China’s Foreign Policy in the Case of the Conflict in Darfur

Trond Risa

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UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Department of Political Science
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Abbreviations

AMIS – African Union Mission in the Sudan
AU – African Union
CAR – Central African Republic
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
CNPC – Chinese National Petroleum Company
CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPA – Darfur Peace Agreement
ECFR – European Council on Foreign Relations
EU – European Union
FOCAC – Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GoS – Government of Sudan
GDI – Gross Domestic Income
HDI – Human Development Index
HRC – Human Rights Council
ICC – International Criminal Court
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IR – International relations
JEM – Justice and Equality Movement

NAM – Non-Aligned Movement

NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

P5 – The five permanent members of the UN Security Council

PKO – Peacekeeping Operation

PLA – People’s Liberation Army

PRC – People’s Republic of China

R2P – Responsibility to Protect

ROC – Republic of China

SLM/A – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

UNAMID – African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNMIS – United Nations Mission in the Sudan

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WTO – World Trade Organisation
1. Introduction

The conflict in Darfur has often been called one of the worst humanitarian crises today, with an estimated death toll of 300,000 and 2.5 million people displaced from their homes since the conflict broke out in 2003 (UN 2008). Allegations of human rights violations, war crimes and even genocide have been levelled against the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its allies in the Janjaweed militias (Rolandsen 2007: 151). The conflict, and the resulting international pressure on GoS, is threatening the peace agreement in the long running civil war between the north and the south of Sudan (Comprehensive Peace Agreement – CPA). Cross border refugee flows into the neighbouring countries of Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) are threatening to further destabilise an already unstable region. After four years of debates and resolutions in the UN Security Council (UNSC), a peacekeeping operation with UN participation (African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur - UNAMID) was established in 2007 (UN 2009). Thus, what largely started out as a rebellion against marginalisation in a remote and desolate area of Sudan has had national, regional and global consequences.

In this period, China has played a central and controversial role. On the one hand, China had political, economical and military relations to GoS, and protected GoS from sanctions in the Security Council. On the other hand, China joined international efforts to achieve Sudanese consent to UN presence in Darfur, which paved the way for the establishment of UNAMID. In this thesis I aim to investigate this contradiction in China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict. As this contradictory role appears to come on the back of an increasingly active foreign policy on the part of China, I further aim to investigate how this case relates to more general characteristics of China’s foreign policy and its relations to the international system of states.
I have chosen to investigate this through a three-part analysis. First, I will use the theory of contingent realism to perform a preliminary analysis of China’s foreign policy. Based on my findings here I have deduced two hypotheses, which will be investigated in the two last parts of the analysis. The first hypothesis constructs a theoretical framework (Yin 1989: 40) for understanding and analysing China’s foreign policy, the second applies this framework in an analysis of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict. The hypotheses are:

- *China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy.*
- *The increase in China’s relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict.*

### 1.1 Theory – Contingent Realism

I have chosen to use a strand of current political realism referred to as contingent realism as theory for the thesis. This theory argues that the assumptions of realism as a theory of international politics create the foundations for understanding the international system, but that the inclusion of factors on inter- and intra-state level must be included in order to perform a foreign policy analysis.

The reason for choosing realism is that I regard the actors, their preferences and the international structure to conform to central realist assumptions. According to Legro and Moravcsik, the following assumptions are necessary and sufficient to define precise realist international relations (IR) theory:

"Assumption 1—the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy. [...] Assumption 2—the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals. [...] Assumption 3—international structure: the primacy of material capabilities.”

(Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 12-16)
The main actor in the case at hand is the Chinese government. Opposition and internal antagonisms exist in China, and official policy “has to be mediated via the economic interests of private corporations and the political motivations and aspirations of local state officials” (Taylor 2009:5). However, given the CCP’s monopoly on state power and its instrumental view on foreign policy, I regard China as a sufficiently rational and unitary actor to fulfil basic realist assumptions. Also in terms of preferences and international structure, realism appears to be an appropriate theory. I regard China’s foreign policy as being to a considerable degree aimed at increasing its material capabilities, thus promoting its own sovereignty and survival through self-help in international anarchy. The strong and enduring emphasis on non-interference in internal affairs contributes to this view.

As the thesis aims to perform an analysis of foreign policy, not of the international system as such, some additions to the above-mentioned assumptions are required. To be able to understand, explain and predict specific acts of foreign policy, we are also required to include variables on inter- and intra-state levels. Contingent realism, in the form of postclassical and neoclassical realism, offers the necessary tools and insights for a foreign policy analysis. Postclassical realism emphasises inter-state factors related to the possibility of war, whereas neoclassical realism emphasises factors on the intra-state, or domestic, level, including the non-material factor of perceptions. Combining factors from the international system with interstate and domestic level factors enables us to perform an empirically rich and theoretically informed foreign policy analysis that stays within the structural limits of realism (Wivel 2005: 374).

Even if contingent realism allows us to include other variables than structural level and material factors, there are limits to how much explanatory power can be attributed to such factors. Factors like ideas, identities and institutions can only serve as intervening variables between the independent variable of material incentives from the international system, and the dependent variable of foreign policy. Denying
independent causality to such factors has obvious consequences for the analysis, as many potentially relevant areas of interest fall outside the theory’s explanatory realm. However, as similar limitations will always occur when choosing a theoretical approach, what is important is that the chosen theory is appropriate for the research question, and that the scholar is aware of the limitations imposed by this choice.

1.2 Empirical Data

1.2.1 China

An important characteristic of China is that it can be regarded as both a great power and a developing country. By looking at absolute figures, China is obviously a great power. Measured by land area China is the world’s fourth largest (CIA 2008), it is currently rivalling Germany for the spot as the world’s third largest economy (IMF 2008), and by population the largest country in the world (CIA 2008). China also has nuclear weapons and a permanent seat in the UNSC (P5 status), which further confirms the great power status. But by looking at relative figures, China can also be regarded as a developing country. This is the case with World Bank classification, based on GDI per capita (World Bank 2009). Also according to other classifications, such as the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), China scores much lower than traditional great powers do (UNDP 2007). In the thesis we will see how this influences China’s international relations, due to the contradictory incentives this creates from the international system.

China’s foreign policy can roughly be divided into three periods. The first period is under Mao Zedong, who was China’s leader from the establishment of the People’s Republic (PRC) in 1949 until his death in 1976. This period was characterised by a strong emphasis on political and ideological issues, both in domestic and foreign affairs. Foreign policy was in this period dominated by an activist approach, where China promoted socialist and anti-colonialist regimes and movements in a number of developing countries around the world. Through this activism, China was also
attempting to balance against the influence of the US, USSR and Taiwan (Alden, Large og Soares de Oliveira: 15).

Deng Xiaoping emerged as the new leader in 1978 after a period of power struggles following Mao’s death. This marks the start of the second period, where ideology gave way to pragmatism and reforms aimed at economic growth (He Wenping 2008). China ended its support to revolutionary movements and regimes in developing countries, focusing instead on economically motivated relations to both Western and developing countries.

The third period starts in 1989, a year that saw both the fall of the Berlin Wall and the brutal crackdown on the student protests at Tiananmen Square. For a number of reasons, this led to a resurgence in China’s political relations to the developing world (Taylor 2006: 939). This time, though, relations were based on an acceptance of the incumbent regime, regardless of ideology.

Through all periods, non-interference and respect for sovereignty have been central principles in China’s foreign policy (Taylor 2006: 940). This has protected China against foreign dominance and interference in internal affairs. But their use as basis for China’s outward relations to other countries have often meant a de facto acceptance and protection of illiberal policies and illegitimate regimes shunned by the West.

Since emerging from the relative isolation of the Mao-era, China has increasingly embraced liberal norms and ideas and international cooperation promoted by the West. China is currently an active and constructive member of a number of international organisations and regimes, and is increasingly appearing as a responsible member of international society (Gill and Yanzhong Huang 2006: 22-23). Thus it appears that there is a certain duality in China’s international relations,
1.2.2 Sino-Sudanese relations

Sudan gained independence in 1956, and established diplomatic relations with China in 1959. However, Sino-Sudanese relations go further back. An often used point of reference is ‘Chinese Gordon’. In the 1860’s, the British army officer Charles Gordon gained fame for his role in suppressing the Taiping insurgency in China. In the 1870’s he was relocated to Sudan, where he continued to perform his colonial duties, including counter insurgency campaigns. Gordon was killed by Mahdist rebels in 1885, but his name is still used in Sino-Sudanese relations to conjure images of a common colonial past (Large 2008a: 94).

China’s current relations to Sudan are dominated by oil. When Western companies left Sudan’s largely undeveloped oil industry in the 1990s, they were replaced by Asian actors. Chinese companies are by far the largest investors and operators in the Sudanese oil industry, and played an indispensable part in turning Sudan to from a net importer to a net exporter of oil in 1999 (Large 2007: 6-7). This was a lucrative investment for the Chinese companies involved, and it also provided China with a steady supply of oil. It was also lucrative for the government of Sudan, who was finally earning foreign currency after years of unrest and US sanctions. That Chinese investments undermined Western attempts to isolate or influence the regime was not popular in the West, but did not create big headlines until the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003.

As the thesis aims to show, since the breakout of conflict in Darfur, China has been balancing its traditional principle of non-interference with its wish to be viewed as a responsible great power. China has continued its relations with GoS and blocked attempts to sanction GoS in the UN Security Council. But increasingly, China has joined international efforts to solve the conflict, and played an active role in securing GoS consent to UN presence in Darfur. This contradiction between non-interference and international responsibility is what I refer to in my hypotheses as the two tracks of China’s foreign policy, and is the focus of the thesis.
1.3 Research Method

Gerring defines case studies as intensive studies of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (Gerring 2004: 342). In this thesis, the single unit under investigation is China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur, whereas the larger class of similar units is the foreign policy of post-Mao China in general. The single-case research design on the basis of an established IR theory means that the study is a theoretically interpretative one, where the aim is to use established theory to interpret and analyse individual cases (Andersen 1997: 68). The study also aims towards theoretical development. In chapters 4 and 5, I establish a China-specific analytical framework based on general IR theory and empirical data. The aim here is theory generation through exploratory research (Gerring 2004: 349-50). The use of this framework to perform a study of a specific case of China’s foreign policy in chapter 6 also functions as a test of the framework’s validity. The analysis in chapter 6 is not a cross-case study, and the case itself is a unit of the larger class of units that the framework is derived from, therefore this test is not a particularly strong test. However, it will give an indication of the usefulness of the framework. Should it appear to be a useful analytical tool, it may form the basis for further analyses of China’s post-Mao foreign policy, thus having contributed to analytic generalisation (Yin 1989: 38).

The representativeness of the case under investigation is a key element in evaluating the external validity of the study (Gerring 2007: 217). In this respect, the choice of case is problematic, as the case of the conflict in Darfur is an outlier in several ways. The mere observation that the situation in Darfur is one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises implies that this case is all but representative. Also, Sudan is one of only a handful of global pariah states. Such states are politically and diplomatically isolated, stand outside great power alliance structures, and are continuously targeted in the UN and other international forums (Harkavy 1981: 135; Jo and Gatzke 2007: 170
and 174). Additionally, Sino-Sudanese are much deeper and more complex than most other of China’s foreign relations, through Chinese involvement in the oil industry, and through the contradictory demands on Chinese foreign policy discussed above. However, I argue that Darfur is an appropriate case for these very reasons. The duality in China’s foreign policy is the underlying theme of the thesis, and nowhere else has the contradictory demands been more visible than here. I expect the mechanisms of the two-track policy to be particularly visible in a case where the two tracks collide and can thus to some degree be regarded as a crucial case (Gerring 2004: 347). In this respect, the external validity is far better than the representativeness of the case would suggest.

Since there is no room for statistical or other control, the quality of the gathered data, and my own use of these, is all the more important to the study’s internal validity. Given the nature of the case, my principle sources have been second hand, therefore source triangulation and source critique has been particularly important. I have used as a wide a range of sources as possible, including academic literature, news media, reports, resolutions and statements from NGOs, authorities and the UN. In addition, I have interviewed researchers and government officials in Norway and China. The interviews were informal, using an interview guide rather than deciding questions and response alternatives before the interview (Grønmo 1996: 78). The interviews and the field trip to China have contributed to the variety of sources, provided information and perspectives that were less available in written sources, and increased my understanding of the object under study. I believe that I have achieved sufficient internal validity to support the thesis’ claims of causality.

Critical use of a multitude of sources will also add to the thesis’ reliability. Source triangulation will reduce the chances of systematic bias or fallacies (Yin 1989: 95-98). Open and available sources and separation of empirical data from interpretation and analysis, adds to transparency and replicability of the investigation. The interviews represent a certain challenge to the reliability of the thesis. Due to their informal and unstructured nature, the same interviews can hardly be repeated or recreated. However, the guide and notes from the interviews are available for scholars wishing to repeat the
study. The same guide can also be used to perform new interviews with the same or other interviewees. The interviews constitute only a small part of the total source material and the thesis’ findings does not rest solely on information found in the interviews. As they complement rather than contradict the written sources, therefore the interviews add more to the study’s reliability than they detract.

1.4 Outline for the Thesis

After this introduction, the next chapter will present and discuss contingent realism, which is the chosen theory for the thesis. A brief empirical chapter follows in chapter 3, before the three analytical chapters. The analysis aims to investigate China’s seemingly contradictory roles in the Darfur conflict. The first step is to perform a preliminary analysis of China’s foreign policy, based on contingent realism. From this analysis, I will deduce two hypotheses about China’s foreign policy. This will take place in chapter 4. The second step is to create a framework for analysing China’s foreign policy in general, and particularly in situations were competing demands are made on China. This will be performed in chapter 5 on the basis of the first hypothesis:

- **China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy.**

The hypothesis claims that China is leading separate foreign policies towards separate groups of countries. One track based on non-intervention and respect for sovereignty, which forms the basis for relations with developing countries. Another track based on international responsibility towards Western countries. Further, it claims that these two tracks stem from the post-Mao reforms emphasising economic growth. The assumption is that China adapts its foreign policy to suit its economic needs, and that non-intervention gives access to Third World resources and responsibility gives access to Western markets, capital and know-how.
The third step is to use this two track analytical framework to perform a foreign policy analysis on China’s role in the Darfur conflict. This analysis will be performed in chapter 6 on the basis of the second hypothesis:

- *The increase in China’s relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict.*

The assumption is that economic growth has led formerly unrelated areas to overlap, creating conflicting demands on China. This has happened in the case of the conflict in Darfur, where China’s relations to GoS calls for protection of Sudanese sovereignty, while its relations to the Western world calls for interference in Sudanese internal affairs if GoS is unable or unwilling to end the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. In chapter 7, I will sum up my findings, and point out areas for further research.
2. Theory

2.1 Political Realism as Theoretical Framework

The aim for the thesis is to understand China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict, and how this relates to more general characteristics of China and its foreign policy. On the background of this, I chose to use a rationalist, rather than a constructivist, approach, and a materialist rather than an idealist, approach. More precisely, I chose to use political realism as theoretical framework for the analysis. Political realism analyses how characteristics of the international system influences and limits the possibilities and policies of states, and the outcome of interaction between states. Thus, political realism promises to be an appropriate and fruitful theoretical basis for investigating the linkage between the international system and China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict.

However, the choice of theoretical framework also has its consequences. Focus on material factors excludes non-material factors like ideas and processes. Focus on the structural level excludes factors on individual and domestic levels. Focus on rationality excludes norms and identities, and focus and states excludes institutions. This naturally has consequences for the types of findings we can expect to make. However, these consequences are largely, but not completely, moderated by choosing a strand of current political realism that opens for the inclusion of several of the above-mentioned factors as intermediate variables. However, as causality in the model stems from the structural level, and the central actor is a unitary and rational state, complementary analyses using other theoretical paradigms would still be beneficial for the cumulative knowledge about the case at hand.

