Legitimacy of Civil Society Organisations

A comparative study of two CSOs and how they are perceived by their constituencies in Chatsworth, South Africa

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ABM   Abahlali baseMjondolo
- AEC   Anti-Eviction Campaign
- AGM   Annual General Meeting
- AIDS   Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
- ANC   African National Congress
- APF   Anti Privatisation Forum
- BEE   Black Economic Empowerment
- BFRA   Bayview Flats Residents Association
- CBO   Community-Based Organisation
- CBP   Community-Based Planning
- CCF   Concerned Citizens Forum
- CCDT   Crossmoor Community Development Trust
- CCG   Concerned Citizens Group
- CCS   Centre for Civil Society
- CHAC   Chatsworth Housing Action Committee
- CORE   The Co-Operative for Research and Education
- CPF   Community Policing Forum
- CSG   Child Support Grant
- CSO   Civil Society Organisation
- DA   Democratic Alliance
- DHAC   Durban Housing Action Committee
- FAC   Flatdwellers Action Committee
- FRA   Flats Residents Associations
- FXI   Freedom of Expression Institute
- GAA   Group Areas Act
- GEAR   Growth Employment and Redistribution
- HIV   Human Immunodeficiency Virus
- IBR   Institute for Black Research
- IDP   Integrated Development Plans
- IFP   Inkatha Freedom Party

- IRIN   The Integrated Regional Information Network
- KZN   KwaZulu-Natal
- LPM   Landless People's Movement
- MF   Minority Front
- NEDLAC   The National Economic Development and Labour Council
- NGO   Non Governmental Organisation
- NIC   Natal Indian Congress
- POS   Political Opportunity Structure
- PSM   People's Socialist Movement
- RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme
- SASF   Southern African Social Forum
- SIT   School for International Training
- SMI   Social Movements Indaba
- SMG   State Maintenance Grant
- SDCEA   South Durban Community Environmental Alliance
- TAC   Treatment Action Campaign
- UDF   United Democratic Front
- UKZN   University of KwaZulu-Natal
- WDF   Wentworth Development Forum
- WEC   Women Empowerment Centre
- W-FRA   Westcliff Flats Residents Association
- WSF   World Social Forum

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Maps locating Bayview and Westcliff

Bayview

Westcliff

Source: www.durban.gov.za

Photos: by Author

"Not all CBOs are able to facilitate collective action effectively. The extent to which they can do so depends critically on the degree to which citizens hold them accountable and legitimate."

(Heller 2000; Schönwalder 1997 in Krishna 2004: 9)

1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis is to examine the internal dynamics of grassroots level organisation in two poor communities in post-apartheid South Africa. Since the end of apartheid new social struggles have sprung up all over the country opposing local governments and municipalities for failing to provide proper and affordable service delivery. According to Ballard et al. (2006: xiii) there has been a polarised response towards what these struggles are and who they represent. For some these struggles are the new opposition and the true voice of the poor and marginalised, for others aligned to the state they are just irresponsible actions of few activists with a limited understanding of the complexities of the post-apartheid reconstruction. This thesis seeks to unfold the inner complexities within two such social struggles, and attempts to add detail to the understanding of how groups of poor and marginalised work and function in their localities, as well as who they are and what they represent. In much of the literature on civil society, and especially on social movements, emphasis has often been placed on its relation to the state. Although this relationship is important to investigate, it is equally pertinent to explore the nature of relationships and the tensions that exist within civil society. This thesis will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the inner workings of civil society groups, and the challenges related to the plurality of their base. By seeking primarily to get a better understanding of the internal dynamics and relationships within civil society organisations (CSOs) this thesis will be a contribution to the criticism in the literature of treating civil society as one homogeneous agent (Habib & Kotzé 2003) and of romanticising civil society in a way that ignores issues of power, politics, and internal conflicts (Mercer 2002, Mohan & Stokke 2000, Purcell 2006).

The main goal of this thesis is to investigate two CSOs' perceived legitimacy through presenting utterances and stories of the people living in the communities they are based, as well as of the people actively involved in the CSOs. Their perceptions of the CSOs are central in the understanding of how the CSOs work in their constituencies and whether they are perceived as legitimate representatives of the people.

Although the relation between the CSOs and the state will be investigated, this relationship is primarily intended to offer a better understanding of the relations and dynamics within the CSOs and their constituencies. These diverse sets of relationships within and

between the CSOs and their constituencies, as well as between the CSOs and the formal political system, will be investigated through the concept of legitimacy.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy will be scrutinised through four main analytical concepts, namely; framing, political strategies, participation, and delivery. By looking deeper into what these concepts contain, and how they play out in the two communities - through the workings of the two CSOs - the thesis will shed light on how the CSOs frame their issues, construct themselves, and motivate mobilisation in their constituencies (through framing), as well as how they relate to the formal local political system[1] (through political strategies), and how they relate to the people they are supposed to represent through their organisational structure and ways of working within their constituencies (through participation and delivery). These aspects will be assessed through three themes within theories on social movements, namely cultural framing, political opportunity structures (POS), and mobilising structure. The centre of attention is, then, on the relation between the CSOs and their constituencies, and the relation between the CSOs and the local formal political system. These two relations influence on each other and together they form a three-divided complex of actors: the CSOs, their constituencies, and the local formal political system. A working model with an overview of the four analytical concepts and how they influence on these two relationships is presented in the theoretical framework (see figure 1).

The topic focus is interesting as it will contribute to the academic literature and research on social movements and community struggles in post-apartheid South Africa. It touches some very important issues and processes in present South Africa, 14 years after apartheid, where the growth in post-apartheid community struggles and their fight for free or affordable access to basic services has been an eye-catching reality, especially since the end of the 1990s. South Africa's liberal democracy has been heavily criticised for its neoliberal approach and for not providing basic services to the masses of the poor, such as proper shelter, and free access to electricity and water. How CSOs adopt various strategies in getting access to these basic

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[1] The thesis uses various names for the formal political system throughout the thesis. These are 'eThekwini Municipality' or just 'municipality', 'state', 'local state', 'government', 'local government', 'council' and 'town council'. These names referring to the formal political system - mostly at local, but also at national level - are used interchangeably throughout the thesis and reflect the activists and informants' interchangeably use of the concept.

services and what impact these strategies have on the CSOs within their constituencies can provide interesting findings on how CSOs work and function in their localities as well as whether the people they represent think they do contribute to an improvement of their situation. The two CSOs serve as illustrations of how plural civil society groups in the post-apartheid context are, and contribute in the criticism in the literature against romanticising civil society by assuming that it is a homogeneous entity that will lead to true 'trickling down' of resources and deepening democracy through the post-apartheid participatory approaches.

Background for research questions

This thesis seeks to do a comparative study of two CSOs both located in Chatsworth. Chatsworth is a predominantly Indian township on the outskirts of Durban, and is the largest city on the east coast of South Africa. The two CSOs, namely the Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA) and the Westclif Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) are both located in the so-called 'flatted' areas of Chatsworth that consist mainly of the low-income government-owned housing, the blocks of flats, that were built in the 1960s under apartheid to house those classified as Indians that were forcibly removed from their homes under the Group Areas Act (of 1950). The BFRA is located in Bayview community - in unit two, while the W-FRA is located in the neighbouring community Westcliff - in unit three. These case areas are interesting because it is claimed that they were the sites of the first visible signs of social struggle in the post-apartheid era that sparked social resistance in other communities all over South Africa. At least that is the view of my informants, although Desai argues that "to say that this struggle begins in Chatsworth is a kind of shorthand, which saves the trouble of explaining each time that, like all revolts that grow, it has many beginnings" (2002:7). However, as movements do ebb and flow, it was interesting to take a deeper look into these pockets of resistance in Chatsworth, once so powerful, to see how persistent they still were some five years after their peak-period from 1999 to 2002. The fieldwork material used in this thesis was collected from late September 2006 till mid-January 2007.

The thesis treats the W-FRA and the BFRA as CSOs namely because they both form part of civil society, but their struggle history, and their current workings in their respective communities, have rendered them with characteristics similar to both social movements, community based organisations (CBOs), and NGOs. Both have not employed all these characteristics simultaneously, but as the discussion throughout this thesis will show, their

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differences today make them look quite similar to CBOs in one case, and NGOs in the other. Despite this, the thesis also acknowledges the hybrid nature of these CSOs in that the different strategies they utilise in different spaces and for different outcomes show that they employ characteristics similar to all these civil society groups, although to different extent, depending on the context and the situation.

Research Questions

To assess the legitimacy of the two CSOs presented above, I will look at various aspects that together characterise the CSOs and their relation to their constituents and the political system, and what influence these characteristics have on the legitimacy they (the CSOs) attain in their constituencies. The thesis' main research question is:

- ***What strategies are utilized by CSOs to present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the people, and how are these strategies able to give them legitimacy within their constituencies?***

To shed light on the various aspects contained in the concept of legitimacy and the strategies used by the CSOs in achieving legitimacy, I have used three questions that concretise the specific issues and aspects of *strategies to gain legitimacy*, and have formulated them as:

a) *How do the CSOs frame their demands, how do they present themselves as the solution to the problems, and how does their choice of motivational framing impact on their legitimacy?*

b) *What relation do the CSOs have to the formal political system, and how does this relation impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs?*

c) *How do the CSOs organise community participation (and distribute resources) and how does this impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs?*

The first question (a) will shed light on the CSOs' use of framing strategies by looking at their ability to diagnose problems, create a collective identity with their constituents, frame a solution to their problems, and motivating people to participate in the proposed strategies and ways forward. The second question (b) looks at the CSOs' relation to the formal political system and what significance this relation has on the relation between the CSO and its

constituency, implied in this is that the legitimacy the CSOs obtain in their constituency is based on their choices of political strategies. The constituents' perceptions of the state are important for whether they perceive their CSO as legitimate or not, and will be discussed in the analysis. The third question (c) assumes that there is a link between the CSOs' legitimacy and the constituents' level of participation in CSO activities and their access to resources (delivery) from the CSO. The assessment of participation and delivery will elucidate important aspects of the CSOs' organisational structure.

The structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters and provides an analysis of the legitimacy attained by the W-FRA and the BFRA in their constituencies in two neighbouring communities in Chatsworth, South Africa. The aim is to see how two relatively identical CSOs use different means in striving to achieve identical goals, and how their choices of strategies to reach their goals render them different in the eyes of their constituents.

Chapter 2 offers a historical and current contextualisation of the two CSOs that provide an important background in which they developed and came into being. The socioeconomic challenges facing the two CSOs today portrays the current climate they are facing in their work and forms part of their social basis.

Chapter 3 is a presentation of the theoretical framework that frames the discussion in the analytical chapters five, six and seven. Here the concept of legitimacy is defined mainly through four analytical concepts that will be analysed through three themes in theories on social movements.

Chapter 4 is a presentation of my methodological approach where the discussion of strengths and weaknesses in my data-collection and the processing of the data will form an important basis to assess the quality of my research.

Chapter 5 gives the reader a look into the discourses (framing strategies) used by the two CSOs, and how they try to convince their constituents that the issues they fight for are unjust and need to be acted upon to be changed. How the CSOs attract participants and supporters through diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing is at the heart of the discussion.

Chapter 6 analyses the relation between the CSOs and the political system. How the political opportunities and constraints facing them are utilised impact on the relation they develop to the political system, and ultimately to their own constituents.

Chapter 7 assesses the organisational structure of the CSOs. Their organisational form influences on the CSOs' relation to their constituents and ultimately on their attained legitimacy within their constituencies.

The last chapter summarises the findings of the thesis and explicitly answers the research questions guiding the discussion. The main aspects of the two CSOs' framing strategies, use of political strategies, and organisational structure, will be discussed against what implications these characteristics can have for their future role in their constituencies.

2. CHATSWORTH: HISTORY AND SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Description of the area

> Chatsworth was laid out on either side of a ridge many kilometres long. From this ridge, countless roads lead down in steep slopes, and are intersected by streets that run parallel to the Highway. There are rows of semi-detached, two-story flats painted in faded pastel shades of blue, orange, lilac, pink, turquoise and lavender. At the bottom of the ridge, where a valley is formed, the semi-detached flats mutate into huge, bulky tenement blocks containing six families a piece. Here, the poorest of the poor have been put to live and die, cramped, ugly, unsafe and hidden from view.

(Desai 2000:4)

The huge, bulky tenement blocks are the government-owned flats located in both Bayview and Westcliff. Today they are more than 40 years old and are not as colourful and bright as the rest of the houses and buildings around. In this sea of pastel shaded colours the blocks lie bleak, tired and exhausted from years in the sun and the rain. The blocks have a bleak yellowish colour, with a bleak wine-coloured foundation wall, and are ridden with profound cracks and tagging, looking as if they desperately need a stroke of paint to fresh them up and cement to patch the profound cracks. These washed-out colours and deep-ridden cracks are clear signs of poverty and destitution, and prove the age of these flats like wrinkles on an old face show how long a person has withstood time.

The flats come in three different sizes; a one-bedroom and a kitchen, a two-bedroom and a kitchen, and a three-bedroom and a kitchen. For many, the flats do not house a family of few members, but often families with many children, extended families, or even families of three or four generations. This results in crammed spaces with no privacy.

In between the blocks are washing stones of cement placed in groups of four, and two taps next to these. Some taps are frequently in use, others are dried up with no sign of running water, or closed with a type of box and a padlock. Judging from these observations, these taps are not communal, and the water running through is not free.

Around and between each block of flats are narrow pathways of cement which one can use when moving from one place to another. These pathways are often wet and slippery as a

result of spring water coming up from the ground, and have resulted in people falling and injuring themselves[2]. On rainy days many flats get flooded, and many have experienced all their furniture and things being destroyed.

When ignoring the details of the tenement blocks, the overall area looks beautiful. The blocks are surrounded by a very green and lavish landscape, and mango trees are a common view. The bushes around some of the flats grow wild and look as if they are going to drown and encapsulate the flats with their branches and leaves. On the flatland between the blocks the grass grows high. If one stands by one of the flats on top of one of the highest hills, one can, beyond the sea of pastel-shaded buildings and dark grey asbestos roofs, catch a glimpse of the real sea: the Indian Ocean.

Despite these green and beautiful surroundings, the high grass and the wild-growing bushes have their own dark story. Accounts and stories from the people living here illuminate the hidden dangers in these, superficially, beautiful spaces. Snakes are common, and the tall, thick bushes provide a perfect hiding spot for robbers and murderers. In this context, mothers are scared of their children playing around in the tall grass in danger of getting bitten, or of snakes sneaking into the flats. One informant told me she has had snakes coming into her flat, one even in her bed. During my stay in the area I also saw snakes; one had been smashed with stones by one of the neighbours. Despite the fears of snakes among the residents in these communities, the fear of humans utilising these perfect hiding spots is greater. One Bayview resident said in an interview:

> The bushes are growing. Here the workers are going to work, they get robbed in the morning, there's murders because of bushes. When you walk down to forty [40] you'll see what I mean. There is so many bushes, and the road from Umlazi, KwaMashu is a pathway. Now we don't know who is doing the murders, or who's robbing the people because we have no electricity.
>
> (Bayview resident 4)

In addition to the natural surroundings, the lack of proper streetlights (as mentioned by this informant) is a problem.

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[2] I was told by one neighbour that her daughter fell and broke her leg because of the slippery pathway. She sued the Municipality for not doing a proper upgrading to improve the conditions (informal conversation, Westcliff resident).

Through observations, informal conversations and interviews, I got familiar with the problems with the flats themselves: Unstable buildings create cracks in the walls; some blocks looking as if they are going to collapse any time[3]. The hollow and porous brick-walls and cracks makes it easier for water to seep through, resulting in flooded flats, and a discolouring of inside walls due to a sort of mould that sticks to them creating a dirty look. This requires people that can afford it to re-paint the inside walls every-two years[4]. Asbestos roofs and no ceilings often result in high temperatures inside the flats, in the top-floor especially. High levels of dampness and heat have resulted in high levels of wheezing, asthma, and respiratory problems among the people there.

All places, no matter how dilapidated they might be, do have their own story. The following section brings us back to the beginning of Chatsworth's existence and its history up to now.

Historical background

Chatsworth was built in the 1960s, early 1970s. Under apartheid it acted as a buffer zone between the Black townships KwaMashu and Umlazi, and the White suburbs of Durban (Freund 2001). Today it houses around 350.000 people. Although most were Indian due to apartheid segregation laws, today around 30 percent of the population are Africans (Desai 2002). The notorious Group Areas Act (GAA) of 1950 (Act No. 41 of 1950) uprooted people from their homes, and for the Indians living in central areas and 'Homelands' around Durban, their forced relocation put them in homes in the newly built township. Tightly knit social networks were dissolved, and extended families were broken up into nuclear families. This made life tough as strangers became neighbours and additional financial burdens were placed on them. The relocations resulted in a downward spiralling development for the people forced to live in Chatsworth.

Despite the breaking down of the once-so-strong civic life present among the Indians before being relocated, new community structures sprung up in Chatsworth in the late 1960s. People divided themselves in wards, elected committees, mobilized and put up a 'shadow town council (Desai 2002). As this was seen as a danger, Council resisted the mobilization by criticizing leaders of being revolutionaries that were inciting the poor, and continued apace with forced evictions of the residents to created fear and division in the communities. Anti-

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[3] See front page photo/illustration.

[4] Informal conversations, Westcliff residents.

poverty protests were also opposed by further rent increases and a 'no nonsense approach' (Desai 2002:26).

Local leaders from the wealthier middle class opposed the call by the Indian Welfare Society to mix people from the low and high-income groups so lower-class people could be lifted by the upper-class people (Natal Mercury, April 9, 1969 in Desai 2002). And they also supported further rent-increases despite resistance from the Chatsworth Civic Association. This led to an uneven development of the areas within Chatsworth and put a spoke in the wheels of a unified response "in a manner typical of Indian and generally anti-apartheid politics" (Desai 2002:27). The affluent framed the issues and had access to the media and existing political organizations, so issues of poverty and lack of housing was sidelined, even by progressive organizations in the area (Desai 2002).

The downfall of Chatsworth, and the build up to the 90s

Together with an oppressive apartheid system that restrained the mobility of people, making it even more difficult to travel back and forth from work, alcoholism, suicide, child abuse, and divorces escalated. From the mid 1970s to the early 1980s gangsterism thrived, and with it violence, corrupted polices and a whole lot of drug-dealing escalated (Desai 2002). In 1980, an investigation by the Chatsworth Indian Child and Welfare Society found that mass unemployment and increased divorce rates accelerated the number of Chatsworth residents relying on state grants (Desai 2002).

Amidst this socioeconomic breakdown the newly inaugurated Chatsworth Housing Action Committee (CHAC) began to stir up large protests against rent increases and the Council's attempts to sell the flats to the residents. Despite their opposition, evictions continued. In 1983, however, after the increased anti-apartheid mobilization in the 1980 school boycotts, the state instituted a host of reforms. Indians and Coloureds were offered representation in the tricameral parliamentary system, and in Chatsworth it was a noticeable cut-back in evictions. The tricameral parliament attracted wealthy middle class individuals from Chatsworth, but few people voted for them. On the other side of the divide Indian politicians and professional middle-class people that were in the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) played a major role in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and in the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC), but the NIC was never able to build a mass base in Chatsworth (Desai 2002).

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Instead, local civic organizations started to assert themselves in Chatsworth, and as protests became more recurrent, a clear set of demands emerged. In July 1989, 300 protesters came together on the Regional Offices of the House of Delegates. Many were tear-gassed and arrested. They demanded more affordable rents. During this period of marches, boycotts, and rallies, all kinds of groups from all over (students, workers, churches and civic associations) supported each other's demands, and the DHAC grew in strength. This was a year before the revolt in South African cities intensified so much that the National Party was forced to abandon apartheid (Desai 2002).

From 1990 liberation movements were unbanned, the GAA was repealed, and with that the apartheid regime was dismantled (Desai 2000, 2002, Smith 2001). In 1994 the ANC came to power, and a new era of history began.

The post-apartheid era

In 1994, the ANC won the government seat and a transition to a multi-party, no-racial democracy commenced (Edigheji 2003). South Africa's transition to liberal democracy happened in a peaceful manner and is seen as a social revolution where the real beneficiaries were the popular masses. With this transition civil society was transformed as the previous networks of civil society were absorbed in part into the state apparatus. The United Democratic Front, ANC, civics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) where either now part of the government or operating in close collaboration with it. This period changed the relations between state and civil society from being adversarial to being more collaborative and development oriented (Ballard et al. 2005), and so the political opportunities changed.

The new government's promises of 'a better life for all' and their party programme, namely the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) represented a radical constitutional reform that granted extensive formal rights to all citizens (Stokke & Oldfield 2004), and is seen one of the most progressive constitutions in the World. Together with the absorption of many civil society groups into the state apparatus, these promises lead to a decline in the civil society activity in the early 1990s as the citizens of South Africa patiently waited for the seed of democracy (newly-planted) to grow and surround them with a net of security and improved socioeconomic conditions.

When changes did not occur, and the government, with President Thabo Mbeki in the lead, changed the RDP into the neoliberal structural adjustment programme: the Growth

Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996, people started waking up from their doze of hope and realised that the promised improvements were not coming anytime soon.

Privatisation distanced the government from being a 'provider' to a mere 'ensurer' of service delivery (Bond 2004, Stokke and Oldfield 2004) using NGOs as their contractors. This was followed by cost-recovery policies and changed the political and economic discourse on water and electricity from being a natural right, to a 'scarce' economic good (Ruiters 2004). While new infrastructure was rolled out, the high price of services and high levels of non-payment led to a low-level war between local authorities and working class consumers (Ruiters 2004). Massive service cut-offs in water and electricity services, and litigation against the poor, spurred resistance in townships all over South Africa. Demanding affordable access to basic services and proper housing, people began engaging in meetings, discussing strategies and ways to claim back their rights and dignity (Desai 2002). In light of these circumstances, CSOs such as the BFRA and the W-FRA in Chatsworth came into being.

The birth of the post-apartheid resistance

> "The struggle in Chatsworth helped to ignite rebellions in other areas, and to illuminate struggles already happening elsewhere"
>
> (Desai 2002:7)

The Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA) in Chatsworth's unit two - Bayview, and the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) in unit three - Westcliff - or 'Bangladesh' as most people call it - are both formally constituted organizations comprised of people living in the government-owned flats described above. They both emerged out of this post-apartheid environment. In pace with rising unemployment rates as a result of the shedding of thousands of jobs in the clothing sector, poverty levels, services-cut offs and forced evictions increased, inciting anger and frustration among the people in Chatsworth. According to the W-FRA leader:

> What actually motivated us to start organising was when the government they decided to chop off the child support grant by one third. And whilst they did that they said it was for the purpose of redistribution to Black people. It was a fair decision, but while they decreased the child support grant by one third they increased the rent the same month. And that was the difficult part.

Tenants in the four government-owned flatted communities in Chatsworth (Bayview, Westcliff, Woodhurst and Crossmoor) were facing the same problems, and started organizing together as the Flatdwellers Action Committee (FAC). They held meetings, elected

representatives from the each community, and for about one year they jointly mobilized in protest marches, served memorandums, had discussions with the municipality around their problems, and managed to prevent evictions through the court-system with the help of wealthy individuals and low-priced attorneys. The Municipality eventually refused any direct communication with the Chatsworth activists and created instead a working group to act as a communicator between it (municipality) and the activists. According to the W-FRA leader, this working group turned out unable to speak the poor people's case "So, we that were truly representing the poor could not (…) put ourselves into this group because they didn't make decisions on how people were people." It was close to the national elections in 1999 and a temporary moratorium on evictions gave the Chatsworth activists time to rethink their position and strategies.

Just before the national elections in 1999, the activists in the FAC then decided to invite all the political parties to a meeting in Westcliff together with people from all the communities of Chatsworth. That turned out to be a turning-point in their struggle. Attending the meeting was a pre-apartheid freedom fighter, Professor Fatima Meer, representing a group called the Concerned Citizens Group (CCG) made mostly of Indian ANC members and pre-apartheid freedom fighters. They were going to Indian communities to promote people to vote for the ANC in the upcoming national elections, but especially to convince Indians not to vote for the 'white parties' (the New National Party and the Democratic Party) in the upcoming general elections in June 1999 (Desai 2000, 2002, Dwyer 2006). Instead, they were met with anger and stories of the poverty in the flatted areas of Chatsworth. "At that meeting they were attacked very badly, and it was at that meeting that the Concerned Citizens Group and Fatima Meer decided what their position (…) in our communities were. When they truly listened to the plights of the poor people" (interview, W-FRA leader).

At this moment things started to change. Professor Meer and the CCG members realised that the situation in these communities was far more complex than what they first thought was the lack of a revolutionary, non-racial consciousness (Desai 2000, 2002). After spending some time in the communities, and being exposed to the poor and appalling conditions people were living under, with no fault of their own, Professor Meer and the CCG members realised that the reason for non-payment of rent and services in these communities was an 'economics of non-payment', and not a 'culture of non-payment'[5] as proposed by the

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[5] There has been a debate about the government's view/discourse on the 'culture of non-payment'. For a discussion challenging this view see McDonald and Pape (2002).

government. Instead of canvassing for votes for the ANC, Professor Meer and the CCG got together with the residents of Bayview and Westcliff and made a survey of the socioeconomic conditions in the communities.

The results were appalling: of 504 families in the Bayview and Westcliff areas, 75% lived below the poverty line, 58% were unemployed and 42% were dependent on welfare grants (Fatima Meer in Natal Mercury 17 February 1999 in Dwyer 2006). In addition to this, children where not in schools for lack of fees, and diseases of poverty raged unchecked (Desai 2000). The results were piled in a report to present to the ANC government to convince them that evictions and services cut-offs should not be visited on these poor. Thinking this report would be the first snowball in building up for positive changes in the communities, it was instead a proof of disbelief and disappointment in the ANC seeing that they totally ignored the terrible conditions it had exposed. The CCG then abandoned its quest for votes for the ANC, and turned itself into a human rights pressure group. It acted as a catalyst revitalizing flatdwellers' associations in Units 2, 3 and 10 of Chatsworth, and a powerful leadership started to emerge in these areas (Desai 2000). In meetings with CCG, Chatsworth flats residents, community groups from around Durban, students, academics and others, actions were discussed, banners made, political videos showed, and so the crafting of a powerful resistance was born (Dwyer 2006). The CCG changed its name into the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF) to disassociate itself from its previous connections to the ANC, and in line with its new identity as the co-ordinating body linking groups in Durban and South Africa. It was at this time the two CSOs were formally constituted, in June 1999, just after the national elections. Coming from neighbouring communities, living under the same socioeconomic conditions in government-owned flats, and having an identical history and grievances, it is almost impossible to differentiate one from the other.

The Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA) in Bayview has an executive of 18 members, of which 17 are women (Benjamin 2007). The current leader is a young male of 25[6] years that has been the chairperson of the BFRA since six months after its birth. The leader's involvement in community activism started early with being the Secretary of the FAC at an age of 18. When the BFRA was constituted he was elected Secretary, and was later on (when the initial chairperson resigned) nominated and elected by the community to be the leader

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[6] That was in 2006 during my fieldwork, this year he will be 27.

