REDD in Zanzibar:
An Ethnography of Stakeholders

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Thesis submitted for Master of Arts

Department of Social Anthropology
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Abstract

Climate change and its possible detrimental effects are among the most widely debated issues of our time. Deforestation and forest degradation may account for nearly 20% of the global emissions. “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)” has therefore been launched as a global framework. Efforts made by wealthier factions of the international community to initiate a system of payments to governments and local people in the South for not cutting trees, aim to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. What does this grand, global framework look like when implemented in different areas of the world? This thesis attempts to paint a picture of what REDD looks like “on the ground” in Zanzibar, drawing upon fieldwork conducted on Unguja Island, Zanzibar in East Africa.

My data is based both on a long-term village stay and constant contact and interaction with the implementers of the REDD pilot project HIMA – *Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili* (Conservation of Natural Forests) - Piloting REDD in Zanzibar through Community Forest Management – throughout my fieldwork. In this thesis I argue that there are aspects of the HIMA stakeholders’ characteristics and relationships which can provide possibilities for the accomplishment of the HIMA project and REDD in Zanzibar. That said, I believe lack of other sufficient income opportunities which could substitute the sale of forest products for the villagers, will make it hard to achieve a decrease in deforestation. If the business of forest products is in fact successfully limited it seems unlikely that villagers will be appropriately compensated, especially since the possible REDD money Zanzibar can attract through sales of carbon quotas is not expected to be substantial enough for money to be distributed to individuals.

In this thesis I am also concerned with how commercial logging is viewed by the implementers as a place-bound activity which happens in rural communities. I argue that not enough attention is being paid to urban demand for firewood and charcoal as well as other external factors. By following specific firewood all the way from the forest through the sale processes to end use as cooking fuel, I identify urban and rural people involved in the business. These local middle-men, drivers, and conductors could lose a substantial part of their income as a result of the HIMA project. Yet, they themselves are also integral to the success of the project. Thus, I believe they too should be considered stakeholders.

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Ingvild Andersen

Oslo, May 10th 2012

List of Central Names and Acronyms

ASP – The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP)

CARE International – International development organization

CCM – *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (Party of the Revolution)

CUF – The Civic United Front

DCCFF – The Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits, and Forestry, Zanzibar

HIMA – *Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili* (Conservation of Natural Forests) - Piloting REDD in Zanzibar through Community Forest Management

Imani – A pseudonym for the village where I stayed for 5 months

IMF – The International Monetary Fund

JECA – Jozani Environmental Conservation Association

JOCDO - Jozani Credit Development Organization

MALE – The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Environment, Zanzibar

NGENARECO – Ngezi Natural Resources Conservation Organization

NGO – Non-governmental organization

NICFI – Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative

LPG – Liquid petrol gas

REDD – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

REDD+ – REDD plus forest regeneration and rehabilitation

RO – Right of Occupancy

SCC – *Shehia* Conservation Committee

SEDCA – The South Environment Development Conservation Association

Sheha **–** Leader of a *shehia*

Shehia **–** Local government unit consisting of one big or a few small villages

TANU – Tanzania African National Union

UN-REDD - The United Nations' initiative on REDD in developing countries

VSLA – Village Savings and Loans Association

Prologue: REDD

Recent years have seen an increase in concern about climate change and its detrimental effects. Especially the anthropogenic causes of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions are high on the international agenda. For some actors such as the United Nations and Norway, reducing emissions from the forest sector is crucial in order to achieve a needed decrease as deforestation and forest degradation may account for nearly 20% of global emissions (LTS International et al. 2011a:3; UN-REDD Programme 2009a). This has created what is now known as REDD.

REDD is an acronym for "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation", and "shorthand for both a set of *policies* or *actions* that aim to reduce emissions and increase removals, and for the final *outcomes* of those policies or actions (Angelsen 2009:2, emphases in original)." The goal is to create reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions via wealthier factions of the international community paying forest owners and users in the South to conserve and manage their forests better. The possibility of selling carbon credits creates financial value of forest conservation (Angelsen 2009:1). REDD is portrayed as a "win-win-win situation" which in addition to gains for the climate will contribute to biodiversity and sustainable development (Nilsen 2010:38). The newer REDD+[1] also entails forest regeneration and rehabilitation (Angelsen 2009:2). REDD is supposed to evolve into a performance-based system where payments are made only after verified results (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2009:18). There is yet no universal agreement as to whether this is to be done through markets, funds, or other mechanisms.

REDD involves and is supported by a range of actors on local, national, regional and global level. Important REDD countries in the South include for example Brazil, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, Paraguay, and Bolivia. Northern donors include Norway, France, United Kingdom, United States of America, Japan, and Australia which all committed to REDD through COP 15 in Copenhagen December 2009 (Nilsen 2010:12-13; Voluntary REDD+ Database 2011). The UN-REDD Programme is the United Nation's initiative on REDD in developing countries. Launched in 2008, the aim since has been to assist developing

[1] For reasons of simplification and because my thesis is not focused on technicalities, I will use "REDD" and not "REDD+" or other acronyms.

countries in the process of drafting and implementing national REDD strategies (UN-REDD Programme 2009b). In addition to UN-REDD, countries in the North and South are entering into bilateral agreements.

Norway is one of the leading forces behind REDD, following the launch of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) by Norwegian Prime Minister Stoltenberg during the Bali 2007 negotiations on climate change. Here he promised up to 3 billion NOK annually in order to make REDD happen and work (LTS International et al. 2011b:4). Norway's support to REDD is channeled both through multilateral institutions and bilaterally, and the country is by far the largest contributor to UN-REDD (Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office 2012).

REDD has received criticism and encountered problems when facing reality on the ground; for instance regarding unclear ownership issues, weak governance and inadequate data basis. In addition to this, REDD is in itself an unclear framework where a lot is yet to be decided (Angelsen 2009:1). In the beginning REDD was focused simply on trees, whereas later emphasis has also been put on the people who live in and around forests. This is especially due to pressure from non-governmental organizations on human and indigenous rights (Howell and McNeill 2011). Impacts on the social, cultural, and economical situation for people living in and adjacent forests have been included as a necessary concern in the development of REDD (see for instance Griffiths 2009). Whether this is in fact being done, is still debated as REDD begins to be implemented.

Introduction: Thesis

What does this big, global idea of REDD actually look like "on the ground"? The Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Oslo through Professor Signe Howell have in collaboration with Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) started researching different aspects of REDD. An important part is ethnographic research examining how REDD is experienced by local people in the South. Seeing that REDD, at least in the beginning, was focused mainly on trees and forests in a biological sense, the idea is for master students to produce case studies which see trees and forests as part of peoples' lives.

My project is part of the ethnographic research at the local level, focusing on the challenges of implementation and how different stakeholders perceive their roles. The rationale for this thesis is exactly my belief in that forests do not exist outside of social context (see also Tsing 2005:xi). In this thesis it will be emphasized how trees, forests, and conservation are matters of importance in many people's lives in my field location Zanzibar, Tanzania. I find that the discipline of social anthropology with its focus on local people and social context based on long-term fieldwork creates a unique opportunity to look into such issues in detail. This I believe is among anthropology's strengths in comparison with other academic disciplines. The long duration of research also separates anthropological studies from the short stays in the field that donors and implementers conduct. Based on this, I think anthropologists like myself can make valuable contributions to the understanding of how global ideas like REDD are perceived and experienced by those who are directly involved.

My focus in this thesis is on one REDD pilot project in Zanzibar called HIMA – *Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili* (Conservation of Natural Forests) - Piloting REDD in Zanzibar through Community Forest Management – which is funded by Norway through the Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The project is being implemented by CARE International in partnership with the Zanzibarian Department of Forestry and local organizations JECA, SEDCA, and NGARENCO. Tanzania is a main collaborator with Norway in REDD, and therefore an important part of the REDD research project. Among my reasons for choosing the project on Zanzibar and not one of the mainland projects was to see how REDD is evolving and working in a small island group. Even though my thesis is not based around comparison with the

mainland projects, differences between them and the HIMA project when it comes to laws and norms of land tenure, history of development and forest-related projects, the target beneficiaries' religion, cultural features, socio-economic status, and so on, also fuelled my curiosity.

Main Research Questions and Arguments

In this thesis I am particularly concerned with the different *stakeholders*[1] of the HIMA project in Zanzibar, their characteristics and relationships with each other. I also want to investigate implications of the HIMA project's focus. I believe that I through this can give an empirically-based picture of what a global idea like REDD might look like "on the ground".

The official stakeholders I have chosen to focus on are CARE International, the Zanzibarian Department of Forestry, the local organizations of JECA and SEDCA, and Imani[2] as an example of a village where the project is implemented. In addition I draw attention to groups of people involved in the woodfuel business who I argue should be considered stakeholders because they can affect and be affected by the HIMA project.

This thesis is based on two main research questions;

1) ***To what extent can the characteristics and relationships of the main stakeholders of the HIMA project be said to affect the project and possibilities for REDD?***

2) ***What implications does the main focus of the HIMA project have for the project and possibilities for REDD, and for the people involved?***

I will argue that there are aspects of the stakeholders' characteristics and relationships which can provide possibilities for accomplishment of the HIMA project and REDD in Zanzibar. Examples include Imani villagers' wish to discontinue their participation in the woodfuel business, CARE International and the Department of Forestry's long history of involvement in community management projects, and local organizations like JECA's function as links to "the grassroots".

[1] See page 16 for elaboration of the concept.
[2] Not the village's real name.

That said, there are several other sides to the stakeholders which I believe can substantially diminish the chances of accomplishment. In this thesis I point especially to how Imani villagers depend heavily on the woodfuel business. There are seemingly few readily available alternatives and it is hard to imagine that the small-scale businesses promoted by the HIMA implementers will bring in the same level of income as woodfuel. Following this, an actual decrease in deforestation is difficult to perceive. Additionally, should this in fact be achieved through restrictions on the woodfuel business it is likely that both the Imani villagers and others involved in the business, who I point to in chapter 2, will end up worse off than before.

The close relationships between the implementers can bring good cooperation and efficient implementation, but I argue that they at the same time create a climate where the major components of the HIMA project and REDD are not thoroughly debated. Implementation continues without important questions being discussed. One such issue which I argue is not addressed to the extent needed, is the role of external forces both when it comes to what causes deforestation and in the implementers' encouragement of alternative income sources. Through what I call "the paradox of the HIMA project" I suggest that the implementers of the HIMA project portray local, rural villagers as destroyers of the forests in line with the imaginary of "tragedy of the commons". Nevertheless, I believe the project is influenced by an international discourse[3] which sees local, rural villagers as exemplary conservationists and community management as the solution to overuse of natural resources. This paradox is what brings the official stakeholders together. At the same time it is what leads to the neglect of external factors and the omission of those identified in chapter 2 who can affect and be affected by the project, but are not recognized as stakeholders.

Methodology

My fieldwork on Zanzibar spanned six months, from January to July 2011. The first five weeks were spent in Zanzibar Town establishing contacts, enrolling in language classes, visiting CARE's office, and joining field visits to HIMA project areas. From mid-February to July I was based in Imani village in Kitogani in the central part of Unguja Island. Here the

[3] A complex concept which I discuss in chapter 4.

REDD pilot project HIMA is being implemented. During this time I also stayed in contact with CARE and the Department of Forestry, as well as with the local organizations JECA and SEDCA.

In the village participant-observation was the main data-gathering technique utilized, combined with semi-structured interviews and informal conversations. I focused on participating in daily life as much as possible in order to understand the way of life and especially the use and importance of forest-related products and its significance in local economy. This entailed staying in the household of local villagers Salha and Nassor; eating, sleeping, and working with family members and neighbors. Hours were spent helping children with their homework, listening to Salha and her neighbors' stories and opinions, watching children play and women cook outside the house together with Salha's elderly mother, going on visits, working in the gardens, and eating local cuisine. As is typical for anthropologists in this area (e.g. Walley 2004:119), I went on several visits to my hosts' family members and friends in town and in other areas. I also went frequently to VSLA meetings[4] in Kitogani and accompanied Salha to JECA meetings. As my language skills progressed I raised topics concerning the forests in informal conversations.

In addition to participant-observation, interviewing is a cornerstone ethnographic method and a way of getting to know others and their worldviews. For anthropologists interviews are often accompaniments to participant-observation which can give interesting and insightful statements, but this relies on a range of factors such as the prior relationship between researcher and interviewee and the way questions are asked (Madden 2010:67-73). After the first few weeks in Imani, I conducted structured interviews with members from every household of Imani, partly together with another researcher[5]. I found this to be a great way of getting to know more villagers, attaining an overview of the village, and introducing each household to my research. Furthermore, I conducted a large number of semi-structured interviews during my stay which gave me valuable insights on topics such as the environment, use of the forests, and involvement in the woodfuel business. Due to the need for interpreters in interview situations and their limitations when it came to simultaneous translations, the interviews I conducted were semi-structured and I had prepared extensive

[4] See chapter 1.
[5] Marcy Hollar, student of International Development Studies, University of Utrecht.

interview guides in advance. Two of the interviews were focus groups with adults, two with children.

In addition, I utilized an approach influenced by Appadurai (1986), Kopytoff (1986), and Vayda (1983) where I traced some specific firewood from start to finish in order to create a cultural biography. Through this approach I am in chapter 2 able to draw attention to certain groups of people who I argue will influence and themselves be influenced by the HIMA project, but who are still not considered stakeholders by the implementers. I believe this can have serious consequences both in terms of their own likely loss of income and for the possibility of an actual decrease in deforestation in Zanzibar.

I had contacted CARE before I left for Zanzibar, and quickly established contact when I arrived. Throughout my stay I visited their office frequently and learnt a lot about CARE's work. I got to know the staff members of CARE and the Department of Forestry and as I eventually spent quite a lot of time in the CARE office was to a certain degree able to utilize participant-observation as a tool there too. During the last half of my stay of Zanzibar I conducted interviews with all the HIMA staff of JECA, CARE and the Department of Forestry. I also participated in several field visits in both JECA's and SEDCA's areas of work during my stay. I was invited by CARE to these meetings, and got a lift with the project's drivers for practical reasons and as common hospitality. The transport part of field visits turned out to be just as interesting for me because I got to witness the social interaction between staff members of the Department of Forestry, CARE, JECA, and SEDCA, outside of the settings of meetings. I do not emphasize meetings between the implementers and villages in this thesis because there were no meetings in Kitogani. However, I still draw on meetings in other areas to a certain extent.

The staff members of JECA and SEDCA were first encountered in CARE's office and on field trips. I continued to come across them on such occasions, and also in the Department of Forestry's offices, throughout my stay. One member of JECA, Awesu, was a regular houseguest in the house where I lived in Imani, enabling me to get to know him a bit further. I also attended a few meetings in their office. Extensive interviews were conducted with the two men who are directly connected to the HIMA project, as well as the leader of JECA. On one occasion I accompanied staff members to different sights along the east coast where villagers had planted trees. This trip did not include CARE or Department staff, and granted me the possibility of observing the JECA staff without the presence of the other entities. The

data I have produced in relation to the second local organization, SEDCA, is exclusively based on encounters in the CARE office and on field visits[6].

There is also a third major local organization in the HIMA project, NGENARECO, which is active on the island of Pemba. I met representatives of NGENARECO briefly in CARE's offices, but as I focused my fieldwork on Unguja I will not draw upon NGENARECO in my thesis. Due to the fact that JECA works in the area where Imani is located and I had more interaction with the staff members, my data material is more elaborate than for SEDCA. However, to a certain extent, SEDCA will still be referred to. Norway, as represented through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Dar es Salaam, will also be part of this thesis, but because my interaction with them was limited due to geographical distance and time limits, Norway will have a correspondingly smaller role.

Main Informants[7]

Throughout my fieldwork many people made an impact on me and taught me in different ways about Imani, Zanzibar and the HIMA project. There is no room to account for them all, but some of them became for different reasons what I regard as main informants and will be presented here.

In Imani I stayed in the house of Salha and Nassor. Salha is an active woman in many regards, but for my work her involvement in the conservation committee[8] was especially beneficial. This made it possible for me to grasp the work of the committee in a way that I believe I would not have been able to without a close relationship with Salha. I also accompanied her to meetings with JECA where she is a representative for the committee. In addition, Salha knows everyone in Imani and Kitogani well and could always help me find relevant interviewees. We had many long conversations together, often relaxing on the floor of the living room in the evenings, which gave me invaluable insight into the way of life in Imani and Kitogani, and also their experiences with previous development projects. I found

[6] The history of SEDCA presented shortly in chapter 3 has been provided by Hajj M. Hajj on my request.
[7] For my informants in the village I will use pseudonyms as promised to them.
[8] An important feature of the HIMA project, see below.

her to be very honest, yet I am keenly aware that her view of people and projects is her own version of reality and might be different from others'.

One of my first interviews in Imani was with Nadra, an elderly woman who has quit engaging in wood cutting because of poor health. Since she was so outspoken about forest activities she participated in previously and her relatives and neighbors at present, this turned out to be just one of many interviews and conversations with Nadra. Eventually I also got to know her middle-aged daughter, Shawana. The two women live in the same house together with Shawana's children. Shawana and some of the older children are active in wood felling, and firewood is the household's main source of income. When following the trajectory of some bundles of firewood, it ended up being Shawana who cut and sold the specific bundles of firewood that I traced. She volunteered to introduce me to Nadra's brother Hassan, who bought the bundles and agreed to let me follow them to town.

Hajj is a man of about 40 years old who looks quite worn out, but is always cheerful. He is heavily involved in cutting firewood in addition to other income-generating activities, and therefore often quite busy. At times it was hard to find him when I wanted an interview, but Hajj would always locate me the minute he was free again. I also frequently had quick chats on forest-related subjects with him as we passed each other in Imani. In addition, Hajj was the one who taught me how charcoal is made. Together with his mother and other family members, Hajj helped me understand a lot about Imani and the villagers' use of and dependence on the forest.

The local organization JECA played a central role in my fieldwork as the main partner for CARE and the Department of Forestry in the area where Imani is located. Two JECA staff members, Awesu and Simai, are now paid by the HIMA project and cooperate closely with the other entities. I met them frequently; on field trips together with CARE and the Department and at JECA meetings. Quite often I encountered them at random in the offices of CARE and the Department. Awesu, residing next to Imani, was also a regular houseguest of Salha and Nassor, which meant that I spent quite some time with him.

When first contacting CARE in Zanzibar, I spoke with Raja. He is British, hired by the HIMA project as a technical advisor for REDD. Without his willingness to introduce me to the other staff members, the first part of my fieldwork would have been much more difficult. We stayed in contact throughout my stay, and I learned a lot about the HIMA project and the

REDD component from him. Raja was very outspoken when it came to advantages and problems related to the HIMA project and REDD. I believe this might have been influenced by the fact that he to a certain extent is an outsider, and the only foreigner in the office. Our shared cultural background might have influenced our relationship.

The first person Raja introduced me to in CARE was Fatma, a cheerful woman in her thirties from the neighboring island of Pemba. She turned out to be my main informant among the HIMA project staff with her readiness to help me, answer questions and let me go with her on field trips to villages.

Ethical Reflections and Possible Limitations

Self-reflection on ethical challenges and possible limitations is an important part of anthropologists' work, and crucial for both writer and readers in order to see strengths and weaknesses of a thesis. When addressing different aspects relevant from my fieldwork here, I will show how I have tried to minimize possible limitations.

Some of the villagers in Imani were skeptical towards my research, at least in the beginning of my stay, as they were uncertain about the consequences this could have on them. Many of them are involved in activities contributing to deforestation and which they may have thought I would blame them for. It was hard to get across the idea that even though my research evolved around forests, I was not there to pass judgment. A few villagers remained hesitant towards me when it came to interviews. Others were surprisingly outspoken, and as a result they were often asked for interviews about use of the forest. This could have contributed to a bias in my material. To minimize this I tried to include reluctant people in interviews that were not strictly about personal use of the forest. In general, the villagers were open and generous also when it came to issues concerning forests, which assisted me in producing elaborate data material from the village. In order to comply with local customs, I chose to cover my hair in public in the village. This may have been unnecessary since I was clearly a *mzungu* – a white person, and thereby perceived of as Christian and not Muslim anyway, but I believe it emphasized for people how I wanted to live among them on their terms.

Beforehand I saw distancing myself from CARE and the Department of Forestry as crucial. In the field I found this to be hard, but on the other hand not really a problem *per se*. The villagers in Imani knew I was not employed by CARE or the Department, but I think many realized that in fact my findings could be read by them. There were no apparent conflicts with CARE or the Department and knowledge about their work was low, so for the villagers I do not think that this was of particular importance. When attending meetings in other villages, I always introduced myself at some point and emphasized that I was a student and not employed by any organization or government.

Neither in Imani nor other villages where I went on field visits was the fact that I come from the country which funds the HIMA project as a REDD pilot project, mentioned. I chose not to raise this topic myself as I feared it could affect peoples' perception of me and the project. For their part, I believe most were unaware of the role of Norway and/or not concerned with issues of funding. Many also had a limited knowledge of Northern countries. For CARE and the Department of Forestry the role of Norway was of course known. I do not know whether this influenced them in helping me to the extent they did in my fieldwork, but it was never a topic of discussion.

Larsen (2008:6) writes for her fieldworks in Zanzibar that as a female anthropologist in a sex-segregated society she spent more time with women than men,. This was also the case for the part of my fieldwork based in Imani and will undoubtedly influence my material. I sought to make up for this by always trying to reach as many men as women when conducting interviews. This was at times difficult because men spend a lot of time either at work or cultivating fields far away from the village. It was culturally inappropriate for me to spend a lot of time with men on my own. With CARE, the Department of Forestry, JECA and SEDCA I was free to interact with men.

My own limitations when it came to the Swahili language might have had implications for the data produced, and was the main reason behind using assistants in the village and with JECA when conducting interviews[9]. In the beginning of my stay in the village I think the language barrier might actually have worked in my favor, making people perceive of me as less 'harmful'. The obvious disadvantage is that I was only in a limited sense able to understand or hold conversations on my own that were directly relevant for my research. This

[9] Interviews with CARE and the Department were conducted in English without assistants.

did, however, improve with time, which enabled me to collect and produce data also through conversations.

