Communities within a Community:
Differentiating the Bosniak Community in Bosnia

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Abstract

This thesis is based on a six months of fieldwork in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina has over 500 years of history and within this history there has been a process of modernisation together with the rest of Europe. The Muslim population have adapted along with this process and made Islam in Bosnia an «islam» with particularities.

This paper explores the differences within one overarching Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, I apply a historical aspect to compare how these differences have become more apparent after the transition from a socialist Yugoslavia, from suppressed religion to an independent and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina with freedom of religion.

Muslims in Bosnia have the agency to choose in which degree they want to practice Islam and in particular youth is a period where Muslims test borders that break with the Islamic laws. I will discuss some of these aspects and show, through empirical examples, how Muslims grade some actions as accepted despite the fact that it might be illegal according to the Islamic law.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 between the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs have changed the demographics of the nation. Since the war fractions are adherent to different religions the religious identity of the different war fractions were played out, which in turn led to an Islamic revival. During the war foreign fighters came to Bosnia and Herzegovina and this paper will focus on the Arabs that came to fight on the Muslim side. Furthermore, the Arabs brought with them an strict interpretation of Islam that parts of the Muslim population have become adherent to, which in turn has led to a more polarized Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This paper will address some of the impacts of the encounter between two different «islams» and how the two «islams» are lived out differently.
Acknowledgement

Firstly, my thoughts goes to all of my informants. Without you this would never have been written. I want you to know that it feels cold to write you in as «informants». We made some unforgettable memories. Inshallah, I dont hope any of you feel that I put «you» in a bad light with this paper.

«Ramush and family»: Thanks for taking me with you on a week seminar with Talal and Gil and everything else.

«Yunus Emre»: You and your family will always be special to me.

At the University of Oslo my appreciation goes to Unni Wikan for giving me important guidelines when I started to write. Further, to my co-students Marie, Camilla and Christina for all the help with this paper. Oliver, thanks for every conversation and strange episodes in Bosnia.

Thanks to my ever present family. You really do not understand what this paper is about. That is however my fault, as I never felt the need to explain for you. Anyway, it does not make you any less special for me. Mats, thanks for the map. Neil, thanks for taking time to check my English.

Ole Kokvik, Oslo, June 2010.
«Our dear Zenica, today and for ever. This town has an attractive name. It is associated with the precious epicenter of «human sight», and, at the same time, it suggests that this name has not been given by chance, but, that, since the beginning, it has expressed some focused meaning of an ancient, original settlement of the present town that was built in the center of the valley which, as the whole, resembles the pupil of the eye. The central position of the settlement in this geographical eye has produced its warm name: Zenica.

Zenica is located in one of the largest and the most beautiful valleys in the middle course of the river Bosnia. The valley is 12 km long and spreads from the Lašva Canyon in the south to the Vranduk Canyon in the north. On the east and west side it is surrounded by the hills that moderately descend towards the river Bosnia, thus closing the alluvial field, 1-2 km wide with the average sea level of 350 m, where, by the curving stream of the river Bosnia, there is the main urban core».

(Zenica 2000: 160).
View of Zenica from the Smetovi mountain.
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Introduction with geography and demographics.

This paper presents a historical perspective to understand the changes Bosniaks in Bosnia and Hercegovina¹ have undergone in the wake of the political changes from a socialist Yugoslavia² to today’s Bosnia with freedom of religion. It is based on fieldwork in the Bosnian town of Zenica from January to July 2008 and again for 3 weeks in September during ramazan³. This research describes differences among Muslims which is derived from aspects of everyday life in Zenica. Socialist Yugoslavia suppressed religion in the public sphere while today religion is visibly presented through language and symbols in the landscape. The fierce war in the historically multinational Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 between the three major nationalities in Bosnia, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, changed the country in multiple ways. Zenica was a Muslim stronghold during the war and is therefore the reason I choose the town for my fieldwork. After decades of religious suppression, how has the Bosniak identities and religiosity developed since the war in a now democratic country with freedom of religion? Have differences in the religious Muslim community become more transparent? Finally, what are the social impacts of the mujahideen, with their «wahhabi»⁴ influenced Islam, having on their interaction with the Bosnian Muslims?

¹ The nation Bosnia Herzegovina, Bosna i Hercegovina, will be simplified as Bosnia in this paper. Bosniaks, Bošnjaci, is the largest community in Bosnia and often referred to as the Muslims in Bosnia.
² The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Jugoslavija, was established in 1945 and formally dissolved in 1992. The dissolving process practically started with the death of Yugoslavia’s leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980. Bosnia was one of Yugoslavia’s autonomous republics along with Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, which all are independent countries today. Socialist Yugoslavia had in principle a communistic ideology.
³ Ramazan (ramadan), is the month when Muslims celebrate the revelation of the Quran.
⁴ Discussion regarding the analytical term «wahhabism» will be brought forth in chapter 1.
Bosnia is located in the Balkans, which are situated in South-eastern Europe, bordering with Croatia to the north, west and south, Serbia to the east, and Montenegro to the southeast. As a result of the war Bosnia is divided into two parts; Republika Srpska (RS) in the north and the east and Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) in the centre and the west with 51 percent of the territory. While RS has a vast majority of Bosnian Serbs, the Federation is dominated Bosniaks with the remainder being mostly Croats. Bosnia, in total, has a population of around 4,6 million people, of which approximately 40 percent are Bosniaks, while the Federation is home to 2,8 millions inhabitants, of which around 70 percent are Bosniaks. Besides the three previously mentioned religions in Bosnia there is also a few minority religions such as Judaism, Jehovah witnesses and Baptism.
Zenica is positioned in the middle of Bosnia approximately 70 kilometres northwest of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. Zenica lies in a valley and was built up around the steel industry from the late 19th century and expanded during the socialist period. However, presently the factories do not produce as much as in pre-war period. The estimated population of the town of Zenica, the third largest town in the Federation, according to the municipality's statistics office numbers from 31.12.2004, has a total of 128,657 inhabitants, whereof approximately 83 percent are Bosniaks, 10 percent are Croats, 5 percent are Serbs, and the remaining 2 percent is made up of others which includes Gypsies. Before the war the total number of inhabitants was 145,517 whereof approximately 56 percent were Bosniaks, 16 percent were Croats, 15 percent were Serbs, 10 percent were Yugoslavs, and 3 percent others. Yugoslavs in the 1991 census were primarily Bosniaks who were containing their Muslim origin. In 2008 the Federation had a working stock of 769,388, whereof only 430,745 were employed with their average monthly gross income coming to around 1,100 KM (www.fzs.ba), prices for apartments and houses in Zenica was around 1300.- KM per square meter. Zenica boasts a large and famous prison, a hospital, a military camp, a football stadium where the national team often play, and the all-important steel industry.

In the first chapter I will elaborate the theoretical positions and the analytical terms this paper is based on. In chapter 2 I mainly discuss methodology and include an introduction of my informants. The third chapter elaborates on the essential history to contextualise the developments forming how Muslims live and practice Islam in Bosnia today. Within these three chapters the field and the people will be further introduced. Chapter 4, «The Bosniak Communities», will bring forth differences within the Bosniak community. Chapter 5, «Production of the Sacred: Struggle to be a better Muslim», illustrates aspects of Bosniaks adaptations to their religion. Chapter 6, «Bosnian «islam» encounter «wahhabi-islam»», discuss how Muslims adherent to different «islams» live out their life as Muslims. The content of the empirical chapters will be more precisely referred to in the first three chapters, theory, method and history, and the paper ends with concluding remarks.

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3 The municipality of Zenica is larger than the town Zenica that I am referring to in this paper. It is estimated that above 100,000 lives in the town, 2004: 128,657 inhabitants. 106,552 (82.82%) Bosniaks, 13,056 (10.15%) Croats, 6,771 (5.26%) Serbs, and 2,278 (1.77%) others. The last official census from 1991: 145,517 inhabitants. 80,359 (55.22%) Bosniaks, 22,510 (15.47%) Croats, 22,433 (15.42%) Serbs, 15,654 (10.76%) Yugoslavs, and 4,561 (3.13%) others.

6 2 KM, konvertibilna marka, equals around 1 Euro.

7 The steel industry is owned by Lakshmi Mittal, who is one of the richest in the world.
1. Theory

**Ethnicity, NATIONality, COMMUNITY.**

It is a general discourse to describe the different communities living in Bosnia with ethnicity and nationalism, both internally and externally, but Bringa argues that Muslims in Bosnia are more towards «sentiment and a common experience» instead of descent, which «partly excludes them from a discourse which evolves around (...) «ethnic identity»» (Bringa 1993: 86-87). Also Malcolm is in line with Bringa: «For centuries the language, history and geographical location of these two sorts of Bosnian Christians had been the same - which means that in most important respects the substratum which lay beneath their own religious identity was one and the same» (Malcolm 2002: 200). I agree with Bringa and Malcolm but I am taking it a step further by turning away from the nationality and ethnicity terms to Cohen´s concept of community (Cohen 1985) as the present situation is different than during the war and its aftermaths. Furthermore, I do not want to play up under the ethnic and nationalistic hatred that existed during the war and still exists in some area´s of Bosnia today, though to a much lesser extent than for 15 years ago. I find Cohen’s (1985) community term along with Barth´s theory on boundaries and relations (Barth 1969) essential to understand the processes of differentiation within the Bosniak community and the processes that unifies them towards the other communities. Cohen searches for similarity and difference, at the same time, within the communities and he adds a barthian understanding of relational boundaries, «although they recognize important differences among themselves, they also suppose themselves to be more like each other than like the members of other communities» (Cohen 1985: 21).

Differences between the communities are represented in the landscape through religious symbols, like how people dress and give greetings and how they conduct their religious practices. It is within these areas the relations become visible and are being played out to position the community to which they belong, with the result that it is the blurry boundaries that constitute the different communities (Barth 1969).

Before the war religion was only one of several ways to categorize the communities (Bringa 1995), but since that time «ethno-religious identity has been lifted to the foreground in both the public and private spheres» (Kolind 2007: 124). Bosnia is one country, I will describe the different people living there who belong to the various communities which are directly related to their religious heritage, with Bosnian Muslims as adherent to Islam, Bosnian Croats to Catholicism, and Bosnian Serbs to Christian Orthodoxy. In other words, different confessional communities within one nation-state. The term Bosnian is rarely used in Bosnia because it only manifests that you are
from Bosnia and not which community you belong to within Bosnia, while Bosnian Muslims say they are from Bosnia most of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs refer to themselves as Croats and Serbs with direct link to their perception of motherland, respectively, Croatia and Serbia. A Muslim in Bosnia cannot choose another motherland and during the war from 1992 to 1995 the Serbs, and initially the Croats, tried unsuccessfully to implement areas of Bosnia into Serbia and Croatia. The war in Bosnia brought forward a strong sense of belonging to one of the three major religions in Bosnia and led the religious belonging to a definitive metonym for the different fighting parties. Bosnian Muslims are called Bosniaks or Muslims and although the first is a more political directed term as belonging to the country, the latter is more related towards religion, but they have the same meaning when expressed in everyday life. I will use Bosniak\(^8\) as the term for the community of Bosnian Muslims because not all of the members are believers, as a Bosniak informant stated to me «I am a Muslim, but atheist». Although the political correct way to address the different nations within Bosnia would be Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serb, and Bosniak or Bosnian Muslims, I will address the different communities in Bosnia as Bosniak, Croat, and Serb, since they are the most commonly used marker in everyday speak. E.g. If I describe a Croat from Croatia I will specify using the term Croatian Croat.

I will problematise the ethnicity and nationalism terms with the Bosnian setting I have experienced in the vast majority Bosniak town of Zenica. Ethnicity is usually applicable when only «cultural differences are perceived as being important, and are made socially relevant, do social relationships have an ethnic element (...) Ethnic groups tend to have myths of common origin and they nearly always have ideologies encouraging endogamy» (Eriksen 2002: 12-13). Firstly, the Bosniaks do not have a different descent than Serbs and Croats\(^9\) (Bringa 1993, Malcolm 2002). Secondly, in everyday life they basically do not differentiate between each other, which I will exemplify with two episodes during my fieldwork. The first, when I was sitting at a cafe with the 35 year old Vedad, a Bosniak engaged with the Serb Jelena. I asked Vedad what Bosniaks around him say about his relationship with a Serb. He looked at me with a mixture of seriousness and surprise and said: «Nothing. Do you know?». It was a serious question and I found myself in a position where I became my informant´s informant, nevertheless the answer was simple: «Nothing, absolutely nothing». Vedad and I have several common friends and I have only heard positive things about Jelena, throughout my fieldwork I realised her Serb nationality has never been a issue

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\(^8\) Leading Bosnian Muslims decided in 1993 to use the term Bosniak instead of Bosnian Muslim to be directly linked to the territory of Bosnia instead of a religious group living in Bosnia.

\(^9\) Elaborated in the history section of this paper.
in the everyday interaction with others. I also know of three inter-community marriages in town over the last two years and how a Bosniak informant had a crush on a Croat girl from a neighbouring village. It was estimated that up to 27 percent of pre-war marriages in Bosnia were inter-communal (Bringa 1995: 151). During and after the war marriages were close to purely inner-communal. From the experience of my fieldwork there now seems to be a slight increase in inter-communal marriages again.

The second episode took place over two days. One Friday evening I was out drinking beer with Bajram and several of his friends. Bajram is a 26 years old Bosniak living with his parents, who are practicing Muslims, and his younger sister. That evening we met three girls from Scandinavia, who were born in Bosnia and fled with their families during the war and were now visiting Zenica. One of the girls talked and flirted with a friend of Bajram, Igor. The next day we meet the girls again. After a while the girls started to talk very harsh against Serbs, describing devious acts they performed during the war and how they are still not to be trusted. Shortly after Bajram interrupted and told the girls that Igor from last night was Serb, with the effect that the girls became mute and looked at each other stunned. I had met Igor several times before this episode and I was unaware that he was Serb. Afterwards, Bajram and I talked about this incident and he told me how its common for people from the diaspora to express anger towards Serbs, while they who live here do not share the same anger. These two are examples of everyday life where Bosniaks interact with Serbs and no differences are made. However, the idea of the Serb community as perpetrators exists in parts of the Bosniak community but not the Serbs they know and interact with. Serb dominated areas like Belgrade and Banja Luka raises negative connotations for many of my informants. There are several exceptions to this aspect and I have been to Belgrade with two of my Bosniak informants. Bosniaks attend the town’s Catholic school, referred to by many as the best school, and the school’s indoor sports hall is used by everyone for activities like football and handball. Albums of the popular Serbian Serb singer Jelena Karleuša, aka JK, are sold throughout the town. Serbian Serbs play for the top division team (Čelik) in football and basketball, and at least one of the players drives around in a car with belgrade licence plates. On religious holidays such as Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox, banners are hung in town proclaiming the event and when it is an Orthodox holiday\(^\text{10}\) the banners are written in both latin and cyrillic. Several informants have pointed out to me that they do not differ between the communities in town and because of this open environment they describe Zenica as the «green town». However, there are events that bring the

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\(^{10}\) Happy easter: *srećan uskrs* in latin and *срећан јускре* in cyrillic.
Bosniak community together vis-à-vis the other communities, e.g. *ramazan*, which I will bring forth in the coming chapters.

Now, the more difficult matter of converting nationality into the analytical term of community. The Presidency of Bosnia consists of three members, one from each of the communities, where the leading role of the Presidency rotates every eight months and they are elected every fourth year. This political arrangement I do not find compatible with «to most nationalisms, the political organisation should be ethnic in character in that it represents the interests of a particular ethnic group» (Eriksen 2000: 99-100). Although the elected persons in the Presidency works for their community within Bosnia, they try to cooperate in matters of foreign politics. The closest thing to being a nation within Bosnia is RS where it is estimated that up to 90 percent of the population belongs to the Serb community, but it does not take away the fact that RS is a part of the nation-state Bosnia. Also, there are some major political difficulties between the RS and the Federation\(^1^1\). I bring it down to the following question: Are these three nations working for their nation within one nation-state, or three communities in one nation-state working for their community? It is perhaps the same side of the coin but I prefer the latter as the best analytical tool to describe my experience in Bosnia, or more particular in a Bosniak majority town in the Federation\(^1^2\). A valid digression, Anderson’s description of one nation-state as a «imagined community» (Anderson 1983), I rephrase, to the nation-state of Bosnia as imagined communities.

On the nation-state level with religious and especially political leaders, differences between the communities are played out but in everyday life in Zenica that is not visible. Consequently, on the nation-state level most of the Bosniaks consider themselves a community different from the communities of Croats and Serbs but in the social everyday life in Zenica the community of Bosniaks differs within. When looking within the so-called solitary community of Bosniaks the different layers of religious interpretations, traditions, beliefs and non-belief start to amplify and brings me to the conclusion that there exists sub-communities within an overall Bosniak community. What brings the Bosniaks together as one community is their common religious identity and heritage, often through the attendant religious rituals and symbols, e.g. *ramazan*, *džuma* (friday noon prayer in the mosque), male circumcisions, *hidžab* (hijab), *bjelica* (Muslim male headgear), and sayings like *Selam Alejkum*\(^1^3\). Here, *ramazan* is the strongest institution to

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\(^{11}\) I recommend «The Bosnian state a decade after Dayton» by Sumantra Bose for further reading.

\(^{12}\) Other towns in the Federation like Mostar, a geographically separated town between Bosniaks and the majority Croats were nationalism continually is played out (see Tomac 2009).

\(^{13}\) *Selam alejkum* is an arabic greeting: «May God´s peace be with you». And *alejkum selam* is the answer to it.
show the community as a whole vis-à-vis other groups and making the boundaries to other groups transparent. It is especially in this setting the barthian relationship comes forth (Cohen 1985, Barth 1969). *Ramazan* has a strong social impact on everyday social life because of its monthly duration and that the daylight fasting makes the social landscape of Zenica vacant. This vacancy, which comes as a result of a religious requirement like *ramazan*, differentiates the Bosniak community from the other communities. Accordingly, on the first level of connecting community it is close to Durkheimian sociology where religion and rituals affirm the organisation of the society (Cohen 1985: 50), however Durkheim did not manage to recognise the differentiation that may exist within one community, as is the case with the Bosniaks. These mentioned rituals and symbols are at the same time connectors for the community as well as differentiators within the community, dividing the community into sub-communities that in some cases challenge each other; my focus is on the differences within the overarching Bosniak community.\(^{14}\)

**Transition and The Cataclysmic Event.**

Several academics bring forth the transition in the former socialist states in Eastern-Europe from communist styled countries to market liberal democratic states (Berdahl, Bunzl, and Lampland 2000) and areas of specific attention like corruption and the rise of mafia (Verdery 1996) during the transition. Probably due to the high degree of unemployment mixed with low income there are sustainable criminality problems in Zenica, whereof they have a common hand movement that symbolises stealing. I have experienced that narcotics are widely sold and used and I know of bribes and corruption in many layers of the society.\(^ {15}\) Transition «is rife with contradiction. It is an interactive process that both reflects and constitutes a dynamic interplay between large-scale systems and local-indeed, individual-phenomena» (Berdahl 2000: 5). The war in Bosnia was special and I define it as a cataclysmic event. A cataclysmic event is the «annihilation of history and the destruction of personality (...) invoke discontinuity between the dead and the living. (...) points of reference for collective being (...) `total´ in that they focus the attention of all biographies within a population however geographically defined» (Feuchtwang 2000: 59-60). A cataclysmic event within the transition made «ordinary people make sense of and find meaning in a rapidly changing world» (Berdahl 2000: 5). For many religion gave them meaning, whereof all my informants have stated that there was a rapid increase of practicing Muslims throughout the war, or «the uncertainty was the growing importance (and power) of Islam in the public sphere, which had been completely

\(^{14}\) The overarching Bosniak community will be divided into analytical sub-communities in chapter 4.

\(^{15}\) Mafia, criminality and drugs are not the scope of interest in this paper.
secularized before the war» (Maček 2007: 45). In other words, due to the increase of religiosity, Islam was perceived both negatively and positively within the Bosniak community. The war in Bosnia intervened totally in everyone’s lives and brought together personal and community narratives since the war fractions existed of different confessional communities with their own religion as the metonym with their own specific history.

«wahhabism».

I suggest through my findings that the differences within the Bosniak community perhaps equals, or even overtake, the differences towards the other communities. This is another argument for community and not the nationalism discourse and I will utilise Harrison’s «rhetoric of cultural pollution» (Harrison 1999) to state my point. When the mujahideen came to Bosnia during the war they introduced the «wahhabi» (vehabije) interpretation of how to be a Muslim, or perhaps more accurately, how to live as a Muslim. «Wahhabis» emphasis «the correct living out of faith (orthopraxy) is a necessary corollary to correctness of belief (orthodoxy)» (DeLong-Bas 2004: 11).

Bosnian Muslims are Sunni Muslims adherent to the Hanafi Islamic law school, while «wahhabism» is close to the Hanbali school of law in Sunni Islam16, which is geographically covering Saudi-Arabia. Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-1792), thereof «wahhabism», formed the dominant Islamic tradition in Saudi-Arabia through his association with the Royal family and «in the spirit of (...) Hanbal» (Netton 1997: 256). The term «wahhabism» is a debated one. Firstly that «followers» of this tradition are often ascribed so by opponents of it and that «followers» find the term derogatory. Experience taught me that they usually describe themselves as muwahhidūn (monotheists/unitarians), or more rarely selefije (ancestors or predecessors). The 24 year old Anis explained the use of the term predecessors by saying «we are more true to the way of the Prophet than Bosnian Islam». Secondly, the terms (mis)used and misinterpreted by journalists, security advisers, politicians, and intellectuals regarding Muslims fighting for a cause17 differs from «wahhabism», salafism, fundamentalism, jihadism, and Islamic radicalism. They have different interpretation of the teachings of al-Wahhab and have included a geographical socio-political aspect dependent upon the situation of the group or organisation. However there are major differences between the terms18: «Bin Laden preaches war against Christians and Jews; Ibn Abd al-Wahhab

16 Around 90 percent of Muslims are Sunni Muslims, and Sunni Islam have four major law schools.
17 The «cause» is usually defined illegitimate.
18 Differences in these terms, and the use of them, is a topic beyond this paper. Opposite of «wahhabism», salafism is a rarely used term by Bosniaks.
called for treaty relationships with them» (DeLong-Bas 2004: 278). Their opinion about correct behavior and their actual behavior, orthopraxy, is important. What I emphasise is al-Wahhab´s focus on demonstration of faith without separation of the private and public sphere. Al-Wahhab

«specified five activities that were to be carried out by every believer as a demonstration of faith: (1) a return to the Quran and the examples of Muhammad and the early Muslim community for knowledge rather than relying on someone else´s explanation; (2) basing judgment and wisdom on the direct contents of the Quran rather than interpretations of it; (3) avoidance of bribery and corruption; (4) shunning of superstitious practices; and (5) not disclaiming something that is recorded in the Quran simply because someone else claims that it is not necessary to follow it» (DeLong-Bas 2004: 79).

It is a fundamental understanding of Islam and al-Wahhab strictly rely on the Quran and only hadith19 from the Prophet, while other law school´s apply hadith´s from the «Rightly Guided Caliphs20» (DeLong-Bas 2004: 54). «Wahhabism» is term that does not exist in the Quran or the Hadith, the doctrine´s focus, and a reason followers dislike it. Further, al-Wahhab denied «hidden or secret knowledge of the Quran» (DeLong-Bas 2004: 44) opposite of Shia Islam and parts of Sufism. He worked for a strict monotheism whereof he excluded religious activities directed to prophets, holy persons and tombs (DeLong-Bas 2004: 61), again opposite of Shia and aspects of Sufism. It is on the basis of these five activities I utilise «wahhabism»21 as an analytical term. Furthermore, the term «wahhabism» is commonly used by traditional Bosnian Muslims and, following the examples of the Prophet, many «wahhabis» include a return to how the Prophet lived and do not separate between private and public spheres. Therefore, in Bosnia «wahhabis» usually dress differently with short trousers, some have a specific beard, some of them prefer that their wife wear a niqab and they have a perception of correct praying. These aspects give visible differences in the landscape between «wahhabi» influenced Muslims in Bosnia and traditional Bosnian Muslims. They perceive Shia Muslims as unbelievers and are negatively oriented with regards to sufism22, which they regard

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19 Hadith is records of what the Prophet Muhammad and his companions said and did, which is important in the interpretation of Islamic law.