Political realism also has additional limitations. A theory that only addresses the structure of the international system is insufficient to perform a foreign policy
analysis. Such a theory can predict the outcome of international interaction and conflicts, and therefore also give foreign policy advice. However, it cannot account for specific foreign policy choices and actions, only for how these may influence the state’s possibility to succeed in the international system (Waltz 1979: 71-72). We therefore need a further specification of the linkage between structural incentives and actual foreign policy. We need a theory that can assist in explaining how central realist assumptions like anarchy and self-help influence foreign policy, while at the same time allowing for additional influence from non-structural and non-material factors. As we will see in the next part, much recent realist research, often referred to as postclassical or neoclassical realism, does exactly this.

2.2 Contingent Realism

Within the general theoretical framework of political realism, I have chosen contingent realism as defined by Wivel in his article “Explaining why state X made a certain move last Tuesday: the promise and limitations of realist foreign policy analysis” (Wivel 2005). The article does not present a separate theory, rather, three strands of realist theory and their corresponding levels of analysis are systematised and presented as a combined approach for performing foreign policy analysis. The three strands are neorealism, postclassical realism and neoclassical realism. They deal with one level of analysis each, respectively the international system, the inter-state level, and the intra-state or domestic level.

Neorealism addresses how characteristics of the international system give incentives to state action, and limit the probable outcome of international conflicts and interaction (Waltz 1979: 68-69). This theory outlines the structure of the international system and the underlying causality that flows from this structure. The two next theories add additional detail as to how these incentives are influenced by, or contingent on, other factors. Postclassical realism addresses material factors on the inter-state level (Brooks 1997). Neoclassical realism addresses both materialist and idealist factors on the domestic level. In this combined approach, incentives from the international system
functions as independent variable, the inter- and intra-state factors as intermediate variables, and foreign policy as dependent variable (See Figure 2-1).

**Figure 2-1: Contingent Realism**

There are strong similarities between neoclassical and postclassical realism, and the two terms are often interchanged. An important part of Wivel’s contribution is the disentanglement of the two, highlighting similarities and differences. Their main similarity is that they posit non-structural level factors as intervening variables between the international system and foreign policy. Their main differences are the levels of analysis, and that neoclassical realism also opens for the inclusion of non-materialist factors.

### 2.3 Neorealism

Arguably the most influential direction within realism for the last thirty years is the structural realism or neorealism proposed by Kenneth Waltz (Wivel 2005: 356). A basic premise in realism is that the international system of states is anarchic, in that there are no superior international authority that can govern international relations or guarantee the survival of the individual state (Waltz 1979:88). This has several consequences, particularly that any state must ensure its own survival through self-help. The strength of states is measured mainly by material, and particularly military, capabilities, and can be used to ensure survival and influence other, less powerful
states. Survival and influence is sought domestically through increasing material capabilities, and externally through alliances with other states (Mingst 2001: 67-69).

In practice, the international system strongly influences the behaviour of states. States that pursue policies that go against the military, economic or political interests of stronger states run the risk of being met with military, economic or political countermeasures. To oppose states or blocs of states with such countermeasures, or to threat to do so, is referred to as balancing, and is a central part of realist theory and practice (Rynning and Guzzini 2001: 9). Further, states that pursue policies that lead to a deterioration of its resources will lose power and influence in the international system. States that wish to retain or strengthen their position without being balanced against have relatively limited latitude, but stronger states have more than weaker ones. The possibility to act unilaterally in international affairs is greater, and the consequences of it smaller for strong states than for weak states. If a conflict was to occur, the outcome would to a considerable degree be decided by material capabilities. A foreign policy based on these principles, aiming at state survival through maintaining or increasing material capabilities and balancing against opponents in the international system, is often referred to as realpolitik (Waltz 1979: 116-17).

The assumption that the international system influences state behaviour by rewarding and punishing various actions (Waltz 1979: 74), does not prevent foreign policy from being influenced by other factors. First, the limits on behaviour are wide enough to allow for some manoeuvrability. Far from all acts of foreign policy are immediately met with either reward or punishment. Second, it is often unclear what policies would serve the national interest best in any given situation. Both information and the actors’ rationality are limited, and the international system can be murky and difficult to read (Rose 1998: 152). Third, it is not uncommon to see that states pursue policies that run contrary to the interests of strong states or blocs. Following neorealist logic, such behaviour would trigger balancing from other states and thus be harmful to national interest. Thus, to understand the relation between the international system and foreign policy, we need to see closer at the factors the influence this relation. This is where postclassical and neoclassical realism come into play. They both assume that
intervening variables on the inter- and intra-state levels influence how structural factors and incentives are translated into actual foreign policy.

2.4 Postclassical Realism

Postclassical realism posits the probability of inter-state war as intervening variable. This influences foreign policy in two ways: the relationship between long and short term focus, and between military security and economic capabilities (Brooks 1997: 446-447). In the international system there is always a possibility of armed conflict, and such conflict can in the worst scenario threaten the existence of states. Neorealist theory claims that states always prepare for the worst case scenario, and that this possibilistic view determines how states behave (Waltz 1979: 102). Postclassical realism, on the other hand, claims that states consider the probability of armed conflict, and that this has consequences for policy choices (Brooks 1997: 472). When the probability of war is high, short term survival trumps long term planning, and military security trumps economic capabilities. This is the case even when such actions would be detrimental in the long term, as military loss and eradication would be even more detrimental. Opposite, when probability of conflict is low, the state in question can choose policies that increase its long term material capabilities, even if this means reduced short term military preparedness.

The probability of war is decided neither by the international system in itself, nor by the material capabilities of states alone. According to postclassical realism there are several material factors that influence the probability of war, and therefore how states understand and react to incentives from the international system. There is a wide range of IR research that investigates what factors increase or decrease the probability of war, and both Brooks and Wivel classify these into technological, geographical or economic explanations. In addition, Wivel identifies theoretical contributions that emphasise various characteristics of the relationship between the states as decisive
(Brooks 1997: 456 and Wivel 2005: 360). Given this width and variation, it becomes clear that postclassical realism is not a unitary theoretical approach, and does not give coherent and universal assumptions about decisive factors. Which factors influence the possibility of war, and how, must be established through studies of the individual case at hand. What makes it appropriate to group these approaches together is that they implicitly or explicitly identify material factors that influence the probability of interstate war, and that this possibility acts as an intermediate variable between the international system and foreign policy.

So far we have concentrated on material factors on the inter-state level. As mentioned above, contingent realism also concerns material and non-material factors on the domestic level. This is what we will be looking at in the next part, which deals with neoclassical realism.

2.5 Neoclassical Realism

Like postclassical realism, neoclassical realism opens the door to a number of factors that influence a country’s foreign policy. However, whereas postclassical realism considers the various factors to be ordered around the probability of war, the factors of neoclassical realism are seen to function as intermediate variables in and by themselves (Wivel 2005: 360-61). According to Rose important neoclassical variables include, but are not limited to, the decision makers’ perceptions, particularly of the international system and relative power; the state’s ability to extract and control resources from society; and if the state is revisionist or status quo oriented (Rose 1998:157-58). Again, the theoretical width and variation makes it impossible to deduce testable hypotheses about individual cases directly from theory. Rather, theory gives us clues about what types of domestic factors are expected to influence how states relate to incentives from the international system. The key to neoclassical realist research is therefore deduction of hypotheses about relevant domestic factors from extensive empirical research of the study object.

Arguably the most basic characteristic of neoclassical realism is that it also opens for the use of non-material factors in the analysis. Neoclassical realists emphasise that
policy is performed by human beings, and that these human beings act on the basis of incomplete information, limited rationality, with a number of different and partially contradictory considerations to make, often under great stress (Wivel 2005: 361). To disregard such issues in a foreign policy analysis would only give superficial and incomplete knowledge. Thus it is not sufficient to investigate military, economical, and technological indicators, it is also necessary to investigate the decision makers’ perceptions of these and other indicators.

One weakness of such an approach is that perceptions are hard to measure, impossible to quantify, and that research can become less precise and more open to speculation. This is particularly the case when we do not have access to the decision makers, or are unsure whether they are giving complete and correct information. Another weakness is that an analysis that includes such a wide variety of factors risks ending up being a collection of case specific variables. This would give results with limited potential for generalisation, and that would be hard to test on other cases, thus having consequences for the study’s external validity.

The strength of this approach is that including ideas and perceptions gives a richer and more complete picture of the ideas and processes that lie behind actual political decisions. It should also be pointed out that measuring and comparing material factors is not necessarily unproblematic either. How many square kilometers of territory are the equivalents of a cruise missile? How many power plants are the equivalents of a university? Wohlfirth argues that the distribution of material power cannot be measured and that the relationship between resources and perceptions of them need to be examined through research of the individual case (Wohlfirth 1993: 294-5).

2.6 How to Perform a Realist Foreign Policy Analysis?

So far we have discussed how incentives derived from the structure of the international system of states are translated into foreign policy through intermediate variables on the
inter- and intra-state level. We now need to look briefly at how these levels can be combined to perform a realist foreign policy analysis. The first challenge is to decide which variables go into the analysis without it becoming a collection of case specific arguments with little or no relevance to other cases or to theory. This is particularly challenging when it comes to domestic level and non-material factors. The structural conditions are relatively constant and always yield influence, whereas factors on the inter- and intra-state level vary in explanatory power. For the analysis to have theoretical, generalisable and cumulative value, the selection of factors must be structured and systematic, and form the basis for deduction of testable hypotheses. One of the most important contributions of postclassical and neoclassical realism is to add richness and determinedness to the structural and material constraints of neorealism. One way to combine material and non-material factors and ensure a systematic selection of intermediate variables, is to use non-structural level and non-material factors to explain outcomes that cannot be accounted for by incentives from the international system. Specifically, this means to investigate first which incentives the international system gives to China’s foreign policy. Second, how the relation between the international system and foreign policy is influenced by the possibility of war. Third, how domestic level factors influence the relation between the international system and foreign policy. Of particular importance on the domestic level is how Chinese decision makers perceive central elements of the international system, including the level of threat and the distribution of relative power. If significant parts of the foreign policy are still to be accounted for, the search for further domestic level intermediate variables continues. Potential variables must then be evaluated through the formulation and testing of hypotheses.

The second challenge in performing a contingent realist foreign policy analysis can be summed up thus: When does it stop being realism? A foreign policy analysis will always include a trade-off between parsimony and explanatory power. The more factors are included, the further removed we are from parsimony and generalisability. And the more of these factors are non-structural and non-material, the further removed we are from the basic assumptions of realism. Legro og Moravcsik criticise much recent political realism for having strained too far from these assumptions, and moved
too far in the direction of other theoretical paradigms (Legro og Moravcsik 1999). This is a criticism not to be taken lightly. However, I argue that the inclusion of inter- and intra-state and even non-material factors should not in itself prevent a foreign policy analysis from being regarded as realist. Similar arguments are also made by several of current realism’s most prominent scholars (Feaver et.al 2000). As long as the structural and materialist variables function as independent variables, and others as intervening, my analysis should conform to, if not the purist views of Legro and Moravcsik, then at least the practices of current realist research.
3. Empirical Data

3.1 China’s Foreign Policy under Mao

When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on 1 October 1949, the new regime cancelled all international relations and agreements established by the old regime. New ones had to be established with the PRC, and in the following years, a number of new relations and agreements were established, particularly with countries in the socialist camp (Zhou Yihang 2004: 14). Mutual respect for internal affairs and the right of self-determination were central elements already in PRC’s foreign affairs, and in 1953 the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formulated during establishment of diplomatic relations with India in 1953 (Zhou Yihang 2004: 72). Their main object was to ensure that India did not interfere in China’s struggle to control Tibet (Svedahl and Bekkevold 2009 – [Interview]), they have since been central to China’s diplomacy and international relations, both in rhetoric and in practice. The principles are: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; Mutual non-aggression; Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; Equality and mutual benefit; and Peaceful coexistence.

The principles’ strong emphasis on sovereignty and non-aggression showed how central independence and a safe international environment have been for the PRC since its inception. However, the principles are general enough to have given legitimacy to a wide range of policies. Until the late 1970’s, China pursued an active foreign policy in Third World countries, motivated on the one hand by ideology and politics, on the other hand by realpolitikal balancing against US, USSR and Taiwanese influence (He Wenping 2008). China referred to their participation in wars in Vietnam and Korea, and support for African anticolonialist movements as protection of the countries’ populations against interference and aggression from foreign imperialists (Zhou Yihang 2004: 30-31).

After initially siding with the socialist camp, Chinese allegiances soon shifted towards the non-aligned countries of the developing world (Tow 1994: 126). At the same time,
China cultivated close relations with the USSR in the 1950s and early 60s, and after gradually falling out with the USSR, with the US in the 1970s and 80s (Tow 1994: 135-136). There has thus been a tension between the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand, and the realpolitik of securing survival and influence through balancing and alliances on the other hand, since the early days of PRC. Through this thesis, I aim to investigate if and how this tension still plays a role in China’s foreign policy in general, and in the case of the Darfur conflict in particular.

3.2 China’s Foreign Policy 1978-1989

Towards the end of the 1970’s, a period of extensive changes and reforms started in China. The start of this epoch is normally attributed to Deng Xiaoping’s take-over of power in China in 1978 (Shirk 2007: 15). After nearly 30 years of ideology and political principles under Mao, focus now shifted to political pragmatism and economic growth. The reforms prepared the ground for the strong and lengthy economic growth that is still taking place in China, but also had far-reaching political consequences. Of particular relevance here is that pragmatism and economic growth also became the focus of foreign policy (He Wenping 2008). Political principles and ideology were replaced by economic principles, investments and trade. Consequently, political, economical and military support for friendly and ideologically similar regimes and movements were replaced by respect for and relations to the incumbent regime of any country, regardless of its ideology (Snow 2008: xviii).

This pragmatist turn also coincided with a perception of the world as safer than before (Yong Deng 2008: 5). Deng Xiaoping and other central decision makers believed that the bipolar world order was gradually being replaced by a multipolar world, where war between the superpowers was avoidable. Even if this view to a certain degree reflected decreasing tensions in the world, it was also an expression of the new leaders’ subjective and culturally contingent perceptions. But regardless of whether the new
feeling of security was imagined or real, this shift gave China the opportunity to put their efforts into long-term economic growth rather than short-term survival. This meant that support for organisations and regimes that were of no economic benefit to China was reduced or terminated, as China scaled back its relations with the developing world significantly (He Wenping 2008). This also meant an acceptance of any incumbent regime, regardless of ideology and legitimacy.

3.3 China’s Foreign Policy Since 1989

1989 became a turning point both for China and the rest of the world. On the world stage, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. In China, the government was under great strain due to protests in large parts of the country. This culminated in the brutal crackdown on protesters on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, resulting in the deaths of several hundred people. The crackdown was followed by restrictions of civil liberties, persecution of civilians and purges in the CCP (Fewsmith 2008: 22-24).

The brutal conduct led to strong reactions from many quarters of the world and deterioration in China’s international relations, particularly towards the West. Western Europe and the U.S. were quick to enforce economic and military sanctions against China, (Yahuda 1994: 269). But at the same time, another group of countries remained silent about the matter, some even publicly defending China’s right to deal with internal affairs as they saw fit, and particularly with social upheaval (Snow 1994: 311). These countries, such as Pakistan and Cuba, were typically undemocratic regimes confronted by a troublesome domestic opposition and strained relations with Western countries, thus sharing many political challenges with China. These countries did not sever their political and economic ties with China. Isolation from the strong and influential states of the West had political and economic consequences for China, and clearly showed the price of being regarded as a pariah state. Not only did the loss of prestige decrease China’s influence in global politics (Wohlfforth 1993: 28), but the imposition of sanctions meant a decrease in trade volume and difficulties with buying
military hardware. At the same time, it became clear how important good relations with regimes that shared China’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference were.

