ANTICIPATING VIOLENCE INTELLIGENTLY
FUNCTIONAL IMPACTS OF INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
INTO REGIONAL CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

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To my family.
The original and new members
(You know who you are).
Ideas spawn projects that eventually become research. This case is not the exception. Even though the original idea and aims resulted from personal interests and wonder, this final product has been benefited from the worthy and constructing contributions of fellow scholars, institutional supports and personal belief in the endeavour. Without following an order of importance since any input has been instrumental in the stage it was received, I want to express my recognition and gratitude to those who deserve it. Thanks to Martin Austvoll Nome, to his patience, sincere involvement and methodological support in the early phase of this enquiry, the idea took shape and gained analytical precision for further development. My deep gratitude to Karin Dokken, whose sound, devoted and pleasant supervision, encouragement and time allowed the proper fulfilment of this thesis. Thank you for reminding me that in research the art of communication is equally as important as systematic investigation. I am grateful to the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, for providing excellent working conditions and facilitating this study and my stay in Addis Ababa. Without the willingness and time of each of the key informants this analysis would have never been substantiated, thence I gratefully appreciate it. Thanks to fellow colleagues and friends Rasmus Christian Bering, Jakob Aasland Ravndal and Sébastien Miraglia-Yossen for your rhizomatic feedback and comments on early ideas and drafts. I am also indebted to Julio Villarruel Mora for such a timely, patient and effective graphic assistance. Thanks brother. To my parents Rodolfo and Gemma my endless gratitude for their moral and material support, but first and foremost for believing in me. Thanks also to Kaja Tank-Nielsen Heidar for her friendship and solidarity in the final stage. My recognition to the MA Programme in Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Oslo, for suitably providing a resourceful and stimulating environment for the development of ideas. Last but not least, many thanks are due to the Mexican Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) of which grant programme for higher studies overseas has funded this project. Without each and all of them, this study would not have been what it is now. Yet any shortcoming remains all my own.

Aaron Villarruel Mora
Oslo, November 2009
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN Assistant Country Coordinator</td>
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<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Training Association</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>The Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>The African Union</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN Country Coordinator</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>CEWERU</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN National Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning Systems</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN Committee of Permanent States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>The Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
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<td>FEWER</td>
<td>Forum on Early Warning and Early Response</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN Field Monitor</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>The Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IGADD</td>
<td>The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<td>INCREP</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN Incident Report</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations Theories</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN Local Peace Committees</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MDSD</td>
<td>Most Different Systems Design</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Company</td>
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<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar Systems Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NRI</td>
<td>IGAD’s CEWARN National Research Institute</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>The Organisation of American States</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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OECD  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLF  Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF  Ogaden National Liberation Front
OOTW  Operations Other than War
OSCE  The Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe
OSINT  Open Source Intelligence
PKI  Peacekeeping Intelligence
PMC  Private Military Contractor
PRIO  International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
RCEWS  Regional Conflict Early Warning Systems
RMA  Revolution in Military Affairs
RPG  Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RRA  Rahanweyn Resistance Army
SALW  Short Arms and Light Weapons
SCED  Single-Case Experimental Design
SIGINT  Signals Intelligence
SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SITREP  IGAD’s CEWARN Situation Report
SNNPR  Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
SSR  Security Sector Reform
TCEW  IGAD’s CEWARN Technical Committee on Early Warning
TIV  Trend Indicator Value
TV  Television
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, Uppsala University
UN  The United Nations
UNAMID  United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
INTRODUCTION

“WITWER: But it’s not the future if you stop it. Isn’t that a fundamental paradox?

ANDERTON: Yes, it is [...] You’re talking about predetermination, which happens all the time. [...] The fact that you prevented it from happening doesn’t change the fact that it was going to happen.”

[Philip K. Dick’s ‘The Minority Report’]

In 2008 there were 33 active armed conflicts in the world according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset\(^1\). Even though this record proves more optimistic compared with the more than 50 cases registered in the aftermath of the Cold War\(^2\), the complexities and consequences of contemporary violent struggles are qualitatively more challenging\(^3\) (Paris & Sisk, 2009). More than 30’000,000 refugees, internally displaced and stateless persons were reported only in 2008 (UNHCR, 2008:111). Moreover, the loss of lives and other less quantifiable effects of violent conflicts —such as the devastation of physical and institutional infrastructure, or the psychological and historical dimensions to name a few— make a case for tackling conflicts proactively.

What if violence could be avoidable? This apparently rhetorical question finds an answer beyond the hypothetical universe, since the prevention of violent conflicts is not only an idealistic desire but a certainly real, viable and even rational strategy in terms of cost/efficiency calculations. In fact, the prevention of organised violence is an inextricable area of security analysis and policy, therefore requiring to be seized.

Well, anticipating human-provoked tragedies is no longer science fiction, at least within socio-political conflicts. Unlike Dick’s futuristic story, where the crime of murder was foresighted and prevented through a clairvoyant law-enforcement device, contemporary conflict management offers the possibility to preclude crises through combinations of analytical, humanitarian and political instruments. Among the measures for conflict prevention stand out the so-called conflict early warning systems (CEWS) due to their sophisticated approach towards violence-prone disputes. In essence, these open and multi-stakeholder tools consist of a series of procedures for the identification, monitoring and alert of conflicts prone to turn violent, aiming at the

\(^1\) V.4, 2008 www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIIO/ (15\(^{th}\) of March, 2009).
\(^2\) www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/graphs/reg_year89.pdf (15\(^{th}\) of March, 2009).
\(^3\) Only within the United Nations’ system (UN) the budget requirements for the 18 peacekeeping operations in 2009 amounts to US$7.6 billion. This is approximately 0.5 per cent of the global military spending (United Nations, 2009:4). In addition, the 12 post-war peace-building missions for the same year demand US$278 million (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 2009), whereas the global humanitarian relief adds US$227’324,744 to the annual budgetary requirements (OCHA, 2009:10).
development of strategic options for their timely and proper tackling. Indeed, an attractive asset for policy-making both discursively and pragmatically.

However, akin to the quoted dialogue between Witwer and Anderton, CEWS face the quandaries of engaging in situations that are not yet tragic. From the philosophical dilemma of whether to prevent only violence or the very conflict itself, to more operative requirements such as the right timing or the most suitable strategy, CEWS cope with the complexities of the space-time continuum. This metaphysical condition turns CEWS open to scepticism, ambiguities and distortions in different arenas particularly due to their strongly policy-oriented nature. Especially when the implications of such prevenient endeavours are unclear.

In the academic sphere, in spite of scholar contributions to the field there is no consensual definition of conflict early warning. CEWS are rather conceptualised broadly or emphasising different aspects, approaches or instances. In addition, their epistemological position tends to vary depending on the disciplinary approach, as their methodological and analytical stands may differ at the point of contention. Indicators, models and applications are not always precisely equivalent or complementary.

Within the policy field the term has become fashionable, being used as frequently as inarticulately or wrongly as synonymous of other constructs. The practical flexibility of CEWS is both productive and detrimental in this area: Whether as a comprehensively versatile and promising initiative, as a gimmicky resort to conveniently fit into discourses and funds, or as a rhetorical means to please principals, donors and / or constituencies, it offers several possibilities. In addition, issues of authority, division of labour, regulation or mandate are important factors that impact the creation, performance and results of these anticipatory ventures.

Several dimensions of CEWS, such as their possibilities, challenges, successes or failures are being explored by a growing body of literature from the late 1990s on (e.g. Adelman & Schmeidl, 1998; Davies & Gurr, 1998; Harff & Gurr, 1998; Schmeidl & Jenkins, 1998; van Walraven, 1998; Mwaûra & Schmeidl, 2002; Carment & Schnabel, 2003, 2004; Schnabel & Carment, 2004). Similarly, policy recommendations are being developed drawing on the lessons learned from past experiences and case studies (e.g. Lund, 1996a, 1996b, 2002; Jentleson, 2000; Zartman, 2001, 2005; Austin, 2004;
Ramcharan, 2005). Thus, increasingly more initiatives are being created, consolidated and reinforced by a number of actors in many regions of the world.

International organisations such as those within the UN are pioneers in the design and implementation of conflict prevention strategies and CEWS. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have also developed early warning and analytical capacities, with a sound impact in the local level. Several states through their development agencies and security sector have taken part in the quest for CEWS as well. However, preventive capabilities within regional institutions such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are considered amongst the most competent and institutionalised in the field thus far. In addition, anticipatory instruments of non-Western bodies like the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa or, in a way, the Organisation of American States (OAS) are playing a leading role in the monitoring and management of violence-prone conflicts in their own regions.

The main components of CEWS include information gathering and analysis, formulation of scenarios and response options, as well as the communication of such analysis to policymakers for supporting timely interventions. This very apparatus characterises intelligence operations, although in a parallel covert manner.

The term ‘intelligence’ within the Political Sciences refers to the reserved synergic instrumentalisation of knowledge, power and security for diverse purposes. A useful and consensual definition is that of Sherman Kent (1949: ix), identifying three important and intertwined dimensions in its meaning, namely: The knowledge to safeguard the national welfare, the type of organisations that produces that kind of knowledge and the activities pursued by those organisations.

As a system of processes embedded in the security sphere, intelligence is predominantly and distinctively marked by the crucial elements of secrecy, rationality and dynamic adaptability. Its proactive time approach and the consideration of intervention if needed, involve the resort to any available means so as to neutralise imminent security threats. And even though some applications are found in other spheres widening its range and scope, intelligence have remained primarily bound to the state, its security, integrity and interests.
Both CEWS and intelligence provide strategic knowledge-based instruments aimed at enhancing policymaking capabilities to timely identify critical developments threatening security, in order to formulate and implement coherent strategies to prevent or limit their destructive effects. Nonetheless, in spite of their evident parallelism, their literatures have rather kept themselves queerly distant from one another. On the one hand, studies on CEWS show a peculiar ambiguity concerning their relation with intelligence. While some scholars stress that both fields are clear-cut distinguishable and even incompatible, others argue that they are highly imbricated with potential for joint ventures. Susanne Schmeidl (Schmeidl & Jenkins, 1998; Schmeidl, 2002:73), for instance, contends that early warning differs from intelligence by the fact that the former concentrates on human security whilst the later is devoted to national or state security. On the contrary, authors like Howard Adelman (1998a, 1998b, 1998c) make a case that CEWS derive from intelligence, and that the former is necessarily an integral part of the later.

On the other hand, even though intelligence studies are working hard in the revitalisation and adaptation of both the discipline and its practice to the requirements of the post 9/11 security constellation, its potential in the area of conflict management remains underexplored. Taking part in crucial security debates concerning civil–military relations, like the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), operation other than war (OOTW) or the security sector reform (SSR), the role of intelligence is rising as a central connecting issue. However, unlike the thriving developments on peacekeeping intelligence (e.g. Eriksson et al, 1996; Välimäki, 2000; Jong et al, 2003; Carment & Rudner, 2006; Aasland Ravndal, 2009), research linking intelligence with conflict prevention and CEWS remains –astonishingly enough– sparse contrasting with its imperative necessity.

As it stands, the insight into CEWS could benefit from the vaster experience, continuous fine-tuning and progressive theorisation of intelligence studies. Intelligence would gain from the innovations in parallel issue–areas, the networking and growing scholar production of CEWS to improve its role in the current Post–Cold War security configuration. Through such fascinating conversation, the learning and improvement for each and both would be mutual. Besides, mutual and institutional biases might be overcome, shortcomings adjusted and liabilities defeated.
This study thus brings together research on intelligence, CEWS and the governance of security policy in the Post–Cold War era in order to shed light on the implications of integrating intelligence products into CEWS, asserting it is high time these two universes began a dialogue.

**Argument and Research Focus**

By focusing on only one aspect covered by Kent’s formulation and associating it to conflict early warning systems, it is possible to fill an important part of this knowledge gap in a systematic and delimited manner. Hence, by concentrating on the implications of incorporating intelligence as knowledge products into regional conflict early warning systems (RCEWS), one may explore the significance of this venture for the policymaking of violence anticipation strategies.

Here it is necessary to mention that since intelligence products contain vital information pertaining national interests and the security of a state, its capabilities and vulnerabilities, these are highly valuable supplies both for the owners and for those interested in owning them. As a strategic asset, an intelligence product is a precious commodity; one that has to be protected along with its sources and methods. Given the high value of that knowledge, acquiring it may demand ‘whatever steps required’ including hostile and furtive measures that may contravene fundamental democratic values. In spite of contributing to the debate on whether or not to resort to non-democratic means to achieve democratic ends, and that its potential might anticipate violence in conflicts in a more timely, accurate and sound fashion, not many RCEWS scholars and practitioners are precisely enthusiastic about it. Scepticisms still prevail in the field. However the issue deserves to be studied, given the likelihood of avoiding or reducing the loss of lives and of social order. Not to mention the possibility of increasing the efficiency in the use of the available resources for conflict management.

This particular merger may entail the adjustment of some procedures, roles and functions, as well as alter the regulation and control of the relations between the intelligence and the RCEWS communities and processes. This functional aspect is important insofar as such variations may either potentiate their joint venture or
jeopardise the potential of the former and the accountability of the later. Organisatorily one may optimise the other’s labour and thus minimise fatalities, destructiveness and risks. However this may be at the expense of autonomy. Thence, for the sake of this enquiry the analysis of the incorporation of intelligence products into conflict early warning systems is restricted to the regulation of policy sectors and to the extent to which political authority is either centralised or fragmented.

As a corollary, this thesis aims expressly at answering a specific research question:

*What are the impacts on the regulation of issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of political authority of regional conflict early warning systems, of integrating intelligence products into their analysis of violence-prone conflicts?*  

It is argued here that incorporating intelligence into RCEWS could enhance their efficiency and improve their effectiveness, through the support of the capabilities and precision it entails, however with significant side effects to be considered. By concentrating on the organisational and authoritative dimensions, this endeavour demonstrates that not only is a merger between intelligence and RCEWS advisable, but also that its systematic study is feasible. In addition, it may give some hints for further enquiries, either on other sorts of this integration or on its implications for and impacts on other policy or theoretical sectors.

In answering the fundamental question of this thesis, the theoretical support for studying such impacts is threefold. First, conflict prevention theories permit to understand the challenges of anticipating violence-prone conflicts, as well as the nature and role of RCEWS in their management. Secondly, intelligence theories help in realising what intelligence products are and their implications for RCEWS. Emphasis is placed on issues of secrecy, instrumentality and security –both for the providers as for the recipients–; however considering intelligence not as an end in itself, but as a means to a higher political objective.

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4 The operationalisation of variables is thoroughly developed in the forthcoming methodological chapter.
Thirdly, the security governance approach explores the effects of such merger on the regulation of issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of political authority. It is resorted to since it explains “the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent security needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy in the absence of a unifying authority” (Krahmann, 2003a:11).

To contrast the conceptual and theoretical examinations, a comparative case study following the method of structured, focused case comparison (George & Bennet, 2005) is the cornerstone of this thesis’ methodology. It consists of general questions reflecting the research objective, asked of each case under study to guide and standardise data collection. Enabling, thus, systematic comparability by focusing only on certain aspects of the examined cases.

Following the ‘Most Similar Systems Design’ (MSSD) –also known as the Mill’s method of difference–, case selection comprises here two similar instances, differing only in the independent variable. The unit of analysis is the anticipatory strategy of a RCEWS in a violent–prone conflict –put it differently: ‘CEWS-conflict’–. Therefore, one of the cases gives an account of the anticipatory strategy of a RCEWS resorting to intelligence sources, whereas the second case accounts for another instance of the same RCEWS, in which the analysis did without intelligence inputs. The selected cases draw on two anticipatory strategies from the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Greater Horn of Africa. Their criteria for selection include being both cross-border pastoral-related conflicts, within the same conflict cluster and taking place the same year, aiming thus at leveraging comparability.

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**Organisation of the Work and Volume Outline**

This volume consists of three parts comprised of five chapters in total. The first part is the analytical body made up of chapters one and two. The former explains the methodological framework and the operationalisation of variables within which the
project is structured. The later puts forward the theoretical framework supporting this study, so as to explain their associated concepts and analyse their relation.

The second part provides the empirical component to this thesis and it encompasses chapters three and four. The third analyses CEWARN as a regional conflict early warning system, its structure and role in the strategic context it is embedded, in order to gain familiarity with the selected case studies. In chapter four, case comparison is undertaken. Here, the alert concerning a cross-border counter-attack being planned by communities from the Ethiopian Dire district\(^5\) is contrasted with the alert regarding boundary disputes between the Oromiya and Somali regions requiring immediate response\(^6\). This chapter underpins the potential variation of integrating or not intelligence inputs into CEWARN’s anticipatory analysis. It concentrates on the impacts on the regulation of issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of political authority such variance may entail.

Finally, the third part covers chapter five. It organises and presents the findings and observations regarding the areas of interest for this thesis, as well as the result of the research question and the appraisal of the leading thesis statement. Furthermore, it reviews the challenges and dilemmas of integrating intelligence into regional conflict early warning systems, along with some concluding remarks and suggestions for further research resulting from this project. Additionally, a case study protocol is offered as appendix for methodological precision and transparency purposes.

In the end we may know if anticipating violence through RCEWS resorting to intelligence is a fundamental paradox, predetermination, both or none. Hopefully, we will likewise realise whether the fact that violence was prevented from happening does not change that it was going to happen, as the opening quotation suggests.

\(^6\) CEWARN Alert dated 9th of February 2009. CEWARN, 2009b. Cases are selected because of their comparability features and due to the availability of documentation as detailed above.
1. LINKING THE WHAT, WHY AND HOW: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

What? The Nature and Scope of this Research

In order to ascertain the functional impacts of incorporating intelligence products into regional conflict early warning systems (RCEWS), attention is here centred in two particular dimensions of such systems: The regulation of issue-areas and the degree of centralisation of political authority. Therefore the emphasis is placed on the causal explanatory variable, to give an account of whether or not such integration conveys variations in RCEWS’ analyses of violence-prone conflicts, regarding both the coordination of policy sectors and how centralised or fragmented political authority becomes. If the analysis suggests that such variations turn to be positive, an explanation of their main causal mechanisms is drawn up. Meaning with this that other dimensions and conditions are held constant and hence, unexplored.

The independent variable is expressed as the integration of intelligence products into RCEWS. Resorting to Shulsky and Schmitt’s definition (2002:57), intelligence products are understood as any means by which an intelligence analyst transmits processed information to the policymaker or action-taker who needs it and can use it. In this case those involved in CEWARN’s conflict analysis.

For the sake of this project, RCEWS are understood as knowledge-based and policy-oriented processes of violence anticipation, within the preventive management strategy of a socio-political conflict prone to turn armed\(^7\). Restricted to the timing previous to the outbreak of organised collective violence, or its re-emergence after a stand-by period, these entail the monitoring of conflict escalation dynamics and the alert of imminent aggression. This under the form and function of systematic procedures, instrumentally embedded in a consortium of actors-stakeholders, linked by their interdependent interests and needs, self-identified as a conflict early warning system. Emphasis is on the regional level of analysis, since it encompasses more precisely the security dynamics of an area (Buzan & Wæver, 2003) including the transnational ones (James & Sharma, 2006).

\(^7\) Here, the threshold of violence is that of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme: At least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, resulting from the use of armed force between contending parties. www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/definitions_all.htm (May, 2008)
The dependent variable is the kind of impacts such integration may implicate on RCEWS’ regulation of issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of their political authority. It encompasses two interrelated constructs of interest that need to be clarified. First, the regulation of issue-areas pertains to the number and range of policy issues and sectors under the authority of one or more political institutions. Their measurements are expressed as a tripartite standard as follows:

a) **The number of issue-areas**: In nominal scale, quantifying in cardinals its reported figure
b) **The range of policy issues**: In ordinal scale with values ranging from 1 to 7 corresponding to the level of control of such issue-areas, according to the following criterion: 1 Lowest, 2 Lower, 3 Low, 4 Medium, 5 High, 6 Higher, 7 Highest; and
c) **The number of authorities**: In nominal scale, quantifying in cardinals those involved

The other construct of interest, the centralisation of political authority, denotes the extent to which the location and scope of the final authority in command of approving and implementing decisions and policies, is monopolised or shared. Its appraisal in this study is the value along an ordinal scaled continuum, circumscribed by the ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ poles. Ranging, thus, from higher and lowers among the ideal values-poles. Three dichotomous factors determine it, namely:

a) **The location of final authority**: Nominal scaled as either outside or within the RCEWS
b) **The scope of the authority**: Nominal scaled as either encompassing or specific
c) **The type of rule**: Nominal scaled as either compulsory or voluntary

According to these criteria, the highest degree of centralisation implies a compulsory, encompassing final authority outside the RCEWS’s structure. Conversely, the highest extent of decentralisation connotes a voluntary, specific final authority within the very RCEWS.

The interconnection of both constructs lays on their reciprocal relation: The higher the degree of political authority, the stronger the regulation of issue-areas is expected to be. Conversely, the looser the control in more than one policy issue or sector, the more decentralised the political dominance is presumed. For elucidative purposes, Figure 1 below helps in clarifying the core idea of this project in a graphic and friendly manner.