20 The four persons that succeeded the Prophet as leaders of the Muslim community.

21 I do not have any derogatory intent when I write «wahhabism».

22 Sufism is a mystical and esoteric tradition in Islam.
to be superstition. Sufism is widespread and has a long history in Bosnia and in Zenica there are two different sufi orders.

Appadurai (1990) argues for anthropologists to implement perspectives regarding globalisation and mobility in a moving world. He divides the movement in the world into different analytical scapes and global flows: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes (Appadurai 1990: 296). All scapes are connected and have global impacts, though the impacts vary in different geographical locations and settings (Appadurai 1990). Ethnoscapes depict the human flows and migration in the world, technoscapes are technology that makes boundaries less apparent and move the flows of people and commodity in a higher speed, finanscapes are the financial flows, mediascapes are the production and spread of information both in the private and the public and ideoscapes are ideologies that conflicts with nation-states (Appadurai 1990). The cataclysmic event in Bosnia made global impact and all scales were activated. Mediascapes informed the Muslim world about the atrocities happening to the Muslim population. Through techno- and finanscapes money, weapons, human aid and soldiers came to Bosnia in support of the Muslims and therefore also became ethnoscapes. With the flow of the arriving soldiers «wahhabism» came to Bosnia as new ideoscapes. The mujahideen came as a flows of fighting humans from Europe, Afghanistan and Arab countries and they brought with them «wahhabism». A minority of the Bosniak population have adapted to «wahhabism», this represents, for some Bosniaks, a threat to their «boundaries (...) by intrusion of foreign cultural forms» (Harrison 1999: 10) and in some cases a «matter out of place» (Douglas 1966: 36) polluting the «islam» they know and have inherited over centuries. Many Bosniaks do not regard the other communities in Bosnia as a threat to the Bosniak identity as they formerly had. Now the threat is the intrusion and change within their community. The relationship between traditional Muslims in Bosnia and the «wahhabi» influenced Muslims will be covered in chapter 6.

Self presentation, Agency and Religiosity.

I found Goffman’s (Goffman 1959) theoretical presentation of self in everyday life useful as an analytical framework among my informants behaviour in different social settings. Particularly Goffman’s structural view with «horizontal and vertical status divisions and the kinds of social

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23 According to multiple internetsites Prism Research in Bosnia conducted a survey in 2006 and found that close to 70 percent oppose the presence of «wahhabism» in Bosnia. While around 13 percent support or live in accordance with «wahhabism» (www.worldpoliticsreview.com). Prism Research refused to give me a copy of the research since it belonged to a ordering second part, which they neither would give me any information about. However, the percentage of «wahhabi» supporters in this survey is higher than I have experienced.
relations which relate these several groupings to one another» (Goffman 1959: 232-233) was relevant with the informants whose family practiced Islam. In regards to religious aspects of alcohol and girls they represented themselves in the «front region» one way when relating to «vertical status» like family and religious authorities, while among friends in the «horizontal status» they did not prepare their representation in the «back region» for the «front region» (Goffman 1959). Cohen criticises Goffman for reducing selfhood to «not extend beyond the skills and imperatives of performance» (Cohen 1994: 68). Cohen searches for agency in people and how all people change continuously from birth to adulthood, his emphasises is on the period of adolescence (Cohen 1994: 66-67). Which sub-community a Bosniak belongs to correlates to the adolescence and family relations of the individual. Moore (1994) writes about gender, household and power relations as a discourse in societies as well as within the family. The relationships between parents and children are such power relations that families «produce specific sorts of persons with specific social identities, and particular rights and needs» (Moore 1994: 92-93).

I find Cohen´s (1994) discussion of self consciousness and the development of humans into the society constructive, where the conventions which individuals are being shaped into, through their socialisation into the society, establish consciousness about right and wrong. Another pattern is an increased awareness of the religious conventions among my informants that participated in Quran school, mekteb, which is also related to the religiosity of their parents and family. The more religious the family members are the higher the probability that their children participate in mekteb, which also means a higher focus on proper religious behaviour at home; a relationship between individuals and institutions, where agency in how people represent themselves exists. Klocker´s terms of «thin» and «thick» agency are useful in explaining the social conditions in Zenica, where «thin» agency refers to «decisions and everyday actions that are carried out within highly restrictive contexts, characterised by few viable alternatives, while thick agency is having the latitude to act within a broad range of options» (Klocker 2007: 85). In general, thick agency is widespread in the society while thin agency is closer to the vertical status. An extreme example of the thick agency in Zenica was a man who sold DVD´s on the small bridge in the centre of the town and among the covers laying with the front up was a pornography movie named «Inzest». The «wahhabi» inspired Muslims I met, upheld a thin agency also in the horizontal status among their like-minded friends, correlating with their focus on orthopraxy. My informants have learned, through adolescence and general knowledge, where to apply thin or thick agency.
Another aspect of agency is narratives. Giddens perceive the self identity as «routinely created and sustained in the reflective activities of the individual (...) the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of (...) biography» (Giddens 1991: 52-53), however self identity should be considered in compliance with the surroundings. Or a «duality of landscape» with a «landscape of consciousness» within the individual and a «landscape of action» the individual takes part in (Bruner 2004: 698-699). Narratives are constructions, interpretations and reinterpretations of the past suited for the present. Thus laying the ground for the future and through this agency it constitute people’s lives and identity (Somers 1994; Bruner 2004). Somers applies an ontological dimension of narratives that opens up for a «historically and empirically based research into social action and social agency that is at once temporal, relational, and cultural, as well as institutional, material, and macro-structural» (Somers 1994: 607). Here I divide narratives into historical and collective memory. Historical memories is directed to the individual recollection of the past, while the collective memory is where the majority have formed memory like «a life is not «how it was» but how it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and retold» (Bruner 2004: 708). Informants who had fought inSEDMA portrayed Sedma as a perfect unit in accordance with Islamic law, hence no stealing or alcohol consumption. However, informants who fought in the mujahideen told me about alcohol consumption in Sedma. Furthermore, one Bosniak informant left Sedma due to the stealing and alcohol consumption and he specified for me that «not many in the unit drank alcohol». It is a collective memory for the majority of Sedma that constitutes their present identity, both on an individual and on a group level, particularly in this matter where it is difficult to separate the individuals in the group from the whole group. Therefore the group must remain pure, and members of a community or group «are always involved in (...) the multiplicity of social relations in which they are enmeshed» (Ortner 2006: 130) where statements influence other individuals as well as themselves.

In the continuum of this paper I will analytically divide the overarching Bosniak community into sub-communities that are dependent upon different degrees of lived religiosity. I will present the differences between the sub-communities with socialpsychologist Allport terms «intrinsic» and «extrinsic» in relation to religious motivation: Intrinsic is when the religion exists in the person as an end, while extrinsic is religion as means (Allport & Ross 1967). In other words, the more intrinsic an individual is the more the religious belief is behind their actions, while an individual that is more extrinsic perceives the religious community more as a social movement with

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24 Sedma muslimanska brigada, the 7th Muslim brigade, called Sedma was a part of ARBiH, but differs from most of the other ARBiH units since it was established and based on Islamic military jurisprudence; in accordance with sharia.
possibilities. Along with Goffman and Allport theories Barth’s (1967) generative model made me understand how it was beneficial to utilize Muslim Symbols and to attend Friday prayer. The generative model focuses on individual agency and options within social limitations or possibilities in economical, physical, political and religious matters. However, the psychologist Allport searched for inner motivation in individuals while I use the terms in light of my empirical data through observation and conversations. Since I do not know the inner religious beliefs of my informants I divide the Bosniak community by lived religiosity. For example the džuma is perceived a religious duty for Muslim men but it includes a social aspect where they afterwards gather and meet friends and or family. I have observed that the number of participants in džuma increases with the weather conditions and that among my informants the more religious they are the more often they go to Friday prayer independent of the weather condition or other circumstances. Patterns like this has made it possible for me to categorise informants as more intrinsic in lived religiosity and that they participate more frequently than the extrinsic orientated informants who perhaps have a more social or beneficial aspect in their religiosity.

Symbols and Identity.

An Imam correctly told me that «the Muslim identity is complex». The Bosniak identity as one community is played out towards the other communities with specific symbols which are, or have, religious connotations or secular connotations. However there is not always a clear cut between religious or secular meaning in the use of the different symbols. Secular symbols are e.g. the official flag of Bosnia or a twist in the language, while hijab and ramazan are examples of more religious orientated symbols. Eriksen argues that «nationalism lays claim to symbols which have a great importance for people, and argues that these symbols represent the nation-state» (Eriksen 2002: 106). Meanwhile, the closest symbol to the Bosnian nation-state is the flag that is basically only used by Bosniaks as Croats and Serbs in general exert, respectively, the Croatian and the Serbian flag. Again, another argument for community rather than nationalism as a analytical device. The exertion of different flags by the different communities represent the lack of one symbol they can agree upon.

It is the use of the symbols and what they mean in everyday life I have concentrated on rather than the deeper meaning of the symbol in it’s self. I perceive symbols like Turner’s (1967) focus on symbols in social processes and interaction with human interest and intent in the usage of
them. Ortner’s work «on key symbols» (Ortner 1973) draws on former anthropological elaboration of symbols like Turner but there are differences in their theory. Symbols for Turner (1967) are part of rituals while Ortner states that «key symbols may also include rituals» (Ortner 1973: 1341), I agree with her. Ortner states that to be a key symbol it must comply with at least one of these five aspects: That (1) it is important for the members, (2) it arouses them positively or negatively, (3) it appears in different contexts like conversations and actions, (4) it elaborates the surroundings and (5) it restricts the members through norms and or sanctions (Ortner 1973: 1339). Ramazan fulfils every requirement to be considered a key symbol. Ramazan intervenes on individuals behaviour and make them the opposite of indifferent, it is systemic, it is in conversations, it inflicts the society, it includes a numbers of rules and it is important for the community. Key symbols can be divided into summarizing and elaborating, where a summarizing symbol is the «important mode of operation (...) its focusing power, its drawing-together, intensifying, catalyzing impact upon the respondent» (Ortner 1973: 1342). It unifies the community through «priority relative to other meanings of the system (...) respondent to the grounds of the system as a whole» (Ortner 1973: 1344). Elaborating symbols are «power of its formal or organizational role in the relation to the system (...) ordering of conceptual experience» (Ortner 1973: 1344), where the subcategory of «root metaphor» is a «static formal images serving metaphor functions for thought» (Ortner 1973: 1342). Typical elaborating symbols within the Bosniak community is hijab and bjelica. Even though ramazan is close to Ortner’s key scenario, a second subcategory of elaborating symbols, with «dramatic, phased action sequences serving scenario functions for action» (Ortner 1973: 1342), I interpret ramazan as the summarizing key symbol of Bosniaks in Zenica vis-à-vis the other communities. Ramazan is an individual event but the sum of all individuals unifies them. While the different symbols states that a person is belonging to the Bosniak community as opposed the others, it does not eventually state the persons religious beliefs; believing and belonging, belonging without believing. The use and adherence to the different symbols enables me to divide the Bosniak community into sub-communities even though they at the same time unite them into one community.

**Modernity and Secularism.**

When I write about modernity and secularism it is in coherence with Asad (2003), who draws on Taylor (1998). Both Asad (2003) and Taylor (1992, 1998) emphasise the importance of the plurality

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25 Key symbols equals *core symbols* for Schneider, and *dominant symbols* for Turner (Ortner 1973: 1338).
in a society and how individuals and families adapt to a secular society in different ways. In this matter, among others, both criticise Habermas (1989, 2007) for a lack of pluralism in societies. For Asad and Taylor modernity is not a static or fixed term, but a political project by people in power which aims to institutionalise the society in several aspects «constitutionalism, moral autonomy, democracy, human rights, civil equality, industry, consumerism, freedom of the market – and secularism» (Asad 2003:13). Secularism is a political doctrine within the modernity project and seeks to strip away «myth, magic, and the sacred» (Asad 2003: 13) only for government individuals to put the state before themselves: «European rulers (...) desire to create new human subjects» (Asad 2003: 110). While a «secular society (...) is a modern construct based on the legal distinction between public and private, on a political arrangement requiring `religion` to be subjected by law to the private domain» (Asad 2001: 1). Bosnia today is a society with freedom of religion, as opposed to the Yugoslav area, where religion is brought back in the public domain because they have «a legal right to express (...) beliefs (...) and to exercise (...) religion without hindrance» (Asad 2003: 205). However, an important aspect that Asad (2003) points out is that in secularism religion and state are not actually separated because the state decides the place of religion in the state. Further, a feature of the secular society is the possibility that individuals can make free choices, which perhaps have resulted in the thick agency that I observed in Bosnia. Asad (Asad 2003) outlines the difficulties in separating religion from the secular and an example of this I found transparent in Bosnia was in the use of symbols. A symbol that has religious connotations, like the half-moon and star may for practicing Muslims be seen as a religious symbol while for non-practicing Muslims or “atheist Muslims” it could be used to state their belonging to the Bosniak community, hereby applied in a secular non-religious manner. A female informant of mine had the half-moon and star tattooed on her body despite knowing that tattoos are illegal according to sharia. I interpret this as a symbol utilised more towards stating belonging than believing. The thick agency and the tattoo example «vindicate the essential freedom and responsibility of the sovereign self in opposition to the constraints of that self by religious discourse» (Asad 2003: 16). The fact that apparently religious symbols and places have an ambivalent meaning within the Bosniak community refracts me from the sacred-profane dichotomy started by Durkheim (see also Asad 1986: 12).

Asad argues that every religion is a product of historical and cultural developments (Asad 1993, 2003) or «particular «islams»» (Varisco 2005: 160). Therefore, in chapter 3, I will outline

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26 Discussions about secularism is a subject beyond the scope of this paper. I prefer Asad and Taylor theories on secularism with their interest on differences within a secular society, opposite of a more discoursive and westernised Habermas.
important historical events which Muslims in Bosnia have been subject to, to give an understanding of how Muslims live out Islam in Bosnia today. Historical, geographical and interpretive differences in how Islam is lived out, or «islams», will be discussed in chapter 6.

W«riting Muslims».

Anthropology from Geertz (1968) and Gellner (1981) on Muslims and Islam was praised and became a standard for others in the field of anthropology of Islam but over the last two decades they have been strongly criticized by e.g. Asad (1986), Varisco (2005) and Marranci (2008). Geertz and Gellner produced Muslims into one group of essentialised people, whom all are «Islam» and «we never learn what Islam means in praxis» (Varisco 2005: 76) and Muslims «do not speak, they do not think, they behave» (Asad 1986: 8). In other words, human agency and differences within large populations have disappeared. Varisco claims that Islam can only be represented while «Muslims can be observed (...) their behavior witnessed. (...) it is necessary to observe others as they live their lives» (Varisco 2005: 20). Islam is for Islamic scholars to interpret, while Muslims and their actions, opinions and understanding of Islam are for anthropologists to study. Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus, atheists and so on are so much more than religious duties: «Defining Islam will not explain what Muslims do and why they do things differently over time and space» (Varisco 2005: 161). My theoretical method is «charting how beliefs and ideas are put into practice: not how they are supposed to be or should be, but how they unfold in an observable manner in one small place at one particular time» (Varisco 2005: 140). Through different local settings a more global comparing can be performed to obtain similarities and differences among Muslims who share a common belief in Allah. What is interesting in the Bosnian setting is how different «islams» interact in Bosnia.

2. Methodology

«Observing Muslims».

Inspired by Varisco’s (2005) book and argumentation I use «Islam» or «Islamic» to refer to the normative Islam and «Muslim» and «Muslims» for the individual and groups, what they say and how they act differently. I am generally applying informants perception and interpretation of right and wrong, or more correct better or worse, regarding themselves and the society. While I leave sharia to Islamic scholars28. I have studied the essentialised Islam at the University of Oslo, while here I am observing and writing about Muslims. An example of research in line with Asad and Varisco is «Being Muslim the Bosnian Way» by Bringa (Bringa 1995). A special episode in my fieldwork was when an Imam at the end of a conversation gave me a clear analogy from Bringa´s book and asked: «Do you remember what the old man in the beginning of the book asked Bringa?». «No. It´s been a long time since I read it», I replied. «He asked her to write the truth». The Imam smiled. I smiled back, and we both knew, without saying, the obvious meaning between the lines. The Imam meant Bringa wrote the truth and more importantly he encouraged me to be dedicated in telling the truth.

Residence and Field.

I came by bus to Zenica late on the 9th of January, the Islamic New Year eve for the year. I hired a taxi that took me to a cheap hotel where I stayed while I tried to arrange an apartment for the rest of my fieldwork. On the 12th of January I put up a written note in the Bosniak language on 12 different places in town shortly describing myself, my purpose and that I was searching for an apartment. Two days later the note had given me two informants and the fieldwork progressed. On the 27th of January I hired a small apartment in the town. While sometimes during the fieldwork I also stayed at informant places and I lived 3 weeks with a family during ramazan. Zenica is a city with over 100,000 inhabitants and I got informants of both sexes and with a wide range of age from different places within the town. I was nevertheless surprised at how small the town felt in the matter of informants knowing each other or knowing each other through others.

My fieldwork was conducted in an urban setting where my focus was people and not the location, however I choose this location because of its role in the last war and that its a

28 A digression: At two different occasions practising Muslims excused the behavior of other Muslims, who were drugdealers, and asked me to «check out what Islam really is, and not what Muslims does».
predominantly Muslim area. The field was my informants, which is in line with location «as an ongoing project. (...) one strategically works at» (Gupta & Ferguson 1997: 37) or with Sanjek (1990), who considers being in the field more an attitude or engagement than location. In urban Bosnia I found a wide range of differences among my informants that are most probably not to be found on the countryside in Bosnia. In Zenica it is easier to conceal actions from family and friends while on the countryside everyday life is more transparent and as several of my informants told me: «on the countryside you are closer to God»\(^{29}\).

Languages and Myself.

I am far from a fluent speaker of the local languages and I can easily misunderstand sentences but people did find it amusing that I tried to speak their language. It generally created a positive curiosity among persons I came in contact with but two criminals also accused me of being a spy\(^{30}\). When I had to speak local languages the people I talked with had remarkable patience and we often used a pocket sized dictionary in «Serbo-Croatian» which I always carried with me. I have only once been corrected in use of an *ekavica* pronunciation that is more typical in Serbia, instead of the common *ijekavica* in Zenica. Then by two informants from the Croat community and it was not the only time I used an *ekavica* pronunciation\(^{31}\). My low skills in the languages resulted that conversations usually were spoken in English, which my informants also preferred. On four occasions I used my informants as thoroughly selected interpreters\(^{32}\). I have spoke with informants in English, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, Scandinavian languages and German, however all statements will be presented in English for simplicity and to anonymise informants. In this thesis some emic words will be in the Bosnian language because of their importance and because they were used during conversations in English.

My Norwegian Christian protestant background was never an issue, but me being from a richer country than Bosnia made three of my informants want to establish business with me,

\(^{29}\) Meaning that the countryside have a thinner agency; more religious than secular compared with Zenica.

\(^{30}\) I interpret the ascribed spy claims as an in heritage from the Socialist Yugoslavia where Tito de facto had such a system to protect his position. Several of my informants said that it is possible that I am a spy, but that they didn’t care, while the two criminals created problems for me. I was actually warned about criminality in Zenica pre-fieldwork, by a Bosnian Serb in Belgrade who had grown up in the vicinity of Zenica.

\(^{31}\) Example: The English word «time» is in ekavian «vreme» while in ijekavian «vrijeme».

\(^{32}\) E.g. a Serb woman to interview the Serb Orthodox priest in Zenica, and a practising Muslim during conversations with an Imam.
nothing was planned or specific and it didn’t take me long to see that it was more the idea of making money rather than to actually establish something.

Because, before the fieldwork, I had spent time in the former Yugoslavia in areas belonging to the different communities and together with people from these different communities, I found myself in a position to point out what is more particular for the Bosniak community vis-à-vis the other communities. For example, the negative abbreviations towards homosexuality could be drawn to the Islamic doctrine where homosexuality is illegal\(^3\). It is usual to mock friends by calling them \textit{«gay»} when they said or did something outside the socially expected or when they disagreed in discussions. But, I have experienced this anti-homosexuality as widespread in the region\(^3\). However, being among Bosniaks in a vast majority Bosniak town was a new experience for me and I had more than enough distance to observe informants lives and to be thrilled with their particularities (Frøystad 2003, my translation). Foreigners living in Zenica is so unusual that it made me a status symbol for at least two of my informants, who told me that knowing me would raise their own social status (cf. Wadel 1991).

My presence and discussions about religious matters and «correct behaviour» had perhaps an impact on a few of my informant’s reflections of themselves as a Muslim with belonging to Islamic norms. An example in this matter is Bajram, who liked nightlife and to flirt with girls. I have drunk alcohol with Bajram several times during the fieldwork and at the end of my stay he stated: \textit{«I will try to stop drinking alcohol. To be a better Muslim»}. Later in the same conversation he said \textit{«I am not sure if I can stop having sex»}.

\textbf{Selection of informants, anonymising and ethics.}

I have 26 close informants that I met daily or weekly and from 4 of them I had regular contact with their families. In a broader sense I had over 50 informants that I have talked with and interacted with several times each month and furthermore my informants acquaintances. All my sources are 19 years or older, whereof the main age group is between 20 and 45 years. My informants reflect the difference in demographics in Zenica with a vast majority of Bosniaks, a few Croats, Serbs and persons from inter-communal marriage. I am a man doing fieldwork among Muslims and my focus was on men. But I also had a total of six female informants\(^3\) and other Bosniak women who I met.

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\(^3\) Homosexuality (in practise) is interpreted as illegal by the vast majority of Islamic scholars around the world.

\(^3\) In Belgrade 30th of June 2001 Serbian right wingers attacked «the Pride Parade» and injured several of the participants.

\(^3\) Three Bosniak females, two croat females, and one Serb female.
through male informants. The central Bosniak informants for this paper be introduced in chapter 4. I used a kind of snowball sampling by expanding the numbers of informants through acquaintances (Gullestad 1984) and I did this with different informants to prevent ending up with one large social group of friends with similar lifestyles and opinions. It was a mixture between my informants arranging for me to meet persons they thought I would find interesting, and my linking up with their friends. I tried to establish contacts that would be as close to a cross section of the society as I could manage. I usually preferred to keep groups and individuals separated to crosscheck information, to verify, expand, or reject data, with the different informants. On two occasions, a demonstration and a war remembrance, I invited informants with me as a reason for me to be there but in general I was invited to social activities. A few times I provoked informants to observe their first response to the topic I wanted to discuss, e.g. calling «wahhabi» inspired Muslims «wahhabi» instead of muwahhidūn and sometimes I asked my Bosniak informants “What is a good Muslim?” to see their emphasis on the subject. In general they responded with a clear reference to Islam and an ironic remark about the stupidity of the question.

Through interaction and conversations I found, with three exceptions no difference in the «relationship between actions and notions (...) notions (...) to knowledge, beliefs, ideas or ideals» (Holy and Stuchlik 1983: 35-36). I interpret this general honesty to the thick agency among the population. One of the exceptions was a male friend of Bajram, Sefik, from a well known practicing Muslim family in town who told me several times during my stay that he abstains from alcohol. But Bajram and two other informants stated that outside of Zenica Sefik drinks alcohol. It was most likely an impression control from his side towards me and parts of the surroundings; presenting himself as a more practicing Muslim than he actually was (Goffman 1959). I felt that informants were very honest with me and if they made what they subjectively perceive as a mistake they would often discuss it with me. Among my practising informants it was usual to state «Nobody is perfect. Its human to make errors», which is a reference to Islam.

I informed everybody I was in contact with about the details of my presence, that I was a student of anthropology doing fieldwork about Muslims and Islam in Bosnia and that they would be anonymised. All names of informants are fictitious, unless36 they are written in full name. The level of anonymising in this paper is higher than I wanted it to be but there is no way around it and especially in regards to the Imams, sufi Șeih’s, and individuals who fought in the mujahideen. I need to protect my informants opinions, experiences and histories which they have discussed and

36 If a person is stated in full name, I have the persons approval.
shared with me so it cannot be used against them by others. For example, when I refer to an Imam it is one of the three Imams I was in regular contact with out of the 9 Imams detached to one of the 9 Mosques\(^{37}\) positioned within Zenica. I had contact with both sufi orders and their leaders, Šejh, from hereon called a Šejh. The Imams and Šejh’s are married and while the three Imams are below 50 years, the two Šejh’s\(^{38}\) are over 70 years of age. This high degree of anonymity results in less contextualisation regarding certain informants and I do have information that is too compromising to use explicitly.

