact that the two groups seems to be competing for dominance. Egyptians say that all Ashkalija are Egyptians, while Ashkaliija leaders say all Egyptians are really Ashkaliija (ref). This is possible because they have the same primordial criteria for inclusion and exclusion. There is no entropy-resistance in between these groups. Albanians do in general believe they can see who belongs to these three groups by judging their physical appearance, but not which of the three groups they belong to\(^{43}\). It is perceived as impossible for Albanians to declare themselves as Roma, indicating that the three Roma categories are entropy-resistant to other groups.

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\(^{42}\) This relies on an interview of an OSCE Political Officer, conducted by me in December 2001.

\(^{43}\) Many informants said that they could see a Roma, Egyptian or Ashkali in “90% of the cases”.
The Roma ethnic category (take away the Egyptians and Ashkaljia) is by no means less complicated. The Romas seems to be split in three fractions; what could be referred to as ‘Albanian-oriented’ and ‘Serbian-oriented’, while one unfortunate group is ‘betwixt and between’. As Romas are in general a very vulnerable group, it is natural that they have, through experiences and interaction in their everyday life, their sympathy and understanding closer to the dominant group in their area. By both Albanians and Serbs they are considered to be of ‘low’ culture, even uncivilised. In addition, as we mentioned earlier, they suffered from retaliation attacks from Albanians right after the war, as Albanians considered them to be cooperating with the Serbs. It is not surprising then that the political party established by Roma leaders in the Albanian areas, United Roma Party of Kosovo (PREBK)\textsuperscript{44}, has taken a quite radical political stand, making statements in line with the radical Albanian political parties\textsuperscript{45}. The Romas living in Serb areas, mostly in Gracanica, can naturally not identify themselves with this agitation, as that would revoke social sanctions by the Serb community whom they share a rather small territory together with\textsuperscript{46}. Politically, it is even worse for the Romas living in the few mixed villages in the Municipality of Kamenica in Eastern Kosovo. The OSCE attempted to bring together all fractions for a meeting in front of the 2001 elections. The meeting failed to unite the group. The ‘Albanian-oriented’ Romas have a leadership that are located in Prizren, some of which are referred to as intellectuals\textsuperscript{47}. Under is a simplified figure showing the line of conflict as perceived by the different ethnic groups themselves.

\textsuperscript{44} The name, United Roma Party of Kosovo, was made in consultation with OSCE. There were none candidates from Serbian areas on the Candidates List for the 2001 Elections (ref\textsuperscript{7})
\textsuperscript{45} This relies on interview with an OSCE political officer.
\textsuperscript{46} Gracanica is commonly referred to as a Serbian ‘enclave’ comprising approximately four square Km of land, guarded by KFOR.
\textsuperscript{47} However, none of them dared to be on top of the Candidates List. Therefore PREBK ended up with a representative from Gjilan, whom no-one found suitable but nevertheless had to accept (ref). This might cause the party members to lose commitment to the party.
Yet another group is the ‘Gorani’. These are of Roma origin and speak a Serbian dialect. The ‘Gorani’ are mostly located in the Municipality of Dragash, at the mountainous border with Albania. People often refer to stories indicating that they were sent there as part of a political ambitious plan in the 1960ies to make the international border coincide with an ethnic border, dividing the Albanians in Albania with the Albanians in Yugoslavia (ref). Duijzings however, came to another conclusion; the Gorani villagers were one of the few compact and isolated Slav settlements that converted to Islam in the second half of the eighteen century without loosing their mother tongue (Duijzings 2000). Similar processes happened in Eastern Macedonia. ‘Gora’ is the name of a village and means ‘mountain’ in Serbian. Subsequently, the Romas living in the mountain area in Dragash between Yugoslavia and Albania have been referred to as the ‘Gorani’. They live in an ethnically homogenous area east of Dragash city. While the category is used often and on several villages in neighbouring Macedonia, it is with few exceptions only used for Dragash inside Kosovo. In Dragash town itself, the population is mixed, while on the countryside it is clearly segregated.

In the Municipal Elections 2000, the Gorani were represented with their own political party (GIG), which received almost 2000 votes. For the 2001 Elections, they were in a coalition with the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo (BSDAK), that also represent another ethnic group called ‘Bosniacs’. The result of the 2001 elections shows only 300 extra

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48 Those who did not convert and retain their Slav identity were called Torbesh and pomaks (eastern Maceonida and Bulagaria). (Duijzongs 2000:16)
votes for the coalition, suggesting that many Gorani did not identify themselves with the BSDAK. One of the reasons might be that the leaders of BSDAK, who were Bosniacs, considered all Gorani as Bosniacs. One of the Gorani leaders who established GIG and in strongly emphasised the unique Gorani identity in 2000, claimed in the 2001 Election Campaign to be Bosniac - “We are all Bosniacs” he is quoted to have said about the Gorani.

An informant in the OSCE later admitted that GIG was constructed by OSCE and not on the initiative of its members. One of the reasons for the construct, was that the Electoral System defines set-aside seats for minorities only though a Political Party. Without a political party, a minority group can not be designated set-aside seats in the Provincial Assembly. OSCE therefore encouraged the development of political parties for all ethnic minorities.

Some of the Bosniac leaders claim that the Bosniacs in Kosovo descend from an heretic sect called ‘Bogumis’ in Bosnia. The sect has been historically prosecuted and discriminated by both the catholic and the Orthodox Church. An advisor in OSCE interpreted this as an attempt to get out of the “muslimised Slavs” category that will connect them with the Serb population. The term ‘Bosniac’ already have connotations referring to a people that suffered by Serbian oppression and injustice during the war in Bosnia. Referring to the ‘Bogumis’, the Bosniacs are presented as victims; first by the established churches throughout their history, then by Serb violence, which targeted them as Muslims. Disregarding whether the historical reference is legitimate or not, this could be seen as a strategy for achieving acceptance by the Albanian majority. Those who suffered during the repression and violence of the 90ies have naturally not much sympathy for those who took advantage of the situation – the opposite might apply if they suffered just as much as Albanians.

Turks are considered an ethnic minority by the UNMIK administration, but were treated and generally perceived as Albanians until the 1970s, when Belgrade authorities promoted Turkish identity in order to counter-balance the political ascendance of the Albanians in

49 Quoted by an OSCE officer who participated in meetings with the politician.
50 This information is stated in OSCE press releases and policy documents, as well as in interview with an OSCE officer responsible for minority rights and participation.
51 This information derives from interview with the OSCE officer.
Kosovo (Duijzings 2000:18). During this period, ending with the war and international intervention, many Albanians feel the Turks tended to be politically more on the Serb side than the Albanian, like the Romas. Despite this and that they speak Turkish in their homes and are of Ottoman-Turkish origin, the Turks are very well integrated. Most Turks speak Albanian and in the southern Prizren region, Turkish words and expressions are used in the regional Albanian dialect. This might be related to the fact that the Turkish language has had the status as a lingua franca in the region (Duijzings 2000), and the urban high culture has for centuries looked to Istanbul and Turkey.

The Turkish category will not necessary cease to become distinct, because of their integration in Albanian society. According to Barth, ethnic boundaries persists despite a flow of personnel across them. In other words, categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories (Barth 1969:9-10)

Even though Albanians often consider them Albanian, except that they are of Turkish origin, we must regard it as a distinct ethnic group. The Turkish political party, PDTK, used only Turkish to address their voters in the 2001 political campaign. They therefore did not sought to compete for other votes than the ones they could get from the Turkish ethnic network.

Don Handelman argue that the concept of situational ethnicity and Barths concept of ethnic boundaries in terms of principles of inclusion and exclusion, are complementary perspectives that relates to different dimensions of ethnic organisation (Handelman 1978:261ff). He creates four organisational dimensions of ethnicity “ranging from the casual to the corporate (…): the ethnic category, the ethnic network, the ethnic association, and the ethnic community” (Handelman 1978:263). These dimensions represents ideal types in a continuum of organisational completeness, from membership in an ethnic category to a territorial defined ethnic community (Handelman 1978:272). Eriksen has pointed out that not all ethnic categories follow these phases chronologically, as an alternative to ethnic incorporation is assimilation (Eriksen 1993:44). It is also criticized for having limited explanatory power
because it does not grasp the varying cultural significance of ethnicity (Eriksen 1991b)\(^{52}\). I claim however, that by adding a timeline to the table, it is still useful to use Handelman’s ideal types of incorporation on non-assimilated ethnic categories. One of the gains of this is that it shows in which ethnic group gains and looses incorporate strength.

The table in annex 1 is an attempt to include such a dimension to Handelman’s table and apply it on the different ethnic groups in Kosovo. It should not be regarded as any authoritative attempt of classification; rather it is used to illustrate a general development. Such changes can for example indicate changes in state policies towards minorities. The table has a structure where ethnic groups that strengthen their incorporation moves up along the timeline, while ethnic groups that loose incorporation, or are increasingly assimilated, moves down. The arrows indicate ethnic groups that have moved from one category to another according to defined period. The small circle indicates when an ethnic category emerged.

An Albanian who now lives in Kosovo, told me about the village of Stroga in Macedonia, where he grew up. The village is located on the boundary between the two major rivalling ethnic communities, not far from Ohrid. As pressure and tension between Albanians and Macedonians grew, more and more of the community became Turkish. Those who were ‘really really’ Turkish were then distinguished from those who had not successfully managed to convince the local community about their ‘conversion’. Many persons that claimed to be Turkish had grandfathers that still wear the plis, the traditional Albanian hat (ref). This shows that the social setting has an impact on the development of the group. Conflict and external political developments have an impact that can redefine its criteria for inclusion and exclusion; the social setting is changed and makes other classifications are more favourable in the social situation.

\(^{52}\) Eriksen says “Handelman's (1977) typology of ethnic incorporation, ranking ethnic groups or categories from the socially very loose to the socially very strongly incorporated, has similarly limited explanatory power. It is misleading insofar as it treats ethnic categories or groups as analytical entities. This will not do: it is necessary to account for the production and reproduction of ethnicity in a less abstract, less static way in order to understand its concrete manifestations. Any detailed analysis of ethnicity must therefore take into account the varying cultural significance of ethnicity, not only cross-culturally, but also intra-culturally and perhaps most importantly, intra-personally.” (Eriksen 1991b). Eriksen suggest that it is more to gain from studying how ethnic signs signify the communication of cultural difference either as competitive strategies or because ethnic signs refer to “systematic distinctiveness which is in part being reproduced outside of the acts of communicating distinctiveness” (Eriksen 1991b).
There has been a drastic change in the incorporation of ethnic groups in Kosovo, just after the war. From 1999 to 2000 all groups stepped at least one step higher on the annexed table showing degrees of incorporation. The process of democratisation has thus enhanced the relevance of ethnicity in politics. UNMIK, and in particular OSCE, has had a clear strategy on gaining legitimate representation from minorities through political parties in the new elected institutions for self-government\(^{53}\).

This process must be seen on the basis of introducing a plural party system where it has formerly been only one political party, enjoying monopoly over political discourse. In the 1980s, the Communist Party was the only forum for political discourse. The introduction of a multi-party system, encouraging parties to form, naturally made ethnicity, as an extension of social organisation, into political units. But it is not merely social organisation that makes ethno-political representation seems natural. The development also reflects a wider development in Western-Europe and Northern America, where proportionate representation of ethnicity, race and gender has become a dominant political issue and has led to a ‘pillarisation’ strategy (Rex) or corporatism (Brown) in which groups of the population is represented through non-governmental organisations and political parties, supported by the government. In Kosovo a certified political party was given a lot of resources by the OSCE. These resources were allocated by Political Party Service Centres where all political parties got services and access to resources very much similar to what a company gets at the so-called ‘office hotels’ – office space, phone, access to fax, email and internet, secretary services and inclusion in a information circular system. Such resources obviously have a positive impact on the development of incorporation of different ethnic groups.

The ethnic categories have two different possible strategies: assimilation or incorporation to a higher level of ethnic organisation and accept a minority status (Barth 1969, Eriksen 1991). If choosing the second, the category must emphasise ethnic identity, using it to develop new positions and patterns to organize activities in those sectors formerly not found in their

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\(^{53}\) This information relies on an interview with an OSCE officer responsible for minority rights and participation.
society, or inadequately developed for the new purposes (Barth 1969:33). In the case of Kosovo today, it is clearly favoured to choose the strategy of incorporation, as that is the strategy of UNMIK in the set-up of self-governance institutions through an electoral system, in which minorities are given set-aside seats provided that they are represented by a political party. Incorporation does however demand a certain degree of acceptance from the ethnic majority. If acceptance is not widespread among the ethnic majority, enclavisation of the community’s territorial base is a natural process that then will take form, like the Serbs have been subject to. The ethnic categories that do not have a territorial base, does not have this option, as in the case of the Roma people, whom to many, seeking refuge in Serbia or Macedonia has been an option. We must therefore make a distinction between incorporated categories which are accepted as minorities and in which majority community’s territory.

Incorporation and ‘pillarisation’ of ethnic groups freezes the boundaries between the groups and makes them static, which decreases opportunities for using identities situationally. This has been a common problem for colonial administrations in the first half of the twentieth century, often using Social Anthropologists to investigate failure of integration and adherence to the colonial state (see Evans-Pritchard 1979). Promoters of this model often do not consider the loss of dynamics between ethnic groups and situational identity (see Brown 2000:136-147). The obsession in which UNMIK can be perceived to handle ethnicity in Kosovo, has for some been characterised as ‘ethnocracy’ (Malazogu 2001). The question is however, if there is any other way of transforming the political system and political culture into a multi-party democracy.

**What Now?**

Kosovo is now divided in two territories. One Serbian; north of the Iber river (Mitrovica North, Zvecan and Zubin Potok), Gracanica and a few other smaller pockets here and there (in Gjilan region in particular); and one Albanian; the rest of the province. The minorities in each territory, either the Romas in the Serb area or the ‘Albanian-oriented’ minorities (Roma, Ashkalja, Egyptians, Bosniacs, Turks, Gorani etc.) in the Albanian areas, live on the mercy of the dominant group, trying to achieve its acceptance. The groups that do not succeed are
subject to violence and intimidation. Politically there is full consensus in the population of each territory; the Serbs unanimously demands that Yugoslav authorities come back in control, while the Albanians and the Albanian-oriented minorities unanimously demands full independence.

The UNMIK administration and the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which it is legally based upon, balance between the two. It imposes and maintain a political stalemate. As the self-governance institutions takes form and develops according to Western-European standards of state administration, it seems politically more and more far fetched that the Yugoslav Federation should govern Kosovo, as they did before the war or even before 1989 anytime in the near future. This perception has reached the Kosovo-Serb population, who awaited political signals from Belgrade towards the elections of 2001; eventually the argument for participation was: “participation will at least give us something, if we don’t participate everything will be lost”. Yugoslav and Serbian authorities realised also this fact and made a political turn on the issue of Kosovo right before the elections; the strategy of political boycott of the municipal elections in 2000 had not discredited the international administration as much as it was thought to do, and it did not give the Kosovo-Serbs anything except lack of representation, attention and support, which the strategy was meant to produce. Therefore, President Kostunica set up a commission led by the moderate Nebosja Covic, who have successfully negotiated an end to the Albanian uprising in the Presevo valley in Southern Serbia; this commission will negotiate with UNMIK on all Kosovo-related issues for the Yugoslav Federation.

The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General Haekkerup signed an agreement with the Yugoslav Commission, referred to as the Common Document, in which UNMIK were obliged to improve support of Serbian communities in Kosovo. The agreement, referred to as the ‘Common Document’, also included the set-up of a University and a Municipal building in Mitrovica North. The divided town is generally perceived as one of the crucial

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54 Only the Turks can be said to have achieved full acceptance – probably much helped by the notion of its urban cultural heritage and the Turkish language that has had status as a lingua franca.
issues of Kosovo, and Albanians fear that the territory north of the Iber river (that divides Mitrovica) will be given to Serbia, since it is only populated by Serbs and borders Serbia. Resistance against this political solution is well rooted among Kosovo intellectuals and in its civil society. A popular song in the folk-pop genre by Shkurte Fejza is named “No, do not divide Mitrovica” (Jo, nuk ndohet Mitrovica). The song reveals the general perception among Albanians regarding the issue:

Without disappearing all boys and girls
No, don’t divide Mitrovica
[she] is as a crown, coin is her name
Between Iber and Sitnica [rivers]
Temle of gold and glory
Is city of Mitrovica

Ibri washes her cheeks
Shala e Boygoves gives the spirit

In the high mountains of (…) mines
Sounds heart of Kosova

Without all boys and girls disappear
No, Mitrovica cannot be divided
No, we don’t leave our lands
All Kosova is ours

[If] one drop is touched from Ibri
one eyelash of Trepca shakes
Shalas mountains will stand up

55 There are a few Albanians living in an enclave protected by KFOR in Mitrovica North, as well as a village further West.
Venes of the heart will burn with flame

From fortress walls
Will be released mountain eagles
Kaqanik and Boletin, whole Kosova covered in smoke

The song refers to the Trepca mines that once employed thousands of mine workers and exploited the area for minerals. The whole mine complex is now nothing else than a gigantic rusted metallic monster, and an international mine consortium has concluded that it needs billions of Euro in investments, but will even then, not be profitable in decades. It also faces an unmanageable environmental problem. Even though there are no treasures in the mines, the idea of dividing the territory symbolises defeat and will receive fierce resistance: eagles will be released, referring to male bravery, from fortressed walls, the traditional *kulla* houses, as in Kacanik and Boletin during the war, well known for its fierce guerrilla fighters.

The “division of Kosovo” was referred to by a Political Officer in OSCE as a real alternative. “If the Parliament doesn’t work, division is the only option”, he said (ref). Kosovo is thus on the verge of division unless the elite of all ethnic communities co-operates and ethnic tolerance is enhanced. This is what is at stake in Kosovo today.
4. Cultural Diversification and High Culture

The theoretical concept of civil society and literate high cultures was developed on the basis of the emerging middle class in the Western European cosmopolitan cities; like Paris, London and Vienna in the 19th century. Jurgen Habermas claim that not only did the new class in the social strata of society gain a critical role towards the aristocratic class, they also created and obtained an inclusive public discourse in which rationality was a ruling principle (Habermas 1991 [1962]). Thus the new class contributed to identify political solutions that were far more effective than the royal administration could develop. The ideal of a civil society was that in which any citizen could participate, on the grounds of being a citizen; a society of equals with a common interest of improving the life and prospects of its people. The principle was however, inclusiveness; any citizen could participate and it was his rational arguments that should be the basis for discussion, disregarded his social status56. This was, however, merely an ideal; it included really only a fraction of the citizens, an elite, which could participate in such discussions because of the social status, prestige and economical power. They were devoted to political and economical affairs not unlike the citizens in the ancient Greek city state; as men freed from everyday labour.

The new elite represented a sophistication of the common culture of the society; cultural sophistication became the sign of the new social class of economically privileged. In its early stages, cultural sophistication and the privilege of economic freedom made the class visibly different from the rest of the society. They soon represented a literate high culture that legitimised their position through education. As the class became representatives of the people in a political system that demanded a certain public popularity and support, integration with the common man became a concern and objective. Vertical integration between the elite and the people became not only vital for the legitimisation of political power; in an era of increasing tension and public unrest following rapid industrialisation, it became essential for the security and integrity of the state.

56 These circles consisted of men, representing the households as masters of the house, and was thus a manifestation of the social organisation of the time. It has been a lot of discussion about when the historical height of this period was, Richard Sennet (19??), for example, describes a period later than Habermas
The foundation of nation-states is based on economic growth generated by industrialism and market capitalism. For Gellner, the process of achieving economic growth is entangled with cognitive growth, meaning that the society allows “the wells of truths to pass into public, neutral control” (Gellner 1983: 78). The high culture of an increasingly powerful middle class, consisting of traders and industrial entrepreneurs were eager to push for standardised and homogeneous educational institutions, providing qualified labour for increasingly advanced and demanding job positions. These institutions become the tool for vertical integration between the high culture and the people it represents, as well as ensuring congruence between the high culture and the state.

With the status of an autonomous province in 1974, a full University was opened in Pristina. Throughout the 1980s it produced the first graduated students with degrees in higher education. The economy had not been worse however, and not many of the students had any jobs to go to. Young people from all over Kosovo migrated to Pristina in order to get higher education and prospects of good jobs and a better life; after years of studying, there was nothing but disappointment to await them. The University and its branches continued to be the centre for many of them for a long time after their graduation. The education of all these students expanded the high culture of Kosovo as well as creating vertical integration, legitimising it as representing the culture and the interests of the people.

When the autonomy of the province was taken away in 1990, Kosovo-Albanian students that had just graduated from the University started several political parties. The introduction of communism after the Second World War organised the literate high culture in the Communist Party; the public discourse of civil society happened thereafter within the framework of the Communist Party, in which the Kosovo branch was in the periphery, heavily influenced by what happened in Belgrade. Belgrade was the main centre for public discourse throughout the

57 It is said that the demonstrations of 1981 was initiated by a student that found a cockroach in his soup at the student’s cantina. He screamed out to all the other students: “This is it! I have had enough of this!”. The other students joined him and created a massive spontaneous demonstration with more than 10,000 students in the streets of Pristina.
Yugoslav period until the 1991, when LDK was established and took over most of the Kosovo-Albanian members of the Communist Party. This process coincided with the fall of communism in neighbouring Albania; Tirana now became an alternative centre for the high culture in Kosovo. Thus the new political centre became Tirana for the Kosovo-Albanian elite, while Belgrade remained to be the centre for the Kosovo-Serb elite.

**High Culture and Vertical Integration**

The basis of the elder high culture is its political control of the social organisation of society. This control is based in the family. One of the most fundamental features of group consensus is at the level of kinship authority. The family forms a political body. The Master of the Household, Zoteri I Shtepis, is its authority and representative in political matters; the family operates as one undivided unit (see Chapter 3). The next unit on the scale of social organisation is the close ties and alliances between families, also referred to as fis, or clans. I will not here only include clans like in the old traditional sense as a political unit with a banner and a council, but in a much broader sense. Extended as well as nuclear families tend to make closer bond to some other families, especially in societies were the family as a central institution in social organisation is very strong. Common for the two types, kinship and its allies, is that their relation is based upon loyalty; the commitment and duty to return favours is institutionalised in a repetitive structure of action. These two types forms the basis for the leader to emerge on the public stage. The table below shows the ideal types of the different levels of social organisation and their type of bonds.

