On Foreign Soil:
Nostalgia and Social Drama Among
Political Activists in Kaliningrad

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Abstract

This thesis is based around fieldwork conducted among political activists in Kaliningrad, Russia. Special attention is paid to activists who belong to the National Bolshevik Party and to the Baltic Republican Party, due to their connection to one of the major themes of this thesis, namely how politicized nostalgia is played out in social drama.

The NBP and BRP have formed emotional, nostalgic connections to the Russian / Soviet and Prussian / German heritages of the Kaliningrad region respectively, and this nostalgia forms a fundamental axis around which their political activism revolves. These two political movements often stand in opposition to each other, as the NBP seeks continued cooperation with Russia, while the BRP wants more independence for the Kaliningrad region. This leads to interesting possibilities for comparison of whether or not their political activism share the same, cultural basis.

In order to investigate this cultural basis, this thesis views culture as shared knowledge, with the analytical focus being on the concept of 'cultural models', borrowed from cognitive anthropology. Such knowledge is furthermore viewed in relation to emotions, and how these are connected to knowledge. In this context, literature from the ethnographic region of postsocialist eastern Europe is used extensively, as issues such as nostalgia, loss and anger are key terms in the ethnography of this region. Once the relationship between knowledge and emotions are established (with reference to the empirical reality of Kaliningrad), the thesis turns towards explaining how this dialectical relationship is played out in political activism as social drama. Some special attention is here also paid to the seeming counter-pole of social drama, namely the purposeful obscuring and hiding of some social facts. This 'clandestine mode' of acting is also highly defining for how political activism in Kaliningrad is organized, and in how the activists and authorities relate to each other.

This thesis takes a somewhat alternative view on relationships of power. First of all, this analytical direction is somewhat deemphasized in favor of analytical directions that emphasize not why political activists feel and act the way they do, but which forms such emotions and social acts take. In order to illuminate this, this thesis makes use of theories which views power not in terms of how it is embodied, internalized or forced upon people in hierarchical fashion. Rather, the focus is on how relationships of power is also used by the people who are subject to them.

In relation to nostalgia, social understandings of 'time' and 'space' are also highly important. However, this thesis does not start working with such fundamental concepts from the outset. Instead, the focus returns to these concepts towards the end of thesis, where they are seen in relation to the issues that have already been discussed. This is done in an attempt to work from the specific (empirical) towards the abstract, rather than the other way around.
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The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centred in the three following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope?
-Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1787[1855]:488)

Acknowledgements

A quote by a famous philosopher might seem like a clichéd way of starting a thesis, but hopefully its relevance will shine through in the following pages, both in Kant's relationship with Kaliningrad / Königsberg (he was born, lived and died there) and in the quote's relevance to the theme of this thesis. Before this, however, some thanks are in order.

I extend my gratitude to everyone who has helped me during the writing of this thesis. Fellow students, proofreaders, friends and family.

Special thanks to my supervisors. First to Susanne Brandstädter for helping me give this thesis some much needed structure, as well as for helping me decide to conduct my fieldwork in Russia. And also to Halvard Vike for invaluable help and guidance during the final months of completing the thesis, without whose help it would not have its current shape.

Lastly, I would like to thank my informants for so willingly sharing with me not only their social lives, but their thoughts and emotions as well. Thank you for being my much needed friends in a foreign land.
Introduction

Russian politics are politics filled with corruption, personal scandals and lack of accountability to the people the politicians are supposed to govern. At least, this is how Russian politics are viewed in Western media, and seemingly in Western mainstream society in general. Political activists, on the other hand, are portrayed as freedom fighters, who want to change Russian society in a more democratic direction. These views can also be found among many people in Russia, but there also exists a multiplicity of other common models for understanding Russian politics as well. While many accuse president / prime minister Vladimir Putin and the United Russia party of widespread corruption and cronyism, others praise them for providing people with work and economic safety. Barely three weeks before this thesis was finished, Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet published an interview with Russian author and oppositional activist with the National Bolshevik Party, Zakhar Prilepin¹, my meeting with whom is described in short later in this thesis (p. 20-21). The article was titled "A Warrior in Battle Against Putin"². Answering a question on whether it was frightening to be a critic of the ruling political regime in Russia, Prilepin replied that "Of course we have problems, but not to the degree that it is claimed in the West". When such a statement is made by one of the most primary figureheads in Russian political activism, it reveals the need for a reinterpretation of political activism in Russia. In the same article, Prilepin is asked about his connections with the National Bolshevik movement, and whether he and the NBP wishes to return to communism. Prilepin answers: "80% of the Russian population is nostalgic in relation to the Soviet Union. One does not long after Stalin or gulag, but much was achieved in many fields, that benefited most people. It is these values that are missed. Everyone understands that the Soviet Union is gone.". Whether or not Prilepin's figure of 80% is true or not, nostalgia (in several forms, as I soon hope to demonstrate) is widespread among both activists and non-activists in Kaliningrad, which is the area of Russia where I have performed my fieldwork. Indeed, it was a wish to investigate nostalgia as a social phenomenon that drew me to Russia and Kaliningrad⁴ in the first place.

I begin this thesis by asking a question in two parts: How is nostalgia and the understanding of history tied to political activism in Kaliningrad, and how is this activism mediated by and

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¹ Formerly a member of the OMON (see p. 30), but since turned activist. Has written several books, some of which have been translated to other languages. Active in the NBP since 1996.
³ This and all future excerpts from the article translated by me.
⁴ Kaliningrad was formerly the German city of Königsberg. Kaliningrad is both the name of the city, as well as the name of the region (Oblast). I use the name 'Kaliningrad' when speaking about the city, and 'Kaliningrad Oblast' when speaking about the region.
through cultural knowledge, emotions and social drama? In this thesis, I argue that social performance through various aspects of political activism in Kaliningrad is tied to specific understandings of time and place, as well as to emotional connections to such times and places. Such emotional connections, for example to periods of time and/or the surrounding landscape (or cityscape), are not arbitrarily formed simply through living in proximity to it. They are also subject to social processes and resulting cultural knowledge that help determine what emotions are formed, what those emotions consist of, as well as how those emotions are displayed through social performances. In this thesis I attempt to exemplify this by showing how people relate differently to issues of time and space, and especially the German and Russian heritages in Kaliningrad/Königsberg, for example as visible in the cityscape, based on cultural knowledge which value them differently, and that this leads to different expressions through political activism. Kaliningrad/Königsberg is an excellent field for the study of such themes, due to the city's and regions dual heritages, which coexist in a myriad of intricate ways. To show this contrast in highly visible terms, I describe activists from two political parties, namely the Baltic Republican Party and the National Bolshevik Party who value the German and Russian heritage of the city respectively. It is my argument that cultural models as organizers of knowledge, emotional attachments to times and places, as well as social drama which draws on this knowledge and emotion, are central in how political activism in Kaliningrad is performed. Instead of working with somewhat abstract concepts such as 'time' and 'space' from the outset, I rather return to these in later chapters, in an attempt to illuminate them through various analyses that have by then taken place throughout the thesis.

I will describe analytical theories as well as explanations on former research in the ethnographic field of postsocialist eastern Europe as such research becomes specifically relevant to this thesis, rather than including a separate chapter on theoretical fundamentals that is disconnected from the empirical reality of political activism in Kaliningrad. I will, however, state some of my analytical inclinations here, so that readers will know what to expect further on. My arguments are heavily based on theories related to cognitive anthropology, especially those concerning cultural models, which I use to explain how my informants relate cultural knowledge to social performance and emotions. Such a perspective, I argue, is extremely valuable in uncovering the relationship between internal thoughts and external (social) acts, as well as in explaining what knowledge is

For a more complete explanation, see Shore (1996:42-71). Cultural models can be understood as conventional mental models which exist in people's minds, but are to a large degree shared with other people, who for example live in the same community. These cultural models consist of conventionalized knowledge that help individuals organize emotions, memories and so forth in relation to social contexts, and in relation to each other. Some of these models are 'instituted', meaning that they are conventional and patterned, for example in the form of a handshake, or in the form of a patterned performance, in Turner's (1982) sense of social drama, which I return to later (p. 55)
cultural (shared) and not. It wish to state here that I do not use such cognitivist perspectives in order to unravel something about my informants' internal psychological states. The focus is rather on investigating the ways in which internal knowledge is externalized in social space. In connection to this, I concentrate on social performance of specific types related to political activism, viewed through the lens of 'social drama', spearheaded by theoreticians such as Victor Turner. Using this perspective, it is possible to further uncover what forms externalized, social knowledge takes, in how it is dramatized and made visible to others. In order to also maintain a motivational, rather than simply mechanical viewpoint, I bring in the subject of emotions in relation to the aforementioned themes. As an entryway into the field of emotions, I primarily make use of anthropological literature on postsocialist eastern Europe, where issues such as feelings of loss and nostalgia, which are highly relevant to this thesis, are central themes. I attempt to relate knowledge, emotions and social performance to each other, and to various aspects of political activism in Kaliningrad. It is my hope and belief that this seemingly idiosyncratic mix of analytical perspectives that deal with knowledge, social acts and motivations respectively will lead to new insights into the fundamental characteristics of oppositional political activism in Kaliningrad.

Given the area of study that this thesis revolves around (political activism), it would seem that the field itself is ideally suited for a study of top-down political relationships and power structures. However, I have chosen to somewhat deemphasize such aspects, instead concentrating on alternative explanations. This is ultimately in order to gain new insight into the organization of political activism, by attempting to view it from a new perspective. On the other hand, it would be impossible to completely exclude such issues from the discussions, seeing as how they are linked to everything I talk about in this thesis. Therefore, when talking about power, I ascribe to a way of describing power relations not in how people internalize them, or are acted upon by others. Rather, I focus on how political activists act in and through such power relations, in attempts to use structures of power to their own advantage. In this task, I use Vike (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011) as my primary source of arguments.

I will begin this thesis by introducing an ethnographic vignette describing the small military town of Baltiysk, where I lived from late January to early March 2011. It would perhaps seem strange to start this thesis by introducing a town which does not feature at all in the lives of my activist informants, but I believe that I have good reason for doing so. First of all, my stay in Baltiysk during the early part of my fieldwork meant that I was very open to peculiarities which I had not yet gotten used to, meaning that I was probably able to cognitively process more relevant details, than when my living in Kaliningrad had later become somewhat more routinized. Because of this, the following vignette will be given from a more personal point of view than the other
ethnographic examples in this thesis. I hope that by revealing some of my own internal subjectivity at the outset, I can avoid shrouding myself in a veil of supposed objectivity later on. Perhaps more importantly, in Baltiysk I came across many of the themes that would later turn out to be important for my project, and which are described and analyzed later in this thesis. The connections between the focus on the region's German heritage and on Russian militarism in relation to political activism and nostalgia are issues I will return to throughout this thesis.
Baltiysk

As our car approached Baltiysk, I got to see a part of Russia that corresponded closely with what I think of as the Russia of Western imagination. While I had been struck by the urban modernity of Kaliningrad, the road to Baltiysk was increasingly dominated by barbed wire fences, guard towers and military camps. Most of these installations, however, seemed deteriorated and unused. The two naval guardsmen in their pitch-black trenchcoats merely gave our car a disinterested glance as we rolled on past the checkpoint before entering the city. On the way, we also passed by several relics of German history. A sewage ditch, apparently still in use, signalled by its peculiar smell, was pointed out to me as one of the masterstrokes of German ingenuity, seeing as it was still in use so many years after it was built. German architecture across the region, I found, was very often praised by the region's now Russian inhabitants.

A long allée of massive German-era oak trees encased the road. The trees stood very close to the road itself, and the treeline was filled with photographs, flowers and other memorials to those who had crashed into them. After many years of this, someone had apparently decided to change things, and white rings now marked the base of the trees, scheduling them for cutting. It was obvious that things were already changing in Baltiysk since being completely opened only a few days ago, after being closed for more than 60 years.

An Atmosphere of Militarism

Even before my fieldwork begun, I had been aware of the possibility of living in Baltiysk, this small town of slightly more than 30,000 residents, situated on the Vistula Spit by the Baltic Sea. Since the end of World War II, and especially after 1952 when a naval base was established in the town by Soviet authorities, Baltiysk has been a closed city, meaning that few foreigners have been inside the town in the last sixty years. This, however, changed from the start of 2011 when, I was told, the city opened to foreigners as well. By a stroke of luck, I arrived in Kaliningrad Oblast just a few days later, and a friend of my friend was able to rent out a flat to me in Baltiysk. A mixture of curiosity and romantic notions about living in a formerly inaccessible place caused me to go pursue this opportunity at once. While the move to Baltiysk was not purely motivated by fieldwork, as political activism is mostly centered on Kaliningrad, Baltiysk was less than an hour's drive from Kaliningrad anyway. Thus, before January was over, I had moved from Kaliningrad to Baltiysk.

Surrounded by water on three sides, the sea is never far away in Baltiysk. It was on my way
to the beach near my new home on the day after I arrived, that I first experienced the militarized nature of civilian life in the town. The walk took me through Park Primorskiy (Seaside Park), which by now looks more like a forest than a park, much due to the cutbacks on public spending since the end of the Soviet Era. As I walked, a thundering sound could be heard in the distance, reverberating through the air, repeating itself continuously. It wasn't until the sound returned after a minute's lull that I understood what I was hearing. The navy was test-firing cannons. The largest of them seemed to cause the air itself to shake. People were hurrying past me across the frozen mud, seemingly unaffected. This military ritual would repeat itself nearly every day during my stay in Baltiysk, and it struck me that cannons had probably been firing almost continuously in Baltiysk since WWII.

As I neared the Baltic Sea, a troop of soldiers carrying Kalashnikov rifles walked past, blocking my path to the beach. Such marching soldiers were often singing the World War II era war song Katyusha, which was originally intended to inspire against the German invaders. The singing of this particular song also has special symbolic value in this place, as Baltiysk was formerly known as the German city of Pillau. World War II symbolism, especially in the form of Victory Day celebrations, play a large part in how the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast understand historical time, and form emotional, nostalgic connections to it.

**Participating for pay**

Soon, I was walking through Park Primorskiy and the town's military district on a regular basis. The Baltic Fleet Training Academy, a magnificent though crumbling building from German times, as well as the moored destroyers of the fleet, became everyday sights. The reasons for these walks were what was quickly becoming my main activity in Baltiysk, namely going to the training center. As the focus of my fieldwork at the time was among political activists in Kaliningrad itself, I was spending less time in Baltiysk than I had first hoped I would. In other words, I was observing much more than I was participating in the everyday life of the town. Paying my way into the training center became a convenient way of "participating-for-pay", where I was able to participate in at least one aspect of Baltiysk's everyday life. It also allowed me some insight into the lives of some of the soldiers, who also trained there. The walk to the training center took me past an unused part of Baltiysk's harbor, occupied by old German defensive fortifications. Due to the harsh winds blowing in from the seaside, I sometimes had to seek shelter in these old bunkers. The training center itself, called Priboy (roughly meaning 'surf' or 'beating of waves'), stood in stark contrast to the surrounding World War II era bunkers. *Priboy* had everything that could be desired of a modern training center, including weightlifting room, swimming pool and more. The windows gave a great view of the statue of Catherine the Great further down the coastline, and watching the churning
ocean outside provided an odd sense of tranquility even during intense training sessions.

In both Kaliningrad and Baltiysk, I had been struck by how much many of the inhabitants valued the German history of the region, both in the positive way they spoke about the old German architecture (contrary to the negative attitude towards Soviet era architecture), and in how positively they viewed modern Germany as how a good society should be like. Inside the Priboy training center, the music that was played over the loudspeakers was most often Western, and a significant amount of this was German. It was also seemingly more common for people to speak German than English. When I attempted to communicate my needs in the center's reception during one of my first visits, I was greeted with attempts to communicate in German. Unfortunately, my own German was worse than my Russian. This focus on the region's German heritage foreshadowed many of the issues I would be dealing with later in relation to political activists, and which will be dealt with later in this thesis.

The End of My Stay
I was sitting in my apartment one morning in early March, when the militsiya (lit. 'Militia', though used as the Russian word for police; since renamed politsiya) came knocking on my door. They took me down to the police station, where I was informed that it was not legal for a foreigner to live in Baltiysk. This was contrary to what I had been hearing people say for over one month now, and took me by surprise. Even people who lived in Baltiysk had seemed sure that the law had changed. Because of my breach of Russian administrative law, I was fined 2000 rubles. But worse, I also had to move away from Baltiysk before the day was over. My exit from Baltiysk was hurried, to say the least. Though I was too stressed to think about it at the time, I later reflected that I was not the first person to be evicted from Baltiysk. After World War II, when Kaliningrad Oblast was created as a Russian region from parts of the German province of East Prussia, thousands of people suffered much worse fates than my own, when they were evicted from their permanent homes. Even though I had only been living in Baltiysk for a little more than one month, being forcefully separated from the town was still quite painful. For a long time afterwards, I was filled by a melancholic yearning to go back. Ironically, this melancholic yearning was precisely what I was looking for in my informants, as many of them also yearned to go back to times and places which were now either gone or inaccessible. I was later able to find this sort of nostalgia among my informants, and it forms a central issue that is discussed in this thesis.

After being expelled from Baltiysk, I returned to the city of Kaliningrad, where my fieldwork among political activists continued as before. My relations with them even improved, as we now shared some common negative experiences with Russian authorities.
Kaliningrad

In its current form, and especially with its current ethnic composition, Kaliningrad is a very young city, rebuilt from the ruins of Königsberg by the Soviet Union shortly after World War II. The name Kaliningrad, in addition to referring to the city itself, is also used to refer to Kaliningrad Oblast, the administrative subdivision of which the city is part. Russia itself is composed of 83 federal subjects of various types, of which Oblasts are the most common type, with 46 federal subjects being Oblasts. The other types are Republics (21), Krais (9), Autonomous Okrugs (4), Federal Cities (2) and Autonomous Oblasts (1). These federal subject have varying degrees of autonomy, based both upon their type and on other specifics. Though Russia is often conceived of as a singular entity, at least in the west, this is not completely descriptive of reality. In everything from the varying degrees of autonomy given to different federal subjects, to the competition for control that is fought between various state agencies, Russia emerges as anything but unified. This is especially visible in Kaliningrad, where many desire increased independence from Russia, as will be made apparent later.

In general, Oblasts are the type of federal subject which are the most tied to the central government in Moscow. In Kaliningrad, this central control is perceived by many, activists and others alike, to be restricting the region's development, as the Oblast is increasingly slipping away from the rest of Russia in its economical ties and ideational influences, which are often closer to western Europe. This is causing some people to argue and campaign for giving Kaliningrad greater independence, either through changing the region's status from an Oblast into that of a Republic, or through severing Kaliningrad's ties to Russia altogether, which is characteristic of the Baltic Republican Party's stance. The campaigning for such increased independence, however, has not gone uncontested. Other groups, such as the National Bolshevik Party, as well as a large amount of apolitical people, wishes that the region retain its close ties with Russia as a whole.

Cityscape and Architecture

The city of Kaliningrad is organized around Lenin Avenue (Leninskiy Prospekt), which runs north-south through the city. Various other avenues, such as Moscow Avenue (Moskovskiy Prospekt) and World Avenue (Prospekt Mira) run from or through this avenue to bind the rest of the city together. Along Lenin Avenue lies various landmarks, including (south to north) South Station, Königsberg Cathedral, Immanuel Kant's grave, the House of Soviets, Hotel Kaliningrad, the Plaza, the Mother
Russia monument, Europe (Evropa) shopping center, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, Victory Square and North Station. These landmarks have several levels of importance, both as markers for spatial pathfinding, and as conduits of social action due to their connections with a Halbwachsian (1950 [1980]) understanding of collective memory.

A strange blend of architectural styles from different eras make up the Kaliningradian cityscape. Prussian forts and cathedrals, as well as some surviving German residential homes, stand side by side with Soviet era tower blocks, contemporary apartments and newly built replicas of old, Prussian houses. While contemporary buildings are being developed in a wide variety of styles, they all stand in stark contrast to buildings of the former Soviet and German eras, which are both easily recognizable. An identification is often made between these specific periods of time, and these buildings as the embodiments of these times in the landscape. These periods of time are further identified with certain forms or ways of life, and such buildings thus come to have meaning for the people who live in and near them. A common model in Kaliningrad for understanding the cityscape, especially among young people who grew up after the fall of the Soviet Union, posits the German architecture as filled with positive values ascribed to perceived German ingenuity and technical ability, while Soviet architecture is connected to the negative values such as decay and corruption, which are seen as continuing problems in Kaliningrad today.

A Short History

The area surrounding the city of Königsberg / Kaliningrad, once the greater part of historical East Prussia, has a long history that began before the city itself existed. The Old Prussians, an ethnic subgroup of the Baltic people, further divided into tribes (Sudovians, Galindians etc.) were the area's native, autonomous inhabitants up until the 13th century. From this point on, the area was gradually conquered by the Teutonic Order, a militant order of German crusader knights with the self-defined objective of Christianizing the Baltic region, which was at the time home to the polytheistic religion of the Old Prussians. The Order founded the city of Königsberg on the newly occupied territory, using it as their base of operations. Over time, the population of Old Prussians were assimilated into the populations of Germans and Lithuanians, which had become the dominant ethnic groups (Gimbutas 1963). This process of forced ethnic assimilation and displacement would repeat itself several hundred years later, this time befalling the Germans.

Königsberg eventually came to be the property of Prussia, and was later on incorporated into Germany when the nation was unified. After World War I and the reinstitution of Poland, Königsberg was isolated from the rest of Germany. This was one of the reasons given by Nazi

6 For a general history and political analysis of the Kaliningrad region, see Krickus (2002)
Germany for declaring war on Poland in 1939, namely in order to get rid of this so-called "Danzig Corridor". During World War II, Königsberg was first bombed by British forces in 1944, before the Soviet Union besieged the city the following year. The resulting Battle of Königsberg raged in the early months of 1945, and was one of the last German bastions to surrender, long after the Soviet front lines had moved past the city and on towards Berlin. The battle left the city depopulated and in ruins, with much of the old German architecture having disappeared (Krickus 2002; Denny 2007).