In the beginning of my fieldwork I had a few conversations with two male academics working with social science at the University of Zenica (UNZE) but I found their understanding of the society in line with what Barth categorise as interpret data (Barth 1999), from their subjective native point of view. I limited this kind of conversations since I did not find them productive for my fieldwork. However, I found conversations with Islamic scholars enlightening, only first after they understood that I had knowledge about Islam. The conversation topics then turned from Islam into how Muslims in Bosnia live out Islam. Instead of spending time on discussions about Islamic jurisprudence, we discussed what Muslims in Bosnia do and their perceptions of better and worse. The Muslims I found most normative, in accordance to Islamic law, in daily speech were those influenced by «wahhabism», whom were sceptical towards me and my presence, in the beginning.

I was asked by four different Bosniaks to return to Islam\(^{39}\), once, whereof two of them stressed the fact that they were obliged by their religion to do so. However, the most persistent effort to convert me was conducted by two mid-aged males from Jehovah’s Witnesses who I conversed with about religion in Bosnia three times during my fieldwork.

**Sources for information.**

This fieldwork has primarily been observation, participation and conversations in the Zenica area, but it has been multi-sited (Marcus 1998) as I have tried to cover as much as possible throughout the fieldwork; Mosques, Churches, Tekija and zikr\(^{40}\), funeral, weddings, ramazan, demonstrations, demonstrations, demonstrations,

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\(^{37}\) Nine Mosques within my definition of the town Zenica. There are also other positions as Imams outside Mosques, e.g in the prison and at the hospital in town.

\(^{38}\) The two Šejh’s had an charismatic personality that made people around them relaxed. I find the feeling difficult to explain with words.

\(^{39}\) I actually expected that more Muslims would ask me to convert. The mentioned four had different background: a sufi Šejh, a former mujahideen, a criminal, and a «wahhabi» influenced Bosniak. It is actually a return to Islam, not converting, as they mean that everyone is born Muslim through Allah.

\(^{40}\) Tekija is the building or house belonging to a Sufi order, where they perform zikr; a devotional act repeating the names of Allah. «Wahhabis» oppose zikr in groups as sufi’s do.
political rally meetings, remembrance gathering for the last war, concerts, sports events, restaurants, bars, a brothel, and nightclubs. I have kept up with local and national news through TV, newspapers and journals and monitored posters in town to know what will happen. I have been to informants’ homes for dinner, coffee, TV and discussions, but the social venue in Bosnia is coffee places. I have spent uncountable hours drinking loads of strong coffee while hanging out with informants. I have gathered official local statistics, bought and read the local history book and conducted quantitative research by counting frequency of people attending different mosques on different weekdays, times and weather conditions and the percentage of females wearing hijab. I took several pictures and collected different texts as posters and menu’s. I nearly always had a notebook to write important headnotes when needed, but in general I trusted my memory and wrote it down as fieldnotes at home (Sanjek 1990). On several occasions I showed my informants that I was taking notes and a few times I asked them to write down certain aspects I knew was too hard to remember. I also conducted five semi-structured interviews during my fieldwork. Even though I conducted multi-sited fieldwork, this paper emphasise on interaction, on conversations and on observation with informants, alone or in groups.
3. History

The histories of Bosnia are complex and differs among the country’s communities, «The facts of history are nothing; interpretation is everything» (Carr 1961). For each of the different communities in Bosnia there are different histories and myths about their past. These histories reflect the present and they were used to bring the different communities against each other in the last war. However, I will focus on what I consider historical facts. I need to explain the history of Bosnia and in particular the Muslim history to contextualise the Bosniak situation as a part of a secular Europe and I want the reader to have in mind the strategic geographical position of the Balkans; historically connecting east to west. I will utilise «Bosnia a short History» by Malcolm (Malcolm 2002) for a general history about Bosnia, and «The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity» by Karčić (Karčić 1999) to present the Muslim history and transformation from within.

Pre-Islamization.

Bosnia was inhabited by Illyrians since the Neolithic age and it was first from around year 600 AD when the region obtained a massive immigration by Slavs. Later the same century,

«Serbs and the Croats were, from the earliest times, distinct but closely connected, living and migrating in tandem (...) they came to the Balkans there was already a large Slav population in place - larger than the population of the Serbs and the Croats» (Malcolm 2002: 8).

The Croats came from what today is South Poland and established themselves in areas that today is Croatia and Bosnia. The Serbs migrated from present day Czech to areas which today is Serbia and Bosnia. As a digression; Yugoslavia, literally, means south slavs. The Croats and Serbs were not Christianised before the 10th century and outwards, approximately 500 years before Islam came to the region with the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The split of Christianity in year 1054 eventually led to the different religious communities of Catholic and Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, with the
Croats having political and geographical ties to Rome and Catholicism while the Serbs were closer to Constantinople and Orthodox Christianity.

**The Ottoman Empire.**

Turks and the Ottoman empire had been in Sarajevo since the 1440’s, before the Ottoman Empire took control over Bosnia in 1463, with the Ottomans came the start of a mass conversion in the region. From the first accurate tax census, by the Ottomans in 1485, Malcolm assess 155,251 Christians and 21,734 Muslims, in the 1520’s Malcolm assess 98,095 Christians and 84,675 Muslims and without any particular Muslim immigration in that period it indicates the mass conversion of Christians to Muslims (Malcolm 2002: 51-54). In the 17th century the Muslim community was the largest in Bosnia and when they became Muslims they usually changed their last names from a typical Slav name into a Muslim name, e.g. from Stanković to Islamović. Up to the present day most Croats and Serbs have referred to Muslims as, respectively, actually Croats or Serbs.

For my research it is not important which religions the ancestors of the Muslims in Bosnia belonged to but the social fact that they have existed as Muslims since the 15th century and that they are believers of Allah and his Prophet. Malcolm draws on five valid factors for this mass conversions from Christianity to Islam with (1) the Devşirme system were Ottomans took Christian boys, converted them to Islam and made them an integral part of the Ottoman system, for example, elite soldiers (janissaries) with special benefits of the empire (Malcolm 2002: 65-66). (2) The «privileged legal status of the Muslims (...) that Christians could not bring law-suits against a Muslim in court», (3) «slaves who converted to Islam could apply for freedom», (4) «growth of Muslims towns (...) filled with Muslim institutions» (Malcolm 2002:66-68) and (5) «the influx of already Islamicized Slavs (...) from Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria (...) the retreat of the Ottomans from areas which they had long occupied in Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia and Hungary» (Malcolm 2002: 68-69). Malcolm leaves an empty space of belief, as belief in Allah is nothing and sociopolitical dimensions everything. Therefore I add belief as a factor of why large parts of the population in Bosnia converted to Islam. Furthermore, Bosnia was not a prioritised area for the Catholic and Orthodox church (Malcolm 2002).

Under Ottoman rule Muslims became the majority in Bosnia and they lived in accordance with sharia, while the Christian population was given a high degree of religious freedom.
The Tanzimat.
The tanzimat started within the Ottoman Empire in 1839 and was a reform to modernize the
Ottoman Empire to meet the increased political and military power of West-Europe, hence a
product of industrialization and modernization, including secularization, that had taken place in
parts of Europe for centuries. The tanzimat was formed by Ottomans who had studied in Europe
and they constructed it similar to European systems with centralized institutions over e.g. education,
law, military, industry and with equality for it’s people. In other words, the Ottomans were adopting
a European system in an effort to become as strong as the European countries. With the tanzimat
Bosnia got «separate institutions for the administration of Shari`a and secular laws (...) Shari`a
courts (...) became special courts for the administration of Islamic law in matters of personal status
(...) of Muslims and Muslim endowments» (Karčić 1999: 56-58). It is important to notice that these
reforms took place within an Islamic Ottoman Empire and it resulted in «both ideological support
for and rejection of modernization (...) within an Islamic framework» (Karčić 1999:71). However, it
took over two decades, after the introduction of tanzimat, «for the Bosniaks to move from the
rejection of reforms to their acceptance» (Karčić 1999: 70). In the period up to when tanzimat was
accepted there were armed clashes between Bosniaks and Ottoman forces, mainly due to political
and not too much religious issues as some lost their position. With that position went their political
and economic power, e.g. the system of janissaries was abolished. A common Bosniak anecdote told
by several informants regarding the Ottoman presence in Bosnia: «When the Ottomans first came
they were offered fruit served by girls and they honorably accepted the fruit, in the end they were
aiming for the girls and not the fruit».

With tanzimat, and it’s extensive freedom of religion, a revival of Christianity took place
with increased presence of Christian missionaries who targeted the non-Muslim population and
Catholic and Orthodox Churches were built especially in urban areas (Karčić 1999: 69). With the
revival of Christianity nationalism raised, the Serbs along with the Russians went to war against the
Ottomans in the late 1860’s. The Ottomans won but in a new war against the Hapsburg Monarchy,
the Ottoman Empire lost control over Bosnia in 1878. The Hapsburg Monarchy, also knows as
Austria-Hungary, did however not officially annex Bosnia before 1908. The Muslims in Bosnia
were now facing several challenges as a minority and outside of an Islamic polity for the first time.

The Hapsburg Monarchy and World War I.
The Hapsburg Monarchy intensified the political project of modernization in Bosnia that the
Ottomans had started and the economical sector developed rapidly. The Hapsburg utilized the
natural resources, e.g. the steel industry in Zenica, and the industrialization led to improvement of the infrastructure. The industrial sector gradually took over for traditional agriculture, and led to further urbanization.

The Hapsburg «found in Bosnia three main groups with the main factor of differentiation was religion» (Karčić 1999: 100). The Bosniaks have been called Bosniaks in the Muslim part of the world. While their non-Muslim neighbours have often referred to Bosniaks as Turks or poturice (half-Turks) due to their adherence to Islam or as earlier mentioned Croat or Serb Muslims. The use of Turkish and Arabic language was an official part of the Ottoman Empire while Persian was a part of the poetic traditions. These languages started to vanish with the Hapsburg introduction of the Serbo-Croat language in 1907. However Turkish and Arabic was upheld by Islamic scholars and students in Mosques and medresas41. The introduction of the Serbo-Croat language gave both a cyrillic and a latin alphabet with respectively the Serbs close ties to Russia and the Croats to Western Europe. The Bosniaks had opted for a language named Bosnian, but were only allowed to use it within their community. More important was that the Bosniaks «failed to gain official recognition of their historical name (...) the name Musliman (the Muslims) was adopted (...) not as an ethnic group but as a religious group» (Karčić 1999: 95-103). These two aspects of language and nationality decreased Bosniaks right to belong to the country and therefore the Bosniaks became «a religious minority (...) instead of being the ruling majority» (Karčić 1999: 99) under the Hapsburg rule. The Muslims were given autonomy in their religious issues by the Hapsburg and through interpretation of sharia by communicating with Turkish and Arab Islamic Scholars on several issues, they developed into the new political environment. According to Karčić (1999) the main issues for the Muslims were, firstly, wether to migrate or to integrate into a non Islamic country. Many Muslims left for other Muslim countries and Karčić estimates that 150,000 Bosniaks left between 1878 and 1918, Malcolm estimates 100,000 but at the same time takes into account the Muslims who migrated into Bosnia from Serbia, Croatia and the Hapsburg Monarchy. The majority who stayed integrated into a non-Muslim country. Secondly, was how they could serve in a non-Muslim army they fought against in the war between the Hapsburg and the Ottomans. «This practice was justified by reference to early and classical Muslim scholars who allowed alliance between Muslim and non-Muslims under condition that it was beneficial to Islam» (Karčić 1999: 122), with special focus to protect the Muslims living in the same nation. They served in the non-Muslim army in return for religious freedom. Lastly, the relationship between Islam and European culture was widely discussed and in the end the Bosniaks aimed «that Bosnia should become a

41 Medresa is a religious Islamic school that also includes common learnings.
country capable to respond to European challenges (...) to work for the enlightenment and cultural advance of Bosniaks as well their Islamic ethical education» (Karčić 1999: 149). They adopted to political institutions like law and order, education and science, and tax with a «selective adoption of European cultural norms and institutions, based on the compatibility (...) with Islam» (Karčić 1999: 152).

In the 1890’s Muslims newspapers and printing houses emerged and reading societies were «founded around coffeehouses where educated people would meet (...) and discuss current issues» (Karčić 1999: 97). These reading societies resulted in the establishment of a Muslim political party in 1906. With the political party Muslims tried to work for their rights within the Hapsburg political institutions and in 1910 they became a part of the first parliament in the country. The Serbs founded their first political party in 1907, and the Croats in 1908. The Hapsburg leadership modernized the educational system, including the education for Islamic scholars that from then combined «knowledge of Shari`a disciplines together with the understanding of European continental (...) jurisprudence and laws» (Karčić 1999: 93). The Hapsburg also subsidized schools for each of the three communities and appointed the religious authorities in Bosnia for the Catholic and Orthodox Church with approval from respectively the Pope and and the Patriarch, in 1882 they established, in agreement with the Muslim community, the Reis ul-ulema (Karčić 1999: 124). Appointed by the Hapsburg Reis ul-ulema was the highest Islamic authority in Bosnia, and it remains so today. The Reis ul-ulema kept the connection to the Muslim world, especially to Istanbul, while they developed into a European styled society. As Karčić states: «Fourty years of Hapsburg rule left significant changes in economy, society, culture and politics. These changes dramatically changed the lives and way of thinking of Bosniaks» (Karčić 1999: 75). It was a gradual process and it happened through a legal Islamic framework with fatawa, although far from all Islamic scholars in Bosnia agreed on the development. Nevertheless, the Muslim population adapted to the society and it was legitimized through sharia.

The end of the Hapsburg in Bosnia came with WW-I and yet again with a rise of nationalistic desire from Serbia. The famous assassination in 1914 of Prince Franz Ferdinand, the next in line to rule the Hapsburg, in Sarajevo by a Serb nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, led the region into a new war with the Hapsburg against the Serbs. Most Muslims fought with the Hapsburg but some fought on the Serb side. Towards the end of the war political cooperation between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Muslims was established and in 1918 the «sovereign state of Slovenes, Croats

\[\text{In 1895 the Quran was for the first time «translated into Bosnian by a Serbian Orthodox priest» (Karić 1999: 288).}\]

\[\text{Fatwa (pl. fatawa) is a legal judgement on a specific topic by a Mufti, who is educated in Islamic law; sharia.}\]
and Serbs was (...) in existence» (Malcolm 2002: 162). Once again, the Bosniak community was not credited as a nation.

**Kingdom of Yugoslavia and World War II.**

The name of the state became Yugoslavia and had basically the same territory as the later Yugoslavia consisted of and in 1929 it became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As a part of the secularism in Turkey the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in 1924, which in turn oriented the Bosnian Muslims «toward Egypt, as a new islamic religious center, and to Europe, their immediate surrounding» (Karčić 2007). The ties to Turkey were weakened and the Kingdom controlled the contact between the Muslim religious elite in Bosnia and Egypt; strengthening the ties with Europe.

In 1930 the «Yugoslav monarch Aleksandar Karadjordjević abolished the autonomy of the Islamic Religious Community» (Karčić 1999: 132) and the Muslims were given the lowest positions in the ministries and departments of the new royal government (Malcolm 2002: 169). The Kingdom also standardized all schools with western curriculum, including *medresas*. King Aleksandar controlled the Muslim community but after he was assassinated in 1934 the Muslims achieved more independence concerning Islamic matters. The modernizing process with secularization had it’s effects from first the tanzimat and then during the Hapsburg. The effects were visible in the increasing number of Muslims studying abroad in western countries and Muslim women working in factories, which was unusual in other Muslim countries in the first decades of the 20th century (Malcolm 2002: 141).

The Kingdom ended in 1941 with the Nazi invasion supported by the Italians and Croats, while the Serbs loyal to the Russians fought against the axis forces. The WW-II was perhaps the most complex war in the area throughout history and it left the Muslims in an ambivalent position. Again they found themselves in a position where it was not clear as to which side they would benefit from supporting. Muslims fought on all sides, the Croatian *ustaša*, Serbian *četnici*, German nazi´s and the communist *partizan* led by Tito, and was killed by all sides (Malcolm 2002: 192). The majority of the Muslims fought with the Croats and the *Reis ul-ulema* at that time «was a self-identified `Croat’» (Malcolm 2002: 185). It is estimated that around 75,000 Muslims, 8 percent of the Muslim population, died during the war. Only Jews and Gypsies had higher casualties in percent. 12,000 of the 14,000 Jews in Bosnia was killed by the axis and most of their Synagog's were destroyed (Malcolm 2002: 176). After the war most of the remaining Jews moved to Israel and the Gypsies became the 4th largest community in Bosnia. Many Gypsies categorise themselves as
Christian or Muslim and it is therefore difficult to assess the correct numbers of Gypsies in Bosnia still at present time. A Muslim SS division, the Handžar divizija, was established in agreement with the nazi’s to prevent the Croats from more atrocities against the Muslim population but it came with little effect. Throughout the war «756 mosques had been destroyed or badly damaged» (Malcolm 2002: 196). The partizans gained soldiers throughout the war and in 1944 up to 2,000 members of the Handžar division joined Tito (Malcolm 2002: 191). The reason Tito gained Muslim support, despite the Muslims suspicion against communism, was the fear of Bosnia being annex into Croatia or Serbia. Tito, and his partizans, won the war and in 1945 Bosnia was a part of Titoist Yugoslavia.

The Socialist Yugoslavia.

During socialist Yugoslavia industry, urbanisation and infrastructure increased. Zenica as example: The 2,101 inhabitants in 1879 raised slowly to around 12,000 in 1940 and it boosted to 46,510 in 1961 and to around 75,000 in 1975 (Zenica 2000: 232). The increase of inhabitants are closely connected to the development of the steel industry and along with this development Zenica got several typical East European socialist high apartment buildings to house the new working stock and their families. The steel industry in Zenica was, at it’s peak45, one of the largest in South-east Europe.

The Muslim fear of communism came through and the Bosnian Muslims became more oppressed than ever before. Even though the Yugoslav constitution from 1946 proclaimed religious freedom and «the separation between Church and state» (Malcolm 2002: 195) the period from 1945 to 1954 was especially hard. The state abolished sharia courts for private matters, Sufism and their Tekijas were banned, women were not allowed to wear the veil, male circumcising was not recommended, schools with Islamic subjects were closed as were the Muslim print houses and other Muslim cultural and educational societies and teaching Islam to children in mosques became illegal (Malcolm 2002: 195-197). Malcolm states that Muslims in the military might have been forced to eat pork (Malcolm 2002: 196) but two of my oldest informants told me: «You are not forced. There is just nothing else to eat. Day after day». They chose not to eat pork. In 1949 and 1950 several hundred Muslim members of a student group called «Young Muslims» were imprisoned for opposing the government treatment of Muslims and their religion (Malcolm 2002: 196). Earlier, in 1945 to 1946 its «estimated that up to 250,000 people were killed by Tito’s mass shootings, forced death marches and concentration camps» (Malcolm 2002: 193). People from all communities were

45 An informant who worked at the steel plant told me that before the war over 12,000 were employed through the steel industry, compared with around 4,000 in 2008.
killed. Tito tried to control and govern the citizens so they would put the state before themselves (Asad 2003). Mosques were taken by the government and used as museums, warehouses and stables and many «Muslim graveyards were turned into parks and building-sites» (Malcolm 2002: 196). In 1958 *vakufs* were completely taken over by the government (Malcolm 2002: 196) and there were over 5,000 *vakufs* in Bosnia (Karčić 1999: 128). The Orthodox and the Catholic church also experienced difficulties, however not as bad as the Muslims. This is due to the fact that Islam as a religion includes social practices more extensive than the two Christian communities in Bosnia (Malcolm 2002: 194), an aspect which Bosniaks also have pointed out for me. Tito tried to produce a Yugoslavia with a homogenic population and when religion was one of the major differences it was suppressed. The state controlled Islamic association was an exception for the suppressed Muslims but through state control it was assured that only Muslims apparently loyal to the state were assigned. The state decided the place of religion in the society (Asad 2003) and the grandfather of one of my informants experienced this. He was an Imam at a Mosque in Zenica and when he refused to read a political oriented paper from the government during *džuma* he was imprisoned for 45 days. However, during the period of religious suppression some resistance did exist; Sufi orders met privately, Islam was taught in Mosques and Islamic texts circulated (Malcolm 2002: 195). Further, it was possible to conduct *hadžđe* in the socialist period, as some of my informants did.

A major change for the Muslims situation in Bosnia started in 1948 when Stalin decided to take Yugoslavia out of the Comintern, a European organisation for Communist countries. The break with Comintern led Tito and Yugoslavia into cooperation with countries neither tied to the communist block or NATO. In 1961 the establishment of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) with Egypt, India, Indonesia and Ghana took place. Yugoslavia’s cooperation with three of the most populous Muslim countries in the world improved the situation of the Muslims in Bosnia. «Yugoslavia’s Muslim community was now being used as a tool of Tito’s self-styled ‘non-aligned’ foreign policy» (Malcolm 2002: 196). Again, it was the Muslims loyal to Tito’s government who were assigned to official duties with Muslims countries. Through the NAM Muslims started to study at Arab universities in the 1970’s and in 1977 Saudi-Arabia sponsored the Faculty of Islamic Theology in Sarajevo (Malcolm 2002: 201). Furthermore, Arabs came to Bosnia for education and work, e.g. at the steel industry in Zenica, and some of them stayed permanently, including two of

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46 *Vakuf* is a Muslim religious endowment donated, often land or a building, by a Muslim to the Muslim community. The *Tekija* in Zenica is a *vakuf*.

47 *Hadžđe* (arabic: Hajj) is the pilgrimage to Mecca that is a religious duty every capable Muslim should conduct once in life. A person who has conducted *Hadžđe* is called *Hadžija* (male) or *Hadžinca* (female).
my informants. With this new international cooperation the status of the Muslims changed; macro politics increased a community and it’s individual members status and the changed status can be tracked with the change in the Yugoslavian census: In 1948 the Muslims could choose between «Muslim Serbs» (72,000), «Muslim Croats» (25,000), or «Muslims nationally undeclared» (778,000), while in 1961 it was «Muslim in the ethnic sense» and then in 1971 it was «Muslim, in the sense of a nation» (Malcolm 2002: 198-199). Still not equal with the other nations.

A central aspect to bring forth in this matter is that the movement to become a nation among Muslims in Bosnia in the 1960´s and 1970´s was conducted by apparently secular and communist Muslims, hence not a direct religious movement. The Muslims worked to be ascribed as a nation and not only as a religious community. However, in the same period a Islamic revival also took place in Bosnia with Alija Izetbegović in the front row. An important revival which I will turn to later.

While Tito’s participation in the NAM, on a macro scale, increased the Muslim social status another macro happening, the Iranian revolution in 1979 made Iran the Islamic Republic of Iran, decreased it. Due to fear of Islamic revival the Yugoslav government charged in 1983 thirteen Muslims for «hostile and counterrevolutionary acts derived from Muslim nationalism» (Malcolm 2002: 208). Izetbegović was imprisoned for 11 years but was pardoned after 5 years. This episode strengthened the position of Muslims loyal to the Government who wanted a Muslim secular identity alongside a Muslim national identity (Malcolm 2002: 208). Bringa presents a reflexive view of the Muslim situation in everyday life in Yugoslavia. She precisely states that the «leading Islamic scholars´ accommodation to the communist authorities led them to encourage Muslims to put their obligations to the state before their obligations as practicing Muslims» (Bringa 1995: 199). Bringa’s focus is a rural village before the war, while my fieldwork is from a urban town post-war. However, Bringa’s book is useful to compare Muslims during Yugoslavia and Muslims in present Bosnia to see the development of Muslim communal identity. During the period of socialist Yugoslavia, religious life became attorned to the private sphere and out of the immediate government range. However, older informants have explained me that while it was not illegal to be a religious man, you had no chance of a carrier and was always working on the ground. In this matter Bringa brings forth that to «be a Moslem in heart (...) is an expression often used by non-devout, non-practicing Moslem to refer to their cultural identity» (Bringa 1993: 86). My findings suggests that this definition needs to be widen. Two male Bosniaks in their late 50’s explained to me how they were a part of the government, one in politics and the other taking higher university education, and that they concealed their religiosity from the surroundings. Keeping it within their
private sphere, with their wife’s as an important factor to uphold the Muslim religious life at home (see also Bringa 1995: 9-10). In other words, they were practicing Muslims but still a integral high-level part of socialist Yugoslavia. They both told me that it was not unusual to fast during *ramazan* by pretending to drink and eat in front of coworkers and if they were not able to pray, they could pray either later or earlier than the Islamic recommended time periods. Bringa argues the opposite, that being a practicing Muslim omits the possibility to «hold communist party membership» (Bringa 1995: 204), but who at that time would admit such a combination. «Muslim in heart» should therefore, I suggest, be expanded to be a «incognito» religious person alongside the Bosniak community identity of non-practicing Muslims. Today, as both of my sources emphasised, it is different, and these differences will be obvious in the following chapters.