(Interview, BFRA leader). The committee has not changed much over the years where "almost 90% of the people that are still in the current committee have been there [in] the last 4-5 years" (Interview,BFRA leader).

The Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) is located in the neighbouring community, Westcliff. The W-FRA also has a committee dominated by women. Although it has gone through changes over the years, many of today's committee members have been there for many years. The biggest difference between the two CSOs is the leadership: whilst the BFRA is lead by a young man, the W-FRA has had a 40 something year-old female leader since its birth.

Both CSOs have democratically elected leaders and committee members, but are dependent on committed people, as all work is unpaid and voluntary. This entails a certain flexibility in the roles given each elected committee member and leader, where their roles can be overlapping, or even be 'taken over' by 'volunteers'[7]. The CSOs do not have the resources for a formal office, so the leaders' homes often function as provisory offices from which they organize the activities necessary for the running of the organization, such as writing, printing and scanning documents/letters. Despite having relatively identical historical beginnings, sharing the same grievances and goals, and having a more or less informal organizational structure, the CSOs do, as will transpire throughout the discussion in the analytical chapters, have many important differences.

The period (1999-2002) in which the CCF was most active in the communities was also the period of most action. Both activists and people from both communities speak warmly of this particular time in the history of their struggle, and many see themselves as igniters of the post-apartheid struggles in South Africa. One W-FRA committee member, the first to be forcibly evicted in Chatsworth, proudly said: "In fact I started the struggle" (Interview,W-FRA member 1). The BFRA leader, talking of Chatsworth as a whole, said:

> From the eviction and the resistance that occurred in Bayview and Westcliff here in Chatsworth in the year 2000, the Anti Eviction Campaign started in the Western Cape, the Anti-Privatisation Forum started in Johannesburg, so Chatsworth, in a sense, gave rise and birth to social movements in South Africa.

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[7] Volunteers are here defined as people actively involved in CSO activities, but who do not have any formal position in the CSO as they have never been formally elected into the committee.

Today, the CCF does not have such an active presence in Chatsworth as during the three first years (1999-2002) of its existence. While some argue it has demised, others argue that the CCF, just like other movements, have quiet periods and that these kind of inactive periods can be used to rethink new strategies in relation to the state (Dwyer 2004, Desai 2002). In an interview with the front leader of the CCF, Professor Fatima Meer, she argued that the CCF gradually abated. She claims that due to lack of funding it was difficult to sustain the organisation and uphold momentum. Nonetheless, she argues that as an organisation it made a difference and that the people in it are still active today.

Whether or not the CCF is inactive today has certainly not affected the level of activity in the two communities, especially not in Westcliff. The following part presents today's continued socioeconomic challenges in the two communities, and forms an important backdrop in understanding the issues facing the W-FRA and the BFRA in their daily workings.

Continued socioeconomic challenges

The awakening of civil society, and especially of the W-FRA and the BFRA, must be seen in light of neoliberalism and globalisation. The effects this has had on the South African economy and society as a whole is the cutting back on free or heavily subsidised essential services that meet basic needs, undermining of the progressive labour legislation, the reduction of progressive taxation and the free flow of money between countries (Egan and Wafer 2004).

Today's socioeconomic problems have worsened since the ANC came to power and represent great challenges for the people in Bayview and Westcliff. According to statistics based on the 2001 census around 40% of the population in both Bayview and Westcliff are not economically active and more than half of the people in both communities have no income (58% in Bayview, 55% in Westcliff) (Ward profiles 2003, StatsSA). Other surveys done in the communities by the IBR and CCG together with the BFRA "showed about 76% living below poverty (…) living below R1200,-. There was 46% unemployment rate and 16% no income. The recent [survey] was done when the Council was doing the upgrade (…) and that showed 86-87% living below the poverty line" (Interview,BFRA leader). The BFRA leader continued to say: "If you look at the expenses and the income then [people] are generally

living in poverty". Judging by these poor economic conditions the non-payment of rent and services seems to be rather unavoidable.

Non-payment of rent and services is rife in both Bayview and Westcliff. Although most paid during apartheid, many have accumulated huge arrears due to a combination of raised unemployment rates, the reduction of social grants (due to the replacement of the State Maintenance Grant during apartheid with the Child Support Grant in April 1998), and increased prices for rent and services.

Non-payment is, in the gust of the market-oriented GEAR and its push for cost-recovery, punished with cut-offs, and most controversially in the case of South Africa, evictions (McDonald & Pape 2002). These methods of counteraction towards non-payment have been met with anger and resistance among the people in both communities till this day, and have raised questions among people unable to understand the government's behaviour: "If the government raises and increase of rental and not increase our salary, how are we gonna cope?" (Interview,Bayview resident 4).

Drug-abuse in both Bayview and Westcliff is soaring and represents a huge challenge especially among the youth[8]. 'Sugars', a highly addictive drug consisting of a mix of cocaine, heroin, rat poison, and, some say, house detergents, is rife in both communities. According to the founder and chairperson of the Chatsworth Anti-Drug Forum the drug is most widespread in the Indian communities in Durban (Chatsworth and Phoenix) and has resulted in:

> ...untold damage to the individual users and their families; the abuse has changed these neighbourhoods. Crime is going through the roof because abusers steal anything they can to pay for their next hit [dose]. Gang wars have taken off - there have been four gang-related killings in the last few months - and there appears to be no end in sight.
>
> (IRIN 2007)[9]

In addition to this, alcohol abuse and domestic violence is rife. In most cases of domestic violence the men beat their wife and children, and some incidents have even resulted in death[10].

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[8] www.iol.za

[9] 'South Africa: The drug trade's bitter taste' at www.alertnet.org, 17 May 2007.

[10] The W-FRA leader told me about a six-year old girl by the name Nikita who was killed by her father in Westcliff. The Nikita-case is well-known in the community. During my fieldwork period the CPF were arranging '16 Days of Activism' against violence against women and children, and in several community meetings in Westcliff the W-FRA leader tried to urge people in the community, especially the men, to participate

The drug-trafficking in the area has enriched those living of this business, the *drug-lords*. Although immensely disliked in both Bayview and Westcliff, some people have ended up being small-scale drug-dealers themselves due to the difficultness of getting a job with enough pay to remain safe in their home, and be able to feed their children[11].

Accusations against community leaders in being involved in drug-business happens, and are in some cases used to undermine a leader's reputation and legitimacy. During my fieldwork that kind of accusations against the leaders did happen, and were used more vividly were constituents regarded their leader as being illegitimate. Even the leaders themselves acknowledged the fact that some community leaders are involved in this life-destroying business. One of the leaders said in an interview: "Most community leaders benefit from drug lords, some of them may be involved in it, you know, one way or the other. That have family members involved in it, you know".

Despite knowing who the drug-dealers are, and despite their aversion towards them, people seem to be helpless in their quest to get rid of them. According to residents in both areas, the difficulty in combating the drug-circulation is mainly due to a corrupted police force that in many cases benefit from the drug business itself. One informant told me: "I feel the polices are corrupted. They are not strong, they are not there for the community, they are only there for the drug-people" (Interview,BFRA member 1), another had no hope in it being changed, lamenting: "The thing is you can't really count on it being changed, you know, the local police involvement, because they are very corrupt (…)" (Interview,BFRA leader). This lack of trust in the police is a huge challenge and makes it almost an impossibility to do anything about the social problems in the communities.

As many are unemployed and struggle to get an income, many become small-scale shopkeepers and transform their private home into a type of 'tuck-shop' from where they sell all kinds of snacks and sweets, some even cigarettes and alcohol. Others go from door to door in the community selling clothes, underwear, make-up and other petty things. This is a survival strategy used by many people in the communities as it is difficult to accumulate money by other means. Some sell things at the weekly 'Bangladesh Market' in Westcliff on Fridays and Saturdays. Those who cannot get adequate money, due to the desperateness of their situation, are often pushed into lending money from local loan-sharks, also called

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in the making of a human chain arranged by the CPF to mark aversion against women and child abuse. In one community meeting she said: 'Let's never forget Nikita' (community meeting, Westcliff, 08.11.06).

[11] Informal conversations, Westlciff.

'interest-people'. Although they provide an immediate relief, they are, in many ways, a long-term pain. From what I observed and heard, there was about a handful of them in Westcliff, and about the same in Bayview. Being the last resort for people in desperate situations, and knowing they utilise the poor, they are generally not liked in the communities. One lady angrily lamented:

> (...) there are people that collect interest in the area. Speaking of those people that are eating poor people's money that don't have food on their table, don't have the next meal on their tables, people are so desperate, they go to the interest-people and ask them for help, (…) those are the people I don't think should be living here in this place, in this area like this.
>
> <div align="right">(Interview,Westcliff resident 8)</div>

According to Benjamin people also borrow money from drug-dealers, or buy on credit from tuck shops in the area. "The interest rates are often so high that some end up paying solely the interest. Some people (mostly women) are forced to go begging on street corners and shopping malls, or are forced into prostitution to pay off their debts or to buy food" (2007:193).

This socioeconomic context forms a backdrop to the analysis of the two CSOs' cultural framing strategies, their choice of political strategies and their mobilising structure. These themes are presented in the theoretical framework in the following chapter. What will be evident is that the two CSOs generally share identical framing strategies, but have significant differences in their political strategies and mobilising structure.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter provides a general overview of the theoretical framework used in this thesis to assess the legitimacy of the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) and the Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA). The theoretical framework is based on McAdam et al.'s (2004) synthesizing, comparative perspective on social movements based on themes that have been emphasized in recent social movement theory, namely; cultural framing, political opportunity structures (POS), and mobilizing structures.

Although the thesis uses themes from social movement theories, it does not necessarily mean that the W-FRA and BFRA (here referred to as CSOs) are defined as social movements, but rather that these social movement themes can illuminate important aspects of the CSOs by virtue of their explanatory power and because they are prevailing themes within the literature on civil society. The CSOs are, after all, conceptualised as the smallest building blocks of social movements due to their history as being part of a social movement (Desai 2002, Dwyer 2004; 2006). And although a single organisation is not a social movement in itself, it can, despite organisational differences, be involved in a social movement process (Tilly 1988, Oliver 1989 in della Porta & Diani 2006). The three different social movement themes are seen as complementary and will help to shed light on both internal and external aspects that are important to know in order to assess the CSOs' legitimacy among their constituents.

Before discussing each of these social movement themes, a presentation and explanation of the main concepts used in the thesis will provide a better understanding of their use and their substance.

Civil society

It is a need to recognize that there exist a myriad of definitions on civil society. The term has generally been used vaguely, although presented as if it carries a clear and universal meaning (Tvedt 1998), but the definition proposed by the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society is illustrative:

> "Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests,
> purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the
> state, family and market though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society,

family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups" (LSE 2005:2).

This definition captures the multi-faceted nature of the concept, as well as rendering it analytically and empirical useful, and at the same time grasping neatly the South African case.

Civil society is seen as a carrier of positive values such as trust, tolerance and co-operation and has therefore become synonymous with 'good' society (Van Rooy 1998:12). Although it might be 'good', warnings are posed against treating civil society as a homogenous entity as it then will become overly romanticized. Oversimplifying the concept civil society is seen as a malady due to its location in a complex reality of conflicting interests and opposing agendas. The treatment of South African civil society as a homogenous entity has rendered it academically and politically unsustainable (Habib & Kotzé 2003). Civil society has been made "synonymous with the voluntary sector (Third sector), and particularly with (…) groups (…) and other actors explicitly involved in 'change work' (Van Rooy 1998:15), and is defined as all "organised expressions of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, the state and the market" (Habib & Kotzé 2003:249).

The concept of legitimacy

The concept of legitimacy has been debated for decades in the disciplines of sociology and political science, and even for *centuries* in social and political philosophy (Jost & Major 2001). It is argued that Max Weber is the single most important theorist on the subject (Zelditch 2001). Weber meant that the legitimacy has a decisive meaning for the stability and exercise of authority in social organisations, and that all social systems try to create a legitimacy foundation through, for example, socialisation. In that sense, "although political legitimacy dominates, legitimacy is a phenomenon of "the social order"" (Zelditch 2001:39). Although being important in understanding political life, the concept of legitimacy is fruitful in understanding everyday social interactions (Ridgeway 2001). This argument is based on the belief that people value many characteristics that are strongly associated with perceptions of legitimacy, such as fairness, truthfulness, and rationality (Jost & Major 2001).

A large part of the literature on legitimacy is normative; focusing on what people ought to think is legitimate (Zelditch 2001). This thesis will focus on describing the empirical behaviour of actors, hence arguing that a subjective definition of the term is sufficient for the purpose of the thesis. The definition of legitimacy here, then, is that: a CSO is seen as legitimate if it works in accordance with the interests of the people, and adopt (political) strategies, organizational procedures, and distribute resources in a way that is acceptable among its constituents.

The thesis looks at four analytical concepts (framing, political strategies, delivery, and participation) that will be analyzed and discussed through *three* social movement themes, namely *cultural framing*, *political opportunity structure* (POS), and *mobilizing structure*. The four analytical concepts are operationalised in the presentation of each social movement theme which will be presented later in this chapter.

The discussion of the four analytical concepts is intended to illuminate the content of the relationship between the CSOs and their constituencies (micro-level), as well as the content of the relationship between the CSOs and the state (meso-level). Altogether, they constitute a complex picture of the various relationships that co-exist and influence each other in the space(s) between the grassroots and the state. Figure 1 presents a working-model illustrating the various linkages between the four analytical concepts, and how they interact in the spaces between the CSOs and their constituencies, as well as between the CSOs and the formal local political system, and how these relations impact on each other.

Figure 1: Working model.
An overview of the relation between the CSO and the community and the CSO and the formal political
system, respectively, and how the four analytical concepts (framing, political strategies, participation and
delivery) impact on these relationships. The two relationships illustrated here also influence each other.
Source: Fieldwork.

How these four aspects (framing, political strategies, delivery and participation) are interlinked with the CSOs' legitimacy will be discussed in the following analytical chapters. Before going into the discussion of the three social movement themes the thesis will first define and discuss three 'blocks' of civil society groups: civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and community based organisations (CBOs). The reason behind this choice is that the thesis is referring to the W-FRA and the BFRA as CSOs since they both are part of civil society, but as will transpire in the discussion in the analytical chapters, their differences make them look like different types of CSOs, one employing characteristics similar to a 'typical' CBO, and the other characteristics rendering it similar to an NGO.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

When referring to both the W-FRA and the BFRA simultaneously, the thesis uses the term civil society organizations (CSOs). Although there are differences between different types of civil society organizations, such as CBOs and NGOs, the term civil society organisations (CSOs) is a more all-encompassing term and refers to the broad range of associations and groupings that fall under the term civil society (Habib & Kotzé 2003). The choice of calling

them CSOs from the outset of the thesis also facilitates a more nuanced description of them later on in the analysis when their differences appear more clearly.

Like social movements, CSOs are part of a heterogeneous society. Thus, in order to avoid homogenizing it, and rather comply with the request of Habib & Kotzé (2003) to consider civil society as a heterogeneous space, this thesis assumes a description of CSOs identical to Jelin's description of social movements, namely as: "objects constructed by the researcher, which do not necessarily coincide with the empirical form of collective action. Seen from the outside they may present a certain degree of unity, but internally, they are always heterogeneous, diverse" (quoted in Egan & Wafer 2004:2). The W-FRA and the BFRA's seemingly identical form should, therefore, not trick researchers into thinking they are altogether identical. As will be discussed in the analysis, they do have important organisational and 'political' differences.

It is also argued that accountability and transparency are central elements in the strength of CSOs (Habib & Kotzé 2003). Therefore, it is interesting to see how two CSOs, that at first glance seem to be very similar, are perceived differently among their constituents precisely due to their different ways of being accountable and transparent.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Although NGOs are seen as part of civil society, Van Rooy makes a distinction between NGOs and CSOs arguing "NGOs are often described in service delivery roles, whereas CSOs are depicted as political agents" (Van Rooy 1998:35). In practice, NGOs are bigger, more formalised organizations (Habib & Kotzé 2003). They are not necessarily driven by internal democracy, and might, under the authority of a strong leader, not constitute a space for wider participation in decision-making processes (Mercer 2002). They are also said to be distinguished from community-based organisations (Habib & Kotzé 2003). NGOs are largely defined by their sub-contractual role to the state (Habib 2005). To say that an organisation is an NGO Tvedt (1998:15) has listed five criteria: 1) it has to be formally constituted, but not necessarily registered legally, 2) it has to be non-governmental in its basic structure, and organisationally separate from the government, 3) it has to be self-governed with elected representatives that should be responsible to their constituency, 4) it can not generate profit, and, 5) has to be based on voluntary work to a high extent. In many cases the NGOs do not have formal members, but rather 'supporters', because their loyalty to the organisation is

measured through their participation in it (Tvedt 1998). Some of these criteria are criticized for not being applicable to African civil society. In the Third World, NGO leaders can often be self-elected, and the internal organisational procedures can be unclear. This can render the organisation unreliable and illegitimate due to its lack of transparency (Tostensen et al. 2001).

The literature argues that civil society organisations that derive more than a certain percentage of their income from domestic public sources or foreign donors cannot be said to be part of civil society. The reason is that such an organisation can be too dependent on the state to actually represent a genuine expression of civil society (Tostensen et al. 2001).

Community Based Organisations (CBOs)

CBOs are usually smaller, less formalized groupings or associations operating at community level (Habib & Kotzé 2003). Since they are based on voluntary work, and most people that join these organizations often are resource-poor and unemployed, commitment and perseverance is usually lacking and constitute a great challenge. Continued participation by people in these types of organizations is then most often motivated by religion or personal identification with the problem at hand (Habib & Kotzé 2003). It is argued that CBOs in developing countries are organising around "the human fall-out" of neoliberal programmes. These smaller CBOs are situated closer to ordinary people's lives and tend to organise around quite specific issues and identities which are broadly related to social exclusion and exploitation (Habib & Kotzé 2003).

In the post-apartheid context CBOs emerged from within marginalised communities to enable the residents to survive the ravages of poverty in a neoliberal climate (Habib & Kotzé 2003).

The CSOs in this thesis share similar characteristics to social movements, as defined by Habib & Kotze (2003). Social movements are seen as largely preoccupied with protesting against the impact of neo-liberal, social and economic policies and preventing their further implementation in South Africa. In the same manner, the CSOs in Chatsworth are challenging the local state in preventing it from evicting poor residents who are unable to pay their rents (Desai 2000, 2002, Dwyer 2004, 2006, Habib & Kotzé 2003).

According to Miraftab & Wills (2005) the South African civil society is by the media presented as a division between 'authentic' NGOs and community-based organisations that are portrayed as 'rightful' and 'authentic' voices of the poor, against the grassroots movements whom are presented as 'inauthentic' and who's agency often is criminalized

(Miraftab & Wills 2005:209). Anyhow, some analyses of civil society in South Africa argue that although CBOs and social movements are seen as two different analytical constructs, they are seen as fluid and non-static entities (Habib & Kotzé 2003).

Key themes in social movement theories

Cultural Framing

> "The conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action"
>
> (McAdam et al. 2004:6)

Studies of cultural framing focus on how cultural processes create a basis for, and are a product of, collective action (Stokke 1999). Framing-based studies of movement *culture* have a more-or-less agency-oriented theoretical perspective and are all concerned with *meaning*. Since their beginning, and up to now, their main interest has been to see how internal dynamics start and maintain collective action efforts. Studies on framing have contributed to an "increased understanding of the emergence and articulation of grievances, the dynamics of recruitment and mobilisation, and the maintenance of solidarity and collective identity" (Williams 2004:94). Snow and Benford (1988) have looked at three types of framing all necessary in moving people to actually partake in collective actions. These three framing-types are *diagnostic*, *prognostic*, and *motivational* framing. Analogically, Gamson (1992) argues that three types of frames, namely 'injustice', 'agency', and 'identity' frames are all necessary for a frame to go from understanding to motivating action.

Diagnostic frames entail problem-identification and attribution of blame. This means that what the people or the organisation see as a problematic aspect of their social life is diagnosed as such, as well as whom or what is to blame for the problems are explicitly voiced. *Prognostic* framing involves an articulation of a proposed solution, suggesting specific strategies or a plan to solve the problem at hand. Although finding people who agree with the framed problems and the proposed solutions, this alone is not necessarily enough to attract supporters' participation. In order to motivate people to take part in ameliorative collective action *motivational* framing is necessary. Motivational framing provides a rationale for action, a "calls to arms" and includes the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive (Benford & Snow 2000). This refers to what Gamson (1992) calls the "agency" component of collective action frames. In addition to these framing tasks, the creation of a

collective 'we' and a 'them' identity (also done in the CSOs' diagnostic framing) is necessary to create a collective sense of togetherness and 'being in the same boat'. The common identity built in the CSOs framing-work can play a very important part in building unity. This happens when people define themselves within the same frames (by belonging to the same community, by being unemployed, by being poor, and so on). Furthermore, this can facilitate the engagement of people in 'contentious politics' through collective mobilisation (Stokke 1999).

These three framing components are all necessary in the mobilisation in Westcliff and Bayview. Cultural framing is then defined based on the CSOs' diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. In order to assess their *legitimacy* in relation to their use of framing, the thesis will look at how people in Bayview and Westcliff identify themselves with the BFRA and the W-FRA, their strategies, aims, and ways of communicating with them, and whether they believe the CSOs are working in line with their ideas and perceptions. Although framing is almost exclusively restricted to discourse, this thesis will look at the implementation of actions as necessary to convince the people that the CSOs' discourse is resonant and believable. This is, as my findings show, necessary for the CSOs to be able to motivate people to participate in mobilisation, but also important for the CSOs to have a continued significance in their constituency. Thus, for framing work to be successful, it depends on the organisational structure (the mobilising structure) of the organisation. A similar argument is posed by Dwyer (2006:103) when he argues that: "What form an organization takes is crucial, for while a particular framing process may encourage mobilization (…) the potential for framing is conditional upon participants' access to mobilizing structures".

Framing political opportunity

Political discourses are very important in most political struggles and give marginalized groups the possibility to take advantage of such discourses as one of their few assets (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen 2002). Political discourses exist within and between the political sphere and civil society, and can have positive outcomes for a social movement when used strategically for the benefit of the movement. Such discourses are interesting to take into consideration when scrutinizing the movements (Millstein et al. 2003). A key feature of the 1994 transition to democracy was the strong commitment to human rights on the part of all parties, and in particular the ANC (Egan and Wafer 2004). This transition proved to be a process of legitimization (Kelman 2001) as the progressive constitution legitimized all South

African's claims to their rights, as contradictory to the apartheid past. Ballard (2005) argues that the uncritical celebration of rights is problematic in that it tends to result in the assumption that because one has the right to education, adequate housing and services, that it must somehow be so. Yet, it is important to note the creative ways in which social movements have adopted the notion of rights. Claims to rights help even legitimize illegal activities such as reconnections and occupations of property (Greenberg 2004). How the W-FRA and the BFRA has adopted a language of rights in their framing work will be discussed more in depth in the following chapter.

The political discourses present in South African context are a mixture of the neoliberal globalisation discourse lead by dominant global institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation (Bond 2004, Egan and Wafer 2004), a powerful global development discourse that favours institutional reforms in favour of democratisation, human rights (Jones 2005), decentralisation, good governance and strengthening of civil society. Such discourses and their institutional manifestations define political spaces for various individual and collective actors who claim to be the legitimate expressions of these good causes and the people (Millstein et al. 2003). The next part discusses how political spaces are utilized by collective actors.

Political Opportunity Structure (POS)

In recent years, the relationship between social movements and the state has gained more attention. In scrutinizing this relationship, the study of political opportunity structures (POS) is of great relevance. The POS can briefly be described as political opportunities that can trigger collective mobilisation (Stokke 1999). The notion of political opportunity structures moves the analytical attention away from the movements themselves "and on to the contours and dynamics of the wider society in which the movements operate" (Williams 2004:95). Tarrow (2004) claims that the POS addresses the structures (both formal and informal) of the political system that creates opportunities or constraints for collective mobilisation.

McAdam (2004:27) integrates four studies (done by Brockett 1991, Duyvendak & Giugni 1992, Kriesi, Koopmans, Rucht 1996, and Tarrow 1994) on these contours and dynamics, and has presented the similarities in their views on the political opportunities and constraints facing social movements as;

1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system;

2) the stability or instability of that set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity;

3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and,

4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression.

The first dimension highlights the formal legal and institutional structure of a given polity. The second and third dimensions are more directed towards the significance of the informal structure of power relations. The fourth dimension concerns repression in form of police violence, especially under protests. I also choose to include in this concept state efforts to co-opt or demobilise oppositional movements. This can happen through offering well-paid jobs to the leaders of these movements thus attacking the core of a movement's strength.

The openness or closure of the institutionalized political system

The post-apartheid period has witnessed a relative opening up of the institutionalised political system, giving people more opportunities to participate in, and influence, policy processes. The instruments and spaces that have become available make interaction between the state and civil society possible, and have indeed paved the way for a dual relationship where also civil society actors can challenge the state. The instruments available are the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the media, the courts, the constitution, and formalised attempts to have public input into most policies, local governments' Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), and even rhetorical support for mass demonstrations (Ballard 2005). Despite the opening up of these spaces, some analysts of the South African political economy have questioned the participation of CSOs in public policy processes (Edigheji 2003). Meer (1999, in Edigheji 2003) argues that participation of CSOs in policy processes has rather demobilised and delegitimized organs of civil society. The reason is that those who participate in the policy process have little time to consult with their constituencies on all issues, and as accountability and transparency is important for CSOs, they are being undermined as a result. Despite these negative aspects, one has to recognise the positive aspects of this civil society participation because they have made the process of governance more transparent, and elected officials to be more accountable (Edigheji 2003:105).

How the instruments and spaces that have been made available, such as IDPs and election of ward-committees, have been received and utilised by the two CSOs, and how their choices have influenced their legitimacy within their constituencies will be discussed later in the thesis.

Political opportunities can stimulate people to participate in contentious politics, while political constraints can be understood as the government's propensity to contain conflict between the state and the social movement through the use of different means. These can be seen as different forms of repression (Tarrow 1998), and will also be discussed later in the chapter.

Accessible 'spaces' for movement participation

Invited spaces of citizenship are created from above by local and international donors and governmental interventions (Miraftab & Wills 2005:209). In the case of the activists in Chatsworth, the creation of ward-committees through *supposedly* democratic elections serves as an example of an invited space they have made use of.

       Invented spaces of citizenship are spaces that are chosen, demanded, and seized through collective action from below (Miraftab & Wills 2005), one such space is the Social Movements Indaba (SMI). Invented spaces have, by the South African media and government, been termed 'inauthentic' because they have been created as a result of the "practicing agency of the citizens struggling to expand the public sphere" (Miraftab & Wills 2005:210).

       Insurgent spaces of citizenship are spaces that are grounded in civil society and are actions that are "exercised in the streets of a city, in the squatter camps and in the everyday life spaces of those excluded from the state's citizenship project" (Miraftab & Wills 2005:201).

Political strategies and contentious politics

Political strategies are, within the context of the two communities, strategies that have been used to communicate to the formal local political system the needs of the people in their quest for improving the socioeconomic situation they find themselves in.