The outwardly oriented Chinese growth model depended on good relations with other countries, but good relations with different groups of countries hinged on different issues. The West was still key to continued economic growth, whereas developing countries was a source of support in political issues were there was tension between China and the West. This political support moderated the effect of isolation, thus having the double effect of weakening Western influence over China, and giving incentives for deepening relations with developing countries.

With the accelerating disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, the world’s balance of power changed dramatically. Again, China predicted multipolarity and increased political room for less powerful actors and states (Tow 1994: 132; Zhou Yihuang 2004: 34). But contrary to this prediction, the bipolar order of the Cold War gave way to unipolarity, with US and Western hegemony. The allies of the US did not loosen their ties to the sole remaining superpower, in addition a number of former Warsaw Pact countries wanted to form closer relations to EU, NATO and the US. In the industrialised world, therefore, the possibilities for Chinese influence were relatively unchanged.

In the Third World, the end of the Cold War also had major consequences. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the US need for balancing against Soviet influence in the developing world. Consequently, Western cooperation with and aid to developing countries changed character. The former emphasis on ideological and strategic concerns was replaced by economic and political conditionalities on issues such as democracy, human rights and macro economic reform (Alden 2005: 154-155). This approach is often referred to as the Washington Consensus due to the most important organisations to design and promote the conditions were the Washington based institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the
US Treasury Department. These demands for reform were obviously unpopular with many Third World elites, as it undermined their own power and was seen as interference in internal affairs.

The combination of China’s need for non-Western allies, loss of competition due to the new geopolitical situation, and Third World discontent with increasing Western conditionalities led to a resurgence in political relations between China and the developing world. As China in the early 1990s started to outgrow its self-sufficiency on an increasing number of resources, the political dimension of Third World relations was complemented with an economic dimension. Third World countries, particularly in Africa, were rich in a number of natural resources, such as oil, gas, timber and minerals. Due to a number of political, economical and security reasons, these resources were largely undeveloped. This further accelerated the deepening of relations with the developing world, as China offered bilateral cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful cooperation. This approach has since been referred to as resource diplomacy or the Beijing Consensus, in opposition to the conditionality-laden Washington Consensus. It is characterised by Chinese companies and government working in tandem to secure access to a wide range of resources, such as oil, natural gas, minerals and timber. Typically, financial aid and large and prestigious construction projects, such as infrastructure, shopping malls and presidential palaces are tied in to sweeten the deals. The projects are typically financed by China Exim Bank¹, and are free of political conditionalities (Alden, Large og Soares de Oliveira 2008: 16).

3.4 Sino-Sudanese Relations

Sino-Sudanese relations fit well into the pattern discussed above, but are particularly influenced by China’s investment in the Sudanese oil industry. Western oil companies found oil in Sudan in the 1970s, but until the late 1990’s, only small scale production was taking place. Unstable and difficult political conditions, poor infrastructure and

¹ The Export-Import Bank of China, a government bank aimed at implementing state policies, promote the export of Chinese products and to support Chinese companies with comparative advantages (http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/profile/introduction.jsp retrieved 11 April 2009)
lack of a competent labour supply made investments problematic, costly and risky. Oil production was particularly difficult as the discoveries were made in the war ravaged areas in the South (ECOS 2007: 3-4) and due to the poor international image of GoS. This culminated in US and international sanctions throughout the 1990s (Brosché 2008: 92), and led the large Western companies to pull out from oil production in Sudan (Mining Weekly 2007).

When the Western companies left, they were largely replaced by Asian companies, with Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and its subsidiaries as central in all parts of the value chain (Large 2007: 3). In the course of few years, oil production had increased significantly, necessary infrastructure such as pipelines, terminals and refineries had been constructed, and in 1999 Sudan went from being a net importer to a net exporter of oil. The infrastructure was largely built with Chinese labour, materials and financing, and a large part of the oil was exported to China. The income from oil production gave GoS sorely needed access to foreign capital after years of sanctions and isolation and decades of civil war. The fact that Chinese investments undermined Western sanctions was unpopular in the West, but did not create big headlines until the conflict in Darfur reached international media and public opinion in 2003.

3.5 The conflict in Darfur

On 26 October 2003, an armed rebel group attacked the town of Golo in Darfur, and this event is regarded by many as the start of the armed conflict in Darfur (Brosché 2008: 11-12). This triggered a series of attacks and counterattacks. The conflict soon evolved into what has been called one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of our time. On one side of the conflict are the Darfurian rebel groups, by far the most important being Sudan Liberation Movement / Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). On the other is GoS and its allied local militias known collectively as Janjaweed.
The conflict lines are complex, and both politics, culture, ethnicity, religion, economy and ecology are central to the conflict. Fractionalisation and shifting alliances of groups on both sides of the conflict is adding enormously to this complexity. However, two central and partly overlapping dividing lines none the less exist. One is a centre-periphery conflict, where Darfurians claim to have been marginalised for generations by the country’s ruling elite. The other is more local, where sedentary farmers that cultivate the land, and nomads that need land for grazing, compete over fertile land, which is an increasingly scarce resource in Darfur (Brosché 2008: 5-7; Young et.al. 2005: vii).

The nomadic groups are to some degree descendants of Arabs who migrated across Sahara in the Middle Ages, whereas the sedentary groups do not claim such non-African roots (Flint and de Waal 2005). Through centuries of inter-marriage and co-habitation, cultural and physical differences have largely vanished, and most Darfurians are Muslims and speak the Arab language, although not necessarily as their native tongue. However, this largely fictional division between Arabs and non-Arabs is still salient, and is used by both sides to mobilise along in times of conflict.

The ruling elite of the GoS largely share the nomad’s Arab roots. When groups of largely non-Arab descent rebelled in 2003, GoS were both unable and unwilling to fight the rebellion solely with the regular armed forces. GoS therefore quickly formed alliances with armed militias of Arab descent. Existing militias were trained and armed, and new ones were formed by the government. These groups are collectively referred to as Janjaweed (Rolandsen 2007: 156-158).

There are many reasons that the conflict gained so much attention in international public opinion, but arguably the most important one is that GoS and Janjaweed to a large degree targeted civilian, rather than military, targets (Appiah-Mensah 2005: 10-11). Their counter-insurgency campaign was aimed largely at punishing villages and ethnical groups suspected of supporting and harbouring rebels. This led to a very large number of killed and displaced people, and human rights violations against the civilian population in Darfur.
There were several attempts to mediate in the conflict, and in 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by GoS and a faction of the SLM/A. This did not end the conflict, as the non-signatories to the DPA continued their rebellion (ICG 2007: 24).

3.6 Negotiations, Peace Agreements and UN Resolutions

There were several attempts to mediate in the conflict. Early negotiations led by Tchad led to the signing of the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement in April 2004 (ICG 2005: 3). This agreement included the establishment of a small African Union (AU) led observatory mission called African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). The truce was broken shortly afterwards, but AMIS remained in Darfur, and was gradually expanded to 7000 troops (Prunier 2007). New AU led negotiations were started in Abuja, Nigeria in July 2004, leading to the Abuja Security Protocol, but also this agreement was broken shortly afterwards.

In the course of the spring of 2004, the conflict started to gain attention in international media and public opinion, and following several debates, the UNSC adopted its first resolution on Darfur on 30 July 2004 (UN 2009). The demands of Resolution 1556 included that GoS should disarm the Janjaweed and prosecute their leaders, and otherwise cooperate with the UN, AU and other concerned parties to create a quick, peaceful and negotiated solution of the armed conflict. The resolution threatened with sanctions should GoS not comply with the demands. An arms embargo against non-state actors was also part of the resolution, which was adopted with 13 positive votes and two abstentions (China and Pakistan).

Resolution 1556 had little effect the situation in Darfur, and on 18 September 2004, Resolution 1564 was adopted with 11 positive votes and four abstentions (Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia) (ibid.). The resolution did not include any new sanctions
or reactions, but GoS was criticised for not complying, and threatened with further sanctions against the country’s oil sector, government and individuals in the case of further non-compliance.

Due to lacking progress in the peace process, Resolution 1591 was adopted on 29 March 2005, with 12 positive votes and three abstentions (Algeria, China and Russia) (ibid.). Individuals that obstructed the peace process and committed war crimes in Darfur would be identified by an ad-hoc committee, and be subjected to international travel restrictions and economic sanctions. Additionally, the arms embargo was expanded to include the sale of arms to GoS to use in Darfur. Three days later, UNSC adopted Resolution 1593 with twelve positive votes and three abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China and USA), referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (ibid.). The above-mentioned committee later identified four individuals from respectively Sudan’s armed forces, Janjaweed, SLM/A and a JEM faction. Sanctions against them were imposed in resolution 1672, adopted on 25 April 2006, with twelve positive votes and three abstentions (China, Qatar and Russia) (ibid.).

In the same period, the AU led negotiations continued in Abuja, and on 5 May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by GoS and a faction of SLM/A (ICG 2007: i). JEM, the rest of SLM/A and other rebel groups did not sign the DPA, which therefore did little to end the conflict. The DPA also included the transition of AMIS into a UN operation, which was unanimously adopted by the UNSC in Resolution 1679 on 16 May 2006 (UN 2009). However, this transition was made contingent on Sudanese consent, which was not given. In Resolution 1706, adopted on 31 August 2006 with twelve positive votes and three abstentions (China, Qatar and Russia), the mandate of the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in South Sudan (United Nations Mission in the Sudan - UNMIS) was expanded to also include Darfur (ibid.). Yet again, this was made contingent on Sudanese consent, and yet again GoS refused.

Despite of negotiations in Abuja, resolutions in New York and an ever increasing AMIS, violence, unrest and atrocities continued in Darfur. A breakthrough in the peace process came in Addis Ababa in November 2006, when then UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan and representatives of GoS, AU and the UN reached principled agreement that AMIS should be strengthened, expanded and eventually transformed into a hybrid operation between the UN and AU, rather than to an exclusive UN operation. GoS had for long refused the presence of UN troops in Darfur, and this agreement, called the Annan plan, was regarded as an important step forward to attain peace in Darfur (Holslag 2008: 79). However, behind the principled consent to the plan lay numerous objections to its practicalities (Sudan Tribune 2007, August 2). Thus, AMIS continued to be the only foreign troops allowed in Darfur.

China was an early supporter of the Annan plan, and meant that UN troops were necessary to stabilise the situation in Darfur. At the same time, they pointed out that the conflict was an internal affair and that foreign troops could not be deployed in Darfur without the consent of GoS. A more pragmatic argument, shared by several other actors and observers was that a military solution without GoS consent would most likely lead to a further deterioration rather than improving it (Holslag 2007: 3; Stiansen 2009 [Interview]). China called on GoS both publicly and in direct dialogue to accept UN presence in Darfur. Chinese president Hu Jintao discussed the situation with Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in Beijing in November 2006 and in Khartoum in February 2007, and with Sudanese vice president Salva Kiir Mayardit in Beijing in July 2007 (Large 2008: 100). China also appointed a special envoy, Liu Guijin, in May 2007. The position was formally as envoy to Africa, but in reality his sole responsibility was Sudan and Darfur (Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2009 – [Interview]). The US special envoy to Sudan also credited China’s efforts, saying that they complemented, rather than undercut, the Western sanctions based approach (China Daily 2007, April 12; Washington Post 2007, January 13).

During the summer of 2007, GoS principled consent turned in to an actual consent, and with this, China and other countries could give their support to an international PKO in Darfur without breaking their principles about sovereignty and non-
intervention in internal affairs. On 31 July 2007 a unanimous UNSC adopted Resolution 1769, which approved the establishment and deployment of the African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID (UN 2009).

China has since claimed credit for their role in making GoS accept UN presence in Darfur (Holslag 2007: 8), but is difficult to judge what factors were most important to GoS, and what the outcome would have been without China’s engagement. However, what is clear is that China was involved in the process of creating GoS consent both bilaterally and multilaterally, and tried to find a pragmatic solution that balanced both Western, and Sudanese demands. By supporting an UN-led PKO, they joined the international effort to solve a humanitarian crisis. By insisting on Sudanese consent, they showed Sudan and other allies in the Third World that the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence were still being practiced. At the same time they protected their own oil interests in Sudan, and kept the door shut to interference in China’s own internal affairs.
4. Contingent Realism and Deduction of Hypotheses

In the theory chapter, I presented Wivel’s contingent realism, emphasising how this approach to foreign policy analysis requires a three level investigation. In this theoretical model, incentives from the international system are seen as independent variable, factors on the inter- and intra-state levels are intermediate variables, and foreign policy is dependent variable. The analysis starts out with the parsimony and general predictions of neorealism on the structural level, and then gradually adds complexity and empirical richness on the inter- and intra-state level, using postclassical and neoclassical realism respectively. The aim is that each of the levels will account for variance in foreign policy that is unaccounted for on the level above. As the analysis moves from the general towards the more specific, the analyst thus needs to investigate how the incentives from the international system are translated into concrete foreign policy through various inter- and intrastate factors.

In the current chapter, which is the first of three analysis chapters, I will perform a contingent realist analysis of the foreign policy of China. By using IR theory to interpret and investigate China’s foreign policy, I wish to uncover intermediate variables that can add richness and determinedness to our understanding of the case at hand. However, the findings of this analysis need to be tested to investigate their validity and explanatory power. Therefore, based on the theoretically informed three level analysis outlined above, I will deduce two hypotheses about the linkage between the international system and China’s foreign policy. The first hypothesis regards what the analysis indicate is a general characteristic of China’s foreign policy after Mao:

- *China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy.*

In chapter 5, this hypothesis will be tested and constitute a theoretical framework for understanding and analysing China’s foreign policy. The second hypothesis regards
China’s foreign policy in the case of Darfur, and is an application of my framework in a foreign policy analysis:

- *The increase in China’s relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict.*

This analysis will take place in chapter 6.

### 4.1 Neorealism and Incentives from the International System

The first level of analysis of contingent realism is the international system, as seen by neorealism. Neorealism does not claim to predict the actions of individual states. However, it does predict that on average, states will be rewarded or punished for respectively obeying or disobeying the unwritten laws of the international system. This creates incentives for states to behave in certain ways. The most basic incentive, given the anarchic nature of the international system, is for states to promote their own survival through increasing one’s own military, economic or political capabilities, through entering into alliances with other states, and typically through a combination of the two (Waltz 1979: 91-92).

How does this relate to Chinese foreign policy? Given neorealism’s emphasis on material capabilities, two assumptions are particularly relevant. First, the incentives from the international system differ between strong and weak states. Second, and strongly related to the first point, with changes in relative power come changes in the incentives from the international system. I will address these two assumptions separately.

#### 4.1.1 Weak and strong states

China can be regarded as both weak and strong. When viewed in absolute terms, it is a great power, when viewed in relative terms it is a developing country. This gives China opposing incentives from the international system. We can therefore expect certain contradictions in its foreign policy, and that it will be punished if it disregards one or both sets of incentives.
The contradictions in China’s foreign policy are visible. On the one hand, China in many ways acts as a responsible member of the international community. It is a member of the WTO, has signed a number of non-proliferation treaties, and has joined international efforts to solve issues like avian flu, international terrorism and piracy (Yong Deng 2006: 201). On the other hand, China also acts in opposition to Western opinion. Some examples are China’s relations with pariah regimes such as the governments of North Korea and Burma, its often hostile language over the issue of Taiwan, and its lack of political conditionalities in its dealings with developing countries (Alden 2007: 60). Thus, at the same time China emphasises both responsibility and sovereignty, both involvement and non-interference (Holslag 2007: 1-2).