The Soviet Union acquired Königsberg after World War II, as a new Oblast of the Russian SFSR, the dominant partner in the Soviet Union. This direct territorial conquest stands in contrast to post-war Soviet buffer states such as East Germany and Poland, which remained independent from the Soviet Union, and retained a degree of internal autonomy. The acquisition of Königsberg was accepted by the other Allied nations in 1946, even before the division of Germany itself was finalized. In the same year, the city was renamed "Kaliningrad", after Chairman of the Soviet Union Mikhail Kalinin, joining a Soviet tradition of renaming cities after the Union's leaders (Leningrad, Stalingrad etc.). Other towns in the area were also given Russian names, which were not mere translations from German to Russian, but completely new names which wiped away the German ones completely. Pillau became Baltiysk, Rauschen became Svetlogorsk, Fischhausen became Primorsk, and so on. Streets were also given Russian names, and before long, most German references in the landscape had been removed. To recreate Königsberg and East Prussia as completely Russian, however, simple renaming of places was not enough. Places are connected to the people who live there, as the Soviet leadership soon realized, and had realized many times before when entire ethnic groups were deported from their homelands to Siberia, Kazakhstan and other places. Between 1945 and 1950, all registered German citizens were expelled from the area, being sent to the DDR, and to various places within the Soviet Union, which often meant Siberia. The German presence in what had now become Kaliningrad was at an end. The region had new owners, and by the end of 1946, about 200.000 Soviet citizens had settled in the newly created Oblast, growing to more than 600.000 by 1959 (Krickus 2002:40). The German influence was not entirely gone, however, and was still physically visible in many remaining buildings that had survived the war. Neither was the German historical heritage forgotten by the new citizens, who paradoxically worked to retain it. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this fondness for everything German has become increasingly important, and in other ways than before. This includes naming conventions, with many campaigning for the return of the original German names of towns and cities in the region, and especially to Kaliningrad / Königsberg itself. This has not happened so far. There has, however, been some recent efforts to rebuild some of Kaliningrad's German heritage, including repairing Königsberg Cathedral, reconstructing a Baltic fishing village in the center of
Kaliningrad, as well as talks about rebuilding Königsberg Castle.

The city and surrounding areas were gradually rebuilt after the war, but in a completely different architectural style. These buildings consist of robust and functional tower blocks, often adorned with reliefs depicting Lenin or other important Soviet persons and symbols. The remains of Königsberg Castle, perhaps the most primary landmark of old Königsberg, were demolished in 1968. The House of Soviets (Dom Sovietov) was built in its place, though the building design proved to be architecturally unstable, as it sank into the subterranean remains of the castle, and it remains unfinished and unused to this day (Krickus 2002). Its supremely visible placement alone in the center if Kaliningrad, ensures that it for many stands as the most cogent symbol of the failure of the Soviet Union. The Soviet architecture has decayed over time, as have the even older German buildings, though there is a general consensus among people that the latter has stood the test of time much better than the former. This urban decay has apparently increased in speed since the end of the Soviet era, as the state retreated from their former responsibility of building maintenance. At the same time, new buildings built by private actors in contemporary architectural styles have increasingly sprung up across the city. Architecturally, the city of Kaliningrad is thus divided into three distinct phases: German, Soviet and Post-Soviet, often existing directly adjacent to one another.

**Current political situation**

During the Soviet era, citizens of Kaliningrad had relatively free access to nearby Lithuania. As Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union, it was relatively easy to gain access. When the USSR collapsed, new areas were immediately opened for citizens of Kaliningrad. The West, for a long time idealized and mythologized in Russian public discourse and writing (Yurchak 2005:158-206), was suddenly opened. Though visas were nearly always required for visiting such countries, control measures were often lax, due to the new era of friendship between Russia and the West in 1990s.

This situation did not last for very long, however, and was soon completely reversed. In 2004, Poland and Lithuania joined the European Union, also signing the Schengen Agreement, which eliminates border controls between member states, but also mandates strict border controls towards non-member states as a way of limiting immigration into the EU. This has pejoratively been called Fortress Europe, in reference to Hitler's idea of Festung Europa. This new development left Kaliningrad geographically cut off from the rest of the world, as an island in the middle of Europe. Gaining access to neighbouring Poland and Lithuania can now be exceedingly difficult and time-consuming. The only way to reach mainland Russia without several visas is now by plane. Thus, while the collapse of the Soviet Union is usually viewed as an event that opened eastern
Europe to the world, not to mention opening the rest of the world to eastern Europe, the effects have been exactly the opposite in Kaliningrad, which in many ways has become increasingly isolated from the rest of the world. At the same time, the imaginary West described by Yurchak (2005:158-206) is more teasingly close than ever.

Economically, Kaliningrad has become increasingly wealthy in recent years, which is visible in the changed and changing cityscape. This close contact with "Western wealth" coming into the Oblast, while being unable to experience all the other things associated with the idealized West, contributes to a feeling of "being trapped", as many choose to describe it. Some political groups, such as the Baltic Republican Party (p. 18) seize on precisely this sort of sentiments in their political activism.
3

Activism

My original intent when arriving in Kaliningrad was to focus almost exclusively on the National Bolshevik movement, whose members are referred to as natsboly (singular natsbol), a shortening of the Russian natsjonal-bolshevik. I was hoping to find a network of National Bolsheviks large enough to occupy me full time. Had I arrived a few years earlier, I might have found just that. At its height, the National Bolshevik Party in Kaliningrad might have had as much as 800 members, according to various statements from remaining natsboly. Now, however, active membership has declined to about 20-25 people. Because of legal problems with state authorities, these members are careful not to publicly state that they are natsboly, especially in the context of performing political activism. This means that there might potentially be many more who share National Bolshevik sentiments, but choose to remain outside of any public political party.

These natsboly are involved in various forms of political activism in Kaliningrad, often in league with other activists who do not consider themselves to be National Bolsheviks. Natsboly were not always working together at rallies and demonstrations, but instead they were individually active in various other movements. To understand how this is possible while still remaining as a united movement, it is important to first understand the basics of how oppositional political activism in Kaliningrad is organized. Simply put, the organization of oppositional political activism in the Oblast is based on a large network of loose alliances. The only clearly visible common denominator of nearly all the involved activists is an anti-Putin, anti-Kremlin stance. Events, demonstrations, rallies etc. are often organized through specific groups or movements who specify a cause or theme for the event, which is nearly always at odds with mainstream Kremlin or local parliament politics. Other parties, movements and people are then invited, or show up, in support of this cause, often to deliver their own view on the matter, and help define their place in the public counter-discourse (that is, counter to the discourse provided by various institutions of the state). For example, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which is the largest opposition party to United Russia on a national level, and also one of the largest organizers of political events in

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7 This is probably an overstatement. Shenfield (2001:190) estimates the membership in Moscow at approximately the same time to be 500 members, which would make the Kaliningradian membership larger than that of Moscow, which seems unlikely. Shenfield also estimates total membership to be 6000 to 7000, which has probably declined after the ban (described below), at least officially.
8 See p. 20
9 The largest political party in Russia. It's politics can be described as centrist and conservative, with a large dose of nationalism. The party is widely seen as inseparable from Vladimir Putin.
Kaliningrad, organized a march during the 1st of May, 2011. That the Communist Party should choose to march on the Worker's Day did not come as a big surprise to me. However, they also invited other groups of activists to join them. As the march started with the Communist Party in front, they were quickly followed by the Nationalist "black bloc", the Patriots of Russia\textsuperscript{10}, various liberal parties such as Solidarnost ('Solidarity') and Yabloko ('Apple'), an environmental group and various other activists. People from different political movements thus band together for common causes, and the dividing lines between such groups can sometimes get very blurry. It was frequently said by many political activists whom I talked to, that what specific movement you belong to is not that important, relative to which people you work with, and what types of activism you do. Some people also belonged to several political groups at once, among other things in order to increase the amount of areas where they could be active.

These two factors, namely the small size of the National Bolshevik movement, as well as its strong connections to other activist groups in Kaliningrad, made me reconsider my focus when it came to informants. As the National Bolshevik Party had too few members to occupy me full time, and these members were intricately linked to other political groups, I decided to search out informants in other places as well. I managed to establish contact with members of the Baltic Republican Party, who I will detail further below. Being a separatist, liberal movement, the BRP in many ways represent the ideological counterpole of the NBP, which is one of the reason why I sought out this party specifically. People from other political groupings are also represented among my informants, including members of the Communist Party, Patriots of Russia, Solidarnost, the Nationalist movement etc., as well as unaffiliated activists. In addition to these political informants, I also had access to many people who were not politically involved in any way.

My informants ranged in age from 19 to people in their eighties. Their socioeconomic status varied, but overall my informants mostly consisted of well-educated people, many of whom had gotten their education from the local Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University. Higher education, however, did not necessarily imply wealth. Many were marginalized in different ways, as described below. Many informants had lost their jobs as a direct result of their political activism, and had trouble finding new work. Others had chosen professions that tends to deemphasize wealth, at least in the short term, such as poetry and writing. Such professions are, in a way, safer, in that a poet or writer cannot be fired. Those who have been fired from their jobs because of political activism often state that their employers had been pressured to fire them by state authorities, or that the employers fired them preemptively in order to avoid trouble with the police. Since being fired, many activists experience problems being reemployed, perhaps even more so than non-activist Kaliningradians,

\textsuperscript{10} See p. 20
who also face difficulties with employment.

Overall, if including everyone who I had at least one meaningful interaction with, meaning that the interaction produced some form of data, I had somewhere between 50 and 100 informants. About half of these were non-activists. This is using the term 'informant' very loosely, however, and most of my data comes from close interaction with about 20 people (half activists, half non-activists). Six political activists, as well as one non-activist, can be said to have been key informants, whom I interacted with more extensively than others. Three of the activists were from the NBP, one from the BRP, and two were unaffiliated, but with connections to the BRP. Three of these people, as described in the thesis, were party leaders. As such, they had much influence among other activists. They were also somewhat more active than the typical activist. Therefore, my data is probably slanted somewhat in the direction of more radical and active activists, rather than more casual activists.

**Motivations for Activism**

Political activists occupy a peculiar position in the Russian political system. To a degree, their position on the fringes of Russian politics are somewhat self-chosen, in the sense that if they merely wanted political influence, they could for example have joined the United Russia party. Instead, activists from smaller parties such as the NBP and BRP have chosen to join parties whose chances of gaining political power at the moment seems slim. Thus, other factors than a search for the fastest way to political influence are of more primary importance here. Some of these factors, I argue in this thesis, are the various cultural models of understanding aspects of the world that are disseminated among the Kaliningradian population, as well as emotions such as nostalgia that are attached to these.

As I will detail in a few pages, the choice to perform political acts are often the main difference between political activists and non-activists, more than actual ideologies and beliefs. In some cases the answer is perhaps to be found in the fact that many activists come from already marginalized backgrounds. For example, many come from non-Russian ethnic backgrounds, and belong to ethnic groups such as Tatars, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Others were already unemployed before becoming activists, and had long been unable to find employment. At other times, however, such social and economic factors are seemingly not present. The search for a stronger group identity might be important for some, as being a member of a political movement positions the activist as firmly against something, namely the state. Willingly endangering one's social status in this way might seem counterintuitive, but will be discussed in some detail on p. 65.
National Bolshevik Party

National Bolshevism is an ideology dating from the early 20th century, during the time of the Russian Civil War. It should not be confused with National Communism, which was an entirely different phenomenon. National Bolshevism reached the peak of its influence in the 1930s, when Stalin and his ideologues co-opted many of the ideas of the movement during the formulation of their idea of "socialism in one country". This earlier form of National Bolshevism is in many ways distinct from that practiced in Russia today, and rather represents a resurgence of fundamental ideas, rather than an ideological continuity.

The largest National Bolshevik movement in Russia is the National Bolshevik Party, formed by Eduard Limonov and Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin has since left the party, and now wields considerable ideological influence in Russian politics, in ways that are described on p. 52. The NBP is also active outside of Russia, most visibly in other post-Soviet states such as Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine, but also in Western countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Various small groups have sprung up and died out over the years since the NBP was founded. The NBP maintains connections with these groups, meaning that since the founding of the movement, the National Bolshevik Party has become an international movement, albeit a small one.

In broad terms, National Bolshevik ideology represent a fusion of the ideologies of Nationalism and Communism. In the case of the NBP, this nationalism is Russian nationalism, though over time there has been a change of focus from pure Russian ethnicity, to self-identification with, and being considered part of, Russian "culture". One of the effects of this turnover is the NBP over time losing many of its racist elements, with many of the hardcore racialists having joined the splinter group National Bolshevik Front. When I was in Kaliningrad, at least one of the members of the NBP was of Central Asian descent, a group of people despised by many Kaliningradians. Unfortunately, party leader Grigori11 stated, the party and the city's general nationalist movements still had many racists. This sort of nationalist racism is, however, often disentangle from common Russian everyday racism, which is extremely common in Kaliningrad, and could be found among all political groupings I interacted with. The Communist part of NBP ideology indicates a belief in communism as the most desirable way for the state to deal with economic and state-structural issues. Nationalism, especially in the form of a belief in "Russian culture", is on the other hand often invoked as a way of dealing with moral issues, such as drug use, homosexuality and so on. Russian nationalism also has strong connections ideas of Russian soil, native land etc. which will be detailed later. Appreciation for various aspects of the Soviet Era is often expressed by NBP

11 Also one of the central organizers of the city's nationalist and Straight Edge movements.
members, including for important leaders such as Lenin and Stalin. Some of the themes that are often talked about is the issue of state welfare, which was widespread in Soviet times but is now all but absent, as well as a wish for the state to take a more guiding role in the moral development of its citizens, instead of leaving them to be shaped by liberal market forces. An example of this, that was expressed to me by two NBP members, is that the state should intervene in public displays of homosexuality, in order to protect its citizens from such perceived moral depravity. But while there exists a wish for a return of a more "Soviet-style" rule, there still exists much ambiguity among natsboly about certain aspects of the Soviet Era. There is widespread recognition that the Soviet system was not perfect, and that changes to the system would need to be made. All the same, the restoration of Russian international integrity and recognition that the nation enjoyed as the perceived leader of the Soviet Union remains paramount to many members. To many people in Russia who self-identify strongly with their nation, natsboly or not, this sudden loss of prestige at the fall of the Soviet Union, along with a failure to regain it in subsequent years, is perceived as directly emotionally painful. Thus, such thoughts and emotions are not exclusive to the natsboly. Rather, it is their political expression that differentiates the NBP from "normal people".

Researcher of fascism Stephen Shenfield (2001:209) argues that NBP ideology has some contradictions. Limonov has for example on various occasions expressed admiration for leaders that are vastly ideologically different, such as Joseph Stalin and anarchist Nestor Makhno. Thus, "he equally lionizes the secret police chiefs who uphold the power of the totalitarian state and the rebels who seek to overthrow all state power" (Shenfield 2001:209). Answering a letter in the Limonka newspaper, the official organ of the NBP, Limonov attempts to answer why the NBP is riddled with such seeming contradictions:

Banal ideas are always untrue. Only paradox is true. The very name of our party is paradoxical from the point of view of customary logic. Our ideology is paradoxical, combining within itself conservatism and revolution, nationalism and Eurasianism, hierarchy and equality. The way we see the situation is paradoxical; so are the remedies we propose. But the merit of man as a species is his ability to overcome banality, to stretch his thought and will, to grasp what is hard to grasp, and to accomplish what is hard to accomplish (Limonov 1997, quoted in Shenfield 2001:210)

Shenfield (2001:210) further argues that such inconsistencies are less serious than they appear, as NBP ideology is mainly defined by what it is against (i.e. the 'evil triad of liberalism/democracy/capitalism'), rather than what it is for, which brings to mind Barth's (1969) theories on ethnic groups and boundaries, where ethnicity is also described as being primarily self-
defining by who one is not. Shenfield (2001:210) further connects this love of paradox to NBP's provocative style, functioning alongside obscene language and striking artwork as a shock tactic.

As previously stated, the NBP has shrunk in size in recent years, at least in Kaliningrad. The main reason for this, according to remaining members, is the passing of several resolutions by the Russian Supreme Court from 2005 to 2007, which outlawed the NBP, on the grounds that the party violates Russian law by declaring themselves as a political party without being registered as such. Finally, the NBP was also branded as an extremist organization, and many members increasingly experienced problems with the authorities. At about the same time, the local party leader in Kaliningrad, Grigori, was jailed for three years after an incident during a political demonstration. This also added to the decrease in membership. At the time of my fieldwork, Grigori was out of prison again. In the meantime, Fyodor¹³ had functioned as the leader of the movement, and the two now shared the leadership. Before the ban, natsboly in Kaliningrad met and even lived together communally in a sort of "clubhouse" devoted to the purpose, but this has stopped since the ban.

**Baltic Republican Party**

The Baltic Republican Party is a local party that is active only in Kaliningrad Oblast. The reason for this is that their ideology is focused specifically on achieving greater independence for the region, and political activity in other regions of Russia would thus be pointless. A law in the Russian legal code makes it impossible for local parties to register officially, as any political party requires a set number of members from various regions of Russia in order to register. Because of this law, the BRP has been unable to register officially, leading to the party's formal ban by the Constitutional Court in 2003. Despite this setback, membership in the BRP is increasing according to Leonid¹⁴, who claims about 500 members. There is also a certain amount of support among the general population of Kaliningrad for the party's fundamental idea of increased independence for the region, though this does not necessarily imply a wish to separate from Russia completely. Many of these people have also never heard about the BRP, despite the party being active since 1993.

Apart from the BRPs separatist stance, the party generally promotes liberalism, though Leonid also expressed during an interview that the BRP will accept people with any political stance into the party, as long as that person shares the party's fundamental view that Kaliningrad should be

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¹³ Deputy to one of the elected opposition politicians in the local Duma. Leader of the city's anti-nuclear movement, who protest the future building of a nuclear power plant on Kaliningradian soil. Fyodor was in 2011 sentenced to prison for two years on corruption charges. He escaped to Lithuania for a while, but returned in 2012, and was jailed.

¹⁴ One of two party leaders in the BRP. Has spent several years of his life in the UK in the late '90s / early '00s. Leonid maintains many links to pro-independence movements across Europe, and Germany in particular, as well as to political activists in Kaliningrad.
more independent from Russia, and closer to Europe. The party has strong pro-Western leanings, with independence from Russia going hand in hand with a wish for greater integration with the rest of Europe. This wish to move closer to the rest of Europe is an increasingly popular idea outside the party as well. Kaliningrad is already more Europeanized than other Russian cities, and has an old German heritage, which by many is valued above the Soviet one. Also, the countries neighbouring Kaliningrad (Poland and Lithuania) having joined the Schengen Agreement, makes it much harder for Kaliningradians to go abroad. It is for this reason that the BRP refers to Kaliningrad Oblast as a prison in the middle of Europe; a prison that houses one million people. This sentiment is echoed, though usually in milder terms, by other people as well, including non-activists. Along with it's pro-Western stance, the members of the BRP generally value the region's German heritage. The party is campaigning for returning the city's name to its original German name 'Königsberg', accusing politicians of maintaining the Soviet heritage of naming cities after political leaders, long after cities like Leningrad and Stalingrad have reverted to their original names. Many people in the region, especially those of younger generations, already use the name Königsberg or, more often, its shortened, Russianized form "Kenig", when referring to the city. Pro-German sentiments in general are also extremely common in Kaliningrad, which is apparent in a myriad of ways, one of the most obvious ones being the sheer amount of people who speak German, who sometimes seem to outnumber the English-speakers. Conversely, the view of the Soviet Union is mostly negative among BRP members, and its heritage is looked upon as something that one needs to get rid off. This includes attempts at changing the city's landscape, for example through party leader Leonid's campaigning to remove a statue of Aleksandr Marinesko, who was proclaimed a Hero of the Soviet Union in 1990, just before the Union came apart, which is detailed further on p. 75.

The BRP's pro-Western stance should not be taken as an indication that members' views on foreign influence is unilaterally positive. While BRP's members want Kaliningrad / Königsberg to be independent, they also want it to be self-reliant. During a talk with Leonid in a local jazz café, he expressed to me his irritation over the arrogance of many Germans who want to reclaim Kaliningrad for Germany. Like he said, "They can't come here and take away my home! I am the landlord (khoziain) here!". He further indicated that while he wanted Germans to start coming back to the region, it was out of the question to simply give back plots of land where Russian families had now been living for generations. While Leonid regards the expulsion of Germans from the region as a war crime, it would simply be a new war crime to expulse the Russians now. Thus, even the BRP's uncharacteristic (for Russian politics) pro-Western stance does not imply a "selling-out" of Kaliningrad / Königsberg to Western powers. Such considerations aside, the BRP, like the NBP, maintains an international network. The BRP works with people and groups who are sympathetic to
their cause, and Leonid often travels to Germany in order to build networks there.

Other Activists

In addition to the NBP and the BRP, I have also been in contact with a variety of members of other political parties, some of the more important of which are described below. In Kaliningrad, two of the largest activist parties are the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Patriots of Russia. The latter is relatively small on the national level, while having a relatively large local following in Kaliningrad. While Patriots of Russia's official ideology is influenced by socialism and left-wing nationalism, many members subscribed to more right-wing policies as well, meaning that the party in many ways functions as an umbrella-organization for political activists, at least in Kaliningrad.

The ideology of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) should not be equated with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or even communist ideology, on a one-to-one basis. While certain socialist aspects are prevalent in the party's ideology, many members are also socially conservative, which marks the party as very distinct from communist parties in Western Europe, which tend to be socially progressive. Radical socialism has also been toned down in recent years. Among younger party activists, however, the ideology tends to be more radically socialist. I have mainly interacted with these younger activists.

The Nationalist grouping in Kaliningrad consists of several smaller organizations that work together. During demonstrations they often form a "black bloc" of people dressed in mostly black clothing. Grigori, one of the leaders of the National Bolshevik Party, was also a central person in organizing the nationalists, which enabled me to interact with some of the people in this grouping. Many nationalists and natsboly are also Straight-Edgers\(^\text{15}\). Abstinence from drugs and alcohol is also common among other political activists, though for different reasons, as I will later explain. Grigori was keen to point out that NBP and the nationalists did not have any direct connection to racism beyond the personal racism of some members, though the police often intervened in their actions on such grounds, accusing them of extremism.

