International Institutions and Norm Socialization in Southern Africa

The Impact of SADC Peace and Security Norms on Botswana’s and South Africa’s Foreign Policy Towards the Crisis in Zimbabwe

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Acronyms

ANC  African National Congress
APRM  African Peer Review Mechanism
ASPA  American Service Members Protection Act
AU  The African Union
BCM  Black Consciousness Movement
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)
MDC  Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T  Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai
MFAIC  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
        Cooperation (Botswana)
NEPAD  New Economic Partnership for Africa’s
        Development
OAU  Organization for African Unity
OPDS  Organ for Politics, Defense and Security (SADC)
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADC-PF  SADC Parliamentary Forum
SACP  South Africa Communist Party
IS  Survival International
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF  Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic
        Front
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People’s Union
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1. Introduction

If the MDC does not reject the legitimacy of ZANU-PF, we cannot do it either. We cannot be more Catholic than the pope.\(^1\)

Ghulam H. Asmal, Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa\(^2\)

The moment you adopt policies that impact on other countries, we can no longer talk of sovereignty. Then we must remind of the duties and responsibilities that we adhere to.

Samuel Outlule, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Botswana\(^3\)

How do norms embedded in African international institutions affect state policies? In the last two decades, the security dynamics of Southern Africa have seen radical changes, both in terms of the conflicts that dominate the region and the way states deal with them. These changes have been particularly noticeable in the regional response to the political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe.\(^4\) This study focuses on two states – Botswana and South Africa – that have chosen unexpected and divergent ways of dealing with this regional challenge. The objective is to analyze whether, and how, peace and security norms embedded in the regional institutions have influenced these two states in their foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during the crisis.

In the post-colonial period before 1990, two “macro-conflicts” were decisive in initiating – as well as fuelling – interstate and civil war in the Southern Africa. Regionally, the tension between the Apartheid-regime in South Africa and the so-called frontline states led the former to intervene militarily in Namibia and Angola and support anti-government guerrilla groups in Mozambique. Globally, the rivalry for influence between the superpowers led to both direct interventions by troops from other regions, as well as external funding of parties struggling for power domination.

\(^{1}\) MDC - The Movement for Democratic Change, Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party.
\(^{2}\) Director of SADC, Africa Multilateral Branch
\(^{3}\) Permanent Secretary
\(^{4}\) Investigating the period from 1998 to January 2009.
In this period, two regional institutions were instrumental in governing the relations between states. The Southern African Development Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980 with the objective of reducing member states’ economic and political dependency on South Africa, and coordinate external aid and investments in the region (Dokken, 2008:102). In addition, norms on issues of peace and security were institutionalized in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The charter of the OAU underscored the norms of non-interference, understood as the principles of sovereign equality of states, the sanctity of borders, the principle of non-intervention, and the rejection of imperialism (Williams, 2007:264-65). Even though there are several accounts of violations of these norms, they were considered fundamental both by governments and state elites. In practice, this meant that solidarity between state elites trumped solidarity with oppressed populations. Criticism of state leaders on the grounds of their domestic policies was considered taboo, and gross human rights violations or electoral fraud were not considered issues for regional organizations.

The end of the Cold War, and the demise of Apartheid in South Africa, marked a new era in the regional security dynamics. With superpower rivalry on the decline, states in the region could no longer count on external actors to care for their security. Hence, they saw the need for creating, and institutionalizing, a sub-regional security regime. In 1992 SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). While this formalized the relations between member states and made the organization a legal unit under international law, the organization still promoted the norms of non-interference (Ngoma, 2005:145).

At the turn of the millennium, however, a new set of peace and security norms were introduced. The amended SADC treaty adopted in 2001, declares that the organization and its member states shall act in accordance with the principles of

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5 The existence of an international norm is not so much conditional on whether it is being violated or not, but rather whether norm-breaking leads to sanctions and condemnations by other actors Williams, Paul D. (2007) From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture. Afr Aff (Lond) 106:253-79.

6 E.g. the protocol of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security from 2001, re-affirms the principles of: “strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighborliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States;”(SADC Organ, 2001)
human rights, democracy and the rule of law”. Moreover, their objective is to “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability”. The African Union, superseding the OAU in 2002, condemns unconstitutional changes of government and opens for interventions into the internal affairs of member states in cases of “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000). This introduced the norms of non-indifference to the region, based on the principles of non-indifference towards human rights violations, and non-indifference towards unconstitutional changes of government within member states (Williams, 2007:255). However, the norms of non-indifference did not replace the norms of non-interference. Rather, both norm sets continued to coexist in Southern Africa. This rendered SADC’s legal framework highly ambiguous with regard to regional responses to domestic conflicts and grave human rights abuses.

1.1 Research question

SADC’s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe is a stark example of the inconsistency between the organizations’ institutionalized norms and its practice. The erosion of democracy under Mugabe’s regime first became evident at the turn of the millennium with the initiation of a state-led land reform leading to eviction of farm workers. Zimbabwe’s economy was shaken by skyrocketing unemployment combined with an equally increasing inflation. This was followed by violent persecution of the political opposition and its supporters, human rights violations and fraudulent elections in 2002, 2005 and 2008. In dealing with the crisis in Zimbabwe, SADC and its member states have been accused of showing more solidarity with the country’s president than its people – in short, of following the norms of non-interference. However, SADC’s member states have not been unison about how to deal with Zimbabwe, and it seems that the individual member states and their governments differ in their commitment to the SADC peace and security norms.

This thesis focuses on two states, namely Botswana and South Africa, which stand out for the way their foreign policy relates to SADC’s ambiguous peace and security
norms. Starting with the latter, South Africa, a country praised for its peaceful dismantling of the Apartheid regime and initially assumed to be a beacon for human rights in the region, has not followed through in its approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe. From a rather idealistic stand in 1994, South Africa has gradually changed its foreign policy to comply with the norms of non-interference. On the other hand, Botswana, despite its modest capabilities both militarily and politically, has been the most vocal critic of Mugabe’s regime in the region, and is the country coming closest to comply with the norms of non-indifference (BBC Online, 2008, Khama, 2008:24).

As mentioned at the outset, the objective of this study is to analyze whether, and how, norms embedded in SADC have contributed to shape the preferences of Botswana and South Africa in their foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. To this end, I adopt Jeffrey Checkel’s (2005) theoretical framework for studying how states are inducted into the norms and rules of a community or institution through international socialization. Checkel’s framework has been applied successfully to the European context, where scholars examine the mechanism through which “institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents, leading them to internalize new roles or group-community norms” (Checkel, 2005:802). Adapting my research objective to fit with Checkel’s theory, my research question is the following:

What mechanisms can explain South Africa’s and Botswana’s compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in their approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe?

This question is answered by analyzing Botswana’s and South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe by means of a structured, focused comparison of the two cases.

Checkel’s theoretical framework, does not offer a single theory of socialization. Rather, it emphasizes the identification of conditions, or scope conditions, that enable or increase the efficiency of the respective causal mechanisms (Checkel, 2005:803).

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7 There are many ways of understanding the term causal mechanisms, see Mahoney, James. (2003) Tentative Answers to Questions About Causal Mechanisms. In American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA. I adopt George and Bennett’s definition that causal mechanisms are “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities”. See George, AL, and A Bennett. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Mit Press. p. 137
These conditions can form part of the backdrop of the socialization process in the form of special characteristics of the organization or the target state. Or, they can be a characteristic of the socialization process itself, such as special features of the interaction or the relationship between the actors. Thus, scope conditions provide knowledge about the range and applicability of the causal mechanism. For each case, I therefore formulate a secondary research question:

*What are the scope conditions under which the socializing mechanism is enabled?*

To identify new scope conditions it is important not only to analyze the characteristics of the international organization, SADC, but also to analyse the historical and institutional context of the two target states, South Africa and Botswana.

The aim of this study is thus twofold. First, determine what mechanisms can explain South Africa’s and Botswana’s degree of compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in their foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, map out the scope conditions which have enabled these socializing mechanisms to operate. The analytical framework is thus applied to the African context, in order to test for explanatory power and to stimulate further theory development.

1.2 Why, and how, study international socialization in Africa?

There is a need to demystify African international relations and develop theory that can explain outcomes in regional politics. However, because of the neo-patrimonial nature of many African states, scholars tend to focus on the exceptional, rather than look for general patterns. This creates a picture of African international politics as exotic, incomprehensible, and not suitable for theory development (Dokken, 2008).

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8 Neo-patrimonialism is a term often used to describe the nature of African states. It is a system where patrons, or leaders, use state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is indicative of informal patron-client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals. Other related terms are “degrees of statehood” (Clapham, 1998) and “quasi-states” (Jackson, 1990). For an overview, see (Dokken, 2008:27-48)
However, the fact that African institutions not always function in the way their treaties and legal texts indicate does not mean that they are arbitrary or follow no observable logic. After all, while the same can easily be said about international institutions in Europe, this has not prevented scholars from looking for patterns and generalizations in that region.

Applying classical theories of international relations, such as liberalism and realism, to analyse African politics, is far from unproblematic. First, they obscure the importance of non-state actors and the idiosyncratic nature of the African state. By and large, the state in Africa consists of a variety of state and non-state actors that hold diverging interests and interact both in the national as well as the international arena (Dokken, 2008:24-25). Second, they are poorly equipped to analyse state-society interactions of a neo-patrimonial nature and their impact on the development of seemingly “national” security policies (Clapham, 1998, Jackson, 1990, Williams, 2007:255). Third, they do not take into account the impact of ideology and ideas that are crucial for understanding how norms influence state behaviour (Hasenclever et al., 2000).

Like rational choice, constructivism is not a substantive theory of International Relations, but rather an approach to social inquiry (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:393). Still, constructivists, by exploring issues of identity and interests, have demonstrated that their sociological approach leads to new and meaningful interpretations of international politics. According to Alexander Wendt the two increasingly accepted basic tenets of constructivism are:

(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt, 1999:1).

In other words, constructivists argue that it is misleading to consider actor’s interests as “given”. Rather, they see actors’ interests and preferences as socially constructed and endogenous to interaction.

By opening up for influence by non-state and transnational actors, the impact of ideas and ideology, and the social construction of identities and preferences, constructivism
provides an analytical tool far better suited for studying the impact of African international institutions. However, constructivism has its shortcomings. While having demonstrated that norms and the social construction of preferences matter, they often fail to “address when, how, and why it occurs” (Checkel, 1998:325). This shortcoming is also evident in recent constructivist approaches to the study of African international politics.

*Conventional constructivism* seeks to counter these limitations. Scholars within this approach seek to

explore the role of social facts—norms or culture—in constructing the interests and identities of states and/or agents. True to their ontological underpinnings, such “construction” comes about not only or primarily through strategic choice but also through dynamic processes of persuasion or social learning. In making and documenting such claims, these scholars will typically consider alternative explanations and/or employ counterfactual analysis (Jupille et al., 2003:14).

Checkel’s theory of international socialization is situated within this strain of scholars. The framework provides a middle-range theory aimed at integrating constructivist theory with empirical research. To this end, it proposes a synthetic approach to international socialization that encompasses both rational, instrumental choices, and social learning. The objective of the framework is to investigate the micro-processes that can explain how actors are “exposed to, receive, process, and then act upon” norms within international institutions” (Johnston, 2001:488). To this end, the theory provides the researcher with a set of causal mechanisms and scope conditions that lead to this outcome (Checkel, 2001).

The way rationalism and constructivism is merged in Checkel’s theory has three benefits. First, it enables an investigation that is sensitive both to policymakers’ material concerns and strategic calculations, as well as ideas and the impact of learning and persuasion. This makes the analysis more attentive to the actual mechanisms at work, reducing the risk of overemphasising the impact of

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9 Williams (2007) analyzes the origins and development of the AU’s security culture and the ongoing process of norm localization. However, by bracketing the interaction process where preferences are mediated and subsequently changed, he evades the question of how these norms are spread.

socialization. Second, it provides a richer account of events, because it permits explanations that combine several distinct casual mechanisms leading to one outcome. Third, while perhaps not appealing to hardcore rationalists, or full-fledged “post-positivists”, the research design may find resonance within the more moderate segments of both camps.

While the concept of international socialization has been fruitful in study of interactions processes and outcomes in international institutions in Europe, it has not been much applied to study other regions. Johnston and Acharya’s work on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an exception in this regard.\textsuperscript{11} However, when it comes to studies of African international institutions (e.g. Herbst, 2007), the lack of a rigorous analytical framework prevents these accounts from contributing to theory development on African international relations.

In more practical terms, the pragmatism of theories of international socialization make them well suited for studying African international institutions as what they are, rather than what scholars believe they ought to be.\textsuperscript{12} Once processes of interaction and socialization, or the lack of such, are analysed and mapped out, scholars and practitioners are better equipped to address the shortcomings of these institutions and propose concrete solutions to mitigate them.

1.3 The crisis in Zimbabwe and its precedents

When European settlers arrived in the area now known as Zimbabwe towards the end of the nineteenth century, land was distributed disproportionately in favour of the Europeans, displacing the Shona, Ndebele, and other indigenous peoples. This laid the ground for conflicts over land that has continued up until today. In 1979, the Lancaster House Agreement ended the civil war between indigenous groups and the


\textsuperscript{12} Other scholarly works that follow this rationale with success is Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.
white minority-led government of Ian Smith. However, despite the landslide victory of Robert Mugabe and ZANU in the following elections, the handling of the land issue was deferred to a later stage.  

Freedom from colonizers did not mean freedom from violence. Conflicts among the indigenous political groupings did not end until ZANU and ZAPU reached a unity agreement in 1988 that merged the two parties, creating ZANU-PF. However, the reconciled liberation movements were not able to solve the problem of skewed land distribution. In 1998 Mugabe’s decisions to participate in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and admit pensions to veterans from the war for independence, contributed to severely strain the country’s budget. At the same time Zimbabwe’s trade union launched its own political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), posing a threat to Mugabe’s power base. In an attempt to strengthen the support for ZANU-PF in rural areas, Mugabe began to redistribute land to blacks in 2000, claiming that whites made up less than 1% of the population, but held 70% of the country’s commercially viable arable land (BBC Online, 2002). The chaotic implementation of the land reform led to a sharp decline in agricultural exports, the country’s leading export producing sector. As a result, Zimbabwe experienced a severe hard-currency shortage, which has led to hyperinflation and chronic shortages in imported fuel and consumer goods. In 2002, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations on charges of human rights abuses during the process of land redistribution, as well as the rigging of elections (BBC Online, 2003).

The Zimbabwean parliamentary elections held in March 2005, in which ZANU-PF won a two-thirds majority, were again criticized by international observers as being flawed. The opposition party, MDC, reported of threats and intimidations prior to the elections, as well as tampering with the vote during the elections. For these reasons, the senate elections the same year were largely boycotted by the MDC (Matlosa, 2005). The same year, the African Commission’s Fact Finding Mission Report on

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13 ZANU - The Zimbabwe African National Union
Zimbabwe documented serious human rights violations (Tsunga, 2005). SADC however, endorsed the elections as free and fair.

On March 11, 2007, several opposition officials, among them MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, were brutally assaulted while in police custody. This was followed by a wave of petrol bombings of selected police stations countrywide. In reaction to these events, the SADC heads of state convened in an extraordinary meeting in Dar-Es-Salaam to find an urgent solution. The summit called for a SADC sponsored inter-party dialogue that was to be facilitated by South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki (Badza, 2008).

In this period, a drought affecting the entire region, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, hyperinflation, and the government’s price controls and land reforms all contributed to deepen Zimbabwe’s economic and humanitarian crisis. This created a tense and conflict-ridden environment for the harmonized elections held in March 2008.

The major contestants for the presidential seat were Robert Mugabe of the ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T. It was generally acknowledged that the latter had achieved a significant majority of seats in the election, but results were withheld for several weeks. Violent persecution and arrests of opposition politicians and supporters were commonplace both before and after the first election round. As a result, Tsvangirai withdrew from the second run-off. Mugabe retained control by gaining 85 percent of the vote in the second round, where he was the only presidential candidate.

In September 2008, the MDC and ZANU-PF reached a power-sharing agreement where Mugabe would remain as president and Tsvangirai would become prime minister. However, due to ministerial differences between the political parties and foot-dragging by Mugabe, the agreement was not fully implemented until February 13, 2009. In the meantime, problems in Zimbabwe reached crisis proportions in the

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14 Assembly/AU/Dec.56 (IV)
15 The harmonized elections comprised presidential, house of assembly, senatorial and local government elections, all held on one day.
areas of living standards and public health. A major cholera outbreak is said to have claimed more than 3300 lives (BBC Online, 2009).