In a regular neorealist understanding, one would expect that China’s strengths would influence it to be more assertive and demanding in its foreign policy, whereas its weaknesses would push it towards meekness and humility, and to align itself with stronger states. However, empirical data seem to suggest that it is the opposite that is the case. It appears to be China as great power that acts in concert with the international community, and China as developing country that opposes it. Recognition as great power is sought through international cooperation, whereas the benefits of good relations with the developing world are sought through being their benefactor and a protector of sovereignty. This does not imply that I reject the explanatory power of political realism in the case of China, but it does mean that more complexity must be added to our theoretical model. This will be done by investigating the influence of intermediate variables on the inter- and intra-state levels. But first, we need to investigate the other assumption mentioned above, namely that with changes in relative power come changes in the incentives from the international system.
4.1.2 Changes in relative power

If strong and weak states should pursue different foreign policies in order to maximise their security, it follows logically that changes in relative power lead to changes in the incentives from the international system. To ensure optimum security and influence, a state needs to adjust its foreign policy when such changes occur. China’s strong and lengthy economic growth has led to an increase in its relative power in the international system. The resulting prediction is that China must adjust its foreign policy, or suffer the loss of security and influence that comes from ignoring or misjudging its relative power. Has 30 years of economic growth coincided with a similar long term movement away from policies related to weak countries, and towards policies related to strong countries. No, empirical data doesn’t give support to this prediction. The emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention is still strong, but within these principles China appears oriented less towards conflict and more towards compromise and cooperation (Nuland 2006: 59).

Has China suffered from this, as neorealism would have us expect from a state seemingly ignoring the incentives from the international system? Following neorealist reasoning, China is undoubtedly more secure and influential now than it was 30 years ago, due to the spectacular rise in its material capabilities. However, the question is not whether China is less or more secure and influential now than it was 30 years ago. Rather, the question is whether China is less or more secure and influential than it would have been had it adopted an increasingly assertive foreign policy during the last 30 years. This is admittedly a difficult question to answer, as one should always be careful with counterfactual speculation. But to be able to support this assumption, one would have to point to clear deviations from the expectations, to specific factors that indicate a less safe China than its material capabilities suggest. And I argue that unambiguous empirical support for this expectation is hard to find. In the current unipolar world order, the developed Western countries control by far the largest material capabilities, and this group of countries can therefore to a considerable degree define the terms of international cooperation on a number of issue areas. As long as this unipolarity exists, it is hard to imagine how a more conflictual stance can ease the
access to Western markets and other economic and political cooperation that China’s model for economic growth is largely based on.

I do not mean to suggest that China has no room for maneuvering in its foreign policy. Even within an outwardly oriented and economically pragmatic development model, there is considerable room for policy choice. The development model chosen to pursue economic growth has limited, rather than determined, China’s foreign policy options. Neither do I mean to suggest that China necessarily has profited more from its chosen policy than it would have with a more assertive one. Rather, I suggest that with the theories and empirical data investigated so far, there is not sufficient evidence to support the neorealist prediction that China has been punished for being less assertive in its foreign policy than its material capabilities would allow. I further suggest that a purely neorealist approach has limited explanatory power in such matters. The reason for this is neorealism’s narrow focus on material capabilities and power as the sole determinants of the outcomes of interaction and conflicts in the international system. This leaves no room for additional factors in explaining such outcomes. This is where postclassical and neoclassical realism adds additional explanatory power, by adding factors on the inter- and intra-state levels to the analysis.

I argue that following the increase in relative power, there has been a visible, long term shift in Chinese foreign policy. However, this shift has not been towards less or more assertiveness in foreign policy, on the dimension between non-interference and responsibility in international affairs. Rather, the most significant shift in China’s foreign policy has been from being relatively isolated under Mao to become very active and engaged internationally, both bilaterally and multilaterally, after Mao. This expansion of activities has followed both the responsible great power track, and the non-interfering track (See Figure 4-1). As I will discuss in greater detail in the next chapter, China appears to have had one type of relations with developing countries, based on non-interference and sovereignty, and another type of relations with Western countries, based on responsibility and multilateralism. And as its political and
economic ties with the outside world have increased, this emergence from international isolation has followed both types of relations, rather than to move from one to the other. To be able to trace this linkage between the international system and foreign policy, we need to look at intervening variables at the inter- and intra-state levels.

![Figure 4-1 – China’s two-track emergence from isolation](image)

4.2 Postclassical Realism and the Probability of War

The first set of intervening variables is on the inter-state, or what Wivel calls the systemic, level. As discussed in the theory chapter, the main variable here is how the probability, not just the possibility, of war influences the incentives from the international system. High probability of war gives incentives to focus on short term survival and increases in military security, whereas low probability gives incentives to focus on long term economic gains and increases in power. High probability of war gives policy incentives in line with neorealist predictions of military armament and balancing of power. Low probability, on the other hand, requires additional investigation to make predictions. Here, it is necessary to ask what strategies individual states pursue to create long term economic growth, how these strategies relate to incentives from the international system, and how this translates into foreign
policy. How likely war is to break out at any given point in time is hard to measure with great precision. However, it is possible to give a general idea about a country’s level of threat, and how the country responds. In line with neorealist predictions, we will expect China to adjust its foreign policies to the incentives of the international system, in this instance the probability of war, or suffer the consequences for not doing so.

The People’s Republic of China was established by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, after winning a 20 year long civil war against the Kuomintang. The backdrop was decades of instability and foreign dominance, and the civil war itself was interrupted only by war with Japan (Chang-tai Hung 2001: 465-466). The world had far from recuperated from World War II, and the tension between the U.S. and USSR was already high. There was also unrest and war in neighbouring countries like Korea and French Indochina, which China were soon involved in (Foot 2001: 4). We would therefore expect that China in this period would focus on short term survival through armament and balancing.

China’s foreign policy from 1949 until Mao’s death in 1976 focused heavily on politics and ideology, and little on economic gain (Robinson 1994: 556). In its foreign policy, China supported a large number of revolutionary and anti-colonialist movements in many parts of the world. By doing this, China wanted to promote socialist revolution, increase its number of allies and counter U.S., Soviet and Taiwanese influence in these countries and regions (Foot 2001: 4). Domestically, the aim was to increase the legitimacy of the regime, and the country’s uniformity and cohesion (Robinson 1994: 556). Economically, China was inward looking, attempting to create self-sufficiency through a planned economy. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, and the reforms of the Great Leap Forward led to plummeting industrial output and widespread famine (Smil 1999: 1619-1620). China saw little if any economic development and growth in this period, but the CCP managed to consolidate its control over the country and its borders and inhabitants, and prevent the onset of
war. They also managed to gain control over China’s seat in the UN Security Council from Taiwan (Yong Deng 2008: 232). China also started a nuclear research program aimed at breaking the superpower’s monopoly on nuclear weapons, and became a nuclear power in the 1960s (Zhou Yihuang 2004: 28-29). In the early years of the People’s Republic, both the regional and global environment was insecure, and the level of threat and probability of war was high. Given these circumstances, a foreign policy aimed at short term survival through balancing and preparing for war was in line with the incentives from the international system.

Gradually the bipolar world order was established, the chances of a new great power war declined, and with that the probability of China having to defend itself militarily. However, this was not reflected in Chinese foreign policy during Mao’s reign. Rather, the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s increased the emphasis on ideological purity. This period saw persecution of the educated, the wealthy and the resourceful, all important ingredients in economic development. Instead of taking part in the economic and technological developments of the postwar period, China moved in the opposite direction, towards economic and societal backwardness. Even though the decreasing possibility for inter-state war gave incentives to prioritise long term economic growth over short term military preparedness, China did not adjust its policies accordingly.

Deng Xiaoping’s take-over and consolidation of power in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s led to huge economic and political changes in China. The new leadership changed its political objectives from spreading socialist revolution in the world to creating economic growth at home, and its policies from rigid principles to economic pragmatism (Foot 2006: 84). To ensure economic growth would require investment capital, technology and human resources, and also markets for a burgeoning export industry. All of this was scarce in China and its traditional allies, but available in Western countries. China therefore started a policy of opening up to the West (Shirk 2007: 19). This pragmatic turn also had consequences for China’s relations with the developing world. Even though the Five Principles of Friendly Co-existence were still in place, the new focus was on mutual economic benefit. Support to organisations and regimes that were of no economic benefit to China was reduced or terminated, as
China scaled back its relations with the developing world significantly (Tang 2006: 16). Given the increasingly peaceful environment, an approach aimed at ensuring economic growth was much more in line with postclassical predictions than the policies of the preceding period. However, the shift in domestic and foreign policy was too abrupt to be explained as a mechanistic result of changing incentives from the international system, as a purely material approach would argue. Even if the shift reflects long-term changes in the international system, we need to look elsewhere for the factors that actuated the shift.

Shortly after the start of the reform period, China’s economy started to grow significantly, and this created new demands on the Chinese leadership. The growing economy increased the interdependence between China and other countries and international organisations, and there has also been an ever growing portfolio of economic and political interests to maintain and protect (Robinson 1994: 191-194). This created a need for a more active, engaged and multifaceted foreign policy, addressing a wider range of issues and actors. China’s foreign policy efforts were in this period largely aimed at cultivating economic and political relations to Western countries, both multilaterally and bilaterally.

The events of 1989 led to a resurgence in China’s political relations to the developing world, as the necessity of having non-Western allies became apparent. Throughout the 1990’s, when China needed to look abroad for a growing number of raw materials, the political ties were complemented by economic ties. In addition to having vast amounts of untapped natural resources, Africa was a potential export market. Their common colonial pasts and their shared emphasis on non-interference contributed to the ease and speed with which Sino-African economic relations were developed. Once again, China was able to adapt its foreign policy to the changing needs dictated by changes in its relative power and in the international environment. But this time, the shift in policies appears more directly to have reflected changes in the incentives from the international system, and was not dependent upon a change of leadership.
Having inherited a country in poor economic shape and policies that were badly out of sync with the surrounding world, the new generation of leadership quickly adjusted China’s domestic and foreign policy to suit the incentives from the international system. Later shifts in these incentives, triggered in 1989 by domestic and international events, and in the 1990s by an increase in relative power, quickly led to further adjustments in order to ensure continued economic growth. We can therefore conclude that in the post-Mao era, policies that prioritised long term economic growth over short term balancing and armament were largely in line with the incentives from the international system. No wars or conflicts have seriously threatened the peace and stability of the country. Instead, China adopted changing policies in order to increase its material capabilities and political and economic influence, thereby also increasing its security.

4.3 Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Factors

The last level of analysis in contingent realism is the domestic level. According to neoclassical realism, factors on this level also influence how incentives from the international system are translated into foreign policy. As discussed above, China’s foreign policy under Mao did not always act according to the incentives from the international system. Neorealists and postclassical realists make no assumptions about why, as they consider the “black box” of domestic politics to be outside the realm of theories of international politics (Christensen 1996: 13). Neoclassical realists, however, claim that both material and non-material factors on the domestic level influence foreign policy. Their assumptions are still compatible with the structural focus of neorealism, as the influence of these domestic factors are viewed as intervening variables between the independent variable of the international system, and the dependent variable of foreign policy.

This level of analysis is the one that deviates furthest from the parsimonious assumptions of neorealism, as they open for any number of factors to be included in the analysis. Neoclassical realist theory in itself has no specific set of variables. Both Rose and Wivel give several suggestions as to which variables may be important to
investigate, but they also emphasise that relevant variables must be identified on a case by case basis (Rose 1998: 165; Wivel 2005: 363). This requires extensive research to identify the relevant variables, and rigorous testing to check if the selection is adequate. In investigating post-Mao China, two factors appear to be particularly relevant. The first seems to be part of most neoclassical realist work: the decision makers’ perceptions, particularly of the international system. The second is more directly related to the case at hand: The legitimacy of the regime.

4.3.1 Perceptions of Decision Makers

The fact that politics is performed by human beings, and that human beings have limited information and rationality, suggests that perception and interpretation form an important part of the decision making process (Wivel 2005: 374). This may explain why the foreign policy in the later years of Mao was not adapted to the decreasing possibility of war. We have already seen that states are punished or rewarded for obeying or disobeying the incentives of the international system. But what these incentives are based on may not always be so obvious. To test the assumption that perceptions play a role as an intervening variable between the international system and foreign policy, we need to assume that decision makers will choose policies according to their beliefs, but be rewarded or punished according to how well their policies respond to the incentives from the international system.

That Mao and the first generation of Chinese leadership should view the world as hostile and the probability of war as high is not surprising, given the violent and insecure backdrop of the proclamation of the PRC in 1949. And as we have seen, this view appears to have been correct for the first years in the life of the People’s Republic. However, as China and its surroundings gradually grew more stable, a shift in policy from survival to growth would have provided China with more long term security. Instead, Chinese leadership under Mao continued its struggle against what they saw as internal and external enemies. The misperception of the international
system may explain why policies continued, even when being punished in the international system through not taking part in the technological and economical progress of the era.

The new generation of leadership after Mao had different perceptions. War was avoidable, and China’s best interest lay in increasing its material capabilities. The following shift in political and economical priorities reflected the fact that war was less probable than it had been in the early years of the People’s Republic. However, the shift in the international environment was not as abrupt as the swift change in policies would suggest. The probability of war did not change overnight as Mao passed away. Rather, it was the new leadership’s perceptions that radically differed from those of the previous leadership, and I argue that it was this difference in perceptions that triggered the profound change in Chinese foreign and domestic policies. And as discussed above, the generations of leadership after Mao have pursued policies that have increased China’s power, influence and security significantly, suggesting that their interpretations were more in line with the realities of the international system than those of their predecessors.

4.3.2 The Legitimacy of the Regime

Several analysts (Foot 2006: 84; Hjellum 1997: 49) argue that since the start of the reform period, the legitimacy of CCP rule is based on economic growth and stability. In undemocratic countries, ruling elites need to find legitimacy in other ways than through elections. Under Mao, legitimacy appears to have been based on ideology and the party’s ability to protect the country from external and internal enemies. If it is the case that the base of legitimacy influences how incentives from the international system are translated into policies, there are two separate sets of incentives on the choice of foreign policy. Domestically, the government of the country will be evaluated against how well they perform on their contract with their citizens. If their performance is not satisfactory, they will lose legitimacy, which may lead to social unrest and, in the worst case, regime change. Externally, the country itself will be evaluated against how well it interprets the incentives from the international system,
and adapts its policies accordingly. Failure to do so will lead to loss in power, influence and security, and in the worst case, war.

In many cases, such as when legitimacy is based on growth and stability in a low-threat environment, these two sets of incentives will line up. Economic growth will both enhance the country’s position in the international system, and increase its legitimacy at home. In other cases, they will not, and this created opposing incentives for the incumbent regime. In order to test whether the base of legitimacy has influence on the choice of policies, we need to assume that in cases where there is a mismatch between external and internal incentives, the internal incentives will form the basis for policy choice.

As we have seen, in the later years of Mao’s reign, China did not take advantage of its growing security. In the discussion above, this was explained by the leadership’s misperception of the level of threat in the international system. A complementary explanation is put forward here: The legitimacy of the regime was so closely connected to nationalist and socialist ideology that it was nearly impossible to take the necessary steps to create economic growth. In order to create growth, China needed Western capital and technology, but to open its borders to the perceived enemy could result in loss of legitimacy for the CCP. Faced with a conflict between external and domestic demands, Chinese leadership let the domestic incentives form the basis for policy choice, resulting in a loss of relative power, influence and security.

