Multi-Party Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts

“The Norwegian Model” in Practice

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1. Introduction

The central aim of my research is to analyze the “Norwegian model” as an example of multi-party peace mediation and evaluate its strengths and limitations. The Norwegian case is unique in the extent to which NGOs take part in Norwegian foreign relations—a field traditionally limited to sovereign states. While a burgeoning literature addresses the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in conflict resolution, there is currently very little systematic theory on the role of state-NGO partnerships in this field. I attempt to address this deficiency through an exploratory case study of Norwegian mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Guatemala, and Sudan. Using a temporal mediation cycle framework, I compare examples of the “Norwegian model” using the method of structured focused comparison along several variable dimensions. Organizing the cases within a cyclical framework highlights the various demands of a peace process as the mediation evolves, as well as the potential contributions of various third party actors. Based on the empirical findings from these three cases, I evaluate four hypothesized potential strengths and four potential limitations of the “Norwegian model” of peace mediation.

The results of the present study indicate that the proposed “model” is better described as a fluid partnership that reflects a shared set of values about the boundaries of interaction between the public and private spheres. There exists no recipe for the “Norwegian model,” and success on the ground owes far more to the characteristics of the conflicting parties than to the efforts of the mediators. In addition, the presence (or absence) of a powerful actor capable of enforcing implementation proved decisive to the overall outcome following the signing of a negotiated agreement in each of the three cases studied. Nevertheless, the cases illustrate that the Norwegian state and NGO actors provided a valuable contribution to conflict resolution efforts when able to combine the resources and legitimacy of the state with the moral authority and local presence of the NGOs. In sum, the Norwegian role in peace mediation is potentially positive, but certainly limited.
1.1 What is the “Norwegian model” and why is it important?

What is commonly known as the “Norwegian model,” a phrase coined by former State Secretary Jan Egeland, describes a pattern of cooperation between the Norwegian government and Norwegian NGOs in peace negotiations, evident from at least the early 1990’s (Dobinson and Dale 2000:63; Matlary 2002:46). The model depends on the close historical, and often personal, links between the “Big Five” NGOs and the Norwegian government.¹ The contours of the “Norwegian model” have been extensively researched within the domestic academic literature, yet the model remains relatively unknown abroad. However, given the explosive growth in NGOs globally, virtually all states in the international system now grapple with the challenges of government-NGO cooperation. In this sense, the “Norwegian model” may prove relevant for a variety of states as an example of relatively institutionalized cooperation.

The basic premise of the “Norwegian model,” cooperation between states and NGOs, is not uniquely Norwegian at all, however. For example, Italy and the Holy See engaged in close cooperation with the Roman Catholic NGO Sant’Egidio in the peace process for Mozambique, leading to the signing of a formal agreement exactly one year prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords (Bartoli 1999:248-249; Jackson 2005:153-176). The Atlanta-based Carter Center, led by former US president Jimmy Carter, has also garnered attention for several successful mediation efforts, and the Center also maintains relatively close ties to the US government (Brinkley 1995:90-98; Taulbee and Crickmore 2003:157-168). Nevertheless, the “Norwegian model” appears to include a more institutionalized and interdependent state-NGO relationship than exists elsewhere. That Norwegian state funds account for the majority of the “Big Five” NGOs’ operating budgets would be unthinkable in the United States, for example.

¹ The “Big Five” include Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid, the Norwegian Red Cross, The Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children Norway.
Two trends in international relations suggest an analysis of the “Norwegian model” would prove useful beyond Norway’s borders. The first is the exponential growth in NGOs worldwide over the past two decades. In addition, the share of civil wars, as well as international conflicts involving a violent internal struggle, continues to grow in relation to the number of interstate wars. This poses formidable obstacles to diplomatic practices originally developed for interaction among sovereign states. The increasing importance of non-state actors in violent conflict forces third party mediators to adapt existing diplomatic strategies based on state sovereignty to a context with more fluid boundaries and complex interrelations. In Norway, these trends combine for a form of peace mediation that includes states and NGOs as mediators in civil conflict.

1.2 The effectiveness of Norwegian peace mediation in civil conflicts

Cooperation with Norwegian NGOs allows the Norwegian state to simultaneously engage non-state actors at the negotiation table and channel controversial aid and assistance through trusted NGOs with local networks and a long history of involvement in the conflict region. While the NGOs gain both access to the political channels needed to reach a peace agreement and a stable source of funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian government is able to avoid directly financing armed non-state groups which its allies designate as foreign terrorist organizations. This represents an example of Norway’s concern for the international effects of peace mediation. The complex, interdependent relationship between the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Norwegian NGOs may thus exemplify a pragmatic compromise to the contradictions posed by an international system in which diplomatic practice has yet to comprehend the significance of non-state actors in international conflict.

The “Norwegian model” of NGO-state cooperation may be uniquely suited to the mediation of intrastate conflicts for four reasons:
1. **Deniability**: if politically necessary, the parties can deny the existence of high-level negotiations. Likewise, the Norwegian state can initially sidestep the issue of the non-state actor’s legitimacy by supporting a Track II process.

2. **Local knowledge**: the Norwegian NGO can utilize its knowledge base and networks to provide a comprehensive assessment of the conflict and identify prospective negotiators among the warring parties.

3. **Trusted mediator**: the NGO is more likely than the Norwegian state to have established trust among the parties, owing to the NGO’s long-term involvement in the region. Thus, the NGO is likely to be more readily accepted as a mediator than the Norwegian state as such.

4. **Streamlined coordination**: this system of cooperation is relatively institutionalized, contributing to a more coherent mediation policy than would likely occur if the Norwegian state and the Norwegian NGO(s) each operated independently.

Conversely, I have identified four counterarguments which merit equal consideration. The following list outlines the potential drawbacks of the “Norwegian model”:

1. **Democratic incompatibility**: by supporting the NGO-led peace process, the Norwegian government cedes foreign policy sovereignty to an NGO that is not democratically accountable to the Norwegian people.

2. **Mutual aims critical**: the “Norwegian model” depends crucially on mutual agreement regarding the aims and procedures of mediation. Where this condition does not hold, the model breaks down.

3. **Diplomats overnight**: NGO representatives often lack formal diplomatic training. While this may lead to more creative and flexible problem-solving, NGO mediators may be nonetheless insufficiently prepared for the diplomatic complexity of their work.
4. **Mediators without muscle**: neither the Norwegian government, nor the partner NGOs are able to guarantee implementation with the terms of a peace agreement. Thus, the “Norwegian model” is more likely to produce formal agreements without any teeth than a peace process involving mediators with greater military and economic power.

The above eight factors are by no means mutually exclusive. I intend to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the model and its effectiveness in the mediation of civil wars through a structured focused comparison of three instances of mediation. The format of the rest of the paper is as follows: In the second chapter, I review the existing literature on state-NGO peace mediation, addressing the lack of systematic theory on this particular topic. That is, while certain aspects of NGO mediation and state mediation are considered separately, the literature is rather thin on the subject of state-NGO mediation, consisting mainly of descriptive accounts of specific mediation attempts. The third chapter outlines the methodology for the case studies to follow, including the choice of cases, mode of analysis and sources of data. The fourth chapter consists of the three individual case studies: Norwegian peace mediation in the Middle East (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Guatemala, and Sudan, respectively. The fifth chapter compares the results of the three case studies along the variable dimensions outlined in the methods chapter and assesses the proposed strengths and limitations. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of the implications of the results for the future of the Norwegian state-NGO peace mediation and the prospects for exporting the “Norwegian model” abroad.
2. Theoretical Framework

There exists very little systematic theory on the subject of state-NGO peace mediation and existing research fails to integrate both the motivations of the mediator and the outcome of mediation. More commonly, the theoretical literature adopts the perspective of either the state or the NGO as a mediator, while the literature on state-NGO mediation attempts to extract “lessons learned” from single case studies. In the following chapter, I put forward an integrative theoretical framework for understanding both the “input” and the “output” dimensions of mediation, building upon existing theory on the domestic sources of foreign policy and the effectiveness of multiparty mediation. This discussion provides the background context for understanding the cases to follow.

While Putnam’s (1988) concept of two-level games opened up the domestic context of international negotiators to scrutiny, the same has not occurred for third party mediators. This represents a hole in the mediation literature that scholars of political science have largely neglected thus far. However, Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power,” though only fleetingly applied to mediation, provides a rational choice explanation for Norway’s role as a peace mediator. Inspired by the rational choice theory of neoliberal institutionalism, soft power refers to a state’s “attractive power,” and derives from a state’s:

…Culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye 2004:11).

Nye mentions Norway only briefly in his book, but the concept of soft power provides a rationale for why peace mediation may in fact advance the Norwegian national interest; as Nye explains, “Norway’s place at so many negotiating tables elevates its usefulness and value to larger countries,” (2004:10). Princen accepts the idea behind the “soft power” rationale for mediation, but argues that seemingly neutral mediators may also have “religious or philosophical” interests in serving as mediators, or may simply have nothing better to do (1992:49-50). I advocate
Princen’s view of the motives for mediation, but unlike Princen, argue that the various rationales for peace mediation have significant consequences for its implementation and their implications deserve consideration. Regarding mediation outcomes, Crocker et al.’s *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (1999) generalizes about the utility and effectiveness of multiparty mediation based on a compilation of qualitative case studies. I adopt their theoretical framework of linking multiparty mediation to the temporal concept of a conflict cycle and specify the implications of the Crocker et al. theory for Norway. I compare these to Egeland’s argument on the comparative advantages of small states as peacemakers, relative to superpowers.

The following chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I review the literature on Norwegian foreign policy history in order to provide a historical background and domestic context for the subsequent case studies. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss the Crocker et al. (1999) framework for multiparty mediation and present a series of potential strengths and limitations of Norwegian state-NGO peace mediation.

### 2.1 Norwegian Foreign Policy

In his review of Norwegian foreign relations from the Middle Ages to the present, Olav Riste identifies three phases: a “classic’ neutralism” in international affairs, from Norway’s emergence as a sovereign state in 1905 to the dawn of World War I; a “moralistic advocacy of international law” during the interwar years; and the embrace of “active internationalism” following the German occupation of World War II and subsequent membership in NATO (Riste 2005:206). Riste argues that since the end of the Cold War, the former two strands of Norwegian foreign policy have re-emerged in force, creating a conflict of priorities (2005:275). Both the isolationist trend and the emphasis on military alliance membership reflect a broader ideological turn to political realism. While these two strands advocate diametrically opposed policy, the motivating factors for each stem from a concern for Norway’s national
interest. The “missionary impulse” Riste identifies (2005:256), however, points to an alternative theoretical inspiration; namely, idealism. Tension between these two theoretical paradigms forms an underlying current running through debates on EU membership, Norway’s participation in NATO-led ISAF operations in Afghanistan (Toje 17 January 2008), and not least, Norway’s role as a peace mediator.

Norway’s identity as a peacemaker has deep roots within domestic society, reflecting the influence of a Lutheran missionary history, a traditional concern for humanistic values (Dobinson and Dale 2000:48), and the efforts of prominent historical figures, including Fridtjof Nansen’s aid to refugees of World War I. During the 1990’s, Norway emerged as an international peacemaker through several high profile mediation efforts, in particular, the signing of the Oslo Accords for the Israeli-Palestinian (hereafter, the Middle East) peace process. In addition to its engagement in the Middle East, Norway solidified its standing as a mediator through intervention in Guatemala, Mali, Cyprus, the Balkans, Sudan, and Colombia, and unofficial initiatives in Haiti and Eritrea-Ethiopia (Dobinson and Dale 2000:45; Matlary 2002:8, 49-50). While much has been written in the international mediation literature about the Oslo Accords for the Middle East, Norway’s role in a myriad of other peace processes receives only passing attention outside of the domestic arena.

The main elements of the Norwegian approach to peacemaking include its prioritization as a key foreign policy objective, the tremendous support among domestic constituents for Norway’s role as a peace mediator, the Norwegian government’s willingness to share responsibility for mediation with NGO leaders, and the government’s willingness to engage in dialogue with the parties to any conflict (Dobinson and Dale 2000:58-59), regardless of their complicity in the violence or designation as terrorist organizations. Engagement in peace mediation strengthens many Norwegians’ self-image of their country as a force for peace in the world (Leira et al. 2007:11-16). However, foreign policy as identity politics implies a need for visibility, both domestically and abroad. Touval and Zartman observe that “small and medium-sized powers may also wish to enhance their influence and prestige through mediation,” (2001:430). For Norway, experience as a peace
mediator translates into international credibility as a state at the forefront of humanitarian affairs. As Joseph Nye explains, “the posture of peacemaker identifies Norway with values shared by other nations that enhance Norway’s soft power,” (Nye 2004:10). This is not to say that Norway engages in peace diplomacy for cynical reasons. In fact, Norway may well have failed to anticipate the international ripple effects of the Oslo peace process for the Middle East. However, conflict mediation is now recognized abroad as a core element of Norwegian public diplomacy (Nye 2004, 112). The Norwegian “self-image” has become its international identity as well.

As this discussion suggests, peace mediation serves a variety of interests within society; thus, the broad base of domestic support derives from both instrumental and normative sources. In fact, in addition to the soft power and the missionary impulse rationales, Riste maintains that peace mediation may also serve to deflect attention from the more divisive foreign policy issues of EU and NATO membership (Riste 2005:285). Peace mediation is a non-controversial foreign policy for small states; the costs are negligible and the consequences of failure relatively mild. Mediators may invite criticism if negotiations fail (especially within the domestic context), but success attracts international praise and media attention. Moreover, Norway’s role as a peace mediator grants officials in the Foreign Ministry access to top officials in the US State Department and in the European Union (Matlary 2002:61-65).

The current president of the Norwegian parliament, Thorbjørn Jagland, cautions against the tendency in Norwegian peace mediation towards going it alone (Jagland 3 January 2008). However, from a soft power perspective, multilateral initiatives dilute the potential for Norway to receive international recognition from a negotiated

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2 After I presented a case study of Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords for the Middle East, a member of the Foreign Ministry strongly objected to my insinuation that Norway sought a mediator role in order to enhance its international prestige, arguing that the outpouring of media attention took the Foreign Ministry by surprise (Bronebakk 15 February 2007). Regardless, the Foreign Ministry was well aware of this effect in subsequent peace processes (Egeland 22 October 2007).

3 Leira et al. (2007:15) argues that Norway is not viewed as a force for peace internationally. In a 2005 survey of citizens in eight European countries, humanitarian engagement was not once named in a write-in question about Norway’s positive characteristics. However, I argue that a survey of foreign policymakers internationally would lead to quite different results.
agreement. If peace mediation is seen as an access card into international politics, Norway will be less willing to insist on additional cooperation. Perhaps more importantly, the overwhelming and immediate success of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East at the time of signing may have led to overconfidence in Norway’s skill as a peacemaker. Determining whether this in fact occurred would require a research project in itself, but these two hypotheses may explain why Norway accepted the role as a sole mediator in subsequent peace processes, as in Sri Lanka.

In sum, domestic sources of Norwegian peace mediation suggest a rather complex picture of causality that includes both normative and instrumental motives—perhaps even for a single decision-maker. However, do the sources of foreign policy impact the type of strategy used? Although Princen argues for acknowledging a wide range of foreign policy objectives underlying mediator behavior, he fails to recognize that the diversity of motives may influence the strategy chosen. For their part, Dobinson and Dale argue that Norwegian cultural values impact the mediation strategies used (2000:61). These cultural values, in turn, also inspire the decision to engage in mediation in the first place. For example, Dobinson and Dale argue that Norwegian peacemaking efforts tend to favor avoiding conflict at all costs (2000:56), rather than attempting to build non-violent arenas for expressing legitimate grievances. Thus, although Princen dismisses the motives of mediators with no material incentive in the conflict as irrelevant, Dobinson’s and Dale’s analysis suggests mediator motives may impact the strategy used and therefore, the effectiveness of mediation.

Dobinson and Dale do not clearly state whether the impetus for a cultural approach to peacemaking derives from the Foreign Ministry and/or the NGOs involved. However, I argue that unpacking each actor’s motives for mediation may suggest potential challenges and opportunities for cooperation. Analogous to the Putnam (1988) model of two-level games, I expect to find evidence that the internal policymaking process among NGOs and the Foreign Ministry leaves a domestic imprint on the actual mediation process. Even the interests of neutral mediators matter.
2.2 Small State-NGO Peace Mediation and the Conflict Cycle

Whereas the previous section examined the domestic sources of foreign policy, this section outlines a model for foreign policy implementation. Research on specifically NGO-state cooperation in peace mediation is scarce and consists mainly of single case studies of specific mediation efforts. Exponential growth in non-traditional mediation over the last few decades warrants greater attention from international relations scholars. The efforts of NGOs such as the International Committee for the Red Cross and the Quakers, international and regional governmental organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and a variety of independent individuals or “special envoys” with quasi-official legitimacy increasingly complement the diplomatic roles traditionally filled by states, and in some cases, replace states entirely (Crocker et al. 2001:498). This development owes to a variety of factors, including the global proliferation of NGOs, the increase in international governmental organizational (IGO) activity following the end of the Cold War, and an emerging norm in favor of intervention in domestic conflicts for humanitarian purposes (Crocker et al. 2001:498-499).

Unfortunately, few scholars have addressed the theoretical challenge posed by non-traditional mediation. One notable exception is the work of Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. In this volume, Crocker et al. (1999) attempt to synthesize a series of single case studies into a general analysis of multiparty mediation. The authors propose a theoretical framework for understanding multiparty mediation as a “synthesis” of “structural” and “social-psychological” paradigms (Crocker et al. 1999:24). Their framework links mediation strategy to the concept of a conflict “life cycle,” (Crocker et al. 1999:26). That is, the utility of each type of actor depends on the current phase of the conflict cycle. The roles of the various mediators may thus shift over time in response to the needs of the conflict. Inherent in this model is the assumption that regardless of their causes, all conflicts follow a certain pattern. As
described by Crocker et al., the table below outlines the different stages of the conflict cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Intensity</th>
<th>Rising/High Intensity</th>
<th>Declining Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “Rising tensions between or among parties”</td>
<td>• “Outbreak of violence”</td>
<td>• “Ceasefire”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Confrontation”</td>
<td>• “Escalation of military hostilities”</td>
<td>• “Formal settlement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Rapprochement and eventual reconciliation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Possibly, “doubling back into violence”</td>
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</table>

Crocker et al. advocate exploiting the “comparative advantage” of different mediators according to the needs of each particular conflict phase (1999:26-29). In the early phases of the conflict, when fighting is still relatively contained, the potential for third-party mediators to enter the conflict is relatively high, while their chances for success are relatively low (Ibid). At this point, NGOs are more likely to take an interest in mediation, while state actors avoid wading into a conflict that has not yet deteriorated into full-scale war. Simultaneously, the parties to the conflict are still relatively optimistic about their ability to win concessions on the battleground and are thus, less willing to compromise at the negotiation table (Ibid. 29-31). As the conflict escalates, the potential for a settlement increases, while the opportunities for mediator involvement decline. Positions harden, raising the stakes of submitting to negotiation. However, as the conflict reaches a hurting stalemate, the prospect of achieving a military victory fade and a negotiated settlement appears ever more attractive (Ibid.)