Working with assistants necessitated semi-structured interviews with interview guides which I prepared in advance, as their level of English was not sufficient enough to allow for simultaneous translation. This might be considered a drawback in my material, but I tried to make up for it by producing extensive interview guides and often adding questions during the interviews, as well as listening very carefully in order to understand as much as possible myself.

Analytical Perspectives and Important Concepts

In this section I will put forward the analytical perspectives that are most important in my thesis, as well as clarify some concepts which will be important.

Thick Description

> *"What the ethnographer is in fact faced with (…) is a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render* (Geertz 1973:9-10)*."*

Geertz (1973:9-10) emphasizes how ethnography is "thick description" and how this demands thorough work in the field and in the process of writing in order to make the material clear both to the anthropologist and readers. Providing thick description is something I find to be an important task for me as part of the REDD research project producing one case study. Following this, I want in chapters 1 and 3 to focus in depth on different official stakeholders of the HIMA project in order to provide a thick description of the project which brings the reader "into touch with the lives of strangers (Geertz 1973:16)." I find the approach of following firewood that I utilize in chapter 2 to be a way of creating a thick description in the sense of discovering lesser recognized stakeholders. Chapter 4 draws on the thick description of the other chapters.

Anthropology of Development

REDD is meant to become a performance-based system of payments, thus not aid. That said, the HIMA REDD pilot project at the time of my fieldwork closely resembled just a development project in its funding and activities. There was neither any talk in Zanzibar of it being something else, nor does the Norwegian Embassy contradict this. In addition, the HIMA implementers have discovered that REDD payments for Zanzibar in the future will not be sufficient to initiate payments to individuals. This means that the compensation local villagers get most likely will resemble the "traditional" outcomes of development projects such as schools, health clinics, and so on. Based on this, I view the HIMA project first and foremost as a development project and find the anthropology of development relevant for my thesis, as well as academic contributions on development from close disciplines such as human geography and political science.

The involvement of anthropologists with development projects has been growing steadily since the mid-1970s related to the increasing emphasis on culture and the impact of development projects on local people (Escobar 1991:658-659). Anthropologists sympathetic to the idea of development often focus on projects' outcomes. Projects are investigated at all levels, but always with an eye on what goes "wrong", why and how it can be fixed (Ferguson 1990:10).

Some anthropologists rather question the *intention* of development itself (Lie 2008:122). Development as an institution is seen by for instance Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1990) as a

> "*bureaucratic force with global reach and an explicitly pro-capitalist agenda, operating as a tool of regimes that seek to perpetuate relations of inequality and dependence between the West and the rest and, through their representation, to perpetuate the construction of others as postcolonial subjects* (in Green 2003:124)."

This turn, frequently called "post-development theory", applies a discursive approach inspired by Foucault (Lie 2008:122; Arce and Long 2000:24; Nustad 2003:37). Development constitutes a particular discourse that is manifested as an objective form of knowledge through the regularity of various development institutions' practices. In being formed by the discourse, actors' agencies thus reproduce the very discourse by which they are shaped (Lie 2008:122; with reference to Ferguson 1990). I position myself somewhat between these

paradigms. The scope of my thesis does not include an investigation of development in itself, but a discursive approach inspired by Foucault underlines this thesis and is particularly relevant in chapter 4. Here I also elaborate on the concept of "discourse".

Post-development theory has an significant influence, particularly through bringing power and political aspects into the discussion and providing explanations of why so many development projects seem to fail (Nustad 2001:482). Yet, it has also received criticism for ascribing so much power to discourse that it limits the role of human agency to a mere reproducer of discourse (Lie 2008:123; Green 2003:127; Nustad 2003:42). Actor-focused scholars such as Long (e.g. 1989, 1992, 2004) emphasize what actually happens "on the ground" rather than assumptions of development as a "machine" (Ferguson 1990).

I do not believe that development is a machine that waltzes independently of people's actions and intentions. However, in the case of the HIMA project it does seem that the project proceeds without questioning by the implementers, a point that I specifically address in chapter 3 where I emphasize how the context that the implementers work under is important in order to understand the lack of questioning, but this context is not *deterministic*.

Furthermore, chapter 4 argues that the HIMA project's emphasis on "community management" is influenced implicitly by international development discourse. In addition, this chapter portrays the discourse of deforestation on Zanzibar inspired by Foucault's work on the power of discourse. This should not be taken to mean that I find discourse deterministic in the way that Ferguson, Escobar, and others can be criticized for. In this regard I confer with Crewe and Harrison in that

> "(…) *while individuals are differently constrained by their structural positions, including their access to resources, each makes choices within these constrains, and the nature of the choices needs to be understood* (Crewe and Harrison 1998:156)."

Theoretically, I believe there is room for individual agency also in relation to discourse, empirically with the HIMA project it seems that in certain aspects this room is not grasped.

Environmental Anthropology

My thesis, like the research project that I am part of, is influenced by environmental anthropology especially on environmentalism and local people's encounters with nature

conservation (for instance Brosius 2008, 2000, 1999; Tsing 2008, 2005; Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 1998; Ellen 2008, 1986; Conklin and Graham 1995). Anthropology on environment(alism) and development are mutually influencing. The growing literature in anthropology which critiques the involvement of Northern environmentalists and their organizations in the South relates to Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995), and is concerned with Foucault's work on the power of discourse (Dove and Carpenter 2008:47; Brosius 2008:363-364). Anthropologists concerned with development and the environment now focus on institutions carrying out development and conservation projects in the South, which is also a major point in this thesis.

Social Interface

In the preparatory phases as well as throughout my fieldwork, I intended to make use of Long's concept of "social interface", defined as:

> "*a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative and social interest, are most likely to be found* (Long 1989:2)."

Such critical points of linkage are made visible in face-to-face encounters between individuals or units who represent different interests. The aim is to use such meetings in order to elaborate on how actors' goals, perceptions, values, interests and relationships are reinforced and transformed in the process (Arce and Long 1992:214). Focusing on transformation in encounters with target populations can mediate post-development theory's rigid picture of the power of development (Nustad 2001:479). I intended to supplement with Tsing's (2005) concept "friction". As there was no meeting arranged by the HIMA implementers in Kitogani during my time there[10], I find the interface and friction concepts hard to use specifically in this thesis. Yet, because I have been inspired by them, they are bound to have influenced my work in the field and my writing.

Other Perspectives

Throughout the four main chapters of this thesis I deploy several analytical perspectives, such as on non-governmental organizations as well as the combined analytical and methodological

[10] There was talk of such a meeting, but it kept on being postponed.

perspective of "social life of things". These will be thoroughly presented when relevant. I have let the patterns and points of interest I have found through my fieldwork guide me, and therefore I make use of different perspectives in order to highlight the different findings.

Stakeholders

I call this "an ethnography of stakeholders" and should therefore clarify what I mean by this concept. In the 1990s the dominant shareholders' view of business was influenced by a perspective which emphasized a variety of stakeholders to which a corporation needed to be accountable in its decision-making and practices. Such stakeholders include employees, local and global communities, suppliers, consumers, non-governmental organizations, and other advocacy groups (Lewis and Kanji 2009:151). Stakeholder participation is now also a highly influential perspective in the world of environmental management and development (Reed 2008).

In this thesis stakeholders will be viewed as those who are affected by or can affect the HIMA project (following Freeman 1984; Reed 2008:2418; Green 2003:131). It will be important to identify stakeholders and their stake in the HIMA project, as well as look into their characteristics and relationships. I must emphasize that even if individuals or groups are recognized as stakeholders by the implementers of a project, this does not automatically imply that their opinions are sought after or taken into consideration. There is still definitely a sense of power differentiation between stakeholders, which I will discuss for the related concept of "partners" in chapter 3. Partners are those who are officially stated as such in the HIMA project documents, unlike stakeholders, which in this thesis are primarily defined by me.

Note on Language

Some Swahili words will be used in this thesis either because they lack sufficient English translations or in order to clarify informants' exact use of words. They will be indicated in italics. There are Swahili words which are similar in singular and plural form and I will use *(pl.)* when I refer to the plural form of such words.

Outline of Thesis

After this first part of the introduction, my thesis continues with an overview of Tanzania, Zanzibar, and REDD. This again is followed by the four main chapters. Chapter 1 concerns the village of Imani, where I conducted my fieldwork. Through thick description and regional ethnography, I analyze different characteristics of Imani and the implications these have for the possibility of the HIMA project and REDD. The purpose of chapter 2 is; through following the trajectory of specific firewood, to discover people who are not included as official stakeholders in the HIMA project. I will show how these people may still affect and be affected by the project. In chapter 3 I focus on the main HIMA implementers; CARE, the Department of Forestry, and JECA. I take a particularly close look at the close relationships between these agencies and analyze the implications these close relationships have on the HIMA project and REDD. Chapter 4 addresses the inherent paradox in the HIMA project that brings together the official stakeholders, but leaves out the less recognized ones under the paradigm of "community management". In the concluding remarks I sum up the issues that have been raised in this ethnography of stakeholders.



Tanzania. Source: University of Texas Libraries (ring around Zanzibar added).



Zanzibar (Unguja) and Pemba. Source: University of Texas Libraries (Kitogani and Imani added).

Introduction:
Tanzania, Zanzibar, and REDD

Tanzania and Zanzibar

Tanzania was formed as a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 after independence from colonial powers. The country is located in East Africa and borders Kenya and Uganda in the north and Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique in the south. To the west it neighbors Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo, and to the east is the Indian Ocean where the island group of Zanzibar is located some 30 kilometers of the coast. The country is large but relatively sparsely populated, with about 40 million inhabitants at present.

Today Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous region of the country Tanzania, led by the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar in all matters not regarding the union. Zanzibar has its own presidency, government ministries and parliament as well as representation in the Tanzanian parliament. One could say that the union government has little presence in Zanzibar beyond the post offices and the military (Myers 1999:91).

There are three levels of government structures below the central level of administration in Zanzibar; the regional administration (5 regions), the district administration (10 districts), and the 236 *shehia(pl.)* (Othman et al. 2003:51). *Shehia* is a local government unit consisting of one big or a few small villages (Törhönen 1998:71). The *shehia* that Imani belongs to, Kitogani, is the smallest administrative unit serving 17 small neighboring villages. A *shehia* is led by a *sheha* who is appointed by the Regional Commissioner upon advice from the District Commissioner (Othman et al. 2003:60). As will be evident in the following, *shehia(pl.)* are important entities in the HIMA project.

The main islands of Zanzibar are Unguja (often referred to as Zanzibar) and Pemba. Unguja is the most populated island, and also where the most important city, Zanzibar Town, is located. Imani is in the central part of Unguja. There are about 1 million inhabitants in Zanzibar; most of them Sunni-Muslims who speak the Swahili language. Annual population growth rate is 3.1% (The Department of Commerical Crops 2008:1). Tourism plays an important part in the islands' economy (Makame and Boon 2008:94).

Forest vegetation in Zanzibar covers about 63,908 ha, equivalent to 23.7% of the total land area. The forests are mainly coral rag forests, mangroves, and to a smaller extent high forests. Deforestation rates are similar to that of the whole of Tanzania estimated to be at least 1% annually (The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 2001; FAO 2011). In coral rag areas at least 1000 ha of natural vegetation are cleared annually. Utilization and exploitation of forests for woodfuel, building materials, salt production, agricultural, and residential use are considered among the reasons for deforestation in the region (The Department of Commerical Crops 2008:14)[1].

Regional Ethnography

Zanzibar is often referred to as part of a region labeled "the Swahili Coast" which stretches along the coast of East Africa from Somalia to Mozambique (Larsen 2008:25). Life on Zanzibar, as on the greater Swahili coast, has always been influenced by its strategic and maritime location between the interior of the African continent and the sailing routes across the Indian Ocean (Middleton 1992:10-11). A main topic in the ethnography of the Swahili region has been the issue of whether the people living here are to be viewed as one group or not, and if so, how they are characterized. The background for this focus seems to be the area's long-time contact with foreigners. This history challenges the longstanding view in academia of Africa as consisting of bounded entities in isolation from other groups (Middleton 1992:viii; Caplan 1975:xv).

Despite this, several scholars emphasize that the Swahilis have through time maintained a sense of common identity (Winther 2008:24; Larsen 2008:38), and that locally people distinguish between Swahilis and non-Swahilis (Middleton 1992:1). Middleton (1992:2) and Caplan (1975:xv) also describe characteristics which might define the Swahili; for instance language, religion, and "distinguishable culture". With this in mind, I will in this thesis draw upon regional ethnography from the Swahili coast.

Anthropology of the Swahili coast is furthermore concerned with the belief in spirits. Larsen (e.g. 2008, 1998) is one example. She has also written about gender (e.g. 1990). The emic divide between *dini*, practices understood as Islamic, and *mila*, practices viewed as customary/indigenous, is frequently a topic of academic discussion (e.g. Topan 2009; Larsen 2008; Middleton 1992; Caplan 1975). Additionally, some newer works focus on modernity

[1] See chapter 4.

(Caplan and Topan 2004; Winther 2008). Forest conservation on the Swahili coast is not a common topic for anthropologists, but for instance Walley (2004) has written about a conservation project on Mafia Island Marine Park. I draw on her work in chapter 1.

Most anthropological literature about Zanzibar specifically has focused on coastal settlements (e.g.Winther 2008; Tobisson 2009; Tobisson et al. 1998; Rawlence 2005; Myers 2002) or Zanzibar Town (e.g. Larsen 2008). My focus on Imani which is an inland village can therefore be a small yet important contribution to the empirical knowledge of Zanzibar.

History and Politics

Zanzibar's first known inhabitants are believed to be Bantu-speaking immigrants from the African continent. Perhaps as early as the eight century B.C. Arabs arrived, and with time trading posts and settlements were established. There was contact and intermarriages between Arabs, other immigrants, and the first inhabitants, which created the mix that characterizes Zanzibar today (Middleton 1992:11-12, 15; Petterson 2002:5-6; Winther 2008:22). Yet, Zanzibar has been, and to some extent continues to be, characterized by a hierarchy divided along ethnic lines with Africans at the bottom. Arabs were ranked higher, but still below Europeans (Middleton 1992:14, 24-25; Larsen 2000).

Arab control of the East African coast grew with the expansion of the slave trade and other enterprises, and Zanzibar became the most important trading center in the Western Indian Ocean (Middleton 1992:7, 12-13, 46-47; Petterson 2002:6). Around 1850 two-third of the Zanzibarian population consisted of slaves (Middleton 1992:24). Arabs continued arriving in Zanzibar and seized land from the African inhabitants to the extent that most productive land belonged to Arabs (Petterson 2002:7).

Use of slaves on clove plantations persisted up to 1897 when Zanzibar, a British protectorate from 1890, outlawed slavery (Middleton 1992:48; Petterson 2002:8; Winther 2008:28). Many plantations continued by use of wage labor in a manner reminiscent of a tenant system, but clove export is at present not as important for the economy. Freed slaves for the most part stayed were they were (Middleton 1992:7, 26). The British kept firm control, but ruled indirectly through the Arab sultan (Middleton 1992:50). This did not bring prosperity, but rather intensified inequality along ethnic and class lines with Arabs coming out of it significantly better than Africans (Petterson 2002:9).

In 1963 the British granted Zanzibar independence at a time when it was resigning from many of its colonial possessions. Control was left in the hands of the Arabs (Winther 2008:41). Only a month later revolution was a fact, when the sultan's government was overthrown by African Zanzibarians around the Afro-Shirazi party (ASP), likely with external assistance (Bakari 2000:102-106). Not long after, the new regime agreed with Tanganyika on the creation of a union under the name of Tanzania (Bakari 2000:118-125).

In the aftermath of the revolution under the reign of ASP, political enemies were persecuted and even assassinated. The socialist-oriented regime in Zanzibar upheld a one-party system, which some hold to have constituted a totalitarian system as there was no political or civil space left open. That said, the revolutionary government did carry out some progressive measures for the Zanzibarian people, such as land reform (Bakari 2000:107-110). In 1977 the Zanzibarian ASP and the mainland TANU merged to form CCM, a party that would remain in sole power on Zanzibar for decades (Bakari 2000:114). During the 1980s Zanzibar slowly started to liberate its economy and closed political and civil atmosphere[2] (Törhönen 1998:13; Bakari 2000:115, 118). However, the economic reforms introduced since do not seem to have resulted in significant improvements of the poverty level (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 2002). Multi-party elections were held for the first time in 1995. CCM won by a small margin, with the biggest opposition party CUF finishing almost neck and neck. While CCM has its stronghold on Unguja, CUF holds Pemba; a division that continues (Törhönen 1998:13). In 2010 the first coalition government with CCM and CUF was set up.

Land Tenure

Land tenure is an important issue in relation to REDD, and I will refer to the outline of land tenure in Zanzibar presented here through this thesis.

The land tenure system of Zanzibar is multifaceted because it incorporates both community practices and government legislation (The Department of Commerical Crops 2008:2). Since the land reform that followed the 1964 revolution, *all land is officially public land*, owned and controlled by the government, but individuals and groups can get holdership rights either through a lease or by a grant as a Right of Occupancy (RO) (Törhönen 1998:63-64). ROs can be bought, sold, given away, inherited, leased, or otherwise transferred, but only

[2] See chapter 3.

to Zanzibarian nationals[3]. The transfer must be registered with the government, and a service charge paid. If land is used in a way perceived by the government as incorrect, the grant can be withdrawn. Trees are owned separately and ownership must be registered as well (The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar 1994). A move towards individualization of land was mentioned already in 1961 (Middleton 1961), but there is some communally held land in rural areas (Törhönen 1998:49).

In the area where Imani is located, the customary right to land under cultivation is often based on descent from a common ancestor believed to be the first to settle in the area and clear the land (see Tobisson et al. 1998:678). This should not be taken to mean that (use of) land is not bought and sold (Törhönen 1998:49-50, 92). Yet, rural land transfer and the user rights themselves are seldom formalized through government registration. Generally distribution of land in Zanzibar is quite equal when it comes to gender, although to some extent there is a predominance of male owners (Törhönen 1998:90-91).

For local people the combination of complex legislation and customary practices can confuse and contribute to limited knowledge of current legislation and lack of secure tenure. This uncertainty is said to prevent them from committing to long-term investments and good land management practices. The Land Tenure Act of 1992/1993 and related legislation aims to address the insecurity and the lack of clarity for community management initiatives (The Department of Commerical Crops 2008:2). As for the HIMA project, the main approach is for communities to draft land use management plans and have these formalized by the government (see below).

REDD in Tanzania and Zanzibar

Norway is by far the main financer of REDD in Tanzania, bilaterally and through the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD (LTS International et al. 2011a:36). Norway has committed 500 million NOK to REDD in Tanzania over a five-year period (LTS International et al. 2011a:xiii; The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam 2009). The letter of intent between Tanzania and Norway concerning a climate change partnership focused on REDD

[3] But land for e.g. tourism can be leased to foreigners in cooperation with a local partner (Törhönen 1998:62, 89).

was signed in April 2008. Following this the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam began supporting the national REDD process which was formally launched in August 2009. The same year the Norwegian Embassy selected nine civil society proposals for REDD pilot projects (LTS International et al. 2011a:xiii, 8-11). One of these is the HIMA project – the pilot project that this thesis focuses on.

When it comes to Zanzibar, in the beginning of the process the semi-autonomous region was to a large extent not represented in REDD negotiations, research, or agreements in Tanzania. For instance, Zanzibar initially had no representative in the National REDD Task Force. This has been somewhat mitigated as the REDD process in Tanzania has developed. Yet, Zanzibar is still not part of UN-REDD (LTS International et al. 2011a:11, 24, 47). There is only one pilot project on the islands.

The HIMA Project

The HIMA project in Zanzibar is being implemented by the non-governmental organization CARE International in partnership with, among others, the Department of Forestry and local organizations[4]. The contract between CARE International in Tanzania and Norway concerning the HIMA project was signed in March 2010. This contract has a value of almost 40 million NOK made available for the period of April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2014 (The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CARE International in Tanzania 2010).

HIMA is an acronym for "*Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili*[5] - Piloting REDD in Zanzibar through Community Forest Management". The aim is to utilize a pro-poor and gender-equitable approach to community forest management. 27,650 ha of community upland forest and mangrove on *shehia* level in seven districts on Unguja and Pemba are to be protected, with an up-scaling planned beyond the first phase. 16,000 rural households are among the target beneficiaries (CARE International n.d.-b). The project focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and degradation, and generating carbon income which will

[4] The complete list of partners: Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry; Department of Environment; 3 local umbrella organizations of SCCs (JECA, SEDCA and NGENARECO); CARE International's Poverty, Environment and Climate Change Network; CARE Norway; Tanzania Gender Network Program; Terra Global; Sokoine University of Agriculture; and Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam. The implementing stakeholders I focus on will be presented and analyzed in chapter 3.
[5] "Conservation of Natural Forests".

provide direct and equitable incentives to communities to conserve forests sustainably. A central part of the HIMA project is piloting carbon financing, thus making way for REDD. But, it has already been realized by the implementers that the scope of REDD money Zanzibar can attract will not be grand enough to allow for individual compensation. This underlines the importance of alternative income sources for the people who could lose their income through restrictions on the woodfuel business. I will throughout this thesis emphasize some shortcomings the HIMA project has in this regard.

In practical terms, the HIMA project's community management approach entails eight stages (The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources 2011), some will be exemplified by Kitogani in chapter 1. The initial preparation stage includes actions such as meetings with *shehia* leadership, awareness-raising in communities, and the establishment of *Shehia* Conservation Committees (SCCs). SCCs are responsible for selling permits for use of the forests, making sure that land use management plans are followed. Following this is the design of a land use management plan, where the borders of a *shehia's* territory is made clear and this land subsequently divided into zones according to what the level of restriction should be on extraction. The plan is then to be formalized by the government after assessment and evaluations in the communities.