1.4 The thesis in outline

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 presents Checkel’s theoretical framework on international socialization more thoroughly. Moreover, it discusses the challenges that arise when transporting this theory to the study of international organizations in Southern Africa. On the basis of this discussion it develops new scope conditions that are relevant to the SADC region and makes judgements about which causal mechanisms are more likely to prevail under these conditions.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology and design of the research. This study uses a combination of the method of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005) and process-tracing, in order to identify and validate the causal mechanisms leading to the socialization of norms within the SADC. In this thesis, the method of structured, focused comparison is operationalized in a three-step procedure. The first step is to briefly present the state’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during the crisis, and determine to which degree it conforms to SADC’s peace and security norms. The second step is to analyse the historical and institutional context of the state in question. The third step is to analyse whether the foreign policy outcome in each case is the result of regional socialization by scoring the indicators of each socializing mechanism, namely bargaining, social influence, role-playing and normative suasion. Furthermore, it is to identify the scope conditions enabling this mechanism to operate.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the two cases of South Africa’s and Botswana’s foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe in relation to international socialization.

Chapter 6 concludes the study, first, by summarizing and comparing the findings of the two case studies. Second, it evaluates the utility of the theoretical framework for studying international relations in Africa. Finally, policy implications following from this study are presented.
1.5 Findings

The findings of the present study indicate that Checkel’s theoretical framework proves itself fruitful both in identifying regional norm socialization, as well as in disproving the impact of the phenomenon. It argues that South Africa was socialized into the norms of non-interference as a result of mainly social influence by SADC’s in-group of former liberation movement states. Further, it argues that Botswana’s approach to Zimbabwe was mainly the result of cost-benefit calculation independent of regional socialization. However, the analysis also showed that socialization facilitated Botswana’s choice of taking a tougher stance towards the regime in Harare.

Moreover, the study provides further indications of the utility of engaging a theoretical approach that cuts across the rationalist/constructivist divide. It argues that strategic calculations to a large extent can explain the behaviour of the actors. At the same time however, issues of identity and identification play a pivotal role in determining the preferences and interests upon which these strategic calculations are based.

There are two important limits to the study. First, it only analyzes state and non-state interactions within the SADC community. This means that while socialization attempts from extra-regional actors are commented upon, they are in no way given the same scrutiny as processes of regional socialization. Second, it analyzes socialization at the level of the state. This might seem paradoxical, considering the nature of African states. However, it does not mean that transnational processes are not addressed. Rather, they form part of discussions of identity and identification in the region. Moreover, although parts of the data describe socialization at the agent level, inferences are only made at the state level.
2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the analytical framework that will be applied to analyse regional socialization within SADC. First, it presents the constructivist approach to regional norms and identity. These concepts are a key to understand and appreciate the theoretical framework. The second part of the chapter presents and operationalizes the four causal mechanisms that connect socialization with norm compliance. It also presents the various scope conditions describing when, and under what conditions, a particular socialization outcome is more likely. The third section transports the theoretical framework to the Southern African context. Moreover, it articulates and presents SADC scope conditions that are likely to be salient for processes of regional socialization in Southern Africa.

2.1 International norms and state identity

Among constructivist scholars there is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2005:891, Katzenstein, 1996:5). In order to understand the concept of norms, it is therefore necessary to explore the concept of identity. Although an exact definition of identity has yet to be agreed upon (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:399), Alexander Wendt (1999) has moved modern constructivism along in addressing this problem. Wendt argues that while state identities are rooted in an actor’s self-understandings, they also depend on whether that identity is recognized by other actors. This gives them an intersubjective quality. Thus, identities are constituted by the interaction of these internal and external ideas. Wendt identifies several types of identities, of which two will be relevant for this study: role identities and type identities. The former is a product of dyadic relationships between states, and is in its nature uniquely social. Role identities include enemies, allies, partners etc. Type identities, on the other hand, are social categories that share some social characteristics. This content is given by more or less formal membership rules that define what counts as a type identity. State type identities include regime types or
forms of states, such as: democratic, authoritarian, monarchic, developmental, neopatrimonial etc. They also include other “inescapable” characteristics, such as African, Southern African etc.\textsuperscript{16} Unlike role identities, however, the characteristics that underlie type identities are intrinsic to actors. At any time in history, certain type identities have more or less international legitimacy (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:399). In the contemporary state system, a liberal democratic type identity is afforded the most legitimacy (Clark, 2005).

As standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity, norms can be codified in international law or be customary, i.e. habitual. Norms are not set in stone; they can emerge, evolve, spread into new arenas or regions, or disappear. When norms spread or new norms emerge, they are not introduced into a normative vacuum. Rather, they enter a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest. In these situations, compliance with well-established norms might be considered appropriate, while compliance with emerging norms is often considered explicitly “inappropriate”. Since norms, by definition, embody a quality of obligation or virtue and shared moral assessment, they “prompt justifications for actions and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2005:897). The emergence of new norms can therefore bring about frictions and conflict between actors.

Belief in the impact of norms on state conduct has often been juxtaposed to rationalism and rational thought. According to rationalists, subjects are guided by a logic of consequences, always seeking to maximize their own gains within the given structure. Hence, if a state happens to comply with an international norm it does so because this is deemed the most likely way to obtain what is in that states’ interests. Rational choice theory also holds that these interests or preferences are given exogenously. This means that while the means to fulfil goals might depend on the environment, interests are given prior to interaction and remain static. Constructivist theory however, argues that structure does not only constrain the actors, it also

\textsuperscript{16} However, these categories undoubtedly also have a social component. Think only about the position of Turkey and Israel in relation to a European or Asian type identity.
constitutes their identity. State preferences are therefore not exogenous or given prior to interaction, but are created and shaped intersubjectively. According to constructivists, agents are guided by a *logic of appropriateness*. Instead of acting “rationally” – doing what will possibly maximize gains – states try to do what is considered appropriate for an actor with their identity. As an example, human rights norms may constrain state behaviour less because of power considerations, than because they are a constitutive feature of democratic states.

However, this strict division between rationalism and norms is rejected by many constructivist scholars (Checkel, 1997, Checkel, 1999). They argue that the utilities of actors can be specified as social or ideational, as well as material. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (2005:910-11), such strict divisions between norms and rationalism ignore the fact that instrumental rationality and strategic interaction play a significant role in highly politicized social construction of norms, preferences, identities and common knowledge by actors in world politics.

### 2.2 Four mechanisms of international socialization

The aim of this study is twofold. First, determine what mechanisms can explain South Africa’s and Botswana’s degree of compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in their foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, map out the scope conditions, under which these socializing mechanisms are enabled.

To this end, it applies Checkel’s theoretical framework for studying international socialization. The concept of international socialization refers to the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. This implies that an actor switches either from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness, or from following *one* logic of appropriateness to following *another* logic of appropriateness. In this study, international socialization is conceptualized as the process of inducting South Africa and Botswana into compliance with the peace

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and security norms of SADC. This is understood as degrees of compliance with either the norms of non-indifference or the norms of non-interference. This distinction will be further operationalized in the following chapter (see p. 40).

In this study, the term causal mechanism refers to the “intermediate processes along which international institutions may lead actors toward accepting the norms, rules, and modes of behaviour of a given community” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1049). The causal mechanisms are thus descriptions of how processes of international socialization might occur. Checkel theorizes four such “intermediate processes” or causal mechanisms, namely bargaining, social influence, role-playing and normative suasion. The objective of the theoretical framework is thus to determine whether these mechanisms are responsible for norm compliant foreign policy outcome, and moreover, under which conditions these causal mechanisms operate in Southern Africa.

### 2.2.1 Strategic calculation: bargaining and social influence

The mechanisms of *bargaining* and *social influence* can be grouped together under the larger and more general mechanism of *strategic calculation*. When these mechanisms are operating, agents act instrumentally rational, and comply with group norms because they seek to maximize their interests. These benefits are often induced when international institutions offer the government of a target state positive incentives and rewards, on the condition that it adopts and complies with the community norms. While these interests can be both material and/or ideational, they are always seen as exogenous to interaction. Moreover, since agents always act rationally, they can – and will – break with these norms if it benefits their given interests. Therefore, when these mechanisms operate alone there can – by definition – be no socialization or internalization of norms. In other words, no change from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness occurs (Checkel, 2005:805-09).

Bargaining implies that the community or institution can be conceived as an actor that uses carrots or sticks through the manipulation of constraints. When this is the
operating mechanism, behavioural adaptation in line with community norms is more likely under the following scope conditions:

- Intergovernmental reinforcement: Targeted governments expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance.
- Transnational reinforcement: Targeted social actors expect the costs of putting pressure on the government to be lower than the benefits of conditional external rewards, and these actors are strong enough to force the government to comply with the international norms. (Checkel, 2005:809, Schimmelfennig, 2005).

Social influence implies that the community or institution is perceived as a social environment, or structure, that induces change in agent behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1052-53). In this case, the mere membership of the international institution evokes the socialization of actors. Deviant behaviour is corrected by the international equivalent of “group pressure” (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1049). Rewards might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations. Punishments might include shaming, shunning and exclusion. The effect of successful social influence is an actor’s conformity with the position advocated by a group as a result of “real or imagined group pressure” (Nemeth in Johnston, 2001:499). Thus, while persuasion would entail public conformity with private acceptances, social influence can come in the form of “mediated normative influence”. This means that behaviour is chosen because “it is considered appropriate for maximizing social rewards” (Johnston, 2005:1034). Building on this argument, I add that social influence can be operative even before any rewards and punishments have been given. This may happen, when states “know” that deviant behaviour will be punished, and consequently seek to decrease friction in their relations with other states or institutions. Friction is here not necessarily understood as a conflict, but as controversy that requires agents to justify their actions and risk isolation. While some states have interests that make them
willing to risk such frictions or conflicts, others follow the path that the group community already has set out.

One way of clarifying the difference between bargaining and social influence is to combine the dichotomy of preferences (the focus of arguing) versus constraints (the focus of bargaining), with the dichotomy of socialization through actors versus socialization through structures (see table 1).

**TABLE 1. A typology of socialization mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What induces change?</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>Preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor</strong></td>
<td>Bargaining</td>
<td>Normative suasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Social influence</td>
<td>Role-playing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Özürn and Checkel, 2005)

Accordingly, “international institutions can be conceived as actors who use persuasive tactics or carrots and sticks, or conceived as providing a social environment that channels social influence and induces certain role enactments” (Özürn and Checkel, 2005:1052). However, it is central to note that the distinction between bargaining and social influence is related to the role of the community, as an actor or a structure, and not to the use of material or ideational constraints. After all, a central tenet of constructivist approach is that meaning is socially constructed. Accordingly, what hardcore rationalists would categorize as a strictly material constraint, such as a sanction, also has a socially constructed meaning, in the form of shaming or social exclusion.

The rewards and punishments of social influence are considered social because only groups can provide them, and only groups whose approval an actor values will have this influence (Johnston, 2001:499). Thus a scope condition increasing the likelihood of social influence is when:

- The target state has prior identification with the socializing group.

Based on Schimmelfennig’s (2005:830-32) operationalization of strategic calculation I identify three indicators of strategic calculation: two that that apply for both
bargaining and social influence and one that distinguishes between the two mechanisms. (1) When informants frame foreign policy decisions as a weighing of costs and benefits. Target states conform to international norms if it increases their utility, and on the condition that the cost of adaptation is smaller than the benefits of external rewards or the costs of external punishment. Such reward and punishments include aid and economic assistance, as well as membership in – or threats of exclusion from – international institutions. (2) When actors manipulate the norms strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization. They use and interpret international norms to justify their self-interested claims, and frame their preferences and actions as norm consistent. (3) The last indicator distinguishes between bargaining and social influence. Bargaining entails that the institution operates as one actor, while social influence, requires that the international institution constitutes a social environment (Zürn and Checkel, 2005:1049).

2.2.2 Role-playing

The concept of role-playing has roots in organizational theory and cognitive/social psychology. This approach sees agents as boundedly rational, implying that they “experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information” (Simon in Williamson, 1981:553). On the state level this implies that actors with limited resources do not have the capability to thoroughly calculate the costs and benefits of all possible courses of action. In this context, organizational or group environments provide simplifying shortcuts, cues and buffers that can lead to the enactment of particular role conceptions, or role playing. Hence, instead of trying to attend to all situations and issues simultaneously, boundedly rational states resort to role playing. They act according to what is expected of them, but without reflecting consciously on the reasons for choosing exactly that course of action. When role-playing, policymakers acquire the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations – irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. When this mechanism is dominant, conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role-playing. The shift from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness has
started (Checkel, 2005:804). According to Johnston, role-playing actors have no preference over means, and only vaguely formed preferences over ends (Johnston, 2005). Building on this, I add that role-playing implies a thin preference change, in the way that the actor’s preferences shift towards gaining acceptance by the group community.

Checkel present several scope conditions for role-playing at the agent level. However, as I focus on socialization at the state level, these scope conditions are not relevant for this study. Instead, I propose a scope condition that is in accordance with the previous conceptualization of role-playing. Thus, this socializing mechanism is more likely to operate when:

- The bureaucratic capacity of the target state is low, impeding policymakers from resorting to cost-benefit calculations typical of bargaining and social influence.\(^{18}\)

Johnston states that choosing which groups to role-play involves a degree of prior identification. Hence, like for the mechanism of social influence, a second scope condition increasing the likelihood of adopting new role conceptions in line with community/group norms is therefore when:

- The target state has prior identification with the socializing group.

This study uses two indicators of role-playing. (1) When agents/actors comply with group/community norms, but in an unreflected manner. Rather than consider whether the course of action is right or wrong, informants emphasize that it is what is done and what is expected within this particular institutional setting (Checkel, 2005:811). (2) When states comply differently with norms across contexts.\(^{19}\) This indicates that norms are not internalized. Thus, if the state belongs to, or operates within, several institutions or communities, it might behave according to one set of norms in one community, while following another set of norms in another setting.

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\(^{18}\) Bureaucratic capacity can be low due to several factors, such as public servants’ and politicians’ inexperience or lack of training, material constraints, corruption, etc.

\(^{19}\) By context, I here mean different levels of societal interaction, ranging from the domestic, to the regional and further to the extra-regional or global level.
2.2.3 Normative suasion

Constructivist scholars add a communicative understanding of rationality drawing on Habermasian social theory, as well as insights from social psychology. When this mechanism is operating, communicatively rational social agents do not so much calculate costs and benefits or seek cues from their environment. Instead, these agents present arguments and try to persuade and convince each other. In other words, their interests and preferences are open for redefinition depending on the arguments that are raised (Risse-Kappen, 2003:6-11). When this form of arguing takes place, agents actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness. Arguments and attempts at persuasion may then change the most basic properties of agents, namely their identities and their interests (Checkel, 2005:812).

Contributors to the literature on international socialization articulate a series of scope conditions under which persuasion-socialization dynamics occur. They suggest that arguing and persuasion are more likely to change the interests of social agents and lead to arguing when the following conditions hold (Gheciu, 2005, Lewis, 2005):

- The target of the socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information.
- The target of socialization has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency’s message.
- The socializing agency does not lecture or demand, but instead acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.
- The socializing agency is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong.

This study uses three indicators of normative suasion that leads to norm compliance. (1) When informants provide full and thorough justifications for their compliance with the peace and security norms, indicating that they not only see their actions as beneficial, or expected of them, but actually the right thing to do, even though they might not always have thought so (Checkel, 2005:812). This indicates internalization of the peace and security norms. (2) When informants argue that similar issues should
be dealt with in the same way. This indicates consistency with norms across contexts, and strengthens the evidence of internalization. (3) When informants explain changes or developments leading to policies consistent with SADC peace and security norms by referring to interactions characterized as “persuasion, arguing or learning”. However, in real life, people are not necessarily aware of how or where they learnt something new. Therefore, for this indicator to be confirmed, it does not have to be entirely clear to the socialized agent him/herself how the change has come about. However, the informant should explain that these interactions of arguing and persuasion made them see events “in a new light” or provided “new perspective to the understanding of the issue”. Without this indicator, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that normative suasion has found place.

Figure 1 provides a graphical presentation of how scope conditions are linked to compliance through causal mechanisms.

**FIGURE 1. Linking scope conditions to compliance through causal mechanisms**

**Scope conditions:**
- Intergovernmental reinforcement
- Transnational reinforcement
- Identification with socializing group
- Low bureaucratic capacity
- Novel environment
- Prior beliefs
  - Socializing actor is authoritative member of in-group to which the target wants to belong
  - Socializing agency does not lecture or demand
2.3 Transporting the framework to the African context

Checkel’s theoretical framework is originally developed to analyse European relations and institutions. To be fruitful for the study of Southern African international politics, certain adaptations ought to be made. The following section discusses important differences between African and European international institutions and presents the implications of these considerations for the theoretical framework.

2.3.1 Fewer contact points

In contrast with their European counterparts, African international organizations have much fewer contact points between state agents, and thus fewer venues where socialization can take place. Even regional organizations like SADC are characterised by having sparsely funded secretariats with few permanent staff members and state representatives. In contrast, most of the scholarly works that focus on norm socialization study processes of intense interaction between states and state officials within tight-knit European institutions (Checkel, 2005, Gheciu, 2005, Schimmelfennig, 2005). However, this does not necessarily imply that there are no arenas for socialization in Southern Africa. The SADC summit and the SADC Organ for Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) both have meetings at regular intervals.