A group of political bloggers calling themselves Amberkant\(^\text{16}\) is also highly influential among activist circles in Kaliningrad. In addition to blogging, they also organize meetings where they invite people who are perceived to be important. An example is National Bolshevik author

\(^{15}\) Straight Edge (abbreviated sXe) is an offshoot of the Punk subculture, whose adherents refrain from a wide variety of perceived moral vices. These vices commonly include smoking, drinking and narcotics, and sometimes eating meat and having sex outside of marriage as well. Straight Edgers often organize themselves into 'crews', which can consist of anything from a circle of friends, to a larger organization with specific ideological goals. This subculture originated in the West, and is also widespread there.

\(^{16}\) Reflecting Kaliningrad's connection to the production of amber products, as well as to Immanuel Kant.
Zakhar Prilepin, who came to hold a speech at the local university in February 2011, before conversing with Amberkant members in a get-together at a restaurant that evening. It was here that I first realized how widespread National Bolshevik ideas are, through people reading books by Limonov, Dugin and Prilepin. Even among people who do not consider themselves part of the ideology, such books are quite popular.

In addition, many activists chose to not be active in any specific political party, instead becoming freelance activists, often performing activism on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds. Being unaffiliated does not imply, however, that these activists live in a vacuum relative to more organized groupings. Like with all other groups, there is considerable interaction with other activists of various ideologies. Those unaffiliated activists whom I interacted with mostly considered themselves to be of a liberal, democratic inclination, and I got in contact with them through my interaction with one of the leaders of the BRP.

**Non-Activists**

While political activists were my main focus, I interacted a lot with other people who were not politically inclined as well. These people included a group of students / young adults in their mid-twenties, friends of friends (ranging in age from their early thirties to late forties), the owners of my flat, and so on. In some cases, these people became proper informants, as I explained in further detail about what I was doing, and they consented to becoming part of my research. However, as many of the people in this category whom I interacted with were not properly informed about my status as a researcher, at least not by me, any insight I got will be used only in the most generalized fashion.

Such non-activists often functioned as a control group, in the sense that I used them to seek out alternative and disconfirming observations (see Stewart 1998:21-22). I continuously examined the discourses, world views etc. that I commonly encountered among activists in relation to those I encountered among others in Kaliningrad. For instance, political activism, or even interest in politics, turned out to be relatively unusual among most people, where the talk usually revolves around the futility of trying to change Russian politics. It seems that political activists therefore share some belief in the usefulness of political action, which most other people do not share. This is a fundamental characteristic that distinguishes activists from many other people, and is perhaps characteristic enough that it is the acting upon such (for others) untenable beliefs that excludes activists from the larger group of "normal people", from svoi. The word svoi (in this context meaning 'us/ours') is central to understanding a widespread cultural model of group coherence in Russia. In one sense, it can be used to speak about belonging to a place or family (Paxson 2005:82).
In another sense, it can describe a distance from what is not *svoi*, like "normal people" bonding together against the state, and against politics in general, during the Soviet era (Yurchak 2005:102-103). Even though the non-politicals were mostly a control group, this is not to say that interaction with such people did not produce valuable data in itself. In fact, as a way of gaining knowledge about the day-to-day life in Kaliningradian society, this sort of interaction and resulting insight was invaluable.

On a side note, I consequently refer to people considering themselves part of Kaliningrad as Kaliningradians. Mostly, this is just a convenience to separate people living in Kaliningrad from Russians in general. But it is also due to the fact that many people, especially young ones, refer to themselves this way, as they self-identify more with the Kaliningrad region than with Russia as a whole. Travelling to other parts of Russia is often spoken about by such people as "going to Russia".

**Relationship Between Activists and Non-Activists**

All of the political parties described are quite minor in both size and influence, in relation to the population of Kaliningrad. Even on the whole, taken together, the oppositional activist movement is relatively small. While people who are not normally involved in political activism sometimes join the activists in larger demonstrations, activists often perform their activities separately from the rest of society. Oftentimes, people do not dare to participate, due to fear of repercussions. Police often publicly videotaped demonstrations, with the implication being that the footage would be used as evidence later. Several of my non-activist informants told me during interviews that Russians were afraid of angering the state, due to historical reasons connected to the Soviet Union, and to the earlier Czar. At the same time, many Kaliningradians viewed the political system as riddled with corruption, and that any intervention on their part would not do anything to alleviate the situation. The state was viewed as simply too powerful to be influenced by the general population.

Speaking specifically about the NBP, one young non-activist informant told me that she knew about a few of these activists, but that they were "pizza-faces" who were "unable to get laid", and that they were therefore involved in activism. Another informant in the same group told me that he supported many of the NBPs ideals, but that he would not become involved in politics before a revolution came about. He felt that a revolution was in the air, but that it might take some time to start, and that he was ready to join it as soon as that happened.

Antagonistic attitudes towards political activists is not something that is peculiar to postsocialist non-activists, but rather a continuation of practices that existed at least as far back as the era of Perestroika, where dissidents were seen by most people who considered themselves...
"normal people" as not part of svoi (Yurchak 2005:102-108). I would argue that it is also in these historical lines that one finds many of the reasons for the political apathy that exists among many people in Kaliningrad. Powerful narratives and cultural models that posits the political system as corrupt and unjust, coupled with ones that focus on the danger of being a dissident have been slow to die, and feelings of alienation in relation to the withstanding political system has continued into postsocialist times.
4

Method

Participation and its Limits

I have already dealt with some parts of my method in the preceding chapters, but here I will deal
some issues more explicitly. In all anthropological projects, participant observation forms the
preferred method of scientific inquiry. During recent years, there has been increasing discussion
within the field of anthropology on whether or not participant observation is suitable as a field-
defining method, or whether other methods of inquiry should also be accepted. Among the most
popular of these has been modified versions of participant observation, which still allow at least
some measure of on-the-ground fieldwork, like for example Marcus' (1998:79-104) description of
the emergence of multi-sited ethnography. My own fieldwork, however, has been primarily single-
sited. The spread-out, urban nature of Kaliningrad, however, led to other challenges described on
p.27, as well as sometimes giving the impression that Kaliningrad is a multi-sited field in itself, in
the way informants act differently in various parts of the cityscape.

I have chosen an "old-fashioned" approach to anthropological fieldwork, where participant
observation forms the core of my method. I will here discuss some elements that were part of my
method, as they apply to this specific setting. Before fieldwork commenced, I had made the
commitment to participate in as many spheres of my informants' lives as possible, from their
participating in public political demonstrations to their private lives at home, in an attempt to seek
out thematic overlap in the performance of political activism, and the rest of their lives. In this, I
was largely successful. Participating in demonstrations, pickets and other forms of activism, I was
able to gather much data about subjects that interested me. I was also able to participate in various
activities which can seem at the same time public and private, like going to the movies, the pub and
so on. Towards the end of the fieldwork, some informants increasingly began to let me into some
aspects of their personal lives, providing me with much valuable insight. In addition to participating
in direct political activism, I was also able to participate in connected events, such as party meetings
and friendly gatherings of affiliated activists, as well as in "events" that resulted from political
activism, such as arrests and court cases.

Public, visible surveillance by policemen with cameras, and other forms of intervention
directed at demonstrators by state authorities, forced me to take a more cautious stance in such
public displays. While still walking with, talking to and photographing demonstrators, I avoided
overly political displays, such as carrying banners, shouting slogans and so on. I nonetheless ended up having problems with police authorities, though as mentioned this ironically turned out to help integrate me with informants, as we now shared similar experiences. One of my experiences in this area is detailed in chapter 6.

**Language**

Language was a continuing problem for me during fieldwork, especially during the first months. I had started my Russian language training before arrival in Kaliningrad, but widespread use of slang terms among young people, as well as the Kaliningradian habit of talking relatively fast, made understanding initially difficult. I was ultimately able to understand most of the Russian conversations I heard, as well as to make myself understood, but I make no claims on mastery of the Russian language. The language problem was partially mitigated, however, by conversing in English, using trusted translators, as well as my access to three native Kaliningradians with a university level education in English.

**Data**

In my fieldwork, I have focused on collecting multiple modes of data, which can be used to triangulate and double-check observations (see Stewart 1998:28-29). The types of collected data takes several forms. The first of these forms can be called pre-existing data, that exist before anthropological observation, but whose value as data depends on anthropological analysis and interpretation. Examples of such data include texts, articles, blogs and art. I have collected many underground newspapers, that are mainly passed along from hand to hand among political activists, and to people who are not politically interested. The other primary form of text which I have collected is blog-entries from Kaliningrad's very active political blogging community, which has direct ties to other forms of political activity. These forms of data provide some insight into the narratives of various political activists in Kaliningrad, but is in many ways disassociated from the public, social arena, and in need of real-world contextualization before analysis. I have therefore concentrated mainly on collecting other forms of data through participant observation. This type of data was collected from contexts described above, and consists of scratch notes taken during semi-formal interviews, recollections written shortly after the situation has resolved, sound-recordings and so on. I have concentrated on recording not only what has been said, but also on putting what was said in a specific social context, describing the environment and general "mood" of the situation and so on. In fact, narratives and interview material forms a very small part of the ethnographic examples used in this thesis, in a deliberate attempt at guiding my own and the
reader's attention beyond what is being said, to what is being done, and to what is happening behind
the stage. I have several reasons for doing this. Firstly, I argue that it is methodically useful to
attempt to go beyond socially expressed narratives, where the content is often spoken to achieve
certain social effects. The political narratives used by activists in Kaliningrad is often especially
difficult to take at face value, as the narratives they use have the particular goal of achieving social
change. While this is in itself interesting, it is outside the scope of this thesis. Secondly, there is an
ethical dimension here. Some activists asked that they not be quoted directly. On a more general
level, I have decided to avoid direct statements that might get activists into trouble with authorities.

Positioning
Before going into the field, I was aware that my close interaction with political activists might cause
some problems with Russian authorities. This was also confirmed by my informants a few days
after my arrival, when Fyodor and Grigori stated that by talking to them, I might be seen as working
in league with them, thus potentially causing such problems. Their statements, proved to be quite
prophetic, as I had trouble with authorities on several occasions, with at least one of my arrests
being because of my interaction with activists. Thus, despite my attempts at appearing to be neutral
in relation to the conflict between activists and authorities, my interaction with activists was
perceived as cooperation, making my attempts at neutrality unsuccessful. Nonetheless, in this thesis
I have attempted to maintain an academical neutrality in my description of the events that occurred.

In relation to my informants, I always took on the role as an anthropology student. By this, I
mean that I was always been truthful with anyone I talked to that I was writing a thesis, and that I
was in Kaliningrad to do research. As the fieldwork progressed, this also became a necessity for my
own sake, in order to maintain a professional distance. This is not to say that I did not slip almost
automatically into other roles as well. I suspect that some informants wished to place me in a
preexisting social category, and I was often treated as a friend or acquaintance by people I got to
know, albeit always one who did not fit the role perfectly. Conversely, I also think that some people
preferred to shut me out of their lives, rather than deal with the trouble of categorizing me. This was
also at least partially due to my role as a fieldworker, according to verbal accounts that came to me
through informants who had talked to some of the people in question. The reason given to me for
not wishing to initiate contact was the fear of losing anonymity, and thus being exposed to state-
mandated repercussions. This precluded contact with some potential informants, though it was not a
common occurrence. Everyone who I was properly able to inform about the anonymization issue
agreed to talk to me, and none of them cut the contact later. A potential result of this, however, is
that the data might be slanted in the direction of people who are more vocal in their opinions, and
willing to risk such repercussions, implying that some of the more moderate versions of activism might be underrepresented in the data.

My fieldwork was spent in an urban environment, which presents some challenges in relation to anthropological fieldwork. Al-Zubaidi (2005) states that creating a close rapport with a small number of informants is impossible in an urban setting. I have nonetheless attempted to do this to a certain degree, which is reflected in my small number of key informants. Furthermore, Al-Zubaidi states that the fragmented nature of urban reality, where it is nearly impossible to focus on coherent groups like 'tribes' or 'families', mandates the use of alternative sources, such as written materials. In this thesis, I take this into consideration, by maintaining some focus on my informants' internet activity, their political newspapers, and so on.

**Ethical Dimensions**

During my fieldwork, I was surprised at the number of informants who stated they did not wish to be anonymized. Some said that they were not afraid of state repression, and had always been public with their political activism. Others thought that their activism might gain more legitimacy if they were named, and that publicity might even lead to insulation from repression, as authorities seldom act against well-known activists. Personally, I also wished to leave this decision to my informants, instead of taking the top-down, professional perspective that I am somehow more able to know what kind of consequences lack of anonymity might have for my informants. However, I have still decided to anonymize all names in this thesis. Some informants still preferred to be anonymous, and might easily be identified through their association with named persons in the text. Some persons, such as party leaders, are anyway easily identified, and these can be considered cases of "courtesy anonymization", where I have taken steps to maintain the anonymity of other activists who interact with these people.

Another ethical issue is my interaction with police and authorities. This thesis describes one of these interactions in detail, when I was arrested after a demonstration. It would be all too easy for me to attempt to defend myself against police allegations throughout this thesis. On the other hand, the arrest was directly tied to my actions during fieldwork, constituted a very valuable source of data, and altered my relationship to my informants dramatically. It is therefore impossible not to describe it in some way. In an attempt to solve this issue, I have elected to describe the situation as neutrally as possible, while hoping that I have now made the reader aware of my potentially non-neutral standpoint.
Alcohol

Anthropologists, due to their use of participant observation as their primary method, are often faced with partaking in the consumption of alcohol and drugs. To not do so might result in being relegated to a purely observatory role, or affecting what is going on to such a degree that the resulting data is affected, through inadvertently taking on the role as a culturally universal "party-pooper".

During my own fieldwork, this sort of dilemma presented itself repeatedly. To not drink, as I sometimes chose to do, would at times relegate me to this observatory role. Worse, choosing not to drink is not an isolated act that merely has consequences then and there. Many informants would rather not spend their free time with someone who is not perceived as the type of person that enjoys drinking. I attempted to solve this in several ways. Sometimes I interacted with understanding people, who continued on regardless of what I was doing. Other times I interacted with tee-totallers, of which there were many among political activists in Kaliningrad. But most of the time, I drank.

The question then becomes how valuable participant observation under the influence of alcohol is, relative to unaffected pure observation. While many drugs have the tendency to make the user introspective and socially withdrawn, alcohol has a social potential that makes it more easy for anthropologists to study. I deal with this later in chapter 15. As for the question of whether alcohol intoxication renders data invalid or corrupted, I leave this up to the reader to judge, being content with informing about its possible effects.
5

Demonstration

Introduction

This is the first of three ethnographic vignettes I will use in order to illustrate the three-stage cycle of involvement with authorities that most political activists in Kaliningrad tend to go through, namely:

1) Participating in a political demonstration
2) Being arrested
3) Appearing in court

At the end of the cycle, the activists either take various steps to discontinue it (for example by ceasing to perform activism, or by continuing their activism through more clandestine methods), or let the circle repeat itself by performing further activism. This latter option is the one most often chosen by informants I have been talking to. While arrests can lead to repercussions such as fines, loss of work and so on, it also has a tendency to cement bonds between activists who share similar experiences, as well as increasing legitimacy in relation to other activists.

The following case is taken from a demonstration against the perceived corruption and ballot-stuffing of previously held elections.

Southern Park

I had often been walking south along Lenin Avenue (*Leninskiy Prospekt*), that long main street which ties the center of Kaliningrad together. Never before, however, had I walked by foot to the street's southernmost extreme, wherefrom the cityscape grows ever more residential and peripheral the further south you continue. On this end of the street sits Southern Station (*Yuzhniy Voksal*, the formerly German *Hauptbahnhof*) which parallels the Northern Station (*Severniy Voksal*) at the other end of the street, about 3 kilometres away. Next to the station stands what could be called a "medium-sized" shopping mall, if comparing it to the numerous other such establishments in Kaliningrad, where I had scheduled my meeting with Leonid, the leader of the BRP.

I had been having trouble adjusting to the more relaxed attitude towards punctual time in Kaliningrad, which caused me to once again be early. It did not take too long, however, before Leonid came to meet me. We exchanged some informal greetings, and went into the Viktoria

17 A large food and general store chain, with shops all across Kaliningrad Oblast.
to buy some batteries for his camera. Afterwards, we proceeded across the street towards Southern 
Park (Yuzhniy Park), also called the Park of the 40 year Anniversary of the Komsomol, where the 
demonstration was to be held. Leonid warned me again, as he had done the previous day, that the 
police might search us on the way into the park. I was somewhat worried that they might take 
offense at my dictaphone, but Leonid said that it would probably be no problem. Leonid had good 
knowledge of Russian surveillance laws, having worked within the surveillance-industry for several 
years. Having also been fired from said job after being arrested for allegedly performing illegal 
surveillance, and narrowly escaping going prison for three years by using certain laws to his 
advantage, I decided to trust his judgement. On our way to the park, we ran into many activists, all 
of whom seemed to know Leonid. He explained to me that he was a very central person in 
Kaliningrad's activist movement, and that he therefore knew a lot of political activists, regardless of 
whether they agreed with his political views or not.

Police Intervention
Southern Park was not the chosen spot of Kaliningrad's political activists, but rather the place they 
had been given by the police during recent demonstrations. On earlier occasions, activists had been 
allowed to demonstrate in Victory Square (Ploshad' Pobedy) which, though being situated in the 
opposite northern extreme of Lenin Avenue, is much more centrally located. Now, activists were 
feeling that they had been relegated to Southern Park, were in addition to being less centrally 
situated, they were also less visible to passers-by due to the forested nature of the park. The 
entrances to the park are also more easily guarded by police officers than the more open Victory 
Square, which thousands of people walk across every day. This does not stop the police from 
attempting to guard entrance to rallies in such places as well, however. Luckily for us, the police 
made no attempt to search us on the way into the park, though they managed to maintain an 
imimidating presence near the entrance. When we had gotten inside, we were soon approached by a 
female activist who had just taken a photo on her cellphone, showing an OMON-van standing 
outside the park. OMON (Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya, or 'Special Purpose Police Unit') 
is an almost universally hated organization among Kaliningrad's political activists. Though 
originally intended as the Soviet (later Russian) equivalent to the special police forces of other 
countries, such as the United States' SWAT and Germany's GSG 9, OMON is nowadays often 
tasked with riot control duties, where they are known to be exceedingly brutal in their methods. 
Though Leonid did not know about any incidents where the OMON had been unleashed against 
political demonstrators in Kaliningrad, the threat that they some day might serves as a reminder 
from the police to the demonstrators that the latter are themselves responsible to make sure that any
political demonstration does not spiral out of control, while at the same time leaving it painfully ambiguous what "out of control" really means. The physical presence of the OMON, along with the physical presence of police near the park's entrances, serves as a very effective demotivational mechanism, where passers-by who are perhaps only marginally interested in politics are discouraged from attending. The threshold for participating becomes much higher when it demands passing through police searches, and potentially end up being subjected to state violence, should the demonstration get out of control. As a result of this, no more than a few hundred people attended the demonstration in Southern Park on this day, most of them being "professional" political activists who had been involved in activism for a while. At least for now, the police had managed to cordon off and quarantine the political activism to a relatively "safe" area, where it might vent itself without affecting "normal" society.

Playing it out
Inside the park, the political activists gathered around a scene, where representatives of the various political movements held speeches. Such speeches were always held during larger political demonstrations, and often featured figureheads from various political groupings, activists that had been elected to the local Duma, and so on, speaking on a variety of issues. Speakers usually talked using a special tone of voice, that set it apart from normal speech. This issue will be dealt with in several ways later on. One of the themes that was spoken about during this demonstration was the perceived electoral fraud that had plagued recent Russian elections. Occasionally, some of the speakers would make the demonstrators join them in chanting some unifying slogan. One such slogan was 'The Rats Must Leave' ('Krysy dalzhny ujti'), a slogan which was also printed on stickers and button badges, where it showed the colors of Putin's United Russia party, with the party's bear symbol replaced by a particularly nasty-looking rat. I was handed one of these buttons by an older man, a former doctor, who was campaigning as part of a doctor's union, demonstrating against being unlawfully fired from their jobs. After handing me the button, he told me to hide it away in my pocket, and not wear it during the demonstration. The public display of certain symbols were one of the things that police were watching out for. Neither the NBP or the BRP were flying any flags or banners during the demonstration, as displaying the symbols of a banned party during a demonstration would lead to immediate intervention by the police. Some of the BRP members and associates (non-members who agreed with some of the BRPs views), however, chose to wear a small, metal lapel pin, displaying the BRP logo. The pin was small enough to be almost unnoticeable, except on close inspection. Though these banned parties were not publicly showing their symbols, other groups were. As the BRP flag was banned, Leonid had instead brought along
another flag, namely the former city flag of Königsberg. This symbology of this flag managed to encapsulate the core tenets of the BRP (i.e. separation from Russia, and alignment with Germany) without explicitly connecting it to the BRP itself. After all, it was merely a historical, German flag.

During the speeches that were held on the scene, the demonstrators were not standing by as idle onlookers. Instead, many were using the occasion to intermingle with other activists, and Leonid helped introduce me to many new people. One man came walking up to us, asking who I was. Leonid replied that he did not know. At the time, I did not know why he said so, but I chose to play along. Later, Leonid told me that this man worked as an informant for the police, who was infiltrating activist circles. I also got into a talk with one of the nationalists, talking about several issues. It was from this man that I first found out how involved Grigori was with the nationalist movement, as he mentioned Grigori as one of the central organizers of the movement. One of the oldest activists in the crowd was a woman who had moved to Kaliningrad in 1948, and who was now campaigning for the removal of all Jews from the Kremlin, and from the local Duma. As the intermingling progressed, Leonid and I banded together with several other people, eventually forming a group of seven people, consisting mostly of BRP supporters and unaffiliated activists, as well as Igor, a young man from the Communist Party.