The next step is implementation which begins with awareness raising, capacity building, establishment of a patrol regime, initiation of Village Savings and Loans Associations, and empowerment strategies for women and the poorest. In order to manage the utilization of the forests in zones with restrictions on use, a system of permits should be installed and the purchases recorded. Throughout the forest resources are to be recorded, sampled, and monitored based on certain guidelines. After two to five years there should be a review of the current state of the forest resources, wealth assessments, status of the SCC, and so on. The goal is that after five years, the people involved in resource management in one *shehia* can be able to assist other *shehia(pl.)* without as much technical and financial support. Initiation of the community management process can either be made by request from communities themselves, or from the outside based on the presence of important, but threatened forest areas.

Further components of the present HIMA project include mechanisms for leakage control, surveys of relevant natural resources and local households, and establishment of technical systems for instance for setting up baselines for carbon measurements. Leakage

control is important in order to make sure that decrease in deforestation in one area is not simply a result of people cutting trees in a different area. Tree-planting is another part of the project, particularly establishment of woodlots for local people so that they can use and sell wood from their lot instead of cutting the forests. The HIMA staff members also participate in workshops and seminars on larger REDD issues and framework in Zanzibar and Tanzania. A smaller part of the HIMA project is to approach deforestation caused by the business of woodfuel through encouraging Zanzibar Town dwellers to switch to alternative sources of cooking fuel.

Already before this version of the HIMA project, CARE, the Department of Forestry, and local organizations have worked on similar community management projects and this work is to be continued and scaled up. Therefore some *shehia(pl.)* are new whereas others, such as Kitogani, already have SCCs and land management plans and maps. In chapter 1 will, among other things, look into the details of the Kitogani SCC and show that it despite good intentions does not seem to function properly.

Chapter 1:
Diversified yet Forest Dependent:
The Inland Village of Imani

"*The question (…) is whether the resource and livelihood system has* access to additional resources *that can act as a buffer to the reduction in resource availability during the early phases of the new natural resource management system.*"

(Havnevik 2006:187, my emphasis)

A typical scene from Imani with stacks of firewood ready for sale. Zanzibar, May 2011.

Introduction

For about five months, from mid-February to July 2011, I lived in Imani, a village in the *shehia* of Kitogani in the central part of Unguja. Here I stayed in the house of a family of four; married couple Nassor and Salha, their youngest son, and Salha's elderly mother. In this chapter I want to address the following questions: *What are the characteristics of the village of Imani? What implications do these characteristics have for the HIMA project and REDD?* The aim is to provide a thick description of Imani as an example of a village where the HIMA project is being implemented. I will argue that there are some aspects of Imani which could enable the project and REDD to succeed, yet particularly the scope of forest dependency and seemingly few readily available alternatives in this village is a challenge when it comes to restricting deforestation and achieving success for the HIMA project and REDD.

Outline of Imani

Imani is situated inland about 30 kilometers from Zanzibar Town, with a long stretch of mangrove on one side and sizeable coral rag forest areas on the other. One of the main roads to Zanzibar Town passes directly through the village, which makes transportation of people and products fairly easy. The climate of the area is typical for Zanzibar. All year the temperatures are quite high, but the two annual periods of rains provide a slight respite from the heat, as is also the case of the "cold" period in July and August.

The village consists of approximately 30 single-story close quartered houses. Some houses are made of brick and some of stone. Brick-based houses are considered better and are more common among the families which are relatively better off. Water and electricity are available, but because people have to pay for installation and equipment only a few have both, some have one of them, and others neither[1]. For those wealthier families in Imani who have electricity, it is mostly used for lightning, TVs, refrigerators, and freezers. Nevertheless, power connections can be quite unstable and it is usually cut at least once every day. At times electricity or water can be cut for days up to several months.

[1] See Winther (2008) on electricity implementation in Zanzibar.

In addition to residential houses, one can find two small local shops selling vegetables, bread, cookies, batteries, school supplies, and firewood. One shop has a shed outside where men can relax. When there are popular European football matches on TV, all the men of Imani gather in front of the store's TV. Vegetables, fruits, and firewood are also sold along the roadside. There is furthermore a small mosque in the middle of the village.

Social Organization

I will in this section describe some important principles for social organization that I find to affect the lives of Imani villagers – and possibly their relationship to and engagement with the HIMA project and REDD.

Kinship and Marriage

Ties of kinship are the strongest glue binding people together in Imani, as Walley (2004:117) has highlighted for Mafia Island south of Zanzibar. Reckoning kinship cognately is the most common practice among the Swahili, especially in rural areas (Caplan 1969; Middleton 1992:101; Horton and Middleton 2000). This also seems to hold true for Imani as both one's mother's and father's families are important.

Imani residents generally trace descent through their mother or father to one of three descent groups present in Imani. Those groups are to some extent intertwined by marriage. One of the groups, the descendants of two named brothers who lived during the first half of the 20th century, can be considered to be somewhat wealthier than the others. Salha and Nassor, my hosts, are of this descent group. Generally speaking, some people from this group have better houses according to local standards, more people are formally employed, and they own more appliances. They are well represented in decision-making processes in Kitogani, and the *sheha* himself is a family member. In total this descent group as a whole can also be said to engage less in forest cutting, which I will get back to.

Asking people of a certain person's kinship relations might lead to different answers, as they emphasize different relations depending on their own connection and the situation (see also Walley 2004:119). Kinship relations are complex because of several factors. The ideal pattern of marriage is between cousins; preferably cross-cousins or paternal parallel-cousins

according to Middleton (1992:111), which means that people can be related in several ways. Ideally, marriages should be arranged through betrothals when the couple are children or yet to be born (Horton and Middleton 2000:147). These days it seems that love marriages are becoming more common, and there was some talk in Imani about letting children marry who they want. Divorces are not unusual in Imani or the greater Swahili area (Middleton 1992:124-125), but people then tend to remarry. For later marriages women are freer to make their own choices regarding spouses (Middleton 1992:123).

With basis in the Quran, Zanzibarian men can be married to up to four women at a time, which adds to the complexity of kinship relations. Each marriage, however, for the most part necessitate the building of a new house. As a result of the added expenses of taking on more wives and children, only wealthy men are polygamous. In Imani there are just a few men who have more than one wife. It is common to underline *ndugu wa tumbo moja* – "siblings of one womb", meaning full blood siblings, as opposed to half-siblings who share the same father but are of different mothers (see also Middleton 1992:113). That said, half-siblings are also regarded as close kin and referred to as siblings (*ndugu*).

The decision about settlement after marriage is usually made by the groom, possibly influenced by his family. This viri- or neolocal pattern means that women often move to a different area after marriage (see also Winther 2008). Despite this, moving does not necessarily mean that women are surrounded by strangers, because of customs like marriage between cousins; the new neighbors can still also be kin. It is common for women to travel home frequently to visit family and attend weddings and funerals (see Walley 2004:117-118 for Mafia).

People rely on kinship relations for help in their daily life. For instance, Nassor and Salha live three houses away from Nassor's brother Amour and sister-in-law Jokha. When Salha is away, Jokha will cook for her family and vice versa. In the past, Jokha also was granted permission from Salha to farm some land belonging to Salha and her siblings. Amour can similarly rely on his wife and Salha's help (Salha being both his cousin and sister-in-law), as he did when he was in charge of a big conference at the school, and the two women cooked for his guests for hours several days in a row. It can be hard to separate whether such reciprocal relationships are based on friendship or kinship as one's neighbors and friends tend to be relatives either way.

The loyalty people have to family members can, however, also cause strain, as for instance for another Imani villager, Hajj, who has relatives in an area of Unguja where finding firewood is said to be even harder than in Imani. Hajj is often called by his relatives asking or begging him to provide them with firewood or charcoal. Similarly, other people expressed that town people on a visit would expect to take firewood with them when they leave, which some people are hesitant to give because they have worked hard to acquire it, and rely on it for income[2].

Kinship, being a main structuring principle for social organization in Imani, might influence the HIMA project and the possibilities for REDD. This is especially so because of the differences in living standards between the main decent groups in Imani, which also relates to the extent of which they depend on the forests for income. The inclusion of differentially situated individuals from all the three families in decision-making might be important in order to reach those who are doing the actual cutting of the forests and for them to get a say in the development of the HIMA project and later REDD. This view entails seeing internal difference in villages and not just imagining villages as undifferentiated wholes, a point elaborated on in chapter 4.

Gender

Culture and religion influence gender relations and gender activities. Middleton writes that Swahili men hold general authority and that most formal political and other roles are for men. Women are believed to be different and often also inferior, although more “modern” Swahili, especially women, might object to this (Middleton 1992:114). Caplan underlines what she sees as an oppressive situation that many Swahili women live under (Caplan 1989).

This emphasis on men in Swahili societies is also the case in Imani. Generally men are the ones to take professional occupations, make big decisions, farm further away from the houses, and so on, while women spend more time in the house cooking, cleaning, and looking after children, in addition to farming in gardens closer to home. Imani consists to an extent of two spheres; one for men and one for women, which can be regarded as separate but also complementary (Middleton 1992:119; Winther 2008:13). After work, men will hang out in the shed outside one of the local shops or in the center of Kitogani. They also go far away to farm, meaning that I would hardly see even Nassor whose house I was living in. Going to the

[2] See chapter 2.

local mosques is at the same time confined to men only. Watching and playing soccer is another popular activity for men only in Imani. In all, although limited by the short amount of time I spent in the men's sphere, it seemed that men have more spare time than women.

Even if there are things that women do not do in Imani, in my experience women were not too strictly confined to the domestic sphere. Caplan (1989:202) writes that women on the neighboring island of Mafia are theoretically subordinate to their husbands and should always seek permission before leaving the house. Imani women seemed to me generally free to move around in order to do their tasks, shop groceries, go to town, or visit relatives. However, it might lead to conflict with their husbands if women let other engagements take up their time to such an extent that they do not complete their domestic tasks. One way around this is to arrange for other women to help out, which was common in the household where I lived.

Additionally, both genders are involved in a range of income-generating activities. Middleton emphasizes how the productive efforts of countryside Swahili women are appreciably equal to men's (1992:114). This might mediate the differences between the genders. Women are in fact important social and economic figures, and have a say in their kin groups quite equivalent to what men have (Middleton 1992:114; Horton and Middleton 2000:156). When it came to discussions and many household decisions, I found Imani women to be very outspoken and convincing also in relation to their husbands. In some cases, men do however still exercise the right to decide how money earned by their wives will be spent. Some women are members of *shehia* committees and other such organizations, but commonly there are more men in these groups. The presence of women is likely to be influenced by organizations like CARE and JECA which demand female membership.

The different roles and responsibilities of men and women in Imani have implications for the HIMA project and REDD. This is especially true because CARE has an approach which focuses on gender. It is mainly centered on women's empowerment which can be said to be positive in areas where men and women have different but complementary roles and where men typically hold more power. This is essential because women might withhold their opinions in large meetings. Through making sure women are present in SCCs and pressing them for their views in joint meetings, the HIMA implementers try to include women's voices in the project – a factor that can be important, not only because of human concerns, but also for the success of HIMA and REDD especially as cutting the forest for firewood is an activity

mostly carried out by women[3]. The danger in the HIMA project, as in other women-centered approaches, is that men and the relational aspect of gender can be forgotten.

Religion

Zanzibar is a predominately Muslim society with 90 percent Muslims, mostly Sunni (Larsen 1998:62). All Imani villagers state Islam as their religion. Religion in Zanzibar as in the wider Swahili region is a set of beliefs and practices which entails both 'orthodox' Islamic beliefs and rites, but also many deemed to be marginal to it (Horton and Middleton 2000:180). The former is often referred to as *dini* and the latter as *mila*, indicating a separation between religion and custom often perceived as Arabic and African respectively in origin (Middleton 1992:171). Many other scholars, however, dismiss this distinction and for instance claim that the phenomenon of spirit possession forms an integrated part of Zanzibarian Islamic beliefs (Larsen 1998:62; Horton and Middleton 2000:180; Middleton 1992:162).

In everyday life in Imani, in addition to the fact that women will cover their hair and most of their body, religion is especially prominent in the five daily prayers. Men generally pray in the mosque in Imani or Kitogani center while women pray at home. Rules regarding women's attendance in mosques vary along the Swahili coast, but are usually restricted as it is in Imani (Middleton 1992:115). Children of both sexes attend Quran schools. Here they are taught to pray and recite the Quran, and how to behave according to Islam. This comes in addition to what they learn about religion through formal education and at home. The holy month of Ramadan (for Ramadan's importance in Zanzibar see Larsen 2011), its end ceremony *Eid el Fitri*, and other Muslim holidays such as *Eid el Hajj* and the birth of the Prophet are very important in Imani, and social happenings where people get together.

I did not hear of spirit possession in Imani, but about witchdoctors, herbal medicine, and family shrines. There are witchdoctors in neighboring villages who people turn to when medicine provided by the hospital fails. People use knowledge given by such doctors together with what they have learned from relatives about herbal medicine. Many Imani villagers are very knowledgeable about the different plants in their gardens or the forests and what diseases they cure. The belief in "Western" medicine is, however, extensive and people seek the help

[3] I will get back to this.

of doctors educated in Western medicine. There are said to be family shrines in caves or big trees where people go with food offerings. Such trees should be marked with pieces of cloth in red, white, and black so that they will not be cut down. Newborns should be brought here to ensure them a safe life. When encountering problems, people can also turn to these shrines.

The implementers of the HIMA project use phrases from Muslim scripture in meetings and in a special brochure in order to influence people in Zanzibar to care for their environment. When asked, Imani villagers state that the Quran promotes care for the environment, but this was never mentioned except from in answers to direct questions. The implementers are to some extent in contact with religious leaders. In Kitogani, I heard that children had planted trees in the mangrove as part of a project by the Quran school, but this was not confirmed or emphasized in conversations with religious leaders. One of them, an Imani resident, is also involved in the business of poles. Nevertheless, if the implementers convince religious leaders at local and national level, it could be possible for them to use their prominent roles to promote environmentally friendly behavior. Due to my limited data on spiritual beliefs, it is hard to predict possible implications for the HIMA project and REDD.

Understandings of the Environment and Forests

The Environment

The Swahili word most commonly translated as “nature” or “the environment” is *mazingira*, which according to Walley (2004:140) implies general surroundings and carries none of the connotations of “nature” in English. When explaining what *mazingira* entails, people in Imani tend to put forward a very broad ranging idea, which will be presented in this sub-section. I take the use in Imani to be more in line with “the environment” than “nature”, and quite similar to “surroundings”, yet still as will be seen, its use starts from ones body. Most Imani people are familiar with the word *mazingira*. Some say they heard this word for the first time back in their childhood schooling, others about two to five years ago. This latest statement might be connected to an increase in activities of non-governmental organizations.

For Imani residents, *mazingira* is closely linked to the concept of “cleaning the environment/surroundings” (*kusafisha mazingira*). This cleaning starts from the body, which

should always be kept clean, they say, according to Islam. One should also wear clean clothes and not put clean and dirty clothes together. Cleaning the environment then extends to cleaning the house, which is a crucial daily task. If you do not clean the house, others will think less of you, and you will be at risk for diseases. Women are the ones mainly responsible for the day-to-day house cleaning. This includes sweeping the floors and the immediate surroundings of the house at least once every morning, as well as washing dishes and clothes. Men are more involved in activities such as cutting grass and brushes close to the houses and burning garbage. Occasionally, villagers stated, "special doctors" will come to patrol the houses to see if they are clean.

Furthermore, cleaning the environment entails cleaning the village as a whole, including the nearby forests. For instance, people feel that the sides of the roads should be cleaned for rubbish although this is seldom done. At this level, protecting (*kulinda*) the environment comes into the picture, and seems connected to what they have learnt from entities such as the SCC, JECA, and CARE about deforestation. The risk of diseases like malaria, diarrhea, and cholera are among the reasons Imani people state for the importance of protecting the environment. People also believe environmental protection can increase the occurrence of rain and wind. This can be done by planting trees and by making small holes in the ground outside one's house where garbage is put and later set on fire.

The concept of planning is very important. People state that they teach their children never to cut the forest carelessly and especially not to start a fire without careful preparations. Garbage should be placed in the household damps and not just thrown anywhere. This is particularly important these days, people say, as the use of non-degradable material such as plastic is increasing. In practice, plastic leftovers are still often thrown at random.

Many people in Imani were hesitant to answer questions about *mazingira*, for instance saying they were uneducated and not qualified to answer. Educated people would reply with more confidence, but the answers would nevertheless comply with this general pattern. The broad-ranging view of *mazingira*/the environment that the Imani residents put forward includes a lot more than conservation of natural resources which is an important goal for the HIMA implementers, for whom the use of the word is more influenced by international environmentalism and development circles (see also Walley 2004). These different perceptions could be a source of misunderstandings between the different parties. That said, the Imani perception already includes protecting the environment, which can have positive

implications for the success of the HIMA project and REDD. As a result of the history of contact with the implementers, one can speculate that the emphasis on protecting the environment, as well as the solution of planting trees, is influenced precisely by CARE and other organizations.

Forests

Imani people's concept of "a forest" is also relevant for the HIMA project. When asked about the distance to the forest, several informants would reply with an estimate of about two or more kilometers. This amazed me, as I would see tree upon tree right next to the houses and imagined these to be part of "a forest". When going deeper into this subject, people would say that the nearby area indeed was part of forests, but that when thinking of where the forests are, they would rather envision areas where firewood can be cut. Imani people feel that in the nearby forests it is only possible to get a few sticks for domestic use, and still this demands heavy work. There is a general consent among villagers that forests are "further away than before" and they feel compelled to go further in order to harvest wood intended for sale. This might lead them to cross the boundaries of other *shehia(pl.)* and/or into areas where use of the forests is restricted, creating potential for conflicts with other forest-dependent communities and SCCs, as wells as the police and forest guards. People relate this change to the present and past exploitation of the surrounding forests in order to get firewood, charcoal, building materials and agricultural land.

Villagers perceive a link between reduction in rainfall and weaker winds, and deforestation. This makes life more taxing, as heat might lead one to tire more quickly and the rain is important for cultivation. Fruits are also hard to find in the forest these days. The solution stated is to plant more trees. This is an activity carried out by some Imani villagers. There are people who have small plantations of casuarina trees (*mivinje*) or similar kinds of trees which are encouraged by the HIMA implementers as an alternative source of firewood easing the dependence on natural forests.

When getting into the subject of why some people cut firewood in the forests and others do not, people would mention the lack of education and prevalence of poverty. There are just a handful of people who rarely or never go to the forest for cutting firewood for the purpose of sale, and they might be considered among the most fortunate. Generally they trace their descent to the same group. They also belong to households where at least one adult has a

steady job and family members successfully engage in a wide range of other income-generating activities. Education is important for acquiring a job such as being a teacher, and thereby a regular salary. However, I did not find lack of education to be a factor explaining that people are unaware of consequences of their actions – many villagers seemed rather to feel very guilty for engaging in activities believed to cause deforestation. Cutting the forest to a large extent for cash needs is never glorified; it is the strains of the work that is emphasized. "If I could, I would stop immediately" is what firewood depending people like Shawana, a middle-aged woman of Imani, would say to me.

The fact that Imani villagers ascribe importance to the use side of forests when explaining the concept of "a forest" is a sign of the importance forest products have in the local economy. A utilitarian view of forests[4], and, one could say by extent, of nature, does not share the kind of romance for nature underlying much conservationist agenda (see also Walley 2004:144), and can lead to misunderstandings in encounters with people with such a background. The success of the HIMA project and REDD will be influenced by the implementers' and villagers' awareness of these differences and the possible misunderstandings they can create. At the same time, the Imani villagers' message of wanting to stop cutting trees is a sign that limiting deforestation could be achievable. I will return to some of the points made here in chapter 4.

[4] Focusing on the utilitarian view is not meant to deny that there is a spiritual connection with forests for instance through forest shrines and related beliefs (see above).



Kitogani's land use map. Provided by CARE.

The Kitogani *Sheha* and Conservation Committee

In the introduction, the smallest government unit of a *shehia* which is led by a *sheha* was presented. *Masheha*[5] and the *shehia* structure are very important in the HIMA project and I will therefore present some Kitogani details. The *sheha* of Kitogani, a man of about 70 years old, is an inhabitant of Imani and therefore has a great presence in the village. He has been the *sheha* for 13 years. In addition to the *sheha* council there are four committees under the Kitogani s*heha*; for health, school, development, and conservation. Among the *sheha's* official responsibilities are to implement all government policy, to solve conflicts in families and the community, and to keep records of significant events. He characterizes his role in forest conservation as to oversee all use of land on behalf of the government. The *sheha* stated that he is the patron for the *Shehia* Conservation Committee (SCC) and should resolve all matter concerning the forests. The cooperation of *masheha* could be crucial in the success or failure of the HIMA project and thereby REDD because of the influence and power they have in their areas both informally and as government (district) representatives.

As Kitogani has been involved in regulations of the forests even before the HIMA project became a REDD pilot project, a land use management agreement and map had already been drafted. A SCC has been set up to manage the forests according to the plan. Kitogani's SCC consists of people who have volunteered or been appointed by the community, about 20 people in total. Most of them are men, but a few are women (women's participation is an important requirement from the HIMA implementers). Members of the committee are expected to meet once every month, but congregate less frequently. Some matters are resolved between the key members alone on an *ad-hoc* basis, as I witnessed because I stayed with Salha who is the cashier. In addition to supervising the land use plan, the committee sells permits to men and women who want to cut trees for firewood, poles, agricultural land, and the like. Replanting of forests and mangrove might also be activities undertaken. One woman and one man from the SCC of each *shehia* represent their areas in the local organization JECA's meetings. The *sheha* should always be one of the committee members, but there were different opinions in Imani and Kitogani regarding whether he participated enough and to what extent he actually worked against the committee by selling "permits" on his own.