       'Political strategies' are the actions taken by movements and are, in this thesis, defined in light of Tarrow's (1998) concept of '*contentious politics*'. Tarrow argues "contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents" and it is "triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack

resources on their own" (1998:2). This definition characterises social movements as acting in opposition to the state, immediately thinking that their relationship to the state is overtly conflictual. But Tarrow argues strategies can vary from outright resistance to cooperation. This flexibility, Tarrow argues, is characteristic of the modern social movement which is seen as a "multiform phenomenon ranging from protests that physically and symbolically attack the dominant system to those that bring movements within the range of conventional politics" (1998:104). This view is applicable to the findings in this thesis.

Repression versus state control

The state's efforts in containing protest actions, or people's resistance against forced evictions in Bayview and Westcliff, can be perceived differently depending on whether it is through the state or the people's eyes they are seen. della Porta and Diani (1999) argue that the state, when using police to control protests or resistance against evictions, see their actions as their legitimate right to exert power. For the state it will be a necessary political means to restore peace and order, whilst for the people that experiences the police violence, will see it as a form of state *repression*. Repressive means can have an impact on the action repertoire. It can lead to the employment of more radical methods of protest, and can create bigger conflicts between social movements and the political system. della Porta (2004) argues that in general, a tolerant and soft style of policing favours the diffusion of protest, while a repressive and hard policing of protest results in a shrinking of mass movements but a radicalization of smaller protest groups. What is evident in the analysis is that resistance against forced evictions have been met with violent responses.

"Contentious collective action is the basis of social movements, not because movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and often the only recourse that ordinary people possess against better-equipped opponents or powerful states" (Tarrow 1998:3). Organisers use contention to exploit political opportunities, create collective identities, bring people together in organisations, and mobilise them against more powerful opponents. "Much of the history of movement-state interaction can be read as a duet of strategy and counterstrategy between movement activist and power holders" (Tarrow 1998:3).

Martin and Miller (2003) argue that a relational and contextual approach to the study of contentious politics can provide nuanced and rigorous explanations of the processes and mechanisms driving contention, and a spatial perspective can produce more illuminative understandings of how people perceive, shape and act upon grievances and opportunities.

Creswell (1996) in Martin and Miller (2003) talk about 'in-place' and 'out-of-place' behaviour, where the former shapes everyday social behaviour, the latter calls attention to the unspoken social order or disruption of everyday social activity for example in the form of social protest. The places where grievances are identified and aired are not necessarily the same places where contentious politics eventually play out. Depending upon the geography of political opportunity, the contestants may attempt to shift conflict to different 'spaces of engagement' (Cox 1998 in Martin & Miller 2003:148) – either different places or different scales. It is exactly the contextual conditions in local places (socioeconomic differences between people living, for example, in the same area) that have triggered social unrest, shaped as social movements or protest actions, in South Africa.

Habib and Kotzé (2003) argue the CBOs experience increased marginalisation within the communities they organize in and represent. This marginalisation has put them in an adversarial relation to the government.

Mobilising Structure

Inspired by the abundant empirical work done by proponents of resource mobilisation theory and the political process model, the interest in studying the organisational dynamics of social movements has grown among movement scholars (McAdam et al. 2004). The study of mobilizing structures is in this respect essential. Mobilizing structures are defined as "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam et al. 2004: 3). One important strategy used by social movements in line with this is building social networks (Stokke 1999). By doing this, social movements can gain wide support which can form a basis for their establishment as a social movement. McCarthy (2004:141) argues that:

> The choices that activists make about how to more or less formally pursue change have consequences for their ability to raise material resources and mobilize dissident efforts, as well as for society-wide *legitimacy* - all of which can directly affect the chances that their common efforts will succeed. (Emphasis added)

A CSO's mobilizing structure is, then, interlinked with its ability to access resources, to mobilize people, and to gain legitimacy among its constituents which will finally affect their ability to reach their goals. Participation and delivery are two important issues that will be discussed in the analysis and constitute an important part of the W-FRA and the BFRA's

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mobilising structure. Mobilising structure is in this thesis not only concerned with the social networks the CSOs are made of, but their organisational structure and day-to-day operations and activities that facilitate a continued interaction between the CSOs and their constituents. This is also emphasized by Krishna (2004) who argues that CBOs need to have repeated and continuous interactions with their constituents not only to gain legitimacy, but to be able to build legitimacy.

The thesis distinguishes between three forms of participation, namely participation, non-participation and non-inclusion or exclusion. The three forms of participation are defined as follows: a) *Participation*: People's active or passive presence in community meetings and/or other arrangements organised by the CSO, b) *non-participation*: People's lack of participation due to personal choice, and, c) *non-inclusion/exclusion*: People's lack of participation due to factors outside their personal control such as the CSO's way of including or excluding them in various ways.

Social movements are usually embedded in dense relational settings and the creation of s*ocial networks* facilitates participation. Social structure affects individual and collective behaviour, and is generated and reproduced through action (Diani 2004).

Studies of diverse organisations have suggested that embeddedness in social networks not only matters for recruitment, but also discourages leaving the organisation, and maintains continued participation. Despite the arguments suggesting social networks are important, empirical evidence from other studies suggest that mobilization can arise outside social networks, or not at all despite the presence of social networks (Diani 2004). Another line of criticism against the importance of social networks argues that "focusing on networks diverts attention away from the really crucial process for mobilization, namely, the transmission of cognitive cultural messages. Although it can happen trough networks, it may also take place through other channels, such as the media" (Diani 2004:343). In this thesis, the physical presence and visibility of the CSOs in their constituencies is crucial for their ability to gather people and convey such "cultural messages" Diani (2004) is referring to.

CSO-structure
This thesis argues that a CSO is made up of a web of networks and relations that exist within the CSO and between the CSO and its community (its constituents) and other organizations

and groups (on a local and national level). These networks and relations, in sum, is the structure of the organization. As already mentioned, Diani argues that social structure affects individual and collective behaviour, and that structure, in exchange, is generated and reproduced through *action* (Diani 2004:339). Although he might refer to structure as the local and national context a CSO finds itself in, this thesis delimits social structure to a CSO's *internal organizational structure*. How this maintains, and is maintained by, the networks the CSO has with its immediate environment, its constituency, and other organizations and groups, as well as the formal local political system, is decisive for what legitimacy it receives in its constituency. Where the constituents have a direct influence on the organization through their direct participation in it, the structure of the organization is in line with what they perceive as legitimate. Where the opposite is the case, the organization will most probably be perceived as illegitimate.

For a CSO to maintain itself, then, is dependent on how this structure is maintained. But what is more important here is how the CSO maintain its *legitimacy*, and especially, its *structural* legitimacy (i.e. its legitimacy within its constituency based on how the CSO is structured and include its constituency in its daily workings as well as happenings).

Movement scholars concerned with the organizational dynamics of social movements have turned their attention to looking at, amongst other things, the "specification of the relationship between organizational form and type of movement" (McAdam et al. 2004:4). It will be argued in this thesis that the organizational form employed by the CSOs will impact on their relation with their constituents, and will as a result influence the constituents' perceptions of the CSOs.

The three social movement themes discussed here are seen as resources (organisational, political and cultural) which are important for a social movement (Stokke 1999).

Delivery and clientelism

Delivery is the distribution of goods, both tangible (such as groceries, clothes, school-stationary, funding) and non-tangible (entertainment, transport, information and so on) by the CSOs to their constituents. The concept of delivery (and access to resources) is discussed parallel to the discussion of the CSO – NGO divide, and is closely interrelated with the CSOs' use of political strategies (and relation to the state), and how open they (the CSOs) are in

regards to their constituents' participation in CSO-related activities (their mobilising structure).

Delivery can, depending on *how* an organisation chooses to deliver (distribute resources), foster clientelistic relations between the organisation and its constituents. Clientelistic relations are "based on the award of personal favours, and at times coercion, by the ruler - the patron - to the citizens, who are the clients" (Edigheji 2003:74). This creates a type of interdependent relationship between the CSO (the rulers) and its constituents (the ruled) where both, more or less, will benefit from each other's relationship. The reality is, however, that the patron manages to uphold this system due to the clients' deprived situation. Whether there are any signs of this type of relationship in any of the two communities the CSOs here are based will become evident in the analysis.

Summary

The theoretical framework presented here will be used to assess both the internal and external aspects of the W-FRA and the BFRA. Knowing that each dimension has both strengths and weaknesses, this theoretical framework offers *complementary* perspectives on CSOs. The political opportunity approach gives valuable insights into the *structural* opportunities and constraints facing the CSOs, but has limited understanding of context-specific processes and actors, whilst the actor-oriented approaches of cultural framing and mobilising structure do account for *internal processes* and the *context* within which the CSOs have developed and base their work, but lacks the structural dynamics in which these are embedded.

This thesis aims therefore at analysing the two CSOs' legitimacy by looking at how the CSOs frame (and politicize) their demands, their solutions and their 'enemies', where in the political terrain they choose to work, and how these choices are received by their constituents, and how people are mobilised into the activities of the CSOs. These issues are closely interlinked with the issue of legitimacy, and as will be discussed, legitimacy plays a major role in facilitating support to the CSOs by their constituents.

3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This chapter will present the research strategy employed in this thesis. How the data has been gathered and processed throughout the fieldwork period, as well as throughout the writing of this thesis, will be accounted for, as well as the weaknesses and the strengths of these choices. This discussion will create a basis for an assessment of the credibility, the confirmability, and the transferability of my findings.

Community mobilization in Chatsworth

Studying community mobilization has been an interest of mine since the beginning of my academic journey. After spending a year as an exchange student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, studying civil society and gaining knowledge on community mobilization in the areas around Durban, the motivation in studying community mobilization within civil society in South Africa, was even more intrigued.

The idea to choose Chatsworth as a research location for my studies was proposed by Dr. Richard Ballard, a professor at the School of Development Studies. Dr. Ballard has a great knowledge of civil society in South Africa. After reading about the Chatsworth-struggle[12] I was curious to see what was currently going on there and what changes had been made as a result of the struggle. To get more information about the current situation, Dr. Ballard, advised me to contact the leader of the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) whom he knew was currently very active in the struggles in Westcliff. A few days after talking with the W-FRA leader over the phone, I found myself in the midst of a rally in Crossmoor, one of the communities in Chatsworth. The rally consisted of several hundred people and activists from Chatsworth and surrounding areas. From that day on I had almost daily contact with the activists until I moved into Westcliff a community in Chatsworth one month later.

Fieldwork in Westcliff

The fieldwork was conducted in Westcliff from September 2006 to Mid-January 2007. I was living there from 25th October till 14th January. By literary being side by side to my key-

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[12] Desai 2000, 2002, Dwyer 2004

informant throughout big parts of my fieldwork, I gained valuable knowledge and understanding of the history of the area and the organisations. I also got insight into the current processes there, the W-FRA's daily activities and the various spaces and relations the W-FRA leader had to involve in as part of the W-FRA's activities and mobilisation.

By living in the area I got a great opportunity to see for myself who was the most active in the local organization, what kind and extent of knowledge people in the area had about their community, I also had access to people's life stories that gave me a deeper understanding and insight into the topic I was investigating as well as the background so important for understanding the current situation in the area, as well as the everyday happenings in the community, both in the private and the semi-public sphere.

Fieldwork in Bayview

Throughout the months living there and participating in W-FRA activities, I also gained valuable knowledge of the local dynamics at play in the neighbouring community Bayview, and the organisation situated there, the BFRA. It was interesting to include BFRA in my research as I became aware that although the BFRA was quite similar to the W-FRA and had the same struggle history, it had developed in a quite different direction. The interest to compare these two organizations was then intrigued.

I also participated in educational workshops at the CCS at the UKZN with students and civil society leaders, and was in the organizational group arranging the SMI 2006 in Durban. Being part of such events I got access to the spheres outside the immediate community and got a better understanding of how the W-FRA and the BFRA network with other groups facing similar challenges.

The development of research questions

Throughout the weeks and months I spent both living in Westcliff and participating in all the activities the W-FRA was involved in, I gained valuable knowledge of the local dynamics at play in the neighbouring community Bayview, and the BFRA's activity.

Before going into the field I had a general assumption of what I wanted to look at, but due to the limited knowledge I had about what was going on there, the research question was not ultimately set. I choose to say research *question* instead of research *problem* to avoid giving the impression that the issues studied are inherently problematic, which is not the case.

Johannesen & Tufte (2002) also share this view. The first phase doing 'explorative fieldwork' gave me a notion of what was going on, but still I was not sure what was of specific interest for my research. The development of my research question concur with ethnographic research where: "the development of research problems are rarely completed before fieldwork begins (...) the collection of primary data often plays a key role in that process of development" (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:37). In line with this approach, my initial research question changed after having spent a considerable amount of time in the field, and having seen what issues transpired throughout my interactions with people there. From being concerned with finding out as much as possible about the local struggles and seeking to grasp every aspect of what they contained, my research focus was eventually narrowed down. According to Thagaard (2006) the formulation of research questions should not be fixed, but open to changes both through the research process and the writing process. From focusing on the strategies employed by the activists in Westcliff in their struggle for housing and access to service delivery, I got familiar with a similar organisation; the BFRA in the neighbouring community. Getting familiar with two such similar organisations, and seeing how different they worked, I was intrigued to do a comparative study of them. From studying their similarities and their differences, I discovered that their different level of activity in their constituencies had an impact on the constituents' perception of them. From hearing people's stories and opinions, the research focus was narrowed down to look at the *legitimacy* the two CSOs attain in their constituencies. Focusing on legitimacy, and how I chose to define it, demanded an analysis of several aspects that together could shed light on the issue, and the nuances within the concept.

Methodological approach

This thesis is a study of civil society organisations' (CSOs) attained legitimacy in their constituencies, and is a comparative study of two CSOs situated in the same context. The methodology used in my thesis is based on an intensive ethnographic study of the W-FRA and the BFRA, and it was not always done in a systematic and formalised way. The main strategy was to be as close to the people as possible, and participate in all the happenings where activists from the organisations were present. Being an observer, a participant, engaging in informal conversations, writing field-notes, and doing semi-structured interviews, as well as reading literature done on the struggle in the area, I got very familiar with the various issues at hand in the communities, and their struggle.

Doing ethnography

> Ethnography is a method or a set of methods. In its most characteristic form it involves the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions - in fact, collecting whatever data is available to throw light on the issues that are at the focus of the research.
>
> <div align="right">(Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:1)</div>

This accurately describes the method I applied when approaching the field. When initially going into the area I choose to approach the field with an 'open-mind' and choose to do a several weeks long *explorative fieldwork* to gather as much information as I could to broaden my understanding of the mobilisation in the area.

Entry in the field

Thagaard (2006) argues that to get an entrance in the field the most important strategy is to get to know a central person, a gatekeeper, from that environment. A 'gatekeeper' has the authority to give the researcher restricted or unrestricted access to an environment or an organisation (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995). The person I first made contact with did function as a gatekeeper that gave me access into the field, and put me in contact with other informants and persons both from the local communities in the area (Chatsworth) as well as with activists from around Durban. Altogether, they gave me a broader view on the nature of the activism in the Durban areas. Almost on a daily basis I attended different happenings (see appendix 2: List of events), and throughout my fieldwork I was exposed to the daily running of the W-FRA, as well as its networks and associations with other organisations and movements. Through those intensive experiences I developed a more profound understanding of what the struggles were all about, especially in the eyes of those that were deeply involved in them.

In addition to the important role the gatekeeper played in granting me access into the field, the 'nature' of the field was to my advantage. Thagaard (2006) argues that in environments where people are *not* concerned with concealing their activities, they are usually more open to researchers coming in. In those cases getting access to the field is unproblematic. Chatsworth has, since the struggle escalated in the late 1990s and was exposed both in the media and thoroughly portrayed in Desai's books (see Desai 2000 and 2002), been a site exposed to researchers ranging from established academics to undergraduate university students from near and far. This was obviously to my advantage as people were used to

researchers coming into the area. In most cases my informants seemed to share their stories willingly, but in one case one informant expressed scepticism towards using her time on interviews stating researchers come and go but never do anything good for the community:

> Our voices, you can never hear our voices. People just come and interview, like eh… I'm not, I'm not saying…we see you one day, after that we don't see you… There's no agreement, there's no…you know. If you come to hear our stories, then after our stories go we don't hear a peep of you to say maybe, you know what, certain thing…
> (Interview, BFRA member 1)

This experience made me think about what positive impact my research could have on these people's situation. After having thought about it I realise that indirectly, somehow, the research done in these areas is one in a number of contributions to studies on civil society in South Africa. This can be of valuable importance for example for the South African government's current implementation of 'state-civil society partnerships' where the local state, for example in Durban, are inducing participation by the communities in decision-making processes around development planning[13]. Providing information on the nature of the dynamics happening in these communities can make decision-makers taking into account the local power-structures present in such settings to be able to target the needs of the true impoverished. Another issue is that by exemplifying and showing how the economic policies of the South African government impacts negatively on the poor, this thesis can be a contribution in the information of local communities in Chatsworth that the South African government can take into account when making decisions that have a direct impact on the people on the ground. By publishing the thesis in Norway, Norwegian institutions working with development projects in South Africa can be made aware of the various aspects of civil society groups in South Africa when implementing development projects or in interacting with the South African government. It must be noted, thus, that this thesis is only a limited contribution, but hopefully a valuable one.

Interacting with people in organisations made up of the urban poor, the unequal power-relations between the researcher and the researched are also obviously going to impact on the knowledge-production. Being literally the only white-coloured person in the community did not exactly render me unnoticeable, however, my long stay in one of the communities, and the contacts I made there, gave me an advantage in getting the trust of my informants in my role and my intentions with doing research there.

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[13] See Ballard et al. (2007) for more on these partnerships in Durban (eThekwini).

Data Collection

The data collected for this thesis has been done through qualitative interviews, direct and participant observation, informal conversations and secondary sources such as books, articles, films, and news articles and web pages from the internet. Before doing my fieldwork I read about the services and housing struggles in the area thus giving me an insight into the relatively contemporary history of the area. Informal conversations with key informants gave me a further insight in other perspectives of the history of the struggle in the area and of the present situation and issues. Yin (2003) argues that when you really have performed data triangulation, the events or facts of the case-study have been supported by more than a single sort of evidence (Yin 2003). Data triangulation is the collection of information from multiple sources. This thesis has used data triangulation. Participant observation has been the main method employed in gathering data-material, followed by semi-structured interviews. I will discuss each in turn.

Participant observation

The overall objective with participant observation is to be able to describe what people say and do in settings that are not structured or controlled by the researcher (Fangen 2004), and is normally done in fieldworks that last for an extended amount of time. Becker (1970 in Fangen 2004) argues that a long fieldwork increases the confirmability of the data-material as your conclusion is based on several hundreds of tests; not only have you seen many actions and heard many utterances that support your conclusion, but you have also seen so many actions and utterances that serve as evidence to disprove alternative conclusions. According to Hammersleay & Atkinson all social research takes the form of participant observation in that "it involves participating in the social world, in whatever role, and reflecting on the products of that participation" (1995:17). Becker (1970 in Fangen 2004) argues that data-material from doing fieldwork is 'rich' because the researcher will have a complex picture of the people he/she studies over time. Participant observation facilitates a closer relation between the researcher and the researched than any other qualitative method, and gives the researcher the opportunity to compare what the informants say with what they do.

Doing an intensive fieldwork over several months with daily interaction with the field facilitated a huge amount of participant observation. At times, the information I was exposed

to was so massive and intensive that I would not to be able to reconstruct all the information in my field notes. Spending most of the days with the activists from early morning to late night made it difficult to write down thorough field notes at the end of the day. Although wishing to do so, I was too tired to write down all the interesting observations I had made after having spent several intensive hours in the field. Despite this, all the continuous observations I did, the repeated happenings in the field, as well as the recurrent character of the stories told, made it easier to map out the recurrent and central issues concerning the people in the community. Fangen (2004) argues that when living in the field, being a fulltime participant observer, one cannot, and should not, note down everything that happens. It is important to be selective, if not, analysing the material will be too time-consuming to process.

I lived in one of the flats in Westcliff community for almost three months, and participated in a lot of the activities the W-FRA was a part of almost on a daily basis already one month before I moved into Westcliff. Hesselberg (1998) argues that being a participant observer is especially suitable when studying complex social contexts, such as interconnected networks and the role local leaders play in their constituencies. Spending much time with a local leader in the field gave me an insight into the daily activities managed by the leader, and all the interactions she was involved in throughout the course of a day.

The impact of the researcher's presence

The role as a white researcher from Europe is contested when having to deal with different actors in a community of urban poor enmeshed with people of conflicting interests and unequal power relations. No matter the level of participation by the researcher, her presence has an impact on the people she studies. It is important that the researcher reflects over how the informants perceive her and how the researcher's presence influences the informants. Where the fieldwork has a long duration the informants can 'forget' that the researcher is there and they behave as they normally would. How aware the informants are about the researcher's presence is also dependent on how busy they are with their own activities, and to which extent the researcher participates in the activities (Thagaard 2006). Where the researcher participates to the same extent as the researched, her presence will be less disturbing. Thus, the less one stands out, the less influence one will have on the people that are studied.

When I was in the field I tried to participate as much as I could in all the activities that happened. Although I always presented myself as a master's degree student from Norway

doing research on the struggle and the organisations in the area, my role was not only that of a researcher. Throughout my stay there I developed friendship bonds to certain individuals, and spent some of my time visiting people and chatting about issues not necessarily connected to what I essentially was suppose to study. Being frequently seen with the local leader (W-FRA leader) in the community, though, could have had an impact on how the people in the community related to me, and what they told me in the interviews. Being aware of this, I believe that by the character of the interviews and the conversations I engaged in, people seemed in general to be very honest in their answers.

Participant observation has played an important role in the development of my knowledge of the struggles in Chatsworth. It has provided me with a nuanced picture of existing power structures in the community (Westcliff), and how these play out in people's daily interactions. Without the information gathered and accumulated throughout this time I would not have had the same prerequisites I had to do a study of the CSOs' attained legitimacy in their constituencies. These observations also made it easier for me to get a better understanding of the informants' experiences with what they said in the interviews.

Interviews

The choice to do interviews was done to hear the nuances in people's own experiences and opinions, to substantiate the knowledge I already had, and to produce explicit material, with the informant's own words, that later could be used in the thesis as quotes. I choose to use a digital recorder for all the interviews for various reasons. The main reason was to facilitate my attention on the stories of the informants, keep an eye contact, and do the interview as similar to a normal conversation as possible without frantically taking notes. This was an intentional choice to make the informant comfortable and relaxed, at the same time I could think about probing questions to get more information on an issue, or clarify unclear answers. By recording everything no information will be subjected to interpretation by the researcher in the first phase of gathering data. This will increase the reliability of the data, and the quotes used in the thesis will be literally the informants' own expressions.

Using a recorder also has its negative sides. Hesselberg (1998) argues that the informant may be reluctant to speak openly about sensitive issues as he/she may be scared that the answers might be used against him/her. In other cases the informant can be scared of giving the 'wrong' answers. I experienced both. In one interview I had to assure the informant

that his answers would be treated with confidentiality as he said some things he was scared would be known to others. In another interview one informant felt uncomfortable with being recorded in fear of saying something wrong. The situation might have had the character of being formal and 'controlled' by the researcher so as to giving the informant associations of it being an oral exam. In these cases I had to assure that the information would be treated confidentially, and letting the informant know that there were no right or wrong answers. To make the informant comfortable about recording the interview I told her some of the questions and topics I was going to ask about so she felt more control over the situation. Despite these limitations, the interviews conducted gave me much information.

In many interviews the informants became emotionally involved in the issues they spoke about. Some got agitated about certain issues that concerned them a lot in their daily lives and that seemed to disturb them. At the same time they could laugh, or shake their head in resignation. These emotional expressions transpiring throughout an interview was for me signs that gave a strong impression of the answers being trustworthy.

In one occasion, one informant spoke about five to ten minutes before I could ask her the first question. She also avoided any eye-contact with me throughout the interview. This body language appeared for me as if the informant was reluctant to do the interview, and did not want me to ask questions she maybe did not feel comfortable of answering. During the interview she also literally expressed her concern about researchers coming into the community without contributing in changing things for the better for the community (see above). Because of this obvious reluctance towards me as a researcher I choose to ask her relative 'innocent' questions that provided me with background information I could use in the thesis. Later on in the interview she did change her attitude towards me slightly and seemed to express more vividly feelings around her opinions on various issues. The information provided in this interview was valuable for my thesis, and has been used explicitly in the text.

It was necessary for me to conduct interviews in Bayview, as most of the information I heard of what was going on there in most cases came from people not residing in the community. Doing interviews there proved valuable in testing what I had heard up against people's own experiences there. This way I could easier confirm or refute the information I already had.

Selection and access

The selection of informants to interview was done based on the networks I had developed in the field. Most of the people I had contact with, and whom I first interviewed, were all related to the W-FRA either as committee members (in this thesis simply referred to as 'W-FRA members') or 'volunteers' and participants in the W-FRA activities. I realized that the results would be biased when only relating to people that obviously would have mostly positive things to say about the organisation. Therefore, I choose to go around in the community (Westcliff) and actively seek people that were not affiliated to the CSO or any other organisation, or that did support other groups[14] in the communities. I did this to have access to other viewpoints on the W-FRA. One strategy was to go around in the community and ask random people whether I could interview them, or actively seek people I had heard of that were part of 'opposition' groups in the communities. Other times I met people by coincidence and that were neighbors of people I knew. Often people's doors were open and gave me access to sit in their homes and conduct the interview. In Westcliff most of the people in the flats knew I was there as a reseacher, and as I was the only white-colored in the community I was easy to spot. Being a white person in this township made up of most Indians and about 30% Africans was not problematic at all. I was generally welcomed in most people's homes and was always invited to a soft-drink or some food.

When interviewing people that were seen as the W-FRA's opposition I was met with suspicion and anger among some W-FRA members as they thought I had taken sides with their 'enemy'. They quickly accepted it when I explained to them thoroughly the purpose of my research and the importance of not being biased. I had to say that to get a 'real' picture of the W-FRA I had to include other views as well. Although it ended well, I still felt bad about the whole experience. As seen here, getting a too close relation with certain informants can create conflicts when the researcher does something the informants perceive as working against them and their integrity. What I learnt from this experience is the importance of being honest about one's intentions so that one will not get misunderstood along the way. I thought I had been clear on my role, but having spent a considerable amount of time with the W-FRA

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[14] I choose to use 'groups' here as people claiming to represent other organisations in Westcliff and Bayview often consisted of few individuals. According to both W-FRA and BFRA no other groups in any of the two communities are formally constituted.

activists clearly impacted on their expectations from me. For many I became a friend more than I was a researcher. What I can say now, after having been in the field, and experiencing such an intensive fieldwork, is that without my intensive interaction with the W-FRA activists and becoming 'one of them' I would not have had access to the information that led me to seek other informants that could shed light on alternative aspects of the W-FRA, or even choosing to compare the W-FRA to the BFRA.

Informants selected in Bayview where suggested by W-FRA activists in Westcliff. Although most of the interviews were done with people suggested by W-FRA activists, and thus would to a higher extent produce biased results, I did use the 'snowball method' there asking the informants I first interviewed if they could put me in contact with other informants in the community (Bayview) that would be interesting to speak to. In Bayview I spoke with people that had been actively involved in the BFRA, but not part of the committee, as well as committee members and the BFRA leader.