Additionally, state agents meeting within SADC generally have more power in their hands. Thus, successful socialization attempts within the organization are likely to have greater impact on the target states’ policies. SADC meetings usually consist of state leaders, presidents or foreign ministers, who interact and make decisions. Simultaneously, many African states are characterised by a weak civil society and a highly centralized decision making process. In such societies, socialization of the top leadership can be inferred to have a great impact on foreign policy (Risse-Kappen, 1995). As a result of this feature, a scope condition increasing the likelihood of

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20 After all, foreign policy making can be centralized even if the domestic sphere in general is highly decentralized (c.f. the features of the neo-patrimonial state).
socialization within SADC is when there is a high degree of power centralization in the target state government.

### 2.3.2 Group dynamics and divergent values

African international institutions are inclusive and democratic, in the sense that they usually have no criteria for membership and all decisions are made by consensus. This is in sharp contrast with the EU, where future members have to fulfil a set of criteria before at all entering into negotiations with the organization. In Europe, norms are usually spread from the core to the periphery, from the community of states that are already members towards future members. This creates an in-group of member states with a shared set of norms, and an out-group of members-to-be that have to comply with these norms to become part of the EU. Within African institutions, norms are contested not primarily between members and members-to-be, but between groups within the organization itself.

Within SADC, there are no decided-upon common values to which all member states adhere and that can be spread to the organization’s members (Nathan, 2006). This makes cooperation and achievements both on economic as well as security issues difficult (Dokken, 2008:102-03). Nathan points to two key lines of divisions within SADC: between pacific and militarist approaches to regional security, and between democratic and authoritarian orientations in domestic politics (Nathan, 2006:606). On these issues, the most accentuated dividing line has been drawn between those states that are led by armed liberation movements and those escaping from colonial rule through negotiations. In the former camp, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola are the main actors, while Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania form part of the latter. South Africa holds a special position, as it is a mixture of the two, having experienced both armed and political struggle, leading to a political compromise with the end of Apartheid in 1994. While some states fluctuate in their allegiance, and can be found on both sides of the dividing line on certain issues, the overall pattern shows the

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21 Mozambique actually seems to position itself mainly in the out-group, despite its history as a former liberation movement state.
armed liberation – negotiated settlement dichotomy to hold. Within SADC, the national tensions are transferred to the organization, making it hard to agree on common objectives.

According to Johnston (2005:1020), international socialization is contingent on the international organization having a coherent identity with a clearly linked set of normative characteristics. Without this feature, it is alleged, socialization effects will be diluted, or nonexistent. While SADC’s lack of such coherence may complicate international socialization, the phenomenon is not precluded. However, it does mean that an analysis of regional socialization in Southern Africa must be attentive to three idiosyncrasies of SADC. First, the lack of common values and identity makes it unlikely that the organization operates as one unitary actor. Instead, SADC has the feature of an arena or social environment, where norms are contested and group dynamics influence socialization processes. This make bargaining less likely, and increases the impact of social influence (Johnston, 2001:499). Second, it creates group dynamics within the organization that are likely to affect policy outcomes, where identification with either the in-group or the out-group (or other groups), is likely to determine what norms are adopted. Third, the lack of shared norms also creates a lack of trust between states and groups of states, in turn requiring attention to state identities and especially role identities (see p.17). While role identities shared by European states are mainly restricted to ally and partner, role identities found in the Southern Africa include ally, enemy, hegemon and partner. I argue that the identity of the target state is likely to affect the way actors relate to these states, influencing processes of socialization. This relates to Johnston’s scope condition stating that identification with the socializing group increases the likelihood of both social influence and role-playing.

2.3.3 Hollow promises

According to Herbst (2007), African institutions tend to be hollow, meaning that member states may have few intentions of upholding the laws and rules of these organizations. This however, does not mean that African international organizations do not serve a concrete purpose. Historically, domestic forces have threatened
African leaders much more concretely than international concerns. The result is that African state leaders, in general, are much more attentive to the rational design of international institutions to protect and extend their domestic standing rather than strengthen their states’ standing on international issues. As a consequence, they are extremely enthusiastic about regional cooperation that highlights sovereignty, helps secure national leaders hold on power, and asks little in return (Herbst, 2007:130). By insisting on inclusive institutions with a high degree of democracy, African leaders have ensured that the probability of the institution taking action against any particular country is minimal (Herbst, 2007:136-37).

While this might be the modus operandi of many African state elites, also within SADC (Matlosa, 2005:6), Botswana and South Africa do not necessarily adopt this approach to regional cooperation. They are both democracies where the ruling parties enjoy a high degree of public support. Both governments have received more than 50 percent of the votes in every election since majority rule was introduced (Botswana: 1966, South Africa: 1994). Since 1995, both countries have been labelled free in Freedom Houses annual assessments of civil and political liberties. These two countries should therefore be more likely to fulfil their international obligations, than to use international institutions merely to bolster their own legitimacy.

However, while many of these institutions may have been created for questionable purposes, and their treaties contain obligations that are never intended to be implemented, state leaders have no guarantee that this will always be the case. In his analysis of European integration, Leon Lindberg (1970) introduces the concept of “forward linkage”. This describes a phenomenon where an obligation to participate in common decision-making spurs a process that considerably increases the scope of the system or its institutional capacities. The ambiguity of SADCs rules on peace and security issues has made it possible for member states to sign protocols and treaties without intentions of honouring them. As long as there is no agreement on how to interpret these legal texts, they represent no threat to state leaders that fear progressive norms. However, if member states start using certain parts of the legal framework for self-interested purposes, it becomes increasingly harder to ignore the
other, less desirable, aspects of the legal framework. In other words, treaties that initially were considered hollow may at some later time come to be seen as binding.

Related to this issue, is the use of legal texts as templates for right conduct. In her study of socialization within NATO, Gheciu (2005) argues that much of the “teaching” or persuading appears to involve agents from the defense organization offering legal, organizational and normative templates for reorganizing civil-military relations in new member states. While Gheciu interprets this as an instance of normative suasion, Johnston (2005:1023) suggests that the templates themselves could be responsible for eliciting new norms of behavior. To clarify: if normative suasion implies a teacher saying “this is the way you should do X, if you have identity Y”, he argues that the templates also can be seen to provide a “method for acting Y-like”. Hence, by this rationale, the mere existence of such templates could facilitate role-playing.

Johnston then goes on to question why these templates constrain actor behavior. Are these constrains merely institutional, prescribing the construction of new organizations with the related incentives to optimize material, social or psychological interests? Or are they ideational, the templates themselves embodying concepts of identity and interest? In the former case, templates might facilitate socialization through bargaining or social influence. In the latter, however, the templates do not necessarily only provide constrains or simplifying shortcuts regarding expected behavior. Rather, I argue that the templates can, in their own right, convey arguments that change the basic properties of agents, namely their identities and their interests. In Europe, such templates are normally accompanied by some authoritative actor or “teacher” eliciting community norms. In SADC however, because of the feature of hollow promises, the templates sometimes never become more than ideas in the treaties and protocols. I argue, however, that such templates still may have the ability change agents’ identities and interests. This is not very likely to happen when templates and state identities are on collision course. However, if the identity and interests of the target state is already “in tune” with the identity and interests inherent in the template, I argue that states can learn new conceptions of identity and interests from these templates, without the existence of a “teacher” or “authoritative actor”. In
this way, target states can actively internalize new understandings of appropriateness – in other words be socialized – solely by the power of the argument inherent in the template.

This leads to the identification of two scope conditions. First, the existence of legal templates with *explicit guidelines* for appropriate conduct make it easier for target states to identify and adopt appropriate behavior, thus increasing the likelihood of international socialization. Second, how states relate to, and interpret these legal texts is likely to be influenced by the identity of the member state. A state is more prone to follow templates that embody concepts of identity and interests that are compatible with its existing or desired identity. Thus, this confirms the importance of state identity as a scope condition of socialization

### 2.3.4 SADC scope conditions

As the previous discussion has demonstrated, African international institutions in general and SADC in particular differ from their European counterparts in several aspects. The aforementioned characteristics of fewer contact points, group dynamics, divergent values and hollow promises, are likely to affect processes of norm socialization in the region. Based on the original scope conditions identified in Checkel’s research project (2007), and the previous discussion, I therefore articulated a new set of scope conditions that are specific to the SADC context (see table 2).

In the analysis of the case studies, these scope conditions will be scrutinized in order to determine whether they have a significant impact, enabling or increasing the likelihood of any of the four socialization mechanisms to take place.
The label “SADC scope conditions” implies that they are inherent, but not exclusive to, the SADC context. The scope conditions originate both from Checkel’s framework (2.2.1-2.2.3) and from the recent discussion (2.3.1-2.3.3).
3. Methodology

This chapter presents the research methodology undertaken in this study. First, it presents how the qualitative case study, and the method of *structured, focused comparison*, is applied to study norm socialization within SADC. Second, it shows how the reliability and validity of the data is strengthened by the use of the process-tracing and data-triangulation. Third, it presents Adcock and Colliers (2001) model for increasing measurement validity in reference to the variables.

3.1 The qualitative case study

In accordance with Checkel’s recommendations, this investigation of regional socialization is performed as a case study.23 More specifically, it follows George and Bennett’s (2005) method of *structured, focused comparison*, using process-tracing as the main technique to guide the gathering and structuring of the empirical data.

George and Bennett (2005:17) define a case as “an instance of a class of events”. In this study, the class of events is socialization within international institutions. I study two “instances”, namely the socialization of South Africa and Botswana, respectively, into different degrees of compliance with the peace and security norms of SADC, in their foreign policy approach towards Zimbabwe. George and Bennett (2005:5) define the case study approach as a “detailed examination of an aspect of an historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events”. Mabry (2008:214-15) states that the “raison d’être of case study is deep understanding of particular instances of a phenomenon”. This implies that the investigation needs to go beyond countable aspects and trends. It demands an interest, not only in the overall patterns, but in the peculiarities of each case. The attention to detail that the case study offers, allows for contextualized comparisons of

23 According to Checkel (2007:817), the case study technique is a preferred approach to studying international socialization because it is “especially well suited to establishing scope conditions and examining causal mechanisms”. Several of the contributors to Checkel’s volume use process-tracing as their main method.
phenomena, which larger scale statistical studies do not (George and Bennett, 2005:19).

In this study, the cases have been selected for two main reasons. First, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, they represent diverging and unexpected approaches to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, because these states often are seen as the democratic forerunners of the sub-region, it is of particular interest to study how they relate to and are influenced by SADC’s peace and security norms.

3.1.1 Structured, focused comparison

The methodological framework of this study is based on, but not equal to, the method of *structured, focused comparison* (George and Bennett, 2005). This is a method that makes it possible to draw generalizations from a small number of cases. It requires the researcher to structure the analysis of each case around a set of ‘standardized general questions’ and focus selectively on those aspects of each case that are relevant for the research question. The main objective of this task is not the question formulation in itself, but to insist that case researchers follow a procedure of systematic data compilation. Hence, while not asking the question explicitly, I present the following three-step procedure to ensure that data is compiled and analysed systematically – and equally – in both cases:

First, I start by briefly presenting the state’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe during the crisis, and determine to which degree it conforms to SADC’s peace and security norms. Second, I analyse the historical and institutional context of the state in question. Historical context refers to features of the state that are consequences of historical developments, including prior beliefs, identity and identification. Institutional context refers to the configuration of the state, comprising bureaucratic capacity, degree of power centralization, and the novelty of the situation. The objective of this task is to set the stage for each case and determine the configuration of the scope conditions that are properties of the target state (See table 3, p. 33). Third, I analyse whether the foreign policy outcome in each case is the result of regional socialization by scoring the indicators of each socializing mechanism,
namely bargaining, social influence, role-playing and normative suasion. Furthermore, I identify the scope conditions enabling this mechanism to operate. To avoid drawing hasty conclusions in regard to the impact of socialization, I also present rival explanations and discuss whether they are able to account for the actor’s norm compliant behaviour.

*External validity* concerns the issue of determining whether findings can be generalized beyond the specific case study. The aim of this study is to apply Checkel’s model to the African context in order to test for explanatory power and to stimulate further theory development. Considering that the scope conditions identified are specific to the SADC context, the findings should be applicable mainly to other cases of regional norm socialization in Southern Africa. Additionally, the model can serve as basis for the development of frameworks for studying international socialization outside Europe.

### 3.2 Data

*Reliability* relates to whether the researcher demonstrates that the operations of a study can be repeated with the same results. The objective is to minimize errors and biases in the study (Yin, 2003:37). This requires transparency with regard to choice of methods and the way data is analysed. In this study, I increase reliability by being explicit about the reasons for choices made in the course of both the data collection and during the analysis.

*Internal validity* concerns the establishment of a causal relationship whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions. This implies exploring the possibility that a proposed causal relationship might be caused by a third variable, a so-called spurious effect (Yin, 2003:34). I enhance internal validity by explicitly operationalizing the variables and addressing rival explanations. The process-tracing technique contributes to increase internal validity, by focusing on documenting causal relationships at the micro level.
3.2.1 Process-tracing and data triangulation

By combining process-tracing and data-triangulation, the reliability of the findings are enhanced. The aim of process-tracing is to illuminate a causal relationship between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable.

Process tracing forces the investigator to take equifinality into account, that is, to consider the alternative paths through which the outcome could have occurred (…) it offers the possibility of mapping out one or more potential causal paths that are consistent with the outcome and the process-tracing evidence in a single case (George and Bennett, 2005:206-07).

The application of process-tracing usually implies that one ought to carefully map the process and explore the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism (Checkel, 2005:6). Thus, the technique of process-tracing is useful when connecting international institutions with socializing outcomes through the four causal mechanisms presented in the previous chapter.

The data for process-tracing is overwhelmingly qualitative in nature, and includes historical memoirs, interviews, press accounts and documents (Checkel, 2005:6). This fits well with the method of data triangulation, where data reliability is strengthened when different modes of data collection lead to the same result. The intention is that by using preferably three, or more, modes of data collection, at least two will produce similar answers. If the data collection produces three different answers, the questions need to be reframed, the method reconsidered, or both (Mabry, 2008:221). In this study, I triangulate data from multiple sources including: qualitative interviews with scholars and officials in Botswana’s and South Africa’s foreign affairs departments; written primary sources such as treaties, protocols, communiqués and government documents; and secondary literature including newspaper articles and scholarly analyses.

3.2.2 Interview design and selection of the informants

Gaining access to government officials and politicians in developing countries can be demanding. The challenges include identifying the relevant, knowledgeable people, getting their attention and scheduling an interview. In both South Africa and
Botswana preliminary talks with Norwegian and foreign scholars working in the field, proved helpful in this process. The staffs at the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria, as well as the University of Botswana, were welcoming and helpful in advising me about potential informants both within the departments of foreign affairs as well as within the academic sphere.

In both countries I focused on reaching informants that worked within the ambit of regional foreign policy formulation, either as government officials, other practitioners or scholars. In total, 9 respondents participated in semi-structured interviews, 4 within Botswana and 5 in South Africa. For an overview of the informants, see appendix 1. Additionally, I had informal conversations with 8 other relevant people. This group constituted scholars from South Africa, Botswana and Norway, in addition to a long-time consultant to the Botswana government with experience and knowledge of the workings of the Botswana society. These interviews proved crucial in getting background information and access to relevant sources. As such, they contributed to increase the quality of the semi-structured interviews.

The interviews were conducted in Gaborone and Pretoria in the period February 3–21 2009. They were semi-structured, meaning that they were performed on the basis of an interview guide consisting of approximately 20 questions. All the questions were spelled out and formulated concretely in the interview guide. However, I asked additional questions and follow-ups depending on the informant’s position and knowledge; and the general course of the conversation. The questions in the interview guide reflected five main topics: (1) what is the government’s view on the Zimbabwe crisis? (2) How have domestic pressures affected the decision-making process? (3) How have regional and extra-regional pressures affected the decision-making process? (4) What does the informant characterize as the identity of the state? (5) How consistent is the government’s foreign policy?

Local scholars advised me that recording the interviews might inhibit the informants and create fears that the information gathered might be used for unintended purposes.

24 Jan Isaksen and Elling Tømmeland at Chr. Michelsen’s Institute and Cedric de Coning at NUPI were particularly helpful in this regard.
at a later stage. This could have led the informants to withhold information or opinions that could have been important. I therefore chose to take notes during the interviews and transcribe them shortly after the session, while the interview was fresh in my mind. Generally, I noted keywords. However, when it was evident that the phrasing of an answer was particularly important, I took down exact quotes. In sum, this ensured a more confidential and trustful atmosphere during the interview, without diminishing the value of the information gathered to any relevant extent.

There are primarily three limitations with my selection of respondents. First, the absence of politicians in my informant group can have impeded access to important insights. For obvious reasons, the task of reaching this segment of policymakers is extremely difficult and not one I engaged in. However, while I haven’t interviewed this group personally, I have found ways to reduce the effects of this shortcoming. By referring to official speeches and monographs, biographies and transcripts of press interviews, I have gained access information thematically similar to the topics in my interview guide. A second limitation is the relatively small number of informants. However, this is countered by the use of data triangulation, preventing reliance on only one source of information. Additionally, the consistency of the informant’s statements indicates that a saturation point was reached and that a higher number of respondents would not have significantly altered the overall findings (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:73). A third limitation is the credibility of the informants. According to Rubin and Rubin (1995:224-25), interviews in which truth is most routinely problematic are evaluation interviews where the performance of the informant is questioned and valued. The informants interviewed for this study often receive funding from external donors. Additionally their performance is evaluated by their employers. Hence, they might be inclined to inflate their role in certain processes or paint a rosy picture of events to boost their own or their government’s stature. To overcome this problem I made an effort to show understanding for the obstacles that policymakers meet, and tried to avoid making informants feel obliged to give formalistic statements on how things “should have been done” (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:224-25).
1995:218-23). Data triangulation and comparing statements with those of other unrelated informants was crucial in weighing the evidence presented, and discounting for bias.