58 Urban people will avoid to stress the political relevance of ‘clans’, as it represents ‘traditional’ society. ‘Family allies’ is therefore a better term, also referring to political groupings that are not connected directly by kinship.
The leader has thus entered the high culture of the society through a position in political organisation, a private company or state institution. The position demands a person with a network, which the leader can mobilise through kinship and kinship allies. The support needed to come into this position is to a large extent generated by kinship and loyalty towards the respective family. By doing so, the family and its allies have gained a representative in the high culture and elite. This is the level of the kryetar, leaders in public administration, NGOs or companies that can be used to promote the interest of the family and its allies. The next level is that of charismatic leadership, referring to Webers ideal types of leadership (Weber 1971 [1922]), in which the person has a position that is not legitimized on kinship and family allies alone, but supersedes this by mobilising a whole group of people because of representing a far higher cause. It is a charismatic type of leadership because it defends and promotes the national question at which much more than the life and self-realisation of a set of individuals is at stake, but the whole nation and the realisation of the nation. The nation is something much more than the sum of its individuals; it is also the sum of the history of a people with roots in an ancient civilisation. It is the prospect of a whole people that is at stake. Only highly respected members of the high culture is acknowledged the task to lead the nation, and then through support from broad alliances in the high culture, penetrating the social strata of society to the every village, where public support is ensured by participation of family leaders in political parties.
A vital part of participation in high culture is thus the making of loyalties and alliances. Any person that enjoys broad support with many loyalties will enter or be expected to enter the political scene. Because of this mechanism, the politics takes the form of a few strong alliances that can afford to be in opposition. Within these alliances, almost complete consensus is enjoyed. The social sanctions that apply to those who do not comply with the loyalty are ilt into the social organisations. In such systems, consensus on issues and particular interests in general are identified by particular persons; interests and politics are personalised.

One informant told me that in his school, where all the students that were old enough to vote decided collectively that they would vote for the LDK in the municipality elections. They simply decided that there was enough violence and that they would show their disgrace for the political fraction that was linked with the violence (PDK) by voting for the moderate LDK. In an anonymous society with a high degree of individuality, this would have been unthinkable. When asking people about how their family voted, most people admitted that all their family members voted for the same party. My informants agreed that this was normal. In one of my host families, a situation occurred, in which the wife choose to vote for PDK, while her husband voted for LDK. For her, this was a clear rebellion to mark disobedience with her husband, whom enforced very strict ‘traditional’ rules in the house, which she in everyday life did not find any way of opposing. The elections for her, was an opportunity to show that she had an individual stand that she could argue for, without obeying her husband in all matters. This was thus a reaction to the conformity demanded by the Master of the house (Zoteri I Shtepis), suggesting that she did not necessarily enjoy the subordination in everyday life. Jon Pettersen, one member of what I have called the New High Culture, was suspicious that his father might have actually voted a different party than what his mother and himself did. He hesitated to ask him about it, and left it un-discussed. He said that this could only happen in his family, which was sort of special in Kosovo; they looked on the elections as something more up to the individual than what was normal in the society.

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59 An example is the Chief Editor of the newspaper Koha Ditore, who many have been expecting to create a new political party.
Still, it can not be concluded that it is the extension of social organisation into politics, or rather social organisation is enough to explain the profound consensus and conformity in the civil resistance movement. The social organisation makes it possible for strong unity and conformity within the group, but does not mobilise unless there is external pressure and opposition. The Serbian state oppression and racist Yugoslav hierarchalisation of ethnic groups within the territory, in which the Albanians shared the bottom line together with the Roma population, has mobilised this conformity. These two elements, a social organisation with alliances based on kinship and an external threat from another group, created a civil resistance movement with complete consensus in political issues. The discourse within the movement showed disputes about the tools and methods of the engagement, but never about the goal of the struggle.

To illustrate this mechanism; when UNMIK and OSCE started to approve political parties for the municipal elections, it was evident that many of the political parties were a result of this mechanism. Even after a period of consolidation there was at the end a total of 30 political parties, all with literally the same party program. At the elections, only three of the parties got any votes. The fourth biggest party got merely 0,5 % of the votes. This is because the power base needed for popular vote requires something fundamental different than what a network of loyalties made with face-to-face interaction can generate. The election campaign reveals two different principles of social organisation related to the accumulation of social position, prestige and power. The first, based on a traditional peasant society, the other imported from western ‘anonymous’ industrial societies, where the political orientation of the actors and a broad political platform and organisational structure are the normative basis for popular support.

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60 Even the few minority parties had the same party program as the Kosovo-Albanian parties, except they were targeting a particular minority group.
The New High Culture

During the civil resistance of the 1990s, many of the middle class either emigrated themselves or managed to send their children abroad, providing them with higher-status educational degrees and prospects of well paid jobs abroad. After the war, with the economical improvements brought by the international involvement and job openings for English-speakers, most of these either returned, or started visiting Kosovo on a regular basis. Many of them have lived ten years in Western European or North American countries, and upon return, they present a ‘western’ life style and way of thinking. They constantly introduce new cultural elements into a society that has been based on traditional economy with few international relations. They constitute what I have called the ‘new high culture’, as opposed to the elder high culture that grew up within the communist party and took part in the civil resistance movement at the height of their intellectual age.

In order to further grasp what constitute the new high culture, it is necessary to compare it with that which is described above, the elder high culture. It will then be obvious that the new high culture does not follow the same fundamental principles for social position, prestige and power, loyalties and kinship alliances is not relevant basis for employment in for example the international organisations; important here is to speak English and obtain a basic understanding of the ‘western’ way of thinking. Their position is legitimised by their performance and competence in interaction with foreigners; their well-functioning and efficiency within the organisation is based on whether they can comply with bureaucratic principles and systems.

Apart from their knowledge of English and openness towards ‘western’ lifestyle and ideology, they also have a network outside Kosovo. If they did not emigrate during part of the 1990s themselves, they have friends that did, in which they keep in contact through the internet. Through the exchange of information about their friends abroad they are part of a transnational community. Through the internet, they also keep updated on political and lifestyle-

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61 The kinship networks of for example employees are often kept hidden for the international staff. I know several NGOs that has only after some years realised they have hired many members of the same family, obviously because local staff promote them.
related news outside Kosovo. They have often travelled in Europe and North America, but has merely been around in Kosovo, and in particular not in the rural areas. Below is an attempt to place these differences in a table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Operating area</th>
<th>Elder High Culture</th>
<th>New High Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pristina and village and region of origin</td>
<td>Pristina only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International operating area</td>
<td>‘Ethnic Albanian’ area (Shqiperia Etnik)</td>
<td>Europe and North American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of the ‘outside world’</td>
<td>The ‘outside world’ and the ‘international factor’ as something external</td>
<td>Europe and the west as something they are part of; legitimising lifestyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International languages</td>
<td>Some French maybe</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational experience</td>
<td>Yugoslav Communist Party</td>
<td>International humanitarian organisations and project-based local NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>Authoritarian / hierarchic / collectivistic</td>
<td>Liberalist / anarchist / individualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Base</td>
<td>network within high culture and kinship alliances.</td>
<td>Through internationals and Albanians working for international organisations or with financial support from them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>University of Pristina</td>
<td>In Europe or North America; or no higher education save English classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalties</td>
<td>Loyalty to family, parties and patrons</td>
<td>Loyalty to Family, group of close friends and lifestyle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the elder high culture, Pristina is a centre within the ethnic Albanian area (Shqiperia Etnik) and the rural areas are the periphery. For the new high culture, Pristina is a periphery, and the centres are the major cities in Western Europe and North America. Another important difference is education; while the elder high culture has been educated within the Yugoslav educational system, the new high culture got their basic education in Pristina during the years of resistance in the parallel system and then sought higher education abroad.

In Bourdieu’s sense, the new high culture are in possession of a powerful symbolic capital. The older established high culture also acknowledge the fact that they possess knowledge and certain know-how that they do not have. Apart from their closeness to ‘international culture’, one of these knowledge are the new information technology. ‘Internet’ has become an almost
mystical and powerful tool, which makes the new high culture representatives of the western world in a region that have been isolated.

One institution can work as an example of the new high culture; and institution providing internet services. They started with humanitarian funding from western countries and international NGO’s, but does now generate most of their own money through selling their services to clients. The small office is packed with small desks with computers. At any time of the day, there will be some young enthusiastic persons in the office, even at night, when groups of them often play computer games over the network. Friends of the employees come visiting them all the time and get free access to computer internet and phone, which is a precious resource in Kosovo. Besides numerous computer books and manuals, there are equally many posters and postcards of western music, film and fashion celebrities. Most of the time there will be popular ‘western’ music played from one of the computers with loudspeakers.

One of the central figures at this institution is Torgeir Grimson\(^{62}\). Torgeir has been living abroad for the last five years, but has now just returned after the war, exciting to participate in the build-up of his home country; just like most others of his colleagues. His father, a well respected laywor, stressed the he should finish the studies that he started at a foreign university, which he later did. He was well respected at the institution because he easily got acquainted with internationals and soon had a network of important donors. He looks like any young guy from Western-Europe or North-America, wearing urban fashion sports-like clothing, occupied with music, film, fashion, design, information technology, international politics and travelling. His favourite music band is the Bo Kasper’s Orchestra, a Swedish jazz band very few outside Scandinavia and none else in Kosovo for sure has ever heard about. Besides the fact that he and his friends earn a lot more than the average Pristina citizen and has therefore more consumer opportunities, it is easy to see that he and his friends appear different in the social landscape, even in urban Pristina. When going out for a beer, which

\(^{62}\) Name is made up by the author and for the sake of shedding light on comparability, the names used follow Scandinavian naming tradition.
they often in the late evening, they smile and joke a lot about films or friends, as well as enter into serious discussion about the revolution of the Information Technology and its new possibilities and international politics in the light of the potential for an independent Kosovo, or about their rival institution.

In conversions with Torgeir and his friends, the lack of cultural capital of peasants and villagers is a recurring subject. Peasants represent all kinds of cultural “garbage” or lack of urban manners, and indirectly cause the failure in urban planning, because of the massive influx to the city from the rural areas after the war. There are certain attributes connected to the social behaviour of ‘villagers’ that is stressed in order to make distance to them as a social group and the low status of rural people:

They spit in the streets
They are rude to women
They drive without showing respect for driving rules and manners
They listen to traditional music
Their clothes are dirty and ridiculously old fashioned
They do not understand urban manners
They have no clue about what a democracy is, how it should work, and what ‘independence’ really means.

One time we were talking about clothes, Torgeir told me jokingly that I looked like I was from the rural Drenica valley. I had tried to dress like the person in the street; jeans, shirt and V-shaped sweater with a black leather jacket on top. This was the clothing fashion as I saw it on the streets; for them I clearly did not fulfil their criteria for urban fashion, but this criteria was subordinated to the fact that I came from Western Europe. Nobody else in this milieu ever pointed out my unfashionable clothing, except Torgeir, whom new me well, and then in a jokingly manner.

Kosovo-Albanians visiting Kosovo from abroad, for example USA, come as ‘tourists’ in their home country and possess a huge amount of cultural capital; they are looked upon as the few
successful, living out ‘the American dream’. They are in general automatically looked upon as part of the new high culture. They are among the richest in local terms. This symbolic capital was questioned by Torgeir however; he knew the working and living conditions of Albanians in New York. He illustrated this by joking, pretending that he told them: “Hey, didn’t I see you busting your ass off making those pizzas in Little Italy!”. Their cultural capital could be questioned by insiders who knew their actual everyday low-status life. Even though membership in the new high culture easily comes with western life-style and economic freedom, that is not all to it.

The new high culture has emerged as a result of the increasingly trans-national younger generation of middle class families, but also out of the need for the international community has for a group that can be mediators of their cause. These young people have often the same cultural references as the Western European and North American employees in international NGOs and the UN administration. Torgeir is also very well aware of this fact and is conscious about overcoming the cultural barrier when interacting with internationals. He has two specific techniques; first, the ‘sitcoms’; when he meets a new international person, he will first “brake the ice” by referring to well known ‘sit-coms’, like Seinfeldt and Friends. He would start the conversation with “Oh, by the way, that reminds me of that episode of Seinfeldt, you know when they do [this and that]….and George goes … “. They will all laugh, both in relief of loosening up a tense first meeting, but also because they feel no longer any cultural barrier in between them. When being stopped by the British KFOR soldiers patrolling Pristina for example, Torgeir explains how he disregards the local interpreter; because “he will probably speak much worse English than himself” and is a barrier he can avoid, even though it makes the interpreter irritated because of the loss of integrity. He approaches the soldiers directly and say something about the latest football match in England, or asks about their favourite team. He often rejects their team in favour of Chelsea, which he knows most of them don’t like, and both parties will laughingly reject each other as symbolical enemies; but they are now ‘enemies’ identified as being on common cultural grounds; they are on the same playfield. In a place were crossing cultural boundaries is a major trouble in the everyday life of an international employee, it is a big relief and they are usually happy to be helpful.
Torgeir and his friends are between 22 and 26 years of age. Most persons in the new high culture are below 30 years old. Veton Surroi and his media corporation, the newspaper Koha Ditore and the television channel Koha TV, has made it a policy to hire only people of this kind. In his companies therefore, more than 70% of the employees are under the age of 30.\textsuperscript{63} This has been a conscious strategy for Surroi, as he targets the urban areas, and want to introduce the new things these young people represent, in an effort to change the society. He defend this policy on the assumption that the new high culture represents new solutions and ways of thinking that Kosovo need. The elder high culture, which is based on the heritage from a one-party communist system, is seen as trapped within the old ways of thinking, which has shown its failures. The new high culture is also based upon tolerance for cultural diversification because of its liberal and pluralist “open mind”, which promotes an open and critical discourse in civil society.

The new high culture will probably be manifested politically in the near future; for example a new political party or renewed leadership of older parties. They are the future political leaders of Kosovo, just like the students under the university-boom during the 1970s are leaders.

\textit{The Display of High Culture}

Shkodra, a city in North-West Albania and Gjakova, in Western Kosovo, are two cities that are perceived as having a rich urban high culture as part of their cultural heritage. For Shkodra, this is linked to the period where the city was under Venice administration. The heritage from Catholicism and Venetian art and architecture in this period still pervades as an emblem on their urban high culture. Under the Hoxha regime however, the most prominent catholic priest was killed and the town church was used as a gymnastics hall and cinema instead. After the regime fell, the catholic identity has again blossomed.

\textsuperscript{63} This relies on my own estimate, based on the telephone list at Koha TV. In general, the technicians were often a bit older than the journalists.
At an international scientific conference in Shkodra arranged by the University of Shkodra, I participated in a delegation of intellectuals from Kosovo. The conference was formally inaugurated at the theatre 9.00 in the morning. The stage was decorated with a big version of the city emblem and some flowers on a huge Turkish carpet. There were approximately 340 people in the audience, of which 34% were women, all of them were sitting next to what I assumed to be either their husband or a male family member. The guests sitting in the first front rows were more properly dressed than the rest; all of them in suits. The session started with the Albanian national anthem being played over an old loudspeaker system. Everyone stood up in honour and respect. After the song, the hostess, a woman in a pink jacket and black short skirt, declared the conference for officially opened. Then the Director of the Museum, in dark suit, gave a short speech. The hostess presented a short poem, before a female opera singer in light blue jacket sang “the song of Shkodra”. Then again another female singer presented a song in the same pompous Italian opera-style fashion, while seven camera men with old video-cameras and three photographers got closer on their subjects. Another song was presented by a man in dark suit. Yet another one by a woman in a flashy red jacket. She sang one more tune, before a five men choir in dark dresses sang a song that were slightly more folk-like to me, but my informant disagreed; folk songs are only for ‘highlanders’, meaning ‘villagers’. “Many Catholics in Shkodra speaks Italian”, she said; “they are of very high…high…”, “high culture?”, I suggested. “Yes”, she said. “Very European. Gjakova also have city songs, but not Pristina, because it is a new city and has mixed population. It is a melting pot of villagers”, she said. The pink hostess presented an old couple singing a theatre-like song of quarrelling between husband and wife, while acting their roles by using one-hand gestures, pretty much like an Italian opera. Then a new female singer in white transparent jacket and black long skirt. I had again the impression that this one, as well as the next one that came after had a more folk-like character.

While a piece of Western-European composer was played by a small orchestra of ten violinists, my informant told me about the Catholic priest Gjergj Fishta, who was killed by the Hoxha regime because he linked the Muslim mosque and the Catholic church together and
thus strengthened the religious community in the town. People now commemorate him and have taken up his tradition of linking the mosque and the church together with lights. The pink hostess introduces another male singer in dark dress when my informants notices that no governmental official is present; at a folk music and ethnographical festival in Gjirokaster in Southern-Albania some weeks ago, there had even been a minister present. This, she argued, was because the government of Fatos Nano and the Democratic Party is Tosk, while Shkodra is more or less like the Gheg capitol. Another male singer in dark suit performed a song. Then another one. And when the presentation was finally over, we went out like it was a celebrity party, from a beautiful building dressed in beautiful clothing into the muddy dark street of North-West Albania, a city controlled by mafia and where policemen wear masks in order not to get recognised and face retaliation for arresting criminals. Only the camera-men, facing towards the old theatre building, did not seem to feel the bizarre contrast.

If the inauguration had been in Kosovo, the political context would have been slightly different. The Albanian national would have been on the stage, maybe together with the city emblem. The national anthem would have ended with ‘Lavdi!’ (honour) shouted out at the end. Further on, the speakers would most certainly include the political goal of an independent Kosovo. The songs presented would be related to the suffering of the war and the rightness of the political goal of independence. The form would be in the spirit of the strong and fiercely fighting, rather than that of the royal or elitist, focused on self-presentation as in Shkodra. The focus would be on culture and cultural heritage, as in Shkodra, but in the context of legitimising the political goals of independence.

The description above illustrates the display of elder high culture, and is quite different from the new high culture. For example when opening a new bar; a year after the international intervention, new bars, cafes and restaurants popped up everywhere and they all competed about being the most fashionable and stylish. It was sort of a competition about which was the best new bar in town. So the new high culture contributed to make some of them more fashionable than others. One of the few that managed to ‘stay on the top’, was in a former bunker in the basement of a resident building downtown Pristina. The entrance did not look
like any entrance to anything public; only a closed steel door and no signs. Going into it was like entering a new world; inside was conceptual art; silver painted toilets and a colonial Leicester wine-red sofa section in an atmosphere in between red walls with poster promoting films nobody had ever heard about and a high ceiling flashed by the light from huge candles. The music was “top of the line” pop and soft techno. VIP cards were distributed to the few lucky ones, who would be allowed to be part of the few exclusive clients, as they would soon close the doors for anyone without it. The opening was almost a religious experience; the core of the new high culture was there, and nobody else. Everyone agreed that the VIP thing was excellent; finally a place only for us. The hidden-away entrance, prevented ‘villagers’ to find their way.

Time showed however, that exclusiveness was impossible to implement, simply because everyone new everyone, or at least someone; how could the guards in the door prevent someone’s cousin to enter? Shortly, the place was crowded with ‘villagers’, as Torgeir said, and the elitist atmosphere of high culture that was felt the first month, when even top journalists, writers and some politicians got drunk in the bar, was soon gone to new bars nobody had heard of. Thus only the place with its style and music was left for others to experience, feeling they are part of the new; the fashionable elite; the future.
5. The Intellectual elite – Maintaining the Grand Story

This chapter is devoted to analyse the discourse within the intellectual elite, and a description of the social milieu in which it is operating. There are two aspects of the milieu which are particularly relevant for this study; first, the production of knowledge as a social activity within an institutional framework, second, the interaction between institutions and its distribution of knowledge to the wider population.

There are two different roles for the institutions of concern: production of knowledge and distribution of knowledge. Under is a table that identifies these types of institutions in Kosovo according to these roles.64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production of Knowledge</th>
<th>Distribution of Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Institutes</td>
<td>Publishing houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Pristina (Faculty of Philosophy and Faculty of Linguistics)</td>
<td>Riljinda Publishing House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy of Science and Arts</td>
<td>Kosova Information Centre (KIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute of Albanology</td>
<td>RTK TV, Bujdar, Koha Ditore, Kosova Sot, Zeri, Bota Sot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research institutes and the university produce knowledge and present it in academic books and texts printed at the publishing houses. These books are not easily available for the public and are mostly absorbed by academic colleagues, students at the university and journalists. Thus media agencies take part in making it more accessible and present it in a more popular manner. Often new knowledge is merely absorbed and its origin not referred to when presented; it is part of the numerous assumptions hidden in the description of an event or in discussions. The table above does not include political parties, because they are representing knowledge rather than distributing or producing it.65

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64 Serbian institutions are not considered in this table, as they are located outside Kosovo. The table represents a simplification. It can, for example, be argued that journalists also are part of the production of knowledge.

65 If the political parties in Kosovo had a detailed programme, they could have been part of the distribution of knowledge chain. However, as all their programmes are similar and in the size of half an A4 paper, they merely take part in the distribution of new knowledge.
Even though the intellectual elite is spread over both types of institutions, this analysis will concentrate on the knowledge-producing type of institutions; these are the institutions that introduce new knowledge and have a great role in re-creating and maintaining knowledge that support nationalist claims in the civil society. As stated in Chapter 2, the analysis will focus on events within the framework of these institutions.