**Aftermath**

When the rally ended, the crowd dispersed peacefully, and our group proceeded to eat dinner at a nearby restaurant. On the way, I got into talks with people who would later become trusted informants, namely Pavel, Lyudmila and Oleg. They were all unaffiliated activists, who shared varying degrees of support for the BRP, as well as for Patriots of Russia and various liberal parties such as Solidarnost. Pavel expressed that he agreed with many of BRPs standpoints, but that he was more of a social democrat than a liberal, with liberalism being BRPs official political ideology. Such sentiments were common among BRPs supporters, who do not necessarily follow the party's views completely, but who see it as a rallying point for people who want increased independence from Russia.

As I talked to Igor about our respective political views, I couldn't help but notice that his views were different from those of the rest of the group. Moreover, he was part of one of the "Kremlin parties" (the CPRF), who were all widely distrusted by many activists, due to their supposed collaboration with the Putin regime. Leonid, however, commented that 'he is from a

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18 Unaffiliated activist, with some links to the BRP. Works as a lawyer.
19 Unaffiliated activist, with some links to the BRP. Good friend of Pavel. Of Uzbek heritage.
20 Unaffiliated activist, with close ties to the BRP. Also very interested in Ukrainian politics, and was in Ukraine at the time of the Orange Revolution.
21 Described by the others as one of the "new generation" communists. Linked to the CPRF.
Kremlin party, but he's not dangerous'. Many CPRF members are given this special status by other activists. In fact, the CPRF occupies a special position in Kaliningrad's political life. On the one hand, it is the second largest party in the Kremlin. On the other hand, the CPRF is one of the central organizers of on-the-ground political activism in Kaliningrad. There is talk about a "new generation of communists", associated with the CPRF, who diverges from the conservative mother party by being more leftist, and more revolutionarily inclined. According to Leonid, Igor was a member of this new generation.

While eating at the café, I also talked more to Pavel. He claimed that he and Lyudmila, who was the only woman in our group, had been arrested during a rally, and had been held by the police for 90 hours. During this time, they had not been given anything to eat or drink, except for some tea that a police officer had bought for them with his own money. They were currently in the process of taking this case up with the European Court of Human Rights. Taking their cases to this court has become increasingly popular among political activists in recent years, as it allows their cases to be judged in what is perceived as a more neutral environment, contrary to Russian courts who are perceived as corrupt and willing to support police decisions. Leonid has also sent his case to the same court. Being a lawyer, Pavel knew his way around the Russian system of law, and was currently fighting for his case in Russian court. He did not know when his last court hearing would be, but I was invited to attend, and this is detailed in chapter 7. Lawyers, especially freelance lawyers, do not necessarily have the high social status that they have in the West, and it seems relatively common for lawyers to work in opposition to state authorities, rather than for them.

Flash Mob

As the dinner continued, it became apparent that the days work was not over. After being relegated to the Southern Park for a legal but hidden demonstration, some activists had decided that they would stage an illegal flash mob right next to the Mother Russia monument, in order to get some more public attention. Though my involvement in such a demonstration would necessarily be limited, I decided to come along in order to document what happened, as well as to talk to the activists before and after the event.

After taking the bus to the monument, Leonid and I quickly distanced ourselves from the demonstrators, so as not to be associated with them from a legal point of view. The demonstrators put on masks of varying sorts, including monster masks and welding masks, the latter in order to symbolize Kaliningrad governor Nikolay Tsukanov22 who is a former welder. No explicit political

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22 Tsukanov replaced the former governor Georgy Boos in 2010. Boos was immensely unpopular in the city, and his replacement was seen by activists as partly due to widespread annoyance with his rule.
symbols were used. Instead, a pirate flag was flown behind the demonstrators who lined up in front of Mother Russia. The lack of any political symbology was done partly in order to test how the police would react to such "non-political" provocation. And indeed, the police did not intervene during the event. Instead, they stood perhaps 20 meters away, watching the demonstration carefully. People who were walking by, apparently encouraged by the lack of police interference, stopped to talk to demonstrators, and have their pictures taken with them. The whole event was over in a few minutes, after which I spoke to some of the demonstrators about the political situation in Russia, how Russia was perceived abroad (which was a topic which I was repeatedly asked about throughout my fieldwork) and so on, before people went each to their own.
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Arrest

The following case describes my own involvement with authorities following my witnessing of the illegal flash mob described in the last case. It was the third time I was involved with the authorities, after previously being arrested in Baltyisk, as well as being searched by the police during a political demonstration by the CPRF. Ideally, I would have used an example that did not specifically revolve around me to such a high degree, as there is the danger that the data might have been corrupted by my own, emotional involvement in the proceedings. However, I was unfortunately unable to attend the arrest and following interrogation of any of my informants in person. I will therefore attempt to utilize this case for what it is worth, while attempting to keep relatively impartial. Such personal involvement is not necessarily only detrimental, however, as it allowed me to experience the proceedings in excruciating detail from a viewpoint usually held by my informants, albeit without some of the added pressures that they are often put under. My experiences are also quite similar to descriptions many informants gave me about occasions where they were arrested and interrogated.

The Real Aftermath

It was two days after the flash mob that the police came knocking on my door in the morning. The circumstances were similar to my last arrest. There was only one man in charge this time around, but similarly to last time, a large, muscular man and a young, female translator were present. I was presented with an invitation to come to the police station in order to talk about my participation in the illegal demonstration two days ago. Though the thesis was formally speaking an invitation, my participation did not seem voluntary, as the officers wanted me to come along right away. After a long discussion, my friend who was also present managed to convince the officers to postpone the interrogation for a few days, as she wanted to go with me to make sure that I was not mistreated or deceived in any way.

In the meantime, I spent my time talking to others who also had problems with the police because of the flash mob. Pavel and Lyudmila had also been presented with the same invitation as me, and were going to decline showing up. According to Pavel (the lawyer), the police had been too late in presenting their protocol to us, and presenting it now would have no effect, as it would not be valid in Russian court. That is, unless one would voluntarily go down to the police station to talk to the police, thus giving juridical validity to the protocol. My friend had told the police that she would go with me (the implication being "bring me") to the police station on the agreed date,
meaning that she might face some problems if I did not show up. Ironically, the interrogation was scheduled for the same day as the state-owned channel NTV was filming me together with people from the BRP, as we were laying flowers on Immanuel Kant's grave on the dead philosopher's birthday. While contemplating what further trouble this might entail for me, I hurried from the church to the police station.

**Interrogation**

The police station turned out to be a small office space, dedicated to a small police sub-department, charged with combating civil disorder. The office was located within what was, while not a shopping mall per se (i.e. lacking the specific, open organization of shops with interconnecting walkways and "units"), a building filled with shops. We were led into a small room, sparsely but nicely decorated. On the walls hung several old calendars, the most recent one from 2010 having been converted into one representing 2011, by drawing a line through the last zero. In the room was the translator, interrogator and secretary, as well as the plainclothes officer that was present during my arrest. My friend had told me that she suspected that this man worked for the FSB. Whoever he was, he did not seem to have a clear-cut role during the interrogation.

The interrogator, a woman named Fedotova, was also the head of this specific sub-department of the police. She was well known among the city's activists as the one who usually interrogated them. She started the interrogation by asking straight out what I had been doing on the 17th of April near the Mother Russia monument. I replied that I had been photographing the event, as well as talking to the demonstrators both before and after the flash mob. The next question was whether I knew or had dealings with any of the demonstrators. Beforehand, I had decided not to name anyone, or talk about politic activism. Therefore, I replied that I had been invited to the interrogation in order to speak about what I, and only I, had been doing on the 17th, that my relationship with any of the demonstrators was not on the agenda, and that I would not talk about such matters. The plainclothes officer did not seem particularly happy with this response, saying one of the few words he spoke during the entire interrogation, namely "Why?". I responded that I would only be answering questions relating to my actions at that specific time and place. At that point I also asked, perhaps somewhat rudely, why I had not yet been read my rights, at which point Fedotova then asked the translator to read them to me. I had heard these rights before when I was arrested in Baltiysk. In theory, these rights are quite extensive. Many activists state, however, that these rights are not always upheld in practice.

At this point, the interrogation also changed gear. Fedotova confronted me with the official

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23 *Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, or 'Federal Security Service'. Main successor to the KGB.
accusation that was being leveled against me, namely that I was the organizer of the flash mob, and that I had thus breached the Administrative Law of the Russian Federation. Curious, I asked what specifically I had been observed doing, to which Fedotova answered that I had been seen talking to the demonstrators both before and after the demonstration in a friendly way, as if I knew them, and that she was forced to conclude that I was in league with them, and had helped organize the demonstration. She further stated that being as near an illegal demonstration as I was, was illegal. I asked if everyone who had walked near the monument had done something illegal, as there had been quite a few of these people. She repeated that my guilt was evident through my close interaction with the demonstrators, as I was not merely walking by and taking pictures as others had done. I said that if that was her conclusion from what I had done, there was nothing I could do, except deny that I had participated in or organized the event.

In the end, I was asked to pay a 2000 ruble fine for breaking the law, or else the case would be sent to court. As I was convinced of my own innocence, and curious to how a court would see it otherwise, I refused to confess. It had also turned out that I was not risking much by going to court. The fine could theoretically be increased to 5000 rubles, but this was still within my means. Pavel had also offered me his juridical help for free. Contrary to my informants, who risked losing their jobs and facing other discrimination, I had relatively little to lose, and much to win from seeing the Russian court system in action.

I was then told that the case would be sent to court, and that I would be informed about the court date if the court accepted it. It would also be possible to send evidence, witnesses etc. to the court. When I stated that there existed photographic evidence of me as a non-participant (i.e. photographer) in the demonstration, Fedotova told me that I would be allowed to show this evidence in court. The rest of the interrogation mainly consisted of writing forms, receiving translated documents and so on. During this time, the general mood lightened somewhat, and the writing and passing of documents seemed more like pure business that just needed to be taken care of.

Afterwards, I talked to Leonid on the telephone. When I told him that I had been charged with organizing an illegal demonstration, we both laughed. 'Those fucking idiots!' Leonid said light-heartedly 'They don't have any case on you at all. Don't worry.' A little later, Lyudmila offered me to attend her case in court, so that I would see what the proceedings were like, and I gladly took this opportunity.
Court

A month almost to the day after the police came to visit me, I went with Lyudmila to court, in order to view the proceedings of her case. The day before, I had been within an inch of being arrested again, when I was observing a group of young nationalists under the leadership of Grigori doing a run against drugs in a park nearby. I had met this group in the exact same spot where I was now meeting with Lyudmila, in Vasilevsky Square (Ploshad' Vasilevskogo). My near arrest and upcoming court case made my visit to court that day seem highly relevant, as I was interested in seeing how the court system worked.

This was the second time Lyudmila was in court for this case, having previously won the case in a lower court. The police, however, had decided to take the case further. The accusation she was being charged for, was that she had demonstrated in support of jailed Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who has become something of a political idol after his incarceration for various charges of economical crime, which many activists argue was rather because of his involvement in Kremlin-critical politics. Lyudmila did not deny that she had demonstrated, but stated that she had done so alone, thus making it legal. The police argued that she had done this demonstration together with Pavel, thus making it an unsanctioned and illegal public demonstration. Lyudmila and Pavel, however, used the counter-argument that they had been standing far enough apart from each other that they were not actually seen to be working together in unison. As Russian law was unclear about how far apart they would have to stand in order to not constitute an organized demonstration, the case had gone to court.

When we arrived at the courthouse, a crowd of people was standing outside, waiting to get in. Fedotova was also there. This was my third run-in with her, as I had also seen her in the meantime since the interrogation, while I was talking to a nationalist during the 1st of May demonstration. It later turned out that she served as the prosecutor in the case against Lyudmila. As we waited, we were approached by Boris, a BRP member who had come to support Lyudmila during her case. I had also met Boris on several occasions before. He always seemed to be wearing the BRP badge on the chest of his denim jacket, and even did so in court. Before being allowed into the courthouse, we all had to go through security checks, which included a metal detector and a guard, as well as a passport control. We all passed through without problems, but the tight security made entrance a time-consuming procedure. On the inside, Pavel came to meet us.
Lyudmila's Case

We waited for what seemed like an eternity, before Lyudmila's case started. There was no separation between the police officers and the activists in the meantime, and we all saw each other in the hallway. When we were finally called into the courtroom, I was the only one to go inside with Lyudmila, as I was going to use my dictaphone to record the proceedings. At the same time, I had the impression that the activists thought that this was something that would work to their advantage, as I would perhaps be perceived as a foreign, neutral observer, thus making sure that the case proceeded according to Russian law. The courtroom was much smaller than I expected, essentially amounting to an office. The only people present were Lyudmila, Fedotova, the judge, the secretary and myself. The case started with the judge making a lengthy statement about the nature of the case, how the proceedings would go about and so on. After this, Lyudmila and Fedotova were allowed to state their arguments, the nature of which I have described above. At one point, Fedotova asked the judge if he could make me turn off the dictaphone, as she did not feel comfortable being recorded. The judge answered that he could not do so, as bringing a dictaphone into the courtroom was completely legal. This further added to my suspicion that I was being perceived as being more directly in league with the activists than I actually was trying to be.

The proceedings ended with everyone present watching a piece of video evidence on the judge's computer. In this video, Pavel and Lyudmila was shown demonstrating in support of Khodorkovsky. The video shows Pavel standing near the Mother Russia monument holding a sign saying 'Freedom for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev! We are for the right decision!', while police officers are threatening him with arrest, unless he stops what he is doing. Lyudmila is standing nearby, sporting a t-shirt with the same slogan. After a while, the two of them change places, and at one point they are standing right next to each other, though this is after Pavel has taken down his sign, and before Lyudmila has started demonstrating. Lyudmila then stands in front of the monument in a "modelling posture", reminiscent of that used by women in the modelling industry, while onlookers take pictures. Pavel and Lyudmila change places again, and after a while they are lead away peacefully by the police.

Back in the hallway, we waited for the judge to make a decision. While we were waiting, Pavel was informed that his case proceedings were also going to be held shortly. This had taken Pavel by surprise, as he had not received any information about this. The information had apparently been sent in the mail, but as is often the case with the Russian postal system, it had never arrived. Pavel hurried off to find his friend, another lawyer, who was in the building at the time, while the rest of us continued to wait. Lyudmila listened to her case proceedings on the dictaphone over and over until the battery finally ran out, all the time mulling over what she should have done.
differently. Lyudmila's nervousness must have reached almost intolerable limits when we were finally called into the courtroom again, and even I who had no personal stake in the case, was feeling anxious at this point. There were a few more people in the courtroom this time around. In addition to Boris, who followed us inside, there were also the arresting officers. As the judge started speaking, it quickly became apparent where things were leading. Boris gave me a hidden thumbs-up, to indicate that things were going well. In the end, Lyudmila was pronounced \textit{not guilty}, as her actions could not be considered part of a public demonstration. Fedotova and the officers seemed somewhat disappointed by this, but not overly so. This is perhaps understandable, as they often deal with such cases as part of their job.

\textbf{Pavel's Case}

Lyudmila was literally jumping with joy, as we quickly proceeded from the courtroom to watch the remaining part of Pavel's case, which was being held on another floor. Luckily for me, Pavel's case was being held in two separate bouts, meaning that I was able to attend the second part. Once again, Fedotova was serving as the prosecutor. Pavel's lawyer was also there, in addition to the judge, secretary and myself. The proceedings were somewhat similar to those of Lyudmila's case, though the normal courtroom procedure was continually breached. Pavel would often rise from his seat, in order to give some comment to his defence, to which the judge would tell him to sit down and wait. Lyudmila had also been rising from her seat every time she was allowed to speak, while Fedotova never rose from her seat, and was sometimes resting her head on the wall behind her while speaking. In the break, while we were waiting for the judge to make his decision, I asked Pavel about this discrepancy in the ways the two sides acted, and whether the Russian court system was such that the accused had to stand, while the prosecution was allowed to sit. This was not so, Pavel answered. According to him, Fedotova was merely being rude, or perhaps she was not very well versed in courtroom procedure. Whether this lack of observance of ritualized bodily movement by the prosecution affected the outcome of the cases is difficult to say, but Pavel ended up winning his case as well, even though he subjectively felt that it had all gone very badly for him. While waiting for the judgement, however, we had discussed winning as a likely outcome, as the judge had probably by that point heard about Lyudmila being pronounced \textit{not guilty}. Even though this "inter-judge contagion" was not supposed to happen, it was widely suspected that it often did. The prosecution, including Fedotova, did not show up while the judge pronounced his decision, where Pavel was also found \textit{not guilty}.

On the way out of the courthouse, Pavel said that while parts of the Russian justice system was corrupt, there were apparently other parts that were not. Unluckily for me though, he said, I
was probably going to get another judge. A judge against which no political activist had ever won a case. Winning this case though, served as a large moral victory for them and other political activists, as it showed that it was possible to perform individual protests without repercussions, except having to fight for that right in court of course. This had now been proven in two instances of court, in two separate cases, and all the time with separate judges, thus helping to set a precedent.
Core Arguments

I will now begin my analysis of political activism in Kaliningrad, and how it is related to knowledge, emotions and social drama. As the example of the court case above is hopefully fresh in the reader's mind after just reading it, I will use it to illustrate some of the issues that I will discuss in this thesis.

One of my core arguments revolves around a juxtaposition of how the feeling state we call "nostalgia" is acted out in social drama through a dramatic mode of being, a mode which is again conceptualized and understood through various culturally based dramatic models (see Shore 1996:65). This is a much larger argument which I will not get into yet, but which will be gradually made clear throughout the thesis. The main purpose of these vignettes is to pinpoint how social drama is played out using different but connected dramatic models in various settings. These settings include political demonstrations, police interrogations and court cases, as already described. The courtroom setting gives us examples of how some dramatic models become institutionalized, where deviations from the script is not tolerated, such as when Pavel attempted to speak out of turn. Other breaches of protocol, however, are tolerated, such as when Fedotova sits while speaking, or leans her head on the wall. This indicates that structural power, as well as cultural models of such power relations, is at work here.

In this thesis, I take the view that people are able to act within structures and relationships of power, and to use power-from-above in ways that benefit them, sometimes paradoxically in order to change the structures and relationships themselves. Indeed, many of the empirical examples I use in this thesis describes various ways in which activists analyze, subvert and destabilize state power through legal protests, the court system and so on. I follow Vike's (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011) argument that people who might be seen as low in social status might very well be aware of the power structures that they are part of, but still seek to maintain and use these structures for various pragmatic reasons, for example to "control the actions of their relevant others" (Vike in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011:377). This perspective runs somewhat counter to the Marxist perspective of power as based on ideology and hegemony (see Marx 1867 [1992]), nor do I use the Bourdieuan idea of *habitus* (see Bourdieu 1977), where structures of power are understood as internalized, and thus in control of its subjects. Rather, I focus not so much on *why* political activists feel and act the way they do, but rather which forms such emotions and social acts take. The pragmatic reasoning described by Vike (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011) can be seen in how political activists seek not to
disrupt the political system in itself, but rather to cleanse it of corruption and bad influences. It is the contents, and not the container, that is seen as the problem. In this case, this is evident through the activists' participation in the court system, for example by Pavel working as a lawyer. The court system is seen as corrupt because of other perceived faults with the overarching social system, but not as something that is wrong as an institution. The lack of internalization of power relations are also visible in other ethnographic examples from Russia, for example in how Yurchak (2005) describes widespread counter-tactics to state control during Soviet times24, without attempting to actually change the system itself.

To serve as a defender or prosecutor in a court case requires knowledge of various rules and laws pertaining to the crime in question, as well as of such rules and laws that are involved in the courthouse procedure itself. It also requires more subtle knowledge of voice modulation, bodily posture and so on, when speaking in a court setting. Taken together, these form what I in chapter 10 speak of as a **dramatic model** for understanding, interpreting and acting in a court setting. As most people do not understand every aspect of this model, and know that they don't, they usually delegate the actual work of the court case to a professional such as a lawyer. When it comes to punishment as a result of illegal political activism, however, the direct punishment by law through fines is often less expensive than hiring a lawyer, and activists therefore choose to fight their case on their own. This can also happen even when the activist in question has an available lawyer for free, such as in Lyudmila's case. In this thesis I suggest that this is because activists actively seek to use the social drama for various purposes, and that this is a central way of both acting out emotional states, as well as a tool for exerting various forms of social influence on others.

A seeming opposite to social drama is formed by secrecy, where some social facts are hidden from view, such as my identity in relation to the supposed police informant, or from where the police gets their information. In chapter 11, I argue that such secrets also forms part of social drama, and are directly important to the performance of political activism in various ways, especially in the regulation of how emotions or knowledge are displayed or withheld.

Instead of talking about these issues together without properly defining and discussing them first, I now turn towards discussing them separately, before bringing the issues together in later chapters. I start with the issue of emotions or, more specifically, nostalgia.

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24 For more examples of resistance against state power, see Scott (1985).
Nostalgia

In chapter 12, I am going to discuss how physical objects can serve as conduits for mental knowledge and memories, which in turn provoke emotions, potentially leading to the acting out of these emotions in social drama. Before that, however, a discussion is needed on what these emotions consist of. Much has already been written on the anthropology of emotions in relation to such issues as knowledge. Take for example Wikan's (1992) description of how some Balinese scholars criticize Westerners for using only their thoughts, without emotions such as courage, and that their ideas thus do not spring alive, hinting at possible connections between knowledge, emotions and social acts. I will not get involved too heavily with the general anthropological study of emotions here, however, as much of it is not relevant to the theme of this thesis. Instead, I will focus specifically on one emotion, or perhaps a set of emotions, that is intimately connected to political activism in Kaliningrad, namely nostalgia. There is little doubt that the issue of nostalgia is highly relevant in the study of postsocialist Europe, and it keeps returning in ethnographic literature from the region, for example in the writings of Berdahl (1999:175-177) and Yurchak (2005:8, 77). Recently, there have been some attempts to deal explicitly with the theme (see Heady and Miller in Svašek 2006). Heady and Miller deal with nostalgia specifically in relation to Russia. While their focus is on rural Russia, they provide much valuable insight into Russia in general as well, and I will therefore use their article as a starting point for discussing nostalgia in relation to Russia. In the following pages, I hope to exemplify how an emotional, nostalgic connection to an imagined past serves as a central, organizing factor for much political activism in Kaliningrad, even for those people who are directly anti-nostalgic.