3.3 Validity of variables

I adopt Adcock and Colliers (2001) model for ensuring measurement validity in both qualitative and quantitative research. Adcock and Collier describe the relationship between the initial concepts and actual observations. This is done by operationalizing concepts by creating indicators that are subsequently scored with reference to the empirical data. According to Adcock and Collier, measurement validity is achieved when the “scores meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept” (2001:530). By sticking to Adcock and Collier’s method of conceptualizing, operationalizing and creating indicators of key variables; and using case study and process-tracing to observe these variables, I improve validity.

In this study, the independent variables are synonymous with the causal mechanisms described in the previous chapter: strategic calculation in the form of bargaining or social influence; role-playing; and normative suasion. The operationalization of these concepts and their subsequent indicators are based on Checkel’s operationalizations. In the chapter presenting the theoretical framework, these operationalizations were fleshed out by developing indicators to achieve a higher degree of precision and quality of measurement (see p. 19).

The dependent variable is the state’s degree of compliance with the SADC peace and security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. However, as mentioned previously, the SADC treaty is ambiguous and can be seen to support both the norms of non-indifference as well as the norms of non-interference. I approach this in the following way: Depending on the degree of compliance with either set of norms, foreign policy outcomes will be distributed on a continuum where compliance with

the norms of non-interference and the norms of non-indifference constitute the two extremes.

Foreign policy outcomes in compliance with the *norms of non-interference*, will then include: states disregarding or minimizing the importance of human rights violations or unconstitutional changes of government within other states; outright support for the member state in question; and at the extreme end of the scale, threats or punitive measures directed at actors complying with the norms of non-indifference. Foreign policy outcomes with a high degree of compliance with the norms of *non-indifference* will include: vocal criticism of human rights violations within other member states, the call for initiating legal measures in accordance with international law, the issuing of sanctions or other punitive measures; and at the extreme end of the continuum, intervention with either civilian or military personnel.
4. South Africa

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to determine what causal mechanisms can explain South Africa’s compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The core argument is that the mechanisms of primarily social influence and secondarily bargaining, contributed to socialize South Africa into a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-interference. Moreover, due to cognitive dissonance, a process where preferences are adjusted to actions, these norms were internalized.27

Second, to identify the scope conditions which have enabled the main socializing mechanism to operate. These include: (1) the group dynamics of SADC, (2) the prior beliefs of the ruling party, (3) that the socializing actor was an authoritative member of in-group to which the South Africa seeks to belong; (4) South Africa’s identity as an “Africa-oriented partner”; (5) a novel and uncertain environment; and (6) the high degree of power centralization in the government.

4.1 Foreign policy towards Zimbabwe

Assessing the period up until 2004, Schoeman and Alden conclude that:

South African foreign policy seems to oscillate between public support for the Mugabe regime, based on the conviction that the objective should be to contribute bilaterally and multilaterally to an internal solution to the crisis, and bouts of public, though guarded criticism based on frustration with the deteriorating situation and the impact on South Africa and the rest of the region (2004:2).

This policy of constructive engagement with Mugabe is often dubbed “quiet diplomacy”.28 While South African leaders, at times, have been frank about the failures of this approach, they have been quick to point out that the alternative, open criticism, or what they call megaphone-diplomacy, is out of the question (Schoeman and Alden, 2004:4). In 2002 South Africa pushed for a harder line against Zimbabwe,

27 The mechanism of cognitive dissonance will be further elaborated later in this chapter. See p. 56.
agreeing to suspend the country from the Commonwealth. When the Commonwealth continued the suspension of Zimbabwe the following year, Nigeria and South Africa opposed the decision arguing that progress was being made in normalising the situation. When the Commonwealth still went forward with its decision, South Africa expressed its strong disagreement, stating that there had been no mandate laid down for Zimbabwe’s continued suspension and referring to it as “undemocratic and unhelpful” (Graham, 2005:141, Nathan, 2005).

After a brutal crackdown against the opposition in March 2007, South Africa issued its strongest criticism of Zimbabwe to that date. Nevertheless, Tshwane claimed it would stick to its policy of quiet diplomacy because open criticism had yielded no results (The Guardian, 2007). 29 Subsequently, a SADC summit in Tanzania called for a SADC sponsored inter-party dialogue that was to be facilitated by South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki. However, South Africa’s so-called quiet diplomacy continued more or less unaltered.

In 2008 Zimbabwe held presidential and parliamentary elections characterized by pre-election violence, persecutions and arrests of opposition politicians and human rights violations on behalf of the security forces. After the first round of elections, the South African government backed the SADC mission’s statement that the elections had been a "peaceful and credible expression of the will of the people" (Thyne, 2006). After the elections, however, South Africa worked towards reaching a consensus agreement within SADC on a common approach towards Zimbabwe. This was done simultaneously with President Mbeki’s efforts as a mediator in the negotiations between ZANU-PF and MDC. While Mbeki resigned as president of South Africa in September 2008, these efforts finally led to the creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009.

Nevertheless, in general, South Africa’s stance throughout the period from 2000 until the GNU was formed in February 2009 was to regard Zimbabwe’s problems as primarily internal, and to be solved by its own leaders.

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29 Tshwane is South Africa’s administrative capital also known as Pretoria.
Tshwane’s foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe in this period involved disregard or minimization of the importance of human rights violations or unconstitutional changes of government in Zimbabwe; outright support for Mugabe; and criticism of other actors or states acting in according to the norms of non-indifference. Thus, I conclude that it constitutes a foreign policy outcome with a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-interference.

4.2 Historical and institutional context of South Africa

The objective of this section is to set the stage for the analysis and determine the configuration of the scope conditions that are properties of the socializing actor, namely South Africa. To present the historical and institutional context in a systematic fashion, the discussion is structured around the following topics: prior beliefs; identity; identification; bureaucratic capacity; degree of power centralization; and the novelty of the environment. These topics relate to the SADC scope conditions presented in the previous chapter (see table 2, p. 33).

4.2.1 Prior beliefs

When the ANC came to power in 1994 the party had struggled for almost a century to introduce democracy, majority rule and human rights to South Africa. The Freedom Charter of 1955, containing the core principles of the ANC called for equal rights for all national groups and had an explicit focus on human rights in its approach to the struggle against apartheid.\(^30\) ANC’s comprehensive foreign policy document (ANC, 1994) indicates that the organization carries with it a strong dedication to human rights and democracy when it comes to foreign policy as well. Considering the importance of external assistance for the victory of the majority in South Africa, it has been important for South Africa not only to advocate these principles

\(^30\) The Freedom Charter was the statement of core principles of the South African Congress Alliance, which consisted of the African National Congress and its allies the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People's Congress. The charter was adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, on 26 June 1955.
domestically, but also translate them into ambitious and idealistic foreign policy goals.

Simultaneously, the ANC, as a liberation movement with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, felt most at home in the Non-Aligned Movement. It was supportive of other liberation struggles and antagonistic towards Western powers that buttressed the apartheid regime (Nathan, 2008:2). This orientation is anti-imperialist in the sense that it rejects the interference of foreign – often Western – powers on the African continent. It is fundamentally sceptical of the intentions of these actors and sees their actions as attempts to exploit African states and their resources. This is combined with elements of Pan-Africanism, an ideology that calls for a politically united Africa and solidarity among African states. 31 It rejects all shades of imperialism on the continent, and underscores the need for African solidarity. In its extreme form, this ideology rejects critique of African states or state elites as a betrayal of the Pan-African cause. Mbeki and his supporters within the ANC have been sympathetic to these principles (see p.58)

According to Checkel, normative suasion is more likely when the target of socialization has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency’s message. The ANC carries with it two sets of ideologies that at times are in opposition to each other. While the legacy of human rights and democracy is somewhat inconsistent with the norms of non-interference, the principles of anti-imperialism and Pan-Africanism are to some extent inconsistent with the norms of non-indifference. However, it is not possible to say that either of these two ideologies have enough foothold in the ANC to rule out compliance with either extreme of SADC’s peace and security norms.

31 This world-view is related to the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) that emerged in South Africa in the 60s, fronted by its leader, the late Steve Biko. From its onset, the BCM aggressively launched an attack on traditional White values, especially the ‘condescending’ values of Whites of liberal opinion. The BCM spurred a greater cohesiveness and solidarity amongst black groups in general and the creation of a distinct Black identity in South Africa.
4.2.2 Identity

One of the critical challenges that have confronted South Africa in its regional relations has been how to relate to its neighbours in a way that does not suggest insensitive hegemonism, but at the same time provides regional leadership (Matlosa, 2007:104-06). South Africa holds a dominant position in Africa as a whole and in Southern Africa in particular. With a gross domestic product valued at US$ 453.3 billion (2006), making up nearly a quarter of the continent’s total, it is the economic powerhouse of Africa. In terms of military power, South Africa takes the lead. Despite the fact that South Africa still is a developing country with a relatively weak state (Nathan, 2006), the country stands unchallenged in terms of material capacities in the sub-region.

Since Apartheid's demise, this has made South African foreign policy formation a balancing act. On the one hand, policymakers wanted to implement the ANC’s ambitious foreign policy goals: the African Renaissance and its two main institutions the African Union and NEPAD. However, before even considering the feasibility of this project, South African leaders needed the goodwill of wary neighbour states. The uneasy balance between Tshwane’s wish to portray itself as a partner, and the neighbouring states’ perceptions of South Africa as a hegemon, created one of the major headaches for the country’s foreign policy makers. This dynamic has been instrumental in determining the leeway of political leaders in the formation of South African foreign policy. In order to change the regional perception of South Africa, Tshwane has had to strengthen and mediate its role identity as an “Africa-oriented partner” through both words and actions (Schoeman, 2007). The mantra among informants in the DFA: “what is good for South Africa is good for the whole continent” illustrates this thinking.

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32 GDP (purchasing power parity). The CIA World Factbook
33 At least if measured in terms of military spending. At its lowest, in 1999, South Africa’s military expenditure was still 30 percent of the Sub-Saharan total, and 20 percent of Africa’s total.
South Africa’s *type identity* is Southern African and democratic, while its *role identity* leans towards “Africa-oriented partner”. Especially this latter role identity is likely to influence the socialization process, since it affects the way institutions relate to states, as well as how states relate to one another. This argument is also relevant for South Africa’s relation to the in-group.

### 4.2.3 Identification

SADC is characterized by strong elements of group dynamics, where the former liberation states constitute the most cohesive faction, the in-group. The leaders of these states are determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity, and adhere strictly to the norms of non-interference. “Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid”, this posture prohibits liberation movement states from publicly criticising each other (Nathan, 2006:611). Members of the out-group, like Botswana and Zambia, are viewed as second-class members because they have no history of liberation struggle (Orbon, 2009).

South Africa, however, does not fit easily into either the in-group or the out-group. On the one hand, South Africa’s road to majority rule is a result of both violent struggle and negotiations. On the other hand, the ANC is indebted, both ideologically and materially, to the liberation movements that supported them in crucial periods (Mills and Clapham, 1991:9, Schoeman and Alden, 2004:3). Now, leaders like Robert Mugabe, Namibia’s Sam Nujoma and Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos feel that they preceded the South African leadership in the liberation struggle and complain that the ANC government has not repaid the sacrifices their countries made for the liberation of South Africa (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003:186). While South Africa today is the most powerful in economic and military terms, Mugabe’s legacy as a frontrunner in the liberation movement has enabled Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence in the region. In this way the legacy of liberation politics is instrumental for the power dynamics in the region, creating a balance of power based more on history than on size and resources (Nathan, 2005:367).
A scope condition of both social influence and role-playing is when the target state identifies with the socializing group. South Africa’s debt and affinity for the liberation movement states in the region, makes Tshwane identify with SADC’s in-group. This identification stems not only from historical ties, but also from strategic considerations, in terms of realizing the “African Agenda”. An additional scope condition that increases the likelihood of normative suasion is when the socializing agency is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong. In SADC, Zimbabwe’s strong position makes it the authoritative member of the in-group of former liberation states. This is something Tshwane’s policymakers cannot ignore when trying to implement their African agenda and strengthen their identity as an “Africa-oriented partner”.

### 4.2.4 Bureaucratic capacity

During the Apartheid era, South African governments followed a traditional Western – industrial world – colonial policy approach, consisting of incremental policy changes controlled by white bureaucratic elites and aimed at preserving the status quo. From 1994 the policymaking processes changed with the emergence of a representative and legitimate government. The bureaucracy became a mix of new civil servants working next to Apartheid-era civil functionaries. While the former tended to emphasize internationalism and solidarity with the problems of the developing world, the latter embraced the logic of neo-realism, focusing on trade and the self-interest of the state (Nieuwkerk, 2006:91-92). Despite efforts to address these shortcomings, some of the ministerial departments were still transformed only on the senior management levels at the turn of the millennium (BooySEN, 2001). This created problems in formulating and coordinating a coherent foreign policy.

A scope condition that increases the likelihood of role-playing, is when the actor’s bureaucratic capacity is low, impeding it from resorting to cost-benefit calculations typical of bargaining and social influence. This scope condition was present in South Africa.
4.2.5 Degree of power centralization

Both Mandela and Mbeki’s cabinets were characterized by a top-down approach to governing the state. This contributed to making foreign policy more susceptible to the vanities of the top leadership in general and the president in particular. Decisions were usually taken at the level of the presidency, if not by the president himself. The feature of non-transparency was to be strengthened under the presidency of Mbeki. His new system of integrated governance contributed to concentrate power in the hands of a small number of individuals occupying senior decision making positions in both the executive structures of government and of the ruling party (Nieuwkerk, 2006:106-12). Under both presidents, societal interests, such as trade unions and other mass movements, had almost no impact on foreign policy. While they were allowed to voice their complaints, this did not alter the guidelines set out by the government.

The degree of power centralization within the target state is a scope condition increasing the likelihood of socialization within SADC. South African foreign policymaking has been characterized by a high degree of power centralization in the government. This contributed to make South African leaders more open to influence from the international community, than from civil society or other domestic actors.

4.2.6 Novelty of the environment

When the government of national unity led by the ANC took office in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy had to be designed more or less from scratch. The ANC had only limited experience in foreign relations and certainly no experience with foreign policy-making through the state apparatus. Additionally, the rapidly changing international environment further complicated foreign policy formation for the new government. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union created an unstable and unpredictable international environment. Moreover, in the 1990s Southern Africa’s role in world politics diminished. The “War on Terror” starting in 2001, did not change this situation.
A scope condition of normative suasion is when the agent is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information. This scope condition was existent in South Africa’s case.

This section has revealed the following scope conditions: The ruling party’s prior beliefs were not inconsistent with the norms of non-interference. South Africa had a strong relation to SADC’s in-group; a desire to strengthen its identity as an “Africa-oriented partner”. Furthermore the government was in a novel environment; had a low bureaucratic capacity and a high degree of power centralization in the government.

4.3 Analysing regional socialization

The following analysis will show that social influence, in the form of concerted condemnation and criticism from the in-group of liberation movement states, contributed to cajole South Africa into following the norms of non-interference in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.

4.3.1 Strategic calculation through social influence

The first indicator of strategic calculation in South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe is the way foreign policy decisions are framed as calculations of costs and benefits. According to DFA official Ghulam H. Asmal (2009), South Africa’s relatively successful mediation in Zimbabwe has “enhanced South Africa’s legitimacy as a broker and credible player in the region”. However, Asmal claims that this is only an unintended consequence of Tshwane’s approach, and that the process “has not been used to increase the stature of South Africa or to position [themselves] in the international community”. There are reasons to be critical to this statement, not at least considering how highly the virtue of modesty is held within the ANC. South Africa does not necessarily have an interest in increasing its stature per se. However,

35 South Africa’s mediation effort can be deemed successful in reference to the creation of the Government of National Unity in February 2009.

it does have an interest in being accepted and trusted by the regional society of states and especially by the in-group. This became particularly acute as the implementation of the African Agenda became the overall objective of South African regional foreign policy towards the end of the 1990s. The result was an increased adherence to non-interference and multilateralism, and an aversion to criticise or in any way go against the norms of the in-group.

Rather than opt for unilateral action, South Africa has been highly pragmatic as to what policies on Zimbabwe it sees as feasible and constructive. This is reflected in the way South Africa has rejected SADC as an instrument to gather support for an interventionist approach towards Mugabe and ZANU-PF. According to DFA official, Makaya:

The pressure from SADC has to be collective to be effective. It is impossible to get a consensus on such criticism. Mozambique, Namibia, Angola and South Africa, all have solidarity with Mugabe stemming from liberation politics (Makaya, 2009).

