Possibilities and constraints of local civil society organisations in the struggle towards democratisation in Burundi

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<tr>
<td>ABDP</td>
<td>Association for the defence and the promotion of the rights of the prisoners</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRODH</td>
<td>Association for the Promotion of the Human Rights and of the prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFOB</td>
<td>Collective of the Female Organizations and NGO’s of Burundi.</td>
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<td>COSOME</td>
<td>Civil society for the monitoring of elections</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSC</td>
<td>Forum pour le renforcement de la societe civile- Forum for the reinforcement of the civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>The Front for Democracy in Burundi-Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ligue ITEKA</td>
<td>Burundian Human Rights League</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Organisation for Governmental Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLUCOME</td>
<td>L’Observatoire de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Malversations Economiques- the Observatory for the struggle against corruption.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Radio Publique Africaine- African Public Radio</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union Pour le Progres National Africain</td>
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The World Bank
1. Introduction to the study of civil society and democratisation in Burundi

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased emphasis on the concept of civil society among researchers and a widespread assumption among many policy makers in different parts of the world about its global relevance in strengthening societal development and democracy (Lewis:2002:569). Even though the concept of civil society has been seen as central to contemporary discourses on democracy and democratisation, there exists considerable controversy over the conditions under which civil society is said to exist, its location and the constraints under which it operates (Pereira:2001:158).

The contemporary revival of the “civil society” notion is generally related to the political liberalisation and democratisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. In the 1990’s the debate on political liberalisation further spread from these regions into the continent of Africa (Sjøgren:2001:35). However as the idea of civil society is firmly rooted in liberal political thought, there exist significant doubts regarding the notion of civil society and thus its applicability to the political realities of African nations.

Democratisation in Africa has to a large extent been absorbed by the Western neoliberal “good governance discourse” where the notion of civil society is seen as inherently democratic. This approach to civil society and democratisation is predominantly a-historical and de-contextualised from historical structures. Viewing civil society as having mainly a “consolidating” role is an unrealistic picture of what the existing civil society in Africa actually entails (Abrahamsen:2000:52-57).

Across Africa, civil society takes on a different character from that of most Western liberal democracies. It reflects underlying social and economic conditions as well as the particular historical and political circumstances of individual countries. Prevailing ethnic and kinship structures, the legacy of colonialism, the pattern of economic development and authoritarian forms of political rule gives rise to a different form of
civil society than what can be said to be the case of most of the Western World (Wake:2004). Consequently, there is a possibility that civil society within the process of democratisation can be impeded by factors such as a dependence of external funding, ethnic divisions, state censorship and gender bias- all of which strongly characterise African politics.

While Western scholars have emphasised the need to take local conditions into consideration, in reality there have been few attempts to actually do so. Peace negotiations and democratisation in countries raged by civil war in Africa have often been conducted on an elite level, excluding the civil society. What Samuel Huntington has termed the “third wave of democracy”, whereby several countries of the world shifted from authoritarian rule to democracy over the last quarter of the twentieth century, was often brought about by what has been referred to as ‘elite transition’ (Bentley and Southall:2000:149).

According to Comaroff (1999), there is a need to focus less on high levels of rhetoric abstraction and historical generalisations towards producing more close up observations of civil society. In close relation to this Mamdani (1996:19) argues the need for ‘an analysis of actually existing civil society so as to understand its actual formation rather than as a promised agenda for change’.

In this specific context, Burundi is a particularly interesting case. Since Burundi gained independence from the Belgians in 1962 the country has been plagued by three periods of ethnic civil unrest. Burundi’s conflicts are rooted in the unequal distribution of wealth and power which has a strong ethnic and regional dimension. The country’s populations is made up of three ethnic groups- the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa- comprising of approximately 85%, 14% and 1% of the population respectively (Krueger:2007:23) The crisis- to a large extent- has been exacerbated by the ongoing civil war facing the country since October 1993.

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1 As no population counts based on ethnicity has been done in the past half century, the percentage has most probably changed (Kruger:2007:24).
Postcolonial ethnic oligarchies have often provided a hostile terrain for democratic processes which are often said to have been the case in Burundi. It has been argued that inequalities along ethnic and regional lines which reflect the Burundian crisis lower the prospects of democratisation and reconciliation (Sandbrook:2000:66). Despite these odds, in 28 of August 2000 the political fractional parties of Burundi signed a peace agreement to end an era of violence. Following from this, in 2005 Burundi had their first democratic election after 12 years of civil war and a power-sharing government was subsequently established. With the nation under the governance of a democratically elected government for the past three years, we are now witnessing the longest period of democratic rule in the Burundi’s history. In this respect it is interesting to investigate the local civil society in Burundi.

Currently there does not appear to exist any substantial study of local civil society in Burundi and its role in the ongoing democratisation process. This thesis intends to fill parts of this knowledge gap. This thesis specifically aims to highlight out the civil society actors that exist in contemporary Burundi who are considered of high importance regarding the democratisation and development of civil society. In additional an investigation as to how these are able to engage in political and democratic processes will be undertaken.

This thesis will deliberate on the possibilities and constrains of local civil society organisations (CSO’s) in the on going democratisation process. With this research focus in mind, the material of the civil society in Burundi is primarily based on interviews of local civil society organisations in the capital of Bujumbura and the rural municipality of Butaganzwa north in Burundi. Due to 90 percent of the Burundian population living in rural areas, it is vital that rural municipalities are not excluded from civil society when analysing civil society as a whole (Tribune:2008).
1.1 Aim and Research question

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the civil society in Burundi from both an urban and a rural perspective. As previously mentioned, Burundi is currently experiencing an ongoing democratisation process. However, there currently exists no documented research related to if and how the local civil society might contribute in this process.

Accordingly, the research question which will be addressed throughout this thesis is:

What represents civil society organisations in Burundi and what role does civil society play in the process towards democratisation?

This thesis chose to investigate the relationship between one independent variable and one dependent variable-the relationship between civil society (independent) and democratisation (dependent). There are many additional factors that also influence the democratisation process. Modernisation, industrialisation, and socio-economical factors, increased economic growth, are for instance factors that are seen as positive for a country undergoing a democratisation processes. Burundi is suffering from an economic crisis characterised by an extreme poverty. Rural poverty in particular has been noted to have increased by 80 % since 1993 (Bentley, Southall:2005:21-22). Today Burundi is ranked as the third poorest country in the world by the World Bank (WB:2008). Socio-economic conditions clearly set constraints to any democratisation process, as extreme poverty -which is the case in Burundi- hampers the overall societal development of a country. Nevertheless, the limited scope of this thesis does not allow me to discuss several of these factors. Consequently, I argue that it is better to undertake a comprehensive study of one specific aspect in depth that might influence the democratisation process rather than attempting to simultaneously analyse several factors which could lead to a very superficial analysis that is unable to provide significant further research to the already lacking field.

At present, there exists little- if any- research related to civil society in Burundi and the role it can play in the democratisation process. Consequently this thesis will
provide new knowledge regarding the role of civil society in Burundi in the ongoing democratisation process.

The civil society of Burundi will be analysed in the light of *ethnicity, citizenship, political* and *financial* autonomy. As these are considered to represent some of the more significant aspects to address within the specific context of the Burundian nation state.

### 1.2 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The following chapter- *chapter 2*- will discuss the overall research design used for the purpose of this thesis. Fieldwork and interviews of CSO’s in Burundi constitute an important part of this thesis and this chapter aims to assess the various methodological challenges related to this. *Chapter 3* introduces the thesis’s theoretical framework. This chapter discuss the problematic concept of civil society with regards to African political realities. In addition it aims to specify and delimit the important concepts of civil society and democratisation and how these will be used for the purpose of this thesis. *Chapter 4* provides a background of the political scene within Burundi where the particular socio-political realities of Burundi is introduced. This chapter aims to deliberate on how the historical socio-political evolvement in Burundi from pre-colonial to post colonial time has shaped the society- and therefore also the civil society in Burundi. The dimension of ethnicity and citizenship and how the Burundians are politically tied to these identities are central aspects to this chapter. These dimensions will be further explored in the analysis of Bujumbura civil society in *chapter 5*. The first part of chapter 5 will present a typology of the CSO’s of enquiry. The objectives, methods of work and achievements of these CSO’s will be assessed. *Chapter 6* emphasises the rural dimension of civil society in the specific context of the municipality of Butaganzwa. *Chapter 7* highlights the main findings of the study and concluding remarks will be presented in *chapter 8*. 
2. Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the overall quality of the method and research design used for the purpose of this thesis. This thesis will draw upon theoretical and empirical literature, but the main focus lies on the interviews conducted during my fieldwork in Burundi. Consequently, this chapter will mainly focus on the challenges related to this.

2.1 Single Case Study and the choice of case

The primary objective of this thesis has been to undertake a contextual analysis of the local civil society in Burundi in order to analyse the specific role it has the potential to play throughout the process of democratisation.

Consequently, the type of research design this thesis has chosen to undertake is the use of case studies. The choice of using case studies serves as the most appropriate research design for this thesis due to the fact that the ability of other forms of research strategies to capture contextual conditions is limited (Yin:2003:13).

Accordingly, the approach of my thesis will be structured as an explorative case study due to the fact that prior to this thesis no previous research in relation to local civil society and democratisation in the given context-the Burundi nation state-has yet been undertaken.

It is important to note here that while the route of an exploratory case study is the primary method of research design, it is not exclusively exploratory due to the fact that the key arguments of this thesis have built on various theoretical contributions within the existing literature on civil society and democratisation. This approach is similar to what Andersen refers to as “theory interpretive design” (Andersen:1997:68). The aim of such an approach to a case study is to utilize a theoretical framework in order to structure the revealed empirical material. Existing
theory within the areas of civil society, democracy and democratisation will form the principle theoretical framework which will be used for the purpose of my analysis.

While this thesis focuses on the civil society process of the African nation state Burundi, it is important to bear in mind that drawing parallel conclusion to other countries in the African Great Lakes region will pose difficulties as one need to investigate CSO’s in its given context. This is because national history, culture and development are important aspects to consider when analysing civil society and the role it can play in a democratisation process. However, in spite of these difficulties the research of this thesis will demonstrate that there do exist particular historical and cultural similarities between several countries within the Great Lakes Region, particularly between Burundi and Rwanda.

Further knowledge about the development of civil society actors in relation to the democratisation process in Burundi can therefore-at times-provide an increased understanding of certain dimensions considered important to civil society within further countries throughout this region of Africa.

Gerring (2004) makes a distinction between formal and informal units. The formal unit is the unit chosen for intensive analysis of which one has in-depth knowledge. The informal unit refers to other units that are brought into the analysis in a less structured way often as a part of the introduction or the conclusion (Gerring:2004:343-344). Burundi forms the basis for this thesis’s formal unit of analysis while other countries in Africa, particularly those situated within the Great Lakes region, serve as informal units of analysis.

There already exist extensive research contributions in the area of civil society and its contribution to democratisation. Why then is Burundi interesting to investigate in this respect?

Firstly, there presently lacks any consensus in regard to the role civil society is expected to play in the strengthening of democracy- especially in an African context.
Furthermore, the notion of civil society and democracy in an African context is highly controversial. However, despite varying political viewpoints there are now indications that CSO’s have the ability to positively contribute towards the democratisation process (Makumbe:1998). Within the context of Burundi there presently exists no documented research on Burundian civil society. A major civil milestone for the nation lies in the fact that Burundi has recently undergone its first democratic election. However, peace and security of the nation remains fragile.

Consequently I believe it is of high importance to conduct an in depth study of the present day CSO’s operation throughout Burundi in order to assess whether CSO’s in Burundi can contribute towards enhanced democracy.

If this is not the case, it is also important to view how political- historical aspects possibly obstruct the development of a viable civil society and the consequences this has for the democratisation process. This research aims to provide a contribution to the debate regarding civil society and democratisation in Africa.

2.2 Sources and Fieldwork

The thesis is based on the triangulation of sources, between primary and secondary sources which enhance the data’s reliability (Yin:2003:97). When selecting sources their relevance compared to the research question was emphasised. For the purpose of this thesis a collection of relevant data regarding the independent variable- civil society in Burundi and my dependent variable- democracy and democratisation was necessary in order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the two variables.

Several types of sources have been used for the purpose of this thesis such as books, reports and news articles. However, the primary material for my analysis is based on semi-structured interviews conducted under my fieldwork in Bujumbura and Butaganzwa. Yin (2003:93) argues that ‘most of the best case studies are based on a variety of sources’.
Due to the lack of documented research regarding CSO’s in Burundi, the only sources of information related to the independent variable (civil society) has been based on primary sources from my interviews. Relevant books and research within the literature field have also been utilised in order to back up my arguments and findings.

Throughout my fieldwork in Burundi twelve semi-structured qualitative interviews of a selected number of local CSO’s based in the capital of Bujumbura were conducted over a period of three weeks (January 21 to February 10). In addition four days were spent in Butaganzwa, a rural community north in Burundi, where a workshop was held and attended by representatives from the majority of the existing “communitarian associations” within this municipality. As part of this workshop further observation, fieldwork and some informal interviews with representatives from local communitarian associations were undertaken. During every interview in Butaganzwa there was always a member of the administration present. I was not allowed to discuss their relationship to the local administration. From these observations it is probable that the communitarian associations withheld information they otherwise would have given me if the administration was not present.

Most of the interviews in Bujumbura were conducted with one informant at the time, often with the director or members of staff who held positions of leadership within the organisation. However, several interviews comprised of interviewing two or three informants at the time. The length of the interviews varied from one to three hours and in ten out of twelve interviews a tape recorded was utilised. Interviews with politicians, representatives from international NGO’s, general members of the community and two Danish missionaries living both in the capital and in the rural province were conducted. Most of the interviews were conducted in French with additional help from a language interpreter. In the even of language confusion and

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2 Appendix 1
when certain clarifications were needed. I purposely chose to have a Congolese interpreter with me at all times. Because certain questions asked were targeted at gaining a greater understanding of the sensitive ethnic roots of the conflict and ethnic divide that still exist between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, employing a Hutu or a Tutsi interpreter had the potential to bias the information required. Therefore, employing a Congolese interpreter was vital in order to obtain information regarding the ethnic dimension. My interpreter was the one asking the ethnic related question as he was familiar with the “do’s” and “don’ts” regarding ethnicity. Most probably this gave me more information regarding these questions than what I would have obtained alone.

Recognising that patron-client relationships exist in urban civil society, this was one of the aspects this thesis has intended to investigate. However, given the short time frame under which this fieldwork was undertaken it was unfeasible to obtain sufficient information to state something concrete regarding these networks. Consequently the dimension of patron-client relationship will not be discussed in detail regarding the local civil society in Bujumbura.

Despite spending a shorter period of time in the rural municipality of Butaganzwa, patron-client networks were more visible in this area making it more viable to discuss the patron-client relationship in chapter 6- which concern the rural communitarian associations of Butaganzwa.

Presently there is limited literature in regards to the socio-political situation of Burundi. As a consequence this has resulted in a number of challenges with regards to writing this thesis. My main sources on Burundi are therefore based on a few notable scholars of the region in general, Lemarchand (1994 and 1995), Chretien (1995), Reyntjens (1995) Uvin (1999), Herisse (2000) Bentley and Souhall (2005) and a recent contribution from Krueger (2007).
2.3 Validity and Reliability

2.3.1 Construct validity

Construct validity is especially problematic in relation to case study design. This is because investigators can engage in high levels of “subjectivity” in relation to the collection of data (Yin:2003:93). Subjectivity appeared to be particular problematic and challenging in relation to collecting the necessary data material regarding the independent variable-civil society in Burundi. As there presently exist no documented research within the literature of civil society within the specific context of Burundi, the selection of local CSO’s was not easily completed. Due to the lack of certainty to as whether there even exists a civil society in the given context, a lengthy and time consuming process was necessary to map out the necessary CSO’s on which to build the case study. However, the fact that four months prior to my fieldwork in Burundi were focused on establishing contact with experts in the field\(^4\), who could provide reliable information about the local CSO’s represented in the capital of Bujumbura,\(^5\) strengthen the construct validity of my independent variable-civil society.

The final choice of organisations is a selection of the most established CSO’s in Bujumbura. A further factor that strengthens the construct validity is the fact that a comprehensive understanding of the theoretical framework was obtained before the fieldwork was conducted. Thorough understanding of the literature was able to provide an indication of the type of data required for the research. The limited scope and time frame of this thesis, made it necessary to exclude certain important sources which may have reduced the construct validity of the arguments made in this study.

\(^4\) I contacted representatives from the UN, UNIFEM, NRC, ACCORD, Danish missionaries, WB.

\(^5\) Prior to making the final decision regarding the local CSO’s of enquiry I wrote 1000 emails to people in Burundi Bujumbura.
2.3.2 Internal Validity

When explaining a phenomenon, it is often assumed that there exists a causal relationship. The internal validity is concerned with whether this correlation is valid. This thesis chooses not to use the term causal relationship rather, the terms causal mechanism will be employed (Gerring:2004:348). I intend to assess whether CSO’s in Burundi impact on the ongoing democratisation in Burundi. In order to ensure the validity of the causal mechanism outlined in this thesis, a set of rival explanations is necessary. If the rival explanations are found to be implausible, this strengthens the causal mechanisms set out for this thesis and thereby the internal validity.

2.3.3 External validity

One much debated question with regards to single case study design is concerned whether the findings and conclusions can be generalized beyond the single case of Burundi (Yin:2003:37). In other words, if it possible to draw any conclusions regarding civil society and democratisation in other countries in Africa -based on the findings in this particular study.

The external validity of a single case study is weaker than in a case study existing of several cases. A focus on civil society and democratisation of several countries in the Great Lakes Region for instance would have strengthened the ability to prove one’s assertions. However, such a case study would have proven too comprehensive with regards to the timeframe of this thesis. Burundi is a country where the path towards democratisation is unstable. Therefore the aim of this thesis is to assess what role the civil society in Burundi can play in this respect. These aspects are viewed in the light of the specific Burundian context focusing on historical aspects which obviously have influenced the Burundian society and possibly the civil society. Focusing on the dimensions of ethnicity and political autonomy in order to view how these dimensions have affected the civil society and also the path towards democratisation. Even though the emphasis of this thesis is linked to the specific historical context of Burundi, Burundi is in certain ways similar to other countries in the region. They
have all been colonised, Burundi and Rwanda were previously part of the same country and is therefore comprised by the same “ethnic” groups of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. While the aim is not to draw conclusion from my findings to other countries in the region, it is assumed that the findings of this thesis in relation to civil society and democratisation in Burundi can provide useful knowledge concerning civil society and democratisation in the neighbouring region.

The theory used for the purpose of this thesis stems from an African context in general and not for Burundi explicitly. According to Yin (2003:37) use of theory from a more general basis strengthens the external validity.

With regards to generalizations it is a question of whether cases, findings are representative for all of Burundi and whether the rural case of Butaganzwa is representative for other rural cases in Burundi.