Given this understanding of the conflict cycle, Crocker et al. argue that “…multiparty mediation can help to prevent the escalation of stakes by creating a set of parallel tracks for informal dialogue and communication,” (Crocker et al. 1999:668). They advocate NGO intervention at the early stages, when dialogue alone may succeed in averting an escalation of the conflict by settling grievances and

4 Crocker et al. (1999:26).
warning of the consequences of continued violence for each side (Crocker et al. 1999:30). NGOs can also be effective in the middle phase by:

…Establish[ing] informal channels of communication without compromising the interests of the parties or formally committing them to a politically risky course of action (Crocker et al. 1999:31).

As the conflict reaches its apex, state mediators may be called upon to exert pressure on the parties to submit to negotiations, while NGOs and “small powers” can pursue pre-negotiations and/or track II negotiations to support the official process (Ibid). The official process may also require the muscle and legitimacy of regional organizations in order to ratify and implement an eventual agreement (Ibid. 32-33). Lastly, in the implementation stages, the efforts of all earlier mediators can assist in pursuing peace-building measures at the official and grassroots levels (Ibid).

The theoretical framework of Crocker et al. (1999) provides a contrast to the argument that mediators should enter a conflict only when it is “ripe” (or “ready”) for mediation. Rather, Crocker et al. (1999) advocate coordinating multiparty mediation to allow for different types of intervention throughout the conflict cycle. Crocker et al. acknowledge that small states, international and regional organizations may all potentially take the lead as mediators, but that great powers are more likely to do so (Ibid. 32). The authors maintain that while small states and NGOs may be able to facilitate negotiations during high levels of conflict through a track II channel, implementation of an eventual agreement will “require concerted engagement and follow-up by states or groups of states,” (Crocker et al. 1999:31).

So, what then are the comparative advantages of small states and NGOs? In general, the literature on small states in international relations is relatively thin. Specifically within the field of mediation theory, the role of small states has received more attention, but as Princen notes: “before the twentieth century, only states

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5 For examples, see Bercovitch (1997), Pruitt (1997) and Zartman (1997).

6 Neumann and Gstohl cite four main reasons for this deficiency: US dominance in IR scholarship, a focus on the “major issues” of IR in which small states play at best a supporting role, the tendency for small state scholars to write in their national languages and the emphasis on large-scale empirical outcomes, in which small states exert less influence (2004:18-19).
intervened as mediators and only powerful states at that,” (1992:6). According to Princen, as mediators, small states are more likely than great powers to “elicit information relatively easily” from the parties, due to their perceived neutrality (1992:43). Princen argues that a neutral mediator may “change the tenor of the negotiations” to allow for integrative, rather than distributive, bargaining (1992:44).

In *Impotent Superpower- Potent Small State*, Jan Egeland proposes a theory for how small states can succeed in peace diplomacy where their superpower counterparts fail (Egeland 1988:175). Egeland bases his theory on a comparison of Norway and the United States; nevertheless, the analysis may apply to small states and superpowers more generally. For example, in comparison to US foreign policy, Norway’s strategic interests are less likely to conflict with human rights goals (Egeland 1988:175). Norway also has “less complicated foreign policy objectives and less organizational tension” (Egeland 1988:5). Historical factors also play a role, namely, Norway’s lack of a colonial past, support for decolonization and record of generous foreign aid (Egeland 1988:5). Norway’s bureaucratic structure also differs significantly from that of the US in that the Foreign Ministry remains relatively insulated from the turf battles that plague the US State Department, Congress, and the Pentagon (Egeland 1988:27). The Norwegian Foreign Ministry operates with a level of autonomy commensurate to allow for long-term policy implementation, regardless of the election cycles (Egeland 1988:173-174). In short, through a confluence of historical factors and institutional structure, Norway is both willing and able to serve as a mediator in conflicts with only a minimal chance of success. His argument concerns both Norway’s opportunities for serving as a mediator (less strategic tension, continuity in foreign policy, etc.) and its effectiveness in doing so (no history of decolonization, generous foreign aid, local knowledge).

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7 This work is particularly relevant given that Egeland served as Secretary of State for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990 to 1997, that is, throughout the peace process and signing of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East as well as the peace process for Guatemala. Egeland is widely credited with establishing a more activist foreign policy for the Norwegian state. His experience as director of the Norwegian Red Cross and as chairman of Amnesty International in Norway provides a clear example of the close connection between Norwegian NGOs and the Norwegian government.
While Egeland’s argument focuses mainly on the advantages of the state, in terms of the political process, the advantages of NGOs as mediators include their role in building up civil society, their legitimacy at the local level and their vast knowledge base about the conflict region. States in the midst of civil war typically lack a vibrant civil society, whether due to long-term state intimidation, ethnic fractionalization, or simply the resource demands of ongoing war. As mediators, states are constrained in reaching out to these fragile institutions through both norms of non-intervention and mutual suspicion. NGOs with local knowledge are, however, able to build networks of trust even within societies in conflict. NGO personnel are also able to provide advice on specific cultural and historical context of the conflict due to their often long-term presence in the region.

Based on the Crocker, Hampson and Aall theoretical framework and Egeland’s theory of small-state comparative advantages, I propose the following general framework for understanding how the “Norwegian model” operates within a mediation cycle framework. The two frameworks—for the conflict cycle and the mediation cycle, respectively—are herein described as analytically separate entities. The extent to which these frameworks overlap remains an empirical question. Within the mediation literature, proposed links between the two frameworks include the theory that a mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary premise for negotiations, for example. However, determining the extent and nature of the links between the conflict cycle and the mediation cycle is beyond the scope of this paper.

Table 2.2.2 on the following page outlines the expected traits of mediation for a given phase of the mediation cycle. These statements should not be understood as specific hypotheses, but rather, as general characteristics of mediation based on a division of labor throughout the life cycle of the mediation attempt.

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8 I am indebted to Professor Arild Underdal for this suggestion.
Table 2.2.2 Mediation Cycle Framework for the “Norwegian Model”

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Intensity</th>
<th>Rising/High Intensity</th>
<th>Declining Intensity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Norwegian NGOs with presence in local region begin conflict resolution activities in addition to existing development projects</td>
<td>• Norwegian Foreign Ministry begins cooperation with Norwegian NGOs on ground through financial support of Track II mediation</td>
<td>• Norway supports grassroots peace process, through which NGOs take lead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties to conflict accept Norwegian actors due to their lack of colonial past, lack of material interest in conflict and history of foreign aid to region.</td>
<td>• Norwegian Track II efforts begin to take on character of pre-negotiation.</td>
<td>• Great powers, international and/or regional organizations heavily involved and commit to assisting with implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No great powers currently show interest in mediating conflict themselves.</td>
<td>• Contacts made through local NGOs utilized to broach subject of Track I negotiations. Norwegian actors guarantee secrecy of eventual negotiations and offer to hold them in Norway.</td>
<td>• Norway pledges development aid tied to eventual peace agreement, but otherwise, moves into background of mediation efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Track I negotiations begin and gain momentum. A breakthrough in talks leads Norway to press for international and/or regional organization involvement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
does not resume, (2) an external monitor punishes violations of the agreement and forces its implementation, (3) the parties re-negotiate the terms of the agreement or (4) the parties return to the low intensity conflict phase. In practice, combinations of these scenarios may also occur, such as partial external implementation and a resurgence of low-level violence.

2.3 Strengths and Limitations of the “Norwegian Model”

According to the conflict cycle framework, the level of Norwegian control over the direction of the peace process resembles a bell curve. In the first phase, many small actors engage in conflict resolution initiatives and no clear peace process develops. In the second phase, Norway assists the parties in serious talks and communicates directly with each side. In the third phase, the parties themselves accept responsibility for implementation and additional third parties assist in monitoring and, in some cases, implementation of the agreement. The irony of this model is that ensuring continued domestic support for peace mediation may require emphasizing the importance of the Norwegian role in the peace process following the signing of a negotiated agreement, when international and domestic media attention is at its peak. This is also when Norwegian influence over the process approaches its ebb.

Through the conflict cycle framework, the potential advantages and disadvantages of the “Norwegian model” identified in the introduction to this paper can be temporally located according to phases in the conflict. These factors are reprinted in Table 2.3.1. The first advantage, deniability, concerns the extent to which negotiations offer the protection of secrecy to the actors involved. Deniability is likely to be a main concern during the “rising/high” phases of the conflict, when engaging in negotiations may create a perception of weakness. The parties are likely to require secrecy as a condition for beginning any kind of talks. Deniability also refers to the Norwegian state’s ability to provide financial assistance to one or more
of the parties through the NGO. This fig leaf may be necessary to avoid upsetting allies that might perceive such funding as support to terrorist organizations.

The value of local knowledge, the second factor, enters into the “low intensity” phase, as Norwegian NGOs with a network of contacts and a history of development aid in the region begin grassroots efforts to avert conflict. This local knowledge base remains an asset throughout the conflict cycle, as officials from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry rely on their NGO counterparts for advice and utilize their networks. In addition, the NGOs also develop a level of trust within the afflicted community. The NGOs’ legitimacy on the local level represents the third major advantage of the “Norwegian model.” The Foreign Ministry employs the resources of the state, both to finance peace initiatives and to access political networks, but the NGO partners retain their status as “trusted mediators” in the local context. This factor is likely to enter at all phases of the conflict cycle, but is of particular importance during the “rising/high” phase, when barriers to entry for mediators are exceedingly high.

The final potential advantage of the “Norwegian model” is the potential for streamlined cooperation. Through direct contacts and often informal personal networks, NGO representatives within the conflict region and officials from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry coordinate their efforts to allow for the type of role shifting outlined in the framework above. In contrast to multi-party mediation efforts elsewhere, this perhaps represents a primary strength of the “Norwegian model.” Close contacts between the NGOs and the Foreign Ministry may help to dampen any potential turf battles between the two. In contrast, the multiplicity of mediation initiatives in Burundi during the 1990’s is cited as an example of the type of “fragmentation” that may occur in the absence of a central coordinating mechanism.
Hara identifies no less than 35 separate mediators for the Burundian conflict in the 1990’s alone (1999:153-157). The challenge is to coordinate the advantages of each actor in a complementary fashion. Arguably, the “Norwegian model” represents an example of cooperation based on the principle of comparative advantage.

The four potential disadvantages of the “Norwegian model” include three of a practical nature and one normative concern. The latter relates to the democratic implications of state-NGO partnerships. If the state cedes important foreign policy tasks to an NGO, does this weaken democratic control over Norwegian foreign affairs? Is the secrecy necessary to enable negotiations acceptable from a democratic perspective? These and related questions form a normative critique of the “Norwegian model,” which I will address in the comparative analysis following the case studies.

A second criticism of the “Norwegian model” concerns the importance of mutual aims. In practice, Norwegian NGOs and officials from the Foreign Ministry have managed to maintain a broad consensus on the strategy and aims of mediation. In part, this may reflect the closeness of Norwegian society. Personal relationships among NGO leaders and officials from the Foreign Ministry are not at all uncommon, as would be expected in a country of approximately 4.5 million people. In addition, as discussed in the review of Norwegian foreign policy, there exists a general ideological consensus on the importance of Norway’s role as a force for peace. Even when differences of opinion do occur, a compromise solution often results. For example, when the Foreign Ministry opposed Norwegian Church Aid’s plan for peace mediation in Mali, the Ministry provided money for development projects, but refrained from official involvement in the process (Sommerfeldt 30 March 2007). Nevertheless, ideological consensus on the aims and strategies of peace mediation should not be taken for granted. Given that Foreign Ministry funds account for the majority of the “Big Five” organizations’ budgets, the NGOs are financially dependent on the goodwill of the Norwegian government. Likewise, Norwegian NGOs in conflict regions are perceived as representatives of Norway. Their tactics
on the ground thus, rightly or not, reflect on the foreign policy of the Norwegian government. Consequently, the “Norwegian model” implies a situation of mutual dependence. The model would cease to function without consensus among both NGOs and the government.

A third practical concern relates to the lack of diplomatic training among NGO leaders. This is both a strength and a weakness of NGOs; a strength, in the sense that their non-official status helps in building trust as mediators lacking a hidden agenda; a weakness, in that NGO representatives may be unprepared for the type of complicated diplomacy required for intractable conflicts. Of course, the alternative view is that NGO diplomacy and official diplomacy can prove complementary. Regardless, NGO representatives do not receive the sort of formalized professional training required for diplomats; hence, one would expect that the quality of NGO mediation would be, if not less effective, at least more variable.

Lastly, in terms of practical difficulties, the “Norwegian model” lacks the resources for enforcement of an eventual peace agreement. Returning to the mediation cycle framework, in the “declining” phase, Norway will likely require the assistance of more powerful actors, such as great powers or regional and/or international organizations, in order to enforce and assist in the implementation of a peace agreement. Both the Norwegian state and their NGO counterparts are “mediators without muscles.” Compiled together, these four potential disadvantages form a powerful counterargument against misplaced optimism over the effectiveness of the “Norwegian model.” I will return to this critique in the comparative analysis chapter and comment on its salience in light of the case studies.
3. Methodology

3.1 Qualitative Case Study

The following analysis consists of a series of three case studies of the “Norwegian model.” According to Bennett: “a case study is… the investigation of a well-defined aspect of a historical happening” (2004:21), in this instance: Norwegian state-NGO cooperation in peace mediation. The nature of the research question determines the method chosen; that is, what is the “Norwegian model” and what are its strengths and limitations? In order to organize the analysis, the previous section presented a theoretical framework based on the concept of a mediation cycle involving multiple third party actors. Accordingly, the theoretical framework includes both the individual elements of mediation and the temporal sequence in which these occur.

In the cases studies to follow, I apply the model of multiparty mediation listed in Table 2.2.2 on page 19 to three cases of Norwegian peace mediation in civil conflicts. Each case is organized according to the three mediation cycle phases and deviations from the theoretical model are reported. I conclude each case by comparing its relative fit of the theoretical model. In the comparative analysis chapter following the case studies, I assess the implications of the case study results for mediation effectiveness according to the potential strengths and weaknesses of Norwegian peace mediation listed in Table 2.3.1 on page 21.

The case study methodology used consists of a combination of process tracing techniques and controlled comparison. The former describes the method of examining the rationale provided for policy choices, the timing of policy decisions, and finally, comparing these two factors to what the proposed model would predict. Van Evera defines process tracing as:
The tracing of a causal process by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes… [This] includes the tracing of both decision processes and causal processes that do not involve decisions (Van Evera 1997:52).

Conclusions drawn from process tracing constitute a “strong test of theory,” as the “predictions are often unique” to the case(s) studied (Van Evera 1997:65). Conversely, with input-output models of behavior, cases that appear similar may simply exhibit “illusory commonality,” meaning that two or more observations share similar values by coincidence and not due to a shared underlying causal mechanism (Ragin 1987:48). Likewise, two observations may differ significantly in value, but nevertheless result from the same causal mechanism (Ibid).

However, the main drawback of a process tracing approach is that the uniqueness of the theory also limits its applicability to other cases. While the conclusions of the analysis should result in high content validity for the Norwegian case, this comes at the sacrifice of parsimonious theory. Further research is required to establish conclusions for small states as a whole, for example. Likewise, case studies do not identify the theory’s antecedent conditions (Van Evera 1997:71). We cannot be sure whether the causal mechanisms identified owe to a unique antecedent condition in the Norwegian case or that the conclusions hold generally.

The case study analysis to follow also includes techniques of controlled comparison. I compare the three cases along several variable dimensions, in accordance with the temporal framework presented in the previous chapter. These variables comprise elements of whole cases and thus, “should be understood in relation to each other,” rather than as isolated characteristics (Ragin 1987:52). I understand each variable as a step in the mediation process, undoubtedly conditioned by previous policy choices and situational constraints. This type of controlled comparison of general characteristics corresponds to George’s definition of a “disciplined –configurative case study,” (George 1979:51). Roughly speaking, the cases consist of two types of independent variables: process and contextual, while the dependent variables refer to the outcome of mediation in a broad sense. However, in order to go beyond a correlative model of causation, I examine the statements of
actors involved in each process, through interviews and written accounts. From an epistemological perspective, the variables of this study differ significantly from an experiment in the natural sciences. Each variable contains an element of human agency and as such, understanding the motives for behaviour requires abandoning an instrumentally rational view of human action. The statements of the actors involved, while subject to bias and lapses in memory, nevertheless establish a more complete model of causality than assumptions of instrumental rationality would permit.

Table 3.3.1 below identifies the independent and dependent variables in a general sense. As the table illustrates, the case studies to follow consist of a controlled comparison to the extent that each analysis proceeds according to a single defined set of variables. However, the study also employs process tracing techniques to evaluate the mediation attempt from beginning to end, through a series of intervening variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3.1 Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Cycle Phase</strong></td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>Rising/High</td>
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<td>Declining</td>
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3.2 Case Selection

The analysis is limited to mediation of internal conflicts in the post-Cold War period involving Norwegian state-NGO cooperation: the Israeli-Palestinian,
Guatemala, and Sudan peace processes, respectively. These cases also include a non-state actor as one of the parties to the conflict. All three peace processes are representative cases in that they are readily identified with the “Norwegian model” and occurred during roughly the same time period. Each case thus fits the conditions for the framework for multi-party mediation based on the conflict cycle: “they are units within which the process entailed by the hypothesis can take place,” (King et al. 1994:221). Significant variation in the independent variables helps to minimize the role of certain background characteristics to the conflict. For example, the choice of three different continents should minimize the role of geographic context in generalizing about the interactive model of peace mediation. The role and importance of religion to the conflict, as well as the involvement of additional third party actors, also varied significantly across the cases studied. Nevertheless, the three peace processes are most likely linked. In statistical terms, we should expect significant autocorrelation among the three cases. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry in particular can hardly be expected to approach each instance of mediation without any reference to the others. Hence, the three cases cannot be considered completely independent from one another, and the conclusions of the analysis are necessarily modest as evidence of a more general phenomenon among small states (King et al. 1994: 222).

At a minimum, competing policy demands require a coherent and consistent approach to mediation engagements occurring over the same time span. In other words, I expect policymakers (including NGOs) will maintain a relatively stable set of priorities, changing course dramatically only in response to external events. At a maximum, I expect to find evidence of learning, as policymakers adapt their strategies based on previous results. The latter hypothesis requires a more thorough research strategy, but the temporal sequencing of policy changes provides at least some clue, as do the statements of policymakers at the time.
3.3 Data

The interviews were conducted over a roughly one-year period, from 2007 to 2008. Subjects were chosen for their familiarity and experience with Norwegian peace mediation, as well as their availability during the research process. The structure of the interviews was relatively open-ended and the majority occurred before the theoretical framework had been fully developed. As King, Keohane and Verba observe, “data has a way of disciplining thought,” (1994:13). Likewise, I found some of the most interesting avenues of research through an inductive analysis of the interview transcripts. Prior to each interview, I conducted a search on the newspaper database “Retriever” for any Norwegian newspaper articles on the interview subject since approximately 1990.\(^9\) I then noted a series of questions based on each interviewee’s role in the various peace processes and jotted down topics I intended to address (i.e. how state-NGO cooperation initially began).