Ethical concerns

Staying as long as I did in the field gave me information on things that, if used, could potentially harm my informants. Although presenting myself as being a researcher, the informal character of most of my interactions could have led people to forgetting what I was actually there to do. At times informants shared sensitive personal information with me, and I was witness to activities that according to South African law and regulations are illegal. Although some of these activities could provide some nuances in the material when assessing the legitimacy of the organisations, I have chosen to exclude this information to protect my informants.

Being so close to people for such a long time may lead to a less distanced relation between the researcher and the researched, and instead of regarding me as being a researcher, for some I was perceived as a friend. The information disclosed in settings where my informants regarded me as a friend raised ethical concerns about using the information. When sensitive information has been disclosed it has been done in such a way that the informant cannot be recognised.

I believe that although my integrity as a researcher might be harmed because I choose not to disclose sensitive information, trying to avoid any harm on the informants outweigh the choice of including such sensitive information. As such I did not find it ethical justifiable to use such information in the publication of this thesis.

Analysing the data

The analysis of data is not a distinct stage of ethnographic research (Hammerlsey & Atkinson 1995), it is something that is done in a continuous process since the beginning of a study (Fangen 2004). Thagaard argues that analysis and interpretation are two activities that happen parallel to each other throughout the research process, and that they are difficult to differentiate because the researcher continuously reflects over how the material gathered can be interpreted while still in the field. However, despite being closely interconnected, the processing of data material in an early stage is seen as different from the later stages where development of concepts and reflections over how the material should be understood is done. The researcher's independent analysis of the data after fieldwork distances herself from the subjects under study (informants) and the relation changes to that between the researcher and the text developed from the field (Thagaard 2006). The arguments posed throughout this thesis should therefore not be considered to be an objective truth.

While it is rare for ethnographic analysis to begin from a well-defined theory, the process of analysis cannot but rely on the existing ideas of the ethnographer and those that she can get access to in the literature. The theoretical knowledge one has, and develops through the analysis of the data, should be used as resources to make sense of the data (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995). When looking for patterns or anything that stands out, what one is looking for depends on one's research focus and theoretical orientation. At times analytical concepts may arise 'spontaneously' being used by the participants themselves, and may be worth following up as they may mark theoretically important or interesting phenomena (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995). The analysis of the data has been done in different ways. As discussed under I used analytical concepts from the theory. But other aspects of my findings are shed light on through concepts developed from the data-material. This analytical method is inspired by grounded theory. Grounded theory is an inductive method where the informants' stories and the data-material gathered is guiding the analysis. Although traditional grounded theory was exclusively inductive, Strauss & Corbin (1990) are open for a more flexible relation between the categories developed from the empirical material and the use of relevant literature that can shed light on the empirical material (Strauss & Corbin 1990). This can give the researcher an effective tool in interpreting the material and understanding connections in the material better. This has especially been done in chapter 7 where I have tried to find different dimensions within the empirical data and added theoretical concepts (such as the 'free-rider' challenge) to better discuss and understand the issue of participation.

22 of 25 interviews were transcribed and provided a massive material constituting more than 300 typed and some hand-written pages. The last three interviews were not transcribed as the information was not very different from the other interviews, however, it does not mean that all the interviews transcribed were dramatically different from each other.

In assessing the informants' perceptions of the CSOs' legitimacy I tried to find recurrent themes in the material that said something about their views on the CSOs and the leadership. The material was coded in topics, and quotes from informants regarding each of these topics were placed in separate word-documents. This was very time-consuming, and I eventually changed strategy as I found four main analytical concepts that could be used in guiding the analysis of the material. The four analytical concepts are related to, and inspired by, three key themes in theories on social movements, namely: cultural framing, political opportunity structure, and mobilizing structure. Using these theories as a point of departure interesting themes and issues transpired within each of them. Using analytical concepts related to the theory proved valuable in making sense of the massive material gathered in the field. Most of the material in the analysis stems from interviews, informal conversations and participant observation. Much of the background information in chapter 2 stems from secondary sources, and from both interviews and informal conversations in the field.

The quotes I have used throughout the thesis are the informants' utterances on a material level and have been presented literally as they were expressed in the interviews. Still, the selection of quotes and how they have been presented and used in the text is an analytical expression of what I perceive as important to understand people's feelings about their CSO. The selection of quotes is done to exemplify and substantiate central aspects of the material, as well as nuances in people's views. Some informants were more vivid and thorough in their descriptions, thus, quotes from these individuals are more recurrent in the text.

Assessing the quality of the research

In social sciences, it has traditionally been proposed some standard criteria to determine the quality of the research. These criteria have been called reliability, validity and generalisation (Kvale 1996). Their usefulness has been fruitful in quantitative studies where knowledge has been seen as something measureable. These criteria have been replaced by some concepts that

better grasp and reflect the underlying assumptions in much qualitative research, namely credibility, confirmability, and transferability (Thagaard 2006).

One way of demonstrating the *credibility* of the research is to discuss how the researcher uses and develops information from the field (Thagaard 2006) so that the reader can assess the choices made by the researcher. I have tried the outmost to make the research as transparent as possible, and have done so mainly through explaining my positionality in the field, the context in which I gathered the data, as well as the theories and analytical strategies applied in the knowledge production and understanding of the topic and the informants' stories. Triangulation of data-gathering methods, yielding information from various sources, has contributed to overlapping findings thereby increasing the credibility of my interpretation and analysis of the data. Despite my efforts in accounting for my choices along the way, the uneven selection of data may render the analysis more familiar to some than others. This is not uncommon.

Whether the results can be confirmed or corroborated by others relates to the criteria of *confirmability*. Most of the aspects discussed within the concept of legitimacy are present within the theories framing this research. How I have applied the theory in the analysis of the findings appear clearly in the text. Other aspects of my findings are shed light on through concepts developed from the data-material. Thus, the concepts used in assessing legitimacy have been accounted for and have together produced a relatively credible understanding of legitimacy. As said earlier, the confirmability of the data collected increases when doing long fieldworks. The initial data gathered, and the assumptions made by the researcher about this data, can be strengthened or weakened based on continuous observations and data-collection in the field. See attached a list of all the events I participated in during my fieldwork period (Appendix 2). Although the findings presented in the analysis of the thesis can be said to be 'constructed' by the researcher it "does not automatically imply that they do not or cannot represent social phenomena" (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:18).

My findings cannot be generalized as the material was gathered in a specific place at a specific time. Richard Pithouse argues that when an academic article gets published it can do damage because the timeframe is so slow that when it finally gets published the situation is different on the ground. However, academic writing is valuable in that it records "what happens as it happens" although it can never be comprehensive as a phenomenon do have "layers of meaning". Anyhow, "lessons can be learnt from different times and different

moments" (Interview, 15.11.06). Having this in mind, I believe that although the findings in my thesis cannot be generalized, they are one contribution among many towards the understanding of civil society in South Africa. The fieldwork was done within groups of people, mostly, but not exclusively, made up of Indians, living in the flatted area in two neighbouring communities in Chatsworth, Durban. Thus, civil society groups that operate in other contexts will be influenced by other circumstances and other mechanisms that work differently and can create different outcomes. However, the researcher's understanding that develops throughout and within the frame of a study can be relevant in other similar studies.

Summary

This chapter has presented the methodological choices done in collecting and analyzing the data. Most of the data-collection was done through participant observation by living in one of the communities and by participating in all the spheres used by the activists. To substantiate my observations I chose to do interviews. Most of the information I have from the BFRA was collected through informal conversations with W-FRA activists and others, and mainly through interviews in Bayview. The massive data-material gathered through four months with intensive participation and being exposed to stories and happenings almost on a daily basis have increased the credibility and the confirmability of my findings. Despite having been so fortunate of having such close interaction with the field, the findings must not be interpreted as objective truth as the data gathered has been subjected to interpretation and analysis solely by the researcher.

4. FRAMING

This chapter will use the cultural framing approach to assess the W-FRA and the BFRA's use of framing strategies to diagnose problems, to distinguish between a 'we' (the activists) and a 'them' (usually the state), propose solutions and motivate people to partake in their actions. The issues framed as problematic, how these issues are justified by blaming the government's broken promises and unfulfilled constitutional rights, as well as the creation of a collective identity as 'poor', is identical for the two CSOs. The main differences between the CSOs are, however, on the frequency of their framing (W-FRA having more meetings and other activities in its community that facilitates communication with its constituents than the BFRA), and their different ways of motivating their constituents to participate in the CSO work and actions. The findings show that the W-FRA's uses a more altruistic motivational framing, whilst the BFRA uses a frame of duress. These differences will form a basis from which one of the CSOs (W-FRA) attains a more legitimate role in its constituency than the other (BFRA).

Diagnosing the problems and politicizing issues

The W-FRA and the BFRA have throughout the years of their existence had similar grievances and have diagnosed the same issues as problematic. Today, although the W-FRA is more active than the BFRA in its community through regular community meetings and frequent communication with its constituents, the same issues are *still* equally pertinent for the CSO activists and the constituents in both communities. The reason both communities share the same grievances is that they are both situated in the same socioeconomic context, and are facing similar challenges in regards to local social problems and economic deprivation mainly due to the government's socioeconomic policies. The following is a presentation of the issues diagnosed as problematic and which the W-FRA, especially, tries to combat through motivating its constituents on the need to act collectively in order to change them. The current issues have been seen as problematic for many years as the socioeconomic situation these people live under has not been improved since the birth of the CSOs.

The following is a presentation of the issues diagnosed as problematic. Although the presentation here can be apprehended as mere 'facts', it has to be noted that the information is

based on the informants' stories and the CSOs' use of framing. The information presented here was used by the CSOs in informing their constituents on why they are facing these problems and how they can combat them collectively. Most of the information transpired through weekly community meetings in Westcliff, other public gatherings, and one meeting in Bayview, as well as through many informal conversations with the W-FRA leader done frequently throughout the fieldwork period.

Ownership

The struggle against the government's attempt to sell the flats to the people is ongoing, and seems to represent a battle over meaning between the local government and the Chatsworth activists. Sale of government-owned property is part of the ANC's neoliberal strategy to transfer the administrative responsibility of the flats from Council to a locally elected body corporate in the communities.From the government's side it has been promoted with beautiful rhetoric: 'bringing housing to previously disadvantaged communities is the basis of our democracy, and owning one's own home is a form of empowerment for the people of Durban'[15]. To counteract it, and convince people that home-ownership will worsen their situation, the W-FRA conducts frequent meetings to discuss this issue. At one occasion they invited people already familiar with the problems with *home-ownership.* In one extraordinary meeting held especially to inform people from both Bayview and Westcliff about the problems, some activists from Wentworth (neighbouring township) argued that the body corporate system is detrimental to the relations between neighbours and families because of money (Wentworth activist leader speaking at meeting in Westcliff 05.11.06). Increased rates and interests have put people that were previously in good financial standing in huge arrears, and the body corporates are bankrupted. Another argument against ownership says the costs of living in a privately owned flat will be the same as when being a tenant. One W-FRA member, replicating what was said on the various meetings, said in an interview:

> The Body Corporate, the levies, the rates…It doesn't make sense. If you pay rent, lights, and water then suddenly Council want to get you and say 'now you don't pay rent, you pay RATE, lights, and water', but if you have to judge your rent-money and your rate-money it's almost the same thing! (...) So why is Council bluffing the people?
>
> (Interview,W-FRA member 4)

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[15] eThekwini Municipality Mayor Obed Mlaba quoted in Govender 2006:*'Home ownership for tenants', February 2, 2006* (www.durban.gov.za), published at the official website of eThekwini Municipality.

A Bayview resident feared the Body Corporate system would result in corruption, saying:

> The only problem is that among the people: who can you trust to be a body corporate? (...) Because they might elect a rog [thug]! And if you give money and they cheat your money, what are you going to do?
>
> (Interview,Bayview resident 3)

Another strategy to prevent people from accepting transfer of ownership is to tell them that the organization can no longer help them once the transfer-papers are signed. In the same extraordinary meeting the W-FRA leader said "Don't go to Rent Office. Then you work against us and our integrity" (Extraordinary meeting, Westcliff 05.11.06). In the one and only community meeting held in Bayview the BFRA leader used the same argument in another manner saying: All people that signed for ownership can not be helped. Do not sign whether you are threatened or not!" These arguments are used in the CSOs' relentless fight against the ownership because they know that shifting state-owned property into the hands of the people themselves will remove an important mobilizing subject. Desai has grasped this point as well arguing that "by privatizing living arrangements, collective memories of struggle would be replaced by the immediacy of dealing with banks and other lending institutions as individuals" (2000:48). To avoid a splitting up of people in matters like this the W-FRA leader continuously says "together we stand, divided we fall". This phrase has become her mantra and is used in all occasions possible to educate people on the importance of fighting this issue jointly.

However, it is important to notice that both CSOs relentlessly try to *convince* their constituents not to sign ownership-papers because many people do not have specific objections against ownership. Many think the idea of owning one's own home sounds nice. This has resulted in the CSOs changing their tactic in battling this issue because it seems that people eventually will accept it anyway. Now they are setting some terms; demanding a proper upgrade of the flats, and an arrears wipe-off before transferring of ownership can be done. The reason is that although the National Housing Subsidy Discount Benefit Scheme offers a subsidy of R7.500 to tenants who want to buy their flats, making it sound like the flats are free (see Appendix 4), people with arrears have to sign mortgage statements and pay their arrears in full before taking ownership (Narsiah 2002). As said in the Westcliff meetings, when people sign ownership they will thus automatically acknowledge their arrears.

The ownership issue is, as seen here, fused with confusing and conflicting mindsets, and has pushed the CSOs to change their strategies from rejecting the transfer of ownership to being open for a trade-off.

Prepaid meters

Both CSOs diagnose the installation of prepaid meters as a problem they need to combat, and argue mainly that the 'prepaids' will reduce people's access to electricity or water as their access depends on how much money they can pay. When not able to pay for water "the maximum access is 200 litres a day" (W-FRA leader speaking in community meeting 29.10.06) and a water-flow restrictor (by informants called a *'trickler'*) will dramatically reduce the water flow so it will take several hours to fill up a bucket of water. When able to pay, 20% of the paid amount will go towards the down-payment of people's arrears. In that way the prepaid system is forcing people to pay back their arrears. It is also reducing the amount of electricity available at once: "With prepaid meters you can not use all appliances in the house at the same time. The geezer[16] takes most electricity" (BFRA leader speaking at meeting in Bayview 26.11.06). The other argument posed by the BFRA leader is: "(...) we face problems if we destroy meters; they [Municipality] will say we tampered; now WE have problems!" The reason this is a problem is that for each time someone has illegally reconnected themselves to the water or the electricity grid they will be disconnected and fined with R820,-[17]. This is the main reason people have accumulated so many arrears over the years. According to the W-FRA leader, around 84% of the people living in Westcliff and Bayview have arrears (community meeting, 27.10.06). When someone asked the W-FRA leader why the CSOs in Westcliff and Bayview do not want to accept the prepaid system she firmly replied that they want a full write-off of arrears before implementing the 'prepaids' (Community meeting, Westcliff, 29.11.06).

For poor people with little or no income the prepaid system can end up forcing people to use other methods, such as drinking from polluted water streams, in order to get water. One of my informants in Westcliff told me that she and the many children she was the caretaker of were forced to drink water from a still-standing stream nearby due to being disconnected from the water grid. They became sick, and later it was revealed that the water turned out to contain dangerously high levels of Coliforms and E-coli which made it unhealthy and unfit for human consumption (Desai 2002). The same year, in 2000, KwaZulu-Natal experienced the worst cholera outbreak in the history of South Africa.

The arguments used by the BFRA in pleading its constituents not to accept the prepaid meters seemed to be an attempt in making them feel they were going against the others in the

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[16] Hot water container.

[17] At the time of my fieldwork 1ZAR (South African Rand) equalized 1NOK (Norwegian Crone).

community and contributing to the BFRA losing its battle against the prepaid system: "Few rotten potatoes went there to sign [accept prepaid water/electricity meters], so now we others also get rotten. If we don't do things together we're gonna loose" (Community meeting, Bayview, 16.11.06).

Although the W-FRA and the BFRA fight the same issue, they use different strategies in convincing people to fight it jointly. The W-FRA leader educates people on the consequences of signing and the costs involved, whilst the BFRA leader, although mentioning certain negative aspects, rather speak badly of the people that have already accepted the prepaid system.

Demand for arrear wipe-off

The accumulation of arrears is a huge problem in both communities and is a daily topic and major concern among the residents. Many are thousands of rands in arrears, some up to R80.000. The CSOs' aim to delete people's arrears is interconnected with their resistance against the prepaid system and the transferring of ownership as in both cases people have to account for their accumulated arrears and are forced to pay them back. In an extraordinary meeting arranged in Westcliff for residents from both communities a joint resolution letter was drafted. It ended with the words: "We will only talk to you if you write off all arrears!" (Public meeting, Westcliff, 05.11.06). At the moment the Council is only 'parking off' the arrears (see Appendix 4).

Upgrading

> They know we gonna fight tooth and nail for good homes! We don't want to accept it like it is now.
>> (W-FRA leader speaking in community meeting 22.11.06)

As illustrated in chapter two, the flats are in a very bad condition. The CSOs complain about a previous attempt by council to renovate and upgrade the flats that ended up in a total failure putting the flats in a worse condition than they already were in. The W-FRA leader complains about the waste of money: "R10.5 million was invested in Chatsworth for the upgrading; we have not seen any benefit of the upgradings!" (W-FRA leader in meeting 29.10.06). This problem is recognised by all residents in the two communities, making the issue of upgrading imperative for both paying and non-paying tenants.

Broken promises and a language of rights

The W-FRA and the BFRA have, as seen above, identical demands, additionally, they also frame their demands remarkably similarly. Two frames were outstanding and repeatedly used by all informants when framing issues as problematic. The first frame stresses the government's failure to deliver and claims that the government (more specifically local councillors) has broken the promises it has given the people. A sense of being betrayed and ignored by the government characterizes this frame, which here is referred to as 'the broken promises' frame. The second frame emphasizes people's rights to their claims, both as citizens and as human beings, and is here called 'the language of rights' frame. The common use of these two frames is identical for the two CSOs, and forms part of their view on whom and what is to be blamed for their problems. With these frames they manage to justify their continued activity and efforts in trying to mobilize their constituents. These frames were also found to be resonant in the constituents' own presentation and stories of what they themselves perceived as the root to their problems. The broken promises frame will be discussed first, followed by the language of rights frame.

Broken promises

Part of the diagnostic framing is to attribute blame on somebody for the problems identified by the CSOs. The South African government, and more explicitly the local government and the eThekwini Municipality, is generally blamed for people's problems and miseries in the communities. On a general basis the government is accused of giving promises it still has not been able to meet, promises such as those in their election manifesto "a better life for all" used to canvass votes among the poorer sections of the population. One BFRA member pointed at the local councillors as failures angrily saying: "(…) you [local councillors] promised us so much of things (…), you have failed to give us your promises (..), now is a time that we need you and you can't do what you all [promised] (Interview,BFRA member 1). Many claim that the councillors and representatives of the various political parties at local level coming into the communities during elections are only hunting for the poor people's votes for themselves to be elected as political leaders rather than actually helping the poor:

> When the councillor comes in he only goes to the poors and he ask for.., he gives them opportunities but the opportunities he gives is false opportunities. He promises things and after (...) he can never offer it. After he gets his votes he gets his things he know now he's the government itself, he can never be with us, he's always against us. You see?

This view is widespread amongst the informants of both communities and forms the basis of people's scepticism towards political councillors and representatives of various political parties, especially during election time. People do not know who or which political party to vote for as they do not know who can replace the current ANC government (especially at local level) and improve the conditions in the communities. One W-FRA member confirms this view saying that "All political parties make false promises" (Interview, W-FRA member 2). The lack of a political party to the left of the ANC is also a main reason for people's disbelief that the other political parties can make changes.

AW-FRA member calls the ANC liars saying: "ANC won, ANC didn't give us nothing! Nothing! (…) is like you're living with promises and lies at the same time!" (Interview, W-FRA member 4). Another W-FRA member believes the ANC councillors lead to division in the communities saying: "I'm a registered voter and a member of the ANC. I'm ashamed because they promised a better life for all. Councillors bring division instead of unity" (Interview, W-FRA member 2). People's view is also that "Council" is not only breaking their promises, but also breaking people's homes. A W-FRA member angrily said: "But Council, YOU should put shame in your face to say "we promised these people to give them homes" but you go and destroy people's homes" (Interview,W-FRA member 4).

Whilst most people are tired of waiting for the long-promised delivery and see the promises given by the government as broken promises, one Bayview resident saw it, still, as a delayed delivery of the promised services: "people are confused and every party say they will deliver, same that the ANC said they promise, but I think they are a bit slow with delivery" (Interview, Bayview resident 3).

Many people question the discrepancy between the government's promises of service delivery and their implementation of cost-recovery measures that forces relatively poor people to pay for their services, but also to pay back the arrears they have accumulated due to their unaffordability to pay their services. One Bayview resident question this discrepancy, saying: "And why now you promised us all that, and now you are coming to a time when you put in this prepaid meters, and if you buy a 100 rand of power, 50 rand will go to the arrears?" (Interview,Bayview resident 3).

The general views among my informants show that most people in both Bayview and Westcliff believe the national government, since its coming to power has broken the promises it has given the people of South Africa. They are angry of the implementation of cost-

recovery technology that will leave many poor and unemployed without adequate access to electricity or water, and cannot understand how the government offer promises it clearly has not been able to hold. Alongside the broken promises, a frame on the language of rights has developed. In the next section I will illustrate how people use a language of rights not only to protest against the government's 'delayed' or 'lack of' delivery, but also to provide access to services for themselves.

Language of rights: justifying illegal actions

The broken promises frame clearly shows *who* is to blame for people's miseries. Alongside this frame the progressive Constitution in South Africa has facilitated the development of what I would call a language of rights among the post-apartheid activists. The activists and people in Chatsworth are no exception as they talk about their constituted rights when framing their demands. Two of the W-FRA activists have even used Children's Rights in the courtroom when fighting for access to housing or water (Interview,W-FRA members 4 and 6).

But people also emphasize their rights as human beings arguing that the government does not treat the poor well: "the government must see us with a pair of eyes, as we are all human beings they should be treating us like human beings!" (Interview,W-FRA member 4), and that also the poor should have the right to live in proper conditions: "It is our right to live in a decent, habitable room" (W-FRA leader in W-FRA meeting 29.10.06).

In both communities, illegal reconnections of both water and electricity are widespread, and the amount of people living in arrears due to non-payment (of rent and services) is huge. Non-payment is a result of people's inability to pay. Their awareness of their rights and the organisations' use of a language of rights to demand proper housing and affordable services have led more people to stop paying rent and services, due to their belief that it is their right to have this access whether they can afford to or not. The W-FRA leader tells the story of when they declared a defiance campaign because the government was not listening to the plights of the poor. The Head of Housing received a memorandum stating that people were not willing to pay for rent or services anymore. The main argument was based on a language of rights, the W-FRA leader explains:

> We went on a defiance and we told people not to pay. We told people not to pay because we thought that is was their RIGHT not to pay. If you are living in a house

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where the disrepair is so bad, your taps and your pipes are leaking and you'd be overcharged for water, what would you do? You wouldn't pay, that is the reality. I think people have a right not to pay.

People's awareness of their rights have also made way for legitimating illegal actions such as illegal reconnections of water and electricity. One BFRA member said firmly:

> They [Council/Municipality] took out our power boxes. So I'm not afraid to say that we are using illegal, because they promised us, voting time they promised us: 'vote for me' they'll be giving free education, lights and water and all these things.
>
> (Interview,BFRA member 2)

The language of rights is also used to justify their actions of protest:

> We write up placards and we march on the roads where we call a strike, and we barricade the road and we get involved with young childs (…) and they go on into the streets and they say: 'we have the rights to education, we have no school fees and', you know, 'we have the right to put boards on the roads' and everything.
>
> (Interview,BFRA member 1)

This language of rights that is so commonly used by activists and residents in the two communities has been developed since the CCG, and later CCF, became involved in the struggle in the two areas. The W-FRA leader explains:

> When Fatima Meer and them came in they played a very crucial role. The one thing they really did was that they educated us on our rights. Prior to that we weren't so strong and powerful because we didn't know how to really act, and what we could do because we didn't know our rights, we didn't know the Constitution, you know, how constitutionally we were protected and all that. (…) We thought that it was not even our right to question, but now we realised that it is our right, a democratic right, to know what is happening, with even the taxes that we pay! (…) And all this education came about through the Concerned Citizens Group, which later upon related itself into the CCF.

Even in public gatherings, such as in a rally in Crossmoor, a well-known leader, activist and academic, Ashwin Desai, told people that one of their rights is to go against the system that breaks them down, explicitly saying who is wrong: "If the law is wrong, (…) it is our right to break it. (…). YOU are right, and the government is WRONG! YOU are right, and Mike Sutcliffe is wrong!" (Speech at a rally in Crossmoor, Chatsworth, 24.09.06).

Although people in both Bayview and Westcliff have access to water and electricity through illegal means by using their rights to access such services, Desai (2002) asks whether activists really can acquire any gains from the practice and language of "human rights" based on the time, energy and mobilisation that was put into the Manqele case (a case to regain

access to water for a single-mother being the caretaker of many children) that lost in court. Despite suffering losses through the court-system although using a language of rights, it seemed during my stay in the community that people used their awareness about their rights to continue fighting for their rights, and to demand from the government to implement them. After all, people continue to struggle in their daily lives, the arrears accumulate and each day is harder to provide "a decent meal on the table" (phrase used by many informants), despite South Africa having one of the most progressive Constitutions in the World.

Ballard (2005) is also sceptical of having an uncritical celebration of rights on behalf of activists, due to the lack of implementation of such rights. Despite Ballard and Desai's scepticism it is important to note the creative ways in which social movements have adopted the notion of rights, for example to regain access to services they have been disconnected from.

As seen here, when diagnosing the issues as unjust, a dichotomy between a 'we' and a 'them' is automatically made. How this is done explicitly is discussed in the following section.

The creation of a collective identity (we), and putting the blame on a 'them'

This part discusses how the W-FRA and the BFRA distinguish between a 'we' and a 'them'. Constructing a common 'we' identity is crucial to build up and to mobilize groups of people as it creates a boundary between activists (the people) and the ones they mobilize against (usually the state). This distinction says something about people's view on the state. This part shows how the W-FRA constructs an identity among its constituents generally termed as 'poor' (although this collective identity does not resonate with all the constituents that live in the same community), and how the state is portrayed as the people's adversary.

Towards a collective identity as 'the poors'

In the first instance the people's common experiences living in the same socioeconomic context has facilitated a common identity that, in this case, is class-based. Desai captures the essence of this collective identity in his book "We are the Poors" (2002) which title draws inspiration from an incident in Westcliff where one designer-bedecked African councillor in a mass meeting in Westcliff began castigating the crowd saying Indians were too privileged.