Tito died in 1980 and with his death the already established nationalistic movements grew rapidly alongside Yugoslavia’s foreign dept. This laid the ground for a dark period in the former Yugoslavia, hitting Bosnia especially hard.

**Yugoslavia’s fall and the Bosnian war.**

Nationalism, playing the strings of the different religious foundations, raised again primarily with Slobodan Milošević, the President of Serbia from 1989 to 1997, and then with Franjo Tudman, the President of Croatia from 1990 to 1999. Izetbegović was the leader of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and in 1990 he became the President of the Bosniak community. Izetbegović held the position until 1996 and from 1996 to 2000 he shared the presidency of Bosnia with a representative from the Croat and another from the Serb community (Malcolm 2002: 218). Izetbegović was «personally identified with the religious element of the ´religious or national identity´» (Malcolm 2002: 219 and with him a Muslim religious revival became the answer to the wave of nationalism. A wave that unfortunately reached a level beyond the point of no return, whereof Croatia and Serbia wanted to annex parts of Bosnia. The then current secular Bosniak leadership was replaced by a more religious one, Izetbegović wanted a state without «alcoholism, pornography and prostitution (...) that Islam is not simply a set of private beliefs but a whole way of life with a social and political dimension» (Malcolm 2002: 220). With the rise of nationalism within Yugoslavia the brotherhood and unity sense faded out and the communities produced and played out differences in everyday life. Religious symbols and national flags started to appear more frequently, political parties were nationalistic parties and language differences vis-à-vis the other communities evolved. The leading linguistics in the Croat community produced differences in language, e.g. by introducing new words «extracted from relatively obscure nineteenth-century dictionaries, while
others have been newly coined words with no antecedents in earlier Croatian linguistic history» (Greenberg 2004: 119). Meanwhile, the Bosniaks «intellectual elite attempted to spread an appreciation for the Islamic roots of Bosniacs by infusing the language with new words and expressions from Turkish and Arabic» (Greenberg 2004: 166). Selam alejkum became the common greeting among Bosniaks. Bosnia has now three official languages; Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. The production of language is still a ongoing process in Bosnia.

The declaration of independence from both Slovenia and Croatia on the 25th of June 1991 led to 10 days of fighting in Slovenia while Croatia suffered harder mostly due to its large Serb population and the fact that the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was per ce controlled by Serbs. With control over JNA the Serbs controlled almost all of the heavy weaponry and combined with an international embargo over the former Yugoslavia the Croats and especially the Bosniaks suffered with insufficient military means. In 1992 the war came to Bosnia after a declaration of independence on the 1st of March. The war in Bosnia represented a new scenario for the Muslims, as for the first time no nations outside the geographical Yugoslavia where directly involved. In earlier wars the Bosniaks never managed to position themselves into one community fighting for one side, instead different Bosniaks fought on different war fractions against each other. This war led them together as one community against the other two main communities though it had one exception. In the Northern part of Bosnia called the Bihać pocket, a successful Bosniak businessman named Abdić declared autonomy for the area with his followers, they fought alongside Serb forces against the Bosniak army (Malcolm 2002: 255). The war in Bosnia was hard and the Bosniaks were in the beginning of the war fighting both Croat forces (HVO) and Serb forces (VRS). But on the 1st of March 1994, with pressure from in particular USA, the Croats and Bosniaks agreed to a Muslim-Croat Federation shared by the two communities. From then on they fought in separate units against the Serbs. This cooperation was a vital turning point in the war for HVO and the Bosniak forces (ARBiH) as they achieved momentum and success against the VRS supported by JNA. On the 11th of July 1995 VRS killed around 8,000 Bosniak males in the UN


49 Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija.

50 Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane.

51 Vojska Republike Srpske.

52 Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine.

53 Beside the official forces, HVO, ARBiH and VRS, the different communities also had paramilitary units working partly independently outside the central command. The most famous groups are the Serbian «Arkan’s Tigers» and the Mujahideen.
protected Srebrenica area, a Bosniak dominated pocket in East Bosnia bordering Serbia. It was the highest number of mass-killings in Europe since WW-II. The genocide in Srebrenica was followed by a VRS mortar attack in Sarajevo on the 28th of August that killed 37 persons, this finally led to intensified international pressure against the Serb leaders. The pressure included NATO bombings of VRS positions from the 30th of August and continued for approximately 2 weeks. The NATO bombings also resulted in further momentum for the HVO and ARBiH and eventually resulted in peace with a political agreement on the 21st of November 1995. Negotiated in Dayton, USA, they divided Bosnia into the two entities: the Federation and RS. Earlier efforts for a peace agreement had been turned down, and it was per ce USA with NATO that forced through the Dayton agreement which was officially signed on December 14th 1995 in Paris by Milošević, Tudman, and Izetbegović.

At least 97,207 persons were killed in direct war actions, whereof 39,684 were civilians and 57,523 were armed forces, out of the killed persons around 73 percent belonged to the Bosniak community, while around 20 percent belonged to the Serb community and around 7 percent from the Croat community (www.norveska.ba). Throughout the war the Serbs and Croats forced out people belonging to the other communities from areas they controlled or attacked; a part of their plan to annex parts of Bosnia. They tried to produce homogenized areas by frequently erasing specific symbols of the other communities, especially Mosques. Out of 1144 Mosques (Džamije) 614 were destroyed during the war and 307 were damaged. Serbs were responsible, respectively, for 534 and 249 of them (Omerdić 1999: 476, my translation). Tekijas, religious schools (mektebs), tombs (turbe) and vakufs were also affected by these acts. Saudi-Arabia donated money to build and rebuild Mosques after the war while during the war they economically supported the Muslims in Bosnia. These Saudi-Arabian donations are by Kepel defined as «petrol-Islam»; money derived from oil resources with a purpose of helping Muslims in need as well as spreading their «wahhabi»-Islam (Kepel 2004). Petrol-Islam inflicts all five scapes (Appadurai 1990) in Bosnia. Especially in the early stages of the war areas in Bosnia became more homogenized through movement of the different communities to areas their community controlled, due to uncertainty, harassment and war atrocities. Many Bosniaks came to Zenica from other parts of Bosnia, meanwhile most Croats and Serbs moved to predominately Croat or Serb controlled areas. Several inhabitants also moved abroad. According to informants this homogenization was partly upheld after the war since it was usual to exchange apartments, e.g. a Serb family from Zenica would change apartment or house

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54 After spending years in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, and with friends from all communities, the war and it’s horrible atrocities is still a mystery for me.
with a Bosniak family from Banja Luka. These two factors have made a large impact in the demographics of Bosnia and there has been a decrease of Croats and Serbs in Zenica from 38,087 in 1991 to estimated 19,827 in 2004. According to an informant working in OSCE, the OSCE do not want an official census because it will manifest in more communal dominated areas than there was pre-war and this is what OSCE is trying to prevent. The people who stayed are respected and informants told me that what matters is that people are good and not their religious adherence (see also Kolind 2007). The people who left during the war are looked down upon and informants told me that after the war it was usual to sing «where were you during the war» when people who had fled visited the town (see also Jansen 2007), especially towards Bosniaks.

Zenica was a safe haven for the Bosniaks during the war and therefore all Mosques, as the churches, in town lived through the war. In Islam, churches and synagogues are recognized as sacred places, with this religious reference the religious buildings were protected by the Bosniak mayor in town. Zenica was secured in 1993 through successful military operations and «nowhere else did the Muslim’s (...) offensive achieve such decisive results» (Shrader 2003: 117). Apart from six artillery shells on the 19th of April 1993 which had devastating impact on the centre of Zenica (Shrader 2003: 177), the town was mostly spared from direct war actions. In the beginning of the war VRS fired a few mortars into Zenica but the rounds were not activated and therefore caused no harm. The VRS left Zenica early in the war due to pressure from armed Bosniaks, who even managed to capture some of their weaponry. The heavy fighting took place in Croat controlled areas south-west of Zenica called the Lašva Valley with Vitez, Travnik and Kiseljak. During 1993 HVO, in well-planed attacks, forced Bosniaks out of the area and killed over 1000 Bosniaks of both sexes and all ages. Because the city was surrounded by HVO and VRS the primary problem in Zenica was lack of food, drinking water and medicin, making aid from international and religious organisations crucial.

During the war there were two famous Muslim military units of importance in or around the vicinity of Zenica; the 7th Muslim brigade (Sedma) and the El-Mudžahid. While the 7th Muslim brigade was directly controlled by the ARBiH, the El-Mudžahid had a more diffuse role and operated more freely. Even though they were under the chain of command of the ARBiH.

55 Banja Luka is perceived as the Serb capital in Bosnia.
56 One exception: The orthodox church in Zenica was shoot at, by a smallarm, once during the war. Through the mayor in Zenica the damage was paid for by the Bosniak community. Beside the Orthodox church there are two Catholic churches in Zenica.
57 It is still uncertain who fired these shells; whether it was from HVO or VRS forces.
Bosnian Muslims was a part of Sedma sometime during the war and out of them 236 were killed (Terović 2006: 439-520, my translation). The mujahideen was mostly foreign Muslims entering Bosnia to fight for Islam: jihad (džihad). They consisted mainly of Arabs and many of them came from Afghanistan where the war against the USSR had ended in 1989. British and other European Muslims came to fight, as the atrocities against the Muslim population was perceived as a plan to reduce Muslims in Bosnia and Europe (see Husein 2007: 91). Most Bosniaks do still share this sentiment, especially because of the embargo. The numbers of mujahideen in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 varies but gathered on the information I received from informants who was a part of Sedma and El-Mudžahid, I estimate around 1,500 persons. They were welcomed by Izetbegović and many of them were granted Bosnian identification. The Muslims in the mujahideen came to Bosnia with a different lifestyle and the «new» «wahhabi» interpretation of Islam. Differences between the foreign Muslims and the Bosniaks were played out and for some the differences between the «islams» was a «religious chock», whereof the mujahideen called Islam in Bosnia for communism-islam. The Bosniaks were, and still are, scattered in their view of mujahideen. On one side they are full of respect for their coming voluntary to fight the Bosniak cause while on the other side Bosniaks do not appreciate how parts of the mujahideen denounced the way Islam were (not) practiced in Bosnia. Furthermore, that some individuals in the mujahideen tried to force Bosniaks to follow their «islam». The mujahideen was also called garibi58 (Hečimović 2006) by the Bosniaks, meaning Arabs. The mujahideen presence and their «wahhabism» have made an impact among Muslims in Bosnia and I will cover these relations in chapter 6.

The call for a Islamic revival.

Through the historical project of modernisation, including secularism, European styled institutions were implemented in Bosnia and something more important, a European mind of thought was adopted with e.g. work ethics and clothing. Furthermore, during socialist Yugoslavia the religiosity in Bosnia became closely attorned to the private sphere and out of the immediate reach of the Government and religious symbols were rarely shown in public. With the awakening of nationalism, a call of Islam from several leading Bosniaks, including Izetbegović, was brought out to the Bosniak community. They made «a deliberate attempt to islamize the meaning of the war» (Bougarel 2007: 170) but it was «authoritarian policies, in which political and religious leaders strove to impose their own conception of Islam and definition of Muslim national identity

58 Garib means foreigner, poor man, or he who is without fellowman (Kaljia 1989: 290, my translation). Garibi was usually understood as arabs, however a few informants understood garibi as «without fellowman».
upon a large secular population» (Bougarel 2007: 170). According to Bougarel «SDA leaders even stated that the war happened ‘only because we are bad Muslims’» (Bougarel 2007: 170).

I have to comment the last statement from Bougarel about «bad Muslims», since he leaves it kind of high and dry. In this setting «bad Muslims» may have two different meanings. Firstly that the war was a punishment from Allah or secondly that Muslims did not show the other communities what it really meant to be a Muslim. The latter meaning not inviting Serbs and Croats into the Muslim private sphere and through that being a part along with Serb and Croat propaganda of producing themselves as «the other». A practicing Muslim told me:

«We never opened our mosques and houses to show to them righteousness in Islam. We never gave them an opportunity to learn what Islam is teaching about non-Muslims. Instead, they took knowledge about Islam from legends and writings about Muslims who were wrongdoers and as such misrepresented Islam. Therefore, they have wrong picture of Islam and we take part of responsibility.»

Since the first meaning would de facto implicate that killings of Muslims in Bosnia is justified through Islam as a punishment from Allah for being «bad Muslims»59, I opt for «bad Muslims» as in the latter meaning. The informant emphasized that «Četniks massacred all Muslims, no matter whether they practice Islam or not. Those Muslims never thought that such scenario may happen due to the fact that they did not practice Islam and were living similar way of life». By being «the other», the propaganda and «fear of Islam» from the political and military leaders of the Serb and Croat communities encompassed straightforwardly into the vast majority of their communities.

The «call for Islam» discourse started by the political and religious leaders that infested the Bosniak community combined with the war unified the Bosniak community. The discourse had it’s effects and was strengthened by the atrocities from the Croats and Serbs. A statement given in 1993 from one of the Imams in Sedma, Suljeman Kurtanović, brings forward aspects of the Muslim understanding of their past, the present war and the future situation:

«The time is gone, inch’Allah, when my people were ‘undetermined’, or ‘Serbs of Islamic faith’, or ‘Croats of Islamic faith’, ‘poturice’, traitors to the faith of ancestors.

59 Appreciation to Prof. Šukrija Ramić at the Islamic Pedagogical Faculty in Zenica, and to Prof. Fikret Karčić at the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo for discussions around this problematic subject.
The time has come when we have proven that we really have sound foundations, that all of us, or at least a large majority of us, are mudžahidi, that džihad is our path and our choice, our destiny, the creator of our destiny. (...) No child will believe any more in the toy called ‘Brotherhood and Unity’, in a community shared with perpetrators and murders. The young generations have seen and understood who our open or covert enemies are. The lesson of četnici and ustaše has been taught to them by the tenacity of the mudžahidi and the graves of the šehidi (Kurtanović 1993 in Bougarel 2007: 174).

The discourse was a direct critique of weak belief and practice among the Muslims in Bosnia, all my sources in Zenica have told me that an increased number of Bosniaks attended prayers in Mosques throughout the war, and they attended more frequently. At present time Kurtanović statements are by mostly perceived as radical but during the war these statements were more than acceptable. The religious revival exemplifies that religion has always been in Bosnia, the secular never excludes religion but rather «in certain respects «the secular» obviously overlap with «the religious»» (Asad 2003: 25). Furthermore, the pre-war situation compared with the war stands as an example of «how the changes in concepts articulate changes in practices» (Asad 2003: 25), the revival actually changed and increased religiosity for many Muslims during the war. The Socialist rulers decided where religion was to be and who was to lead the state controlled religion but still people were not forced out of their belief and practice. Religion was merely forced into the private sphere, where it was upheld, making room for the thick description in the society.

After the war Bosnia became a democratic country with freedom of religion and equal status for all communities. Religious institutions have been renovated and rejuvenated. Religious activities and opinions are distributed through TV, radio, internet, newspapers and journals. Religion once again has a role in the public educational system and religious organisations are conducting social work. Religious symbols like hijab are now common in the public sphere.

In Zenica almost all grocery stores and coffeehouses sell alcohol and there are several bars and three nightclubs. Pornography is sold openly in the streets and in CD/DVD shops, even beside Mosques. This is the same as before the war and in the outskirts of the town there are still prostitutes and brothels. Gambling is widespread all over Bosnia and in Zenica there are numerous betting shops (kladionica), slot machine stores (slot mašina), state lottery stands and one tombola. Association with this is not in accordance with sharia and alcohol, pornography and prostitution was exactly what Izetbegović wanted to erase from the Bosniak society.

Šehid is a honourable religious title ascribed to Muslims who had a martyr death, usually in jihad.
4. The Bosniak Communities.

«People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity».

(Cohen 1985: 118)

Cataclysmic Effects.

The effects of the war and the Islamic revival were had its effects. According to all my informants the break up of Yugoslavia and the following war majorly increased religiosity among Muslims in Bosnia. An increased number of Muslims went to Mosque, fewer Bosniaks drank alcohol and religion united them during and after the cataclysmic event. The effect lasted until around year 1999. It had a continuous rise from 1991 to 1996, then remained steady from 1996 to around 1999 and then was on the decrease up to around 2007. While «now it is the core of people again, as it used to be», Alem told me. Alem is a 58 year old practicing Muslim. During the war and the following years the best way to represent your Bosniak identity was through Islam and the best place to do this was in the Mosques.

There are still more people in Mosques than there were pre-war and it is connected to (1) the homogenisation of Bosnia and the fact that Zenica has a higher Bosniak population than in 1991, and (2) there are slightly more practicing Muslims than it used to be. I have not met a Bosniak who was a practicing Muslim pre-war and then stopped to practice, meanwhile the opposite happened with at least four of my informants. Imad was an «atheist and true Yugoslav», however in 1995 he became a traditional mumin: «I stopped drinking. I try to live in accordance with Islam. And I still listen to rockmusic». Imad got married four years ago and his wife wears hijab. Close to all informants who are practicing Muslims, mumin, explain this religious rise and fall by referring to the Quran. In the words of the 28 year old Behram: «if you experience a storm at the sea you pray to God, but when you reach land you stop praying». Even though none of them remembered from

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61 Informants only differ on when the decrease came. The year range from 1998 to 2001. I chose to follow an Imam who observed the decrease at «his» Mosque late in 1999.

62 This homogenisation will prevent the high percentage of inner-communal marriages that existed pre-war.

63 Mumin is an Islamic term, in the Quran, for a believer. In everyday Bosnia it practically stands for a practicing Muslim that abstains from alcohol and other substances that alter the state of mind.
which sura\textsuperscript{64} they know its message. Referring to the Quran is common elsewhere in the Muslim world (see Varisco 2005: 153). Behram asked his grandfather and showed me two weeks later:

«31. Hast thou not seen how the ships glide on the sea by Allah’s grace, that He may show you of his wonders? Lo! therein indeed are portents for every stedfast, grateful (heart). 32. And if a wave enshroudeth them like awnings, they cry unto Allah, making their faith pure for Him only. But when He bringeth them safe to land, some of them compromise. None denieth Our signs save every traitor ingrate» (Quran 31: 31-32).

Not-practicing Muslims explained the same religious alteration through practical reasons. Sanin, 30 years, stated that «alcohol was a luxury when we struggled for basic needs. (...) people gathered more in Mosques. We prayed more when it was a war». It is usual for practicing Muslims to explain social phenomena through Islam, while non-practicing Muslims often describe the same aspects through practical reasoning.

The religious revival and decrease in Bosnia is not an isolated case. Poland had a similar rise and fall of religion in their transition from a socialist nation under influence of the Soviet Union into a democratic country in 1989. Approximately 88 percent of the Polish people are Catholics and they went more often to Church until the end of 1989, simultaneously the network of the Catholic Church was used to establish a political movement and they were backed by the Vatican (Haynes 1998: 86-104). Shortly after Poland became democratic the Church started to lose popularity again (Haynes 1998). As the Vatican backed the Catholics in Poland, the Muslims in Bosnia were supported by the Muslim world. In both countries people sought to their religious belonging and it gave a rise in religiosity that did not endure. The Polish citizens turned towards the Catholic Church, opposite the Orthodox and Communist Russians and the Bosniaks turned to Islam opposite the Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs.

A democratic society changed the public sphere where they now had the freedom to state their identity. Symbols with religious connotations became visible and street names changed from i.e. «Titova» to «Alija Izetbegović». Socialism eroded from the landscape. However, in this alteration the thick agency remained. Thick agency came as a result of the modernising project, including

\textsuperscript{64} Sura is a «chapter» in the Quran. There is a total of 114 sura’s in the Quran.
secularism, making individuals choose what to do within the bases of the secular Bosnian constitutional law. The thick agency is connected to the separation between the private and the public sphere. In general, traditional Bosniaks do not judge other’s actions, while «wahhabi» influenced Muslims rarely differ between private and public and therefore comment on other persons actions. Freedom of religion made religion visible, which in turn made people more aware of their communal and religious heritage. Nonetheless, visible religion does not necessarily make people more religious. This freedom enabled Bosniaks to practice their religion in the public sphere without any sanctions, symbols were utilised to state one’s religion or state belonging to their community. Religion was brought forth in the public sphere and within this change differences in the Bosniak community became more apparent, these differences had, to a certain degree, been concealed by the far more distinct private and public spheres during socialism.

Believing and Belonging, Belonging without Believing.

Believing in the Šehadet is the definition of a believing Muslim, although not all Muslims in Bosnia are believers. Persons who ascribe and are ascribed as Muslims without believing in the Šehadet are often described as "Musliman samo po imenu" (“Muslim only by name”). Due to this fact I have chosen to define all Muslims in Bosnia as Bosniaks, since the word Bosniak does not have direct link to Islam. The Bosniak community is a community with a broad spectre of diversity and to understand the differences I have differentiated the overall community into sub-communities:

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65 Alcohol is legal in the secular law, while illegal in Islamic law. (Practicing) Homosexuality is legal in the secular law, not in Islamic law. Though, have in mind that the secular law decides the place of religion in the society (Asad 2003).

66 Šehadet (Arabic: Shahada) is the Islamic creed «There is no deity but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God».
The sub-communities are generalised for an analytical purpose; hence there are differences within each of the sub-communities. Further, a person is obviously not static and can move from one sub-community to another. The Bosniaks usually divide the Bosniak community into Muslim, practicing Muslim, and «wahhabi», while I add sub-communities to give a better understanding of the diversity within the overarching community. To give a clearer understanding of the size of the sub-communities I will provide an estimation: atheist and agnostics take up 10 percent, not-practicing 70 percent, and 20 percent practicing Muslims including a maximum of 4 percent «wahhabis».

According to most of my informants the main distinguishing factor for being a mumin is to abstain from alcohol and I choose to follow their definition. This aspect makes abstaining from alcohol the main marker, or symbol, for a mumin. Mumins usually prefer to stay away from social gatherings that includes alcohol and therefore create relations with who you prefer to socialise with.

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67 The estimation is derived from several informants statements and my own experience.

68 According to Sharia, Islamic law, it is not allowed to use substances that alters a person’s state of mind, like alcohol and narcotics. Alcohol consumption is common in most Muslim countries: see Wikan (2004) regarding Egypt, and Holy (1991) among Berti’s in Sudan.
Within these relations you visibly define yourself as a practicing Muslim or not (Barth 1969). The sub-communities are created in coherence with patterns, i.e. alcohol, which I have noticed. Another pattern, the more intrinsic a person is the more he/she answers and reflects through Islamic terms. Furthermore, the more intrinsic a person was the more appreciated I was for coming to Bosnia to see what Islam and Muslims really are like; opposite of the western discourse «on Islam» as they perceive it. The not-practicing Bosniaks, who are adherently more extrinsic, focus and emphasise on the social aspects in the society. Some in the latter group even laughed ironically, as one Bosniak stated «study Islam, here?» when I told them that I was in Zenica to study Muslims. I interpret that behaviour as their own perception of Bosniaks, or at least themselves, as not particularly «Islamic». I remember well the first time I said «not-practicing Muslim» to Behram, a practicing Muslim. I told him that it feels to me that it sounds kind of horrible to say something like that, whereof he answered: «You should not, because it is the truth».

Family ties in Bosnia are strong and most people live at home until married or until they leave for higher education or work. They live at home due to tradition and the economical situation. The religious or non-religious upbringing through family relations manifests in the individual and usually lays the ground for which sub-community he/she belongs to.