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8 The way these variables are systematised and analysed is expressed in the following parts.
The lack of similar studies thus far offers both possibilities and challenges. From the absence of strong theories explaining such precise phenomenon to the deficient systematisation and availability of data, the researcher may face interesting obstacles. But every problem is an opportunity in disguise, and overcoming these in an attempt at filling those gaps worth the effort.

The methodological aims of this project can be divided in two main directions. On the one hand, given the very nature of the study and the state of research on the topic, the academic purpose could not realistically aspire to theory development, even less to theory testing. Thence, the analysis intends to provide theoretically supported explanations for, and empirical evidence of the phenomenon in question, to serve as research reference for further theory construction. On the other hand and due to these reasons, the pragmatic intent deems neither to stress context specificity of the observations nor to claim the universality of the resulting inferences, but a wider applicability of both the analysis and its findings.

The possibilities of studying the integration of intelligence products into RCEWS, allow for shedding light on the impact of such incorporation, as well as for gaining insight into the variance and the causal mechanisms it may lead to. In doing so,
assessments of the feasibility of such integration for violent conflict anticipation would have a background to rely on. In addition, further research could lead to the optimisation of the involved process, enhancing and improving, thus, its efficiency.

However, the insufficiency of analytical antecedents urges to resort to the development of an *ad hoc* framework. This suggests a rather solid systematic approach supported by complementary methods, coherently organised through a consistent rationale. And this is not precisely an easy undertaking.

Thus, instead of adopting either the inductive approach or the hypotetico-deductive slant, this research follows the abductive approach of science (Haig, 2005). While inductive analyses resort to observations to generate hypotheses, drawing on the existent theorisation on the causes of the phenomenon under investigation, hypotetico-deductive studies are guided by hypotheses to assess their validity (King *et al*, 2001; Hoyle *et al*, 2002). Put differently, in the former, research produces hypotheses whereas in the later, hypotheses guide to research. Thus, even though this thesis may appear to be of the inductive type, with no previous referents to resort to, to claim it would be as over pretentious as imprecise. And with no available, testable hypotheses thus far, any deductive enquiry is, then, ruled out.

Instead, the abductive approach allows for fulfilling the purpose of this study. Within this framework, guided by evolving research questions information is analysed to detect robust empirical regularities—or phenomena—. Then, explanations of the detected phenomena are offered by abductively inferring the existence of underlying causal mechanisms. Here, abductive inference operates as follows (Haig, 2005:372–373):

1. Reasoning from phenomena understood as presumed effects, to their hypothetically supported explanations in terms of underlying causal mechanisms
2. Assessing positive judgements of the initial plausibility of these explanations
3. Construct models of causal mechanisms by analogy with relevant ideas in domains that are well understood
4. Attempt to elaborate and develop theoretical explanations on the nature of causal mechanisms in question
5. Assess the resulting theoretical explanations against their rivals with respect to their explanatory goodness (power)
6. Cast judgements of the best of competing explanations
By following these procedures, it is possible to discover whether there is variance, and to explain its causality in case it proved existent.

Henceforth, rather than ascribing this exploration exclusively to the correlational tradition—aimed to uncover the recurring patterns of actions, events and conditions associated with a phenomenon—, this study privileges a rather causational epistemology. It entails the identification and description of the underlying causal factors which, in actual circumstances, are sufficient to bring about more observable phenomena of the kind being studied by the field in question (Dessler, 1991:343). Causation seeks, thus, to overcome the limits of correlation through models that capture the structure and process that generate phenomena.

Within this logic and due to the above mentioned reasons, a quantitative research design is unlikely here. The indeterminacy of datasets on the type, occurrence and regularity of the phenomenon under study⁹, or of its recorded associations with specific factors, conditions and states-of-affairs leads to opt for a qualitative format. Qualitative research comprises iterative procedures where knowledge is developed stepwise from the collected data in a flexible and continuous fashion. By privileging holism over analytic rigidity, qualitative analysis looks at phenomena as integrative wholes in a historical perspective, to account for the specific outcomes or processes chosen for study due to their significance. Their results are neither necessarily more nor better than those from the quantitative tradition, but qualitative findings are certainly better connected ones.

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**Which? Specifying the Methodological Design**

In accordance with the above mentioned the methodology for this study entails a ‘grand design’ leaded by the method of structured, focused case comparison. It consists—as its name indicates—of a type of case study *structured* by general questions, reflecting the research objectives asked in each instance to guide and standardise the data requirements (George & Bennett, 2005:67). It is *focused* since it deals only with certain, clearly defined aspects of the examined cases. Finally, the

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⁹ Namely, the integration of intelligence products into regional conflict early warning systems.
comparison element connotes that it does not rely on a single analogy, but on the scrutiny of representatively contrastable sets of affairs.

George and Bennett (2005:73-86) also suggest a series of procedures for such controlled comparative enquiries, according to three phases: Design, implementation and development of case implications (Druckman, 2005:210-211). Since the last ones pertain to the logistical application and its analysis, this part concentrates on the design phase only, which encompasses five instrumental tasks, namely:

1. Specification of the problem and research objective
2. Specification of variables and the development of a research strategy
3. Case selection, stressing well-definition and comparability of instances
4. Relating variance in the variables pondering how to discover their causal relations; and
5. Formulation of data requirements and general questions to be asked of each case

So far, the first and second tasks have been –hopefully well– approached both in the introduction and in the first part of this chapter. Regarding the third, attention is here on only a couple of cases outlined as two anticipatory strategies of CEWARN in a violence-prone conflict. For the sake of comparability, those conflicts are trans-boundary pastoral-related disputes occurring the same year, that have not reached the armed stage yet, within the same Somali cluster, and requiring immediate response. Otherwise stated, the unit of analysis is in abstract terms ‘CEWS–conflict’.

Following the five-tasked scheme, variance in the variables has also been addressed in their operationalisation at the beginning of this chapter. However, in order to substantially fulfil the fourth chore, the first pages of this methodological framing until Figure 1 inclusive, are intended to be a helpful recurrent referent. Moreover, to discover causal relations between various outcomes and configurations of variables, the design is supported by the comparative method of difference\textsuperscript{10}, proposed by John Stuart Mill.

Mill’s method of difference consists of a comparison of a small number of most similar cases, ideally comparable in all respects except for the independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005:81). It applies when only a few cases are available for analysis, selecting those which may be representative for their universe.

\textsuperscript{10} Also known as the method of negative comparison.
and population. This layout is often associated with Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) ‘most similar systems design’ (MSSD).\textsuperscript{11}

The method of difference aims at identifying variables associated with their outcomes in the form of a quasi-experimental controlled comparison. Difference in the observed outcomes is, thus, isolated as due to the influence of plausible variance in the independent variable. Furthermore, it clarifies causality particularly well if three assumptions are met (George & Bennett, 2005:155):

a. The causal relation being investigated must be a deterministic regularity involving only one condition that is either necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome
b. All causally relevant variables must be identified prior to the analysis
c. Cases that represent the full range of all logically and socially possible causal paths must be available for study

However, this approach has three main limitations to consider. The first one is that cases are deliberately defined instead of randomly chosen. Second, its inherent logic of elimination in which factors are excluded, leaves the explanation dependent on the relation between the remaining elements only. This is serious, since it may lead to the omission of relevant variables, to exclude plausible causes or constitute ‘false positives’ when attributing causal significance to biased conditions.

The third constraint is the condition of ‘equifinality’\textsuperscript{12} (George & Bennett, 2005:157), present when different instances of the phenomenon under investigation have alternative determinants. Hence, the same sort of outcome may appear in different cases via different sets of independent variables.

To overcome these drawbacks, process tracing is incorporated here after considerable suggestions (George & Bennett, 2005; Druckman, 2005; Checkel, 2005), aiming at strengthening comparison and the assessments of sufficiency and necessity for single variables and case selection. Once again, as its name states it implies to trace a process in a systematic fashion. It attempts to identify the intervening causal process –the causal chain and the causal mechanism– between an independent variable –or variables– and the outcome of the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005:206; Checkel, 2005:5). Here, the researcher maps the set –or sets– of causal paths that

\textsuperscript{11} Or the comparison of closely matched cases –similar in all of their independent variables except one, and differing in their dependent variable– frequently referred to as ‘MSSD’ after its abbreviation.

\textsuperscript{12} Alias ‘multiple causality’ or the problem of ‘plurality of causes’, observed in many social phenomena.
might lead to a given outcome. Thus, causal explanations are reinforced by empirically substantiated assertions about the causal effects of independent variables, their causal mechanisms and the observed process or processes leading to outcomes.

Finally, the fifth task in the method of structured, focused comparison’s design phase entails establishing the data requirements and general questions to be asked of each case. These are expressly listed at the case study protocol in the appendix. In accordance with the dependent variable, they encompass:

A. The number and range of policy issues and sectors under the authority of one or more political institutions in CEWARN’s anticipatory strategy; and
B. The extent to which the location and scope of its final authority in command of approving and implementing decisions and policies is centralised

With this methodological configuration, structured, focused comparison provides the grand strategy, supported by the logic of Mill’s method of difference and process tracing to overcome limitations for social science research. After presenting the methodological design, a vindication of its structure and selection is in order, as the next part does as follows.

Why? A Justification for the Methodological Design

The method of structured, focused case comparison is selected because it stands out as the one that best suits the nature and scope of this study. As Druckman (2005:209-210) points out, it uses concepts to guide case selection and description, emphasising the matching of observational units. This strategy contributes to research in the form of accumulative theorisations on the specific phenomenon under study, and on its mechanisms, if any.

Mill’s method of difference is chosen, since its logic fits coherently with the variation of interest implicit in the research question in a twofold manner. Firstly, it permits to get to sound causal inferences drawn from case comparison. Second, it allows for achieving control on the cases. Its liabilities are addressed by paying attention to alternative causes, to ensure that no relevant variables are left out from the comparison. Furthermore, the backing of an additional check on the results of
cross-case comparison is provided by analytical process tracing, focused on interactive causal processes. Now, two questions may be floating already.

Why not only one case? Because a single illustration in this study:

a) Does not account for variance, and the before-after comparison\(^{13}\) is not feasible
b) May be biased by context-specific features, thus highly prone to ‘false positives’
c) Is insufficient for a wider applicability for the resulting inferences, making them spurious and/or invalid

Why not more instances? Once again, a threefold answer. Because it would:

a) Increase problems of ‘underdetermination’\(^{14}\), ‘equifinality’ and ‘counterfactuality’\(^{15}\)
b) Complicate finding closely-matched comparable cases for experimental control
c) Exceed the available time, space and analysis required for this thesis

Reliance on qualitative methods and disregard for statistical analysis are here, due to the lack of systematic databases or previous studies on the topic. Besides, the limited access to recorded documents poses serious hindrances.

### VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

Every time an empirical ingredient is devised for social research, one has to address –besides ethical guidelines– the necessary requirements of trustworthiness, credibility, confirmability and data dependability to corroborate its academic rigour (Adcock & Collier, 2001; King et al, 2001; Hoyle et al, 2002; Yin, 2008). In this regard, Robert Yin (2008:40-45) stresses the importance of four quality criteria for case studies, suggesting important measures to enhance them. These are widely recognised in social science and attended to in this study, along with their respective improving manoeuvres, detailed in a clear manner as Figure 2 displays as follows.

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\(^{13}\) A form of controlled comparison achieved by dividing a single longitudinal case into ‘before case’ and ‘after case’ that follows a discontinuous change in an important variable, also called ‘single-case experimental design’—or SCED after its abbreviation— (Barlow et al, 2008).

\(^{14}\) Or facing too many variables in a few cases, contributing to imprecision, dispersion or indeterminacy.

\(^{15}\) Or reporting contradictory facts among cases, complexifying comparison and analysis.
First, construct validity consists of identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. It is tackled in the first part of this chapter, and reminded by the design phase of the method of structured, focused comparison. To improve it, as Yin suggests, it is resorted to multiple sources of information, a chain of evidence and a case study report draft to be reviewed by key informants.

Secondly, internal validity attempts to establish a causal relation, whereby certain causal conditions are believed to lead to outcome conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships. It allows for determining whether integrating intelligence products into RCEWS impacts the regulation of issue-areas and the degree of centralisation of political authority. Also addressed in the design phase, it is enhanced through pattern matching, explanation building, addressing rival explanations and using logical models.

Third, external validity concerns defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalised. Here, the use of replication logic aims at increasing its leverage, however taking into account the limited parsimony of this study stated above. Finally, reliability proves that the implementation of the study can be repeated with the same results, and it is tackled by systematising its procedures as much as possible. The case study and fieldwork protocol included in the appendix takes charge of that. In addition, an institutional letter from IGAD’s CEWARN certifying this enquiry is also enclosed. However one has to consider the implications of undertaking social science research with intelligence studies. It is discussed below but first, information acquisition procedures.

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**Table: Criteria and Manoeuvres for Enhancing Research Quality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERION</th>
<th>MANOEUVRES</th>
<th>PHASE OF RESEARCH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Construct Validity</strong></td>
<td>〇 Use multiple sources of evidence</td>
<td>Data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〇 Establish a chain of evidence</td>
<td>Data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〇 Have Key Informants Review Draft</td>
<td>Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Validity</strong></td>
<td>〇 Do pattern matching</td>
<td>Data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〇 Do explanation building</td>
<td>Data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〇 Address rival explanations</td>
<td>Data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〇 Use logic models</td>
<td>Data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Validity</strong></td>
<td>〇 Use replication logic</td>
<td>Research design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reliability</strong></td>
<td>〇 Use case study protocol</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>〇 Develop case study database</td>
<td>Data Collection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Yin, 2008:41.
After giving an account of the methodological strategy, or ‘grand design’, it is time to frame the techniques for data collection and their respective sources. Given the lack of intensive research on the topic, it is resorted to qualitative literature review so as to support the theoretical component of this thesis. In addition, a field trip of slightly more than a fortnight to Addis Ababa backs this thesis’ empirical element. The Ethiopian capital is selected since it hosts the CEWARN headquarters, as well as several organisations and institutions holding data that cannot be obtained from abroad.

Therefore, both primary and secondary sources are employed in answering the research question. The former encompass official CEWARN documents along with key informants, including CEWARN officers and analysts. The later include academic products, such as books, chapters, articles and papers, as well as reports from other sources and an online blog. This is done to critically contrast the obtained information for the sake of impartiality, to strengthen validity and minimise biases.

Key informants are addressed by means of in-depth semi-structured interviews (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Miles & Gilbert, 2005). These questioning formats are conversational consultations, supported by previously formulated information requirements, designed for flowing as a natural dialogue between interviewer and interviewee(s). Semi-structured interviews provide valuable flexibility since these:

- Permit the collection of data from general to particular topics
- Are less intrusive, increase spontaneity and reduce the tension of interrogation-like situations; thus providing both orally and non-verbally inputs
- Inform and confirm both facts and additional data (reasons, background, effects)
- Can be held both individually or with groups allowing to develop acquaintance

Aware of the nature and objectives of this research, each key informant is also required to fill in a methodological instrument to help identifying CEWARN’s issue-areas, their range and the authorities involved, when intelligence products are integrated into its analysis and when they are not. Such instrument is systematised and enclosed in the case study protocol, along with the interview guide in the appendix.

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16 Normative framework, baseline reports, country updates, cluster updates, situation briefs and alerts.
17 To protect their identities are referred to as numbered Key Informants, as mutually agreed.
Additionally to the requirements of academic research, any study on intelligence has to cope with the quintessential feature of their object of study, namely secrecy. Since intelligence contains vital knowledge for the security of a state and its interests, it has to be protected and access to it is restricted depending on the vulnerability it conveys. However, intelligence research has three methodological defences against the hindrance of secrecy which are also employed in this study, namely: Contrasting comparison, objectivity and impact (Johnson, 2006; Warner, 2006).

Contrasting comparison is obtained by supporting the primary sources with secondary ones in order to arrive at stronger judgements. Objectivity is reinforced by the extent to which the researcher avoids biases and subtler approaches, whereas assessments of the impact of the topic are enhanced by reading between the lines of its timing, form and contents. By paying attention to these methodological tools, increases the possibility to arrive at a more sound understanding of whether intelligence makes a difference for policymaking and how well, if it does.

Besides, one must work with what one has, and the very access to intelligence determines both the sources and analytical procedures. According to Warner (2006) there are two main forms of conducting intelligence research: On the inside and on the outside. Simply put, studying intelligence on the outside means no official access to the original records, whereas on the inside implies sanctioned or complete access to official information. Nevertheless, combinations of both are preferred—and applied here—to overcome their inherent limitations, namely the lack of access of the former, and the often lack of review, contextual specificity and scientific rigour of the later.

In sum, this study works with the granted access and with the available sources. It is resorted here to CEWARN protocols governing the management of information, to testimonies and private files from officers outside the official records. In addition, declassified documents and open source intelligence are looked at. A narrative in the case study form is written, assisted by a chronology, organisational charts, field notes and a careful reading of the events that provide the backdrop of the incorporation of intelligence products into CEWARN’s analysis. Conclusions are, then, drawn from the evidence, reasons, risks and resources involved in such merger.
2. GOVERNING CONFLICT ANTICIPATION INTELLIGENTLY: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research aims at taking stock of what happens when regional conflict early warning systems (RCEWS) integrate intelligence products into their analysis of violence-prone conflicts, constraining the study to the impacts on their regulation of issue-areas and on their degree of centralisation of political authority. To do so, it is necessary to get theoretical support to seize the five core components of this research question\(^\text{19}\), in order to understand their interaction. That is what this chapter provides.

In its first part, conflict prevention theories assist in explaining what RCEWS are, and their endeavour of analysing conflicts prone to become violent. Later, intelligence theories help to understand what intelligence products actually are, convey and entail when incorporated into such instruments. Finally, to realise what the regulation of issue-areas and the degree of centralisation of political authority imply, and how these could be affected by this particular integration, it is resorted to the ‘security governance’ approach. Then it shall be possible to hypothetically reply this enquiry’s directive question, and subsequently contrast such response empirically in the forthcoming chapters.

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\textit{To Prevent (Conflicts) or to Anticipate (Violence)?}

Given that RCEWS are the object of this study, one has to get acquainted with these and their labour of conflict analysis and violence prevention. An instrumental way to get it is by exploring RCEWS in relation to their anticipatory approach to conflict management.

Trying to prevent future human-provoked calamities is a philosophical issue in itself, especially concerning time. More often than not, armed conflicts are analysed and managed once they erupt and when violence is manifest. This makes sense within a causal logic where every reaction requires a previous action as precedent so as to

\(^{19}\) Namely: 1) RCEWS, 2) Intelligence products, 3) RCEWS’ analysis of violence-prone conflicts, 4) RCEWS’ regulation of issue-areas, and 5) The degree of centralization of RCEWS’ political authority.
take place. However, an alternative to this reactive rationale is to tackle disputes through a proactive approach. Overcoming, thus the limitations of the traditionally retrospective academic method and the difficulties of the classical prospective stand of policy-making. And this is precisely the principle of conflict prevention.

One form of proactive engagement is to keep the very conflict from occurring, suffocating it through deterrence, pre-emptive interventions, containment, or through other coercive means. By doing so, the transformative function and ‘productive’ dimension of conflicts\(^{20}\) are severed, insofar as the non-violent options to resolve them drop inversely proportionally to the probabilities of escalation and deterioration. But a dispute can also be monitored since its early non-violent stages through indicators and signals for policymaking. Thus, conflict anticipation through early action may take place. Meaning with this, not that disputes are to be predicted and avoided at all, but that the aim is to keep them from overcoming the violence threshold\(^{21}\). Consequently, the option is both politically and analytically more plausible.

The literature and policy discourse tend to use the terms prevention and anticipation interchangeably. However as far as this project concerns, its focus on anticipation will borrow the developments of the field, in spite of being labelled as conflict prevention. Antecedents of preventing wars can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, or more precisely to the Congress of Vienna as Ackermann (2003) suggests. Nevertheless, conflict anticipation as an approach dates from the notions of ‘preventive diplomacy’, developed within the framework of the United Nations by former Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjöld and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and then as ‘conflict prevention’ with Kofi Annan (Ackermann, 2003; Moolakkattu, 2005). Consequently, from late 1970s on, the term has been appropriated by researchers and statesmen alike, and its implementation performed by both state and non-state actors.

But the dialogue between the academic and the policymaking communities on the matter is not exempt from paradoxes. In spite of the widening range of actors taking part in conflict anticipation, their shared objectives and the moral imperative of the endeavour, divergent understandings, agendas, interests and debates are the top

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\(^{20}\) As processes of socio-political change allowing for the identification of covert needs and incompatibilities; the recognition of the parties’ capabilities and behaviour as well as the (re)construction of social order(s). Of course, opposed to their destructive dimension.

\(^{21}\) Refer to footnote number 7 for refreshing such threshold.

One way to fill the gap between the study of conflict anticipation and its policy-making is through the convergence of a scientific epistemology and pragmatic methodologies. Therefore, by combining an academic retrospective lens to understand conflicts from past outcomes to their originating conditions, with the policy-making prospective procedure working from current conditions to future outcomes, a ‘retrodictive’ approach rises so as to predict future events from current outcomes and past antecedents (Schmeidl & Jenkins 1998:473).