**Institutional Production of Knowledge**

According to Smith (1986), the primitive and simple life of traditional societies is appealing to urban people because it represent the opposite of city-life and complex anonymous society with economical competition. Intellectuals are engaged in an ‘urban populism’, when forming the basis for museums of folklore and ethnography (Smith 1986:190). The intellectuals themselves are most often urban middle class. The life ethnographers study is therefore often the life opposite of their own. Like one ethnographer in Pristina that left for a tiny small village in southern Kosovo for ten days; upon return, she said “I am so glad to be back in the city. I am a city-person. I am not made for small places, villages…” (ref). The research institute described on the following pages are one of the institutions that are particularly occupied with the cultural legacy of people in Kosovo.

The institute I will use as a case, which represent institutional production of knowledge, is located in a grey office building with lots of windows and an architectural design that best can be described as innovative Yugoslav urban architecture within the framework of the functionalism of the 60’ies. Above the glass entrance in front of a small fountain, there is a poorly printed banner saying its name. In the entrance hall there is a reception (or handy-mans office) with the only telephone in the building and a guard. In front of the reception there is a huge table with some chairs around. On this table there is a list of names that the employees sign when they enter. It is, however, easier to ask the people hanging around the reception chatting or having coffee, because they will always know exactly who is in or not. But let’s take a look at the list on the table. It is ordered chronologically according to academic titles. On top, there is only one person, with the title ‘Academic’. This is the highest title achievable
and only one person has got this within the institute. The next is ‘doctor’ displayed with ‘Dr.’ in front of the names, starting with the director of the institute. After approx. 10-15 names, persons with the Magistrate title is listed with ‘Mg.’ and the persons with only the Masters degree is listed as ‘Mr.’ or ‘Ms.’. At the end, some persons without any title at all are listed.

The institute has four departments; history, lingvistics, ethnology and literature. Each department has its leader (Head of Department). Most employees are men in the age 45 to 65. In 1998 they decided to establish a youth scholarship program, in order to get more young people into the institute. Each department was supposed to establish two positions for persons under the age of 25 that were working with their Master degree. The scholarship only got five students into the institute before it was abandoned because of lack of funds. Though the institute is now officially governed by the UNMIK Department of Education, together with the university. The staff was hoping for increased budget and higher salaries under the UN administration, but the international principal gave the institute the ultimatum of either abandon 20 positions and thereby be able to increase the salary, or keep all the employees on the same low salary as before. The institute the latter, keeping all its employees on the same low salary level. The Department of Education is reforming the University and wants to reform the institute too, but is uncertain about how and has until now prioritised other parts of the university.

The office premises is spread on two floors and seem to have been distributed to each employee without any particular order or department affiliation. The office of Mr. Hansen and Dr. Pettersen can be used as an example. Mr. Hansen is an ‘up-and-coming’ Magistrate in his late 30’ies, who works in the Department of Lingvistics. He is young, but well respected among the elders. He is very active and eager to produce and publish texts, as well as taking part in organising symposiums. Dr. Pettersen is about 30 years older. He not only enjoys the respect older men has, but also because of the long academic career he has behind him. Even Mr. Hansen would stand up in respect when he entered the office they both share. He has also a profound humanistic appearance, perhaps because of his gently gestures. He has specialised in epics, and what is called ‘epicology’.
There are often guests in their office; anyone that drop by will be asked to sit down and offered to drink coffee, even though it is not always expected of to accept the offer. When I was their guest, Mr. Hansen always look eagerly around in the piles of books on his desk, under it, or on the bench behind him to find that specific book he believe will be interesting for me to read. He then wrote a small personal greeting on the first page and hand it over while telling how important the book is. He would start by giving away his own published works; Often small leaflets of poorly printed manuscripts of poems, theatre plays or a short academic text about the contribution of some well-known historic academic person. Then, as in my case, when he understood my particular field of interest, he even brought a book for me while being in Tirana, where books are more available, and at one-third of the price. After a while I realised the importance of exchanging books like this. Books are sold at the Riljinda Publishing House, in some book shops, or like second-hand on the streets. Even though it seem to be a boom in the publishing business compared to when imported books were not allowed, books are in general very difficult to obtain. In particular if you are interested in specific topics that are not popular. The low salary level makes also books very expensive. Therefore, giving a book is a great gesture and a good manner for building relations and a network among social scientists.
Dr. Pettersen and Dr. Hansen arranged a seminar on the ethno-cultural meeting between Kosovo-Albanians and Albanians in Albania during the refugee crisis. The conference took place in an auditorium, as illustrated below. There were approximately 80 participants. I counted only 10 women, two of them obviously too young to have any other role than that of a curious student, and two of them, wives of male academics that were present. One woman had a leading role throughout the conference. She was a leader of a visiting research institution from Albania. There was no microphone on the speaker’s stand, and the speaker thereby had to rely on his/her own strength of voice.

The seminar was declared open by the director of the institute. He reminded us about the many victims of the war and introduced one minutes silence in the honour of the victims. Everyone in the audience stood up in silence and respect. I don’t think more than 20 seconds had passed, before the director shouted “Lavdi”, whereby the audience responded loudly like as if they were part of a military battalion; “Lavdi!”, meaning ‘glory’ or ‘honour’, referring to the sacrifices done for the ‘national question’. The conference had started.

The visiting institution from Albania held a welcome speech, first mentioning the importance of cooperation between Kosovo and Albania institutions, then, commenting the ‘ethno-psychological’ and ‘ethno-cultural’ meeting between Albanians from Kosovo and Albanians in Albania during the war in spring 1999. Another person held a short speech about the historical division between the Albanian people, before the visiting female leader called upon the first speaker on the program, who discussed how ‘immune’ to all obstacles the friendship between the two were throughout the 1990s.

The presentation of papers took place on a designated speaker’s stand. The papers were always presented as texts that were read loudly by the speaker, sentence by sentence. It is not very different from how a radio news reporter reads, with few variations in voice tone, going

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66 (Mbijetesa Etnokulturore e Kosoves se Shpermgulur me Dhune me 1999)
67 (Preferencat she imuniteti shoqeror i shqiptareve te Kosoves gjate konfliktit te viteve te '90-ta te shekullit XX)
down at the end of each sentence. This conveyed authority and respect for the text and the meaning of it. In case the speaker got confused with the notes, the speaker would keep silent until the right page or sentence was found and continue reading. Few people would dare to make digressions that were not part of his or her text. Those who did were mostly outsiders in the audience that nobody within the milieu took seriously. Social sciences rely fully on the text to convey its meaning; a meaning oral language can not. When finished, the audience applauded the presenter, in particular those who had more authority and respect.

In a work-shop at the same seminar, sometimes less than 20% of the audience followed the paper that was presented in any detail. It looked like the reading was a formal ritual that was important in its form, not for its content. Those who were in the panel did not make any attempt to comment the presented papers, apart from complimenting its presentation.

When the speaker was standing at the speaker's stand reading the paper, it was obvious for that person that he or she was frontstage, having the attention of the audience. However, the distinction between front stage and backstage was not very sharp. To take an example: on a session at a similar conference in Shkodra (also described in Chapter 4), people with video-camera and curious on-lookers completely blocked the view for the rest of the approx. 150 people in the audience. They either did not feel that they where actually on the stage, or felt that their role as documenting the event overshadowed the need for the audience to see.

There was not much discussion or disagreements on arguments. None of the papers argued against another presenter. There was, however, a sort of ‘collective voice’ from the audience; an expression of a feeling about the correctness of what was presented; the presence of a collective sentiment was felt. This was a more subtle ‘audience feeling’ that expressed itself in mumbling, nodding and noise-level. When any of the more prominent intellectuals spoke the noise-level of the audience was very low, everyone concentrating on hearing the

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68 This leads to a reflection about the correlation between a sharp divide between private and public spheres and anonymous society.
69 It must be added here that my understanding of the language was poor and that these observations are therefore questionable.
text; people were often nodding to signal their content with the text. Whereas for the less respected and younger scientists, there would be a constant mumbling noise in the audience, even people talking in the phone or discussing other issues in between themselves.

At a dinner, I asked the director of a museum of ethnology, an elder man, how he would define ‘ethnology’. He felt insulted and showed irritation about the question; "Everyone knows what ethnology is!", he said loudly. “It is ‘ethnos’ and ‘logos’! Everyone knows what it means!”. My excuse about using different definitions all around the world did not help much. I asked because I did not notice any discussion on the terminology used in the papers. The researchers did not feel any need for defining these terms, as their meaning was already clear and beyond doubt for all participants. The scientific milieus have a high degree of unified terminology and a common framework of understanding. The terminological regime was maintained collectively, through conformity and respect for the efforts that had been undertaken by senior and deceased scientists in studying the topics of concern.

In discussion with an ethnographer at the institute, the political goal of the scientific discipline was indicated; the aim was to “describe the culture before it disappeared”, she said. Her speciality was ‘traditional clothing’. She said that traditional clothing would soon not be used by anyone anymore. That is why it was not important to study modern clothes and fashion. The difference between the urban and rural areas, she said was in this context just that the rural areas were slower. It took them more time to catch up with modern things. Now, even people in far-reached villages have started to use manufactured materials bought at the market, instead of making the materials themselves. This represented the start of a change, which eventually will make traditional clothing disappear all together. On the street, she saw two women in traditional clothing and immediately went up to them to take two photos of them (see the photo below that I took of her in this moment). She did not talk to them; “Only the scarf was traditional!”, she said. The rest of the clothes, even though it looked very traditional, with even a wooden plate around the women’s waist holding up the skirt, was just old modern clothes that had similar function and design; half-long skirt on top of some wide pants.
As mentioned earlier, there was a scholarship acknowledged to younger persons at a research institute in Pristina. They kept often together and formed the “youths” at the institute. I made fun of them calling them the ‘young rebels’, because they often expressed a critical standpoint towards the elder intellectuals and what they perceived as old-fashioned way of thinking. This was of course only done when none of the persons concerned were present, as they had to remain respectful to them. Their perception of the institute was as a “club of old men” that remained in the institute because there were no pensions to take care of them otherwise\textsuperscript{70}. They often referred to the general Albanian academic level as being very low, or as one of them told me wittingly; “we have reached your university’s knees”. The Albanian “backwardness”, was perceived as a result of Serbian state mis-governance; Kosovo had lost decades of development, just as Albania suffered under the communist regime.

They believed the old generation sitting on top of such institutions as theirs, were incapable of imposing the necessary change, in order to reach international research standards. One informant often complained about his mentor, whom he would be arguing with, because he believed he was hopelessly lost in “the old world of strict forms and structure”. He wanted to be more experimental and personal in his writing about poetry. He also wanted to present his own ideas, not just copying and referring to the most respected of the scientists of that particular field. He advocated a ‘more modern form’ of scientific analysis.

\textsuperscript{70} At the time of the field work there were no pensions paid to elder people. The UN started payment of pensions in 2002.
Even though the young rebels believed they represented a change in the institution, hoping that the old generation would eventually loose power, they could not escape the feeling of great respect for the older scientists, and the most famous of them in particular. They are also motivated and inspired by them and have personal ambitions to become one of them, the great scientists. They copy the academic dress code (shirt and jacket or a dress is typical), they have idols among the scientists; often the non-living, and wanted to image themselves as ‘scientists’. They asked me for fun; “who of us look the most like a scientist?” Then they would secretly tell me who they think themselves look and act most scientifically. As there are very few female scientists, I was curious to know who the young female students had as idols. I was puzzled by the response. Obviously, they resented to have idols in their own milieu. Then they would rather have idols among the earlier and now dead scientists. One of them, a woman, referred to another female scientist as her idol. I had personally met the person she referred to. She had written what was, in my opinion, the most interesting paper; simply because she had dared to present some rather innovating theoretical correlations between legendary myths and symbols, but she was openly ridiculed by her own colleagues as an outsider. For a young female scientist, it was a political statement; she represented a woman that was truly scientific, daring to present new co-relations and question established theories, but also someone who was misunderstood socially and not enjoying the respect she ought to, according to her contribution.

That there is not much theoretical disagreements and critical discourse, does not mean there is not fractions and group relations that stresses the others incompetence. One of the other linguists are for example very annoyed with another scientist, whom he believes always make a big deal about all the things he publishes, pretending he is one of the only scientist within his field and that his research is the continuation of the work of a recently dead and greatly respected academician. Such criticism, obviously based upon personal ambitions, would never be presented to persons outside his own group of to-him loyal persons. In order to hear it, I had to reaffirm my loyalty to him. He would only tell this to his own group of loyalties, the ones he could trust and confess private things to. This does not change the meeting between the rival in public, fronts stage. When the mentioned person met with his rival, it looked just
as respectful and polite as any other meeting. But they were not part of the same group of loyal friends.

The virtue of a person seems to be connected to public manners and politeness, just like the British ‘gentleman’ ideal. Among the elite, who recognise themselves as representatives of high culture, presentation of your own virtuous character in this regard is vital; to be gracious, polite and humanistic in appearance and public social relations. The earlier mentioned Dr. Pettersen is an obvious winner in this context. His facial expressions and his gestures give him a profound humanistic impression on other people. He is among the few who can repeat the ‘si jeni? A je mir?’ gesture every five minutes and give you a feeling that he really means it and cares about you for every time he asks. The opposite if this would be to show anger in public. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 3); to insult someone in public can imply a life-long enemy-relationship with not only one person, but also his group of loyal friends and family, even their family allies. In order to avoid this, people even smile and are very polite when they crash their car; a gentleman would then shake your hand and apologise with an expression of empathy and understanding. In this way, the social organisation thus easily provides sanctions for those who does not respect the kinship structures and alliances in society.

The strong conformity is also caused by the political aspect of the social sciences in the context of a post-war society. The intellectuals tries to make sense of the suffering of the people and support solutions that avoid it to happen again. They do so under the paradigm of the ethnic nation and its Grand Story. Ethnography and Social Anthropology is part of the presentation of the nation as a homogenous unit. This was without doubt one of the prime political functions for Anthropology in the era of nation-building in Europe and the discipline in colonial ruled countries in the Third World; Borofsky (1994) remarks it as a paradox that many Third World leaders turn to anthropological texts to reconstruct their cultural pasts “filled with notions of homogeneity and stability that anthropologists now reject as too simplified. Just when anthropology’s traditional conception of culture is being questioned
within the discipline, Third World leaders seem to be appropriating it for their own political ends” (Borofsky 1994:8). This process is also noted by Leif John Fosse, who has conducted an anthropological case study of the construction of nationalism in Namibia (Fosse 1996). As Kosovo has been more or less isolated from the post-functionalist academic discourse in the social sciences, intellectuals in Kosovo too, uses cultural knowledge for the national cause.

The Grand Story Presentation

At the conference described earlier, an exhibition was set up outside the entrance. It was paintings made by an artist and drawings made by children. They all illustrated the ‘Racak massacre’, which is often referred to as a ‘turning point’ in the conflict. OSCE Ambassador William Walker called the US State Secretary Albright from the site of the massacre on inspection the day after it was found; the line was crossed; the amount of human rights violations the was possible to accept for the ‘international community’ exceeded the respect for state sovereignty and the international law protecting it. In media it was presented as the final proof that eliminated all doubts. Intervention was legitimate. In the Kosovo-Albanian Grand Story of oppression, suffering and legitimate civil resistance and violent revolt; it became a symbol of final acknowledgment.

Later, at another occasion, there was another exhibition in the entrance, with photos and materials that were found on the bodies of dead Kosovo-Albanians71. There were also some letters that families had received from their sons that were in prison in Serbia. The exhibition was opened with a small theatre play about a mother and her small baby that came to the site where her son that had been killed. She found his small notebook and some pieces of clothing. She presented her trauma and suffering. It was sort of a commemorative theatre play. A collective trauma was presented. It was not only the suffering of the families and their dead family members individually. It was the suffering of the nation.

71 A similar commemorative ceremony was arranged in Kursumlija Municipality, displaying clothing and possessions of missing Serbs in April 2002 (Borba 23 Mars quoted in Daily Falcon 2002a)
Mr. Hansen had published articles in magazines about a massacre, where he had friends among the killed, taking part in the documentation human rights violations. For Dr. Pettersen the issue was broader; he would constantly refer to the Berlin conference and what he called “betrayal of the Albanians”. Even as we once crossed the border to Albania by foot, maybe not without reason, he told me the story of the betrayal at the Berlin conference. In his view, the international border between Kosovo and Albania should not have been there; the border was set south of Kosovo because of a political game between the bigger powers. Every time he told it, which was most times we had time to talk, he spoke with the same amount of eager. What astonished me, was that a young man that just had returned to Kosovo from ten years in Denmark, told the exact same story. The betrayal is not only written in several books (see Qosja 1998 [1992]), and those who reads it become aware of it; I soon realised that everyone knew it, and that they felt obliged to tell it to foreigners who had not heard it. It was a collective story, the story of a nation. Presenting it is a matter of performance; moreover, presentation of it to foreigners was an obligation. Those who can present it well, is enacting Grand Story representation. They present the nation.

The institute has a committee for changing place names in Kosovo. One example of a name change conducted by the official committee is the suburb of Pristina that has previously been called ‘Dragodan’, a Serbian place name. Albanians have also used this name and has until now not had any other name for it. The committee therefore decided it should be called ‘Arberia’, which refers to the ancient place in southern Albania from which many Albanians emigrated to Italy centuries ago. The official committee announces the name changes in the newspapers. This is another way in which the institute is part of presenting the Grand Story for the public.

There is no crisis of representation in the intellectual milieu in Kosovo. To use Kuhn’s vocabulary, the theoretical paradigm of the Grand Story has few anomalies. The science done within it, is normal science (Kuhn 1996 [1962]). The puzzle is solvable. The theoretical framework is that of the Grand Story; indisputable and guarded by authority by the respected
elder high culture. Science and politics are in congruence. Nationalism as a principle has achieved its aim on the social scientific disciplines.
6. The Political Elite – Enacting Grand Story Representation

Myths and symbols are, according to Smith, “not simply ‘instruments’ of leaders and elites of the day, not even of whole communities. They are potent signs and explanations, they have capacities for generating emotion in successive generations, they possess explosive power that goes far beyond the ‘rational’ uses in which elites and social scientists deem appropriate” (Smith 1986:201). Therefore, myths and symbols have the effect of creating vertical integration between the elite and the people, which is vital in particular for the political elite, whom power is legitimised by public popularity and popular vote. They gain political power through being perceived as representing the Grand Story and presenting it in public ceremonies.

Flags are often a central symbol occurring in the public ceremonies in Kosovo, most importantly the Albanian and Yugoslav state flag. Smith exemplifies his theories by using perceptions of landscape, statues and monuments, but does not mention flags. Neither does he mention symbols of representation, such as official emblems. Maybe this is because Smith perceives flags and state emblems are purely modern political constructions that do not reflect any ethno-nationalist roots that surpass modernity? Throughout ethnographic descriptions of several public ceremonies where politicians are enacting Grand Story representation in order to gain public popularity, it will be obvious that a state flag also can evoke such deeply rooted sentiments.

Three different types of public ceremonies are described; political campaign rallies, demonstrations, and commemorative ceremonies. Through these ethnographical accounts, the framework for the political discourse should emerge around certain ethnic sentiments and cultural-mythological symbols related to the Grand Story, for example mythical landscapes and the notion of mother earth and fertility in popular music, enhancing territorial identity and belonging.
There are two major political fractions in Kosovo, apart from that between the Albanian parties and the Serbian party. It is the LDK; the platform of which the civil resistance movement was established and the parallel system maintained, and the parties that emerged out of the KLA structure; the Democratic Party (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK). The political parties have one leader that symbolise the parties and what it stands for. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova (LDK), Haxhim Thaci (PDK) and Haradinaj (AAK) are the three leading figures that were vital for vertical integration in the interim government (IAC). These three leaders represent a type of charismatic leadership, following Max Webers definitions (Weber 1971 [1922]). The personification of politics and leadership is also rooted in the one-party political structure of communist Yugoslavia. Within a one-party structure, it is the persons in the party that is discussed, not the party as compared to other parties, since there are no other parties to compare to. Thus, when multi parties are introduced, the parties tend to not be clearly defined apart from each other and party programmes are poorly outlined. It is which politicians that are in the party that define them apart, as if the party and its structure was irrelevant. The party becomes the sum of its politicians, relying on their alliances and a network of loyal heads of families. Thus, the party becomes an extension of social organisation. The reason why only three of the Kosovo-Albanian parties get any votes, is the fact that they keep the network of loyalties from the organisation of the parallel system and the KLA guerrilla organisation. These three parties have a structure, all the way down to the village level. Even though these organisational structures are changed and altered, for example by immigration to the cities, they still remain as the main sets of political networks, firmly based in the social organisation of society. These two fractions are still dividing the population in those who supported the non-violent means and those who regarded this as a failure, and therefore supported the use of violence in the civil resistance movement.

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72 The Interim Administration Council (IAC) also consisted of minority representatives.
73 In aftermath, it seems like both fractions are equally proud of the violent resistance and the KLA organisation, but the LDK fraction distanced themselves from the guerrilla organisation and are critical, seeing them as a ‘necessary evil’. 

Political life can be analysed in terms of a theatre, following Erwin Goffman (1971). Politicians in Kosovo are actors on a political scene, where Grand Story representation of the respect, dignity, honour, justice and legitimacy of the Albanian nation is at play. There are certain choices to how they choose to represent their party and the national cause. There are also certain things they can not do or say, because it will most certainly lead to major loss of popularity. Within these areas the politician do have choices. In the case a certain reference-group do have choices, it is possible to analyse them in terms of actors on a public theatre (Goffman), whereas if a person cease to exert choices, the person also by definition cease to be an actor (Eriksen 1989:25). The table below indicate the framework of which politicians must conform to, and the possibilities they have with regards to choice of roles and themes as actors on the political scene.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Ego Politician</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Independence for Kosovo as a political goal and that nothing which acknowledge the unrealistic character or hindrance of this, including acceptance of anything that reminds of the status of Kosovo as anything less than an independent state.</td>
<td>- Criticize others within the elite for not conforming with the above mentioned ‘untouchable’ areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The rightness of the battle against Serbian state dominance including the use of arms and that this battle was fought with dignity, self-respect and without repudiation of basic moral rules.</td>
<td>- Criticize others for lack of respect, tolerance and dignity, especially when vulnerable groups such as mothers, children and elders are involved (not including minority groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- That the oppression of the Serbian state against Kosovo-Albanians is systemic and structural not possible to change in any other way than separating Kosovo from Serbia and the Yugoslav federation.</td>
<td>- Criticize actors and parties outside the Albanian community, for example the International community, for lack of progress and clear procedures (Restriction towards criticizing Serbs and the Serbian state directly).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- That the future of Kosovo is to be part of Western-Europe (referred to simply as ‘Europe’) and its institutions and economy.</td>
<td>- Express gratitude and thankfulness on behalf of the sacrifices done during the war, or certain actors who has contributed to a political case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74 The following analysis is predominantly based on Kosovo-Albanian politicians.