This implies a pragmatic approach to the promotion of human rights. Implicitly, Makaya acknowledges the need for criticism, but as long as unison multilateral criticism is unachievable, silence, or quiet diplomacy, is preferable to unilateral action. The possibility of creating a second block of states within SADC that were critical of Zimbabwe was also out of the question. This would only serve to split SADC, and further undermine the resolve and efficiency of the organization. Moreover, it would sabotage South Africa’s attempts at improving its role identity as a partner vis-à-vis the in-group of liberation movement states. After all, this group of states were the ones most likely to sabotage Mbeki’s long-term objective of realizing the African agenda (Schoeman and Alden, 2004).

The second indicator of strategic calculation is the way South Africa has manipulated norms strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization. In its approach to Mugabe Tshwane has used, and interpreted, international norms to justify self-interested claims and frame preferences and actions as norm consistent. South African officials and leaders openly endorse the norms of non-interference, stating that South Africa cannot criticize Zimbabwe. However, South Africa has not abandoned its interests in the promotion of human rights and democracy, something
clearly seen in its commitment to the International Criminal Court (this will be further discussed shortly) and the resources it spends to realize the African Agenda. However, the combination of adherence to the norm of non-interference, and at the same time a commitment to human rights and democracy makes foreign policy making a difficult task. When these two considerations come on collision course, however, it is the norms of non-interference that prevail (Nathan, 2008).

Having found indicators of strategic calculation, it is necessary to determine whether social influence or bargaining has been most dominant. Social influence requires that the international institution constitutes a social environment that induces change in agent behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments. Through the 1990s, South Africa intervened in several internal conflicts in the region, to a large extent acting in compliance with the norms of non-indifference. These efforts included an extended diplomatic intervention after the coup in Nigeria in 1993 and a military intervention along with Botswana to mitigate political turmoil in Lesotho in 1998. Moreover, South Africa opposed the in-group of liberation movement states’ decision to intervene on the side of Congolese president Laurent Kabila in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998. These efforts were sanctioned by the in-group, leading South Africa to back down and adopt policies more in compliance with the norms of non-interference. The following paragraphs will briefly sketch out the consequences of these events. 37

As a response to South Africa’s diplomatic intervention in Nigeria, the in-group threatened neither military action nor sanctions, but rather regional isolation. They accused South Africa of “expediency” and failing to consult them on African affairs (Nieuwkerk, 2006:143). Thabo Mbeki later concluded that the defeat in creating regional support for a tough stance on Nigeria “highlighted the potential limits of

South Africa’s influence as an individual country (...) and the need to act in concert with others and to forge strategic alliances in pursuit of foreign policy objectives” (Mbeki in Gumede, 2005:179, Sparks, 2003). For Mbeki and the South African government, in-group acceptance was seen as both a means to implement the African Agenda, as well as an end in itself, due to historical ties. Thus, regional isolation was just as severe as any material coercive action.

The intervention in Lesotho restored order in the long run, but was a rather questionable success in the short term (Vleuten, 2008:206). In addition to dozens of civilian casualties, eight South African and an estimated 58 Basotho soldiers were killed. Anarchy and public demonstrations that had followed the invasion, led to looting of the capital and the destruction of two-thirds of commercial property in other major cities (Nathan, 2006:612). While the consequences of the intervention did not persuade South Africa to discard peacekeeping or peacemaking as foreign policy instrument, it certainly did make Tshwane wary of the potential consequences of an aggressive promotion of democracy in the region. For one, it exposed the limits of South African military capabilities and led to widespread domestic criticism of the government (Southall, 1998). More important in terms of regional socialization, South Africa’s choice to intervene without the explicit consent of the SADC’s in-group increased tensions in regional politics. It fed into rival SADC member’s (primarily Zimbabwe’s) accusations that South Africa operated with double standards. South Africa had chosen to intervene militarily in Lesotho with a faulty SADC mandate while simultaneously objecting to the calls for a SADC intervention in the DRC (Landsberg, 2000:113, Mpanyane, 2009). This created problems in relation to South Africa’s role identity vis-à-vis the in-group of liberations movement states. The most tangible result of these realizations was the formulation of the White paper on South African participation in international peace missions, approved in October 1998, immediately after the intervention. According to Santho (2000), the white paper was “profoundly influenced by the disastrous intervention in Lesotho” and emphasized the need for a clear international mandate prior to the deployment of military contingents, as well as concern for South Africa’s limited resources and capabilities (DFA, 1999).
In relation to the intervention in the DRC, it seems that Mandela and South Africa became somewhat more pragmatic in their approach towards the in-group. In contrast with the diplomatic intervention in Nigeria, the government now started taking the initiative, actively manipulating parties and seeking compromise to enhance their overall objectives of realizing the African Agenda and developing its role identity as an “Africa-oriented” partner vis-à-vis the states in the region. (Berman and Sams, 2000:179, Nathan, 2006:613-14, Southscan, 1998). This indicates that Tshwane adopted a more active approach, where bargaining played a larger role.

When studying these three events, an emerging pattern is how the in-group of former liberation movement states constituted a social environment within the organization, distributing social rewards and punishments to force South Africa into compliance with its norms. In other words, I argue that, social influence was the mechanism leading South Africa to alter its foreign policies to comply with the norms of non-interference. However, in the course of these events, South Africa’s preferences changed to very little degree. Tshwane’s commitment to human rights and accountability remained long-term objectives, as did the strengthening of South Africa’s role identity as an “Africa-oriented partner” vis-à-vis the regional states.

Faced with the growing crisis in Zimbabwe at the turn of the millennium, these previous experiences made the mere possibility of social sanctions form a constraint on Tshwane’s foreign policy formation. This informed South Africa’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe. In the words of Edward Makaya, director for bilateral relations in the DFA:

What would South Africa have achieved with a hard stance on Zimbabwe? Only African isolation. Then Mugabe’s criticism [that South Africa is acting as a bully on the continent] would have been right. In this regard, the lessons learned in Nigeria and Lesotho were crucial in developing South Africa’s foreign policy approach in the region (Makaya, 2009).

According to Johnston, “social influence rests on the `influenced´ actor having prior identification with a relevant reference group”. The importance of this prior identification can be illustrated by South Africa’s refusal to sign a non-surrender agreement with the US after the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. The creation of the ICC had created fears in Washington that the US
would lose jurisdiction over its own soldiers in foreign territory. Consequently, the American government passed an act restricting U.S. cooperation with the ICC, making U.S. support of peacekeeping missions and U.S. military aid conditional on the conclusion of bilateral non-surrender agreements (Kelley, 2007). When Tshwane refused to give in to American pressure to sign the non-surrender agreement, Washington cut off military aid to the country. While South Africa had bowed to the social sanctions from the SADC in-group, it was not willing to heed to Washington’s pressures. The lack of both identification with, and need for acceptance from, the US, made South Africa prioritize normative ideals, in terms of adherence to human rights, over apparently materialist interests. To South Africa, neither the social nor the material components of Washington’s rewards were considered important enough to sacrifice its commitment to the ICC.

In relation to the crisis in Zimbabwe, this dynamic is reflected in the way the government has rejected Western criticism of their approach to Mugabe (The Guardian, 2008). At the AU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2008, SADC – and South Africa in particular – was given the task of finding a solution to the impasse. However, the US and the UK did not want to trust the AU with that task. Instead, they intended to pass a resolution in the UN Security Council imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. South Africa responded by working actively to convince China and Russia that sanctions would be counterproductive to the AU’s ability to engage successfully with Zimbabwe. In the end, the resolution was voted down (Makaya, 2009). Paradoxically, the pressure from the extra-regional actors seems to have strengthened the resolve of the South African government to choose its own path:

> We value the EU, but I get frustrated when people judge or prejudge our effort (...) This is, after all, our region and we know how to act. In our opinion, the solution is there. It would therefore assist a great deal if the friends of the parties [referring to UK and US relationship to the MDC] would stick to our approach (Asmal, 2009).

To sum up, the empirical data indicates that the mechanism of social influence, and to a certain extent bargaining, was crucial in socializing South Africa into compliance with the norms of non-interference in its foreign policy on Zimbabwe.
4.3.2 Internalization of the norms of non-interference

The first indicator of norm internalization is when policymakers provide a full and thorough justification for their actions, arguing that it is the “right thing to do”. The empirical data suggests that Tshwane sees its foreign policy choices not only as strategically, but also morally correct. In 2001 a senior member of the ANC justified the “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe by arguing that South Africa would not repeat Mandela’s “terrible mistake” when he acted as a “bully” against the Nigerian dictatorship and “everyone stood aside and we were isolated” (Nathan, 2005:368). Not only does this statement show that the government has adapted its policies in the face of regional protest. By regarding the country’s former behaviour as a “terrible mistake” and South Africa as acting as a “bully”, it also shows an adoption of the language of the regional actors critical of South Africa’s initial policy of human rights promotion. This indicates an internalization of the norm of non-interference beyond that of strategic calculation.

This way of thinking was also common among the informants within South Africa’s DFA. They emphasized that South Africa was neither morally nor politically authorised to impose a solution or intervene in the conflict between the parties in Zimbabwe (Asmal, 2009, Makaya, 2009, Reid, 2009, Vilakazi, 2009). The correctness of South Africa’s approach was further elaborated with the view that “a negotiated inclusive political process will lead to an inclusive long-lasting settlement. It had to be led by the parties themselves, and be driven from within” (Reid, 2009). On the question of avoiding a hegemon approach, Vilakazi says “after all South Africa’s approach has done so that Mbeki has the ears of all parties. The UK burnt their bridges as early as 1997” (Vilakazi, 2009). This contributes to show that policymakers provide thorough and well-founded justifications for their choices, indicating that the norms South Africa initially had complied with as a result of strategic calculation now are internalized.

The second indicator of internalization of the norms of non-interference, is the fact that South African foreign policy is both coherent and consistent across contexts (Nathan, 2008, Nathan, 2005). In the UN Security Council, South African diplomats
have worked to vote down sanctions against Zimbabwe, upsetting both EU and US diplomats. More generally, they have promoted an anti-imperialist agenda seeking to keep matters of state’s internal affairs out of the UNSC (Nathan, 2008:6). Instead, South African diplomats have forwarded matters, such as accusations of human rights abuses pointed at Burma and Sudan, to the UN Human Rights Committee. South Africa’s adherence to the norm of non-interference is evident also in its relations to the regime in Sudan. As a member of the UN Security Council, South Africa has supported the Sudanese government in rejecting sanctions against combatants who attack civilians and obstruct peace efforts, and against parties to the conflict in Sudan that refuse to co-operate with UNAMID, the UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur (Nathan, 2008:1). On the issue of Zimbabwe, Mbeki has spoken with one voice to both the West and to the sub-region, emphasizing negotiations; that South Africa cannot impose its will on Zimbabwe; and that South Africa cannot openly criticize Mugabe. These findings not only indicate norm internalization, they also exclude the existence of role-playing. After all, role-playing would entail that agents were “unreflected as to their justification of their norm-compliant behaviour” and that compliance were consistent within contexts, but inconsistent across contexts.

According to Checkel (2005), normative suasion is the only operating mechanism that leads directly to internalization of norms. However, neither the previous discussion nor the empirical data suggests that norm-conforming behaviour, in this case, is a result of interactions characterized as “persuasion, normative suasion or learning”. Rather, social influence and bargaining hold ground as the dominant socializing mechanism.

If normative suasion was not the operating mechanism, how can we explain that South Africa seems to have internalized the norms of non-interference? I propose one main cause, and two contributory causes. The main cause is the effect of cognitive dissonance. This is a condition that arises when an actor’s behaviour is on a collision course with its preferences. For most actors, this discrepancy between conduct and preferences is not sustainable. According to Festinger (1957), “actors who – for ulterior reasons – act in a certain manner and need to justify these activities to themselves and others begin to internalize the justification, even though they were
initially critical of it”. Due to social influence and bargaining, Tshwane was forced to adopt policies that were on collision course with its stated preferences emphasizing the promotion of democracy and human rights. Cognitive dissonance led Tshwane to adapt its preferences to conform to its behaviour. This secondary mechanism of socialization was facilitated, first, by the Pan-Africanist and Anti-Imperialism sympathies inherent in the ANC leadership in general, and with Mbeki in particular. Second, it was strengthened by the external pressure from the West and the UK. According to Johnston (2001:500), the discomfort with being perceived as inconsistent or hypocritical in relation to past actions and commitments, and the positive moods with being viewed as consistent with one’s self-professed identity, leads people whose consistency is challenged to respond by greater conformist behaviour. South Africa had for a long time sought to strengthen its role identity as an “Africa-oriented partner” in relation to the other states in the region. The more the criticism from the West increased, the more important it was for South Africa to show its commitment to the norms appropriate for its role identity. Identification with the in-group, as well as criticism from the authoritative member, Zimbabwe, strengthened this dynamic. Tshwane could not retreat from its position on Zimbabwe without seeming to retreat from its dedication to Pan-Africanism in the face of “imperialist” pressures.

4.3.3 Competing explanations

In order to rule out other explanations for South Africa’s compliance with the norms of non-interference in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, this section explores two competing, and one counterfactual, explanations. First, it discusses the impact of individuals, second, it investigates a strictly materialist rational approach, and third it examines why domestic pressures did not lead to a change in South Africa’s foreign policy.

Exploring the impact of individuals, it is evident that the crisis in Zimbabwe, and South Africa’s foreign policy response, coincides more or less with the change of presidents in South Africa from Mandela to Mbeki. This could indicate that South Africa’s compliance with the norms of non-interference in its foreign policy towards
Zimbabwe stems from the preferences of Mbeki, and not from any processes of regional socialization. Without doubt, there were important differences between Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. According to researcher and former DFA employee, Tanana Mpanyane (2009), both leaders were dedicated personally to a human rights-based foreign policy, but Mbeki was “more pragmatic and concerned with Pan-African solidarity with an African worldview”. Mandela’s worldview “was that of an internationalist”.

However, despite the differences, in terms of foreign policy-making, it is more appropriate to regard the two presidencies as a continuous period. This is not to downplay the role of personal leadership in relation to state institutions, but rather to highlight Mbeki’s formidable role in foreign policy formation during both periods. According to Mills (1997), Mandela’s international prestige and stature, and his command of every major foreign policy decision and issue, was so complete as to almost overshadow the DFA, the cabinet and the parliament. However, Mbeki had an influential hand in fashioning and articulating foreign policy concerns. According to Director of bilateral affairs in the DFA, Edward Makaya (2009), Mbeki was “crucial in terms of policy formation” right from the start. He likens the relationship between the two leaders as that of Mandela acting as a “chairman of the board”, while Mbeki held the role of “chief executive”. 38

Mbeki’s adherence to Pan-Africanism did not prevent him from taking part in the interventions in Lesotho and Nigeria and in the conflict over the in-groups intervention in the DRC. The outcomes of these efforts, however, did not leave him unchanged:

Mbeki was always sympathetic to Pan-African solidarity, but in his presidency these thoughts were refined and implemented. South Africa’s foreign policy incursion in Nigeria, Lesotho and the DRC only helped convince Mbeki of the correctness of his foreign policy strategy. He became convinced that South Africa cannot become the regional hegemon, in the sense that there is no room for unilateralism. This realization also made it necessary to refrain from being seen to

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listen to Western powers (...) The intrinsic values behind Mbeki’s policies have not necessarily changed, but the strategy on how to accomplish these goals has (Mpanyane, 2009).

While Mbeki may not have experienced any all out change of values or perceptions, as Mpanyane points out, the events of the 1990s convinced him of the rightness of the Pan-African cause, emphasizing multilateralism and non-interference. Rather, South Africa’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe was first and foremost influenced by external reactions to South Africa’s initial attempts at unilaterally promoting democracy and human rights in the region in the 1990s. This strengthens my argument that regional socialization through social influence and bargaining is best suited to explain South Africa’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe.

A rational/materialist explanation could argue that Tshwane’s foreign policy reflects an acknowledgement that South Africa does not have sufficient leverage over Zimbabwe to impose any policy changes. Thus, the rational solution for Tshwane was to maximize its gains within these given constraints. However, in terms of material interests South Africa has had much to gain from a more interventionist approach. First, South Africa has seen a large influx of refugees 39 pressuring already weakened public service institutions (Makaya, 2009). These refugees have been accused of taking jobs and committing crime, spurring eruptions of xenophobic violence (Steinberg, 2008). Second, in terms of domestic politics, the media, NGOs and civil society have all been critical of the government’s policy towards Zimbabwe. Finally, a continued economic meltdown has been, and will continue to be, detrimental to South Africa’s own economy. These factors all speak in favour of following a more interventionist approach on Zimbabwe, such as closing borders, freezing trade, cutting power supplies. Arguably, these are all policies that would have had relatively little impact on South Africa, but a large impact on Zimbabwe. In strict material terms, they could therefore be deemed rational. Adding ideas and identity to the equation, however, it is clear that such policies would be detrimental to South Africa’s role identity as an “Africa-oriented partner” vis-à-vis the regional actors.