During the interviews, questions were modified based on the conversation, while ensuring that I also addressed the questions and issues noted beforehand. This relatively flexible method was intended to ensure that relevant information did not go unnoticed, even if I had not anticipated broaching certain subjects during my preparation. According to Rubin and Rubin: “qualitative interviewing design is flexible, iterative, and continuous,” (2004:43). The questioning was designed to fit the expertise of the interviewee, concentrating on first-person narratives of the events in question. The lines of questioning began relatively open-ended. For example, I opened every interview by asking, “How did you first become involved in X peace process?” In this way, my intention was to encourage the interviewees to share their experiences as they perceived them. I closed each interview by asking the interviewee if he/she could think of anything important to the topic that I had not asked about. The majority of the interviews were taped and transcripts are available upon request. For those that were not recorded, detailed notes are available.

\(^9\) For the interview with Paul Wee, I conducted a Google search for background information.
Several of the main research institutes compiled reports on the various peace processes, often at the behest of the Foreign Ministry. These provide valuable information on the extent to which the implementation of mediation policy met the goals of the Foreign Ministry, and often include a lengthy background discussion of the conflict. I also refer to Norwegian newspaper articles written throughout the cases analyzed, as well as Foreign Ministry press releases. The cases also draw information from first-person accounts of the peace processes, particularly in the Middle East case.

The secondary literature used consists of scholarly journal articles and books written on the three peace processes analyzed here. The first case, on the Oslo peace process for the Middle East, employs the lion’s share of the secondary literature included in this paper. This owes to the overwhelming academic attention this peace process received in relation to the two latter cases. Nevertheless, the cases on Guatemala and Sudan also include secondary literature, primarily to provide background on the cases and to situate Norway’s contribution in the context of the peace processes as a whole.
4. Cases

The cases that follow are organized in chronological order, according to the signing of a negotiated agreement. Although the Guatemala peace process began in 1990, prior to the initiation of the Oslo back channel (in January 1993), the latter resulted in an agreement first and cemented Norway’s international position as a peacemaker. Accordingly, accounts of the Guatemala process often suggest the shadow of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East. For this reason, I place the Middle East case first. The main period of Norwegian involvement in the IGAD peace process for Sudan began in 1998 and resulted in a signed peace agreement in January 2005.

4.1 The Oslo Process for the Middle East

4.1.1 Low

The background characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict are well documented and will hence receive only brief mention here. The substance of the conflict concerns conflicting claims to the territory of present-day Israel and to the degree of autonomy granted to the Palestinian inhabitants of Israeli-occupied territory. Palestinians and Israelis are particularly divided on the status of Palestinian refugees who demand to return to their former homes in Israel and to the control of Jerusalem, home to Islamic, Jewish and Christian holy sites.

In 1991, the US organized a multilateral peace conference in Madrid, with representation from Israel, several of the Arab states and the major global actors, including Russia, Japan and the EU. At this time, Israel maintained control over the Gaza strip and the West Bank, both of which were occupied primarily by Palestinians, with scattered clusters of Israeli settlements. Israel justified control of these regions as a security interest, to protect Israeli settlers and to prevent terrorist
attacks emanating from Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) served as the de facto political leadership for the Palestinian population. Given the absence of Palestinian self-rule in Israel and in Israeli-occupied territories, the PLO maintained its headquarters in exile, in Tunis.

The PLO clearly entered negotiations as the weaker party. The fall of the Soviet Union removed one of the PLO’s key supporters, and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War strained the PLO’s relationship with the United States and led the Gulf States to cut off much needed financial support (Qurie 2006:34-35; Tveit 2005: 406-407; Zartman 1997:196). According to then-US Secretary of State James Baker: “in the wake of the Gulf War, the PLO stood close to collapse,” (Baker 1999:186). At the same time, Hamas continued to gain strength within Palestinian society, threatening the political dominance of Arafat’s ruling party, Fatah.

Israel entered multilateral negotiations under pressure from the Bush I administration, which threatened to withdraw financial support (Tveit 2005:330; Zartman 1997:197); Israel’s commitment to the negotiations was correspondingly weak. In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir of the conservative Likud party admitted retrospectively that Israel’s participation in the Madrid conference was only an act (Tveit 2005:353). The Israeli government strongly objected to any type of UN involvement (Baker 1999:194; Tveit 2005:326). Shamir also refused to allow official representation from the PLO in Madrid (Baker 1999:188-191). At the time, Israeli law forbade direct contact with members of the PLO (Waage 2000:80). The Israeli government feared that direct negotiations would grant the PLO status as a legitimate political actor. However, in a compromise, Israel agreed to allow Palestinians to attend the conference as members of the Jordanian delegation—in effect, attempting to negotiate with Palestinians while circumventing the PLO (Beilin 1995:25). Nevertheless, once negotiations began, it soon became clear that the Palestinian delegates received their instructions directly from Arafat, who ensured they would stall the negotiating process until the PLO received official recognition as the
representative of the Palestinian people (Waage 2004:54; Tveit 2005:288, 345). Given the motivations of each side, the Madrid peace process quickly ground to a halt.

In the June 1992 elections, the Israeli Labour party defeated Likud, and Yitzhak Rabin replaced Shamir as Prime Minister. Shimon Peres, a rival of Rabin’s who was seen as more amenable to peace, was named Foreign Minister (Corbin 1994:26). The new Israeli Labour government realized that without an agreement, the PLO might be forced to cede control to Hamas—a group which posed a far greater threat to Israel than the PLO ever had (Tveit 2005:289; Zartman 1997:197). Thus, while both Israel and the PLO stalled in the official negotiations, each side recognized a window of opportunity was closing.

The Oslo channel began against this backdrop, with the initial goal of breaking the stalemate in the official negotiations (Waage 2000:78-79). However, Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process began long before 1993 (Egeland et al. 1994:8). Norway enjoyed a special relationship with Israel since the latter state’s founding in 1948. The Norwegian Labor party in particular maintained close ties to its sister party in Israel (Egeland 2007:224; Waage 2000: 25, 32, 47-48). As former Norwegian Labor party chairman Haakon Lie stated, “When Israel asked for something, we never asked questions. We did as we were asked,”


In fact, Norway sold heavy water to Israel in 1959 with the verbal promise that it would be used only “for peaceful purposes” (Bondevik 2006:253; Tveit 2005:207, 251; Waage 2000:32).

Norway’s uncritical support first began to wane following Israel’s overwhelming victory in the Six Day War of 1967, but the real turning point occurred during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon (Stoltenberg 2001: 261-262; Waage 2000:36, 42). Norwegian soldiers served in the UN peacekeeping force for Lebanon...
(UNIFIL) and witnessed the pre-emptive Israeli invasion of Beirut firsthand. Norwegian humanitarian NGOs also attended to the wounded civilians in Lebanon, including the Palestinian refugees. Their efforts also enhanced Norway’s standing within Palestinian society (Waage 2000:44-45).

In 1978, PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat established contact with the Norwegian Ambassador in Beirut, Hans Wilhelm Longva (Waage 2000:51, Tveit 2005:25). Two years later, Arafat told Longva that he understood the Norwegian public strongly supported Israel, but that he hoped Norway would one day help the PLO negotiate with Israel through secret diplomacy (Stoltenberg 2001:264; Tveit 2005:35). Arafat sought out Norway as a country with close ties to both Israel and the United States (Waage 2000:51). Throughout the 1980’s, then-Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg repeatedly expressed to both sides his willingness to host peace negotiations on Norwegian soil, often at Arafat’s behest (Stoltenberg 2001:264-268; Tveit 2005:173; Waage 2000:63,66). However, Israel continued to reject any suggestion of negotiating directly with the PLO (Ibid.). Thus, the groundwork for Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process began long before 1993, through the work of, among others, Longva and Stoltenberg in the Foreign Ministry and the humanitarian aid efforts of various Norwegian NGOs.

In 1989, then-Norwegian Foreign Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik agreed to provide government funding for a comprehensive study of the living conditions of Palestinians in Gaza, to be conducted by the social science research institute Fafo (Waage 2000:68-69). Fafo’s founder, Terje Rød-Larsen was living in Cairo at the time, while his wife, Mona Juul, served as a diplomat for the Norwegian Embassy in Egypt (Corbin 1994:12). While in Cairo, Rød-Larsen established a friendship with the brother of the PLO Chairman, Fathi Arafat, and it was Fathi who suggested the concept for the Gaza survey (Tveit 2005:290). The idea was controversial within the Foreign Ministry. Fafo had earlier been involved in a financially disastrous development project in Northern Norway, which also revealed suspicious ties to a Russian parliamentarian (Egeland 2007:227-228). Nevertheless, Bondevik signed off
on the project. Marianne Heiberg, a Middle East researcher from the Norwegian Institute for International Politics (NUPI), was hired to help lead the research study. Heiberg was also the wife of then-Minister of Defense Johan Jørgen Holst.

Beginning in the late 1980’s, Sweden assisted the PLO in establishing contact with the US (Egeland 22 October 2007; Tveit 2005: 275; Waage 2000:56). However, Sweden lacked the type of close relationship to Israel that Norway enjoyed and in 1992, Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson suggested the PLO contact his good friend Thorvald Stoltenberg about seeking Norwegian assistance (Egeland 22 October 2007; Egeland 2007:225). Soon after, the PLO’s finance minister, Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurie), visited Oslo to request Norwegian aid for the PLO from State Secretary Jan Egeland (Qurie 2006:37; Tveit 2005:346). Although Egeland could not grant the request, he and Mona Juul (who was also present) were impressed by Ala (Waage 2000:70). Juul introduced Ala to her husband, Terje Rød-Larsen, and obtained Ala’s assurances of full support for Fafo’s research on the living conditions of Palestinians in Gaza (Ibid.).

Rød-Larsen also met Yossi Beilin in 1992. Beilin was a young and promising politician in the Israeli Labor party and enjoyed a close relationship to Shimon Peres (Ibid. 72). The two men discussed the ongoing Madrid peace process and Rød-Larsen suggested holding secret peace talks between Israel and the PLO in Norway. Beilin was warm to the idea, but was not in a position to influence Shamir (Beilin 1999:52; Tveit 2005:349). Following the election of Rabin, Beilin was named Deputy Secretary of State, and in September 1992, Egeland, Juul and Rød-Larsen formally invited the Israelis to participate in secret negotiations with the PLO (Waage 2000:78). Beilin could not attend himself, given Rabin’s likely opposition (Beilin 1999:62). However, Beilin suggested to Egeland that his friend Yair Hirschfeld attend the meeting in Oslo (Egeland 2007:229). On the Palestinian side, Abu Ala accepted the invitation to Oslo, with the consent of Arafat.
4.1.2 Rising/High

The first Oslo peace talks were held in January 1993 at Borregaard, a Sarpsborg mansion owned by the CEO of Orkla, who was a close friend of Rød-Larsen’s (Tveit 2005:373). From the beginning, only Jan Egeland, Mona Juul and Thorvald Stoltenberg from the Foreign Ministry were aware of the secret talks, in addition to Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (Waage 2004:64, 83). Egeland also kept the US State Department regularly informed of the talks, knowing that American support was crucial to the implementation of any eventual settlement (Egeland 2007:229-230). The Americans did not object provided the back channel supported the official multilateral peace process.

Two Israeli academics attended the meeting in Sarpsborg: Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak. PLO finance minister Abu Ala and Abu Mazen’s (Mahmoud Abbas’) advisor Hassan Asfour represented the Palestinians, along with Maher al Kurd, their interpreter. Neither side could be sure of the other’s official status. Arafat stood behind the channel from the beginning (Qurie 2006:51) and the Palestinians assumed Peres supported the two Israeli academics. In truth, Israeli Deputy State Secretary Beilin kept the first meeting secret from Peres, in order to maintain deniability (Tveit 2005:376). Fafo served as the official cover for the Oslo talks: Ron Pundak and Yair Hirschfeld were listed on Fafo’s payroll and the Foreign Ministry paid Fafo’s internal costs, with Egeland’s approval (Egeland 2007:239; Tveit 2005:373).11

At the start of the first meeting, Marianne Heiberg presented the results of Fafo’s survey of the living conditions of Palestinians in Gaza, in line with the research seminar cover. Heiberg herself was unaware of the true nature of the meeting at this time (Tveit 2005:385). When the actual negotiations began, Juul, Larsen and Egeland operated within a strictly facilitative role, handling the logistics of the meetings and building personal relationships with the representatives during

11 The entire channel cost the Foreign Ministry five million Norwegian kroner (roughly one million US dollars). The Ministry’s financial department accepted the requests without comment; but more detailed financial reporting would have been required had negotiations lasted much longer (Egeland 2007:239-240).
coffee breaks and meals (Tveit 2005:375; Waage 2004:80-83). The Norwegian actors sought to maintain a “discrete distance” from the negotiations (Tveit 2005:379). Within the Foreign Ministry, the idea of allowing Rød-Larsen, as Fafo’s director, to lead peace facilitation was not uncontroversial, given Fafo’s mismanagement of earlier projects, as mentioned above (Egeland 2007:227-228). Moreover, Rød-Larsen had “never been a part of or trained by the ministry of foreign affairs,” (Waage 2004:62). However, he had developed a network of contacts within the Foreign Ministry and within the Labor party more generally, not the least of which through his wife, Mona Juul.

During the course of the first two meetings, the parties reached an agreement on a declaration of principles (known as the Sarpsborg DoP) for a peace process: Israeli forces would end the occupation in Gaza and grant the Palestinians a foothold in the West Bank, most likely in Jericho. The exact nature of Palestinian self-rule was ambiguous, but the emerging agreement would give the Israelis an exit strategy for Gaza and allow the Palestinians some degree of territorial control. Beilin upgraded the channel after the second meeting by contacting Peres, who then informed Rabin (Beilin 1999:71-73). Unbeknownst to Peres and Beilin, Rabin had already received word of the channel through Israeli intelligence and contacted US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to tell him that Israel did not take the Oslo channel seriously (Tveit 2005:380-381). As a result, the US largely disregarded the back channel as well. After all, the Oslo channel was only one of several informal channels at the time (Qurie 2006:85). In addition to its contacts in the United States, Israel also informed Egypt about the channel sporadically (Savir 1998:42).

After the third meeting, PLO foreign minister Abu Mazen informed Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco about the Oslo channel (Tveit 2005:381). The PLO also demanded Israel upgrade its representation beyond the two academics. However, in April 1993, Johan Jørgen Holst replaced Thorvald Stoltenberg as Foreign Minister when the latter accepted a position as the UN mediator for the former Yugoslavia. As Defense Minister, Holst built a network of contacts in the Middle East, and had in
fact already met Arafat, Rabin and Peres (Egeland et al. 1994:8; Tveit 2005:35, 221-222). Holst had a reputation within the Israeli Labor party as “arrogant” for his direct criticism of Israel during the war in Lebanon (Tveit 2005:214). Arafat was pleased to hear of Holst’s appointment and considered him sympathetic to the Palestinian cause (Ibid.383).

Holst enjoyed a good relationship with Rød-Larsen, through cooperation with a peace project in Sudan three years earlier (Ibid. 384). However, the new Foreign Minister was less generous to Egeland, pushing the latter to the side in the Oslo talks. Egeland accepted a position as Stoltenberg’s assistant in May, partly out of frustration with Holst, who unsuccessfully sought to have Rød-Larsen replace Egeland as State Secretary (Ibid.389). In May 1993, Holst surprised the delegates by taking an active role in the fifth round of negotiations, which was held while the Foreign Ministry hosted an official conference on Palestinian refugee issues (Beilin 1999:84; Qurie 2006:138). Holst began communicating directly with each side by phone and through letters; within the Oslo meetings, he did not hesitate to formulate potential points of compromise (Tveit 2005:390, 398; Waage 2004:107).

In late May 1993, Israel officially upgraded the channel by sending Uri Savir, the press attaché for the Israeli consulate in New York (Beilin 1999:85; Tveit 2005:393-394). Holst’s personal engagement in the process may have helped prod the Israelis into this decision; with the Norwegian Foreign Minister involved, Israel needed official representation as well (Waage 2004:108). In his own account of the Oslo channel, Savir praises the Norwegians, and Rød-Larsen especially, for creating a relaxed atmosphere for negotiations—the “Oslo spirit,” (Savir 1998:11). The Oslo setting lacked the formalities of traditional diplomatic protocol and the secrecy of the talks eliminated the incentive to play for the domestic audience (Egeland 2007:245-246). Directly prior to the meeting, a Norwegian reporter contacted Egeland about rumors that the PLO and Israeli government were meeting secretly in Oslo (Ibid. 235). Egeland responded by suggesting the rumor must be a reference to the official conference on refugee issues. It was clear to Egeland that the leak came from the US
State Department. Accordingly, the parties urged Egeland to quit using the secure phone from the US Embassy and to limit the flow of information to the Americans about the channel (Egeland 2007:235). For the Israelis, keeping the US in the dark served to pre-empt criticism that Israel favored the Oslo channel over the official Madrid process and allowed Israel to negotiate a deal with the Palestinians without the threat of US pressure (Tveit 2005:419-420). The Palestinians, on the other hand, actively sought out US involvement, but news of direct negotiations with Israel posed a substantial security threat to the actors involved and would have led to a political debacle for the PLO.

The Oslo channel began to develop a momentum of its own by June 1993, and the Israelis decided to send a lawyer to the negotiations. Yoel Singer, an Israeli lawyer and former military officer, had Rabin’s confidence and signalled to the Palestinians that the Prime Minister stood behind the negotiators (Ibid. 399, 404). The two old political rivals, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, managed to cooperate and present a united front for the negotiations. The Palestinians, on the other hand, remained at a distinct disadvantage in the negotiations due to internal disputes. Arafat’s negotiators struggled occasionally with their English and lacked “juridical competence,” (Ibid.399). Moreover, all of the Palestinian negotiators were from the exiled population, not from the occupied territories (Ibid.). Divisions within Fatah led Arafat to prioritize negotiators he could trust; personal loyalty trumped all other considerations (Ibid.399-400). Larsen suggested the Palestinians bring a lawyer to the negotiations, but Arafat “ignored him,” (Ibid.).