75 This table by no means a final assessment and should not be taken categorically. It is based upon the political party programs, close surveillance of the biggest daily newspapers (Koha Ditore, Bota Sot, Kosova Sot and Zeri), political arrangements (political party rallies, public ceremonies and a political conference) and interviews with politicians.
Braking with the framework of political norms would have a devastating effect for any politician and lead to immediate un-popularity, even social sanctions by colleagues and institutions. This is the framework for the roles that persons who enacts must obey to the rules of conformism as well as cultural habitus as described earlier. As the choices of how to play roles are unwritten and surely uncountable, there is certain innovation of style and competition of role display, especially among politicians of the numerous smaller political parties.

A good example is a politician that ‘cooped’ the position as representative of a demonstration for the release of political prisoners. He said he participated as a private person, as a head of a family that also had suffered for the cause. His enacting was, however, the one of a politician playing out the role of Grand Story representation. He walked in front of the others. In a black suit with his arm around his son. In front of them were children holding posters with photos of the missing family members.

The arranger of the demonstration was upset and angry, because they had selected those who would speak and present the claims to the representative of the UN administration, whom they already had established good contacts with. The politician took over the speaking time, and presented strong demands “aggressively and even came with racist comments” to the international employee, who was of North African origin.

In order to gain in the struggle for popular support, it is essential to make people feel that something meaningful for them is being represented and taken care of by the politician. Thus, the politician must be perceived as someone who cares about the same matters as the people. In the case of the politician mentioned above, the fact that he had a family member who had been imprisoned legitimised the ‘coop’, as he could refer to being present as a citizen, not politician. The issue was very concrete; more than 100 young men from the same neighbourhood in Gjakova were collectively sentenced to 12 to 13 years in prison in Serbia. Many issues are, however, are not this concrete, and will therefore be represented indirectly by the usage of symbols. They thus represent a challenge for the politicians, whose aim is to
make people relate to their persons as representation of the culture of their nation, and in a way which makes the cultural diversification of the high culture reasonable because of the task it is assign for. In the following chapter, ethnographical data will be used to analyse these cases as they occur in public ceremonies.

**Public ceremonies**

Three different types of public ceremonies and events will be analysed; first, political mass meetings, such as political rallies and meetings organised by a political party; second, mass demonstrations, in particular a series of demonstrations for the release of Kosovo-Albanian political prisoners in Serbia; and last, commemoration ceremonies, such as the celebration of the ‘Flag Day’, *Diten e Flamurit*.

**Political mass meetings**

As an example of political mass meetings, I will use a political rally organized by a political party (AAK) in Pristina, September 2000. During the months of September and early October there was numerous such arrangements as part of the elections campaign for the elections the October 28th. This rally was one of the many similar rallies for political parties participating in the election campaign. I will describe the form and structure of the arrangement and reflect upon my own perceptions of how it felt to be part of it.

The arrangement started with a car rally. Members of the party filled up their cars with people and went in convoys through town using their horn extensively and screaming while hanging out of windows, sitting on the roof of the car and waiving with the Albanian flag. The noise was loud enough to make every citizen of Pristina hear it. The cars had posters of AAK on the front of the cars and in the back windows. This had the effect, except of blocking the traffic and making a carnival-like appearance in the street, of directing attention. People immediately understood that an arrangement had started and those who sympathised with AAK or/and were curious would follow the processions of young gangs and flag-bearers towards the
arrangement location, which was as usual in front of the National Theatre. Here they played loud music and everyone could see that something was about to happen. Flags and banners were all around the building, red carpets down the stairs to a speaker’s podium. Next to the long red banner with the black eagle coming down from the roof, was a huge white AAK flag with the slogan “Initiative, Courage, Engagement – Success is Guaranteed”, *Iniciative – Guxim – Angazhim, Sukses i Garantuar*. Chairs for prominent guests filled up the right half of the stage. And guards lined up in a rectangular formation in front holding a white long banner with AAK inscription, created a rectangular space in front of the stage. This was the first phase of the arrangement when people were entertained by loud popular music from the huge loudspeakers, waiting eagerly and with expectations to what was soon to happen, while new gangs of in particular young men came marching with flags from all directions.

I felt more and more anxious as gangs of youth poured in screaming with their flags from all directions effectively filling up the space. However, I noticed that the youths were amused by their ‘performance’, while one person in particular shouted as loud as he could, the others laughed and smiled before they joined in and tried to shout even louder. It was clearly a cultural event for them, with high entertaining value; as arrangements like this had been illegal for the last 9 years, I had no problem understanding their enthusiasm.

There was from the beginning a clear border between the young active participants often with AAK or Albanian flags that stood close to the guards, and the older, not so active people, standing more passively at a distance observing from the other side of the street. Entering phase two of the arrangement, this line was more blurred, as people effectively filled up the street that first seemed to be a boundary between the two groups. But it was still there, visible as the point were flags ceased to be in use.
The red colour indicates participants with Albanian flags, while the dark grey dots indicates the passive onlookers.

Finally, almost two hours late, the man everyone had been waiting for, the leader of the party Ramush Haradinaj came in the middle of a procession with all the most prominent party members around him, bodyguards on alert in front and a new crowd following in the back. The excitement was overwhelming as he entered the stage and sat down on the chairs at the right together with all the municipal leader candidates. Another half hour went while the senior guards in black dresses and white AAK armbands went back and forth organising the crowds, keeping them away from the stage. I noticed the particular meaning of these armbands when one of the guards told another one to give his armband away, because there was a lack of armbands. The guard was obviously greatly disappointed, feeling ‘degraded’ and resisted the order, claiming there was no reason why he should give his away and why not another guard could do it. After a short dispute, a senior guard in black suit and the same type of armband showed up; he told the guard to give away his armband, an order he reluctantly had to obey. Without the armband he obviously felt less of a guard than the guards with an
armband. He was no longer a guard with authority, but a simple party member with only an AAK T-shirt to signalise his membership in the group.

Phase three started with the stage performances. First there were school children holding up one big red letter over their head. When walking from the entrance of the theatre, into the stage and down the stairs to the left, the letter eventually, with a bit of imagination, made up the first three words in the AAK slogan “Initiative”, “Courage”, and “Engagement”. Then, a row of children in traditional Albanian white dresses came walking in, two and two, from the right, standing below the stairs encircled by the guards, looking very cute. Half an hour went and finally Haradinaj was introduced and entered the speaker’s podium with the AAK flag and a huge red banner with an eagle on the middle hanging from the roof in the background. As he entered, the crowd shouted “Ramushi! Ramushi! Ramushi!” at an overwhelming volume. Finally he got to speak, and did so without using a single negative word. His speech was short without any controversies. The speech was that of a victorious war commander, referring to their military victory; he stressed that it was a victory at high costs, but it was worth it; now we can start anew. Then there was a presentation of the candidates of each of the 30 municipalities, starting with the Pristina leader candidate. This took a long time, as every candidate held a short speech, and the crowd got restless. Finally, when the last candidate was presented, there was a concert in which made the crowd very excited. Some parents took their children on their shoulders while doing short dancing moves and clapping their hands smiling and laughing. What started as a quite aggressive demonstration of political power was now a celebrative event full of positive social energy. This marked the last phase of the arrangement. The crowd dispersed peacefully as the concerts went on and on. When there were no more singers, the loudspeakers continued to play popular Kosovo-Albanian music for hours, late into the evening.

Mass Demonstrations

To illustrate mass demonstrations, ethnographical data from a series of political demonstration for the release of Albanian prisoners in Serbia will be used. These
demonstrations also took place in from of the National Theatre in Pristina, between mid September to late November 2000. I will first describe the demonstrations in the same manner as the previous example, focusing on the form and structure of the arrangement, and reflect upon my own perceptions of how it felt to be part of it.

The first demonstration for the release of Albanian prisoners in Serbia that I observed was a procession of about 250 participants from Gjakova in Pristina, mentioned earlier in the chapter. It was organised by the Office for Missing and Disappeared People (Zure per te Borgosor dhe Teshdukor) in Gjakova. They marched slowly from the University to the OSCE HQ building, where representatives from OSCE met representatives from the demonstration.

The beginning of the procession was clearly marked, first by a UNMIK police car and then about 30 meters later, a row of children waking strictly on line and very close to each other. Every one of them had a picture, a bit bigger than an A4 piece of paper, in front of their chests. They were accompanied by two adults, who made sure that the children were walking in line. Another organizer walked on the front side of the procession yelling in a tone like he was complaining and asking sincerely for the people on the sidewalk to feel solidarity with the procession and give it space and respect. After the children there was a marked gap of three-four meters, where a big politician, described earlier, in black suit walking side by side what was, I presume, his 20 years old son. The man was clearly extinguished from the other participants by his cloths and the fact that he walked with his right hand on the shoulder of a young man with a marked physical distance to the children in front and the front row of the general participants in the back. The main procession behind them started with its front row holding a banner that covered the whole width of the procession saying "Free the Prisoners Now!". Over the banner, pictures, similar to those displayed by the children, were held up making the banner and pictures cover most of the space in front. The amount of pictures declined after the first rows of people and was only sporadically displayed later in the procession, which in total covered nearly 100 meters.

The participants were silent and their body and face expression showed great grievance. The only sound you could here was the organizer up front and an old women that with raised voice
cried out her complaints from the middle of the procession. Besides these two voices there were only the sound of many people walking silently and the general background noise of the town. People on the sidewalks and around the street shops stopped and stood still in silence as the procession went by. None of the on-lookers said anything and had face expressions as if they were caught by surprise and shocked by the procession, reminded about a suffering they could feel themselves. It looked and felt like a funeral procession that demanded respect for the dead and their families.\footnote{And in many ways it was. Albanians deliberately claim that tens of thousands of Albanians are still in prisons in Serbia. ICRC, who have visited each and every one of the prisons reports that there are only 911 albanians in Serbian prisons, leaving the assumption that many people on the pictures were victims of the war never identified (missing persons)). The figures used in public media have later decreased closer to the ICRC figure.}

The procession had two elements which I noted in particular. First, the children in front had an obvious symbolic effect as constituting the future generation and the innocent victims of the war, whose fathers had been deported. Secondly, the person in black suite that were given a special place in between the children and the front of the procession. This person seemed to personify the sorrow and grievance of the whole procession. His body language and how he bent his head down and forward in a humble fashion and at the same time looked up with pride suggested that he was the leader of the procession in which the others had given their trust and the moral responsibility of representing them. I asked people about who the man in black suit was. The reply was first that he had been a political prisoner in Serbia. Another person told me he was a leader of the liberal party, but had never been a prisoner. Then I was told that he was the leader of the Christian-Democratic Party, that he was a Catholic and that he had once been prisoner in Serbia for a short period. Even though I could not get the correct personalia of this person from the crowd, everyone agreed however that he was an important figure and they all felt that they should know who he was. Later I found out who he was; a leader in one of the small parties. It seemed, then, that the procession was organised by a political party, displaying their leader for the public as one who calls for settlement for an issue that concerns a great number of Albanians.
In an interview with one of the leaders of the ‘Office for Missing and Disappeared People’, it turned out that the politician was not invited to represent the procession at all. He simply joined in the procession because he sympathised with the participants and wanted to participate on the basis of a civilian. The organisers had decided before the demonstration who was going to represent them and prepared what each of them should tell the OSCE representatives. The political leader, who showed up as the demonstration started, also had relatives in prison in Serbia; he therefore had a reason to participate. But the arrangers felt annoyed by the way he presented himself as their representative and in particular the way he dominated the dialogue with representatives of the OSCE at the end of the procession. The participants of the demonstration were relatives of 140 young men all from the same area in Gjakova who were imprisoned in Serbia, sentenced to 12 and 13 years for collective charges of avoiding to help the Yugoslav Army and thereby indirectly helping the KLA. They had for some time had contact with a North-African expatriate working for the UN on the issue. They all new and recognised this person when he met the procession for receiving their claims. The politician, however, dominated the discussion and started presenting the cause by discrediting the OSCE representative's Arab Muslim background. This was annoying for the participants of the procession who felt that their issue had been brought into politics in a manner they did not wish or intend. They did not, however, manage to neutralise the politician. A student at the University, who was present, said explicitly that the politician had "cooped" the arrangement for his own political ambitions. This was done in the very start of the procession, without consulting the organizers.

Less than a month later, a small arrangement was set up at the same place, outside the National Theatre. The same organisation had organised a performance by the children of the families from Gjakova, whom had their sons imprisoned. The children stood like as if in a choir on top of the stairs to the entrance of the building, while one of them read a poem. The poem was about the prisoners, their suffering and how much they missed their families. The poems and letters where read with a raised and complaining voice. Some of the mothers sitting in front cried out comments about their misery. The families stayed there overnight, sleeping on mattresses and keeping warm in the autumn cold with woollen blankets. They
looked very miserable. The old women were sitting in groups with their daughters and grand children, while some men went back and forth with foodstuff and blankets, but mostly standing in back with the other men. Their faces expressed great grievance and sorrow. Again, I felt like it was a funeral party.

Two days later, approximately 10-12,000 people came to show their support for the families that had settled in front of the theatre. Most shops and restaurants in the centre of Pristina were closed in solidarity with the demonstration. A photo shop had a sign on their closed door saying Solidarizim me Protesten; “in solidarity with the protest”. Even the street sellers covered their goods and stopped their business for the hours of the demonstration. The student’s union urged all the students at the university to participate. The ‘National and University Library’ closed between 12 and 15 in support of the demonstration. That the institutions and shops had supported the demonstration like this, made it almost impossible to go anywhere else. Between the hours of 12 and 15, there was simply nothing else to do, than to follow the crowds going towards the demonstration. Even companies closed giving their employees time off to go to the demonstration.

The the families from Gjakova has sat down in protest sayin they will not leave before their sons are back from prisons in Serbia (left). Only four hours later, they are supported by 10-12,000 Kosovars promenading the Mother Theresa street.

The arrangement was obviously was not prepared for this amount of people. The stage consisted of some smaller signs with some slogans, photos and two Albanian flags. The speaker’s voice drowned in the noise of the crowd. The crowd did not seem very focused on
the arrangement at all. Rather, people went promenading up and down the Mother Theresa street from the University as far in front of the theatre as they could. ‘Kurzo’ they called it. Kurzo was a method for making demonstrations during the first years of the civil resistance, reducing the risk for police violence. Instead of making one march by one compact crowd with banners and flags shouting slogans, streets were filled with people walking back and forth as if on a busy day. The effect was a less aggressively demonstration, but the message was the same. The streets were blocked for traffic, and nobody could misinterpret the message. Now people seemed to enjoy re-enacting the event. People smiled and met friends and relatives along their way, while walking slowly chatting with friends. It was a major socio-cultural event nobody wanted to miss. The major discussion topic to come was about who were there, how big the crowds were and what had happened, at the same time as it was complete consensus on the political issue.

The demonstration was repeated the day after. Even though everyone expected it to gather even larger crowds, it seemed that people had lost a bit of their enthusiasm. There were almost the same amount of people, but people stayed for a shorter time and were more spread out. As the Director of the National and University Museum stated: “It is destructive to demonstrate all day every day. We exhaust our selves. And the poor old women sitting in front of the theatre. What if they get sick? We should rather demonstrate once massively for one or maximum two hours in order for the media to get a good picture and that’s it” (Gergurj 2000).

It was obviously a disagreement about the methods and strategy that was used. The organiser said afterwards that the women were very depressed by the lack of results. No international media had covered the event. The political parties had given their full support to the cause, and the international elite knew about the problem, but was not able to do anything else than reminding about the issue in meetings with higher level officials in the EU and Western-European countries, who at this time were more concerned with embracing the new government in Belgrade, supporting their entering into office.
The 143 prisoners from Gjakova were released from Serbian jails in April 2001. They were pardoned by President Kostunica, and declared not guilty. The International Red Cross (ICRC) thus drove the prisoners in five busses back to Gjakova were the crowds were waiting for them. I was personally not there, but my informants told me and showed me what they captured on video. The town centre was full of cars and people. A huge traffic jam blocked the roads to the place the busses were supposed to arrive. Police kept the crowd off the busses in order for them to park, before the prisoners came out and found their respective families. The concerned families were all from the same quarter of town. They had put the Albanian flag on the front door of their houses to signal the homecoming and celebration of their son(s). At the party, the women in the extended family stayed in a separate room; dancing, eating cakes and drinking tea, while the men walked from house to house and stayed, drinking tea and coffee in the men’s room. The women of the family would serve the men with tea, coffee and cakes. Only the men of the family could enter the women’s room. On a private tape, one of the men of the house were dancing for a short time with the women in the women’s room, which made them all laugh loudly acknowledging the crossing of a cultural boundary. While the women were mostly standing and often dancing, holding hands together up at head’s height, and doing dance steps in the traditional dancing circle, the men always sat down in the men’s room. Like this, some families celebrated till two o’clock in the morning.

**Commemoration ceremonies**

The following description is an ethnographical account of the ‘Flag Day’ (*Diten e Flamurit*), on 28th of November in Pristina 2000 and 2001. A statue of the KLA commander Zahir Pajaziti was inaugurated outside the Grand hotel in 2000, while the next year, a statue of the legendary hero, Skenderbeg, was inaugurated outside the National Theatre. I will describe both of these events, focusing on the form and structure of the arrangement.

28th of November is the national day of Albania, referring to the date when Albanian leaders declared independence from Ottoman rule in 1912, and when partisan leader Enver Hoxha marched into Tirana in 1944. It is also said that legendary hero Skenderbeg raised it on this
date in 1443, as symbol of resistance against the Ottoman rule in the region. On 28th of November 2000, the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK)\(^{77}\) had approximately 100 soldiers in formation in front of a podium with a new statue of Zahir Pajaziti, the first commander in KLA that died in action, late in 1997. He was declared a national hero (hero i kombit). Pajaziti was from the Pristina region, making him a more urban symbol than Adem Jashari, to the disappointment to many rural people.

Approximately 5,000 people showed up to watch the arrangement. Only a dozen people brought their own flags. Eight Albanian flags were displayed on the stage. A NATO flag was put up next to one of them. The ceremony was opened by General Agim Ceku, who shouted out some short orders out to the troops first, in which they shouted back loud and powerful (stand fast, halt, ease etc.). He then held a 12 minute long speech where he focused on the achievements that were made and the future of the TMK as a national army defending the flag and the nation. Then his deputy held a much shorter speech, ending with announcing the national anthem to be sung. A male choir in black dresses sang the national anthem, that was ended with the tribute of the soldiers, shouting out ‘Lavdi!’ (‘glory’, ‘honour’). This was a powerful symbolic representation of a combination of strength and discipline under a uniting national anthem and flag. The choir continued to sing some songs of pompous fashion, before a party of actors in traditional dresses played out a symbolic battle with swords and shields referring to the recent liberation as a fight continuing from historical battles of legendary times. They also sang some traditional Albanian folk songs with some polyphonic choir elements.

Then there was a shift to popular modern music. As soon as the well-known rhythms of the first pop-song went through the loudspeakers, people cheered and shouted in excitement. People on the rooftop of the nearby hotel, where I was, started immediately to clap their hands and making dance moves, while smiling at each other recognising the great song being

\(^{77}\) The TMK was established as a political compromise when KLA was formally dismantled and disarmed in Autumn 1999. It is supposed to be a civil response unit in case of natural or other catastrophe demanding non-armed rapid response efforts. The Corps have licence for 3000 weapons and has 5000 employees, of which most are former KLA soldiers. TNK is very active in making commemorative sites for KLA soldiers who died during the war.
played. There was first a male singer and then a women in red dress. Then there was one more song where actors in traditional dresses danced in front of the singer. When the arrangement ended after one hour and 20 minutes, less than one-quarter of the time had been used on speeches and the formal proceedings with speeches and the choir singing the national anthem, while the rest had been consumed with popular songs in the form of a concert.

When the arrangement was over, people went immediately up on the stage to get a closer look at the statue. The statue was surrounded by people for hours afterwards.

The ‘Flag Day’ in 1999 was a huge event with flags everywhere and massive crowds going crazy. When I asked an informant about what to expect on the day, he responded wittingly that it was like the independence day in Norway, except with less flags and traditional clothing. At the end of the day, I was disappointed, the crowds were not big and it did not have the strong nationalistic character like other mass meetings, especially compared to the political rallies earlier in the year.

Obviously, the 1999 Flag Day mobilised more people because it was less than four months after the end of the war and the ‘victory’ of Kosovo-Albanian resistance and NATO’s military intervention. But when I attended the next Flag Day in 2001, which was quite different, I realise something else; the TMK ceremony had not managed to mobilise many people because of political reasons. Informants told me they had not even heard about Zahir Pajaziti and hardly knew who he was. Many also said they were tired of the ceremonies of the TMK, who inaugurated statues commemorating killed KLA soldiers all around Kosovo. Some says the statue looks like a criminal; a man with a Kalashnikov rifle in his hand, and a very old ‘pirate-like’ pistol in his belt. The statue may appeal to those with political affiliation in the former KLA political structure, but generates distress among those with other political affiliation.