Nostalgia is of course heavily linked to the issue of memory. This issue has also received much attention in anthropology recently, with Berliner (2005) describing a "Memory Boom" in the discipline. As I deal mostly with the emotional aspects of nostalgia, however, I will discuss the issue of memory in relation to it only when it becomes directly relevant. Later, in chapter 12, I will as already stated discuss collective memory as it is inscribed on the local landscape, and how such memories can serve as emotional motivators and cognitive organizers of social action.

Imagined Nostalgia

Let me first clarify nostalgia's relationship with an actually existing past. As Heady and Miller (in Svašek 2006:49) points out, nostalgia can come about as a result of shared memories of real, actual
loss. Comparing the Russian villages of Moshkino and Listnoe, they find that nostalgia for the Soviet Union is more common in the village that has experienced more severe economic decline and social disruption (Heady and Miller in Svašek 2006:47). In my own fieldwork, Leonid explained to me how nostalgia for the Soviet Union is often felt by people who were treated well by the state apparatus during the Soviet Era. In the case of Kaliningrad, this often means former soldiers and officers, and their families. This was often echoed by many of my non-activist informants as well, who offered this information without me referencing what Leonid had said. If this is true, then in these cases nostalgia (or the lack thereof) has a basis in actual, lived experiences.

Though nostalgia can be based on such real memories, there also exists the possibility of what Appadurai (1996:30) calls "nostalgia without memory". That is, nostalgia that builds on the idea of time and place, rather than direct experience of it. As such, it is also subject to various processes of social construction. Like Appadurai says:

> The past is now not a land to return to in a simple politics of memory. It has become a synchronic warehouse of cultural scenarios, a kind of temporal central casting, to which recourse can be taken as appropriate [...] (Appadurai 1996:30)

Elaborating on this, it would seem reasonable to say that the past is not simply something that is remembered or not remembered. Neither is it only a struggle over which way it should be remembered, though this is certainly forms part of it. Rather, it can at the same time form a reservoir of meaning, a motivator for social action and as organizer of cultural knowledge. While Appadurai (1996:77) speaks about constructed nostalgia in relation to consumerism and advertising, his arguments are very much applicable here. For example, the natsboly who are discussed in this thesis have been subject to earlier generations' nostalgia about the Soviet Union their entire lives, and have, I suggest, partially because of this formed a nostalgic connection to the Soviet Union themselves. Appadurai (1996:77) calls such constructed forms of nostalgia 'imagined nostalgia', meaning a nostalgia for something that never was. In the case of the natsboly, the Soviet Union certainly existed, and the question becomes whether it existed in the way that they envision ("remember") it, to which the answer is that, no, it probably did not. But neither did it in the way that many older people now nostalgically remember the Soviet Union. Thus, while nostalgia has a basis in reality, it does not necessarily reflect past realities accurately. It is always to a certain degree "imagined" in Appadurai's sense, and it is my argument that anything that can be imagined can also be socially constructed. As many of the natsboly are too young to remember much (or anything) about the actual Soviet Union, they have to get their highly real "memories" somewhere else. Part
of this may come from memory connected to the landscape (see chapter 12), but in the context of Kaliningrad, many of the evocative landmarks are of German origin. Thus, there are other social factors at work here, that helps create the nostalgic emotions that the *natsboly* quite clearly have.

**Restorative and Reflective Nostalgia**

Boym (2001) identifies two strains of nostalgia: *restorative nostalgia* and *reflective nostalgia*. The two are connected, says Boym (2001:49), in that they "can use the same triggers of memory and symbols, [...] but tell different stories about it". However, restorative nostalgia is concerned with national past and future, while reflective nostalgia is more concerned with individual and cultural memory. The former gravitates towards collective symbols, while the latter gravitates towards individual narratives. And while reflective nostalgia can be ironic and humorous, restorative nostalgia takes itself dead seriously (Boym 2001:49), thus paving the way for nostalgia-dependent political movements such as the NBP. While these terms are useful in distinguishing what nostalgia is and does, I will here argue that the division into two such ideal types of nostalgia are nothing more than just that: ideal types. The public expression and "use" of nostalgia, that is restorative nostalgia, is heavily context-dependent, and dependent on the so-called reflective nostalgia of individuals. Rather than seeing the two as separate phenomenon, I see restorative nostalgia as a particularly emotion-laden form of reflective nostalgia (a dimension that Boym does not talk much about), strong enough to motivate social action based on those emotional states. Furthermore, as an outgrowth of this, restorative nostalgia has the potential to take an institutionalized form, something that reflective nostalgia lacks. Thus, my division between the two forms concern the division between collective and purely individual nostalgia, rather than a division between two idealized subtypes. What characterizes restorative nostalgia is thus one of magnitude of emotion, social expression outside the mind of the individual, and the existence of a relatively shared cultural model for expressing and understanding it.

When nostalgia reaches a certain level of public expression, it often loses its identification as nostalgia, a word which is often linked to melancholia, and may instead be called "national fervour" or something similar. Kaliningradians, for example, often speak of being filled with patriotism at certain times, for example when contemplating a statue of Mother Russia (*Rodina Mat’*). I will, however, attempt to show how such emotional sentiments is predicated upon specific notions of time, space and history, and thus warrants the nostalgic label. And if 'nostalgia' proves to be an improper term for such strong, action-motivating "nationalistic feelings", I will at least attempt to show how this is once again a question of magnitude of emotion, not necessarily different types of emotional states per se. As mentioned, Heady and Miller (in Svašek 2006:47-48) talk about degrees
of nostalgia in Russia, that are connected to actual changes in circumstances related to economy and social life. Comparing two Russian villages, they state that there exists less nostalgia in one of the villages, as there is less objective occasion for it. Hence, magnitude of emotion and actual social circumstances often correlate. It would also seem that emotional magnitude is connected to the opportunities that are provided for dramatizing these emotions, and for ordering them in relation to other emotions. These are issues that I will return to in chapter 10, where I talk about dramatic models and modes, and chapter 12, where I talk about physical objects as carriers of memory and knowledge.

**Nostalgia and Modernity**

Boym (2001) connects nostalgia to the rise of modernity, where (different from earlier) the understanding of time is not only sequential, but also progressive, advancing from a less advanced past, and towards a more advanced future. Such an understanding of time is exceedingly conducive to nostalgia, as nostalgia serves as a countermeasure to such an understanding, undermining the very idea of linear time through its preoccupation with restoring the past (Boym 2001:13). This is what Boym (2001:41-48) calls restorative nostalgia, namely a politicized version of nostalgia that is not content with reflecting over the past (reflective nostalgia), but seeks to restore it in some form. This sort of nostalgia is typical of the National Bolshevik Party, whose members seek to restore certain aspects of the Soviet Union, as well as Russian national integrity. In the same way, it is also typical of members of the Baltic Republican Party, who seek to recreate an even more distant past, while diminishing Russian control over Kaliningrad. In any case, such a restoration presumes that something has been lost, and that the melancholy feeling of loss is present. This feeling of loss is one of the fundamental building blocks that define nostalgia. What modernists understand as change, nostalgics understand as loss, which is precisely why, as Boym (2001:xvi) says, nostalgia is the historical emotion of our age. Bock (1999:232) even goes so far as to say that attacks of nostalgia is one of the hallmarks of the modern, protean man. No matter how connected this is to the emotion we call melancholia, however:

Unlike melancholia, which confines itself to the planes of individual consciousness, nostalgia is about the relationship between individual biography and the biography of groups and nations, between personal and collective memory (Boym 2001:xvi).

If Boym is right in this statement, then melancholia, though a central ingredient in nostalgia, cannot alone explain restorative nostalgia as a phenomenon. It is my argument, however, that nostalgia, can
be seen as consisting of a blend of emotions, including melancholia, which together creates something that is greater than the sum of all its constituent emotions. Moreover, in its restorative form, nostalgia has highly visible connections to social drama, which will itself be dealt with in chapter 10.

**Nostalgia and Anthropology**

Relatively little attention has been paid to nostalgia in the social sciences. Perhaps this is due to its connections to the field of psychology, through its links to melancholia, and further to clinical depression. More likely, it is because nostalgia is not normally viewed, from a Western point of view, as an action-motivating sentiment, but rather as an action-demotivating one, through its melancholy aspects. Nostalgic sentiments are often written off, such as in this example:

> There also are culturally specific “emotions” that are barely emotions at all, since they do not move anyone; they are vague feeling states like “nostalgia for the lilies of the field”; narrowly defined, shallow, and culturally specific, with little if any motivating affect behind them (Lindholm in Casey and Edgerton 2005:43)

Though Lindholm is admittedly talking about a very specific form of nostalgia, or rather in a very specific context, where the feeling states involved may not produce much motivating affect, I would argue that this is no different from a state of slight anger or sympathy, both of which might not "produce" any external actions beyond the internal feeling states they create. Once again, magnitude of emotion is one of the central factors for determining the social relevance of the emotion outside the individual.

Svašek (2006:2) writes that postsocialist Europe is a fascinating area of research for the study of emotion, but that much of the focus in research from the region has been on economical, political and social dimensions of transition, not the emotional ones. Furthermore, emotions are fundamentally individual phenomena, while being dialectically linked to social processes. Instead of viewing individuals as reacting to emotional triggers in isolation, or viewing collectivities as deterministically following common social norms of emotional behaviour, Svašek (2006:6-7) and the other authors of the book in question, views the individual as thinking, feeling, positioned and socially embedded. This is in line with how I view both emotions and cultural knowledge throughout this thesis, namely as individually centred, but embedded in emotionally significant social networks. Part of this 'social embedding' is formed by layers of more or less shared cultural knowledge, what Shore (1996:42-71) calls cultural models.

Svašek (2006:5-6) criticizes cultural constructionists who overstate the cultural boundedness
of emotional discourses, in that emotionally powerful situations such as 'danger' or 'loss' are more or less universal. I argue, however, this does not mean that nostalgia is not being in some way culturally organized, in the sense that it is based on a cultural model for not only understanding and expressing certain emotions, but also in positioning these emotions in relation to each other. For example, Svašek (2006:13) writes of how "feelings of loss and nostalgia have led to anger and outrage, empowering people to take public action". In my view, this obscures matters somewhat, by not detailing how one emotion turns into the other. If the magnitude of one emotion is in itself enough to somehow turn it into an entirely different emotion, this points to interesting things. While it does not necessarily mean that the two share a common origin, it indicates that they are organized by a common emotional script. After all, we do not speak about joy that is strong enough that it turns into anger, meaning that the organization of emotions in relation to each other is not random. Therefore, the linkages of emotions seem to follow patterns. Patterns that are based on cultural models for understanding and acting them.

Svašek (2006:14) speaks of emotional performance and sentimental drama, which are theatrical metaphors that "acknowledge that people are able to hide or exaggerate their feelings, and that they can play emotional roles with the intention of creating a certain effect in their intended public". However, these roles are restricted by institutional and cultural pressures (Svašek 2006:14), and the enactment of institutional and cultural scripts about emotion is connected to the allocation of social roles (Parkinson 1995, quoted in Svašek 2006:14). These restrictions limit what is practically possible, which as Vike (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011) writes is one of the fundamental characteristics of power.

**Nostalgia in Russia**

Concerns with time and place are often inseparable when it comes to nostalgia, as it so often is elsewhere when these two themes come up. People in Kaliningrad who are nostalgic about the 1960s are not feeling nostalgic about the 1960s anywhere, but rather about the 1960s in Kaliningrad, or wherever they lived at the time. Times, places and people become intimately connected in such emotionally loaded memories. Boym (2001:xviii) states that 'to unearth the fragments of nostalgia we need a dual archaeology of memory and of place, and a dual history of illusions and of actual practices'. Substituting anthropology for archaeology, that is what I attempt to do in this thesis.

When telling one of my non-activist informants that I had come to Russia to study nostalgia, she exclaimed that she had until then thought that nostalgia was a peculiarly Russian phenomenon. If nothing else, this says something about the centrality of nostalgia for Russian identity. Nostalgia
has a peculiar history in Russia, one that is not separate from the history of the term in Western Europe, but is instead reactionary to it. As nostalgia was regarded as a European disease, nations that wished to distinguish themselves from the old Europe often based their identity on an anti-nostalgic premise (Boym 2001:17). As Petr Chaadaev wrote in the first half of the nineteenth century:

We, Russians, like illegitimate children, come to this world without patrimony, without any links with people who lived on the earth before us. Our memories go no further back than yesterday; we are as it were strangers to ourselves (Chaadaev, quoted in Boym 2001:17)

In contrast to early nineteenth century Americans, who optimistically saw themselves as running ahead of history, Russians saw themselves as lagging behind it (Boym 2001:17). This critique by Chaadaev of the Russian spiritual longing (*toska*) and lack of historical consciousness later became features of the Russian soul (*dusha*) (Boym 2001:17), which is in many ways central to the self-definition of many Russians, and which will be dealt with in chapter 11. Even earlier, when the Russian army was entering Germany in 1733, it was struck by an epidemic of that old-fashioned version of nostalgia which often struck soldiers who were far from home, namely homesickness. The general of the army then threatened that “the first to fall sick will be buried alive”. After this sentence was carried out on a few occasions, it seems to have cured the remaining nostalgic soldiers (Boym 2001:5), or at least the public expressions of it. I would surmise that the choice of this exact type of punishment was not arbitrary either, seeing as it is heavily connected to notions of land or soil (*zemlya*). Nostalgia connected to Russia's soil was thus punished by being buried alive in German soil. Paxson (2005:203) shows how the native land (*rodina*) is in rural Russia seen as the best place to be buried. Zemlya is heavily connected to this concept of Motherland (also *rodina*). Paxson (2005:53) states that *rodina* (and *rodnoi*; a more general term indicating "one's own", nativeness, intimacy and familiarity) is connected to profound emotions. Like she says, *rodnoi* 'is a word with earth and soil in it, as well as ancestral rootedness' (Paxson 2005:53), and *rodina* is 'a word that rings with nostalgia for one's country and the sweet safety of one's own mother' (Paxson 2005:203). This is particularly true for activists from parties such as the NBP and BRP, whose restorative form of nostalgia is specifically aimed at restoring a *rodina* in some form, though they might disagree completely on what form it should take. Emotional connections to seemingly abstract concepts such as "Motherland" can thus be exceedingly powerful, and serve as a motivator for social action. At the same time, such concepts are also based on cultural models for understanding them, thus indicating that knowledge and emotions share strong
connections in how they are socially performed.

Even though Russia was perhaps an anti-nostalgic nation in the way its state apparatus chose to act, this does not necessarily say much about how its normal citizens, or even those who participate directly in the control mechanisms of the state apparatus, positioned themselves in relation to nostalgia. It would also seem absurd to say that being anti-nostalgic would entail the lack of nostalgic feeling states, just as much as it would be absurd to say that the anti-violent attitude of the Semai (Dentan 1979) would entail a lack of anger. Rather, I would argue that anti-nostalgia entails a certain devaluation of these nostalgic feeling states, as well as social control mechanism controlling their public expression. Thus, states and other such supra-individual institutions, can appear as anti-nostalgic in the meaning that nostalgic feeling states do not seem to constitute part of their apparatus for understanding and acting upon the world. This is seemingly an illusion, however, as even the Soviet state apparatus contained nostalgic elements, which I will now turn to discussing.

If Russians themselves had ever been anti-nostalgic on an “ideological” rather than emotional plane, this anti-nostalgia paradoxically seems to have gradually died out during an era when institutionalized anti-nostalgia was at its strongest. Though part of this process can be ascribed to popular resistance to state practices of control during the Soviet Era, in forms described by Yurchak (2005), the Soviet state always appeared ambivalent on the issue. If the idea of the historical nation is, from an internal and emotional perspective, based upon nostalgic feeling states, it is highly telling that the earlier form of Russian National Bolshevism should reach its highest form of public expression under Stalin, only a few years after the old Russia disappeared. Also telling in relation to nostalgia is the appellations to patriotism that was used by the Soviet state as a strategy to create anti-German emotional sentiments during World War II, which was based around creating anger at the German invasion of Russian, historical soil. Later, this was further crystallized in the annual public display of military force during Victory Day celebrations, making the remembrance of World War II itself a centerpoint for the public expression of both reflective and restorative nostalgia, all organized by the state itself. The Victory Day celebration goes on to this day, and has lately turned into a festival where the Soviet Union itself is at the centerpoint of remembrance. On this day (9th of May, 2011), the buildings around Victory Square in Kaliningrad were covered in banners depicting heroes and generals of the Soviet Union, surrounded by Soviet symbols such as the red star. It came as no surprise to me that the event was popular with many natsboly, with whom I watched a practice parade a few days earlier, where great effort was made to identify all the various armoured vehicles that rolled past us. Also unsurprisingly, members of the BRP were less enthusiastic, expressing views that the Victory Day celebration was merely an expression of Russian militarism, something that they did not wish to be a part of. In these cases,
cultural models of social drama seem to interact with models that govern the understanding of history. The models that are used by the various spectators, as well as the emotional significance that is attached to them, guide not only the way in which political activists perform their own social dramas, but also how they perceive the social dramas of others.

Thus, an event (World War II) that marked the rising of one of the world's most anti-nostalgic nations to the rise of a superpower, seems to have become subject to feelings of reflective nostalgia when the USSR fell into decline, seeking to restore the particular circumstances of that particular time in the nation's history. Later, after this union of nations itself fell apart, the Victory Day celebration has increasingly come to be symbolic for the entire Soviet Era. At the same time, the nostalgic sentiments have grown from reflective to restorative. To this day, the Russian state apparatus remains ambiguous on the issue of nostalgia, though the ambiguity now concerns nostalgia for the Soviet Union, rather than for Czarist Russia. Russian president Vladimir Putin has several times expressed his sadness at the passing of the Soviet Union, calling it 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century'\(^25\), while at the same time speaking about the futility of trying to rebuild it\(^26\). While the last part of this statement might seem directly anti-nostalgic, admitting the difficulty of rebuilding an idealized past does not automatically preclude restorative nostalgia. Indeed, the dialectic process of looking back while looking forward is an intrinsic part of the restorative nostalgia of many groups, including the NBP. As Fyodor told me during an interview, natsboly seek to use the best aspects of the Soviet Union to create a new Russia of the future, not simply restore the Soviet Union, which had its faults. This is eerily similar to the seemingly Eurasianist ideological statements espoused by Putin a few months later, during the declaration of the future creation of the Eurasian Union\(^27\). Dugin, one of the co-founders of the NBP, is now one of the central ideologues of the United Russia party, as well as a professor and director of the Center of Conservative Studies at Moscow University. The United Russia party seems to be picking up elements of Eurasianist ideology, especially in this recent declaration of the Eurasian Union.

**Dual Heritages and Nostalgia in Kaliningrad**

Walking around the city with half-Kyrgyzstani NBP member Almas\(^28\) one evening, we visited several memorials to fallen Russian soldiers of the Great Patriotic War (World War II). His

28 Ordinary member of the NBP. Faces some discrimination in Kaliningrad due to his ancestry. Describes himself as a patriot, who loves Russia. Friend of Grigori, and the two play together in a Hardcore-band.
grandfather had been a tank commander during the war. My grandfather had also more or less worked alongside the Soviet Union during World War II, when a small group of Norwegian soldiers supported the Soviet Union during the Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive in the north of Norway. Thus, the military exploits of our grandfathers became a central point of our conversation. Walking around the city's parks became a nostalgic sojourn of the city's communist past. Monuments to the fallen soldiers are quite numerous, and served as conversational material, highlighting how the landscape can serve as a conduit of collective memory and knowledge. Upon reaching a particular monument in the shape of a pillar, Almas told me that he and other people often came there to reflect, and that these reflections filled him with strong feelings of a patriotic connection to Russia. What surprised me more was that Almas spoke positively about the Prussian forts that we also encountered on our walk. I had expected that nostalgic attitudes towards either German or Russian heritage would be a point of division among people, especially among people so distinctly pro-Russian as the natsboly. The actual case, however, turned out to be far more complex. It suddenly appeared to me that the two parallel lines of heritage-based nostalgia, the German and the Russian one, were not parallel at all, but rather serve different purposes for different people in different contexts. For Almas, the German heritage, though positively valued, did not serve as a central organizer of his knowledge, emotions and social performance. I was faced with the possibility that for some of my informants, some of the things I was investigating were simply not that important. In time, however, I realized that this was in itself interesting. My informants' differing emotional connections to different parts of German and Russian heritage, then, turned out to be crucial in determining what emotions they felt, and what motivated them to social action through political activism. With these things in mind, I now turn to an analysis of social drama, which includes the acting out of emotions in social contexts.
Social Drama

Old New Year
I would like to use an introductory example of social drama here, from when I attended two celebrations of the Russian 'Old New Year' (Staryj Novyj God; based on the Julian calendar) on two separate nights. On both occasions, various sorts of divination was performed, in order to divine the coming year for the people present. One of these rituals was the act of bibliomancy, which is performed by the person being divined naming a page and a line in a book, which is then read aloud, and "believed" to say something about the future of the person. This was often accompanied with a question by the person being divined, which the text was then meant to answer. The books used was never just any book, but a book of some significance. In these cases, books by Pushkin and Plato was used, which shows how the writings of such well-regarded authors are seen as somehow meaningful, whether they are quoted outright, or used in a ritual to foretell the future. I need to stop here for a second to explain why I wrote "believed" in the way I did above. This is to show that the people who were involved in these divinations did not directly believe in the divinations themselves, at least not unambiguously. Rather, these rituals form part of an "occult", secret mode of knowledge and acting, which will become important later on.