She was met with anger from the crowd and an Indian lady screamed: "We are not Indians, we are the poors!" Another lady in the crowd, an African lady, said with a good-humoured tone: "We are not African, we are the poors!" (Desai 2002:44). The struggle they all were, and still are, facing has been a source to rethink identities in the new South Africa. During my stay in the area this collective identity of being 'poor' came up to the surface and was highly present in most of my informants' views on themselves. The word 'poors' was used so often, and seemed as if it in a way had become a trademark for the people in the two communities. Promoting an identity as poor has resulted in an all-inclusive identity irrespective of other differences. This discursive strategy is advantageous in that it includes and targets a wide spectre of people within the two communities.

This collective identity of being 'poor' came out strongly in most of the interviews, informal conversations, meetings, and even public gatherings where leaders and activists used this term frequently. When I asked one informant in Westcliff how many poor people there are in the community, she said: "Lots, lots [of] people. For rich people I think two or three or four. People in this community [are] poor people, really poor people" (Interview, W-FRA member 6).

Despite all the negative connotations attached to being 'poor', people are filled with pride, self-esteem, and strength. People generally do not seem to be ashamed of being poor, and openly fight in solidarity with other 'poors'. Some see themselves as educated people ("We are strong people, we are educated people (…)", Interview, BFRA member 1). Such views were evident among several of my informants in the two communities.

Some argue that CSOs appeal to substantive like-mindedness between representative and those represented "by virtue of existential qualities that are usually impossible to renounce such as gender, race and ethnic origin" (Lavalle et al. 2007:14). This thesis, on the contrary, argues that those qualities are not the ones that are used as common characteristics for creating a common identity in these two communities. There are about 30% Africans living in the area, and the collective identity that has been drafted is not created on the sole reason of being Indian or African, but by being in the same deprived socioeconomic situation. The collective identity as 'poor' is communicated over other identities such as being a Hindu, a Christian or a Muslim (religious identity), or an ANC or MF supporter (political affiliation). Although the CSOs target those that identify themselves with being 'poor', not all in the community share this identity.

Non-poor

Although the people active in the CSOs in most cases have a collective 'we' identity as 'poor', I discovered that some people in Westcliff distinguish between non-payers and rate-payers as 'the poor' versus 'the rich', respectively. Some informants who pay their rent and services do not want to involve themselves in the W-FRA because they believe the W-FRA only represents the 'poor' non-payers and treat the rate-payers badly. They do not want to identify themselves as being poor, and they also argue that people in the community are not as poor as they often want to give an impression of. These informants even call the people claiming to be poor for being drug-addicts and alcoholics: "There's not many poor people here, because most of them are alcoholics, drug addicts, so where poor coming in this place when you've got money for all that?" (Interview,Westcliff residents 6 and 7).

Although these 'non-poor' people are concerned about issues that overlap with the W-FRA's issues (such as upgrading of the flats), they choose *not* to fight for these issues with and through the W-FRA. This shows that the W-FRA is primarily focusing on framing 'the poor' people in the community, and gives an impression, among other people in the community not identifying themselves as poor, that the W-FRA is biased explicitly towards fighting for 'the poor's' grievances and concerns. This is what two informants said in a joint interview:

> Fatima Meer and all. They didn't come for people like us, paying rent. (…) They only [came] for the people not paying rent, that's why they call it poverty area. Poverty, they make US like poverty here too! But we are not poverty because we pay the rent. So people only come here to fight for people that don't pay the rent.
>
> (Interview,Westcliff residents 6 and 7)

This shows that the W-FRA seems to target people that identify as being poor, and not the people that do not share this identity. The lack of a proper 'identity frame' - that is the convergence of people's personal identity with the identity framed by the [CSOs] which is necessary to motivate action (Gamson 1992) - seems to be the reason why all in the community do not identify themselves with the collective 'we'-identity the W-FRA tries to communicate to the people.

My findings show that there are several types of 'groups' in the two communities. 1) There are unemployed people dependent on social grants and/or low incomes from alternative sources of work that often maintain a whole family of several members with their grant-money and low income, and others, who despite being unemployed, neither have access to

social grants. The two last groups are those struggling to maintain themselves and/or their families, and are generally unfit to pay for rent and services. These generally define and identify themselves with being in the group of the 'poors'. 2) Those that are from the working class and are paying rent and services (and who refuse to be called poor), and 3) those that gain income through dodgy channels and are seen as rich by other people in the community (so-called 'interest-people'), but that also in many instances 'join the bandwagon' of the 'poors' by refusing to pay rent and services despite affording to do so.

The poors' image of the state as the 'enemy'

How the state is framed is ultimately decisive for the people's perception of it. Here I will discuss the CSOs' framing of the state, and as a result, people's views on the state. Understanding people's views on the state is fruitful in understanding why people are sceptical towards or happy with their CSOs' choice of political strategies and whether their sentiments about the relation strengthens or weakens the legitimacy of the CSOs. The CSOs' use of political strategies and their constituents' reactions towards is discussed in the next chapter.

Public gatherings and events are platforms where identities are shaped, issues voiced, and the creation of a common glue that holds people together is made. The speeches held often contain words and phrases people can identify themselves with. In these speeches, a 'we' and 'them' is constructed, and the explicit and simplistic ways of communicating this to the people easily creates an immediate understanding among the people of who 'us' (we the people) and who 'them' (usually the state) are.

In a public celebration of Diwali[18] in Westcliff community, Professor Fatima Meer held a powerful speech to the people. Utilising the symbolic value of the story behind this important Hindu festival and celebration, she made a clear division of a 'we' and a 'them'.

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[18] Diwali is the celebration of the return of the Hindu god Rama, who came back from a battle after defeating the demon Ravina. When Rama returned, people welcomed him with "thousands of lights" in their homes, a tradition that characterizes Diwali celebrations. At the metaphysical level, Diwali signifies the victory of good over evil (http://media.www.thepenn.org).

Based on two characters from the story that many people, especially the Hindus, are familiar with, she created a clear distinction of a 'we' and a 'them' saying:

> You, people of Chatsworth, are the living [spirit] of Rama, Rama discovered Ravina, and he fought him to death. And you have discovered your Ravina. And no matter how much your Ravina oppresses you, you are always fighting him. And I'm now referring to the Town Council, that is *your* Ravina. Every now and again they come and they oppress you, (…) but you stand up to that Council, and you are never oppressed. Your fate in yourself, just like Rama had fate in himself, and there was unity between him and Sita and his brothers, and through that fate and that unity they conquered Ravina. And you are conquering your Ravina, through your fate in your self and in your neighbours.
>
> (Speech at Diwali celebration, Westcliff 22.10.06)

Professor Meer uses this well-known story as an analogue to the struggle of the flatdwellers in Chatsworth, and portrays the people as the good King Rama, and Town Council as the evil demon Ravina, who oppress the people. The story is not only explicitly and clearly making a 'we' and 'them' distinction, but is also giving values attached to these distinctions where 'we' (the people) are good, whilst 'them' (the Town Council) are portrayed as bad and as the people's oppressors. She is also emphasizing the people's need of having fate in themselves and unity with each other (their neighbours) in order to stand up against the oppression executed by Town Council.

As already mentioned in the theoretical framework studies of cultural framing focus on how cultural processes create a basis for, and are a product of, collective action (Stokke 1999). The celebration of Diwali represents exactly one such cultural process that has been shared across religious and cultural groups over time within the communities of Chatsworth, and has today become meaningful, in different ways, to all people living there. Even Desai argues that the people living in Chatsworth have been part of a cultural process where: "all religious groups and races living in the mosaic of Chatsworth [have] participated in the celebration of Diwali and raised the slogan 'lights for all'. In this way, Diwali in South Africa [has been] rethought, politicized, and made accessible to all the community" (2002:42). Diwali, then, has become an effective glue in creating a collective of united people in Chatsworth. It has been recognised as a good occasion to gather the people of Chatsworth, in line with other similar events of collective celebrations, and has contributed to strengthening the social atmosphere in the communities. The W-FRA leader recognises the role of these avenues of collective celebrations, and says in an interview:

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> After we started organising the Youth Day functions, the Woman's Day functions, Diwali functions, we found that people would socialise very well, and the whole (…) atmosphere in the community started to change. People started to realise more about (…) being social and sociable, even with your neighbours for that matter. And things did change drastically.

Negative descriptions of the government (Council) are not only made in public speeches by well-known and experienced activists such as Professor Meer, but are also reflected in the sentiments of the CSO activists in both communities. They see the government as someone who uses the people ("I feel there's no future for our people anymore because of the government. I'm not against the government, but the government is using us". Interview,BFRA member 1), as careless ("They don't care about the poor people", interview, BFRA member 1), someone who oppresses the people (see Prof. Fatima Meer's speech), and who comes with false promises (see broken promises frame). Some ask why Council is so blind, naïve and foolish and see the Council as "uneducated, illiterate barbarians" (Interview,W-FRA member 4), and even racist. The Council is not working for the poor, it has, according to a WFRA member, accused her and her family for 'unseemly behaviour' running a brothel and illegal business, although these are untrue accusations. And, although she was a paying tenant, Council came to evict her. She thinks councillors are bringing division instead of unity (Interview,W-FRA member 2). The general sentiment among residents in both communities is that Council has treated them like criminals, coming with false accusations as an excuse to execute violence on them during evictions especially. This sentiment among the people is also in line with how the government is portrayed in the literature in how they resolve issues of non-payment (see McDonald & Pape 2002). The people have had such an extent of confrontations with local government and local councillors that they have learnt not to trust them.

Although being successfully able to diagnose the problems and frame the issues convincingly, the CSOs also need to present themselves as the solutions to the diagnosed problems in an equivalent convincing fashion.

Continuation of apartheid struggles

Although most of my informants had never participated in any struggle under apartheid, they framed the present struggle as similar to the anti-apartheid struggle, and even address each other with names used by anti-apartheid activists. In a context of ongoing bad living

conditions, growing unemployment and raising prices for food, rent and services people cannot but compare their living to the apartheid days, some even claiming life in post-apartheid South Africa being worse. In an interview with the W-FRA leader it clearly came out that the residents in Chatsworth are fighting for the *implementation* of the rights the anti-apartheid activists once fought for, and see their struggle as a prolongation of the apartheid fight. She believes the government judges poor people for living a too good life when they once in a while can eat a warm meal or purchase new clothes. The W-FRA leader says: "I think they have the right to wear something new. And they have a right to eat good food. That's what South Africa, that's what the fight, you know, the apartheid fight, was about: 'a better life for all'".

Both CSOs in this study fight for the implementation of the government's policies, but they resent the government's affirmative policies (such as the BEE strategy) and go as far as calling it racist. Most Indian informants feel discriminated and unfairly treated by the government and many claim the present government treats them worse than the apartheid-government did. One W-FRA member confirmed this view in an interview when she angrily said: "Now the ANC, the way we look at it, has become racist! They are racist because they give five Blacks employment and one Indian employment which is not fair!" (Interview,W-FRA member 4).

Claiming that the government is like, or worse than, the white apartheid government, activists in Chatsworth use the same words that were used by the anti-apartheid activists in public gatherings, marches and rallies. Leaders and activists within the civil society environment address each other as 'comrade', and they often use powerful anti-apartheid slogans in their speeches and in marches, like *"Viva*[19] [name] *viva"* or *"Amandla! Awetu!"* (Power! Power to the people!).

The historical struggle in Westcliff and Bayview has a special position in people's memories and stories. In both communities the residents, together as flats residents associations under the CCF banner, have resisted forced evictions by fighting the brutal use of rubber bullets, tear-gas, batons and fierce police-dogs by Council security forces. People (both residents and CSO members) in both communities spoke proudly of the time the community got together

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[19] Meaning 'long live' in various languages (Spanish, Portuguese) and is a type of cheering honoring and supporting persons or whatever issues one might be cheering for. An expression of gratitude or respect.

and fought the security personnel by making human walls to stop them from entering people's homes.

In Westcliff, this struggle history is used to describe the W-FRA as defenders of the community and as martyrs sacrificing their lives for the people and fighting for the future of the children. In several of the interviews with W-FRA members the W-FRA leaders are spoken of as altruistic defenders of the community sacrificing both their lives and their children's' lives in the confrontations. One W-FRA member said:

> Westcliff Flats Residents Association (…) are able to die for us! They [W-FRA leaders] fighting for the people, they never fighting for themselves. [W-FRA leader] never got problem, they got the money themselves, the children [of the W-FRA leaders] themselves they give everything, fighting for the poor people only. (…) They worry about the people, all the poor people.
>
> (Interview, W-FRA member 6)

The view that the W-FRA is fighting for people's human rights has validity outside its community boundaries, and is acknowledged by powerful persons, such as Professor Meer, which has an important symbolic significance for the people of Chatsworth through her involvement in their struggle as the leader of the CCF. People's admiration and respect for her is also connected to her history as an anti-apartheid freedom fighter. In a speech she held in Westcliff during the Diwali celebration she said: "everyone honours you [people of Chatsworth], admires you, and you are known nationally, as the fighters for human rights" (speech held on Diwali 22.10.06).

The CSOs' use of motivational frames

The last of the framing tasks is motivational framing. It is closely connected to participation and non-participation that will be discussed in the chapter on 'Participation'. The leaders of the two CSOs here try to motivate the people they represent to engage and participate, but they use different words in their motivation. The motivational frames used by both CSO leaders focus on the benefits/gains of participating in CSO activities, but the gains and benefits people will obtain if choosing to participate are different for the two CSOs. Whilst the W-FRA leader says people's involvement and commitment to the organization will result in a divine benefit, the BFRA leader motivates people only to participate in selected happenings (here the ward-elections) and uses duress rather than persuasion by telling his constituents they will not receive material benefits if they choose not to participate. The W-

FRA's 'divine benefit' frame and the BFRA's 'material benefit' frame will be discussed in turn.

The W-FRA's 'divine benefit' frame

The W-FRA leader tries to entice participation in the weekly community meetings and feeding schemes, as well as in other activities and happenings by saying: "A service to humanity is a service to God", thereby trying to convince people how important their work is for the community and the people in it. This phrase was in many instances also used by the W-FRA leader to justify her personal involvement in the community. One W-FRA committee member explained how this phrase also gave her inspiration to join the W-FRA saying:

> From looking at [the W-FRA leaders] heart FOR the poor people, I decided myself to join them, become a committee member and do the same work: help those in need. And as [the W-FRA leader] always tells us every single time at the meeting: *"A service to humanity is a service to God"* which I believe in my heart. If you can't serve men, how can you serve God? Because you see God is a person who's generally religious, we look at He is the one who is our provider, but in human life we've got to provide for each and other, and how can we do it if we haven't got a heart?
>
> (Interview, W-FRA member 4)

In addition to using a frame of 'divine benefit', as discussed above, the W-FRA leader also re-tells the history of the resistance in Chatsworth to constantly remind people of the W-FRA's past strength and significance in the community. As already mentioned, people in Chatsworth see their struggle as igniting the post-apartheid struggles in South Africa. In Westcliff, the W-FRA leader tries explicitly to attach pride in people based on past accomplishments and resistance. I interpret it as a motivational strategy aiming at giving people hope that their continued struggle is necessary and important to be able to change their present situation. The CSO members and residents of both communities warmly tell of their participation in these happenings. The W-FRA leader once said in a meeting: "The story of the struggle in Chatsworth is studied, researched (…). Isn't that something we should be proud of?" (Meeting in Westcliff 22.11.06). In the same meeting she said: "People around the country started organising just AFTER we started organising!" Habib & Kotzé (2003) argues that continued participation by people in CBOs is often motivated by religion.

The BFRA's 'material benefit' frame

The BFRA leader, on the other hand, uses enticement in a more conditional way rather pressuring people to participate by saying they will reap material benefits, such as reception of food-hampers, only if they come to important meetings and gatherings (such as ward-elections). In one community meeting held in Bayview the BFRA leader said: "The people that don't meet up at the meeting will not get [food] hampers on Christmas!" (26.11.06). Duress is the main method used. But unlike the W-FRA, he does not urge people to participate in CSO or community activities in the same manner. Part of the reason may be the lack of meetings and other happenings in the community for the past year.

The main difference between the two leaders' motivational framing is that the W-FRA leader uses people's belief in God to make her statements appealing for them to actually choose to participate on voluntary basis, whilst the BFRA leader uses people's weakness in being poor to attract participants.

The past stories of united resistance in the communities have a strong presence in people's memories today and can be used in the CSOs' framing in showing people that joint resistance can give good results, but there is a need for the CSO leaders to constantly create motivational frames that are appealing to the people and that can motivate them to join in the ongoing struggles.

However, when listening to people's stories and views, many said that would the community undergo dramatic happenings, such as forced evictions, they believe the people in the communities will converge and resists it jointly, just as they did in the past. The importance of using motivational framing, then, is to attract people to partake in the daily activities of the organisation and to keep it running.

During my stay in Chatsworth, only the W-FRA was active in its community on a regular (almost daily) basis, and was concerned about attracting participants to contribute in the daily running of the organisation. The emphasis on promoting participation despite the absence of forced evictions seemed to be pertinent in being able to jointly fight the current issues at hand.

The BFRA, on the other hand, was not active in the community on a daily basis, and did not even seem to be concerned about it. The BFRA's invisibility and lack of activity in the community was rather seen as problematic by its constituents.

The importance of converting discourses into actions

Even if a CSO is successful in attracting participants through its use of discourse (framing), its ability to maintain people's participation in the CSO is dependent on whether its discourses are transferred into concrete actions. The thesis argues that whether the CSOs are able to transform what they say into specific actions, or not, is crucial for understanding how legitimate they are among their constituents. Although a CSO is able to get its constituents to identify and sympathize themselves with its demands and goals, and even is successfully able to motivate people to participate in collective ameliorative actions, this alone is not necessarily sufficient to be able to maintain the constituents in the CSO and discourage them from leaving the CSO.

One important reason for arguing that the CSOs should convert their discourses into concrete actions in their communities to present themselves as the legitimate bodies in their constituencies is based on the fact that people in both Bayview and Westcliff have been met with many promises since the new government came to power. These promises of a 'better life for all' have been proposed by local councillors and politicians affiliated to various political parties, over and over again, especially during elections, but as has been discussed above, despite all the promises that have been made by various political parties, once elections are over the people never see anything more of neither the politicians nor their promises. This has created a sense of disbelief among the people in Bayview and Westcliff towards people that come with nice promises (but are never able to fulfil them). The CSOs' relation to the formal political system through their choices of political strategies, then, has in the light of their constituents' perception of the state, and those associated with it, an important impact on how they are perceived among their constituents.

Another way of converting discourses into actions is not only through the CSOs' choices of political strategies, but their specific activities in and with their constituencies. This thesis argues that the arrangement of frequent community meetings open for all the constituents is important for the CSOs to be perceived as legitimate, and is an important strategy for the CSOs to maintain a communication with its constituents. This, in turn, facilitates the constituents' continued participation in the CSOs. The thesis argues that the W-FRA's choice of conducting weekly community meetings is an important source to maintain and discourage participants from leaving the organisation (and its struggle), and is an important strategy to maintain its legitimacy among its constituents. When the opposite is happening, meaning

when the organisation holds irregular and few community meetings, the organisation will as a result have little communication and interaction with its constituents, and may risk to loose its legitimacy and significance among its constituents. The latter is happening with the BFRA in Bayview. The importance of conducting community meetings will be discussed in the last analytical chapter on participation/mobilising structure.

Summary

This chapter has provided a discussion of the framing strategies used by the CSOs in diagnosing the problems, their solution and way forward to solve them, as well as their use of motivational frames to motivate people to join in their actions. Both the W-FRA and the BFRA face the same challenges, and target 'the poor' in their constituencies. Portraying the political system as an enemy and an oppressor is done at all spheres were interaction between the CSOs and their constituents happen. Even much-respected CCF leaders and front figures of the Chatsworth struggles hold powerful speeches to audiences from the poor communities and portray the state as an enemy and an oppressor against the people who are poor and good. This framing gives people a certain view on state authorities that influences their view on their CSOs' choice of political strategies.

The similarities between the W-FRA and the BFRA are many, but they do differ on the way they motivate their constituents to partake in the organisation's actions and happenings. Whilst the W-FRA employs a 'divine benefit' frame where people's involvement is portrayed as an altruistic action which is both individually and collectively beneficial, the BFRA uses a 'material benefit' frame which in a way forces people to choose between receiving or not receiving material goods.

Although having similar framing, this thesis argues that in order for the CSOs to have a continued significance in their communities they have to maintain their interaction with their constituents, not only through discourses, but through frequent actions. What will be evident is that whether the CSOs transform their discourses into specific actions has an impact on people's perception of them as legitimate or not. The W-FRA's frequent activity in its constituency through weekly meetings, feeding schemes, and other activities, clearly gives it a far more legitimate status among its constituents than the BFRA which is close to absent and has fair little communication with its constituents. The issue of frequent community meetings and its role for legitimacy will be discussed in chapter 7.

The next chapter discusses the CSOs' relations with the state, and how their choice of political strategies influences their legitimacy.

5. POLITICAL STRATEGIES

In this chapter the theory on political opportunity structure (POS) will be used to look at what political opportunities and constraints are facing the W-FRA and the BFRA in a post-apartheid context, and how they utilize the political spaces open for them. The focus is on what political strategies they make use of and how these choices impact on the legitimacy they attain in their constituencies. Although their choices of political strategies are overlapping, and in many ways identical, they have developed a different relation to the state. Whilst the BFRA leader employs a close relation to the formal political system to have better access to resources, the W-FRA leader thinks such a close relation will impair the community's struggle for improved living conditions and therefore chooses to have an autonomous relation to the political system. Their difference in strategies impacts the relation to their constituents, and as a result their legitimacy is weakened or strengthened.

The CSOs' choice of political strategies can facilitate a better understanding of *what kind* of CSOs they are. The leaders play an important role in the running of the CSO, so the leaders' view on what types of strategies to use, and not least *where* in the political system they should work (outside/inside), have an immense impact on how the CSO as a whole is situated in relation to the formal political system, and what kind of relation is generated as a result.

The first part provides a short presentation of the CSOs' common historical experiences with the political opportunity and constraints they have faced since their birth (around 1999). McAdam's (2004) synthesis of the formal and informal structures that create opportunities or constraints for collective mobilisation guides this historical background, as well as the previous political strategies used by both CSOs in the past. This forms an important backdrop to investigate the different political strategies employed by the CSOs today, and how the CSOs are perceived by their constituents in light of the choices they make in a changed environment with more opened spaces for participation by civil society in the institutionalised political system.

Political opportunities and constraints for movements

The political opportunities and constraints facing the two CSOs and how they have been dealt with in the past forms an important background to understand the CSOs' current attitude towards the state and their choice of strategies in a changing political environment.

Previous political strategies

The political strategies used by social movements in post-apartheid South Africa today are diverse, and many of which was usual during the anti-apartheid struggles. The political strategies used by both CSOs have since their birth been *identical*. They have both utilised 'in- and out of system' strategies such as; protest marches, rallies, petitions, picketing, court-battles, as well as marching to local councillors' homes and cutting their electricity and water connection. Activists speak proudly of the Ten Rand Campaign where they marched to Rent Office in town and demanded affordable rate, and waved fake R10 notes. They have engaged local political leaders in conversations over their problems, been active in the local community policing forums (CPFs) around local problems such as drugs and crime, and have networked with other civil society groups and actors through national and international forums such as the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) and the World Social Forum (WSF), both forums made mostly of grassroots organisations. They have also engaged in more 'violent' actions such as street-blockades with burning tyres, they have made human walls to stop Council security forces from entering flats during forced evictions (these incidents have often lead to violent clashes between the people and the security personnel). They have occupied the Rent Office, and one informant told me she had even slapped one of the local councillors in the face (informal conversation,W-FRA member 1).

The openness or closure of the institutionalized political system

As already mentioned in chapter 2, the post-apartheid era has led to a revival of South African civil society as a reaction against the ANC government's neoliberal socioeconomic policies. The new political climate emphasising a non-racial society and equal constituted rights for all South African citizens have opened up the political opportunities for civil society and represent a legitimate background in which to mobilise due to the government's unfulfilled

promises. In a climate of worsened living conditions, people have woken up from their doze of hope, and started mobilising against the state.

As said in the previous chapter, the state's unfulfilled promises have led people in general to perceive the state as illegitimate and untrustworthy. This lack of trust in the state still hangs in people's minds today, and represents an important reason for their reluctance towards any state authorities. These experiences are identical for the constituents in both Westcliff and Bayview.

Informal structure of power-relations

Both CSOs have developed an informal, but yet decisive, network with powerful individuals that in different ways have contributed tremendously in the CSOs' struggle. Networks consist of apartheid freedom fighters that took the role as leaders and mentors for the CSOs in the post-apartheid struggles, and people with specific skills and education that offered their expertise when needed (such as low-priced attorneys that helped the CSOs in court-battles). The CCF leadership were in many ways the drivers behind the proportionately success experienced by the people in Bayview and Westcliff. They helped make their struggle visible in the media, and as former activists with academic background/education, they have great knowledge of the South African formal political system, the rights of the people (as constituted in the Bill of rights), and are equipped with valuable knowledge about movement tactics and strategies. These alliances have strengthened the poor people in Westcliff and Bayview though their expanded knowledge about their rights, what strategies and actions they can make use of in their struggle, and how their situation is interlinked with happenings on a national and global level. This common background has given the organisations in Westcliff *and* Bayview a powerful consciousness about the situation they find themselves in, and how to utilise upcoming opportunities in their struggle.

Having these kinds of personal alliances and networks have also provided the CSOs with access to key players within the government as many of their alliances have been part of the anti-apartheid movement. This access is crucial for the purposes of accessing information, attending important meetings and influencing policy (Ballard et al. 2005).

At the beginning, the people in the communities did not fight court-battles, it was when the CCF came in the communities and joined in the struggle there that the people in Bayview and Westcliff learnt more about their constitutional rights. According to the W-FRA leader:

> We didn't know the Constitution (…) how constitutionally we were protected and all that. The one thing they [CCF] did was that they taught us (…) our rights, they supported us financially. (…) When we went to the municipality to engage in discussions with them, we were accompanied by them because they were more (…) educated on the policies and procedures of the municipality. And therefore, that made us more powerful, because we were taught about all this (…) we could ask the municipality "why was we paying for this" and "what was it being used for"? We thought that it was not even our right to question, but now we realised that it is our right, a democratic right, to know what is happening, with even the taxes that we pay! (...) And all this education came about through the Concerned Citizens Group, which later upon related itself into the CCF.

State's capacity and propensity for repression

Both constituencies' past experiences with Council-violence (through forced evictions in both communities) have painted a picture in their minds of the government's repressive and authoritarian reactions towards what the people perceive as justified and legitimate grievances and protests. Till this day the memories of the council security forces' violent opposition against people's efforts to protect families from being evicted stay strong in their minds, and most people still perceive the state as an oppressor. This historical background, that is identical for the two CSOs, forms an important context and backdrop to understand the history and dynamics behind the present situation in the communities, and people's perception of their CSO as legitimate or not.

The present situation: what differentiates the W-FRA and the BFRA?