To test whether the intermediate variable of legitimacy also has explanatory power after Mao is more complicated, as internal and external incentives to a considerable degree line up in this period. However, one indication may be found in China’s foreign policy towards developing countries in the last few years. Throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s, China did not seem to be too troubled by the criticism it received for its relations with pariah regimes like Sudan and Burma, or its lack of conditionalities in its dealings with developing countries in general. In this period and in these matters,
the goal of fuelling its economic growth seems to have overridden the concerns of being viewed as a responsible stakeholder in the world. China’s influence and standing in international forums suffered as a result of this, but this was viewed as being made up for by the growth in relative power related to its economic growth. This suggests that domestic legitimacy has overridden incentives towards more cooperation with the Western world, resulting in punishment through loss of prestige and influence for disregarding the incentives from the international system.

However, this view appears to have been gradually changing since the mid 2000s. Starting in 2006, there appears to have been a shift in Chinese foreign policy towards pariah states (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008: 38). China got more deeply involved in joining international efforts to solve problems in North Korea, Iran and Sudan. Kleine-Ahlbrandt argues that this was more related to the potential direct economic consequences than to concerns about image in the Western World (Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2009 – [Interview]). China has large investments to protect in problematic countries and regions, and as a major player in international production and trade, China will easily be negatively affected by local, national and international insecurity. Regardless of the reason for this tentative policy shift, it had the double effect of bringing China more in line with the international community and creating a safer environment for continued economic growth. In this instance, legitimacy based on economic growth and incentives from the international system are mutually reinforcing rather than competing.

4.4 Deduction of Hypotheses

From this rather brief analysis I aim to deduce testable hypotheses about the relation between the international system, various inter- and intra-state factors, and foreign policy. The basic assumptions of neorealism, originating from the anarchical nature of the international system, are regarded as the source of causality in this chain. The first intervening variable is how the possibility of inter-state war influences policies towards either short term survival or long term power. The remaining intervening variables appear on the domestic level. However, on this level theory does not specify
which variables have explanatory power. Neoclassical realism largely leaves it to the individual study to specify which, and how, domestic levels factors influence the effect of incentives from the international system on foreign policy.

On the basis of the assumptions of neorealism and postclassical realism and empirical data, I have identified what I regard as two central factors that function as intervening variables on the domestic level: The perceptions of decision makers and the basis of legitimacy of the regime. Having identified these factors, the next phase of the analysis is to test their explanatory power in order to assess if they are the key variables that can account for the elements of China’s foreign policy that are still unaccounted for. This will be done by deducing two related hypotheses from the above discussion. The first hypothesis will form the basis of a theoretical framework for analysing China’s foreign policy. The other hypothesis uses this framework to analyse China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur.

The first hypothesis is that the pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy. I argue that this policy is related to the two domestic level variables, perceptions and legitimacy, through their common emphasis on economic growth. The perceptions of decision makers that are of particular relevance here are the ones concerning incentives from the international system, the probability of war and their own legitimacy. As discussed above, the level of threat has been perceived as significantly lower after Mao than during his reign. In line with postclassical predictions, this has been followed by an emphasis on long term economic growth. In the same period, the basis of the CCP’s legitimacy has shifted from ideological purity to economical growth. When the political credentials of their collaborators are no longer important, China can cultivate relations with any country that promises economic or other benefit, using whatever foreign policy approach that appears relevant. And the assumption of the two-tracked foreign policy is that this allows China to cultivate separate foreign policies towards separate groups of
countries. Following the analysis in chapter 5, the two-track approach will be regarded as a theoretical framework that can be used foreign policy analysis of various cases of China’s foreign policy.

My second hypothesis is that the increase in China’s relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict. This hypothesis will be analysed in the third and last analysis chapter. Here, the framework presented above will be put to use in investigating China’s foreign policy in a particular case. Supplementing the framework, I further hypothesise that economic growth, as arguably the most important element of relative power, has not only caused a two-track policy, but also caused the tracks to collide.
5. Pursuit of Economic Growth and Two Tracks of Foreign Policy

In this chapter I will investigate the first of my two main hypotheses, which is:

*China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy.*

In order to do so, I will first discuss the two premises of the hypothesis, namely that China has pursued economic growth, and that China leads a two-tracked foreign policy. Second, I will discuss the claim of causality, namely that the two-track approach is caused by the pursuit of economic growth.

5.1 Pursuit of Economic Growth

As discussed in previous chapters, creating economic growth has been essential to the CCP since Deng’s take-over and consolidation of power in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. I argue that there are two main reasons for this. One is that economic growth would increase China’s security through increased absolute and relative power in the international system. A stronger economy would result in a potential for higher military budgets. This would not only deter possible aggressors, but also improve China’s international leverage. Weaker countries might look to China for alliances and protection, whereas stronger countries would need to take China’s preferences into consideration when developing policies. This is coherent with neorealism’s assumptions that a country’s security is largely based on its material capabilities.

A stronger economy would also increase security through increased influence in non-military spheres. Competition in the political and economic spheres can be just as fierce as in the military sphere. With a stronger economic base comes greater ability to influence the outcomes of conflicts and negotiations with countries and international organisations and regimes (Waltz 1979: 194-195).
The other main reason for China’s emphasis on economic growth is the CCP’s legitimacy and its ability to stay in power. Violent upheaval and regime change as a result of popular discontent has happened several times in China’s history, including in the CCP’s own take-over of power in China. Under Mao, legitimacy and social cohesion was largely sought through ideology and nationalism. The pragmatist turn of his successors sought to reduce the role of ideology and instead strengthen the material base for the CCP’s rule. Improved living standards for the country’s population has increased the regime’s legitimacy and increased its chances for survival. As discussed earlier in the text, economic growth has now to a large degree replaced ideology as the basis of the regime’s legitimacy.

Poverty is a potential threat not only to CCP rule, but also to the survival of the country itself. China’s territory is vast, and the cultural and ethnical diversity of its population is immense. This makes China a challenging country to govern, and a weak economy adds to this challenge. Lack of funds has negative consequences for the ability to maintain law and order, and to support social cohesion and nation building through education and welfare programs. Fragmentation of the state’s authority may lead to calls for greater autonomy and even secession from groups or regions. Economic growth can therefore reduce the tension between groups and dissatisfaction with the authorities. And if ideology or material benefits fail in maintaining regime legitimacy and social stability, economic growth may also be used to improve military strength. The threat or use of force may succeed were ideology or stability fail.

The benefits of a strong economy are thus many, both to states, citizens and governments. Post-Mao leadership has taken advantage of a safer international environment, and introduced reforms and policies aimed at long term economic growth. To the degree that there is a causal link between these reforms and economic growth, they have been hugely successful. But I argue that these reforms have also had consequences for China’s foreign policy, as will be discussed in the next part.
5.2 Track One - Non-Interference

The second premise of the hypothesis currently under investigation is that China leads a two-tracked foreign policy: One track towards developing countries, emphasising principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, another towards Western countries, emphasising multilateralism and international responsibility.

Since the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention has been a central part of Chinese foreign policy. The background for this was China’s experiences with interference, occupation and colonisation from foreign powers in the preceding decades, and it was important to prevent this from happening again. The century preceding the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, starting with China’s loss to Britain in the Opium Wars of the 1840s – 1860s, is often referred to as the Century of Humiliation. This period saw widespread destruction and looting on the part of Western countries, and China was forced to accept treaties that greatly favoured Western economic and political interests (Gries 2005: 45-47). Other defining events in this period was the secession of Hong Kong to Britain, Macau to Portugal and Taiwan to Japan, and the atrocities of Japanese soldiers in the 1930s and 1940s in the Second Sino-Japanese War. This period has had huge influence on Chinese citizens and decision makers, and is often used to explain China’s strong emphasis on principles like sovereignty and non-intervention (Gries 2005: 47-48; Svedahl and Bekkevold 2009 – [Interview]).

These and similar principles were formalised in China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence during diplomatic negotiations with India in 1954. Again, safeguarding Chinese internal interests were pivotal, in this instance making sure that India would not interfere in China’s campaign against Tibetan independence. In more recent years, when direct interference from foreign nations has become less probable, the principles have been used to protect China from criticism on issues like democracy and human rights.
Even though they are largely rooted in domestic needs, these principles also form the basis of China’s outward foreign policy. They have also proved to be a very flexible set of principles, being used to legitimise a wide range of policies, as we saw in chapter 3. In the 1950’s to the 1970’s, China was directly or indirectly involved in several wars, including in Korea and Vietnam (Christensen 2006), Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Snow 1994: 289). They also supported a number of other revolutionary and anti-colonial movements around the world. The argument was that China was aiding these countries and peoples to achieve independence and self-determination from colonisers and oppressors. This activist approach to non-interference stands in stark contrast to how these principles are currently exercised, where the incumbent regime of any country is regarded as legitimate, regardless of its political ideology and how it came to and stays in power.

It could easily be argued that such changes should be attributed to *realpolitik*, not to different theoretical interpretations of principles of statehood and sovereignty. As we saw in chapter 3, Chinese activism in the Third World under Mao is often described as a way of balancing against U.S. and Soviet influence. Similarly, the current seemingly depoliticised approach is often explained as being tailored to fit China’s current political and economical needs. While this view may have some explanatory power, it would also be wrong to label China’s emphasis on non-interference as pure rhetorics and power politics. The abuses of foreign powers during the Century of Humiliation are not soon to be forgotten. Ideas of independence, self-determination and sovereignty run deep among Chinese public and elites, and so does mistrust of former colonial powers’ attempts to influence politics in China and elsewhere (Li Anshan 2009 - [Interview]; Svedahl og Bekkevold 2009 – [Interview]).

We have seen in earlier chapters how China’s relations with developing countries can be roughly divided into three periods. The first period was under Mao, with an activist approach based on ideology and great power balancing. The second period started with the onset of growth oriented reforms in 1978, when China scaled back its support for like-minded movements and regimes in the Third World. For most of the 1980’s China saw little use for contacts in Africa beyond regular diplomatic relations. This also meant that the practicing of the non-intervention principle changed towards respecting
the regimes and sovereignty of other countries. This practice of non-intervention is more in line with the spirit of peaceful coexistence than pre-1980’s activism. Ironically, therefore, post-Mao pragmatism can be said to be responsible for the restoration of principles in China’s foreign policy towards developing countries.

The third and current period was necessitated by China’s post-Tiananmen isolation in 1989, when many developing countries supported China’s right to deal resolutely with what was regarded as an internal affair (Snow 1994: 292). Even though the isolation ended relatively quickly (Kim 1994: 134), it showed that cultivating close relations with developing countries would be useful should China ever fall out with the West again, even if such relations would entail little direct economic benefit. Indeed, given the large number of developing countries and their shared emphasis of non-interference, a deepening of relations with these countries would lessen Chinese dependence on Western goodwill in international arenas (Taylor 2006: 939). The expansion of political ties were soon followed in the early 1990s by a similar expansion of economic ties, as Chinese growth made the country ever more dependent on external supply of raw materials. Sino-African economic ties grew quickly, and China is today Africa’s second biggest trading partners (Taylor 2009: 1).

Even though the practicing of the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty has turned 180 degrees, it has nonetheless been a central part of Chinese foreign policy since the proclamation of the PRC in 1949. The next part of the chapter will discuss what I regard as the other track of Chinese foreign policy.

5.3 Track Two - Responsibility

In addition to the foreign policy track of non-intervention towards developing countries presented above, I argue that China has cultivated a different sort of relationship with Western countries, that it strives towards a different image of itself in Western countries than it does in developing countries. The background for this track
of foreign policy is for recognition as a responsible great power, both politically and economically, through a multilateral and norm-abiding approach appreciated in the West (Wohlforth 1993: 28).

As Foot argues, membership criteria in the international society have developed from pluralist to solidarist, from independent interests of sovereign states, towards ideas of common values and the common good (Foot 2001: 2). The ever-increasing number of international norms, agreements and organisations are indicative of the existence of a trend towards commonality in international relations. This commonality is visible through we should keep separate norms and ideas, particularly about human rights, on the one hand, and actual cooperation on the other.

In the traditional view of international law, the rights of states are preeminent. What happens within the borders of the individual state is the sole responsibility of that state’s government. These are the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty as discussed above. Since the end of World War II, international law has increasingly applied to individual human beings, not just to states (Foot 2001: 2). The central argument here is that basic human rights may override the rights of states. The most explicit argument along these lines comes from the proponents of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), who claim that when states are unable or unwilling to protect the basic human rights of its citizens, the responsibility goes to the international society, regardless of the consent of the state in question (Grono 2006: 623). This doctrine opens for the use of all necessary means, from naming and shaming to military intervention, to safeguard basic human rights. In a similar line of thinking are the conditionalities concerning democracy, good governance, transparency etc that are typically attached to development aid and assistance from Western and international donors. There is also a pressure on Western companies to adhere to similar norms when doing business in countries where laws or practices on issues such as labour rights and environmental standards are lax or nonexistent.

Where norms and ideas about human rights may often be unclear and open to unending philosophical debate, there is also the more practical issue of actual international cooperation. This takes place in numerous forms, such as through various
organisations, regimes, negotiations and agreements, and on numerous issues, such as trade, health, disarmament and environmental issues. Also here, the trend is towards more multilateral cooperation and ideas of the common good (Foot 2001: 8-9). However, two caveats are necessary. The first is that one should be careful not to overstate the depth of this shift towards cooperation and shared norms in international relations. States rarely, if ever, act in ways that are clearly detrimental to their own interests, even if such acts would benefit the greater good. From a rationalist point of view, the basis for international cooperation is the interdependence of states in an increasingly globalised world. Cooperation may lead to material or other benefit for the involved parties, and states will typically cooperate when this is of short- or long-term benefit to them. As argued by postclassical realism, such instances of mutual benefit will not be uncommon when the probability of war is low, and this might explain the surge in international cooperation after the end of the Second World War.

The second caveat is that one should also be careful not to overstate the breadth of this shift. International cooperation beyond regular diplomatic ties is a much more important feature between developed nations than between developing ones. Increasingly, it is the smaller and weaker states of the world that adhere to the Westphalian principles of statehood, while the stronger countries join the club of cooperating nations. The push for both norms diffusion and practical cooperation comes mainly from the developed countries in the West. These countries also constitute the richest and strongest of the world’s nations. This means that Western countries and organisations function as gatekeepers for the entry into international society. To be fully accepted as a responsible member of international society, one needs to embrace both the norms and the practicalities of international cooperation. Countries that do not adhere to one or the other will not be able to benefit fully from economic and political cooperation with the West (Foot 2001: 11-12).

Arguably the most important arena for international cooperation is the UN and its numerous agencies and organisations. China was one of the founding members of the
UN, and when the old regime fled to the island of Taiwan due to losing the civil war in 1949, they retained China’s seat in the UN. After years of campaigning, the PRC succeeded in getting UN recognition as the legitimate government of China in 1971, thus taking over China’s seat in the UN and permanent membership in the Security Council. Due to decolonialisation, the number of member states to the UN had increased greatly since its establishment, and especially the number of African states had grown significantly. China had supported many of these countries’ struggles for independence, and African votes were important in securing UN recognition for the PRC (Yong Deng 2008: 232).