2.3.4 Reliability

Reliability involves demonstrating that the operations of a study can be repeated with the same findings my another investigator (Yin:2003:34). In a qualitative case study it is essential to make sure that the methods that have been used are well documented. Yin (2003:105) refers to this as a “chain of evidence”. This is vital due to the fact that it is not possible with the use of qualitative method to measure the margin of error which is possible with the use of quantitative methods. The challenges of reliability encountered in the writing of this thesis displayed characteristics of Yin’s chain of evidence. In some cases the information of one informant only was utilised. However, in every case this thesis has endeavoured to verify the reliability of the information with other informants. With no documented research within the field, there was no other way to verify the reliability of my sources. Another challenge relates to the accuracy of information in the interviews of the “community based organisations” in areas where interviewees spoke only Kirundi or Swahili. In these cases the information obtained was entirely dependent on the levels of interpreter used. A particular problem with this relate to the potential of some information
becoming lost in translating from one language to another. However, due to the fact that another French speaking person was always present during the interviews verified what my interpreter said. The accuracy of the information is assumed to have remained relatively high. Furthermore, in regards to the accuracy of information throughout the interviews conducted in the capital, my level of French is at a sufficiently high enough level to understand what was being said.
3. Theoretical Framework of civil society and democratisation

The definition of the term “civil society” is wide ranging and diverse comprising of many different yet complex view-points. For this reason there are many theoretical interpretations of the term “civil society”-each being dependent and relevant within the specific context and domain in which the term is being used. Due to the ambiguity of the term, there exists a fundamental level of disagreement around its use. Consequently, there is a necessity to specify its meaning related to the context in which it is being applied in order for the concept to be both theoretically rewarding and analytically coherent (Sjøgren:2001:21).

For the purpose of this thesis the theoretical framework that will be presented below intends to provide an in depth insight regarding why and how civil society can be seen as politically relevant in the ongoing democratisation process in Burundi. Furthermore, the thesis examines the role in which “civil society” can play as a constructive actor in the process towards influencing political change and further levels of democratisation throughout Burundi. The theoretical framework used in this thesis will consists of wide range of theoretical approaches drawing on examples from a wider political context as well as drawing on more specifically concepts and approaches related to the subject of enquiry- the Burundi nation state.

3.1 Civil Society and the general debate

The section that follows will present a critique to the most utilised approach of the civil society namely the neo-liberal. My argument is that the neo- liberal perception of civil society fails to take into consideration that a civil society may differ in its role, depth and function proportionately to the context of enquiry. In relation to the Burundi nation state, one need to look into the historical structural processes in order
to thoroughly emphasise the role civil society may play in the ongoing democratisation process in Burundi.

Civil society is often associated with democratisation and liberalisation, however in reality the concepts it embodies are far more extensive and profound. The political relevance of the term has been contested since its origins and there still exists confusion around its degree of utility for democracy (Chandhoke:1995:203).

Despite the concept of civil society embodying a long history which derived as a philosophical notion from the writings of Hegel, Gramsci and Marx, the current debate which views “civil society” as a tool for analysing politics- is a fairly recent revival of the theoretical and political concept that started during the 1980’s. The contemporary revival of the term has been seen as a consequence of the political liberalisation and democratisation in Latin America and Eastern Europe during the 1980s and early 90s. Research attention where directed to the various forces within society, and the relations between state and society. Applying this debate within an African context, the relevance of civil society is often linked to the developmental and democratic failures of the mainly statist and sometimes authoritarian models- although the reasons for their failures are highly contested (Sjøgren:2001:36).

In relation to this a further problem is the narrow definition for the concept of civil society within this approach. Civil society is presented as associational life in general, with voluntary organisations independent of the state, and this conceptualisation represents a particular notion of state and society, where the state represents power while the civil society belongs to the sphere of liberty and freedom. This narrow sovereign conception of power gives rise to a “romantic” view of civil society as being fully democratic and also implies that a transition to democracy can be achieved by organisations functioning outside the state limiting their power (Sjøgren:2001:52-54).

The early 1990s witnessed the emergence of the WB’s “good governance” strategy together with a return of multi-party democracies on the African continent. The WB’s
liberal political scientists posed great expectations upon civil society as a force for democratisation and development. The introduction of the notion “good governance” to the development discourse came about in 1989 through a report called, *Sub Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth*, and to this day development discourse regarding democratisation of African nations remain highly influenced by this report (Abrahamsen:2000:52-53).

In this context, the “good governance” strategy emphasise the importance of the emergence of associations such as informal, voluntary organisations, farming associations, women’s groups and professional associations throughout the African continent over the past decade. Even though an increase in the numerous associations such as those noted above has occurred in Africa, the “good governance” presupposition that civil society and the organisations that constitute it are of an inherently democratic character is contentious and often questionable which lacks common agreement- particularly within the context of Africa.

Various scholars such as Diamond and Chazan, while differing in their holistic views of civil society are similar in that they exclude ethnic or other types of primordial organisations. As a result, the perspectives of Diamond and Chazan overlook the power dimensions within civil society. This particular view has a tendency to exaggerate and isolate the separation between state and civil society to the extent that we are left with a reified dichotomy rather than a framework which allows for a relational analysis of how state and society are separated and united in specific contexts. In other words, it obscures more than it reveals in regards to what forces in society that are likely to contribute to political change.

Consequently, this neo-liberal view of civil society will neither be used for the purpose of this thesis which derives from a specifically African context nor in discussion relating to the subject of enquiry.
Mamdani (1996), criticises the neo-liberalist good governance view of civil society which in his view tends to glorify civil society and conceptualise it as being internally *homogenous* and *democratic* and externally opposing the state.

Mamdani (1996) characterises it as a methodological bias and a clear unwillingness to concretely analyse ‘actual civil society’. Following on from this, a neo-liberalistic normative description of civil society lead us to an analytical prescription and confusion of how we want civil society to be (normative) rather than focusing on how it actually is. If one believes that civil society always represent democratic values one looses the analytical function of civil society. Neo-liberalists do not take into consideration that a civil society differ in its role, depth, and function in different contexts. One can argue that these structural elements are crucial when analysing which role civil society can play in a democratisation process (Sjøgren:2001:35).

My approach to the concept of civil society refers to urban independent local CSO’s and rural communitarian associations and the complexities within the structure and capacity of these organisations. In other words, the concept “civil society” in this context and which will be used for the purpose of the thesis is a collective of institutions whose members are represented in a complex of domestic non-state actors who indirectly or directly promote or struggle for political change(Grugel:2002:95-96).

It is interesting to emphasise that the neo-liberalist understanding of civil society presented above, often does not pay attention to the question of power. However, in order to use civil society analytically the concept should be referred to as a conflictive practise related to power. In other words it refers to a struggle about who is justified to define the common goals and furthermore in which way they should be addressed. Consequently it is of great importance to identify who is active in civil society and how citizenship is constructed in order to analyze its democratic potential (Grugel:2002:94-95).
From the discussion above, I will argue that one should not import the concept of civil society in relation to Africa directly from the neo-liberal perspective deriving from the West. However, it makes little sense to create a definition that is totally unrelated to the Western tradition. Nevertheless, the concept needs to open up for the rich associational life that exists in Africa today. Therefore the concept of civil society with regards to this thesis allows for the inclusion of a wide array of political activities, whether they are long established or more recent. The theoretical reflection made with regards to civil society also needs to be put into a larger context in relation to democracy and the process of democratisation.

3.2 Civil society and Democratisation

The way one defines democracy influences the assessment of its existence and quality. There are many various interpretations of the prerequisites necessary to obtain a democracy and as a result the concept ‘democracy’ remains somewhat unclear and at times even highly contested (Beetham:2005:1)

The minimalist and Shumpeterian definitions of liberal democracy allocate little room for civil society and focus mainly on variables such as free and fair elections, some civil and political rights and majority rule. Many African scholars criticise the way in which the liberal democracy definition has been applied within an African context and see it as irrelevant due to its Western origin (Abrahamsen:2000:69-73). More recent contributions operate with a broader democratic definition such as Beetham (2005:5) who proposes that ‘Democracy should be defined in terms of its underlying principles and only secondly in terms of the institutions that uphold them’.

Grugel(2002:92) follow in the same direction when he argues that democracy requires that subordinate groups should be able to obtains the resources necessary to play an important role within civil society and consequently with regard to the state.
For the purpose of this thesis, democracy will not only be seen as the establishment of governing political institutions but more profoundly as the creation, extension and practice of social citizenship. It is of great importance to identify who is active in civil society and how citizenship is constructed in order to analyze its democratic potential (Grugel:2002:92-95). In this approach the focus is driven away from the view where the state is seen in isolation from the society and focuses on the interactive state-society relation and the power constellations within the society as a whole.

With regards to *democratisation* the role of civil society in that process is contestable. The neo-liberal perspective (Diamond:1994 et al) view civil society essentially as an aid to the state while the radical perspective view the function of civil society as reforming the state. This thesis represents neither of these two approaches. Democratisation will combine these two elements which leave us with a notion of democratisation viewing the democratic function of civil society in its engagement with the state as a force for change (Grugel:2002:95-96).

*Democratisation* of the state can be seen as changes in the balance of power among different political forces and of state-society relations so that the state in the process becomes more autonomous from dominant political classes and social groups and correspondingly more embedded among and responsive to subordinate ones (Sjøgren:2007: 23).

Moreover, from an analytical perspective the role of the citizenship in this respect is tied up to the conflicting interactions related to power and the constant struggle between who is entitled to say what in the process of defining common problems and the means with which to face them. Emphasising on citizenship in terms of democratisation directs us to analyse the social relationships and power struggles among various groups in society and forces us to view that democracy also operates on the micro-level of social relationships and not just on the macro-level of institutions (Grugel:2002:11-12).
In the case of Burundi, citizenship has been tied up to ethnicity. The Tutsi have been seen as the ones holding the political power, while the Hutus in many ways have been excluded from the political arena. Consequently there has been a power struggle between these two ethnic groups over political power.

Following from this the next sections of this chapter will put the civil society concept into an African context which will be used for the purpose of my thesis further on.

### 3.3 Civil Society and State relations in an African context

In this section I argue that one need to look upon civil society in Africa with regards to history. One need to view that the civil society is not static rather it evolves over time in relation to the structural changes of power.

Since the end of the Cold War, a new view of underlying causes of the African conflicts that have engrossed the continent for years have emerged among African intellectuals. These views have emphasised not only the importance of political institutions but also the role in which “civil society” can play as a counterbalance or even scrutinize the state (Abrahamsen:2000:52-56).

However, according to Chabal and Daloz (1999), *civil society* in Africa represents an “illusion”. Their argument is based on the idea that a concept that derives from a distinct period of European history is irrelevant in explaining politics on a continent with a distinctively different cultural and political setting.

The loose interpretation of the term *civil society* is highly problematic as it is often represented as a conceptual rag bag standing as a sharp contrast to the more specific manner as represented in political theory (Chandhoke:1995:38). Chabal and Daloz go as far as to claim that ‘there are no evidence of functional civil society in Africa apart from clientilistic considerations of identity’ (Chabal,Daloz:1999:14-15). They represent a theory named-political instrumentalization of disorder. This theory claims that the colonial powers never institutionalized the colonial state.
The arguments made by Chabal and Daloz (1999) are based on the use of a normative explanation of civil society. As mentioned previously in this chapter, this notion of civil society obscures more than it reveals as it fails to consider the actual existing civil society in relation to the specific historical context.

The debate around civil society has, as highlighted, been absorbed with the notion of a liberal civil society. As a consequence, non-Western sensibilities have often criticised the notion for being Eurocentric. The liberal definition of civil society—which focuses on the social arena between the state and the individual lead to the conclusions that state based political organizations and Western style individualism are unproblematic universals (Chazan:1992:73). However, politics cannot be exclusively analysed from the point of view of state institutions. The contemporary revival of the term “civil society” which takes a more political viewpoint and which serves as a critique and a challenge to the "top-down” notion of society-state relations therefore perhaps encompasses a more holistic understanding of the concept. In my point of view if the impact on African realities of the idea of civil society is to be fully understood, its terms must be read against the specificities of local histories (Comaroff, Comaroff:1999:27-28). Even those who aim to include the historical and cultural specificity of civil society often fall into the trap of wanting an universally applicable theoretical tool. In other words, civil society, even when recognized as a normative Western construct, nevertheless, has a way of presenting this as the only viable option for developing politics. This has resulted in scholars displaying ambivalence in using the term “civil society” as an analytical tool in an African context (Garland:1999:73-74).

According to Ekeh(1992), there exists a misrepresentation of the role exercised by the civil society that arises from an unqualified application of the Western construct of civil society to the African situation. In the West civil society arose as a counterbalance and check to the totalitarian state, whereas civil society in Africa has historically evolved around a social welfare construct that represents the functions that the state could not or would not perform (Osaghae:1995:193-194).
This definition does not sufficiently reflect the diversity and strength of the CSO’s that exist in Africa today. Nevertheless, it is a reminder that there is a need for a non-Western approach to the civil society perspective. It is not analytically relevant to only talk about individual organisations in terms of their opportunity to challenge the state as have been done by Western scholars. The western scholars often exclude organisations of kinship and ethnicity in the definition of civil society, which are relevant to discuss within the African civil society. This exclusion has had a significant impact on social movements throughout Africa particularly in the rural areas where organisations tend to be more ethnically based and where primary objective most of all is an expression of needs and not necessarily to antagonise the state (Osaghae:1995:194).

Political scientists often conclude from the relative absence of voluntary associations in Africa that the continent suffers from a weak civil society. Yet, civil society cannot be utilised as an analytical tool if it represents an absence. I argue that the focus needs to be directed so that the concept enables us to identify those forces and institutions that do have some potential for producing a more productive engagement between state and society (Karlstrøm:1999:106). Considerations of institutional variations in new democracies need to be complemented by an understanding of their underlying political dynamics, but also a clear comprehension of how and with what result individuals and groups gain access to political power and what they do with this power once they obtain it (Haynes:2002:254).

Gibbon for instance, criticises civil society theory for idealising both the character of the organisations that constitute this sphere and also their capacity and tendency to challenge the power relations in society. He stresses the fact that associations within civil society are not automatically participatory, democratic or accountable referring internally within the organisation or their ideological orientation. Many CSO’s in Africa represent ethnic, kinship, family values and therefore have nothing to do with democratic values and opposing the state (Sjøgren:2001:39).
The argument is not based on the fact that theorising and generalising ambitions should be left out rather it argues that they should be directed more empirically as opposed to deductively based. Characterising the state as oppressive and the civil society as democratic will cover up the real power interrelations between the state and society, including the relations of power domination and conflict that exist within civil society and the informal sector. Gibbon is weary of general formulations of a neutral plural civil society arguing that a civil society is structurally differentiated due to relations, cleavages and forms of organisations. Organisations individually interact with the state in various ways, and the relations vary from confrontational to clientilistic. Consequently, an historical (liberalistic) comprehension of civil society will not explore the forces that sustain and produce it. (Sjøgren:2001:40)

I therefore argue that one need to take into account the historical structural processes when analysing the civil society in Burundi. Mamdani (1996) support my argument when he argues that the western liberal construct of civil society is a-historical way of analyzing a continent where history played a crucial role in explaining the various countries state-society relations. His critique also emphasises the neglect of rural conditions and the institutional particularities of urban and rural state form in Africa. His approach towards politicisation, collective identities and democratisation is rooted in colonialism and their institutionalisation of what he refers to as the “bifurcated state” (Mamdani:1996:16-23).

Neither accountability to local structures, nor participation was given priority by the colonial authorities. In this state-form, the urban areas were governed by civil law and racial exclusion from civil society while the rural areas were governed by customary law and further marked by authoritarian inclusion into separated ethnic traditional units. In Burundi the Hutu’s were transformed into a deprived native identity while the Tutsi into a privileged settler identity (Mamdani:2002). In these rural areas each tribe was declared a homogenous cultural unit and the chief of this unit had ultimate power which led to what Mamdani(1996:37) calls “decentralised despotism”. In the wake of independence, the urban civil society was “deracialised”,
but the rural areas were never “detribalised”, let alone democratised. Struggles were related to local contexts even though ethnicity as a form of power also contributed to it (Sjøgren:2001:40).

The construction of citizenship is an important element to take into account when studying a country such as Burundi, where ethnic conflict has raged over the last decade. One can argue that the construction of citizenship in Burundi has changed as a consequence of colonial settlement. In Burundi the social categories of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa shared a common culture language and belief system and there is evidence to show that what appeared to be socio-political differences were created during the colonial era (Daley:2006b:17).

Based on the theoretical framework of Mamdani (1996), citizenship in Burundi was during the colonial time categorised in term of ethnicity whereas the Tutsi minority were in hold of the power, the Hutu were excluded from their political rights. In this way the colonisers influenced the societal structure making the citizens mobilise and identify themselves around their ethnic identity unknown from the past. Consequently, a historical analysis of changing state power and of resource access, and the intersection of these with ethnicity is of utterly importance to understanding inter-group conflict in Burundi (International Crisis Group:2007).

It is also a necessary element to investigate when assessing the role of the civil society in Burundi is to view if citizenship remains tied up to identifications around ethnicity.

*My first argument is therefore that the historical construction of citizenship around ethnicity in Burundi has weakened the capacity of the CSO’s to gather around common political goals. Consequently this hampers the role and capacity of CSO’s as promoters for democracy.*
3.4 The interchange between civil society and democratisation in an African context

In this section I put forward the argument that democratisation in the Burundian context needs to be seen in the light of historical structural processes. When discussing democratisation, especially in a country like Burundi, one needs to take into account the previous attempts of transition, setbacks and areas of progress in order to use these as lessons for how to make it possible for a regime change to take place.

The problem with the framework used to analyse democratic transition in Africa is embedded in the definition of the concept itself. One of the most established dimensions of modernisations theory and the Western construct of the transition process towards democracy is the role given to the strategic elite. In this view the transition process is defined as the interval between one regime and another. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter(1986), this involves an exclusion of the past and a construction of the future. The only main absolute requirement for transition to democracy is a commitment to democratisation on the part of the elite (Grugel:2002:48-51). This can be said to be democratisation from ‘above’, or what often is referred to as a top down approach, as it leaves little room and insight into context-specific actors and processes (Tørnquist, Stokke, Harris:2004:5).

This particular view of “transition” does not undertake a thorough analysis of past transitions and progress recorded as the beginning point for present transition. This undermines the meaning of a transition as a historical and continuous process rather than a state of being. It is a (normative) a-historic construct ignoring the importance of a more suitable framework which not only includes the current social and political elements of a nation state but also includes past political and social changes. History is a basic, yet underrated dimension of the democratisation process. The impacts from
the past often reflects in countries transition toward a regime change (Pridham:2000:29) Transition is a continuation of previous attempts which for most countries and certainly for Burundi started with the transition from colonial rule. Even though this process has had many setbacks in terms of coups, authoritarian one-party systems and military regimes it is crucial to address what went wrong earlier in the nation’s history and use these lessons in the analysis of transitions today (Osaghae:1995:188).

“Path dependence means that history matters, we cannot understand today’s choices without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions. It is important to know more about the culturally derived norms and behaviour and how they interact with formal rules to get better answers to such issues (Putnam:1993:181)

Evidently the elite perspective can be useful when analysing the internal sources for democratic transition. It can also be used as a tool when analysing transitions managed by military elites such as in Nigeria and Ghana. Nevertheless it is not suited in the same way to analyse a forced transition which can be said to be the case of Burundi. Overemphasising the elite is also a problem because there is no guarantee that the elite themselves are committed to democratic principles. The perspective of elite serves more the interest of the Western powers. It also downplays the relevance of the ordinary peoples in the democratisation process (Osaghae:1995:190-192).

Grugel (2002:92) criticises the most common literature on transitions to democracy as he claims it builds upon this minimalist definition and fails to include civil society as a component in the struggle towards democracy.