Prior to the July meeting at Halvorsbøle, Foreign Minister Holst engaged in a form of shuttle diplomacy while ostensibly on vacation in Tunisia (Ibid. 410-411). Holst, Juul and Rød-Larsen met with Arafat—a meeting which Holst described in detail in a personal letter to Israeli Foreign Minister Peres (Tveit 2005:415; Waage 2004:112-114).12 According to Abu Ala, Holst told Arafat: “Either we can seize the

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12 Ala notes that Holst briefed Peres on the meeting with Arafat, although it is unclear whether the Palestinians knew this at the time (Qurie 2006:201).
opportunity to reach a direct agreement now, or lose everything,” and also that “Israel has many red lines,” that necessitate compromise through “creative ambiguity” (Qurie 2006:200). Holst also emphasized that the Israelis might be willing to compromise by ceding Jericho (Tveit 2005:421). To Peres, Holst wrote that the Palestinians would not compromise without the promise of Jericho (Ibid. 422). Arafat expressed his trust in Holst and confided that he was desperate to reach in agreement (Ibid. 412). In addition, Abu Ala observes:

It was clear to us that Holst’s purpose in holding this meeting was, among other things, to ascertain that Yasser Arafat was fully aware of developments in Oslo (Qurie 2006:201).

Holst was unaware that Arafat had also sent a letter to Rabin, writing that he would “delay all sensitive issues, especially Jerusalem… if he could just get an interim agreement,” (Tveit 2005:415). Abu Mazen also contacted Peres through Egyptian President Mubarak to warn that Rabin and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher wanted to close down the Oslo channel (Ibid.). However, despite the flood of diplomatic activity from all sides, both the eleventh and twelfth round of negotiations in Norway collapsed.

On August 16th, Rød-Larsen received word from Arafat that the PLO was ready to compromise on the Israeli demands (Ibid. 434). Rød-Larsen called Holst and urged him to meet with Peres at Haga Slott in Stockholm, where the Israeli Foreign Minister stayed during a planned official visit (Ibid.). Peres insisted they call Arafat from Stockholm immediately and end the negotiations the same night (Waage 2004:133). Once Arafat managed to assemble all of his advisors together (including, this time, a Lebanese attorney), Holst conveyed the dialogue between the PLO Chairman in Tunis and the Israeli Foreign Minister in Stockholm for several hours of negotiations (Tveit 2005:436-438). During the breaks, Peres called Rabin in Jerusalem and the Palestinians contacted the Egyptians (Ibid.). The marathon negotiating session ended in a final agreement, primarily on the basis of the Israeli positions (Waage 2004:133). The Palestinians, worried about their competence in English, taped the entire phone conversation. After translating the document to
Arabic, the Palestinians noted points in the dialogue when Holst formulated the Palestinian positions better than they had done, and also anticipated potential problems in the language they had not foreseen (Qurie 2006:240; Tveit 2005:447).

The PLO and Israeli Foreign Ministers, Abu Ala and Shimon Peres, respectively, initialed the negotiated agreement in a secret ceremony in Oslo on August 13th, 1993. Peres, Holst, Rød-Larsen and Juul then traveled to California to inform US Secretary of State Christopher and the chief US negotiator for the official multilateral negotiations, Dennis Ross. Prior to the meeting, Peres suggested they present the Oslo accords as US-brokered agreement and Holst agreed (Tveit 2005:451). Christopher and Ross welcomed the agreement, but Christopher refused to allow the US to take credit, arguing that “the truth would come out, sooner or later,” (Egeland 2007:241; Tveit 2005:455). Christopher agreed, however, to host the signing ceremony on the White House lawn.

4.1.3 Declining

The international press reaction to the signing of the Oslo Accords brought the Norwegian effort into the spotlight. Although the signing ceremony took place on the White House lawn, the role of the Norwegian mediators soon attracted the attention of the international media (Waage 2004:153-155). In October 1993, the United States and the European Union established the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) to coordinate assistance to the occupied territories (Ibid.172). The US and the EU soon became deadlocked on the question of who should chair the AHLC; Norway emerged as “the compromise candidate,” (Ibid.175). In addition to its leadership role, Norway contributed more than any other donor in relative terms. From 1993 to 1999, Norwegian aid comprised nine percent of all foreign aid to the occupied territories (Lilland and Kjerland 2003:107; Waage 2004:156). Disbursement of aid to the Palestinians did not proceed smoothly, however. The Palestinian leadership lacked the administrative experience and institutions necessary for the implementation of economic development programs and donors balked at the
prospect of disbursing aid without effective mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability (Waage 2004:180). In response, Norway led many of the development projects itself, fearing that a slowing of aid flows might derail the peace process (Lilland and Kjerland 2003:109). Unfortunately, this meant that projects were evaluated less carefully than was desirable, resulting in charges that Norwegian aid contributed to corruption within the Palestinian administration (Ibid.).

The original Norwegian mediators also continued to offer their services when called upon, although their role in the process leading to the Oslo II Interim Agreement remained minor; the parties negotiated directly, for the most part (Waage 2004:190-191). However, both Israel and the PLO failed to meet the timetable requirements established by the two Oslo agreements and continued violence increased support for extremist elements within each side. In addition, support from international donors stumbled over crucial questions on the establishment of Palestinian police forces and frustration at the incompetence of the Palestinian administrative organs. For its part, Israel failed to halt the ambitions of settlers and even Peres adopted a hard line on security in response to the growing political threat of the opposition. Israeli roadblocks and increased security measures in turn crippled the Palestinian economy and increased support for Hamas. In sum, a series of violations from both sides resulted in an escalatory spiral of violence. Without strong international pressure to re-establish a peace process, the Oslo agreements fell apart.

4.1.4 Preliminary Assessment

Table 4.1.4 below depicts the mediation cycle framework from Table 2.2.2, adapted to the Middle East case. In the “low intensity” phase, the efforts of Norwegian NGOs leading to the initiation of the Oslo back channel pale in comparison to those of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Although Fafo conducted a

13 Johan Jørgen Holst remained at the forefront of Norwegian assistance to the peace process until his death in 1994. The World Bank subsequently established the Johan Jørgen Holst Peace Fund to provide budgetary assistance for the Palestinian administration in the occupied territories (Waage 2004:184).
survey of the living conditions of the Palestinians living in Gaza prior to the beginning of the Oslo channel, the Fafo survey was preceded by years of behind-the-scenes diplomacy and informal networking among Norwegian diplomats and potential contacts within the Middle East. To be sure, Norway enjoyed a closer and more institutionalized relationship with Israel than with the PLO, but it had also built contacts within Palestinian society, not the least of which through Hans Wilhelm Longva’s personal relationship with Yasir Arafat.

Table 4.1.4 Mediation Cycle Framework for the Middle East Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Intensity</th>
<th>Rising/High Intensity</th>
<th>Declining Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Norwegian Foreign Ministry develops contacts on both sides of the conflict and expresses willingness to serve as mediator. Fafo involvement seen as complementary to Foreign Ministry strategy</td>
<td>• Norwegian Foreign Ministry offers financial support to Fafo for Track II mediation</td>
<td>• Norway chairs AHLC, sends troops for TIPH and supports grassroots peace process initiatives such as P2P (through which Fafo takes lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties to conflict accept Norwegian actors due to their close relationship to Israel and the United States, and Norway’s lack of material interest in conflict</td>
<td>• Fafo contacts invited to participate in Oslo back channel negotiations</td>
<td>• International community supports implementation on ad hoc basis, ambivalent about enforcing Oslo Agreement when politically inconvenient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties opposed to allowing the United States to mediate the conflict (due to lack of PLO recognition and potential for US to wield leverage)</td>
<td>• Parties upgrade Oslo channel through official participation</td>
<td>• Norwegian efforts still central to implementation, but Norway lacks capacity for enforcement without substantial assistance of more powerful international actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Signing of the DoP leads to US involvement and signing ceremony on White House lawn</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The second characteristic, that Norwegians will be accepted as relatively neutral mediators, proved largely correct. Both parties agreed that Norway had no material interest in the substance of an eventual peace agreement. Arafat trusted the Norwegians to act fairly towards the PLO; he also understood and indeed appreciated Norway’s historically close relationship to Israel. Perhaps at this stage, however, both parties underestimated Norway’s interest in simply achieving a peace agreement, regardless of its substance.

Regarding the third characteristic: whether the US-led Madrid process truly demonstrated a great power interest in mediating between the Israelis and the Palestinians remains largely a question of definition. The US pressured Israel into
participating in the official multilateral talks in Madrid and Washington, but these did not include a Palestinian delegation. Rather, the Jordanian delegation was comprised of both Jordanian and Palestinian representatives. Thus, the US undoubtedly proved an interest in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but not between Israel and the PLO.

The Middle East case follows relatively closely the general formula depicted in Table 2.2.2 on page 19 for the “rising/high” phase of mediation. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry cooperated closely with Fafo Director Rød-Larsen, with the former covering all expenses associated with the talks. Both Fafo and the Foreign Ministry utilized their contact networks to invite potential negotiators. Also, the Oslo channel began at a relatively unofficial level—at least on the Israeli side—and were held under the auspices of a Fafo conference. However, the Oslo channel steadily evolved into more official negotiations as Arafat, Peres and Rabin actively increased their involvement.

The final characteristic for the “rising/high” phase in Table 2.2.2 is that the Norwegian actors press for regional and international involvement in the mediation. In the Middle East case, UN involvement was ruled out from the start, owing to the acrimonious relationship between Israel and the UN General Assembly. Moreover, the Middle East lacked an overarching regional organization that included both parties to the conflict. Consequently, the Norwegian mediators did not press for greater regional or international organizational involvement. Rather, Norway informed the United States of the Oslo agreement, along with the parties, and the signing ceremony was held on the US lawn. In the Middle East case, no regional or international institutions presented a viable alternative to this type of ad hoc superpower involvement.

The “declining phase” depicted in Table 2.2.2 accurately describes the Norwegian effort in the post-settlement phase. Norway held the chairmanship of the multilateral AHLC and contributed significant financial support to the development of the occupied territories. Norway also supplied personnel for the TIPH forces and
supported the grassroots Fafo-led “people-to-people” peace-building measures. Despite multilateral collaboration in the implementation phase, however, Norway’s efforts did not gradually fade into the periphery. Rather, Norway often found itself in the position of carrying the burden for politically sensitive enforcement tasks for which no other state or organization would take responsibility, such as establishing a Palestinian police force.

4.2 The Peace Process for Guatemala

4.2.1 Low

Following a CIA-backed coup of the democratically-elected government in 1954, Guatemala experienced over 30 years of civil war, resulting in over 200,000 deaths and 150,000 refugees (CEH 1999). The guerrilla insurgency movement Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) was first established in 1962 as a Marxist opponent to the military government in Guatemala City (Costello 1997:11). The guerrilla movement encountered a brutal counter-insurgency campaign from the government, including the systematic use of extra-judicial executions and kidnappings prior to general elections (Høgdahl 1994:35). The Guatemalan state remained entirely in the control of the army, which sustained power through “an indiscriminate and uncontrolled use of violence,” (Lux de Coti 2000:108). Moreover, as a means of combating communism, US intelligence agencies assisted the Guatemalan army through training and intelligence sharing (Ibid. 110).

Although FAR was nearly eliminated in the 1960’s, by 1982 various militia groups combined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)

14 The following description of the background conditions (two paragraphs) is an excerpt from Bersagel (2007:1-2).
15 The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) was established by treaty in 1994 with a mandate “to clarify with objectivity, equity and impartiality, the human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the armed confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan people,” (CEH 1999: “Prologue”)
In the late 1970’s the guerrilla movement included 6,000-8,000 members, yet remained at a stalemate with the government forces, who enjoyed tacit (and sometimes explicit) support from the US government (Costello 1997:13-14; Dillon et al. 2 April 1995). The guerrilla groups were responsible for 32 massacres and numerous kidnappings. However, the Guatemalan truth commission ultimately reported that guerrilla actions accounted for only three percent of all human rights abuses during the civil war, compared to 93 percent “committed by agents of the State, in particular the army” (Lux de Coti 2000:113).

Underlying the conflict between the military government and the insurgent groups was a social and economic system characterized by staggering inequality. Although members of the indigenous Maya people comprised 60 percent of the population, Guatemala remained politically dominated by the Ladino minority (Seider 1997:68; Jonas 1991:65-67). While the Mayan majority remained largely outside of the conflict from the beginning, the URNG began recruiting from the indigenous population in the 1970’s; it also identified more closely with the Mayan cause than the government (Costello 1997:13; Jonas 1991:136-139). Moreover, massive internal and external refugee movements, rural massacres and the government-led deforestation of highland areas exacerbated the already highly inequitable distribution of land and tenuous economic status of the Mayan majority (Ibid.).

In the 1980’s, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias launched the Contadora process—a regional forum for the various peace processes in Central America (Krøvel 2001: 23). The Contadora process led to the Esquipulas agreement of 1987, which stipulated that each warring Central American government should initiate peace talks with the respective rebel group, and that no government should interfere

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16 Henrik Hovland, an investigator for the Guatemalan truth commission, observes that the guerrilla groups may have committed a larger share of the atrocities, but that the investigators were hampered by “political bias, lack of investigative skills” and the investigators’ failure to visit many remote areas (2000:122).

17 “Ladino” refers to Latin Americans of mixed Spanish and indigenous ancestry.
in the civil wars of its neighboring countries (Jonas 1991:202). By the end of the decade, the Guatemalan government faced significant economic pressure to reach a settlement with the URNG in order to attract much-needed foreign investment (Costello 1997:15; Salvesen 21 November 2007). Thus, both sides were faced with a military stalemate and economic ruin (Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003:252).

Norwegian involvement in conflict resolution efforts in Guatemala began through Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) following the 1976 earthquake (Skauen 20 March 2007). NCA’s coordinator in Guatemala, Petter Skauen, describes how upon arriving, the Mayan people told him the real humanitarian catastrophe was not the earthquake, but rather, the war between the government and the guerrilla groups (Skauen 20 March 2007). As a permanent representative for NCA in Guatemala, Skauen developed a network of relationships at all levels of Guatemalan society and on all sides of the conflict. The government initially suspected NCA of maintaining alliances with the guerrilla groups, given NCA’s development aid projects in regions known as guerrilla strongholds (Ibid). However, NCA also assisted in development projects directed by the army, building contacts within the government (Ibid). In 1986, Skauen accompanied members of the URNG on a visit to Norway to meet with Latin America solidarity groups and to allow URNG members to present their case to the Foreign Ministry (Ibid). Skauen also invited one of Guatemala’s military leaders (and the director of the army’s aid program) to Norway for a few low-key meetings with politicians. Both trips were kept secret, but the military visitor was killed shortly after his return to Guatemala (Ibid).

Throughout the 1980’s, the URNG expanded its operations abroad, seeking support for the guerrilla cause from European governments and NGOs (Stålsett 20 May 2007). The Guatemalan government (via representatives of the Committee for National Reconciliation, or CRN) planned to meet with the URNG for negotiations in 1987 in Madrid, Spain (AP 1987). However, the Guatemalan army remained opposed to any type of peace talks with the guerrilla movement and the meeting was aborted (Skauen 20 March 2007). In 1988, Jorge Rosal, the URNG’s representative
in Switzerland, met with Paul Wee at the International Labor Organization headquarters in Geneva. Wee was then serving as the Assistant Secretary-General for International Affairs for the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)—also located in Geneva (Wee 6 February 2008). Wee introduced Rosal to LWF Secretary-General Gunnar Stålsett, and the three discussed the possibility of sending a joint LWF-Vatican delegation to Guatemala to support the Esquipulas process (Wee 6 February 2008).

In October 1989, Wee represented LWF on a joint delegation trip to Latin America. On October 13th, Wee and a Lutheran pastor working for LWF in El Salvador, Phillip Anderson, met with Guatemalan Defense Minister Hector Gramajo (Wee 6 February 2008). Wee’s description of the meeting follows:

At first, the Minister of Defense just laughed and said the guerrillas were on the run anyway. The USSR was waning and with it, the support for such movements. The Minister said he didn’t take a ragtag bunch of guerrillas seriously. “We are the people with power,” he said. He talked in a macho way about their power. Then we told him, “How many of his commanders had been killed? Listen, you’re losing a lot of good men in the field. Plus, your country is so unstable; you can’t produce agriculture and export it without great cost. Plus, the European Community is willing to consider limits on imports of Guatemalan products. Economically, the country would suffer.” We also included (appealed to) his legacy as a person who had brought 30 years of civil war to an end. He listened and said he would meet with members of the military high command. We waited in his office. He returned from the meeting and said he would be willing to meet outside the country with the URNG (6 February 2008).

Following the delegation’s return from Latin America, LWF first contacted Sweden about hosting the meeting. However, the Swedish embassy in Guatemala was attacked soon after and one of the guards was killed. Although the Swedish ambassador doubted the attack had any connection to LWF’s request, Sweden declined nonetheless (Ibid). Consequently, in deciding where to host the meeting Stålsett considered both Norway and Germany:

…Germany, because it was a very strong base group [of NGOs] in Germany that was involved… in the developments in Guatemala before it became the peace process. … But in Norway, I had the access directly to the Foreign Ministry. …The then-Foreign Minister…Bondevik, had… visited Guatemala
Bondevik accepted the request without hesitation and insisted that the Foreign Ministry would gladly cover the costs of hosting the meeting (Ibid). In order to identify potential negotiators from the government side, Stålseth contacted Petter Skauen (Sørbo et al. 1998:11-12). The government sent a delegation under the Committee for National Reconciliation (CRN) banner and the URNG sent four members of their diplomatic/political commission. In this way, both sides could deny the leadership had ever been involved in negotiations (Wee 6 February 2008).

4.2.2 Rising/High

The first formal negotiations between the Guatemalan government (via the CRN) and the URNG took place in Oslo, Norway in March 1990 (Stålseth 20 May 2007; Wee 6 February 2008). Stålseth and Skauen met the parties at the airport. Jorge Serrano, who later became president, attended on behalf of the CRN. Four or five of the negotiators had attended secondary school together in Guatemala City and now found each other on opposing sides (Skauen 20 March 2007; Stålseth 20 May 2007). The proposed mediator, Catholic Archbishop Quezada Toruño, fell ill in the days prior to the meeting and remained hospitalized in Miami (Ibid).

Norwegian Church Aid decided not to participate in the meeting, fearing reprisals against local staff in Guatemala (Salvesen 21 November 2007; Stålseth 20 May 2007). As a result, the Committee for International and Ecumenical Relations of the State Church of Norway, led by Secretary-General Trond Bakkevig, officially hosted the meeting (Salvesen 21 November 2007). In addition, Skauen became formally associated with LWF, while the Foreign Ministry paid his salary through NCA (Skauen 20 March 2007; Stålseth 20 May 2007). The Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) already paid approximately 80 percent of NCA’s budget for development and humanitarian relief.
work (as is typical for Norwegian aid organizations) but NCA remained officially outside of the peace process (Skauen 20 March 2007).