39 No one knows the exact number, but there are probably at least 3 million Zimbabweans in South Africa today.
Finally, we turn to the impact of domestic pressures. While the trade union COSATU and the communist party SACP hold large constituencies and have historically been influential within the ANC, their protests against Tshwane’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe have not been heard.\textsuperscript{40} According to Ghulam Asmal:

> We have discussed the issue [of Zimbabwe] with the critical parties of the civil society and engaged them in debate, but at the same time we must keep our eye on the ball. The criticism has not made us reconsider our approach. Criticism is part of the unenviable job of the negotiator. He must listen, but cannot defend himself (Asmal, 2009).

Tshwane’s foreign policy is more likely to be informed by events or interactions in the international environment than as a result of the impact of the opposition parties or public opinion. This indicates that the scope condition of transgovernmental reinforcement is not found in the case of South Africa, or at least that attempts at transgovernmental reinforcement did not have any measurable effects on foreign policy-making. Moreover, it confirms that the high degree of power centralization in the government has facilitated the socialization of the state into the norms of non-interference.

### 4.4 Findings

This chapter has analyzed whether one, or more, of Checkel’s causal mechanisms can explain South Africa’s compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The analysis indicates that the mechanism that best explains South Africa’s degree of compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe is, primarily, the mechanism of social influence and, secondarily, bargaining. The analysis shows that the following scope conditions have enabled the effectiveness of the causal mechanism.

- **Group dynamics of the organization:** Lack of common norms and values within SADC led to the creation of rivalling groups, impeding the organization from reaching agreements and implementing solutions on peace and security.

\textsuperscript{40} See for example: News24.com. 27.10, 2004 Deportation: Sacp ‘Outraged’.
issues. In this environment, the in-group of former liberation movements was the most cohesive and had most political power relative to other actors. The in-group could therefore impose sanctions on what it considered to be deviant behaviour.

- **The socializing actor was an authoritative member of an in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong:** South Africa’s ambition of implementing the African agenda, in combination with its historical ties with the former liberation movements, placed Zimbabwe as the authoritative member of the in-group to which South Africa wanted to belong. This made Tshwane vulnerable for social sanctions from Mugabe.

- **Prior beliefs:** The beliefs of South Africa’s leaders were not in conflict with the norms of non-interference.

- **The identity of the target state:** South Africa has sought to rid itself of the hegemon label, while strengthening its identity as an “Africa-oriented partner” vis-à-vis the other states in the region. This made it necessary to seek multilateral solutions to regional problems and accept the norms of the dominant group.

- **The target of the socialization attempt was in a novel and uncertain environment:** This, first and foremost, made South Africa unprepared for the regional response spurred by Tshwane’s initial progressive policies in Nigeria, Lesotho and the DRC.

- **High degree of power centralization in the target state government:** This prevented civil society and opposition parties from influencing and changing South African foreign policy, leaving the socialization process to continue more or less undisturbed.

This gives the following graphical illustration of the socialization process in South Africa (FIGURE 2.):
The analysis also shows that the norms of non-interference have been internalized and form part of South African policy formation. This has mainly been the result of the secondary mechanism of cognitive dissonance. However, while Tshwane has internalized the norms of non-interference, this has not made South Africa leave its adherence to the promotion of human rights and democracy. These values continue to form part of South Africa’s identity and interests. However, the lessons learned in the 1990s has convinced South Africa’s foreign policy-makers that the only way to promote these norms are through multilateral efforts (Hamill, 2006). In order to promote human rights and democracy, Tshwane has had to follow policies that would be considered legitimate by all SADC members. Because of the lack of common norms within SADC, however, the respect for state sovereignty and adherence to the norms of non-interference tends to trump the norms of non-indifference (Nathan, 2008). This has made the issue of dealing with human rights violations in other countries an extremely complicated endeavor for South Africa’s policymakers.
5. Botswana

As in the previous analysis, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, to determine what causal mechanisms can explain Botswana’s compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in its foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The core argument is that Gaborone’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has mainly been the result of cost-benefit calculations independent of any socialization attempts. However, normative suasion also played a role in facilitating the outcome. The SADC’s legal templates, although not adhered to by all member states, provided a guideline for appropriate behaviour that was compatible with both the “liberal democratic” as well as the “Southern African” aspects of Botswana’s identity.

Second, the analysis seeks to identify the scope conditions under which the socializing mechanism of normative suasion has been enabled. These include: (1) the group dynamics of SADC, (2) the existence of legal templates with explicit guidelines for appropriate conduct, (3) Botswana’s liberal democratic identity, and (4) the prior beliefs of the ruling party and the government.

5.1 Foreign policy towards Zimbabwe

During the first years of the crisis in Zimbabwe, the government of Botswana vacillated in its dealings with Mugabe and Zanu-PF. More often than not, Botswana followed the SADC approach of quiet diplomacy. In the West, however, presidents Quett Masire and Festus Mogae started criticizing Zimbabwe more openly (Outtule, 2009). President Mogae became known as the first leader in the region to explicitly link the deteriorating economic situation and the crisis in Zimbabwe to bad governance (ISS, 2009):

> The reality is that the region cannot afford to have its second-largest economy sinking because of this situation…while we support land reform in Zimbabwe completely, we feel the implementation of the strategy is incorrect. (Mogae quoted in The Guardian, 2001)

However, criticism remained guarded and Botswana mainly stuck with SADC’s approach, relying on South Africa’s efforts to find a domestic solution to the crisis.
When Zimbabwe held parliamentary elections in 2005, a delegation from Botswana formed part of the SADC observer mission. However, while the opposition and Western countries argued that the elections had been flawed, Botswana’s observers reported that they were free and fair (Mmegi, 2005).

The major shift in Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe came after the elections in 2008. When the election results were held back and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off elections, Botswana called for sanctions against Mugabe and the expulsion of Zimbabwe from regional organizations, namely SADC and the AU (Financial Times, 2009, Skelemani, 2009). This time the criticism was not only directed to the Western world, but was advanced both at the AU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2008 and at SADC’s summits. President Khama and Foreign Minister Phandu Skelemani repeatedly stated that they did not recognize the legitimacy of President Mugabe and Zanu-PF, and demanded a re-run of the flawed elections.

In the last years, and especially after the 2008 elections, Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe has involved vocal criticism of human rights violations; calls for initiating measures against Zimbabwe and Mugabe through various forms of sanctions. I therefore conclude that it constitutes a foreign policy outcome with a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-indifference.

5.2 Historical and institutional context of Botswana

The objective of this section is to set the stage for the analysis and determine the configuration of the scope conditions constituting properties of the socializing actor, namely Botswana. As for the previous case, this section is structured around the topics related to the SADC scope conditions: prior beliefs; identity; identification; bureaucratic capacity; degree of power centralization; and the novelty of the environment (see table 2, p. 33).
5.2.1 Prior beliefs

In contrast to many former colonies in the region, Botswana gained its independence mainly through cooperation and negotiation.\(^{41}\) In 1966, Britain accepted proposals for democratic self-government which lead to the first general elections and independence. The good relations with Britain, and the absence of any armed liberation movements, were conducive to a stable political and societal environment for the new leaders of Botswana.

Furthermore, the capitalist pragmatism of Botswana’s first leader, President Seretse Khama, contributed to detach the country from the so-called liberation politics and Pan-Africanist ideology. While Botswana’s first mass party, the Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP) adopted a radical anti-colonial stance, Seretse Khama’s Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP)\(^{42}\), integrated not only the emerging educated elite of teachers and civil servants, but also the traditional chiefs. The BDP, with its emphasis on a multiracial democratic society, emerged victorious from the first elections in 1965 and has held the reins of power ever since (Acemoglu et al., 2001:15).

In terms of “ingrained, prior belief”, Botswana’s ruling party, the BDP, has emphasized democracy and economic prudence, while rejecting the Pan-Africanist solidarity of the former liberation movements. Thus, while the inherent beliefs of Botswana’s ruling party were not in conflict with either extreme of SADC’s peace and security norms, they were biased towards support for the norms of non-difference.

5.2.2 Identity

Botswana’s small size, and its position between the powerful states of South Africa and Zimbabwe, has concerned Botswana’s leaders since independence (Dale, 1995).

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\(^{41}\) As early as 1895, three Tswana chiefs, Khama III, Batheon and Sebele, went to Britain to ask Queen Victoria for Britain, and not Cecil Rhodes to control the protectorate. The three chiefs succeeded in their endeavor to convince the colonial powers. See (Parsons, 1998)

\(^{42}\) Later to become the Botswana Democratic Party
This has led Gaborone to seek to reduce the country’s economic dependency on South Africa, while increasing cooperation with other states and a host of public and private aid donors – particularly in the West. In many ways the Apartheid regime in South Africa increased Botswana’s international appeal. While South Africa was isolated regionally, and increasingly also globally during the 1980s, Botswana, with its democratic political system; economic growth and prudence; and tolerant racial climate, became a tempting substitute (Dale, 1995:151). Gaborone especially sought the assistance of the US, encouraging Washington to take over the leading role of economic benefactor and diplomatic shield. Political and military aid was a symbol of US commitment and ensured Washington access to key leaders (Zaffiro, 1992:98).

Historically, Botswana’s geopolitical position has made it vulnerable. More recently, however, these geopolitical features have also provided opportunities. Osei-Hwedie (2009) argues that Botswana’s limited capabilities have given Gaborone leeway to formulate foreign policy more freely, without being interpreted as a threat to regional power structures. However, at the same time, Botswana’s relations with the West has contributed to somewhat isolate the country regionally (Maundeni, 2009).

Botswana’s need for extra-regional partners has made its leaders emphasize its democratic type identity and its role identity as a “Western-oriented partner”. However, as will be argued, Botswana’s democracy is far from flawless. This makes it necessary for Botswana’s policymakers to continuously and inter-subjectively seek to manage, mediate and strengthen these aspects of its identity to prove eligible for aid, trade, and investments.

5.2.3 Identification

Botswana identifies as much, or even more, with extra-regional states as with other SADC states. As mentioned, the absence of armed struggle in pursuit of independence kept Botswana out of the network of armed liberation movements and alienated it from SADC’s in-group of states. Moreover, during Apartheid, Gaborone had a largely pragmatic approach to the regime in South Africa. The governing principle was to avoid any action that could legitimize white minority rule, while at
the same time steering clear of policies that could give South Africa the pretext to intervene, either militarily or politically. However, as more states became independent from colonial rulers, and diamond mining made Botswana more economically independent from the southern neighbour, Gaborone’s foreign policy towards South Africa became more activist (Niemann, 1993). Nevertheless, Botswana’s support to the liberation struggle did not prevent the government from arresting or deporting ANC officials (Dale, 1995, Niemann, 1993). In other words, Botswana’s support for the ANC was not limitless, but rather weighed against pragmatist preferences, and attuned at securing the sovereignty, stability, and the economy of Botswana. 

A scope condition increasing the likelihood of normative suasion is when the socializing agency is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target state belongs or wants to belong. Botswana’s leaders were not particularly committed to the solidarity and camaraderie that defined SADC’s in-group of states. Rather they sought allies and partners outside the region, such as the US and UK. This made Botswana more susceptible to extra-regional socialization attempts that emphasized democracy, human rights and the norms of non-indifference, rather than socialization attempts emanating from the SADC in-group.

5.2.4 Bureaucratic capacity

Botswana’s bureaucracy has faced serious shortages of trained personnel. Despite conscious efforts to increase the capacity of the civil service and replace expatriates with local officials, there was still a lack of highly trained and skilled public servants in the mid 1990s (Hope, 1995). However, this has not prevented Botswana’s foreign policy bureaucracy from successfully utilizing international institutions and international law, as well as its negotiation skills, to ensure greater revenues and profitable trade agreements (Acemoglu, et al., 2001:18). Moreover, the civil service is

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[43] In 1987 the Botswana government bought shares in the South African diamond mining company, De Beers, and created a large scale soda ash and salt mining operation, the exports of which were destined for South Africa and the region. This happened at a time when the world was pressed to isolate the apartheid regime. See: Niemann, Michael. (1993) Diamonds Are a State's Best Friend: Botswana's Foreign Policy in Southern Africa. . Africa Today 40:21.
relatively well paid by international and private sector standards, contributing to a relatively low prevalence of corruption (Olowu, 1999).  

A scope condition of role-playing is when the bureaucratic capacity of the target of socialization is low, preventing it from calculating the costs and benefits of possible courses of action. The limited capacity of the Botswana bureaucracy increased the likelihood of the state resorting to role-playing. However, judging by previous foreign policy successes, this feature should not be exaggerated.

5.2.5 Degree of power centralization in the government

Although Botswana has been hailed as Africa’s oldest and most stable democracy (Acemoglu, et al., 2001), its political system has several flaws. Regular free elections are held, but there has never been a change of ruling party. While the sitting president has resigned several times, it has so far never happened during an election. Instead, the head of state has usually been superseded by his vice president in the middle of a presidential term (Good, 2002:15). This has enabled the new president to consolidate his power, and, in the face of an almost non-existent opposition, secure a victory in the ensuing elections. In terms of foreign policy formation, decisions are made by a small elite, where the president has the last word (Sharp, 2009).

Botswana’s indigenous political institutions, kgotlas, are often credited for the success of Botswana democratic culture (Acemoglu, et al., 2001). These forums enable public participation in the political process, and place restrictions on the political power of elites. However, several scholars (Binsbergen, 1995, Holm and Molutsi, 1992, Hope and Somolekae, 1998) argue that the kgotlas mostly constitute a rubber stamp on elite policies:

Emphatic public reference to, and artificial emulation of, the kgotla model can produce, in the mind of common Batswana, a sense of historic continuity and

44 According to Transparency International’s index of perception of corruption Botswana scored 5.8 (10 being least corrupt), better than any other African country.

45 In kgotlas, an assembly of adult males in which issues of the public were discussed, commoners were allowed to make suggestions and criticize chiefs Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. (2001) An African Success Story: Botswana. CEPR Discussion Papers.
legitimation where in fact there is discontinuity, transformation and unchecked elite appropriation of societal power (Binsbergen, 1995).

In order to bolster the party’s popularity, Botswana’s leaders still use the dynamics of the kgotla to adopt policies that resonate with the public. After Vice President Masire lost his place in the National Assembly in 1969, the government launched the Accelerated Rural Development Programme, involving extensive investment in infrastructure in rural areas. After losing ground in the 1994 elections, the BDP responded by introducing popular reforms such as reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 and allowing Batswana outside the country to vote (Acemoglu, et al., 2001:15-16). Sitting President Ian Khama, uses such informal conversations with the public to “get a sense of what people think [the government] should be doing” (FinancialTimes, 2009).

The degree of power centralization within the target state is a scope condition increasing the likelihood of socialization within SADC. The overall top-down feature of Botswana’s democracy, combined with the country’s dependence on foreign states and donors, contributes to make Botswana’s leaders open to influence from the international community. At the same time, the government consults the public in order to adopt popular policies that can strengthen its hold on power. This decreases the relatively high degree of power centralization in the government somewhat.

5.2.6 Novelty of the environment

After the end of the Cold War and the demise of Apartheid, Botswana found itself at a foreign policy crossroads. Until then, foreign policy had largely been driven by Cold War and anti-Apartheid-inspired calculations of national interest and geopolitical constraints (Zaffiro, 1992). As states were democratizing in the region, and cold war allegiances were downplayed, Botswana needed to find a way to maintain its strategic appeal among its traditional partners and allies, first and foremost the UK and the US. Gaborone had fears that donors would abandon

46 He was swiftly returned as one of the members nominated by President Khama
Botswana to engage the newly democratized South Africa. This meant that the country would have to find new ways to continue to be perceived as “special” and attractive to the West (Dale, 1995:154). This development coincided with changes in the aid donor community’s view on conditionality. In addition to the Washington consensus, social and political performance (multi-party democracy, human rights and good governance) now became the new mantra within the donor community (Singh, 2004:82). A scope condition of normative suasion is when the target of socialization is in a novel and uncertain environment. The aforementioned factors strengthened Gaborone’s inclination to take cues from international institutions and other, more experienced actors, through the 1990s and well into the present decade. However, it is exaggerated to claim that the recent years, when the major shift in Botswana’s policies has come, constituted a novel and uncertain environment for Botswana’s policymakers.

This section has revealed the following scope conditions: The ruling party’s ingrained beliefs were not incompatible with any of the peace and security norms embedded in SADC. The government did not seek acceptance from SADC’s in-group, but rather from Western states and donors. In terms of identity, Gaborone was concerned with strengthening its “liberal democratic” type identity and its role identity as a “Western-oriented partner”. Moreover, the government had a low bureaucratic capacity and a relatively high degree of power centralization.

5.3 Analyzing regional socialization

The following analysis will show that Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe was mainly the result of cost-benefit calculations in relation to the transnational consequences of the crisis in the neighbouring country. Moreover, it argues that socialization in the form of normative suasion did *facilitate* Botswana’s choice of foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.
5.3.1 Strategic calculation

A first indicator of strategic calculation is when foreign policy decisions are framed as a calculation of costs and benefits. While this indicator certainly is found in Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, there is little evidence that this outcome is due to socialization processes in regional institutions. The empirical evidence indicates that neither the SADC itself, nor other member states have been successful in cajoling Botswana into compliance with the norms of non-indifference. Rather, the relevant costs and benefits that have influenced Botswana’s stand is linked to the domestic concerns of the public and the political elite, as well as indirect pressure from extra-regional actors such as the US and the EU.