During the Cold War, China’s role in the UN was relatively passive. In the Security Council, China abstained on most issues not directly related to its own national interest, and this was paralleled in the General Assembly and other UN organisations. Since the 1990’s, however, China has become increasingly active in the UN system. One very clear example of China’s increased activity and engagement is China’s participation in UN peace-keeping operations (PKO). China started contributing personnel in 1990, and is now a significant contributor to PKOs around the world. China will still oppose intervention that lacks a UNSC resolution and an invitation by the receiving country, but the increasing willingness to not only support and finance but also contribute military personnel to UN PKOs signals that China has come a long way in embracing the norms associated with responsible nations (Carlson 2006: 221-222).

This new-found acceptance of international military intervention was also key to attaining at least the preliminary solution in the Darfur conflict that the establishment of UNAMID represents. When GoS was unwilling to deal with the rebellion in Darfur without violating human rights, the international demand was for a UN led solution, and the hybrid operation of UNAMID largely fulfilled these demands. But this example once again shows the flexibility in Chinese foreign policy principles. To say that UNAMID was invited by GoS would be an exaggeration, and even their mere consent to the operation was only given after strong international pressure and numerous UNSC resolutions. However, once this consent was acquired, China
supported the establishment of UNAMID through Resolution 1769, as it formally fulfilled their requirements for supporting a military intervention.

An area of international cooperation and interaction that has become increasingly important during the last few decades is international trade. The WTO is the main international body to deal with the rules of trade between nations, and as international trade has become increasingly important, the WTO has become an increasingly influential organisation. China became a member of the WTO in 2001. China’s membership was an important step both for China and for international trade, but should be viewed as one of many steps towards economical liberalisation that started with the reforms in the late 1970s (Kim 2006: 287). China was already very much involved with world trade, and did not need to make any severe adjustments to fulfill the demands of entry into the WTO.

Since the early 1990s China has also increasingly joined the world’s arms control regimes. China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and has also joined a number of other arms control and disarmaments arrangements. “Whereas in 1970, China had signed up to only 10-20 per cent of the arms control arrangements for which it was eligible, by 1996 it had joined 85-90 per cent.” (Foot 2001: 13). China has also become increasingly active in several other issue areas, such as the environment, health issues and terrorism, and in regional arenas such as APEC, ASEAN Plus Three and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

There is thus ample evidence that China has increasingly become an active and engaged participant in the practicalities of international cooperation, through the examples mentioned above and numerous others. When it comes to the immaterial norms and ideas of human rights, however, China is much more reluctant. In issue areas that do not challenge the legitimacy of the government, such as labour rights and gender equality, China participates in relevant processes and organisations. In other
areas, such as the norms of civil and political rights and the issue of Tibet, China is staunchly opposed to any external interference.

In the West, human rights tend to be equated with civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to vote. In China, on the other hand, the emphasis is on socio-economic rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living (Svedahl and Bekkevold 2009 – [Interview])). As discussed earlier, the CCP’s unspoken contract with the Chinese people is one of securing economic growth and stability. The argument is that at least as long as China is a developing country, this can only be delivered by the incumbent regime. Democracy is inefficient and populist, will have negative effects for the country, and calls for more of it is unpatriotic and detrimental to the country. Few observers doubt that the Chinese government has played an important part in the economic growth that has occurred for the last 30 years. Whether this is due to or in spite of the absence of democracy is a question not to be debated here. What is relevant here is this: First, that the Chinese government and its particular mix of socialism and capitalism is largely successful in claiming ownership and taking credit for the economic success, particularly with domestic audiences. Second, that the regime’s opposition against domestic and international calls for civil and political rights prevents China from full entry into the club of responsible nations.

This discussion shows that there has been an expansion from pluralist to solidarist membership criteria in international society, and that these criteria regard both norms and ideas on the one hand, and actual cooperation on the other. It also shows that China has largely met these criteria when it comes to international cooperation and participation, but much less so when it comes to central norms and ideas, and that this prevents full membership status for China in international society. However, meeting these criteria and attaining status as a responsible great power has been a dominating feature of China’s relations to the Western world, particularly since the early 1990s.

5.4 Two-Tracked Foreign Policy?

Following the discussions above, it appears that the notion of a two-tracked foreign policy on the part of post-Mao China is plausible, but that it needs further
specification. Particularly the implicit linearity of the statement, where the tracks are seen to be straight, seems to be too crude. Even though the most important shift in China’s relations with the Third World occurred with the transfer of power following the death of Mao, post-Mao policies towards developing countries have also undergone important changes. The main change was when the neglect of the 1980s gave way to a deepening of political relations from 1989. However, the increasing dominance of economic relations since the 1990s constitute if not a shift, then at least a certain reorientation, in policy.

There have been fewer shifts in China’s relations to Western countries, here the development is more unidirectional. But as we have seen, there are some crucial exceptions to China’s embrace of norms and ideas. And these exceptions are in the areas that are arguably the most important for Western countries, namely civil and political rights.

However, I argue that China has led separate sets of foreign policy towards the West and the Third World, and that this has characterised China’s emergence from international isolation. At any given time, China’s policies towards the West are discernible from those towards developing countries. Policies towards the West have been aimed at acceptance as a responsible great power, even though important norms are left out. Similarly, policies towards the developing world have been characterised by principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty, regardless of how the principles have been practiced. By including the notion that the two tracks are flexible, incomplete and open to changes over time, I conclude that China follows a two-track approach to foreign policy.

5.5 Causality

The hypothesis under investigation is that China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy. Having discussed and
corroborated the premises of the argument, we now need to ask how emphasis on responsibility towards Western countries and on sovereignty towards developing countries has resulted from the pursuit of economic growth.

5.5.1 Economic Growth and Great Power Responsibility

I argue that China benefits economically from a responsible image in mainly two ways. The first is instrumental and practical, and can be found in the rationale for the opening up policies that started in the late 1970’s. In order to create economic growth, China needed capital, technology, human resources and export markets. This was scarce in China, and available in the West, particularly in the USA. China needed economic, legal and political reforms, removing domestic barriers to trade and foreign investment. But the removal of similar barriers in the West was equally important, and this could not take place if China was seen as a hostile revisionist state. The lower the Sino-U.S. tensions, the fewer formal and informal hindrances to trade and investment between the two countries. And the bigger the size and larger the scope of China’s economy, the more beneficial good relations are to its main investors and markets.

The second and closely related way in which a responsible image is beneficial to China is through the normative mechanisms of gate-keeping or membership requirements for responsible nations. The liberal democracies of the West form the world’s most powerful bloc, both politically and economically. Non-Western countries that want to benefit from this, e.g. through access to markets and capital or political influence, must abide by various standards. By playing by rules largely dictated by Western powers, China is to an increasing degree viewed as a responsible nation, thus increasingly being allowed such access and influence. For example, in discussing China’s increased participation on arms control issues, Foot argues “Much of this more positive behaviour [...] relates to China’s wish to be viewed as responsible.”(Foot 2001: 13).

If good relations to the West are this important to China, how can we explain China’s non-acceptance of civil and political rights? This has obviously prevented China from full entry into international society. I suggest that there are several explanations for
this. Economically, the loss is compensated by the economic gain from having good relations with developing countries, as we will see shortly, and these relations benefit from emphasis on non-interference and sovereignty. Politically, to expect a non-democratic regime to support democracy is not particularly realistic, as this would obviously undermine the incumbent regime. Even democratically elected governments would rarely, if ever, support policies and principles that would lead to loss of power.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, there are also political benefits from having good relations with developing countries. An additional factor in explaining the above-mentioned Chinese non-compliance concerns identity and culture. Independence and freedom from interference are central to Chinese thinking, and one should not underestimate the importance of such ideas. Even though one could argue that the defense of the sovereignty of other countries is often instrumental as much as principled, defense of Chinese sovereignty is all principle (Nuland 2006: 55).

### 5.5.2 Economic Growth and Non-Interference

Moving on the other track of China’s foreign policy, how would the non-interference policies gain China’s economic growth? Here, the picture is more complex. The economic benefits of China’s policies since the 1990s are easy to detect. Respect for sovereignty and opposition to conditionalities have given China access to natural resources and markets that were out of reach for Western corporations, due to unwillingness to invest in troublesome areas, and to sanctions and other restrictions on trading with politically problematic countries. This has contributed to energy security, and has also fuelled China’s continued growth as China outgrew its own supplies of oil and a number of other resources.

One should also consider that Chinese decision makers to a considerable degree regard social instability and unrest both domestically and abroad merely as the result of poverty and lack of development (Wang Suolao 2009 – [Interview]). Economic growth through investments rather than political and economic reforms is thus regarded as the
solution to many of the Third World’s problems, including the humanitarian
catastrophe in Darfur. By investing heavily in developing countries, China hopes not
only for short term returns on the individual investments. The hope is that the
countries’ economic growth and social stability will make them even more lucrative
trading partners, and in the process making China even less dependent on Western
goodwill (Taylor 2007: 12).

Having seen what role economic factors currently play in China’s relations to
developing countries, two questions need to be discussed: First, can China’s relations
current to developing countries solely by economic factors? And second, if economic
factors only became important in the 1990s, how can we explain China’s foreign
policy towards the developing world before the 1990s?

First, even though economic factors have become increasingly important, particularly
when it comes to relations to certain resource rich countries like Sudan, Angola and
Zambia, the political factors discussed above are still very important. This becomes
apparent when observing that the policies of the Beijing Consensus also form the basis
for relations with countries that are not resource-rich and have no direct economic
benefit to China. By establishing itself as protector and benefactor of a large number
of developing countries, China can increasingly rely on their votes and support in
international forums. During the last decade, support for the Chinese positions in the
UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on human rights
issues have increased significantly, whereas the positions of the European Union (EU)
have decreased correspondingly (Gowan and Brantner 2008: 2).

This discussion also largely answers the second question, namely how to explain
China’s foreign policy towards the developing world before the 1990s. One of the
lessons of post-Tiananmen isolation was that China could not rely solely on their
relations with Western countries. Even though the developing world offered less
economic benefit and political influence, relations to them were necessary at a time
when China was under great pressure from the West. Additionally, these countries
made few, if any, demands on China’s policy, and they also made China less
vulnerable to Western pressure and influence.
This, however, cannot explain China’s lack of interest in the Third World in the 1980s. Again, I argue that we need to look at economic factors. After basing such relations on political and ideological ideas under Mao, the pragmatist turn of Deng Xiaoping also meant a reorientation of foreign policy. As war was regarded as much less probable than in the early years of the PRC in 1949, focus shifted from promoting security through supporting socialist revolution and balancing against competing great powers, to creating economic growth at home. This required a more efficient and growth oriented use of available resources, and more harmonious relations to the U.S. and other Western countries. Thus economically and politically costly support for friendly regimes and movements in the developing world was replaced with a tolerance of the incumbents, regardless of ideology. And as China was still self sufficient with important resources and was preoccupied with its relations to the West, there was no need to cultivate relations with the Third World beyond regular diplomatic ties.

5.5.3 Conclusion

Post-Mao relations to the developing world have gone through several phases, and apart from the first years after 1989, the pursuit of economic growth has been a major explanatory factor of both the relations themselves and their characteristics. Similarly, China’s increasing emphasis on responsibility through international cooperation and, at least to some degree, the embrace of Western liberal norms and ideas appears largely to be rooted in strategies to create economic growth. This was to be achieved directly, through an emphasis on international trade and cooperation, and indirectly, through the more intangible benefits of being regarded as a responsible great power. The analysis thus appears to largely support the hypothesis that China has led a two-tracked foreign policy, and that this is due to the pursuit of economic growth.

However, if we go back even further, already under Mao, China can be said to have led separate foreign policies towards separate groups of countries. Sovereignty and non-interference was an intrinsic part of both domestic and foreign policy from the
establishment of the PRC. Similarly, China’s close cooperation with the USSR in the 1950s and early 1960s, and its marriage of convenience with the U.S. in the 1970s, is testament to a separate foreign policy towards the superpowers of the time, albeit of a different character than its current great power policies. This suggests that China’s two-tracked foreign policy predates the pursuit of economic growth, and that the explanation for this duality in China’s foreign policy is to be found elsewhere.

However, I do not regard this as evidence that the hypothesis is false. Rather than rejecting my hypothesis, I argue that it is too crude. Rather than claiming that post-Mao pursuit of economic growth is the cause of the two-track foreign policy itself, I argue that the pursuit is the cause of the current application of the two-tracked foreign policy. Separate foreign policies for the West and the developing world predates the reforms of Deng Xiaoping. However, it was with the pragmatist turn starting in 1978 that China started its emphasis on responsibility in international affairs, and this approach was undertaken largely in order to create economic growth. Further, China’s post-Mao policies towards the developing world can also largely be explained by the pursuit of economic growth. This means that although the pursuit of economic growth cannot explain the existence of a two-tracked foreign policy, it can to a considerable degree explain the current practice of this approach to foreign policy. And as such, the hypothesis should be nuanced and specified rather than falsified.

On the basis of this analysis and the resulting caveats, I have established that China leads a two-tracked foreign policy, and that this is currently fuelled by the pursuit of economic growth. In the next chapter I will use this finding as a theoretical framework for analysing Chinese foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict.
6. Relative Power and Conflicting Foreign Policies

In the previous chapter, I discussed how a combination of economic and political factors has caused China to lead a two-tracked foreign policy. Further, I defined this two-tracked approach as a theoretical framework for understanding and analysing China’s foreign policy. In the current chapter I will use this framework to analyse China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur. The specific hypothesis for the analysis is:

*The increase in China’s relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur.*

The premises for the hypothesis will be discussed first, then I will analyse the claim of causality. The premises are that China’s relative power has increased, and that there is a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict. The claimed causality is that the increase in relative power has caused the two tracks to conflict.

### 6.1 Increase in China’s Relative Power

To investigate whether China’s relative power has increased, we need to decide which factors make up a country’s power, and see how China performs on these factors, compared with the rest of the world, over time. In line with the realist approach of the thesis, I will focus mainly on material factors, but also on other factors where relevant.

Economic capabilities are important indicators of a country’s power under any circumstances, and according to postclassical realism particularly so when the probability of war is low. Since the start of its reform period 30 years ago, China has seen a GDP growth of close to 10% annually (Shirk 2007: 19-20; See also Appendix 3). Its total GDP has increased from ca 300 billion USD in 1980 to more than 3 trillion
USD in 2007. This rate of growth is stronger than both the growth in the world economy in general, and the growth of its competitors. Measured in total GDP, then, China has seen an increase in both absolute and relative power, and is currently rivalling Germany for the spot as the third largest economy in the world, after USA and Japan.

However, it would be imprecise to take this as evidence that China is the third or fourth most powerful nation in the world. China’s large economy stems in large part from its large population, hence GDP per capita is still relatively low. Like total GDP, GDP per capita is an imprecise measure. However, it does give an indication of how developed, industrialised and modern an economy and a society is. Also, a higher GDP per capita gives a higher surplus to spend on areas that may further increase the country’s relative power, such as military armament and investments in areas such as infrastructure, healthcare, education and research.

According to World Bank classification, China currently ranks as a developing country, which means that in relative economic terms, China lags far behind the advanced industrial countries of the world. Even so, China’s GDP per capita has risen from ca 300 USD in 1980 to ca 2500 USD in 2007, and if growth continues at similar rates, China will become an upper middle income country within 5-10 years (See Appendix 3). Chinese economy and society is modernising and developing quickly, getting increasingly advanced and competitive. This is further evidenced by China’s steady climb up the global value chain through the increased quality, sophistication and diversity of its export products.

Other indicators of power give a similar impression. A steady increase in military spending over the last 30 years has modernised and improved China’s large but formerly unsophisticated armed forces (Shirk 2007: 72-73). This upgrade translates into an increase in both defensive and offensive capabilities. Also politically, China can be said to have increased its influence. China’s outwardly oriented developmental strategy has increased the number and depth of bilateral and multilateral relations,
giving improved influence and leverage both in individual countries and in international organisations and regimes.