78 17th of May is the independence day of Norway, which is celebrated by people walking in the streets with flags and traditional dresses. This statement made me think comparably and I had to admit that I was much more aware of nationalistic ceremonies in Kosovo than I would be in my own country.
On the 2001 Flag Day, there were more than twice as many people, and they were standing patiently in the area outside the National Theatre waiting for the huge statue of Skenderbeg to be placed into its sockets; the area was made like an eagle’s nest, with four pillars, or claws, embracing it. I was told the idea came from Mark Krasniqi, leader of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PShDK), who had arranged with the making and transport of the statue. It was, however, Ibrahim Rugova who was the main attraction during the inauguration. The Municipal Assembly and its LDK appointed Mayor of Pristina, had taken a central role and approved the project. There were no TMK soldiers present, just a stand opposite the theatre, were the politicians spoke through a microphone. After the speeches, which lasted for at least half and hour, there was the same show as last year, with ritual fights between actors with swords in traditional Albanian clothing. After that, music was played on the loudspeakers till late in the evening. The statue had been delayed at the border of Kosovo, because of a dispute between the TMK soldiers, who were supposed to transport the statue. The crowds therefore waited till late in the evening, just in order to see the statue being lifted on place and fastened on its sockets.

The political usage of ethno-nationalistic symbols and myths

This chapter will analyse the usage of symbols and myths on the political arena, based upon the ethnographical accounts presented in the previous chapter. The analysis focus on how the political elite use symbols to communicate political legitimacy and how the sentiments of the people are confirmed through the symbols communicated, thereby assuring congruence between the culture and state politics as enacted by the politicians. It is clearly a one-way communication, as the masses first of all absorbs what is communicated, and are seldom able to give their individual responses.

The ethnographical account from the commemorative ceremonies, where the same national day mobilised a quite different crowd, shows the extent in which there is a ‘message back’ from the masses. The crowds that were mobilised reflected the political legitimacy of the
arrangers, and giving a signal about the popularity of the politicians, as well as how well they managed to reflect the sentiments of the people. The Skenderbeg statue mobilised more than twice as many people as the statue of the KLA commander. An election and competition of popular vote is obviously where the popularity of the politicians and their parties are best measured. Apart from elections, it is public polls and mobilisation in public ceremonies like these, that indicates their popularity. It can be felt by both actors and participants in public ceremonies. It is this feeling that the politicians seek to evoke.

To use the same theoretical framework on ceremonies, it is necessary that the physical landscape of the arrangement as the formal framework for communication; the stage, the music, speaker’s stand and actors constitute the medium in which the message of political legitimacy is sought to be presented via. Following this perspective; as an observer or participant in the masses, what happens on stage is more like a theatre, or a puppet show, as most people are far away from the actors and see them as small puppet-like figures. The symbols in use are vital tools for making even the smallest ‘puppet-show’ hit the emotions of the passive onlookers, making it being experienced as spectacular, conveying a story that gives meaning to their life-world.

The illustration below shows how symbols are communicated by politicians in order to return political legitimacy.
Crucial for the success of the public ceremony, is whether there is a felt relation between the enactment of political legitimacy and the audience. If that is the case, there is congruence between culture and polity, and this congruence is felt by the audience; it evokes the sentiments of the people, who feels that the social order enforced by the state is legitimate and represents the people, as the symbols and myths intertwines the Grand Story of the nation with the participant as part of a people in which culture is reflected in its state.

The more conformity there is in political life, the more will the actors of political representation merely reproduce the sentiments of the masses: they are to some extent puppets, performing a forced theatre play in which they do not have much influence to control or govern. Political conformity restricts the possible choices that the political actors have. An indication for political conformity is the similarity of the political programmes of all the Albanian political parties. When looking at the patterns in which the political elite present themselves in public life, it is the political conformity that is investigated. When looking on how individual politicians are manoeuvring and testing out new ways of gaining popularity, within the framework of political conformity, it is the performance of the actor we investigate.

The repetitive elements of public ceremonies, enforced by political conformity, will be analysed in the following. Those elements are in particular popular music, the mother-child relation as a symbol of national vulnerability, the Albanian flag and mental geo-political maps.

**Commemoration and the ‘unknown soldier’**
Paul Connerton has investigated how the memory of groups is conveyed and sustained (Connerton 1989). He argues that groups do not transmit social memory in texts, but in social practices and rituals; most notably in commemorative ceremonies. Central for commemorative ceremonies is bodily practises, because “commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative only in so far as they are performative; performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit; and habit cannot be though without a notion of bodily
automatisms” (Connerton 1989:4-5). Groups remember through bodily practises; every group will “entrust to bodily automatisatisms the values and categories which they are most anxious to conserve. They will know how well the past can be kept in mind by a habitual memory sedimented in the body” (Connerton 1989:102). We can say that even though modern ceremonies have a majority of passive participants, they are not entirely on-lookers, if they encompass in the bodily practice that the social memory is hidden in; by wearing certain cloths for example, or standing up when the national anthem is played and shout out “Lavdi!” when it finishes. By saying “Lavdi!”, the participants confirm their partaking in the conservation of the memory of the group, in this context, the Kosovo-Albanian nationalist Grand Story. People who does not identify with the group, would “resist being forced to pay lip-service to an alien set of rites, incompatible with their own vision of the ‘truth’, because to enact a rite is always, in some sense, to assent to its meaning” (Connerton 1989:44).

Rites are expressive because of their regularity (Connerton 1989:44). Being formalised and repetitive is essential for a rite to convey meaning and express feelings. Thus all the commemorative ceremonies organised by the KPC are similar in form and structure; a procession of soldiers, the minute of silence, the national anthem, the shouting of “Lavdi!”, the speech by a senior officer expressing the honour of the person being commemorated, and the unveiling of the statue, plaque or hand-over of medals. A story is told and repeated over and over again through bodily practice, which makes the group able to remember.

Rites tend to occur at special places at fixed times, often marking a beginning and an end (Connerton 1989:44). At a national level, this often achieved through ceremonies following the calendar, referring to an old event happening at the “exact same time” of the year far back in history; thus connecting the two events. Such is the case with the Flag Day; The 28th of November has been celebrated every year over almost hundred years, some even say since the
battle of Kosovo. This repetition connects people of today with people of yesterday providing meaningful continuation between the past and the present; it is therefore also a celebration of the sustainable collective memory and identity of the group.

Anderson has used the commemoration of ‘the unknown soldier’ as an example of modern cultural emblems; the identity of the soldier is no longer relevant, as he or she represents the nation and nothing more; “what else could they be but Germans, Americans, Argentinians…?” Anderson asks polemically, arguing that nationalism is concerned with religious imaginings of death and immortality (Anderson 1991:10 [1983]). Yet, there are few statues of ‘the unknown soldier’ in Kosovo. There are some plaques that commemorate the deceased people in general and the “sacrifices” made. These are few however, and has to do with the fact that this is an phenomenon of anonymous industrial nation-states.

**Popular music on the political arena**

Music is a vital part of the public ceremonies in Kosovo. The time spent on music surpasses anything else; it often constitute more than two-thirds of the time of the arrangement, like on the Flag Day in 2000; the speeches lasted only for less than twenty minutes, while the concert afterwards lasted for more than an hour.

One important factor is that concerts with Albanian musicians had been banned by the Serbian authorities the last decade. Between 1991 and 1999, there were no mass public ceremonies arranged, other than the demonstrations of 1991-92. There are also few other concerts arranged by non-political actors, save small concerts in bars and restaurants, because it is almost impossible to generate income to cover the costs. Only one such music concert was arranged during my fieldwork. That was financed by international agencies. Thus the political parties are alone in fulfilling people’s desire for public concerts.
The music that is presented however, is not randomly selected, but represents the political cosmology and Grand Story in the political discourse. The songs projects nationalistic sentiments and patriotic virtues. The songs can be divided into two types: traditional and modern. The traditional songs remind people about the Albanian cultural heritage and restore pride and dignity for the ethnic group. It also relates to the dispute about whether the Albanians descend from the Illyrians, which is a fundamental argument for independency for Kosovo. An example of this was the short theatre play with actors in ancient dresses presenting a battle with swords and shields on the Flag Day. This is a symbolic battle linking the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 to the current battle for liberation for Serbia and independence. The fact that it was played out with traditional music and on stage in between the TMK soldiers standing in formation, strengthened the symbolic meaning of the act. When performing a traditional music piece, most musicians were dressed in traditional cloths, or at least the Albanian hat ‘plis’. Often there were dancers that illustrated the theme of the music or danced traditional dances.

What I call modern music is modern in form, but is still based upon traditional Albanian or Balkan musical themes. It is mostly the rhythm, bass and drums that follows the concept of modern pop music. Apart from the songs that are about love, which will not be played the events we are concerned about, most of the songs are about patriotism. The main object of the texts is the political strive for independence. Like the one Ilir Shaqiri performed on the Flag Day: “Song for Zahir Pajaziti” (Kenga per Zahir Pajazitu)\textsuperscript{79}:

\begin{verbatim}
Man, get together
Skenderbeg’s blood
Kosova has raised
Homelands breast
Longing for freedom
Was burned year by year
Zahir Pajaziti man who waits for thunder
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{79} The song is transcribed and translated by me, with the help of an informant, from a audio cassette for sale in the streets of Pristina.
Llapjane mother stands up

Like a wolf
(because) that day blood of Arber

was flowing in a river
she was looking for her son
heart was burning like fire
eyes like two mountain springs
one ? in her hand
when she saw light of the eagle
she made her heart like a stone
she spoke as a man
Boys are set off on a journey (on their way)

In round for free liberation
Let their lifes be
Given to my people
Over the valleys/fields of Kosova
Tear becomes dew
Liberations are coming helded thoth to throth
Zahir Pajaziti a dore in the sky
Our blood (for) Kosova
Let become light and sun

This song contains many of the symbols frequently repeated in popular culture in Kosovo. First of all, there is a reference to the ancient history and its Albanian-Illyrian population called ‘Arber’ in the land of Arberia. Men are referred to as having Skenderbeg’s blood. This connects the battles of the resistance against Ottoman control in the 14th century till today. From that time on Albanians, who were the first to settle in the area in the time of Arberia, have lived under foreign rule, and thus their ‘longing for freedom’ from then on, ‘burned year
by year’. The battle of today is a culmination of centuries of oppression. One long fight is about to be finalised. Further on, animistic symbols are used to describe specific virtues of persons. The wolf characterises physical hardship and strength. The eagle is the Albanian national animal and symbolises the Albanian nation; it is its protector, as when it took the red banner up from the ground and saved the pride of Albanians in Skenderbeg’s battles against the Ottomans. The eagle gives strength to become rational and avoid emotional distress. It encourages people to make sacrifices for the nation. The eagle helps the mother to turn her ‘heart into stone’ and ‘speak like a man’.

There is also a symbolism used for territorial belonging. The ‘homeland’ is a female. When she stands up, it is like if she is the one who fights, through her sons. The word ‘blood’ is repeated three times. It has an extensive symbolic meaning that connects family and clan ties with territorial belonging as well as warfare and feuds. It is also connected to the oath (bese) that is the most vital part of a man’s virtue and character. The soldiers make an oath of commitment to the fight, and their promise in realising the goal of liberation comes ‘oath to oath’. The text ends with an active imperative: ‘Let become light and sun’, appealing to the listener to join the fight and to encourage the fighters.

On the political arena, these songs legitimise political goals and ambitions, as well as confirming people’s commitment to achieve them. Popular music is capable of doing something on the political arena that no speech can do. It connects the culture and sentiments of the people, through the usage of meaningful symbols and metaphors, to the politicians and their institutional legitimacy. The song about Zahir Pajaziti legitimise the political strive for independence as the destiny of the Albanian nation. The outcome is vertical integration; it closes the gap between high culture and the masses.

**Mothers and Children as symbols of national vulnerability**

In mass demonstrations and commemorative ceremonies, such as the ones where children in traditional customs sign or play a theatre play on the podium, or in exhibitions or theatre, such as the one at the research institute where the theme about a mother finding her dead child,
women and children is frequently used as a symbol. Women, virgins and children symbolises the nation and represents the part of the territory that needs to be defended. According to Duijzings, the strength of the nation is measured according to whether the men are able to defend their women (Duijzings 2000:20-21). The men that participate in the liberation warfare are representatives of families. The suffering of the families also calls for sympathy with the immense sacrifices done of something as valuable as the sons of their families, the workforce and guarantors for the future of their elder family members. It also reflects men’s ideal virtue in relation to women’s. The man should be strong, brave and have courage like Zahir Pajaziti, sacrificing his blood for the nation, while the women should be good mothers with a strong relation to her sons, and let them fight for liberation. Women make sacrifices on behalf of the nation by letting her son defend the motherland. She overcomes the emotional attachment to her son and ‘speaks up like a man’, like the song for Zahir Pajaziti. The most vulnerable part of the nation thus takes on the braveness of a man and the eagle in order to defend her territory that is threatened.

A song by Shyhrete Behluli, called “On the Flag Day” (Ne Diten e Flamurit) is about a letter that a mother receives from her son that is imprisoned in Serbia:

On flags day
In one old house
One kosovar mother
Received a letter
With red letters
Filled the white paper
My dear mother I great you with homesickness

Mother be brave
Do not shed tears from your eyes
Stronger than prison
Your son has become
Although this letter
I am writing in the dark
I am happy it is read
In lightness of free Kosova

Have the nightingales started to sing
This year in Kosovo?
Has the Flag been raised on 28th of November
Did the youths wear
Red and black mother?
Did it charm the eagle
To be waived in freedom?

Did they crack with guns mother?
The best people of freedom?
Was there a big wedding
In the heart of Albania?
Were flowers placed on the graves of the war heroes?
Does Kosovo hear our Albanian song?

Was there water in the fountain mother
To extinguish you thirst
Did you have force as last year, to win over death?
Have the wrinkles made your forehead heavy?
Mother be strong because your son is strong

God wanted mother
And found a way
That this piece of letter
Gets to your hand
I have sufficient colour
But I have no more paper
I just felt with my heart mother
To congratulate you with the flag day
This song refer to the Albanian prisoners in Serbia, such as the young men from Gjakova, that the demonstrations described earlier was about. The son is sort of a martyr by being in prison. He is suffering in prison on the Flag Day, the day of liberation and freedom; still, he is brave and overcomes the hardship. He pays the price for the freedom of the nation, and the song reflects gratitude for the suffering that was necessary in order to gain freedom. What the prisoner cares about is not himself, but the national cause and his mother and family. His self-realisation is depending on it. Death, sacrifices and martyrdom is a substantial part of nationalism and becomes a central theme in time of crisis and war (Duijzings 2000:32). Popular music easily evokes sentiments by combining stories related to the war with references to ethno-nationalistic myths.

The Albanian Flag

The Albanian Flag has a tremendous importance in Kosovo; it is a dominant symbol, in Turner’s sense; it symbolises the political strive for independence, values “that are regarded as ends in themselves”, (Turner 1967:20). It is a powerful symbol that all Kosovo-Albanians have attached a lot of meaning and sentiments to. Most of my informants have argued that they would sacrifice personally for the flag. If they would see someone humiliate it, for example by stepping on it, they would feel great humiliation and expressed readiness to take action, even to kill. A particular situation that exemplifies this arose when a Norwegian KFOR soldier in Oblic took the Albanian Flag from a wedding procession and stepped on it. The security situation that arose illustrate the sentiments that was mobilised. The street was immediately blocked by angry people. At the end of the day, the situation was solved by an officer of higher rank that gently folded the flag with respect and according to custom, and handed it in a ceremonial fashion back to the owners. The event was written about in all main Kosovar newspapers, and even in one of the biggest Norwegian dailies (Aftenposten). All informants I asked stressed the desire to “defend the flag”, even to kill for its honour. It is almost certain that the soldier that stepped on the flag would have been injured, or even killed, if he were an unarmed civilian without protection.
Another case illustrates how much respect the international communities have gained for the flag. In the preparation for the municipal elections in October 2000, the OSCE, UNMIK and KFOR discussed their flag policy on Election Day. The idea was that the Albanian flag, because it represents only one ethnic group and exclude the many minorities of Kosovo, were not to be used on the buildings that were used for polling stations, or in a distance of 100 meters from it. A discussion occurred between the parties, of who were going to remove illegally raised flags. The conclusion was that the approximately 2000 International Polling Station Supervisors that had the responsibility for the polling stations were supposed to remove the flags. After the leader of PDK, Haxhim Thaci, went to the media three days before Election Day urging people to put up the Albanian flag on the buildings, and warned about trouble in case they were taken down, the decision was waived the evening before Election Day. Because of security reasons, no international personnel should try to remove any flags. The result was that most of the polling centres were marked with the flag of the majority ethnic group, while UNMIK was formally urging ethnic minorities to participate in the self-governance institutions and develop tolerance for their political representation.

The Albanian Flag is red in colour with a two-headed black eagle (Sqhiponje) in the middle. Like most national flags, the shape is rectangular. The Albanian flag represents a continuation of the clan banners. In medieval times, every clan, consisting of an alliance of families, mostly whole villages or valleys, had a banner. The Albanian flag is said to be the clan (fis) flag of Skenderbeg. The history of the flag is thus rooted in the history of Albanian opposition to the ottoman Turks in the 14th century. The red colour is often perceived as being ‘blood red’, referring to the strong kinship ties, and the potential for blood-feuds if these bonds are disrespected. This is related to the fact that signal flags of the red colour is “by social

80 The Albanian Flag have not always been as it is today. It is, in line with the culture, in constant change. The most recent change was done right after the fall of the Hoxha Communist regime. The communist star above the head of the eagle was removed. This shows how intertwined the flag is with cultural change. The star was imported from the communist ideology introduced in Albania right after World War II. When the ideology it symbolised did not anymore represent the prevailing idea of neither the state and its people, the flag had to be revised to reflect the changes in culture.

81 The Albanian writer Ismail Kadare describes the commitment to the banner in his book about blood feuds Broken April (19).
convention” a warning of danger (Firth 1989:332 [1973]). The red colour also resembles the modern red flag of revolutions representing a new ideology that demands governmental reforms. A plain red flag is also supposed to have been used by Khawarij Caliphs in the 8th century, contrasting that of plain black used by Mohammed and the Abbasid Caliphs; The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman still uses a plain red flag (Firth 1989:336 [1973]).

Raymond Firth is among the few who has analysed the usage of national flags; he finds that “the defining character of each flag is provided by the uniqueness of the combination as part of a group of related colour masses” (Firth 1989:337 [1973]). If they were to be printed in black and white, it would not have been possible to distinguish from each others. Still, there are few colours that are used, mostly red and blue, as well as white and black, and partly green. The colours always symbolises something; for example is red often bloodshed, as in the flag of Afghanistan, where it symbolises the wars fought against aggressors (Firth 1989:350 [1973]). It can also symbolise valour, as in the flag of Colombia. Green is often land and prosperity, as in the flag of Kenya, where its red colour symbolises the blood of the people (Firth 1989:350 [1973]). The fact that red, white and blue is so often repeated, and that most flags are in three colours only, must be the influence of the French revolution, and its ‘tricolour’.

As for the Albanian flag, the legend says that an eagle came and lifted the red banner up from the ground after its bearer had been wounded. Thereby the eagle saved the banner from the humiliation of being left on the ground. The special character of the eagle being two-headed has by an Albanian ethnographer been traced back to the Hittits, who used a more simple version of an eagle with two heads. It was however, paradoxically also used by the Kingdom of Hungarians, Croats and Serbs and is still manifested for example on the Austrian state symbol and the Yugoslav currency ‘Dinar’ notes. The theory that the two eagles were put together when the two states Austria and Hungary merged is however, more credible. The eagle is an old Roman state military symbol. It is used by many European states, as well as others, the USA for example. Throughout history, it has been a sign for governance; its symbol has been sustainable maybe because it conveyed statesmanship and its culture and
theory, which is universal for all cultures; its striving for an ordered state-controlled society have never ceased to become an ambitious project.

Birds are subject to a special symbolist value in Kosovo. The battle scene for the famous 1389 battle is for example named after the blackbird. The nightingale is, as we have seen earlier, frequently used as a symbol of freedom. The ‘Kukuvajka’ refers to superstition and is incorporated in an expression used when either mourning, when women is supposed to shout out Koko! in sorrow, or to avoid something evil to happen. Birds have symbolic features of the totemic type. The eagle must also be understood as part of this context.

The Yugoslav federation had flags for ethnic minorities. The flag for the Albanian minority was a red flag with a yellow star in upper left corner. The Albanian flag, however, represents a reference to a country outside Yugoslavia. The Albanian flag not only symbolises an ethnic community, it symbolises its political claim for independence. The flag was therefore very important in the political campaign of the first elections in 2000. The AAK rally described earlier had hundreds of flags. On the official Flag Day, two months later, there was only eight flags on the stage and a dozen brought by the crowd. The message to be conveyed with the flag, ‘independence’, was not anymore connected to a specific event where people’s opinion was important. The elections had shown that all Albanians were unified when confronted about the claim of independence and self-governance.

There is an increasing awareness in the political elite, that Kosovo needs a new flag if it is acknowledged as independent. The President of LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, presented his suggestion for the new state flag the day after LDK won the municipal elections in 2000.

82 An interesting title in the newspaper, referring to the seminar I attended in Shkodra, was “Kukuvajka conference schensore” – using the superstitions symbolic reference to undermine the seriousness of the scientific seminar.

83 There are also ceremonies in which the Albanian flag is primarily used for its ethnic connotations. When a house is built, especially in the rural areas, a flag is raised on top of the building to indicate which ethnic group is settling there. In marriage ceremonies, the couple will drive around town in a car with a flag, while family members will follow in the cars behind, using their horns and play loud music to attract attention. In funerals the flag will be on top of the coffin, indicating the ethnic belonging of the deceased person.
It is a widespread opinion that any new state flag for Kosovo must be based upon the Albanian flag, bearing its red colour and the eagle. Rugova’s suggestion is the Albanian Flag encircled with blue colour. This obviously refers to the EU flag; blue with a circle of stars in the middle. It also bears a banner inscribed ‘Dardania’, referring to the place-name used for Kosovo before the Ottoman Empire and its people Dardanians, who, according to Malcolm, most certainly belonged to the Illyrian grouping (Malcolm 1998:31).