The relative opening up of the institutionalised political system in South Africa has changed the political landscape and has, although offering the same opportunities for both CSOs, been used differently by them. This part discusses the two CSOs' use of the political opportunities opened up for them and the various spaces in which they have chosen to act. Although they have used identical political strategies, and spaces to voice their concerns, they have since end of 2005 developed a different relationship and attitude towards the local political system.

Opened opportunities: the use of invited spaces

The opening up of the institutionalized political system gives civil society actors the possibility to utilize these opened spaces for their own benefit. This entails a more collaborative relation to the state as these spaces are created *for* civil society actors *by* the state. Both the W-FRA and the BFRA have utilized spaces made available for their participation, such as election of a ward-committee. Whilst both CSOs were positive towards participating in the election of a ward-committee (that happened during my fieldwork in 2006), the ward-elections had different outcomes for the two CSOs. While the BFRA leader, who already works within the political system, saw the ward elections as a victory for the BFRA and its constituency by winning four of the ten seats in the ward-committee, the W-FRA leader ended up walking angrily out of the ward-election locale in protest against what she perceived as "a very, very corrupted, very badly rigged" election with "no sense of respect for the poor and the community" because "people were influenced in the wrong direction". Even when the W-FRA leader raised objections "nobody objected, and it was still overruled" (Interview, W-FRA leader). Despite both having positive expectations of using this 'invited space', their different experiences reinforced their attitude towards how to relate to the state.

The BFRA had a relative positive experience, contrary to previous years (according to the BFRA leader the local ANC has a reputation of conducting ward-elections in an undemocratic manner). Winning four of the seats in the ward-committee has strengthened the BFRA's belief that working within and/or through state-structures can give positive outcomes.

The W-FRA, on the other hand, had yet another bad experience with the conduction of the ward-elections that led to a reinforcement of their resentment towards working within the local political system. The W-FRA expressed that it will keep working outside state structures, and maintain an autonomous relation to the state.

Participatory approaches

One of the instruments available for a dual relationship between civil society and the state is, as mentioned earlier, the local governments' Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). An IDP is a development plan at city level aimed at leading to city-wide economic growth through ward-based consultation which aims at identifying and targeting the needs of the citizens in the various communities in the city. In Durban, the IDP was adopted in June 2003 to provide

a more detailed framework for the council's activities over a five-year period (Ballard et al. 2007). A part of this is Community Based Planning (CBP) which is a methodology that provides municipalities with the means to strengthen the participatory aspects of their IDP[20]. The overall objective of CBP is to get communities to take ownership of the process of resolving their own problems. It entails a task team visiting each ward that plans intensive for two weekends to allocate R50.000 to facilitate a development process (Ballard et al. 2007). *"The 50.000 rand is used to purchase equipment for them to start the community projects, and no cash is given"* (Interview,BFRA leader). The BFRA leader applied for a job in the eThekwini Municipality, and is now working in the task team that visits the different wards as part of the CBP. The BFRA leader says his constituency has access to important resources, such as a loud hailer and a PH system that will benefit the facilitation of mobilisation in Bayview. He believes the change of strategy, by working within the political system, has given access to much-needed resources. The BFRA leader explains in an interview:

> I also would say to people that (...) all these things existed, but because we were the outside fighting the social movements against this, the system, we were not getting access to all these things, although they were available. We could actually be accessing moneys that can come back into the social movement for our activism, you know. Fighting against the very same system, but using their very own resources. Now, you know, past that, we have (...) existed for 7 to 8 years and don't have, community organisations don't have these things.

The argument is that by working within state structures one will have access to resources that would not be accessible otherwise.

Ballard et al. (2007) are sceptical of how influential community-identified needs are in determining projects. One official they interviewed concede that none of the projects approved in the municipal budget 2002–2003 were developed in reference to priority lists generated by communities in the IDP process (Subban in Ballard et al. 2007:274). Thinking that the communities' concerns have not come through, although the intention to let the communities target their own needs has been central, makes one think whether the BFRA leader has made a good choice of taking an active part in this process or not. How the leader's choice has been received by his constituency will be discussed in the following excerpt.

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[20] The html-version of the file (downloaded 20.11.08): http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/services/departments/abm/conference/ntsiki/.

Criticisms of the BFRA leader's job

Among the constituents in Bayview and among residents and activists in Westcliff, the fact that the BFRA leader has a full-time job in eThekwini Municipality *and* at the same time being the community leader in Bayview is quite peculiar and, for many, contradictory. The job was not offered the BFRA leader by initiative of the municipality, but was a job the leader applied for on his own initiative thinking that the job would reap benefits for both Bayview and Westcliff.

When speaking to informants in Bayview, many of them complained about the BFRA leader's engagement with the Municipality. They are discontent with the fact that the leader works for the Municipality and see the job as a disturbance that takes the leader's attention away from his community work. Some are quite confused about the BFRA leader's role in the community, and doubt his intentions with working there. They call him corrupt and a 'sell-out', and accuse him for not being considerate to the people in the community, but rather thinking of himself. According to informants, the leader is also reluctant to let someone else take the leadership position, despite not being able to take on all the responsibilities and duties supposed to be managed by him. In general, the legitimacy of the leader and his committee is questioned. Several informants questioned how the leader could be working in the political system when they were in opposition to it, saying: "We are fighting Council, how can our chairperson work for Council?!" (Interview,Bayview resident 1). Another informant felt a great discrepancy between the BFRA leader's job in the municipality and his leadership-role in the community and thought that the leader works as a camouflaged undercover agent for the municipality:

> How come this [person] be actively involved in the affairs of the people in the area itself? You can't do that. So, (…) you are taking information from the people itself and getting back to Council, you're feeding them.
>
> (Interview,Bayview resident 2)

The leader was accused of being careless about the community and prioritizing his personal benefits over the people's common good:

> And now that [BFRA leader] is working for Council (…) he called up a mass meeting here, he told the people: *"it doesn't mean I'm working for Council I don't care for you all. I do care for you all, by doing this thing here. I also got to put food on my table, it's a paying job"*. And he started convincing the people and telling them *"please, now you must give me all these bills because I'm gonna work with council to sort these*

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problems out". And he was just walking out. All these people [BFRA committee] were walking out. So from there we never heard from [BFRA leader] up to now!

(Interview,Bayview resident 1)

Calling people that work for council for 'sell-outs' were quite common among my informants. The BFRA leader was termed as a 'sell-out' as people felt that he, by taking a job in the municipality, was deceiving the people supposed to be protected and guided by their leader:

The worst thing [BFRA leader] did was to work for Council. It's like he was selling us to Council. We were calling him a 'sell-out', so the other communities didn't like that. How can you work for Council when you say you're fighting for the poor of the poorest? You see? That's where the problem is".

(Interview,Bayview resident 1)

Besides being angry at the BFRA leader's job in the municipality, another important reason people are angry is the BFRA's reduced activity in the area. One Bayview resident explained:

When he started working for the Council he wasn't much interested in the community, there was no meetings… not that I know of. Like he used to have big meetings here too, there was no meetings nothing, everything just sort of, died.

(Interview,Bayview resident 4)

Although the criticism comes mostly from Bayview residents, even the BFRA members are reluctant towards the leader's collaboration with the state.

In one interview with a BFRA member I was explained that people's reluctance against the BFRA leader's work in the municipality is mainly because they think he is a local councillor. Even the BFRA member herself thought so, but was convinced that it is not the case: "I have asked [BFRA leader] this question: 'How could he work with councillor?' He said, you know, he's not councillor, he's one of the people that educate people, he runs a workshop" (Interview,BFRA member 1).

Ashwin Desai thinks social movements should work outside party politics, and has been critical towards movements such as the TAC for too much involvement into party politics (Friedman and Mottiar 2004). Despite this critique, the CCF's inactivity since end of 2002 and the questions this spurred, has made him suggest that the CCF and others need to consider more carefully how to engage with the government, work with others who are supportive of, but not committed to, the CCF, and how to build alliances without compromising principles (Dwyer 2004). Maybe this change in Desai's view on strategising in relation to the political

system has had an impact on the BFRA leader's choice of working in the Municipality? According to the BFRA leader himself, the decision of taking a job in the municipality was done after discussions with several people, one of them being Ashwin Desai. According to the BFRA leader, he also conferred with the constituency, the BFRA committee, and powerful individuals that have been actively involved in the Chatsworth struggles, before accepting the municipality job, and they were all positive. If this is true, why are people in the community so much against the BFRA leader's job in the Municipality?

The job in the Municipality is clearly impacting on the BFRA's relationship with its constituents. Looking at the history of violent clashes between Council security and people in both Bayview and Westcliff it is not strange that they have a strained relationship with the state. As discussed in chapter 5, the continued framing of the state as an enemy and a violent oppressor does not exactly help in easing the people's view on the state.

One observation made me think that having a foot within state structures does not necessarily mean that one will have the freedom, or the influence, to use the position to the benefit of the people in poor communities. The observation was done at a rally in Crossmoor, a community in Chatsworth, where a local councillor held a speech saying he had sympathy with the people that had been evicted from their homes (by private owners) and had just experienced their newly-built shacks being thorn down by Municipal authorities. He said that although he had sympathy with the people, his mere presence at the rally and his sympathy and involvement in their community struggles put him in a position were he, at the present moment, was facing disciplinary hearings. His job was on the line for being concerned and for expressing his views in public. Ballard et al. (2007) argue that one of the challenges facing decision-making at the local political level is attempts by individual councillors to secure development for their wards. This may be a reason the councillor showing up at the Crossmoor rally was threatened with loosing his job.

Activists from both Bayview and Westcliff were present at the same rally, and heard the same speeches. The thesis, then, argues that in addition to having negative experiences with the state through violent clashes during forced evictions, and being fed with discourses that the state is an enemy and an oppressor, hearing a local councillor saying he faces disciplinary hearings for being the least involved in the local struggles adds more fuel to the already burning fire. It seems that, in this case, people's resentment towards the BFRA leader's too close affiliation with the local state has many reasons, and this resentment is in line with what new social movement theorists would argue; that too close ties to the political

system will reduce the integrity and legitimacy of the organizations and activists that choose such a close relation.

What can be asked is whether the BFRA leader chooses such a close relation primarily to get access to important resources that can be canalized into the community, or for his own benefit. Is his distance to the community intentional due to the danger that he might jeopardize his job and at the same time loose access to resources beneficial for the community? It has to be mentioned that the BFRA leader could not attend the ward-elections himself due to his job in the municipality. Is his fear of loosing his job genuinely due to his *own* loss, or the *community's* loss of beneficial resources?

W-FRA in Westcliff

The situation in Westcliff is quite different from Bayview. Here, the W-FRA leader has refused several offers to work as a local councillor for various political parties. The W-FRA leader thinks working within the system, although receiving a high salary, is not the right way to help the community. The leader thinks the system rather *restrains* the people's opportunities saying:

> I've been offered a place (…) within political parties many times. (…) The DA offered, the Minority Front offered, the IFP offered, but I don't think that's for me. I don't think I would want to be a councillor, I think I'd rather like being, you know, an activist. Even if it's voluntary I think that's fine with me (…). I think it gives me more (…) not just freedom, it gives me more pleasure (…) to really serve the poor. To try to make changes so that people's lives can be better. There's no other purpose.

One of the W-FRA members is of the opinion that anyone working for government will never help the poor. She says that Crossmoor, Bayview and Woodhurst (other 'poor' areas in Chatsworth) are all facing the same problems as in Westcliff, but it is only Westcliff that is going forward. That is because of a strong leadership. She continues:

> [W-FRA leader], when starting this organisation, left her job, but [BFRA leader] is with the Council. That is like backbiting. Sometimes it's hard to get [BFRA leader]. [BFRA leader] doesn't stand for his people, but people complain to US.
> (Interview,W-FRA member 1)

The W-FRA leader's reluctance to work within the formal political system is in line with most constituents' views both in Westcliff and in Bayview. The W-FRA leader is choosing

political strategies that are suitable with people's experiences, views and opinions of the state, and focuses therefore on having a good relation to her constituents. While past experiences stand strong in people's memories, continued happenings - such as badly conducted ward-elections, cut-offs, and continued warnings of new evictions, as well as the aggressive implementation of cost-recovery measures - are reinforcing the strong sentiments people already have against the state and everything associated with it.

From this discussion, it appears that the BFRA leader in Bayview considers the CSO's access to resources over its credibility among its constituents. This collaborative relationship between the BFRA and the state can resemble a political clientelistic relation where the BFRA leader's work is 'traded' with goods from the state.

The W-FRA leader, on the other hand, chooses to be autonomous from the state, although having friendly relations with local councillors and other actors in the political system. The main focus is to be trustworthy and accountable to the constituents, and *serve the poor* in an altruistic fashion. The W-FRA leader's reason to be involved in the local struggle is connected to the motivational framing she uses to motivate people to participate in the W-FRA's activities.

The W-FRA has continued to have a distant relationship to the state, and is perceived to be far more legitimate among its constituents in Westcliff than is the case for the BFRA in Bayview.

The two CSO leaders' different relationship to the political system is not received identical by their constituents. In the case of the close relationship the BFRA leader has developed to the state, the constituents do not show the same enthusiasm towards a close relation with the state and expressed openly in the interviews their personal sentiments and reluctance against such a relation. Informants in Westcliff also had negative sentiments about the leader in the neighbouring community having such close affiliation to the political system.

Linking with other struggles: the use of invented spaces

Until late 2005 (about a year before my fieldwork) the two CSOs have shared similar strategies, and used the same spaces to voice their concerns and to link with other struggles. Both BFRA and the W-FRA have participated in the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) since its beginning. The SMI is a platform for social movements and grassroots groups from all

over South Africa to share experiences of struggles against social and environmental injustices, and have even had participants from other African countries. SMI was launched at the height of the struggle against the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 (SMI 2005), and was part of the organization of a huge march of 20.000 activists from Alexandra township to Sandton. It is arranged once a year, and has been held in Johannesburg all the years since its beginning, but due to the recent growth in activism around Durban and in KwaZulu-Natal and the questions that spurred around its representativeness if always being held in Johannesburg, the SMI was for the first time since its start held in Durban in 2006 (Harris 2006).

The W-FRA took an active part in the planning committee of the upcoming SMI and participated in weekly meetings, workshops, and all the logistical planning required to organize and carry through the SMI. The BFRA, on the other hand, had no active members participating in any part of the SMI planning process, nor at the SMI conference itself. There were some activists from Bayview, but none of these were officially part of the BFRA committee, although speaking on behalf of the community. When the BFRA leader was asked of his lack of involvement he replied:

> Every year's SMI I was the organising person, sort of the coordinator that actually got the people (...) went to Johannesburg and all that. And every year I was one of the people that went to all of the meetings, the national meetings ...committee meetings.
>
> **Q: But the latest meetings for this year's SMI, you did have representatives from this community?**
>
> Yes, but *I* was not there personally and that's something that all the committees from the other provinces were questioning me about (...) and I think it all surfaced after the SMI in the exchange of emails that they realised what the true reason for my lack of involvement was and they were truly acceptable.
>
> (Interview,BFRA leader)

The SMI in Durban witnessed a division in the ranks of activists in the country. While the W-FRA played an important role and active part of it, the BFRA leader and committee did not take any part of it, neither in the planning process, nor in the conference itself. Harris (2006) did interview many of the different activists involved in the SMI, both those critical of it, and those optimistic. Her findings show that there were mainly three criticisms against the SMI: organizational structure, the role of academics, and maintenance of grassroots character. While the W-FRA leader and the members that did participate in the SMI were positive of its value in uniting, defining and benefiting all the struggles going on in South Africa, the BFRA leader, when asked about his personal opinion on the SMI said:

> It's the greatest thing that ever happened to this country, but I just feel that *all* provinces should be in support. And the reason why the SMI, I wouldn't say it's not working because it is proven to be working, but in Durban why certain movements [divide] is because of politics. I've been part of the [SMI] from the day that it started. I was in Johannesburg when we went to the big march from Alex to Sandton…we walked that distance with people from the Bayview Flats Residents Association. We know what it *WAS* to be part of that struggle, and then after that we gave birth to the SMI and the very first [SMI]. Up until the last one, that I just came in the first and wouldn't pitch up after that, I've been part of every single year [SMI]. And all that, it was just academics in Bayview …in Durban, that caused this sort of division in Durban, in the community.

The BFRA leader seems to blame the division among the activists in relation to the SMI on academics. Harris finds that the activists' problem with the role of academics goes from arguments saying academics are not committed to the grassroots' struggles, to saying that academics are interested in "the movements' work to the extent that it could further their own research" (2006:47). The BFRA leader did not, however, clearly state what he specifically meant by arguing that academics create division among activists in Durban.

While people in Westcliff got feedback from what had happened in the SMI through a W-FRA member's active communication with her neighbours, and through the W-FRA meetings, the BFRA itself would not have much to say to the people about the SMI due to their absence.

The BFRA's absence from participating in the SMI is just one incident along a line of other happenings, and seems to be a process where the BFRA has distanced itself more from the grassroots, and gotten closer to the formal political system.

Breaking the 'Unity'?

In Westcliff, people are expressing frustration with the situation in Bayview. The reason being that they fight the same struggles and have done so up through the years of their existence, but now see division between them and the 'brother' community. According to the BFRA leader:

> Westcliff and Bayview were always the very brother-sister-kind-of-thing. Where whatever happens in Bayview happens in Westcliff and whatever happens in Westcliff happens in Bayview. And because we are so close to each other and we started the struggle together we would always partake for each other.

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Today, they are divided along lines of tensions and discrepancies between their view on what strategies to use, and what relation to have with the political system. According to the BFRA leader the disunity between the two organisations is not based on community-level because "people from Bayview meet people from Westcliff, and people from Westcliff meet people from Bayview, we still have that", but the differences are on a leadership-level. The BFRA leader claims the tensions between the W-FRA leaders and the BFRA started when he took the job in the Municipality and W-FRA members went around "claiming that I sold people out, claiming that I would take up this job and not representing people" (interview,BFRA leader).

The W-FRA leader concurs with the BFRA leader's view saying that frictions and disunity only exist between individuals on leadership level, but not the community as a whole:

> I think in Chatsworth our unity is still there. If you look at Bayview, and it's like I am saying individuals always think that the struggle is about them when it is not. I think the struggle is actually with communities and not with individuals.

The importance of Chatsworth and Durban communities and groups to stay united was voiced by CCF leaders at public gatherings where activists from both Westcliff and Bayview were present. The issue seems to be, then, that the resentment against the BFRA by its constituents revolves mainly around its choice of political strategies. It is clear that the constituents are willing to fight the challenges they are continuously facing, but the question seems to be who is going to lead them forward.

Political competition for legitimate representation

In the midst of the internal challenges facing the people of Bayview due to the change in the BFRA's activity there, yet another issue ignites more confusion among the people of Bayview: there exists a puzzle of individuals claiming they want to help the people there. There are around three individuals in Bayview in a political competition over attracting as many constituents as possible to 'their' organisation, trying to demand legitimacy among the people there. Despite these internal contestations for the monopoly of a legitimate right to 'rule' and represent the community, the constituents themselves argue that these individuals are all promoting their own interests and do not care much about the people they try to attract to their organisations.

What is common for both Bayview and Westcliff is that the so-called 'opposition' in the respective communities is ANC-aligned and often fight primarily for the rent-payers. The BFRA leader was laughing when I asked about the different 'leaders' in the area that seemed to be fighting over getting supporters from the community. According to him the other individuals trying to get a good reputation in the community had failed to do so, and when talking of one of them he said the 'opposition' "hasn't become democratically elected by the community" (Interview, BFRA leader). Although the BFRA seemed to have no worries of being 'out conquered' by other individuals in the community trying to present themselves as the people's representatives, the fact is that the BFRA's lessened role in Bayview has created both anger, frustration and confusion among the people that have been actively involved in the BFRA and that identify themselves with the struggle it represents. One Bayview resident illustrated the general frustration among the constituents there when she said: "You don't know who is who in this who! You don't know who to trust, who's misleading us or who's leading us" (Interview, Bayview resident 4). People's frustration has escalated due to the recent happenings in the community (the municipality has started implementing prepaid electricity meters).

In Westcliff, the political landscape is quite similar to Bayview were two of the 'oppositions' in the area are ANC-aligned. They also generally fight for the rent-payers. According to the W-FRA leader, the W-FRA is the only organization really fighting for the people that cannot afford paying their rent and services. When asked what the W-FRA's challenges are, she said:

> Ooh! The major challenge for us is the ANC itself! And its corruptedness. And opportunists. I think the challenge for us is, you know, it's not a big challenge I don't see it as a big challenge, because over the years it has been the same one and two individuals, not groups of people and we have managed very well to overcome that because we have the support of the community. It's political parties, individuals were involved, first they came as IFP, now they're coming as the ANC. You never know what people's real agenda is, and that's the real purpose of, you know, starting all this opposition.

Although there are other individuals in both communities that try to form their own parties and try to 'overthrow' the BFRA and the W-FRA respectively, both the BFRA and the W-FRA use the same arguments: they are both *formally constituted*, and they have a *struggle history* in the area to refer to. Through their role in previous happenings in their respective communities they have built up an important significance in their constituencies. One W-FRA member said:

All these years [W-FRA leaders] were running this committee. Everything was a success and nobody had a problem. So why now, another committee coming in poisoning your mind, and taking you away that side and forgetting about the first committee you was in? Used to come when your water was cut, the lights [W-FRA member] used to come and put for you. So why forget those, the past, and go to another committee which you don't know what want?

(Interview,W-FRA member 5)

Summary

The two CSOs have employed different strategies towards the state. Although having utilized identical invited spaces (such as the election of a ward-committee) their different experiences with it have rendered them with different attitudes towards state-facilitated spaces for civil society participation. While the BFRA won four of the seats in the ward-committee, the W-FRA leader walked out from the election-locale in protest against the corrupted manner it was organised. Although having had identical experiences with, and attitudes against the political system, the BFRA and the W-FRA have developed different relations to the political system The BFRA's 'success' in winning four of the seats in the ward-committee, and the BFRA leader's job in the municipality has resulted in the BFRA developing a closer and friendlier relation with the state. Despite the BFRA leader's positive views on such a close relation with the state, his committee is sceptical about it, and the constituents are generally outrageous. These reactions from his committee and constituency have rendered the organisation illegitimate, both within its constituency and among activists in the neighbouring community. The BFRA's withdrawal from the SMI process also shows that the BFRA has distanced itself from fighting within civil society and have bigger aspirations of making changes through the formal political system.

Unlike the BFRA, the W-FRA has maintained a close relation to its constituency, and kept a distant relation to the state. The distant relationship to the state concurs with its negative framing of the state and the constituents' negative experiences and views of the state. This has been to the benefit of the W-FRA as its framing of the state is concurring with its political actions, and has strengthened its legitimacy among its constituents.

Acknowledging the interconnection between use of framing and choice of political strategies is important when trying to understand why CSOs are seen as legitimate or not. Where discourses (framing) and use of political strategies correspond, people will most likely

perceive the CSO as legitimate. Where they do not correspond the CSO will most likely be seen as being illegitimate.

The next chapter will discuss various types and domains of participation and how people are included in or excluded from the various activities of the CSOs and their resources.

6. PARTICIPATION

> The community in large should be in every meeting, the community in large should be everywhere. Whether it's small or whether it's big. That is how we will get things done from the government. A person going by himself he won't get nothing.
>
> (Interview, Bayview resident 9)

This chapter will discuss three forms of participation, and mainly three domains in which these forms of participation take place. Discussing the issue of participation will reveal interesting organisational differences employed by the W-FRA and the BFRA. What type of participation is encouraged by the CSOs through their organisational structure is an important source from which to assess the legitimacy they attain in their constituencies. The CSOs' organisational structures differ, the BFRA employing a more NGO-like structure than the W-FRA that maintains a grassroots character similar to a CBO. What kind of participation is encouraged will elucidate important findings of whether the CSOs are working in line with their constituents' interests, thus strengthening or weakening their role as legitimate representatives of the people. This will also shed light on the internal dynamics and power-structures that exist within civil society groups such as these organisations.

First, the various *types* of participation that characterise the constituents' involvement in CSO activities will be defined, and the various domains in which these forms of participation take place (or not) are presented. The presentation serves as a foundation for the subsequent discussion which is divided in three parts discussing the three forms of participation.

Three types of participation

There will be a distinction between participation, non-participation and non-inclusion/exclusion. The three forms of participation are defined as follows: a) *Participation*: People's active or passive presence (and participation) in community meetings and/or other arrangements organised by the CSO, b) *non-participation*: People's lack of participation due to personal choice, and, c) *non-inclusion/exclusion*: People's lack of participation due to factors outside their personal control such as the CSO's way of including or excluding them in various ways.

Three domains of participation

There are mainly three domains in which the level of participation by constituents in Bayview and Westcliff will be discussed. These are the participation of constituents in decision-making processes, in community activities, and in activities outside the community.

The first domain, *decision-making processes*, is here operationalised as *elections* such as the Annual General Meeting (AGM) where chairperson and committee members are elected/re-elected (usually once a year). An assessment of participation in this sphere is interesting to see whether important decisions of the CSOs are taken in line with the interests of the wider community.

The second sphere, community activities, is operationalised as *community meetings*, and *other activities* such as feeding schemes, religious celebrations like Diwali and Christmas, women's groups, youth groups, home-based care, and so on, and that are confine to the community. Community meetings are important because they serve as forums where information flows, grievances are voiced, and issues are discussed and acted upon as a collective. When being open for participation they can create a feeling of ownership among the constituents, and in many ways one can argue that they are important vehicles for ensuring that decisions are taken in line with the interests of the constituents. Frequent conduction of open community meetings (i.e. open for anyone to participate in) ensure and maintain a fair degree of internal democracy, and a relative continuous communication between the CSO and its constituents which is important when changes in the political opportunities (and constraints) happen and need to be acted upon. The thesis argues that a good communication between the CSOs and their constituents facilitates mobilisation *and* increases the people's perception of their CSO as legitimate.

Participation in other activities is in many ways important for building a sense of ownership and feeling of being included in collective matters, and includes the fair or unfair distribution of resources from the CSOs to its constituents. How resources are distributed is an important measure of whether people are adequately included in the CSO activities. Whether the CSOs' constituents think they have equal access to the resources possessed by the CSOs, or not, is an important measure for their perception of their CSO as legitimate or illegitimate. As will be seen in the following discussion, the CSOs differ in their distribution of resources and their inclusion of their constituents in collective celebrations such as Diwali and/or Christmas.

The third domain, *activities outside the community*, consists of *political and educational activities* that are necessarily attached to the work of the CSOs*, such as mobilisation in protest marches, defiance campaigns, and rallies for and/or with other civil society groups, or participation in forums such as the SMI, as well as participation in educational workshops, lectures[21] and conferences. Attending these kinds of activities can in many ways be fruitful for the participants' understanding of their situation and can equip them with powerful tools in linking with other people in similar struggles and in thinking of new strategies to change their status quo. Not least, having knowledge of the external structures shaped mainly by politics and economy on a national and global level, and how these power structures impact the communities on a local and individual level, gives a certain feeling of empowerment among the individuals exposed to this 'wisdom' through participating in the spaces utilised by the CSOs.

In the following part, the three types of participation that are identified in this thesis will be discussed in light of the three domains of participation. The two CSOs differ substantially on how they include their constituents in the various domains of participation and what type of 'participation' is promoted as a result of these choices.