For the first evening, the Norwegian hosts greeted the Guatemalan negotiators with a welcome party at the Heftye Villa at Holmenkollen (Ibid). The parties stayed up until four o’clock in the morning drinking whiskey and talking (Ibid). At about nine o’clock the next morning, the first meeting opened with a formal greeting from State Secretary Vollebæk; Foreign Minister Bondevik also attended. Beyond this, the Foreign Ministry remained in the background (Bondevik 2006:271; Skauen 20 March 2007). Stålsett describes the format of the negotiations as follows:

[After the brief greeting] we said, “Now it’s up to you. You chair the meeting yourself. It’s your meeting. We have provided the support for you to come here and you know what the agenda is about. We will be here in this house, but not in the room,” (Stålsett 20 May 2007).

According to Hilde Salvesen, “one important thing about this meeting in March 1990 was that the guerrillas were somehow put on the same level as a negotiating partner,” (Salvesen 21 November 2007). The Norwegian facilitators made a concentrated effort to ensure the quality of the accommodations, the food, the amount of informal conversation—everything—was equal. This did not, however, prevent the parties from arguing “who had the nicer hotel—or even the biggest mini-bar,” (Wee 6 February 2008).

By the end of the week, the Guatemalan representatives and their hosts sat down to dinner “lamenting the fact that there was no agreement,” (Wee 6 February 2008). At this point, “an interesting dynamic” developed (Ibid). URNG negotiator Jorge Rosal rose from the table and addressed his counterparts from the CRN:

Listen, it’s been wonderful to be with you this week. I just want you to know that I have made a number of mistakes these past few years. I am really sorry

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18 Hilde Salvesen, a member of the World Student Christian Federation, assisted in the logistics of the meetings and attended lunch and dinner with the respective Guatemalan delegations, along with her fellow students (Salvesen 21 November 2007).
about that, because there are 200,000 people dead. I just wanted you to know that is partly my fault (Rosal, quoted in Wee 6 February 2008).

Wee remembers that he “was just shaking” after hearing Rosal’s speech:

Then, someone from the other side got up and said the same thing. Then everyone in a circle got up and did the same thing. Everyone was crying and embracing each other. Somebody said, “Let’s go back across the street and see if we can’t pound out this agreement,” (Ibid).

The negotiators returned directly to their hotel and “four hours later, they came up with a page and a half” agreement (Ibid). Bondevik hosted the signing ceremony the following morning, March 30th, for what became known as the Oslo Accord for Guatemala. The agreement laid the framework for the Guatemalan peace process and was unique in recognizing both the “substantial” underlying issues of social inequality and human rights, as well as the “operational” issues surrounding the military conflict (Sørbø et al. 1998, 12). In large part, the agreement to negotiate on “substantial” issues first reflected the URNG’s strategic position. Stålsett observes that the URNG was “far more advanced strategically,” (20 May 2007; Salvesen 21 November 2007). The guerrilla organization understood that the government would be able to safely ignore the URNG’s grievances once the military demobilization process occurred.

Following the Oslo meeting, Stålsett told the parties that the LWF “had done the role befitting an NGO” and would now “pull back” from the process (Wee 6 February 2008). Wee reports that the parties reacted strongly to this suggestion: “Both sides asked the LWF to hang in there,” (Ibid). Accordingly, LWF established a consortium of faith-based NGOs, including the National Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches and the Latin American Council of Churches (together known as “the Four Councils”) (Ibid). Throughout, Stålsett and Skauen (who now represented LWF) kept in close contact with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, reporting on political updates through the Norwegian Ambassador to Mexico, Rolf Berg (Krøvel 2001:25-28). Skauen also built on his personal connections with the leaders on both sides of the conflict, taking each on excursions outside Guatemala,
including to his cottage in Norway (Skauen 20 March 2007). The Norwegian Foreign Ministry enthusiastically supported the NGO initiative and made it clear to the parties that the Norwegian state would be more than willing to host additional meetings and eventually, a signing ceremony (Krøvel 2001:26). Krøvel interprets Norway’s eagerness as a strategic move to preempt other would-be mediators (Ibid).

Egeland maintains that the success of peace negotiations depends significantly on whether the parties are both “willing and able” to commit to peace (Egeland 22 October 2007). In the case of the URNG, Egeland argues that they were willing, but not able (Ibid.). Accordingly, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry assisted the URNG financially—paying for flights to the various meetings, lodging and meals, etc. The Foreign Ministry even paid for international legal assistance for the URNG (Egeland 22 October 2007). These measures were primarily funneled through LWF and the Norwegian Embassy in Mexico (Salvesen 15 May 2008). After 1993, the Foreign Ministry began to clearly allocate funds to the URNG (rather than the more ambiguous funding requests used earlier), amounting to approximately five million NOK (Krøvel 2001:29). Krøvel argues that these funds gave the Norwegian Foreign Ministry leverage over the URNG, which it used in the negotiations on the truth commission (Ibid).

The UN became involved as an observer to the process in 1991, but its role remained limited. However, the Group of Friends was established in 1992, including Spain, Colombia, Portugal, the United States, Venezuela, Mexico and Norway. Norway’s inclusion confirmed the significance of its role in the peace process. In the same year, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Rigoberta Menchu, a prominent Guatemalan leader dedicated to indigenous rights for the Mayan people. Although the Norwegian facilitators had no formal role in the selection process, the award was interpreted as a sign of Norway’s commitment to peace in Guatemala. Regardless, the Norwegian NGOs, and not the Foreign Ministry, set the tone for Norwegian engagement during this period.
In May 1993, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano committed a “self-coup” by suspending the parliament and declaring a state of emergency. The army subsequently withdrew its support from Serrano and the latter resigned in early June. At this point, the role of the UN was upgraded from observer to mediator status, replacing Archbishop Toruño, who had served as a mediator following his recovery from illness (Stålsett 20 May 2007). Stålsett had supported stronger UN involvement for some time, believing Toruño had been “over-asked” and “did not have all the competence or the energy to cover” the complexity of the negotiations (Ibid). Moreover, involving the UN would send a strong signal about the seriousness of the peace talks. Toruño objected to diminishing his role and the Guatemalan government only reluctantly agreed to UN involvement (Ibid).

The first two UN mediators were rejected by one or both of the parties, but from 1994, Jean Arnault filled the role and gained the confidence of both sides (Stålsett 20 May 2007). Additionally, the UN deployed a human rights observer mission, MINUGUA, to Guatemala (Salvesen 2002:27). A parallel peace process also began in 1994, involving representatives of Guatemalan civil society. Four Assembly of Civil Society (ASC) meetings were held in Mexico, Guatemala, Canada and the United States. On behalf of the “Four Councils,” Stålsett chaired the US meeting and led an ecumenical service for the participants in the Church of the Reformation in downtown Washington, D.C. (Wee 6 February 2008). The US State Department hosted a luncheon for the main delegates, signaling a decisive change in policy given the State Department’s previous listing of the URNG as a foreign terrorist organization (Stålsett 20 May 2007). The Norwegian Foreign Ministry remained primarily involved in the official negotiations and was not represented at the ASC meetings above the ambassador level (Stålsett 20 May 2007).

In April 1994, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry developed a set of guidelines for additional development aid to support democratization and the rights of marginalized groups in Guatemala (Ekern 2000:14). Known as the “peace package,” the new aid initiative took inspiration from the aid package developed in support of the Middle
East peace process (Ibid. 14). The Foreign Ministry channelled funding through
Norwegian NGOs operating in Guatemala, such as Norwegian Church Aid,
Norwegian Peoples Aid, Norway’s Save the Children and the Norwegian Refugee
Council (Ibid. 14). Partially in order to improve coordination between the Foreign
Ministry and the various aid agencies operating in Guatemala, Norway established a
provisional embassy in Guatemala City in 1995. To a certain extent, the
simultaneous development and diplomatic initiatives proved complementary. Ekern
writes:

…General knowledge about Norway’s participation in the group of friendly
countries that shepherded the peace process certainly contributed to generate
positive feelings towards the Norwegian NGOs in many Guatemalan contexts

Ekern notes, however, that despite Norwegian Church Aid’s involvement in the
diplomatic effort (through Petter Skauen), the NGOs involved in development
assistance were rarely informed about the ongoing political negotiations (Ekern

By 1995, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry began to grow impatient with the
slow pace of negotiations. In an interview with the Norwegian daily Aftenposten,
State Secretary Jan Egeland emphasized the significant Norwegian financial
collection to Guatemala, cautioning that “we will not be able to continue to give
Guatemala so much attention if the peace process continues indefinitely,” (Christian
1995:7).19 Egeland says his words were not meant as a threat to cut off finding, but
rather, “that Norway couldn’t spend so much time, energy and money,” on an
unending peace process (Egeland 22 October 2007). However, independent
commentators argue that Norway used development aid as both a carrot and a stick
(Liland and Alsaker Kjerland 2003:254).

19 “[Risen bak speilet er at] vi ikke vil kunne fortsette å gi Guatemala så mye oppmerksomhet dersom fredsprosessen skal
On December 29th, 1996, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry hosted the signing ceremony for the ceasefire in the Oslo City Hall. According to Egeland, only about five Norwegian actors had been involved in the mediation: himself, Skauen, Stålsett, and Norwegian Ambassador to Guatemala Arne Åsheim (in addition to the assistants of each) (Egeland 22 October 2007).

4.2.3 Declining

Following the signing of the ceasefire, MINUGUA’s mission expanded to include implementation tasks, led by former UN mediator Jean Arnault (Salvesen 2002:27). While MINUGUA’s mandate included verification of the terms of the implementation process, MINUGUA had no independent power to enforce violations of the accords (Ibid. 28). Although military hostilities ended with the signing of the 1996 agreement, an upsurge in violent crime throughout Guatemala has come to pose the most significant challenge to peace and security. Moreover, given the civil police authorities’ inability to contain a rising crime rate, the Guatemalan military remains in control of domestic security, contrary to the terms of the demobilization accords (Salvesen 2001:56, 60; Salvesen 2002:9-11). In May 1999, a referendum designed to incorporate the peace agreements into the Guatemalan constitution was defeated (Salvesen 2002:23). The military interpreted this result as a mandate in favour of their political legitimacy and their continued efforts to block the peace process (Ibid.).

On a visit to Guatemala in 2000, Stålsett observed that while the conflict itself had ended, the underlying social conditions that gave rise to civil war remained—namely, a highly unequal distribution of wealth and land, weak civil society institutions and the lack of an independent and impartial judiciary (Hjorthol 2000). Salvesen confirms this assessment: “Less than 1% of the farmers own 75% of the land (and all the best land), while 96% of the producers are concentrated on 20% of the land,” (2002:15). Although the Guatemalan peace accords were unique in addressing the “root causes” of conflict, their implementation continues to lag (Ibid. 19).
Salvesen believes part of the problem lies in the content of the accords, which established an overly-ambitious timetable for implementation (Ibid. 31). Failure to meet the timetable, in turn, generated pessimism about the entire peace process (Ibid.). Salvesen also points out that the agreement on demobilization failed to include trust-building measures, leaving the URNG without any leverage once demobilization had been completed (Ibid. 20). A second problem concerns the lack of ownership in the accords, which accordingly became a source of “horse-trading” in the parliament (Salvesen 14 May 2008). Moreover, the civil society organizations so vocal during the peace process proved less competent in peace-building than originally assumed. In part, their weakness owes to a lack of management, as civil society leaders flocked to politics (Ibid. 24). However, many of the civil society organizations had never been as representative or as influential as they appeared. Even during the process, Former Norwegian State Secretary Jan Egeland held a certain degree of scepticism towards these “shell” NGOs:

I wondered: who did some of these NGOs represent? You have a Guatemalan women’s organization with six women and a charter, but no membership structure, [and they are telling the URNG]… ‘If you don’t vote as we demand, you are against the women of Guatemala,’ (Egeland 22 October 2007).

The challenge of wider reconciliation also involves persuading former combatants to take ownership of the process. Egeland emphasizes that the signatories of peace agreements are often “not popular… outside of Oslo” and that their decision to reach an agreement with the enemy “is not easily portrayed,” (22 October 2007). The signatories must not only explain to their followers why peace is desirable, but also, “what did we fight for?” (Ibid.). This challenge proved formidable for both parties.

On the development side, a Consultative Group (CG) of donor countries and financial institutions was established to coordinate international aid flows to Guatemala (Ibid. 29). The Norwegian Foreign Ministry also disbursed over NOK 70 million in aid to specific one-year projects for peace between 1995 and 1998 through the “peace package,” in addition to existing development and humanitarian aid
Grants were given to both UN agencies and to Norwegian NGOs. The Norwegian NGOs’ local partner NGOs actually carried out the projects and none of these programs from either the UN or the NGOs were reviewed by the Foreign Ministry (Ibid. 21). The newly-established Norwegian embassy simply did not have the administrative capacity to complete the reviews (Ekern 2000:22). Accordingly, peace package funds went mainly to the support of existing NGO activities (Ibid. 23). The Foreign Ministry commissioned the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights to complete a formal review of the peace package in 1997 (Ekern et al. 1998:7). The researchers found wide variation in the quality of individual peace projects, but as a general weakness, few incorporated the government in peace-building initiatives; rather, these “tended to take the form of campaigns against the Guatemalan government,” (Ekern 2000:24; Ekern et al. 1998:67).

4.2.4 Preliminary Assessment

Table 4.2.4 adapts the mediation cycle framework to the Guatemalan case. Regarding the “low intensity” phase, Norwegian Church Aid had been active in Guatemala since the 1976 earthquake and regional director Petter Skauen built a network of contacts on not only both sides of the conflict, but also those outside of it. Moreover, no great power demonstrated interest in mediating the conflict. In fact, the role of the United States in the Guatemalan civil war is perhaps most generously characterized as profoundly counterproductive. Lastly, while the parties to the conflict did not choose Norway per se, but rather, the Lutheran World Federation to host the mediation, Norway’s lack of a colonial past and of a material interest in the conflict undoubtedly made Oslo an uncontroversial site for negotiations. More importantly, Norway’s record as a provider of foreign aid both generated goodwill among the parties and provided the Norwegian actors with a network of Guatemalan contacts to draw from. One slight deviation from the original framework in Table

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20 The Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala was upgraded to permanent status in 1997.
2.2.2 on page 19 is that LWF is not a Norwegian organization, but rather, an international organization that happened to be led by a Norwegian with close connections to the government. Given the variety of potential sites for negotiations, it is unlikely that Norway would have hosted the meetings without Stålsett’s leadership of the LWF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2.4 Mediation Cycle Framework for the Guatemala Case</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Intensity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA establishes presence in the local region through long-standing development projects, relationships with actors on all sides of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties to conflict accept offer of mediation from LWF and allow talks to be held in Oslo due to Norway's lack of a colonial past and of a material interest in conflict, as well as history of Norwegian foreign aid to region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No great powers currently show interest in mediating conflict themselves.</td>
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</table>

Regarding the “rising/high” intensity phase of mediation, the Guatemalan case again dovetails fairly neatly with the proposed characteristics. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry financially supported the Track II negotiations held in Oslo, to which both sides sent officials whose efforts could be denied as unrepresentative of the respective Guatemalan government and URNG leadership. The Foreign Ministry offered the delegates a secure venue for negotiations and the State Church of Norway served as the sponsor, owing to NCA’s reluctance to link itself officially to the peace process. The outcome of this meeting, the March 30th Oslo Agreement, marked the opening of an official negotiation process. However, the increased involvement of international organizations appears to stem not only from the momentum arising within the mediation process, but also as a reaction to Serrano’s “self-coup.” The establishment of the Group of Friends in 1992 appears connected to the progress
made in negotiations. However, UN involvement remained minimal prior to Serrano’s exit. Rather, UN mediation was seen as both a means of indicating the seriousness of the channel and placing international pressure on the actors to prevent the type of political chaos Serrano’s “self-coup” generated.

According to Table 2.2.2, the “declining” intensity phase includes Norwegian efforts to support a grassroots peace process, through which NGOs take the lead. In the Guatemala case, however, the Norwegian NGOs and their international partners supported grassroots ASC meetings before an agreement was signed. Following the 1996 ceasefire, Norwegian NGOs (including NCA, Save the Children Norway, Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Refugee Council) channelled the majority of Norwegian “peace package” assistance through local partner organizations. Nevertheless, many of the ASC-represented NGOs proved far less effective in assisting with peace-building initiatives during the implementation phase. The UN assisted in the implementation phase through the MINUGUA observer mission, led by mediator Jean Arnault, and the Consultative Group of donor countries directed the administration of international development aid to Guatemala. Consistent with the Table 2.3.2 framework, Norway’s role in the implementation phase has taken a relatively low profile internationally, as demonstrated by the limited mention of Norway’s efforts in academic literature on the Guatemalan peace process produced by non-Norwegian researchers.

4.3 The Sudan Peace Process

4.3.1 Low

The background characteristics of the nearly fifty-year-long civil war between the Northern and Southern region of Sudan include tensions among rival ethnic groups, a troubled colonial past and weak political control outside of the capitol, Khartoum. The boundaries of present-day Sudan reflect the administrative imperatives of the British colonial authority, rather than any indigenous political
identification. Sudan became an independent state only in 1956, when the British ceded political control to the Afro-Arabic Northern leaders in Khartoum (El-Battahani 2006:12; Deng 1995:11). While significant ethnic, religious and economic diversity within both the North and the South cautions against oversimplification, a main fault line emerged between the predominantly Islamic and Afro-Arabic North and the predominantly Christian and black African South.

From 1955 until 1972, conflict raged in what is perhaps most accurately described as an amalgam of “interlocking civil wars,” (El-Battahani 2006:10). The two main points of contention between the North and the South, however, concerned whether Sudan should adopt a unified or federal structure and whether the country should employ an Islamic or a secular legal system (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:80). While Khartoum advocated a unitary government and the state-wide application of sharia law, rebel groups such as the Anyanya sought greater autonomy for the Southern regions and a secular basis for political authority (Deng 1995:140-141; Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:80).

In 1972, Northern President Ja’far Numeiri and South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) leader Joseph Lagu signed the Addis Ababa Agreement. In addition to the ceasefire, the Addis Ababa Agreement established a “short-lived administrative structure for the autonomous south,” with a capitol in Juba (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:75). The Addis Ababa Agreement also paved the way for the first Norwegian NGO to begin work in Sudan. At the invitation of the Sudan Council of Churches, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) began a program for assisting with the repatriation of refugees (COWI 1997:14). NCA’s activities expanded to include development work in the Southern region, in cooperation with the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA), a relief organization closely connected to the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (COWI 1997:27, 17). Faced with the difficulty of administering aid within Sudan’s divided political environment, NCA chose to establish separate offices for directing the respective operations in the
North and in the South: the former, in Khartoum; and the latter, in Nairobi (COWI 1997:35).