It is important not to exclude the role of popular mobilization as it has in most cases played a crucial role in the initial development of democratisation (Haynes:2002:255). As pointed out earlier in this chapter there is however a need to view the actual impact of civil society with a critical lens as the democratic relevance of certain organizations can vary over time and space. Civil society groups that are ethnically based can be less dedicated to the idea of democracy where their motives
lie more in pursuing their own personal aspirations rather than achieving democracy in the interests of the nation as a whole (Haynes:2002:255). Grugel (2002) emphasise an important point in relation to this when he address that civil societies in practise are very different in their composition. Who exactly represent civil society and who does not? And what exactly is their role in the process? One need to consider these crucial elements when analysing the role the civil society can play in further enhancing a democratic development.

Western scholars have emphasised the need to take local conditions into considerations in building democracy in Africa. Nevertheless, until present very little effort has actually been made to move beyond the prescriptive Western orientation. Frequently analysis of transitions in Africa derives from the frameworks of Latin American and Easter European experiences. These frameworks glorify the unilinear development assumptions and the triumph of American and Western liberal democracy (Osaghae:1995:186). Based on modernisation theory, this unilinear view on democracy points out that economic development is crucial to democracy and that underdeveloped countries are not ‘ripe for democracy’. However, the goal of fostering economical liberalisation through IMF and the WB proved insufficient in its efforts to promote the establishment of even the most basic of democracies. However, the experience in many parts of Africa has been that the efforts of economic liberalisation while intending to bring about positive societal change in fact lead to even greater levels of impoverished people enabling the environment for democracy in underdeveloped countries (Abrahamsen:2000:48).

Diamond, one of the leading scholars on the globalisation of democracy school admits that the current democratisation is a Western construct and recommends that the West must assist the organic development in the particular ‘soil’ of each country, without imposing its own particular vision of how democracy should function (Osaghae:1995:186-187). However, the Western scholars view civil society from a purely consolidation perspective instead of focusing on the role people can play to make sure democracy serves their interests. These shortcomings give room for a
broader understanding of the dynamics of democratisation and the critical role that civil society can play in the process of democratic transition. This because viewing civil society mainly as ensuring the consolidation of democracy does not give a realistic picture of the capacity usually held by the African civil societies today.

There is therefore a need to focus more on the interest of CSO’s whose activities do not explicitly relate to the democratic process and how they can be empowered by the process. Put simply, if expectation of ordinary people is not taken into consideration, the very foundations of the new democracies could be threatened (Osaghae:1995:194).

This section has made an attempt to explain that political transitions dominantly have been analyzed from a top-down perspective focusing on a narrow range of political processes and institutions. Critical rethinking of the transitions paradigm requires that structural factors, such as historical legacies and ethnic identities are important when determining the path of political transition. One can argue that there is a need to complement on the top-down approach by offering a bottom up perspective revealing the structural importance of civil society and the role of history and ethnicity in that context.

*From the theoretical perspectives presented above one can argue that the civil society should have a role in the democratisation process, however is this the case in Burundi? And what role can the civil society play in Burundi?*
3.5 Political and financial autonomy in relation to democratisation

Central to the civil society argument from a neo-liberal perspective and closely coupled to the state versus society construct, is the concern with autonomy of associational life vis a vis the state. This has become a key defining characteristic of civil society as well as a normative goal. Many scholars use autonomy as a prerequisite in their definition of civil society. However, if autonomy from the state is inherent in the very definition of civil society, then this weakens the usefulness in explaining the processes of democratisation (Beckman:2001b:53). In most of Africa the CSOs are not fully political or financially independent.

Therefore the role of autonomous associational life with regards to democratisation needs to be established concretely in specific historical contexts, rather than being assumed as inevitable. This question needs to be addresses recognising the nature of conflicting interests in the balance between these in society at large, the state and the strategic option available. In relation to this thesis it is interesting to look upon the degree of autonomy the various CSO’s holds.

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6 Diamon, White, Taylor (Beckman:2001b:53).
3.6 The interplay of Kinship, Ethnicity, citizenship and Democratisation.

This section aims to explain the importance of ethnicity and kinship within the African society. My argument is that one cannot exclude the notion of ethnicity and kinship when discussing the role of civil society in Burundi. As ethnicity still is bound up to the notion of citizenship, and kinship is a part of the social construction these dimension are important to discuss in order to comprehend the Burundian civil society.

Generally in Africa the society has historically been built on kinship relations. However, within the context of the conventional western concept of civil society, kinship is not included as part of this domain. Seen as a part of “private life” which stands in contrast to the “public domain” of state and civil society in western thought, kinship is therefore excluded from the objective categorical conception of civil society (Karlstrøm:1999:106-107).

The question that needs to be asked is whether the exclusion of kinship based associational forms of civil society is an appropriate approach to take within the context of the Burundian nation-state and its accompanying culture? This is because in Burundi- as in most African societies throughout the Sub-Saharan region- kinship cannot be viewed as a strictly “private” domain. As a contrast to European societies, kinship in Africa is seen as having both a private and a public face. An example of this can be seen in Uganda where the majority of people argue that the orderly ascending hierarchy of ranked lineages and clan heads (Bataka) and where the king is viewed as the “head of all the clan heads” produces the most stable, cohesive and responsive political order as possible.

In Africa many countries have been affected by civil war after independence of the colonial powers that took place in the 1960s. As a consequence for almost all Burundians life has become polarized along ethnic lines.
According to Bayart, most situations where the structuring of the contemporary political arena seems to be articulated in terms of ethnicity this relates to identities that were not present a century ago or at least not divided in the same sense. Consequently, this suggests that contemporary ethnic conflict is a manufactured concept dating back to post-colonial modernization. Due to the fact that the notion of ‘ethnic group’ was one of the ideological premises of the colonial administration, it became expedient for the groups to define their existence in this way As time passed, this ethnic division among the people became the relationship between the subject people themselves (Haynes:2002: 136-137).

As mentioned earlier Chazan together with other scholars argues that associations based on ethnic identities together with those based on kinship are by definition erased from the concept of civil society. The argument is based on the fact that the engagement with the state is not considered constructive and because they are seen as promoting parochial rather than cross-cutting social solidarities (Comaroff, Comaroff:1999:109). Resulting from the intentional entrenchment of ethnic identities by the colonial powers together with the failure of most post-colonial African states to obtain stability among their subjects (people), it seems probable that the existing ethnic bonds and solidarities will not vanish or may even become weaker in Africa in the near future. Consequently, for the purpose of this thesis it seems inappropriate to exclude ethnic associations, when undertaking an in-depth and thorough analysis of Burunsi’s civil society and in its struggle for democracy. Mamdani (1996) characterises ethnicity as representing a biased role where on the one side it can fulfil the potential democratic and inclusive as well as nourish the authoritarian and exclusive forms of politics (Sjøgren:2001:41).

Whatever the historical origins of ethnicity were, ethnic exclusion has come to dominate the Burundian society. Competing narratives of identity stand as the prime cause of conflict. As a result the conflict dynamics raise crucial questions in the search for an understanding of the politics of cultural pluralism and to the relationship
between the organisation of civil society and its implication for development in the country (Young:2006:25).

The most relevant conceptualisation of civil society in this context is to consider civil society as consisting of non-state organizational activity regardless as to whether or not the organizations within the state conform to the classical norm of civility. Consequently, this will facilitate the assessment of the negative as well as the positive contributions of organizations to democratisation. The analytical task lies in gaining an understanding of the conditions under which these organisations can perform a constructive mediating role and the circumstances under which they become divisive and destructive (Karlstrøm:1999:110).

To sum up, civil society and its relationship to democratisation cannot be understood in abstract terms, but it requires a thorough analysis of the various groups and interests involved in these struggles. The neo-liberalist view on civil society represents a somewhat harmonious equality-based sphere. The reality however is slightly different, and structures of power, hierarchies and wealth is rooted in every civil society.

From the discussion made above, one can assume that ethnicity will be an important dimension within the Burundian civil society. As a natural outcome, it is important to investigate in depth how the relationships between these ethnic groups are explored within the local civil society in Burundi.

My argument is that ethnicity hampers the development of a vital civil society in Burundi.

Only in the last decade have one dedicated more attention to the relationship between democracy and trust. This relates in particular to countries which are ethnically fragmented. It can be argued that generalized trust among people is favourable to desirable forms of democracy, while particularized trust to family or to members of ethnic or religious groups are less beneficial in a democratisation process (Warren:1999:1-3). Putnam (1993) argues that a civic culture of “generalized trust”
and social solidarity between citizens, who are willing and capable of organising together, and cooperate on common goals represent an important societal prerequisite for a vital democracy. Even though Putnam’s work in relation to this context is unsatisfactory due to his narrow definition of civil society, he does underline an important aspect regarding trust and democracy.

Differences among oppositional groups regarding ideology as well as short term goals are central strategic dilemmas that influence the ability to cooperate (Posusney:2005:94) and Dahl( 1971:115) argues that

“Incentives toward cooperation are stronger when each subculture cannot form a majority capable of governing except by entering into a coalition with representatives of other subcultures.”

The possibility of cooperation is therefore weakened if a country is split in two subcultures, where one is a majority and the other a minority. This is seen in the case of Burundi, where the ruling Tutsi represent 14 percent of the population and the Hutus the other 85 percent. In this situation the majority group Hutu has fewer incentives for being conciliatory towards the minority, since they have the strength to form a majority coalition among themselves. Furthermore, the minority also has few incentives to act conciliatory, because of fears of permanent political domination of the majority (Dahl:1971:116). Until 1993 in Burundi, the ruling group has been the minority Tutsi. The majority Hutu has been politically excluded for years. This has clearly intensified the ethnic divide which is still persistent in Burundi.

Furthermore, Dahl emphasise the importance of trust in order to obtain a democratic system (Dahl:1971:150) Dahl argues that in “at least three ways, mutual trust favours “polyarchy” and public contestation while extreme distrust favour hegemony”. The first reason for this is the fact that within a democracy two-way or mutual communication is necessary and obtaining two-way communication between people who do not trust one another is difficult to achieve. Secondly, a degree of mutual trust is necessary in order for people to organise voluntarily in search for their own preferences. Levin argues that the extreme distrust between Ethiopian groups can partly explain the lack of organisation around common interests and preferences “The
mutual distrust and lack of cooperation which inform the political climate of the country are directly related to a very low regard for man’s capacity for solidarity and consensus…The idea that it is possible to transcend the prevailing atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion by trusting one another…has been slow to appear and extremely rare”. The third explanation to the fact that lack of trust can lead to hegemony, is that conflict are more threatening for people who do not trust each other in the first place. Competition which serve as an important element within a democracy, demands a whole lot of trust between the opponents: they can be competitors but not enemies (Dahl 1971:151-152)

My argument is that the distrust that exists between the Hutu and the Tutsi impedes the vertical as well as the horizontal cooperation making it difficult to cooperate and mobilise around common democratic goals. A question important to address in that respect is if the CSO’s function as consolatory or dividing with regards to establishing trust among the ethnic groups?

In order to understand the present one needs to understand the past. To analyse civil society and its role within the Burundi society today it is first of all necessary to have a thorough understanding of the societal and political challenges which the nation has encountered. This chapter aims to gain insight into and understand how ethnic relations and structural power dimensions have evolved in Burundi throughout history. The focus will primarily be on how and why social identities have evolved. My argument is based on the fact that ethnicity was a cultural identity before the colonial period. However, during colonial and post-colonial time ethnicity was transformed into a source of political differentiation and mobilisation leading up to acts of violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi respectively. The division between the two ethnic groups is still applicable to the contemporary Burundian society posing a challenge to the development of viable civil society functioning as a viable contributor towards democracy.
4. From bloodshed to hope in Burundi?

4.1 Introduction

The countless events plaguing the Great Lakes Region since the late 1980’s has attracted much attention. Since its independence Africa had never seen so much violence and so much killing in one place and on so many occasions as in the case of Burundi. Despite the atrocities that took place, news from Burundi has been largely marginalised compared to its neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the Burundi history has been- and continues to be highly turbulent.

Burundi has been affected of low-intensity warfare since the end of the colonial era in 1961. An estimated number of 330.000 died in the genocide killings of 1972 and 1988. Moments of hope were present in the phase of the early 1990’s, when African countries moved towards multiparty democracy. For a moment it appeared that Burundi was to be one of the promising candidates for civil reform. The outcome of the 1993 elections was immediately described by one, western scholar as “one of the most remarkable transitions to democracy yet seen in Africa” (Lemarchand: 1995: xi). However, the reality that followed proved to be quite different.

The enhancement of the democratic transition came to a halt when the first Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by the Tutsi opposition. This event threw Burundi toward another decade of civil strife and ethnic conflict killing more than 300.000 people together with 600.000 fleeing the country (Daley:2007a:306, Herrisse:2000:1). A peace agreement was settled in 2005 and Burundi experienced its first democratic election where the voters approved of a power-sharing constitution, including both Hutu and Tutsi. However, despite the signing of a peace agreement, total peace has not yet returned to the region and the civil state of Burundi

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7 The exact numbers are not precise due to the fact that the numbers vary from source to source (Lemarchand:1995).
has been characterised as being in a state of “no peace-no war” (International crisis groups: 2007). The peace agreement has recognised that governance and ‘structural violence’ are at the root of Burundi’s civil conflict. However it fails to address the complexity of politics in both Africa and in Burundi. The agreement views the actors of African politics as international actors, the domestic political elite and the armed movements, excluding the civil society (Daley: 2006a:304).

An assessment of some of the root causes of the current crisis in Burundi will include an analytical description of the nation’s history. The affect history has had on the societal and power structures in Burundi will in turn affect the function or dysfunction of current civil society. In order to analytically view the role civil society can play in the ongoing democratisation process, the development of power structures within the Burundian society and the role of ethnicity needs to be addressed (Herisse: 2000:1). Consequently, undertaking an historical analysis of changing state power, local power and resource access, and their intersection with ethnicity is of critical importance in understanding inter-group conflict in Burundi (Daley: 2006b:7).

In Burundi, *ethnicity*, has been the central organising principle of the modern state with its successive policies of differentiation and exclusion. The ongoing violence is linked to an increasingly, factionalised political elite, based on the cleavages found in Burundian society, who mobilise ethnicity in their struggle for control over the state. (Daley: 2006b:1). Peace efforts conducted over the past couple of years have made efforts aimed at correcting the ethnic imbalance through power-sharing and reform of governmental institutions. However, these efforts alone are unlikely to resolve the political crisis. This is primarily because they not only fail to address the complex social reality of Burundi society but they do not include the people of Burundi as part of a broader non-ethnic political community serving as a prerequisite for a stable democracy (Daley: 2006b:1).

Presently, there is no scholarly consensus to the degree of impact colonialism had on the stratification of the Burundi society into ethnic rivalries. It can be said that,
'Radically divergent interpretations of history provide the basis upon which collective identities are built and act as powerful justifications of current behaviour' (Uvin:1999:254).

Burundi is known for being an oral society which complicates the exact nature of history (Uvin:1999:254). Both scholars and people in Burundi disagree upon historical accounts about ethnicity as a political factor. However, Gurr argues that it is of little relevance to know the precise nature of pre-colonial relations between Hutu and Tutsi arguing that:

“ The key to identifying communal groups is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart” (Uvin:1999:255).

The relevance of this is that even if it is hard to understand the exact nature of when and how ethnicity became a defining trait, the most important is to understand that at the end of independence, the population of Burundi identified themselves in accordance to ethnicity.

4.2 Burundian history and background of the conflict

Pre-colonial time
Unlike many states in Africa, the state of Burundi was not a colonial construct. It existed prior to colonial rule although its boundaries were extended as a result of colonial conquest of neighbouring territories. Burundian pre-colonial history was characterised by various social identities coexisting, and sometimes even overlapping (Daley:2006b:6-7). The categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed in Burundian pre-colonial history. However, there appears to be no evidence of ethnic conflict between these three ethnic groups during this time.

In order to understand how this polarisation came about it is important to investigate what took place under colonial rule. It can be argued that the societal structure from
pre-colonial Burundi should leave better preconditions for democracy to transpire than other countries in Africa. However, the arrival of colonial powers did something to the nation’s social structure creating “ethnic” groups hostile to one another.

4.2.1 Colonial Rule

Burundi was first a part of the German colony of Ruanda-Urundi (1897-1916) up until its defeat in the First World War. As a consequence Burundi was placed under Belgian control until its independence in 1962.

The Belgian colonisers observed from the beginning that in Burundi the ruling group was the Ganwa (princes)\(^8\) followed by the Tutsi. Within this social structure, while some Hutu did occupy posts as landowners or political or religious leaders, they did not however, hold as many high status positions as the Tutsi and the Ganwa (Krueger:2007:25). The minority Twa, on the other hand was totally marginalized in the social structure (Krueger:2007:26).

The Belgian colonial take over left permanent indications of its presence within the Burundi society. The Belgians, like many other colonialists, found governance easier if exercised through a fixed, formal, hierarchical social structure. As a consequence they introduced pre-conceptions of racial superiority and applied their biased interpretations in favour of the Tutsi to the hierarchical social structure of the pre-colonial society. They awarded employment of authority to the Tutsi and left the Hutu and the Twa the assignment of tilling the soil (Krueger:2007:26). This led the Hutu’s with the feeling of being “ripped off” from the responsibility and the privileges they previously had possessed hardening the boundaries between the two ethnic groups. The colonial powers introduced “indirect rule”, where what has been

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\(^8\) *Ganwa* where the real powerholders in the traditional society, and where not identified with either Hutu or Tutsi (Lemarchand:1995:15)
later called the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ was used to justify European support for the minority Tutsi as natural leaders. The implementation of indirect rule made it possible for the Belgians to ‘combine exploitation with neglect’ and they did almost nothing to develop, educate or cultivate the general African population (Krueger:2007:27).

Under Belgian rule the indigenous population were classified into racial groupings where the superior Tutsi, were those who where pastoralists and who had Caucasian features. The label “Hutu” was given to those defined as cultivators with negroid features and classification. Twa was assigned to those who were hunters and gathers with pygmyoid features.10 This racial classification subsequently and unsurprisingly led to notions of superiority and inferiority (Daley:2006b:8).

In addition to the above mentioned as a destabilising effect the colonial powers introduced the “race” myth and the notion of “ethnicity”. Furthermore, the incorporation of traditional power structures into the “indirect rule” favoured by the colonial administration resulted in exclusion of the indigenous courts, the Bashingantahe. These actions combined resulted in a loss of a common Burundi destiny. Hence creating ethnocentrism, an ideology of ethnic supremacy adopted into segments of the population creating cleavages difficult to heal (Herrisse:2000:). According to Drayton (1995:10) ‘Colonialism created a situation whereby a single identity, ethnicity, was prioritised over the multiplicity of identities held by the African people’. In Burundi this resulted in a transformation of the political culture, leading to the downfall of the existing “national consensus” (Daley:2006:b7).

Mamdani(1996) explains it as,

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9 A myth imported from 19th century Europe, which placed yet another construction on the history of Tutsi hegemony (Lemarchand:1999)

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“The politics of Africanization was simultaneously unifying and fragmentation: unifying the victims of colonial racism but dividing the same majority along ethnic lines that reflected the actual process of redistribution”.

The colonial powers discriminated the Hutus in favour of the Tutsi, excluding the Hutus from political power. How this affected the socio political context of Burundi will be deliberated on below.