Dramatic Modes and Models
The example above is only one example of many. Poets and authors are often recited in various occasions, often using a non-standard, modified voice filled with pathos, perhaps to denote difference from standard, unquoted speech. But it is also, I suspect, to denote the talking as part of a dramatic mode of acting, of social drama. This dramatic aspect is also visible in all three cases I have presented in chapters 5 to 7, for example in modulation of voice by speech givers, interrogators and judges. The interrogated (me in this case) and the accused (Lyudmila and Pavel in court) also use the same mode of performance in the situation where they find themselves, using a type of voice that is set apart from that of everyday conversation. The relevance of such ways of speaking in different social contexts in Russia is made perhaps even more evident by looking at the fact that animated speech can, according to Pesmen (in Berdahl et. al. 2000:201), also characterize a speaker as souled (filled with dusha). On the other hand, unanimated speech, such as that used by the judge during the trial, appears as unsouled. As such, it is perceived through the cultural models.
of the Russian soul as lacking in depth, and thus perhaps also lacking secretive and hidden aspects. This is dealt with further in chapter 11.

A dramatic mode of acting (and being), I argue, is an integral and fundamental part of Kaliningradian self-understanding and social relations, and is contrasted with a parallel secretive mode. Let me from the outset say that I do not intend to say that Kaliningradians consciously or subconsciously change seamlessly in and out of dramatic and non-dramatic modes, or that the dramatic mode is necessarily understood as separate from a "standard mode". The recitation of poetry, perhaps while standing on a chair to denote further dissimilarity from normal talk, forms a very clear example of going into dramatic mode for a specific function, and for a limited amount of time. The knowledge of how to understand and use such a mode is an example of what Shore (1996:64-65) calls a dramatic model, which is a subset of expressive/conceptual models in general, which again corresponds with what Bennardo and Kronenfeld (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011:88) would call a cultural model of action, or what D'Andrade (1992) would call a schema. Shore describe such dramatic models in the following way:

[...] ritual and drama are important ways that communities externalize and objectify otherwise inchoate or inarticulate experiences. Whatever purely personal functions such performances have, they have the social function of constituting experiences as public artifacts. (Shore 1996:65).

Even though modification of voice and body posture during the recitation of poetry forms a fairly formal and ritualized subset of a dramatic model, it is already one step removed from the even more formal and ritualized, and also institutionalized, dramatic model of formal, theatrical performances. That is, it is one step closer to the reality of daily life, than the constructed ritual of the theatre. This, to me, is an indication that knowledge about ways of acting, based on a prototypical dramatic model, can be found in even less formalized settings.

Dramaticism
My reason for distinguishing models, motivations and modes like I do, is to distinguish respectively knowledge, emotions and social acts from each other. I am not implying that these can really be surgically separated from each other, as I am indeed trying to show how they connect. The reason for making such analytical distinctions is merely in order to help illuminate such connections. I have already accounted in short for how models and motivations relate to each other through my description of nostalgia in Russia, and I will therefore here concentrate on describing how these are both related to social performances and expressions of such emotions, through what could be
termed what Turner (1982) calls social dramas. Turner is the central figure in anthropological theory on social drama, and I will build on his arguments in the following discussion. Turner (1982:9-12) links social drama to antagonism, as something that breaks the normal flow of social activity through a breach of social norms. This breach can slide into crisis, which is where the drama is acted out. Even at quiet moments, says Turner (1982:11), social life is "pregnant" with social dramas that can break out at any time. Social drama forms the "primordial and perennial agonistic mode" (Turner 1982:11), and is "the experiential matrix from which the many genres of cultural performance [...] have been generated" (Turner 1982: 78). He also views social dramas as inherently occurring 'within groups bounded by shared values and interests of persons and having a real or alleged common history' (Turner 1982:69). This last point is somewhat contrary to the views on the connections between individuals, society and culture which I present in this thesis, where social drama is viewed as occurring between, and independent from groups. A good example of this is, once again, the contrast between the NBP and the BRP, who certainly self-identify as part of a bounded group on a larger level (as Russians), but who do not have many values and interests in common, except for a general wish to change the existing political system. Even the sharing of history is problematic in this case, as people from the two groupings read their histories using different models, infused with different emotions.

One central challenge of talking about everyday dramaticism is specifying the way in which it relates to what could be called more formal expressions of drama, such as theatre and ritual. It is my view that the divisions between formal and informal dramatic models is certainly existent, but largely dependent on one another. I therefore follow Turner's (1982:11, 78, 91-92) definition of social drama described above, as a primordial mode that gives birth to genres of cultural performance such as theatre. I maintain, however, that this is probably a dialectical process, where inspiration from formalized theatre also generates models for how social drama is "supposed" to be acted out. In an attempt at unraveling this dialectic process, I primarily investigate the way in which everyday dramatic models draws inspiration from formal ones connected to theatre and ritual, rather than the other way around.

Gluckman & Gluckman (in Moore and Myerhoff 1977:227) explains that dramas should not be seen as 'secular rituals', as even though dramas and rituals share similarities, they are also in many ways distinct, for example in that they work in different social contexts, and through different mechanisms of action. Thus, they use the term 'ceremonious' to separate conventionalized symbolic forms of action or speech which do not involve beliefs in occult power, from 'ritual', which invoke precisely such beliefs. It is my argument that such a division creates an unnecessary dichotomy between occult and non-occult thought. This obscures rather than illuminates what dramaticism is,
as drama is itself partially dependent on "believing what cannot be seen". Whether or not these invisible, socially active forces correspond to a Western definition of "occult", it does not necessarily warrant such a dichotomy. I will deal with this further in chapter 11, when talking about social drama in relation to secrecy and the hidden.

Kertzer (1988) also investigates drama in relation to ritual. In defining ritual, he takes a middle-ground position, in labelling it not as strictly limited to the religious sphere, nor as any type of standardized human activity. Instead, he says, "ritual is an analytical category that helps us deal with the chaos of human experience and put it into a coherent framework" (Kertzer 1988:8), as well as "symbolic behavior that is socially standardized and repetitive" (Kertzer 1988:9). He also states that ritual is formal in quality, and that the repetitive and often redundant nature of ritual is a means of channeling emotion, guiding cognition, and organizing social groups (Kertzer 1988:9). These statements imply that Kertzer uses the term ritual interchangeably for both the knowledge ('analytical category', 'guiding cognition'), the motivations ('channeling emotions') and the acts ('symbolic behavior') of ritual. While such a viewpoint is certainly valid, seeing as they are all connected, I will argue that much can be gained by viewing them separately. Thus, my upcoming arguments is not as much a critique of Kertzer's arguments, but rather an expansion upon them. As an extension upon Kertzer's work, I attempt to unravel how ritual is intimately connected with all types of 'standardized human activity', through investigating the relationship between "formal" and "informal" dramatic models, as described above.

Ritual, says Kertzer (1988:10-11), frequently has a dramatic character. This dramatic character in turn helps define social roles, as well as provoke emotional response. This is reminiscent of how Goffman (1959) describes how people take on social 'parts' in relation to others. In relation to drama, Goffman states that people often make use of signs during their activity, "which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure" (Goffman 1959:40). Ritual dramas, says Kertzer (1988:10-11) are also found in politics. My own fieldwork was filled with numerous examples of this, with one of the most visible ones being the use of pathos-filled voice by speech-givers during political demonstrations, which can be interpreted as a signifier meant to show that what is being said has some special significance in the unfolding drama, that is set apart from everyday speech. Even more ritualistic was the following of a set scripts during demonstrations: The use of flags to identify different political movements, timed events, marching, chanting slogans and so on. Even the police filming the demonstrators often took on a ritualistic character. At least, it certainly helped define social roles and provoke emotional responses.

While Kertzer describes very well what drama does, he in part fails to define what drama is.
He uses Cohen's (1981:156) definition of drama as "a limited sequence of action, defined in space and time, which is set aside from the ordinary flow of purposeful social activity". This definition is useful in determining some aspects of drama, but it still does not specify what kind of action is implied or what its relationship with the 'ordinary flow of purposeful social activity' is, as well as seeming to imply that drama cannot be purposeful social activity. Kertzer (1988:88-89) further connects drama to vividness of symbolism and emotional excitement, while also indicating that drama comes in various amounts, and is not simply there or not, when he talks about Yukio Mishima's suicide after a failed coup-attempt in Japan, stating that "few political rituals are as dramatic as this" (Kertzer 1988:88; emphasis mine). I would argue that to search out what drama is, which is vital to understand in the search of what it does, one would need to look at how people understand and have knowledge of drama through dramatic models, and what emotions are present, as well as the magnitude of such emotions, and what causes them. This latter point about magnitude can also be connected to what Kertzer (1988:80) calls the salience, prominence and distinctiveness of different schemas in people's memories. That is, some schemas (models) are in some way more 'loaded' than others, and might be invested with a greater emotional and motivational magnitude, helping to account for how people choose to employ some schemas (models) before others. Lastly, to understand what drama is, one would need to look at how people act out this knowledge and emotion, and how well they actually master the expression in relation to shared models of how such a performance is supposed to look. This is exactly what I am attempting to describe in this thesis, namely the connections between knowledge, motivations and acts. In addition to Cohen's definition above, then, I attempt to specifically look at what types of actions drama involves, how it relates to the understanding of space and time, and how it relates to a so-called 'ordinary flow of social activity'.

The connection between dramatic performances and politicized emotions has also been noted by anthropologists writing about postsocialist Europe. Zerilli (in Svašek 2006:76-77) explicitly links the formal world of property rights in Romania with the subjective realm of emotions through the enactment of 'sentimental dramas'. The enactment of certain emotions in the public sphere serves to align people with each other, and against others. This is similar to Heady and Miller's (in Svašek 2006) views on the connectedness of nostalgia with the emotional economy, the economy being another area of human performance which is often viewed as 'formal'. Explaining Zerilli's article, Svašek says that:
The theatrical metaphors of emotional performance and sentimental drama acknowledge that people are able to hide or exaggerate their feelings, and that they can play emotional roles with the intention of creating a certain effect in their intended public (Svašek 2006:14).

Still, she continues, people are not entirely free to create and perform emotional dramas by their own choosing. Thus, I would argue, there needs to be some sort of elective mechanism at work here. One part of this is certainly power relations. Another might be emotional connections and the internalization of cultural models which are beyond a person's pragmatic control of his or her social performance. I have earlier in this thesis attempted to give some indications of such elective mechanisms, through describing Vike's (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011) views on power and hegemony. On the whole, however, such elective mechanisms fall outside the scope of this thesis, though their influence should not be underestimated.

Svašek (2006:14), through Parkinson (1995:202), connects this to the 'enactment of institutional and cultural scripts about emotions', which depend on the allocation and renegotiation of roles and stage-setting, which takes place before the acting even starts. By viewing 'performance' and 'drama' as theatrical metaphors, Svašek (2006:14) also points towards the inherent connectedness of socially expressed emotions with the formal nature of the theatre. This is reminiscent of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) argument that we live by the metaphors we use, which is an early indication that formal and informal models of social drama are somehow related.

The Cult of the Individual
Some empirical examples are in order at this point. I have already described the use of pathos-filled speech during political demonstrations. Theatrical political demagoguery, where the speaker modulates his/her voice and body language during a political speech, such as in the way it was done by Adolf Hitler, has lessened in the West after World War II, due to it's connotations with fascism and national socialism. While such inflammatory rhetorical devices do not simply create the impression that what is being said is false per se, it is often understood as a conscious "trick" by the speaker, used to create certain feeling states and actions in and by the listeners, such as described by Goffman (1959). The situation is different in Russia, where inflammatory political speech, as well as the seemingly voluntary instigation of personal and political scandals, are legitimate and effective ways of conducting politics. The oft repeated maxim, most often by Russians themselves, that Russia cannot function without a "great leader", or change the current political situation without one, can perhaps be traced to this phenomenon. Paxson (2005:109-113) describes this in terms of the Russian term khoziain ('boss' or 'landlord'), which many Russians regard as the right
and necessary way to rule and be ruled. The nation-*khoziai*n is a powerful figure of the radiant past (Paxson 2005:111), the restoration of which forms an important part of the restorative nostalgia of many Russian activists. I would also argue that when such little weight is placed on political ideology, while much weight is placed on personal characteristics (such as mastering of social drama), individual politicians take on much importance in people's minds, becoming signifiers of something more than themselves.

While these processes are very much visible on the national level with political personalities such as Putin, Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov, I would prefer to use some examples from my own fieldwork. Much has been said in recent years about the revival of Stalinism, or at least reverence for Stalin, in Russia (in relation to National Bolshevism, see Shenfield 2001). This resurgence is evident among National Bolsheviks, who often express admiration for him, as well as for other historical personalities such as Lenin. This often goes hand in hand with historical revisionism. I asked two of my *natsboly* informants what they though about the GULag-system, to which they replied that "the extent of that system has been dramatically exaggerated. I might not even have existed, at least not institutionally.". The "personality cult" surrounding NBP leader Eduard Limonov is another example. Limonov often uses dramatic flair and scandalous speech in what seems to be way of creating attention and political debate. For example, in relation to the concept of the Russian soul (*dusha*), Limonov once wrote:

That fucking Russian Soul! The fact of having it should be considered high treason, punishable by death, by strangulation perhaps. (Limonov 1998f, quoted in Shenfield 2001:46)

Such statements cannot help but create debate in Russia, especially when it comes from someone who is a self-professed Russian nationalist. Even more controversial, at least internationally, has been Limonov's interaction with former president of Republika Srpska and now convicted war criminal, Radovan Karadžić. A video\(^{29}\) shows Limonov speaking to Karadžić (in English) outside Sarajevo during the siege of the city. They discuss geopolitics and Serb independence, while machine guns fire in the background. Towards the end of the video, Limonov is seen firing a machine gun at Sarajevo. For these actions, many regard Limonov as a war criminal, adding to the controversy surrounding him. Due to the controversy surrounding Limonov, not only because of this example but through many others as well, he is a well-known figure, whose books and other publications normally sell quite well, even outside National Bolshevik circles. When I asked

natsbol about the controversy surrounding Limonov, they said that it is not possible to take everything Limonov says or does literally, and that attention should rather be paid to what his actions mean or signify. I must confess my surprise, as I had expected various sorts of justification for Limonov's actions, especially from the members of his own political party. Rather, these members instantly pointed towards the need for another model for understanding Limonov's actions. Looking back to Limonov's statement about the paradoxicality inherent in National Bolshevik thought, this also points towards the need for a non-literal model of knowledge to understand such ways of acting. *Panorama* analyst Vyacheslav Likhachev (quoted in Shenfield 2001:209) has proposed the theory that "[...] the NBP does not promote an ideology in the usual sense, but a 'heroic' style or ethos, the display of which by its members is obligatory". This indicates that the natsbol understanding of the world, as well as members' ways of acting in it, is predicated on the understanding of a dramatic model, as well as mastering of social drama. Furthermore, this is a confrontational and agonistic version of social drama, just as Turner (1982:9-12) describes it. Beyond this, it is also deliberate, in that it seeks to deliberately create breach and crisis. Instead of applying redressive machinery (Turner 1982:10) to resolve the situation through patching up quarrels and mending social ties, however, the state rather chooses to resolve the problem through repressive mechanisms.
Secrecy: Drama and Anti-Drama

Parallel to highly visible dramatic performances, political activists also make good use of secrecy. Such a clandestine mode of performance seemingly forms a diametrical opposite of social drama, with the main motivation being the concealment of knowledge, emotions and acts, rather than bringing them into public view. Goffman (1959:141) describes secrets as "destructive information" that needs to be controlled, if it should not disturb social performances. He further divides such secrets into several distinctive subtypes (Goffman 1959:141-143), and people into performers (owners of secrets) and those who are performed upon (Goffman 1959:144). While Goffman's theories provide a useful framework for analyzing the social effects of secrecy, I take a somewhat less rigid viewpoint in this chapter, viewing people as simultaneously performers and performed upon, and also aware that they are being performed upon. I also argue that secrets not only disturb social performances, but are important performative tools themselves.

Among activists in Kaliningrad, secrecy is often a direct countermeasure against perceived police use of secret surveillance. To make the situation even more complex, the "game of secrecy" that is the result of this struggle to know and act before the other side does, forms an arena for dramatic performances in itself. I have already in short mentioned how natsboly do not publicly state that belong to the NBP, and that BRP members partially hide their lapel pin during public demonstrations, both in order to avoid trouble with the authorities. Before discussing these issues further, I would like to use a few more examples to illustrate.

Anonymization Tactics

Much political activism in Kaliningrad, and Russia in general, is planned and performed on the internet. Various activists write political blogs, participate in discussion groups, spread information about political ideologies, and so on. One of the most popular sites for general internet activism is Vkontakte ('In touch'), which is widely considered to be something of a Russian equivalent to the American social networking site Facebook. However, as this website is kept on servers located in Russia, many activists suspect that their personal Vkontakte profiles are being monitored by the authorities. As a way of dealing with this, activists have developed several counter-tactics. One of these is the creation of several decoy profiles and pages, containing information that runs counter to

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30 Both Vkontakte and Facebook are social networking sites which allow users to create unique personal profiles where their likes, pictures and messages can be uploaded for viewing by designated friends and (optionally) strangers.
their actual political standpoints. Only close friends are told which one of the profiles are real. These profiles, which can be viewed as containers of social, external personalities, can be used to spy on and infiltrate other activist circles as well, which I will get back to soon. Another tactic has been to move internet activism to other sites, such as Facebook, which are viewed as less susceptible to Russian state interference and surveillance. The situation escalated when the FSB in April of 2011 started demanding that they be given the encryption algorithms for Skype\(^{31}\), which had recently been acquired by Microsoft for ($8 billion)\(^{32}\). Access to these algorithms would theoretically allow the FSB to secretly monitor conversations that pass through Skype, causing alarm among both activists and non-activists who use Skype daily to talk to family, friends and associates. Further alarm was caused when rumours spread that Microsoft had agreed to the proposition, though the company disagreed that this disclosure would allow the FSB to monitor conversations. This demand from the FSB came at approximately the same time as the bureau proposed to outright ban many internet services such as gmail, hotmail and so on, though this was later stopped by the Duma\(^{33}\).

**Leonid's Case**

Leonid once used to work in the surveillance-business, installing security cameras in businesses across the region. Due to his political activism, Leonid claims, the police decided to act against him, through his line of work. He was hired to install hidden surveillance equipment in a business whose boss suspected that his employees were stealing from the company. As Leonid went about his work, the boss pulled out a police identification badge, and arrested Leonid for 'installing a surveillance device inside a domestic item', which is illegal by Russian law. Threatened with prison for three years, Leonid was able to get away without legal consequences, but was unable to continue in his work afterwards.

In relation to my own arrest, Leonid made the joking comment that I was finding precisely what I was looking for in Kaliningrad. Like he said, "There is your Soviet nostalgia. Right there.". For Leonid, and several other members of the BRP, "nostalgia" for the Soviet Union is connected to issues such as surveillance, police informants and so on. He remembers the Soviet Union as a place of secrets and police informants, and of violence, as he grew up as part of one of the street gangs of

\(^{31}\) An internet service which allows users to contact each other and talk via text messages, as well as audio and/or video conferences, at no monetary cost.


Kazan. In the sense of Heady and Miller (in Svašek 2006) then, it seems that anti-nostalgia also has links to actual, lived experiences.

**Espionage**

As already stated, surveillance and "spy-tactics" were also common among the activists themselves, in that activists from various groupings would sometimes infiltrate each other's movements, and spy on each other. Due to the secrecy of these methods, it is not possible for me to know with any confidence how widespread such tactics are, but according to some non-affiliated activists I spoke to, they are relatively widespread. For example, one of my informants had infiltrated the ranks of a political party under false pretences. Though she had a different political ideology than said party, she gave away the impression of sharing the party's ideals. She participated in rallies organized by the party, went to their meetings, befriended their members and so on, in order to monitor and gain information about the party's activities. She performed these actions on her own initiative, and the information she gained was disseminated among other activists whom she trusted. While doing this, however, she fell in love with a young man in the party. The two of them had since been to visit this man's parents at their house, both of whom were also believers in the party's ideology, while none knew about my informant's original intentions. This was perceived as very emotionally painful for the informant in question, as her motivations and emotions in relation to political espionage, and to personal relations, were equally real. Going back to my argument that there exists relatively little separation between formal and non-formal dramatic models in Kaliningradian society, the last example above becomes more clear. While the situation is perceived as highly meaningful for the informant in question, it also follows a somewhat theatrical structure that frames the dramatic situation. This is not to say that the informant in question has voluntarily created a theatrical social drama, due to any fundamental human need for drama. Rather, a cultural model of theatrical structure forms a way through which this social drama can be understood by the person, who in this case is the only one who knows that a play is being acted out. Thus, even performances that are socially invisible can be interpreted by the actors themselves using a socially embedded framework.

**The Pernicious, and It's Social Effects**

A large part of the 'game of secrecy' consists of reacting to things that cannot necessarily be perceived, but which is still potentially present, such as when activists employ counter-surveillance tactics on the internet. In a sense, the people involved admit the incomplete nature of their sensory apparatus, instead believing in things that cannot be directly perceived. This is hardly anything new, as it forms a central part of belief in supernatural forces, which anthropology has been studying.
since the discipline's inception. Going all the way back to the example of divination, this 'genre of cultural performance' (Turner 1982:78), this "occultism", can itself be said to be part of a clandestine mode, where secrecy and lack of sure knowledge adds to the dramatic aspect of it. This was part of what I attempted to show through the example of the bibliomancy session on p. 54. My fieldwork was also filled with similar encounters, including talking with Almas and others about conspiracy theories. Beliefs in such conspiracies are very common in Kaliningrad, both among activists and non-activists. What is also interesting is the way in which this hidden game employs all manner of tactics to avoid detection, yet at the same time its social effects, as well as the knowledge that the game itself exists, are things that are meant to be highly socially visible. Furthermore, the game is played partly out of fear of the potential effects of losing. And to not play the game, is to lose it.

The connection of social secrecy to occultism, then, is also a connection to such aspects of it as fear of unknown influences. One of the seminal studies here is the well-known study of witchcraft among the Azande by Evans-Pritchard (1937), where he describes Azande beliefs that some people are witches, and are able to injure other people through hidden, supernatural means. There also exist newer studies of such phenomena that are of interest in this case. Piot (2010:115), talking about Pentecostals in Togo being accused of witchcraft, states that being labeled a witch

[...] while at first blush sociologically counterintuitive – because being labeled a witch can produce ignominy and ostracism – such confessions can also enhance social standing, for they bestow fear and power over others.