Within this logic, conflict anticipation may be understood according to Lund as:

“structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes peacefully and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes”. (Lund, 2002:117)

Complementarily, Carment and Schnabel point out that conflict anticipation entails:

“a medium and long–term proactive operational or structural strategy undertaken by a variety of actors, intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international environment”. (Carment & Schnabel, 2003b:11)

Therefore, depending on the type of conflict, the degree and form of involvement of third parties and on the extent of political will, may the scope of such prevenient endeavours be operational or structural (Carnegie Commission, 1997), also identified as light and deep prevention respectively (Ramsbotham et al, 2005:108).

Operational or light prevention aims at anticipating situations with clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed struggles. This means, intervening in disputes before they reach the violent stage, focusing on their triggers and the escalation dynamics usually in the form of diplomatic interventions, mid-term missions or facilitative mediation efforts. Conversely, structural or deep anticipation tackles the root causes of conflict. In international clashes, the focus is on recurrent issues and on the particular relation of the contending parties, whereas in intra-national conflicts the emphasis is placed on development, political culture, intra- and inter-community relations. Figure 3 below gives an account of each and some of their measures.
Figure 3. Conflict Anticipation Measures

The effectiveness of these depends particularly on four essential factors according to Jentleson (2003:27): The purposiveness of conflict interactions, the availability of early warning, opportunities for meaningful response strategies, and the unavoidability of joint action. Let us concentrate on the second one since it is the object of study of this thesis.

**TAKING STOCK ON CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS**

Timely monitoring of, involvement in and response to violence-prone conflicts are likely not only to save lives but also to obviate the need for often dangerous, costly, and politically troubled peacekeeping and humanitarian operations\(^2\). Reactive interventions are often at even higher costs and greater risks both militarily, politically and economically. In addition, more daunting tasks must be faced, such as containing hostilities, alleviating massive suffering, and repairing vast destruction through expensive reconstruction (Lund, 1996a:380; Carnegie Commission, 1997; Griffin, 2001).

Within this logic of a proven feasible cost-effective calculation, the primordial essence of conflict early warning systems (CEWS) is the proactive engagement in the earlier stages of potential violent conflicts or crises, in order to prevent or at least alleviate destructiveness (Davies & Gurr, 1999:2). Aiming for early action, these systems place themselves as preconditions for developing political will and engagement strategies, in pre-conflict peace-building and pre-emptive peacemaking initiatives.

Involving an institutional setup whose main components are the collection and analysis of information, the formulation of scenarios and response options, as well as the communication of such analysis, CEWS are useful knowledge-based resources to enhance the ability of decision-makers to timely identify critical developments (Schmeidl, 2002:73). This is done in order to formulate and implement coherent strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts. Thus, by monitoring specific societies with potential for violent clashes, and by seeking ways to act timely and properly

\(^2\) In a 1999 study (Brown & Rosecrance, 1999) it was estimated that the costs of conflict prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been US$33.3 billion, compared to the US$53.7 billion of its actual cost. The US$7.3 billion intervention bill for the intervention in Somalia could be no more than US$1.5 billion if effective preventive action would be undertaken, or the US$5 billion for the conflict resolution process in Haiti could be reduced up to US$2.3 billion if an anticipatory approach would be applied. In addition, successful timely engagements such as that of the Macedonian case, where US$0.3 billion vis-à-vis the estimated US$15 billion had the conflict even reached the intermediate intensity phase only, vindicate the exploration and development of anticipatory ventures to violence.
enough to nip an impending crisis where it is urgent, feasible and cost-effective, the main
tasks of CEWS are:

A. To identify the correlation, causality, type(s) and location of a potentially violent conflict
B. To track and assess its development in terms of actors’ behaviours and escalation dynamics
C. To formulate and often take part in the implementation of early action strategies, conductive to the effective, sound and sustainable resolution of the conflict in question

Geographically speaking, CEWS may well be strictly localised, of national character, or regional comprising several national units and sub-units. The later is the level of analysis on which this thesis is focused since it encompasses more precisely the security dynamics of an area (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Some global efforts have been undertaken to develop a worldwide anticipatory humanitarian device. However, a global CEWS is far from being properly operational at the time of writing. Thence the emphasis is henceforth on regional conflict early warning systems (RCEWS).

Within these systems, two main methods can be identified (Adelman & Schmeidl, 1998; Davies & Gurr, 1998; Austin, 2004; Ramsbotham et al, 2005). On the one hand, quantitative RCEWS rely on statistical data, focusing on the places and circumstances under which crises are likely to take place. In this regard, different early warning indicators have been recognised to appraise a society’s crisis proneness. For instance, Timothy Sisk (1996) stresses the importance of seven factors: The degree of structural tension in the society; the status of territorial sovereignty – shared or divided –; the nature of social cleavages – overlapping or crosscutting –; the extent of legitimacy of political governance; the degree of cultural tension; the level of governmental repression and of counter-mobilisation along group lines; and the influence of external actors. On the contrary, Ted Gurr (Davies & Gurr, 1998) suggests concentrating on three main variables: Collective incentives, capacities for joint action, and external opportunities.

Each RCEWS has its own methodology and prioritises its indicators and variables, constructed from previous coded data, and justified by correlations, risk-proneness assessments or aggregate indices. Depending on the focus, emphasis may be placed on facts and figures about poverty, development, human rights, refugee flows, arms transfers, state failure or environmental degradation data, to name a few.

But three main disadvantages of quantitative RCEWS are considerable. First, they tend to lack case-sensitivity and context specificity. Second, they are limited to the area
where conflict anticipation might concentrate its efforts. Thirdly these are mostly probabilistic estimations of crisis-proneness instead of precise warning mechanisms.

On the other hand, qualitative RCEWS monitor particular societies and situations. These may take the form of surveys of specific conflicts or groups of conflicts, and their sources vary from humanitarian agencies’ reports, press releases, media analyses, academic assessments, diplomatic missions to intelligence inputs when they get access to them. These systems tend to be richer in content and contextual information. Nevertheless, they usually face the issue of information overload. Therefore, these are more useful in cases where the expertise on the issue-area by external analysts and situational insight of field observers are integrated in a networked fashion.

Some authors recognise three core techniques used by RCEWS (e.g. Schmeidl & Jenkins, 1998; Meier & Linotte, 2006). Structural risk assessments, as their strong quantitative stand implies, use structural indicators, statistical models and formulas as inputs for data processing. Dynamic events analyses, on the other hand, rely on behavioural indicators incorporating some qualitative elements to the quantitative survey. Finally, consultative processes are based on panel of area experts and their appraisal of both quantitative data and qualitative information.

Furthermore, RCEWS are distinguished according to their location, organisation and purpose. On the one hand, three generations of RCEWS are identified based on differences in their demands, institutional needs and mandates (OECD, 2009:34-35). First generation RCEWS are essentially headquarter-based, drawing on information collected from different sources, of which analysis resorts to a variety of methods. These systems first appeared in the mid 1990s and even some are active nowadays. Second generation RCEWS date from early 2000 onwards and have a stronger link with conflict areas. By incorporating networks of field monitors, analysis is undertaken following a combination of methodologies, producing a wider range of products. Often these provide recommendations or bring decision makers together to plan responses. Finally, third generation RCEWS –2003 until today– are based in conflict areas. These are organised similarly to second generation systems, but with stronger response links and the main aim of de-escalation. Networks of multilevel stakeholders take part in their response system, even in-the-field monitors for immediate initial engagement.
On the other hand, RCEWS are also categorised depending on their scope and composition as governmental, inter-governmental, non-governmental or multi-stakeholder systems. Governmental RCEWS remain within the state structure exclusively, either in the form of a single entity or as a multi-agency effort, whereas intergovernmental endeavours are comprised of different governmental coalitions. Multi-stakeholder RCEWS are coalitions of state and non-state actors pooling resources and expertises to anticipate violence in conflicts of their mutual concern.

But every initiative has its drawbacks and RCEWS are certainly not the exception. Among their main problems stand out the availability of timely, reliable and accurate information, and the lack of political will (Adelman & Schmeidl, 1998; Davies & Gurr, 1998; Schmeidl & Jenkins, 1998;). Another is the linkage between early warning and early action, of which effective synergies could help in solving the previous dilemmas. A fourth one is the lack of consensus concerning whether or not to resort to covert sources, methods or inputs to anticipate and tackle violent crises in conflicts, such as those associated under the rubric of intelligence.

The evidence shows that the missing link between warners and action-takers is not really provoked by the low quality of the warning itself or due to its complete absence (Carnegie Commission, 1997; Jentleson, 2000; Griffin, 2001; Lund, 2002). There were plenty of evidence and proper warning before the genocide in Rwanda, the crisis in Liberia, the deterioration of the situation in Somalia or the recent wars in Lebanon. The failure was in the mobilisation of political will and in the lack of response to warning signals (Jentleson, 2000; Griffin, 2001; Zartman, 2001, 2005).

From its own conceptual grounds to its practice and results RCEWS may be criticised, especially by the policy-making and advocacy communities. For some, they may represent instruments of external interventionism, threats to sovereignty, self-determination and freedoms; intrusive surveillance operations in disguise or hindrances for domestic control. Others see in them costly, uncertain and unconvincing instruments, difficult to present to both principals and constituencies, prone to be far more counterproductive than their promising potential.

But what if intelligence inputs could overcome these obstacles?
Making Intelligence Intelligible

Since the incorporation of intelligence products into RCEWS’ analyses of violence-prone conflicts is the independent variable of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by intelligence and the milieu in which it operates, so as to understand intelligence products and their significance. And this is what this part of the chapter tackles.

Beyond commonly narrow associations with espionage and international intrigue, intelligence is a rather complex environment both conceptually and pragmatically. Within the Political Sciences the term ‘intelligence’ is often used to refer the relation of knowledge, power and security in quite odd manners. Traditionally, it is attached to the type of privileged information for statesmen coming from any source, and the activities of acquiring, producing, disseminating and protecting it by any means, and possibly acting on that information. It can be an instrument for power acquisition and expansion, even the continuation of war by other means (Der Derian, 1993), or a form of power itself (Herman, 1996; Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002).

For decades, intelligence has been zealously kept hidden from the public grasp due to its strategic value as a competitive advantage, and because of the relentless surveillance from the enemy. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the Cold War, progressive declassification of archives, public claims for accountability and recent ‘failures’ have fostered the scientific study of intelligence in order to improve its understanding. In addition, the current security assemblage demands its refinement so as to enhance its speed, assertiveness and effectiveness in practice.

Defining intelligence is not a straightforward task. Differences across regimes, practices, emphases and theorisations provide fertile ground for debates as beneficial for the field, as responsible for the lack of consensus on its nature, rationale and methods. However, what is widely agreed is that any definition of intelligence has to encompass its ontology, epistemology and methodology (e.g. Herman, 1996,2001; Välimäki, 2000; Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002; Johnson, 2006; Dunn & Mauer, 2009; Gill et al, 2009; Lowental, 2009). Therefore, to give an account of what intelligence means, this part draws on

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23 With some remarkable exceptions such as Sherman Kent’s work (1949).
24 Such as the 9-11, the inexistent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that led to the intervention in Iraq, or recent terrorist attacks in Europe and Asia.
different conceptualisations to construct a particular understanding of its nature, rationale and methodology, and thus, seize what intelligence products entail.

THE ONTOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE

A useful and recurrent definition of intelligence is that of Sherman Kent (1949: ix), identifying three important and intertwined dimensions in its sense. It states that it pertains to the knowledge to safeguard the national welfare, the type of organisations that produces that kind of knowledge, and the activities pursued by such organisations. This standard formulation is a benchmark for further developments, underlining the mutual indwelling of its subject, object and methods within a state-centric framework.

Complementarily to this triad, Clark (2004) stresses that intelligence is a focused process relying on information from all available sources, designated to reduce the level of uncertainty for a decision-maker. It aims at furthering the collective –national or state– interests in improving an environment. Its relevance, thus, resides in that intelligence is central to the maintenance and improvement of security and safety.

Peter Gill (2009:214) supplements the insight on intelligence, pointing out that it stands for the knowledge, organisation and their “mainly secret activities –targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action– intended to enhance security and or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities”. Note in this expression the importance of secrecy, interactions and time transcendence in its nature, its twofold outcome orientation, and the absence of the state as its referent.

Indeed, Michel Warner (2009:19) affirms that the “locus of intelligence is not the state as such, but also sovereignties”. By understanding sovereignties as actors distinguished by their competitive willingness to use violence to hold or gain control over people, resources and territory, Warner (2009:20) finally provides room for recognising other actors engaged in intelligence ventures, such as organisations, multinational companies (MNCs), private military contractors (PMCs) and ‘shadow networks’. Warner also stresses that, concerning intelligence’s instrumentality, it can be either defensive by emphasising security, or offensive when focused on gaining power or its expansion.

Last but –certainly– not least, even though open sources provide between the eighty and ninety per cent of intelligence’s input (Herman, 1996; Gill & Phythian, 2006;
Johnson, 2006), secrecy is the hallmark that distinguishes it from other information, related processes, and endeavours. But this feature charges a high, frictional price reflected in the intelligence product. As Warner notes (2009:23) secrecy conveys a threefold burden, since one has to calculate its direct costs, potential inefficiency and the hazards of disclosure.

Secrecy is not cheap. It requires investing enormous amounts of funds, energy and time for technological support, training, deployment, bribing and other activities related to information gathering, its analysis, storage and dissemination. Inefficiency refers to the limitations and challenges clandestine operations pose on the quality of the information. Data might be incomplete, fragmented, coded, imprecise or even deceptive. But paradoxically, many of intelligence’s inputs are only effective if they are secret. Finally, the hazards of disclosure are unavoidably inherent to secrecy, since it may raise suspicion or enmity, thus undermining one’s moral quality and credibility. It may also provoke hostilities from the subject under surveillance –even from third parties– or take place at an inappropriate timing, and then affect other developments.

Intelligence transcends time since it serves today to anticipate future threats based on insight from the past. It allows for moving from dealing with uncertainty to risk management, which is dealt in depth in the next part as follows.

**INTELLIGENCE’S EPISTEMOLOGY**

The epistemological dimension is central for intelligence products, since it pertains to what can be known through these. The kind and scope of the knowledge collected by intelligence, its acquisition, production and consequences are necessarily a function of its nature and concurrently prescribe its methodology. In order to better understand their interaction and the significance of the produced knowledge, a logical path is to address three essential questions: What is knowable to intelligence? What is intelligence knowledge and what kind of variations does it have? And finally, how is it acquired?

To begin with, depending on the requirements and the target it is possible to get everything it is accurately known about it, or scratch some hints to give an idea of it. Certain geographical information is usually readily available, along with some historical and economic facts, whereas leaders’ profiles, motivations and behaviour may be less
discernible. Since intelligence’s quest is knowledge for security purposes, given today’s complex threat environment, what is actually knowable becomes increasingly blurred and scarce. Insofar as risk and uncertainty are becoming the hallmark of world politics in the 21st Century, intelligence undergoes an epistemological shift as well.

As Dunn and Mauer point out (2009), threats to security were traditionally conceived in terms of what could be measured, monitored and surveilled. Until the Cold War period threats represented calculable dangers, and knowledge about these was available and secured. Vulnerability25 and risks26 were known since actors and trends were predictably identified. Defeating them – and thus achieving security – was through recognised, conventional measures. However, the current uncertainty provokes that one can no longer predict with accuracy neither threat outcomes nor probabilities. Thence, intelligence is shifting from a ‘security of knowns’ to risk management.

To cope with the current security milieu, some authors (e.g. Rathmell, 2002; Scott & Jackson, 2004; Dunn & Maurer, 2009; Hastedt & Skelly, 2009; Marrin, 2009) advocate for moving from an obsession to certainty, to embracing reality and its uncertainness. Thus, threat assessment – understanding now threats as potential perils consciously and actively created by a security actor or actors for another(s) – may yield its preponderance to risk assessment. It is necessary to understand that risks only materialise when they actually occur, therefore pertaining to a virtual future, which difficult their appraisal. Additionally one has to take into account their collateral, indirect and unintended effects.

As a corollary, this new epistemology for intelligence – including its products – urges for a move from a rationale centred in the knowable and calculable to accept and manage imprecision, uncertainty and error. Aiming at controlling the uncontrollable is a self-feigned sham. Knowledge coexists with perceptions, unpredictability and complexity; and they have to be taken into account. Yet, both epistemologies coexist nowadays.

Now, to seize what knowledge is for intelligence and its products, as its nature conveys, it entails anything to improve a sovereignty’s security and/or welfare. Therefore, intelligence is differentiated in terms of its operational necessities (Johnson, 2006). On the one hand, strategic intelligence implies the knowledge and foreknowledge of potential risks and gains in a glocal survey of the world, as the prelude to executive

25 The level of exposure to particular threats.
26 The likelihood and impact of encountering a threat.
decision and action. On the other hand, tactical intelligence is the set of events and conditions concerning specific developments, threats and opportunities in the sense of ‘situational awareness’\textsuperscript{27}, according to the military jargon. Strategic intelligence refers to broadly rich, contextual and mid-long term knowledge, whereas tactic intelligence represents precise, short-term local inputs.

Since intelligence and its products aim at supporting decision-making, their inputs and outputs are expected to be relevant, timely, reliable, accurate, complete and – especially – actionable.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{intelligence_cognitive_distinction.png}
\caption{Intelligence’s Cognitive Distinction}
\end{figure}

Source: Adapted from Gill & Phythian (2006:71).

Figure 4 above helps in clearly depicting what intelligence—as knowledge—is and what is not, distinguishing it from other sorts of inputs. From the bottom upwards, a fact represents a statement about past, present or plausible circumstances, events or subjects—i.e. targets—that after checking can be confirmed, denied or corrected. It is recorded from the immediate sources as raw pieces of information. When the available facts are appraised and coded to offer qualitative or quantitative attributes of a variable or set of variables, they become data. As a result of measurements, data are basis for identifying observable trends or patterns from which systematic conclusions may be drawn. Information, then, is a set of analysed facts and data containing a message that aims at

\textsuperscript{27} Strategic, environmental perceptions within given space-time frameworks, for understanding and projection.
influencing a set of affairs. Here, accounts of the targets, areas or developments gain significance for the intelligence consumer as their usefulness increases. For its part, knowledge implies the understanding of the subjects, circumstances or developments relating the available information to its context. Thus, the relations of actors, structures, environments and phenomena became internalised and useable.

Finally, intelligence is the privileged knowledge resulting from the collection, analysis and interpretation of the available data and information concerning a sovereignty’s security and/or welfare, covert and significant for planning and action-taking. And as Scott and Jackson (2004:10) argue, different kinds of knowledge must be coherently related with diverse kinds of power. In this sense, Kent (1949:32–37) emphasises the eight most relevant power–knowledge connections for intelligence and its products:

1. **Personalities.** Biographical record of targeted individuals: networks, milieu, skills
2. **Geographic.** Descriptive territorial information and its relation with human activity
3. **Military.** Assets, capabilities, developments, recruitment patterns, tactics and laws
4. **Economic.** Account of resource availability, industrial, financial and trade issues
5. **Political.** Nature of systems, regimes, leaders, forces, ideologies, laws and powers
6. **Social.** Population, urban-rural dynamics, migration, beliefs, organisations & culture
7. **Moral.** Doctrines of life, nationalism, religiosity, myths, popular knowledge, custom
8. **Scientific-Technological.** Ideas, studies, know-how, communications, patents

But how is this knowledge acquired? Since intelligence pertains essential existential and welfare interests, its inputs come from any source by whatever means necessary; including overt and covert ones. Contrary to what it might be believed, most of the information supplies for intelligence and its products comes from open sources as noted above, but the small share of clandestinely seized insight is vital.

Information requirements determine the supply and, in turn, the format and relevance of the final product. Sometimes sources and techniques are rationally resorted on a separate basis or complementary incorporated into an ‘all-source fusion’ method. Figure 5 below shows the main sources and collection techniques resorted to by intelligence. But transforming knowledge into intelligence follows the processes depicted in Figures 4 and 6 according to the methodology described below.
**Figure 5. Main Intelligence Sources and Collection Techniques**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>JARGON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open Sources</td>
<td>Raw &amp; publicly available, non-encrypted information</td>
<td>OSINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Intelligence</td>
<td>Information gathered via technological devices. Divided in two major categories, namely:</td>
<td>TECHINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
<td>Photography, snapshots, audiovisual surveillance, bugs, satellites, etc.</td>
<td>IMINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
<td>Interception &amp; analysis of encrypted communications (broadcastings, correspondence, phone conversations)</td>
<td>SIGINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
<td>Espionage, infiltration, recruitment of foreign agents, interrogation, any knowledge coming directly from people</td>
<td>HUMINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Action</td>
<td>Secret intervention in other actors’ affairs in hopes of improving national security and interests. Avoidance of the noisy military option, considered in between diplomacy and open war.</td>
<td>‘silent option’ ‘3rd option’ ‘special activities’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self elaboration based on Välimäki, 2000; Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002; Gill & Phythian, 2006; Johnson, 2006 and Lowenthal, 2009.

**INTELLIGENCE’S METHODOLOGY: A PROCESS OF PROCESSES**

Once intelligence’s nature and rationale have been clarified, it is necessary to identify the methodology involved in producing it, of which logic may well be described as a process of processes.