In line with the material focus of realism, I regard the economic dimension, particularly growth but also modernisation, as the biggest and single most important factor in China’s increased relative power. I also regard changes along other dimensions as largely resulting from the changes in economic power, rather than as representing separate developments. As this chapter is concerned mainly with relative power, I also argue that an absolute measure of power is unnecessary for my purpose. Rather, the purpose is to investigate the reliability of the premise that China’s relative power has increased. And for that purpose the above discussion should be sufficient.

6.2 Sino-Sudanese Relations

The second premise of my hypothesis is that there is a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur. According to the thesis’ two-track argument, China’s relations with GoS are based on non-interference and respect for sovereignty, whereas its relations to the West are based on responsibility in international affairs. As the discussion aims to show, the two tracks collide when there are made competing demands on Chinese policy, as is the case in the conflict in Darfur. An investigation of the chosen policies will reveal how China deals with these competing demands. There is also an important element of time involved: Before and after the breakout of conflict in Darfur. Not only because China’s foreign policy in the conflict is the case under investigation, but also because the breakout of conflict marks the point where the two tracks collide. China’s bilateral relations to GoS precede the breakout of conflict in Darfur, but the demands on China as a responsible state only become urgent after conflict breaks out of in Darfur and GoS is accused of human rights violations. The breakout also marks the point in time where GoS’ pariah status is irrevocably established.
China and Sudan established diplomatic relations in 1959, three years after Sudanese independence, but the historical roots drawn upon in current relations go further back. The often used references to Chinese Gordon conjure feelings of a common colonial past, and a common opposition against interference from great powers and imperialists. China’s current relations to Sudan are to a large degree dominated by oil. An insecure production environment, a difficult business environment, and a deteriorating international political environment led Western companies to give up oil production Sudan.

Discontented with Western meddling in what was regarded as internal affairs, Sudan turned east in its search for business partners (Large 2007: 2-3). In 1997, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) was formed by the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC – 40% share of GNOPC), Malaysian national oil company Petronas (30%), the private Canadian company Arakis Energy (25%, share later sold to Indian national oil company ONGC) and the Sudanese state company Sudapet (5%) (ECOS n.d.). With fresh investment capital came a significant upscaling of the Sudanese oil industry, including upgrading of existing and development of new oil fields and related infrastructure such as refineries and terminals. Most important was a 1540 km pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, linking Sudanese oil to the world market (Downs 2000: 17-18). The pipeline was finished in 1999 and was instrumental in turning Sudan into a net exporter of oil the same year, leading to a strong increase in national income and foreign exchange earnings. CNPC and other Chinese companies are also involved in production, construction and operation in other oil fields and oil related industries and activities.

Two issues should be pointed out here. First, there are many other actors involved than the Chinese ones. CNPS’s shared ownership in GNPOC is similar to the ownership structure of several other business consortia, and this structure has not changed qualitatively since the outbreak of conflict in Darfur (ECOS n.d.). This means that China was not alone in developing Sudan’s oil industry and boosting GoS’s income. Second, most other non-Western companies involved in Sudan’s oil industry are also
state owned or controlled companies. Thus again, China is not the only government to have cultivated relations to GoS.

Even though China is only one of several foreign actors in Sudan’s oil industry, China’s minority share in GNPOC and other consortia does not fully reflect its involvement in Sudan and its oil industry. Chinese companies and workers have been responsible for building and operating a substantial amount of the above-mentioned infrastructure (Downs 2000 17-18). This is typical for the approach to resource rich developing countries since the 1990’s.

Another issue that sets China apart from actors in Sudan is its permanent seat in the UN Security Council. There is no direct link between China’s P5 status and its investments in Sudan’s oil industry, this only becomes a relevant issue when other countries attempt to pressure and sanction GoS through the UNSC. The parallel interests and close relations of the governments of China and Sudan on the one hand, and the international responsibility and influence of P5 status on the other hand, adds yet another dimension to the already complex relationship between the two countries. Thus, Sino-Sudanese relations are more complex than can be measured by pure economic means.

The breakout of conflict in Darfur did not initially lead to a change in Sino-Sudanese relations. Both the insurgency and GoS’s counter-insurgency campaign took place within the country’s borders. Sudan was therefore not in violation of international law, and the situation was to be regarded as an internal affair. In this situation China was expected not to intervene in the conflict: Not to support the rebels, not to prevent GoS from performing their chosen policy, and to object to other countries’ attempts to interfere. And oil production continued unabated, and China regarded the conflict as an internal problem, related to underdevelopment, ethnicity and drought (Wang Suolao 2009 – [Interview]). They underscored the local dimension of ethnical and cultural animosity, rather than the centre-periphery dimension of marginalisation and neglect.
They saw GoS’s role mainly as a government exercising its right to use force to defend itself from violent rebellion and to restore law and order (ICG 2008: 29), and did not share Western accusations that GoS was involved in human rights violations in Darfur.

6.3 Conflicting Demands

There will always be a certain contradiction between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy, because they are based on different principles of jurisdiction and decision making. Whereas the principle of non-interference is based on the rights of states to decide over its own territory and citizens, the principle of responsibility is based on international cooperation and liberal ideas and norms, particularly the rights of individual human beings to protection from human rights violations (Taylor 2007: 6). In actual foreign policy, though, a contradiction between the two approaches is more rare. As we have seen in earlier chapters, it is both possible and beneficial for China to lead a two-tracked foreign policy, because the tracks are directed towards separate groups of countries and correspondingly separate issue areas.

The basis and principles for Sino-Sudanese relations were unaffected by the outbreak of conflict in Darfur, but it nonetheless led to a significant change in the demands on China’s foreign policy: The principles of non-interference and sovereignty were challenged by the principle of international responsibility. Rather than China’s obligations towards Sudan being influenced, a new and conflicting set of obligations emerged, namely those towards Western countries. GoS was already an unpopular regime when China started investing in 1997, but its image deteriorated significantly after accusations of human rights violations in Darfur from 2003. Since Sudan was not yet the pariah state it would later become, and China’s relations to Sudan were in line with China’s relations to other African countries, in reality, the demands for Chinese responsibility in this period were negligible.

During the last 10-15 years, China has cultivated bilateral relations with a number of developing countries, including Sudan, based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Simultaneously, China has cultivated an image of
responsibility through international cooperation and an embrace of certain liberal ideas and norms. In the case of the conflict in Darfur, these two foreign policy tracks collide because they require China to simultaneously perform two completely different foreign policies towards one country and on one issue area. On the one hand, as long as GoS does not violate international law, China is expected to give precedence to the rights of states. On the other hand, when mounting evidence links GoS to human rights violations in Darfur, China is expected to give precedence to the rights of people. Thus there is a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur, and this necessarily has consequences for policy choices. It is not obvious, however, how this situation of competing demands is to be solved. This is the subject for the next part.

6.4 Balancing Policies

When the conflict in Darfur and the GoS counter-insurgency campaign reached Western public opinion in 2003, demands for international action became increasingly vocal. GoS reluctantly agreed to AU led peace negotiations in 2004, and China supported this process, emphasising the need for regional rather than international involvement. They also emphasised that the process was help to solve an internal problem, that GoS consent to outside involvement was vital and that any negotiations and solutions should not infringe on Sudanese sovereignty.

In the UN, GoS objection to UN and Western interference was followed up by China’s protection of Sudanese sovereignty. China expressed concern over the humanitarian situation in Darfur, but did not share the opinion that GoS was involved in human rights violations. They also strongly opposed the use of sanctions, as this would not only infringe on Sudanese sovereignty but also further aggravate the situation. China’s veto power meant that resolutions containing sanctions and accusations of GoS’ complicity in human rights violations could not be adopted.
As in the case of investment in Sudan’s oil industry, China was not alone in defending GoS. We saw in chapter three how other countries, particularly Russia, Pakistan and Qatar, also opposed the proposed sanctions. Regardless of this, China was a major obstacle to Western attempts to put pressure on GoS. Both multilaterally, by using its veto power to water down resolutions that it later abstained from voting over, and bilaterally, by continuing its close economic and political relations when Western countries tried to pressure GoS through isolation.

Rather than choosing one track over the other, China has chosen a balancing approach (He Wenping 2007: 35). Multilaterally, this balancing act is visible in China’s behaviour and voting in the UNSC. Instead of either supporting or vetoing the many UN resolutions on Darfur, China abstained from voting over them. By accepting the passing of resolutions, China showed a degree of responsibility. But by watering them down to an acceptable level first, they also protected GoS and Sudan’s sovereignty. Further, Resolution 1591 left the identification of war criminals to a committee, and Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC, rather than identifying those responsible for the crisis in the UNSC. In this way, China was able to act responsibly and join the international efforts to create peace in Darfur, at the same time as protecting Sudanese sovereignty.

Also bilaterally, China has balanced the principles of sovereignty and responsibility through adjusting the policies within the principles, rather than changing the principles themselves. This is particularly the case for the principle of sovereignty. As the various peace processes and UN resolutions had little effect on the humanitarian situation in Darfur, China took an increasingly active approach towards attaining GoS consent to UN presence in Darfur. In addition to appeals for GoS to accept UN presence in Darfur, China also used economic leverage. In early 2007 Sudan was taken off China’s list of preferred trading partners, a list over countries that the authorities give financial incentives to invest in (Sudan Tribune 2007, March 6). In this way, China attempted to influence the policies of another country, while formally respecting its sovereignty and not interfering in its internal affairs.
It is difficult to say anything definitive about the grounds for GoS’s consent to UN presence in Darfur, and China’s importance in achieving it. Some observers argue that China had little or no influence on GoS (Bøås 2008 – [Interview]; Stiansen 2009 – [Interview]), others claim that consent wouldn’t have been achieved without Chinese involvement (He Wenping 2009 – [Interview]; Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2009 – [Interview]). An interesting observation is that my interviewees in China, whether Chinese or Western, were all of the opinion that Chinese involvement was critical in achieving consent, whereas my interviewees in Norway meant that this was not the case. This illustrates both the problems associated with second hand sources, and the importance of source triangulation. One of the reasons for this ambiguity may lie in the actual role played by China. The interviewees agree that rather than being a separate actor as such, playing a direct, active part in negotiations and discussions, China functioned more as an intermediary between Western actors and GoS. By doing this, China could contribute to finding solutions and arrangements that GoS could accept, and at the same time act as a guarantor against violation of Sudanese sovereignty (Holslag 2007: 7-8).

Also, according to several interviewees, China would not have blocked further sanctions against Sudan and its government in the Security Council (He Wenping 2009 – [Interview]; Wang Suolao 2009 – [Interview]). At this stage, African and Arab countries and their regional organisations AU and the Arab League, also supported implementation of the Annan Plan (Holslag 2007: 7). These actors had long objected to Western interference in Sudan’s internal affairs, but they regarded the hybrid UN-AU approach of the Annan Plan as an acceptable solution. With this development, China was not willing to being GoS’s sole protector in international forums. Since the GoS gave their consent, we will never know whether this understanding of the situation was correct, but the prospect of losing its protection in the Security Council must indeed have been an uncomfortable thought for President Bashir and his colleagues. In this perspective, by being catalyst rather than agent, I argue that China
played an important role in attaining the consent. A UN or other military operation in Darfur was highly unlikely had GoS not consented, I therefore conclude that China’s efforts were critical in ensuring UN presence in Darfur.

Several observers argue that this more active approach to foreign relations is indicative of a more general shift in China’s foreign policy doctrine, moving away from the traditional focus on non-interference towards a more active and internationally oriented approach (Foot 2001: 15-16; Svedahl og Bekkevold – [Intervju]). An important reason for this shift has to do with interdependence and the strong growth in China’s political and economical ties with the world. This gives more influence, but at the same time leaves China more vulnerable to external influence. This has necessitated a more active foreign policy. Such a shift is particularly visible in China’s relations to several pariah states. China is constantly criticised from Western countries and publics for their relations to and protection of such states, and is increasingly realising that their influence in these states is rather limited. (Bøås 2008 – [Interview]; Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2009 – [Interview]; Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008: 38-39). And when influence is limited, so is the benefit of continued protection. An end to blanket protection of pariah states would at best contribute to positive changes in the countries in question, and at least spare China from some of its criticism.

An additional factor that may contribute to our understanding of this shift is the fact that Beijing was to host the Olympic Games in 2008. China saw this as confirmation of their acceptance as a member of international society, whereas many Western actors saw this as an opportunity to use the international attention as a lever to make China pursue more liberal domestic and foreign policies. However, as Bekkevold argues, it would be naive to think that a sporting event has the power to make a country fundamentally change its policies (Svedahl and Bekkevold 2009 – [Interview]). Additionally, the political effect aimed for by Chinese authorities was as much about internal legitimacy as external image. However, the international focus on China in this period, and the desire to host a successful and flawless Olympiad appears to have been instrumental in making China somewhat more flexible on this and certain other
issues, indicating that the Olympic Games may have been conducive to China’s increased involvement (Holslag 2008: 80).

6.5 Causality

Having corroborated the two premises of the hypothesis, it is now time to discuss its claim of causality, which is that the increase in relative power has led to the conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur. The claim of causality is obviously an indirect one. Changes in relative power do not in themselves affect foreign policy. The implicit assumption needs to be made explicit. How is it expected that such changes affect foreign policy?

The implicit assumption is two-part. First, the increase in relative power has led to a change in the incentives from the international system. It has increased China’s security and influence in international affairs, but contrary to neorealist assumptions, this has not led to a unidirectional movement towards more assertiveness in international affairs. Rather, China’s policies appear much less confrontational and more aimed at promoting peaceful relations than before (Gill and Yanzhong Huang 2006: 21). Indeed, the promotion of a harmonious world is the current generation of Chinese leadership’s aim for international relations (Jakobson 2007: 14). In line with contingent realist reasoning, I argue that this is founded on a perception of the probability for inter-state conflict as low, and on an outwardly oriented model for economic growth. War is regarded as improbable, therefore long term economic growth is what best serves China’s national interests. Further, economic growth is largely based on international trade, both through import of natural resources and export of manufactured goods. Given that the natural resources in question are largely non-renewable, China’s reliance on such imports is likely to increase rather than decrease. And even though the affluence and purchasing power of the China’s domestic market is increasing, domestic consumption will not be able to replace the
income currently earned through export anytime soon. China’s development model, consisting of economic pragmatism and an outward looking economic policy, is based a perception of a low probability of war. Under such a development model, war, unrest and lack of trust has negative consequences for economic development (Taylor 2009:4). Also, good relations and a positive image gives more influence, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In sum, the increase in relative power has created incentives to promote an outwardly oriented economy and peaceful international relations.

The second implicit assumption is that the increase in relative power has made formerly distant and unrelated areas overlap, meaning that what was earlier mostly a difference between principles with few practical consequences, becomes increasingly relevant to policy choice and design. With the increase in relative power comes an expansion of international political and economic interests to maintain, of issue areas that are affected, and of actors to cultivate relations with. These actors often have diverging interests and preferences, some emphasising sovereignty and non-interference, others responsibility in international affairs. And some issue areas are associated with diverging policy demands, such as when the rights of states and the rights of humans cannot simultaneously be fulfilled. When China bases its foreign policy on two diverging sets of foreign policy principles, this increases the risk that issue areas or the interests or preferences of its allies will overlap. In other words, when China’s relative power increases through the mechanisms discussed above, the probability of a collision between the two tracks of foreign policy also increases.