It is precisely this sort logic that the surveillance tactics of the FSB, and the activists themselves, function through. In the case of the FSB, revealing the use of surveillance, often through performing an arrest on its basis, simply adds to the unfolding social drama in a myriad of ways, for example by increasing emotions such as fear, and by helping to maintain a widespread cultural model of what the FSB is and does. For the activists themselves, the after-effects are less similar to the witchcraft logic, as the unintended revealing of secrecy destroys its manipulative power, and the only thing that remains is 'ignominy and ostracism'. This is evident, for example, in how the supposed police informant was treated during the political demonstration described in chapter 5, where he was not trusted, and a game of secrecy involving my identity was being played at his expense. The main difference between the FSB and activists here is that while the FSB may also face public ostracism, they have pragmatic power in forcing people to self-restrict their activities that turn this sense of distrust into fear. The activists themselves hold no such power over other activists once the secret is revealed.
Being unable to spot such destructive, hidden agendas can also lead to negative social consequences beyond the effect of the agendas themselves. During my fieldwork, I was repeatedly reprimanded by several of my activist and non-activist informants as being naïve for questioning the truth of conspiracy theories, that all Kremlin parties follow United Russia's directions, or the often stated fact that all politicians are automatically greedy, corrupt and only involved in the political game in order to gain power. My skepticism at alternative, "hidden" truths was sometimes interpreted as being naïve, and not being able to see beyond the surface of things, into the depth.

**Dusha and Depth**

Few things are as important for Russian self-understanding, or for foreign stereotypization of Russians, as the Russian soul, or *dusha*. However, the concept has a wide array of meanings. Boym (2001:17) links it to spiritual longing, which I have already linked to nostalgic emotions. One of Ries' (1997:29) informants speaks of it as the link between the individual and the *narod* ('people'; related to the word *rodina*), and as "the inborn ability to feel what is right and what is wrong". Pesmen (in Berdahl et. al. 2000:181-207) links *dusha* further to spatiality, and especially the spatial metaphor of *depth*:

In Russian literature and philosophy, in everyday post-Soviet discourses of city, nation, morality and personhood, in the media and in the understanding and use of space, the metaphor of spatial extension, *depth*, has long been a master organizing principle (Pesmen in Berdahl et. al. 2000:181)

These widely varying definitions are probably tied to what Pesmen (in Berdahl et. al. 2000:183) calls the impossibility of fully knowing or defining what *dusha* is, which is a fundamental characteristic of its depth. Pesmen (in Berdahl et. al. 2000:183-188) further links *dusha* to closedness and invisibility, which is a result of its unknowable nature, that other people except for the individual in question are unable to experience. What the unknown here consists of varies, but is often said to be closer to emotions of suffering, than emotions of joy (Pesmen in Berdahl et. al. 2000:195). All of these metaphors for speaking about *dusha*, I argue, are related to its hidden, secretive nature. In the same way that *dusha* implies that some negative emotions are kept hidden, it perhaps also implies that some social acts based on these emotions are kept hidden from public view as well. The cultural model of *dusha*, which seemingly varies so much in its characteristics that it is hard to define it as cultural, in this case serves as an organizer of knowledge, of what should be kept hidden and not. Furthermore, it also places a certain value upon secrets by their very nature. Though it might seem slightly speculative to say so, I will at least argue that there exists a
possibility that the value placed on *dusha* and secrets are key to the creation of new secrets, whether it is political corruption, police surveillance or secret political allegiances. Through its links to *dusha*, secrets may come to be seen as important as such, and therefore in some way connected to strong emotions. At the same time, *dusha* is in itself overtly dramatized. As already mentioned, passionate speech can cause a speaker to seem ensouled (Pesmen in Berdahl et. al. 2000:201). In such cases, the bringing forth of hidden aspects of a person into a social arena is a fundamentally important part of the unfolding social drama. Activists also relate many of their actions back to their own *dusha*, though they are often reluctant to use this metaphor unless specifically asked about *dusha*. This might be due to a developing preference for other methods of explaining inner emotional lives among political activists or among Kaliningradians in general, but more likely I would say it is because of the perceived difficulty in explaining *dusha* to a foreigner, tied up as the concept is with concepts of *narod*, *rodina* and so on. I will now turn to explaining concepts such as these in relation to landscape and memory, and I start of this discussion with a short ethnographic example.
Knowing the Landscape

The rain was coming down intermittently, as we made our way further into the forests that surrounded Kaliningrad. At times, the rain came in tiny drops, at others like a tropical torrent. In any case, it created a stark contrast to the warm, well-lit shopping mall were we had been standing half an hour earlier, buying food and alcohol for our trip. Being the host of the occasion, I had paid for most of these things, and my miserly side was secretly hoping that the outing would better be worth our while. Me and Leonid had met our guide Roman\textsuperscript{34} about a week earlier, while sitting in the park having a discussion with Feliks, a well-known, classical liberal member of the local parliament. Being an avid hunter of historical treasures, Roman had volunteered to take us metal detecting in the woods, to look for relics from World War II. Being interested in history, I had decided to go for it.

We put up camp in a place where treasure hunters reportedly camped quite often, and after eating, we started searching. According to Roman, treasure hunters in Kaliningrad, of which there are apparently quite a few, often come up with interesting historical finds. Most of the time, these are kept by the hunters themselves, or sold on the black market to collectors. However, though there is certainly money to be made, Roman insisted that most of the treasure hunters do what they do because of historical interest.

We had chosen a search site where it was possible to find objects dating from the Battle of Königsberg, where German soldiers were fighting the soldiers of the Soviet Red Army during World War II. Roman had previously made some very interesting finds in this area. I was shown two axes from the Prussian era (informally speaking, the era preceding the Nazi German era), and Roman had also found several nearly intact \textit{Sturmgewehr} (a rare WWII German rifle) not too far away. Though our search did not yield anything as spectacular as this, we did make a few interesting finds. One of these was a piece of an engine, possibly belonging to a WWII era motorized vehicle. The piece had some historical value, and could fetch a relatively good price on the black market. As it held little emotional value to those uninitiated into the mysteries of the internal machinery of WWII vehicles, it was given to Roman for selling. Our next find was of a newer date, namely a lapel pin belonging to a Young Pioneer of the Soviet-era, who had probably lost it while on a field trip in the woods some time during the 1980s. In addition to these finds,

\textsuperscript{34} Roman was a young follower of nazism. He was formerly part of a liberal youth movement headed by Feliks, but had since converted.
Roman had also gifted me several other finds, including old German coins and iron crosses. The most interesting gift, however, was a lapel pin from a German 1\textsuperscript{st} of May celebration. It was special in that it showed the hammer and sickle (though spread apart, unlike in the flag of the USSR) over the Nazi German eagle (Reichsadler), meaning that it was probably manufactured in 1940 or 1941, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was in effect. I later showed this object to several people, many of whom were astounded to see an example of such a close cultural interaction between the USSR and Nazi Germany. Having had our fill for the day, me and Leonid eventually headed home by ourselves, while Roman stayed behind to look for more treasures.

**Discovering Treasures**

Which objects are interesting is far from random. During our digs, modern "garbage" was simply thrown away again after being dug up. Other objects that were difficult to sell, such as the Prussian axes, were hidden away, to be shown to others later. This sort of collecting of historical artifacts is reminiscent of what Ten Dyke (2000:141) calls 'discovering treasures', in relation to her East German informants' collection of various artifacts from the GDR era, as well as the act of showing these artifacts to interested visitors. Just as treasure hunters can develop strong emotional connections to objects they find, so did Ten Dyke's informants also have 'clear, significant feelings' about their objects (Ten Dyke 2000:142). There are certainly differences between these two cases. For example, Ten Dyke's informants have a personal relationship with these objects because they are directly connected to their lives during the GDR era, when they interacted with such objects on a daily basis. Connected to this is the time perspective, where treasure hunters have a connection with objects that have been buried for decades or centuries, while Ten Dyke is talking to her informants barely two or three years after the fall of the GDR, when the memory of such objects can still be said to be "fresh". That these two cases should exhibit similarities across such temporal differences, especially when their social significance is connected to the passage of time, is striking.

Another striking aspect of digging for treasures is the connections to secrecy, as detailed in chapter 11. In a sense, Roman and other treasure hunters are attempting to uncover the hidden, and make it socially relevant. At the same time, they are also playing the secretive game, hiding their activities and finds from authorities, only showing them to a select few. Following arguments that I have already made, this makes the activity seem even more meaningful, as the objects are not for everyone to see.

**Time and Place, Close and Distant**

The physical passage of time, and the social conceptualization of time, can be viewed as separate
but related phenomena. Talking of how reconfigurable conceptions of time and history can be, Verdery (1999:115-116) uses the example of how during the postsocialist period in Romania, the pre- and post-communist eras are reconnected by the revising of history. This is possible by stripping away the communist era as something unwanted. This opens the notions of time that underlie history to question. The understanding of temporal process, the shapes of history and the conception of time's passage are all altered. I would argue that a similar process is happening in Kaliningrad, where the pre-communist past is reconnected with the present. In Kaliningrad, this past happens to be German. There are no non-communist, Russian objects to dig from the ground, or old buildings to muse over.

When a part of a landscape has been devalued due to its specific historical connotations (the Soviet era in this case), connections seem to happen with those parts of the landscape which have not been devalued, in this case the German ones. Just as the memory of the Soviet era has been devalued, so is the memory of Nazi Germany played down in this context. Just as pre- and post-communist eras can be pasted to form a continuity, the Nazi era seems to have been willfully excised from the continuity of the German/Prussian timeline. It is not that anyone disputes the real events of World War II, or refuses to talk about them. Indeed, the city is full of memorials to fallen soldiers of the Red Army. But the Nazi German era is not seen as fully part of the German historical continuum, but rather as something separate. Reflecting how culturally based ideas are unevenly spread even in small populations (see for example Barth, in Bowen and Roger 1999:78-89), some people still see these eras as forming a continuity, and thus devalue the entire German era that precedes the current Russian one, which often also coincides with a devaluation of the current era and valuing of the Soviet era. In rarer instances, like with Roman, the Nazi German era is highly valued along with the rest of the German historical continuum. In these cases, different cultural models exists for explaining and emotionalizing various historical periods in relation to each other.

To put it in other words, then, the physical landmarks in the cityscape are not perceived as valid markers in the creation of a specifically Russian svoi, connected to the Russian ideas of soil and Motherland. The choice then lies in building a sense of svoi around what other people devalue (such as the NBP does in relation to the Soviet Union), building it around valued parts of the cityscape that is nonetheless unconnected to Russian svoi (which the BRP does), or building it around other markers than those found in the landscape (which everyone in Kaliningrad of course do to some degree, but seemingly not without a sense of being detached from the rest of Russia).

To the same degree that memories do not necessarily have to consist of actual, lived experiences, emotional, nostalgic connections to physical objects and landscapes are not necessarily formed upon those objects and landscapes that are local and physically perceived. Just as
conceptions of time is subject to a myriad of sociocultural processes which obscures and plays with its physical realities, conceptions of place seem to follow the same pattern. This means that a landmark such as the Moscow Kremlin can be seen as local and "ours" in that it is further connected to related ideas about what is "Russian". This means that long distances, just as long time periods, can be influenced by cultural ideas, so that it appears more close than physical reality would seem to indicate. This is further connected to the concept of soil (zemlya, also translatable as 'earth' or 'land'), used to evoke nationalist sentiments connected to specifically Russian soil. What is here meant by soil is neither specific types of physical / geological soil, nor just the soil that by chance lies within a nation's international borders. Rather, the concept of soil draws on both of these meanings at the same time, and draws it through a process of abstraction that paradoxically makes the concept seem more real and meaningful than before.

**The NBP and the BRP: Two Examples of Zemlya**

The concept of soil is often employed by NBP activists. Take for example an excerpt from and article in the 'Sober Paper' (Trezvaya Gazeta)\textsuperscript{35,36}, the main article concerning a march of the Kaliningradian Black Bloc (a coalition of different nationalist groupings), and an appeal for closer cooperation with communists, and which shows the importance of the concept: 'Due to these communists, and Stalin personally, we live here, on Kaliningradian soil' (freely translated). Soil also forms an important part of NBPs specific brand of nationalism, where the concept of the Russian nation is connected not mainly to ethnicity, but to soil. Due to soil's mystified connections with geographical borders, the control of certain pieces of soil by encapsulating it within these borders becomes important. This concept of soil, then, gives us the beginnings of an explanation for the National Bolshevik and Eurasianist preoccupation with the restoration of Russian soil (or 'vital space') that was lost after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this still fails to explain why some specific soil is perceived as more important than others, how it comes to be perceived this way, how it comes to be seen as specifically Russian, why such notions are not universally shared among Russians, and why such notions are shared by many people who are not ethnically Russian. In an attempt to explain this, I will now attempt an analysis of the connection of soil to the workings of individual and collective memory.

The BRP sells a variety of objects, such as t-shirts and locally produced alcohol, in order to raise money for their cause. In the end of 2011, the BRP started selling 'East Prussian soil'\textsuperscript{37} to

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\textsuperscript{35} A street newspaper organized by Grigori, published on a quarterly basis, and spread from hand to hand. It contains articles of a nationalist and Straight Edge nature. For the connections between Straight Edge and National Bolshevism, see p. 20


\textsuperscript{37} Due to reasons of anonymization, this reference is not shown.
foreigners who are unable to retrieve the soil themselves. The sale of this soil is marketed mainly
towards Germans who had ancestors that lived in the region. Basic soil (or heimaterde, as it is
advertised in German) is priced at 50 euro, but prices can vary up to 100 euro if the soil is to be
collected from a specific and / or remote place, which often means the ancestral homestead. The
BRP offers to take pictures of the place where the soil is collected, to help prove the soil's
authenticity. In this case, the soil is physical, and is sold as a bottled product. Its value as such a
commercial product, however, is hinged solely on the understanding that it has some sort of
emotional or even metaphysical value as Soil, rather than as normal soil. Different from many other
objects without utilitarian value, but which may still have collector's value, soil is not man-made in
the physical sense. Unlike fallen meteorites and precious metals, it is not particularly rare either.
Physically similar soil could probably be found outside of Kaliningrad. In theory, soil could be
collected outside of Kaliningrad, sold as 'East Prussian soil', and none would be any wiser, as there
are absolutely no physical factors that positively link the soil to the Kaliningrad region. It would
seem clear, then, that the factors determining the value of such soil are based purely on emotional
value attached to it due to its connection with larger concepts that involve history, nostalgia and
rodina / heimat, rather than physical value.

Physical Objects and Memory
"Physical memories", often existing as embedded in the landscape, are to some degree independent
of mental memories, even though we use the terms somewhat interchangeably in our daily
language. When we speak about a photograph as a memory, we do not mean that it is an actual
mental memory, but rather a trigger for mental memories. It serves as a medium as well as a
message, and Paxson (2005:85) posits that memories themselves work the same way. Physical
memories such as photographs makes the sharing of mental memories possible. Though in this case
only the photographer is in possession of the "true" memory of the event (or not, depending on how
reliable we believe memory to be), some aspects of the mental memory and the meanings
surrounding it is nonetheless transmitted to the people viewing the photograph, sometimes framed
by a narrative told by the original photographer.

In the case of treasure hunters in Kaliningrad, the physical objects are not photographs, but
rather a wide variety of physical objects, some more open to interpretation than others. This
interpretation aspect is also opened up because there is no original creator to tell a narrative that sets
the object in a specific, cultural framework, though some people such as archaeologists and
historians are certainly given greater rights to create interpretations in relation to such objects. It is
interesting to note that the right of such professionals to create such interpretations usually start
where there are no original narrators connected to the objects left to create a narrative of their own. As each artifact is unearthed, the digging is always followed by an effort to place the object within a preconceived framework or universe of meaning. It is highly telling that some objects that are dug up, such as newer, "unhistorical" artifacts and garbage, are thrown away again immediately. This shows that the meanings afforded to the various objects are far from random, but rather based on preconceived understandings of history and the passage of time. While today's garbage is just garbage, yesterday's garbage has become today's treasures.

**Landscape and Memory**

Before proceeding further with this analysis, I would like to introduce some examples of landscape's connection to emotions and memory. As previously mentioned in the introductory chapters, the river Pregolya (German: *Pregel*) runs through the center of Kaliningrad. Near this river stand two different monuments that are awarded vastly different meanings, based on the local understanding of their placement in the city's history. On the north side of the river stands the House of the Soviets (*Dom Sovyetov*), built on top of the remains of Königsberg Castle that was ruined during World War II. Construction of the building started in the 1960s, but stopped during the 1980s, and was never completed. For many citizens of Kaliningrad, the building came to symbolize the failure of the Soviet system. Being highly visible in the city's landscape, the House of Soviets serves as a potent physical signifier of this perceived failure. In 2005, the facade was painted blue, and windows were installed, but even though this improved the structure's aesthetics somewhat, people were still not convinced. After all, these changes were done after the Soviet Union had collapsed, and did little to improve the building's connections to a currently devalued historical era. Such improvements were seen not as much as attempts to finish the building, as attempts to cover up previous failures. Though the House of Soviets is officially guarded, the guards are often easily bribed or bypassed, and the building's rooftop is now often used by young people for picnics and similar outings.

The Königsberg Cathedral shares the history of the Königsberg Castle, though perhaps in reverse. Also destroyed during World War II, the cathedral was allowed to remain a ruin in the following decades, as it was located on an island in the middle of the Pregolya, without much possibilities for city development. This changed with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the cathedral was reconstructed in the 1990s. The cathedral now houses Immanuel Kant's mausoleum which survived the bombing raids of World War II, a museum, an Orthodox chapel and a Lutheran chapel. It has kept its old German name (Königsberg Cathedral), and the bells in the cathedral's tower regularly chime notes from a symphony by German composer Ludwig van Beethoven.
It seems clear that each of these buildings serve different ideological functions, which connects further to their functions in people's local understandings of temporality and spatiality. The House of Soviets was meant, at least by the state, to serve as a symbol of Soviet superiority and the victory of socialism, but came to be associated with the perceived failures of both the system and the ideology of the USSR. The same can be said of many building projects in the Soviet Union, and even successful projects such as the Moscow Metro now conveys a certain irony about the Soviet system (Lemon in Berdahl et. al. 2000:15). As the Soviet Union never possessed absolute power in defining the meaning-universes of its citizens, and perhaps even quite little power in relation to many other states due to the widespread counter-tactics among the population against such attempts at mental domination (read Yurchak 2005:77-157), the physical markers of the Soviet regime was infused with alternative meanings. Alternative in the way that these meanings were neither part of official state discourse, nor any organized counter-discourse. Rather, in Kaliningrad it seems to have grown out of the increased appreciation for the region's German heritage. The whole process, which I will now describe, was pieced together from interviews with several informants, and this thus constitutes their view on history. The positive reevaluation of the German legacy, which had been valued rather negatively in the immediate post-war years, surfaced in Kaliningrad during the 1960s. At the time, West Germany offered to rebuild the old Königsberg Castle that had been destroyed during World War II, but Brezhnev rejected the idea, and ordered the building of the House of Soviets to replace it. Pro-German sentiments, at least when it comes to cultural heritage, then grew through the following decades, especially during the period of Perestroika. During this era, new identities based on culture and ethnicity were becoming increasingly legitimate, as alternatives to the internationalist model of 'homo sovieticus'. This culminated in the ceasing of the building of the House of Soviets in the 1980s due to lack of funding and lack of structural integrity of the building, which only added to diminishing the legitimacy of the project. This was followed in the early 1990s by the reconstruction of the Königsberg Cathedral. The cathedral, then, serves as a primary symbol or signifier of the region's rediscovered, Prussian / German heritage, while the House of Soviets serves as a somewhat painful reminder of a time that has become devalued. Many Kaliningradians now hope that the building will be destroyed, and the castle reconstructed. There were reportedly plans to do this a few years ago, but these plans are now on hold.

These two buildings are not the only examples of such remodelling of the cityscape for ideological purposes. Victory Square, in many ways the absolute center of the city of Kaliningrad, was also remodelled in 2005. While Kaliningrad has been somewhat slower than other major Russian cities in removing physical and linguistic remnants of the Soviet era, for example retaining the city's Soviet name (named after the Soviet politician, Mikhail Kalinin), the statue of Lenin was
removed from Victory Square in 2005 and moved to a less central location within the city. In its place was built an enormous pillar, often said by citizens to resemble a phallos, as well as the opulent, orthodox Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, made to resemble the cathedral of the same name in Moscow. Thus a new foundational historical setting is created for Kaliningrad in one architectural sweep, connecting the city to Russian history (and to Moscow) through the building of an Orthodox cathedral, which simultaneously overwrites Soviet history. Still, the local government often seems reluctant "desovietize" the city completely. Indeed, the changes to the House of Soviets and Victory Square only came about as a result of a visit by president Vladimir Putin. Thus, certain political groupings are often campaigning to undo parts of the Soviet architectural heritage. While the BRP is highly involved in issues such as the renaming the city to its original name 'Königsberg', the party is also campaigning for changing certain aspects of the cityscape. An example of this is Leonid's campaigning for the removal of a statue of the Soviet war hero Aleksandr Marinesko, a submarine captain who helped sink the ship Wilhelm Gustloff outside Königsberg in 1945, killing thousands of civilians (Williams 1997). Leonid argues that not only should the statue be removed, and Marinesko regarded as a war criminal, but that the statue should also be replaced by a memorial to the victims that died in the incident. The monument was unveiled as recently as 2003, after Marinesko had been declared a Hero of the Soviet Union as late as in 1990, and as such the monument causes particular anger among some people, as it for many symbolizes the beginnings of a resovietization of Kaliningrad.