**Figure 6. The Intelligence Cycle**

As Figure 6 shows above, intelligence—as activities—functions as a continuous and mutually reinforcing cycle. It gains from the interplay of previous, current and future efforts, products and experiences, as well as from the synergy of both strategic and tactic tasks. But each mission deems a case-by-case approach.

With the mission at the centre of the process—stressing the principle of aiming for higher security and welfare above all—the flow of the process follows a clockwise motion, with the planning and direction phase as an ideal point of departure\(^2^8\). Here is when the actors, objectives, means, timing and tactics are set. Afterwards, depending on the information requirements, collection takes place either remotely resorting to intermediaries or even through close contact, by means of technical or human resources—or combinations of both. Then, information is organised, decrypted, and intelligibly displayed in the processing and exploitation phase in order to proceed to interpret it and issue the expected intelligence products—reports, backgrounds, records, evidence, etc. Finally, the product is handed in to the proper officers or agencies in order to contribute or not in the decision-making and action taking processes. Simultaneously the product is integrated into the archives of the topic in question, enhancing the intelligence community’s expertise and knowledge in that matter, and the availability of the material for future requests.

As Marrin (2009) states, this cycle is an ideal, descriptive model of the interactions between knowledge, organisation, activities, and decision-making embedded in intelligence. This does not mean that it may not get suboptimal or politicised. Sometimes it does. However, it serves as a framework for comprehending the processes that underlie the evolution from facts to intelligence products.

**INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS**

The importance of the final intelligence products is, thus, prominent since these synthesise intelligence’s nature, rationale and method. As stated above, intelligence products result from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of available overt and covert information concerning developments, actors or areas of operation, potentially significant to decision-making and action-taking to gage threats and

\(^{28}\) Nevertheless, having in mind the connections with past and present inter-related missions, and their previous phases as a background, illustrating the recursive character of the intelligence cycle.
risks. They differ from other knowledge products for being secured value-added items that optimise public and secret information, which besides of being relevant, timely and accurate, are ‘actionable’ allowing policymakers to act upon them in a precise and concrete manner. These items answer concretely and reliably thorny threat questions of what, when, where, who, how, and against which or who.

There are three main forms of strategic intelligence products one can distinguish (Kent, 1949:7-8): Basic descriptive, current reportorial and speculative-evaluative. The basic ones are the standard products of any intelligence system in which analysts give an account and broadly assess the target, development and/or area of operations. Current reports provide the latest information on ongoing events and developments. More than a collection of news, their analysis briefs the facts in context. Another sort of current reportorial products beyond immediate timeframes –especially relevant for security policymaking and its implementation– are warnings, which are dealt in detail below. Finally, speculative-evaluative products entail estimations and assessments of possible futures. These are the most ambitious and problematic of intelligence products since they aim at providing forewarning, prospective and forecasts, which is everything but easy. Products may be generated from within the intelligence community, requested from outside partners or combinations of both, focusing on special requirements.

The form and function of an intelligence product is necessarily related to its final ‘consumer’. Therefore, the way it is disseminated and the form knowledge is presented and communicated to decision-makers and action-takers are instrumental. In order to improve their efficiency, products must be customised to the needs and requirements of the final consumer. Especially when its dissemination contemplates actors outside the strategic state establishments, as some RCEWS stakeholders. This demands a mutual understanding where analysts are expected to understand their policymaking\(^{29}\), and policymakers ought to recognise both realistic assessments and the limits of knowledge (Marrin, 2009:147). Such tailoring conveys the arduous duty of punctually give policymakers what they want and what they need to know to decide and, eventually, act.

One has to always bear in mind that the reason for the existence of intelligence is that of supporting security policymaking and its implementation. Products that do not reach policymaking are more costly and less useful. Not only in terms of their direct,\(^{29}\) Including its structure, procedures, timings, actors, preferences and even behaviour.
inefficiency and disclosure costs, but also because knowledge has to be protected through one of the three main intelligence missions\(^\text{30}\). Counterintelligence\(^\text{31}\).

Access to these products is strictly hierarchical and highly guarded. The more compromising information these contain, the higher their classification for clearance. Usually, intelligence—as knowledge—is shared only to top officials under strict protocols governing its dissemination. Secured networks are the preferred vehicle for its distribution (Gill & Phythian, 2006:92), being these digital and/or analogous ones.

With all this in mind, the quality of its content, the timing and adequacy of its communication, and the degree of policy receptivity bear upon the impact of intelligence products. Evidently, these convey a number of strategic advantages but also of burdens one must calculate. Especially for its integration in multilateral peace undertakings, such as RCEWS as the following part of this framework shows.

**Intelligence– RCEWS Relations**

RCEWS scholars and practitioners alike repeatedly stress that their endeavours are certainly not synonymous of intelligence. Even though RCEWS and intelligence might share similar means, their ends differ. Among their main differences Susanne Schmeidl (2002) points out an array of essential, procedural features. According to the author, the aim of RCEWS is societal welfare and human security whereas traditional intelligence is attached to national security and state interests. Thence, the former stands out for its openness, including the reliance on open source, in contrast to the later of which secrecy is a quintessence. By focusing on narrowly defined state security and national interests, intelligence proceeds under the premise of self-sufficiency, Schmeidl argues. Every process from the above illustrated cycle is then exclusively performed by members of the intelligence community, and analysis takes place in-house. Conversely, RCEWS resort to multilateral cooperation schemes with public and private actors, and even outsource expertise from universities, research institutions and think tanks. But as noted above, their relation is not so excluding.

\(^{30}\) Being the other two information collection and cover action, or the furtive interference in a competitor’s set of affairs so as to foster one’s interests (Herman, 1996; Schulsky & Schmitt, 2002; Gill& Phythian,2006; Johnson, 2006; Lowenthal, 2009).

\(^{31}\) The securing and protection from hostile acquisition of strategic knowledge by enemies’ intelligence.
RCEWS and intelligence also differ in their degree of centralisation, particularly concerning their accessibility and the dissemination of their analysis. But even though RCEWS tend to make publicly available most of their products, some of these are reserved for certain kinds of users as well. Moreover, intelligence agencies progressively declassify documents and some RCEWS gradually resort to intelligence inputs. Thence the distinction is not that black and white. What is true is that states do not share information vital to their national security, except when doing it conveys more gains than the vulnerability it entails.

Another important issue is the fact that RCEWS are ordinarily constrained by their mandates. Member states will seek to avoid any potential hint of counterintelligence, or of assigning their individual resources to interests other than their own. Furthermore, most RCEWS lack the infrastructure, expertise and personnel to undertake intelligence operations. Since they commonly depend on external donors for securing their funding, their assets, activities, staff and processes are subject of oversight. Also, the imperatives of transparency, accountability and responsiveness secern RCEWS.

But even though RCEWS lack the resources or mandate to undertake intelligence ventures, they may incorporate organisational, technological, capacity-building and knowledge products from their covert counterparts. Especially when both share the central function of turning uncertainty into risk, and thus allow for calculating threat probabilities and possible outcomes. This is reached through warning and anticipation.

Warning is the process of providing vital support to decision-makers in their primary strategic missions. It goes beyond thinking about issues before they become problems, since warnings provide coherent, contextualised reference frames that facilitate the understanding and assessment of threats, as well as protection against them. Particularly concerning RCEWS and intelligence mutual interest in the anticipation of violence-prone conflicts. Dunn and Mauer (2009:129) remark two different types of warning, present both in overt and covert modalities. First, monitoring warning surveys general trends of particular developments towards forecasting probabilistic appraisals. The second is discovery warnings, which identify variations, unprecedented situations, and new patterns.

Warning is the raison d’etre of both RCEWS and intelligence. However, imprudent warning may undermine security and welfare by feeding a sense of vulnerability and
provoking anxiety. Liabilities such as ‘crying wolf’ and timeliness may impact negatively the value that both might add. But these could be overcome if the problem to be confronted is clearly recognised, defined and understood. Moreover, foresight requires awareness and appreciation, even considering randomness and surprise. This may be feasible through the proper and regulated incorporation of intelligence products into RCEWS. In fact, other sectors of conflict management increasingly explore closer links with intelligence, to the point of even speak about peacekeeping intelligence (PKI), a:

“new form of intelligence that emphasises open sources information, multilateral sharing of intelligence of all levels, the use of intelligence to ensure force protection, and interoperability and commonality with coalition partners and non-governmental organisations. Unlike national intelligence, which tends to be intensely focused, PKI covers a broad array of information gathering, partners and objectives”.

(Carment et al, 2006b:1)

Some RCEWS exploit their affinities with intelligence to further expand current partnerships, or even to produce innovative developments in other issue-areas. But some operative issues of this joint security endeavour ought to be appraised in advanced.

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**From Security Government to Security Governance**

Aware of the implications of integrating intelligence products into RCEWS, in order to know the possible impacts on the regulation of their issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of their political authority, it is required a model to explain this quite operative dependent variable. An effective alternative is found within contemporary security studies. Mindful of the complexities of the contemporary security milieu, and interested in giving an account of it, a body of work within the field explains how security, in the midst of its current clutter, is increasingly becoming a matter of management and regulation of disorder. A solution for this conundrum lies in the incorporation of a useful, organising –although fairly contentious– principle to security analysis and policy: Governance.

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32 Metaphor of Aesop’s fable, referring to situations where false alarms may ruin the credibility of warnings and the reliance of decision-makers, while increasing the proneness to dismiss real threats.

33 Since warnings are of worth only if these come in timely and expeditiously for actions to be taken.
More than a mere juxtaposition of essentially contested concepts, ‘security governance’ aims at overcoming the limitations of traditional International Relations (IR) frameworks concerning the analysis of today’s security and its policing. This approach from the early 1990s on is also eclectic enough to embrace and accommodate the potential of previous theorisations with new developments. But in spite of the interesting efforts made to disambiguate the definition of governance in a number of settings\textsuperscript{34}, the emphasis is here on the peace and security fields only, since these are those of RCEWS.

Webber et al (2004:8) sustain that security governance comprises five essential features to explain the current security environment: ‘Heterarchies’ opposite to state hierarchies; the interaction of a large number of actors, both public and private; institutionalisation that is both formal and informal; relations between actors that are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much as by formal regulations, aiming a collective purpose; and finally but above all surpasses the distinction of governance from government\textsuperscript{35}. And this is the milieu in which RCEWS operate.

By reviewing the existing literature on security governance it is possible to identify two interrelated orientations, although each displays a slightly defined stress. In fact, Kirchner and Sperling (2007a:18) point out how security governance has been employed in four general ways, with pairs clearly revealing their emphasis, namely:

1) As a general theory (Webber \textit{et al}, 2004)
3) As a system of international and transnational regimes (Young, 1997), and
4) As a heuristic device for security management (Hänggi, 2003, 2005)

The first dyad, a more analytical oeuvre, signalises the insufficiency of traditional theories to cope with the present security assemblage. From a contemporary critique to balance of power, security communities and security regimes, Elke Krahmann (2003a) notes how anachronistic it is to study current phenomena with frameworks pertaining to past periods and dissimilar contexts. In a paradoxical scenario where the expansion of the scope and functions of security accompanies inversely proportional resources and expertises, interests of actors get split. This provokes the fragmentation of security

\textsuperscript{35} To avoid mistakenly considering government as an actor, governmental agents are referred as part of the state structure or public sector, opposite to non-governmental agents like the private sector.
policymaking and of its implementation, where overlapping interactive networks of actors and processes coexist, demanding regulation and management. As a result, it is witnessed a shift from the government of security to its governance (Krahmann, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Hänggi, 2003, 2005). A clear example of this trend in security ventures is found in RCEWS as the discussion on their composition and methods argues above.

According to this approach, such fragmentation is undergone along a continuum of two ideal types (Krahmann, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2008). On the one hand, ‘security government’ entails the politico-administrative systems, structures and processes that still concentrate authority of security policy-making and its implementation within the state, in which several issue-areas are directly and centrally coordinated by a unified public agency. On the other hand, ‘security governance’ denotes

“the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent [security] needs and interests, through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority”. (Krahmann, 2003a:11, 2005a:20)

It is characterised by policymaking arrangements in which different security issue-areas are regulated by multiple or separate specialised agencies, not necessarily public. These ideal types act as circumscribing poles, along which the differentiation continuum of security policymaking and its implementation takes place. They affect also RCEWS as undertakings to anticipate violence in conflicts at the current security assemblage as they are. This differentiation occurs in seven identified dimensions (Krahmann, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a, 2005b, 2008):

1. Geographical scope 
2. Functional Scope 
3. Resources 
4. Interests 
5. Norms 
6. Decision-making 
7. Policy implementation

Each may take different forms depending on its degree of centralisation-fragmentation. Note that these dimensions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Nor all of them apply to every security issue-area either. This may suggest that the configuration of these dimensions, and their closeness to governance or government in RCEWS, may get altered when intelligence products are integrated. Figure 7 below depicts this more clearly, stressing which dimension is the important for this analysis.
As illustrated above, the concentration of the geographical scope refers to policymaking and implementation on a state-centric basis, whereas its fragmentation shows three trends (Krahmann, 2003a:12): downwards –from global to sub-national levels–, upwards –from local to the macro-regional or global levels–, and sideways –from public to private and voluntary actors–. This does not suggest state substitution, but the dispersion of its authority. The functional scope accounts for the extent to which security issue areas are integrated either by a single authority or by multiple and separate ones, and for the inclusion of public and private actors.
The resource dimension gets centralised when all or most of the requirements and supplies for the making and/or the implementation of security policies are held or channelled by the state and its agencies. In turn, resource fragmentation occurs when public and private actors participate in common security problem-solving. Interests can be centred when individual pursuits are subordinated to the common ones, or dislocated by the recognition of heterogeneous –or even conflicting– interests, enabling each actor their pursuance without external regulation.

The normative dimension undergoes centralisation when norms such as –for example– sovereignty or command and control promote a stronger state, while its fragmentation limits state sovereignty, or prioritises self-regulation and ‘marketisation’ among public-private coalitions. Under the ideal type of security government, decision-making may get monopolised hierarchically around public agencies, encompassing democratic or consensual procedures. For its part, security governance decision-making entails a horizontal dispersion of authority among public and private actors at different levels, ruled by negotiation, formal and informal agreements and in accord with the various accepted inequalities and structural weights. Finally, policy implementation may get centralised authoritatively or even coercively if deemed necessary, whereas under security governance it gets decentralised, policies are self-enforced, and compliance is more flexible –even voluntary or including more non-state actors–.

For the sake of analytical precision, the emphasis is placed here on the functional scope, since it fits utterly the requirements of the research question; specifically, those of the independent variable, in accordance with the methodological framework. Thence, the remaining dimensions will not be considered.

Following Krahmann’s approach (2003b:334, 2005b:251), the functional scope is a key dimension in encouraging the fragmentation of political authority that leads to the tendency from security government to security governance. It pertains to the number and range of policy issues –or sectors– of a political structure, along with the type and number of authorities involved in them. Under the centralised ideal type of security government, functionality takes the form of administrative systems in which several issue-areas are directly and centrally coordinated by a single and unified public agency. Often, this agency

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36 Refer to the chapter “Linking the What, Why and How: Methodological Framework” of this thesis.
37 Along with the resource and normative dimensions, and their interactions with the others.
is located at the Ministry of Defence, National Security, Foreign Affairs, Interior, or their equivalents. In turn, under security governance, functionality takes shape of policymaking arrangements in which different issue-areas—or policy sectors—are regulated and managed by multiple and/or specialised agencies not necessarily public. Thus enabling the participation of NGOs, PMCs or even MNCs into security ventures such as RCEWS.

Indicators of functional centralisation or fragmentation of political authority—i.e. security government or governance respectively—are the location and scope of the final authority that approves and implements policies in particular sectors (Krahmann, 2003ab:334). If the final authority of a security structure—such as a RCEWS—lies on a wide-range outer state agency, its degree of centralisation is thus higher. On the other hand, if it lies within the security structure in question on a consortium of stakeholders—both public and private—with specific authorities, the lower its degree of centralisation of political authority is. The later allows for the integration of sectorial interests, differentiated decision-making procedures by issue-area, hands-off regulation or even self-regulation, which bring valuable checks and balances to the security endeavour.

Examples of the security governance’s functional dimension, according to Krahmann (2003a:15) encompass:

- Broadening of the concept, scope, functions and institutionalization of security
- Enlargement of security structures, including new members and stakeholders
- The realisation that notions from previous periods—e.g. Cold War’s human security—fail to fit to novel—i.e. present—security structures and challenges
- Maintaining institutional divisions between actors at different levels and issue-areas
- Clear division of responsibilities among actors, such as traditional military issues, non-traditional security issues, support tasks, etc
- Growing recognition of non-traditional areas of security and of states’ limited resources and expertise to meet them by themselves
- Higher role of private actors in the governance of security leading to specialisation

This differentiation of tasks and actors among combat, non-combat and support functions may lead to changes in interest perceptions, and fragmented—even voluntary—decision-making and policy implementation arrangements. Thence, more flexible structures allow for and demand actors a more independent—and interdependent—performance in their provision of security (Krahmann, 2005b:255).

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38 Therefore, instrumental for the forthcoming analysis as well as for answering the research question.
39 Therefore, the higher the extent of its fragmentation, and the more security governance-oriented.
40 In the Euro-Atlantic area.
According to this framework, it is possible to identify the anticipation of violent conflicts as the security area in which RCEWS operate as political security structures. Security governance’s functional dimension also allows for knowing and explaining whether the incorporation of information inputs coming from the intelligence community, turns RCEWS from a security governance arrangement to a security government one, or vice versa. If so, it also permits to take a look at how does it happen by analysing their division of labour, the number and scope of authorities involved, their type of rule and the issue-areas they cover. Thus, an account of how centralised or fragmented political authority in RCEWS when such incorporation occurs, becomes plausible and compatible with the systematisation of the methodological framework.

Clearly, the incorporation of intelligence products into RCEWS allows for improving the quality of the available knowledge on conflicts before they turn violent, in terms of precision, reliability and above all usefulness. With such inputs, early warning could enhance its timeliness and its knowledge would become more assertive, leveraging early action strategies. Thus, not only effectiveness of pre-violence conflict management are optimised, but also cooperation among –strategic– state and non-state stakeholders. Nevertheless, such integration implies costs and considerable burdens for both.

From simpler to more complex issues, RCEWS with potential to include intelligence inputs must always resign themselves only with the pieces of knowledge and / or restricted access the strategic institutions may grant. By doing so, since intelligence products contain sensitive knowledge, resorting to these conveys protocols and conditions additional to RCEWS usual operation. These may include strengthening security measures or shifting meeting and analysis location. Decision-making might also swap from imposing additional clearances or officers, to assume the control of some structures and processes, even –especially– the final authority.

At first sight, it appears that the integration of intelligence products may alter the regulation of RCEWS policy sectors and centralise its final authority. This might undermine their independence and objectiveness, their very spirit and perhaps their mandate as well. Thus, the security and safety of societies or peoples could be traded for national or group interests. Is this worth for the sake of preventing death and destruction? Let us find it out and contrast it empirically with CEWARN in the Greater Horn of Africa.
3. ANTICIPATING VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA. IGAD’S CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM

After the previous theoretical and conceptual exposition, the present chapter gives an account of the RCEWS that provides the empirical referent for this thesis. In doing so, a description of its strategic context shows the importance of such endeavour as well as the challenges it faces. Subsequently, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is presented according to the theoretical and conceptual elements discussed above. A final emphasis is placed on the integration of intelligence products into their conflict analysis as a prelude to case comparison, performed in the following chapter.

Strategic Context

The Horn of Africa is one of the most unstable regions in the world. In strictly geographic terms it tends to be constrained to Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. However, its security interactions reach Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. This seven-fold complex is best known as the Greater Horn of Africa. Located east of the continent, this region comprises more than 5 million square kilometres and above 200 million inhabitants. As the map shows in Figure 8 below, it is mostly an arid lowland area with semi-arid, mountainous environments. Water resources and fertile lands are rather scarce, except from southern Sudan, the western parts of Ethiopia and Kenya, or Uganda. When intense droughts do not scourge these countries, catastrophic floods contribute to the regional harshness.

Demographically, the Greater Horn is quite ethnically heterogeneous. Besides of hosting a number of ethnic groups, these groupings also present considerable tribal, kin and clan-based cleavages fuelling inter- and intra-societal tensions even across state borders. According to Mwaïra et al (2002:34), three main cultural divides have been successfully politicised in this region: (1) The fault line between Arab and Black Africa linked to the Muslim-Christian split, (2) the segmentation of highland and lowland cultures, and (3) the divide between peasant cultures and nomadic pastoralism. This last one is important inasmuch as livestock occupies about 70% of the peoples of the Greater

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41 Half of the whole European territory and a third of its total population (2009 figures).
Horn (CEWARN, 2006a; Mkutu, 2008). In addition, deprivation and poverty are quintessential, and if that is not enough, the food and health situation may be aggravated by the threat of pervasive famines and diseases during the tough seasons.