The members of the presidency of the LDK do not agree upon the flag suggested by Rugova. One of them presented to me what would be her suggestion; she thinks the blue colour is too dominating in Rugova’s flag, suggesting only the upper left corner to be used for symbols, leaving the rest of the flag red. This shows that the elite is aware of the problem, and this will soon become a great political issue. As the sketch of the territory of Kosovo has become a widespread used symbol in the self-governance institutions, it is likely that this will be absorbed in future suggestions. There is thus an ongoing discourse of how the new flag should look like. As suggestions for a Kosovo flag appears, it is evident that nationalistic sentiments have made an important shift from orientation towards the Albanian state, relying on their symbols of representation, to making its own. In making new symbols of representation, the political elite is actively engaged in both emphasising newly appeared sentiments and slowly contributes to changing the mainstream nationalistic sentiments.
Political-symbolic Maps

When the wall dividing Eastern and Western Berlin fell, it was under the slogan: “return to Europe”. Europe then meant the economic centres in Western Europe concentrated in the rectangular area between France and Northern Italy in the South, England in the North-West and West-Germany and Austria in the East. The term ‘Europe’ has become a symbolic term that strongly refers to this specific area and its economic success. The east is compared to the economic centres in this specific area. Laszlo Kurti have called this the myths of ‘hierarchalisation’ of Europe (Kurti 1997). A new term, ‘Central Europe’ was made as a reference to the more successfully countries of the formal Eastern Europe, such as the Czech republic, and now Poland, whom have achieved great economic prosperity since the 1994 crack, as well as Hungary. According to Kurti, people in Eastern Europe have prior to this development been educated to think in terms of a hierarchy of nations since the middle of the last century, when Vienna was on ‘top of the hierarchy’. When the iron curtain fell, the former east bloc states struggle an ethno-nationalistic fight of their place in the hierarchy. The intellectual elite in the Balkans especially

“have been indulging in a perverse form of indoctrination. In this new literary representation, which has dominated the eastern European, and for that matter the Balkan intellectual scene, the principal culprits continue to be national ‘others’. For each nation-state emerging out of the Soviet empire, the ‘neighbouring other’ assumes the characteristics of the externalised evil; at the same time, in their quest to prove their own 'Europeaness' and 'modernity', the intellectuals look at the internal and neighbouring 'others' in disgust (...) As long as the mythological Western 'other' continues to persist (not only in the personifications of Goethe, Fichte, and Herder of the eighteen century but, more and more, in the embodiments of the late-capitalist West of Micheal Jackson, Ted Turner and Bill Gates of Windows '95 fame), there will always be images of the mythological 'Eastern' or 'Balkan' (Kurti 1997).

Yugoslavia is said to always have had an ethnic hierarchy ranging from the Slovenes at top, to Croats, Serbs, Bosnians and Albanians and Romas at bottom. For Kosovo-Albanians today, being part of Europe means superseding all the other nations of Yugoslavia, that has been ‘on top’ of them. Most of the Kosovo-Albanian parties therefore want membership in the European Union.

One of my informants in the new high culture emphasised the delight he felt when coming to USA; because for the Americans he was ‘European’, not “from Kosovo”, as he would be presented in Europe. He escaped the identity as Albanian from a worn-torn place in Europe,
by being simply ‘European’, and therefore not on the bottom of a long hierarchy of nations in Europe.

Rexhep Qosja entered the political scene in 1999 as part of the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) from being an ‘Academician’, which is the highest intellectual distinction, at the ‘Institute of Albanology’. He has put forward a strategy for the unification of Albanians (*Strategjia e Bashkimit Shqiptar*), where illustrates this by using ‘the European palace’ as a metaphor;

> In the common European palace, the rooms of which are being made, but will not have a roof so soon, all its members will not have the same rooms. Someone will enter sooner, and someone later; someone will take the upper floor, and someone the lower one; someone will have the roof-top, and someone the basement; someone will be at the waiting room, and someone in the hall! And, the place that someone will take in this palace, most probably, will depend less on its size, and more on its scale of development (Qosja 1998:240 [1992]).

Being part of Europe is the political goal of the national movement, and that does not mean Eastern Europe;

> The ideology of the Albanian National Revival is an ideology of liberation from the slavery of an Eastern state – as Turkey was, respectively an ideology of protection from the occupying policy of the Balkan neighbours, which belong to the circle of the Eastern European civilisation (…. ) we are trying to free ourselves from the consequences of our departure from Europe by getting back to Europe (Qosja 1998:227-228 [1992]).

Economic development is the main motivation. Qosja presents unification of the Albanian areas as a necessity for such development, saying that the Albanian “backwardness” is a consequence of the division of these areas, and wants an ethnically united Albania to be part of a “Europe of united regions” (Qosja 1998:238 [1992]).

It is possible to say that politics in Kosovo presents a geo-political symbolic map, a universe, in which there is a hierarchy of nations according to economical development. Western Europe is on top of this hierarchy and to be considered an ally of the successful economic system of European Union is the main priority of Albanian politicians in Kosovo today. This is reflected in speeches, symbols, the usage of the EU and USA flag in the streets, the suggestion of a new flag based on the EU flag and the fact that all the Albanian-oriented political parties have closer ties with EU as goal.
When talking with politicians in Kosovo, I often get the impression that their presentation of political issues are in essence a repetition of a set of ideal types of stories wide-spread in the population sophisticatedly adapted to personal interests. This might happen mostly in interaction with foreigners, as Kosovo-Albanians in general feel it is important to let their story of oppression and unjust be known. Foreigners will be presented with the Grand Story over and over again by different people, repeating the same repertoire. Like folk tales, these repertoires are widely distributed in the population. Like the young refugee returning from 9 years in Denmark telling me with great enthusiasm how Albanians were betrayed on the Berlin conference in exact the same manner as the Professor in ethnology from Institute of Albanology told it to me for the fifth time, even while we were crossing the border to Albania on foot.

For Wittgenstein (1997 [1953]), how we interpret a sound as a word and that word as meaningful in combination with actions, unveils a world consisting of larger patterns (forms of life) of interpretative customs in the society. A word is understood on the basis of the actions it is used with. We learn our basic language, not by labelling objects, but by doing things with language. Often we do not understand the meaning for the words initially. We simply learn to use the words in these contexts, like children who learn to recite the National Anthem without knowing what the words means. It is simply a language game, something one does when everyone stands up in a commemorative ceremony. Each words can have countless roles with different meanings, but makes sense when used in a specific context. The words are inseparable from its context of action, which determines the rules of the game, which constitutes its practice when it is followed. When you understand the practice, you understand the language. When these practices fall into patterns, they constitute what Wittgenstein calls customs. “To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)” (Wittgenstein 1997:110f, 198-199 [1953]). Thus, language is a collection of language-games, constituting institutions as the usage is wide-spread and subject to conformism. The international community is trying to introduce another set of institutions and customs; that of a democratic and open society, based upon a culture of transparency and
anonymous bureaucratic professionalism in a legal regime. This not only represents new social structures and administrative routines, but new language-games. To understand the problems facing the implementation of a democratic environment in Kosovo, it is essential to look at how difficult it is to transform these institutions and customs of language-games.

It is important to notice that even though the language is learnt as intertwined with concrete actions, the meaning of words can be taken from its primitive form and passed on to a more metaphoric language game. From learning how to ‘catch’ a ball, we can use the term in relation to a joke: “Did you ‘catch’ that?” In such a way we can use metaphors and still relate them to actions and have a concrete understanding of them. However, in Kosovo today, there are a lot of abstract terms that are imposed by the international community which politicians have no meaning related to, or does so quite differently than what international representatives does. Take the term ‘democarcy’ for example. All the political parties are democratic and its politicians demand the implementation of democracy. Yet, very little of their experience and knowledge can be related to the term. For most of them, it means something which Western-Europe has and does successfully; a success they want to copy. One politician presented the argument “This is not democracy! This is undemocratic!” when commenting a UNMIK regulation which protects the identity of persons from the media in certain events of criminal accusations and accidents. For him, democracy meant a complete freedom of speech without any restrictions.

Take the politician described in a previous chapter for example, who cooped a demonstration for political prisoners; he clearly acted out a role he has adopted by inspiration and belief in what a politician should do in the context of such an event. His main aim was to present himself as a leader defending a vulnerable group of people for the public. The politician visualises political power for the public and the rhetoric he uses is in the context of this particular language-game.

A normal political tactic is to continue to use arguments that represent meaning for people, even if these arguments have been falsified. Like the number of prisoners in Serbia, which
was investigated by the ICRC, and set to around 800. Still, politicians referred to it as “thousands”, mixing the number with missing persons in general. It took approximately half a year before the politicians started using the numbers that were close to the official number of prisoners. For the international community, it is a virtue to base such numbers on so called ‘fact-finding missions’, like those conducted by the ICRC who visited prisons in Serbia. But for the Albanian politician, the point was to reflect the importance of the sorrow and grief of the families, and the political importance of maintaining the political landscape of opposites between ‘us’ the oppressed Albanians and the ‘them’, ‘the others’, the Serbs and the tremendous suffering the Serbian state has placed upon Albanians. Numbers is in this context irrelevant. This is part of the background in which we have to analyse much of the interaction between politicians and representatives of the international community.

**Elections and Democratisation**

There were little changes in the election results from the municipal elections 2000 to the provincial elections 2001, with the exception of the participation of Kosovo-Serbs. In 2001, the Serb party ‘Return’ (Povratak) became the third biggest party. In both elections, LDK had nearly 50 % of the votes, while PDK had around 25 % and AAK approximately 8 % (OSCE 2001). While in the 2000 elections, non of the smaller parties got more than 0,7 % votes, three parties had more than 1 % votes in the 2001 elections; National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK), Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party (KDTP) and Vatan (VTN)\(^3\). The Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSHK) got 0,98 %. Four smaller parties therefore gained popular votes as compared with the 2000 elections.

There were big movements of voters right before both of the elections. In 2000, it was political violence that led many voters to LDK rather than PDK and AAK, because they were perceived as more likely to be behind the violence someway or the other. In 2001, it also became evident in public polls that many voters had not yet decided what to vote. Kosovo
Action for Civic Initiatives (KACI), one of the NGOs making public polls, estimated that it might be as many as 25% of the voters, who are not satisfied with any of the bigger parties, and subsequently ‘float’ between them (Hysa 2001). Still, most voters continue to vote for the bigger parties.

The participation declined almost 80% in 2000, to 64% in 2001. Though it indicates a decreasing interest in the elections, it must also be seen on the background of an increased electorate, which in 2001 was 1.25 million, as opposed to less than 900,000 in 2000 (OSCE 2002). The increase is party due to the fact that Kosovo-Serbs boycotted both the civil registration process in 2000, and were not registered as voters before 2001.

Only one of the parties had party program that was notably different from the others. The Justice Party of Kosovo (PD) was established late in 2001. Their program had two focal arguments; justice and pensions. The party emphasised the need for an operative juridical system operating at international standards, and care for elderly and to secure their pensions. They got 0.57% of the votes, which is more than most of the other parties established in the early 1990s. This indicates that there is a potential in the electorate for parties with niche programmes. It also indicates a process of increased political diversification. This might be the result of a political climate in which Serbia is not anymore a big threat, and thus fragmentise the political blocs that were mobilised during the 1990s. It is then not unreasonable to guess that the new high culture will play an important role in this process of a changed political landscape in the near future.

A media monitoring report from the OSCE concludes that there is no correlation between media coverage of specific political parties and their election results (OSCE 2001b). There are examples of smaller parties that had relatively substantial media coverage, but did not gain votes. This indicates that media coverage does not work unless there is a party structure and organisation involving people throughout Kosovo, as the bigger parties has. It also suggests

84 VTN was created in coalition between Bosniacs and Goranis.
that elements of social organisation are making the electorate stable within the bigger parties. A Political Officer in the OSCE confirms that voting in rural areas still follow family and clan relations, and is decided by heads of families \(^{85}\).

The Grand Story of ethno-nationalistic myths and symbols is the key principle for the political elite when mobilising popular support. It provides vertical integration through evoking feelings of common belonging in public ceremonies. Political legitimacy is a continuation of the social organisation and creates therefore a strong political conformity when confronted with an ethno-national opponent. The political elite does not legitimise itself rationality, other than to external parties, such as the international elite and Serbian nationalism, but through enactment of Grand Story representation; they represent the ethnie and its interests.

The international community is trying to introduce a democratic and open society, based upon a culture of transparency and anonymous bureaucratic professionalism in a legal regime. This means not only to introduce new social structures and administrative routines, but to cut off the close relation between political life and social organisation. This process has been happening over decades in Western Europe, through industrialisation and an increasingly anonymous society. Kosovo still remains to be a quite traditional society. This is the background in which the democratisation of Kosovo has to be looked upon. To further understand the problems facing the implementation of a democratic environment in Kosovo, we need to look at the culture of the international elite present in Kosovo, whose mandate is to impose this change.

\(^{85}\) This information comes from an interview with a Political Officer in OSCE December 2001.
7. The International elite – The Culture of Foreign Masters and Experts

In the period 1999-2001, there were at all times approximately 40,000 KFOR troops, and more than 5,000 international staff working for more than 100 registered International Organisations in Kosovo. But apart from political analysis and some regional economical considerations, even though I searched thoroughly, I found no socio-economic investigation done with the focus of evaluating the impact of this extensive international presence has on society. The only sociological considerations taken, are the ones done by the numerous organisations themselves, often while writing project proposals aiming at approval of funds allocations. The bigger organisations, like UN, OSCE, EU and KFOR, has their own analytical sections, aiming at improving decision-making for its leaders. As an analyst within such a section at KFOR headquarters said; their impact in the organisation is not measurable and they do not have any mandate except providing papers for whoever reads them. These papers were mostly, in this case, decision-making scenarios considering political reactions from the different parties and ethnic communities to decisions done, and what impact they will have for the operation of the organisation.

This chapter will look at cultural aspects of the international elite, its presence and interaction with the Kosovo population and other elites. Central to the description is how the international community interact and influence other elites, within the high culture of society. For analytical purposes, I will treat all international employees in Kosovo as constituting an elite in the society, with the exception of regular patrolling KFOR soldiers that live in military camps and are not allowed to go outside in civilian clothing.

**Types of international organisations**

There are three types of organisations employing international employees; international NGOs, the UNMIK governmental structure, including its EU and OSCE components, and the KFOR Multinational Brigade. In the table under I have outlined the structural differences
between the three organisations for the international employee, and policies which has impact on the social interaction between international employees and the local population. The table is meant to indicate differences and patterns and should not be considered categorically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>NGO’s</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant experience required. Recruitment at NGO’s head quarters outside Kosovo. Short term contracts, varying from 3 months to 1 year basis.</td>
<td>Higher education required. All top positions are secondment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that respective country. Else, employment at Brussels (EU), New York (UN) or Vienna (OSCE). Some recruitment in Kosovo if required. Short term contracts, usually on 6 months basis</td>
<td>Employee is part of a contingent in a military unit from that respective country. Home military command has negotiated a specific number of positions within the KFOR HQ according to the extent of that country’s involvement. Contracts on 6 months basis.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>NGO’s</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project based. Focus on humanitarian aid or shorter-term development in a small-scale environment.</td>
<td>Apply the authority of international interim government on behalf of the UN Security Council. Development of state institutions and preparing for transferring the responsibility of these institutions to democratically elected representatives or professionally trained bureaucrats.</td>
<td>Assuring security for the population through patrolling and search/confiscation of illegal weapons. Readiness for regional security threats.</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement restrictions</th>
<th>NGO’s</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Few restrictions. General rules of conduct, which is up to the employee to judge in each situation; applies on where to move and when. Follows advice from the UN.</td>
<td>Employee must report every movement outside designated city or village by radio to a movement control unit. Must use UN hotels when staying overnight in other cities. Strict rules of conduct. Security unit decides the security alert levels, each with a specified set of procedures.</td>
<td>No movement outside designated military camp except on patrol/orders or if approved, and then in armed groups of at least four soldiers. Officers can move more freely, but only with a reason. All meals are taken inside the camp and limited or none alcohol consumption is allowed.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local staff and interaction with international employees</th>
<th>NGO’s</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extensive usage of local staff. Local staff are often given project management responsibility. Counterpart policy used as phasing out strategy, often by making projects become self sustainable NGO’s.</td>
<td>Extensive usage of local staff, but mostly in subordinate positions, as assistants to international staff, drivers and interpreters. Internationals are always superior and never subordinated to local staff. UNMIK departments has local co-heads as counterparts under training for future hand-over.</td>
<td>Very limited usage of local staff. Only used as interpreters and then under strict conditions and rules.</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of internal employees (as of 2000)</th>
<th>NGO’s</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>KFOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 1,000</td>
<td>Approx. 6,000 (includes 4,000 UNMIK Police)</td>
<td>Approx. 40,000</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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In general most international employees do not have social interaction with the local population other than their locally employed assistants, drivers and secretaries. If they do so, it is done through an interpreter, as for example UNMIK international police or KFOR. The movement restrictions applied for KFOR, and the fact that they have very few local employees, rules out any social interaction between international and local, other than what occur on duty. When a KFOR soldier takes part in social interaction with locals, it is on patrol, in uniform, armed and in a group of at least four soldiers, speaking through an interpreter. As a KFOR soldier stationed in Oblic, an industrial suburb only 2 km on the outskirts of Pristina, said: “It is a bit weird….I have been here for nine months now and I haven’t been to Pristina yet.” The regular UNMIK Police Officer is the group of international employees that has the most contact with the local population. They operate together with up to four local police officers in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), enforcing rules and regulations in the streets. Thus they meet local people in a situation where something is at stake and their concerns in everyday life are communicated.

It is the international employees in the NGO’s that enjoys the most liberal movement restrictions. Depending on the work assigned, as well as the size of the organisation, these employees have often the most frequent social interaction with locals outside their own organisation. But then again, their aim is often to find local NGO’s or personnel that can manage their projects, and they therefore mostly interact within the ‘NGO community’. They have, however, often a large network that penetrates the described new high culture as well as some of the international elite in the UNMIK structure. Their funding often comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or their development agency in their home country. Thus they have a strong and resourceful international network, which they in many cases directly or indirectly transfers partly to the co-operating local NGO and their local staff. Local staff has greater responsibilities in NGO’s than in the UNMIK or KFOR structure.

In general though, international staff are always superior to local staff. In no organisations is an international employee set subordinate to a local employee in the organisational hierarchy.
In civil society, the international employees appear to be very rich in local economical terms, allowing them a living standard much higher than even the local upper class. Thus, let alone KFOR who does not take part in civil society, international employees constitutes an elite group in the society.

An ‘international’ in Kosovo means a person with a foreign citizenship and a background that has no kinship links to the society. Many Albanians hold citizenships other than Yugoslavian, as a result of emigration. It has happen that a ‘trans-national local’ was sent to Kosovo as an international employee. This created however, a strange situation in which the other international employees not really acknowledged the person to be an international at their own level of competence, seeing it as a mistake done by the headquarters or respective government.

International employees seldom stay here without being employed in an organisation. They have nothing else than their work that connects them to the place. Occasionally, some ‘internationals’ experience periods of days or weeks of ‘unemployment’ while changing jobs. In general all the international employees are recruited outside Kosovo and then ‘deployed’ or sent “to the field”. When their contract expires, usually within 6 months, there is nothing that keeps them back. I have heard of a few ‘internationals’ who has settled in Kosovo after their job contracts expired; one was even trying to start a small restaurant business. Though these cases might increase, creating immigration from western countries to Kosovo, this is very occasional and mostly by people who have ‘burnt their bridges’ to their home country.

**Being an ‘international’**

An ‘international’ seconded to work for the OSCE will for example first sign a contract with his country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then sent to OSCE HQ in Vienna where s/he signs a contract with OSCE and is then be deployed to OSCE HQ in Kosovo, where an introductory programme is followed, before deployment “to the field” at field or regional offices is done. The introductory programme goes through topics ranging from security measures, personnel
policy, how to use the radio system, driving test for OSCE driving permit, briefing about political parties and fractions, and local history and culture, before it ends in an excursion to a field office. The programme is obligatory for all new international staff and lasts for three days, including one day for the excursion. When I attended such a programme, the historical and political briefing was of high quality, but the briefing on local culture was very poor; two more or less randomly selected local employees, one Serbian and one Albanian, was put on the scene to list up their traditions and answer questions about their culture. A quite embarrassing moment arose when they kept repeating the same traditions and customs; “we also have that”, the other commented as they tried to find traditions and customs that were distinct for their ethnic group. This confused the newly arrived internationals, as they and contradicted their perception of the conflict as being grounded in cultural incompatible differences between the two.

Finding accommodation is the next step. Local staff are helpful and gets a lot of credit in their network for getting customers to the housing business. Normally anyone who has the possibility to rent out a flat or house, earns more than a normal good salary in rent, when they rent to ‘internationals’. This is therefore a lucrative business. Needless to say, internationals have created a mortgage marked with prices that seems as high as in any big city in Europe, save the great cosmopolitan centres. Living standards is, however, what the ‘internationals’ never really get used to. Even with big houses and flats; the power cuts and lack of water constantly reminds ‘internationals’ that they are not at home.

International employees are normally assigned to a vehicle that provides freedom of movement Kosovo-wide. The white UN and OSCE vehicles and the red and white UNMIK Police vehicles, popularly called “coca-cola cars” seems to be everywhere. Some ‘internationals’ joked about a T-shirt that had been made; it said to newly deployed internationals “Welcome to Kosovo – your cars are already here!”. Having a car to move around with, or the possibility to use the 24 hrs duty driver is one of the vital privileges of international staff. Most national staff does not even have an OSCE or UN driving permit, as they must have a reason for taking it. National staff can not sign for vehicles; either they use
the duty driver, or the ‘international’ must drive them. This gives the international employee social capital, in which the national employee have to be thankful for being driven anywhere that is not strictly on the work route. Internationals also take pleasure in driving these vehicles, which are normally brand new Toyota Frontrunners (UN) or Mitzubitchi Pajero jeeps (OSCE) or Toyota Landcruisers; in a traffic culture where the “biggest car wins”, driving such vehicles makes you feel powerful. The ‘international’ employee also have extra cultural capital of being from a rich country where driving culture is more refined, a result of years of public information campaigns and well developed driving test curriculums, as well as well developed road infrastructure. During a short trip, most international drivers will at least comment through speech or body language the ridiculous driving of the ‘locals’ at least once, even with local staff in the car.