In 1978, oil was discovered in Southern Sudan (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:88). Unsurprisingly, in 1983, Numeiri claimed oil revenues for Khartoum and split the south into three separate administrative regions in an effort to weaken Southern political unity (El-Battahani 2006:13; Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:88). Numeiri also “moved relentlessly toward imposing Islamic law,” gaining the support of the politically influential Muslim Brotherhood (Deng 1995:12). In response to these developments, John Garang established the SPLM/A from his base in Ethiopia and began waging war against the North (El-Battahani 2006:13). Garang advocated a vision of a “New Sudan,” in which a federal system would protect southern autonomy and in which political authority would derive from a secular, rather than an Islamic, legal basis. By the end of 1983, the Addis Ababa Agreement had fallen apart, with a sustained military effort from the SPLM/A against the North and Khartoum’s arming of paramilitary groups to wage war against SPLM/A strongholds in the south.

In 1985, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) began operations in Sudan, in partnership with the SRRA (COWI 1997:17-19). In contrast to NCA’s attempt to avoid partiality, NPA explicitly supported the SPLM/A cause (Ibid.). NPA’s close relationship to the SPLM/A proved useful, however, following the UN negotiated Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989. OLS consisted of an agreement between the government in the North (now controlled by Omer al-Bashir) and the SPLM/A to allow humanitarian agencies to administer relief to civilians “trapped in war-zones” (Rolandsen 2005:30). The OLS agreement did not, however, grant foreign NGOs access to areas controlled by the SPLM/A, owing to Khartoum’s opposition (Ibid. 31). As a result, by 1992, NPA provided food and medical assistance to civilians within regions in which no other foreign NGO operated (COWI 1997:19, 27). NPA’s strategy attracted no small measure of controversy, however. Both NCA and NPA received a relatively equal amount of funding from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry,
roughly 50 million NOK per year (Sørbo et al. 1998:27), but it was no secret that NPA’s food aid often went directly to the SPLM/A’s front lines (COWI 1997:20). As stated in an evaluation report for the Foreign Ministry, NPA efforts involved:

…Supplying food and medical services very close to the front-line …allowing families to remain in inhospitable areas to support soldiers on the front …allowing the sale of relief supplies to generate resources for military procurement and… allowing the education of young men whom the SPLA hoped to recruit as its future cadres (1997:47).

The net result of the Foreign Ministry’s funding of both NPA and NCA was confusion over whether the Norwegian government intended to simply support development aid to Sudanese civilians or take a political stand in a civil war (COWI 1997:53-54). NPA’s role in the conflict deepened in 1992, following the loss of one of the SPLM/A’s strongest supporters, the Ethiopian Mengistu regime. The SPLM/A split into two factions along ethnic lines; Riek Machar led the splinter group SPLM/United against John Garang’s mainstream SPLM/A (COWI 1997:18; Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:93-94). A member of the NPA staff videotaped a SPLM/United-led massacre of a rival ethnic village and the video was broadcast widely in the Western media, decisively strengthening international support for the mainstream SPLM/A, and consequently, NPA’s own relationship to Garang (COWI 1997:18).

In 1993, both Garang and Machar met separately with Norwegian State Secretary Jan Egeland, then occupied by the Oslo back channel for the Middle East (COWI 1997:23). Concurrently, Bashir requested assistance in mediating the civil war with the South from the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:103). A committee of IGAD members comprised the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia and chaired

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21 The largest donor to NPA’s Sudan operations during the 1990’s was the US government, through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (COWI 1997:32).

22 The 1997 evaluation report names the Norwegian “Foreign Minister” as the main figure in the channel, meaning Johan Jørgen Holst (COWI 1997:23). This is incorrect; Egeland initiated the channel (Vraalsen 25 April 2008).

23 IGADD was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996.
by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi agreed to mediate the conflict (Ibid.). The following January, before IGAD negotiations began, Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials on a visit to Khartoum broached the subject of secret negotiations between the North and South (Ibid). IGAD peace talks began in March 1994 (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006:105), while Norway simultaneously attempted to persuade Garang to enter secret negotiations (COWI 1997:23). Garang had “reservations about the ‘timing’ of the Norwegian initiative,” but ultimately agreed to negotiate (Ibid.).

The Oslo back channel for the Sudan culminated in four meetings between the Government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A between March and June 1994, involving approximately three to four members of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, including Vraalsen, Egeland, and Kjell Harald Dahlen (COWI 1997:23; Odin and Henden 1994; Vraalsen 25 April 2008). The Resident Representative of NCA, Halvor Aschjem also assisted the talks by “managing transport arrangements,” “conveying messages between [the] MFA and SPLA,” and “providing Dr. Garang with a mobile satellite phone,” (COWI 1997:24; Berg 1994). In addition, the Christian Michelsen Institute provided a cover for the talks. CMI researcher Gunnar Sørbo insisted the meetings at Holmenkollen Park Hotel were held as part of an “academic conference,” (Bjellaanes 1994). Negotiations ended in June, when an article in a Norwegian Christian newspaper, Vårt Land, received a tip from SPLM/A officials and published an exposé of the secret channel (Hødnebø 28 March 2008; NTB 1994). But, according to Tom Vraalsen, a participant in the talks on behalf of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, the dissolution of the secret channel resulted from both parties’ unwillingness to come to an agreement (Vraalsen 25 April 2008). Both the Eritrean and the US governments criticized the Norwegian back channel, which “at best confused the parallel peace effort by IGADD, at worst undermined or derailed it,” (COWI 1997:24).

24 The 1997 evaluation report states that the “Resident Representative of NPA” assisted in the talks (COWI 1997). Aftenposten reported, however, that NCA Regional Representative Halvor Aschjem was involved (Berg 1994; Beck et al. 1994). This seems more likely, particularly given Aschjem’s later role in the IGAD talks for the Foreign Ministry.
With the failure of the Oslo talks, Norway became officially involved in the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)\textsuperscript{25} of Western countries, established in the summer of 1994 to support the official mediation (Ibid. 105). Four years later, a "combination of drought, famine and heavy fighting in southern Sudan" attracted international attention to the civil war, not least, within Norway (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). The new Minister of International Development, Hilde Fraøjfjord Johnson, interpreted the crisis in Sudan as a sign that humanitarian aid would achieve only meagre results without a political solution to the civil war (Ibid.). Fraøjfjord Johnson’s interest in East Africa was personal as well. The daughter of Norwegian missionaries, Fraøjfjord Johnson was born in Tanzania, spoke fluent Swahili and wrote her graduate thesis in social anthropology on the country of her birth (Stokke 30 August 2003). When the chairmanship of the IPF Forum became vacant, Fraøjfjord Johnsen volunteered to take the seat and began assembling a team of Norwegian experts to assist in a more assertive approach to the Sudan peace process (Fraøjfjord Johnson 15 March 2005; Hødnebø 28 March 2008). The University of Bergen had for nearly three decades engaged in academic cooperation with the University of Khartoum, and Bergen’s Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) boasted a strong research profile on Sudan. Hence, Fraojfjord Johnson invited CMI’s Kjell Hødnebø, a historian educated at the University of Bergen, to join the Foreign Ministry’s Sudan team (Ibid.).

While CMI took the appointment in stride, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) proved less willing to part with its foremost Sudan expert, Halvor Aschjem. According to NCA Secretary General Atle Sommerfeldt, Fraojfjord Johnson “poached” Aschjem from NCA (Sommerfeldt 30 March 2007). Up until this point, NCA had regularly engaged with the Foreign Ministry in a dialogue on the situation in the Sudan (Ibid.). Sommerfeldt explains that in response to Fraojfjord Johnson’s request, “of course I had to say ‘yes,’ but the problem was that we [NCA] then lost our investment, so to say;” (Ibid.). With the new appointment, Aschjem “became a

\textsuperscript{25} Initially, the IPF was called the “Friends of IGAD.”
diplomat overnight” and was no longer affiliated with NCA (Ibid.). Thus, although NCA could boast that its former Regional Representative to the Sudan gained a seat at the official IGAD talks, Aschjem had no regular contact with his former employer (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). This became a source of bitterness for NCA during the talks.

Also in 1998, the Secretary General of the UN appointed Tom Vraalsen to the post of UN Special Envoy for the Humanitarian Affairs of the Sudan, a position he held until 2005 (Norwegian MFA 11 June 1998; Vraalsen 25 April 2008). Vraalsen at that time served as Norway’s Ambassador to the United States, but as stated earlier, he had also participated in the Oslo back channel for the Sudan. As UN Special Envoy, Vraalsen’s was charged with ensuring the implementation of Operation Lifeline Sudan. In addition, in March 1999, Norway hosted a meeting of the IGAD Partners Forum in Oslo (Norwegian MFA 8 March 1999). Thus, Norway’s role in the IGAD process was entrenched before the negotiations reached a critical point.

4.3.2 Rising/High

In contrast to the previous cases, the Norwegian NGOs played no official role in the IGAD process. Khartoum and the SPLM/A sought to keep the process closed not only to civil society, but also to the rebel leaders of a growing insurgency movement in Darfur (Stiansen 11 April 2008). Instead, several church-based NGOs, including NCA, established a parallel “people-to-people” peace-building track through the Sudan Ecumenical Council (Villumstad 15 June 2004). Communication with the Foreign Ministry was limited to informal conversations between NGO representatives and the Norwegian observer team (Vraalsen 25 April 2008), as well as the NGOs’ protests at the exclusivity of the process (Villumstad 15 June 2004).

Although the Norwegian government upgraded its diplomatic efforts in 1998, the IGAD peace process did not gain momentum prior to the inauguration of US President George W. Bush (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). Before that time, the US
government remained reluctant to engage in the Sudan peace process, preferring a military victory by the SPLM/A to a negotiated peace that would grant any political authority to an Islamist government known to have granted safe haven to Osama bin Laden (Sørbø et al. 1998:32). Sudan was placed on the State Department’s list of state supporters of terrorism as early as 1993, and al-Bashir’s support of Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 also earned Khartoum few friends in Washington (Woodward 2006:53).

By 2001, a motley coalition of Evangelical Christian congressmen and representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus, in addition to human rights NGO leaders, generated increased pressure on newly-elected US president George W. Bush to support the peace process as a means of aiding the southern Sudanese (Ibid.113-117). Bush named John Danforth Special Envoy to the Sudan on September 6th. Five days later, the events of September 11th only heightened the urgency for achieving a negotiated solution (Ibid. 120). As Woodward observes, for its part: “Sudan was motivated largely by the fear that the US might decide to strike out quickly against states such as those on the terrorism list” (Ibid.). According to an observer to the IGAD process:

…Certainly something that the Government of Sudan wanted to come out of this process was the normalization of relations with the US… and everything that entails. …Particularly in Machakos… 9/11 was not very distant (Stiansen 11 April 2008).

Norway participated in the talks leading to the 2002 Machakos agreement as an observer to the IGAD process. Since 2001, Norway also worked as a member of the “troika” of key observer countries, along with the US and the UK (Hødnebø 28 March 2008; Sumbeiywo 2006:22). In 2001, Kenyan Lazaro Sumbeiywo was appointed mediator of the IGAD forum by host country president, Daniel arap Moi. Sumbeiywo also mediated talks between the North and the South over additional contested territories held “outside of the auspices of IGAD,” to which Norway also held observer status (Sumbeiywo 2006:24). In 2002, the Foreign Ministry invited Endre Stiansen, a former colleague of Hødnebø’s at the University of Bergen and a
leading Norwegian historian on the Sudan, to join the observer team (Stiansen 11 April 2008).  

Crucially, Hilde Frafjord Johnson established a personal connection to both SPLM/A leader John Garang and the Vice President in Khartoum, Ali Osman Taha; she would support the process by “talking to them either on the phone or privately,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008). Her role began prior to the Machakos negotiations, and Kenya’s chief negotiator, Lazoro Sumbeiywo, was aware of Frafjord Johnson’s contact with the parties throughout (Stiansen 11 April 2008). As Stiansen explains, there was never a concern that Frafjord Johnson was establishing “a separate Norwegian track to try to… upstage Sumbeiywo,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008). By 2001, Norway pursued a clear strategy to “ensure the IGAD track was the only track,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008), in contrast to the approach taken in 1994, and in opposition to a joint Egyptian-Libyan initiative to host a separate mediation channel. In addition, Norway was one of the major donors to the IGAD process, assisted by flexible budget roles that allow the Foreign Ministry to quickly approve financing with a minimum of bureaucratic hurdles (Stiansen 11 April 2008; Vraalsen 25 April 2008).

The IGAD observers “had joint meetings with the mediation [Sumbeiywo] every night,” and “also worked together with the parties,” (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). Within the troika, the US, UK and Norway discussed the various proposals and “tried to hammer out common positions,” (Ibid.). According to Hødnebø, the parties were “more or less aware” of disagreements among the troika members and “there was an intense effort on their part to get us on their side on the different issues,” (Ibid.).

26 Stiansen was a researcher in Sudanese economic history at the Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) prior to the appointment, but had briefed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Sudan previously (Stiansen 11 April 2008).

27 Halvor Aschjem knew both government and SPLM representatives from his work with NCA (Kelleher 2006:299) and as stated earlier, through his participation in the secret back channel in 1994. Hence, he may have assisted Hilde Frafjord Johnson in establishing such a close connection with the parties.
Hødnebø confirms that the parties were “absolutely” negotiating both with each other and with the observers (Ibid.).

The Machakos Protocol marked a revolutionary change in the ongoing Sudanese peace process (Haysom 2006:28; Stiansen 11 April 2008). Signed in July 2002, the Protocol for the first time opened the door to Southern secession, after an interim period of six years. In addition, the parties agreed that sharia law would apply to Muslims in the north, but not to non-Muslims, even those residing in the north. In 2003 and 2004, the IGAD process also produced agreements on security, power sharing and wealth sharing. Outside of the IGAD framework, in 2004 the parties agreed to resolution of the Abyei conflict (largely through US-led mediation) and to the conflict in the Blue Nile states and Southern Kordofan. Sumbeiywo explains that these agreements were initially outside the Machakos framework and the Government of Sudan refused to allow their inclusion in the IGAD process (Sumbeiywo 2006:24). The resulting negotiations involved the same observers and Sumbeiywo as the chief mediator, but under the auspices of an ad hoc Kenyan-led negotiating framework (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).

Following a stalemate in the negotiations in late 2002 and early 2003, Frafjord Johnson proved instrumental in encouraging the parties to attend talks in Naivasha (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). Garang famously proclaimed that he would come for “only one day,” but the negotiations ended up lasting one and a half years (Hødnebø 28 March 2008; Sumbeiywo 2006:25). Regarding Frafjord Johnson’s role in Naivasha, Hødnebø explains:

This was not publicly very well known: the system was that I was in the field talking to the parties and saw what the differences were on specific issues. And then I would call her [Frafjord Johnson] and she would then have the telephone numbers to John Garang and Ali Osman Taha…. Hilde would then talk to the two tops and mediate... because there were weeks when they really didn’t talk to each other…. So at certain moments we had the feeling that [there] were only three persons who really knew what was going on: it was Hilde and the two of them [Taha and Garang]. Then they would know that both of them had talked to her and they would know each other’s point [of view]…. So by the next meeting, they would have talked to her and they would have moved. So
the next meeting would be to explore the way forward and then, you know, kind of say, “Ok, you know I know that you have talked to Hilde.” And then… they would move… And then gradually this would happen over part of the time (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).

Hødnebø confirms that while the Government of Sudan pursued negotiations “to keep the SPLM in the fold,” Khartoum often perceived that “their real counterpart was Washington,” particularly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (28 March 2008). He explains:

> You can imagine while Washington attacks Iraq... people in Khartoum are dead nervous of being the next target. You negotiate in order not to be the next target (Hødnebø 28 March 2008).

However, in Stiansen’s estimation, the impact of the Iraq war was “first, to take the pressure off the negotiations,” and “second, in ruling out many of the …worst scenarios for Khartoum,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008). Regardless of their impact, the Americans began to grate on the nerves of the UN mediators and the fellow observer countries by 2004, when the domestic pressure of the presidential re-election campaign increased the Bush administration’s eagerness to achieve a foreign policy victory in Sudan (Hødnebø 28 March 2008; Sumbeiywo 2006:25). According to Sumbeiywo:

> In early 2004 they [the Americans] even brought an aircraft and said, “Let’s sign an agreement half way so that the parties can attend the State of the Union Address.” I resisted that (Sumbeiywo 2006:25).

Nevertheless, Stiansen cautions that “one should not overestimate third parties’ ability to influence these things,” (Stiansen 11 April 2008). Hødnebø echoes that “we shouldn’t underestimate the pressure from Sudanese themselves—from many groups,” including “the high command in the military” in southern Sudan (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). Regardless of the ultimate source of pressure, on January 9, 2005, the SPLM and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) following 16 months of negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya. The CPA consists of six protocol agreements: (1) the aforementioned Machakos, (2) agreements on power sharing and (3) wealth sharing, (4) the special administration of
Abyei, (5) the agreement on Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States and (6) security arrangements. The terms of the Machakos protocol have already been summarized, but the main thrust of the CPA also includes a formula for sharing future oil revenues, integrating security forces and quotas for political representation of the SPLM and the northern government, under the auspices of the National Congress Party (NCP).

4.3.3 Declining

From shortly after the signing of the CPA until 2007, Norway chaired the Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC), charged with overseeing the implementation (Vraalsen 25 April 2008). However, the AEC got off to a slow start following the death of SPLM leader John Garang in a helicopter crash in the summer of 2005 (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). Tom Vraalsen led the Norwegian AEC contingent, which was comprised entirely of personnel affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vraalsen 25 April 2005), including Endre Stiansen. The AEC members included regional organizations such as the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union, as well as the Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, the UK and Norway. Norway also sent a small contingent of 27 staff officers and UN observers to Sudan to assist the UN peacekeeping force authorized by the Security Council in March 2005 (Ellingsen 2006; Isaksen Wangberg 2005). In comparison, by 2006, the total UN Mission in Sudan consisted of approximately 10,000 military and police officers (Sudan-UNMIS-Background 2008).

Additionally, Norway hosted a donor conference for Sudan in Oslo in April 2005, resulting in pledges of over 4.5 billion US dollars from a broad spectrum of states and international organizations (Norwegian MFA 12 April 2005). Much of Norway’s diplomatic engagement on the Sudan issue since that time has been focused on ensuring these pledges are fulfilled (Hødnebø 28 March 2008). In addition, the Foreign Ministry established a “framework for peace-building” in 2005, based partly on an influential report published by the Christian Michelsen Institute.
The report recommended greater third party coordination, particularly among donors, and a more sustained approach to peace-building than simply the absence of violence (Sørbø 2004:16-18). Rather, international efforts should be based on building up functioning institutions and civic organizations equipped to deal with future conflicts in a peaceful manner (Ibid.).