Even between the members of the committee, the knowledge of CARE and the HIMA project is minimal, but they are familiar with JECA. No one had heard about REDD at the

[5] Plural of *sheha*.

time of my stay. When I joined the Imani villagers in the forest to see how they went about their cutting, I wanted to buy a permit from the committee because villagers had told me they sometimes get in trouble with the police. As I made the request to the SCC, however, I learnt that this procedure was not well known. There was doubt among the committee members concerning what activities and number of people it would apply to, and what to charge for the permit itself. In the end I bought one for 3,000 Tanzanian shillings[6], and got the oral approval from the *sheha* and key members of the committee. That said, I discovered later that all along the committee and villagers had known we would go outside of the *shehia* borders to cut firewood. The Kitogani SCC is not entitled to issue permits for other areas, just as they are the only ones that have the right of issuing permits within Kitogani.

Some of the more outspoken villagers would tell me directly that they do not usually buy permits, something that the confusion around my purchase can indicate is true. Several people know that one needs a kind of permission for cutting firewood in certain areas, but may still avoid purchasing one. Many believe that such permits can be bought directly from the *sheha*. Through this confusion and non-compliance with actual rules, it is quite obvious that the system of permits is not functioning well at the moment and that the Kitogani SCC is not able to control and manage the surrounding forests in the way they are supposed to through the HIMA project. This has consequences for the possibility of an actual decrease in deforestation in the area as well as for Kitogani's prospect of REDD money in the future.

Local Economy

This section will focus on the economical activities that the residents of Imani engage in – what Seppälä (1998:34) calls "the portfolio of activities". In order to do this, I will describe the different income-generating activities that people engage in, with a specific focus on the forest in the last part. The characteristics of the local economy is an important backdrop to understanding issues of deforestation as well as the relationship between the different stakeholders, which I will get into more in the following chapters.

Each Imani villager is involved in a wide range of these income-generating activities making the total number of sources of income for the village as a whole very high. This

[6] About $1.90.

extensive diversification on an individual and village level is found in nearby areas too, such as the coastal village of Jambiani (Tobisson 2009) and mainland Lindi (Seppälä 1998). There is, however, also a sense of specialization in that each person and household has its own specific "portfolio" of activities which is slightly different from others. This is the foundation for exchange relationships within the village (Seppälä 1998:12, 21-22). The specific individual and household constellations of income sources can also change over time, both within a year and more long-term. For Imani, it is nevertheless important to keep in mind how the sale of forest products is a significant part of people's income despite their wide range of other activities.

Formal Occupations

Quite a few men and a smaller number of women in Imani hold formal or semi-formal occupations. This includes teaching at the local school, working at the gas stations in Kitogani center, and as shopkeepers. Others have less structured employments that might be called semi-formal[7], as the salary is not set or guaranteed. An example is young men working as drivers or conductors on local buses, an occupational group I will come back to in chapter 2.

Agriculture and Livestock-Keeping

Almost all the villagers in Imani are involved in agricultural activities, growing vegetable and fruit crops such as spinach, tomato, onion, cassava, yams, coconuts, and bananas. Most employed people supplement their income with agriculture, and for a large proportion of the villagers, cultivation is their main activity in addition to cutting firewood. Quite some time is spent on agriculture, especially at certain times of the year depending on the seasons of rain. The cultivation is done manually, using hands and hoes. Heavy machinery, such as tractors, is non-existent. Women work mainly in gardens closer to the houses while men cultivate fields further away. The produce is used domestically, and also sold directly to others or through the local shops or middle-men. Agriculture is important for subsistence needs, but all households add to their own produce through buying vegetables, fruits, tomato paste, sugar, tea, and especially rice which is the main staple but not grown locally.

[7] A frequently used term is "informal", but I prefer semi-formal here in order to emphasize that there is a sense of employment and regularity.

Some people have inherited rights to agricultural lands through kinship relations[8] or are permitted to cultivate part of other relatives' or neighbors' plots. For people without such access, clearing the forests or engaging in slash and burn agriculture might be their only options. This can cause conflict with the SCC if done in a manner perceived non-environmentally friendly. In one such case that I observed in Imani, the committee claimed that some of the poorer people from the village together with relatives from elsewhere cleared a large area of the forest portraying it as being done for cultivation purposes, but rather intended to use it to get firewood. This matter was still unresolved at the time when I left Kitogani. Uncontrolled fires from slash and burn agriculture in the forests are also a known problem in the area.

In addition to vegetables, fruits are important for the local diet. Fruit trees have been planted within proximity of the houses and provide the inhabitants with produce such as mangos, bananas, oranges, and breadfruits. In addition to sale of fruit, many Imani women make juice from fruits for domestic use, as well as to sell from their houses or local shops. Fruit trees are tended to in a different manner than trees of the forest, as leftovers from the kitchen may be applied as fertilizer. Some also say that they *cultivate* for instance banana plants. There is furthermore quite the number of coconut trees around Imani. Coconuts are used mainly for cooking, as coconut milk is an essential part of Zanzibar cuisine on a daily basis. In addition to cooking, people make use of coconuts for multiple purposes, such as for eating as a snack or producing ropes from the outer fibers. Coconuts can also be purchased from the local shop.

Most villagers keep livestock. The most common animals to keep are chickens and ducks, which often walk around freely, but sleep in their owner's houses or roosts. Poultry are used for sale or domestic consumption, as are eggs. A few people have goats or cattle for meat, milk, and help in transportation. Bulls are used for transportation of for instance agricultural or forest products and the owners may rent them out to other villagers. Hunting seems to be a rare activity, but might have been hidden from me as it is often done illegally in areas where hunting is forbidden.

[8] See introduction.

Use of the Forests

The people of Imani are to great extent users of the forests that surround them; the majority of villagers are involved in selling firewood and charcoal, and they all utilize these products as cooking fuel. Although no one depends only on the forest for income, for a large percentage of Imani villagers sale of forest products is the most substantial part of their households' total income. As forest is a main feature of my thesis, I wish to emphasize the importance of the forests in local economy through detailed descriptions of the process of cutting firewood and selling it, and also of producing charcoal[9]. There are in addition to firewood and charcoal also a few non-timber products that Imani villagers harvest from the forests; such as honey from bee hives and fruits to the extent that they are available.

The most common source of cooking fuel in Imani is firewood, which is used daily also by those who have electricity (see also Winther 2008:11, chapter 10). To supplement, people utilize charcoal and to a much lesser extent gas and electricity. Gathering (including cutting) firewood for cooking seems to be an activity mostly performed by women, but men might help out. Some also purchase firewood at times. As they enter the forests in order to take a shortcut or get to their fields, women and men pick up fallen branches or cut some that can be used as firewood. Cutting firewood in the nearby mangrove area is completely prohibited, however still quite common. In order to get enough firewood, especially to an extent where it can be sold for profit, Imani villagers have to go far from the village. These days good areas for cutting are at the outskirts of Kitogani or even in other *shehia(pl.)*. Crossing into other *shehia(pl.)*, or local areas where the forests are protected creates potential for conflict, and villagers say that at times they have to hide from the police or forest guards[10]. The long distance also makes buses, small trucks, or carts essential for transporting the firewood back to the village. People normally go by hired car or regular bus to the desired forest area, but may have to walk the long way back by foot.

Sometimes smaller groups based on kin relations or friendship make trips to the forest to cut firewood, but often the majority of Imani residents go together. Trips like these might

[9] Cutting trees for poles was carried out to a smaller extent than firewood and charcoal in Imani, and therefore I choose not to focus on it here. The business of woodfuel will be an important feature of chapter 2 as well.
[10] There is a system of forest guards, paid by the government through the district level – seemingly without direct connection to the HIMA project, who patrol to make sure people are not cutting in restricted areas without permission. For Kitogani and a neighboring area, however, there is only one forest guard. He does random patrols a few days a week, or if he hears of intent of misuse. People caught are taken to the police before fines and possible confiscation is to be decided by the SCC. There can be conflicts when he encounters people involved in illegal activities.

take the whole day, occasionally several trips over many days are made in order to carry all the stacks of firewood back. People go to the forests up to about three times per week depending on other engagements. When the villagers go together, there are mostly women present, but also a few men. Trips usually take place at daytime when many of the men are busy at work, which explains some of the gender imbalance. When women are away, children are taken care of by elderly women and older siblings.

Cutting firewood is perceived as a physically demanding task that makes you tired and dirty, and might involve danger – such as being stung by bees or bitten by snakes. Collecting firewood is also an increasingly time-consuming activity because people experience that they have to travel further and further in order to get enough firewood to earn a living. Many people feel that the time spent and money earned does not really add up to a true profit. People often emphasize this relationship between time and money.

Some Imani villagers also produce charcoal from wood cut in the forests. This is again a task which takes time and is physically challenging. In order to make charcoal, firewood is stacked between wooden poles set out in a square or rectangular shape and then set on fire. After the fire is started, the stack is left for about three to four days. When the fire process is assumed to be finished, one has to take the stack apart with a hoe or similar tool. When reaching for charred pieces in order to dismantle the pile, dark, black smoke seeps out. This smoke is troublesome for the respiratory system, and many people feel they need special herbal medicine in order to avoid diseases from it. There is no protective gear or equipment in use. Several charred pieces are normally not fully burned out, and water needs to be added. Some also needs to be chopped up in order to be suitably sized for sale. Old flour or rice sacks are used to store the finished charcoal in.

Charcoal is sold at a higher price than firewood, but again, the time and efforts needed make people feel it is not a particularly profitable activity. This might be the reason why only a few people in Imani make charcoal on a regular basis. Some prepare charcoal only a couple of times every year or not at all. Before Ramadan it is expected that the demand and prices will be high as people are preparing for the big feasts of the holy month, and more people get into producing charcoal. Making charcoal for domestic use alone is rare.

Other Income-Generating Activities

Most people, and particularly women, engage in small individual businesses (*biashara ndogo ndogo*) or cooperatives to add further to their households' income. It is common to be involved in several such income-generating activities at the same time in addition to the woodfuel business, possible formal and semi-formal occupations, and subsistence agriculture. Activities performed include tailoring, other kinds of handicrafts, making ropes, or selling vegetables, juice, breads, cakes, space in refrigerators and freezers, or power from sockets – among a whole range of other engagements.

There are no tourists visiting Imani as it is not situated along the coast and does not house any tourist attractions. Therefore, few villagers make their living from tourism, which is more prominent in other parts of Unguja., but there are some who work in hotels on the coast and others who make products which are sold in the gift shop in nearby Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. Since Imani is an inland village, fishing is not a common activity. Fish is still an important part of Imani diet and usually bought from the local shop or people from other villages. In coastal Zanzibar seaweed farming is becoming a popular income-generating activity (see Winther 2008:chapter 5 on the importance for neighboring Uroa ; Tobisson 2009 for Jambiani), but it is impossible in inland Imani.

Local Economy and the HIMA Project

In this section the goal has been to portray the wide range of income-generating activities that Imani villagers engage in, with special emphasis on the use of forests. Although most residents are involved in many different activities simultaneously creating a vast diversification of income sources, there is still a great dependence on the business of forest products. This has obvious implications for the HIMA project and REDD because of its relationship to deforestation. The dependence on forests for income might be greater in Imani than some other villages, for instance coastal settlements with access to resources that the Imani residents do not have to the same extent (or at all), such as tourism, fishing, and seaweed farming. These are also all businesses directed at an external market. For Imani the woodfuel business is the only business which brings in certain external capital, a point I will return to in chapter 4.

As the quote initiating this chapter highlighted, in order to have successful implementation of a project directed at deforestation, local people need other possible

resources to turn to. It is hard to imagine alternatives for the Imani villagers that could fully reduce their economic dependence on the forests. It is my belief that this is not so because the residents are not already diversifying their business practices creatively, but because compared to formal (and possibly semi-formal) occupations and the sale of forest products, the range of other activities carried out still produce only a small surplus. If the Imani residents get access to alternatives equivalent to the level of income they draw from forest-related products, there could be a positive effect on deforestation and thereby possible REDD money could come their way too. However, as will be a topic in chapter 4, one can question the idea of removing an important source of external capital income (the woodfuel business) and replacing it with small-scale activities directed at an internal market only (selling juice and bread to fellow villagers for instance).

Village Savings and Loans Associations

Many of the economical activities mentioned above have been made possible through loans, savings, and education provided by so-called Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) initiated by CARE. The HIMA implementers hope that such groups will limit the Imani villagers' dependence on the forest for income. VSLAs are therefore important in their approach to restricting deforestation. Some Imani villagers claim that VSLAs actually contribute to increased deforestation.

The Development of VSLAs

VSLAs bear some resemblance to what Geertz (1962), Ardener (1964, 1995), and others have called "rotating credit associations" – associations formed upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund, which is given in entirely or in part to each contributor in rotation. VSLAs meet weekly, and every member is obliged to pay a stipulated amount of money for saving (for instance 1,000 Tanzanian shillings[11]). There is room to save a little more than the share value in some groups. However, as opposed to rotating credit associations where money is distributed to members in rotation, the VSLA money is kept until the end of a cycle, commonly until year's end. Then settlements are done according to every individual's savings. Throughout the cycle, small loans can be obtained from the savings.

[11] About $0.60.

This microfinance scheme is based on a model developed by CARE International in Niger (Anyango et al. 2007:11). It is a system that spans most of Zanzibar with an estimate of more than 4,500 participants in 2006 (Anyango et al. 2007:14). In the weekly VSLA meetings, members can ask for a loan by stating the reason for needing it to the other attendees who in turn either grant or withhold the loan. The money people access through loans is supposed to go to starting income-generating activities. By starting a small business with the money, one will also be able to repay the loan. When reimbursing loans, people should state how they earned the money in order to avoid it coming from activities that might lead to deforestation. A system of fines for violations of group conducts such as coming late have been introduced, as well as making the people who want loans pay a fee. This works as interest for savers. The amounts of money the VSLAs have managed to save up are quite high in many of the groups.

At present there are six VSLAs in Kitogani with members from different villages. The first VSLA group in Kitogani was started and trained in 2001 to 2002 by CARE as a means to divert the villagers from selling firewood to starting other income-generating activities. When CARE withdrew after this, responsibility was handed to JOCDO, a credit development organization, which have since trained more groups in Kitogani (Anyango et al. 2007:13). JOCDO provides education on entrepreneurship as well as on the importance of the environment, and assists the VSLAs as needed. They see themselves as heavily linked to JECA as their goals and areas of work overlap.

Gender Perspectives

Despite CARE's female-focus, Zanzibar VSLAs are open to both men and women. Still they are more popular among Kitogani women as is also the case in other parts of the islands (Anyango et al. 2007:14). Almost all Imani women are members of such groups. Many groups meet during hours of the days when people with formal occupations (mostly men) are at work, making it particularly difficult for them to participate. It might also be that it appears to men that there are few small business opportunities for them. This is because those activities already started and seemingly advocated by the implementers tend to be sewing, juice-making, bread-baking, and so on – all activities considered women's work (Tobisson 2012 personal comm.). If it is so as proposed above that men have more spare time than women, there is particular reason to enlist them in the search for new income-generating activities.

Through Adila, an Imani woman heavily dependent on the forests for income, I also learned that what she and others call her husband's "unwillingness to work" contributes to her extensive cutting of the forest. Adila is left with a great responsibility for providing for her family. Promotion of income-generating activities directed at women, and participation in a VSLA, might help Adila and limit her dependence on the forest, but also put an extra strain on her. An initiative which makes her husband contribute more to the household through other activities might lead to even better results when it comes to both easing Adila's hardship as well as the detrimental consequences on the forests. This speaks to the need for seeing gender as relational and not as "women only".

Increasing Deforestation?

In Imani and the wider Kitogani there are different opinions when it comes to whether VSLAs are actually decreasing the importance of the forest for income. There are some, mostly men, who claim that women only use their VSLA money on jewelry or furniture and ridicule the whole idea of such groups. Others, like Adila mentioned above, say that because of limited income opportunities and in order to pay the weekly amount, people have to cut trees to a larger extent than they would normally if they were not VSLA members. This obviously contradicts the purpose of the VSLAs, especially the principle of stating the source of money handed in. These two points of critique toward VSLAs can have some critical warnings for achievement of the HIMA project's goals as well as the prospect of REDD. They also support the position made above that in order for projects targeting deforestation to be successful, there needs to be other resources or options than forest-related ones available.

In the VSLA group that I know best, there are some who do not go to the forest to cut. This seems to be the more fortunate women with men and families that are better off than others – implying that improved economic position can have a positive effect on limiting the use and dependence of forests. The less fortunate often feel obliged to take loans in order to cover expenses that will not genereate direct income, such as for repairing the house, sending family members to the hospital, paying for children's school uniforms, and so on. For many, this creates a negative economical spiral, which might lead to an increase in their extraction of wood for sale.

VSLAs and the HIMA Project

Although not as directly connected at the moment, CARE still sees VSLAs as important means of reaching the goals of the HIMA project and REDD. This is also evident in the Community Forest Management Guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (2011). People in Imani generally state that they would stop cutting trees for business if there were sufficient alternatives; a willingness that their already wide diversification of income sources indicates is likely to be genuine. Introducing them to other income-generating alternatives through for instance VSLAs could therefore be a way to curb deforestation. The fact that better-off women are less involved in the woodfuel business also indicates that it might be a successful way forward. Worth restating, however, is the devastating effect VSLAs can have by actually increasing the dependence on forests by creating an additional need for cash every week.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter the village of Imani, an example of a village where the HIMA project and later REDD is being implemented, have been presented. We can see that there are aspects of village organization and practices that could enable success for the HIMA project and REDD, such as the Imani villagers stated willingness to quit cutting the forests. Yet, especially the heavy dependence on forest products for income and the apparent lack of good alternatives make it hard to imagine a real decline in deforestation. The confusion around the *sheha's* role in the management of forests and the present malfunction of the SCC's permit system could also have important consequences for the HIMA project and REDD.

Chapter 2:
Tracing Firewood: Discovering Less Recognized Stakeholders and the Business of Woodfuel

"Given the importance of woodfuel, both as a source of and a sink for greenhouse gases (GHGs), it is striking how little attention is paid to it in the REDD+ literature."

(Hofstad, Köhlin, and Namaalwa 2009:238)

Bundles of firewood and bags of charcoal transported on the roof of a local bus. Zanzibar, March 2011.

Introduction

This chapter will take us from Imani to Zanzibar Town. As seen, firewood and charcoal are important both in domestic cooking and as income-generating products for Imani villagers. This dependency on forest products, however, stretches far beyond Imani and connects the village with other places. In rural Unguja it is a usual sight to see stacks of firewood and bags of charcoal lining the sides of the roads, ready to be transported to town or other areas of limited forest resources. Local buses overloaded with firewood and charcoal as depicted on the chapter cover photo, go back and forth between rural areas and Zanzibar Town from early morning to sunset. In town, small shops everywhere offer firewood and charcoal for sale. The sheer visibility and grand scale of this was for me a reason to emphasize the business of woodfuel in my fieldwork. The HIMA implementers also stress the importance of the woodfuel business for deforestation in Zanzibar, and believe it is important to limit it in order to achieve a decrease in deforestation. That said, they possibly overlook some factors which I will emphasize in chapter 4. Despite the importance of woodfuel, there is little attention to it in the REDD literature Hofstad et.al argues (2009:238), and with this chapter I seek to make a contribution.

What kind of things are firewood and charcoal? What characterizes the woodfuel business? To what extent are there people in the woodfuel business who are not included as official stakeholders in the HIMA project, yet who can still be said to affect and be affected by it? In this chapter, through an approach inspired by Appadurai (1986), Kopytoff (1986), and Vayda (1983)[1], I trace specific firewood all the way from felling by Imani villagers through the sale by middle-men to its end use in Zanzibar Town[2]. Based on this trajectory I will argue that firewood and charcoal as commodities and gifts can create, influence, and underpin relations between people. Furthermore, the business of woodfuel is a major part of many Zanzibarians' lives and for many it constitutes their livelihoods. Due to their participation in the business, there are certain people, especially those involved in transportation and those residing in Zanzibar Town, who affect and can be affected by the HIMA project. Yet, these people are not considered official stakeholders. In order to create an ethnography of

[1] See below.
[2] Since I follow specific firewood, charcoal will play a somewhat smaller role in the first part of this chapter. The characteristics of the business of charcoal are, however, to a large extent similar to that of firewood, although the process of production adds another step to the process. How charcoal is made was described in chapter 1. In the sections following the specific trajectory, I will speak of the business of woodfuel to encompass both firewood and charcoal.

stakeholders I find it imperative also to portray people and groups of people who can be said to have a stake in the project without it being (sufficiently) recognized.

The Social Life of Things

A main point for this thesis and the research project that I am a part of is that trees and forests do not exist outside of social context. In "*The Social Life of Things: Commodities in a Cultural Perspective*", Appadurai (1986:3) states that commodities, viewed as objects of use and economic value, have social lives. Firewood and charcoal, being used, sold and bought, is a commodity in Imani and elsewhere on Zanzibar, and can, following Appadurai, be said to have social lives.

Appadurai furthermore draws attention to things' circulation. It is through motion that things' human and social context becomes visible, making following things the way to discover trajectories and relations of specific things (Appadurai 1986:5). This a view elaborated on by Kopytoff. He proposes to undertake life history enquiries of things similar to that done for people's lives in order to construct cultural biographies of things (Kopytoff 1986:66).

Vayda (1983) puts forward an approach labeled "progressive contextualization" which bears resemblance to this, although not made explicit by either party. He is specifically concerned with deforestation and therefore particularly relevant for my research. In order to understand the forces contributing to deforestation in Indonesia, Vayda explains how researchers focused on specific activities, such as timber cutting, performed by specific people in specific places at specific times and then traced the causes and effects of these activities outwards.

My goal in the field and through this chapter is to construct a cultural biography of a few specific sticks of firewood as a way to discover more stakeholders of the HIMA project and the relationship of the business of woodfuel with the HIMA project and REDD. This is done by a focus on specific actors set in specific places and time as I came into contact with them through tracing firewood. Later on I went back to interview and spend more time with people involved in the trajectory as well as others engaged in similar kinds of activities so as to broaden my understanding. For reasons of clarity I will mostly refer to the particular people

involved in the trajectory. Even though it is firewood that is being followed the focus will be on the people involved in the trajectory as my thesis concerns (human) stakeholders. I believe that this approach inspired by Appadurai, Kopytoff, and Vayda will reveal important aspects of deforestation on Zanzibar relevant for the HIMA project and REDD.