Experience in Kosovo is among ‘internationals’ judged based on how many missions you have done in governmental organisations like UN, OSCE and EU, and which other conflicts you have worked in for international NGOs. Also important is for how long time you have been in Kosovo, and to what extent you have been around in Kosovo; meaning if you ‘know’ Kosovo geographically and have been to the biggest cities in all the regions and visited certain tourist spots such as monasteries, the cave outside Lipjan, the Rugova valley, the Serbian mountainous enclave in Strpce and so forth. These criteria for measuring experience are based on mobility; how active the ‘international’ have been to use vehicle privileges for private recreation. It can be checked in a ten minutes conversation, which is the usually what is done in the first informal chat between strangers, in order to get acquainted. Cultural understanding and competence is determined by knowledge of local languages, Albanian or Serbian; but this knowledge seldom reaches to the conversational level of that language.

The framework for all social interaction for international employees is the organisation. Very seldom do internationals interact with the local population outside their job. This is due to their time limited stay, usually no more than six months and the fact that they do not speak the language. Also, the internationals normally feels alienated to the culture and tend to create their own mix of culture among international working colleagues. There are numerous
restaurants and bars that try to create an environment where internationals feel more at home; raising the prices is an easy method for getting ‘locals’ away. One place is for example made similar to a German ‘bierstube’, and often has two musicians playing “Hotel California” and other songs recognisable by any ‘international’. Another place, outside the UN Administration headquarters, does not allow locals at all. It is constantly full of ‘internationals’, mostly police officers off duty, drinking beer and watching European football matches on TV. As there is nothing to do at home and since there are no friends other than colleagues, what to do after work is to get some colleagues together to go for dinner at a restaurant, and then go for a beer. This is routine and invitations for dinner is a usual gesture even if you have just met. To “gather some people from dinner” is very easy. Local employees are excluded from these social events because their private economy does not allow it; internationals earn five to twelve times as much as local employees, and thus operates at the other side of the spending scale. Often local employees also avoid coming with internationals for lunch, even if they are invited; they know it will cost them too much, and if they are paid for they will feel embarrassed. The local employees that are invited, are often the ones that the international work closely with. As no local staff are superior to international staff, it is normally their assistants and subordinates that they interact with. Drivers, assistants, interpreters and associates feel still on duty of course, even though the international might consider them as friends after work.

It is amazing how open, friendly and polite social interaction among ‘internationals’ are. Because of the lack of normal social life, it seems that there is a feeling that “we are all in the same boat” and everyone tries through diplomatic gestures to make life easier for each others socially, the few months they live here. It seems like they are all diplomats constantly trying to get connected with the right people that can enlarge their own network and prove useful in their assignment. A private party is maybe the best example. Not knowing anyone there is by no means a disadvantage. It is just like going into a meeting; going from group to group, introducing your self to strangers is perfectly normal. Moreover, people expect you to do it, and make them able to expand their own network. All kinds of differences in interests, culture
and education is under-communicated and made relevant only as a pool for making jokes about own culture and country.

The social life is not only crucial for international employees to have a comfortable private life. It is crucial for the job they do as well. The network that an international build consists more of people met in social life, than in a job context. Socialising after work also generate trustful relations that apply when decisions are taken. Getting close to decision making is not only something that follows the job description, but is based upon hours of off-duty socialisation, making a group of trusties, who together can influence or take decisions at work. As an employee in one of the UNMIK departments, I realised after a month in office, that the decisions were not taken by the senior officer and his deputy, but in consensus by a group of people that ‘hanged out’ in his office. When I was suggested to get responsibility for a part of the operation, I was informally asked about my capabilities in a normal social context. After two days, one of the persons I knew was ‘hanging out’ in the office of the senior colleague came into my office saying “OK, you can have it. We trust you”. From then on, I was free to come and go at the office where all the decisions were taken, and go to take part in the decision making.

I participated in a wedding party, arranged for an international couple who was planning a long stay in Kosovo, and thus married in Pristina, while waiting for the marriage ceremony back home. I was not originally invited and hesitated to go, because I assumed it would be only for close friends, and I had not ever met the groom; only twice had I met the bride. But that was no disadvantage; hardly anyone I spoke with at the wedding said they knew the couple personally, other than very briefly. The ceremony followed the traditional structure, which assumed the participants to be in family or close relation to each other. When the bride was going to throw the flowers over her shoulder, to the crowd of single female friends and family members symbolising who were going to be married next, most women discretely disappeared. As they hardly knew the bride, most of these women hesitated and avoided being at any proximity to the potential landing point of those flowers. Finally, one of elder woman saved the scene from embarrassment and waived enthusiastically with her hands signalling
where to throw the flowers. She got it of course, and the important traditional ritual was
secured. The participants of the party were brought together by an organisation on a mission
and they did not know each other outside the diplomatic gestures of working relations. But
these gestures saved the play, even through a wedding ceremony, as the internationals acted
as if they were close friends and in close relationships.

‘Internationals’ in Kosovo live, act and are perceived as an elite. They have positions that all
together decide about most aspects of the life of the people in the province. The power
enjoyed, and the life as an elite, feels good, but it is at the cost of the high living conditions
they are used to. As one informant put it; “the life is great, but the place is not”. People stay
because they enjoy the life as an elite with interesting and powerful jobs, a life they cannot
have at home. They enjoy lots of respect and both formal and informal power to an extent
most of them will never have at home. On the other hand they have to make sacrifices with
regards to living standards. They have to walk through “shitty streets”, not getting the food
they want and having problems with electricity and water at their accommodation, as well as
constant stomach issues.

In 2000, the self-image of most of the UNMIK institutions was very low. Complains about
the organisation was not only done to express concerns about its performance, but more like a
collective self-image that the ‘new ones’ soon learned to re-present. A person recruited from
the UN Volunteers programme (UNV), repeatedly declared the whole mission to be “shitty”. I
asked why, and what experience he had to judge it as more shitty than other missions. He
replied; “Well, I don’t. This is my first mission, but everyone says it is a shitty mission, so it
must be. Many of them have been in other missions”. To be critical about the organisation
means also to communicate an understanding of how the whole operation is operating,
something which remains a mystery for most ‘internationals’, who are on short-term
contracts.
‘Hierarchalisation’ of Nations

Communicating and making fun of national stereotypes are very common among international employees. The nationality of international personnel is by no means unimportant. ‘Internationals’ feel committed to represent their country in a good manner, presenting it as best they can when meeting someone who does not know their country well. It also makes communication and interaction between strangers easy; one of the first questions is usually “Where are you from?”; from there a number of discussion topics about countries and their success and achievements derive. The international employee can be regarded as a new type of diplomats, representing their nation on semi-governmental assignment. Not surprisingly, there is sort of a hierarchy of nations that prevails in the perceptions of the different nationalities among international staff. Which nation is good at this and bad at that is a common discussion topic, where the different countries represented by the internationals are compared.

Top quality personnel is perceived as coming from USA, Britain, Germany and Scandinavia. While the USA is associated with being a superpower, the Germans are associated with discipline, the Brits with high academic competence, and the Scandinavian personnel with neutrality. The French is seen as a Serbian ally and often are perceived as doubtful with regards to neutrality. The Italians are perceived as lacking discipline and too talkative, incapable of taken serious action when needed. On the other side of the spectre are the countries like Pakistan, India, Kenya, Fiji and Bangladesh. Their personnel contribution are seen as useless and constantly object to jokes that ridiculous them. An example is the story of the policeman from Fiji, who was tasked to guide the traffic in a crossroad where the traffic light was out of order. He is supposed to have said: “Oh! This is the first time I have seen traffic lights!”.
Judgment of personnel is related to economic development and the perceived ‘success’ of the country of origin. For example are policemen from USA regarded as of high standard by ‘locals’ and newly arrived ‘internationals’. The policy of the USA is however, only to send retired and dismissed policemen that are no longer qualified to be used in service in USA; therefore experienced non-American ‘internationals’ have the social capital to discredit this normal assumption with factual arguments.

A report on interim governance says about corruption among international personnel in Kosovo; “The attitudes of international officials towards such activities seem to vary from total non-acceptance to greater tolerance, based on experiences in their home countries” (CMI 2002:45). No doubt, the stereotypes refer to real discrepancies with regards to working standards, but they also create a climate for judgment of personnel which do not rely on their individual professionalism and performance. A UN employee from Pakistan temporarily set to work for the OSCE, which only contains European and North American employees, felt this. He said to me, as I sort of represented ‘Europe’ and a member state of the OSCE; “No, this is your organisation. It is not for me. I better get back to the UN where I belong”. He constantly felt he was mistrusted and checked upon. When the job was finished, he said, referring to the OSCE leadership; “They did not think we could do it, just because we are not Europeans. But we did. We proved that we could do it”. We, in this context were a group of UNVs from all over the world, many from African and South-Asian countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated quality of personnel</th>
<th>Nations (character)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Top quality personnel</td>
<td>USA (powerful), Brittain (ally), Germany (disciplin), Scandinavia (neutrality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel with doubtful performance</td>
<td>France (political ally of Serbia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy (lack of discipline, only talk no action)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey zone countries where impression of international personnel depends on personal experience</td>
<td>Finland (neutrality), Spain, Turkey (partly ally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations associated with low quality on international personnel</td>
<td>Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana, India, Bangladesh, Fiji</td>
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The diplomatic elite

The international diplomats make up an elite within the international elite. These are persons with high educations in Social Sciences that has been taken into the various Ministries of Foreign Affairs in their respective nation-states, gone through internal training programmes and worked for their ministries often over decades. They are present in Kosovo either as representatives of their states through a representational office, or they have been nominated to ‘political’ positions in the leadership of the major international organisations, the EU, OSCE or UN, whom are all lead by diplomats or former politicians and ministers. This group are even more exclusive and has even less contact with the general population than the general international elite. They interact mostly with each others, and formally with the local political elite. I will describe one of the representational offices as an example.

Most representational offices, like the one I will here describe, are located in close proximity to the KFOR HQ at ‘Film City’, a hillside overlooking downtown Pristina. The office is a house, in which is also the residence of the international staff. A fence surrounds it, guarded by one security guard, who sits in a small shelter at the port. The national flag is located on the top of the building, signalling which representational office it is.

The main activity of the office is to gather information about projects that its state supports financially, and the general political development, in particular, political cases that are subject to discussion and concern by the international community. The office has therefore meetings with the leadership in the UN, OSCE and EU on a regular basis. The goal is to obtain an official state policy in these issues. Vital in this regard, is what the stand of other states is, and therefore, it is in close contact with the other representational offices, in particular the most influential of them and close allies. The office has also close contact with staff seconded from their country, and obtain much information through these workers, as well as from their own military contingency. For certain other persons that has a representational status one way or the other, the office arranges a ‘reseption’; where specially invited people can meet each other and broaden their network.
I attended one of these ‘receptions’, which I will shortly describe here. The office had invited all political parties to be represented, in order not to show any political affiliation. Officers from the national KFOR contingent was present with many officers; captains and majors. Several national co-workers deployed in different organisations were also present, alongside with representatives of the UN and OSCE, as well as certain NGOs that the office had supported financially. The event lasted for less than two hours, in which most of it was spent talking and getting acquainted with people of interest. Since all the persons present were in positions that demanded certain understanding and cooperation between each others, everyone was sort of searching to each others, trying to figure out who the others were, where they were working, and whether that person “would be interesting for me”; meaning that the person could become a contact point that could be useful for the work of “my organisation”. Therefore, the first half-an hour was just about hanging around to figure out who the people were, until the diplomat of the office held a short speech about their activities and introduce some of the key persons present. There was a buffet set up for the party, and the diplomat of the office invited us to enjoy the lunch. The lunch was merely small ‘finger-food’, but enough to make the people busy; it was a good reason for ending a conversation and jumping into another one, going over to the buffet, take a few pieces of ‘finger-food’ and enter the conversation of another party. Another half-an hour passed before some people started leaving. After two hours, all the participants had left.

I experienced people at the ‘reception’ as being “informally formal”. All possible gestures and etiquette were very important, as they also aided us all in being able to meet across political, organisational and cultural boundaries, as well as across social statuses. At the same time, the lunch implied that we were eating together, something trivial and everyday-like, which have connotations to family bonds and the less formal. The goals was met however, I personally met a lot of people that were very “interesting for me”, for potential jobs, for my research and potential interviews, as well as information about the activity of other organisations and who they were and how they were thinking.
**Usage of symbols**

Even though international staff often express themselves negatively about the usage of Albanian national symbols, judging it to be nationalistic, their own national symbols are often extensively used. Especially on KFOR troops, vehicles and installations are national flags used extensively. A Swedish KFOR checkpoint just south of Pristina has a two times four meters big Swedish flag over the road. Most Scandinavian KFOR vehicles have a 30x 60 cm national flag on top, often together with the battalion-flag. Not all nations use flags though, take the British for example; their units only have a small 3x5 cm Union Jack flag on their uniform. I asked a British Major working at the KFOR headquarters whether he believed the usage of symbols by KFOR had any impact on the society. He dismissed that possibility responding that “some nations had always used their flags, while others don’t. If you go up a fjord in Norway, you will see flags everywhere. That’s just how it is.”. The Scottish battalion within the British KFOR contingent often used their provincial flag however. So did the Irish. It is therefore naive to believe that the usage of national symbols by the international elite and its organisations is not of political significance.

The usage of flags is a need for marking the country’s contribution to the operation and presence in the international community. Considering Firth’s analytical division between flags as signals and flags as symbols (Firth 1989:332 [1973]), the flags used by these military contingents are both complex symbols of national belonging, and a signal of which state has the administrative responsibility for the units. KFOR has divided Kosovo into sections controlled by countries participating in the multinational brigade. The contributing nations are therefore also marking their territory. Going by road between the big cities in Kosovo, it is impossible not to get to know which country controls what part of Kosovo. As the numerous checkpoints and military camps alongside the road are marked with flags, travellers will constantly be reminded whose military force controls the area. Kosovo-Albanians often put up the flags of the KFOR contributing nation that control their areas next to the Albanian flag, and the EU and maybe USA or NATO flag, indicating the desire to have a state like the rest of the world seems to have. Through the usage of national symbols by the international elite, they are constantly reminded about their own lack of an internationally recognised state.
This usage of flags can be interpreted as a reference to national interests, as claimed by Firth; ‘showing the flag’ means “staking a claim to national interests. So when a Soviet ship opened a passenger run between South-East Asia and Australia, this new development was interpreted by foreign diplomats as a matter of Russian policy – ‘another Russian step to show her flag in a new area’” (Firth 1989:354 [1973]). In certain settings where many states are involved, the flag points to the structure of power and authority of the nation-state, in which dissent to the values and respect it conveys will be met accordingly. International staff therefore also often use a big sticker of either their national flag or the UN flag on the front doors of the flats they stay in or personal vehicles, as a preventive method, seeking protection against crimes, robbery and brake-ins; their message is that the flat is part of the national interests of a powerful nation, in which a simply thief might want to reconsider getting in trouble with. Military vehicles does however, not only use flags for preventive purposes; their usage is part of ‘showing the flag’, stating national interests on behalf of a state. Their excessive usage is contradicting the goal of creating tolerance and reconciliation in the population, as they promote nationalist sentiments. That the military officers do not recognise this fact, must be because the usage of the flag is rather unconscious, not something they reflect upon; it is an institutionalised practice and builds on their own deeply rooted nationalist sentiments.

Perceptions of ‘locals’

The following article exemplifies many elements in ‘western’ perception of the local population and culture on the Balkans;

Now Milosevic is gone. He has been replaced by extremely civilized people, not only the new Yugoslav president, Vojislav Kostunica, or the new Serbian prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, but also the people around both of them. I happened, by chance, to have dinner last week with someone who works closely with Djindjic. He spoke flawless English, told funny jokes, and was as pro-Western as it possible for an East European to be; he also said he hoped very much that Milosevic would be in prison within the next few weeks. Yet in Macedonia, the violence continues, and it has nothing to do with the Serbs (Applebaum 200??).
The author was surprised about how ‘civilised’ the Serbs she met were, obviously because she did not expect them to be so. They even spoke flawless English and were as western as possible for them to be. Being ‘western’ is related to being ‘civilised’. No wonder that ‘internationals’ find it easier to communicate with the new high culture.

To be ‘civilised’ seems to be a virtue that follows economic development and national-cultural prosperity. It finds its opposition in traditional warfare. It is a common perception that war is not only making people become ‘uncivilised’, but it also starts because people are ‘uncivilised’. A Norwegian General once said in a seminar about intervention in Bosnia and the Srebrenica massacre; “We should have known what to expect. The people on the Balkans have done nothing but killing each others throughout history. The only thing they understand [respond to] is [superior] military force.” Not surprisingly, the international employees that are deployed to the Balkans feel superior with regards to competence and knowledge because they are from well developed countries that have enjoyed peace for …at least 50 years. The perception of ‘locals’, to be intellectually subordinate with regards to competence, manifest itself in numerous ways.

The Department of Local Government issued a statement about Kosovo as “on the path of sustainable economic and social development which gives the people of Kosovo a future in Europe as normal European citizens” (UNMIK 2000). This supports a notion about the ‘locals’ as of not being European in a place not really part of Europe, but which has to be ‘europeanised’.

One ex-military officer working in the UNMIK structures referred to his driver and his assistant, whom he believed were very good guys, provided that they were lead properly. He said that the ‘locals’ in general are like this; they are loyal and very good workers, but none of them are leaders. With good leaders we can have them to do anything; for example if we were to put together an army, he said; they would be excellent soldiers if only they were lead and

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86 Western states have fought wars all around the world without loosing their perceived ‘civilised’ manners. It can be assumed that this is because modern warfare is based on technology that makes warfare ‘less dirty’.

87 This is based upon my own participation at a seminar about Srebrenica in Oslo, 1998.
trained by ‘internationals’ officers, meaning Western-European military officers. Many other ‘internationals’ expressed great concern about the leadership capability of the ‘locals’ when the ‘internationals’ were “pulling out”, referring to the establishment of self-governance institutions and the phasing out of international involvement in public administration. In this respect, members of the new high culture are pointed out as possible ‘bright lights’ in this process of building leadership “among the locals”.

**The International Elite and the new High Culture**

Some ‘locals’ are perceived as more ‘European’, ‘civilised’ and ‘western’ than others; these are members of the new high culture. When some ‘locals’ are identified to be a good contact person and ‘advocatist’ of projects that the international elite is constantly looking for, such as those few good projects on reconciliation and inter-ethnic tolerance, they quickly become subject to popularity among the internationals. Some of these persons are constantly on seminars, training courses and conferences, often located abroad. Since there is so many different international NGOs involved in the same type of projects, names of ‘locals’ that are doing something that is related to these kinds of activities, are quickly spread around and referred to in a wide range of NGOs. When the NGOs are looking for staff to civil society support projects, they all go to the same persons. It is often only people within the new high culture that aork with such projects, as it is, by the elder high culture, seen as non-patriotic. They also do not have the network required, neither do they have any political interest or ideological fundament for such, to advocate for example tolerance and reconciliation.

Without the international elite, the new high culture would not have been a social group with the influence they now have. It is quite legitimate to say that the international elite has created the new high culture, through their needs for their projects and activities. The few projects supported by international NGOs before the war, such as the “Post Pessimist” youth project, engaged persons whom five years later are prominent figures in the civil society. The NGO
support, in particular that which focus on young people and projects the bring youths together across ethnic boundaries, have created an elite among middle class urban young people. This elite has been trained and ‘educated’ through certain activities over a long period by the international elite, which eventually makes them good candidates for leading positions in the civil society and public administration. This is not a result of an orchestrated training programme, but the result of a need in the system of international agencies, which has resulted in the stimulation and competence-enhancement of a particular social group over many years.

The reason why the international elite and the new high culture communicate so well, is their cultural likeness as part of the ‘western’ popular culture. As when Torgeir present jokes from the ‘Seinfeld’ TV show in order to make the ‘internationals’ comfortable with him, focusing on their cultural likeness, rather than their differences (see chapter 4). But it is also ideological; even though the new high culture also advocate the rightness of independence of Kosovo, they do so with a comparative perspective on other nation-states and with an understanding of minority rights and problems of integration. They are therefore and effective tool for the international elite and their interests.
8. The Development of Territorial Identity and Civic Nationalism

Kosovo-Albanians are object to immense pressure to accept and tolerate other ethnic groups in Kosovo. How does this affect the Albanian ethnic category? Albanians clearly does not regard the smaller groups (Turks, Roma, Gora, Ashkalija, Serbs) as within the Albanian ethnic category, even though many of the ‘Albanian-oriented’ minority groups themselves claim to be Albanians or with Albanian origin. This relates to the power that the majority group has. It is not easy to identify the boundaries of the ethnic category when the category is subject to claims from different groups. This might resemble the situation in Germany, where there is no consensus about what criteria should apply for deciding who is German and who is not (Forsythe 1989:139ff).

The now dominant Kosovo-Albanian majority have started to accept the other ethnic groups in Kosovo and their minority rights; both as they see the political necessity of having international support and legitimacy based on international standards of democratic rule, as opposed to violent governance of the Serbian state they fought against in the 1990s; but also because they are somewhat content that their goal of independence is within reach following the current political development. Minority groups are incorporated into civil society through organisations, political parties and representation in different political forums, and is gradually achieving acceptance from the Albanian majority. As incorporated minorities can not be assimilated in the Albanian ethnic category, there is a need for a wider term that the government can actively use to legitimize itself, through a projection of its citizens as living in one (imagined) community. This term must necessarily be based upon an identity, in which borders of inclusion and exclusion, is coherent with the borders of the territory in which the government has legislative authority; therefore a territorial identity based upon citizenship. In Kosovo, this territorial identity has generated the term ‘kosovar’, which only recently has

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88 Part of this chapter is published in Gheg in JAVA magazine, Kosovo (Andersen 2001)
been taken into use, and constitute a dramatic change in the politics of ethno-nationalistic sentiments in Kosovo.