**Figure 8. The Greater Horn of Africa and its Strategic Context**


Politically, this region suffers a common African problem provoked by the interplay of state failure, underdevelopment and conflict which creates a self-reinforcing vicious circle. During the colonial period, the European powers altered the local and regional balance of power, overriding traditional frameworks, and arbitrary imposing alien frameworks and boundaries (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:221). The rapid decolonisation and late independences, the experiment of transplanting a modern –Westphalian–Western-like state system, and the international juridical recognition of the new states exacerbated regional volatility. The result: Mostly feeble entities both as states – regarding institutionalisation and socio-political cohesion– and as powers –concerning resources and force–, in an interplay in which neither is strong enough to win nor weak enough to lose.

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Politics in the Greater Horn as in most of Africa has been characterised by highly personalised, neo-patrimonial and even ‘kleptocratic’ regimes (Bayart et al, 1999; Bayart, 2009) in which most leaders and their elites ‘capture’ the state, thus controlling flows and exchanges however lacking capacity or will –or both– to foster formal institutionalisation. Governments are for the most part detached from their populations, except from their social networks of loyalty and commitment at the expense of some civil sectors (Mamdani, 1996). This political instrumentalisation of disorder (Chabal & Daloz, 1999: xviii) has led to entities with a deficit of compromise, sense of national community or consciousness as known in the West (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:226). Fertile ground for the flourishing of shadow non-state networks and warlordism (Duffield, 1998; Reno, 1998).

Geopolitically, the Greater Horn of Africa has a noteworthy strategic importance. It is a vantage point for both power projection and rear-base support towards the centre of the continent and the Middle East. In addition, it plays an important role for regional stability in the Great Lakes region. Among the main security issues (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:241-242; Mwaïra et al, 2002) the Greater Horn undergoes protracted civil wars driven mainly by secessionist agendas43. In contrast to other parts of Africa, it has also experienced interstate –modern, Westphalian– wars about borders and territory44. External, partisan intervention has taken place as well since the Cold War45. Additionally, mutual destabilizing interventionism in the neighbours’ affairs is instrumentally the dominant foreign policy pattern in East Africa. Regimes tend to ally to and support movements opposed to the government of neighbouring states, which entails spillovers of domestic politics and the transnationalisation of ravaging conflicts and their consequences. Moreover the Horn has also been repeatedly subject to international humanitarian operations46. Adding more complexity, a collapsed state –Somalia– whose nationalism embraces neighbouring Somali minorities, the Ethiopian imperial reminiscence and its belligerent tradition of engagement, and Sudan’s issues put a heavier burden on the regional security dynamics.

43 Sudan from 1956 on, Ethiopia since 1961, Uganda from the early 1980s, Somalia from 1991 on.
45 Cuba and the Soviet Union supporting Ethiopia in 1977 against Somalia; US backing Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ugandan insurgencies; Libya and Egypt in Sudan; the Arab Peninsula in Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea; or central and southern Africa in Kenya and Uganda.
46 Including the failed interventions in Somalia SINCE the 1990s, the long-standing Eritrean-Ethiopian border mission, the limited involvement of the African Union, or the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
The methodology of the Failed States Index is defined at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_faq_methodology (August, 2009).


Table 1. Security-Related Facts and Figures for the Greater Horn of Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Index 2006 (Value and rank)¹</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value and Accountability 2008 (Approx. -2.5 to +2.5)²</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability 2008 (Approx. -2.5 to +2.5)³</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>-3.28</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness 2008 (Approx. -2.5 to +2.5)⁴</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-2.51</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law 2008⁵ (Approx. -2.5 to +2.5)⁵</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
<td>-1.50</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption 2008 (Approx. -2.5 to +2.5)⁶</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Violent Conflicts in 2008⁷</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Failure Risk 2009⁸</td>
<td>80,6</td>
<td>90,3</td>
<td>98,9</td>
<td>101,4</td>
<td>114,7</td>
<td>112,4</td>
<td>96,9</td>
<td>99,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Transfers 2004-08 (TIVs, and % of global share)⁹</td>
<td>12/&lt;0,5</td>
<td>581/1</td>
<td>207/&lt;0,5</td>
<td>122/&lt;0,5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>582/1</td>
<td>33/&lt;0,5</td>
<td>1537/=3,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Self Elaboration with data meanings, measurements and sources being as follows:


³ Perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, in spite of the complete arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council (Res 751/92) on Somalia, weaponry is smuggled. Instead, TIVs measure trends in international arms transfers, such as changes in the total flow of weapons and the geographic pattern of arms exports or imports. Source: SIPRI, 2009⁴⁸.

⁴ Perceptions of the quality of public services, and of the degree of its independence from political pressures; the quality of rule of law; the risk of crime and violence. Higher values correspond to better performance. Source: World Bank. Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators.

⁵ Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Higher values correspond to better performance. Source: World Bank. Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators.⁶

⁶ Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Higher values correspond to better performance. Source: World Bank. Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators.


⁹ Trend Indicator Value (TIV) values the volume of arms transferred, expressed in thousands of US$ at constant (1990) prices. They do not represent the financial value of goods transferred. Instead, TIVs measure trends in international arms transfers, such as changes in the total flow of weapons and the geographic pattern of arms exports or imports. Source: SIPRI, 2009⁴⁹.

* In spite of the complete arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council (Res 751/92) on Somalia, weaponry is smuggled through the black market. The ban was partially lifted in 2006.


⁴⁸ The methodology of the Failed States Index is defined at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_faq_methodology (August, 2009).

Table 1 above gives an account of the severe situation in the Greater Horn concerning development, governance and security. This, along with proxy wars waged during the Cold War, porous borders and poor state regulations, and the flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW)\textsuperscript{50} have steadily been destabilising factors. These unfavourable conditions complementarily make the neighbourhood one of the World’s most conflict- and violence-prone, as well as regularly in need of humanitarian aid. All this has led to a number of recent armed conflicts and wars, displayed by Figure 9 below.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|p{0.8\textwidth}|}
\hline
\textbf{COUNTRY} & \textbf{DESCRIPTION} \\
\hline
Djibouti & Interstate war with Eritrea on territorial incompatibilities. Since April 1996 \\
Eritrea & Interstate war with Djibouti on territorial incompatibilities. Since April 1996 \textit{Previous armed conflicts:} 3 wars from 1989 on \\
Ethiopia & Intrastate war with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) on territorial incompatibilities. Since January 1994 \\
 & Intrastate war with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) on territorial incompatibilities. Since January 1974 \textit{Previous armed conflicts:} 7 wars from 1989; 21 conflicts from 2002; 2 registered cases of one-sided organised violence from 1989 on \\
Somalia & Intrastate war with foreign involvement on government incompatibilities. Since 1978 \textit{Previous armed conflicts:} 24 conflicts from 2002; 4 registered cases of one-sided organised violence from 1989 on \\
Sudan & Intrastate war between the government of Sudan and opposition groups on government incompatibilities. Since May 1983 \\
 & Habaniya - Falata ethnic, political and territorial conflict. Since 2006. Non-state \\
 & Government - civilians one-sided violence. Since December 1989 \\
 & Janjaweed - civilians one-sided violence. Since 2001 \textit{Previous armed conflicts:} 20 conflicts from 2002; 7 registered cases of one-sided organised violence from 1989 on \\
Uganda & Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) - civilians one-sided violence. Ethnic and political. Since 1989. Non-state \textit{Previous armed conflicts:} 1 war from 1989; 6 conflicts from 2002; 5 registered cases of one-sided organised violence from 1989 on \\
 & Luo - Kikuyu ethnic and political conflict. Since 2008. Non-state \textit{Previous armed conflicts:} 10 conflicts from 2002; 3 registered cases of one-sided organised violence from 1989 on \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Active and Previous Conflicts* in the Greater Horn (2008)}
\end{table}

\* Only accounts of organized violence after the Cold War. Source: Self-elaboration based on the Uppsala Conflict Database \url{http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdbsearch.php} (August, 2009).

\textsuperscript{50} Small arms are hand-held small caliber firearms (handguns, rifles, and man-portable machine guns) whereas light weapons include medium-caliber and explosive man-portable and vehicle-mounted antipersonnel, antitank and antiaircraft rockets, grenades, missiles, landmines, mortars and rocket propelled grenades (RPG).
In the midst of this hostile environment, efforts to mitigate regional adversities have come both from overseas and from the very countries of the Greater Horn. Awareness of their common problems and of the necessity to tackle them jointly has led the seven countries to increase mutual collaboration. However, for the above mentioned reasons, each state seeks to assure the safeguard of its sovereignty every time it takes part in any cooperation scheme. Thus, partnerships are rather gradual and focused. Among these, stands out the creation of the then Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).

After recurrent natural disasters – and their tragic effects – that severely devastated East Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda agreed to fashion a development forum devoted to drought and desertification control in the region (Dokken, 2008:107). Supported by the international community, IGADD was established in January 1986, and after gaining its independence in 1993, Eritrea joined this venture becoming the seventh member51. In the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa of 1995, it was decided to revitalise the organisation and its scope to encompass social, economic, and security areas of cooperation. Evolving to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996, it has since then been the main forum for conflict resolution and development promotion in the Greater Horn.

By widening its scope and functions to security issue-areas, the organisation’s biggest challenge has been, as the former IGAD Executive Secretary notes, “adapting to the demands of institutionalised processes for regional consultations, decision-making, advanced planning and preparedness” (Bashir, 2002:10). This is tackled through partnerships with international institutions, donors and the inclusion of stakeholders. Thus, a Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management (IGAD, 1998) was developed, engaging IGAD more actively in humanitarian, peace and security affairs. Prioritising the prevention of violent conflicts, emphasis is placed on promoting a culture of peace and tolerance, building capacities for conflict prevention and on the development of a conflict early warning instrument. Then, IGAD takes part in the

51 Nevertheless, Eritrea declared unilaterally its suspension in 2007, being effective since 2008.
Sudanese and Somali peace agreements, in initiatives for controlling the flow of SALW, and in coordination efforts with relevant bodies. In addition, an emergency relief fund is established as well as the systematisation of post-conflict and peace-building efforts in the region.

In accordance to this programme and after international consultancy processes, the Khartoum declaration of November 2000 approved a protocol for the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for the IGAD member states, entering into force in July 2003. Thereafter, this instrument has been operational in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda focusing on a common security problem: Cross-border pastoral and related conflicts. These and their significance are detailed as follows.

**PASTORALIST-RELATED CONFLICTS IN THE GREATER HORN**

Pastoral conflicts are more than ordinary quarrels between rural shepherders, at least in the Greater Horn of Africa. These are violence-prone disputes involving pastoralists, their livelihood, environment and their way of life, deeply rooted in the interaction of economic, cultural and political cleavages. They get dynamic and complex, not only due to their causes, but also because of the actors and dimensions these absorb.

Parties to these conflicts may include different actors, so that one may face pastoralist versus pastoralist disputes, struggles involving nomadic herders vis-a-vis agriculturalists, clashes between pastoralists from different ethnic groups, skirmishes between pastoralists and government agents, or combinations of these.

Since in 70 percent of the total area in the Greater Horn people’s livelihood depends on herding livestock on open bushland (CWEARN, 2006a; Mkutu, 2008), these conflicts take place throughout the region. But those occurring along shared borderlands especially concern the IGAD member states, setting the scope and mandate of CEWARN’s duties. However, the main challenge is that pastoralist conflicts are not localised. The very nomadic way of life of herders keeps them in constant motion, and such mobility bears upon their disputes, additionally to other factors boosting their dynamism.

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52 Made possible by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Forum on Early warning and Early Response (FEWER) and Swiss Peace Foundation.
The causes of pastoralist conflicts are of environmental, economic, socio-cultural, political and historical nature, but above all combinations of these. Herders wander searching for grazing land, water or food, enduring the burden of the region’s environmental harshness. Droughts, floods, epidemics, famines and other disasters contribute with their roam for survival to the point of being considered ‘ecological refugees’ (Hjort av Ornäs & Salin, 1989).

For more than 25 million people in the Greater Horn, livestock is and has been their only livelihood. During colonial times, the authorities marginalised and oppressed local agro-pastoral communities, which withstood and countered governmental violence. While trying to pacify these peoples, the colonial powers denied any significant development. Demarcations were set careless of ethnic composition, livelihood systems or social relations. This imposed restrictions on human and cattle flows, and thus, additional segmentations. In turn, every time an animal died, the only way to replenish stock was by cattle raiding. Along with decolonisation came new systems favouring private to communal ownership of the means of production, especially land. Subsistence occupations faced serious threats.

Aggravating their meagre situation, population growth, corruption and selective rural development has led to the socio-economic polarisation between agro-industry and small holders. Only state-sponsored agro-industrial areas get subsidies and support to leverage and enhance productivity. Moreover, urban and rural elites increase their capacities to substitute pastoralist goods with those from the world market. This marginalises even more subsistence farmers as well as nomadic herders, exacerbating their relentless poverty, and resource depletion.

This socio-ecological underdevelopment (re-)produces the political economy of conflict (Mwurâ et al, 2002:33). On the one hand, even though raiding has long been a cultural practice bounded to tribal governance, all these strains on pastoralists compel most of them to seek alternative –dishonourable– livelihoods such as banditry and cattle rustling. Raids entitled by the elders’ blessing have replenished reduced herds, expanded grazing fields, increased bride prices and demonstrated manhood and heroism (CEWARN, 2006a:12). Now, rustling is both an initiation ritual and a distributive mechanism of wealth and power in the Greater Horn’s unfavourable environment.
On the other hand, regional armed conflicts and insurgencies’ cross-border operations allow the proliferation and availability of SALW\textsuperscript{53}. This entices herders to acquire firearms, resulting in interethnic arms races, undermining traditional conflict resolution practices and fuelling livestock warlord rivalry. The traditional practice gets thus, distorted. Moreover, in the vast boundary zones rule of law, social services and communication are poor; roads are few and damaged, and state border infrastructure is deficient. This increases warlords’ room to manoeuvre, to the point that often small cattle-raider militias are better equipped than governmental security forces. The state repeatedly resorts to dysfunctional or wrong-headed unilateral policies, especially—sometimes indiscriminately—to the use of force to tackle underlying causes of conflict, appealing to national security.

A multilateral option to tackle this situation is found in IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which is analysed in detail as follows.

\textbf{An Appraisal of CEWARN as a Regional Conflict Early Warning System}

CEWARN’s mandate is to promote the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and early response concerning potentially violent pastoralist conflicts, as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region (CEWARN, 2002). According to Article 5 of its Protocol, this is done through the gathering, verification, and analysis of information on such conflicts, and the communication of such analysis to decision-makers of IGAD organs and to the governments of its member states.

CEWARN’s structure is based on networks of data and information gathering about cross-border, violence-prone areas, clustering pastoralist-related conflicts. These clusters comprise the common borders of Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya—the Karamoja cluster, operational since 2003—, the converging boundaries of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia—the Somali Cluster, operational since 2005—, the shared border areas of Djibouti and Eritrea—the Afar Issa cluster— and the border areas of Djibouti and Ethiopia—the Dikhil cluster—. These two last ones are in process of being operational. At the local level, Field Monitors (FM) document facts, data and information on situations and

\textsuperscript{53} A Kalashnikov used to cost several dozen cows. Now it is readily available for five or even one.
developments brewing in their areas of surveillance. They periodically consult Local Peace Committees (LPC) consisting of governmental administrative and security bodies, elders, community leaders and civil society to weight their credibility and verify the information in the area where the events are said to have occurred. Then, Field Monitors systematise inputs into preset indicators and reporting formats. For the time being, fourteen monitors have been deployed throughout the Karamojan Cluster, whereas eight of them look after the Somali Cluster (CEWARN, 2006a:18).

Such inputs are raised to the national level, and submitted to CEWARN Country Coordinator (CC) and National Research Institutes (NRI) following mutually determined protocols (CEWARN, 2007:8). Country Coordinators and their Assistants (ACC) recruit, train, supervise and manage Field Monitors, providing them logistic support. They review what is reported by these monitors in terms of consistency and completeness, assessing the relevance of such reports and—if necessary—requesting additional information. Country Coordinators also contrast field reports with additional sources to complement, corroborate or refute them. Then Country Coordinators ‘package’ the early warning information, communicating it as Incident Reports (IncRep) and Situation Reports (SitRep) through an on-line secured platform. Finally, coordinators and their assistants prepare response options and recommendations directed at different policy levels of the countries in question, reporting to their national CEWARN unit (CEWERU) and to the regional CEWARN Unit. Note that the data of each member state belongs to each country (CEWARN, 2007:19), thus its sharing and publication is up to each state’s validation.

CEWERUs are the primordial coordinating units appointed by their respective member state, attached to a strategic Ministry, such as Foreign Affairs, Interior, Security and Defence, or Development. Each CEWERU has a steering committee encompassing representatives of the central government and of provincial administrations, Parliamentarians, the police, military and intelligence establishments. Besides, academic and research institutions are included, and even civil society—and religious organisations—may be represented here. CEWERUs collect relevant information on conflict early warning

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54 Monitoring areas -and thus, FMs scope- are circumscribed by the administrative boundaries of the side of the countries they are attached to in each cluster, i.e. the Ethiopian or Kenyan sides of the Somali cluster.
55 CEWARN’s Peace, Conflict and Violent Incident Indicators are presented below.
56 Each IGAD Member state presumably holds the same structure at the national level: Field Monitors, a Country Coordinator, an Assistant Country Coordinator, a National Research Institute and a CEWERU.
and on early response; receive analyses and reports from the Field Monitors, Country Coordinators and National Research Institutes, while enriching them with supplementary inputs from any source. CEWERUs also develop the definitive response initiatives for the national level, to be implemented in cooperation with local communities and/or sub-regional peace councils (CEWARN, 2006a:19). At this stage of the process is when and where intelligence inputs may be integrated into CEWARN if deem necessary, in case the reported developments or situations overlap with national security interests.

To complete the coverage of the national level, National Research Institutes are partner NGOs, universities, academic and research institutions, or think tanks that host and supervise the Country Coordinators’ labour in each CEWARN member. They assist in setting up and managing information networks, in the production of analyses and reports, as well as in coordinating tasks and communication with CEWERUs and with the CEWARN Unit, reaching thus the regional level.

The CEWARN Unit, with headquarters in Addis Ababa is the substantive administrative, liaison and quality control node of this regional conflict early warning system. It hosts staff from the IGAD member states, and undertakes the management of this mechanism from its finances to the systematisation of data and information collection. The CEWARN Unit also undertakes conflict analyses, strategic and operational planning, research and training programmes. This unit is also responsible for public relations and communications both inside the CEWARN structure and with external entities. Thence, it helps coordinating networking and technical support among stakeholders across levels, including response to conflict early warning.

Also at the regional level, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) and the Technical Committee on Early Warning (TCEW) endorse the coordination of the linkage between early warning and early response in the CEWARN structure. The later runs technical consultations on the CEWARN mechanism. It receives six-month and annual reports from the CEWARN Unit on the state of the mechanism, and submits recommendations to the Committee of Permanent Secretaries. Similarly, the CPS is reported by the CEWARN Unit just like the Technical Committee on Early Warning. However, its functions are more of administrative nature, such as authorising users of information –suggested by the IGAD Secretariat–, or linking managerial, technical and policy issues. The Committee of Permanent Secretaries also reports to the IGAD Council.
of Ministers and makes recommendations on conflict in the Greater Horn, and about coordination in the CEWARN structure. It also decides on cooperation between states and non-state actors in conflict early warning and management, as well as on preventative actions according to the available resources and calculations. These three last ones comprise the final authority of the CEWARN mechanism.

Feedback from these upward flows and relations is gotten downward from the very top IGAD organs. Through its Peace and Security Division it provides leverage to regional policy issues and decisions via the Committee of Permanent Secretaries. Moreover, the CEWARN Unit as the essential node for the whole mechanism receives recommendations from IGAD’s Peace and Security Division, which in turn are properly channelled and in due course to the pertaining component. Figure 10 below depicts CEWARN structure and processes in a clearer fashion.

**Figure 10. IGAD’s CEWARN Structure and Processes**

![Diagram of IGAD’s CEWARN Structure and Processes](image)

According to its mandate and structure, CEWARN stands out as a regional conflict early warning system in scope, since it encompasses several national and sub-national units in the Greater Horn of Africa. It integrates both qualitative and quantitative methods, however with a marked emphasis on the former.58

Due to the relations between actors and to the context in which it is enmeshed, CEWARN cannot realistically cover all kinds of violent clashes taking place in the region. Therefore, it concentrates only on pastoral and related cross-border conflicts within the areas in which the mechanism is operational, explored in detail above. However, it proclaims an ‘incremental approach’ which aims at eventually cover other sorts of conflicts, as conditions to do so develop (CEWARN, 2006a; Key Informant 3, 2009).

This allows for promoting awareness on common problems for the member states, for seeking joint solutions and even for experimenting with the inclusion of relevant –non-state– stakeholders to increase cost-effectiveness. Thus, confidence-building is in progress to gradually explore other areas of security cooperation, insofar as necessary steps are taken such as improving inter-state relations, securing development or reconstructing the social fabric, while furthering institutionalisation.

CEWARN’s techniques are a combination of mainly dynamic events analyses, based on behavioural qualitative indicators, and consultative processes with area experts and political officers. Such indicators comprise series of observable facts, correlated to patterns leading to violence in local conflicts.