From Imani to the Forest and Back

Half an hour after schedule, at 9.30 a.m., Ali, the Imani villagers' normal driver, arrives in the village, and the back of his truck is soon filled with about 30 people going on this day's trip to the forest. Today Ali will take the participants and me out of Imani and Kitogani and into a neighboring shehia *where there is a more abundant forest area.*

Ali is 23 years old and has lived in Kitogani all his life. Nowadays he lives with his wife and their baby boy, and tries to provide for them by being a driver. Sometimes he transports bricks for home-building, but he relies on the people going to the forest for most of his income. They pay him 350 Tanzanian shillings[3] for every bundle he brings back to the village. Ali has a few regular partners in his work, out of which one group is from Imani. They call him to say when and where they are going, and he brings the truck. In a regular week he estimates that he makes three round-trips to the forest, using about eight hours every time. When in the forest he also makes sure to cut some firewood himself for domestic use.

After ten minutes we get off the main road and head into the forest. We continue to go deeper and deeper in and have to crouch as branches of trees hit us. When the car stops we are in the middle of dense forest in a remote area and everyone gets out. People spread out in order to find firewood. A few men go together in one direction, and me and the women another. The groups again subdivide as needed. The women of one such a small group work in the same area, but everyone goes different ways in order to search for trees to cut. Very soon the sound of all the people chopping trees starts. Every now and then a small conversation occurs between the women; about how many bundles one has got so far, where to proceed next, or about other everyday things. To figure out where the others are, people have to call their names and go by the sound of the reply as the forest is so dense.

[3] About $0.20.

One of the women in the forest this day is Shawana. She is in her mid-forties and stays with her children and elderly mother in Imani. Selling firewood is a main source of income for the household in addition to agriculture and other small businesses, and every week Shawana goes to the forest. Nowadays she usually goes about two times a week, using from eight to ten hours, whereas previously she states that she used less time because there was plenty of firewood. When she goes to the forest now, Shawana attempts to find between six and fifteen bundles depending on availability. This particular day in the forest she had to stop at seven because she was attacked by bees.

Even though she depends on firewood for income, Shawana sometimes gives bundles to visitors as gifts, particularly if close relatives come to visit and especially around Ramadan, but it does not happen every month. She never calls relatives to say that she has firewood for them; she only gives when they visit. There are, however, times when she sends firewood to her aunt or sister in town or to relatives in another part of Unguja where firewood is scarce. Shawana does not get any direct returns for these gifts, but the receivers may at times help out with for instance making clothes for her or the children.

Each of Shawana's bundles of firewood are approximately of the same size, round with a diameter of about 30 to 40 centimeters, but the exact number of sticks is not counted. The sticks are about 80 centimeters long. This seems to be the norm for Zanzibar as a whole. Buyers experience that some sellers will offer bundles with sticks shorter than this, and give preference to people they know provide long and straight sticks. People generally appear not to be too occupied with what kind of trees the firewood comes from, but they are concerned with it not being moistened by rain at the point of purchase.

Everyone decides for themselves when enough wood is cut, and then carries it to the main path for tying the sticks together. Some use pieces of old cloth, others ropes made from coconut fibers or small twigs to make bundles. When finished, people call Ali so that he knows where all bundles are located and can transport them back to Imani. The villagers then proceeds home on foot, a long and tiresome walk.

From Imani to Town

The next day I can see how stacks of firewood cover the ground all along the main road in the southern part of Imani. They are all promised to buyers and some have already sent payment. The Imani villagers will soon place the purchased bundles on local buses to have them transported to their buyers. 30 of Shawana's bundles, collected partially on the day I went with her, are promised to her maternal uncle Hassan. He is expected to come himself to pick up the firewood, and arrives in Imani already the following day by bus.

Hassan is a corpulent man in his late fifties residing in Zanzibar Town, but he is originally from the southern tip of Unguja. In the city he lives with his family and works as a teacher. In addition to teaching he owns a small shop next to his house where his family sells vegetables, fruits, firewood, and charcoal. The forest-related products Hassan either buys in the countryside like on this day, or cuts himself in connection with his field a bit further south from Imani. When he has new bundles of firewood, Hassan cuts the sticks into smaller pieces and makes smaller bundles so that town dwellers can afford the purchase. Bags of charcoal are also dispersed into smaller packets for the same reason. For Hassan, woodfuel is only business, so he states that he seldom gives away firewood or charcoal as gifts.

Hassan and I sit down on the water-pipe that crosses through Imani, waiting for a bus to arrive to take us and the bundles to town. After quite some time, a bus passes the other way, and Hassan runs to the road signaling by great gestures that he wants to go with them when they return to town again. Shawana also calls the driver to make sure that there will be room upon their return, and half an hour later this bus stops for us. The two conductors place Hassan's bundles on the roof while he watches that it is done carefully before we climb inside.

One of the conductors is Mohammed. The 25-year-old is a Kitogani resident who works on a bus owned by his brother as a driver and conductor. In addition he cultivates a field. Mohammed finds his job hard because of the time and effort it takes. Every week he works most days, making about three trips a day back and forth between Zanzibar Town and the island's southernmost settlement. Being a conductor is physically demanding and entails climbing up and down from the roof and arranging the goods that people want to store in the carrying compartment to make sure that nothing falls out.

The number of passengers and goods vary greatly and thereby also the salary and working hours. Mohammed's salary is based on the fare people pay for themselves and their goods, but he finds that the most income-bringing is commodities and not people. The fee for passengers depends on where they get on, and is about 1,000 shillings per person from Imani[4], but the price for the transportation of for example firewood is 300 shillings[5] per bundle regardless of place of boarding.

As the bus reaches the center of Kitogani more bundles are loaded onto the vehicle. Hassan inquires about the price of some bundles that are left behind, but he foregoes the purchase because the firewood is moist. The same thing occurs when we stop not far from the forest area where we went two days prior before the bus continues towards town. At Mwanakwerkwe, a large market area and transportation hub in Zanzibar Town, people and bundles that are not Hassan's are unloaded right next to the big section for forest-related products. Now there are only the two of us, the staff of the bus and Hassan's bundles remaining, and we head off the main road onto one of the many smaller dirt roads through the residential areas of Zanzibar Town. By twisting and turning through the narrow streets, sometimes stopping, backing up, and trying again in order not to avoid clipping the curve or tearing down a power line, we arrive close to Hassan's house at last. The conductors unload the firewood and Hassan's sons show up to help carry it to Hassan's small shop.

Sale and Purchase in Town

I return some days later, and sit down at the outside of Hassan's house overlooking the shop. Hassan joins me with a plastic box that contains some small change. Not long after a neighboring woman named Rabia comes up to us asking to buy firewood. She puts 400 shillings[6] in Hassan's box and gets a small-sized bundle.

Rabia is a forty year old woman, who in addition to being a housewife engages in several small businesses such as selling different products from coconut trees, groundnuts, and curry powder, as well as firewood. She started her business a long time ago to avoid being totally dependent on her husband. On this day her own firewood was not dry because of rain

[4] About $0.60. This price varied during my stay because of increase in petrol prices.
[5] About $0.20.
[6] About $0.25.

so she had to make a purchase in order to cook for her family. Firewood is her only source of cooking fuel. Rabia buys frequently from Hassan when she is out of firewood herself, especially since she can get firewood from him on a credit. Sometimes she also gives Hassan money to buy firewood on her behalf when he makes trips to the countryside which she later sells in town. When she has firewood, Rabia sometimes gives a bundle or half a bundle to neighbors or family members as gifts.

I am permitted to accompany Rabia to her home which is just a couple of houses from Hassan's. We sit down outside of her house and I am introduced to family members and by-passers. All are women who are engaged in different activities like making baskets out of leaves from banana trees. Around noon the women begin to prepare the main meal of the day, and Rabia proceeds to her kitchen. When one enters her house, there is first a big, open room. In the opposite end of this room there is a corner sheltered by a roof and walls on three sides that constitute Rabia's kitchen. There are not a lot of things in this room, but some food is placed here, as well as the stove area that consists of three large coral stones set in a triangular shape. Rabia tears small pieces off the sticks and put these in the middle of the stove. The larger sticks are placed leaning on the stones towards the center. She slips a corner of a plastic bag between the pieces of wood and the whole sticks, and then lights it on fire. The rest of the wood catches fire, and Rabia is soon able to start cooking sembe*, porridge made of maize flour, to feed her family of seven.*

What Kind of Things are Firewood and Charcoal?

After being cut by Shawana in the forest, brought to Imani by Ali, sold to Hassan, transported to town by Mohammed, and then purchased and used by Rabia – the social life of this specific firewood can be said to be over. Based on this trajectory I will now show how firewood and charcoal (which follows the same sale process as wood after production) are both commodities and gifts in Zanzibar, and play a role in the relationships between people.

Kopytoff is concerned with how commodities are not only produced materially, but also culturally marked as being a certain kind of thing. Out of the range of objects in a society, only some are considered appropriate for being marked as commodities. The same object can also be viewed differently from one time to another or from one person to another.

Such processes can reveal a moral economy (Kopytoff 1986:64). Tracing the cultural biography of a specific object is a way of discovering what kind of thing it is and to what extent it is a commodity.

There is no doubt that firewood and charcoal are viewed as commodities in Zanzibar in the sense that they have use value as cooking fuel and can be exchanged quite easily. This exchange is mainly done with money and there were few indications that one can use firewood or charcoal for barter trade. We have seen through the trajectory of the specific firewood that the business is exhausting for some involved, but still the process is fairly quick and the exchanges straight forward. Charcoal, having to be produced as well, is even more tedious. No one I met seemed to struggle morally with the concept of firewood and charcoal being commodities that can be bought and sold. There are however quite a few people especially in Imani who feel guilty because they contribute to damaging the environment by engaging in the woodfuel business, as was mentioned in chapter 1 and will be elaborated on chapter 4. People's position in the business can be relevant to the way specific people look at the business and its relation to deforestation, as well as individual differences. The issue was raised by Hassan, the urban middle-man, but not by Rabia who also runs a business of firewood.

In his work on the cultural biography of things, Kopytoff focuses on how culture works against commoditization of some objects by a process he calls singularization. In every society, there are things that are publicly precluded from being commoditized. Such things then become non-commodities and "priceless"; they cannot be bought or sold because they are seen as sacred or of little worth (Kopytoff 1986:73-74). Some things remain non-commodities, while other objects go in and out of commodity state through a biography. During the specific trajectory of firewood portrayed above, there were no instances of firewood being drawn out of the commodity sphere before reaching its end use. The bundles were simply bought and sold with the exchange medium being money throughout the course. People are concerned with the relationship between time, effort, and money generated. The business functions on supply and demand basis. However, people like Shawana and Rabia mentioned the possibility of giving away woodfuel as gifts, and this is a practice that I observed during my fieldwork.

These statements and observations bring Mauss' work on "the gift" to mind. Mauss (1995) emphasizes three obligations that come with gifts: the obligation to repay, give, and

receive. Giving gifts to visitors is very important as I witnessed it in Imani and Zanzibar Town. Hosts will make great efforts to provide good gifts for their guests when they leave. These gifts consist in addition to firewood and charcoal, of fruits and vegetables which are less abundant in the visitors' area of residence. Fruits and vegetable are the most common gifts. The closer the relative, the more generous the gifts seem to be. When Salha and Nassor's oldest child, Yusra, visited one day, she returned to town with a large basket full of many different varieties of fruits and vegetables, in addition to firewood her parents had bought for her in Imani. Nassor even jokingly teased Salha for wanting to send Yusra home with vegetables easily bought in town, possibly a way of emphasizing the size of the gift. For me, this illustrated the importance and magnitude of gift-giving in Zanzibar.

Many people in Imani today regard collection and production of firewood and charcoal as time-consuming and tiresome. Thus, they are to some extent reluctant to put forward such items as gifts, yet they will on certain occasions and for certain people. Relatives are emphasized in this context like we saw in Shawana's statements above. Nassor and Salha also bought firewood for Yusra. There is a special concern for relatives in areas where firewood is hard to obtain. On the receiver side, there seems to be a desire from people in such areas to receive firewood as gifts when they visit, which might be interpreted as a demand and/or an obligation to give for Imani villagers. Gifts like these, however, are not free, but come with the kind of reciprocal relationships Mauss (1995) highlights. Shawana mentioned that she does not get any direct returns when she gives firewood as gifts to relatives, but that they will help her out when it comes to other things, such as making clothes for her and her children, providing an example of reciprocality.

The gift-giving of woodfuel might be able to continue even if the HIMA project and REDD succeed in restricting the supply side of the business of woodfuel due to the allowance for rural dwellers to harvest wood to a limited extent. It might also be replaced by other kinds of gifts – for instance more vegetables and fruits, or possibly REDD money[7]. If people in town are influenced to use other sources of cooking fuel, the desire and demand for woodfuel as gifts is likely to be reduced as well.

Exchange of gifts create reciprocal relationships and can be tools for maintaining these over time (Mauss 1995). However, based on the social life of firewood as portrayed in this chapter, one can also view firewood in business exchanges to be part of relationships. Some

[7] Direct carbon quotas can be hard to give away due to practical issues.

are involved in business with relatives, such as Shawana and Hassan. Here the niece and uncle are able to make use of their relationship for business purposes. It seemed that the business was a major part of Shawana and Hassan's interaction. The HIMA project and REDD can possibly influence this if restrictions are put on the woodfuel business. The business also plays a role in the friendship and neighbor relations between Hassan and Rabia, which even if hard to measure, must be influenced especially by the fact that Hassan trusts Rabia with buying on credit occasionally and her confidence in him when giving him money to purchase firewood on her behalf. Following the trajectory, it became evident that all involved knew each other well and were used to participating in this business together. Through the woodfuel business, people who have other relationships (relatives, friends, and neighbors) can cooperate and possible deepen their relations. Furthermore, the business has the possibility of bringing together people who would otherwise not be in contact even if that was not the case in this specific trajectory (if one disregards me).

The business of firewood and charcoal is a major part of many Zanzibarians lives and for many, it constitutes their livelihoods. Both as commodities and as gifts woodfuel can also create, influence, and underpin relations between people.

The Less Recognized Stakeholders

In this section the focus is on the people involved in the trajectory and their relationship to the HIMA project and REDD. I will propose some ways the HIMA project, and REDD if it is introduced in the future, can affect the lives of these people and how they themselves might influence the success of the project. In short, this entails explaining how these people can be considered stakeholders, even if not particularly taken into account in HIMA policy as is the case especially for town dwellers.

Shawana can be said to fit in well in with the HIMA project's stated target beneficiaries, because she is a forest-dependent woman from Kitogani, one of the project *shehia(pl.)*. She is heavily involved in the cutting of firewood, and a switch to other less environmentally-threatening income-generating activities will have an impact on deforestation (even if small on an individual basis), yet substituting such a fundamental part of a household's income might be hard.

As a Kitogani resident, Ali, the Imani villagers' bus driver, is also among the recognized stakeholders of the HIMA project. He is for instance already eligible for membership in a VSLA. If included among those involved in the cutting of forest for business purposes, he can also be further targeted by CARE for education and support for starting other income-generating activities. This will only happen if the scope is widened from those who do the actual felling of trees, and if women are not emphasized to an extent which excludes men.

While the implementers are acutely aware of the woodfuel business and its implications for deforestation, there is not an emphasis on middle-men like Hassan. For instance there are no planned activities encouraging alternative sources of income for urban residents. The focus is rather on promoting other options for people in the countryside to stop them from cutting, and to a lesser extent on persuading town dwellers to change from firewood and charcoal to bottled gas (LPG) or other sources of cooking fuel. People like Hassan will not be able to continue their role as middle-men if either one is successful. This possible loss of income lacks attention in the HIMA project, but becomes quite evident if seen through the perspective I utilize here.

Mohammed, the conductor and driver between southern Unguja and town, lives in a target area for the HIMA project and is therefore included as a stakeholder in the project. However, I believe that his potential loss of income if the business of forest-related products is limited is not directly accounted for in the HIMA project. There will of course still be a need for transporting people back and forth between Zanzibar Town and the countryside, but according to Mohammed this will probably not genereate an adequate income. If included in activities promoting other sources of income, he might get a chance to make a living off other means. If villagers increase the export of other goods to town or elsewhere, it is possible that Mohammed could continue. That said, as is a topic in both chapter 1 and 4, suggested alternative income activities are rarely directed outside of the local market.

Town dwellers like Rabia, dependent on firewood or charcoal for cooking, are targeted to a small extent in the HIMA project through the part of the project concerned with influencing people in town to change to alternative sources of cooking fuel. At the time of my fieldwork, the prospect of trying to have people switch to gas was being evaluated. The conclusion was to discard gas because it turned out only a few wealthy people bought the necessary equipment. CARE wants to find other options which more people can obtain. If, for example, Rabia shifts to another cooking source, this could have an impact on deforestation.

The fact that Rabia is also a middle-man in the business of forest-related products who might lose income if HIMA and REDD is implemented successfully is, as was discussed for Hassan, to a lesser extent a concern for the project. It is a paradox that CARE, which has an approach focused on women's empowerment, might end up contributing to the demise of a business that Rabia started in order to be more independent from her husband.

Following this review, one can see that all the people involved – rural sellers, drivers and conductors, middle-men, and urban users – have stakes in the HIMA project and REDD because of their engagement in the business of woodfuel. It is possible that they can be negatively influenced by the project. This is especially true in the case of urban residents dependent on woodfuel for income. These people are to a large extent excluded from both support for new income-generating activities as well as future REDD income because they do not live in forest areas. Their actions will also influence the success rate of the HIMA project and the scope of REDD money because of the relationship to deforestation.

Concluding Remarks

A trajectory of specific firewood has been used as a tool for discovering more stakeholders of the HIMA project through the business of woodfuel. I have also investigated what kind of things firewood and charcoal are locally. It has become evident that there are more people with stakes in the HIMA project than are openly recognized and accounted for, such as people involved in transportation and urban middle-men particularly. These are people who can influence the success of the project as well as the possibility of REDD, and who might be affected themselves – this is why I believe they should be recognized as stakeholders. The implementers seem aware of the woodfuel business' impact on deforestation, and state limitation to be a tool for slowing down the rate of deforestation, but this is not as evident in project policy and practice. In the following chapters I look into possible reasons for this omission.

Chapter 3:
Close Relationships but Few Questions: The HIMA Implementers

"[A]ll NGOs operate within a contextual matrix derived from specific locational and historic circumstances that change over time."

(Carroll 1992:38 in Lewis and Kanji 2009:34)

Village meeting in southern Zanzibar. Staff from CARE and the Department of Forestry (right), Hajj from SEDCA (standing, left). Zanzibar, February 2011.

Introduction

Close relationships between the main implementing stakeholders – the non-governmental organizations of CARE, JECA, and SEDCA, the Department of Forestry, and the people that constitute them, were to me striking features when I encountered them during my fieldwork. In this chapter I discuss the following questions; *What are the characteristics of the main implementing stakeholders and of their relationships with each other? What implications do the close relationships have for the HIMA project and the possibility of REDD?* I will show that these close relationships challenge common assumptions and expectations of a clear boundary between NGOs and the state. Following this, I emphasize that the "blurring of the boundaries" between the NGOs and the state in the case of the HIMA project is hardly surprising if viewed in light of the context the implementers operate within. Towards the end, I examine the implications the close relationships within this context have for the possibility of success for the HIMA project and REDD implementation. I will argue that close relationships can be an asset for the HIMA project facilitating cooperation, efficient implementation, and sustainability past the project timeframe. However, at the same time they can hinder important questions from being raised about the main framework of the project, for instance regarding the omission of certain groups involved in the woodfuel business as portrayed in the previous chapter.

Ideas about Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs are often seen as part of the "third sector" or "civil society" in a model that divides the world of institutions into three; the first sector of government, the second of market and for-profit businesses, and the third consisting of organizations that do not fit within the previous two sectors, known as "civil society" (Lewis and Kanji 2009:8, 125). The term civil society is, however, as with NGOs, imagined differently by different people (see for instance Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). There are two main perspectives; the liberal one where civil society is seen as a good thing that balances the state and market, and the radical one where there is not the same emphasis on harmony but rather on power struggles (Lewis and Kanji 2009:64-65). Either way, "the treatment of civil society is often excessively normative rather than analytical: it is seen as a source of 'good', distinct from a 'bad' imputed to the state and the

market (Bebbington, Hickey, and Mitlin 2008:6; see also Mercer 2002:9; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999).” The boundaries between the sectors are held to be clear and normative.

NGOs are significant parts of civil society and increasingly termed “*civil society organizations*” these days. In this chapter, I am concerned with NGOs specifically, but the three sector model portrayed above is important in displaying ideas about an opposition between the state and such organizations. In the past decades NGOs have become very important actors in development, also in relation to environmental issues – particularly because donors (including Northern countries and agencies such as the World Bank and IMF) wish to bypass the state in developing countries and channel money directly to NGOs instead. Yet, though such organizations seem to be everywhere, the challenge of understanding the phenomenon of NGOs remains. A reason for this can be that NGOs take multiple roles, shapes and forms in different countries as well as within single countries. Organizations can vary in size, formality, bureaucracy, funding, power, and professionalism, making it hard to find an adequate definition (Lewis and Kanji 2009:1-3).

Several scholars (e.g. Mercer 2002:12) have emphasized that this diversity is set aside in much of the academic literature in favor of generalizations based on ideology and normative agendas by people directly involved with, or sympathetic to, NGOs. This is influenced by and is influencing the view of the general public and NGOs themselves. Foremost, NGOs are valued for their possibilities in relation to the “new policy agenda”, based on neoliberal economies and liberal democratic theory.

> *“(…) NGOs [are seen] as everything that governments are not: unburdened with large bureaucracies, relatively flexible and open to innovation, more effective and faster at implementing development efforts, and able to identify and respond to grass-roots needs* (Fisher 1997:444)*.”*

NGOs are seen not only as something different from the state, but also as an efficient alternative – such as in analysts’ and donors’ support for NGOs rather than states as service providers, and the down-sizing of government as part of a neoliberal policies (Lewis and Kanji 2009:92).