Norway contributed significant financial resources to the implementation efforts, although the US was the largest donor in real terms (Vraalsen 25 April 2008). In 2007, Sudan received “the most Norwegian aid of any country, a total of NOK 700 million,” of which the lion’s share was deposited into two multi-donor trust funds, in addition to support to the UN System (Stiansen 21 January 2007). However, the multi-donor trust funds “are very complex instruments” with a comprehensive list of bureaucratic procurement rules that preclude rapid transfers to a new administration. Navigating the management rules of the multi-donor trust funds required an organizational capacity and level of experience that the SPLM lacked (Stiansen 11 April 2008). The administrative demands of implementing the CPA exposed weaknesses in the SPLM structure, including a “top-heavy administration” and a lack of “administrative experience,” (Ibid.). While many in the SPLM are “extremely capable,” after over 20 years of civil war, the SPLM was “probably a little bit naïve about what it would take… to run a modern government under very difficult circumstances,” (Ibid.).

According to Tom Vraalsen, National Congress Party (NCP) intransigence is the main obstacle to full implementation of the CPA (25 April 2008). Since Garang’s death, the NCP has sought to marginalize its lead negotiator in Naivasha, Ali Osman Taha, and maintain control over the SPLM as a “junior partner in the government (ICG 2008:1; Vraalsen 25 April 2008). Although renewed warfare seems unlikely, the NCP continues to “block… implementation of provisions necessary for the 2011 southern referendum,” (ICG 2008:1). The International Crisis Group also observes that the SPLM “has been dealing with serious internal tensions since Garang’s death in July 2005,” (Ibid. 5). Moreover, since the eruption of the
conflict in Darfur in 2003, the attention of the international community has drifted west, lifting pressure on the parties to fulfill the terms of the CPA. While the situation in Darfur derives from its own complex mixture of historical, political, cultural and environmental factors, undoubtedly, the CPA contributed to the rebels’ discontent (Stiansen 11 April 2008). By dividing political power largely along north-south lines, the CPA shut out the rebels in Darfur from national-level political authority, leaving Darfur “in the northern Sudan, at the mercy of the NCP,” (Ibid.).

Thus, although a full assessment of the CPA requires a longer time horizon, it is fair to say that implementation is lagging. According to Vraalsen, “everything is delayed” in terms of the various steps to implementation spelled out in the CPA. In addition, Vraalsen explains:

Part of the problem is that [on the] 9th of January, 2005, when the agreement was signed, a large number of countries witnessed that. They signed on to it: the United States, Norway, the UK, Netherlands, Italy, the EU as such, World Bank, UN—I mean, you name it. On the 10th of January, everybody was looking at Darfur (Ibid.).

The ongoing war in Darfur consumes both the time and resources of the international diplomatic and donor community. At the time of writing, it remains an open question as to whether implementation of the CPA will continue through 2011 as planned.

4.3.4 Preliminary Assessment

Table 4.3.4 details the mediation cycle framework for Norway’s role in the IGAD peace process. In the “low intensity” phase, the Sudan case corresponds closely to the theoretical mediation cycle framework, with the significant exception of the failed attempt to negotiate a peace agreement through a Norwegian back channel. The structure of the failed channel, according to existing documentation, appears similar to the Middle East case in its involvement of a staff member from a Norwegian NGO (Norwegian Church Aid) and a small group of officials from the
Foreign Ministry, including Vraalsen and Egeland. The dissolution of the track left the mediation cycle within the “low intensity” phase once more.

In the “rising/high intensity” phase, the Sudan case differs significantly from the original framework. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry did not cooperate closely with Norwegian NGOs. Rather, the Minister of Development recruited NCA veteran Halvor Aschjem to join the Ministry. Frafjord Johnson also recruited academic experts on Sudan to the observer team, and the Norwegian Ambassador to the US, Tom Vraalsen, assisted the UN Secretary-General. Norway hosted the observers for meetings in Norway, but the core negotiations between the parties occurred in Kenya. Frafjord Johnson directed Norwegian engagement in the Sudan, serving as the chair of the IGAD observers and mediating personally between the two principals. Norway’s efforts during this phase occurred solely within the framework of the IGAD talks. Lastly, the breakthrough in Machakos followed increased US involvement after the September 11th terrorist attacks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3.4 Mediation Cycle Framework for the Sudan Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Intensity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA and NPA develop presence in the local region. NCA begins conflict resolution activities in addition to existing development projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian back channel between Khartoum and SPLM collapses after four meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum and SPLM accept Norwegian membership in IGAD due to Norway’s lack of colonial past, lack of material interest in conflict and history of foreign aid to region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US prefers military solution to negotiated peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the “declining intensity” phase, Norwegian support to grassroots peace building occurred indirectly through the usual funding of NCA, which led “people-to-
people’ ecumenical initiatives. Norway hosted a donors’ conference in April 2005, and pledged significant amount of its own resources to the implementation, through two multi-donor trust funds and the UN System. It also sent 27 military officers and UN observers to assist the UN Mission in Sudan. Furthermore, Norway chaired the AEC from 2005 to 2007, and its diplomatic efforts support the multilateral framework, rather than a unilateral Norwegian initiative.
5. Comparative Analysis

The three cases examined highlight significant variation in the procedural and contextual variables among common examples of the “Norwegian model.” In this section, I return to my research questions posed in the introduction and the methods chapters, namely: (1) what is the “Norwegian model?” and (2) what are its strengths and limitations? The first section of this chapter compares the cases according to the variables outlined in Table 3.3.1 of the methods chapter. The second section analyzes the cases according to the hypothesized strengths and limitations of the “Norwegian model.”

5.1 Comparison of Cases

5.1.1 Independent Variables: Contextual

This section describes the independent variables that form the context for the Norwegian efforts in the three cases. In terms of the background characteristics of the conflict, the three cases encompass a wide degree of variation. However, the legitimacy of the non-state group proved a contentious issue in all three cases. In the Middle East and Guatemala, the US had tacitly or openly supported the government side and opposed the rebel organizations, which in both cases had received at least ideological support from the Soviet Union. In contrast, in the Sudan case, the US government preferred the SPLM to the government side, due to the latter’s links to Islamic terrorism. In addition, the conflicts in the Middle East and Guatemala involved two main belligerents. In the Sudan, the situation was less clear. Although the IGAD process addressed the conflict between the North and the South, this was only one of many overlapping civil wars in the Sudan. By 2003, the conflict in Darfur began to overshadow the North-South divide.
Table 5.1.1 Comparison of Contextual Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Low Intensity</th>
<th>Rising/High Intensity</th>
<th>Declining Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td>• Conflict issues include territory and religion</td>
<td>• Norway informs US during beginning of channel</td>
<td>• AHLC directs assistance to occupied territories, but members wary of providing military support and also, of funding Palestinian security force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Two main parties: Israel and PLO</td>
<td>• Both Israel and PLO maintain contact with regional and international allies (and each other) regarding channel</td>
<td>• PLO fails to halt terrorist attacks on Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PLO not recognized in official US-led multilateral negotiations</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Israel continues building of settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Labour government elected in Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PLO weakened following Gulf War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td>• Conflict issues include socioeconomic inequality and ethnicity</td>
<td>• Multi-state Group of Friends supports peace process</td>
<td>• MINUGUA observers monitor implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Two main parties: government and URNG</td>
<td>• UN becomes mediator</td>
<td>• Consultative Group of donor countries directs aid flows to Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• US support to government; URNG listed as terrorist group</td>
<td>• MINUGUA monitoring force deployed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase in international economic pressure on Guatemalan government</td>
<td>• “Four Councils” lead civil society meetings (ASCs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Loss of ideological and military support to government from abroad</td>
<td>• NCA conducts parallel civil society peace-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td>• Conflict issues include political control over territory and resources, ethnicity and religion</td>
<td>• Troika (US, UK and Norway) supports IGAD process, along with additional observers</td>
<td>• Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) monitors status of implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Two main parties (government and SPLM), but many others as well; various conflicts</td>
<td>• More assertive US pressure against Khartoum after September 11th terrorist attacks</td>
<td>• World Bank directs multi-donor trust funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• US support for SPLM</td>
<td></td>
<td>• UNMIS observers monitor implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• IGAD forum of neighboring states begins peace negotiations on Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the negotiations, the status of the conflict did not change significantly in any of the cases examined. That is, neither side led a decisive military attack against the other such that the balance of power on the ground shifted towards one party.
The military stalemate that held at the initiation of negotiations remained in place throughout. Rather, momentum within the process itself, as well as changes in the external international environment, appeared far more instrumental in driving the talks forward. Table 5.1.1 details the contextual factors that emerged to push negotiations forward. In each case, international attention to the conflict helped to strengthen internal pressure for a negotiated solution. In terms of the involvement of additional third parties, the US played a key role in each of the cases studied. In addition, the involvement of civil society actors in Guatemala contrasts starkly with the Middle East case, in which civil society organizations were not even aware of the negotiations. In Sudan, the organizations leading the civil society peace track were aware of negotiations, but had no connection to the IGAD talks.

In the “declining intensity” phase, various international organizations and ad hoc multi-lateral committees directed aid flows in all three cases. However, the willingness of international actors to exert pressure varied significantly. In the Middle East case, the international members of the AHLC demonstrated the least resolve to ensure implementation proceeded on schedule, balking at measures that might prove politically uncomfortable.

5.1.2 Independent Variables: Process

Table 5.1.2 provides a comparison of the three cases according to the procedural independent variables, that is, the behavior of the Norwegian actors. In the “low intensity” phase, the three cases differ with respect to the initiative taken by NGOs and by the state. In the Guatemala case, NGOs led Norwegian entry into the peace process, whereas the Foreign Ministry alone participated in the IGAD talks. The parties and observers to the IGAD talks consisted only of state entities; hence, the Minister of Development was not realistically able to open the process to NGOs on her own initiative. Nonetheless, the absence of NGOs in the negotiations contrasts with the previous two cases.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 5.1.2 Comparison of Procedural Independent Variables</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Intensity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close historical relationship between Norway and Israel,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>especially through respective Labour parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian diplomatic contact with PLO since 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rød-Larsen leads Fafo research on living conditions in Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWF accepted as mediator in 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stålsett asks Norwegian Foreign Ministry to host secret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peace talks in Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petter Skauen of NCA contacted to assist in selecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian research institutes active in the Sudan since the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA and NPA establish presence in the Sudan in 1970’s and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980’s, NPA sides openly with SPLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway hosts secret peace talks between GoS and SPLM in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994, but these collapse after four meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Minister of International Development named chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of IGAD Partners Forum in 1998. Frafjord Johnson recruits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members of NGOs and research institutes to Norway’s IGAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observer team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Ambassador Vraalsen serves as UN Special Envoy for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation of OLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Middle East case, Rød-Larsen worked in concert with the Foreign Ministry, but the Norwegian state’s involvement with the two parties began decades
before Fafo conducted its surveying of the living conditions in Gaza. Rød-Larsen’s title as the director of Fafo served a useful purpose as a cover for official negotiations, but he informed only a handful of colleagues at Fafo about his activities. Strategy and mediation tactics were determined solely in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry.

In the “rising/high” phase, the three cases vary according to the level of autonomy the Norwegian actors enjoyed as mediators. While the Oslo back channel for the Middle East consisted exclusively of a small group of Norwegian mediators, the Guatemala case began through cooperation between NGOs and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and quickly expanded to include the UN, the Group of Friends and numerous civil society organizations. Lastly, in the Sudan case, Norwegian mediation efforts in the context of the IGAD forum occurred solely through a multilateral process. Although Frafjord Johnson played a unique role, her efforts depended on the acceptance of the official IGAD mediator, Lazaro Sumbeiywo.

In the “declining intensity” phase, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Norwegian NGOs remained engaged in the conflict region in all three cases: through troop contributions to peacekeeping forces in the Middle East (in Hebron) and the Sudan and through long-term development aid in all three cases. Norway continued to serve as a mediator for the parties only in the Middle East case, but the Foreign Ministry established a diplomatic presence in all three cases through Norwegian consulates and/or embassies in the regions. In all three cases, Norwegian NGOs contributed to development work and peace-building initiatives in the implementation phase.

5.1.3 Dependent Variables: Outcome

In all three cases, the parties accepted offers of mediation and began negotiations directly afterwards. In the Sudan case, however, the first mediation attempt ended without agreement. In terms of the mediation cycle framework, negotiations ended in the “rising/high” phase and returned to the “low” phase.
Nevertheless, the IGAD mediation picked up momentum in 2001 and the negotiations reached a turning point in Machakos in 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1.3 Comparison of Dependent Variables: Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties accept Norwegian mediation as back channel to official multilateral negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Written agreement on framework for peace process: 1993 Oslo Accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementation lags and eventually falls apart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties accept LWF-led mediation held in Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Six written agreements signed from 1990-1996 address root causes of conflict and ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementation more or less complete: military ceasefire, but increase in crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties accept offer of Norwegian back channel, but negotiations fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Parties accept Norway as member of IGAD Partners Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement addresses all core issues of North-South conflict, but not conflict in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementation lagging on all fronts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Completion date set for 2011, including referendum on independence of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three cases resulted in the signing of a written agreement. In the Oslo channel for the Middle East, the agreement consisted of a framework for further negotiations. The time between the initiation of negotiations and the signing of a written agreement was also the shortest of the three cases: from January to August 1993. In the Guatemala case, negotiations lasted from 1990 to 1996 and resulted in six separate agreements that together formed a comprehensive peace treaty. The URNG refused to agree to a ceasefire until the substantive issues were negotiated. In the Sudan case, the 2002 Machakos Protocol laid out a framework for negotiations, opening the door for the eventual secession of Southern Sudan and a compromise on religion allowing sharia law to apply in the north, but not in the south. The final negotiations began in Naivasha, Kenya in 2003, resulting in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Although the CPA can be
considered a comprehensive North-South agreement, it did not address the conflict in Darfur.

Of the three cases examined, the Guatemala peace agreement has been most successfully implemented. Although a sharp increase in crime rates followed the signing of the 1996 ceasefire agreement, Guatemala has not experienced a return to armed conflict between warring parties. The Oslo Accords for the Middle East collapsed completely; Israel continued to build new settlements in the occupied territories and the PLO failed to halt terrorist attacks against Israel. At the time of writing, the success or failure of the CPA for Sudan remains an open question. However, by 2008, implementation lagged on all fronts. The referendum on secession is set to be held in 2011, but preparatory measures have yet to be implemented. In the interim, the conflict in Darfur continues to consume the resources and attention of the international community, suggesting third-party enforcement measures of the CPA are likely to be limited.

5.2 Strengths and Limitations

Based on the comparative analysis of three cases of the “Norwegian model,” the following section addresses the potential strengths and limitations of Norwegian state-NGO cooperation listed in Table 2.3.1 on page 20 of Chapter Two. The mediation cycle framework used to organize the empirical presentation illustrates how the demands of a peace process evolve as negotiations proceed. While the strengths of the “Norwegian model” apply overwhelmingly to the “low intensity” and “rising/high intensity” phases, the “declining intensity” phase requires the leadership of a more powerful actor. This finding suggests that the comparative advantage enjoyed by Norwegian actors during the first two phases may allow for a valuable contribution towards conflict resolution. However, the ultimate success or failure of a peace process depends only to a rather limited extent on Norwegian efforts.
5.2.1 Strengths

Deniability

The potential advantage of “deniability” within the “Norwegian model” refers to the ability both for the parties to deny the existence of official negotiations and for the Norwegian state to channel aid to a belligerent non-state actor through a Norwegian NGO. In the Middle East case and for the first negotiations held in Oslo in the Guatemala case, cooperation between the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and NGOs allowed the parties to conceal their involvement in direct negotiations with the opposing side. In the Middle East case, maintaining the secrecy of the channel was absolutely decisive for the parties’ participation. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians faced a real threat from hardliners within their own sides if word leaked of peace talks with the enemy. Moreover, the Israelis also had an interest in concealing the talks from the US during the most critical stage, forestalling potential interference in the eventual agreement. Under the auspices of Fafo, Rød-Larsen arranged the secret meetings as “academic seminars” and the Foreign Ministry covered Fafo’s expenses through ambiguous funding requests signed by the State Secretary.

In the Guatemala case, the parties demonstrated their concern for maintaining deniability by sending negotiators with strong connections to their respective leaders, but not the principals themselves. The Committee for International and Ecumenical Relations of the State Church of Norway officially hosted the meeting, with assistance from the Lutheran World Federation. Petter Skauen of Norwegian Church Aid attended the talks, but as a representative of LWF. Although the parties held the talks in secret, they agreed to a formal announcement of the Oslo Agreement for Guatemala on March 30, 1990—an official acknowledgement that a peace process had begun.

In the Sudan case, the initiation and eventual collapse of the 1994 back channel remained secret until exposed by a Norwegian newspaper. However, the IGAD
mediation occurred openly. That is, although the content of the talks was held secret, the existence of direct negotiations between the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A was public information. As a result, there was no need for NGOs to provide a cover for negotiations. In sum, the variation among the three cases suggests that deniability can be a significant advantage of state-NGO cooperation and also, perhaps, a motivating factor for the same. Hence, the lack of cooperation in the Sudan case may derive in part due to the openness of the IGAD process from the beginning. A cover operation was unnecessary.

One factor highlighted by the accounts of the three back channels is the importance of secretive and flexible funding mechanisms. The Foreign Ministry funded secret talks for the Middle East, Guatemala and Sudan without arousing suspicion from the Ministry’s accounting department. The ability to move funds quickly without bureaucratic oversight proved extremely useful in maintaining the secrecy of all three channels. It also allowed the Foreign Ministry to fund rebel groups classified as terrorist organizations by the United States. Rather than support these organizations directly, the Norwegian state funnelled financial assistance through NGOs. In the Guatemala case, this occurred relatively openly and proved a source of contention with the Guatemalan government at times. Nonetheless, channelling funds through the NGOs provided at least a semblance of distance for the Foreign Ministry and did not appear to attract significant protest from Norwegian allies.

Local knowledge

In all three of the cases examined, Norwegian NGO staff members’ expertise and local contact networks provided the Norwegian Foreign Ministry with valuable (and often, essential) links to the local context. With the exception of the Middle East case, Norwegian NGOs’ presence in the conflict region preceded that of the Foreign Ministry. This occurred in 1994 for Sudan as well, although the negotiations proved unsuccessful. According to a Norwegian diplomat responsible in 2003 for compiling the Foreign Ministry’s internal analysis of Norwegian peace mediation:
When Norwegian authorities came into the peace efforts in, for example, Guatemala, “the table was already set” through the network of contacts Petter Skauen (Norwegian Church Aid) had established and the trust and respect he had earned, not least within civil society (Sjøberg 22 April 2008).

In the Sudan case, the Minister of Development recruited NGO and research institute personnel with a wealth of knowledge about the conflict. This knowledge base, including Frafjord Johnson’s own background, allowed the Norwegian observers to play an influential role in supporting the mediation—far in excess of what might be expected of a small country with no ostensible interest in the Sudan. In short, local knowledge clearly proved to be a major advantage of state-NGO collaboration in all three of the cases studied.