**Producing Stereotypes.**

I have chosen to exemplify the different sub-communities through informants that are close to stereotypes for the defined sub-community they belong to, along with other general patterns of the sub-community.

Atheist and agnostic. Vedad is a 35 year old man engaged to a Serb. Vedad’s mother believes but does not practice, while his father does not believe. Vedad never went to mekteb or experienced any Islamic practice at home, he defines himself as «Muslim, but atheist» and is, by others, ascribed as Muslim; «Muslim only by name». He is secular in the meaning that nothing has a religious purpose. Atheists and agnostics have similar perceptions of the society and how they live, however agnostics do not rule out that Allah is the creator. This sub-community often reacts when practicing Muslims act or state wishes opposite of Islamic law. During a conversation at a coffee place, a good-looking girl passed us and the practicing Musalim said «I would like to fuck her». I immediately saw that the
agnostic Senad reacted with surprise over Musalim’s statement. Later, I asked Senad about his reaction and he told me that he sometimes get “sick of hypocrisy of so-called Muslims”. Musalim, on the other hand, described a couple that threw garbage on the street with the remark: “they are not truly Muslims”. It is their constructed narrative that comes to the front, e.g. the mumin speak through her/his close attachment to Islam.

Within this group a minority eats pork, while those who don’t explain it through pragmatic reasons. As the agnostic Marisa told me: “pork meat is cheap and it is not good nutrition”. Practical explanations, opposite religious, is a pattern in this sub-community. Further, Marisa explained that she could “never be with a practicing Muslim. We would be to different in our social life», again, explained with practical reasons. The example with pork does imply a heritage of what is and what is not accepted within the Bosniak community; a condition of extrinsic conformity pressure. While believers and especially mumins explain it in an intrinsic form by referring directly to sharia that forbids Muslims to eat pork. Atheists and agnostics identify themselves by belonging to the Bosniak community without believing. An atheist person rarely uses any symbols with religious connotations, while a few agnostics may utilise symbols.

Believing, but not practicing. Elif is a 25 year old man with a believing not-practicing father, his mother borders to agnostic but parts of her family are practicing Muslims, his father also drank alcohol. Elif’s parents had a small discussion about weather he was to go to mekteb or not and he ended up going to mekteb for a few months. Elif is trying to become a practicing Muslim, as some others do, and 40 days before ramazan he stopped drinking alcohol. Five months later he started to drink alcohol again.

This is the sub-community with the largest differences where some borders to mumin and others towards agnostic. They do practice; praying, going to Mosque and džuma, and partly fast during ramazan. They practice Islam in different degrees but not enough to ascribe themselves or to be ascribed as a practicing Muslim, mostly due to public consumption of alcohol. Something worth mentioning is that a few in this group with practicing families are ascribed as practicing by their family, who does not know that their son, daughter, sister, or brother drinks alcohol due to her/his self presentation in the vertical status (Goffman 1959). For example, the 24 year old woman, Sedija,

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69 40 is a holy number in Islam: The Prophet was 40 years when he started to recieve the revelation from Allah, in the month of Ramazan.
was able to conceal alcohol consumption from her parents as she only drank a few beers among friends in private gatherings. Still, her boyfriend Kenan refers to her as a practicing Muslim. It is a production of what is better and worse in the society, both on an individual and communal level. This sub-community has the highest frequency of utilised symbols and some in this category have conducted hajj. An uncle of an informant is a Hadžija but «still he drinks a few beer from time to time».

Traditional Practicing Bosnian Muslim. The 28 year old Kenan is a practicing Muslim who has never tasted alcohol, his parents are practicing Muslims and he went to mekteb in his adolescence. He attends džuma whenever he can and «I try to pray five times a day, but some days I do not have the opportunity». Usually it is his work situation that prevents him from praying accordingly. They try to follow the guidelines of Islam and they are the most persistent practicing Muslims during ramazan. Very few Mumins utilise symbols to state her/his belief and if they have not conducted hajj they stress the importance of it and have future plans of it.

There are no difference between a Sufi and a traditional practicing Muslim in everyday life. A Sufi, additionally, conducts zikr and might conduct rituals like wedding in Tekija instead of a Mosque. My estimation of active Sufis in Zenica is up to 60 persons with a slight majority adherent to the order with Tekija. A few people conducts zikr from time to time and are often referred to as «Sufi sympathisers». The Tekija-order conduct zikr two times a week, on Sundays and Thursdays. While the order that applies to a Mosque conduct zikr only on Thursdays. The Šejh in the Mosque-order stated humorously to me «they must be boring for God». Further, the Tekija-order conduct zikr during ramazan while the Mosque-order does not. A person is usually a Sufi through family relations. Being a Sufi does not correlate with mumin, hence a Sufi may also be not-practicing. I met a Sufi in his 40’s at a bar and we drank alcohol and talked. While drinking he said «I am a Sufi, but only this much» and held his thumb and forefinger 0,5 cm apart. He smiled and ordered a new beer from the Serb bartender. He was drunk.

Within this sub-category it is common to find a husband/wife that is also a practicing Muslim and it is not unusual to find a partner through established family and friends relations. If

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70 This production will be described in the next chapter. It is what Bosnian Muslims define as tolerated acts despite what is stated in sharia.

71 They usually perfom zikr in the evening after the akšam (the fourth daily prayer) or jajcija (last daily prayer).
they meet someone they like and want to know better, they may ask around about how that person is. If/when they meet, others might be present. This is not usual for not-practicing Bosniaks. I lived at Behram in his family house during *ramazan* and his whole family, including grandparents, are practicing Muslims. We often discussed religion in Bosnia and differences today opposite to the socialist era. One late evening I was talking with his mother, Jasmina, while his father, Halim, was washing the dishes after *iftar*. Meanwhile, the grandfather was praying beside the couch. Jasmina told me that religion was «private and people who lived in accordance with Islam used to socialise with others who practiced». At once the father joined in from the kitchen and emphasised that «religion was completely private». In this sub-category religion is still much more adherent to the private than public sphere; it has been so since 1945. Later in the discussion they said to me that if you are a practicing Muslim it is common to marry someone who practices, or at least is close to practice. Behram referred to Halida, the girl he was getting married to in a few months and he stressed the fact that she is a practicing Muslim. Further, Jasmina referred to her sister who practice Islam and is married to a man who only partially practices, stating that there are always exceptions. Jasmina and her sister only wear hijab when they pray. They both percieve hijab as a religious duty and Jasmina stated «it is between me and God». Behram quickly followed up: «It is the same with Halida». Jasmina told me that she «grew up not using it. If I shall use it then it must be 100 percent from my side». She continued and told me that both her husband and father had recommended her to use hijab and as they were with us in the discussion they interrupted with «it is our religious duty». Jasminas father continued: «Islam tell us to correct a person that do not follow the correct path. Anyway it is her choice and I respect it». Since I never had observed this correction, I later asked Behram and he told me that he had corrected people a few times, only to close friends who he knew practiced Islam. The correction was towards alcohol and gambling. Behram stressed that «it only happens in close relations, as within families», and later «no one in town does this openly». When Jasmina took on her hijab and went for pray in the bedroom our discussion ended and we watched TV.

Arab «wahhabi». People in this sub-category are born Arabs but due to the fact that they are Bosnian citizens and Muslims I perceive them as Bosniaks. Abdul is 46 years old and came from

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72 *Iftar* is the meal that breaks the fast after the sun has gone down. *Sehur* is the meal before sunrise.

73 All my informants regard hijab as a religious duty and do therefore not categorise hijab as a religious symbol.
Qatar to Bosnia in 1993 to conduct jihad. «It was my religious duty to fight for Islam in Bosnia», he explained to me. During the war he obtained a Bosnian citizenship and he is now married to a Bosniak, they have three children. Abdul and his family live in the countryside in the vicinity of Zenica and he «like Bosnia and its nature» and further «I have nothing to return to». Some of them might be prosecuted in their country of birth for fighting without permission in another country. These persons came with the scapes (Appadurai 1990) during the war and brought with them the ideoscapes of «wahhabism». Some of the former fighting Arabs are in contact through internet and telephone and sometimes they meet up. Not all Arabs living in Bosnia have a «wahhabi» interpretation of Islam and I have met one Arab-born male who was drinking alcohol in a bar. Further, some Arabs were in Bosnia pre-war and some came after the war.

A common marker for all «wahhabi» influenced Muslims is that they do not except Shia Islam as true Islam. In the words of the Arab born Malik: «Sunni and Shia is like earth and sky or water and fire». This blacken of Shia-Islam is a pattern for persons in this sub-category and they often bring up the theme.

Bosniak «wahhabi». Ermin was a atheist up until the age of 19 and in 1994 he started to rethink his «way of life». He used to drink alcohol and smoke marihuana. A friend of Ermin had «converted to wahhabism» and introduced Ermin to his «wahhabi» acquaintances. Ermin was curious and socialised with them. Within the group he became friend with a Mujahid, who taught «wahhabism». After approximately two years Ermin grew tired of the «negative speech towards other Muslims and monotone interests». He stressed their constant discussion regarding correct behaviour for a Muslim and how they only socialised with other «wahhabis». Ermin compared the Bosnian «wahhabis» with the mujahideen he knew and stated that «Bosnian «wahhabis» are often more «wahhabi» than the mujahideen». However, he pointed out that in the recent years most «wahhabis» are more open than they used to be. My experience is that a born Bosnian «wahhabi» emphasise and is more strict in regards to orthopraxy than the Arab «wahhabis» I have met and talked with. This is a perspective that most other traditional mumin\`s concur with. Ermin went from «wahhabi» to traditional mumin after two years. When he became a practicing Muslim there were

74 During and after the war USA pressured the Bosniak leadership to expell «foreign fighters». By granting them Bosniak citizenship they were no longer «foreign fighters».

75 Mainly because Shia-Islam consider Ali ibn Abi Talib as Muhammad’s successor. He was Muhammad’s son-in-law. In Sunni-Islam Abu Bakr As-Siddiq is the first Caliph.
some arguments with his non-practicing father. His father was bothered when Ermin prayed, he did not understand Ermin and the reasons for his praying. Ermin told me his «father doesn't understand me. (...) sometimes I do not know what my father is», pointing to his father’s Muslim origin.

The 24 year old Anis grew up with non-practicing parents and he attended mekteb for only a short period. He was always dressed properly in a «wahhabi-style» and had a nice cut beard, a more typical «wahhabi» beard being long with a short moustache. Anis emphasised that a male Muslim is supposed to be «covered from beneath the knees and up to the navel». However, other Muslims might be dressed «wahhabi-style» without being «wahhabi», like one of the Sufi Šejh’s in town. Anis had only finished secondary school but he has a high salary through his profession. «Wahhabis» are close to the traditional practicing Muslims in Bosnia, however they differ in a few aspects, especially in the way that they do not have a split between the private and the public in their religious perspective and due to that many of them have problems socialising with Muslims who i.e. drink alcohol. One day I was sitting with Anis and his friends at a coffee place when an acquaintance of his walked past us. They greeted each other with «Selam Alejkum» and the acquaintance stressed that he was on his way to drink juice at «Club»76. Anis discussed with his «wahhabi» friends, and me, that he knew that the acquaintance drank alcohol: «A true Muslim should never drink alcohol! But the worst is that he also lies about it. Don’t he know that I know that he drinks alcohol!». It was probably an impression control (Goffman 1959) by the acquaintance towards a mumin and especially a «wahhabi». A traditional mumin is usually not bothered by others who drink alcohol because they perceive it as a relation between the individual and God; belonging to the private sphere. While a traditional mumin keeps the thin agency in privacy, the «wahhabi» applies it in the public. This perspective also exemplifies the gap between «wahhabis» and traditional Muslims; both practicing and not-practicing. A «wahhabi» friend of Anis told me that «there is nothing a Muslim does that is not regulated by sharia». When I asked for examples he said «if you spit you shall spit to your left, when you go to the toilet you shall sit, rules regarding sex, (...) everything is regulated. And this is only the small things, imagine all other things». The traditional mumin, Musalim, regards «wahhabism» as the easiest form of Islam since «they follow the Quran in every aspect of life and do not think themselves». A «wahhabi» would most probably be proud when someone states that he/she follows the Quran in every aspect, just as much as he/she would not agree that it is the easiest form of Islam.

76 «Club» is one of the nightclubs in town.
The definite majority of this sub-community has been raised in a non-practicing tradition and have not experienced how traditional practicing Muslims actually live out Islam in Bosnia. I have not met a «wahhabi» that is raised in a traditional Bosniak 
mumin family. Persons in this sub-category have adapted to the ideoscapes of «wahhabism» usually along with or through friends and they basically only socialise with other «wahhabis». They are certain that they live more in accordance with Islam than traditional Bosnian Muslims. Arab NGO’s have promoted «wahhabism» and spread information and books, internet is also used as a source of information. They do not use symbols and in the words of Anis: «someone who has nothing inside express it outside». The traditional Bosnian Muslim Behram concurred but at the same time corrected Anis in the conversation with «you express it too definite». A «wahhabi» would never marry a woman who is not-practicing, or not willing to practice Islam. In the words of Anis: «You are either in or out, it’s white or black». A «wahhabi» requires that their wife at least wears hijab, while a common traditional 
mumin prefer that his wife wears hijab but that it is up to the wife to decide. While «wahhabis» apply their thin agency to themselves and sometimes to people around them, traditional mumin upheld it in the private sphere.

Many «wahhabis» live in the countryside as they do not find the urban and secular public sphere in accordance with how they perceive Islam, e.g. commercials for jägermeister, tuborg, and lingerie, alcohol consumption, and lightly dressed girls. Some informants compared them with the amish. «Wahhabis» working, living and spending time in Zenica have in general become more open than those who live in the countryside. In the countryside its easier to live, or create a life, closer to «the way of the Prophet». «Wahhabis» are referred to as second time converts by other Bosniaks, due to their sudden change in how they live their lives. Chapter 6 will discuss mujahideen, «wahhabism», and «wahhabis» further and their relation to traditional Bosnian Muslims and the opposite.

**Perceptions of being Bosniak.**

The term Bosniak is «multi-vocal» (Turner 1967) as it has different connotations for different members of the community. For Behram, being a Bosnian Muslim is primarily because he practices Islam and secondarily in a community sense. The «wahhabi» Anis emphasise Islam even more than Behram. For Vedad, Bosnian Muslim has the meaning of belonging to what is perceived as a religious community. While for Elif the religious aspect and the belonging aspect is close to equal.
They are all Bosniaks and are defined as Muslims, irrespectively if they believe in the Šehadet or not. It is their heritage of being Muslim (Bosniak) that unifies them. They are connected through a shared sense of belonging through historical events, particularly the recent war when which community you belonged to became vital and they suffered together as one community. Vedad is born Muslim, he was told from birth that he is a Muslim and everybody around him ascribe him as Muslim. He truly is a «Muslim, but atheist». If Yugoslavia still existed, Vedad would probably define himself as «Yugoslav» as Imad used to perceive of himself. Yugoslavia is no more and today he lives in Bosnia and, as he is not a Croat or Serb, he has inherited «Muslim» through the history of his predecessors who converted to Islam. He, as do other Bosniaks, belongs to the Bosniak community because there is «a feeling among the members that they do share a modicum of agreement» (Cohen 1994: 17). Despite all their differences they are one community and truly a community in the words of Anderson; «imagined community» (Anderson 1983). Bosniaks believe and belong, and belong without belief.

«Differences that makes a difference».

There are «differences that make a difference» (Bateson 1979: 99) between these sub-communities. When I refer to traditional Bosnian Muslims I refer to the frames Islam in Bosnia adopted through the historical developments; «islam». This traditional Bosnian Islam practiced a clear division between the public and private sphere, especially in urban areas, where religion as such primarily was conducted in the latter.

Practical reasoning from not-practicing and religious reasoning from practicing Bosniaks are not clear cut. There is, of course, a religious perspective behind Marisa`s statement when she says she cannot be with a practicing Muslim - she does not believe. For Behram, who wants to be with a practicing Muslim, a social or practical aspect is included - he does not want to have a wife that drinks alcohol. Nonetheless, they do differ in their explanations - practical or religious. They both know that it is hard to have a partner that does not share a «modicum of agreement» in belief or lifestyle.

The different sub-communities generally reproduce themselves through marrying a person within the sub-community they belong to, or at least close to it. They share the same faith but they reproduce the degree of how they practice Islam - a form of lived religious endogamy. Marisa who could never be with a practicing Muslim and Behram who wants to raise his children the way he
has been raised by his parents would not marry a not-practicing person. So it was during the socialist period and it continues today, it will most likely continue in the future. It is all about their values in life and how they want to live their life; for mumins it is strongly connected to Islam. It makes the sub-communities within the Bosniak community, to a certain degree, homogenised through inner-sub-community marriages because a sub-community also «share a modicum of agreement» (Cohen 1994) within the wider modicum of the Bosniak community. This applies especially for the sub-community of traditional practicing Bosniaks and, to an even in a higher degree, «wahhabis» who socialise mostly with other «wahhabis». The different sub-communities reproduce themselves, although an individual can change from one sub-community to another. With the exception of the sub-community of «wahhabis» the borders between the different sub-communities are rarely visible to the eye and a few «wahhabi» inspired Bosniaks do not dress like typical «wahhabis». Borders between the sub-communities exist and I will exemplify further.

In the beginning of my fieldwork I was drinking coffee with Marisa. She had discussed myself and my agenda with two of her friends in Zenica. They thought it would be difficult for me to get in contact with practicing Muslims. After that discussion Marisa suggested to me: «you should give an impression that you might want to become a Muslim. So you can talk with them». It was the second week of my fieldwork and as I had not yet met a mumin I feared for my fieldwork. Today I know how wrong they were. This example of borders between sub-communities is extreme; the borders are generally not that divided.

Halida told me about a schooltrip she had to Montenegro and on that trip her friends were surprised when she prayed five times a day. «They didn’t know, but they don’t care about it. I don’t talk about my faith as Behram does». Halidas friends did not know she was a mumin and this episode exemplifies that some traditional mumins are more private than others.

I was eating with Emil, a 32 year old Bosniak, and his wife Razija. Emil is a mumin, although he did not use to be, while Razija has always been a mumin. Razija is another practicing Muslim who only wears hijab while praying. They told me about their differences in family traditions. Emil grew up with little practice of Islam and never attended mekteb. She attended mekteb and they practiced at home. When I was about to leave, Emil asked me if I wanted to go to mosque with him one day, although he was not sure if he was allowed to bring a non-Muslim to Mosque. He turned his head towards Razija, who immediately stated «possible». «She knows more than me», he said smiling. I concurred and realized the importance of family and mekteb in relation to practice and knowledge of Islam.
Adolescence, Family, and Mekteb: Integrating Conventions.

Mekteb is a Quranic school usually conducted by an Imam in a Mosque on Saturdays. It is for young Muslims who go to primary school and the classes are separated by knowledge and not age and normally dependent upon how long a person has been attending mekteb. The majority of Bosniaks with believing parents have been to mekteb; some for only a few months, other for years. There is an increase in the number of Bosniaks that attend mekteb at present time compared with the suppressing socialist period. Behram went to mekteb because his parents wanted him to have an official religious education. He attended mekteb regularly for 5 years from the age of 7. «I learned the foundation of Islam. Islamic history, the Prophet’s history, and sura’s», Behram told me. After approximately 3 years at mekteb Behram was introduced to the Arabic alphabet to «prepare to recite the Quran». All the informants who attended mekteb emphasised how the Imam taught them Islam through a relaxed pedagogical method. Elif, who only attended mekteb for a few months explained that «we learned by reason and not by the stick». Kenan attended for 4 years and emphasised an «open environment without force, and it was generally stories about good behaviour». Behram’s brother did not want to attend mekteb, therefore he pretended to go while he instead wandered around in Zenica. His parents thought he was at mekteb but they found out through friends, who asked them why their son was alone in the town on a Saturday morning. After that he started to attend mekteb regularly. The pedagogical method concerning practice and proper behaviour in mekteb seems to have the effect that participants have integrated an understanding of the norms of Islam, conventions in a religious aspect they bring with them into the society and a learning of what is halal (legal) and haram (illegal) and the grey zone in between them. Furthermore, they learn their individual obligations as a Muslim (farz) and the value of good deeds (sevap). However, how a Muslim conduct the duties is a matter of individual adaptation interacting with the family and with the Bosniak community, which I will return to in the next chapter.

Mekteb is not only a place where they learn about Islam and how to practice Islam as Muslims, it is also a social venue where they meet friends and potential friends and where most Bosniaks grow a positive attachment to the Mosque and the Imam. I interpret this positive attachment as a result of a stimulating learning environment with less focus on memorising and strict control by the teacher. They speak respectfully about the Imam that taught them in mekteb, as

Farz is the individual religious duty, and consists mainly of the five pillars of Islam: (1) Šehadet, (2) namaz (the five daily prayers), (3) zekat (tax to people in need), (4) post (fasting), and (5) hadždž.

Sevap is good deeds to Allah and/or a person.
well as the period they went to mekteb. The Imam becomes a person they establish a personal attachment to and not only a religious authority.

Mekteb is the official and important learning of Islam, however their home and upbringing is another aspect. A person like Elif might come home from mekteb and see his father drink a beer, while a person like Behram is more likely to find his parents praying in the living room. When your family are mumins it is far more likely that you become a mumin. If the family believes and only partly practice it is likely that you will do the same. Halida went to mekteb for only a year, however «I got most of my religious learning from my grandparents. They took care of me while my mother and father was at work». The way you are brought up, the stories you are told and what you experience form your narrative - perception of your self - which again form your actions (Giddens 1991; Somers 1994; Bruner 2004). However, Bosniaks have the agency to choose their directions (Cohen 1994), which is the case for Bajram. Bajram’s parents are mumins while he is not. He drinks alcohol and that is his choice despite the fact that his parents do not want him to do so. Bajram wants to be a mumin but he is having a hard time staying away from the temptations that keeps him from being a mumin, temptations that are breaching the Islamic norms they have learned and for Bajram it is alcohol and sex. He actually struggles to be mumin and the interesting part is that such a struggle brings the integrated religious learning to the (visible) surface. An opposite example of Bajram and his family is Ermin, whose father does not understand why Ermin became a mumin. The mekteb and the family relations lay the religious ground for an individual, with the relations at home as the most important factor for which degree of practicing Muslim you develop to be. They form the conventions which members of the Bosniak community are socialised into (Cohen 1994). They are the most important arenas of religious or non-religious learning.

Religious expectations are higher in practicing families and through that the family’s religious structures are reproduced. The thin agency operates within the private sphere of the family, opposite to the public town with its thick agency. It is within the thin agency that a person is corrected by others and adapt to the expectations. It is within these power relations a persons identity is formed (Moore 1994). Families and individuals within families are producing and reproducing the different sub-communities that in turn reproduce the differences in the Bosniak community.
Symbols state Community.

Religion has changed in the public sphere and Bosniaks are free to show their religious heritage through symbols associated with Islam. There are different reasons for symbols being used. Firstly, as they now can, opposite to the socialist period and therefore they do. Secondly, it’s used to state their belonging to the Bosniak community in a more extrinsic matter. Thirdly, religion itself; intrinsic. To veil is perceived as a religious duty (intrinsic) and therefore not a symbol. There are other visible markers with religious connotations: half-moon and star, *tespih*\(^{79}\), *bjelica*\(^{80}\), *selam alejkum*, and *ilahija*\(^{81}\).

Women wearing neckless with the half-moon hanging between their breasts in a wide crevice. «*Selam alejkum*» while drinking beer. Tattoo with the half-moon and star. *Tespih* hanging in cars. *Bjelica* used as a daily cap. They are symbols «*to express the particular meanings which the community has for them*» (Cohen 1985: 19) and generally it is persons who belong to the non-practicing part of the Bosniak community that use them. However, they do believe and therefore they are «symbols to signal the commonality of our beliefs, but this says little about how we interpret and make meaningful to ourselves those symbols» (Cohen 1994: 19). Atheist do not, with few exceptions, use such symbols. Kenan does not think people are more religious than before the war but that there are «*more religious markers and language*» in the society. Not only did I observed that *mumins* did not use symbols, they themselves are aware of it as well as most not-practicing Bosniaks do know that it is not necessarily a religious statement. Therefore, symbols with religious connotations have a mere secular purpose than religious (Asad 2003) in Bosnia. Bosniaks who were practicing before the war are still practicing and they do not present their belonging, due to the fact that they believe and practice their belief in a larger extent than others. Behram’s grandfather considers that «*religion should be in the heart*» while Musalim’s uncle, a *mumin*, thinks that «*they only take what they like and use it*». The use of these religious symbols in Bosnia «stimulate reflection on one’s own cultural distinctiveness» (Eriksen 2002: 102) and thereby states their belonging to the Bosniak community.