In many places near the city's center, the streets are made of cobblestones, and have been in existence since German times. Attempts to replace them with modern, asphalted streets have met with resistance from local citizens. This is despite the fact that these cobblestones reportedly have a tendency to ruin cars over time, and that the average car in Kaliningrad apparently has a significantly reduced life expectancy because of this. Such anti-modernist sentiments against the idea of "progress" has been evident across eastern Europe after the fall of communism. A similar example to this case is when Berdahl (1999:174-175) describes how East Germans would take to using their old Trabi cars as a marker to distinguish themselves from the West Germans by willfully reintroducing objects from a recently devalued part of history, in an attempt to reintroduce positive connotations were negative ones had taken over. The similarity of these two versions of social drama lies in how issues of remembrance, sentimentality etc. are allowed to take center stage over issues of efficiency and ease of use. With this in mind, Boym (2001:xvi-xvii) is probably right in saying that nostalgia is both as symptom of and a reaction against modernism. In an attempt to reach the core of this issue, the following two short chapters will concern two perhaps fundamental social concepts, namely 'time' and 'space'.
Attitudes Towards Time
Traces of attitudes towards time can be found in how people act in and through it. Leonid being late (by my own, cultural model for defining 'late') for our meeting before the demonstration described in chapter 5 was not a one time occurrence, or simply a personal habit of his. Being somewhat late, at least for purely personal appointments, was not only normal, but expected. While situations regarded as "formal" might require being on time, private meetings between friends and acquaintances seldom required much precision when it came to time. Neither did such events usually have a pre-planned ending, except in cases where one of the involved has to attend to some other, more formal event, such as for example work.

Verdery (1996:39-57) points out that during the communist era in Romania, time was subject to 'etatization', something which is also echoed by Yurchak when it comes to Russia (2005:155-157). According to Verdery (1996:41-50), in communist Romania, time was appropriated by the state in several ways, for example through enforced participation in public events, where much of the time was actually spent waiting for the event to commence. The state's seizure of time, combined with bureaucratic inefficiency which failed to allocate this time efficiently, led to the people of Romania spending much of their simply waiting. As a response, citizens used various methods to speed this time up, as well as to slow other time down. In Russia, as in other eastern European nations, citizens engaged in informal economic networks, which in Russia is called blat (lit. 'pull'), for speeding up the process of procuring resources, finding assistance for various sorts of work, avoiding spending time in lines and so on (Yurchak 2005:155-156). People also freed up and slowed down time by taking undemanding, part-time work with much time off, and by engaging in temporally "distant" pursuits such as ancient history and archaeology (Yurchak 2005:156). As Yurchak (2005:156) points out, such tactics did not merely result in more free time, but rather deterritorialized temporality. Curiously, such notions of temporality was not something that was common to all Soviet citizens, but was rather something that was particular to a large, heterogenous population of "apoliticals" that were uninterested in the political and socialist aspects of the Soviet Union. As Yurchak says:
The constant refrain in all these milieus that they were profoundly uninterested in anything political was, of course, not a nihilistic position, but a kind of politics that refused heroic "clear truths". This was a politics of "deep truths" that were grounded in deterritorialized spaces and times. (Yurchak 2005:157).

If these statements by Verdery and Yurchak are read in conjunction with the examples I have laid out in the preceding pages, it is possible to glimpse some continuity in understandings of time from the Soviet period to the present day. Though the etatization of time by the state has decreased since the fall of the Soviet Union, it is still structured in other ways, for example through maintenance of clock time in relation to work, what Birth (in Casey and Edgerton 2005:20) discusses as time in 'industrial' societies38. Simultaneously, the various tactics for deterritorializing temporality continues. Blat still lives on in the way people conduct business, and many people maintain contacts in various important institutions, who can help "grease the wheels" in times of need. It is also normal to fill up free time with various "cultural" pursuits, such as art, reading psychology and so on. Emotional interest in temporally related issues such as history continues, which reaches a public, political expression in the agenda of both the NBP and the BRP. Such emotions and social dramatization would be impossible without cultural models to delineate what time is, however.

Being late for appointments, to use a seemingly banal but actually quite telling example, seems to serve as a way of reconstituting time spent with friends and acquaintances as informal, non-institutionalized time, free from unwanted outside interference. Events that are perceived as more formalized, such as the political rally in question, are still subject to a stricter structuralization of time, however. Though attendance is of course voluntary, it still follows the same logic as the etatization of time, in how it demands adherence to certain time frames. However, as there is no structural state power at work to demand attendance, people may come and go as they wish within this time frame. Both of these are examples of temporal models in action, as they consist of knowledge of how to relate to the temporal aspects of the varying situations.

**Temporal Models and Practicallity**

These arguments seems to point in two directions. First of all, it indicates that the understanding of time in Kaliningrad follows different models that are employed in different contexts, and that people are able to use these models flexibly, changing their notions of the importance of keeping exact time to fit the specific situation. Secondly, it indicates that people use these models rather pragmatically, and that we are seeing something other than a specific understanding of time being

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38 This notion of an artificial, industrial time versus a naturalistic, biological time has recently been criticized. See Birth (in Casey and Edgerton 2005:20-22).
enforced upon people through structural power relations. As Vike (in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011:376-392) points out, people do not simply behave in ways that benefit the powerful because it has been enforced by something akin to the Marxist idea of ideology and hegemony, or internalized as Bourdieuan *habitus*. Rather, people take part in and legitimize such seeming dominance for various pragmatic ends, for example to 'control the actions of their relevant others' (Vike in Kronenfeld et. al. 2011:377). The main point here in relation to time is that people may choose to adhere to some models of time in specific contexts, as it is simply pragmatic and easy to do so.

Such pragmatism might also be the reason for the police to come knocking at the door of those suspected of illegal activism in the morning. After all, there is less chance that said activists will have started their daily activities by then. This happened to me on both occasions when the police came at my door, and several activists recognized the pattern. At the same time, arriving in the morning also means that the authorities may invade time that is usually regarded as private, and which is often spent eating breakfast, grooming and so on. By arriving early, the police may intercept the normal flow of daily life, and take control of the person's time. Much of this may be spent, as Verdery (1996:39-57) indeed talks about, waiting at the behest of the authorities. This is highly visible, for example, in how Pavel and Lyudmila had to spend a significant amount of time in police custody while waiting to be processed.

**Different Conceptions of Time**

It would be imprecise to talk about differing but related models of time without analyzing in what way and to what degree they are related. How closely related is the understanding of personal, "friend time" described above to the understanding of historical, national time, for example? I have already tried to point towards some linkages here, for example in how people during the Soviet era spent their time immersing themselves in ancient history and archaeology (Yurchak 2005:156), or indeed how this tradition continues today in how Roman spends his free time digging up "treasures" with his metal detector. What such linkages do not explain, however, is in what way they are supposed to link, and in what way the link itself is socially and individually relevant. Neither do they exclude the possibility of two completely different models of time working side by side at the same time without much interaction, with one being used to guide the temporal aspects of social interaction between the treasure hunters, and another being used to understand historical time, without being perceived as relevant to each other at all. To find if and how they link, then, it would be necessary to investigate the prototypical, cultural model of time, if such a model exists, and investigate where the two split off from each other. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

It is my overall argument that different cultural models of time are not necessarily perceived
as linked to each other, in the way that they are acted out in social spaces. Historical time and "friend time" can coexist without much interaction. I'm not arguing that one should not seek out connections between such models of time, as they almost certainly exist. My argument is rather that in any study that involves the concept of social time, it is highly important to know exactly what kind of social time one is talking about. In this way it possible to illuminate the multiplicity of the time concept.
Space

Historical Spaces
The demonstration in Southern Park showcases the political nature of space in Russia and Kaliningrad. When the authorities forced the activists to perform their demonstration in Southern Park rather than in the more central Victory Square, their actions achieve at least two things.

First, on a more abstract level, it forces the activists into the periphery, and away from the center. According to Shore (1996:270-272) there exists a cultural model for understanding space (a spatial model) among the Samoans, that contrasts center and periphery, not as dichotomies, but as graded in relationship to each other. Though Shore uses the Samoans as an example, the basic model should be familiar to Westerners and perhaps others as well, though its relationship with other cultural models will perhaps be different. This spatial model is common in Kaliningrad as well, and becomes subject to a high degree of common usage due to the geographical situatedness of Kaliningrad Oblast. The region is at the center of Europe, as well as being on the periphery of Russia. The model works on other spatial levels as well. Kaliningrad itself is at the center of the oblast, while the town of Mamonovo near the Polish border is at the periphery, while paradoxically also being closer to the center of Europe. In this specific case, Southern Park is peripheral in relation to the central Victory Square. The contextuality of such contrasting is evident here, as the Southern Park is understood as peripheral only in relation to Victory Square, not in relation to Mamonovo. Peripherality is not only spatial, in that space is not only physical, but is also socially constructed, and serve as reservoirs of cultural memory. It is thus also connected to issues of power and, in this case, politics. Using the example of the Samoans again, Shore (1996:271) states that the "Centrality of political intercourse is quite literally 'grounded' in local geography", related to the center / periphery model.

Etatization of Space
Following Verdery's (1996:39-57) arguments about the etatization of time it is perhaps possible to say that the controlling the use of public space can constitute an "etatization of space". Through conscious use by the authorities of a cultural model that contrast center and periphery, political activists have their legitimacy taken away, as peripheral spaces are not regarded as normal and relevant spaces for political activism. As they are moved away from the center, the activists are also
removed from social relevance, and pushed towards connotations of social irrelevance. Non-activist outsiders use their preconceived mental models for understanding what is going on, thus perceiving the activists as peripheral. Being placed on the periphery does not only move the activists away from the center, however. It also removes them from the greater 'Russian community' associated with places such as Victory Square. This place serves as a mediator of memory embedded in the landscape, and thus as a conduit for knowledge, emotions and acts connected with such landmark. Through powerfully symbolic, and cognitively vivid, structures such as the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour and the World War II memorial, Victory Square is probably the most primary symbolic representative and reminder of abstract concepts such as zemlya, svoi and rodina in the cityscape.

The cultural models for understanding and talking about these concepts has changed over time, however, and this has most recently been expressed in the restoration of Victory Square. The building of the new church for example has not altered the perceived connection of Victory Square to Russian soil, it has merely updated it to fit with changing cultural models. Thus, by being denied entrance to Victory Square, activists are also denied all historical legitimacy that derives from emotionally loaded collective memory connected to such a place. This certainly affects how their demonstration is viewed by outsiders. Not only are they seen as peripheral and irrelevant; they are also seen as disconnected from a sense of svoi and rodina. In a sense, they become outsiders and outcasts, at least temporarily. This is not to say that non-activists are unable to see the true purposes of the authorities' actions against activists. The authorities, however, make use of widespread (cultural) models that people are likely to use for understanding the situation, thus increasing their chances that passers-by will interpret the activists actions in a way that is beneficial for the authorities. It is also important to not forget that the authorities also gather the activists in Southern Park for a more practical reason; inside the wooded park, activists have less chance of being perceived by passers-by in the first place.

It is precisely to avoid such peripheralization that activists decided to perform a flash mob in the center of the city after the demonstration in Southern Park had ended. As the police did not immediately intervene either, more people dared to interact with the activists, having their photographs taken with them and so on. The rather small flash mob that included perhaps a dozen activists managed to create at least as much interaction with people passing by as the much larger but hidden demonstration in the park. By placing the flash mob in the center of the city, right in front of the monument of Mother Russia, it immediately acquired a political significance that the earlier demonstration could not, by firmly connecting it to powerful spatial-temporal concepts such as 'center' and 'rodina'. The police still have counter-tactics against such performances, however.
During my participation in a Strategy-31\(^{39}\) rally in Victory Square, where Lyudmila and Pavel were also involved, and which the police were aware of beforehand, some policemen showed up with video cameras, filming the activists. Though several non-activists were standing nearby, nobody dared to join the activists. Through such measures, the activists were immediately branded as outsiders and outcasts once again.

\(^{39}\) A illegal political rally held on the 31\(^{st}\) of every month which has this date. Usually organized by the Other Russia coalition, of which the NBP is a central member, though at present in Kaliningrad, none of these groups are involved.
Alcohol

The issue of alcohol is interesting in relation to this thesis in two ways. Firstly, it is methodically relevant, as has been described on p. 28. Secondly, it is interesting because of what alcohol does, or what it is believed or meant to do. While there is certainly overlap between these two, the overlap is not complete, and is partially dependent on what I hope to show is cultural model used to interpret the effects of alcohol upon one's self and others. This might seem like an arbitrary subject, when placed side by side with issues such as nostalgia and political activism, but the link is present in several ways. First of all, alcohol has a definitive link to emotional expression and dramaticism, both in the way that it (supposedly) enhances an individual's self-felt ability to express certain emotions and in the perceived social tolerance for expressing these emotions under the effects of alcohol. This latter point is also connected to the way that people tend to interpret such expressions differently than if the individual had been in a sober state, meaning that there must exist some cultural model that organizes knowledge of how to interpret such expressions. It is also interesting to note that many political activists, whose way of translating knowledge and sentiments into political acts I by now hope to have established, are teetotalers, and that this must certainly have its reasons. With this in mind, I intend this short chapter on alcohol as a summing up of themes and issues that have been discussed in this thesis, before proceeding towards a final conclusion.

Cultural Models of Alcohol's Effects

There already exists a variety of anthropological research on alcohol. Winkelman and Bletzler (in Casey and Edgerton 2005:337-357) summarize this research by saying that such studies...

(...) have contributed to the perspective that alcohol effects are part of a cultural and community dynamic that dramatically mediates consequences of alcohol consumption. This contributes to psychocultural rather than physiological views of alcohol effects. (Winkelman and Bletzer in Casey and Edgerton 2005:340-341; emphasis mine)

Winkelman and Bletzer (in Casey and Edgerton 2005:340-341) also describe the history of the consumption of alcohol, arguing that it has historically served as a "social lubricant in the context of intergroup and intragroup competition, power, and patronage". I wish to focus on two other aspects of alcohol consumption, the first being the often spoken assertion, both in Russia and many parts of the Western world, that alcohol makes social interaction flow more easily. Or, as Paxson (2005:79)
says in relation to Russia, it helps the soul to 'open up'. Here, the focus is on how cultural models affect alcohol's physical effects. The second is the reaction of political activists in Kaliningrad to alcohol consumption.

Some cultural models of alcohol seem to serve as mediators for certain feeling states, where some emotions are seen (and felt) to be more easy to express under alcoholic influence, bringing the hidden into public view. The same cultural models also set the stage for how these expressions are understood by others who view these feeling states being expressed. A commonly heard saying, for example, is 'He's drunk, he doesn't know what he's saying'. One could say that the drinking of alcohol in a social context makes abnormal and 'foolish' behaviour seem contextually normal, which is reminiscent of Bakhtin's (1941 / 1965 [1984]) theories on 'the Carnivalesque'. In this context, emotions that are hidden from social expression are allowed to come to the fore. As already mentioned, drinking is in Russia often spoken of as a way for the soul (dusha) to open up (raskryt'sia) (Paxson 2005:79). This corresponds with the general argument of alcohol's effects which I have put forward above. Opening up the dusha, which is supposed to remain hidden under normal circumstances, implies expressing emotions that are not normally seen. The hidden and the potentially pernicious secrets that was described in chapter 11 is revealed, and acted out in social drama. It was often during drinking sessions, for example, that my informants plucked up the courage to tell me exactly what I was doing wrong. My lack of cultural models for understanding the day-to-day social interaction in Kaliningrad often made my actions (or lack thereof) feel socially disruptive to them, which could only be remedied by telling me how to act properly. While such problems could also be spoken about without the influence of alcohol, the specific context seemingly opened new vistas of social "frankness" with little fear of insult, as well as immediate reconciliation in the case of disagreement. In these cases, alcohol had the exact opposite effects of the violence described above, rather corresponding to what Winkelman and Bletzler (in Casey and Edgerton 2005:340-341) calls a 'social lubricant'.

Against Alcohol

I will analyze how alcohol works in a social setting among activists and non-activists in Kaliningrad, by investigating how it works when it is deliberately absent. As already stated, many activists are teetotalers. These non-drinkers divide themselves into two general camps, namely those who do not drink for ideological, political reasons, and those who are primarily concerned with health and psychological benefits in a non-politicized way. While discussing the issue of alcohol with Oleg one day, he stated that people such as him and Pavel practiced such abstinence simply because it made sense health-wise, while for people such as Grigori and the straight edgers, it had
become political ideology, where the focus lay on changing other people's understanding of the alcohol issue. In cognitivist terms, then, the focus of Grigori and others lay on changing people's cultural models when it came to alcohol.

Grigori, in addition to being one of the local leaders of the NBP, was also a primary figure in the city's Nationalist and Straight Edge movements, two movements which, from my point of view, seemed quite inseparable in Kaliningrad. While it was easy to find nationalists and natsboly who were not straight-edgers, I never met a straight-edger who was not a nationalist, though this might be because they remain socially separate from each other. To the sXe natsboly, alcohol, as well as smoking, narcotics, sex outside of marriage, and several other perceived vices, has strongly felt connections to the perceived degradation of public morals, which they seek to rectify through a morally strict form of nationalism. These emotional states have also been politicized through their campaigning to stop the selling of alcohol by rule of law. Being unable to change the law because of their lack of control over state institutions, and thus lack of structural power, they instead attempt to change people's attitude towards such things. The 'Sober Paper' is filled with articles containing negative views on alcohol. For example, an article titled "Alcohol vs. the Young Brain" details how alcohol is destroying the minds and bodies of the nation's youth, while another article in the same edition describes a demonstration performed by the "Popeye Mosh Crew" (xPMCx) in the city of Vladimir, where the group was carrying a banner saying 'Alcohol Kills' in front of a public building, and afterwards lying down, spread out in front of the building in deathlike postures, to signify the lethality of alcohol. While I did not witness any specific demonstrations or the like against alcohol, I did participate in a run performed by Grigori and a group of male, nationalist youth, where they were protesting against the widespread use of drugs in Kaliningradian society. During this event, the activist youth were running through a park, chanting slogans of 'against drugs, against degradation', while handing out flyers. Before they were able to clean up trash in the park as they had planned, the event ended with every single activist being led away by the police.

Politically or not, the teetotalling movement is very much a reaction against the increasing use and abuse of alcohol in Russian society, which Anderson (in Hann and Dunn 1996:102) links to the liberalization of the vodka trade after the fall of the Soviet Union. The increasing abuse of alcohol is also viewed by political teetotallers as linked to the moral degradation of society in general. It is precisely this sort of perceived degradation that Grigori and others seek to rid Russian society of. This moral degradation is perceived as a form of loss, and there exists a nostalgic yearning to go back to a time and place where widespread consumption of alcohol was nonexistent.

By extension, it is a yearning to go back to a perceived time and place where moral degradation itself was nonexistent. To achieve this, social dramatization of this knowledge and these emotions through political activism is seen as a pragmatic way of achieving this restorative form of nostalgia.
Conclusion

I began this thesis by asking a question: How is nostalgia and the understanding of history tied to political activism in Kaliningrad, and how is this activism mediated by and through cultural knowledge, emotions and social drama?. It is now time to see whether I have been successful in answering it. In this thesis, I have argued that the links of nostalgia and understanding of history to political activism are evident in the way that nostalgia for the Soviet Union or for Germany serves as a motivator for specific types of political actions, designed to model the current world in an idealized image of the past. I have attempted to show that knowledge (cultural models) for understanding the Soviet Union in relation to present day Russia vary widely between people, generally falling into one of two camps: those who view the influence as negative, and those who view it as positive. While most non-politicals are usually slightly ambiguous on the issue, and even the natsboly have some concerns, the NBP's views on the Soviet Union are mainly positive. It is perhaps this widespread disagreement in Kaliningradian society of what cultural model of the Soviet Union best fits reality (not to mention the social agendas of those who adhere to it) that makes activists such as the nationalists and natsboly infuse their own cultural model with so much related emotions, such as nostalgia. These emotions are played out in a social drama, which takes specific forms based on other cultural models for how such emotions are supposed to be acted out. This shows the dialectic relationship that different cultural models have to each other, as motivators and as scripts, and as influencing and influenced by emotion. The circle continues in how the social drama that is influenced by all of these factors is designed to imprint these models and emotions on others. This circle dialectic between models, motivations and social drama, I have argued in this thesis, is part of a fundamental basis of social reality, which all political activism is based upon. I have talked less in this thesis about relations of power, the actual state practices that create dissatisfaction, and so on, which are all things that are vital for political activism to arise, and for deciding what shape it will take. It has been my intention to focus more on what forms such dissatisfaction with power takes, rather than describing from where it comes. In this, I hope that I have at least to some degree succeeded.

Throughout the thesis, I have argued for the combination of various analytical perspectives, such as cognitive anthropology's concept of cultural models, Turner's (1982) concept of social drama, as well as concepts of emotions developed by authors studying the ethnographic field of eastern Europe. Through such seemingly idiosyncratic combinations, I hope to have illuminated some aspects of how knowledge and motivations combine in social acts, what forms such social acts take, and what such social acts are meant to achieve. To accomplish this, I have also maintained
a focus throughout the thesis on the relationship between the socially visible and the hidden. I have argued that it is this process where the hidden becomes visible, where knowledge and emotions turns into social drama, that one can find some of the fundamental characteristics of not only political activism, but also of how Kaliningradians relate to the world around them, whether it is to memories existing in the cityscape, or to the people they interact with on a daily basis. The perspective taken on relationships of power in this thesis has been especially useful in this regard. Through its use, I hope to have illuminated how people understand state power as both visible and hidden, and how they are able to act both through and against it simultaneously.

In the beginning of this thesis, I included a quote by Immanuel Kant. It seemed highly appropriate to use a quote from a philosopher so important for many Kaliningradians, as the quote was also directly relevant to the issues of this thesis. In this thesis, I have attempted to the best of my abilities to investigate the relationship between 'What can I know' (knowledge), 'What ought I to do' (social drama) and 'What may I hope?' (emotions) (Kant 1787[1855]:488). Without such fundamental questions being asked by activists on some level, I say as my final statement, political activism in Kaliningrad would not be a reality.
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Appendix: Pictures

The overgrown remains of Park Primorskiy (Baltiysk).

Apartment complex in Baltiysk, where I lived from January to early March 2011.
Demonstration in Southern Park. (Photo: Dmitri Trunov; anonymized by me)

Victory Square. Monolith in foreground, Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in background.
Monument to Mother Russia, with shopping center in the background.

The rebuilt Königsberg Cathedral.
"Rebuilt" Baltic fishing village. Soviet era apartments can be seen in the background.