**Trusted mediators**

The presence of NGO staff in the negotiations may increase the parties’ trust in the mediators. However, the corollary is that participating in mediation may damage trust in the NGO on the ground. For example, Norwegian Church Aid decided not to take a visible role in the 1990 Oslo negotiations for Guatemala out of fear that doing so might place local staff members at risk. Nevertheless, Petter Skauen’s personal reputation for integrity, built through over 20 years of development work in Guatemala, earned respect from both the government and URNG negotiators. Likewise, LWF’s religious character likely contributed to a sense of trust in the mediation—or in any case, more so than would be expected for a team consisting solely of diplomats from a sovereign state.

In the Middle East case, Rød-Larsen’s relationship with Fathi Arafat and Yossi Beilin undoubtedly helped to build a sense of trust in the Fafo leader. However, members of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry enjoyed even deeper connections with the parties: in particular, Longva’s relationship with Yassir Arafat and the Norwegian Labour party’s strong ties to its Israeli counterpart. Johan Jørgen Holst could also boast of good relations with the Palestinians, although he was less popular with the Israelis. Therefore, in contrast to the Guatemala case, both the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and NGOs were considered trusted mediators. In fact, accounts of the Oslo
back channel written by the Israeli and Palestinian actors, respectively, refer almost exclusively to “the Norwegians,” rather than distinguishing between NGO personnel and the diplomats from the Foreign Ministry.

In the Sudan case, neither the Foreign Ministry nor the recruited NGO personnel and academics enjoyed a personal relationship with any of the parties, with the exception of Halvor Aschjem, who also assisted the Ministry with the failed back channel in 1994. Hødnebø and Stiansen knew who the leaders were on both sides, but neither of them knew any of the actors personally prior to the negotiations. Similarly, Frafjord Johnson became acquainted with Garang and Taha after assuming the post of Minister of Development and the Environment.

Overall, the cases demonstrate that trusted NGO personnel are a definite asset to a mediation team, although it is perhaps rare to find potential mediators who have established good personal relationships with both sides. Due to the difference in the average tenure of NGO field representatives vs. diplomats in a single region, it is more likely NGO personnel would develop such contacts, but the example of NPA’s explicit political stance in the Sudan conflict suggests that NGOs with a long-term presence in the region may, alternatively, generate tremendous hostility from one of the sides.

**Streamlined cooperation**

In the foreword to Norwegian edition of BBC journalist Jane Corbin’s account of the Oslo peace process, Terje Rød-Larsen, Mona Juul and Jan Egeland cite the institutionalization of cooperation between the state and NGOs as one of Norway’s main strengths as a peacemaker and also as a factor leading to the Norwegian role in Guatemala (Egeland et al. 1994:8). Egeland maintains that the “Norwegian model” of peace mediation in particular became institutionalized in the 1990’s (22 October 2007). While cooperation between the Norwegian state and Norwegian NGOs in peace mediation has indeed proceeded relatively smoothly, it is hardly “institutionalized.” Rather, the level of institutionalization evident in development
cooperation between the Norwegian state and these same NGOs contrasts with the type of ad hoc partnerships found in peace mediation. As the cases demonstrate, the particular form of cooperation varied significantly from the Middle East, to Guatemala and the Sudan and often occurred through fortuitous connections and informal relationships.

Nevertheless, in each of the three cases examined, there was an institutionalized willingness on the part of both the Foreign Ministry and the Norwegian NGOs to work with one another. Where the “Norwegian model” appears particularly one-sided, as in the Sudan, the reasons for a lack of cooperation stem not from a lack of trust, but rather, from procedural concerns and pressure from the parties themselves. When the Norwegian Foreign Ministry enters multilateral negotiations as a state party, it can be quite difficult to explain why a Norwegian NGO should also be offered a seat at the table. This poses a challenge to integrating the “Norwegian model” into a multilateral process.

In the Sudan, the Minister of Development’s solution was to recruit NGO personnel to the Norwegian observer team, utilizing Norwegian expertise on the Sudan through the Foreign Ministry’s direction. While this proved unproblematic for academic research institutes, Norwegian development organizations were less than pleased with the arrangement. In Guatemala, Norway’s membership in the Group of Friends represented a separate channel to which only state actors were invited. Although communication between the Foreign Ministry and Stålsett and Skauen occurred on an informal basis, the Norwegian NGOs engaged in development work in Guatemala were left largely outside the official process.

5.2.2 Limitations

Democratic incompatibility

While the participation of Norwegian NGOs (and LWF) in the peace processes examined may have weakened democratic control over Norwegian foreign policy,
there is no indication that the Norwegian public objected to their inclusion. On the contrary, the signing of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East is hailed as Norway’s absolute largest diplomatic success and, while it lasted, a strong source of pride among ordinary Norwegians. Moreover, the Norwegian NGOs can hardly be considered completely independent of the Foreign Ministry, especially within the context of the “Norwegian model.” The Foreign Ministry holds the purse strings in the relationship; given this leverage, it would be perfectly well positioned to end cooperation with an NGO that deviated from official Norwegian policy during a peace process.

Nevertheless, the Ministry’s funding of NCA and NPA in the Sudan case demonstrates that in the “low intensity” phase, the Foreign Ministry has allowed NGOs to pursue widely divergent strategies with respect to an ongoing conflict. At best, this gives the impression of inconsistency in Norwegian foreign policy; at worst, it represents an example of NGOs creating de facto Norwegian foreign policy on the ground. This lack of democratic oversight could prove especially problematic with displeased local actors who are both aware of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s extensive financial support to Norwegian NGOs and are disposed to publicize this relationship (and the NGOs’ relation to the conflict) in the international media.

In addition to the focus on the Norwegian NGOs’ role in determining Norwegian foreign policy, the cases highlighted the democratic tensions of representation in grassroots peace-building. In the Guatemala case, the failure of local NGOs to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement highlights the difficulty of achieving democratic representation in the peace process on a local level. The civil society organizations in the ASC meetings certainly presented a more complex and comprehensive picture of the various groups with a stake in the conflict, but their claims to represent the Guatemalan people were somewhat speculative. In large part, this represents an inevitable dilemma in working within a country suffering from decades of civil war. Civil society institutions are likely to be weak, if present at all, and the government and opposition groups are unlikely to have
democratic mandates of their own. In this context, one can credibly argue that the ASC process formed the closest approximation to a democratic process that could be expected. Likewise, a major challenge in both the Sudan and the Middle East cases was the need to build up local democratic institutions that were capable of implementing the agreements at the grassroots level.

_Mutual aims critical_

Given the close cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and NGOs within the "Norwegian model," mutual trust among representatives from both sides is absolutely essential. In the Middle East case, certain figures in the Foreign Ministry were sceptical of Rød-Larsen’s involvement from the outset. However, his connection to Mona Juul and excellent relationship with Foreign Minister Holst meant that Rød-Larsen earned the trust of the Foreign Ministry’s decision makers. As noted earlier, the actors involved in the Oslo back channel for the Middle East operated in close cooperation with one another, and those who remained involved in the channel throughout accepted (or at least, did not oppose) the increasingly activist mediation style Holst adopted.

In the Guatemala case, Stålsett’s close connections to the Norwegian government and Skauen’s longtime friendship with Stålsett and members of the Ministry ensured both men enjoyed a high level of trust with members of the Foreign Ministry. More importantly, Stålsett trusted the Foreign Ministry to assist in the peace process that he had literally brought to their doorstep. In terms of the mediation strategy, there were no strong disagreements that came forth in either the literature or the interviews and both the NGO representatives and the Foreign Ministry were, for example, in agreement on the importance of a strong UN role in the peace process. In the Sudan, the question of mutual aims was moot. The members of the Norwegian observer team recruited from NGOs and academia were employed by the Foreign Ministry; they were responsible to Frafjord Johnson and not to their former employers.
Consequently, the three cases demonstrate remarkably successful examples of cooperation in terms of mutual aims. When asked if there had been any instances in which the Foreign Ministry had not agreed with NCA’s conflict resolution strategy, NCA Secretary-General Atle Sommerfeldt cited the example of Mali (Sommerfeldt 30 March 2007). He explained that in consequence, the Foreign Ministry declined NCA’s proposed offer of involvement, but continued to provide funding for development, which NCA then diverted to their conflict resolution efforts (Ibid.). While this outside example indicates the Foreign Ministry would simply refrain from engaging in a peace process in which it did not share the aims of the potential NGO partner, it is unclear what would occur if the state and NGO(s) encountered substantial disagreement in the “rising/high intensity” phase—that is, during a peace process.

*Diplomats overnight*

Although none of the NGO staff members who participated in the three peace processes examined had received any formal diplomatic training, there was no evidence to suggest that this created a problem for the mediation efforts. On the contrary, most existing analyses of the peace process praise the work of Rød-Larsen, Skauen, Stålsett and Aschem. While the Oslo channel has attracted criticism in recent years for suspected bias towards Israel, there is no indication that a lack of diplomatic training on Rød-Larsen’s part is related to this charge. Stiansen spoke of the difficulties of understanding the compressed “time dimension” of negotiations, in contrast to the world of academia, but adjusted quickly to the situation and continued his employment Foreign Ministry as a member of the Assessment and Evaluation Committee. Hence, NGO representatives’ lack of diplomatic training did not appear to have any significant negative effect on the mediation in any of the cases studied.

*Mediator without muscles*

In his assessment of the future of Norwegian peace diplomacy, Egeland argues that “the time for the ‘lonely wolf’ is coming to an end,” and that peace mediation
“has to be ‘multilateralized’ again,” (Egeland 22 October 2007). As a former Undersecretary General to the UN, Egeland is understandably in favor of multilateral solutions. Nevertheless, his assessment of the limitations of Norwegian peace mediation is consistent with the cases examined. In the Middle East, Guatemala and Sudan, implementation of the peace agreements succeeded in direct relation to the level of international assistance and enforcement. In the Middle East, Norway exerted a tremendous effort to keep the Oslo Agreements afloat, by serving as chair of the AHLC, deploying TIPH forces to Hebron and contributing development aid to the occupied territories at a level that far exceeded any other state contributor on a per capita basis. Nonetheless, without sustained and concentrated pressure from international allies, Norway could not prevent the PLO or Israel from reneging on the Oslo framework.

In the Guatemala case, a strong UN presence was decisive in ensuring the (at least partial) implementation of the peace agreement. Likewise, the NCP’s demonstrated unwillingness to implement the terms of the CPA without sustained international pressure also demonstrates the importance of multilateralism for the implementation of a peace agreement. Hence, although the “Norwegian model” enjoys certain advantages in the negotiations towards a peace agreement, Norwegian efforts alone are insufficient in the implementation phase. In all likelihood, this conclusion comes as no surprise for the Norwegian actors involved; however, it underscores the need for Norway to exercise an equally intense and sustained effort in encouraging multilateral participation in the implementation process as is demonstrated during the mediation process leading up to the signing of a peace agreement. Diplomatic energy is also required to persuade the parties to accept the assistance of multilateral actors. Regardless of the context of Norwegian state-NGO cooperation in peace mediation, the assistance of more powerful states and/or multilateral organizations is essential for successful implementation of a peace agreement.
6. Conclusion

As an example of multi-party peace mediation, Norwegian state-NGO cooperation in the Middle East, Guatemala, and the Sudan illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of small state conflict resolution initiatives. The mediation cycle framework for the “Norwegian model,” based on the Crocker, Hampson and Aall model, proved a rough fit in the Middle East and the Sudan case, but corresponded very closely with the Guatemala case. Indicative of the level of variation, the cases exhibit few similarities in terms of the initiation of mediation. In the Middle East, long-standing political and diplomatic connections, combined with the more recent NGO study in Gaza, led to the opening of a back channel to the official negotiations in Madrid and Washington. By contrast, in the Guatemala case, LWF paved the way for the Foreign Ministry and Norwegian NGOs to enter the peace process. In the Sudan, Norway’s record of humanitarian assistance, academic expertise, and the Minister of Development’s personal engagement led to a key role in supporting the IGAD process.

These findings suggest the “Norwegian model” is less of a “model” than the name implies, if the word “model” is conceived of as a recipe for cooperation. Rather, the “Norwegian model” is perhaps more accurately described as a pattern of cooperation in the sense that all three cases include a combination of various traits considered characteristic of the “Norwegian model,” although the cases exhibit a range of combinations of these traits. Above all, the cases demonstrate a distinctive openness to state-NGO cooperation in foreign relations—a unique approach for a sovereign state. Through partnerships with Norwegian NGOs, the Foreign Ministry utilizes the knowledge base (and in the Middle East and Guatemala cases, the networks) of NGO representatives, while granting the NGOs access to the political decision making process. Using the NGOs as a front for negotiations also proved useful in allowing the negotiating parties to maintain deniability. The Sudan case operated somewhat differently, however, in that the “Norwegian model” proved less
of a partnership than a recruitment strategy. This is nonetheless relatively unique in a comparative perspective, in that the Foreign Ministry recruited academics and NGO representatives outside of the domestic political arena, but it is hardly the type of distinctive cooperation seen in the Middle East and Guatemala cases. Further research is required to assess whether the Sudan case is indicative of a new trend in Norwegian foreign policy. An analysis of additional cases, such as Norway’s role in Sri Lanka, might prove useful in this regard.

Although the use of the word “model” is perhaps somewhat misleading, the “Norwegian model” is indeed Norwegian in the sense that the presence of a Norwegian national in a prominent role within the NGO leadership structure appears to be a prerequisite for cooperation. Although the Lutheran World Federation played a major role in the Guatemala peace talks, Norway’s entry into the peace process depended on the initiative of Gunnar Stålsett, a former leader of the Norwegian Center Party and a member of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee with strong ties to the Norwegian government. In the Middle East and Sudan, only personnel from Norwegian NGOs participated in the peace processes.

Given the high level of cooperation among the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and its Canadian, Dutch, Swiss and Nordic counterparts, one might expect a similar approach to peace mediation. Development NGOs and research institutes from the above named countries operate globally, including within many of the conflict zones addressed through Norwegian mediation. However, a Foreign Ministry internal assessment completed in 2003 emphasized the importance of individual Norwegians in leadership roles within the UN in facilitating Norway’s entry into a peace process, but makes no mention of any strategy to cultivate ties with nationals of likeminded countries (Sjøberg 22 April 2008). In terms of conflict expertise and ties to the local community, non-Norwegian NGOs may thus represent an untapped resource for partnerships.

The relatively closed nature of the “Norwegian model” underscores the importance of informal social ties and personal trust in explaining Norwegian state-
NGO cooperation. To borrow an expression from game theory, it is easier to enter a cooperative relationship within the context of an infinitely repeated game. The close quarters of Norwegian society, combined with a healthy independent media, ensure a level of transparency that serves as a check on public officials. Simply put, reputations are both easily well-established and quickly tarnished. Moreover, there is a revolving door between the Foreign Ministry and NGOs in Norwegian society. As a result, trust among public actors takes a less institutionalized form than is the case in larger countries. Given the interdependence of Norwegian NGOs and the Foreign Ministry, even down to the individual level, social connections provide a much stronger bond of trust than institutional ties alone. This makes cooperation across national borders in an area as sensitive as peace mediation more problematic. External actors are not beholden to the same reputation constraints and their motives may appear more opaque.

Following the signing of the Oslo Accords for the Middle East, peace mediation became a core element of Norwegian foreign policy. However, the initiation of the Guatemala peace process predates the Middle East back channel and occurred under a different Norwegian government. Furthermore, Norway’s enhanced involvement in the IGAD forum through the efforts of Frafjord Johnson occurred under a third government. This indicates that peace mediation enjoys support across political lines in Norway. In the Guatemala case, the Foreign Ministry accepted a role without hesitation, but did not seek out involvement on its own initiative; LWF took the lead. Also, although the Guatemala and Middle East negotiations overlap, none of the same actors were involved in both, with the exception of Jan Egeland. A diplomat in the Foreign Ministry confirmed that information sharing among peace mediators consisted mainly of informal consultations among diplomats in the various regional departments within the Ministry (Sjøberg 22 April 2008). A comprehensive internal review was not undertaken prior to 2003 (Ibid.). Accordingly, there is little evidence of a learning process across cases. Each adapted in its own way and none of the actors interviewed explicitly pointed to “lessons learned” from previous cases. In
fact, those involved in Guatemala on the NGO side stated flatly that the Middle East case did not influence their mediating strategy.

Although institutional changes within the Foreign Ministry—namely, the establishment of a separate “Section for Peace and Reconciliation” in 2006—may move the “Norwegian model” closer to the definition of a model as a “recipe” than as a “pattern,” the findings of the present study indicate the overall impact of these changes on the ultimate success of failure of specific peace initiatives will undoubtedly prove minimal. The intent in creating the Section for Peace and Reconciliation was to compile the Ministry’s internal competence and experience into a single division to facilitate more institutionalized information sharing (Sjøberg 22 April 2008). Given the findings of the present study, the new department should prove capable of expanding upon the advantages of local knowledge and streamlining cooperation, not least by ensuring the availability of flexible financial resources for supporting a peace process. However, there is a danger that visible results will be needed to justify the new department’s existence. This could lead to an overemphasis on Norway’s role in mediating a successful peace agreement. The results of the present study suggests the new department should concentrate an equal effort on diplomacy among potential implementing powers, such as the UN, the EU and the United States, as on the mediation of the conflict itself. Moreover, maintaining deniability may prove more difficult. Given Norway’s increasingly institutionalized prioritization of peace mediation, potential negotiators may be greeted with no small degree of suspicion when travelling to Oslo for an ostensible “academic conference.”

For NGOs, the new department may assist in formalizing cooperation by providing a clear point of contact within the Ministry, hence, diminishing the importance of social ties. However, increasing formalization will create a corresponding demand for more formal bonds of trust between NGOs and the Ministry. Lastly, the creation of the Section for Peace and Reconciliation may serve to prevent a deficit of democracy in Norwegian foreign policy by encouraging the development of a comprehensive strategy for humanitarian aid and diplomacy.
towards a conflict region. By employing personnel with a singular focus on peace and reconciliation, the new department should create incentives for conducting a more coherent and consistent foreign policy than was the case in, for example, the distribution of humanitarian aid to the Sudan during the 1990’s.

Regardless, Norwegian actors should remain sober about the success rate for peace mediation. Organizational changes may improve the Norwegian effort, but the major constraints to successful peacemaking lie outside of Norwegian influence. As the cases demonstrate, peace agreements result primarily through the efforts of the parties themselves, as well as a confluence of fortuitous circumstances, both domestically and internationally. While the three cases of the “Norwegian model” examined here underline the potential advantages of the Norwegian contribution, agreement on a written document is only one element of the process. Success in peace mediation depends first and foremost on the will of the parties, but also on the ability of the mediators to engage in a consistent and cooperative initiative with additional third parties throughout the mediation cycle—from the initiation of mediation through implementation. Complementary conflict resolution techniques are required from actors with diverse comparative strengths and weaknesses at different phases of the cycle. In short, development of a comprehensive peace mediation strategy requires thinking beyond the “Norwegian model.”
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