Neoliberalism has provided room for NGOs, but many of the organizations which have taken up this space, as well as sympathetic analysts and others, are not in favor of a neoliberal agenda[1].

> *"(…) analysts, activists, and radical critics of neoliberal development agenda value NGOs for their ability to politicize issues that were not formerly politicized (…)* (Fisher 1997:445)*."*

They believe NGOs should challenge power relationships and act like "watchdogs" in relation to the state, questioning decisions and lobbying for political change particularly for marginalized groups (Mercer 2002:8; Fisher 1997:444). NGOs are seen to represent the "grassroots" and campaign on their behalf. We can see that even if from different standpoints (neoliberalism or a more radical political position), a line is drawn between NGOs (civil society) and the state.

Recent years have seen an increase in literature on NGOs that is less influenced by political standpoints and that moves beyond assumptions and expectations to investigate the empirical reality, especially as some find that NGOs have not brought about the success hoped for (for instance Hulme and Edwards 1997; Bebbington, Hickey, and Mitlin 2008; Lewis 2004, 1997; Lewis and Kanji 2009; Mercer 2002; Igoe and Kelsall 2005). Research now focuses more on relations and the interweaving between states and NGOs than on their opposition (Mercer 2002:12). This is also what I will do in this chapter. That said, such ideas portrayed above are still present, even if less explicit, in development discourse and in the local settings of both donors and recipients (Igoe and Kelsall 2005:5, 20; Rawlence 2005:150 for Zanzibar) – I also suggest in relation to REDD. Therefore, I believe the perceived boundary between NGOs and the state is a good starting point for what will follow in this chapter.

The HIMA Implementers

This section portrays some characteristics of the HIMA implementers that I find to be important for the understanding of the project's main stakeholders, as well as for what will

[1]However, even if opposed to the neoliberal agenda, with REDD, NGOs are increasingly drawn into a neoliberal project.

follow. Some of the features of these stakeholders will be further analyzed in the subsequent sections, as well as touched upon in the chapters to come.

CARE International

CARE International was founded directly after World War II. Originally known as the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, it aimed at sending food aid and basic supplies to Europe in the form of "CARE packages" (CARE International n.d.-a). Today, CARE International characterizes itself as "a leading relief and development non-governmental organization fighting global poverty" that works in about 87 countries around the world (CARE International n.d.-c). The organization aspires to tackle underlying causes of poverty in order to help people to become self-sufficient, but also to deliver emergency aid. In total CARE International has about 12,000 employees, with 97% being nationals of the countries where programs are run. CARE International is known for their emphasis on women's empowerment and microfinance schemes like VSLAs which was presented in chapter 1.

CARE International started working in Tanzania in 1994 in response to the increase of refugees from Rwanda, and has since involved itself in education, health, microfinance, and environmental programs covering most of the country, including Zanzibar (CARE International 2010). Working with local people in order to secure access and control over natural resources, but also for this local management to ensure conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, has become a central focus for CARE International in Tanzania's regional offices in Zanzibar[2]. CARE is quite familiar with local settings and actors because the present HIMA project is a continuation of previous community forestry projects. This is likely an advantage for implementation – and possibly also a factor in the decision of Norway to allocate funding for a REDD pilot project to CARE.

CARE's main base in Zanzibar is in Zanzibar Town. Four out of five HIMA staff members here are Zanzibarian nationals, while the fifth is British. They have all completed higher education at the bachelor's or master's level, mainly within fields like agricultural economy, forestry, and natural resource management. The point will be made later in this

[2] For simplification, I use "CARE" in this thesis about the part of the organization located in the regional office in Zanzibar Town, Unguja.

chapter that all the Zanzibarian nationals have a professional background from the Department of Forestry.

The high percentage of Zanzibarian staff could be positive in terms of the distance between them and local people being less than is described for foreign experts and local people in many development projects. That said, as they are urban residents with higher education, there is definitely a sense of difference in status and class between CARE staff and local villagers. The fact that HIMA project targets both deforestation and development is perhaps not reflected in the educational and professional background of the CARE staff. Most of them have natural science education and previous work experience concerned with biological aspects of forests. Only one has education with a development focus. Although the staff members' educations and work experiences are highly relevant for their present positions, their lack of training in the field of development could be questioned. Poverty alleviation is in fact a main goal of the HIMA project. For the local people in villages like Imani it would also be imperative that the implementers understand the social and human aspects of forests and conservation.

The Department of Forestry

In the HIMA project, as in previous projects, CARE works closely with the Zanzibar Department for Commercial Crops, Fruit, and Forestry (DCCFF). DCCFF is administratively placed under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Environment (MALE) as one of eight departments (The Ministry of Agriculture n.d.). For reasons of simplification, I will use "the Department of Forestry" or "the Department" to refer to the part of DCCFF working with forests. This is also how they are termed in everyday speech.

There is a REDD group in the Department of Forestry which consists of two women; a Leakage Officer and a Community Forest Facilitator, in addition to the District Officers of Forestry. The REDD Unit consists of Zanzibarian nationals. The two women in the unit, as well as the District Officer for the Central District where Kitogani is located, all hold diplomas in forestry and have long careers in the Department. Through their work they have been involved with organizations like CARE and international donors.

The REDD Unit sees its tasks to include "working with communities and help them with controlling deforestation". This entails training in raising seedlings and managing

woodlots, and providing knowledge of sustainable forest use. In addition they are to assist villagers in finding alternative income-generating activities which are less detrimental for the forests. The District Officers in each district where the project is being implemented are coordinators between the villages and the Department, and are often part of the same activities as CARE and the REDD Unit. Additionally they are to provide direct guidance to SCCs.

The Department of Forestry through the REDD Unit is an important partner in the HIMA project with staff members who have educational as well as long professional careers within the field of forestry. Their background is very similar to the CARE staff members and can have the same kind of benefits and disadvantages. Even though development is also a stated goal of the Department, the REDD unit lack official skills within this field. This could be compensated to some extent by the Department's (and CARE's) practical experiences with poverty alleviation, but is still, I believe, an issue worth raising.

JECA

CARE and the Department of Forestry cooperate with local organizations in order to implement the HIMA project and REDD. One of these organizations is Jozani Environmental Conservation Association (JECA). JECA presents itself as a community-based, non-governmental organization, but was started in the mid-1990s as the Department of Forestry saw that it had trouble controlling the forests in this area. I will revisit this topic later.

JECA began working in seven *shehia(pl.)* immediately around what became the Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park and soon extended to two more – Kitogani was one of these. The organization is concerned with conservation of natural resources, particularly forests and mangroves, as well as economic and social development. This resembles the combination of concern for both nature and people that CARE and the Department also express. The basis of JECA is SCCs in the nine *shehia(pl.)*, however all residents in the area are considered members. There are a few people volunteering for JECA besides the representatives from the SCCs. They lead the organization and are the ones I will call the staff of JECA. All of them are local residents who have held other important positions in their home *shehia(pl.)*, a point I will return to. The JECA staff members' educational level, however, is limited to primary or secondary school. Their way into JECA has been through engagement in local SCCs. In HIMA project documents as well as in my conversations with the other implementers, the low level of education that the JECA staff members (and their

colleagues in other local organizations) have accomplished was considered a challenge to project implementation.

Staff members are generally not paid, but two staff members are presently funded by the HIMA project and work closely with the other implementers. Outside of the HIMA project, JECA has no fixed budget. The organization is run on an *ad-hoc* basis depending on whether funding is available, which creates uncertainty and makes long-term planning difficult. Their biggest donor is CARE, but they have previously also been supported by other international donors. JECA also has some income from the gift shop in the Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park. According to the chairman, JECA currently receives 4 million shillings[3] every three months into their account for the HIMA project. Out of this money the two staff members working for the HIMA project get their salary, $600 per month is for office expenditures, and the rest is for different HIMA activities – such as awareness-rising in schools. JECA has a vital role in the HIMA project in their function as a link between CARE and the Department on one side and local villages on the other. I will get back to this in the following and in chapter 4.

SEDCA[4]

Another important partner in the HIMA project is the non-governmental organization of the South Environment Development Conservation Association (SEDCA). In 2007, a group of people in the South District got the idea of starting an organization modeled on JECA in order to do something about the destruction of the surrounding forests. At the time of establishment, there were 11 *shehia(pl.)* involved and recently a 12th has been incorporated. Since their founding SEDCA has cooperated with CARE, and at present they are part of the HIMA project in the same way JECA is and receive funding through the project.

[3] About $2700.
[4] Some information on SEDCA has been provided by Hajj M. Hajj on my request. As stated previously, they play a smaller role in my data material than JECA.

Crossing Boundaries

After introducing the implementers, I will look further into two features of their relationships, which I find to be particularly good examples of how a clear division between the state and NGOs does not exist empirically in this case.

Providing the Grassroots with NGOs

Many NGOs start off as social movements when a group of people come together on an issue that they believe in strongly. In time, such social movements might be institutionalized and become non-governmental organizations (Korten in Lewis and Kanji 2009:66; Fisher 1997:451). Tanzania's pastoralist land rights movement which began with local resistance to the alienation of traditional grazing lands in Maasai and Barabaig communities and continued with the registration of pastoralist NGOs is one regional example (Igoe 2003). However, there are instances where organizations are not started as a result of "grassroots"[5] initiatives. Their initiation might not be outside of government structures either, which has implications for the assumed boundary between state and NGOs. JECA, as seen previously, is one such case in point and will be the focus of this sub-section.

In the mid-90s the Department of Forestry, a government agency, saw that it struggled to manage and control the use of forests in the area around Kitogani. Their way forward was to decentralize. The Department started SCCs in several *shehia(pl.)* and subsequently the organization of JECA with representatives from these committees as its basis was formed. In a way one can say that JECA was initiated in order to function as a "service provider" of public forest management helping the state with tasks it was not able to achieve itself. I will get back to the proliferation of service provision by NGOs in Zanzibar in the 1990s.

Being initiated by the government does not necessarily indicate that an organization is irrelevant at a grassroots level. Neither does the government's role in the initiation of JECA prevent the organization from contributing to grassroots interests for the issue at stake. NGOs can advocate issues which have yet to create a wider social movement (Lewis and Kanji 2009:67). The way SEDCA was started with more local initiative based on the model of JECA shows that the formation of one organization can lead to grassroots interest in starting similar organizations elsewhere. If a government-initiated organization is deemed successful

[5] A term often vaguely defined. Here I take it to mean "local people".

in villages it might also inspire people to start similar organizations in order to deal with other issues that they find important.

There are indications which signal an actual connection to the grassroots in the HIMA project, for example how the local NGOs are based on representatives from member *shehia(pl.)*. Furthermore, staff members of JECA all live in villages within the organization's area of work and several have experience from the SCCs of their *shehia(pl.)*. This background can entail a strong connection to the "grassroots". Their continued residency means that they are available for discussions and questions. It is easier for villagers to state their opinions or ask questions to a neighbor they have known for a long time, as compared to staff members of other institutions who are usually urban-based and consist of many people from other parts of Zanzibar[6] and are only in villages for short periods of time.

When there are big meetings in *shehia(pl.)* concerning the HIMA project, the local representatives of JECA or SEDCA also seem to live up to their ascribed role in the project as the connection to the grassroots. As can be seen in the chapter cover picture, the staff members of CARE and the Department sit together behind desks and on chairs facing the villagers together. The local NGO staff members, on the other hand, appear, consciously or not, to attempt to manifest their position as the link by standing or sitting between the delegation and the crowd. At times they will rephrase what the delegation members have tried to express, in a way which might be more comprehensible for villagers. They also have more immediate contact with the local population on a daily basis through their NGO work, for instance doing awareness-raising sessions in schools, than the other implementing entities.

In order to obtain the positions they now occupy, it is hardly a coincidence that the three main staff members of JECA are significant people who in their immediate past have had other leadership positions in their villages. For instance, the chairman of JECA has had important political engagements in his home *shehia*. As will be discussed in chapter 4 exemplified by Imani/Kitogani, differences between the staff members of the local NGOs and their neighbors might be increased as they now receive a higher and stable (yet temporary) salary through the HIMA project. Many scholars have pointed to the occurrence of organizations that started with close connections to the grassroots eventually losing this as the organization develops (Lewis and Kanji 2009:67). It is also worth mentioning a point that will

[6] For instance, most of the HIMA staff members of CARE and the Department are from the neighboring island of Pemba. The District Officer for the area around Imani is however local to the district and well known also in Imani.

be made in association to partnerships in the following. Due to the local organizations' close relationships to the HIMA implementers as well as the scope of funding they receive from the project, it could be that they become more accountable to CARE and the Department (even Norway) than to the grassroots that they are supposed to represent (see also Fisher 1997:454; Igoe and Kelsall 2005:36).

In this sub-section we have seen that on an institutional level even though JECA presents itself as a non-government organization, their initiation speaks of a close connection to the government. This indicates that a clear boundary between state and NGOs is hardly the case in this situation. However, despite the organization not being the result of grassroots initiative outside of the sphere of the state, there might still be grounds for arguing that JECA has a strong connection to the grassroots. It also influenced local people to start SEDCA.

Boundary-Crossing Professionals

"I used to work for the Department, as usual."

Soud from CARE

Anthropologist David Lewis is bringing the specific human aspects of governments and NGOs into the debate on the imagined opposition between state and NGOs. In his papers on life-work histories from the Philippines, Bangladesh, and the UK, Lewis (2011, 2008) emphasizes an exchange of professionals between the public and non-governmental sectors. He writes that the movement of people between the sectors is increasing in many parts of the world and that following this the boundary between NGOs and the state is becoming increasingly blurred (Lewis 2011:739). I will show that this is the case for the HIMA project when it comes to CARE and the Department, but also point to a discrepancy between Lewis' work and my material regarding the consequences of "changing sides."

When I participated in my first field visits in Zanzibar, I struggled to understand which of the HIMA staff members were from CARE and who were from the Department of Forestry. They all go to meetings in villages together in one often packed project vehicle. People are picked up at various locations around Zanzibar Town, frequently close to their homes and not from their offices, making it hard to use this as a way of comprehending which entity they represent. While on the road to meetings, the different HIMA staff members joke,

laugh, and chat together quite extensively, which indicate to me quite close personal relationships. They sit together behind the same desks in front of the villagers when meetings are held (as seen on the chapter cover picture), speaking in turn, and helping each other out with answering questions – in short appearing as *one* solid unit. Even when visiting CARE's office, I would often see people I later learned were from the Department. This continued through the duration of my stay.

As time passed by and I got to know the HIMA staff members better, it became obvious who were employed by CARE and who were part of the Department. There is no doubt that at any given time, people are officially employed by one and not both. Yet, at a later point in my stay, when I looked into the HIMA staff members' professional lives, I grasped the reason for my initial confusions. Four out of five[7] current CARE-employees working with the HIMA project have had long careers in the Department of Forestry before joining CARE. Three of them worked for the Department even up to the beginning of the REDD pilot project in 2010 when they were hired by CARE. The majority of CARE's HIMA staff might therefore be labeled "boundary-crossing professionals (Lewis 2011:735)," having "crossed the border" between the (imagined) clear opposition between NGOs and the state. This adds to the institutional closeness of the two entities, resembling that presented in the previous sub-section.

When it comes to motivations for applying for the CARE-based positions of the HIMA project, Fatma – now CARE's Program Officer of Community Forestry and Institutional Strengthening, for instance, stated that she believed that with her professional and educational background she would have the capacity to do what HIMA wants to do. Soud – now CARE's Program Quality and Learning Officer, said he wanted to improve his career and because of this, he found international organizations interesting. Their motivation, as suggested to me, speaks of a quite straight-forward desire to develop their careers and to work in a position where they can use experience gained through work and education. Lewis, on the other hand, rather emphasizes that many of his informants seemed troubled with "crossing the boundary," even for the same kind of career-improving reasons. For example in Bangladesh; "longstanding tensions between the government and non-governmental sectors has made it controversial for those within NGOs to be seen to associate openly with government, and *vice versa* (Lewis 2011:746, italics in original)" or from the Philippines; "(…) colleagues view

[7] The fifth one is Raja, the British national who acts as a technical adviser.

boundary crossing as a form of 'transgression', associated with 'having broken the rules' (Lewis 2008:132)." In my material, I do not find the same sort of conflicts that Lewis mentioned in regards to his informants – neither in the "boundary-crossing" individuals themselves, nor in the attitude the HIMA staff still employed by the Department have towards those who have recently switched to CARE. This illustrates the variation of boundary-blurring among different places that Lewis himself has noted (Lewis 2008:126).

Furthermore, Lewis writes that "the boundary which separates state and non-state actors is at one level an abstract, conceptual category distinction *existing within the minds of people who are active around it* (Lewis 2011:739, my emphasis)." When raising the topic of the relationship between CARE and the Department and the implications for CARE as a so-called NGO, however, I felt that the idea of a boundary for the most part existed in my head only. Some simply, despite my continuing attempts, did not seem to understand what my questions were really about. Others just dismissed them. "The cooperation is very good. The Department is the main partner for CARE, and we work and plan together. It does not affect anything. There is no problem in planning and working together," for instance Leakage Control Officer Ali in CARE said, providing a quite typical answer to my question. This was confirmed from the Department-side as Community Forest Facilitator Rahika for instance stated that "In a way, we are in the same department, because of the way we work. The cooperation is good, close and excellent." There seemed to be no active boundary-upholding on the part of CARE or Department staff members. Although a few mentioned the possibility of conflicts, the British technical adviser Raja was the only one out of the five who expressed true concern about the relationship itself. He was also the only one never to work in the Department, and the one with the most similar background to my own. I believe the next section concerning the history of NGOs in Zanzibar and so-called partnerships will shed some light on the discrepancy between Lewis' material and mine.

Following the case of the boundary-crossing professionals it seems that based on the personal level, through professional careers and positive relationships, it is hard to argue for a clear division of boundaries between the state and NGOs. This is also the case for the institutional bonds that follow from the personal relationships, and as will be seen is also shaped by the partnership design of the project.

The NGO Context

The quote beginning this chapter highlights how NGOs do not operate independently adjusting easily to the assumptions and expectations portrayed above, but rather within a specific socio-historical setting (Carroll 1992:38 in Lewis and Kanji 2009:34; also Igoe and Kelsall 2005:8). I argue that it is only through the particular Zanzibarian setting that the HIMA implementers' relationships can be understood, and I will point to two important aspects of the local NGO context. The next section will look at the implications the context and the implementers' relationships can have for the HIMA project and REDD.

The History of NGOs in Zanzibar

The 1980s saw many countries in Africa in severe economic crises, which led to processes with the IMF towards structural adjustment programs. The policies of IMF included a considerable devaluation of countries' currencies and restrictions on government expenditure. This was intended to make room for market forces to operate. In order to avoid corruption and bureaucracy, the state was subsequently for the most part bypassed at the expense of NGOs when it came to development efforts (Kiondo 1993:168-169). Zanzibar was not spared from economic crisis and experienced shortage of food, medicine and other necessities during this period (Bakari 2000:118).

As seen in the introduction, the first revolutionary governments of Zanzibar kept a strong lid on political and civil organizations, to an extent which can be labeled totalitarian. The socialist-oriented one-party state limited associational life to what could be fitted under the party "umbrella," both in Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania (Bakari 2000:311; Kiondo 1993:164-166). Due to the crisis and inspired by structural adjustment programs, however, the government of Zanzibar slowly started to liberate the economy and loosen its grip on political and civil life (Bakari 2000:115, 118; Törhönen 1998:13; Myers 1999:93). At the same time the central government abandoned the attempt to directly deliver social services (Kiondo 1995:133).

According to Rawlence (2005:148) the withdrawal of the state from service provision opened up a huge market for non-government alternatives in Zanzibar. The proliferation of NGOs from this point in time and forward can equally be observed in Tanzania as a whole (Kiondo 1993:170). Increasingly NGOs took up service provision in the absence of the state

maintaining these tasks or were delegated such responsibilities from donors or the state. The case of SCCs and JECA being initiated by the Zanzibarian government because of the latter's incapability when it came to halting deforestation, can be seen as an example of decentralization and the expansion of service provision by NGOs instead of the state. CARE's work in Tanzania in different fields of development is another.

It should however be noted that the types of NGOs encouraged were foremost service providers – like JECA for forest management, and not critical, political voices in opposition to the state. An additional point to mention in this regard is that despite the introduction of a multi-party system in Zanzibar in 1992 and the first multi-party election in 1995, there are either way only two major parties. As seen in the introduction, even up to 2010 CCM was still the sole ruling party. One can imagine that NGOs' critique of the state in such a situation, especially with the authoritarian background, easily could easily be interpreted as or converted to support for the opposition party and thereby dismissed or even actively silenced. Currently there is a coalition government consisting of CCM and long-time rival CUF, which could have the possibility of providing a somewhat different climate for NGO critique of the state. However, recent comments from President Shein on "getting rid of all unuseful NGOs" (Yussuf 2012) speaks of a continuing strong control of civil society.

I believe the relationship between NGOs and the state in the case of the HIMA project must be viewed in light of the history of development of NGOs in Zanzibar. History shows how a clear boundary between NGOs and the state has never been the case on the islands.

The Buzzword of "Partnership"

Writing in 1998, Lewis, and Crewe and Harrison, put words to a trend in development circles that can be said to still have a stronghold today – so-called "partnerships" between governments, donors, and NGOs (Lewis 1998; Crewe and Harrison 1998:chapter 4). Donors no longer speak for instance of "beneficiaries", but rather label the recipients "partners". This is supposed to avoid implying passivity through placing the receivers on equal terms with donors, and is related to the concept of "stakeholders" as discussed in the introduction. Donors are now involved in a range of "partnerships" with local NGOs and communities in the South, which can give them a sense of legitimacy and accountability (Crewe and Harrison 1998:70-73). Such donors are both (Northern) governments and NGOs, and in light of the partnership paradigm, the idea of separation between states and NGOs is again challenged.