4.2.2 The socio-political context of Burundian civil society

One can argue that there exist a gap between the country’s national leaders and Burundi’s grass-root organisations. This is a result of the brutal decades of civil war which has contributed to the construction of a population deeply cynical and alienated regarding their leaders as self-serving, corrupt and unresponsive. However, the civil society existing in Burundi is not static; it evolves over time together with historical processes and the change of power that has taken place in the country. It has been argued by the WB that over the last couple of years the Burundi local civil society has gone through a positive development (Brachet, Wolphe: 2005: 2). However, there is no documented analysis over what this encounters.

Historically, in Burundi the concept of civil society and associational groupings were absorbed into the political system, as well as in the social and cultural structure of the society. As mentioned in chapter 3, the identity of Burundians in that period was related to kinship and lineages. Consequently, civil society was absorbed into these kinship and familial relations. As for the most part, traditional rulers were born rather than elected or appointed, therefore ‘civil society’ did not need to be as actively involved in the choice of leaders as they are in a democratic system of governance that is emerging in Africa now and in Burundi respectively (Makumbe: 1998: 306).

Critics of civil society in Africa and those who claim that civil society has no meaningful function in this context, fail to realize that unlike most developed countries, the countries in Africa have undergone major obstacles to the development of its civil society since the beginning of colonialism (Makumbe: 1998: 310). During
colonial time in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa the formation of civic groups were discouraged. The only politically active CSO’s during the colonial era were those whose membership comprised the settlers and the colonizers themselves. These organisations excluded Africans in general. Thus, in rural areas the religious associations were well established (Makumbe:1998:307).

However, Prince Rwagasore\textsuperscript{11} contributed to the emergence of a nationalist combat among the population. In 1958, right before Burundi gained their independence the first elite of intellectuals graduated from the University of Burundi. This gave roots to the emergence of associations more or less autonomous. The vitality of the various labour and student movements that took place in the period of 1960-1966 was a result of the desire to escape from the clientelistic politics that had marked the era of colonisation\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the emergence of various associational formations in Burundi prior to 1990, these organisations were highly repressed by the authoritarian regime at the time. Their opportunities to speak up and to express their opinions freely were limited. The concept of a civil society in Burundi primarily took form with the emergence of the democratic development of multiparty democracies in Africa in the early 1990’s. Nevertheless the meaning of the notion civil society and its role remained vague. Legally the local civil society gained a sustainable foothold in relation to the state in April 1992 with a Public Law favouring the creation of local non-governmental organization (Herisse:2000:14). The launching of the new law led to more than a thousand organisations legally registered together with more than five thousand associations establishing in the rural areas of Burundi. However, the majority of these organisations were usually one dimensional, predominantly unisex, limited in their membership (ethnicity), capacity, and purpose, and more often existed in name alone

\textsuperscript{11} The son of king Mwambutsa IV, the hero of Burundian independence, he was assassinated 13 of October 1961 just before Burundi gained its official independence the 1 of July 1962.

\textsuperscript{12} Interview: Melchior, Ndayishimiye
with one person assuming all leadership positions (Herisse:2000:5). Today, while many grassroots organizations genuinely do represent the interests and needs of the local citizenry, many are also connected with local elite groups that promote their own vested interests. Hence, it is important to keep in mind that Burundi has only had one decade in which to construct a civil society capable of effectively protecting and promoting the interests of citizens.

From the sections presented above one can argue that ethnicity and clientelism often associated with many African states is also represented within the Burundian society. This has led to severe ramifications for the development of a Burundian civil society. Consequently, these dimensions will be further elaborated on in the sections below.

4.3 The pivotal role of ethnicity in the Burundian society.

There exist two main hypotheses with regard to ethnicity and how the ethnic groups came about. One view argues for the fact that there is no difference between Hutu and Tutsi (Chretien:1995). While the other (Reyntjens:1995) Lemarchand (1994), who argue that Hutu and Tutsi were originally different peoples, with different origins and that differences are socio-biological. Historical evidence to prove one or the other is difficult. However, popular proverbs dated before colonial rule mentioning Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and historical accounts of a societal hierarchy indicate that the categories existed before arrival of the colonial powers.

However, this highlights how volatile the situation was to political manipulation that favoured specific versions of history. This thesis will argue the fact that the ethnic categorisation existed before colonial time and that “ethnicity” as a concept of identity and power evolved with the colonisation period.

In Burundi the narrative of identity is highly contested and revolves around different historical readings. However, there exists a scholarly consensus that agriculturalists and pastoralists have long existed in symbiosis in the region of Great Lakes. The ethnonyms took form in the 19th century and their generalization was likely linked to
political centralization. The generalization, primoridalization and racialization of the Hutu-Tutsi difference were a product of Belgian colonial rule. Tutsi as the “ruling group” rule-ship was systematized and its range of functions greatly expanded by the Belgian colonisers (Young:2006:17).

What needs to be asked is why has ethnicity become the catalyst for violence as opposed to other lines of social cleavages?

The question of the role of ethnicity in explaining the conflict in Burundi has possessed a central place in the literature. The conflict in Burundi has often been characterised as clashes between the two main ethnic groups, namely the Hutu and Tutsi (Ndikumana:2005:415). Lemarchand (1995:1) points out a crucial characteristically ‘paradox’ in the history of Burundi. This paradox can be explained through the fact that unlike other sub-Saharan African countries, historically the ethnic groups in Burundi are marked by a relatively peaceful cohabitation, speaking the same language, sharing the same culture and in addition submitted to the same monarchical structure (Ndikumana:2005:415). Consequently, it is of importance to elaborate on history in order to understand why ethnicity became the generating factor of violent conflict.

4.3.1 Ethnicity and Patron-Client Relationship

In pre-colonial times, patron-client relationship was once the linchpin of Burundi society. Essentially this was a relationship of exchange between individuals of unequal status, between a client who searched for protection and a patron with wealth. Much has been said about the nature of patron-client relationships linked to the idea of protection and oppression. However, in Burundi there was a certain stability within this relationship. Nevertheless, the cohesion that existed could not persist in an environment of war and ethnic conflict and patron-client ties served only to accelerate the process of ethnic polarization. The language of “clientelism” give crucial clues to an understanding of the cultural frame of the patron-client framework consequently, focusing on the normative aspects of power relationships
(Lemarchand:1995:11-12). Inequality was the precondition for social exchange and the motive for seeking the protection of a superior. What can be said is that Burundi represented a highly complex society where ethnic affiliations were by no means in the past the most reliable indicator of social ranking. Kinship and clan ties where the indicators shaping the order, and through clientage ties one could improve the chances in life which added another variable to the already complex social structure. However, shortly before the independence one could clearly see separate ethnic identities who developed in pace with the social change that took place, and the constant growing political competition (Lemarchand:1995:13-14)

Ethnicity is clearly politicised. This phenomenon is well explained by Alphonse Rugabarara,

“The use of the term Hutu and Tutsi reflects a deliberate effort to create and maintain a Tutsi ideology and a Hutu ideology….. These two ideologies, born in the womb of the political class shortly before independence, have created and maintained this so-called ethnic consciousness, which may not have come into being had the experience of politics been lived and defined differently….. Behind the problem of definitions (of ethnic categories) lies a problem of perception”(Lemarchand:1995:14).

In other words, ethnicity has been politicised and manipulated by the elite for political gains. In Burundi where the majority of the population suffer from analphabetisms and 37.6\textsuperscript{13} of the population lives below the poverty line, political manipulation is conducted more easily than if the population was politically autonomous and economically independent. The reason why the Tutsi elite was able to mobilise people around ethnicity was the historical patterns of integration of citizen and subject established by the Belgian colonial state, where Tutsi were the citizens holding the political power, while the Hutus where the subjects, almost entirely excluded from the political arena. (Mamdani:1996).

\textsuperscript{13} Human Development Index (2007), Burundi was ranked 81 out of 108 developing countries.
Consequently, Burundi went from a country once having a complex social structure to becoming a simplistic society where *ethnicity* served as the main social identification reducing all other social roles (Lemarchand:1995:14-15). Citizenship became related to ethnic identification and the political discourse was between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Unsurprisingly, the Pygmoid Batwa, was excluded from the public discourse and the princely elite *Ganwa* were assimilated within the Tutsi elite. Resultantly, the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy was enforced which has led to deep-rooted suspicions, massacres, wastage of resources and general insecurity and confusion leading to various political and social roles that were of importance for the cohesion of a national identity vanished (Udogu:1995:799).

### 4.3.2 Ethnicity and the political culture of post-colonial Burundi

The monarchy survived the colonial period to a certain degree through social strength which resulted in the royalist and biethnic party UPRONA being established. UPRONA was led by a prince named Louis Rwagasore who won elections in 1961 (Uvin:1999:256). One pivotal factor to the violence that arose was the assassination of Rwagasore by the opposition leaving the party in internal conflict. Competition for state power suddenly became between three groups: the *Tutsi- Hima*, the *Tutsi-Banyaruguru* and a small up and coming *Hutu elite*.

However, the independence movement started off violently. The first deadly conflict occurred in the late 1950s and the early 1960s with the rise of nationalist movements. Directly following the de-colonisation, in the year of 1966 Burundi experienced a Coup d’État led by Micombero. This group consisting of *Tutsi- Hima* controlled the army and after their force came into power they excluded other Tutsis and all Hutus from the political competition for power.\(^\text{14}\) As a result of this coup up until 1993 political and economic power in Burundi was held by three military regimes namely, Micombero from 1966 to 1982, Bagaza from 1982-1987 and Buyoya from 1987 to

\(^{14}\) Interview: Melchior, Ndayishimiye
1983 (UNDP:2006:6-8). Each used their military positions and their power to maintain their privileges. Given that all these military leaders represented the Tutsi-Hima group it meant that all the most important positions within a society were held by this specific group (Uvin:1999:257).

As the colonisation arguably has played a central role in Burundi’s ethnic civil unrest, one of the elements that will be emphasised throughout this thesis is that political identities and structures needs to be seen in the light of history.

Mamdani (2001:21-22) emphasise this fact and argues that political identities emerge from ‘the process of state formation’ and therefore political identities need to be understood in the light of history of state formation. During this process identities are generated in terms of a group’s access to state power. In the case of Burundi, the Tutsi-Hima clearly gained more access to power which again intensified the differences between the ethnic groups.

Even if one can say that colonialism has contributed to the ethnic-conflict, Mamdani (2001) asserts that blame must also be given to the post-colonial state who failed to promote a more inclusive vision of society- that is a society that transcends external concepts of race and ethnicity (Daley:2006b:12)

The awareness of the heterogeneous origins of Burundi people leads us to a more nuanced picture of the persistence of the conflict and the struggles over the state. Rivalries between clans, communes and families absorb the social structure and cut across ethnic boundaries. As a result of the heterogeneous Tutsi group, its dynastic families and the various social bases for inter-ethnic relations, Lemarchand (1994) in his contributions challenge the simplistic view of social identities in the discourse about the conflict in Burundi. In regards to the current structure of Burundi’s post-colonial state the Hutu and Tutsi division is only one out of many explanatory factors. There exists at least five specific cleavages around which conflict occurred: intra-aristocracy, between the old guard and the young modernised elite, between Hutu and Tutsi, intra-Tutsi, between the military and the political elite, and more recent intra-
Hutu (Palipehutu-FNL). Today, there exist deep divisions within each ethnic group between “hardliners” and moderates” and divides between the Burundian elite and the general population (educated vs uneducated, rural vs urban between employed and unemployed). In addition, there are other social challenges such as women still experiencing legal and societal discrimination, including discriminatory laws and credit practices and the marginalization of the minority Twa (Brachet, Wolpe:2005:5).

4.4 “Watershed” events polarising the Hutu and Tutsi

As explained above, the history of Burundi represents several examples of turbulent incidents of *Coup d’Ètats* and other political uprisings affecting the Burundi society. Two specific events need to be highlighted due to the influence it had on the ethnic polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi.

Firstly, an aborted Hutu uprising launched at Tutsi citizens took place in 1972 unleashing violence and killings of genocidal dimension. Some 2000-3000 Tutsi were killed by the Hutu rebels. In the weeks and months that followed a brutal repression took place coordinated by the Tutsi led Burundian army. The Tutsi dominated government was also involved as a result of their fear of losing their political domination. In parts of the country Hutus were indiscriminately massacred. In other parts it was more systematic where the “intellectuals”; teachers, school children and any Hutus with education were murdered (Eller:1999:234, UNDP2006). The objective was to destroy the seeds of from which would grow up to be tomorrows intelligentsia. Anyone with experience from the colonial era understood that the existence of an intellectual elite was the prerequisite for initiative, independence and leadership (Mamdani:2001:230). Consequently, around 200.000 thousand Hutu were massacred, while another 150.000 fled the country. The massacres that took place gave Burundi and the Great Lakes the first glimpse of a genocidal wave of killings (Mamdani:2001:215).
In the wake of the democratic election of 1993 the first Hutu newly elected President Melchior Ndadaye, and other Frodebu leaders were killed by amidst a failed military coup. Within a few hours the Tutsi had totally eliminated what a democratic transition had struggled to build up over the past five years (Lemarchand:1995:xiii). They destroyed the hope of the Hutu population who for the first time in years saw an end of the ethnic discrimination and the marginalisation by the Tutsi elite.

Ndadaye had just before his assassination explained the election of 1993 with these specific words;

“After three decades of Tutsi hegemony, there finally emerged on the horizon the promise of a civil society free of ethnic violence, where citizenship would no longer be held hostage by ethnic identity” (Lemarchand:1995:xiii).

The event of 1993 led to an incredible rage among the Hutu, especially throughout the countryside leading to a brutal mass killing of the Tutsi population in general.

Subsequently, the result of these two events mentioned above has brought about an unbridgeable moral distance between the Hutu and Tutsi (Lemarchand:1995:xiii).

4.5 The Arusha Accord and the Burundian Peace Process

In Burundi the peace-process began as a regional initiative which culminated in not only the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000 but also the imposition one year later of a three year old transitional government (Bentely, Southall:2005:77). Despite elections in June and July 2005 and the election to office by a Hutu President, Pierre Nkurunziza on the 29th of August 2005, peace still remains fragile. This is primarily because the ceasefire agreement did not
successfully include all the factions of the Hutu group, the FNL-Paliphehutu\textsuperscript{15} (Daley:2006b:15).

Each of the parties that were involved in the Arusha Peace agreements collectively agreed on the fact that ‘the conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions; It stems from a struggle by the political class to accede and to remain in power’\textsuperscript{16}

Nineteen interests groups were represented in the Arusha negotiations, seventeen political parties (ten and seven of which, were Tutsi and Hutu dominated respectively) as well as the Government of Burundi and the National Assembly, the latter two comprising members from the military and from the main Tutsi Party, UPRONA (Daley:2006b:15) The Batwa group, whose status had never changed since colonial times, was not represented in Arusha, However, after the Arusha Agreement for the Batwa were granted two seats in the Senate and the Parliament (Nindorera:2003:6-7).

The Burundian peace process has to a large extent been elite led- between the two main political parties at the time UPRONA and FRODEBU- which is not uncommon in Africa (Bentley, Southall:2005:63). However, it should be mentioned that the reason why the process has been intractable might be the fact that the elite in Burundi has been so detached from the civil society focusing on their narrow interests (Bentley, Southall:2005:150).

The unwillingness of the political elite to open up the political space is a crucial element in the discussions relating to participation of civil society groups in the conflict. Women organization’s campaigned to be included in the peace talks and garnered considerable international support by asking for the implementation of UN

\textsuperscript{15} (Arusha Peace Agreement, Ch1, Article 4:16)
Security Council Resolution 1325 which call for ‘measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and…involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements.’ (Daley:2006b:23). However in the end, the women organisations were only allowed to observe the ongoing negotiations.

4.5.1 Civil society and the Peace Process

At this stage of the thesis it is necessary to note that there exist certain basic structural reasons as to why civil society has been overwhelmingly excluded from the initial Burundian peace process.

Firstly, one can say that the governing class is made up of politicians and soldiers, competing and collaborating with each other for very limited resources within an extremely poor state. Even though the major parties such as UPRONA and FRODEBU were established a long time ago their existence revolves around a patronage network. In a society with limited economic resources, and the state is central in the allocation of resources, parties tend to proliferate as ambitious individuals or groups creating vehicles for personal advancement. While they will claim promotion of particular interests, in Burundi they often rest upon the mobilisation of ethnic interests which is still the easiest signifier in order to gain support in the society (Bentley and Southall:2005:152-153).

Secondly, civil society was largely excluded from the peace process due to the fact that international relations between states are often conducted on an elite level-between politicians. In the case of Burundi, the peace agreement was a result of regional and international pressure upon the military government at the time to return back to civility (Bentley, Southall:2005:152-153). As the peace agreement was a regional and international interference in Burundi’s internal affairs it became more difficult to open up for the civil society. Too little was done to include the civil society as only a few symbolic civil society representatives from the women’s networks were present as observers of the negotiation process.
The Arusha Accord provided for the emplacement of a government which would oversee the progression of Burundi to elections and a transition to democracy. Today there are still increasing violations of both the constitution and the Arusha Peace Accords, as well as persecution of political opposition groups for their opinions (Forse:2006).

### 4.6 Conclusion

The peace agreement that took place can be seen more as a step forward, however there is scepticism concerning its potential for bringing about a transition to democracy. The peace remains fragile and in order to continue on the positive path, various parts from the society need to be included. There is a widely expressed view among Burundians “that foreigners cannot and will not solve the Burundian problems”. In that respect it is important to view what role the local civil society can play in the continuing peace process in Burundi and whether the civil society actors can constructively contribute to a sustainable peace in the country (Bentley and Southall:2005:159).

As we have seen from this section the Peace Agreement of Arusha took place without the inclusion of the civil society. However, one can argue that this peace agreement created an “atmosphere” where the development of CSO’s could function more independent from the state. *How did the CSO’s work prior to the Arusha peace process of 2000? And how has the civil society developed in Burundi since the election of 2005.* Are these organisations capable of contributing towards a reconsolidating of the Hutu Tutsi communities and furthermore to a more stable democracy? The analysis that follows will map out a selection of the contemporary civil society in Burundi today, and further analyse its strength and the weaknesses. Finally some indications of the role CSO’s might have in the ongoing democratisations process will be addressed.
5. Civil society in Bujumbura

5.1 Introduction

As mentioned in chapter 4, in 1992 a public law was introduced approving the creation of local associations’ independence from the Burundian state. Civil society is not static and will evolve in conjunction with the power dimensions within a society. This type of evolution appears to also be the case for Burundi, where civil war raging the country in the 1990s, followed by the constant change of power constellations has hampered the nation’s civil society development.

The civil society of Burundi remains in its infancy, yet, it is necessary to note that positive developments indicating the emergence of a more civilised civil society have begun to eventuate over the past several years. This analysis will map out a number of the main civil society actors in Burundi, Bujumbura and will also discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Burundian civil society.

Throughout the first part of this analysis I will present and discuss the selection of civil society actors that were investigated in the capital of Burundi, Bujumbura. Focusing primarily on organisations situated within the Bujumbura region is largely attributable to the fact that most of the organised CSO’s are located there. However, it is necessary to note that some of these organisations also have offices located in more rural areas outside the capital.