According to official documents (CEWARN, 2005,2006a; IGAD et al, 2009) and testimonies (Key Informant 1, 2009; Key Informant 5, 2009), these are sorted into categories of both conflict and peace indicators, as well as violent incidents signals, serving as sources on which the different CEWARN early warning products are based. Figure 11 below presents the categorisation of such signals, which harmonise with those suggested by Sisk (1996) in the previous chapter. Note that as a top CEWARN officer remarks “some of these indicators do not apply for the Somali cluster, whereas all of them are relevant for the Karamojan cluster” (Key Informant 5, 2009).

58 As opposed to those CEWS circumscribed to either quantitative or qualitative platforms. This has helped CEWARN to gain international recognition and serve as a model for best practices to other African RCEWS.
CONFLICT INDICATORS

**Provocative-Triggering Behaviour**
- All-male migrations
- Pre-raid blessings
- Traditional forecasts

**Environmental Pressure**
- Natural disasters
- Land competition
- More livestock in secure areas
- Grazing areas abandoned
- Livestock disease

**Behavioural Aggravators**
- Development aid problems
- New Markets due to security
- Harmful livestock policies
- Bullets as commodities
- Livestock prices dropped
- Increases in livestock sales
- Media controls
- Negative media coverage
- Influx of IDPs
- Separation of groups
- Religious peace building
- Increases in livestock price
- Migrant labourers
- Pastoral migration
- Security escorts
- Protests
- Post-raid blessings
- Interruption of self help activities
- Harmful migration policy
- Small arms availability
- Negotiations taking place
- Student attendance interrupted

**Armed Intervention**
- Internal armed support
- External armed support

**PEACE INDICATORS**

**Alliance Formation**
- Inter-ethnic group alliance
- Ethnic group–government alliance

**Exchange Behaviour**
- Peaceful Celebration
- Inter-group sharing
- Inter-group marriage
- Cross-border trade
- Gift offering

**Mitigating Behaviour**
- Access to health care
- Small arms disclosure
- Arms reduction programme
- Access to education
- Stable bride price
- Markets remain open
- Positive media coverage
- Relief distributions
- Law enforcement

**Peace Initiatives**
- Women peace messengers
- Weapons reduction program
- NGO peace initiatives
- Local peace initiatives

**VIOLENT INCIDENT INDICATORS**

**Armed Clashes**
- Military battles between an official army and other armed party
- Other non-state armed clashes

**Raids**
- Raids with abductions
- Organised raids
- Livestock theft

(May include injuries or death to humans and/or damage, destruction or theft of property)

**Protest Demonstrations**
- Peaceful protests (may include isolated or low-level violence)
- Violent turmoil or riots

**Other Crime**
- Assults other than abductions
- Banditry (except cattle raiding)


The quantitative element of CEWARN’s methodology is provided by descriptive nominal statistics on the frequency of these indicators by period, incident or area of reporting, or on their aggregate values. Probabilistic, structural risk assessments are not yet developed. However, this deficiency is recognised by the mechanism and the integration of such inputs is an important goal to achieve by 2011 (CEWARN, 2006a:37).

Due to its nature, scope and composition CEWARN is an intergovernmental, multi-stakeholder regional conflict early warning system. It may be regarded a second generation RCEWS upgrading its status to a third generation one, as discussed in the previous theoretical chapter. Even though CEWARN is regional in geographic scope, it is based on the information gathering and networking taking place at the actual conflict.
areas by field monitors. Besides, CEWARN also contemplates early response in which stakeholders from different levels coordinate efforts to avoid the escalation of pastoralist conflicts or the outbreak of violence. Nevertheless, the implementation of early response depends to a high extent on the governmental structures of each IGAD country and on its coordination with non-state entities at the local and national levels.

CEWARN’s early warning comprises a set of products aimed to different recipients that could be distinguished as classified and open warning, which contravenes the supposed full transparency of RCEWS. On the one hand, classified warning pertains to forewarnings of which access is limited to some CEWARN stakeholders, such as national and regional state agents. These encompass reports from Field Monitors, but most importantly Incident Reports (IncReps) and Situation Reports (SitReps), produced by Country Coordinators and National Research Institutes in cooperation with CEWERUs and the CEWARN Unit.

IncReps are operational anticipation products documenting violent events as they occur, giving an account of their main features such as perpetrators, victims, location, and motives. Likewise, the type of aggression and its method are reported, along with the intervening actors –supporters, informants, etc– within the timeline of its occurrence, emphasising the consequences of such violent behaviours, especially fatalities and livestock losses. IncReps draw on CEWARN’s Violent Incident Indicators listed in Figure 11, are of urgent monitoring character and focus on tragic events only.

SitReps are monitoring warning reports on the overall situation of the areas of surveillance, regardless of their volatility or calmness, issued on a weekly basis. These register contextual conditions in a comprehensive manner, including intra- and inter-societal relations, the security situation, ecological and economic performance, and the status of the social fabric. These are built upon the CEWARN’s Peace and Conflict Indicators shown in Figure 11 above, and combine operational and structural anticipation according with the theoretical analysis, although with a marked prominence of the later.

By integrating signs of convergence such as its Peace Indicators, CEWARN overcomes the limitation of under-reporting conflicts prone to (re-)escalation in which many RCEWS fall (Bond & Meier, 2006:135). Since violence is more discernible and has a higher degree of probability, registering it becomes easier than surveying cooperative behaviour. But with such coalescence, CEWARN provides more reliable –and above all
useful—warning to decision-makers, as it allows for comparison over time and behaviour, improving violence anticipation and making the most of avenues for action. This facilitates the formulation of more timely, coherent, and targeted response strategies, optimising the often tortuous link between early warning and early action observed by the literature. Thus, CEWARN stands out not only as the most developed RCEWS in the Greater Horn, but also in the continent (Dokken, 2008). Moreover, the incorporation of both operational and structural anticipation, as well as early warning and early response has granted international recognition to its proactive approach.

On the other hand, CEWARN’s open early warning includes six different products readily available to all stakeholders and to the general public through CEWARN’s website as their final versions are endorsed (CEWARN, 2005, 2006a, 2007). First, CEWARN Alerts are warnings on ongoing or impeding conflicts in the monitoring clusters requiring immediate action. Alerts are produced as the developments occur and reach the national and regional levels. Secondly, CEWARN Situation Briefs inform on current sets of affairs or on events that may affect the dynamics of the conflicts under surveillance. Their production varies insofar as the need arises and also is of national and regional reach. CEWARN Country Updates are the third open warning product, which gives an account of the peace and security situation in the reporting areas from each side of their clusters. These are produced every four months with a national scope. The fourth product is the CEWARN Cluster Report, also four monthly but with regional scope in communicating cooperative and conflict developments. These four open warnings are of monitoring nature in conformity with the theoretical categories presented above.

In addition, two discovery warning products are public. CEWARN Country Baseline Studies are analyses on a country’s aggregate performance regarding its monitoring areas, clusters, forewarnings and responses. A Baseline is issued for all new areas and evaluates every five years. Thus, its scope is national. Finally, CEWARN Annual Risk Assessments aim at capturing the evolution of cross-border, pastoral conflict trends with national and regional reach. These are due to be launched in the forthcoming years.

With these distinctive clearances, one might think that CEWARN departs from the traditional openness that apparently characterises RCEWS according to Schmeidl (2002). However, this twofold retrieval has its logic. As a multi-stakeholder security structure,

[59] [www.cewarn.org/index_files/Page404.htm](August, 2009).
CEWARN draws on the existing capacities of each involved actor, and is regulated by negotiated policy arrangements built upon the participant’s particularities, structural weights and involvement. Different stakeholders have different tasks and procedures as hypothesised by the security governance approach. This concerns particularly knowledge, since access to it depends on the role played in CEWARN’s structure and processes. Data ownership and information management is reserved to the state, its agencies, and to the declassification granted from the national level to upper or lower layers.

Besides, commonsensible differentiations are required to protect sensitive knowledge pertaining to governmental interests, assets, sources, procedures, channels and information depots. Hazardous knowledge is neither appropriate nor prudent to non-state stakeholders since it may compromise their stance and even their integrity. Last but not least, the costs of secrecy are calculated as theory states, especially those concerning potential inefficiency of IncReps and SitReps as well as the hazards of their disclosure.

Regarding early action, CEWARN has not yet developed a fully fledged response component proportional to its early warning mechanism. As remarked by one of its top officers, temporarily “CEWARN coordinates, but not perform response” (Key Informant 5, 2009). The system is in process, building cross-border modalities and articulated structures for eventual joint response to warnings. Thus, for the time being mitigating steps are taken either locally or at the national level. When Field Monitors recur to Local Peace Committees for validating reports, governmental capacities deployed within the monitoring areas can act upon early warning and upon their own surveillance if deem prudent. This means, when developments can be promptly tackled or in case these require urgent intervention (Key Informant 1, 2009).

Early response can also take place under the existing governmental structures and capabilities of each IGAD member state; varying thus according to the governance of each country and on their experience in conflict prevention. Therefore, national early response is more institutionalised and open in some members like the Kenyan, constituted by government agents and civil society on equal basis. On the contrary, in Ethiopia or Uganda the government tightly predominates and their structures are in developing. Whether the response is local or national, it depends on the situation, priorities and resources (Key Informant 2, 2009). Similarly are intelligence products integrated into CEWARN’s anticipatory strategies as presented next.
The Integration of Intelligence Products into CEWARN

If after this analytical exposition it is not yet clear whether CEWARN incorporates intelligence products into its conflict analysis, the answer is yes, it does. However, “intelligence is integrated not directly into the report, but into the reporting system” quoting a CEWARN officer (Key Informant 5, 2009). Such incorporation is done on a discretionary and case-by-case basis.

When is an intelligence product integrated into CEWARN’s conflict early warning? Every time the information reported by the Field Monitors is false, incomplete, or misleading and when it pertains to governmental security interests. Since monitors cannot completely cover the vast areas of reporting\(^{60}\), it is impossible to get timely information on what’s happening in every corner of the clusters with the available resources. Then, when governmental strategic calculations and national assessments deem prudent, some classified knowledge is incorporated into CEWARN’s surveillance. Sometimes conflict analysts get what is required from the Field Monitors and from open source validation through the Country Coordinator, doing without intelligence.

The purpose of such conglutination is assisting the CEWARN mechanism to verify information that may be lacking, or to give more precision to the collected data. As far as governments are concerned, it complements—not replaces— their existing intelligence capabilities\(^{61}\). So this strategic joint venture aims at filling the cognitive gaps on pastoralist violence-prone conflicts while mutually overcoming logistical challenges.

Governments shall obviously not share all its knowledge with the CEWARN structure. Therefore, the kind of intelligence inputs being integrated into its analysis is limited to basic descriptive and current reportorial ones, discussed in the theoretical framework. The former includes evidence for pastoral conflicts on the identities of aggressors, their backgrounds, profiles and whereabouts. Lists of names are the most recurrent item. Also, facts and figures on the attacks such as records and timelines on fatalities, livestock losses and accounts of damaged property, or even maps are supplemented. Engagement of actors such as military or police forces, operative assets, covert informants, or supporters may strengthen CEWARN’s analysis as well.

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\(^{60}\) Which sometimes are as large as Switzerland’s total area.

\(^{61}\) Understood as knowledge, organisation and activities.
Current reportorial products being integrated into CEWARN anticipatory strategies encompass estimations of the attackers’ resources, capabilities, strategies and tactics; as well as the incidence and implications of ongoing sets of affairs. Even some modest speculative-evaluative products may be complemented to follow patterns, infer trends and forecast impending incidents or behaviours (Key informant 2, 2009). Note that the sources of information and collection methods come along with these products, as well as assessments of their reliability and degree of confidence.

These inputs are provided by officers of the state’s military, intelligence and security establishments or by representatives of strategic government agencies (Key Informant 1, 2009). Mostly these are first presented to the head of the national conflict early warning and response unit (CEWERU), who is appointed by his government. Largely “CEWERU heads are ‘government persons’ with close relations with national security or even that have been working with intelligence, hence insiders” (Key Informant 5, 2009).

The product is integrated and discussed into CEWARN’s structure at the national level through the CEWERU, especially via the steering committee –consisting of relevant governmental and security institutions– or even at the Country Coordiantion. Products may be eventually shared with other layers and stakeholders if deemed prudent. Interestingly, much of the intelligence products are transmitted verbally, through secured mailing or in physical form (Key Informant 2, 2009; Key Informant 3, 2009).

Both the CEWARN Unit and the CEWERUs appeal for a clear demarcation of roles concerning the resort to intelligence in the CEWARN mechanism. Governmental security institutions discuss all the sensitive knowledge, and eventually may convey part of it to the CEWERU for early warning purposes, should situations require so. The intelligence establishment has its own structure and conducts missions as opposed to CEWARN, which relies mostly on open sources and does not engage in clandestine operations. But as stated by a top CEWARN officer: “Intelligence is still required for information verification and early warning support” (Key Informant 2, 2009). Some strategic information may reinforce field reports through their validation by the Local Peace Committees before sending these to their Country Coordinators, but not in the form of intelligence products.

Remarkably, the incorporation of intelligence products into CEWARN is neither as institutionalised nor as systematised as one might believe. Modalities, procedures and arrangements are still developing. Since once again this integration strictly takes place in
the national level, it depends on the different protocols and organisational schemes for each government. Therefore, one cannot think about something even close to intelligence sharing or cooperation among the IGAD member states at this stage. Not within the mid-term either due to their patterns of security interactions.

The implications of integrating intelligence products into CEWARN are diverse. On the one hand it supports the analytical validation process, boosting the early warning knowledge, since intelligence gives more precision to the collected information. A top CEWARN officer confidently states “we have realised that in conflict early warning you require an aspect of intelligence to improve quality control” (Key Informant 2, 2009). It helps increasing the degree of credibility and confidence among decision-makers for sound policy-making. Especially when intelligence’s systematic, trained and disciplined capacities are supplemented to rumours, hearsay or emotional accounts of herders or traders. This supports the first part of this thesis’ argument, stated in the introduction.

On the other hand, sometimes tension rises between CEWARN and state institutions concerning data collection and information management. Sensitive knowledge has to be protected from public attention or media coverage, particularly concerning governmental casualties or its –stealth– procedures. Besides, since some violent incidents within the conflict clusters involve state forces, knowledge on its intervention is released only after being validated by the CEWERU head, prior calculation of secrecy costs and benefits as supported by the theory. Nevertheless, understanding and confidence prevails among government and intergovernmental bodies.

Confidentiality is the imperative and knowledge protection the most important issue-area when such coalescence occurs. Moreover, it entails cognitive earnings. The condition for supporting CEWARN’s conflict analysis with intelligence inputs is that the mechanism has to feed governmental security institutions back with raw data and early warning products. Even data and methodologies from the civil society and NGOs are shared with the strategic establishments, since occasionally these get more or better information than the military or the police through their networks and on-the-field labour (Key Informant 4, 2009; Key Informant 5, 2009).

“The idea that we cooperate together is good, but it will always be limited, and we have to accept that” says a CEWARN officer remarking that “relevant ministries watch CEWARN’s knowledge very carefully, especially when delivered information that they lack
on particular developments or areas” (Key Informant 2, 2009). Another officer adds: “When CEWARN’s data, information and methodology are presented to security entities they say: ‘Ok give it to us, and we will give you back the very information you already have, but that is not right’, and they validate it” (Key Informant 5, 2009). Which may endanger conflict early warning if reality as it actually is, is replaced by state’s constructions of ‘what is right’. This fends for the second part of this thesis’ argument.

But once governmental agencies have validated and endorsed their information, it is released either through the CEWARN Unit within the mechanism, or unilaterally through the media for publicity or advocacy purposes. According to a CEWARN officer “when intelligence comes to our possession, it becomes open knowledge. It is a disclosure and the member states know that. We know our delimitations, they know our position. ‘Once information has been validated it has to be public’ it is stated in the Protocol” (Key Informant 5, 2009). Integrating intelligence knowledge into CEWARN improves the mechanism’s effectiveness due to intelligence’s experience and expertise. “It is an advantage; there are disadvantages as well but it’s ok. There are checks and balances” notes a CEWARN officer (Key Informant 5, 2009), proving the thesis statement.

The security governance framework allows for understanding CEWARN as a security structure devoted to the management of instability in the Greater Horn of Africa, fitting into its complex security milieu. It presents the five features suggested by Webber et al (2004:8): It is an undertaking comprised by a network of state and non-state actors from the Field Monitors to the IGAD Council of Ministers. Its organisation encompasses overlapping, mixed ascendancies and the coexistence of divergent patterns of interaction, with the collective purpose of anticipating violence in pastoralist cross-border conflicts.

The relations of its stakeholders are framed by intersubjective understandings of these conflicts as a common problem, of the willingness to change their current situation and of shared views of a desirable, peaceful outcome. Ideas in the form of operational concepts, know-how and methodologies are also internalised and acted upon. Norms such as sovereignty, subsidiarity62 and specialisation in the division of labour also guide the processes between CEWARN stakeholders. Such ideas, norms and understandings are embedded in the CEWARN structure acquiring legitimacy, conditioning stakeholders in function of their role and weight, (re)producing agreed power relations.

62 The principle by which certain matters are handled by lower or less centralised competent authorities.
The transformation of IGADD into IGAD in 1995 and the subsequent engagement in peace and conflict issues since 1998, manifest the expansion of the organisation’s scope into security areas, in spite of the accepted challenges to cope with that development (Bashir, 2002:10). The inclusion of new members such as Eritrea and civil society, academic or individual non-state stakeholders led to institutional divisions and clear-cut distinctions of responsibilities between these, according to levels and issue-areas. Thus, specialisation has increasingly characterised CEWARN’s scheme allowing for differentiated clearances, especially concerning data and information management.

According to this approach, CEWARN shows a more decentralised, security governance-oriented configuration. The seven governments of the Greater Horn interact with national and international NGOs, research centres, and local traditional bodies through policy arrangements ruling the policy sectors appointed in CEWARN’s mandate. The institutionalisation of the CEWARN Protocol, Strategy and standard procedures coexist with less formal terms of reference, such as those between Field Monitors and Country Coordinators, or those of each CEWERU which are variably ad hoc. Clearly, issue-areas are decentralised, performed and governed by sets of authorities. CEWARN’s final authority is tripartitely shared by the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, the IGAD Council of Ministers and the IGAD Secretariat. Its location is thus, within the CEWARN structure and with a specific rule although their meetings take place in different venues.

So far it has been proved that incorporating intelligence into RCEWS could improve their effectiveness, however with significant side effects to be considered. The answer to the research question is likely to convey no repercussions as the Key Informant 5 implies above, since as soon as intelligence products are incorporated into CEWARN their level of classification gets softened. It connotes organisational and regulatory invariance. But why and to which extent?

The following chapter provides further empirical backing on the functional, regulatory and authoritative impacts of integrating intelligence products into CEWARN’s anticipatory strategy. This is done through the comparative survey of selected warnings of imminent pastoralist violence, within the Somali cluster in early 2009.
This chapter aims at reinforcing the empirical component of this thesis by providing a comparative case study. Here, two instances of CEWARN’s anticipatory strategies illustrate the impact on this RCEWS’ regulation of issue-areas and degree of centralisation of political authority, of integrating intelligence products into its violence-surveillance labour. To do so, one has to first get acquainted with the cluster in which both took place to understand the causes and dynamics of these conflicts. Then, the instance in which the monitoring of a cross-border counter-attack planned by communities of an Ethiopian district did without intelligence inputs is examined. The next part explores the analysis of boundary disputes between the Ethiopian regions of Oromiya and Somali requiring immediate response, in which intelligence products complemented the open source accounts. Finally, an analysis of the impact of such variance on the independent variable concludes this chapter, giving way to the resulting conclusions of this research.

The CEWARN Somali Cluster

As mentioned earlier CEWARN monitors cross-border pastoralist-related conflicts prone to become armed, within certain areas only. Two of them, the Karamoja and Somali clusters are already operational and may thus reinforce the documentation of CEWARN’s experience. Due to the complexity of the former and to the availability of more systematised information in the Ethiopian side of the later, the Somali cluster provides more feasible conditions for this research’s case comparison.

CEWARN’s Somali cluster is located at the shared borderlands of southern Ethiopia, northern Kenya and south western Somalia, functioning since June 2005 with eight field monitors (CEWARN, 2006a:18). On the Ethiopian side it encompasses the Borena, Liben and Afder provincial zones of the Oromiya and Somali regional states. However, the most intense and frequent conflicts have been registered across the border municipalities –or kebeles– of the Dire, Moyale, Dolo Odo, Dolobay and Bare districts –or
woredas\textsuperscript{63}. On the Kenyan side, the areas of reporting straddle the districts –wilaja– of Ijara, Tana River, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Moyale and Marsabit, belonging to the Eastern and North Eastern provinces –or mikoa\textsuperscript{64}. Even though at the time of writing a Somali CEWERU is being created, no CEWARN monitoring takes place in Somalia due to its current situation. The map in Figure 12 below helps portraying the location of this cluster.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure12.jpg}
\caption{IGAD’s CEWARN Somali Cluster}
\end{figure}

This depiction does not express any position regarding the legal status and/or delimitation of boundaries. Source: Self-elaboration based on CEWARN, 2006a, 2006b.