When an increase in relative power takes place on a background of this model, a large increase in bilateral and multilateral relations result. On the one hand, an increase in bilateral relations leads to increasing demands on the protection of non-interference. On the other hand, an increase in multilateral relations leads to increasing demands on international responsibility. And with growing numbers of relations comes the growing probability that some of them will overlap, that competing demands will be made on China in the same geographical or political area.
This, I argue, is the case with the conflict in Darfur. The increase in relative power through an outwardly oriented economy and a cultivation of peaceful relations with different groups of countries has led to both close bilateral ties with GoS, and an adoption of certain liberal Western ideas and norms. When GoS is unable or unwilling to halt, and even suspected of being involved in, human rights violations in Darfur, the two tracks collide.

On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, I mean to have found sufficient evidence to support both the premises and the claim of causality of the hypothesis under investigation. As the analysis has been based on the theoretical framework constructed in chapters 4 and 5, I regard the validity of this framework to also have been corroborated. But as in the previous chapter, the hypothesis under investigation needs further specification. Not because it is too crude or lacks nuance, as in the previous chapter, but because it rests on two implicit assumptions about the conditions on which the hypothesis is said to operate. Thus the claim that an increase in relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy is valid only under the following two conditions: First, that growth is based on a development strategy of economic pragmatism and an outward looking economic policy. Second, that the resulting increase in relative power lead to situations that put competing demands on Chinese policies.
7. Conclusion

In this thesis I have investigated the contradiction in China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict, and this case relates to more general characteristics of China’s foreign policy and its relations to the international system of states. China was not directly involved in this conflict, but none the less found itself in the centre of attention. On the one hand, China had close relations to the Government of Sudan and strong economic interests in the country. Sino-Sudanese relations had expanded amidst Western attempts to isolate GoS, and China opposed sanctions and interventions in the UN Security Council. On the other hand, China to an increasing degree contributed to the international effort to solve the crisis in Darfur, particularly through its efforts in making GoS consent to UN presence in Darfur.

7.1 Theory

I have performed the investigation within a theoretical framework of political realism. The reason for choosing realism is that I regard the actors, their preferences and the international structure to conform to central realist assumptions. China as the main actor appears both unitary and rational and promotes its own sovereignty and survival in an anarchic international system through self-help, relying largely on realpolitik and material capabilities. Other important actors are either states themselves, or owned or controlled by states. The relations between China and Sudan are on a state-to-state level, private companies, NGOs etc play only a peripheral part in these relations.

As neorealism is mainly concerned with structural conditions and the outcome of inter-state conflicts, this theory is insufficient for performing an analysis of the determinants of a state’s foreign policy. The qualitative and partly non-material nature of the data and the single case research design also meant that some theoretical parsimony had to be sacrificed in order to identify relevant variables and achieve greater empirical richness.
An approach called contingent realism presented by Danish IR scholar Anders Wivel appeared appropriate for my purpose. This approach combines the structural focus of neorealism with the inter- and intra-state focus of postclassical and neoclassical realism. Where neorealism is largely limited to understanding the nature of the international system and predicting the outcome of conflicts, the inclusion of postclassical and neoclassical realism allows us to understand better the links between the international system and foreign policy. More precisely, it inserts intervening variables on inter- and intra-state levels between the independent variable of material incentives from the international system and the dependent variable of foreign policy. This three-level approach allows us to perform a foreign policy analysis, by deducing and testing predictions about a country’s foreign policy.

The main contribution of postclassical realism is its inclusion of the inter-state intervening variable of probability, rather than the mere possibility, of conflict. Low probability of war allows states to pursue long-term goals of economic growth and increased power, rather than short-term goals of survival and military preparedness. The main contribution of neoclassical realism is the inclusion of domestic-level, or intra-state, variables, particularly the non-material factor of perception. Neoclassical realism regards anarchy as murky and both information and rationality as limited. Thus the decision-makers’ perceptions of issues like capabilities and intentions act as an important intervening variable between the international system and foreign policy.

Critics may argue that postclassical and neoclassical realism breaks with both the theoretical parsimony, structural level of analysis and materialist basis of political realism. I argue that this is not the case. The international system is still seen as anarchic, incentives from the international system is still the main driver for foreign policy, and material capabilities is still the main determinant of both these incentives and the outcome of international interaction and conflicts. Therefore, this combined approach does not violate the assumptions of neorealism.
7.2 Analysis

On the basis of this theoretical approach and empirical data I performed a three-part analysis. The first step was to perform a preliminary analysis of China’s foreign policy using the combined theories and analytical levels of contingent realism. The aim was that each level should be able to account for variance in foreign policy that was accounted for on the above levels. Neorealism laid out the basic assumptions of the international system, and posited that countries who disregarded structural incentives would on average suffer for it through loss of security and influence. Postclassical realism introduced the intervening variable of probability of inter-state war, thus explaining the shift in emphasis from short-term survival to long-term economic growth. Neoclassical realism introduced the domestic level variables of perceptions and legitimay, contributing to the understanding of shifts in policies that could not be accounted for by similar shifts in the international system. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, I deduced the following two hypotheses about the link between incentives from the international system and foreign policy.

- China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy.
- The increase in China’s relative power has led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy in the case of the Darfur conflict.

The first hypothesis is concerned with more general trends in China’s foreign policy, aims to establish a theoretical framework for understanding and analysing China’s foreign policy, and thus prepare the ground for an analysis of specific cases of foreign policy. The second hypothesis builds on this framework, and investigates how these general trends are translated into actual foreign policy in the case of Darfur. Both hypotheses attempt to strike a balance between theoretical parsimony and empirical richness. However, due to its empirical nature, the second hypothesis is further removed from the theory than is the first.
7.3 Hypothesis 1 – Economic growth and two tracks of foreign policy

The first hypothesis is that China’s pursuit of economic growth after Mao has led China to follow a two-tracked foreign policy. One track is towards developing countries, emphasising principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. The other track is towards the Western world, emphasising multilateralism and international responsibility. The analysis showed that there are two tracks to China’s foreign policy. It also showed that the claim that this stemmed from the post-Mao emphasis on economic growth needed modification. Already under Mao, the pattern of non-interference policies towards developing countries and responsibilities towards the great powers of the international system was visible. However, the two tracks have gone through severe changes since Mao.

The principle of non-intervention has been the basis for China’s relations with developing countries since the adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954, but the specific policies related to the principle have changed drastically. Under Mao, China pursued an activist approach, with direct and indirect involvement in many Third World countries. This was justified to a large degree by presenting its policies as protecting these countries from colonialists, imperialists and other oppressors. After the pragmatist turn under Deng, China’s relations to Third World countries were scaled back significantly, reflecting the emphasis on economic growth, and the limited use for the Third World in China’s development model. New development came again with post-Tiananmen isolation, when it was the countries of the developing world that defended China’s right to deal with internal affairs in general, and with violent challengers to its regime in particular. This sparked a renewal of political relations with developing countries.

Throughout the 1990’s, this was followed by a deepening of economic relations. The end of the Cold War meant new global political realities. China’s economic growth
was also starting to put a strain on its domestic resources, which meant that oil and other resources to an increasing degree had to be sought externally. To a large degree, such resources were sought through direct investments in developing countries, rather than through trade on international resource markets. And as China had the possibility to back up its business proposals with large scale aid and development programs, and did not present political conditions to cooperation, China was yet again becoming a significant actor in Africa.

With this willingness to cultivate economic and political relations with any regime, regardless of its political and ideological standing, it becomes apparent that the actual policies of the non-interference principle have changed significantly, in two ways. The first is the level and method of activity: From active direct involvement under Mao, via passiveness in the 1980’s, to revived activity since 1989 through arms length business based principles. The second, and arguably most significant, change is the shift away from politics to economics as base for international relations. From pre-Deng support for revolutionary leftist regimes and movements, regardless of their direct benefits to China, to post-Mao support for and relations with any government, regardless of ideology and legitimacy.

The change in China’s relations to Western countries is less dramatic, but significant none the less. Even if political cooperation had begun already under Mao, the economic reforms of Opening Up and Inviting In led to a significant change in China’s relations to the Western world. Anti-imperialist posturing under Mao gave way to close economic cooperation under and after Deng. And with the end of the Cold War came a marked expansion of both international cooperation on numerous economic and political issues, and a certain embrace of liberal norms and ideas.

Thus, the conclusion of the first hypothesis is that even though China’s two tracked foreign policy predates the take-over of Deng, its current content is qualitatively different from that of earlier periods. Particularly the profound changes in the understanding and practicing of the non-intervention principle, and how these relate to the economic and political reorientation of the reform period, makes it reasonable to
argue that today’s two-tracked foreign policy to a large degree is caused by post-Mao pursuit of economic growth.

7.4 Hypothesis 2 – Increase in relative power and colliding tracks.

The second hypothesis uses the framework established in the previous chapters to perform a case study of China’s foreign policy in the case of the conflict in Darfur. Supplementing the framework, it further claims that economic growth has not only caused a two-track policy, but also caused the tracks to collide in the case under investigation.

The analysis shows that on a number of indicators, China has experienced a sharp increase in both absolute and relative increase power due to its strong economic growth for the last thirty years. It further shows that the two-tracked approach to foreign policy extends into Sino-Sudanese relations, and that these collide in the case of the conflict in Darfur. The reason for the collision is that there are made competing demands on China’s foreign policy on one specific issue area. As GoS does not break international law, China is required to respect Sudan’s sovereignty. But as gross human rights violations are taking place in Darfur, China’s P5 status requires it to intervene in the conflict. Thus there is a conflict between the rights of states and the rights of humans, between sovereignty and responsibility.

China dealt with this through balancing the two principles rather than choosing one over the other. By adjusting the policies within the principles, rather than the principles themselves, China was able to act responsibly and join the international efforts to create peace in Darfur, at the same time as protecting Sudanese sovereignty.

The investigation of the hypothesis’ causal claim corroborated the hypothesis’ explanatory power, but that further specification was required to increase its precision.
The hypothesis that an increase in relative power had led to a conflict between the two tracks of China’s foreign policy rested on two implicit assumptions: First, that China’s economic growth was based on a development strategy of economic pragmatism and an outward looking economic policy. Second, that the resulting increase in relative power led to situations that put competing demands on Chinese policies. Thus the hypothesis is valid only under these two conditions.

7.5 Implications for further research

In this thesis, I have attempted to establish a theoretical framework for understanding China’s foreign policy, and applied this framework to perform a foreign policy analysis on the case of the conflict in Darfur. This thesis has only investigated the case of Darfur, but other scholarly works suggest that similar tensions and contradictions are at play in China’s relations to other countries as well. The two track framework should be well suited for analysing China’s foreign policy in similar situations, particularly its relations to other pariah states such as Burma and North Korea. The framework would also be useful in analysing the principles and application of the Beijing Consensus more generally, as this stands in implicit, and often explicit, contradiction to Western efforts to influence Third World regimes.

Even though the framework has been developed for analysing situations where competing demands are made on China, it could also contribute to the understanding of situations and policies where such conflicts do not occur. It would not be surprising to find that the two tracks influence each other also in issue areas where they are not in direct opposition. Analysing for example why China adopt some Western norms and reject others on the basis of this tension in foreign policy principles and practices could yield interesting and fruitful results.

In addition to further research based on the results of this thesis, I also believe that an analysis of the same case but using different theory or methods would be fruitful. Of particular interest would be non-material and non-rationalist approaches, as these would illuminate different aspects of the current case than realism can.
constructivist approach could investigate if and how interests and norms influence Chinese decision making, whereas neoliberal institutionalism would shed light on if and how cooperation in international organisations and institutions in itself has influenced Chinese foreign policy.

By building on current International Relations theory, deducing hypotheses from theory and empirical data, and constructing an analytical framework for further research, I believe that I have contributed to both the cumulative knowledge and understanding of China, and to theoretical development.
Literature


*Journal of Contemporary China*, 17 (54), pp. 71-84.


*Foreign Affairs*, 87 (1), pp. 38-56.


Appendix 1 – Interview Guide

- Start interviews with a short present of the thesis and its’ hypotheses, and a discussion about the interviewees views on the hypotheses.

Foreign policy in general

- Do you think that there are changes in the principles or practical application of China’s non-intervention policy?
- How important is status and recognition from Western countries for China?
- How does China balance pragmatism and principles in foreign policy?
- Is it problematic for China to have close relations to regimes that are regarded in the West as illegitimate?
- Do you believe there are limits to China’s non-interference policy?

Foreign policy – Darfur

- How influential do you think China was in making GoS accepting UN presence in Darfur?
- How did China exert this influence?
- Why did China exert this influence?
- What other factors do you think influenced GoS to accept UN troops in Darfur? (UN/US pressure, CPA etc.)
- Do you think the Olympic Games had an impact on China’s actions?
- Is such influence compatible with the principle of non-intervention?
- Do you think that genocide, war crimes, human rights violations etc has taken place in Darfur?
- What would have happened if GoS did not accept UN troops in Darfur?
- Do you think that GoS deserves criticism for the humanitarian situation in Darfur?
• Do you think that China deserves criticism for the humanitarian situation in Darfur?
• Why do you think is the reason for China’s unwillingness to support sanctions and interventions?
• Do you think there would have been a military intervention in Darfur without the consent of GoS?
• Do you think that the current ICC process has influence on the situation in Darfur, and if so, how?
• How much influence do you think China has over GoS?
• Do you have suggestions about issues etc that has not been brought up in the interview?
Appendix 2 – Interviews

**Boås, Morten.** Researcher, Regional Coordinator for Africa, FAFO. Date: 23 December 2008. Place: FAFO, Oslo

**He Wenping.** Professor, Director of the Division of African Studies of Institute of West-Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Date: 25 February 2009. Place: IWAAS, Beijing

**Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie T.** China Adviser / North East Asia Project Director, The International Crisis Group. Date: 3 March 2009. The International Crisis Group, Beijing.

**Li Anshan.** Professor, International Politics, School of International Studies, Peking University. Date: 26 February 2009. Place: Peking University.

**Regler, Sonja.** PhD Student, School of International Studies, Peking University. Date: 5 March 2009. Place: Peking University

**Rolandsen, Øystein.** PhD Student, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW). Date: 14 January 2009: Place: PRIO.

**Stiansen, Endre.** Counsellor for Development, Norwegian MFA. Date: 16 February 2009. Place: Oslo.

**Svedahl, Erik and Jo Inge Bekkevold.** Minister Counsellor and Counsellor Economic Affairs at the Norwegian Embassy in Beijing. Date: 4 March 2009. Place: the Norwegian Embassy in Beijing

**Torp, Ole.** NRK’s Asia correspondent. Date: 03.03.09. Place: NRK’s office in Beijing.
Wang Suolao. Ph.D, Associate Professor, Institute of Afro-Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Peking University. Date: 24 February 2009. Place: Peking University

Zha Dajiong. Professor, International Political Economy, School of International Studies, Peking University. Date: 5 March 2009. Place: Peking University
## Appendix 3 – Statistical Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Subject Descriptor</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Estimates start after</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>GDP/capita, current prices</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>313.321</td>
<td>2,483.038</td>
<td>5,339.893</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>GDP, current prices</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>826.142</td>
<td>3,320.913</td>
<td>4,376.392</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>GDP/capita, current prices</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>10,749.605</td>
<td>40,400.402</td>
<td>53,632.257</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>GDP, current prices</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>1,059.558</td>
<td>4,381.576</td>
<td>5,439.098</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>GDP/capita, current prices</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>9,073.937</td>
<td>34,296.061</td>
<td>42,873.237</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>2,789.525</td>
<td>13,807.550</td>
<td>17,310.369</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>GDP/capita, current prices</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>12,255.081</td>
<td>45,725.348</td>
<td>54,038.639</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data retrieved on 21 May 2009 from:  
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008  
Specific data:  
Other sources and methods of measurement will show similar, but not identical, figures.