After a thorough deliberation of the civil society actors, I will go on to discuss the possible constraints in regards to the nature of civil society in Burundi. These constraints will be examined in relation to political and financial autonomy, ethnicity citizenship and trust.
Lastly I will conclude this analysis by presenting a variety of possibilities which indicate the possible roles that the Burundian civil society may come to play in the ongoing democratisation process.

Chapter 6 represent the second part of this analysis and here I will elaborate on the communitarian associations located in the rural municipality Butaganzwa north of Burundi. This chapter will function as a supplement to the primary analysis. It is intended that by dividing the analysis of this thesis into two separate chapters that we are able to ascertain a more comprehensive insight in the important aspect of both the rural and urban cleavages that exist in Burundi. In this chapter there will be a particular emphasis on the patron-client relationship.

5.2 Typology of Burundian local civil society

In this section I will present a typology of local CSO’s that I investigated within Bujumbura. The clear division throughout the various local CSO’s provides an understanding of the various vocational areas the organisations present.

Providing insight into the various types of local CSO’s will also clarify the objectives, methods of work and the achievements of each of the organisations investigated.

Furthermore the analysis of these CSO’s will provide an indication of the role they play in the Burundian society today. This is important as it will go on to provide pertinent information necessary for an in depth analysis of the civil society in chapter 5 and 6.

5.2.1 Administration of the civil society network

With the legal approval for the construction of local CSO’s, Burundi became instantly affected by the creation of such an enormous number of local organisations each with various purposes and representing different areas of the Burundian society.
However, despite Burundi having experienced an inundation of various local CSO’s the general character was that these organisations embodied several weaknesses.

It appeared that the organisations did not know how to organise themselves nor had sufficient capacity or expertise in order to create objectives that were possible to realise. A clear lack of horizontal cooperation existed between the various CSO’s. It was under the initiative to change these tendencies within the Burundian civil society, that FORSC (Forum for the reinforcement of the civil society) was created in 2002.\textsuperscript{17}

FORSC characterises an umbrella organisation of the civil society in Burundi organised around the motive of reinforcing the civil society in terms of cooperation, capacity, working methods and expertise. The forum does not take part in the activities of the organisations, but functions primarily as a coordinator for the various activities the members pursue. In its initial years, the forum was organised around 26 member organisations. Today it has a membership of more than 104 organisations.\textsuperscript{18}

In the initial period FORSC had three main objectives. The first was to facilitate collaboration between CSO’s, making them consult with one another on various topics. The reason behind this objective was to strengthen the capacity of the civil society in general, as cooperation between organisations was viewed as making them more visible, thereby enforcing their possibility to influence the people and put pressure on the government. Secondly, FORSC made a permanent diagnostic of the social, economic, political and security situation of the country. In 2002 Burundi was still in a state of war resulting in many CSO’s differing in their views around the nation’s security situation. As a result one of FORSC’s main objectives was to gather people within the civil society and to create a collective vision (consensus) as far as possible regarding the political problems and security issues Burundi was facing.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview: Gordien Baranyanka and Emmanuel Nshimirimana

\textsuperscript{18} Interview: Gordien Baranyanka
This would enable the CSO’s to create common goals that people can gather around and collectively work towards.¹⁹

In order to improve the collaboration among the CSO’s, FORSC created a website, and organised radio broadcasts enabling CSO’s to express their arguments and exchange information regarding their areas of expertise. Due to these broadcasts my informant in FORSC, stated that the collaboration and exchange of information between the organisations have notably improved over the last couple of years.

Once every trimester FORSC organise seminars where civil society actors, members and non-members and other personnel of expertise such as lawyers, economists and scientists come together and perform a socio-political and economic analyses of Burundi. The recommendations and results are written in a document representing the consensus of the civil society. The result and recommendations are further sent to the government in order to put pressure for change on specific areas such as human rights violations, corruption.²⁰

Over the last year FORSC has also established a regional initiative in order to improve the civil society activities in the rural areas. As will be presented in the second part of this analysis, the collaboration between CSO’s in the urban areas of Bujumbura and the communitarian associations in the rural areas are weak. In order to improve the cooperation, a network has been created where one representative is sent out to the sixteen rural provinces, addressing the governor about the political wishes of the rural population in the specific province. This might serve two purposes, firstly, the rural population are provided with a person who can speak their case. Secondly, through the use of representatives, urban civil society is able to become more aware of the actual work which these communitarian associations are

¹⁹ Interview: Ibid

²⁰ Interview: Gordien Baranyanka.
providing facilitating future collaboration between the urban CSO’s and the rural communitarian associations.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite the positive tendencies mentioned in this section towards enhancing the horizontal cooperation between the CSO’s, only five of the organisations which will be elaborated upon in this thesis are official members of FORSC. These were: Dushirehamwe, Biraturaba, ITEKA, OAG and COSOME. COSOME was founded by the FORSC in 2005. \textsuperscript{22}

The scarcity of membership within FORSC confirms that there still exists a lack of horizontal collaboration within the Burundian civil society. This indicated a clear weakness in regards to the overall influence of FORSC.

However, what is really hampering the efficiency and influence of FORSC is the fact that the government is seeking to undermine the creation of such networks in Burundi. The government has yet to officially recognize FORSC as an organisation, and there are indications that it opposes the enforcement of such a network in fear of the impact this network might have in rendering the civil society stronger.\textsuperscript{23} If the CSO’s collaborate together more tightly, it is clear that it will become more difficult for the government to manipulate or to take control over their work. It will increase the political autonomy of the civil society. This in turn will give more strength to the civil society obtaining a stronger influence on the state. Nevertheless, FORSC continues to actively lobby state officials in order to become officially approved.\textsuperscript{24} Despite its weaknesses, my informant at FORSC, Gordien Baranyanka, states that the creation of this network organisation has made them less vulnerable with regards to the political pressure from the state.

\textsuperscript{21} Interview: ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Interview: Gordien Baranyanka, Melchior, Ndayishimiye, Christine , Miturumbwe, Emmanuel Nshimirimana.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview: Gordien Baranyanka.

\textsuperscript{24} Interview: Ibid.
5.2.2 Organisations that promote and defend human rights, justice and equal citizenship.

This category represents organisations that in one way or another defend the human rights of different groups within the Burundian society. The violations of human rights have been severe throughout Burundian history and despite the democratic election of 2005, the government has not managed to bring about a society free of human rights violations. The human rights situation is unstable due to the lack of capacity of rights-holders and duty-bearers. There is widespread poverty, and few enjoy the full range of economic and social rights (United Nations:2008).

The CSO’s representing this category are many and vary in terms of capacity and strength. However, the four represented here are all well recognised in Bujumbura. The most established one of these three- Ligue ITEKA, Burundian Human Rights League (ITEKA), has the capacity to focus on the promotion of human rights on a larger scale than the other organisations. Hence, ITEKA actively defends and promotes human rights and justice related to different areas such as civil rights, political rights, social rights and economical rights.

The other three organisations while advocating human rights, they do so on a much smaller scale. Activities include the promoting of the rights of a specific vulnerable group of people, such as prisoners, namely Association for the Promotion of the Human Rights and of the prisoners, APRODH and Burundian Association for the defence and the promotion of the rights of the prisoners, ABDP. The fourth organisation Biraturaba a Kirundi word, which means ‘that concerns us’, works to improve the rights and living conditions of the most vulnerable and marginalized group within the Burundian society, namely the Batwa.

ITEKA is the oldest and most established CSO in Burundi born under a period of democratic liberalisation in 1991. It is founded on the main objective to protect and promote Human Rights throughout Burundi. In order to achieve their goal, ITEKA has placed human rights observers around the country, who document individual cases of killings, executions and other types of abuses. The organisations also direct,
assist and advise a number of people in cases of “disappearance”, arbitrary detentions and legal proceedings. On average 500-600 cases are investigated annually.\textsuperscript{25}

One part of ITEKA’s program is to assist detainees. As part of this work ITEKA has agreements with more than twenty five lawyers to represent cases of individuals before the Burundian criminal courts and other jurisdictions. In order to transport witnesses to court hearings ITEKA collaborates with APRODH and ABDP in order to increase its efficiency. The transportation of witnesses is important in a country as Burundi where the lack of infrastructure makes it difficult for the prisoners living in rural areas to come to Bujumbura. The transportation of detainees also increases the efficiency of the legal procedure and ensures that the right of both victims and defendants are respected by the court.\textsuperscript{26}

Lobbying is one of the most crucial elements of the ITEKA’s work. The organisation chairs the Observatory on Governmental Action (OAG), which is an organisation that will be presented more in depth below.\textsuperscript{27} ITEKA has specifically had the role, especially during the peace negotiations, of drawing public, governmental and international attention, through press releases and public statements on the various human rights issues at the time. This work has continued and today ITEKA lobby the government in order to improve the rights of all citizens and to secure the country better against human rights violations\textsuperscript{28}

ITEKA uses many resources on human rights promotional work in order to improve the foundation for respect of human rights in Burundi. It actively works with the local radio, namely Radio Isanganiro and Radio Publique Africain (RPA), in order to render its message more visible.\textsuperscript{29} It has informative broadcasts talking about the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Interview: Chantal, Niyokindi
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{27} Interview: Chantal, Niyokindi and Melchior, Ndayishimiye
\item \textsuperscript{28} Interview: Chantal Niyokindi
\item \textsuperscript{29} Interview: Dr. Chantal Niyokindi, Mathias Manirakiza and Emmanuel Nsabimana:
\end{itemize}
importance of respecting human rights and the actual abuses of human rights taking place in Burundi. In collaboration with Radio Isanganiro ITEKA stages a weekly discussion broadcast every Sunday morning called Kunama - “meeting place”- where a debate on the importance of human rights with respect to developing democracy in Burundi takes place. In these broadcasts ITEKA often take contributions from the population who can ask questions related to human rights abuses. An annual rapport is published by ITEKA regarding the evolution of the Human Rights situation throughout Burundi. Some of my informants highlighted that the civil society in Bujumbura is characterised as most influential in the area of human rights.

**APRODH** and **ABDP** work on a smaller scale than ITEKA, promoting human rights especially related to prisoners. ABDP was founded in 1995, however due to intensified conflict throughout Burundi during this period, the organisation fully began its work in 1997.

ABDP and APRODH each share the same core objectives. That is to defend and advance the human and legal rights of Burundi’s detainees and prisoners. The leader of APRODH, Jean Claver was originally the founder of ABDP. However, due to economical embezzlements, he decided to leave the organisation and start APRODH in 2001.

From my observations while the objectives of these two organisations are very similar, they ensure that their work does not overlap. Both of these organisations activities are firmly rooted in practical measures- to improve the conditions in the prisons of Burundi. The mid 1990’s was especially a period where the government

30 Dr. Chantal Niyokindi and www.ligue-iteka.bi:

31 Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirimana:

32 Interview: Laurent Gahungu:
used prisons to exert their authority. As a consequence, torture and execution of prisoners was an everyday occurrence.  

One of the objectives of ABDP is to ensure that the authorities respect the norms of the legal process. As most detainees in Burundi lack the means to defend themselves effectively, ABDP, in collaboration with a number of Burundian lawyers has established a legal assistance program for detainees. (Amnesty International: 2001). APRODH has taken a similar role aimed specifically at victims of sexual violence due to sexual violence becoming an increasing problem towards the end of the 1990’s.

In addition, medical assistance programs aimed at detainees and victims of sexual violence and torture are conducted by these two organisations. In terms of the detainees, this is done in order to combat deficiencies that often leave prisoners vulnerable to illness and disease.

Further to the above mentioned roles of these two organisations, both ABDP and APRODH perform an educative role in prisons. This is because the majority of juveniles have no access to formal training. ABDP has been active in arranging training in areas such as agriculture, mechanics and carpentry, while APRODH focus more on educating the police and prison guards of the rules and laws that exist. This is to prevent incidents of violence with the prisoners.

Both ABDP and APROD work actively against torture. ABDP was the first organisation to make public statements against tortures in 1998.  

Both of the organisations document cases of torture and intervene regularly to protect people at risk of torture. My informant in ABDP state that the campaigns against torture have proven successful and that the government has followed some recommendations that both these organisations have made.

33 Interview: Laurent Gahungu and Pierre Claver Mbonimpa

34 Interview: Laurent Gahungu:
Over the past several years, the conditions in Burundi’s central prisons have improved significantly thanks in part to the work of ABDP and APRODH. Whereas ABDP had an influential role prior to the economic embezzlements that took place, this incident has put the organisation in economical difficulties. Several of my informant highlighted that today APRODH is more influential and efficient in protecting the rights of prisoners than ABDP.\footnote{Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Paulin Murhimanya, Alexis, Nsahimana}

As mentioned earlier, Batwas have always been a marginalized group within the Burundian society and also within the political discourse. The problems affecting the Batwa are quite similar throughout the country. In Burundi, land is a source of power, and the subordinate identity of Batwa can to a certain extent be explained by their lack of land, as the majority live on the land of others. In addition, only a marginal percentage of Batwa are educated. Most Batwa today have been forced from their hunter-gatherer existence in order to work as casual labourers on other people’s land. They are powerless and poor, and discriminated against because they are an ethnic minority (Integrated Regional Information Networks: 2008).

BIRATURABA was created in 2002 primarily aimed towards promoting the rights of the marginalized population of the Batwa. BIRATURABA’s primary aim is to reduce and prevent ignorance and indifference towards the Batwa within the population of Burundi.\footnote{Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirimana}

BIRATURABA’s strategy is to operate in one specific area at the time so that the achievements will be more visible. The primary objective for BIRATURABA is to provide the Batwa people with their own land. As the Batwa have no land, they are constantly forced to move, making it impossible for the children to start school and hence gain a sufficient education.\footnote{Melchior, Dayishimiye} For one of BIRATURABA’s projects they work
towards the local administration, as most of the Batwas are located in rural local communities. Through the local administration they find areas where they can build houses, and with a small funding from an Italian NGO they have managed to construct 50 houses. BIRATURABA offers the expertise needed, but it is the Batwa themselves who are in charge of the construction. In addition, BIRATURABA helps the Batwa children to be enrolled into primary school and in various provinces and they have succeeded to register 140 children into primary school.

When evaluating their project, BIRATURABA has observed that the Batwa in the commune are now less marginalized. The Batwa themselves have expressed that they are more respected both by the local population and also by the administration.\(^\text{38}\)

### 5.2.3 Governmental surveillance and fights against corruption.

The organisations representing this category aim at observing and critically analysing the governmental action on a range of political areas. In order to achieve these goals, three different organisations are presented in this category- each of which encompass different strategies, hold different degrees of capacity and therefore represent different roles within the civil society. The first organisation that will be presented- the OAG- can be seen as the most established of the three, due to it having more experience and expertise to date within this specific area in addition to it employing more staff than the other two organisations of focus.

OAG is a network organisations made up of eighteen different associations, six journalists and six parliamentarians. The primary objective of this organisation is to conduct research, analysis and advocacy on Burundian government policy and practise in order to raise public awareness and increase government accountability.\(^\text{39}\)

Established in 2001 its first main activity was to observe the Arusha Peace

\(^\text{38}\)Ibid

\(^\text{39}\) Interview: Melchior, Ndayishimiye
negotiations. Following the elections of 2005, OAG conducted a major study, namely an analysis of the Burundi government's first year in power which later has been referred to in both local and international analysis of the region. The overall mission of OAG is to hold leaders more accountable for the actions they undertake that affect the people of Burundi particularly where human rights appear to have been ignored or overseen. 40

Within the civil society, OAG holds an important role as it is one of the few organisations within Burundi able to provide critical analysis and profound research on various political issues affecting the nation. It conducts surveys, opinion polls and studies about the implementations of the Government’s commitments as well as undertaking contextual analysis aimed at understanding the country’s political development. The OAG plays a highly active role, they organise regular workshops and conferences that provide an account of positive and negative impacts of the Government’s “achievements”. 41

Numerous publications have been created. Among the most influential publications in terms of governmental assessment accomplished include survey and publications concerning the Burundian Electoral System, Assessment of the implementation of the Arusha Accord and Repatriation and Land Property Management. 42 One can argue that these reports serve as important research material if policies of development in these areas should be carried out.

While the OAG clearly play an influential role in improving human rights and the civil society in Burundi, a survey conducted in 2007 by members of the OAG states that the organisation was not well known outside the urban areas of Burundi. As a result from the survey’s findings the OAG has since realised the importance of using

40 Ibid
41 Interview: Alexis, Nsahimana and Melchior Ndayishimiye
42 www.oag.bi and Interview: Melchior Ndayishimiye
radio as a further primary medium in order to get their message across to the rural provinces, which is almost the only method for the rural population to be informed of its presence and role.\textsuperscript{43}

Lobbying and advocacy towards the government is also an important part of OAG’s agenda in attempting to influence changes in government policies and decision-making. Several of my informants emphasised the important role of OAG in that respect.\textsuperscript{44} An example of OAG’s achievements was the objection against the former Minister of Information and Communication. The organisation contested against the Minister’s constant manipulation against the media and the press. As a consequence of OAG’s pressure on the government, the president Pierre Nkurunziza decided to remove the minister and have him replaced.

\textbf{COSOME} comprising 13 member organisations was established in 2005 by FORSC for the purpose of monitoring and observing the democratic election process.

Elections in Burundi are often associated with massacres and Coup d’Ètats. Both the elections of 1972 and 1993 led to violent conflict between the two main ethnic groups (Eller:1999). Consequently there was a crucial need for an organisation such as COSOME to observe the electoral campaign of the political parties involved and further explain to the people what this meant in practical terms. As the education level in Burundi is limited, there was a need for an organisation who could explain to the nation’s citizens- in familiar terms- what the various political party programs and agendas entail in reality.

Throughout the early days of COSOME its role was primarily to inform the people about the democratic process. In collaboration with the media it observed the electoral process to ensure that actions by political parties were undertaken under the correct process. They placed observers throughout the region in every province that

\textsuperscript{43} Interview: Melchior Ndayishimiye;

\textsuperscript{44} Interview: Alexis, Nsahimana, Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Dr. Chantal, Niyokindi.
provided reports back to the organisation’s head quarter in Bujumbura. After the elections a report was made public.

After the 2005 election, COSOME has gone on to also adopt the role as “civic educators” through a special education program. Through this program COSOME staff train teachers in various provinces about the democratic and electoral process. Furthermore these teachers travel throughout the different municipalities within each of the provinces and educate the citizens about democratic values and democracy in general. This year they have educated around 2500 teachers who work throughout the entire country.

In addition to the educative program, COSOME has also started to prepare for the next election of 2010. Whereas COSOME earlier had a special focus on specific groups within the Burundian society, their strategy has shifted towards the population as a whole. At present COSOME are producing a video about the electoral process as well as addressing the potential questions that might be related to this process.

Lobbying is also an important aspect of COSOME’s work. Several members of the organisation exercise lobbying with Members of Parliament regarding governmental policies. Currently, COSOME is in the process of influencing the “common” law. Based on research within this area the organisation provides the government with proposals to include in any new legislation and laws being passed. They put pressure on the government to amend the laws regarding how politicians should behave to ensure they are held accountable for their actions including their adherence to human rights and the electoral process. COSOME also pressures the government to alter current policy on how the police should perform their tasks and civil responsibilities. As COSOME undertakes this lobbying in an active and visible manner throughout the country which has resulted in the government having undertaken on occasion policy changes as a result of the organisation’s influence.