Participation

The thesis argues that it is important for CSOs to take into account their constituents' consent on any decisions made by allowing for the constituents' contributions in form of personal opinions and suggestions on how things should be done, or simply allowing their mere presence in the decision-making processes. Likewise, it is important to include the constituents in all activities both in and outside of the community and to let them know they are part and parcel of a collective where both tangible and non-tangible resources are shared. This is important for the constituents to feel their CSO is representing them in a way they can identify with, as well as giving them a feeling that the CSO is representing their interests and fights their struggles. Where the organizational structure of the CSOs facilitates tight communication with their constituents they will strengthen their legitimacy.

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[21] The Centre for Civil Society (CCS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) arranges educational workshops and lectures, and often invites activists from the Durban area to participate. Funding for transport is usually given. The CCS aims at building organisations working for socioeconomic equality. According to the W-FRA leader, the CCS also helps people getting computer-skills, and helps them applying for jobs (W-FRA meeting 22.11.06).

The W-FRA has maintained an organizational structure that encourages frequent communication with its constituents. It conducts weekly meetings at one of the local schools, and at times organises public meetings where activists and residents from neighboring areas are invited. The weekly meetings are arranged at the same day, place, and time, and the W-FRA leaders and committee members always urge people to participate in these meetings which are always open for anyone to participate in.

People are also encouraged to attend arrangements - meetings, marches, workshops, discussion forums like the SMI and CPF - both inside and outside of the community. At one meeting where the W-FRA leader received a price for her arrangement of the Diwali-celebration she said "the biggest appreciation is when people attend all kinds of functions" (speaking at community meeting in Westcliff, 27.10.06). During my stay in the community the weekly meetings went unabated, and in addition to the political activities, the W-FRA arranged a weekly feeding-scheme (every Thursday) with resources from its own constituents. The activity of the W-FRA and its members were very visible in the community, and facilitated a communication between the constituents and the organisation.

This thesis argues that frequent communication between the CSOs and their constituents is crucial for strengthening their legitimacy in the long run. Krishna argues that "it takes long time and repeated and continuous interactions for CBOs to acquire legitimacy with their constituents" (2004:9). In a political climate such as that in Westcliff and Bayview where several individuals are trying to portray themselves as the people's representatives, but rather promote their own interests, people do not easily trust people that come with nice words and promises. Based on this reality, the thesis argues that it is important for the CSOs to go through with repeated actions over a long period to show people that the CSOs are accountable to them.

The majority of the people I spoke with in Westcliff were very grateful for the W-FRA leaders' efforts and personal contributions in the community. One informant in Westcliff emphasised the imperative role the W-FRA leader had played in the ongoing work of the organisation throughout her time as the leader, saying:

> There will be no organization after [W-FRA leader] steps down because nobody can stand up and speak for the people. Nobody will take a slap or the words that [W-FRA leader] took, even the teargas - she was tear-gassed, she was bitten by the dog - security dogs. She takes our problems, she goes to High Court. She stands up with everyone's issues. If she falls down, the organization falls down. There'll be no organization, the community will fall down."
>
> (Interview,W-FRA member 1)

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These sentiments were apparent among several of my informants in Westcliff, and some in Bayview. When I asked what would happen if the W-FRA leader would resign, she brutally said: "I will commit suicide. You can't do anything alone, you need to be well-organised, you need the crowd" (Interview,W-FRA member 1).

In addition to having frequent actions, the conduction of transparent and open elections is also important. Every year in Westcliff, the W-FRA holds an annual general meeting (AGM) where leader and committee members are elected/re-elected. As mentioned earlier, the W-FRA has had almost the same committee for many years. When asking the W-FRA leader why she had been the leader since the birth of the organisation, she said:

> Well, for many, many years we are challenging the system, having elections, and all the time people are electing the same person. There were times when I gave in a letter of resignation and …maybe I'm tired now, and people wouldn't accept. You know, then you just think you have to go on.

None of my informants in Westcliff had any negative comments on the conduction of elections in the community, or on the membership-composition of the W-FRA.

The W-FRA is a CBO in its structure and organisation, and has chosen to keep a close communication with its constituents through its choice of organisational structure. Its distance to the political system discussed in the previous chapter, is also contributing to the maintenance of its close and open relation to its constituents. The adoption of an organisational structure promoting and facilitating participation by the constituents and transparency has strengthened the W-FRA's legitimacy.

Although participation is important, how participation is encouraged has an impact on the CSOs' legitimacy. Chapter 5 discussed the differences in motivational framing and found that whilst the W-FRA encourages people to participate in all its activities by appealing to people's belief in God, the BFRA uses duress to motivate people to participate in meetings. What is striking is that the BFRA did not arrange regular community meetings and had only four meetings the last year (2006). Why did the BFRA leader use duress in forcing people to come in an upcoming meeting when only four meetings had been held the last year? His use of duress was done in the community meeting I attended (that was the only meeting held during the four months I was in the field) and he wanted people to attend a meeting the

following day. According to informants the meeting the leader spoke about was never held. Why did then the BFRA leader seem to be so desperate to attract participants to the meeting the following day when it was not even held? Can my presence in the meeting he said so be the reason? Was it to give me a good impression of the BFRA, being a white researcher from overseas? Or was it to portray the BFRA as an active organisation that needed to entice people with groceries to attract participation? Did the BFRA-leader try to give me an impression that the limited activity in the community was to blame on non-participation by the constituents?

Non-Participation

Non-participation is the lack of incentive by people to participate in their CSO's activities. In this sense, non-participation is voluntary and cannot be blamed directly on the CSOs, unless the CSOs are organised in a way that renders them illegitimate among their constituents resulting in the lack of interest or belief by the constituents in the CSO.

Some of my informants in both communities, independent of how they perceived the W-FRA or the BFRA, feel that the lack of agency among the people to engage in community-issues could not solely be blamed on the CSOs, but that part of the blame should be put on the constituents. The lack of incentive among constituents is, amongst other things, blamed on their greediness. One Bayview resident said: "People want handouts, they don't utilise all opportunities given to them - like the Women Empowerment Centre (WEC) where they could learn how to sow clothes so they could earn a living - People don't want to work!" She continued to say that people's lack of interest is to blame on the BFRA leader for not being actively involved in telling the people that WEC is a good opportunity for them (Interview,Bayview resident 1). Here non-participation is interlinked with the BFRA-leader's lack of motivational incentive to inform the people about opportunities they can make use of.

Another 'collective weakness' in the community was blamed on a lack of leadership and fortitude among the people to oppose the current BFRA committee's way of leading the community despite being unsatisfied with it. One Bayview resident said: "Strong leaders stand their ground", and compared strong leaders with being like the W-FRA leaders in the neighbouring community Westcliff (Interview,Bayview resident 1). Another resident said the problems in Bayview are based on the community's lack of unity: "The challenge in the community is to stand and unite. (…) People complain about drugs, but if I would have a march against drugs, nobody would join me. No unity at all", and that people will join the

organisation and fight only if they get something in return: "you must have something to suffice people here, honestly". He continued to say: "People in Bayview love different people at different times. (…) I think so many Gods have come down here and changed the hearts of our people, it's hard" (Interview,Bayview resident 3). This also illustrates the complex nature of politics going on in the community as was discussed briefly in chapter 6 where there is a political competition between individuals over being the legitimate representatives of the people in the two communities.

When having lived in Westcliff for quite some time I got the impression that people wanted to be freed from their arrears so they could start afresh, but that they could not free their arrears solely based on their personal efforts due to a structure of unemployment and limited opportunities to get an income. One resident in Bayview put me in two minds about this issue when he said: "They will keep the arrears as long as they get food. The only thing that people in this area think about is food" (Interview,Bayview resident 3). I know there are many people in Westcliff and Bayview that are in huge arrears due to non-payment. Many of these do have access to food on a daily basis, but I also heard of people that are too poor to buy food everyday. This utterance may have several meanings, but in the context it was said it pointed to people's lack of agency, of engaging in collective actions, to fight for scrapping their arrears. The informant said people did not bother about getting rid of their arrears as long as someone (organisations or individuals) give them food-hampers on a regular basis. His sentiment concurs with Bayview resident 1 saying that people only want handouts, and do not want to engage in activities that can enhance their situation.

If taking these characteristics of the constituents into account, can one say that people want changes, but unless someone will make those changes for them, people are not going to engage in these struggles on their own initiative? If it is so, maybe the BFRA leader's use of duress, trying to entice people with access to groceries, is a good strategy to encourage participation?

In Westcliff, one W-FRA member said similar things as some of the informants in Bayview, complaining on people's lack of incentive to engage in the W-FRA's activities and mobilisation:

> We have to still go on, never leave it [the struggle]. We must never sit back reluctant in
> our homes, we must fight our battle (…). We don't need fun and entertainment and all
> of this. We'll have that AFTER our struggle is over. People are getting bored. You see,

> most of the people here they are running to entertainment world, but you are forgetting to see what is behind you!
>
> <div align="right">(Interview, W-FRA member 1)</div>

She continued to say that one has to make sacrifices to be actively involved in the struggle: "When you talk about meetings people don't show up, but if there's a show people come to me and ask 'why you didn't tell me?'". She argues people are not willing to sacrifice their time and efforts in doing community work, and says that she leaves her child at home, although she does not like it, in order to do the duties appointed to her by the W-FRA. She believes all should make an effort to win the struggle (she wishes for a good home, a job and education for her children) before enjoying entertainment and be relaxed in ones home.

Non-participation and free-riders

Based on the utterances above, are the people in Bayview and Westcliff, which are not actively involved in organisational activities, so-called 'free-riders'[22]?

Free-riding is a question of why rational, self-interested individuals would act to achieve a collective good when they can withhold contributions and still enjoy the fruits of others' collective efforts (Olson 1965 in Benford 1993:197). Rational choice explanations of collective political action focus on explaining why individuals do *not* participate rather than explaining why they do (Finkel et al. 1989).

Judging from the utterances presented above it seems that there are people in the two communities that are benefiting from other's collective efforts, but even so, are they free-riders? To assess whether it is a matter of free-riding or not one has to take into account the activity of the CSOs, and the current happenings in the two communities regarding issues they mobilise against. Can one argue that in communities where there are no urgent happenings, such as forced evictions and implementation of prepaid meters, that non-participation is a matter of free-riding? And what does non-participation have to do with legitimacy?

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[22] Informants used the expression 'jumping on the bandwagon' of people who withheld their own contribution to the struggle in the area, and benefited from the CSO's work although doing nothing. One example is people I knew about in Westcliff who could afford to pay their rates and additional living expenses, but that withheld their payments and had illegal access to electricity and water like others who simply could not afford it. These people would not necessarily participate in the CSO activities.

Westcliff

In Westcliff, the W-FRA is very active arranging weekly meetings, feeding schemes, huge celebrations (Diwali), as well as encouraging its members and constituents to participate in forums at local, national and international levels. The W-FRA chooses to be active and tries to mobilise people into these activities despite not being faced with forced evictions or threats of violent clashes. In the absence of violent evictions, is non-participation in the W-FRA activities a matter of free-riding?

The W-FRA's choice of being continuous active is a strategy to be better equipped to handle future happenings that necessitates collective mobilisation. It is argued that repeated and continuous interactions between CBOs and their constituents are important for CBOs to gain legitimacy, but also to avoid free-riding. Krishna argues: "free riding is likely to be less common when people know they are likely to interact with each other and derive benefits over multiple occasions stretching out into the future" (2004:32). In line with this the W-FRA's choice of being active in its community can be an important source to avoid free-riding when it needs its constituents to participate in future mobilisation. Additionally, the W-FRA's continuous active role in its constituency, in addition to the framing it utilises, is crucial to prove to people that the organisation is there for them. This thesis argues that despite a lack of involvement by some constituents, informants in Westcliff perceive the W-FRA as legitimate based on the actions it has been part of, as well as the continued actions it arranges in the community. Non-involvement among the constituents in Westcliff can, thus, not be primarily blamed on the motivational framing or efforts by the W-FRA leadership, but on people's belief there is no need to attend meetings and other activities. Non-participation due to an individual's non-identification with the organisation's goals is exemplified earlier with the rate-payers that do not feel represented in the same way as the non-payers in the community. This seems to be an issue of inadequate inclusion of *all* in the framing work of the W-FRA, and that these constituent's feel safe in their homes because they are up-to-date with their payments.

In Westcliff, the leaders' and committee's continued effort in keeping the W-FRA active and ongoing showed that mobilization was more frequent in Westcliff than in Bayview.

Bayview

The views among the informants above focus on people's *voluntary* non-participation. Non-participation in Bayview is not to blame on free-riding when taking into account people's

non-participation in BFRA's activities. The reason for this assumption is that the BFRA has experienced a lull in its activity since late 2005 and generally the whole of 2006. The BFRA, judging from its limited activity in the community, seems to give low priority to frequent interactions with its constituents due to the lull in physical actions exerted by the authorities. Despite the organisational lull of the BFRA and the lull in forced evictions and similar actions exercised by the authorities, one BFRA member believes that there is no problem to gather a crowd to oppose forced evictions and engage in violent clashes should it be needed. In an interview with the BFRA leader he said that the organisation's activity is dependent on happenings in the community and upcoming issues. In periods with no specific happenings the organization sees no need of calling people in to meetings. Non-participation is here due exclusively to the BFRA's inactivity and limited communication with its constituents.

One BFRA member expressed indirectly that the BFRA was going to arrange a Christmas party to weigh up for its inactivity for a long period of time. She said: "Like how we had a Christmas [in December 2006], we used to bring the community back together, you see? They mustn't think we are lacking, [that] we go down, we are still there for our people" (Interview,BFRA member 1). It seems that this informant do see the lack of activity as a problem in that people will not know whether the BFRA is their representatives or not. In chapter 5 the importance of framing, and not least using framing, to facilitate collective action is crucial to attract participants. Simultaneously the thesis argued that being continuously active with one's constituents is important to maintain their support. This is also argued by Krishna (2004) that links the practice of frequent interaction between CBOs and their constituencies with the CBOs' attained legitimacy among their constituents, as well as to the prevention of free-riding.

In Bayview, then, the lull in BFRA's activity is the main reason for non-participation in the community. With this in mind, the next part discusses legitimacy proportionately to non-inclusion or exclusion of the constituents by their CSOs.

Non-inclusion and exclusion

Only in Bayview did people complain about the BFRA's way of conducting the annual general meeting (AGM). When asked how it works when the BFRA elects/re-elects a new committee one Bayview resident angrily said: "I think they [BFRA] never ever had like an election where they called people to voice their opinion and the people to choose the ones that

they want. There's never ever happened!" Later on in the interview she told me that the BFRA had recently carried through with the election of a new committee without the presence of the majority of the people:

> There was supposed to be an election. We set a date. [But] on [that] date they didn't have elections. So when they had elections, they had it with, like a few people. They didn't have a majority, you understand me? By the time we said 'Jack Robertson' the election was done. Imagine we got a committee, we have people here, a thousand - can we have election with about 50 people?
>
> (Interview,Bayview resident 1)

Not only was the election carried through on a date unknown for most of the people in the community, but according to the same informant the BFRA leader and committee often use other methods to gain votes. She explained: "this is what they say 'you have to elect me, otherwise when the groceries come I won't give you groceries'. This is how they work, this is how they work" (Interview,Bayview resident 1). The BFRA's use of duress towards its constituents to keep its position in the community resembles a patron-client relation where the clients, who are the poor people in Bayview, become reliant on their patron, the BFRA, to have access to much-needed resources like groceries. The clients can often be coerced to do certain things, in this case re-elect the current leader and committee, in return for personal goods (Edigheji 2003).

When speaking with the leader himself, the elections are fair and done openly with the whole community. He told me the AGM was initially done every year, but at one of the elections "the community then decided that we needed to amend the Constitution and make it a bi-AGM, so it would be every two year[s]" because they were seeing the same people were coming in the committee "they felt that it would be pointless re-electing after a year". The current committee has not been drastically changed over the years. According to the BFRA leader "in the last five years I can say that almost 90% of the people that are still in the current committee have been there, of the last four to five years" (Interview,BFRA leader).

While the W-FRA holds frequent community meetings in its constituency, the BFRA in Bayview was close to inactive. The BFRA's lack of frequent meetings with its constituents is a problem, and many informants questioned it claiming they did not know what was going on in the area and that the BFRA was 'invisible' in the sense that there were no community meetings, no action. One informant said with a resignation in her voice: "I can't even see a meeting, I can't see anything happen. Everything is like dead" (Interview,Bayview resident

8). Another informant felt excluded from the meetings angrily arguing that the BFRA had no communication with the people in its constituency whatsoever. His quote summarizes the general sentiment among most of my informants in Bayview when he said:

> You have to unite. And for the community to unite you have to have meeting, not by your house, but we have a community hall. Get the people out there, hire buses, let the people know 'this is what we going through, this is what we going to do' so people will know 'we are doing it because we live here'. (…) Even the parties that was here at the bottom. No children from here were taken to the parties. How do we communicate with the chairperson who says he's running this place, what communication does he got with the people?
>
> <div align="right">(Interview,Bayview resident 9)</div>

According to the leader in Bayview the BFRA has on average four to five community meetings in a year. But if there are certain issues that need to be resolved they have meetings almost every single week. "For example if they start disconnecting electricity tomorrow, then there will be meetings happening regularly until the issues are resolved" (Interview,BFRA leader). According to one BFRA committee member the turnout at community meetings is immense:

> When we call up [a meeting] we call up the whole area which is about 2000 or something. We have a good response. (…) we ask the people:'what do you all say? Give us your voices so we can help you all. It's not for us to make decisions all the time, it's for you all to lead these decisions on'.
>
> <div align="right">(Interview,BFRA member 1)</div>

I was surprised by this great number, especially when the crowd present at the one and only community meeting that was held in the area during my fieldwork period had approximately 50 attendants. When asked why the BFRA had such few community meetings in a year the BFRA leader explained:

> For example in a year where there was not much activity there was no need to call a meeting, (…) apart from having a meeting (…) once every quarter. (…) But, as I said is difficult to say that it is just four meetings because sometimes we have a meeting almost every single week. (…) It all depends on the issues. For example if they start disconnecting electricity tomorrow, then there will be meetings happening regularly until the issues are resolved.

Despite the BFRA's arguments that there is no need to conduct frequent community meetings in quiet periods its constituents do not share the same view. The discrepancy between the BFRA and its constituents' view on how things should be done and how the BFRA should work in its community, is weakening the BFRA's attained legitimacy among its constituents.

The BFRA's characteristics are on several aspects similar to the characteristics of NGOs as presented in chapter 3. NGOs are not necessarily driven by internal democracy and might exclude its constituents from participating in decision-making processes (Mercer 2002). The BFRA is accused by several informants of excluding its constituents from participating in election of a new committee that, according to the BFRA leader, is held every other year. Although the BFRA is organisationally separate from the government, the leader works in the eThekwini Municipality and is regarded with scepticism by his constituents. His job has already impacted on his activity in Bayview, and he cannot participate in all the spaces available for the people in Bayview, like the ward-elections. The current organisational structure of the BFRA renders it unaccountable among its constituents. Compared to the W-FRA's organisational structure that facilitates and encourages a close communication with its constituents, the BFRA seems to be the W-FRA's total opposite.

Whilst people in Bayview are concerned about the BFRA's invisibility and absence in the community as a whole, and complain that the BFRA committee, as a whole, excludes those not closely related to them by kin or friendship, the problem in Westcliff has another character. Whilst the W-FRA has an active presence and role in the community, and includes all that are interested in joining the organisation, some committee members complain on the behaviour of other members of the committee. One W-FRA member was worried that people in the community would not take the W-FRA seriously due to the inappropriate actions of a fellow committee member saying: "You never see new people sitting in the taxi going for shows (...) [the W-FRA member] take the same people and people question ME!" (Interview,W-FRA member 1). Based on several stories I heard about this particular committee member I had to ask the W-FRA leader why the W-FRA choose to keep a committee member that many perceived as a corrupt person. The leader explained that many people that are formally elected into the committee are not doing the community work demanded from them. Due to this, the daily workings of the W-FRA, and its continued existence in the community, is very dependent on the voluntary labour done by the committee members. Because of this, the W-FRA's dependency of the voluntary labour done by this member will be far more fruitful for the organisation as a whole than if expelling the person from the organisation. This has made me aware that despite seeing corruption as something that is unwanted, one has to accept it when the total gain of the organisation exceeds the total loss. In this case, loosing one person's free labour was far more costly than the partial loss of credibility in the committee as a result of that person's behaviour.

The interconnection of resources and participation

> When you look at community-based organisations, funders don't come and just fund you, they always rather fund a non-governmental organisation, an NGO, but NGOs don't actually do anything.
>
> (Interview,W-FRA leader)

Delivery is an important aspect of participation. This part will mainly look at how the CSOs' incoming resources are distributed to their constituents. An overview of the resource-flows in the two CSOs is presented in figure 2 and 3. The discussion will focus on two aspects: 1) the *differences* between where the CSOs' resources come from, and 2) the distribution of resources to their constituents. Their different sources of resources are not directly impacting their attained legitimacy as much as their distribution of resources. They can rather be argued to strengthen the sentiments the constituents have of their CSOs.

As seen in the figures, the CSOs have similar resource-flows, but differ mainly on two aspects: The first is that the BFRA receives resources from the local state, and the W-FRA does not. The second is that the W-FRA receives resources from its constituents. This did not seem to be the case in the BFRA. These differences impact on their attained legitimacy. While BFRA's access to resources from the state weakens its legitimacy among its constituents, for reasons that will be discussed later, the W-FRA's access to resources by its own constituents is a source to strengthen its legitimacy.

Resources are defined as tangible and non-tangible resources. The tangible resources are commodities such as sewing machines, computers, clothes, and food distributed by the CSO to its constituents within the boundaries of the community. The non-tangible resources can be anything from entertainment, the provision of free transport, to activities leading to building up people's personal resources and social networks through educational workshops, seminars, lectures and forums at local, national, and even international level (such as the WSF).

Bayview

Figure 2: Flows of resources into and from the BFRA

According to BFRA leader and some committee members many activities are currently benefiting the community. They have a youth organization that is part of the eThekwini Development Forum, monthly distribution of food hampers and occasionally clothing, distribution of stationary and school uniforms at school start, they offer home-based HIV/AIDS care, access to equipment (loud hailer and PH system) to show films and communicate with the community given by the CBP ward development program in which the BFRA leader is currently working, a computer centre at a primary school in Bayview with sponsored computers given by the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, and they arranged a big Christmas party in December 2006.

The BFRA leader argues for the positive aspects of having access to resources from the state, however, the BFRA has weakened its legitimacy in its constituency, not due to the resources coming from the state, but because they do not reach the people. His job in the municipality, as discussed in chapter 6, is a source of great concern among the constituents that rather strengthens the view on the BFRA as illegitimate.

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According to informants many the resources are not reaching the people. People claim the BFRA has access to resources it keeps secret for the rest of the community. Some people accuse committee members of dividing huge sums of money among themselves:

> People have been misusing funding! That is why the Bayview Flats Residents Association is not resisting! It's a family-thing, it's a friendship-thing, it's not because you are focusing on the poor of the poorest!
>
> (Interview,Bayview resident 1)

People that are not part of this close-knit system of friendship and family ties do not have access to the resources managed by the BFRA. People's opinions on how resources are used in Bayview are also interlinked with the low level of activity by the BFRA in the community making it even more difficult for people to see how the resources are used. These claims of corruption weaken the legitimacy of the BFRA among its constituents.

Resources already known by the constituents to be in possession of the BFRA are not used on the constituents, although the BFRA leader claiming that they are. One informant said:

> I didn't even know the organization sponsored computers, but they [other residents] said there was, and I don't even know where the computers are. You see, Bayview don't even have a youth [organisation]. (…) So I don't have any idea where are these computers gone to!
>
> (Interview,Bayview resident 7)

Another youth concurringly lamented: "We don't have a youth organization, nothing! Everything was sponsored" (Interview,Bayview resident 6). Another Bayview resident said that the BFRA has access to sowing machines that are not in use.

It is also claimed that resources are used by the BFRA to contain complaints by the constituency against the BFRA. One young resident lamented: "They have this way of shutting people by giving them groceries and full of stuff" (Interview,Bayview resident 7). Another resident concurred saying that the BFRA are "…Giving them groceries, giving out clothes to them, but if you don't speak against them you can get, but if you don't get, especially me, because I confront them and say 'what is going on'" (Interview,Bayview resident 8). When asking a Bayview resident if he sees any bright future for the community, he said:

> To be honest, if there is no change within the structure of chair and vice-chair and the organization itself, I don't see it moving very far. It's always going to be the way it is. The people that are on the top are going to be gaining, and the poor, that are always poor, are going to remain like this until it's finished and it's going the be the same thing over and over again.
>
> (Interview,Bayview resident 7)

According to Professor Fatima Meer, small grassroots organizations like the two CSOs in Bayview and Westcliff do not have corruption:

> Not when organisations like us have funding. We are scrupulous; it's never ever any corruption. We don't ask for more money than we need. I mean I'm very, very strict on this. You budget for the event, and then you go out and find the money that you need to see that the event succeeds"

Despite the fact that these organisations are small-scale, do not receive any regular funding, and do not have a bank account or a treasurer, the informants in Bayview have refuted the assumption that there cannot be any corruption in such small organisations as the BFRA. Whether resources are divided among only the leadership, or simply not in use despite being accessible, are two forms of corruption.

In Westcliff, however, the W-FRA's way of managing incoming resources is done in the way described by Professor Meer. They canvass for funding and support to carry through specific projects, events and happenings in their constituency (see Appendix 5).

Westcliff

Figure 3: Flows of resources into and from the W-FRA

The W-FRA is highly active and visible in its constituency through regular meetings and activities. Incoming resources are usually accounted for in plenum at the regular Wednesday meetings. Most of my informants were happy with the effort and personal financial contributions made by the W-FRA leader and her family to carry through different events (like Diwali and feeding scheme). Except for some complaining on a devious committee member (as discussed earlier) no one had anything negative to say about the W-FRA's way of distributing resources.

The collection of resources by the constituents to the W-FRA was done to be able to carry through the weekly feeding schemes. This thesis argues that by letting the constituency contribute with their own resources, as well as their own labour to carry through activities such as the feeding scheme, people will feel ownership and pride of having contributed to the successful carrying-out of such activities. Sitting together with the activists and volunteers cutting vegetables and preparing the food was a nice experience and it seemed as if these collective activities strengthened friendship ties among the constituents. In one occasion, however, one resident was excluded from participating to the carrying-out of the feeding-scheme as the money she donated was rejected by the W-FRA leaders. The rejection was based on personal conflicts between them, and the W-FRA leader's belief that the donation was made based on devious intentions.

In Westcliff it seems that the way resources are distributed is not so closely connected to who participates in the activities. People are informed about upcoming activities, events, and distribution of groceries through the Wednesday meetings. By participating in the community meetings, or by speaking with those that participated, one will get access to the resources coming in. When it comes to grocery hampers these are distributed in turn due to limited parcels. Those 20 families that receive a grocery hamper today will not receive next time as it will be given to other families that did not receive any hampers the first time. This system of rotation is supposed to divide the resources as fairly as possible. Although the W-FRA in general is seen as distributing their resources fairly, one W-FRA committee member complained that another committee member on occasions took several grocery hampers. Despite complaints within the committee on one of their members, the general views of the W-FRA were positive.