After a night out, Elif and his friends took the car and drove home. The driver was influenced by alcohol. Down the street they saw a police car, so they rolled down the windows and

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\(^{79}\) *Tespih* is the prayer beads used for counting while conducting *zikr* to remember the 99 names of Allah. «*Wahhabiss*» oppose *tespih* since the Prophet did not pray with it.

\(^{80}\) *Bjelica* is a small Muslim head cap that comes in different colours, usually black and white.

\(^{81}\) *Ilahija* is Islamic oriented music.
started to play *ilahiya* music loudly. They tried to overpresent their Muslim identity to avoid being stopped by the police. They did this to generate the possibility of avoiding problems (Barth 1967). In this case, «symbols are malleable (...) they can be made to ’fit´ the circumstances of the individual» (Cohen 1985: 18). They were not stopped. That might be a coincident, as I know of others Bosniaks with visible symbols in their car getting fined for e.g. speeding. Furthermore, others are not being fined even though they do not have any visible symbols.

The more a person emphasises the religious importance the more the focus is on Islam rather than community. «Wahhabis» with their dress code is, as veiling, perceived as a religious duty and they reject symbolism in it. I attended a demonstration for «Abu Hamza»82 in Zenica the 2nd of February. Around 2000 people had gathered to support him and there were a few Saudi-Arabian flags83 in the crowd. In this setting I interpret this as a symbol primarily to state that Islam is the definite priority, not nationality.

In Bosnia, I find the use of the mentioned symbols more extrinsic than intrinsic. It seems like a compensation for being ’less´ of a Muslim, in the sense of not practicing in the degree a *mumin* does. Therefore the same symbol has different connotations and is given different meaning internally in a community (Cohen 1994); differentiating the sub-communities. Regarding traditional practicing Muslims that rarely uses symbols, I will ascribe them «*Mumin* in heart». They learn at home that these symbols do not express faith. Through religious symbols there is more visible religiosity today, though the, lived out, intrinsic belief has not changed much.

**Ramazan.**

Earlier in this chapter I have shown how the Bosniak community consists of different layers of religious interpretations, traditions, beliefs and non-beliefs which brought me to the conclusion that there exists sub-communities within the overall Bosniak community.

The 1st of March is Bosnia´s Independence day. Banners are put up in the streets proclaiming the day. However, only the community of Bosniaks consider it Independence day; Croats and Serbs do not as they celebrate the important days of respectively Croatia and Serbia. This secular day could have been used to play out the identity as a Bosniak, however there is not

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82 «Abu Hamza» was a part of the mujahideen and he was in a situation were he could be expelled from Bosnia due to controversies around his identification.

83 The Saudi-Arabian flag is green with the *Sehadet* inscribed in white.
any celebration. According to Bajram it is «because the Serbs and the Croats does not want to». Ramazan is different. Ramazan is a religious duty, farz, and it connects the Bosniak community both by religious means and by conformity; intrinsic and extrinsic. It is a period to show one’s affection to God by restraining themselves. Further, the reward of sevap is increased. Ramazan has a strong social impact on everyday social life because of its monthly duration and that the daylight fasting makes the social landscape of Zenica vacant. Restaurants, coffee places and bars were close to empty all the time, as opposed to the rest of the year. Furthermore, some of these places also stopped serving alcohol during ramazan. The vacancy is a result of the religious requirement of ramazan and visibly separates the Bosniak community from the other communities like nothing else, therefore making the boundaries transparent (Cohen 1985: 57, Barth 1969). This vacancy lasts for around 27 days followed by ramazanski bajram; 3 days of celebration where they break the fast on the first day. This makes ramazan the summarizing key symbol (Ortner 1973: 1342) of the Bosniak community vis-à-vis the other communities.

Ramazan unifies the Bosniak community, while at the same time differentiates the Bosniak community as the borders between the sub-communities are upheld. Close to all Bosniaks sacrifice something during ramazan. A mumin will try hard to conduct ramazan in a correct manner; not eating or drinking between sunrise and sunset every day, praying at least five times a day within the correct period of time, being with their family for iftar and sehur, and conducting sevap. The majority of the not-practicing Bosniaks abstain from alcohol during ramazan. «No, its ramazan», an informant stated when I offered him a beer. That may be all the sacrifice of a not-practicing Bosniak while others fasts for a smaller period and pray more often. Not drinking alcohol is for many a sacrifice enough to express their faith. No alcohol in this period is a definite change that makes a difference towards the other communities in Bosnia. The atheist Vedad stayed more at home than usual to avoid eating publicly during daytime. Vedad conformed himself to ramazan and is close to a completely extrinsic perspective. During ramazan I often had dinner at Vedad’s place, sometimes we went out for a coffee and then usually stayed inside. I kept away from the mumin family I lived with when I was eating during daytime, I just could not eat in front of them, even though they specifically told me that it would not be a problem for them.

Through these different actions they all participate in the Bosniak community. Rituals like ramazan «confirms and strengthens social identity and people’s sense of location: it is an important means through which people experience community» (Cohen 1985: 50). They all sacrifice
something, sacrifices are made in different degrees on a intrinsic-extrinsic `scale´ (Allport & Ross 1967).

Many non-believers conform to the Bosniak community during *ramazan* even though they do not follow sharia. They follow, or should follow, the secular Bosnian law. A believer has a basic knowledge of what *halal* and *haram* means in sharia. A believer knows, or knows about, the religious obligations. However they do not comply with all of them, at least not enough to be ascribed *mumin*. Within the believing part of the Bosniak community there is a production of what is better and what is worse for them as Muslims believing in Allah. These productions take place both on an individual and a collective level. On the other side, «wahhabism» with their fundamental interpretation of Islam there is less, or no, room for such a production. Because, in their own words, «we are more true to the way of the Prophet». 
A bar during *ramazan*: We are not serving alcohol during *ramazan*.
5. Production of the Sacred: Struggle to be a better Muslim.

«There are good Muslims and bad Muslims, devout Muslims and indifferent Muslims. These do not get properly represented under the umbrella of an essentialized and homogenized «Islam»».

(Varisco 2005: 20)

When I refer to «production» I am suggesting that traditional Bosnian Muslims interpret and adapt aspects of Islamic law in a manner that suites them and the life that they live. Also how Bosniaks produce what they perceive as more «halal» or «better» or «pure» and what is more «haram» or «worse» or «dangerous» despite the clear regulations of the Islamic law. In other words, the production is aspects from of the Bosniak communities that they themselves perceive either as more pure or more dangerous within their own society (Douglas 1966).

Although non-believers are affected and conform to the collective norms, like ramazan, they do not produce what is better or worse in connection with sharia and therefore this chapter will focus on the believing part of the Bosniak community. However, «wahhabis» apply a fundamental, or literally, interpretation of Islam and do therefore not produce anything which is opposite to their sharia interpretation; «black or white» through the words of Anis. The production of better or worse is in regard to aspects like ramazan, veiling, sex, porn, gambling, tattoos, alcohol, narcotics and pork84, whereof some are temptations in the Bosnian society.

The production takes place both on a communal level and on an individual level within the given norms of the community. For some believers it is a struggle to continue to be a practicing Muslim or to become a better Muslim by not breaking the Islamic laws. To avoid any confusion - a large part of the believing non-practicing group do not struggle in the same ways, in regards to religious practice, as they want to continue with their lives like they always have done.

«Gravity of Sin»

Through patterns of Bosniaks perception of sin I choose to differentiate aspects of sin into two groups. (1) How you conduct, or not conduct, farz, is between the individual and God85.

84 These aspects are illegal through sharia, or at least disputed among Islamic scholars and all informants are aware of it.
85 Allah literally means God. Christian Arabs use Allah.
Furthermore, what you do with your own body is your own responsibility. (2) The human relations. Injustice between people is the worst aspect and it is not up to God to forgive but up to the people who are involved. Believers are aware of this distinction whether it is explicit or implicit. It is within the first category the production takes place and where the thick agency belongs. The thin agency is within the latter and many Bosniaks judge actions that harm others, like stealing, violence and selling drugs.

The day after a fight occurred in a nightclub, where a man got badly beaten by nine other men, Bajram was upset and told me «They will get their punishment sooner or later. Because God knows». Another example is Behram, who asks «why?», regarding a drug dealer he sometimes see attending Mosque. Although actions in the latter category has fixed punishment in sharia it is upheld by the Bosnian secular law. In Bosnia, Muslims, at least mumins, regard sharia as correct but they perceive it in a more symbolic sense and most of them state that sharia cannot be applied into the Bosnian society as the society exists today. Behram’s grandfather told me that «it would be better to take the punishment right away than to wait for judgement day» and «the punishment in sharia should be viewed as how dangerous the act is for the society». This meaning that the worse an act is the harder the punishment as stated in sharia; the gravity of sin. This makes sharia a norm for Muslims in Bosnia. The thick agency is upheld by most informants who express that freedom and choice is Islam and further that «only Allah can judge». In Bosnia, Islam is traditionally an individual and private faith.

Producing norms.

The production conducted by Bosniaks who define what is better or worse for themselves as Muslims brings forth the aspect that «the meanings which religious commitment have for us may be quite different» (Cohen 1994: 19). Aspects of this production are as follows:

Ramazan. The general rule among non-practicing Bosniaks is not to drink alcohol during ramazan and therefore «it shows that they know what is right and wrong», Musalim expressed. This is a production by the community and is accepted by most people because it exemplifies their religiosity by being better Muslims during ramazan through sacrificing at least alcohol. «They do something», Emil said and referred to an increased practice of Islam. Of those who abstain from alcohol during ramazan around half start to drink after the fast is broke with ramazanski bajram, the remaining
half usually wait until after the three days of *ramazanski bajram* which is an individual production of when it is acceptable to start to drink alcohol again.

Veiling. Hijab became illegal under Tito and disappeared from the public sphere. However, in the countryside it was used by some. All informants, including females, agree upon hijab as a religious duty and hijab is therefore not regarded as a symbol by my informants. Today women can choose to wear hijab but few do. Four women I know only use hijab while praying or when they attend Mosque or *Tekija*. It is a heritage from the socialist period that continues today. They choose not to wear hijab and are respected for their decision by people whom they are closely connected to. It is not uncommon that women choose to wear hijab when they get married or have performed *hadždž*. Elif’s cousin studies in Indonesia and she must wear hijab at her university, meanwhile in Bosnia she does not. One evening I was out for a walk with the 20 year old Bashir, a son of a «wahhabi» who describe himself as a *mumin* even though he drinks alcohol in public. Three girls wearing miniskirts passed us on the street and he asked «*what do you think they want?*». I waited with my answer so he continued: «*they want cock!*». Three minutes later two women with hijab walked past us and Bashir stated «*They are good Muslims. Nobody forces them to go like that*.» For all *mumins* I have talked with, hijab represents religious purity, as it is for most of my non-practicing informants who further claim that it is the women who moved in from the countryside who wear hijab. They are both partially right. Women from the countryside who moved in to Zenica use hijab, but so does women who have lived their whole life in Zenica. Hijab does not necessarily equals religious purity. I have once observed a non married woman, around 20 years old, with hijab making out with a boy in a corner of a dark café. Furthermore, some non-practicing informants have told me similar stories but I believe them to be rare occurrences. In general, though there are exceptions, women with hijab do not stay out late and they don’t go to nightclubs, which is the common behaviour for a person in the *mumin* sub-community. My impression is that women with hijab are met with higher standards for proper Muslim behaviour than the women that do not veil, especially from the non-practicing population. Niqab was introduced in Bosnia with «wahhabism» and niqab is for most Bosniaks «*too much*» and they claim that niqab has never been used in Bosnia. «Wahhabis» refer to *zar* that

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86 Some male informants have stated that hijab is a religious duty to prevent males from taking their focus away from their duties as Muslims; not to loose their concentration to womens apperance. Hijab in the Quran: see Sura 24: 30-31.

87 Throughout my fieldwork, at different places in different timeperiods I have counted and made quantitative tables over females wearing hijab in Zenica. My result is that around 7,1 percent (78 out of 1098) of all females counted aged around 16 years and up use hijab in everyday life. And it is a slight higher percentage among older women than younger. One time I was counting an Imam came by. He asked what I was doing alone on a café. «I am counting females with hijab», I answered. «How many?», he asked. «Maximum 10 percent», I answered. «Only 10 percent!?», he stated and seemed surprised.
existed in Bosnia before WW-II, the *zar* being similar in form to *niqab*. However, *zar* was, as *niqab* is, far from common. «Wahhabis» will require that their wife must at least wear hijab. Veiling, or more correct not veiling, is definitely a collective Bosniak production opposite of the sharia law - it has become their tradition not to veil.

Porn. Pornography is widespread and I have observed it at informants, including *mumins*, homes. One informant even showed me (private) pictures of him and his ex-girlfriend `in action`. Furthermore, some informants talked about pornography. This is a collective production where individuals choose themselves to see/have it or not, without anybody else knowing about it.

Sex. The sexual age of consent in Bosnia is 14. Bajram and Sefik said that it is difficult to find a virgin in Zenica that is over 18 years. Later, I asked Marisa about it and she told me «it is usual to start to have sex when you are 16-17 years. At least for girls». In other words, sexual activity when not married is common, including both casual sex and sex in steady relationships. Kenan and his girlfriend are not married and they have sexual intercourse. His practicing grandmother had told him that sex within a long term relationship, even if they were not married, was acceptable, while one-night-stands are illegal. Also, Kenan and other informants have stated that «sex is given by God as something good between two persons». Kenan produces, through his family relation, sex with his girlfriend outside of marriage into «*halal*». Ahmed is and has always been a *mumin*. He is 29 years old and he married his girlfriend in May 2008 after a three year long relationship. Around six months into their relationship they started to be sexual active and had sex for almost four months before they stopped. «We started to have really bad consciousness after sex and it only got worse (...) we had to stop». The religious conventions and the belief he had integrated through adolescence made him and his girlfriend avoiding sex as they both perceived it as a sin. «It was worst not having sex in the beginning», Ahmed told me. They did not produce sex outside of marriage as accepted, they both knew they broke the religious law and chose to follow their religion over their own desire.

Gambling. Straight after *džuma* I joined Kenan and his friends for a coffee. One of his friends was planning to put a bet on a football match and discussed it with us. Kenan told me in front of his

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88 During my fieldwork I have recognised around 9 women wearing niqab in Zenica.

89 I have not spoke with a female «wahhabi».

90 Gambling and alcohol: «They question thee about strong drink and games of chance. Say: In both is great sin, and (some) utility for men; but the sin of them is greater than their usefulness» (Quran 2: 219).

91 *Džuma* is *farz* (duty) for Muslim males; Friday at noon. In Bosnia there is a tradition for females not to attend *džuma* due to lack of space and to prepare lunch at home. I have counted and the numbers of attendants at different Mosques generally is multiplied with 10 during *džuma* opposed the other prayers which are not obligatory to conduct in Mosque. E.g. 65 attendants on a Wednesday, 400 on a rainy Friday and up to 700 a sunny Friday.
friends that «everyone in Zenica gambles». Then his friend left for the kladionica to gamble. Not all
gamble but many do and it is generally the male part of the population that gamble. Gambling may
harm others and I know of people who have spent all their money on gambling, which in turn
created problems for the family. It is perceived as an easy way to make money, although they
generally loose. Gambling is a collective production from «haram» to a setting that is accepted
within the Bosniak community and there are many places to gamble.

Tattoos. There are a few tattoo studios in Zenica and in the summertime you can visualise the
tattooed bodies. It is fairly common in Zenica to see people with tattoos. Behram: «I want a tattoo
but I cannot», for him it would be to disrespect the will of God. For others it is an individual choice
and an aspect between her/him and God. While some believers don’t care.

PORK, MARIHuana, Alcohol. Pork is, in the Bosniak community, produced to be far more haram
than alcohol and marihuana, even though alcohol holds a larger gravity of sin in Islamic
jurisprudence. Through the words of Musalim: «What alters your state of mind is the mother of all
sins, because its the cause to other sins (...) therefore no one should drink alcohol because then you
can harm others». When Elif travels abroad he prefers eating at McDonald’s where he knows he
can order «food without pork», while after eating he may drink a beer and tequila. I am quiet sure
that every grocery store in Zenica sells alcohol, including almost all the smaller street stores.
Alcohol is in general, as earlier described, the difference of being a mumin or not. Pork on the other
hand, is sold in only two large grocery stores and there the cold counter is separated and marked
«svinjetina» (pork). Furthermore, only one bar/restaurant, which is owned by a Croat, serves pork.

This communal production of pork as being very haram when compared with alcohol, influences,
as mentioned, the definite majority of the non-believing part of the Bosniak community. Pork is
truly a «matter out of place» (Douglas 1966) in the Bosniak community. The legal age to purchase
alcohol in Bosnia is 18 while the legal drinking age is 16. That is the Bosnian law. However, in
reality, having money to buy alcohol is the actual age limit. Furthermore, alcohol is not expensive,
e.g. a beer costs less than 1KM. Alcohol is produced to be not that ´bad´ in the Bosniak community,
at least much ´better´ than pork. Narcotics is also common and two criminals told me that
«marihuana, amphetamine and heroin are most common» and according to several informants
street prices are around 5KM for 5gram marihuana and 20KM for one dose of heroin. Marihuana is,

92 Pork is illegal to eat in sharia, with one exception; the importance of human life outrule the prohibition of pork in
matter of crisis (hunger).
by some, perceived as equal to alcohol, furthermore by some as close to cigarettes. Through observance I know that narcotics is easily assessable in Bosnia and some use it.

Minor production by individuals in the Bosniak community also take place, like Behram who choose not to memorise too much of the Quran because according to him sharia regulations recommends you not to forget what you have learned. The effect of the production is that «individuals can experience and express their attachment to a society without compromising their individuality» (Cohen 1985: 18), or their narrative as a Muslim. The production is what the non-believing part of the Bosniak community reacts against and especially production acted through a mumin. A mumin has a high standard for themselves and sets high standard through the eyes of others, as I have seen with women who wear hijab.

The Struggle between Ruf and Nefs.

Despite the production conducted by Muslims in Bosnia they have a sense of what halal and haram is in Islamic jurisprudence and for those who believe and want to live more in accordance with Islam it is a struggle to actually do so. It is an individual struggle combined with expectations from close the relations of family and sometimes friends.

I was attending a private party at an informant´s apartment where there were seven men and two women, all in their 20´s. I knew most of them. With the exception of myself and Kenan, a mumin, everybody was drinking alcohol, furthermore four of them smoked marihuana twice during the evening. Kenan’s girlfriend was there and she drank two beers. It was unusual for them that I did not drink alcohol and therefore they constantly offered me alcohol. Furthermore, with Kenan as an exception, the boys mocked me for not drinking, especially Ednan who took an active role in it. Precisely at 22:18, in the middle of a discussion regarding relationships between men and women, we heard the call for prayer from a nearby Mosque. The drinking and the discussion stopped for a few seconds, before it all continued with the sound from the Mosque in the background. After a while their continuous pressure and mocking irritated me, so when Ednan again tried to give me a beer I instantly reacted saying: «I am trying to be a good Muslim». His response was immediate: «WHAT DID YOU SAY?». It became quiet again for a few seconds. Without answering I looked at him knowing he had heard exactly what I said and consequently he turned his face away from me and was quiet for around 10 minutes. He was thoughtful and stared at his beer. I brought up the subject with Ednan another evening, I apologised for my comment and described my frustration
over how he pressured me. Ednan responded «It’s ok. You made me think». Kenan later told me: «I liked your comment (...) I don’t like it when it is too much drinking».

There are two aspects in this episode that is worth attention. The first is that I applied ‘thin agency’ by (in)directly criticising Ednan for drinking alcohol, which is extremely rare. The other aspect is that I interpret his reaction as a sign of bad conscience, which made me understand that within some Bosniaks there is a struggle to be a better Muslim. Bajram, who wants to quit drinking alcohol, Elif, who tried to quit drinking alcohol and Ahmed who stopped having sex with his girlfriend. I feel that this struggle is more common than it is possible to observe. It is only with my closest informants I have been able to understand it, or to be more correct - they have allowed me to understand it. They who struggle seem to struggle with their break of the learned religious conventions which are socialised into the individuals. I discussed the struggle with Behram who explained it to me by referring to the Quranic terms of Ruh and Nefs: «Ruh resembles the godly. Nefs is the earthy part that tend to earthly pleasures. Like wanting a car». I later talked with Behram and his grandfather about it and the grandfather deepened the terms: «Ruh is the spirit in every individual given by Allah. Nefs is the soul every Muslim should work on to control oneself and improve as a Muslim». Behram and his grandfather continued to talk about it while I listened. It is a constant fight between the two and success is when you reach a middle way; not to materialistic and not to ascetic. It is, as earlier described, typical for a mumin to explain social life through Islam. Another mumin, Musalim, reflected on ‘sins’ and told me that «if there is a place where no sins is committed then Allah will place people who do commit sins. Because we humans are not perfect». Musalim did not remember if it was from the Quran or from the hadith. Bajram had an easier explanation regarding the same subject: «nobody is perfect». These two religious explanations legitimise ‘sin’ in the society and make room for the thick agency, for themselves as well as others, thus legitimising both their own agency and the agency of others. Perhaps even more important is the production of what is more pure and what is more dangerous for themselves and for the society, despite what sharia states, which legitimises action on the individual level within the Bosniak community. This in turn provides less struggle between Ruh and Nefs for the individual who crosses the borders of Islamic law, because the majority of the Bosniaks have produced it to be socially acceptable.
A Landscape of Temptations.

The landscape in Zenica consists of «temptations» which are not in coherence with sharia. Surrounded by or access to for example alcohol, narcotics, porn and gambling\textsuperscript{93} increases the struggle in urban areas. This is perhaps the major reason that people in Bosnia consider the countryside as more religious and perhaps it is correct that «on the countryside you are closer to God». This is also the reason why many «wahhabis» prefer not to live in urban areas. Zenica is a «duality of landscape» for believing Muslims, with a «landscape of consciousness» within the individual and a «landscape of action» the individual takes part in (Bruner 2004). Whereof the consciousness has been shaped through adolescence, family and mekteb and the action includes the temptations the individual meets and acts on. The consciousness, within the individual, in the landscape of action starts in youth when the individual obtains more freedom and responsibility and control their own agency.

My informants regard the youth period from the age around 16 and up to 25 years, although how long it last differs from person to person. According to Kenan «it is the period when many try alcohol, marihuana and want to have a girlfriend». For Behram the period «was a fixation on girls (...) everybody else talked about how good sex is» and «I really worked with Nefs in that period». Senad said that «everybody in my class had tried marihuana. At least the boys», during his last year in high school. One informant lost his virginity when he was 16 years old to a prostitute paid by two older friends. Emil looked up to the criminals «with money, good cars and beautiful girls» and Marisa who told me that most of her friends had their sex-debut when they were 16-17 years old. The interaction between youth draws attention towards the temptations and mumins are influenced by non-practicing persons that e.g. talk about how much fun it becomes when you drink alcohol. The curiosity rises towards sexual activity, intoxication and gambling and is increased through stories by others, with the result that some cross the borders of the conventions they have learned through adolescence. I used to exercise in the park where I observed youth who drank alcohol and young couples fornicating. They meet in places out of range from their family, who they usually live with until they are married. Bajram who has passed 25 years of age continues in this pattern, although he wants to change. Meanwhile some mumins break with this lifestyle and try not to be a part of the production that contributes to legitimising breaks with their lived religiosity. Like Kenan, who told me that «when you have been out a few times then it only becomes repetition (...) I prefer to stay at home when the others go out». A mumin rarely, or never, goes out to bars and clubs in the

\textsuperscript{93} In one street there is four different kladionica within 60 meters.
night as they generally distance themselves from people who drinks alcohol. They choose not to be a part of the landscape of that action. Musalim enjoys sitting on a café in the evenings but «go home when drunk people appear». A result of this is that individuals within the different sub-communities prefer to socialise with each other and therefore uphold the differences between the sub-communities. They share a more «modicum of agreement» (Cohen 1994) than they do with people from the other sub-communities. Drinking alcohol and staying in places where people drink alcohol is a differentiating mechanism that corresponds with certain sections and sub-communities within the Bosniak community. I am under the impression that a mumin confirms and strengthen her/his belief and correlating practice when they, for example, observe a drug dealer in Mosque or drunk people in town.