Much of the initial interest for partnerships in development circles came from a desire to build links between government agencies and NGOs in development projects (Farrington and Bebbington 1993 in Lewis 1998:325-326). Another way of putting it is that it is a way of diminishing the boundary between the state and NGOs. It can still be said to follow the same line of thought as neoliberal arguments for NGOs, because also with partnerships the idea is to increase efficiency, sustainability, and transparency. Partnerships are seen to enable sustainability and increase capacity of the partners making donations and the partnership itself redundant with time.

As "partnership" is a buzzword in development circles and loosely, or even hardly ever defined, it can have different meanings to different actors. Therefore it can be difficult to grasp what it actually entails in terms of practical measures. Lewis emphasizes how partnership arrangements are rarely subjected to detailed investigation (1998). Crewe and Harrison list a range of activities that partnership can refer to, for example activities such as giving grants, technical assistance or equipment, sharing information, managing projects in cooperation, and joining forces to lobby decision-makers (Crewe and Harrison 1998:72-73).

At present the HIMA project resembles just another development project and not the performance-based system of payments REDD is supposed to become, and partnership is the mode of operation. The contract between CARE and Norway lists a range of so-called "partner institutions" [8], here I am mostly concerned with the main implementing stakeholders described in the beginning of the chapter. One could say that both Norway as the donor and CARE as an international NGO engage in this kind of partnership with the Department, JECA, and SEDCA. Through the local organizations they also see themselves as connected to local communities in Zanzibar, which can provide them with the legitimacy and accountability Crewe and Harrison mention.

It is not explicitly stated in the contract between Norway and CARE exactly what the practical implications of partnership with the Department and the local organizations are, but capacity building is especially highlighted as an important activity. In addition, there is in practice seemingly a sense of working together sharing information and managing the project. This is visible in how they cooperate and stay in contact on a daily basis, as well as go to the field together. CARE, the Department, JECA, and SEDCA will all state the same objectives for the project, which indicates that they are attuned in this regard. That said, there was some

[8] See introduction for the full list.

indications of a lack of communication flow, as illustrated by District Officer for Forestry, Ali; “if I am not there [for instance in a meeting held by CARE], I will never hear of it”.

In order to understand the HIMA project, it is important to acknowledge that it is defined as a “partnership” and entails the kind of close cooperation portrayed in the previous section; yet as I will soon emphasize, that being partners does not mean that the institutions are all equally powerful in the partnership.

The NGO Context

The setting that the implementing stakeholders of the HIMA project operate under has now been contextualized by the history of NGOs in Zanzibar and the developmental buzzword of “partnership”. The role of the state in the HIMA project is substantial, but this is not surprising given the history of NGOs in Zanzibar and participation as the mode of operation. I believe that an understanding of the relationship between the main stakeholders of the HIMA project is more thorough if viewed through the context provided here, than through assumptions and expectations with little foundation in empirical reality.

Implications for the HIMA Project

To end this chapter, I want to investigate the implications the close relationships between the HIMA implementers within this context can have for the project. I will argue that they can provide possibilities of cooperation, efficient implementation, and sustainability beyond the project timeframe, but that they at the same time hinder important discussions about the project.

Cooperation, Efficiency, and Sustainability

Among the positive sides of the close relationships between CARE and the Department that staff members of the entities themselves mentioned, were that it enables good cooperation and creates greater possibilities for sustainability for the project if and when CARE phases out. “Working with the Department can lead to good implementation,” Soud stated for instance, “the HIMA project is a four-year project and will eventually phase out activities. The Department or the government will take them ahead. The cooperation is good for the phasing

out and for sustainability." By going to the field together, CARE and the Department, and also the local organizations, speak as "one voice" instead of representatives of different institutions arriving in villages at different times saying conflicting things. This can be important in getting their message across to villagers and through that laying the groundwork for good and efficient implementation locally. At an individual level, personalities that go together and close personal relationships such as between the boundary-crossing professionals of CARE and their colleagues in the Department are important for a functioning cooperation (see also Hulme and Edwards 1992:17). It was also through CARE, an NGO, that there was funding to get for such a project. This enables a grander scale of deforestation alleviation measures to get underway much faster than the Zanzibarian state would have been able to enact them. In addition to providing the grounds for good cooperation, these arguments point to efficiency, expeditious implementation, and even openness to innovation (in this case REDD). These are reasons for support of NGOs within a neoliberal paradigm – even if in this case, the state is heavily involved.

It was noted by the HIMA staff members of CARE that sometimes bureaucracy in the Department of Forestry (and other state agencies) delays their work. Avoiding state bureaucracy is a main reason for neoliberal support to NGOs. It can be argued, however, that although avoiding bureaucracy is efficient and less bureaucracy could be a legitimate wish in terms of quicker implementation, it is only through the bureaucracy that real and lasting change is truly possible (see for instance Hulme and Edwards 1992). One example particularly relevant for REDD is the issue of property rights of land, which can hardly be secured without going through the state and the legal system[9]. It might therefore be argued that close relationships with the state like in the HIMA project is an efficient and necessary tool for implementation and long-term change.

In the idea of partnerships the goal is for the partnership itself and donations not to be needed after some time. Through for instance capacity building, continuation and sustainability of the project is to be ensured. When CARE phases out, as they plan to eventually, one could argue as CARE's Soud does, that it is will be an asset for the project that the Department and others have been on board all along as they have the knowledge to secure continuity and that the accomplishment the project may have achieved are not reversed. That said, funding might disappear altogether with CARE's withdrawal if REDD

[9] For instance, in the introduction we saw how use rights of land in rural areas in Zanzibar are seldom registered with the government. This is an indication of insecure tenure.

has not been implemented in a constructive manner. This will make it hard even for long-time partners to continue the project, especially in a country like Zanzibar/Tanzania where state funds are very limited. Neither is the funding local organizations like JECA get from other donors currently substantial. In addition, the implementers are starting to see that the scope of possible REDD money (through carbon markets or funds) for Zanzibar will not be enough to compensate individuals. This means that REDD money in itself might not be a sufficient incentive for villagers to continue their effort to halt deforestation after the pilot phase or later if CARE and other external funding (and through that project activities) are stopped. Thus, NGOs' close connection to a state (which most likely will in one form or another always be present) in a project could help sustainability. However, because especially funding is an important issue, sustainability is not automatically ensured.

Few Discussions, No Change

Even if the HIMA institutions work closely together in a partnership, and many people on direct questioning will point to aspects of the project that they consider less fortunate – for instance the lack of focus on urban factors in deforestation and the woodfuel business, this still does not seem to lead to any true discussions about major issues which could lead to change of direction. There are few critical voices raised when it comes to issues concerning the main framework of the project. I believe reasons for this can be found in the NGO context.

As we have seen, possibilities of good cooperation between the implementers, efficient implementation, and sustainability exist in the HIMA project. But, although the implementers are labeled partners, working together in partnership, plain equality should not be taken for granted. Crewe and Harrison (1998:87) warn that the talk of partnership often fails to address potential conflict and inequalities. The issue of power is significant in relation to partnerships where the funding always goes in the same direction (Crewe and Harrison 1998:77). We are reminded about Mauss' work on "the gift"; that to accept a gift without returning or repaying is to face subordination (Mauss 1995; see also Crewe and Harrison 1998:88). Gifts are not free and this includes gifts given as development aid (Nustad 2003:21; Crewe and Harrison 1998:88). Funding for NGOs and development projects might come with a range of explicit or implicit conditionalities for the receivers.

This is relevant for the HIMA project as JECA and SEDCA are always on the receiver side (though they do forward some money to SCCs). CARE has multiple identities in this

regard as a receiver of money from Norway and a giver of funds within the current project as well as in the past. They are and have been the main financial supporter of the local organizations. Thus, CARE can be said to stand in a strong position vis-à-vis JECA and SEDCA. CARE's connection to Norway through the HIMA project can also raise their position in relation to the Department. However, being a representative of the state gives the Department a sense of authority with regard to the other main implementers. Their role in initiating JECA can further indicate possible power imbalance in the Department's favor. That said, the donor might need the receiver as much as the other way round (Crewe and Harrison 1998:74, 77), for instance for a sense of legitimacy and connection to the grassroots that the local organizations can provide to CARE, the Department, and Norway. I still consider CARE and the Department to be much stronger institutions in the HIMA project partnership than the local NGOs.

For organizations and analysts with more radical political hopes for NGOs, it is important that such organizations work as "watchdogs" in relation to the state, questioning decisions and lobbying for political change. Several scholars, however, emphasize how close relationships between the state and NGOs can hinder a critical stance (see for instance Mercer 1999:248; Hulme and Edwards 1992:17-18; 1997; Fisher 1997:454). If NGOs like CARE, JECA, or SEDCA raise difficult issues or even support opposition towards the government, it might cause serious strain on the relation, affecting for example funding, support, and room to exist for NGOs. I believe this can be the case for small NGOs in their relations to larger international organizations as well, as in the partnership between local organizations and CARE in the HIMA project. When there are strong differences in power between "partners" it might be hard for those at the bottom to raise critical opinions, especially as they rely on the others for funding and assistance.

JECA and SEDCA do not seem to act as watchdogs in the HIMA project, neither towards the Department nor CARE. It can be argued that such expectations put undue stress on small organizations that run on a short-term basis dependent on much more powerful entities for funding and assistance. Through the NGO context it becomes difficult to imagine a strong watchdog role for the local NGOs. When the state has restricted the plurality of organizational life for a long time, and then only in times of difficulty opens it up and even itself initiated NGOs, functioning as a watchdog can be imagined to be hard for small NGOs. This is so for JECA which was, as discussed previously, initiated by the Department itself, and is funded by CARE/the HIMA project. It should also be remembered that the state

encouraged service provision NGOs and not politically-minded organizations. Although we have seen that the space for NGOs has been opened since the 1980s, the state still holds a strong grip which is evident in President Shein's quote. CARE and the Department's close relationship institutionally and on a personal level makes it hard to perceive the possibility of criticism or suggestions for major changes in the project framework between them.

In sum, I believe this leads to a kind of partnership where important questions about the way forward are not raised. Having NGOs or others in a kind of watchdog role could have positive implications for the HIMA project itself and the people it affects by securing the implementers make sound decisions, or at least making it more necessary for them to give reasons for choices. I would argue that there are aspects to the existing framework that could be questioned, and in this thesis I raise some issues of concern.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has dealt with the main implementing stakeholders of the HIMA project and their close relationships with each other. The roles of the history of NGOs in Tanzania/Zanzibar and the current trend of development "partnerships" have been highlighted as possible backgrounds for the blurring of boundaries between the state and NGOs that the HIMA project exemplifies. Close relationships between the implementers were investigated in order to see the implications they have on the HIMA project and the possibilities of REDD. It has been argued that the close relationships have advantages in terms of good cooperation, efficient implementation, and sustainability, yet at the same time, they create a climate where critical, and possibly needed, questions are not raised.

Chapter 4:
Rural Villagers as Cause *and* Solution: The Paradox of the HIMA Project

"(…) [C]ommunity-based conservation initiatives must be founded on images of community that recognize their internal differences and processes, their relations with external actors, and the institutions that affect both."

(Agrawal and Gibson 2001:2)

Hajj clearing a pile of charcoal.
Zanzibar, May 2011

Introduction

How do the official stakeholders explain deforestation in Zanzibar? When it comes to forces of deforestation, what implications does the focus of the HIMA project have on the possibilities of the project and REDD? This chapter contextualizes the HIMA project by addressing what I suggest is an inherent paradox. Through what I will call the discourse of deforestation in Zanzibar, local, rural communities are blamed for deforestation in a way that can be associated with imagery of "the tragedy of the commons." Despite this, the HIMA project approach, in my view, is influenced by an international discourse which sees local, rural villagers in the South as exemplary conservationists in line with the notion of "ecologically noble savages" living in harmony with nature in homogenous communities. As a result of this, rural communities are targeted when it comes to the HIMA project's solution for halting deforestation. This paradox is what draws together the main stakeholders and what excludes the less recognized stakeholders described in chapter 2.

The first part of this chapter will portray the discourse of deforestation in Zanzibar and look into power relations between the main stakeholders I believe can be seen through this discourse. Thereafter, I will proceed by going into detail about the HIMA project's main way of targeting the drivers of deforestation present in the discourse – that is community management. The last section will argue that the HIMA project's approach is based on ideas of "community" that have taken a stronghold in the developmental and environmental circles (e.g. donors and NGOs) through the last decades. Such ideas might conceal internal differences in villages like Imani, and I will look into existing dissimilarities as well as the possibility of increased differences with the HIMA project and REDD. In addition, current ideas of "community" can mask the importance of external forces when it comes to resource extraction and the possibility of halting deforestation. I believe this is also the case for the HIMA project and can have negative consequences for both the possibility of decreasing deforestation and for the people involved.

The Discourse of Deforestation

Several reasons were indicated by the different stakeholders in regard to deforestation in Zanzibar, ranging from cutting wood for firewood, charcoal, and building materials, to clearing forests for agriculture and uncontrolled fires from slash and burn cultivation. All are viewed to be intensified these days because of population growth. The goal here, which is related to my choice of research questions, is not to determine the true causes of deforestation in Zanzibar, but to look at how the perception of driving forces of deforestation links the main stakeholders together.

Discovering a Discourse

What struck me when raising questions about deforestation forces in Zanzibar was the level of coherence that everyone, from forest-dependent villagers in Imani to all the implementers at different levels, had in common. The intensification of extraction for woodfuel and building materials as well as clearing of forest land for agriculture, all due to population increase and poverty, was mentioned time and time again – to an extent that I believe is grounds for portraying it as a "discourse".

Foucault defines a discourse as consisting of a group of statements linked to a 'referential', which in turn consists of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied by it (1972:91). Or to put it in the words of Hall; "a set of statements that provides a way for communicating about a particular topic at a particular historical moment (Hall, in Kalland 2009:4)." Discourse includes language, but also what is represented through language (Grillo 1997:12). What Foucault calls a "discursive regime" defines what is possible to think and do, and creates what appears as the unquestionable and objective truth (Foucault 1972; Dove and Carpenter 2008:49). It seems that for Imani villagers and the implementers there is *one* shared way of communicating about drivers of deforestation – a set of statements that can be said to constitute a discourse in the sense described here. In summary, the discourse of deforestation depicts that people, because of population growth and poverty, overuse the forest resources.

Although hard to determine, this coherence might come from a decade of contact between Imani and the implementers through the HIMA project and its predecessors. Arce

and Long (1992:214) emphasize how perceptions can be transformed in encounters between actors involved in rural development projects. For Imani villagers, the state of the forests is visually apparent in their surroundings, and stories of more abundant forests in the past are passed down through the generations. The hardship that less accessibility of firewood creates is bodily experienced as portrayed in chapters 1 and 3. Even as the detrimental effects of use of the forests are noticeable in people's own lives and the similarity between them and the implementers when it comes to stating the reasons for deforestation were striking, I found myself surprised by the magnitude of *guilt* that the Imani villagers expressed for their extraction of forest resources.

Power Aspects in the Discourse

When I spoke with Imani residents about deforestation, most of them were remarkably quick to express their feelings of guilt for being involved in forest extraction through the woodfuel business and other activities. Some would even hold that people from poorer countries like Zanzibar/Tanzania were more responsible for ruining the environment than people of developed countries like my own. Many would say that every country in the world has its own way of destroying the environment, yet the majority still emphasized the role of the poor. The guilt expressed by Imani villagers made me interested in power aspects of the discourse. This can tell us something about the relationships between the stakeholders of the HIMA project. It also bears resemblance to the power aspects of "partnership" described in the previous chapter.

Although neither the amount of the implementers' influence of Imani residents' guilt nor the authenticity of the feeling of guilt can be verified, the need to express it is a sign that the Imani villagers accept that they are viewed to be responsible for deforestation – even if they are quick to blame poverty. Through the chain of official stakeholders – from the villagers to local organizations, CARE, and the Department – villagers are the ones viewed as causing deforestation and the only ones to express guilt. The other stakeholders are "innocent," and rather try to teach and correct rural communities in what is right and what is wrong when it comes to management and use of forests.

There is a strong power aspect in having the authority to define a problem and delegate responsibility. With a development-type of project as the solution to the defined problem comes measures that make people conform to the discursive and practical universe (Escobar

1991:667). In the HIMA project, even as it will be seen to have a community-directed approach, the power of definition still lies in the implementers – especially CARE and the Department. The project's framework is defined by a specific set of actors, which can be seen to limit the scope of true participation of local villagers. I found the implementers to be understanding when it comes to the villagers' dependence on the forest for income. Nevertheless a normative approach which entails that local people need to change their behavior is a great part of the project in addition to installment of institutions[1].

The View of Small-Scale Societies

One can find in scholarly circles, the NGO world, and popular media, two grand discourses of local, rural people (Smith and Wishnie 2000:493-494). These images of small-scale societies come under different names. In the following I will focus on "the tragedy of the commons", a negative view, and "environmentally noble savages", a positive view, and the paradox that the HIMA project seems to be influenced by both. This is a way of showing how the problem of deforestation is presented in Zanzibar as well as relationships between the official stakeholders (that is mostly the local villages on one side and the implementers on the other). It can also shed light on the omission of certain groups of people from the project framework as presented in chapter 2.

The discourse of deforestation's focus on the detrimental effects human behavior and population growth have on forests, brings to mind the image of a "tragedy of the commons" where individuals increasingly overuse an open resource. Hardin (1968) is often regarded as the one to coin the concept of "the tragedy of the commons." yet he and others have acknowledged that he was not the first to speak of such issues. Regardless, Hardin's article was the true starting point of a scholarly discussion that remains part of different academic fields, including anthropology.

Hardin's main argument is that "freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (1968:162)." In a commons – like a pasture in Hardin's example or a forest in this thesis – open to use by

[1] See below.

all[2], every individual will want to maximize his own gain by adding cattle to the pasture or cutting trees in the forest. The negative impact of adding a cow or cutting a tree is not individual, but will be spread out on all the users. This leads to a positive gain for the maximizing individual and works as an incentive for increased use. Local people are trapped in an unavoidable tragedy according to Hardin. With time and improvements in social conditions the population will increase to a point where they exploit their resource beyond its carrying capacity and a "tragedy of the commons" occurs. This view relates to other ways of coining small-scale societies "primitive polluters" with a long record of environmental destruction (Smith and Wishnie 2000:494).

Although not articulated in the exact same vocabulary, I believe the discourse of deforestation depicts the situation in Zanzibarian forests as tragedies of the commons. The importance paid to population growth and people's action as reasons for overuse, is particularly related to such a view. Rural Zanzibarians are blamed for deforestation, making them into destroyers of the forests – even if the implementers might be understanding of the reasons behind it. Such a negative take on local people stands in stark contrast to another common view of people in small-scale societies – seeing local, rural people as "ecologically noble savages." The latter view might still be present in the HIMA project approach. This is part of the inherent paradox of the HIMA project that this chapter focuses on.

Ideas of "ecologically noble savages" (term phrased by Redford 1990, in Conklin and Graham 1995:698) depict local people in the South as protectors of the environment living in harmony with nature – especially favored in the West as an antipode to the development of modern societies (Hames 2007; Dahl 1993; Conklin and Graham 1995). Although this view commonly focuses on native people, a term that might not apply for Zanzibarians[3], I believe it is applicable for other kinds of small-scale societies (as in Smith and Wishnie 2000).

Anthropologists and others have shown how environmentally-oriented organizations portray local, rurally based people as "guardians of the earth" – how for instance rain forest people in Amazonia and Malaysia are presented in positive ways assumed to make Western people care and donate. Local groups are made into "idols" and their ways of living assumed

[2] In Zanzibar, as previously mentioned, land is owned by the government and used by individuals and groups, to some extent today and enlarged by the HIMA project, forests are now being managed at a local level. There are already some restrictions on use, but as the execution of these control-mechanisms are limited, there is a sense of *de facto* open access today when it comes to forest resources (see also Feeny et. al 1990).
[3] A discussion I do not find room for in this thesis.

to be in harmony with nature and each other is seen as the solution to social and environmental problems (e.g. Brosius 2000:298; Conklin and Graham 1995:698; Ellen 1986:8-9). Anthropologists arguing against the model of "ecologically noble savages" by providing examples of local people who destroy their environment or questioning the intentional side of small-scale conservation are often stepping into a highly politically charged field. This is because the image is used by organizations, indigenous people, and others to defend the rights of local communities in resource management (Smith and Wishnie 2000:494; Li 1996).

The HIMA Project's Main Approach

Community management is the HIMA project's main approach, and entails installing conservational norms and management practices in *shehia(pl.)* first and foremost, as well as supporting villagers in creating income opportunities that lessen their dependence on the forest. The role of income-generating activities is also in my opinion crucial in curbing deforestation in Zanzibar, yet I believe the focus on small-scale activities for mostly local markets can be questioned, as well as the possibility of success for the norm-changing component of the project.

"Community", "Participation", and "Partnership"

Community-based approaches became increasingly popular in development discourse and policy from the 1980s (Li 1996:503), especially in relation to the concepts of "participation" and "partnership". The idea arose as a reaction against the 1960s and 70s' top-down, state-led development projects and is related to the proliferation of NGOs in development that was described in chapter 3. There was a growing frustration with governments' inability to create development and the limited participation of local people in decisions affecting their lives. By and large at this point, local people were simply seen as passive recipients of development interventions. Instead, reactionary forces – a loosely woven transnational moment unified by goals such as social justice, environmental health, and sustainability (McCay 2001:183) – now wanted to include local people in the planning and the enactment of solutions to the problems they face. Value was placed on local (rural) people's knowledge and understandings (Lewis and Kanji 2009:73-75; see also Crewe and Harrison 1998:70; Agrawal and Gibson

2001:1; Brosius 2008:381-382). Community-based programs of resource management make local people *stakeholders* (Agrawal 2003:245).

With time, development agencies and donor states accepted and valued such an approach. “Participation”, “partnership”, and “community” have become buzzwords within development agencies and among donors that are still important today, also – and perhaps especially – when it comes to resource management (Tsing 2005:247). Scholars producing accounts of successful community management of resources and indigenous knowledge, some inspired by the ecologically noble savage-imagery as presented above, have also influenced this turn.