Summary

Three forms of participation have been discussed in this chapter, as well as the interconnection between participation and access to resources. The discussion here has shown that the BFRA has excluded most of its constituents from important processes such as decision-making, and has very limited communication with its constituents due to few and irregular community meetings. The BFRA is also accused of hiding information from its constituents regarding incoming resources. The issue of distribution of resources was very contentious when speaking with informants in Bayview. When asked what they think about their CSO many spoke explicitly of the BFRA's misuse of resources. Limited activities by the BFRA in its constituency, together with claims of corruption and misuse of resources have severely weakened the BFRA's position in its constituency as well as its legitimacy. The conclusion is clearly that the BFRA's way of excluding the people, having limited interaction with its constituents, and rather speaking on behalf of them than with them makes it look similar to an NGO which is distanced from the people. It seems people's participation in the BFRA activities is secondary to the BFRA's functions and existence. As a result people think the BFRA is illegitimate because it does not work in line with their interests, and therefore does not really represent them although claiming to do so.

The W-FRA, on the other hand, seems to be the BFRA's opposite. By conducting weekly community meetings and feeding schemes the W-FRA has a good and frequent communication with its constituents. Its way of working and interacting with its constituency has shown the people that it is transparent and all-inclusive. Generally people had good sentiments and opinions about the W-FRA. These findings show that the W-FRA has an important and central role in this constituency that has contributed to strengthening its legitimacy among its constituents. Its way of working, focusing on being close to the people, renders it looking very similar to a typical community-based organisation (CBO).

7. CONCLUSION

This thesis has done a comparative study of two superficially identical CSOs, namely the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA), and the Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA). They both developed as a response against the worsened socioeconomic conditions after apartheid, and have been mobilising together in an effort to demand affordable rent and services from the government. Despite sharing the same aims and having used identical strategies throughout their existence, they have since around 2005 gone in different directions. My aim has been to assess their differences, and how their current mode of working has been able to give them legitimacy among their constituents. The thesis has focused on the strategies they have used to present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the people, and how these strategies have strengthened or weakened their legitimacy. Legitimacy has been assessed through four concepts that have guided the discussion, namely; framing, political strategies, participation, and delivery. The concepts have been developed and inspired both by three themes in social movement theories (cultural framing, political opportunity structure, and mobilising structure), and by the empirical material gathered from the field. The main research question to be answered was:

What strategies are utilized by CSOs to present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the people, and how are these strategies able to give them legitimacy within their constituencies?

In order to answer this question I have identified *three* sets of 'strategies' or ways of working employed by the CSOs, and assessed legitimacy through looking at each of these 'issues'. Each issue was formed as questions aiming at shedding light on the four aspects of legitimacy. It is important to note that the four aspects illuminated through the three following questions are interconnected.

The first issue is cultural framing and looks at the interaction between the CSOs and their constituents. The question posed was:

How do the CSOs frame their demands, how do they present themselves as the solution to the problems, and how does their choice of motivational framing impact on their legitimacy?

This issue was assessed through scrutinising the CSOs' use of framing strategies to identify problems, attribute blame, create a collective, all-inclusive 'we' identity, propose solutions to their problems, and motivate people to take part in collective actions. Finding that the two CSOs generally share the same strategies in framing their demands and proposing solutions, the main difference was the leaders' motivational framing. The BFRA leader used a 'material benefit' frame mainly based on duress and enticement that contributed partly to the weakening of its legitimacy among its constituents. The W-FRA leader's use of a 'divine benefit' frame based on persuasion and sweet talk, however, seemed appealing to the people and did not have any negative effects on the W-FRA's legitimacy.

The second issue looks at the relation between the CSOs and the formal political system by assessing their political strategies:

What relation do the CSOs have to the formal political system, and how does this relation impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs?

The two CSOs differ mainly on their relation to the state. The BFRA leader currently has a full-time job in the municipality and is not very active in its constituency. Although the leader argues that his position will provide the community with much-needed resources, his constituents are generally discontent about his job. They perceive the state and anyone associated with it negatively. This perception of the state has been fed to them through the CSOs' framing of the state as the enemy. The discrepancy between what the BFRA leader says and what he does has fostered sentiments of anger, frustration, resignation, and confusion amongst his constituents. The BFRA leader's close ties with the political system represents a double-moral that the constituents are not willing to accept, and has generally weakened the legitimacy of the BFRA.

The W-FRA leader is reluctant to work within state structures believing that it will only impair their struggle. Her sentiments and her actions are in harmony with how the W-FRA frames the state. The choice of working outside state structures and focusing on being

close to the people has strengthened the reputation and the legitimacy of the W-FRA in its constituency and outside.

The last issue looks at the interconnection between the constituents' participation in CSO activities and their access to resources (delivery) and asks:

How do the CSOs organise community participation (and distribute resources) and how does this impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs?

As seen in the last chapter the CSOs differ much on how they include and exclude their constituents in CSO activities. The BFRA's way of excluding its constituents from various spheres of participation or simply choosing not to engage its constituents in its workings by having few and irregular meetings and closed decision-making processes, have rendered it illegitimate amongst its constituents. The W-FRA's conduction of weekly meetings and regular activities that are open for all constituents to participate in, have facilitated and encouraged participation and transparency through regular interaction between the W-FRA and the constituency. As such, it has strengthened its legitimacy in its constituency.

The findings are summarised in table 1.

Table 1: Overview of the BFRA and the W-FRA's strategies for legitimacy

	Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA)	**Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA)**
Framing	'Material benefit' frame based on duress	'Divine benefit' frame based on persuasion and sweet-talk
Political strategies	Engagement	Define terms of engagement (autonomy-way-of-thinking)
Organisation	Assumed adherence (indirect representation)	System for internal democracy/adherence (in relation to community meetings: report and feedback = dialogue)

Source: Fieldwork.

Although the W-FRA and the BFRA initially were community-based organisations (CBOs) when they started organising in the late 1990s, they have on the basis of their choices of

strategies developed in different directions. While the W-FRA has maintained its CBO character and its closeness to the people on the ground, the BFRA has distanced itself from the people it is supposed to represent and have lost much of its credibility. Its characteristics are more similar to NGOs that do not necessarily have a close relation to the people on the ground. In a climate of political contestation between individuals and groups over being the people's representatives in both Bayview and Westcliff, it is hard for the CSOs to maintain their position. The people in Bayview, especially, expressed a sense of confusion and frustration over the invisibility of the BFRA and anger over not knowing what was happening. This thesis argues that CSOs that have continuous interactions with its constituents and activities that require their involvement will strengthen their role and position in their constituencies as the people's representatives. Where the opposite happens, where CSOs have limited communication with their constituents, other individuals/groups can more easily disturb the CSO's position in the community and attract its supporters towards their alternative organisations. The W-FRA and the BFRA's historical role and significance in the two communities stand strong in people's memories today. They have a history of being the people's guardians by being in the forefront protecting people against forced evictions and police violence, re-connecting their water and electricity, fighting court-battles, going in marches, and networking with other struggles, as well as engaging the municipality in discussions. Having a strong history to refer to, the people in both constituencies still regard both the W-FRA and the BFRA as the only organisations that can fight the poor people's battles. However, the BFRA's diminished role over a long period of time has distanced itself from the people to an extent that people are starting to turn their back on it.

What can these findings say about the role legitimacy have in political struggles over socioeconomic improvements?

The first issue to be learnt is that CSOs should 'practice what they preach' and avoid discrepancies between what they say and what they do. Many poor people have experienced local state officials coming into their communities during elections making promises of socioeconomic improvements that are never implemented. Seeing the same tendencies within their supposedly representative organisations will weaken the organisations' support-base and distance them from the people they are supposed to represent. Looking at the fragmented struggles in South Africa and the ebb and flow of social struggles in general, it is important to

take into account the importance of legitimacy in keeping up the activity and the struggle of community-based organisations.

Another issue is the importance of keeping up the activity of the CSOs in their constituencies, no matter if these activities are apolitical and concerned around local issues within the constituency. The W-FRA has shown, through its perseverance and continuous activity in and outside its constituency that it matters to have a continuous interaction with its constituents. Not only to maintain the support-base, but to foster good relations in the community and a sense of security that the CSO is there to help in people's everyday struggles. Having a good interaction between the constituents and the CSO will facilitate future mobilisation.

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APPENDIX 1: List of Interviews

The following list is an overview of all the interviews conducted for the purpose of this thesis. Those not referred to explicitly in the text are also included. All informants, except three, have been made anonymous and are referred to with codes such as "Bayview resident 1". The interviews that were conducted with more than one informant are separated as individual interviews in the list to protect the anonymity of the informants.

W-FRA members	Date of interview
W-FRA leader	09.01.07
W-FRA member 1	17.12.06
W-FRA member 2	17.12.06
W-FRA member 3	20.12.06
W-FRA member 4	21.12.06
W-FRA-member 5	21.12.06
W-FRA member 6	04.01.07
W-FRA member 7	06.01.07

Westcliff residents	
Westcliff resident 1	20.12.06
Westcliff resident 2	20.12.06
Westcliff resident 3	21.12.06
Westcliff resident 4	04.01.07
Westcliff resident 5	05.01.07
Westcliff resident 6	05.01.07
Westcliff resident 7	05.01.07
Westcliff resident 8	21.12.06

Westcliff resident 9	21.12.06

BFRA members

BFRA leader	08.01.07
BFRA member 1	29.12.06
BFRA member 2	08.01.07

Bayview residents

Bayview resident 1	29.12.06
Bayview resident 2	29.12.06
Bayview resident 3	31.12.06
Bayview resident 4	07.01.07
Bayview resident 5	08.01.07
Bayview resident 6	08.01.07
Bayview resident 7	08.01.07
Bayview resident 8	08.01.07
Bayview resident 9	08.01.07

Other informants

| Richard Pithouse, academic/activist	15.11.06
Professor Fatima Meer, academic/activist/CCF-leader	09.01.07
Rocky Naidoo, PR Councilor (Democratic Alliance)	01.11.06

APPENDIX 2: List of Events

EVENT	ORGANISATIONS/PEOPLE PRESENT	PLACE	DATE
Rally	CCDT activists, BFRA, W-FRA, ABM, SDCEA, WDF	Crossmoor (Chatsworth)	24.09.2006
Urgency meeting	W-FRA and CCDT	Westcliff	25.09.2006
Court case for Crossmoor 'landinvadors'	CCDT, W-FRA, (BFRA), ABM, SDCEA, (WDF), Ashwin Desai, Heinrich Bhömke, lawyers and attorneys	Durban High Court	26.09.2006
Engen meeting. Protest against the upgrade of Engen's HF Alkylation Unit	SDCEA, WDF, ABM, W-FRA, BFRA	Austerville Civic Centre (Wentworth)	27.09.2006
Community meeting	W-FRA, CCDT	Westcliff	28.09.2006
SMI meeting	W-FRA, Bayview residents	CCS/UKZN	30.09.2006
Feeding scheme	W-FRA and others	Westcliff	05.10.2006
SMI meeting	W-FRA, Bayview residents	CCS/UKZN	07.10.2006
Diwali celebration	W-FRA and Chatsworth communities	Westcliff	22.10.2006
SMI meeting	W-FRA, Bayview residents	CCS/UKZN	24.10.2006
Moved into Westcliff		Westcliff	25.10.2006
Feeding scheme	WFRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	26.10.2006
Community meeting	WFRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	27.10.2006
SMI workshop	ABM, WFRA, SDCEA, CCDT, PSM, CCS, Ashwin Desai	CCS/UKZN	28.10.2006
Public community meeting	150 families from Westcliff, some from Silver Heights, Bayview residents	Westcliff	29.10.2006
Workshop on Reconciliation and Development	SIT students + activists (WFRA, Bayview activists, SDCEA, WDF), writer: Faith Ka'Manzi	CCS/UKZN	1-3 + 6-7 Nov. 2006
Feeding scheme	WFRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	02.11.2006
SMI meeting		CCS/UKZN	04.11.2006
Extraordinary community meeting	WFRA + constituents, Bayview residents, CCDT, Silver Heights, SIT students Prof.Meer, Prof.Bond, Des D'Sa (SDCEA)	Westcliff	05.11.2006
Pain of Africa: SDCEA call out South Durban and Durban residents to speak out on the abuse of Multinational Corporations	BFRA, WFRA, SDCEA, CCS, WDF, eThekwini Municipality	Austerville Civic Centre (Wentworth)	08.11.2006
Feeding scheme	W-FRA+constituents	Westcliff	09.11.2006
*(Legal) protest

Calling South Durban and Durban residents to a public protest at the Shell and BP (SAPREF) | Around 500 people: Residents/activists from Westcliff, Bayview, Wentworth, Umlazi, SIT students, PSM, activists/academics: Patrick | Outside SAPREF main gate (Isipingo) | 10.11.2006 |

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Refinery	Bond, Dennis Brutus, Harald Witt and more		
Corpse Awards	Speakers: Patrick Bond (CCS), Dennis Brutus (CCS,?), Bobby Peek (Groundwork), Trevor Ngwane (APF?, SECC), residents/activists from Westcliff and Bayview (and more people)	Claremont Race-Course (Durban)	10.11.2006
Crossmoor rally/Christmas party	W-FRA leader, local D.A.councillor Devan Naicker, CCDT and Crossmoor residents	Crossmoor (Chatsworth)	12.11.2006
Folk dance and music from North-Eastern India	Westcliff and Bayview residents/activists, Professor Fatima Meer (IBR), and the Consulate General of India in Durban, eThekwini Municipality, Aryan Benevolent Home	Pattunden Theatre, 80 Arena Park Drive, Unit 6 (Chatsworth)	13.11.2006
Community meeting	W-FRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	15.11.2006
Feeding scheme	W-FRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	16.11.2006
Community meeting	BFRA+Bayview residents	Bayview	16.11.2006
Ward elections (for ward 69 Bayview, and 70 Westcliff)	BFRA+W-FRA activists/residents	Bayview and unit 5 (Chatsworth)	18.11.2006
Community meeting	WFRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	22.11.2006
CPF meeting	WFRA	Unit 5 (Chatsworth)	22.11.2006
GRAIN workshop	WFRA, Bayview residents, SIT students, SDCEA, WDF, Groundwork, and more (activists from different parts of the world)	Botanical Gardens (Durban)	23.11.2006
Feeding scheme	WFRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	23.11.2006
SMI meeting		CCS/UKZN	25.11.2006
FXI workshop	WFRA, Bayview residents, SDCEA, Harrissmith (Free state) and others	CCS/UKZN	25.11.2006
Community meeting	WFRA+Westcliff residents	Westcliff	29.11.2006
Wolpe Lecture: Archbishop Ndungane on "Africans and Development"	WFRA, BFRA, and others	UKZN	30.11.2006
SMI conference	WFRA,TAC,Bayview activists, AEC,LPM,APF, CCDT, Fishermen,Abasha Youth, SDCEA,WDF, Jubilee South Africa, Dennis Brutus, Fatima Meer and others	UKZN	2 - 6.12.2006
Wolpe Lecture: George Galloway "Muslim views"	WFRA,BFRA?,CCDT,SDCEA, WDF, Dennis Brutus, Prof.Bond, Heinrich Bhömke and others	UKZN	13.12.2006
Christmas party	(I was not present)	Bayview	18.12.2006

APPENDIX 3:   Eviction Letter

ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY
Procurement and Infrastructure
Housing Department

Main Street
Civic Centre
Chatsworth
4092
PO Box 828
Durban 4000

Tel (031) 311 1111
Fax (031) 311 5012

ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY

REF:NO. : CH/_____|_____

CHATSWORTH BRANCH OFFICE

17 October 2006

TO ALL PERSONS IN ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF

N 115

Dear Sir / Madam

ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF COUNCIL DWELLING

It has come to my attention that you are illegally occupying the abovementioned Council dwelling and I must advise you that I have no alternative but to invoke Section 39 of the Development and Housing Act (House of Delegates) No 4 of 1987 which reads as follows:

"39   Ejectment of persons.

If any person moves into, lives in or on, occupies or uses any immovable property belonging to the Board without the written permission of the Head of Department or a person authorised by him may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, after having obtained a judgement or order of court, enter upon and take possession of that property and employ such force as may be necessary to remove from the property that person with his dependants and their possessions."

I therefore advise you to vacate these premises within thirty days of the date of this letter.

If you do vacate the premises within thirty days of the days of this letter no action will be taken against you. If however you do not vacate these premises within the stipulated period , action will be instituted to eject you.

Yours faithfully

for HEAD : HOUSING

APPENDIX 4: Transferring of ownership letter

ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY
Procurement and Infrastructure
Housing Department

2 Aries Place
Woodhurst
Chatsworth
4092
PO Box 828
Durban 4000

Tel. (031) 311 5053
Fax (031) 311 5012

07-11-2006

Mr/Mrs.

GLENOVER ROAD
WESTCLIFF

Dear Sir/Madam GLENOVER MANOR

PROMOTING SECTIONAL TITLE OWNERSHIP OF YOUR FLAT.

We are pleased to advise you that the Government's Discount Benefit Scheme will allow you to take ownership of your flat for **FREE** in your specific case. However, where the household income is more than R1501, 00 per month, then you are required to pay R300, 00 transfer costs as soon as possible. If your rent account is in arrears, the Housing Department is prepared to park off the rental arrears (only) onto your Title Deed.

A presentation to discuss the process to purchase your flat, will be held as mentioned below. Thereafter, you can sign the offer to purchase document. The presentation will also include the following:
- Purchasing your flat in terms of Sectional Title Act.
- Briefly explaining what is a Body Corporate, Trustees, Management Rules and Conduct Rules.

The sign up **presentation** will be held as follows:	The sign up **session** will be held as follows:
DATE : 20ᵗʰ November (Monday)	DATE : 20ᵗʰ November (Monday)
TIME : 10.15 am to 10.30 am	TIME : 10.30 am to 12noon
VENUE: **Chatsworth Branch Office,**	VENUE: **Chatsworth Branch Office,**

When you attend this meeting, please bring the following documents with you: -
1. Photocopies of: -
      1. (1) Your Book of Life. (13 digits, Bar coded).
      1. (2) Your wife's Book of Life
      1. (3) Marriage Certificate or Ante Nuptial Contract
      1. (4) Divorce Order (if divorced) / Death Certificate
      1. (5) Your latest Rent Account
      1. (6) Latest Payslip, Grant details, Unemployment details, Affidavit.
      1. (7) Attached Income Affidavit; <u>completed by you and duly signed by a Commissioner of Oaths.</u>

<u>Note:</u> *Your old green ID cards will not be accepted.*

It is important for you and your spouse to attend this meeting and we look forward to seeing you there!
PLEASE NOTE: HUSBAND AND WIFE MUST BE PRESENT TO SIGN.

Please note that it is compulsory for you to call at the above office / or make an appointment to indicate which of the following options you prefer: -
either you want to buy your flat, or you want to continue to rent your flat, or you would prefer to be considered for a transfer to the low cost Housing programme. **This information is required for survey purposes only.** There will be no follow up action on this survey.

Kindly note that with effect from July 2008, **economic rentals** will be charged for all unsold flats/units to ensure sustain ability.

Yours faithfully

HEAD HOUSING

INCOME AFFIDAVIT

PROJ _ ___ HSE ___

I _____ Identity Number _____

Address_____

Do solemnly and sincerely declare that : - (delete which is not applicable)
1. I am employed (letter from employer and / or payslip required)
2. I am unemployed.
3. My spouse is employed (letter from employer and/ or payslip required)
4. My spouse is unemployed.
5. I am a pensioner or collect a disability (grant letter from Pension Fund or Home Affairs Office required)
6. My spouse is a pensioner or collect a disability(grant letter from Pension Fund or Home Affairs Office required)
7. My adult children lived with / do not live with me.
8. My adult children living with me, earn an income as follows: -

      NAME   INCOME

a) _____   _____
b) _____   _____
c) _____   _____

9. I am / my spouse is self employed (bank statement for last 3 months required)
I am in receipt of R _____ per month from self employment as _____
My spouse is in in receipt of R _____ per month from self employment as a
_____

10. My other source of income are as follows: -

_____

_____

_____

_____

Sworn to and signed at _____ on this _____ day of _____ 2006

_____
SIGNATURE

I hereby certify that the deponent has acknowledge that he/she knows and understand the contents of this AFFIDAVIT and he / she has no objection to taking the prescribed oath and that he / she considers the oath to be binding on his / conscience.

_____
COMMISSIONER OF OATH

130

APPENDIX 5:   Sponsor letter

WESTCLIFF FLAT RESIDENCE ASSOCIATION

212 GLENOVER ROAD, WESTCLIFF, CHATSWORTH
TEL: (031) 401 1155

11/10/06

DEAR _____

Warm greetings from Westcliff Flat Residence Association.

It is Diwali celebration again. The time is upon us and we intend to organize a function for the poor of Westcliff and surrounding area.

We humbly appeal to you for your sponsorship in cash or kind. Our needs are as follows :-

1. 10 Deks breyani – chicken
2. Sound
3. Marquee & chairs
4. Stage
5. Eats
6. Entertainment

Please assist us to to make this a successful event for the less fortunate.

Our target date is 22 October 2006 at Lotus Primary School sports field. Therefore all contributions to be made by Friday 20 October 2006.

Thanking you in anticipation.

_____
OLEAN NAIDOO

APPENDIX 6: Interview Questions and topics

All the interviews done with the BFRA/W-FRA leaders, committee members, and constituents had an informal character where several issues were discussed. Due to the myriad of questions asked in different ways, and various probing (follow-up) questions used, I have chosen to present the core questions and topics that were spoken about in the interviews, and that are most relevant for this thesis.

Common questions for BFRA/W-FRA leaders:

- When and why involved in the current struggle, ever been part of anti-apartheid struggle?
- Have you experienced violent clashes with police/security personnel during mobilizations?
- About BFRA/W-FRA:
  - Information on organizational structure (structure of committee: how has it changed since its beginning? internal division of labour, decision-making processes and conduction of community meetings, does the organization have an office), available resources, aims, current activities/campaigns, challenges (internal/external).
- What forums are you involved in concerning the community?
- What is the BFRA/W-FRA doing to fight social problems in the community (drugs, domestic violence, police corruption)?
- Does the organization have 'struggle-plumbers/-electricians'?
- Do most people that support the organisation not pay rent? How many do not pay rent in this community? Do you promote people not to pay rent?
- Opinion on working within the state:
  - will working within state-structures benefit the community/struggle in any way? If being a local councilor, can one do much to help the community/struggle or will one be restrained? Can resources from working within the formal political system benefit the communities?
- What do you think about ward-elections?
- What do you think about social movements working for the people on the ground, trying to become a political party with an idea of having a positive impact on the ground?
- Did you ever vote ANC?
- Do you cooperate with other individuals in the community that represent other organisations or affiliations? What about the local school-principal, religious leaders etc.?
- How is the unity between the 'flatted' communities (Westcliff, Bayview, Crossmoor and Woodhurst) in Chatsworth today, and how has it changed since the CCF?
- What do you think about the Social Movements Indaba (SMI)?

- Opinions on future of the community and the struggle

BFRA leader:

- Does your job in the municipality benefit the community and other communities, how?
- The area has social problems like drugs, domestic violence and crime, you said that your organization has an HIV/AIDS unit; do you work with drugs in the area and the youth?
- What do you define as poverty, and how many poor people are there in this area?
- Do you have arrears?
- Have you been threatened with eviction and been cut-off from water/electricity, are you illegally connected to water/electricity?

W-FRA leader:

- How did the struggle in Chatsworth start?
- How many people were you together trying to organise?
- How did it develop until Fatima Meer and Ashwin Desai (CCF)came?
- Who taught you about what strategies to use? That time, how did you get funding/resources to do those actions?
- What was the difference between the CCG and the CCF?
- Of all the strategies used (in- and out-of-system), which of these do you think were the most powerful ones?
- Which years were the most active, were most things happened?
- How did the CCF help?
- Do you think police repression and this brutality against people can scare people away from resisting?
- How would you describe an ordinary member of the organisation?
- How do you create a community-feeling or a unity in the community (e.g. through arrangement of Diwali)?
- Have you been offered a good job in any political party?
- Can you tell me about the previous upgrading of the flats?
- What makes you continue being a leader despite all the challenges you have met?
- What will happen if you resign, will your constituents be able to continue the fight?

BFRA/W-FRA members:

- When/why involved in the current struggle, ever been part of anti-apartheid struggle?
- Current struggles and challenges, how to deal with them

- The organisation's activities, aims, accomplishments, and strategies (knowledge about the organization, personal involvement/relation to it, and personal opinion on its role)
- Opinions about the state, its 's role and whether current government will make socioeconomic improvements (relation to/perception of the state)
- Opinions about the constituents' involvement in the CSO activities and how to/why involve them
- How define themselves, (poor?) and others (in the community, the state)
- Opinions about the future

Bayview/Westcliff constituents:

- When and why moved to Westcliff?
- Ever been part of previous (anti-apartheid) or current struggles, why, why not?
- Current living conditions and what challenges faced with? Any idea how to combat the problems?
- Opinions about BFRA/W-FRA (is BFRA/W-FRA a good avenue to create changes in the community?)
- Opinions about the government and socioeconomic living conditions in the community
- Future predictions about their life and the struggle in the community
- How they define themselves (poor?) and is CSO representing them.
- The organizational landscape in the community: what forces are at play, and who do they 'support'?

Professor Fatima Meer:

- When did you get involved in the Chatsworth struggles and why?
- What role did the CCF have with working with the communities in Chatsworth?
- Do you see any differences or similarities from the strategies that people used during the apartheid period and now
- Do you think there is a need to revive an umbrella body like the CCF again and is it possible to unite all the struggles?
- Do you think the WSF is a good forum to voice the people's voices on the ground worldwide?
- Do you think ANC or any other political party will make changes to the betterment of the poor people?
- Are social movements necessary?
- What strategies have been effective and what strategies should be employed by social movements?

Richard Pithouse:

- Why are social movements necessary?
- What role can academics play in social movements' struggles?
- Do today's struggles differ much from the anti-apartheid struggles?
- What do you think about the Social Movements Indaba in trying to unite the struggles or at least trying to make a platform for people to voice their experiences and grievances and their struggles on the ground? What do you see as the main challenges for movements uniting?
- What do you think about the future of social movements/local struggles in South Africa?
- What do you think is the strength of the CBOs being very local and very small? Do you think uniting with other communities and social movements, like ABM, would be a good idea?
- Do you thing social movements should keep away from politics, and not involve themselves as political parties, to actually have an impact on the ground?
- Do you think it's fruitful for activists to attend workshops and seminars?

Local councilor Rocky Naidoo (D.A):

- What is your role as a local councillor?
- In what degree have you been involved in the local struggles in Chatsworth?
- How free is your mandate to actually be involved in the struggles of the people in these areas?
- Do you support the struggle?
- What challenges do you meet by being in an ANC dominated council?
- Do you see any way forward for local councillors and community activists to work together on issues of housing, basic services, and service delivery?