Maturity from youth to adulthood is central for a mumin who has participated in the landscape of action where the period of youth is most probably the hardest period of struggle due to curiosity and pressure from friends. Some have given into the temptations and found out that it does not suit their landscape of consciousness, like Behram who gambled for a short period of time but found out that «it took away my focus from the important things», implying the lived practice of his belief. Marriage, or a steady girlfriend, contributes to end the period when individuals test their conventions, for some. According to all my informants it is common for Bosniaks to increase their lived religiosity with age. To become more religious with age is common in Europe: «the 55+ group stand out in the age category with a relative higher proportion declaring that they believe in a God» (www.ec.europa.eu). The reflected pattern in the Bosniak community is that a practicing Bosniak conducts the duties in an individual adaptation that interacts with the standards of their family and/or with the Bosniak community.

As discussed, the importance of religious upbringing with mekteb and particularly at home is essential for how a Muslim in Bosnia will choose to practice Islam. During the period of youth the learned conventions are tested through individual curiosity and interaction with other youths. Maturity and marriage are a central elements for a Bosniak in gaining control when faced with the different temptations. The examples of the major production of what is «better» and «worse», or purer and dangerous, among Bosniaks make traditional Bosnian Islam into an «islam» with particularities (Varisco 2005). However, it does not mean that those who are a part of the production have less belief (intrinsic), but the way they live makes them appear as less religious (extrinsic). They have the agency to choose their path and to form their own narrative, but there might be a
struggle between their «landscape of consciousness» and the surrounding «landscape of action». Islam in Bosnia has developed through the Bosniaks own special history and geographical position that has formed this particular «islam», with all its internal differences. The production has been and still is an ongoing process and I argue that the process of production belongs to the process of modernisation of which the political project of secularism is a part of (Asad 2003). This «islam» is their heritage and individuals can choose how to live as a Bosniak.

«Islam Between East and West»94.

I have shown aspects of the Bosnian «islam» that has formed over centuries from the time when the Ottomans invaded Bosnia. Bosniaks are an integral part of Europe undergoing the same historical modernization as the rest of Europe up to WW-II and then a similar development as Eastern Europe after WW-II. As described in the history part of this paper they adapted along with sharia, not against it. The Swiss Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan argues that Muslims in Europe should adapt to the European society by interpretations of sharia to create a western «islam» (Ramadan 1999). What Ramadan works for with Muslims in Europe is what Bosnian «islam» has done over centuries, therefore I argue that traditional Bosnian Muslims are «Muslims as a part of Europe» and not «Muslims in Europe»: Bosniaks are Europeans - they do not need to be.

I was asked several times if I considered Bosnia «east or west» and once I answered east only to provoke, the questioner was truly offended. I told him that I had said «east» to provoke and it ended up as a productive discussion. All traditional Bosniaks, in every sub-community, are clear on their European heritage. The atheist Vedad told me that «This is Europe, not the Middle East». Another informant created a homepage on the internet to show pictures of Zenica «without mujahideen and long beards because this is Bosnia». The hadžija who focused on the Bosniaks physical attributes, told me that when he conducted hajj «Arabs asked me when I converted to Islam (...) I am white and have blue eyes (...) I had to convince them that I am born Muslim». The most specified statement came from Musalim: «Allah made us European Muslims and adapted us to that and it is not the same as else where. Like Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan». Furthermore, the Islamic scholar I talked with said that «through Bosnia Muslims in Europe can be connected to the Arab world», with reference to Bosnia’s geographical location as well as the history of Bosniaks.

94 Title is taken from the book «Islam Between East and West» (Izetbegović 1985) from 1980, however the contents of the book and this paper has little in common.
The UN resolution that led to the embargo on Yugoslavia in late 1991 made a strong impact on the Bosniak feeling of being European. The embargo was a serious blow for the Bosniak community which was the definite weakest community, in military means, in Bosnia. Bosniak officials tried to lift the embargo but France and the United Kingdom opposed it. The Bosniaks received (unofficial) support from the USA, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which in turn led to a further feeling of neglect by their co-European countries. Bosniaks express deep disappointment with European countries for their position during the war and how they neglected to see the problems Bosniaks, as a part of Europe, faced. From my knowledge of the last war in Bosnia, I share far more than «a modicum of agreement» with, or for, them in this matter. It is not uncommon to hear from a Bosniak that it was «a larger European plan to remove Muslims from Europe». Despite the European neglect they still are Europeans and they continue to be Europeans. However, this neglect, along with help and support from non-Europeans, has led to changes in the Bosniak society. According to the perception of Bosniaks, Europe was passively watching the war, while fellow Muslims came with the scapes (Appadurai 1990) to voluntarily fight for Islam and the Bosniaks.
The «Sejmenska džamije». From the 18th century and has the name from an Ottoman military unit.
The «Ensar džamije». Founded by Saudi-Arabia in 1998 and it is the largest Mosque in Zenica.
6. «Bosnian islam» encounter «wahhabi-islam».

«Muslims cannot be reduced to their religion, since Islam exists only through interpretations».

(Marranci 2008: 74)

In the history part of this paper I have shown the historical processes Muslims in Bosnia have undertaken and, in order to illustrate aspects of the «Bosnian islam», I have described the differences within the Bosniak community in light of how they live out Islam. With the war the mujahideen came to Bosnia with «wahhabi islam», an «islam» with a different historical and geographical background. This made Bosnia into a country with two «islams». The mujahideen have made an impact on the Bosniak community; some Bosniaks turned to «wahhabi islam» while some traditional Bosniaks have established an aversion to «wahhabi islam», which in turn made the Bosniak community more polarized.

Domestic Islamic influence was present in Bosnia before the war with Arabs who came to Bosnia through the NAM and with Bosniaks studying abroad in places like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Some Bosniaks were inspired by, or in, the Arab World, for them Islam became their main reference in life and far more important than nationality (Sorabji 1989). Furthermore, Bosniaks had for years conducted hajj to the holiest site in Islam; Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Already in the late 1980’s a very small number of Bosniaks were present in the landscape with the specific «wahhabi» appearances; beard, shorter pants and a strict Islamic interpretation (Sorabji 1989) which shows that Bosniaks were liable to become adherent to «wahhabi-islam» already before the war. However, none of my traditional Bosniak informants had ever heard about «wahhabism» before the war and therefore it is considered to be common knowledge that «wahhabism» came to Bosnia with the war.

In this chapter I will describe the impact that the mujahideen had during the war in relation to «Bosnian islam» and Bosniaks and then elaborate the differences in how «wahhabis» and traditional Bosniaks live out Islam. Furthermore, I will describe how the differences between these two «islams» affect the relations between adherents to those two «islams».

95 Except from the Islamic scholars I spoke with during my fieldwork: they knew about «wahhabism».
Foreign Fighters.

I will divide the impacts the mujahideen had on the Bosniak community into three overlapping parts: military, civilian and religious. They overlap because the military and the civil impact have a religious dimension in them; the mujahideen perspectives of how Islam shall be lived out. Firstly, the military impact the mujahideen had in the war.

The Taliban victory over Soviet Union, in Afghanistan, in 1989 resulted in unoccupied *mudżahidi* fighters that found jihad in Bosnia and in Chechnya. Muslims also came from European and Arab nations to conduct jihad. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia donated around 600 million dollars to the Bosniaks between 1992 and 2002 and they claim to have donated a further 300 million dollars for weapons to the *ARBiH* (Bećirević 2008: 84). No other country supported the Bosniaks like Saudi Arabia. «Wahhabism» was present before the war and therefore before the mujahideen came to Bosnia, but it was definitely the cataclysmic event, the war, that had the strongest impact on the spread of «wahhabism» in Bosnia. During the war foreign «wahhabis» came to Bosnia as soldiers and aid-workers and furthermore, they missioned and spread «wahhabism» to the Bosniaks.

Bosniak informants who fought in *Sedma* divide individuals in the mujahideen into four groups: (1) The ones that arrived in 1992 and early in 1993 who came to fight and did not correct how Islam was practiced in Bosnia. «They were true soldiers and good people», a former member of *Sedma* stated. (2) Those who arrived later in 1993 and onwards, tended to correct and seek to change how Bosniaks practiced Islam, including Bosniak soldiers. «They did not only come to fight. They came to mission and they created problems», another former soldier in *Sedma* said. (3) There were also criminals who came to Bosnia under the cover of being mujahideen. They exploited a country in war. «Two criminals lived here in Zenica and they were wearing niqab to hide from the public», Vedad told me. (4) Intelligence personnel from western countries that infiltrated the mujahideen to retrieve intelligence information. «They were not circumcised», a former mujahideen explained to me. The two last groups are not the scope of this paper.

One former mujahideen I talked with did not separate between the first and second group and he concluded that «we were all coming to Bosnia with the same purpose. To conduct jihad».

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96 Not Afghans, but Arabs who had fought in Afghanistan for the Taliban.
97 E.g. United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait and Yemen.
98 The most famous is the Frenchman Lionel Dumont. He robbed a petrol station, killed a police officer and was imprisoned for 20 years. He escaped from prison after three years.
99 Ted Skinner and Derek Arnold were killed by the mujahideen and they might have been working for the SAS (British Special Air Service) (Shrader 2003: 53).
During the war around 1,500 mujahideen came to Bosnia, whereof around 500 were stationed in the vicinity of Zenica. Furthermore, Bosniaks fought with the mujahideen units and Arabs that came to Yugoslavia during the socialist period participated as fighters and translators. The number of Bosnians that fought alongside the mujahideen differs, «at least 500» Hajrullah told me. Hajrullah lived in the countryside and did not practice Islam until he joined the mujahideen, who «trained me to fight (...) and taught me Islam». Hajrullah became a «wahhabi» and he still lives in the countryside.

The mujahideen fought with and for the Bosniaks from 1992 but they did not become an official part of the ARBiH, the El-Mudžahid unit, until 13 August 1993 (Kohlmann 2004: 91). Furthermore, the mujahideen fought in different units in different areas of Bosnia throughout the war. However, all my informants who fought in Sedma stated that the mujahideens were not a part of the ARBiH, they probably stated this due to the difficulties of commanding the mujahideen. According to an informant the mujahideens were «not to control», who further told me that on some occasions ARBiH officers «had to stop the mujahideen from war atrocities». During the war the mujahideen became feared by Serbs and Croats for their fearless fighting and the atrocities they committed. A «wahhabi» explained it with other words: «They prevented more Serbs from going to Haag».

The Sedma was established in accordance with Islamic military jurisprudence (Terović 2006) which does not allow e.g. torture of enemies, mutilation of dead bodies and killing non-combatants, these are some aspects that parts of the mujahideen did not upheld. Elements in the mujahideen vandalised rural churches, tortured prisoners of war and killed Serb prisoners including beheadings of two captured Serb soldiers. They fought against Serb and Croat forces, they killed foreign aid-workers and there were clashes between mujahideen elements and the Bosniak armed forces with deadly outcome (Kohlmann 2004). When I discussed war incidents involving the mujahideen with a former mujahideen, he told me that «some people did things they should not have done», implying that some, but not all, were uncontrollable. After that comment he specified

100 The role of the mujahideen in the war is a too large subject for this paper. For a detailed description of the mujahideen in Bosnia I recommend Evan F. Kohlmann’s book «Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe. The Afghan-Bosnian Network». (Kohlmann 2004). However, have in mind that Kohlmann is a security advisor.

101 A former commander in the mujahideen stated after the war that «No bosnian general was allowed to command us» (www.freerepublic.com).

102 They did not always succeed. On 15 September 2008 the former Chief of Staff of ARBiH, Rasim Delić, was sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to three years imprisonment for not preventing that «12 Bosnian Serb soldiers were subject to maltreatment, (...) severe beatings and electric shocks» (www.un.org) by the El-Mudžahid in 1995.
that «in all religions there are people who are not good». Furthermore, he told me that «we» had to lead the way in the armed fights as «the others did not have our faith».

On one level they were a community of Muslims who fought to protect all Muslims and their land, on another level they differed in how they actually were to fight and who was actually in command. My informants who fought in Sedma have told me that they did not want the mujahideen to come; «we needed weapons, not fighters».

Secondly, the civilian impact of the mujahideen on the local population. Mirsad worked as an interpreter for Médecins Sans Frontières103 (MSF) during the war in Bosnia and he told me about an episode in Zenica:

«One hot summer day two girls were sunbathing by the river Bosna with little clothes on. Two mudžahidi with weapons approached them and forced them to go home and dress properly. Instead the two girls went to Médecins Sans Frontières and complained. They explained to us how they before the war had problems keeping their clothes on in front of men with weapons opposed to now when they cannot take their clothes off in front of men with weapons».

Although this story has a certain degree of humour in it, it brings forth the differences in how Islam shall be lived out in a «wahhabi» interpretation compared with the thick agency in «Bosnian islam». Furthermore, an informant told me how one mujahid forced a Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) out of the area they lived in despite the Bosniaks wishes for the NGO to be present, due to the lack of food and medicine. The Bosniaks later apologised to the NGO. Jasmina and her family who had a small store and in 1994 five mujahideen came to them, whereof one mujahid told them to turn of the music104. «Of course we turned the radio off», Jasmina told me and smiled. Yet another example is of the young couple who were kissing publicly and were corrected and spat on by a mujahid. There are several similar stories describing such interaction between individuals in the mujahideen and Bosniaks.

Several mujahideen were derogatory towards the social life of Muslims in Bosnia and when they first encountered the «Bosnian islam» they called it, according to a former mujahideen, «communism islam». The above examples show that individuals in the mujahideen were not only

103 Doctors Without Borders.
104 Some «wahhabis» perceive music as a sin.
conducting *da`wa*, some of them tried to change the environment so Muslims in Bosnia would become what they perceive are righteous Muslims: they tried to use «the ability of an ego to impose its will on an alter in social action, in interpersonal relations» (Wolf 2001: 384) both among the armed forces and among the civilian population. It was a power struggle with aggression and harassment from some Arab «wahhabis» against Bosniaks.

Thirdly, the religious impact from «wahhabis» towards Bosniaks. A former soldier in Sedma told me that «there were small clashes between us and Arabs in religious matters» and with small clashes he meant non-violent but rough discussions regarding issues like alcohol consumption and how to perform namaz. Similar episodes were reported in Afghanistan were many «of the Arab youth that came couldn’t come to grips with the *shirk*\(^{105}\) practices of some Afghans. (…) The youths were quick to denounce them, and the Afghans (…) in return would then become angered and felt alienated» (Muhajir 2009: 165). A former mujahideen was under the impression that «*if it had not been for the war and us coming to Bosnia, Islam would have been erased within 50 years (…) it would only have been muslim names*». I interpret that from a mujahideen perspective they tried to demonstrate what was «correct Islam», while for a Bosniak it became derogatory as it meant that Islam in Bosnia was not proper Islam. This is thus similar to how the Afghans felt. After the war former mujahideen individuals continued with *da`wa* separatly or along with Saudi Arabian NGO’s. The Bosniaks who had turned to «wahhabism» continued what they had adapted to through the *da`wa* and corrected other Bosniak’s religious perspectives and practice. I will later discuss the religious differences between «wahhabis» and traditional Bosniaks further.

**21-Nov-1995: Foreign Fighters without a War.**

There were other, «non-wahhabi», foreigners in Bosnia during the war. Germans and Dutch fought on the Croat side and Russians, Greeks and Ukrainians fought on the Serb side (Wiebes 2003: 205-206). On the Bosniak side Turks came to fight and Iranians were present too. According to informants who fought in Sedma the Iranians did not fight but they had a more logistical and military training role as well as providing much needed weaponry. The non «wahhabi» foreigners came with the scapes but did not bring any ideoscapes (Appadurai 1990) with them, at least none that were sustainable, as the mujahideen did. Furthermore, they were not as big of a concern as

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\(^{105}\) *Shirk* means polytheism and is the worst sin in Islam. In «wahhabism» there is a strong emphasis on *tevhid* (monotheism). They considered anything that might break monotheism as *shirk*, like shrines and intercession, as they mean parts of Sufism consists of.
«wahhabism» started to be for USA and NATO at that time\textsuperscript{106}. It was practically only the Arabs who came who were perceived as a problem and with the Dayton agreement all foreign forces had to be withdrawn\textsuperscript{107}. While the foreigners on the Serb and on the Croat side could retreat to Serbia or Croatia the situation for Arab born fighters was more complex as some of them risked imprisonment in their homecountry for fighting in Bosnia. Many of the mujahideen left Bosnia for Chechnya or returned home, while others stayed and got married. Among the former mujahideen, still in Bosnia, I have experienced that they keep contact through the telephone; a former mujahid wanted to introduce me to other former mujahideen and made some calls.

9/11 increased the focus on Arabs in Bosnia, as well as elsewhere in the world, and from September 2001 until February 2002 one Egyptian war veteran was expelled to Egypt where he was imprisoned and six Algerian men, whereof five were naturalised Bosnian citizens, were taken to Guantanamo by USA even though they were to be released by FBiH Supreme Court for lack of evidence (Li 2009). In 2008 five of them were released from Guantanamo. «By December 2008, 660 citizenships had been revoked, 400 of them held by individuals of ’Afro-Asian’ origin, and deportation proceedings have begun against an unknown number» (Li 2009). The mentioned episodes are most likely a violation of the human rights\textsuperscript{108}. Imad Husein, aka «Abu Hamza», from Syria came to Yugoslavia in the 1980’s and he is married to a Bosniak with whom he have children. Husein was a part of the mujahideen and in October 2008 he was placed in detention to await a possible future deportation to Syria because of a threat to national security. This happened despite the fact that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina found that there is a lack of evidence (Li 2009). Other Arabs have been denationalised and placed in detention in Bosnia with reference to national security. The work for deportation of Arabs «was driven primarily by western, and especially U.S., pressure» (Li 2009). The denationalisation of Arab born people who fought in the war is not well received among the definite majority of my Bosniak informants, since many of them «came and fought for us» through the words of Emil. While Anis defines it as «catastrophic (...) this is how we return their help» and Bajram is «certain that they do not cause any problems, so they deserve to stay here». Marisa is one of the rare exceptions, she thinks that «the government know more than they can say and therefore they can expel them».

\textsuperscript{106} With 9/11 it became a global war against terrorism.

\textsuperscript{107} Dayton agreement, Article III, paragraph 2: «In particular, all foreign Forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina» (www.oscebih.org).

\textsuperscript{108} For further reading, see Darryl Li (Li 2009).
The possible deportation of «Abu Hamza»\textsuperscript{109} is especially hard for Bosniaks to understand as he has lived in the area for over 20 years and has a Bosniak wife and children. On the 2nd of February a demonstration for, and with, «Abu Hamza» took place in Zenica (see picture), around 2000 people attended to support him and «his right to live in Bosnia», as Hajrullah explained to me. I attended that demonstration and the speeches contained massive support for «Abu Hamza» while anti-western and anti-Serb sentiments were played out:

The early encounters between «Bosnian islam» and «wahhabi islam», primarily the mujahideen, have made a substantial impact on the social relationship between them. I interpret that the mujahideen have become a key symbol (Ortner 1973) for «wahhabism» in Bosnia as they came with the ideoscapes, had the appearance of a «typical wahhabi» and that they spread it to other Bosniaks who in turn have continued. Traditional Bosniaks are scattered in their perception of the mujahideen. The mujahideen are respected for coming voluntarily to Bosnia to fight, while they at the same time arouse negative feelings for their correction of «Bosnian islam». It «takes at least two

\textsuperscript{109} In a vote after a TV-discussion about, and with, «Abu Hamza» on BHT (Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina) tuesday 15 January 2008 63 percent voted for the mujahideen to stay in Bosnia, while 37 percent voted for deportation. Have in mind that members of the Serb and Croat community could vote and they do in general not appreciate former members of the mujahideen.
somethings to create a difference» (Bateson 1979: 68) and «wahhabi islam» and «Bosnian islam» is two aspects of Islam that are very different. Due to the lived segregation between «wahhabis» and traditional Bosniaks there is rarely interaction between them in everyday life and therefore I will primarily outline their perspectives of each other.

«True Muslims».
The embargo over Yugoslavia stoked the Bosniaks who in turn felt neglected by Europe. The Islamic revival before and during the war, along with the scapes (Appadurai 1990) that raised support from Saudi Arabia and brought with them Arab «wahhabis» opened up for «wahhabism» in Bosnia. While the mujahideen voluntary travelled to Bosnia in order to fight, hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks fled abroad.

I discussed the impact of the mujahideen with Hajrullah and he asked me: «when our brothers left the Arabs came, what is the true Islam for you?». I answered him: «what about Sedma and the Bosniak army?», whereof he answered «they are born here». Hajrullah continued and told me how the mujahideen taught him Islam and the duties that come with being a Muslim, «it is to follow the Prophet» he stressed.

The war as a cataclysmic event resulted in that «ordinary people make sense of and find meaning in a rapidly changing world» (Berdahl 2000) and within this event religion provided meaning for many Bosniaks, whereof the mujahideen had a strong influence on some, as Hajrullah. «Wahhabism» provided a totalitarian religious doctrine that covers all aspects of life; religious, private and public, or as Anis told me: «Every aspect in life is regulated in Islam». With the support from Muslims countries around the world and the alienation by Europe the Bosniaks lifted their religious identity and the mujahideen with their visible attributes and their orthopraxy became for some Bosniaks a symbol of a purer «islam» then they had formerly experienced: «More true to the way of the Prophet», as Anis and his friends like to claim.

For some Bosniaks, the Arab fighters and the Arabic language stands for something holier than Bosnian «islam». The outer attributes of an Arab «wahhabi» and their strong orthopraxy in every aspect of life are seemingly more «Islamic» than traditional Bosnian Muslims. It is hard to see who is a practicing Muslim among traditional Bosniaks and further, they who have become «wahhabis» have generally never experienced how Islam is practiced by a traditional mumin due to the separation of the private and the public sphere. Furthermore, the Quran is written in Arabic, which some Bosniaks perceive as a holy language. An informant of mine brought a book in Arabic

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110 The political dimension is within the religious for a conservative «wahhabi».
with him to Bosnia and many were surprised when they could see sports pages in Arabic, they only knew of Arabic in the Quran and when praying. This seems like a form of domestic devotion; what comes from abroad is better than what has been and then especially Arabs and Arabic; giving connotations to, respectively, the Prophet and the Quran.

Hajrullah stated that the mujahideen are «true Muslims», thereby including that he, as a «wahhabi», is also a ‘true Muslim’ and other Bosniaks necessarily are not. Hajrullah and the former mujahideen I talked with emphasis that they fought against an attack on Islam by Serbs and Croats, meanwhile some members of the Sedma stated that they fought for Muslims in the sense of Bosniaks and thereof nation. It seems like religion, for some, truly became the meaning in their life.

The rise of religious importance and the impact of the mujahideen made some Bosniaks adapt to «wahhabi islam» and strengthening their Muslim identity while they simultaneously distanced themselves from Europe. The disappointment over the embargo and Europe is present in almost every Bosniak I have met, independent of which sub-community the Bosniak belong to. I interpret this strong sentiment towards the feeling of neglect by European countries as a more vital contributor for «wahhabism» in Bosnia than the mujahideen had, because the European neglect made the Bosniak community dependent of the Arab support.

In Bosnia, Muslims have an official Islamic Community112 (IZ) led by the Reis ul-Ulema. The IZ, and «Bosnian islam», is adherent to the Hanafi law school while «wahhabism» is connected to the Hanbali law school and there are differences within these two law schools. The IZ decides the program and curriculum where as Bosniaks receive official Islamic teaching and furthermore, the IZ employ the Imams at Mosques. The «wahhabis» I met are skeptical to the Reis ul-Ulema and one «wahhabi» stated that «they talk as they know but they don’t know» regarding the IZ, which in a «wahhabi» perspective represents the «Bosnian islam» they are derogatory towards.

In Bosnia today there is a discursive aspect113 between leading Islamic scholars (IZ) and «wahhabis». «Wahhabis» in Bosnia therefore have their own organisations, like the youth organisations «Young Muslims» and «Active Islamic Youth», that «works independently outside the IZ» according to Anis.