The HIMA Project and Community Management

The HIMA project is inspired by exactly such a mindset that was described above. The subtitle of the HIMA project – “Piloting REDD in Zanzibar through Community Forest Management” – reveals that this is the project’s main approach[4]. Community management is the proposed way for halting deforestation and making way for REDD. Partnership is the expressed mode of operation as seen in chapter 3.

The solution to ”tragedies of the commons” according to Hardin (1968), was privatization of land, or possibly strong government control. In the aftermath of his article, despite its great acknowledgement, many scholars have claimed that there is a variety of other possible arrangements for management of common-pool resources which Hardin missed. Feeny et al. (1990) describe four categories of property rights in which common-property resources are held; open access, private property, communal property, and state property – of which all but the first can be successful, yet none are infallible. Anthropologists and other social scientists since Hardin have argued that many resources which seem to be open access, in fact are managed quite well by local people (see for instance Ostrom et al. 1999:278). This, however, seems not to be the case for the Zanzibarian villages I visited as part of my fieldwork.

The goal of the HIMA project is to create restrictions on use that turns *de facto* open access resources (really state property) – potentially the sites of “tragedies of the commons”, into communal property in the sense put forward by Feeny et al. (1990:4); “a resource held by

[4] See introduction for details.

an identifiable community of interdependent users who exclude outsiders and regulate the members' use." We can see that the HIMA project is about installing institutions that previously were either non-existent or largely ineffective. Interest in communal property is related to the popular discourse on participation, partnership, and community (Feeny et al. 1990:13). The relation is also visible in this quote;

> "*When* rules are devised and managed by resource users, *they will better reflect the characteristics of the resource, and the users will be more familiar with the rules and thereby more likely to comply with them* (Dolšak and Ostrom 2003:22, emphasis in original)."

Community management is seen as the path out of tragedies of the commons.

The Role of Norms[5]

Hardin's perspective is based on a model of resource users as norm-free maximizers of immediate gains who will not cooperate without coercion by external authorities (Ostrom 1999:496). I do not believe that the HIMA implementers view villagers in Zanzibar as norm-free people in every aspect of their lives who lack the possibility of making long-term decisions. My impression based on the way the implementers speak of villagers, is that they see them as maximizers without many existing norms that ensure sustainable use of the forests. Like Soud in CARE said; "[because of lack of proper planning] people will just do what they think is the easiest and best." The implementers (like local people themselves) state poverty as the reason behind the maximizing, and understand that villagers have few other viable options than forest extraction. Lack of regulations on the forests until now as well as practices that bend the existing rules put up by HIMA in Kitogani (for instance use of the mangrove which is to be fully conserved and boundary-crossing in and out of the *shehia* forests), do give the impression that there are few existing norms for the use of the forests.

The HIMA project attempts to target this lack of norms by giving importance to what is called "awareness-rising." Although possibly necessary for an increase in compliance of the rules as well as for granting local people agency and the ability of communication and longer perspectives, this approach runs the risk of instilling the sense of guilt that I described above.

[5] I see norms as informal social rules that structure and influence behavior, and thus establish commitments to particular ways of acting (Ensminger and Knight 1997), but do not find room for a greater discussion of the term here.

There is also the issue of whether conservationist norms can be introduced in a community by external actors. Agrawal and Gibson (2001:12) stress that we "hardly know which strategies successfully alter the norms people hold of conservation, especially when the resources in question are a critical part of the family income." This emphasizes the challenges of such an approach, especially in Imani where woodfuel is a substantial part of many households' income.

How norm installation regarding conservation might not be sufficient in itself is visible in the example of Salha, the woman I stayed with in Imani. Salha was the only Imani villager to state that she had stopped cutting trees for business because of CARE. When the organization held a big meeting in Kitogani at the beginning of the millennium concerning the detrimental effects of large-scale harvesting of wood for business and offered help and loans for other income-generating activities through VSLAs, Salha was among the first to join. Currently she is involved in a whole range of different small business and cooperatives, and has an important position in Kitogani's first VSLA. Salha is also a member of the Kitogani SCC, and I witnessed her advocate environmental-friendly behavior to other villagers.

Statements and actions, however, may not always be consistent even when awareness-rising seems to have worked. Perhaps this is especially so in areas of the world where people are struggling to provide for their families and to improve their lives. It became clear to me after some time in her household, that Salha still makes money from the woodfuel business. This happens through her acting as a middle-man between other villagers in Kitogani who continue with wood felling and her sister-in-law in town who sells firewood to her neighbors. Both supply and demand for woodfuel continue to exist. Even without her direct involvement, Salha is able to make money from the business, despite her expressed concern for the environment. I will later explore the demand side of the woodfuel business which I believe is partially overlooked by the implementers.

The Role of Income-Generating Activities

The HIMA project is not putting all its effort into awareness-rising only. The implementers seem aware of how forest resources are an important part of rural Zanzibarians' income, and recognize that they will only be able to halt deforestation if people have other income-generating activities.

Alternative sources of income have been an issue for CARE in Zanzibar for a long time, especially in their work with VSLAs and women's empowerment. This component is also important in the HIMA project. As seen in chapter 1, many people in Imani are exceptionally creative and productive in diversifying their sources of income. Many of them have learned about how to start and run businesses through NGOs, and prepare and sell several products such as bread, juice, ropes, and so on. Even as I discussed the issue of income sources with several HIMA implementers, it did not become clear to me exactly what kind of income-generating activities they advocate, but most of those mentioned were in line with the kind of work Imani villagers already perform – selling produce in one's village or *shehia*. The production of more efficient stoves for sale, as a few Kitogani residents have already been trained in, is another. I also got the impression that the implementers are still looking for more types of feasible business opportunities for villagers.

Alternative income-generating activities can be salient to the success of the HIMA project, but the development of businesses is at present to a large extent concerned with the internal markets of villages and *shehia(pl.)*, except for a few projects targeted at tourists[6]. One could expect there to be a limit on the number of viable businesses involving providing bread, juice, and the like locally. In a way this can be seen more as an internal exchange of money because the surplus is rather small for most of the businesses that already exist and the villagers compete internally for the same money. In order to truly advocate and provide effective alternatives, I believe it is necessary to look beyond the local market, a point that will be returned to shortly. The suggested alternatives should also be made explicit, yet not at the expense of villagers' own creativity in creating businesses.

The Idea of "Community"

Community management approaches like the HIMA project's rely on the developmental buzz words of "community", "participation", and "partnership". I will now look into perceptions of "community," a concept that can be said to be related to the ecologically noble savage-perspective. Despite its popularity, the concept of community rarely receives attention or analysis from those involved in resource usage and management (Agrawal and Gibson

[6] For instance a women's cooperative in Kitogani which produces bags for sale to visitors in connection with the Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park.

2001:1). I suggest that community approaches like the HIMA project's can imply a specific idea of community which possibly conceals internal differences and power in villages like Imani. Although Imani can be seen as quite homogenous, there are a number of existing internal differences. With the HIMA project and REDD, there might also be an increase in dissimilarities. Towards the end of this section I will get into the role of external forces when it comes to Imani, the HIMA project and REDD, a point I believe the implementers do not address in a substantial way.

Small-Scale Communities as Homogenous

Previously, I described how in the last decades an emphasis on "communities" has become salient. There seems to be an idea that small-scale societies hold on to what the North has lost through modernization. Communities in the South are believed to live in harmony with nature as well as with each other in interdependent communities (McCay 2001:180; Li 1996:502). Although perhaps no longer as strikingly prevalent, this still continues as an implicit premise that constitutes practice in developmental and environmental projects.

In the continued romanticizing of communities in the South, *the homogenous structure* is stressed. Observers assume communities to be groups of individuals equal in terms of income, ethnicity, religion, and language – a picture that might intersect well with the realities of rural areas of poorer countries where community resource management projects are mainly based. People living in the same location may indeed hold similar occupations, depend on the same resources, speak the same language, belong to the same ethnic or religious group, and so on (Agrawal and Gibson 2001:9-10). That said, concluding from these facts that groups are homogenous and completely without internal differences, might still conceal important aspects of small-scale societies.

Homogeneity and Internal Differences in Imani

Anthropologists and others have attempted to dissolve Northern ideas about small-scale societies as homogenous, egalitarian groups, by recognizing and showcasing internal differences (Dove and Carpenter 2008:38-39; Brosius 2008:363; Tsing 2008:393). Examples include Conklin and Graham's work (e.g. 1995) on Amazonian Indians and Brosius' (e.g. 2000) from Malaysia. Li (1996:502) and Tsing (2008:395) emphasize that although representations of communities might be idealized, they can still produce strategic gains for

individuals or groups of people involved. Being viewed as a "community" can also encourage people to act together (Walley 2004:137).

In Imani there is definitely a sense of homogeneity in that people generally are of the same ethnicity and religion, for example there is only one household of mainlanders who are not considered Zanzibarians. All people are involved in agriculture, although as portrayed in chapter 1, a few have formal and semi-formal occupations that increase their income level. As also mentioned, one descent group appears to be more affluent than others in terms of housing, assets, income, and so on. Their access to agricultural land too seems greater and more stable. Even though still substantial if we see the descent group as a whole, there are a few individuals from this family who are not as dependent on forest products for income as is the rest of the village. In addition, this family is especially well-represented in decision-making in Imani and Kitogani, with representatives in different *shehia* committees as well as the *sheha* himself being a member. This can be connected to their level of education, which in total may be greater than other families'. Also there are other discrepancies, differences in for instance age and gender might be especially relevant when it comes to use and conservation of the forests – particularly because women are emphasized by CARE.

These internal differences do not necessarily *discredit* the community concept since this depends on the level of analysis. However, as the quote by Agrawal and Gibson (2001:2) that begun this chapter highlights, one can argue that community-based conservation initiatives should be founded on images of community that recognize internal differences. This is especially so because projects like the HIMA project can influence existing discrepancies.

Tsing, Li, and Walley remind us that projects based on images of small-scale communities that emphasize homogeneity can in fact create collaborations and possibilities for local people, and should therefore not simply be dismissed by researchers (for instance Tsing 2005, 2008; Li 1996; Walley 2004). As I will show in the following, the HIMA project indeed creates opportunities for villagers, but at the same time these are not necessarily as available to every villager. In time, local differences can in fact be increased.

For Salha, the woman I stayed with in Imani, engagement with organizations like CARE and JECA as part of the Kitogani SCC and the first VSLA have indeed granted her opportunities. She is for instance especially proud of how she has been able to travel to Dar es

Salaam and Dodoma on mainland Tanzania to participate in workshops, of which she at times tells vivid stories. There are other Imani villagers who have been to the mainland, but such trips are quite expensive and not that common. Experiences Salha has had as part of SCC and VSLA, as well as the possible status increase such memberships lead to, can count as examples of the opportunities community management approaches like the HIMA project's can create. The practical outcomes for Kitogani of such workshops, however, were harder to get a hold of.

Alongside Salha on some of these trips has been her friend Awesu, one of the two JECA staff members now paid by the HIMA project – himself once a Kitogani resident who joined the SCC. On one occasion, when passing through Awesu's village close to Imani, a woman pointed towards an exceptionally large house under construction. "This is the new house Awesu is getting built" she said poignantly to me, "paid by HIMA money." This statement points to that with the HIMA project; differences in wealth in Kitogani might be increased. Even Salha, as a representative of the Kitogani SCC in JECA assembly meetings, gets paid when attending meetings. Handing out money to the attendees is a common practice when the local organizations, CARE, and the Department hold meetings in *shehia(pl.)*[7]. Such meetings are mainly for local SCC members.

Mentioned in chapter 1 was the episode where the Kitogani SCC investigated members of one of the less fortunate families in Imani for pretending to cultivate in the forest, but rather using this as an excuse for cutting trees for the woodfuel business. With the HIMA project and perhaps especially result-based REDD, there exists the possibility of an increase in such disputes. As the poorest in Imani also are the ones with limited access to agricultural land, the zoning of Kitogani can increase their difficulties. In the land use management plan there are designated areas for residence and agriculture around the present settlements. The rest of the land has restrictions and little or no use is allowed. If villagers do not have rights to use the land in the designated area, their possibilities for both permanent and slash and burn cultivation might be limited as the project proceeds. These people also tend to be among those heavily dependent on the woodfuel business.

To summarize; even though Imani may be quite homogenous, there are already certain internal differences and these again might be intensified by the HIMA project and REDD.

[7] I witnessed payments between 1,000 to 10,000 Tanzania shillings, equaling about $0.6 to $6.

External Forces

Viewing small-scale societies as homogenous units can mask how external forces such as urban factors affect the extraction of natural resources and thereby the use of a commons (Agrawal 2002:45). In chapter 2 we saw how urban dwellers influence the cutting of the forests in rural areas, yet are not considered stakeholders. Community management programs are about making local people stakeholders, but in the HIMA project only *rurally* located people are in fact included. I relate this to their community management approach.

> Dolšak and Ostrom hightlight the role of external markets in resource extraction;
>
> *"(…) many common-pool resource users rely on external markets both for their alternative sources of income and for a market in which they can sell products originating from use of the resource (…)* (Dolšak and Ostrom 2003:18)*."*

Previously, I have argued that the alternative sources of income that the HIMA implementers encourage and the activities that the Imani villagers already engage in, are mostly directed at the village and *shehia* market. I suggest there is a limit to the opportunities offered by this local market, and that in order to create viable business opportunities that are not forest-dependent, alternative activities should be directed at external markets. Worth restating is also that for Imani villagers the woodfuel business is one of few income-generating activities (if not the only) directed at an external market, making the profit made a possible true surplus for Imani residents and not just a way of exchanging money with fellow villagers. The HIMA implementers' attempt to replace an outward-directed business with simply small-scale internal ones can prove to be difficult, especially in Imani where there are few resources with current external markets. This will have negative consequences both for the prospect of restricting deforestation as well as for Imani villagers who could loose their livelihood without having sufficient alternatives.

In the example of Salha's continued income from the business of woodfuel, I indicated that it was possible because there still is a supply and demand for such products. The supply side is a major concern for the HIMA implementers who focus on rural areas. A smaller part of the HIMA project is to approach deforestation caused by the business of woodfuel from the opposite side – to limit demand by influencing town dwellers to use alternative sources of cooking fuel. The HIMA implementers stated that restricting demand could be a beneficial way to proceed, but this did not seem to result in discussions or practical changes to the

project. Such lack of debate or alteration of direction was in the previous chapter related to the close boundaries between the implementers as well as the context they operate within.

Due to low turnover-rate for the advertised LPG (liquid petrol gas) so far, it is hard to estimate the exact consequences of an urban switch of fuel for deforestation. Depending on market logic of supply and demand, it is however very likely that curbing demand can be a successful tool for limiting deforestation[8]. Put simply; *if there is no one to buy woodfuel, there is no point for villagers to cut firewood* (except for their own domestic use). Related to the role of norms and awareness-rising in the HIMA project, it should be underlined that this is so whether the villagers are environmentally conscious or not. Neither is it dependent on the functioning of institutions such as SCCs.

Furthermore, images of small-scale, homogenous communities often leave out the very fact that such communities have neighbors. Border-crossing into Kitogani by "outsiders" as well as the Kitogani residents crossing into other *shehia(pl.)* for woodfuel is already a topic of discussion both in Kitogani as well as when I went with the implementers to HIMA meetings in other *shehia(pl.).* One can imagine that border-crossing could become more common with the project's implementation. When the revenue is based on the level of conservation within one *shehia*, crossing into other *shehia(pl.)* for woodfuel could become an option with two-folded benefits; both REDD money and money from the woodfuel business. Leakage control is though part of both the HIMA project as well as the REDD mechanism itself. Ali, the District Officer for Forestry in the Central District, even holds that border-crossing will occur less with the development of the HIMA project and REDD, as communities will protect their borders better. He did not clarify what he meant by this protection or mention other kinds of consequences such border control encounters might have. It is probable, however, that there could be conflicts – disputes that the SCCs and the implementers will have to deal with.

I suggest that the HIMA project's lack of proper concern with external forces both in the sense of external markets for forest-independent alternatives for income, urban demand for woodfuel and other forest products, and (although less neglected) border disputes, can be connected to the idea of community and the community management approaches so popular in donor and NGO circles these days. This is especially so in relation to the emphasis on rural

[8] Yet this still does not avoid the necessity of sufficient alternative sources of income for those in rural and urban areas who loose income.

villagers at the expense of town dwellers also referred to in chapter 2. According to this mindset, some groups inhabit the desired symbolic capital and others do not. Symbolic capital, as formulated by Bourdieu (1996:61), is any kind of feature (physical, cultural, social, or economic) recognized and valued by others. Rural people imagined to be living in homogenous societies in tune with nature, score high on symbolic capital in the eyes of donors and NGOs, while urban residents with their assumed modern life and disconnectedness from nature score low. Brosius also emphasizes how environmental organizations privilege certain actors and marginalize others (2008:365). As I have described, it is the idealized antipode to modern, Western life that is emphasized in the ecologically noble savage-image as well as in the paradigm of community. Town people in the South, like their urban counterparts in the North/West, rather represent an unwanted modern present and future.

The picture of interdependent small-scale communities does neither give room for seeing how local economy is connected to external markets both for forest products as well as the other sources of income, an importance the quote of Dolšak and Ostrom above emphasizes. It should be obvious that use of a resource, even in the terms of "tragedies of the commons", does not occur only in narrowly defined localized spaces, but is influenced by a range of external forces.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have shown that there are two views of local, rural people implicitly present in the HIMA project; one positive and one negative. Even as these people are blamed for deforestation in a discourse influenced by "the tragedy of the commons" scenario, the solution is still located to the countryside. The paradox is what brings the official stakeholders together, and what leads to the exclusion of less recognized stakeholders. I have argued that the paradox occurs because the HIMA project with its community management approach is part of a paradigm within the developmental circles highlighting small-scale communities as living in harmony with nature and each other in accordance with the idea of "ecologically noble savages". There are some crucial potential pitfalls to the kind of approach that the HIMA project advocates based on their (implicit) view of community. This is especially so when it comes to the omission of external forces' influence on deforestation, which includes

central issues such as urban factors, the role of external markets, and the possibility of border-crossing conflicts between neighboring *shehia(pl.)*. The lack of discussion about the project framework among the implementers as described in chapter 3 makes a change of course hard to envisage.

Concluding Remarks

In this thesis I have attempted to provide an in-depth account of the stakeholders' characteristics and relationships in an externally financed environmental development project, although because of the limited space a master's thesis allows, I have chosen to focus on certain areas. I have argued that there are sides to these stakeholders that can provide the possibility of accomplishment for the HIMA project and REDD. For Imani this includes the villagers' explicit desire to stop cutting the forests for business purposes if they see other income generating options as feasible. The main implementers – CARE and the Department of Forestry – consist of knowledgeable people who have worked with natural resources and local, rural people for a long time. JECA and SEDCA as local organizations can be said to function as mediators between the different official stakeholders, which could be essential for the success of the project. The close relationships between the implementers create possibilities for good cooperation and efficient implementation.

That said, there are certain aspects of the stakeholders' characteristics and relationships that call for critical attention especially in relation to the HIMA project's focus. For Imani and Kitogani I have emphasized that despite good intentions, the SCC appears not to function as intended. This results in increased deforestation. People in this area rely heavily on the woodfuel business for income despite their great skills in diversifying income. There are few readily available alternatives that can bring in substantial income, and it is hard to imagine that the small-scale businesses promoted by the HIMA implementers for instance through VSLAs will produce a living wage.

I have pointed to the limited attention paid to external forces both in relation to what causes deforestation and in the implementers' advocating of alternative income sources, and related this to the paradigm of "community management." The continuing urban demand for woodfuel works as an incentive for rural people to continue their engagement in extensive wood felling. Without other products to sell at external markets it also seems unlikely that Imani villagers will limit their cutting of forests. The omission of external forces can therefore have consequences for the possibility of decreasing deforestation.

At the same time as working towards a decrease in deforestation, the HIMA project wants to contribute to social and economic development (for rural dwellers). However necessary, extending the focus from simply trees and conservation to include people is a very complex and difficult task. I have through this thesis attempted to show how people's livelihoods could actually be at risk as a result of the HIMA project's current direction and approaches.

Based on my findings, I suggest that in order to successfully reduce deforestation in Zanzibar, limiting the business of woodfuel is an important factor. One of the most efficient solutions would be to put real effort and money into having urban dwellers change to other sources of cooking fuel. This suggestion is not dependent on the functioning of institutions such as SCCs or conservationist norms in rural areas like the HIMA project is. It is rather based on a simple theory of supply and demand. Either how, it could have the severe consequences for the people involved, both in rural and urban settings, that the HIMA project has in its current form. For Imani, restrictions on the business of woodfuel would entail that many households lose their most substantial cash income. When REDD money is expected not to become available to the individuals that lose out, and the income-generating options suggested hardly will result in the same level of income, it is easy to see how they in fact could end up being worse off than before the HIMA REDD pilot project. Urban middle-men, sellers of woodfuel, and others can fall into the same kind of situation, especially as they are rarely recognized as even having a stake in the HIMA project.

The points of concern that have been raised through this ethnography of stakeholders are not exhaustive, and no flawless solutions have been put forward. I still consider it to paint an extensive picture of what a global idea like REDD might look like on the ground. I have not attempted to discredit the HIMA project as such, but I do want to end this thesis by underlining my uneasiness with the lack of questioning about the project framework I find on the part of the implementers. There appears to be a certain *laissez-faire* atmosphere as the project progresses. In one way, the project is proceeding slowly as implementation is taking longer than expected, but in another way it is evolving quite rapidly. The project has been developed and is continuing according to ambitious goals and approaches characterized implicitly and explicitly by the international REDD and development agenda. These goals and approaches are not subjects of critical analysis or sometimes even awareness. No one seems to call for a halt and ask needed questions of the background, direction, goals, approaches, or consequences of the project. The HIMA project simply continues down a path that could be

imperfect both when it comes to the possibility of a decrease in deforestation as well as the chance for real development for the people of Zanzibar.

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