Corruption is a highly problematic issue in Burundi which affects the lowest classes of society. Burundi was ranked 130 out of 163 countries surveyed in the

As Burundi also is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, it is clear that the widespread corruption impede the development of the Burundian society.

The CSO - the Observatory for the struggle against corruption- OLUCOME, works specifically around the issues of corruption and economic fraud. The organisation puts pressure on the state regarding these critical areas.

OLUCOME is one of the few CSO’s operating in Burundi without foreign funding. As a result its capacity in terms of resources and hiring permanent staff is limited. The organisation comprised of 5 permanent staff consists but it also has access to over 400 members who work voluntarily for the organisation and help to raise funding for OLUCOME’s work.

Despite these limitations, many of my informants from other CSO’s highlighted the important role of OLUCOME noting it successful in its ability to actively put pressure and criticize the state, regarding issues of corruption and economic embezzlement. OLUCOME regularly criticizes the government of its failure to arrest people who are responsible for such crimes. The organization has at least reported more than 1500 instances of corruption amounting to approximately 100 million US dollars during the last 12 years.\(^45\)

A key factor driving corruption in Burundi is due to the fact that some of the government revenues and expenditures have not been regularly listed on the budget. In 2006, the finance minister allegedly performed an improper sale of the presidential plane “Falcon 50”. OLUCOME criticized the speed at which the sale was made, and complained that the government did not accept the highest bid loosing $2 million dollars in the process. Even though this was a known fact among the civil society

\(^{45}\) Interview: Gabriel, Rufyiri:
actors, none of them expressed this publicly except OLUCOME. Shortly after OLUCOME denounced this fact, the President Pierre Nkurunziza demoted his finance minister. This serves as an example of the fact that their “message” is heard (Amnesty International:2006)\(^{46}\)

However, slightly after OLUCOME publicly exposed this information my informant, Gabriel Rufyiri was arrested on the charge of defamation. In addition several members of the OLUCOME have been threatened on their life, supposedly by people working for the government. A key indicator that corruption is still very present within the current government and that the work of these organizations still has had a small affect in achieving an improved civil society. The examples above are clearly barriers which have affected the intended functioning of organization such as OLUCOME. However, informant Gabriel Rufyiri was clear when he stated that ‘everyone who wishes to realize something for the better of a whole population must agree to put his life at risk’. Since this incident of 2006, the organization continues its work in the same way, and addresses the international community, such as Amnesty International if threats are made from the government.

\subsection{5.2.4 Organisations for the promotion of the freedom of speech (media)}

Development and democratisation depend on a well-functioning media. In many African countries, media has been an integrated part of the government’s machinery of repression. However, media can also play an important role in pushing forward democratic ideas and movements. Nevertheless, the media in Africa rarely constitute a tool which can positively contribute to the strengthening of civil society due to the heavy control exercised by the state (Makumbe:1998:312).

\(^{46}\) Interview: Gabriel, Rufyiri.
Regarding the media in Burundi, a particular potential form of media to inform citizens is the role of the radio. Due to Burundi’s limited literacy rate, radio occupies a role as an important source of information. This is because the written press is almost non-existent, and the only newspaper that comes out every day is nationally run. There exists both private and nationally run radios in Burundi but these have been largely affected by a high level of state censorship.

The development of an independent media is a fairly recent phenomenon in Burundi. Prior to the elections of 2005, the existing private radios did not actively promote the civil society. In general the media was prior to 2005 solely made up of either private or national radio stations primarily serving the purpose of the state. Recently, however, one can argue that the role of the media in Burundi has changed with the foundation of the independent private radios namely Radio Isanganiro and RPA both established in the wake of the democratic election of 2005.

As they were established in a period where Burundi was negotiating for peace the objectives were largely associated to peace and democratisation. The role of the radio in the initial period of existence was to put pressure on the government so that all groups were included in the negotiation process, including the rebel party FNL-PALIPEHUTU

As a consequence, conflict took form between the independent private radio stations and the government. The government assumed that the radio stations worked for the rebels. In the end, the radio stations managed to convince the government to a certain degree that listening to the various opinions was necessary in order to obtain peace. One can argue that media played a key role in the election of 2005 by monitoring the electoral process, and informing the population in both rural and urban areas about irregularities and insecurity that caused elections to be postponed in some regions. Their objective was to make sure that the general population understood what the

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47 In 2001, the FNL split into two factions, one of the factions remain outside the peace agreement and continue to terrorise the civilian population (Bentley Southall:2005:84)
election meant for the country in practical terms. In addition, these two radios performed an observatory role making sure that the election was conducted in a “transparent” manner as far as this was possible.

Today, the role of Radio Isanganiro and RPA, are first and foremost *room for dialogue* where conflicting parts within the Burundian society can express their arguments. One can argue that these radio stations constitute a significant role within the civil society in Burundi as they operate fairly independent from the state, in addition to promoting the ideas and thoughts of CSO’s.

No one is excluded from radio broadcasts debates between civil society groups, government deputies and members of the rebel group take part in discussions concerning various topics of conflict. Hence, one can argue that these radio channels take part in setting the political agenda. Many relevant questions regarding issues such as corruption and human rights violations are brought up in the light. Even though the radio stations have antennas in the various provinces of the Burundian state it still seems like the urban population has more access to the information they provide.

Seen in a comparative perspective, the role of the private radio’s in Burundi differ from private radio channels in other parts of the region. In Tanzania for instance the private radio channels that exist still work generally for the ministers and in Rwanda private radios are strictly forbidden as the freedom of speech is almost non existent. This is a quite common phenomenon in many parts of Africa where even though the radio is supposedly “private” it is still affected by a heavy self censorship from the state. Even though the government in Burundi makes attempts to influence the radio or limit the scope of work and broadcast undertaken it has been made clear that this does not heavily affect their ongoing strategic planning of their work. Radio Isanganiro and RPA continue to address controversial questions, often criticising the government for its work.
The private radio stations are the main source- and often the only source of objective information in Burundi both in the rural and in the urban areas. This is namely due to the fact that 40.7 percent of the population above 15 years old are illiterate (Human Development Report:2007). Consequently, the radio is the only source of information for these people. Among a population where 37.6 percent live under the poverty line, most of whom are situated in the rural areas of the country, radio is the only medium to which most people have access to on a regular basis. Radio Isanganiro and RPA ensure that information is provided in all the languages that are spoken in Burundi, Kirundi, Swahili and French. Radio Isanganiro are also able to broadcast in Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania. This serves an important political purpose as many Burundian have fled the country during times of war. Through these broadcast refugees in other countries can get updated on the political situation in Burundi.48

The majority of my informants within the CSO’s highlighted the importance of having private independent radio stations, so that their message and their work could be made more visible for the public. 49

Based on this one can argue that the media contributes to strengthen the civil society as it renders their action more visible increasing its influence and affect towards the state. In addition the developments of independent radios facilitate the cooperation of various civil society groups.

5.2.5 Organisation for the promotion of gender equality in the peace-process

Mainly two network organisations are the main contributors in promoting the role of women and gender equality in Burundi today. These are the Collective of the Female

48 Interview: Mathias Manirakiza
49 Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirima, Alexis Nsahimana, Dr. Chantal, Niyokindi, Gordien, Baranyanka, Pierre -Claver Mbonimpa
Organizations and NGO’s of Burundi, CAFOB and Dushirehamwe, an organisation which aims for peaceful cohabitation through the reinforcement of female leadership.

CAFOB can be characterised as the main and largest collective of women associations in Burundi comprised of 52 CSO’s, with more than 30.000 members. CAFOB is also known for having the leading administrative role of these women organisations and was officially created in 1997, in a difficult time of war. As the early peace negotiations of Arusha were taking place, CAFOB progressively became the “voice” of the women of Burundi. Madame Goretti Nduwayo, currently working for the UNIFEM emphasise that during this period, the government consulted CAFOB on issues regarding women in particular (Report CAFOB:2007).

Today these two network organisations are comprising 300 women organisation cooperating with each other in various domains. It has been estimated that the women network reaches out to more than 7000 women at the community level. As a result they have gained increasing national recognition over the last couple of years. (InternationalAlert:2006:1).

Statistics of member organizations since 1994.

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50 Interview: Concilie, Gahungere and Alexis, Nsahimana:

51 Report from CAFOB:2007
CAFOB attempts to improve the capacity of the 52 comprising member organisations. In addition they function as a collective contributing to the amelioration of life and improvement of the socio-economic and legal rights of women in Burundi.

Dushirehamwe, a Kirundi word for ‘lets reconcile’ was established in 1996 as a network organisation of individuals engaged in training program of trainers in gender and conflict prevention, management and peace-building approaches in collaboration with International Alert and UNIFEM. In 2002, it became an independent CSO with a primary focus on peace-building (International Alert:2006).

One of Dushirehamwe’s main activities involves creating local initiatives for women. Dushirehamwe’s work is conducted throughout thirteen provinces (out of 17). 158 trainers are present and 390 leaders at the community level are involved with peace education, community reconciliation, early warning activities and raising the awareness of women’s rights in relation to gender-based violence. My informants could prove that this program had involved over 9000 people in one year. 52

One of Dushirehamwe’s and CAFOB’s main priorities over the recent time has been to put pressure on the government to include women in the decision making positions. Both network organisations were active in lobbying for women participation in the democratic election of 2005. Together with the coalition of

52 Interview: Christine and Scholastique Harusihyakira:
women organisations Dushirehamwe was a key facilitator in ensuring that Burundi’s new constitution was gender sensitive. In addition they took part in analysing the draft constitution and electoral code from a gender perspective.

CAFOB specifically played an important role in getting women issues included in the Arusha peace negotiations. As a result, women now represent 30% of staff employed within the Burundi government. In reality, however, despite their increased presence of government roles the formal representation of women is not fully respected (International Alert:2006).  

Today, these two women organisations collectively work together in order to make gender violence a major political issue in Burundi and to address the lack of governmental action. They actively try to give out information to women about their rights and raise the awareness of the sexual violence taking place in Burundi today.

CAFOB works with families in order to change the mentality of men, women and children. They teach them about equality and how to change the traditional patterns of inequality that still exist between Burundian women and men today. Out of the 40.4 percent of the Burundian citizens who are illiterate, 77.6 percent of these are women (Human Development Report:2007). This poses difficulties for the women organisations when proving information about their work. This is because it is particularly difficult to reach out to the mass population through personal meetings. This is why education among women is crucial in order to enhance development in Burundi.  

Dushirehamwe has as one of their important activities, to assist the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced people. As thousands of refugees and internally displaced people that left during the war are returning to Burundi, there are inevitable tensions over land claims and other issues. As Dushirehamwe, is one of the

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53 Interview: Concilie, Gahungere, Christine, Miturumbwe and Scholastique.

54 Interview: ibid.
organisations that actually is stationed in most parts of the country, it is able to
constructively work closely with communities to ensure that refugees are not rejected.

Dushirehamwe train women on their rights and responsibilities and on political
participation. It enables better linkages to be created between women at the grass root
level and women decision makers, for instance women in government through
regular exchange meetings.

While the two organisations have similar objectives, their role and practical function
in the field is quite different. CAFOB’s work mainly comprises of improving the
capacity of the member organisations together with pressuring the state on various
issues concerning gender. Dushirehamwe on the other hand works actively in the
field, especially targeted at women in rural areas.55

5.3 Conclusion

In this section I have discussed the urban CSO’s of enquiry. This was undertaken in
order to present the role and function of each of these organisations within the
Burundian society. By presenting their objectives and some of their results, one is
able to gain a better understanding and comprehension of the role they play within
the civil society.

From the typology above, one can argue that there has been a positive development
within the CSO’s since the public law of 1992, which allowed for these organisations
to emerge. While the above mentioned civil society actors- are distinctly different
they all play an important roles within the Burundian society. Several of these
organisations have demonstrated the power and capacity to confront the government,
while other display powers in being able to enhance the human rights of Burundian
citizens. In certain aspects the CSO’s operating within Burundi appear to have

55 Christine, Miturumbwe and Scholastique Harushiyakira.
replaced the role of the state. While it is clear that the organisations of focus in this thesis hold an important function within the Burundian society, it is important to highlight that they are also inhibited by certain issues preventing them from operating to their optimal levels. Throughout chapter three I have outlined the constraints linked to political and financial autonomy, ethnic cleavages, construction of citizenship and patron client relationships. The way in which these particular constraints have the power and capacity to influence civil society and its relation to democratisation will be discussed below.

5.4 Autonomy

5.4.1 Political autonomy

As mentioned in chapter 3, a central argument to the civil society from a neo-liberal perspective, is the concern with autonomy of associational life vis a vis the state. Subsequently, the investigation and analysis of the degree of autonomy and the development of autonomy will be the principle focus of the following section. In the section below I will discuss the constraints related to lack of political autonomy in Burundi urban civil society.

Scholars supporting the neo-liberal view of civil society, argue that civil society in an African context cannot provide any significant contribution towards democratisation due to the lack of autonomy of the civil society actors. Political autonomy from the state and foreign donors are both seen as desirable features of CSO’s. However, in an African context, this is rarely the case. Experience demonstrates that the state often seeks to inhibit the scope for effective independent action through political interference, co-option and restrictive legislation. White (1994) acknowledges that the boundaries between the state and civil society are blurry in practice and that the autonomy of civil society is variable. Yet he considers autonomy to be part of the attributes of civil society as an “ideal type concept” (Beckman:2001b:53). This
coincides with my observation from the CSO’s situated in Bujumbura. The autonomy of the CSO’s varied- often significantly.

Several of my informants argued that the CSO’s demonstrate an increased political autonomy than that prior to the Peace Agreement in 2000. Consequently, one can argue that the development of the civil society in conjunction with the nation’s political development has enhanced both peace and stability within the state of Burundi.

According to Diamond, if civil society actors can operate as viable and effective, they need to be autonomous and well endowed with the right kind of resources. However, a minority of civil society actors in Africa are able to function without the support of international NGO’s or support from the state. A characteristic of many civil society actors in Africa is the fact that they often are overpowered by the control and command of the state and are therefore often seen as mere “promoters” of the state (Makumbe: 1998:312) rather than playing a more influential and substantive role in the improvement of civil society.

The Burundian CSO’s analysed in the first part of this section, all depend on foreign funding in order to function. With regards to the state, the civil society actors are officially independent and there is no financial support to the CSO’s from the state. It is important to distinguish between distance and autonomy – organisations may sympathise with a political actor, and thus enjoy closeness to it and consequent influence, but remain autonomous because they continue to set their own priorities. It is difficult to observe the difference between being autonomous and having a relationship towards the political actor even though they operate as autonomous from the state.

However, some of my informants emphasised this aspect in relation to LITEKA which was an organisation created by representatives from the FRODEBU party, the main Hutu party. Especially during the critical years of war, LITEKA was accused for having close ties with the political party FRODEBU. On the one hand such close
ties to a political party, representing in majority the role of the Hutus can possibly weaken the role of a civil society when in principle their primary objective is to serve the overall good for all citizens. Under the civil war, this might have been of concern as people were closely tied up to ethnicity and therefore highly representing their ethnic group. However, since the peace agreement, the political parties that were once linked to either Hutu or Tutsi, have made attempts to change this perception by allowing all ethnic groups to be included in the parties. Therefore, on the other hand, ties held to one of the main political parties give LITEKA an increased influence vis-a-vis the state on certain issues they wish to pursue, enhancing the capacity of the civil society. As a consequence of the ethnic war, LITEKA is today more conscious about their political strategies and has tried to adapt their policies so that they are not accused for only supporting the Hutu population.\textsuperscript{56}

Several of my informants placed emphasis on the fact that the CSO’s in Burundi have been notably affected by heavy governmental censorship. The initial period of the emergence of CSO’s during the early 1990’s up until 2000 civil society had little autonomy due to the fact that the Burundian government actively manipulated and influenced the work of any CSO’s working within Burundi.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the level of heavy manipulation, control and influence exerted by the government to which civil society was subject, it can be argued that Burundi has undergone a positive development since the end of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000. In the urban areas political censorship has significantly reduced over the recent years.

Bratton (1994:3) argues that in order for CSO’s to be politically active, the citizens need to be able to communicate with one another and debate the governmental situation. State owned media is not conducive to civil society, and civil society is always stronger where there is a diversity of media outlets and political views. Resultantly, the positive development with regards to political autonomy can be

\textsuperscript{56} Interview: Chantal, Niyokindi

\textsuperscript{57} Interview: Mathias Manirikiza, Emmanuel Nsabimana
illustrated through the role of the media in the Burundian context. As mentioned earlier, prior to the peace-agreement both the private and state owned radios were heavily censored by the state. The state owned radios were- and still are- legitimized promoters of the state. The voice and influence of state owned broadcasters subsequently inhibited the views and voices of CSO’s and preventing them from being able to extend their voice throughout the larger public. As mentioned in the typology of the media, radio functions as the most important way of reaching out to a highly illiterate Burundian public.

Since the election of 2005, privately owned radio broadcasters have undergone a positive development in terms of their political autonomy from the state. My informant in Radio Isanganiro underlined this fact when he emphasised that their staff were strictly prohibited of any political relation to the existing parties of politics. Within Radio Isanganiro, there have been incidents when journalists who have been members of political parties have been replaced due to their political allegiances. The radios of enquiry, RPA and Isanganiro both hold a high degree of independence from the state. This independence is demonstrated through the broadcasts that they have, where they challenge the state on various sensitive issues regarding corruption and human rights violations. As mentioned earlier, both RPA and Isanganiro collaborate with the civil society actors and address the government on various issues of concern. The government is starting to realize the level of influence that radio has on the general population. As a result, Members of Parliament (MP’s) are beginning to participate in on-air discussions regarding various political issues. My informants at the private radio broadcasters underline that there are still confrontations between the government and the media, however the government is realising that it is not always in their best interests to appear to be constantly opposing the media.

58 Interview: Mathias Manirikiza,

RPA and Radio Isanganiro enhance the capacity of the civil society on a general level. They actively ensure that their work and objectives display a high level of transparency and are highly visible to the people and the state. My informants in both the private radio stations of enquiry highlight their degree of independency from the state compared to other private radio stations in the region. As mentioned earlier, in Rwanda, there exists no liberty of expression at all as the civil society is entirely influenced and controlled by the government (Uvin, Unsworth: 2002:5). Evidence of this was brought to light by my informant in RPA who attended a meeting in Rwanda in December 2007. During my informant’s identity check the Rwandan police noticed that he was a journalist. The police asked what type of organisation my informant worked for. Upon telling the police he worked for private radio broadcaster RPA, they replied “oh you work for a radio station that confronts the government- it would never take place in this country”.

There are however tendencies that demonstrate the instability of the political independence of the Burundian CSO’s in relation to the state. In the wake of the election that took place in 2005, tension arose between the CSO’s and the Burundian government. The government had wanted to restrict the civil society and their influence. Accordingly, by means of the political and economic manipulation the government attempted to influence the Burundian population into believe that journalists worked for the “white”. The government demanded that people should stop listening to the radio claiming that the journalists were liars who were not to be believed. In 2006 several journalists, one of whom was the director of Radio Isanganiro, Mathias Manirakiza was sent to jail allegedly for political reasons while in reality he was merely voicing his concern regarding the nations’ civil liberties. During this period, RPA and Radio Isanganiro had questioned the truth of the government’s accusation against the opposition planning a Coup d’État. The private radios claimed that the accusations appeared to be an excuse from the government to

60 Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana
attenuate the opposition and the private media. As a subsequence of this government track down three journalists from the private media were imprisoned (Committee to Protect Journalists:2006).