A second indicator of socialization through strategic calculation is when agents manipulate norms strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization. In this case we should see Botswana’s leaders trying to give the impression that they are critical of Mugabe, while simultaneously refusing to address the issue in any substantial and binding way. This was more or less Gaborone’s approach up until the elections in 2008. An analysis of more recent events, however, shows the complete opposite strategy. Botswana’s policymakers now manipulate the norms of non-indifference to mitigate possible negative regional reactions. Foreign Minister, Phandu Skelemani holds that:

> Botswana has no choice but to openly express her concern about the deteriorating political situation, and make calls for authorities in that country to take necessary steps to end the unnecessary suffering of the people of Zimbabwe (…) We do not accept that, by doing so, we are interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe because the situation in that country adversely affects us (SundayStandard, 2008, emphasis added).

Botswana’s justifications invoke the norm of state sovereignty:

> While the SADC has resorted to quiet diplomacy this does not exclude [us from] voicing our concerns. In articulating government views you are enacting your own sovereignty. We have to be consistent and principled (Ntakhwana, 2009).

In other words, the data indicates that Botswana’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe is influenced by cost-benefit calculations based on mainly domestic concerns. This
explanation is not compatible with regional socialization and will therefore be addressed more thoroughly in the section on competing explanations (see p. 82).

### 5.3.2 Normative suasion through legal templates

While Botswana’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe seems to be driven by a logic of consequences, the empirical data also reveals that it is informed by a logic of appropriateness. Director of the Africa and Asia Department, Zibane Ntakhwana (2009) states that Botswana took its position “because of the principles. If required, we should have the moral courage to do so again”.

A first indicator of normative suasion is when empirical data show actors providing a full and thorough justification for their actions, arguing that compliance is “the right thing to do”. While this is no direct indicator of normative suasion, it does indicate internalization of norms. Botswana’s policymakers perceive themselves as having the recipe for success in the region, a recipe that so far has brought them economic growth, stability and democracy. Moreover, they see it as a duty to spread this knowledge:

> When we joined [SADC] it was on the hope that its members will live by the standards they have set for themselves. We are disappointed. The President of this country has said it. But in all this we are happy because Botswana has a legitimate claim to moral ground (Phandu Skelemani quoted in Sunday Standard, 2008).

This demonstrates Gaborone’s dedication to democracy, as well as to the rules and treaties of SADC. When Mugabe’s regime broke these rules in the 2008 elections, Gaborone saw it as their duty to criticize and sanction Zimbabwe:

> The government had to say something when the opposition decided to withdraw from the run-offs. We all ascribe to the principles of SADC on elections and democracy. We cannot accept the behaviour seen in Zimbabwe (Ntakhwana, 2009).

A mix of strategic calculation and a logic of appropriateness is evident in the government’s justifications of their tougher stance on Zimbabwe. This is best summarized in the following statement by permanent secretary to the MFAIC, Samuel Outlule:
In an organization like SADC, one should expect that the same laws should apply in all countries. When we market ourselves as a region we must apply to the same rules. All these things [going on in Zimbabwe] were affecting the whole region (Outluule, 2009).

On the one hand, Outluule refers to laws that should be “expected” to be applied to in “all countries”. On the other hand, this should be done because SADC “markets” itself as a region and that the crisis is “affecting” the whole region”. No doubt, the crisis in Zimbabwe has affected the region, materially through refugee flows and other transnational consequences, and ideationally by questioning SADC’s dedication to democracy. Botswana relies on its image as a liberal democratic state with a good record of governance and adherence to international law, in order to enhance trade, aid or investments. However, this image is not only a facade. Rather, it is a vital part of the country’s identity and a product of how Botswana’s leaders see themselves, how they wish to be seen, as well as how other states regard them. Thus, Botswana’s decision to take a tougher stance on Zimbabwe reflects both self-interested cost-benefit calculation, as well as a logic of appropriateness, where Botswana is acting in accordance with its liberal democratic identity.

A second indicator of internalization of a norm is when agents are consistent across contexts. In the case of Botswana, this indicator can be somewhat evasive. Considering Botswana’s modest size and relatively weak position in international politics, it is doubtful that the government has got the capabilities to be consistent across all contexts. Even so, the country shows a good track record, having contributed to UN operations in Somalia, the DRC and Darfur, as well as the intervention in Lesotho along with South Africa. Interviews also indicate a wider dedication to the norms of non-indifference.

Perhaps in the future this process might set a precedent. We did not do it to please or amuse anyone. We took our position because of the principles. If required, we should have the moral courage to do so again. It must inform our positions in the future (Ntakhwana, 2009).

In the domestic arena where one should expect the most consistency, on the other hand, Botswana has a mixed record. Several scholars are critical of the political system, questioning the checks and balances on government (Sebudubu and Osei-
Hwedie, 2006) and the political elite’s dedication to democracy (Good, 2002).\textsuperscript{47} GTZ coordinator and long-time Botswana resident, Helmut Orbon (2009), says “the good governance and democratic credentials of Botswana are overrated internationally. It is not a lively participatory democracy that thrives on public, political discourse”.

Another domestic issue that contributes to question the governments’ dedication to the norms of non-indifference has been the maltreatment of the indigenous San people. They have been evicted from their traditional homelands, allegedly to make way for diamond mining.\textsuperscript{48} In 2002, the UK-based NGO, Survival International (SI), rather successfully linked the conflict between the government and the San with the global campaign against “Blood Diamonds”.\textsuperscript{49} If Botswana’s leaders were consistent in their adherence to the norms of non-indifference across contexts, it is likely that they would be more attentive to the critique forwarded against them. In the conflict with the San people and SI, however, state leaders rejected all accusations of human rights abuse. Their strategy was to clear Botswana’s name abroad, rather than to address the accusations at home (Taylor and Mokhawa, 2003).

This inconsistency in Gaborone’s adherence to democracy and human rights could indicate that their dedication to democracy is a result of strategic calculation to gain rewards or that the government is role-playing democracy. However, this argument is weakened by two factors. First, if Gaborone’s foreign policy was merely a result of cost-benefit considerations, they would presumably be content with a solution in Zimbabwe that contributed to stabilize the regional environment. However, it is clear that Botswana’s policymakers, and Khama in particular, were not pleased with the

\textsuperscript{47} Kenneth Good was professor at the University of Botswana for several years, but was deported from the country in 2005, allegedly because his of academic works, that were highly critical of Botswana’s political elite and the treatment of the San people. See Taylor, Ian. (2006) The Limits of the African Miracle: Academic Freedom in Botswana and the Deportation of Kenneth Good. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24:101 - 22.


power-sharing agreement that South Africa promoted in SADC. Khama feared that the Government of National Unity would set “a bad precedent for the continent”:

We didn’t agree to this sharing of power, just like we didn’t agree to the Kenyan model either because we felt that what we need to do is to ensure, on the continent, that we have credible elections. And if a ruling party thinks it’s likely to lose, and then uses its position as a ruling party to manipulate the outcome of the election so that they can extend their term in power, is not the way to go (quoted in Financial Times, 2009).

This quote demonstrates that Gaborone’s interest in supporting democracy surpasses mere cost-benefit calculations. Second, while the domestic policies might question the ruling party’s dedication to liberal democracy as understood in Europe, statements by informants do indicate that they adhere to a narrow form thereof. To them, the main hallmark of democracy is the holding of regular elections. In this view, it is unproblematic that civil society remains weak, public opinion has little impact besides elections, and the peaceful change of leaders – and not ruling parties – is seen as the litmus test of democratic consolidation (Good, 2002). Thus, I argue that Botswana’s commitment to democracy – albeit a narrow form thereof – is internalized. Moreover, it seems that this dedication to democracy informs Botswana’s foreign policy, at least when it is not overshadowed by more pragmatist concerns.

From where does this commitment to democracy, even in foreign politics, emanate? First, a probable source is Botswana’s historic experience of peaceful liberation and its indigenous democratic institutions. Second, this inherent democratic culture has been nurtured and strengthened by Botswana’s interaction with actors, both states and NGO’s that have favoured the country for its democratic features and, after all, relatively good governance. However, this does not spring out of the regional

50 Khama actually ended up backing the GNU after the MDC accepted it, but Khama still holds that a new run-off election would have been the best solution Financial Times. (2009) Transcription of Interview with Ian Khama.
52 Botswana’s choice to sign the non-surrender agreement with the US over the ICC reflects the pragmatism of the BDP government in its international relations. Then Permanent Secretary to the MFAIC, Ernest Mpofu, “admitted that the government had misgivings about the agreement” (Mukumbira, 2003). While the government’s preferences remained in favor of the ICC, it could not afford losing the military aid relations with the US.
community. There is thus a possibility that Botswana has been socialized into the norms of non-indifference by extra-regional actors. However, a thorough investigation into this possibility is beyond the scope of this study.

The empirical evidence does suggest, however, that Botswana’s foreign policy is influenced by SADC’s rules, principles and organizational objectives. While foreign policy-makers argue that Botswana follows universal principles of right conduct, and that their position would have been possible even without the SADC legal framework, a closer look at the empirical data suggests otherwise (Ntakhwana, 2009, Outlule, 2009). When justifying their foreign policy on Zimbabwe, the government uses the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (hereby referred to as the SADC elections principles) as their default reference for rightful conduct. This is a quote from the government’s official justification for its condemnation of the Zimbabwe 2008 elections.

It is abundantly clear (...) that the result of the June 27, 2008 run-off election cannot be accepted, as it violates the core principles of SADC, the African Union and the United Nations. As a country that practices democracy and the rule of law, Botswana does not, therefore, recognize the outcome of the Presidential run-off election, and would expect other SADC member states to do the same. It is against this background that Botswana urges SADC to assume its responsibilities by taking proactive steps that are consistent with its principles and objectives (Government of Botswana, 2008 emphasis added).

The policymakers’ desire to localize these principles within a Southern African context should not be underestimated. By doing this, they show that Botswana’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe is not only compatible with the “liberal democratic” aspects, but also with the “Southern African” aspects of its identity. The following section will substantiate this argument.

Because of the lack of common norms within the SADC community, there are no “teachers” accepted by all members on issues of peace and security (Nathan, 2006).

However, templates, in the form of protocols, treaties and principles, abound. While member states fail to agree on which norms to hold highest, SADC legal texts and protocols provide a wide range of templates for appropriate state behavior. Regarding technicalities, for instance trade standards, the ideational aspect is minimal. However, the SADC election principles, adopted by the SADC Summit in 2004, constituted a legal template rife with ideational aspect. The first section of the document, commits member states to the following principles in the conduct of democratic elections:

- Full participation of the citizens in the political process
- Freedom of association
- Political tolerance
- Regular intervals for elections as provided for by the respective National Constitutions
- Equal opportunity for all political parties to access the state media
- Equal opportunity to exercise the right to vote and be voted for
- Independence of the Judiciary and impartiality of the electoral institutions
- Voter education
- Acceptance and respect of the election results by political parties proclaimed to have been free and fair by the competent National Electoral Authorities in accordance with the law of the land
- Challenge of the election results as provided for in the law of the land

The document also states that SADC can send electoral observation missions by invitation of the country holding the elections. These latter provisions make up the larger part of the document, making it stronger on election observation than on actual election management (Matlosa, 2005:6). Thus, the SADC election principles concerns issues directly related to the identity of states. To Botswana, with both an interest in being perceived as a liberal democracy in the region, both for strategic as well as ideational reasons, the SADC election principles were particularly salient. The adoption of templates regarding such issues will affect how a state is perceived by others, with the potential of affecting both preferences and identity. In short, these principles constituted a method for making judgements about the electoral processes

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54 The SADC Principles are related to existing principles crafted at level of the AU, as well as the existing SADC treaties and protocols, see Matlosa, Khabele. (2005) Democratisation at the Crossroads: Challenges for the Sadc Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. In ISS Paper 118. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
within other member states that would be considered appropriate for, and compatible with, a Southern African state identity.

Because the SADC election principles are subordinate to national laws, Tsunga (2005:4) argues that the principles are merely aspirational and “do not create international obligations”. In this regard, however, Botswana is a regional exception. First, Gaborone is dedicated to international treaties and agreements. Indeed, the government has been accused of having a poor record of ratifying international treaties and conventions (Ditshwanelo, 2006:25), but the empirical data indicates that once they have ratified international agreements, the government is dedicated to follow its obligations (Sharp, 2009). Foreign ministry official, Zibane Ntakhwana, explains the governments practice in this way:

Before we sign agreements we have to look at how and if we are able to capacitate and implement them. On any given issue we do a thorough process of consulting to appreciate all dimensions. We will not rush to sign because it is considered the right thing to do. Rather, we seek to assure the implementation of all parts of the agreements. If we have reservations, we’ll make them known and express them. If we cannot uphold the agreement, we do not sign (Ntakhwana, 2009).

Botswana’s explicit endorsement of the SADC election principles should therefore count as more than empty promises. Second, adherence to the election principles was not only compatible with Botswana’s prior beliefs – it would also serve to strengthen Botswana’s identity as liberal democratic state vis-à-vis extra-regional actors. Third, in contrast to, for example, human rights or other more universal guidelines, the limits of the election principles are clearly stated. They provide member states with a definition of democratic elections, and guidelines for how these events should be monitored and judged. Assuming that it is easier for states to make judgements about clearly defined events, rather than general issues, this would have contributed to make the SADC principles more applicable and easier to adhere to.

These considerations, however, Botswana did not lead Botswana to invoke the SADC election principles to condemn Zimbabwe’s flawed parliamentary elections in 2005.

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55 As an example, Botswana waited six years to sign the UN convention on the Rights of the Child, arguing that they would not be able to enforce it with regard to child labour, particularly in rural areas Sharp, Chris. (2009) Personal Interview February 18. Gaborone. UN. (2001) Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Despite the fact, that the principles were adopted only months prior to the elections, and could have provided SADC with a powerful tool to hold Zimbabwe’s leaders accountable. The emergence of the SADC principles had attracted considerable attention in both Europe and North America (Matlosa, 2005:13). However, despite this extra-regional pressure, Botswana went along with the rest of SADC to endorse the elections as free and fair (Osei-Hwedie, 2009).

Were the observers from Botswana ignorant of the situation in Zimbabwe, or were they just not dedicated enough to the SADC principles? The data from both informants and local media indicate that the government knew about the flaws of the 2005 elections (Mmegi, 2005):

Mugabe had created a situation where people in the cities [making up the bulk of MDC’s followers] did not have time to vote because polls were closed too early. That benefited Zanu-PF (Outlule, 2009).

Member of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature in South Africa, Dan Moabi, claimed that Botswana’s endorsement of the elections reflected a concern for the regional reaction if Gaborone were to give a frank assessment of the electoral process in Zimbabwe (Mohapi, 2005). This indicates that Botswana’s choice to endorse the 2005 elections, and not invoke the SADC election principles, was the result of social influence in an effort to reduce tensions and avoid regional criticism.

Before the 2008 elections, however, the initial regional unity in support of Mugabe was starting to disintegrate. After a brutal crackdown against the MDC in March 2007, the president of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, stated that quiet diplomacy had failed. He called on SADC to adopt measures to prevent Zimbabwe from falling further into economic and political turmoil (The Guardian, 2007). According to Landsberg, these events marked a:

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56 Osei-Hwedie adds two more reasons for the Botswana elections monitor’s endorsement of the 2005 elections. First, the Botswana election observers based their assessment on the places/constituencies they visited for a limited time, which to them appeared free and fair. Second, Mugabe's government had not yet acquired the notoriety it has currently. Osei-Hwedie, Bertha. (2009) Personal Communication May 5.

57 ANC member and Gauteng Provincial Deputy Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP)
[f]undamental shift in South African policy and in African opinion towards Mugabe (...) African leaders want to see Zimbabwe become a stable democracy and prosperous again and Mugabe is not leading the country in that direction (Landsberg quoted in The Guardian, 2007).

This demonstrated that it was possible for other SADC states to make judgements about the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe.

After the flawed elections in 2008, Botswana took a much tougher stand against the regime in Harare. President Khama called for sanctions and the expulsion of Zimbabwe from regional forums. Along with a shift in regional opinion that decreased the likelihood of social sanctions against Botswana, the election principles had contributed to broaden the scope of appropriate behaviour within SADC. Considering that the SADC election principles had been adopted by all member states (albeit not always with the best of intentions), these principles constituted a method for making judgements about the electoral processes within other member states that was considered appropriate, and compatible with, a Southern African state identity. Hence, for Botswana, the SADC principles provided a legal template that made it possible to accommodate both its “Southern African”, as well as its “liberal democratic” identity.