Where traditional Bosnian Muslims, including the IZ, still upheld a split between the public and private sphere, «wahhabis» bring forth their opinions in both spheres. A gay-parade took place

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111 In England Muslims became more radical of the war in Bosnia, especially due to the Europe supported embargo (Husein 2007).

112 Islamska Zajednica (IZ). In English: The Islamic Community (IC).

113 A topic beyond this paper.
in Sarajevo in the month of *ramazan* in 2008 and «wahhabis» reacted with fury and physically attacked participants in the gay-parade. Elif later told me that «*at least they take a stand*», implicitly stating that the *IZ* do nothing. The statement from Elif was the only time I experienced that a non «wahhabi» who talked in a positive tone towards how «wahhabis» react and try to correct the society they live in. But, as stated earlier, there is a widespread anti-homosexuality among all the communities in Bosnia and this might be the reason for the positive attitude directed to the «wahhabis» in this case. However, also apparently secular football hooligans attacked the gay-parade, in a larger number than the «wahhabis». For me, the attacks on the gay-parade from a religious fraction («wahhabis») and an secular fraction (hooligans) becomes a metaphor for a polarized Bosniak community. Furthermore, it visualises that there are secular movements114, as well as religious, in Bosnia.

2nd Time Converts: Bosnian «wahhabis».

Generally when I asked a «wahhabi» why he had become «wahhabi» they referred directly to belief and that it is the correct way to be a Muslim. «*Because we embrace the whole Islam, not parts of it*,» a friend of Anis stated, the statement includes a clear reference to their perception of «Bosnian islam».

As earlier described, most of the Bosniaks who turned to «wahhabism» were not *mumins* and they were not raised by a *mumin* family. Because of the divide between public and private sphere where traditional «Bosnian islam» is attorned to the private most «wahhabis» have not experienced how «Bosnian islam» is practiced. What they have experienced and observed is the public sphere with the mentioned temptations and the production of what is better and what is worse, despite the fixed laws of sharia, by fellow Bosniaks. It is the mentioned ‘production’ and the lifestyle that follows that the «wahhabis» react against. This is connected to their doctrine of orthopraxy that provides outcome into correctness of orthodoxy (DeLong-Bas 2004), meaning that the «wahhabis» are strict in their religious practice and in general do not separate religion between public and private sphere. Which in turn gives the major separation between «Bosnian islam» and «wahhabi islam», hence when a traditional Bosniak becomes a «wahhabi» he/she is referred to as a «2nd time convert», by other Bosniaks, due to the major change of lifestyle.

When I discussed the rise and fall of religiosity among Bosniaks with «wahhabis» they compared it with themselves. Ermin, who used to socialise with «wahhabis», told me that «they have become more open», Hajrullah told me that he «spend time with the family again» and Anis

114 Secular movements are not the scope of this paper.
who knew «some who went to Austria where they are stricter». Further, some who were inspired, like Ermin, have turned to living like a traditional Bosnian mumin. However, they all specified for me that some are still very strict and referred particularly to those who live in the countryside. Therefore it is useful to divide between conservative and moderate «wahhabis»; there are differences among «wahhabis» also. Anis told me that he knew a few «wahhabis» who moved from Bosnia to Austria because «wahhabis» in Bosnia «was not pure enough». I asked him to specify and he explained to me that «wahhabis» in Austria states «kafir115, because some of us vote in political election» and I have observed «wahhabis» at a SDA political rally meeting before the Bosnian election in 2008.

A pattern among «wahhabis» is young men with low education, an aspect they partly agree on. They only partly agree due to the fact that older men also become «wahhabi», according to Ermin, who further told me that some of the people he knew lived a «radical life before the war, with alcohol and drugs». Ermin’s statement gives ground to the common phrase of traditional Bosniaks: «radical before the war, radical after the war» with a reference that «wahhabi islam» is radical. Even though some «wahhabis» have opened up they still prefer to be with likeminded «wahhabis» because a part of their orthopraxy is to stay away from all aspects that «wahhabis» perceive as non-Islamic: «black or white», as Anis stated. While Ermin had problems with his father when he started to practice Islam, Hajrullah and Anis withdrew themselves from their family who were, according to them, «not true Muslims».

**Lived Religious Differences between «islams».**

In a religious matter it is not much that divide the different interpretations of (Sunni) Islam, or as Anis stated: «we are all brothers». The differences are more a question of how Islam is lived out, or chosen to be lived out. While «Bosnian islam» is a product of its own historical processes which have formed it, «wahhabism» is another «islam».

«Wahhabis» are certain that «wahhabism» is the correct (way to live out) Islam and with their orthopraxy they present it in the public sphere, towards other people. They have a focus on da’wa and try to mission «wahhabism» to others and some correct what they perceive is wrong conduct by a Muslim. Not all «wahhabis» correct others but those who do are well noticed by traditional Bosniaks. I have never observed Anis correct others but during discussions his religious opinions are unquestionable. Their doctrine emphasise, according to Anis, the «way of the Prophet»

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115 Kafir means disbeliever in Islam.

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and they literally try to live in accordance with how the Prophet lived; or how they interpret how the Prophet lived.

When I asked Halim what he thought about «wahhabism» he answered immediately «I wish wahhabism never came to Bosnia». Many other traditional Bosniaks have stated similar opinions. Traditional Bosniaks in general do not appreciate «wahhabism». I will discuss five central aspects which create differences between traditional Bosniaks and «wahhabis» in how they practice Islam.

Firstly, the general physical appearance of a «wahhabi» with long beard, shorter trousers and women wearing niqab differs from the traditional Bosniak appearance. Most «wahhabis» perceive niqab as the correct hijab and a «wahhabi» told me that «here, they who use, use half-hijab», with reference to niqab as the correct way to veil. I was at a café with Emil when a woman in niqab and black gloves passed us, I asked Emil what he thought about it. Emil answered that hijab is to be used so women do not draw attention from men performing their religious duty and he continued: «her husband must have a serious problem if he gets so aroused of female hands», with reference to the gloves. «This is not the Middle-East», Musalim stated and implied that he does not like their outer attributes. Furthermore, many of my informants question if niqab is voluntarily. This is parallel to the situation Wikan illustrates with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Cairo, Egypt116, which results in a common concern in the population, mostly for the female role in the society (Wikan 2004: 344, my translation).

Secondly, that «wahhabis» perform namaz differently from «Bosnian islam». After I had been to Mosques a few times I observed that «wahhabis» left before the majority were done with the praying, therefore I discussed it with Behram and Anis. While traditional Bosnian Muslims keep their hands below their stomach during parts of the prayer «wahhabis» proclaim that, in the words of Anis, «the Prophet always prayed with his hands above the stomach». Furthermore, Behram explained that in «Bosnian islam» it is a tradition to perform the whole prayer, both the obligatory part (farz) and the voluntary part (sunet117), and then to have tespih prayer together, in silence, for so to leave the Mosque. Meanwhile, «wahhabis» only do the obligatory part of the prayer and then leave the Mosque and conduct the remaining parts individually; they pray less numbers of rekats118 in Mosque. Anis stated that «tespih should only be conducted alone, as the Prophet did», therefore

116 Many Egyptians work in Saudi Arabia and are influenced by «wahhabism» there.
117 Sunet is according to traditional Bosniaks a part of the prayer recommended by the Prophet.
118 Rekat is one part of the praying circle. There are different rekats; i.e. standing and kneeling.
they perform it individually after Mosque. Behram told me that he «found it strange in the beginning but realised that they only had learned to pray from other wahhabis» and therefore he now care less regarding the way they pray. «Wahhabis», according to themselves, pray like the Prophet and define the way traditional Bosnian Muslims pray for bid`a. In Islam, innovations, bid`a, are usually perceived as a sin and Bajram has experienced «wahhabis» stating bid`a after he was praying in Mosque. The «wahhabi» focus on following the way of the Prophet so as to prevent any form of bid`a or shirk.

Thirdly, that «wahhabis» reject Sufism which has a long history in Bosnia. Moderate «wahhabis» define Sufism as bid`a while the more conservative define it as shirk, mostly due to the zikr that «wahhabis» claim the Prophet never performed in groups; «It is not the proper way to do it», Hajrullah told me. Furthermore, as some Sufi orders in the world includes shrines and intercession (shirk) «wahhabis» oppose Sufism in general.

One particular incident between a Sufi Šeih and a «wahhabi» took place in the summer of 2006 at the Saudi Arabian sponsored Mosque in town. The Imam was not present at one prayer and with the exception of one male «wahhabi» the attending Muslims wanted the Šeih to lead the prayer for them119. The «wahhabi» protested with harsh words and ended up walking out of the Mosque to demonstrate his opinion about the Šeih and through that sufi adherents. This episode provoked the remaining Muslims.

Fourthly, that «wahhabis» are derogatory against the «Bosnian islam». The strict wahhabi doctrine of orthopraxy makes all acts which are not in accordance with their perception of Islam problematic. Anis explained to me that «you have to follow Islam, if you don`t then it is not correct». By following Islam, he meant following sharia literally: «everything is regulated by the Quran and the Hadith». Hajrullah explained to me that «wahhabis» generally only socialise with each other because «being with someone who does not follow sharia is not good». Any production of better or worse is regarded as a break of sharia by «wahhabis». «It is up to God to judge», Hajrullah told me, while later in the same conversation he stated that «it is our duty as a Muslim to bring people back to the correct way of Islam», which is an aspect of the «wahhabi» da`wa.

A similar episode as the one with the Sufi Šeih took place in another Mosque, where the man who was to lead the prayer, due to the absent Imam, was wearing a wedding ring of gold. Kenan

119 When the Imam is not present at a prayer it is usually the most respected man, and/or with Islamic knowledge, in Mosque that leads the prayer.
told me that a «wahhabi» objected to let the man lead the prayer as gold is prohibited for men to wear by sharia, therefore «he was embarrassed and chose not to lead the prayer». However, other people later told him that wearing gold is not one of the reason to not lead the prayer. Kenan said that «this is typical wahhabi, enjoy preaching and think they have knowledge out to their little finger».

I was discussing credit with a «wahhabi» and a traditional mumin. According to sharia interest is illegal. While the «wahhabi» refused to take credit for anything else than housing, the traditional mumin stated that in some cases it might be necessary to buy a car on credit to for example «have the opportunity to get a job and make a living». The «wahhabi» shook his head, whereof the traditional mumin in return stated: «Easy for you to say, with a good salary and an expensive car».

Fifthly, this aspect is connected to all of the above empirical examples; that some «wahhabis» break the tradition of thick agency in the society and intervene in relations that traditionally has been a matter between the individual and God, or at least in close relations. Some «wahhabis» correct others, even persons they do not know and by doing that they transgress the traditional borders of the private and public spheres. I interpret this as an indirect form of da`wa because when they correct they also mission their perception of how a Muslim shall live: «back to the right path of Islam», as Hajrullah stated. «Wahhabis» know that they are confronting other Muslims publicly, but «it is our duty as Muslims to correct when people sin», Hajrullah stated. By claiming it is his religious duty Hajrullah uphold the orthopraxy.

The mentioned differences construct a gap between «wahhabis» and traditional Bosniaks, thus considering that «social interaction is contingent upon such interpretation; it is, essentially, the transaction of meaning» (Cohen 1985: 17), in this case between «wahhabis» and traditional Bosniaks. The interpretations and meanings differ and de facto creates a gap in their relationship and conflicts of interest regarding what it means to live as a Muslim has given the result that many «wahhabis» live in more rural areas; away from what they perceive as misconduct of other Muslims. This is also why they prefer to be with other «wahhabis». These differences exists partly because «Bosnian islam» and «wahhabism» are two particular «islams» (Varisco 2005) each with unique historical and geographical backgrounds, but mostly due to the «wahhabi» emphasis on orthopraxy.

The mentioned five aspects give the result that the majority of the traditional Bosniaks I met perceive «wahhabism» as a polluting factor to their «Bosnian islam». This polluting, I interpret, can
be directed to two parts of the traditional Bosniak identity - Islam and European - which I now will discuss further.

Pollution of the Bosniak heritage.

The religious aspect. The correction of traditional Bosniaks religious practice, by «wahhabis», is what upsets traditional Bosniaks the most. When «wahhabis» define and confront the practice of traditional Bosniaks as *bid`a* or *shirk* they actually state that traditional Bosniaks conduct sin through their Islamic practices and thereby insult the corrected persons and furthermore degrade the «Bosnian islam». By undermining religious aspects of «Bosnian islam» like *namaz* and Sufis they simultaneously state that «wahhabi islam» is the (only) correct Islam.

   It is particularly people in the sub-community of traditional mumins who are the most offended in this matter, it is they who have adressed these issues with me. Due to such derogatory statements from «wahhabis», Musalim describes «wahhabism» as «the plauge of Islam». Kenan question the «wahhabi» doctrine and stated that they are «so literate that they don`t understand the real meaning of Islam». When I asked Kenan to specify on his statement he referred to their use of shorter pants and called it a misinterpretation: «the Prophet meant that you shall not use to much material to show status if people around you suffer, you should help them (...) here a few drive around in an expensive car. It does not make sense».

There has been a change among «wahhabis» with the effect that some «wahhabis» have become more moderate, like Anis. During my fieldwork and several conversations with Behram and Anis I could see that they started to respect each other: they are both *mumins* and therefore a minority in Bosnia. One evening they prayed together in Anis` apartment, while I was watching TV, and after the pray they humorously mocked each other for the difference in how they pray. Although humorous, it still has a underlying religious cause. Another example of moderate «wahhabis» is in the Mosque used for *zikr* every thursday, there sufis and «wahhabis» pray together and when they are done the «wahhabis» go home while the sufis start to perform *zikr*. One Sufi in this order told me that there is a «relaxed atmosphere between us and wahhabis in this Mosque». However, the traditional Bosniaks still know how «wahhabis» perceive them.

Along with the degrading of «Bosnian islam» the heritage of the thick agency and religion as a private matter is confronted and therefore «wahhabis» pollute the Islam as they know it, it is a threat to their «boundaries (...) by intrusion of foreign cultural forms» (Harrison 1999: 10). These mentioned aspects are the reason that Halim, and many others, never wanted «wahhabism» in Bosnia.
The European aspect. The physical appearance of «wahhabis» transgress the borders of the Bosniaks as Europeans. In particular, niqab is a torn in the eye for many traditional Bosniaks. When I have been socializing with informants and a woman with niqab has passed us some reacted by shaking their head while other comment on it, like Imad: «This is not Bosnia, it belongs to the Middle East». Their perception of being a pure part of Europe is put in danger by the visible attributes of the «wahhabis».

With the impact of «wahhabism» in Bosnia they have been subjected to the western `war on terrorism`, for example the Algerians who were taken to Guantanamo. All Bosniaks I have talked with stated that Muslims in Bosnia are not terrorists, including the Arab born. Although, the traditional Bosniaks know that it is the «wahhabis» who may destroy the picture they themselves have of Muslims in Bosnia, as peaceful and tolerate. They do not want to be a part of the western discourse regarding radical Islam. Independently of their opinion, some Arab born Bosniaks risks deportation from Bosnia.

By polluting their heritage of being European and their «islam», or perhaps their European-Islam, developed over centuries «wahhabis» become a «matter out of place» (Douglas 1966) for traditional Bosniaks. It seems, to me, that the introduction of «wahhabism» is perceived as a threat to not being perceived as Europeans, by others.
Concluding remarks.

Throughout this thesis I have explored various aspects of being a Bosniak and analysed the differences within the Bosniak community. How individuals in different sub-communities within an overarching Bosniak community reflects and acts differently on the religious and the social aspects they meet in Bosnia. Furthermore, how the transition from a socialist state that suppressed religion to a democratic country with freedom of religion has made these differences more transparent.

These sub-communities, as I have defined them, seem to reproduce themselves by marrying someone who practice Islam to a similar extent as yourself and that the size of the sub-communities are similar to the socialist period. According to my data there is a slight increase of practicing Muslims in Bosnia at present time compared with the socialist period, however it has decreased since 1999 when Bosnia began to settle after the war. In other words, the Islamic revival in Bosnia was not sustainable. Also «wahhabis» have explained to me that a similar process took place among them, as for example Ermin who turned from «wahhabism» into a traditional mumin. Furthermore, how Anis explained that some «wahhabis» have become more open, or «moderate», and the Sufi order who perform namaz with «wahhabis» before they conduct zikr. I interpret the rise and fall of lived religiosity as an search for meaning during the war, a war filled with uncertainty and suffering. Behram: «if you experience a storm at the sea you pray to God, but when you reach land you stop praying». For me, this statement is an excellent metaphor, for Behram it is a part of his Muslim faith.

People have the agency to change sub-communities but they might meet resistance in their close relations, thin agency, both regarding becoming a mumin or the opposite. The adolescence at home together with official Islamic learning in mekteb often correlates with the individuals future sub-community, for example it is far more likely that people start to drink alcohol if their family already does so. Not to mention in youth, when Bosniaks are confronted with aspects that break with sharia and how they actually struggle to keep with being mumin or to become mumin. While others break with sharia without any will to change, close to all Bosniaks do practice during ramazan, they do something and that something is usually avoiding drinking alcohol for a month. For some that is a statement of belief, while for others it is conformity or tradition.

The Bosniak community have produced aspects that are haram in Islamic jurisprudence to be accepted in the society and through that production, either on on a collective level or in close relations, they legitimise the break of the sharia, for example approval of sex in non married
relationships. While eating pork is produced to be one of the heaviest «gravities of sin» you can do to yourself.

The process of modernization and the political project of secularism have naturalized the Bosniak community as a part of Europe and they have adapted within the frames of the Islamic jurisprudence. Despite the anger against European nations who supported the embargo over Yugoslavia in the war they still perceive themselves as Europeans. The embargo left them vulnerable and deferred against the other war fractions but still it did not change their European heritage, however it did open the door for Saudi Arabia to mission their «wahhabi islam» alongside almost 1 billion dollars of oil money. Therefore I argue that it was the European neglect of the Bosniak situation that helped lay the ground for «wahhabism»; it enabled the mujahideen and Saudi Arabia to make an impact.

The impact of «wahhabism» in Bosnia should be researched further, especially empirical based research, to better understand the social aspects that attracts particularly young Bosniak males to change their life almost completely. An interesting perspective I found was that those who had taken a «wahhabi» influenced lifestyle were not raised in a practicing Muslim family, although rare exceptions exists. «Wahhabi islam» have made an impact in the Bosniak community, thus leading to a more polarized Bosniak community than there perhaps ever has been. Through orthopraxy «wahhabis» isolate themselves from non «wahhabi» Muslims and further, through orthopraxhy they confront and degrade the «Bosnian islam» to not be a «true Islam». I feel certain that the aversion they create among their fellow Bosniaks through their orthopraxy will prevent growth of the «wahabbi» sub-community. Furthermore, traditional Bosniaks often presented themselves as Europeans, to me, when they meet «the other»: «wahhabis». Therefore I argue that «wahhabism» in Bosnia has led many of the traditional Bosniaks to overpresent themselves as Europeans, perhaps to equal the impact of «wahhabism».

I assess that as long as there is a `war on terrorism` «wahhabis» throughout the world will be in the scope of western intelligence agencies, hence Bosnia will not be an exception.

I hope, that I with this paper have made it possible to understand that «Bosnian islam» is an particular «islam» developed through its own specific history, as a part of Europe.
Glossary of Bosnian terms.

*Bosnian* (Arabic) – English word/meaning.

*ARBiH; Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* – The Bosniak Army during the last war.

*Bid`a (Bid`ah)* – Innovation. Religious innovations in Islam are usually illegal.

*Bjelica* – Male Muslim headgear.

*Bosna i Hercegovina* – Bosnia and Herzegovina.

*Bošnjaci* – Bosniaks and/or Muslims belonging to Bosnia.

*Četnici* – Historical Serbian nationalist movement and former military fractions.

*Da`wa (Da`wah)* – To mission Islam.

*Džamija (Masjid)* – Mosque.

*Džihad (Jihad)* – Holy war, in this paper, but could also mean “inner war”.

*Džuma (Jumu`ah)* – Friday noon prayer in Mosque.

*Ekavica* – Variation in the local languages.

*El-Mudžahid* – Military unit consisting of mujahideens in the last war.

*Farz (Fard)* – The individual religious duties. Consists mainly of the five pillars of Islam.

*Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine* – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

*Garibi* – Arabs. While dictionary states foreigner, poor man, or he who is without fellowman.

*Hadždž (Hajj)* – Pilgrimage to Mecca. A religious duty every capable Muslim should conduct once in life.

*Halal* – Legal according to Islamic law.

*Handžar divizija* – Muslim SS division during WW-II.

*Haram* – Illegal according to Islamic law.

*Hidžab (Hijab)* – Modest Muslim dress for women, covering head (hair) and shoulder.

*HVO; Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane* – Croat forces during the last war.
Iftar – The evening meal that breaks the fast in *ramazan* after the sun has gone down.

*Ijekavica* – Variation in the languages.

*Ila*hi*ja* (Nasheed) – Islamic oriented text/music.

*IZ, Islamska Zajednica* – Islamic Community (of Bosnia).

*Jugoslavija* – Yugoslavia.

*JNA; Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* – Yugoslav People’s Army.

*Kafir* – Unbeliever.

*KM; Konvertibilna marka* – The local currency.

*Kladionica* – Betting shops.

*Medresa* (Madrasah) – Islamic educational institution.

*Mekteb* (Maktab) – Quran school.

*Mesdžid* (Masjid) – Functions as a Mosque but does not have a minaret, e.g. a transformed house.

*Mu*ḏahidi (Mujahideen) – Freedom fighters or holy warriors.

*Mu*min (Muʿmin) – Quranic term for a believer.

*Musliman samo po imenu* – Muslim only by name.

*Muwahhidūn* (Muwahhidûn) – Monotheists or unitarians. Also an Islamic interpretation/practise.

*Namaz* (Salat) – The five daily prayers.

*Nefs* (Nafs) – A Quranic term: The soul every Muslim should work on to control oneself.

*Partizan* – Communist military unit led by Tito in WW-II.

*Post* (Sawm) – Fasting.

*Poturice* – Half-Turks. Meaning converts to Islam.

*Ramazan* (Ramadan) – The month when Muslims celebrate the revelation of the Quran.

*Ramazanski bajram* (Eid ul-Fitr) – 3 days of celebration after the fasting in *ramazan*.

*Reis ul-ulema* – The Muslim religious leader in Bosnia (leader of the *IZ*).

*Rekat* – One part of the praying circle. Different *rekats*, for example standing and kneeling.
RS, Republika Srpska – “The Serb Republic”.

Ruf – A Quranic term: The spirit in every individual given by Allah.

Sedma Muslimanska Brigada – The 7th Muslim Brigade that operated during the last war.

Šehadet (Shahada) – The Islamic creed: «There is no deity but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God».

Šehidi (Shahid) – Muslim martyr; died heroically or innocent.

Sehur (Suhoor) – The morning meal before the daily fast in ramazan.

Šejh (Sheik) – Leader of a Sufi order/branch. Or, a honorary title given a man who is learned in Islam.

Selam Alejkum (As-Salamu Alaykum) – A greeting: May God’s Peace be upon you.

Selefije (Salafi) – Ancestors or predecessors. Also an Islamic interpretation/practise.

Sevap – Good deeds in name of God towards someone/something that benefits from your action.

Shirk – Polytheism. The worst sin in Islam.

Slot mašina – Slot machine.

Sunet – Part of namaz (pray) which is recommended by the Prophet.

Svinjetina – Pork (meat).

Uskrs – Easter.

Tekija (Khanqah) – Building or house belonging to a Sufi order, where they e.g. conduct zikr.

Tespih (Mishaba/Tesbih) – A prayer and prayer beads used for counting while conducting zikr.

Turbe (Qubbat) – Tomb.

UNZE – University of Zenica.

Ustaša – Historical Croatian nationalist movement and former military fractions.

Vakuf – A Muslim religious endowment donated, e.g. land or building, by a Muslim to the Muslim community.

Vehabije (Wahhabi) – An Islamic law tradition originated in Saudi-Arabia in the 18th Century.

VRS, Vojska Republike Srpske – Serb forces during the last war.
Zar – A veil for women, similar to niqab, that was used before WW-II.

Zekat (Zakat) – Annual tax to people in need.

Zikr (Dhikr) – Sufi ritual. Remembrance of Allah through his names and qualities.
Bibliography


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