According to my informants within the media sector it was the work of the civil society private radio broadcasters that convinced the people to realize that what was being said about the journalists by the government was unjust. As a result of civil society pressure through the CSOs and private radio broadcasters, the journalists were liberated.\(^6^1\)

This incident provides a clear example of the role that the media can play in providing information to its citizens that would otherwise never have been undertaken.\(^6^2\)

One can argue from this that to a certain degree the civil society in Burundi is able to influence the attitudes of people and which for the most part has the ability to function fairly independently from the state. To date throughout 2007 there have been no reports of the government using direct censorship or that it suspending operations by independent media (US Department of State:2007). This is a direct contrast to 2006 where state censorship was much more visible and where attempts to manipulate CSOs and the media’s voice undertaken to far greater level.

From my observations there were clear indications that the Burundian government still want to limit the influence of the CSO’s. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note here that while many journalists working within the Radio have expressed fear of their own security, they continue to confront the government through their work.\(^6^3\)

In contrast to Burundi, the government of Rwanda has over the past several years introduced laws and practices that severely constrain the civil society. In addition

\(^{61}\) Interview: Mathias Manirikiza
\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{63}\) Interview: Mathias Manirikiza and Emmanuel Nsabimana
there are constant harassments and intimidations of opponents, media, NGO’s and CSO leaders. While these types of actions from the Burundian government are also evident they are not conducted to the same scale. Burundians CSO’s have a large degree of freedom of speech and the ability to oppose the government on several political issues of concern (Uvin, Unsworth: 2002: 5).

From this one can argue that there still exist high levels of suspicion and distrust exercised by the state, however, the political autonomy of the civil society organizations operating within Burundi can be viewed as relatively developed—particularly—when comparing the civil state situation to that of Rwanda.

Throughout Part 1 I have discussed the degree of political autonomy exercised by the civil society actors in Bujumbura. It can be argued that the CSO’s in Bujumbura have gained enhanced levels of political autonomy from the state since the Peace Agreement of Arusha the 20th August 2000. Today civil society organizations have a freedom of speech and the possibility to address the state—these freedoms have not always been the case. Despite these positive developments the civil society organizations in Bujumbura have a long way to go in order to achieve full political autonomy. Nevertheless, in comparison with to Rwanda where freedom of speech and associational activity is fully controlled by the state— one can argue that Burundi has advanced with regards to political autonomy from the state.

5.4.2 Financial autonomy

Fragility and dependence of finances
A further dimension of organisational independence is financial autonomy. As emphasised in the first part of the analysis, an overall weakness characterising the Burundian local CSOs, is the lack of financial autonomy. All of the organisations except OLUCOME depend heavily on foreign donors in order to carry out their

64 Interview: Emmanuel Nshimirimana:
objectives. In this section I will discuss how dependency on foreign donors might influence and affect the work and the development of local CSO’s in Burundi.

The creation of a local CSO is one thing, however, the fully fledged functioning of a CSO and being able to preserve its independence is another. Most of the local organisations that have been created in Burundi have been founded under the expectation and hope that their continued existence will ultimately be financed by a foreign donor, either from an international NGO or other exterior funding. Fortunately for establishing CSOs the law of 1992 did not include any subvention or public financial support.

In general the total percentage of the total budget funding of most of Burundi’s civil society organizations- and all of the organizations that I personally investigated- deriving from domestic financial sources is minimal. In some instances domestic finances of CSOs comprises of less than 1%. The level of funding CSO’s receive from foreign donors varies. For the larger associations, the funding received varies in terms of the organisation’s objectives, its size and the type of reputation they have. Reputation in this sense refers to the previous work undertaken by the organisation and the level of result which have been accomplished in the past.

The high dependency CSOs have on foreign financial aid renders the various CSO’s extremely fragile in terms of autonomy. For the organizations investigated for the purpose of this thesis, dependency of foreign aid creates problem of durability. Several of my informants highlighted that many of the CSOs do not understand the importance of financial independence. Alexis Nsahimana, the director of COSOME emphasises this fact. Nsahimana recalled that on several occasions he attempted to discuss with the various CSO’s of the importance of creating strategies that will render them more financially independent. From my observations there existed very few organisations that had strategies and that were undertaking activities driving

65 Interview: Alexis, Nsahimana
66Ibid.
them to become more financially independent from foreign aid. One of the exceptions was Radio Isanganiro.

In the case of Burundi where poverty of the Burundian CSO’s is prevalent, the dependence on foreign donors in certain cases forces organisations to adjust their political, social and civic agendas to suit those of their benefactors. However, the danger involved in this is that the CSO’s could potentially lose their identity and instead become more of an extension of the foreign donor agencies than autonomous independent organisations with their own voice and objectives (Makumbe:1998:315). When this issue was brought up during my interviews, all of the informants underlined the constraints related to being dependent on foreign donors. However, due to the poor economic development in Burundi, they believed there was no way around it.

Nsahimana, stated that the influence of the foreign donors could not be denied and argued that foreign donors have certain areas where they more easily give funding. This effectively might influence the choice of areas of work and projects of the various CSOs. It is important to note here that certain associations obtain funding more easily than others in Burundi. From my observations the organisations developed around subjects such as AIDS, environment, gender equality and human rights often received easier financial support than others. Furthermore, the organisations promoting the marginalized groups, such as Batwa, within the society in the other hand displayed a harder time searching for funding.

According to Michael Bratton (1994:8), the over-dependence on foreign funding has consequences for the development of the civil society. He states that the direction of accountability might be reversed within the organisation, with the leaders reporting to donors rather than to members or clients. Another negative impact relating to the organisations political liability is the fact that the organisation might loose its credibility as advocates for the “public good” therefore causing it to loose its integrity among its citizens. It is clear that the issues addressed above might prove to be problematic for certain organisations in Burundi, however this does not seem to be
entirely correct in the case of Burundi civil society on a more general level. As previously mentioned, in 2006 when the government arrested certain private radio journalists it was the pressure from both the people and civil society actors which led to the government having to release the journalists. This is one such example that illustrates that the civil society has integrity and influence throughout large areas of the population and that that the citizens rely on them as advocates for their own good.

As was pointed out by some of my informants, for the projects the foreign donors fund, the individual organisation still have the liberty to choose the strategic plan of the project as long as they can prove where the money has been spent. There is also a possibility to decline the projects they propose.  

A further problem with foreign donors highlighted by several of my informants related to the fact that foreign donors rarely approve of projects that would render the CSO’s more economically independent. Consequently, the CSO’s will constantly be in a dependency relationship with the international donors. This has the potential to hamper the individual development of the civil society in general. The constant struggle for new funding obstructs the efficiency of the organisations due to so much of their time having to be devoted to finding potential funding rather than focusing on their core objectives. In addition, there is always the fear of not getting new funding which would lead to the reduction of the civil society.

A further problem that follows from foreign donors is that many of the organisations are only funded once. Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa, the leader of the human rights organisation APRODH mentions this as a challenge to the civil society in Burundi. Many CSO’s in Burundi receive one financial transaction only before they get cut off. One of the reasons is the fact that there still exist organisations in Burundi working for their private interests and therefore wants to keep the money for private interests.

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67 Interview: Alexis Nsahimana

68 Pierre Claver Mbonimpa is the Founder and Director of APRODH; Association for the promotion of the human rights and of the prisoner.
gains. However, this is not always the case. There is also the challenge related to the financial capacity and the know-how of the organisations. Many organisations might have good objectives and strategies of how to achieve them, but they do not know how to organise where funding should be allocated and how it should be spent. This is exacerbated by the fact that much of the staff who works within Burundi’s CSO are not trained in budgeting and financial matters. These constraints prevents new organisations from developing.

While it is evident that the dependence on foreign funding within the Burundi civil society has its downfalls, foreign aid is also noted to play a beneficial role within the Burundi civil society. The director of Radio Isanganiro mentioned one of the positive aspects of funding by foreign donors when he stated that foreign donations render the CSO’s independent of the state, thus enabling them more political autonomy.

In this section I have emphasised the challenges of Burundian CSO’s encounter in relation to their dependency on foreign funding. It is clear that the foreign funding has the potential to influence the work of certain CSO’s. However, as a consequence of Burundi’s limited economical capacity it is important to recognise that in reality there is a lack of any substantial alternative in the near future. Despite the high degree of financial dependence on foreign funding it is also important to view the positive aspect of foreign funding. This is that foreign donors actually allow for the existence of CSO’s in Burundi. Another contribution of foreign funding is the fact that it renders the CSO’s more politically autonomous from the state, enhancing their capacity to challenge the state.

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69 Interview: Pierre Claver Mbonimpa.

70 Interview: Mathias Manirikiza.
5.5 Ethnicity

One of the elements emphasised throughout this thesis builds on the importance of *historical processes* which has shaped the structures of power within the Burundian society and therefore also the civil society in Burundi. A main question addressed in this section is: Does *ethnicity* hamper the function of CSO’s in Bujumbura?

As emphasised in the theoretical chapter, as citizenship and political identities in Burundi are related to ethnicity one cannot exclude the dimension of ethnicity when discussing the role and capacity of civil society actors in relation to the democratisation process in Burundi. In this section I will discuss how the political identities of ethnicity are explored within the urban CSO’s presented above. Furthermore, I intend to assess how the civil society actors address the dimension of ethnicity and the way in which they work to overcome the ethnic cleavages.

In chapter 4, I highlighted that Burundi citizenship has been divided along ethnic lines. Ethnicity has been politicised and manipulated by the Tutsi elite for political gains. Kasfir argues against the exclusion of ethnic groups from civil society on several grounds and states that in societies where ethnic identities are strong and politicised, if ethnic demands are excluded from civil society it will be difficult to expect CSO’s to represent anything close to the full agenda of citizens (Wake:2004:12) Hence, it is important to address the issues of ethnicity and citizenship in order to understand the role civil society actors can play in a democratisation process.

5.5.1 Citizenship

One of the explanations of the extreme polarization along ethnic lines lies in the occurrence of violence. As mentioned in the contextual chapter, in Burundi where the structure of ethnic domination tended to give power and privilege to the minority Tutsi, political exclusion was the rule for more than 80 percent of the Hutu population. After independence the ethnic polarisation continued to allow the Tutsi to
consolidate their grip on the government as well as the military. The elections of 1972 and 1993 ended in violence and mass-killings between the two ethnic groups, affecting on a larger scale the Hutu population.

Severe acts of violence can polarise social boundaries for generations and they can also become absorbed in people’s sense of identity. When the social identity becomes associated with ethnicity it becomes part of the citizenship of each individual (Uvin:1999:266).

According to Comaroff, Comaroff (1996:26), citizenship is a necessary principle of equivalence within the democratic nation-state. The political relevance of ethnicity is problematic, but as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, where ethnicity takes hold of the political imagination it also becomes the basis for political participation and one can argue that this has been the case in Burundi (Kasfir:1976:28). According to Peter Uvin (2006), the building of a civil society requires the creation of processes that allow people at all levels of society to engage in collective action; to learn to build their own capacities; and ultimately, to act as citizens.

*How do the civil society actors address the question of ethnicity, and how does this affect the development of a well functioning civil society? Can civil society contribute towards creating a common civic responsibility?*

Mamdani argues that *citizenship* can be either *ethnic* or *civic*. *Civic citizenship* refers to membership of the central state. The qualifications for citizenship and the rights to which one is entitled are specified in the constitution. These rights are individual and located in the political and civil domain (Mamdani:2001:29)

*Ethnic citizenship* on the other hand is a result of membership in the Native Authority. It is often related to rights of a social or economic nature where these rights are not accessed individually but by virtue of group membership, the group being the ethnic community. In relation to Burundi, one can argue that Tutsi where the “*citizens*”, with rights specified in the constitution. Accordingly the Tutsi were
the only group who could fully participate as members of the state. The Hutus were the *subjects*, and were thereby politically excluded.

When talking about political exclusion, this implies the denial of political rights to specific ethnic or ethno-regional communities—most notably the right to vote, organize political parties, freely contest elections and thus become full participants in the political life of the country (Lemarchand:1999:5-6). The denial of full citizenship to one selected group is likely to fuel violent tension as have been the case in Burundi. Mamdani’s theoretical approach to citizenship divided between ethnic and civic can to a large extent explain the disproportionate level of ethnic representation that has affected the CSO’s in Bujumbura.

In order to serve as a forum for the integration of different ethnic groups, it is important that the CSO’s in question applies—in the highest possible degree—an open recruitment process. As for the case of Burundi, it is necessary that the CSO’s of enquiry have an open recruitment in terms of ethnicity. If recruitment is excluded based on ethnicity and the organisation attempts to monopolize the affiliation of their members, then the CSOs cannot contribute to integration or conciliation. It may even aggravate the ethnic cleavage—creating further political turbulence. (Hadenius,Uggla:1996:1623).

In Burundi, several of my informants highlighted the problem of existing CSO’s created around ethnicity, with exclusive memberships. These types of CSO’s are hampering the development of the civil society as a whole. However, the organisations that I investigated in Bujumbura consisted of a mixture of the two ethnic groups. Nonetheless, some of my informants highlighted that this had not always been the case. The constraints related to the dimension of ethnicity within the CSO’s of enquiry were linked to when they were created in the political spectrum of Burundi’s history. For instance LITEKA— as mentioned previously— was created in 1991 by members of the FRODEBU political party, when war was raging in Burundi. Consequently, they are associated as being a Hutu promoting party. Today the aspect of ethnicity is less prevalent then before as all the organisations of enquiry have
strategies for including both of the ethnic groups in the organisations, and openly discuss the problems related to ethnicity. This coincides with my argument related to historical legacies and the fact that a society transforms with the shift of power dimensions within a society.

My informant in RPA, drew attention to the fact that Tutsi domination has existed in the civil society up until recently. As highlighted with the theoretical framework of Mamdani, since the colonial time Tutsi have been associated with those with political power, while the Hutus where excluded from the political arena at least until 1993. In Burundi, these historical structures still persist within the society and are therefore reflected in the civil society structure also.\(^71\)

As the different CSO’s were created within different periods of the Burundian conflict, some prior to the peace agreement of 2000 others after, this has affected their individual experience with the dimension of ethnicity. Several of my informants who represented organisations that were created during the critical years of the Burundian civil war 1993-1996 described their organisational development as constrained due to ethnicity. Specifically the women’s networks CAFOB and Dushirehamwe, emphasise the difficulty of getting Hutu women and Tutsi women to collaborate around the common goals of the organisation. Dushirehamwe was created by two women, one Hutu and one Tutsi. In their initial period, they put a lot of effort in analyzing how to overcome the ethnic tension.\(^72\) The organisation was made up of both Hutu and Tutsi women, however, at first the members with different ethnic backgrounds would not even engage with one another. As a consequence this made it difficult for the organisation to function around common objectives. These internal fractions made the civil society weak preventing it becoming a mobilising force with the ability to apply pressure on the state.\(^73\) However, CAFOB argues that women’s organisations were the first to discuss openly about the issues of ethnicity and to

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\(^{71}\) Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana

\(^{72}\) Interview: Christine, Miturumbwe and Scholastique Harushiyakira

\(^{73}\) Interview: ibid.
emphasise the importance of fighting for common goals. Both Dushirehamwe and CAFOB argue that the Burundian society is sensitive to ethnicity. However, through the creation of these women’s organisations they have been able to bring both Hutus and Tutsi women to fight for common goals regarding women’s rights and female inclusion in political participation. Accordingly the ethnic separation today is less prevalent in urban Burundi than it was before.\textsuperscript{74}

With regards to the private radio broadcasters, Tutsi journalists still remain overrepresented compared to Hutus. However, it was argued by my informants within the media that these power structures between the Hutus and Tutsis had improved over the last couple of years. The ethnic dimension between the two groups today can be characterised as very different compared to the period during the years of the war between 1994 and 1996. During the critical years, the media favoured the Tutsi, and in many ways excluded the Hutu. This led to ethnic tensions from time to time. The current director of RPA, Emmanuel Nsabimana, argues that the media works more professionally towards the ethnic dimension today. Representing one of the few Hutu’s in a leading position, he argues that the contemporary private radios include all the various ethnic groups. Despite this positive trend, the civil society is still sensitive to ethnicity.\textsuperscript{75}

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Dahl (1971:151-152) emphasises that the possibility of cooperation is weakened if the society is split into two ethnic groups—particularly where one is a majority and one is a minority. In addition as have been the case in Burundi, the minority Tutsi, has enjoyed the political power while the majority Hutu have been totally excluded from the political arena. Clearly this intensifies the distrust between the two groups. Deep distrust is a central feature of the Burundian society, and this distrust can be viewed at two levels; distrust exists between people at the local level, mainly along ethnical lines in addition to regional

\textsuperscript{74} Interview: Christine, Miturumbwe and Scholastique Harushiyakira and Concilie, Gahungere

\textsuperscript{75} Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana, Mathias Manirikiza
ones. Distrust also occurs between the people and the state. This is especially prevalent at the regional level, which will be addressed in the next chapter.

Due to the historical legacy of war and massacres, many have argued that the Burundians in general have learned through history to become inherently “distrusting”. Emmanuel Nsabimana provides an example of the level of distrust within the Burundian society, stating that “people don’t trust each other in general”. Nsabimana highlights that in the urban areas of Burundi civilians are more open than those located in the rural areas. Burundi has been and still is- though to a lesser extent- a society built upon rumours. Rumours have in the past had a tendency to have a negative influence on the ethnic tension between Hutu and Tutsi.

Several of my informants emphasised that ethnicity and trust obstruct the development of the civil society in Burundi. Many of the civil society leaders encounter difficulties due to the fact that their political pressure is interpreted as either Hutu or Tutsi oriented. For example, when a Hutu from one branch of the civil society want to pursue a political case that he sees as wrong against a Tutsi, at times his action is not considered as an attempt to promote for positive change, but rather it is seen as having an ethnic undertone. Consequently it becomes difficult for CSO’s to promote change.

The strategy applied to the CSO’s in Bujumbura has attempted to unite both Tutsi and Hutu in the organisations to the greatest level possible. Consequently, the Bujumbura CSO’s have experienced less negative reactions related to ethno-cultural belonging over recent years. As a result, trust and cooperation is improving. However, it is still fragile and there is a need for stabilisation within the country in order to develop these positive trends.

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76 Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana:
77 Emmanuel Nsabimana, Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Mathias Manirakiza
As I have highlighted in this section, the CSO’s in Burundi during the 1990s were clearly obstructed as a consequence of ethnic cleavages and divides. The organisations suffered from severe problems in organising themselves around common interests and preferences. One can argue that the CSO’s are influenced by the political processes within the society. Since the peace agreement of Arusha, one can argue that the ethnic divide is less prevalent in urban areas as all the CSO’s of enquiry in Bujumbura represented both Hutus and Tutsis. Nevertheless, the Burundian society is still sensible to ethnicity. The impact of this is still visible within the Burundian society as will be presented in the section below.

5.5.2 Ethnic tension

Education and Ethnicity

The monopoly of political power in Burundi held by the particular Tutsi group over the last 40 years, has been imbued at almost every level of society. This has also been the case within the Burundi education system. From primary to the tertiary level, ethnic tensions are present (Bentley and Southall:2005:179) and there still exists a distinct disproportion of educated people between Hutus and Tutsis within modern day Burundi. The Tutsi still represents the intellectual elite.