The reporting areas are quite remote from their respective capitals –some of them at over 800 km–, where the national entities of CEWARN are located. The main communication route is the Ethio-Kenyan highway, which connects Addis Ababa with Nairobi passing through Moyale. There are a few secondary gravel roads, but during the rainy season these become rather difficult to drive on. Mobile phone network gets irregular whereas internet access is poor.

\textsuperscript{63} A kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia, equivalent to a ward. Each kebele belongs to a woreda or administrative district, which in turn is part of a zone within one of the eight ethno-linguistic Federal Regional States (kililoch).

\textsuperscript{64} In Kenya, a mkoa -mikoa plural in Swahili- is one of the eight provinces in which the country is divided. Each province is divided into districts -wilaja-, which in turn is subdivided into taarafa. These are in turn divided into locations -mtaa-, comprised of different sublocations, or mtaa mdogo.
As stated in the previous chapter, resource scarcity characterises this arid and semi-arid areas. The dry seasons range from May to July and from December to February. This later is the hottest and driest one, in which herders wander for water and grazing land. Only two rainfall seasons tend to irrigate this cluster, one from March to May and the other during September-November. The former is more important for livestock watering and grazing than the later, which is heavy in the highlands often resulting in floods. In the areas around Moyale, due to the crossing Dawa and Genale rivers, vegetation is thicker and richer in grassland. Thus, it is relatively more fertile in spite of environmental degradation. On the riverbanks and valleys, semi-sedentary agro-pastoralists grow some crops and raise cattle for milk- and related products. Some urban residents and traders are found as well, but the principal livelihood is pastoralism.

The area hosts an array of communities, though not so heterogenic as the Karamoja cluster (Key informant 4, 2009). The most prominent groups in number and interactions are the Digodia and the Borana in the Ethiopian woredas of Dolo Odo and Moyale, as well as the Garre, Gabra and Rendile in the Kenyan wajila of Moyale and Mandera (CEWARN, 2006b:9). Of special interest are the pastoralist Borana, Garre and Gabra since they take part in the cases presented below.

According to the Uppsala Conflict Database\(^5\) the Borana is a traditionally semi-nomadic clan belonging to the Oromo ethnic group, the largest in Ethiopia. It has historically been the dominant power in the area, but about century and a half ago, diverse Somali groups expanded westward and moved into Borana territory, repelling them. Land contention among rivalling groups is constantly configuring local politics. In spite of being majority in the Ethiopian Borana zone at the Oromiya region, some groups live in the neighbouring Moyale and Marsabit wajila of Kenya. After the droughts from the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Borana lost about 80% of livestock, forcing them to roam with their remaining cattle in search for water and pasture, triggering –often violent– struggles with adjacent groups. Currently about 200 000 Borana are estimated within the Somali cluster (Key informant 1, 2009).

The Gabra tribe also lives in these borderlands numbering approximately 35 000 people\(^6\). The camel is the essential base of its economy, although its sustenance also

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\(^5\) [www.pcr.uu.se/gpdb/database/gpcountry.php?id=55&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa](September, 2009).

\(^6\) [www.pcr.uu.se/gpdb/database/gpcountry.php?id=85&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa](September, 2009).
includes goats, cattle and sheep (Key informant 5, 2009). Gabra communities have also been scourged by droughts since 1990, loosing more than three-quarters of their herds due to thirst or hunger. Transhumance of their livelihood has also led them to territories ruled by adversary groups, resulting in hostilities and increasingly fiercer skirmishes.

Living in the same harsh area, the Garre is a sub-clan of the Somali Digil clan. Reckoned from 50 000 people to hundreds of thousands, this community differs linguistically from its Somali kinship since they speak an Oromiya dialect. This has granted the Garre a flexible identity leading both to struggle and cooperation with neighbouring groups (CEWARN, 2006b:9). Its leadership is made up of clan leaders and administrators, and like many other Somali clans, it has built up its own militia and engaged in violent clashes with foes. Reportedly, the Garre have links with the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) which have self-proclaimed the autonomous region of ‘South-West Somalia’ in the collapsed land.67

In spite of being “the most chaotic and challenging cluster” (Key informant 2, 2009) the Somali is reportedly “less violent compared to the Karamoja cluster” (Key informant 5, 2009). Indeed, when surprisingly asked whether less violent incidents occur in the Somali cluster, a top CEWARN officer confidently answers:

“Of course! 75% of our reports come from Karamoja Cluster. Yet anything in Somalia destabilises the neighbouring countries. For example, internally displaced persons and refugees come with their arms and they sell them, and these arms go to Karamoja cluster. They don’t stay there. Why? One reason: The countries sharing border with Somalia are quite aware of the security situation there. So, security is very high; you cannot go around freely with your arms. What do you do? You sell them. If you don’t use them, you sell them. So because of that, those areas are relatively calm in spite of Somalia’s disorder”.

(Key informant 5, 2009)

One has to bear in mind that the Somali cluster entered into function two years after the Karamoja one. But still, conflict propensity is surprisingly lower in the former as Table 2 below corroborates it with figures.

67 www.pcr.uu.se/gpdata/database/gpcountry.php?id=141&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa# (September, 2009).
Table 2. CEWARN Cluster Comparison of Reported Conflict Outcomes

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIOLENT INCIDENTS</td>
<td>HUMAN DEATHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>566</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1 665</td>
<td>2 841</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recovered</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 283</td>
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CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN THE SOMALI CLUSTER

Pastoralist cross-border clashes in the Somali cluster are—as any conflict—product of the interplay of structural, catalyst and triggering causes. Their context and its interactions require considering conflict causation as an integral whole, instead of favouring isolated factors (CEWARN, 2006b:11-12; Key informant 2, 2009).

Within the structural causes stands out the intertwining of environmental stress and the competition for scarce resources. As stated earlier, the rough ecological conditions intensify inter-group competition for the increasingly scarce resources, exacerbated by population growth.

Local politics and territorial control also contribute structurally with the formation of conflicts in the Somali cluster. On the one hand, the devolution of power by the Ethiopian constitution of 1995 grouped communities in linguistic regional states or *kililochs*. Administrative decentralisation reached the *woreda* level as well, resulting in constant boundary (re-)demarcations undermining pastoralists’ mobility and ethnic affiliations. It particularly affects the bordering *woredas* divided by the Oromiya and the Somali regions, aggravating with territorial cleavages the already strained resource disputes. A governmental initiative to mitigate these was the 2004 referendum to draw the limits of such regions. However it rather intensified the violence between Garre, Gabra and Borana, which temporarily suspended the initiative until tensions de-escalate.

On the other hand, the competition of local politicians over the public administration and resources fuel existing conflicts. Territorial control of townships ascertains power among rivalling clans, and allows for privileging certain groups to deny access or expel others.
Related to that, the hardening of ethnic identities surpasses among catalyst causes of pastoralist conflicts within this cluster. Previously flexible identities turn partisan, intensifying kin-based mobilisation. Administrative inadequacies and weakness, along with the culture of impunity resultant from the decentralisation process also quicken conflict formation. Local and district security forces are rather precarious in infrastructure and equipment; personnel is insufficient and often ill trained, undermining law enforcement. In spite of their role in regional dispute-settling, community elders and traditional conflict resolution practices are also weakened by the third catalyst cause: The proliferation of SALW due to the situation in Somalia, the fall of military regimes and to international arms traffickers.

The interaction of these structural causes and catalysts with three triggers detonates the outbreak of conflicts in the area. The first trigger is the practice of raiding as a coping mechanism. The depletion of herds by diseases or environmental factors has encouraged livestock rustling of neighbouring groups, as means to replenish lost animals. Forays are also instrumentalised for acquiring a livelihood, paying dowry or avenging prior offences or felonies. Such raids are not confined to the hinterlands, but also take place across district, zone, regional and national borders (Key informant 1, 2009).

Secondly, acts of crime and banditry unleash inter-communal skirmishes; especially the murder of traditional chiefs or local politicians which leads to interethnic enmity and to spirals of reprisals and counter-reprisals. Linked to this is the third trigger: Electoral and political violence. It concerns the resulting turbulences from the referendum on the Oromiya and Somali regional boundaries, the operations of rebel groups in the area – the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) or the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) –, and governmental engagements to combat these.

Within this challenging context, CEWARN’s endeavour of anticipating large-scale violence through the monitoring of this cluster’s conflicts relies primarily on open sources. However, in some particular occasions the developments under surveillance require the support of intelligence inputs so as to assertively prevent atrocities from happening. In the following parts, two cases are analysed to underpin the impacts on CEWARN’s regulation of issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of its political authority, of integrating intelligence products into its anticipatory strategy.
Case 1. Cross-border Counter Attack Being Planned by Dire Woreda Communities

In December the 4th 2008, members of the Gabra clan from Kenya stole about 800 head of cattle from the Borana clan in the Dire woreda, leaving one fatality and three people injured. The ethnic nuances of the incident, as well as the very booty, endangered the situation to escalate into armed inter-communal feuds. According to the Ethiopian side of the cluster (CEWARN, 2009a), Kenya failed to properly take measures on its implicated Gabra, and to show amenability for cross-border dialogue. Such omission was perceived by the Ethiopian Borana as culprit concealment on the part of Kenyan communities.

This inaction and the subsequent inability of the respective authorities to recover the stolen livestock supported the impression of governmental thoughtlessness and unresponsiveness. This, along with interethnic grievances volatilised even more the tense environment, encouraging communities to take the matters into their own hands.

Reports by Ethiopian field monitors warned the readying of Borana groups to counter attack the Kenyan Gabra. Efforts by communities and governmental forces to regain the stolen cattle after the 4th of December raid, led to the recovery of about three quarter parts of the stolen herd in neighbouring areas. However threats of retaliatory onslaught remained, along with the possibility of an impending spiral of violence.

Security officials both in Ethiopia and Kenya repeatedly reported their temporary unfitness to forestall imminent Borana counter-attacks. Such logistic obstacles were perceived as governmental injustices, fuelling communal dissatisfaction. Moreover, an ominous drought exacerbated pastoralist pressing to get back their rustled livestock.

In this case, analysis took place as stipulated by CEWARN’s Standard Operating Procedure’s Manual (CEWARN, 2007), in conformity with the Protocol (CEWARN, 2002) and its current strategy (CEWARN, 2006a). The structure and processes discussed in the previous chapter were kept, along with the roles and functions of stakeholders.

Following the methodological and theoretical frameworks of this thesis, ten policy sectors or issue-areas were identified within CEWARN’s labour, according to the recently referred documents and to the five key informants. These issue-areas and assessments on their regulation were systematised through the methodological instrument included at the appendix, and recorded as Table 3 displays as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE-AREA</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>AUTHORITIES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>High-Higher</td>
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<td>Communication</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>FM, NRI, CC, CEWARN</td>
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<td>High-Higher</td>
<td>FM, LPC, CC, NRI, CEWARN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Validation (Incl. Quality Control)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>FM, LPC, CC, NRI, CEWARN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>FM, CC, CEWARN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation of Scenarios</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>FM, CC, NRI, CEWARN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Options</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>CC, NRI, CEWERU, CEWARN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>High-Higher</td>
<td>CC, CEWARN, CEWERU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data &amp; Information Management</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>CEWERU, CEWARN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>FM, CC, CEWERU, CEWARN</td>
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Stuck to its mandate, CEWARN operated the main components of most conflict early warning systems –as studied in previous chapters– as issue-areas, namely: Coordination, communication, data and information collection; validation of information and quality control; analysis, formulation of scenarios, design of response options, dissemination of early warning, information management and protection; and training.

Notably, information gathering and the dissemination of early warning were appraised among the policy sectors of higher range, being regulated by three authorities. Information collection was preponderantly local and national performed by both state and non-state actors, based on data collected by the Field Monitors discussed with Local Peace Committees at the Dire woreda. Insight was complemented by the Country Coordinator with information from open sources only. Its high assessment here was product of the shared view that this issue-area is the cornerstone of CEWARN’s labour.

Dissemination happened in a twofold manner: Nationally through the Ethiopian Country Coordination and CEWERU to domestic agencies, and regionally via the CEWARN Unit to the rest of stakeholders at different levels. Its rank was justified by the fact that the timing and form in which early warning is disseminated plays a decisive role in the anticipatory tackling of violence, as theory and testimonies prove (Key Informant 3, 2009).

Remarkably, training resulted to be the second highest issue-area. This on the basis that capacity-building enabled the intervening actors to internalise CEWARN’s mechanism and processes, as well as to perform their duties effectively and in a
coordinated manner. It involved four authorities of local, national and regional scope: Field Monitors, the Country Coordinator, the Ethiopian CEWERU and the CEWARN Unit.

But the policy issue of highest score by consensus was information management and protection, reserved to only two authorities: The national CEWERU and the CEWARN Unit. Even though the analysis was based on open sources, informants and reports had to be secured following the clearance protocols. This underlines the highest relevance and the lowest decentralisation of CEWARN’s knowledge component.

The resultant analysis of CEWARN’s regulation of issue-areas –doing without intelligence inputs for its anticipatory strategy– shows that these are ten interdependent policy sectors stipulated by its Protocol. Their management lay on shared authorities grouping stakeholders from different levels with complementary areas of specialisation. Clearly, the rule of these policy sectors is proportional to the weights and capabilities of each actor, and to the magnitude of the very issue-area within the mechanism.

Concerning the independent variable’s second construct of interest –namely the degree of centralisation of political authority–, the location of CEWARN’s final authority remained multilateral and inside this conflict early warning system. In this instance, the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, the IGAD Council of Ministers and the IGAD Secretariat through its Peace and Security Division held the ultimate decision-making and policy-implementation power over the CEWARN mechanism, within its structure.

The scope of this final authority was of an issue-specific administrative nature. It concentrated on the authorisation of information handling, coordinating the whole mechanism, resource management and policy calculations as presented in the preceding chapter\textsuperscript{68}. The type of rule of this final authority was rather compulsory, however within its areas of competence. The other agencies of the CEWARN system performed their duties normally, in accordance with the standard operating procedures (CEWARN, 2007) and with the formal and informal arrangements between the involved stakeholders.

Among the CEWARN recommendations, the Ethiopian Country Coordinator pointed out bolstering up local security capabilities by the government apparatus as the crucial measure, since district authorities were unable to deter imminent reprisals. In addition, it was suggested to combine efforts by both Kenyan an Ethiopian stakeholders to resolve this cross-border conflict and resume the peace process with the parties. To

\textsuperscript{68} Refer to the part “An Appraisal of CEWARN as a Conflict Early Warning System” in the previous chapter.
mitigate inter-group animosities remained arresting the perpetrators of the initial raid by Kenyan authorities, and furthering cooperation between the Ethiopian and Kenyan CEWERUs, to follow up the restitution of the remaining purloined livestock.

Since response to early warning depends on each country’s existing structures and capabilities, no joint action was reported. A CEWARN Country Coordinator remarks: “We’re building the common response structure, unless you have a response component don’t expect any coherent action to early warning” (Key informant 3, 2009). However, the same informant acquainted that federal and regional reinforcements supported the local security forces, whereas the communication between the Ethiopian and Kenyan CEWERUs got strengthened, so as to resume conflict resolution processes on separate basis in each country.

**Case 2. Boundary Disputes Between Oromiya and Somali Regions Requiring Immediate Response**

In February 2009 (CEWARN, 2009b), Field Monitors reported critical values for conflict indicators and low peace signals since the 5th week of the year in the Ethiopian side of the cluster; especially around the Moyale kebeles of the Liben and Borena woredas. From the 27th of January on, tensions rose between Borana and Garre communities concerning the ownership of water reservoirs in the area. The Borana appealed that two wells tapped by Garre groups actually belonged to them, on the grounds of the still unresolved territorial dispute on the boundaries of Ethiopia’s Oromiya and Somali regions. Particularly, over Moyale and surrounding kebeles such as Arero, Mio and Filtu.

Latent hostilities increased between the groups, whereas violent incidents escalated in both frequency and impact within the area. On January the 26th it was reported that a group of Borana killed two members of the Garre community in the Hudat woreda. The next day attempts to dig another well in the Wachile woreda faced such vehement opposition that protestors burnt the drillers’ machinery. Two days after, a group of Borana ambushed a vehicle in the Tuk’a kebele on its rout from Yabelo to Moyale, wounding one Garre. The driver and some passengers were presumably related to the previous incidents.
Next week, the 5th of February, a crowd of around 400 Borana from the Arero wereda raided Hudat woreda including the police post and other administrative stations, killing eleven members of the Garre community, seven Gabra and two policemen, leaving another wounded. The day after, the conflict spreads to the Gofa kebele where nine Garre and two Borana lost their lives, and four people resulted injured. Then, on the 7th of February, attempts by Borana groups to raid again the Garre are reported in neighbouring kebeles of the Somali region, although no loss of property was recorded. The maps in Figure 12 above and Figure 13 below situate the main features of this particular situation.

Figure 13. Disputes Across the Oromiya and Somali Regions

This representation does not express any position regarding the legal status and/or delimitation of boundaries.


A total of 33 deaths69, 6 wounded, destruction of infrastructure and several rustling attempts in two weeks deemed urgent action; especially when the Borana-Garre

69 Note that the threshold of violence was not surpassed, since the sum of fatalities was product of three violent incidents in which only the second one (5th of February) violence was organised, resulting in 20 deaths. The two deaths of the 26th of January were considered murders, and the 11 in Gofa a spill over.
conflict was manifest in several kebeles of the Ethiopian Yebelo, Arero and Moyale woredas. Potential for spill over to adjacent woredas, and even to Kenyan neighbouring districts in which rivalries between these ethnic groups and their allies is latent, was considerable. Worryingly, security officers got trapped due to allegiances to their respective communities, undermining their capacities to stabilise and appease the area. Moreover, governmental facilities and casualties were counted among the outcomes of such ravaging. Besides, state’s initiatives to manage the situation through federal organs started moving onward.

In this case, the aggregate outcome and intensity of the upheavals, as well as their spill over within such short timing justified the resort to intelligence inputs to reinforce CEWARN’s early warning. But more than anything else, the sabotage and crimes on governmental security forces deemed it instrumental. Thus, intelligence products were incorporated in basic descriptive and current reportorial formats at the Ethiopian CEWERU and Country Coordination. Even information from the Kenyan side was included.

During the validation process, intelligence confirmed the resultant fatalities, loss and damage of property during the informed turmoil, cross-checking the CEWARN figures and accounts (Key informant 5, 2009). In addition, estimates on the key players’ identities and whereabouts supplemented the knowledge for early response (Key informant 2, 2009). These products however, were conveyed and discussed only among the government officers of the Ethiopian CEWERU’s steering committee, namely the Ministry of National Defence, the Federal Police, National Security and Intelligence Services. In addition, representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Development, as well as Parliamentarians were briefed on the content of such products, for the devising of response options (Key informant 3, 2009). One of the recipients and discussants of such intelligence products reasserts it, introducing insight on the actions for this warning:

“I know, for sure that in this particular alert, members of the steering committee at the federal level, including intelligence and police forces, have taken their information and acted upon it, but within their own structures. I know that in this particular case, recommendations have been followed and acted upon and that intelligence has been integrated because it has been communicated to them [strategic governmental institutions]. But they managed it within their own structure, reinforcing their own information collection, activities, etc, and acted upon it”.

(Key informant 3, 2009)
Contrary to expectations and in spite of what intelligence products entail, analysis obeyed CEWARN’s procedures and its protocol (CEWARN, 2007, 2002) without any adjustment. No additional management, different protocols or actors altered the composition and operation of this regional conflict early warning system. Why? Because at the validation and quality control stage, the Ethiopian CEWERU put into effect the clause stating that the ownership of information and its volition is up to each government (CEWARN, 2007:19). Intelligence products were integrated into the CEWARN strategy, but reserving its access to Ethiopian officials of the relevant strategic institutions. In other words, inputs were incorporated but not shared with each of the stakeholders.

Astonishingly, the same ten issue-areas identified in the previous case remained constant; even the same authorities of each policy sector and appraisals of their range. The resulting systematisation of the key informants’ assessments suggest as follows:

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<td>Coordination</td>
<td>High-Higher</td>
<td>CPS, IGAD Secretariat, IGAD Council of Ministers</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>FM, NRI, CC, CEWARN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Collection</td>
<td>High-Higher</td>
<td>FM, LPC, CC</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>FM, LPC, CC, NRI, CEWARN</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>FM, CC, CEWARN</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulation of Scenarios</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>FM, CC, NRI, CEWARN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Options</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>CC, NRI, CEWERU, CEWARN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>High-Higher</td>
<td>CC, CEWARN, CEWERU</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data &amp; Information Management (Incl. Protection)</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>CEWERU, CEWARN</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>FM, CC, CEWERU, CEWARN</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. CEWARN Regulation of Issue-areas Integrating Intelligence Products


Compared to Table 3 on the Dire woreda case, Table 4 above reflects exactly the same values concerning CEWARN’s issue-areas and their regulation. Information collection, dissemination of early warning and training remained higher policy sectors following the same instrumental logic of the previous case; all the more reason for holding information management and protection as the most crucial issue-area. However this time with the observed variance of the access differential concerning the integrated intelligence products, and the insisting confidentiality on the sensitive information by the
Ethiopian officials. This was possible due to the coexistence of *ad hoc* regulations on the management of knowledge based on national information ownership, and CEWARN’s normative framework. No change on the regulation of issue-areas occurred since no contravention took place.