Johnston suggests that the application of legal templates for learning appropriate behavior only leads to mimicking or role-playing. However, in Botswana’s case, these principles were already compatible with the prior beliefs of policymakers and the identity of the state. Accordingly, they were easily adopted and internalized, even though they were not accompanied by any explicit process of normative suasion. Prior to the adoption of the SADC election principles, it is doubtful that Botswana could have criticized Mugabe without receiving the scorn of other in-group members. This can explain why Botswana until recently criticized Zimbabwe more freely in Europe and the US, than within African contexts like SADC or the AU.58 However, I argue that the SADC election principles together with the shift in regional opinion

58 There are of course other interpretations of this: a) Botswana has only been acting rhetorically when condemning Mugabe in front of Western leaders. b) it is much more difficult to condemn someone to their face than to travel 11 hours by plane and do the same thing.
mainly facilitated Botswana’s position, and that it was not the main cause of Botswana’s decision to follow the norms of non-indifference in its approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe. To present the main cause of this foreign policy shift, I now turn to explore alternative explanations.

5.3.3 Competing explanations

There are three explanations for why Botswana reacted more strongly to the fraudulent elections in 2008, than in 2005. The contributing causes were the effects of extra-regional influence and the change of leadership in Botswana, while the overall deterioration of the situation in Zimbabwe and the transnational consequences this had for Botswana, is considered the main cause of the foreign policy change.

The effects of extra-regional influence on Botswana constitute one contributing cause. The conflict with the San and the subsequent international shaming campaign by the British NGO Survival International contributed to taint Botswana’s image as Southern Africa’s beacon of democracy and good governance (Taylor and Mokhawa, 2003). Although rich in natural resources, Botswana needs to increase the private sector to create jobs. Further improving its relations with the West to increase aid, trade and investments has been an important step towards accomplishing this task. In this regard, the crisis in Zimbabwe created an opportunity for Botswana to show its commitment to democratic ideals and the rule of law, strengthening its “liberal democratic” and “Western oriented” identity. Indeed, Botswana’s tougher stance on Zimbabwe has resounded well within the US and the EU. Not surprisingly, however, Botswana’s policymakers deny that their policy change is a result of strategic bargaining or social influence from the West:

This is not a question for us to get a pat on the back (...) This is not a position of the West, although we found ourselves to share their concerns (...) It is difficult to measure by any terms, but the fact that we stayed the course has probably been beneficial. We followed our principles and I think we have got respect on a moral ground (Ntakhwana, 2009).

While there is reason to be critical to this statement, it also holds some truth. After all, Botswana has just recently embraced the policies of the EU and the US, and not
after the crisis in Zimbabwe deteriorated to the extent that it could no longer be ignored.

Another contributing cause was the impact of President Ian Khama. His background as army general and his loyalty to the US and the UK has contributed to influence the governments’ preferences. The shift in foreign policy came only a few weeks after Khama had taken over the presidency from Festus Mogae. Khama has emphasized his commitment to democracy on several occasions. On the other hand, Khama has served as Vice President under Mogae from 1998 to 2008, and has had an influential role in Botswana’s foreign policy during the entire crisis in Zimbabwe. Moreover, informants within the MFAIC, say they imagine that Mogae, faced with the same situation, ―would have done the same as Khama‖ (Ntakhwana, 2009). Thus, while Khama’s style is certainly more confrontational than his predecessor, I argue that the change of leadership is not a sufficient explanation for Botswana’s foreign policy change.

The main cause of Gaborone’s foreign policy shift, however, is the increasingly grave consequences that the crisis in Zimbabwe has had for Botswana on numerous arenas. The main costs are linked to provision of food, shelter and health facilities to the refugees; repatriation of illegal immigrants; increases in crime; economic loss as a result of declining trade with Zimbabwe; and outbreaks of foot and mouth disease and cholera outbreaks (Mmegi, 2006). Outlule argues that these adverse effects on the well being of Botswana and its citizens are the main reasons for the new foreign policy on Zimbabwe:

The moment you adopt policies that impact on other countries, we can no longer talk of sovereignty. Then we must remind of the duties and responsibilities that we adhere to (Outlule, 2009).

Moreover, the public in Botswana has long opposed SADC’s quiet diplomacy, both for self-interested reasons, such as fear of crime, as well as altruistic reasons,

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59 He has also been criticized for “authoritarianism” by the press and the opposition parties for the creation of an intelligence body with a secret budget, and a new media practitioners act Sebudubu, David. (2009) Personal Interview February 13. Gaborone.
protesting the suffering and human rights violations in the neighbouring country. The government shares this concern:

> It's a situation we'd rather not have, but what can we do? We can't chase away people who are running, who we know are running because there is great suffering in their own country (Skelemani, 2009).

In February 2009 about 600,000 Zimbabweans were seeking refuge in Botswana, constituting approximately 1/3 of the total population. As a result, Botswana’s ruling party, the BDP, has feared outbursts of xenophobic attacks equal to those seen in South Africa. Additionally, policymakers mention pressures from civil society, NGOs and grassroots that are supportive of political change in Zimbabwe. According to Ntakhwana (2009), “civil society has contributed to raise public awareness and opinion and had a positive impact on government policies.”

In this perspective, the more interventionist approach towards Zimbabwe has benefited the Botswana government in three ways. First, it contributed to boost the government’s popularity in the public opinion. Although Botswana’s civil society has been critical of the governments handling of refugees, they were very pleased with Khama’s criticism of Zimbabwe (Osei-Hwedie, 2009). Second, it strengthened Botswana’s relations with the West by reiterating Botswana’s dedication to a democratic region, strengthening the country’s “liberal democratic” identity vis-à-vis the EU and the US. Third, if the policy succeeds in contributing to a solving crisis in Zimbabwe, the policy may mitigate the suffering of Zimbabweans, as well as the adverse consequences this has had for Botswana’s citizens and society.

### 5.4 Findings

This chapter has analyzed whether one, or more, of Checkel’s causal mechanisms can explain Botswana’s compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in its foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. The previous discussion indicates that the

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60 Human rights group Ditshwanelo, trade unions and opposition parties.
main cause for the foreign policy change was the transnational consequences of the crisis in Zimbabwe. This led to a high refugee influx; spread of livestock diseases; decreasing trade; and public concern for the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. Although Botswana has had a high degree of power centralization, its leaders were simultaneously responsive to public grievances that threatened their hold on power. This sensitivity to public criticism was awakened as the situation in the neighbouring country deteriorated and started to affect the lives of ordinary people in Botswana. Contributing to these factors was Gaborone’s need to revitalize its identity as a liberal democracy and “Western-oriented partner” after having been tainted by SIs “Blood diamond” campaign. Moreover, Gaborone was worried that Zimbabwe and Mugabe would affect the whole region, questioning SADC’s adherence to democracy and human rights and thus undermining Botswana’s efforts to attract investments, trade and aid.

However, the analysis also indicates that socialization in the form of normative suasion through legal templates did facilitate Botswana’s choice of foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The SADC election principles “taught” Botswana how to act in accordance with the “Southern African” aspects of its identity, while at the same time following conduct considered appropriate for the “liberal democratic” aspects of its identity. The SADC election principles thus enlarged the scope of behaviour that would be considered appropriate by the regional community. This contributed to remove some of the ideational constrains from Botswana’s calculations of the most beneficial policies towards Zimbabwe. Gaborone could now choose among foreign policy outcomes that had a high degree of compliance with the norms of non-indifference, without fearing regional condemnation. The analysis shows that the following scope conditions enabled the effectiveness of the causal mechanism.

(FIGURE 3.):

- **Group dynamics of the organization**: Lack of common norms and values led to the creation of rivalling groups, impeding the organization from reaching agreements and implementing solutions on peace and security issues. Botswana, however, did not identify with, nor need the acceptance of, SADC’s
in-group. Instead, it sought acceptance from extra-regional partners such as the EU and the US. As a small country with limited capabilities, combined with a lack of ties to the in-group of states, this gave Botswana more leeway to dictate its own policies in the region.

- **The existence of a legal template with explicit guidelines for appropriate conduct**: The SADC election principles contributed to make condemnation of Zimbabwe’s flawed elections compatible with both Botswana’s “Southern African” and as well as its “liberal democratic” identity.

- **Prior beliefs**: Botswana’s ruling party, the BDP, has emphasized democracy and economic prudence, and rejected the pan-Africanist solidarity of the former liberation movements. The beliefs of Botswana’s leaders were therefore not in conflict with the norms of non-difference.

- **Identity of the target state**: Botswana’s “liberal democratic” type identity has been both an end in itself, as well as a means to gain aid, trade and investments and to maintain its good relations with the West. Another aspect of Botswana’s type identity is “Southern African”. The SADC principles expanded the scope of appropriate conduct for this latter aspect of Botswana’s identity, rendering it possible to criticize the internal affairs of Zimbabwe.

**FIGURE 3. Norm socialization in the case of Botswana**
6. Conclusion

The objective of this study has been twofold. First, to determine what mechanisms can explain South Africa’s and Botswana’s degree of compliance with SADC’s peace and security norms in their foreign policy towards the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, it has been to map out the scope conditions under which these socializing mechanisms are enabled. To this end, Checkel’s theoretical framework of international socialization was applied to each of the two cases through the method of structured, focused comparison. Checkel’s framework was originally developed to study socialization in Europe. Building upon scholarly works on African international institutions in general, and SADC in particular, the framework has been adapted to Southern Africa, identifying scope conditions specific for this region.

By keeping the investigation process explicit and systematic, the validity and the reliability of the study has been strengthened. This contributes to lay the ground for fruitful critique, as well as for further theoretical developments.

Although SADC members do have several identity traits in common, they cannot be said to have a shared, coherent identity. Moreover, the norms governing issues of peace and security are ambiguous. Johnston (2005:1020) argues that without a coherent identity with a clearly linked set of normative characteristics, “the socialization effects of the institution will be diluted or indeed nonexistent”. SADC can thus be considered a “least likely” case of norm socialization. Indeed, it is highly unlikely to see any all-out preference or identity change a result of normative suasion in the SADC region. Nevertheless, the findings challenge Johnston’s claim by showing that norm socialization can occur under such adverse conditions (see table 4).
### TABLE 3. The general framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Scope conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>International institutions</td>
<td>Bargaining</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Institutional design/setting of the interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Properties of the actor to be socialized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Role playing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Properties of the socializing actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Normative suasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4. The cases as presented in this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>In-group acceptance</th>
<th>Bargaining</th>
<th>Behavioural change in line with the requirements of the institution</th>
<th>Group dynamics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social influence</td>
<td>Internalization through secondary mechanism of cognitive dissonance</td>
<td>Socializing actor is authoritative member of in-group</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prior beliefs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity of target state</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Novel and uncertain environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High degree of power centralization</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>SADC legal framework</th>
<th>Normative suasion</th>
<th>Learning new appropriate behaviour compatible with a Southern African state identity</th>
<th>Group dynamics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(especially SADC election principles)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The existence of legal templates with explicit guidelines for appropriate conduct</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prior beliefs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identity of target state</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Starting with South Africa, the analysis shows that the mechanism of social influence not only led to norm compliant behaviour, but even the internalization of the norms of non-interference. However, the socializing actor was not SADC as an institution,
but, first and foremost, the in-group of liberation movement states. This was enabled by several scope conditions inherent both to the regional organization, SADC, and the target state, South Africa (see table 4). In terms of the former, SADC’s group dynamics made the in-group of former liberation movements the possibility to impose social sanctions on what it considered to be deviant behaviour. Moreover, in this group, Zimbabwe was the authoritative member, further complicating South African criticism. In terms of the latter, the prior beliefs of the ANC, as well as the identity of South Africa facilitated the adoption of the norms of non-interference. Additionally, a novel and uncertain environment made South Africa unprepared for the regional response and more responsive to regional cues, while the high degree of power centralization made the government less responsive to domestic pressures. The analysis also shows that the norms of non-interference have been internalized and form part of South African policy formation, mainly through the secondary mechanism of cognitive dissonance. However, this has not made South Africa leave its adherence to the promotion of human rights and democracy. These values continue to form part of South Africa’s identity and interests, making the issue of dealing with human rights violations in other countries an extremely complicated endeavor.

In the case of Botswana, the analysis shows that compliance with the norms of non-indifference in the country’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe was largely a result of cost-benefit calculations independent of any socialization attempts. In other words, norm socialization cannot by itself explain the outcome. However, normative suasion did influence Botswana’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. The creation and adoption of the SADC treaty (and especially the SADC election principles) “taught” Botswana how to act in accordance with its “Southern African” identity, while at the same time following conduct appropriate for its “liberal democratic” identity. This was enabled by several scope conditions inherent both to SADC and Botswana (see table 4). In terms of the former, the group dynamics of SADC gave Botswana, with its lack of ties to the powerful in-group, more leeway to dictate its own policies in the region. The existence of legal templates with explicit guidelines for appropriate conduct, in particular the SADC election guidelines, contributed to make
condemnation of Zimbabwe’s flawed elections compatible with both Botswana’s “Southern African” and “liberal democratic” identity. In terms of the latter, the prior beliefs of the ruling party, as well as the identity of the state, contributed to facilitate the adoption of the SADC election principles. This was the result of both normative concerns, in the form of a dedication to democracy, as well as more strategic concerns, in Botswana’s efforts to attract aid, trade and investments.

In sum, SADC’s feature of group dynamics made issues of identity and identification key to the outcome of socialization attempts. This will be further elaborated below.

6.1 Theoretical implications

This investigation has two sets of theoretical implications. First, it shows that the adaption of Checkel’s theoretical framework proves fruitful for the study of norm socialization within a Southern African context. The findings show its utility both in identifying regional norm socialization (the case of South Africa), as well as in questioning the effects of the phenomenon (the case of Botswana). The strength of the framework is that it, on the one hand, provides rigour to the investigation by offering four clearly defined causal mechanisms leading to socialization (bargaining, social influence, role-playing and normative suasion). On the other hand, the focus on identifying or clarifying scope conditions makes the framework flexible and adaptable to new contexts.

Second, it provides further indications of the utility of “engaging questions that cut across the rationalist/constructivist boundary” (Wendt and Fearon, 2002:52). The analysis shows that strategic calculations to a large extent can explain the behaviour of the actors. This is mainly due to the ambiguity of the SADC peace and security norms and the lack of common values within the organization which make trust and cooperation difficult. Simultaneously, however, issues of identity and identification play a pivotal role in determining the preferences and interests upon which these strategic calculations are based. These issues of identity and identification are continuously mediated, constructed, and reconstructed socially. These processes are
informed by a variety of factors including geopolitics, prior beliefs, historical affinities, and cost-benefit calculations. Thus, while a purely rationalist account would have overemphasized the “rationality” of the actors, a “post-positivist” approach would have left out important issues of material capabilities and strategy. This study seeks to work the middle ground by capturing a nuanced picture more in synch with actual events. This is done by grounding potentially fleeting concepts, like identity, norms, social influence, role-playing and learning, in concrete and identifiable features of SADC and the member states. The findings are therefore not to be interpreted as support for either of the two paradigms, constructivism and rationalism. Rather, the study builds on the view that the point of IR scholarship is not to validate methods, but rather “to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern” (Wendt and Fearon, 2002:68).

6.2 Policy implications

For practitioners that see the adoption of the norms of non-indifference and a greater concern for human rights and democracy as a desirable outcome of regional cooperation within SADC, this study provides the following policy implications:

There is little in the findings to indicate that the SADC member states are increasingly moving towards adopting norms that can be labelled democratic. As the case study of South Africa demonstrates, socialization might just as well lead to internalization of the norms of non-interference. The reason is that as long as there is no agreement on the interpretation of SADC’s peace and security norms, influential groups of states are more likely to become socializing actors, rather than the organization itself. However, as the case of Botswana shows, states inclined to comply with the norms of non-indifference can find justification and legitimization of their stands in SADC’s treaties. Particularly, if the legal texts contain explicit guidelines that are less open to individual interpretation. In this way, SADC rules and treaties can become effective at a later point, despite their initial hollowness. However, for this to happen, dedication to democracy has to be strengthened, not only at the institutional level, but also within key member states. However, SADC’s
particularities have often prevented the adoption of treaties and protocols that are both explicit and binding. A fruitful strategy would therefore be to lower the level of ambition in the content of the treaties, while at the same time making them more concrete and explicit. For SADC states that are willing to take commitments seriously, legal texts would thus provide an important tool, not only to determine possible courses of action, but also to legitimize and justify progressive actions and make them acceptable to the regional community. This can set off a process where obligations and promises made within SADC are increasingly respected by the members (Lindberg, 1970). In this way, practitioners can actually make use of SADC’s group dynamics to strengthen member states’ respect for human rights and democracy incrementally.
Appendix 1: Informants

Botswana

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC)  
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Director: Africa & Asia Department, MFAIC  
Zibane J. Ntakhwana

GTZ coordinator, SADC Peace & Security Programme  
Helmut Orbon

Senior Lecturer, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana  
Bertha Osei-Hwedie

South Africa

Director: Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)  
Edward X. Makaya

Director: SADC, Africa Multilateral Branch, DFA  
Ghulam H. Asmal

Deputy Director: Zambia & Zimbabwe, DFA  
John Vilakazi

Assistant Director, Zambia & Zimbabwe, DFA  
Eden Reid

Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies; and former researcher at the DFA (94–06)  
Tanana Mpanyane
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