Since the nation’s independence successive military regimes have sought to exclude the Hutu from education, especially above high school level. State services kept records that identified children as either Hutu or Tutsi. These have been used to exclude Hutus from enrolling into high school and college. As mentioned in the contextual chapter the divide between the Hutu and Tutsi population was intensified by the 1972 mass- killings. The Tutsi benefited from the colonial system while the Hutu’s suffered a general loss of political, social and economic power. Consequently, the marginalisation of Hutus led to few Hutu’s ever gaining access to higher education in Burundi, and many of those who actually did were killed in 1972. (Bentley and Southall:2005:179).
The implication of the intentional exclusion of Hutus in regards to their marginalisation within the education system is visible within contemporary Burundian society which has subsequently affected the general structure of the local civil society. This is because education and expertise are essential requirements of a well functioning civil society. Education and expertise are vital elements of being able to effectively an efficiently run organisations that have sufficient capacity required to influence the state.

The domination of Tutsis within the intellectual elite has also led to a domination of Tutsis within the civil society. The director of Radio Publique Africaine—a member of the Hutu group—highlights the ethnic divide within the civil society and emphasises that up until four years ago the civil society was largely dominated by Tutsis. The explanation for this clear ethnic divide is highly related to education and the fact that Tutsis continue to represent the majority within the intellectual elite.78

Even though there was a representative mix of the ethnic groups within the CSO’s, due to the educated elite being Tutsi, they continue to hold the leadership positions. The inclusion of Hutus within civil society has posed some difficulties. This is because, some of the Hutus who become integrated into an organisation require intensive levels of training in order to adequately perform their roles and the responsibilities associated with the job they have been hired to undertake.

For example within the radio, a Hutu entering an organisation with no formal education will be inferior to a Tutsi who already has the prerequisite educational background required to perform journalistic research. Even though the Hutu population are able to be taught how to perform various tasks and roles, Nsabimana highlights that there is a danger of ‘ethnic tension’. While this was not underlined specifically by my informants, it was clear that the lack of education of the Hutu

78 Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana
population poses constraints in their ability to obtain ethnic equivalence within the civil society in the near future.\(^79\)

Education - or rather the lack of education - is a severe problem for the development of the country as a whole. This is because it is almost always the intellectual who manipulate the non-educated.\(^80\) The majority of the non educated are located in the rural parts of Burundi and it is usually the rurally based population who frequently engage in conflict and who kill each. Therefore education is a crucial weakness both for the development of the Burundian society as a whole but also in relation to political autonomy. This is because if the population is educated the government and its allegiances are less able to easily manipulate the population.\(^81\) During my fieldwork, I observed severe differences between the urban and the rural civil society. Hence, I believe it is of high importance to highlight the urban-rural dimension in relation to the civil society in Burundi. The differences I experienced in the rural area of Butaganzwa regarding elements of ethnicity, autonomy and patron-client relationship will be presented in a separate chapter below.

\(^{79}\) Interview: Emmanuel Nsabimana
\(^{80}\) Interview: ibid
\(^{81}\) Interview: ibid
6. Rural civil society - case of Butuganzwa

The urban-rural dimension is important when discussing the civil society aspect in Burundi. As Kasfir points out, it is not possible to argue that ends of democracy are furthered if one excludes the issues and organisations that represents the majority of the population (Wake:2004:14). It is impossible to isolate the political development of civil society in Burundi from the regional political context (Reyntjens:2001:21). As the majority of the Burundian population-90 percent\textsuperscript{82}- are situated in the rural areas, one needs to consider the development in these more isolated regions in order to be able to accurately comment on the civil society as a democratic contributor.

Mamdani (1996) - who sees little movement toward democratisation despite recent political change in Africa- argues that only when the rural inhabitants are organised as true citizens will democracy be possible in Africa. This insight partly explains the findings I made in accordance to the development of civil society in Burundi.

This section will explore the dimension of civil society actors in the rural areas of Butaganzwa north of Burundi, who are referred to in this context as “communitarian associations”. My argument is that civil society actors have been shaped politically, by the colonial imposition of a certain form of rule, and that these identities still persist in Burundi today. Consequently, the rural areas are more ethnically based than those CSO’s in the urban areas of Bujumbura.

6.1 Organisations represented in Butaganzwa

During my field work in Butaganzwa I was able to secure a group of representatives from most of the communitarian associations in the municipality in order to carry out a workshop in regards to this issue. The communitarian associations presented below

\textsuperscript{82} International Herald Tribune:2008
is therefore the total picture of existing “communitarian associations” in the municipality.

More than 300 communitarian associations in Butaganzwa represented various domains of *agriculture*. The main objectives of these agricultural associations were linked to the cultivation of crops or animals. Some of those who possessed goats or cows had created “solidarity networks”, meaning that they shared their animals with the members of the association. The little money they earned from their crops was divided between the members of the associations. Within these agricultural associations their objectives are linked to development of the agricultural sector. The main challenges encountered by this group of people, is concerned with access to resources, modern equipment and expertise in addition to the lack of connection to foreign export markets for coffee and tea. Many of these 300 agricultural encompassed highly similar objectives. However, despite sharing common goals and objectives there appeared to be no collaboration between any of the organisations. Neither did there exist any collaboration with any of the agricultural CSO’s situated in Bujumbura.

In addition to the associations representing various domains within the agricultural sector, other associations represented operated within the domains of water and hydraulic management, Artisans, Youth and Sport Associations, humanitarians Associations and the minority Batwa.

The main objective of *water and hydraulic management* associations was to provide the population of Butaganzwa with clean water. As a consequence of war, several of the water resources have been destroyed. In addition, many people do not have basic knowledge of hygiene in order to maintain the standard of the water. The work of these associations is to provide people with the necessary knowledge of how to maintain the water pumps in order to prevent people from contracting diseases due to infected water.
Youth organisations were represented by young people in the municipality. Their main objective was to organise activities for the younger population in terms of sport and culture. The purpose of this was to prevent the violence which has been a problem in the region.

Batwa association was mainly comprised by the Batwa women and youth. Their main objective was related to gaining money necessary to survive. By tilling the soil of others or making pottery to sell on the market they could provide the associations with some resources to survive. The aim of the Batwa population is to be recognized as equals in relation to the other groups in the municipality so they are working overcome the ignorance against them.

The community based associations observed in Butaganzwa proved to be clearly different from those found in the urban area of Bujumbura. In the rural areas of Burundi, the majority of community based organisations that exist today were established after the political crisis of 1996 as Butaganzwa was one of the areas most affected by the war. They represented mainly informal self help groups and peasant organisations. Each of these organisations shared similarities in their lack of availability to resources and capacity. There existed a visible internal hierarchical patron-client relationship throughout several of the organisations and in relation to the local government.

The main characteristic shared by the majority of these associations was that the organisations represent developmental objectives rather than objectives serving any clear democratic purpose. The objectives are mainly related to the development of the agricultural sector. My observation was that most of these communitarian associations were either based on familial ties, kinship or ethnicity. Only a small percentage of the population had access to any education above primary school level which evidently inhibited the population from developing the required expertise needed in order to create an organisation.
*Patron client relationship* networks usually exist within ethnic groups. Most of the associations represented above were based on ethnicity and there were evident signs of patron-client relationships on various levels between the local administration and the civil society and also within the CSO’s. Several of the members representing the organisations highlighted their dissatisfaction with the local administration. Part of this discontent was the result of the local administration’s constant collection of money from these organisations.

In Burundi where a decentralisation process has taken place, such a process can enforce the patron client relationships that already exist within the society. If local traditional patrons control the state apparatus at its lower levels, they may actually pose a severe impediment to popular participation (Hadenius, Uggla:1996:1621) In the case of Butaganzwa this appears to have been the case- primarily due to the fact that the poverty and the lack of education are severe in this region. As a result the population is more susceptible to being easily manipulated by the local government.

The majority of these associations had gained official approval by the local administration, however gaining approval from the local government has not always translated to enjoying a role of freedom from it. For example local administration actively engaged in evident signs of surveillance. There was also a total misinterpretation from the local government of what role the communitarian associations should play in the region. The notion of “civil society” was intended to enhance the development of the municipality, however it was clear from the local administration that they were not allowed to interfere in the politics conducted in the municipality. Accordingly, there was a clear absence of political autonomy amongst these associations.

As presented in the first part of this analysis, out of the CSO’s in Bujumbura, a number of these had antennas and offices in the rural part of the country. However, in general this was more of an exception than the rule. This characterizes a weakness of the civil society in Burundi. This is because almost none of the organisations make attempts to actively collaborate with the smaller associations throughout the interior
regions of the country. When the majority of the population live in rural areas this clearly displays a weakness as CSOs are failing to represent the general view of the majority of the population. This raises the question of whether the rural population have any significant say in the decisions made on behalf of the “nation” as a whole.

In terms of financial funding, the rural associations they live in the hope of getting funded by development agencies. The extreme poverty and the lack of resources that exists in most of the rural areas, including Butaganzwa hamper the mobilisation of a viable organisation capable of creating objectives that can realistically reduce poverty. For example the associations that are able to gain funding from their agricultural production have to then pay the local administration, which hampers their ability to develop.

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Mamdani criticise the neglect of rural conditions and the institutional particularities of urban and rural state form in Africa. His approach towards politicisation, collective identities and democratisation is rooted in colonialism and their institutionalisation of what he refers to as the “bifurcated state” (Mamdani:1996:16-23). Mamdani argues that the “civil society” organisations aimed at authoritarian regimes in Africa have been heavily based in the urban middle class which underlines my findings in Burundi. In order to understand the civil society in contemporary rural Burundi, one needs to emphasise this rural-urban divide particular for the African state.

Mamdani’s theoretical framework (1996) helps to explain the differences in my findings between the civil society actors in Bujumbura and Butaganzwa. In his theory regarding the “bifurcated state” he argues that the civil society became bifurcated as well, represented as civilised in the urban areas while tribalized in rural areas.

This serves as a critique to the theory of Chabal Daloz of the political instrumentalization of disorder-mentioned in the theoretical chapter. Chabal and Daloz reject the notion that colonialism was decisive in shaping these societies in this direction: “the time has long passed when we, Westerners, had to expiate the colonial
crime of our forefathers” (Chabal Daloz: 1999:xviii) Instead, Chabal and Daloz (1999:11) argue that the essential feature which should be emphasised is “the significance of continuities in political practice from the pre to the post-colonial period”. My main argument related to the above is that a society is not static but it is constantly affected by the changing structural processes of history. Consequently the colonialism has affected the modern day divide between the rural and urban civil society in Burundi.

This analysis has emphasised that there exists a distinctive difference between the urban and the rural CSO’s in Burundi in terms of capacity, autonomy, ethnicity and patron-client relationship.

The question that now needs to be addressed is in which way such a divided civil society can contribute in the democratisation process. This will be presented in the section below.
7. Civil society and democratisation in Burundi

Summing up chapter 5 and 6

The relationship between civil society and the democratisation process is a complicated one. The emergence of a civil society is not a guarantee for democracy, however it is unlikely that a viable democracy can function without a viable civil society (Woods:1992:94). It is within the civil society that public opinions take form and it is through CSO’s that individuals are able to influence government decision making.

As viewed in chapter 5, Burundi has only experienced one decade in which to set about developing its own civil society. Therefore it would be largely inappropriate to expect the civil society of Burundi to function to the same levels as it does in most developing countries.

Nevertheless, from the analysis undertaken above it can be argued that the CSO’s in Bujumbura are necessary contributors to the Burundian society in various ways. Today, there exist various categories of CSOs in Bujumbura which contribute towards the advancement of democracy in various ways and in different degrees.

7.1 Main findings

The human rights organisations- LITEKA, ABDP and APRODH- existing for more than a decade are viewed by the rest of the civil society as the most influential of the CSO’s. With over ten years of operational experience in Burundi, these organisations have had the time to strengthen their political influence. This has facilitated these organisations achieving their goals and objectives more efficiently than other CSOs operating in Bujumbura. The role of the above mentioned organisations can be characterised as “protectors of life” in the sense that they are able to directly assist
victims of human rights violations in addition to actively lobbying the government on human rights issues of concern. Their achievements in protecting life provide favourable conditions necessary for the democratisation process to transpire.

The female networks of CAFOB and Dushirehamwe play an important role within the urban civil society network in Burundi. Their role is to create awareness among women regarding their rights and responsibilities. In addition they train women to participate in politics and furthermore enhance their socio-political capacity. Promoting the democratic and political awareness among the population clearly creates favourable conditions for enhanced democracy. Furthermore, these network organisations have lobbied the government in order to advance the involvement of women in the political arena. Such an initiative is a contribution towards improved gender equality within the Burundian society.

Representing governmental surveillance and the fight against corruption, the specific organisations OAG, COSOME and OLUCOME hold the capacity to contribute in the democratisation process more directly and effectively than most of the CSO’s in Burundi. This due to the fact that they actively challenge the state on political issues of concern. Each of these organisations provides a small yet important contribution towards further transparency of governmental policies. The OAG together with COSOME holds an important educative role with regards to promoting democratic values among different pockets of the population. As outlined in this thesis, the example of OLUCOME has proven that it is possible for the CSO’s to make a contribution towards the battle against corruption.

A further important aspect of development within the civil society of Bujumbura is the emergence of the private radio stations, particularly those independent from the state- RPA and Radio Isanganiro. Despite several attempts from the government to censor the work of these radio broadcasters, this form of media has the capacity to render the work of the CSO’s more visible both for the citizens and for the state. This has clearly strengthens the visibility of the work of CSO’s in addition to enhancing influence vis a vis the state. The above mentioned radio stations have even
ameliorated the cooperation between the civil society and the state by means of Burundian politicians often choosing to make guest appearances on radio broadcasts in order to actively talk about political issues of concern.

Despite these positive developments there are several constraints which hinder the influence of the CSO’s. Political censorship still exists to varying degrees and the government continues to make attempts to influence the work of the civil society. Even now the government still views civil society as an opposition rather than as a positive contributor to the state. In addition, all the CSO’s in Bujumbura are dependent on foreign funding which hampers their efficiency. This is because instead of being able to focus solely on their objectives they find themselves on a constant search for new funding so that they are able to continue to operate.

As also emphasised in chapter 5 and 6 civil society in Burundi is still affected by the ethnic division of Hutu and Tutsi although most of the organisations in the urban areas have implemented strategies to overcome this problem. This ongoing ethnic division has subsequently stalled the speed at which Burundi’s democratisation process has transpired.

The CSO’s in Bujumbura have however proved that they are on their way to overcome the ethnic cleavage. Though ethnicity still persists within the Burundian society, hindering to a certain degree the cooperation between the CSO’s, there has been a clear improvement compared to a few years ago. Within the civil society the ethnic representation of the various ethnicities employed within the civil society is becoming increasingly proportionate. Today there are several Hutus in leading positions within the civil society which was not the case prior to the election of 2005. From these finding it can be argued to a certain extent that the CSO’s in Bujumbura play a consolatory role with regards to the ethnic cleavage. Nevertheless, as the Tutsi population still represents the majority of the intellectual elite in Bujumbura, the civil society still remains elite led in certain ways.
As Ekhe (1975) explains, due to the colonial experience in Africa, many African countries seem to have two publics, one “civil” and one “primordial”. This can be said to be the case of Burundi, where the CSO’s represent both “civil” and democratic functions but also structures of patron–client relationships from the past. This dimension is especially visible with regard to the rural-urban divide. While the communitarian associations in the rural area of Butaganzwa lack the capacity, structure and expertise required to influence the local government and to contribute to political change, the CSO’s investigated in the urban area of Bujumbura hold the capacity and resources necessary to a certain extent to influence the enhancement of democracy.

In contrast to the CSO’s in Bujumbura, the communitarian association in Butaganzwa were closely tied up to ethnicity and kinship which appears to have hindered their democratic potential. In addition, the few communitarian associations that exist in Butaganzwa were mainly focused on developmental issues such as agriculture rather than concentrating on democratic objectives. Furthermore, the cooperation and synergies between these associations appeared to be almost non-existent. Accordingly this has led to a lack of mobilisation and strength between the communitarian associations-vital elements in promoting and enhancing the democratisation process.

From the findings presented above, the CSO’s hold different roles within the Burundian society and there exists clear differentiation between the urban civil society and the rural civil society. Due to 90 percent of the population in Burundi living in rural areas, the overall weakness of the associations observed in Butaganzwa clearly hampers the civil society of Burundi on the whole. This is because the majority of the citizens are excluded from the civil society activities as they tend to take place mainly in Bujumbura. Even though some of the CSO’s in Bujumbura had offices in the rural areas this was more of an exception than the rule. There existed no cooperation between the CSO’s in Bujumbura and the communitarian associations of Butaganzwa.
Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the civil society in Burundi has an important role within the Burundian society. In many ways they have taken the role that the state holds in Western countries. While their degree of influence is hard to measure, parts of the civil society hold the ability to influence the state. Furthermore, while civil society in Burundi will not necessarily produce democracy, it is essential as an arena in which contending political norms develop and evolve. This may provide a breeding ground for democracy in a long term perspective.
8. Conclusion

8.1 Future research

My point of departure for investigating the relationship between civil society and democratisation in Burundi was the fact that no prior research has been done on the area. The relationship between civil society and democratisation has gained more attention over the last decade, however there is still a lack of micro studies and knowledge regarding civil society in Africa existing today. Despite important contributions regarding these issues from important Africanist scholars such as Mamdani and Kasfir, the debate is still largely tied up to the neo-liberal literature. This view looks upon civil society as inherently democratic and fails to take into consideration the fact that a civil society may differ in its role and function depending on the context. As for Africa, the societal structures clearly differ from those in the more developed countries. This thesis has filled parts of the knowledge gap regarding the interplay of civil society and the democratisation process in the context of Burundi. Nevertheless, a single case study conducted over a limited period of time has its limits. Therefore there is a need to conduct further research on the area.

In Burundi as in most countries where civil war has raged for years, the main victims are often women. In Burundi, women comprise the majority of the population. For this reason, they play an important role in the transition process towards democratisation. As mentioned earlier the illiteracy levels in Burundi among women are higher than those of the men. Consequently, women are provided with fewer opportunities to participate in politics. Equality of opportunity for women is still a distant goal in Burundi and in order to create a democratic state where women have the possibility to express their points of views to the same extent as men, more research on women’s network organisations in Burundi and how to increase and enforce their capacity is needed.
Providing a means of comparison to other African nations, as illustrated in the analysis, Burundians and the civil society holds a higher degree of freedom of speech compared to other countries in the Great Lakes Region. The issues related to ethnicity and the crisis between the two dominant groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis are able to be openly discussed in the policies arena. Consequently, there now appears to be an enhanced effort to discuss the ethnic problems in order to overcome these. This is for instance not the case in Rwanda where there exists no freedom of speech or any ability to discuss the issues related to ethnicity. As the freedom of speech is severely limited in Rwanda the development of a vital civil society will be significantly hampered. As Rwanda and Burundi in many ways share a similar history of colonisation and are comprised of the same ethnic groups, and interesting study would be to compare the civil society in these two countries and to establish potential reasoning’s to why these two countries have significantly divergent approaches towards CSO’s and the democratisation process.
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**Websites:**


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**Other documents:**

Report from FORSC: 2006 and 2008

Report from CAFOB: 2008

Appendix 1.
List of people interviewed

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