Regarding CEWARN’s degree of centralisation of political authority, its final command remained invariant as well. Once again the decisive executive power was held by the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, the IGAD Council of Ministers and the IGAD Secretariat via its Peace and Security Division. It did not leave the CEWARN structure after all, and the scope of such authority did not change either. Their type of rule invariably stayed compulsory, respecting the principle of subsidiarity, and with the agreed formal and informal discretionary arrangements between stakeholders.

Following the analysis of this impending alert, scenarios were formulated along with the design of response options. Among the recommendations for early action from the Ethiopian Country Coordination, stood out the immediate intervention by regional and federal security forces to stabilise the situation. The ineffectiveness of local administration capabilities and personnel to manage the disputes without taking sides was hindering the resolution of this dispute. Moreover, since the origin of these and related incidents are deeply rooted in the undetermined boundary issue between the Oromiya and the Somali regions, a peaceful solution satisfying all parties had to be reached to prevent large-scale spirals of violence. Responsible federal agencies and regional administrative governments were encouraged to give priority to the issue, and to seriously follow up its resolution in a steady fashion. Therefore, mediation efforts were also suggested to be supported by authorities at different levels of the administration.

Another important advice was a resource mapping initiative for governmental and community groups, in order to make an inventory and concretely depict the available resources in the area. Thus, a fixed definition of assets and agreements on the entitlement to tap these would tackle resource disputes and ameliorate their depletion.

A complementary feasible alternative to manage this conflict was the involvement of community elders into the governmental efforts. Traditional conflict resolution through elders has proved a positive, substantial impact in settling disputes within the cluster according to CEWARN records (CEWARN, 2006b; IGAD *et al.*, 2009). All of these actions were performed although according to governmental priorities and resources at different
timings, some of them still ongoing. After calculations of disclosure, the Ethiopian CEWERU released intelligence’s cross-checking accounts on the human and material losses to the CEWARN Unit, to be managed and warded into its classified warnings.

The results of case comparison indicate that integrating intelligence products into CEWARN analysis brings about no substantial variation, as reasserted by key CEWARN officers (Key informant 2, 2009; Key informant 3, 2009; Key informant 5, 2009). The magnitude of such merger may require the reinforcement of confidentiality provisions, or greater insistence on the protection of sensitive knowledge; but still within the CEWARN operational framework (CEWARN, 2002, 2005, 2006a, 2007; IGAD et al, 2009).

Interestingly, in spite of being a regional conflict early warning system, one can notice in CEWARN the prevalence of national entities on important policy sectors, such as information gathering, dissemination and management. Given the patterns of interaction between the IGAD countries, it is logical to keep certain degree of distrust in initiatives involving joint surveillance, and sensitive conflict knowledge. In rational terms, because of the nature of the states of the Greater Horn and of the context in which these are enmeshed intelligence products are valuable strategic assets. Sharing, declassifying or risking intelligence is perceived as a loss of strategic advantage and power.

As far as CEWARN concerns, a recurring insistence in the differentiation from intelligence ventures marks its discourse, as suspicion rises along the local communities towards the unpleasantness of being monitored and intervened in their controversies. Contrary to what one may expect, most of the labour of this RCEWS is performed by national existing resources, structures and procedures but regionally coordinated in function of the nature and repercussions of pastoral cross-border conflicts.

This is not to say that CEWARN is a bureaucratic mirage. It has provided a forum for sharing experiences, processes and build bridges between the countries of the Greater Horn. And as CEWARN officers state (Key Informant 1, 2009; Key Informant 2, 2009; Key Informant 4, 2009; Key Informant 5, 2009) its contribution in confidence building in the region is invaluable. Now officers from different countries of the Greater Horn can ring one another and discuss common security issues. Before 2003 this was unthinkable, so security perceptions do change. Likewise, it has raised awareness on and solidarity towards pastoral communities. The ultimate answer of the research question is provided in the following and final chapter of this thesis, along with some concluding remarks.
5. CONCLUSIONS

This study has sought to contribute with the understanding of conflict early warning systems, intelligence and the functional effects of their synergy. Clearly, incorporating intelligence products into regional conflict early warning systems entails no significant impact neither on their regulation of issue-areas, nor on their degree of centralisation of political authority. At least not in the CEWARN case. As the analysis of the structure and processes of this RCEWS in chapter three, and the subsequent case comparison reveal, the functional impact of such integration is minimal in terms of magnitude.

Apart from higher confidentiality and retrieval differentials, functions remained equal. The same ten issue-areas assigned by this RCEWS mandate comprise its anticipatory strategy, with or without intelligence inputs. The regulation of these policy sectors holds the same range and is managed by the same authorities, regardless of the type of inputs or of their source. But what does this outcome convey to policymaking, theory and methodology? These implications are presented as follows, supported by the main findings of this thesis.

Policy Implications

The reason for this invariance lies in the very nature of the CEWARN structure, which enables the coexistence of institutionalised rules for some levels and issue-areas, and ad hoc discretional understandings for others. The fragmentation and specialisation of CEWARN’s policymaking embedded in its ‘security governance’ configuration, allows for the differentiation of levels, policy sectors, stakeholders and their management.

This corresponds to Krahmann’s approach (2005b:255) in which more flexible structures allow for and demand actors a more independent –and interdependent– performance in their provision of security. Thus, even though reporting procedures and methods for conflict analysis in CEWARN are formally regulated in the local and regional levels, governmental stakeholders can proceed according to informal, discretional protocols safeguarding their sovereignty; like invoking the principle of data ownership.

According to case comparison ten issue-areas and their regulation remained invariant in this regional conflict early warning system as rendered by Figure 14 below.
Information management—including protection—proved the policy sector of the highest range and lowest decentralisation, since only two authorities perform it in two layers: The CEWARN Unit regionally and the CEWERU at the national level. In this later is where intelligence products may be integrated into this RCEWS anticipatory strategy, although its first analysis is reserved to governmental officers of its steering committee.

Since after supplementing additional inputs and validating field reports records get disclosed, the strategic establishments carefully calculate the softening of classification levels. Incorporating intelligence products into CEWARN’s anticipatory strategy does not imply that these are integrated unabridged into the records, or that every stakeholder access to these either. Intelligence products are conveyed, discussed and sanitised among the national officials of the steering committee and then debriefed to the relevant stakeholders through the classified warning channels. “They don’t give all the information” note two CEWARN officers (Key Informant 2, 2009; Key Informant 5, 2009). Thence, no different management or organisational alteration occurs because ‘the product’ itself never leaves the governmental clearances within the CEWARN system.

Political authority within this RCEWS remained considerably decentralised. The decisive ascendancy is held within CEWARN by the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, the IGAD Secretariat and the IGAD Council of Ministers, as Figure 10 shows in chapter.
three. The rule of this multilateral, intergovernmental triad concentrates on executive and political affairs, allowing for stakeholders in charge of other issue-areas to manage their duties following the principle of subsidiarity. Their authority however is compulsory, thence not completely fragmented or suggesting self-regulation.

Due to the fact that several processes within CEWARN are developing –including the incorporation of intelligence inputs–, one cannot appraise more precisely the impacts of such integration. This can be improved insofar as procedures get systematised and institutionalised, to seize their implications in a sound fashion.

Theoretical Implications

The expected impact was negligible because of the organising design of the regional conflict early warning systems under study. Differentiated tasks and stakeholders in a security structure such as that of a RCEWS convey different procedures by issue-area. Intelligence sharing may happen at the highest extent of security cooperation, when the security interactions of certain actors are quite interdependent and institutionalised. This is not the case for the Greater Horn of Africa, therefore ad hoc integration schemes occur.

Incorporating intelligence into conflict early warning systems entails ambiguous relations in which none has yet a proper understanding of the other, often provoking quandaries. But these fusions are possible and do occur, however a clear demarcation of roles and functions is needed to fulfil mandates and needs. Intelligence is a buzz-word especially in CEWS, thus improving this synergy depends highly on its systematic institutionalisation, and on mutual understanding of shared values and goals.

The deficit of literature on the coalition of intelligence and conflict anticipation mechanisms stimulated the customisation of this project. The security governance approach provided a useful framework for this enquiry in spite of suiting better modern Western phenomena. Further research may take advantage of this approach and study the impact of such merger on the other six dimensions –geographical, norms, interests, resources, decision-making or implementation–, or following different methodologies.

Other CEWS may serve as empirical referents as well, such as that of the UN, NATO, OSCE, ASEAN, ECOWAS, or OAS. Even other levels of analysis may be explored, like national CEWS, those of MNCs or at different stages of conflict management. Research on
the fusion of intelligence and conflict early warning systems may also consider other components of intelligence, such as its organisation or activities. There is an unfolding research on each field to resort to, but joint academic ventures are utmost needed.

Methodological Implications

Structured, focused case comparison combined with the Mill’s method of difference reinforced by process tracing contributed in answering the research question. Due to the complex nature of the enquiry, the empirical element had to be solid enough in the absence of a sound theoretical support. By focusing on the dependent variable in each case, comparison served its purpose positively. Even though the registered impact was token, process tracing helped in explaining why and in constructing case narratives.

Besides, every academic attempt to have a look at intelligence faces constraints and opportunities, and this one was not the exception. By combining the methodologies of Social Science Research and Intelligence Studies, one may face liabilities in two related fronts: Those inherent in the knowledge and those concerning its access. On the one hand, information related to intelligence –knowledge, organisation or activities– tends to be ambiguously dispersed, fragmented and unsystematically compartmentalised. Not to mention ciphered, with no available translations or combinations of the above.

On the other hand access to certain data is limited, often even to the facilities in which information is analysed and guarded. The use of materials with different levels of classification is usually restricted as well. Moreover, the bureaucratic schedules of informants and of information disclosure may hinder research. Cared about the possible misuse or politicisation of knowledge, sensitive information keepers may also ask the researcher additional protocols on the management and use of information. In general, the obstacles to sort out are neither a few nor simple, although overcoming them is both stimulating and fascinating.

After all, anticipating violence in conflicts through RCEWS resorting to intelligence is not a paradox. It is however predetermination, but a prevision that worth being furthered. Preventing atrocities from happening certainly does not change the fact that these were going to happen.
Appendix

ANTICIPATING VIOLENCE INTELLIGENTLY
FUNCTIONAL IMPACTS OF INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS INTO REGIONAL CONFLICT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS
CASE STUDY AND FIELDWORK PROTOCOL

AARON ELI VILLARRUEL MORA
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Research Question
What are the impacts on the regulation of issue-areas and on the degree of centralisation of political authority of regional conflict early warning systems, of integrating intelligence products into their analysis of violence-prone conflicts?

Hypotheses and Propositions
‘Incorporating intelligence into regional CEWS could enhance their efficiency and improve their effectiveness, through the support of the capabilities and precision it entails, however with significant side effects to be considered.’

Operative Questions

Theoretical – conceptual
o How does the CEWARN Mechanism function?
 o What is the CEWARN structure and division of labour like?
 o Which actors take part in CEWARN?
 o How are the roles and functions established?
 o What kind of information inputs does CEWARN resort to?
 o Does CEWARN integrate intelligence products? If so, how does it impact its function?

Case Studies
 o Is there any difference between the information systematisation, availability and accessibility concerning CEWARN’s clusters for early warning?
 o What are the main issues, facts and figures of CEWARN’s Somali Cluster?
 o Which representative early warning cases within the Somali cluster can be object of systematic comparison concerning the impacts of integrating intelligence inputs?
 o Is there the necessary and sufficient information so as to give a comparative account of such cases in an equally analytical fashion?
 o Which data sources shall be used? Are such data sources available?

Sources of Information
 o Official CEWARN Documents
 o CEWARN Protocol 2002
 o CEWARN Strategy 2007–2010
 o CEWARN Coding Book 2005
 o Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure Governing the Technical Committee on Early Warning (TCEW) of CEWARN
Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure Governing the Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) of CEWARN

Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure Governing the Country Coordinators (CC) and Assistant Country Coordinators (ACC) of CEWARN

Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure Governing the National Research Institutes (NRI) of CEWARN

CEWARN Baselines for the Somali Cluster December 2008–March 2009

CEWARN Country Updates for the Somali Cluster December 2008–March 2009

CEWARN Situation Briefs for the Somali Cluster December 2008–March 2009

CEWARN Alerts for the Somali Cluster December 2008–March 2009

CEWARN Cluster Updates December 2008–March 2009

CEWARN Training Manual 2009

Considered Interviews

CEWARN Research and Training Officer

CEWARN Public Relations and Communications Officer

CEWARN Liaison Officer

CEWARN IT & Data Management Officer

CEWARN Director

CEWARN Conflict Analysis Officer

ISS Senior Researcher Conflict Prevention Programme

African Peace Support Training Association (APSTA) Senior Researcher

CEWERU Head

CEWARN Country Coordinator

Inter Africa Group Ethiopia Executive Director

Data Collection Procedures

Sites and Contacts

CEWARN Unit, Addis Ababa. Contact: CEWARN Research and Training Officer

ISS, Addis Ababa Office. Contact: Professor Berouk Mesfin

Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Contact: Mr. Gebrayohannes Kassa.

Inter Africa Group (IAG Ethiopia). Contact: Mr. Tamirat Kebede. Executive Director

African Peace Support Training Association. Contact: Debay Tadesse Researcher

Preparation Prior to Site Visits

Get in advance different maps of Ethiopia and Addis Ababa

Get local mobile SIM card for asking for and scheduling meetings and interviews

Required Devices

Discrete unblocked mobile phone with excellent reception and emission, camera, video and audio recorder + GPS

Audio recorder allowing quick and reliable digitalisation of recordings

Digital Plug-in Microphone

USB–Firewire cable transfer; USB 1Gb Portable Memory

Laptop

Required Software


Corel DRAW Graphic Suite X4

Microsoft Office 2007

Sony Sonic Stage 4.3

Portable non-transparent plastic folder to protect printed files and documents
### Data Collection Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monday</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arrival to Addis and acquaintance</td>
<td>Locate sites, and routes; take times</td>
<td>Scheduling interviews</td>
<td>CEWARN Internship Steps</td>
<td>Visit to the CEWAN Unit</td>
<td>(Free)</td>
<td>Elaboration of research questionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presentation of research at CEWARN Interviewing, systematise data</td>
<td>Interviewing. Organise data. Draft chain of evidence and narratives</td>
<td>Interviewing. Organise data. Draft chain of evidence and narratives</td>
<td>Handing in termination letter, final report &amp; produced materials</td>
<td>Fly back to Oslo</td>
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### Field Procedures
- Identification of sites, contacts, times and conditions
- Presentation and identification of relevant data sources
- Acquisition and review of necessary documents
- Understanding of the structure, rationale and composition of the system
- Contact and meeting with key informants
- Identification, acquisition and review of additional complementary documents
- After careful reading and understanding, ask for interview appointments
- Undertake interviews, analyse, construct chain of evidence and narratives
- Protect identity of interviewees and share the original recording

### Case Study Outline

**Objectives**
- Give an account of the context in which cases are embedded
- Provide the conflict background, analysis and outcomes focusing on the variables
- Study the implications of the variance (if any) on the regulation of issue-areas and the degree of centralisation of political authority of integrating intelligence products into CEWARN

### Information Requirements from Key Informants (Interview Guide)

**On CEWARN**
- CEWARN rely on in-state existing mechanisms for conflict prevention. Which ones?
- How is the cooperation between the different CEWERUs (of the Member States)?
- Is the relation between CC-ACC and CEWERU closer than with other CEWARN members?
- What is the difference between academic and research institutions?
- According to CEWARN’s structure and procedures, where do data collection, validation and analysis take place?
- Have intelligence officers have been (or still are) part of any of the CEWERUs? If so:
  - Where have they been cooperating within the CEWARN structure?
  - What is their status?
- How are the CEWERUs made up?
  - Intelligence services, police, military (name of institutions)?
- Incorporation of supplementary necessary data/information at the CEWERUs, CC & NRI.
  - What kind of additional information would that be? Are intelligence products included?
Do these items need a special treatment when included to CEWARN’s conflict analysis?

What kind of steps has been taken when states share sensitive information?

- Have IGAD member states contributed to CEWARN’s conflict analysis with any sort of information coming from its intelligence community?
  - In which instances?
- According to CEWARN’s normative framework the main policy issues of CEWARN are information collection, validation, analysis, formulation of scenarios and response option and dissemination. Is that right? Is there any other missing?
  - Does the integration of intelligence products affect these? If so, which ones and how?
  - Within a scale of 1 to 7, qualify the range of these issue areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Lowest</th>
<th>2 Lower</th>
<th>3 Low</th>
<th>4 Medium</th>
<th>5 High</th>
<th>6 Higher</th>
<th>7 Highest</th>
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- When intelligence products are incorporated into CEWARN’s conflict analysis, is there any other issue-area added? (Sanitisation, protection, oversight, auditory, etc) If so...
- How many authorities are involved in the management of these issue-areas when intelligence products are incorporated into conflict early warning as supplementary inputs?
- Which authority takes charge of which issue-area (within and outside CEWARN)
- Does the final authority on CEWARN remain within its structure or are yielded to a state agency? If so, which one is it? Where is it located? How does it affect CEWARN’s functions?
- What kind of scope does this final authority have: A specific or an inclusive one?
- Is the rule of this final authority mandatory or voluntary?
- Which authority is the responsible of the management and safety of these inputs?
- Who have access to intelligence products for purposes of conflict analysis?
- How are intelligence products integrated into CEWARN’s analysis protected?
- What kind of intelligence products have been incorporated into CEWARN’s analysis? (maps, lists, names, locations, coordinates, numbers, figures, signals, reports, photographs, surveillance audio/video recordings, etc...)

On the Somali Cluster

- What are the main issues and challenges within the Somali cluster?
  - Is it more violence-prone or more peaceful than the other sub-regions?
- How has the prevention of violent conflict been performed so far within this cluster?
- Do the involved states equally contribute with the violence anticipation efforts?
  - If not, why?
- How do the CEWERUs cope with cross-border pastoralist conflicts and national security?

On the Selected Cases

- Were the CEWARN alerts of the 12th of February and 9th of January supplemented with intelligence products?
  - If so, did these require any particular treatment?
  - If so, what kind of prerogatives? How did it impact CEWARN’s structure and functions?
  - Is it a standard procedure? How institutionalised it is? Any additional process or actor?
  - What was the resulting action/response to early warning?
  - How were they implemented? Why?

Interviewees

- Key Informant 1. Interview. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (09-06-09)
- Key Informant 2. Interview. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (14-06-09)
- Key Informant 3. Interview. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (16-06-09)
- Key Informant 4. Interview. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (17-06-09)
- Key Informant 5. Interview. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (18-06-09)
**Note on the Key informants and the Management of their Interviews**

Every Key informant is directly involved in the CEWARN mechanism, either at the regional level as top officers at the CEWARN Unit, or heading a country coordination. A copy of the interviews has been shared only with the CEWARN Unit. The name and position of the interviewees are replaced by a reference code to protect their identity. Only the audio tracks will be used by the researcher without any transcription in accordance to the agreed terms of reference.

**METHODOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT FOR ASSESSING THE REGULATION OF ISSUE-AREAS IN THE IGAD’S CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISM**

CEWARN’s Policy Sectors when intelligence Products are NOT integrated into the analysis
CEWARN’s Policy Sectors when intelligence Products ARE integrated into the analysis
(One item per case)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE-AREAS</th>
<th>ISSUE-AREA RANGE</th>
<th>AUTHORITY IN CHARGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>Communication</td>
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<td>Information Collection</td>
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<td>Validation (incl. recognition)</td>
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<td>Analysis</td>
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<td>Formulation of scenarios</td>
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<td>Response option</td>
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<td>Dissemination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data &amp; information management (incl. storage &amp; protection)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other (s)?</strong></td>
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**Range Scale**

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<th>1 Lowest</th>
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To Whom It May Concern

This is to certify that; Mr. Aaron Eli Villarruel Mora had an internship at the Conflict Early Warning and early Response Mechanism unit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development [CEWARN/IGAD] during the period 8–19 June, 2009.

Mr. Mora made use of CEWARN Resource Centre and managed to access general information on CEWARN’s work, including areas of reporting, cluster, country and regional reports, attended a presentation session on the CEWARN Mechanism, and convened different meetings in collaboration with the unit’s professional staff.

Before departure Mr. Aaron presented his Master of Arts thesis outlines to CEWARN staff in a meeting, comments were made to assess him improves his study paper.

Mr. Mora proved to be committed, cooperative and energetic in terms of conducting research and following up to the effective conclusion of assignments given to him by the CEWARN staff.

Moreover, he successfully pursued the endeavor to combine theory with practice in writing up his Master degree research paper titled “Anticipating Violence Intelligently; Impacts of Integrating Intelligence products into Conflict Early Warning Systems”.

In reality, Mr. Mora, is a valuable individual and an asset to whichever institution he will be engaged with.

CEWARN is wishing him the very best in his effort to finalize his post graduate studies and related endeavors in future life.

Sincerely,

Raymond M. Kitevu
Ag. Director CEWARN Unit
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**Interviews:**


**Blog:**