**Development of territorial identity**

The ‘Kosovar’ term has emerged as a reference to the whole population of Kosovo; it is a supra-ethnic category that disregards ethnicity. The category ‘Kosovar’ first appeared in the early 1990s. The term derives from Albanian and means ‘person from kosovo’, just as ‘Gjakovar’ means ‘person from Gjakova’ (city in Western Kosovo) or ‘Shqiptar’ means ‘person from Shqiperia’ (Albania). The US State Department is referred to as the first among international agencies that used the term ‘Kosovars’ during the escalation of guerrilla warfare in 1998, but the term was used as early as 1991 on a collection of articles targeting the international community; titled “What the Kosovars say and demand”. Though the civil resistance movement throughout the 1990s may have used the term for referring primarily to Kosovo-Albanians as opposed to the Serbian regime at the time, the term does not exclude any ethnic groups of people living in Kosovo.

Any state structure operating with full, or even partly, jurisdiction within a specific territory, will create symbols of representation. For the UN, that analytically can be defined as a separate state, it was nearly impossible to use Yugoslav state symbols and emblems; it would not only be rejected by the majority of the population as it clearly does not identify with the Yugoslav state, it was legally problematic. To agree upon new symbols is a difficult task, as it need to represent the whole population and at the same time, reflect the sentiments of the people. The UN protectorate started to use the UN logo and its colours as emblems and symbols on its institutions, but more and more it has been mixed with Kosovo-unique
symbols. Since the borders of the state institutions\textsuperscript{89} are the borders of Kosovo, it was natural that a simple sketch of the territory was used as part of these emblems. In early 2000 therefore, Kosovo Police Service (KPS) got a small sketch of the Kosovo territory in the colours of the UN logo as its official logo. The symbol thus indicates the territory of its authority as well as referring to the UN interim protectorate. The Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK) used the logo of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), but with a black sketch of Kosovo instead of the two-headed eagle. It thus has a clear Albanian ethnic reference as it used the black on red colours from the Albanian flag, as well as having the same structure as the KLA emblem. This is however, the only state institution that has an ethno-national symbolic reference. The usage of a sketch of the territory of Kosovo has got more and more widespread and appears now on many political party and NGO emblems.

Some political parties have also changed their names to include a reference to the territory of Kosovo. In the 2000 elections, the Christian-Democratic party was called Albanian Union of Christian Democrats (UShDK), while it was changed to Partia Shqiptare Demokristiane e Kosoves (PSHDK) in 2001. There is an ongoing language debate in Kosovo, that started in late 2001, where some linguists wants to impose the Albanian dialect ‘Gheg’ as the official language in Kosovo. At the same time, there has been a big debate about the integrity of the

\footnote{For analytical purposes, I will refer to the UNMIK administration as a state. This is normally not done by the International community as it according to UNSCR 1244 is an interim government.}
border of Kosovo, based on the agreement between Macedonia and the Yugoslav Federation to change the borders in 1999. This created a demand to the UN from the Kosovo-Albanian parties to annul the agreement in early 2002. These events indicate that the Kosovo-Albanian ethno-nationalistic sentiments have made an important shift from orientation towards the Albanian state, relying on their symbols of representation, to making its own.

These developments indicate that the territorial identity is strengthened as a result of a functional state and state institutions that the population identify themselves with. The Municipal Assemblies and the central Provincial (Kosovo-wide) Assembly, that founded a coalition government in February 2002, will further contribute to a development where the population identify themselves with legitimate leaders of the state and subsequently strengthen the identity of the whole population that is services by the state in the territory it has authority over.

The gradual introduction of self-governance is a careful process were the Kosovo-Albanians and Albanian-sympathic minorities are given reason to be optimistic about the progress and their claim for independence, while not contradicting UNSCR 1244 and loosing the participation of the minorities, as the minorities are a crucial part of the development and especially for the Kosovo-Serbs and in relations with the Yugoslav state. Success in this act of balancing has started to transform ethnic nationalism into a more civic strive for making the new institutions reflect the culture of the population it services. The Kosovar identity will therefore be strengthened along with the strengthening of the self-governance institutions. If good governance is established, and people identify with the state as its citizens; congruence between the sentiments of the people and its government is developed, and, following Gellners definition of ‘nationalism’; a ‘Kosovo nationalism’ is promoted. This Kosovo nationalism can be developed into civic nationalistic sentiments for Kosovo and the future of its population, the ‘Kosovars’. The Kosovar identity has thus the potential of transcending the
widespread ethno-nationalist politics in Kosovo, first of all among Albanians, but on longer-term also the Serbs.

**The potential of the ‘Kosovar’ identity**

Nationalism is, according to Gellner, a principle that guards the balance of the homogenous character of the nation. The homogenous cultural community feeling of the population is abstract, completely different from the traditional face-to-face relation that controlled people’s life in earlier times. The nation gives its members an expectation of a shared and homogenous high culture. Its implementation phase, what Gellner calls ‘early nationalism’, is therefore critical, as its citizens have egalitarian expectation confronted with non-egalitarian reality and cultural homogeneity is yet not reached. The citizens might experience great diversities between those who take part in the new high culture and those who does not (Gellner 1983:73ff). In periods with changes and inequality, political movements based upon ethnicity might rise (Llobera 1994:104, Bowman 1994, Eriksen 1993:100). Turned around, in the context of Kosovo, we experience strong ethno-political sentiments in the transition from the Yugoslav nation-state to the potential upcoming Kosovo nation-state. In other words, a state of limbo with regards to identity politics, where ethnicity is the given winner. A natural question for us would therefore be: What is the main hindrance of a successful transitional process from ethnical oriented politics to a politics of a ‘kosovar’ nation-state?

The following subchapters looks at three aspects of the ‘Kosovar’ identity that are critical to its development. First, the relation between Kosovo-Albanians and Albania, aimed at indicating the strength of Albanian ethno-nationalistic sentiments; second, how the Kosovo-Serbs and other minorities relate to the ‘Kosovar’ identity; third, the international community and how the UN administration relates to the ‘Kosovar’ identity.
Kosovar Identity and Albania

Economy is of immense importance in international relations and in creating perception of ‘the others’. Rex claims, that what he call ‘economic’ nationalism can lead to separatist movements and successful nationalism (Rex 1997), as was the case with Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Therefore, we can assume that the relationship between Kosovo and Albania also depends very much on economic development. Even though the communist Albanian state has not been without economical achievements (i.e. on industry and education in the 1970s), all its engagements have suffered from hopeless, ineffective management and state co-ordination, poor technological development, corruption, as well as several collapses and revolts (1991 and 1997). The living standards, that had not been visible because of the closed borders, became a shocking experience for the 400,000 Kosovars who fled to Albania during the NATO bombing campaign. This has given the Kosovo population, either by personal experience or by the experience of friends and family, an insight in the poor condition of Albania and its lack of effective state organisation and political stalemate. In my opinion, this concrete experience has had a significant impact on the Kosovars and their perception of Albanian ethnographic diversity. As the International Crisis Group (2000) concludes in a report on the issue:

“The overwhelming majority of all Albanians agree that the different historical paths taken by the people of Albania as distinct from those from the former Yugoslavia, mean that a certain amount of time has to pass before either group is ready for the difficulties that they themselves, let alone their neighbours, would have to face in trying to unite geographically all the Albanians of the Balkans. Nevertheless, a new political and national identity is still in the process of formation” (International Crisis Group 2000).

The cultural difference between Kosovo and Albania is partly based upon a different perception of the state and its governance – the Yugoslavian state system differed greatly from the Albanian, and Kosovo-Albanians have also had their own parallel state system running throughout the 1990s. In one way the Albanian people in Kosovo are now closer to the Albanian people of Albania, compared to the closed border of Tito’s Yugoslavia and

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90 The bombing campaign started March 24 1999. The refugee influx to Albania and Macedonia started four days later on March 28.
Hoxha’s Albania. At the same time is the cultural difference between the two more and more acknowledged and stressed by Kosovo-Albanians.

An indicator of the strength of the relation between Albanians in Kosovo and the Albanian state is the Albanian common language convention, referred to as ‘gjyha letrare’. Gjuha Letrare was created at a Grammar Conference in Tirana in 1972, and is predominantly based on the ‘Tosk’ dialect of Southern Albania. This language convention is both oral and written. In formal interaction, letrare is used. After the war in Kosovo, letrare was introduced as first language in all TV and radio broadcasters based in Pristina. People acknowledge that proper speaking is intertwined with social status and represents a sort of symbolic capital in which people are perceived as closer to proper Albanian high culture based in Tirana (earlier it was the Serbian language that provided a perception of closeness to Serbian high culture based in Belgrade). Because Albanians in Kosovo speak the Gheg dialect, they have to learn have to speak ‘properly’. Like X and Y who just after participating on a TV program gave compliments to each others ability to speak letrare – “I didn’t know you spoke so good letrare. It was very proper and correct!” Y responded “No, actually I did some mistakes. I said [half of Gheg word] and then I quickly corrected my self”. One of the most prominent TV reporter is from Albania. X says about him that; “he speaks so beautiful. It is very difficult for us to speak in such a way”. In late 2001, there were 24 Albanian employees from Albania working in TV and radio stations, newspapers and publishing houses in Kosovo very much for this reason. They are proof reading and correcting the language that Kosovo-Albanians produce. To discuss the issue is however very sensitive, as the conformity towards the ‘Albanian Nation’ and the ‘National Question’ is very strong. Anyone that does not follow such conventions will immediately be publicly known. One linguist is well known for just this. Even before the war he publicly sang in Gheg dialect with his music band. In 2001 he got a column in one of the daily newspapers, but it was too provoking and the editor felt obliged
to stop it. The linguist was very disappointed, but managed to find funding to publish his own magazine discussing the language and related identity issues in the Gheg dialect. A Professor in the Northern Albanian town of Shkodra proof read the texts. The first issues of the magazine got immediately sold out, which indicates a public interest in discussing the identity relation between Kosovo and Albania.

The language debate in Kosovo also indicates that Albanians in Kosovo can identify themselves with an official language slightly different from their daily speech as long as there is a reason for it. For example if there is an external threat, like the Serbian regime and the subsequent mobilisation of the ‘National Question’. As Kosovo has its own governmental institutions out of reach for Belgrade and these institutions seem more functional, the basis for the strong conformity to stress ethnic ties to the ‘mother land’ (as opposed to the threatening ‘colonising’ Serbia) seems to fall apart. As many anthropological studies have concluded: the less threatening ‘they’ are, the less unification will exist among ‘us’. This mechanism of segmentary opposition has been a classical observation since Evans-Pritchard’s study ‘The Nuer’ in 1940 (Evans-Pritchard 1972 [1940]).

Kosovar Identity and the Minorities

The recognised ethnic groups in Kosovo are Albanian, Serb, Turk, Roma, Ashkalja, Egyptian, Bosniac and Gorani. Kosovo is more or less divided into two territories – one Albanian and one Serbian, depending on which group is in a dominant position. The Serbian areas are the North of Mitrovica and the areas bordering Serbia, as well as small pockets often referred to as ‘enclaves’ elsewhere in Central and Eastern Kosovo. The other ethnic groups seek acceptance from the dominant group in their area. The demographical division in Kosovo mirrors the political division that follows the same ethnic boundary. Albanians and minorities
in their territory seek independence, while the Serbian areas seek re-integration with Serbia
and FR Yugoslavia.

Though many Kosovo-Serbs acknowledge that their community is also part of the category
‘Kosovar’ or ‘Kosovas’ (in Serbian), some of their leaders have indicated that they will not
support the development of a Kosovo territorial identity, as they fear that this will support the
Kosovo-Albanian claims for independence. A prominent Kosovo-Serbian religious leader is
for example quoted to have said “There is no such thing as Kosovars, only Albanians and
Serbs”.

During the elections preparations when Serb participation in the Provincial elections were still
a big question mark, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) chose
not to use terms as ‘minority’, ‘kosovar’ and ethnic groups. Rather the OSCE would use
‘community’ for any village and then refer to it according to which ethnic group is dominant.
It would also refer to Kosovars as ‘habitual residents’. The Civil Administration pillar of the
UN did however not hesitate to use the term ‘minorities’. The OSCE was more sensitive to
criticism because they were responsible for arranging the elections and promote the
participation of all ethnic groups. The discrepancy in the usage of these terms shows that
there is a need for a term that refers to the whole population. The term currently in use,
‘habitual resident’, do not have any other than technical connotations.

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91 In a joint operation between the OSCE and UN Civil Administration aiming to register the
population and targeting the Serb community in particular into the Civil Registry and the
Voter’s List for the elections, the OSCE would call the operation ‘Community Registration’,
while the UN called it ‘Minority Registration’.

92 The Kosovo-Serbs boycotted the first Municipal Elections in October 2000.
Of concern is also the split in political affiliation among the representatives from the Coalition Return. The Candidate List is said to reflect the struggle between the Yugoslav federation, with President Kostunica and the Serbian state government and Prime Minister Djindjic. Some have expressed concern that the first group is definitely more negative to support the self-government institutions than the latter. Critical for this process is whether the Serb population finally feel that their interests are represented and that the self-government institutions service them on equal basis with Albanians. This again relies on a functional Provincial Assembly. Political Officers in the UN administration is convinced that they will approve symbols of representation (like flag, emblems and even national anthem) as long as it is based on consensus in the Provincial Assembly, meaning that it is approved by the Serb community and other minorities.

The International Community and the UNSCR 1244 Political Stalemate

The international employees working in the UN are split between those who have sympathy for the Serbs and those who have sympathy for the Albanians (often changing according to which group is perceived as suffering the most). The split between Serbian and Albanian sympathies does to some extent reflect the citizenship of the employee. This is particularly true in OSCE, where all international employees with few exceptions are seconded by their respective states. Kosovo-Albanians will often refer to the French as Serbian-friendly, while Americans are seen as more sympathetic to the Albanian cause. The UNSCR 1244 is however a platform that international employees are committed to, keeping Kosovo as a province of FR Yugoslavia. The prevailing scepticism among international employees for granting independence to Kosovo has however not prevented the development of Kosovo-unique symbols of representation. The municipalities, the different UN governmental institutions, the Kosovo Police Service, the Kosovo Protection Corps (established out of the now disbanded KLA guerrilla organisation), and the different political parties all have made their own
emblems and flags that are based on a simple sketch of the Kosovo territory. There is no strategy or thinking behind the making of these symbols and what changes the UN administration imposes in this respect. In the current phase, where authority is handed over to democratically elected representatives of the people of Kosovo, the main concern for internationals seems to be primarily the technical aspect of regulations and the proper functioning of the governmental institutions. A Political Officer in the OSCE said that there was even an internal censorship with regards to any discussion about the impact of the UN administration with regards to the identity of the people it governs. Any discussion about this will end in the political stalemate imposed by the UNSCR 1244 and the issue of the final status of Kosovo.

Currently the international administration emphasise that Kosovo creates sustainable democratic institutions that operates according to the standards of other European states. This process involves a development were there is congruence between the sentiments of the people and its government. As long as the limits of self-governance allowed within the UNSCR 1244 framework is not reached, there will be no change in the direction of this development. The report from the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2001) and its recommendation on granting ‘conditional’ independence to Kosovo is an indication that the limits of what the international community is ready to approve is not yet reached. The final status issue relies on the regional political development and in particular on whether the Yugoslav federation will prevail as it is today. Until now, the general development strengthens the perception that “more independence” will be granted gradually. Subsequently, there is a optimism in the (Albanian-oriented) population with regards to the direction of the final status issue – and therefore more willingness to concession towards the international community, which will strengthen the self-governmental institutions, and thereby the development of Kosovo-unique symbols of representation and the ‘Kosovar’ identity. If this
trend turns, however, and the general perception is that the full potential of the self-governance of Kosovo is reached (and it is not independence), the support to pan-Albanian political orientation and ethno-nationalism might increase.

**Transforming Ethnic Nationalism**

The gradual introduction of self-governance is a careful process were the Kosovo-Albanians and Albanian-sympathetic minorities are given reason to be optimistic about the progress and their claim for independence, while not contradicting UNSCR 1244 and loosing the participation of the minorities, as the minorities are a crucial part of the development. Success in this act of balancing has started to transform ethnic nationalism into a more civic strive for making the new institutions reflect the culture of the population it services. Essential to the ‘Kosovar’ identity is the success of the international administration in establishing institutions that provides good governance to its population, in a way that its people can identify with. While doing so, congruence between the sentiments of the people and its government is developed, and therefore a ‘Kosovo nationalism’ is promoted. This Kosovo nationalism can be developed into civic nationalistic sentiments for Kosovo and the future of its population, the ‘Kosovars’. The Kosovar identity will therefore be strengthened along with the strengthening of the self-governance institutions. The Kosovar identity has thus the potential of transcending the widespread ethno-nationalist politics in Kosovo, first of all among Albanians, but on longer-term also the Serbs. This process is however more or less an unconscious process, as there is an internal censorship within the UN administration about discussing any issues that may alter the UNSCR 1244 interim status of Kosovo.

There are three major concerns with regards to the development of the ‘Kosovar’ identity. First, the strength of the Albanian ethno-nationalistic sentiments in Kosovo’s predominantly Albanian population. Secondly, the Kosovo-Serbs might deny the usage of any reference to territorial identity that gives an impression of separation from Yugoslavia. Thirdly, the
international community might be reluctant to strengthen territorial identity as a re-integration in Yugoslavia following UNSCR 1244 would then seem more and more impossible.

The self-governance institutions will surely push for independence and take stand in issues that relates to the final status of Kosovo. One recent issue is the border agreement between Yugoslavia and Macedonia; the provincial assembly passed a resolution that rejected the border agreement in May 2002, which was over-ruled by the UN (BBC 2002). This was a development easy to predict, where the government seeks total state powers and challenges the UN. There is already lots of murmuring about the international elite and their arrogant control over the province referring to colonial rule. Many have urged the speed up of the process of passing power to the local elite. The ‘internationals’ are often referred to as “arrogant”, “stupid” and on short-term ‘tourist’-like stays in Kosovo, with own career-related interests; they are strangers in the territory and their power is only legitimate for an interim extraordinary period. They have no roots in the territory as ‘kosovars’ have.

**Conclusion**

In the introductory chapter, a set of hypothesis was established, in order to streamline our investigation and maintain a disciplined scope of inquiry. A conclusion will now be made. It should be pointed out, that the conclusion is based on a limited investigation, and should not be seen as final, but rather, a basis for further investigation. Each of these hypothesis was; the Albanian high culture is in a process of diversification (1), a new high culture has emerged, providing a spearhead for the ideology of the international elite (2), the international elite represent a positive example of multiculturalism (3), and territorial identity can be promoted to counter-balance ethno-nationalistic sentiments (4).

Important positive indicators for the first hypothesis (1) is that mobilisation to the opposing ‘other’, the Serbian governance of Kosovo, has ceased to be a uniting element in civil society. The international elite might take over the role as opposing ‘others’ to a certain extent. Analyses of election results also indicate increasing political diversity; the new high culture
seems to be about to manifest itself in politics. Negative indicators is that there is still total consensus about the political goal of independence.

The new high culture (2) has been created partly out of the need of the international elite, and partly due to emigration and the creation of trans-national communities. The group is already represented in public administration, trusted and believed in, by the international elite. It is opposing the elder high culture, represented in the political and intellectual elite, which produces and enacts representation of an ethno-nationalist Grand Story.

The international elite (3) presents itself as a wide range of nations, working together in as an orchestrated unit. It is, however, a ‘hierarchy of nations’ amongst the international elite, based on the economic development and prosperity of the different nation-states, which is also manifested through the political influence and extent of involvement in Kosovo. This hierarchy is enhanced by the national symbols used by the different contingents among the international elite, and the focus on national stereotypes and home nation in the interaction amongst them. This hierarchy reflects well in the population, building on a similar hierarchy operating in the former Yugoslavia. Thus it is more the ‘plural society’ (see Kuper 1997 [1969]) that is presented by the international elite, rather than successful multiculturalism.

Territorial identity (4), such as the ‘Kosovar’ identity, is found to be a basis for counter-balancing ethnic identities. It is also found to be enhanced by ‘good governance’ and the increased well-functioning of the self-governance institutions. The ongoing discourse about the state flag of independent Kosovo among the political elite, is an issue that has promoted reflections about the ‘Kosovar’ identity and the potential of a independent state that integrates all its ethnic communities.

The overall problem for this investigation was what the premises were for a high culture in Kosovo that de-emphasise ethno-nationalistic sentiments and enhance multi-cultural society of tolerance and respect for human rights values. Some answers are indicated; an empowered new high culture in civil society and public administration, providing grounds for self-
governance institutions providing ‘good governance’ to all ethnic communities it services, which again enhances territorial identity that counter-balances ethno-nationalist sentiments. This development, and a new high culture manifested in politics, provides a basis for a political elite that de-emphasise ethnic identity and ethno-specific interests in politics.

The positive indicators in this process is the prospects of an enhanced territorial identity and the new high culture, as the part of the elite who can contribute to the implementation of self-governance and civil society in which these norms and values are central. ‘Good governance’ that respects the rights of all ethnic communities and secures their participation is essential for this process.

The negative indicators are; a political elite that is enacting representation of a Grand Story, in which the intellectual elite has developed, following an ideology which is at odds with values of inter-ethnic tolerance and human rights. The international elite contributes, through the projection of a ‘hierarchy of nations’, to an ideology in which there are certain comparable values and skills following national origin; a projection that is incompatible with its goal of promoting human rights and tolerance.
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ANNEX 1
Dynamic Classification of Ethnic Incorporation in Kosovo

|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|

Legend
- Albanian
- Serbian
- Gorani
- Turkish
- Egyptian